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THE WORLD SINCE 1914



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THE WORLD SINCE 1914

BY
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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK

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1933

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*To
Julie
Whose help makes every
task a pleasure*

FOREWORD

Today more than at any previous time is it essential for the sake of world peace that citizens everywhere be familiar with the outstanding issues that confront the nations. The period since 1914 has been crowded with events of world importance, with complex questions of war guilt, reparation, war debts, disarmament, reconstruction, national minorities, territorial readjustments, economic upheaval, and dictatorships. The mind is easily confused by the magnitude of some of the problems and by the technical aspects of others. Yet, only in the widespread knowledge of the origins and history of these factors, can there be any real hope of future international harmony.

It is the aim of this volume to contribute to a clarification of the issues, and to provide a readable, organized, and compact exposition of the world developments which, at the time of writing, appeared to be the most promising — or the most portentous.

W. C. L.

NEW YORK
February, 1933

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PART I

INTERNATIONAL SCENES

Belgium on August 4, England forthwith declared war on Germany.

The World War was on. Who was to blame, no one could say, but in every belligerent capital the people were wild with an hysterical joy!

CHAPTER II

A WORLD WAR

THE SPREAD OF THE CONFLAGRATION, 1914-1917

Before the year 1914 came to a close, three more countries had entered the war. Montenegro joined Serbia on August 7. Eight days later Germany received an ultimatum from Japan. She was "advised" to withdraw all German warships from Chinese and Japanese waters, and to surrender to Japan, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China," the Kiao-chau territory, leased in 1898 for ninety-nine years. Japan had several motives for this manoeuvre. In a treaty of 1902, as renewed and revised in 1905 and 1911, Japan and England had promised to aid one another in the event that either was attacked in her Far Eastern possessions by an enemy power. Now, since Germany was preparing to use Kiao-chau on the Shantung Peninsula as a naval base from which to act against British commerce and shipping in the Far East, England called upon Japan to fulfill her alliance obligations. This request, together with a hope of falling heir to Germany's interests in China, and a desire to secure revenge for Germany's unfriendly attitude of 1895 after the Sino-Japanese War, caused Japan to send the ultimatum. Upon Germany's failure to reply to the ultimatum within the indicated eight-day limit, Japan declared war (August 23).

By November 7 the Japanese had captured Tsingtau, the chief German stronghold in Shantung. It had been defended by 4500 men, many of whom were reservists. Thereafter Japan confined her military activities to cooperating with the British in patrolling the Pacific Ocean; furnishing supplies and munitions to the Entente Powers, especially Russia; and contributing several squadrons of war vessels to help convoy ships through submarine zones in the Mediterranean Sea and eastern waters.

Meanwhile, Germany's hopes were raised by the advent of Turkey into the war on her side. On August 2, 1914, at the

height of the diplomatic crisis, Germany and Turkey had signed a secret treaty to become effective in the event of war between Germany and Russia. Under the terms of the agreement Turkey was to help Germany in return for a guarantee of territorial integrity. Since the Allies¹ were ignorant of this treaty, they bargained with Turkey for her neutrality. The Sublime Porte apparently enjoyed these negotiations, and the more the Allies offered, the more the Turks demanded. Simultaneously, with the help of German officers and money, secret and extensive military preparations were being made, for Turkey considered the time ripe to thwart Russia's designs on the Straits, to strike a blow at Pan-Slavism, and to end British dominance in Egypt and Cyprus.

In October, 1914, two German cruisers, the *Goben* and the *Breslau*, were driven into a Turkish port by Allied war vessels. Although the Germans refused to leave the port within the twenty-four-hour limit set by international law, the Turks declined to intern them. To the protests of the Allies, the Sultan's Government replied by "purchasing" the ships and forming a Turco-German squadron commanded by the German Admiral von Souchon. On October 29, without a declaration of war, this fleet bombarded several Russian Black Sea ports, and on November 3 Russia declared war on Turkey. Two days later England and France did likewise.

Turkey's step appeared tremendously important to Germany and for a time seriously worried the Allies. Communications between Russia and her partners via the Straits were now cut off, in consequence of which the Allies found it difficult to get the much-needed Russian grain and to send the tsar's forces munitions and other war materials. Moreover, it was generally expected that the declaration of a Holy War by the sultan would cause the Mohammedans in the French and English possessions in Africa and Asia to revolt. As it happened, the appeal of a Holy War was slight, and such English agents as Colonel Lawrence and Gertrude Bell actually were able to induce many Moslem Arabs to revolt against the sultan.

¹ Soon after the outbreak of hostilities the Entente Powers came to be known popularly as "the Allies," while the German system was referred to as "the Central Powers."

Unable to win Turkey as an ally, the Entente Powers soon consoled themselves by partitioning the Ottoman Empire — on paper — according to the accepted principles of modern imperialism. A secret treaty of March, 1915, virtually wiped out European Turkey. Constantinople and the Straits were assigned to Russia. A small area around Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse was left intact, probably as a bait with which to entice Bulgaria. Asiatic Turkey was reserved to France and England, to be disposed of by these two powers in a later agreement. In the same treaty, Russia permitted England to extend her influence over most of the central or neutral zone which had been established in Persia by the understanding of 1907. Not until 1917, when the Bolsheviks published all secret treaties found in the Russian archives, did this pact become generally known.¹

Italy, on August 3, 1914, had declared her neutrality on the ground that the war was offensive on the part of the Central Powers and that the terms of the Triple Alliance therefore were not operative in so far as she was concerned. The chief immediate advantage of Italy's stand accrued to France, since the latter could now mass most of her available forces along the northern and eastern frontiers to stem the tide of the German invasion. Moreover, as a neutral, Italy would refrain from interference with the transport of troops from North Africa to France and would abstain from hampering British lines of communication in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary had really expected Italy to render assistance in a general war, and they were content to have their "ally" remain neutral. When Italy, however, withdrew her troops some distance from the French frontier and concentrated most of her fleet in the Adriatic, Austria began to worry.

A flood of offers from both groups of combatants placed Italy

¹ The following are the leading supplementary secret treaties signed with regard to Near Eastern territories: The Sazonov-Paleologue Agreement of April 26, 1916, in which France agreed that Russia should get about 60,000 square miles of Turkish Armenia; the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916, which assigned Syria and an extensive hinterland to France, and most of Arabia south of the French zone to England; the Treaty of London (April 26, 1915), in which England, France, and Russia promised Italy a part of Anatolia; and the agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne (April 17, 1917), in which France and England agreed to let Italy have approximately the southern third of Anatolia, plus a sphere of influence north of Smyrna.

in a position of vantage. She could well afford to sit back and await bids, entering the fray only when she considered such action most profitable. Although a strong group in Italy favored joining the Allies, there were numerous persons who felt that much could be obtained without going to war. A third faction pointed out that the Italians had little cause for quarrel with Germany and that, on the contrary, powerful economic, spiritual, and political ties existed between the two countries.

Matters were brought to a head when Italy, early in the war, announced that, under Article 7 of the Triple Alliance convention, she was entitled to compensations for any Austrian gains in the Balkans. In December, 1914, therefore, after Austria had occupied Serbian territory, Italy extended her control over the Albanian city of Avlona, at the mouth of the Adriatic. This was accomplished with little difficulty, since the Albanian ruler had recently left the country.¹ The Italians then demanded from Francis Joseph a part of *Italia Irredenta* as additional compensation for Austrian territorial gains. When the Italian Government discovered, in January, 1915, that Germany was urging Austria to compensate Italy even to the extent of ceding the entire Trentino, it demanded still more. On February 21 Italy "refused her consent in the future to any military action by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, unless an agreement . . . should have been previously reached on the subject of compensation, an agreement which it would be idle to hope to reach otherwise than upon the basis of the cession of territories at present in the possession of Austria-Hungary." By March 9 Austria, frightened by Russian advances in Galicia, signified her willingness to negotiate with Italy on this principle.

During these months the Allies had not been idle. They had carried on extensive negotiations to discover the bait which would bring Italy into the contest on their side. In the competitive bidding the Entente had the advantage. Austria, after all, did not care to cede her territories to one of her "friends." The Allies, on the other hand, were hampered by no such considerations. They were willing to let Italy have most of what she wanted in Austria and along the Adriatic.

After much telegraphing back and forth, Italy, on April 8,

¹ See p. 343.

finally presented Austria with a draft treaty of eleven articles as her price for neutrality. The demands far exceeded the Austrian maximum concessions. The Vienna cabinet was willing to grant Italy the southern part of the Tyrol; a slight addition of territory along the Isonzo River in the northeast; a free hand in Albania; and the conversion of Trieste into a free city, with special rights for the Italian inhabitants, an Italian university, and local self-government. These terms did not satisfy Rome, and hence, while still negotiating with Austria, Italy on April 26, 1915, signed a secret treaty with France and Great Britain at London.

Under the terms of this document, Italy, in return for joining the Allies within a month, was to receive: (1) the Trentino, Trieste, and the South Tyrol with its population of approximately 250,000 Germans; (2) Gorizia, Gradisca, Istria, and the islands of the Gulf of Quarnero, in all which the Italians formed about one-third of the population; (3) northern Dalmatia, of whose inhabitants about three per cent were Italians; (4) a protectorate over Avlona and its hinterland, that is, over Albania; (5) outright ownership of the Greek Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean, occupied since 1912; (6) a sphere of influence in Asiatic Turkey; (7) an extension of her colonial possessions in Africa if France and England secured the German African colonies; (8) a special war loan and part of the war indemnity; and (9) a promise that the papacy would not be permitted to take any diplomatic action contrary to the wishes of the Italian Government. Thus the Adriatic was to be made an Italian lake; Austria was to be cut off from the sea; unredeemed Italians were to be freed; about half a million Germans, Southslavs, and Balkan peoples were to be subjected to Italian control; and the flag of Italy was to fly over larger African possessions.

One week later Italy renounced the Triple Alliance and resumed "complete liberty of action"—on the ground that Austria had flagrantly violated both the letter and the spirit of that covenant. On May 23 the government of Victor Emmanuel issued a declaration of war against Austria, to take effect the following morning. Not until fifteen months later (August 28, 1916) were hostilities declared against Germany. In the words of Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, Italy too had "responded to

the call of idealism." In doing so, however, she was neither worse nor better than any other belligerent.

On September 5, 1915, Italy adhered to the Pact of London, an agreement made on September 4 of the previous year by England, France, and Russia. This bond, to which Japan also became a party, converted the Triple Entente into a wartime alliance and stipulated that none of the Allies should entertain peace proposals or cease fighting without the previous concurrence of the other signatories. On the day after Italy entered the struggle, the Republic of San Marino, with its population of less than 12,000, hidden away in the Apennine Mountains, also declared war on Austria.

A treaty of 1661, renewed on several occasions, obligated Portugal to lend military support to England whenever the latter so requested. Hence, on November 23, 1914, the government of Portugal resolved to intervene as an ally of England immediately upon receipt of such demand. An actual grant of military aid was voted on May 19, 1915, and troops were despatched to fight in Africa. In February, 1916, after German submarines had done considerable damage to Allied shipping, and when some forty German and Austrian merchant vessels were resting in Portuguese harbors, Sir Edward Grey asked Portugal to seize these ships. The request was obeyed with alacrity, and Germany retaliated by declaring war (March 9, 1916).

Both warring factions, meanwhile, were carrying on negotiations and propaganda in the Balkans to acquire additional friends. In the competition for Bulgarian help, Germany had the advantage. The Bulgarians had not forgotten their humiliation in the Balkan War of 1913, for which they placed chief blame on Serbia, and they frankly awaited a chance to strike back at the hated enemy. There was no hurry, however, and Bulgaria carefully watched the course of military events. When, in 1915, the Allied campaign at Gallipoli failed and the Russians were fleeing from Galicia and Poland, Bulgaria decided to join the Central Powers. She admitted that her policy and choice were dictated by a desire to achieve her "national ideals," that is, to incorporate in her possessions most of Serbian and part of Greek Macedonia. After Germany had forced Turkey to agree to a recti-

fication of her borders in Bulgaria's favor, the latter signed (September 6, 1915) a convention of alliance with Austria. Then, on October 14, with her troops already across the Serbian border, Bulgaria declared war on her neighbor.

Bulgaria's aid was of great immediate advantage to the Central Powers, for it made possible the complete crushing of Serbia and Montenegro. Strategically this resulted in giving Germany control over a straight line of communications and transportation from Berlin to Constantinople, and even to Bagdad. The successful bid for Bulgarian help was the last diplomatic victory of the Central Powers. The remaining fifteen countries that entered as belligerents did so on the side of the Allies.

In Rumania, as elsewhere, agents of both parties attempted to win over the authorities. The Hohenzollern King Carol wanted to join the Central Powers in accordance with his treaty obligations. The cabinet preferred neutrality, particularly since it was undecided whether it was more anxious to get territory from Austria or Russia. To make things worse for the Allies, Russia insisted on reserving for Serbia some of the Austrian land that Rumania wanted. However, the succession to the throne of Carol's son, Ferdinand, in October, 1914, was favorable to the Allies, since the new ruler more nearly reflected the pro-Allied feeling of the people. The Austro-German military victories in 1914 and 1915 made the Rumanians hesitate to take sides, but when, in 1916, the Central Powers met reverses on the French, Italian, Russian, and Near Eastern fronts, Ferdinand's Government decided that the time had come to enter on the winning side—provided a high enough price could be established.

As in the case of Italy and other late entrants, bids were entertained from both sides. Again the Dual Monarchy hesitated to promise cession of a number of her provinces to a prospective friend, and the Allies had the upper hand in the bidding. Russia, moreover, was able to exert diplomatic pressure at Bucharest. A secret treaty was signed on August 17, 1916, between Rumania, England, Russia, France, and Italy, whereby Rumania was to enter the war at once in return for (1) Transylvania, which comprised about one-half of Hungary and was populated by an approximately equal number of Magyars and Rumanians; (2) the large Austrian duchy of Bukowina, about one-third of

whose inhabitants were Rumanian; and (3) the Banat of Temesvar, also with a population only one-third Rumanian. On August 27 Rumania declared war on Austria. Imitating Italy, she explained her defection from her former alliance obligations on the ground that altered circumstances had restored her liberty of action.¹

Greece remained as the only important neutral in the Balkans. King Constantine, related to William II and fearful of a Bulgarian invasion, favored neutrality, if not actual alliance with Germany. But Eleutherios Venizelos, prime minister since 1910, thought that by joining the Allies Greece would at last be able to complete her unification. He therefore urged that Greece fulfill the obligations of a pre-war treaty with Serbia in which these two countries had promised to aid one another in case of attack by Bulgaria. Furthermore, France and England held out parts of Albania and Turkey as bait to the Greeks. That these same sections of Albania and Turkey had already been promised to Italy made little difference to the French and British who, in fact, further offered Greece part of Serbian Macedonia! The king was obdurate. With the aid of the German-officered General Staff he ousted the premier in 1914, and again in 1915. In the elections of December, 1915, the Venizelists refused to vote, and the remaining electorate endorsed the government's policy of neutrality.

By this time the Allies had become impatient. They wanted a base of operations at Salonica and wished to help Serbia from the south. Late in 1915 the French General Sarraill forcibly took over control of Salonica and set up an Allied headquarters. An Allied base also was established on the neutralized Greek island of Corfu. When Constantine protested these violations of Greek neutrality and compared them to Germany's violation of Belgium, the Allies rejoined that Greek neutrality had never been guaranteed by treaty. Then, resorting to still more radical measures, they established a blockade, demanded the demobilization of the Greek army, recognized a Venizelist government at Salonica,

¹When Germany, in 1915, advanced Bulgaria a loan of about \$15,000,000, the London *Daily News* carried a headline: "German Bribe to Bulgaria!" When England, one year later, advanced Rumania a loan of some \$25,000,000, the same paper said: "Loan to Rumania: Bank of England agrees to advance £5,000,000." Willis, I. C., *England's Holy War*, 1928, p. 212.

and in the summer of 1917 ordered the dethronement of the king and the abdication of his eldest son. The Allied army, moreover, marched on Athens—the capital of a state which still was neutral. On June 12, 1917, Constantine finally abdicated in favor of his second son, Alexander. Thereupon Venizelos was called to head a new government and all known German sympathizers were exiled. On July 2, 1917, Greece officially became one of the Allied Powers.¹ France and England now repeated their promise to reward Greece with land which previously had been covenanted to Italy.

ENTRY OF THE UNITED STATES

a. NEUTRALITY IN THOUGHT AND DEED

Most Americans, accustomed to basking in the sun of geographical isolation, received the news of the outbreak of war with amazement. At a time when people were still talking about the Hague Conferences; when Secretary of State Bryan was negotiating arbitration treaties with the more important countries of the world; when pacifists, economists, and diplomats were deprecating war as a satisfactory means of settling international disputes; when the establishment of peace foundations had become almost a vogue; and when the Nobel Peace Prize, founded by the inventor of dynamite, was a highly coveted international award—at such a time it was incomprehensible to Americans that war could be precipitated. Hence, in the early days of the conflict, there was a widespread feeling that the United States could hardly become a party to the struggle. She might act as mediator or umpire, but active participation appeared remote, since it was totally foreign to all her traditions.

In accord with this spirit, President Wilson, on August 4, 1914, declared the neutrality of the United States. Five days later he appealed to his "Fellow-Countrymen," urging "very earnestly upon them the sort of speech and conduct which would best safeguard the Nation against distress and disaster." He asked them to "act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all con-

¹ Venizelos' illegal government at Salonica had declared war on Germany on November 28, 1916.

cerned." He reminded them that "the people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war," and warned that it would be "easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it." The United States, therefore, "must be neutral in fact as well as in name," and the people "must be impartial in thought as well as in action."

This appeal achieved a transient popularity. Even Theodore Roosevelt and the Anglophile Ambassador to England, Walter Hines Page, concurred at first. But neutrality in thought as well as in action was well-nigh impossible. In the words of one magazine editor, "only persons mentally unsexed or paralyzed" could remain without a decided preference for one side or the other; and as Page later said, "A government can be neutral, but no man can be."

The reasons are clear why absolute neutrality could not be upheld. First, the United States, as a land of immigrants, contained many inhabitants of foreign birth or the children of foreigners. Most of these persons had come from countries engaged in the conflict; they were definitely of German, Irish, Russian, Italian, English, or other foreign sympathies. Even those who had become naturalized were manifestly friendly to the cause of their native lands, and traditional prejudices readily came to the surface, often to the indignation of "real" Americans. Some of the latter, such as Roosevelt, actually advocated the deportation of all "hyphenates" who openly expressed sentimental preferences for either group of belligerents.

Secondly, as the greatest neutral and the one best able to supply essential war materials, the United States was bound to become closely associated with the warring powers, particularly since both sides were actuated by a double object with respect to her. They aimed at securing as much of American foodstuffs and supplies as possible, while simultaneously preventing the enemy's getting anything. Thirdly, as the strongest neutral the United States soon came to be regarded as the champion of neutral rights for the world. Finally, the activities of English and German propagandists in the United States made continued neutrality more and more difficult. The Allied agents, on the whole, were subtle and understood American psychology; the Germans and Austrians were tactless and inclined to violence.

Indeed, the lack in Germany of a Bismarck to look after the "imponderables" was painfully evident.

b. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUCH

In the fall of 1914 the United States, Germany, and England were in a position analogous to that occupied by the United States, France, and England during the Napoleonic period. Germany realized that to defeat England it was necessary to cut off her overseas supplies. Great Britain likewise felt that Germany could be beaten only if her people were starved and her munition supply curtailed. The immediate economic victims of the policies embarked upon by the belligerents to accomplish their respective aims were American merchants, shippers, manufacturers, and laborers.

The first, and for many months the most serious, offenders of neutral rights were the British. Through Orders in Council they arbitrarily and continuously enlarged the list of contraband goods, on the ground that the changed conditions of modern warfare made obsolete even such agreements as the Declaration of London (1909).¹ Eventually the British seized as contraband nearly everything that was sent to Germany or to one of her neutral neighbors. An amusing instance of this British interference with trade between neutrals happened in March, 1916, when a case of ladies' silk hosiery shipped on a Swedish boat by a New York department store to Gothenburg, Sweden, was seized by the British on suspicion that the goods might be forwarded to the Germans. The shippers angrily protested that ladies' stockings ought not to be classed as war materials. The British also seized and opened mail addressed from the United States to Germany on the flimsy excuse that pro-Germans in America were sending copper and other contraband to Germany by post.

The quicker to starve out her enemy, England declared a blockade of Germany. Now, according to international usage,

¹When the war broke out neither England nor Germany had ratified this Declaration, which listed the war materials subject to confiscation as contraband if found on their way to an enemy country. In 1914 the United States attempted to get both sides to accept this Declaration. Germany agreed, but Britain temporized.

only "effective" blockades were legal. In other words, a patrolling fleet of sufficient size had to be kept before the blockaded ports to prevent any ships from entering or leaving these ports. Yet, since the advent of the submarine and improved coast defenses made it impracticable for England to blockade German shores, her ships were stationed in the English Channel and at the entrance to the North Sea from Scotland to Norway, hundreds of miles from the German ports. Thus not only Germany but also neutral Holland and the three Scandinavian states were "blockaded." Moreover, the English gave up the customary practice of searching neutral vessels on the high seas and instead forced all ships into British ports, there to be searched, and, incidentally, often delayed for weeks. The United States protested vigorously against these illegalities and made it clear that damages would be claimed. To this threat the British raised no serious objections.

British ships adopted the practice of flying American flags as a *ruse de guerre* and as protection against German submarines. Again the United States protested, but to no avail. In July, 1916, England published a "Black List" of some eighty American firms which were considered German-owned or friendly to the German cause. British subjects were ordered not to trade with these firms and British shippers were told not to handle their products. Neutral shippers, too, were warned not to carry the goods of the proscribed companies under penalty of losing coaling rights at British ports. Inclusion in the "Black List" incidentally made it difficult for the concerns in question to obtain loans from banks. This ill-advised act of the British aroused furious protests in the United States and was partly responsible for the enactment of a huge Naval Appropriations Bill in September, 1916. Not the least annoying practice of the English during the early war years was the nonchalant disregard of American notes of protest, which often went unanswered for weeks or even months.

Perhaps one explanation for the continued British violation of American neutrality rights, despite frequent protests from Washington, is to be found in some remarks of Sir Edward Grey to Ambassador Page. In 1916 Grey told Page: "America must remember that we are fighting her fight as well as ours.

You dare not press us too far." The implication was, of course, that Germany was as dangerous a commercial rival of the United States as of Britain, and that a defeat of the Teutonic power would materially benefit both English-speaking peoples. When President Wilson heard of Grey's remark he is reputed to have said: "(Grey) was right. War with England would mean a German victory. I will not embarrass England."

Among the American people the illegal actions of the British created strong anti-Allied feelings. Anti-British protests poured in on Wilson from all parts of the country. Many Southerners protested against the blockade and the listing of cotton as a contraband. The packers of Chicago and the farmers of the Northwest urged Wilson to "open the way to hungry markets for their goods." In the East, the commission merchants of New York complained bitterly that their business should have to be carried on "by leave of England." Eventually several bills were placed before Congress for embargos on munition shipments to England. In the spring of 1915, Colonel Edward M. House, on a mission to Europe as observer for the President, told the British that their course would have grave results. Touching, as it did, "the pocketbooks and the sensibilities of many Americans," the English quarrel could be forgotten only if eclipsed by a dispute with Germany.

With things at such a pass, the Germans provided the eclipse. On February 4, 1915, the German Government announced that the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, are hereby declared to be war zone. On and after the eighteenth of February, 1915, every enemy merchant ship found in this said war zone will be destroyed without its being always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews and passengers on that account. Even neutral ships are exposed to danger in the war zone, as, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered on January 31 by the British Government and of the accidents of naval war, it cannot always be avoided to strike even neutral ships in attacks that are directed against enemy ships.

This course, the Germans felt, was no more than justified by England's illegal blockade. It was a desperate attempt to win the war, but it was a tactical blunder. The American Government at once threatened to "hold the Imperial German Government to strict accountability" if the submarine campaign led to the loss of American lives.

Germany's resort to unrestricted submarine warfare was, perhaps, the direct cause for the entry of the United States into the war. International law forbade the sinking of merchant vessels without warning and without provision for the safety of crews and passengers. Submarines, however, could not fulfill these requirements. The early submarines were small, frail craft which could be destroyed by ramming or by one well-aimed shot at the periscope. They were effective only when they could attack unseen. If a submarine did warn a vessel prior to firing a torpedo, the unfortunate crew and passengers could not possibly be taken aboard the "U-boat," for lack of room. The submarine simply had not been far enough developed before 1914 to secure recognition in international law. The Germans, therefore, had a choice of obeying international law and discarding a new and potentially effective weapon with which they alone were adequately equipped, or of violating the law and risking the enmity of the neutral powers. Unfortunately for Germany, the neutrals took the attitude that submarines must be made to conform to the rules of war or else be abandoned as a weapon.¹

On February 20, 1915, the United States attempted to bring about a *modus vivendi* by asking the belligerents to agree not to sow floating mines, not to use submarines except according to the rules of war, and not to use neutral flags for the purpose of disguise. England, moreover, was asked to allow the shipment of foodstuffs to Germany, where American agents would see that they were used only to feed civilians. Both sides, however, found objections to this scheme, and nothing came of it.²

In the midst of the discussions over the right and wrong of the

¹ After the war, when all the larger nations except Germany were well equipped with fleets of submarines, the diplomats of the world changed their views on this subject.

² Whereas the United States refused to recognize the right of Germany to use submarines unrestrictedly, on the ground that this would involve a wartime alteration of international law, she simultaneously stated to England, in a note of March 30, 1915, that "the Government of the United States, is, of course, not oblivious to the great changes which have occurred in the condition and means of naval warfare since the rules hitherto governing legal blockade were formed. It might be ready to admit that the old form of blockade with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy possessing the means and opportunity to make an effective defense by the use of submarines, mines, and aircraft."

various measures resorted to by the belligerents, came news of the sinking (March 28, 1915) of the British steamer *Falaba*, with the loss of one American life. On May 1 the American tanker *Gulflight* was torpedoed with loss of two members of her crew. Before the Washington authorities had found time to take definite action on either of these cases, the Cunard liner, *Lusitania*, was sunk, on May 7, 1915. She was torpedoed without warning, seven miles off the southeastern coast of Ireland. Over eleven hundred lives were lost, including those of more than one hundred Americans. Many people in the United States clamored for an immediate declaration of hostilities, but President Wilson felt that the nation was not yet ready for war and its tribulations. He took a week to gather data and then forwarded a protest to Germany.

In his note, the President reviewed the entire submarine controversy, called the sinkings a crime against humanity, insisted on the punishment of the commander of the U-boat that had torpedoed the *Lusitania*, demanded an official disavowal of the act, and asked for a promise that such activities would not be condoned in future. Before the reply arrived at Washington, the German Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, explained that Germany had no intention of sinking neutral vessels if they did not resist search and seizure. This assurance, however, did not protect neutral passengers on belligerent ships and therefore would not apply in cases similar to that of the *Lusitania*.

The reply of the German Government to Wilson's note stated that he had not taken cognizance of all the facts in the case. The Germans claimed that the *Lusitania* had concealed guns, was a British auxiliary cruiser, was loaded with a cargo of munitions, and came under the category of transport, since she also carried Canadian soldiers. Under these circumstances, it was said, the sinking was a justifiable act of self-defense.

This answer was considered unsatisfactory, and notes were exchanged over a period of more than three months. The points of difference in the "facts" of the case as represented by Germany and the United States have never been settled, but on September 1, 1915, Germany agreed in future not to sink liners without warning and without saving the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners did not try to escape or offer resistance.

Wilson thereupon received warm applause for having won so signal a diplomatic victory by pacific means.¹

The *Lusitania* crisis introduced a period of neutrality during which America was "too proud to fight." In a speech of May 10, 1915, President Wilson declared: "The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be the example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world, and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right." Privately, if the testimony of his secretary Tumulty can be relied upon, Wilson hesitated to go to war chiefly because he was "not sure whether the present emotionalism of the country would last long enough to sustain any action (he) would suggest to Congress, and thus in case of failure (the government) should be left without that fine backing and support so necessary to maintain a great cause."

Several forces, however, were at work which gradually won over the public to the point of view of intervention. These forces were, first, the anti-German activities of such men as Theodore Roosevelt, General Wood, and Secretary of War Garrison, of the National Security League, and of Allied agents; secondly, the violent propaganda methods of German and Austrian agents; and thirdly, the interests of American financiers.

In May, 1915, a group of prominent New Yorkers sent a telegram to the President which expressed their "conviction that national interest and honor imperatively required adequate measures both to secure reparation for past violations by Germany of American rights, and secure guarantees against future violations." Later in the same month this body, considerably augmented, decided that the best way in which its members, as loyal Americans, could put their patriotism into practice, was to attend a summer camp for military training. General Wood, then in command of the Department of the East, favored the

¹ During the controversy, Secretary of State Bryan resigned. He could not agree with Wilson that American citizens had the right to jeopardize the peace of their country by insisting on the prerogative of travel on belligerent merchant vessels. Additional material on the *Lusitania* affair will be found in the note at the end of this chapter.

scheme, and so the first military training camp for patriotic business and professional men was opened at Plattsburgh Barracks in the summer of 1915.

The enterprise attracted nation-wide attention, and similar camps soon were established in other parts of the country. Since the number of men who were ready to display their patriotic feelings by attending camps was limited by the considerable expense involved, Congress, on June 3, 1916, authorized the secretary of war to furnish uniforms, pay, transportation costs, and rations to all who were willing to "serve." The military ardor of the country was heightened in proportion to the increasing popularity of the camps, to which thousands of young men now went — some for a lark, some quite seriously.

The spirit of preparedness engendered by the camps and the speeches of prominent men was further stimulated by the activities of European agents. Whereas the Allied emissaries carried on a skillful campaign, consisting chiefly of newspaper subsidies and the circulation of German atrocity myths, the German and Austrian agents, apparently innocent of any knowledge of American psychology, resorted to the blunter methods of conspiracy, fraud, and even violence. The Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Constantine Dumba, and the German military and naval attaches, Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed, were accused of implication in conspiracies to blow up munition factories and transport ships, to foment strikes and sabotage in munition plants, to forge passports for German officers and reservists, and to prevent the manufacture of war materials in iron and steel works. Popular resentment soon flared high, and in 1915 Washington requested the recall of all three men.

In the fall of 1916, when the Allied fortunes of war were at ebb tide, Henry P. Davison, of the firm of J. P. Morgan, visited Europe. Upon his return he reported that the situation of the Allies was precarious. This news greatly worried American financiers, for it happened that in 1915 and 1916 Anglo-French loans of over one and a half billion dollars had been floated in America, largely through the house of Morgan. Germany, on the other hand, had borrowed little. Obviously, "to those who sponsored and participated in these loans, whose financial reputation and whose principal and interest depended upon the con-

tinued solvency of the debtor nations, it was not a matter of indifference which side won the war." Finance, too, aligned itself with the Allies.

Meanwhile President Wilson, realizing the inevitability of some form of intervention, but still convinced that he "could not move faster than the mass of . . . people would permit," had toured the country in January and February, 1916, making speeches on preparedness. Point was given to his warnings when Germany, on February 9, announced that her submarine commanders would be ordered to sink all armed belligerent merchant vessels without warning. Since, by this time, every large British merchant vessel was armed, it was felt in many parts of the United States that American citizens should be forbidden to sail on such ships lest war with Germany result. Senator Gore of Oklahoma and Representative McLemore of Texas immediately introduced congressional resolutions designed to prohibit Americans from traveling on armed merchantmen. Wilson, however, used his influence to have the resolutions tabled. It was at this juncture that a so-called House Memorandum or House-Grey Agreement was drawn up in London.

Colonel House had gone to Europe once more, in 1916, to see if it were not possible to bring about peace — particularly, it appears, a peace favorable to the Allies. On February 22 he agreed with Grey that Wilson should propose a conference to end the fighting. Should the Allies accept the proposal, it was understood, and should Germany refuse it, the United States would probably enter the war against Germany. "Colonel House expressed the conviction," wrote Grey, "that if such a conference met, it would secure peace on terms not unfavorable to the Allies, and if it failed to secure peace, the United States would leave the conference as a belligerent on the side of the Allies, if Germany was unreasonable." Nothing came of this memorandum, chiefly because the Allies hoped the United States would fight Germany over the submarine issue, in which case the Entente Powers would be less hampered by idealism in a division of the spoils.

It seemed as though the wishes of the Allies might be fulfilled when, in March, 1916, the unarmed Channel steamer, *Sussex*, was attacked without warning, and several Americans were

injured. A note from the United States was soon forthcoming, which concluded with the following ultimatum: "Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

To this the Germans replied in May with the declaration that they would do their "utmost to confine the operations of war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents" and that their naval forces had been ordered not to sink merchant vessels "without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempted to escape or offered resistance." However, this concession — it was merely a statement of policy and in no sense a "pledge" — was made contingent upon the United States requiring England to observe the rules of international law. This condition was not accepted by the State Department, which warned Germany that she would be held to a "scrupulous execution" of the new policy regardless of the conduct of any other government. The outcome of the *Sussex* affair was regarded in many quarters as another diplomatic triumph for Wilson, who in June, 1916, was renominated by acclamation to be the Democratic candidate for president.

A few days before Wilson's renomination, Congress had passed a National Defense Act (June 3, 1916). This law provided for a substantial increase in the size of the regular army, for a National Guard of almost half a million men, and for the establishment of an officers' reserve corps. In the same spirit of preparedness Congress, three months later, passed the Naval Appropriations Bill, which carried the largest sum (\$502,000,000) that had ever been voted at one time for national defense and provided for the building of a navy approximately equal to that of Britain. The government also created a Council of National Defense, consisting of six cabinet members and seven civilian experts, to draft plans of defense in case of war, and a United States Shipping Board, to develop a sizable mercantile marine.

In the election of 1916, Wilson's campaign managers emphasized the energetic measures taken by the government in defense of national security and pointed with pride to "the splendid

diplomatic victories of our great President who has preserved the vital interests of our government and kept us out of war." This idea — "he kept us out of war" — made an excellent slogan and doubtless gained many votes, particularly among the enfranchised women of the West and among German-American groups.

The Republican candidate, Charles E. Hughes, promised to uphold America's neutral rights "without fear or favor." He carefully avoided committing himself strongly on any side. The election was remarkably close and finally hinged on the returns from California. Several days after the casting of the ballots it was announced that Wilson had carried that state by a few thousand votes, albeit the Progressive Republican candidate for the Senate, Hiram Johnson, won his contest by some 300,000 votes.

C. FIVE MONTHS : FROM PEACE TO WAR

On December 12, 1916, the Central Powers, victorious on every front, offered to discuss peace terms at a general conference but stated no specific bases on which they would be willing to negotiate. The Allies rejected this proposal as being less "an offer of peace than . . . a manoeuvre of war" and as designed to cause dissension among the Entente Powers. On December 18 President Wilson offered the mediation of the United States and requested both sides specifically to state their war aims in the hope that a comparison thereof might lead to an understanding. The following month, while Germany still spoke in generalities, the Allies issued a statement of their peace conditions. Desiring, as they said, "to insure a peace upon the principles of liberty and justice," they demanded the restoration with indemnity of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro; the evacuation "with just reparation" of France, Russia, and Rumania; "restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force"; liberation of the Italians, Slavs, Rumanians, and Czechoslovaks under foreign domination, and of the peoples "subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks"; expulsion of the Turks from Europe; and a just and stable reorganization of the Continent.

The basis of these aims was, of course, the Secret Treaties.

The Central Powers could hardly be expected to take the demands seriously, and even Wilson regarded them as a bluff. On January 22, 1917, therefore, the President addressed the Senate on the subject of peace. He argued that the only durable peace was a "peace between equals," a "peace without victory," a negotiated, not an imposed, peace. And he was ready, in the name of the people of the United States, to guarantee any just peace which might be arrived at by an "international concert" and which would be based upon the recognition of the equality of all nations and of the principle "that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed."

Had they been wise, the diplomats of the Central Powers would immediately have issued a statement of their war aims. Instead, they refrained from such a procedure until January 29 — two days before the world was notified that Germany would again resort to unrestricted submarine warfare. Then, though the German terms, in view of the military situation, were fairly reasonable, it was too late for negotiation.

On February 3, 1917, the United States replied to the submarine announcement by severing relations with the German Empire. On February 26, after a number of American vessels had been torpedoed without warning, the President asked Congress for authority to arm American merchantmen against submarines. A Senate filibuster, by what Wilson called "a little group of wilful men," successfully held off a vote on the authorizing measure until the congressional session expired (March 4). Thereupon the attorney-general discovered an old statute which conferred the desired power upon the president, and Wilson carried out his intention. In consequence there ensued a period of "armed neutrality" which could only be a prelude to armed participation.

Two additional events now occurred which tended to make the American people sympathetic to a war policy: the sending of the Zimmermann Note by Germany and the March Revolution in Russia. At the time that Congress was discussing the measure to arm merchantmen, the administration released for publication a copy of an intercepted German despatch handed to Ambassador Page by Lord Balfour. This despatch was a note from the German Foreign Secretary, Alfred Zimmermann, to the German

Minister in Mexico, explaining that unrestricted submarine warfare would be renewed in the near future, but that endeavors would be made "in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral." In the event of this not succeeding, continued the message, Germany was ready to propose an alliance to Mexico providing for a joint war against the United States. As her reward, Mexico would be permitted to regain some of the lands lost in the Mexican War of the previous century. Japan was to be invited to adhere to the alliance. The government of Mexico, however, was not to be informed of any of this "until the outbreak of war with the United States is certain."

Considered in its true light there was nothing illegal or brutal about this so-called "Zimmermann Plot." Germany was quite within her rights to seek additional allies in case of war with the United States. But in the words of Senator Lodge, the note seemed to be "of almost unlimited use in forcing the situation." The "war hawks," 1917 edition, skillfully manipulated the contents in "Ems Despatch" fashion. By stressing certain parts of the note and disregarding or omitting others, they were able greatly to strengthen the war spirit, particularly in the hitherto lukewarm Southwest.

There now remained only one big obstacle to America's entry into the conflict — autocratic Russia. If, as Wilson had pointed out in his speech on January 22 and as the Allies now kept repeating, a just peace could only be arrived at through a recognition of the principle that all governments derived their powers from the consent of the governed, then it would be awkward for America to fight on the same side with tsarist Russia. In the middle of March, 1917, however, Nicholas II abdicated and a liberal provisional government came into control. Thus there was removed, as Secretary of State Lansing said, the last obstacle to regarding the war as one for democracy and against autocracy. The new situation was all the more important in view of the alarming frequency with which American ships now were being sunk by German submarines. Wilson summoned Congress to meet in special session "to receive a communication concerning grave matters of national policy," and devoted thirteen days to formulating a war message.

Amid solemn surroundings and with profound gravity the President, on the evening of April 2, 1917, urged Congress "to declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States." He reviewed the long controversy with "this natural foe to liberty" and explained that the conflict had narrowed down to a life and death struggle between the forces of democracy and autocracy. The world had to be "made safe for democracy" and it was America's duty to dedicate her blood and money to the task. "God helping her she can do no other."

A resolution declaring that a state of war existed between Germany and the United States was passed in the Senate on April 4 by a vote of 82 to 6. A similar resolution was passed in the House on April 6 by 373 votes to 50. On the same day Wilson proclaimed the war.¹

The Allies were overjoyed at America's entrance into the war. The morale of their people and soldiers went up tremendously. In Germany there was no great manifestation of feeling. Many Germans felt that, in one way or another, the United States had been helping the Allied cause, and so far as the matter of troops went, it would be at least a year before any effective American force could be injected into the struggle.

Cuba and Panama declared war on Germany the day after the United States did. Greece, Siam, Liberia, China, and Brazil entered the conflict later in the same year. In 1918 Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Haiti, and Honduras followed suit. Altogether the count stood twenty-three nations against four. Truly, the war had become a World War.

NOTE ON THE *LUSITANIA* CASE

The whole truth concerning the *Lusitania* case may never be known. The testimony of presumably equally creditable witnesses is highly conflicting, especially on the more important points. The official British investigation of the sinking was farcical, and the resulting Mersey Report is illuminating chiefly as an example of excellent war propaganda.

It has not yet been satisfactorily proved or disproved whether the *Lusitania* was armed or whether she carried Canadian soldiers. It is known that she was a

¹On December 7, 1917, war was declared against Austria-Hungary. The United States did not declare war on Bulgaria or Turkey.

British auxiliary cruiser, that is, a liner so constructed as to be readily convertible into fighting form, and that she carried several million rounds of ammunition as well as tons of shrapnel shells. Moreover, the munitions were placed aboard the vessel despite the fact that an American statute prohibited the carrying of explosive substances on passenger ships or trains. The captain of the vessel and the port authorities at New York who issued the clearance papers, therefore, were guilty of a violation of American law. (Senator LaFollette, in 1917, was reported to have said that Wilson was informed of this illegal circumstance four days before the *Lusitania* sailed.) All this, however, did not justify the unwarned sinking of the ship, any more than did the issuance on May 1, 1915, of a special German notice warning Americans that they risked their lives if they sailed through the war zone on English or other Allied vessels.

It is known, furthermore, that Captain Turner of the *Lusitania*, despite special warnings from the British Admiralty regarding the presence of German submarines in the waters near the British Isles, failed to follow the official "advice" regarding precautionary measures. He failed to zigzag, he stuck to the usual trade route instead of varying the course, and he proceeded at only three-quarter speed. The vessel, moreover, though she was known to be in especial danger, was permitted to cross the ocean without escort and with not even the usual patrol to convoy her through the war zone. When reading Turner's replies to questions regarding these points at the official investigation, one cannot help feeling that the captain, as a staunch patriot, concealed far more than he revealed.

Perhaps the British felt that the presence of several hundred neutrals aboard was sufficient protection for the much-needed ammunition. They may have thought that Germany would never commit so serious a blunder as to risk drowning or blowing up hundreds of Americans and other neutrals. But the Germans did torpedo the vessel, and the resultant effect on world sentiment toward Germany was perhaps more useful to the Allied cause than the cartridges would have been.

CHAPTER III

THE ALTAR OF MARS

"THE NATION AT WAR"

Few people realized, when the World War broke out, how radically different this conflict would be from all previous ones. The four years from 1914 to 1918 witnessed the evolution of an entirely new historical concept, the idea of a "nation at war." This concept rendered it futile any longer to regard the nation merely as a "reservoir to pour its reinforcements into the army." Rather, each nation had to be considered as a "mighty river in which were merged many tributary forces of which the army was but one." The warring governments soon became aware that the outcome this time would depend not so much on the better professional army and the more daring leaders, as on the availability of almost unlimited material resources. Every combatant, therefore, feverishly mobilized not alone its fighting men and leaders, but also its scientists, engineers, organizers, financial geniuses, manual laborers, propagandists, inventors, artists, teachers, farmers, manufacturers, women, and production and transportation facilities.

For waging war each side had certain advantages. In the matter of physical equipment Germany was the best prepared of any power. The German railway system was superbly coordinated for military manoeuvring, the routes having been laid out under the critical supervision of the German General Staff. In 1914 there were thirteen double lines to the western frontier and it was possible to send 550 trains a day across the Rhine bridges. During the first two weeks of the war, a train passed approximately every ten minutes over the railway bridge at Cologne.

The German army was the most highly-trained and best-disciplined fighting machine on the Continent. Even the huge

reserve forces were so thoroughly trained that the High Command did not hesitate to throw them into the front lines at the very outset of hostilities. At the apex of the German military pyramid was the General Staff, a body which "by rigor of selection and training was unmatched for professional knowledge and skill, if subject to the mental 'grooves' which characterize all professions." There was, further, a corps of excellent officers. Though often conceited and harsh, these leaders were well versed in tactics and eager to maintain a proud tradition of victory. Complementing the commissioned officer personnel was an efficient group of regular non-commissioned officers, men bred to the service and unexcelled in technical lore and ability to handle soldiers.

Though the armies of Germany's allies were greatly inferior to her own, even this circumstance reacted favorably in that it enabled the Germans to dominate the coalition. German officers drew up most of the important plans of campaign along all fronts and often also supervised their execution. That the Germans made tactical blunders during the war, and that decisive moves frequently were taken by subordinate rather than commanding officers, does not detract from the marvel of the system. These weaknesses were, if anything, more evident in the camp of the Allies.

In military equipment the Germans before the war had developed and adapted to a greater degree than the other powers the howitzer, the machine gun, and the submarine. The effectiveness of the German heavy guns before which the massive walls of Liege in Belgium crumbled, the deadly and demoralizing effect of German machine gun fire, and the ravages on shipping of the submarines soon made the Allies realize that they were not fighting "just another war." On the "home front," too, Germany, because of her highly industrialized state, was better able than any of the Allies except England to keep sending the necessary war materials to the fighting lines. Great stores of raw materials and of gold reserves were on hand in Germany, and commercial factories were converted with great rapidity into manufactories of munitions, shells, hospital supplies, military machines, and other wartime necessities. The process of transformation was swift and efficient, but the resultant dislocation

of the national economy was so great as to cause much misery after the return of peace.

Geographically, the advantage, at least for a time, also lay with the Central Powers. After the collapse of Serbia and the entry of Bulgaria into the war, Germany and her allies formed a solid geographical unit from the North Sea to Arabia. Troops, supplies, orders could be sent from one part of the area, or from one front, to another with expedition and with relatively little danger of Allied interference. Whole armies could readily be shifted from France to Galicia, or from Galicia to the Italian front, or even from Prussia to the Near East. With the Allies the situation was otherwise. Russia was completely separated from her friends by enemy- or ice-bound seas. She could neither readily import those manufactured products which her industrial backwardness did not allow her to make at home, nor supply England and France with the valuable grain of which she had a surplus.

The advantages possessed by the Allies were also numerous. They had a far greater reserve of man power than had the Central Powers. Russia alone had a population almost as great as that of all the enemy countries combined. "The Central Powers totalled in geographical area 2,225,000 square miles; in population, 158,000,000; and in annual revenues about \$4,000,000,000. The Entente Powers with their allies covered 37,267,000 square miles; numbered 1,392,000,000 people; and had a yearly income of \$6,881,000,000." A similar situation prevailed with regard to economic and industrial resources. Germany's resources were capable of quicker and more efficient mobilization, but the Allies had much larger reservoirs upon which to draw. The Entente Powers knew that the longer the war lasted the greater would the disparity between the respective human and economic means become, and the more enhanced would be the Allied chances of victory.

Furthermore, so long as the British navy, the largest and strongest in the world, could maintain control of the seas, the Allies would be able to secure supplies from the neutral world and prevent Germany from doing likewise. The successful blockade of Germany eventually proved to be one of the deciding factors in the conflict, and this feat was the contribution of British

sea power. Financially, too, the Allies enjoyed the brighter prospects. With a few possible exceptions, notably England, the Allied countries had stored up gold reserves to meet the needs of a future struggle. In addition, they could readily float loans in neutral states. The funds realized through these flotations often remained in the lending countries, being spent immediately for additional war supplies.

During the World War, as on no previous occasion, national psychology played a prominent part. In the warring countries the governments resorted to all known means to keep up the morale and spirit of troops and people. The task, of course, became increasingly difficult as the war dragged on, but the slogan-coiners became correspondingly more ingenious. Even more important than domestic propaganda, however, was the need for "proper" presentation of the respective cases in neutral countries. Here the Allies had the advantage. Their propagandists were more skilled than the Germans and Austrians, and they understood the psychology of the neutrals, particularly the Americans, far better than did their enemies. The still-existing widespread popular belief in many of the "atrocities myths" which were circulated by the Allies during the war about the Germans, is weighty testimony of the ability of the English, French, and American propaganda agents.


MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1914-1915

The armies of Germany in August, 1914, were under the supreme command of General Helmuth von Moltke, nephew of the great von Moltke of Franco-Prussian War fame. The German plan of campaign was that which had been drawn up by General Alfred von Schlieffen, chief of the General Staff from 1891 to 1906, a man who early had envisaged the possibility, indeed, the probability, of a war on two fronts. The essence of the scheme was to make the most of Germany's superiority in speed of mobilization. Consequently, provision was made for only a thin line of troops on the eastern frontier to hold up the presumed slow-moving Russians, and for the employment of as many troops as possible in a sweeping drive on Paris. The official time-table allotted six weeks for this "swift and shattering blow" that was to be dealt in the west. Then, after the fall of

Paris, such troops as might be spared from France were to be shipped eastward to smash the power of Russia.

In pursuance of this plan a powerful German force advanced all along the line from Holland to Switzerland early in August, 1914. The left wing, as had been anticipated, soon came to a halt before the strong forts of Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort, and the rough territory of the Vosges Mountains. The right, which in order to avoid the strongly fortified approach through north-eastern France had invaded Belgium where the terrain was more favorable and the forts fewer in number, swept all before it. The first check came at the well protected city of Liege, but within three days the sixteen-inch siege howitzers of the invaders had battered down the walls of the surrounding forts. Thereafter the march through southeastern Belgium was effected with ease. Despite the arrival of a highly trained British expeditionary unit and of French reinforcements, the Germans pushed steadily forward, taking Charleroi, Mons, Namur, Louvain, and Brussels as they went. By the end of August they had crossed into France and stormed Lille. They progressed through Picardy and Champagne in advance of the official time-table and forced the British-French-Belgian troops back on the whole line extending from Mons to Verdun. At the beginning of September the French retreated beyond the Marne, the Germans were within fifteen miles of Paris, and the French Government fled to Bordeaux. The small British force on the extreme west of the Allied forces was in especial danger of being run down by the German First Army under General von Kluck, for this army was advancing most rapidly in order to approach and attack Paris from the northwest.

At this point Marshal Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, decided to collect his scattered forces south of the Marne and check the German drive. For an entire week, from September 5 to 12, the First Battle of the Marne raged. The French were reenforced by troops released from duty on the southern frontier following Italy's declaration of neutrality and by the military garrison of Paris which was rushed to the front in commandeered taxicabs. The Germans, on the other hand, were weakened at the crucial moment by having to despatch some troops from the Marne to East Prussia, which was being overrun by the Russians.



And it was the right wing — precisely that part of the line where von Schlieffen had insisted on the greatest strength and where the brunt of the French attack now was aimed — which was called upon to release men for the emergency in the east. As a result of this step the Germans found it necessary to turn their middle in support of the right flank, whereupon General Ferdinand Foch and his Frenchmen drove back the weakened center. The Germans finally retreated in orderly fashion to the line of the




Aisne River. Here they proceeded to "dig in" and organize behind a network of intricate trench and barbed wire defenses — an innovation of modern warfare. At the end of the scheduled six weeks, therefore, the Germans, although in a dominant position, were not in Paris. The swift and shattering blow had fallen short of its objective.

After the Marne, both sides became aware of the importance of an enormous gap of over one hundred miles reaching from Arras westward to the sea. Immediately there began a precipitate "race to the sea," a series of attempts by the Germans and the Allies to outflank one another in order to reach and occupy the Channel ports. Had the Germans been permitted to achieve this objective, they would have controlled all Belgium and would have been able seriously to interfere with British aid to France. For a time the Germans again seemed to be invincible, capturing Ghent, Bruges, Ostend, Zeebrugge, and Antwerp before the first fortnight of October had passed. But in Flanders, a little corner in southwestern Belgium and northwestern France, they were stopped at the First Battle of Ypres (termed "Wipers" by the British soldiers). As a result of this battle the Allies continued to hold a strip of Belgium and to control the cities of Calais, Dunkirk, and Boulogne for the duration of the war. These were important assets from both the strategic and the psychological points of view.

During the winter of 1914-1915 the enemies merely consolidated their positions along the entire six-hundred-mile front from southwestern Belgium to the Alps. Occasional indecisive trench engagements only served to bring out more clearly the state of deadlock which had been reached. The actual advantage was unquestionably with the invaders. They were in control of most of Belgium with its highly industrialized regions and of northern France with its coal and iron mines and steel works. The military rule of the occupied areas was harsh, as was every other phase of the war on both sides, but much of the foreign sympathy with the sufferers and indignation at the brutalities of the conquerors was based on skillful and untruthful propaganda.

In the meantime the Russians had mobilized more rapidly than either their foes or their allies had anticipated, and had sent two large forces against Germany and Austria-Hungary from the Polish salient. The one, under Rennenkampf, pushed northward into East Prussia. The other, under Brussilov, advanced southward into Austrian Galicia. So swift was the progress of the tsar's troops that enthusiasts in the Russian capital, the name of which, for patriotic reasons, was changed from St. Petersburg to Petrograd, raised a prize of \$100,000 to be awarded



the first Russian soldier to set foot in Berlin. In alarm the German Government called upon General Paul von Hindenburg to stop the invader.

Hindenburg had been retired because of old age in 1912 (he was born in 1847), but he was regarded as the leading authority on the strategy and military geography of East Prussia, and he responded at once to the call. General Erich Ludendorff, a younger man and an able strategist, was appointed Hindenburg's chief of staff. Seasoned veterans from the western front were also despatched to the east at this time. In a series of great victories Hindenburg and his aides cleared Germany of the invaders and pushed on into Russia. From August 26 to 31 the Germans won a great victory near Tannenberg. This was followed by a rout of the Russians in the treacherous and swampy region of the Masurian Lakes (September 5 to 15). In February, 1915, a third Russian disaster occurred, at Augustovo. The total Russian losses in these campaigns were estimated at a million and a half men, together with a large number of guns.

Against their other foes the Russians were more successful. The Austro-Hungarian forces were drawn from the numerous mixed nationalities in the monarchy, and though the German and Magyar troops generally acquitted themselves loyally, the same was not true of the Slavic and Italian contingents. These found it difficult to be faithful to their oppressors and they often mutinied or deserted.¹ Hence, despite their paucity of equipment, the Russians advanced rapidly into Austrian Galicia and drove the defenders back to the Carpathians. On March 22, 1915, the Russians took the great fortress of Przemyśl.

The need to send all available men against Russia made it impossible for Austria to conquer Serbia. Not until December 2, 1914, was Belgrade, the capital, taken, and then it was held for only two weeks. By Christmas the Serbian Government felt it safe to return to Belgrade, and before the year was up the invaders were pushed back across the Austrian border. The Serbs, however, were unable to fulfill their desire to penetrate into the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In the spring of 1915 the campaigns on the nine-hundred-mile eastern front were vigorously renewed by the Central Powers.

¹ By 1916, 100,000 Czechs and Slovaks alone were fighting in Allied ranks.

As soon as the weather permitted, Hindenburg pushed on toward Petrograd. At the same time the German General von Mackensen, who had been given command over a combined Austro-German force, planned the expulsion of the Russians from Galicia. From May 15 to 17 Mackensen's men were victorious in the Battle of the San, and in the course of a few weeks the Russians were made to give up the conquests of the previous nine months. By September the tsar's troops were cleared out of all but the eastern tip of Galicia, had been driven from Russian Poland, and had been ousted from Courland and most of Lithuania along the Baltic. Their casualties were enormous and their supplies were ebbing quickly. Only one rifle was available for every three recruits in training behind the lines, and the ammunition supplies were nearing exhaustion. Russia required almost a year to recover from the blows of 1915.

To make matters worse for the Allies, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in October, 1915, and cooperated with Mackensen and his Austro-Germans in a combined drive on Serbia. Within two months the kingdom was conquered. The same fate befell Montenegro shortly thereafter, and in the spring of 1916 the war was carried down into northern Albania.

The acute shortage of materials in Russia led, in 1915, to the conception of an Allied attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula and the Dardanelles in order to open a direct path of communications between the various Entente Powers. Such a venture would simultaneously divert some of the Turkish troops who were harassing Russia from the south, make easier the Allied campaigns in Mesopotamia, and, if successful, isolate Turkey from her friends and encourage some of the still neutral Balkan states to throw in their lot with the Allied group.

A powerful Franco-British fleet was sent to the region and, on February 19, 1915, the defenses at the entrance to the Dardanelles were subjected to a heavy bombardment. The forts soon were demolished and the ships sailed into the Narrows. Here, however, the vessels met disaster because of floating mines and the efficient fire of Krupp guns concealed behind massive, German-planned fortifications. After the loss of several ships and several thousand men the Allied fleet withdrew. There followed an attack by land, under the leadership of Sir Ian

Hamilton. The attacking force consisted chiefly of French and British colonial troops and of the Anzacs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps). The men fought bravely, and readily gained control of the plain on the peninsula, but they found it impossible to capture the fortified hills which commanded the plain. In the end the Turks, well led though poorly supplied, were victorious, and the attacking forces withdrew (December) — leaving the sultan in control of the Straits throughout the war. In April, 1916, came the further disheartening news to the Allies that the Turks under General von der Goltz had bottled up and captured General Townshend with fifty thousand men at Kut-el-Amara in Mesopotamia. It was only small consolation to the French and British that in the meantime they had occupied Salonica in neutral Greece.

While these things were going on in the east, there was relative quiet on the western front. Some attempts were made by both sides to break the deadlock in Flanders, but none of these assumed outstanding proportions. The Allies won slight successes at Neuve Chapelle in March, 1915, but the Germans came back with a vigorous counter-attack the next month, precipitating the Second Battle of Ypres. Here, on April 22, the Germans made the first large-scale use of poison gas. The greenish chlorine clouds wreaked havoc among the unprotected British soldiers, and a four-mile gap in the Allied lines was created in short order. The absence of any appreciable results on the few previous occasions when less poisonous vapors had been used, however, had made the Germans skeptical of the value of the new gas and they were unprepared to take advantage of the hole in the Allied front. The lack of German reserves enabled the Allies to bring up sufficient English and Indian reinforcements to hold the contested ground. Further attempts of the Allies to push the enemy back in this region, in June and September, did little more than increase the toll of lives. The Germans, anxious to conserve man power for the big eastern drives, were content merely to hold their trenches. The entrance of Italy into the war, therefore, was the one high light in the Allied chronicles for 1915, though Italian aid did not assume formidable proportions for another twelvemonth.

MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1916

Just as the year 1915 had witnessed a series of powerful offensives in the east, so 1916 was destined to be marked by big drives in the west. Each side launched one tremendous offensive, the Germans at Verdun, from February to July; the Allies at the Somme, from June to November. The Germans had several reasons for attacking Verdun. The German commander here, at least nominally, was Crown Prince Frederick William. A great victory by his forces would naturally do much to check any possible decline in Hohenzollern prestige in the fatherland. Moreover, Verdun was the greatest remaining French stronghold, the-"heart of France." Its fall would probably mean an almost unhindered further German advance into French territory. In addition, if the French lost Verdun, the moral effect on both sides would be enormous. If, on the other hand, its capture could not be effected, France, thought the Germans, would at least be bled white and her people be ready to quit the war. Finally, French control of the Verdun region threatened both the German railway communications and the Lorraine iron fields, and this peril had to be removed.

On February 21, after enormous and secret preparations which had lasted many weeks, the Germans opened their campaign with a terrific bombardment. Over one million shells, it is said, were hurled against the French from thousands of cannon within the first twelve hours of battle. Then, behind a protective "curtain of fire," the infantry units advanced. At first progress was easy, for the shells had done their damage. But Verdun was a naturally fortified area, situated high and requiring attack from below. It was surrounded by a ring of auxiliary fortresses, all powerful and all well designed. The French commanders several times wavered and contemplated withdrawal, but they permitted none of the men to discover their thoughts. Instead, the soldiers were urged to fight to the death, imbued with a spirit expressed in the words: "They shall not pass!"

In June the Germans were four miles from Verdun. As previously in the case of Paris, however, they were not *in* the city. They now found it necessary, moreover, to curtail further supplies of men and munitions in order to meet, the Allied counter-offensive on the Somme. Hence, though they gained over one

hundred square miles of territory, the drive was a failure. Verdun was the second major check to the German advance as the Marne had been the first. This time the price in men was well over half a million on each side.


Costly and fierce as was the Verdun campaign, it was surpassed in almost every respect — numbers of men engaged, quantities of munitions used, casualties, and tactical difficulties — by that of the Somme. Partly in order to relieve the pressure against Verdun and partly to make the most of simultaneous drives undertaken by the Russians and Italians, the British and French carefully prepared this offensive, whose strategic objectives were Bapaume and Peronne on either side of the Somme. During the first half of 1916 the British army had been strengthened through the introduction of conscription in England (January), and great stores of ammunition had been accumulated. In the last week of June the British began a bombardment of the German lines, utilizing more munitions "each day than the total amount manufactured in Great Britain during the first eleven months of the war."

In addition, the British in September brought into the fight an entirely new weapon, the "tank." Lest the secret escape that a new weapon was being made in certain factories, the British War Office had let it be known that the government had ordered the manufacture of some tanks. In consequence this inapt name has continued in use as a designation for the armored cars which, running on caterpillar chains rather than wheels, are capable of passing over trenches and barbed wire, crossing muddy fields, and brushing aside shrubbery and trees without danger of getting stuck or upsetting. Had the British refrained from using the tanks until large numbers thereof were available, the war might well have come to a quicker end, for the Germans at first were horrified by the strange steel monsters. As it was, the Germans themselves soon built tanks and devised effective anti-tank guns and land mines.

The Battle of the Somme netted the Allies more than one hundred square miles of land, but failed to give them Bapaume and Peronne. On the other hand, the Germans were driven back several miles, were forced to ease the pressure on Verdun, and were prevented from sending any of the western troops to meet

the advancing Russians in the east. The total loss of lives in this "titanic grapple," as Ludendorff called it, was estimated at more than one and a quarter million. Well over half the casualties were suffered by the Allies, but the latter were far better able than the Germans to afford great losses in man power. Indeed, the terrible cost in killed and wounded convinced a number of German officers that any undue prolongation of the conflict would make a German defeat inevitable.

The year of the two great drives on the western front also witnessed the first great campaign on the Austro-Italian front.



Here the terrain provided enormous difficulties. The Austrian province of the Trentino was a salient protruding into Italy, but the territory was so mountainous that the fighting there soon resolved itself into a "series of machine gun duels above the clouds for the possession of strategic hilltops," a veritable "combat in three dimensions amid the eternal snows." Sometimes, indeed, cannon had to be dragged from 6000 to 8000 feet up rough mountain sides by sheer man power. To the east of this mountainous region was the Italian province of Venetia, extending northward as far as the Carnic Alps. South of Venetia was the Gulf of Venice and the Adriatic Sea, while on its east lay the Isonzo plain and the Julian Alps, rugged mountains from which heavy artillery could easily command the approaches from all sides.

While the Austrians, for the sake of conserving men, temporarily remained on the defensive, the Italian commander, Cadorna, drew up a plan of campaign for an attack along the Isonzo. It seemed to him better to launch the first movement eastward then to head into the inhospitable Trentino mountains. Because of Italy's poor state of preparation and the bad weather, the campaign did not start until some weeks after the country's entry into the war. Then, in June and July, 1915, was fought the First Battle of the Isonzo. Despite large losses, the Italians gained little by their attack. A second campaign was launched in October and carried on until December. The Austrian defenders had better artillery than had the Italians, but the latter outnumbered the former two to one. Again the Italians had practically nothing to show for their sacrifices. Trench warfare now set in and continued until the following May. In 1915 the Italians lost more than a quarter-million men, while the Austrian losses were only half as great.

Early in the winter of 1915 the Austrians had suggested to the German High Command a combined attack on Italy. This idea had been spurned by the Germans and was again objected to when revived by the Austrians in 1916. Now, however, the latter determined to proceed with attack plans on their own account. They decided to launch a campaign from the Trentino salient and penetrate into the Venetian plain through which ran two railway lines. If the Austrian attack succeeded, the Italian flank would be broken and the railways, which brought men and supplies to the Isonzo front, would be captured. Four hundred thousand men were gathered for the campaign and placed under the command of Archduke Charles, heir-apparent to the thrones of Francis Joseph. On May 14 more than 2000 guns began a preliminary bombardment along a thirty-mile front.

The Italians fell back as had been expected and by June the Austrians were only eighteen miles from Vicenza, the last stronghold protecting the northern railway line. At this point, the Austrians were compelled to despatch some of their best divisions to Galicia to stop a fierce Russian drive. The weakened remainder of the force could not continue the offensive. Soon Cadorna, having received half a million reinforcements, began a counter-offensive. The Austrians were pushed back into the

Trentino, and then the heaviest of the Italian guns and **numerous** troops were transferred to the Isonzo front. Here a vigorous attack was launched in August and on the ninth the city of Gorizia on the heights east of the river was captured. Further Italian attacks failed of any important result save that of tiring the weaker Austrian forces. In 1916 the Austrian casualties were 260,000; those of the Italians, 483,000.

The emergency in Galicia which had necessitated the withdrawal of Austrian troops from Italy was the Brussilov campaign, opened on June 5, 1916. This offensive — the last great effort of Russia in the war — was originally planned for July. The Russian command felt certain that a smashing victory could be won if the country had until then to recover from the earlier defeats. But the French asked for a Russian offensive to relieve the German pressure on Verdun and the Italians pleaded for a Russian attack to force Austria to release her grip on Venetia. It was in answer to these requests that Brussilov undertook his campaign prematurely.

The Austrians were the victims of complete surprise. Many of their heavy guns and crack divisions had recently been shifted to the Italian sector. Consequently the Russians were able to advance with relatively little opposition. They once more conquered eastern Galicia, occupied Bukowina, and headed toward Lemberg. Before the attack was spent, over 300,000 men and 400 guns were captured. The Russians themselves were astonished by the speed of their progress and they had not enough reserves at hand to follow up the victories. Their reserves were far away to the north, and the north-south railway communications were woefully inadequate. On the other hand, the Austrians soon rushed back some of their troops and guns from Italy. German reinforcements also arrived and supreme command was taken over by the German Generals von Falkenhayn and von Mackensen.

The Russian advance hence was quickly checked, **but** the hopes of the Allies were renewed when Rumania espoused their cause in August. Again the optimistic outlook was destined to **be** short-lived. Rumania was included in a vigorous Teutonic counter-offensive, and while Mackensen **attacked with a Bulgarian** force from **the south**, Falkenhayn **hammered away at the**

new enemy from the west and north. Within less than four months the Rumanian capital fell, and when the new year (1917) dawned only a small northeastern corner of the kingdom remained unconquered. This triumph was all the more important to the Central Powers since they now were able to avail themselves of the large Rumanian wheat crop and oil resources.

MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1917

Early in 1917 the position of Germany appeared fairly satisfactory. In the previous August, Hindenburg, now a field marshal, had been given supreme command over all the forces of the Central Powers. Ludendorff, as quartermaster general, was his chief of staff and the actual directing genius. Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, Poland, most of Belgium, northern France, all were in German hands. Russia was beaten down and the Italians were just holding their ground. In April, however, the Allies found cause to rejoice—when the United States entered on their side. For several months the United States rendered aid chiefly in the form of money, supplies, war and merchant vessels, slogans, and heightened morale. But after October, American soldiers were in the thick of the fight.

Activities on the western front in 1917 commenced with a strategic German retreat, involving the voluntary relinquishment of about one thousand square miles of territory. The purpose of the retreat was to straighten and strengthen the battle line and to effect economies in men. This last was a most important consideration with the Germans, since they had only 2,500,000 men in France with which to oppose the Allies' 3,900,000. During their retreat the Germans were careful to destroy everything that lay between their old position and the new line. The latter, a marvel of defensive strength, followed the direction Lens-St. Quentin-Rheims. To the Germans it was known as the "Siegfried Line." The Allies called it the "Hindenburg Line."

All the offensive movements in the west this year were undertaken by the Allies. In April the British launched an attack near Arras, and the French one near Laon. Despite certain initial successes—the British took Vimy Ridge and the French both ends of the Chemin des Dames—the net results hardly justified the tremendous losses, particularly those of the

French. The latter were led by General Robert Nivelle, who had achieved prominence at Verdun and had succeeded Joffre as commander-in-chief in December, 1916. Joffre had been replaced because some groups in France had wearied of his cautious tactics which contemplated defeating Germany by a slow process of attrition of men and materials. Nivelle favored entirely different methods and envisaged broader objectives, the end of trench fighting, and speedy victory. He was vigorously supported by the new prime ministers of England and France, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, respectively, men themselves active and aggressive.

Unfortunately for Nivelle a number of factors militated against his success. The Germans everywhere occupied the commanding positions. They were aware of some of his plans through the capture of prisoners with documents. The morale of the French troops was poor, for numerous abuses had crept into the French military system and, besides, the soldiers regarded Nivelle's tactics as unnecessarily wasteful of human life. In May ten divisions mutinied, though this intelligence was kept from the people by the strictest kind of censorship. Nivelle soon was replaced by General Henri Petain who was considerably more expert in the art of handling men. Under the new leader trench duty was more nearly equalized, rest camps were established, more extensive leaves of absence were granted (some of the soldiers had been without leave for two years), the discipline was made less harsh, with the aid of the American Red Cross the wounded were better cared for, and Petain himself went on visiting tours to the officers and men. Only twenty-three of the mutineers were executed, although upwards of one hundred were deported to French colonies. For the remainder of the year 1917 French efforts were confined to minor attacks along the Meuse and the Aisne and to the recapturing of small areas around Verdun and Soissons.


The British were somewhat more active. From July to October they fought the Third Battle of Ypres, eventually taking Passchendaele Ridge, a highly prized observation post. Then in November, without a preliminary bombardment, they launched a furious drive at Cambrai, utilizing a fleet of nearly four hundred tanks. Rapid headway was made, but a brilliant German

counter-attack soon recovered most of the lost ground. Thus ended the campaigns of 1917 in the west. Few tactical or geographical gains were made by either side.

Even more discouraging to the Allied cause than the French mutinies and the costliness of the few small successes, was the collapse of Russia. Conditions in the Russian army, always bad, became little short of intolerable after the defeats of 1916. It was estimated that from the outbreak of the war to January, 1917, desertions totalled 1,200,000. Discipline was broken down and the men were suspicious of their officers, considering them to be responsible for the continuation of the war. The peasant soldiers were desirous of returning home to their fields, many of which by this time stood greatly in need of cultivation. Other soldiers were anxious to return to their families, which were suffering want and needed providers. Simultaneously, the people behind the lines, especially the middle and working classes, were goaded into indignation by the short-sightedness and corruption which characterized official actions, and by the governmental repression which, notorious in peace time, had become unbearable during the period of conflict.

The moderates among the discontented elements were strong enough to bring about the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in March, 1917, and the establishment of a liberal provisional government under Prince Lvov. Military defeats, however, continued; the radicals agitated for further changes; and the extreme radicals, known as Bolsheviks, organized councils or "soviets" of soldiers, workmen, and peasants, which demanded recognition as representatives of the people. In the summer Lvov fell from power and the Socialist Alexander Kerensky reorganized the government.

It was Kerensky's aim to reform Russia and at the same time to carry on the war against the Central Powers. He realized that the Russian people would not consent to make further sacrifices unless convinced that they were being asked to fight for an ideal rather than merely to enrich capitalists and imperialists. Therefore he sought to bring about an Allied conference for the formulation of war aims which would envisage a peace "without annexations and without indemnities." His frantic appeals unheeded by the Allies, Kerensky determined to launch



THE EASTERN FRONT, 1914-1917.

one last, desperate offensive. Brussilov was replaced as commander-in-chief by General Komilov, a shadow of discipline was restored among the troops, and a new drive was planned for July, 1917-»

The offensive was doomed to failure before it began. German and Austrian agents had successfully fomented a spirit of mutiny in and behind the lines. Bolshevik representatives had been equally diligent in spreading the contagion of desertion and disobedience. The soldiers sometimes organized debate meetings on whether or not to carry out their orders. The plan of campaign, moreover, was betrayed to the enemies. Consequently the Austrians soon repelled those Russians who remained loyal and drove them out of Galicia and Bukowina before the end of August. The Germans similarly drove back the enemy and in September captured the city of Riga and pushed into Esthonia. Meanwhile the Bolsheviks made further capital of the new military reverses and rallied great numbers to their cause by shouting the slogans "Peace! Land! Bread!" and "All power to the Soviets!" In November the Kerensky Government was overthrown, and the Bolsheviks, led by N. Lenin and Leon Trotsky, came into power.

A few days later the Bolsheviks suggested to the Allies the conclusion of a general armistice and the termination of the war by a treaty embodying the principles of "no annexations and no indemnities" and of "self-determination" for *all* subject peoples. The Allies, confident that the Russian people would repudiate the November Revolution, paid no attention to this proposal and, in fact, refused to recognize the Bolshevik Government. The latter then agreed to a separate armistice with the Central Powers on December 15, and one week later a peace conference assembled at Brest-Litovsk in Poland attended by delegates from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Russia. The peace arrived at was a dictated one, since the Bolsheviks faced the alternatives of accepting the German terms or suffering further invasion of Russia. The necessary signatures were affixed on March 3, 1918.

Under the provisions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Russians agreed (i) not to spread their propaganda in the lands owned or occupied by the Central Powers; (2) to evacuate the

Armenian provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, which were to be reorganized "in agreement with the neighboring states, especially with Turkey"; (3) to evacuate Esthonia, Livonia, Finland, and the Aaland Islands, as well as to give up Poland, Courland, and Lithuania, the future status of these last three to be determined by the Central Powers "in agreement with their populations"; (4) to clear the Ukraine of Russian troops, recognize and make peace with the newly established Ukrainian People's Republic, and recognize in advance any treaty made between this republic and the Central Powers. By supplementary treaties of August, 1918, Russia was further obliged to pay an indemnity of one and a half billion dollars, accord Germany most-favored-nation commercial treatment, and refrain from prohibiting or taxing the export of rough or hewn timber. Altogether the Russians gave up 500,000 square miles of territory and 66,000,000 people. The treaty gave proof of the temper of the Germans and was, perhaps, an indication of the type of general peace which might have been concluded had the Central Powers emerged victorious.¹

With Russia out of the war, the cause of Rumania was hopeless. Consequently, in May, 1918, she accepted the Treaty of Bucharest. The Dobrudja and the Carpathian foothills and passes were surrendered. Important oil concessions were granted to the Central Powers, and Rumania agreed to revise her tariff schedules in their favor. Mohammedans and Jews were to be accorded equal rights with the Christians in the kingdom. Rumania was given permission to extend her control over the fertile Russian province of Bessarabia and to have free access to the Black Sea over a designated route in the Dobrudja.

The year of Russia's defection was notable also for the near-collapse of another Allied power, Italy. There the troops in the line, the workers in the munition factories, and the civilians were all dissatisfied with the progress of the war. They were tired of

¹ The Germans lost no time in establishing their control over the northern areas given up by Russia. The throne of Finland was offered to Prince Charles of Hesse, brother-in-law of the German Emperor; William II himself became king of Esthonia; and Lithuania was presented to Prince William of Urach. A pro-German dictatorship was set up in the Ukraine which, by the so-called "Bread Peace," surrendered 42,000 wagonloads of grain to the Central Powers. Following the war and the German Revolution, all these states became republics.

the constant sacrifices which led to no appreciable military gain and, besides, they had no particular grievance against Germany. The example set by the Russians created a strong impression, and agents of the Central Powers busily and effectively spread germs of sedition. The Germans were well aware of the "defeatist" spirit in Italy and decided to turn it to their direct advantage through a surprise offensive at one of the most difficult and least expected points along the front.

Under the command of the German General von Below, and "stiffened" by the reenforcement of six German divisions, the Austrians began a terrific gas and shell bombardment on the Julian front on October 24, 1917. A breach was effected at Caporetto and within four days Cividale and Gorizia had been taken, Udine was threatened, 100,000 men and 700 guns had been captured, and the Italians were hastening back toward the Piave in unparalleled confusion and rout. By November 10, after the loss of another 150,000 prisoners and 1100 guns, the Italian army was forced south of the river.

There, however, the retreat came to an end. French and British troops were hurriedly despatched to Italy to bolster the resistance of the defenders; Cadorna was replaced by Armando Diaz, who better understood the psychology of the soldiers; and the line was strengthened by the injection of enthusiastic boys of seventeen and eighteen. The sudden danger to the country created, behind the lines, a patriotic feeling of unity which rapidly displaced the earlier spirit of defeatism. The Austro-Germans, on the other hand, had outrun their food and supply transport and were weary with the burden of rapid and sustained offense. Despite the loss of over 600,000 effectives in the "Caporetto Disaster," therefore, the Italians now were able to regain some of the lost ground. Before much could be accomplished, the snowfall put an end to the fighting for the year.

Only in the Near East could the Allies boast of success in 1917, for here the earlier defeat of General Townshend was amply avenged. In March, General Maude took Bagdad. In December, Allenby entered Jerusalem. Moreover, through skillful propagandist activities and vague promises of political advantage the English had succeeded in weaning a number of chieftains in Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and the Hejaz from

their loyalty to the Turkish Sultan, their temporal and spiritual overlord. Prominent in this diplomatic aspect of the war was Colonel T. E. Lawrence, a young Oxford graduate who had learned several Arab dialects while at work on archaeological excavations in Syria and Mesopotamia.

NAVAL OPERATIONS¹

The German navy was not nearly so well prepared for conflict when the war broke out as was the army. The extensive construction programs outlined in the navy laws of 1898 and 1900 had not yet been completed, and the superiority of British sea power was an unquestioned fact. Similarly, the French navy was larger than that of Austria-Hungary. The German Admiralty therefore withdrew its High Seas Fleet into protected homeland waters, under the guns of the forts at Kiel and on Heligoland. The plan was to wait in port until the opportunity should arise for a successful, concentrated attack on a section of the British fleet.

In the meantime an effective British blockade, albeit an illegal one, was established against Germany. The German merchant marine was quickly swept off the seas and the vessels were either captured or interned. The same fate overtook the German naval vessels which happened to be located at outlying points when hostilities began. Thus, a squadron of cruisers under Admiral von Spee, while attempting to return home from the Pacific, met and defeated a smaller English squadron near Coronel off the coast of Chile (November 1, 1914), only to be destroyed in turn by a superior British fleet off the Falkland Islands on December 8.

¹ Except in the case of German East Africa, the war in the German colonies was of short duration. Kiao-chau in China, as has been indicated, was captured by the Japanese in 1914. In the same year, British ships, with aid from Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, seized all the German islands in the Pacific. Togoland in Africa was taken by British and French colonial forces in 1914, and the Cameroons in 1916. German South West Africa was conquered in 1915 by General Smuts, who first had to help put down a rebellion of Boers under De Wet in British South Africa. German East Africa held out against forces drawn from South Africa, the Belgian Congo, British East Africa, Rhodesia, India, and Portuguese East Africa, until November 14, 1918 — three days after the signing of the armistice. The German commander, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, had at his disposal only a few thousand troops, largely native. Yet it required a force of 130,000 Allied troops and an expenditure of about \$350,000,000 to compel his surrender.

In the early months of the war the Germans attempted some raids against British coastal towns. On November 2, 1914, a battle cruiser squadron attacked the British coast off Norfolk, and on December 16 another bombarded the Yorkshire coast. Both fleets returned home safely after doing considerable damage. A third raiding squadron got into a fight with a British fleet off Dogger Bank on January 24, 1915, and was forced to return with some losses. Slightly more successful than these activities were the exploits of a number of isolated commerce raiders, generally fast, light cruisers. Distinction in this class was won by the *Mowe* which in fifteen months sank or captured thirty-eight ships, more than twice as many as the number taken by any other surface vessel during the war; the *Emden* which, operating in the Indian Ocean, sank fifteen cruisers or destroyers within three months; the *Karlsruhe* which accounted for seventeen enemy vessels; and the *Seeadler* which destroyed ten.

These feats, spectacular though they were, could hardly starve out the British. England's blockading policy, on the other hand, was fairly successful in cutting off Germany's imports. Hence the Germans, at the insistence of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, strove to accomplish their end by means of the submarine or U-boat. The international difficulties with neutrals into which Germany was plunged as a result of the activities of this type of craft have been discussed in the preceding chapter. Of the efficacy of the submarine as a weapon, at least temporarily, there could be no doubt. April, 1917, was the banner month for submarines. In that month one ship out of every four which left the British Isles was destroyed. Altogether, German under-sea boats destroyed over 5000 Allied and neutral merchant and fishing vessels. Surface craft and mines accounted for six or seven hundred more, so that the total of destroyed tonnage approached the 15,000,000 mark. Only 216 German submarines were sunk.

Before the struggle ended, the Allies had devised several successful counter-weapons against the submarines. Hydrophones were developed which betrayed the presence of the undersea craft while it was still miles away. Effective depth bombs were invented and heavy mine barrages laid. Wire netting was stretched across the English Channel. Merchant vessels were

escorted by powerful convoys, especially after the services of the navy of the United States became available. The famous American "Mystery" or "Q-ships" lured unwary U-boats to their destruction. The art of camouflage was perfected so that even the largest vessels became almost indistinguishable at short distances. Moreover, the Germans had only a limited number of trained submarine crews and the strenuous duties quickly told on the overworked men.

The only large naval engagement of the war was the famous Battle of Jutland, or as the Germans call it, Skagerrak (May 31 to June 1, 1916). The German High Seas Fleet at this time was commanded by Admiral Reinhard von Scheer, a believer in aggressive action. Under his orders, Vice-Admiral Franz von Hipper sailed off in the morning of May 31, 1916, with a scouting squadron to attract part of the British Grand Fleet by a demonstration off the southwest coast of Norway. The English vessels were then to be attacked and annihilated by the main German fleet under Scheer, who followed Hipper at a distance of some fifty miles. It happened that the British were aware of the German plan to emerge from the base, though they were unfamiliar with the purpose of the manoeuvre. Accordingly a concentration of the British fleet in the North Sea had been ordered on May 30.

On the afternoon of the thirty-first, Hipper's scouting fleet came into accidental contact with a British scouting squadron under Vice-Admiral David Beatty. Hipper manoeuvred to fall back toward the main fleet and Beatty simultaneously turned so as to draw the Germans toward the large English fleet under Admiral John Jellicoe. The latter came up with his ships late in the afternoon and succeeded in taking a position between the German fleet and its home base.

The resulting battle was the biggest in history from the point of view of tonnage and armaments. The British had a total of 151 ships, including 37 capital ships. Their opponents had 101 vessels, including 27 capital ships. Scheer, realizing the greater strength of the British, determined merely to slip away from the enemy and make for the home port, and in the night of May 31-June 1 the Germans, aided by fog and mist, eluded the entire British fleet. In this sense, and from the standpoint of losses

sustained, the Germans were successful in the Battle of Jutland. With the smaller fleet they had inflicted the heavier losses. The Germans lost one large and ten small ships, as well as 2545 officers and men. The British lost three large and eleven small ships, and 6274 officers and men. Nevertheless, England continued to exercise control of the seas.

The German fleet, despite its heavier armor and more accurate marksmanship, remained practically inactive for the remainder of the war. Scheer made another sortie in August, 1916, but returned home as soon as his Zeppelin scouts notified him that the British fleet stood ready to meet him. The last wartime sally of the German fleet was made in April, 1918, in the direction of Norway. Again nothing was accomplished and the ships returned to port, this time because of an accident to the propeller of the battle cruiser *Moltke*.

THE WAR IN THE AIR

Exceedingly important among the many new types of weapons introduced during the war were the airships and airplanes. The Germans were first to make earnest use of airships against the enemy. Early in 1915 they began sending over to England large dirigible balloons or Zeppelins (named after their inventor, Ferdinand von Zeppelin) which dropped bombs over the coast towns, thereby incidentally further demonstrating the futility of regarding the dangers of modern warfare as being confined to specially selected "combatants." The Zeppelin raids not only served the actual military purpose of destroying factories, supply depots, and communications, but had a nerve-wracking effect on the civilians. The late summer of 1916 witnessed an especially intensive Zeppelin campaign, but thereafter a rapid decline in the use of these raiders set in. They were large and therefore offered easy targets to the anti-aircraft guns which gradually came to be developed. The invention of the explosive bullet, moreover, made highly impracticable the further employment of craft which depended for buoyancy on huge bags filled with gas.

The Zeppelins soon were replaced by the smaller, cheaper, and faster heavier-than-air craft or airplanes. These machines began making bombing raids over England, particularly over

London, from early in 1917 onward. Both the Germans and the Allies quickly came to regard them as the "eyes" of their armies, reconnoitering the enemy lines, directing friendly shell fire, warning of attack preparations, taking photographs of enemy positions, and scattering propaganda leaflets over enemy trenches and cities. Anti-aircraft weapons were quickly developed and camouflage against air observations was practised, but the craft nevertheless remained useful.

Originally the aviators were equipped merely with pistols or rifles, but soon light machine guns were mounted in the planes. In May, 1915, the twenty-five-year-old Anthony Fokker invented an interrupter gear which made it possible for plane pilots to fire machine guns to the front without danger of having the bullets strike the propeller blades. For a time this device gave the Germans considerable air superiority over the Allies. In the beginning, air combats generally were single engagements in which individual pilots fought one another to the death. A chivalrous air code was developed and air "aces" became national heroes. Among the most distinguished of these aces were Baron Manfred von Richthofen, "the Red Knight of Germany"; the Frenchman, Rene Fonck; and the American, Eddie Rickenbacker.

Single combat, however, soon made way for organized squadron manoeuvres, and regular battles occurred between enemy squadrons or "circuses" of from ten to fifty planes each. Every combat squadron was led by a squadron leader who picked his own pilots and who himself set an example of skill and daring. Such squadrons were also useful in harassing retreating columns of the enemy or impeding the advance of reserves.

POISON GAS

Though first used by the Germans, poison gases soon became popular as weapons with both sides. Altogether, the belligerents experimented in the field with about three score gases or mixtures of gases. The effects in each case were either lethal or lacrimatory, and the means of projection, hand or rifle grenades, toxic smoke candles, artillery shells, minenwerfer, trench mortars, and aerial bombs or cylinders. Poison gases may be of the non-persistent type, mingling with the air upon dispersion and quickly

losing their effectiveness, or of the persistent type, lingering, upon dispersion, for hours or even days with continued strength and effectiveness. In the first class, used chiefly in the earlier days of the war, are found such sensory irritant gases as lacrimators, sternutators, and vomiting gases, and such lung irritant gases as chloropicrin, phosgene, and chlorine. Mustard gas (dichloroethylsulphide) is typical of the second class.

It is difficult to estimate the precise number of war casualties due to gas, since so many men were disabled by several agents. Besides, many men who were discharged from military hospitals died within a few years of their release as a result of having been gassed. This inability to know exactly how many men were killed or badly affected by gas has led the protagonists of chemical warfare to advertise gas as the most humane of weapons. But General A. A. Fries, head of the American Chemical Warfare Service in France, wrote: "Unquestionably many of those who died on the battlefield from other causes suffered also from gas. No other single element of war, unless you call powder a basic element, accounted for so many casualties among the American troops. Indeed, it is believed that a greater number of casualties was not inflicted by any other arm of the Service, unless possibly the infantry, and even in that case it would be necessary to account for all injured by bullets, machine guns, and hand grenades. This is true, in spite of the fact that the German was so nearly completely out of gas when the Americans began their offensive at St. Mihiel and the Argonne, that practically no gas casualties occurred during the St. Mihiel offensive, and only a very few until after a week of the Argonne fighting."¹

Chlorine gas was perhaps the most used of the early gases, but the far more destructive mustard gas soon achieved the unenviable title of "king of poison gases." This gas is capable of working its way through gloves, clothing, and masks, and of burning into horrible blisters every bit of skin with which it comes in contact. According to another officer of the American Chemical Warfare Service, it was proposed to have containers that would hold a ton of mustard gas carried over German cities by plane and released with a time fuse arranged for explosion several hundred

¹ Fries, A. A., and West, C. J., *Chemical Warfare*, 1921. Reprinted by permission of the McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

feet above the ground. It was expected that a one-ton container would account for an acre or more of territory, "and that not one living thing, not even a rat, would live." The armistice was concluded before the plan could be put into effect.

The science of developing effective gas masks lagged somewhat behind the preparation of new gases, and the masks offered only a fair amount of protection. Gases were developed which so irritated sensitive organs that the men in frenzy were forced to take off the masks, and then the lethal gases were able to take quick effect. The Germans in 1917, for example, developed diphenylchloroarsine, which is atomized into fine particles upon explosion and which, in a concentration of as little as one part in ten million, causes sneezing cramps as well as severe burning sensations in nose, lungs, and throat. In stronger concentrations it causes severe vomiting. Considerable time was required before the masks used by the Allied troops were readjusted to secure immunity against this gas, which was projected in the notorious Blue Cross Shells.

According to General Fries the utilization and destructiveness of gas in the World War "was a child's game compared to what it will be in the future."¹

PROPAGANDA

It has long been a commonplace that "when war is declared, Truth is the first casualty." Propaganda, therefore, was not a new weapon during the war. It has been used as a means of converting masses of people to desired view-points for centuries. More than a century ago the Austrian Chancellor, Prince Metternich, maintained that half a dozen of Napoleon's paid pamphleteers were worth as much to the French Emperor as an army of three hundred thousand men. On no previous occasion, however, was propaganda work carried on in so widespread and scientific a manner as during the last war. Every government gathered its propaganda experts into organized and supervised groups to work day and night in order that the country might

¹ In November, 1932, Stanley Baldwin was reported to have declared before the House of Commons: "Before the last war ended we had in this country three inventions of such destructive power that they were not used as a matter of public conscience. In the next war there will be no such restraint."

be "educated and aroused as to the reason, justice, and necessity of the war."

Prodigious amounts of energy were devoted to convincing the respective peoples that their cause was the righteous one; that the enemy was motivated by jealousy, greed, and a general fiendishness; that their own leaders were inspired by idealism, while the opponents were selfish materialists and imperialists; that no sacrifice was too great to remove from the earth the scum which was the foe; and so on *ad nauseam*. Venerable preachers and dignified teachers vied with one another in bitter vituperation of the enemy who more often than not worshipped the same God and had a parallel culture. Professional orators and spellbinders worked themselves into fits of apoplexy to the accompanying applause of the future cannon fodder, and few lies were so malicious or so stupidly ridiculous that they did not find thousands of believers. No longer were children frightened into quiet by tales of the bogey man — far better stories were spun around the theme of the foe. The skill of the propaganda artists was attested to by the circumstance that for many years after the war widespread belief in even the most outrageous lies and misstatements persisted. The official misinformation was disseminated by superpublicity methods. The later official retractions were printed in obscure places, or tucked in between columns of advertising in the newspapers.

During the war, then, the lie, like so many other crimes, became a "patriotic virtue," and the propagandist could with a clear conscience tell a lie — provided he "stuck to it." In each country an official propaganda bureau was erected: in Germany it was the *Pressekonferenz*; England had her Crewe House, directed by Lord Northcliffe; in France it was *La Maison de La Presse*, supplemented by *le Comité Catholique*; and in the United States, George Creel supervised the activities of the Committee on Public Information. Toward the end of the war there was created an Inter-Allied Board, under the able direction of Lord Northcliffe, to supervise the scientific lie system.

Atrocity myths were eagerly read by the people in all countries. Just as men and women in the Allied countries repeated with apparent gusto the "horrible" acts of the Germans in cutting off babies' hands and attacking women, so the people in Central

Europe were eager to hear about the latest French, Serbian, or Russian atrocity, about the cigars filled with gunpowder which the Belgians offered to German soldiers, or the coffee and strychnine given by a French priest to a German sergeant. Faked photographs with the caption, "the camera cannot lie," were circulated throughout the world, and "in Vienna an enterprising firm supplied atrocity photographs with blanks for the headings so that they might be used for propaganda purposes by either side." The cinema also scored a great success as a vehicle of propaganda.

The news was twisted and distorted without restraint, and much injustice was done by enterprising propagandists who ignorantly or maliciously mistranslated enemy expressions. Thus, one Allied patriot who heard some Germans sing Luther's famous hymn, *Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott*, reported his horror at hearing the idolatrous "Huns" sing, "*Hindenburg ist unser Gott*" Another spread the myth that the Germans were transporting their soldiers' corpses to fat-rendering plants. His story was based on a German order relating to the disposition of the carcasses of horses.

The following, from Arthur Ponsonby's *Falsehood in War-Time*, offers one of the most interesting examples of the "manufacture of news":

THE FALL OF ANTWERP

November 1914

When the fall of Antwerp got known, the church bells were rung (meaning in Germany). *Kölnische Zeitung*.

According to the *Kölnische Zeitung*, the clergy of Antwerp were compelled to ring the church bells when the fortress was taken.

Le Matin (Paris).

According to what *Le Matin* has heard from Cologne, the Belgian priests who refused to ring the church bells when Antwerp was taken have been driven away from their places. *The Times* (London).

According to what *The Times* has heard from Cologne via Paris, the unfortunate Belgian priests who refused to ring the church bells when Antwerp was taken have been sentenced to hard labor.

Corriere della Sera (Milan).

According to information to the *Corriere della Sera* from Cologne via London, it is confirmed that the barbaric conquerors of Antwerp pun-

ished the unfortunate Belgian priests for their heroic refusal to ring the church bells by hanging them as living clappers to the bells with their heads down. " *Le Matin* }

Not only was all this propaganda successful in whipping up the proper spirit of sacrifice among the various peoples, it also led to a veritable persecution mania. Attacks on and arrests of "enemy suspects" were frequent and brutal, and many an innocent person who happened to be cursed with a name of "enemy origin" found it expedient to change that name to something more "native." In the United States, grave suspicion attached to the housewife who absent-mindedly attempted to purchase *sauerkraut* in the neighborhood delicatessen store, having forgotten that from the time of the entry of the land into the war that important article of diet had become "liberty cabbage." German measles, similarly, were rechristened "liberty measles."

Never before had "germs of hate" been so widely and successfully spread. Never before had the hate of peoples been so thoroughly and scientifically mobilized. Rarely had national governments stooped so low in the sport of international villification. And all this, presumably, in order to preserve the blessings of civilization. A "Holy War" and a "Crusade" the struggle was called by its apostles, especially by those who remained behind in comfortable offices.

PEACE MOVES AND WAR AIMS

Long before the armistice of November, 1918, put an end to armed hostilities, a number of peace offers had been advanced by each side. The earliest important proffer of peace came from the Central Powers in December, 1916. Thereafter, as defeatism and war-weariness among the peoples became progressively more marked, suggestions for ending the war followed one another in rapid succession. For a time, indeed, peace rather than victory was the cry of many — capitalists, socialists, pacifists, Christians, and diplomats alike — who feared for civilization and the future of mankind.

The peace proposal of the Central Powers, made at a time (December 12, 1916) when they were generally victorious, and President Wilson's attempt, some days later, to secure a definition

¹ Reprinted by permission of E. P. Dutton & Co. and Geo. Allen & Unwin, Ltd.

of war aims, have already been discussed.¹ The Allies, in reply, were content to stigmatize the German move as calculated more to sow dissension within their ranks than to end the war, and to publish in turn (January, 1917), a series of peace demands based largely upon the Secret Treaties. Although the positions taken by the opposing diplomats were incompatible, Wilson made these moves the occasion for an optimistic speech to the Senate (January, 1917) wherein he advocated a "peace without victory" and pledged the help of the United States in guaranteeing a just and lasting settlement.

About five months after Wilson's pronouncement there began to arrive in Stockholm, Sweden, delegates from the socialist parties and workers' organizations in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia, and several neutral states, in order to discuss means whereby Labor might help bring the conflict to a close. The corresponding bodies in the Allied countries were inclined at first to regard this move as a subtle phase of German propaganda, but when their suspicions were removed they selected delegates to represent England, France, Italy, and the United States. The governments of these four countries refused to issue the necessary passports to the delegates and the Stockholm conference broke up in failure.

On August 1, 1917, Pope Benedict XV issued a plea for a "just and durable" peace. He proposed the substitution in international affairs of the "moral force of right" for the "material force of arms," the restoration of all occupied territories, reciprocal forfeiture of indemnity claims, a guarantee of freedom of the seas, provision for the future settlement of international disputes by arbitration, a decrease in armaments, and a conciliatory settlement, involving plebiscites if necessary, of the rival territorial claims in such regions as Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, and the Trentino. Wilson, as spokesman for the Allies, replied to this plea on August 27, saying that the negotiation of peace on any condition with the Imperial German Government was out of question. Only when the German people repudiated their "irresponsible" government would the Allies consent to discuss peace. The Central Powers regarded with favor the general terms of the papal plan, but were silent on restorations and indemnities.

¹ See p. 41.

The Bolsheviks in Russia made an attempt to bring about immediate peace in 1917 by publishing the texts of the Secret Treaties to which Russia had been a party. This expose of the obviously imperialist schemes for which they were being called upon to make further sacrifices, thoroughly aroused the people in England, France, and Italy. It required a considerable number of idealistic statements by Wilson and the Allied leaders to offset the effects of this shock to the disillusioned citizens.

From Austria-Hungary came two important moves for peace in 1917. Relations between the two leading Central Powers were no longer as cordial as they had been earlier in the war. Friction had developed between Austrian and German officers over such matters as the disposition of troops, the planning of campaigns, and the allotment of war materials. Upon the death of Francis Joseph in 1916, there came to the thrones of Austria-Hungary the young and inexperienced Charles, who viewed with alarm the increasing discontent and disloyalty of his subject nationalities. Patriotic Austrians, fearing the preponderance of a victorious Germany, had come to add to the German plea *Gott strafe England*, another—*Und schiltze uns vor Deutschland* ! It was not surprising, therefore, that Charles in the spring of 1917 should have attempted to achieve an immediate peace, even if that meant a separate peace. In a letter to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte de Bourbon-Parma, Charles asked the latter to convey to President Poincare the emperor-king's readiness to recognize the "just claims" of France to Alsace-Lorraine and to agree to the complete restoration of Belgium and Serbia. However, nothing came of this incident. Similarly devoid of results was a vague restatement of Austrian war aims in December, by Foreign Minister Count Czernin.

On January 5, 1918, while the memories of Russia's defection and Italy's disaster were still fresh, Lloyd George explained his latest conception of the Allied war aims in a speech to the British Trade Unions. Although his stand now was somewhat more moderate than it had been on any previous occasion, the premier's demands still entailed great sacrifices on the part of the Central Powers, and nothing but gains for the Allies. He outlined as an ideal program (1) the accordance of "genuine self-government" to the subject nationalities of the Dual Monarchy; (2) the evac-

uation and restoration of northern France, northern Italy, Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania; (3) the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France; (4) the redemption of "unredeemed Italy"; (5) the resurrection of an independent Poland; (6) recognition of the "separate national condition" of the non-Turkish subjects of the Ottoman Empire; (7) the internationalization of the Straits; and (8) the application of the principle of self-determination to all Germany's colonies. Not a word about the subject nationalities or discontented colonies of the Allies!

The best-known statement of war aims came from President Wilson on January 8, 1918. In an address to Congress the President summarized his program in "Fourteen Points" as follows:

1. "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at," and the abolition of secret diplomacy.
2. "Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war" except by international action.
3. "The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers (tariffs) and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions. . . ."
4. "Adequate guarantees . . . that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with public safety."
5. "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims" with proper consideration of the "interests of the populations concerned."
6. "The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy. . . ."
7. The evacuation and restoration of Belgium.
8. The evacuation and restoration of France and the return of Alsace-Lorraine.
9. "A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy along clearly recognizable lines of nationality."
10. The "freest opportunity of autonomous development" for the peoples of Austria-Hungary.
11. Evacuation and restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro; free access to the sea for Serbia; determination by friendly counsel of "the relations of the several Balkan states to one another"; and international guarantees of the economic and territorial integrity of the Balkan states.
12. Autonomous development for the non-Turkish possessions of the sultan, and internationalization of the Dardanelles.
13. Resurrection of an independent Poland with access to the sea.

14. Formation of "a general association of nations . . . under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."¹

Several times throughout 1918 Wilson reiterated in one form or another the main views expressed in this program in an effort to convince the people both in the Allied and enemy countries that the "Fourteen Points" really were the aims for which the war was being continued. Thousands of copies of the points were scattered over German trenches and towns by Allied airplanes to shake the power of the Hohenzollern Government. The authorities in England, France, and Italy, however, never officially accepted all the points, though they were too shrewd to protest against them during the conflict. Consequently a protracted quarrel between Wilson and the Allied statesmen was made inevitable at the forthcoming peace conference.

THE END, 1918

Early in 1918 Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff explained to a secret session of the Reichstag a plan of campaign which, it was claimed, would bring the war to a close within the year. The cost would be a further million casualties. The Reichstag approved the proposal and preparations were immediately begun for the supreme German effort of the war. Veteran divisions were rushed to the western front from Russia, and for the first time since the early days of the contest the Allied superiority in numbers was overcome. Indeed, the 400,000 British casualties of 1917 had not yet been replaced and American troops were arriving at the rate of only 25,000 monthly. The Germans accordingly hoped to end the struggle within four months—before the effect of American man power would have time to make itself felt.

The first drive opened on March 21, 1918, along the fifty-mile sector Arras-St. Quentin-La Fere. The Germans planned to drive a wedge between the independently commanded British and French forces and to crowd the former back to the sea. Within a few days the English actually were driven back 35 miles,

¹ Wilson may well have been influenced in the formulation of these points by Jeremy Bentham's *Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace*, 1796.

forced to relinquish 1500 square miles of ground, and made to suffer 300,000 losses, including 100,000 prisoners. For a time it appeared as though the desired gap might be created, but the British line rallied and retreated without breaking. The dismay of the Allies over this setback was heightened when the Germans brought into action a 400,000-pound gun which projected shells into Paris from a distance of 75 miles. This "Big Bertha," however, did more psychological than material damage.

One reason for the success of the German drive was the failure of General Petain to hurry French reinforcements to the support of the British. The Allied leaders took the lesson to heart and were constrained at last to set up a unified command. It is true that in the previous November, after the Caporetto retreat, the English, French, and Italian premiers, gathered at Rapallo, had established a Supreme War Council to give unity to Allied efforts. But this was valuable more from the point of view of economic and financial cooperation than from that of military coordination. Consequently, on March 26, 1918, General Ferdinand Foch, who had achieved some successes and was known for his determination and will-power, was placed in command of all the Allied forces in France. A few weeks later he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. Thereafter one master director and strategist was supreme, although the various national commanders retained direct control over their individual forces.

Unified command greatly strengthened the Allied military machine. Additional support came from the action of the British in passing a stricter conscription law and sending across the Channel 355,000 men in one month. Conscription, or the draft, had also been introduced into the United States by the Selective Service Act of May, 1917, and in 1918 men were called and prepared for duty at an amazingly rapid rate. In response to urgent appeals by the French, 675,000 men were sent to Europe between April and July, 1918. On April 28 an American division for the first time was assigned to an active fighting sector, in Picardy. The American Commander-in-Chief, John J. Pershing, resolutely refused to permit the use of his troops as fillers for casualty gaps in British or French units. He insisted that the Americans be assigned to fight as distinct and unbroken units even if that necessitated longer periods of battle acclimatization along quiet sectors.

For this stand Pershing was accused by his Allied colleagues of having a non-cooperative temperament and of seeking personal glory, but in the United States his course was generally approved.

Meanwhile, on April 9, Ludendorff had launched a second drive against the British — this time west of Lille, between La Bassee and Armentieres — the objective again being the Channel ports. The defenders, under Sir Douglas Haig, lost Armentieres and Passchendaele and were driven back fifteen miles. The Bethune and Ypres salients, however, were held, and the ports therefore saved.

Their partial successes fired the Germans on to still greater efforts. With men discharged from hospitals and boys from the class of 1920, Ludendorff soon replaced almost three-fourths of his recent losses and was able to strike a third sledge-hammer blow on May 27. On this occasion the brunt of the attack fell on the French, between Soissons and Rheims. In two days Soissons fell. Soon thereafter the Marne was reached and crossed. Chateau-Thierry was captured. Paris was only forty-four miles away. Then the advance was checked. Rheims held out, and the thousands of Americans hastily thrown into the line by Foch stopped the foe. In the region of Belleau Wood, the Americans actually regained some lost ground. A renewed German onslaught between June 9 and 15 netted only a six-mile gain between Montdidier and Noyon.

With the courage of despair the Germans launched a last drive in the middle of July. Rheims was the first objective. Its fall would split the French front and make easy an advance through the valley of the Marne to Paris. Ludendorff knew that the capture of Rheims would win the war for him. Foch knew it, too. From July 15 to 18 the battle for Rheims raged. Between Chateau-Thierry and Epernay the Americans fought with a stubbornness that surprised the Germans, and at the point of their farthest advance the latter gained only six miles. Then their strength was spent. On July 18 the last German drive of the war merged into a great Allied counter-offensive. This was followed by a series of relentless assaults which came to an end only with the signing of an armistice in November.

When Foch issued his orders for the counter-offensive in July, there were about 1,000,000 Americans in France. During the

next few months additional troops arrived at an average rate of 10,000 per day. In November, therefore, the American soldiers in France numbered 2,085,000. War materials also were sent over in enormous and unprecedented quantities, and thanks to the vigilance of the Anglo-American sea patrol, transport casualties and losses were few. Accordingly, Foch had no need to worry about conserving man power. He could press assault after assault without let-up and without allowing the Germans to rest.



THE WESTERN FRONT IN 1914 AND 1918.

The initial encounter of the new offensive was the Second Battle of the Marne, which raged from July 18 to August 3, and in which 85,000 Americans participated. At its conclusion, Chateau-Thierry and Soissons were once more in Allied hands, and the Germans had been forced to retire behind the Aisne-Vesle River. On August 8 another powerful attack was launched along the Somme in Picardy and the Germans were driven back ten miles along the whole line. Before the end of the month, Montdidier,

Bapaume, and Noyon had been retaken and 130,000 prisoners captured. P6ronne fell on the first of September, Lens on the fourth. Two weeks later a force of more than 500,000 Americans wiped out the St. Mihiel salient near Verdun.

As September drew to a close the cause of Germany seemed hopeless. The Hindenburg Line was cracking. The morale of the troops was breaking. Supplies of munitions and food were rapidly dwindling. Revolutionary tremors were felt behind the lines. The submarine campaign was an obvious failure. Ludendorff's confidence was shaken, and on September 29, following the receipt of news of impending collapse in Bulgaria, he had a nervous breakdown. On that day he informed the emperor at a Spa conference that the war was lost. Two days later Hindenburg insisted that Germany make a peace offer, and on October 2 the liberal-minded Prince Maximilian of Baden was appointed chancellor. The prince took two socialists into his cabinet—the first such instance in the history of the empire. He then entered into negotiations with Wilson for peace terms, expressing his satisfaction with the principles laid down in the "Fourteen Points," and stressing the circumstance that Germany was in process of being transformed into a democratic monarchy. Wilson, however, continued the exchange of notes for another month, intimating more and more openly that Germany must drop the Hohenzollerns.

While the diplomats negotiated, the Allied soldiers continued their advance. St. Quentin, Cambrai, Lille, Laon were invested in rapid order, and by the end of October few Germans were left in France. Some of the hardest fighting had occurred in the difficult terrain of the Meuse-Argonne region, where 1,200,000 Americans had helped cut the main line of German communications at Sedan. One-fifth of the entire battle line was at this time manned by Americans.

Bad as was the situation of Germany, the plight of her allies was even worse. In June the Austrians started a last desperate offensive in the hope of putting Italy out of the war. Unfortunately for the attackers, General Diaz gained knowledge of the plans and was prepared to meet the shock. At first the Austrians were able to advance a few miles. The Piave River, however, suddenly overflowed, and the torrents of water swept away ten

of the fourteen bridges, causing panic among the invaders. Diaz now brought into action huge reserve forces and the Austrians soon were made to retrace their steps. On October 24 an Italian offensive was launched against the Trentino. At Vittubrio Veneto the Austrian army was split and routed, and by November 3 the Italians were in possession of Trieste. They had taken 300,000 prisoners.

