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POLITICAL & LITERARY ESSAYS

THIRD SERIES

BY THE

EARL OF CROMER

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PREFACE

SOME apology is perhaps necessary for the title given to this work. It is called *Political and Literary Essays* because I have thought it desirable to preserve the title which was given to the two volumes which preceded it. As a matter of fact, however, with the exception of a review of Sir Sidney Lee's *Life of Shakespeare* and perhaps of the Essay on "Lord Curzon's War Poems," the subjects treated are wholly political. The greater portion of them deal, either directly or indirectly, with matters connected with the all-absorbing question of the day—the War. On this subject I cannot pretend to have said anything beyond what has been already stated, in different language, by other politicians and journalists, many of whom can speak with greater authority than myself. But, having recently been debarred by ill-health from taking any part in political affairs in other spheres of action, it has interested me to write these Essays, and it may perhaps interest some few of my countrymen to read them. I have, therefore, ventured to republish them.

All have appeared either in the *Spectator*, the *Quarterly Review*, the *Nineteenth Century and After*, or the *National Review*. They are republished by permission of the editors of these periodicals. I have also to thank Lord Curzon of Kedleston and his publishers, Messrs. George Allen & Unwin, for allowing the republication of the Introduction which I wrote to the collection of Lord Curzon's speeches entitled *Subjects of the Day*.

CROMER.

LONDON, *March* 1916.

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I

LORD CURZON'S IMPERIALISM.[1]

AT the Colonial Conference of 1907 one of its most distinguished members (Mr. Deakin) asked a very pertinent question. Galled by the obstructions which are the inevitable result of partisan warfare, he indignantly asked whether party politicians intended to emulate Saturn. "Is the party system," he said, "to destroy everything but itself?" Lord Curzon's speeches, of which a very judicious selection has been made by Mr. Chapman-Huston, add another item to the abundant testimony which might be furnished that Mr. Deakin's question may now be answered with a distinct negative. A great national crisis has, for the time being at all events, purged the dross from a system whose excesses appeared but a short time ago to constitute a real national danger. When we find fighting side by side with a leading Conservative politician such as Lord Curzon a Radical philosopher like Mr. Frederic Harrison, who forty-five years ago warned his countrymen that, alone amongst civilized nations, "the very germ of international morality" was wanting in Prussia, a Socialist such as Mr. Blatch-

[1] *Subjects of the Day.* By Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G. Edited by Desmond M. Chapman-Huston, with an Introduction by the Earl of Cromer. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. London, 1915.

ford, an impulsive but warm-hearted and courageous demagogue such as Mr. Lloyd George, together with numberless others to whom an ardent desire for peace has heretofore been as the breath of their nostrils, and who now have regretfully to admit that the country which gave birth to Goethe has also produced such political abortions as Treitschke and Bernhardi—a sure indication is given that a harmony of discords has been created such as the British political world has never known at any former time.[1] This strange and hallowed union brings home to us a fact which possibly many of us never fully realized before—the fact that we are all democrats here. Our differences of opinion, albeit they are at times acute, pale into insignificance before the sinister spectre of German absolutism. I hope and believe that, with very rare exceptions, all, from the nearly non-existent Tory of the old school to the ultra-democratic member of an extreme Radical club, recognize that we are now fighting for the freedom which for ages past has been the peculiar appanage of the Anglo-Saxon race, and without which that spurious imitation of true civilization, termed German *Kultur*, would afford the keynote to the further progress of the world, and thus pronounce an irrevocable divorce between wisdom and morality on the one hand and learning on the other.

Even in normal times Lord Curzon can scarcely be regarded as an extreme political partisan. Reading between the lines of his numerous public utterances, it is easy to see that, like most statesmen of wide sympathies and enlarged political vision, he at times chafes at the fetters imposed by the necessities of party connections. Mr.

[1] The formation of a Coalition Ministry since this Introduction was written confirms the correctness of the view stated above.

Chapman-Huston has, therefore, very wisely excluded from this collection of speeches most of those utterances of relatively ephemeral interest which deal with party issues. The only exceptions are two speeches, one on Home Rule in Ireland and the other on the Finance Bill of 1909—the latter being a subject on which, in spite of my general sympathy with Lord Curzon's political creed, I was unable to share his views. Some portion of that speech is, indeed, devoted to combating the arguments which I advanced—but to my great regret advanced in vain—in order to convince the House of Lords that the Bill should be allowed to become law.

I cannot say what impression the perusal of Lord Curzon's speeches will make on the mind of the general reader. Neither can I flatter myself with the illusion that any commendation emanating from myself will excite an interest beyond what may naturally be evoked by their intrinsic merits. But I may go so far as to say that to myself Mr. Chapman-Huston's publication is extremely welcome, for I regard Lord Curzon as the most able, as he is certainly by far the most eloquent, exponent of that sane Imperialism to which this country is wedded as a necessity of its existence. "We have," Lord Curzon says, "to answer our helm, and it is an Imperial helm, down all the tides of Time." The main tenets of the code which governs and, at all events in the recent past, has always governed British expansion have almost passed into commonplaces in so far as those who have devoted special attention to the subject are concerned. The recent action of all, whether of British or non-British origin, who owe allegiance to King George V., has, indeed, shown to an astonished and, in the case of our enemies, a deeply dis-

appointed world, the priceless fruits which the adoption of that wise and righteous code has secured to its authors. But it may be doubted whether it is even yet fully understood by the mass of the British public. The platform sentimentalist still at times claims a monopoly of that sympathy for subject races the value of which no rational Imperialist will be disposed to underrate, oblivious of the fact that in order to produce a full measure of beneficial results sympathy must, as Lord Curzon very rightly points out, be accompanied by strength, courage, and, above all, by accurate knowledge. We still at times hear insinuations that the great desire of that splendid Indian Civil Service, whose prowess Lord Curzon vaunts in noble and inspiring words, and every member of which feels, in a greater or less degree, that he "has his hand on the pulse of the universe," is to maintain in ignoble thraldom the people whose moral and material welfare is the ceaseless object of their solicitude. The fallacy that every Imperialist agent is possessed with an insane desire to enlarge the area of territories painted red on the map of the world is far from being extinct. It may confidently be anticipated that when, as may not improbably happen, Mesopotamia is added to the dominions of the Crown and the British and Russian frontiers become conterminous—a consummation which it has for more than a century past been the main object of Anglo-Indian statesmanship to avoid—it will be forgotten that no warmer advocate of Persian independence ever existed than an Imperialist Viceroy, and that this political misfortune, as I should term it, was due, not to the vaulting ambition of some purely imaginary "prancing Pro-Consul," but to the fact that, in the purchase of the Persian

oilfields, a Government and Parliament of marked democratic tendencies rushed into a very important undertaking without any due appreciation of the gravity of its proceedings or of the ultimate consequences which those proceedings would probably involve.

It is well, therefore, that the wishes and aspirations of rational Imperialists should be reiterated by a foremost representative of the Imperial school. Cicero gave utterance to the very wise maxim that the first qualification necessary to an orator who aspires to guide the political destinies of his countrymen is that he should know his subject. *Ad consilium de republica dandum, caput est nosse rempublicam.* No living Englishman, at all events in so far as the management of the overseas dominions of the Crown are concerned, fulfils the Ciceronian requirement to a greater extent than Lord Curzon. Moreover, apart from considerations of this nature, the utterances of a statesman who, at a time when public opinion generally was strongly in favour of limiting our military preparations to the necessities of home defence, had the foresight to prophesy that before long we might be fighting for the independence of Belgium, are surely at the present moment worthy of special attention.

It is perhaps too much to hope that Lord Curzon's speeches will find many readers outside the limits of the British Dominions. Nevertheless, at a moment when a desperate effort is being made to substitute German for British world-power, much that Lord Curzon says may well afford food for the reflection of neutral nations, and especially for those of our own kith and kin on the other side of the Atlantic. They may profitably ask themselves whether, if a succession

of rulers imbued with absolutist Prussian principles had for more than a century sat on the Viceregal throne adorned by a long line of statesmen from Warren Hastings downwards, a leading Indian Prince would, at the close of that period, have been found to offer spontaneous homage to the memory of the founder of Prussian rule in India. I trow not. Yet one of the leading Indian Princes (the Maharaja of Nepal) expressed in 1907 his surprise that the memory of the victor of Plassey had "remained for so long unhonoured in marble." They may ask why, instead of the occurrence of that anti-British outbreak which was confidently anticipated by the ill-informed politicians of Berlin, the natives of India rallied to the defence of the British Crown, and they will find the answer in Lord Curzon's words. "Why are these men coming? What has induced them to volunteer to take part in our fighting? They are thousands of miles away. They cannot hear the thunder or see the smoke of the guns. Their frontiers have not been crossed, their homes are not in jeopardy. They are not our kith and kin; no call of the blood appeals to them. Is it not clear that they are coming because the Empire means something to them much more than mere government or power? It speaks to them of justice, of righteousness, of mercy, and of truth. They have no desire to exchange that rule for the Prussian sabre or the jackboot of the German trooper. They have no desire to change that rule for any other. If any testimony was ever required to the feelings by which they are actuated and to the success of the fundamental principles by which we have endeavoured to rule them, surely it is to be found in this convincing and overwhelming demonstration."

From another and somewhat more personal

point of view the republication of these speeches is, I think, to be welcomed. Lord Morley, in his *Life of Gladstone*, remarks, with great truth, that it is far more difficult for a politician to get rid of a spurious reputation than it is to acquire one that is genuine. Most of the leading agents in the execution of British Imperial policy, and none more than Lord Curzon, have at times suffered from the popular misapprehensions indicated by Lord Morley. It is eminently desirable that the British public should understand something of the character and should appreciate the true nature of the motives which guide the actions of those who take a leading part in British political life. The actions and opinions of Lord Curzon, in common with those of all other politicians, are, of course, a very legitimate subject for criticism, but he has a fair right to claim that the motives which dictated those actions and the process of reasoning which led to the formation of those opinions should be taken from his own lips rather than that they should be judged by the light of the interpretation often erroneously placed upon them by hostile or ill-informed critics. What inferences may, therefore, be garnered from these speeches as to the principal motives which have inspired Lord Curzon in dealing with public affairs, and notably with those associated with Imperialist policy ?

In the first place, it is clear that Lord Curzon is animated by a sincere and perfervid patriotism. He displays none of that tepid cosmopolitanism which, when carried to an extreme, as is not unfrequently the case, degenerates into an ignoble depreciation of his country's worth. The love of his native country, that root which in the doggerel but profoundly true verse of the poet Churchill " never fails to bring forth golden

fruit," burns brightly within him. He is ever seeking to link the actions of the present with the grandeur of the historic past. The interest which he has persistently displayed in the preservation of ancient monuments is, it may confidently be conjectured, not wholly archaeological. He bids us visit the homes of great men in order that we may more fully understand their lives. He dwells with affectionate tenderness on the "unequalled country scenery of England"—its old-time villages, its mediaeval mansions, its village churches "with their sacred tale of bygone history and romance," and he exhorts us to do whatever is possible to save these picturesque relics of the past from the ever-increasing menace of the grimy factory and the pinchbeck villa. When he passes Whitehall he sees in imagination "the courtly figure of Charles I." ascending the scaffold, and on arrival in Old Palace Yard he remembers that "it is the place where the old tournaments and trials by battle were held, where the head of Guy Fawkes was struck off, and where the wife of Sir Walter Raleigh carried away the severed head of her husband in a bag." He wishes us to beautify London, and in doing so to beware lest we efface any of the memories of its chequered and illustrious past. He sings "Floreat Etona" at the top of his voice, and recalls with pride that it was with those words on his lips that one of his schoolboy contemporaries fell, shot through the heart, whilst leading a cavalry charge against a savage South African foe. He recognizes that the kindred and occasionally rival institution of Harrow can turn out patriots of equal gallantry and value. He cherishes "the atmosphere of broad and liberal culture which emanates from the halls and quadrangles of Oxford," and he trusts that

that ancient seat of learning, when "revivified and re-endowed," will become "a potent instrument for moulding the character and increasing the usefulness of the Anglo-Saxon race."

But it is the heroic deeds of his countrymen rather than the external aspects of his native country which more especially supply fuel to the large-hearted patriotism of Lord Curzon. Equally with another and deep-thinking Imperialist, Sir Alfred Lyall, his imagination is set aglow by the "frontier grave" celebrated in Newbolt's touching and inspiriting verse.[1] He recounts with pride how Englishmen like Captain Scott and his comrades have been found willing to lay down their lives "for a great idea." He bids us remember the noble epitaph, surpassing in its terse, virile, and pathetic simplicity even the words cut on the tomb of a seventh-century saint in the Cathedral of Ely,[2] which were inscribed on the rude cross covering the remains of that gallant soldier who walked out to certain death in a shrieking Antarctic snowstorm in order to save the lives of his friends: "Hereabouts died a very gallant gentleman." It is well to remember such deeds and the words which record them. They should appeal trumpet-tongued to future generations of Captain Oates' countrymen.

Yet amidst all these manifestations of a very legitimate patriotism there is not the slightest trace of that lust for power and domination for their own sake which has been rightly stigmatized

[1] Qui procul hinc—the legend's writ,
The frontier grave is far away—
Qui ante diem periit
Sed miles, sed pro patria.

[2] Lucem tuam Ovino
Da, Deus, et requiem.
Amen.

by moralists from the days of Tacitus downwards. The Imperialism which Lord Curzon favours is not that of nation-devouring Rome, whose heavy hand, albeit its weight was to some extent tempered by the humanizing influence of Hellas, numbed the intellect and chilled the nascent aspirations of the subject races which fell under her sway. Rather is it a vivifying force on which the populations incorporated into the British Empire may readily graft and develop all that is best in their own national characteristics. Whilst dwelling, in language which deserves to take a high place even amongst the noble records of British oratory, on the services rendered by the veterans of the Indian Mutiny, Lord Curzon is careful to remind his audience that out of the chaos and suffering of that stormy period there sprang "a new sense of peace and harmony, bearing fruit in a high and purifying resolve. Never let it be forgotten that the result of the Mutiny was not merely an England victorious, but an India pacified, united, and started once more upon a wondrous career of advance and expansion." Lord Curzon fully recognizes that the main, and indeed the only true justification of Imperialism, is to be found in the uses to which the Imperial power is applied. "The real cement of Empire is brotherhood, and the real basis of brotherhood is mutual understanding." The material interests of the mother-country, important though they be, must be waived aside if they conflict with the interests and aspirations of the dependency. A higher standpoint than any material advantage must be adopted. "Never sacrifice a subject interest—that is, the interest of a subject dependency or possession —to exclusively British interests. Do not force upon your dependencies a policy which may be

distasteful or unsuitable to them, merely because it is advantageous to yourselves. The meaning of Empire is, not to impose on dependencies the will of the mother-country or master power, but to effect a harmonious co-ordination of the interests of the whole." Again, Lord Curzon says, there should be "no Roman wall of military defence, no Chinese wall of selfish exclusiveness, but a wall of human hearts built around our Empire, a wall which, when all other defences crumble and give way, will perhaps avail to keep it safe." Allegiance to the Crown constitutes, indeed, an invaluable link between the various scattered units of the British Empire. But why does it fulfil this useful function? Because the Monarchy constitutes "the embodiment of an idea, the expression of an ideal which we fondly believe is blessed from on high, and which we hope will redound to the blessing and advantage of untold millions of the human race."

Quotations from Lord Curzon's speeches inculcating the same lesson as in those already cited might be multiplied, but sufficient has been said to show that, far from entertaining the vulgar and unworthy views sometimes attributed to British Imperialists, Lord Curzon speaks with dignified gravity—I might almost say with reverential awe—of the duties of Empire and of the heavy responsibilities imposed on the British Government and nation. Addressing the youths who year by year issue forth to the uttermost parts of the earth from our schools and colleges with the honour and reputation of England in their keeping, he exhorts them to "lead clean and healthy lives," to miss no opportunities for following "noble and unselfish ends," and he adds this eloquent description of the mission which the Anglo-Saxon race is called upon to

perform : " Wherever unknown lands are waiting to be opened up, wherever the secrets or treasures of the earth are waiting to be wrested from her, wherever peoples are lying in backwardness or barbarism, wherever new civilizations are capable of being planted, or old civilizations of being revived, wherever ignorance or superstition is rampant, wherever enlightenment and progress are possible, wherever duty and self-sacrifice call —there is, as there has been for hundreds of years, the true summons of the Anglo-Saxon race."

There is, of course, room for wide differences of opinion as regards the particular methods which should be adopted in the execution of the Imperial policy which Lord Curzon advocates, as also in respect to the time when those methods should be applied. But this is not the moment to discuss points of this nature. The main question on which not only Englishmen but, indeed, all the civilized world have now to form an opinion is whether the basic principle of Lord Curzon's Imperialism should be maintained, or whether it should be swept away and give place to the wholly antagonistic ideals which would prevail if the Prussian dream of world dictatorship were realized. A comparison between the spirit which pervades Lord Curzon's speeches and the recent Report of Lord Bryce's Committee on the behaviour of the German Army in Belgium would materially help an impartial neutral to form a judgment on this important subject.

I conclude this brief Introduction with some remarks conceived in a somewhat lighter vein. In some respects Englishmen are remarkably elastic—more so, I think, than any other members of the European family. I could give numerous instances, which are within my own experience, to show how readily young men fresh from the

English schools or universities adapt themselves to new surroundings and speedily identify themselves with the interests of the people over whom they are called to rule. But on certain points the Englishman never shakes off his insular habits. Lord Curzon in one of his speeches says: "From my own experience, I would say that the first thing an Englishman does in the outlying portions of the Empire is to make a race-course; the second is to make a golf-course." I can confirm the correctness of this testimony. In 1872, I landed on the island of Perim, where the ship bearing Lord Northbrook to India stopped in order to enable him to form an opinion as regards an important question then pending connected with the erection of certain fortifications. The island of Perim is surely one of the most desolate and inhospitable spots on the face of the globe. Its sun-baked surface consists of glistening black rock and of sand. There is not a vestige of vegetation on the whole island. Neither is there any natural water supply. I gathered during my brief visit that the principal inhabitants of the island were scorpions, one of which is to be found under almost every stone. The lighthouse-keeper, who together with a young officer in command of a detachment of Sepoys formed the total white population of Perim, took me to the top of the lighthouse, whence the whole of the island was visible. After alluding to other objects of local interest, he pointed to an arid waste of sand and said, "That is the race-course." As there was no four-footed beast on the island I expressed my surprise, and inquired whether any races had ever taken place. He was unable to answer this question, but he assured me that the particular locality which he indicated had "always been called the race-course."

When I arrived in Cairo, less than a year after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir had been fought, every department of the Administration was in a state of the utmost confusion. Nevertheless, a race-course had already been laid out and a grand-stand erected. A golf-course followed after a short interval.

May 17, 1915.

II

LORD CURZON'S WAR POEMS [1]

"*Spectator*," *July* 17, 1915

IT was inevitable that the passions, hopes, and sorrows which have been evoked by the death-struggle in which the great nations of Europe are now engaged should elicit an outburst of song. What more fitting subject for a sad but proud and patriotic threnody could, indeed, be found than the "Roll of Honour," which now appears with mournful regularity in the columns of the daily Press, accompanied, as is often the case, with illustrations which bring home to us in a manner heretofore unknown to the present generation the lugubrious pathos of Pericles' beautiful metaphor that "the loss of the youth of the city was as if the spring was taken out of the year"? Is any theme more calculated to inspire the Muse of Poetry than the prolonged agony of heroic Belgium? Can anything be imagined more apt to stir those emotions which form the raw material of poetry than the sight of the champions of true civilization and high morality standing forth, sword in hand, to crush a system whose triumph would blast the progress of the human race, enthrone an ignoble materialism in the

[1] *War Poems, and other Translations.* By Lord Curzon of Kedleston. London: John Lane. 4s. 6d. net.

place of those high ideals towards which the most enlightened spirits of modern times have for years past been painfully yet strenuously groping their way, and thrust upon the world a moral bankruptcy far less excusable than the savagery of ancient or mediaeval times, inasmuch as the errors of the past were largely due to ignorance, whereas it is sought to defend those of the present and to obscure their moral obliquity by a learning which is real and by a ratiocination which is pseudo-scientific and spurious? It was also inevitable that, in the expression of their sorrows, sympathies, and aspirations, classical students should often revert to the use of those languages which, whether in prose or poetry, have for ages past served as models for the expression of human thought. Thus Sir Herbert Warren, when he read the touching tribute paid by a poet of genius (Sir Henry Newbolt) to old Cliftonians fallen on the battlefield, found that the stately English lines "rang in his head," and forthwith "shaped themselves into Greek."[1] More recently a poet who, in the *Eton College Chronicle*, cast a thin veil of anonymity over his personality by signing with the initials "G. M.," mourned the death of a gallant young Etonian, the heir to wealth and title, who gave his life for his country, in lines which, in spite of Lord Curzon's very apposite reserve as to the views which an ancient Greek would have held about the productions of the most erudite of modern scholars, are nevertheless so essentially Greek in sentiment as to embody a bitter wail over the cruelty of that obscure deity (*θεὸς ἀτέκμαρτος*)—the "Unknown God," whom the Athenians "ignorantly worshipped"—who has inflicted such terrible woes on suffering mankind.

[1] *Spectator*, April 10, 1915.

Lord Curzon in his brief preface almost apologizes for having joined the throng of those statesmen and politicians who have preceded him in falling victims to the "amiable hobby" of translation. For two reasons no apology is necessary. One is that the translations themselves possess great intrinsic merits. The other is that, although Lord Curzon has made himself the mouthpiece of ideas conceived by others, he has by no means, in assuming the part of a translator, sunk his own vigorous personality. His unswerving patriotism, his high sense of duty, his admiration and sympathy for all those deeds and thoughts which call forth eulogistic or sympathetic treatment, are clearly discernible whether he is giving us an English version of the French of Verhaeren and Cammaerts, or of the Greek of Demosthenes and the Anthologists.

Lord Curzon has, of course, had to consider the great stumbling-block which lies in the path of every translator. To what extent is paraphrase permissible? Great poets have before now succumbed to the temptation, which is ever present to the mind of the translator, of acquiring greater freedom of speech in translating by neglecting the precise words of the original poem and merely embodying the main facts, principles, or sentiments which the poet has wished to set forth. Others have gone further and have not hesitated to introduce entirely fresh matter of their own, either because they have thought it topical to the ideas of the original author, or because the imperious necessities of rhyme or metre have constrained them to the adoption of this course. The precision of the scholarly Bentley was shocked by the latitude which Pope allowed himself in translating the *Iliad*. "A very pretty poem,

Mr. Pope," he said, "but you must not call it Homer." Lord Curzon has, therefore, very wisely decided to adhere as far as possible to the original text, but not invariably to discard paraphrase. "My object has been," he says, "nearly everywhere, not to paraphrase, but to translate." A good example of the results to be obtained by this method is the translation of the celebrated epitaph on those who fell at the battle of Chaeronea which occurs in Demosthenes' oration "On the Crown." The fidelity of the translation is unquestionable, and although possibly the melody and harmonious flow of the English version would have gained if greater latitude had been allowed, it contains no line or expression which can fairly be said to jar on the ear of the English reader.

It is, however, in the translation of the Belgian war poems that the results of Lord Curzon's methods may best be appreciated. "There is," he says, "a substantial identity in modern cultured thought and expression which renders the translation, *e.g.*, of French or German lyrics into English one of no extraordinary difficulty." It will probably be conceded by all who read this volume that in this sphere Lord Curzon has been eminently successful. Indeed, inasmuch as probably all of us yield more readily to the emotions excited by words addressed to us in our mother-tongue than by sentiments expressed in a foreign language, it is very possible that English readers will in some cases prefer the translations to the originals, in spite of the praise which may rightly be accorded to the French versions. One example must suffice. M. Cammaerts has embodied the self-sacrifice, the determination, and glowing patriotism of his countrymen in the stirring poem entitled "Chantons, Belges, Chantons." Lord

Curzon's translation is no less spirited than the original. Here is one stanza :

Reck not that your wounds are bleeding,
Reck not that your voice is weak :
Deeper than the roar of cannon,
Higher than the battle-shriek,
E'en although your wounds are bleeding,
E'en although your heart-strings break,
Sing of hope and hate unshaken,
'Neath this fair autumnal sun :
Sing how, when the tempter whispered,
"Sweet is vengeance, when 'tis done,"
Said we louder, "We are prouder,
Mercy's garland to have won ! "

In this case Lord Curzon has adhered closely to the original text, and he has given us in rhythmical and faultless English a vivid impression of the lofty scorn and fiery indignation which the Belgian poet pours on the ruthless invaders of his native country.

It is to the episodes connected with the war that we owe the publication of this attractive volume. But the general reader, and more especially the lover of classical literature, will rejoice at the opportunity which has thus been afforded to him of reading some other fugitive pieces unconnected with recent events which have from time to time been composed by Lord Curzon. In the domain of literature he displays a courage equal to that which full many a time he has shown in the field of politics and administration. So competent, and at the same time so indulgent, a critic as Professor Mackail was not altogether satisfied with the translation by Shelley of Plato's "flawless lines," Ἀστὴρ πρὶν μὲν ἔλαμπες, etc. Undeterred, however, by the risk of criticism, Lord Curzon has given us two versions, one in English and the other in Latin, of this pearl amongst epigrams. Of these, priority

of merit must certainly be assigned to the translation into the dead language. It is singularly felicitous :

> Stella prius vivis Eoa luce nitebas,
> At nunc Hesperio Manibus orbe nites.

Indeed, some of Lord Curzon's most notable successes have been achieved in Latin verse. The rendering of Collins's " Sleep of the Brave " is excellent.

Lord Curzon has also not been deterred by the very qualified praise which has been meted out to a numerous band of translators, from the days of Cicero downwards, from giving us another version of the world-famous epitaph of Simonides on the Spartans who fell at Thermopylae. The attempt to render these few pregnant words into English hexameter and pentameter verse is, so far as I am aware, novel :—

> Stranger, go hence and say to the men who hold Lacedaemon—
> " Here, far away, we lie, proudly obeying her words ! "

Symonds, in dealing with this epigram, says that none of the translations are " very good," and he expresses the opinion that the difficulty lies mainly in deciding whether ῥήμασι is, as Cicero held, to be considered as the equivalent of ῥήτραις (*legibus*), or should be construed " orders." A good deal may, of course, in this as in other cases, be attributed to the quasi-impossibility of rivalling in any modern tongue the terseness of an inflected language. But the real difficulty lies outside the range of merely verbal criticisms such as that of Symonds. It sometimes occurs that by some happy chance or inspiration, as in the case of the Εἰπέ τις, Ἡράκλειτε of William Cory, the exquisite bloom of the original Greek does not

evaporate when passing through the crucible of translation. But in other cases, after dwelling with lenient sympathy on the attempts of the most erudite and skilful workmen, it has to be confessed that, for reasons which may be felt more easily than expressed, Greek genius, jealous of its own proud literary monopoly, has in some instances bequeathed to us poetry which, in order to be fully appreciated, must be read in the original language.

Finally, it may be said that Lord Curzon has given us some specimens of what he can do when his Muse, no longer dwelling on the tragedy of Belgium, or oppressed by the mournful gloom which occasionally hung over the Greek outlook on life, lends itself to affording to English readers an interpretation of the sprightly and caustic humour of France. Nowhere is that humour more prominent than in the satire displayed in epitaphs on the lives of the unworthy or the insignificant. To quote one instance in point, readers of French history will remember that Louis XV., on his accession, was named "Le Bien-Aimé," and Carlyle has told us how President Hénault, "in his sleek official way," sang a dithyramb over the merits which appeared to justify the assumption of this title. Its singular inappropriateness was on the death of Louis XV. stereotyped in the lines :

> Ci-gît Louis—ce pauvre Roi ;
> On dit qu'il fût bon, mais à quoi ?

Lord Curzon has culled from Lord Chesterfield's Letters an epitaph couched in a somewhat similar strain composed on a certain Colas—"Un homme futile et fainéant"—which Lord Chesterfield somewhat maliciously applied to the recently defunct King of Poland :

Colas est mort de maladie,
Tu veux que j'en pleure le sort ;
Que diable veux-tu que j'en die ?
Colas vivoit, Colas est mort.

Lord Curzon has preserved both the wit and conciseness of the original. He translates :

Colley fell ill, and is no more !
His fate you bid me to deplore ;
But what the deuce is to be said ?
Colley was living, Colley's dead.

III

MODERN AUSTRIA[1]

"*Quarterly Review*," *Oct.-Dec.* 1915

SIGNOR VIRGINIO GAYDA, whose work, entitled *La Crisi di un Impero*, has now been most opportunely translated into English, is a writer of ability. His facts are marshalled with lucidity. His generalizations, though perhaps at times somewhat too comprehensive, are bold and striking. His proclivities are ardently nationalist and anti-Clerical, with apparently a strong tinge of Socialism. He pours forth all the vials of his wrath on the Christian Socialists of Austria who, he considers, under the auspices of the late Dr. Lueger, betrayed the cause both of Nationalism and Socialism by forming an unnatural alliance with the Church. His work, which may without exaggeration be termed an account of what is possibly the last agony of the Hapsburg Dynasty, merits the attention of the politicians of all countries. It is, moreover, especially instructive for Englishmen. We are in this country so accustomed to associate Imperialism with over-

[1] *Modern Austria: Her Racial and Social Problems.* By Virginio Gayda. London: Unwin, 1915.

The Hapsburg Monarchy. By H. Wickham Steed. Third Edition. London: Constable, 1914.

The Southern Slav Question. By R. W. Seton-Watson. London: Constable, 1911.

seas dominion that we are perhaps somewhat inclined to forget that the essentially land Empire of Austria furnishes object-lessons of the highest import as to the manner in which Imperial problems may be solved.

If we seek to differentiate between the tasks which Austria and England have respectively set themselves to perform, we find that, in dealing with race problems, the former country has not, save to a very limited extent in the case of Bosnia, had to encounter the obstacles created by colour antipathy, which precludes intermarriage; religious practices, such as the Hindoo caste system, which discourage social intercourse; or the various incidents which crop up in countries where polygamous institutions exist, or where the legal status of slavery is recognized, or where, as is the case amongst Moslems, religion and custom have given a character of rigid immutability to archaic laws. As regards the cleavage caused by differences of religious faith, it is not only possible, but highly probable, that Christian animosities, *inter se*, have proved an even greater impediment to amalgamation and assimilation in the Austrian Empire than those apparently more profound differences which separate all Christians from all Moslems and Hindoos. On the other hand, absolutist Austria has possessed one advantage which has been denied to democratic England. From the days of Pericles downwards, laws and politics in all democratic countries have invariably tended to produce a series of isolated measures lacking in that sustained consistency which absolutism renders possible. The advantage, however, is more apparent than real. History has abundantly shown that the instincts of blind, blundering, but withal well-intentioned Demos have, in many

matters essential to national welfare, often led to happier results than those obtained by the trained intelligence, consistency of purpose, and transmitted traditions of government possessed by the few. When, however, all these points of difference have been eliminated, there remains one central fact where similarity exists. Both England and Austria have been endeavouring to solve the main problem of Imperialism, which consists in harmonizing under one rule the interests of various races speaking divers tongues, differing widely in ethnological origin and culture, and often animated by conflicting national aspirations.

How have the two countries faced this problem? By methods which lie as the poles asunder. The difference becomes especially prominent if, leaving aside all purely administrative measures, which must necessarily present many features of identity in all civilized countries, we consider, not so much what England has attempted to do—for both the merit and demerit of Democracy is that it often cannot define its ultimate object with any degree of precision—but rather what she has not attempted to achieve. From the first connection of the English with the subject races which have fallen under their sway, a consistent and comprehensive policy of Anglicization has been definitely discarded. A sympathy, at times tepid but never altogether extinct, for the national aspirations of the subject race has been persistently evinced. It has been sought to conjure the danger to which Imperial rule is exposed through the action of extreme nationalism by just and beneficial administration, and by timely and limited concessions to nationalist demands.

The main aim of Austrian policy has been

totally different. From the days of Maria Theresa and her headstrong son, Joseph II., onwards, although the methods adopted have varied, the object pursued has been the same. It has been to effect the Germanization of the various heterogeneous units which collectively make up the Austrian Empire. History records but one partial success in the execution of a policy of this sort. The easy-going polytheism of the ancient world greatly facilitated the process of Romanization, but even the Roman success can only be accepted with qualifications. There was a good deal of poetical exaggeration in the oft-quoted boast of Claudian that Rome's maternal instincts led her to gather into her capacious bosom all her subject races on equal terms, while the eulogy of Rutilius—"Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam"—was speedily belied, shortly after it was written, by the dismemberment of the Roman Empire. Moreover, the stubborn monotheism of the Jews successfully resisted even temporary Roman assimilation; and total disruption ensued when it became evident that that complete homogeneity amongst the component parts of the Empire, which constitutes the only sure foundation of a powerful national character, was wholly wanting. As M. Le Bon says in his *Lois psychologiques de l'Évolution des Peuples*:

> Cette communauté de sentiments, d'idées, de croyances et d'intérêts créés par de lentes accumulations héréditaires, donne à la constitution mentale d'un peuple une grande identité et une grande fixité. Elle assure du même coup à ce peuple une immense puissance. Elle a fait la grandeur de Rome dans l'antiquité, celle des Anglais de nos jours. Dès qu'elle disparaît, les peuples se désagrègent. Le rôle de Rome fut fini quand elle ne la posséda plus.

By what methods has Austria attempted to

give effect to the policy of Germanization? The chief interest of Signor Gayda's book lies in the fact that he has subjected those methods to a pitiless analysis. He gives us a picture of an Austria which assuredly no longer deserves the epithet of "felix" with which the world has been familiarized by the old mediaeval distich. The country is riven and torn asunder in a very special degree by all the most volcanic tendencies of the present age. Eight different nationalities contend for equality of treatment, and even at times for supremacy. It will be as well to enumerate them. They are the Italians, the Northern Slavs (Czechs, Ruthenes and Slovaks), the Southern Slavs (Slovenes, Serbs and Croats), the Poles, the Roumanians, and the Hungarians (Magyars). The whole political and administrative machinery of the country is honeycombed by the mutual rivalries of these various races. Amidst this mosaic of nationalities, there is no room for an Austrian fatherland. When the German speaks of "Austria," he thinks of Vienna, the Czech of Prague, the Pole of Cracow, and the Croat of Agram. Amidst all this nationalist chaos, the non-national Jew steps in and is gradually causing a social and economic revolution. He ousts the peasant proprietor, and in some cases the large landowner, from his rural possessions. He fixes with a relentless grasp on all the industries of the country, and he inspires all classes alike with fear and hatred. The need for social legislation of various sorts is urgent. It may be illustrated by a single, but very significant, fact. The census of 1900 showed that in Vienna there were no less than 165,000 people habitually living more than six in a room. Yet little or nothing can be done, because national rivalries and jealousies block the way to effective

legislation. The aristocracy is tinged with mediaevalism, and still holds tenaciously to many of its moribund privileges. The Church, which is animated by extreme Ultramontane sympathies, still exercises a predominant influence over the action of the State; while, at the same time, the political character which Catholicism has assumed has led to a decay of real religious faith. Nationalist sentiments are gradually penetrating into the army.

These are but a few of the symptoms of a disease which, if Signor Gayda's account be correct, permeates the whole body politic of Austria. They must be taken into serious account in considering a question which must inevitably before long engage the attention of the statesmen of Europe. That question is, Can Austria, as a single political entity, survive the crisis through which the world is now passing? With the experience furnished by history, it would be rash to answer this question with a confident negative. There is much truth in Signor Gayda's remark that "there has always been in the history of this great and ancient Empire something which has, as it were, retarded its course. Revolutions, which have radically transformed other Western nations, have scarcely touched it in passing." The power of recuperation shown by the bundle of disconnected national units termed "Austria" from staggering blows which seemed calculated to ensure the total shipwreck of the whole machine of State has, indeed, been such as to astonish the world; but it is to be observed that this recuperative power was manifested at a time when dynastic rather than national interests determined the course of policy. The recoveries of Austria are not, in fact, indications of that sturdy and un-

quenchable health which enabled a homogeneous people like the French to recover from crushing defeat, but are rather to be regarded as incidents arising from the principles, then generally accepted but now loudly challenged, which were applied by all Europe in deciding on the destinies of nations. They happened when the maintenance of the Balance of Power was regarded by all statesmen as the corner-stone of European policy.

It is now very generally admitted by politicians of all shades of opinion in England that the principle of the Balance of Power, even if it be not altogether discarded, must be applied in a very different spirit to that which has heretofore prevailed. It was denounced by John Bright as "a foul idol, fouler than any heathen tribe ever worshipped"; and Bright's political successors, with the full assent of others of more conservative tendencies, have, in a greater or less degree, joined in the condemnation. There is rather more to be said in favour of the abstract principle of the Balance of Power than some of its extreme opponents are at times inclined to admit. Some balance of power is very necessary in order to ensure the peace of Europe, and to prevent the abuse of power on the part of any specially formidable nation. The obvious intention originally entertained by Germany at the commencement of the present war to establish not merely an European hegemony but an omnipotent world-power, without any regard to national rights, at once caused the importance of the old arguments in favour of maintaining, even by clumsy methods, some sort of equilibrium between the powers of the great States of Europe to spring again into importance. But not a word can be said in defence of the manner in which

in former times the principle has been applied. Under the old régime, the monarchs of Europe vied with each other in making arrangements, such as the successive Partitions of Poland, which inflicted cruel injustice on the populations concerned, who were considered as mere pawns in the game played by rival rulers and dynasties. The French Revolution produced no change for the better; and the evils of the system reached their culminating point during the period of Napoleonic ascendency. "These Bonapartes," as Mr. Atteridge truly says in his history of *Napoleon's Brothers*, "thought of marking out kingdoms on the map of Europe, and setting up thrones, much as company promoters think of registering companies and allotting shares."

Both the moral principles advocated by the best thought of Europe and a wise appreciation of the methods most calculated to preserve the peace of the world, alike rebel against the continuance of a system of this sort. It is censured on ethical grounds. Its condemnation on practical grounds is scarcely less decisive, for its application has brought not peace but a sword into the world. It is now generally recognized by all the most advanced democratic nations that national rights and aspirations should be given precedence over any considerations based on the necessity of establishing, by artificial means, a proportionate distribution of power and influence. But it is too frequently forgotten that the mere acceptation of the principle will carry us but a very short way towards its practical application. It is here that the facts and arguments set forth in Signor Gayda's work become of special value. They demonstrate the very serious obstacles which have to be encountered in the application of the nationalist principle.

The difficulty of dealing with territories where no ethnographical frontier exists, and where divers nationalities overlap, has been recently brought into special prominence by the internecine warfare which took place amongst the States of the Balkan Peninsula. Nor is this the only case in which the highest statesmanship will be required to reconcile conflicting national aspirations. It is a mistake to suppose that the internal conflict, which has for some long time past been raging in Austria, merely consists of one between the Slav and the Teuton. It is far more complex than that. The issue between Italy and Austria is, indeed, comparatively simple, although even in this case some questions of great intricacy may, and probably will, arise as between the national claims of the Italians and the Slavs. But the problem of reconciling the claims of the different units of the Slav race is far more bewildering in its complexity. Notably, there is, Signor Gayda remarks, "much to be done before a complete unification of the Southern Slavs can be accomplished."

Bolingbroke, speaking of the Hapsburgs in the eighteenth century, said: "I never think of the conduct of that family without recollecting the image of a man braiding a rope of hay, whilst his ass bites off the other end." Perhaps the "threefold ropes of twisted sand," with which, in the old Border ballad, an attempt was made to bind the wicked Lord Soulis, who was in league with the devil, would be a more appropriate metaphor to apply to the political programme which, for many generations, the rulers of Austria have endeavoured to execute. The task of welding together the component parts of the Empire into one cohesive whole would, in any case, have been one of extreme difficulty. The want of

political insight displayed in the adoption of the methods designed to secure cohesion has enormously enhanced the intricacy of the problem. With, possibly, the single exception of Metternich, who, whatever may be thought of the policy with which his name will always be associated, was a man of powerful intellect, the soil of Austria has been singularly unprolific of statesmen of the first rank. The constructive genius of the Prussian Stein or that of the Italian Cavour has been conspicuous by its absence. The general character of Austrian statesmanship has been personified rather in the ineptitude of political tricksters, such as Thugut; and the diplomacy of men of this type was very unevenly matched when it had to deal with antagonists, such as Cavour and Bismarck, whose methods, though no less unscrupulous, far surpassed theirs in intelligence. Both Prussia and Italy profited by the mistakes of Austria. "Whenever," Sir Robert Morier says in his *Memoirs*, "the great Chancellor got into serious difficulty and seemed running his head straight up against a wall, a *deus ex machina* was certain to appear in the shape of some gigantic blunder committed by his adversaries"; and, amongst those adversaries, Austria was assuredly the most blundering. Moreover, Austrian policy has always been characterized by a marked inability to recognize facts until their recognition was enforced by disaster. The dream of maintaining the Holy Roman Empire, which involved political dominion from the Eider to Brindisi, was not altogether dispelled even when that senile institution had at last received its final shattering blow at the hands of Napoleon. The crushing defeat of Sadowa was necessary before Austria could realize the truth. The pungent wit of Rivarol

enabled him to state in epigrammatic form one of the causes which have led to successive Austrian failures in the realm of politics. "Les coalisés," he said, "ont toujours été en arrière d'une armée, d'une année et d'une idée." Count Andrassy, though a man of marked ability, thought that the presence of "a band of music" would be sufficient to quell all opposition to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Austria, Signor Gayda says, "the truth is always discovered and understood very tardily."

But, whatever may be said of Austria's inability to stem the flowing tide of aggressive nationalism displayed by the heterogeneous units of the Empire, it would be in the highest degree unjust not to recognize that there has been a certain nobility and idealism in the programme which she has endeavoured to execute. It has been based on the fundamental fact that German is superior to Slav civilization. Even so strong an anti-Austrian as Signor Gayda, who naturally looks at the whole Austrian question mainly from the Italian point of view, admits that German nationalism, in its struggle with Czech aspirations, "attempts to save a race and its national consciousness by simply raising its standard of culture." The only hope of building an Empire upon a sure foundation of this description would have been to adopt measures calculated to persuade each subject race of the advantages to be derived from assimilating the superior culture which was within its grasp. The policy which Austria has adopted has been the antithesis of this principle. Generally speaking, she has striven to secure the predominance of German culture by the inexorable suppression of the culture of her subject races. Although the main

aim has never varied, a certain amount of somewhat sinister elasticity has been displayed in the adaptation of the means to the end. In some cases, it has been sought to extinguish separatist tendencies by stern and direct measures of repression. In others, more subtle and indirect methods have been tried, with varying degrees of adroitness and with varying success. When, as in the case of the Slavs and Italians, no racial affinity exists, the national element which appears to constitute the least local danger has been used to overwhelm the rival and more menacing nationality. Thus, in the neighbourhood of Trieste and on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, an attempt has been made to Slavify the population in order to crush out Italian national aspirations, which, alike from self-interest and inherited tradition, have always been regarded with special disfavour by the rulers of Austria. Where, on the other hand, racial affinities threaten an amalgamation of semi-conflicting interests, the aim of the Government has been to foment rivalries in order to keep the separate nationalities apart. Thus, every effort has been made to widen the breach between Croats and Orthodox Serbs. Moreover, in the very singular instance of the Ruthenes, to which more particular reference will presently be made, Austrian statesmen, in spite of their strong anti-national proclivities, have not hesitated to throw aside their most cherished principles, and to encourage local national aspirations in order to combat the attractions of the more dangerous and more potentially absorbent nationalism of Russia. A brief description of the methods adopted and the results achieved in each of the separate units of the Empire will bring these points into greater prominence.

Of all the political problems which spring from the Austrian national medley, none ought to be more easy of solution than that of the eventual fate of the Trentino. Of the 347,000 inhabitants of this province, no less than 338,000 are Italians. The reasons which dictated the occupation of the province by Austria are purely strategical. It constitutes in reality "a great entrenched camp in the heart of Lombardy and Venetia, threatening the valley of the Po, one of the most vital arteries of Italy and the link between her richest and most productive cities." In this case the most strenuous attempts to Germanize the province have been made. For administrative purposes it has been united to the South Tyrol, the most German of all the Austrian possessions. A lofty mountain barrier, whose only gate is through the Brenner pass, separates the two districts. They are not united by any natural tie, geographical, ethnographical, historical, or economic. The natural outlet of the Trentino trade is towards the south. By the erection of a customs barrier an attempt has been made to force it in a northerly direction. The result has been to cause the decay of the silk, iron, glass, and mining industries, which formerly flourished. "Isolated, forced back on itself, the Trentino had to transform itself from an industrial country into an agricultural Alpine land." In so far as the sentiments of the inhabitants are concerned, the policy of Germanization has proved a complete failure. Their sympathies remain wholly Italian. There cannot be a shadow of doubt that, under any territorial resettlement conducted on a nationalist basis, the Trentino should fall to Italy.

Of the 900,000 Italians who are subjects of the Emperor of Austria, about 200,000 are

concentrated in Trieste, the town which Signor Gayda considers is "morally the capital of *Italia Irredenta.*" A policy of direct Germanization offered, in this case, very little prospect of success. The German nucleus, which might have formed the foundation for the execution of such a policy, was almost wholly wanting. The population of Trieste and its neighbourhood, when not Italian, is almost exclusively Slav. Nevertheless, some attempts in the direction of Germanization have been made. German schools in Trieste are liberally supported by the State, while such support is rigorously denied to schools in which the language used is Italian. In default of a policy of direct Germanization, which the facts of the case rendered impossible of execution, the Austrian Government has fallen back on attempts to denationalize the Italian population through the agency of the Slav element. Large numbers of Slovene labourers have been imported to work on the railway. Slav employés have in every administration been given the preference over Italians. Simultaneously, stern measures of suppression have been adopted against everything tending to keep alive the Italian national spirit. The editor of the leading Italian newspaper published at Trieste recently celebrated his twelve-hundredth confiscation.

It will thus be seen that the case of Trieste and its immediate neighbourhood is more complex than that of the Trentino. One point, however, is abundantly clear. In any territorial redistribution based on nationalist principles, the German claims may be at once put out of court. The population is certainly not German. It is partly Italian and partly Slav. Looking to the geographical facts and the other circum-

stances which have to be taken into consideration, it would appear reasonable, even after allowing for some exaggeration on the part of Signor Gayda, to allow Italian, within certain limits, to predominate over Slav claims. There is, however, one point in connection with this branch of the subject which is of great importance and which would appear to call for the very earnest attention of the statesmen of Europe and more especially of the rulers of Italy. Every one must desire that the peace to be concluded at the close of the present war shall be durable. Unless the question of the ultimate destiny of Trieste be most carefully handled, it may contain the seeds of very serious international trouble in the future. It is difficult to believe that the populations of Central Europe will permanently acquiesce in any arrangement which entirely shuts them off from a trade outlet in the Mediterranean. This source of danger would be minimized, though probably not altogether removed, by making Trieste a free port, and generally by the adoption on the part of Italy of a liberal customs and trade policy, which would encourage her northern neighbours to make commercial use of the Adriatic ports.

Italian ambition is, however, not limited to the acquisition of the Trentino, Trieste, and Istria. It appears that Italy claims, if not the whole, at all events a considerable portion of Dalmatia. If nationality is to be the basis of future redistribution, it will be impossible to make this claim good. The Slav population of Dalmatia is far in excess of the Italian. Even Signor Gayda recognizes that a " violent anti-Italian feeling " exists amongst the Dalmatian Slavs. It is difficult to believe that these sentiments are, as Signor Gayda contends, wholly artificial, and

that they have been nursed into existence by the Machiavellian policy of the Austrian Government. Neither is his argument, that "the country's past has been wholly Italian, as its soul is even now," altogether convincing. It would appear, therefore, that unless Italy is prepared in some degree to play false to the principle of nationalism and to cherish dreams of conquest, considerable concessions will, in dealing with the case of Dalmatia, have to be made to the Slavs. Signor Gayda appears to recognize that some such concessions will be necessary.

"Undoubtedly," he says, "the Italian people must come to terms with the Slavs; they must not do violence to their national aspirations, their claims to economic liberty. But it is a question of restoring a just balance and the natural harmony between Italians and Slavs which existed before 1866, before the Austrian Government's new policy."

He does not, however, give us any indication of the manner in which the "just balance" which he recommends may be established. It cannot be too strongly urged that a cordial understanding between Italy and the Southern Slavs is requisite, not merely in deference to the principle of nationality, but also because it is enormously in the interests of both races to hold together in the face of Teutonic aggression.

Priestly influences, which have always been allowed to exercise a disastrously preponderating weight in the councils of the Austrian Government, are clearly traceable in the treatment which has been accorded to Bosnia. The process of Germanization has, in that province, taken a form, than which nothing can be more calculated to promote internal discord, of a campaign persistently waged on behalf of Catholicism

against the Bosnian Church. There has been a large influx of Catholics into all the principal towns. The number in Sarajevo increased from 608 in 1879 to 10,762 in 1895. Croatian Clericals have been called in to administer the province. They now represent 42 per cent of the public employés. German has been made the current official language; and, as the different Northern Slav races cannot communicate with one another through the medium of their own languages, they are obliged to use German as a sort of *lingua franca*. The religious autonomy of Bosnia, which has endured for five hundred years, has been broken up. The Austrian Government has assumed the right of nominating the Orthodox bishops and "popes." Their stipends have been placed on the State Budget. They have thus been transformed into Government officials. In the schools, the use of the German and the disuse of the national language are encouraged by all possible means. "In every profession special favours are reserved for the Catholics; commercial concessions are given to them alone; large works and public contracts are entrusted only to Catholics and German foreigners." It is hoped that by these, and other similar means, Serbian nationalism, which is closely allied to Serbian Orthodoxy, will eventually be extinguished.