In the meantime, on September 30, Bulgaria had surrendered unconditionally and signed an armistice at Salonica. The withdrawal of German forces to France and of Austrians to Italy had so weakened the Bulgarians that they feared a Franco-Serbo-Greek invasion from the south. To avoid such a contingency they announced their willingness to quit the fray. In the armistice the Allies were accorded full permission to use Bulgarian territory as a military base. Bulgaria's withdrawal, furthermore, served to isolate Turkey from the Central Powers and to make the Sultan's Government panicky. Not only was there danger of an attack from the west on Adrianople and Constantinople, but in the east Damascus, Beirut, and Aleppo, all had fallen, and the enemy was fast marching on Mosul. In consequence the sultan expressed a readiness to surrender. On October 31 the Armistice of Mudros was signed, and Turkey, too, became available as a base for further Allied operations.

These disasters to its eastern friends naturally had a fatal reaction on the Dual Monarchy, which was itself in a process of disintegration because of the separatist activities of the subject nationalities. As early as 1917 the Southslavic subjects of Austria-Hungary had signed a Declaration of Corfu with the Serbians, agreeing to unite with the latter in a new Slavic state. In the fall of 1918 the Hungarians, Bohemians, Slovaks, and Poles declared their independence. These difficulties made it almost impossible for Emperor Charles to offer further resistance to the advancing Italians. On November 3, therefore, his representatives signed an armistice, based upon unconditional surrender, with General Diaz. Thereafter Germany was left to continue the unequal struggle alone.

Two days after Austria's surrender, Wilson notified Prince Maximilian that he might apply to Marshal Foch for armistice terms. The Allies were quite willing to end the fighting, not only

to stop the carnage, but because even Foch thought it might take "four or five months" before the Germans could be driven east of the Rhine. Doubtless the retreating troops, though not particularly anxious to get killed for the sake of prolonging the occupation of Belgium, would fight much harder when it was a question of defending the fatherland against invasion. Foch, accordingly, drew up armistice terms which would make it impossible for Germany to renew the war if she accepted the truce. Moreover, it was made clear that the peace which presumably was to follow the armistice would be based upon an *amended* form of the "Fourteen Points." The amendments (1) reserved to the Allies "complete freedom" at the expected peace conference on the subject of freedom of the seas; (2) so defined the "restoration" of invaded territories as to include damages done to the civilian populations and property by the Germans; and (3) converted the demand for autonomy for the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary into one for independence. On the eighth of November the terms were handed to Germany's delegates. Three days were allowed for unconditional acceptance.

The armistice terms included thirty-five clauses. Within fourteen days Germany was to evacuate France, Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, and Luxemburg; and within a month all the territory west of the Rhine. Allied troops were to occupy the evacuated territory in Germany together with the Rhenish bridgeheads at Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz to a depth of thirty kilometers east of the Rhine. The treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest were to be renounced, and all German troops withdrawn from Russia, Rumania, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary. A specified number of warships and all submarines were to be surrendered, and within two weeks the Allies were to receive, in good order, 5000 locomotives, 150,000 railway cars, and 5000 motor lorries. All Allied prisoners of war were to be repatriated at once, without reciprocity, and the blockade against Germany was to remain in force. Large quantities of artillery and war materials were to be surrendered.

The week preceding the signing of the armistice was a turbulent one in Germany. Ludendorff fell from power. The navy mutinied. A separatist movement broke out in Bavaria. The emperor and crown prince fled to Holland. Prince Max was

forced out of the chancellorship, and a group of socialists led by Friedrich Ebert took over the government of a new German Republic (November 9). Since the socialists had no desire to continue or subsequently renew the war, they accepted the armistice terms as presented. At five o'clock in the morning of November 11, in a railway car in the dark Compiègne Forest, two German delegates signed the papers that were to end the first World War. At eleven o'clock the slaughter officially ceased. Millions throughout the world again became delirious with joy.

THE PRICE OF WAR

The World War, which lasted 1565 days, was undoubtedly the bloodiest and costliest war that has ever been fought. During the course of the conflict about 65,000,000 men were mobilized and forced to participate, for a longer or shorter time, in the economically unproductive activity of organized destruction. Of these men some 9,000,000 — one in seven — died in action or of wounds. 22,000,000 — one in three — were wounded, and of these 7,000,000 were permanently disabled. Many of the wounded, moreover, died within a few years after the war, as a consequence of their disabilities, while thousands of shell-shocked or gassed veterans continued to lead tortured existences. More than 5,000,000 men were reported as "missing" after the conflict and of these many perhaps were literally blown to atoms so that no traces remained.

More than twice as many men were killed in battle during the World War as in all the major wars from 1790 to 1913 together, including the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, the Danish War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War, the American War between the States, the Franco-Prussian War, the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the Balkan Wars. Two-thirds of the men mobilized, and two-thirds of those killed, were on the Allied side.

The number of civilian deaths due to the war was slightly in excess of the number of soldier deaths. The non-combatants fell victim to such disasters as starvation, disease, massacres, epidemics, and raids. In addition, the various national birth rates declined, sometimes to dangerously low figures.

Equally staggering were the monetary costs of the combat and

the destruction of property on land and sea. The average *daily* cost to all belligerents of the war in the first three years was \$123,000,000. In 1918 the average daily cost was \$244,000,000, that is, over \$10,000,000 per hour! The total net direct cost of conducting the war thus was \$186,000,000,000, the Allies expending \$126,000,000,000, and the Central Powers \$60,000,000,000. To this sum must be added property damage on land to the extent of almost \$30,000,000,000; damage on sea to the extent of \$7,000,000,000; production losses of about \$45,000,000,000; and war relief and losses to neutrals of more than \$2,000,000,000. The total real economic cost amounted to \$270,000,000,000.

If to this figure be added the \$67,000,000,000 generally estimated as the capitalized value of the human lives lost as a direct consequence of the war, a total of \$337,000,000,000 is reached. This sum does not take into account the additional economic loss caused by the wholesale crippling and devitalization of soldiers and civilians, the billions of dollars of interest due on the debts contracted by the fighting powers, or the vast sums which will continue to be appropriated as pension money for generations to come. It is more than double the capitalized value of all the wealth of any one belligerent except the United States. Verily, the men who met to consider the terms of peace after the World War faced a grave responsibility — the responsibility of so settling conditions that the ghastly losses in lives and goods should not have been entirely in vain.

THE NEW WORLD

Before considering the story of the peace conference which brought hostilities to an official close, it may be interesting to note some of the outstanding effects of the war on world conditions in general:

(1) Four great autocracies were swept away, those in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey.

(2) A wave of republicanism swept over Europe. In 1914 France, Switzerland, Portugal, San Marino, and Andorra were the only republics on the Continent. Between 1917 and 1932 twelve new Continental republics came into being. Socialist and Labor Governments became common.

(3) Almost simultaneously with the extension of republican

forms of government there grew up a general distrust of democracy, due, possibly, to the inability of the new governments to solve the complex post-war problems. Consequently there appeared a number of dictators who proposed to save their peoples from destruction by energetic, if despotic, measures.

(4) Two great politico-economic experiments were inaugurated: Bolshevism and Fascism.

(5) There was a decided change in the relative importance of nations in Europe. With the disruption of Austria-Hungary and the territorial changes in Germany and Russia there appeared a number of new states, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, which henceforth were to play an important rôle in international affairs. Before the war six Great Powers determined international relations in Europe. The eclipse of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary, and the emergence of a number of states of the second rank increased the number of actors on the international stage and complicated the solution of international problems.

(6) The great exaggeration of the spirit of nationalism during the war and the widespread dissemination of the idea of national self-determination, made political and economic international relations after the war more difficult than ever. Each newly freed nationality was anxious to enjoy its new-found sovereignty to the full. As a result, political intrigues, economic rivalries, jealous quarrels, new tariffs, and new oppressions fanned the flames of old hatreds and overwhelmed Europe with another dangerous hysteria.

(7) The spreading of the principles of nationalism and self-determination also gave impetus to unrest and turmoil in nearly all the overseas possessions of the Allied powers, in Egypt, India, Korea, the Philippine Islands, East Africa, and elsewhere. Little attempt was made to apply idealistic principles in these regions.

(8) Despite the fervent asseverations of the diplomats that the World War was to be the "war to end wars," the peace treaty which finally was drawn up created as many new wounds as it healed old ones, and failed to end the suspicion and fear which for so long had overclouded diplomacy. New military alliances soon were formed to take the place of old, Europe quickly was divided anew into hostile camps, the number of men under arms

in 1932 exceeded by some millions the number in 1913, and the world's military and naval budgets continued to make increasingly heavy demands on the purses of harassed, but apparently patient, tax-payers.

(9) Instrumentalities for international cooperation and for the peaceful settlement of international disputes were provided by the establishment of the League of Nations and the World Court. Whether or not full advantage would be taken of these instrumentalities, remained a question.

(10) In many countries democratic reforms were introduced, particularly in the direction of suffrage extension. Partly because of a new spirit and partly because of the services they had rendered during the war, women were widely enfranchised.

(11) Temporarily, at least, Labor assumed a new importance in the world order. This was due, apparently, to the transient shortage of skilled laborers, to a realization that the man on the fighting line would have been helpless without the full support of the man at the factory, and to a radical propaganda which thrived during the periods of economic distress that followed the war. In eastern Europe, moreover, the hitherto down-trodden agrarians actually secured control of a number of governments.

(12) There was a temporary religious revival. It was inevitable that many of the young men who were so constantly surrounded by death should seek refuge in religion and comfort in the belief in another and perhaps better world. Mysticism and spiritualism also enjoyed great popularity in the post-war years.

(13) Education suffered greatly during the war and in the lean years following it, but there was a general feeling that in the proper education of the young lay the best guarantee against a repetition of the catastrophe. Wherever money was available, therefore, increased attention was paid to the training of children and of adults.

(14) Youth movements became popular, especially in China, Germany, Italy, and Russia. The younger men and women of the world were made serious- and political-minded by the diplomatic and economic crises which grew out of the war, and they eagerly anticipated a wholesale regeneration of their respective peoples. Generally the training to which they were subjected was, in the first instance, military!

(15) The war taught the nations useful lessons in cooperation and "team-work," and all the value of these was not lost upon the return of peace. Often in attempts to solve outstanding international economic and social problems, good use was made of the wartime experience in cooperation. World conferences became frequent occurrences. ^

(16) The United States, occupying a position as debtor nation in 1914, emerged from the war as the world's greatest creditor. Her new importance, however, was the cause of much ill-will and jealousy.

(17) Through their participation in the World War, their membership in the League of Nations, and their increasing importance as markets, the Latin American states came to have a new and more prominent standing in world affairs.

(18) The war served as a stimulus to scientific and commercial advances as well as to the development of more efficient machines of destruction. Important discoveries were made in the field of medicine, there was progress in the art of ship building, and great strides were made in aviation. New industries were stimulated, particularly where wartime conditions deprived a country of products which formerly had been available only through import. Thus the inability of the United States to get aniline dyes from Germany gave rise to the development of an important American dye industry.

(19) Impetus was given to a movement for general disarmament, but progress in this direction was painfully slow.

(20) A complete and world-wide economic reorganization and rehabilitation was necessitated, for the war dislocated the economic machinery of all the participants and even of the neutrals. In direct consequence of the war and its aftermath, a depression made its appearance toward the end of 1929 which, becoming universal and lasting for several years, boosted the world unemployment figure to twenty-five million, bankrupted nations, and gave rise to unprecedented world unrest. The world could not afford to blow up wealth at the rate of millions of dollars per hour. The depression was part of the price that had to be paid for the extravagance of the four-year holocaust.

CHAPTER IV

THE MAKING OF PEACE

PERSONALITIES AT THE CONFERENCE

Long before the armistice celebrations subsided, (Paris having been selected as the scene for the conclusion of peace made ready for this new festival. |At first it had been thought that the peace might be negotiated in neutral Switzerland, in Lausanne or Geneva, but the French would not hear of this. In Paris the Germans had humbled them forty-eight years previously, and in Paris they would now humble the Germans. The French capital therefore prepared to receive some of the most distinguished statesmen, jurists, and scholars of the Allied world who would cooperate in the dictation of a peace to the vanquished. There were not to be any Germans, Austrians, Turks, or Bulgarians at the conference. These would be called in later — to affix their signatures to completed documents,

In December, 1918, Woodrow Wilson embarked for Europe. Against the advice of judicious friends, the President had determined to leave the land whose destinies he had been elected to guide, and to attend the conference in person. The arrival in Europe of this latest of "demi-gods" was eagerly anticipated, not only by the statesmen, but by the people. A general feeling seemed to prevail that Wilson was the one person who could "rise above the tumult of passion" that surged through the world.

Wilson's reception in Europe was commensurate with the glamour attached to his name. The people were overjoyed at this coming of "a second Messiah." In England, Londoners crowded into the streets by hundreds of thousands to get a glimpse of the great Wilson. Frenchmen, it is said, burst into tears in his presence. Not since the days of the ancient empire had Rome witnessed such a triumphal march as that accorded

the President of the United States. Even in Germany he was considered a savior. Small wonder that he should have thought himself in absolute control of matters in Paris.

But the glamour was deceptive. ¹ Actually Wilson did not even have the support of his own countrymen. [Though he announced that it was with the "greatest enthusiasm and pleasure" that he accepted the "mandate" of the American people to draw up a treaty of the type which he contemplated, the truth was that his party had been defeated in the congressional elections of 1918. (Wilson's defeat might not have been so thorough if he had not specifically asked the American people to elect a Democratic Congress so that he might be effectively supported during the critical months to come. Since the Republicans in Congress frequently had endorsed the President's war measures more warmly than had his own "followers," his attitude caused resentment among fair-minded citizens. The Republicans captured a majority in both houses and hence the new Congress — the one which would decide on the acceptance or rejection of the treaty to be drawn up in Paris — was hostile to the administration. To make matters worse, the President went to Europe without taking along a single influential member of the Republican Party.^{1/}

With the President went Secretary of State Lansing and Henry White. The latter was a retired, wealthy, Republican career diplomat who spoke French fluently, dressed well, and had been ambassador to France, but who had little influence among Europeans and almost no voice in the affairs of his party. The remaining two members of the delegation already were in Europe: General Tasker Bliss, a scholar as well as a soldier, and a man whose abilities were not always recognized at the time, and Colonel Edward M. House, who had preceded Wilson to make the necessary preparations. So far as American politics were concerned, therefore, the peace would be a Democratic one, and some of the Republican Senators would vote against its ratification as a mere matter of party loyalty. Had Wilson been a really shrewd politician, he would have taken along a man

¹ Wilson further increased his unpopularity at home by ordering Postmaster-General Burleson to assume control over all the transatlantic cable lines for the sake of censoring news to and from Europe.

such as ex-President Taft or Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Wilson's tactical mistakes were due, in some measure, to his character and personality. His idealism frequently was above the heads of most people, yet he rarely took pains to make himself understood. For him it was sufficient that he had an ideal, and he was willing to sacrifice much, even friendships, for the sake of his ideas. Though his knowledge of European problems and affairs was limited, he sometimes failed to look at the reports drawn up after months of investigation and research by the technical experts whom he had taken to Europe to advise him on matters within their respective fields of knowledge. In diplomacy, Wilson was no match for his diplomatic colleagues in Paris. Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Venizelos flattered and cajoled him until he was pushed off the pedestal upon which he had come to stand.

The leading delegate from England was David Lloyd George, head of the Liberal Party, and prime minister since 1916. Feeling that his government ought to receive a vote of confidence from the English people before he went to the conference, "little Davey" called for elections on December 14, 1918. His chief slogans during the ensuing hysterical "khaki campaign" — and he knew full well that they could never be realized — were "Make Germany Pay," "Hang the Kaiser," and "Shilling for shilling and ton for ton." The London *Daily Mail*, owned by Lord Northcliffe and managed by his brother, Lord Rothermere, aided Lloyd George with the cry: "They will cheat you yet — those Huns!" The premier won an overwhelming victory, his coalition securing a majority of 260 seats. J

[Lloyd George was one of the most interesting personalities at the Paris Peace Conference. With his large shock of grey hair, his boundless energy and restlessness, his alert mind and lightning-like decisions which often were unmade as quickly as they were made, with his dislike for matters of detail, his delightful humor and wit, his great emotionalism and cleverness, his indifference to any mistakes he might make, and his wisdom in relying upon the advice of a staff of expert assistants, the Welsh attorney would have occupied a position of prominence at the gathering even if he had represented a less important country

than Great Britain. 'Lloyd George was never at a loss to find the most appealing argument to the "vanity, weakness, or self-interest" of his immediate listener. Consistently and unerringly he was able to find "the weak joints in an adversary's harness."¹

The British Premier, moreover, and the members of his contingent, were much better informed on the day to day progress being made on the treaty than were the American or French delegates. The reason for this was no mystery. (The treaty terms were drafted by numerous committees, each in charge of a certain section, and meeting in different hotels. The British committeemen were required every evening to send a report of the day's proceedings to a central office under Lord Hardinge at the Hotel Majestic, where mimeographed reports of all the minutes were made. By means of high-powered cars these were distributed, on the same evening, to all British representatives. This arrangement gave the British committeemen a great advantage over their colleagues.

The French deputation was led by Georges Clemenceau, variously nicknamed "Tiger" and *Pere la Victoire*. Clemenceau, it has been said, had one illusion — France, and one disillusion — mankind, including Frenchmen. The "Tiger" was old. He had been a newspaper correspondent in the United States during the War between the States, almost sixty years before the meeting of the Peace Conference. He had seen much and experienced much, and he had become thoroughly skeptical and cynical. Until he himself came into power, Clemenceau had been violently opposed to governmental oppression and censorship, and had been instrumental in bringing about the overthrow of almost a score of cabinets at various times in his career. Yet when he became premier and minister of war, from 1917 to 1920, he perfected a splendid "gagging-machine" of his own.

Clemenceau undoubtedly was the best diplomat at the conference, far surpassing his colleagues in knowledge of world affairs and human nature. More than anyone else did he enjoy little jokes at Wilson's expense and probably no one succeeded in insulting so many people at the gathering as he. Though usually selecting for his targets the representatives from the

¹ Clemenceau is said to have exclaimed at one time: "I suppose that man can read, but I doubt whether he ever does."

smaller countries, he reputedly exclaimed, on one occasion: "Even God was satisfied with Ten Commandments, but Wilson insists on Fourteen!" And on another he is said to have remarked, "Lloyd George believes himself to be Napoleon, but President Wilson believes himself to be Jesus Christ." Despite this attitude, he was prudent and diplomatic enough to pay a lip service to the American ideals and British hopes.

Never once did Clemenceau lose sight of the goals which he had set for himself at the conference: to exalt and secure France, and to weaken Germany. His love of France apparently was the only sincere thing about him, and doubtless much of his effort in seeing that the visiting delegates were well entertained was calculated to make them more amenable to his views.

Premier Vittorio Orlando and Baron Sidney Sonnino were at the head of the Italian delegation. Orlando was a learned, eloquent, and artful diplomat, a Sicilian, and an ex-professor of law. However, he had no command of English and hence exerted relatively little influence in the general proceedings. Besides, he constantly irritated Wilson by insisting on the fulfillment of the Secret Treaties which had been the price of Italy's participation in the war. Sonnino, son of a Jewish father and Scotch mother, though usually considered the dominant delegate, was too stubborn and indiscreet to be a good diplomat. Signori Nitti and Tittoni, who later replaced these men as Italy's representatives, were little more successful in pleading their country's cause.

The less important delegates at Paris also constituted an interesting group of personalities. Clemenceau's colleagues, well in the background, were Pichon, Tardieu, and Cambon. Since Clemenceau "was by nature and experience not likely to share his power with any one," his aides rarely attempted to challenge his supremacy. President Poincaré and Marshal Foch, however, though not official delegates to the conference, had considerable influence. Both men had set their hearts upon crushing Germany once and for all, and were anxious to go even further in achieving this aim than was the more astute Clemenceau. Poincaré's policy of opposition to Wilson's ideas, in fact, was so annoying to the American President that the latter long hesitated to accept an invitation to a dinner tendered by the French

Executive at the Elysee Palace during the last week of Wilson's stay in France.

Lloyd George was accompanied by Lord Balfour, Bonar Law, and G. N. Barnes, Minister of Pensions. From Greece came Eleutherios Venizelos, the "Ulysses of the Conference." Poland sent as her chief delegate Roman Dmowski, but when he failed to convince the conference of the justice of his demands, the Poles sent the great pianist, Ignace Paderewski, to see whether he could harmonize the conflicting interests of his countrymen with those of their neighbors. To his sorrow, Paderewski soon discovered that he was no match for the international politicians gathered at Paris. The representatives of Japan, led by Marquis Saionji and Baron Makino, played a shrewd game at the conference. They had little to say on European questions, not wishing to make enemies, but when the discussions concerned the Far East they were all the more vocal. In general, they voted with the United States and England.

The long-suffering and persecuted Armenians sent as their chief spokesman Boghos Nubar Pasha, who demanded a stretch of territory extending from the Caspian to the Black and Mediterranean seas. He reenforced his pleas with a thrilling summary of Armenian massacres through the ages. From Belgium came Foreign Minister Hymans; from new-born Czechoslovakia, Premier Kramars and Foreign Minister Benes; from Jugoslavia,¹ Pashitch and ex-Premier Trumbitch. Rumania was represented by her premier, Jon Bratianu, while from South Africa came Generals Smuts and Botha, able statesmen both. The case of the Zionist Jews was placed in the hands of Dr. Chaim Weizmann of London. The Portuguese and Siamese, the Esthonians and Livonians, the Lebanese and Georgians, all were represented, and even the far-off Koreans selected two delegates. These last, since they had to make their way chiefly on foot, arrived just as the conference was winding up its affairs.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE

Long before the armistice, the leading belligerent governments had appointed experts to collect data and classify statistics on

¹ For the sake of brevity, the name "Jugoslavia" will be used to designate the region known officially, until 1929, as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

all subjects that might conceivably come within the sphere of discussion at the expected peace conference. Since the Allies made no attempt to coordinate their efforts in this direction, and since much of the work was done by subordinates or by people who had no connection with either the war or foreign affairs departments in their respective countries, some of the labor was wasted and later served no definite purpose. A good deal of it, however, was invaluable, and frequently "ideas appeared at the Conference which could be traced back to laborious pens working at a time when the Germans seemed almost invincible."

In the United States a group of experts was gathered by Colonel House, with headquarters in the New York offices of the American Geographical Society, to study the linguistic, economic, and ethnographic factors in central and eastern European history. The activities of this group provided the background for the Fourteen Points and furnished President Wilson with a tentative scheme for territorial settlements. Similar preparations were made in other countries, and such national groups as the Poles and Czechs had well-functioning propaganda committees which did considerable work of a like nature. As a result, every delegation that came to Paris brought with it a clutter of statistics and memoranda.

The first plenary or full session of the Peace Conference was held on January 18, 1919. Most of the nations of the world were represented, there being seventy delegates and j^lejpoten-tiaries, and numerous substitutes. Accompanying each delegation was a large staff of secretaries, advisers, journalists, representatives of business interests, and hangers-on. Fifty or sixty nationals came from even the smaller countries, and each nation wanted at least one hotel as its own special headquarters. The British had five such hotels. Many of the accompanying "experts," incidentally, were that in name only. Thus, "at the opening of the Conference, not one of the British experts on one country had ever been in that country."

So large and unwieldy a group could not possibly do business efficiently, and only six plenary sessions were held. For all practical purposes the conference consisted of the Supreme Peace Council, or Council of Ten, made up of the President and

Secretary of State of the United States, and the premiers and foreign ministers of England, France, Italy, and Japan. While this "Big Ten" assumed the right to decide what should or should not be taken up at the larger conference meetings, the five so-called Principal Allied and Associated Powers also insisted on membership on every committee or commission that was appointed. Supported, as CISMenceau pointed out, by twelve million soldiers, the Great Powers found little difficulty in convincing the smaller ones of their paramount interests.

It soon was felt that even a body of ten was too large for expedition and secrecy, and in March it was definitely announced that henceforth the brunt of the work would be borne by the Council of Four, consisting of the chiefs from the United States, England, France, and Italy. The "Big Four" held a total of 14 sessions. Tapan voiced no objection to this arrangement, since the Japanese delegates rarely had attended meetings anyway. In April, Orlando left Paris in a huff because Wilson addressed an appeal to the Italian people over his head, and thereafter the "Big Three" conducted its meetings in strictest secrecy, for Clemenceau's knowledge of English made it possible to dispense with the services of even the official interpreter.

The routine and investigation work of the conference was attended to in the 1600 meetings held by the 58 commissions and committees that were appointed. The Commission on the League of Nations, the Commission on Reparation for Damages, and the Commission on Territorial Problems were among the more important of these bodies.

Before discussing the general problems facing the conference it may be interesting to note some of the multifarious and tiresome engagements that the leading delegates were forced to keep. Wilson's schedule on the typical, fairly busy day of April 17, 1919, included the following appointments:

- 11 :00 A.M. Dr. Wellington Koo, to present the Chinese Delegation to the Peace Conference.
- 11:10 A.M. Marquis de Voguë and a delegation of seven others, representing the Congrès Français, to present their view as to the disposition of the left bank of the Rhine.
- 11:30 A.M. Assyrian and Chaldean Delegation, with a message from the Assyrian-Chaldean nation.

- 11:45 A.M. Dalmation Delegation, to present to the President the result of the plebiscite of that part of Dalmatia occupied by Italians.
- Noon M. Bucquet, Charge d'Affaires of San Marino, to convey the action of the Grand Council of San Marino, conferring on the President Honorary Citizenship in the Republic of San Marino.
- 12:10 P.M. M. Colonder, Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- 12 : 20 P.M. Miss Rose Schneiderman and Miss Mary Anderson, delegates of the National Women's Trade League of the United States.
- 12 : 30 P.M. The Patriarch of Constantinople, the head of the Orthodox Eastern Church.
- 12 : 45 P.M. Essad Pasha, delegate of Albania, to present the claims of Albania.
- 1 : 00 P.M. M. M. L. Coromilas, Greek Minister at Rome, to pay his respects.
- Luncheon Mr. Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War.
- 4 : 00 P.M. Mr. Herbert Hoover.
- 4 : 15 P.M. M. Bratianu, of the Rumanian Delegation.
- 4 30 P.M. Dr. Alfonso Costa, former Portuguese Minister, Portuguese Delegate to the Peace Conference.
- 4 : 45 P.M. M. Boghos Nubar Pasha, president of the Armenian National Delegation, accompanied by M. A. Aharoman and Professor A. Der Hagopian, of Robert College.
- 5:15 P.M. M. Pashitch, of the Serbian Delegation.
- 5 : 30 P.M. Mr. Frank Walsh, of the Irish-American Delegation.¹

As can well be imagined, the leaders at Paris also received thousands of written reports and requests. These concerned every variety of topic from Corsican demands for autonomy to Siamese demands for indemnities and Arab chieftains' demands for higher salaries. Naturally the ranking delegates did not read all the petitions, but many of the latter had to be given special consideration lest friendly feelings be hurt. Under the circumstances, it is remarkable that the peacemakers even retained their sanity. On the other hand, these circumstances also help to explain the abandon exhibited in many of the social activities.²

¹ *Daily Mail*, Paris Edition, April 18, 1919. Quoted in Dillon, E. J., *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference*, 1920, p. iii.

² The dance craze which affected everyone at the conference, from prime ministers to hotel chambermaids, led C16menceau to remark: "je n'ai jamais vu les figures si tristes ni les derribes si gais !"

GENERAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CONFERENCE

The number of knotty problems which faced the conference was legion. Not only did the Paris assemblage have to draw up peace terms which would satisfy at least the more important of the twenty-three Allied countries, and agree on a covenant for a league of nations that would be acceptable to some forty or fifty not particularly friendly nations, but it also had to feed the starving millions in central and eastern Europe,¹ control the restless victorious armies, satisfy a hysterical public opinion at home, and make peace between the dozen or more nations which fought their own little wars after the World War came to an end/ In the days immediately following the war Europe more nearly resembled a seething cauldron than at any other time in its history. Poles and Ukrainians, Rumanians and Hungarians, Greeks and Turks, Serbs and Montenegrins, Czechs and Germans, Russians and Armenians, Italians and Jugoslavs, all were striving to efface one another from the earth. The Great Powers themselves were so much at odds over policies and view-points that the Versailles Treaty in its final form might never have been signed had Germany possessed a second Bismarck or a Talleyrand to look after her interests. In retrospect it seems miraculous that any treaty was drawn up in the pandemonium that was Europe in 1919.

The question of publicity was among the first of the major problems requiring solution. Wilson's stand on the matter of "open covenants openly arrived at" seemed to imply that everything would be done and discussed without secrecy. Actually, most of the important meetings were held behind closed doors, and precisely what went on during the meetings of the "Big Three" probably will never be known, since few minutes were kept. Newspapermen were admitted to the plenary sessions and general meetings, and were given definite releases for their papers,

¹ Herbert Hoover served as Director-General of Allied Relief in Paris.

The Allied blockade of Germany was maintained until March 14, 1919, when the Brussels Agreement was reached permitting Germany to buy foodstuffs from the outside world. This unnecessary piece of revenge was keenly resented by the Germans, and their disgust was not diminished when they discovered that the concession at Brussels was made by the Allies only to keep Germany from "going Bolshevik."

but the doors of the other council chambers were opened only occasionally, and then usually for photographers.

All messages and reports from France to the United States or from the United States to France were censored by government officials, lest Americans hear of the dissensions in Europe or Europeans discover the weakening support accorded Wilson by his countrymen. The secrecy was often justifiable. The war hysteria, far from dying out with the signing of the armistice, seemed to become greater as the conference days dragged on, and the acrimonious haggling following each leakage of proposed territorial or other adjustments increased the tension.

In the plenary sessions, to which newspapermen had access, the bedlam of languages made it difficult to get anything accurately. Everything that was said had to be interpreted for someone, and not infrequently the interpreter varied the style, increased the bombast, or added to the errors of the speaker. Paul Mantoux, the ablest of the interpreters, saved the dignity of many a speaker by translating freely but sensibly.

The question of which language to designate as official was another problem to bother the diplomats. Clemenceau demanded that the French version of the prospective treaty be regarded as final. The British and Americans insisted on equality for the English version, whereupon the Italians asked for a similarly authoritative Italian text. In the end it was agreed that the French and English texts of the treaty with Germany were to be considered "both authentic," the claim of the Italians being entirely disregarded when Orlando left the conference. The lesser treaties were drafted in all three languages, but in case of dispute the French copy was designated as authoritative.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty confronting the delegates was that of reconciling the dispositions agreed upon in the Secret Treaties with the idealistic principles laid down by Wilson in his Fourteen Points and accepted by Germany as the basis for the peace discussions. These treaties were incompatible with the idea of a peace without victory. Now, in defending the final Versailles Treaty before a group of United States Senators in the autumn of 1919, Wilson stated that he knew nothing about the Secret Treaties when he made his speech embodying the Fourteen Points (January, 1918) and that he first saw the docu-

ments when he arrived in Europe for the conference. Yet it is hard to reconcile this statement with available evidence.

During his mission to America in April, 1917, Lord Balfour discussed at least the London Treaty with both Colonel House and President Wilson, and in January, 1918, he wrote directly to the President about "his thoughts on the Italian territorial claims under the Treaty of London concluded in 1915." In March, 1918, he stated in the Commons that Wilson was being kept fully informed by the Allies, and in May he told the same body: "I have no secrets from President Wilson. Every thought I have in the way of diplomacy connected with the war is absolutely open to President Wilson." Furthermore, after their successful revolution of November, 1917, the Bolsheviks gave out for publication the texts of all Secret Treaties found in the Russian archives. The texts were printed in the *Manchester Guardian* and a few weeks later in the *New York Evening Post*, thus becoming "public property" long before the armistice. As early as July 21, 1917, moreover, Wilson had written House to the effect that American economic power would be such that the Allies must perforce yield to American pressure and accept the American peace program. England and France, he wrote, "have not the same views with regard to peace that we have by any means. When the War is over we can force them to our way of thinking."

Here, then, appears to have been the crux of the matter. Wilson seems to have thought that he could force the Allies into his way of thinking and therefore did not trouble to remember the Secret Treaties. They were unimportant to him and hence were easily forgotten. When he was confronted with them again, in 1919, as an obstacle to his scheme of peace, their existence may well have been a shock to him. Consequently it is possible, as his friend, Colonel House, pointed out nine years later, that in the confusion and turmoil, and under the suspicious cross-examination of the inquisitorial Senators, Wilson, in denying any foreknowledge of the documents, may have spoken "from conviction," not being able to remember "on the spur of the moment . . . when he first heard of this or that."

Be that as it may, Wilson's idealism certainly came into sharp conflict with Allied materialism at the conference — and in most cases materialism triumphed. Sometimes, Wilson was firm.

Thus, during an impasse over the Saar question, he threatened to go home unless he had his way. Again, he showed such firmness in refusing to give Fiume to Italy that Orlando and Sonnino went home, ill-humored and piqued. These instances, however, were rare, and some of them doubtless hastened rather than arrested the decline of the President's prestige.

Last among the general obstacles to progress at the conference was the temporary return to their respective countries, in February and March, 1919, of Wilson and Lloyd George. Wilson came back to the United States to consider the bills that Congress had passed during his absence and to explain to the Senate the tentative draft of the League Covenant. Lloyd George returned to England to console the increasing number of unemployed with promises for a bright future. During this interim, too, Clemenceau was shot, and it was found advisable to leave the bullet in his body. His attacker, one Cottin, was executed for "murder."¹

DRAWING UP THE TREATY

In the actual drawing up of the treaty terms, long hours were consumed in wrangling over the wording of the league of nations' covenant that the gathering was expected to bring into being, over the question of French security and the fate of the left bank of the Rhine, the Italian and Polish claims, the disposition of the erstwhile German colonies and the former possessions of the Turkish Empire, and over the reparation for damages that was to be exacted from Germany.

A serious difference of opinion arose concerning the advisability of incorporating the projected covenant in the general peace agreement. Wilson insisted on having it included in the treaty, lest the nations, in their selfishness, hysteria, and materialism, shelve the covenant indefinitely. He had his way, and the second plenary session, on January 25, 1919, appointed him chairman of a committee to draft the covenant. His leading colleagues on this commission, which represented fourteen states, were Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, Léon Bourgeois, Vittorio Orlando, and Baron Makino.

¹ The armistice with Germany, which had been renewed on December 12, 1918, and January 16, 1919, was again extended on February 16, 1919.

The basis for the commission's work was provided by a number of draft covenants and prior statements and outlines, such as the Smuts draft, the Draft Convention of Lord Phillimore, and the speeches of President Wilson. On February 14 Wilson presented a completed report to another plenary session of the conference. It met with considerable criticism, and in all, twenty-six changes were made before the covenant was finally adopted (April 28). Against the wishes of France, a new article, 21, was added, giving recognition for the first time in a diplomatic document to the Monroe Doctrine: "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." The Japanese attempted to have inserted into the League Covenant an amendment confirming the principle of the equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals. This was rejected by Wilson, chiefly at the instigation of England and Australia, lest it lead to a movement for unrestricted oriental immigration.

Simultaneously with the problem of wording the Covenant arose the question of providing France with the security for which she longed. Reminiscences of what had happened along the Rhine frontier during the times of Napoleon I, of Napoleon III, and in 1914, and the fear that Germany might seek revenge for her treatment at the conference, made the French delegates panicky in their attempts to render unlikely future invasions. The only means of achieving this security, it seemed to them, was so to cripple Germany — politically, militarily, territorially, economically, and commercially — that she never again could threaten their beloved France. Poincare and Foch, in particular, were imbued with this idea, and during the course of the proceedings the marshal said: "Recourse must be had in the first place to all the means provided by Nature, and Nature has placed but one barrier across the line of invasion: the Rhine."

In accordance with this view, Foch and his followers demanded that Germany's western frontier be fixed at the Rhine, and that the ten thousand square miles of territory between the Rhine on the east, and Holland, Belgium, and France on the west, be

erected into an autonomous, neutral state, more or less under French protection. That such a scheme would be utterly detestable to the inhabitants of the area made no difference to the patriots of France. Indeed, anticipating just such a favorable opportunity, France and Russia in 1917 had signed an agreement providing for precisely this type of buffer state. The arrangement, however, had never met with the approval of England, and at the conference both the British and American delegations strenuously opposed the creation of "another Alsace-Lorraine."

After prolonged bargaining, Clemenceau agreed to a compromise. The area in question was to be occupied by Allied troops for a stated period of years after the signing of the treaty. The northern sector, including the bridgehead at Cologne, was to be occupied for five years; the central zone, with the bridgehead at Coblenz, for ten years; and the southern sector, including the bridgehead at Mainz, for fifteen years. All the time limits, however, were contingent upon Germany's prompt fulfillment of the other parts of the treaty; otherwise the occupation might continue indefinitely. In addition, a zone extending fifty kilometers (a little over thirty-one miles) east of the Rhine was to be "demilitarized." In other words, no fortifications might be built and no armed forces assembled in the district. *Die Wacht am Rhein* was to be terminated.

Still further to reassure the French, Wilson and Lloyd George promised to sign special treaties which should guarantee that the United States and England, respectively, would come to the aid of France if ever she were "invaded" by Germany. Upon Clemenceau's insistence, the word "invaded" was changed to "attacked," and the "Tiger" at last was satisfied. On June 28, 1919, therefore, when the Versailles Treaty was signed, two supplementary treaties, one Franco-English and the other Franco-American, were signed, which guaranteed the eastern boundary of France against German aggression — and this despite Wilson's statement, in a speech of September 27, 1918, that "there can be no leagues, or alliances, or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations." ¹

¹ For the ultimate fate of these two treaties, see p. 187.

Meanwhile another problem, closely related to that of French security, had arisen; namely, the disposition of the Saar Basin. This Rhenish territory, lying directly east of Lorraine and belonging partly to Prussia and partly to Bavaria, is one of the world's greatest coal-producing sections. With an area of 723 square miles and a population of 713,000 (1922), it is an exceedingly valuable stretch of territory. In 1913 its coal output was over 17,000,000 tons — equal to 40% of the entire French production. In that same year it also produced over 2,000,000 tons of steel, as well as large quantities of glass and pottery. The estimated coal reserves of the Saar Basin are 17,000,000,000 tons — more than those in all France and equal to more than a fifth of Germany's pre-war reserves. Now, since the Germans had damaged many of the coal mines in northern France, it was felt by the Allies that due compensation in kind should be paid to the victims. Clemenceau demanded the cession of the Basin.

From the view-points of history and ethnology, the claims of the French to the region were almost nil. The extreme western portion of the Saar had belonged to France for a time under Louis XIV, and most of the rest was conquered by the French during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. After Napoleon's downfall it was all assigned to Prussia and Bavaria. Nearly all the inhabitants are German in stock and sympathy. From the point of view of reparation, France had better claims, particularly since Saar coal was absolutely essential to the proper development of the Lorraine iron fields. The two regions had formed a solid economic unit before the war.

The problem facing the conference, therefore, was how to give France the coal without giving her the land or the people. A committee of British, French, and American experts was delegated to solve the riddle. The arrangement proposed by this group carried out the intentions of the Peace Conference as nearly as seemed humanly possible and was accepted as a solution for the problem. France was given full ownership of all the coal mines and mining accessories, to do with as she saw fit. The entire district was included in the French customs boundary and French money was to circulate there freely. France was given permission to set up schools for the children of the miners and prescribe instruction in French. The value of the

coal taken out of the Basin was to be credited to Germany's reparation account.

While certain important rights were reserved to France, the territory was to be governed by a commission of the League of Nations, with wide administrative, legislative, and judicial powers. The natives were to lose their representation in the Reichstag and in the Prussian and Bavarian legislatures. At the end of fifteen years the inhabitants should vote "by communes or districts" as to "the sovereignty under which they desire to be placed." This "sovereignty" might be an autonomous state under League control, or it might be France, or Germany. All men and women over twenty, who lived in the Basin at the time of the signing of the treaty, were declared eligible to participate in the plebiscite. After the balloting the League of Nations should decide definitely on the sovereignty, "taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants as expressed by voting." If the Saar went back to Germany, the latter should repurchase control of the mines from France at a price determined by three experts, a Frenchman, a German, and an appointee of the League. Unless otherwise agreed upon before then by France and Germany, the price should be paid in gold, within one year.

The single item that took up more of the time of the Council of Four and of numerous lesser bodies than any other, was that arising from the conflict of the Italian demands with those of the newly formed Serb-Croat-Slovene state. In addition to insisting on the fulfillment of the terms of the Treaty of London — under which she had been promised territory extending from the Brenner Pass in the Tyrol to the port of Avlona in Albania, plus the Dodecanese Islands and some land in Africa and Asia — Italy now also demanded the port of Fiume and part of the Dalmatian coast, both of which had belonged to Austria-Hungary. That the Tyrol contained 250,000 Germans; that the Italian acquisitions in the northeast, including Gorizia, Gradisca, and Istria, contained some 300,000 Southslavs; and that the Dodecanese Islands were almost wholly Greek in population, did not deter Italy from seeking, in addition, to annex Dalmatian territory in which the Slavs several times outnumbered the Italian residents.

Italy wanted Fiume not only for commercial reasons, but also to prevent the appearance of a new, strong rival in the Adriatic. One of the reasons for the pre-war enmity between Italy and Austria had been the struggle for the control of the Adriatic, and now that the Austrian peril was removed, Italy did not propose to allow another rival to come upon the stage. Rome knew that without Fiume Yugoslavia could not readily achieve maritime greatness.

Orlando and Sonnino advanced a number of claims to the extra slice of territory which they desired. They reminded their colleagues that when the Treaty of London was signed, another agreement was made which promised Fiume to Serbia in return for the latter's consent that some Serbian territory be offered to Bulgaria if she join the Entente side. Now that this exchange was no longer necessary — Bulgaria having chosen the wrong friends — Italy thought Fiume should fall to her. The Italian delegates also protested, according to Henry White, that Italy had actually "saved" the Allies five times during the war, and that Russia's defection had made the conflict last longer than Italy had expected, thus entailing greater sacrifices than she had bargained for. Lastly, strategic and geographic reasons were advanced to establish Italy's claim to Fiume, it being demonstrated that the port was directly *connected* with Italy by sea, but *separated* from Yugoslavia by mountains!

The Slavic delegates were not backward in presenting their view of the case. They showed that of all their country's railways, the only good ones led to Fiume. They cited the principle of national self-determination and quoted figures to show that the Slavs far outnumbered the Italians in Dalmatia, while in Fiume itself, if the suburb of Sušak were included, the two nationalities were at least equally represented. The fact that the Italians opposed a plebiscite in the region added to the plausibility of this claim. Finally, it could not be gainsaid that the new kingdom needed and was entitled to a seaport; and the only available good port was Fiume. The Serbs could see no reason, therefore, why Italy should further add to the already large Slavic minority under her jurisdiction.

After the Council of Four had listened to all arguments, a line was drawn, giving Italy somewhat less than the Treaty of

London had promised. Orlando and Sonnino, knowing that its acceptance would result in the overthrow of their government, unhesitatingly rejected this "Wilson" or "American Line." When Wilson thereupon appealed to the Italian people over the heads of the two delegates, the latter angrily quitted Paris. Though they returned after some days, cheered by the support of their constituents, their ministry fell on June 19. Singnori Nitti and Tittoni, who replaced Orlando and Sonnino, were equally unsuccessful in achieving a satisfactory settlement," and so the Fiume-Adriatic controversy raged on after the conference adjourned. It finally was settled by direct negotiations between Italy and Jugoslavia.¹

The Polish question, though perplexing enough, was never quite so disconcerting as that of Fiume. Since the Allies had promised to restore a united and independent Poland, with access to the sea, it merely remained for the committee in charge to delimit the proper boundaries. Few people took seriously the exaggerated demands advanced by the Polish delegates, but a snag was struck when it was discovered that in order to give Poland her outlet to the sea, East Prussia might have to be severed from Germany. A corridor, including the city of Danzig with its purely German population of 300,000, would have to be created and given to Poland. This would be a clear violation of the principle of self-determination, but it was considered preferable to sacrifice German nationality rather than Polish commercial potentialities. Accordingly, there was assigned to Poland a large section of West Prussia, in which Germans and Poles were well intermingled because the German governments had fostered colonization in this originally Polish territory.

This arrangement, incidentally, fitted in well with the two-fold scheme of France to weaken Germany and to create a strong eastern ally to take the place which Russia had occupied in the pre-war system of alliances. In the words of M. Pichon, France wanted a Poland "*grande et forte, tres-forte*" Owing chiefly to the opposition of Lloyd George, who had no interest in a strong Poland and who feared a German-Polish war, the Marienwerder district east of the Vistula River was not to be given to Poland without a plebiscite. Danzig, moreover, was made a Free City,

¹ See p. 310.

economically subservient to Poland but administered by the League of Nations.

The allocation of Germany's former colonies and of the erstwhile possessions of the crumbling Ottoman Empire was another troublesome issue. Some of the Allied statesmen favored outright partition and annexation, but others objected to this solution as being too obviously imperialistic and contrary to the expressed Allied war aims. Yet, since restoring the possessions to their former owners would be unwise from a business viewpoint, as well as (supposedly) unjust to millions of mistreated natives, some other formula had to be evolved.¹ A way out of the dilemma was suggested in a pamphlet entitled *The League of Nations*, published in December, 1918, by General Smuts.

In this brochure Smuts discussed a scheme which had been mentioned by several persons at the conference and which has since come to be known as the mandate system. The plan was to dispose of the territories that were to be taken from Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, by assigning them to the League. The latter was then to "delegate its authority" to some other state which it might appoint "as its agent and mandatory," subject to certain supervisory restrictions. Wilson took this design and applied it to all the non-Turkish regions of the Ottoman Empire and to all the German possessions except Kiao-chau.

Some 1,244,000 square miles of land with a population of about 18,000,000 and an annual trade of \$166,000,000, were given to the League of Nations which, in turn, was to allot them to various mandatory powers. The latter were to act as stewards for the League in the protection of these relatively backward peoples who as yet were unable to stand alone in the cruel and complex world. [The actual mandatory distributions

¹ Much was said of the manner in which Germany had maltreated natives and of the impossibility of allowing her to continue doing so. This sentiment was bolstered by a *Report on the Natives of South West Africa and Their Treatment by Germany*, which, circulated as a *Blue Book* of the Union of South Africa, served to convince hesitant Allied imperialists that Germany's colonies must not be restored to her. In 1926, however, the Assembly of South West Africa unanimously adopted resolutions to request the governments of England and of the Union of South Africa to expunge the *Blue Book* from their official records, and to impound and destroy all copies that could be found in public libraries and official booksellers' stocks, on the ground that the document was "brought out in wartime" and therefore "had the significance of a war instrument."

were suspiciously in accord with the imperialistic aims and schemes that had been delineated in the Secret Treaties. All League members were promised equal commercial and trading opportunities in the mandates, and the mandatories were required to report annually to a League of Nations Mandates Commission.¹

The disposition of the Kiao-chau leasehold caused great difficulties because China, one of the Allies, demanded its return to her, while Japan, another Ally, refused to give it up. Wilson favored the Chinese claims, but when Japan threatened to remain outside the League unless her occupation were recognized, Wilson wavered. Lloyd George and Clemenceau also explained to Wilson that in order to secure the assistance of the Japanese fleet against the German submarines in 1917 they had promised to permit Japan to keep Kiao-chau. Eventually, therefore, it was agreed to give Germany's former rights in the Shantung Peninsula to Japan. At the same time, however, Tokyo promised to restore the area to China, retaining only certain important economic privileges. The Chinese delegation opposed this decision and refused to sign the Versailles Treaty. Hence China did not become a member of the League until she signed the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria. It was some time before Japan kept her promise to give Kiao-chau back to China.

One of the last items to be settled, though it had been among the first to be mentioned, was that of reparation. On the presumption that Germany was principally responsible for the war, the Allied pre-armistice note of November 5, 1918, had stipulated that the Germans would be expected to pay for "all damage done To the civilian population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germany, by land, by sea, and from the air." Now, when the commission on reparation of the conference met, the British and French delegates insisted that Germany be held liable for all the costs of the war and for pensions as well as for actual damages. The Americans denied the justice of this plea, in view of the pre-armistice negotiations, and appeal was made to the Council of Four. Here Wilson was able to secure an agreement that, except in the case of Belgium, the war costs were not to be added to the damages. In conse-

¹ For the disposition of the mandates, see p. 158,

quence of an able memorandum on the subject by General Smuts, however, pensions were reckoned as damages rather than as war costs. Ten categories of " Damages " were listed and it remained only to set the figure that Germany would be required to pay.

The American members of the commission, Thomas P. Lamont, Bernard Baruch, Norman Davis, and Vance McCormick, wanted to set a fixed sum, with definite time and methods of payment. They believed that the factor of certainty would be helpful to both sides, since the one would know on how much aid it could rely for rebuilding purposes and the other could make definite plans for paying off its obligations. The remaining commissioners, however, refused to give any definite statements of their damage estimates. They thought that any sum, no matter how large, would be unsatisfactory to their constituencies at home and would result in the overthrow of the existing ministries. Furthermore, they wanted Germany to pay to the limit of her capacity and they were afraid of setting too low a sum. It soon became evident, moreover, that even those who favored fixing a sum could not agree on a satisfactory figure, the demands varying from fifteen to two hundred billion dollars.

The best quick solution, therefore, was to shelve the matter for future settlement, making only a temporary arrangement for immediate payments on account. Accordingly it was stated that Germany should pay by May, 1921, in gold or its equiva- lent, a total of twenty billion marks (almost five billion dollars). A special Reparation Commission, meanwhile, was to set a fixed total and regulate the future payments.

Now, with the chief stumbling blocks removed, the treaty was at last given definite form and the Germans were ordered to call for the document.

SIGNING THE TREATY

Some three weeks before the presentation of the peace terms to the Germans, Henry White had written to Senator Lodge: "Marshal Foch has stated distinctly in the presence of General Bliss that nothing would give him more satisfaction than the refusal of the Germans to sign the treaty, as in that case he would be able to enter Germany at the head of an Allied army, to overrun the country completely, to take possession of the finan-

cial centres, and to squeeze out every bit of money available throughout the land." This hostile attitude was clearly reflected in the manner in which the treaty was handed to the representatives of the defeated power.

Upon receipt of the order to send delegates to get the terms, Germany, with a show of spirit, despatched some secretaries who were to act as messengers and bring the document to Berlin for consideration by the authorities. The Allies chose to interpret this as an insult and warned Germany to send a full-fledged diplomatic delegation at once. The warning was heeded, and on April 29 a German delegation of six, led by Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, former Imperial German Ambassador to Denmark and now Foreign Minister of the Republic, arrived in Versailles. The movements of the delegates were carefully restricted: they were guarded by Allied officers, were kept in their hotel behind barbed wire, and were forbidden to communicate with any of the Allied deputies.

On May 7, the fourth anniversary of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the peace terms were formally presented by Clemenceau in the small Trianon Palace near Versailles. As each Allied and American delegation arrived, it was saluted by a guard of honor. This guard was withdrawn when the Germans were called. Then Clemenceau, addressing the representatives of the German Republic as "*Messieurs les diliguis de l' Empire allemand*"(!), said: "You have before you the accredited plenipotentiaries of all the small and great powers united to fight together in the war that has been so cruelly imposed upon them. The time has come when we must settle our accounts. You have asked for peace. We are ready to give you peace."

Brockdorff-Rantzau, possibly because of excessive emotion and oncoming illness, rather tactlessly replied to Clemenceau without rising. He admitted that his countrymen "were under no illusion as to the extent of their defeat and the degree of their helplessness," but he denied that Germany was solely responsible for the war and announced that Germany, though friendless, still had right and justice on her side. This attitude merely served to strengthen the position of the "I-told-you-so" group among the Allies and was generally regarded as additional proof of Germany's inability to understand any language other than force.

Clemenceau notified the German delegation that three weeks would be allowed in which to consider the terms, that no oral discussion would be permitted, and that all complaints would have to be submitted in writing. Under this injunction an average of one German note a day reached the Allies, and whatever discussion there was took place in the columns of the newspaper press. As was to be expected, the announcement of the terms in Germany resulted in a furious outburst. Communists and reactionaries, alike, denounced Allied "treachery" and "deceit." Popular sentiment was well expressed by Chancellor Scheidemann (Social Democrat) when he said: "What hand would not wither that sought to lay itself and us in those chains?"¹ After a brief extension of the time limit, the German delegation, on May 29, submitted a detailed memorandum to the Allies. It contained an elaborate commentary on the treaty, denied that Germany alone was responsible for the contest, and emphasized the impossibility of fulfilling all the terms. The treaty itself covered 230 large printed pages. But the German reply occupied 443 pages!

Ten committees were set to work on the German memorandum, and on June 16 the results of their deliberations were incorporated into an Allied reply. Only a few modifications were made, and these chiefly owing to Lloyd George, whose intransigence was lessening. The main alteration concerned the withholding of Upper Silesia from Poland until a plebiscite should have indicated the wishes of the inhabitants. The Germans were given five days, and then two more, in which to accept the revised treaty. Failure to do so, they were told, would mean invasion.

Although a considerable number of Germans appeared ready to renew the struggle rather than sign the document, Hindenburg, on June 20, announced that further resistance on the western front, at least, was impossible. That same day the Scheidemann Government, including Brockdorff -Rantzaut resigned. There was no time for sentiment, however, and on June 21,

¹ Special criticism was levied at the section of the treaty which demanded that starving Germany hand over to France and Belgium 140,000 milch cows and 120,000 sheep within three months after the signing of the document. This demand, in Part VIII, Annex IV, of the treaty, was not published in the official summary of the terms as released to the Allied press.

Gustav Bauer, another Social Democrat, became chancellor. The following day, a Sunday, the German Assembly at Weimar voted a conditional acceptance, objecting only to the articles saddling Germany with sole war guilt and violation of the code of war, and demanding the surrender, for trial before Allied courts, of the "culprits" William von Hohenzollern and Paul von Hindenburg.

The Allies now repeated their demand for unconditional acceptance and refused any further extension of the time limit: seven o'clock in the evening of Monday, June 23, would bring either acquiescence or invasion. At a little after five, therefore, von Hamiel, the new German representative, announced Germany's acceptance. His country, he said, was yielding to "overwhelming force, but without on that account abandoning her views in regard to the unheard-of injustice of the conditions of peace."

It still remained for Germany to find someone willing to go to Versailles to sign the treaty. Eventually, Foreign Minister, Hermann Miiller and Colonial Minister Johannes Bell agreed to act as emissaries:—Once again the German delegates, having arrived in Paris, were restricted in their actions and guarded like prisoners. It was decided to have the final ceremony in the Hall of Mirrors, where almost fifty years before the king of Prussia had become emperor of Germany. As the Germans left Paris for Versailles, French mobs bombarded them with a hail of stones and vocal abuse.

At three o'clock in the afternoon of June 28, the fifth anniversary of the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the Germans were admitted to the Hall of Mirrors. "Miiller was pale and nervous. Bell held himself erect and calm." They signed first, and the Allied delegates followed in the alphabetical order of their countries' names in French. The United States was listed as *Amirique du Nord*, and so Wilson's signature came first.¹

On June 29, the day after the signing of the treaty, Colonel House left Paris for London to hasten the practical development of the League of Nations. On that day he wrote in his diary: "I should have preferred a different peace."

¹ Ratifications between the Allies and Germany were finally exchanged in Paris on January 10, 1920. Four other treaties also were drawn up by the Peace Conference, with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Collectively the five treaties are known as the Peace of Paris.

CHAPTER V

FIVE FAMOUS TREATIES

VERSAILLES

The purpose of the Treaty of Versailles, according to its preamble, was to replace the state of war "by a firm, just and durable peace." The document comprised fifteen parts, including 440 articles and almost a score of annexes.¹ 1

Alsace and Lorraine were returned to France. Belgium, after a "plebiscite" conducted by the Belgian authorities, received the strategically important regions of Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnet, with a combined population of 70,000. As the result of another plebiscite, Denmark received northern Schleswig, taken from her by Prussia and Austria in 1864, while southern Schleswig voted to remain with Germany. Czechoslovakia was awarded a small section of Upper Silesia. To independent Poland, Germany ceded most of Posen and West Prussia — a stretch of territory 260 miles long and averaging 80 miles in width, with a population less than two-thirds Polish. After plebiscites favoring the Germans, the East Prussian districts of Marienwerder and Allenstein were permitted to remain with Prussia.

In industrial Upper Silesia a plebiscite was ordered to be held under the supervision of an Allied commission and a Franco-Italian military force. The ballot returns showed over 700,000 votes for Germany and less than 480,000 for Poland; of the communes, 754 voted for adherence to Germany, while 699 preferred incorporation in Poland. The Poles thereupon claimed all the areas with Polish majorities, while Germany maintained that the entire region was an indivisible economic unit and belonged of right to her. Strife ensued, particularly when

¹ Part I, containing the 26 articles of the Covenant of the League, is considered in the next chapter.

France and England disagreed over a solution, and the matter was referred to the League Council. The latter accepted the recommendations of a special committee, partitioning Silesia so as to leave Germany more than half of the people and land area, but giving Poland most of the economic resources. Thus, Poland acquired 53 of the 67 coal mines, 9 of the 14 steel- and rolling-mills, all the zinc and lead foundries, about three-fourths of the coal-production area, and 11 of the 16 zinc and lead mines.

Danzig, with a population almost wholly German, was made a Free City under League control, but Poland was accorded special diplomatic and economic rights therein. The Memel district was ceded to the Allies. In 1923 it was awarded to Lithuania.

Germany renounced "in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions" these being later apportioned among Great Britain, France, Belgium, Japan, the Union of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand as mandates of the League. The German control of Kiao-chau was renounced in favor of Japan. All Germany's special rights and privileges in China, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, and Egypt were also given up. The Allied and Associated Powers reserved "the right to retain and liquidate all property, rights and interest" belonging to private German nationals or companies within territories controlled by these powers, including territories newly ceded to them. Compensation to the owners was to be made by the German Government.¹ All Germany's property and concessions in the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, and her special interests in Austria and Hungary, were forfeited.

Germany agreed to the abrogation of the treaty of 1839 which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, and recognized the severance of Luxemburg from the German Customs Union. Luxemburg's "regime of neutrality" also was terminated and Germany's right to exploit the railways of the Grand Duchy cut short. Germany was forbidden to "maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east

¹ Some of this property, notably in the United States, was later returned to the German owners.

of the Rhine." Armed forces could not be assembled, nor manoeuvres held, in this area, and existing fortifications were to be dismantled.

"As compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of France and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war," Germany ceded to France the coal mines in the Saar Basin "in full and absolute possession, with exclusive rights of exploitation." The government of the Basin was to be entrusted for fifteen years to a "commission representing the League of Nations." Then, as has been indicated, a plebiscite was to be taken. The fortifications and harbors of the islands of Heligoland and Dune were to be destroyed. Germany consented to recognize any treaty arrangements that might be entered into between the Allies and the territories formerly comprising the Russian Empire as of August 1, 1914, and she acknowledged and promised to respect the independence of Austria.

Part V of the treaty contained the military, naval, and aviation clauses. The German General Staff was abolished. The army was limited to 100,000 men, including a maximum of 4000 officers. These forces were to be "devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory and to the control of the frontiers." Lest Germany resort to subterfuge, it was ordained that the number of officials, such as customs officers, forest guards, and coast guards, must not exceed the number employed in 1913. The strength of the gendarmerie and local police forces could be increased only in proportion to the population increase since 1913.

The manufacture of armaments, munitions, and war materials was strictly limited, and such materials could be stored only "at points to be notified to the Governments" of the Allies. No war materials were to be imported or exported, and poison gases, armored cars, and tanks were neither to be made nor purchased. Compulsory military service was abolished and only voluntary enlistments of twelve consecutive years for privates and non-commissioned men, and of twenty-five consecutive years for officers, were permitted. It was forbidden to discharge more than five per cent of the total effectives in men or officers in any one year. Finally, "educational establishments, the

universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs and, generally speaking, associations of every description, whatever be the age of their members, must not occupy themselves with any military matters."

The naval provisions were equally drastic. Germany was permitted to retain only six battleships, six light cruisers, six destroyers, and twelve torpedo boats. No submarines were allowed her and no new warships might be built except for purposes of replacement. The naval personnel was limited to 15,000 men, including a maximum of 1500 officers and warrant officers. The periods of enlistment were similar to those stipulated for the army. No one in the merchant marine was to receive naval training. All the war vessels above the stated quota were either to be dismantled and converted into merchant ships or turned over to the Allies.¹ Germany was forbidden to have any military or naval air forces, and all aeronautical war material had to be surrendered.

The Allies reserved the right to, and later did, appoint commissions of control to supervise the execution of the disarmament clauses. The commissions, whose expenses Germany was required to bear, were given extensive powers of investigation. By 1927, however, they had all been abolished. Although the military, naval, and aerial restrictions were designed, in general, to last as long as the treaty itself, many of the clauses already have undergone modification in practice. Most of the changes have been made with the assent of the Conference of Ambassadors.² The treaty implied, moreover, that the restrictions upon Germany's fighting establishments were not merely calculated to render it impossible for her to resume "military aggression," but were the first steps toward a general reduction of armaments throughout the world. This condition was declared to be one of the first duties of the League to promote.

"William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor,"

¹ On June 21, 1919, the crews of the surrendered German ships, which were ordered to Scapa Flow in the Orkneys, opened the sea cocks on, and sent to the bottom, fifty-three vessels. Although this last attempt to rescue German naval honor forestalled an impending quarrel over a division of the spoils among the Allies, it made the British furious. Germany therefore was ordered to build some additional merchantmen for the Allies.

² See p. 127 n.

was publicly arraigned in the treaty "for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." A special Allied tribunal was to be appointed to try him, "thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defense." However, the Allies were spared much embarrassment when the Netherlands refused to extradite William. Germany was also required to surrender for trial before Allied courts any designated "persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war." Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg was one of the "persons" thus accused of "atrocities." Eventually the Allies permitted the trials to be held in Leipzig, where the court procedure naturally was perfunctory. Only about a dozen of the less important "War Criminals" were tried, and they received light sentences.

The legal justification for demanding reparation from Germany was put into the so-called "guilt clause" of the treaty, Article 231:

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

In Article 232 it was recognized that the resources of Germany were not adequate "to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage," and Germany was required only "to make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property . . . by land, by sea, and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in Annex I. . . ."

This annex listed ten loss-and-damage categories, including military pensions and the allowances paid by the Allied governments to the families of persons mobilized or serving at the fronts. In addition, Germany was to reimburse Belgium with interest at five per cent for all the money the latter borrowed from the Allied governments during the war years.

A Reparation Commission was to be appointed by the Allies to determine the total amount of reparation and to "draw up a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligation within a period of thirty years from May 1, 1921." Meanwhile, up to May 1,

1921, Germany was to pay, in gold, ships, securities, or commodities, the equivalent of five billion dollars. Out of this advance sum the cost of the army of occupation was first to be met, and the balance applied to reparation.

Since full reparation obviously could not be paid in cash, it was stipulated that Germany might pay part in the form of specified commodities. The right of the Allies was recognized "to the replacement, ton for ton and class for class, of all merchant marine ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war." Germany therefore was made to surrender all her merchant vessels of 1600 or more tons gross; one-half the ships, by tonnage, of 1000 to 1600 tons gross; and one-fourth, by tonnage, of all her steam trawlers and fishing boats. If the Reparation Commission so demanded, Germany was also to build ships for the Allies up to a maximum of 200,000 tons a year for five years.

The economic resources of Germany, furthermore, were to be devoted "directly to the physical restoration of the invaded areas." The Allies consequently were permitted to file with the Reparation Commission lists showing:

(a) Animals, machinery, equipment, tools and like articles of a commercial character, which have been seized, consumed or destroyed by Germany or destroyed in direct consequence of military operations, and which such Governments, for the purpose of meeting immediate and urgent needs, desire to have replaced by animals and articles of the same nature which are in being in German territory at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

(b) Reconstruction materials (stones, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, wood, window-glass, steel, lime, cement, etc.), machinery, heating apparatus, furniture and like articles of a commercial character which the said Governments desire to have produced and manufactured in Germany and delivered to them to permit of the restoration of the invaded areas.¹

¹ As an immediate advance on account of animals to be delivered, Germany was required to surrender within three months: "(1) To the French Government: 500 stallions (3 to 7 years); 30,000 fillies and mares (18 months to 7 years); type: Ardennais, Boulonnais or Belgian; 2000 bulls (18 months to 3 years); 90,000 milch cows (2 to 6 years); 1000 rams; 100,000 sheep; 10,000 goats. (2) To the Belgian Government: 200 stallions (3 to 7 years), large Belgian type; 5000 mares (3 to 7 years), large Belgian type; 5000 fillies (18 months to 3 years), large Belgian type; 2000 bulls (18 months to 3 years); 50,000 milch cows (2 to 6 years); 40,000 heifers; 200 rams; 20,000 sheep; 15,000 sows. The animals delivered shall be of average health and condition. To the extent that animals so delivered cannot be identified as animals taken or seized, the value of such animals shall be credited against the reparation obligations of Germany."

Germany next agreed to make annual coal deliveries for ten years as follows: 7,000,000 tons to France, 8,000,000 to Belgium, an average of 7,700,000 to Italy, and, "if directed by the Reparation Commission/" a smaller amount to Luxemburg. In addition, France was to receive "annually for a period not exceeding ten years an amount of coal equal to the difference between the annual production before the war of the coal mines of the Nord and Pas de Calais, destroyed as a result of the war, and the production of the mines of the same areas during the years in question: such delivery not to exceed 20,000,000 tons in any one year of the first five years, and 8,000,000 tons in any one year of the succeeding five years." Likewise, for each of the three years following the coming into force of the treaty, France was to receive 35,000 tons of benzol, 50,000 of coal tar, and 30,000 of ammonium sulphate. The Reparation Commission was given an option on the delivery of dyestuffs and chemicals up to fifty per cent "of the total stock of each and every kind of dyestuff and chemical drug in Germany or! under German control."

Some special provisions of the treaty required Germany to return the trophies, flags, and works of art taken from France in the war of 1870; to give to the University of Louvain documents and manuscripts equivalent in "number and value" to those destroyed during the war; to "restore to His Majesty the King of the Hedjaz the original Koran of the Caliph Othman, which was removed from Medina by the Turkish authorities and is stated to have been presented to the ex-Emperor William I I " ; and to "hand over to His Britannic Majesty's Government the skull of the Sultan Mkwawa, which was removed from the Protectorate of German East Africa and taken to Germany." ¹

The Reparation Commission was empowered to recommend action in case of default on any item by Germany, and it was stipulated that "the measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts

¹ It is interesting to note that this skull was to be handed over to the British Government, not returned to East Africa. Up to 1932 the skull had not yet been surrendered, the German Government pleading ignorance of its exact whereabouts. The people of Berlin prevented the return to France of the flags captured in battle in 1870-1871 by burning them on the avenue *Unter den Linden*,

of war, may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals and in general such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances."

The remainder of the treaty disposed of such technical questions as international financial matters disturbed by the war, commercial relations, treaties, debts, property rights, contracts and judgments, industrial property, aerial navigation, the Kiel Canal, ports, waterways, and railways. By Article 264, the products of Allied manufacture were accorded most-favored-nation treatment in Germany. The Elbe, Oder, Niemen, and Danube rivers were "declared international." Together with the Rhine they were placed under the control of international commissions in order that free access to the sea might be provided for the landlocked states of central Europe.

In the ports of Hamburg and Stettin, Germany was made to lease free zones to Czechoslovakia for ninety-nine years. Allied goods were to receive "the most favorable treatment" that was extended to internal traffic on German railways. The Kiel Canal and its approaches were made "free and open" on equal terms to the merchant and war vessels of all countries at peace with Germany. An International Labor Organization was created to help bring about an era of "social justice" as the basis of a universal peace,¹ and, finally, Germany recognized in advance any treaties or dispositions that might be made between the Allies and Germany's former friends.

The guarantees for the execution of the treaty were written into Part XIV: "The German territory situated to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present Treaty." Depending on the faithfulness with which Germany carried out the terms of the treaty, the occupation was to be successively restricted, so that the bridgehead at Cologne might be evacuated after five years, that at Coblenz after ten years, and that at Mainz after fifteen. On the other hand, the occupation might be prolonged indefinitely, or any evacuated part reoccupied, if Germany misbehaved.

¹ See p. 144. The tariff restrictions on Germany lapsed in 1925.

Actually, the last of the 75,000 occupying troops were withdrawn in 1930, after the adoption of the Young Plan for reparation. The American and English troops in the occupied zone got along fairly well with the German inhabitants. The French, however, aroused considerable hatred, for they spread propaganda calculated to alienate the people from Germany; used colored troops in the zone and ordered the German Government to maintain brothels with German girls for the use of these troops; and imposed disproportionately severe penalties for slight offenses committed by the natives.

[The Versailles Treaty, in summary, reduced the European area of Germany by one-eighth and her population by 6,500,000. It deprived her of all colonies and of virtually all investments and holdings abroad. (In 1913 these foreign holdings had totalled over \$6,000,000,000 and had been equal to nearly 10% of the country's wealth.) She lost 15.5% of her arable land, 12% of her livestock, and almost one-tenth of her manufacturing establishments. Her merchant marine was reduced from 5,700,000 tons to less than 500,000 tons. Her navy, formerly second only to England's, was virtually wiped out, and her army reduced to one-seventh of the size of that of France — though for these two items the German taxpayers might well be thankful. By her European cessions Germany lost potash, iron, coal, zinc, lead, and food. She surrendered about two-fifths of her coal reserves, nearly two-thirds of her iron ore, about seven-tenths of her zinc, and more than half of her lead. The loss of the colonies entailed the loss of large rubber, oil, and fibre supplies. Moreover, the new territorial alignments "broke down the pre-war organization of industry and commerce, so that for a long time even the industrial plant which Germany retained was incapable of working at its former level of efficiency." Finally, she signed a blank reparation check.

Small wonder that the treaty came to be known as a "Carthaginian Peace."]

SAINT GERMAIN-EN-LAYE

The Council of Four at Paris did not confine its treaty-making activities to the German situation. Before Wilson and Lloyd George left Paris, late in June, 1919, the "Big Four" had sketched

a preliminary draft treaty with Austria, had decided on the boundaries of Hungary, and had considered the cases of Bulgaria and Turkey. But the final form of the treaties with Germany's allies was the work largely of a special Council of Five. This new Supreme Council consisted of Chairman Clemenceau and one representative each from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. It functioned until January 21, 1920, when, upon Clemenceau's resignation, it ceased to exist.¹ All the minor treaties bore considerable resemblance to that of Versailles.

The Austrian peace delegation was presented with a draft peace treaty on June 2, 1919. Any protests were to be submitted in writing. An interesting controversy developed when the Austrians insisted that the Republic of German Austria, which came into being on November 12, 1918, and with which the Allies were now dealing, was a new-born state which had never been at war with the Allies — at least no more so than Czechoslovakia or Poland or any other of the states which were created, in whole or in part, out of that conglomeration of nationalities which was the former Austria-Hungary. Hence, it was argued, German Austria could not be held responsible for the actions of the old Dual Monarchy. The Allies impatiently shelved this inconvenient legal nicety and wrote into the preamble of the final treaty (signed September 10, 1919) that "the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has now ceased to exist, and has been replaced in Austria by a republican government." In Article 177, moreover, "Austria" was made to accept responsibility for causing loss and damage to the Allies "as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Austria-Hungary and her allies."

Despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that the new governments of both Germany and Austria favored an *Anschluss* or union of the racially and linguistically related neighbors, Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain forbade the union of Germany and Austria, and imposed upon the latter the obligation to "abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence." The

¹ The execution of the treaties thereafter was left to the Council or Conference of Ambassadors made up of the ambassadors to Paris from the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, and of a French representative.

Austrians were compelled, in fact, to change the name of their state from "German Austria" to "Republic of Austria." The purpose of the Allies was to prevent the strengthening of Germany by the addition of several million Austrians and to protect Czechoslovakia against a German encirclement.¹

It was no easy task to decide on the territorial redistribution of the former Habsburg domains. Not only did Austria and Hungary have to be dealt with, but all the jealous heirs of the old monarchy: Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Poland, Italy, and Rumania, had to be at least partly satisfied. There were no clear-cut ethnic, national, or even economic border lines, and a dozen new and old national groups clamored for adequate recognition. It was, indeed, easier to take the land away from Austria and Hungary than to divide it among the "victors." Weary hours were spent in deciding the fate of particular railway terminals, canals, and strategic salients, and in the end, no one was entirely happy.

To Italy, Austria ceded the South Tyrol, the Trentino, Trieste, Istria, and some islands off Dalmatia. The South Tyrol, though inhabited by 250,000 Germans, was demanded by Italy on the strength of the Secret Treaties and on the ground that, since the Alps were "her natural defenses," she needed the strategic Brenner Pass for military and protective reasons. The section of Czechoslovakia made up from former Austrian territory included Bohemia, Moravia, part of Lower Austria, and nearly all Austrian Silesia, these areas containing about 3,000,000 Germans. Poland received Austrian Galicia. The highly industrialized Teschen district, claimed by both Poland and Czechoslovakia, eventually was divided between the two by the Council of Ambassadors. Rumania was awarded Bukowina. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Dalmatian coast and islands went to Yugoslavia. Altogether the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy was reduced in area and population by three-fourths.

The remainder of the 381 articles which comprised the Treaty of St. Germain were, in general, replicas or adaptations of the Versailles clauses. The articles of the League Covenant and the International Labor Organization were copied from the German treaty. Austria agreed to all terms arrived at between the

¹ See also p. 427.

Allies and her former friends; gave up all her rights, privileges, and concessions in non-European areas; assented to a blank reparation check; accepted special regulations governing navigation on the Danube and concerning the transfer of railway lines and stocks; acknowledged the right of the Allies to try designated Austrian "War Criminals"; and granted to Czechoslovakia the right to send her own trains over specified Austrian routes toward the Adriatic. Austria herself was guaranteed free access to the Adriatic via the territories formerly comprising the Austrian Empire. The pre-war debt of the Dual Monarchy was to be divided proportionally among all the former Habsburg domains. Austria surrendered her entire naval force, retaining only three police boats on the Danube. Her army was limited to 30,000 volunteers, with restrictions on enlistment and discharge similar to those placed on the German forces.

NEUILLY

Bulgaria, forestalling punishment, sent a long memorandum to the Paris Conference some time before her peace terms had been decided upon. In the document it was explained (1) that Bulgaria's entry into the war was the fault largely of ex-King Ferdinand, who had abdicated on October 4, 1918; (2) that the kingdom in consequence was not to be regarded as deserving of penalty; and (3) that, for ethnological and historical reasons, Bulgaria had a right to considerable extensions of territory, especially in Macedonia and the Dobrudja. The Allies curtly refused to accept these views and reminded Bulgaria that, after all, she was a defeated power. Bulgaria had no choice other than to sign the Treaty of Neuilly (November 27, 1919).

For strategic, military, and railway reasons, the treaty assigned to Yugoslavia four small regions in western Bulgaria. One of the ceded areas was the Strumitsa salient, which had proved highly annoying to the Allies during the war, and all four cessions contained large Bulgarian majorities. Greece was awarded Western Thrace and a slight improvement in the Greco-Bulgarian boundary, with the consequent loss to Bulgaria of her Aegean coastline. The Allies, however, promised "to ensure the economic outlets of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea."

Bulgaria's army was limited to 20,000 men and her other

armed officials to 13,000 — "so that the total number of rifles in use . . . shall not exceed 33,000." Her navy was abolished, though for "police and fishery duties" she was allowed to retain "four torpedo boats and six motor boats, all without torpedoes and torpedo apparatus." The economic, political, and international arrangements were similar to those made for Austria. In addition to the immediate surrender of some livestock to Greece, the former Serbia, and Rumania, Bulgaria also had to accept reparation obligations. These eventually were fixed at \$450,000,000, payable in 37 years from January 1, 1921. Bulgaria's total losses in land and population were relatively small, but combined with her landlocked position they helped to make her one of the weakest of the Balkan powers.

TRIANON

Not until June 4, 1920, was the peace treaty with Hungary signed, in the Grand Trianon Palace at Versailles. The delay was due to the unsettled condition of affairs in Hungary, where the downfall of the Habsburgs resulted in a fierce struggle for control between monarchists, republicans, socialists, and communists.¹ The turmoil was increased by frequent and violent anti-Allied outbursts which, occurring while the treaty was being drafted, influenced the Allies only to the extent of making one important concession, namely, allowing the new state to take the name of "Hungary" rather than "Hungarian Republic." But the people were warned that a Habsburg restoration would be "neither recognized nor tolerated."

All the states surrounding Hungary were allotted slices of the old Magyar kingdom. Rumania received Transylvania, some of the plain west of Transylvania, and two-thirds of the Banat of Temesvar, including a total of approximately one and a half million Magyars. To Yugoslavia went Croatia-Slavonia and the western third of Temesvar, along with half a million Magyars. Slovakia became part of the new republic of Czechoslovakia, which also acquired some territory to the south and east of the Carpathian Mountains. Almost a million Magyars and half a million Ruthenes were thus incorporated into Czechoslovakia. Austria secured Burgenland, or German West Hungary. Ob-

¹ See Chapter XVI.

viously, "the territorial adjustments were difficult to reconcile with any one clear-cut principle."

The other treaty terms were similar to those with Austria and Bulgaria. Hungary's army was cut to 35,000 men and her navy reduced to a few patrol boats. She too was made liable for reparation through a guilt clause.

SEVRES

In November, 1914, Lloyd George had declared: "I am glad that the Turk is to be called to a final account for his long record of infamy against humanity." Not quite six years later he told the House of Commons that the arrangements contemplated by the forthcoming treaty with the sultan would at last release "all non-Turkish populations from Turkish sway." He neglected to say on that occasion that the treaty contemplated a reversal of the situation by subjecting the Turks to the sway of Europeans. The principles underlying the treaty with Turkey were largely those embodied in the Secret Treaties, although a few modifications were made necessary by the Bolshevik Revolution and Russia's consequent temporary withdrawal from the imperialist scene, by President Wilson's stand on self-determination, and by the conflicting interests of Italy and Greece.

In the Treaty of Sevres (August 10, 1920), Turkey acknowledged the loss of all her rights in Egypt, the Sudan, Cyprus, Tripoli, Morocco, and Tunis. She likewise renounced all rights over Arabia, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Syria. Smyrna and the Ionian hinterland were to be temporarily administered by Greece, which power also received some former Turkish islands in the Aegean and part of Eastern Thrace. Italy was confirmed in the possession of Rhodes and Dodecanesia, though she promised eventually to cede the latter to Greece.

The zone of the Straits was demilitarized and internationalized. It had originally been hoped that the United States might assume a mandate over Constantinople, but the unfavorable reactions of the American people to the peace treaties in general made it plain that President Wilson would not be upheld in the assumption of mandatory obligations. The city, therefore, remained under Turkish sovereignty, as did also a small part of the European mainland up to the Chatalja lines.

Turkey agreed to recognize Armenia as a "free and independent state" with boundaries to be drawn by Wilson in the area of the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis. Kurdistan was to receive autonomy, but her boundary might be rectified in favor of Persia. Nothing was left to Turkey save mountainous Anatolia and a corner of Europe. Moreover, on the same day that the treaty was signed, a tripartite agreement was reached by the British, French, and Italian delegates, whereby spheres of influence in Anatolia were outlined for France and Italy. The French sphere was to the north of Syria; the Italian, south and east of Smyrna.

Hiough the treaty was signed by the representatives of Mohammed VI, and though the sultan, overawed by the Allied ships and forces at Constantinople, was willing to ratify the document, an energetic group of Turkish Nationalists, led by Mustapha Kemal, determined to prevent ratification. The story of their success is told in another chapter.¹

THE MINORITIES TREATIES

The boundary adjustments involved in the treaties created an acute problem of national minorities. National spirit was fanned by the war and the Peace Conference and national jealousies were aroused. Vengeful reprisals were to be expected. In the words of Wilson, nothing was "more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities." To prevent trouble, safeguards for the minorities had to be set up. It was essential to guarantee at least a modicum of racial, religious, social, linguistic, and economic equality for the numerous national minorities.

In the cases of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey the guarantees were included in the peace treaties. Then, despite considerable opposition on their part, Poland, Rumania, Greece, Jugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia were required to sign special treaties embodying similar guarantees. Most of the countries concerned objected to the treaties as an infringement of their several sovereignties and as an encouragement to separatist tendencies. But the Great Powers were insistent, and the obliga-

¹ See Chapter XX.

tions were assumed. In each instance the supervision over the minorities was left to the League, and only with the consent of a majority of the Council might these guarantees be altered or modified. Eventually, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia, and Albania entered into parallel agreements with the League.

The treaties followed a somewhat uniform pattern, any differences being due to particular local problems. They included guarantees of life and liberty to all subjects regardless of race, nationality, or religion; they permitted the private and public worship of any creed or belief not inimical to public morals; and they protected the use of the minority languages, under certain conditions, in business and in the schools.

Such, in brief, were the provisions of the treaties arising from the "war to end wars." They were patently one-sided. They were replete with unstable compromises. They reflected materialism tinged, here and there, with idealism — but also with hypocrisy. They sowed the seeds of future conflict. The manner of drafting the terms was novel, as were also many of the provisions. It is to be hoped that few of the novelties and fewer still of the terms ever come to be regarded as precedents.

Yet, in appraising the work of the treaty-makers of 1919 and 1920, the enormous difficulties — material and psychological — under which they labored, must be remembered. Some of their mistakes were obvious at the time they were made, but many stood out more clearly only after the passing of several years. There was much hatred and vengeance, hypocrisy and force, but all these factors were part of the "human nature" and the "civilization" of the day. The four years of blood and mire had not increased reasonableness nor sweetened tempers.

One ray of light, however, one *potential* force of a "new world" did emerge — the League of Nations. It was only a weak structure, to be sure, but it was the first concrete realization of a dream centuries old. It may be remembered some day when the other provisions of the treaties are forgotten.

CHAPTER VI

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

EARLY PLANS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE

^The pertinence of the observation regarding the absence of anything new under the sun is strikingly illustrated in the history of plans for an association of the nations. Collected in book form, the texts of the most important schemes for international arbitration and organization from the time of the ancient Greeks to the twentieth century cover about 1000 closely-printed pages.¹ Most of the costly wars in history have, in fact, served to stimulate the proposal of new plans to preserve peace and settle international disputes by arbitration rather than armed conflict.

^Troubled by the constant strife between the Italian city-states and the German emperors, the poet Dante, in his *De Monarchia* (1313?), suggested the unification of all western Christendom under one strong and God-fearing ruler. About the same time the French lawyer, Pierre Dubois,) variously labelled idealist and scoundrel,/proposed a Roman Catholic league to enforce peace in western-Europe and the establishment of an international court under the headship of the pope) Lest, however, "the number of the damned be greatly increased," the author advised that this tribunal inflict only temporal, not spiritual penalties. If any Christians persisted in their desire to fight, their ardor should be diverted, thought Dubois, against the infidels who held the Holy Land.

Several centuries later, as a result of the turmoil of the French Religious conflicts and the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), three great contributions were made to the literature of peace. In 1623 Emeric Cruce pointed out the need for controlling the commercial causes of war and advocated the institution of a permanent council of ambassadors at Venice to settle disputes among the Christian states. Interestingly enough, he also

¹Darby, W. E., *International Tribunals*, 3 ed., 1900.

maintained that every armed conflict was the concern of all civilized countries — a contention which is the essence of Article 11 of the Covenant adopted in 1919 at Paris.]

(Hugo Grotius in 1625 published the first systematic treatise on the fundamental principles of international law (*On the Law of War and Peace*), and outlined an interesting plan of peaceful arbitration.¹) Thirteen years later the Due de Sully advocated a Great Design which, unfortunately, was too advanced to appeal to the ambitious and jealous rulers of his day. The theory of this design was the creation of a federation of European states to be managed by a council of seventy. The latter was to have final jurisdiction in the settlement of disputes, and its decisions were to be upheld, if necessary, by an international police force. Sully's ideas were elaborated upon and popularized in 1713 by the Abbe de St. Pierre.

The Quakers were avowed advocates of peace, and in 1693 William Penn wrote an interesting *Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe* wherein he advised the formation of a general parliament with wide powers of arbitration. In the Germanies, Gottfried Leibnitz — philosopher, mathematician, diplomat — proposed (1715) a Catholic confederation of Europe under the temporal control of the Holy Roman Emperor and the religious supervision of the pope. The ravages of the Seven Years' War and the American Revolution led the intellectual radical, Jeremy Bentham, to publish a *Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace* which envisaged the creation of an international court of justice, the limitation of armaments, and the abolition of secret diplomacy with its attendant evils: bribery and suspicion.

The great German thinker, Immanuel Kant, contributed to the peace movement two famous tracts on *Universal Cosmo-Political History* (1784) and *Perpetual Peace* (1795). He regarded the rival ambitions of absolute monarchs as the chief cause of war and recommended the establishment of more democratic forms of government. (He also believed that much might be done to preserve international harmony by the abolition of standing armies, the prohibition of armed interference by one state in the affairs of another, and the federation of the states into one large association.)

In a sense, the Holy Alliance, formed between Russia, Austria, and Prussia in 1815, was an organization for the maintenance of peace, as was the so-called Concert of Europe which, growing out of the Quadruple Alliance of 1814, attempted with greater or less success to settle the major European issues of the nineteenth century by conference rather than war. Throughout that century the cause of world peace received the able support of such prominent persons as William Allen, founder of the Peace Society of England (1816), James and John Stuart Mill, Johann Bluntschli, and Alfred Nobel. In 1899 and 1907 there were convened at The Hague two much-heralded, but not especially successful, peace conferences.

The peace movement had many advocates in the United States. In 1815 David Low Dodge, having lost a fortune in consequence of the War of 1812, founded the New York Peace Society. The same year saw the establishment of a similar alliance in Massachusetts, and in 1828 William Ladd formed the American Peace Society. Some time later Ladd wrote a well-known *Essay on a Congress of Nations for the Adjustment of International Disputes without Resort to Arms*. His scheme contemplated the organization of a voluntary association of states in which each member should retain its identity. [By 1914 there were about 150 peace societies scattered throughout the western world) among them the well-financed World Peace Foundation established in Boston by a book publisher named Edward Ginn, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

(The outbreak of the World War for a time made people lose faith in the value of peace work] Before long, however, the catastrophic nature of the struggle imbued idealists with new strength to agitate for the establishment of an instrument which would replace armed conflict as a means of settling international difficulties. (During the first two years of the war there were formed in the United States an American League to Limit Armaments, an American Union against Militarism, a Women's Peace Party, and a League to Enforce Peace. This last counted among its sponsors Theodore Marburg, ex-President Taft, President Lowell of Harvard, and Hamilton Holt, editor of the *Independent*, and it soon acquired the backing of leading

statesmen in the United States and England. (In 1916 it prepared drafts for a covenant of an international league to prevent war and arbitrate disputes./

(President Wilson publicly endorsed the suggestions of the League to Enforce Peace, and finally incorporated the idea of a "general association of nations" as the fourteenth of his famous points. Meanwhile a group of English lawyers, led by Lord Phillimore, had also drafted a league charter, and by the time of America's entry into the war it was generally understood that the forthcoming peace conference would have to give the matter its earnest consideration.)

In an earlier chapter there has been detailed the story of the drafting and adoption of the final covenant at Paris. Not only was this document made an integral part of each of the five peace treaties, but the League of Nations which it created was given supervision over the fulfillment of many of the treaty clauses. The League, indeed, was entrusted with the task of " liquidating the war and implementing the peace" — an assignment which was made all the more difficult by the failure of the United States to become a member .)

MECHANICS OF THE LEAGUE

No better explanation of the purpose of the League can be given than to quote the preamble to the Covenant:

The High Contracting Parties

In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security

by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,

by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations,

by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments,

and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another,

Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations.

The original members of the League were the signatories named in an annex to the Covenant and such of a group of invited states as acceded without reservation to the document within two months of its coming into force. By a two-thirds

vote of the Assembly, membership may further be extended to any fully self-governing state, dominion, or colony provided the latter can give effective guarantees of its sincere desire to observe its international obligations, and its willingness to accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League with regard to its armaments.

Any member state which has fulfilled its obligations under the Covenant may withdraw from the League after two years' notice. By the close of 1932, only two states—Brazil and Costa Rica—had availed themselves of this privilege, leaving a total membership of fifty-seven. The Covenant itself is a flexible document which may be amended by the unanimous vote of the Council and a majority vote of the Assembly. A number of amendments, relating chiefly to procedure, have already been adopted.

The League budget for 1932 amounted to about \$6,500,000, representing an increase of more than 50% over that of 1922. The expenses are allocated among the members according to a scale devised by a special committee. The total cost is divided into 986 units and a certain number of these units are charged to each member. Great Britain pays most—105 units. France and Germany are responsible for 79 units apiece, and such small countries as Albania and the Central American states each contribute one unit. The meetings of the Council and the various committees are held in the Secretariat Building at Geneva, the former Hotel National. Because of its size, the Assembly has had to meet in the Hall of the Reformation, on the other side of Lake Geneva. A special edifice, however, has been under construction in Ariana Park, and when completed will become the permanent home of the Assembly.

The League functions through an Assembly, a Council, and a permanent Secretariat. The Assembly consists of representatives of all the members, each state being entitled to a maximum of three delegates, but only one vote. These representatives, as well as all the officials of the League, enjoy diplomatic immunity. Sessions are held annually at Geneva, beginning on the second Monday in September, or, if this day should fall after the tenth of the month, on the first Monday. Special sessions may be held in times of emergency. The first Assembly

was called by President Wilson and convened on November 15, 1920.

Each new session of the Assembly is presided over by the president of the Council until such time as the permanent president and six vice-presidents are elected. Then these seven, together with the chairmen of six standing committees, constitute a General Committee which is responsible for the conduct of business. The standing committees, on which each state is represented by one delegate, are concerned with: (1) legal and constitutional questions, (2) the work of the technical organizations, (3) reduction of armaments, (4) budget and internal administration, (5) social problems, and (6) political questions. In addition to these groups there are numerous auxiliary and special committees.

At its meetings the Assembly may consider "any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world." From the very start, "the Assembly established itself as a platform from which the representatives of the Governments associated in the League could annually give expression to their general views, their grievances, their criticisms, and their aspirations." Specifically, the tasks of the body are to select the non-permanent members of the Council, control the budget, admit new members, elect concurrently with the Council the judges of the World Court, and, if it sees fit, advise the reconsideration of treaties which have become inapplicable.

The League Council, composed of one delegate from each of the states entitled to representation, corresponds somewhat to the executive branch in a national government. Originally the Covenant provided for five permanent and four non-permanent Council seats, the former to go to the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan; the latter, pending other selections by the Assembly, to Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and Spain. Because of the refusal of the United States to join the League, there were until 1922 only eight members in the Council. In that year the Assembly increased the number of non-permanent seats to six, thus giving the smaller states a majority. Four years later the total membership of the Council was increased to fourteen, when Germany secured a permanent seat and provision was made for three additional non-permanent members. The

terms of the non-permanent members have been fixed at three years and are staggered so that each year three states must retire. In general, retiring members are not immediately reelected.

Since 1929 the Council has held three regular meetings a year—in January, May, and September—usually at Geneva. Extra meetings may be called at any time. The presidency of the body is rotated in successive sessions among the delegates in the alphabetical order of the names of the member states in French. Except in matters of procedure, decisions of the Council must be unanimous. Whenever a subject is under discussion concerning a non-member of the Council, that state is entitled to temporary representation thereon. Like the Assembly, the Council may take under advisement any question affecting world peace or threatening the harmony of international relations. Since this body is so much smaller than the Assembly, and can be more quickly gathered, it is called upon to handle most of the emergency situations. The first Council meeting was summoned by President Wilson for January 16, 1920, at Paris. Ten additional meetings were held in that crucial year.

The specific duties assigned to the Council by the Covenant include the formulation of plans for the reduction of national armaments, the study of the annual reports submitted by the mandatories regarding the administration of their charges, and the devising of means for the protection of the territorial integrity of member states against external aggression. It must also inquire into any international disputes which may be submitted to it, and may refer these disputes to the Assembly. Finally, it must recommend to the member states what effectives each should contribute in the event that "the covenants of the League" require protection.

The third agency of the League is the permanent Secretariat, or "civil service," established at Geneva. It comprises a Secretary-General (who also acts in that capacity at Council and Assembly meetings) and a staff selected by him with the approval of the Council. The first Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, was named in the annex to the Covenant. With Allied approval he began to assemble his assistants and establish temporary quarters in London immediately after the adoption of the text of the Covenant on April 28, 1919—two months

before the signing of the Versailles Treaty. Sir Eric soon proved himself to be an officer of remarkable ability, combining tactfulness, hard work, fairness, and efficiency. Future secretaries-general were to be appointed by the Council with the approval of the Assembly.

The Secretary-General is assisted by one deputy- and three under-secretaries, and by a staff of almost seven hundred employees (1932) drawn from more than fifty nations. Staff members are employed and paid by the League; theoretically at least, they do not represent the interests of their respective countries. The Secretariat is divided into eleven sections which are concerned with and gather material on such matters as mandates, disarmament, health, minorities, and economic and financial questions. The Secretary-General is responsible for the registration and publication of all treaties entered into between League members or voluntarily submitted to him by non-members. At the end of May, 1930, the number of documents so registered was 2330. The texts of the treaties are published in their original language as well as in French and English.

To lighten the work of these three main bodies the League has created several auxiliary organs known as Technical Organizations and Advisory Committees. In the former group are the Economic and Financial Organization, the Organization on Communications and Transit, and the Health Organization. Among the Advisory Committees are those on mandates, traffic in opium, and intellectual cooperation. There are, in addition, some temporary groups, such as was the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. A number of international bureaus which originated independently of the League, such as the International Hydrographic Bureau at Monaco, also have been placed under the auspices of that association.

Two other major agencies must be considered to a certain extent part of the machinery of the League: the Permanent Court of International Justice, or World Court, and the International Labor Organization. According to Article 14 of the Covenant:

The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine

any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

In execution of this mandate the Council, at its second session (February, 1920), appointed a committee of leading jurists to draw up a statute for such a court. The committee met at The Hague and within five weeks (June 16 to July 24) agreed unanimously upon a detailed draft covering the organization, procedure, and jurisdiction of the proposed tribunal. Throughout the deliberations a prominent part was taken by the American member of the committee, ex-Secretary of State Elihu Root. The plan was forthwith delivered to the Council which, after making a few amendments, passed it on to the first Assembly. The latter added some more amendments and on December 13, 1920, unanimously adopted it as the statute of the court.

The Council then prepared a protocol of ratification which included the statute as an annex, and submitted the document to the League members. The court was to come into existence as soon as a majority of the members should have ratified the protocol. By September, 1921, the necessary minimum of ratifications was secured,¹ and the Council and Assembly concurrently but separately elected the first group of judges.² The Hague was picked as the seat of the Court. Its expenses, about \$500,000 annually, are borne by the members on a *pro rata* basis.

The Court was originally composed of eleven judges and four deputy-judges, all chosen for nine-year terms by absolute majorities in the Council and Assembly. The president and vice-president are elected by the judges themselves, and hold office for three years. The annual sessions of the Court commence on June 15, and the first one, that of 1922, lasted only a couple of months. In order to emphasize the permanent character of the tribunal, a committee of jurists, appointed by the Council, recommended (March, 1929) that the number of judges

¹ Thereafter ratification proceeded more slowly. Only fourteen additional acquiescences were recorded in the next nine years.

² Up to 1932 three Americans served on the court. John Bassett Moore was among the original selections, but he resigned in 1928. Charles Evans Hughes was elected in the same year as his successor, but resigned in 1930. Frank B. Kellogg was then chosen to fill the vacancy. For the attitude of the United States towards the Court see Chapter XXII.

be increased to fifteen, that the deputy-judgeships be abolished, and that, except for certain fixed vacations, the Court remain in session throughout the year. By the institution of a process of rotation among the judges the burden on the individual jurists would remain within reasonable limits. A protocol embodying these recommendations was placed before the members of the Court, and early in 1931 it became effective.

The jurisdiction of the Court is of two kinds, voluntary and compulsory. When two or more states having a dispute refer it to the Court for settlement, the tribunal's voluntary jurisdiction is being invoked. A certain number of states, however, have signed an "Optional Clause" which was attached to the Protocol of the Court. This clause binds its ratifiers to accept the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court "as compulsory, *ipso facto* and without special convention" in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international law, a breach of an international obligation, or the nature and extent of reparation to be made for any such breach. For signatories of this clause, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court is compulsory. Thirty-nine states had ratified it by 1932, including Germany, England, and Italy. Reference of disputes to the Court has also been made compulsory by the terms of some of the numerous bilateral treaties of conciliation and arbitration which have been signed since the war.

The procedure of the Court is like that of any regular tribunal. Briefs must be filed, arguments are heard, evidence is examined, and decisions are rendered by a majority vote of the judges after private deliberation. Only states may bring suit before the Court, and judgments may be given in default when a country fails to answer a plaintiff's summons for trial.

In addition to those mentioned, the Court has one other function, namely, to give advisory opinions to the Council and Assembly. The Council, especially, has availed itself of this opportunity to secure advice on legal points. The opinions, which are rendered after the usual court procedure, are binding on no one, but they have generally been accepted as valid. This use of the Court has undergone some criticism, first because the Council itself has not yet been able to decide whether it must vote unanimously to ask for an advisory opinion, and secondly,

because the procedure appears to have the characteristics more of international politics than law.

The Permanent Court has not entirely replaced the old Hague Tribunal which was set up in 1899. The latter is merely a panel or list of 132 eminent jurists from which a court may be selected to arbitrate any dispute between signatories of the Hague Convention. The World Court does not arbitrate quarrels; it interprets international law and decides on treaty violations. By 1932 about a score each of decisions and advisory opinions had been handed down.

The International Labor Organization, although it is entirely autonomous and responsible only to itself and public opinion, is also an organ of the League. It was brought into being in the interests of labor through Part XIII of the Versailles Treaty. Since, under Article 23 of the Covenant, the League was pledged "to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children" in all countries, the Council and Assembly agreed to supply the Organization with funds and make membership in it automatic with League membership. Germany, however, was represented in the labor association for some years before her entry into the League, and Brazil remained a member of the I. L. O. even after her withdrawal from the League. '

The structure of the Organization is similar to that of the League itself. There is a General Conference which corresponds to the Assembly, a Governing Board which is analogous to the Council, and an International Labor Office which is similar to the Secretariat. The Conference, which meets annually, consists of four delegates from each member state, one chosen by labor, one by the employers, and two by the government. The method of voting is by head.

The Conference has no actual legislative powers, but it can readily focus world attention upon certain evils and point the way to an improvement in labor conditions. By two-thirds votes, it may pass either recommendations or draft conventions. The former usually consist of broad principles enunciated in order to guide the various states in their own labor legislation. The conventions are detailed legal proposals which, it is hoped, may be adopted by the states members. Both the recom-

mendations and the conventions are transmitted to the various governments by the Secretary-General of the League, and each state is bound to submit the proposals to its legislative authority for consideration.

The Governing Body, which meets at least once every three months, is made up of twenty-four persons, six representing the workers, six the employers, and twelve the governments. In order that the states of greatest industrial importance might have a permanent voice in the activities of the Organization, it was provided that one delegate each from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Switzerland be always included among the twelve governmental representatives in the Governing Body. The remaining four are chosen by the government delegates in the General Conference, excluding the delegates from the eight countries mentioned. The deputies of the workers and employers in the Conference choose the respective representatives for the Governing Body. Members of the Body hold office for three years. Their chief function is the election and control of a Director of the International Labor Office.

This Office has its headquarters in a separate building at Geneva and is served by a personnel of more than three hundred men and women. Its functions are to collect information on all phases of industrial life and labor, prepare the agenda for the annual Conference meetings, and maintain contact with the various volunteer labor societies throughout the world. It also publishes an *Official Bulletin* and an *International Labor Review*.

Most of the conventions thus far proposed by the I. L. O. have dealt with the general improvement of working conditions. They relate to the length of working hours, unemployment, the labor of women and children, medical examinations, night work, sanitary conditions, the right of combination among agricultural workers, and the like. Ratification of the drafts has not been rapid, particularly among the western industrial powers, but some improvements have resulted, especially in the Orient. In Persia, for example, the evils of child labor in the rug industry have been mitigated, and in Japan and India factory conditions have undergone slight betterment. As a mile-post in the history of industrial welfare the I. L. O. has proved itself eminently

useful. It provides labor with an active, if conservative, leadership.

THE LEAGUE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

Each state which is a member of the League of Nations enters into thirty-four specific engagements under the Covenant. Of these, nineteen deal directly or indirectly with the preservation of peace. To begin with, the members "undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League" (Art. 10). In case of such aggression, it becomes the duty of the Council to "advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." To have force, any decision that the Council may come to in this regard must be arrived at unanimously. Hence no power with representation in that body can be made to go to war against its will in order to meet its responsibilities under this article.

Further, "any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not" is declared to be a matter of concern to the whole League, and each member has the "friendly right" to bring to the attention of the "Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends" (Art. 11). All parties to the Covenant agree to submit to arbitration or judicial settlement any disputes which, arising between them, are suited to such forms of settlement, or else to lay their difficulties before the Council.

As an added inducement to this course of action, the members promise not to go to war against any state which accepts the arbitral award, judicial decision, or Council report (provided the latter is unanimous). Should the Council fail to reach a report, the members reserve the privilege "to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice" (Arts. 13, 15). In no case, however, will resort be had to war until three months after the award or report is made (Art. 12).

Whenever the Council is asked to settle a quarrel, it may refer the dispute to the Assembly. Here a decision, to be conclusive,

must be concurred in by the representatives of all the states having seats in the Council and by a majority of the remaining members of the League. Should the Council, however, find that a dispute arises "out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction" of one of the contending parties, then no recommendation of settlement whatever may be made (Art. 15).

The Covenant also provides penalties for the infraction of its pledges. Whenever a nation resorts to armed hostilities in violation of its agreements, "it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against" the entire League. In such case the culprit is to be subjected to an immediate "severance of all trade or financial relations" both with the members of the League and with non-affiliated countries. This "economic weapon" may be applied to the private affairs of the nationals of the guilty state as well as to its government (Art. 16).

In order to minimize the loss and inconvenience which might result to the boycotting states from such a procedure, the League members promise mutually to support one another in the financial and economic measures which may be taken against a covenant-breaking power. Should the economic sanction prove of no avail in dealing with a recalcitrant state, the Council may go so far as to *recommend* to the governments concerned "what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."

The protective sanctions of Article 16 are equally valid in the event of an attack by a non-member of the League on a member (Art. 17). Whenever two non-members are involved, moreover, the Council may also "take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute."

THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

In the first twelve years of its existence the League was called upon to examine more than thirty political disputes, most of them, in one way or another, legacies of the war. As a rule the cases were handled by the Council, but a few were referred to the Assembly, the Council of Ambassadors, or the Permanent Court.

Some of the quarrels, such as that of 1923 between Italy and Greece over the murder of several Italian officers on Greek soil, were really serious threats to world peace. Others, such as that of 1921-1922 between Finland and Soviet Russia over the treatment of the inhabitants of Eastern Karelia, were of lesser importance. A number, including the Polish-Lithuanian controversy over Vilna and the Hungaro-Rumanian "optants" difficulty, the League was unable to settle. On the whole, as is only to be expected, the League has been able to assert its mission more strongly where small nations have been involved. The larger nations are more likely to regard League investigations as infringements on their sovereign rights. They are also better able to bring various forms of pressure to bear in their favor.

One of the first disputes¹ brought to the attention of the Council concerned the Aaland Islands which lie between Sweden and Finland and command the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia. Both Finland and the Islands, whose population in 1920 was 27,000, had once belonged to Sweden, but in 1809 they were lost to Russia, which governed them as a single administrative unit until 1917. Then, when Finland declared her independence, that country extended her sovereignty over the archipelago. In January, 1918, Sweden recognized the independent status of Finland, making no reservations whatever regarding the Aaland Islands, though the inhabitants of the latter are chiefly of Swedish stock and speak the Swedish language.

Before many months had passed, however, the Aalanders, demanding the right of self-determination, began to agitate for union with Sweden. Two unofficial plebiscites which were instituted showed a large majority in favor of the transfer of allegiance. The government of Sweden gave the separatist movement no support, but the Swedish people displayed considerable interest in the matter, particularly when open revolt seemed imminent. The Finns eventually despatched troops to the Islands and arrested the two leading agitators. Thereupon the Swedes demanded action of their authorities and for a time it looked like

¹ Disputes other than those here discussed, which were referred to the League for settlement, will be considered in connection with the histories of the countries concerned.

war. On June 19, 1920, however, at which time Finland had not yet been admitted to League membership, Great Britain exercised her "friendly right" under the Covenant to direct the attention of Secretary-General Drummond to the case.

In July the Council was convened in London and it called on each of the disputants to present its side of the clash. Finland's representative held that the affair was of a purely domestic nature, that Sweden had interposed no reservations anent the Islands at the time she recognized Finland, and that consequently danger of war was non-existent. The Swedish delegate pointed out that the Aalanders obviously desired union with Sweden, that the latter country had in no way abetted the separatist movement, and that the Council had every right to consider the case since it clearly threatened a rupture of peace. By way of solution he advocated the holding of a plebiscite. The situation was further complicated by the doubt existing whether or not the provisions of the Treaty of Paris (1856), whereby the Islands had been demilitarized, were still in force.

The Council, before proceeding further with the investigation, assigned to a committee of jurists the task of answering two questions: (1) Did the matter really lie within the sole and domestic jurisdiction of Finland? (2) Were the international obligations regarding demilitarization still in effect? In September, 1920, the committee reported, replying to the query of domestic jurisdiction in the negative and to that regarding demilitarization in the affirmative. Its legal competence to deal with the dispute thus established, the Council appointed another committee to visit Sweden, Finland, and the Islands and gather evidence upon which a fair decision might be based.

Four days after the evidence was placed before the Council, that body made public (June 24, 1921) its decision as follows: (1) Finland was to have sovereignty over the Islands; (2) the Aalanders were to be guaranteed autonomy and the protection of their political rights; (3) the rights of private property and the use of Swedish in the schools were to be preserved; and (4) the archipelago should be neutralized and unfortified. On April 6, 1922, there went into force a new international convention which guaranteed the neutrality of the Islands and afforded **them** requisite international protection. Thus was ended a dis-

pute which might well have brought on another war in the very wake of the World War.

Another interesting dispute settled by the League was the Turco-Iraq or Mosul boundary controversy. According to the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which finally established peace between Turkey and the Allies, the frontier separating the former from England's mandate-kingdom Iraq (Mesopotamia) was to be drawn "in friendly arrangement" between Turkey and England. If no agreement could be reached within nine months by this method, the matter should be referred to the League Council.

In due time representatives of the two powers met at Constantinople and expended considerable energy in a futile attempt to fix a mutually-acceptable boundary line. The difficulty centered in the disposition of the Mosul vilayet which, rich in oil, was claimed by both parties. At the time of the Armistice of Mudros (October, 1918) the British had been in occupation merely of the southern third of the vilayet, but in the succeeding months, without military provocation by the Turks, they had advanced some ninety-five miles farther north. To all this occupied area the English now laid claim, and on August 6, 1924, they lodged an appeal with the League. Advantage was taken of the opportunity, moreover, to claim in addition part of the vilayet of Hakkari, north of Mosul.

In pleading her case before the Council, Britain maintained that Iraq needed the disputed region to provide a natural frontier and to furnish an unrestricted grain supply. Oil, ostensibly, had little to do with the affair. The Turks, who had been given representation on the Council for the duration of the investigation, objected that the land had never been conquered during the war and that the Mosul population, on the whole, favored Turkish control.

While the hearings were in progress the litigants agreed to uphold the status quo along the border. Unfortunately, the two powers variously interpreted the status quo, with the result that there occurred a number of annoying frontier incidents. The emergency brought on a special Council meeting in October, 1924, at Brussels, where a provisional boundary line was drawn, pending a final judgment. Turkey was made responsible for the maintenance of order north of this Brussels Line, and England to the

south of it. The provisional boundary, incidentally, was traced to coincide with the line of furthest British post-armistice military occupation.

Meanwhile a commission of inquiry was appointed, consisting of a Swede, a Hungarian, and a Belgian. The commissioners first went to London to hear England's story, and then to Angora to get the Turkish view-point; early in 1925 they arrived on the scene of the dispute. To the accompaniment of several exciting incidents a thorough investigation was conducted, and in September, 1925, the commission's report was laid before the Council.

The document definitely established Turkey's sovereignty over the vilayet and explained that neither England nor Iraq had a right to claim it by conquest. If the Council, however, proposed to base its decision on the best interests of the natives rather than upon sovereign rights, the vilayet should be assigned to Iraq, *provided* the British control over that kingdom were extended for a period of about twenty-five years. Unless British supervision were continued, Iraq would experience grave disorders, and then the Mosul population would be better off under Turkish domination. The report intimated that a majority of the inhabitants seemed to favor Anglo-Iraq control, but advocated that the Turkish suggestion for a plebiscite be not carried out since the people were in too backward a state. If the Council, moreover, should decide in favor of the British and Iraq, then it was morally bound to give the mandate easily defensible boundaries, that is, to give it either the entire region claimed by the British, or at least all the land south of the Brussels Line.

While the representatives of Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay in the Council were asked to study these suggestions, the Permanent Court was asked for advisory opinions on two points that had been raised by the Turks: (1) Was the Council's decision to be regarded as an arbitral award, a recommendation, or merely a mediation? (2) Would a mere majority vote of the Council give validity to the final judgment or was unanimity required, and were the representatives of the disputants entitled to votes? The Court expressed the opinions that under the terms of the Lausanne Treaty the Council's decision was binding on both parties, and that the final decision had to be unanimous, not counting the votes of the contending powers. Close upon the

heels of this announcement came rumors of fresh disorders in Mosul, and a special Council investigator, an Estonian general, was sent to the scene. On December 10, 1925, he rendered a report which was unfavorable to the Turks.

Six days later the Council met once more, this time to dispose of the quarrel. The Turkish representative refused to attend, explaining by note that he was not authorized to participate in proceedings based on the theory that Turkey could not veto any proposed solution. This obstinate attitude combined with the investigator's adverse report injured Turkey's cause, and a judgment soon was voted which incorporated those counsels of the commission of inquiry which favored Iraq. It was stipulated that the Brussels Line become the permanent Turco-Iraq boundary, that England take steps to secure the extension of her mandate over Iraq for a further twenty-five years unless the kingdom should earlier become a member of the League, and that the Kurdish minority be guaranteed the appointment of Kurdish local officials and the use of the Kurdish language in its schools.

Great Britain and Iraq naturally accepted the award at once, and in January, 1926, concluded a treaty extending British mandatory control for the required quarter-century. In March the Council officially took note of this agreement and confirmed its decision of the previous December. Turkey, of course, was angry. She became exceedingly suspicious of the League and drew closer to Russia. The British, however, strove to effect a reconciliation, and in June, 1926, an Anglo-Turkish treaty was negotiated whereby a small section of the vilayet was re-ceded to Turkey, the revised boundary was recognized as definitive, and some royalties from the Mosul oil fields were confirmed to Turkey.

Late in 1928 the Council played a conspicuous part in preventing an international incident in Latin America from developing into certain conflict. On December 8 of that year it was announced in the press that an armed clash had taken place in the Chaco district, a wilderness region long in dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. Further despatches describing the progress of hostilities appeared at frequent intervals and war seemed inevitable, especially after the Bolivian Republic, which considered itself the victim of unjust aggression, rejected the

mediation of Argentina and of the Pan-American Conference on Arbitration and Conciliation which happened to be in session at Washington.

Fortunately, a League Council meeting was scheduled for December 10, and, though neither disputant had referred the case to the League, the Chaco dispute was at once taken under advisement. A telegram was quickly despatched by the Council expressing its "full conviction that the two States which, by signing the Covenant, had solemnly pledged themselves to seek by pacific means the solution of disputes arising between them would have recourse to such methods as would be in conformity with their international obligations and would appear in the present circumstances to be most likely to secure the maintenance of peace and the settlement of the dispute."

Both powers replied that they had no intentions of violating their covenantal obligations, but Bolivia insisted upon her right to demand satisfaction and to take necessary defensive measures. In point of fact, within ten days of the publication of the first alarming press notice, both states agreed to accept the good offices of the Pan-American Conference. The latter appointed a committee of conciliation which soon resolved the immediate quarrel.

War was thus averted, but since the underlying causes of the dispute remained untouched, renewed disorders broke out in May, 1929. After a vigorous interchange of telegrams between the two republics and Geneva, the former reiterated their peaceful inclinations and agreed to smooth out their fundamental differences at a conference table rather than on the field of battle. Eventually representatives of Bolivia and Paraguay met at Washington to conclude a pact of non-aggression.

In the words of Uruguay's delegate to the Council, the action taken by the League in this controversy was "a recognition of the fact that Latin America constitutes an integral part of the League. (It served) to dissipate what was felt to be a very real anomaly, in that, despite the American countries' membership of the League, the latter appeared to take no action where problems affecting America were concerned. . . . This action . . . had the effect of binding America more closely to the League."¹

¹ The quarrel was renewed in 1932, and once more the League, the United States, and several South American countries acted to prevent war.

ADMINISTRATION OF TERRITORY

The Versailles Treaty, it will be recalled, placed upon the League responsibility for the international government of the Saar Basin and the Free City of Danzig. Early in 1920, therefore, the Council set up the necessary machinery for the rule of these areas. In so far as the Basin was concerned, the peace treaty stipulated that a governing commission be appointed, to consist of five members, one a Frenchman by birth and citizenship, one a native of the territory, and three citizens of three countries other than France or Germany. All appointments were, to be for one year, renewable at their expiration. The Council at its second session named such a commission, and on February 25, 1920, the latter entered upon its duties.

France was represented on the commission by Chairman V. Rault, ex-Prefect of Lyons and a staunch patriot. The member for the Saar was Alfred von Boch, an able local official, while the remaining commissioners were a Belgian, a Dane who had been living in Paris for twenty years, and a Canadian. Von Boch was so disgusted with the pro-French attitude taken on all questions by his colleagues that he resigned in September, 1920. His successor proved to be quite willing to cooperate with the chairman. For the first half dozen years of its administration, therefore, the Governing Commission could hardly be called an impartial authority.

In its first proclamation to the inhabitants, the Commission stressed its determination "to carry out strictly the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, and to enforce respect on the part of all for these clauses, both in letter and in spirit." In addition, the people were warned as follows: "Being firmly resolved to impose respect for its authority, (the Commission) will fearlessly suppress all attempts, from whatever source, to disturb or mislead the population. It will tolerate neither open violence, intrigue, nor passive resistance. The Treaty of Peace does not leave it without the necessary authority, and the powers conferred will permit the Commission to devote itself to its task without being troubled with useless and criminal opposition." In conclusion, however, the natives were consoled with the promise that the officials, in the exercise of their authority, would be "inspired by the principles which directed the establishment of the League of Nations."

Among the privileges which the peace treaty conceded to France in the district were the right to substitute French for German money in connection with the working of the mines which had been turned over to her, the option of establishing schools for the French mine employees' children in which the instruction should be in the French language, and the permission to incorporate the Basin entirely within the French customs regime. The natives, on the other hand, were given certain protective guarantees. They had the right to lodge complaints against the administration with the League Council. None of the laws in force at the time of the armistice might be modified by the Commission without the consent of elected representatives of the inhabitants. The maintenance of order was to be entrusted solely to a local gendarmerie established for that purpose.

The people in the Saar were not only annoyed by France's exercise of her legal powers, but they had a number of specific grievances against the Commission. The election of representatives, for example, was deferred until March, 1922; and after their election, the people's deputies, organized as an Advisory Committee, were not consulted by the Commission on some of its most important measures. All sorts of privileges were extended to German children who could be induced to attend the French schools. Whenever the natives drew up a complaint, moreover, it had to be transmitted to the Council through the Commission, and the latter took good care to minimize the objections. When the French Government protested to M. Rault against the heavy coal taxes in the Basin, the tax rate was graciously and expeditiously reduced. Finally, despite the treaty stipulation regarding the formation of a local gendarmerie to maintain order, a French army, varying in size from 5000 to 8000 men, was constantly stationed in the area.

In 1923, when the German miners went on strike out of sympathy for their fellow-workmen in the Ruhr district which was then being placed under occupation by French troops, the Commission inaugurated severe repressive measures. Picketing was forbidden, it was made a penal offense to speak against the League, and the press was effectively muzzled. Since the Commission was responsible only to the League and not to the inhabitants, and since M. Rault was present at every Council session

at which the Saar was a subject of discussion, the people ordinarily had little chance to secure a fair hearing. On this occasion, however, the protests were so serious that England requested the League to conduct an investigation.

The Council had always seemed anxious to endorse every move of the Commission, and the same spirit was evidenced in the manner in which the investigation of 1923 was approached. Care was taken to prevent the appearance of an inquiry. The entire Commission was invited to attend a Council session on the Saar and the commissioners were politely questioned by the Council delegates. During the proceedings Rault admitted that the Commission had a branch office in Paris, that the French troops received both their pay and their orders from France, and that, as the representative of France on the governing body, he felt in duty bound to further the interests of his country.

The Council studiously refrained from expressing any criticism of Rault's activities and merely suggested that the army might better be replaced by a local force of gendarmes. Despite this whitewashing of the affair, the prestige of the Commission as an impartial group of international officials was undermined, and in 1923 and 1924 its membership was thoroughly revised. In 1926 Rault resigned, being succeeded in the chairmanship by a Canadian, who in turn was replaced by the Englishman, Sir Ernest Wilton. These changes not only reduced the antagonism of the inhabitants of the territory, but of the German people as well, for the latter naturally sympathized with their vexed countrymen.

In 1927 the question once more arose of the French troops in the Saar, for the League recommendation of 1923 had resulted in only a partial withdrawal of the force. Since Germany now was a member of the Council, there took place some vigorous discussions on the matter. In the end it was agreed that the troops should be recalled and replaced by an emergency Railway Defense Force of 800 men, the latter to be recruited from the British, French, and Belgian armies of occupation in the Rhineland. Thus Was the "Saar garrison" eliminated and a check placed on the number of men France might in future send to the region.

According to the peace treaty the permanent future status of the Saar is to be decided in 1935 by a plebiscite of all inhabitants who were of voting age at the time the land was severed from

Germany. For this purpose a records commissioner was ordered in 1922 to collect the necessary voting statistics and deposit them with the League. Although this arrangement had been put into the treaty to satisfy France, the latter in 1929 announced her willingness to waive the plebiscite and settle with Germany on other terms. In consequence of this declaration negotiations were begun between representatives of the two countries with a view to effecting an early retransfer of the Basin to the fatherland. When the labor of the delegates is successfully consummated, the work of the League in governing the territory will come to an end.¹

MANDATES AND MINORITIES

Under Article 22 of the Covenant, the League of Nations was made responsible for the well-being and development of the peoples inhabiting the late German overseas possessions (except Kiao-chau) and the former lands of the Ottoman Empire in the Arabian Peninsula. Certain of the more advanced nations were to be delegated by the League as mandatory powers to exercise on its behalf a tutelage over these relatively backward areas. The mandatory powers would be obliged to render annual reports of their administration to the Council, and there was to be constituted a Permanent Mandates Commission to examine the reports and in general advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

The latter were divided into three categories according to their stage of development, their geographical situation, and the level of their economic conditions. In the first division were put the Class A mandates, which included the communities formerly attached to the Turkish Empire. The members of this group were regarded as having "reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone." Among the Class B mandates were included the former German possessions in Central Africa. These were held to need definite governmental supervision and their prospects for self-government were remote. In the Class C group were placed German South West Africa and the Pacific islands which had

¹ For the governance of the Free City of Danzig see p. 473-

once belonged to Germany. These, "owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, or other circumstances/" were thought to be "best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory," subject to certain safeguards in the interests of the indigenous population.

Since the Covenant made no mention of the mandatory powers nor of the manner in which the areas were to be distributed, these details had to be dealt with at special conferences of the interested countries. The assignment of the C and B mandates was attended to in 1919 by the Big Four of the Peace Conference. In the former sphere, German South West Africa was assigned to the Union of South Africa; German Samoa, to New Zealand; the island of Nauru, to Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand jointly;¹ all the other German islands south of the equator, to Australia, and those north of the equator, to Japan. The Class B mandates were distributed so that England got one-sixth of the Cameroons, one-third of Togoland, and most of German East Africa (Tanganyika); France secured the remaining five-sixths of the Cameroons and two-thirds of Togoland; and Belgium received the northwestern corner of East Africa, Ruanda-Urundi. A special conference at San Remo in April, 1920, allotted the Class A mandates in such fashion that Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan went to Great Britain, and Syria and Lebanon to France. All these apportionments were approved by the League Council between December, 1920, and September, 1924.

Late in 1920 there was created the Permanent Mandates Commission whose function would be to scan the mandatories' reports and present facts and recommendations to the Council. In 1932 the Commission consisted of eleven members, a majority from non-mandatory powers, and one a woman. A representative of the I. L. O. may be present in an advisory capacity at all meetings. The members are selected for indefinite terms on the basis of

¹ Ostensibly the reason for the assignment of this island to the three authorities was the inability of Australia and New Zealand to agree on any other satisfactory arrangement. The fact, however, that the island, whose area is only 8.4 square miles, has estimated phosphate reserves of 42,000,000 tons, may have had something to do with the final disposition. The rule of the island is in the hands of an administrator appointed by the three governments.

their personal qualifications. While no member may simultaneously be an office-holder in his country, an exception is made in the case of professors of state universities. The powers of the Commission are purely advisory, but it keeps the Council informed whether or not the various mandates are being administered in the interests of the natives and in accordance with the principles laid down in the Covenant. At some future time, perhaps, its powers may be augmented to include the right to render decisions and make direct recommendations to the mandatories.

The actual administration of some of the mandates in the years since 1919 will be discussed in the chapters dealing with the various mandatory powers. Be it said at this point, however, that the mandate system has proved of considerable value in focussing public opinion on the "sacred trust" of proper colonial administration and in substituting the idea of a trusteeship of backward peoples for the crass pre-war concept of imperialist exploitation. The theory of League mandates has opened the way to a somewhat more responsible "spirit of world politics."

In addition to the peoples in the mandated areas, there were placed under League guardianship some thirty million members of national minorities scattered throughout central and eastern Europe. This protection was provided through a series of special minority treaties and conventions, signed at or soon after the Paris Peace Conference.¹ Most of the minority agreements provide that infractions of the accepted obligations toward minorities may be called to the attention of the Council by any member of that body. The responsibilities of the League in respect of the minorities are heavy, especially since they may so often take on a political guise. The Council must shield the minorities against mistreatment and yet must be careful not to infringe upon the sovereign rights or hurt the national pride of the majorities. This phase of the League's activities has been subjected to frequent adverse criticism and comment.

In an attempt to remedy some of the evils, the Council in 1929 slightly revised its procedure of dealing with minority disputes. A Minorities Committee was established, to consist of the president of the Council and two delegates chosen by him. To this organ was assigned the duty of deciding whether or not questions

¹ See p. 132.

regarding minority rights should be laid before the Council. All communications between the Committee and the governments concerned must be carried on through the channel of the Minorities Section of the Secretariat, the latter also being responsible for the collection of pertinent data and information on the entire subject of minorities. Thus far it has been the practice of the Council not to impose its decisions in minority disputes, but rather to point out the path of conciliation and compromise.

THE WORTH OF THE LEAGUE

The Covenant imposed upon the League of Nations a multitude of tasks in addition to those which have been mentioned. Valuable financial assistance has been rendered by the League to needy states in central Europe and the Balkans. It has played a prominent rôle in the organization of national security and in the movement for a reduction of armaments. Highly important, if less spectacular, work has been accomplished through its agencies in such fields as preventive medicine, epidemiology, the codification of international law, the suppression of the traffic in women, children, and opium, and the struggle against slavery and forced labor. Much has been done under its auspices to promote international intellectual cooperation, to facilitate international transit and communications, and to coordinate the activities of the various health and scientific organizations throughout the world. Systematization, continuity, and efficiency have been brought into a host of human spheres of activity.

Perhaps the greatest general contribution of the League has been its influence in spreading the idea of international cooperation. More than any other agency, the League has helped to make people aware of the existence of world conditions and world problems and to dispel the old ideas concerning purely national and isolated difficulties. It is a decided advance merely to have a periodic assemblage of representatives from all over the world at one conference table, so that these delegates may come to know their respective worths and outlooks. The concept of an association of nations is, as we have seen, old; the actuality of a League of Nations is new. Support and encouragement are needed, and above all, cooperation. The League of Nations is what the nations make of it — nothing more, and nothing less.

CHAPTER VII

REPARATION

THE FIRST FOUR YEARS, 1919-1923

In the Peace of Paris, as we have seen, the Allies demanded that the Central Powers, and Germany in particular, because of their presumed sole responsibility for the war, make complete financial restitution for the property damage done to Allied civilians and assume the burden of the pension and separation allowances added to the Allied budgets in consequence of the conflict. War guilt and reparation thus were expressly linked together.

To evaluate the amount of the damages and formulate a method of payment, were tasks assigned by the peace treaty to a special Reparation Commission. This agency was to consist of one representative each from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and the remaining Allied powers. Since the United States did not ratify the treaty, however, no American member was appointed. A Belgian was selected to represent the lesser states. In a brief struggle between England and France to dominate the Commission, the French emerged triumphant. The Commissioners had until May, 1921, to hear and pass on Allied claims for damages and to set a total reparation figure. Meanwhile Germany was to pay on account, in gold or its equivalent, the sum of twenty billion gold marks, a mark being worth 23.82 cents.

While the Commission deliberated, the Allied statesmen held a number of conferences to decide on a scale of distribution of the reparation receipts and to attempt, independently of the official committee, to arrive at a total indemnity figure and a method of payment. At the Spa Conference in July, 1920, distributidn percentages were agreed upon, France being allotted 52 % of the total receipts, the British Empire 22%, Italy 10%, Belgium 8%, and all other claimants the remaining 8 %. At a later conference it was

decided to present Germany with a bill for \$56,000,000,000, but this figure was so high as to startle even Allied experts, and its acceptance was not pressed.

Meanwhile, in January, 1921, Germany announced that she had completed payment, in the form of coal, rolling stock, etc., of the twenty billion marks demanded on account, and that further payments would be withheld until a final reparation total was established. The Reparation Commission quickly looked into the matter and declared the German claim to be false and based upon the fixing of an unduly high price level for the goods delivered. According to the Commissioners, Germany's payments were still sixty per cent short of the twenty-billion goal. In the absence of any neutral arbitral body to reconcile these differences, a voluminous but fruitless exchange of notes ensued, which lasted until the Commission exercised its power to declare Germany in voluntary default on her obligations (March).

The seemingly defiant attitude of the defeated nation on this and other occasions aroused the ire of the Allied statesmen, especially of Lloyd George, who in March referred to a new German reparation proffer as "an offense and an exasperation." To punish the republic for her audacity, the Allied zone of occupation was extended across the east bank of the Rhine to include the important industrial centers of Dusseldorf, Duisburg, and Ruhrort (March 8). The occupied area was surrounded with a customs wall against German products, and special taxes were levied on German imports into Allied countries.

Seven weeks later (April 28) the Reparation Commission announced that the total German indemnity should be 132,000,000,000 gold marks, or about \$32,000,000,000. Although this was the lowest sum that had yet been given official sanction, it was three times as high as the figure which had been recommended by the economic experts at the Peace Conference. Germany was not expected to remit the whole sum at once, but according to a London Schedule which was drawn up later, she was to pay fixed annuities of \$500,000,000 plus variable annuities corresponding to a tax of twenty-six per cent on her exports. Technical details regarding the issue of three classes of bonds to help meet the indebtedness were also set forth. The final plan was forwarded to Germany on May 5, and six days later,

following threats of an Allied occupation of the Ruhr district, the schedule was accepted by the government of Chancellor Wirth.

In order to meet the annual outlay of hundreds of millions of dollars without return, Germany obviously needed a favorable balance of trade. Instead, for some time after the war, Germany had an unfavorable trade balance. Huge quantities of raw materials had to be purchased from abroad in order to replenish the stocks that had been used up or lost during the conflict. Since these imports could not possibly be paid for in full by an immediate reexport of manufactures, they made necessary the export of a large percentage of the none-too-plentiful gold. The resulting shortage of capital was made still more acute by the activities of some wealthy men who, like Hugo Stinnes, hastily invested their surplus funds in foreign securities lest the government place on their shoulders the chief burden of taxes for reparation purposes. German international credit fell so low that foreign loans were unobtainable and high prices had to be paid for foreign exchange. The budget was balanced only through recourse to wholesale inflation, and every time the government bought foreign currency with which to make reparation payments, the value of the mark experienced a further decline.

Despite all these difficulties, Germany, in the opinion of some authorities, might have been able to fulfill her obligations had she really been anxious to do so and had the Allies shown a willingness to help her. There undoubtedly was evident in Germany a definite lack of will to pay — attributable in part to the circumstance that the stipulated annuities did not even cover the annual interest charges on the total reparation debt. In other words, the indebtedness would increase every year no matter how faithfully the payments were made. And the Allies for their part in no way tried to improve Germany's international credit standing or help her trade.

Even so, the first installment of a quarter-billion dollars was promptly met on August 31, 1921, though at the price of another decline in the value of the mark and a further acceleration in the printing of paper money. A moratorium therefore was asked for the 1922 payments. In March, 1922, the Allies granted a partial moratorium and agreed to accept some of the unpostponed

dues in the form of goods. Monthly deliveries were arranged for, and the revised schedule was adhered to through the payment of July 15. As the mark now had fallen to less than one-hundredth of its par value, the Reparation Commission suspended further payments, accepting instead short-term treasury notes. Germany, however, requested a total moratorium for two years — until the end of 1924.

This suit precipitated a double quarrel, one between Germany and the Allies, and another between England and France, or more specifically, between Premiers Lloyd George and Poincaré. The British, bearing in mind that Germany had been their best customer in pre-war days, had gradually come to realize that economic ruination of the republic could only lead to increased English economic distress. Hence Lloyd George, anxious to reopen the great German market to British goods at the earliest possible moment, was ready at once to grant the moratorium.

The French, on the other hand, were furious. They felt bad enough not to have been awarded full damages in the first place, and now, in addition, they were being asked to wait two years without receiving a sou. They estimated that in the past two years France had expended \$5700 a minute on reconstruction and pensions, to which items Germany had made the trifling contribution of \$381 per minute. Consequently Poincaré would agree to the moratorium only on condition that Germany furnish "productive guarantees/" that is, transfer to French control the mines and dyestuff factories in the Rhineland. Inasmuch as Lloyd George was of no mind to allow a further disruption of German economic life, the remaining months of 1922 were spent in a steady exchange of notes between London, Paris, and Berlin. Finally Poincaré determined to apply the "big stick," for he was convinced that Germany could pay, if only she would.

Under the terms of the Versailles Treaty the Allies might undertake definite reprisals whenever Germany voluntarily defaulted on her obligations. Poincaré therefore busily scanned the record of payments in search of defaults. He soon found them, in timber: Germany had defaulted on 140,000 telegraph poles. Later he also discovered shortages in coal and cattle deliveries. The Reparation Commission was notified and the culprit was called to account. The republic maintained that the default

was temporary and involuntary, being due to the necessity for drawing up new contracts with the timber companies because of the unstable and declining currency. Over the strenuous protests of the British member, who, it is said, referred to the procedure as the greatest timber scandal since the Wooden Horse of Troy, the Commission declared Germany in default on the poles. Shortly thereafter she was declared in general default.

In January, 1923, French, Belgian, and Italian troops occupied the Ruhr district as far east as Dortmund. Some of the French troops were colored. The administration of the region was entrusted to an international mission of control known from its initials in French as the M. I. C. U. M. The British law officers of the Crown gave it as their opinion that the occupation was illegal, and England refused to participate in the venture.

The Ruhr was the very heart of German industry, producing as it did eighty per cent of the country's coal, iron, and steel, and being responsible for seventy per cent of its commercial railway traffic. By the occupation, therefore, the French in effect crushed the last breath out of the German economic body, while yet demanding a continuation of reparation payments.

The Germans, of course, were embittered by the turn of events. They could not fight, but they inaugurated a policy of passive resistance in which representatives of all classes of the population, from leading industrialists to hungry radicals, participated. The situation led a prominent German to remark: "Two men have united the German people — Bismarck in 1871 and Poincare in 1923."

Despite harsh and often cruel treatment by the occupying troops, the inhabitants of the Ruhr persistently refused to carry out orders given by the invaders. The telephone, telegraph, and railway services came to a standstill. The mines and factories were deserted. Newspapers refused to publish French and Belgian decrees. Local officials disregarded foreign commands. Jail terms were accepted with dogged patience and promises of reward from the aliens for services were spurned with contempt. Most of the German mayors in the district eventually were imprisoned. In less than a year 147,000 natives either were deported or voluntarily left their homes in the Ruhr and migrated to other parts of Germany.

The Berlin Government, moreover, stopped all reparation payments, forbade the Ruhr inhabitants to have dealings with the intruders, and subsidized the striking miners and workmen with food and clothing as well as with plenty of freshly printed paper money. As a consequence the French were compelled to utilize their troops to work the mines and run the trains — with little success. The men found it difficult to operate the German machines, and numerous accidents occurred. During the occupation, indeed, France secured only one-fourth as much Ruhr coal as she had received during equal time periods prior to 1923. In anger and desperation the invaders declared a state of siege, prohibited the export of Ruhr products to Germany, seized private as well as public funds, and engaged in wholesale loot and plunder. Blood was shed. About 100 persons were killed and 150 badly wounded.

The mark, meanwhile, continued steadily to decline, being quoted in August at 5,000,000 to the dollar. Doubtless one reason why the Germans carried on the unequal struggle with such obstinacy may be traced to their conviction that Poincare was less interested in reparation than in a "wedding of Ruhr coke with Lorraine iron," for the coal in the fields of northern France was unsuited to the Lorraine iron ore. Such a project had actually been envisaged in a private report to Poincare in May, 1922, by M. Dariac, President of the Finance Commission of the Chamber of Deputies.

In the winter of 1923-1924 the French and Belgians attempted to set up one or two separatist states in the Rhineland, called "Revolver Republics" by the loyal inhabitants. For this purpose discontented laborers and radicals, as well as released convicts and rowdies, from all over Germany were imported into the Rhineland and encouraged to proclaim the region independent. Here again strenuous opposition was encountered from the British, to say nothing of the angry natives, and the French found it expedient to withdraw their support from the movement in February, 1924. Those separatists who were not fortunate enough to escape quickly under French protection were roughly handled by the patriots.

In unoccupied Germany conditions during 1923 became almost equally intolerable. Bankruptcy and collapse loomed on the

economic horizon and the government was forced to choose between complete surrender and total disintegration. On September 26, 1923, the authorities at Berlin announced the immediate and unconditional cessation of passive resistance. Poincare apparently had triumphed, but the price of victory was high. Friendship with England was strained to the breaking point; neutral opinion everywhere was alienated by what were considered France's bullying tactics; and the total suspension of German reparation payments, together with foreign distrust of French methods, caused an alarming drop in the value of the franc. It was therefore deemed advisable to resume negotiations at once, and a proposal was adopted for the appointment of an impartial, international committee of experts to study the problem of Germany's capacity to pay and render a report on the whole subject of reparation. The commissioners were to be economic experts rather than politicians, and the report was to be based on fact, not sentiment. Though the idea of a committee of experts was advanced at this juncture by Germany, it had earlier (1922) been suggested by the American Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes.

THE EXPERTS' (DAWES) PLAN, 1924-1929

The task of selecting a group of economic experts to deal with reparation was entrusted to the Reparation Commission. In November, 1923, that body appointed two committees: the first, consisting of two representatives each from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, was to study and report on ways and means for balancing the German budget and stabilizing the mark; the second, consisting of one delegate from each of the same five countries, should estimate the amount of German capital that had been exported and suggest means of bringing the funds back into the land.

The committees began work in January, 1924, carried on their investigations in Berlin and Paris, and reported to the Commission on April 9. The smaller committee, under the chairmanship of Reginald McKenna of England, reported that German capital to the extent of \$1,687,500,000 was invested abroad at the end of 1923, while Germany held about \$300,000,000 of foreign currency. For the rest, this committee merely endorsed the recom-

mendations of the larger group which, under the chairmanship of the American financier, General Charles G. Dawes, submitted a detailed and comprehensive plan of 124 pages.

The committeemen who drew up this Dawes, or, more properly, Experts' Plan, approached their task as "business men anxious to obtain effective results." They viewed the reparation question in the light of recovery of debt rather than imposition of penalties, and they believed that "since, as a result of the war, the creditors of Germany are paying taxes . . . to the limit of their capacity, so also must Germany pay taxes . . . to the limit of her capacity." Though charged merely with the task of discovering means to balance Germany's budget and stabilize her currency, the experts naturally had to stipulate the amount of reparation money that was to be included in her annual budgetary calculations. After its study of the situation, the committee came to the optimistic conclusion that the republic was "well equipped with resources and the means to exploit them" and that, provided her credit shortage were overcome, she would readily "be able to resume a favored position in world competition."

In brief summary, the Experts' Plan included the following recommendations: (1) full economic and fiscal sovereignty should be restored to Germany, that is, the Ruhr should be evacuated; (2) there should be established, as a depository for reparation payments, a central bank of issue (*Reichsbank*), endowed with a capital of 400,000,000 gold marks, having a fifty-year monopoly for the issue of paper money, and supervised by a board of seven Germans and seven foreigners under the chairmanship of one of the latter; (3) reparation payments should start at 1,000,000,000 gold marks for the first year and gradually rise over a period of four years to a "standard" annuity of 2,500,000,000 marks; (4) this standard might in future be raised or lowered in accord with the fluctuations of an "index of prosperity" to be calculated upon the base period 1927-1929; (5) an immediate foreign loan of 800,000,000 gold marks should be concluded; (6) the sources for the reparation money should be a transport tax, railway bonds, industrial debentures, and pledged budgetary revenues from alcohol, tobacco, beer, sugar, and customs; (7) to watch over the execution of the **Plan in**

Germany there should be appointed a foreign Agent General for Reparation Payments. He should be assisted by a Transfer Committee and by special foreign commissioners to supervise the pledged revenues, the railways, the railway and industrial bonds, and the bank of issue.

The Reparation Commission accepted the report as a basis for a solution of the reparation problem and notified Germany (April 11, 1924) of its decision. The republic endorsed the Plan within five days, and then England, Italy, and Belgium all registered their acquiescence within another week. France alone held out until, as a result of the May elections, Poincare was toppled from power and the more moderate Herriot became premier. Thereupon a conference was held in London in July to draft a protocol for putting the scheme into effect at the earliest possible moment, since the experts had warned against "undue delay in giving execution to the plan."

The course of the conference was not smooth. There was bitter wrangling before the English and Americans could make the French see the inadvisability of permitting any nation in future to apply military sanctions on its own account. Eventually it was decided that henceforth sanctions were to be applied solely in case of a flagrant violation by Germany of her obligations, and then only by the concerted action of all the Allies following a specially called conference. The Germans could be declared in default only by a unanimous vote of the Reparation Commission.

On August 31, 1924, the protocol was signed in London and the necessary laws for executing the Plan were proclaimed in Germany. On the next day the Plan became effective. Evacuation of the Ruhr began at once, and by August 1, 1925, not a foreign soldier remained in the district. For the first time in the years that had elapsed since the signing of the Versailles Treaty, the diplomatic tension in Europe was lessened.

Under the supervision of Agent General S. Parker Gilbert, an American in his early thirties, the Plan gave promise of working well. German business picked up, reparation payments were made promptly, and a general confidence in Germany's future was restored. There seemed little doubt that Germany eventually

would be able to meet with relative ease even the large "standard" annuities.¹

Nevertheless one did not have to be a financier to realize that the Experts' Plan was only a temporary solution. It suffered from some very apparent weaknesses. Because it had not been empowered to do so, the Dawes Committee had not fixed a total reparation bill. Technically, therefore, the old total of \$32,000,000,000 set by the Reparation Commission in May, 1921, was still in force. Yet it was obvious (1) that so high a sum could not possibly be the definitive total, and (2) that Germany would not long continue to make huge annual payments with no knowledge as to how many years the process would have to go on. Moreover, the highly elaborate system of international economic control for which the Plan provided was distasteful to both sides.

These defects were pointed out in the report of Agent General Gilbert in December, 1927, when he said: "As time goes on, and practical experience accumulates, it becomes always clearer that neither the reparation problem, nor the other problems depending upon it; will be finally solved until Germany has been given a definite task to perform on her own responsibility, without foreign supervision and without transfer protection." An additional German grievance, closely linked to the subject of reparation, was the continued Rhineland occupation which, to all appearances, would last until 1935.

In 1928 the air was rife with talk concerning the desirability of reaching a more satisfactory reparation settlement and solving the difficulty of the Rhineland. While the Ninth Assembly of

¹ The Dawes payments, and the sources from which they were derived in the first five years, were as follows, in millions of marks:

SOURCE	1ST YEAR	2ND YEAR	3RD YEAR	4TH YEAR	5TH YEAR
Railway bonds	200	595	550	660	660
Reparation loan	800				
Transport tax		250	290	290	290
Industrial debentures . .		125	250	300	300
Sale of railway shares . .		250			
Ordinary budget			110	500	1250
Special budget contribution			300		
Total	1000	1220	1500	1750	2500

the League was in session at Geneva, representatives from Germany, England, France, Italy, Belgium, and Japan met (September 16) and unanimously agreed that a new committee of international banking experts ought to be appointed to work out a "complete and final settlement of the reparation problem." Later it was decided to invite the United States to membership on the committee, and in due time a group of the world's leading bankers was chosen to wrestle with what was perhaps the world's most difficult problem.

THE YOUNG PLAN, 1929-1931

The new committee of experts, soon to be known as the Young Committee, from its American chairman, Owen D. Young, held its first meeting in Paris on February 11, 1929. It faced a difficult task, inasmuch as a compromise would have to be formulated among a large number of widely differing demands. Germany wanted a considerable reduction in the annuities, below the level of the Dawes "standard." France favored an immediate liquidation of reparation through the flotation of a tremendous German bond issue and a division of the receipts among the Allies according to the Spa percentages. England hoped for an abolition of the deliveries in kind since these were interfering with her manufacturing industries. Germany and the bankers urged a termination of the political control of reparation. In April the gathering nearly broke up when the German delegate, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, obstinately clung to a reparation figure which little more than covered the Allied war debt payments to the United States.

More than seventeen weeks of concentrated and hard work were required before the Committee's report was ready. On June 7, however, a document of 45,000 words was handed to the governments concerned and to the Reparation Commission. In presenting its findings and recommendations, the Committee averred that its members had carried on the proceedings in the spirit of the Dawes Committee and had tried to frame a fair and acceptable scheme "by determining the number and amount of annuities, and by providing for the conversion of the reparation debt from a political to a commercial obligation."

The new Plan contemplated a total indemnity bill with a cap-

italized value at 5½% of about 34,000,000,000 marks, or \$8,032,500,000, to be paid over a period of 58½ years.¹ Significantly enough, the number of annuities coincided exactly with the number of Inter-Allied war debt payments still outstanding. In devising its schedule for these annuity payments the Young Committee had borne in mind three important principles: (1) the desirability of dividing the payments into an unconditional and a postponable part; (2) the need for a continuance of deliveries in kind, at least for a few more years; and (3) the advisability of formulating a specific procedure to be followed when economic stress made necessary postponement of the conditional payments.

The average annuities to all the creditor powers for the first thirty-seven payment years were set at approximately \$473,700,000. The remaining twenty-two annuities were to average only about three-fourths of this amount and were to correspond to the simultaneous "outpayments" of the creditor powers. Thus the Plan a second time linked reparation and war debts, for the reference to "outpayments" concerned the remaining installments on account of the Inter-Allied debts. Emphasis was given once more to this aspect of the situation in a separate memorandum signed simultaneously with the Young Report by all but the American delegates. This promised Germany two-thirds relief on the reparation account for all war-debt reductions enjoyed by the creditors during the thirty-seven-year period, and whole relief to Germany for any such concessions during the final twenty-two-year period.

The unconditional part of the annuity was set at \$157,212,000, payable in foreign currencies in equal monthly installments. Of this money, \$110,100,000 was assigned to France "in order to allow her to mobilize a substantial part of her share in the total annuity." The average annual sum accruing to each of the creditors in the first thirty-seven years was fixed so that France should receive \$249,276,000; the British Empire, \$97,424,000 (this being slightly less than would have fallen to the empire under the Spa percentages); Italy, \$50,903,000; the United States, \$15,745,000 (to cover the cost of the army of occupation); and the remaining claimants, \$32,872,000. After 1966 the dis-

¹ In actual payments, the amount to be turned over to the Allies from September 1, 1929, to March 1, 1988, was to total some \$26,350,000,000.

tribution of moneys was to be in approximately the same proportions.

Two sources of revenue were provided in the Plan for the first set of annuities, the railways and the budget; the second set was to be derived entirely from the budget. In the words of the report: "The Railway Company shall be under an obligation to pay for 37 years a direct tax comprising if necessary the Transport Tax to an annual amount of (\$157,212,000), being equal to the non-postponable annual amount of the annuity. This tax shall be imposed by German legislation, and the receipts therefrom guaranteed by the German Government." The difference between this guaranteed sum and the total annuity should be made up from the budget, the burden thus imposed rising from a minimum of \$270,700,000 in the second annuity year to \$421,000,000 in the thirty-seventh. Thereafter the contribution from the railways should cease and the remaining annuities be met in full from the budget and from certain profits accruing to Germany from a long-term deposit which might be made in a newly created Bank for International Settlements.

The railway and industrial bonds issued at the suggestion of the Dawes Committee should be cancelled, and the Reparation Commission, along with most of the other foreign control boards, abolished. It was the firm belief of the Committee "that the basis of security for the payment of annuities is the solemn undertaking of the German Government, to which no further guarantee can add anything whatsoever." To protect German currency against possible disorganization because of difficulty in meeting the conditional obligations, the Plan provided that "the German Government by giving at least ninety days' previous notice shall have the right to suspend for a moratorium period of two years from its due date all or part of the transfer of that part of the annuity described as postponable."

In order to provide for a transitional period and avoid a sudden shock to German economic conditions, it was advocated that deliveries in kind be continued for a period of ten years, in annually decreasing amounts. During the first year deliveries to the value of \$178,650,000 might be made. During the tenth, \$71,460,000 would be the maximum. These payments, which were, of course, to be included in the total annuities, averaged

about one-half of the deliveries in kind which had been fixed by the Dawes Plan. In the ten years France was to receive a total of 54.45% of the payments in kind, and England, 23.05%.

It remained only to remove the shadow of politics from the reparation problem and to provide for some intermediary agency to handle the technical details arising between the original payment of the annuities by Germany in marks and the final receipt of these payments in their own currency by the individual creditor powers. To achieve these ends the Young Committee recommended the establishment of a Bank for International Settlements.

In connection with the annuity payments this bank was to act as trustee for the creditor countries. It was to perform "the entire work of external administration of this plan, . . . act as the agency for the receipt and distribution of funds, and . . . supervise and assist in the commercialization and mobilization of certain portions of the annuities." Furthermore, the bank was "to provide additional facilities for the international movement of funds, and to afford a ready instrument for promoting international financial relations." Thus it was in reality to be a bank for the several national central banks, with a capital stock of \$100,000,000, only one-fourth of which was to be paid up immediately. It was hoped that the sound use of credit through the Bank for International Settlements would help "contribute to the stability of international finance and the growth of world trade."

The bank was to be endowed with broad powers, including the authority to deal with all questions relating to the postponable reparation items. It was to be managed by a board of directors consisting (1) of the governors of the central banks of the seven nations represented on the Young Committee, or by their nominees; (2) of one additional director appointed by each of these governors from among his countrymen; and (3) of not more than nine additional directors chosen by the first fourteen from lists submitted by the other governments interested in the reparation settlement. Sound banking, not politics, was to guide the board in its deliberations.

The advantages of the Young Plan over that of 1924 were clearly set forth by the Young Committee itself:

The proposed plan continues and completes the work begun by the Dawes Plan, which the position alike of Germany and of the other countries made it impossible to do more than indicate in outline in 1924. By the final reduction and fixation of the German debt, by the establishment of a progressive scale of annuities, and by the facilities which the new bank offers for lessening disturbance in the payment of annuities, it sets the seal on the inclusion of the German debt in the list of international settlements. If it involves appreciable reduction of payments to the creditor countries on what might have been anticipated under the continued operation of the Dawes Plan, it at the same time eliminates the uncertainties [such as the index of prosperity] which were inherent in that plan, and were equally inimical to the interest of the debtor and to the creditors, by substituting a definite settlement under which the debtor knows the exact extent of his obligations.

The Young Plan was fairly well received in diplomatic circles, and delegates were selected to meet in conference at The Hague on August 6, 1929, in order to draft a protocol for putting the new arrangement into effect.

The Hague Conference sat until August 31, adjourned, and then held a second session from January 3 to 20, 1930. At first it appeared as though the proceedings would be wrecked through the intransigence of England's leading delegate, the Laborite Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip Snowden, who objected to three aspects of the Plan. He demanded that England's share of the payments be restored to the level agreed upon at Spa in 1920, that her proportion of unconditional annuities be increased, and that further limits be placed upon the deliveries in kind. But agreement finally was reached, at one-thirty in the morning of August 28, 1929, by a virtual acceptance of the British demands. Snowden secured for his country an annual increase of almost \$10,000,000 in the first thirty-seven annuity years, an assignment of about \$13,000,000 a year in unconditional payments, and prohibition of the reexport by the creditor countries of the deliveries received from Germany in kind.

Other difficulties remained to be smoothed out, but by January 20, 1930, the delegates were able to sign a Final Act which provided for the going into force of the Young Plan as soon as (1) it was ratified by any four of the following creditors: France, England, Belgium, Italy, Japan; (2) the laws necessary for its operation were promulgated in Germany; and (3) the Bank for International Settlements was established. The Act also sub-

stituted the new schedule of payments retroactively for the Dawes schedule as from September 1, 1929, and provided for the complete evacuation of the Rhineland by Allied troops "not later than the end of June, 1930."¹ Finally, at the insistence of the French, who were frightened by a renewal of nationalist outbursts in Germany, the idea of sanctions was revived by a clause which restored to the various Allied powers "full liberty of action" whenever the Permanent Court of International Justice should declare Germany in wilful default.²

Ratification of the Final Act occurred in the spring of 1930. Only in Germany did the government encounter much trouble in securing popular approval for the Plan. There Dr. Schacht, maintaining that the payments could not be met, resigned as head of the Reichsbank in protest, while Dr. Alfred Hugenberg, a former Krupp director and now leader of the extreme nationalists, forced the holding of a plebiscite on the question. The vote was favorable to the authorities and the Plan therefore went into effect.

Once more the nations were relieved, feeling, apparently, that a "complete and final settlement" had at last been reached. Yet, within less than two years, the Young annuities had to be suspended.

MORATORIUM, 1931-1932³

In the German parliamentary elections of September, 1930, the extremists of both the right and left, all opponents of the Young Plan, won surprisingly many votes.⁴ Foreign investors thereupon became uneasy and a heavy withdrawal of money from Germany resulted. Within a few weeks \$200,000,000 was recalled, and although a large loan from a New York syndicate tended to stabilize conditions between November and the


¹ The last foreign soldiers left the Rhineland some time after this date, but at any rate the provocative question of the occupation was definitely ended five years before the minimum time limit set by the Versailles Treaty.

² At this time new reparation arrangements, extending in each case until 1966, also were reached with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. They were incorporated in a Paris Agreement on Eastern Reparations, signed April 28, 1930. Turkey was excused from all reparation payments by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).

³ For the material in this section I have drawn heavily on Lippman, W. and Scroggs, W. O., *The United States in World Affairs, 1931, 1932*.

⁴ See p. 394.

TOTAL YOUNG PLAN ANNUITIES 1930 — 1988



Courtesy of the New York Evening Post

This diagram illustrates the expected flow of payments under the terms of the Young Plan and the various Inter-Allied debt agreements. It will be seen that most of the moneys would eventually reach the United States. The question of the Allied war debts to the United States is discussed in greater detail in Chapter XXII.

following May, it was clearly apparent that "German finances were . . . easily capable of being upset."

Conditions elsewhere in Europe were little better. The whole structure of western political economy seemed to be breaking down under the strain of post-war readjustments. The entire world was in the grip of a prolonged depression. Relief proposals, of course, were legion, but the only really important development was a scheme for the creation of an economic federation of Europe, advanced before the League Assembly (September, 1930) by Aristide Briand, the French Foreign Minister. Unfortunately, it soon appeared that the motive behind this idea was "not so much to revive the economic life of the Continent as to consolidate the hegemony of France and uphold the dispositions of the peace treaties. Point was given to this view of the project by the fact that the French were just then further strengthening their immense frontier defenses and building up a huge gold reserve.

With great diplomatic tact, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Johann Schober, advised the Assembly at Geneva that the situation was far too acute to permit of long-drawn-out negotiations for a Pan-Europa, but that a beginning in the direction of federation should be made by the prompt conclusion of regional agreements. The suggestion was favorably received, and throughout 1931 a series of economic and grain conferences was held in the leading European capitals. Economic rivalry and national jealousy, however, prevented the reaching of any important understanding other than an Austro-German agreement to conclude a customs union.

On March 23, 1931, Germany and Austria made public the text of this agreement to conclude a treaty which, while fully maintaining the independence of the signatories and paying due regard to their respective obligations to third states, would "mark the beginning of a new order of European economic conditions on lines of regional agreements." Barring a few exceptions during a transitional period, customs duties between Germany and Austria were to be entirely abolished. Goods from other countries were to be subject to identical duties in the two republics, the schedules to be arrived at by joint agreement. Wherever possible, the signatories were to negotiate similar

though separate trade treaties with third powers. The respective customs administrations were to be independent of one another, but all receipts were "to be apportioned between the two countries according to a quota." The parties were ready "to enter into negotiation for a similar agreement with any other country expressing such desire."

Lest misunderstanding result, Dr. Julius Curtius, the German Foreign Minister, explained the step as follows:

The attempt which M. Briand has launched in his vast plan to unite all or almost all the states of Europe in common action cannot succeed except through long and difficult effort because of the great differences in the political economy and conditions which exist in the various countries of Europe. . . . The aim which we have all set before us of a union of all the European states will be more easily realized if we conclude regional agreements and if we create spheres of influence which it will be much easier later to incorporate in a general Pan-European organization. Germany and Austria have decided to start out on this road in a first practical act. . . . In acting this way, the German and Austrian governments will, I hope, contribute in very vital fashion to the fundamental idea of a United States of Europe, an idea which envisages not only the economic entente but also the consolidation of European and world peace.

The announcement of the contemplated customs union was cordially received in England, where the bankers were in favor of any move that might help safeguard their foreign loans, but it was the cause of excited outbursts in France and among France's central European allies. Professing to see in the proposed customs pact a veiled *Anschluss* or Austro-German union, France sought to prevent its consummation by strong diplomatic and financial pressure. Thus she quite suddenly adopted an uncompromising stand in the current Anglo-Franco-Italian naval parleys which until then had been progressing fairly satisfactorily, and made the granting of a much-needed loan of \$21,000,000 to Austria contingent upon the latter's renunciation of the customs protocol.

Austria needed this money in order to save from collapse the *Kredit Anstalt*, a bank which had numerous foreign branches, which controlled almost three-fourths of Austrian banking, and which dominated two-thirds of Austria's industry through share holdings and credit advances. Despite the emergency Austria rejected the politically-weighted French terms and appealed to

England instead. On June 16, 1931, the Bank of England advanced the money in the form of a short-term loan renewable at seven-day intervals. This development was generally regarded as a diplomatic defeat for France, and the authorities at Paris were obviously angry with Britain.

The most serious immediate international outcome of the Austrian affair was the precipitation of another financial crisis in Germany, for "although the commitments of the German banks in Austria were an insignificant part of their total assets, the (difficulties) of the *Kredit Anstalt* shook confidence in the solvency of Central Europe." Panic had indeed for some time been latent in Germany's adverse trade balance, in the vulnerability of her financial structure, and in her growing budgetary deficit.¹

Hampered by reactionaries and communists at home and by French diplomacy abroad, the German Government had energetically striven to avert economic ruin. Between July, 1930, and July, 1931, Chancellor Briining, backed by President von Hindenburg, issued dozens of emergency decrees increasing taxes, lowering salaries, pensions, and unemployment benefits, and effecting other economies, chiefly at the expense of education and social welfare. But the Austrian exigency, combined with the adverse psychological effect of an ill-timed visit of Briining and Curtius to England (June 6, 1931) at the very time when French good-will was needed, precipitated a new crisis. Well-to-do Germans, fearing national bankruptcy, hastily invested in foreign securities, while panicky Americans, Dutchmen, and Swiss withdrew their credits at a rapid rate. In the first three weeks of June, 1931, the Reichsbank lost \$227,000,000 in gold, equivalent to 41 % of its total holdings. It appeared doubtful, on Saturday, June 20, whether the German banks would reopen their doors on the following Monday.

At this juncture President Hoover, in the interest of the "economic recovery of the world," proposed a one-year world moratorium from July 1, involving postponement "of all payments on inter-governmental debts, reparations and relief debts,

¹ Germany's unfavorable balance of trade for the period 1924-1931 was 6,300,000,000 marks. The budgetary deficit in 1931 was 1,250,000,000 marks. Unemployment figures in the same year advanced to 6,000,000. In July, 1931, the short-term credits of the republic totalled \$3,000,000,000.

both principal and interest . . . not including obligations of governments held by private parties." Before making his announcement the President had secured the approval of his cabinet, of experts in international finance, and of leading Senators and Representatives. He was careful, none the less, to make a simultaneous declaration that he did "not approve in any remote sense of the cancellation of the debts to" the United States.

The scheme was hailed with enthusiasm by the American people and was agreeable to every important country except France. The French objected that the Hoover proposal bore no relation to the Young Plan, whose form they were anxious to maintain intact. Consequently more than two weeks were spent in harmonizing the Hoover scheme with the Young Plan, and although the moratorium by common consent was allowed to go into effect on July 1, 1931, the final arrangements were not concluded until five days later.

The main points of the moratorium were as follows: (1) All inter-governmental debt payments, including conditional reparation dues, were to be postponed for the year July 1, 1931-June 30, 1932; (2) the unconditional reparation payments were to be continued by Germany, but the Bank for International Settlements was to reinvest the entire sum in government-guaranteed German railway bonds, the railway immediately handing back the funds to the government; (3) the postponed dues were to be paid in ten equal instalments commencing July 1, 1933 ; (4) assistance was to be given the smaller European states whose finances might be seriously disturbed by the discontinuance of reparation receipts, by loans from the larger central banks acting through the B. I. S.; (5) in the matter of deliveries in kind, a committee of experts was to "reconcile the material necessities with the spirit of President Hoover's proposal"; and (6) assurances were to be given that Germany would use the money freed by the moratorium "for exclusively economic purposes," not for military preparations.

When the plan went into effect optimism in the United States ran high and stocks registered a considerable advance. But so far as Germany was concerned, the moratorium negotiations were little more than a general advertisement of her financial

exhaustion and of the continued bitterness of Franco-German diplomatic relations. On the day the moratorium went into force the gold coverage of the Reichsbank was down to 40.1%, the gold loss in the last week of June alone having been more than **\$100,000,000.**

In July the heavy losses continued, a French loan being rejected because of its unacceptable political conditions, which included a request that Germany recognize her eastern frontier as definite. On July 13 the great *Darmstadter und Nationalbank* failed and on the fourteenth all German banks were forced by governmental decree temporarily to close their doors. To deal with the new crisis, "conversations" were held in Paris (July 17 to 19), followed by a conference at London (July 20 to 23). The whip hand at these gatherings was held by France, who alone in Europe had large funds available, but who was angered by the continued attempts of Germany, Austria, England, and the United States to reach vital settlements without her assistance.¹ The French had few German investments, but they regarded their reparation claims as a sort of first mortgage on Germany, the payment of which was far more important than the security of the speculative investments of the British, Americans, and others.

In accord with a decision reached at the London Conference, the B. I. S., on August 8, convened a committee "to inquire into the immediate further credit needs of Germany and to study the possibilities of converting a portion of the short-term credits into long-term credits." Ten days later this committee, headed by its American chairman, Albert H. Wiggin, reported. It recommended that the existing short-term credit be continued for a period of six months and pointed out the need for additional credits in the form of a long-term loan. In this latter connection, however, the committee made clear that "financial remedies alone will be powerless to restore the world's economic prosperity until there is a radical change" in the policy of obstruction whereby the nations had permitted "the development of an international financial system which involves the annual payment of large sums by debtor to creditor countries, while at the same time putting obstacles in the way of the free movement

¹ On September 3 Germany and Austria renounced their proposed customs pact. See p. 429.

of goods." Until international commerce should be freed from artificial obstructions such as tariffs, therefore, it was impossible "to suggest definite plans for securing to Germany long-term credits."

The first recommendation of the committee was promptly adopted and a "Standstill Agreement" reached whereby all short-term credits to Germany were extended until February 29, 1932. This was merely a temporary measure and could in no way be regarded as a final solution of the financial crisis. Hence, at Germany's urgent request, the B. I. S. convened a Special Advisory Committee at Basel in December, 1931. This Committee, in possession of more facts than the Wiggin Committee, reported on December 23 that "Germany would be justified in declaring — in accordance with her rights under the Young Plan — that in spite of the steps she has taken to maintain the stability of her currency she will not be able in the year beginning in July next (1932) to transfer the conditional part of the annuity."

Calling for concerted action in the world crisis which had now taken "formidable dimensions" as a result of the general decline in volume of world trade and the fall in gold prices, the Committee further stated that the prompt "adjustment of all inter-governmental debts to the existing situation of the world . . . is the only lasting step capable of reestablishing economic stability and real peace."

The seriousness of the situation was at last brought home to all the statesmen. The "Standstill Agreement" relating to short-term credits was extended for another year from February, 1932. Not long thereafter Chancellor Brüning announced that Germany, with the best of intentions, could not continue the Young annuities. It was no longer a question of the will to pay — Germany *could* not pay. In the meantime British finance had also crashed,¹ and this new crisis shook still more the confidence of the world in its financial structure. Hopefully, England, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Japan agreed to hold another reparation conference in June, 1932, this time at Lausanne. "The object of the conference," said a British communique, "will be to agree on a lasting settlement of the questions

¹ See p. 250.

raised in the report of the (Special Advisory Committee) and on measures necessary to solve the other economic and financial difficulties which are responsible for and may prolong the present world crisis."

LAUSANNE, 1932

On June 16, 1932, the representatives of Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan met at Lausanne, as per schedule, to consider measures for the improvement of the world economic situation. After three weeks of discussion an agreement was reached which provided for the reduction of the German reparation debt to a total of 3,000,000,000 marks or \$714,000,000. To meet this debt the Berlin Government was to deliver to the B. I. S. five per cent bonds for the entire amount. The bonds were to be held by the bank as trustee for three years, after which they might be negotiated and placed in the open market. Germany might at any time redeem at par bonds not yet issued, and after fifteen years all bonds which the bank had been unable to negotiate were to be cancelled. Interest on the bonds was to be calculated from the date of their negotiation.

It was not philanthropy which induced the creditor delegates to agree to a forfeiture of more than ninety per cent of the Young reparation figure. They were motivated primarily by a desire to make possible the revival of world trade and to remove the fateful cloud of insecurity which hovered over the nations. The return of prosperity, they felt, was dependent upon commerce and security, and these should be restored through the virtual abolition of reparation. In addition, the Lausanne Conference urged the League of Nations to convene at the earliest possible opportunity a world economic and monetary congress.

When the agreement was made public, the newspapers everywhere hailed the beginning of a new epoch in post-war history. Franz von Papen, who had become German Chancellor after the resignation of Heinrich Brüning (May 30), was regarded at home and abroad as an astute and able diplomat. But there was another side to the story. It soon was revealed that the delegates of England, France, Italy, and Belgium had come to a separate "gentlemen's agreement" which provided that the Lausanne convention would have final effect only after ratifica-

tion by the several powers and that such ratification would not follow "until a satisfactory settlement had been reached between them and their own creditors." In case no such settlement could be arranged, "the agreement with Germany will not be ratified and a new situation will arise and the interested governments will confer on what is to be done. In such an event the legal position is that which existed before the Hoover moratorium." Germany was, of course, to be notified of these reservations.

Now, the chief creditor of the signatories of the gentlemen's agreement was the United States, and the American Government had repeatedly and consistently maintained that there was no official relation between reparation and war debts. As late as the winter of 1931, when representatives of France and Italy had approached President Hoover on the question of a general revision of inter-governmental debts, he had insisted that Europe must work out its own reparation solution independently of anything the United States might do. Apparently the Lausanne agreement was meant to be a step in this direction, but its announcement was received in Washington with vigorous assertions to the effect that cancellation of the war debts was unthinkable even if reparation obligations were entirely abolished. Many Americans resented what they regarded as an attempt by Europe to pass on responsibility for the world dilemma to the United States. The Democratic Party went so far as to insert an anti-cancellation plank into its campaign platform of 1932.

The Lausanne agreement therefore was dropped, at least temporarily, and the world depression continued, while the nationalists in Germany renewed and intensified their attacks against the "weak" government which could force no large concessions from the former Allies. One gain seemed fairly evident, however, that probably no future conference could ever set a higher reparation figure than the one established at Lausanne.¹

¹ In accord with the resolution of the Lausanne Conference, the League Council made preparations for the convening of a world economic and financial gathering at London in 1933. In order to secure the cooperation of the United States it was necessary to omit from the agenda all talk of reparation, war debts, and tariffs. Few international debt payments were met in the months following the expiry of the Hoover moratorium on June 30, 1932.

CHAPTER VIII

WANTED: SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

THE NEW HEGEMONY OF FRANCE

Long before the last echoes of the World War had died down, France, victorious but worried, embarked upon a prolonged "search for security" — security, in particular, against the bogey of another German invasion. Twice within the memory of living men had the pounding of German military boots been heard on French soil, and the citizens of the Third Republic were fearful of still another incursion. So long as Germany retained a shadow of her former economic and military might and so long as her population increased at a rate far greater than that in France, it seemed necessary to seek iron-clad guarantees of protection and help.

The leader in this hunt for security was Raymond Poincare who, born in Lorraine, nourished from earliest youth a bitter hatred of Germany, the despoiler of his native province. So frantic were his efforts at times to find safeguards that some of his own countrymen reproached him with "monstrous cowardice." The foreign policies of other French premiers, however, of the conservative Tardieu, of the liberal Herriot, and even of the moderate and optimistic Briand, were all motivated by the same fear. Differ as they might in their views on domestic policies, the statesmen of France invariably sought one common goal in international affairs: security.

The first practical post-armistice step in the achievement of security was the signing, on June 28, 1919, of two identical treaties of guarantee between France and England, and France and the United States. These treaties, it will be recalled, provided that England and the United States, respectively, should "come immediately to (France's) assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by

Germany." Whatever comfort France might have gotten from these agreements was destined to be short lived. The United States Senate refused to ratify the American treaty, and thereupon the one with England, although already ratified, automatically became void, since its acceptance had been made "contingent upon the United States Government undertaking

Of more lasting satisfaction was a Franco-Belgian military alliance of September, 1920, which provided that each signatory should come to the support of the other in case of attack by Germany.¹ The League of Nations was notified of the existence of the military accord but the actual terms were kept secret. In 1929 there were rumors of a revision of the treaty and the Dutch became alarmed over the possibility that it might have been altered so as to envisage military action against Holland as well as Germany. The reason for this fear was that the government of the Netherlands in 1927 had rejected a proposed convention with Belgium under which the latter would have gained valuable commercial benefits.

Next, France sought a substitute to take the place occupied in the pre-war alliance scheme by Russia. The logical candidate was Poland, for the latter stood in as much fear of vengeful Germany and, incidentally, of Soviet Russia, as did France. The natural attachment between the two republics was further increased when France, in 1920, lent Poland men, money, and munitions with which to fight the Bolsheviks, whom the French feared only less than the Germans. A Franco-Polish treaty was signed on February 19, 1921, and ratified in May, 1922. bound the two governments to consult on all International matters of mutual interest and to act in concert for the maintenance of all treaties to which they were or might become parties. The better to defend their territories and safeguard their legitimate interests, the signatories also undertook to lend one another military aid in the event of any unprovoked attack.

In the following years this treaty was supplemented by half a

¹ As the price for this alliance France agreed to the inclusion of Luxemburg in a customs union with Belgium, although the Luxemburgers had earlier voted for an economic affiliation with France.

dozen conventions, including a military agreement of September, 1922, which apparently was aimed at Soviet Russia. The military convention was renewed in 1932 for a further period of ten years. Under its terms France lent Poland commissioned and non-commissioned officers and kept her liberally supplied with war materials.

The pivot of two alliances, France also determined once more to approach England. The Entente Cordiale, it was felt, was still in existence; why not strengthen it? Late in 1921, accordingly, the French Ambassador in London presented to the British Foreign Secretary plans for a definite political alliance. The ensuing negotiations were not happy. The British would promise immediate assistance only in case of a direct German invasion of France, but even Poincaré had to admit that there was little likelihood of unprovoked German aggression against French soil in the near future. On the other hand, France was apprehensive lest Germany attack Poland, and in that event the Third Republic was bound by treaty to come to the aid of her ally. It was against such a contingency that the French sought treaty assurance of British military support for thirty years. But Lloyd George refused to commit himself to anything more than a ten-year agreement to help France in the event of a direct German attack. Such an arrangement was tentatively concluded at Cannes (January, 1922).

Meanwhile other differences had arisen between France and England. At the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armaments (1921-1922),¹ a proposal of Great Britain and the United States to abolish submarines was laid aside largely because of the opposition of France. The breach between the two former allies was widened still more by their opposing views on the German reparation question. In July, 1922, therefore, further alliance negotiations lapsed. Early in 1923, when France, over the protests of Britain, sent troops into the Ruhr, the Entente Cordiale was terminated.

Worried by the unexpected complications arising from the Ruhr occupations, France at once set out to find additional friends. Diplomatic "feelers" were extended, and in October 1923, President Masaryk and Foreign Minister Beneš of Czecho-

¹ See p. 206.

Slovakia were induced to visit Paris. Three months later, on January 25, 1924, a Franco-Czech pact was concluded whereby the signatories agreed to settle by pacific means any disputes that might arise between them; promised to consult with one another if Germany and Austria tried to unite, or if Germany or Hungary attempted a monarchist restoration; and undertook to "concert upon" common measures in dealing with matters relating to their security or the peace treaties. Thus, within less than five years after the signing of the Versailles Treaty and the adoption of the Covenant of the League, four links had been forged in a new chain — military alliances.

In June, 1926, France concluded another security agreement. This time with Rumania. The two powers promised never to attack or invade each other except in legitimate defense or under a League decision, and to submit to arbitration all disputes arising between them. Subject to any resolutions that might be passed by the League Council or Assembly, they agreed to act together in forestalling attempts to change the political status of Europe as determined by the peace treaties. Finally, they undertook, within the framework of the League Covenant, to consult with one another regarding prospective action if either were attacked without provocation.¹ In November, 1927, France signed a similar treaty with Yugoslavia.

Meanwhile the several eastern allies of France had formed a partnership among themselves. In 1920 and 1921 a Little Entente was organized by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania for purposes of keeping intact the Treaty of Trianon, preventing a restoration of the Habsburgs, and opposing a solid front to any possible Hungarian irredentist outbreak. The entente was effected by the signing of three dual alliances, between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (August 14, 1920), Czechoslovakia and Rumania (April 23, 1921), and Yugoslavia and Rumania (June 7, 1921). In March, 1921, moreover, Rumania signed a treaty of alliance with Poland, and during 1922 opportunity was found for the establishment of cordial relations between the remaining members of the Little Entente and

¹ Rumania in a special protocol promised not to provoke a war with Russia, for France had no desire to become involved in a military conflict because of an ally's aggression.

Poland.¹ Finally, for the sake of adopting a unified policy and making possible economic as well as diplomatic cooperation, the foreign ministers of the entente states decided to hold periodic conferences to which Poland might on occasion be invited. At the tenth such conference, held in May, 1929, the set of entente treaties was renewed.

The ties that bound these satellite to France were not alone those of treaty obligations, but also those of finance over a period of years. French bankers lent the four states hundreds of millions of dollars and extended to them huge credits for munition purchases in France. The financial relations between the countries in the year 1931 offer an excellent illustration of this situation. In March, Rumania secured a foreign loan of \$50,000,000, most of the money coming from Paris. In April, Czechoslovakia received a French loan of \$50,000,000, the negotiations being concluded on the same day that Foreign Minister Benes denounced before the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies the proposed Austro-German customs union. Poland was able in the same month to borrow \$40,000,000 in Paris, the specific creditors in this case being the *Banque des Pays du Nord* and the Schneider-Creusot munition manufacturers. In May, finally, Yugoslavia contracted a loan of \$42,000,000 for purposes of financial stabilization and the construction of public works.

The new French hegemony thus created in the name of security actually was founded upon an armed *camp* of the type that had proved so futile and dangerous in 1914. The combined standing armies of the Little Entente and Poland in 1932 totalled about 800,000 men, and France boasted 600,000 effectives. This imposing military array loomed large as a fresh challenge to the peace of Europe and was one of the moving factors behind the conclusion of two other treaty systems, centering, respectively, in Soviet Russia and Fascist Italy.

RUSSIAN PRECAUTIONS

On April 10, 1922, the representatives of thirty-four nations, including Germany and Russia, met at Genoa to devise ways

¹The Polish-Rumanian treaty of 1921 was directed chiefly against Russian aggression. When the agreement was renewed in 1926 and again in 1931 its scope was widened so as to include a Rumanian guarantee of Poland's western boundaries against German aggression.

and means for improving the European economic situation. The conference appeared to be progressing satisfactorily and discussions on various loans and credits were well advanced, when news reached the gathering that on Easter Sunday (April 16) Walter Rathenau and George Chicherin, chiefs, respectively, of the German and Russian foreign offices, had signed a treaty at the little Italian watering place of Rapallo.

There was sufficient cause why these two powers should have been drawn together at this time. Neither had as yet been restored to membership in good standing among the nations of Europe, both were fearful of the possible designs of an unfriendly Allied or French-controlled coalition, and both were anxious to establish new trade contacts. To many Germans the pact seemed to clear the way to an alliance with Russia and make possible defiance of the Allies and their oppressive treaty demands. To the Russian leaders it meant the restoration of diplomatic relations with a Great Power, the opportunity to secure credit extensions, and lessened fear of the Franco-Polish alliance.

By the terms of the Treaty of Rapallo the Soviet Government was accorded recognition by Germany, reciprocal consular and trade relations were reestablished; and all pre-war debts and claims were mutually cancelled. If Russia ever paid her other creditors, however, Germany was to receive equal consideration. The news of the treaty angered the Allied delegates, and the Genoa Conference broke up without settling any of the major issues confronting the powers.

Within a few years after the conclusion of the Rapallo Treaty, the Bolshevik Government began to fear the formation of an overwhelming European coalition against Russia. Hence it was determined at Moscow to negotiate a series of non-aggression pacts with neighboring countries. The first such achievement was the signing, in December, 1925, of a treaty of friendship and neutrality with Turkey. The Turkish Republic shared Russia's distrust of the western states, and in particular of the League of Nations, because the latter had just awarded the rich Mosul district to Iraq and because of a dispute over the expulsion of the Greek Patriarch from Constantinople. In the treaty each signatory agreed not to attack the other and to remain neutral if the other were attacked by a third power or group of powers. Each

also undertook to remain aloof from any general political, financial, or economic move aimed at the other.

Four months later a similar covenant was signed at Berlin with Germany. The Reich was indignant over the bickerings which attended the vote on its admission into the League in that year and consequently the German Foreign Office looked with favor on closer relations with Moscow. The Berlin Treaty, which was closely patterned after the Turkish model, provided for mutual neutrality in the event of attack without provocation. Each signatory agreed not to participate in any financial or economic boycott directed against the other. Since Germany's entry into the League was still under consideration at this time, and since, under Article 16 of the Covenant, the League has the power to establish economic or financial boycotts, Germany promised to make reservations to this article which would permit her to refrain from action against Russia unless she herself considered Russia to be the aggressor. Before the end of 1926 the Bolsheviks had concluded similar agreements with Lithuania and Afghanistan, and not long thereafter non-aggression treaties were negotiated with Persia and Latvia.

In 1931 and 1932 there occurred a slight change in the Continental diplomatic line-up. France, for years the leading European foe of Soviet Russia, gradually shifted her position. The Third Republic had long been desirous of securing access to the vast Russian oil resources. Russia also placed huge orders abroad, and France saw no reason why these should nearly all fall to Germany, England, and Italy. In Germany, moreover, the reactionaries and monarchists were becoming strong enough to frighten both the French and the Bolsheviks, for the German nationalists openly threatened to repudiate the Versailles Treaty and vehemently paraded their hatred of communism. Hence, while still bound to Germany, Turkey, Italy, and other countries by neutrality or trade agreements, Russia in 1931 initialled, and in 1932 signed, a neutrality treaty with France.

In July, 1931, neutrality pacts were signed between Russia on the one hand and Finland and Poland severally on the other. A convention also was negotiated with Rumania, despite the fact that the Bolsheviks were not yet reconciled to the loss of Bessarabia to that Balkan kingdom. The reversals in Polish

and Rumanian diplomatic policies were owing to the example of France and to fear of the nationalist groups in Germany, Austria, and Hungary.¹ In the end, the new situation appeared to react most favorably to France since the latter was virtually assured that Russia would not participate with Germany and Fascist Italy in any violent attempt to revise the peace treaties which were so dear to Paris.

ITALIAN TREATIES

It was not to be expected that Fascist Italy would remain isolate3""wliile the other Continental powers were engaged in so frantic a search for securitv. Italy, in fact, had great ambitions ana bitter enemies7and Italy therefore needed friends.

The post-war period saw the development of a serious struggle between France and Italy for control of the western Mediteranean. In consequence there resulted a dangerous race in armaments, and extensive military preparations were made on both sides of the Franco-Italian border. Several times naval parleys between the Great Powers broke down because Italy insisted on parity with France, while *the -latter just as firmly contended* that parity was not allowable. Besides, France possesses territory both in Europe and North Africa which according to the Italians, belongs of right to them, Italy, finallyj regards Franc as being"chiefly to blame'for her inability in 1919 to secure more extensive colonial acquisitions.

Steps to build up an Italian hegemony were therefore undertaken shortly after Mussolini's advent to power. Treaties of friendship and neutrality were signed with Czechoslovakia (1924), Yugoslavia (1924), Rumania (1926), Spain (1926), Hungary (1927), Turkey (1928), Greece (1928), and Austria (1930). A military alliance was concluded with Albania (1927). Unusually favorable trade relations were established with Soviet Russia. By drawing especially closely to Hungary and Austria, and by openly siding with Germany and Russia on matters pertaining to the peace settlement, Italy eventually emerged as one of the strongest champions of peace treaty revision. Care was taken, at the same time, to keep up cordial relations with Eng-

¹ In November, 1932, the Russo-Rumanian negotiations for a non-aggression pact were dropped.

land, and in 1931 and 1932 special efforts were made to secure the good-will of the United States.




Thus, in 1932, fourteen years after the armistice, Europe was again divided into armed camps. In place of the two big pre-war alliances, each with a host of satellites, there were now three major groups. But, as in the previous case, a number of the countries simultaneously had ties with two opposing alliance nuclei, and as before, finance played a large part in determining the line-up. The outlook was hardly one to inspire confidence in the hearts of any European people. France, in particular, was virtually bound by her various treaties to defend the frontiers of five proteges, not one of which was a first-class power and each of which had numerous enemies. Fortunately, the organization of the new alliances was paralleled by several efforts to guarantee peace and security through more conciliatory means. Most of these attempts originated within the frame-work of the League.

GENEVA — LOCARNO — PARIS

According to Article 8 of the Covenant, the members of the League recognize "that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." The task of formulating specific plans for the reduction of armaments was entrusted to the Council, assisted by a permanent advisory commission on military, naval, and air questions. Even before the League began to function as a body, a beginning was made in the way of compulsory disarmament by the arms clauses of the peace treaties with the several defeated powers. Moreover, in a note to Germany of June 16, 1919, the Allies plainly stated that German disarmament was definitely to be regarded as one of the "first steps" toward a general reduction of armaments.

Upon formal invitation of the First Assembly of the League, the Council, in February, 1921, appointed a Temporary Mixed Commission to draw up proposals for the reduction of armaments. While the Commission was at work, the Second Assembly suggested that the proposals be embodied in a draft treaty, and the Third Assembly requested that the document provide some definite form of mutual security to be given in exchange for

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the limitation of armaments. The Commission acted on these views and eventually formulated a draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance which was unanimously adopted by the Fourth Assembly in September, 1923.

The document provided for security by a pledge of the signatories to come to the aid of any one of their number who was the victim of foreign attack. Parties to the treaty might enter into supplementary regional alliances, but these must not conflict with the general convention and must be acceptable to the League. The determination of the aggressor in any conflict was left to the Council, which must render a verdict within four days after the outbreak of hostilities. Regarding disarmament, it was stipulated that the Council should devise a scale of armament reductions to "a point compatible with national security." No country should secure the benefits of the mutual guarantee which did not limit its armaments according to the Council plan within two years after the publication thereof.

When the draft treaty was circulated among the powers, it failed to secure a single signature. Some nations were ready to accept its terms in principle, but many, including Great Britain and Germany, definitely repudiated it. Most of the states protested against the absence of any adequate definition of "aggression" or "aggressor," objected to the lack of an arbitration formula, and complained of the vagueness of the disarmament provision. England was especially averse to assuming the indefinite military obligations implied in the document. Under the circumstances it was generally felt that the treaty failed to provide that essential element of security which must precede any considerable reduction of armaments.

In the meantime the governments of England and France had come under the leadership, respectively, of Ramsay MacDonald and Edouard Herriot, two believers in moderation and peace. Both premiers seemed earnestly resolved to devise some formula whereby "arbitration, security, and disarmament" might become established as the foundation stones of all future international relationships. In September, 1924, they introduced a joint resolution at the Fifth Assembly of the League, reopening the entire question of security and disarmament. As a result of this move the Assembly, in the following month, unanimously ap-

proved "the most ambitious peace plan that governments had ever discussed" — a Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes

The Geneva Protocol, as it soon came to be known, stigmatized aggressive war as an international crime. To prevent such wars from arising, it stipulated that the nations adhering to its terms must agree (1) not to go to war against other signatories who abided by their international obligations; (2) to refer all justiciable disputes to the World Court and all political quarrels to the League Council or to special arbitration committees; (3) not to mobilize their armed forces while a dispute was in process of being arbitrated; (4) to regard as "aggressor"⁷ any nation which refused to submit a difference to some method of peaceful settlement or which rejected an arbitral decision and resorted to war; (5) to recognize the power of the League Council to declare an economic boycott against such an aggressor state; (6) that the costs of any war be "borne by the aggressor state up to the limit of its capacity," but that such indemnity include no cessions of territory; and (7) to participate in an international conference for the reduction of armaments. No part of the Protocol should go into effect until the efforts of this should have resulted in at least partial disarmament.

Although some of the smaller states displayed great eagerness to ratify the Geneva Protocol, the British refused to adhere to it, and the document never came into force. MacDonald was toppled from power on domestic issues soon after his return to London, and his successors, the Conservative Premier Baldwin and Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain, were of no mind to endorse world-wide commitments and sanctions. Moreover they had little faith in the "efficacy of compulsory arbitration as a means of preserving peace. Without the ratification England, of course, the Protocol was valueless. Fortunately this rejection of the first important attempt to define in general terms the aggressor in all future conflicts was soon followed by the acceptance of another scheme which aimed at least to make possible identification of any future aggressor in one of the worst of Europe's many sore spots: the Rhineland.

In the hope of allaying the mutual suspicions with which the French and Germans regarded each other's every action, Berlin

had several times (December, 1922; May, 1923; September, 1923) suggested to Paris the negotiation of protective agreements in the form of frontier guarantees, anti-war pledges, and arbitration projects. Each time, however, France had been cold to the proposals. Undismayed by these setbacks and by the fate of the Geneva Protocol, Germany, through Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, in February, 1925, once more broached the subject to France.

Stresemann suggested a pact between England, Italy, France, and Germany for guaranteeing the existing Rhine frontiers and for settling future international disputes by arbitration rather than war, and a series of arbitration treaties between Germany and her neighbors east and west. This time the conciliatory Briand in France and even Chamberlain in England lent willing ears to the plan, but before definite negotiations could be inaugurated, the French insisted (1) that Germany agree to seek League membership; (2) that Belgium become a signer of the proposed pact; (3) that nothing in the contemplated document be interpreted to interfere with France's obligations to her ally, Poland, or with the Allies' obligations under the League Covenant; and (4) that Czechoslovakia and Poland be invited to attend the proposed parleys. Stresemann accepted the conditions, for he was anxious at the time to secure new foreign loans and replace by a feeling of security the air of uncertainty which enveloped Europe.

From October 5 to 16, 1925, delegates from Germany, France, England, Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia met at Locarno in Switzerland. For the first time since the war all powers met on an equal footing. The proceedings were carried on informally and conversationally in a manner quite different from that which had prevailed at earlier gatherings. Even the knottiest points were solved by friendly discussion and frank interchange of opinion. So strikingly different were the attitudes of the delegates on this occasion from the usual diplomatic poses that the phrase "spirit of Locarno" was coined to describe the changed atmosphere.

In this spirit seven treaties or conventions were concluded to preserve the signatory states "from the scourge of war" and to provide "for the peaceful settlement of disputes of every

nature which might eventually arise between them." The documents initialled included a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, France, England, Italy, and Belgium; four arbitration treaties or conventions between Germany as the party of the first, and Belgium, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia severally as parties of the second; *and two special treaties of guarantee between France and Poland, and France and Czechoslovakia.*

In the major pact the powers "collectively and severally" guaranteed "the maintenance of the territorial status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France" as fixed by the Versailles Treaty, and the demilitarization of German territory west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine as stipulated in the same treaty. Germany, France, and Belgium also agreed that they would "in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other" except (1) in "legitimate defense"; (2) in case of a "flagrant breach" of the demilitarization formula; (3) in fulfillment of the sanctions of Article 16 of the League Covenant; or (4) as a result of League action against a state which was the first to attack a member of that body. The same three states, further, undertook to settle by peaceful means "all questions of every kind which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy."

All signatories bound themselves to aid the power against which a violation of the treaty was perpetrated. Where violation was doubtful, the League Council was to decide. The obligations of the signatories as members of the League were in no way to be affected by the pact, nor was the League itself to be restricted in any manner by the agreement. The treaty was to go into effect immediately upon Germany's entry into the League and was to remain in force until such time as the Council by a two-thirds majority might decide that the League "ensures sufficient protection to the high contracting parties."

The four arbitration treaties provided that all disputes between Germany and the several co-signatories "which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to

the Permanent Court of International Justice." This provision was not to apply to "disputes arising out of events prior to the present convention and belonging to the past," and hence was not binding in the case of problems which, like that of the Polish Corridor, arose out of the peace settlement. The remaining treaties, those between France and her two allies, provided that if the respective signatories were made to suffer from a failure to observe the undertakings of Locarno, they would "lend each other immediately aid and assistance, if such a failure is accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms."

The Locarno achievements were widely hailed as precursors of a new era in world history. Briand burst forth in optimistic speeches, prophesying the end of war and a future in which there would be only "conciliation, arbitration, peace!" Unfortunately, neither the pacts nor the spirit of Locarno were actual guarantees of peace. True, the Rhine frontier apparently was safeguarded. Germany gave up all claims to Alsace-Lorraine and France all hopes of a Rhineland protectorate. Yet the problem of Germany's eastern frontiers remained unsolved, and there was no real guarantee that it would be settled peaceably. The Locarno spirit of friendliness and compromise, moreover, was only sporadically evident in international affairs after 1925. It seemed to have been entirely forgotten in the very next year, while Germany's application for membership in the League was under consideration,¹ but it experienced a gratifying revival in 1927.

In the spring of the latter year Foreign Minister Briand despatched a note to Washington suggesting a Franco-American engagement "mutually outlawing war." After several months of correspondence the American Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, proposed (December 28, 1927) that France and the United States join in an effort to induce a number of the powers to sign a general anti-war pact. It was not difficult to interest the members of the League in such a scheme, for by signing the Covenant these powers had automatically promised to have recourse to war only as a means of last resort. Eight months later, on August 27, 1928, delegates from fifteen nations subscribed to an anti-war agreement in Paris. The • document,

¹Seep. 412.

which consisted of a preamble and three articles, soon came to be known as the Kellogg Pact or Pact of Paris.

In Article I the High Contracting Parties solemnly declared "in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." In Article II the states agreed "that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means." The third article outlined the terms of ratification and adherence. According to the preamble "any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty." If a signatory should break its pledge, therefore, the other parties would recover their freedom of action with respect to the trespasser. Copies of the document and invitations to adhere thereto were sent by Mr. Kellogg to forty-eight other countries. By August, 1932, a total of sixty-two acceptances had been recorded.¹

The negotiation of the Pact was surrounded by circumstances which gave it the appearance of being little more than a gesture. In an official letter written during the course of the parleys, Kellogg expressed the view of the United States that no anti-war treaty could contain anything "which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty." Obviously, the actions are few which cannot be classed under "self-defense." Moreover, the Pact did not renounce or outlaw war; it merely renounced war as an instrument of *national* policy. The community of nations remained free to indulge in any deadly fireworks which it deemed necessary. Again, there was no provision for enforcement. The Pact was founded on the hope that public opinion might be strong and influential enough, even in time of emergency, to restrain any particular nation from violating what were simply moral obligations. Finally, the entire

¹ Russia was so anxious to have this document come into force that she induced Esthonia, Latvia, Poland, and Rumania to adhere with her to the Litvinov Protocol (February, 1929) whereby the Pact became effective at once, regardless of the actions of other states. Later in the year Lithuania, Turkey, Persia, and the Free City of Danzig also adhered.

affair appeared cynical when the ratification of the document in the American Senate was followed three weeks later by the passage of a bill providing for the construction of fifteen new cruisers at a cost of over a quarter-billion dollars. The incident led a critic to remark: "What the government wants is more peace, and more ships to enforce it with."

Nevertheless the general acceptance of the Pact was a step in advance, a world cooperative step toward the outlawry of war "as an ideal and a goal." With a view, moreover, to bringing the League Covenant into closer harmony with the Pact, the Tenth Assembly, in September, 1929, proposed an amendment of that clause of the former which enjoined signatories to refrain from war until at least three months after the report of the arbitral or judicial body to which any particular dispute had been submitted, so as to read: "they [the disputants] agree that they will in no case resort to war." This suggestion, however, was slow to win general approval and had not been officially adopted by the end of 1932. Such incidents as the Sino-Japanese controversy of 1931-1932¹ seemed to indicate that a warless future could be guaranteed only if the Pact of Paris (or some substitute for this Pact) were provided with adequate "teeth" so that its violation would be regarded as something more serious than just the perpetration of an unmoral act.

THE PROGRESS OF DISARMAMENT

The delegates who were gathered at Geneva in September, 1925, for the Sixth Assembly of the League, faced a grave responsibility. Five Assemblies had already met, deliberated, and dispersed, and yet the question of disarmament was hardly nearer solution than it had been in 1920. True, there had been two attempts—the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol—to bring about a limitation of armaments, but both had been repudiated by the member states. Hence the time had come to take some definite action that would revive popular confidence in the League and be acceptable to the governments of the world. In this spirit the Assembly requested the Council "to make a preparatory study with a view to a Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments in order

¹ See Chapter XXI.

that, as soon as satisfactory conditions [of security] have been assured . . . the said Conference may be convened and a general reduction and limitation of armaments may be realized."

The Council heeded this request and appointed a Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, to meet at Geneva on May 18, 1926. There were represented on the Commission all the members of the Council, a number of other League members, Germany, and the United States. Russia was invited, but refused to participate until November, 1927, after the settlement of a dispute with Switzerland arising from the assassination in 1922 of a Soviet diplomat on Swiss soil. The agenda of the Commission consisted of a *Questionnaire* that had been prepared in December, 1925, by the Council. It was believed that the queries thus presented must receive constructive answer before a disarmament convention could be drafted.¹

The Commission divided the questions into two groups and referred them, along with some additional queries of its own, to two sub-committees, assisted by numerous special bodies of experts. At a second plenary session of the Commission, held in September, 1926, the sub-committees were urged on to greater speed, and by the middle of March, 1927, replies to the *Questionnaire* had been distributed to all the powers represented on the Commission.

On the basis of these answers the British and French governments prepared draft conventions to serve as starting points for the talks at the next session of the Preparatory Commission (March-April, 1927). The two drafts conflicted on nearly every vital issue, and there was little harmony in the conversations which were based upon them. The technical aspects of the disarmament problem were constantly pushed into the background by fear, jealousy, national pride, and economics. In general, the United States, Germany, and England were to be found on one side in the voting, and France and her satellites on the other.

Three problems proved to be especially thorny. Although it was agreed that limitation of land armaments necessarily

¹The questions may be found in J. W. Wheeler-Bennett's *Disarmament and Security since Locarno, 1925-1931*, 1932. On pp. 357-363 of the book can be found an excellent and succinct résumé of the national attitudes of the Great Powers towards disarmament.

involved limitation of effectives, there was a decided difference of opinion on how to estimate effectives. France and the other countries that employed conscription objected to the inclusion of trained reserves in the category of effectives, while the states with volunteer armies maintained that a man who had just completed several years of service with the colors was in every way as well prepared to fight as one who still drilled with his regiment. In the matter of naval limitation, England and the United States believed that there should be a total tonnage restriction for each nation, plus a limit on the tonnage of each class of ships. France and Italy, however, while subscribing to the idea of a limited total tonnage, thought that each country should be free to build within its allotment whatever vessels it saw fit. On the question of international supervision, France and her *cortège habituel*, as it has well been called, were anxious to set up an elaborate system of international control, whereas the other states contended that the main reliance for the enforcement of any disarmament program must be placed on the good faith of the parties concerned.

The Commission, unable to reach one final agreement, drew up a draft convention which embodied both the points that had secured general assent and the alternative texts of all articles on which there had been dissension. This convention did not come up for a second reading until April, 1929 — two years later. In the meantime many things happened in the spheres of security and disarmament.

To understand the story of the further disarmament proceedings of 1927, it is necessary first to refer briefly to the days of 1919-1920. Since the Peace Conference had ignored the question of the freedom of the seas, presumably at England's request, a number of influential groups in the United States agitated soon after the war for the building of a navy, second to none, that would be able to enforce American rights in any future conflict. For a time it appeared as if the pre-war Anglo-German naval rivalry would be replaced by an equally dangerous Anglo-American competition. By virtue of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, moreover, Japan would surely be on the side of England. To avoid, if possible, any such catastrophe, President Harding extended invitations to a group of powers to attend a conference

at Washington in the winter of 1921-1922 to consider naval limitation as well as the entire question of the Pacific and the Far East.

Seven treaties were drafted and signed by the Conference, and of these two five-power treaties dealt with naval limitation. In the one, the five powers (United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy) agreed that submarines should obey the same rules of naval warfare that applied to surface vessels, and outlawed asphyxiating gas as a weapon. The other limited the tonnage and fixed the quota of capital ships and aircraft carriers to be allowed each of the same five states.¹ The tonnage limits for capital ships were as follows: United States, 525,000 tons; Great Britain, 525,000 tons; Japan, 315,000 tons; France, 175,000 tons; and Italy, 175,000. These figures established the ratio of 5 : 5 : 3 : 1.67 : 1.67. In order to achieve the Washington limit, most of the powers had to scrap ships that were already built or under construction.

Five years after the adoption of this treaty President Coolidge invited (February, 1927) Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan to attend with the United States an international conference to consider the limitation of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. He reminded the powers that the Washington Conference had resulted in the imposition of tonnage restrictions on capital ships and aircraft carriers, and suggested that the time had come to deal similarly with the remaining classes of war vessels. Only Great Britain and Japan accepted the invitation. The other two states declared that such a conference would serve only to increase the difficulties under which the Preparatory Commission was working. France in addition professed to see in the invitation a disregard of the rights of small nations, particularly, it would seem, the nations that could be counted upon to vote as she did. Hence it was only a Three-Power Conference that opened in June, 1927, at Geneva. Mr. Hugh Gibson, the chief delegate from the United States, was elected president.

The Americans suggested a total tonnage restriction in each of the three ship categories under discussion and proposed the same ratio between the three powers that had earlier been decided

¹A capital ship is one which has a greater displacement than 10,000 tons and carries guns larger than eight-inch bore.

upon with regard to the capital ships and aircraft carriers, namely, 5:5:3. Although Japan was, on the whole, inclined to side with the United States on this and other matters, England, ruled by a Conservative ministry, held quite different views. She insisted that mathematical parity with the United States was by no means equivalent to practical parity and maintained that the need to protect 80,000 miles of trade and communication lines made it imperative that there be no restriction on her right to build small (7500-ton) cruisers with six-inch guns. However, she was anxious to set a limit upon the building of 10,000-ton cruisers with eight-inch guns — the type best suited to American needs because of America's paucity of naval bases and long coast line.

In August the Conference broke up, with nothing accomplished toward the further limitation of naval armaments. Instead, there was a renewal of the suspicion and ill-will between the United States and Great Britain that had temporarily subsided after the signing of the Washington treaties. One year after the end of the Conference the suspicion in America changed to indignation and anger.

The *New York American* in September, 1928, uncovered a secret military-naval compromise which earlier in the year had been reached by London and Paris. By the terms of the agreement France promised to support Britain's stand on naval limitation at all future disarmament meetings, and England withdrew her objections to the exclusion of trained reserves from the category of military effectives. The publication of this arrangement was greeted with so vigorous a popular protest in both England and America, that the London and Paris foreign offices eventually were forced to explain their actions in official communiques. Although the two powers protested that they had been motivated solely by a desire to speed disarmament, the American people were highly skeptical of Albion's sincerity. In February, 1929, Congress enacted a bill for the construction of a new aircraft carrier and fifteen cruisers of the very type which was most objectionable to the British Admiralty. The cost of these ships was placed at \$274,000,000.¹

¹ It is not known how the secret document was discovered by the newspaper. In 1930 France retaliated against William Randolph Hearst, owner of the *New York American*, by refusing him permission to visit the country. He was classed as "an enemy of the Republic."

While these events were taking place, the Preparatory Commission continued its deliberations. In the face of "international wrath and ridicule . . . the delegates wrestled with arguments about the effect of fog on war, split hairs about the allowances to be made for hogs in considering a nation's armament, and examined the history of international weather." In 1928 there was some excitement when Soviet Russia, represented by M. Litvinov, urged complete and absolute disarmament, including the abolition of all military, naval, and air forces and ministries, and the destruction of all heavy weapons, fortresses, and war-material factories. This task was to be carried out in either one or four years, and provision was to be made for the necessary national and maritime police forces to preserve domestic order and protect property.

The Russian proposal was tabled after a bitter speech by Lord Cushendun, who intimated that the real motive of the scheme was to enable the Bolsheviks the better to carry on their international propaganda. When Litvinov thereupon advanced a second plan, providing for gradual and proportional disarmament according to a fixed scale, Jonkheer Loudon, president of the Commission, requested the Soviet delegation to attend future meetings "in a constructive spirit and not with the idea of destroying the work . . . already done." (!) Only Germany and Turkey supported the Russian views, and it was rapidly becoming evident that Berlin was growing impatient over the delay of the former Allies in fulfilling their pledge in the Versailles Treaty to regard Germany's disarmament as "the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations."

During 1929, while the Commission, at its sixth session, was reading for a second time the draft convention of 1927 and effecting compromises on several hitherto disputed points, there occurred a *rapprochement* between the United States and England. The signing of the Kellogg Pact restored a measure of good feeling, and both President Hoover and Premier MacDonald expressed renewed hopes for a further reduction of naval armaments. In October the British Prime Minister visited the United States. The outcome of the resultant friendly conversations was the calling for January 21, 1930, of a London Naval Conference of the five great naval powers. Almost exactly

three months after the opening of the Conference, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan signed (April 22) a London Naval Treaty. Because of their contest for control of the western Mediterranean, France and Italy withheld their signatures from the pact. The document was proclaimed on January 31, 1931.

The treaty, which was to remain in force until 1936, solved the problem of relative cruiser strengths by compromise. The United States secured the right to have eighteen cruisers of the 10,000-ton, eight-inch gun type and 143,500 tons of smaller cruisers (total 323,500 tons). England was permitted to have fifteen of the large cruisers and 192,000 tons of smaller ones (total 339,000 tons). Japan was willing to accept a maximum of twelve 10,000-ton cruisers and smaller craft to the extent of 100,450 tons (total 208,850 tons). The tonnage allotments for destroyers were set at 150,000 tons each for the United States and Great Britain, and 105,000 tons for Japan. Each of the three powers was allowed to have a submarine tonnage of 52,700, and no new capital ships were to be laid down until 1936. The aircraft carrier figures were revised to read 135,000 tons each for the United States and England, and 105,000 for Japan.

Perhaps the most famous part of the treaty was Article 21, the so-called safeguarding or "escalator" clause. This gave permission to any one of the signatories to increase its tonnage in any category if, in its opinion, its national security was endangered by new construction on the part of any non-signatory. The only requirement in such case was prompt notification to the other treaty signers. The latter thereupon would become free to make proportionate increases in their own navies.

Although the treaty obviously accorded parity to the United States and Great Britain and checked any immediate race in armaments, it hardly deserved the gleeful reception which it received in some circles. America's naval tonnage allotment according to the London agreement was 1,114,600 tons — only 7000 tons less than her total naval strength at the opening of the Conference. Moreover, in order to replace obsolete vessels and build up to the parity level, it was estimated that the United States would have to expend more than a billion dollars in the period 1931-1936. Finally, since there was no special provision

for security, France left the gathering determined to maintain a fleet superior to any that Italy might build. Italy was equally determined to construct a fleet that would be on a par with the navy of France.

While the London Naval Conference was in progress, the Preparatory Commission had adjourned its sixth session in the hope that the naval deadlock might be broken. The failure of France and Italy to sign the treaty and the expectation of possible new developments during the League Assembly meeting in September, 1930, prolonged the adjournment until November. Then, however, the sixth session was resumed, and the delegates determined to reach results. On December 9, 1930, a final Draft Convention for the Disarmament Conference was adopted. The vote was far from unanimous, and important reservations were attached by one or more powers to virtually every important article.


In January, 1931, the League Council selected Geneva as the site of the world's first general Disarmament Conference, and fixed February 2, 1932, as the date of meeting. Four months later the Council designated Arthur Henderson, then British Foreign Secretary in England's second Labor Government, president of the Conference. In August the Labor Government fell and Henderson became the leader of the Labor opposition, but

EXPENDITURES FOR ARMAMENTS BY GREAT POWERS

	IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS		PERCENT- AGE OF INCREASE OR DE- CREASE FROM 1913-14 TO 1930-31	INDEX OF WHOLE- SALE PRICES (1913=100)	PER CAPITA ARMS EX- PENDITURES 1930-31 (IN DOL- LARS)
	1913-14	1930-31			
Great Britain	375.1	535	" f 42	116	11.48
France	348.7	455.3	+ 30	105	13.13
Italy	179.1	258.9	+ 44	100	7.92
Japan	95.5	232.1	+ 142	131	4.04
Russia	447.7	579.4	30	185	3.58
United States	244.6	727.7	+ 197	118	6.84
Totals	1690.7	2788.4	+ 65		
(Omitting Germany)					
Germany	463.3	170.4	- 63	122	2.70
Totals	2154	2958.8	+ 37		
(Including Germany)					

WORLD EXPENDITURE FOR ARMAMENTS

Comparison by years in millions of dollars



The world's expenditures for armaments in one year would pay the expenses of the League of Nations, the World Court, and the International Labor Office for six centuries. There was considerable opposition in Congress to appropriating \$450,000 to cover the expenses of the American delegation to the Disarmament Conference (1932), yet this sum represented less than one-sixteenth of one per cent of the amount appropriated in the previous year for American armaments.

when the gathering met he nevertheless attended as president. The Twelfth Assembly of the League, on a motion of the Italian Foreign Minister, Dino Grandi, passed a resolution (September, 1931) requesting the Council to urge all governments to give full proof of their desire to ensure the success of the forthcoming conference by agreeing for one year "to refrain from any measures involving an increase in their armaments." By January 1, 1932, this arms truce, which was to go into effect as of November 1, 1931, had been accepted by fifty-four nations, including the United States and Soviet Russia. When the Disarmament Conference opened, there were present more than two hundred delegates representing about sixty states.

The Draft Convention which was placed before the Conference in February, 1932, was a very general document which indicated the methods of limitation that might be adopted, but which left to the Conference the application of these methods and the decisions as to ratios and figures. It was a "skeleton lacking flesh and blood" and it offered merely blanks and dashes in place of figures. Among the specific recommendations were

budgetary limitation of armaments; limitation of periods of military service; limitation of military, naval, and air effectives; acceptance of the form of naval restriction laid down in the London Treaty; and the appointment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission to sit at Geneva and advise the League Council on the progress of fulfillment of the projected Disarmament Treaty.

Perhaps even more ominous for the success of the Conference than the flood of reservations to every one of these points and many others, was the official position once more taken by France. Armed at all points, protected by a ring of the world's most modern fortresses, and holding a sheaf of security agreements, France, in July, 1931, announced that the present state of her armaments was based entirely on the existing disarmed state of Germany. If Germany were permitted to add to her armaments, the Third Republic would be obliged to do likewise. At the Conference the French representatives steadfastly refused to vote for any general reduction of armaments unless adequate security were guaranteed, preferably by the placing of a powerful military and naval force under the control of the League of Nations. This means of achieving security, though endorsed by the allies of France, satisfied none of the other larger states. Deadlock therefore ensued.

The Conference dragged on wearily through the spring and summer of 1932, unable to agree on any really vital matters. The sessions were somewhat enlivened in June, when President Hoover publicly proposed that the arms of the world should be reduced by about one-third. He advocated abolition of all tanks, bombing planes, large mobile guns, and chemical warfare; reduction by one-third of all land forces above a minimum police component and of submarine and battleship tonnages; and tonnage reduction by one-fourth of all aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. "The time has come," he said, "when we should cut through the brush and adopt some broad and definite method of reducing the overwhelming burden of arms which now lies upon the toilers of the world." Such a reduction would not only augment the assurances of peace, but would "save the people of the world from ten to fifteen billions of wasted dollars during the next ten years."

Italy, Germany, and Russia welcomed the plan, but England and Japan opposed the complete abolition of tanks, bombing planes, and large mobile guns. France "sympathized" with the project but reminded the Conference that the reduction of armaments still was bound up with the organization of international security. She also explained that the scheme was incomplete since it made no provision for the application of international sanctions in the event of a nation becoming aggressive. Once more deadlock resulted, and after several months of well-nigh fruitless deliberation the Conference adjourned until January, 1933.¹

One of the most unfortunate results of the virtual failure of the Conference at its first session and of the attitude of France, was the reaction caused in Italy, Russia, and Germany. In the former two countries the authorities became more disdainful and impatient than ever of the impotence of the League and of international peace congresses. In the German Republic the fear of widespread European military preparations and alliance formations, the disgust over the intransigence of France, and the fervent desire for the restoration of the fatherland to a plane of complete equality with the other Great Powers, strengthened the hands of the restless nationalists. Through the mouth of Defense Minister General Kurt von Schleicher the nationalists definitely demanded (August-September, 1932) that the world either disarm down to the level set for Germany in the Versailles Treaty or recognize the equality of the Germans as a great people and place no obstacle in the way of their arming up to the degree of their neighbors. The German Government also, announced its intention to abstain from any further participation in the Disarmament Conference until the right of the Germans to absolute equality among the nations should have been admitted.

Thus, fourteen years after the close of the "war to end wars," the world armament situation was potentially one of the greatest

¹ During the course of the Lausanne Conference on Reparation in June and July, 1932, France and England found occasion to come to an agreement providing for the mutual exchange of views "with complete candor" on such outstanding problems as reparation, economic revival, and disarmament. This was at first regarded by the other powers as a renewal of the Entente Cordiale which had lapsed in 1923, but within the succeeding months most of the other European states adhered to the understanding.

threats of a new war. The number of men under arms at any one moment was greater than at any time in 1913, and in the face of a world-wide economic depression, the larger governments devoted from seventy to eighty per cent of their budgetary appropriations to paying for past conflicts, bolstering existing defenses, and preparing for future wars. The cry of millions was still for "security and disarmament."

CHAPTER IX

UNREST IN AFRICA AND ASIA

AN AWAKENING AFRICA

Shortly after the outbreak of the World War, Germany proposed to the Allies that the neutrality of the African colonies be maintained during the period of the conflict, on the ground that the preservation of Europe's ascendancy in Africa depended upon the solidarity of the white race in that continent. This suggestion was rejected, and the war was carried into Africa as well as into the other portions of the globe. Thus it happened that after the war, the general disorganization following an extended period of armed conflict combined with a series of other factors to produce great unrest from Morocco to the Cape of Good Hope.

Among the more provocative of these factors must be counted, first, the reaction against a long period of oppressive treatment; secondly, the influence of some of the religious teaching; thirdly, the increasing competition for work between blacks and whites in such relatively well-developed regions as South Africa; and fourthly, the effects of a certain amount of education.

When the western peoples in the nineteenth century contemplated the opening up of the Dark Continent, they were definitely aware of their moral obligations towards the backward Africans. As early as 1885, in the General Act of the Berlin Conference, the representatives of the leading countries of the western world had agreed for the sake of humanity and civilization "to protect the natives in their moral and material well-being; to cooperate in the suppression of slavery and the slave trade; to further the education and civilization of the natives; to protect missionaries, scientists, and explorers "; and to preserve the freedom of religion. An attempt to persuade the Conference to restrict the sale of liquor and firearms had come to nothing more than the expression of a general wish in favor of the control of these traffics.

Neither the agreements nor the wishes of the Conference were observed, and for years there was carried on a thriving trade in whisky, arms, and slaves. While there was considerable talk about what soon came to be known as the "white man's burden," relatively little was done before the war in the direction of shouldering this burden. Indeed, in order to make possible the realization of fat dividends on their investments, white concessionaires, from King Leopold of Belgium to Barney Isaacs of London, employed tactics that were anything but ethical or humane. The natural wealth of Africa and the physical powers of the inhabitants were ruthlessly exploited until the natives were driven in despair to rebel against the "black man's burden."

In Kenya, the former British East Africa, for example, the unrest reached a climax in 1921, when, as a result of a general economic depression, the white employers announced a reduction of wages for all black workers to two-thirds of their former level. The negroes at first were helpless, but eventually a native government clerk named Harry Thuku founded an East Africa Native Association and organized protest meetings. Thuku's speeches assumed an increasingly violent and anti-European tenor, and in spite of his alleged criminal record, his meetings sometimes were attended by as many as five thousand natives. In 1922 he was arrested for sedition, and when the crowds tried to interfere with the police at the jail where he was being held, the guards discharged their rifles, killing about twenty of the rioters. Thuku was deported to Jubaland without a trial, and the now leaderless natives consoled themselves by forming a harmless sort of black trade union to protect their common interests.

Although the religious doctrines disseminated by the missionaries in Africa frequently were calculated to make the natives satisfied with a position of inferiority relative to their white masters, some of the teachings had an opposite effect. The blacks were stirred by the recital of such incidents as David's victory over Goliath, by assurances that all human beings were God's children, and by the sentiments expressed in songs like "Onward, Christian soldiers, marching as to war!" In view of the susceptibility of negroes to emotional movements of the revivalist-meeting type, it is not remarkable that there should have appeared in various parts of Africa performers of miracles and

so-called prophets, who attracted large native followings. Frequently such movements became violently anti-European.

The most threatening of these manifestations occurred in 1921 in the Belgian Congo, where one Simon Kimbangu, a carpenter who had become a Baptist, dreamed that he was divinely directed to go forth and heal the sick. He followed this injunction and possibly did effect some cures, since his following increased tremendously. The "Kimbangists" established their own native chapels, churches, and schools, and, what was worse, stopped working in the fields in order to be near Kimbangu the Prophet. The latter volubly quoted passages from the Bible and boasted that his enemies were powerless to harm him. Gradually the movement grew more radical and revolutionary, and the white inhabitants of the Congo became alarmed. Kimbangu was arrested, and, after a picturesque trial, sentenced to death, though he had never advocated violent resistance to the whites. Later his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. As a result of this and similar occurrences, a district commissioner in the Lower Congo issued a decree prohibiting any native from teaching or preaching without a certificate from some Protestant or Catholic missionary organization.

In the Union of South Africa it was the increasing labor competition between the blacks and whites which led to unrest. Here the negroes, who outnumbered the whites four or five to one, gradually were becoming more and more skilled in the various occupations which previously had been monopolized by the latter. So serious did the challenge to white supremacy become that in 1918 the white trade unions threatened to call a strike unless the colored engineers were dismissed from a particular job.

Although the Supreme Court of South Africa took a hostile attitude towards regulations tending to discriminate between equally competent persons solely on the ground of color, the trade unions continued to agitate, together with the South African Labor Party, until the latter finally came into power. Then, in 1926, a Color Bar Bill was passed definitely excluding the blacks from certain occupations. The fact that whites were paid from five to ten times as much as were blacks for identical services meant, of course, that certain employing groups preferred negro

labor. The danger of a drastically lowered general standard of living, however, was serious enough to enable the more costly white labor to maintain, at least temporarily, its preeminence.

The modicum of education which had fallen to the Africans eventually led to the perception among a few leading natives that African conditions were in need of radical improvement, and that a determined stand must be made for fairer treatment. Indeed, in 1919, 1921, and 1923, negro delegates from Africa, and a few from America, met in Paris, London, and Lisbon, respectively, under the auspices of a Pan-African Congress, to draw up a charter of liberties for the black man.¹ Among the demands made were those for political, economic, and educational equality; the restoration of confiscated native lands; the checking of further ruthless industrial and concessionary exploitation; and the appointment by the League of Nations of direct diplomatic representatives with powers of investigation in the mandated areas.

These meetings, though they failed to lead to any immediate improvement in conditions, laid the basis for a growing race consciousness and served notice that the blacks were cognizant of the economic value of "their" continent. Certainly, with its population of 135,000,000, and with an area approximately equal to that of Europe and North America combined, Africa's value can only increase with the passing of years. Gold, diamonds, vegetable oils, cocoa, coffee, timber, copper, tin, rubber, sugar, cotton, all are found or can be raised in Africa in large quantities, to say nothing of ivory, cattle, meat, coal, fruits, and pepper. Intelligent natives naturally consider such a prize worth a struggle. They are determined that the cry of "Africa for the whites" shall eventually be shouted down by their own cry of "Africa for the Africans."