It is, however, in Bohemia that the war between nationalism and Germanization has been waged with the greatest bitterness and also with the most decisive results. It has turned very largely on the question of language. In 1905, under the auspices of Count Badeni, an ordinance was issued to the effect that all provincial functionaries must know both Czech and German; and, although the intense opposition to this

ordinance led to its repeal before any attempt had been made to execute it, it is none the less a fact that almost the whole administration of the country has passed into Czech hands. Out of 24,720 State officials, only 5305 are Germans. There are 1088 Czech, and only 161 German provincial employés. In the railway offices, 6890 posts are occupied by Czechs and only 1400 by Germans. In fact, to use Signor Gayda's expressive phrase, the Germans, in spite of their relatively high standard of intelligence and the acknowledged superiority of their civilization, are being "stifled by the Slav mass." But the Czechs are far from being satisfied with the triumphs which they have already achieved. The two races have been ever drifting further and further apart. A German member of the Austrian Parliament declared that he would rather believe in the dissolution of Austria than in the possibility of an understanding between Czech and German. As the breach has widened, the demands of the Czechs have increased. They now ask that Czech should be treated as an official language, and that there should be Czech Ministers. At one time a solemn resolution was passed by the Czech "Club" to the effect that every deputy should pledge himself not to open his mouth in Parliament until his right to speak in his own language was acknowledged; and this was done in the face of the fact that at the time more than four hundred members of the Austrian Parliament did not understand Czech. In a word, it may be said that, in Bohemia, the policy of Germanization has proved a complete failure. It is clear that, whatever be the reason, the Germans, in spite of heroic efforts made through the medium of education, Labour Exchanges which favour Germans, and other

similar methods, can neither assimilate nor even reconcile the Czechs.

The case of the Ruthenes is, as has been already mentioned, somewhat special. There are three and a half millions of these people residing on the Russian frontier in the eastern zone of Galicia and in the Bukowina, besides half a million in Hungary beyond the Carpathians in the mountainous district which centres in Marmaros Sziget. They are in reality Little or Red Russians, who were rechristened Ruthenes by the Austrian Count Stadion, in order, in some degree, to obliterate their Russian origin. They speak a language which is a dialect of Russian. In matters of religion, the mass of the population belong to the Greek Uniate Church, which, for all practical purposes, may be regarded as a branch of Catholicism. The policy adopted by the Austrian Government in this province has met with a certain degree of success; but it is especially worthy of note that this success is due, not to efforts made in the direction of Germanization, but to the adoption of a local nationalist programme. Every effort has been made to annihilate Russian sympathies and to form a new national Ruthenian individuality. In the schools an attempt has been made to adopt the Latin in the place of the Cyrillic character, and to transform the Little Russian dialect now in use into a separate and really autonomous language. A so-called Ukraine separatist party was, under the auspices of Count Badeni, called into existence. Its programme was explained by a leading Ruthenian deputy in the following words: "We Ruthenes are an autonomous people with a national and political character of our own, and as such we wish to cultivate and develop our nation in Austria. We bind ourselves to be

loyal to the Pope and to Catholicism and to our Uniate Greek ritual." The apparent contradiction between the policy adopted by the Austrian Government in this region and elsewhere is to be explained by the reflection that its aim has been, not merely to alienate Ruthenian sympathies from Russia, but also to attract those of the neighbouring twenty-three millions of Little Russians who reside in Russian territory. Thus, it was probably thought, a gigantic Irredentist movement could be inaugurated against the Empire of the Czar. In spite of all these efforts, however, it would appear that the old Little Russian movement is not by any means dead amongst the Ruthenes. Signor Gayda thinks that it is merely slumbering, and that it is ready at some later period to be quickened into life. He declares that, among the 2500 priests of the Galician Uniate Church, there are at least 800 Russophils who only wait their opportunity to break their connection with the Latin Church and again to draw near to Russia.

Hungary has remained comparatively quiescent since the concessions embodied in the "Ausgleich" were wrung from the Austrian Government; but the result of that arrangement has naturally been to enfeeble the general process of Germanization, and to create in its place a narrow policy of Magyarization, whose defects have been eloquently exposed both by Mr. Wickham Steed and by Mr. Seton-Watson. There are still two and a half millions of Germans in Hungary as compared to about ten millions of Hungarians, but the number of German schools has sunk from 1232 in 1869 to not more than 500 at the present time. Moreover, the claims of Hungarian nationalism have not yet been fully satisfied. Demands continue to be made

for a separate flag, for the use of Magyar words of command in the army, and for an increase in the proportion of Hungarian officers in the Hungarian regiments.

Thus, with the solitary exception of the small purely Germanic nucleus—comprising the Vorarlberg, the Salzburg country, Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, and Carinthia—the same features everywhere characterize the general political situation. The fire of nationalism burns so strongly as to obscure the flame of all other movements. Everywhere it has triumphed over economic interests. It has absorbed Socialism. On the one hand, the Socialists imbued with German sympathies have rallied to the Emperor, and have been jocularly given by their opponents the singularly paradoxical title of "Imperial-Royal Socialists" (K.K. Sozialdemokratie). On the other hand, the Czech Socialists, departing widely from the original programme of such men as Marx, Engels, and Lassalle, have turned their attention to national rather than to economic aims. Even the Austrian bureaucracy, whose rigid uniformity had been regarded as one of the most powerful agents to further the process of Germanization, has become tainted with the nationalist spirit. "The great unitary *bloc* of the bureaucracy," Signor Gayda says, "is shattered."

Parliamentary Government, in the sense in which we generally understand that term, exists no more in Austria than it does in Germany. Nevertheless, the introduction of universal suffrage, in 1906, albeit the movement originated in a great measure from the desire of the Czech and Polish feudal nobility to secure their hereditary rights and privileges against the encroachments of the Central Government, constituted

a real, and, without doubt, a perfectly honest attempt to deal with the several national movements which were rending the Empire asunder. It was hoped that, in a Parliament where all classes and all nationalities were truly represented, all would combine to deal with the real legislative needs of the whole Empire. The result has, in this respect, been most disappointing. The democratic vote, far from allaying, has increased the intensity of nationalist exclusiveness. Particularism has triumphed over solidarity. Experience has shown that the representatives of the eight separate races view every question which is brought before them exclusively from the point of view of their own nationality. Thus, the whole legislative machinery of the State is, more or less, paralysed. No measure of general utility can be passed into law without small economic concessions being made to each separate group in order to ensure a Parliamentary majority. Verily, as Signor Gayda says, race egotism is "powerful, exclusive, and intolerant."

What is to be the outcome of all this bewildering political chaos? Signor Gayda does not attempt to solve the perplexing enigma. He merely observes that "some formula will certainly be discovered to solve it." The discoverer of that formula will contribute much to the cause of peace in Europe, and should earn the eternal gratitude of the various populations concerned; but he has yet to appear on the scene. In the meanwhile, it may be observed that, although the Protestant crusade, which had "Los von Rom" as its battle-cry, has as yet met with no great success, it may confidently be predicted that, were any attempt made to convert Austria into a great Slav Empire, the Pan-Germanist movement would at once be quickened into new

and vigorous life. The leaders of that movement do not conceal their designs. One of them, speaking in 1906, did not hesitate to say:

> We are completely indifferent to the fact of the Austrian Dynasty and State; on the contrary, we hope and desire to be finally liberated from this State so as to be able to live under the glorious sceptre of the Hohenzollerns.

It is, indeed, inconceivable that the German Irredentists, for such they really are, who have up to the present time constituted the backbone of the Austrian Empire, should allow themselves to be completely "stifled by the Slav mass." If the principle of nationalism is pushed so far as to threaten their vital interests, they will clamour, and with much reason, for the same principle to be applied to them. They will demand that they should be politically united to their brother-Teutons of Northern Germany.

It seems, however, highly improbable that any attempt will be made to establish one great Slav Empire. There is in reality no true Pan-Slav movement in Austria. The Northern Slavs —the Czechs, Poles, and Ruthenes—are geographically widely separated from their Southern brethren—the Serbs, the Slovenes, and the Croats. Differences based on historical traditions, education, and language also stand in the way of amalgamation. Moreover, up to the present time there has been no real unity of purpose even amongst the Southern Slavs. Croats and Serbs are ethnologically related to each other. They speak a common language. But, while the former are Catholics and write in Latin, the latter are Orthodox and use Cyrillic characters. There has thus, up to the present time, been much hostility between these two branches of the Slav race. A Coalition party has, however, now

sprung up whose object it is to unite the most intelligent elements amongst both Serbs and Croats. Signor Gayda thinks that the Southern Slavs are gradually getting to understand each other; and Mr. Seton-Watson, who enters into a full discussion of this highly important question, is of opinion that "Croato-Serb unity must and will come." It is greatly to be hoped that Italy will not interpose any obstacles to its accomplishment.

Amidst the numerous plans for federation and for the bestowal of local autonomy in various degrees, which have from time to time been put forward, only to be discarded by reason of the obstacles which they would have encountered in their execution, it appears that the scheme designated as Trialism is that which finds most favour at Vienna, while it also in some degree elicits the approval of the Slovenes and Croats. This plan would involve adding a third kingdom, that of Illyria, to the present Dual Monarchy. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia would be gathered together in one group and would constitute a kingdom under the sceptre of the Emperor. The proposal appears statesmanlike, but it would be presumptuous on the part of any foreigner to hazard an opinion on its feasibility. It is, however, clear that it would encounter strong opposition in Hungary, all the more so because one of the objects of the Viennese politicians in putting it forward would not improbably be that, by the creation of a new Illyrian kingdom, some means might be found to balance the strong and at times even arrogant pressure which Magyar influence exercises on the Central Government. Moreover, it is certain that, as one of the results of the present war, the conditions under which in the future the problem

will have to be solved will differ materially from those which have obtained in the past. It may well be that it is now too late to adopt the policy of Trialism with any prospect of success, and that nothing short of the creation of a wholly independent Southern Slav State will meet the requirements of the situation. The sword has been thrown into the balance, and the sword must decide. Mr. Steed, who was previously inclined to take a hopeful view of the future of Austria, says, speaking in the preface to the last edition of his great work of the recent action taken against Serbia:

> I confess that, notwithstanding much experience of the foolishness and short-sighted unmorality of the Austro-Hungarian official world, I was not prepared for a policy so wickedly foolhardy, not to say deliberately suicidal, as that adopted by the advisers of the Hapsburg Crown in connection with the death of the late Heir-Presumptive. . . . I did not anticipate that even "moderate foresight on the part of the Dynasty" would have been utterly lacking, nor that "the line of least resistance" to intrigue and warlike clamour would have been so readily taken. In a word, I under-estimated both the folly and the cynical weakness of the men responsible for the management of Hapsburg affairs.

Pending the solution of this stupendous question it may be observed that the creation of a Southern Slav State would almost necessarily involve the acknowledgment of the independence of the Northern Slavs and the gravitation of the Austrian Germans towards Germany. In other words, Austria would cease to exist. My object, however, is not so much to discuss what solutions are possible, as to perform the more humble task of directing public attention to its importance, and of indicating the very great difficulties which stand in the way of the full application of nationalist principles. It is well that the

nature of those difficulties should be realized, not only by the statesmen, but also by the general public, of this country.

Finally, it would be both unjust and ungenerous not to recognize that the political bed of thorns on which Fate has destined that Modern Austria should lie, is not wholly of her own making. It has, in its essential features, been created by the onward march of democracy, which has given an immense impulse to the nationalist movement throughout the world. The political problems which have arisen out of that movement are of surpassing difficulty. Nor is it as yet at all clear how they can be solved. It is the irony of Fate that the various issues at stake should have acquired special prominence in a country which, as Signor Gayda truly says, has "never grasped the importance of national movements and national passions," and which, as Mr. Steed puts it, has shown "a perpetual inability to appreciate the force of the moral elements in a situation." The accusation which may justly be brought against Austria is that her faulty statesmanship, far from tending towards a solution of the problems involved, has greatly enhanced their inherent difficulties. "Mistakes committed in statesmanship," Bismarck has said, "are not always punished at once, but they always do harm in the end. The logic of history is a more exact and a more exacting accountant than is the strictest national auditing department." The day of retribution for Austria appears to be at hand. She has to give an account of her stewardship to the auditors, not only of her own country, but also of the civilized world in general. It can scarcely be doubted that their verdict will be unfavourable. The ultimate survival of Austria as a separate political

entity is more than doubtful; but, if she is to survive at all, she will certainly have to make a radical change in the principles of government which, under priestly and military influences, have so far guided her action.

IV

GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE [1]

"*Spectator*," *October* 16, 1915

IT cannot be doubted that the historians of the future, in their endeavours to unravel the tangled skein of opinions and events which dominate human affairs, will, in dealing with the present crisis, be met with the same perplexing problems which have presented themselves to the minds of their predecessors. They will ask themselves what relation the proximate bore to the underlying causes of the war. They will inquire whether this great world-struggle was due to the personal influence and idiosyncrasies of a few prominent individuals, or whether, on the other hand, the individuals concerned were blind instruments in the hands of Destiny, and were merely the unconscious victims of circumstances which they could not control even if they had tried to do so. The philosopher with Carlylese tendencies will gravitate in the former direction. The followers of the school of which Buckle was the most prominent exponent will discard biographical details and look in a greater degree to general causes. As a mere matter of academic discussion, it is still possible for any one who

[1] *Germany and Eastern Europe*. By Lewis B. Namier, B.A. London: Duckworth and Co. 1s.

cares to treat history as a lawyer would treat a brief to maintain, on the one hand, that the wars of the Napoleonic period would never have occurred if no such man as Napoleon had ever been born, or, on the other hand, that the circumstances of the time were such as necessarily to engender the predominance of either Napoleon or some one possessing qualities similar to his. Anglo-Indian authorities still dispute as to whether the Indian Mutiny was due to the issues of greased cartridges to the sepoys, or whether this incident was merely the spark applied to combustible material which, on other grounds, was ready to explode.

Amidst the many vacillations of public opinion which find expression in the abundant war literature of the day, it is, to say the least, refreshing to come across a writer of marked ability who has a very clear opinion, not only on the main reasons which have led to the present contest, but also, which is perhaps more remarkable, as to one, at all events, of the results which will certainly ensue from it. Mr. Namier, who writes with a very full knowledge of Slavonic affairs and a real insight into the broader aspects of Eastern politics, does not hesitate to treat the war as essentially an "Eastern war." It is, he thinks, the "inevitable outcome of Germany's political association with Austria and of the deep-rooted and secular antagonism between Teuton and Slav." No less decisive is his verdict in respect to one of the results of the contest. Whether the Allies or the Central European Powers are the ultimate victors, Austria must, as the French would say, "payer les pots cassés." That singular concourse of political atoms which Prince Gortschakoff described as being "not a State but a Government" must be dissolved into

its original elements. "The Austro-Hungarian monarchy must cease to exist."

Without waiting for the final verdict of history, it is possible even now to advance certain propositions of unquestionable validity in respect to the recent relations between Slavs and Teutons. In the first place, it is certain that a succession of German, and notably of Prussian, statesmen have persistently regarded it as a cardinal principle of German policy to oppose by all possible means the union of the Slav races. In the second place, the close political relations between Prussia and Austria which have existed since 1866 have tended to precipitate a clash of interests, which, however, was for the time being averted by the astuteness and foresight of Prince Bismarck. In the third place, the rapid growth of latter-day Pan-Germanism gave an immense stimulus to such race animosity as previously existed, and materially increased the probability of a serious collision between Russia and the Central European Empires.

It was natural enough that an absolutist Government such as that of Prussia should view with disfavour both the growth of free institutions in neighbouring States and the consolidation of homogeneous nationalities, which was almost certain to encourage the adoption of those institutions. This aspect of the question found expression in a speech made by the present Kaiser in 1905, when, speaking of the Poles, he dwelt on the iniquities of "the lower classes who revolted against their Sovereign." And this predisposition was enormously enhanced by a consideration of the obvious fact that German predominance in Europe depended to a very great extent on the maintenance of disunion amongst the Slavs. Hence it can be no matter

for surprise that the policy of Germany has for many years past been distinctly anti-Polish. Every possible obstacle has been placed in the way of a conciliation between the Russians and the Poles, whilst at the same time every effort has been made to direct Russian Slavonic sympathies towards the Balkan Peninsula and to divert them from Central Europe. No one condemned preventive wars more strongly than Prince Bismarck. He once likened a nation which engaged in any such war to a man who committed suicide in order to escape from death. But he was an adept in the art of preventive diplomacy. He at one time encouraged the idea that England should be made the lightning-conductor of all the hatred which Continental nations felt for each other. Similarly, he looked on the encouragement of Russian religious sympathies for the Balkanic populations as an admirable safety-valve through which Pan-Slavism, based to a greater extent on racial and linguistic affinities with the Central European Slavs, might blow off its steam.

Prince Bismarck was well aware that when two persons mount on one horse, one must ride behind. His intention, of course, always was that Prussia should be the foremost cavalier. For many years all the efforts of his diplomacy were directed towards preventing Austria from dominating the political situation, and thus dragging Northern Germany into a conflict with Russia upon issues of Austrian rather than of North German importance. Actuated by sentiments such as these, he made a secret treaty with Russia which, although the offence was condoned, was regarded at Vienna as little short of an act of political treachery. He constantly inveighed against "Hungarian Chauvinism," and he per-

sistently urged on Austrian statesmen the desirability of leaving to England the task of checking Russian aggression on Turkey.

Judged by the light of after events, the retirement of Prince Bismarck from the direction of German affairs in 1890 was probably the most important political occurrence of modern times. It produced in Germany a transformation somewhat similar to that which Sallust declared took place in his own time at Rome. Arrogance and pride took the place of self-restraint and moderation. No moralist can attempt to defend the diplomatic methods adopted by Prince Bismarck, but his aims were perfectly legitimate, and, moreover—and this is a point of vital importance—they were definite. He always made a very great distinction between what he called *Interessenpolitik*—that is to say, a policy directed towards the realization and defence of national interests—and *Machtpolitik*—in other words, a policy which merely aimed at the acquisition of power for its own sake. More especially did he censure the idea of "working for prestige" (*auf Prestige wirtschaften*). Mr. Namier, in a phrase which felicitously combines both compliment and condemnation, says, speaking of the Bismarckian policy, that "its essence was brutal egotism, but its brutality was sane."

It is no exaggeration to say that on the retirement of Prince Bismarck a situation was created fraught with greater danger to the peace of the world than could have been produced by any other conceivable political combination. Enormous power was conferred on a few individuals of no great ability and of little wisdom, who did not know what they wanted. The brutality of the Bismarckian system was retained even to the extent of acquiring a character of hyper-brutality.

Its sanity evaporated. German Imperialism, which took the form of a Pan-Germanism intended to overshadow the whole world, sprang into existence. The leaders of the Imperialist movement were inspired by what Macaulay somewhere calls "all the restlessness and irresolution of aspiring mediocrity." They did not, and probably could not, define their own aims with any degree of precision. To those who have been behind the political scenes, and have thus learnt from experience with what singularly little wisdom the world is often governed, it is quite conceivable that they never had any very definite aims, and that they merely allowed themselves to be wafted by a boundless but ill-defined ambition towards the Niagara over which they eventually plunged. Mr. Namier remarks with very great truth :—

> No compromise nor understanding is possible with a nation or government which proclaims a programme of world-policy and world-power and yet fails to limit its views to certain definite objects. . . . The material meaning of the phrase about "the place in the sun" has never been explained to us. Like a Jack-in-the-box, the spectre of German Imperialism appeared where anything was happening, whether in China or in Morocco, in South Africa or in the distant islands of the Pacific, in Asia Minor or in the South American Republics.

Hence, eventually, arose the world-disaster which will affect the destinies of generations as yet unborn.

It would be an exaggeration to maintain that the race-antagonism of Slavs and Teutons in the Near East was the sole cause which led to the cataclysm. But it was certainly one of the principal contributory causes. So, also, Mr. Namier has rendered good service in drawing marked attention to the necessity, when eventu-

ally the terms of peace come to be discussed, of not allowing the importance of the West European questions at issue to obscure that of the Near Eastern political problems. It is most necessary to bear this warning in mind, all the more so because the point is one which may readily receive less attention than it deserves in this country. The "average Englishman," Mr. Namier very truly observes, thinks he has no quarrel with Austria. What he wants is "to crush the hateful spirit of Prussian militarism." Mr. Namier does not think that this spirit can be crushed. "Militarism in Germany," he says, "is not the creed of one caste; it is the living faith of the whole nation." Without in any degree wishing to challenge the accuracy of this statement, it is nevertheless permissible to hope that, if genuine Constitutional government were introduced into Germany, the danger to other nations produced by the existing form of militarism would be greatly diminished. But, however this may be, it is certain that unless some satisfactory settlement can be made of Near Eastern questions, and of the problems which have arisen out of the peculiar composition of the Hapsburg Monarchy, it will not be possible to lay the foundations of a durable peace. Mr. Namier is probably right in holding that one, at all events, of the pillars on which such a peace should be made to rest is the disappearance of Austria-Hungary from the map of Europe as a separate political entity.

V

NATIONALISM IN THE NEAR EAST [1]

"*Spectator*," *September* 11, 1915

THE author of *Nationalism and War in the Near East* veils his identity under the title of a "Diplomatist." He is not an American, but he sympathizes strongly with American institutions and habits of thought. One of the first points to be borne in mind in dealing with the views of the advanced class of politicians to which "Diplomatist" evidently belongs is that they have an inveterate habit of indulging in sweeping generalizations which very often embody a half of the truth, but very rarely the whole truth. Numerous passages, for instance, might be quoted from this book to show that, in the opinion of the author, the instincts of the public in democratic countries are generally right in their treatment of foreign affairs, whilst those of the rulers, and especially of the diplomatists, who "all underestimate moral forces," are almost invariably wrong. Instances from recent English history may, in fact, be cited in support of this view. During the American Civil War "the masses," to use the classification to which Mr.

[1] *Nationalism and War in the Near East.* By a Diplomatist. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d. net.

Gladstone gave currency, were generally more correct in their appreciation of the true issues at stake than "the classes." Again, during the Italian Wars of Liberation the English democracy warmly favoured Italian aspirations, although in this case their views were shared by statesmen, such as Lord Palmerston, Lord Russell, and Sir James Hudson, who were typical diplomatists, and who, under even the most liberal interpretation of the term, could scarcely be classed as "democrats." On the other hand, the sympathies of the Court and those of a large section of English upper-class society were distinctly pro-Austrian. Against instances such as these, which may be credited to the side of democracy, there must be balanced so significant a fact as that, up to the very last moment before the outbreak of the present war, the English democracy generally believed in the pacific intentions of Germany, and were disposed to regard all those who held an opposite opinion as scaremongers who were unworthy of credence. Many important democratic leaders, indeed, distinguished themselves by the insistence with which they dwelt on the desirability of effecting sweeping reductions in our naval and military armaments. In this case, it was the few, rather than the many, who were true prophets, and it is perhaps rather fortunate that one, at all events, of "the electorates of Western Europe" failed in some degree "to impress on its Government its own instincts of common-sense and conscience." The mistake on the part of the special representatives of democracy was very pardonable, for they were ill-informed of the facts of the case, neither were any adequate steps taken to awaken them from the fool's paradise in which they were living. But it is somewhat less excusable on the

part of a "Diplomatist" who, as Lord Courtney tells us in his foreword, "has moved in and out amongst Chancelleries, and knows their atmosphere without ever having succumbed to its asphyxiating influence." It appears, however, that, in spite of his wide experience, "Diplomatist" was so far mistaken in his forecast of the immediate future as to write but a very short time ago that "West-European nations have, broadly speaking, outgrown war," and that, having "become men," they were disposed to "put away such childish things as trial by battle."

Another example of somewhat hasty generalization is where "Diplomatist," basing his conclusion exclusively on recent Balkan history, says that "the development of democratic control over foreign affairs has undoubtedly had the effect of weakening the moral obligations of treaties." The admission is creditable to the author's impartiality, for it shows his desire, although he evidently entertains a strong sympathy for democracy, not to overstate his case. But, if his conclusion be correct, the outlook as regards inaugurating an era of universal peace is indeed gloomy, for, with the example of the treatment accorded to Belgium and Luxemburg by the absolutist Government of Germany fresh in our memories, most politicians have been gradually coming more and more round to the opinion that the only way to enhance the value and strengthen the security of treaties is to make, not only Governments, but also nations, parties to their conclusion.

Notwithstanding these blemishes, however, if blemishes they be, which seem to dictate the exercise of some caution in accepting all the author's conclusions, Lord Courtney is quite justified in saying that he has written an

" original, thoughtful, and a thought-provoking book, which invites to inquiry and reflection." He is thoroughly conversant with his subject. He affords us an admirable clue to guide us through the bewildering labyrinth of Balkan politics. His sympathies move in directions which command, or at all events should command, universal respect, and, in many cases, he asserts principles which constitute, not merely the best, but indeed the only sound, basis for the treatment of Balkan politics in the future.

It is of no use now to bewail the Balkan tragedy, for tragedy it really was, or to indulge in speculations as to what might have happened if Dr. Daneff had been a wise statesman, and if the fatal order to the Bulgarian Army to attack the Serbians had not been given. Sir Edward Grey correctly summed up the course run by the Balkan War when he said that it began in a war of liberation, passed rapidly into a war of annexation, and ended in a war of extermination. So far as results are concerned, it is impossible to indicate a single really satisfactory feature in the settlement concluded at the end of the war. Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro were about doubled in size. Roumania also gained something. Bulgaria, on the other hand, which country had borne the brunt of the fighting against the Turks, was deprived of a considerable portion of her conquests, and driven back far within what she claims as her natural ethnological frontier. The only gain to the cause of nationalism was that Albania was recognized as a separate national entity; but the democratic progress in this case was more apparent than real, for, even before the war, the allegiance of the wild Albanian clansmen to the Turk never went so far as to allow of an effective administration of

Albanian territory by Turkish officials. Moreover, looking to all the circumstances of the case, it seems very doubtful whether Albania can for long survive as an independent State. "Diplomatist" appears to look back with great satisfaction to the Ottoman Revolution, which, he considers, was, "morally speaking, as epoch-making an event for Asia as was the French Revolution for Europe." Indeed, though he is not sparing in his criticisms of the Young Turks, whose policy, he says, "in a few months transformed the Macedonian millennium into a pandemonium," his indulgence towards every political movement of a democratic character is carried so far as to lead him to ascribe the "cowardly murder" of Nazim Pasha, the Minister of War, to "a purely patriotic inspiration and a perfectly sound military judgment." As regards the final results of the Ottoman Revolution, all that can be said is that time alone can show whether or not the regeneration of any Moslem country can be accomplished by purely political changes of any kind. Broadly speaking, "Diplomatist" is apparently justified in saying that the net political result of the Balkan War and the unstatesmanlike Treaty of Bucharest was merely to "leave an aftermath of wars of extermination and the seeds of future wars of annexation." It will be more profitable, however, instead of dwelling any further on the history of a past heavily laden with political error, to inquire whether, from the experience gained, some useful lessons may not be derived for the conduct of affairs in the future.

Carlyle, amidst many high-sounding and hasty generalizations, never made a greater mistake than when he declared that the "swallowing of formulae" was one of the main characteristics

of the French Revolution. Vandal was much nearer the truth when he said that no one could thoroughly understand the Revolution if he did not realize the extraordinary influence exercised by "words and formulae" during the Revolutionary period. It would appear, indeed, that democracy develops a Shandean tendency to become "hobby-horsical." A fetish is made of ideals, which very often contain the germs of some thoroughly sound principle, and the idealists are over-prone to regard as their sworn enemies all those who, albeit they often agree in the objects to be attained, are inclined to doubt the wisdom of some of the methods proposed for attaining them. It is, however, true that if idealists blossom at times into visionaries, the "practical man" often degenerates into being a mere empiricist. Sound statesmanship is generally to be found in discovering what would be called in statics the resultant between the two extreme lines of thought and action. English democrats appear at present to have adopted two shibboleths, which they think constitute the keys to the proper treatment of international relations in the future. These are, first, that the principle of the Balance of Power should be absolutely discarded; and, secondly, as "Diplomatist" puts the case, that the Governments of Europe should be "immediately inoculated with a strong dose of democratic diplomacy." Both principles unquestionably contain an element of truth. It remains to be considered how far they are capable of application by the British Government and nation.

In the Balkan Peninsula an attempt was made to arrive at a settlement, not on the basis of the historical, geographical, and ethnological facts of the situation, but on that of the Balance of Power

either of the Balkan States, *inter se*, or their rival supporters amongst the Great Powers. It has proved to be a complete failure. It is unnecessary to repeat all "Diplomatist's" arguments under this head. It will be sufficient to say that he makes out an absolutely unanswerable case in support of his general conclusion that "a democratic movement cannot finally be brought to rest by a diplomatic settlement." Does it, therefore, follow that the principle of the Balance of Power should be in all cases discarded? Any such inference would, to say the least, be hasty. That principle rests on a psychological basis, which, albeit it involves a somewhat humiliating confession of human weakness, is none the less sound—namely, that all political and economic history teaches us that any individuals or any classes who obtain excessive power are, sooner or later, likely to abuse it. It is perfectly reasonable to infer that nations, which are aggregations of individuals, will do the same, and history furnishes abundant examples to prove that the inference has often been correct. This doctrine will, without doubt, be regarded by some as merely the phantasm of a belated Whig politician. It is, indeed, a fact that the essence of Whig principles was involved in devising a number of checks and counterchecks against an abuse of power, and although those principles were often applied for self-interested motives, and although the Whigs as a political party are now extinct, the fundamental article of their political creed, inasmuch as it is based on the fallibility of human nature and the sway of human passions, retains its validity. A striking instance in point is furnished by the war in which we are now engaged. Even if there had been no violation of Belgian territory, the British Govern-

ment would have been perfectly justified in resisting the attempt of Germany to establish an European hegemony. Moreover, it is especially worthy of note that in this case the plea that the theory of the Balance of Power should be absolutely discarded is wholly irreconcilable with the counter-plea that the principle of nationalism should be substituted in its place. German policy involves the negation of nationalism. The policy of the Allies, on the other hand, although to some extent based on the maintenance of the Balance of Power, also involves the assertion of the nationalist principle. If this chain of argument be correct, the conclusion to be drawn from it would appear to be that the principle of the Balance of Power, although it has been woefully abused in the past, should not be altogether discarded. It should, however, be applied with greater judgment and statesmanship than heretofore. Notably, wherever such a course is possible, the counter-principle of nationalism should be allowed precedence. The qualification as regards possibility is necessary, for if there is one lesson more than another inculcated by recent events in the Balkans, it is that it is extremely difficult when nationalities overlap to arrive at a satisfactory territorial settlement on a purely ethnographical basis. The world has yet to discover a method, other than that of the employment of force, for dealing with recalcitrant minorities. Almost every nation in Europe has its Ulster.

Turning to the question of how far British diplomacy should be democratized, it is, in the first place, to be observed that since the policy of affording strong support to the Ottoman Empire was abandoned, it cannot be said that the policy of the British Government has any-

where been either anti-nationalist or anti-democratic, but—and the point is too frequently forgotten—its influence has been limited. The force of circumstances has obliged British Ministers to place the maintenance of European peace before all other considerations.

Nevertheless, some change is certainly required. "Diplomatist" and others are quite right when they maintain that the people of the United Kingdom have not been sufficiently associated with their rulers in the treatment of foreign affairs. How can a better state of things be inaugurated? Certainly not by conducting all the details of diplomacy from the house-tops, or by charging a Committee of the House of Commons to deal with them. The Cabinet is in reality a Committee of the House of Commons. The democracy, if it is not satisfied with the manner in which its affairs are being conducted, can effect a change of Ministers. Some other remedy has to be found.

Democratic rule, though infinitely preferable to absolutism in any form, has its defects, and one of the principal of those defects is that a democratic Minister labours under a sore temptation to maintain his position by saying nothing but pleasant things to the public. Lord Bryce in his *American Commonwealth* has remarked with great truth that "perhaps no form of government needs great leaders so much as democracy." The main requirement of English public life at present, notably in so far as the conduct of foreign affairs is concerned, would appear to be to find leaders who, without sacrificing their powers of guidance, will have the moral courage to state unpalatable truths to the democracy. If that courage had been possessed in an adequate degree, the war in which we are now engaged

would not have come as so great a surprise to the mass of the nation. The accusations which advanced politicians bring with some reason against the manner in which our foreign relations have recently been conducted are, in fact, misdirected. They should be brought, not against British diplomacy, but against British statesmanship.

VI

THE SUICIDE OF THE TURK[1]

"*Spectator*," *October* 23, 1915

SOME hundred and fifty years ago, Horace Walpole thought that the Turk was politically moribund. In 1797, Napoleon wrote to the Directory that "the vast Ottoman Empire was daily crumbling into decay." Baron Stockmar records in his Memoirs: "In August, 1829, there was a general belief in the break up of the Ottoman Empire. Wellington and Aberdeen shared in this belief." Lord Palmerston not only realized the impending danger, but also indicated the only possible way to avert it, albeit, like Ovid's Medea, having recognized the path which was right, he was forced by circumstances to follow that which was wrong. So early as 1837, he "came to the conclusion that to strengthen the small Christian States of the Near East was the true policy both of Turkey and England." In 1877, Lord Salisbury sorrowfully remarked that "all had tried to save Turkey," but that she scorned salvation. In spite of these gloomy forebodings, the Sick Man of Europe survived, not so much by reason of his own inherent vitality as because, although, with the single exception of England, none of the Powers of Europe really

[1] *Forty Years in Constantinople.* By Sir Edwin Pears. London: Herbert Jenkins. 16s. net.

wished him to recover, all alike dreaded the results which would probably ensue from his premature demise. Russia never seriously favoured the cause of reform in Turkey, whilst Austria, to further her own ambitious designs, stimulated discord in the Turkish provinces. It will be a sombre act of political justice if, as will not improbably be the case, in ruining her victim, she causes her own house to fall about her ears. With ordinary prudence the Turk might still have lingered on in the position of an independent Power until his own vices brought about internal dissolution. But the inherited folly of the rulers of Turkey led them to precipitate their own end. "I like the Turks," a German friend said to Sir Edwin Pears in October 1914, "but I think they are committing suicide." If there is one result of the present war which may be predicted with some degree of confidence, it is that the fate of Turkey in Europe is sealed. If the Turks are vanquished, they will be swept back into Asia. If with the help of their allies they are the victors, they will become the vassals of the most egotistical Power in Europe, of which they have allowed themselves to be the subservient tools.

For forty years Sir Edwin Pears was an intelligent observer of what probably was the death-agony of Turkey. He may point with justifiable pride to the fact that, at a time when the mass of his countrymen were ardent Turcophils, he was amongst the first to draw public attention to the vices inherent in Turkish rule. But whilst unsparing in his criticisms of the Turkish Government, he is no Turcophobe. I have never, indeed, yet met an Englishman who had been brought much in actual contact with the Turks who was a Turcophobe. Nubar Pasha, who had

a talent for epigrammatic but somewhat shallow generalization, used to explain the sympathy which, as a rule, Turks and Englishmen display for each other by saying that "the English were the Turks of the West." What he meant was that both had the instincts of an Imperial and dominant race. This is true, yet no analogy could be more misleading. Sir Edwin Pears hit the mark much more accurately when, in reply to Sir Henry Layard's remark that "the Turk has a genius for government," he said: "That is the one thing for which essentially he has no genius." The opinion entertained by both Nubar Pasha and Sir Henry Layard was at one time very commonly accepted, and there is just this amount of truth in it, that the Turk in his prime used to be able to preserve order of a kind. I learnt from actual experience gained shortly after the Crimean War that an unarmed man or woman could travel in the wildest parts of Albania with as great a sense of security as would have been enjoyed in an English county. But the fallacy of Nubar Pasha's epigram is at once apparent when the methods adopted respectively by the Englishman and the Turk for preserving order are considered. The former has always relied mainly on moral, the latter wholly on physical, force to maintain his rule. The sympathy between the two races is due, not to the cause which Nubar Pasha indicated, but to the facts that the Englishman often finds in the ordinary Turk a fine manly fellow, whilst the Turk discovers in the Englishman a truthfulness and a sense of justice which he is all the more prone to appreciate inasmuch as his experience has very generally brought him into contact with individuals in whom the absence of these qualities is conspicuous.

Looking to the conditions prevailing in the various Mohammedan States of the world, their stagnation, their apparent inability to progress either on Islamic lines or on those of the exotic civilization of Europe, it is not surprising that there should at times be a disposition to establish a connection between political decadence and the religion of Islam. Whilst the adoption of the religion of Islam unquestionably constitutes a real advance to a primitive society, it is certain that many of the customs which cluster round that religion, such as polygamy, the seclusion of women, the recognition of the legal status of slavery, and the immutability of the Sacred Law, are hindrances to the adaptation of Islam to the needs of more advanced communities. But however this may be, it is worthy of note that, with one exception, the causes which have contributed to the decay of the Ottoman Empire are wholly unconnected with religion. The principal of those causes have been corruption, financial extravagance, and the adoption of a system which, for the sake of brevity, may be termed government by massacre.

When Sir Edwin Pears arrived in Constantinople in 1873, he "soon discovered that the Government was honeycombed with corruption." As it was at Rome in the time of Sallust, so it was at Constantinople when Abdul-Hamid reigned, *Omnia Romae venalia esse.* During Sir Edwin Pears's residence of forty years no improvement took place. When the Committee of Union and Progress wished to deal with the evils of excessive centralization, they found that the principal obstacle in their path was that, if any discretionary power were left to a local Governor, he would be sure to use it with the object of enriching himself. It will suffice to give

one illustration of the working of the system. A wooden bridge had to be built near Constantinople. The price paid was £8000, which was sufficient to allow of a large profit to the contractor and a handsome sum as bakshish to the local Governor. The latter was so pleased with this arrangement that he said to the contractor: "This has been a good business. Can't you find another like it?" Unfortunately, no other bridge was required in the immediate neighbourhood, but the contractor acutely remarked that if the bridge which had just been built were burnt down, it would be necessary to construct another. Within a fortnight the bridge was in ashes.

As regards financial extravagance, it will be sufficient to say that Abdul-Hamid spent annually no less than £1,200,000 on spies. The corner-stone of financial reform, and, indeed, indirectly of all other reforms, in these backward Oriental States consists in the complete separation of the funds at the disposal of the ruler from those devoted to public purposes. In 1878 the Sultan made some inquiries as to whether the services of a British official could be placed at his disposal with a view to the reorganization of his finances. A communication was made to me on the subject. I replied that before I could consider any offer I should wish to know whether the Sultan was prepared to accept a Civil List. As I had anticipated, the subject was then allowed to drop.

Excessive cruelty has been one of the chief features of Ottoman rule in recent times. It has extended even to the brute creation. Sir Edwin Pears tells once again the ghastly story of how, when it was decided to kill the dogs which used to infest the streets of Constantinople, they were transported in batches to a waterless island in the Sea of Marmora and left to die of thirst. Such

an inhuman proceeding is wholly contrary to the teaching of the Koran. It is, however, in relation to the subject of cruelty only that some apparent connection may be established between misgovernment and religion. The Armenian massacres were certainly to some extent due to religious fanaticism.

There can be no doubt of the existence of fanaticism in Turkey. But why does it exist? Mainly because it has been sedulously fostered by the rulers of Turkey. It was the corner-stone of Abdul-Hamid's policy. During the fleeting period when the ascendancy of the moderates amongst the Committee afforded some illusory hopes that a brighter day had dawned for Turkey, it seemed that the fanatical spirit was for a time quenched. But these halcyon days were of short duration. A well-informed correspondent of the *Times* has recently told us that "Talaat Bey and his extremist allies have out-Hamided Abdul-Hamid." The predominant European Power at Constantinople has done nothing to check the savage propensities of the actual rulers of Turkey. Sir Edwin Pears tells us that during the first Armenian massacres, the Germans, alone amongst the residents of Constantinople, maintained a disgraceful silence. "They seemed to have been possessed by the idea that it was in the interests of their country that they should do nothing to lose the favour of Abdul-Hamid." The notorious Count Reventlow has recently expressed his unqualified approval of the treatment meted out by the Ottoman Government to the "bloodthirsty" Armenians. In spite, however, of all these barbarous influences and unfavourable symptoms, indications are not wanting that some sections at all events of the Turkish people are wiser and more humane than

their rulers. Sir Edwin Pears quotes the public utterance of a venerable and highly respected Moslem in which he strongly protested against the Armenian massacres. More recently the Sheikh-ul-Islam resigned his office and boldly stated that he "believed that it was the duty of Moslems to treat Christians as brethren." Many instances have occurred, both in Abdul-Hamid's time and during the recent massacres, of humane Moslems endeavouring to protect Christians, and Sir Edwin Pears is able to record as his final judgment that "the events of the last six years have had the satisfactory result of showing the decay of Moslem fanaticism."

Looking at the matter as a whole, educated Moslems throughout the world, as also their rulers in India, Egypt, and Algeria, may take heart of grace. There is every reason for dissociating the Turkish régime, whether past or present, from the true teaching and real interests of Islam; but there is none for supposing that the decadence of Turkey, taken by itself, prohibits the hope that the elements of true civilization can be introduced amongst a population professing the Moslem faith.

There is, however, one lesson which educated Mohammedans may very profitably draw from recent events in Turkey. Young Turkey has proved a complete failure. So has Young Persia. So has Young Egypt. And Young China does not appear to have been so far much more successful than any of these. Why is this? It is because everywhere an attempt has been made to spring at one bound from absolutism to complete liberty. The Young Turkish movement, in spite of the fair hopes which it excited, and in spite of the good intentions which enabled Sir Edwin Pears to record that, in its initial stages, it created

"the best Government which Turkey has ever had," was from the first foredoomed to failure. The country was not prepared to assimilate such drastic changes as were effected. The idea of Constitutional government could not be grasped by the mass of the population. What did the Constitution mean? "Was it a person? Was it a new Caliph?" The soldier interpreted the word "liberty" as according him the right to "obey or disobey as he liked." Such is the testimony of Sir Edwin Pears. That of Miss Durham, who was staying in an Albanian village when the Constitution was proclaimed, is no less decisive. "All asked if the news had not come when they were to begin expelling the Giaours. Constitution was not going to tolerate Giaours any more; the land was to be swept clean of them. They were only waiting orders to kill the lot, and hoped it would be soon. That was what the new rule was made for."

Moslem patriots, in whatsoever part of the world they may reside, will do well, instead of aiming at the immediate achievement of an unrealizable ideal, to recognize that, by doing so, they are certain to bring about a reaction, and that their co-religionists will be both wiser and more patriotic if, before endeavouring to introduce a full measure of liberal reform, they will submit to the necessity of passing through a transitionary period when the best government for their respective countries will be that of a tempered and benevolent despotism. But in order to carry out this programme it is essential to find a suitable despot.

VII

THE RÉGIME OF THE YOUNG TURK[1]

"*Spectator*," *November* 27, 1915

SIR MARK SYKES'S work, *The Caliphs' Last Heritage*, is divided into two wholly distinct parts. The first deals with the history of the Ottoman Empire. The second is a narrative of travel undertaken during several successive years in various parts of the Ottoman dominions.

Sir Mark observes that no impartial or general study of the history of the Ottoman Empire in Asia has ever been undertaken. He dismisses Creasy's work as "useless." He speaks with somewhat greater respect of the work of the "periwigged Frenchman," De Guignes, whose *Histoire des Huns* still holds the field as a classic, albeit it was published more than one hundred and fifty years ago. He makes no allusion to the ponderous work of the German Hammer, which has never been translated into English, and whose enormous bulk is in itself sufficient to repel all but the most ardent historical student. Neither does he allude to the *Tarikh-i-Jevdet*, a well-written and very impartial work which brings Turkish history down to the middle of the nineteenth century. The author was Jevdet Pasha, at one time Minister of Justice at Constantinople.

[1] *The Caliphs' Last Heritage*. By Lieut.-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, Bart., M.P. London: Macmillan and Co. 20s. net.

In his own brief but interesting sketch of Turkish history, Sir Mark Sykes draws attention to a point the historical importance of which is perhaps not always fully appreciated. It was in 1355 that Suleiman Pasha, the great-grandson of the celebrated Ertoghrul, established himself at Gallipoli. Although in subsequent years a large portion of the Balkan Peninsula was overrun by the Turkish hordes, it was not until 1453 that Mohammed II., the Conqueror, taking advantage of the dissensions between the Greek and Latin Churches, which were an insuperable obstacle to Western unity of action, was able to capture the city of Constantine Palaeologus and to offer Moslem prayers in the church of St. Sophia. The event was one of world-wide and far-reaching importance. "Modern history," Lord Acton said, "begins under the stress of Ottoman Conquest." Up to 1453, Byzantium had been a bulwark of Europe against Asia. Henceforth it was an outpost of Asia planted in Europe. Its capture appeared at the time to be, as Sir Mark Sykes puts it, a "crowning mercy" for the Turks. As a matter of fact, it ultimately proved their ruin. Mohammed II. was not only a Conqueror, he was a statesman. He did all in his power to associate Greek intelligence with Turkish force. His efforts proved unsuccessful. Byzantium ceased to be the principal seat of learning in Europe, or, indeed, a seat of learning at all. The representatives of Greek intellect fled from the uncongenial atmosphere which surrounded them. They were scattered over the face of Europe and became the heralds of the Renaissance. All that was good in Byzantinism departed. All that was evil—its cruelty, intrigue, and deceit—remained. The Turks, Sir Mark Sykes says, "in taking Stambul let slip a

treasure and gained a pestilence." The humanizing element, which might perhaps in the end have brought the Turks within the comity of civilized nations, disappeared. The barbarian element gained the upper hand. Hence began a struggle which has lasted for four and a half centuries. The curtain has now apparently risen on the final act of the drama. Verily, as Homer says, Ate is slow of foot, but, in spite of her limping gait, she in the end generally reaches her goal.

The second part of Sir Mark Sykes's book, in which he gives a graphic account of the conditions of the districts through which he travelled, is, however, of greater interest than the first, which is wholly historical. In the East, comedy galls the kibe of tragedy. Like every thoughtful traveller, Sir Mark Sykes seems to have realized both the tragic and the comic sides of the scenes which he witnessed and the characters with whom he was brought into contact. Assuredly the former is more calculated to evoke tears than the latter is to move to laughter. Everywhere the same tale is told. Everywhere misgovernment, corruption, cruelty, and folly reign supreme. Everywhere the gifts of Nature are spurned, and the most rudimentary principles which should govern the relations between the rulers and the ruled are neglected :—

"Formerly," a "mild-eyed" old Kurd said, "we lived with the Armenians like brothers. Religion was the only difference. Now we are always quarrelling about I know not what. Are we in fault? Are the Armenians in fault? I know not—by God, I know not. All of us suffer, Kurd and Armenian alike. Soldiers come in every day, eat our chickens, beat our men, and demand taxes twenty-five years in arrear. How will it end? The Hamidieh rob us, the Vali robs us, the Mudir robs us. What are we to do? How are we to live?"

The only halting and singularly mendacious apology which can be made for this state of things is that proffered by an ingenious Turkish police officer. "The people like being taxed. They don't want any money." Vast tracts of land, which might be brought under cultivation, remain undeveloped. "Mount your horse," an old Mesopotamian Mollah said to Sir Mark Sykes, "and ride for eighteen hours, either north or south, and you will ride through a valley three hours broad, which might be full of villages, but the Government gains nothing from it." In this connection it is worthy of note that the people themselves would welcome the adoption of a more enlightened policy. In Mesopotamia they are anxiously awaiting the completion of the Baghdad Railway; neither, as might have been conjectured, do those who are interested in the caravan trade regard the execution of this project with any dislike or jealousy. They are sufficiently enlightened to see that, when the main artery is constructed, lateral traffic will increase.

Side by side with this tragedy of misrule *in excelsis*, there appear all the comic incidents which inevitably occur when the backward and unsymmetrical East is first brought in contact with the progressive and symmetrical West. Sir Mark Sykes inveighs against the evils which are the first results of attempts to Europeanize Orientals. Like most Englishmen who have resided in the East, his heart goes out to the old-fashioned Oriental who maintains a noble, if somewhat primitive, standard of self-respect and honour, and who often truly represents "the constant service of the antique world." His sympathy diminishes when the fez and the black frock-coat take the place of the turban and the flowing robe. It altogether evaporates when a

felt hat supersedes the fez. He gives many typical instances of Eastern anomalies. The police sergeant who commanded his escort during one of his Mesopotamian journeys was himself "a brisk young murderer." He met a young Armenian who "wept over the punishment of his great nation," who expressed the greatest admiration for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Renan, Kant, Herbert Spencer, Gladstone, Spurgeon, Nietzsche, and Shakespeare, but whose library turned out, on further inquiry and examination, to consist solely of an advertisement of Eno's Fruit Salt from which he quoted freely. In the desert Sir Mark Sykes met a train from Damascus. He hailed it as a foot-passenger would hail an omnibus in Piccadilly. The engine-driver accordingly "stopped for a chat, salaaming just as he would have done had he been riding a donkey." It is all very laughable, but, when one ponders over the lot of the people whose destinies in life are at stake, somewhat sad; and what makes it, in the eyes of an Englishman, still more sad is that in some quarters England, for reasons which are, of course, wholly inadequate, is held responsible for Turkish misrule. The political and social news which penetrates into Armenia and Mesopotamia is, however, not very accurate, and is certainly of a very miscellaneous character. A ruling Pasha asked Sir Mark Sykes in the same breath whether the Algeciras Conference had broken down, and whether it was true that Sarah Bernhardt's travelling theatrical tent was larger than his.

The most instructive portion of Sir Mark Sykes's book is that in which he tells us of the results which accrued from the downfall of the late Sultan. It is a commonplace of political science to assert that the most dangerous moment

in the life of any nation is when a thoroughly bad government falls with a crash, and when no elements are available to produce a better government in its place. The government of Abdul-Hamid was execrable. It deserved to fall. At the same time, even the worst government has some merits. So long as it exists, it is a refuge against complete anarchy. Abdul-Hamid represented an idea, it may be a bad idea, but still one which gave some sort of cohesion to the Turkish Empire. With his fall the mainspring was taken out of the whole machine. Practically it may be said that anarchy ensued. Sir Mark Sykes saw *Huriyeh* (Liberty) at work in the distant provinces of the Empire. "What, O father of Mahmud," he said to an old Arab acquaintance, "is this *Huriyeh*?" The "father of Mahmud" replied without hesitation "that there is no law and each one can do all he likes." Neither was this lawless interpretation of liberty confined to Moslems. The Greek Christians in the neighbourhood of Hebron were "armed to the teeth and glad of *Huriyeh*, for they say they can now raid as well as other men." In Syria, "the people carried openly the revolvers they used to secrete about their persons; murderers and thieves were not punished, yet on the other hand there was not a great increase in the number of the thieving and murderous fraternity; taxes were neither paid not asked for, public demonstrations had become a national amusement, the police were cheerfully impotent, and all except the Government officials were patiently waiting for something to turn up." In Anatolia, a muleteer who had been discharged from Sir Mark Sykes's service "spent all his time singing 'Liberty — Equality — Fraternity,' the reason being that the Committee at Smyrna released

him from prison, where he was undergoing sentence for his third murder."

In a word, Sir Mark Sykes confirms the testimony of all other competent witnesses. The Young Turk has proved a complete failure; neither can any great improvement be expected from the exercise of German influence. "The Germans have no instinct for developing a new country. Accustomed to State aid and to State management, to drill, discipline, and formality, they run their zealousness to seed in hosts of unnecessary official regulations, and in enormous expensive [railway] stations. At the same time they neglect every interest of the land they hope to make their own." Nevertheless, Germany's machine-made officers and her military system, albeit it is "inhuman, precise, bookish, and rigid," possess great attractions for many of the Young Turks. "There is so much that can be learnt by mere rote and mimicry, and a little German varnish can be made to go so far. A moustache improver, a ridiculous stiff swagger, a brusque, overbearing, staccato voice, can be mastered in a week, and, once mastered, can be assumed when required, leaving twenty-three hours out of twenty-four to idling, intriguing, secret drinking, and any other illicit means of wasting time that Constantinople affords."

To those who sympathize with all that is best in the East, and who would be glad to see the reasonable national aspirations of Easterns realized, the picture drawn by Sir Mark Sykes is not, on the whole, calculated to mitigate their present despondency. "The old evils, it is true, have gone, but new evils have come, and the old virtues are dying. Go where you will in Constantinople, you will find no signs of hope or vitality."

VIII

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR [1]

"*Spectator*," *September* 4, 1915

STRICT impartiality is a quality which at times receives a higher meed of praise than it deserves. The so-called impartiality of those whom Canning satirized as the friends of every country but their own is far from being a virtue. It is a vice, which not unfrequently has its origin in love of notoriety, self-righteousness, or overweening vanity. Impartiality may also at times arise from sheer indecision of character. In some cases a man who avows that he has no opinion on some subject of first-rate importance stands self-condemned either of moral cowardice or of inexcusable apathy. There is, however, a form of impartiality which is entitled to universal respect. There are men who are both capable and desirous of forming deliberate opinions, but who none the less wish to weigh with the utmost conscientiousness and to the fullest extent the arguments on both sides of a controversy before arriving at any conclusion. This frame of mind tends in some degree to hypercriticism. It leads the seeker after truth to reject all but absolutely

[1] *The Diplomacy of the War of 1914.* By Ellery C. Stowell, Assistant Professor of International Law, Columbia University. Cambridge: at the Riverside Press. Constable & Co., London. 21s. net.

first-rate evidence, and eventually to introduce numerous qualifications into the delivery of his final judgment. Nevertheless, the deliberate verdict of men of this class merits very special attention. The processes of ratiocination which they adopt before stating their views are in themselves a guarantee that they are not influenced by bias or prejudice of any kind. Their final conclusions are, therefore, all the more valuable. Professor Stowell appears to be animated by impartiality of this latter type. He has compiled a very detailed and perfectly accurate *précis* of the diplomatic correspondence which preceded the war. He does not shirk the issues which are involved. His book really covers the same ground as that already trodden by the talented author of *J'Accuse!* but the extreme moderation with which he expresses his opinions, the degree to which he admits extenuating circumstances in dealing with political crimes and misdemeanours, and the lenity of his final judgments stand in strong contrast to the fiery anathemas which the author of that remarkable work, after framing a scathing indictment of his own countrymen, launches against those whom he holds responsible for the catastrophe with which the world has now been visited. Englishmen, strong in the righteousness of their cause, and firmly convinced that in this case they and their Allies are the champions of civilization, may perhaps feel surprised at the leniency of some of the judgments pronounced, but they will none the less rejoice that an authority who approaches the whole subject in the calm judicial spirit displayed by Professor Stowell has in no case given a decision favourable to, and has in almost all cases been distinctly condemnatory of, the proceedings of the common foe.

In a very interesting chapter which deals with the deep underlying causes of the war, Professor Stowell says that in reality it constitutes a contest between two great rival systems of thought—nationalism and internationalism. It is, indeed, a fact that whilst the remaining nations of the world have been laboriously struggling upwards towards the attainment of that broader conception of human society involved in the principle of internationalism, and thus strengthening that "peace power" which must of necessity be based on a respect for international law, Germany's "mystic conception of the divine position of the State," as Professor Stowell euphemistically calls autocracy *in excelsis*, has prevented her from co-operating in the general movement. She has taken her stand on nationalism of the most narrow and exclusive type, the basis of which is that the interests of the rest of the human race are to be sacrificed to those of Germany. She has resolved to hack her own way through to a place in the sun, and practically to exclude others from participating in the genial warmth of the solar rays. Intent on this object, she has for a long time past steadily set her face against all proposals tending towards placing the peace of the world on a more assured basis than heretofore. Thus, at the Hague, the German representative stoutly opposed the principle of obligatory arbitration, and the German Government has persistently refused to consider any arrangements for limiting the armaments of the Powers of Europe. The tendency of German jurists has been to consider the observance of treaty obligations, not as a sacred duty, but rather as one to be decided by the light of policy and the self-interest of the moment. Professor Stowell considers "the German view on this point to be an

anachronism, and, taking into consideration all the aspects of the subject, the greatest error of mankind." He is, however, so far indulgent to Germany as to sympathize in some degree with her desire for expansion, and to recognize that, inasmuch as most of the habitable globe has been already more or less appropriated by other Powers, it is extremely difficult for her to expand. He expresses disapproval of the dislike entertained by other Powers at the growing ascendancy of the Germans at Constantinople. At the same time, he himself supplies an excellent reason why that dislike should have been entertained. If, he says, "England and France could have been sure that, once Germany had expanded over these regions [*i.e.* Asia Minor], she would subscribe to their own philosophy of the *status quo*, and not take advantage of this increase of strength to make it a fulcrum for a further advance, they could doubtless have reached some agreement with her." Unfortunately, no confidence whatever could be felt that there was any limit to the aggressive intentions of Germany. To this consideration may be added the argument, which would certainly have carried great weight amongst influential sections of the English public, that all the evidence forthcoming pointed to the conclusion that German expansion was so designed as to be of exclusive benefit to German commercial and political interests, and that German influence was in no way exerted, as in the case of English influence in India and Egypt, to benefit either civilization in its moral aspects, or the true interests of the inhabitants of the countries in which it was paramount. In spite, however, of his indulgence, Professor Stowell's final judgment on the general aims of German policy is sufficiently decisive. "Before we yield up our

cherished ideals," he says, "we will strive, by force of arms if necessary, to meet the force which that marvellously perfected national State has thrown against the foundation of our international order. We will help to overthrow the projects of such a Government, and recognize none that will not live within the same community of common international ideas."

Professor Stowell examines at length the question where the responsibility for the war really rests. He experiences a great, perhaps a somewhat excessive, difficulty in "determining with any degree of accuracy which party is the aggressor in any conflict." He takes the charitable view of holding that Germany did not really wish for war, which is probably true if she could have gained a complete diplomatic triumph over the rest of Europe without fighting. But, inasmuch as this was obviously impossible, Professor Stowell thinks that Germany, by refusing to enter into a Conference with a view to settling the acute point of difference between Russia and Austria, incurred the largest share of blame. He brushes aside the flimsy excuses offered by the German Government for their treatment of Belgium. There is, in fact, not a tittle of evidence to support the German contention that, if they had not entered Belgian territory, the French would have done so. The real reason for the action of Germany in this connection was explained in a significant remark which Herr von Jagow let fall, on August 3rd, in conversation with Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, when the latter alluded to the fact that "the French frontier is of such an extent as to make a passage through Belgium avoidable." Herr von Jagow naïvely replied: "But that frontier is too well fortified." Moreover, no

excuses based on after-thoughts can obliterate the impression made by the German Chancellor's very explicit statement to the Reichstag on August 4th. "Necessity," he said, "knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have possibly already entered on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law." Mr. Roosevelt has said: "It will never be possible in any war to commit a clearer breach of international morality than that committed in the invasion of Belgium." Professor Stowell's view, though expressed in somewhat less decisive language, is substantially the same as that of Mr. Roosevelt.

Professor Stowell strongly condemns the proceedings of Austria, notably because "she concealed her intentions and tried to lull to rest the suspicions of the Powers, while she prepared an ultimatum to Serbia, which she knew could not possibly be accepted." He does not altogether acquit Russia of blame. He thinks her military preparations were "precipitate," but he adds that "never did country have greater provocation." He admits that Russia displayed a "most unusually conciliatory disposition" in the face of Austria's arbitrary and high-handed proceedings. As regards France, he thinks that the French Government "does not seem to have been as active in working for peace as England and Italy," a circumstance which he explains by maintaining that the French Ministers were from the outset clearly of opinion that the only hope of peace lay in the *Entente* Powers making a firm stand against the Austro-German demands.

Professor Stowell, of course, acquits England of all responsibility for the war. Indeed, he goes so far as to say: "It is very possible that the French and English statesmen might have hit

upon some plan to prevent the outbreak of the war, but my thorough examination of the documents and my study of European politics have not made it possible for me to discover wherein that possibility lay." All Englishmen will read with pride and pleasure the glowing tribute which Professor Stowell pays to Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy. "On the whole," he says, "I believe, unsuccessful as the event proved, Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy, as pourtrayed in the British White Papers, will stand forth as one of England's glories and as a pattern for generations to come." In point of fact, what German statesmen hoped and expected from the first was that England would adopt the dastardly policy of throwing over her Allies, and declaring in effect that she would in no circumstances take part in the contest. At that exorbitant price, peace might perhaps have for a time been preserved. The rage against England is largely due to the fact that the Germans wholly misunderstood the character both of the English Ministers and of the English nation.

The whole of the facts connected with the negotiations which preceded the war are so well known to the public, and have been so thoroughly discussed from every point of view, that it is unnecessary here to do more than draw attention to one or two salient features.

In the last chapter of his book, Professor Stowell propounds a number of questions, to some of which he gives answers, whilst others he considers must, in view of the scantiness of the available information, remain unanswered. In the former category is the question, "Did the German Government know the contents of the Austrian Note to Serbia before it was presented?" Professor Stowell's reply is as follows: "I am

convinced that the German Government spoke the truth and that the Note was not previously communicated. From an examination it would seem probable that this ignorance was prearranged." But in the "Questions without Answers" Professor Stowell includes this query: "Did Von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, telegraph the contents of the Austrian Note to the Kaiser before it was presented to Serbia?" Now, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador at Vienna, states categorically that, "although he was unable to verify it, he had private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum before it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor." Dealing with this statement, Professor Stowell remarks: "If there should prove to be any truth in this allegation, it would have an important bearing upon the responsibility of the Kaiser, and show that Germany was afflicted with a secret or irresponsible diplomacy similar to that which was the curse of the old régime in France."

Professor Stowell is possibly not very fully informed as regards the methods adopted by German diplomacy; neither perhaps does he realize the fact that that diplomacy comes into court with a damning record for tortuous proceedings, dating from the days of Frederick the Great, such as is unparalleled in the history of any other country. It is notorious that the "secret and irresponsible diplomacy," at which Professor Stowell merely hints, actually exists. At Cairo, the agent employed was Baron Oppenheim. It is generally believed that Baron von Kühlmann occupied a similar position in London. It cannot be doubted that there were other agents in every capital of the world. Inasmuch

as their principal function was to communicate direct to the Kaiser over the heads of their chiefs, it can readily be understood that this pernicious system often led to much friction. The fact of its existence, however, renders it not merely highly probable, but almost certain, that Sir Maurice de Bunsen's information was perfectly correct. It would be quite in accordance with German methods that the Austrian Note should have been received at Berlin, but that Herr von Jagow should have been designedly kept in ignorance of its contents in order that, in dealing with the foreign diplomatists, he should be able to say that the German Foreign Office had not been consulted before it was delivered to Serbia.

Professor Stowell discusses at length the vexed question whether Sir Edward Grey should or should not have yielded to French and Russian pressure to the extent of declaring, at an early stage of the negotiations, the intention of England to support the Dual Alliance. He was at first inclined to think that such a declaration should have been made, but eventually came to the conclusion that the course which Sir Edward Grey pursued was unquestionably right. Apart from any considerations based on the necessity of securing the general support of the public in England, any opinion on this subject must to a great extent depend upon what view is held as to the sincerity of the German statesmen when they declared their wish to avoid war. Sir Edward Grey believed that they were sincere, and, if he was right, the policy which he pursued was unquestionably the best. On the other hand, as Mr. Oliver pertinently remarks, speaking of this episode in his *Ordeal by Battle*, "there are some practical disadvantages in being a gentleman."

IX

THE GERMAN HISTORIANS [1]

"*Spectator*," *August* 28, 1915

AMIDST the numerous results which have ensued from the present war, one of the most notable assuredly is that the mask has been torn from the face of German *Kultur*. Its dictates are no longer received with that hushed acquiescence which the world was formerly inclined to yield to deep, albeit somewhat arrogant, erudition. *Kultur* has been placed on its defence. Moreover, the whole professorial class of Germany, and notably her historians, has been arraigned at the bar of civilization. A jury, constituted of the leaders alike of ethics and of intellect in every country in the world, has been unconsciously empanelled to try the case. The issue at stake is one of supreme importance. For some two thousand years the world has laboriously, although not very successfully, been endeavouring to live up to a certain moral standard which, whether it be held to have originated in the Porch of the Stoics or in the stable of Bethlehem, has been generally accepted, alike by those who believe and those who discard its divine origin,

[1] *Modern Germany and her Historians.* By Antoine Guilland, Professor of History at L'École Polytechnique Suisse. London: Jarrold & Sons. 7s. 6d. net.

as the basis of civilized society. Until recently, no one was disposed to challenge the accuracy of Goldwin Smith's statement that "Humanity, as it passes through phase after phase of the historical movement, may advance indefinitely in excellence, but its advance will be an indefinite approximation to the Christian type. A divergence from that type, to whatever extent it may take place, will not be progress, but debasement and corruption. In a moral point of view, in short, the world may abandon Christianity, but can never advance beyond it."

A nation which boasts that it stands in the vanguard of civilization has now rebelled against the universal sway of this moral standard. It has set up a wholly different criterion by which human actions are to be judged. It has placed the interests of Germany—or perhaps it would be more strictly correct to say the interests of Prussia—in opposition to those of the rest of the human race, with the significant exception of the semi-barbarous Turks. Those who do not conform to the new standard are condemned to extinction, inasmuch as they are held guilty of what one of the leading exponents of the revised code of morals calls "anti-German sins." Broadly speaking, therefore, the issue which the jury has to try is to decide whether, as the Germans themselves maintain, the new principles, which they are endeavouring to thrust at the point of the sword on the acceptation of the world, embody a system which, to the great benefit of humanity, may profitably take the place of the pre-existing code of morals, the latter being condemned as effete and worn-out, or whether, on the contrary, the rebellion of Germany against that code does not constitute an unpardonable act of treason against the sole basis on which civilization can

be made to rest. It is as yet perhaps too early to anticipate the final verdict. The passions and the emotions evoked during a time of war militate against the delivery of a thoroughly impartial judgment. Nevertheless, the evidence for the prosecution may advantageously be collected with a view to facilitating the ultimate decision of the tribunal.

The French edition of M. Antoine Guilland's book on the German historians was published some years ago. The recent appearance of an English translation is to be welcomed. In a work which displays profound knowledge of the subject, acute powers of analysis, and an attitude of severe impartiality, M. Guilland has given us a sketch of the lives and teaching of five notable individuals who, more than all others, have played the part to which a now almost forgotten German historian (Häusser) considered that historians should aspire—namely, to be the " educators and leaders of the nation." These are, in the first place, Niebuhr, the founder of the school of modern historical criticism, who " felt like Tacitus," and who wrote his *History of Rome* in order to " regenerate " the youth of his country and to " render them capable of great things "; and, in the second place, Ranke, the most judicial, and therefore, in his own country, the least appreciated, of the five. The former, although endowed with a liberal mind, was in reality a reactionary in politics. He did not believe that liberty could " come from below." It must, he thought, be " granted by, not snatched from, the powers that be " ; and even Ranke, in spite of a distinct taint of Radicalism, was a convinced and devoted servant of the Hohenzollerns, and held that national development must be the work of " powerful personalities." Carlyle was a

zealous advocate of this doctrine, which is, of course, in strict conformity with Hohenzollern interests. Lord Acton partially agreed with him, but he added the significant and very true remark that "History is often made by energetic men steadfastly following ideas, *mostly wrong*, that determine events."

These two men were what M. Guilland calls "the forerunners." Niebuhr wrote entirely, and Ranke partially, before the full tide of absolutism had set in. Then, in 1849, came what was really the turning-point of modern German history, the miscarriage of the Frankfort Parliament. Moltke, the great protagonist of militarism, rejoiced. Democracy, he thought, had foundered. "The time of heroes was coming after that of brawlers and scribblers." Order, of which he was an ardent devotee, would reign supreme, and he added, unconsciously paraphrasing a couplet of the English poet Akenside, that "order had sometimes produced liberty, but liberty had never produced order." It was about this time that the next two historians of whom M. Guilland treats rose to fame. These were Mommsen and Sybel. Both of these eminent men, as Karl Hildebrand wrote in 1874, "made history to suit their fancy." Sadowa and Sedan converted them to the cause of absolutism. Mommsen, however, in spite of his whole-hearted Caesarism, never entirely bowed the knee to Bismarck; and Sybel at times made some rather half-hearted endeavours to cover the most arbitrary and lawless acts of the Prussian Government with a cloak of morality. The men of action scoffed at these timid reservations, and tore to shreds all qualifications which stood in the way of executing their projects. Years before either Mommsen or Sybel was born, their great exemplar

had boldly stated the principle to which, in more covert language, they had given their adhesion. Frederick the Great when he entered Silesia said : " I take in the first place. I can always find pedants enough to prove my rights." Prince Bismarck was no less frank. " Even," he said, " if he has poor arguments at his disposal, that man is always right if he has the majority of bayonets on his side " ; and his disciple Roon, speaking of the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, remarked : " The question of the duchies is not a question of rights ; it is a question of force, and we it is who have the force."

It was, however, reserved for the fifth on M. Guilland's list of historians to preach the gospel of " might is right " in its most naked and unabashed form, and not merely to preach it, but to gain the general acceptance of his countrymen for his preaching. The main tenets of Treitschke's political philosophy are now sufficiently familiar to the British public to render it unnecessary to expound them afresh. It may, however, be remarked that this " coryphaeus of Imperialism," as M. Guilland calls him, accomplished what may truly be called a triumph of paradox. He showed that there is no absolutely necessary connection between demagogues and Demos. The very same arts which, since the birth of history, have been employed by popular leaders to ingratiate themselves with the mob, were enlisted in the cause of aggressive absolutism to gratify the Chauvinism of the Prussian Junkers. Whilst rendering lip-service to the cause of truth, Treitschke at the same time did not hesitate to taint history, if not with falsehood, at all events with false inferences and specious conclusions based on a perversion of facts. " Simple, impartial history," he declared, " could not agree

with a passionate and quarrelsome nation." Accordingly, he avowedly set to work to write history "with anger and passion." It might have been thought that a philosophic German historian, knowing the characteristics of his countrymen, would have been so far animated by a high sense of his moral responsibilities as to endeavour to assuage their unbridled passions, and to appease their excessive combativeness. And this, in fact, is what Ranke, in spite of his ardent patriotism, endeavoured to some extent to do. A friend of Prussia, he was a greater friend of truth. Treitschke adopted an entirely different system. He used all the resources of a powerful intellect and of a ready wit, which, though unusual in a German, was characteristically national inasmuch as it was wholly wanting in refinement, to inflame still further the combustible passions of those whom he addressed, and to quicken into action that wholly unreasonable tendency to quarrel which, in defiance both of right and reason, he regarded as a national asset. More especially did he hound his countrymen on to give a free rein to their insane hatred of England, which Mr. Harbutt Dawson, who knew him well, and who, moreover, has a kindly word to say for him, declares is based on the "traditional envy of his nation."

What can Germans plead in answer to the charge that they are endeavouring to pervert the morals of the world? They can urge that a noble army of German scientists, thinkers, and scholars has added greatly to the store of knowledge possessed by the human race. Even this plea, though, broadly speaking, admissible, must be accepted with some qualifications. Until recently, the tendency, not only in England but also elsewhere, has been, far from minimizing,

somewhat to exaggerate the debt of gratitude which the world of intellect owes to Germany. Since the war broke out, more searching inquiry has been made as to the extent to which this debt is really due. Nowhere has the subject been better treated than in a series of able articles which appeared in a recent number of the *Quarterly Review*, and in which the highest English authorities on science, art, literature, scholarship, and history dealt with the achievements of Germany in each of these spheres of intellectual activity. The general verdict was that unqualified praise may be awarded to German industry, German research, and the admirable powers of organization displayed by Germans in adapting their means to their ends, but that no claim to any predominance of genius or originality can, in any single case, be admitted. More than this, whatever learning the Germans may possess, they have certainly not acquired the faculty of displaying it in a manner such as to render it attractive to other learners. Every English lover of classical literature will pay willing homage to the inestimable services rendered by such men as Pauly-Wissowa and Roscher, and will acknowledge, perhaps with some tinge of remorse, that no English authors can compete with them in the realms of encyclopaedic arrangement of knowledge and mythological lore. None the less, after poring over the erudite but somewhat arid and ponderous textbooks of German scholars, he will turn with a sense of relief to the writings of Englishmen, such as Gilbert Murray, Jebb, and Verrall, or to those of Frenchmen, such as Bérard and Boissier, where he will find, running through their literary productions, an electric current of geniality and human sympathy in which their German co-

adjutors are wholly wanting. It may be confidently asserted that such a work as Livingstone's *Greek Genius and its Meaning to Us*, which would almost certainly be viewed with scorn by German scholars, has afforded instruction and pleasure to a class, fortunately numerous in our own country, which, without making any pretension to deep scholarship, values and appreciates classical literature. Again, what man who wishes to know something of the history of the Ottoman Turks or of the Jews would have the courage to tackle the bulky volumes, in the one case, of Hammer, or, in the other, of Joseph Salvador? He will be repelled by the form in which instruction is imparted, and will gladly turn to the lively pages of Creasy, who gave to the world what is really the concentrated essence of Hammer in a manageable volume, and to the works of Renan, Milman, or Darmesteter, which, though by no means wanting in profundity, are eminently more attractive than those of Salvador.

But the question of the extent to which Germany has enriched the knowledge of the world is, after all, only a collateral issue. There is something worse than ignorance. Moral degradation is much worse. The German historians, from Niebuhr downwards, have frequently advanced the plea that "knowledge ennobles the character." It certainly ought to do so. It appears, however, to have produced a precisely opposite effect in Germany. Recent events conclusively prove that of late years German character, far from having been elevated, has deteriorated. Deterioration was, indeed, almost inevitable in view of the fact that the teaching of the leading German historians, which has gained full possession of the mind of the nation, has been based on wholly false premises. To

expose fully the fallacies of their arguments would require a volume. But allusion may here be made to one or two points of special importance.

The foundation of the whole German conception of universal and national development is, as M. Guilland has pointed out, based on a theory put forward by the historical school of law, the application of which necessitates the *Rights of States*, which are drawn from history, being allowed to predominate over the *Rights of Man*, which are drawn from human reason. In a few pregnant words M. Albert Sorel has conclusively exposed the fallacy of this theory. The German historians, he says, "extorted from inveterate abuses the principle of the perpetuity of abuses." Moreover, they "transformed very ancient usurpation into lawfulness."

Another favourite device of the German historians is to maintain that the predominance of the strong over the weak is "an indisputable law of life." Treitschke used this argument in 1861 when dealing with the then existing German Confederation. "There is no safety for us," he said, "except by the annihilation of the small States." It is now sought to apply this same theory on a far larger scale. This is, in reality, an instance of misapplied Darwinism. The validity of the theory can only be admitted if human beings are in all respects to be assimilated to the brute creation. It involves a complete confusion between a law of Nature and a "law of life." Animals, birds, and insects devour each other because they are obliged to do so in order to live, and because they are not restrained from doing so by any moral or intellectual scruples. This is the law of Nature. But the "law of life," to which Treitschke and his fellow-historians

appeal, has not been ordained by Nature. It has been made by men, and, moreover, by bad men. In so far as it exists, it ought to be repealed. It assumes not only that the Germans cannot prosper without the extinction of Belgians, Dutch, Danes, and others, but also that the survival of the Teuton and the annihilation of all other presumably inferior races are a necessity dictated in the general interests of civilization. Now this, as Euclid would have said, is absurd.

Led astray by sophistry and fallacious reasoning of this sort, the Germans, in spite of their great powers of organization, their industry, and their singular grasp of detail, have become, in the realm of politics, not only the most backward but the most ill-judging nation in the world. This fact was recognized by Prince Bülow in his *Imperial Germany*. He said that German home policy has, with rare exceptions, been a "history of political mistakes." M. Albert Sorel remarks, with great truth, that "the Germans often lack critical ability in the discovery of causes, and are mistaken in their estimations of things as a whole." The diplomatic events which preceded the present war constitute a striking instance of the truth of M. Sorel's observation. The Germans entirely miscalculated the effect which their conduct was likely to produce, not only on the separate nations who were more particularly involved, but also on the public opinion of the world in general.

The thousands of corpses which now lie festering on the plains of Flanders, in the forests of Poland, and elsewhere amply testify to the terrible results which have ensued from these miscalculations. But assuredly, unless Astraea has finally taken flight from the earth never to return, retribution will eventually overtake the

authors of the greatest and least excusable crime which the world has ever witnessed. The gods, Aeschylus has told us, are not unmindful of those who cause great slaughter—*τῶν πολυκτόνων γὰρ οὐκ ἄσκοποι θεοί.*

X

AN ETHICAL ICONOCLAST [1]

"*Spectator*," *November* 20, 1915

THERE have been in the world before now, not only many selfish men and women, but also schools of philosophy which have been tainted with selfishness. The Cyrenaics and, although to a less extent, the Epicureans, who absorbed and qualified the Cyrenaic philosophy, were hedonists; but Nietzsche would have rejected the teaching of Aristippus or Epicurus with a scorn no less decisive than that with which he treated all other philosophers who had preceded him. He was wholly original to this extent, that he was the first to elevate unabashed egotism to the dignity of a virtue. The world, he thought, was decadent. The only hope for the future of the human race lay in the complete extirpation of every form of that altruism which was the bastard product of Christianity, weak-kneed philosophy, and democracy. This bald, but accurate, statement of Nietzsche's aims is in itself almost sufficient to ensure the immediate rejection of his teaching, not only by every Christian, but by every man of ordinary common

[1] *Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Germany.* By H. L. Stewart, M.A. (Oxon.), D.Ph. London: Edward Arnold. 7s. 6d. net.

sense. That teaching is especially repellent to Englishmen, for England is the country in which altruism has taken the deepest root. It was perhaps some perception of this fact that led Nietzsche, albeit he did not spare Junkerdom, or, indeed, any other class of society, whether in Germany or elsewhere, to pour forth all the vials of his wrath on everything English. The most eminent English thinkers found no grace in his eyes. John Stuart Mill was a "blockhead," and Darwin was "an intellectual plebeian, like all of his nation." It is probable, on the other hand, that most of the members of this plebeian nation will not care to inquire very curiously into the basis on which Nietzsche's philosophy rests. They will be content merely to exhibit some amazement that the nineteenth century of the Christian era could have produced so strange a moral and intellectual abortion. They may, however, ask for an explanation, and a fairly adequate explanation is not far to seek. For the last ten years of his life Nietzsche, who died in 1900, was avowedly insane. It scarcely requires Professor Stewart's masterly analysis of his doctrines and profound psychological knowledge to arrive at the conclusion that "he was more or less mad from first to last." There was madness in his family. His father died mad. A portrait of Nietzsche is given in his biography, which has been written by M. Daniel Halévy. The wild glance which gleams from the eye is that of a madman. The manner in which Nietzsche speaks of "the eternal joy of the future, the joy which also understands the joy of annihilating," the commendation which, amidst unmeasured abuse of everything else emanating from a Christian source, he applies to the savage idea of Tertullian that one of the special joys of

the blessed will be to witness the tortures of the damned, and the insistence with which he dwells on the "sense of satisfaction" to be derived from the infliction of cruelty, come perilously near the ravings of a homicidal maniac. Moreover, the atmosphere of gloomy pessimism which Nietzsche shed around him scarcely harmonizes with a condition of complete sanity. He did, indeed, vigorously deny that he was a pessimist, and in order to evade the logical consequence of his own doctrines he invented the "extraordinary hypothesis," as Professor Stewart calls it, of the "Eternal Return," an idea which appears to have some rather far-fetched analogy with the Pythagorean doctrine of the transmigration of souls, and with the actual Brahminical and Buddhist teaching of the present time. But, for all that, ultra-pessimism was in reality the keynote of all his thoughts and of all his conduct. Thomas Love Peacock, in *Nightmare Abbey*, makes one of his characters, who is meant to be a caricature of Byron, say to his friends: "Let us all be unhappy together." Nietzsche, although not wanting in affection for his friends and relations, appears in social life to have acted somewhat on this principle. As he advanced in life the gloom deepened. Death and dissentiment of opinion severed him from his friends. There is a melancholy pathos in the terms in which he wrote to his sister. "A 'profound' man has need of friends, at least if he has no God. I have neither God nor friends."

But however much the average Englishman may be inclined to dismiss Nietzsche and his philosophy from his mind with the reflection that the man was mad, ardent seekers after truth will require some more satisfying reply to his subversive teaching. That some such reply should

be given is all the more necessary owing to the fact that the English mind generally has no natural bent towards metaphysics. Indeed, large numbers even of educated Englishmen are inclined to agree with Jowett that only such a limited knowledge of metaphysics is necessary as "will enable the mind to get rid of them." It is probable that there are but few people in this country who have read the whole of Nietzsche's voluminous works. Professor Stewart has, therefore, done a real service alike to the thinker, the practical politician, and the general reader by giving them a brief but singularly lucid sketch of Nietzsche's philosophy, and by exposing the fallacies of his reasoning. It is eminently satisfactory to learn on such high authority that Nietzsche was a very incompetent metaphysician. He had "all the vices of the amateur; in particular, he had the vice of hurry, and he had the vice of seeking some *one* principle by which all conduct should be explained." Neither was he more competent as a psychologist than he was as a metaphysician. His psychology of motive is "utterly wrong." Even those who are neither metaphysicians nor psychologists can readily grasp the force of Professor Stewart's argument that "even from a psychology that is right no ethic can automatically follow. An investigation of the impulses which, as a matter of fact, we have obeyed, cannot inform us which of these impulses we *should* obey." This plain common-sense argument cuts at the root of the whole of Nietzsche's pseudo-philosophy.

From the point of view both of the politician and of the general reader, perhaps the most interesting and important portion of Professor Stewart's work is that in which he dwells on the extent to which Nietzsche's philosophy has pene-

trated German thought and has influenced German action. But before dealing with this point it will be desirable to explain somewhat more fully why it is that that philosophy is wholly subversive of the foundations on which modern society may be said to rest.

Attacks on Christianity from atheists, agnostics, pantheists, and others have been common enough in the past, but up to the present time the Christian moral code has been generally accepted and respected even by those who do not profess the Christian faith. It has been held that, although possibly the world might abandon Christianity, it could never, from a moral point of view, advance beyond it. The thoughtful Moslem will argue that he can attain to as high a standard of morality as the Christian, but through a different channel. The pantheist will not contest the excellence of the Christian moral ideals, but will inveigh against what he considers the intolerance of holding that those ideals constitute a Christian monopoly. Nietzsche bids avaunt to all such processes of ratiocination. His attacks against the sceptic Strauss are as vigorous as those which he directs against Christian priests and ministers. Strauss was "a coward, a timid thinker who stops half way, a weakling afraid to face public opinion." Nietzsche was a sufficiently acute logician to see that Christian morality was the citadel of Christianity itself, and that if the latter was to be destroyed, the former must in the first instance be undermined. He held that "it was not the dogma which at first won acceptance for the morality, but the morality which won acceptance for the dogma." Hence, whilst avowedly atheistical, and whilst preaching that "the greatest modern event is this, that God is dead," his main efforts

were directed to showing that the Christian "workshop of virtue positively reeks." For nearly two thousand years Christian ways of thinking had "obscured the real issue between a high and low humanity." The outcome of Christianity was that low types of character flourished, contemptible qualities were encouraged, and the higher impulses of man were strangled at their birth. Nietzsche, who had no wish to pose as a mere ethical Nihilist, found himself necessarily constrained to substitute some other standard for the moral code which he wished to obliterate. He announced the leading tenet of the new code in the following terms: "Humanity must always act so as to evolve men of genius; it has no other task." He, therefore, advocated the odious theory that "will to power" should be the sole guiding principle for the regulation of human conduct. This, in plain English, meant that in the struggle for life every man was to be a law unto himself, and that the devil might take the hindmost. Eventually the "superman"—that is to say, the strongest and most forceful character—was to reign supreme. All weaklings who stood in his way were to be crushed out of existence. The whole end of humanity was to produce a small residuum of supermen. "The glory of man is that he is no end, but a means." The superman would almost certainly be an aristocrat, not by reason of his birth, albeit heredity was one of the bases on which Nietzsche's fantastic philosophy rested, nor by reason of his intellectual attainments, for "intellect alone did not ennoble," but because the aristocracy were more likely than any other class to furnish individuals sufficiently strong and sufficiently unscrupulous to exalt themselves above their fellow-creatures

by the sheer exercise of ruthless force. Supermen, fortunately for the rest of the world, have been few and far between. But some have existed. Napoleon, for instance, was "the incarnation of the noble ideal itself." It was a great blessing for what Nietzsche called the "gregarious Europeans" of his day to find in him an absolute ruler "in whom the ruling instincts culminated." Were Nietzsche now alive he would possibly regard the present Kaiser as a superman, although, in some respects, that autocratic ruler hardly comes up to the prescribed standard so much as some of those who stand behind his throne. It may be conjectured, Professor Stewart acutely remarks, "how bellicose that group must be in which William II. is the apostle of peace."

It is obvious that Nietzsche's teaching, even if it did not gain general acceptance, must have contributed to that moral collapse in Germany which has been one of the most extraordinary, and also one of the most tragic, events of modern times. But how far has his influence reached? To what extent is the shameless mendacity of the German learned classes and the cruelty of German soldiers due to Nietzsche's teaching? The question has received various answers. Nietzsche contradicted himself over and over again. His reasoning, though at times acute, was often very incoherent and slipshod. The result is that, by tearing passages from his writings without considering their context or their general tendency, he may be proved to have been alike a warm adherent or a sturdy opponent of German latter-day methods. One thing, however, is certain. It is that from at least the days of Frederick the Great Prussian statesmanship has been conducted on principles very much akin to those advocated by Nietzsche.

What the latter did was to convert a large body of the German public to the views previously held by the statesmen. The case could not be better stated than in Professor Stewart's words.

" Nietzsche's power," he says, " has not been exercised over the masses that he despised, nor over the academic philosophers at whom he railed ; but it has been potent in a circle which wields a far more decisive influence over public affairs. A huge proportion of the German middle-class passes through the closely associated training of the University and the military corps ; it is here that the strongest public opinion is nurtured, and it is here that Nietzsche has been acclaimed a prophet. He has been the herald of a new order to the German student and to the German army cadet. They are not so stupid as not to see that with all his scolding he is their spiritual kinsman. To the eager, hot youth of the country he has translated into philosophical terms the story of the Fatherland's past ; he has fired the imagination with a creed which sees only two possibilities, *Weltmacht oder Niedergang*. What the statesmen of Berlin had for generations been whispering into one another's ears in secret Nietzsche has proclaimed upon the housetops ; he inspired the thought that the unscrupulous selfishness which Prussia had plainly practised, and the ruthlessness which had marked the campaigns of her troops, were not something to be ashamed of, but something to be gloried in ; he cast the halo of an intellectual vindication round the methods of aggression which the bureaucracy had followed, but which they had formerly thought it desirable to mask before the public opinion of Europe."

One of the reasons why we are now at war is to prevent the philosophy of Nietzsche from becoming one of the main principles which will serve to guide the future course of progress and civilization.

XI

PAN-GERMANISM [1]

Spectator," September 25, 1915

EVEN after more than a year of war there are still visible some lamentable national symptoms, such as the enforcement of untimely Trade Union rules and the narrow-minded dislike displayed to the employment of women and unskilled labour in British factories, which seem to indicate that some sections of the community are not as yet fully alive to the importance of all the issues at stake in the present contest. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, it may be said that the British public have at last woke up from the deep lethargy in which they were steeped before the war, and which was due partly to the culpable silence of responsible statesmen, who gave no adequate warning of the impending danger, and partly to the fact that many of their natural leaders steadfastly refused to accept any evidence save that which led up to their own foregone and wholly incorrect conclusions. However slow the mass of the people of this country may be to grasp any new general idea with which they are unfamiliar, they experienced no difficulty in understanding what " militarism " meant, or

[1] *Le Pangermanisme.* Par Ch. Andler, Professeur à l'Université de Paris. Paris : Librairie Armand Colin. 0 fr. 50 c.

what was the significance of "frightfulness." The former term quickened into life that intense dislike of military rule which has become a deeply rooted national tradition. The latter, when it took the form of bombarding unfortified towns, sinking unarmed merchantmen, and slaughtering women and children, woke up all that generous and whole-hearted disgust for cruelty in all its forms which is one of the best characteristics of contemporaneous public opinion in humanitarian England. There is, however, another feature of German policy the nature of which is possibly not yet generally understood either in England or in America. It may be doubted whether the British or American public fully realize the true aims of German ambition, or the extent to which the realization of those aims would affect the interests both of their own countries and of every other country in the world. A few years ago a talented Frenchman, M. Chéradame, endeavoured to explain the real meaning of the Pan-Germanic movement. His work did not attract all the attention it deserved. It was published at a time when the extent to which Germany had in thought cut herself off from the community of civilized nations was not as yet fully realized. Another Frenchman, Professor Andler, of the University of Paris, has now taken up the treatment of this subject. It will be well to make an attempt to familiarize the public with some of the leading facts set forth in Professor Andler's very able and interesting pamphlet. It embodies the collective opinions of a considerable number of very distinguished French savants.

It is impossible to understand the French Revolution without taking into account the teaching of those philosophers who heralded its advent. It has often been remarked that the

origin of almost every law passed in the early stages of the Revolutionary period may be distinctly traced to the ideas propagated by Rousseau. Similarly, the utterances of the swarm of German professors and others who for many years past have been ardently preaching the gospel of Pan-Germanism afford the true key to the explanation of the recent political programme adopted by German statesmen. Officials have naturally been somewhat more reticent than their unofficial supporters. Nevertheless, the language which the former have at times employed has been sufficiently explicit. Prince Bülow said publicly in 1904: "The King must be at the head of Prussia; Prussia at the head of Germany; and Germany at the head of the universe." Moreover, he testified to the fact that the Pan-German League, which represents the most extreme form of German Chauvinism, had deserved great credit for the manner in which it had "stimulated and evoked national sentiment." More recently, the time having come when there was no longer any need to wear a mask, the Kaiser announced in a General Order to his troops, of which copies were found in the possession of prisoners taken by the Russians, that "the sole object of the war was to ensure the triumph of that Great Germany, which was to dominate all Europe." In this utterance the Kaiser was too modest. It cannot be doubted that the aim of the rulers of the future "Great Germany" is to dominate, not only the whole of Europe, but also the whole of the world.

List may be said to have been the real originator of the political programme which the German Government is now endeavouring to carry out, but the extent to which both his methods and the sentiments which he entertained

towards other countries differed from those of the modern Pan-Germanists is sufficiently illustrated by the following extract from his work entitled *Insular Supremacy*. Writing before the abolition of the Corn Laws, he bitterly attacked the then existing commercial policy of England, but he added : " How vain do the efforts of those appear to us who have striven to found their universal dominion on military power compared with the attempt of England. . . . Let us then congratulate ourselves on the immense progress of that [the English] nation, and wish her prosperity for all future time."

In 1892 and subsequent years, German Chauvinism, which had, of course, received a great stimulus from the astounding successes achieved against Austria in 1866 and France in 1870, took the form of proposing to establish a gigantic Customs Union, which was to include all the States of Central Europe, and which was to be especially directed against the commercial policy of the United States as conceived by Mr. McKinley. The programme speedily broadened out from commercial union to territorial acquisition. It was pointed out by one Pan-Germanist (Fritz Bley) that it was absurd to leave maritime Flanders in the possession of a race so " physically and intellectually inferior " as the French, and that this rich province, which had been most iniquitously torn from the flank of Germany by the predatory Turenne, ought to return to its original owners. The possession of Holland, which country had been " fertilized by German blood," was also necessary to Germany. Moreover, the Dutch would readily perceive that it was in their own interests to fall in with German views. Did they not need some adequate security against British aggression ? As for Belgium,

Mr. E. Seelmann observed that Charlemagne did not massacre all the Saxons. On the contrary, a number of them were deported to the banks of the Meuse. Their descendants were obviously German. A *Saxonia Irredenta*, therefore, existed, which was pining for reunion to her German Motherland. A learned economist, Ernst von Halle, indignantly asked whether, both from an economic and geographical point of view, it was not "monstrous" that the mouths of the Rhine and the Danube, which were so singularly fitted by Nature to play an important part in the exchange of German produce with that of other countries, should be in the hands of strangers. Russia would, of course, have to be pushed back. She must be made to give up all the territories assigned to her in 1815, which had been most unjustly "lost to Prussia." There were, Paul de Lagarde pointed out, huge tracts of Russian territory which would serve admirably, not merely to satisfy the territorial ambitions of many minor German Princes, but as homes for the redundant proletariat of Germany. The Poles, as also the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, would have to be transported elsewhere, their places being taken by German colonists. According to Professor Hasse, a military "glacis" ought to be formed all round the German Empire. It should consist of a broad belt of country to be inhabited solely by soldiers retired from the German Army. Thus Germany would be preserved from the contagion of her neighbours. It might be possible to come to some amicable arrangement with France, for the French could not fail to recognize the truth of Max Harden's proposition that the limits in which Germany was confined after the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 were far too narrow to satisfy her require-

ments. France could be afforded a guarantee that her African Empire would be secured to her. She might be able to reduce those naval and military armaments which weighed so seriously on her resources. She might even secure the services of some admirable German commercial organizers and agents. In return, Germany would obtain possession of certain colonies, and would, as a preliminary to the Mediterranean becoming a German lake, be allowed to construct a "German Gibraltar" in the neighbourhood of Toulon. If this arrangement was considered somewhat too leonine, Friedrich Lange was ready with an answer. It must always be understood, he explained, that if nations were to be asked to contribute towards maintaining the peace of the world, it was for others to immolate themselves, and that only as a very last resource should any sacrifices be demanded of the people of Germany.

The intense egotism of the programme put forward by the Pan-Germanists is probably best illustrated by the treatment which it was suggested should be accorded to Austria, the scorned handmaid of Germany. The services of that country could, indeed, be for a time utilized to act as a rampart against Slav aggression, but any arrangement of this nature could only be temporary. Austria, Friedrich Lange explained, was after all, "a political abortion, the petrified residuum of a confusion of Babylonian languages." Hungary was a mere "bundle of impossibilities." It was necessary, Paul de Lagarde said, that all the "lamentable nationalities" which constituted the Empire of Austria should be eventually submerged by the flowing German tide. Austria, Hasse thought, had been far too liberally treated in 1866. She ought to have been made to cede Bohemia and Moravia. The time was inevitably

approaching when Germany would have to "lay a strong hand on the ruins of the Hapsburg State."

As for Turkey, it was obvious that by the non-fulfilment of certain engagements contracted at Berlin in 1878 the Turks had sacrificed whatever international rights they might otherwise have possessed. The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire might, it is true, lead to a European conflagration, but, none the less, Germany must not hesitate. To her must fall the lion's share of the spoil. "God will never abandon a true German." Pastor Naumann, who accompanied the Kaiser to the Holy Land, did not think it inconsistent with his duty as a minister of the Christian religion to urge that Germany should remain "politically indifferent" to such things as Armenian massacres. It was not a part of Germany's duty to encourage Christian missions. The main thing was to remember that the heritage of the Sultan would shortly be thrown on to the political market. Germany must be prepared to acquire the greater part of it, notably the whole of Asia Minor. Other Pan-Germanists urged that the possession of Crete was "a vital question" for Germany, and that "a sane egotism" (*ein gesunder nationaler Egoismus*) could scarcely do less than demand the cession of that island and also of Armenia. The German Empire, Hasse maintained, must extend from the Baltic to the Persian Gulf. All foreign influence should be rigorously excluded from the whole of this vast territory. Anton Sprenger plaintively asked how it could be explained that Mesopotamia, the site of the Garden of Eden, as also Syria, were not in German hands.

Paul Rohrbach urged, as a first step towards the creation of an African Empire, that the

Belgian and Portuguese possessions in Africa should be acquired. After that had been done England would be inclined to make concessions in Egypt and elsewhere. The whole of Morocco must, of course, fall to Germany, either by the employment of force, as Max Harden suggested, or by gradual and persistent pressure on the French, who, Joachim von Bülow pointed out, were " a decadent nation." In fact, everywhere colonial expansion was to be effected by the adoption of two alternative methods. These were infiltration, or, if that did not suffice, the use of violence.

Both of these methods were to be adopted in America. Professor Unold, after a tour through the Republics of South America, informed the Reichstag that everywhere he had found distinct traces of Germanism. Charles V. had granted Venezuela as a fief to an Augsburg family named Welser. Thus Venezuela manifestly belonged to Germany. Moreover, a member of the Welser family had been decapitated in 1546. Was it not monstrous that his death had not yet been avenged ? The Fuggers, the celebrated bankers of Augsburg, whom Michelet thought changed the face of the world by supplying Charles V. with funds, had also been granted a charter placing them in possession of a large tract of country in the neighbourhood of the Straits of Magellan. Why was this charter to be treated as a mere " scrap of paper " ? As regards Brazil, Alfred Funke contented himself with putting forward the wholly ridiculous proposal that special representation should be accorded in the Brazilian Parliament to German residents. But this relatively moderate programme was far from satisfying the more extreme Pan-Germanists. All these South American Republics must, Lange

thought, be brought into the German fold, either with their own consent or by the use of force. Another Pan-Germanist, Josef Reimer, pointed out that they would be all the more willing to listen to reason inasmuch as their own interests indicated the necessity of obtaining strong support against their "natural enemies," the United States.

In North America, a somewhat different note was sounded. Professor Julius Goebel, of the University of Illinois, dwelt on the fact that England was the natural enemy of the United States, and that the work of extending civilization was really entrusted to the people of Germany and America, more especially, in the case of the latter country, to the German-Americans. The fear expressed by Benjamin Franklin that America would some day be Germanized was based on very substantial grounds. Germanization, Professor Goebel held, must in the end certainly ensue.

When, however, Pan-Germanism had extended its tentacles over Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, there would still be a fifth continent which would be left un-Germanized. Was Australasia to remain outside the fold? Emil Jung, an Austrian writer, answered this question with a decisive negative. It was foolishly thought that the Australians, who have recently shed their blood like water in resisting German aggression, would be readily persuaded to assert their independence, and to inflict an incurable wound on their Motherland—*Aeternumque daret matri sub pectore volnus.* When this happened it was essential that Germany should be prepared to step into the lapsed heritage of England.

These are not, as might readily be surmised, the ravings of the inmates of some lunatic asylum.

They are the deliberately expressed opinions of men of unquestionable learning. They are the outpourings of what Wordsworth called " sapient Germany," whose wisdom seems to have evaporated under the intoxicating influence of the *cupido regnandi*—the lust for acquiring power for its own sake.

Miss Durham, in one of her graphic accounts of life in the Near East, relates how an Albanian explained to her why his countrymen murdered men but spared women. The reason was that women could not defend themselves, whereas it was obviously necessary to shoot a man for the very simple reason that, as he was armed, he could not be robbed until he had been first murdered. This naïf and acutely logical savage unconsciously gave Miss Durham a brief but by no means inaccurate epitome of Prussian State ethics and Prussian political morality as interpreted by some of the foremost exponents of that false code of civilization termed German *Kultur*. Nevertheless, in spite of all these very frank utterances, so hardy is the belief of many Germans in the credulity of the world, and especially in that of the British and American public, that we are still at times asked to believe that the Germans are a much-maligned people, and that they are led by a ruler whose true title to greatness is that he is a " Prince of Peace."

XII

GERMANIA MENDAX [1]

"*Spectator*," *October* 9, 1915

AMIDST the abundant war literature of the day, no publication calls for more serious consideration, both from the public and the leading politicians of this country, than the scathing indictment framed against Germany by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Report of Lord Bryce's Committee, which has practically remained unanswered, has already familiarized the public with the proceedings of the German Army in Belgium. The French Report shows that the brutality of those proceedings was rivalled by the conduct of the German troops in France. But the French Report does more than this. It brings vividly home to the mind of any one who reflects on its contents the extreme gravity and perplexity of the problems which will have to be discussed when the war is over, and the enormous difficulties which will have to be encountered before any satisfactory solution of those problems can be found. Two conclusions may confidently be drawn from the French statement. Both rest on incontrovertible evidence

[1] *Germany's Violations of the Laws of War*, 1914–15. Compiled under the auspices of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Translated, with an Introduction, by J. O. P. Bland. London: William Heinemann. 5s. net.