RECENT AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS

, It was not only the blacks in Africa who adopted a new attitude in the post-war years, but the whites, too, changed their views on several aspects of the native situation. True, during the war the traditional materialistic policies had been reflected

¹ The number of countries represented dwindled from thirty at the 1921 Congress to thirteen in 1923.

in the secret wartime dispositions made by the Allied powers of the German colonial possessions. At the Paris Peace Conference, however, as has been noted, President Wilson's idealism clashed with these imperialist aspirations. A compromise was effected, and in the Covenant of the League the "well-being and development" of peoples "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" were designated as "a sacred trust of civilization." Hence, instead of becoming outright owners of the lands which were taken from Germany on the ground of her mistreating the natives, the Allied countries became trustees, or stewards, of the League in the administration of affairs therein.

Despite the fact that a cynical view of this arrangement may readily be taken, particularly since the assignment of the mandates followed almost exactly along the lines of the secret agreements, it must be conceded that the written reminder of trusteeship and the creation of a Permanent Mandates Commission doubtless recalled to the white administrators their moral obligations to educate the colonials and develop the overseas areas for the benefit of the natives as well as the Europeans. This realization has been responsible for the introduction of a number of colonial reforms, and on occasion the policies of the mandatory powers towards their non-mandatory possessions also have come under the influence of the spirit of trusteeship.

Eventually, the whites came to realize that the continued abuse of native labor and the decimation of the population were entirely out of accord with the economic interests of the West. The concessionaires began to realize that rubber plantations were worthless without the necessary people to work them. The same condition held with respect to diamond and gold mines and fruit plantations. Thus the fear of economic loss also was responsible for the better treatment of the natives in some sections.

From 1920 on, France earnestly attempted to stimulate the economic development of her overseas possessions. It was hoped to secure a larger proportion of French imports, particularly raw materials, from the colonies. Progress was slow, however, and after more than a decade of effort, which included an impressive Colonial Exposition at Paris (1931), almost nine-tenths of

France's colonial imports continued to come from other countries' possessions.¹

The French authorities began to pay more attention to the spread of vocational and professional education in their African territories. Since instruction was in the French tongue, this reform would, incidentally, enable any French officer to assume command over bodies of native soldiery. In point of fact, after the war, military conscription was introduced into all the French African colonies. As one French historian put it, the native auxiliaries were called "to the honor of defending France's flag." By way of encouraging the process of "assimilation" of her "African "children," France offered citizenship to all such natives who had served with distinction either in a civil capacity or in her armies during the war. In the period from 1914 to 1925 only eighty-eight men in all French West Africa accepted the bid. The beneficent influences of education and economic improvement, however, have on occasion continued to be overshadowed by the harsh tactics employed by punitive expeditions sent out to avenge minor wrongs.

A British Parliamentary Commission which visited East Africa in 1925 declared its conviction that "the status of trusteeship involves an ethical conception, that is to say, it imposes upon the trustee a moral duty and a moral attitude." Although the English authorities failed to abide wholly by the spirit of this report, the punishments for minor infractions of rules were made much less severe in a number of the British-controlled areas than had formerly been the case. Educational opportunities for the negroes were increased and the government liberally assisted in the upkeep of native churches. Yet, generally speaking, the whites were careful to retain the upper hand whenever the interests of the natives came into conflict with their own.

In other regions the doings of callous exploiters frequently reached the ears of groups that were able to force reform measures. Thus, a report published by the American Professor Ross upon the conditions which he witnessed during a trip through Portuguese Africa in 1925 was brought to the notice of the League, and in 1926 the Portuguese Government was constrained

¹ One per cent of the cotton used in France came from French colonies in 1920, and two per cent in 1925.

to set up a Committee of Protection in each colonial district. Similar improvements have taken place elsewhere on the continent.

The current problems of Africa, and of Europe in Africa, appear, in short, to be these: Given a certain amount of education and economic opportunity, the natives doubtless will desire at least autonomy, if not independence. Kept in subjection, without education, and without the opportunity to better themselves, they will be considerably less useful in the development of the urgently needed natural resources. While renewed humanitarian and altruistic considerations serve as powerful stimuli to the extension of both spiritual and practical schooling, the limited amount of enlightenment already spread has been responsible for the appearance, here and there, of an unmistakable clamoring for more equitable treatment. Obviously, the western world must concentrate upon finding a workable solution for the African dilemma. Africa must continue to learn from Europe, and it would seem to be the white man's duty, for the sake of progress and civilization, to teach Africa in as friendly a way as possible.

THE WEST AND ASIA

One of the chief characteristics of the impact of West and East in Asia was the attempt to bring about an inordinately rapid industrialization of that continent. The huge, conservative Asiatic mass, containing one-half the population of the world; tied to cultures some of which were two thousand years old; weighed down by autocratic administrations, by caste systems, and by primitive traditions and methods; torn between a rising young nationalism and a greedy western imperialism in some sections, but never yet visited by white men in other sections; with little linguistic unity, and full of conflicting and fanatical religious beliefs — this Asia was profoundly stirred by its contact with the West, especially during the twentieth century. The very fact that Europeans and Americans, alien peoples, strove to impose a foreign domination upon the Asiatics drove many of the latter into a greater reverence and veneration for their own traditions and customs. They held to their accustomed ways with a fervent tenacity — often, of course, to their own woe. And into

such an environment the Westerners tried post-haste to introduce steam railroads, electric current, enormous factories, industrial machinery, western "efficiency methods," and all the trappings of European and American capitalism.

Before Europe reached its present state of civilization it passed through a Renaissance, a Reformation, a century of religious wars, a Commercial Revolution, a French revolutionary epoch, and an Industrial Revolution — but in Asia the aim was to convert a medieval melting-pot into a twentieth-century industrial hive. Asia was made to suffer all the pangs of a tenfold revolution at one and the same time.¹

The attempted hasty industrialization of his continent was not the only bewildering phenomenon which the Asiatic was forced to witness. He was made to look out upon a most confusing and terrifying series of contrasts. How startling it must have been to him on occasion to hear almost simultaneously the pacific words of a missionary and the sputtering of a machine gun; to be told of Wilson's Fourteen Points and self-determination, and at the same time to see foreign gunboats on Chinese rivers, foreign battle planes over Afghan villages, or foreign troops swaggering through Indian towns. He must have been amazed by the facility with which the Westerners mixed lofty idealism with vulgar materialism, by the complete lack of coordination between charitable right hands and grasping left hands. He heard his autocratic systems of government denounced, and he witnessed the setting up of even more autocratic regimes. Still more was he puzzled, after the war, to hear from some Europeans about the wonders of industrialism and the advantages of the capitalist order, and from others about the evils of capitalism and imperialism, and the glories of an international brotherhood of man based upon a communist system. With his own condition, moreover, he was dissatisfied. What was he to do?

It was one of the unfortunate aspects of the situation that the

¹ One is reminded, in this connection, of Kipling's lines:

Now it is not good for the Christian's health to hustle the Aryan brown,
For the Christian riles and the Aryan smiles and he weareth the Christian down;
And the end of the fight is a tombstone white with the name of the late deceased,
And the epitaph drear: "A fool lies here who tried to hustle the East."

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people in Asia did not know just what they wanted. They were discontented, oppressed, and depressed. They groped in the dark, and they were hysterical when they were not phlegmatic. Their great stumbling-block was the paucity of adequate leadership. Frequently such leaders as did arise were inexperienced, unpractical visionaries with grandiose but mystical schemes and dreams. Interested groups generally found little difficulty in counteracting the influence of these leaders by holding them up to ridicule as adolescent schoolboys, or else throwing them into prison. At best, it was oratory and curses against blast furnace and armored tank. To this rule, however, there were a few conspicuous exceptions, notably Mahatma Gandhi and the "Chinese George Washington," Dr. Sun Yat-sen.¹

ASIA AND THE WAR

The hundreds of millions of people who comprise the mass population of Asia found their course of life but little altered as a consequence of the military aspects of the World War. Even India and China were only slightly affected by the actual fighting. In the former country more than a million men fought on the side of the British, but over three hundred million people remained at home, and of these many doubtless were unaware that a world struggle was in progress. In the case of China the official declaration of war resulted in little more than the confiscation of a number of German merchant vessels in Chinese harbors and the drafting of coolies to labor behind the lines.

More important were the economic and psychological effects produced in Asia by the course of the war. Many of the more moderate Indian leaders who believed that a loyal India would be rewarded with political autonomy after the conflict became radical and bitter when they realized the futility of their hopes. At the same time a few of these leaders added considerably to their experience and prestige by participating in the Paris Peace Conference and in some of the post-war British Imperial Conferences. During the war, moreover, India's iron and steel industries were stimulated and new commercial contacts were established between India and Japan. Both of these developments,

¹ For discussions of post-war developments in Palestine, India, Syria, China, and Japan see chapters XI, XII, and XXI.

incidentally, reacted unfavorably on England's trade balance with India.

In China, the passing of Kiao-chau from German to Japanese control caused a renewed flaring up of a young nationalism which strove to assert the right of the Chinese to their fatherland. Japanese and other interested groups, however, soon brought diplomatic pressure to bear on the nationalists, and in addition, local chieftains were encouraged to revolt and set themselves up as war lords in various parts of China. It thus appeared to many real Chinese patriots that whereas nationalism was praised as the worship of the soul of nations in the West, this same spirit, when it appeared in so-called backward countries, was to be crushed under the heels of western and Japanese imperialists.

In Persia, where, during the war, Russians, Englishmen, and Turks had fought their battles on neutral soil, national resentment was strong enough in the post-war years to bring about the ousting of the weak ruler and the setting up of a patriotic dictatorship under Rheza Khan, who eventually (1925) was proclaimed Shah.

The far-away Dutch East Indies, with their population of 60,000,000, also witnessed considerable restlessness and discontent during the years following 1919. The authorities there accused Moscow of having stirred up the troubles, but regardless of the truth or falsity of this statement, no one could deny the prevalence of widespread dissatisfaction. Several armed detachments, however, soon convinced the malcontents that they were not included in that part of the world which had been "made safe for democracy."

Although the two main aspects of the Asiatic Revolt — resentment at European domination, and discontent over the suffering occasioned by the changed economic and social situation resulting from the "modernization" of Asia — expressed themselves in a variety of ways, the only really effective weapon which the natives were able to use against the aggression of western machinery and arms was the economic boycott. Uprisings could be crushed, bombs were more destructive than arrows or lances, tanks more deadly than fanatical foolhardiness — but the only way to beat an oriental boycott was to make concessions. More than once Japan was forced to give way, when her demands on China were

too unpopular, by the power of a Chinese boycott which threatened to cripple Japanese trade and commerce. England several times felt the force of Indian boycotts, and though she never actually surrendered, she much preferred not to have to deal with the unpleasant phenomenon. But here again the absence of proper leadership precluded the unity necessary to support a successful demand for more equitable treatment.

For a time after the World War the universality of unrest in Asia gave rise to talk of a Pan-Asia movement. It was feared in some quarters that the Asiatics might attempt to set up a counterpoise to the League of Nations and thereby definitely divide East and West into two powerful, hostile combinations. Yet remote as a Pan-Europa may seem, a Pan-Asia would appear to be even more distant. It has been said that the psychological differences between India and China, for example, are greater than the corresponding differences between western Europe and China. The groups so loosely termed "Asiatics" by the Europeans, really are widely separated from one another by political, economic, social, and religious gaps that are far greater than those among the various European peoples.

Of more immediate importance have been the relations of Asia with the League of Nations. Japan, of course, became not only a member, but a leading member, with a permanent seat in the Council and an influential voice in affairs. China, too, became a member, and was elected to a temporary seat in the Council. Persia, India, and Siam also were admitted to membership in their own right, and all have taken an active part in the workings of the League.

These relationships appear the more remarkable when it is remembered that the League of Nations was conceived fundamentally as a preventive and remedy for antagonisms arising out of the developments of European, and not of Asiatic, life.¹ Much of Asia's future confidence in the League will depend upon the latter's attitude towards such struggling countries as China — countries which are striving with might and main to absorb the shock of the clash of West and East and to reach a working compromise between the two.

¹ The case of Japan is not so astonishing, since Japan is herself a "militarized, industrialized, commercialized nation of the first rank."

From a material standpoint Asia needs assistance, needs to learn about western advances, and doubtless should introduce some western methods at a fairly rapid rate. The people need to be educated, stable governments set up, machines utilized, agricultural methods improved, certain religious rites revised, wider view-points introduced, and the economic systems brought into harmony with a general world economy. But this cannot be achieved overnight, nor can it be accomplished by forceful imposition upon unwilling recipients. Asiatic traditions as such would not need to be entirely discarded and replaced by European traditions. Instead, Asiatic traditions should be transformed from medievalism and gradually made to fit modern conditions. First the new view-points and attitudes, then the new methods — this would seem to be the most effective approach in a region where custom plays so important a rôle.

PART II

NATIONAL SCENES

CHAPTER X

GREAT BRITAIN

WAR AND PEACE

At the time of England's entry into the war the Liberals, led by H. H. Asquith and supported by the Irish Nationalists and the Laborites, controlled the government. The ministry, however, soon became unpopular. There were public clamors against the press censorship, the sluggishness of the munitions service, the unchecked activities of profiteers, the enlistment system, and the defeat at Gallipoli. Accordingly Asquith, in 1915, thought it wise to reorganize the cabinet. A new government was formed, supported by a coalition of Liberals, Conservatives, and Laborites. David Lloyd George was placed at the head of the ministry of munitions.

The revised cabinet proved too unwieldy and phlegmatic to satisfy the dynamic Lloyd George. Within a year and a half he managed to advance himself into Asquith's place as premier, whereupon governmental proceedings rapidly assumed a new vigor. The life of the Parliament was extended for the duration of the war. An attempt was made to solve the long-standing Irish Question. Conditions in India were investigated with a view to the introduction of reforms in government. The electoral system was revised and women over thirty were enfranchised. Two Fisher Education Bills were passed making elementary education compulsory for children and limiting child labor in mills, but the funds necessary to carry out these laws were not immediately obtainable.

In the late autumn of 1918, Lloyd George, feeling that the electorate ought to express its sentiments by ballot once more, called for new elections on December 14, 1918. He expected, of course, that an election coming within a few weeks of the successful close of hostilities would result in an easy victory for the

government. In these "khaki elections" Lloyd George appealed to the people to support the wartime coalition on its record. He undertook, if endorsed, to advocate the hanging of William II and the exaction of a huge indemnity from Germany. A pledge was given that measures would be passed to prevent the dumping of foreign goods and to protect the "essential industries." Finally, Lloyd George promised that the Irish Question would be settled, the House of Lords reformed, and the veterans adequately cared for.

On this platform the coalition, which during the campaign had been deserted by some Liberals and Conservatives and by all Laborites, captured two-thirds of the seats in the Commons. The Labor Party, with sixty-three seats, became the official Opposition. The membership of the coalition was seventy per cent Conservative, and hence, although the prime minister was a Liberal, the Conservatives predominated in the cabinet. Lloyd George at once went to Paris, but after the signing of the peace treaties became deeply involved in matters of imperial administration. Before long, his attention was absorbed by England's critical economic situation.

During the early post-war years British industry had climbed to a peak of prosperity. The world, "bent on replenishing its depleted stocks, had thought only of buying." Prices and wages had risen steadily, the number of people employed had increased rapidly, and there had been a general tendency to shorten the work week. By the middle of 1920 there were three times as many registered companies in England as there had been in 1918. In October, 1920, the cost of living was 2.67 times as high as before the war. However, this state of affairs, the result of a temporary boom, did not last.

As 1920 drew to a close, conditions underwent a precipitate change. Numerous and serious strikes broke out and unemployment increased so rapidly that a new Unemployment Insurance Act was passed to supersede that of 1911. By July, 1921, two million persons, in a population of forty-two millions, were idle. The reasons for this disaster were many. The war had impoverished several of England's best customers, including Germany, Russia, and the Danubian states. Then, while the British strove to return to a gold standard and reestablish the pound sterling

at its pre-war value, most of the Continental governments resorted to inflation. In the world market this meant that the price of English goods was high, for British manufacturing costs greatly exceeded those in countries where inflation resulted in cheap labor. Further, the circumstance that England's machines and factories remained intact during the conflict was not an unmixed blessing. For now, although England still had plenty of machinery, much of this was antiquated and inefficient. Competition with the more modern methods and implements in use in the United States and Germany therefore became increasingly difficult.¹

During the war, too, the British had suffered a loss of markets to more fortunate rivals, notably the United States and Japan. The former acquired much of Britain's trade in Latin America; Japan secured much of it in China and India. Between 1914 and 1919, moreover, thousands of English women had entered the labor field, taking jobs which formerly had been reserved for men. Naturally not all the women relinquished their positions when the demobilized soldiers returned to look for work. Again, the many high tariff barriers erected by the newly created and strongly nationalistic Continental states seriously curtailed Britain's export trade. Since both the population and the productive capacity of Britain were greater in 1922 than in 1913, the general reduction in the volume of her export trade caused grave concern. Her foreign clientele in 1924 was actually one-third less than it had been just before the war.

In addition to these factors there must be considered England's enormous war losses, which were far greater than those of the rest of the British Empire combined. Some 750,000 of her men had been killed and twice that number wounded. Her total war expenses surpassed eight billion pounds, and her domestic and foreign debt burden at the end of the war was ten times that of 1914. About 2200 vessels, with a combined displacement of 8,000,000 tons, had been destroyed. This last factor might have acted as a stimulus to ship building, but the forced surrender by Germany of most of her ships checked any such development. By 1921 almost a third of the men employed in the English ship-

¹ At a time when four-fifths of the coal in Germany was being washed mechanically, this was true of only one-fourth of the mineral in England.

building industry were out of work. The unemployment problem was aggravated by the fact that the Britishers, unlike the Russians and the French, could not fall back upon agriculture in times of industrial depression. England is primarily a manufacturing and exporting country. Only seven per cent of her population lives on the soil and sixty per cent of her food supply must be imported. Hence the only solution for the crisis lay in a revival of trade and industry.

The government that first had to cope with this complicated situation was the coalition under Lloyd George. In the beginning resort was had to two temporary expedients. One was the readjustment of the unemployment insurance scales so as to allot what was popularly known as a "dole" of fifteen shillings per week to involuntarily unemployed men and twelve to women, for a maximum of fifteen weeks per year. This measure involved an annual outlay of millions of pounds and at best was of transitory value. It was in no sense a cure for chronic unemployment. Secondly, the government encouraged the emigration of jobless workmen to other parts of the empire, especially Canada. Inasmuch as the laborers generally were not eager to migrate and the dominions set up severe qualifications for entrance, the scheme offered little relief.

In 1921, however, two specific attempts were made to get at the root of the trouble by reviving industry. In March, England signed a trade agreement with Russia, based upon a mutual pledge that neither country would spread propaganda against the other. Then, with the reluctant acquiescence of Lloyd George, there was passed a Safeguarding of Industries Act. This measure, upon which the Conservative members of the coalition insisted, levied a duty of $33\frac{1}{3}\%$ to protect certain key industries which were considered "indispensable in the event of another war." The same act placed a tax on imports from countries with a depreciated currency. Much unfavorable comment was aroused by this deviation from England's traditional free trade policy.

BALDWIN AND MACDONALD

Meanwhile the Conservatives began to weary of the dominance of Lloyd George. They disliked a treaty which had been signed

in December, 1921 with Ireland,¹ and they favored closer cooperation with France. They complained about the troubles England was having in the Near and Middle East, and they charged the government with extravagance. In October, 1922, therefore, in a caucus at the Carlton Club, the Conservatives decided to withdraw from the coalition. Thereupon Lloyd George resigned and the Conservative leader, Andrew Bonar Law, formed a ministry. Since the Conservatives controlled only a plurality of seats, new elections were necessary. Election day was set for November 15.

The Conservatives entered the campaign with a united front and with a platform promising "tranquillity and stability." The Liberals were badly disunited. Lloyd George, at the head of a group called the National Liberal Party, pointed once more to his war record, promised economy, and upheld the virtues of strong government. Asquith, still bitter over the Welshman's wartime tactics, had organized an Independent Liberal Party, favoring free trade and economy. Many of the electors who formerly had voted the Liberal ticket, now appeared ready to turn for action to the Labor Party, whose program was moderately socialistic. It advocated the nationalization of mines and railways, the passage of advanced social legislation, and the adoption of a peaceful foreign policy.

The contest ended in a complete triumph for the Conservatives, who secured well over half the seats. The Labor Party, which in 1900 had captured only two seats, was now returned with 142. The Liberals formed a poor third. Bonar Law retained the premiership, but ill health forced him to resign in May, 1923. He was succeeded by the less experienced Stanley Baldwin, a former business man who had entered politics in 1906, had occupied several responsible financial offices between 1917 and 1923, and had arranged the funding of the war debt of England to the United States in January, 1923.

Baldwin, who was fond of repeating: "I am not a clever man," was obliged to face an unemployment situation which by this time had grown to be a "chronic malady." He became somewhat panicky and jumped at the suggestion of some of his extremist colleagues that protection and imperial preference

¹ See p. 259.

(preferential tariff rates between the several parts of the empire) were the only cures for the industrial depression. Since, however, Bonar Law had pledged the party not to change the tariff without a mandate from the people, Baldwin felt in honor bound to dissolve Parliament and set new elections for December. Thus a safe majority was placed in danger on the tariff issue.

This unexpected occasion stimulated the Liberals into renewed action. Asquith and Lloyd George became reconciled and vigorously campaigned for the continuance of free trade. If they could not oust the Conservatives from power, the Liberals hoped at least to recapture some of the seats previously lost to the Laborites. The Conservatives pointed out that tariff barriers against England were everywhere being erected and that the kingdom was becoming a dumping ground for foreign manufactures. They considered the empire self-sufficient and maintained that an intra-imperial system of preferential rates would free its members from dependence upon foreign good-will and trade. Despite their desire to place high rates upon manufactured articles, however, the Conservatives promised not to tax raw materials, wheat, or meat, and agreed to reduce the rates on some items, notably sugar. The Laborites once more aired their socialistic views. They favored free trade, proposed the nationalization of mines and railways, wanted the government to subsidize housing and power developments, advocated a capital levy on all fortunes exceeding £5000, and recommended revision of the Versailles Treaty.

Because of the three-cornered aspect of the elections it was possible for the Conservatives to lose almost ninety seats while yet polling nearly as many popular votes as in the previous election. Though still the largest party in the Commons, they now failed to command the necessary majority to control that body. The Laborites, on the other hand, increased their representation to 191 seats, and the Liberals were third with 157.

When Parliament met, in January, 1924, the Liberals joined with the Laborites in voting a lack of confidence in the Baldwin Government. The Lloyd George-Asquith group preferred to risk a coalition with the untried Laborites rather than encourage the "confusion, vacillation, and impotence" which had characterized the Conservative rule. Hence James Ramsay Mac-

Donald, leader of the Labor Party, became head of England's first Labor Government.¹

MacDonald was born in 1866, the son of a laborer, in the small Scottish fishing village of Lossiemouth. He went to a boarding school for a time but secured most of his education by attending evening classes and by avid reading. Eventually he chose the career of a journalist and made frequent trips to the various parts of the empire. In 1896 he married the daughter of a university professor. Mrs. MacDonald, whose uncle was the famous chemist, Lord Kelvin, brought her husband valuable social contacts as well as considerable wealth.

Early in his career Ramsay MacDonald was instrumental in bringing about a political fusion of the intellectual socialists with the trade unionists of England, and he was one of the founders of the British Labor Party. From 1900 to 1912 he was secretary of the party, and from 1911 to 1914, its leader. In 1914 he resigned his headship, feeling that he could not endorse the party's support of the war. As an avowed pacifist he was ostracized socially and imprisoned for a time. He was defeated for Parliament in the "khaki elections," but regained a seat in 1922. He

¹ The rise of the British Labor Party was comparatively swift. The party grew out of the efforts of a Labor Representation Committee, which, meeting for the first time in 1900, strove to secure adequate political representation for the workers. Although not really socialistic in its sympathies, the Committee received the hearty support of such intellectual socialist societies as the Fabians and of the Independent Labor Party, a socialist organization founded in 1893 by an ex-miner named Keir Hardie. The following table gives in round numbers the total of votes cast for the Labor Party in the years 1900 to 1931 and the number of members elected to the Commons:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Votes</i>	<i>Members</i>
1900	60,000	2
1906	323,000	29
1910 (Jan.)	505,000	40
1910 (Dec.)	375,000	42
1918	2,244,000	57
1922	4,235,000	142 (increase partly due to en-
1923	4,300,000	191 franchisement of women)
1924	5,500,000	151
1929	8,380,000	289
1931	7,000,000	52 (decrease explained later)

The party wished to bring about social reform by parliamentary means, favored the nationalization of industries with compensation to owners, upheld the existing democratic monarchical form of government, advocated the development of the empire along lines of local autonomy, and was opposed to class war.

is a sincere and cultivated gentleman, and a remarkably effective orator.

Among the premier's able assistants in the first Labor cabinet were Philip Snowden and Arthur Henderson. Snowden, who became chancellor of the exchequer, was a former clerk, an ardent pacifist and free-trader, a financial genius, and a stubborn parliamentarian. Henderson, appointed home secretary, was an ex-iron worker who had become prominent as an aide to Lloyd George during the war. He is basically a "trade-union man."

The first Labor Government worked under serious difficulties. Despite MacDonald's insistence that the "labor movement had never had the least inclination to try short cuts to the millenium," there were persistent rumors that private property soon would be confiscated and the institution of the family abolished. Investors became panicky and American financiers began to withdraw their balances from London. The financial move was due in part to an attempt at discrediting socialism as an idea, and in part to a failure to realize that the Labor Party was opposed to revolution, that it merely aimed at advancing by parliamentary means the welfare of the laboring classes, and that it "rejected class warfare" though it "accepted class consciousness." Indeed, the MacDonald Government also had a very practical reason for refraining from revolutionary methods: it depended for its tenure of office on the votes of the Liberal Party. This circumstance of necessity tempered its program and hampered its freedom of action.

The accomplishments of the Labor Government in the domestic sphere were not particularly striking. The unemployment situation became worse rather than better during the nine months of Labor rule and unemployment relief had to be further extended. The idea of a capital levy was dropped. The Wheatley Bill, providing for the construction, with government aid, of thousands of houses to rent at nine shillings per week each, was passed. Some of the war duties were repealed, and those on tea, coffee, and sugar were lowered.

More spectacular were the exploits in the field of foreign affairs. The government played a prominent rôle in the final acceptance of the Dawes Plan. MacDonald also urged the admission of Germany into the League and favored closer British relations

with that body. He supported the Geneva Protocol of 1924, which aimed at ensuring international peace by defining the term "aggressor nation." The government voted to build several new cruisers, but simultaneously, as a gesture of disarmament, stopped the building of a naval base at Singapore. Relations with France, now led by Herriot, were improved. Finally, as the result of general and commercial treaties, Russia received diplomatic recognition, and British goods were promised a more favorable reception in the Russian market.

Unfortunately for its continued existence, the Labor Government soon came under popular suspicion as being amenable to pressure from the Bolsheviks. The trade treaty was attacked and much excitement ensued when the government dropped a case against an acting editor of the communistic *Workers' Weekly*, who was accused of inciting British soldiers to mutiny. On a parliamentary motion to appoint a committee of inquiry on this governmental policy, MacDonald was defeated through the defection of the Liberals. He dissolved Parliament and ordered new elections.

During the campaign (October, 1924) the cause of Labor was seriously injured by the publication of the so-called Zinoviev or Red Letter. This missive was supposed to have been written by a Bolshevik leader to British communists, urging the latter to make ready for revolution. Five years later the letter was proved to have been a forgery, but at the time it effectively hurt the Laborites. Many voters felt uncomfortable in the thought that the Labor ministry apparently had condoned unbridled freedom for communist propaganda and they preferred not to see another socialist government in office. The workers, moreover, grumbled because the Labor Government had done so little to improve the economic situation. That the distress was world-wide did not enter into their calculations.

The Conservatives garnered over 400 seats in the election, while the Laborites and Liberals together had less than 200. The Conservative Party secured this majority of over 200 seats despite the fact that it actually polled only a minority of the popular vote. This seeming paradox again was due to the three-cornered elections and the absence of any system of proportional representation. Naturally MacDonald resigned the premiership.

Stanley Baldwin took the reins once more and Austen Chamberlain became foreign secretary.

FIVE YEARS OF CONSERVATIVE RULE

Soon after his reentry into office, Baldwin did something which *he* termed "safeguarding employment," but which his opponents, mindful of a campaign pledge of his not to introduce protectionist legislation, called a "back door" step toward a high tariff system. He secured the passage of an act which made it possible for any industry desiring protection to lay its case before the Board of Trade. A special committee of the Board then was to make a study of the situation and report to Parliament. If the case for protection was upheld by the committee, Parliament was to authorize appropriate duties in the next finance bill. This and other attempts to alleviate distress notwithstanding, the Conservative Government soon was faced by a serious labor crisis.

Among the hardest hit of British industries at this time was the coal industry. Before the war England used millions of tons of coal annually in her own industries and sold additional millions to foreign countries. But after the conflict, and especially after 1920, the importance of coal as a fuel began to decline. The rising popularity of oil as a source of fuel supply, the increasing use of hydroelectric power, and the development of Diesel ship engines, all caused a drop in the demand for coal. Moreover, under the terms of the Versailles Treaty, Germany annually supplied huge quantities of coal to France, Italy, and other regions which formerly had depended on English coal. Russia, too, because of domestic difficulties, bought 13,000,000 tons less coal in 1925 than in an average pre-war year. Simultaneously the general decline in English business lessened the domestic demand for coal.¹

Now, in 1924 the miners had forced the owners to sign a wage agreement that was to run until the summer of 1925. Before the contract term expired, however, conditions became so bad that many mines had to shut down. By June, 1925, about one-fourth of the insured men in the coal industry were without work. When the miners nevertheless refused to accept a proposal of the

¹ In 1928 the Industrial Transference Board estimated the irreducible surplus of men in the British coal industry at 200,000*

operators to lengthen the working day from seven to eight hours and to take lower wages, the owners threatened to discontinue the system of wage agreements and to introduce a new time and wage scale on July 31, 1925. The workers disregarded this threat and were all the more encouraged in their stand when the railwaymen agreed not to transport coal in the event of a lockout. The Baldwin Government, in order to prevent the closing of all mines, thereupon undertook temporarily to subsidize the industry so that the existing wage agreement might be continued pending the investigations of a parliamentary commission of inquiry. The total cost of this subsidy, which lasted for nine months, amounted to more than \$100,000,000.

The Coal Commission, whose chairman was Sir Herbert Samuel, reported in March, 1926. It was the opinion of the members that the coal industry would have to be radically reorganized if it were to be kept alive. The report urged government ownership of the mines, with private management under lease from the authorities. In a number of instances it was recommended to close the mines because they were too deep to be worked profitably, and in other cases amalgamation was advised. A continuance of the government subsidy was declared preposterous, and a decrease in wages was considered inevitable.

This report satisfied neither party, and while the government tried frantically to arrange further peace conferences, the operators gave notice that the wage agreement would be considered terminated after May 1, 1926. The workmen threatened to strike, and the situation was made more ominous when the General Council of the Trades Union Congress, with which the Miners' Federation was affiliated, announced its intention to call a "general strike" unless the wishes of the miners were met by May 3. The owners remained adamant and the general strike began as scheduled. The following industries were affected: transport, printing, heavy chemicals, iron and steel, metals, and all building except hospitals and houses. Specific orders were issued against strikes in the electric, gas, sanitary, health, and food services, and all violence was interdicted.

The strike actually involved less than half of the trade union membership and less than one-sixth of the total working population, but it frightened the government into declaring the exist-

ence of a State of Emergency.¹ Thousands of volunteers strove to keep the trains, buses, and industries going, and 250,000 special constables were commissioned to protect the volunteers. Troops and warships were stationed at strategic points. But there was little violence. Rather, a gay humor was discernible, possibly because of the novelty of the situation. Emergency bus and tram drivers vied with one another in displays of wit, and placards bearing inscriptions such as "Don't stop me! I can't start again!" were much in evidence.

On May 12, after nine days, the general strike came to an end. The Trades Union Congress called it off on the promise that further negotiations would be pushed by the government. Baldwin asked that there be no vindictiveness and that the men be taken back by their former employers. This caused new difficulties. Some employers found it hard to discharge all their volunteer substitutes. The industrial disorganization following the strike temporarily decreased the amount of work to be done. The coal strike continued for six more months, until November 19. For a time, indeed, England had to import coal from the United States and Germany to keep her factories and railways running.!

Meanwhile the plight of the miners was becoming desperate. Their resources dwindled, a cold winter was coming on, and the government appeared more friendly to the owners than to the workers. Gradually the cold and hungry men drifted back to work on the owners' terms, and the strike had to be ended. The net result of the struggle was the lengthening of the working hours, the lowering of the wages, and the complete disregarding of the Samuel Commission's recommendations. Part of the blame for the waning of popular sympathy with the strikers must fall on the unwise tactics employed by "Emperor" A. J. Cook, the secretary of the Miners' Federation and the leader of the strike.

Politically, the strike weakened both the Labor and the Liberal Parties. In the former group, extremists pointed to the failure of the coal strikers proving the need for more direct action.

¹ About two and a half million union members struck. The total union membership was six million, and the total working population numbered about sixteen million.

MacDonald, however, succeeded in holding the party together. The Liberal Party was split asunder once more when Asquith, now Lord Oxford, and Lloyd George disagreed on the question of supporting the strikers. The Conservatives, on the other hand, were more solidly united than before and were determined to rid England by law of the possibility of a future general strike. Accordingly, in 1927, they pushed through Parliament the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act which made general strikes illegal, forbade picketing, and protected against any union "disability" or "disadvantage" union members who refused to join in illegal strikes. The Act also struck at the Labor Party by changing the old law which had permitted unions to collect assessments for political purposes from their members unless the latter formally protested. Now the political levy was forbidden unless the member gave his written consent in advance. This clause led one labor leader to refer to the Act as "a declaration of war on the whole labor movement."

The Conservatives attempted to reap another advantage from the strike situation. They proposed to strengthen that great conservative bulwark, the House of Lords. By the Parliament Act of 1911 the power of the upper house had been curtailed in several ways. Money bills became law within thirty days after their passage by the Commons regardless of the attitude of the Lords, and the Speaker of the lower house was empowered to determine whether or not a measure was a money bill. In ordinary legislation the Lords were left with a suspensive veto. The Conservatives never had approved of these arrangements and now they felt that the "socialist peril" was grave enough to warrant strengthening the Lords. Then, even though a temporary wave of public opinion might place a Labor Government in the saddle, the destinies of Old England would be properly safeguarded.

In June, 1927, Baldwin introduced a plan whereby, for the sake of efficiency, the number of seats in the House of Lords should be reduced from approximately 800 to about 350. This really would not involve a serious change since, under the existing system, the attendance of the Lords rarely exceeded 200. Some of the members should be appointed for life by the Crown and the others elected by the peers. The right of the Crown to

create new peers in time of parliamentary deadlock should be surrendered and the legislative power of the House of Lords increased. The whole scheme was so violently opposed in debate in 1927, and again in 1928, by the younger Conservatives as well as the Laborites and Liberals, that it never was formulated into a bill. The Liberals, indeed, issued a manifesto warning the government that the adoption of such a system might force the nation to make a choice between "an uncontrolled hereditary Chamber and revolution."

Among the more liberal reforms passed by the Baldwin Government were new provisions for widows', orphans', and old-age pensions, and the further extension of female suffrage. The electoral act of 1918 had limited the franchise to women of thirty or over, lest the women, who greatly outnumbered the men after the war, predominate in politics. This act, which simultaneously removed the few remaining property qualifications for male voters, had been passed in recognition of the valuable services rendered by women during the war. Possibly also, it was in line with the general tendency toward democracy which characterized many parts of Europe immediately after the close of the war. Not unnaturally, the women in England were dissatisfied with the high age restriction and chose to consider the arrangement a slur on their mentality and maturity. A decade of active campaigning was crowned with success when, in March, 1928, Parliament extended the vote to all women over twenty-one. With the addition of this "flapper vote" England's electorate numbered approximately 12,500,000 men and 14,500,000 women.

During the Conservative regime there occurred an interesting religious controversy. For many years the leaders of the established Anglican Church had been engaged in revising the old Book of Common Prayer. In 1927 an altered edition, in harmony with a new wave of Anglo-Catholicism, was presented to Parliament for its approval. The Lords at once accepted the revised form but the Commons rejected it. A few modifications then were made, but the Commons registered another adverse vote in June, 1928. The rejections came only after long and earnest debates both within and without Parliament, and the popular interest in the matter was attested to by the fact that for a time the Prayer Book became a "best seller."

It was the fear of a restoration of "popery," more than anything else, that led to the final declination of the Book, for the latter was more comprehensive and more Catholic than had been its predecessor. The Anglican bishops were grieved to find that their work failed of acceptance largely because of the votes cast by the Baptist, Methodist, Jewish, and agnostic members of the legislature, and so a stimulus was given to a movement for disestablishment. Such procedure would deprive the Church of considerable prestige and revenue, but it would also permit far more independence of action and perhaps instil more vigor into clerical activities.

In the matter of foreign policies the Conservatives did not play a heroic role. War debt agreements with Italy and France were reached and the Locarno Pact, in part the outcome of MacDonald's activities at Geneva in 1924, was concluded. An equivocal part was acted during the negotiations for Germany's entrance into the League, and friendship with the United States was dangerously strained over the matter of naval disarmament. Most bitter were the Anglo-Russian dealings. Chamberlain managed to unearth a series of Russian anti-British plots reaching all the way from England to China, and in May, 1927, diplomatic relations between London and Moscow were severed. The foreign secretary, finally, was no more than lukewarm towards the Kellogg Pact.

The chronic industrial depression proved to be as much a thorn to the Conservatives as it had been to Labor. Higher tariff rates, the establishment of some new industries in southern England, the active support given by the government to foreign commercial advertising and propaganda, and the popularity of England with American tourists, all failed to revive industrial strength. On the other hand, irrational organization, antiquated methods, and emotional antipathy towards necessary amalgamation and cooperation persisted, while only here and there a few individuals pointed to developments in the United States and Germany as examples of the benefits to be derived from "rationalization"¹ and concentration.

To make matters worse, report had it that there was no future for British industry and that capital would bring in a greater

¹ See p. 403.

return if invested abroad rather than at home. As a consequence it was often difficult to raise sufficient funds for even urgently needed equipment. British exports in 1927, reduced to the price level of 1914, totalled only 79% of those in 1913. From 1913 to 1927 British exports fell 21%, although the total world's export trade rose in the same period by 18%. In January, 1927, England had 1,500,000 unemployed. By July, 1928, 29.1% of the man power in the coal industry was idle, as was 28.3% of that in ship building, 21.2% in iron and steel, and about 15% each in the cotton and woolen industries.¹

THE SECOND LABOR GOVERNMENT

Small wonder, therefore, that unemployment and industrial troubles loomed large in the parliamentary elections of May 30, 1929. The aggressive foreign policy and general conservatism of the Baldwin administration, which had remained in office for a full five-year term, made good campaign material for the Laborites and Liberals, but unemployment was an even better catchword. Baldwin, Lloyd George, and MacDonald made innumerable speeches, and special pains were taken to appeal to the newest voters, the five million "flappers" who, it was felt, would exercise a powerful and discriminating influence in this, their first, opportunity to cast ballots.

The Conservatives adopted as their slogan "Safety First!" and pointed with pride to their attitude during the general strike and their firm stand against socialism and its perils. They advocated a policy of permitting industry to "save itself" without government interference, but also urged higher protective and anti-dumping measures as well as extreme imperial preference. They emphasized the increasing cooperation between employers and workmen that was in evidence and prophesied that this factor, combined with more vigorous rationalization, would soon restore prosperity. They opposed the recognition of Russia without special guarantees as to propaganda and debts, stressed the need for sufficient imperial defense, and objected to any additional commitments in the matter of world peace beyond those embodied in the League Covenant, the Locarno Agreements, and the Paris Pact.

¹ The figures are from Andre* Siegfried's *England's Crisis*, 1931.

The Liberals, controlled by Lloyd George chiefly because he had personal charge of the several millions of dollars in the party "war chest," once again thought they saw an opportunity to come out of oblivion. In a little booklet called *We Can Conquer Unemployment* they recommended a stupendously large public works program as the quickest solution for the difficulties. But on this score the other two parties combined in a campaign of anti-Liberal ridicule. In speech, press, and cartoon the Conservatives and Laborites attacked the Lloyd George program as little short of ludicrous, from the points of view both of expense and expediency. The Liberals also reaffirmed their undying reverence for free trade and advocated closer cooperation with the League of Nations and Germany. They favored friendship with the United States and Russia and urged the immediate evacuation of the Rhineland.

The Laborites published a volume entitled *Labour and the Ration* and were particularly successful in their use of slogans and vivid posters, many of which were especially calculated to attract the younger voters. The Labor Party advocated nationalization of the leading industries, an extensive public works program, longer compulsory education for children, the development of natural resources — particularly hydroelectric power, and the appointment of special economic committees to aid the government in formulating its policies. Promise was made of shorter working hours, higher direct taxes, additional social legislation, and the repeal of the Trade Unions Act of 1927.

In foreign affairs the Laborites held approximately the same views as the Liberals. In some instances they were ready to be even more conciliatory, especially in their willingness to come to a naval agreement with the United States — this not only in the interest of peace, but also in that of economy. In addition, they stressed their determination to prevent future war. "What a disgrace it is to all our Christian professions," said MacDonald, "that, even in this day, nations are spending more in paying for past wars and preparing for future ones than in training the young generation in virtue, in protecting our mothers and fathers from poverty, and in smoothing and soothing the last years of our aged!"

Over 22,000,000 of the eligible 27,000,000 electors went to the

polls. Labor captured 289 seats, the Conservatives 259, and the Liberals 58. Though no party had a majority, and though the Conservatives actually secured 250,000 more popular votes than the Laborites, it was clear that the people had repudiated the Baldwin Government. On June 6, 1929, therefore, MacDonald became prime minister for the second time. Again, however, he depended on the votes of the Liberals to remain in office. They were ready to support him rather than Baldwin chiefly because of opposition to the latter's foreign policies. The poor showing of the Liberals, incidentally, gave rise to a feeling that the mission of the party had been fulfilled, or at least that the days of Lloyd George's leadership were numbered. Indeed, some Liberals, after the election, actually went over to the Labor side in the conviction that only MacDonald's party was in a position to do the will of the people.

The cabinet appointments were much the same as those in 1924. Snowden again headed the exchequer and Arthur Henderson, "Uncle Arthur," became foreign secretary. James H. Thomas was appointed Lord Privy Seal. In this capacity his functions were purely nominal and he was expected to devote all his time to coordinating plans for the relief of unemployment. When his efforts proved of insufficient avail he was transferred to another post and replaced by Thomas Johnston. For the first time in history, moreover, a woman was appointed to a British cabinet: Margaret Bondfield, Minister of Labor.

The control of the Laborites became somewhat precarious when their Liberal supporters split into a left and a right wing. The former, led by Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel, though not always in agreement with Labor's policies, still preferred Labor to any Conservative Government. The right wing, led by Sir John Simon, was ready to vote against the government at any time. The Labor Party itself suffered half a dozen defections when the millionaire socialist, Oswald Mosley, and some friends became convinced that MacDonald was not striving sufficiently hard to remedy unemployment.

The energies of the Labor Government soon were concentrated on urgent matters of foreign policy. Attempts were made to allay the native disaffections in India, Arabia, and Egypt without prejudice to England's position. Diplomatic relations with

Russia were restored and the promise of a wide Russian market secured. The Young Plan for Reparation was accepted and Snowden won much popular admiration for his stubborn fight on behalf of the financial rights of his country. MacDonald visited President Hoover in the United States and so prepared the way for the London Naval Conference of 1930. At the Imperial Conference of 1930 MacDonald refused to agree to the Canadian Premier's suggestion for a preferential tariff arrangement under which foreign wheat would have been taxed, because this would have increased the price of bread in England and because Labor was pledged to free trade. Throughout the spring and summer of 1931 Arthur Henderson was conspicuous in the movement for world disarmament and in the preparations for the Disarmament Conference of 1932. Gradually the popular suspicion that the Laborites were unreasoning internationalists and "Little Engenders" gave way to a feeling that MacDonald's endeavors really were for world peace, not world revolution.

In the domestic field the Laborites again did nothing spectacular. The government contemplated introducing a measure to keep children in school until the age of fifteen rather than fourteen as was the case, but when it became evident that many Catholic Labor members would join the Opposition in voting against such a bill because the Catholic schools protested that they had not the proper accommodations, the matter was dropped. An attempt to modify the Trade Unions Act of 1927 was abandoned after the government suffered a defeat in committee on one clause of its proposed bill. Agriculture was aided a little, the coal situation was slightly improved by the Coal Mines Act of 1930 which required a certain amount of collaboration in the marketing of the product, and numerous reforms were effected in the auto vehicle transport system. Snowden's budgets were fairly satisfactory to most groups of opinion, though his recommendations for higher income and heavier land taxes naturally aroused hostility in some quarters. On the question of supporting the land taxes, the right and left wings of the Liberal Party drifted still farther apart.

During this administration several important steps also were taken against militarism. The government withdrew its grants for military training in the public schools, fully restored the civil

and political rights of the conscientious objectors in the World War, and abolished the death penalty for desertion or cowardice in the army. The Optional Clause of the Protocol of the World Court was signed, and thus England was pledged to submit to judicial settlement any international dispute involving the interpretation of a treaty or a question of international law.

The most important campaign pledge of the Laborites remained largely unfulfilled — that of unemployment relief. There was no dearth of attempts to restore trade, but they were of little avail. The Prince of Wales embarked upon a number of good-will tours, notably to Latin America, in the hope that he might be an effective social sales-manager. When he returned he delivered a series of frank addresses in which he urged British business men to wake up to modern methods and fashions and to go out and look for trade rather than remain at home and wait for customers at the door. A cabinet minister went to Canada in a vain effort to secure orders for British goods. Negotiations were several times undertaken to get the Continental states to reduce their tariff schedules in the interest of a general trade revival, but again there was only failure to record.

Public works were inaugurated and the unemployment benefits were once more readjusted, with a view to caring for 1,000,000 persons at any time. The dole continued to eat away hundreds of millions of dollars per year. By the end of August, 1931, the unemployed numbered 2,700,000, and a month later, 2,825,000. The people realized by this time that the situation was one of world-wide distress and was not confined to England, but the Labor Government had to admit that it had promised more than it could perform. Labor lost a number of seats in by-elections, and MacDonald's position as premier was not one to arouse envy in the hearts even of political opponents.

THE NATIONAL COALITION

In the late summer of 1931 the government noticed with alarm that the country's gold reserve was shrinking rapidly; The general effects of the depression and heavy foreign, especially French, withdrawals made the situation acute. Besides, a budgetary deficit of \$186,000,000 loomed for the fiscal year 1931-1932. MacDonald and Snowden therefore drew up a plan which

was calculated to save the nation's credit by increasing revenues and decreasing expenditures. The essence of the scheme was higher taxation and more economy. Considerable slashes were suggested in governmental salaries, pensions, and unemployment benefits. A majority of the cabinet, however, refused to endorse these proposals to economize at the expense of the working people, and on August 25, 1931, MacDonald tendered the king the resignation of the entire ministry. Shortly thereafter he reassumed control with a new "National" ministry composed of members drawn from all three parties.

Soon after this startling development became public, the Labor Party held a meeting and expelled MacDonald, Snowden, Thomas, and a few other leaders. Arthur Henderson was elected to succeed MacDonald in the leadership of the party, and the latter officially went into opposition. These events, abrupt though they were, had really been expected for some time. While the rank and file of the party had been leaning more and more toward a really socialist goal, MacDonald and his close associates had become middle-class liberals. Though still greatly concerned with the welfare of the people, the ousted leaders of the Labor Party appeared to be quite content with the social status quo of the land. They could no longer be called true representatives of the working class.

In September, 1931, the National cabinet introduced and pushed through Parliament a finance bill which embodied most of the proposals that had been suggested by the premier some weeks earlier. The government maintained that the new law exacted equal sacrifices from all citizens regardless of rank or station, but the Labor Party insisted that actually nine-tenths of the savings effected were made at the expense of the working people. When the terms of the act were announced, England witnessed a situation such as had not existed for many years. Thousands of school teachers, postmen, and other government employees held protest meetings against the salary reductions. There were dozens of mass meetings of the unemployed and riots had to be put down in London, Liverpool, Salford, Glasgow, and other large cities. Most threatening was a naval mutiny which occurred at Invergordon and involved 8700 men. The sailors on several warships, believing that they received much heavier

cuts proportionately than the officers, refused to obey the orders of their superiors until the authorities should have corrected the inequality. They were successful in their demand.

Such incidents naturally tended to shake foreign confidence in the stability of Britain. The kingdom's credit fell rapidly and at one time in September the foreign withdrawals from the vaults of the Bank of England amounted to several million pounds daily. As has been indicated previously,¹ some of these withdrawals probably had diplomatic motivation, but whatever the cause, the result was so great a depletion in England's gold reserve that Parliament, on September 21, 1931, repealed that law of the realm which had required the government to issue and sell gold at par. In other words, England "went off the gold standard." Almost immediately the value of the English pound fell from \$4.86 to \$3.49 and thereafter fluctuated between \$3.00 and \$4.00. The chief consolations of this move were first the belief that the cost of production would be considerably lowered and British goods thus secure a sales advantage in the world market, and secondly, a sizable diminution in the real value of the internal debt.

By this time it had generally become felt that the people should be given an opportunity to express their views on the policies of the National Government. Parliament therefore was dissolved and new elections were held on October 27, 1931. The candidates who supported the National government ran as Conservatives, National Laborites, and National Liberals. The opposition candidates retained their names of Laborites and Liberals. So far as a party platform was concerned, the Nationals were of necessity vague. They asked for a vote of confidence from the people, advocated tariff protection, and requested a blank check to do what they considered best for the country. The Laborites had their customary platform, but lacking their old leaders they seemed to find it difficult to make their points clear to the voters. MacDonald and Snowden, indeed, joined the Conservatives in prophesying disaster if the Labor Party were victorious.

The results of the election were more than surprising even to the most experienced political sages. The Nationals secured a majority of 493 seats in the Commons, out of a total of 615 seats.

¹ See p. 180 and also p. 408.

The Conservatives alone had a majority of 327 over all other groups and therefore became the backbone of the next National Government. The popular votes were distributed as follows: Conservative, 12,000,000; Labor, 7,000,000; and Liberal, 3,000,000. MacDonald, reelected as a National Laborite after a hard fight in the constituency of Seaham Harbour, undertook to form another cabinet. It included four National Laborites, five National Liberals, and eleven Conservatives. Neville Chamberlain, a Conservative and an able proponent of high tariffs, became chancellor of the exchequer. The Liberal Sir John Simon became foreign minister. None of the extremist Conservatives, such as Austen Chamberlain or Winston Churchill, secured ministerial posts.

Though MacDonald retained the premiership, his control was by leave of the Conservatives. Stanley Baldwin, leader of the latter, proved himself staunchly loyal to MacDonald, although he might easily have caused his overthrow. As a matter of fact, in order to extend the life of the National Government and to maintain "national unity in the presence of the grave problems" that confronted England "and the whole world," the extraordinary step was taken of permitting individual members of the cabinet to express in Parliament "by speech and vote," views contrary to those held by the majority of the cabinet. Thus was broken a constitutional principle of 148 years' standing.

The government now drew up a series of measures which it fondly hoped would revive prosperity. In February, 1932, a minimum tariff of ten per cent was imposed upon all imports save raw cotton, wool, meat, fish, and wheat. Then a new "corn law" was passed virtually guaranteeing a minimum of one dollar a bushel for a specified quantity of domestic wheat. In March and later months individual items in the tariff schedule experienced further rises, and a special Tariff Commission was empowered to raise any duty as much as one hundred per cent against countries which discriminated against British goods.¹ In order to decrease expenditures the British war loan, calculated at ten billion dollars, was converted and the interest rate reduced

¹ Protection and economic nationalism seemed for a time to have become veritable fetishes with the British. In the first flush of the abandonment of free trade the "Buy British" movement was carried to such an extreme that the British Broadcasting Company was urged to boycott foreign in favor of domestic music.


so as to effect an annual saving in interest payments of tens of millions of dollars. The people were urged to help the government by paying income taxes in advance of the date required by law and by selling to the authorities their private gold possessions. Large quantities of gold, moreover, were imported from India.

In foreign affairs, policies were dictated chiefly by economic interests. A definite attempt was made at the Lausanne Reparation Conference in the summer of 1932 to draw more closely to the creditor France while yet remaining on good terms with the debtors Germany and Austria, and there was much talk about the revival of the old Entente Cordiale. At an Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa (July-August, 1932) the representatives of England and the dominions sought to bring about an improvement in the economic situation of all members of the empire by the exchange of trade concessions and privileges. A dozen bilateral trade treaties were signed which fell far short of accomplishing what had optimistically been hoped for from the Conference. The sessions were characterized by a much greater willingness on the part of everyone, especially the dominions, to demand sacrifices rather than to make them and gave evidence of the existence of serious intra-imperial economic rivalries. The slight concessions that England did make in the way of imperial preference eventually led to the resignation from the National cabinet of the free-trade Liberal members (September) and their replacement by Conservatives. In September, 1932, England extended to Russia eighteen-month credits. It was hoped thus to attract some of the Soviet orders which were being sent to Germany and Italy.

All these efforts, however, were insufficient to restore economic health to England. Wages continued to decline, there were serious strikes in the textile and other industries, and the unemployment figure rose to the three-million mark, the highest in the history of the land. The national debt late in 1932 was about thirty-five billion dollars. Once again, therefore, people began to wonder: "Has the sun of England's glory set?"

ENGLAND AND THE DOMINIONS

The war and post-war periods witnessed some remarkable changes in the relationships between the component parts of the



J. RAMSAY MACDONALD AND EDOUARD HERRIOT AT LAUSANNE, 1932 *Wide World*

British Empire. Beginning with the year 1911, and interrupted only temporarily by the vicissitudes of the war, numerous imperial conferences have been held, attended by the premiers of England, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and, most recently, the Irish Free State. At these gatherings, which possess no legal powers, the English and dominion delegates discuss the varied problems which confront the empire as a whole and which affect the relations of the members one to another. The method of the conferees is to seek agreement on general principles, to embody the agreements in draft resolutions, and then to work for the acceptance of the resolutions by the home governments.

The exigencies of the war, the dependence of England on the help furnished by the dominions, the independent signature by the latter of the peace treaties, and the circumstance that the dominions became fully competent members of the League of Nations, served greatly to alter the relationships between the mother country and the colonies. Long before all the legal niceties involved in the new status of dominions were worked out, the dominions proceeded with a number of actions which are usually regarded as falling within the category of sovereign powers.

Canada, for example, in 1923 signed with the United States a Halibut Fisheries Treaty which bore the signatures only of the American and Canadian representatives. This precedent was followed in a number of later treaties between Canada and the United States and Canada and European countries. Some of the dominions appointed their own diplomatic ministers abroad. Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa administered mandates in their own names and on their own responsibilities. In 1930 the Australians successfully contended that their choice for the governor-generalship, who in this case happened to be a native, should be accepted. In 1931 an Irish minister undertook directly to advise the king, and the Irish Free State assumed a Great Seal of its own.

In principle most of these actions had been affirmed by the Imperial Conference of 1926. In a document known as the Balfour Report this Conference had declared: "They [Great Britain and the dominions] are autonomous communities within

the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." It remained to have this principle enacted into imperial law, and in 1929 a committee representing Great Britain and the dominions was appointed to report on a method of bringing the old legal restrictions and the new constitutional practice into harmony. The report of the committee was accepted by the Imperial Conference of 1930 and steps were taken in each dominion and England to give it the force of law. This was finally accomplished on December 10, 1931, with the passage by the British Parliament of the Statute of Westminster.

The Statute recognized the equal status of the dominions with the mother country and thus virtually accorded them independence. It was provided that in future no law passed by a dominion parliament could be declared void "on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England" or to the provisions of any existing or future act of the Parliament of Great Britain. The dominion parliaments have full power to pass laws having extra-territorial operation, that is, laws applying to dominion citizens living abroad or traveling on the high seas. No law of the Parliament of Great Britain is applicable to any dominion unless the latter specifically requests and consents to the extension of such law to its domains. No longer may the king on advice of his ministers "disallow" an act of a dominion parliament, and henceforth no alteration in the laws concerning succession to the throne or the royal style and titles may be made without the assent of the parliaments of all the dominions as well as that of Great Britain.

Thus there was created a "British Commonwealth of Independent Nations," a group of separate political entities avowing allegiance to one and the same symbol of unity: the Crown. The king, a feeling of commonwealth citizenship, and perhaps a certain pride in descent from common stock, remain as the dominant ties between England and the dominions. It must not be overlooked, however, that the dominions, as long as they do not entirely break away from Britain, enjoy the protection of a powerful navy which is paid for chiefly by the people of Great Britain.

The great freedom accorded the dominions has led some observers to believe that the British Empire, the "frailest of political structures" as they call it, is doomed. The answer to this view was well given by Sir Cecil Hurst, editor of the *British International Yearbook*, in the words: "In truth, it is the full recognition of the right of each of the great self-governing communities of the Empire to be the master of its own destinies which renders it so unlikely that the connecting bonds of Empire will snap. What this full recognition of their autonomy has done is to eliminate from relations with the mother country the elements that chafed and embittered the sentiments of the dominion peoples, and it is these elements that would have weakened and might ultimately have worn away the connecting bonds. . . . The British Empire will endure so long as it serves a useful purpose, so long as its constituent elements find it better to belong to it than to stand alone."¹

Although the chief function of the king of England is to serve as a symbol of unity for the empire, he also occupies an important position at home. Theoretically still able to veto parliamentary legislation, he has no actual executive power. A strong personality, such as was Edward VII, may exert considerable political influence through personal relationships with the leading officials. A weaker king serves at least to satisfy the love for social tradition and the essentially aristocratic leanings of the British. The huge drop in the normal amount of Christmas shopping which paralleled the grave illness of King George V in the winter of 1928 was striking proof of the personal loyalty of his subjects. The Prince of Wales has given fair promise of being equally popular. An England without a king would appear to be an incongruity; and yet, few people in 1914 thought that either Germany or Russia would be a republic within four years.

¹ Wright, Q., ed., *Great Britain and the Dominions*, Harris Foundation Lectures, 1927. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

CHAPTER XI

SOME BRITISH PROBLEMS OF EMPIRE

THE IRISH FREE STATE

a. "ENGLAND'S NECESSITY IS IRELAND'S OPPORTUNITY"

In the summer of 1914 the British Parliament passed an Irish Home Rule Bill. This action, it was hoped, would put an end to Irish agitation for local autonomy, a movement dating from the time (1801) when Ireland became an integral part of the United Kingdom. In the latter half of the nineteenth century Premier Gladstone had twice attempted to settle the difficulty by the grant of home rule, but his first bill had failed of passage in the Commons and the second had been vetoed by the Lords. In 1912 the lower house had passed a third Home Rule Bill, and this time, though again opposed by the peers, the measure had become law in 1914, after the Commons, in accordance with the Parliament Act of 1911, had passed it three successive times in an interval of two years.

Had the provisions of the law gone into force, Ireland doubtless would have been rent by civil war. The six "Ulster" counties in the northeast, being industrialized and largely Protestant, were resolved not to submit to the control of an Irish parliament, the majority of whose members would be elected by the Catholic farmers in the twenty-six southern counties. The people in the south were equally determined that one parliament should rule the entire island. Upon the passage of the bill both sides organized military forces in preparation for an armed conflict, but before blood was shed, the outbreak of the World War caused the British Government to suspend the operation of home rule. John Redmond, leader of a militant group of South Irishmen who called themselves Irish Nationalists, assured Sir Edward Grey that his followers would remain loyal during the war. The fealty of the Ulsterites was a foregone conclusion.

The British authorities now pursued remarkably ill-advised tactics in Ireland. Although the Ulsterites were permitted to form a military division of their own for overseas service, the Irish Nationalists were denied a similar request and South Irish recruits were encouraged to enter English regiments. With little cause or reason petty annoyances were heaped upon the people in the southern counties until they became furious. In 1916 the discontent finally crystallized in a so-called Easter Rebellion.

This uprising was the work of a group of radicals who had left the Irish Nationalist Party, which still officially supported the British, and formed an extremist Irish Republican Brotherhood. Most of the Brothers also were affiliated with a society known as *Sinn Fein* ("We Ourselves"), which had originally been organized to bring about industrial betterment among the masses and to develop Irish national sentiment. In 1914 the association had entered the political field and during the war it became thoroughly identified with the republican movement. The Republicans, accordingly, were generally known as Sinn Feiners.

On Easter Monday, 1916, the Sinn Feiners seized some public buildings in Dublin and issued a proclamation in the name of the "Provisional Government of the Irish Republic." Germany had promised to aid the rebels by "land, sea, and air," but the tightness of the British blockade made such help impracticable. The English put down the rebellion within a week, shot fifteen of the leaders, including Sir Roger Casement, and placed Ireland under martial law. Thousands of men and women were arrested and many deported to England. These drastic measures only served to swell the ranks of Sinn Fein sympathizers.

In 1917 Lloyd George attempted without success to solve the Irish question by a conference with representative leaders. The violence and disorder increased until a crisis was reached in 1918 when the British Parliament applied a Conscription Act to Ireland. The opposition to this measure was so strong that the authorities saw no hope of enforcing it. Hence they offered to suspend its provisions on condition that a sufficiently large number of Irishmen volunteered for service. The volume of enlistments, however, was small, and the outlook for the future ominous. The signing of the armistice occurred in time to prevent disaster.

The British parliamentary elections of December, 1918, in which the Irish still took part, assumed the form, in southern Ireland, of a contest between the Nationalists and the Sinn Feiners. The former stood for home rule, the latter for independence. In Ulster, the Unionist group, which preferred close union with England, was supreme. Of the 105 seats to which Ireland was entitled in Parliament, the Unionists secured 25, the Nationalists 7, and the Sinn Feiners 73. After election, the Sinn Fein deputies refused to attend the Parliament at Westminster, preferring to consider their election a mandate from the people to set up a separate Irish parliament. This they did, at Dublin, in January, 1919. The deputies took the name of Irish Republican Party and called their parliament *Bail Eireann*.

At the first meeting of this body twenty-nine men were present. The remaining forty-four were in prison, on their way to prison, or in hiding. Nothing daunted, the Dáil selected three delegates to attend the Peace Conference and plead the cause of Irish self-determination. The assemblage at Paris, however, refused to recognize these emissaries. At a subsequent meeting the Dáil appointed a ministry and elected Eamonn de Valera president.

De Valera was born in New York in 1882 of a Spanish father and an Irish mother. While still in his infancy he was taken to Ireland. He grew up to be a professor of mathematics. A fervent orator and patriot, he had also been one of the leaders of the Easter Rebellion. On this occasion he had been captured and sentenced to death, but his sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment. In 1917 he benefited by a general amnesty but in 1918 was imprisoned again for further revolutionary activities. This time he escaped to the United States, there securing considerable financial assistance for his plans. After the war he returned to Ireland and soon forged to the head of the republican camp.

The defiance of the Dáil led to an actual state of war between the "Irish Republic" and Great Britain. The English military and police forces were obliged to fight pitched battles with the Irish Republican Army led by the young and able Michael Collins. Cruelties were perpetrated on both sides, and in December, 1920, a large part of the city of Cork was burned. Especially hateful to the Irish were the "Auxiliaries" sent over from England to aid the police. These reinforcements soon were nicknamed

"Black-and-Tans," because their uniform consisted of a khaki outfit with black bands on hat and arm. The Irish claimed that many of them were convicts released from jail for the express purpose of terrorizing the Republicans into submission. Whether or not this was true, it soon became obvious that force could not satisfactorily settle the question of Ireland's status.

To end the strife, Lloyd George secured the passage by Parliament of another Home Rule Act in December, 1920. This law conceded more local autonomy to Ireland than had the earlier one, but it set up separate parliaments for northern and southern Ireland. The Ulsterites accepted the law and proceeded to put it into execution. The other Irishmen balked. They no longer were satisfied with mere home rule and they objected to a division of the island into two parts. When England, despite this opposition, ordered elections held in the spring of 1921, the Sinn Feiners captured 124 of the 128 seats provided for in the South Irish Parliament. At the opening session of this assembly the four members from Dublin University were the only delegates present. The body at once adjourned, never to meet again.

Still hopeful, Lloyd George in June, 1921, invited de Valera to London to discuss an amicable settlement. A conference was arranged, but the proposals of Lloyd George were unacceptable to the Irish. In October a second conference was held so that means might be found whereby "the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire could best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations." This time the Irish delegation was headed by Arthur Griffith, founder of Sinn Fein. Early in the morning of December 6, 1921, the British and Irish plenipotentiaries signed a treaty which, in effect, was the birth certificate of a new Irish Free State.

b. FREE-STATERS VERSUS REPUBLICANS

The treaty provided that "Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the community of nations known as the British Empire, as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa, with a Parliament having powers to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled

and known as the Irish Free State." Officials of the Free State were to take an oath of allegiance to the king of England, but the office of lord-lieutenant was abolished. The Crown was to be represented, as in the case of Canada, by a governor-general. The coasts of Ireland were to be protected by the British fleet and England was to retain authority over a number of Irish ports as naval bases. The Free State was to have its own military forces and revenue cutters, and eventually was to share in the burden of coast defenses. It was also to assume a portion of the British national debt, the amount to be determined later. Northern Ireland was given a choice of joining the Free State or of continuing the relationship established with England by the act of 1920. Ulster chose the latter course, so that a suitable boundary line remained to be adjusted.

When news of the treaty reached Ireland, there was a break in Sinn Féin ranks. De Valera denounced the document and resigned from the presidency when the Dáil accepted it by a vote of 64 to 57. Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins now led the movement for the organization of the Free State, and a committee was appointed to draft an appropriate constitution (January, 1922). De Valera and his followers thereupon withdrew from the Dáil, boasting, "We made it impossible for the British Government to rule Ireland, and we can also make it impossible for an Irish Government working under British authority to rule Ireland." For the next twelvemonth de Valera and his republican "Irregulars" terrorized the countryside. Murder, arson, pillage, and border raids into Ulster made life a nightmare for peaceably inclined inhabitants. On June 16, 1922, elections for a new provisional parliament were held. The chief issue was the acceptance or rejection of the treaty with England. The Republicans interfered with the elections in an ingenious variety of ways, tearing up railway tracks, intimidating voters, and assassinating speakers. Nevertheless, the friends of the treaty were overwhelmingly victorious in the balloting.

The Irregulars were able for some time to continue their lawless activities with apparent immunity because many members of the provisional government were loath to deal harshly with the men who had been their comrades in the struggle against England. **But** in August, 1922, the Republicans killed Michael Collins from

ambush. A few days earlier Arthur Griffith had died from overwork and worry. William Cosgrave and Kevin O'Higgins thereupon came to the head of the parliamentary forces and determined on a ruthless suppression of the disorder. The provisional parliament, which met in September, 1922, supported this stand and elected Cosgrave president. A struggle followed, fiercer and more brutal than even that with England in 1920 and 1921. Thousands were imprisoned and scores were assassinated or executed. Eventually the Free Staters triumphed, and in the spring of 1923 de Valera ordered his followers to lay down their arms. Damage had been occasioned to the extent of almost a quarter-billion dollars.

From 1923 to 1927 de Valera and his followers abstained from violence. Organized as the *Fianna Fail*, or Republican Party, they put up candidates for election to parliament, but when elected these delegates automatically excluded themselves from office by refusing to take the oath of allegiance to the king as required by the constitution. For a time this actually was useful to Cosgrave, for it meant that there was no large opposition group in the legislature. On July 10, 1927, however, Kevin O'Higgins, Cosgrave's assistant, was assassinated. As minister of justice, O'Higgins had been active in repressing the Irregulars some years earlier, and he was generally regarded as the "strong man" of Ireland. Though de Valera and his aides denied complicity in the murder, the government determined to prevent similar occurrences in future and to curtail the objectionable activities of the *Fianna Fail*. A public safety act empowered the authorities to deal vigorously with acts of wilful lawlessness, and the electoral law was amended so that no one might become a candidate for office without previously asserting his intention to fulfill all requirements of the constitution. In other words, all parliamentary candidates had to agree in advance to take the oath of allegiance if elected.

By this time popular opinion in southern Ireland was decidedly averse to the methods of de Valera. Moreover, a number of Irish-Americans, who had been assisting de Valera financially, were alienated by this latest murder outrage, which was generally regarded as an outcome of the *Fianna Fail* leader's tactics. De Valera therefore wisely announced his intention to head a con-

stitutional opposition in the national parliament, and the political atmosphere at once became calmer. In the elections of September, 1927, de Valera's party, having forsworn violence, secured 57 of the 153 seats in the Dail. This success made it the second largest party in the parliament, with only six seats less than Cosgrave's Free State Party, *Cumann na nGaedheal*.

C. THE COSGRAVE ADMINISTRATION

The provisional parliament which had assembled in September, 1922, and which had elected Cosgrave president, had also adopted a constitution (October 25, 1922). The instrument was republican in character and had been accepted by the British Parliament without change. On December 6, 1922, accordingly, King George V had proclaimed the Irish Free State (*Saorstát Éireann*). Immediately thereafter the last British troops had been withdrawn from the newest dominion.

Theoretically the executive power in the Irish Free State was made to rest with the governor-general; actually it was vested in a responsible Executive Council. A bicameral legislature (*Oireachtas*) was set up, consisting of a Senate and a Chamber. The Senate (*Seanad Éireann*) contains sixty members, each elected for twelve years. At first all citizens of thirty or more could vote for Senators, but by an amendment of 1928 this power was transferred to the two legislative houses voting jointly on a panel nominated by them in equal parts. The Senate cannot amend money bills and in general has only a suspensive veto. The lower house, or *Dail Éireann*, is elected for four years on a basis of proportional representation by all citizens over twenty-one. It elects the president of the Executive Council, who is the chief administrative officer in the land. Religious freedom is guaranteed and Irish is the national language, though English enjoys official equality.

The first elections under this constitution were held in August, 1923. Cosgrave's party gained only a plurality in the lower house, but the absence of the de Valera Republicans enabled him to retain control of the Dail. After the elections of 1927, when the Republicans took their seats in parliament, several attempts were made to oust Cosgrave. On one occasion it required the deciding ballot of the Speaker to thwart a vote of no confidence.

The Free State adopted its own flag of green, white, and gold, and sent diplomatic representatives to the United States, France, Germany, Belgium, and to Geneva. In September, 1923, the Free State was admitted to the League of Nations and soon thereafter was elected to a non-permanent seat in the Council. Ireland now also secured representation at the British Imperial Conferences.

A thorny question that remained to be settled grew out of Article 12 of the treaty of 1921. This article stipulated that if Northern Ireland preferred not to join the Free State, a commission of three should be appointed to determine the boundary between the two regions. One representative should be appointed by England, one by Ulster, and one by Southern Ireland. When the British Government in May, 1924, prepared to set up the boundary commission, the northern counties refused to send a delegate. The British therefore appointed one for them. The commission visited the border areas in 1925 and heard evidence for several months. The Free State wanted to add the counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh, but the Ulsterites were determined to keep every inch of the six northeastern counties. The award of the commission was never published, but the Free State delegate resigned on the ground that the two English delegates were moved more by political considerations than by the wishes of the inhabitants.

Before any overt action took place, a Free State delegation was sent to London to negotiate directly with the British Government. The decisions of the commission were disregarded and a compromise was reached under which the boundary was to remain as fixed by the Home Rule Act of 1920. This was a complete victory for Ulster. However, the Free State was relieved of responsibility for its share of the public debt of the United Kingdom as of 1921. This arrangement met with some opposition in the Dail but was accepted in December, 1925, by a fair majority. The tension between the two parts of Ireland was eased and they agreed "mutually to aid one another in a spirit of neighborly comradeship."

It was to be expected that there would be a nationalistic reaction in the Free State after the achievement of dominion status. There was a strong movement to make Gaelic the language of

the people, and many family and place names were gaelicized. Thus, William Cosgrave became Liam McCosgair, and the city of Queenstown became Cobh. Special Irish coins and postage stamps were adopted and all the mail boxes painted green instead of the former royal red. In the spring of 1929 Gaelic was made compulsory for lawyers as it had previously been made for civil servants. The Irish delegate to the League Assembly was instructed to deliver his speeches in Gaelic. The language is difficult, and English apparently remains more popular. The Free State has an exceptionally severe censorship system, and many of **the** world's leading books, papers, and periodicals have been proscribed on moral or political grounds.

The Cosgrave regime, which lasted until 1932, could boast of laudable economic and material achievements. Economies were effected by the consolidation of overlapping departments and the establishment of an efficient poor-relief method. The police and postal systems were reorganized, the standing army was reduced from 50,000 to 6000 men, and in 1929 the public safety act was allowed to lapse. Special land purchase provisions were enacted and various forms of agriculture received subsidies. By 1929 the hydroelectric potentialities of the River Shannon had been developed. A modernized system of education was inaugurated, and for the first time in many years most of the three million inhabitants appeared to be reasonably prosperous and contented. So great was domestic and foreign confidence in the future of the Free State, that in December, 1927, a loan of \$35,000,000 floated in Dublin and New York at less than five per cent interest was oversubscribed in a few hours.¹

d. PRESIDENT DE VALERA

Despite the success of President Cosgrave in bringing prosperity and security to the Free State, there were signs, by 1930, that the days of his control were numbered. The general economic depression and the vogue of economic nationalism strongly affected Erin, and the antagonists of the government made the most of the inevitable economic difficulties. Early in 1930,

¹ Considerable sums of foreign money were secured by the legalization of sweepstakes for the benefit of Irish hospitals and charitable institutions. This device was opposed both by Mr. Cosgrave and Mr. de Valera, but it is popular with the citizens.

indeed, the Cosgrave cabinet was defeated by two votes when it opposed an increase in old age pensions. The president at once resigned, but after a short interval was reelected. Other problems, however, soon arose to trouble the administration.

Many farmers were alienated by the strict enforcement of the laws against the exportation of low grade agricultural products and the use of inferior bulls for breeding. Users of electric current expressed disappointment because the poor distribution facilities forced the state to exceed its promised rates for power from the Shannon plants. The refusal of the government to adopt a high tariff angered the manufacturers. Quiet citizens were offended by the violent tone which was adopted in debate and controversy by some of the ministry's ablest members. The reduction of salaries (1931-1932) in the army, the police force, and the civil service, brought additional unpopularity.

When the discontent took the form of renewed disorders and secret military activities by the Irish Republican Army and other anti-government societies, a new and more stringent public safety measure was enacted in October, 1931. It created military courts for the trial of persons accused of committing violence or engaging in armed drills, and thus further aroused the ire of the opposition. Finally, when Cosgrave and his associates declared that the Free State could enjoy greater freedom and security within the British Commonwealth than outside it, they lost the chief appeal which attached to the traditional Irish hero, namely, that of being in opposition to England. By contrast, de Valera now seemed much more heroic.

The approaching election in February, 1932, promised to be of unusual interest. The chief issue in the campaign was the acceptance or rejection of the platform announced by Fianna Fail. This program, the keynote of which was political and economic self-sufficiency, included the following points: (1) abolition of the oath of "faithfulness" to the king which was required of all deputies by the treaty of 1921 with England; (2) retention by the Irish treasury of certain land-purchase instalments (£3,000,-000 annually) that were owing to British bondholders under financial agreements of 1921, 1923, and 1926; (3) suspension of the public safety act of 1931; and (4) erection of a high tariff wall.

When the ballots were counted, it appeared that the new Dail would include 72 supporters of de Valera, 57 followers of Cosgrave, 17 Independents, and 7 Laborites. When the house convened, the Independents threw in their lot with Cosgrave and the representatives of Labor joined de Valera. The latter therefore controlled the Dail, by a precariously narrow margin. In March, 1932, he was elected president of the Executive Council.

President de Valera quickly became aware that it was easier to promise far-reaching changes than to inaugurate them. To begin with, a majority of the Senators still were pro-Cosgrave, and the upper house had the constitutional right to hold up for eighteen months acts passed by the Dail. The oath requirement, moreover, was based on a clause in a bilateral treaty that had been registered with the League Secretariat. Again, the annuity payments, though guaranteed by the British Government, were private debts. Retention of the money, therefore, though it would lighten the task of balancing of the budget, would simultaneously entail a violation of financial conventions and moral obligations. A high tariff wall might, of course, be raised, but since Ireland depended for her prosperity on exports, it was dangerous to invite protectionist retaliation. The suspension of the public safety law was the only election pledge that could be carried out with relative ease, and in March this was done. Meanwhile the Labor members of the Dail threatened to withdraw their support from the government unless prompt steps were taken to relieve the hardships of unemployment.

The British Government naturally refused to countenance either the unilateral abrogation of the oath clause in the treaty or the repudiation of the annuities. In their public statements the English generally emphasized only the illegality of the Irish contentions, but the underlying reason for their determined stand was strategic. In sheer self-defense England could not tolerate the establishment of an Irish state which might at any time be used by some foreign power as a military or naval base. The threat of a high tariff caused the Britishers little worry since they could easily retaliate in kind. Whereas England purchased nine-tenths of the exports of the Free State, only one-twelfth of all British exports went to Ireland.

Throughout the spring and early summer of 1932 de Valera and J. H. Thomas, British Secretary for the Dominions, conferred and parleyed, but with little success. Thomas warned that recourse would be had to a tariff war if the annuities were not paid. Many of the Irish farmers and small business men were frightened at such a prospect, but de Valera remained firm. In fact, he added to his demands another, to wit, the unification of northern and southern Ireland. Meanwhile the Irish Senate had blocked an attempt of the Dail to remove the oath of allegiance from the constitution and the Irish Finance Minister had announced further extensive pay cuts and heavy tax increases. In June, de Valera withheld from England £1,500,000 of annuity money and expressed a willingness to have the Anglo-Irish dispute settled by arbitration. Thomas accepted the idea of arbitration, but another snag was struck when he refused de Valera's condition that the arbitrators be chosen from without the empire. Most of the people in the other dominions sided with England in the quarrel.¹

In July the long-expected tariff war was launched. In the hope that she might gain some economic advantages, the Free State participated in the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa in July and August, but little actual benefit accrued to her from the agreements there reached. Attempts were then made to negotiate special trade treaties with Germany, Poland, and other countries, but again with little result.

Naturally the popularity of the Fianna Fail decreased during these months of diplomatic failure and economic stress. Several groups of farmers actually resolved not to meet their annuity payments unless the dispute with England soon were settled. In September, de Valera offered to deposit the suspended funds in the Bank for International Settlements pending an arbitral award, but since he still insisted that the tribunal be international, the stalemate persisted. There the "Irish Question" rested late in 1932.

¹ No British or dominion flags were displayed at the Roman Catholic Eucharistic Congress which was held at Dublin in June, 1932, and the governor-general was not invited to attend the official reception that was held on the occasion. Free State ministers later also boycotted private affairs to which the representative of the king was invited.

"INDEPENDENT" EGYPT

When Turkey and England went to war in 1914, Egypt was placed in a unique position. Though occupied by Great Britain since 1882, Egypt still was under the technical sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan. In December, 1914, however, England freed the people from the incubus of two loyalties by announcing that "the suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is terminated." On the same occasion Britain also extended a protectorate over the land of the Nile, deposed Khedive Abbas II, who happened to be living in Constantinople, and elevated Abbas' uncle, Hussein Kernel, to the throne as sultan of Egypt. England agreed, moreover, to take "upon herself the sole burden of the present war without calling on-the Egyptian people for aid therein."

This promise was soon violated, and Egypt began to seethe with discontent. The British organized an Egyptian Labor and Camel Corps to provide transportation facilities for their armies in Palestine and Syria. Service in the corps at first was voluntary and good wages were paid, but as the war continued the treatment of the men became progressively worse and in the end resort was had to forced recruiting. Because of the poor accommodations, thousands of the Egyptians froze to death during the cold Palestine winters, and some of the conscripts were made to fight. The British authorities, furthermore, requisitioned Egyptian livestock and grain at their own prices. In some cases the Egyptians later were forced to buy back the surplus at enhanced prices. Dubious methods were used to exact Red Cross contributions from the ignorant peasants or fellahin. In addition to these material grievances, the Egyptians experienced the general dislike of patriots for foreign rule and the traditional hatred of Moslems for Christians. The desire for independence, too, was quickened by President Wilson's talk about self-determination. Yet open revolt did not occur during the war years because so many British troops were quartered in the land.

After the armistice the Egyptians were amazed to find that, although a number of Indian rajahs and Arab sheikhs had been invited to attend the Peace Conference, no such privilege was accorded them. The leader of the Nationalist Party (*Wafd*), Saad Zaghlul Pasha, resolutely placed himself at the head of a delegation and embarked for Paris to present Egypt's case for

independence. The British arrested the delegation and shipped it to Malta. This act forced the hand of the Nationalists and precipitated the Insurrection of 1919. The rioting was so severe that 60,000 soldiers under General Allenby were required to restore order. Eventually, the imprisoned delegates were released and Allenby "helped" form a new cabinet. In addition, a mission of investigation under Lord Milner was despatched to Egypt.

The mission, which was said to have received 29 messages of welcome and 1131 of ill-will, investigated, and then returned to London. Here Milner also interviewed Zaghlul, who had since gone to England. In its completed report the Milner Mission recommended that Egypt be given independence, but with a number of restrictions. England should be permitted to maintain a permanent garrison at Suez and have access to the entire territory in time of war. England should also supply Egypt with expert financial and judicial advisers and appoint a high commissioner with veto power over legislation affecting foreigners. Finally, all agreements that might be negotiated between Egypt and foreign countries should secure the prior consent of Britain. When these terms were incorporated in a treaty and offered to Egypt in 1921, the Nationalists unhesitatingly rejected them.

Rioting broke out anew, Zaghlul was again arrested and this time sent to Gibraltar, and Allenby once more utilized his troops. The general also suggested that England proclaim the treaty terms as a unilateral declaration. This was done, on February 28, 1922, and Egypt was proclaimed "an independent sovereign state." The following points, however, were "absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government": the defense of Suez, the defense of Egypt against foreign aggression, the protection of foreigners and their interests in Egypt, and the control of the Sudan. The latter was important as a source of raw cotton and as the area from which Egypt's water supply could be controlled. Coincident with the public announcement of the "termination" of the British protectorate, Sultan Ahmed Fuad, who had succeeded Hussein in 1917, changed his title to that of king.

The "British Monroe Doctrine over Egypt" naturally irked the Nationalists, but they were powerless to resist it. A consti-

tution was drawn up for the new kingdom in 1923, and parliamentary elections were held in January, 1924. The *Wafdist*s were overwhelmingly victorious at the polls and Zaghlul, who had returned home again, became premier. He still hoped for real independence and went to London to see Premier MacDonald, but his quest was in vain.

Another crisis occurred in November, 1924, when Sir Lee Stack, governor-general of the Sudan and *sirdar* or commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, was murdered in Cairo. Both Fuad and Zaghlul expressed their horror at the crime and promised swift pipsecution of the assassins, but the English used the opportunity to issue a severe ultimatum. They demanded an official apology, the punishment of the criminals, the suppression of political demonstrations, an indemnity of half a million pounds, and the immediate withdrawal of all Egyptian officers and troops from the Sudan. They further announced the indefinite extension for cotton cultivation of the Gezireh irrigation area in the Sudan. This involved a serious threat to Egypt's water supply.

Zaghlul at once accepted all terms save those relating to the Sudan. The British thereupon occupied the customs house at Alexandria, and Zaghlul resigned in protest. He was succeeded by the more tractable Ziwar Pasha, who agreed to the British demands. Subsequently England promised to use only the waters of the Blue Nile for the Sudanese irrigation projects and to leave the White Nile for Egypt, but the Egyptians continued to be alarmed by successive British dam projects. The parliament, controlled by Nationalists, appealed to the League of Nations for redress, but Foreign Secretary Chamberlain issued a warning that the affair was purely domestic — between England and a colony. Accordingly, no member of the League brought up the Egyptian question. "Independent" Egypt was unable to secure a hearing for her case.

The next few years witnessed a virtual stalemate in Egyptian politics. Several parliaments were convened and dismissed, and the Nationalist majorities persistently voted down all measures of the ministers who were friendly to England. In 1926 Zaghlul again would have become premier but for the objection of High Commissioner Lord Lloyd. Nevertheless, until his death in August, 1927, the Wafd leader ruled the parliament.

His last serious clashes with the British occurred over his proposal to increase the size of the Egyptian army and his opposition to a new treaty which would have prolonged indefinitely the stay of British troops in Egypt.

Although the Nationalist Party remained intact after the death of Zaghlul, it was able to accomplish but little since the king and many of his aides, who owed their positions to the existing regime, displayed pro-English sympathies. Fuad, moreover, was not at all inclined to accord his people a democratic government, and he heartily disliked the institution of parliamentary responsibility.

The return to power of a Labor Government in England in June, 1929, once more raised Egyptian hopes for independence. There was great joy when Lord Lloyd was replaced as high commissioner by the more liberal Sir Percy Loraine, and when, on August 6, 1929, Foreign Secretary Henderson announced the draft of a new treaty to be presented to the parliaments of England and Egypt.

Under the proposed treaty the British troops were to be withdrawn from all Egypt save a strip along the Suez Canal. A military alliance was to be consummated between the two countries whereby each would come to the support of the other in case of war. Egyptian troops were to be trained uniformly with the British, and in case of war England might use Egypt as a base of action. If Egypt decided to engage foreign assistants or advisers these were, in general, to be Britishers. England was to support an Egyptian petition for admission to the League and help Egypt secure an abolition of the foreign extraterritorial rights. The condominium over the Sudan, as established in 1899, was to be renewed. The office of high commissioner was to be abolished and ambassadors were to be exchanged. The life of the treaty was to be twenty-five years.

Although acceptance of this treaty might have been a further step in the direction of independence, it did not satisfy Zaghlul's successor, Mustapha Nahas Pasha. The agreement, therefore, was rejected by the Nationalist ministry and parliament which had come into power after the elections of December, 1929. The people became restless again and the parliament soon was suspended — the fourth such instance in five years. Ismail Sidky

Pasha thereupon became dictator, and on October 23, 1930, promulgated a new constitution.

This document provided for a Senate of one hundred members, sixty to be appointed by the king and forty elected, and for a Chamber of Deputies with 150 members. The electoral system was made indirect and universal manhood suffrage permitted only in the first electoral stage. The king was given the right to suspend or dissolve parliament. The new constitution reflected a definite attempt to reduce the power of the Wafdists. Owing to excellent governmental supervision the reactions of the people to the document were less violent than might have been expected. In an endeavor to uphold the constitution of 1923, however, and to oust Sidky from office, the Wafdists under Nahas now were joined by the Liberal Constitutional Party led by ex-Premier Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha. Prior to this union Mahmoud, who had accepted an honorary degree from Oxford in 1929, had been just as obnoxious to the Wafdists as Sidky, but now common cause was made against the latter's newly organized People's Party. This consisted of the wealthier citizens, some business men, and the politicians in power.

Nahas and Mahmoud, though claiming to control ninety per cent of the vote, threatened to boycott the election promised for 1931. Sidky's government, ostensibly to "preserve the public peace," thereupon forbade all Wafdist meetings and prohibited the publication of boycott propaganda. On May 14, 16, and 18, 1931, the popular elections were held. The people were to select one voter in every fifty to act as parliamentary elector on June 1. Before the balloting, the opposition leaders were prevented from leaving Cairo for fear that they might induce the people to abstain from voting. Hundreds of persons were killed and many more wounded in election riots, for the police and military had been given strict commands to repress disorder! The Nationalists claimed that government agents actually entered private houses and forced people to go out and vote. The secondary elections in June aroused less interest and disorder, and resulted in an overwhelming victory for the government.

On June 20, 1931, the new parliament was opened with much pomp. In the speech from the throne it was pointed out that much had been done of late to improve the economic condition

of the country, and that, despite the depression, the budget had been balanced. An unfortunate impression was created when the king left the parliamentary chambers without taking an oath to the new constitution. Sidky, however, remarked that such an oath would be superfluous since the king had sworn to observe the earlier constitution in 1924. Then, "acting under a solicitude for the amenities of public life and political controversy," Sidky immediately introduced a new and stringent press law.

Throughout 1931 and 1932 Sidky retained dictatorial control of the land. Parliament was convened and prorogued at his will, and severe repressive measures were taken against over-enthusiastic Wafdists, communists, and members of a new Labor Party. Considerable economic distress was experienced in these years, largely because of the decline in the price of cotton.

The attitude of the British Government towards these disturbing events was one of passive observation. The Egyptians were informed that they themselves would have to settle their domestic difficulties. No attempt was made to prevent the king and the dictator from using the army to thwart the apparent will of the people. The doubtful wisdom of Britain's entire post-war policy was called to the attention of Englishmen by the publication of a special trade mission report in 1931. This document showed that British sales to Egypt had declined from 30.5% of the total imports in 1913, to 20.3% in 1930. This loss was due, in part, to the lower prices of French and Italian wares. But the Egyptians' dislike for Britain's official policy doubtless must bear some of the blame for England's declining share in the trade of over 14,000,000 potential customers.

INDIA

a. INDIA AND THE WAR

Within three months after the outbreak of the World War, Indian troops were fighting on the western front, for India, like the other British colonies, remained loyal during the conflict. Altogether, India supplied 1,300,000 men, who were utilized in Egypt, China, East Africa, Arabia, and the Balkans, as well as in France. The government of India, moreover, presented England with a gift of \$500,000,000. This was supplemented

by a "voluntary" donation of \$25,000,000 by the several hundred princes of the quasi-independent Indian States. But the circumstance that she did not make it necessary for England to quell native revolts was India's greatest contribution to the Allied cause.

The political life of India had long been characterized by discontent and unrest. Conditions had been bad under the regime of the British East India Company (1600-1857), and there had been relatively little improvement under the administration of the English Government which, in 1857-1858, had relieved the company of its control. The Government of India Act (1858) and the Indian Councils Act (1909), both intended to better the political situation, had failed to satisfy many of the native leaders. The latter, through their travels and studies in the West, had come to look upon genuinely representative government as an immediate goal. During the war, therefore, the Indian leaders made it quite evident that they hoped to win great concessions as a reward for their loyalty. Their hands were strengthened by the fact that the war brought about a temporary *rapprochement* between the Moslems and Hindus in India.

The Mohammedans refused to heed the Ottoman Sultan's call for a Holy War against England and instead united with the Hindus in aiding the British and demanding political reform. In 1916 the Indian National Congress, organized by leading patriots in 1885, and the All-India Moslem League, founded in 1906, met together for the first time. Prominent at the gathering were the radical newspaper editor, Lokamanya Tilak, and a remarkably active Irishwoman named Mrs. Annie Besant.¹ The fraternization of Moslems and Hindus resulted in the presentation to England (1916) of a plan for reform known as the Congress-League Scheme.

With their attention centered upon fighting the war, the British at first paid little heed to the scheme. Eventually, however, the dissemination in India of Bolshevik propaganda and of Wilson's speeches on self-determination caused so much unrest

¹ Mrs. Besant was president of the mystic Theosophical Society and was so strenuous an advocate of Indian nationalism that she was several times deported from India. She edited a paper called *The New India*, whose slogan was "Home Rule for India."

that action became imperative. In 1917 the Secretary of State for India, E. S. Montagu, determined to investigate affairs with a view to the introduction of reforms leading ultimately to self-government. Careful to stress that the steps toward self-government would perforce be "gradual," Mr. Montagu went to India, and, together with Viceroy Lord Chelmsford, held numerous interviews.

The consensus of opinion among British officialdom in India was that any diminution of British power would lead to disorder, repression, and caste warfare. This view was upheld by the European merchants in India and by some wealthy Moslems who feared the consequences of Brahmin rule. The Nationalist spokesmen, on the other hand, heaped up charges of extravagance and waste against British rule. They complained of the laxity of famine control, of the cost of the army, and of the haughty attitude adopted by Britishers in their relations with the natives. They also demanded a protective tariff against certain English products.

Following these interviews, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was published in July, 1918. For several months thereafter, parliamentary committees were at work framing legislation based upon the principles enunciated in the document. Meanwhile an increasing discontent in India, manifested by strikes and agitation, led the viceroy's government to decree the so-called Rowlatt Acts, which greatly circumscribed the civil liberties of the people. These laws empowered the government to suppress revolutionary activities by the suspension of jury trial, the curtailment of the right of appeal, and the infliction of severe penalties. Later all public meetings were forbidden. In the spring of 1919 the conflict between the authorities and the natives reached a climax at Amritsar, in the Punjab.

Here the rioting had cost the lives of some English persons, including a woman missionary. Brigadier-General Dyer was called upon to restore order. On one occasion the general discovered that a mass meeting was being illegally held in an enclosed public square. Dyer marched some troops to the meeting-place and gave the command to fire into the crowd. The firing ceased when the ammunition was exhausted. About four hundred people were killed and three times as many wounded.

Popular indignation was so great that Parliament appointed the Hunter Commission to investigate the "massacre." The report of this Commission whitewashed the affair, though it did censure Dyer for shooting without notice and for continuing to fire after he had the situation in hand. The Indians were furious over the report, particularly since Dyer admitted during the inquiry that he could have controlled the situation without firing a shot. The anger of the natives was hardly appeased when they found that Dyer, though recalled from India, lost neither rank nor pension. The general's English admirers, in fact, presented him with a sword and a large sum of money in recognition of his services to the empire.

The Indians, therefore, were in no happy mood when Parliament, late in 1919, passed the Government of India Act, based upon the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. This Act, which applied only to the fifteen provinces comprising British India, increased the number of voters from 30,000 to over 5,000,000, thus enfranchising 2.5% of the population. The viceroy was to be assisted, as before, by a National Legislature consisting of a Council of State and an Assembly. The membership of the Council was placed at 60, and of these 33 were to be elected by a restricted, wealthy body of voters. In the Assembly provision was made for 144 seats, 103 of them elective. Laws generally required the consent of the Assembly, although in some instances the assent of the Council was declared sufficient. In case of emergency the viceroy might issue decrees with the force of law. The viceroy was given control of the budget. Further reforms, it was provided, would be considered after ten years.

The most remarkable feature of the law was that which created in India a dyarchy or double government in provincial matters. In each of the legislative provinces such matters as police, law, and administration were "reserved" to the governor of the province and to the officials responsible to him. The governor, of course, was appointed by the viceroy, who himself was an appointee of the emperor of India. Affairs such as sanitation, education, agriculture, and health were "transferred" to the supervision of the provincial councils, a majority of whose members were elected. Officials carrying out transferred powers were made responsible to these councils.

The Indian Nationalists, now organized as a party, were not content with these reforms. They complained that the viceroy still would be supreme through his control of the purse strings; that the Act, which in effect was India's constitution, ought to be subject to revision in less than the prescribed decade; that the franchise was too restricted; and that the provincial councils would not be able to appropriate sufficiently large sums for educational and agricultural projects. A movement to secure further concessions from the British was at once inaugurated, the leading agitator now being Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.

b. THE " HOLY ONE "

Gandhi was born in 1869 of a politically prominent family. After a morbid and unhappy youth, which included a marriage at thirteen, he went to England to study law, under the threefold vow of celibacy, vegetarianism, and abstention from alcohol. "Shy, retiring, lonesome, awkward, uncouth in dress and speech, bewildered by strange manners, and nearly starving in a country where people took little pains to provide for vegetarians, he suffered pitifully. In time, however, he located a vegetarian restaurant; and with regular and ample meals his health improved. " Following his admission to the bar, Gandhi returned to India to practice his profession. He was not particularly successful and hence was delighted when an opportunity offered itself to handle a case in South Africa.

For the next twenty years Gandhi remained in South Africa, fighting to uphold the rights of the immigrant Indian laborers. He soon rose to eminence as a successful pleader, and the British Government usually supported him in his endeavors to establish the equality of Indians with other subjects of the empire. For this aid Gandhi was grateful, and during the war he was active in securing Indian military enlistments. After the return of peace, however, such measures as the Rowlatt Acts and the Amritsar Massacre converted him into an outstanding opponent of British policy.

Personally Gandhi is an enigma, having been labelled in turn a prophet, a madman, and a politician. He is a small, wizened ascetic who spends much time fasting and praying and is little interested in riches or pleasure. His followers, over whose minds

and actions he has come to wield an almost uncanny power, call him *Mahatma*, the "Great Soul" or the "Holy One." Like many other gifted Indians he gradually came to the conclusion that the "gigantic sordidness" of western industrialism was totally incompatible with the beautiful soul-communing spirit of Orientalism. To men of Gandhi's type, "the Great War was a clinching argument, demonstrating the hollowness of western culture and the failure of institutional Christianity."

Gandhi strove fervently to secure *swaraj* or home rule for India and was the leading advocate of the wearing of homespun cloth or *khaddar*. He abhorred violence, and when he saw that England hesitated to grant autonomy voluntarily, he began preaching a campaign of passive resistance. His followers were urged to adopt a policy of material and spiritual non-cooperation (*satyagraha*). Before long the Hindus effectively boycotted British schools, courts, receptions, and products; remained away from the polls; and disregarded the Rowlatt Laws. The natives fondly hoped that by thus proving the British reforms a farce and by injuring British pocketbooks they would secure an early grant of *swaraj*. During 1920 and 1921 several incidents aided Gandhi's movement. The Moslems flocked to his standard because of the manner in which the Allies treated Turkey in the peace negotiations at Sevres. Additional recruits were secured when it was learned that the British Parliament had restricted the area in the African colony of Kenya in which Hindus might settle. The brutality of the police in dealing with Indian crowds and individuals also reacted to the Mahatma's advantage.

Unfortunately for the lasting success of Gandhi's plans, the Indians displayed far more zeal in burning English cloth than in producing homespun. Gandhi attributed too much power to the spinning wheel and he frequently talked over the heads of his listeners. Sometimes, after inflaming them with his eloquent speeches, he found it impossible to restrain them from rash actions. A visit of the Prince of Wales to India, in November, 1921, was made the occasion for serious strikes and riots, and in March, 1922, Gandhi was sentenced to six years' imprisonment for inciting the populace to violence.

With Gandhi in prison, the popular anti-British agitation subsided and the Moslems and Hindus fell to quarreling again.

Non-cooperation had apparently proved a failure. A number of the Nationalists, led by C. R. Das, now decided to abandon the boycott and run candidates for election to the Legislative Assembly. Here, as members of a newly formed Swarajist Party, they could at least air their views in public debate. From 1922 to 1927, therefore, the home rule agitation was confined chiefly to the legislative chambers. Under these circumstances the government considered it safe to free Gandhi, in January, 1924, after he had had an operation for appendicitis. Following his release, Gandhi remained in retirement for about five years.

C. THE CONTINUANCE OF STRIFE

Meanwhile abundant opportunity had been offered to observe the workings of the dyarchy. In December, 1924, a special committee of the Assembly voted the dyarchic system a failure. Both the British and the Indian committee members were in agreement on this point. In September, 1925, Pandit Motilal Nehru, who had succeeded to the leadership of the Swarajists upon the death of Das, asked the Assembly, in the name of the Indian people, for full responsible government in the provinces and responsible government in all national spheres save those of defense and foreign affairs. It soon became obvious, therefore, that the appointment of a commission to consider a revision of the Montagu reforms could not be deferred until 1929.

Accordingly, a Statutory Commission, representing all three British parties and headed by Sir John Simon, was appointed in 1927. There were no Indians on this body, but Simon issued an invitation to the leading native statesmen to work with the group "in joint conference." The Nationalists, however, resented their official exclusion and boycotted the delegation when it arrived in India. Although the Commission's special train was heavily guarded, several attempts were made to dynamite it. The Commission's investigations ended in April, 1929, and a two-volume report was published in June, 1930.¹

During the time that the Simon Commission was at work, the tide of Indian nationalism rose once more. Gandhi emerged

¹ The Simon Commission confined its investigation to the provinces comprising British India. A special Butler Commission simultaneously investigated conditions in the Native States.

from retirement and was supported by an energetic group of leaders, among them the poetess, Mme. Sarojini Naidu, the well-liked Pandit Motilal Nehru, and the latter's fiery son, Pandit Jawarhalal Nehru. At an All-India Nationalist Congress of 1929, which represented nationalistic Moslems as well as Hindus, a resolution was passed demanding immediate dominion status for India. There was a strong movement in favor of a resolution for absolute independence, but this was forestalled through the influence of Gandhi. The Mahatma felt that dominion status was the only platform on which India could stand with a solid front. In March, 1930, Gandhi issued an ultimatum to the viceroy demanding immediate dominion status.

When his demand was rejected, Gandhi once more launched a civil disobedience campaign. Choosing as the main target for his passive resistance the government salt monopoly, he determined to violate a law which forbade the natives to manufacture salt from sea water. For this purpose he and a small band of volunteers marched 170 miles from Sabarnati to Dandi on the Gulf of Cambay, to make salt. He first violated the law on April 6, 1930. This action was the signal for a general defiance of laws throughout India. Many Hindu officials resigned and the collection of taxes was resisted. In the cities hundreds of natives obstructed railway and street traffic by lying down on the tracks or in the path of vehicles. Gandhi again cautioned his followers to abstain from violence, but they were not all as gentle as he, and much blood was shed. The authorities for a time refrained from arresting the Holy One lest he be regarded as a martyr, but in May the situation became so bad that he and other prominent Nationalists were jailed.

The resulting anger of the people was further heightened when the recommendations of the Simon Commission became known. The report has been called "reactionary in the extreme and cautious to a fault in limiting the sphere of experimentation in 'nation building/' " It aimed at increasing the powers of the secretary of state for India, of the governor-general, and of the provincial governors. It studiously avoided even a reference to dominion status or independence and it hurt educated Indians by the curt manner in which it proposed making the provincial legislatures a school wherein the natives might secure "primary

instruction and training in government." The degree of popular indignation at the entire course of events in India may be gauged from the circumstance that in December, 1930, the prisons contained 30,000 patriots. More and more members of the Nationalist Congress began to demand complete independence.

The incarceration of the leaders and the approach of the rainy season checked the outbursts as 1930 drew to a close. The bond of unity between the various groups, as usual, had been frail, and now, as in every previous instance, the Moslems and Hindus, the high and low castes, found in union more strain than strength.

Meanwhile, Viceroy Lord Irwin had suggested, and the British Government had called, a Round Table Conference in London as a possible means of arriving at some Indian compromise. It was understood that the recommendations of the Simon Commission would be in no way binding on His Majesty's Government, and it was hoped that "Indians of all schools of thought" would be ready to participate in the deliberations. On November 12, 1930, such a Round Table assembled. The gathering consisted of thirteen British members — Premier MacDonald and four members from each of the three political parties — and of seventy-six Indians. The latter represented the Native States and virtually all political groups in British India save the so-called Congress Nationalists, including Gandhi, who preferred to remain in jail rather than cooperate. The Indian delegation included both Moslems and Hindus as well as women deputies and even a pariah or member of the "untouchable" caste.

The Round Table achieved a number of results before closing on January 19, 1931. The Native Princes announced their willingness to enter a federation with British India. It was agreed that the province of Burma should be separated from India without prejudice to its own constitutional development. The high caste members signed a pledge approving political equality for the untouchables in the projected constitution. The greatest quandary that faced the conference was the Moslem-Hindu controversy. The Moslems feared for their treatment under an autonomous government since they formed only twenty-two per cent of the population. They insisted upon separate communal electorates and a share in the government services wherever sizable Moslem minorities existed. This

problem was not settled by the Conference, but it was hoped that the Moslems and Hindus together might work out a compromise solution for presentation to a second Round Table later in 1931. A draft constitution for an Indian federation also was considered, but the British delegates insisted that responsibility for defense, foreign affairs, and external financial matters must remain with the governor-general. Dominion status, accordingly, seemed out of the question.

When the Indian conferees returned from London to explain their accomplishments, the extremists at home, many of whom now were released from confinement, showed great dissatisfaction. They regarded the gains as no more than "a cup of milk for a hungry lion." Gandhi renewed his civil disobedience campaign until March, 1931, when a truce was reached, known as the Irwin-Gandhi Agreement. The Nationalists promised to refrain from further civil disobedience, while the government granted a large number of amnesties and gave its consent to peaceful picketing and boycotting. A month later the liberal-minded Lord Irwin was succeeded as viceroy by the Earl of Willingdon. Unfortunately, neither side really lived up to the terms of the truce, and disorder and discontent were rife all through the summer. Supported by a number of Conservatives and Liberals, the Labor Government of England proposed a reassembling of the Round Table Conference in September, 1931. Gandhi, after much hesitation, accepted an invitation to attend. He came as the representative of the National Congress.

The second Round Table Conference was a disappointing affair. Not only were the proceedings made difficult by the conflicting views of the Indians and Britishers on the extent of self-government to be accorded India, but the delegates from the Native States and from British India could not agree on the kind of federation they wanted, the Moslems and Hindus found themselves farther apart than ever on the question of special political safeguards for the former and for the several other Indian minorities, and there were differences of opinion regarding the exact status to be assigned to the untouchables. Much to the chagrin of Gandhi, Premier MacDonald, now at the head of the National cabinet, adroitly informed the Indians that the matter of a new constitution would have to wait until they

themselves could reach a compromise on the question of communal electorates and minority safeguards. After several months had been spent in fruitless wrangling, the English Premier adjourned the Conference (December 1, 1931), appointed three committees to work out the details of franchise, finance, and federal structure, and promised to reconvene the Round Table when the reports of the committees were ready. Most of the Indian delegates went home convinced that the gathering had been a failure.

Throughout 1931¹ the anti-British manifestations had repeatedly taken the form of attempts on the lives of officials. Now the unsuccessful conclusion of the Round Table spurred the natives to further violence. Conditions became so bad that Lord Willingdon felt constrained to issue a series of exceedingly harsh ordinances. Upon his return Gandhi sought to induce the viceroy to rescind the decrees, but when his request was disregarded, the civil disobedience campaign was renewed. Thereupon the Mahatma was once more jailed (January, 1932). In April, President Mme. Naidu and four hundred other members of the National Congress were arrested when they defied a vice-regal injunction against meeting. The number of arrests for violation of special ordinances totalled 48,500 in the first five months of 1932, and each passing week saw an increase in the ranks of those who demanded independence.

Such incidents were hardly conducive to a settlement of the controversies laid bare at the Round Table Conference. Not only did Anglo-Indian relations become bitterer than at any previous time, but the Moslem-Hindu rift widened rapidly. Between May and July, 1932, there were bloody religious outbreaks in Bombay, Calcutta, and other large cities, and a toll of several hundred lives was exacted. Eventually the All-India Moslem League repudiated the violence of the Hindu Nationalists and denounced the extreme demands of the All-India National Congress. The two bodies apparently agreed on only one important point, and that for different reasons: they both decided to boycott the expected third Round Table. The impasse sorely tried the patience of the British, and finally, on

¹ In this year English imports to India were one-third less than they had been in 1930. The economic depression added greatly to unrest and turmoil in the land.

June 28, 1932, Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India in the National cabinet, announced that the English Government itself would devise a solution for the minorities question, would then recall the Round Table Conference to complete all unfinished business and draw up an Indian constitution, and would finally submit all decisions, in the form of a bill, to Parliament. The news of this intention was greeted in India with renewed riots and bloodshed.

In September the British electoral scheme was made public. It established separate communal electorates for, and allocated specified numbers of seats in the provincial legislatures to, about a dozen Indian groups, including Hindus, Moslems, untouchables, Sikhs, and Indian Christians. Although the plan seemed fair to the various minorities and classes, its publication resulted in renewed riots, and Gandhi, still in prison, opposed it with all the eloquence at his command. The Mahatma explained that he would never give his support to a system which, instead of permitting Indian citizens to vote as citizens, required them to go to the polls as Hindus, Moslems, Christians, or untouchables. Such an arrangement, he thought, would only lead to a perpetuation and intensification of religious and caste controversies. Although an articulate group of untouchables, led by Dr. B. M. Ambedkar, was in favor of the British scheme as affording much-needed protection to the depressed and minority groups, Gandhi, on September 20, 1932, began a "fast unto death from food of any kind, save water." The fast, he declared, would cease only upon the withdrawal of the provision regarding separate communal electorates for the depressed classes.