—in many cases on the testimony of German officers and soldiers. The first of these conclusions is that Germany's violation of all her most recent and solemn engagements has been flagrant. The second is that these breaches of good faith are the result of a policy deliberately adopted by the German Government. This latter point is, as Mr. Bland says in his preface to the English translation, "all-important." The flimsy apologies offered by the German authorities for their own behaviour are wholly based on allegations, which are advanced without a shadow of proof, that the Allies were themselves neglectful of treaty obligations, and that, therefore, retaliation was in self-defence not only justifiable but also necessary. That individual French, English, or Belgian soldiers may have committed acts which are worthy of blame is both possible and probable. There must be many men fighting on both sides who never heard of the Conventions framed at Geneva and elsewhere, or who, even if they had heard of them, had not the moral sense of duty which would have enforced obedience to their provisions. Amidst the whirlwind of passions evoked by the present contest, it can be no matter for surprise that, in individual cases, all sense of the distinction between right and wrong should for the time being have been quenched. But it is absurd to contend that the occurrence of isolated cases of this sort, which are part of the inevitable horrors of war, affords any sufficient plea for the systematic violation of treaty engagements of which the German Government and the highest German military authorities have certainly been guilty. Moreover, although the truth of the accusation is obviously incapable of being absolutely proved, there is very good reason for holding that the moral guilt of the

German Government is of even a deeper dye than is to be inferred from the actual violation of its engagement. A very strong suspicion exists that those engagements were taken with what casuists call a mental reserve that they need not and would not be respected. In 1902 a manual was issued to the German Army under the authority of the General Staff in which German officers were expressly warned against adopting the "humanitarian ideas" embodied in the Geneva, Brussels, and Hague Conventions, and it was urged that "custom and the hereditary tradition of the German Army" were safer guides for conduct than provisions elaborated in time of peace by "jurists." The German Government has, indeed, so far repudiated these doctrines as to recognize that atonement may be made for any violation of the Hague rules by pecuniary payments, but no amended edition of the manual has ever been issued, nor has it been replaced by any new manual. A few instances will suffice to show that the violation of treaty obligations has been not casual or accidental, but systematic.

The Hague Convention explicitly forbids the slaughter of prisoners or the issue of orders directing that no quarter shall be given. In the face of this engagement the German General Stenger issued the following order:

> From and after to-day no more prisoners are to be taken. All prisoners are to be massacred. The wounded, whether with or without arms, are to be killed off. Even when prisoners are in regularly constituted units they are to be killed. No living enemy must be left behind us.

The testimony of German prisoners shows that this order was ruthlessly obeyed. A note-book found in the possession of a German

non-commissioned officer contains the following entry :

> We had to camp at Kessel (to the east of Antwerp). The captain called us round him and said : " In the fort we are going to take there will very probably be English soldiers. But I don't wish to see any English prisoners with my company." A general Bravo ! of approval was the answer.

It is impossible to read without shuddering the accounts given in the French Report of the manner in which both prisoners and wounded men were deliberately murdered. The conduct of the German soldiers contrasts very unfavourably with that of the French troops during the early stages of the Revolutionary Wars, who, to their infinite credit, absolutely refused to obey the brutal orders issued by Barrère that no English prisoners were to be taken.

The Hague Convention lays down in very express terms that the inhabitants of a country who take up arms to resist an invading force are to be treated as belligerents, and, further, that family honour and rights, individual life, and private property are to be respected. The manner in which this provision was interpreted by the German authorities is sufficiently illustrated by what took place at Reims. Hostages were taken. The population were warned that they must " remain absolutely quiet, and refrain from attempting in any way to take part in the battle." The following notice was then issued :

> On the slightest attempt at disorder these hostages will be hanged. In the same way, should any violation occur of the instructions above laid down, the city will be entirely or partially burnt and its inhabitants hanged.

The note-book of a German soldier who had been fighting in Belgium contains the following entry : " The King having directed the people

to defend the country by all possible means, we have received orders to shoot the entire male population." M. Charles Barbe, a French officer of the police, thus describes the proceedings of the Bavarian troops at Nomeny :

> Some German soldiers fired at all the passers-by ; they killed a child, to me unknown, which could not have been more than two years of age. I saw this child, clad in a red-and-white striped dress ; it fell stone dead. I also saw a woman sixty years of age killed in her garden, an invalid who had come out to get a little fresh air.

M. Georges Munier, another French police officer, after dwelling on a number of murders committed by the German troops, adds :

> These massacres had all the appearance of being regularly organized. The Germans proceeded as follows : First, they forbade any one from going into the streets on any pretext whatsoever. Then, when all the inhabitants had taken refuge in their cellars, they set fire to the houses. Those who had taken refuge were thus compelled to come out again, when they were shot at sight.

The Geneva Convention provides that field ambulances and the fixed establishments of the Army Medical Service should be respected and protected by the belligerents. In defiance of this engagement, ambulances flying the Red Cross flag have been deliberately made the targets of the German troops. French medical officers and their assistants have been treated with the utmost brutality.

The Hague Convention expressly forbids the use of " bullets which spread or flatten out easily in the human body." The German General Staff have publicly notified that, " notwithstanding the provisions of the Geneva Convention, the German troops will henceforward make use of

dum-dum bullets, because the French and English troops have been the first to do so." This latter statement is unsupported by any sort of proof.

The use of asphyxiating gases, flame projectors, and burning liquids also constitutes flagrant violations of the provisions of the Hague Convention.

The attack or bombardment of undefended towns and villages is also expressly forbidden, and it is enjoined that historic buildings, places of public worship, etc., should, so far as is possible, be spared. In spite of this injunction, bombs have been dropped promiscuously on towns which are wholly undefended, thereby causing the deaths of a large number of non-combatants, including many women and children. As for historic buildings, the views of the highest German military authorities may be gathered from the contents of a letter which General von Disfurth wrote to the *Tag*. "If all the monuments and all the masterpieces of architecture which stand between our guns and those of the enemy were blown to the devil," the General says, "we should not care a straw. The thing is not worth a moment's discussion."

The Hague Convention also lays down that "a belligerent is forbidden to compel the subjects of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country." The following testimony of a Bavarian officer (Oberleutnant Eberlein) will show the extent to which this engagement has been respected:

> We arrested three other civilians and then I had a brilliant idea. We gave them chairs and we then ordered them to go and sit out in the middle of the street. . . . The flank-fire from the houses quickly diminished, so that we were able to occupy the opposite house and thus dominate the principal street. Every living being who

showed himself in the street was shot. . . . Later on I learned that the regiment of reserve which entered Saint-Dié further to the north had tried the same experiment. The four civilians whom they had compelled, in the same way, to sit out in the street, were killed by French bullets.

Moreover, French prisoners, and even women and children, have on many occasions been deliberately used as screens to protect the German troops.

As for the "family honour" to which the Hague Convention enjoins respect, all that need be said is that in France, as in Belgium, the most brutal outrages on women have been of frequent occurrence.

The conclusion to be drawn from all these facts is that when the Allies come to discuss the terms of peace they will be treating with a Government and a nation who in the past have shown the most cynical disregard for all the engagements which they have taken, and that, therefore, no sort of reliance can be placed on any engagements which they may take for the future. The gravity of the case is greatly enhanced by the attitude which neutral nations who were parties to the Hague and other Conventions have assumed during the war. No general protest has been made against the conduct of the German Government. Notably, in spite of the great sympathy displayed in the United States for the cause of the Allies, the American Government has carefully abstained from any action save that dictated by purely American interests. The extreme reluctance of neutrals to interfere constitutes in itself a strong *prima-facie* proof that the suggestion, frequently put forward, that for the future some sort of concerted international action should be arranged to prevent wars is of very doubtful utility. It

is useless to frame a law unless some penalties can be imposed in case of its infringement. All the suggestions based on international action which have so far been made break down on the point that no practical means can be devised for enforcing respect for international decisions.

Mr. Bland apparently sees the difficulty involved in this aspect of the case. "Only by a systematic process of education," he says, "can the principles embodied in the Hague Conventions become a vital force in the world. . . . It will not suffice to defeat Germany in war. Unless and until a strong moral reaction against Junkerdom can be brought about in the soul of her people, humanity will be compelled to stand on guard against its ever-recurring treasons, stratagems, and spoils." This may be, and probably is, quite true; but if so, the difficulty of providing for the immediate future becomes all the more apparent. Education is a slow process. We shall have to wait for at least a generation before it can produce any decisive result. It may, however, be noted as a symptom from which some comfort may be derived that the French statement shows that in some cases individual Germans are alive to the iniquities which have been committed, and are ashamed of the conduct of their own countrymen. Thus, one German soldier writes:

> Together with the righteous anger of our troops, a spirit of pure vandalism exists. In villages which are already completely deserted they set fire to the houses just as the spirit moves them. My heart grieves for the inhabitants. It may be that they make use of treacherous weapons, but if so, after all, they are only defending their country.

Another makes the following entry in his notebook: "This method of making war is absolutely

barbarous. I wonder how we can have the face to rail at the conduct of the Russians when we are behaving much worse in France; at every opportunity, on one pretext or another, we pillage and burn." A third writes: "There is really some truth in all the talk about German barbarians."

In the meanwhile, the broad fact which will have to be faced when the war is over is that there will still be some sixty millions of very warlike and highly educated people residing in the centre of Europe who have set up a standard of civilization utterly opposed to that received by the rest of the world, and whose public policy rests on a foundation of shameless mendacity. For the time being there can be but one solid security against the menace which the existence of such a nation constitutes to its neighbours. It consists in crippling its warlike strength to such an extent as to render it impotent for at least a generation. If this is done, time will be afforded for education and moral influences to produce an effect, and it may be hoped that eventually the German nation will recover from the fit of insanity into which, under the *oestrus* of an arrogant sense of power and a boundless ambition, it has for the time being lapsed. We must continue the war until this object has been achieved.

XIII

GERMAN MILITARY ETHICS

"The National Review," November 1915.

PROFESSOR ANDLER of the Sorbonne, who recently showed, out of the mouths of German witnesses, all that is implied in the term Pan-Germanism, has now written an interesting treatise on what may be called the psychology of the German General Staff.[1] The theory and practice of "frightfulness" came as sudden revelations to a bewildered and horror-stricken world. There would have been less surprise if the public of this and of other civilized countries had been more familiar with German literature, and had followed with a greater degree of attention the development of German thought. For, in truth, "frightfulness" is no plant which has grown up with mushroom-like rapidity during the present war. On the contrary, like almost everything else of German origin, it is the outcome of a philosophy based on scientific or, it would perhaps be more correct to say, on pseudo-scientific principles, which has, in the first instance, been taught by the leaders of German thought, and has then gradually taken possession

[1] *Les Usages de la Guerre et la doctrine de l'État-Major Allemand.* Par Professor Charles Andler. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1fr. 25c. An English translation of this work by Mr. Bernard Miall has been published by Messrs. T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd.

of the minds of the whole army—a word which, as has been frequently and truthfully explained by Prince von Bülow and other politicians, is in Germany synonymous with that of the nation.

The originator of the political programme which the German Government is now endeavouring to carry out was the economist List, albeit the methods which he contemplated differed widely from those which have actually been adopted. The father of German military ethics was Clausewitz, the most eminent of the pupils of Scharnhorst. Outside the ranks of those officers of the army who have made a study of the art of war, the works of Clausewitz are probably but little known in this country. He is generally regarded as one who taught strategy and tactics, but he was, in reality, much more than a strategist or a tactician. He was a political philosopher who may be said to have laid down a code dealing with the general principles upon which war should be conducted. Clausewitz died in 1831. His theories were developed in two remarkable articles which appeared in the *Deutsche Rundschau* in 1877–78, entitled "Military Necessity and Humanity" (*Militaerische Notwendigkeit und Humanitat*), which were written by Julius von Hartmann, a Hanoverian general who was born in 1817 and died in 1878. They were adopted by Field-Marshal von Moltke. They served as the inspiration to some of Prince Bismarck's most characteristically "blood-and-iron" utterances. They were finally embodied in a handbook issued by the German General Staff in 1902 and entitled *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*, and they have recently found practical expression in various bloodthirsty proclamations issued by Generals

Stenger, Bülow, von der Goltz, and other German commanders during the present war.

The German mind, even in its manifestations of the most extreme savagery, always gravitates towards idealism. The German is not, like the Englishman, content to adopt a practice without searching minutely for any reason, beyond the most ordinary common sense, for its adoption. His *Weltanschauung* may be, and often is, altogether wrong. It may be, and often is, opposed to ideas generally accepted by the rest of the civilized world. It may be, and often is, based on a false process of ratiocination, whose sophistry could be pierced by any ordinary schoolboy. It may be, and often is, a mere cloak which worldly wisdom dictates should be used to hide the crude egotism of national aspirations, the arrogance of intellectual pride, or the true aims of a boundless ambition. Nevertheless, the German is not happy unless he has an *Anschauung* of one sort or another. He may occasionally, as when in a moment of forgetfulness Prince Bülow recognized that the invasion of Belgium was a flagrant violation of treaty rights, lapse into stating a bald, unvarnished truth, but more frequently, when he is about to commit a crime against the received canons of civilization, he wishes to throw a veil of abstract philosophy over his criminality. Clausewitz and those who followed him have, therefore, clothed "frightfulness" with an idealistic garment. Their main contention is that the ideal of the Swiss jurist Bluntschli and others, who have endeavoured from time to time to mitigate the horrors of war, is altogether false, that there may be war between civilized nations, but that to speak of "civilizing war" involves a contradiction in terms, and, indeed, that the phrase is scarcely intelligible. They

hold that when war is declared all the ordinary rules of society which obtain in time of peace are suspended, that an abnormal situation is created, and that the use of force, and of nothing but force, in every direction becomes legitimate. Moreover, they consider that the substitution of the war for the peace ideal is ennobling. "Whoever," General von Hartmann said, "has traversed a battlefield and has shuddered at all the horrors hé has witnessed, finds a new sense of vigour and elevation in the thought that there all the tragic gravity of military necessity has reigned supreme, and that legitimate passion has duly performed its task." So far, therefore, from endeavouring to "civilize" war, it should be made as brutal as possible. The conduct of war, Moltke thought, should not be "hampered by any theoretical obstacles," but it is worthy of note that the reasons given for the adoption of this doctrine by the German militarists are somewhat contradictory. Whilst some argue that, in the interests of humanity, war should be brutalized in order that it may all the more speedily be concluded, others, on the contrary, maintain that war is a laudable object in itself irrespective of the special reasons for which it is waged, and that without war the civilization of the world would stagnate. The utterances of Moltke, in spite of his acutely logical mind, are on this point somewhat ambiguous. Writing in March 1879 to a philanthropic friend, named Hanschild, who advocated a general disarmament, he said: "No improvement in the present state of things is to be expected until all people recognize that any war, even one which terminates in victory, is a national misfortune." But nine months later he expressed himself in a letter to Bluntschli in the following terms: "Perpetual

peace is a dream and, moreover, not a beautiful dream. War is part of the universal order of things instituted by God. A war brings forth all the most noble qualities of man, courage and abnegation, fidelity to duty, and a spirit of self-sacrifice carried to the extent of incurring the risk of death." As, however, all roads lead to Rome, so also the processes of reasoning adopted by the German militarists, whether they be of the purely military or of the pseudo-humanitarian type, all lead to the same conclusion, namely, that the first duty of a nation at war is to conquer, and that in order to achieve that result all methods are justifiable.

The fundamental conception of Clausewitz, on which the whole of his doctrine rests, is that the methods adopted in the conduct of every war recorded in history are the outcome of contemporaneous thought and social conditions (*Jede Zeit hat ihre eigenen Kriege*), that up to the time when he wrote these methods had been "imperfect," inasmuch as they had been obliged to conform to the dictates of an ephemeral and ill-informed public opinion, and that an endeavour should be made to attain to an ideal state of things, which he termed "absolute war"—in other words, war whose ruthlessness was not to be tempered by any considerations based on humanity, public morality, or compassion for the vanquished. The historical arguments which are used in the development of this theory are singularly instructive, inasmuch as they throw a flood of light on the morality of the Clausewitzian philosophy. During the contest in which we are now engaged, it has frequently been alleged that the adoption of German principles, whether in the political or the military spheres of action, would involve a return to mediaeval

ideas and practices. Clausewitz, however, looking back on the records of the past, came to the conclusion that his ideal had been most fully realized, not during the Middle Ages, but at the time when, under the influence of the fanatical Madame de Maintenon, Louvois instituted the world-famous dragonnades as a means to effect conversions to the Roman Catholic religion. There can, in fact, be no doubt that Louvois, albeit he left a stain on the national reputation of France upon which Michelet and other French historians have dwelt with remorse and contrition, acted in strict conformity with the principles advocated by the school of which Clausewitz was the originator and leading apostle. The Germans recognize that the exercise of mere brutality for its own sake is unjustifiable, not so much on account of the moral condemnation which it entails, as because it is useless. On the other hand, they hold that there is no limit to the brutality which may properly be employed during a war provided it contributes towards the achievement of its end. Louvois's aim was to annihilate Protestantism in the Palatinate. What, therefore, could be more natural and legitimate than that he should let loose squadrons of dragoons to massacre or otherwise maltreat all the Protestants in the province, and that he should instruct Marshal Boufflers that if the enemy burnt one friendly village he was, as a measure of retaliation, to burn ten of theirs ? If once the doctrine that, in all cases, the end justifies the means be accepted to its fullest extent, the logic is faultless. Of all the errors which may arise in the conduct of war, those which are due to sheer kindness of heart (*bonté d'âme*) are, Clausewitz thought, the most calculated to lead to disaster.

The eighteenth century was a "period of military and social decadence." A sad lapse from the ideal of "absolute war" took place. Fighting was confined to the armies in the field. War was conducted with a reprehensible regard for the interests of the non-combatant populations. For the most part they stood aside and were allowed to pursue their ordinary avocations without being molested, not perhaps to the extent revealed by the fact that a pack of foxhounds traversed the battlefield of Naseby in the previous century when the opposing armies were about to contend, but still enough to interfere with the full application of sound military principle. A "pedantic science" still held to the idea that the maltreatment of a hostile population was to be deprecated as it might lead to reprisals. The crushing blows inflicted by Frederick the Great at Rossbach and Leuthen failed "to awaken the slumbering century."

The French Revolution produced a salutary change. It unbridled the energies of nations. But the generals of the early Revolutionary period failed to make full use of their opportunities. They allowed themselves to be hampered in their actions by numerous "technical imperfections." Notably, they committed the lamentable error of either paying for forced requisitions levied on a hostile population, or at all events of acknowledging the debts which were due. It was not until Napoleon, for whom the German militarists have always professed the greatest admiration, stepped on the scene that a real step forward was taken in the direction of making war "absolute." He saw the advantages which could be derived from a total abandonment of the faulty principles which had been adopted in the past. He gave up all idea of supplying

his armies from their bases in France and caused them to live wholly on the hostile countries which they occupied. This plan met with the warmest approval both of Clausewitz and Moltke. Clausewitz, indeed, argued that there were two reasons why it was necessary to occupy the territory belonging to an enemy, even if there was no intention of rendering the occupation permanent. One was to levy contributions; the other was to devastate the country in order to cause loss to the enemy. "I do not like," he further added, "to hear of generals who are victorious without shedding blood." When Bluntschli suggested to Moltke that requisitions levied in an enemy's country should only be "proportionate to its resources," the latter at once expressed his unqualified dissent from this doctrine. Soldiers, he urged, underwent many hardships and privations. They could not content themselves with demands limited by restrictions of any kind. They must be allowed to take all that they wanted. This is the application of the principle of Clausewitz that in deciding on the amount of rigour with which an occupied province is to be treated no limit could be assigned until the point had been reached when the country is wholly "exhausted, impoverished and devastated."

General von Hartmann, who developed the doctrines of Clausewitz, went so far as to make what at first sight might appear to be some concessions to humanitarian ideas, but on closer examination it will be found that these concessions were quite valueless. He did, indeed, say that "murder, brutality, theft, accompanied with violence and pillage, were crimes in time of war as much as in time of peace," but almost in the same breath he pleaded that authorized

violence of every description used in order to achieve victory is perfectly justifiable. How, therefore, was the distinction to be made between what is permissible and what is forbidden ? The difficulty was obvious, all the more so because when the interests of humanity and of strategy came into collision the former would invariably have to yield to the latter. The general in command must be a law unto himself. He alone had the right to decide. All that could be done was to trust to the "chivalrous nature" of officers who, General von Hartmann thought, will, in the case of the German army, always act as "gentlemen." The conduct of many German officers during the war of 1870–71, and still more that displayed during the present contest, sufficiently testifies to the slight value which can be attached to this security. On the whole, we may cordially agree with General von Hartmann that if once the principles which he advocated are adopted, "it will be almost impossible in practice to distinguish between the two sorts of activity allowed to belligerents," that is to say, between permissible and forbidden violence. However much the sufferings of non-combatants may excite our pity, General von Hartmann bids us remember that every war now partakes of the nature of a national rising (*Volkskrieg*), that in such a case "terrorism becomes a first principle of military necessity," and that more especially it is essential to make no distinction between public and private property. Moreover, terrorism, he maintains, will really be a blessing in disguise, as it will enforce on the population of the hostile country a sense of its collective responsibility.

Prince Bismarck was, of course, a warm adherent of the doctrines of Clausewitz. He

blamed the German soldiers for the leniency with which they at times treated the French francs-tireurs. As regards the Turcos, who are regular troops, he said that it was contrary to all established rule to make any "negro prisoners." They were "bandits" and "abominable monsters" who ought to be massacred without the least hesitation. The slaughter of combatants was not, indeed, sufficient to appease Prince Bismarck's rage. "It will come to this," he said, "that we will shoot down every male inhabitant."[1] Curiously enough, he found some support for his savage propensities in an unexpected quarter. The American General Sheridan, who was attached to the German Headquarters in 1870, said that the right course to pursue was to "cause the inhabitants so much suffering that they might long for peace, and force the Government to demand it. The people must be left nothing but their eyes to weep with over the war." Prince Bismarck's biographer remarks that this seemed to him to be a "somewhat heartless" utterance, but he adds that the course proposed was "perhaps worthy of consideration."[2]

The rules laid down by the German General Staff in their handbook published in 1902 explain with a frankness which leaves nothing to be desired the manner in which the theories of Clausewitz and von Hartmann are to be applied. In the first place, the ground is at once cut away from under the feet of those who negotiated the Hague, Geneva, and Brussels Conventions by the explicit statement that the "German military authorities do not recognize the validity of any international conventions dealing with the laws

[1] *Bismarck.* By Dr. Moritz Busch, vol. i. p. 224.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 171.

of war." After deprecating the propagation of humanitarian ideas amongst the officers of the army, the broad principle is asserted that in time of war the end always justifies the means. Humanitarian considerations are only to be taken into account if they do not conflict with military necessity. In the case of the bombardment of a town, it is not by any means necessary to give warning beforehand that it is about to take place. The slaughter of prisoners is deprecated and should be of rare occurrence, but is none the less at times justifiable, as, for instance, when no means are forthcoming to guard them or when a sufficient amount of transport to enable them to be removed elsewhere is not available. Hostages to serve as securities for the good conduct of the civil population may be taken, and the practice of obliging them to expose their lives to danger is especially commended, inasmuch as experience has shown that the most happy results can be obtained by the adoption of this system. Also, the inhabitants of any country occupied by German troops may be made to work for their conquerors, the penalty of death being inflicted in case of refusal. Treacherous guides, even although any errors they may have committed are not wilful, are to be executed. The levy of war contributions is to be pitiless (*impitoyable*).

It will thus be seen that from the days of Clausewitz onwards an ever-ascending scale of ruthless brutality has characterized the utterances of responsible German authorities in their declarations as to the manner in which war should be conducted. Whether, after the present war, German militarists will think that the ideal of " absolute war " has been fully realized is perhaps doubtful, but it is certain that a very considerable

stride in that direction has been made. Indeed, recent practice goes even further than what would appear to have been contemplated at any former time. Even the handbook of 1902 allows of certain restrictions in humanitarian interests. It provides that, save under very exceptional circumstances, the lives of prisoners and of wounded men should be spared, that expansive bullets are not to be used, and that quarter is to be given to soldiers who lay down their arms. The recent report of the French Government shows that the murder of prisoners and of wounded men has been of frequent occurrence, that the use of dum-dum bullets by the German troops has been officially authorized, and that, on more than one occasion, orders have been issued by German officers that no quarter is to be given.

On the whole, it may be said that Professor Andler's pamphlet constitutes a striking comment on the praiseworthy efforts which have at times been made by both official and unofficial philanthropists to mitigate the horrors of war. It also shows that the negotiators of the Hague and other similar Conventions displayed an almost naïve amount of confidence in ever inviting the German Government to take part in proceedings which their principal authorities regarded as a mere farce, or in attaching the least importance to German declarations which were made without the least intention of abiding by their contents. "Fronti nulla fides" should be the motto of all foreign Governments who have to deal with German statesmen. The German idea of the way in which they always intended, and still intend, to conduct war may, in fact, be very accurately embodied in the following simple code:

Art. I. The duty of a nation at war is to conquer.

Art. II. In order to achieve this object all measures, however indefensible in time of peace, are justifiable.

Art. III. All engagements taken in time of peace lapse when war is declared.

There can only be one satisfactory method of dealing with a people who act on these principles. It is so to cripple their military strength as to prevent them from again making war for at least another generation.

XIV

GERMAN PATRIOTISM [1]

"*The Spectator*," *October* 2, 1915

No greater mistake can be made by a nation that is at war than to underrate the strength of its antagonists. Napoleon, whom Clausewitz termed the incarnate genius of war, made the most colossal blunders in the realm of politics. Not only, in spite of his well-known aphorism that the moral is to the physical as two to one, did he habitually underestimate the strength of all moral and spiritual forces, but he was possessed with the wholly erroneous idea that when he had vanquished armies he had subdued nations. It was this error which led him to his ruin. Moscow and Madrid might be occupied, but Russia and Spain survived. Prussia might be devastated by French troops, but the only result was to evoke the indomitable spirit of Prussian nationalism. It was otherwise when Napoleon had to deal with purely administrative or military questions. In these spheres of action he rarely missed his mark. His administrative system, as Mr. Bodley has pointed out, has stood erect for three generations of men. It has constituted the framework which has kept French society together amid

[1] *The Teaching of History in Girls' Schools in North and Central Germany.* Report by Eva Dodge, M.A. Manchester: at the University Press. 1908. 1s. 6d. net.

the fever of insurrection or the more lingering disorders of Parliamentary government. As a soldier, Napoleon may perhaps be justly accused of having paid insufficient attention to the advice of those of his Marshals who had served in Spain, and who warned him at Waterloo that he had to deal with the British infantry, whom General Foy described as "the best in the world." Generally speaking, however, he never fell into the mistake of underestimating the military strength of his opponents. Beugnot relates that one of his Council (the Comte de Cessac) opposed his marriage with an Austrian Archduchess on the ground that Austria "n'était plus une puissance," upon which Napoleon promptly replied: "L'Autriche n'est plus une puissance! On voit bien, Monsieur, que vous n'étiez pas à Wagram."

Neither the English nor the French nation has from the very commencement of the present war been at all inclined to underestimate the military prowess of its redoubtable foes. Indeed, in the first instance there was perhaps rather a disposition to overrate their military qualities. The rapid and decisive victories of 1866 and 1870 had enormously enhanced the prestige of the German Army. A distinguished Frenchman said to me shortly after the campaign of 1870–71 that the French soldier was so disheartened that, in the presence of a German force, he would think himself defeated before he fired off his rifle. That was a gross exaggeration even at the time. Recent events have now conclusively proved that, man for man, the British or French soldier is a match, and perhaps more than a match, for his German adversary. The tradition of German invincibility has been shattered. But there are other qualities besides those of pure military

efficiency of which account has to be taken. The spirit which animates the contending armies has to be considered. Shakespeare was quite right when he said that he is thrice-armed who feels his quarrel just. It cannot be doubted, for instance, that one of the factors which contributed to British defeat during the American War of Independence was that a considerable section of the British nation never had their hearts really in the cause for which they were fighting. Chatham's son, and possibly others, refused to serve.

What is the spirit which now animates the German nation and the German Army? Abundant evidence is forthcoming to show that a feeling of intense hatred against the Allies, and especially against England, has been evoked in Germany. But do the Germans really believe in the justice of their cause? To Englishmen, who know the facts, which have been carefully concealed from the German public, it seems almost incredible that they should do so, and this feeling, coupled with a general belief that all individuality has been crushed out in Germany, and that the whole national machine moves with the regularity of clockwork at the bidding of an absolutist Government, appears to have engendered the notion amongst some sections of the British public that German patriotism is not what is called "spontaneous," but that it is an artificial product made to order, and that it would speedily wither if the pressure which has produced it were withdrawn. In all this there is what John Stuart Mill very appositely called a "bandying of half-truths." It is a fact that the rigid discipline of the whole German system has produced a unity of thought and action in the nation which is unknown in any democratic country. But it involves a most dangerous fallacy to suppose that on this account

the patriotism of the men who have faced almost certain death from the rifles and machine-guns of the Allied troops is spurious and wanting in spontaneity. It is nothing of the sort. It may well be that, more especially in the elementary schools, where the Government has strenuously endeavoured to combat the reception of Socialist doctrines, German patriotism is to a great extent the outcome of that respect for authority which a very strict and long course of disciplinary education and government is able to produce on a somewhat docile people. But whatever be the cause, there can be no doubt of the result. A patriotism which is very real and very ardent exists. It can lead to nothing but error and disappointment if we at all deceive ourselves on this point.

In a sense it may be said that all patriotism is spontaneous. Even Locke would possibly have admitted that love of country is as nearly "innate" as any idea can be. If not innate, it is certainly instinctive. It is probable that the mere physical features of some monotonous plain or inhospitable ice-bound coast are as attractive in the eyes of their inhabitants as the rugged beauty of the wild Alpine scenes which, Goldsmith has told us, but bind all the more the mountaineer to the place of his birth. But it is, of course, true that patriotism, though instinctive, may be fostered and directed in certain specific channels by association and education. It is a commonplace to state that education may give divers trends to patriotism. Nothing is more characteristic of Napoleon's methods than the Catechism which he caused to be adopted for use in the French schools. He endeavoured to elevate Imperialism to the dignity of a religion. In answer to the question as to what was to be

thought of those who were unfaithful in their duties towards the Emperor, French children were taught to reply: "According to St. Paul, they sin against the ordinance of God, and are deserving of everlasting damnation." The Emperor, it was said, was the "Anointed of the Lord, through consecration by the Pope, who is the head of the Church universal." Similarly, it cannot be doubted that the whole efforts of German, and especially of Prussian, educationalists have been directed towards instilling into the minds of the German youth a patriotism of a highly exclusive and narrow type. Cosmopolitanism, though it need not and should not destroy patriotism, rather tends to enfeeble it. The Holy Roman Empire was an institution which partook of a cosmopolitan character, and so long as it existed it tended to disunite Germans and to enfeeble German patriotism. Towards the end of the eighteenth century writers such as Wieland, Herder, and even Goethe, openly sneered at national pride. Cosmopolitan principles have now been altogether banished from the schools of Germany. The German youth have been taught to scout Lucan's idea that they were born into the world to benefit the human race. On the contrary, all their efforts are to be directed to the exclusive glorification of Germany, whose civilization is vaunted in terms of the utmost extravagance as vastly superior to that of all other countries, and to the maintenance of the existing system under which Germany is governed.

In 1908 a very interesting Report was written by Miss Eva Dodge on the teaching of history in the girls' schools of Northern and Central Germany. Summarizing the result of some very extended inquiries, Miss Dodge says, in answer to the question, "What is, for a German, the aim

of history-teaching?" that "in general, it appears to be the cultivation of patriotism." She visited Eisenach, for instance, and there she found it laid down, as a rule for the guidance of teachers, that "history-teaching must cultivate love for Emperor and Empire, homeland, fatherland, and fellow-countrymen." She went to Leipsic, and there she learnt that, in dealing with Roman history, the children were taught that the Emperor Augustus committed the crime of sending "Varus, the proud and arrogant," to "bring all Germany under the yoke of Rome." "What," the little girls are asked, "should we do if we want to be worthy of our forefathers?" The answer is that they should emulate the conduct of the German women who killed themselves and their children rather than fall into the hands of the Romans. At Halle, "the bloody deeds of the French Revolution are purposely held up before the children's eyes that their hearts may sicken at the thought of any attempt to change the Government by violent means." At Altenburg, the Workmen's Protection Act was carefully explained to the children and was represented as the exclusive work of the Kaiser. This leads to the question, "What are your duties towards the Kaiser?" and to the inevitable answer, "To be grateful to him and to wish him long life and a long reign." On the receipt of this answer, the teacher said: "There is a fine song about him which you all know—it is exactly suitable. Sing it, then!"—upon which the whole class of girls sprang to their feet and sang *Heil dir im Siegeskranz*. Instances of this sort might be multiplied.

In the suggestions for the consideration of teachers in the British elementary schools, the Board of Education lays down the principle that

" when dealing with the story of our Empire, the teacher will have abundant opportunity to bring home to his class the fact that in learning British history they are learning a part of a larger whole, and that their sympathy and respect are due to other nations and races, with whom, whether as enemies, allies, rulers, or traders, Englishmen have had and still have so many dealings.", Sentiments of this sort appear to be wholly excluded from the German curriculum as interpreted by Treitschke and others of his sort. These teachers have endeavoured, not merely to encourage an ardent love of Germany, but also to stimulate by all possible means a profound hatred of all other countries. Napoleon once said that " what one nation most hates is another nation." The rest of the civilized world has spurned this detestable doctrine, and has been laboriously endeavouring to eliminate it from the creeds of nations. Germany, on the contrary, has adopted it as the corner-stone of her scholastic policy. That sturdy old Tory, Thomas Love Peacock, makes one of his characters observe that in some cases the only result of education is to give a fixed direction to natural stupidity. German education, in its most recent phases, is open to a somewhat similar charge. Though it develops the intellect, it gives a fixed direction to such minds as are naturally disposed to be receptive of non-moral ideas. The fact that the German ideal is monstrous, and that the teaching in the German schools has, in so far as the subject immediately under discussion is concerned, been anti-Christian and subversive both of public and private morality, should not, however, blind us to the fact that the views propagated by these professors of immorality have been generally accepted by the whole nation,

and that their teaching has modelled the thoughts of the present generation of Germans. We may hold that the ideal is altogether false, and that the means adopted to ensure its acceptance are deeply tainted with moral and intellectual corruption, but we must not forget that it has generated a very real, earnest, and fervid patriotism, which is capable of prompting the most heroic deeds of self-sacrifice. Let us, therefore, wholly abandon all conclusions based on the theory that German patriotism is a manufactured article, that it is wanting in spontaneity, and that its outward manifestations give an incorrect idea of German public opinion. To a German the course adopted by the London County Council a few years ago, but subsequently abandoned, of refusing to allow Empire Day to be celebrated, and forbidding the use of the Union Jack in the schools under their control, would be inconceivable.

XV

THE TEACHING OF PATRIOTISM

"The Nineteenth Century," November 1915

It would be difficult to conceive a greater contrast in national ideals than is presented, on the one hand, by the doctrines preached by that school of German thought of which General Bernhardi, though not the most able, is probably the most notorious exponent, and, on the other hand, by the English Humanists, as set forth in a recent work, entitled *Citizens to Be*, of which Miss M. Hughes is the author.

> To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity [Bernhardi says], and thus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individual, leads to error, since, in a human race conceived as a whole, struggle and, by implication, the most essential vital principle would be ruled out. Any action in favour of collective humanity outside the limits of the State and nationality is impossible. Such conceptions belong to the wide domain of Utopias.[1]

Miss Hughes defines her political and educational creed in the following words: "As Humanists we cannot stand for any tribal or purely national ideal. . . . Upon a Humanist foundation of social individuality and freedom no educational system can be maintained that stops short of international fellowship."[2] In the one case, the ideal which

[1] Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War.*
[2] *Citizens to Be*, pp. 272 and 282.

it is sought to attain is that of a highly exclusive nationalism. In the other, nationalism is merged into internationalism. The contrast between the principles advocated respectively by the Humanist and Nationalist schools of English thought is not nearly so great as that between all English and all German ideals. Nevertheless, even in the former case there is great divergence, if not of aims, at all events of methods. Sir Robert Baden-Powell, whose organization of the Boy Scouts has been one of the most successful, as it has also been one of the most beneficial educational movements of modern times, has adopted "Country first, self second" as his motto, and has addressed his youthful cohorts in the following terms:

> Don't be disgraced like the young Romans, who lost the Empire of their forefathers by being wishy-washy slackers without any go or patriotism in them. Play up! Each man in his place, and play the game! Your forefathers worked hard, fought hard, and died hard to make this Empire for you. Don't let them look down from heaven and see you loafing about with your hands in your pockets, doing nothing to keep it up.

Whatever be the merits or demerits of the rival ideals, Sir Robert Baden-Powell's breezy manliness has the immense advantage of being comprehensible to all alike, and more especially to boys, whereas the aims of Miss Hughes are not likely to be fully understood by any but a very few highly educated and thoughtful adults. That, however, does not in itself constitute a sufficient reason for accepting the teaching of Sir Robert Baden-Powell and rejecting that of Miss Hughes. "Action towards ideals," Mr. Welton very truly remarks,[1] "is the one unchanging condition of a

[1] *The Psychology of Education*, p. 462.

fruitful life." What, therefore, are the merits and demerits of the rival systems ?

It is unnecessary to dwell at any length on the German ideal. Its condemnation has been writ large in letters of blood in both hemispheres and in at least three continents. There is probably not an individual to be found in any class of British society who would not view with horror and disdain the incorporation into the educational or political systems of his country of principles such as those which, under the auspices of Treitschke and his brotherhood, have laid a firm grip on the thought of Modern Germany. The utmost efforts of the all-powerful German " State " have, as Mr. Harbutt Dawson has said, been directed towards " identifying patriotism with slavish acceptance of the official policy, and loyalty with mechanical adulation of the Sovereign." [1] We do not in this country want to be drilled into patriotism. We wish our patriotism to be the expression, not of the desires of human machines, but of freemen who are prepared to lay down their lives in defence of the institutions which they and their forefathers have fashioned for themselves. We do not wish every English child who learns the Church Catechism to be told that he has no duty to perform towards his neighbour unless that neighbour happens to be his own countryman or countrywoman. The question of the adoption of the German ideal or of anything approaching to it in this country may, therefore, at once be put out of court. It is otherwise with the case of the divergencies of opinion between the British nationalists and internationalists *inter se*. That branch of the question calls for more ample treatment.

[1] *What is Wrong with Germany ?* p. 65.

Internationalism is attractive inasmuch as it holds up to the mind a very high ideal—probably the highest ideal which is conceivable in the sphere of politics. It connotes a recognition of the brotherhood of man and of the sisterhood of woman. For at least half a century the minds both of the wisest politicians and of the deepest thinkers of the world have been moving in the direction of internationalism. Mr. Muirhead, who has written a preface to Miss Hughes' book and whose Humanism is presumably no less ardent and sincere than hers, recognizes that the present war is in its essence a life-and-death struggle between internationalism and nationalism of an extreme type. There is, in fact, much truth in the apparent paradox that the contest constitutes a "war to end war," though so long as human passions survive it may well be doubted whether this ideal can ever be fully realized. There is not, for all the purposes of immediate action, any necessary conflict between internationalism and rational nationalism. None but the most shallow empiricist will decry Humanist theories or humanitarian policy. The same individual whose mind glows with patriotic pride when he reads of some deed of daring performed by his countrymen in Flanders, or at the Dardanelles, may with perfect consistency dwell with an equal degree of pride on the noble campaign waged for more than a century by the country of his birth against slavery in all its forms. Indeed, he may go a step further and, without in any degree paying homage to the odious German theory that war is from time to time necessary in order to give a tonic to national virility, he may urge that, at the cost of infinite suffering and of untold national agony, the War in which we are now engaged may possibly result in stimulating a sentiment

which is presumably in strict harmony with Humanist ideas. *Παθήματα μαθήματα γίνονται.* Amidst the temporary wreck of social progress, and amidst the desolation which has been caused in family life, it is at all events possible to dwell with satisfaction on the effect which, it may be hoped, has been produced in this country in the direction of allaying class hatred and of fostering a sense of community of interests between rich and poor, high and low. Notably, it may be said that abundant evidence is forthcoming to show that, whereas the only link between the German officers and men is that which results from an iron and often brutal discipline, Englishmen of every class in the fighting ranks are bound together by ties which, to say the least, are riveted by mutual respect, and which it would be scarcely an exaggeration to characterize in many instances as those of affection. There is no feature in the present contest on which Englishmen may dwell with greater pride, with greater satisfaction, and, it may be added, with greater hopefulness that a bright social future lies before their country.

Internationalism, in so far as it tends to establish amity between nations, to check national arrogance and self-sufficiency, to encourage the youth of one country to assimilate all that is best in the moral characteristics or intellectual attainments of other countries, to enforce the sacredness of treaty obligations, to ensure respect for the weak, to disparage the abuse of power by the strong, to blast as false doctrine the theory that "might is right," and to point out the moral obliquity of giving practical application to that theory, is altogether commendable. Internationalist teaching may also very properly dwell on the fact that exclusive nationalism may

perhaps be regarded as only a stepping-stone to the conception of a higher ideal which embraces the whole human race, and which, though extremely difficult of attainment at any time and quite impossible of attainment in any but a remote future, should none the less be regarded as the pole-star to which the compass of political action and educational effort may profitably be directed. But if it goes further than this, if it is used as a didactic agency to decry legitimate patriotism and to substitute a flabby cosmopolitanism in its place, if it omits to inculcate into the minds of the youth of the country that, though their thoughts may soar to the skies, their feet must rest on the earth, if it does not tell them that, society being constituted as it is, their first duty is to love their country and, if needs be, to fight and die for it, and that this conception of duty must be allowed to hold good even at the cost of some sacrifice of the international ideal—if international teaching fails in any of these respects and becomes visionary to the extent of losing all sense of practical requirements, then it is not only pernicious but in the highest degree dangerous. When a man of such humane tendencies and of such strong liberal sentiments as the late Sir Alfred Lyall said, " I should like a little more fierceness and honest brutality in the national temperament," he spoke not only as a deep thinker, but also as a man who had had actual experience in the government of human beings. It was as far from his thoughts as it would be from those of any Humanist to advocate any measures which could reasonably be called brutal. What he wished to do was to give expression to an opinion which is often forced on the minds of those who, like himself, have not only thought but have also acted. He

wished to give a very necessary warning that sentimentalism should not be allowed to undermine virility of character. He would have been the last to condemn reasonable internationalism, but he would have protested with all his strength against internationalist being allowed to degenerate into anti-patriotic teaching.

In which direction does the training and education afforded to the youth of this country tend—towards the attainment of the noble ideal of Miss Hughes, or towards that of Sir Robert Baden-Powell, which, though less far-reaching, is also by no means wanting in nobility? So far as our public schools and their allied preparatory schools are concerned, the answer cannot be doubtful. In these institutions it is not necessary to instil nationalist sentiments into the minds of the scholars. On the other hand, it would probably be quite impossible for internationalist teaching in any extreme form to take root and to blossom in that uncongenial soil. As a result alike of inherited traditions, social connections, and home associations, our public schools are, and are likely to remain, natural nurseries of a very perfervid patriotism. A thrill of astonishment—it may almost be said of horror—ran through the land when the Head Master of Eton somewhat injudiciously gave utterance to sentiments which, however erroneously, were interpreted as showing unpatriotic tendencies. No one objected to Dr. Lyttelton giving free expression to his personal opinions, but the whole class of that society which furnishes scholars for Eton very strongly resented their youthful members being subjected to any influences which might tend to weaken their patriotic fervour. Much the same may be said of the Universities. The Roll of Honour, which recurs with mournful

regularity in the daily papers, sufficiently testifies to the nature of the sentiments generally entertained in institutions of this description. Cambridge alone has sent 10,076 of her sons to the War. Of these 474 have been killed and 671 wounded, 104 are prisoners or missing, 223 have been mentioned in despatches, two have received the Victoria Cross, thirty-two the D.S.O., and forty-two the Military Cross. The other Universities and Public Schools could, without doubt, show an equally noble record.

But how does the case stand as regards those schools which are under Government control and supervision? It is difficult to give any very concise and definite answer to this question. In every educational system much must be left to the discretion of the individual teacher. The Germans, from whose methods we may learn much without in any way adopting either their aims or the principles of their educational system, are well aware of this. "Der Lehrer," they say, "ist die Methode." If common report speaks truly, the general tendency amongst the teachers of the British elementary schools is to lean rather to the cosmopolitan than to the nationalist conception of training, but no evidence appears to be forthcoming on which any general conclusion on this point can be based. Something, however, is to be gathered from the official documents which have from time to time emanated from Whitehall. The Central Authorities would appear to speak with bated breath of the question of teaching patriotism. The only rather indirect allusion to the subject in the "Code of Regulations for Elementary Schools in England" is contained in the following somewhat Delphic utterance. The Introduction to the Code, after drawing attention to the necessity of encouraging

habits of industry, self-control, and other moral qualities, goes on to say :

> In all these endeavours the School should enlist, as far as possible, the interest and co-operation of the parents and the home in an united effort to enable the children not merely to reach their full development as individuals, but also to become upright and useful members of the community in which they live, and worthy sons and daughters of the country to which they belong.

Besides the Code, however, there was issued in 1914—though before the outbreak of war—some *Suggestions for the Teaching of History.* Goethe once said that the main advantage of the teaching of history was to be sought in the enthusiasm which it awoke. It cannot be said that these very cautious official *Suggestions* are much calculated to evoke patriotic enthusiasm. In the first place, it is stated at the outset that teachers are to be careful, whilst they are affording instruction in English history, to instil into the minds of their pupils a proper degree of " respect and sympathy for other nations and races "—an admirable and timely warning, and one, moreover, which is especially necessary to children in a country which counts its subjects of other races by millions. But might it not profitably have been accompanied by some remarks tending to explain the reasons why a very special degree of " respect and sympathy " is due by every British child to his own country ? On this point, however, the *Suggestions* maintain a perverse silence. It is, indeed, almost impossible to avoid the suspicion that they have been deliberately prepared with a view to acting as an anodyne to those timid and weak-kneed patriots who have the spectre of " militarism " so constantly before their eyes as to indulge in the wholly illusory

fear that neither patriotism nor anything approaching to martial ardour can be encouraged without a serious risk being incurred of Great Britain being Prussianized.

Again, allusion is made to the interest which children are likely to take in "the heroes of Agincourt, Drake, Wolfe," and others, but this is apparently only done to enforce the unquestionably sound conclusion that children had much better occupy their minds with the historical events which cluster round the names of these celebrities than be "harassed" with the unsavoury details of the divorce of Henry the Eighth, or with "the intrigues of Charles the Second's reign." The names of Chatham, Clive, Wolfe, and Nelson are mentioned incidentally as celebrated Englishmen who have been associated with the extension of the Empire, as also those of Wilberforce, Howard, Lord Shaftesbury, and Elizabeth Fry in connection with social reform, and those of Cartwright, Watt, Stephenson, Smeaton, Brindley, and Lister in connection with industrial revolution and the progress of science. Attention is drawn to the advisability of taking children to see the historic buildings, monuments, and other objects of national interest in their country, as, for instance, Nelson's *Victory*. It might have been thought that the mention of this famous ship would have led the official compiler of the *Suggestions* to say something of the glorious episode which decided the fate of Europe. He does nothing of the sort. The *Victory* is classed with Stonehenge, and the teacher is merely told to see that the children approach these and other similar objects of national interest "with a reverence and understanding which will prevent them from defacing them by cutting their names on them or carrying

away pieces." The advice is excellent, but does it quite rise to the occasion? On the whole, it may be said that the *Suggestions* are of an extremely feeble and colourless character. If the patriotism of the rising generation were solely based on such teaching as this the outlook for patriots would be somewhat gloomy.

A pamphlet of a very different description, entitled *St. David's Day*, has, since the War commenced, been issued by the Welsh Department of the Board of Education. It glows with the most ardent patriotism, but the patriotism is almost wholly local. Every Welsh child is invited to shout "The Land of my Fathers" at the top of his voice. The achievements of Owen Glendower are recounted with pride, and then a jump of nearly four hundred years is made and the gallantry of Sir Thomas Picton, who was a Pembrokeshire man, is very rightly eulogized. Welshmen are especially enjoined on no account to abandon the use of the Welsh language. The pamphlet strikes the right note. There is a great deal of local feeling in this country, and it is very probable that the best method which can be adopted for evoking the patriotism of the Welshman, the East Anglian, the Yorkshireman, and the man of Kent is to dwell on the heroic deeds performed by those who were born respectively in each of these localities. But it is perhaps rather to be regretted that Mr. Alfred Davis, the compiler of the pamphlet, did not dwell with somewhat greater insistence on the bond which unites Welshmen with the rest of their fellow-countrymen. It may be noted, however, that Welsh children, after they have sung "The Land of my Fathers" and "God Bless the Prince of Wales," are invited to join in singing "God Save the King."

Attention may also be drawn to a very useful little work entitled *A Primer of English Citizenship for Use in Schools*,[1] and written, in 1913, by Mr. Frederick Swann, formerly Head Master of the Ilkley Grammar School. It is not an ambitious work. It does not advocate any special principles or defend any particular theory of government or administration. But it gives a simple and concise account of things that every schoolboy should know, such as the prerogatives of the Crown, the functions and composition of the two Houses of Parliament, the machinery of the local administration of the country, the nature of British Imperial rule, and other cognate subjects. Moreover, a few sound, healthy, common-sense maxims are laid down as a guidance to children in the performance of their duties as loyal, upright, and useful citizens.

On the whole, it may be said that the Board of Education does little or nothing to teach patriotism, neither apparently is any attempt made to check the idiosyncrasies of those teachers whose personal proclivities would rather lead them to discourage patriotic sentiment. Cannot something be done to remedy this defect ?

The French are fully alive to the necessity of action. M. Sarraut, the Minister of Public Instruction, recently issued the following circular :

> You all understand that education is a special personal means of seconding the efforts of our Armies. Its *rôle* is, indeed, so to act that the entire country shall know why it is fighting—for what past, for what future, for what facts, for what ideas ; and thus, by informing national opinion with this knowledge, to maintain and strengthen the country in its unshakable confidence in and its desire for complete victory.