Within five days some of the Brahmins and untouchables worked out a compromise. The untouchables surrendered their right to separate electorates and in return were to be allotted twice as many seats in the provincial legislatures as under the British award. They were promised a fair proportion of public offices and a sufficiently large share of the budgetary appropriations for their social betterment. Although Gandhi now broke his fast, the electoral settlement was not yet satisfactory to the various other minorities and the Hindu-Moslem controversy also continued to rage. A third Round Table was summoned to meet in London late in 1932, but Gandhi, whom the viceroy

refused to release so long as the civil disobedience campaign lasted, was not named as a member.

That the position of the English in India is far from enviable, must be evident. Having once taken an interest in Indian affairs, England cannot simply withdraw and allow the natives to struggle for themselves. Whatever unity there may be in India is fostered largely by opposition to a common antagonist, England. If the foreigners were to depart at once, questions of race, caste, religion, language, provincialism, and economics, to say nothing of political inexperience, illiteracy, and the force of tradition, would very likely create dangerous and difficult barriers to a settled Indian national life. Conceivably, foreign complications might also arise. But certainly the British could do much more toward preparing India for an independent existence than they have been doing. Their laxity in this respect has been notorious, and India has too long been considered as being important to the British Empire rather than as being important to the Indians. Today this attitude appears to be rapidly changing. The British doubtless will proceed more energetically in the extension of educational and governmental rights in the future than they have in the past.

PALESTINE

In July, 1922, the League assigned Palestine to Great Britain as a Class A mandate. At that time the Holy Land had a population of about 757,000. Of these, 83,000 were Jews, 73,000 Christian Arabs, and most of the remainder Moslem Arabs. The fact that the terms of the mandate specifically confirmed the Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which England had promised to establish in Palestine "a national home for the Jewish people," greatly disappointed the large Moslem majority. The Arabs found little consolation in the parallel promise that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities." In fact, they failed to see how any part of the arrangement could be reconciled with England's wartime promises of Arab independence or with Wilson's theory of self-determination. Nor, finally, were they made any the happier to discover that the first British High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, was a Jew.

Sir Herbert, on September 1, 1922, promulgated a constitution for Palestine. It provided for a high commissioner, a commander-in-chief, and an appointive Executive Council. There was also to be a Legislative Council, consisting of the high commissioner and twenty-two deputies. Ten of these were to be appointed by the high commissioner and the remaining twelve (eight Moslems, two Christians, and two Jews) were to be elected by a system of primary and secondary elections. The Moslems, however, refused to vote at elections for this Council, and Sir Herbert was obliged to govern with the aid of an appointed Advisory Council.¹

The discontent of the Arabs with political, economic, and religious conditions crystallized in a violent anti-Jewish outbreak in August, 1929. Several Jewish communities were attacked and 133 Jews killed. The MacDonald Government rushed warships and airplanes to the scene and order was restored within a few weeks. A special British Commission of Inquiry, headed by Sir Walter Shaw, established as the cause for the rioting "the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility toward the Jews, consequent upon the disappointment of their political and national aspirations, and fear for their economic future." A report issued by the League Mandates Commission, however, claimed that the outburst was directed as much against England as against the Jews, and blamed the British for failure to provide adequate military and police protection. Foreign Secretary Henderson severely criticized the League report as inclining towards "the more extreme Jewish contentions regarding the meaning and object of the mandate."

At any rate, the Arabs did enumerate certain specific grievances against both the authorities and the Jews. They complained that the land legislation, by enabling the Jews to buy up large portions of the none-too-plentiful arable land, was threatening the existence of thousands of Arabs. They objected to the government's favorable attitude toward Jewish immigration, for by 1930 the number of Jews had increased to more than 160,000. And they did not like the type of immigrants who entered Palestine. Most of the entering Jews came, or fled,

¹ In 1928 Sir John Robert Chancellor became high commissioner, and he in turn was succeeded (1931) by General Sir Arthur Wauchope.

from Poland, Russia, and Rumania. They were usually poor, and, so claimed the Arabs, frequently radical. It was certainly true that relatively few Jews of means attempted to settle in the Holy Land. The wealthy Jewry, in general, preferred to contribute financially to the upbuilding of the homeland and to foster Zionism by proxy.

A further Arab-Jewish dispute involved the famous Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. At this wall, supposedly a relic of Solomon's temple, the Jews had been accustomed to worship and to mourn. Since the wall happens to adjoin one of the most sacred of Mohammedan shrines, the Mosque of Omar, there was a golden opportunity for strife whenever religiously excited Jews and Moslems appeared for worship simultaneously at the neighboring holy spots. So serious did this Wailing Wall situation become that the British Government in 1930, with the approval of the League of Nations Council, appointed a commission, consisting of a Swede, a Swiss, and a Dutchman, to frame a solution of the problem. In June, 1931, the commission reported that the wall and its adjoining pavement were Moslem property, but that, with certain restrictions, the Jews should be granted free access to the wall. These recommendations were at once put into effect by the high commissioner.

Meanwhile the British Government had come into sharp conflict with the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency for Palestine. In May, 1930, the authorities had indefinitely suspended immigration permits already issued to some 2400 prospective Jewish immigrants. The ban was imposed pending a study of Palestinian economic conditions by a commission under Sir John Hope Simpson. The commission, after making a complete survey of Palestinian affairs, issued its report in October, 1930. Simultaneously with the appearance of the report, the British Colonial Office published a White Paper which announced a new official policy in the future administration of the mandate.

The White Paper maintained that too much haste had been shown in the upbuilding of the Jewish homeland, and that, as a result, the future welfare of the Arabs had been jeopardized.

The condition of the Arab peasant [said the Paper] leaves much to be desired and a policy of land development is needed if the improvement

of his condition of life is to be effected. The sole agencies which have pursued a consistent policy have been the Jewish colonization societies, private and public. The Jewish settlers had every advantage that capital, science and organization could give them. To these and the energy of the settlers themselves their remarkable progress is due. On the other hand, the Arab population while lacking the advantages enjoyed by the Jewish settlers has been by an excess of births over deaths increasing rapidly, while the land available for their sustenance has decreased by about 250,000 acres. This area has passed into Jewish hands. . . . It can now be definitely stated that at the present time and with the present methods of Arab cultivation there remains no margin of land available for agricultural development by new immigrants, with the exception of such undeveloped land as the various Jewish organizations hold in reserve.

Further, according to the White Paper:

It is only the closest cooperation between the government and the leaders of the Arab and Jewish communities that can prevent Palestine from drifting into a situation that would imperil on the one hand the devoted work of those who have sought to build up a Jewish national home, and on the other the interests of a majority of the population who at present possess few resources of their own with which to sustain the struggle for existence.

Obviously, close cooperation between Arabs and Jews was impossible so long as the Arabs felt that Jewish immigration was depriving them of land, work, and political power. For, as the Simpson report pointed out, the Jewish Foundation Fund, which leased land to Jewish colonies, had forbidden Arab labor on its soil, and the General Federation of Jewish Labor had adopted a policy of importing Jewish workmen rather than employing landless Arabs. Under these circumstances, the government of England felt justified in continuing the suspension of immigrations.

The declaration of this new British policy was gratifying to the Arabs, who appeared ready, in 1931, to vote for members of a Legislative Council of the type previously outlined. But the Jews, both within and without Palestine, were angry. Dr. Chaim Weizmann resigned as president of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency. Other influential officers of these societies protested in like manner. The British Government was accused of a "cruel and unfair betrayal" and of "almost unparalleled ingratitude and treachery . . . toward a credulous and harassed people." Even leaders of the Con-

servative and Liberal parties attacked the Labor Government for what they designated as a repudiation of the Balfour Declaration. The MacDonald Government, however, insisted that it was simply striving to carry out the threefold task of giving the Jews a national home in Palestine (not of making Palestine a Jewish National Home), of dealing fairly with the large Moslem majority, and of preparing the land for eventual self-government.

In 1932 the government of Palestine eased its restrictions against further immigration and permitted free entry to any farmer, merchant, or business man who possessed a minimum capital of \$2500. During the holiday season of 1932 the authorities took sufficient precautions so that no disturbances marred the celebrations. In this year, too, numerous plans were offered, by Arabs, Jews, and Englishmen, for the termination of England's mandate and the substitution of direct League control, but no scheme was acceptable to more than a few partisans.

Economically, Palestine has made remarkable progress, due chiefly to Jewish money and initiative. Jewish capital to the extent of well over \$50,000,000 has flowed into the Holy Land since the war. Electrification is going on rapidly through the efforts of a Palestine Electric Corporation. In 1927 construction was begun on a 24,000 horse-power hydroelectric plant utilizing the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers. A well-backed corporation has been formed to extract the salts which, in solution, make up nearly a fourth of the water in the Dead Sea. A Hebrew University was opened in Jerusalem in 1925. Yet, whether Palestine will ever fulfill the dreams of fervent Zionists by furnishing a home for three million Jews, remains doubtful.

CHAPTER XII

VICTORIOUS FRANCE

POLITICS IN FRANCE

French politics are organized on a somewhat different basis from that found in most parliamentary systems. There are a few parties, particularly radical parties, which have definite organizations and party funds, and hold periodic conventions. In addition, there are numerous political groups which, though they have none of these characteristics, are listed under special names and are entitled to representation on parliamentary committees, provided they have a certain minimum number of adherents. In recent years the national legislature has contained from ten to fifteen such groups, there being fewer groups in the upper than in the lower house.¹

Since, in view of this situation, it is difficult for any one group to command a majority of the votes in the Chamber, the government functions through a system of coalitions or *blocs*. Frequently the make-up of a bloc is based upon a few major issues, and when new issues arise, group realignments follow. Hence the average life of cabinets in France is short, and by the end of 1932 the Third Republic had had more than ninety ministries. In a period of eighteen months in 1923 and 1924 there were seven ministries, and a like number rose and fell in the years 1928 to 1930. A fair degree of stability in governmental policies is nevertheless maintained by the presence of more or less permanent undersecretaries, and because the ministerial changes often involve merely a shuffling and reassignment of portfolios.

During the war and until November, 1919, France was governed by a bloc which assumed the name of "Sacred Union."

¹ The conservative groups in the Chamber, as in most of the Continental lower houses, are seated to the right of the Speaker, the moderates in front of him, and the radicals to his left. Hence the designations, "Right," "Center," and "Left," indicate the general political stand of any group or party.

After the elections of 1919 the Union split into two other coalitions, the *Bloc National* and the *Cartel des Gauches*. The *Bloc National* was made up of conservatives and moderates led by Clemenceau, Poincare, Millerand, and Briand. It hoped to reduce Germany to economic bondage and make France "secure/ ' was opposed to socialism, and favored friendly relations with the papacy. The Cartel was led by Edouard Herriot and the much-maligned "financial wizard," Joseph Caillaux. This group was anti-clerical, favored higher income taxes and an extension of state social control, proposed to reduce the power of the Senate, and, while fully as anxious as the Bloc to give France security, advocated a liberal foreign policy, including friendship with Germany and Russia. Independent of these coalitions were the communists on the left, and the *Camelots du roi* or royalists, led by Leon Daudet, on the right. Neither of these extremist affiliations enjoyed much popularity.

The powers of the French President are strictly limited and he exercises far less control than does the chief executive of the United States. Yet, if he happen to possess a dominating personality, the president may exert considerable influence on the course of politics. Poincare, for example, was anything but a figurehead during his incumbency from 1913 to 1920.

When Poincare's term expired, the National Assembly elected Paul Deschanel in his place. Clemenceau was a candidate in this election, but his popularity suffered in a general nationalistic dissatisfaction over the moderation (!) of the Versailles Treaty. Indeed, he soon heard himself called, not *Pere Ia Victoire*, but *Perd Ia Victoire!* In September, 1920, Deschanel was forced to retire because of ill health and was succeeded by an able, conservative politician, Alexandre Millerand.

Unfortunately for his tenure of office Millerand was determined to take a leading part in legislative as well as executive affairs. In 1922, for example, he forced a Briand Government out of office, and in 1924 took the unusual step of having a presidential petition read before the Chamber. When the Left came into power in 1924, therefore, Millerand was forced to resign. He was regarded as autocratic and reactionary, and his threat to organize a body of energetic young "Blue Shirts" had aroused fears of a fascist dictatorship. The next president was Gaston

Doumergue — bachelor, lawyer, ex-magistrate, former president of the Senate, and a Protestant. He was equally cordial to all parties, and although he was not a great president, "he was at least a charming one." In 1931 the sexagenarian Doumergue, accompanied by many good wishes, left the presidency to marry and retire to private life.

The National Assembly, dominated by the Right, now chose Paul Doumer, president of the Senate, to become chief executive. Doumer's closest rival for the honor was Briand, but the latter lost many of the conservative votes because he was supported by the socialists and because his moderate foreign policy had aroused the ire of the nationalists. Like so many other French officials, Doumer had begun his career as a radical. Maturity, however, and a settled income tended to make him a conservative in later life. He was well known in financial circles, had at one time been a colonial governor, and had twice been minister of finance in Briand cabinets. He lost four sons in the war, and his election, generally regarded as a chauvinist victory, caused some apprehension in Germany.

To the heartfelt sorrow of his countrymen, Doumer was assassinated in May, 1932, by a Russian emigre who in some mystic way hoped by the deed to help free Russia from Bolshevik control. Once more the Senate and the Chamber met together to select a president and this time the choice fell on Albert Lebrun, who earlier had succeeded Doumer as head of the upper house. The new president, whose parliamentary experience dated from 1900, had political sympathies similar to those of Poincare. In his first presidential message, however, he promised to be an impartial arbiter among all parliamentary groups.

THE FRANC AND ITS SAVIOR

In international affairs the attitudes of all post-war ministries in France were determined, as we have seen, by a desire to make the republic secure against foreign aggression.¹ In carrying out this policy, some leaders, such as Poincare and Andre Tardieu, were generally unyielding; others, notably Briand and Herriot, were conciliatory. Nevertheless, since the same end always was

kept in view, there was a marked degree of unity in French foreign politics. On domestic issues, however, and especially in economic and clerical matters, the various cabinets held widely divergent opinions.

When the war came to a close France was in a state of domestic chaos. The northern tenth of the country had been reduced to wasteland. Farms, villages, mines, houses, factories, wells, public buildings, railway lines, roads, and private possessions had been laid in ruins. In their stead were barbed wire entanglements, shell holes, debris, charred remains, trenches, ammunition dumps and duds, poisoned wells, and flooded mines. Almost 300,000 private houses and more than 6000 public buildings were utterly destroyed, and over 430,000 houses together with 11,000 public structures were seriously damaged. Two million persons had been forced to leave their homes. The number of wrecked factories totalled 20,000.

Small wonder, therefore, that in 1919 the army should have been restless and mutinous, the laboring masses in the cities starving and clamoring for bread, and the middle class seized with a fear of the spread of communism. So great was the apprehension among the conservative peasants and the middle-class burghers of violence and disorder that the *Bloc National* was victorious in the elections of 1919 and moderate government thus was ensured at least until 1924.

Financial difficulties soon arose to plague the Bloc. Confidently expecting that Germany would be made to pay the total cost of reconstruction, the government, while refusing to raise the tax rate, proceeded to spend billions on the restoration of the devastated areas and, so it was claimed, in restoring or building some private fortunes as well. The total value of expenditures assessed against a special reconstruction budget was estimated at upwards of seven billion dollars, most of this money being raised by the flotation of loans and the printing of paper money. Month after month went by, however, and the expected sums from Germany were not forthcoming. Indeed, late in 1921, as we have seen, Germany asked for a partial moratorium. The French extremists, led by Poincare and Tardieu, therefore agitated for the downfall of Premier Briand, who had come to the head of the government in January, 1921. They

succeeded in their endeavors (January, 1922) and Poincaré soon assumed the chief ministerial post.

Raymond Poincaré was born in 1860, in Lorraine. An able lawyer and financier, exceedingly energetic, possessed of a lucid and logical mind, he had "just the right degree of narrow-mindedness for his middle-class electorate." He secured a cabinet position for the first time in 1893, was many times premier, and from 1913 to 1920 was president of the republic. Alternately showered with praise and abuse, at one time popular, at another repudiated, he steadfastly pursued the goal of a powerful and secure France. "Nicknames were fastened upon him — Poincaré la Guerre, Poincaré la Ruhr — but without any parade he kept on his logical course."

The new premier secured foreign loans, introduced financial reforms, and raised the taxes, yet the inflated franc continued to decline in value and the budget remained unbalanced. Many of the Frenchmen who had been living on incomes from investments and who now found themselves facing starvation because of their shrinking real wealth lost all confidence in the government. Poincaré's blustering tactics in the Ruhr, moreover, and his favorable attitude towards the papacy were also unpopular. The parties of the Left consequently hoped to overthrow him at the next election and promised the voters financial reform, greater reliance on direct taxation, closer cooperation with the League, and a more conciliatory foreign policy. In the balloting of May, 1924, the Left secured control of the Chamber, and ex-Professor Herriot of Lyons, leader of the group called Radical Socialists, became premier. Despite their name, the Radical Socialists are liberals and not socialists. They profess a firm faith in the republic and desire above all to ensure prosperity and security at home and abroad.

Herriot was the idol of Lyons, having been mayor of that city for a score of years. Even while prime minister he spent two nights a week on trains, commuting between Paris and Lyons so that he might attend to both his national and municipal duties. He was sincere and honest, but inexperienced in national politics, and he injured his reputation by his complete informality.

In its foreign policies the Herriot ministry was fairly successful. It accepted the Dawes Plan, established more cordial relations

with England, Russia, and Germany, and took a leading part in the framing of the Geneva Protocol. It was less fortunate in its domestic, particularly its anti-clerical, policies and it failed to solve the financial dilemma. Hence when the Chamber in April, 1925, refused to countenance further inflation, the ministry fell. Some troublous months followed, during which Paul Painlevé organized two ministries, and Briand, three. The franc continued to drop, and by July, 1926, was worth only two cents, that is, one-tenth of its pre-war value. Government bonds sold below par and old loans matured faster than new ones could be floated. At this crisis group lines in the Chamber were effaced and a special National Union ministry was formed (1926), headed by Poincaré and including six ex-premiers.[^] The veteran prime minister now remained in office for three years, until July, 1929. During this period he earned the title of "savior of the franc."

Poincaré promptly informed the legislature that financial salvation could be obtained only through increased taxation and stringent economy. Since the Chamber by now had come to be in a reasonably receptive mood, new taxes were voted (August, 1926) and the French people had to submit to one of the highest tax rates in the western world. The problems presented by the huge floating debt were solved by a special Autonomous Fund Commission which proceeded to pay off the short-term notes, consolidate and refund other issues, and in some cases reduce the interest rate from six to three per cent. Surplus local courts, prisons, and treasury offices were closed and the number of army officers was reduced.

In 1926 the budget was balanced — for the first time in thirteen years. There was, in fact, a surplus of about \$60,000,000. The franc consequently rose in value, and by December, 1926, was worth approximately four cents. It was stabilized at this level by the Chamber in 1928. This action, of course, constituted a virtual repudiation of four-fifths of the internal debt, for it reduced the value of pre-war and war bonds to twenty per cent of their original par rating. In the elections of 1928 the policies of Poincaré were upheld by the vote of the people. Unfortunately for his successors, however, the power in the Chamber was almost equally divided between Right and Left.

Both groups supported him, but when ill health forced his retirement a year later (July, 1929), they fell to quarreling.

THREE TRYING YEARS, 1929-1932

Following Poincaré's resignation several short-lived ministries struggled with the difficult financial and diplomatic problems. First came a government under Briand, but it fell on the questions of finance, the adoption of the Young Plan, and the evacuation of the Rhineland. Briand was succeeded by Tardieu, a journalist and author who had come into some prominence as an assistant of Clemenceau and a follower of Poincaré. Since Briand entered this new cabinet as foreign minister, it appeared as though the Tardieu Government might combine Poincaré's firmness and financial success with a conciliatory foreign program. However, the delicate balance in the Chamber made matters difficult and in the midst of the parleys at the London Naval Conference, Tardieu was overthrown. Two weeks later he formed another cabinet, recruited largely from the Right. The Left regarded this as a challenge and annoyed Tardieu by persistently voting adversely on whatever measures came up for action. In the summer of 1930 the premier was driven to ensure an extension of the life of his ministry by bringing about an adjournment of the Chamber.

Despite the handicap of a most uncertain tenure of office, much was accomplished by the Tardieu ministries. Taxes were reduced, the term of military service was cut from three years to one, and the size of the army was diminished. The war budget, however, was considerably expanded so that new fortifications might be built and impressive war manoeuvres held on the Italian and German frontiers. France wanted her neighbors to know that she was thoroughly aware of the danger lurking in the bellicose speeches of the respective fascist leaders, Mussolini and Hitler. Through the influence of Foreign Minister Briand the Young Plan was ratified, the evacuation of the Rhineland begun, and the French scheme for a Pan-European Federation announced.¹

¹ In the spring of 1930 President Doumergue and a large parliamentary party visited Algiers in celebration of the centennial of that city's conquest. Later the president also visited Morocco and Tunis.

Now, in the German elections of September, 1930, the nationalist parties received a surprisingly heavy vote. This occasioned a severe reaction in France because the German nationalists were known to be the most determined opponents of the Versailles Treaty and the Young Plan. Many Frenchmen therefore became panicky over what they called Briand's "weak" and "traitorous" foreign policy. Poincare emerged once more to complain that though it was pleasant to listen to "international hymns to the divinity of peace," France also needed "other things" to give her a "feeling of security." Hence when the parliament met again, in November, 1930, many of Tardieu's conservative supporters turned against Briand. A month later the government fell, on a senatorial interpellation as to its general policy. The occasion for the challenge was provided by a bank scandal which appeared to involve several cabinet officers and undersecretaries.

Senator Theodore Steeg thereupon organized a government which proved to be perilously weak. Because it included Briand it failed to obtain the full support of the Right, and it was opposed by the socialists for its attitude on financial and military matters. The difficult situation was made even more complex for the new premier by the circumstance that the world-wide depression which began late in 1929 had gradually come to make itself felt even in France, where the almost perfect balance between industry and agriculture had hitherto staved off the hardships attendant upon decreasing trade and increasing unemployment. Steeg secured a breathing spell by dismissing the legislature for the Christmas recess (1930) at his first parliamentary appearance, but when the chambers reconvened he was immediately ousted. He had been in office only six weeks.

Another senator, Pierre Laval, next formed a cabinet (January, 1931). A brilliant orator and genial politician, Laval, although only forty-seven years old, had already held the portfolios of public works, justice, and labor. His chief support came from the Right and he entrusted both Briand and Tardieu with ministerial posts. He remained premier for more than a year, until February, 1932, but during this period he had to reconstitute his cabinet three times.

In domestic affairs the Laval cabinets faced a number of vex-

ing problems. Unemployment figures rose steadily, the volume of exports continued to decline, and there were only faint prospects of a balanced budget. When serious financial losses threatened some of the most important private business enterprises in the land, the government fought strenuously to win over the Chamber and Senate to its view that the state was obligated to rescue such ventures from bankruptcy. In accord with this policy a huge credit was extended to the French Line (*Compagnie Generale Transatlantique*) and funds were advanced to the Bank of France to enable it more easily to withstand the financial losses incurred through the depreciation of its sterling holdings when England in 1931 went off the gold standard.

Important matters of international concern also arose to tax the ability and patience of Premier Laval. It was during his incumbency that France interposed so strenuously against the projected Austro-German Customs Accord of 1931 and that she accepted, in modified form, President Hoover's plan for the temporary suspension of all inter-governmental debt payments. Laval also visited the United States to hold "conversations" with Hoover on subjects of general interest to their respective countries. Early in 1932 a delegation headed by Tardieu was sent to participate in the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

As time went on, Laval leaned more and more heavily on his conservative supporters. This circumstance became sharply evident in January, 1932, when Briand's place in the foreign office was taken by the premier himself. Ostensibly Briand resigned because of ill health, but there were persistent rumors that he had been dismissed. Less than two months later, on March 7, Briand died. He was sincerely mourned even by his former critics and he was accorded a state funeral. The last honors were paid him by Andre Tardieu who, two weeks earlier, had been recalled from the Disarmament Conference to replace M. Laval as premier. The latter had fallen in consequence of a senatorial interpellation on an electoral law which, had it been passed, would have reacted to the advantage of the Right in the forthcoming (May, 1932) elections.

Between the time of Tardieu's return to power and the elections, little was done in the way of legislation. Many of the people's representatives, in fact, left Paris in order to conduct

campaigns for reelection. A budget, nevertheless, was adopted, with an ingeniously devised "paper surplus" of about \$150,000, and a certain amount of protection for French industry was provided by a system of import quotas. Definite limitations were placed upon the quantities of specified products that could be imported. The United States in particular was affected by these quotas.

The elections of May, 1932, betrayed a decided leftward swing of popular sympathies. The Radical Socialists, still led by Herriot, captured 160 of the available 614 deputies' seats and became the largest group in the Chamber. The liberals and radicals had effectively pointed out during the campaign that the rule of the Right had bequeathed the country an empty treasury, a high unemployment figure, a heavy burden of military expenditures, and huge financial losses through state loans to bankrupt private firms and unstable foreign governments. Moreover, the voters apparently had not been in sympathy with LavaPs and Tardieu's departures from the conciliatory principles of Briand's foreign policy.

Tardieu resigned after the elections and in June was succeeded by Herriot, who explained that the sum total of his plans was the improvement of domestic and foreign economic and political understandings. The problems which faced him in the fulfillment of these aims were serious. They included (1) the formulation of a policy in respect of Germany's demand to be freed from the armament restrictions of the Versailles Treaty; (2) the discovery of a means to prevent the increasing unfriendliness of Fascist Italy from becoming a war menace; (3) the settlement of the reparation and war-debt controversies; (4) the balancing of the budget; and (5) the restoration of economic prosperity.

FRANCE AND THE PAPACY

Interesting among the cultural developments in post-war France was the partial reconciliation of the government with the Catholic Church. In 1901 and 1905 the French Government, controlled by anti-clericals, had greatly curtailed the number and activities of the religious orders; had closed monasteries, convents, and some of the church schools; and had nationalized the church property. One of the effects of this policy had been

a decrease in the number of French Catholic missionaries who, going abroad, might have carried overseas French culture along with Roman Catholicism. Trouble, moreover, had been occasioned at home, for some of the faithful Catholics made common cause with the monarchists in agitating against the stability of the Third Republic. Indeed, a monarchist-Catholic organization, *L'Action Française*, had been formed to advocate the restoration of monarchy and the reestablishment of a state-supported Catholic Church.

After the war, however, in order to advance French interests abroad and to patch up quarrels at home, the French authorities gave evidence of a willingness to resume cordial relations with the papacy. The Vatican proved equally amenable to negotiations, for a *rapprochement* obviously would strengthen the position of the Church not only in France but wherever French culture was being implanted. Moreover, *L'Action Française* now had come under the domination of a philosophical skeptic and an advocate of violence in political life, Charles Maurras. His works had been recommended for the Index in 1914 and twelve years later were placed thereon. Naturally the Church did not care to continue an alliance with Maurras.

The steps in the process of reconciliation were gradual. In 1919 Clemenceau nominated an Alsatian bishop. In the following year the French Government sent a representative to take part in the ceremonies attending the beatification of Joan of Arc. In 1921, after a lapse of seventeen years, diplomatic relations between France and the Vatican were restored and soon thereafter France permitted a number of religious orders to return. In 1927 the publications of *L'Action Française* were placed on the Index and some time later the Archbishop of Paris issued an edict virtually excommunicating Catholics who remained affiliated with the monarchist groups. The complete restoration by the state of the clerical property previously nationalized also received consideration, especially from the Right groups, but the anti-clericals appeared determined to prevent this final concession.

THE PROBLEM OF ALSACE-LORRAINE

When, upon the conclusion of the armistice, French troops crossed the Vosges Mountains into Alsace-Lorraine, they were

everywhere greeted with parades, banners, triumphal arches, and kisses. There was also much weeping, and everyone, from "Papa" Joffre down, appeared to be tearfully happy. Only later was it rumored that many of the girls in Strasbourg who had embraced the French soldiers had been especially imported for that purpose from France. Troubles, moreover, soon followed. The newly recovered provinces and their motherland quickly found themselves at issue over questions of language, religion, political rights, and economic opportunities, for France promptly violated a promise given in 1918 that there would be no interference with the traditions, customs, or local rights of the inhabitants.

When France regained the provinces only one-fourth of the natives habitually spoke French; the remaining three-fourths used any one of five German dialects. This situation had existed for centuries: under the rulers of the *ancien regime*, under Napoleon and his successors, and under the German Emperors from 1871 to 1918. Yet, after the war, the French, feeling that only French-speaking people could be genuine patriots of the republic, tried to force their language on the provincials. German, therefore, was barred from all schools. The opposition to this attempt at Gallicizing the inhabitants was so great, however, that a compromise soon had to be reached. It was agreed, eventually, that children would have to learn French exclusively only during the first two school years. Thereafter they might receive three hours a week of German instruction and the German language might also be used in the periods that were given over to religious teaching.

Meanwhile the provinces had been flooded with railroad and public-service officials who spoke only French. This situation led to a Lorraine railway walk-out in 1919, the strikers demanding the removal of all French railway officials and of all foremen who could not speak German. Said one of the strike leaders: "It wasn't worth while to get rid of the Germans if the French come and take all the good jobs." The strikers won their point.

A further quarrel between France and the provinces arose out of religious differences. Alsace-Lorraine is inhabited mainly by a staunch Catholic population, and under German rule the region had been permitted to continue the relationship with the papacy

that had been established under the Napoleonic Concordat of 1801. The local government had paid the salaries of the clergy and religious instruction had been given in the schools. The *Bloc National* acquiesced in this arrangement until 1924, but when the anti-clericals came into power, Premier Herriot decided that since France had scrapped the Concordat, Alsace-Lorraine should be required to do likewise. He therefore proposed to disestablish the Church and prohibit religious instruction in the classrooms.

The Catholic school children thereupon went on strike and refused to return to their classes until Herriot receded from his extreme position. A compromise again was reached. All children, regardless of faith, were to attend the same schools for academic instruction, while religious classes were to be held in separate Catholic, Protestant (chiefly Lutheran), and Jewish schools. The Catholic Church was not wholly content with this solution of the problem and complained that some of the religious education was being delegated to specially imported anti-clerical teachers. The Church also wanted history to be taught exclusively by Catholic instructors. Nevertheless the settlement was adhered to and it appeared to work in a fairly satisfactory manner.

Under German rule the natives also had enjoyed considerable local autonomy. They had had a separate parliament since 1911 and Strasbourg had been governed by its own powerful Municipal Council. This situation was respected for a brief time by the French and a special commissioner-general was appointed to govern the provinces from Strasbourg. In 1925, however, the office of commissioner-general was abolished, the local parliament and the Municipal Council were deprived of their powers, and the whole administration was centralized in Paris. Thus was created another grievance, for the Alsatians and Lorrainers were unaccustomed to, and much annoyed by, the extremely centralized French system. They could not understand, for example, why a peasant who wanted to build a fence on his property along a public highway had first to consult the Paris authorities and get the consent of the minister of the interior. In the pre-war years life had been far less complicated. Even more painful to the natives was the official abolition of the

geographical designations of Alsace and Lorraine, and the redivision of the provinces into the three new departments of the Upper Rhine, the Lower Rhine, and the Moselle.

Finally, there were economic grievances. From the material standpoint the natives doubtless had been better off under German control than they now were under the French. The coal, iron, textile, and potash industries all had prospered more before 1918 than thereafter. The natural trade outlets and business connections of the provinces were with Germany, and Lorraine iron ore could best be worked with German coal from Westphalia. The normal development of renewed trade relationships between Germany and the "freed" region, moreover, was greatly impeded by the constant political bickering between France and Germany.

Annoyed by such a combination of political, economic, religious, and social grievances, the natives often found it difficult to uphold an appearance of loyalty to France. In May, 1926, in fact, a *Heimatbund* or Home League was formed which, particularly strong in Alsace, demanded local autonomy and priority for German in the schools.

In November, 1927, the French suppressed three German newspapers in Alsace on the ground that they were advocating reunion with Germany. The following May, fifteen Alsations were tried for conspiracy and disloyalty, four of them being convicted. In December, 1928, an Alsatian butcher attempted to assassinate the French state's attorney who had prosecuted the alleged conspirators. As a result of this incident a number of French parliamentary deputies left the Chamber when a member from Alsace, some time later, rose to speak.

The situation became so critical that Poincaré, during a parliamentary debate in February, 1929, delivered a ten-hour speech on the question of Alsace-Lorraine. He reviewed the history of the conflict between France and the provinces and intimated that the autonomist movement was receiving moral and financial support from "east of the Rhine."¹ He admitted that France had made some errors but promised better conditions in future. His speech was well received, and upon its conclusion the Chamber,

¹The German Foreign Minister, Stresemann, denied the existence of any official German support for the autonomist **movement**.

by an overwhelming vote, registered its faith in the patriotic attachment of Alsace and Lorraine "to the Republic and to France, one and indivisible."

Despite this official vote of confidence in their fidelity, the people of Alsace and Lorraine continued to feel unhappy. At first, glad to be reunited with France, they soon were as restless as ever they had been under the German regime. Perhaps the difficulty lies partly in the character of the natives. From an old local rhyme it would certainly appear that the Alsatians have long regarded themselves as being habitually discontented:

Hans, Hans of Schnokeloch
Has all that he desires;
But what he has, he doesn't want,
And what he wants, he hasn't got.
Hans, Hans of Schnokeloch
Has all that he desires.¹

LA MISSION CIVILISATRICE IN SYRIA

The experiences of France in her Syrian mandate, an important silk-producing area, were even more troublous than those in Alsace-Lorraine. Difficulties began almost from the moment that French control was extended over the region.

For administrative purposes, and probably also to prevent the development of any strong national feeling, the land was divided into five (later four) administrative areas, each with a different name and law system, but all subordinate to one high commissioner. Martial law was declared, a rigid censorship was established, and French became the language of the law courts. Much of the gold in Syria was drained away and a new paper currency was introduced, which fluctuated with the depreciated French paper francs. The Moslems, moreover, who comprised a majority of the population, came to believe that the French were favoring the Christian minority.

In November, 1924, High Commissioner General Weygand, a conservative Catholic who had been appointed to his post in April, 1923, was removed at the insistence of the anti-clerical Radical Socialists in the Chamber of Deputies. He was replaced by General Sarrail, who managed to antagonize the Christians

¹ Quoted in *Alsace-Lorraine: A Border Problem*, Foreign Policy Association Information Service, New York, 1930.

as well as the Moslems and who crowned his administrative efforts in July, 1925, by inviting the leaders of some discontented Druse tribes to Damascus for a parley and then putting them in prison when they accepted the call.

Thereupon the Druse tribesmen broke into open revolt. The French captured and shot twenty-four of the rebels and laid their corpses in a row on a leading street of Damascus — as a warning to other obstreperous natives. When the city populace thereupon became enraged and attacked some French troops, the latter were withdrawn from Damascus and the city was bombarded by artillery, rushed by tanks, and bombed by airplanes. About 1000 people were reported killed and the city was partially ruined. The Damascenes, moreover, were required to pay a fine of \$440,000 and to surrender 3000 rifles.

Sarrail was recalled and Senator de Jouvenel appointed to succeed him. Before de Jouvenel arrived in Syria the French subordinate officials had armed the Christians and thus virtually provoked the commission of additional atrocities. The new governor tried to negotiate with the Druses but refused their demand for a "peace conference" since this would have implied recognition of their status as belligerents rather than insurgents. Early in 1926 hostilities were resumed. In May, Damascus was again bombarded, with the loss of perhaps another thousand lives.

The League of Nations Mandates Commission thereupon issued a report criticizing French policy and condemning recourse in mandates to such expedients as air bombardments, incendiaries, destruction of villages, and collective fines, "except in cases of absolute necessity." De Jouvenel now was replaced by Auguste Henri Ponsot who soon crushed all remaining armed outbreaks. The discontent, however, and the demand for autonomy, did not abate.

In 1928 Ponsot convened a Syrian Constituent Assembly to draw up an instrument of government for the mandate. When the nationalist delegates, who were in a majority, insisted on the establishment of an independent republic, the gathering was suspended *sine die* (January, 1929). In May, 1930, the commissioner himself issued a constitution, setting up a republic restricted only by the mandatory powers of France and by French control of its foreign affairs. The document also provided for a

parliament, to be elected quadrennially, and for a president. The latter was always to be a Moslem and was to be chosen by the parliament for five years.¹

The first elections under this constitution were held amid great disorder in January, 1932. Owing, it was asserted, to the interference of the French, the elected deputies included 54 Moderates and only 15 Nationalists, the latter, of course, being opposed to the continuance of the mandate. In June, 1932, again to the accompaniment of trouble and violence, the parliament elected the wealthy Ahmed Ali Bey el-Abed president of the republic.

During a parliamentary debate Poincare once boasted that France had displayed a "magnificent disinterestedness" in her Syrian policies. Probably only few natives of the mandate could be found who would unreservedly endorse this view. Many Syrians are convinced that France is interested primarily in their silk and railways, in their value as an economic and military asset, rather than in their individual welfare and their preparation for independent statehood.

THE POWER OF FRANCE

France emerged from the World War, as she had from the Napoleonic struggles, tired, but capable of a quick return to power. Enjoying an almost complete balance of industry and agriculture, and with half her population engaged in agricultural pursuits, France is virtually self-sufficient in the matter of food supply. Moreover, there is a fairly even distribution of wealth in the land because the national inheritance laws provide for an equal division of the father's estate among the children. The resulting large number of petty proprietorships furnishes a strong undercurrent of popular stability, especially since the peasants are acutely aware of their importance to the state.

French industry has made great strides since the war. The American and British wartime port installations were a permanent asset, as were also the special river, canal, and railway improvements. The French learned much from American experts and greatly bettered their methods and machines. Keen foreign

¹ This constitution did not apply to Greater Lebanon, an area which had earlier been given a republican charter of its own. The population of Syria in 1932 was about 2,800,000.

competition eventually led even the individualistic French manufacturers to realize the value of trust combinations, especially in the chemical, textile, and metallurgical trades. Numerous excellent technical schools were established throughout the country, with a consequent extension of technical and mechanical skill.

The French Government has long been noted for its intelligent and consistent method of business regulation. The state exercises considerable supervision over big business and the national commercial code requires all corporations to divert specified portions of their earnings to reserves. The bankruptcy laws "are so severe that they make the bankrupt business man an actual outcast." At times of labor shortage foreign workers, usually from Poland, Italy, Spain, and Belgium, are invited — but nearly always under contracts which require them to return home when there is no more work for them. In this way unemployment is kept down to a minimum. Because of the official restrictions and the temperament of the people, finally, there occurred no such over-expansion of industry as in post-war Germany. The French preferred, on the whole, to build their large industries "brick by brick out of earnings" rather than on credit.

The world depression affected France later than it did most other countries and found her in an enviable economic position. The unemployment figures, though large for France, were small when compared with those in other lands. The Bank of France had a gold reserve which was second only to that of the American Federal Reserve Bank. The sources of this wealth were the hoardings of the people; the savings entailed by the state through the repudiation of four-fifths of the domestic debt; the income from reparation payments, the tourist traffic, and shipping services; and the export of manufactures, chiefly luxuries. A sizable proportion of the wealth was manipulated in the traditionally skillful French manner to serve political as well as economic ends — to bind to France certain needy allies and to force political concessions from impoverished enemies. French foreign investments once more became noted for reaping diplomatic as well as financial dividends.¹

¹ Although the excess of imports into France over exports for the seven years 1924-1930 was about \$1,500,000,000, the income from the tourist traffic during

No discussion of the basis of French power can be complete without a word on the character of the people. To generalize about the French is virtually impossible. George Meredith once spoke of them as "the most mixed of any European nation." Nevertheless, a few remarks may be risked.

The Frenchman, particularly the French peasant and the shopkeeper, is thrifty, prudent, realistic, and individualistic. Intellectual and economic self-sufficiency are his supreme desiderata; his dream is to have a little property and a little income from investments — not much, perhaps, but enough for comfort. To gain this end he will work unceasingly and will deny himself pleasures and even necessities. He is suspicious and jealous, and "astonishingly void of sentiments when his interests are at stake." And "when at last he considers himself independent, with enough for his own wants, he ignores with beaming self-satisfaction everything that does not appertain to his own community, almost to his own person."¹ The Frenchman's character is at once a fundamental reason for the power of his country, a cause of worry to the government which represents his interests, and a riddle to the foreign statesmen who would have dealings with France.

this same period has been conservatively estimated at \$2,100,000,000. In addition France secured money through shipping and transit services, through reparation in excess of her debt payments, and through interest on credits held abroad. For the period 1924-1930 the total favorable difference between outpayments and income amounted to \$2,800,000,000. This surplus, nearly all in gold, enabled France to assume a leading position in the world's financial market and in the world's diplomatic relations. Most of the French investments abroad, moreover, were in the form of short-term loans which could be recalled on demand and which, therefore, could easily be used as a powerful diplomatic lever.

¹ There is an interesting discussion of this subject in Andre Siegfried's *France — A Study in Nationality*, 1930.

CHAPTER XIII

FASCIST ITALY

THE REWARD OF VICTORY

Italy was the only major power among the victors to experience a complete change in its system of government after the war. This change, hastened by Italian difficulties and disappointments at the Peace Conference, had its inception in the war years. There was, as we have seen, considerable disagreement among Italians in 1914 as to what course Italy should pursue in the struggle. The government issued a declaration of neutrality. The socialists, who had returned 78 deputies to the Chamber in the elections of 1913, endorsed this stand since they regarded the war as a bourgeois, capitalist enterprise from which Italy must keep aloof. But there were many who, for material or emotional reasons, favored intervention: business men, imperialists, and nationalists. These groups, in the name of a "sacred egoism," finally secured Italy's entry into the conflict in return for the offer of strongly coveted territories. The Allies, it will be remembered, promised Italy virtual control of the Adriatic and an extension of her African empire.

The Italians found the war much more exacting than they had anticipated. Over 5,500,000 men had to be mobilized, and of these, 650,000 were killed and 1,000,000 wounded. The net direct cost of the war to Italy was over twelve billion dollars, while property damage amounted to an additional three billions. Moreover, the disastrous rout at Caporetto in 1917 made the final victory of 1918 all the more emotionally exciting. Under these circumstances, Victor Emmanuels subjects were sorely disappointed not to achieve their utmost desires in Dalmatia, Albania, the Near East, and Africa.¹

¹ That their aspirations in the Tyrol were met **to the very limit of the** stipulations of the Secret Treaties, did not console the nationalists.

Reference has already been made to the problems encountered by the Peace Conference in dealing with the fate of Fiume on the east coast of the Adriatic.¹ In order to encourage the South-slavs to break away from Austria in 1918, Italy, by the Pact of Rome, had made some general concessions to their ambitions in the Adriatic. But when it appeared, after the war, that one of the Slavic ambitions was the acquisition of Fiume, the Italians were enraged. Fiume came to have an emotional importance out of all proportion to its economic or strategic value. Histrionic effects were added to the situation in September, 1919, when the patriotic poet, Gabriele D'Annunzio, led a band of blackshirted *Arditi* (shock troops during the war) to Fiume in a chartered boat and took the city by force — over the objections of the Supreme Peace Council and the inhabitants.

Premier Francesco Nitti, who had succeeded Orlando in June, 1919, deprecated such artificial nationalist stimulations and negotiated with Yugoslavia the Treaty of Rapallo (November, 1920), whereby the independence of the Free State of Fiume was recognized "in perpetuity." Soon thereafter Italian troops drove D'Annunzio's legionaries from their stronghold. The net result of the dramatic exploit was only further to infuriate the nationalists against the government.²

During the war, Austrians, Serbs, and Italians had fought on Albanian soil. Italian troops, moreover, continued to occupy the land for several months after the armistice. During this occupation, the Italian delegates to the Peace Conference attempted to secure Albania as an Italian mandate. By way of alternative, they were ready to agree to a partition of Albania among Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia. The Italians were especially interested in the port of Avlona, the key to the Straits of Otranto. Since these Straits are less than forty miles wide, their possession is tantamount to control of the Adriatic. The Albanians, however, desired independence. Encouraged by Wilson's friendly attitude, they undertook a guerilla warfare to drive out the foreigners. By the summer of 1920, the Italian Premier,

¹ See pp. 109-111.

² Neither the Italians nor the Slavs were satisfied with the arrangement, and negotiations were resumed between 1922 and 1924. Eventually, by the Treaty of Rome (January 27, 1924), Italy received the city of Fiume, while Yugoslavia received Port Baros and a fifty-year lease of part of the Fiume harbor.

Giolitti, preoccupied with domestic problems, signed a treaty withdrawing the Italian troops from all Albania save the island of Saseno. Italian nationalists loudly bewailed this additional "inglorious page" in their country's history.

In the Near East, much of the territorial bait that had been held out to Italy either went to Greece or was retained by Turkey, the Italians receiving only some minor commercial concessions. In Africa, where England, France, and Belgium acquired all the former German colonies, Italy was put off with small extensions to Lybia and Somaliland — and that partly at the expense of Egypt. Despite the acquisition in Europe of some 8900 square miles of land and 1,600,000 people, therefore, the Italians accused their Allies of "faithlessness." They professed to be shocked by the "selfishness and general roguery" which faced them at the Peace Conference, and they were angry because "Italian achievements were discounted and Italian imperialism denounced."

The nationalists flung uncomplimentary epithets at most of the diplomats at Paris. Nor was that all. They soon turned against their own ministries, which were accused of weakly consenting to the "mistreatment" of Italy. They blamed their older statesmen for the debacle whereby "the war had been won and the peace lost." Fiery young patriots referred to the "old men" as "filthy parasites on the better blood of the nation," and vowed that they would re-create Italy in such fashion that the world would be "forced to sit up and take notice." Their new Italy would be "one of the nations without which it is impossible to conceive the future history of humanity." Only, the blunderers must first be ousted.

Meanwhile the government was confronted with a disheartening domestic situation. Millions of men had to be demobilized. It was impossible to find employment for many of the returned veterans because the nation's industry was demoralized, jobs had been filled by those who had remained at home, foreign markets were temporarily lost or closed, and foreign trade and tourist traffic were almost at a standstill. Even the "safety valve" of emigration was shut, owing to lack of funds at home and the restrictive legislation of foreign countries. The price of food rose quickly and there was the usual popular hatred of the war profiteers, called *pescicani* or "sharks." Budgetary deficits and

currency inflation added to the general woes. To climax the particular troubles of the former soldiers, many of whom were both economically and socially dislocated, military tribunals were set up to try as traitors those who had led the retreat at Caporetto.

It is not surprising that in the elections of 1919 the socialists should have captured 157 parliamentary seats. In the Chamber these deputies consistently voted against government measures, thereby creating a parliamentary stalemate. The manifestations of discontent throughout the land soon took the form of violent strikes and riots. These were idly watched by the impotent authorities who feared to call upon the army to restore order lest the soldiers fraternize with the people.

Gradually Italy drifted toward radicalism. It was estimated that one-third of the population had "gone red" by the winter of 1919-1920. Socialism spread rapidly in city and country, owing in part to fantastic rumors regarding the marvelous changes being wrought by the proletarian rule in Russia, in part to the influence of Bolshevik emissaries, and in part to the government's inaction. Shouts of "Down with the King!" and "Long live Lenin!" were frequently heard.

"Direct action" schemes began to win increasing favor, and many communes were seized by socialists. Peasant tenants refused to pay rent, large estates were broken up, ex-service men appropriated plots of ground, and numerous outrages, often economically unwise, were perpetrated. In some of the cities, when the employers announced their inability to continue in business unless wages were lowered and hours lengthened, the workmen themselves took over the factories. In the two years 1919 and 1920 a total of 35,000,000 workdays was lost due to strikes and disorders, and there was some talk of the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Even the formation in 1919, by the Sicilian priest, Don Sturzo, of a new, moderately conservative, Catholic People's Party, failed to stem the red tide.

But the period of factory and land "occupation" did not last long. The workers found it difficult to carry on without raw materials, without sufficient food, and without managerial experience. The peasants were illiterate and fundamentally conservative. The socialists split into right and left factions. The

novelty of doing things as the Russians were supposed to be doing them, soon wore off. A general feeling arose that a proletarian state might be no more able to cope with Italy's complex problems than was the existing weak regime. If neither the present parliamentary system nor a possible proletarian state could help Italy, then, wondered a large portion of the population, who should be entrusted with the government?

It so happened that the strife and violence of the war and post-war years had created bonds of sympathy between several important groups. The landlords and property-holders were much affected by the incidents of the brief reign of radicalism. They were determined that Italy should have a government strong enough to protect private property. The university people, the professionals, and many of the young men were disgusted with the whole trend of events since 1914. They wanted to see a general governmental housecleaning and the emergence of a strong and patriotic administration. The nationalists and ex-soldiers were angered by the thought that the net result of their participation in the war might be an anarchic Italy. They, too, wanted to see new men at the governmental helm. At this juncture Benito Mussolini came forward to seize control.

MUSSOLINI

Benito Mussolini was born in Romagna in 1883. His father was a blacksmith, with socialistic leanings. His mother was a school teacher. Upon his mother's advice, Mussolini entered a normal school and eventually became a teacher. Dissatisfied with his lot, and by nature rebellious and restless, he soon quit his position and went to Switzerland. There he studied at Lausanne and Geneva, frequently having to beg his bread. Eventually he obtained work on a socialist newspaper, but his activities in organizing labor and fomenting strikes led the Swiss Government to demand his departure. Returning to Italy for a time, Mussolini took up journalism, and then went to the Trentino in Austria. Once more his socialistic activities made it necessary for him to leave.

He came back to Italy, where he was kept under surveillance as a revolutionary. In 1911 he served a jail sentence for urging the populace to prevent the departure of troops for Tripoli. In

1912, after some able speechmaking at a socialist congress, he became editor of *Avanti*, the official paper of the Italian Socialist Party. When the war broke out he favored Italian neutrality, but nationalism soon triumphed over socialism and he began to urge intervention. For this he was made to resign from *Avanti* and was expelled from the party. Thereupon he founded an interventionist paper in Milan, // *Popolo d'Italia*. He persisted for some years in calling himself a socialist, but he now actually was an Italian nationalist interested in improving the condition of the masses.

When his class was called to the colors in September, 1915, Mussolini entered the army as a private. He served on the Isonzo front and rose to be corporal. In February, 1917, he was sent to a hospital with some forty wounds occasioned by the explosion of an Italian trench mortar. Upon his recovery he was exempted from further military service so that he might return to the editorship of *Il Popolo* and use its columns to combat the growing spirit of defeatism. Mussolini is a "born" leader and actor, with a dominating, magnetic personality. Though his voice is hard, he is an effective orator, adept in the use of short, crisp sentences. He has flashing black eyes, possesses a magnificent scowl, and makes the most of a resemblance to Napoleon. He works hard and pays much attention to matters of detail.

In March, 1919, Mussolini called a meeting of ex-service men and other persons who were interested in solving Italy's problems and anxious to defend her war record against the calumnies of a growing lot of "penitent Magdalenes." The meeting was attended by a colorful group of discontented young agitators, most of whom had been affiliated some years earlier with societies known as *fasci d'azione*. These *fasci* had been organized as early as October, 1914, by young "men of action" eager to have Italy join the Allies in the war. By February, 1915, over one hundred *fasci* had been founded, and vigorous methods of propaganda had been employed to win the country to the interventionist view-point. Mussolini had led the Milan *fascio*, and his // *Popolo* had been the fascist literary organ. Now, under Mussolini's guidance, the former interventionists reorganized themselves at the 1919 meeting into *fasci di combattimento*.



BENITO MUSSOLINI

Wide world

The gathering adopted a revolutionary program which demanded universal suffrage; proportional representation; a legal eight-hour day; a heavy capital levy and inheritance tax; confiscation of some church properties; abolition of the Senate; the calling of a national assembly to decide upon a new form of government; nationalization of the munition plants; the creation of economic councils with legislative powers; management of certain industries, such as railroads, by the workers; and outright annexation of Fiume and Dalmatia. The program was calculated to appeal especially to the returned soldiers, the "proletariat of the trenches." Said Mussolini: "During the war we all felt the incapacity of those who were governing us and we know that we won only by virtue of the Italian people, not by any intelligence or capacity on the part of the administration. Given the chance for a new regime, we must not be faint-hearted. Therefore we are constituting the fasci, bodies capable of creative action and capable of going out in the squares and crying: 'It is we who have the right to succeed this government, for it was we who pushed the country into the war and led it to victory.'"

"ON TO ROME!"

Despite the confidence of its leader, the cause of fascism progressed slowly in 1919. In the elections of that year the two fascist candidates for office in Milan, one of them Mussolini himself, polled a total of less than five thousand votes. During the period of the communist factory occupation, the fascist movement was dormant. With the end of the occupation, however, fascism took on a new life. Recruits came from among the property-holders, the younger sons of business men and merchants, unemployed ex-soldiers who were grieved by the sneers at their wartime services, unoccupied ex-officers, and discontented professionals and students. The wealthier sympathizers, moreover, made generous money contributions.

Filled with nationalist fervor and a bitter hatred for socialists and communists, the fascists embarked upon a campaign of terrorization known as "squadrist." Castor oil, clubs, and guns were used to convert or despatch the radicals. Naturally the fascists were subjected to similar treatment by their adversaries. The violence, incidentally, afforded many individuals the oppor-

tunity to avenge private wrongs. Upwards of a hundred "battles" were fought between the rivals from the summer of 1920 to that of 1921. The government watched the civil war with resignation, for it was too weak to intervene.

Eventually the fascists emerged triumphant. The socialists were divided among themselves, while the fascists had gradually come under the domination of Mussolini's Milan group. The fascists also conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign, using pamphlets, papers, books, and speeches in an attempt to convince patriots that they alone had saved the country from the horrors of Russian Bolshevism and that they alone could restore Italy to a position of domestic security and prosperity and of international respect.

In the elections of May, 1921, the fascists returned 35 deputies to parliament, and in November they constituted themselves the National Fascist Party. By this time, however, their program was quite different from the one which had been adopted in 1919. During the fight against socialism, the fascists had lost both their dislike for the bourgeoisie and their faith in the proletarians. Indeed, the program for the party as drawn up in December, 1921, was so bourgeois as to recommend the substitution of private control for the state monopoly in the postal and telegraph services.

Following the lead of several other patriotic organizations, the fascists now donned distinctive uniforms and adopted a ritual. Since a large number of D'Annunzio's Black Shirts had joined the fascists, the latter decided to adopt the black shirt. They patterned their ceremonial after old Roman customs and chose the Roman salute. The *fascies* or bundle of rods enclosing a battle ax, as carried by the lictors in Roman days to symbolize strength and power, became the emblem of fascism. A Turin student song, *Giovinezza* ("Youth"), popularized during the war, became the fascist anthem.

Meanwhile the government was becoming so weak and unstable that there was talk of forming a coalition ministry and of inviting Mussolini to accept a portfolio. But Mussolini refused, saying, "Fascism will not come into the government by the service entrance." Then, during the spring and summer of 1922, he several times hinted that the fascists might overthrow the weak

parliament and substitute a strong nationalist regime. In September, 1922, at a patriotic celebration, he first raised the cry "On to Rome 1" but hastened to reaffirm his faith in the monarchical system of government, professing merely a desire to see the monarchy strengthened.

Not long thereafter Mussolini presented the Chamber with a series of demands. He warned the parliament that failure to comply might well lead to the use of force. The demands were for a dissolution of the Chamber, electoral changes, new elections, financial reforms, a strong foreign policy, and five cabinet posts for fascists. Despite the fact that the recently organized and well-disciplined Fascist Militia was gradually taking over control of the larger cities in the north, the deputies smiled at the ultimatum and regarded it as a joke. At a National Fascist Congress held at Naples on October 24, 1922, Mussolini explicitly invoked force. Following the delivery of a threatening speech, he entrained for Milan, while some fifty thousand fully armed fascist militiamen began to concentrate on Rome.

When it appeared that the army could not be counted upon to meet this menace, the old and affable, but weak, Premier Facta resigned. There was little violence, for the militia overawed the frightened parliamentarians. On October 29 the king telephoned Mussolini, asking him to form a cabinet. Mussolini at once left Milan for Rome, announcing, "Tomorrow Italy will have not a ministry, but a government." On October 30 the new cabinet took office. It contained only four fascists out of fifteen appointees, and no socialists. The moderate composition of the government was due to Mussolini's desire to follow a policy of compromise and conciliation until he could be certain that popular opinion would support him in more venturesome steps.

MAKING ITALY FASCIST

The parliamentary opponents of fascism, and there were many, hesitated to express an immediate lack of confidence in Mussolini. They hoped that his inexperience would lead him into some tactical blunder which might serve as an excuse for his ousting. But Mussolini was wary. With only slight difficulty he secured a grant of practically dictatorial powers until the end of 1923. Then he assured himself of the loyalty of the adminis-

trative branch of the government by the appointment, from Rome, of fascist prefects and subprefects to govern the various provinces into which the centralized Italian monarchy is divided. Control of the legislature was next assured by the passage of the Acerbo Election Law in December, 1923. In order to secure parliament's consent to this law, Mussolini reminded the legislators that "the revolution has its rights" and that he was as ready as ever to invoke force.

The law stipulated that whichever party obtained the largest number of votes in a national election, provided also that it received no less than one-fourth of the total votes cast, was entitled to two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The remaining seats were to be divided among the other parties in proportion to votes registered. Under this scheme the party that polled a plurality was sure of absolute control of the Chamber, while at the same time there could be no single strong opposition group. In the first elections held under the new system (April, 1924), the fascists, not without recourse to violence, secured a sizable majority of the votes. With the aid of the law so skillfully drawn up by Signor Acerbo, therefore, fascists occupied two-thirds of the seats in the new Chamber.

The chief opposition group in parliament was the Socialist Party, one of whose leaders was a young deputy named Giacomo Matteotti. The latter published a book in 1924, entitled *The Fascisti Exposed*. In this he enumerated a long series of fascist murders and outrages, and threatened to expose as grafters and bribe-takers certain members of Mussolini's new cabinet, notably Under-Secretary of the Interior Finzi. Before he had a chance to present his evidence against these officials, Matteotti disappeared. His body was found in a river two months later. This murder, which occurred in June, 1924, aroused a storm of indignation, especially since it was only the most notorious of a number of excesses.

Since Mussolini had only recently advised the Chamber that "in internal affairs whatever happens, happens through my precise and direct volition and on my express order," it not unnaturally came to be rumored that the "removal" of Matteotti had been demanded. Although little serious credence was given to this accusation, it certainly appeared that Matteotti's charges

had been well-founded, that high officials were implicated in the murder, and that Mussolini had been negligent in the control of his assistants. As a sign of protest, most of the non-fascist deputies withdrew from the Chamber, vowing not to return to their seats as long as fascism remained in power. They hired a hall on the Aventine Hill and spoke and wrote against fascism. The people, recalling the instances of Roman plebeian retirements to the Aventine Hill in olden days, soon referred to the schismatic deputies as the "Aventine Secession." In 1926 the secessionists were definitely deprived of their seats in parliament.

Mussolini saved appearances after the Matteotti affair by dismissing from office nearly everyone who had been connected with the incident and by imprisoning a number of officials, including Finzi. In addition he pledged law and order, appointed a commission for constitutional reform, reorganized the militia, and granted a number of minor political concessions. And yet, not until almost two years later, in March, 1926, were the murderers brought to trial, and then they were defended by the Secretary-General of the Fascist Party, Roberto Farinacci. Some of the accused were acquitted and the others given short jail terms. Thereafter Mussolini took a firmer stand against the violent "squadrists" who, led by local chieftains, still terrorized country districts. In 1927 he ordered the regular police to crush the illegal tactics of the unruly "patriots."

Having weathered the crisis of 1924, Mussolini proceeded in earnest to make himself supreme in Italy. In November, 1925, seven thousand municipalities which had a population of less than five thousand inhabitants each were deprived of their local political rights and placed under the control of *podestds* appointed from Rome. In the following year popular government in virtually all towns and cities was indefinitely suspended and the administration placed in the hands of appointed *podestas*. Rome itself was placed under a governor, and Naples and Milan under special commissioners, all selected by the national government. Parliament was deprived of the right to initiate legislation. The premier became solely responsible to the king and was empowered to issue decrees with the force of law. The press was strictly censored and all opposition papers either bought up or suppressed.

Nothing could be printed without the approval of the proper fascist authority.

Mussolini became supreme commander of all military, naval, and air forces, and new members of the Fascist Party had to swear "to follow without question the orders of *Il Duce* and to serve the cause of the Fascist Revolution with all their might and if necessary with their blood." Secret societies, including the Masons, were abolished. Membership in the Socialist Party at first was made punishable with deportation, and then, in 1926, all opposition parties were abolished. The Fascist Party remained as the only legal political organization. Thus was fulfilled a warning expressed by Mussolini some years earlier: "All parties must end, must fall. I want to see a panorama of ruins about me — the ruins of the other political forces — so that fascism may stand alone, gigantic and dominant."

The membership of the Fascist Party in 1932 totalled well over one million. At the apex of the hierarchical party organization is the Fascist Grand Council, headed by Mussolini as *Il Duce*, the Leader. The Council includes most of the high party and government officials and in 1932 had a membership of about twenty. By virtue of his power to add to its membership at any time, Mussolini entirely dominates the Council, thus carrying out his maxim: "A hierarchy must culminate in a pin-point." By law, the Grand Council of the Fascist Party is recognized as the "supreme organ, coordinating all the activities of the regime." Its chief functions are to draft new legislation, fill its own vacancies, name the successors of both king and premier, deliberate on international treaties involving changes in Italian territory, and appoint the National Directory which is the executive organ of fascism. The members of the Council occupy ministerial posts, and at one time Mussolini himself held eight portfolios simultaneously. The National Directory, consisting of the secretary-general of the party and nine Council appointees, meets monthly under the presidency of *Il Duce*.

The party base consists of some ten thousand local *fasci* which in each province are federated, and controlled by provincial councils and directories. The provincial secretaries appoint the secretaries of the local *fasci*. The entire organization exemplifies well the theory of government stated in the new constitution adopted

by the Fascist Party in October, 1926: "The ordinances and hierarchies without which there can be no discipline of energies nor education of the people, must be illuminated and guided from on top where there is a comprehensive view of powers, duties, functions, and merits."

Since the Fascist Grand Council, for all practical purposes, became the government of Italy, the roles of the Senate and Chamber rapidly diminished in importance. The consent of both houses is still needed for legislation, but Mussolini has adopted the practice of taking action and then having it legalized by the "disciplined" parliament. The electoral procedure is such that a fascist Chamber is assured. Occasionally resistance is encountered in the Senate, whose membership consists of the princes of the royal house and a group of men appointed for life by the king. Mussolini can at any time request the king for enough new appointments to outvote an opposition. In 1928, for example, thirty-seven new Senators were created on Mussolini's orders.

While these changes in form of government went on, Mussolini saw to it that Italy was "purified." As part of the process of purification, anti-fascist lawyers were disbarred, prominent opponents of the regime were imprisoned or exiled, the property of Italian emigrants who said anything adverse to fascism in foreign countries was confiscated, and the universities were staffed with fascist professors. "There is no room," declared Mussolini through the pages of 77 *Popolo d' Italia*, "for the Opposition."

Work on a new penal code was begun in 1926, and completed in 1931. The death penalty, which had been abolished in 1890, was restored for those who attacked "the life or liberty of King, Queen, Crown Prince, or Prime Minister." Parents were forbidden to name their children after "socialists or other rebellious people." Divorce was restricted, masked balls prohibited, swearing made punishable with arrest, cabarets made to close at midnight, and the advocacy of birth control made a criminal offense. Emigration was curtailed and "the use of firearms" made "obligatory to prevent the unauthorized crossing of frontiers." An active secret police force to repress whatever anti-fascism still existed, the O. V. R. A. (*Organizzazione Volontaria*

per la Repressions dell'Antifascismo), was organized and made directly responsible to Mussolini.

Believing that the country's future greatness is in the hands of its youth, Mussolini has decreed that Italian youth be well trained and disciplined. For this purpose there were organized three uniformed societies, the *Balilla*¹ for boys from eight to fourteen, the *Avanguardia* (Advance Guard) for boys between fourteen and eighteen, and the *Giovine Fascisti* (Young Italians) for youths aged eighteen to twenty-one, as well as for some who had been unable to join the other groups. The members of these organizations number about 1,300,000 (1932). They are given military, physical, moral, and religious training, as well as a thorough grounding in fascist aims and achievements. They must learn a "Decalogue of the Young Fascist" whose tenth commandment reads: "One thing should be dear to thee above all: the life of Il Duce." The *Avanguardisti* receive advanced military instruction from officers of the Volunteer Militia for National Security.² In 1926 membership in the Fascist Party was closed to all but "graduates" of the auxiliary groups.

There is less emphasis upon the organization of women into fascist groups, for Mussolini believes that women should remain attached to the household and at best engage in social welfare work.³ About one hundred thousand women are members of *Feminine Fasci*, and there are two societies, the *Piccole Italiane* and the *Giovani Italiane*, for girls under and over twelve, respectively. Approximately six hundred fascist units are in existence outside Italy. They are controlled by a special secretary-general with headquarters in Rome.

¹ Balilla was the nickname of a Genoese boy who in 1746 was the hero of a campaign against the Austrians.

² The Fascist Militia takes an oath of allegiance to the king, but its supreme commander is Mussolini. It is a volunteer force which supplements the regular army. It adheres to the Black Shirt uniform and has a complicated ritual. About 300,000 militiamen are kept constantly mobilized as a sort of special police force for guard and emergency duty. Compulsory military service prevails in Italy, and in general, the youth organizations give pre-military training, while the militia affords post-military training.

³ No Italian women participated in the Olympic Games held at Los Angeles in 1932. The good showing made by the men athletes, however, impelled the authorities to take a more favorable attitude towards gymnastics for women. It is expected that Italy will be represented by both sexes at the Games to be held at Berlin in 1936.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CORPORATE STATE

A strong foothold had been gained among Italian workers before the war by a doctrine known as syndicalism, which advocated the abolition of political government in favor of government by economic groups. During the war many of the syndicalists, led by such men as Edmondo Rossoni, became imbued with a fiery nationalism and fought loyally to down the foreign enemy. In 1919 these nationalistic syndicalists, who were firm believers in the right of private property, united with the nationalistic fascists in the struggle against communism. After the victorious outcome of this conflict, Rossoni began organizing fascist syndicates as a counterbalance to the socialist trade-union movement. He also hoped to reform the Italian governmental system so that representation would be based upon organized economic interests rather than upon geographic-political units. The fascist syndicalists, in contradistinction to those who followed the doctrines of Georges Sorel, the French founder of syndicalism, accepted "the capitalist class as socially productive," preferred "class collaboration" to class warfare, and were ready to accord producers' organizations a place in the governmental machine. Rossoni's movement made rapid headway, and by 1925 the Italian Industrial Employers' Federation recognized the fascist syndicates as Labor's sole spokesmen. In 1926 the federated fascist syndicates had a combined membership of 2,400,000. Mussolini therefore determined to control them.

By a law of April 3, 1926, thirteen confederated fascist syndicates, six of employers, six of employees, and one of intellectuals, were given legal status. Additional associations might be organized upon the representation of ten per cent of the workers or employers in the industry concerned, but government officials were forbidden to participate in the formation. Only one syndicate was permitted in each field of production, and its decisions were made binding upon all the workmen and employers in the industry. The syndicates acquired the sole right to formulate collective contracts and were empowered to tax all persons engaged in their industry regardless of whether or not the tax-payer was a member of the association. The syndicates were forbidden to affiliate with any international organization and became subject to the direct control of a ministry of corporations. The

latter was created in July, 1926, and Mussolini became the first minister of corporations. Each confederation has provincial and local subdivisions.¹

The law also prohibited strikes and lockouts, recognized the validity of collective labor contracts, and established sixteen labor courts from which there is no appeal. Only persons acceptable politically to the local fascist authorities may become members of syndicates. Such members, moreover, are entitled to preference in employment over non-members. Some time after the law was passed a special training school for syndicalist executives was opened at Genoa. The ostensible purpose of this action was "to raise to the dignity of a profession" an office which might have become "for the honest an ideal vocation, and for the dishonest a lucrative business." Obviously, however, the effect of such a training schedule is to give the minister of corporations an even firmer grip over the syndicates. Graduates of the school will tend to represent the interests of the government rather than those of the members of the syndicates. In 1930 the employers' syndicates had 1,187,828 members, but represented 4,327,760 employers. The workers' syndicates had a membership of 3,093,005, and represented 8,222,548 laborers. Of the 143,940 "intellectuals," there were enrolled 75,790.

The statute of 1926 also contemplated the coordination of the activities of the syndicates by the creation of liaison organs known as "corporations." For several years technical difficulties stood in the way of the realization of this proposal. Then, on April 21, 1930, to "adjust disputes between the various groups in the interest of national production," Mussolini inaugurated a National Council of Corporations composed of representatives from the thirteen syndicates, from the government, and from such extra-syndical, but cooperating, institutions as *Dopolavoro*?

The Council was ordered to coordinate the existing organs,

¹ Following are the thirteen confederated syndicates: One each for the employers and employees in Industry, Agriculture, Commerce, Maritime and Aerial Transportation, Land Transportation and Inland Navigation, and Banking, and one of Intellectuals, including professionals and artists.

* *Dopolavoro* ("After Work") was established in May, 1925, as an association to provide workers and their families with physical and cultural recreational facilities. • The society promotes hygiene, education, and art, and its membership card entitles the holder to considerable reductions in fares and admission fees to theatres, museums, and exhibitions. In 1931 the society had 1,622,140 members.

supervise the official employment bureaus, promote production in every way possible, settle inter-syndical disputes, and set up functioning corporations. For better administration the personnel of the Council was divided into seven sections, corresponding roughly to the seven main syndicate divisions. By a decree of February 4, 1931, the seven sections of the Council were to be transformed into corporations with tasks identical to the ones hitherto fulfilled by the sections. Thus the employers and employees in each of the seven chief branches of production were brought together into an organization which was at the same time an administrative agency of the state, controlled by the minister of corporations. The latter, in fact, assumed the power to nominate and remove the corporation presidents.

It had been hoped that the establishment of national syndicates under government supervision would greatly improve the conditions of labor. Progress in this direction, however, was slower than had been anticipated. Rossoni therefore prevailed upon Mussolini to secure the passage of a Charter of Labor calculated to better the work situation. On April 21, 1927, the supposed anniversary of the founding of Rome, Mussolini proclaimed such a charter, the final text of which he himself had drawn up. "The Italian nation/' declared the document, "is an organism having aims, life, and means of action superior to those of the single or grouped individuals who compose it. It is a moral, political, and economic unity which is completely realized in the fascist state." The object of all production is stated to be "the well-being of the producers and the development of national strength." Labor is defined as a "social duty" protected by the state. The latter may intervene, however, only when "private initiative is lacking or is insufficient, or when the political interests of the state are involved."

For the rest, the charter dealt mainly with guarantees of fairness to the workers. Night work should receive higher pay than day work. Piece work should be paid for fortnightly and be high enough to enable a normally industrious person to secure a basic wage. Sunday was made a legal holiday, and an annual paid vacation for every workman was stipulated. Workers dismissed through no fault of their own should receive a discharge compensation. Labor contracts could not be broken because of

change in ownership of enterprise, military service, or brief illnesses.

The state also set for itself the following aims: "First, the perfection of accident insurance; second, the improvement and extension of maternity insurance; third, insurance against occupational illnesses and tuberculosis as an introduction to a system of general health insurance; fourth, the improvement of insurance against involuntary unemployment, and fifth, the adoption of special forms of endowment insurance for young workers/" "Education and instruction, especially vocational instruction/" were made "one of the principal duties of the syndicates." Despite this charter, there is considerable, and apparently justifiable, feeling among Italian workers that thus far the government, in the interests, ostensibly, of more efficient production, has shown great partiality towards the employers.

In May, 1928, a law was passed which made Italy the first large state to have a national legislature representing economic divisions. The membership of the Chamber of Deputies was reduced from 560 to 400. These 400 deputies are elected by the entire kingdom, acting as a single electoral constituency. Candidates to the number of 800 are nominated by the national executive councils of the thirteen confederated syndicates, sitting at Rome. Each syndicate has the right to nominate a definite number of candidates and in each field of production the employers and employees select the same number of nominees. Thus the agricultural employers' and the agricultural employees' confederations each nominate 96 men. Two hundred additional candidates are similarly nominated by a select group of cultural and charitable institutions. From the list of 1000 candidates, the Fascist Grand Council selects 400.

The Council may, if it choose, add names of its own, or even reject the entire list and substitute a new one. When the Council has decided upon a satisfactory "four hundred," the approved list is made public. On election day the voters receive a ballot containing the single question: "Do you approve of the list of deputies designated by the Fascist Grand Council?" The answer is either "yes" or "no" for the entire list. No individual names may be rejected. If the majority of votes cast is "yes," the 400 take their seats. If the majority should ever be

"no," new elections under a rather complicated system must be held.

Universal suffrage was abolished by this electoral law. The franchise is restricted to those who pay a syndicate rate, or pay taxes amounting to at least 100 lire (one lira = 5.26 cents), or receive pensions or salaries from the state or public institutions, or belong to the clergy of a recognized cult. Women are excluded from the national franchise, while men, to vote, must be twenty-one, or eighteen if they are married and have children. The electorate thus was reduced by some 3,000,000 to about 9,500,000 in a population of 42,000,000. The employers, though less numerous than the workers, are represented equally with the latter. The entire electoral procedure is undemocratic, but the fascists are proud of this very fact. They regard democracy as a sign of decadence incompatible with the idea of a strong, united, national state. They consider democracy to have been "a good method of government for the nineteenth century" but regard it as inadequate for the twentieth.

Early in 1929 the executive councils of the syndicates and other institutions met to nominate their candidates for the first elections under the new law. Mussolini's name came first on nearly every list. The Fascist Grand Council then scanned the list of 1000 and selected 400 men of suitable qualifications and "reliable fascist faith." The list was published, and on March 24 the voters were permitted to accept or reject the entire list. Special ballots had to be used by those who wished to vote "no." During the interim between the publication of the list and the election day, the fascists, from Mussolini down, carried on an energetic campaign. No opposition speeches were permitted. Even the pope, reconciled to the Italian Government since the signing of a recent accord, urged Catholics to vote "yes." Approximately 90% of the qualified voters went to the polls. 8,519,559 voted "yes," and only 137,761 voted "no." The dissenting votes came mostly from the larger cities in the north, where the early strength of fascism had lain. Apparently a large portion of the electorate was in sympathy with Mussolini's policies of putting the Italian house in order and viewing matters from a practical and realistic standpoint.

FASCIST ACHIEVEMENTS AT HOME

Economic conditions in the Italian Kingdom experienced a general improvement during the first ten years of the fascist regime. The difficult task of balancing the budget was accomplished by 1926, since which date the treasury generally has held a surplus. The smaller foreign war debts soon were paid off and the debts to the United States and Great Britain were funded in 1925 and 1926, respectively. In 1927 the lira, which had stood at five to the dollar before the war, was stabilized at nineteen to the dollar.

During the period 1930-1932, however, while the world depression was becoming worse, the government found it necessary to reduce salaries, decrease the number of official positions, introduce other economy measures, and float large internal loans. In 1932 the unemployed numbered over a million, but every available force and method of propaganda was mobilized to combat the crisis. Mussolini helped the people in particular localities tide over periods of economic stress by temporarily forcing down rents and food prices. Large producers were forced to regulate output, sales, and prices, and it was forbidden to lower wages without the approval of the central committee of the corporate system. Special efforts were made to reduce the country's dependence upon foreign imports of wheat, cotton, and tobacco by producing more of these staples at home or in the African colonies. In the case of tobacco the attempt was fairly successful. Less availing, though more spectacular, was the officially conducted "Battle of Wheat."

In order to increase domestic wheat production, national wheat raising contests were inaugurated, the prizes being contributed by the government. In one of these competitions Mussolini's own estate at Carpenta won third prize. Il Duce is considered a good farmer, and he strives to be a worthy example to Italian agriculturists. When accepting the third prize, in 1928, Mussolini said: "It is now high time to dedicate billions [of lire] to agriculture if we wish to avoid the economic crisis and demographic decadence which have beset other peoples." The government also encouraged the formation of agricultural cooperatives. An agricultural credit bank was established and special educational facilities were provided by the authorities

to teach modern methods to the peasants. Traveling movies, which graphically demonstrated means whereby farm output might be increased, were sent to all rural districts. Simultaneously, there was a campaign to reduce the importance of spaghetti and macaroni as factors in Italian diet, since the manufacture of these products requires huge quantities of wheat.

Energetic measures were taken to increase Italy's share of world trade and tourist traffic. In 1926 a semi-official National Export Institute was founded to promote foreign trade. Steamship lines received heavy subsidies, and special efforts were made to develop shipping lines to the various Balkan ports, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, and India. In 1931, for the sake of economy and efficiency, the three leading shipping companies were merged. Italian shipyards were kept busy building war vessels for Russia, Turkey, Greece, and several South American states.

Many new cables were laid, the radio industry was encouraged, and high tariff acts were passed. A law of 1930 doubled the duties on automobiles, thereby causing considerable worry to American automobile manufacturers, and giving the Italian Fiat Automobile Company a virtual monopoly of the Italian market. Henry Ford, however, established a branch factory in Milan. Trade pacts were signed with many countries, most recently with Russia (1931), Hungary (1931), and Austria (1932). In the accord with Soviet Russia the Italian Government guaranteed 75% of the credit for Russian purchases made in Italy. In 1929 Italy led Europe in completed hydroelectric power developments, and in the rayon and silk industries.

A special survey of national resources led to the discovery of new sources of mineral wealth. Huge reclamation projects, especially in the Campagna and Pontine Marshes, were set under way, and much money and effort expended upon reforestation schemes. The railway service has been greatly improved, a number of electric trains have been placed in operation, schedules are adhered to, and the number of free passes, which averaged perhaps a million a year before the war, has been reduced to a negligible quantity. Several air lines are being subsidized. Between 1922 and 1928 some 3000 public works were undertaken, and in 1930, on the eighth anniversary of the **March on Rome**, a program was launched for 2000 more. \$825,000,000

were spent on public works from 1922 to 1931, and projects calling for \$470,000,000 were in progress in 1932.

In the interest of law and order, Prefect Cesare Mori of Palermo was entrusted with the task of breaking up the Sicilian Mafia or "Black Hand" organization. He entered upon his duties in 1927, and four years later reported the extinction of the society.

Among the leading obstacles to progress facing the fascists was the illiteracy of the people. In 1911 about 40% of the Italians were illiterate, the proportion being much higher in the south than in the north. The fascists attacked the problem vigorously by voting increasingly large educational budgets, by enforcing more strictly the laws for compulsory school attendance up to the age of fourteen, and by introducing newer pedagogic methods. The number of children in elementary schools increased from 3,200,000 in 1924-1925, to 4,300,000 in 1930-1931. Moreover, in order that the children might be reared "in a healthful spirit of fascism," all the available texts were carefully scrutinized and those not measuring up to fascist political, economic, or nationalist aspirations were tabooed. Besides, a whole new series of fascist texts was written.

The schools provide one of the best fields for the spread of fascist propaganda, and under Italian law any teacher may be removed from office for holding political views contrary to those of the government. In 1931 adult illiteracy was estimated at less than twenty-five per cent, and Italy had twenty-five universities and a number of "higher institutes" giving technical and professional training. Several attempts have been made, privately and semi-officially, to stimulate a new fascist art in Italy, since Mussolini once said: "Without art there is no civilization." Progress in this direction has thus far not been striking.

Material progress, therefore, has been considerable under fascist guidance. Yet, when it is remembered that Italy is still largely dependent upon foreign capital, and has virtually no coal, iron, oil, or phosphates, relatively little timber, and an insufficient food supply, it is difficult to see how Italy can achieve preeminence in a world whose organization is based upon industry and machinery.

One great asset that the Italian people now do have, is national

discipline. They are constantly subjected to a social, political, economic, and intellectual discipline. The motto is "Nothing for the individual, all for Italy." "Fascism," wrote the philosopher Gentile, "means to take life seriously. Life is toil, effort, sacrifice, hard work; a life in which we know very well that there is neither matter nor time for amusement. Before us there always stands an ideal to be realized, an ideal which gives us no respite. We have no time to lose. Even in our sleep we must give account of the talents entrusted to us." Yet, whether the assignment of a political function even to sleep is sufficient to overcome Italy's natural handicap in physical resources, remains to be seen.

THE QUESTION OF ALTO-ADIGE, THE FORMER SOUTH TYROL

Among the most difficult unsolved problems of the fascists is the satisfactory governance of the former South Tyrol. For strategic reasons the Peace Conference assigned to Italy not only that part of the South Tyrol which was inhabited by Italians and which was known as the Trentino, but also the portion which was inhabited almost exclusively by 250,000 Germans. At the time of transfer, one of Italy's delegates to the conference, Signor Tittoni, made a speech in the Italian Chamber in which he assured the new subjects that "their language and cultural institutions would be respected, and their administrative officials enjoy all the privileges of our liberal and democratic legislation." This promise was only partly kept between 1919 and 1922. When the fascists came into power, it was completely disregarded. Fascist policy toward the German minority was summed up in Mussolini's words: "We shall make them Italians."

The process of Italianization was interesting and vigorous. The area was placed under the administration of a prefect appointed from Rome. Italian was made the official language of the courts and of all public services including railways, banks, and water, gas, and electric works. Only Italian-speaking citizens may serve on juries, and all laws and decrees are published in Italian exclusively, although there still are natives who neither read nor understand Italian. Most of the former officials were dismissed and replaced by non-German-speaking **Italians. All inscriptions, signs, placards, catalogues, time-**

tables, menus, etc. must be in Italian. Wherever villages, towns, rivers, mountains, or valleys had German names, these were Italianized, to the discomfiture of both natives and tourists. All maps, guide-books, picture-postcards, and advertisements must bear the new Italian designations, many of which are highly unapt. The old German names may not even appear in parentheses after the new ones.

The name "Tyrol" was abolished and the area renamed Alto-Adige. The use of the words "Tyrol" or "Tyrolese" was made subject to severe penalties. All German newspapers were suppressed, with the exception of one, and that is edited by an Italian as a fascist propaganda sheet. The numerous local touring and alpine clubs were abolished and their property handed over to the single *Club Alpino Italiano*. The leading German bank was dissolved and replaced by an Italian Land Credit Bank. Efforts were made to settle Italians in the German districts. The inhabitants were forced to donate money for the building of monuments to Italian heroes, while the statues of such German heroes as Walther von der Vogelweide and Andreas Hofer were defaced or torn down.

Between 1923 and 1926 all German schools were closed. Early in 1928 German was forbidden even during the periods in religious instruction, but later in the year this prohibition was rescinded. The singing of songs in German, the giving of private instruction in German, and the expression of anti-fascist views, all were forbidden. Oddly enough, although any Italian citizen throughout the remainder of the kingdom might learn German, the inhabitants of the German South Tyrol were deprived of this right.

Most objectionable to the Tyrolese was a decree of January 10, 1926, which ordered the "re-Italianization" of all family names that, in the opinion of the fascist authorities, "had been translated into other languages or defaced by a foreign orthography or the addition of foreign terminations." Likewise, "names of topical origin, derived from places whose names have been translated into other languages, or disguised by a foreign orthography, will resume their Italian forms." All citizens were ordered to watch the files of the *Official Gazette* to see what their names were henceforth to be. Adherence to German forms of officially

Italianized names was made punishable by heavy monetary fines. Many of the Tyrolese, whose ancestors had settled in the land thirteen hundred years previously, were provided with names which they frequently found it difficult to pronounce.

Such measures led to repeated protests from both Germany and Austria. The publication of the decree which forbade the use of German during religious instruction elicited a particularly strong complaint from Chancellor Monsignor Seipel of Austria. Mussolini became aroused over these repeated "interferences," and on March 3, 1928, made a belligerent speech, saying: "The next time I shall make acts do the speaking. . . . A self-respecting state does not tolerate such interference." He dismissed with a sneer the suggestion that the matter be referred to the League of Nations for settlement. Austria became frightened at the tenor of Mussolini's speech and Seipel hastened to explain that he was concerned merely with the cultural aspects of the situation and had no intention of interfering in Italy's domestic affairs.

In 1930 Italy and Austria signed a treaty of conciliation and arbitration, and this was taken to mean that Austria had given up, at least temporarily, the championship of the Tyrolese. But the Tyrolese themselves, a quarter-million hardy peasants and mountaineers, have vowed, in one of their secretly circulated songs, never to rest "until upon the mountains once more the sun of freedom glows, and we are again Tyrolers, in the free German South!"

THE LATERAN ACCORD

In 1870 Napoleon III of France ordered the withdrawal from Rome, the sole remaining temporal domain of the pope, of the French troops which had been stationed there to protect the Holy See against Italian territorial encroachments. When the French were gone, an Italian army was despatched to capture the Eternal City. Pius IX made a show of resistance, but soon ordered the gates thrown open to the attackers. Thus Rome became the capital of Italy, and thus was created the "Roman Question" which for fifty-nine years remained a disturbing factor in Italian national life.

Pope Pius considered himself a victim of unjust force and

denounced the government of Italy. In order to appease His Holiness, the Italian Parliament passed the Law of Papal Guarantees (1871). This act guaranteed to the pope and his successors perpetual possession of St. Peter's, the Vatican and Lateran Palaces, and the Villa of Castel Gandolfo. The popes were granted sovereign rights within these possessions, were recognized as personally inviolable and as having the right to send and receive ambassadors, were accorded free use of the Italian railway, telegraph, and postal systems, and were promised an annual pension of approximately \$645,000.

Pope Pius IX ignored this statute. He would not recognize any unilateral arrangement devised, without negotiations, by the Italian Government, for if the *modus vivendi* between Church and State were merely a law passed by a parliament, it might at any time be abrogated by a succeeding parliament. Moreover, if the status of the pope could be fixed by Italian law, he would become an Italian subject and would be deprived of the prestige accruing from his traditional position as the non-national head of an international religion. The pope therefore retired to the Vatican, called himself "the prisoner of a usurping power," refused to recognize the Savoy dynasty, and directed Italian Catholics to abstain from active participation in the political life of the kingdom. The successors of Pius IX continued this policy, with the result that Italians who aspired to be both loyal Catholics and patriotic citizens were confronted with a serious "conflict of conscience." The controversy deprived the monarchy of the services of many able Catholics and simultaneously curtailed the influence of Catholicism in the shaping of governmental policies.

As time went on, the crisis became somewhat less acute. Intelligent Italians "did their duty by the state, and still called themselves Catholics." The state tried in a number of ways to show that it regarded the popes not as Italian subjects but as foreign sovereigns. Pius X, in 1905, authorized Catholics to participate in parliamentary elections. Yet the "Roman Question" remained, in the words of Mussolini, "a thorn in the flesh of the nation."

When the fascists came into control, they realized that so serious a conflict between Church and State, between religious

conviction and political duty, materially weakened the power of the nation. Religion, they felt, must be made to serve fascism, not to combat it. And Catholicism, because of its personally disciplining aspects, had special appeal for the fascists. The government therefore made some conciliatory moves. The crucifix was restored to classrooms. Religious instruction was made compulsory in the elementary schools. Chaplains were assigned to the army and the salaries of clergymen were raised.

At the same time Pope Pius X I, realizing that continued intransigence would be unwise and convinced that no help could be expected from other countries, was equally prepared to end the quarrel. However, he wanted the initial move to come from Italy, and he insisted that the proceedings be secret. By October, 1926, "unofficial" negotiations were under way. The compulsory absorption of the Catholic Boy Scouts into the Balilla in 1928 threatened for a time to put an end to the conversations, but the Church was mollified when it was stipulated that Catholic priests should give religious instruction to the Balilla units for one hour per week.

The negotiations came to a successful conclusion on February 11, 1929, after almost two and a half years of parleying. The final details were managed for Italy by Mussolini and for the papacy by the astute Cardinal Gasparri. Three documents in all, collectively known as the Lateran Accord, were signed. They comprised a political treaty, a concordat, and a financial agreement. Ratifications were exchanged at the Vatican on June 7.

The political treaty deals with the international status of the papacy. In it the pope regards the "Roman Question" as definitively and irrevocably "settled, and recognizes the kingdom of Italy under the house of Savoy. Italy, in turn, through the establishment of the City of the Vatican under the "complete ownership, exclusive and absolute power, and sovereign jurisdiction" of the Holy See, assures to the latter "absolute and visible independence" as well as "undisputed sovereignty in the field of international relations."

Vatican City has an area of 108.7 acres and a population in excess of 600 inhabitants, 100 of whom are Swiss. There can be "no other authority" in the City than that of the Holy See, with the exception that Italian police may be stationed up to

the foot of the steps leading to the Basilica in St. Peter's Square, which alone remains open to the public. The person of the Sovereign Pontiff is declared "sacred and inviolable," and his right to send and receive diplomatic representatives is recognized. "Italy guarantees always and in every case to allow free correspondence from all nations, including belligerents, to the Holy See and *vice versa*, and to permit free access of bishops from all parts of the world to the Apostolic See." The papacy declares its purpose to "remain extraneous to all temporal disputes between nations and to international congresses convoked for the settlement of such disputes unless the contending parties make a concordant appeal to its mission of peace." In consequence of this declaration, the territory of Vatican City is "in every case" to be considered neutral and inviolable.

The concordat defines the future relations between the papacy and Italy. Roman Catholicism is "the sole religion of the state." The selection of archbishops and bishops rests with the Holy See, but before a candidate is nominated his name must be communicated to the Italian Government "in order to be sure that the latter has no objection from a political standpoint against the nomination." The state still pays the clerical salaries, and bishops, before taking office, must swear loyalty to the state, the king, and the government. The Catholic Church may freely exercise spiritual power and jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, and the state "grants to ecclesiastics protection on the part of its authorities" whenever it shall be necessary in the carrying out of their ministry. In other words, the state will assist in the enforcing, among Catholics, of the canon law. The state also agrees to revise those chapters of its civil law which conflict with the canon law in matters of faith and morals. This has reference chiefly to the institutions of marriage and education.

Marriage is recognized by the state as a sacrament, and, provided certain formalities regarding banns and registration are observed, a religious ceremony is sufficient. A civil ceremony is alike optional for Catholics and non-Catholics. The question of divorce among Catholics is left to the Church. Religious instruction, formerly required only in elementary schools, is compulsory in secondary schools as well. It is to be taught by state-paid instructors who are priests or other clerics "approved

by ecclesiastical authority." However, the Church is not to interfere with the normal curricula or the school administration. The Catholic Action and other popular religious societies are recognized by the state on condition that they refrain from political activity and confine their efforts to "the teaching and practice of Catholic principles." Finally, the "Holy See takes occasion . . . to renew its prohibition to all the ecclesiastics and religious to enroll or take any part in any political party."

In the financial agreement Italy consented to pay immediately upon ratification of the Accord the sum of \$39,375,000, and in addition, \$52,500,000 in five per cent bonds. These moneys were accepted by the papacy "as a final settlement of its financial relations with Italy resulting from the events of 1870."

Thus was terminated a conflict which had lasted for two generations. Henceforth, according to Mussolini, "the citizen is a Catholic and the Catholic is a citizen." Or, as the pope remarked, "God has been restored to Italy and Italy has been restored to God." His Holiness soon emerged from the Vatican to bless the Italians, the royal family, and the world. On December 12, 1930, the Chamber of Deputies struck from the list of national holidays the anniversary of the taking of Rome in 1870 and substituted therefor the date of the signing of the Lateran Accord.

Some differences of opinion regarding the respective spheres of influence of Church and State caused a renewal of difficulties in 1931. On May 25 of that year, Pius XI issued an encyclical on labor. Proclaimed on the fortieth anniversary of the issuance by Pope Leo XIII of his encyclical on labor, *Return Novarum*, it was called *Quadragesimo Anno*. The encyclical deplored the fact that "the whole economic life has become hard, cruel, and relentless in a ghastly measure." The pope urged a "just" wage, advocated the attainment of some property by the workmen, and recommended that wage-earners be made "sharers in some sort in the ownership or the management or profits" of capitalistic enterprise. Communism was declared "detestable," and socialism and Catholicism were called incompatible. Pius lamented the "dreadful scourge" of unemployment and blamed it, in part, on the "extreme freedom of competition."

Lest this complaint against unrestricted competition be considered

an endorsement of the fascist system, however, the pope added: "It is to be feared that the new syndical and corporative institution possesses excessive bureaucratic and political character, and that, notwithstanding (certain general advantages), it risks serving particular political aims rather than contributing to the initiation of a better social order." Pius also protested, and this could apply only to Italy and Russia, that the "destruction of a variety of prosperous institutions that were originally linked with one another has caused society to consist virtually of only individuals and the State."

Such ideas were displeasing to the fascists. They maintained that the pope had no right to pass judgment on economic and social matters. Pius, on the other hand, held that the Church could not surrender its right to exert influence over the economic and social welfare of the family. An open break between Church and State soon threatened, for besides this difference of opinion there existed conflicting views regarding the education of Italian children and the activities of the Catholic societies. Before long, fascist students started destroying church property, trampling the pope's portrait, and attacking priests. On the ground that it was engaging in political activity, Mussolini, on May 30, 1931, closed all the clubs of the Catholic Action, and on the following day he dissolved all Catholic societies not directly connected with the Fascist Party.

Pius denied that the Action was dabbling in politics and accused the government of violating the Lateran Accord. In a special letter he denounced fascist claims regarding the education of youth, called "illicit" the fascist oath which "even little boys and girls are obliged to take, about executing orders without discussion" and deplored the setting up of a "true and real pagan worship of the State." He also complained that Italian children were being diverted from attendance at church service in favor of participation in military and athletic events. The fascists replied by reminding the pope that as sovereign of a foreign state he had no right to interfere in a purely domestic situation. Mussolini announced that "the child as soon as he is old enough to learn belongs to the State alone. No sharing is possible." He also charged that the Action was controlled by former members of the supposedly dissolved Catholic

People's Party, who were making secret preparations to overthrow fascism.

For a time it appeared as though the agreement of 1929 would be torn up, but both Mussolini and the pope adopted reasonable attitudes and a compromise was effected. Mutual expressions of goodwill were exchanged and in September, 1931, the Jesuit Father, Enrico Rosa, a militant anti-fascist, was removed from the editorship of the leading Catholic review in Italy, while at the same time Major Giovanni Giuriatti, the man who first accused the Catholic Action of spreading anti-fascist propaganda, "resigned" the secretary-generalship of the Fascist Party. In addition, the pope placed control of the fifteen hundred reopened Catholic Action clubs in the hands of the bishop of each diocese rather than in those of laymen, as had formerly been the case. The fascists agreed that in future their military and athletic programs would be arranged so as not to interfere with Sunday church services for the children. On February 11, 1932, Mussolini paid a personal visit to the pope. Thus, on the third anniversary of the signing of the Lateran Pact, the newest accord was "officially consecrated."

NATIONALISM AND POPULATION

The fascists, as has repeatedly been pointed out, are extreme nationalists. They are striving to revive the prestige of ancient Rome, and many of them glorify war as a symbol of national strength and virility. Fascist literature is replete with such expressions as "Three cheers for war!" "Long live war!" "The instinct of war is in human nature." "War is one of the most fruitful mystic manifestations." "Strife is the origin of all things." One of the leading "intransigent" publicists, Mario Carli, wrote: "The warlike spirit is the fundamental character of Italians; it is not a fascist invention nor a post-bellum attitude. Find me a single moment of history in which we have not fought — for whom and for what little matters." Mussolini himself, in an article on fascism in the *Encyclopaedia Italiana* declared: "Only war carries human energies to the highest level and puts the seal of nobility upon peoples who have the courage to undertake it."

Although there now appears to be less official sword-rattling

than was evident in the early years of fascist rise to power, the visitor to Italy still is struck by the military atmosphere which pervades every phase of national and local activity. In 1932 the kingdom boasted the fourth largest air fleet in the world and the fifth highest armament expenditure list. A nation which thus glorifies combat and which is desirous of expanding territorially as the old Roman Empire expanded, naturally requires a large population.

The population of Italy in 1927 was estimated at slightly less than 41,000,000. In a speech of that year before parliament, Mussolini was reported as saying: "If Italy wants to count for something, she must appear on the threshold of the second half of the century with a population of not less than 60,000,000 inhabitants. If we fall off, gentlemen, we cannot make an empire, we shall become a colony." In November, 1928, he wrote: "In disciplined, enriched, cultivated Italy there is room for 10,000,000 more men. 60,000,000 Italians would make their weight felt in the history of the world."

Acting on the theory that "without quantity there can be no quality," the Fascist Government strictly prohibited the giving of contraceptive information, further restricted emigration, and placed a tax upon bachelors. On the other side, every conceivable form of propaganda was utilized to encourage marriage and large families. The legal age for marriage was fixed at sixteen for boys and fourteen for girls, and in 1932 newly-weds were offered trips to Rome on the state railways at a fare reduction of eighty per cent. By 1932 the estimated population had risen to over 42,200,000.

The combination of extreme nationalism and a constantly increasing population pressure in a country with limited resources is likely to become a disturbing factor in international politics. With an area of only 120,000 square miles, Italy's density of population is almost 350 to the square mile, and every addition to the population increases the danger of lower standards of living and widespread misery. The kingdom's African colonies offer few attractions to immigrants, and even so large a reclaimed area as the Pontine Marshes between Rome and Naples is expected to accommodate only 100,000 persons. Despite the heroic and intelligent methods employed by the government to

increase the country's food-supplying potentialities, the problem of feeding Italy has become intensified during recent years. The only solution would appear to lie in territorial expansion — imperialism. That the fascists realize this, would seem evident from their numerous allusions to the need for more room. Their feeling is that "Italian nationals must work in Italian territories for the wealth and power of Italy," and that "demographic, economic, and political reasons justify Italy's desire for expansion."

Philosophically, too, the fascists justify imperialism. To quote Mussolini again: "In the fascist doctrine, empire is not only a territorial, a military, or a mercantile expression, but a spiritual or moral one. . . . Fascism regards the tendency to empire — that is to say, the expansion of nations — as a manifestation of vitality. . . ." This spirit at times has made the conduct of Italian foreign affairs a difficult matter.

FASCIST FOREIGN RELATIONS

In the field of external relations the Fascist Government succeeded to a large measure in making amends for the "weaknesses" displayed by the pre-fascist ministries. Mussolini adopted a bold, sometimes bellicose, front and inspired Italy with great confidence in her position as a world power. Simultaneously enormous emphasis was placed upon military, naval, and aerial armaments.

Perhaps the most difficult and threatening of Italy's foreign relations have been those with France. Mussolini, during the early post-war years, did not like to see thousands of Italians flocking to France in search of employment. He was all the more vexed when it appeared that France encouraged the immigrants to become naturalized. France also seemed for a time to be especially hospitable to Italian emigres who had left Italy through dislike for, or fear of, fascism. There is a distinct feeling among Italians, moreover, that Corsica, Savoy, Nice, and Tunis, all in the possession of France, ought to be "restored" to Italy. The fascists place chief blame on the French for the disregard of Italy's "legitimate" claims at the Peace Conference and the failure of the kingdom to secure any mandated territory. Both countries have been competing for control of the western Mediter-

anean and for superiority in naval armaments. In addition, Franco-Italian relations have several times become impaired because of quarrels between Italy and France's allies, especially Yugoslavia. In 1931 a high Italian official characterized the Little Entente as "a military alliance under a French general." Extensive military preparations have been made on both sides of the Franco-Italian border.

France is not the only country which has territories coveted by Italy. On one occasion Mussolini referred to the British island of Malta as part of "Unredeemed Italy," and the Swiss Government has been more than a little annoyed by the persistency with which the fascists have been clamoring for the "restoration" of the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino. In the spring of 1928 England, France, and Spain invited Italy to share in the international government of the Free City of Tangier on the west coast of Morocco.

Mussolini once remarked: "On the west there are national states which have taken definite form and to which we can send nothing except our labor — though even our export of that may be prohibited or restricted any day." Hence strenuous efforts were made to consolidate Italian power in eastern Europe. In 1923, as has been discussed, Rome was confirmed in the possession of the Dodecanese Islands. In the same year the fascists, on a flimsy pretext, tried to take the island of Corfu from Greece. Fiume was definitely acquired in 1924. Treaties of friendship, neutrality, and commerce were signed with a number of the central and eastern European states.¹

In July, 1925, Italy signed a commercial agreement with Yugoslavia whereby the citizens of the latter secured some commercial rights in Italy, Italians were permitted to hold land in certain parts of Yugoslavia, and Italian firms in Yugoslavia were allowed to import Italian labor. There was so much opposition in Yugoslavia to this potential Italian "encroachment," that ratification of the treaty was not secured until 1928. Part of this opposition was due to the development of a serious Southslavic irridentist movement whose goal was the acquisition of a large part of Dalmatia from Italy. The agitation was accompanied by a number of murders and other outrages, and relations be-

¹ See pp. 193 and 329.

tween the two powers continued under high tension. The Italo-Yugoslav quarrel, which in essence was a struggle for the control of the Adriatic, was further intensified by the establishment of an Italian protectorate over Albania.¹

In the years 1931 and 1932 Italy consolidated her post-war orientation of friendships. While drawing further and further from France, Poland, and the Little Entente, she became increasingly friendly towards England, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, and the United States.² On the ninth anniversary of the March on Rome (October, 1931), Mussolini, before a crowd of 100,000, advocated (1) revision of the peace treaties, both in the interests of the former Central Powers and of Italy; (2) a final readjustment of reparation and Inter-Allied war debts; (3) the reaching of a Danubian accord to improve the economic situation of central and eastern Europe; and (4) immediate progress toward disarmament. Six months later the Fascist Grand Council issued an appeal covering the same points.

In May, 1932, Foreign Minister Grandi specifically proclaimed the urgency of a territorial redistribution in North Africa. "If," he said, "at the close of the war, Italy's allies neglected her in the distribution of mandates, Italy must now labor all the harder to make known the real and beneficial forces that she can exert in the colonial field in the interests of civilization." Within two months after this statement, Mussolini himself once more took over the portfolio of foreign affairs. His purpose apparently was to give still more vigor to Italian foreign policies.

ITALY AND ALBANIA

One of the results of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 was the emergence of a new state: Albania. A German prince, William of Wied, was selected to be *emperor* of Albania. William proved himself incapable of governing the mountainous state with its unruly inhabitants, and when the World War broke out, fled to Germany. During the war Albania was officially neutral, but the Austrians, Italians, and Serbians used it as a common

¹ See next section. A five-year treaty of friendship and neutrality, signed in 1924 between Italy and Yugoslavia, was not renewed when it expired in 1929.

² In 1931 Foreign Minister Dino Grandi visited the United States, and in 1932 Italy joined in the Washington Bicentennial Celebration. In 1932 also, a loan of \$15,000,000 was made to Turkey for an industrial three-year plan.

battleground. At the Peace Conference the Italians sought an Albanian mandate, but Wilson objected and told the natives to form a government of their own.

In January, 1920, a shaky provisional government was established, which concentrated its efforts upon ousting the foreign soldiers who still occupied the country. By the fall of 1920 the Italians withdrew, and in December, 1920, Albania became a member of the League of Nations. In 1921 the Council of Ambassadors drew temporary boundary lines for Albania. These were revised by an International Commission in 1925 and finally confirmed at their present location through several international conventions of 1926. The area of Albania is approximately 17,400 square miles, and the estimated population in 1932 was over 1,000,000.

The provisional government led a precarious existence, but out of the general chaos emerged the conspicuous figure of a young Moslem prince, Ahmed Zogu by name. In 1922 Zogu became premier of Albania, retaining this position until June, 1924, when he was ousted by Bishop Fan S. Noli and forced to flee the country. Noli, who had studied at Harvard University and was head of the autocephalous Albanian Orthodox Church, was unable to achieve order, and paved the way for his own downfall before the end of the year. In December, 1924, Zogu returned and Noli fled to Italy. On January 22, 1925, Albania was declared a republic and Zogu was chosen president for seven years by an indirectly elected national assembly.

Zogu now attempted to consolidate his power, but soon found himself obliged to turn to Italy for financial assistance. In 1925 Italian initiative established the Albanian National Bank. Not long thereafter Italy loaned the new republic about ten million dollars, guaranteed by Albania's custom receipts. Other transactions followed and Italy soon stood in a fair way to dominate Albania and thus, incidentally, control the Straits of Otranto. Jugoslavia, of course, was vehemently opposed to any such scheme which would endanger her freedom of access to the Mediterranean Sea. Precisely such a factor, it will be remembered, had constituted one of the grievances of the old Serbai against the Dual Monarchy.

In the period 1926-1927 a number of internal improvements

were prosecuted in Albania with Italian funds and under the supervision of an Italian organization known as "Svea," while Italian officers reorganized the Albanian army. Faced by another serious rebellion in 1926, Zogu once more turned to Italy for aid. This, Mussolini was ready to give — for a price. On November 27, 1926, there was signed between the two countries the Treaty of Tirana. By its terms "Italy and Albania recognize that any disturbance directed against the political, juridical, and territorial status quo of Albania is opposed to their reciprocal political interest." To safeguard this interest the parties "undertake to give their mutual support and collaboration.^ They "likewise undertake not to conclude with other powers political or military agreements prejudicial to the interest of the other party." An accompanying letter gave Italy the right to intervene in the external or internal relations of Albania, whenever the latter so requested.

Thoroughly alarmed at this turn of events, Yugoslavia took advantage of a frontier incident to make certain military preparations. In June, 1927, when an employee of the Yugoslav legation at Durazzo was arrested for espionage, diplomatic relations with Albania were severed. Italy championed the cause of Albania and war seemed imminent. Upon the representations of several neutral powers the matter was adjusted without recourse to arms, but Yugoslavia now eagerly turned to France for an alliance. This was consummated on November 11. Thereupon, on November 22, Italy and Albania signed a twenty-year defensive military pact.

On September 1, 1928, Zogu had himself proclaimed King of the Albanians, as Zog I. In the following year an Italian company secured an important oil concession from the new king and in 1930 an arrangement was concluded whereby an Italian bank was to assume supervision of Albania's coinage system. The Treaty of Tirana, which was to have expired in November, 1931, was renewed.

The little kingdom has remained a potential cause of trouble between Italy and Yugoslavia, especially since Zog has several times hinted that plots against him were being hatched on Yugoslav soil. In February, 1931, while in Vienna to consult physicians, Zog narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of

two of his political antagonists. In September, 1932, thirty-five Albanians, most of them intellectuals, were convicted of conspiracy against the king and a treasonable attempt to establish a republic. Despite repeated denials from Belgrade, Zog intimated that the deeds had been inspired from Yugoslavia. By virtue of the Italo-Albanian pacts, however, continued Italian dominance was assured on both shores of the Adriatic.

CHAPTER XIV

SPAIN

HISTORICAL FACTORS

Maps show Spain as a united country from the time of the fall of Granada (1492), by which date there had been completed the reconquest, by many local Christian kings, of the territories captured by the Moors between 711 and 718. Actually, however, the Spaniards, having little or no unity of language, thought, or traditions, were not at all a homogeneous people. The marriage in 1469 of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, which foreshadowed the union of the two largest kingdoms in Spain, was vigorously opposed by some of the contemporary statesmen because of the great differences which existed between the two peoples. A proud provincialism was the outgrowth of an unusually obstructive geography and centuries of isolated frontier existence occasioned by the struggles against the Moors. At times, foreign invasions, such as that of Napoleon early in the nineteenth century, have brought to the fore a militant embryonic nationalism, but ordinarily "the local legend is still the center and source of spiritual life." Patriotism in Spain still seems to be "a local thing that reflects the geographical division of the country."