The *Times* Paris correspondent, in reporting

[1] Messrs. Longmans, Green & Co. 1913.

the issue of this circular, adds : " Throughout the past year, the War has held a very large place in French education. There is not a schoolmaster who has not devoted some time daily to reading the *Bulletin des Armées*, a recital of acts of heroism, and to comment upon the *communiqués*." Cannot we advantageously follow this good example ? The question is well worthy of the attention of the Government. The policy of the Board of Education, like that of every other Department of the Government, should be ruled not wholly by thinkers, or wholly by practical politicians. It should be the resultant of the two forces. Without going so far as to support John Bright's half-jocular remark that " the worst of great thinkers is that they so often think wrong," it is none the less true that, in deciding on a national policy, the views of the thinkers have in some degree to be transformed and corrected by those of the practical politicians. It is equally true that if the latter pay no heed to the former they are likely to plunge headlong into the slough of a disastrous empiricism. Adam Smith would probably have made a very indifferent Chancellor of the Exchequer, but the British financial system would never have been put on a sound footing if Chancellors of the Exchequer had wholly neglected Adam Smith's teaching. It is almost certain that as administrators of the Home or any other Department, Mr. Herbert Spencer or Mr. Lecky, for instance, would have proved very doubtfully successful. But the intellectual equipment of a statesman who endeavours to deal with social reform without having some acquaintance with the views set forth by men such as either of these philosophers will most certainly be sadly deficient.

It must surely be possible, without falling

into the danger of excessive Government control, against which Germany affords a standing warning, and without sacrificing all that is really good and noble in the programme of the Humanists, to encourage the growth of a reasoned and reasonable patriotism. If the Germans suffer from too much discipline and too much organization, we, on the other hand, are in many directions suffering from too little of either quality. A broad-minded statesman who takes as his motto that invaluable proverb, Μηδὲν ἄγαν, which runs like a silver thread through the whole of Greek thought and literature, ought to be able within reasonable limits to secure the advantages claimed by both the Nationalists and the Internationalists. The nation, as a whole, has no wish that educational policy should be directed towards the creation of an arrogant Chauvinism. Neither, on the other hand, does it wish to be exposed to the dangers which would of necessity result if the minds of the youth of this country were imbued with those ultra-pacificist sentiments which apparently find favour with educational reformers whose views are represented in Miss Hughes' work. "A Humanist ideal of education," she says, "must inevitably become a centre of peace propaganda." It is the duty both of the Government and of Parliament to see that the Department of Education does not become a centre either of peace or of war propaganda, but that it steers a sane middle course between the two extremes of thought.

XVI

THE GERMANIZATION OF SLESVIG [1]

"*Spectator*," *January* 1, 1916

On August 28, 1864, Lord Palmerston wrote to the King of the Belgians a letter which has been recorded by his private secretary and biographer, Mr. Evelyn Ashley, and in which the following passage occurs: "It was an unworthy abuse of power by Austria and Prussia to take advantage of their superior enlightenment and strength to crush an antagonist utterly incapable of successful resistance; the events of this Danish War do not form a page in German history which any honourable or generous German hereafter will look back upon without a blush." It is probable that the honourable or generous German who will blush at the episode to which Lord Palmerston alluded has yet to be born. It is certain that Prince Bismarck, who may be regarded not merely as the principal but even as the sole author of the Danish War, never felt the least contrition in reflecting on his own handiwork. Dr. Moritz Busch states that when talking of the result of the war with France, Prince Bismarck said: "When I was made Prince, the King wished to put Alsace and Lorraine into

[1] *Le Slesvig du Nord, 1906–1914.* Copenhagen: Publié par Les Associations Slesvicoises Réunies du Danemark.

my armorial bearings. I should have preferred Schleswig-Holstein, as that is the diplomatic campaign of which I am most proud." It must, indeed, be confessed that if all considerations based on justice and public morality are set aside, it is impossible not to admire the astuteness, determination, and dogged perseverance which Bismarck displayed in the execution of his Danish policy. He had every one against him. He had quarrelled bitterly with the Chamber and with the whole of the Liberal Party, who were at that time a real power in the land. When at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, under the Presidency of the King, Bismarck proposed that the Duchy of Slesvig should be annexed to Prussia, and reminded His Majesty that all extension of Prussian dominions in former years had resulted from the use of force, the Crown Prince, M. Matter has informed us in his work entitled *Bismarck et son temps*, lifted up his hands in horror, and thought the great Chancellor was a megalomaniac. The King himself was under the impression that he had lunched too copiously. Nevertheless, Bismarck adhered steadfastly to the policy which he had intended to adopt from the first; that is to say, annexation pure and simple. His friend and abettor, Roon, declared openly that the question was "not one of right but of force." In the end Bismarck, in spite of opposition from within and without, carried the day.

The details of the Schleswig-Holstein question were very complicated. Lord Palmerston is said to have declared that there were only two people in England—the Prince Consort and himself—who understood them. But the main issue at stake was simple enough. On March 30, 1863, Frederick VII., King of Denmark, issued

a Decree under which Holstein and Lauenburg were endowed with a certain amount of local independence. Slesvig, on the other hand, became an integral part of the Danish monarchy. This act raised a storm of opposition in Germany. The Diet of Frankfurt decreed a Federal execution. But before any active steps could be taken Frederick VII. died. The crown passed to Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein, who became Christian IX. The new King did not agree to the action of his predecessor, and wished to repudiate it. His Prime Minister, Hall, told him that if he did so he would lose his crown and not improbably his life. The King yielded, and on November 18, 1863, promulgated a Constitution similar to that of Frederick VII. This act rendered war inevitable. German public opinion strongly favoured the claim of the Prince of Augustenburg to the Duchies. The Prussian Chamber urged the King to withdraw from the Convention signed in London in 1852 by which the integrity of the Danish monarchy was guaranteed by all the Powers, and to recognize the claims of the Augustenburg Prince. The King really agreed with the Chamber, but, under pressure from his Chancellor, rejected their address. Before the end of the year, the Federal execution had so far become an accomplished fact that Holstein was occupied by Saxon and Hanoverian troops. There remained, however, the question of Slesvig. Austria, ignorant of the fact that she would be the next victim of Prussian ambition, was the first to put forward the proposal that Slesvig should be occupied as a pledge until such time as the Government of Denmark had fulfilled its engagements taken in 1852, which it was alleged had been violated. Prince Bismarck jumped at the idea, Slesvig was

invaded, and the Danes, after a gallant resistance, were, of course, obliged to yield.

It is never a profitable task to speculate upon what might have been in politics. From an historical point of view, however, it is interesting to remember that if the Treaty Powers had held to their engagements and had supported Denmark by force of arms, the history of Europe might not improbably have been completely changed. It would be ascribing too great a degree of foresight to Prince Bismarck to assume that he had a very clear idea of the sequence of events which resulted from the Danish War. But he certainly, even at that time, had sketched out in his own mind the broad outlines of a programme which he eventually carried out, although he without doubt realized that the particular methods by which it would be executed would have to depend on circumstances. "A statesman," he was wont to say, "is like a traveller through a forest. He knows the general direction which he has to take, but he cannot foresee the exact point where he will issue from the woods." It is certain, however, that he regarded the annexation of the Duchies as a first step towards establishing the hegemony of Prussia in Germany, about which he cared more than for German unity, and that he already thought that his object could not be accomplished without a war leading to the humiliation of Austria. The Powers of Europe, who were onlookers of the Danish political tragedy, recognized that it was an episode of importance, but failed to see that which to the present generation, armed with the wisdom and experience which come from a knowledge of after-events, is now clear—namely, that it really constituted the commencement of a new epoch in the history of the world. It would be hazard-

ous to conjecture what would have happened if they had intervened. It may be that they would have been vanquished, for at that time the Prussian infantry alone was armed with breech-loading rifles. It is a curious fact that, to the best of my belief and recollection, none of the military experts of the day discovered during the Danish War that the introduction of this arm had caused a revolution in the art of war even greater than that which ensued by the substitution of the iron for the wooden ramrod in the days of Frederick the Great. The importance of the change was not fully realized until after the complete defeat of the Austrian Army in 1866. I well remember an Austrian friend of mine telling me that in the first engagement at which he was present during that war, the Prussians were located in a wood which hid them from sight. From the hot and sustained fire which they kept up against the Austrians, it was thought that there must be at least three thousand Prussian infantry in action. It was subsequently discovered that their total force only amounted to one company of two hundred and fifty men. From that moment, my friend told me, he saw that the victory of the Prussians was inevitable. If, however, the Allied Powers had emerged victoriously from the contest, it is possible that the war of 1866 would have been avoided, and it is almost certain that those of 1870 and 1914 would never have taken place. That they did not intervene was mainly the fault of Napoleon III., who was at the time annoyed with the British Government because they had refused to accede to his proposal that a European Congress should be assembled, and who was destined throughout all the latter part of his reign to be the dupe of the German Chan-

cellor. It was not without some reason that Thiers called the Emperor "une grande incapacité méconnue." It was, of course, out of the question that England should act alone, and thus, in spite of the warm sympathy which was felt by all classes for the Danes, and which was enhanced by the arrival in England but a short time before of the gracious Danish Princess who was eventually to be Queen of England, the English Government and public were obliged to remain inactive spectators of a gross violation of treaty rights and of an outrage committed on a brave and almost defenceless nation. The Germans, on the other hand, were elated at the success which had crowned Bismarck's efforts, and began that course of extreme devotion to the "might is right" principle which was to lead to the present gigantic struggle.

In the execution of an Imperial policy only two alternatives are possible. One is to treat the national feelings and aspirations of the subject race with tenderness, and to endeavour, by mild and just government, gradually to attach them to their rulers. This is the method adopted by various processes and with varying success by British Imperialism. The other course is to crush out all national sentiments by sheer force, and to endeavour to assimilate the conquered race in every respect to their conquerors. There could not from the first be a shadow of doubt as to which course would be pursued by Prussia. Germany has been singularly barren of political ideas. With a single exception, wherever the German or Austrian flag has been planted, a process of ruthless Germanization has been adopted. The exception is the Austrian treatment of the Ruthenes. With a view to creating a sympathy between these people and the neigh-

bouring twenty-three millions of Little Russians who reside in Russian territory, and thus inaugurating a gigantic Irredentist movement against the Empire of the Tsar, the Austrian Government, under the auspices of Count Badeni, afforded some encouragement to the growth of Ruthenian autonomy. No such political necessity existed in the case of Slesvig. Immediately after the annexation, the province was rebaptized and became German Schleswig. Napoleon III., when the Treaty of Prague was under consideration in 1866, was able to secure the insertion of an article under which the population of the northern districts of Schleswig was to be ceded to Denmark should they express their desire for union by means of a free vote. This article has been allowed to remain a dead letter, and was, in fact, formally cancelled in 1878. The first Danish representatives sent to Berlin—Messrs. Krüger and Ahlmann—said: "We are Danes, and we wish to remain Danes." The Prussian Government was, however, determined that they should become Germans. The process of Germanization, which commenced immediately after the annexation, received a great impulse on the accession of the present Kaiser in 1888. The Danish language, which had already been excluded from the Tribunals, was practically banished from the schools. Children were only allowed to use their native tongue during four hours a week, which were devoted to religious instruction. Even the German clergy protested, but protested in vain, against this provision. Attendance at the public secondary schools was made compulsory. The school-books abounded in the most contemptuous references to Denmark and to everything Danish. "If the children do not understand German, they must be treated

and taught like deaf mutes." Such, Mr. W. R. Prior says in a recent pamphlet, was the rule prescribed by a Prussian educational authority. Large numbers of Danes were expelled from the province, a measure which elicited even from Professor Delbrück the statement that these expulsions were "most revolting." He added: "But worse than the brutality which makes us the abomination of the civilized world is the infatuation which believes that lasting results can be secured through such measures as these." German societies were instituted with a view to the extermination of the Danish language and to the suppression of all Danish sympathies. Editors of Danish newspapers were prosecuted. Since the present war began a number of prominent Danes, both men and women, in Northern Schleswig have been arrested. In all districts where both German and Danish are spoken the use of the latter language is strictly prohibited at public meetings. This prohibition is, in 1928, to be extended even to those districts where Danish is the universal language. Perhaps the most noteworthy feature in the policy which has been adopted is that, according to a patriotic Dane who has published an interesting pamphlet entitled *The War through Danish Eyes*, the Germans appear to be honestly convinced that this extreme process of Germanization will prove a real and lasting benefit to the populations concerned. Modern Germany is blind. German public opinion is so convinced of the superiority of *Kultur* that it is incapable of recognizing that there can be two sides to the question. What measure of success has, however, so far been achieved? Mr. Prior supplies the answer in the following words: "The whole population holds its own in the face of opponents who have

steadily become more powerful, and of a calculated policy of oppression which is now far more severe than it was fifty years ago. Prussia vanquished Denmark after a campaign of some four months. But the battle against Danish nationalism in Schleswig has been proceeding from that time to the present; and in this battle the aggressors are farther off from victory than they ever were." It may be that, in course of time, the Germans will learn that in some matters force is no remedy, but they have not learnt that lesson yet.

XVII

DEMOCRACY AND DIPLOMACY [1]

"*Spectator*," *December* 4, 1915

THE questions of how far diplomacy should be conducted in secret, and the extent to which it is desirable that international arrangements should be brought under democratic control, have recently received much attention. It is eminently desirable that these subjects should be fully discussed, for, curiously enough, although on many points the opinions of the diplomatists and their critics diverge very widely, neither one class nor the other is by any means satisfied with the existing state of things. One of the principal obstacles which hitherto prevailed to impede a full discussion was that the democratic critics of diplomacy dealt for the most part in rather vague generalities which rendered it difficult fully to realize either the precise nature of the evils against which they declaimed, or the methods which they proposed in order to remedy those evils. This obstacle has now to some extent been removed. Mr. Arthur Ponsonby, who has taken a leading part as a critic of diplomacy, has embodied the case which finds favour in the eyes of himself and his

[1] *Democracy and Diplomacy*. By Arthur Ponsonby, M.P. London: Methuen & Co. 2s. 6d.

associates in a short work entitled *Democracy and Diplomacy.*

Before dealing with Mr. Ponsonby's criticisms or his proposals it will be desirable to say a few words as regards the spirit in which he approaches the subject. That spirit is, to say the least, regrettable. If there is one point more than another on which the special school of politicians to which Mr. Ponsonby belongs is prone to dwell, it is that those who are opposed to their views are incapable of appreciating the nobility of their ideals. There never was a time when it was more necessary than at present to entertain sound national ideals. Whatever may be the results of the war, it is certain that the conditions of society in most civilized communities, as also their thoughts and aspirations, will undergo a great change. National ideals will have to be transformed. National methods will have to be refurbished. It may be that a new era of world-progress will be inaugurated. It is essential that, whilst political thought is in this state of flux, the ideals conceived by the British nation should be worthy of progressive civilization. There is one very noble ideal which is now entertained by many thoughtful people in this country. It is that, amidst all the sorrow and affliction which has been caused by the present war, a great national benefit may accrue from the fact that all classes of society have been knit together in a common effort, and have, for the time being at all events, been inspired by a common sentiment and common aspirations. It is hoped that this sense of unity will survive the war, that all classes will learn to understand each other to a greater extent than has hitherto been the case, and that class discord, if it cannot be made to disappear altogether, will at least be

much mitigated. The obstacles to the attainment of this noble ideal may, indeed, possibly prove insuperable, for no thoughtful politician can fail to entertain some misgivings as to the consequences of the changed conditions of society which will ensue in this country when the war is over. Nevertheless, the example afforded by the Army constitutes a hopeful symptom. All accounts go to show that as one result of the conflict which is now raging there has been a strong tendency to fuse together the different social ranks from which the officers and men are respectively drawn. It is surely the duty of every thoughtful lover of his country to help to the best of his ability towards the realization of this soul-stirring ideal. The spirit in which Mr. Ponsonby approaches the subject now under discussion is, unfortunately, calculated to act in an opposite direction. Throughout the whole of his work there runs a vein of bitter hostility towards all those who are likely to oppose his peculiar political opinions. The views of all the official and aristocratic classes are grossly misrepresented. This is especially the case as regards the diplomatists. There have been in the past, and without doubt there now are, diplomatists who are competent and others who are incompetent, but it is surely the extreme of arrogance and prejudice to speak of all the members of a service which has produced, for instance, such men as Lord Lyons, the late Lord Ampthill, and Sir Robert Morier in the past, and Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Sir Rennell Rodd, Sir Arthur Hardinge, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Sir Arthur Nicolson, and Mr. Marling at the present time, as " spiders of intrigue " who have for too long been allowed to " weave undisturbed their tangled webs in secret," and who should now

" be chased out of darkness into the open light of day " ; whilst the statement that the official advisers of the Secretary of State " treat countries as pawns with a sublime disregard of popular feeling " may without exaggeration be classed as idle and pernicious clap-trap. Mr. Ponsonby's prejudices again crop up in the manifest desire which he shows to exclude all Peers from any real part in the control of public affairs on the ground of their unrepresentative character. Writing of this sort is distinctly mischievous, but it is perhaps not surprising, for all history is there to show that there is no more bitter or unjust critic of aristocracy than an aristocrat who ostentatiously separates himself from the class to which by birth and association he naturally belongs.

Neither is this the only general criticism which may legitimately be made on Mr. Ponsonby's work. He is evidently an ardent, and without doubt a perfectly honest and sincere, democrat. Democratic government in this country stands at present but little in need of any defence. German absolutism has brought home to every class of the community the fact that, although there may be minor differences of opinion between us, we are all democrats here. But if democracy is to be defended at all, the method adopted by Mr. Ponsonby constitutes a very inadequate defence. That method consists in glossing over all the manifold and glaring defects of democratic rule or of ignoring their existence. A more legitimate defence, which should appeal to the minds of all really thoughtful and impartial politicians, is that, in spite of those defects, democratic rule, in view of the fallibility of all human institutions, possesses far greater merits than any alternative system which can be substituted in its place.

The fact that the whole of Europe is at war constitutes Mr. Ponsonby's main criticism on diplomatic action. "Diplomacy," he says, "has failed. This is an outstanding fact about which there can be no manner of dispute. The statesmen of Europe did not succeed in saving the nations from a portentous calamity." This is quite true; but to what was the failure due? Wholly to the fact that the statesmen of Germany and Austria never intended to succeed. All the evidence available goes to show that in the summer of 1914 the war party in these two countries had completely gained the upper hand, and that they were intent on forcing on the calamity which Mr. Ponsonby very rightly describes as portentous. It is probable that nowhere was their action more strongly condemned than amongst the statesmen and diplomatists of other countries who were earnestly striving to preserve the peace of the world. It is notorious that a large amount of personal responsibility rests more especially on the German Ambassadors at the Courts of Vienna and Petrograd. But Mr. Ponsonby is not content with this explanation. He apparently condemns the action of French, British, Russian, and Italian quite as much as that of German or Austrian diplomacy. He is manifestly of opinion that democracy or democratic influence exerted over diplomacy would have succeeded better. Is there any reason for supposing that this view of the case is correct? There is none. The only way in which it is just conceivable that the war might have been averted was for the British Government and the British nation to have made it clear to all the world at a very early period that, under certain contingencies, they would unhesitatingly intervene, and to have, for some long while previous to the war,

prepared for the struggle which, in fact, was almost inevitable. They did nothing of the kind. It is true, as Mr. Ponsonby says, that the people of this country were not well informed—a point to which further allusion will presently be made. But they were not altogether without information. There were, indeed, many statesmen and diplomatists who failed to recognize the gravity of the impending danger. On the other hand, there were others—eminent soldiers, diplomatists, and a very few high-class journalists—who, for some long while previous to the war, never ceased to warn their countrymen of the perils of the situation. Their voices were unheeded; they were regarded as prejudiced and self-interested scaremongers, and their advice was particularly neglected by the special school of politicians to which Mr. Ponsonby belongs, who closed their ears to all warnings, and were determined to believe only what they wished to be true. Far from enforcing the lessons which are obviously to be deduced from the discussions which preceded the war, Mr. Ponsonby wishes to increase the influence of all those classes who were wrong, and to diminish, if not entirely to obliterate, that of those who were right.

Another general observation which may be made on Mr. Ponsonby's views is that, being, like most of the members of the House of Commons, animated by a strong feeling of *esprit de corps*, he greatly exaggerates the political foresight and acumen of that body. For instance, he says that in dealing with domestic affairs the House of Commons "has not only proved its capacity but its special ability." It may well be doubted whether the general public is prepared to accept either the capacity or the ability of the House of Commons at Mr. Ponsonby's valuation.

That House has signally failed in the performance of what is generally considered its most important function—namely, the control of public expenditure. Moreover, it is notorious that of late years many measures of the utmost importance have been hurriedly passed through the House of Commons with a very insufficient degree of discussion and deliberation. Neither has the conduct of foreign affairs in that House of late years been such as to inspire an unlimited amount of confidence in its collective wisdom. The purchase of the Persian oilfields was hustled through the House without any sufficient appreciation of the extreme gravity of the issues at stake.

The facts on which Mr. Ponsonby bases his opinions are often as contestable as the opinions themselves. Thus he says that the secret clauses of the Treaty negotiated between France and this country in 1904 on the subject of Morocco "practically vitiated the whole spirit of the original agreement." Without dwelling at length on this point, it will be sufficient to say that there is no foundation whatever for this statement. The particular Articles of the secret Treaty to which Mr. Ponsonby presumably alludes (III. and IV.) were a very wise measure of preventive diplomacy, and in no way vitiated the arrangement made in the public Treaty. They merely supplemented Article VIII. of that Treaty.

These and other defects which it would be easy to indicate should not, however, be allowed to obscure the fact that Mr. Ponsonby's main contention is one which may and should receive the hearty assent of many who disagree with him in detail. He strongly urges the necessity, in dealing with foreign affairs, of ensuring the co-operation and approval of the great mass of the people. He is manifestly quite right. It is

certain that of recent years foreign affairs have received comparatively less attention in Parliament than was formerly the case. This is partly due to the fact that there are now relatively few Members of Parliament who take much interest in international questions, but still more to the fact to which the Speaker has alluded—namely, that "there is no violent party discord on foreign affairs." Mr. Arthur Balfour holds that immunity from discussion is a good thing in itself. "I think," he said to a Select Committee which sat in 1914, "that neither Indian affairs nor foreign affairs are very fitting subjects for constant discussion and debate." That there is a great deal of force in this criticism cannot be doubted. It would not be difficult to quote instances where public discussion of foreign and Indian affairs has done more harm than good. On the other hand, the absence of discussion naturally engenders ignorance. Which of these two views should be allowed to prevail is perhaps doubtful. My personal opinion is that, on the whole, the importance of enlightening ignorance, coupled with the very great necessity of ensuring the co-operation of the people to which Mr. Ponsonby very rightly alludes, are arguments of such importance that they should be allowed to predominate.

The chief of the proposals made by Mr. Ponsonby in order to dispel the prevailing ignorance on foreign affairs are that in the normal course of things the Foreign Office Vote should be discussed for at least two days in the House of Commons, and that it should be the recognized duty of a Foreign Secretary to make periodical pronouncements in the country on foreign affairs, more especially when Parliament is not sitting. So far as any one who has not sat

in the House of Commons is able to judge, these suggestions would appear to be well worthy of consideration; but they merely touch the fringe of the question. They do not go to the root of the existing evil. There is, in fact, one fatal defect in Mr. Ponsonby's analysis of the situation. He ascribes to faulty diplomacy the results which are, in reality, due to faulty statesmanship. As regards the present war, it seems impossible to get out of the dilemma that for some while previous to its outbreak the British Ministers of the day were either hoodwinked to the extent of not realizing the trend of German policy—an hypothesis which does no credit to their intelligence—or that they realized the danger but had not the foresight or moral courage to warn the democracy of its existence. Reluctance to lay unpleasant truths before the public is no new feature in our political life. For many years successive Ministries declined to let the democracy know that the double Egyptian policy of evacuation and reform, which was favoured by Mr. Ponsonby's political predecessors, was wholly impossible of execution, and that one or other would have to be discarded. More recently, a further striking instance in point has occurred in the domain of military administration. From the very first moment when war was declared, it was obvious to every intelligent observer that if the men required to reinforce the Army could not be obtained under the voluntary system, it would be necessary to have recourse to compulsion. Yet even after fifteen months of war the utterances of the responsible Ministers of the Crown on this all-important subject continue to be Delphic to the verge of incomprehensibility.

What, in fact, we are now suffering from, however little Mr. Ponsonby and his friends

may recognize the fact, is not faulty diplomacy, but want of leadership. In the past, albeit the influence of democracy has been steadily growing, we have had leaders. Peel, Lord John Russell, Lord Palmerston, Disraeli, Gladstone, and Chamberlain were not content to adopt the maxim which the Jacobin leader applied to his followers: *Je suis leur chef; il faut que je les suive.* To a greater or less extent, they led. They did not merely follow. Why is it that the art of leadership appears for the time being to be in abeyance? It is difficult to believe that there has been any general deterioration whether in respect to the character or ability of our public men. The reason must be sought elsewhere. It may probably be found in the facts that with the growth of the electorate democracy has become far more unwieldy than was formerly the case; that some national demoralization has ensued by reason of the frequent concessions made to mere popular clamour, although those concessions were often recognized as faulty by many of the wisest and most liberally-minded statesmen of the day; and that a whole race of time-serving and opportunist politicians has grown up who have led the people to think that they are not only omnipotent, which, when united, they are, but that they are also omniscient, which they most certainly are not.

There is little hope of any real improvement until, on the one hand, political leaders arise who will have the moral courage to state the facts without being deterred by the consideration that in doing so they may sacrifice their influence and impair their power of guidance, and until, on the other hand, the democracy learns that those who merely flatter the people are by no means always their best friends. Reforms in

the method of selecting candidates for the Diplomatic Service, such as those proposed by Lord MacDonnell's Commission, are excellent in their way, and it is to be hoped that they will eventually be adopted. But it is very improbable that they will produce the far-reaching effect which Mr. Ponsonby anticipates. Still less is it likely that any real good will ensue from the fantastic proposal made by Mr. Ponsonby that a House of Commons Committee composed of from thirty to fifty members, from which all those whose services would be of the most value are to be rigorously excluded, should be appointed to advise on foreign affairs. This proposal has, as a matter of course, been scouted by Mr. Balfour, the present Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the House of Commons. It is almost inconceivable that it should be entertained by the responsible Ministers of any party.

XVIII

POLITICAL IDEALS [1]

"*Spectator*," *December* 18, 1915

MR. DELISLE BURNS reminds us that there are several different ways of writing history. There is, in the first place, what he calls the "Date-and-Fact" history, which he considers very much akin to journalism. Now for journalism Mr. Delisle Burns appears to entertain the greatest scorn. "The future historians," he says, "will feel certain that nothing mentioned in a newspaper has much value as a record of the current life of the time. . . . The newspaper reader remains a savage in mistaking the exceptional for the important." If this be so, the political prospect in democratic countries is somewhat gloomy, for apparently the people in those countries will have to choose between two alternatives—namely, that of being governed by "savages" who are in touch with the public opinion of the day, or that of entrusting their fortunes to philosophers who do not reckon with public opinion or keep themselves informed about it, and who would thus certainly before long bring about a state of political chaos. Another method of recording past events is that

[1] *Political Ideals, their Nature and Development: an Essay.* By C. Delisle Burns. Oxford: at the University Press. 2s. 6d.

adopted by Carlyle, and is called by Mr. Delisle Burns "Heroic History." There is also "Naturalistic History," of which Buckle was the great apostle. Mr. Delisle Burns discards these methods, but thinks that much may be learnt from recording not so much what men did as what they hoped to do—in other words, from writing a "History of Ideals." Thus the Athenian ideal was Liberty; the Roman, Order; the mediaeval, as embodied in the Holy Roman Empire, European Unity. The French Revolutionary ideal was Equality, and the modern ideal is Nationalism.

Mr. Delisle Burns, who is evidently a profound scholar and an acute thinker, has worked out this pregnant theme in a very interesting essay which affords abundant food for reflection. His generalizations are at times, perhaps, somewhat too sweeping, and, like most of those who have spoken of the theories of government without having themselves been concerned in its practice, he is terribly logical. There is, after all, some truth in Hawthorne's remark that "no sagacious man will long retain his sagacity if he lives exclusively among reformers and progressive people." Thus, as an instance of a wide and somewhat fallacious generalization, Mr. Delisle Burns says that "no one disputes that Liberty or Order is desirable." But Kaiser William II., followed in a greater or less degree by some seventy million Germans, though they worship Order of a kind, are now disputing very vigorously the desirability of Liberty in the sense in which that word is generally interpreted by the civilized world, or in which presumably Mr. Delisle Burns would himself interpret it. Again, Mr. Delisle Burns speaks of compromise with all the scorn common to politicians of the study.

Compromise, he says, " will always be the political excuse for incompetent and illogical thinking." Lord Morley was at one time of a somewhat similar opinion, but it is, perhaps, open to question whether half a century of political experience has not somewhat modified the views he originally held on this subject. The man who rejects compromise naturally tends to intolerance of the opinions of others and to an overweening degree of confidence in his own judgment. Thus the question of the extent to which political power should be conferred on women is one on which very diverse opinions have been held, and are still held both by experienced politicians and by thinkers at least as eminent as Mr. Delisle Burns. He, however, has not the least difficulty in forming a final judgment on the question. He is an ardent suffragist. He does not consider it worth the trouble to refute the " antiquated and obsolete opinions " of those who differ from him on this subject, and he holds that if their arguments are to be considered as valid, " we must believe that a woman is more like a cow than like a man."

In dealing with the past, Mr. Delisle Burns shows how Athenian liberty degenerated into licence, and he lays down the somewhat questionable proposition that the fall of Athens was " directly due not to the liberty she had attained, but to the attempts she made to limit her ideal to herself." He also explains how Roman order was perverted until it became Roman tyranny, and how by the growth of Nationalism the mediaeval idea of unity as embodied in the Holy Roman Empire was shattered. In dealing with these subjects, however, although Mr. Delisle Burns puts forward his views with much ability, he has, in reality, little to say with which the

historical and political student is not already familiar. It will be more interesting to turn to his observations upon the methods which may or should be adopted in order to realize fully the modern ideal of Nationalism.

Imperialism, Mr. Delisle Burns very truly says, has to be reconciled with Nationalism. And he adds that there seems no possibility of this reconciliation being effected "except through Federalism." Now, if there is one expression in the whole political vocabulary which at once throws the practical and experienced politician on his guard, it is the word "Federation." It is not that he will object to a federal system, or deny its merits. But before giving his assent in any particular instance to Federation, he will want to know in considerable detail what the word means and how the system is to be applied. Mr. Delisle Burns says that "the presence of a dominant partner distinguishes an Empire from a Federation." He adds that the essence of Federation is that each component group is united as an equal to all the others. A Federal Empire he defines in the following words: "What we mean by such a phrase is that each group is most likely to know what is best for itself; that none may be treated as politically incompetent by any other; that each may express through its own institutions, governmental or legislative, its own conception of its own interests." If this is all that is meant by Federation, then it is abundantly clear that in so far as the self-governing Colonies are concerned, the ideal has been realized. None of the self-governing groups which constitute the British Empire are in any way forced to maintain their connection with the central body. They can withdraw whenever they please. The idea of exercising any coercion

in order to prevent them from establishing separate and independent governments is wholly obsolete. Self-government in all internal affairs has been introduced into each of these Colonies. More than this, the critical questions of commercial policy and immigration have both been treated without any serious danger of disruption having been incurred. The Colonies are wholly free to frame their own tariffs, and to allow or not to allow the presence within their midst of other members of the Empire. And yet it cannot be said that the full ideal of Federation has been reached, because the Colonies leave questions of foreign policy and of peace or war entirely in the hands of the dominant partner of the whole concern. The really important question now at issue is whether this state of things can possibly last. The case is thus stated by Sir Charles Sifton in a speech delivered early in 1915 in Montreal :

Bound by no constitution, bound by no rule or law, equity or obligation, Canada has decided as a nation to make war. We have levied an army ; we have sent the greatest army to England that has ever crossed the Atlantic, to take part in the battles of England. We have placed ourselves in opposition to two great world Powers. We are now training and equipping an army greater than the combined forces of Wellington and Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo, and so I say to you that Canada must stand now as a nation. It will no longer do for Canada to play the part of a minor. It will no longer do for Canadians to say that they are not fully and absolutely able to transact their own business. We shall not be allowed to do this any longer by the nations of the world. We shall not be allowed to put ourselves in the position of a minor. The nations will say, If you can levy armies to make war you can attend to your own business, and we will not be referred to the head of the Empire, we want you to answer our questions directly. There are many questions which we shall

have to settle after this war is over, and that is one of them.

It is almost certain that the relations between the Mother Country and the self-governing Colonies will have to be reconsidered at the close of the present war. Those relations are full of anomalies, but a system of government is not to be condemned solely because it is anomalous, neither is the fact that glaring inconsistencies exist in itself sufficient to justify drastic and, it may be, hazardous reform. To quote a single instance in point, nothing could be more anomalous than the system under which for many years past both Egypt and the Egyptian Sudan have been governed, and yet it is no exaggeration to say that the progress which has been made in both these countries is in a large measure due to the fact that their rulers have tolerated many of the most serious of the anomalies of the two systems and have not endeavoured to apply any very drastic or logical remedies to their acknowledged defects. In the case now under consideration the question really at issue is whether the self-governing Colonies themselves think it is better to continue the present system, which, in spite of its defects, has produced very satisfactory results, or whether the time is come when it is necessary to embody the Imperial connection in "a cut-and-dried scheme," the enormous difficulty of framing which has been recognized by every one who has given any serious thought to this matter. "So great is the danger of definite schemes," so high an authority as Sir Charles Lucas has stated, "that it is impossible for warnings against them to be too serious or too often repeated." The only plan so far which has been seriously discussed is that which was put forward

by Sir Joseph Ward in 1911, and Mr. Asquith was able, in a few sentences, to show that his plan of creating a permanent Advisory Council, which should represent the self-governing Colonies as well as the United Kingdom, was open to the strongest objections. It is, however, possible that the difficulties, though great, are not insuperable. It cannot be doubted that at the close of the war the minds of the most experienced Colonial statesmen and administrators will be brought to bear on the subject.

As regards the Dependencies, the case is very different. Mr. Delisle Burns sees no " obstacle to Federalism " in cases such as India or Egypt, or Algeria in respect to France, or the Cameroons in respect to Germany. As regards this point, all that need be said is that if Mr. Delisle Burns's ideal is ever realized, its realization is at present so remote as to be scarcely worth discussing. The idea of federating the States of India is not new. Something of the kind was advanced more than fifty years ago by John Bright. But the principle which now holds the field is comprised in the despatch of the Government of India in December 1911, which contains the following passage :

> The only possible solution of the difficulty would appear to be gradually to give the Provinces a larger measure of self-government, until at last India would consist of a number of administrations, autonomous in all provincial affairs, with the Government of India above them all, and possessing power to interfere in cases of misgovernment, but ordinarily restricting their functions to matters of Imperial concern.

Whatever is done in the direction of self-government in India, it is, however, absolutely necessary that one dominant partner should exist in order to obviate the existence of political

chaos. It cannot be doubted that the whole question of Indian self-government will have to be reconsidered before very long, but it does not help much towards a practical solution for us to be told, as Mr. Delisle Burns tells us, that "governing others in spite of their own will, even if it be for their own good, is an obsolete policy." One of the leading Indian papers (the *Hindoo Patriot*) remarks with great truth:

> We have to make ourselves fit for Home Rule before we can expect to get it. All this premature talk about Home Rule, therefore, serves no other purpose than to fill the minds of the unthinking portion of the community with aspirations which cannot be fulfilled for some time to come, and the non-fulfilment of those aspirations must necessarily cause disappointment and thereby breed discontent.

XIX

THE MORALITY OF NATIONS [1]

"*Spectator*," *February* 19, 1916

MR. DELISLE BURNS is manifestly of opinion that the times are out of joint. With several millions of civilized men dealing death and destruction to each other in every quarter of the globe, who would be prepared to say that he is wrong? He has, therefore, resolutely set himself to work in order to discover some philosophic method or formula which may, at all events, constitute the starting-point for inaugurating a new and, as he hopes, happier era for the whole human race. He points out that "philosophy affects common life more than the practical man cares to admit; the lack of a new philosophy involves the handling of new situations with the primitive conceptions of Plato and Hegel." He is unquestionably right in holding, in the first place, that after the conclusion of this war nations will have to recast many of the ideas which they previously entertained; and, in the second place, that thinkers have exerted an influence on politics and on social life quite as great as, and even probably greater than, men of action. Adam Smith's discovery that wealth and money were not

[1] *The Morality of Nations*. By C. Delisle Burns. London: at the University of London Press. 5s. net.

synonymous terms ultimately revolutionized the economics of the world. But in order to achieve a triumph of this sort the thinker must not only think very deeply, but must also have some novel gospel, which will be subversive of old fallacies, to preach to his erring fellow-creatures. The question, therefore, arises whether Mr. Delisle Burns's thoughts are sufficiently profound, and whether his new philosophy is of a sufficiently novel character to produce any very great impression on the present and on future generations of men.

Mr. Delisle Burns is an idealist. In summing up the results of his inquiries, he says that his proposals are "perhaps not practical politics." The qualifying adverb "perhaps" might have been omitted from this phrase without in any way marring its accuracy. It is no easy matter to get idealists and practical men to understand each other, or to find a common ground on which they may meet for the interchange of opinions. The latter, having a clear perception of the impossibility of at once realizing the whole of the programme of the former, are somewhat too prone to brush all their views aside as fantastic dreams which are undeserving of serious consideration. The idealists, on the other hand, often fail to recognize that the practical men are at times really in sympathy with themselves, and that both are aiming at the attainment of the same objects, although the politicians advocate methods which, in the eyes of enthusiasts, appear both halting and half-hearted. Moreover, the idealists often attribute to practical men ideas which few, if any, entertain. Thus, Mr. Delisle Burns, after indicating the utter worthlessness of newspaper opinion, which, he says, "is generally the ghostly voice of a past age thought by

editors to represent what is generally accepted," goes on to express his scorn for " those who pride themselves on being practical," and who think that " what has occurred will occur, and that nothing can be done but what has been done." Any one who holds to this creed must certainly be very stupid, and should assuredly forfeit his claim to be considered very practical. There is, however, a real difference, if not in aims, at all events in sympathies, between the representatives of the two schools of thought, which it is difficult to bridge over. This difference is incidentally but aptly exemplified by the casual remark of Mr. Delisle Burns that " Mazzini was a greater man than Cavour." As a practical politician, but one who holds that the total rejection of ideals involves a lapse into an unworthy empiricism, I am wholly unable to concur in this view. I hold that Cavour was a much greater man than Mazzini. That, however, is of course a matter of opinion.

What, therefore, is the new philosophy that Mr. Delisle Burns has to expound ? He tells us that Napoleon did not move his troops much more quickly than Assur-bani-pal, and that, from the point of view of sea transport, the generation of 1815 possessed no great advantages over that of Vasco da Gama, or even over the Phoenicians, but that since 1850 increased facilities of locomotion and communication have produced a profound change in the relationship between States. They are far more interdependent than heretofore. Therefore, much of the teaching and many of the practices of the past must be consigned to the waste-paper basket. Also Mr. Delisle Burns deals at some length with the oft-discussed theme of the difference between States and nations. He urges us to discard antiquated ideas, and to

entertain a wholly new conception of the State. On these and on other cognate points he has much to say which is alike interesting and true. But it cannot be said to be very novel. Substantially, when a good deal of philosophy which is the common property of thinkers and of the man in the street is swept away, all that Mr. Delisle Burns has to tell us is that an earnest endeavour should be made to assimilate public and private morality. He hopes that there will be "an end of the nonsense which pretends that the morality of individuals cannot govern the relationship of States." Burke, John Bright, and many other moralists, thinkers, and practical politicians have before now dwelt on the same theme. There seemed at one time a faint hope that some little progress was being made towards the realization of this noble ideal. But Bismarck, followed by latter-day Treitschkes and Bernhardis, appeared on the political stage and, under Prussian auspices, for the time being shattered the ideal to fragments. We shall have to begin the moralization of the world again.

How is a more hopeful era to be inaugurated? Mr. Delisle Burns tells us that it is above all things necessary that we Englishmen should get rid of the "guiding conception" of the three great Government Offices—the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Foreign Office. That conception is at present one of "pure opposition" to other States. Mr. Delisle Burns does not go so far as to say that it is blameworthy on the part of the War Office and the Admiralty that they should look wholly to the efficiency of the Army and Navy respectively. He regretfully admits that, although "direct hostility" to other States is the purpose of both of these Departments, they are only performing their duty, and that they are

acting up to their own, possibly imperfect, ideas of what that duty is. But the case of the Foreign Office is different. It is "believed to represent amicably the distinct interests of a separate State." Mr. Delisle Burns is more fair to British diplomatists than most of the confraternity to which he belongs. He thinks that Ambassadors, Ministers, and Consuls have their uses, and even their merits, and that they have at times rendered valuable services. "At least as much good as evil has been done by the diplomatic system. . . . The officials, aided by tradition, have used special knowledge of foreign countries which is not in the hands of the ordinary voter or even of the average politician." They constitute a barrier capable of resisting "any too sudden or violent outburst of political passion." Mr. Delisle Burns discards the idea that any greater degree of democratic control can, in existing circumstances, be usefully exerted over foreign policy. Such a procedure "would be as futile as any other if the people accept the old conception of the State." On the other hand, the Foreign Office is "hampered by the tradition of diplomacy which it represents." It is "saturated" with wholly false ideas as to the history and proper functions of the State. Moreover, diplomatists are burdened by an "intellectual inability to grasp that one State benefits by increasing wealth in another." "A cynic might be inclined to say that the Foreign Offices in every civilized State are mere departments of the War Offices." Why is this? Because "whether the Fleet is ready has often made a difference to the manner of the Foreign Office." Most ordinary people will perhaps consider this offence as venial. Then, again, the public offices are wedded to the "lying, cheating, and spying system, which is normally

carried on by all civilized States in the Secret Service, for the purposes, of course, of self-defence." It is no valid excuse for the adoption of this system by one nation to say that it must secure itself against the predatory intentions of some other nation. "It is not regarded as moral to cheat your grocer because you suspect that he has cheated or may cheat you." This is very true, but if I have good reason for believing that my grocer is about to sprinkle with arsenic the vegetables which I have requested him to supply, there is surely nothing immoral in my obtaining the services of a detective in order to inquire into the manner in which he is conducting his business. On the contrary, the adoption of such a course would appear to constitute a very wise precaution against myself and my family being poisoned. The idea of any Balance of Power, which is a principle "belonging to the Renaissance situation," is, of course, to be wholly abandoned. By all means let it go as it was understood by Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa, as also at a later period by Metternich and Castlereagh. But even Mr. Delisle Burns recognizes that "no one State can be allowed to predominate over all others," and he does not explain to us how this is to be prevented without some regard to a Balance of Power. The preservation of some such Balance would seem to be very necessary at a time when, as Mr. Delisle Burns somewhat euphemistically puts the case, "Prussian policy still bears the mark of a rather primitive stage of thought." Here, again, the inhabitants of Luxemburg and Belgium might justly cavil at the use of the qualifying adverb "rather." Further, Mr. Delisle Burns vigorously denounces "the ancient lie which has survived that we may secure peace by preparing for war,"

although, with some apparent inconsistency, he admits that " when one State is armed all States will be armed." On this point, the extreme pacificists appear to be incorrigible. Whatever be the disadvantages of a state of armed peace, it is quite impossible to deny that if one-half of the four millions of men that the United Kingdom now has under arms had been ready for service in July 1914, the calamitous war in which more than the half of Europe is now engaged would very probably never have taken place.

The main defect of the Foreign Offices of the world, however, according to Mr. Delisle Burns, is that they consider that they have adequately performed their functions when they have succeeded in preserving peace. This is a great and capital error. Far more than this is required of them. " The avoidance of war is not a peace policy." A peace policy, properly so called, should be adopted. " There never has been a peace policy because there has been no conscious official activity in the complexities of peace." Mr. Delisle Burns proposes, therefore, that, besides a Foreign Office, a Peace Bureau should be established in this country. I am irresistibly reminded of the words —adapted from a little-known play of Goethe's, entitled *Stella*—which Canning, in the *Anti-Jacobin*, puts into the mouth of one of his characters : " A sudden thought strikes me. Let us swear eternal friendship." The experiment suggested by Mr. Delisle Burns would be somewhat hazardous, for experience has shown that extreme pacificists are quite as responsible as, and perhaps even more responsible than, extreme Chauvinists for the outbreak of wars. What are to be the functions of the Peace Bureau ? Apparently its members are not to insist on disarmament, but they are " to believe

in the protestations of our neighbours that they are not aggressive, leaving it to them to prevent their guides leading them into aggression." Mr. Delisle Burns adds, with commendable caution: "It would be a dangerous policy, but the sky would not fall." The danger is quite indubitable. The sky might not fall, but the British Empire would incur a very serious risk of falling. But Mr. Delisle Burns is not discouraged. "Who," he asks, "is likely to interfere with independence? Foreign States. Why should they? That no one has been able to explain, and, therefore, it is said to be inevitable." Mr. Delisle Burns should address these very pertinent and crucial questions to Berlin and Vienna. Were he to do so, he would probably find that explanations, of a sort, were forthcoming. In the meanwhile, it may be observed that even a backsliding and unregenerate British Foreign Office would be too pleased to believe in the peaceful protestations of our neighbours if only the latter can inspire confidence in the truthfulness and sincerity of their assertions. Until that confidence can be entertained it will, from a national point of view, be safer to adopt an attitude leaning to scepticism rather than to undue credulity.

Finally, Mr. Delisle Burns expounds what is his main cure for all the *scelerata insania belli* which now torment the world. Institutions may do something, "but the more fundamental need is, of course, a change of attitude among the citizens." That of officials, he very rightly maintains, will undergo a change if public opinion is transformed. Above all things, "a social sentiment" has to be established in every nation and amongst nations in their relations *inter se*. By "a social sentiment" Mr. Delisle Burns means "a half-emotional, half-reasoned habit of

action which may imply an established attitude, but is very often not conscious until there is a crisis—either danger or a new and strange experience. Such social sentiments are family affection, club or college loyalty, patriotism, human sympathy felt, without regard to frontiers, at the news of an earthquake, and innumerable vaguer habits of action or inhibition expressed in such phrases as 'Women and children first,' 'Noblesse oblige,' 'The things no fellow can do.'"

If Mr. Delisle Burns can do or say anything towards establishing something approaching to this "social sentiment" in Berlin, he will prove a benefactor to the human race. At present, far from showing any sympathy for the programme advocated by Mr. Delisle Burns, the whole population of Germany appears to be deeply embedded in the slough of ancient Greek and Hegelian philosophy. Mr. Delisle Burns, who is a scholar, knows that, although Thucydides, followed later by the Romans Tacitus and Sallust, was a bit of a moralist, the philosopher Aristotle (*Pol.* 1256 b) went perilously near upholding the doctrine that "might is right," and (*Rhet.* i. 9. 24) dwelt with unction on the nobility of vengeance and the wisdom of never making up a quarrel.

To sum up, it may be said that Mr. Delisle Burns's ideals, with which practical politicians may very heartily sympathize, can, even on his own admission, only be realized by the gradual growth of a more enlightened public opinion in all countries. This is quite true, but is it not a truism? Surely most men of ordinary intelligence have arrived at much the same conclusion without any study of the teaching of philosophers from Xenophanes to Mr. Delisle Burns.

Before leaving this work there is one casual remark made by Mr. Delisle Burns which calls

for observation. "The entry of England," he says, "into full alliance with France and Russia cannot yet be fully explained, since the necessary documents are not yet public." Such a hardy belief exists amongst certain sections of the public that some mysterious and pernicious methods of diplomacy are adopted by the British Foreign Office that it is the duty of every one who can speak with authority on this subject, if he is no longer hampered by the obligations of official life, to bear testimony to what actually occurred. I have frequently expressed my personal opinion that the English statesmen—not the diplomatists—failed in their duty in not forewarning the democracy of the peril impending from Germany. Further, I think that the little interest shown by Parliament before the war in foreign affairs, and the fact that international relations have for some years past ceased to cause party strife, resulted in the Foreign Office being somewhat too reticent in the publication of official papers which might to some extent have enlightened the public, especially as regards the situation in the Near East. But I happen to be very fully acquainted with all the circumstances which led to the *entente* with France in 1904, and I am fairly familiar with all that occurred in the course of the subsequent negotiations with Russia. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no documents in connection with either of these transactions remain unpublished which would throw any light upon them other than that which is contained in such papers as are already in the possession of the public. If Mr. Delisle Burns will refer to the papers laid before Parliament (Cd. 7467), he will find convincing proof that in July 1914, the Government of this country was wholly free from any engagement to support

France or Russia in the event of war. The very explicit statement made by Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador on July 29, 1914, and recorded in a despatch to Sir F. Bertie (No. 87), is conclusive on this point.

XX

THE NEW EUROPE[1]

"*Spectator*," *March* 4, 1916

EVERY European will probably agree that at the close of the present war there ought to be, and, indeed, that there must be, some reconstruction of the map of Europe. And every democratic European will also certainly agree that the basis of that reconstruction must be sought in the more ample recognition of the principle of Nationality. The real difficulty, however, consists, not in the enunciation of the principle, but in finding some method by which practical effect may be given to it. Mr. Toynbee has now republished six thoughtful little essays, originally contributed to the *Nation*, in which he deals with this question. It cannot honestly be said that Mr. Toynbee elicits any new facts, or that he adduces any arguments with which politicians who have considered this subject may not be held to be fairly familiar. Nevertheless, his essays stimulate political thought. They afford a very useful *vade-mecum* of the principles which should be borne in mind, and, perhaps still more, of those which should be abjured, in treating the question of reconstruction. Moreover, Mr. Toynbee's writings are in

[1] *The New Europe: Some Essays on Reconstruction.* By Arnold J. Toynbee. London: J. M. Dent & Sons. 1s. 6d. net.

no degree marred by the defect very commonly present in those of the school of political thinkers to which he presumably belongs. He does not inveigh against the obstructiveness of officials, the narrow-mindedness of critics, or the wickedness of Imperialists, who are at times credited with entertaining Chauvinistic intentions and opinions of which they are generally quite guiltless. On the contrary, he looks the facts fairly in the face, and expresses himself with commendable judgment and moderation. He recognizes, for instance, that "only a few peoples have grown up to Nationality in the whole course of history, and that the great majority of living populations are undoubtedly unripe for it." In making this admission, he inferentially accords his approval, not, indeed, to all Imperial policy, but at all events to the main doctrine on which the justification of British Imperialism, as at present practised, rests. Neither, save to a limited extent, can Mr. Toynbee be charged with adopting the course which often renders the outpourings of political theorists the despair of practical politicians. The latter complain, and occasionally with much reason, that the former are in the habit of leaving off at the precise point where they might profitably begin; in other words, that they enunciate principles, which not unfrequently command universal assent, but make no suggestions as to how practical effect can be given to them. Mr. Toynbee, however, in discussing the often conflicting claims of Nationality and economic interests, indicates a natural and very reasonable basis of conciliation. It is to be found in the adoption of a commercial policy based on the principle of the "open door." In dealing with the question of Federation he is less explicit, and certainly less convincing.

Obviously, the first thing to do, as a preliminary to discussing the question of Nationality, is to obtain some clear idea as to what is meant by a "nation." Many eminent political writers have dealt with this question. When the scholar Casaubon was taken to the great hall of the Sorbonne and was told by his guide that on that spot discussions had been going on for several centuries, he asked: "Qu'a-t-on décidé?" An equally pertinent question may be asked in the present instance without its being possible to elicit an absolutely satisfactory reply. It is, indeed, no easy matter to explain in epigrammatic form an idea so complex as that of Nationality. *Definitio est negatio.* It is easier to state what a nation is not than to define what it is. It is certain, for instance, that community of race, religion, and language does not, in itself, suffice to create a common and binding national sentiment. The experience of the world testifies to the accuracy of this statement. To cite a single instance, the inhabitants of Spanish South America were all bound together by close racial and religious ties. They were at one time united in the achievement of a common object—the severance of their connection with the Old World. Yet, when once that object had been attained, far from uniting, they engaged for a period of many years in a series of internecine struggles with each other. Failing, however, the adoption of any comprehensive description which will not err on the side of embracing either too much or too little, Mr. Toynbee's definition may very reasonably be accepted as sufficient for all practical purposes. Nationality, he says, must involve a "will to co-operate." It is at least true to assert that, where that will is conspicuous by its absence, no Nationality can, in the proper

sense of the term, be said to exist. On the other hand, the definition does not afford any useful clue to a practical settlement in the difficult but not uncommon case of a heterogeneous community which contains a large and powerful minority who are unwilling to co-operate.

Mr. Toynbee has no difficulty in proving to demonstration that the German ideas on this subject are not only diametrically opposed to the principle which he advocates, but that they are so wholly incapable of any rational defence that it is amazing that they should have been advanced by people who pride themselves on their high intellectual attainments. We now know more of German aims and intentions than was the case before the cannon on the Belgian frontier awoke a slumbering Europe from its ill-timed lethargy. We know, moreover, that the German policy of the day is no mushroom-growth which has suddenly sprung into existence at the bidding of a few swashbuckling Generals of the Bernhardi type. Long before their voices were heard, eminent German Professors had boasted that the " whole essence of humanity " was concentrated in the German race, and Hegel, whose sinister and fallacious philosophy struck its roots deep into the minds of his countrymen, has pleaded that all history goes to prove that at various epochs the people who most of all represented what he called " the world-spirit " must dominate over all others. Of course, he held that, alone of all the inhabitants of the globe, the Germans possessed that spirit. All who did not possess it were *rechtlos* (devoid of rights). More recently, the German programme has been authoritatively explained, with a precision which leaves nothing to be desired, by Professor Ostwald, who, in 1914, undertook a mission to Stockholm in order to

convert the Swedes to German views. He divulged to them "Germany's great secret." It was that the Germans had "discovered the fact of organization." Germany's ambition, therefore, is to "organize Europe," and it cannot be doubted that, when the task of organizing the Old World has been accomplished, the intention is to take the New World in hand. In fact, as other Germans have stated the case, a decadent world can only be saved from complete ruin by a sustained and ruthless process of Germanization. Another Professor (Franz von Liszt) has been even more explicit, and has furnished a greater degree of detailed information than Professor Ostwald. It is essential, he thinks, to found a Central European Confederation under the hegemony of Germany in order to "check the two menacing world-Powers of Great Britain and Russia."

It has, however, been found convenient to mask the arrogant lust for conquest and world-dominion with which Germany is manifestly inspired by throwing over it a transparent veil of pseudo-nationalist principle to hide its crude brutality. The pleas for the extension of the Fatherland vary greatly. They are adapted to the special circumstances of each State. They are largely based on appeals to the history of a remote past, and, as Mr. Toynbee very truly remarks, "we may almost take it as an axiom that whenever a cause invokes historical sentiment on its behalf, that cause is bankrupt of arguments reasonably applicable to the actual situation." Belgium and Burgundy are claimed for Germany "because the Mediaeval Empire called them its own." As well might King George V. put in a claim to Normandy based on the pretensions of his Plantagenet predecessors. Posen, Schleswig, and also—as a supplementary

argument — Belgium ought to belong to Germany by reason of their proximity. "They are necessary complements to the frontiers of the Fatherland." Flemings and Alsatians must be swept into the net because they speak a Teutonic language. Thus, "patriotic German atlases fetter to the 'Fatherland' masses of Dutchmen, Belgians, Frenchmen, Italians, and Swiss, who are unshakably devoted to their own nationality." Little attention need be paid to all this sophistry, which, indeed, is scarcely capable of deceiving a child. This aspect of the subject is, however, purely negative. The refutation of the German case, though dialectically a matter of extreme simplicity, does not show what a nation is. It merely indicates what it is not.

The "will to co-operate" may be produced by other causes than those which tend to create national sentiment. It may, as in the case of the Hapsburg Monarchy, be due to geographical necessity and economic interests. The idea of a "natural frontier" is so far reasonable that, for instance, Trieste, though an Italian town, is an absolutely necessary outlet for the trade of the non-Italian inhabitants of Central Europe. Fiume stands in the same relation to Hungary. How, therefore, are the conflicting claims of Nationality and economic evolution to be harmonized? Not, assuredly, as Mr. Norman Angell seems to suggest, by looking solely to the economic and ignoring the nationalist factor in the situation, but rather by reconstructing Europe on the very reasonable principle advocated by Mr. Toynbee—namely, that of allowing an "economic right of way" to inland States. It has been applied with success in the case of Antwerp, whose trade was allowed free access to the sea through Dutch territory. Mr. Toynbee cites

further cases in point. The principle, which is one of great value and importance, is capable of extension.

In dealing with another aspect of the application of the Nationalist principle, Mr. Toynbee's views, though, it may be, academically sound, can scarcely be considered very practical. He admits that many peoples are "unripe" for self-government. Hence, the policy of *laissez-faire* is impossible. Such peoples must, at all events for a time, be dominated by others. On the other hand, there is a certain potentiality of nation-making in every homogeneous community. To destroy a fully developed nation is, Mr. Toynbee thinks, "murder." To strangle a community which may some day become a nation is "infanticide." What, therefore, is the solution? Mr. Toynbee finds it in Federation, and he points to the example of the United States to justify his proposal. It is, indeed, a fact that, when North America achieved its independence, there was a moment when it seemed probable that the thirteen sovereign States on the Atlantic seaboard might fly asunder. But the "will to co-operate" existed, and Federation ensued. "This concept of a 'Federal Territory' has been the United States' greatest contribution to political thought." It is, however, more than doubtful whether it will be possible to apply a similar principle elsewhere. Mr. Toynbee appears to forget that, in America, Federation was immensely facilitated by the proximity to each other of the different units who federated. Amongst the component parts of the British Empire the "will to co-operate" exists in a very high degree. Why, therefore, has complete federation not yet taken place, and why does the realization of the idea still present such formidable difficulties? Ob-

viously, because the several units of the Empire are widely scattered. As to India, Egypt, and other similar territories, it is clear that the differences between their inhabitants and those of North America are so profound that no analogy based on the precedent of the United States is of much value. In these cases, all that is possible is to continue the policy which has already been adopted ; that is to say, to do nothing calculated to arrest the growth of nascent and legitimate national aspirations, to govern well and wisely, and to watch the further development of events.

XXI

THE NEUTRALITY OF AMERICA

"*Spectator*," *September* 11, 1915

It can scarcely be expected that the most omnivorous reader will be able to keep abreast of all the voluminous war literature of the day. Nevertheless, it may be hoped that Professor Shield Nicholson's admirable pamphlet, *The Neutrality of the United States in Relation to the British and German Empires* (Macmillan & Co., 6d.), will be widely read both in the United States and in the United Kingdom. It affords abundant food for reflection to the English-speaking race on both sides of the Atlantic.

Amidst the many errors into which German materialism, in its scorn for all moral influences, has fallen, probably none is greater than the miscalculation made of the effect likely to be produced on American public opinion by the war. The German view, as originally held, may, broadly speaking, be stated in the form of a syllogism, thus : The Americans care for nothing but making money. They will make more money if the English, who are their commercial rivals, are crushed out of existence. *Ergo*, America will be wholly on the side of Germany.

Those who, like myself, had seen something of the spirit displayed by the American people

during the great struggle of more than half a century ago, when they were fighting for the unity of their country and for the predominance of a high over a relatively lower moral standard of civilization, were not likely to be deceived by a transparent sophism of this description. They would deride the attempt made by a German megalomaniac, by name Professor Sombart,' whose silly diatribes are quoted by Professor Nicholson, to divide the Teutonic race into German heroes and Anglo-Saxon hucksters. They had learnt from history that the hucksters had often displayed the truest heroism, and, especially if they had been behind the diplomatic scenes, they knew that the heroes had at times shown themselves adepts in the art of huckstering. There are, without doubt, sordid devotees of Mammon in New York and Chicago, as there are in London and Berlin, but it was a very serious political error to suppose that a great nation, which had heretofore posed as the special champion of international morality and of the observance of treaty rights, would suddenly abandon all its most cherished principles, and subordinate them wholly to monetary influences. Absolutism is, however, a bad judge of democracy. The German absolutists do not, indeed, appear until quite recently to have made any really serious effort to understand American public opinion. This mistake being at last recognized, some belated efforts were eventually made to show the Americans how entirely they had misunderstood the spirit which animates German policy. Herr von Mach, for instance, has denounced Bernhardi and all his works. He has explained how erroneous it is to suppose that Germany is the home of militarism; how the Kaiser, whose title of " War Lord " is merely

a synonym for the more usual expression of "Commander-in-Chief," is, in truth, "the great prince of peace"; and how the divine right of Kings, a belief in which has been banished from the Anglo-Saxon world since Charles I. lost his head, is "no more than a deep personal religious conviction." The effect of these blandishments is somewhat discounted by Professor Sombart, who writes exclusively for a German public, and who stoutly declares that "militarism is German heroism made visible"; that it is "a holy thing, the holiest thing on earth"; that the State—that political creation which is so dear to the German mind—is super-individual, inasmuch as it is "the conscious organization of something above the individual," that "something" being apparently incarnated in the Kaiser; that the Germans are "the representatives of God's thought on earth"; that they intend "to take as much of the sea and of the earth as they need for their existence and for their natural increase," but with the consolatory proviso that they "do not want anything more than this"; and that when the aged Kant, who is the sole known German representative of pacificism, wrote a "wretched book" on *Everlasting Peace*, he sinned against "the holy ghost of Germanism." Which is the true representative of contemporaneous German thought —Herr von Mach or Professor Sombart? All the evidence available points to the conclusion that this honour may be assigned to the latter rather than to the former of these antagonistic political philosophers.

The English democracy never made any such serious blunders as these. From the first they felt no doubt that they would secure the sympathies of their brother-democrats on the other

side of the Atlantic. Neither have they been disappointed in their expectation. But it cannot be denied that as outrage succeeded to violation, as more and more solemn treaty obligations were added to the scrap-heap, and as it became daily more apparent that no considerations based on public morality or the dictates of humanity would be allowed to interfere with the ruthless execution of the policy of "frightfulness," Englishmen, notably before the sinking of the *Arabic* led to a change in the attitude assumed by President Wilson, were somewhat amazed at American patience, and, albeit they were very reluctant either to criticize the action of the United States Government or to have the least appearance of proffering advice as to what course was dictated by American interests, they began to mutter *Quousque tandem?* beneath their breath.

Professor Nicholson now explains that the strictures which the policy adopted by President Wilson has evoked, whether in America or in England, arise from "failure to grasp the distinction between national interests and national sympathies." To an outside observer, who has not the privilege of having been brought personally into contact with Mr. Wilson, his public conduct reveals a type of character with which the world has for long been familiar. He is apparently a high-minded man of thought rather than a resolute man of action. He is deeply and very rightly impressed by the responsibility of his position. He is earnestly desirous of doing his duty not only to his country, but also, it cannot be doubted, to the civilized world. Professor Nicholson pays a high and well-deserved tribute to his learning. "Of the theory and the history of political science," he says, "Mr.

Woodrow Wilson knows more than all the other rulers of the world put together." Before forming any opinion he examines the arguments on both sides of any controversy with the most scrupulous care and conscientiousness. "He is himself so reasonable and impartial that he wants to make all the people in the United States equally open-minded and patient." Thus, if he eventually decides on taking any definite action, he will almost certainly have the whole public opinion of America at his back. This is unquestionably a very great advantage. On the other hand, Mr. Wilson cannot escape from the defects of his qualities. "Academic training," Professor Nicholson remarks with great truth, "is liable to beget, not only the very great merit of patience, but the very grave demerit of indecision."

The main issue involved in the present struggle has been stated in many epigrammatic forms. It may be submitted for the consideration of the people of the United States that the essential point, in so far as they are concerned, is this—that the result of the war will supply a practical answer to a crucial question in which they, perhaps more than any other community on the face of the globe, are deeply interested. That question is as follows: "Is democracy a failure?" Political philosophers, at least from the days of Bacon downwards, have repeatedly pointed out that war and revolution afford the surest tests in estimating the solidity of the foundations on which any political fabric is based. How will democracy stand this test? The experience so far gained tends to show that democracy possesses some important but nevertheless relatively minor defects which absolutism avoids, whilst, on the other hand, it can secure

one triumph to which absolutism can never hope to aspire. The defects are manifested by unpleasant symptoms, such as strikes, which seem to indicate an abuse of liberty and a failure to appreciate the gravity of a great crisis, the latter being, in the case of the English democracy, due in some respects to the insular position of England. The triumph, which is of world-wide interest and importance, is that the true basis of Imperial rule has been clearly shown to consist, not in an increase of coercion, but in an extension of liberty. The cohesion displayed in the face of menace by the scattered units which constitute the British Empire is one of the most remarkable and instructive facts recorded in history.

But no final verdict can as yet be delivered on the relative merits of the two systems when judged by the test which has now been applied. The sword has been thrown into the scale, and the sword must, in so far at all events as the present generation is concerned, decide. In the meanwhile the general sympathies of the citizens of the United States can scarcely be a matter of doubt. On every point German ideals run diametrically counter to all the principles of government which the American people hold as most sacred. British ideals, on the contrary, are in complete conformity with those principles. It would be inconceivable that Americans should not display sympathy in the one, and antipathy, amounting almost to a feeling of repulsion, in the other case. That, however, is in itself no reason why America should actively interfere in the contest. "The United States," Professor Nicholson very truly remarks, "cannot set up to be the general judge and policeman for the whole world. Don Quixote himself might have

quailed before such a task." It is perfectly reasonable to maintain that active interference on the part of the United States can only be justified in the eyes of American citizens by arguments based, not on sympathies, but on interests. Nevertheless, it would appear to outsiders that a wide interpretation should be given to the word "interests." That, however, is a point which Americans alone can decide. The main object of Professor Nicholson's work is to elucidate the various pleas and circumstances which merit consideration in arriving at a decision. It would be difficult to strengthen the logical force of the chain of the arguments which he employs in his treatment of this subject, or to improve on the felicity of the language in which those arguments are clothed. He concludes by a statement which is of a nature to carry conviction to the minds of all lovers of justice and humanity in democratic countries. "What," he says, "America owes to others is to support, so far as her duty to herself will permit, the law of nations as against the arbitrary violation by military power."

Before leaving this instructive work it may be mentioned that even those who are fairly familiar with the economic writings of List are possibly unaware of a feature in the history of German development to which Professor Nicholson draws attention—namely, that the political programme which of late years has been steadily pursued by German statesmen was originally traced out almost in its complete entirety by List. There is, however, this notable difference in the method foreshadowed by List and that actually employed by his successors—that whereas List contemplated that his ideals would be attained by none but peaceful means, his suc-

cessors, being in a hurry, and being, moreover, intoxicated with the sense of German omnipotence, have considered it advisable that those ideals should be speedily realized by the use of force. Incidentally, it may be mentioned, as a point which is perhaps worthy of special attention at Amsterdam, that List held that "Holland belongs as much to Germany as Brittany and Normandy belong to France." The remark naturally leads to the reflection that if Germany should be vanquished in the present contest, all will fortunately be well for nations which have been able to preserve their neutrality. The triumph of the Allies will incidentally involve their triumph. But if—*quod Dîs non placeat*—the contrary should prove to be the case, and if Germany should emerge victorious from the struggle, neutrals will eventually have to ask themselves whether a more timely and active interference on their part might not have obviated the disastrous results which must inevitably ensue both to themselves and to the world in general. Unless they are in a position to answer this question with a very confident negative, history will record the highly condemnatory verdict of "Too late"—than which none is more fatal to the reputation of statesmen—on the conduct of the politicians who, during this period of crisis, have guided the destinies of their respective countries.

XXII

A NEUTRAL ON THE WAR [1]

"*Spectator*," *January* 22, 1916

THERE is probably not a single subject of King George V. who, if he were asked to give his opinion on the relative merits of absolutism and democracy, would not unhesitatingly cast his vote in favour of the latter of these two forms of government. There is also probably not a single thoughtful or impartial Briton, Canadian, or Australian who would not admit that the true defence of democracy consists more in dwelling upon the proved deficiencies of absolutism than on maintaining that anything like perfection can be obtained under democratic rule. The defects of democracy are, indeed, glaring and manifold. Never have they been brought into greater prominence than at present. They have assumed different forms in different countries. In France, they were manifested by a state of dangerous unpreparedness against a peril which Frenchmen, confident in the sincerity of their own peaceful intentions, had allowed themselves to underrate. In the United Kingdom, we have had to balance the extraordinary triumph gained by free institutions in welding a

[1] *Before, During, and After 1914.* By Anton Nyström. London: William Heinemann. 7s. 6d. net.

whole heterogeneous Empire together—a feat of which absolutism would have been wholly incapable—against the facts that we were not only less prepared than the French at the outbreak of the war, but that the national discipline, which was essential to ensure victory, was, in the first instance at all events, inadequate in many important respects to meet the crisis. In the United States the weak points of democracy have been no less prominent, but they have shown themselves in a different manner. One of the inevitable consequences of popular government is that the destinies of the State may for a time be entrusted to rulers who, having been chosen in normal circumstances, suddenly find themselves obliged to deal with other circumstances of a wholly unexpected and abnormal character. When Mr. Wilson was elected to be the President of the United States, there was every reason to suppose that the ship of State, which was entrusted to his guidance, would only have to encounter such comparatively light breezes as might be expected from the treatment of the internal affairs of his own country, and of external affairs of no extraordinary importance. Instead of that, the captain of the vessel has found himself tossed hither and thither by a hurricane of a violence hitherto unprecedented in the history of the world.

Has he proved a daring pilot in this extremity? Has he risen to the occasion? Has he fully realized the gravity of the issues at stake? Does he understand that not only the future of his own country, but that of democracy and of the moral well-being of the world, depend on the result of this war? The most indulgent critic, after waiting patiently for symptoms which would have enabled him to reform his judgment,

and which he would have gladly accepted, must now perforce answer all these questions with a decided negative. It is not necessary to assign President Wilson's undoubted shortcomings to a somewhat ignoble and opportunist desire to catch votes which would ensure his own renewal of office. A sufficient explanation is probably to be found in the fact that his very virtues have proved obstacles to his success in the domain of statesmanship. Great intellectual attainments and sound academic training were not the qualities most of all required to deal with a situation which called for strong resolution, a mind capable of grasping firmly the relative importance of events, and a full appreciation of the fact that the blessings of a temporary peace may be secured at too high a price. President Wilson had one of the grandest opportunities ever offered to a statesman. He failed to seize it. He has allowed all the best elements in the great nation over whose fortunes he temporarily presides to be exposed to that for which no material gain can compensate—a loss of self-respect. He has made democracy the laughing-stock of the absolutist Governments of the world, whose diplomatists have hypnotized him with honeyed words, whilst their agents, more rightly interpreting the wishes of their masters, have continued to blow up American factories, slaughter peaceful American citizens on the high seas, and tear to shreds all those international treaties of which it has been the proud boast of the American democracy to pose as the foremost champion.

The sentiments evoked in the United Kingdom are somewhat more complex. In spite of the complete official separation between the two countries, the average Englishman can never be got to regard the Americans as foreigners.

He looks upon them as his own kith and kin. He never expected the United States to join in the war unless some distinctly American interest imperatively called for an appeal to arms. He was surprised, but not deeply offended, when the opportunity was taken by President Wilson to raise a number of intricate legal questions which, in view of the enormous importance of other interests at stake, might well have been allowed to remain dormant. He knew that, at a time when America was herself struggling for her own national unity and existence, a large section of the British public had behaved somewhat shabbily. He was, therefore, to some extent conscience-stricken, and in his desire to make atonement for past errors he was very reluctant to indulge in severe criticism. But when he learnt that the President adjured his fellow-countrymen to construe neutrality into the denial of sympathy with a just cause, which touched the most vital points of civilization and democracy, his surprise deepened into a feeling very akin to shame and contempt. He felt like some member of an illustrious family who learns that a near relation, bearing his own honoured name, has conducted himself in a manner calculated to attract the censure of all high-minded people. He felt ashamed of his kinship, and this sentiment predominated over any purely selfish view of the material help that he could have secured by active assistance from his kinsmen. The situation was saved by a section of the American Press, and by writers such as Professor Church, Mr. Abbott, and others, who convinced the British public that, whatever might be the official attitude of the United States Government, the heart of the American people was really with them. Had it not been for their intervention,

it is possible that, in addition to the other calamitous consequences ensuing from the war, a deplorable estrangement might have taken place between the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race.

A study of Dr. Nyström's work may be earnestly commended to those who think, with President Wilson, that neutrality in action must necessarily be accompanied by apathy or indifference in thought and language. Dr. Nyström is a distinguished Swede. Mr. Edmund Gosse has sketched his career in a brief preface which accompanies the translation of his work. "His intellectual activities have been multifarious." He is a Positivist. He has devoted much of his time to the study of that somewhat disappointing and unproductive science, craniology. He is also a comparative ethnologist, and he is able to show that his countryman, Dr. Sven Hedin, who, he thinks, with some apparent reason, must be bereft of his senses, is talking nonsense when he speaks of the "racial treason" of the British to the Germanic people, for not only is the population of Great Britain highly composite, but the German nation contains a large admixture of Celtic and Slav blood. Prince Bismarck himself said: "I am not a German; I am a Prussian, a Wend." Dr. Nyström has written a voluminous *General History of Civilization.* In the field of practical work, he initiated a far-reaching effort to raise the intellectual level of the Swedish working classes, and founded the Working Man's Institute at Stockholm. He pronounces himself, in the words of the French philosopher Bayle, to be "*neither a Frenchman, nor a German, nor an Englishman, nor a Spaniard, etc.,*" but "*a denizen of the world.*"[1] He is

[1] In this and in other quotations the italics are in the original.

certainly not inspired by any anti-German prejudices. He does full justice to the attainments of German science, German research, and German literature, especially that of the period when the mind of the German nation was represented by such men as Kant, Goethe, and Schiller, and had not been poisoned by the pseudo-philosophy of later writers. More than this, he appears to entertain a warm admiration for the Great Frederick. He thinks that that monarch would never have agreed to the second or third partitions of Poland, and he attaches more importance than is generally attached to the irreproachable moral sentiments which the greatest of the Hohenzollerns expressed on paper, and which he wholly ignored when the time came for him to act. Incidentally, it may be remarked that when Frederick the Grêât made to the philosopher Sulzer the observation to which Dr. Nyström alludes, "You do not understand sufficiently this accursed race to which we belong," it must, in justice to the inhabitants of other countries, be remembered that this judgment on the whole human race was presumably founded mainly on the experience which the ruler of Prussia had gained in dealing with his own subjects.

Such, therefore, are Dr. Nyström's title-deeds to speak on the subject now under discussion. They are more than respectable. They fully justify a claim on the part of Dr. Nyström to speak with the voice of that authority which is derived from profound learning and from the inspiration of high moral aims. What, therefore, has Dr. Nyström to say? He holds that to imagine that "individuals could be absolutely neutral in discussing one or other of the belligerent Powers in this, the vastest war in the history of man, is unthinkable." He, like most Swedes,

and like, probably, most Americans, thinks that his country should take no active part in the war; but, unlike President Wilson and those who agree with him, he is of opinion that "any one who conscientiously, and in the interests of truth and justice, studies the course of events, must be entitled to express his opinion, even if such expression of opinion involves severe criticism. If this were not so, silence in the name of neutrality would be synonymous with cowardice, want of character, or indifference." He gives his reasons for breaking silence. They are as follows:

> The World War has almost entirely destroyed the sense of justice, and all codes of right and wrong were upset when brutal force became the dominant principle. The law of nations no longer exists, all passions have been unchained, hate prevents the exercise of reason, nations live that they may kill and plunge one another into distress and misery, the foremost inventions deal out death and destruction, humaneness is a mockery, truth is withheld and falsehood organized, the future is wrapt in gloom, the brotherhood of nations is made impossible, the brute in us is brought to the fore, and peace will be but a transient truce to be obeyed until the nations, with their souls black with hatred, once more fly at each other's throats.

Dr. Nyström then enters into a very careful examination of the question where the responsibility for the creation of this deplorable state of things rests, and he comes to the only conclusion which is possible to any one who impartially examines all the facts and arguments. The entire responsibility rests with Germany and Austria, especially with the former Power. Dr. Nyström brushes aside, as utterly unworthy of consideration, the flimsy excuses offered by the Germans on the ground that Russia, by a premature mobilization of her troops, rendered the war inevitable

" There is," he says, " no doubt that the German Imperial Government *could have averted war* had they wished to do so." The only German of note who has had the courage and honesty to speak the truth on the subject is Maximilian Harden, who has boldly said : " It is *not against our own will* that we have committed ourselves to this tremendous adventure. We have not been forced into it by surprise. *We willed it*—we had to will it " ; and who also, when speaking of the semi-apologies offered for the violation of Belgian neutrality, said : " Why all this talk ? *It is brute force that dictates our laws.* Has the stronger ever yielded to the impudent pretensions of the weaker ? "

The views expressed by this distinguished neutral should surely carry some weight with other neutrals. Englishmen, at all events, will regard Dr. Nyström's testimony as satisfactory evidence that the very active and very costly campaign of mendacity by which Germany has made such strenuous efforts to influence the opinion of the world, has not altogether met with the success which its authors hoped and anticipated. It is a significant fact that the study of international law has been suspended at the Copenhagen University. It is rightly considered that it would be " a waste of time " to study a science which has temporarily ceased to exist, and which cannot be revived until German Chauvinism, which, as Dr. Nyström says, is " without parallel in the world's history," ceases to dominate Europe.

Dr. Nyström has evidently fully grasped the vital importance of the issues at stake. He sees that, in the words of Coleridge, the Germans have played such tricks with their own consciences that they " dare not look on their own

vices." He understands that there can be no durable peace for Europe until the German bellicose spirit changes, and until the whole nation awakes from the nightmare which at present oppresses it. It may be doubted whether even yet the realities of the situation are fully appreciated by the whole of the British public. Otherwise, it is almost inconceivable that educated men, like the late Home Secretary and writers in the *Nation*, should still cavil at the very moderate proposals tardily advanced by the present Government in order to ensure the victory of civilization.

XXIII

JOHN HAY [1]

"*Spectator*," *December* 25, 1915

FOREIGNERS, a term which for the purposes of the present argument may be held to embrace all but the English-speaking races, must find America and the Americans difficult of comprehension, and even kindred Anglo-Saxons may arrive at very erroneous conclusions as regards the working of American institutions unless they maintain a firm grip of what, for want of a better expression, may be termed political perspective. If either one class or the other keep their attention steadily fixed on the general nature of those institutions, on the really permanent and predominant features of American national character, and on the ideals to the accomplishment of which American policy has generally been directed, they will find much which will elicit their warmest admiration. If, however, they lay undue stress on the casual excrescences of the American system, they will find much to condemn, and may even, more especially if they are themselves the subjects of an absolute ruler, derive some pharisaical but very fallacious consolation from the reflection that the country

[1] *Life and Letters of John Hay.* By William Roscoe Thayer. 2 vols. London: Constable & Co. 21s. net.

of their birth is ruled under a system very different from that which prevails amongst these democratic publicans. The contrasts presented by American political life are, indeed, very striking. On the one hand, it may be noted that a very high standard of morality often constitutes the guiding principle of State policy. On the other hand, a feeling little short of disgust is engendered by the by-products of the system, such, for instance, as corruption, place-hunting, and an extreme degree of newspaper licence, all of which appear to germinate and to blossom freely under democratic rule. Mr. Thayer's very interesting biography of John Hay brings these rival aspects of American public life into special prominence. Both the character and the career of Hay were typically American. The son of a small Illinois doctor, he owed nothing to the accident of birth or to other adventitious causes. He was emphatically a self-made man, but without a tinge of the somewhat displeasing qualities which are at times developed in those who have been the makers of their own fortunes. In his boyhood there was a question of his becoming a schoolmaster. He records that his " very pious friends were convinced that there was no sphere of life for him but the pulpit." He himself wished to be a poet, and at one time wrote to his Egeria, Miss Nora Perry, in the true spirit of juvenile Romanticist despondency. " I have wandered," he said, " this winter in the valley of the shadow of death. All the universe, God, earth and Heaven, have been to me but vague and gloomy phantasms. I have conversed with wild imaginings in the gloom of the forest." To the great benefit both of his country and of literature, this phase lasted but a short while, for, although he maintained to the last his poetic imagination,

it may be inferred from the specimens of his poetry which are reproduced by his biographer that in this particular branch of literary activity he would never have got beyond that mediocrity which, Horace has told us, is hateful alike to gods and men. Eventually he settled down to study the law, but the turning-point in his life came when, at twenty-two years of age, he obtained a post of a nature calculated, probably, more than any other to lay the foundations of an useful political career. He was appointed assistant private secretary to Abraham Lincoln. He thus became apprenticed to a master of rare excellence.

The temptation to turn aside from the biography of Hay himself in order to dwell upon the career of one of the greatest statesmen that the nineteenth century produced is strong. Without unduly yielding to it, it may be noted that Mr. Thayer, without adding anything substantially new to what we know of Lincoln, confirms two impressions which have floated down the tide of history and have fixed themselves in the public mind. He speaks of Lincoln's eloquence and of his homely wit. So good a judge of oratory as Lord Curzon has characterized the famous Gettysburg speech as "a masterpiece of modern English eloquence." The following, which is less known, also reaches a very high standard. It was delivered on March 4, 1861, before the Civil War broke out. "I am loth," Lincoln said, "to close. We are not enemies but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield, and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the

Union, when again touched, as they surely will be, by the better angels of our nature." Lincoln's simple and pathetic eloquence came not from his head but his heart. That is why it produced so great an effect on his hearers. Goethe was quite right when he said :

> Doch werdet ihr nie Herz zu Herzen schaffen,
> Wenn es euch nicht von Herzen geht.

One specimen of that typically national humour for which Lincoln became celebrated may also be given. Although he behaved with the utmost magnanimity to McClellan, who intrigued against him, he could not forbear in private conversation from declaring his true opinion. Hay's diary records that Lincoln said to him : " McClellan is like Jim Jett's brother. Jim used to say that his brother was the d——dest scoundrel that ever lived, but in the infinite mercy of Providence he was also the d——dest fool." We are unable to form an opinion on the justice of this withering analogy, for the fame of Jim Jett's brother has never crossed the Atlantic. In some respects the mantle of the peculiar class of wit possessed by Lincoln appears to have fallen on his private secretary, for years afterwards he records that in the lobby of one of the Houses of Parliament he met Lord Eliot " looking, with his blazing head and whiskers, as if he had just come through hell with his hat off."

After Lincoln's death, Hay's occupations, though of a somewhat promiscuous character, were generally either diplomatic or journalistic. At Paris, he saw a good deal of Napoleon III., for whom he entertained a very great dislike, and whose character he sketched in graphic prose and somewhat indifferent verse. At Vienna, he notes that " Austria is the only country on

earth where the priests wear top boots," and he speaks with democratic scorn of a people who are "starting off with the awkward walk of political babyhood." In Spain, Castelar's principles and oratory excited his warmest admiration. After an interval of some years, during which he wrote for the "Great Moral Organ," in other words for the *Tribune*, he was sent as American Ambassador to London, a post which he occupied with equal advantage to the country which employed him and to that to which he was accredited. Indeed, it may be said that, with the very able assistance of Mr. Henry White, whose numerous friends in this country will read with pleasure the very well deserved praise Mr. Thayer bestows upon him, the greatest work of Hay's life was that he strenuously held to the principle that the two great Anglo-Saxon races should always be united by the bonds of the closest amity. When he was eventually appointed Secretary of State, he encountered great opposition from his own countrymen in the execution of this policy. At one time he speaks of "the mad-dog hatred of England prevalent amongst newspapers and politicians" in America. At another time he records, when speaking of the "Open Door" negotiations in China, that "every Senator he sees says: 'For God's sake, don't let it appear that we have any understanding with England.'" He complains that "Bryan, roaring out his desperate appeals to hate and envy, is having an effect on the dangerous classes." "No sane man," he wrote to a friend abroad, "can appreciate the stupid and mad malignancy of our Anglophobia." But in the end his statesmanship and patience triumphed. After a long struggle, he signed the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, and generally settled all outstanding questions

between the United States and Great Britain in a reasonable and satisfactory manner.

Hay was a staunch democrat in the ordinary and not the American party sense of that term. His hatred of absolutism comes out clearly in the views he expresses about the German Emperor. He mistrusted the German Government, which, he said, was "generally brutal but seldom silly." In November, 1900, he wrote to his friend Henry Adams: "We are spared the infamy of an alliance with Germany. I would rather, I think, be the dupe of China than the chum of the Kaiser." He saw clearly enough that German policy and German intrigues in America, of which a very interesting account is given by Mr. Thayer, were mainly directed towards encouraging American Anglophobia. In spite, however, of his loyalty to democratic institutions, he was not blind to the defects of democracy. He turned with loathing from the place-hunting and corruption which are so prevalent in the United States. He tells how, when the American Consul at Berlin died, the President wished to appoint to the vacant place "the best Consul in the service." He was deterred from doing so. "Before the other man's funeral, nearly every State in the Union had claimed the place by wire." He was obliged to give the Consulship at Iquique to a protégé of a Senator who did not know that Iquique was in Chile, but thought it was in Mexico. "The pressure for a place," he wrote in 1902, "is almost indescribable." Mr. Thayer is scarcely fair on the Old World when he says, in giving some instances of petty corruption in the American Consular Service: "Such practices would cause no remark in a monarchy; in a republic they are among the ironies of patriotism." In none of the more advanced monarchies of

Europe would many of the practices to which Mr. Thayer alludes be tolerated.

Hay's relations with the legislative bodies in America were peculiar. Those with the Senate were very distinctly unfriendly. "There will," he wrote in 1900, "always be thirty-four per cent of the Senate on the blackguard side of every question that comes before them." At a moment when a good deal of pressure is being exerted in this country to place diplomacy to a greater extent than heretofore under democratic control, the opinion on this subject of one of the most eminent and successful diplomatists that America has produced is worth noting. But, in truth, it is impossible to read Mr. Thayer's work without entertaining a strong suspicion that John Hay was one of the least democratic democrats that ever lived. Mr. Thayer says: "Almost from the first he held the Senate as his antagonist. That a few men, not diplomats by training, should have the right to shatter a delicate piece of diplomacy seemed to him as monstrous as if a clodhopper should be privileged to trample on a violin. The artist in him revolted; his reason revolted; his conscience revolted." This assuredly indicates a highly undemocratic frame of mind; neither is an altogether satisfactory explanation afforded by pleading that, as was certainly the case, Hay in his disputes with the Senate was generally right and that the latter were wrong. Diplomatists and other officials who serve a democratic Government have to recognize the fact that in accepting the advantages they must also be prepared to put up with the inconveniences of democracy. Lord Salisbury, who often had to encounter difficulties very similar in character to those which aroused Hay's indignation, treated the matter with more

toleration and in a more philosophic spirit. I remember on one occasion his saying to me that a Foreign Minister in a democratic country was in much the same position as the steersman of a surf-boat outside the mouth of an African river. He has to wait for a high wave to get him over the bar. Being animated with sentiments such as those which Mr. Thayer has described, it was natural that Hay should despise the arts of the demagogue. He speaks with scorn of what he calls "gutter Ciceros," and of the practice adopted during a sharp electoral campaign of "hiring dirty orators by the dozen to blather on street corners." He very rightly held that it was the special duty of statesmen in democratic countries to have the courage of their opinions. He himself wrote a novel, entitled *The Bread Winners*, which was widely read, and which was really an elaborate defence of Capital against the attacks of Labour; and in 1905 he wrote to President Roosevelt: "It is a comfort to see the most popular man in America telling the truth to our masters, the people. It requires no courage to attack wealth and power, but to remind the masses that they too are subject to the law, is something few public men dare to do."

America at her best can produce men of a very high type. Such a man was John Hay. He was an honourable gentleman, a loyal friend, and a far-seeing and courageous statesman rather than a politician in the technical sense in which that term is used both in England and in the United States. So much of his work was done behind the scenes that it may well be that posterity will recognize his signal merits somewhat less than those of others who played on the political stage in the full glare of the footlights. Nevertheless, his Anglo-Saxon kinsmen on both

sides of the Atlantic will be merely performing an act of posthumous justice if they willingly accord to him the sole privilege which, with his dying breath, he claimed. That privilege was that he "should occupy a modest place in the history of his time."

XXIV

SOUTH AMERICA [1]

"*Spectator*," *November* 6, 1915

POLITICAL prophecy, provided the prophets are wise enough to confine their predictions to wide generalizations, is by no means so difficult or so hazardous a task as is often supposed. The path of the historian is, indeed, strewn with the gloomy utterances of false prophets who have regarded as disastrous measures which subsequently proved to be not only beneficial, but highly invigorating to the society and to the State in which they were adopted. But side by side with these prophetic failures many instances may be cited of acute political observers who have made very accurate forecasts of the future. Lord Chesterfield and Vauban, the latter speaking at a time when the French Monarchy seemed to be founded on a rock, both foretold the French Revolution. Where, however, the prophets have almost invariably erred is in not allowing sufficient time for political evolution. They have had a clear vision of the ultimate results which must ensue from the adoption of some faulty system or institution, but they have usually underestimated the time

[1] *The South Americans.* By W. H. Koebel. London: Methuen & Co. 10s. 6d. net.

required for the development and general recognition of its inherent defects. Thus De Tocqueville cast a remarkably accurate horoscope of the course which would be run by the Second Empire, but it took seventeen years to bring about results which he thought would be much more speedily accomplished. South America is another case in point. Sir Spencer Walpole, in his *History of Twenty-five Years*, says that Canning was speaking very wide of the mark when he made his famous boast that the New World could be called into existence to redress the balance of the Old. "Nothing is more certain than that the New World, which Mr. Canning thought he had called into existence, had redressed no balance which was worth redressing. . . . Neither he nor his successors realized that it was the growth of Anglo-Saxon power in the North, and not the destruction of Latin rule in the South, which was ultimately to redress the balance of the world." Until recently, it would have been generally thought that Walpole's criticism was valid. Yet it would now seem that, after the lapse of a century, Canning may possibly turn out to be a truer prophet than the world has heretofore supposed.

"The romance of industry," Mr. Koebel says in his interesting sketch of the present condition of South America, "has probably nothing to show comparable with that worked out in the Americas." The rise of South America dates from the downfall of Spanish rule. Until after the War of Independence, every industry, save that of mining, was discouraged. Moreover, "the policy of Spain, which eventually proved so fatal to her Empire, was directed against the development of colonial intellect." No literature save religious treatises, the Lives of the Saints,

and works on art was allowed to penetrate into the South American continent. Under such conditions no moral or material progress was possible. As in the case of Egypt, which on a far smaller scale presents, from the point of view of economic conditions, some analogy with Argentina and other portions of South America, what was principally required was not so much the speedy introduction of good government as the removal of the artificial obstacles created by bad government which stood in the way of allowing Man free scope to take advantage of the benefits lavished by Nature. The Governments introduced into the sixteen Republics into which the Spanish Monarchy was originally resolved were, in the first instance, distinctly bad. For many years South America suffered from what Mr. Koebel aptly calls "a surfeit of politics." It might have been thought that racial, religious, and linguistic ties would have bound the various States together. "A Costa Rican and an Argentine," Lord Bryce says, "differ less than a Texan does from a Vermonter, or a Caithness man from a Devonshire man. All remain in a sense Spanish; that is, they are much more like Spaniards and more like one another than they are like Frenchmen or Italians. They are nearer to one another than North Americans to Englishmen." Some political writers have gone so far as to maintain the cynical paradox that the less nations know of each other the more likely are their relations to be those of peace and amity. This is manifestly an exaggeration. But history unquestionably proves that community of race, religion, and language is no sure preventive of war. "There is no modern instance," Mr. Bodley says in his work on France, "of a

war between two countries being delayed for a day because their inhabitants were familiar with each other's way of life or of government." Such has certainly proved to be the case in South America. The feeling of a common Hispano-American brotherhood was far too weak to prevent a long series of internecine civil wars. This state of affairs has now, happily, passed away. The era of revolutions, which for a long period tainted the whole political life of the South American Republics, and which afforded the standing test for the gloomy warnings uttered by enemies of democracy, appears to be closed. The various Republics are now on good terms with each other. The most powerful amongst them — Argentina, Brazil, and Chile — have formed what is known as the A.B.C. Alliance; neither is there any sufficient reason for supposing that the harmony which at present exists is likely to be seriously disturbed Moreover, nothing tends so much to bind States together as the existence of a real or supposed common danger. It cannot be doubted that, in spite of all the very sincere endeavours made by the Government of the United States to allay suspicion, South Americans are at times rather disposed to think that their powerful neighbours in the Northern Continent, to whom they are not bound by any racial, linguistic, or other ties, may at some future time initiate a policy which Mr. Koebel embodies in the phrase "South America for the North Americans." Notably, they are inclined to resent the Monroe Doctrine, which they hold to involve a certain degree of patronage, and which, inasmuch as they are now quite capable of defending themselves, they regard as politically unnecessary in order to secure their independence.

Although a century has elapsed since South America threw off the Spanish yoke, it is only during the last fifty years that fair opportunities have been afforded for genuine development. One statistical fact will suffice to show that material progress advanced by leaps and bounds when once the nightmare of internal unrest was shaken off. Between 1894 and 1912 the value of trade (imports and exports) in Argentina advanced from 194 to 865 millions of gold dollars; that of Brazil from 218 to 696 millions; that of Chile from 118 to 271; and that of Uruguay from 61 to 108 millions. And as yet the country is only very partially developed, and is also in many parts greatly under-populated. Lord Bryce thinks that South America is "the chief resource to which the over-peopled countries may look as providing a field for their emigration."

At a time when democracy is on its trial, the life-incidents of these South American Republics present in some respects features of peculiar interest. It is true that South American history does not throw any light on the probable issue of the great world-struggle which is now being fought out. That issue, for the time being at all events, is focussed on the question whether democracy, with its want of discipline, its absence of foresight, its loosely knit systems of government and administration, and its relatively high appreciation of moral forces, can, as a matter of warlike strength, maintain its ground against the highly organized methods of an unscrupulous absolutism. None the less, believers in democratic institutions can, on the whole, derive a certain amount of consolation from South American precedent. It has, indeed, to be remembered that many of the South American democracies have never in any real sense adopted

the spirit of democratic government. The public, and even at times experienced politicians, are somewhat apt to be carried away by words, and to forget that the old proverb, *Cucullus non facit monachum*, applies probably even more in politics than in any other sphere of human thought or action. Some of the South American Republics have had nothing republican about them but the name. They have at times been mere military despotisms. The rule of Diaz in Mexico was wholly autocratic. The same may be said of that of Rosas in Argentina some sixty years ago, and of some others elsewhere. But Argentina, Chile, and Brazil are now genuine Constitutional Republics. They are no longer disguised despotisms. On the whole, it may be said that the South American Republics, after a prolonged and very fiery trial, have justified democratic rule. The progress made in every direction is incomparably greater than anything which could have been accomplished if the independence of the Republics had not been asserted. The success gained was not, indeed, so complete or immediate as enthusiastic Liberals hoped and expected. But that is only an additional proof of the truth of Helvetius's hackneyed aphorism that, although a deal of good work can be got out of human beings, it is a mistake to expect too much of them. As Lord Bryce puts the case, Liberals placed too implicit a faith in the power of liberty. "They ascribed all the faults of existing governments to the monarchies or oligarchies of the past, and did not understand, having little experience of popular rule, how many faults in governments have been, and will continue to be, due not to their form, but to human nature itself." The conclusion which Lord Bryce draws from his review of

South American history is unquestionably sound. "The troubles of these ninety years," he says, "have, accordingly, nothing in them that need dishearten either any friend of Spanish America or any friend of constitutional freedom. The person who ought to reconsider his position is the man who holds that any group of human beings called 'the people' are always right, that the best and sufficient way to fit men for political power is to give it to them, and that the name of republic has the talismanic gift of imparting virtue and wisdom to the community which adopts it."

Another point of great interest both to the politician and the sociologist in connection with South American affairs is that in all the Republics a real fusion has taken place between the white and coloured races. There has never been any "Indian question" in South America at all similar to the "Negro question" in the northern portion of the continent. Intermarriage between the white and coloured races is frequent, with the result that, out of a total population of about forty-two millions, about thirteen millions are mestizos (mixed whites and Indians), and nearly six millions are mulattos and quadroons (mixed whites and negroes). In the United States every one who is not white is classed as coloured. In South America the very contrary is the case. Every one who is not wholly coloured is classed as white. For all political and social purposes it may be said that whites and half-castes constitute one indivisible body. Ignorance and poverty keep the Indians back, but colour antipathy constitutes no obstacle to their political and social advancement. It seems probable that in course of time the population of South America will be definitely fused into one dis-

tinctive and separate type of a nature unknown elsewhere. The results cannot now be predicted with any degree of confidence, but they cannot fail to be important both to the peoples immediately concerned and to the rest of the civilized world.

XXV

SOUTH OF PANAMA[1]

"*Spectator*," *March* 11, 1916.

THE graphic account which Lord Bryce published in 1912 of his travels in South America does not purport to be a political disquisition on the present conditions and future prospects of the South American Republics. Nevertheless, an observant statesman of Lord Bryce's calibre could not visit a country which teems with political problems of the highest interest and importance without forming opinions and offering some conjectures as to the manner in which they admitted of solution. Lord Bryce, like most liberally minded politicians, is an optimist. Without attempting to ignore the defects of South American institutions, or to deny that the name Republic is often used to veil methods of government which depart widely from Republican ideals, he none the less takes, on the whole, a hopeful view of the future of South American democracy. "Pessimism," he truly says, "is easier than optimism, as it is easier to destroy than to construct." It is as well that the other side of the question should be known and studied. It has now been presented to the

[1] *South of Panama*. By Edward Alsworth Ross, Ph.D., LL.D. London: George Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d. net.

world by Professor Edward Ross, of the Wisconsin University, in a work of great interest and of high literary merit. Professor Ross throws diplomatic reticence and discretion to the winds. He knows that "it is the traditional policy of the United States to cultivate the friendship of the South Americans," but he adds: "I have done nothing of the sort. My first obligation is not to National Policy but to Truth." It must be admitted that the truth, as expounded by Professor Ross, is not generally complimentary to the inhabitants or to the institutions of South America, but it has to be borne in mind that many of the most unfavourable conclusions at which he arrives are based on his experiences in Ecuador and Colombia—provinces which were not visited by Lord Bryce. "Light and freedom," he says, "wax as you go South from Panama."

A single example will suffice to show how two competent political observers, with much the same facts before them, may arrive at opposite conclusions. Lord Bryce witnessed an election at Santiago. He commends the manner in which the proceedings were conducted, and he even says that the system of Proportional Representation adopted in Chile is well worthy of study by political students in other countries. Professor Ross, on the other hand, contends that the Chilean electoral methods, though superior to those adopted in Ecuador, where the success of the Government candidate is secured by the rough but effective method of employing troops to drive hostile voters away from the polling-booths, is still open to great animadversion. The *inquilinos* (labourers) used all, as a matter of course, to vote as their masters directed. Now, however, it appears that many of them

expect to be paid, and that a contested election costs the candidate from three to ten thousand dollars, which have to be spent on bribes. Our past electoral history debars us from indulging in too severe a condemnation on proceedings of this nature. For instance, Sir George Trevelyan relates, in his *Life of Charles Fox*, that, at an inquiry into the Shoreham election of 1764, a witness stated that all the members of the local club "would vote for the candidate who would give them most money," and that one of them, by way of emphasizing their resolve to do so, added: "Yes, damn him, if he was a Frenchman."

It was a somewhat unfortunate accident that the chance suggestion thrown out by a German Professor (Waldseemüller) led to the name for the Florentine, Americus Vespuccius, being given to the whole of the Western World. The nomenclature has tended to engender the idea that some sort of special affinity exists between the Northern and Southern Continents. As a matter of fact, the very reverse is the case. Not only are the inhabitants of North and South America severed in a very marked degree by all the racial, religious, and other points of dissimilarity which exist between divers countries of the Old World, but the conditions under which the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Spaniards and Englishmen engaged in the original work of conquest differed so widely as to leave an abiding mark on the subsequent history of the two continents. Moreover, those conditions, whilst they were singularly adapted for the display of the most vigorous characteristics of the Northern, served rather to enhance the defects of the Southern race. The wealth of North America was mainly agricultural, that of South America mineral.