The two most practical elements in the population of early modern Spain were the Jews and the Moriscos.¹ The former, who frequently served as the kings' tax collectors, were active in commerce and trading, and knew how to invest their capital in the most productive enterprises. The Moriscos, with the experience gained from their ancestors' North African sojourn, were skilled in the arts of irrigation and reclamation, and did much to improve the livestock and extend the cultivation of cotton. The forcible expulsion of these peoples — the Jews in

¹ The Moors who remained in Spain after the fall of Granada were known as Moriscos.

1492 and the Moriscos in 1609 — largely for religious reasons, left a population whose leaders, fond of adventure and display, were inclined to despise labor as dishonorable and undignified.

The very components of the population that in other countries became the middle class, in Spain, more often than not, viewed labor as being fit only for infidels and Jews. Those individuals, and there were some, who entered business despite this popular antipathy, were burdened with oppressive fiscal and social disabilities. Since monasteries and nobles were, ordinarily, exempt from taxation, and since more and more land, came into the possession of these privileged groups through royal favor or purchase, the levies on surviving trade and industry were necessarily heavy. Whereas rulers of other lands curried favor with the middle class, most of the Spanish sovereigns blocked its rise. The army and the church, both exceedingly conservative, were considered sufficient pillars of the monarchy. Not until the regime of Charles III (1759-1788), and then only for a short interval, did the bourgeoisie come into prominence.

The same short-sightedness was apparent in the colonial field. A desire to exploit the mineral rather than the agricultural wealth of the land influenced the Spaniards in America as it had at home. Precious metals, not grain; mountains, not fertile valleys; monasteries, not trading posts, were their prime interests in the new world. The few colonials who did prefer the occupations of farming and cattle-raising were hampered and restricted by a host of mercantilist regulations.

Thus even during the years of her greatest apparent glory, Spain contained within herself the causes of decline. Supported in the sixteenth century chiefly by the efforts of a few energetic rulers and by the influx of unearned silver and gold from the Americas, Spain's brilliance could not last in the succeeding centuries because the authorities failed to adapt their economic outlook to the changing economic conditions of the world. The flow of precious metals, instead of being turned into channels of permanent advantage, into commercial and industrial investments, was dissipated in extravagant pageants and expensive foreign and religious policies.

The list of specific corroding influences upon Spanish development from 1500 to 1900 is a long one. Heavy military losses,

the emigration of large numbers of colonial adventurers, the eagerness with which young men and women flocked to the unduly large number of monasteries and convents, the popular hostility towards foreign settlers even when these were officially encouraged to come to Spain (under Charles III), the relative poverty in mineral wealth, and the high percentage of illiteracy, all tended to weaken the monarchy economically and socially. The influence of the Catholic Church was especially obstructive, from an economic standpoint, because of its firm support of the political and social status quo.

During these centuries, too, the government discriminated against agriculture in favor of sheep-raising. A powerful stock-raisers' corporation, the *Mesta*, organized in the medieval period, continued to exist until the middle of the nineteenth century. At its door must be laid much of the responsibility for a declining emphasis upon soil cultivation. The *Mesta* was granted the use of an extensive "royal sheepwalk," no part of which could be worked or enclosed by the people. In consequence, "starting from La Mancha and Extremadura in April, flocks of sheep annually ravaged Castile, returning in September to the places whence they had come."

Spain's economic life, then, for most of the period between the discovery of America and the Spanish-American War, was characterized by unrest, high prices, corruption, lack of financial equilibrium, gross inequalities in the tax system, governmental interference in trade, widespread particularism, and worn-out traditions of nobility. The military disaster suffered at the hands of the United States in 1898 was merely the unfortunate but logical outcome of an unhealthy past.

With this sketch of political, economic, and social difficulties in mind, it is readily understandable why the opening years of the twentieth century should have witnessed a sorry state of things in Spain. The decade and a half between the closing of the war of 1898 and the opening of the World War saw the national stage almost continually occupied by such phenomena as mob attacks on churches, convents, and police forces; general strikes; martial law; colonial uprisings; attempts at political assassination; the suspension of constitutional guarantees; and innumerable military intrigues. Not until the outbreak of the World

War was there a temporary cessation of these symptoms of instability — and then the question of what course to pursue during the struggle served anew to arouse discontent and dissension among the people.

SPAIN AND THE WAR

Although the choice of sympathies in 1914 was difficult for King Alfonso XIII, who had an Austrian mother and an English wife, the Spanish people readily fell into two distinct and opposing groups. Many of the intellectuals and, in general, persons who possessed liberal tendencies and anti-monarchical and anti-clerical views favored the Allied cause. The conservative elements, on the whole, sympathized with the Germans, as did some who were opposed to the French sway in Morocco and the French attitude towards the position of the Church in the State. Those patriots, too, were pro-German, who recalled with bitterness that England's foothold at Gibraltar was the result of a war, not a voluntary cession.

Under the circumstances, the safest decision for the country was to remain neutral, and in October, 1914, the *Cortes* (parliament) so voted. The wisdom of this policy soon became apparent when the belligerents began to send in huge orders for war materials. From 1915 to 1919 Spain enjoyed a gratifying excess of exports over imports, and whereas in 1913 there had been an unfavorable trade balance of \$50,000,000, in 1918 the favorable balance was more than \$60,000,000. After 1919, however, the adverse trade relationship was reestablished.

Although it would seem that the increased industrial and shipping activities should have resulted in comparative prosperity and domestic quiet within Spain, such was not the case. No less than seven ministries held office during the period of the war and ten more rose and fell within the next five years. Liberal, Conservative, and coalition cabinets alike failed of success or stability. This unrest was traceable to four major developments: (1) the discontent and growing radicalism of the laboring classes; (2) the existence of strong regionalist and separatist movements, especially in Catalonia; (3) an unwarranted amount of interference in governmental affairs by military juntas; and

(4) continued military disasters in rebellious Spanish Morocco. These factors must now be considered in detail.

DOMESTIC UNREST AND COLONIAL DEFEAT, 1917-1923

Although labor unrest was a general phenomenon throughout Spain, especially after 1916, it was most conspicuous in Catalonia, where economic difficulties and regionalist dissatisfaction combined to make the opposition to the government exceptionally serious.¹ In 1917 Catalonia, and particularly the manufacturing province of Barcelona, was the scene of costly strikes. On July 17 most of the Catalan members of the national Cortes defied the government and met in a special assembly in the city of Barcelona to demand reforms in administration and in the treatment of their section of the country. They charged that Barcelona's growing industries were burdened with crushing taxes and that the revenue derived from this impost was either squandered in Madrid or spent on public improvements in other provinces.

The meeting of the Catalan deputies was followed by a general strike in Barcelona and the authorities eventually were forced to use machine guns in the restoration of order. Further attempts were made to allay the discontent by promising greater governmental decentralization, the popular election of senators, and the abandonment of the government's arbitrary power to suspend the constitutional guarantees and prorogue the Cortes. These concessions, however, came too late. With the end of the war the unrest increased, and the wave of democracy which temporarily swept the Continent encouraged the people to demand additional reforms. Critical events followed one another in rapid succession.

In December, 1918, a Catalan parliamentary delegation issued a manifesto demanding the creation of "an autonomous Catalan state" with its own cortes, a responsible executive, and its own judiciary. The Catalan language should become "the only official one" and the region should be united "with the other Spanish peoples in a federal union exclusively for foreign affairs, the army and navy, coinage, weights and measures, trade, cus-

¹ Catalonia consists of four provinces in northeastern Spain, including the large industrial center of Barcelona. The natives speak Catalan.

toms, general communications, etc." The regionalists hoped to present this manifesto to President Wilson at the Peace Conference, but the fear of the government's military forces and the strenuous opposition of public opinion in the remainder of the kingdom prevented the taking of such a step. A group of separatists, on the other hand, vigorously declared its determination to win nothing short of absolute independence.

Hardly had the excitement caused by the manifesto died down when, early in 1919, another general strike, provoked in part by socialist and syndicalist propaganda, broke out in Barcelona. All constitutional guarantees were thereupon suspended, and to make matters worse, the civil and military authorities clashed over means to end the strike. Bloody street fighting occurred between the strikers, strike-breakers, police, and soldiery, and similar tragedies were enacted in other parts of the realm. In November, 1919, the Spanish Employers' Association threatened to institute a nation-wide lockout unless the government exercised moderation in its treatment of both employers and workmen. 1920 proved to be a veritable year of terror, and in March, 1921, the premier, while engaged in the task of reconciling several parliamentary elements, was assassinated.

The stability of the ministries, constantly endangered by the labor and regionalist crises, was further jeopardized by the activities of numerous military juntas. These councils, made up of army officers, criticized governmental policies, attempted to interfere with the civil administration, and pursued obstructionist tactics with regard to the Moroccan situation. So offensive did their meddling become that Premier Maura, in January, 1922, attempted to dissolve them by governmental decree. To this, however, the king objected, and so another ministry fell.¹

During these years, too, the army was fighting a losing war against the rebellious Riff tribes in Spanish Morocco. And the more the troops were beaten, the heavier were the taxes imposed upon the people at home and the more oppressive became the weight of military service, censorship, and personal restrictions. A dramatic climax in the situation was reached in 1922 when General Damaso Berenguer, former High Commissioner of Mo-

¹ In November, 1922, the juntas were disbanded.

rocco, published startling charges against the government and demanded a trial of his own conduct as one phase of a thorough investigation into the colonial fiasco. The general accused the ministerial administrations of gross inefficiencies, lack of foresight, and criminal neglect.

Berenguer's complaints, added to the realization of the people that the Moroccan war already had cost thousands of lives and millions of pesetas, stirred passions to white heat. The disgraceful affair at Annual (July, 1921), in which a few thousand Riffs under Abd-el-Krim routed a superior Spanish army, killing about 12,000 men and capturing 1000, and after which the Spanish commander, General Silvestre, committed suicide, precipitated a crisis. A parliamentary Committee of Twenty-One, under the chairmanship of General Picasso, was appointed to investigate the government's conduct of empire.

While 100,000 soldiers slowly continued the campaign against the rebels, the Picasso committee held sessions and examined evidence in both Spain and Morocco. A report was completed in the summer of 1922 and submitted to the Council of Ministers. So significant were the contents of the document that it was immediately suppressed.

Though the exact charges and recommendations were not revealed, the report was believed to implicate a large group of the highest officials and even the king himself. It appears that the death penalty was suggested for a number of the generals who had been in Morocco and for some of the ministers who had remained at home. The king was censured for transmitting attack orders directly to General Silvestre rather than through the regular military channels of the War Office and the Moroccan High Command. It was rumored that the report advocated the abolition of the monarchy. Among the more specific counts were those of General Silvestre's drunkenness, of the presence of several officers at a party at Malaga on the Spanish mainland when they should have been in northern Africa, of the operation by a general of a store in Tetuan in which stolen army goods were sold, and of the circumstance that the soldiers at times were forced to purchase their own food with money borrowed at usurious rates from the officers.

When it became evident that the report was not only being

withheld from the public, but that its recommendations probably would be disregarded, protest meetings were held throughout the kingdom. The Cortes and the newspapers, moreover, now demanded the immediate and full disclosure of all accusations. In fear of a *coup d'etat* the government hastily dissolved the parliament and ordered new elections. The temper of the next national legislature, however, was quite the same as that of the old.

To add to the troubles of the authorities, there came another series of strikes and radical outbreaks. In Barcelona alone, the casualty list of the street fighting and reprisals for the year ending September, 1923, was 337 workmen and employers killed and 434 wounded. Regionalist agitation also increased and the news of the successful fascist *coup* in Italy added to the general excitement. It occasioned little surprise, therefore, when, on September 13, 1923, Captain-General Miguel Primo de Rivera, Military Governor of Barcelona, overthrew the national ministry, suspended the constitution, and set himself up as Military Dictator of Spain. To assist him in his dictatorship he appointed a directorate containing, besides himself, eight generals and an admiral. Though it was evident at the time that the *coup* was directed against the archaic political system of the land rather than against the monarchy, it was not known until some years later that the plan had actually been carried out with the knowledge and consent of King Alfonso. The latter had prudently extended a visit to France so as to arrive in Madrid shortly after the overturn, and then had asked the general to place himself at the head of a military directorate and introduce the necessary reforms.

DICTATORSHIP, 1923-1930

Primo de Rivera, the Marquess de Estella, was born at Cadiz in 1870. During the Spanish-American War he served with the troops in Cuba and the Philippines, and from 1909 to 1913 he fought in Morocco. In the period 1915-1923 he was military governor, successively, of Cadiz, Madrid, and Barcelona. A sincere patriot and a kindly man, he had several times come into conflict with higher authorities because of protests against what he considered the needless "butchery" of soldiers in Morocco.

Once, in fact, he had advocated the evacuation of northern Africa — possibly in exchange for Gibraltar.

Upon assuming dictatorial control Rivera immediately ordered the dissolution of the newly convened Cortes, seized most of the important documents dealing with the Moroccan scandal, established a rigid censorship of press and speech, abolished trial by jury, put an end to some of the remaining vestiges of local self-government, borrowed \$70,000,000 by the issue of treasury bonds, and adopted the slogan "Country, Monarchy, Religion!" His solicitude for religion at once secured for him the friendship of the powerful Catholic Church.

The marquess soon discovered how difficult it is to set up a government which is at the same time strong and satisfactory to a discontented people. Popular hostility to the dictatorship, and, indeed, to the monarchy, was increased by such incidents as the dismissal of provincial legislatures, the unending Moroccan troubles, the levying of heavy fines for slight misdeeds, and the exile of several popular republicans, notably the distinguished philosopher, Miguel de Unamuno. The extreme censorship, moreover, antagonized the leading intellectuals, many of whom began to devote their oratorical and literary abilities to fighting the regime. Early in 1925, for example, thousands of copies of an anti-monarchical pamphlet from the pen of the famous novelist, Blasco Ibanez, were dropped over Spanish towns from airplanes.

Beginning in 1925, however, General de Rivera inaugurated policies calculated to win for the dictatorship the support of public opinion. Martial law, which had been in force since the time of the *coup*, was abolished in May, 1925. Three months later generous annual subsidies were granted to the shipping and ship-building industries. On December 3 the military directorate was replaced by a civil cabinet, all the members of which belonged to the *Unión Patriótica*, a new nationalist party which had been founded under Rivera's auspices. The good-will of the business interests was sought through such means as the creation (1927) of a National Regulating Committee of Industrial Production which alone could sanction the establishment of new, or the extension or transformation of old, industries; the injunction (1927) upon Spanish coal consumers to obtain from forty

to sixty per cent of their fuel needs from the domestic supply; the passage of measures to aid commercial aviation; and the formation (1928) of a state Department of National Economy.

Efforts also were made to settle labor disputes by arbitration, to break up some of the large landed estates, and to expand the national educational facilities. To please the Catalans a high protective tariff was raised. The support of a section of the working class was gained by the appointment to public service positions of some of the leaders of the National Labor Confederation. As a concession to constitutionalism there was convoked a National Advisory Assembly (September, 1927) to sit in place of the Cortes that had been dissolved four years earlier. The assembly, whose four hundred members were all nominated, directly or indirectly, by the government, was given only consultative powers, but in 1928 it was directed to draft a new constitution to replace the one of 1876 which, though suspended, was still valid.

The backing of nationalists was sought by a vigorous foreign policy. In August, 1926, Spain and Italy signed a treaty of friendship in which each side promised to maintain a benevolent neutrality if the other were attacked by a third party (presumably France). One month later Spain served notice of her intention to withdraw from the League of Nations because her demand for a permanent seat in the Council had been refused.¹ Finally, although this was due chiefly to a tactical blunder on the part of Abd-el-Krim, the Moroccan situation was brought under control.

In order to make good his claim to the title of Sultan of Morocco, and incidentally to secure revenge upon the French for their attempted interference with the free movement of his grain supply, Abd-el-Krim committed the fatal mistake of attacking the French as well as the Spaniards. With their superior equipment, organization, command, and resources, and reenforced by a Spanish army, the French found little difficulty in bringing the colonial conflict to a successful close. On May 28, 1926, Abd surrendered, and within another year Rivera could announce the complete "pacification" of Morocco. By that time the

¹ See p. 412. In 1928, just before the required two-year notice of withdrawal took effect, Spain notified the League of her decision to retain her membership.

conflict had cost Spain some \$800,000,000 and an average of over 13,000 lives per year for the decade 1917-1927.

Despite these accomplishments of the government, indications of popular discontent were not lacking. In 1926 there was a mutiny in the artillery corps because men were being promoted through influence rather than by seniority and merit. A plot, in the same year, to set up an independent Catalonia was frustrated mainly by the alertness of the French police, who arrested several Catalan separatist leaders across the border. In 1928 a plot was unearthed in Barcelona to overthrow Rivera, and January, 1929, witnessed a serious outbreak in the artillery corps at Ciudad Real. The mutineers objected to the unfair methods of advancement and demanded the abolition of the dictatorship. As punishment for the revolt the corps was provisionally dissolved and the artillery schools were closed. Six weeks later thousands of university students struck because of the severe censorship and the alleged bad treatment of the engineering classes at Madrid. Matters were only made worse by the closing of the university and the dismissal of a number of professors, and soon it was deemed necessary temporarily to shut the doors of all higher schools in Madrid, Salamanca, Valladolid, and other cities. During these years, moreover, frequent attempts were made to assassinate both the king and the dictator. Through all these manifestations there ran an undercurrent of republicanism which slowly but steadily was gaining in intensity.

On January 28, 1930, after more than six years of difficult rule, Primo de Rivera resigned his powers as suddenly as he had assumed them. Ill health, disagreements with the king, constant disorders, a renewed uprising of several thousand university students because of alleged favoritism shown Catholic institutions, and the refusal of the seventeen recently appointed captains-general to express their further confidence in him, had induced the marquess to give up his office. In a farewell communique he listed among his achievements the pacification of Morocco, the wiping out of terrorism and secessionism, the restoration of national prosperity and prestige, and the calling of a constituent assembly. His opponents, however, emphasized the prolonged disregard of constitutionalism, the failure to end corruption in public life, the financial and economic depression,

and the poor repute into which Spain had fallen in the eyes of the world.¹

Upon his retirement Rivera was succeeded by General Berenguer, the same who in 1922 had demanded the Moroccan investigation. Faithful and loyal to the king, but lacking in qualities of leadership, Berenguer was destined to head an unfortunate administration. Though he inaugurated his regime by easing the censorship and adopting a conciliatory attitude towards the demands of the students, he was unable, in the face of the world depression, to introduce prosperity, provide employment for all laborers, and dispense bread to all who needed it. Even before he had time to outline his plans there were renewed student riots, strikes in Barcelona, Madrid, Sagunta, and other cities, and complaints against the activities or inactivities of several municipal and local administrations. Weary of the hardships and distress attendant upon Spanish rule, moreover, a group of Catalans began to agitate more strenuously than ever for "Catalonianism, Liberalism, Democracy, and Republicanism!"

The king and his ministerial council tried desperately in 1930 to regain the confidence of the people. The National Advisory Assembly was dismissed, but new parliamentary elections were promised for 1931. To aid the farmers, a decree was issued suspending the further importation of wheat. Tariff rates on manufactured products were boosted. Alfonso avowed that future promotions in the army should be determined by seniority and merit alone. Some of the fines "unlawfully" collected by the Rivera Government were returned. Concessions were made to the freedom of speech and meeting, and the police, unless they could secure warrants, were forbidden to search homes.

But all this was in vain. The increased freedom of discussion only showed how widespread the idea of republicanism had become. The people no longer wanted royal favors; they demanded royalty's abdication. In September, 1930, a mass meeting of 20,000 persons in the Madrid bull ring cheered wildly for a republic, and a month later the students at the University of Barcelona publicly shouted "Down with the King!" December brought another military outbreak, a mutiny in the aviation

¹ General de Rivera died in Paris less than a month after his resignation. His body was taken back to Spain and given an impressive state funeral.

corps, and a premature republican revolt led by Niceto Alcalá Zamora, the son of a poor southern landowner. By the end of the year, 10,000 opponents of the monarchy were in prison.¹

Perhaps a word should be said at this point of the character of Alfonso XIII. Courageous, an expert all-round sportsman, clever in repartee, this descendant of Bourbons and Habsburgs is a most imperious person. He loves to exercise autocratic power. The "sterility of parliament and the littleness of politicians" are objects of scorn in his eyes. Above all, he professes to be a Spanish patriot, having intimated on one occasion that the all-important question was of Spain, not of monarchy or republic. He long stayed on as ruler under conditions which might well have induced a weaker man to abdicate and flee.

By 1930 the continued existence of the monarchy obviously rested upon three factors of uncertain strength: the loyalty of the bulk of the army (there was a general for every three hundred men), the support of the rich landowners and the Church, and the dissension within the ranks of the opposition (twenty-two republican parties had been organized). Opposed to any further prolongation of the old regime were the regionalists and separatists, who disliked the centralization of control in Madrid; the socialists and "New Industrialists," who longed for a changed social and economic order commensurate with the needs of the twentieth century; the intellectuals, who preached against the influence of the Church and the medieval state of Spain's spiritual life; and the republicans, who hated the power of the military and the unconstitutional conduct of the royalists. The year 1931 was destined to witness a decisive conflict between the contrary-minded groups.

THE SPANISH REPUBLIC

In February, 1931, Premier Berenguer restored the constitution which his predecessor had suspended in 1923 and decreed the holding of parliamentary elections. Contrary to the general's expectations, the people greeted this news with anger. Nearly

¹ The support given by Alfonso to an expensive building project known as University City further infuriated republicans, anti-clericals, and socialists, who saw in the construction of a new great Catholic institution of learning a blow at the centers that had been established by "liberal intellectuals."

all the anti-government groups announced that they would refuse to vote in any election save one for a constituent assembly. They had no desire to participate in a resurrection of the outworn document of 1876. Berenguer thereupon resigned, just one year after assuming power, and was succeeded by Admiral Juan Aznar, another loyal monarchist. Orders now were issued for municipal and provincial elections in April, 1931, following which there was to be a national election for a constituent cortes that would draft a new, albeit a monarchical, constitution.

To the dismay of the authorities the municipal elections of April 12 resulted in a republican landslide. Admiral Aznar consequently resigned (April 13) and Niceto Alcala Zamora, on behalf of a republican junta, threatened armed revolution unless the king abdicated. On the fourteenth, Alfonso took ship at Cartagena and fled to France. He did not formally abdicate, but merely "suspended the exercise of royal power" and left the country in order to permit his people freely to decide whether they preferred a monarchy or a republic. Zamora, however, immediately proclaimed a republic with himself as provisional president and with executive authority vested in a previously selected coalition cabinet of moderate republicans and socialists.¹

The new government set June 28 as the date for constituent elections and pledged itself to bring about land and church reforms, personal liberty, and a fair degree of local autonomy. Although most of the political groups decided to await the results of the election before taking any further major step, the Provisional Government was kept busy for the first ten weeks of its existence putting down anti-republican movements and communist riots, pleading with the Catalan separatists not to impair the unity of the state, and passing urgent preliminary legislation. Many former royal officials were imprisoned, titles of nobility were abolished, and a red, yellow, and purple tri-color was adopted as the flag of the republic.²

¹ President Zamora earlier in his career had been a monarchist and three times had occupied ministerial posts in royal cabinets. During the Rivera dictatorship, however, he became converted to republicanism, and in December, 1930, as has been mentioned, he led a premature revolt against the king.

² Of the 4200 titles that were abolished, about 350 were those of *grandees*, that is, of persons who had enjoyed the picturesque privilege of appearing before the king without removing their hats.

Two other serious developments commanded the attention of the government prior to the elections. First, wild anti-clerical riots were precipitated when several church officials appealed to faithful Catholics to vote only for deputies who would defend their religion. Churches, monasteries, and convents were burned and looted, property worth millions of pesetas was destroyed, and the lives of members of religious orders, particularly of Jesuits, were endangered. The Zamora Government showed little sympathy with this program of direct action and eventually proclaimed martial law in an attempt to restore order as quickly as possible.

Secondly, a group of Catalans, chiefly radical workmen who feared that the prospective constituent assembly would be conservative or at best mildly liberal, and who regarded any Madrid government as obnoxious, declared an autonomous Catalan Generalidad, elected Colonel Francisco Macia president, and drew up a Statute of Autonomy which provided for virtual independence. It was obvious from the outset, therefore, that Spain's "Irish Question" would arise to disturb the domestic harmony of the republic as it had that of the monarchy. The action of Catalonia, moreover, encouraged other regions, especially the Basque Provinces and Galicia, to demand large measures of local autonomy or home rule.

On June 28, 1931, the people flocked to the polls in the first national election since 1923. The candidates for the office of deputy represented twenty-five parties, including all shades of political opinion from monarchism on the right to communism on the left. The result of the balloting once more proved to be an overwhelming defeat for monarchy and a triumph for moderate republicanism. The Socialist Party, with 117 seats, became the largest single group in the Constituent Cortes which assembled on July 14. The Radical Party, which favored consolidation of the republic and the achievement of liberal reforms, was second, with 93 deputies. The remainder of the 470 seats were divided among a dozen other groups. Although men only had been permitted to take part in the elections, two of the deputies were women. Most of the representatives were young men and only fourteen of them had had any previous parliamentary experience.

The Cortes voted to keep in power the provisional ministry

which Zamora had appointed and then proceeded to the consideration of a republican constitution. While the document was being pieced together, section by section, the cabinet devoted itself to the solution of the more immediate problems. Strenuous efforts were made to stabilize the peseta, effect administrative economies, and bring efficiency into the conduct of government. Half of the civil employees were dismissed, but the salaries of the remainder were increased by a fifth. It required all President Zamora's persuasiveness to induce the Catalan deputies to remain in the Cortes and consent that an agreement should first be reached on the central governmental powers and only later on the regional ones, for a plebiscite in Catalonia had resulted in an overwhelming endorsement of the Statute of Autonomy. Even so, it was necessary, in September, to despatch 10,000 soldiers to Barcelona to quell a combined radical-regionalist uprising.

Negotiations also had to be carried on with the Vatican concerning both the property damage done in the early days of the revolution and the future policies of the republic. Inasmuch as the entire non-Catholic population of Spain was less than 30,000, the relationship between government and papacy was of unusual importance. When the Cortes, in October, adopted resolutions to abolish a state religion, expel the Jesuits and confiscate their property, and prohibit members of religious orders from teaching or engaging in business, President Zamora resigned (October 14, 1931). His action was in protest against what he regarded as unnecessarily harsh terms.

The chief executive post thereupon was entrusted to Manuel Azaiia, a leader of the Radical Party and minister of war in the Zamora cabinet. As head of the War Office, Senor Azana had gained repute for his success in republicanizing the army and converting it from a political clique into a spirited fighting force. So confident was the assembly of his ability and integrity that he was invested with extraordinary powers for the suppression of disorder and violence.

On December 9 the Cortes finally proclaimed the new constitution. Based on the German, Russian, and Mexican models, it proved to be one of the most democratic instruments of its kind in existence. Spain is declared to be "a democratic republic of workers of all classes." Its government consists of a uni-

cameral legislature or Cortes made up of representatives elected for four years by equal, direct, secret suffrage of all citizens over twenty-three years of age without distinction of sex. The president of the republic is elected for a term of six years by an electoral college made up of the members of the Cortes and an equal number (470) of popularly chosen electors. Successive presidential terms are forbidden and no one may be a candidate for the highest office who is an active or reserve military officer, a clergyman, or a member of the reigning family of any country. The powers of the president are considerable but none of his acts is valid unless countersigned by a cabinet minister. The premier and cabinet officers, in whom are vested extensive powers, are directly responsible to the parliament. The latter, moreover, may be suspended only twice in any one year and dissolved only twice in any one presidential term.

In social and cultural matters the break with tradition is wide. There is no state church; complete religious freedom is established; marriages may be dissolved by mutual consent or on petition of either party upon due cause; education is secularized; civil liberties, except in times of national emergency, are guaranteed; and all the artistic and historical treasures of the land are placed under the guardianship of the state, which may prohibit their exportation or demand their expropriation. War is "renounced as an instrument of national policy" and the president, to whom is given the power to declare armed hostilities, may not exercise this function "except subject to the conditions prescribed in the pact of the League of Nations" and after the failure of all other possible means of non-belligerent defense.

With a view to making Spain a country of social justice and equal opportunities, all the wealth of the land is subordinated to the interests of national economy. The state may "participate in the development and coordination of industries and enterprises," nationalize public services, and socialize large estates. It is also permitted, upon making due compensation, to expropriate all types of property, regardless of ownership. Work is made a social obligation and the state is specifically enjoined to protect the laborer, the farmer, and the fisherman.

In the matter of local autonomy the constitution, to the disappointment of the home rule advocates, merely recognizes the

compatibility of autohomous regions with the integral character of the state. Any area desiring autonomy must submit to the national Cortes for its approval a regional charter, and the parliament may delegate to the local authorities the power to administer certain national laws.

By a special "temporary disposition" attached to the document, the Cortes was empowered to elect the republic's first constitutional president. This provision was fulfilled on December 10, and the assembly's choice fell on Niceto Zamora, who had earlier resigned the provisional presidency. Instead of dissolving itself now and ordaining new parliamentary elections, the Constituent Cortes determined to continue sitting as a regular parliament. The deputies feared that a general election might reflect a popular reaction to their policies and felt that the body which had drawn up the constitution should also be permitted to launch the legislative program which would convert its principles into practice.

One of the most spectacular acts of the national legislature was to declare Alfonso XIII guilty of high treason. All his property in Spain was confiscated and he was sentenced to "perpetual imprisonment" if ever again he set foot on Spanish soil. The royal parks were thrown open to the people and some of the palaces were converted into office or institutional buildings. In January, 1932, the Jesuit Order was dissolved and its corporate property, valued at \$30,000,000, seized by the state. A law of the following September ordered the distribution of this wealth for social-welfare purposes. Additional Jesuit possessions, of an estimated worth of \$70,000,000, could not be sequestered because they were held in the names of private persons. The individual Jesuits, of course, soon left the land. As if further to emphasize the new spirit prevailing in the republic, the Cortes held a session on Good Friday of 1932.

In an attempt to aid domestic industry, the tariff, already the highest in Europe, was raised still further, although numerous special commercial treaties were also negotiated. Because of its continuing deficits the *Compania Transatlantica* was dissolved and the Spanish transoceanic steamship service suspended. The Spanish Foreign Legion was disbanded and plans were inaugurated for the economic and political development of

Spanish Morocco. Despite the shortage of funds and the scarcity of capable lay teachers, 7500 new state schools were opened during 1931 and 1932. Considerable work remained to be done on this account, however, for national illiteracy in 1931 was estimated at more than forty-five per cent. Land reform proceeded slowly, but on September 9, 1932, the Cortes adopted a bill providing for the distribution in community farms of about 52,000,000 acres of land formerly held in large estates. Economic prosperity had not yet been introduced to the Spanish people by the end of 1932, and there was considerable criticism of the fact that, despite the hard times, the annual appropriation for the president's salary and entertainment expenses totaled \$180,000.

It was not to be expected that the various autonomist groups would be satisfied with the home rule concessions granted in the constitution. In April, 1932, a meeting of 100,000 Catalans demanded the immediate recognition by Madrid of the Statute of Autonomy as drawn up by their leaders. Like the Sinn Feiners, the Catalans also founded a society called "We Ourselves" (*Nosaltres Sols*) and suffered no lull in the turbulence of their demonstrations. From June to September the Cortes debated home rule measures, finally (September 8) recognizing the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. This was proclaimed in Barcelona (September 25) by Premier Azaiia amid the thunderous acclamation of hundreds of thousands of Catalans.

The Statute gives Catalonia the right to use its own language, anthem, and flag; permission to establish a state government consisting of a president and parliament; the right to communicate officially with the rest of Spain in the Catalan tongue; and the privileges of raising taxes, creating a school system, and enforcing national laws in Catalonia. The Basque Provinces, Galicia, and other non-Castilian regions of Spain now became all the more insistent in their demands for similar grants of autonomy. To many Spaniards it seemed desirable that the republic should eventually become a federation of Spanish states.

As the year 1933 approached, the republic could look back with pride upon its many accomplishments. But at the same time it had to look forward to a continuing period of internal reconstruction, regionalist dissensions, and clashing interests of various economic and cultural groups.

CHAPTER XV

GERMANY

FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC

When the Imperial German Government in the autumn of 1914 appealed to the *Reichstag* for war credits, all parties, including the Social Democrats, voted favorably. This wholehearted support in the face of a national crisis, however, was in no way an endorsement of the general peace-time policies of the government. There was considerable opposition in the empire to a number of arrangements: The chancellor was responsible to the emperor rather than to the lower house. The members of the upper house were appointed by and responsible to the rulers, not the people, of the several federated states. As king of Prussia, the emperor virtually controlled the upper house which, moreover, had greater powers than the *Reichstag*. Criticism had long been leveled at the undemocratic system of voting in Prussia, where the wealthier citizens had more voting power than the poorer ones. Finally, social legislation and labor reform had not entirely kept pace with the needs of the twentieth century. It was despite these grievances that most of the Germans were ready in 1914 to rally to the support of the fatherland against what appeared to be wanton foes.

As the war continued and the weeks became months and the months years, an increasing number of socialists began to regard the struggle in the light of an imperialistic and capitalistic venture rather than a defensive necessity. A definite split in the ranks of the Social Democratic Party was evident by the spring of 1915. The Majority, headed by Friedrich Ebert and Philip Scheidemann, believed in continuing support of the war; the Minority, led by Hugo Haase, opposed the granting of further war credits. Early in 1916 Haase announced in the *Reichstag* that he and his followers were absolutely opposed to any further prolongation of the conflict, and a year later these men organized the Independent

Social Democratic Party, favoring an immediate peace without annexations.

Some radicals regarded even Haase's group as too conservative. Under the leadership of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, these men, of communist sympathies, denounced the war and advocated the forceful establishment of a proletarian dictatorship. In January, 1916, Liebknecht had begun to publish denunciatory letters over the signature "Spartacus," and so his followers came to be known as Spartacists. The eventual imprisonment of the Spartacist leaders failed to lessen the agitation, particularly since the failure of the army to win an early and victorious peace gradually alienated the affections of even the Majority Socialists and the Catholic Center Party under Mathias Erzberger.

In July, 1917, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, who had been in office since 1909, resigned. His successor, Dr. George Michaelis, was no more able than Bethmann had been to report victory or improve bad harvests. Three months later, therefore, Michaelis made way for the learned prime minister of Bavaria, Professor Count Hertling. The latter's refusal to grant wholesale democratic reforms, even after defeated Bulgaria withdrew from the war, forced his retirement in 1918. Finally, the liberal Prince Max of Baden organized (October 2, 1918) a moderate coalition government. Two Majority Socialists, Scheidemann and Bauer, were included in the cabinet. Prince Max was determined to grant widespread reforms in order to save the tottering throne of the Hohenzollerns, but by the time of his appointment the general discontent had become ominous.

The Allied blockade was working havoc with the German food supply. The situation was made worse by bad harvests, particularly during the "turnip winter" of 1916-1917. The masses starved and froze, and only the rich were able to keep warm and satisfy their hunger. Profiteering reached unprecedented heights. The Russian revolutions of 1917, moreover, set an inspiring example to the wretched Germans, and Russian agents were busily engaged in spreading subversive propaganda. Already in June, 1916, there had been a munitions strike. Though sternly suppressed by the authorities, it had been followed by a second strike in April, 1917, and a third, with political aims, in January, 1918. Half a million persons in Berlin and Essen had quit work on this

last occasion for over a week. The strikers committed no violence, but the government determined to deal harshly with the trouble-makers, and many of the men who had hitherto been exempt from military service because of occupation in the essential industries, were punished by being sent to the front. Here they were chiefly instrumental in spreading the idea of revolt among the soldiers.

The German navy, too, had become restless. It had been cooped up for months in the harbors with nothing for the sailors to do but read and philosophize upon revolutionary doctrine, and acquire a dislike for the carousing officers. The latter themselves chafed under the prolonged inactivity and many of them vainly petitioned the emperor for commissions in the army. Meanwhile it had become evident to thinking Germans that England would not be starved out by the submarine campaign and that the ridiculous expansionist promises of the patriotic Fatherland Party recently organized by Admiral von Tirpitz could never be achieved. America's participation in the war, moreover, had at last assumed gigantic proportions.

When Ludendorff's great drive of 1918 collapsed, the fall of the Hohenzollerns was foreshadowed. The army, under-nourished, poorly-equipped, and subjected to a steady flow of radical propaganda, was ready to quit fighting and go home. It was not at all anxious to make further sacrifices either for the emperor or for the capitalists. With much courage, Prince Max now rushed through a number of reforms which converted Germany into a constitutional monarchy. The emperor was made a figure-head, a mere symbol of unity. Ministerial responsibility was introduced and the Reichstag given control over war and peace. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly was granted and an amnesty declared for political prisoners. Electoral reforms were promised in Prussia. Finally Max instituted negotiations with Wilson for an armistice. He carefully pointed out that the new German administration was a government "of the people, in whose hands rested both actually and constitutionally the authority to make decisions."

Toward the end of October, 1918, voice was frequently given to the notion that the emperor should abdicate. Since Wilson insisted that as long as the imperial government was in power

he would discuss only surrender and not peace negotiations, many Germans came to regard William as an obstacle to peace. On October 23 Haase demanded before the Reichstag that the emperor abdicate. On the following day, Gustav Noske of the Majority Socialists made a similar plea. The newspapers quickly took up the cry and on the evening of the twenty-ninth, Scheidemann, as leader of the Majority Socialists, requested Prince Max to secure William's abdication. That night, the emperor, giving only a last-minute notice to the chancellor, fled from Berlin to the army headquarters at Spa — to escape the influenza danger!

Meanwhile, a disaster had occurred (October 28) at the naval base of Kiel. When the rumors spread that the armistice negotiations would probably result in a surrender of the German fleet to the Allies, the German officers determined to forestall such an event. They preferred to seek a heroic and honorable death in an unexpected — and possibly successful — attack upon the British fleet. The 80,000 sailors, however, who would have been involved in this manoeuvre, had no desire to become dead heroes. They indicated their willingness to defend the German coasts against British attacks, but with armistice negotiations under way, they refused to participate in a wholesale suicidal venture. Mutiny resulted, attended by arrests, shootings, and the raising of red flags. Soon the spirit of revolt spread to the workers in Kiel, where revolutionary councils were formed which demanded the abdication of the Hohenzollerns, amnesty for the leaders of earlier mutinies, and equal suffrage rights. Other cities followed the example of Kiel, and by November 7 the demand for a republic was general along the North German coast.

The government hoped in vain to keep the remainder of the country ignorant of these developments. At a great demonstration held in Munich on November 7 an Independent Socialist editor, Kurt Eisner, demanded the forceful overthrow of the Bavarian dynasty. The Wittelsbach king and family made haste to flee and the people organized soldiers', workers', and peasants' councils. On the eighth, a "democratic and social republic" was set up in Bavaria with Eisner as president. Similar councils were established and republican proclamations issued in Berlin and the chief industrial centers of the land. Indeed, the movement was so widespread as to be accompanied by rela-

tively little disorder. The leaders of the Majority Socialists, fearing the loss of followers to the more radical Independents, now warned Prince Max that unless the emperor abdicated by the morning of November 9, they would resign from the government, demand William's deposition, and declare a general strike. Max, hoping to save the monarchy for the Hohenzollern family if not for William I I, labored to secure the latter's abdication in favor of the infant son of the crown prince.

William, at Spa, refused to listen to the chancellor's entreaties. He firmly expected the army to aid him in retaining the imperial crown even against the wishes of the German people. Eventually, however, the General Staff convinced him that the army could not be depended upon to fight the German people for his sake, and at the famous Spa Conference of November 9 even Hindenburg agreed that abdication appeared the wisest step. Just as Ebert and Scheidemann called at the chancellor's palace to announce the expiration of the socialists' ultimatum, Max was informed from Spa that the formula of abdication was being considered. When, therefore, Ebert promised to maintain order and call a national constituent assembly, Max felt justified in surrendering the government into his hands.

Early in the morning of November 10 William fled to Holland, soon to be followed by the crown prince. Not until November 28, however, did Herr von Hohenzollern send in a complete and full abdication in his name and that of the family. By that time all the other German princes had fled and the empire had been converted into a federation of republican states, provisionally governed by a Council of Six People's Commissars. The Council was composed of three Majority and three Independent Socialists under the joint chairmanship of Ebert and Haase. The numerous subordinate officials of the former imperial service patriotically continued to serve the new government, but the Spartacists, again led by Liebknecht and Luxemburg, who had been released from prison, refused to cooperate. The commissars through word of mouth and handbills besought the people to maintain order, regard human life as sacred, and protect private property.

The Spartacists were as much opposed to the establishment of a bourgeois or socialist republic as they had been to the empire. Through their newspaper, *The Red Flag*, as well as by acts of

terrorism, they strove to prevent the calling of a national constituent assembly at least until such time as their tactics should have cowed a sufficiently large number of citizens into accepting the ideal of a communist regime.

It would seem that in the presence of such an enemy the Majority and Independent Socialists, who had split merely over the question of ending the war, should have become reunited. But during the period of estrangement the Independents had become more radical, and they now favored the rapid nationalization and socialization of industry and the postponement of constituent elections until the socialist rule should have become entrenched beyond possibility of upset. The Majority favored a slower process of nationalization, urged compensation for property owners, and desired an early expression of popular sentiment through the means of the ballot.

The question of an election date finally was settled by a national congress of councils. In imitation of the organizations formed by the soldiers and workers of Munich and Berlin, local councils had appeared all over Germany. Frequently, too, they had assumed governmental powers. In December, 1918, a national gathering of these councils was held. The congress, to the delight of the Majority Socialists, excluded communists and decided upon an early date (January 19, 1919) for the constituent elections. The furious communists, choosing to see in these actions the germs of a counter-revolution, stirred up the sailors and marines in Berlin to revolt. When force was used to subdue the rebels, the Independent Socialists withdrew from all national and state posts. This circumstance enabled the Majority Socialists to fill the vacancies — even those in the Council of Commissars — with loyal supporters.

While awaiting election day, the commissars had to complete the demobilization of the returned troops, stave off further starvation despite the continuing Allied blockade, institute some immediate economic and social reforms, and hold in check the extremists both on the right and on the left. The thoroughly ingrained desire of many Germans for law and order, their patriotism, and their willingness to accept any decent government which gave promise of being able to function at all smoothly, rendered the problem of internal control less difficult than might have been

expected. Yet, in anticipation of trouble from the Spartacist camp, the commissars held in readiness a well-equipped force of about three thousand, commanded by ex-imperial officers.

The Spartacists, meanwhile, had formed armed bands which roamed the streets of the larger cities, ready for violence at any moment. The "voice" of these extremists was "Spartacus" Liebknecht himself. Nothing short of outright communism would satisfy him. The "brains" of the movement was the crippled Polish Jewess, Rosa Luxemburg, who had become a German citizen through marriage. The communists chose the week of January 5-12, 1919, for a supreme effort to oust the government.

A climax in the struggle for control was reached on Monday, January 6, when a crowd of 200,000 armed workmen of Spartacist and Independent Socialist sympathies assembled in the center of Berlin. Had these men been resolutely led, the government might have fallen without resistance. The commissars, themselves recruited largely from the laboring classes, dreaded to *us*6 troops against their kind. One after another they refused the responsibility of dealing with the situation, until finally Gustav Noske accepted the task, saying: "All right. Someone must be the bloodhound. I do not shirk the responsibility." An experienced strike organizer, Noske was not afraid to deal with workmen, but he had only a few thousand men with whom to face the huge, armed mob. Fortunately for the government, the radical leaders failed the people at the crucial moment. A communist reporter thus ironically depicted the events of this critical day:

The masses stood from early morning till nine o'clock in the cold and fog. Somewhere or other the leaders sat and deliberated. The fog lifted, the masses continued to stand. But the leaders deliberated. Noon came, and with it cold and hunger. And the leaders deliberated. The masses were feverish with excitement; they asked for a deed, or even a word, to allay their anxiety. But none knew what, for the leaders deliberated. The fog came down again, and with it the dusk. The masses returned saddened to their homes; they had desired to do great things and they had done nothing. For the leaders had deliberated. . . . They deliberated and deliberated and deliberated.

Skirmishes between the communist bands and the police or military continued daily until January 15, on which day both Liebknecht and Luxemburg were arrested — only to be killed on the

way to prison. "Spartacus Week" had failed of its objective and the Spartacist movement collapsed. On January 19 the elections for the national assembly took place in an atmosphere of relative quiet.

THE WORK OF THE WEIMAR ASSEMBLY

More than thirty of the eligible thirty-five million men and women over nineteen voted, on a basis of proportional representation. By the time of the elections the old political parties had all been reorganized and, in some cases, rechristened. The former Conservatives had been reconstructed on a monarchist platform as the German Nationalist Party. The right wing of the former National Liberals, chiefly important business men, had been reformed under Gustav Stresemann as the German People's Party. Though preferring a monarchy, this group was ready to support the republic in the interests of internal peace and national unity.

The Centrists, under the leadership of Mathias Erzberger, temporarily changed their party name to that of Christian Democrats, but soon reverted to the original form. They favored a democratic republic, a bill of rights, and considerable social legislation. The former left-wing National Liberals and the Progressives united to form a new Democratic Party led by the banker, Hjalmar Schacht. The Democrats favored a bourgeois republic, were opposed to a return of the military bureaucracy, promised legal guarantees for workmen, and advocated the prosecution of the war profiteers. The Majority Socialists readopted the name of Social Democrats and continued to urge the gradual scientific socialization of industry and property, while the Independent Socialists urged a more rapid nationalization process. The Spartacists who, on January 1, 1919, had taken the name of German Communist Party, refused to take part in the assembly elections.

When the election returns were counted, it appeared that the Social Democrats, with 163 out of the available 421 seats, would be the largest single group in the assembly. The Centrists received 88 seats, the Democrats 75, the Nationalists 42, the Independent Socialists 22, and the People's Party 21. The remaining ten seats went to four minor parties. Thirty-six women were

elected. To protect the gathering against any possible mob violence, Ebert convoked the National Assembly for February 6 in the peaceful city of Weimar.

The assembly met on the appointed day and at once adopted a previously drafted provisional constitution as its basis for government. Thereupon the Council of Commissars surrendered its powers and a "Weimar Coalition" of Social Democrats, Centrists, and Democrats became the official Government. On February 11 the assembly elected Friedrich Ebert president of the republic (*Reich*). Ebert was an ex-saddler from Heidelberg who had come into prominence as co-leader with Scheidemann of the moderate socialists. In his oath of office he declared himself to be "a son of the working class, grown up in the world of socialistic ideas." As president, he would regard himself as "the authorized representative of the entire German people, not as leader of a single party." Scheidemann became chancellor and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, who was not affiliated with any political party, became foreign minister.

The assembly was faced with the threefold task of putting down internal opposition, concluding peace with the Allies, and giving the republic a permanent constitution. Noske, as Minister of Home Defense, attended to the first of these duties. There were a number of violent mining and railway strikes, and there was plenty of fighting. In Munich a communist government was established after a Nationalist had murdered Kurt Eisner. Noske decided once and for all to "settle accounts with the lunatics," and with the aid of some former army officers proceeded so energetically to crush the radical movement throughout the nation that 15,000 workers had been killed by the summer of 1919. Thereafter, little trouble was to be feared from this source.

The conclusion of peace proved to be a more difficult undertaking. The various factions in the assembly spent precious time in accusing one another of having lost the war, and no group was prepared to accept the treaty as it was presented on May 7 by the Allies. Scheidemann, indeed, resigned the chancellorship rather than agree to the document. In view of the severity of the punishment threatened by the Allies if the assembly rejected the terms, no choice remained but to accept. On June 23, there-

fore, just before the expiration of the time limit, the Weimar delegates agreed to the treaty.

The final task of the assembly was completed on July 31, 1919, with the adoption of a constitution by a vote of 262 to 75. The document was based upon a draft made by Professor Hugo Preuss, a Democrat in politics and an opponent of states' rights. In the final balloting the Social Democrats, Centrists, and Democrats voted for the constitution, while the Independent Socialists, the People's Party, and the Nationalists opposed it. Ebert signed the document, which contains 181 articles, on August 11.

The constitution vests supreme power in the people and defines the Reich as a federation of republican states, called *Länder*. The national government is given the usual powers of a central authority over foreign relations, colonies, immigration, defense, coinage, customs, posts, and telegraphs. In addition, it has the paramount right to legislate upon railway and water traffic; the care of the poor; the protection of mothers, widows, and orphans; the protection of the flora and fauna; the use of natural resources; insurance; education; the protection of workmen; and the cinema. The central administration may also instruct the several states upon the best means of enforcing the national laws.² There is the customary bill of rights, and the suffrage is accorded to all men and women over twenty on a basis of proportional representation. Women are placed on a level of absolute civil equality with men.

Provision is made for a president to be elected by popular vote for a term of seven years. Any German over thirty-five is eligible for the office and there is no restriction as to reelection. The president may be removed from office by a popular referendum following impeachment by a two-thirds vote in the lower house. If the president lose the referendum he must quit his office and may never again become president; if he be upheld, his tenure of office continues for seven years from the date of the voting. There is no vice-president.

¹ In 1920 there were eighteen such *Länder*. Since 1929, when Prussia annexed Waldeck, there have been seventeen.

² The tendency to minimize states' rights soon caused conflicts, particularly between the central authorities and Bavaria, and some slight concessions to the latter have been made. On the question of states' rights, moreover, some of the Bavarians seceded from the Centrist Party to form anew Bavarian People's Party.

The assembly's distaste for autocracy was reflected in the restrictions placed upon the *actual* powers of the chief executive, for in theory these powers are fairly extensive. He represents the Reich, sends and receives ambassadors, signs treaties, appoints and dismisses all national officials whose selection is not otherwise provided for by law, is commander of the army and navy, may invoke force to make the states live up to the obligations imposed upon them by the constitution, and has the right of pardon. He may dismiss the Reichstag, although any particular pretext for such action may not be used more than once and new elections must be held within sixty days (Article 25). In time of national emergency the president has the power to suspend certain guarantees in the constitution (Article 48), but the Reichstag must be informed of the emergency measures at once and upon its demand they must be rescinded. Since, however, no action of his is valid unless countersigned by the chancellor or appropriate minister, the president, in actual practice, can only exercise his functions in accordance with the will of the cabinet, which itself is responsible to the popular branch of the legislature.

The chancellor, who determines all governmental policies and selects the members of the cabinet, is appointed and dismissed by the president. The ministers need not be members of parliament, but they are directly responsible to the Reichstag. Resignation of the cabinet (*Reichsregierung*) must follow only upon a specific vote of lack of confidence. Cabinet decisions are made by majority vote, the chancellor having the power to break a tie. A Supreme Court, sitting at Leipzig, has only a limited original jurisdiction and serves chiefly as a tribunal of appeals to ensure uniform interpretation of the laws. Ordinary questions of justice are left to the decisions of the individual states.

The chief legislative body is the Reichstag, whose members are elected for four years. Since 1920 elections have been held under the Baden system of proportional representation whereby each party secures one deputy for every 60,000 votes that it polls. Since the number of voters fluctuates, the number of deputies changes with each election. Although this plan safeguards the rights of the minority, it has some important defects. The delegates are elected in the order in which their names appear on the

party lists and the top names naturally have the best chance of victory. There is little contact between candidates and electors, since the latter must vote for a party list rather than a personality. This procedure readily enables the political machines to keep their favorites in office.

The Reichstag must assemble within thirty days after its election. When the main body is not in session, foreign affairs and the actions of the cabinet, respectively, are watched over by two standing committees. The Reichstag may pass laws over the veto of the upper house by a two-thirds majority, in which case, however, the president may call for a referendum within three months. Whenever ten per cent of the qualified electors sign a petition demanding a certain law, the Reichstag may either pass it at once or submit it to a popular vote.

The upper house, representing the states, is known as the *Reichsrat*. It may hold up, but it cannot veto, general laws passed by the Reichstag. Its consent, however, is necessary for the passage of any measure affecting the states as such. Each state is entitled to at least one delegate in the Reichsrat, and the larger states have one for every 700,000 of their population. Yet, lest Prussia secure a preponderating influence, it is provided that no state may have more than two-fifths of the total representation. The delegates to the Reichsrat are members of the various state cabinets and are paid by the state governments. In contrast to the Reichstag, the upper house never dies, although its composition changes frequently. After each census the Reichsrat revises the number of delegates composing its body. In 1932 its membership was sixty-eight.

There is no state-supported church in the Reich, and religious freedom is guaranteed. Education is placed under the supervision of the state and teachers are regarded as public officials. School attendance is compulsory until the age of eighteen. Private schools are tolerated only in a few exceptional cases and for religious instruction. The constitution demands the giving of instruction in art, in the latest scientific advances, and in international conciliation. Naturally, much still remains to be done in the way of legislation and monetary appropriations before any such program can be fully carried out.

The influence of the Social Democrats and the Centrists is

evident in the economic clauses of the constitution. All private property must be used to "serve the public good." Expropriation of landed property is permissible where "necessary to satisfy the demand for housing, to promote settlement and reclamation, or to improve agriculture." Private business enterprises adapted for socialization may be transferred to public ownership upon payment of proper compensation. Provision is made for state insurance systems against sickness, accident, old age, and unemployment.

Article 165 of the constitution deals with an interesting phenomenon which enjoyed a temporary vogue in Germany and elsewhere, the workers' council movement:

Statutory bodies representative of workmen and employees are to be created for the protection of their social and economic interests, namely, local workers' councils, district workers' councils, organized so as to correspond with industrial areas, and a National Workers' Council.

The district workers' councils and the National Workers' Council are to join with representatives of employers and other interested sections of the community to form district economic councils and a National Economic Council for the accomplishment of the economic tasks in general and to collaborate in the execution of the socialization laws in particular. . . .

Bills relating to matters of social and economic policy, before being introduced into the Reichstag, shall be submitted by the cabinet to the National Economic Council for an expression of its opinion. The National Economic Council itself has the right to initiate such bills. If the Government does not agree with any such bill it is nevertheless bound to introduce it into the Reichstag, with an explanation of its own standpoint. The National Economic Council may delegate one of its members to appear before the Reichstag in support of the bill.

Owing largely to its unwieldiness — it contains representatives of labor, capital, the consumers, and the government — the National Economic Council has not functioned well. It has, in reality, become an advisory committee on economic questions for the Reichstag. It rarely holds plenary sessions, but its three sections, on finance, social affairs, and political matters, respectively, hold fairly regular meetings.

With the adoption of the constitution, the work was completed for which the assembly had been called. Instead of dissolving itself, however, that body moved to the Reichstag building in Berlin (September 30, 1919) and proclaimed itself the official

legislative organ of the republic. President Ebert's term of office was extended, and in 1922 was again continued, this time by the Reichstag, until June 30, 1925.

THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC

For some time after the adoption of the constitution, the republic in Germany was not entirely safe. While the government had concentrated its energies upon suppressing the communists, opportunity had been taken by the ex-army officers, Junkers, old Conservatives, and other die-hards to form several strong monarchist organizations, such as the League of the Upright and the "Steel Helmets." The monarchists, indeed, had formulated a long list of grievances against the republicans and the assembly. It was rumored that cowardly republicans had made defeat inevitable by undermining the military power of the empire during the last months of the war. The assembly was attacked for its acceptance of the Versailles Treaty and for permitting the country to be overrun by Allied commissions. Some individuals feared that the authorities might turn over to the Allies for trial the so-called "war criminals." Finally, there was a widespread feeling that the assembly had refused to call regular presidential and parliamentary elections lest Hindenburg be elected to the highest office and the way thus paved for a monarchist restoration.

Reactionist activities reached a climax in March, 1920, in an attempted *Putsch* or *coup* planned by Dr. Wolfgang Kapp. The latter, a New Yorker by birth, and founder of a successful East Prussian Agricultural Credit Bank, had secured some notoriety during the war for a fierce attack upon Bethmann's weak policies and for assisting Admiral von Tirpitz in the organization of the Fatherland Party. He was inconspicuous during the revolution but remained in communication throughout 1919 and 1920 with such friends of the ex-emperor as Ludendorff and Tirpitz. General von Liittwitz, commandant of Berlin and ranking officer of the army, and one Major Waldemar Pabst, fell in heartily with Kapp's scheme for a forceful restoration of monarchy. The three men placed themselves at the head of some 8000 soldiers and early in the morning of March 13, 1920, marched twelve miles from the military barracks to Berlin. Herr Noske **had** a force of only 2000 men with which to oppose the **plotters and the Ebert Gov-**

ernment consequently fled for safety to Dresden and then to Stuttgart.

Kapp failed to make the most of his opportunities. Instead of playing the part of the strong man he tried to conciliate all his opponents. Confusion and hesitancy prevailed where quick action and audacity were needed. The chief factor in the overthrow of his regime of a week, however, was the attitude of the laborers. Upon the issuance of a stirring manifesto by Ebert, the workmen throughout the land went on a general strike. The water, gas, electricity, and tramway services were tied up and even the railways were operated only where it was necessary to do so lest the people be made to suffer undue hardships. Kapp's own followers now laughed at him, and he fled from Berlin to Sweden in an airplane, leaving behind a grandiose manifesto of his accomplishments. He soon returned, however, and surrendered to the authorities, only to die in prison while awaiting trial (1922). Luttwitz escaped to Hungary and Pabst sought refuge in Austria. The immediate threat of overthrow was past.

Although the government had won a temporary triumph over the reactionaries, it once again found itself faced with attacks from the Left. The Independent Socialists urged the workers to continue the general strike until the hated Noske, who had organized the forces to shoot the workmen, resigned, until the government's army was disbanded, and until regular elections for a Reichstag were called. Under such pressure the government accepted the resignation of Noske and set June 6, 1920, as the date for parliamentary elections.

In these elections the strength of the three moderate republican groups which had formed the Weimar Coalition fell from 326 to 225 seats, the Social Democrats alone losing 50. The Nationalists, People's Party, and Independent Socialists, on the other hand, secured 124 seats more than in the previous election, while the Communist Party also elected 2 delegates. In the first regularly elected republican Reichstag, accordingly, a coalition government was organized representing the People's Party, Centrists, and Democrats. A prominent Centrist, Konstantin Fehrenbach, who had been president of the Weimar Assembly, became chancellor.

The Kapp affair did not end the attempts of reactionaries to avenge the "betrayal" of the fatherland. They instituted a reign of terror against persons connected with the signing of the peace treaty, persons who in any way gave aid or information to the various Allied commissions that were camped in Germany, and individuals prominently identified with the socialists. Jews and Catholics also were attacked, and attempts were made upon the lives of Ebert and Scheidemann. The Centrist leader, Erzberger, who in 1917 had urged peace without annexations and who later as finance minister had inaugurated radical financial measures, was killed in August, 1921. Then in June, 1922, the brilliant Jew, Walter Rathenau, successful industrialist and shrewd political philosopher, was murdered. Young, able, energetic, a great patriot, he had proved himself highly efficient as head of the War Materials Office and then as minister of reconstruction. His early death was an irreparable loss to the republic. The government replied to these outrages by suspending the constitutional guarantees and passing a special Law for the Protection of the Republic, but the turmoil continued.

In 1923, another *coup*, the Ludendorff-Hitler *Putsch*, was attempted from Bavaria. General Ludendorff, an "impossibilist in politics," and Adolph Hitler, an Austrian who hoped to imitate Mussolini's march on Rome with a march on Berlin, devised a plan to seize the government, but soon came into conflict with a group of Bavarian conspirators led by Gustav von Kahr. As a result, the entire affair degenerated into a most unheroic "beer-hall *Putsch*" whose only result was to cause further annoyance to the harassed authorities. Certainly, the latter had other problems to solve besides that of dealing with the reactionaries. There were, to mention only the more perplexing ones, the questions of reparation, of the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr, of the separatist movements in the Rhineland and in Bavaria, of the enormous drop in value of the mark, of increasing unemployment and closing factories, of a starving populace, and of a possible "Red Peril."

It was fortunate for the life of the republic that economic ties and national patriotism acted as strong cohesive forces, else Germany might have crumbled into bits. There was also a ray of hope in the circumstance that the Social Democrats and Inde-

pendent Socialists reunited in September, 1922, to form the United Social Democratic Party, pledged to preserve the republic, fight communism and reaction, and guard the welfare of the workers.

FINANCES, LOW AND HIGH

So confident had the Imperial German Government been of an early and successful conclusion of the war, that little attention had been paid to increased taxation as a means of meeting the heavy war expenditures. Instead, the authorities had preferred to rely upon the patriotism and confidence of the people to make them buy war bonds, and upon the printing press. The *Reichsbank*, in fact, had been empowered to accept treasury bonds and bills as coverage for additional paper currency. Eventually, of course, the tax rates were raised, and such emergency sources of income as the War Profits Tax and the Turnover Tax created; but Germany actually financed only about five per cent of her war costs by direct levy, whereas England, for example, thus provided for more than twenty per cent of the extraordinary expenditures. When the war came to an end there were almost five times as many marks in circulation as there had been in 1913. And yet, because the outside world was ignorant of the precise facts and because there was for a time considerable confidence in the ability of Germany to recover quickly, the mark, at the end of 1918, still was quoted at half its par value — at 12 instead of 23.82 cents.

This situation could not last long. When the emergency laws which had established maximum commodity price limits during the war, lapsed, prices began to soar in proportion to the great abundance of currency in circulation. The very real shortage of gold, so much of which had been sent to neutral countries in return for war supplies, now became apparent with the discovery that Germany's wartime adverse trade balance had amounted to twelve billion dollars. The country's reserves of raw materials were at a low point, and the entire economic structure of the land was dislocated since every industry and factory had been reorganized during the war to serve the needs of the military exigency. In the face of curtailed credits, adverse trade balances, and reparation payments, the Germans, in order to get the barest

necessities of foodstuffs and raw products, resorted to paper money.

Even in this critical situation the government hesitated to tax more heavily the war profiteers and the big capitalists; and for some reason, realty and income tax assessments continued to be based upon the inflated and fluctuating paper mark instead of upon a gold basis. Thus tax payments, when they fell due, always had a lower real value than had been anticipated at the time of assessment. The circle of mounting deficits and further inflation became increasingly vicious with each passing month. In June, 1921, the Reichsbank began paying a premium for gold, and by November, 1922, a dollar, normally worth 4.2 marks, would purchase 7000 marks.

The crisis was heightened during the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr. The seizure by the French of billions of Reichsbank notes, and the attempt of the German Government to subsidize, with the aid of the printing press, the patriotically idle workers of the occupied region, completely destroyed the value of the currency. Only a miracle could stop the "toboggan slide" of the mark, and no miracle occurred. A belated attempt by the authorities to restrict the purchase by Germans of foreign currency failed of any definite result, and the mark, standing at 160,000 to the dollar early in July, 1923, fell by the end of the month to over 1,000,000 to the dollar. The printers soon found it difficult to meet the demand for paper notes, especially since more than ninety per cent of the government's revenue in the summer of 1923 was acquired by the simple process of assigning money value to scraps of paper. Late in 1923 the government owed the Reichsbank alone about 190 quintillion (190,000,000,000,000,000,000) marks.

When the paper-money fever was at its height the Reichsbank employed 2000 persons merely as overseers of its paper, printing, and transportation establishments, while 30 paper factories, 133 printing offices, and 1783 printing presses were kept busy at top speed to meet the demand for additional notes. The middle of November, 1923, saw the mark quoted at 2.5 trillion to the dollar in Berlin and at four trillion in Cologne. Milk sold for 250,000,000,000 marks a quart, and was scarce even at that price. Even private firms and individuals undertook to print their own

"emergency money" — to the extent of many trillions of "marks." Eventually it became difficult to assign high enough values to the notes to cover the cost of paper and printing, particularly since great care was exercised to adorn the notes with artistic designs.

The economic results of this debacle were catastrophic. It became almost impossible to negotiate loans or make contracts. The middle class suffered most, since its debtors seized the opportunity to retire bonds, lift mortgages, and pay notes. Hitherto comfortable incomes from investments and savings became worthless, and many of the persons who had expected to live on their incomes now found themselves obliged to seek employment in an overcrowded labor market. Trade unions were unable to fulfill their ordinary functions because their funds, too, were worthless. The capitalists, on the other hand, benefited by the cheap labor and cheap cost of materials, and invested *their* financial surpluses in comparatively safe foreign securities. On the strength of the cheap money supply, a large number of "fly-by-night" businesses were set up, only to crash as quickly as they had been established. People hoarded goods and everyone sought to exchange his marks for commodities having a more stable value, thus causing a veritable "*Flucht aus der Mark in die Ware.*"

In the fall of 1923 the German people virtually repudiated the mark and conditions became worse than at any time during the war. Peasants refused to take their products to the cities; merchants closed their shops; there was no standard of wages and, as was to be expected, the rise in wages lagged far behind the increase in prices; thousands of war cripples and persons who had expected to live on fixed incomes faced starvation. Hunger riots became common spectacles and the chaos was made worse by the activities of the foreign troops in the Ruhr, by the separatist movements in the Rhineland and Bavaria, and by the rise to power of communists in Saxony and elsewhere. National cabinets rose and fell with monotonous frequency and the country appeared on the verge of collapse. Finally, in September, 1923, the government declared a state of siege.

Lest Germany fall into complete dissolution, the authorities decided (October, 1923) to launch one last, desperate program whereby the people were to lift themselves out of the mire "by

the hair of the head like Munchausen." A new currency and new bank of issue were to be created, the budget was to be balanced, and a partial restoration of industry brought about. The men who were asked to perform these miracles were Finance Minister Dr. Hans Luther and Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, a bank president and now especially created Currency Commissioner. Equipped with emergency powers, these men actually succeeded in stabilizing the mark — though again at a disastrous financial cost to many Germans and to foreign speculators.

The printing of any more of the worthless paper currency was halted and a special *Rentenbank* was opened on November 15, 1923. This bank issued a new, temporary currency called the *Rententmark*, with an assigned par value equal to that of the pre-war gold mark. Coverage was provided by a virtual blanket mortgage on, or hypothecation of, the agricultural and industrial wealth of Germany. 3,200,000,000 of these marks were issued, this sum being slightly in excess of half the amount of Germany's pre-war currency circulation. The Rentenmark was circulated along with the paper marks at a ratio of one to one trillion. Thus "there was created out of nothing . . . a currency which was kept stable by the confidence of the people."

The budget was balanced by ruthless but apparently necessary measures. War claims were rejected and thousands of public employees, many of whom had received life-time appointments, were dismissed with little or no compensation.¹ Salaries were cut and a temporary moratorium was declared on public loans. The government also raised the tax rates, began to calculate tax payments on a gold basis, and instituted a better system of collection. Finally, the regular realty tax was supplemented by a new "house rent tax" on rented houses, factories, and agricultural buildings.

Many of these acts had to be repealed or modified later, but not until they had served their immediate purpose — until the budget was balanced and inflation stopped. General conditions also became easier when (1) the Dawes Plan went into effect (September, 1924); (2) Germany secured a foreign loan of 800,000,000 gold marks; and (3) the Ruhr was evacuated. A new Reichs-

¹ The Reich dismissed about 330,000 persons in all services, including the railway and postal systems; the states and municipalities dismissed some 400,000 more.

bank then was created to take the place of the Rentenbank, and a Reichsmark was substituted for the Rentenmark. Up to July 5, 1925, paper marks were redeemable at the rate of one trillion to one Reichsmark.

The distress, of course, was not yet over. The low exchange value placed upon paper marks wiped out numerous small fortunes. The lack of liquid capital for a time forced the interest rate up to more than forty per cent. Unemployment became worse because of the bankruptcy of many firms and because goods were no longer in demand for hoarding. But in the end, a measure of stability and confidence was restored, and the path to economic recovery was made less thorny.

DISAPPOINTMENT AND HOPE

In the years immediately following the war a great wave of pessimism swept over the German people. In their defeat it seemed to them as though the world were crumbling, as though civilization itself were coming to an end. All was gloomy, and many a thinker could find refuge and solace only in metaphysical speculation and mysticism. As if by predestination there happened to be available to the hungry seekers after spiritual comfort a number of relevant and scholarly philosophical treatises.

One of these works was the two-volume *Travel Diary of a Philosopher* by Hermann Count von Keyserling, a learned German-Esthonian writer. Although the first volume was in the hands of the printer in 1914 and the second was merely revised during the war years, the final completed work did not appear until 1919. Unable further to sustain a lively interest in a Europe which, after all, "represents only a single facet of the human spirit," and eager to "let fresh influences play upon" him, Keyserling had undertaken a leisurely journey around the world. His observations on the trip confirmed him in his belief of the supremacy of the soul and the preeminent virtue of spiritual perfection. "The shortest way to oneself is a voyage round the world." As is to be expected, the diary praises the contemplative, unhurried life of Asia while indicting the bustling West which "recognizes nothing to be unchangeable" and which "expresses its values in quantitative terms."

The philosopher, however, was enough westerner to see good

in individualism, and the "new man" whom he wished to see arise was to be an idealistic individualist, a man who would "blend the inwardness of Asia with the vigor of Christian Europe." Wisdom, Keyserling thought, not knowledge, was necessary to save western civilization. So great was the popular response to these ideas, at least for a time, that the volumes sold in tens of thousands and a School of Wisdom was founded and endowed at Darmstadt for the training of sages. Oriental mysticism and the striving for wisdom seemed to many Germans the only consolation in a hopeless world.

Of even greater importance than the *Diary* to those who were pessimistic of the future was Oswald Spengler's massive *Decline of the West*. Although this work, too, was conceived before the outbreak of the war and completed late in 1917 while German armies still were winning victories, it suited very well the disillusioned, despairing Germany of 1919 and after. Evidencing erudition in philosophy, literature, history, mathematics, and art, the book has for its theme the cyclic character of the historic process. History is regarded as a succession of complete civilization cycles each of which has its birth in a spring and its death in a winter. The end of each cycle is as inexorable as its beginning. Three such periods have already come and gone: the Indian (beginning about 1800 B.C.), the Antique (from about 900 B.C.), and the Arabian (ushered in with the Christian and Moslem eras). The Western, dating from perhaps 900 A.D., now is in its winter and is doomed to die ere many more centuries pass. Then "there will be no more western culture, no more German, English, or French."

Though the author insisted that his book was not meant to be a pessimistic forecast, the *Decline of the West* came to be regarded in some circles as a well-founded prophecy of the downfall of western supremacy. As such it achieved a considerable vogue and a fairly wide sale. In it the gloomy found confirmation of their fears, and the disillusioned, proof of the futility of things.

Books of pessimism and fatalism were not alone popular in post-war Germany. Volumes on the causes of the war, on how the war might have been prevented, or how it might have been won, sold by the hundreds of thousands. There was a flood of memoirs, especially from officials who felt it necessary to explain

or justify their past actions, and from persons who in one way or another had had any connection with the former imperial household. Oddly enough, no full-length German biography of Wilson appeared until more than a decade after the signing of the peace treaty, although Wilson was a much-discussed personality throughout the land.

Descriptions of the war and of life at the front appeared in great quantities and many of them rapidly went through numerous editions. Remarque's powerful *Im Westen nichts Neues* (1929), translated as *All Quiet on the Western Front*, and then his more mature and thoughtful *The Road Back* (1931), took the country by storm. Psychological novels and psychoanalytical studies dealing with every sort of neurosis and mental illness led the lists of best-sellers; and plays, in order to be successful, had to be tragic and horrible. In art, too, this spirit was reflected, and "expressionism" or "direct action in art" was carried further in Germany than elsewhere. Sombre geometrical and bizarre representations of machinery, of death, of fate, of mental disorders, were all the fashion.

Truly it was a gloomy period in the history of the German mind. "Night falls over Europe," said Walter Rathenau, shortly before his assassination in the streets of Berlin.

The attitude of despair which was so characteristic of the middle-aged and older people in Germany — those whose dreams of a happy and settled future had been blasted by the god of war — was not common among the younger persons. For their plans had not been upset, nor their calculations destroyed. They merely reflected upon the hunger, the privations, the tyrannical regulations and restraints of the war period, and they regarded peace as a cause for optimism. This group protested that its elders had brought on the war by a blind stupidity, a fatalistic groping in the dark, the result of ignorance, conventions, and old-fashioned ideas. But the younger people were made of different stuff. They would not be led blindfold along the path of destruction. They would benefit by the experience of the earlier victims and they would know how to handle themselves in the event of a future crisis.¹

The protest of youth was directed not only against the older

¹ For an excellent discussion of this subject see Gooch, G. P., *Germany*, 1927.

generation, but against the entire industrialized culture which bade fair to bury the individual under mechanization and mass organization. Young Germany sought its exemplars "in old Germany, when life was simpler, and before the creative impulses of the citizen were overlaid by the idolatry of the State." Though the movement sought "to renew contact with the past, it was not reactionary, for it paid homage to the spirit, not to the form, of an earlier age."

As after the humiliation of Prussia by Napoleon in 1806, German youth now felt that regeneration depended upon a higher mental and physical development of the nation. The free, simple life of the ancient Germans, *that* was the cure for despondency and national lethargy. Gymnastics, forest air, sunshine, song, these were needed to revive faith and hope. Accordingly, an organized *Jugendbewegung*, or Youth Movement, which had already made some progress before 1914, aroused renewed interest and attracted millions of recruits. The *Wandervogel*, or Birds of Passage, founded by Karl Fischer in 1904, became a great national society, and German woodlands and mountains reverberated with the sound of cheerful voices. Conventions and restraints were cast aside and freedom allowed to reign. Unnatural barriers to the comradeship of the sexes were removed and parental supervision was reduced to a minimum.¹ The movement promoted a general advance in the health and idealism of German youth, and supplied a much needed optimism to the entire nation.

Just as the ancestral Germans loved their contests of strength and agility, so modern youth chose athletics as the favorite outlet for its restless energies. In every field the Germans strove to achieve superiority over the athletes of other nations, and the Olympic Games of 1928 and 1932 aroused unusual interest. Max Schmeling, the first German to win the world's heavyweight boxing crown, was hailed as a symbol of the new strength, and Fraulein Cillie Aussem, winner of the Wimbledon Tennis Championships in 1931, became a national heroine.

The movement also had its weaknesses. Sometimes freedom was confused with license. There was a tendency among some members of the younger set to flout authority and to sneer at age

¹ Some of the older devotees of the new freedom founded nudist cults and communities, but only a few of these enjoyed any permanency.

and grey hair. Many of the youth organizations became identified with political, religious, or class groups, and often bitterness and strife ensued where brotherliness should have prevailed. The bad economic situation and the increasing ill-will manifested between nations after 1929, led more and more of the growing young men and women to wonder if, after all, their optimism was justified, if muscle and ideals were sufficiently strong to remake civilization. Eventually, many came to criticize in a far milder way than formerly the stupidities that their elders had perpetrated.

PARTIES AND POLITICS, 1924-1932

On March 13, 1924, the Reichstag which had been elected in 1920 was dissolved. During its session, four chancellors — Drs. Wirth, Cuno, Stresemann, and Marx — had striven to restore order and give stability to the republic. In the elections of May 4, 1924, however, the moderate parties with which these men were affiliated lost heavily, while the extremists, right and left, made sizable gains. Chancellor Marx (Centrist) therefore resigned and President Ebert asked the leaders of the Nationalist Party to create a new coalition government. The reactionary temper of the Nationalists, some of whom suggested Admiral von Tirpitz for the chancellorship, soon induced Ebert to recall Marx, who eventually succeeded in effecting another moderate coalition.

The majority which this group controlled was small. Hence when, in order to pass certain railway legislation required by the Dawes Plan, it became necessary to secure a two-thirds majority, the government appealed to the Nationalists for support in return for the promise of some cabinet positions. The Nationalist Party, though officially opposed to the Dawes Plan, responded by permitting its members to vote on the pending legislation at their own discretion. Thereupon enough Nationalists voted affirmatively to make possible the desired enactments. When an attempt was made to fulfill the pledge regarding Nationalist additions to the government, however, the other parties protested so strenuously that the Reichstag was dissolved and new elections were ordered for December 7, 1924.

In this election the middle parties gained a number of seats at the expense of both monarchists and communists, but the Nationalists also elected sufficient delegates to make difficult

the matter of forming a government. On December 11 Marx resigned rather than admit Nationalists into his cabinet, and not until January 15, 1925, was a Centrist-People's-Nationalist coalition formed under Dr. Luther. The continuance of a conciliatory foreign policy despite the presence of Nationalists in the ministry was assured when the portfolio of foreign affairs was left in the hands of Dr. Stresemann. The latter, indeed, remained in continuous control of the foreign office under every government from November, 1923, until his death in October, 1929.

A few weeks after the organization of the Luther cabinet, the president died (February 28). Friedrich Ebert had helped to guide the nation through six difficult years. He had worked hard and faithfully under trying conditions, had been loyal to the interests both of his country and of the working class, and had borne up courageously under much personal abuse. It was a great tribute to his abilities that without any higher education he should have risen to the chief office in a land where academic training is esteemed so highly. Thousands of workers regarded him as a friend and protector, and became staunch supporters of the republic because he was a loyal republican. Since the constitution made no provision for a vice-president, it became necessary to hold Germany's first popular presidential election.


According to German electoral law the president is elected on a national ticket, the candidate receiving a majority of all the votes cast being the victor. In the event that no candidate gets such a majority, a second election must be held. There is no elimination of candidates, though any party may nominate a new standard bearer. The second election goes to the nominee who receives the largest number of votes, whether or not this be a majority. Such a double election had to be resorted to in 1925, for in the first balloting (March 29) no candidate was successful. The votes in the first poll were distributed as follows:

Jarres (Nationalist and People's parties).	10,416,658
Braun (Social Democrat).	7,802,497
Marx (Centrist).	3,887,734
Thalmann (Communist).	1,871,815
Hellpach (Democrat).	1,568,398
Held (Bavarian People's Party).	1,007,450
Ludendorff (Völkische or extreme nationalist party).	285,793
	26,840,345

Before the second election took place, two party coalitions were effected. The Centrists, Democrats, and Social Democrats, who together had polled almost 50% of the votes cast, now jointly nominated the Centrist leader, Dr. Wilhelm Marx. The right parties, which had gotten about 43% of the votes, also combined, but instead of renominating one of the previous candidates, they chose the aged and popular Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg. The Communist Party refused to unite with any other group and renominated Ernst Thälmann.

A spirited campaign ensued, each group striving to draw to the polls some of the millions of qualified voters who had neglected to exercise their franchise in the March contest. The balloting took place on April 26. Almost three and a half million more votes were cast than in the first election, and most of this increase, apparently, went to swell Hindenburg's total. The final returns credited the 77-year-old general with 14,655,641 votes. Marx got 13,751,606 and Thälmann secured 1,931,151. By refusing to join the coalition of middle parties, the Communist Party in a sense made possible the election of the candidate of the Right, for Marx and Thälmann together attracted more counts than the victor.

Hindenburg's election was regarded in many quarters as a blow at the republic. Foreign newspapers, particularly in France and the United States, printed furious outbursts and prophesied freely that the field marshal would recall William II, restore militarism, and plunge the world into another war. It was even advocated, by some spectre-mongers, that force be used to prevent the president-elect from taking office. Hindenburg, however, took the oath to support the republican constitution without reservation or qualification, and his policy of moderation and conciliation soon won the confidence not only of the Germans but of the world. He probably would have preferred to see a restoration of the monarchy, but he had no intention of violating his oath to the republic. By adopting a German rather than a partisan policy he was able to reconcile many factions in Germany and bring together a host of former opponents. The world quickly forgot the evil it had said about him during the war, and his eightieth birthday (October 2, 1927) was made the occasion for world-wide demonstrations of honor and respect.



PAUL VON HINDENBURG

In December, 1925, the Luther ministry resigned. It had fallen into disfavor with the Nationalists because of its sanction of the Locarno Pacts and had lost the support of other groups on domestic issues. Six weeks' time and a threat of presidential dictatorship were required before another cabinet was formed, again by Luther. Soon this government, too, fell (May, 1926), over a minor question regarding the national flag.

The succeeding Marx ministry experienced a lively battle on the subject of confiscating for state use the property of the former ruling houses. Various court opinions had already been rendered on this issue, and the claims of the princes had usually been upheld. On June 20, 1926, the matter was submitted to a referendum. Over fourteen million votes were cast for confiscation and only half a million against it. Since, however, a referendum is successful only in the event that a majority of the entire qualified voting body registers assent, the result was five million votes short of the number needed for confiscation.

Chancellor Marx found it necessary to reorganize his ministry in January, 1927, and to admit some Nationalists into the cabinet. Before the Centrists would agree to this, however, the Nationalists had to promise to uphold the republic, endorse Stresemann's policy of conciliation, and consent to cooperation with the League. The arrangement was not satisfactory, and in March, 1928, the Reichstag was dissolved.

In the elections of May 20 the Nationalists lost heavily, while the Social Democrats increased their parliamentary membership to 152 seats. The Marx coalition of center and right elements therefore resigned, and on June 28 the Social Democrat, Hermann Miiller, who nine years earlier had signed the Versailles Treaty, organized a temporary "Ministry of Personalities." He was the first socialist chancellor since 1920. The provisional ministry was only to function until a more permanent one could be formed, preferably by a "Grand Coalition" of the Social Democratic, Democratic, Centrist, People's, and Bavarian People's parties. The wrangling among the groups was so prolonged that a final union was not cemented until April, 1929. Then, with Miiller still as chancellor, each of the five parties was represented in the new cabinet in proportion to its strength in the lower house.

Muller's regime was not happy. Budgetary difficulties were immense. The acceptance of the Young Plan aroused considerable nationalistic opposition. There was bitter debating over a special levy and revised income taxes. The unemployment situation became critical and there was disagreement over what should constitute a feasible unemployment insurance scheme. On March 27, 1930, the Muller ministry resigned. Three days later, Dr. Heinrich Brüning, leader of the Centrist Party, formed a new moderate coalition.¹

The new ministry desired to continue the moderate policies of its predecessor, namely, to meet all international obligations, to provide agricultural relief while yet practising the strictest economy, and to chart a foreign course based on the principles of Stresemann. Since the latter had died, on October 3, 1929, the foreign portfolio was assigned to one of his close friends, Julius Curtius. The government's tenure was disquietingly shaky and several times the cabinet was saved from falling merely because the opposition was divided among itself or because Hindenburg threatened to dissolve the Reichstag and rule as dictator in conformity with Article 48 of the constitution if the bickering did not cease. In July, 1930, after the Reichstag had definitely rejected a government budget bill, the president carried out his threat. The legislature was dissolved and new elections were ordered for September 14. Meanwhile, in an attempt to check the rapidly mounting national deficit, several emergency budgetary decrees were put into effect.

The outstanding feature of the election of September, 1930, for which twenty-seven parties nominated candidates, was the gain made by two extremist groups, the Communist Party and the National Socialists (*Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*). Of the 35,000,000 popular votes that were cast, the Communist Party obtained 4,587,000, or nearly 40% more than it had polled in 1928. Simultaneously, it increased its member-

¹ In July, 1930, some of the younger members of the Democratic and People's parties organized the State Party. In November the Democratic Party was dissolved and the State Party became its recognized successor. During the same months the Nationalist Party was split by the secession, under the lead of Dr. Alfred Hugenberg, of some reactionaries who favored the restoration of monarchy and who opposed the League of Nations. This group was organized as the Conservative People's Party.

ship in the Reichstag from 54 to 76 seats. Even more striking were the gains of the National Socialists who raised their Reichstag contingent from 12 to 107 and their popular vote from 809,000 (1928) to over 6,400,000. They now formed the second largest group in the lower house, being led only by the Social Democrats with 143 seats. Before analyzing the reasons for this success of the National Socialists, who were also called Fascists, Hitlerites, or Nazis, it is necessary to consider the earlier history of the party and the activities of its leader, Adolph Hitler.

HITLERISM

The future chief of the National Socialists was born on April 20, 1889, in Upper Austria, the son of an obscure customs official. Against the wishes of his father, who wanted him to enter the civil service, Adolph Hitler indulged his talent for drawing and painting, eventually going to Vienna to study architecture and become a master builder. However, he failed to pass the entrance examination to the Painting Academy and barely managed to eke out an existence as decorator and draftsman.

He appears frequently to have gotten into arguments with his fellow-workmen, particularly over questions of politics and economics, and he steadfastly refused to join the Austrian Social Democratic Party, saying that he neither understood its aims nor approved of its methods. In the end he came to attribute his inability to get and hold a job to the machinations of the socialists — whence, probably, his later bitter hatred of Marxism. Moreover, since he generally associated radicalism with Judaism, regarding the socialist movement as an attempt of international Jewry to control the workers, Hitler also became a confirmed anti-Semite.

In 1912 Hitler went to Munich to live, and when the war broke out he requested permission from the Bavarian authorities to fight in the Bavarian army. Apparently he preferred not to join the Austro-Hungarian forces because he objected to the fact that the Dual Monarchy was a state composed of several nationalities rather than a national state. He acquitted himself well in action on the western front, was wounded and gassed, and received the Iron Cross.

The events of the German revolution of 1918 filled the soldier

with bitterness and he remained in comparative obscurity until 1923. Then, with Ludendorff and others, he participated (November 9) in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the government. For his part in the conspiracy Hitler was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, but he was released after having served only a few months. Through his enlistment in the Bavarian army Hitler had lost his citizenship in Austria, and because of his attempted *coup* and subsequent imprisonment he was for a long time unable to acquire citizenship in Germany. It thus happened that the leader of one of the most nationalistic groups in the world was for years (until 1932) a man without a country.

Upon his release from prison Hitler put new life into the National Socialist German Workers' Party, a political organization which he had helped found in 1919 and which had suffered a decline during his enforced inactivity. A daring, but hardly practical, party program of "Twenty-five Points" was drawn up for the group in February, 1920, by the engineer Gottfried Feder, one of the half-dozen original colleagues of Hitler and later economic adviser to the Nazis. Eventually (1930) this outline of party policy was expanded by Hitler himself in a book of memoirs entitled *Mein Kampf* (*My Struggle*).

According to these pronouncements the ultimate goal of the Hitlerites is a "Third Reich,"¹ a Greater Germany wherein should be united in one national comradeship *all* those of "German blood without reference to confession/" including the Germans in Austria, Holland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Alsace. Jews, however, are regarded as having alien blood.² The achievement of this "program for the ages" envisages the abrogation of the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain; the refutation of war guilt; the further drastic revision of reparation; the reacquisition of colonies as an aid to self-sufficiency; the expulsion of all persons not of German blood and of all non-German immigrants who entered the country after August, 1914; governmental assurance of employment and decent living conditions for the citizens; the abolition of unearned income and high interest, and the confiscation of war profits; the national-

¹ The first Reich dated from 1871 to 1918; the second is the republic.

² Hitler himself is a Catholic.

ization of trusts and huge department stores; agrarian reform and the abolition of speculation in land values; better state care for the aged and for the physical as well as mental development of the citizenry; complete religious toleration for all sects not dangerous to the welfare or morality of the nation; and parity with the other Great Powers in armaments. German supremacy on the Continent is to be assured through alliances with England and Italy and through eventual wars with the arch enemy, France, and with Russia, the nearest available outlet for future German colonization. The catchwords of the movement are Nordicism and anti-Semitism.

A careful party organization was developed and the Hakenkreuz, better known by its Sanskrit equivalent of swastika [], became the Nazi emblem. As with the Italian Fascists, there is an elaborate ritual and a military ceremonial. Ordinary party members, of whom in 1932 there were over 700,000, pay small monthly dues and are expected to be faithful attendants at meetings, to which there is generally an admission charge. Above this rank and file are the *Sturmabteilungen*, chiefly German and Austrian university students and graduates who are assigned to such special duties as the protection of Nazi meetings and the breaking-up of radical gatherings. In April, 1932, the national government disbanded these "shock troops" because of their frequent resort to violence, but eventually they were permitted to re-form. Both the regular members and the shock troops wear the party uniform of a brown shirt with a black swastika mounted upon a red and white armband. There is also a small group of party police, the *Schutzstaffeln*, who act as bodyguards for the Nazi leaders and carry out especially difficult missions. They wear a black shirt decorated with a white skull.

For purposes of agitation the Reich was divided into twenty-six districts, each subdivided into "cells" and each "covered" by six or more trained speakers. Hitler himself is a highly successful orator, able to sway large audiences, but it is his manner of speaking rather than the content of his speeches which produces the electric result. Like Mussolini, Hitler capitalizes an effective frown and a magnetic personality. He is popular with German womanhood and the nationalist youth which latter, incidentally, is organized in a Hitler Youth Society,

One of the chief pillars of Hitlerism is the white-collar section of the middle class. When judged by income and standard of living many of the 3,500,000 individuals in this category actually fall into proletarian ranks. Yet, unlike the workers, they do not look to the socialists for economic relief. Class pride makes them seek aid elsewhere, and Hitlerism seems to offer a possible avenue of help. Equally badly off, equally unwilling to acknowledge a common interest with the proletariat, and equally ready to try Nazi remedies, are thousands of former army officers, soldiers' widows, and retired tradesmen.

There are many other Nazi enthusiasts. The anti-Semitic stand of the Hitlerites appeals to many professionals who feel keenly the competition of Jewry in law, medicine, banking, and trade. Retail shopkeepers, their livelihood endangered by the activities of the great trusts and chain stores, favor the National Socialist plan of government protection for small dealers. Much support also comes from the disgruntled peasants, particularly in southern Germany. In June, 1931, the estimated total debt of the farmers was three billion dollars, and since these people have no sympathy with the Marxist attitude towards private property, they tend to rally around the Nazi standards.

University students and graduates form another source of Nazi strength. The number of university students in the Reich increased by sixty per cent between 1914 and 1930, and thousands of unemployed educated persons have come to despair of any improvement in their lot under the existing system. Any program of overturn seems promising to them, and in addition they generally favor the ending of reparation payments, re-acquisition of colonies, and a large army. Finally, a number of industrialists, who fear the progress of communism more than they do the mild anti-capitalism of the National Socialists, also support Hitlerism. Herr Feder was careful to point out, on one occasion, that the proposed socialization of trusts was not aimed "at the real creators of our heavy industry — the Krupps, Kirdorffs, Thyssens, Mannesmanns, and Siemenses."

Labor and some of the stronger Catholic districts have given scant support to Hitler. Less than fifteen per cent of his following in 1932 came from the ranks of Labor, and even of this group a sizable portion doubtless was attracted by the promise

of a job through Nazi influence more than by political conviction.

As the election of September 14, 1930, approached, the Nazis did all in their power to profit by the difficulties confronting the government. "Germany Awaken" and "Work and Bread" were adopted as campaign slogans, and in the fortnight preceding the balloting over 30,000 well-attended meetings were held. The Nazi speakers constantly reminded their listeners of Germany's enslavement and of the governments subserviency to the Allies. The "war-guilt lie" was furiously attacked and reparation was denounced. The orators were generally vague and inconsistent in their promises, and contradiction was in no measure regarded as sinful. Hitler's election manifesto urged the voters to "send the betrayers of their future to the devil."

In protest against the existing conditions and against the apparent inability of the groups in control to remedy them, the voters, as has been indicated, cast their ballots in unprecedented numbers for the extremists of both right and left. Yet, Chancellor Brüning was able to muster sufficient moderate support in the Reichstag to remain in office until May, 1932.

Early in 1932 Chancellor Brüning suggested to the various party leaders that President von Hindenburg's term be extended by the Reichstag and the country thus spared the expense and trouble of an election. Hitler opposed this suggestion, and March 13 was set as the election date. Hindenburg and Hitler both were candidates, the latter becoming (February) a citizen by accepting an appointment as attache of the Brunswick legation at Berlin. Ernst Thälmann again was the candidate of the Communist Party, and the extreme nationalists nominated Theodor Duesterberg.

The campaign was spirited and aroused keen foreign interest. Hindenburg secured 18,650,730 votes, one-half of one per cent less than the required majority for election, and 7,250,000 votes more than Hitler, his nearest competitor. Thälmann was third with 4,983,000 ballots. A second election had to be held and the people went to the polls again on April 10. This time the president was reelected by a plurality of almost 6,000,000 votes in a total of about 36,500,000. **Von Hindenburg**, hailed even

in Paris as the "safest" of all the candidates, began his second seven-year term in his eighty-fifth year.

Two weeks after the presidential contest, the Hitlerites made sizable gains in a number of the state elections, particularly in Prussia. These advances were owing in part to measures taken by Brüning's Socialist-Centrist Government against the Nazis. The storm troops were dissolved and the wearing of the brown shirt uniforms was forbidden. On the other hand, many of the German people began to feel that the chancellor's system of government by emergency decree had accomplished but little. Unemployment figures continued high and the national budgetary deficit soared to \$400,000,000. Herr Brüning's conciliatory foreign policy, moreover, had brought Germany virtually no relief. The entreaties of Germany went unheeded, and France, England, the United States, and the League of Nations gave no indications of willingness to cooperate with the Berlin Government in a settlement of Europe's difficulties. Nationalists in Germany therefore clamored for more effective action, and on May 30, 1932, the Brüning cabinet resigned.

The president selected (May 31) as the new premier, Colonel Franz von Papen, the same who had been accused of illegal activities in the United States during the period of American neutrality. Von Papen chose for his colleagues a group of conservatives who soon were dubbed the "Almanach de Gotha Cabinet." It was evident that the new government could not command a majority in the Reichstag (elected in September, 1930) and the latter was immediately dissolved. New elections were called for July 31. In the meantime the Nazis were permitted once more to don their brown shirts and revive their military organization, and Defense Minister General Kurt von Schleicher, as well as other leaders of the government, publicly began to insist on equal treatment for Germany in the matter of armaments and security.

The Reichstag elections resulted in giving the Hitlerites 230 seats, an increase of 123 since 1930. Their popular vote, moreover, was double that of the previous parliamentary election. The Social Democrats captured 133 seats, and the Centrists, 97. The Reichstag was convened on August 30, 1932, and one of Hitler's lieutenants was elected Speaker. After some further

organization business, the house adjourned until September 12. When it reassembled, the chancellor immediately dissolved it and still another election was ordered for November. Von Papen feared that the body would vote down an economic reconstruction plan which had been launched by the government on September 5 and which contemplated the granting of loans to industry out of the public treasury in order that business might be stimulated and unemployment reduced. In all these cases the chancellor had the full support of President von Hindenburg. On the other hand, he was denounced by the fascists and communists as a dictator and an unconstitutional premier.

As had been expected, the election of November 6 failed to give any one party, or group of parties, control of the Reichstag. The total vote of the Nazis, however, fell off by about 2,000,000, while the Communist Party gained some 700,000 votes. It appeared, therefore, that the cabinet might continue its control without parliamentary restrictions, since the president insisted that the membership of the Reichstag must be such as to ensure the carrying out of definite policies before he would dismiss the ministry. It would be well to note here that the president and chancellor, provided they work in harmony, can thus establish a "constitutional dictatorship" over which the Reichstag has very little power.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND DECLINE

The German Empire of pre-war days was an efficient and closely knit economic organism deriving wealth and power from a fertile soil, an abundance of basic raw materials, a highly intelligent industrial leadership, a skilled and hard-working laboring class, a well-developed and coordinated network of rail- and waterways, overseas possessions, a thriving shipping business, profitable foreign investments, rich markets, and an excellent international credit standing. The conflict of 1914-1918, however, completely dislocated the intricate mechanism and made necessary widespread repairs and readjustments.

Not only did the war cause enormous material damage and death or permanent incapacity to millions of citizens, but the peace treaty, as has been indicated, deprived Germany of one-tenth of her population and one-eighth of her land area. The

defeated power lost about two-fifths of her coal supply, two-thirds of her iron-ore reserves, seven-tenths of her zinc, one-tenth of her manufacturing establishments, one-seventh of her agricultural production, all her colonies and foreign investments, most of her merchant marine, and nearly all her foreign trade contracts. In addition the young republic had to face a bitter and hostile Europe bent more upon hindering than aiding her revival, and to suffer a temporary occupation of her chief industrial region, the Ruhr. In only one respect was shattered Germany fortunate: there was no need to reconstruct war-torn areas,' since most of the actual fighting had been done on foreign soil.

During the years immediately following the war Germany sank lower and lower in the economic scale until the nadir was reached with the collapse of 1923. Just as dissolution seemed imminent, however, government and people united in a determined effort to save the honor of the fatherland and to rebuild its economic structure. Soon thereafter an upward trend set in which continued steadily for six years, until the middle of 1929. In the latter year, the aggregate volume of industrial output reached a point in excess of that of 1913. Germany actually seemed to be second only to the United States in industrial development, standards of living, and potential greatness.

This "industrial efflorescence" of the defeated power was the result of many causes. The enormous foreign sale of German currency and notes, the policy of inflation, and then the wholesale repudiation of the paper money, added some two billion dollars to the real wealth of the country. Benefit was also derived from an extraordinary influx of foreign capital, especially after the going into effect of the Dawes Plan. German foreign loans — national, local, and private — in the period 1924-1928 inclusive, reached a total of 6,800,000,000 marks, about 70% of which came from the United States. A large portion of this borrowed money was immediately reexported in the form of reparation payments, but the remainder was utilized in industrial rehabilitation and expansion.

Another factor which helped recovery was the introduction of the "rationalization movement" into every phase of German industrial and business life. Ascribing the phenomenal rise of

American industry to the ideas of rationalization and mass production, the Germans became convinced that only a coupling of these policies could lead to their economic regeneration. F. W. Taylor and Henry Ford, "fathers," respectively, of industrial efficiency and mass production, became heroes in the eyes of the Germans, and experts were delegated to investigate American methods and systems.

As early as 1921 there was established a National Efficiency Board (*Reichskuratorium für Wirtschaftlichkeit*) which studied, analyzed, and sought to solve the numerous commercial and industrial problems that confronted German industry. Other boards, official and private, concerned themselves with promoting efficiency in the fields of agriculture, management, and construction work. Specifically, the rationalization movement aimed at standardizing products and materials, introducing scientific management and planning, spreading vocational guidance and training, promoting the formation of trusts and combines to prevent duplication and ruinous competition, and coordinating the entire national production process.

Astounding savings were effected by rationalization. The average output per man, in the industries concerned, was 20% higher in 1930 than in 1913. In the coal industry, 562,000 persons in 1925 produced 133,000,000 tons of coal; in 1928, after considerable rationalization, 556,000 persons produced 151,000,000 tons. The number of employees in the automobile industry was reduced from 87,000 in 1925 to 83,000 in 1927, yet the value of the finished product rose during the same period from 771,000,000 to 908,000,000 marks. A large bank which in 1914 employed 334 persons to take care of 9080 accounts, required only 284 persons to handle 18,916 accounts in 1927. Similar results were obtained in agriculture and in other industrial departments.

That rationalization also had its drawbacks, no one could deny. The movement was sometimes carried to extremes, and the Germans themselves came to speak of the need for "rationalizing rationalization." Moreover, merely because certain methods were productive of gratifying results in the United States, was no guarantee that they would be equally useful under European conditions. The almost boundless hope placed in the value of

rationalization also encouraged extravagant borrowing and investments which later proved difficult to repay. It made hard any readjustment to smaller scale production when the supply ran ahead of the demand. Perhaps the strongest indictment against the system was the fact that it threw an increasing number of men out of employment. Despite these disadvantages the rationalization movement was a prime factor in Germany's economic renaissance.

Germany's industrial rise was owing, in addition, to what a competent observer called the three "c's" — coal, chemists, and cartels. Despite the loss of so much of her coal wealth, the republic had little cause to worry about power supply, and the demands of the iron and steel industries were met without difficulty. Extensive reorganization and mechanization of the mines, along with the achievement of a generally higher mining technique, brought production up to a level comparable to that of pre-war years. The coal areas within the present boundaries of Germany produced 140,800,000 tons of the mineral in 1913, but in 1927 they produced 153,600,000 tons. Besides, to compensate for the loss of some of the black coal reserves, the production of the less valuable but readily available brown coal or lignite was greatly increased. It rose from 87,000,000 tons in 1913 to 151,000,000 in 1927. Since the value of lignite is only one-fifth of that of coal, much of the product is converted at the source into electricity and then transported cheaply, efficiently, and directly as power.

The traditional renown of German chemists for skill and ingenuity was well upheld during and after the war, and Germany soon became the world's largest exporter of chemicals. Great advances have been made in the development of dyes, drugs,¹ fertilizers, and photographic materials, and remarkable success has been attained in the field of synthetics. There are already on the market a synthetic quinine substitute, synthetic camphor, indigo, wood alcohol (methanol), nitrates, rubber, gasoline, artificial silk, resin, and leather. The production of synthetic

¹ One of the most valuable drugs discovered was Bayer 205, a powder for the cure of African sleeping sickness. The discoverers of this drug "have refused to disclose its secret but have offered to make it a public formula if Germany is given back one of her African colonies." Cf. Luehr, E., *The New German Republic*, 1929, p. 348.

nitrates, involving the use of liquefied air, is the largest single branch of the chemical industry. The domestic output of nitrates increased from 12,000 tons in 1913 to 800,000 tons in 1928. The imports of Chilean nitrates decreased in the same proportion. Thus Germany rapidly minimized her dependence upon the outside world for the raw materials of industry.

Realizing the value of trust combinations for greater efficiency in production, the Germans perfected the "vertical" trust system, "uniting all stages and parts of an industrial process, such as coal mines, iron mines, steel mills, and shipyards." This form of industrial organization was more highly developed in Germany than in most other countries and the government supported rather than opposed the process of combination. Perhaps the greatest of the trust-builders was Hugo Stinnes (1870-1924), who was responsible for the gigantic Siemens-Rhein-Elbe-Schuckert-Union. At the time of his death Stinnes was said to have had an interest in 1388 business undertakings and to have controlled almost a fifth of Germany's total production. He owned lands, forests, hotels, paper mills, summer resorts, oil fields, newspapers, electrical establishments, banks, coal and iron mines, copper mines, aluminum works, and scores of other properties. Only below Stinnes in the business sphere ranked such names as Krupp, Siemens, Rathenau, Kirdorff, and Thyssen.

The trust was not the only form of combine popular in Germany. As early as 1873 there had appeared a type of organization known as the cartel which "may be loosely defined as any association of independent enterprises formed to regulate for the common benefit either prices, production, markets, or the conditions of purchase or sale, or for two or more of these purposes." It was a form of voluntary "economic planning," a forerunner of the compulsory economic planning embraced in the Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union.

On the eve of the World War there were in existence several hundred such cartels, but during the conflict they were not especially useful since the enormity of war needs virtually eliminated competition. After the war, and especially during the heyday of inflation, they enjoyed a mushroom growth. In 1923 there were about 1500 cartels. These so abused their

ability to control purchases, sales, and prices that a Cartel Law was passed (October, 1923) providing for publicity and for government supervision of their activities. Thenceforth the influence of cartels in the domestic economic system suffered a decline, but compensatory progress was made in the formation of international cartels, particularly in the steel, rail, and potash industries. The largest of these international production- and price-controlling organisms was the Continental Steel Cartel representing Germany, France, Belgium, the Saar, Luxemburg, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary. Permanency in international cartel organization, however, seemed doubtful since it was hard to make the members abide by their limited production quotas and harder still to make them pay fines for over-producing.¹

To all these causes for and achievements of German economic recovery must be added some further items. Government aid, financial and other, was not confined to industry. Shipping and other essential lines of endeavor received support as well. The Versailles Treaty reduced Germany's merchant marine to less than 500,000 tons, and this chiefly in coastwise vessels. The rebuilding of a merchant marine therefore was urgent and was undertaken with zest. 700,000,000 marks were advanced by the government at low interest to encourage shippers, and supplementary loans were made to shipyards to enable them to build cheaply and quickly.

In 1913 the German merchant marine had ranked second only to that of England. In 1920 it occupied twelfth place among the world's commercial fleets, following Spain and Denmark. By 1930 it had risen again to third place, behind England and the United States, with a tonnage well over the four-million mark. Although this still was equivalent to only four-fifths of Germany's pre-war tonnage, the ships now were new and up-to-date in construction. In 1929 the tonnage launched in Germany exceeded that in any other country, and in 1929 and 1930 the two new North German Lloyd liners, *Bremen* and *Europa*, broke all transatlantic speed records.

In lighter-than-air craft Germany similarly rose to a position

¹ Cf. Domeratzky, L., *The International Cartel Movement*, 1928, a *Trade Information Bulletin* (No. 556) of the U. S. Department of Commerce.

of preeminence. The dirigible *Graf Zeppelin*, in August, 1929, circumnavigated the globe in less than twelve days of flying time. Moreover, forbidden to manufacture war planes, the Germans developed commercial planes which achieved enviable records for safety and speed. Among the greatest accomplishments in the scientific field must be mentioned the *Deutsches Museum* in Berlin, perhaps the finest technological museum in the world, where the visitor may see in operation the simplest and the most complicated of old and new machines.

Much good accrued to Germany, finally, from the establishment therein of branches of American firms such as General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Eastman Kodak, Otis Elevator, Mergenthaler Linotype, and National Cash Register. These enterprises not only brought considerable quantities of American capital into the land, but also gave employment to large contingents of German labor and utilized German raw materials. The Germans observed and imitated the methods of these companies and readily adopted such American ideas as chain stores, "five-and-tens," ready-to-wear suits, and gum chewing. Berlin, in fact, with its "Roxy" theatre, its motor cars, its machinery, and its skyscrapers, generally strikes American tourists as being the most Americanized of all Continental cities.

But Germany's economic recovery was not destined to be of long duration. Even while prosperity and optimism rode high, factors appeared which forecast approaching decline. The adverse developments included the gradual replacement of supplies exhausted during the war; an increasing difficulty in securing foreign loans; continual reparation quarrels; inability to recapture completely the former great Russian market and other important pre-war customers; the lack of demand on the part of the government for military and naval supplies; high tariff walls and jealous attitudes on the part of Germany's new, small neighbors, and of the United States, England, and France; the tendency of Germans to cut down on the consumption of rye and potatoes in favor of wheat and vegetables, thus dooming many farmers to surplus crops and to debt; and the decreased requirements of man power owing to the progress of rationalization.

There was a gradual but steady increase in the number of un-

employed university graduates and workers, of both the overall and white-collar types. During the world-depression years following 1930 the situation became acute, and by 1932 it was estimated that Germany, with her population of less than 64,000,000, had an army of unemployed numbering 6,500,000. Unemployment insurance schemes and doles seemed utterly inadequate to meet the problem, and thus excellent campaign material was provided for the communist radicals and the Hitlerite reactionaries.

The government of Chancellor Brüning (1930-1932), supported by President von Hindenburg, strove heroically to deal with the crisis, but the international situation precluded any domestic solution of the difficulties. Despite its heavy reparation obligations the government had appropriated money prodigally during good times for various laudable but non-essential welfare projects and simultaneously had kept the per capita tax burden lower than that in either England or France. This procedure had been justified as the only means of forestalling revolution and securing loyal national support, but whatever its motivating force, the policy was dangerous since it necessitated undue reliance upon foreign loans and credits. A crash was destined to come just as soon as external conditions made further loans impracticable.

When the governments of Germany and Austria, in March, 1931, announced plans for the conclusion of an economic pact which savored of Anschluss, all the power of French finance and diplomacy was mobilized, as we have seen, to frustrate this move. French funds invested in the German-speaking countries were withdrawn and further loans made contingent upon unacceptable political terms. Apparently in order to prevent England from aiding the borrowers, the French drew heavily on the gold reserve of the Bank of England.¹ The latter therefore found it impossible to continue making short term loans to the Reich. Slight assistance was received from the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States, but so close to bankruptcy was Germany that only concerted international action could be of avail.

In June, 1931, it will be recalled, President Hoover proposed an international one-year moratorium on the Allied war debts and the postponable reparation items. Such an arrangement

¹ Cf. Einzig, P., *Behind the Scenes of International Finance*, 2 impr., 1932.

was actually effected, to run from July 1, 1931, to June 30, 1932. Early in the latter year, however, Chancellor Brüning announced in definite terms that Germany would not be able to resume reparation payments when the moratorium expired. The annual exportation of reparation moneys required consistently favorable balances of trade, and Germany could not possibly accumulate such balances under existing tariff and trade restricting conditions.

The Lausanne Conference on Reparation in June-July, 1932, did little to solve the dilemma, and Chancellor von Papen soon reiterated Brüning's declaration. Germany could not make further reparation while her economic life was stagnant.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

From 1919 to 1925 it was the chief aim of German diplomacy to regain for the fatherland admission into the family of nations as a member in good standing. This goal was not only urgent as a protective measure for the disarmed and weakened state, it was vitally necessary to the revival of the trade and commerce upon which German economic recovery depended. German statesmen, however, were divided on the question of whether the new orientation should look eastward or westward, toward Soviet Russia or the Allies. The group which preferred to look eastward advocated alliance with the Bolsheviks and eventual defiance of the oppressive treaty restrictions. Those who looked westward proposed the fulfillment of treaty obligations and reconciliation with the former enemies.

At first it appeared as though the pro-Russian view-point might triumph. On April 10, 1922, as we have seen, the German and Russian delegates to the Genoa Conference concluded a recognition pact and trade treaty at Rapallo. Four years later the principles of the Rapallo agreement were reaffirmed in a treaty of friendship and neutrality negotiated at Berlin.¹ Then, however, the eastward trend of German policy was temporarily halted by the diplomats who advocated "a policy of fulfillment and reconciliation." These men were led by Dr. Gustav Stresemann, often considered the greatest modern German statesman after Bismarck.

¹ For the terms of these treaties, see pp. 191-192.

Born on May 10, 1878, in Berlin, the son of a beer merchant, Stresemann studied at Berlin and Leipzig, specializing in philosophy, political science, and economics. He was a skillful organizer and when only twenty-three years old became secretary of the Union of Saxon Chocolate Manufacturers. Two years later he was one of the moving spirits in the founding of the League of Saxon Manufacturers, a body formed to reorganize the decadent local industries. In 1907 Stresemann was elected to the Reichstag as a National Liberal, and ten years later he became the head of his party — which was the party of big business. During the war he advocated the vigorous prosecution of hostilities and after the revolution he reorganized his followers into the German People's Party, which favored a monarchical form of government but was willing to support the republic in the interests of peace, internal unity, and business revival. As a member of the Weimar Assembly in 1919 he voted against acceptance of the Versailles Treaty.

In August, 1923, Stresemann became chancellor, but the great internal disorder, particularly in southern Germany, and the foreign occupation of the Ruhr, led to his downfall within a few months. Appointed foreign minister by his successor, Chancellor Wirth, he continued to occupy this post under ten successive ministries until his death in October, 1929. The cardinal points of Stresemann's foreign policy, the peace treaty having been signed, were reconciliation with France and Germany's reentry into the community of nations as a free, equal, and respected partner. A gifted orator, honest, and tactful, he soon acquired general trust and respect, though he did have numerous enemies both at home and abroad. In 1926 he, Briand, and Chamberlain were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their contributions (at Locarno) to the cause of world peace. Stresemann was seriously ill all his life, and the duties of office became increasingly strenuous and difficult as the years passed. On October 2, 1929, he saved the MiUler government from downfall over an unemployment insurance law by a brilliant and forceful, but tiring, speech. On the following day he died.

As foreign minister he had been responsible for the discontinuance of the policy of passive resistance in the Ruhr. He had urged with his utmost eloquence the adoption of the Dawes

Plan, thus preparing the way for the evacuation of the Ruhr, the restoration of confidence in German sincerity, and the negotiation of a number of advantageous commercial treaties. His greatest work was connected with the negotiation of the Locarno Treaties (1925) and the admission of Germany into the League (1926).

The story of Locarno, as has been indicated,¹ dated back to the years immediately following the war. It was apparent to competent observers even then that permanent peace in Europe was improbable so long as France and Germany continued to be suspicious of each other's actions, so long as France was haunted by the spectre of German recovery and revenge and Germany feared French designs on the Rhineland and on her economic strength. Stresemann several times suggested to France the signing of a guaranty pact, and in 1925 his proposal met with favor. The Locarno agreements resulted.

After the initialling of the Locarno treaties, Stresemann proceeded to secure ratification of his actions by the Reichstag. This he accomplished by November 27, 1925, over the bitter opposition of the Nationalists, who were not yet reconciled to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. The foreign minister was supported by Hindenburg, by the Social Democrats, and by a group of great industrialists who felt that more cordial diplomatic relations with France might well lead to improved business relations. On December 1 the treaties were signed in London, and on the same day, as a token of the new confidence, Allied military evacuation of the Cologne area was begun. Since the Locarno Pact was to go into force immediately upon Germany's admission to the League, the republic, in February, 1926, applied for membership. A special session of the Assembly was called for March.²

It was natural that Germany should request a permanent seat in the Council as one condition of her application for membership. To her surprise, however, this procedure was followed

¹ See pp. 198-201.

² Accompanying Germany's request for admission was a statement agreed to by the powers at Locarno to the effect that Article 16 of the Covenant bound a member only "to an extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account." This was insisted upon by Germany since the disarmed republic had no desire to become a battle ground in case of League action against a Continental state, or to permit the passage of French troops across her territory in case of a war between Poland and Russia.

by similar demands from Spain, Brazil, Poland, China, Czechoslovakia, and Persia. Immediately, a complicated situation arose. Stresemann insisted that Germany's admission be free of any international bargaining. Yet, since Spain and Brazil happened to occupy non-permanent seats in the Council, their votes were needed to give Germany a permanent seat. To make matters worse, it soon became clear that Chamberlain was supporting the Spanish position while Briand was upholding the case of Poland. Stresemann finally exclaimed that he would never have signed the Locarno treaties had he known of the intrigue apparently connected with their negotiation. The Swedish delegate to the Council, Dr. Unden, next announced that he would not vote to give Poland a permanent seat since all the circumstances involved were contrary to the spirit of the Covenant. Sweden did not waver from this position despite the threat of one foreign power to cancel a large order that had been placed for Swedish telephones and of another to renounce a commercial treaty already negotiated with Sweden.

Neither Council nor Assembly could reconcile the differences, and the League adjourned until September without having acted on Germany's application. A committee was appointed to work out a compromise solution and the delegates scattered, some angry, some disappointed. So great was the reaction in Germany to what was considered unfair treatment, that the policy of eastward orientation once more appeared attractive. It was at this time that the Treaty of Berlin already referred to was concluded with Russia.

When the Assembly met again in September, 1926, Germany was unanimously elected to membership and was given the only additional permanent seat in the Council. By another resolution, however, the number of non-permanent Council members was increased from six to nine and three-year terms for these seats were established. It was expected that Spain, Brazil, and Poland would be elected to such seats, but the former two powers at once gave notice of their intention to withdraw from the League.

German membership in the League soon led to further encouraging developments. In 1927 the last of the Allied commissions in Germany were withdrawn. In the same year a

German, Ludwig Kastl, was appointed to the Permanent Mandates Commission. In 1928 Germany, again thanks to the efforts of Stresemann, adhered to the Kellogg Pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. At the meeting of the League Assembly in 1928 the way was opened for a renewal of reparation parleys, which finally ended in the adoption of the Young Plan (1929) and the complete evacuation of the Rhine territory (1930).

After his death, Stresemann's foreign policies were continued for a time by his friend and successor, Dr. Julius Curtius, but the latter resigned in 1931 over the unsuccessful attempt at economic union with Austria. Thereafter success was less frequent. The conduct of foreign relations became increasingly difficult as a result of the activities of the Hitlerites and other nationalists and the unswerving diplomatic intransigence of France. In 1932 the von Papan cabinet, and particularly Defense Minister von Schleicher, took a firmer stand on the questions of equality in armaments and relief from the reparation burden, but Europe as yet seemed unprepared to grant these concessions.

Although many of the post-war grievances which had irritated the Germans were removed by the close of 1932, there remained as highly disturbing factors the questions of Germany's eastern frontiers,¹ union with Austria, reacquisition of the colonies, repudiation of sole war guilt, equality with the other Great Powers in armaments, and further revision of the reparation schedule. These problems, it would seem, must be solved before the thought of permanent world peace can materialize.

¹ For a discussion of Danzig and the Polish Corridor see pp. 472-475.

CHAPTER XVI

TWO HEIRS OF THE HABSBURGS

THE AUSTRIAN REPUBLIC

a. COLLAPSE, 1918-1919

On November 21, 1916, the aged Emperor-King Francis Joseph died. His reign of sixty-eight years ended, as it had begun, in the midst of tumult and warfare. He was succeeded by his grandnephew, who was crowned Charles the First, and then nicknamed "Charles the Last."

Charles was good-natured and heroic, but inexperienced in statecraft and unable to meet with energy the exigencies of any critical situation. Though his intentions usually were of the best, his decisions often were belated and his actions clumsy. It was his misfortune to become emperor-king and supreme war lord at one of the most critical times in the history of his dynasty.

The events of 1916 to 1918 broke down the morale of the Austro-Hungarian people. The news of the Russian revolutions, the entry of the United States into the war, and the skillful dissemination of Allied propaganda behind the lines helped to undermine the faith of the people in their government, particularly since the latter followed a policy of unbending military autocracy. To make matters worse, the Czechs intrigued against the monarchy, there was mutiny among the Slavic and Hungarian troops and the sailors in the Adriatic, and the people in many of the cities faced starvation. The final blows to Habsburg power came with the appearance in the Vienna streets of mobs shouting: "All power to the Soldiers' and Workers' Councils," and a resolution of the German deputies in the parliament at Vienna to proclaim a separate German-Austrian state.

In a last desperate effort to **hold** his crumbling domains together, Charles issued a manifesto (October 16, 1918) calling

for the formation of a new Austrian federative state in which each people should form an autonomous community. But it was too late for federation. On November 11, nine days after the armistice was signed with Italy, Emperor Charles abdicated.¹ In order not to "set his person as a barrier to the free development of the people whom he loved," Charles definitely renounced any participation in the further administration of the state. Immediately after his abdication he left Vienna for his castle at Eckartsau, and four months later he and his family went to Switzerland as exiles.

Even before Charles had quitted Vienna, the Social Democrats, Christian Socialists, and German Nationals had set up a provisional government in German-Austria by an almost bloodless revolution. On November 12 this Provisional Government issued a tentative constitution which declared German-Austria to be a republic and an integral part of the newly formed German Reich. The black and gold standard of the emperors was replaced by a red, white, and red banner, and Vienna, the erstwhile Imperial City, became the capital of the republic. Meanwhile the non-German portions of the defunct Dual Monarchy had formed the new states of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, or had gone to increase the territories of Italy, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Poland. The general absence of violence attending the break-up of the monarchy was due, in large measure, to the action of Charles in releasing his former officials from the oath of allegiance to him which they had taken upon his accession.

In the interim between the declaration of the German-Austrian Republic and the elections for a constituent assembly in February, 1919, the Provisional Government watched over Austria's welfare. The presidency of the government was rotated among the controlling party leaders, nearly all of whom were Social Democrats or Christian Socialists, men who had no intention of permitting Austria to become a communist state and who quickly suppressed a number of minor Red uprisings. Outstanding among these politicians were Otto Bauer, Victor Adler, Karl Renner, Karl Seitz, and Ignaz Seipel, all of whom desired to establish law and order at the earliest possible moment. Doubtless this was a fortunate circumstance in view of the difficulties

¹ Two days later he abdicated as king of Hungary.

and hardships that faced the Austrians immediately after the war.

At the conclusion of military hostilities thousands of armed Czech, Polish, and Hungarian troops marched home through Austria from the various fronts. Over a million Russian and Italian ex-prisoners of war returned home after their release, and though most of them probably were anxious to leave Austria as quickly as possible, they not infrequently paused by the way-side to snatch some compensation for their long suffering in the prison camps. In Vienna itself, the returned and starving German-Austrian soldiers threatened violence unless food and shelter were provided.

As a member of the Dual Monarchy, German-Austria had been the center of a relatively self-sufficient economic unit. It had received many of its raw materials and foodstuffs from Bohemia and Moravia, had secured grain from Galicia and Hungary, had had two excellent ports on the Adriatic, and had sold its manufactured products to the various parts of the empire as well as to foreign countries. All this was changed with the collapse that followed the military defeat. The great iron, steel, automobile, railway, electrical, textile, paper, and banking industries were ruined because the raw materials now were located in foreign areas, because high tariff walls were raised against Austrian products by nationalistic neighbors, and because Austria could raise only about one-tenth of the food supply that she needed for her population.

The unemployment problem soon became appalling. Every important organization in Austria was overstaffed as a result of the territorial losses. The Austrian bureaucracy had been notorious for its numerous employees, and now thousands of officials were without a livelihood. The same was true of thousands of postmen, railwaymen, bank clerks, and newspapermen. Doctors, professors, and merchants were starving to death, not to mention the large numbers of former army and navy officers and the dispossessed aristocrats.

For a period of four months after the close of armed warfare, the Allies maintained their food blockade of the Central Powers. Austria suffered severely from this action, and in 1919 some 40,000 Austrian children were sent abroad, especially to the

Scandinavian countries, to be fed and brought up. Another 90,000 children were exported in the first half of 1920. For a time, many of the unemployed, starving, and freezing Viennese were sent into the Vienna Forest to chop down trees for firewood which the wealthier inhabitants purchased, not because they needed or wanted it, but because that seemed the most expedient way to keep the proletariat busy and relatively quiet. Conditions were somewhat improved when the American Relief Administration came to Austria.¹

b. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The chaos and disruption which threatened Austria in the winter of 1918-1919 gave rise to a general desire for the early restoration of order and economic stability. Hence the assembly elections of February, 1919, conducted on a basis of proportional representation and universal suffrage, resulted in a triumph for the moderate parties. The Provisional Government resigned and control was placed in the hands of a "Pink Coalition," consisting of the urban Social Democrats, who secured a plurality of the seats, and the agrarian Christian Socialists. Karl Seitz was elected president of the Constituent Assembly and Karl Renner became chancellor. Both of these men were Social Democrats.

The Constituent Assembly confirmed the declaration of the Provisional Government to the effect that German-Austria was a republic and an integral part of Germany. Then the Habsburg family was banished, its property was confiscated, and a foreign policy was charted that would suit Austria's position as a member of the German federation. No effort was made to negotiate for the maintenance of any of the economic arrangements that formerly had existed with the other parts of the Dual Monarchy. Under these circumstances, it occasioned a severe shock to the authorities at Vienna to learn from the French Foreign Office, just prior to the publication of the German peace treaty, that the contemplated union between Germany and Austria would not be permitted by the Allies.

The Treaty of St. Germain, which Austria was compelled to

¹ The horrible situation, particularly in Vienna, is vividly described by Robert Neumann in his novel, *Flood*.

accept in September, 1919, confirmed this prohibition and stipulated that union might take place only with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Inasmuch as Council decisions, in general, have to be unanimous, the outlook for union, or Anschluss, was doubtful, to say the least. Even the name "German-Austrian Republic" had to be purged of the word "German" and changed to "Republic of Austria." The assembly had no choice now other than to proceed, under protest, with the making of a permanent constitution, for this matter had been suspended in order that the document might be made to fit in with the projected German constitution. Finally, on October 1, 1920, the assembly adopted an instrument which followed closely the outline of a draft presented by the Christian Socialists. The latter, fearing the dominance of the numerous and radical Vienna proletariat in any centralized state, had devised a federal system similar to that in Switzerland.

The constitution created a government consisting of a president and a bicameral legislature. The lower house, called *Nationalrat* or National Council, is composed of members elected for four years by all citizens over twenty. The National Council must assemble within thirty days after its election and cannot be prorogued or dissolved except by its own resolution or law. The upper house, called *Bundesrat* or Federal Council, contains a minimum of three and a maximum of twelve representatives from each of the nine provinces or *Länder*. The representatives are elected by the provincial diets and the powers of the Federal Council are chiefly advisory. The chancellor and cabinet are responsible to the lower house and may be impeached by a simple resolution of that body.

Together the two councils constitute the Federal Assembly which, until 1929, had the power to elect a president for a four-year term by secret ballot. In 1929 provision was made for popular presidential elections. A president may be reelected only once, and any citizen over thirty-five, except members of the former ruling house, is eligible for the office. Every act of the president must be countersigned by the chancellor or appropriate cabinet minister. There is no provision for a vice-president.

The initiative and a restricted type of referendum are provided for, particularly where a change in the constitution is

contemplated. The provincial diets retain considerable local autonomy and in numerous instances the enforcement of laws passed by the National Council also is left in their hands. Judicial supremacy is one of the leading characteristics of the government, and the Supreme Court has extensive powers of review. In the matter of social, labor, and agrarian reforms, the Constituent Assembly contented itself with outlining an extensive program, the execution of which was left to the provinces.

The first parliamentary elections under the new constitution were held on October 17, 1920. The Social Democrats lost their plurality to the Christian Socialists, partly through quarrels within their own ranks, partly because of a general dissatisfaction with the Treaty of St. Germain, and partly owing to a wave of anti-Semitism. Two days after the election the Christian Socialists combined with the Pan-German Party to form a new government, the fourth in the history of the republic. On November 25 and 26 the elections for the upper house took place, and on December 9 the Federal Assembly elected Dr. Michael Hainisch, a man of considerable scholastic repute, to be Austria's first president. In the same month Austria was admitted to membership in the League of Nations.

Almost fifteen months after the adoption of this constitution the boundaries of the new republic were finally delimited (December, 1921). Austria comprises nine provinces: Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and Vienna. The Klagenfurt Basin in Carinthia was conceded to Austria rather than to Yugoslavia only after a plebiscite, held on October 10, 1920, had shown that an overwhelming majority of the inhabitants preferred this settlement. Austria's possession of Burgenland was disputed until late in 1921 by Hungary, who withdrew her troops from the area only upon the motion of the Council of Ambassadors. A special plebiscite held on December 17, 1921, in the city and environs of Odenburg (Sopron) in Burgenland, under the supervision of an Italian general, resulted in the eventual award of that district to the Magyars. The area of Austria is 32,369 square miles, and the estimated population in 1932 was 6,680,000. The inhabitants of the city of Vienna alone numbered over **1,800,000.**

C STORM AND STRESS, 1921-1927

During the year 1921 economic conditions in Austria became worse and worse. The winter of 1920-1921 was particularly harsh and thousands starved to death. The government's recourse to inflation only made matters more complicated and the Austrian crown, worth twenty cents at par, soon stood at nearly three thousand to the dollar. Early in 1921 the despairing authorities appealed to the League for funds with which to purchase food for the hungry populace. The reply of the League was to send a commission to investigate the Austrian problem. Meanwhile various international loans and credits, totaling over \$170,000,000, and charitable expenditures to the extent of some \$50,000,000, provided temporary relief.

The terrible economic situation gave an added impetus to the movement for union with Germany. On February 10, 1921, a bill which ordained a plebiscite on the Anschluss was presented to the National Council. If the vote favored union, the government should petition the League for its consent. The Allied Powers, however, refused to permit the holding of the plebiscite and threatened to punish Austria if the bill were passed. The proposal, accordingly, was dropped, but a number of the provinces decided that even if Austria were forbidden to unite with Germany, this prohibition could not apply to the individual provinces. On April 24, 1921, a plebiscite in the Tyrol endorsed union by a vote of 145,302 to 1805. Salzburg, on May 29, voted for union by a count of 103,000 to 800. When Styria and Upper Austria prepared to hold similar plebiscites, the Allies threatened intervention and the central government exerted sufficient political pressure to block the project.

In June, 1921, Dr. Johann Schober, President of Police in Vienna and leader of the Pan-Germans, became premier of another coalition cabinet. He remained in control until May, 1922, though he twice had to reconstruct his cabinet in the interval. The Schober governments spent considerable time discussing ameliorative financial measures and countermanded a number of the steps toward socialization which had been taken by the earlier and more radical ministries. The republic also participated in the conference of Porto Rosa at which several of the Danubian states readjusted their tariff schedules in favor of

one another. By the Treaty of Lana, Czechoslovakia extended a credit of half a billion Czech crowns to Austria for trade purposes, in return for a pledge of friendship. A budget crisis finally resulted in Schober's overthrow.

On June 1, 1922, there came into power as chancellor Mgr. Ignaz Seipel, a middle-aged Jesuit priest who was leader of the Christian Socialist Party. Seipel conciliated the Pan-Germans so that they continued to vote with the Christian Socialists, and then proceeded on a foreign tour to secure financial aid for Austria. Premier Facta of Italy took the occasion to announce that Italy would consider any sort of union between Austria and Germany, or Austria and the other Danubian states, as a cause for war. Seipel, accordingly, visited not only Germany and Czechoslovakia, but England and Italy as well, and finally (September, 1922) addressed a special appeal to the League.

The League Council, after due investigation and deliberation, submitted to Austria for ratification a plan whereby England, France, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Spain, and Holland should guarantee a loan of 650,000,000 gold crowns (\$131,690,000) to run for twenty years. Such Austrian assets as the government tobacco monopoly should serve as security and Austria should pledge certain economic reforms. The League should appoint a commissioner-general and a committee of control made up of one member from each of the guarantor countries. Both of these authorities should reside at Vienna, but there should be no infringement of Austrian sovereignty. Finally, the republic's territorial and economic integrity should once more be guaranteed and Austria repeat her promise not to alienate her own independence.

The Austrian Parliament ratified this arrangement in November, 1922, and passed a Law of Full Powers authorizing the ministry until the end of 1924 to do all things necessary for the carrying out of the financial arrangement. Dr. Alfred Zimmermann of Rotterdam became the League Commissioner and in 1924 a new monetary unit, the schilling, with a par value of about fourteen cents, replaced the crown. Financial progress was rapid and in 1925 Austria was able to show satisfactory closed accounts for the year. Hence the Council, in June,

1926, decided that League control should come to an end with that month.

Similar advances could not be reported in other fields. The general unrest was alarming and in 1924 there followed in fairly rapid succession a socialist's attempt to assassinate Seipel, a strike of 60,000 metal workers, and a serious railway strike. The Jesuit chancellor resigned, to be succeeded in December, 1924, by another Christian Socialist, Rudolf Ramek. At this time Dr. Hainisch was reelected president for a second term.

The domestic difficulties continued during Ramek's incumbency and by the close of 1925 the number of unemployed was over a quarter-million. The discontent and economic stagnation once more brought to the fore the idea of Anschluss, and in February, 1925, leading German and Austrian officials referred to the matter before a large gathering at Magdeburg. Anschluss demonstrations became so popular that Italy and the Little Entente warned the government to prevent any overt action.

In October, 1926, Ramek resigned, ostensibly because of trouble with the civil employees, actually because of the connection of his political coterie with a bank scandal. He was succeeded by Mgr. Seipel who soon came into conflict with the Social Democrats over old-age and invalid pensions. After new elections in April, 1927, Seipel formed another government. In July the cabinet was faced with a situation closely approaching civil war. To understand this crisis it is necessary to consider the development of two powerful, rival political organizations, the *Heimwehr* and the *Schutzbund*.

d. HEIMWEHR AND SCHUTZBUND

From the earliest days of the republic there has existed a bitter feeling between the industrial and the rural interests in Austria. The workers of Vienna, of the plain in eastern Austria which extends southward from Vienna as far as Wiener-Neustadt, and of the Styrian mining districts, form an industrial proletariat with socialistic and anti-clerical leanings. These workers are the core of the Social Democratic Party. Most of the remaining Austrians are agrarian, conservative, and religious. They support the Christian Socialist and Pan-German parties and are bitterly opposed to Marxian socialism.

After the war Vienna fell completely into the hands of the Social Democrats and municipal control was extended to a wide variety of fields. Rents were forced down by law to so low a figure that apartment houses became a drug on the market. In addition a high rent-tax was levied, the proceeds of which were used to build municipal houses for the workmen. The buildings were constructed so as to provide plenty of light and air space for the tenants and usually enclosed an attractive courtyard decorated with the bust of some well-known socialist leader. The *Karl Marx Hof*, completed in 1930, was the largest dwelling house in Europe, being more than three-fifths of a mile long and containing almost 1400 apartments.

The municipality has also acquired control of bus and trolley lines and subway, water, and lighting systems. It has established a municipal brewery, bakery, ice-shop, and crematorium, the last over the strenuous protests of the Catholic Church. Many of the old parade grounds have been converted into public swimming pools and playgrounds. A number of the former palaces have been leased as office buildings and the remainder made to serve the use of various government bureaus.

Most of this is anathema to the conservative peasants, and the bitterness between Vienna and the rural hinterland has expressed itself openly in the organization of two rival militant bodies, the agrarian Heimwehr and the socialist Schutzbund. The program of the Heimwehr, or Austrian Fascists, calls for the overthrow of the socialists in Vienna and union with Germany. Under the leadership of Drs. Richard Steidle and Walter Pfriemer and the wealthy Prince Ernst von Starhemberg, the Heimwehr has associated itself with the Hitler movement in Germany. The Heimwehr included (1931) approximately 60,000 armed men of whom only ten per cent were workmen.

The Schutzbund counted (1931) a trained membership of about 90,000 men, concentrated in the industrial regions. It seems to possess considerable quantities of munitions and war supplies, stored away in secret hiding places such as the office buildings of socialist newspapers, but the government from time to time raids these private arsenals. With annoying frequency the Heimwehr and the Schutzbund arrange for parades or demonstrations in approximately the same place on the same

day, and then the government has all it can do to preserve order. Since, under the peace treaty, Austria's army is limited to 30,000 men, the government really has the smallest armed force in the country.

Now it happened that on July 14, 1927, a jury acquitted three members of the Heimwehr who had been accused of the murder of two socialists in Burgenland. Public sentiment throughout Austria stamped the accused as guilty, and on the day following the verdict, without any preliminary warning, thousands of Viennese workmen went on strike, swarmed into the fashionable *Ringstrasse*, overpowered a small police force, and set fire to the beautiful Palace of Justice. Rioting continued for three days, during which scores of people were killed and hundreds wounded. The palace was partially destroyed, thousands of documents and records were burned, water-soaked, or scattered, and business temporarily came to a standstill.

Following this crisis, clashes between the two organized factions occurred in alarmingly rapid succession. Among the more dangerous affrays were those at Feldkirch in March, 1928, at Wiener-Neustadt in October, 1928, at Gloggnitz and in Vienna in February, 1929, and again in Vienna in August and November, 1929. Several times during 1929 and 1930 the Heimwehr threatened to march on Vienna as the Italian Fascists had marched on Rome, and put an end to what they considered a weak parliamentary government. On September 13, 1931, Dr. Pfriemer actually proclaimed himself dictator and ordered his followers to seize some public buildings in Styria. The Austrian army, however, quickly put down the attempted *Putsch* and some of the leaders were arrested. In December all the accused were acquitted by a jury in Graz. It seemed highly dubious whether Austria could enjoy any real degree of domestic quiet so long as the Heimwehr and Schutzbund continued to exist as private militias.

e. FOREIGN QUESTIONS, 1927-1932

During the years from 1927 to 1929 Chancellor Seipel was pre-occupied with important German and Italian relations. The perennial question of Anschluss again assumed prominence and in 1927 a German and an Austrian committee met to discuss

ways and means for giving the two countries an identical criminal code. In November of the same year Chancellor Marx and Foreign Minister Stresemann of Germany paid visits of friendship to Austria, and in September, 1928, a Pan-German Jurists Congress, held at Salzburg, was attended by the German Minister of Justice. In the summer of 1928 some two hundred thousand Germans visited Austria during a Schubert Festival * and there was frequent expression of a desire for political as well as intellectual union. Yet, in December, 1928, the Austrian Federal Assembly elected Wilhelm Miklas, an opponent of Anschluss, to succeed President Hainisch. Chancellor Seipel had proposed a revision of the constitution so that the popular Hainisch might be elected for a third term, but the project had been defeated.

A serious foreign complication arose in February, 1928, out of two speeches of sympathy made before the Austrian Parliament by Chancellor Seipel and Deputy Kolb for the alienated Germans in the South Tyrol under Italian rule. Although the speakers did no more than express condolence for the plight of their fellow-nationals, the Italian Minister at Vienna was recalled to Rome for a conference with Mussolini. Il Duce made a characteristically strong and warning speech, and Seipel found it expedient to make another and more conciliatory speech in July. Thereupon the Italian Minister returned to his post.

In April, 1929, Seipel unexpectedly resigned the chancellorship. His retirement apparently was due to strife within the Christian Socialist ranks, to criticism of his double rôle as cleric and statesman, and to ill health (he died three years later). Ernst Streeruwitz now became chancellor with a cabinet containing six pro-Anschluss members. His tenure was brief and stormy. In June, 1929, Aristide Briand informed the League that the various armed forces of Austria made her a menace to her neighbors. The Austrian Government denied this, but the socialists claimed that the authorities were in collusion with the Heimwehr. This accusation prompted the Heimwehr leaders to advocate a revision of the constitution whereby the powers of the industrial proletariat would be decreased. When Streeruwitz

¹ The festival was held to commemorate the one hundredth anniversary of the death of Schubert.

opposed some of the suggested changes, his ministry fell and Johann Schober came back into power (September, 1929) with a moderate and able cabinet.

Schober faced some critical moments in trying to steer a course between radicals and conservatives. In November he was told by the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, that an Austrian lapse from parliamentary government would be regarded as a menace to European stability. On December 7, therefore, Schober succeeded in having passed a series of constitutional amendments of his own. They did not interfere with Austria's federal structure, but diverted part of Vienna's revenues to the treasury of Lower Austria, strengthened the powers of the president in time of crisis, substituted popular for parliamentary election of the president, and reduced the political power of the courts.

Having thus taken action to restore order, Chancellor Schober attended the Hague Reparation Conference in January, 1930, and obtained the definite promise that Austria would not be required to meet any further reparation payments until 1943. Then, as a first step in a campaign for foreign monetary aid, Schober paid a visit to Italy (February, 1930). After an interview with Mussolini, he signed with the Italians a pact of friendship and conciliation providing for the judicial settlement of any disputes that might arise between the two neighbors. Nothing was said of the South Tyrol, but Italy promised to look with favor upon the prospect of a new Austrian loan. Schober also went to Berlin lest the impression be given that the Austro-Italian *rapprochement* precluded a possible future Anschluss, and negotiated an Austro-German commercial treaty. He next visited London and Paris and assured the League that he would do his utmost to remove the menace of private armies from his country.

In accordance with this promise the chancellor, upon his return, introduced a disarmament bill into parliament. It proposed to shift the supervision of private stores of munitions from provincial to federal control and increased the penalties for violation of the national arms laws. The measure was passed in June, 1930, although the Social Democrats protested that it was only a blind to foreign countries and in no way decreased the

danger of Heimwehr activities. The socialists were somewhat appeased, however, by the deportation of Major Waldemar Pabst, chief of staff of the Heimwehr and accomplice in the Kapp conspiracy of 1920 in Germany.

One month later Schober had the satisfaction of seeing the loan closed which Austria so urgently needed. The loan was for about \$62,000,000, at 7%, for 27 years. Since the bonds were issued at 95, the investors received considerably more than the stated rate of interest. Owing to the economic stress under which all Europe labored from 1930 on, the economic outlook for Austria remained bleak, despite the loan. Her balance of trade became increasingly unfavorable and unemployment figures jumped so as to include, at one time in 1930, one workman out of every four in the land. In September, 1930, the Schober cabinet, having lost the support of the Christian Socialists over the appointment of a Heimwehr leader as manager of the state railways, was toppled from power. In the next two years Austria was governed under four different chancellors, none of whom seemed able to remove the danger of impending national bankruptcy.¹

f. ANSCHLUSS

The objections of France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and other countries to an Austro-German union are based on a variety of considerations: (1) Alone, the area of Germany is less than that of France; united with Austria, Germany's area would exceed that of France. (2) The combined populations of Germany and Austria are almost one and three-quarter times that of France. (3) Were Austria annexed to Germany, then Czechoslovakia, herself containing over three million Germans, would be half surrounded by German territory. (4) Anschluss would make Germany, rather than weak Austria, the immediate neighbor of Italy and might thereby complicate the question of South Tyrol. (5) An Austro-German union, by placing a solid, powerful block across central Europe, would weaken the Franco-Czech and Franco-Yugoslavic alliances from a military point of

¹ To save the expense of a general presidential election as provided for by the constitutional amendment of 1929, the parliament, on October 9, 1931, reelected Wilhelm Miklas for another term of four years.

view. In addition, Germany would secure direct contact with the Balkans. (6) Though Austria has little coal, she has plenty of iron and timber and a superabundance of hydroelectric power. The combined economic strength of Germany and Austria would thus be exceedingly formidable.

The two countries immediately concerned would experience certain further advantages. Austria would have a free market in Germany, would be able to secure better commercial treaties with foreign areas, and could make use of Germany's highly developed marketing system. Germany would find her trade relations with southeastern Europe greatly facilitated, would have the use of Austria's splendid power resources, and would secure a sizable accretion to her military strength.

Not all the citizens of Germany and Austria favor Anschluss. Many German Protestants, for example, are not at all anxious to incorporate in the Reich over six million Austrian Catholics. Some Germans feel that the Austrians, on the whole, are too easy-going and carefree in their business as well as private lives to be desirable adjuncts to the population. They believe that Germany has pulled Austria's chestnuts out of the fire often enough and should not be called upon to do so any more.

On the other hand, many devout Austrian Catholics fear the loss of influence of the Church in case of union with Protestant Germany. There is also a general dislike of Prussia. The Austrians, except for some of the more progressive business men, do not seem to care for Prussian efficiency methods. Some Viennese fear that union with Germany might reduce Vienna to the status of a second-rate provincial city with a glorious past but an overshadowed present.¹

Two important organizations have been formed to agitate for Anschluss. One is the *Deutsch-Osterreichische Arbeitsgemeinschaft*, or German-Austrian Labor Association, with a limited but

¹ Briand, in a speech before the French Chamber in December, 1928, was reported to have advanced the following bizarre theory of the rights of minorities: "You often hear invoked the formula of the right of minorities. If, in a given state, nine-tenths of the population want to commit political suicide by wiping their country off the map, and if there remained only one-tenth who are so strongly attached to their country as to be opposed to its disappearance, I say that this minority has the right to have its desire of existing as a nation complied with. It would be an inadmissible act to impose upon it brutally, by the will of the majority, the disappearance of its country."

important membership and with headquarters in Vienna. Its purposes are to draw up a program in accordance with which the various institutions of Germany and Austria can eventually be assimilated, and to work against any tendency or action which might create new differences in the political or social organizations of the two countries. The other group is the *Deutsch-Osterreichischer Volksbund*, or German-Austrian Peoples' Union, whose chief activity is centered in Germany. The Union specializes in the staging of popular Anschluss demonstrations and meetings on both sides of the border. It was largely responsible for the Pan-German aspect assumed by the Schubert celebration in 1928.

In 1930 the movement for Anschluss and the *Heim-ins-Reich-Gedanke* (Back-into-the-Commonwealth Thought) were stronger, officially, in Austria than in Germany. But in 1931, as we have seen,¹ economic necessity drove the two states into signing a protocol for a projected customs union. This was immediately and vehemently opposed by France, the Little Entente, and other powers, and financial pressure was brought to bear to make Germany and Austria renounce the document. Soon thereafter the World Court, by a vote of eight to seven, rendered an advisory opinion that the contemplated pact would have violated Austria's pledge of 1922 not to jeopardize her independence.

Though the renunciation of the scheme eased the international tension in Europe, it left unsolved the economic difficulties into which Austria had been plunged. In 1932 the world witnessed in Austria a sovereign state literally begging the League for a credit extension of a few millions of dollars in order that the starving inhabitants might be fed. The republic strove frantically to secure favorable trade treaties with her neighbors, usually without avail. The authorities resorted to desperate methods in vain attempts to prevent further decrease in the country's diminutive gold supply. The leading banks crashed, and finally no funds were left with which to pay out doles.

During the summer of 1932 money was offered Austria — under political conditions which were unacceptable to her patriots. At length, however, economic need overcame all other considerations, and on August 23 the parliament, by a vote of 82 to 80, ratified the Lausanne Protocol, a document drawn

¹ See p. 178.

up under League auspices whereby Austria received a loan of \$42,000,000 for twenty years in return for a promise that the republic would not enter into any political or economic union with Germany until 1952. The fight for acceptance of the protocol was led by Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, a Christian Socialist. The opposition, which included the Pan-Germans, the Agrarian League, and various groups of fascists, was headed by Dr. Schober. In the midst of the debates on the protocol, Schober died. Four days later the document was ratified.

Few men today would dare predict the future of Austria, but among the Austrians themselves there is still considerable faith in the age-old prophecy: *Austria erit in orbe ultima* — Austria will endure on earth forever.

THE KINGDOM OF HUNGARY

a. THE FAILURE OF LIBERALISM

The uncompromising attitude of the ruling Magyars towards their subject nationalities did much to hasten the collapse of Hungary after the war. Just as the Germans in Austria had clung to their privileged position even in the darkest war days, so the Magyars in Hungary had obstinately disregarded the demands of their national minorities for more liberal political and social treatment. Indeed, when Charles issued his Austrian Federalization Manifesto on October 16, 1918, the Magyar leaders, not caring to have a similar decree promulgated with respect to Hungary, declared the *Ausgleich* of 1867 void.¹ An independent Hungary was proclaimed, joined with Austria only through the person of the sovereign. To the dismay of the Hungarian Premier, this action inspired the parliamentary deputies of the subject Rumanians and Slovaks to insist on similar rights of self-determination. Moreover, when Wilson, on October 18, recognized the independence of Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia, the respective minorities in Hungary at once demanded union with their fellow-nationals. Dissolution appeared inevitable.

In Austria, the existence of a fairly numerous bourgeois group

¹ The *Ausgleich* was the document which regulated Austro-Hungarian relations from 1867 to 1918.

had been responsible for the maintenance of a semblance of order even when the disruptive crisis was at its height, but in Hungary, where landholding nobles and servile peasants comprised perhaps three-fourths of the population, there was less temperance. A brief initial period of restraint was owing to the influence of Count Michael Karolyi. On October 24 and 25, 1918, Karolyi organized a National Council made up of his personal followers in parliament, plus compatible elements from the socialistic and non-Magyar groups outside parliament. This revolutionary coalition, backed by the Budapest garrison, demanded and secured Karolyi's appointment as premier.

The man who thus came into power was a liberal and a republican. Despite his noble ancestry and great wealth he had been conspicuous as an agitator for universal suffrage and the breaking up of large estates. During the war he was an outspoken pacifist, was consistently opposed to the policies of Germany, and professed to fear worse consequences from a German victory than an Austro-Hungarian defeat. He was relatively popular with the Allies and hoped to secure special treatment for his country by assuming control. One of his first official acts as premier was to secure a release (November 2) for his subordinates from the oath of fealty to Charles. Then, after ordering the withdrawal from the fronts and the immediate demobilization of all Hungarian troops, he proceeded to Belgrade in an attempt to obtain from General Franchet d'Esperey, commander of the French *Armée de l'Orient*, better armistice terms than General Diaz had granted Austria-Hungary at Villa Giusti.

D'Esperey, however, bluntly showed his contempt for the rather unpolished individuals who composed Karolyi's delegation, and on November 13, 1918, assigned even more Hungarian territory to Rumania and Serbia than had Diaz. Karolyi's disappointment was slightly assuaged, on the same day, when he received a rescript from King Charles announcing His Majesty's retirement from participation in the affairs of Hungary. In point of fact, this "abdication" had no constitutional validity since the document was not countersigned by a parliamentary minister, but for the immediate future, Karolyi's course was made easier.

On November 16 Hungary was declared a republic. The

National Council dissolved the old legislature and ordered the election by universal suffrage of a constituent assembly. The Karolyi ministry, meanwhile, drew up a platform promising liberal press laws, trial by jury, freedom of association, agrarian and educational reforms, proportional representation, separation of church and state, honest settlement of the nationalities problem, friendship with the neighboring states, and the conclusion of a separate peace with the Allies.

The unfavorable foreign and internal conditions made it virtually impossible to put this program into effect. The subject nationalities no longer were interested in "rights"; they desired complete separation from Hungary. The Allies, far from treating Hungary with any special consideration, only tightened the blockade. Returning soldiers swelled the ranks of the unemployed and starving, and foreign ex-prisoners of war roamed and ravaged the countryside. The conservatives objected to the proposed breaking up of the large estates. Communistic ideas trickled in from Russia. The increased wealth and power accumulated by some of the Jews in the government antagonized the anti-Semites. The resignation (January, 1919) of Oscar Jaszi, Minister of Nationalities, deprived the cabinet of one of its strongest men. Soon the entire group of Social Democrats deserted Kirolyi, who thereupon postponed the date for the election of the constituent assembly.

The National Council, at its meeting of January 11, 1919, tried to thrust aside Karolyi by electing him Provisional President of the Hungarian People's Republic. Taking advantage of the weakness of a newly appointed and more radical ministry under Dionysius Berinkey, Karolyi made a desperate effort to regain control by pushing through (February 15) an agrarian reform measure. Under this law, private estates were not to exceed seven hundred acres in area and the peasants were to receive government aid in the purchase of small holdings at pre-war evaluations on fifty-year amortization schemes. Again reform had come too late. Many of the peasants opposed the plan because they could get land on better terms directly from their landlords. Besides, the socialists objected to the law lest it hinder the process of complete nationalization, while the conservatives regarded it as confiscatory.

The final blow to Karolyi came on March 20, with the news that the Peace Conference had definitely awarded Transylvania to Rumania. Since neither the National Council nor Karolyi would acquiesce in this disposition, the president resigned and went into exile. Now, in anticipation of Karolyi's exit, plans had already been drawn up by Sigmund Kunfi, a socialist member of the government, and Bela Kun, an imprisoned communist leader, for a union of the Social Democrats and the recently formed Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. The coalition took the name of International Revolutionary Hungarian Socialist Party and was prepared to take the reins at any time. When Karolyi departed, Kun was released from prison to become head of a new government and commissar for foreign affairs. An ex-bricklayer, Alexander Garbai, became president.

b. DICTATORSHIP: RED AND WHITE

Bela Kun was a Jewish journalist and politician who during the war served as an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army until taken prisoner (1915) by the Russians. In the prison camp he formed friendships with a number of leading Russian revolutionists and when the March Revolution occurred, was released to become head of the propaganda bureau for Kerensky. By the time of the November Revolution he had found opportunity to become well acquainted with Lenin and Trotsky. After the war, he reentered Hungary with a falsified passport and edited a subversive *Red News*. He came into frequent conflict with the police and on one of these occasions was wounded and imprisoned. It was while he rested in jail that Kun negotiated the coalition with the Social Democrats.

Once in power, the People's Commissars, as Kun's cabinet called itself, promulgated drastic decrees. Political opponents were removed by revolutionary tribunals. The sale and consumption of alcoholic liquors was forbidden. A strong, well-disciplined Red Army was organized. As soon as possible the Social Democrats were ousted from the government, and then church property, mines, banks, means of communication and transportation, commercial firms employing over twenty-five persons, estates with an area of more than one hundred acres, and all private property above a certain minimum allowance, were nationalized.

In June, 1919, a formal constitution of the Hungarian Soviet Republic was adopted and preparations were made for spreading the Red gospel into the neighboring states. Much of the available specie money remaining from the former régime was sent to Italy for munitions and war-stuffs, and a new currency was introduced for domestic use. Money was also sent to Vienna for field work and Kun led his Red Legions against Czechoslovakia. While the inspired revolutionists conquered Slovakia with relative ease, the opposition at home was put down by a Red Terror under the direction of a ruffian named Tibor Szamuely.

The communist regime was doomed to early failure. The refusal of the peasants to accept the new currency for their food-stuffs and the maintenance of the Allied blockade brought the cities to the verge of starvation. The trade unionists were angry because factories were shutting down for lack of raw materials and because many Jews were coming into high official positions. At the same time thousands of counter-revolutionists, or "Whites," led by Archduke Joseph, Count Stephen Bethlen, Karolyi's half-brother Julius, and Nicholas Horthy, vice-admiral in the former Austro-Hungarian navy, gathered at Szeged in an area occupied by French troops. Though a premature White uprising in Budapest was easily suppressed, the discontent soon became dangerously widespread. Withdrawing from Czechoslovakia lest the wrath of the Paris Conference be converted into military measures against him, Kun now led his legionaries against a Rumanian army which was marching toward Budapest. This time Kun was defeated and his last hopes shattered. On August 1, 1919, he fled to Vienna — there to be placed in a lunatic asylum. Eventually he made his way to Russia.

For a few days after Kun's flight, a Social Democrat named Julius Peidl took charge of the government, but soon Archduke Joseph, who had been proclaimed regent by the returning counter-revolutionaries, appointed Stephen Friedrich premier. This return of Habsburg influence so frightened Hungary's neighbors that they insisted upon Joseph's withdrawal from the government. In the meantime, the turmoil exceeded anything the country had yet experienced. The Rumanian army, in defiance of the Allied Supreme Council, occupied Budapest for three months, pillaging whatever could be sent or carried away

by train, truck, or person. Three days after the departure of the Rumanians from Budapest, Horthy, who had succeeded Joseph to the command of the White forces, entered the capital (November 14). He replaced Friedrich with Karl Huszar and ordered the calling of an assembly to decide on the future form of government and make peace with the Allies.

Elections were held on January 25, 1920. No party received a majority, but ninety-five per cent of the delegates elected were of monarchist leanings. The assembly, therefore, at its first meeting virtually restored the former monarchical constitution. Inasmuch as an Allied note of February 2 precluded the return of a Habsburg to the throne, Horthy was designated Governor and Regent. The next twelve months witnessed little more in the political sphere than a series of ministerial crises, a wave of reactionary legislation, and a wholesale massacre of Jews. Not until Count Bethlen became premier, in April, 1921, were stability and order restored.

So far did reaction go, that Charles was encouraged to return to Hungary and reclaim the throne, on March 26, 1921. Horthy, however, refused to surrender his powers without the prior consent of the assembly. Besides, the principal Allies registered vigorous protests and Czechoslovakia threatened military action unless Charles left Hungary immediately. The Habsburg, chagrined and disconsolate, returned to Switzerland. On October 20, 1921, he set out for Hungary once more, this time by airplane. He landed at Odenburg and led a hastily gathered force on Budapest. Horthy attempted unsuccessfully to dissuade Charles from his enterprise and when, three days later, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia began to mobilize, the regent sent troops under Captain Julius Gombos to dispute the royal contingent's entry into the capital. Charles was captured and taken to a British war vessel in the Danube.¹ The Little Entente then forced the Hungarian Constituent Assembly to pass (November) a De-thronement Act, deposing the Habsburgs and making the kingship elective. On November 10 Hungary promised to consult with the chief Allies before electing a ruler.

¹ Charles and his family were exiled to the Madeira Islands on November 19. On April 1, 1922, in his thirty-fifth year, Charles succumbed to island fevers and pneumonia.

Early in 1922 the Constituent Assembly came to an end. Except for the conclusion of the highly unsatisfactory Treaty of Trianon, the assembly's accomplishments over two years were practically nil. It did not settle the question of monarchy and it even neglected to ordain the method of election of its own successor. Horthy and Premier Bethlen thereupon drew up an executive electoral decree which greatly restricted the number of voters and substituted open for secret balloting in the country districts. Moreover, a rigorous press censorship was instituted and a prohibition laid on the publication and circulation of the works of such authors as Karl Marx, N. Lenin, and Walt Whitman. Naturally, the delegates elected to the new assembly were overwhelmingly pro-government. A group of Legitimists, those who wanted to make Charles' son, Archduke Otto, king, received little encouragement from the voters. The Bethlen ministry, consequently, was spared further immediate foreign complications.

Undismayed by their defeat in the elections, those ultra-royalists who wanted to cut short the regency founded secret societies of a fascist nature to fight Horthy, the Jews, the trade unions, and the communists. Nuclei for these groups were available in two societies which had been formed to agitate against the peace treaty: the "Awakened Magyars" and the League for Hungarian Integrity. Heartened by the success of the Italian Fascists in 1922, some of the White Terrorists conspired with the Bavarian royalists to overthrow several of the central European governments. The Hungarian authorities, of course, were opposed to such dangerous activities, and in the fall of 1922 the assembly passed a Defense of the Realm Act. This law gave the Royal Hungarian Government power to curb the over-zealous royalists.

The real head of the government and virtual dictator of the land from April, 1921, to August, 1931, was Premier Bethlen, the "Sphinx of Europe." He was born of a noble and wealthy family at Gernyeszeg in Transylvania in 1874. Entering parliament for the first time in 1901, he soon evinced an uncanny ability to clinch the argument in a debate for one side or the other with a few clear-cut sentences. The World War and the Treaty of Trianon left him impoverished and embittered, since, as one of

the Hungarian "optants," he preferred to lose his large estates in Transylvania to acquiring Rumanian citizenship.¹

During the years that followed the passage of the Defense of the Realm Act, Bethlen consolidated his control. In 1925 the franchise was restricted still more, a new drive against communists was undertaken, and a limit was placed upon the number of Jews who might attend the universities. The League of Nations protested against this last as a violation of the rights of minorities and the law eventually had to be modified. In November, 1926, the unicameral assembly created an upper house to take the place of the defunct Table of Magnates. Most of the 244 members of this body are chosen or elected by the several vested groups in the land, including the nobility, the clergy, the municipal councils, the chambers of commerce, and other business and professional institutions. Some are appointed for life by the government, and a few high dignitaries, such as the commander-in-chief of the army, are *ex-officio* members. This chamber, however, has only a suspensive veto and no power over the budget. In December, 1926, the third post-war assembly was elected, the pro-government Union Party scoring an easy victory. Policies in the interests of the landholders, wealthy peasants, and business and church groups thus were ensured for at least five more years.

C FINANCES AND ECONOMICS

When Bethlen's ministry came into office it was confronted with two particularly urgent tasks: the freeing of Hungary from interference by the Little Entente, and the financial and economic reconstruction of the kingdom. The threat from Little Entente circles was reduced when Bethlen secured Hungary's admission into the League of Nations in 1922. Although Hungary, by signing the Covenant, tacitly pledged herself not to attempt a forceful revision of her boundaries, her own sovereignty and integrity were simultaneously guaranteed and she could feel relatively secure against any precipitate intervention by her nervous neighbors. Her new status in the family of nations, moreover, entitled her to assistance in the settlement of her financial difficulties.

¹ See pp. 547-548.

Whilst the League was engaged in the financial reconstruction of Austria, Hungary appealed to the Reparation Commission for similar aid. The Commission investigated and drew up a plan of relief which was adopted by the League Council in December, 1923. The plan provided for (1) the floating of an international loan of 250,000,000 gold crowns (\$50,000,000) under League auspices; (2) the arrest of inflation; (3) the establishment of an independent bank with the exclusive right to issue currency; (4) the payment of reparation in twenty annual instalments of ten million crowns each; (5) the assignment of the revenues from customs and state monopolies as security for the loan; and (6) the appointment of a League Commissioner-General. Hungary accepted the terms in February, 1924, and in May, Jeremiah Smith, Jr., a leading financier of Boston, went to Budapest as agent of the League. Under his supervision the kingdom managed to balance its budget by the opening of the year 1925, eighteen months sooner than had been anticipated and stipulated under the reconstruction plan. On June 10, 1926, therefore, the League voted to end its control. Smith, whose good humor and sympathy had made him extraordinarily popular, resigned, donating his fee of \$100,000 to Hungary's poor. The transition to a new monetary unit, the pengo or "jingler," worth 17.49 cents, was completed by January 1, 1927, and the budget continued to show a surplus until 1930.

Economic reconstruction was more difficult of achievement than financial rehabilitation. The Hungary which was partitioned by the peace treaty had been a well-defined geographic unit and apolitical entity of many centuries' standing. The Treaty of Trianon, however, detached from the old kingdom two-thirds of its land area and three-fifths of its population, leaving the new Hungary without a seacoast, with negligible timber and water power resources, and with few railway terminals.¹ The country did retain an excellent network of railways, a will to substitute new industries for those which were lost, — and a high tariff.

Energetic attempts to foster a new industrial life have been

¹ The area of Hungary is approximately 35,900 square miles and its population according to the census of December, 1930, was 8,683,740. 90% of the inhabitants are Magyars.

partially successful, but Hungary has remained predominantly agricultural. Eighty-two per cent of the land surface is devoted to agricultural purposes and pasturage. Although half of the population earns its livelihood directly from the soil, Hungary is still a land of large estates. In 1930 one-third of the agricultural area was concentrated in some 1500 large holdings, while about 750,000 small owners possessed less than half of the cultivable soil.¹ In the years 1930, 1931, and 1932 Hungary suffered heavy losses due to the falling price of grain in the world market.

Because of its importance as an exporter of foodstuffs and an importer of manufactures, the kingdom of Hungary occupies a strategic position in any move to bring about a Danubian federation. Numerous conferences have been held between the Little Entente, Austria, and Hungary, at which the question of an economic league has been the chief topic of discussion. Each time the same obstacles to union have been encountered. The states concerned are so jealous of their national dignity and sovereignty that concession and compromise are difficult. The question of precisely what form to give the projected union has been another stumbling-block. And the Great Powers, fearing a loss of markets because of the privileged positions which the industries of Austria and Czechoslovakia would have in a federation, have been lukewarm in their reactions to any effective unification schemes. Several times the unsuccessful outcome of the conferences has resulted in the declaration of tariff wars between the conferees.

d. RESTORATION AND REVISION

Hungarian foreign relations after 1920 were shaped primarily by the questions of the kingship and the peace treaty. The lenient attitude of the Hungarian courts towards fascist agitators combined with the royalist sympathies of Bethlen might have led to an early, if forceful, solution of the monarchical complication, but for a split among the royalists themselves. The Legitimists insisted upon the coronation of Archduke Otto. The latter was only a boy — he was born in 1912 — but his cause was ably promoted by his mother, the beautiful Zita, who never

¹ A decree of July, 1928, ordered the 50,000 Hungarian gypsies in the land to give up their nomad life, settle on farms, speak Hungarian, and pay taxes.

wearied of planning to regain her husband's crown for her son. The "Awakened Magyars," on the other hand, rallied around the standard of Archduke Albrecht, popular and wealthy scion of the Hungarian branch of the Habsburgs. Albrecht's cause, too, was fostered by an ambitious mother, a Belgian princess of considerable spiritual and material resource.

In 1926 the activities of all royalist zealots received a temporary check. To finance their schemes, a group of reactionary agitators had begun, in 1925, the wholesale counterfeiting of French francs. When the plot was discovered a year later, the Little Entente became panicky again, and the government reluctantly prosecuted the offenders. A number of high officials were found to have been implicated, and the culprits, whose plea was the patriotic one of revenge against France, were lightly dealt with. Most of them were acquitted and the others received short prison sentences.

The peace of mind of Hungary's neighbors has continued to be upset periodically. In the spring of 1929 various rumors reacted so disturbingly that Bethlen was led to declare that the existing governmental situation was in every way satisfactory and would doubtless remain unchanged so long as Horthy lived. Despite this assurance there was renewed nervousness among the members of the Little Entente with the approach of November 20, 1930, the day on which Otto would reach majority and, according to Habsburg tradition, become head of the house. When the day arrived, the headship of Otto was acknowledged by all members of the family, including Albrecht who, having in the meantime married a commoner, was no longer a rival for the throne. Horthy and Bethlen were prepared to meet a *coup*, but nothing exciting transpired. After a bit of ceremony at a little town in Belgium, where his mother lived, Otto returned to the University of Louvain to finish his collegiate studies. In a brief speech he intimated that he had no desire to endanger the peace of Europe.

The agitation for boundary revision was more ominous than that for monarchical restoration. The peace treaty not only greatly reduced the area and population of Hungary, but assigned almost three million Magyars to neighboring states. Rumania received a million and a half Magyars, Czechoslovakia almost a

million, and Yugoslavia some five hundred thousand. Upon its publication in Budapest the treaty was printed with broad, black bands of mourning around it and an irredentist movement was precipitated which became intensified with each succeeding year. In churches, schoolrooms, private homes, trolleys, restaurants, and dance-halls, everywhere were displayed maps of the old Hungary, with the lost territories in black and the whole surrounded by a crown of thorns. On these maps was printed the question, *Maradhat ez így?* ("Can it remain thus?") and the answer, *Nem I Nem I Soha I* ("No! No! Never!"). These same three words, *Nem I Nem I Soha !* appeared on stamps, gummed seals, envelopes, postcards, badges, posters, plates, buttons, and other objects.

The propaganda was not confined to Hungary. It was early launched on a world-wide scale and was especially successful in England and Italy. The League for Hungarian Integrity and a Magyar National Union, composed chiefly of students, were active in obtaining foreign sympathy for the cause of revision. There is an English branch of the Union, called the Oxford League for Hungarian Self-Determination. Hardly an opportunity was overlooked to present Hungary's case in foreign areas. When Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League of Nations, paid a visit to Buenos Aires in December, 1930, the local Hungarian residents addressed an open letter to him in their native language newspaper, protesting against the Treaty of Trianon. On July 15, 1931, two Hungarian aviators gave wide publicity to the movement by flying from Harbor Grace, Newfoundland, to a point near Budapest, their actual objective, in a monoplane named *Justice for Hungary*.

In the summer of 1927 the London *Daily Mail*, now controlled by Lord Rothermere, launched a special revisionist campaign on Hungary's behalf. One of its correspondents arranged for an interview with Mussolini in March, 1928, in which Il Duce expressed himself in favor of revision. Mussolini, in fact, continued to refer to this subject with increasing emphasis in speeches of June, 1928, July and October, 1930, and several times during 1931 and 1932. In the latter year he openly challenged the hegemony of France and became the champion of treaty revision in general.

In point of fact, a treaty of friendship was signed between Italy and Hungary in 1927. This was followed, late in the same year, by a shipment of arms from Verona, ostensibly to a little Czech town, but really to Hungary. The shipment, labelled "machine parts," attracted the suspicious attention of the Austrian customs officials at the frontier town of St. Gotthard and was subjected to an inspection. Since the Treaty of Trianon forbids the importation of war materials into Hungary, the Little Entente quickly entered a protest with the League of Nations (January, 1928). An investigation followed, but the possible implication of Italy prevented definite disclosures. Hungary received a mild rebuke and the affair was dropped, but the psychological reverberations lingered for some time.

Even more alarming to the Little Entente and to France were the various treaties of friendship negotiated after 1927 between Hungary, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Turkey. Particularly disquieting were Bethlen's frequent visits to the capitals of these countries. Several efforts to bring about cooperation between Hungary and the Little Entente only led to further ill-will, especially in view of the circulation of rumors regarding the inequitable and sometimes harsh treatment of the Magyar minorities in the states concerned.

In 1931 and 1932 the agitation for revision and restoration suffered a temporary decline. The reason was the need of the Hungarian Government for French financial aid. In August, 1931, Premier Bethlen resigned, though his Union Party and its allies had captured almost 200 of the available 245 seats in the lower house in the parliamentary elections of the previous June. Although the motive for his action was officially listed as ill health, a number of other factors apparently entered into the decision. Thus, it was known (1) that the Bethlen Government had left the country a budgetary deficit of about \$30,000,000 in place of an estimated surplus of over \$500,000 for the fiscal year 1930-1931; (2) that the entire Hungarian banking system was in danger of breakdown in consequence of the general economic depression and the effects of the Austrian Kredit Anstalt collapse; and (3) that France, when appealed to for help in the crisis, made a loan contingent upon the cessation of revisionist agitation. On August 15, 1931, a Hungarian loan of

\$25,000,000 was announced in Paris, and four days later Bethlen resigned.

The new premier was a friend of Bethlen's, Count Julius Karolyi. Though he managed to secure the adoption of a budget, Karolyi was beset by problems of financial rehabilitation and political unrest. The League acted upon a request to conduct another Hungarian financial investigation, a short-term loan of \$20,000,000 was obtained from a ten-power consortium, and a partial moratorium (made total in the late summer of 1932) was declared on foreign debt payments. Fascist disorders and communist riots became frequent sights and tariff wars with Czechoslovakia and Rumania added to the difficulties. In September, 1932, after a tenure of little more than a year, the Karolyi cabinet resigned and was succeeded by one under Julius Gombos. The latter's appointment was a blow to the Legitimists, for Gombos had taken a leading part in preventing Charles from regaining the throne in 1921. He was known, however, to be an ardent revisionist and an Italophile.

As 1932 drew to a close, the questions of restoration and revision were still of prime importance in Hungarian domestic and foreign affairs. The irredentist movement overshadowed any demand for democracy at home and remained a serious threat to the peace of Europe and the world.

CHAPTER XVII

TWO SLAVIC REPUBLICS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

a. THE WINNING OF INDEPENDENCE

The strongest and best organized state which emerged from the wreckage of the Dual Monarchy is Czechoslovakia, a republic consisting of the five districts of Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia, and comprising an area of 54,270 square miles.¹ Almost from the outset Czechoslovakia has enjoyed an economic stability and a foreign respect quite unusual for one of the newer and smaller states of Europe. Credit for this achievement is due not only to the high level of civilization attained by the Czechs before the war, but also to the efforts of two former college professors: Thomas Garrigue Masaryk and Eduard Benes.

Thomas Masaryk was born in 1850 of Slovak peasant stock. Despite the handicap of bitter poverty, he managed to secure an excellent scholastic training and eventually became a professor of philosophy at Prague. In 1878 he married an American girl, Charlotte Garrigue, and adopted her surname as his middle name. Through her family connections he acquired an extensive and useful acquaintanceship in the United States. In pre-war days he was conspicuous as a Slovak nationalist, a philosophical liberal, and a lover of truth and justice. He early succeeded in making himself unpopular with the Austrian authorities by his views on national and social rights for the subject Slavs, and when the war broke out he quickly made up his mind that "Austria must be opposed in grim earnest, to the death."

Feeling that he could be more useful to the cause of Czech liberation if he were free from the danger of arrest, Masaryk

¹ The first three of the districts named formerly belonged to Austria, the others to Hungary. The Slavic natives of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia are known as Czechs, those of Slovakia as Slovaks, and those of Ruthenia as Ruthenians, Carpatho-Russians, Ruthenes, or Ukrainians.

made his way into Italy in December, 1914, and then spent the next four years disseminating propaganda and organizing opinion in the leading Allied states. In Russia he helped organize Czechoslovak legions; in the United States he raised funds; in France he set up propaganda headquarters; everywhere he labored to arouse sentiment for Czechoslovak independence. Contact with the "revolutionary movement" (as the struggle for freedom was called at home) was provided by means of an efficient "secret service" directed by Masaryk's student and friend, Eduard Benes.

Benes was born in 1884 near Pilsen, the present Plzeň. He studied at Prague, Berlin, Paris, and Dijon, specializing in law and philosophy. A prolific writer on social, economic, and political subjects, he was also a professor of philosophy and sociology at the Polytechnic School in Prague. He was a nationalist and a great admirer of democracy and hence an avowed opponent of the Habsburg system. When he heard the news of the declaration of hostilities, Benes felt that the Dual Monarchy either "would come to an end through losing the war, or it would come to an end in a social upheaval and revolution after the war." Consequently he was "determined to go to any length and to sacrifice everything, to carry out a revolution." Although at first remaining at home in order to keep Masaryk informed of what was happening there, Benes, too, eventually found it necessary to flee the country. Arrived in Paris, his diplomatic ability and his resourcefulness were of great aid in securing hearings for the cause and in keeping up communications with the revolutionary leaders left behind in Austria-Hungary.¹

The tasks confronting the revolutionaries were exceedingly difficult. Sentiment was divided on what course to pursue to gain freedom. Some prominent leaders — Karl Kramars, for example — advocated relying for guidance and support on Russia and Pan-Slavism. Masaryk and Benes, on the other hand, favored a westward outlook and preferred to seek help and inspiration from the democratic states of the West. Even Russia's defection in 1917 did not entirely remove this bone of contention. Much tact and patience were required to convince

¹ Deserving to rank only below Masaryk and Benes as a founder of the republic is General Milan , who commanded the Czechoslovak legions in France.



THOMAS GARRIGUE MASARYK

the Allies that the Czech leaders were not Austrian spies and to inform them of the actual state of conditions in the Czechoslovak provinces.

All sorts of clever ruses and subterfuges had to be devised in order to maintain communications between the leaders in Paris and those at home. The story of these ruses is fascinating and thrilling, full of arrests and hair-breadth escapes, of secret meetings and code telegrams, falsified passports and faked certificates, microscopic messages carried in hollow teeth and pipe stems, and important state secrets betrayed by the Czech servants of unsuspecting Austrian officials. In addition to all this, money had to be raised, capable journalists had to be found, scores of articles, pamphlets, and manifestos had to be got up, imprisoned leaders had to be replaced, and recognition had to be secured for the National Council of Czechoslovakia (sitting in Paris) as official spokesman for the Czechoslovak people.

With a dogged determination these problems were faced and solved, and in January, 1917, came the first intimation of success when the Allies listed as one of their war aims an autonomous Czechoslovak area. Then, in the fall of 1918, when Allied victory seemed assured, Masaryk, Benes, and Stefanik felt the time ripe to issue a declaration of independence (October 18). Ten days later the Czech National Council in Prague, led by Kramars, took over the reins of administration from the imperial officers, and on October 29 a Slovak National Council voted for union with the Czechs in a single state. The overturn was almost bloodless, and on November 14 a Provisional Assembly unanimously proclaimed the republic. Fittingly enough, Masaryk was elected president, Kramars became premier, Benes was appointed foreign minister, and Stefanik, minister of war. Kramars and Benes soon were despatched to Paris to represent the new republic at the Peace Conference. Thus ended four centuries of Habsburg rule in the realms of "good King Wenceslas."¹

¹ The Provisional Assembly represented only Czechs and Slovaks. The several minorities held aloof, the German in the hope that it might achieve union with Germany or Austria, the Magyar in the belief that it might be permitted to remain with Hungary. Blood was shed when Czech troops were sent to occupy the German towns in Bohemia and Moravia, but Masaryk in a Christmas message promised equality of treatment to Germans and Czechs, and the disturbances gradually ceased.

b. CONSTITUTION AND REFORM

On February 29, 1920, after almost a year's deliberation by a Constitutional Committee, the Provisional Assembly, with relatively little popular discussion, adopted a constitution. The document was modelled after the constitutions of the United States and France, and provided for a democratic, parliamentary regime with a definite separation of powers. The preamble expressed the desire of the country "to join the League of Nations as an enlightened, peaceful, democratic, and progressive member."

The Chamber of Deputies consists of three hundred members who must be at least thirty years of age and who are elected for six years by the compulsory vote of all men and women over twenty-one. The Senate is only half as large as the Chamber and is elected for a period of eight years by all voters over twenty-six. The minimum age limit for senatorial candidates is forty-five. The ministry is directly responsible to the Chamber, which has the power to pass laws over the veto of the upper house. The two houses must meet in March and October of every year and may be called in extra session at any time; between sessions a legislative commission may pass temporary laws. The question of the constitutionality of laws is left to the decision of a Constitutional Court.

The president, who has a suspensive veto and is slightly more powerful than the president of France, is elected for seven years by the two houses meeting together as the National Assembly. Presidential candidates must be over thirty-five and no one (except Masaryk) may serve more than two consecutive terms, although a second reelection after the lapse of a term is permissible. There is no vice-president. On May 27, 1920, Masaryk was elected president for his first full term, and in 1927 he was reelected for a further seven years.

In Czechoslovakia there are numerous political parties. Thus, as a result of the elections of October, 1929, fifteen parties secured representation in the lower house. The political alignments are based in the first instance upon racial divisions and then subdivided according to economic and religious interests. Hence there exist both Czechoslovak and German parties labelled Agrarian, Social Democratic, National Socialist, and Na-

tional Democratic. Similarly, there are Czechoslovak and Slovak People's Catholic parties, and German and Hungarian Christian Socialists. Communistic and independent groups also have taken root. It is not surprising, therefore, that the cabinets should generally have been based upon coalition groupings.

Perhaps the most pressing domestic problem facing the new state was that of land reform. Under Habsburg rule the tendency in all the provinces had been for the concentration of land in a few, large holdings. At one time, for example, thirty-three individuals held one-sixth of all the land in Bohemia, whereas 373,000 peasants owned less than one per cent thereof. In 1918 two per cent of the landlords in Bohemia owned more than twenty-five per cent of the land in that district, while in Moravia nearly one-third of the land was controlled by less than one per cent of the landowners, and in Slovakia half the land was in possession of about one thousand persons. One-fourth of all the farms in Bohemia and Moravia consisted of seven and a half acres or less. Most of the big landholders were Germans or Magyars, members of the former ruling castes.

In April, 1919, almost a year before the adoption of a constitution, the Provisional Assembly inaugurated a program of land reform which now is gradually approaching completion. Laws were passed which provided for the expropriation of all estates exceeding in size 375 acres of arable land or 625 acres of mixed arable and non-arable land. Lands formerly belonging to the Crown or to members of the Habsburg family were to be expropriated without compensation, while in other cases compensation was fixed at a level considerably below the real value of the property before the war. The land thus acquired by the state was to be sold, at generous rates and on easy terms, to small farmers, ex-service men, and, in general, any landless persons who were willing to till the soil. Under no circumstance were more than 37.5 acres to be assigned to any one individual. Non-arable land was made available to scientific institutions, cooperative or public associations, and municipalities and parishes. By 1926, although considerable tracts of land still remained under the control of large holders, more than half a million citizens had become "middle-class farmers" — direct owners of sufficient land to provide a decent living.

The break-up of the large estates had the further effect of precipitating a quarrel between the government and the Roman Catholic Church. Many of the estates had been church property, and the ecclesiastical authorities naturally looked with disfavor upon the wholesale expropriation policy. Popular opinion, however, tended to rally to the support of the government, for, although well over half the population of the republic is nominally of the Catholic faith, and although the Slovaks, on the whole, are pious Catholics, the Czechs are little more than lukewarm in their religious fealty. Countrymen of the heretic John Huss, who was burned to death at the behest of the Council of Constance in 1415, the Czechs had readily become Protestants during the sixteenth century — only to be reconverted to Catholicism through Habsburg force in the seventeenth. Religious fervor, therefore, has not been a conspicuous trait of the Bohemians, and the Czech people showed relatively little sympathy with the land claims of the church.

Expropriation was not the only point of friction between church and state. Estrangement arose out of the circumstance that most of the high church offices in these Slavic provinces had been given, under the monarchy, to Germans and Magyars who were accused of using their clerical influence as much to foster the cause of the Habsburgs as that of Providence. The services had generally been conducted in German or Hungarian, where Latin was not used, and the schools had been regarded as convenient monarchist-clerical propaganda agencies. The republic therefore energetically set about secularizing education and abolished compulsory religious instruction in the schools. In Slovakia, where the clergy had an especially strong hold on education, hundreds of new state schools were opened, over the vigorous protests of the churchmen.

The government insisted that the papacy redraw the diocesan boundaries so as to make them conform to the frontiers of the state, that Czechs be appointed to the higher clerical offices, and that the native tongue be substituted for German or Hungarian wherever the parishes were predominantly Slavic. Some of the radicals and the nationalists in parliament demanded an absolute separation of church and state, and in January, 1920, as part of the so-called "Away from Rome" movement, there was

established a Czechoslovak National Church which proclaimed its independence of the papacy and abolished the requirement of celibacy for the clergy. This church, however, gained almost no Slovak adherents and fewer than a million Czech members.

The quarrels between the two authorities came to a head in 1925 when July 6, the anniversary of the day on which Huss was burned, was proclaimed a national holiday. The papal nuncio was withdrawn from the republic and the Czech Minister was recalled from the Holy See. After a deadlock of more than two years, during which normal diplomatic relations were severed, both sides agreed to compromise. Harmony was restored by the signing of a *modus vivendi* in January, 1928. The diocesan boundaries were to be rearranged to coincide with the republic's borders, the state was to continue paying the salaries of the clergy but was to have a voice in the nomination of bishops, only Czech citizens were to be eligible for appointment as bishops, all church officials were to be required to take an oath of allegiance to the state, and the native language was prescribed for certain services. As a token of the renewed friendship, the pope, in 1929, bestowed upon President Masaryk the Grand Cross of the Order of the Sacred Tomb.

C. THE PROBLEM OF MINORITIES

Czechoslovakia has over 14,000,000 inhabitants, of whom two-thirds are Czechs or Slovaks. The remaining third is made up of approximately 3,300,000 Germans, 760,000 Magyars, 480,000 Ruthenians, and some Poles and Jews. At the Peace Conference of 1919 Czechoslovakia had been required to sign one of the minority treaties for the protection of these non-national subjects, and the constitution of 1920 further guaranteed equality before the law to all subjects without distinction as to race, language, or religion. In accord with these promises special schools have been provided for the minorities, arrangements have been made for the conduct of official business in a minority language where one-fifth of the population uses that tongue, the printed matter on banknotes is repeated in three languages, and a voice in the government has been assured to the minority groups through the adoption of proportional representation in parliament.

Despite these guarantees and concessions, considerable difficulty has been experienced with the subject peoples. The millions of Germans in Bohemia and Moravia who had, on the whole, comprised the upper class in pre-war days, and who were disliked by the Czechs as long having been the oppressors, formed a powerful opposition unit. At first the Germans boycotted the parliamentary elections and skillfully put obstacles in the way of the administration, but gradually they came to realize that more might be gained by an active participation in the political life of the state. Masaryk did all he could to encourage this attitude, and in 1926 two Germans were appointed to cabinet positions in the government of Premier Anton Svehla. In 1927 three-quarters of the Germans in the National Assembly voted to reelect Masaryk president. Naturally there are irreconcilables among both Germans and Czechs, and in 1930 some Bohemian nationalists attempted to wreck theatres in which German films were being shown. But these extremists are limited in number and are being held in check by the authorities.¹

Relations with the Carpatho-Russians have been more strained than those with the Germans. Ruthenia was assigned to Czechoslovakia by the Peace Conference in order to provide the new state with a natural boundary in the Carpathian Mountains and also to bring it into direct contact with Rumania, thus forming a solid ring around Hungary. Although, by the Treaty of St. Germain, the republic was bound to extend local autonomy to Ruthenia, nevertheless, since the Ruthenians as a group had been kept in a relatively backward and illiterate state by the ruling Magyars, the Czechs for some time withheld autonomy lest — so they said — the better-educated Magyars and Jews in the province obtain control. Moreover, inasmuch as the Catholic Church and the Magyars controlled the educational system of Ruthenia, the government of the republic made haste to establish state schools with instruction in the native Ruthenian or Ukrainian tongue, and to decree that, until such time as Ruthenians capable of holding office might be developed, Czech officials

¹ As was to be expected, the former German and Magyar place names have been Slavicized. Prague, for example, is now Praha, while Pressburg has become Bratislava, and Karlsbad was rechristened Karlovy Vary.

should be put in charge of the important governmental positions.

The processes of education and of substitution of Ruthenian for Czech officials were so protracted as to cause bitter complaint. In 1927 and 1928, however, laws were passed which reorganized the entire provincial administrative system of the land and granted Ruthenia not only an autonomous local administration but also an elective local diet. This allayed the discontent somewhat, but the Ruthenians still maintain that too many offices are reserved for Czechs who have the interests of Czechoslovakia rather than those of Ruthenia at heart. The anti-Czech agitation has been carried on even in the United States, where Ruthenian societies have been circulating literature accusing the Czechs of bad faith and of disregarding all principles of self-determination.

The population question is further complicated by the antagonism of the Czechs and Slovaks themselves. The Czechs, who outnumber the Slovaks almost two to one, are somewhat more westernized than their compatriots and tend to dominate the governmental partnership. They have a higher percentage of literacy than the Slovaks, are more inclined toward political liberalism and religious skepticism, and are more interested in industry and commerce than agriculture.¹ The Slovaks are among the most pious and conservative of peasant folk, thanks largely to the efforts of their former Magyar rulers.

Disagreements and quarrels, sometimes to the accompaniment of bloodshed, soon arose. The Slovaks accused the Czechs of monopolizing the desirable offices and violating the "Pittsburgh Pact" of 1918 wherein Masaryk, in order to get the support of the American Slovaks for his Czech-Slovak unification project, was said to have given a promise of Slovak autonomy. The Slovak People's Catholic Party was especially anxious to secure autonomy for the province, gain freedom from governmental interference with the school system, and ensure the continued influence of the clergy over the peasants. In 1924 there was inaugurated a Slovak movement to boycott everything of Czech

¹ Two-thirds of the people in Slovakia and Ruthenia depend directly on the soil for their subsistence, while less than half of the people in the west are dependent upon agriculture.

origin, but between 1926 and 1929 several incidents occurred which lessened the dissension: in 1926 two Slovaks were taken into the cabinet; in 1928 the republic's quarrel with the papacy was patched up; and in 1929 the law which granted administrative autonomy to the provinces went into effect. But then another factor entered to revive the strife — Hungarian irredentism.

The Czechs accused the Magyars both in Slovakia and in Hungary of fomenting a separatist movement having for its ultimate purpose the reunion of Slovakia with the Magyar kingdom. A crisis in this dispute was reached in December, 1928, when a Slovak deputy, Professor Tuka, was accused of being a Hungarian irredentist and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment on charges of espionage and high treason. During the trial, and while the case was being appealed in the several higher courts, Slovakia seethed with unrest. The upholding of the verdict by the highest tribunal in 1930 lessened the agitation, but further trouble was caused by the circulation of reports that Tuka was being mistreated in jail. Although there seemed to be little likelihood of any immediate break-up of the republic, the Czech-Slovak controversy remained a potential danger to the unity of the state.

Her domestic difficulties notwithstanding, Czechoslovakia has made great cultural progress since 1918. The Czechs have long been believers in the value of education and they point with pride to the circumstance that the university at Praha dates from 1348. The famous educator John Amos Komensky (Comenius, 1592-1670) and the religious reformer John Huss are the favorite national heroes of the Czechs, who are fond of referring to their country as the "Land of Komensky." Spurred on by Frantisek Palacky's monumental *History of the Bohemian People* (5 vols., 1836-1867), Czech scholars are now busily engaged in a search for marks of an ancient native culture, untouched by any German veneer. Though they boast of Friedrich Smetana and Anton Dvorak in the field of music, the Czechs have not yet produced any outstanding literary figure, although Karel Capek has achieved some prominence through his play *R. U. R. (Rossohn's Universal Robots, 1921)*, a drama of machine men or automata that perform work. As in the other European countries

of today, there is a marked emphasis upon sports and athletics, and in 1932 the enrolled membership of Czechoslovak sporting and athletic organizations numbered about a million and a half. Huge open-air gymnastic exhibits, called *sokols*, and open-air singing demonstrations are immensely popular.

d. ECONOMICS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

From an economic point of view Czechoslovakia, whose territory was little touched by the ravages of the war, is one of the most fortunate states in Europe. A splendid system of important railway lines and terminals was inherited from the Dual Monarchy, along with approximately 80% of the industries of that defunct state. Though comprising only one-fifth of the area of the old Austria-Hungary, and including only one-fourth of her population, Czechoslovakia possesses four-fifths of the ex-monarchy's manufacturing equipment, including the famous Bohemian glass and pottery works and the textile industries, three-fifths of its breweries, nine-tenths of its soft coal, and three-fifths of its iron ore. On the agricultural side the situation is equally favorable, Czechoslovakia being virtually self-sufficient in the matter of food supply. Under the old regime Bohemia produced 90% of the empire-kingdom's sugar beets, 80% of the hops, and 75% of the fruit. Forty-two per cent of the land in the republic is arable, and Slovakia produces large quantities of flax, maize, and wine, as well as some tobacco. The soil is rich in graphite, copper, lead, and silver. During the decade 1919-1929 Czechoslovakia enjoyed a consistently favorable balance of trade. Her chief economic handicap is her landlocked position, but even this disadvantage is mitigated by the provisions in the peace treaties which grant her access to the sea at Hamburg, Stettin, and Trieste, through German and Italian territory. She has 800 miles of navigable riverways within her own borders and is represented on the international commissions which supervise traffic on the Elbe and Oder rivers.

Since the country has an industrial equipment which originally was intended to take care of the needs of a large empire, the present population cannot absorb the entire manufactured output. Consequently Czechoslovakia depends for her economic prosperity upon cordial trade and business relationships with the out-

side world. Her best customers are Germany, Austria, Great Britain, and Hungary in the order named, while her purchases are made chiefly in Germany, Austria, and Poland. With each of these countries and with many others Czechoslovakia early negotiated commercial and trade treaties and established friendly business contacts. Without such contacts the republic, though it could feed itself, would suffer tremendous economic losses.¹

Business is not the only incentive for Czechoslovakia's desire to have harmonious foreign relations. The republic is about 600 miles long and varies in width from 50 to 125 miles. Its access to the sea depends, as was indicated, upon the upholding of the peace treaties. Five countries, most of them at one time or another hostile, completely surround the state: Germany, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Austria. For about half the length of her boundary she is surrounded by a German pincers formed by the southern German and northern Austrian borders. Hence her eagerness to prevent the consummation of Anschluss. Except for the region of the Carpathians and the Erzgebirge, moreover, her frontiers offer little natural protection.

Masaryk and Benes, the latter of whom has held the portfolio of foreign affairs without interruption from the time of his appointment in 1918, are both personally in favor of a policy of international peace and friendship and have been guided in their decisions "first and foremost by (the republic's) geographical, economic, and political situation in Europe." Five main lines of policy have thus far been pursued: (1) hearty support of the League of Nations as the protector of small states and the mainstay of peace and stability on the Continent;² (2) friendly relations with Russia regardless of her form of government, because of the ties of Slavism and the desire for trade; (3) unswerving support of the peace treaties to which the republic owes its life; (4) endorsement in larger European affairs of the policies of England and France, especially of the latter; and (5) united action with Yugoslavia and Rumania in central European matters,

¹ The unit of currency in Czechoslovakia is the crown, stabilized at 2.96 cents or 33.75 to the dollar. At the Hague Conference in January, 1930, Czechoslovakia's reparation claims and foreign debt were definitely fixed.

² Beneš was part author of the Geneva Protocol of 1924 and was one of the most enthusiastic delegates at the Locarno Conference in 1925.

particularly where these relate to Hungary, the most dissatisfied of Czechoslovakia's neighbors. In pursuance of this last aim, Czechoslovakia, it will be recalled, joined with Yugoslavia and Rumania in the formation (1920-1921) of the Little Entente.¹

From 1921 to 1927 relations between the Little Entente and Austria were friendly. In December, 1921, Austria and Czechoslovakia signed a commercial convention, and in March, 1926, they negotiated a treaty of friendship wherein (1) each promised to remain neutral in case the other were attacked by a third power; (2) each agreed to suppress within its borders any agitation directed against the other; (3) both pledged themselves to cooperate in preventing a restoration of the old regime; and (4) both agreed to submit all future disputes that might arise between them to peaceful arbitration. In the summer of 1928 the Yugoslav Foreign Minister suggested that Austria become a member of the entente, but since Vienna did not care to enter into any alliance aimed at another central European power, *i.e.* Hungary, the invitation was refused. After 1923, when the Little Entente took a prominent part in the arranging of a League of Nations loan to Hungary, relations with the latter also experienced a temporary improvement.

During the period 1923-1927 it appeared as though the bonds of the entente might be loosed. Indeed, two of its members were gradually drifting toward France and the third toward Italy in the new European diplomatic alignment which was taking shape.² However, the revival of Anschluss agitation in Germany and Austria after 1926, the conclusion of a treaty of friendship between Italy and Hungary in 1927 followed by a shipment of arms from the former country to the latter and by a renewed Magyar irredentist agitation, and the serious consideration after 1930 of a Balkan or Danubian federation to improve the economic standing of the several countries concerned, gave new life to the entente relationships.

Although it would be a pity if the entente were revived only on occasions when it appeared necessary to thwart any contemplated action by Austria or Hungary, the idea of such a regional "understanding" eventually may serve as a basis for **the organ-**

¹ See p. 189.

² See p. 192.

ization of a more closely knit economic unit which might enjoy the same economic advantages that accrued to the various parts of the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy by the sheer circumstance of their federation in an economic whole.

POLAND

a. THE BACKGROUND

Organized as a kingdom about the year 1000 by Boleslav the Mighty, Poland, during part of the Middle Ages, led a glorious existence. The period of glamour, however, was followed by an era of gradually declining power and prestige. Internal dissensions and jealousies caused the Poles, on a number of occasions, to search among European nobles, begging this or that prince to become "King of the Pollaks." Since the kingship was elective, the death of a ruler was frequently followed by civil war. The *liberum veto*, a privilege of every noble member of the diet, made it impossible to pass any law in the diet save by unanimous consent. The country, moreover, was lacking in natural, easily defensible frontiers. By the eighteenth century domestic conditions were such as to invite dismemberment.

A crisis was reached in Poland's history when all her neighbors simultaneously came under the rule of powerful personalities: Prussia under Frederick the Great, Austria under Maria Theresa, and Russia under Catherine. These monarchs inaugurated the three famous Partitions of Poland which, stretching over the years from 1772 to 1795, erased from the map of Europe the name of one of its proudest — and weakest — kingdoms. During the Napoleonic period, Poland was for a time in part restored as the grand duchy of Warsaw, but the Congress of Vienna once more partitioned the area.

Throughout the nineteenth century a Polish national spirit continued to grow under foreign oppression, while Polish heroes indulged their talents for revolution in the countries of western Europe, notably France. At last, in the twentieth century, many patriotic Poles thought they discerned in the World War the long-sought-for opportunity to set up a Polish national state. Surely, they felt, the nation which counted among its sons such men as Frederic Chopin and Henryk Sienkiewicz must come into

its own. And thanks largely to the friendship of the Allies and the efforts of Joseph Pilsudski and Ignace Jan Paderewski, it did.

b. JOSEPH PILSUDSKI

Born in 1867, in Russian Poland, of an old Lithuanian noble family, Pilsudski was raised in an atmosphere of revolt against tsarist tyranny. After visiting a number of universities and being expelled from each for revolutionary and socialistic activities, he finally was sent to Siberia in 1887, remaining there until 1892. Upon his return he reengaged in his former pursuits and helped found the Polish Socialist Party, whose basic creed was Polish liberty rather than Marxist economic theory. In 1896 he was again arrested and eventually sent to the Prison of St. Peter and St. Paul in St. Petersburg, a combination asylum and Bastille. Here he remained under close watch for five years, though his friends occasionally managed to communicate with him. Then he escaped, with the aid of a physician who was sent to investigate his sanity.

When Pilsudski's escape became known the entire secret police of the city searched for him, but he eluded capture, it is said, by dining in full dress at one of the leading restaurants and then "leaving town like a gentleman." He went to Austrian Poland, living in the city of Cracow until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. During this contest he returned to Russia to participate in the Revolution of 1905, but in 1907 was back in Cracow. Here he organized and drilled a secret Polish military force, and when the World War broke out offered to lead the men against the Russians, considering them to be the worst oppressors of his people.

It was the aim of Pilsudski and his followers to use Austria "as the sword against Russia and the shield against Germany." They hoped to take advantage of Austria's relatively liberal Polish policy to organize a Polish national army as the instrument of eventual independence. Not all Poles, however, shared this view. A considerable group, led by Roman Dmowski, preferred to fight on Russia's side in the belief that Polish unity depended on the defeat of the Central Powers. A third group of patriots wanted to achieve Polish independence unhampered by the restrictive aid of either Russia or Austria. This view was

most popular among the Poles who lived outside Poland, particularly those in the United States. Their most distinguished representative was the pianist, Ignace Paderewski.

On August 16, 1914, a Supreme Polish National Committee was formed in Cracow to coordinate the activities and supervise the financial and political affairs of a number of Polish military units which had quickly been formed upon the model of Pilsudski's organization. Those Poles who preferred to look for Russian aid in their unification scheme organized a Polish National Committee in Warsaw. The Austrian authorities accorded limited recognition to the Cracow committee and organized two large Polish Legions, commanded by Austrian generals of Polish extraction. Pilsudski's force became the first regiment of the First Legion. In 1916 he was placed in command of a brigade.

Meanwhile the Central Powers and the Russians competed with one another in the issuance of high-sounding but hollow manifestos dealing with the future status of Poland. The upshot was merely to convince the Poles that they could expect as little from one side as from the other, and that salvation lay in independent action. Encouraged by President Wilson's speech of January 22, 1917, in which the President held that "statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland," and heartened by the complete Russian evacuation of Poland later in the same year, Pilsudski addressed his followers, saying: "Russia is beaten now; next we must fight Germany." Berlin's reply to this was the arrest of Pilsudski (July, 1917), the disbanding of the Polish Legions, and the dissolution of the Supreme National Committee.

At the close of the war, improvised local governments were set up throughout Poland. On November 10, 1918, Joseph Pilsudski, recently released by the German Socialists, arrived in Warsaw. He immediately took over command of the Polish armies, and on November 14 became Chief of State. Two days later he announced to the world the existence of a new, independent Polish Republic. Meanwhile, under Dmowski's leadership, the Polish National Committee which had been set up in Warsaw in 1914 had established its headquarters in Paris on August 15, 1917. Thus there were two bodies which claimed to represent the state of Poland.

The Allies, who in their war hysteria identified Pilsudski's "socialism" with Russian Bolshevism, recognized the National Committee in Paris, as did most of the conservative Polish bourgeois and peasant groups who before the war had been affiliated with a party known as the National Democrats. General Pilsudski's Government, on the other hand, was supported by the laboring masses and the more radical peasants as well as by a rapidly growing army of war veterans. This contest for authority, combined with the hostility of Poland's neighbors, a number of local separatist movements, starvation, and the general disorganization following upon four years of warfare, seemed to forebode little good for the new state. Obviously compromise was essential if Poland's newly gained independence was to be preserved.

Eventually the major political differences were patched up by Paderewski, who not only was held in esteem by his own country, but had won the confidence of the leaders and people of the western nations. Paderewski was in the United States when the war ended, but he arrived in Paris on December 15, 1918, and ten days later embarked upon a triumphal tour of Poland. On January 16, 1919, Paderewski became premier and foreign minister, while Pilsudski continued in his capacity as chief of state. Since the cabinet included leaders from all important political and geographical groups in the country, the compromise was complete. Then, while Pilsudski, at the head of half a million men, set out to establish wide frontiers for Poland by military force, Paderewski went to the Paris Conference to render the same patriotic service around the diplomats' table.

Filled with expansionist ambitions and the desire for natural frontiers, the Polish leaders sought to incorporate in the re-born state Lithuania, the Ukraine, Galicia, part of the new Czechoslovakia, and as much more of Germany and Russia as they could claim on ethnological, linguistic, historical, or sentimental grounds. Poland now actually fought three wars, with Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Russia; threatened war on Czechoslovakia; disregarded the admonitions of the Allied Supreme Council; and ended — by accepting frontiers which gave her an area of about 150,000 square miles rather than the 282,000 square miles which her spokesmen had demanded. Through her aggres-

sive actions, moreover, Poland incurred the enmity of all six of her neighbors.

C. INTERNAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS, 1919-1932

**We've a war, and a debt, and a flag, and if this
Ain't to be independent, what on earth is?**

So wrote James Russell Lowell concerning Texas in the 1840's, and Poland in 1919 and 1920 presented much the same spectacle. Paderewski resigned as premier in December, 1919, largely because of popular dissatisfaction with his accomplishments at the Paris Conference. Pilsudski, however, now a Marshal of Poland, remained as chief of state until the adoption of a constitution on March 17, 1921, and the election of a president in December, 1922. The Polish Constitution was drafted by a Constituent Assembly elected on January 26, 1919, by universal man- and womanhood suffrage. Although its work was completed in March, 1921, the assembly postponed parliamentary elections and retained control of the government until November, 1922.

The constitution, based largely upon the French model, provided for an upper house called the Senate and a lower house called the *Sejm*. It established universal suffrage, with a voting age of twenty-one for the *Sejm* and thirty for the Senate, and with proportional representation. The president, whose every act required countersignature by a member of the cabinet, was to be elected for seven years by the Senate and *Sejm* sitting together as the National Assembly. With the consent of the Senate the president might dissolve the *Sejm* at any time before the expiration of its five-year term.¹ Owing to the large number of parties, government soon began to be carried on through the medium of the bloc system, and in the first twelve years of its existence, the Polish Republic had twenty-two ministries.

The first parliament elected under this constitution met as a National Assembly in December, 1922, and elected Gabriel Narutowicz president. Narutowicz took office on the sixteenth of December and was assassinated on the eighteenth. Two days later he was succeeded by Stanislas Wojciechowski. In consequence of these elections Pilsudski gave up his position as chief of state and instead became chief of staff.

¹ See p. 463 for amendment of this provision in 1926.

During the next few years political conditions in Poland were reminiscent of the days of the decadent kingdom. Conservatives and radicals in the parliament were deadlocked, land reform lagged, the financial situation was critical, and widespread corruption prevailed. To make matters worse, the president and the chief of staff, though at one time close friends, became estranged. Pilsudski, in fact, went into temporary retirement, though he was careful to remain in close touch with both the army and the left groups in the Sejm.

The marshal became more and more irritated at the dilatory tactics of the parliamentarians, at the lack of solid legislative accomplishments, and at the perpetual bickering which characterized the deliberations of the Sejm. When, in May, 1926, one of his bitterest enemies, Vincent Witos, became premier, Pilsudski publicly denounced the government for its weakness and corruption, for neglecting the army, and for withholding proper official recognition from the Socialist Party. When it was hinted that the authorities would institute judicial proceedings against the "calumniator," Pilsudski rallied three regiments about him and began a march on Warsaw, reminiscent of the more famous march on Rome.

After a three days' battle (May 12 to 14), in which about six hundred persons were killed and many more wounded, Pilsudski entered the capital while the president and premier resigned and fled (May 14). The marshal now surprised his followers by refusing to set up a formal dictatorship and by declining to accept the presidency. Instead, he urged the National Assembly to elect as president his friend and supporter, Professor Ignace Moscicki, a successful engineer. He himself was content to become minister of war in the new cabinet of Casimir Bartel.

In the next few months a bitter conflict developed between Pilsudski and the Sejm. Although a majority of the deputies had come to dislike the forceful policies of Pilsudski, the latter, by controlling the army and attracting the support of public opinion, was able to force through the legislature a number of constitutional changes. These amendments gave the president greater control over the budget; permitted him, with the consent of the cabinet, to dissolve both houses of parliament; and empowered him to issue decrees with the force of law in certain

economic and fiscal matters during the ninety-day interim which might elapse before the election of a new parliament. The powers of the cabinet were extended to include some legislative functions. When the Sejm made a brave attempt to reassert its authority and actually defeated the ministry on two motions, Pilsudski requested (October, 1926) the president to appoint him as premier.

From October, 1926, until June, 1928 (with a slight interruption due to illness in May, 1928), Pilsudski retained his post of premier. He was able to rule through parliamentary channels because the national legislature did not dare to oppose him. Hostility to this veiled dictatorship increased, however, and in June, 1928, the marshal resigned on the grounds of ill health and disgust with the corruption and inefficiency of the Sejm. Bartel once again became premier and Pilsudski resumed the office of minister of war. No one doubted, however, that the chief of the War Office was the actual head of the government.

Parliamentary difficulties did not cease with the reorganization of the ministry. On the contrary, Pilsudski's own Socialist Party now joined the opposition. Thereupon Pilsudski in a violent press interview attacked the politicians in the Sejm as unworthy intriguers who had "purposely framed the constitution so that the greatest shame which savage ignorant brains could devise would be placed on the nation's most popular men." He accused the deputies of "bawling and acting like swine and renegades," and made it clear that although he had resigned as premier he was still "available for service in critical times." The control of Polish international affairs, he explained, still remained in his hands.

As minister of war, therefore, Pilsudski continued to dictate Polish policies and to urge a revision of the constitution so as greatly to increase the powers of the national executive. The draft of a new constitution, largely the work of Pilsudski's brother, was first published on February 21, 1929. It proposed that the president be chosen by popular vote, rather than by the National Assembly, from two candidates, the one selected by the retiring Sejm and the other by the retiring president. The chief executive should have the sole right to conclude treaties, full power to veto any act of the legislature, the right to convene and

dismiss parliament, and the right to appoint and dismiss ministers without regard, necessarily, to the wishes of the Sejm. In March, 1931, the document passed its first reading in the lower house, and its final adoption seemed only to be a matter of time. Meanwhile, in March, 1932, the parliament was persuaded to pass a measure authorizing the president for three years to issue decrees with the force of law.

During the years from 1928 to 1932 Pilsudski, in a variety of ways, showed his contempt for the parliament. In January, 1929, he refused to attend the official hearings on the budget or defend his requisitions, but when the budget was announced, he criticized it severely. Two months later, when Finance Minister Czechowicz was impeached for the unauthorized expenditure of some \$880,000 in excess of the legal budgetary appropriations, Pilsudski assumed responsibility for the act and defied the Sejm to try him. The case then was suspended, although both Czechowicz and Premier Bartel resigned. In October, Pilsudski was saluted in the lobby of the Sejm building by a group of fifty armed officers who refused the Speaker's bidding to leave. Frequently the convening of the parliament was postponed by presidential decree, while opposition voices were silenced by arbitrary actions of various sorts. Pilsudski once more announced "It is the deputies who endanger Poland most!" and just prior to the elections of November, 1930, about ninety deputies and ex-deputies were arrested in accordance with an official scheme to "cleanse" the political life of the land.

Six different ministries, all controlled by Pilsudski, guided the affairs of the republic in this period of five years. The governments, because of their preponderantly military make-up, were popularly known as "Cabinets of Colonels." * Accustomed as he was to ruling the state in the face of hostile parliamentary majorities, it must have been a relief to Pilsudski when, as a result of the elections of November 16 and 23, 1930, his followers, organized as a Non-Party Union, captured 247 of the 444 seats in the Sejm and 74 of the in seats in the Senate. The decisive victory appeared to have been due not so much to the popularity of the

¹ Special favors were also bestowed on the rank and file of the army, and in 1931 Pilsudski exempted the soldiers from a general fifteen per cent wage cut for government employees.

dictatorship as to the efficiency and skill of the pro-Pilsudski election officials. In May, 1931, Colonel Alexander Prystor, one of the marshal's closest friends, became premier.

The year 1932 closed with War Minister Pilsudski still in the saddle as dictator. He had the support of the army, the president, and the cabinet. A majority in parliament viewed with favor his attempts to strengthen the constitutional powers of the executive. The chief opposition leaders, including M. Witos, three times premier, were in jail, following a sensational trial for conspiracy in January, 1932. The marshal's health, however, was failing, and he found it necessary to take frequent vacations in Egypt and other countries where the climate was less harsh than in Poland.

d. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM

Poland, like so many of her neighbors, suffered severely in the post-war years from financial inflation and economic instability. The ravages of the war and of prolonged hostilities with Russia, a series of bad crops, an unsettled agrarian situation, and several knotty minorities problems constituted a grave threat to the national existence of the republic. Eventually the crisis spurred the Sejm to definite action, and in 1923 a coalition cabinet of experts was appointed, headed by Premier and Finance Minister Ladislav Grabski. This government, which was entrusted with dictatorial emergency powers to stabilize the finances of the country, remained in office from December 19, 1923, until November 13, 1925.

M. Grabski energetically proceeded to check the continued depreciation of the Polish mark. He introduced economy into a number of government departments, reduced the state railway subsidies, advanced the tax rates, and imposed some additional levies. The government also repudiated most of the national debt, dissolved a recently organized Polish State Loan Bank, and set up a new Bank of Poland. A changed unit of currency was adopted, the gold zloty, with the value of a gold franc, and a temporary halt was declared on the further issue of paper money.

To the disappointment of the finance minister, these reforms ended in failure. They were too drastic and bore too heavily on the people as a whole. The harvest of 1924 was so bad that large

quantities of foodstuffs had to be imported and the cost of living went up. About the same time, in consequence of a minorities dispute, German purchases of Polish Silesian coal came to a stop, while in June, 1925, a tariff war ensued with Germany after the failure of negotiations for a commercial treaty. The funding of Poland's debts to the United States and Great Britain (November-December, 1924), and the successful floating of another American loan of \$35,000,000 in February, 1925, offered only temporary relief. In July, 1925, the zloty began to depreciate and four months later Premier Grabski resigned. Neither of his two immediate successors, Count Alexander Skrzynski and V. Witos, was able to restore financial stability.

When the zloty fell to one-half of its par value, the Skrzynski Government invited Professor Kemmerer of Princeton University to study financial conditions in Poland and make recommendations for their improvement. This invitation was confirmed by the Pilsudski dictatorship which, as we have seen, came into being in May, 1926. The Kemmerer Commission, after a two weeks' study of affairs, made a number of sweeping recommendations, many of which were adopted in 1926 by the Polish Government.¹

The application of sounder monetary principles, the harvest of a good crop in 1926, and an increased foreign demand for Polish coal because of the British coal strike in the same year, bade fair to inaugurate a period of economic prosperity. A foreign stabilization loan of \$72,000,000 was obtained in October, 1927, and at the same time Charles S. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, was engaged as financial adviser, with a seat on the board of directors of the Bank of Poland. The national budget was balanced for the first time in the new republic's history. By a decree of October 13, 1927, the zloty was established with a gold value of 11.22 cents.

During the next five years, the Pilsudski regime succeeded in keeping the zloty stable and in balancing the annual budgets. When Mr. Dewey resigned his office in October, 1930, Poland seemed well on the road to financial equilibrium. The economic

¹The Commission pointed out that 36.5% of the budgetary appropriations were for Poland's army alone, exclusive of the appropriations for the state police and frontier guards.

depression which affected the world after 1930 naturally made itself felt in Poland, particularly when the price of grain declined to a record low point for the twentieth century. By the strictest curtailment of expenditures, however, the budget was balanced in 1932 without recourse to inflation. The per capita wealth of Poland in this year was about one-third the per capita wealth of France.

Almost as pressing as the financial question in Poland was the agrarian situation. The socialists and the radical peasants, influenced, doubtless, by the example of Russia, favored the breaking up of all the large estates and the redistribution of the land on a wider basis. The peasants of Galicia and of former Russian Poland, in particular, clamored for more land to support their families. Furthermore, restrictive immigration acts in the United States and Germany added to the misery of the constantly increasing landless proletariat.

The conflicting interests of the conservative estate owners and the agrarian radicals, and the fairly even influence of Right and Left in the parliament, held up for six years the application of remedial measures. An agrarian reform bill of 1919, passed in the following year, was never put into effect, and in 1923 the presentation of another land measure led to the downfall of a cabinet. At last, in December, 1925, an act was passed which provided for the gradual parcelling of large estates at the rate of 200,000 hectares (494,200 acres) annually for ten years. It was provided that expropriation by the state should occur only as a last resort in the event that voluntary parcelling fell behind the required minimum. Payment for the land should be made partly in cash and partly in bonds. Although neither extremist group was satisfied with the law, to which more than 600 amendments were offered, it did prove to be a working compromise on the basis of which further legislation might eventually be enacted.

With her financial and land problems more or less settled, Poland's economic life experienced a definite development. New railways were built and old ones improved, virtually all the arable land of the country was placed under cultivation, thousands of new houses were built, and production as a whole increased rapidly. The lack of sufficient markets, however, proved to be one of the republic's chief handicaps. This difficulty was

accentuated by the fashion of high tariffs which prevailed in the post-war years and by the depression of the early thirties. By 1932 unemployment was a serious problem in Poland, although less than two-fifths of the population was directly dependent upon industry. The authorities dealt harshly with any radical labor movements, for Poland's geographic proximity to Russia made such developments seem doubly dangerous.

e. THE MINORITIES

Since less than three-fourths of the inhabitants of Poland in 1919 were of Polish nationality, the Supreme Council at Paris required the republic to sign a minorities treaty guaranteeing equality of civil and political rights to all citizens, whether or not they belonged to the majority group.¹ Minority nationals who lived within the borders of Poland were to be given the choice of becoming Polish citizens or leaving the country, and in no case might such persons be deprived of life or property or the free exercise of their religion. The right of minorities was guaranteed to establish schools and receive a fair share of state support for these schools wherever the minority formed a "considerable portion" of the population. There were to be no restrictions on the use of minority tongues in business, law courts, public meetings, and religious services. Appeal might be made to the League Council whenever any of these privileges was violated. Though she accepted these obligations, Poland appeared for a time to be no less oppressive towards her subject nationalities than the Russians, Germans, or Austrians had been towards theirs.

The largest minority group in Poland was the solid block of Ruthenes or Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, who formed one-seventh of the total population. The Jews, scattered throughout the land, came next with one-twelfth of the total and the Germans were third with about one-twenty-fifth. Between 1920 and 1924 the position of minorities was particularly hazardous and there was considerable, albeit unsuccessful, agitation among nationalistic Poles to denounce the minority treaty. It was claimed that the document actually was void since it had not been ratified by the United States.

Although a law was passed in September, 1922, granting a

¹ The population of Poland in 1919 was 27,000,000; in 1932, about 31,000,000.

measure of local autonomy to Eastern Galicia, the Ruthenes complained bitterly of Poland's governmental policies. "The lack of consistent administration, . . . the endeavor to colonize the Polish soldiery on the expropriated lands in preference to the local peasantry, the flooding of the region with new, inexperienced, and inefficient administrators/' all seemed to bear witness to an attempt at the enforced Polonization of the eastern provinces. In 1924 the situation became so bad that the Russian Government despatched strong protests to Warsaw and brought the matter to the notice of the world. Russia claimed a direct interest in the treatment of these people because of the large number of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

Though Poland replied defiantly to the Russian notes, Premier Grabski secured the passage of three laws, in July, 1924, concerning the use of minority languages in administrative offices, courts, and schools. Polish was confirmed as the state language, but the parallel use of Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and White Russian was permitted where necessary in the conduct of official and judicial business. Private schools giving instruction through the medium of any one of these languages were to be tolerated, and wherever the parents of forty children, in a region containing a non-Polish minority of at least twenty-five per cent, so requested, the state schools were to provide instruction in the minority tongue. However, instruction in the Polish language in history and geography were to be compulsory in all cases.

Political opposition for a time deferred the application of these laws, but even when they were enforced, relations between the several national groups remained inharmonious. The Ruthenes continued to complain of mistreatment and some of them formed a Ukrainian Military Organization which agitated for the union of southeastern Poland with Russia. The Polish Government accused the association of sabotage and took severe repressive measures to break it up. In 1930 the laments of the minority reached the ears of the League Council, which remitted them to its Committee of Three for consideration.

While the Committee investigated the conflicting reports that were presented to it by the interested parties, the situation in Poland became aggravated. The Ukrainian peasants more and more frequently engaged in such anti-state activities as the non-

payment of taxes, and the government found it necessary to despatch soldiers to arrest the leaders of the movement and compel obedience to the laws. In September, 1932, the authorities dissolved the Ukrainian Radical Party, which had a reputed membership of 400,000, on the ground that it was engaging in communistic and anti-Polish activities. The persistent unrest caused the Committee of Three to request several extensions of time in the rendering of its report to the League Council.

Only slightly less disturbing than the Ruthenian difficulty was the Jewish question in Poland. The Jews for some years after the war were subjected to a bitter persecution. They were accused of being either pro-German or pro-Bolshevik, of lacking Polish patriotism, of refusing to conform their lives to the standards of the nation, and of valuing profits above the national welfare. They were the frequent victims of assault and murder, and they did not even derive benefit from the language laws of 1924. So serious were the rumors which spread abroad concerning the mistreatment of the Jews that two foreign missions, one English and the other American, were sent to Poland to investigate. At length, in June, 1925, the Polish authorities and the Jews came to a conciliatory agreement known as the Declaration of Warsaw.