The natives in the former case were warlike and unaccustomed to labour. The Englishmen either exterminated them or drove them back into the recesses of their primeval forests. The English were thus driven to work with their own hands, and in doing so they developed all those qualities of energy and resourcefulness which are the natural consequences of self-exertion. The aborigines of the Southern Continent were relatively docile and were inured to labour. The Spaniards enslaved them, and in doing so undermined their own national character. They ignored the dignity of labour, and thus encouraged the growth of that "dry-rot of indolence" which, Professor Ross maintains, is still the abiding curse of some of the South American Republics. The objects and methods of the two races also diverged widely. The English colonized. The Spaniards exploited. The occasional identity of political interests has not served to overcome the innate repulsion between the two races. To this day, an Anglo-Saxon in South America is dubbed with the title, intended to be uncomplimentary, of "Gringo"; whilst in North America an Italian, Spaniard, or Portuguese is called by the no more flattering name of a "Dago."

Professor Ross states, and emphasizes his statement by the use of italics, that "the momentous basic fact" of South American life is that, "from the Rio Grande down the West Coast to Cape Horn, free agricultural labour as we know it does not exist." Along the East Coast the case is different. During the dictatorship of Rosas (1835–52), the Argentine labourers "shook off the last fetters of feudalism." But Argentina must be excepted from all South American generalizations. It stands by itself.

It is "a land of hope, where life is on the up curve, not for traders and planters alone—men with capital—but for the wage-earners as well." The working-classes are not, as elsewhere, ill-clad, ill-fed, and down-trodden. Immigration is encouraged, and is conducted on highly intelligent lines. Education is being rapidly developed. Public libraries have been established. Lord Bryce calls Argentina "the United States of the Southern Hemisphere."

The picture given by Professor Ross of the condition of the labouring classes on the West Coast is gloomy in the extreme; neither is there any reason for supposing that it is exaggerated. At Quito "slavery and ill-treatment have sunk the native population into the depths of degradation and hopelessness." Throughout Ecuador, the peons are in a state of "virtual slavery." The status of the agricultural labourers is at its nadir in Colombia. "The peon is virtually a serf, bound to work all his life for a nominal wage." A Bolivian local newspaper described "the moral, intellectual, and material condition of the Indians" as "the worst possible"; but the Aymara, being a more virile and warlike race than most other tribes, appear to be awakening to the necessity of effort on their own behalf. Conflicts have taken place, and the Bolivians are said to be living "in the crater of a slumbering volcano." In the meanwhile, the President issues orders to his subordinates to enforce the laws designed for the protection of Indians, but they are neglected.

In Peru, matters are slightly better, but still very bad. A Native Rights Association has been formed at Lima, but its influence is not widely extended. A Committee of the House of Commons reported in June 1913, that "the Putumayo

case is but a shockingly bad instance of conditions of treatment that are liable to be found over a wide area in South America." The failure to check barbarous proceedings of this sort is due, Professor Ross thinks, not to any want of zeal on the part of the Government at Lima, but to the fact that the judges and prefects who are sent to inquire into them always fall victims to the pressure and to the bribery of those who are interested in preventing any check being placed on the abuses of the system under which rubber is collected. Indians are entrapped into signing contracts, often when drunk, without having the least idea that in doing so they become liable to be sent a hundred miles away to toil in a freezing mine-gallery or a hot cane-field, where they will be practically slaves without the possibility of obtaining any legal protection from the ill-treatment and exactions of their employers.

It cannot be said that there is as yet any "Indian question" in South America. The Indians are numerous. They are believed, exclusive of half-breeds, to number some eight millions. They are a highly prolific race, but owing to drink, disease, and unsanitary conditions the mortality amongst them is appalling. At Bogotá, it is stated, eighty per cent of the children die before they attain the age of two years. Save in a few rare and exceptional instances, the Indians are too timid and ignorant to do anything to assert their own rights. Even in advanced Argentina the peons are "unbelievably stupid." One-handled ploughs have been introduced because they could not be taught to manipulate ploughs with two handles. Little or nothing is done to apply a remedy to their ignorance. In the more backward Republics, the Indians are no more educated, and perhaps

even less educated, than they were in the days of the Incas. Yet it is clear that, without either a revolution or very drastic change, a great deal might be done to improve the lot of the Indian serfs, not only without injuring, but even with the result of bettering the position of, the employers. In Ecuador, "one planter wiped out all debts due to him from peons, with the result that his peons worked for him six days a week instead of four, and, having cash to look forward to, they worked better." But any concessions of this nature are generally condemned by South American public opinion. In Chile, which is far more advanced than some of the more northern Republics, the proprietors were scandalized because an American "provided his four hundred *inquilinos* with tables, benches, and great tubs of beans from which each could help himself." It is satisfactory that Professor Ross is able to add: "He finally had the best *inquilinos* in the district." It is greatly to be hoped that the Peruvians, Chileans, and others will eventually learn the lesson which is taught by the experience of all the world—namely, that free labour is not only more humane, but also more remunerative, than serfdom. But it will probably be long before this lesson is learnt. In Chile, the state of education of many of the upper classes would appear to be very backward. A Chilean lady asked a woman Protestant missionary "if the missionaries were not in league with the Rothschilds to buy souls for Satan."

The treatment of the pure Indians is not the only, nor, indeed, is it, politically speaking, the most important, problem that awaits solution at the hands of future generations in South America. Argentina is a "white man's country." So also, even to a greater extent, is Uruguay.

Although Lord Bryce very rightly indicates that the existence of the Magyars of Hungary, the Finns of Finland, and the Basques of the Western Pyrenees constitute a convincing proof of the fallacy of supposing that the Indo-Europeans are naturally and invariably superior to all the so-called non-Aryan races, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that real progress in South America stands in direct proportion to the prevalence of untainted white blood. Outside Argentina and Uruguay, the mestizo element generally predominates, having been fostered by the relatively slight repugnance to intermarriage between the white and coloured races which distinguishes the Southern Latins from the Northern Teutons. "The future of tropical South America," Professor Ross says, "turns on the value of mixed blood." The "wisest sociologist in Bolivia" assured him that "the failure of the South American Republics has been due to mestizo domination," and that the only hope for the future lay in a large white immigration. A German educational authority, after an experience of four years, came to the conclusion that "the crossing of races has produced a chaotic, unstable, nervous organization, resulting in a type at war with itself." The Germans, of whom a large number are settled in South America, appear generally to be of opinion that by discipline alone can the national character of the South Americans be improved and strengthened. The view is typical of modern German thought; but it is earnestly to be hoped, in the interests both of the South Americans themselves and of the rest of the civilized world, that neither pure-blooded Spaniards, mestizos, nor Indians are destined to be subjected to the ruthless and demoralizing influence of Teutonic *Kultur*. In default of this

drastic and disastrous remedy, time can alone provide a solution. It would be in the highest degree presumptuous even for the best-informed political prophet to venture on any confident prediction as to what the nature of that solution will be.

XXVI

WAR-TIME LETTERS [1]

"*Spectator*," *February* 5, 1916

For the last eighteen months English men and women have lingered with pride and interest over the graphic letters published by the newspapers in which many of the actors in the present titanic struggle describe in manly and straightforward language the events which have been passing under their own eyes. The predominating feature in all these letters is that, although they are for the most part written by military men, the spirit of what we now call militarism is conspicuous by reason of its absence. No joy is expressed in fighting for fighting's sake. No tendency is evinced to exalt might over right. The prevailing note is a stern determination to respond to the call of duty, a confident expectation of ultimate victory, and a hope that the strife of nations will not be continued longer than is necessitated by the paramount obligation of securing the triumph of political justice and public morality. The point is worth noting, for there is a tendency amongst some classes in this country to imagine that soldiers, like the late

[1] *Letters written in War Time* (*XV.-XIX. Centuries*). Selected and arranged by Mrs. H. Wragg. London: Humphrey Milford. 1s. net.

Lord Roberts, who urge the necessity of preparing for war, are inclined to underrate the blessings of peace. There cannot be a greater fallacy. Probably the least bellicose members of any community are those who have had the widest experience of the horrors of war. What was Collingwood's inmost thought at a time when, in company with Nelson, he was sweeping the seas in the cause of European liberty? "I hope," he wrote in 1801, "now we have seen the end of the last war that will be in our days, and that I shall be able to turn my mind to peaceful occupations."

It is possibly the perusal of some of these letters which has induced Mrs. Wragg to make and to publish a short collection of the war correspondence of olden times. However this may be, the idea is singularly felicitous. It is not merely interesting to read what celebrated men and women, themselves often actors in the scenes which they relate, had to say in times of national stress and peril. Besides the interest, encouragement may be derived from the buoyant confidence which the writers for the most part display in the destinies of their country. The letters are spread over a long period of time. They commence with the fifteenth century, and we learn how, in 1449, Margaret Paston spoke of raids on Cromer and Yarmouth, and added that "folks be right sore afeard that they will do much harm this summer." They end with a letter written in 1852 by that eccentric man of genius, Sir Charles Napier, in which, as chance would have it, he quotes the following saying of Frederick the Great, which constitutes a timely reminder that the absence of morality in Prussian statecraft, which has now set the world ablaze, is no plant of recent growth. "Give me the

money to make war," said the great exemplar of German diplomacy, " and I will buy a pretext for half-a-crown."

Mrs. Wragg's work affords little scope for the comments of a reviewer. The most suitable way of treating it is to let the writers of the letters speak for themselves. One of the most interesting of the series is a letter, written on the eve of the approach of the Armada, from Lionel Sharp to the Duke of Buckingham. A prisoner had been taken by Sir Francis Drake. On being asked why the Armada was coming, he

> . . . stoutly answered the Lords, What, but to subdue your nation, and root it out ? Good, said the Lords : and what meant you then to do with the Catholics ? He answered, We meant to send them (good men) directly unto Heaven, as all you that are heretics to Hell. Yea, but, said the Lords, what meant you to do with your whips of cord and wire ? What ? said he, we meant to whip you heretics to death, that have assisted my master's rebels, and done such dishonours to our Catholic king and people. Yea, but what would you have done, said they, with their young children ? They, said he, which were above seven years old, should have gone the way their fathers went ; the rest should have lived, branded in the forehead with the letter L for Lutheran, to perpetual bondage.

Queen Elizabeth's spirited address at Tilbury was the answer to this arrogant threat. It has often been quoted before, but will stand repetition :

> " I do not desire," the great Queen said, " to live to distrust my faithful and loving people. Let tyrants fear. I have always so behaved myself, that under God I have placed my chiefest strength, and safeguard in the loyal hearts and good will of my subjects. And therefore I am come amongst you as you see, at this time, not for my recreation and disport, but being resolved in the midst and heart of the battle to live or die amongst you all, to lay down for my God, and for my kingdom, and

for my people, my honour, and my blood, even in the dust. I know I have the body but of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart and stomach of a king, and of a king of England too; and think foul scorn that Parma, or Spain, or any Prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realm; to which, rather than any dishonour shall grow by me, I myself will take up arms, I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field."

It is easy to imagine the ringing cheers with which such an address as this must have been received.

Cromwell's letters are a strange mixture of gloomy religion and savagery. Writing to Lenthall an account of the siege and capture of Tredah [Drogheda], "a place very strong and difficult of access, being exceedingly high, having a good graft [*i.e.* ditch or moat], and strongly palisadoed," he says:

> I forbade the soldiers to spare any that were in arms in the Town; and I think that night they put to the sword about 2000 men. . . . The next day the other two Towers were summoned; in one of which was about six or seven score; but they refused to yield themselves. . . . When they submitted, their officers were knocked on the head. . . . I am persuaded that this is a righteous judgment of God upon these barbarous wretches, who have imbrued their hands in so much innocent blood, and that it will tend to prevent the effusion of blood for the future. Which are the satisfactory grounds to such actions, which otherwise cannot but work remorse and regret. . . . The last Lord's day before the storm, the Protestants were thrust out of the great Church called St. Peter's, and they had public Mass there; and in this very place near 1000 of them were put to the sword, fleeing thither for safety. I believe all their friars were knocked on the head promiscuously but two.

But, with all his ruthlessness, Cromwell said: "I like no war on women"—a sentiment which, with the fate of Miss Cavell fresh in our memories, may be commended to the Kaiser.

Whilst Cromwell was thus sternly enforcing the will of Parliament, Queen Henrietta Maria, with the passionate energy of a headstrong woman, was stoutly resisting all attempts at compromise, and was upbraiding her ill-fated husband for "beginning again his old game of yielding everything," and adding: "I never in my life did anything from fear, and I hope I shall not begin by the loss of a crown; as to you, you know well that there have been persons who have said that you were of that temper."

Passing to the beginning of the next century, we find Marlborough writhing under the obstacles to action placed in his way by his Dutch allies. "It is very mortifying," he wrote to Lord Godolphin in July 1705, "to find much more obstructions from friends than from enemies." Mrs. Burnet, the wife of the celebrated Bishop, writes to the Duchess of Marlborough testifying to the effect produced by the victory of Ramillies. "The common people, who I feared were grown stupid, have and do now show greater signs of satisfaction and triumph, than I think I ever saw before on any good success whatever." Somewhat later, Horace Walpole exults over the triumphs of the Chatham Administration. "Pondicherry," he writes to Henry Conway in 1761, "is ours, as well as the field of Kirk Denckirk. The Park guns never have time to cool; we ruin ourselves in gunpowder and sky-rockets." The prince of gossips then adds: "I forgot to tell you that the King has got the isle of Dominique and the chicken-pox, two trifles that don't count in the midst of all these festivities."

The poet Cowper strikes the only note of pessimism to be found in the collection. In 1781, he records his opinion that "the loss of America is the ruin of England," and a little later

he adds that England "is affected with every symptom of decay." In 1792, he expresses the opinion very reasonably held by Liberal England at the time of the fatal Declaration of Pillnitz. "It would have been better for Austria and Prussia to let the French alone. All nations have a right to choose their own mode of government, and the sovereignty of the people is a doctrine that evinces itself; for whenever the people choose to be masters they always are so, and none can hinder them."

There is a genial and breezy raciness in the letters of Collingwood and Nelson which is highly invigorating. Nothing could be more graphic than the spirited description, too long to quote, which the former writes to his wife in 1797 of "a brush with the Spaniards"; and the chivalrous nature of Nelson comes out strongly in the account given to his brother in the same year of the capture of a Spanish man-of-war:

> When I hailed the Don, and told him, "This is an English frigate," and demanded his surrender or I would fire into him, his answer was noble, and such as became the illustrious family from which he is descended—"This is a Spanish frigate, and you may begin as soon as you please." I have no idea of a closer or sharper battle: the force to a gun the same, and nearly the same number of men; we having two hundred and fifty. I asked him several times to surrender during the action, but his answer was—"No, Sir: not whilst I have the means of fighting left." When only himself of all the officers were left alive, he hailed, and said he could fight no more, and begged I would stop firing.

Pleasant also it is to read of the relations between the two great naval commanders. On the eve of Trafalgar Nelson writes to Collingwood: "We can, my dear Coll, have no little jealousies. We have only one great object in view, that of annihilating our enemies, and getting a glorious

peace for our country. No man has more confidence in another than I have in you: and no man will render your services more justice than your very old friend." Both were pining to come to close quarters with the enemy. On July 24, 1805, Nelson groaned over "the damned information" of General Brereton, the Governor of Gibraltar, which he feared might enable the French Fleet to escape his clutches, but which fortunately turned out to be false.

From the point of view of literary style, it is a sharp transition to turn from the letters of the sailors to the hard, unimaginative, but eminently sensible remarks of the great Duke of Wellington. He deplores—as what administrator has not deplored?—the constant changes of officers in charge of important Departments. He deprecates the general inattention to orders. "Nobody in the British Army," he writes to Colonel Torrens in 1812, "ever reads a regulation or an order as if it were to be a guide for his conduct, or in any other manner than as an amusing novel." He dwells on the want of discipline in the Army. "We may gain the greatest victories," he writes to Lord Bathurst in 1813, "but we shall do no good until we shall so far alter our system, as to force all ranks to perform their duty." Finally, Sir Walter Scott visits the Field of Waterloo and gives us good reason for holding that the Prussians of 1815 greatly resembled their posterity of a century later.

These extracts will suffice to show the general character of the correspondence. Rarely does a more readable shilling's-worth of literature issue from a publisher's office than is contained in Mrs. Wragg's lively and timely little volume.

XXVII

THE POLITICIAN WORDSWORTH [1]

"*Spectator*," *December* 11, 1915

THE republication of Wordsworth's epoch-making but now well-nigh forgotten tract on the Convention of Cintra should be welcomed alike by those who reverence the memory of the poet-politician, and by all who wish to realize the stages through which English thought has passed in connection with a political principle of the highest importance. Wordsworth was, in fact, the herald of Nationalism. His views were very sound. They were in advance of the public opinion of his day. Some of his utterances may be said, without exaggeration, to have been prophetic. He was an idealist, but one who did not scorn to temper his idealism by the light of practical necessities. Moreover, he was not open to the charge which may, with some justice, be brought against nineteenth-century Liberalism—namely, that its aims were purely destructive. Mr. Gladstone in conversation with me on one occasion recognized the justice of this criticism. Shortly before he determined to adopt the policy of Home Rule for Ireland, I had an opportunity of consulting him as to whether it would be wise for me to

[1] *Wordsworth on the Convention of Cintra.* (*Published* 1809.) With an Introduction by A. V. Dicey. London: Humphrey Milford. 2s. 6d. net.

enter Parliament as a moderate Liberal. He advised me not to do so on the ground that the Liberal programme, which for many years previously had been centred on the destruction of privilege, was at the time nearly completed, and that, therefore, the advent of a period which would be of less interest to Liberals was to be anticipated. That construction formed an essential part of Wordsworth's political ideal is abundantly clear from his attitude to what we should in modern phraseology term militarism. He saw that the frame of mind engendered by military training and habits of thought tended in some degree to deaden the imaginative qualities and to substitute an exaggerated belief in the efficacy of force in the place of those moral aspirations on the development of which he considered the real progress of the world mainly depended. "The paramount efficacy of moral causes," he said, "is not willingly admitted by persons high in the profession of arms." But he did not on this account fall into the other extreme of condemning the military spirit or underrating the importance of military zeal and efficiency. His ideal was to "unite the civic and military spirit in one people and in enduring harmony with each other."

Although, however, Wordsworth's political views were sound, and although his poetic imagination enabled him to clothe them in language of glowing eloquence, at the same time he stands greatly in need of an interpreter. His fiery indignation against oppression of all kinds, his enthusiasm in the cause which he defends, and the redundancy of the thoughts which bubbled up in his mind as he wrote, led him to be tautological, and occasionally even somewhat obscure. Moreover, an old-world turgidity is to

be found in some of his metaphors which rather jars on modern literary taste. For instance, in dealing with a weak point in his case—namely, that it was the right and duty of the Corporation of the City of London to address the Crown in condemnation of the action of the Generals who had signed the Convention of Cintra without waiting for the results of the inquiry which was then proceeding as to their conduct—he says: "It is melancholy to think that the time is come when an attempt has been made to tear out of the venerable crown of the Sovereign of Great Britain a gem which is in the very front of the turban of the Emperor of Morocco."

For these reasons the value and interest of the republished tract are greatly enhanced by the illuminating preface emanating from the pen of Professor Dicey by which it is accompanied. Professor Dicey clearly explains to us why it was that Wordsworth's utterances produced so great an effect at the time. The moment chosen for their publication was singularly propitious. Up to the time of the Treaty of Amiens, the war with France had been the work of a party. Subsequently, the English public began for the first time fully to realize what Napoleon meant when, in one of those public addresses whose bombastic mendacity latter-day German statesmen and professors have endeavoured to emulate, he proclaimed to the world that his aim was "to re-establish universal happiness upon better and surer bases." He meant the subjugation of all independent nationalities. Henceforth the war changed its character. The Whig opposition sank into insignificance. Tories, Whigs, and even Revolutionists joined hands. Wordsworth was able to show, not merely with plausibility, but with some reason, that in the revulsion which

took place in the opinions of himself and his associates there was nothing inconsistent. "Their conduct proved that they kept their eyes steadily fixed upon principles." The war was thus transformed from a party into a national war. "This transformation," Professor Dicey says, "was due in no small degree to Wordsworth's tract on the Convention of Cintra." Wordsworth was able to embody in something approaching to a political programme the national ideals and inchoate aspirations which were simmering in the public mind, but had heretofore received no adequate expression. Moreover, Professor Dicey, by dispensing with a good deal of rather unnecessary verbiage, makes us easily understand what Wordsworth really meant. He has formulated the leading principles of Wordsworth's programme in a few concise and pregnant sentences which enable us to appreciate the extent to which those principles were assimilated by the public thought of this country, and, albeit with the growth of time they have been developed, have never been abandoned.

The facts connected with the Convention of Cintra have been so frequently described that it is unnecessary to dwell upon them at length. It will be sufficient to say that early in August, 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley landed on the coast of Portugal in command of an expeditionary force, and fought and won in quick succession the battles of Roliça and Vimiero. Had he been left in command he would have followed up his advantage, and would without doubt have completely crushed Junot's army. But most unfortunately, whilst the battle of Vimiero was still in progress, Sir Harry Burrard arrived on the scene and took command. Twenty-four hours later, the latter was superseded by Sir Hew

Dalrymple, a cautious and unimaginative veteran who was jealous of Wellesley and who refused to be guided by his advice. Junot fully understood the perilous nature of his position. He sent off Kellermann, who spoke English and was considered a skilful diplomatist, to the English camp with a view to seeing, in the words used by this latter officer, whether "he could get the French army out of the mouse-trap." Before the end of the month, the Convention of Cintra was signed. It consisted of twenty-five articles which Wordsworth described as "a long ladder into a deep abyss of infamy." Its main provisions were that the French should surrender Lisbon and other Portuguese fortresses; that Junot's army should be transported back to France by British vessels; that they should take with them what was euphemistically called their "private property," which Wordsworth rightly held for the most part consisted of plunder; that French civilians who remained in Portugal were to be treated with the utmost leniency; and that those Portuguese who had been traitors to their own country should be placed under the special protection of the British Government. Moreover, the Convention contained the very singular provision that "should there arise doubts as to the meaning of any article it will be explained favourably to the French army." The main defect of the Convention was that the Portuguese Government and authorities, whether civil or military, were not consulted, and were, in fact, practically ignored.

We are now able to deliberate on this subject with the equanimity which will probably be displayed by our posterity in A.D. 2015 in discussing the recent expedition to Gallipoli. Mr. Oman, in his monumental history of the Peninsular War,

sums up the case by saying that "while on the military side the Convention was justifiable, it presented grave political faults." Public opinion was at the time, however, in no mood to accept any such half-hearted verdict. The *Times* of November 4, 1808, contained the following diatribe against the soldier who, in subsequent years, was destined to raise the military fame of England to a higher point than it had ever attained before:

> We will venture to say, that every patriotic and honest heart in this empire felt almost as much indignation on reading this account of the dinner given to Sir Arthur, as it did on reading the articles of the armistice which he signed and negotiated. There was a time when "military characters," as they are here termed, would have declined the honour of meeting a man who had signed such an instrument of national disgrace as this armistice, till he had purged himself before a Court Martial (as we hope Sir Arthur can do) of all voluntary agency in the formation of it.

In order to understand the outburst of public opinion which took place when the news of the Convention of Cintra reached England, it is necessary to take account of the general European situation of the time. In 1808–09, Napoleon was at the zenith of his military fame and power. The astonishing series of successes which had attended his arms had engendered the belief that on land he was invincible. A thick pall of despondency descended on the whole of Europe. Suddenly the general gloom was illumined by a ray of light. It shot forth from Shakespeare's "tawny Spain." Not only was a large French force obliged at Baylen to lay down its arms, but a new character was imported into the war. The whole Spanish nation rose in arms. Napoleon did not realize, and indeed never realized, the nature of the change which thus took place. He failed to see that he had no longer to deal with

Governments and dynasties but with nations. European thought was quicker to appreciate the transformation. Sir Robert Seeley, in his *Life of Stein*, has fully explained how the Spanish success revived, even if it did not create, Prussian Nationalism, and helped to inaugurate the movement which eventually culminated in the liberation of Germany from the French yoke. English Liberalism also woke up to the necessity of a supreme effort. Great were the expectations excited when the first news arrived of the successes at Roliça and Vimiero. Correspondingly great was the disappointment when it was learnt that the full fruits of victory had apparently been snatched from our grasp. Wordsworth rightly interpreted public opinion when he stated that the evacuation of Portugal was not the prime object of the campaign. The important point was " the manner in which that event was to be brought about." He inveighed against what he called " the moral depravity " of the Convention, and he seems not to have exaggerated the effect produced on public opinion when he said : " Not a street, not a public room, not a fireside in the island which was not disturbed as by a local or private trouble ; men of all estates, conditions, and tempers were affected apparently in equal degrees."

There is, however, little to be gained by dwelling any further upon the merits of this controversy. It will be both more interesting and more instructive to speak of the general political programme which Wordsworth advocated. Professor Dicey says that the main items of this programme were four in number. The first may be summarized by saying that it laid down the general principle that national independence was in itself a blessing to the people

concerned. This may now be regarded as a commonplace. It is, however, to be observed that the problems involved in the application of the principle have changed their character a good deal since Wordsworth wrote. He only had in his mind's eye the evils which arise from the oppression exercised by a bad foreign Government over a people who were capable of governing themselves, and he dwelt, with great reason, upon the fact that oppression generally is more deeply resented when it is inflicted at the hands of aliens than when it is the result of native misgovernment. The question which now occupies the minds of many political thinkers in connection with British Imperialism is the extent to which it is justifiable to impose good government at the hands of aliens on the inhabitants of countries such as India and Egypt.

The second principle laid down by Wordsworth was that "every independent nation, and above all England, is interested in the maintenance of the national independence of every other country." When Wordsworth wrote, this idea had germinated but had not as yet taken firm root in the public opinion of the country. The present war, which in a large measure is being waged to ensure the application of Wordsworth's principle, is of itself sufficient to testify to the fact that in this particular respect his view has been assimilated by the main body of his countrymen.

The third and fourth of Wordsworth's principles, which may conveniently be considered together, are of special importance at the present moment. They are stated by Professor Dicey in the following terms: "No State ought to possess irresistible military power so as to menace the legitimate independence of other countries. It is desirable to create a new balance of power."

At a time when the principle of the balance of power is being vigorously attacked for reasons which are often very valid, it is as well to be reminded that so earnest a Liberal as Wordsworth recognized the fact that some balance of power was necessary. But, of course, the balance which he contemplated, and which it is the duty of English statesmen now to contemplate, differed widely from that which found favour in the eyes of Metternich, Castlereagh, and the other statesmen who assembled at Vienna to discuss the question. They aimed at a balance of power which was wholly disconnected with nationality. Wordsworth, on the contrary, as Professor Dicey points out, "contemplated a balance of power which should exist to guarantee the independence of each separate nation." The establishment of such a political equilibrium is at least as necessary now as it was a century ago. One of the main aims of the European statesmen who will have to discuss the terms of peace at the close of the present war should be to assert the very wise principle laid down by Wordsworth in 1809.

Finally, as an instance of Wordsworth's statesmanlike foresight, the following passage from Professor Dicey's preface may be quoted. "He seems," Professor Dicey says, "to have seen the possibility that Bonaparte might find imitators, and that a State might come into existence where 'at the head of all is the mind of one man who acts avowedly upon the principle that everything which can be done safely by the supreme power of a State may be done.'" The Treitschkes, Bernhardis, Nietzsches, and other Germans have, for a long while past, been the apostles of this detestable principle, and at last they have produced the "one man" who is seeking to apply it—the Kaiser William II.

XXVIII

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION [1]

"*Spectator*," *November* 13, 1915

THE Chinese Revolution was a complete success in so far as the attainment of its original object was concerned. It destroyed the Mantchu dynasty, which, according to a well-informed writer in the *Asiatic Review*, Yuan Shi-kai would have preferred to maintain. The principle of an hereditary monarchy, which had lasted for five thousand years, foundered in the struggle. There is something pathetic in the abject terms in which the young Emperor Pou-y, who, in anticipation of coming events, had received the almost ironical title of Hiuen-T'ong, or "the granted charter," descended from the throne of his ancestors and transmitted his Royal power and prerogatives to his masterful Dictator.

"Since Heaven and the people," he declared in his final Edict, "desire a Republican Government, how could we be so contumacious as to retain our throne against the will of our subjects? . . . We hand over our authority to Yuan Shi-kai." But if the destructive policy of the revolutionists was a success, their constructive

[1] *Through the Chinese Revolution*. By Professor Fernand Farjenel. Translated from the French by Dr. Margaret Vivian. London: Duckworth & Co. 7s. 6d. net.

policy was wholly unsuccessful. Qualified local critics held that the attempt to found a Republic was foredoomed to failure. Mr. Bland, who spoke with a very full knowledge of Chinese affairs, pointed out that the canker which was gnawing at the heart of China was not political but economic, that Young China was as corrupt as Old China, and that to the mass of the people "the word 'Republic' meant no more than the blessed word 'Mesopotamia.'" Outside critics, speaking without Mr. Bland's local knowledge, but reasoning on historical analogy and a general acquaintance with Eastern politics, arrived at a similar conclusion. Looking to the broad features of the situation, to the suddenness of the attempted transition from absolutism to complete liberty, to the habits ingrained by long centuries of corruption and maladministration, to the lack of practical experience on the part of the idealists who promoted the Revolution, to the rivalry of the Western Powers who were interested in Chinese affairs, and to the fact that bankruptcy could not be avoided without recourse to foreign capital, which would not be forthcoming unless under conditions highly distasteful to Nationalist sentiment, political observers, however sympathetic to Chinese aspirations, held from the first that history would probably repeat itself, and that the ultimate result of the Revolution would be to establish a new despotism under another name, and perhaps of a somewhat improved type, in place of that which formerly existed. This, in fact, is what actually occurred. Yuan Shi-kai became Emperor in everything but in name, and, according to the most recent reports from China, it would appear that the question of his assuming the Imperial title has

now been mooted. He climbed to power by methods which, though differing in detail, were in all essential matters identical with those adopted in past times on the banks of the Tiber, on those of the Seine, and elsewhere.

There are, however, always at least two sides to every question, particularly to every Revolution, and perhaps very particularly to every Eastern Revolution. It will be as well, therefore, to hear what there is to be said on the subject by an intelligent European who was present during the crisis, who warmly sympathized with the Revolution, who thinks it deserved to succeed, who holds that there was no adequate reason why it should not have succeeded, who appears to be of opinion, although on this latter point his utterances are somewhat ambiguous, that its failure is even now far from being complete and final, and whose warm sympathies with everything Chinese led him, when a sufferer from lumbago, to apply a plaster to his back recommended by the Chinese faculty, and consisting of "a mixture of calcined tiger's bones, bear's grease, resin, and human hair cut into tiny parts." This latter remedy, he says, "did him a great deal of good," so much so that, in anticipation of further attacks of lumbago, he took with him a supply to "the icy regions of Siberia and Russia through which he proposed to travel." Professor Farjenel is an ardent French patriot, and it is manifest that his views are coloured by the consideration, of the truth of which there can be no doubt, that the main principles advocated by the leading Chinese Revolutionists hailed from Paris, albeit they were tinged with a strong element of latter-day Socialism. Socialist doctrines were, indeed, to be enforced by measures as drastic as those

adopted by the most despotic of absolutist rulers. Thus, in the original summary of the aims of the reformers, published in 1904, it was laid down that "monopolists, being a grave menace to the life of the people, shall be outlawed." The temporary prominence given to the feminist movement also in some degree differentiates the Chinese Revolution from its French prototype. Women were organized into battalions and were drilled as soldiers. They were "fired with a fanatical desire to fight to the death for the Revolutionary cause." The examples of Queen Victoria, who was a strong anti-suffragist, and of the "Old Buddha," who with her dying breath deprecated the bestowal of political power on women, were adduced as evidence in favour of feminism. In the end, however, "the Canton Assembly failed to be led astray by the wiles of their lady colleagues," and absolutely declined to associate themselves with the feminist movement. But Professor Farjenel is not discouraged. "It seems," he says, "quite likely that China will be one of the first countries in which women will obtain seats in political assemblies, thus accomplishing in a moment the social evolution of several thousand years."

The main inspiration of the Revolutionary movement, however, came from France. Sun Yatsen was "the incarnate spirit of the Revolution." His studies of Rousseau's works had made him "the confirmed foe of the privileges of the rich and of hereditary government." Young Chinese students were "enthusiastic admirers of the French terrorists and idolized Robespierre." Chenn Kimei, a daring journalist and orator, indeed earned for himself the name of "the Chinese Robespierre." He would not,

Professor Farjenel avers, "hesitate to sacrifice a hundred thousand lives if he deemed it essential to the ultimate success of his cause. He combines the fanaticism of the West with an Eastern disregard for human life." What may be called the top-hamper of the French Revolution was sedulously copied. The old calendar, which dated from the time of the Emperor Houangtai, who reigned more than two thousand years before the birth of Christ, was abolished. The new calendar was made to begin on January 1, 1912, the first year of the Chinese Republic. A Chinese "Marseillaise" was composed. Patriotic songs were sung in which the name of the great American patriot "Hwa-chêng-toon" was somewhat incongruously associated with that of "Na-po-loon," both being described as "Sons of Liberty." Sun Yatsen, Revolutionary writers declared, "was the Washington of the Revolution and Hoang Hing was its Napoleon." Children were taught to extol the courage of the "heroes who died while throwing bombs," one of which, it may be remarked, "pulverized" an unfortunate Tartar Marshal at Canton, "leaving nothing of him but his boots." Dress and personal habits underwent a great change. Every patriot cut off his pigtail, which was regarded as a mark of servitude. A few Conservatives hid their pigtails under their collars, but in those places where the Revolution took the deepest root "there was scarcely a pigtail to be seen." Toothbrushes, which were regarded "as a sign of superior civilization," were introduced, and Professor Farjenel testifies to the fact that on board a boat on which he travelled the sailors passed "the same toothbrush in turn from mouth to mouth." Amidst all these striking changes, it is almost a consolation to learn that the ancient

Chinese custom of beginning dinner with dessert and ending it with soup was preserved.

As regards the Constitution, the model followed was both Revolutionary and Napoleonic. Count Roederer, who, as Lord Rosebery truly remarks, tells us more of Napoleon's thoughts than any other contemporary writer, relates that when Napoleon ordered him to prepare a draft Constitution, he remarked that "a Constitution should be short and—." He was about to add the word "clear," but Napoleon cut him short and said: "Yes, short and obscure." The most important clause in the Chinese Constitution reproduces the Revolutionary principles of 1789, and is conceived in the true spirit of doctrinaire Jacobinism. At the same time it fully realizes the Napoleonic conception of obscurity. "In the Chinese Republic," it is said, "the supreme power belongs to the whole nation." The phrase is elastic. Yuan Shi-kai had no hesitation in accepting it. He bound himself by oath "to make every effort to promulgate the spirit of democracy, to disperse the evils of despotism, and faithfully to obey the Constitution and the wishes of the people."

There can be no doubt that the vast majority of Europeans in China hold opinions diametrically opposed to those of Professor Farjenel. "They are convinced that the Chinese are totally incapable of successfully establishing a Republican form of government." To this Professor Farjenel replies that the Europeans are prejudiced and ignorant, and, moreover, that they are wholly concerned in making money out of China. He states, on the authority of some of his own countrymen, that out of thirteen thousand foreigners resident in China "there are barely ten who can speak the language with any

fluency." Moreover, alluding to Chinese excitability, he says that many of the foreign residents think that "every Chinaman is a potential madman." He palliates the excesses committed during the Revolution. "These are troubles inseparable from a Revolution. Rapine always flourishes in times of anarchy." He adds the philosophical reflection that "matters might have been much worse." He does no more than justice to the Revolutionists when he praises them for abstaining from those general onslaughts on "foreign devils" which had formerly disgraced the annals of China. How far this abstention was due to real feelings of humanity and toleration, or how far it was dictated by a politic desire to give the Western Powers no excuse for interference, is perhaps somewhat doubtful. The general animosity against foreigners does not seem to have been mitigated after the fall of the Mantchu dynasty. Those who were employed by the Chinese Government occupied, in Professor Farjenel's opinion, sinecures. They did not take the trouble to make any reports, as they knew that anything they said "would be consigned to the waste-paper basket." Professor Farjenel also alludes to the fact that many of the French missionaries in China strongly sympathized with the Revolution. It is natural that they should have done so, as it afforded some promise that a reign of religious toleration would be inaugurated. Their testimony is of course valuable, but it stands alone in support of Professor Farjenel's views. For the rest, all he does is to fall back on the usual commonplaces of ultra-Liberals. His work is therefore, on the whole, somewhat disappointing. It shows that he is a generous and warm-hearted enthusiast, but it affords no reason for holding

that sentimental enthusiasm can be made a substitute for real statesmanship. Neither does it afford any ground for reversing the verdict which has generally been delivered by the European world : viz. that, for the time being at all events, the establishment of a real Republican Government in China is an idealist dream which cannot be realized. In the meanwhile, it may be observed that, although no very full account of Chinese affairs has recently emanated from any authoritative source, the power of Yuan Shi-kai appears to have been consolidated.

XXIX

JAPAN[1]

"*Spectator*," *February* 12, 1916

THE West has scarcely even yet recovered from the profound astonishment with which it learnt that the Japanese had suddenly emerged from the chrysalis stage in which they had lain for centuries, and had stepped into the political arena of the world, not merely as a highly civilized, but also as a very powerful nation. The episode was so wholly abnormal, and, save perhaps to a very few possessed of special knowledge, so wholly unexpected. Instances of the East sullenly and resentfully accepting some of the blessings and—it must regretfully be added—not a few of the curses of the West have been common enough. Further, the world has become familiarized with the sight of Eastern rulers who, mistaking the excrescences and by-products of Western civilization for its essence, have endeavoured, in a half-hearted and usually very unintelligent manner, to graft some fragments of modern Western life on a hoary and uncongenial Oriental stock. Moreover, increased contact has often only resulted in the decay of some primitive but highly laudable Eastern

[1] *Japan, the New World-Power.* By Robert P. Porter. London: Humphrey Milford. 6s. net.

virtues, and the assimilation of some very reprehensible Western vices. But that a nation which had hitherto been regarded as the most extreme representative of Eastern conservatism, and which had for centuries past persistently closed its gates against Western intrusion, should suddenly cast off its exclusivist mantle; that it should, as Mr. Porter says in his very interesting work, be able to absorb Western ideas without making a servile copy of them; that in the process of absorption it should succeed in maintaining its original national characteristics; and that in an incredibly short space of time it should be able not merely to withstand but to vanquish a first-rate European Power, was a phenomenon which caused a feeling almost amounting to stupefaction. History afforded no precedent for any such politically unconventional transformation.

What has been the secret of Japanese success? What have been the main causes which have contributed to one of the most momentous events of modern times, and one which is certainly destined to exercise a far-reaching influence on the world-politics of the future? The subject is one which most assuredly deserves consideration at the hands of all students of political, and especially of diplomatic, history.

In the first place, it is to be observed that drastic change in Japan was never likely to split on the rock upon which it has so often foundered elsewhere. The Japanese were differentiated from all other Easterns, and notably from all Moslems, by one striking peculiarity. They may be held for all the purposes of the practical politician to have been devoid of religion. There was no Pope or priest to inculcate the lesson that there was but one path to future

happiness. Intolerance was an exotic plant. An unsuccessful attempt was at one time made by the Jesuits to introduce it into the country. "It was the aggressive intolerance of the Christians," Mr. Porter says, "not their doctrines, which led to their being denounced as agitators." There was no Mollah or Alim to preach that reform and sacrilege were synonymous terms, and that the immutability of the law was based on an ordinance of Divine origin. Reformers had not even to encounter that feeble degree of opposition which, in the days of Roman supremacy, was offered to the introduction of novel ideas by the easy-going pantheism of the ancient world. A school of philosophy, which was a mixture of ancestor and nature worship, and which did not profess any very definite code of morals, had taken the place of religion. It did not facilitate reform, but it greatly hindered the decay of those healthy, invigorating national characteristics which in other Eastern countries have at times tended in some degree to languish when reforms have taken place. The Japanese was not like the Moslem, who, when he casts himself loose from Islamism, often finds himself storm-tossed on a political and social sea without rudder and without compass. Shintoism fostered the civic virtues, and greatly encouraged the growth and maintenance of a singularly sturdy and self-sacrificing patriotism. Veneration for the Emperor was exalted to the dignity of a religion.

Although from a very early period European traders had established some very limited commercial relations with Japan, it was Commodore Perry, of the United States Navy, who took the first decisive step towards breaking down the barrier behind which Japanese exclusiveness

had previously been sheltered. In 1853, he insisted on delivering at the forbidden port of Yedo a formal letter from the President of the United States to the ruler of Japan. In 1858, a commercial treaty was negotiated between the American and Japanese Governments. "Expel the foreigner," however, still continued to be the watchword of the nation. Disorders ensued. The British Legation was attacked in 1861. An English and also an American official were murdered in 1862, and foreign vessels were fired upon. Then followed the Kagoshima bombardment and the Shimonoseki expedition. These incidents constituted the Ithuriel's spear which finally awoke the Japanese from their lethargy :

> The year 1863 was memorable in Japan's history. It saw the "barbarian expelling" agitation deprived of the Emperor's sanction; it saw two principal clans, Satsuma and Choshu, convinced of their country's impotence to defy the Occident; it saw the nation almost fully roused to the disintegrating effects of the feudal system; and it saw the traditional antipathy to foreigners beginning to be exchanged for a desire to study their civilization and to adopt its best features.

The Japanese recognized that, as a necessary preliminary to the organization of their political and administrative system after a fashion which would enable them to withstand the onslaught of Europe, they must be masters in their own house. The country was riven with internal dissensions. Feudalism reigned supreme. It involved the existence of a number of conflicting jurisdictions and separate local administrations. It was essential that these should disappear, and that power should be centralized in the hands of the Emperor. It was then that the spirit of Japanese patriotism and self-sacrifice, which at a later period received such heroic illustration on

the blood-stained battlefields of Manchuria, was conspicuously shown in the domain of internal reform. In other countries the abolition of feudal privileges has either been effected by revolution, or it has been the result of long and acrimonious discussions, not unfrequently accompanied by disorder and bloodshed. Japan was more fortunate. No coercion was necessary. The leading chieftains voluntarily abandoned their privileges :

> The significance of these changes consists less in their magnitude than in the spirit in which they were put forward and accepted. The ex-feudal chiefs offered to surrender their independence ; and as for the samurai, they resigned their substance at the bidding of their master in the spirit in which they would have obeyed orders to commit *hara-kiri*. What manner of people were these to whom a national peril could bring forgetfulness of their immediate personal interests ! . . . And it must be remembered that it was the national army which was called upon for this sacrifice ; no power existed to coerce this body of fighting-men.

Then the tide of rapid, drastic, but intelligent reform advanced with irresistible force. " Knowledge," the Emperor declared in the Imperial Oath sworn on April 6, 1868, " shall be sought for throughout the world so that the welfare of the Empire may be promoted." But the Europeans imported were used as agents. They were not allowed to become masters. Moreover, the Japanese very wisely never adopted any European innovation in its entirety. Adaptation, not imitation, was the principle on which they acted. The result has been writ large on the record of the world's history. " Japan was victorious not because she could command better fighting material than the enemy, but because her subjects shrank from no personal sacrifice in the national cause."

These pre-eminent national characteristics would, however, possibly not have produced such striking results had it not been for a further quality which was a distinguishing feature of Japanese policy throughout the period when the Empire of Japan was in the making. The recent diplomatic history of Japan is a standing and continuous sermon on Juvenal's text—*Nullum numen abest, si sit prudentia.* Japanese statesmen have known, not only what to do, but when to be active and when inactive. They have known when to yield and when to assert themselves. They have always carefully adapted their means to their ends. Their diplomacy has been persistently characterized by extreme moderation. Friends have not been alienated if by any means their amity could be secured. Enemies have not been made save in cases where the continuance of friendship had been rendered impossible without the sacrifice of legitimate national aspirations. When, in 1853, the action of Commodore Perry assumed a menacing character, the Japanese rightly estimated their own weakness. They yielded. In 1900, the Boxer rising occurred, and the Foreign Legations at Peking were besieged. The Japanese, acting on the principle which induced Cavour to send Sardinian troops to the Crimea, saw that an opportunity had come for them to assert themselves. They associated themselves with the expedition organized by other countries, and thus emphasized their own position as a Great Power. But they made no attempt to maintain their troops in China longer than was necessary, nor did they endeavour to extort any concessions for themselves. In the previous war with China the latter Power was humbled to the dust; but when Russia, France, and Germany urged on the Japanese that

"in the interests of peace" they should forgo many of the fruits of victory, they at once yielded. When, towards the close of the Russian War, President Roosevelt urged that the time had come to discuss the terms of peace, the Japanese, being under no delusions as to the reserve of strength possessed by their formidable opponent, at once agreed, and speedily signed the Treaty of Portsmouth. At a later period, when disturbances took place in British Columbia owing to the influx of Japanese immigrants, the Japanese Government readily consented to restrict their numbers. Finally, when, in 1911, the question arose of renewing the Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain, the Japanese were the first to appreciate that any provision for mutual aid which might tend to embroil the relations between the two great Anglo-Saxon communities could not be accepted by Great Britain. They agreed without demur to a modification in the terms of the treaty which effectually averted this danger. The predominating feature in all these transactions is the total absence of that truculence which often accompanies startling success, and for which Prussian diplomacy has gained so sinister and unenviable a notoriety.

Will Japanese statesmanship, now that success has been ensured, continue to be inspired by the same spirit of intelligent moderation which governed its proceedings during the struggle upwards? Mr. Porter thinks that it will, and that Japanese influence will in the future be persistently exercised in the direction of the maintenance of peace. There seems at present no reason for holding that his view is unduly optimistic.

In speculating on the future of Japan it is natural to ask whether existing Japanese in-

stitutions are likely to endure in their present form, and also whether the national character of the Japanese is destined to undergo any important transformations. Under the Constitution of 1889 the executive power is vested in the Emperor, who exercises it through Ministers appointed by, and responsible to, himself. The tenure of office of the Ministers depends wholly on the will of the Emperor. They cannot be dismissed by Parliament. The electoral franchise is granted to all male Japanese of over twenty-five years of age who pay taxes to the amount of £1 a year. It will thus be seen that the Constitution, though probably adapted to the actual requirements of the country, can scarcely be called democratic. Count Okuma in his *Fifty Years of New Japan* said that "the Socialistic spirit is afloat everywhere," and he evidently anticipated that Parliamentary reforms in a democratic sense would before long become inevitable. Another circumstance which, judging from the analogy of other Eastern countries, seems likely to exercise an influence in the direction of encouraging a demand for democratic reform is that the supply of educated young men largely exceeds the demand, and when this happens, as Lord Stowell shrewdly remarked, "the residuum is likely to turn sour." Mr. Porter says that "social problems, as they are understood in Europe and America, do not trouble Japan." There are no suffering poor, and there is no Poor Law. At the same time, economic questions of some gravity are likely to arise. Mr. Porter gives some amazing figures as regards wages and the hours of labour; for instance, he says that an enormous amount of child labour is employed, often at the rate of no more than threepence a day. It is difficult to believe that this state of things can endure. At

present "the views of the capitalists receive far more attention than do those of the labourers."

It is almost inconceivable that the Japanese national character should not be in some measure transformed. "Young Japan," Mr. Porter says, "is intoxicated with ideas, the chaotic ideas of such writers as Tolstoi, Maeterlinck, Nietzsche, and Bernard Shaw." The names of the chosen teachers are not much calculated to inspire any extreme degree of confidence in the wisdom of the teaching. Further, "with the collapse of the feudal system there has been a breakdown of the sense of duty to ancestors, rulers, and superiors, and nothing has taken its place. . . . In art, in literature, and in matters of social custom the old has been swept away, and at present the nation is like a questing hound uncertain which of several tracks to follow. Commercial morality is not what it should be."

The problems which lie before Japanese statesmanship are, therefore, both numerous and arduous. Meanwhile, Englishmen may hail with pleasure the rise of the new Eastern Power, and hope that the solution of these problems may tend to maintain the influence and increase the prosperity of Japan.

XXX

JAVA [1]

"*Spectator*," *January* 8, 1916

MR. DONALD MACLAINE CAMPBELL lived for twenty-three years in Java, where he had business connections. He was also for many years in the British Consular Service. He married a Dutch lady of good family, and evidently lived on terms of intimate friendship with the Dutch community. During the last few years of his residence, he devoted himself to writing a work on the past history, the economic conditions, and the administration of the island which, owing to its scenery and natural resources, has been fitly termed "the gem of the East." After his death, which occurred in June 1913, his widow decided to publish the results of his labours. The decision was wise; for, in spite of the importance of Java and its historical connection with England, the actual knowledge possessed by the average Englishman of the island is very scanty, and is not unfrequently confined to a rather hazy notion that Java is associated with the name of a great Englishman. For two reasons, indeed, the memory of Sir Stamford Raffles deserves to be cherished by his countrymen. He was a great naturalist, and an eminent representative of the

[1] *Java: Past and Present.* By Donald Maclaine Campbell. 2 vols. London: William Heinemann. 36s. net.

peculiar class of adventurous statesmen to whom in a large measure England owes her position in the world. He founded the Zoological Society, and he essayed to establish an Empire which would almost have rivalled that of India. His efforts in the first capacity were crowned with complete success. The Zoological Society has played a distinguished part in the encouragement of scientific learning in this country, and has also afforded instruction and amusement to millions of Sir Stamford Raffles's posterity. As an Empire-builder he was, through no fault of his own, less successful. He incurred the fate which attended many of the early English Imperialists. He lived at a time when, in the minds of those who were the masters of Empire-builders, commercial interests and territorial aggrandisement were each struggling to gain the upper hand. Sir Stamford Raffles looked to the extension of English power. The East India Company, on the other hand, were looking to nothing but commercial gain. He conquered Java, and would have conquered the whole of the East Indian Archipelago for his employers, but the Company thought these possessions both useless and expensive. Raffles bitterly complained that the island was given up "in total ignorance of its value, to the Dutch." Had it not been for his firmness and insistence, together with the support he received from Lord Minto, who, however, most unfortunately died in 1814, it is probable that Singapore, of which port Raffles early recognized the importance, would have followed Java. This mistake was avoided. Eventually, after long, wearisome, and acrimonious discussions, practically the whole of the Archipelago was consigned to the Dutch, whilst England remained supreme in the Malay Peninsula.

Although England and France fought for the possession of India, the main struggle for supremacy in the rest of the East was between the English and the Dutch, and until towards the close of the eighteenth century fortune favoured the latter. The first English factory in Java was established at the seaport of Bantam in February 1603. A few months later, a Dutch fleet arrived at Bantam and set up another factory. The two nations only agreed on one point—namely, to displace the Portuguese, who, in fact, were no match for either of them. Their quarrels with each other were bitter and interminable. The Dutch were very formidable competitors. The English Company endeavoured to come to terms with them, but in vain. Their fault, the English complained in a phrase which was subsequently immortalized by Canning in his celebrated rhyming despatch to Sir Charles Bagot, the British Minister at the Hague, was that they "offered too little and asked too much." In almost every direction the Dutch were for a while victorious. The tact and discretion which they displayed in dealing with the Government of Japan enabled them to oust the Portuguese from the favoured position which the latter had at one time secured in that country, and practically to monopolize the Japanese trade. In 1622, the massacre of Amboyna, of which all the revolting cruelties are narrated by Mr. Campbell, took place. Now that we have for long lived on the most friendly terms with the Dutch, and can view their magnificent Eastern possessions without a pang of jealousy, this episode may advantageously be buried in oblivion. In 1682, the loss of Bantam gave what was really the final blow to the power of the English East India Company in Java, and led, after a short

interval, to the total expulsion of the English from the island. Other conquests followed. Dutch agencies were established in Siam, Tonquin, on the coast of Coromandel, at the mouth of the Hughly, in the islands of Ceylon and Formosa, on the Malabar coast, in Guzerat, in Persia, Arabia, Mauritius, St. Helena, at the Cape of Good Hope, and in China. "The golden age of the Dutch in the East," Mr. Campbell says, "was between 1640 and 1750. They ruled and colonized everywhere." Matters continued very much in this state until Holland became the object of French ambition, and was engulfed in the vortex of the Revolution. The bickerings of the two rival Companies in the East then blossomed out into war between the two countries, and in this war sea power was the predominating factor. One by one the principal possessions of the Dutch fell into English hands. Ceylon was partially captured in 1796, although the complete subjugation of the island was not accomplished until 1815. Malacca shared the same fate, and although it was returned to the Dutch in 1819, it was given back to the English in 1824 in exchange for Bencoolen. The Cape of Good Hope also fell to the English. In 1807, Napoleon appointed General Daendels to be Governor-General of Java. He was described by Lord Minto as "a wretch in every imaginable way, one of the monsters which the worst times of the French Revolution engendered, or rather lifted from the mud at the bottom to flounce and figure away their hour upon the surface. He was greedy, corrupt, and rascally in amassing money for himself, and equally unjust and oppressive in procuring public supplies." It was at this moment that the English directed their attention to the island. The expedition which was organ-

ized by Sir Stamford Raffles was completely successful, and in 1811 Java became an English possession.

Although the English occupation of Java only lasted for five years, it produced lasting results. Under Raffles's vigorous and liberal administration, the government of the island was thoroughly reorganized. The pernicious system of farming the revenues was abolished, the Government ceased to purchase slaves, and torture and mutilation, which had been freely practised by the Dutch, were absolutely forbidden. Moreover, Raffles was wise enough to recognize the ability of many of the Dutch officials. A Proclamation of Lord Minto's, dated September 11, 1811, laid down that "Dutch gentlemen will be eligible to all offices of trust, and will enjoy the confidence of Government according to their respective characters, conduct, and talents, in common with British-born subjects." Dutchmen have generously recognized that it was during the English occupation that the foundations of a better system of government than had hitherto prevailed were laid. "There is no doubt," Mr. Campbell says, "that it was in great measure owing to the five years the English spent on the island that the present great system which rules the Colony could be brought into being. . . . The Dutch were enabled, on their return into possession, to open a fresh book and work on new principles, as in fact they did." It is probable that the success of Sir Stamford Raffles was largely due to the fact that, although his administrative reforms were based on the desirability of introducing some of the most essential elements of European civilization into the country, he did not endeavour to Europeanize too much. To those who have had experience of the harm which

may result from a too rapid application of European legal codes and procedure to a primitive society, where the relations of man to man have from time immemorial been based on custom, the following remarks are highly indicative of a statesmanlike frame of mind :

"The Courts of Justice and Police," Sir Stamford Raffles wrote, "as now modelled, are in full exercise, and I hope this Colony may receive all the advantages of British jurisprudence without entailing on it the disadvantages of a judicial establishment from England, of all things the most to be dreaded for the general prosperity and happiness of the population. The British Courts of Justice fit with difficulty our permanent English establishments in India, but here their introduction would lead to anarchy, vexation, and trouble without end."

The liberal character of the British administration of Java produced its natural consequence. An independent spirit grew up amongst the various Princes and local leaders, with the result that when the Dutch on their return endeavoured to revert to the somewhat harsh and haughty methods of former times, much discontent was caused. Eventually, the great Java War broke out in 1825. It lasted for five years, and ended, after a great sacrifice of life and treasure, in the complete success of the Dutch. The Javanese Prince, named Dipa Negara, who was the leader in the war, and who died in 1855, left, however, behind him the materials for a Home Rule movement which has been simmering ever since, and has occasionally broken out into revolts which have always been easily suppressed.

The system of administration adopted by the Dutch bears a somewhat close resemblance to that of the native States of India, save that in the latter the native rulers enjoy a greater degree of independence than in Java. The Dutch have

been wise enough to preserve the framework and outward and visible signs of the old native administration. The people are nominally ruled by their own chiefs, who, however, are mere puppets in the hands of the Dutch. The native Princes are kept in a good temper by receiving liberal subsidies to replace the loss of their former incomes. Besides this, Mr. Campbell says, " they have enormous incomes from their private estates." The real power is vested in a Governor-General, who is aided by a Council, consisting of a Vice-President and four members. There can be no doubt that under Dutch government the material prosperity of the inhabitants of Java has enormously increased. The revenue, which in 1898 was one hundred and thirty-two million florins, had in 1911 risen to two hundred and forty-seven millions. The Dutch have, of course, had to contend with the economic difficulty which always arises when civilization is introduced into a primitive society, when peace is established, and the ruthless processes, such as famine and disease, which Nature adopts to keep down the numbers of a redundant population, are in a great measure checked. The Javans are a prolific race. In rather over a hundred years the population of the island has increased from about three to over thirty millions; that is to say, as Mr. Campbell observes, " at a rate unequalled anywhere else in the world." It would have been interesting to know more of how the Dutch have dealt with the very difficult question of native education. On this point, however, Mr. Campbell supplies us with very little information. He merely says :

There are excellent schools in Java all over the country, where European boys and girls up to any age can be educated under a very highly efficient staff of

professors, schoolmasters, and schoolmistresses. The schools and staff are under the control of the Government Department of Education, and there are no better institutions of their kind outside Europe. There are also schools for natives, and one or two for Chinese.

On the whole, the Dutch have reason to be proud of what they have achieved in Java. "The Dutch," Mr. Campbell says, "have, of course, their national characteristics, as we have ours, but in honourable methods, always taking into consideration their desire for sureness, even if it necessitates slowness, they have nothing to learn from any nation, and would be able to give, perhaps, a good many points to some. They are a people of very high integrity."

XXXI

GOVERNOR PITT [1]

"*Spectator*," *October* 30, 1915

FOR several reasons Governor Pitt deserved to have his biography written. He was of the stuff of those men who, from the days of Raleigh to those of Rhodes, have made England what she is. It is an act of posthumous justice on the part of one of his countrymen to rescue his reputation from the hands of the German, De Ruville, who saw and exaggerated his faults but ignored his merits. Moreover, he was the progenitor of a line of statesmen. His son Robert, indeed, was an ignoble scion of an illustrious race. The only feat which he performed worthy of floating down the tide of anecdotal history is that, according to a legend of somewhat doubtful authenticity, he travelled from Madras to London with a diamond, worth a King's ransom, in the heel of his boot. But his grandson grasped at world-power at a time when most of the future competitors of his country were torturing their brains over such things as Pragmatic Sanction and spilling their blood for causes which were often of ephemeral importance. His great-grandson proved eventually to be the

[1] *The Life of Thomas Pitt.* By Sir Cornelius Neale Dalton, K.C.M.G. Cambridge: at the University Press. 15s. net.

" pilot who weathered the storm " of the Revolutionary period. He has been happy in his biographer. Sir Cornelius Neale Dalton has not only recounted the deeds and portrayed the character of the man, but he has given us a vivid picture of the state of English society at a time when the leading politicians of the day were mostly corrupt and not unfrequently drunk ; when grave lawyers argued that " infidels were perpetual enemies " with whom no Englishman might trade without the special permission of his Sovereign ; when, in fact, it was almost a duty on the part of every true-born Briton to " beat an outlaw, a traitor, or a pagan," and when the educational standard which prevailed amongst the upper classes may be estimated by reference to the following amazing specimen of primitive and undisciplined orthography which emanated from the pen of a lady of title. " Al hear," Lord Strafford's mother wrote, " are in great rapturs of the King [George I.], and say he is the Wysist and Richis Prince in Yoarup : I hope he will prove soe."

In the Pitt family the domestic barometer stood permanently at " Stormy " for at least three generations. Although it may be gathered from Lord Rosebery's account that the great Chatham entertained a real love for his sister Ann, their relations appear to have been rather those of an armed truce, varied by spasmodic and alternate bursts of rage and affection, than of a solid alliance. But the breezes which ruffled the domestic waters in the time of the grandson were of trifling importance as compared with the hurricanes which at times swept over the family life of the grandfather. The husband quarrelled with the wife from whom he was eventually separated. Both the father

and the mother quarrelled with the sons. The brothers and sisters quarrelled amongst each other, and the more remote kinsmen and kinswomen were in a perpetual state of enmity. The Governor wrote to his eldest son from India commenting on the "hellish confusion" in his family, and complaining that "the vileness of their action on all sides was not to be paralleled in history." Of the female members of the family, Lucy, who was Thomas Pitt's favourite daughter, seems to have been the only member who had a "character of gentleness." Betty, one of Robert Pitt's daughters, is described as having "the face of an angel and a heart of all the furies." It was against Robert that the irascible Governor more especially poured forth all the vials of his wrath. His education appears to have been somewhat peculiar. He was advised by his father to study "Civill Law," as also "fortyfication and Gunnery." In the pursuit of this singularly varied curriculum he certainly did not acquire any sense of parental reverence. He was in the habit of alluding to his mother as "Old Madam." His extravagance was a perpetual source of annoyance to his father. Why should he have spent £500 on an Old Sarum election when it only cost his father £10 "for a dinner the day of the election"? But he did much worse than this. He turned Tory, and was even suspected of strong Jacobite sympathies. His indignant father, who was a stout Whig and Hanoverian, reviled him for joining "factious caballs and contriveing to put a French kickshaw upon the throne againe." Besides the perpetual quarrels with son Robert, there was an even more bitter feud with "Cozen" John, who by a strange fatality was sent to India to support commercial interests which were

wholly at variance with those of the Governor, and who wrote to his kinsman a letter containing "sundry expressions as if it had been dictated to him by the oyster wenches of Billingsgate." He was admonished by the Governor in the following frank terms: "Mind your trade, which is your Masters business, and when the Moors have bang'd you and Stript you of what you have, upon your Submission and begging pardon for what you have done, I may Chance to protect you here." In the end, John was hopelessly worsted. He was evidently no match for his masterful relative.

Thomas Pitt said of himself: "It was never my temper to be quarrelling and jangling." It may be admitted that he was at times sorely tried, but he was evidently a man who would not brook contradiction. Whether in public or domestic affairs, his motto was εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω. At Madras, he said: "There shall be but one Governor whilst I am here." It is probable that his naturally fiery temper was not improved by residence in India. The late Lord Salisbury once said to me that "no one ever kept his temper south of the Isthmus of Suez." A letter from the Governor's agent in London appears to confirm the impression that, in so far as Madras society was concerned, the statement held good in Thomas Pitt's time. "Pray what is it reignes in India," Mr. Godfrey wrote in 1701, "that you are all upon the Quarrells?"

We may, therefore, take it as proven that Thomas Pitt was, in the words of the Governor of the first East India Company, "a fellow of a haughty, huffying, daring temper"; but a little haughtiness, huffiness, and, more especially, daring were perhaps not altogether amiss in the

management of the Indian affairs of the day. Moreover, judged by the standard of morality prevalent at the time, he may be said to have been a man of high character. He was the prince of "interlopers," which was the term applied to those who were accused of infringing the monopoly granted to the original East India Company; but interloping was not condemned by public opinion, and was eventually declared by a Resolution of the House of Commons to be a "perfectly legitimate business in which every Englishman had a right to engage." There appears also to have been nothing objectionable in the means which he adopted for obtaining possession of what Lady Wentworth called the "great dyomont, as big as a great egg." This possession proved, indeed, eventually to be more of a curse than a benefit to him. He hawked it about Europe, thinking at one time that the King of France or Spain, and at another that the King of Prussia, would be "the fairest chapman for it," though he was always quite prepared to treat with "any fforreign Prince about it." What with the bribe paid to the French Court jeweller in order to get him to pronounce the gem flawless, the loss of interest which accrued during the long period before the diamond was sold, and the fact that eventually the French Government failed to pay the whole of the purchase-money, the profit he made was, as his biographer points out, probably not "inordinate." The most questionable transaction in which he was engaged seems to have been the conclusion of an arrangement with Baptiste Martin, the Director-General of the French East India Company at Pondicherry, under which the two companies agreed not in any way to molest each other during the con-

tinuance of the war between France and England. In this case it is difficult to acquit him altogether of treason, or, at all events, of conniving at treason.

Pitt's position while Governor of Madras was one of the utmost difficulty. There was a total want of unity of purpose amongst the English in India. The servants of the Old and New East India Companies only thought of defeating and outwitting each other, and did not hesitate to rely on the aid of what they called "the Moors" with a view to accomplishing their object. The representatives of the Great Mogul treated the agents of the Old and New Companies alike with contumely. The English, one of them said, "were a company of base quarrelling people, and foul dealers." Englishmen in Bengal were publicly "chawbucked" (flogged). In England, political corruption was rampant. The inquiries made by a Committee of the House of Commons elicited the fact that the first East India Company had spent £80,000 in Ministerial bribes. The King's Chief Minister, the Duke of Leeds, was disgraced and impeached. The most complete ignorance existed of the real state of affairs in India. Sir Josiah Child, at one time Governor of the East India Company and a very influential man, was, according to Sir Cornelius Dalton's account, a sanctimonious and despotic prig. He expected his own orders to be obeyed implicitly, however foolish they might be, and he thought that "the laws of England were a heap of nonsense compiled by a few ignorant country gentlemen," and, therefore, unworthy of attention. Appointments to positions of trust in India were shamelessly jobbed. No attention was paid to local opinion. Governors who made any attempt to provide for the safety of the British possessions

were reprimanded, and made personally liable for any expenses which they incurred. It was thought wiser to trust wholly to the observance by the native rulers of the firmans—or, as they were more commonly called, the "phirmaunds"—which they had granted. In the midst of all this confusion, Thomas Pitt kept his head, and seems to have been the only man who had some glimmering sense of the fact that he had an Imperial mission to perform. When Daud Khan appeared before Fort St. George and demanded thirty thousand rupees of the English, Pitt sent him "some Pegu oranges," and eventually bought him off with a smaller sum. He "firmly impressed on the native mind the impregnability of the feeble defences of Fort St. George, and the hopelessness on the part of the Mogul's armies to invest the fortified coast settlement of the English, so long as their command of the sea was assured. . . . Under his rule no native potentate or official dared to take personal liberties with any Englishman in the Carnatic." As an Empire-builder he cannot, of course, claim to rank with his illustrious grandson. Nevertheless, he contributed to lay the foundations of British rule in India. "He is entitled," Sir Cornelius Dalton says, "to a very distinguished position in the long line of our great Proconsuls, who, in every quarter of the globe, dealing with every variety of race, in the face of manifold difficulties and opposition on the part of the Home Authorities, as well as of open enemies abroad, have for centuries done their part to make the British Empire what it is to-day." Without the energy, resourcefulness, and daring shown by such men as Thomas Pitt there would never have been any British Empire.

XXXII

THE THIERS MEMOIRS [1]

"*Spectator*," *February* 26, 1916.

RARELY has a statesman in any country been placed in a position of such responsibility, or had to encounter such formidable difficulties, as M. Thiers when, upon the fall of that artificial and rococo political fabric termed the Second Empire, he undertook, at seventy-three years of age, to guide the destinies of France. He had to make peace with an absolutist and narrow-minded Sovereign at the head of a victorious Army, camped in the heart of French territory, whose commanders knew no pity for a vanquished foe, and whose efforts were seconded by the most adroit and unscrupulous diplomatist of the age. Not only had he to make a peace whose conditions were sure to be leonine, but he had to ensure the execution of its provisions, and in doing so he was, at the very outset, met with the contingency that many of his most influential opponents, alarmed at the recuperative powers shown by their stricken foe, repented of what they deemed the undue moderation of their demands, and showed a strong disposition to renew the contest whilst they still held positions

[1] *Memoirs of M. Thiers, 1871–73.* Translated by F. M. Atkinson. London: George Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.

of great military vantage. Before the task of freeing French territory from the abhorred presence of the foreigner could even be commenced, the tottering Ministry of which Thiers was the head had to deal with an outburst of anarchical rage on the part of the proletariat of Paris so furious and serious as to amount to a civil war. A gigantic sum of money had to be raised from an impoverished country in order to satisfy Prussian avarice. A demoralized Army had to be reorganized, at all events to such an extent as to show both friend and foe alike that the military power of France was still a factor in the European situation. In settling the future form of government with which France was to be endowed, the claims and bitter dissensions of rival dynasties, as well as of those Republicans, some of an extreme, others of a moderate type, who were opposed to all dynasties, had to be carefully weighed and considered. The constant disputes between angry coadjutors, whose nerves were in a high state of tension, enhanced at every moment the friction attendant on the working of a hastily constructed administrative machine composed of very heterogeneous elements.

That, amidst this extraordinary combination of adverse circumstances, one man should have been able to control events; that he should have succeeded in maintaining his position; that he should have secured peace on terms which, though severe, were more favourable than could have been expected; that he should have speedily freed French soil from the presence of the enemy; that he should have restored French credit and reorganized the French Army; and that for three years he should have prevented the smouldering embers of Royalist and Republican animosity from bursting into a blaze which would have been

disastrous to the future of his country—these constitute feats of which any statesman might well be proud. Probably no then living Frenchman but Thiers could have accomplished it. Nevertheless, any survivor of that eventful period, speaking merely from memory and without any minute research into contemporary records, will have no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the Thiers Memoirs, deeply interesting though they be, do not tell the whole tale. Neither, indeed, do they add much to the information previously in the possession of the public. The lion's account of his own conduct is proverbially one-sided. M. Thiers frequently dwells on his own "almost superhuman efforts." He vaunts both the "moderation and firmness" with which he governed France and the esteem with which he was regarded throughout Europe. These boasts are by no means without justification. At the same time, it is impossible not to feel that, in inditing every page of his Memoirs, the autobiographer has wished to pose as a modern Fabius, and to invite his countrymen with one voice to cry: "Unus homo nobis restituit rem." A modest sense of self-depreciation never, however, counted amongst the numerous and unquestionably high qualities of M. Thiers.

The omissions in the Memoirs are, in fact, notable. Take, for instance, the history of the Commune, in itself a political episode of the utmost importance, whose incidents appear to have faded in a manner which is both unaccountable and regrettable from the memories of the present generation. Its true history has never yet been written. The best account is that contained in *Les Convulsions de Paris*, and M. Maxime du Camp, the author of that work,

acknowledged that, until free access was allowed to the records of the period, many points of importance had to be left in obscurity. M. Thiers adds little or nothing to our knowledge on the subject. More especially does he appear to gloss over the terrible nature of the vengeance which was wreaked on the insurrectionists. That the French Army and the French people should have been madly exasperated against those who, whilst the foreigner was in their midst, raised the standard of rebellion, and who were guilty of the ghastly crime of murdering the Archbishop of Paris and his associates, was natural enough. But it is notorious that the punishment subsequently inflicted was perhaps even more than commensurate with the offence. M. Thiers tells us nothing of what really occurred in this connection. He contents himself with observing that many thousands of prisoners were taken, and that "the English Press, always well informed, declared that greater humanity had never been evinced towards greater criminals."

Again, M. Thiers tells us little of the negotiations with the Royalists which took place immediately after his assumption of office. His own sympathies were avowedly Orleanist, but he, very rightly, cared more for conservatism than for the interests of individual Princes. "Every Government," he declared to the Chamber, "must be conservative, and no society could live under a Government that was not." This unequivocal declaration evoked, curiously enough, applause from the Moderate Republican Left and murmurs from the Right, which looked for a more distinct adhesion to its own Royalist principles. Occasionally, the hearts of the small Bonapartist clique beat high; but although Prince Bismarck, who did not wish to see a Republican Government

established in France, at one time suggested with malign adroitness that the three hundred thousand French prisoners then in German hands might be made to constitute an army at the head of which a Napoleon might again be seated on the throne, there was never any really serious prospect of a genuine Napoleonic revival. The case of the Royalists was different. There can be little doubt that if, at the time, they had been able to agree on the choice of a man, there would have been a Royalist Restoration. But it was hopeless to expect any such agreement. I well remember that a distinguished Legitimist said to me at the time : " Mon cher, les Orléanistes sont pires que les Communards." M. Thiers speedily convinced himself that a Restoration was impossible, and that the only hope of the future lay in the establishment of a conservative Republic. None the less, he eventually fell a victim to Royalist effort. Had the Comte de Chambord wished, he could have been King of France, but his historic letter of October 27th, 1873, to that strange and self-elected negotiator, M. Chesnelong, which is given at length in M. Hanotaux's history, finally dashed Royalist hopes to the ground. It showed that, like a true Bourbon, the Count had learnt nothing and had forgotten nothing, and that when he insisted on the substitution of the white flag for the tricolor, which was associated with all the glories of the French Army—an episode afterwards cruelly satirized by Anatole France in his *Île des Pengouins*—he meant more than a sentimental attachment to a piece of bunting, and that he only wished to return to power if the principles which were implied in the symbol were again to be enforced. It was honourable to himself, and also beneficial to France, that he showed his hand so unreservedly. The country

was at heart Republican. A restoration of the Monarchy could only have been temporary, and would assuredly have led to further internal strife, and possibly to European complications.

Perhaps, however, the most interesting, and certainly the most pathetic, portion of the Memoirs is that in which the veteran statesman gives a full account of his experiences at the time when he was knocking at the door of every Foreign Office in Europe in the vain hope of obtaining material assistance for his sorely stricken country. All with one consent began to make excuse. None were prepared for war. All were stupefied at the completeness and rapidity of the Prussian success. In London, he had an interview with Lord Granville, whom he found "guided chiefly by a policy of inertia." A tradition survives at the Foreign Office that what really occurred at this interview, which took place late in the afternoon, was that M. Thiers delivered a long, impassioned, and carefully prepared speech. Lord Granville then made some remarks in reply, but in a few minutes noticed that M. Thiers had leant back in his chair and had fallen fast asleep. He was in the habit of getting up very early in the morning, and, in consequence, often felt greatly fatigued later in the day. Lord Granville allowed him to sleep for a short time, and then took from the grate the fire-irons, which happen to be of a rather exceptionally massive description, and allowed them to fall with a crash on the floor. This awoke M. Thiers, who then rose, shook Lord Granville warmly by the hand, and, after a few words of compliment, withdrew. M. Thiers also saw Mr. Gladstone, to whom he pleaded the cause of France. Mr. Gladstone "preserved a grieved and uncomfortable silence," and then, as we learn from Lord Morley's history, relieved his feelings

by suggesting that Alsace and Lorraine might be neutralized under the guarantee of all the Powers, and by writing to Professor Max Müller a moral disquisition showing how "the smallest errors in the forum of conscience are the greatest in the vast theatre of action." Such arguments addressed to Prince Bismarck produced as much effect as a missile launched from a peashooter on an elephant. He was of opinion that "a guarantee is in these days of little value." Since then, Europe has had every reason to learn that Prince Bismarck's view was correct. At Vienna, the Austrians "clearly saw the danger that threatened Europe," but Count Andrassy, speaking on behalf of Hungary, said that they were "not in a position to make war." All that Count Beust could suggest was that Italy might be utilized as a cat's-paw. "The intervention of Italy was the only way to make the war universal." At Petrograd, M. Thiers found Prince Gortchakow animated by the most profound distrust and dislike of the Prussians. "The whole of Russia," he said to M. Thiers, "is full of sympathy for you and of the opposite for Prussia." But the Tsar was manifestly under secret engagements to Berlin, and definitely declined to afford any material assistance. At Rome, the Italian Ministers were "prodigal of protestations of friendship and of regret that they could not help France." Thus, the chastened and discomfited emissary returned to Paris convinced that France must rely solely on her own resources.

Perhaps the reflection which most forces itself on the mind, after reading this striking example of the results obtained by military preparedness when brought in contact with absence of preparation, is profound astonishment at the ease with which British statesmen and the British

public allowed themselves to be lulled into a false state of security, and remained inactive during the long armed truce which ensued before Germany, judging that the time had at last come, drew up the curtain on the second act of the world-drama, of which that of the first fell at Sedan. Yet there were not wanting acute observers whose vision into the future was more prophetic. Sir Robert Morier had been a strong German sympathizer. He had hoped that German victory would prove a great benefit to civilization. But when he saw that the result would not be a German but what he called a "Bismarckian" peace, he fully realized what it meant. Writing to Sir Louis Mallet, he said that it was "of the greatest importance that we should strengthen and evoke all the Nationalism and Imperialism left within us if we are to hold our own."

Equally interesting is the full account given in the Memoirs of the negotiations between Prince Bismarck and M. Thiers. At the risk of being considered an *advocatus diaboli*, I am constrained to confess that the former of these two statesmen is revealed in a character more worthy of esteem than might have been supposed probable. Indignation at Prussian proceedings and at later Prussian policy should not be allowed to obscure the fact that at that time the Germans had a real grievance against the French. They wished to create an united nation. The first step towards the achievement of this object had been taken. Austria was humbled. It was then hoped to unite together all the South Germans under Prussian hegemony. The aim was perfectly legitimate. It was certainly in complete accordance with the Nationalist principles now generally accepted in this country. But it was well known that the French Government, being still under

the influence of the old Balance of Power theories, would resist its accomplishment by force of arms. Hence the necessity of either abandoning the National programme or engaging in a war.

But if some reasonable justification can be pleaded for making war, none whatever can be proffered for the methods adopted to bring it about. Talleyrand, speaking of his intimate friend Montrond, said: "Je l'aime, parce qu'il n'est pas *infiniment* scrupuleux," to which Montrond replied: "Et moi j'aime Talleyrand, parce qu'il n'est pas du tout scrupuleux." Prince Bismarck bore a closer resemblance to Talleyrand than to Montrond. He was from the first determined on war. He allowed no scruples of any kind to hinder the attainment of his object. His diplomatic conduct resembled the proceedings of the picadors at a Spanish bull-fight, who goad their victim into a fury as a preliminary to the enraged animal launching himself on the matador, who awaits him, sword in hand, to give him his *coup de grâce*. The Hohenzollern candidature to the Spanish throne was a trap which, it cannot be doubted, was designedly laid by Prussian diplomacy with the intention of precipitating the contest which was thought to be inevitable, and when it appeared doubtful whether the desired result would even then be obtained, recourse was had to a falsified telegram, whilst the sympathies of Europe, and especially of England, were alienated from France by the timely production of a draft treaty, which it was ingeniously arranged should be in the handwriting of the French Ambassador, Benedetti, and in which Belgium's guarantee of independence was torn to shreds. But for all that, Prince Bismarck was not a fire-eating bully. He was a statesman. He had no wish to humiliate France unduly, or

to lay the seeds for further dissensions. It is clear from the account given by M. Thiers that, if the terms of peace had had to be decided only by him, they would have been more favourable to France than was actually the case. As it was, in the face of strong opposition, he allowed the original demand for an indemnity to be reduced from six to five milliards of francs, and, after a tough tussle, he agreed to the French remaining in possession of Belfort, a point to which they attached the utmost importance. For the rest, Prince Bismarck was overborne by the Prussian military party and by the King, whose obstinacy and importunities made him declare that "Monarchy makes one a Republican."

It is but an act of posthumous justice to recognize that, although it may be that Prince Bismarck's policy was ruthless and utterly unscrupulous, none the less, had it not undergone a notable change for the worse at the hands of his no less unscrupulous but far less statesmanlike successors, the terrible cataclysm, of which a dismayed world is now the witness, would most probably never have taken place.

XXXIII

DELANE OF THE "TIMES" [1]

"*Spectator*," *January* 15, 1916

No survivor of the mid-Victorian period will be disposed to challenge the accuracy of Sir Edward Cook when he says: "The *Times* of Delane was a national institution; and Delane of the *Times* deserves a place among the notable Englishmen of the Victorian era." The famous editor is, indeed, fully entitled to have his biography included amongst those who were the "Makers of the Nineteenth Century." As to the manner in which his biographer has accomplished his task, there can be but one opinion. In a single volume which, considering the great variety and importance of the subjects treated, may be considered a model of condensation, and in not a single page of which the interest is for one moment allowed to flag, Sir Edward Cook has given us a vivid account of the character and abilities of the man, accompanied by some very judicious comments on the transactions in which he was engaged. He does not attempt to conceal Delane's shortcomings and limitations; but he does full justice to his talents, and he enables the present generation—who require these things

[1] *Delane of the "Times."* By Sir Edward Cook. London: Constable & Co. 5s. net.

to be interpreted to them—to understand how it was that, under special political conditions which can never recur, those talents were singularly suited for display on the field of action to which a fortunate chance destined their possessor. Himself an eminent journalist, Sir Edward Cook is particularly qualified to understand the pitfalls which lie in the path of a fellow-craftsman. He can appreciate better than others the delicacy of the relations between proprietor and editor. He can estimate the extent to which an editor who aspired, to a degree unknown to the present generation, to monopolize the guidance of public opinion, was constantly placed between the Charybdis of indecision and the Scylla of undue haste in pronouncing an opinion, often on very imperfect information, upon the current affairs of the day, and how a flagrant error in either direction must necessarily have resulted in a loss of influence and a sacrifice of public confidence. Delane, in fact, owed the maintenance of his commanding position very largely to the circumstances of the time. If any one who had lived in the days of Pitt and Fox, or even in those of Chatham and Walpole, had been reincarnated during the mid-Victorian period, he would not have experienced much difficulty in familiarizing himself with the political situation. He would, indeed, have found that power had been transferred from the aristocracy and the landed interests to the middle classes. But the transfer singularly falsified the gloomy predictions of the Tory prophets of 1832. No great political or social upheaval took place. Tories and Whigs were, as of old, playing their time-honoured game. They railed against each other, but, however little they may themselves at the time have recognized the fact, and however much

their methods may have differed, they both in reality aimed at the same object. That object was to check a very decided advance of democracy either by stubborn resistance or by timely and very moderate concessions. Nevertheless, the change which had taken place singularly facilitated the action of a journalist possessing the peculiar characteristics of Delane. When Kinglake said something to the effect that the average Englishman, on reading his *Times* after breakfast, found his own rather inchoate ideas very faithfully reflected and very intelligently uttered, he was merely stating in another form the fact that there is in all countries, and notably in England, a stamp of conventionality on middle-class ideas and opinions which exists to a far less degree either amongst the aristocracy or the proletariat. It is this conventionality which renders it a comparatively easy task to cast the horoscope of middle-class political views, and to indicate beforehand what attitude the members of that class are likely to assume in dealing with any special issue. Their attitude will be essentially one which avoids extremes. It will be conservative, but not averse to moderate reform. It will be liberal, but will shrink with alarm from subversive change. Delane was the interpreter of this frame of mind. It was greatly to his credit that he rarely erred, but no man could hope to play the part which he played when the circumstances which contributed to his success had passed away. Those circumstances underwent a complete transformation in 1865. Lord Palmerston's death was the close of an historical epoch. From that time onwards, triumphant democracy advanced with a rush. A political Rip Van Winkle, who had lived in the days of Pitt and Fox, had he descended on earth a

quarter of a century after Lord Palmerston's death, would have found himself in a new world which he would have had much difficulty in understanding.

The history of Delane may in some respects be described as the history of backstairs politics during the eventful period which immediately preceded and immediately followed the accession of democracy to power. It cannot be said that Sir Edward Cook's biography tends generally to give a very exalted idea of the characters of the leading politicians of the time. Still less is it calculated to inspire any regret that the system of government which then obtained has passed away, never to return. The prevailing note throughout the whole of this period was excessive deference, amounting at times even to subserviency, paid by the politicians to the all-powerful journalist. Sturdy old Lord Russell appears to have been the only exception. He steadfastly refused to bow the knee to the journalistic Baal. He was scandalized, and not without reason, at Lord Derby "submitting his Ministerial appointments to Mr. Delane before submitting them to the Queen." But, with this exception, Ministers, of whatsoever party, seem to have vied with each other in attempts to secure the good graces of the redoubtable "Thunderer." Lord Aberdeen communicated an important Cabinet secret to him. Lord Clarendon, whose letters to Delane "would fill a volume," shivered when the *Times* sneered at him for accepting the Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster, and angrily asked why Lord Palmerston had not endeavoured to stifle the criticism. Lord Palmerston, although he had the courage of his opinions and triumphed over the *Times* on the occasion of his celebrated *Civis Romanus sum*

speech, had no secrets from Delane. The persuasive voice of Lord Granville, and the honeyed flattery in the use of which Lord Beaconsfield was an adept, were alike employed to keep Delane in a good temper. Even Mr. Gladstone, although there was not much sympathy between him and Delane, and although he at one time caustically remarked that the *Times* "ought to be prohibited from changing sides more than a certain number of times during the year," did not altogether escape the contagion. Sir Edward Cook records that during the formation of the Cabinet of 1867 Mr. Gladstone "in personal letters to Delane reported progress from Windsor," and that at a dinner-party given by Lord Granville he was "most attentive" to Delane's observations. Delane's power, though not boundless, and perhaps not, as Abraham Lincoln thought, only inferior to that of the Mississippi, was very great. He practically named Mr. Denison to be Speaker, Sir Robert Peel to be Irish Secretary, and Mr. Ward Hunt to be Chancellor of the Exchequer. He used very plain language in tendering advice, and, it must be added, very sound advice, to the most august personage in the realm, who did not scorn to explain in an anonymous letter addressed to the *Times* why it was not accepted. Ministers hung on his words, and the average Englishman suspended his opinion on the current topics of the day until Delane had told him what he ought to think.

"No public character," Lord Acton has said in one of his essays, "has ever stood the revelation of private utterances and correspondence." The verdict is severe—in my opinion, too severe. But if this test is applied in the case now under discussion, it must be admitted that the journalist comes out of it, on the whole, with greater credit

than the politicians. It is, indeed, almost impossible that any individual should, without having his head turned, be the subject of such adulation and solicitation as were offered to Delane. The view taken by his subordinates is sufficiently indicated by the following circumstance which is narrated by Sir Edward Cook, and which reads as if it were an extract from Thackeray's *Book of Snobs*. "It was a proud moment," Sir Edward says, "for an old retainer of the *Times*, who used to be fond of recording it, when he saw the editor *riding* down Whitehall with a duke *walking* on each side." But Delane himself does not appear to have lost his head or to have abused the advantages of his position. The sole fault of which he can be accused is that of boasting, in what Sir Edward Cook very justly calls a somewhat "thrasonical" strain, of his independence. The assertion of that independence did not involve the display of any great amount of moral courage. Delane was shrewd enough to know that it was his main asset, and that his position and influence depended wholly on its maintenance. "Il y a toujours," the worldly-wise French proverb says, "un qui baise et un qui tend la joue." Delane was in the happy position of being generally the party which dispensed rather than that which solicited favours.

The present generation need have no hesitation in answering the question to which, when addressed to him by Lord Granville, Lord Beaconsfield characteristically refused to reply until after Delane's death. That Delane was a supremely able journalist does not admit of the least doubt. But was he in other respects a really able man? As regards the affairs of his own country he was, as Sir Edward Cook says,

generally an accurate "political meteorologist." He usually divined which way the wind was blowing, and trimmed his sails accordingly. He does not seem to have shown any great degree of moral courage in resisting a popular outcry with which he entertained no sympathy. Thus, he supported Lord John Russell's Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, and at the same time confided to Charles Greville that he thought "the whole thing gross humbug and a pack of nonsense." But on purely English matters he was usually on the side of common-sense and sound statesmanship. As regards foreign affairs, Sir Edward Cook says that Delane "was seldom more far-sighted than the majority of his countrymen at the time." The verdict is lenient. It cannot, indeed, be justly imputed as a fault to Delane that he was unable to approach the Schleswig-Holstein question or the Crimean War by the light of the knowledge now in the possession of his posterity, but it is certain that in respect to other matters his want of foresight was far less excusable. As regards the American Civil War he was egregiously wrong, and did an amount of harm which it would be difficult to exaggerate. He was wanting in sympathy for the cause of Italian unity. He strongly opposed the commercial treaty with France, and his forecast of the results of the Franco-Prussian War was utterly erroneous. "Nothing shall ever persuade me," he wrote to Sir William Russell, "except the event, that the Prussians will withstand the French, and I would lay my last shilling upon Casquette against Pumpernickel." The record is sufficient to nullify any claim on the part of Delane to statesmanship of a high order.

In 1855, Mr. Walter, the proprietor of the *Times*,

boasted that "he did not know of the existence of the *Daily Telegraph*." The phrase may be regarded as a measure of the degree of journalistic despotism exercised at one time by Delane and the *Times*. Such a state of things can never recur, neither in the public interests is it at all desirable that it should recur.

XXXIV

SHAKESPEARE [1]

"*Spectator*," *January* 29, 1916

THE Birmingham Shakespearean Library contains nearly ten thousand volumes relating to the great Englishman whom Voltaire, who was pedantically wedded to the rigid standards of literary classicism, had the audacity to term *un grand fou*, and the correct spelling of whose name can now never be known, for he himself, writing in the crabbed old English character which still survived in provincial England when he was a schoolboy, wrote it in four, and the local authorities of Stratford in no less than sixteen, different ways. None the less, a new, or, to speak more correctly a re-edited, and greatly enlarged, Life of Shakespeare cannot be said to be superfluous. Sir Sidney Lee has devoted eighteen years of his life to a profound study of Elizabethan literature. It seems almost presumptuous to comment, even in an eulogistic strain, on such herculean literary labour. Yet it may be some gratification to the author to know that one who can scarcely boast that he has devoted as many days as Sir Sidney Lee has years to Shakespearean study, has been able to read the seven hundred and twenty closely-

[1] *A Life of William Shakespeare*. By Sir Sidney Lee. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 8s. 6d. net.

printed pages of his work without for one moment feeling his interest flag, or wishing that, in Horatian language, the risk of being obscure had been incurred by enforced brevity. It is, in truth, a monumental work. Every incident connected with Shakespeare's life, and every circumstance which can, directly or indirectly, throw some light, however remote, on his character, temperament, and literary aims, is examined with reverential care. The preposterous idea that Bacon was the author of Shakespeare's plays is, indeed, discussed in only a few pages, which, with a very justifiable contempt, are relegated to an appendix. Even in according this treatment to the controversy, Sir Sidney Lee has shown himself more tolerant than Tennyson, who, on receiving a letter inviting his opinion on the subject, said: "I feel inclined to write back 'Sir, don't be a fool.'"

There is no point, however trivial, bearing in any way on the true comprehension of Shakespeare and his works, as to which Sir Sidney Lee has not scrupulously collected all the available evidence and has pronounced judgment. Did Shakespeare ever live in Shoreditch? The "theory rests on a shadowy foundation." Did he, in very truth, ever plant a mulberry-tree? The question cannot be answered with any degree of certainty, for the tradition that he did so was not put on record till 1758, when the alleged tree was cut down by a surly landlord, and its wood converted into "goblets, fancy boxes, and inkstands" by an enterprising wood-carver of Stratford. What was Shakespeare's income? Sir Sidney Lee, after a searching analysis of the available facts and figures, arrives at the conclusion that up to 1599 it was about £150 a year, a sum equal to £750 at the present time, but that

later it rose to £700 (now £3500) a year. What was Shakespeare's precise position at Court when that distressful monarch, James I., conferred on himself the signal honour of enlisting into his service, but fortunately not enslaving the genius of, the greatest of his subjects? Apparently he occupied the humble position of a Groom of the Chamber, and in that capacity received the munificent salary of 52s. 4d. annually, together with an occasional gift of "four and a half yards of scarlet cloth wherewith to make himself a suit of royal red." But, even thus arrayed, he was not allowed to join in any Royal cavalcade, for "the Herald's official order of precedence allotted actors no place." They were described in a contemporary play as "glorious vagabonds." We are told much that is interesting about the famous Globe Theatre. That "vertuous fabrique" was burned down in 1613 by the discharge of "certain Canons," which set fire to the thatch, and caused what was at first thought to be "an idle smoak," but eventually turned out to be a very serious conflagration. "Yet nothing did perish, but wood and straw and a few forsaken cloaks; only one man had his breeches set on fire, that would perhaps have broyled him, if he had not by the benefit of a provident wit put it out with bottled ale." Was the theatre situated on the northern or the southern side of Maid Lane, now Park Street, Southwark? Some two hundred and fifty years after its final demolition by the hand of a gloomy Puritanism, the controversy still continued in the pages of *Notes and Queries*. Sir Sidney Lee throws the weight of his authority into the scale of the north-side partisans. Again, was Shakespeare ever a lawyer's clerk, as has been surmised from his intimate acquaintance with law, which,

however, was greatly exaggerated by Lord Campbell? The inference is no more correct than that he was a soldier and served with Lord Leicester in the Low Countries. His legal and military knowledge is merely another proof of his wonderful receptivity. He was, in the expressive phrase of Coleridge, μυριόνους—thousand-souled. His mind, Sir Sidney Lee says, was like "a highly-sensitised photographic plate." "If he came in contact in an alehouse with a burly, good-humoured toper, the conception of Falstaff found instantaneously admission to his brain." Similarly, the idea that Shakespeare ever visited Scotland, based on the accurate description he gives of Highland scenery in *Macbeth*, may be dismissed as unworthy of credence. He merely assimilated the accounts of the Highlands which he received from Scottish acquaintances in London.

With no less scrupulous care does Sir Sidney Lee examine the sources from which Shakespeare drew both his plots and, in some cases, the separate characters in his plays. Every one knows that Shakespeare seized on a tale of Plutarch's, a legend of Holinshed's, or a poor story of Bandello or some other Italian author, and clothed it with all the splendour of his own inimitable genius. It is, moreover, clear that such characters as Dogberry and Verges were Elizabethan constables transported to Italian soil, and, as Mr. Madden has told us in his delightful work entitled *The Diary of Master William Silence*, that when Shakespeare was describing the actions of his Petruchios, Benedicks, and Beatrices his heart was really far away in the Cotswold Hills watching the feats of the "tercel-gentles," "eyasses," and "haggards" of Gloucestershire falconry. But it is perhaps less well

known, for instance, that Caliban was a faithful portraiture of the idea then current of a Patagonian or Caribbean savage, and that *Cymbeline*, though mainly based on a story of Boccaccio, perhaps—although Sir Sidney Lee thinks to a "very slender" extent—owed its origin to an English work published in 1603 and bearing the amazing and amusing title of "Westward for Smelts, or the Waterman's Fare of Mad Merry Western Wenches, whose tongues albeit, like Bell-clappers, they never leave ringing, yet their Tales are sweet, and will much content you: Written by kinde Kitt of Kingstone."

The question of the extent to which Shakespeare borrowed the thoughts and expressions of his predecessors in other countries is not, in itself, of much importance, all the less so because, even if he be supposed to have borrowed, he almost invariably improved greatly on the original model. All poets must either plagiarize, or at all events have the appearance of plagiarizing. The emotions, which are constant since Time was, form the raw material of poetry, which must necessarily, in Aristotelian language, be "an imitation of the Universal." Juvenal was not far wrong when he said: *Expectes eadem a summo minimoque poeta.* Nevertheless, as a curiosity of literature, there is something rather attractive in comparing the language in which the poets of different ages have clothed ideas common to all of them. That plagiarisms, or apparent plagiarisms, from Greek are more common than from any other language is comprehensible enough when it is remembered that, on the emotions and the relations between man and man, the Greeks said almost all there is worth saying. When Gray, for instance, wrote that "Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise,"

he was, perhaps unconsciously paraphrasing a fragment of Euripides preserved by Stobaeus—*κέρδος ἐν κακοῖς ἀγνωσία.* That Shakespeare was much indebted to his predecessors, especially to Ovid, is certain. His exquisite verses on the familiar Epicurean theme of *Carpe diem*, beginning "What is love? 'Tis not hereafter," is almost a translation from some lines of Lorenzo de Medici:

> Quant' è bella giovinezza
> Che si fugge tuttavia!
> Chi vuol esser lieto, sia;
> Di doman non c' è certezza.

Sir Sidney Lee, of course, touches on the oft-discussed question of the extent of Shakespeare's acquaintance with Greek. That he knew something of the language is certain. Otherwise, Jonson would not have said that he knew less Greek than Latin. Sir Sidney gives some examples of parallelisms between Shakespeare and the Greek tragedians. Numerous other instances might be quoted. Lady Macbeth's famous soliloquy is very Aeschylean (*Choëph.* 70–73). The touching speech of Constance in *King John*, in which she says that "Grief fills the room up of my absent child," may be compared to the description given in the *Agamemnon* (405–15) of the desolation of the deserted husband Menelaus. There is a great resemblance between Jocasta's speech to Eteocles (*Phoenissae* 33) and Wolsey's denunciation of ambition in *Henry VIII.*, which is certainly the genuine work of Shakespeare, although Fletcher co-operated in writing the play. Also when, in the *Orestes* of Euripides (395), Menelaus says: *τί χρῆμα πάσχεις; τίς σ' ἀπόλλυσιν νόσος;* the reply forcibly reminds us of "Conscience doth make cowards of us all"—*ἡ σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δεῖν' εἰργασμένος.* But all

this is by no means conclusive evidence. It may be that Shakespeare had read the Greek tragedians; or, again, it may be, as Sheridan would have put it, that Euripides, for instance, and Shakespeare had the same idea, only Euripides had it first. It is impossible on this point to get beyond conjecture.

Perhaps, however, the most interesting portion of Sir Sidney Lee's work is that in which he deals with the sonnets. Wordsworth thought that in these Shakespeare had "unlocked his heart." Sir Sidney Lee is of a different opinion. He holds that "the collection of sonnets has no reasonable title to be regarded as a personal or autobiographical narrative." It is certain that the "dark lady," of whom such frequent mention is made, cannot have been Mary Fitton, for portraits of that lady, which are still extant, show very clearly that she was not dark, but fair. It is not at all improbable that many of the apparent objects of Shakespeare's adoration were wholly imaginary. "A man," Dr. Giles Fletcher very truly wrote in 1593, "may write of love and not be in love, as well as of husbandry and not go to the plough." Many of the writers of amatory poetry in the Greek Anthology were, as Professor Mahaffy has pointed out, thinking much more of turning a graceful epigram than of gaining the smiles of some fair lady. Dr. Johnson said that Prior's Chloe probably never existed, for that the woman to whom he was attached was "a despicable drab of the lowest species." Much that is strange in the language of the sonnets is explained by remembering that in Elizabethan English the words "lover" and "love" were synonyms for "friend" and "friendship." As regards Shakespeare's relations with Lord Southampton, the only inference

to be drawn from the sonnets is, in Sir Sidney Lee's opinion, that Shakespeare flattered his munificent young patron. Posterity, it may be incidentally remarked, has perhaps scarcely done justice to the early patrons of English literature. They did not, and could not, create genius, but they gave it an opportunity of asserting itself when it might otherwise have languished from sheer inability to live. There is, or at all events there was, at least a half-truth in Martial's satirical verse: *Sint Maecenates, non deerunt, Flacce, Marones.*

Similarly, Sir Sidney Lee discards the idea, which has been countenanced by Professor Courthope and others, that the tragedies, which were composed in the later years of Shakespeare's life, were written under the influence of some tragic events in his own life. "It was contrary to Shakespeare's dramatic aim to label or catalogue in drama his private sympathies or antipathies." He appears, indeed, to have been a poet and a dramatist pure and simple. The records of his private life, which are not so scanty as is often supposed, point to the conclusion that it was uneventful even to the verge of being commonplace. His personal ideals were homely and his aims in life were distinguished for their extreme sobriety. He was himself scarcely aware of the extent to which, by virtue of his prodigious genius, he towered over all competitors.

As to Shakespeare's opinions, Mr. Madden remarks: "In vain you will look to Shakespeare for any light upon the great religious, social, and philosophical questions of his day." If he had any distinct political opinions, it is certain that he was at great pains to conceal them. The absence in *King John* of any allusion to the

signing of Magna Carta is, in itself, significant. All that can be said with certainty is that, naturally enough, Shakespeare disliked the Puritans. They were the sworn enemies of his craft. Further, he had apparently no great sympathy for democracy. Mr. Bagehot acutely remarks that when Shakespeare brings a "citizen" on the stage, the latter almost invariably "does or says something absurd."

Sir Sidney Lee very appropriately introduces his volume by some remarks made by Carlyle tending to show how the love of Shakespeare has knit together the whole Anglo-Saxon race. Some fine lines of the poet Dobell addressed to the people of America express the same noble idea :

> Speak with a living and creative flood
> This universal English, and do stand
> Its breathing book: : live worthy of that grand
> Heroic utterance—parted, yet a whole,
> Far, yet unsevered—children brave and free
> Of the great mother-tongue, and ye shall be
> Lords of an empire wide as Shakespeare's soul,
> Sublime as Milton's immemorial theme,
> And rich as Chaucer's speech, and fair as Spenser's dream.

But Shakespeare's influence has not been confined to the English-speaking race. Not only have the Germans characteristically shown their predatory instincts by seeking to claim him—as also, I believe, Dante—as their own, but the whole or part of his works have been translated into almost all the languages and dialects of the world. In character, opinions, and temperament Shakespeare was a typical sixteenth-century Englishman, but the works which his transcendent genius produced have become the birthright of the whole human race.

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