By the terms of this settlement the Jews, through their political representatives, promised to recognize their duties and obligations to the Polish state and confine any opposition tactics to the regular parliamentary and constitutional channels. In return, the authorities, headed by Premier Grabski, undertook to pay more attention to the educational and economic interests of the Jewry. A number of laws were enacted according the Jews the same linguistic and religious rights as the other minorities, permitting them to keep their shops open on Sundays instead of Saturdays, and reducing certain special taxes on small business which had affected mainly Jewish store-keepers. It was also agreed that no elections should be held on Saturdays so that Orthodox Jews might not be deprived of their right of franchise. There were recurrent anti-Semitic outbursts in the succeeding years, especially in 1931 and 1932, but these laws materially improved the general situation with respect to the Jews.

The German minority problem involved two quarrels. There

was, first, the question of the small tenant farmers who with the aid of the German Government had colonized Prussian Poland. After the war the Poles attempted to evict these colonists, who held the land under special contracts from the German Government, without compensation. Germany, however, took up the case of her nationals and appealed for redress to the League Council. Poland denied the competency of this body and the dispute was placed before the World Court. The latter upheld the jurisdiction of the Council and handed down an advisory opinion to the effect that Poland must respect the private rights of the German nationals. In consequence the Warsaw Government eventually agreed to compensate the evicted Germans.

The second difficulty concerned the status of the Germans in industrial Upper Silesia. Here the minority loudly protested against Polish mistreatment and unfair discrimination, particularly in the matter of educational opportunities. A *Volksbund* was organized to agitate for better conditions and the sympathy of the German Republic was solicited. It was alleged that the Poles exerted every form of pressure from censorship to terrorism on the German minority, especially during elections, and that the state failed to offer adequate protection to the non-Polish inhabitants. The government at Berlin several times brought the Silesian troubles to the attention of the League and in 1931 the representatives of Germany and Poland engaged in a heated debate over Silesia before the Council. The whole dispute really involved the broader problem of a revision of Germany's eastern frontiers and as such remained a threat to peace in eastern Europe.

f. DANZIG AND THE POLISH CORRIDOR

The Paris Peace Conference, it will be remembered, provided for the conversion of the German port of Danzig into a Free City which should be under the economic domination of Poland and the general supervision of the League of Nations. Although nearly all the inhabitants of the city at the time were Germans, it was decided that such an arrangement would best solve the problem of giving Poland access to the sea and a means of establishing commercial contacts with western Europe. In accordance with these aims the League required the people of Danzig

to draw up a constitution and reach an agreement with Poland regarding their future relationships with that republic. A Polish-Danzig Agreement was reached on November 9, 1920, and six days later the Free City officially came into being. The Danzig Constitution received the final approval of the League Council in May, 1922.

Under the terms of the agreement, the constitution, and a supplementary Polish-Danzig Treaty of 1921, Danzig is governed by an Assembly and a Senate, with executive power in the hands of a high commissioner appointed by the League of Nations. The high commissioner also acts as a court of the first instance in disputes between Danzig and Poland, both areas having the right of appeal to the League Council. Poland is responsible for all the foreign relations of the Free City and has supervision over its commercial customs. The port must never be used as a military or naval base without the previous consent of the League. There is complete free trade between the two areas, and a Harbor Board, consisting of five Poles, five Danzigers, and a neutral president, administers the port and watches over the rights of both parties. There is the usual guarantee of the rights of minorities and of the Polish minority in particular. In short, Poland controls the economic and diplomatic life of the Free City, while the inhabitants enjoy a considerable amount of political autonomy.

It need hardly be pointed out that relations between Danzig and Poland have been strained. During the first five years of the existence of the Free City, the League Commissioner handed down almost fifty decisions. Appeals to the Council have been frequent and even the World Court has been called upon to settle disputes. The difficulty of drawing a line between economic and political matters, the traditional hatred between the two peoples, and the fear among the Danzigers that the Poles are contemplating direct annexation of the city, all tend to render the situation one of great danger. Moreover, the Danzigers look with fear upon the rival port-building project inaugurated by Poland at Gdynia.

In order to diminish the dependence of Polish merchants and shippers upon the harbor facilities at Danzig, the Warsaw authorities, with the aid of a French finance and construction syndicate, have been vigorously pushing the development of Gdynia,

a few miles west and north of Danzig. It is hoped eventually to expand this port so that it will be capable of handling upwards of 15,000,000 tons of freight annually. Naturally the inhabitants of Danzig are worried over an enterprise which promises to deflect their chief business, shipping, to a neighboring city. The Germans in the Reich have frequently expressed sympathy with the troubles of the Danzigers, and the Hitlerites in particular have indicated their determination eventually to right what they regard as a glaring wrong of the Versailles Treaty.

West and south of Danzig is a stretch of territory 260 miles long and with an average width of 80 miles, which formerly comprised in part the German provinces of West Prussia and Posen. Through it flows the Vistula River, one of the main arteries of commerce in east-central Europe. Under the terms of the Versailles Treaty this land was assigned to Poland, with a consequent division of Germany into two unconnected sections: Germany proper, extending eastward as far as Pomerania, and East Prussia. The transfer of territory was justified by the Allies on the ground that "the interests which Germans in East Prussia, who number less than two millions, have in establishing a land connection with Germany, are less vital than the interests of the whole Polish nation in securing direct access to the sea."

Through the creation of this "Polish Corridor" Poland became a complete economic unit. Germany, on the other hand, was weakened from both the economic and military view-points, and found it more difficult to exert any considerable influence in the Baltic region. Particularly harsh was the fate of East Prussia, which no longer had a free market in the area of the Corridor for its grain, cattle, timber, and horses. In April, 1921, an agreement was reached between representatives of Berlin and Warsaw whereby Germany was granted freedom of transit for passengers and freight through the Corridor to and from East Prussia. The arrangement, however, was far from satisfactory. Germans who desired to cross the area without passports and without the bother of submitting their belongings to customs inspection, had to travel in special "sealed" cars. Often these cars were highly uncomfortable.

A further grievance of the Germans in the Reich was the conviction that the Poles were mistreating the German minority

which lived in the Corridor. The exact ratio of Germans to Poles in the region in 1918 was never determined, but at present the latter undoubtedly comprise a majority of the inhabitants. The Warsaw Government has induced many of the Germans to leave, often by direct eviction, and has encouraged the colonization of the expropriated lands by Polish settlers. In 1932 the resident Germans numbered perhaps one hundred thousand.

The question of the Polish Corridor has been one of the prime factors in the mutual ill-will manifested by Germany and Poland. A commercial treaty between the two powers hung fire for years because of disputes over the Corridor and the minority difficulties. In 1925, at Locarno, Germany definitely refused to subscribe to a guarantee of her Polish frontiers. Since then, official reference has often been made to the urgent need for a revision of the eastern boundaries. Poland's claim, however, that her economic life depends upon the retention of the Corridor is strongly supported by her ally, France. Incidentally, a considerable portion of the money expended upon commercial and military enterprises in the region was borrowed by Poland from the Schneider-Creusot interests, the leading French armament manufacturers.

g. VILNA: ANOTHER BOUNDARY DISPUTE

In medieval times Vilna was the capital of the grand duchy of Lithuania. Later, when Lithuania and Poland became united, through a marriage alliance between the reigning families, Vilna gradually came under the cultural and economic domination of the Poles. After the partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century, Vilna, for about 125 years, remained under Russian control.

After the Russian Revolution of November, 1917, the Lithuanians declared their independence and attempted to set up a government at Vilna. Fighting ensued, and in January, 1919, the Bolshevik troops captured the city, only to be dislodged in turn by a Polish army. Meanwhile, since the Paris Conference had not drawn a Polish-Lithuanian boundary, the Allied Supreme Council, on December 8, 1919, laid down the so-called "Curzon Line" as a provisional frontier and assigned Vilna to Lithuania. Poland, still engaged in her war with Russia, accepted this as a

temporary disposition. On July 12, 1920, Russia, by the Treaty of Moscow, definitely ceded Vilna to Lithuania.

When the Russo-Polish War came to a close, the Poles claimed Vilna on the ground of conquest and an armed clash with Lithuania resulted. The League Council despatched a military commission to the scene to end the fighting, and in October, 1920, the two governments were induced to sign the Agreement of Suwalki whereby the Curzon Line, in a slightly revised form, was again accepted as a provisional boundary and Vilna was once more assigned to Lithuania.

On October 9, the day before this agreement was to come into force, General Lucien Zeligowski, a Polish freebooter who led some 15,000 irregular troops, occupied the city. Although the Warsaw Government disclaimed responsibility for the act,¹ the general was hailed as a hero in Poland. Lithuania appealed to the League for support and that body for a time toyed with the idea of a plebiscite. In March, 1921, however, the Council recommended direct negotiations between the disputing powers. When these failed of result, the Council, on February 3, 1923, laid down another provisional boundary — this time allotting Vilna to Poland. In the following month the Conference of Ambassadors recognized this boundary as permanent.

The technical state of war which had existed between Poland and Lithuania since October, 1920, now continued until the end of 1927. In December, 1927, the League Council was again forced to take note of the situation when Lithuania complained that her nationals in the Vilna district were being mistreated, and Poland complained that the same was true of the Poles in Lithuania. Marshal Pilsudski and the Lithuanian Premier were requested to come to Geneva, and there an agreement was reached whereby Lithuania consented to end the "state of war" and Poland promised to respect the complete independence and territorial integrity of Lithuania. The question of Vilna, however, was not yet settled, so far as Lithuania was concerned. A Polish-Lithuanian conference at Königsberg in the spring of 1928 accomplished nothing and relations between the neighbors continued under high tension.

¹Cf. Machray, R., *Poland, 1914-1931*, p. 170: "Pilsudski disavowed its pater-
nity at the time, but confessed to it later."

In May, 1928, the Lithuanian Government promulgated a new constitution which designated Vilna as the capital of the country, although the actual business of government was being carried on from Kovno. This action drew a rebuke from the League Council and another Königsberg Conference was called for November, 1928. Again there was only failure to record and the Vilna dispute in consequence has remained a disturbing factor in European politics.

h. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The external relations of Poland since her reestablishment as an independent state have been shaped largely by her geographical propinquity to a number of hostile or, at best, unfriendly powers. To the east there is the Soviet Union; to the north, Lithuania and East Prussia; to the west, Germany. Poland, accordingly, has placed her chief hopes for security upon a series of military alliances and arbitration agreements. In 1921 alliances were formed with Rumania and France and a treaty of neutrality was signed with Czechoslovakia. In 1922 friendly relations were established with the Little Entente. Three years later arbitration treaties were negotiated with Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, Czechoslovakia, and Austria; the alliance with Rumania was renewed; a pact of friendship was drawn up with Jugoslavia; the Locarno Agreements were accepted; and a concordat was signed with the Holy See.

In 1929 Poland, Russia, Esthonia, Latvia, and Rumania agreed to the Litvinov Protocol whereby the Kellogg Pact became immediately effective among the five signatories. In 1931 Poland reached a non-aggression accord with Russia, and the alliances with France and Rumania were renewed. This year, too, saw the conclusion of a Polish loan of \$50,000,000 from a French syndicate in which Schneider-Creusot was chiefly interested, for the completion of an important railway from Polish Upper Silesia to the port of Gdynia. Simultaneously an outcry was raised in Poland against the projected Austro-German Customs Union negotiated by Drs. Schober and Curtius.

Several efforts have been made under Polish auspices to create a Baltic Union, comprised of Poland, Latvia, Esthonia, Finland, and possibly Lithuania. There would be obvious political and

economic advantages to such a confederation, but little actual progress has been made in its direction. Russia is opposed to any plan which would create a Polish hegemony in the Baltic, Lithuania harbors no friendship for Poland, and Finland is leaning increasingly toward a Scandinavian rather than a Baltic orientation.

The Polish standing army at the end of 1931 numbered almost 270,000 effectives, being the fourth largest in the world. In the matter of total expenditures for military and naval armaments Poland ranked ninth among the nations of the world. More than one-third of Poland's budgetary appropriations in 1932 were directly absorbed by armaments. The financial drain was heavy, for the Polish Republic was as yet a poor country.

CHAPTER XVIII

SOVIET RUSSIA

THE OLD REGIME

Nicholas I I , from 1894 to 1917 " Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias," ruled over an empire that comprised almost one-sixth of the total land surface of the globe. His lands, 8,764,000 square miles in all, stretched eastward from Central Europe to the Pacific Ocean, and southward from the icy Arctic to the Black and Caspian seas, the Caucasus, Persia, and China. The inhabitants of this vast area numbered about 180,000,000, slightly fewer than half of whom were Russians proper, or Great Russians. The remainder consisted of Little Russians or Ukrainians, White Russians, Poles, Finns, Letts, Turks, Mongols, Armenians, Jews, and many others. The cultures of these various peoples differed greatly, ranging from the advanced civilization of the European Russian nobility and intelligentsia to the semi-barbarous life of the Siberian aborigines.

Among every 1000 Russians subject to the rule of the emperor in 1914, there were 17 nobles, 125 merchants and townspeople, and more than 800 peasants. Until 1860 these last, with some exceptions, had been serfs, living under feudal restrictions on government- or privately-owned estates. Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881), however, by a series of decrees culminating in that of March, 1861, abolished the institution of serfdom and prescribed a redistribution of the land. In accordance with his orders about half of the cultivated area of European Russia was assigned to the villages or *tnirs*, each peasant being given the right to till, on his own account, a share of the soil belonging to the community. The government advanced the money required to compensate the nobles for their resulting property losses, but the people were expected to reimburse the state over a long term of years.

Aside from certain obvious benefits accruing from the grant of personal freedom, there remained plenty of troubles after 1861 to sadden the lot of the average Russian peasant. Often the freed serfs were unable to support themselves and their families on the farm allotments received from the mir. This difficulty became worse with the passing of years, for the increase in available allotment lands failed to keep pace with the rise in peasant population. An unduly large portion of each year's income was absorbed by the remittances to the government for the land, by the heavy direct taxes imposed by the village, the province, and the state, and by the burdensome indirect levies. There was little incentive for the farmers to improve their holdings since the expense was prohibitive, and the mirs, in a majority of cases, periodically redistributed the plots. The rules and regulations of the village authorities were often quite strict, and peasants generally were not allowed to leave the village and migrate to the city without the approval of the mir.

These evils were somewhat mitigated by a series of agrarian decrees issued after the revolutionary outbursts of 1905. The edicts, among other things, remitted the unpaid redemption dues of the peasants, reduced the power of the mirs over their members, and gave each villager the right to demand outright his share of land held by the community. As direct owner of the property, then, the peasant, as he saw fit, might use, lease, or sell his holding.

To some of the more enterprising countrymen these new opportunities had great appeal, and they hastened to avail themselves of the right to become independent farmers. Many of the peasants, who were "by taste and tradition petty cultivators, ready and eager to buy land, to rent it, sometimes even to rise up and seize it/" soon began to crowd one another "for the opportunity to rent lands at a figure which did not leave them, in return for their labor, as much as they might have earned by working for wages on a neighboring estate." Some were unable "to maintain their holdings under the more individualistic system and sold them to their neighbors, becoming agricultural laborers themselves or going into the cities in search of work." Under these circumstances it is obvious that conditions did not improve sufficiently by 1914 to create a satisfied peasantry. The eve of

the war still found some millions of farming households living in great poverty and greedy for additional land.

The plight of Russia's 2,500,000 industrial workers was no less deplorable than that of the farmers. They suffered from all the ills usually associated with the beginnings of industrial revolutions, and were prevented by an unenlightened government from giving expression to their grievances. Some of their unions were broken up, strikes were often ruthlessly suppressed, and there was relatively little social legislation. As a consequence the industrial proletariat listened eagerly to apostles of reform, and since the workers were herded together in factories and slums, it was easy to agitate among them and reach them with propaganda. Already during the Revolution of 1905 the workingmen had demonstrated their temper by great strikes and riots in St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kovno, Riga, and other cities, and by 1914 they seemed ready for another violent outbreak.

The percentage of illiteracy among the Russian peasants and workers was one of the highest in Europe, and the bane of the population was its thralldom to vodka, a drink containing 40% alcohol. Although the sale of the liquor had been made a state monopoly in order to raise revenue and lessen the evils attendant upon the private dispensation of spirits, drunkenness remained a widespread curse. The masses, on the whole, therefore, were coarse and brutish, and filled with fear and hatred of the upper classes. The state-controlled Greek Orthodox Church, although it had considerable influence with the peasantry, was one of the most loyal supporters of the tsarist regime, and apparently did little to raise the people from their low cultural level.

Political conditions in the empire on the eve of the World War were highly unstable. The censorship was notorious and the police administration ruthless. Nicholas II was ill-suited to the exercise of autocratic powers over a vast domain. Though well-intentioned and patriotic, he was timid and easily swayed by the arguments of whatever person happened to be with him at any particular moment. He was especially dominated by the sensitive Tsarina Alexandra, who herself was under the influence of a Siberian "monk" named Gregory Rasputin. The latter's origins and life are shrouded in legend and obscurity, but he appears to have had great hypnotic powers. He acquired his con-

trol over the empress because he alone seemed able to soothe the hemophilic and cranky young Tsarevitch Alexis. It was said that a word from Rasputin was sufficient to bring about the appointment or dismissal of a minister or general, but his great authority apparently was not always wielded for the good of the nation. The whole situation was ominous, especially since the autocracy, in order to be maintained, required firm and decisive leadership. It could not endure under the guidance of a weak-willed imperial family and an illiterate adventurer.

As a result of the uprising of 1905, Nicholas had granted his people a parliament known as the Duma. Its powers were limited. The electoral law, moreover, was so framed as to render certain a conservative majority in the Duma, and little trouble was experienced by the government in continuing its traditional policies. In 1914 the entire parliament, with the exception of five deputies, patriotically upheld the course of the administration in its decision to go to war. The dissenting legislators, who were arrested and sent to Siberia, belonged to an organization which called itself the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party.¹

Despite the achievement of some military victories in the first weeks of the war, it soon was evident that Russia would experience difficulty in any extended prosecution of the conflict. The country was ill-prepared for war and the obstacles to success were

^xThe "radical" groups in pre-war Russia were the Constitutional Democrats or Cadets, made up of middle-class intellectuals and business men who favored responsible government of the British type; the Social Revolutionaries, chiefly peasants, led by middle-class reformers, whose aim was the transfer of the land to the peasantry and who resorted to terrorism in their effort to bring about a socialization and collectivization of agriculture; and the (Marxian) Social Democratic Party which found its main strength among the industrial workers and which advocated the abolition of private property and the control of production by the masses.

At a meeting of the Social Democrats in London in 1903, opinion was divided on the questions of party discipline, organization, and cooperation with non-proletarian revolutionary factions. One group, led by N. Lenin, favored strict discipline, a centralized organization, and complete independence from bourgeois support. The other preferred a looser party organization and had no objection to admitting non-proletarian "sympathizers." A referendum was taken on these two sets of views and a majority of the votes cast indicated a preference for the Leninist ideas. The partisans of the latter soon came to be known as *bolsheviks* from *bolshinstvo*, meaning "majority," while the others were called *mensheviks* from *menshinstvo*, meaning "minority."

enormous. There was a lack of factories and a consequent shortage of equipment; adequate transportation facilities were wanting; the generalship was poor, and the empress and civil nobility interfered in military matters; corruption was rife in nearly all government departments; and there were rumors of actual treason in high ranks. Hence the German armies before long were able to inflict a series of disastrous defeats upon the Russians, which further weakened the morale and disorganized the industrial structure of the land.

In the first three years of the struggle the tsar called out a total of 15,000,000 men — far more than was necessary or than could be suitably equipped and fed. Millions of hands thus were withdrawn from the fields, where they should have been engaged in planting and harvesting, and millions of men, whose chief pursuit became the destruction rather than production of economic wealth, had to be fed at public expense. Since the soldier's rations in many cases exceeded the average consumption of the individual peasants in peace time, food was required in greater quantities than during normal periods. In addition, the government had to pay allowances to the families of the soldiers.

The railway system was incapable of handling the wartime traffic. The empire in 1914 had only 50,000 miles of railway track — one-fifth as many as the United States, for an area almost three times as great. It was virtually impossible expeditiously to forward supplies to the front, particularly where there was need for north-south shipments. Rumors of terrible conditions among the fighting men and of the enormous casualties gradually leaked back behind the lines, while woeful tales of hunger and misery at home filtered out to the trenches.

The pressure of wartime demands for goods and the success of many of the strikes which occurred in the cities, made prices soar to record heights. Governmental expenditures were four times as high in 1916 as in an average pre-war year, and although much of the extra outlay was financed through Allied loans, taxes had to be boosted and resort was had to inflation, with the result that prices were stimulated to further rises. At the same time, in order to facilitate mobilization, the government instituted prohibition, thus depriving itself of considerable income from vodka sales.

The bad conditions notwithstanding, little heed was paid by the authorities to the numerous demands for a more liberal policy and for ministerial responsibility. The officials strove to discourage voluntary popular movements, even where these were motivated by a desire to aid the cause of the war. Indeed, the minister of the interior, Protopopov, once rejected the offer of a provincial council to provide certain comforts for the troops on the ground that "any form of voluntary cooperation by the Russian people tended toward revolution." Thus the groups in control simultaneously betrayed their fear of the lower classes and maintained an uncompromising, reactionary attitude. Nicholas himself wavered and hesitated, undecided on any course of action, and only too glad to have things remain *in statu quo*. The assassination of Rasputin in December, 1916, by a young nobleman, did little to help the situation.

The first definite indication of the doom of the old regime in Russia was a general factory strike in Petrograd in February, 1917. The walk-out led to unorganized and unplanned, but nevertheless huge, street demonstrations by the proletariat, which was weary of the war, the defeats, the privations, and the high prices. The city garrison, when ordered to disperse the crowds, refused to fire on the demonstrators and, in fact, fraternized with the people. Had the tsar quickly called in some troops from outside the city to suppress both the mobs and the Duma, which also was displaying a restive spirit, or had he agreed to the demands of the liberals for a new cabinet and responsible government, he might have averted, or at least postponed, the approaching crisis. Nicholas, however, could not act with decision. Determined not to grant concessions, too irresolute to take swift action, he temporized and did nothing.

THE TWO REVOLUTIONS OF 1917

The vacillation of the ruler slowly goaded liberal-minded men both within and outside the Duma into a revolutionary stand, and supplied the more radical agitators with excellent propaganda material. Early in March, 1917, there were mob attacks in the larger cities and some peasant riots, while accusations of treachery were hurled against the government from the floor of parliament. At last, on the eleventh of the month, the tsar

ordered the members of the Duma to go home and the working-men in Petrograd to cease striking and return to work. The result of these ill-advised imperial decrees was to precipitate the revolution.

The legislative chamber refused to disperse. Instead, it elected a committee to lead a revolution against the decadent autocracy. Simultaneously the socialist and other radical elements outside the Duma organized a Petrograd Soviet (Council) of Workers* and Soldiers' Deputies which invited all factory and army units to send delegates to its deliberations. The Duma committee and the soviet agreed to cooperate, at least temporarily, and on March 14 a provisional government, headed by the liberal Prince George Lvov, came into being. The cabinet included a majority of Constitutional Democrats. Its most radical member was the Social Revolutionary, Alexander Kerensky, spokesman of the soviet and vice-president of its executive committee.

On March 15 Tsar Nicholas recognized the new government, and then abdicated in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Michael. The latter, however, refused to accept the crown until an assembly, chosen by the people on a basis of universal, direct, secret suffrage, should have decided upon the future form of government for the realm. Nicholas and his immediate family thereupon became prisoners in the imperial palace at Tsarskoe Selo near Petrograd, and the rule of the Romanovs, founded in 1613, came to an abrupt end.

The Provisional Government immediately upon its organization issued decrees easing the censorship of the press, freeing large numbers of political and religious prisoners, recognizing the right of workmen to unionize and strike, and humanizing the disciplinary codes in the army and the navy. Most of the civil and military officials in Russia agreed to serve under the new government, since the tsar himself had legalized its status. The Allied countries, moreover, following the example of the United States, accorded prompt recognition. The Entente diplomats, in fact, felt much relieved when the Provisional Government took office, for rumors had reached them that the imperial authorities, under the instigation of the tsarina, had been contemplating a separate peace with Germany.

Despite these favorable omens the **Lvov cabinet, dependent**

as it was upon a misalliance between the parliamentary revolutionaries and the Petrograd Soviet, was destined to have a short existence. The Duma had been desirous of overthrowing the tsar, for one reason, because he failed to prosecute the war with sufficient vigor, while the workingmen had been partially motivated by a wish to end the slaughter. The soviet, moreover, wanted a thorough revision of the Russian property-holding system, a program with which most of the moderates in the Duma had little sympathy. Finally, whereas the government attempted to solve its difficult tasks by spinning fine theories and enunciating elaborate principles, without regard to the psychology, impatience, or immediate needs of the masses, the soviet quickly perfected a strong central organization, sent agents to establish branch councils at strategic points throughout the country, spread seditious propaganda far and wide, and urged all labor, military, and naval units to send representatives to the parent soviet.

By a famous Order No. 1 of March 14, the Petrograd Soviet instructed the army and the fleet to disregard any commands of the Provisional Government which conflicted with the Soviet's rules and regulations. Local revolutionary committees were quickly set up by the soldiers and sailors, which assumed control over the auxiliary military weapons. Disposition of the latter was to be entrusted to the officers only when the respective local committees were certain that such action would not jeopardize the interests of the revolution. Army discipline thus was shattered, for the soldiers greatly enjoyed their newly gained "responsibilities," and some of the troublesome officers who could not grasp the significance of the changed situation were summarily shot. There also resulted bitter quarreling among the men, for some desired to remain loyal to their officers and the old regime, while others refused to fight and started marching home.

As it gradually became apparent that the Lvov ministry was unable to cope with the difficult situation that was developing, one after another of the moderate members resigned from the cabinet. By July only three of the original appointees, including Kerensky, remained. The latter, in fact, had risen to be minister Of war and head of the government, and he resorted to much elo-

quence and skillful parliamentary procedure in an attempt to restore domestic order while continuing the contest against the Central Powers. By this time, however, even a Social Revolutionary government was unsatisfactory to the masses, who craved the return of peace and direct control over the national means of production. Kerensky's apparent anxiety to postpone elections for a national assembly weakened the confidence of the people in his ultimate motives.

In the fall of 1917, Russia was clearly at the threshold of another revolution. The soldiers were staging what was perhaps the greatest mutiny in military history. The peasants, when they felt certain of the downfall of the tsar and the hated landlords, rose and seized what lands they could, sometimes peacefully, oftentimes with bloodshed. The workers in the towns, many of whom originally had struck for higher pay and shorter hours, became more radical in their demands. Some of them now sought to take over full control of factories and plants and to run them without capitalistic ownership. In order to give more force to their ideals, they formed local Soviets and voluntarily organized themselves into armed units called Red Guards. The subject nationalities, notably the Ukrainians and Finns, were taking advantage of the general confusion to establish their independence, and the armies of Germany and Austria-Hungary were swarming over the western portions of the country. In the face of these conditions, Kerensky's grant of greater local autonomy to the old provincial councils or *zemstvos*, the establishment of universal suffrage, and the promise of far-reaching social and economic reforms as soon as external conditions permitted, failed to satisfy any considerable portion of the people.

In June, 1917, at the initiative of the Petrograd Soviet, there met the first AU-Russian Congress of Soviets. The delegates, numbering about 1000, included Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and Bolsheviks, the latter forming only a small minority of the total. The gathering indulged in fervent speechmaking against imperialism and in favor of peace without annexations and without indemnities, while the chief practical accomplishment was the appointment of an All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. This body, with a membership of 300, was to act as a sort of soviet parliament. It was placed

under the leadership of a presidium of twenty, mainly Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

The Bolsheviks, although overwhelmingly outnumbered in the congress, continued to organize local Soviets and to agitate with great energy against Kerensky. With the aid of German agents and funds they spread their ideas in the trenches, among the workers, and on the farms. Everywhere they shouted the slogan "Peace! Land! Bread!" and promised freedom for the oppressed nationalities. The campaign was ably directed by the "father of Bolshevism," N. Lenin, who had been helped by the Germans to return to Russia from Switzerland. The Germans aided the revolutionaries not out of any sympathy for their ideals, but in order the more quickly to undermine the Russia state system and end the war on the eastern front. The failure of the Allies to re-define their war aims as Kerensky suggested, also reacted to the latter's disadvantage.

The cause of the Bolsheviks received a temporary setback in July when Kerensky successfully put down a premature anarchic uprising which, though it had been strongly opposed by Lenin, nevertheless reacted unfavorably upon the cause of all radical anti-government groups. An equally futile reactionary *coup* under General Laurus Kornilov in September, however, not only enabled the Bolsheviks to recapture their lost ground, but also served to enhance their reputation.

Kornilov was an able strategist who had become relatively popular among the soldiers for his energy and humaneness and his daring escape from an Austrian prison. He had been made commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Kerensky Government, with practically no restrictions upon his military powers. For a time it appeared as though the general and Kerensky were jointly contemplating the establishment of a strong and moderate government that would cut short the internal disorder and continue the war against the Central Powers. However, when Kornilov started to march on Petrograd, Kerensky became frightened before the spectre of a reactionary military dictatorship and hastily assembled some troops with which to meet the general. Kornilov's men, hearing of this state of affairs, refused to follow him any farther, and the government was saved without striking a blow. In his anxiety Kerensky had called on the well-

organized Red Guards to come to his support, and since these were mainly Bolsheviks, the prestige of the latter was considerably advanced in the eyes of the people.

At last, at a party meeting of October, 1917, at which were present delegates of soldiers, sailors, and workingmen, the Bolsheviks decided upon a *coup d'état*. On November 6 and 7, according to schedule, Petrograd was seized by force and the members of the government were arrested, only Kerensky managing to escape from the country. The date for the event had been chosen so as to precede the meeting of the second AU-Russian Congress of Soviets which had been called for the seventh. When this body assembled, therefore, it was faced with a *fait accompli*. Since the gathering contained a Bolshevik majority, it received the announcement with glee and constituted itself the supreme authority in Russia.

The spirit of this second revolt soon spread and everywhere in Russia the local Soviets seized power. The congress meanwhile (November) appointed a new and Bolshevik-controlled Central Executive Committee and an administrative board called the Soviet of People's Commissars. The chairman of this cabinet was Lenin, while Trotsky became commissar for foreign affairs; Alexei Rykov, for the interior; and Joseph Stalin, for workers' and peasants' inspection.

The program which the commissars were expected to launch envisaged the following accomplishments: (1) the immediate conclusion of peace with the Central Powers; (2) the quelling of the numerous local revolts and combating of the separatist movements which had been in progress since the end of the old regime; (3) a complete revision of the economic, social, and political structure of the state, and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat to rule until such time as the entire population would be ready to participate in a communistic government; and (4) the spreading of the proletarian revolution throughout the world. Simultaneously, it would be necessary to care for the returning soldiers and provide food and shelter for the distressed multitudes in the cities.

As an earnest of the good intentions of the new government, the long-postponed elections for a constituent assembly were held on November 25, the date which had finally been set by the

Kerensky Government. To the chagrin of the Bolsheviks, this first Russian election in which the suffrage was universal, secret, and direct, resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Social Revolutionaries. The latter obtained 412 seats in the assembly to 183 for the Bolsheviks, several other groups receiving smaller representations. Had the government been of the responsible type, the Bolsheviks would not have resigned their authority into the hands of the majority party. Having no intention thus to jeopardize their future control, however, they postponed the meeting of the assembly until January 18, 1918, and strove in the meantime to consolidate their strength and intimidate their opponents.

Despite these tactics the assembly, when it met, elected a Social Revolutionary president and voted down a Bolshevik proposal to disarm all classes of the population save the workmen. The Bolshevik delegates thereupon left the hall, and on the following day the Bolsheviks dissolved the "reactionary" assembly by force, while accusing the Social Revolutionaries of "directing the fight of the bourgeoisie against the workingmen's revolution." Local Soviets which betrayed anti-Bolshevik sympathies were likewise dissolved, and many of their leaders imprisoned or exiled. A transitional working-class dictatorship, to last, ostensibly, until the mass of the people could be made to comprehend and voluntarily accept the benefits of communism, thus replaced the short-lived democracy. It may be interesting, at this point, to survey the careers of the two most prominent People's Commissars.

LENIN AND TROTSKY

Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, alias N. Lenin, was born on April 22, 1870, at Simbirsk (now Leninsk) in the province of Kazan. The Ulyanov family, although belonging to the nobility, was known for its liberal, in fact, radical tendencies, and Vladimir's brother, Alexander, was hanged in 1887 for complicity in a plot to kill the tsar. Another brother and two sisters were under constant police surveillance, and Vladimir himself was expelled from the University of Kazan within a month of his matriculation for having participated in a student riot.

Some years later he got permission to enter the university at



77. S. S. R, in Construction
STATUE OF N. LENIN IN LENINGRAD

St. Petersburg, and in 1891 he secured a degree in law. In the meantime he had become absorbed in the study of Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* and had reached the conclusion that only socialism could "lead the Russian people to freedom." He joined a radical group and soon became one of its most active members, for which temerity he had to pay with an involuntary sojourn in Siberia from 1897¹⁰ 1900- While in exile he married (1898) an able fellow-radical, Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, who energetically aided him in his revolutionary activities throughout the remainder of his life.

In 1900 he went to Switzerland and, except for a brief visit during the Revolution of 1905, remained outside Russia until 1917. During these years he edited radical newspapers and traveled extensively in Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, and England, in each place making the acquaintance of outstanding reformers. In 1903, as has been indicated, he became the leader of the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party. Always the memory of his brother Alexander, martyr to the cause, was his guide and comfort. The name of Lenin, indeed, had originally been the alias of the elder Ulyanov.

Lenin was unprepossessing in appearance: short, thickset, bald, and bearded. He never knew the actual pangs of poverty, but he led a moderate, simple life, working hard and regularly, and taking plenty of physical exercise. He was full of confidence in his own powers and ability, conscious of his intellectual superiority, and possessed of an iron will and an unshakable determination. Totally lacking in self-interest, Lenin was uncompromising and unscrupulous where matters of policy were concerned. He hated fruitless discussions, and his calmness and skill in sizing up an opponent made him a dangerous adversary in debate. "He was perhaps the only revolutionary writer who never said more than he meant."

The leader of the Bolsheviks was a realist. Though he saw the world unveiled, he "did not flee into the solitudes of the woods." Capitalism appeared to him as evil incarnate, and world revolution as the highest goal. To achieve the destruction of the former and the attainment of the latter, all means were fair. Lenin was not a man to be loved; he was a master to be feared and admired.

In 1917 the Germans permitted him to return to Russia in a sealed car in order that he might conduct subversive propaganda against the Provisional Government. He carefully planned the overthrow of the bourgeois regime and took note of the widespread peasant and worker movements which, after the first outbursts of violence, had assumed a constructive phase and now aimed at consolidating some of the social and economic results of the overturn. After several months of activity he decided that the time had come to strike, and in October he converted his followers to the same view. On November 6 and 7 the revolution came to pass.

One of Lenin's ablest lieutenants was Lev Davydovitch Bronstein, alias Leon Trotsky. The latter was born in 1879 in the province of Kherson, the son of a hard-working and fairly prosperous Jewish farmer. Trotsky enjoyed only eight years of formal schooling, but he was an avid reader and grew up to be a man of literary culture. The instances of human inequality and injustice which he saw about him in his childhood made deep and lasting impressions upon his sensitive mind, and while still young he came under the influence of radical thinkers. He was arrested for the first time a year after he left school, for having helped to organize a South Russian Worker's Union. Between 1898 and 1917 he spent four years in prison, was twice exiled to Siberia, and lived abroad for twelve years.

Like Lenin he traveled widely in central and western Europe, lecturing in Belgium, France, and Germany, and writing scores of articles and pamphlets. When the break between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks occurred, he for a time led a middle group of Trotskyists, and did not finally go over to Lenin's side until after the March Revolution (1917). During the war he was expelled from France and Spain and deported to the United States, living in New York until 1917 and then attempting to return to Russia. On the way he was held in a concentration camp at Halifax for a month, but upon representations from Kerensky he was released and allowed to proceed.

In appearance Trotsky is more striking than was Lenin. His features are characterized by a prominent nose, black eyes, a high forehead topped with a mass of wavy hair, and heavy lips. Fond of theatrical display and highly susceptible to flattery, he

none the less proved himself an indefatigable worker and a remarkable organizer. He is a believer in discipline and system, and it was he who laid the foundations for the powerful and efficient Red Army. He is a prolific and interesting writer. In 1929 he stated in his autobiography: "Almost a third of a century of my conscious life was entirely filled with revolutionary struggle. And if I had to live it over again, I would unhesitatingly take the same path."

THE END OF FOREIGN AND CIVIL WAR

The conclusion of peace with the Central Powers was accomplished, it will be recalled, through the signing of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918).¹ By the terms of this and two supplementary pacts Russia gave up 500,000 square miles of territory, with 66,000,000 inhabitants, and agreed to pay a heavy indemnity. Harsh though these provisions were, nothing better could be achieved, for Russia was in no position to continue the struggle and Germany was in no mood to be merciful. The conclusion of this peace, moreover, bad as it was, at least permitted the Bolsheviks to concentrate their energies upon domestic affairs.

Most urgent among these internal matters was the need to deal with the numerous counter-revolutionary movements that were arising everywhere. For three years, from 1917 to 1920, the Bolsheviks were engaged in a life-and-death struggle with an opposition variously led by nobles, clergymen, moderate republicans, adventurers, ex-tsarist officers, and champions of local rights. For a time several groups of counter-revolutionaries, out of strategic considerations, were aided by the German invaders. Later the Allies sent men, money, and munitions to be used against the "Reds."

The Allies had several reasons for thus intervening in the affairs of Russia. They hoped by restoring bourgeois control to rebuild the eastern front against Germany. They wanted to preserve from German or Bolshevik hands the stocks of war supplies at

¹See p. 65. Late in 1917 the Bolsheviks denounced and published the texts of the Secret Treaties to which Russia had been a party, but the negotiations with the Central Powers were undertaken only after the Allies had refused a proposal of Trotsky to consider a general peace based on the principles of self-determination for all subject peoples and "no annexations and no indemnities."

Murmansk and Archangel which they had earlier placed at the disposal of the Russians. They were angered by a Bolshevik declaration of January, 1918, cancelling all Russian foreign loans. The Allied blockade was therefore extended to Russia; Allied and American military contingents were sent to Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok; and, when Turkey quit the war, the French bombarded and captured Odessa while the British attacked Baku.¹ Thousands of Czech and Slovak soldiers who previously had deserted to Russia from the Austro-Hungarian armies likewise turned against the Bolsheviks. Nationalistic and anti-socialist groups in Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and the Transcaucasian states took advantage of the turmoil to declare the independence of these regions, and Rumania stepped into the rich province of Bessarabia.²

Wherever they were sent, the foreign troops joined with bands of anti-Bolshevik natives to set up counter-revolutionary or "White" governments. Around Murmansk and Archangel there was established a "North Russian Provisional Government." At Omsk, in Siberia, Admiral Alexander Kolchak, former commander of the Imperial Black Sea Fleet, with the aid of Allied and Czech soldiers, founded an "All-Russian Government." In the south of Russia there was a government under General Denikin, and later, in the southern Ukraine and the Crimea, one under General Peter Wrangel. Nikolai Judenich placed himself at the head of a "Northwest Government of Russia" with headquarters in the Baltic area, while a General Gustav Mannfcrheim assumed control in eastern Finland and Karelia. Along the western border it was the Polish General Haller and the Cossack Hetman, Simon Petlura, who attempted to wrest land and power from the Soviets.

In the beginning it appeared as though the Bolsheviks would be overwhelmed by all these foes. The few Red Guards, capable though they were, could not cope with enemies who outnumbered them several times, and at one stage the followers of Lenin

¹ The Japanese sent thousands of men to southern and eastern Siberia in the belief that the long-awaited opportunity to acquire part of that area had at last arrived. Probably some of the Allied statesmen agreed to intervention because of lack of sympathy with socialistic principles.

² See p. 546.

were in control only of Petrograd and Moscow and of a few provinces surrounding each of these cities.

Two factors, nevertheless, played into the hands of the radicals. First, the intervention of foreign soldiers in what was very definitely a matter for the Russians themselves to settle, induced a number of patriotic persons, especially young officers, to come to the aid of the Reds in repelling the outsiders. Secondly, many of the peasants, although they did not understand the economic theories of the Bolsheviks and did not like their grain-requisitioning policies, were even more disgusted with the activities of the Whites. The latter, wherever they made an advance, inaugurated a White Terror and indicated a determination to restore the old landlord-peasant relationship of pre-revolutionary days. Of the two evils, requisitions and landlordism, the peasants apparently preferred the former. The requisitions, they felt, would stop eventually; but landlordism, if reinstated, might remain a permanent bane. Consequently in the early years of the Bolshevik struggle, the Russian masses, by and large, obstructed the progress of the counter-revolutionaries as much as they dared.

While the Red-White conflict was at its height, it seemed dangerous to the Bolsheviks to keep the ex-imperial family confined in Tsarskoe Selo, where it might become a rallying point for the reactionaries. Hence the Romanov prisoners were sent off into the country, eventually being lodged in the Ural town of Ekaterinburg. It was planned at some future time to subject the former emperor to a public trial, with Trotsky as state prosecutor, but when, in the summer of 1918, the Whites under Kolchak fought their way to the neighborhood of Ekaterinburg, the local soviet officials became panicky and on July 17 ordered the shooting of Nicholas and Alexandra together with their son and four daughters. This incident has been held up by opponents of the Red regime as an example of unique brutality, but it must be remembered, in judging the act, that few revolutions comparable in scope to that in Russia have passed off without the execution of the old rulers.

As the months rolled by, the Bolsheviks gradually managed to develop two powerful weapons with which to cut short domestic and foreign opposition. To crush the counter-revolutionaries there was created, soon after the Bolsheviks assumed power, an

"Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution, Speculation, and Sabotage," known from its initials in Russian as the "Cheka." Trotsky believed that "terror, as the demonstration of the will and strength of the working class, was historically justified/' and Felix Dzerzhinsky, who was placed at the head of the Cheka, appeared to be in agreement with the dictum. After an attempt by a Social Revolutionary to assassinate Lenin in August, 1918, there was inaugurated a veritable "mass terror."

The Cheka was a powerful, secret, revolutionary tribunal which requisitioned, arrested, and executed at will, and then merely presented reports of its activities to the commissars and the Central Executive Committee. There are no reliable statistics on the number of lives taken by this instrument of suppression, but thousands must have been killed — perhaps scores of thousands. At any rate, the backbone of the opposition was broken, the influence of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia was almost obliterated, and the proletariat and peasantry remained as the dominant classes.

The reactionary generals and foreign troops were dealt with by the Red Army, product of the organizing genius of Trotsky. By 1919 the latter had created a well-drilled force of about 100,000 men, led, to a large extent, by patriotic ex-imperial officers. As the Bolshevik army grew in strength, the Allies became less and less anxious to continue their armed interference. Besides, the frequently vindictive and discreditable actions of the Whites disgusted some of the western diplomats, who eventually contented themselves with contributing supplies and a few officers to the cause of restoration. In the summer of 1920 Great Britain, the United States, and Italy began to raise the Russian blockade.

The Red Army required until late in 1920 to restore peace to Russia. Its first great successes came against Judenich who, by October, 1919, was driven back from the neighborhood of Petrograd to Esthonia. The latter country soon repudiated the general and in February, 1920, signed a treaty with Russia at Dorpat (Tartu). This same month saw the capture and shooting of Admiral Kolchak, and the break-up of his government at Omsk. Supported by a strong force of Czechs, Kolchak had actually

gotten control of the Trans-Siberian Railway and of most of the larger towns between Vladivostok and the Volga, but he was unable to penetrate very far into European Russia and lost his life in the attempt. Between July and October, 1920, peace treaties were signed with Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, and Poland.

The war against the Poles, who were desirous of extending their borders to the limits of 1772, was especially difficult, for they were led in part by French officers and equipped in part with French supplies. In May, 1920, they occupied the city of Kiev, but then the Russian Bolsheviks rallied and drove the invaders back to the gates of Warsaw. After several more months of war, a peace was signed at Riga (October 12), and a compromise boundary accepted by both parties. Meanwhile General Denikin in southern Russia was also being defeated. In order to continue his struggle he resorted to conscription among the populations under his control and even compelled Red prisoners to fight under his standards. In the spring of 1920 he resigned his command into the hands of General Wrangel and fled the country. The new commander was able to hold out in the Crimea until November, but then he too went into exile. After six years of continuous warfare, Russia was at peace.

This "Russia" of 1920, however, comprised only a fraction, if a large one, of the territory which had formerly been the empire of the tsar. Poland, Finland, Latvia, Esthonia, Lithuania, White Russia, the Ukraine, Transcaucasia, Bessarabia, and eastern Siberia, all were independent or under foreign occupation. There remained as Russia only an association of autonomous republics and regions known, since the spring of 1918, as the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.). The four Baltic states, Poland, and Bessarabia seemed permanently lost; but in the period 1920-1921 the other areas were all regained.

Between 1919 and 1921 Bolshevik sympathizers seized control of the governments in the Ukraine and White Russia, as well as in the Transcaucasian states of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. Under Russian instigation these last three then combined to form the Transcaucasian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, and on December 30, 1922, at Moscow, delegates from all the Bolshevik states, now four in number, signed a treaty of union. The treaty went into effect on July 6, 1923, and the new

federation was termed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.).¹

The members of the federation retained considerable autonomy, at least in theory, and reserved "the right freely to leave the Union." The word "Russian" was omitted from the official title of the new state since it was hoped that other countries, inhabited by non-Russians, might eventually seek to join the U.S.S.R. In 1924 two Central Asiatic socialist soviet republics, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, entered the Union. A seventh member of the federation, Tadjikistan, formed out of those parts of Uzbekistan which were peopled by the Tadjiks, was admitted late in 1929. Despite the supposed equality of the seven republics, the R.S.F.S.R. dominates the combination. This circumstance is only natural since nine-tenths of the area and seven-tenths of the population of the Union are included within the limits of this single constituent.

The constitutions of the several members of the U.S.S.R., and of the latter itself, were all patterned closely after that of the R.S.F.S.R. as adopted by the fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in July, 1918, and amplified between 1919 and 1930.

GOVERNMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION

The underlying theory of the constitution of the R.S.F.S.R. is communism,² and many of its ideas are traceable to the *Communist Manifesto* published in 1848 by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. To the Bolsheviks communism is both a philosophy and a method. Philosophically it aims at the building of a classless society through the abolition of private property and the common ownership of all means of production and distribution. Its method involves, first, a national, and then an international social revolution under an organized dictatorship of the working people. These principles motivated the congresses of Soviets which adopted or amended the fundamental law of the land.

¹ While under Allied occupation, that part of Siberia which lies east of Lake Baikal had been set up as an independent Far Eastern Republic. In November, 1922, however, a month after the last Japanese soldiers were withdrawn, a constituent assembly voted for immediate incorporation in the R.S.F.S.R.

* In February, 1918, the Bolsheviks adopted the official name of Communist Party, and in 1923 of All-Union Communist Party (C.P.S.U.).

The constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., after giving endorsement to a "Declaration of the Rights of Laboring and Exploited People" which had been issued in November, 1917, proclaims Russia a socialist republic of workers and peasants, with complete central and local authority vested in Soviets of workers', peasants', Cossacks', and Red Army deputies. All land, forests, mineral resources, live-stock, factories, shops, banks, and means of production, communication, and transit are declared the property of the workers' and peasants' state. With a view to wiping out the so-called "parasitic elements" of society, labor is made the duty of every citizen. Special clauses guarantee to workingmen the freedom of religious and atheistic opinion, and the enjoyment of free, universal education. Oppression of national minorities is forbidden and foreign workers who come to dwell in Russia as law-abiding citizens have the same privileges and rights as the laborers.

Supreme authority in the R.S.F.S.R. is lodged with an All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and in the interim between its meetings in an All-Russian Central Executive Committee. The All-Russian Congress is composed of representatives of the city Soviets on the basis of one deputy for every 25,000 *voters*, and of representatives of the provincial Soviets on the basis of one delegate for every 125,000 of the *population*. Since the resulting body, with its membership of more than one thousand, is too unwieldy for the efficient conduct of business, the congress appoints a Central Executive Committee to act as "supreme legislative, administrative, and controlling organ of the R.S.F.S.R."

This committee, whose membership is about four hundred, is charged with the "general direction of the workers' and peasants' government" and has the power to issue decrees and decisions, to unify and coordinate the country's legislation and administration, and to appoint a form of cabinet known as the Council of People's Commissars. The importance of the committee has increased proportionally with the declining influence of the congress. The latter at first met frequently, then its gatherings became annual affairs, and now, at its biennial meetings, it usually is content to approve whatever the committee has ordained.


Since even the committee is too large for the efficient accomp-

ishment of work, it meets only a few times a year, leaving the control of affairs and the supervision of the commissars to a Presidium of about forty. Under the watchful eye of this presidium the council of commissars or *sovnarkom* carries on the actual work of governing the state. Each commissar is assisted by a collegium and is responsible to the whole sovnarkom, the presidium, and the central executive committee. All decrees of the sovnarkom must eventually be submitted to the central executive committee for ratification or annulment. The commissariats include those for heavy and light industry, labor, finance, workmen's and peasants' inspection, central statistical administration, education, health, and social welfare.

The local authority, although strictly supervised by the central government, is in the hands of local Soviets. The cities are governed by urban Soviets elected on a basis of one deputy for each one thousand of the population. Representation is based upon trade or vocation rather than geographical division, and the people in the various occupations vote separately, the ironworkers in one group, the textile workers in another, and so on. In the case of housewives and individual workmen, resort is had to a special type of districting. In the villages and small towns the peasants, home workers, teachers, and doctors meet together to elect one deputy for each one hundred inhabitants. The customary manner of voting is by show of hands.

Representation in the Soviets above the city and village councils is indirect. The village Soviets send delegates to district (*raion*) congresses of Soviets, and these in turn to regional (*krai* or *oblast*) congresses. From these last are chosen the members of the All-Russian Congress. The town and factory Soviets elect their All-Russian Congress delegates directly, but also send representatives to sit in the district and regional congresses. The reason for thus giving the city workers more direct representation in the All-Russian Congress is because they form the core of the Communist Party.

All men and women are allowed to vote who have reached the age of eighteen and who are productive workers, the housekeepers of such workers, soldiers, or sailors. This rule applies equally to native Russians and to foreigners living in Russia. The following groups, with occasional exceptions, are deprived



THE SOVIET POLITICAL STRUCTURE.

both of the suffrage and the right to hold office: (1) persons who employ hired labor for profit; (2) persons who live on an income not derived from their own direct labor; (3) private business men, traders, and commercial agents; (4) monks and clergymen; (5) members of the former ruling dynasty and agents and employees of the former police, gendarmerie, or secret service; (6) lunatics, imbeciles, and criminals. The number of people disfranchised under these regulations varies from year to year. In recent elections about four per cent of the population over eighteen in the villages and seven per cent of that in the cities have, been deprived of the franchise.

The constitutions of the remaining six republics in the U.S.S.R., and of the Union itself (adopted on July 6, 1923), are similar to the one just described. The supreme organ of authority in the Soviet Union is the All-Union Congress of Soviets elected by the city and regional Soviets in each of the republics, again on a basis of one deputy each to every 25,000 urban electors and every 125,000 rural inhabitants. Since the congress in consequence of this arrangement numbers about 2000 delegates, it meets only once every two years, for about a week, to approve the work of the Union Central Executive Committee (*TSIK*) and the Union Council of Commissars. Meetings of the All-Union Congress and the Union Central Executive Committee are held in rotation at the several republican capitals. The committee, moreover, has seven presidents, one from each of the constituent republics. In 1932 the senior president was the former peasant, Mikhail I. Kalinin.

The Union Central Executive Committee, which has supreme legislative and administrative powers whenever the congress is not in session, consists of two bodies, a Union Soviet and a Soviet of Nationalities. The Union Soviet is elected by the All-Union Congress and includes over 400 members representing the seven republics in proportion to their population. The Soviet of Nationalities has about 140 members, elected by the local central executive committees in the various republics, subject to confirmation by the All-Union Congress. The creation of this council of nationalities was not only an official recognition of the fact that the Soviet Union included scores of distinct national groups, but also an attempt to perpetuate the cultural and

linguistic differences between these groups.¹ The whole committee meets three times a year, its two branches sitting and voting separately. Between sessions, the committee's powers are delegated to a Union Presidium of 27 members, 9 appointed by the Union Soviet, 9 by the Soviet of Nationalities, and 9 selected in a joint meeting. This presidium supervises the work of the Union Council of Commissars or sovnarkom. Appointments to the latter are also made by the TSIK, though the Communist Party exercises a decisive influence in the selections.

The Union Sovnarkom consists of a president, several vice-presidents, a chairman of the supreme economic council, and a commissar each for foreign affairs, war and marine, foreign and domestic trade, transport, posts and telegraphs, workers' and peasants' inspection, agriculture, labor, finance, and state planning and statistics. Several of the commissariats mentioned have jurisdiction throughout the entire Union and have no counterpart in the sovnarkoms of the republics. The others share concurrent jurisdiction with respective commissariats in each of the affiliated states. The president of the Union Sovnarkom in 1932 was Viacheslav M. Molotov.

Attached and subordinated to the TSIK there is a Union Supreme Court. The functions of this agency are (1) to provide the supreme courts of the republics with "guiding interpretations on questions of the general legislation of the Union"; (2) to protest before the committee verdicts or decisions of the republican supreme courts which may be in contradiction to Union legislation or adverse to the interests of other members of the federation; (3) to decide legal conflicts between the republics; and (4) to examine cases against high officers accused of committing offenses in connection with their official duties.

Among the distinguishing characteristics of the Russian governmental system, four features stand out most prominently. First, although the U.S.S.R. is a federal state, the central government, specifically the Union Central Executive Committee with its presidium and sovnarkom, has unusually broad powers. It may legislate on almost any conceivable matter from war and peace to sanitation and public health. The member republics,

¹ All-Union government decrees and announcements are published in the six principal languages of the federation.

despite their numerous councils and officials, may legislate freely only on affairs of definitely local importance.

Secondly, since the Bolsheviks believe that the individual's attitude towards political questions is determined by his economic status and occupation, representation rests upon a vocational rather than a geographical basis. The underlying idea is similar to that prevailing in Fascist Italy, but in the latter country capital secures recognition as well as labor. Thirdly, the electoral system is highly indirect. The peasants in the U.S.S.R. are six steps removed from the Union Sovnarkom, the actual executive of the state, and the urban workers four steps. Thus, under the Russian procedure, many of the non-communist deputies are gradually weeded out in the successive elections, and the supreme authority is under little popular control. Finally, there is no separation of powers in the Bolshevik arrangement. The Union Central Executive Committee with its subordinate bodies has supreme legislative, administrative, and judicial control of the land.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The foundation stone of the soviet governmental structure, and the source of its power, is the All-Union Communist Party. Without directions from the latter "no important political or organizational problem is ever decided by the Soviets." The roll of the party in 1932 included about 2,500,000 members and probationers. Seventy per cent of the membership was Great Russian by nationality, and every seventh adherent was a woman. In 1930 almost seven-tenths of the members were workingmen, the remainder being peasants, employees, civil servants, and intellectuals.

In addition to the regular party, there are three junior communist societies with a combined enrollment (1932) of more than 8,000,000 youths and children. These organizations include the *Octiabrists*,¹ an association of children between the ages of eight and ten; the *Pioneers*, for boys and girls from ten to sixteen; and the *Komsomol*, for young men and women from sixteen to twenty-three. New members of the party are now

¹ So named in honor of the Bolshevik Revolution which, according to the old style Russian calendar, occurred in October, 1917.

recruited chiefly from among the graduates of the Komsomol, but not every graduate is guaranteed admission. Before even a working-class youth can become actively affiliated with the Communist Party, he or she must undergo a six-months' period of probation, secure the endorsements of at least two members in good standing, and be accepted by vote of the local party branch. Proletarian origin serves as a special recommendation, while a bourgeois background makes acceptance a doubtful matter.

Seven or eight thousand of the enrolled communists belong to the group known as "Old Bolsheviks/" that is, they were active revolutionaries in the days of tsardom. Generally intelligent and well-educated, these persons have been able to monopolize most of the important party and state offices. They have imposed upon their younger followers a rigid code of discipline and morals. It is impressed "on the mind of every candidate that there must be complete subordination of all personal feelings to the welfare of the party." Communists must place themselves at the full disposal of their superiors, must obey orders implicitly, must go without question wherever and whenever they may be sent, must devote their spare time to preaching the gospel of communism, and must be ready to defend the revolution with their lives.

Each year a control committee purges the party of about two per cent of its members. The grounds for dismissal include drunkenness, immorality, slackness in propagandist zeal, tax evasion, non-payment of dues, attendance at church services, or the cultivation of bourgeois associations. Individuals who seek to utilize their party standing merely for the sake of advancing their careers are expelled as soon as they can be discovered. Such persons are popularly known as *shkurniki*, or men who look after their own skins. Lenin is said to have likened them to radishes, for they are "red" outside, but "white" at heart. Not all infractions of rules, of course, are punishable by expulsion. Delinquents often are reprimanded or demoted.

Until 1932 no communist was permitted to receive a wage or salary in excess of \$115 per month; in 1932 the maximum was raised considerably. Many party members, however, have larger real incomes. Officials are entitled to special traveling allowances and sometimes even to living quarters and auto-

mobiles. Individuals who give evidence of prowess with the pen frequently are rewarded for their literary propaganda activities by being permitted to share in the returns from sales of their productions. Other compensations of membership include eligibility for the important governmental as well as party offices, and preferred treatment at times when food shortages lead to the issuance of ration cards. Children of communists have prior claims over other children to the available scholastic instruction. In view of the heavy obligations attendant upon association with the party, it is perhaps safe to assume that there may be a considerable number of persons in Russia who, while remaining unattached politically, are in sympathy with the Bolshevik cause.

The organization of the Communist Party is outlined in detail in a constitution adopted in December, 1925. At the base of the pyramid-like party structure are some 40,000 local "cells." These cells elect representatives to a biennial party congress which, being too large for efficient work, merely approves the decisions taken by its smaller committees.¹ Of these the most important are a Central Committee and a Central Control Commission. The latter, with a membership of about 200, meets every three months and is charged with the task of consolidating the unity of the party and maintaining discipline and loyalty among the adherents.

The Central Committee — the actual directive agency of the party — is composed of about 70 members with almost as many alternates. Although it meets frequently, its functions are really carried on through two small bureaus and a secretariat. An organization bureau (*Orgbureau*), consisting of twelve regular members, is responsible for fixing the conditions of membership in the party, for promotions and demotions, and for supervising the work of propaganda. It is subordinate to the political bureau (*Politbureau*) which, with nine members (1932), determines the general policies of the party and through it, of the state. The secretariat is responsible "for the current work of organization and execution." Since the personnel of these three bodies is closely interlocked, all power in the party is extremely

¹ In addition to the local branches and the congress, the party hierarchy includes county, provincial, city, and regional committees. There are no separate parties representing the seven federated republics in the Union.

centralized. Until his death in 1924 Lenin was chairman of the Politbureau.

The chief officer of the party is the Secretary-General of the Central Committee. Joseph Stalin, who holds (1932) this office, is at once a member of the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the secretariat. His is the most important voice in the determination of the party's policies. Inasmuch as the party is "the helm of the government," he is the virtual dictator of the Soviet Union.

To uphold its class dictatorship during the transitional period in which Russia is to be prepared for thorough-going communism, the party has resorted to various constitutional and extra-constitutional means. It is the only organized political group tolerated in the land. Anyone not connected with the party who wishes to run for office must do so as a "non-party" man. Since the number of available party candidates is usually limited, the village Soviets are made up largely of non-communists. However, the indirect process of selection for the higher offices invariably leads to a gradual elimination of the non-party deputies from the superior government agencies, and the membership of the Union Presidium and the Union Council of Commissars is almost entirely communist. The strict censorship, the communist propaganda, the open voting, and the circumstance that the naturally hostile groups are deprived of the franchise, are, of course, great helps to the communist candidates in the cities. As has been indicated, moreover, the urban communist strongholds have a greater representation than the rural areas in both the republican and the Union congresses. Most of the high state offices are reserved by the party for its own leaders. Thus, many of the members of the party's Central Committee are also on the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., while some have seats in the presidium and others are commissars.

Contrary to popular foreign opinion of the situation, criticism of policies of the Communist Party is not prohibited. Constructive suggestions, in line with communist policy, are welcomed, but they must come from within the party, not from organized opposition groups. The censorship is exceedingly severe, and the opposition is given no opportunity to speak, write, or print anti-Bolshevik propaganda. The suppression is enforced by a Unified State Political Administration, known from its initials

as the O.G.P.U. This branch of the government is in reality the heir of the Cheka, which was abolished in 1922. The president of the O.G.P.U. sits with the Union Sovnarkom in an advisory capacity.

AN ATTEMPT AT PURE COMMUNISM, 1917-1921

Sweeping as were the alterations effected by the Bolsheviks in the Russian political structure, the early innovations in the economic sphere were still more revolutionary. In accordance with its professed precepts, the Soviet Government, soon after coming into power, endeavored to cut short the capitalistic exploitation of the masses by decreeing the nationalization of the land, the natural resources, and the means of production and distribution. The immediate aim was to permit the peasants to use the land according to their needs and to place the factories, mines, and transportation facilities under the control of the workers. The products of industry and agriculture were to be turned over to the state for distribution among the people, again on a basis of needs. Thus, crops raised by the peasants in excess of their own wants were to be used in feeding the industrial proletariat, while the manufactured output of the latter was to be distributed among the peasantry. A Supreme Economic Council was charged with keeping the factories supplied with raw materials and fuel, providing food for the laborers, and making available to the farmers such manufactured goods as they might require.

While these projects were being formulated, the government, in order to feed the workers properly, found it necessary to decree rations and issue food cards. For purposes of rationing, the people were divided into four classes according to the utility or laboriousness of their jobs. Group I included the heavy manual laborers, while Group IV was composed of the "parasitic elements" of society who performed no useful work. Since the unfortunates who were relegated to this lowest category received a food allowance one-fourth as large as that assigned to persons in Group I, many of the "parasites" died of hunger. The state depended on requisitions from the peasants to secure the food, and in some cases the latter were permitted to keep only enough to feed themselves and to sow the next year's crop.

In order to ease the serious housing situations which developed in the larger cities after 1918, the local authorities were empowered to seize all apartment houses and large dwellings and to quarter in them the workmen and their families. Jewelry and other valuables above a small minimum were confiscated, as were also surplus articles of dress and house furnishings. Private trading was listed as a counter-revolutionary activity, while foreign trade was made a state monopoly and all foreign and domestic debts were cancelled. The substitution of barter for the money economy was encouraged.

The Orthodox Church, of course, was shorn of its power and wealth, and private schools were abolished. Marriage became a civil ceremony, wedlock and divorce were made easy, and the state undertook to care for unwanted children. Women were placed on a level of civil and economic equality with men, and there was an attempt to loosen family ties since family life was regarded as one of the pillars of the capitalist system.

It had originally been planned to devise a schedule of nationalization and to confiscate at first only the large trusts, allowing the smaller businesses temporarily to carry on under the old forms. Actually, the process of nationalization, at least in its earliest stages, was haphazard in the extreme, taking on the character of a punitive, rather than an economic, measure. The workers generally evidenced great impatience to oust their former bosses and managers and to run the factories under the supervision of elected committees. In almost every instance the rate of pay was increased and the hours of labor were shortened, but since few of the men were educated or trained in management there was little discipline and less efficiency.

To make matters worse, the railway system — demoralized during the closing months of the war — now threatened to break down completely. In the fall of 1919, according to Trotsky, sixty per cent of the locomotives were "diseased," and the state engineering experts gloomily predicted that, barring a miracle, the railway "epidemic" would result in "death" before the passing of another year. Hence it rapidly became almost impossible to transport the grain which had been requisitioned from the peasants or even the few manufactured products which were being turned out by the crippled factories. The resulting up-

ward swing of prices was accelerated by the adoption of a lusty policy of inflation. The motive behind the continued issuance of paper money was probably as much to ruin the currency and force the general acceptance of an economy based on barter as to meet current governmental expenses.

For a while it seemed as if even the most radical of transformations might be successful. So long as the counter-revolutionary exploits of the Whites and the intervention of the Allies continued, many of the changes were regarded by the workers and peasants as phases of a transient "War Communism" dictated by the military emergency. With the return of peace, however, the entire procedure began to appear impracticable and conducive more to chaos than to the increased welfare of the masses.

The greatest opposition to the communist régime came from the peasants. At first even these, in mortal fear lest the landlords come back, had offered relatively little resistance to the emissaries of the state who came to requisition their surplus crops. But when the danger was past the farmers eagerly anticipated a new-found prosperity, for they interpreted the abolition of landlordism to mean the end of rents and taxes and the right to an extra strip of land. By 1920, in fact, they had succeeded in occupying more than ninety-six per cent of the arable soil in European Russia. They had neither the time nor the inclination to listen to theories concerning state ownership of all land or the desirability of sharing their produce with the urban proletariat.

In return for their grain, the peasants wanted money or manufactured goods. Unfortunately neither of these desirables was available in sufficient quantities. There was little hard money in circulation and the farmers knew better than to accept the worthless paper. There was a dearth of manufactured goods because importation had almost ceased, the factories were short of raw materials, equipment had broken down, management was poor, and transportation facilities were almost non-existent. In sheer disappointment the peasantry began to hoard its crops and plead poverty whenever the government requisitioners appeared.

In its attempt to enforce the policy of requisitions so that the workers might be fed, the state, as early as 1918, had organized the poorer peasants in each village into committees whose task

it was to denounce the wealthier peasants and make them surrender their surplus to the authorities. This measure added the bitterness of intra-village strife to the country's other difficulties, but did little to increase the available grain supply for the cities. The war and devastation, moreover, and the fact that the counter-revolutionaries for a time controlled the southern parts of Russia, added to the grain shortage. Despairingly the state now armed the workmen, enrolled them in a "Food Army," and sent them into the villages with machine guns, rifles, and bayonets to force the peasants to disgorge their hoardings. For the sake of fairness each district was assessed a certain quota on the basis of existing production statistics, but the searchers after food frequently disregarded the quotas and sometimes left the farmers without sufficient sustenance for their own families.¹

It was now the turn of the peasants to despair. In self-defense they determined to resort to the only powerful weapon known to them — passive resistance. Since everything above their barest needs was to be taken from them, they would raise only enough to keep alive. As fate would have it, several other factors came to the aid of the peasants in their decision to cut down production. First, no fertilizers were being imported; secondly, the domestic manufacture of agricultural machinery was at a standstill; and thirdly, in the years 1920 and 1921 the country suffered from a severe drought.

The grain harvest of 1921 consequently was only two-fifths of that of 1913. Famine resulted — one of the worst in the history of Russia. 40,000,000 persons were affected by the food shortage in 1921 and 1922, and some 5,000,000 starved to death. Conditions were frightful in city and country alike. Millions more might have perished but for the almost unparalleled generosity of foreign, especially American, relief appropriations and contributions.

Meanwhile the industrial situation had well-nigh reached the nadir. The Supreme Economic Council was altogether unable to carry out its functions, and despite the issuance of official decrees lengthening working hours, reintroducing piecework, and establishing rewards for production above the required minimum, the total industrial output in 1920 was but thirteen per

¹ The period 1918-1920 also witnessed some attempts to collectivize farming.

cent of that of 1913. In the last year before the war, fifty times as much metal ore had been mined as in 1920, while the production of oil had been twice as great, that of raw cotton almost three times as great, and that of steel twenty-five times as great.

Cries of "Down with the Soviet Government!" became more and more frequent and vehement during 1920 at meetings of the workers and peasants, and the province of Tambov witnessed a military outbreak. In March, 1921, the sailors at Kronstadt, once the very hotbed of Bolshevism, mutinied. Although most of the mutineers were recent recruits of peasant background, the uprising convinced the Soviet Government that a change in policy was urgent. Under the leadership of Lenin it was decided to effect a strategic retreat.

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY, 1921-1928

At the Tenth Party Congress, in March, 1921, the communists voted to adopt a "New Economic Policy" (Nep). They had come to realize that their enthusiasm had carried them too far, that they had pushed ahead with insufficient regard for the obstacles which an agrarian Russia offered to an industrial dictatorship, that the peasantry was far more interested in land and profits than in communist theory, and that, in order to keep intact the political gains which had been achieved, it might be worth while to make some economic concessions. Such a course would involve retreat, but the withdrawal might be strategic; it need not be a rout. The communists might retain control of the government, the transport system, foreign trade, banking, and large-scale industry, while granting minor concessions with respect to such other aspects of economic life as local trading and graduated wage scales.

Lenin was anxious to convince the people that the communists were quite as able as the capitalists to safeguard the economic health of the country. To this end he recommended that the party change its tactics from "assault to siege." "We are unable to retain all the positions we have taken," he explained, "but, on the other hand, it is only because . . . we have conquered so much space that we have so much to give away and are able to retreat a long way back, and may still continue to retreat, without forfeiting the essential and the fundamental."

Socialism would be upheld, but henceforth it would be a pragmatic socialism — "as much socialism as the exigencies of the situation would permit, and no more." Communism was to be replaced, in effect, by a form of "state capitalism."

The essential features of the Nep were as follows: (i) The forced requisition of foodstuffs from the peasants was replaced by a fixed tax, at first in kind, but after 1924, in money, levied on all agricultural production; any produce raised above the amount of the tax might be freely disposed of in the open market. (2) Private retail trading was permitted under certain restrictions, but the state, in competition, set up retail stores of its own and encouraged consumers' cooperatives. (3) Small factories and shops employing fewer than twenty workers were denationalized and might be restored to private capitalists. (4) A money economy and an intricate state banking system were reintroduced, and in 1924 the chervonetz, based on gold, was stabilized at a nominal value of \$5.15. (5) To secure liquid capital, profit-sharing concessions for mining, manufacturing, transportation, and large-scale agricultural and engineering projects were offered to foreign capitalists on contracts which usually guaranteed the concessionaires' capital against nationalization and gave the state options on the purchase of the firms' products. (6) A graduated wage scale was introduced and the method of food rationing modified; the quantity of essentials that could be bought at the government stores was still limited, but it became both legal and possible to buy additional goods in the open market. (7) State trusts were founded to control production and distribution in the large industries. (8) The compulsory membership of workers in the trade unions was abolished.¹ (9) Plans were laid for the future coordination of all industry in an efficient, waste-eliminating, state-controlled system.

To the delight of the communists it appeared for a time as if

¹ The 23 Russian trade unions, united in an All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, have a membership of more than 13,000,000 throughout the U.S.S.R. Originally the unions, regarded as organs of the state, performed a number of state functions. Since 1922, however, their chief task has been to protect the interests and welfare of the laborers by the negotiation of collective agreements with the local and national economic authorities. Labor disputes are generally settled by arbitration committees. About ten per cent of the unions' incomes (from dues) is devoted to cultural and educational work among the laborers.

the Nep would cure the major economic ills of the country. The area sown to grain by the peasants increased rapidly and by 1926 reached a figure almost equal to that of 1913. A majority of the farmers, although not yet entirely satisfied with the notion that the land really belonged to the state and not to them, seemed content to pay their taxes and dispose of their surpluses in the market. In 1925 the state retreated so far as to permit the renting of land for short periods and the employment of a limited number of farm laborers. Thereupon some of the more enterprising peasants leased their neighbors' lands and hired extra* farm hands. As a result, the peasantry again fell into three classes; the poor, those who were fairly well off, and the well-to-do. In 1928 the authorities took cognizance of this situation by revising the tax schedules so as to exempt entirely the poorest 35% of the peasantry, tatf lightly the middle 53%, and burden rather heavily the remaining 12%, the more prosperous *kulaks*, or " fists."

The state had no intention of allowing the kulaks to develop into a strong class holding large stretches of land. They were tolerated for a time because their enterprise was needed to increase the production of grain, but they were given to understand that the days of their activities were numbered and that the government from the outset contemplated their eventual downfall. As one means of combating the kulaks, and simultaneously of increasing the grain output, the Bolsheviks elaborated an earlier program for the creation of huge state and collective farms. More than 12,000,000 acres were allocated for the establishment of 150 state farms, and every effort was to be made to secure modern machinery and ambitious workers for the enterprise. Little progress, however, was made in this direction before 1928.¹

In the industrial sphere the state successfully continued its virtual monopoly of manufactures. Several hundred state trusts, or syndicates, were created, and endowed with considerable autonomy. Each syndicate was placed under the direction of a committee of managers who, as trustees of the state, were

¹ In order to end the widespread illegal distillation of bad home brew, the communists in 1925 repealed the total prohibition on alcoholic drinks and reestablished the government vodka monopoly. By a law of 1929 the sale of the drink was forbidden on holidays.

made responsible to the Supreme Economic Council. Industrial wage rates were to be settled by direct bargaining between the trusts and the trade unions. About half of the profits were assigned to the government, from one-tenth to one-seventh was expended for the welfare of the workers, and the remainder was used for expansion and reserves. In 1926 the state trusts produced about 77% of the total industrial output of the Soviet Union, while co-operatives accounted for 5%, foreign concessionaires for 3%, and private enterprise for 15%. By this year, too, the volume of industrial production approximated the pre-war level, although the quantity was achieved at the expense of quality.

For the first few years after the introduction of the Nep private trading flourished. In the fiscal year 1923-1924 three-fifths of the retail trade was handled by private merchants. Individuals who took advantage of the opportunity to secure profit in this manner, however, were generally unpopular and soon came to be known collectively as "Nepmen." The government made every effort to fight the Nepmen, especially through the instrument of consumers' cooperatives. Admission to the latter was open to every one except priests and kulaks, and by the spring of 1927 there were about twenty-eight thousand consumers' cooperatives with fourteen million members. During the fiscal year 1926-1927 these societies handled almost half of the retail trade of the Union, while the private traders controlled about one-third, and the state shops accounted for the remaining sixth. The state, incidentally, expected to turn the business of its own stores over to the cooperatives as rapidly as expedient.

The terms of the concessions offered by the Bolsheviks to foreigners were so attractive that contracts were concluded with more than one hundred companies, many from the United States. Frequently, however, the exploitation of the concessions was surrounded with difficulties and a number of the agreements eventually were cancelled or forfeited.

Although the Nep did much to heal the ravages of the early communist experiments and gradually brought production figures back to the pre-war level, considerable hardship was caused by the disparity between the prices of grain and of manufactured products. The state allowed grain to sell at the regular world

market price, but manufactures could be bought only at figures arbitrarily charged by the state trusts. It thus happened that in 1928, while the cost of grain was only half again as great as it had been in 1913, the price of manufactured goods was three or four times as high. The situation was regarded by the government as an excellent means of fighting the kulaks, who appeared to be the biggest losers.

While the Nep was in force special state bureaus were set to work to gather statistical information on every conceivable phase of Russian economic life. The data thus accumulated were to be used in the projection of a five-year plan for the further increase of production and the acceleration of the process of industrialization. On October 1, 1928, this Five-Year Plan (*Piatiletka*) was inaugurated, and in May, 1929, its operation was confirmed by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Before considering the details of the Plan, it is necessary to relate the story of a serious quarrel among the leaders of the Communist Party.

PARTY POLITICS AND CONFLICTS, 1922-1932

Until the spring of 1922, Lenin, occupying the position of chairman of the Politbureau of the Communist Party, was dictator of the Soviet Union. With his great prestige and influence he was able not only to shape important governmental policies, but to prevent any outward appearance of disharmony among the lesser party leaders. The tremendous strain of the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods gradually began to tell on Lenin's health. In May, 1922, he suffered a stroke and temporarily lost the use of his right arm and leg. Upon his recovery he once more applied himself to his work, especially to writing, but he soon found it necessary to entrust many of his administrative duties to friends and assistants — to Leon Kameney, who had once studied law in France; to the enthusiastic Alexei Rykov, one of his earliest disciples; and to other devoted followers.

In March, 1923, he suffered a second stroke. This time, removed to the quiet village of Gorky, near Moscow, he lived in agony for months, buoyed up by the hope that his marvelous physique eventually would triumph over sickness. The end,

when it did come, was unexpected. During the evening of January 21, 1924, he fell into delirium, and within one hour he was dead. To the rank and file of the communists his tomb in Moscow became a shrine; to the party leaders, sorrowful though they may have been, his passing signaled a struggle for control.¹

Outstanding among the candidates for the supreme leadership of the party, and through it of the government, were two men: Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin. Brilliant firebrand, commander of the Red Army, prominent member of most of the important party organs, Trotsky was, after Lenin, the best known of the Bolsheviks to the non-Russian world. He had, however, a considerable number of enemies within the party. Some communists were repelled by his aggressiveness and vanity. Others disliked him because he was so vitriolic in his attacks on persons for whom he had no use. His impatience to inaugurate the world upheaval without regard to the difficult domestic situation in Russia, and his disdain for the peasantry as being far too backward to be of any aid in the firm establishment of communism, antagonized still others. The veterans of the Bolshevik "Old Guard" had not yet forgiven him for his opposition to Lenin up to the very year of the successful revolution. Unfortunately for Trotsky's aspirations in 1924, moreover, his opponents were able to make effective capital of the trenchant epithets which he and Lenin had so plentifully hurled at each other in the early days of their acquaintance.

The main opposition to Trotsky came from three members of the Central Committee of the party: Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev.² The chief of this triumvirate was the Georgian peasant Stalin, really Joseph Visserionovich Dzhughashvili, who was born in 1879 in the Caucasian town of Gori, the son of a shoemaker. Inspired by a decree of Alexander III which made it possible for poor men's sons to enter the priesthood, Joseph's parents early decided to send the boy to a theological seminary. The burly youth, however, had little desire to become a priest and soon displayed far greater acquaintance with Marx than

¹ Soon after Lenin's death the name of Petrograd was changed to Leningrad. The capital of Russia since 1918 has been Moscow.

² Gregory Zinoviev, a cruel man with an abnormally large head, an able organizer, and the director of the communist association which was charged with promoting the world revolution, was really named Osvei Apfelbaum.

with the Bible. He was quickly expelled from the clerical institution to which he had been sent, and became actively affiliated with the Social Democratic Party.

Brutal, unscrupulous, fearless, and taciturn, Dzhugashvili proved himself remarkably adept in the execution of dangerous missions and achieved considerable renown among the radical leaders both in Russia and in exile. Of all the aliases which he found it expedient to assume, none seemed to fit him better than that of "Stalin," meaning "Steel." In 1903 he was one of the first to follow the lead of Lenin as a Bolshevik, and thereafter he remained one of the master's most devoted disciples. "For Stalin there is only one Marx, and Lenin is his prophet."

Despite his cunning and precautions, Stalin was six times arrested and exiled between 1902 and 1913. Five times, through sheer physical prowess and endurance, he managed to escape, but in 1913 he was sent to the Arctic Circle and remained a prisoner until released after the March Revolution. It appears that the tsarist police on no occasion recognized in him a previous offender, else one or another of his sentences might well have been death instead of exile. In disregard of the danger, Stalin preferred to agitate from within Russia rather than from the safety of an office in Switzerland or England. He worked incessantly, writing articles and pamphlets, organizing revolutionary circles in the larger urban centers, and forging banknotes and "expropriating" money from the rich in order to finance the cause.

Over six feet tall, with coal black hair and an olive skin, the peasant Stalin looks every inch an Asiatic fighting man. After the November Revolution, when the Bolsheviks were beset by domestic and foreign foes, he won distinction as a military leader. His greatest exploit, perhaps, was in connection with the successful defense of Tsaritsin on the Lower Volga against the Cossacks. To commemorate his victory the name of the city later was changed to Stalingrad, while upon him was conferred the Order of the Red Standard.

When the government of the R.S.F.S.R. was organized, Stalin, already Secretary-General of the Communist Party, was made Commissar for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (1919-1920). From 1920 to 1923 he held the post of Commissar for Nationalities,

being instrumental, in this capacity, both in the unification of the several Caucasian states into a Transcaucasian Republic, and in the organization of the U.S.S.R. Himself a member of a national minority, he saw to it that the rights of the lesser national groups were well protected. Such, in brief, is the story of the man who entered the lists against Trotsky.

The rival leaders, both of whom professed to be loyal "Leninists," in 1924 expressed antithetical views on several major points of doctrine. Stalin believed capitalism to be so firmly entrenched in the western world as to render futile any efforts at bringing about its immediate overthrow. He therefore preferred to concentrate Bolshevik energies upon the economic advancement of the Soviet Union rather than upon uncertain attempts to dislodge the "enemy of the people" from its stronghold in the industrial West. Trotsky, on the contrary, was intolerant of any let-up in the world revolutionary movement.

Further, Stalin, the peasant, was aware that the welfare of Russia in the last analysis depended upon the cooperation of the country's food producers. Hence he strongly advocated the establishment of better relations between the government and the peasantry, even though this entail a prolongation of the compromise with petty capitalism. Trotsky, however, had no desire to wait until the peasants became reconciled to communism. Revolution in the capitalistic West appeared to him far more important than economic prosperity in Russia. He would simply force the farmers in all lands to bow to the rule of the enlightened proletariat. Finally, whereas Stalin was convinced of the necessity of hiring foreign capital and technical assistance in order to hasten both the industrialization and the communization of Russia, Trotsky looked upon any compromise or deal with the western financiers and experts as the equivalent of high treason.

The duel for supremacy began immediately after Lenin's death, and from the outset Stalin seemed to have the advantage. During his long tenure as secretary-general he had had ample opportunity to see that a majority of the important party posts, especially those in the Central Committee, were filled with his adherents. Elevated to succeed Lenin as chairman of the Politbureau, moreover, he quietly and efficiently conspired with

Kamenev and Zinoviev to oust Trotsky from his governmental positions as commissar for war and member of the Council of Labor and Defense. Early in 1925 this feat was accomplished, and soon thereafter many of Trotsky's followers were removed from the war and navy departments. Next the fallen leader himself was temporarily exiled to the Caucasus "for his health," and upon his return to Moscow entrusted with only a minor state job.

With Trotsky out of the way, Stalin attempted to effect a number of compromises with the peasants and the foreign concession-hunters. So great was his apparent retreat from communism, however, that his erstwhile cronies, Kamenev and Zinoviev, now turned against him. Unawed, Stalin skillfully secured the approval of the party congress of 1925 for his actions, and saw to it that his latest antagonists were demoted and ordered to cease their opposition. He also recruited a new circle of supporters headed by Rykov, chairman of the Union Sovnarkom; Dzerzhinsky, head of the O.G.P.U.; and Bukharin, member of the Supreme Economic Council and editor of the official party newspaper, *Pravda* ("Truth").

Trotsky, seeing in the changed situation an opportunity to retrieve his position, joined forces with the disgruntled Kamenev and Zinoviev and made another effort to oust his enemy from control. Once more the party backed Stalin, for he had been careful to make his policies appear merely as a fulfillment of the wishes of the congress, whereas Trotsky persistently strove to bend the party to his will. The dissidents, or "deviationists," as they came to be called, received another admonition to cease their opposition tactics and submit to the party discipline. More demotions followed and Trotsky was retired from the Politbureau.

When the deviationists further persisted in their anti-Stalinist agitations, the dictator ordered the O.G.P.U. on their trail. Every move of the dissenters was watched and they were given no chance to express their views either in speech or press. Driven to meet in secret, in suburbs and woods, the Trotskyists eventually were charged with the illegal organization of an opposition group. Late in 1927 Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev were expelled from the Communist Party, and in January, 1928, the trio were sent to outlying parts of the Union.

For a brief period Stalin's leadership seemed unchallenged. Kamenev and Zinoviev recanted, and in June, 1928, their plea for reinstatement in the party was granted. Trotsky, however, from his place of exile in Turkestan, continued to agitate against the man whom he regarded as "the outstanding mediocrity of the party/' Experienced revolutionary that he was, Trotsky readily managed to keep in touch with his following, which included a considerable number of dissatisfied workingmen who shared his distrust of Stalin and the peasants. In the winter of 1928-1929 his activities inspired several disturbances, and there is ground for believing that he actually had the support of some Whites who were delighted by this quarrel between the men whom Lenin had characterized as "the two most gifted leaders of the party."

The O.G.P.U. was now ordered to stamp out the opposition, and wholesale arrests were made. Early in 1929 Trotsky himself was accused of counter-revolutionary activity and of "preparing for an armed struggle against the Soviet power." The police ordered his deportation, and in February the angry exile was assisted across the Turkish border. He settled down near Constantinople and in short order produced an autobiography, an interesting account of the Bolshevik Revolution, and innumerable attacks on Stalinism.

All Stalin's actions against Trotskyism were duly upheld by later party conferences. During 1929 and 1930 he was equally successful in crushing a "rightist deviation" led by Rykov and Bukharin. The latter were neither banished nor even expelled from the party, but their political importance was greatly diminished. In 1932 Zinoviev was once more expelled from the party, and the "Man of Steel" appeared to have definitely established his supremacy.

Relentless as destiny itself, yet never spectacular, Stalin pushed ahead, determined to achieve the Marxist goal in his own way — slowly but surely. Never openly forcing his views on anyone, carefully giving the impression of merely carrying out the mandates of the party, he appeared, in 1932, to be one of the most firmly entrenched of Continental dictators. Realizing the importance of being popular with the younger elements in the land, moreover, he kept in close touch with all the youth associa-

tions in the Union. To many young communists he was a hero second in greatness only to Lenin.

PIATILETKA—THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

It was under the watchful eye of Stalin that the Five-Year Plan, which supplanted the Nep, entered into operation. The Plan was nothing less than a complete forecast of the economic and cultural life of the Soviet Union for the quinquennium 1928-1933. It was formulated by a special State Planning Commission or *Gosplan*, whose function it also was to inaugurate and direct the entire program. To ensure the proper balancing, according to schedule, of every phase of the country's production, distribution, and financing, it was stipulated that no major step in industry, agriculture, transportation, or finance might be undertaken without the prior consent of the Gosplan. The Union commissars early made it clear that they would sanction no proposal which failed to obtain the approval of the State Planning Commission.¹

Under the Plan it was hoped within half a decade to increase the industrial output of the U.S.S.R. by 136%, and the agricultural output by 55%. The production of oil and coal was to be doubled; that of iron ore, trebled. The power capacity was to be multiplied by three, and the output more than quadrupled (thus reaching a figure eleven times that of 1913). Technical schools were to be established, foreign experts hired, the cost of production lowered by a third, and the productivity of labor doubled. Fifty-five million acres of cultivated land, representing one-fifth of the peasant holdings, were to be collectivized. Illiteracy was to be virtually wiped out; the number of books published greatly increased; and music and dramatic performances made available to every village.

For the rapid development of industry, agriculture, transportation, electrification, and housing, it was planned to expend

¹ The Gosplan consists of a governing board appointed by the sovnarkom and a staff of several hundred assistants. Its headquarters is located in a special building in Moscow. Besides this central planning body there are numerous local planning commissions throughout the Union. The Supreme Economic Council, moreover, functions as a separate administrative organ which aids in the enforcement of *piatiletka*. In addition to the five-year schedule there was a special one-year plan for each of the years embraced in the sixty-month period.

about \$35,000,000,000. Of this sum \$85,000,000 was reserved for a Volga-Don Canal, over \$100,000,000 for a 900,000 horsepower hydroelectric plant at Dnieprostroy, and millions more for the completion of an eleven-hundred-mile Turkestan-Siberian Railway.

To make possible the proper distribution of raw materials, food-stuffs, and the manufactured products that began to be turned out in relatively large quantities, the Russians strove to repair and improve their transportation facilities. Old Lines were mended, new ones constructed, the wages of employees were raised, and the service was regularized. In the fiscal year 1928-1929 the number of paying railway passengers was almost double the number in 1913. Progress was made in the development of motor-transport facilities, but the building of hard surface roads proceeded slowly. The attempt was made, finally, to obtain the advice of foreign experts. "Technical assistance agreements" were signed with foreign companies and individuals, and generous terms were offered to skilled foreign workmen who would agree to come to Russia.

The immediate aim of this planned national economy was not merely to provide enough goods for the needs of the Russian people, but to create a surplus for export. The ultimate goal was to make Russia self-supporting, in so far as this was reasonably possible. No phase of the project, however, was meant to be carried out at the expense of the health and welfare of the workers.

Since Russia's credit standing abroad was not particularly good, it was necessary to raise at home the funds required for the execution of the Plan. The three chief sources of income decided upon were the profits made by the state trusts, taxes, and domestic loan issues. Capital savings were effected by the introduction of greater economy in all branches of the government, and by a ban on the importation of luxuries. The month was divided into six weeks of five days each, every laborer being entitled to one off-day per week. This revised calendar, however, was enforced only in connection with production activities and did not come into general use.

As soon as the Plan was put into effect, every effort was made by the state and the party to secure the fullest cooperation of the

citizenry. That the program would entail certain hardships on the people was no secret, particularly after the reintroduction in 1928 of a partial rationing system, which soon was expanded to include nearly every food staple. By the unremitting use of oratory, press, radio, cinema, parades, ceremonies, and processions, the people were stirred to a fever of excitement. Everywhere "shock brigades" of young and strong communists vied in the accomplishment of almost superhuman production tasks in order to spread the contagion of enthusiasm. The spirit of competition and rivalry was systematically exploited, prizes were awarded when production quotas were exceeded, and the completion of any exceptionally difficult job in advance of schedule was invariably made the occasion for a joyous celebration. So successful were these governmental stimuli that when, for example, the first blast furnace was fired in the immense Magnitogorsk steel plant (February, 1932), "the people reacted to the news as if it were of some decisive victory on a battlefield."¹

To the amazement of all observers, friendly and hostile alike, the Plan in operation seemed actually to outstrip the Plan on paper. The oil industry completed its five-year assignment in two and a half years. A few months later the 1933 quota output was reached in the manufacture of agricultural machinery, automobiles, and tractors. The five-year production goal in peat, sugar, coal, and electrical equipment was passed after three years, while the output of iron, steel, and textiles also ran ahead of schedule. The Turkestan-Siberian Railway was finished in April, 1930, more than a year ahead of time; its construction, incidentally, was supervised by a builder named Shatoff, who had once been jailed in the United States for his radical activities. The Dnieprostroy dam and power plant were dedicated, with appropriate ceremonies, in the summer of 1932.

In agriculture the results for a time appeared equally gratifying. Although the Plan envisioned a collectivization of only

¹ When completed, Magnitogorsk, located at Magnito Mountain in the Urals, will be the largest steel plant in the world, with a capacity of 4,000,000 tons per year. "Magnitogorsk" became a symbol of industrial greatness to the Russian workers, and the pace of its construction was well-nigh hysterical. See Sherover, M., "Magnitogorsk: Epic of Soviet Labor" in *Current History*, vol. XXXVI, 1932.

20% of the peasant homesteads by 1933, almost 60% of all farm holdings were merged in collectives by 1931. Each collective farm or *kolkhoz* is managed by an elected board of directors. Since nearly all the board members are communists, the party and state virtually control the *kolkhozi*. Great progress also was made in the development of the state farms, known as *sovkhozi*. The largest of these, the "Giant" farm, comprises more than a quarter-million acres. As a result of these achievements surplus Soviet wheat threatened in 1931 to flood the world grain market. The enrollment in consumers' cooperatives, incidentally, had gone up to 55,000,000 by 1932. At this time the cooperatives conducted 160,000 stores, and only 5.5% of the total retail trade was in private hands. Under these auspicious circumstances the Gosplan, confident and ambitious, began the elaboration of another five-year plan — for the calendar years 1933-1937-

And then, in 1931 and 1932, conditions changed and the course of *piatiletka* became unsteady. Already in 1929 and 1930 it had been noticed that the Plan lagged in two of its most important items: a lowered cost of production and an increase in the productivity of labor. It further was evident, often unpleasantly so, that the quantity of output was being produced at the expense of quality. Then, in the spring of 1932, one of the biggest of the new plants, the automobile works at Nizhni-Novgorod which had been expected to turn out 144,000 cars per year, was closed — three months after its much-celebrated opening. This same spring also witnessed an acute shortage of grain and livestock, and another serious agrarian crisis. Why?

A plan as comprehensive as *piatiletka* would have been difficult to fulfill in any country. It was especially hard in a land which was industrially so backward as Russia. Nevertheless, for a time, as we have seen, the projected schedule actually was exceeded. This was true particularly in construction work and in the setting up, with foreign help, of expensive and intricate foreign machinery. But once the factories were built and the machines installed, it soon became evident that the untrained Russian workmen were more likely to ruin than run the complex engines. There was a disastrous shortage of skilled, technical labor, and the factories were staffed largely with inexperienced

ex-peasants. Many of the latter, moreover, were addicted to drink, a situation which was plainly reflected in the growing number of industrial accidents.

A further check to efficient production resulted from the vogue of democracy which prevailed in the management of the factories. The proper operation of the new plants was hampered by the reservation of numerous privileges to the workers. Whereas the successful direction of large-scale industry requires a fairly rigid discipline and a certain minimum of regimentation, the Russian system permitted an arrangement under which the workmen in a plant might refuse to carry out an order of the management until they had previously met to discuss its propriety. This "interference of democratic meetingism," as the communist leaders called it, was one of the most serious obstacles to the success of the Plan.

To make matters still worse, the Gosplan, in its original schedules, had failed to provide for an extension of transportation facilities adequate to meet the needs of expanding industry. In consequence freight piled up in the depots, perishable goods worth millions of dollars rotted at the terminals, and the factories ran short of raw materials. At one time the commissar for transport estimated that ten million tons of freight were assembled at various points, ready for shipment, but that they could not be despatched for lack of trains and crews. The fact, moreover, that some parts of the economic program could be completed far ahead of schedule while others could not, was an additional weakness of the Plan. It threw the entire scheme out of balance, and made necessary complicated and often awkward readjustments.

In order to maintain for any length of time the feverish enthusiasm which the official propaganda created among the people, and in order to enable the laborers to work at top speed over a period of years, a plentiful food supply was most essential. Yet the Soviet Government, for various reasons, found it necessary to curtail the sustenance allowances of its workers. Since neither Russia's credit nor her roubles enjoyed sufficient standing abroad, and since she was in desperate need of foreign machines and goods, she had to export and sell at any price, huge quantities of grain, timber, oil, and other domestic products. To obtain

a surplus for export, the state drastically reduced the rations, once more introduced a modified form of requisitions and grain collections, and used every method in its power to hasten the process of agricultural collectivization.

As a means of tempting individual farmers to pool their interests, the state extended special privileges, including tax reductions and easy credit facilities, to the members of collectives. Persistent non-joiners, on the other hand, were subjected to a crushing tax, were ordered periodically to surrender to the authorities specified quantities of grain, and were deprived of their farms if they failed to meet the exorbitant quotas. It was chiefly the kulaks who suffered under this arrangement, for they had little desire to merge their land, tools, and animals with those of their poorer neighbors, to get in return merely a share of the total profits proportionate to the amount and quality of labor which they would contribute in the fields.

Perhaps the worst aspect of this attempt by the state to "liquidate the kulaks as a class," was the incitement of the poorer against the richer farmers. In each collective a liquidation committee was formed to select the victims for the local "drive," and from 1929 to 1931 the resulting violence and bloodshed were reminiscent of the early days of the Bolshevik regime. The hounded kulaks banded themselves together for self-defense and reprisals, attacked the property of the collectives, and destroyed their own crops and livestock lest these fall into the hands of the hated opponents. Thousands were exiled to Siberia or the north to build roads and other public improvements*. Naturally, some of the less courageous kulaks capitulated and entered the collectives. Before joining, however, they frequently slaughtered their animals, preferring to eat them rather than surrender them to the kolkhozi. Altogether more than a third of the country's livestock was killed, with the result that a serious meat shortage was experienced in 1931 and 1932. The rapid collectivization of the land by force or persuasion also resulted in the Union being short of the necessary agricultural machinery with which to work the large farms.

The net result at home of these stringencies, and of the continued export of badly needed supplies, was a lowering of the general standard of living beneath that which had prevailed in

the later years of the Nep period. There was a parallel decline in the efficiency and enthusiasm of labor, and in the progress of the Five-Year Plan.

The Soviet authorities, well aware of these adverse influences, took energetic steps to counteract them. In the industrial sphere, between 1930 and 1932, the workday was lengthened, discriminations against non-communist skilled workers were lessened, and the control of factory managements over employees was increased while the power of the workers' committees was correspondingly reduced. Differential wage rates were instituted to reward the quick workers and to stimulate the slow ones. Piecework was introduced in a number of new lines, and more efficient methods of accounting and management were adopted in all branches of industry.

A strenuous effort was made to end the rationing of certain staples and to increase the size of the remaining rations. This was all the more necessary since the high cost of foodstuffs made it hard, even with augmented wages, to buy extra-ration supplies. Simultaneously with these compromises, however, the war against private trading was continued with vigor. The state was determined to secure greater efficiency and aggressiveness on the part of its citizens, but only within the framework of the socialist system.

In agriculture the concessions were equally sweeping. The process of collectivization was temporarily slackened. The abler members of the collectives, some of them former kulaks, were given responsible managerial posts. Five per cent of the net income of each collective was set aside as a fund to reimburse members for the animals and machinery which they contributed to the association. Peasants and petty craftsmen were allowed to effect direct exchanges of food and manufactured goods. At the same time, figures were compiled for the second Five-Year Plan and care was taken that the mistakes of the first program should not be repeated.

That the progress of piatiletka had important repercussions on Russia's foreign relations need hardly be stated. Because Russian goods were placed on the world market at prices which often were far below the cost of production, the cry was raised, especially in the United States and France, that the Soviets

were "dumping" their products in the West in order to demoralize the economic systems of the capitalist states and thus prepare the way for an immediate world revolution. It was easier, however, to make this charge than to substantiate it, for the chief object of the Bolsheviks evidently was to secure, at any cost, certain urgently needed manufactures. Although she was entirely willing to consummate reciprocal trade agreements with any states which cared to solicit her business, Russia, lacking credit and funds, was practically forced by circumstances to dispose of her requisitioned surpluses under any and all conditions.¹

The fact that Russia actually suffered from a shortage of labor in 1931 and 1932 — a time when the capitalist world counted well over 20,000,000 souls among its unemployed — offered a challenge which could not easily be disregarded. The contrasting situations furnished plentiful material for thought. They seemed to show clearly the advantages of a system of national economic and social planning over an order which sanctioned planless production, wasteful duplication, and haphazard distribution. In 1932 the authorities and citizens of nearly every modern state were seriously discussing the advisability of drawing up and adopting "five-year plans" of their own.

EDUCATION AND RELIGION

Through its persecution of the intelligentsia and the professionals, and of the well-to-do people whose patronage supported these groups, the Soviet Government inflicted upon Russia a serious cultural loss. It was the middle and upper classes which had supplied most of the empire's famed artists, actors, musicians, singers, dancers, scientists, educators, doctors, and writers; but with the death, exile, or suppression of so many of these talented individuals, the country was left with a sort of cultural vacuum. Worse still, at the time of the communists' advent to power, almost two-thirds of the men and seven-eighths of the women in Russia were illiterate, for the war and revolutions had interfered with a program of the old parliament to establish compulsory, universal education by 1922.

¹ An interesting experiment in international barter was launched in 1932 in the form of a Russo-Turkish treaty which provided that Russia was to sell \$8,000,000 worth of machinery to Turkey, in return for an equivalent amount of raw materials payable over a period of twenty years.

The Bolsheviks, however, had no intention of allowing this deplorable situation to continue. They were determined to build up a new and modern culture, unspoiled by outworn custom and tradition. They intended to educate the masses and extend to every toiler and toiler's child the right to a schooling which had hitherto been restricted to the few.

The resolution of the government to tutor the masses was not alone owing to a desire for righting ancient wrongs, but to a realization that wholesale ignorance and illiteracy would hamper the material development of the state and make impossible the effective spreading of the gospel of socialism. Unless the people, especially the peasants, were literate and able to absorb instruction in the principles of Marxism, they would fail to understand or else misinterpret every policy that the authorities hoped to inaugurate. To new, communist-controlled schools, therefore, was assigned the threefold task of enlightening the adults, preparing a host of energetic and enthusiastic young communists to carry on the work of the veterans of the Revolution, and developing engineers and other technicians to fill the vacancies created by the ousting of the skilled masters of the old regime.

The control of education, which had formerly been in the hands of the Imperial Government, the Orthodox Church, or private individuals, was now placed to a considerable extent into those of the local authorities. As a consequence, the drive against illiteracy has not progressed uniformly throughout the Union. As is to be expected, the larger cities boast some of the most up-to-date schools in the world, while in the remote country districts there are still many one-room school houses without blackboards, textbooks, or good teachers. Time, however, and readier funds, would seem to be the chief requisites for an improvement of this condition.

Wherever it is found necessary to restrict the enrollment in the schools, discrimination is made in favor of the children of members of the Communist Party. The offspring of non-communist workers and peasants receive secondary consideration, whilst the remaining children in any district secure classroom instruction only if sufficient space is available. Special efforts are made to enroll the adults in either factory schools or university extension divisions. As far as possible the schools are staffed

with communists, and promotion appears to depend more on party standing than on scholarly or pedagogic abilities.

Until 1921 Russia's foreign and domestic wars, financial troubles, and economic dislocations prevented the Bolsheviks from devoting any consistent attention to education. With the return of order, however, rapid progress was made on this "front" of the Revolution. Among the ablest and most energetic of educational leaders were the author and critic, Anatoly Lunacharsky, and Lenin's wife and widow, Nadezhda Krupskaya.

By 1926 the total school population of the U.S.S.R. was equal to that of the last pre-war year in Imperial Russia, while in 1930-1931 the elementary school registration was almost two-and-half times as great as had been that of 1914-1915. In 1930, moreover, only one-third of all persons over ten years of age still were illiterate. More than 1,450,000 students were enrolled in 1930-1931 in factory schools, technical institutes, and universities. A decree of 1930 made a minimum of four years of school-attendance compulsory for every child in the Union, the ultimate aim being to make education compulsory for all children between the ages of three and sixteen.¹

In their efforts to shape a new Russian ideology based on Leninism, the authorities place reliance not merely upon schools and teachers, but upon the stage, the cinema, art, literature, radio, music, and every other conceivable medium of propaganda. Though classics of drama and opera are still performed, great efforts are made in every one of these fields to serve the purpose of the Revolution. There is a considerable amount of official direction of and curb on creative accomplishment, but the new Russia has already produced a number of outstanding personalities in literature, science, and art.

Boris Pilniak, author of *The Bare Year*, a mystical and impressionistic account of the famine and war years, and of *The Volga Flows to the Caspian Sea*, is perhaps the best known of the younger writers. Leonid Leonov, whose *Badgers* provides a vivid description of the peasant struggle against the communist ideal, and the poet Demian Bedny have also acquired an in-

¹ An excellent example of a new type of textbook which is appearing in Russia is M. Ilin's *New Russia's Primer*, an English translation of which was published in the United States in 1931.

ternational reading public. Vsevolod Meierhold has achieved recognition as an unusually competent stage director, and the work of S. M. Eisenstein and V. I. Poduvkin in the production of films has aroused admiration in Europe and the United States. Other prominent members of the new Russian intelligentsia include the Marxist historian, M. N. Pokrovsky, and the biophysicist, P. P. Lazarev. In 1932 the Bolsheviks hired Albert Coates, a Russian-born English orchestra conductor, to develop the art of music throughout the Soviet Union.

Radical as were the changes effected with regard to education, those inaugurated in respect of religion were even more startling. Since the followers of Lenin looked upon religion as "the opiate of the people," they resolved to banish forever the power and influence of the clergy. The Orthodox Church was disestablished, its properties confiscated, and many of its finest edifices torn down or converted into clubhouses and museums for the workers and peasants. Further, the Church was deprived of all control over education, marriage, cemeteries, and the registration of births and deaths. At first, religious instruction was entirely forbidden, but eventually the teaching of religion to small groups was permitted outside school or church buildings. The state refused to have any relations with a church hierarchy, but agreed to extend to congregations of twenty or more parishioners the use of some of the confiscated religious property.

Since the communists at first aimed their shafts specifically at the Orthodox Church and raised the ban on the free propagation of other faiths and of atheism, various religious groups such as the Lutherans, Baptists, and Methodists, by dint of considerable social welfare work, quickly won converts from Eastern Catholicism. This situation spurred into renewed activity the Orthodox Church, which had in reality continued to exercise a fair degree of influence over the minds and lives of the peasants. The state, quick to observe this unwelcome turn of events, now limited the activities of all clerical bodies to preaching in churches, and forbade the general propagation of any and all spiritual doctrines except atheism. The fight against religion was made an aspect of the struggle against counter-revolution, and "godless societies" soon sprouted in profusion.

Although attendance at church was not prohibited **to the mass**

of citizens, it was forbidden to members of the Communist Party. Such anniversaries as Christmas and Easter continued to be observed, not as religious holidays, but merely as "traditional days of rest." A definite effort has been made to substitute for them such special revolutionary holidays as Lenin Day.

The ultimate success of the war against religion is, of course, conjectural. The repeated "drives" have caused a great amount of ill-will in the foreign countries, but there seems little ground for doubting that the Bolsheviks are sincere in their belief that religion has always been more a means of oppression than of salvation, and that the gospel of communism is more beneficial than the "word of God." It will, at any rate, be interesting to watch the progress of an avowedly "godless" regime.

RUSSIA IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

a. THE KOMINTERN

The supreme mission of communism lies in four great revolutionary steps: (1) the complete overthrow of the existing order of things; (2) the temporary establishment in all countries of a dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) the creation of a world federation of soviet republics; and (4) the achievement of a universal communist society. To carry out this vast program was the self-imposed task of an international gathering of communists at Moscow in March, 1919. Assured of the support of the Bolshevik Government in any undertaking to spread the world revolution, the congress organized itself as the Third (First Communist) International (Komintern),¹ drew up a schedule of basic objectives and a plan of action, and elected Gregory Zinoviev president. The latter retained this post until 1926 and then was succeeded by Nikolai Bukharin who, in turn, gave way (1929) to I. Y. Koganitzky.

¹The First (Socialist) International, really the International Working Men's Association, was organized in 1864 by Karl Marx and held annual sessions until 1876. The Second International, with which were affiliated most of the Socialist and Labor parties of the world, was established in 1889. Its activities were virtually stopped by the World War but it came to life again in 1919. The moderate Second and the extremely radical Third Internationals have no love for each other. The communist anthem is called the "Internationale." Its words were written in 1871 by Eugene Pottier.

At the Komintern headquarters in Moscow are represented most of the communist parties of the world. By virtue of its strength and backing, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union naturally dominates the proceedings. In its periodical congresses the International has laid down iron-clad rules of discipline both for individual and party members, has outlined a complete program of anti-capitalistic and anti-imperialistic activities, and has encouraged the organization of many new national branches. It sends out speakers and agitators, sets up printing presses, raises funds and occasionally makes special contributions to needy communist groups, despatches representatives to watch over the doings of the national members, determines the policies of all affiliates in both general and specific matters, and in every way tries to stir up the workers in the West and the peasants in the East against the present social and economic order. The Communist International has well been called the "general staff of the world revolution."

Of course, the revolutionary efforts of the Komintern have caused great annoyance to capitalist governments. The authorities in Germany, Hungary, and the Baltic states bitterly resented the aid rendered by the body to the radicals who, in 1919, 1920, and later years, set up or tried to set up local Bolshevik councils. In the United States there was a tragi-comic "Red Scare" which eventually led to the deportation to the Soviet Union of hundreds of alien "suspects" — many of whom were non-Russians. In many parts of the United States, displaying a red flag — the communist emblem — was made punishable by imprisonment.

Eventually, the governments in the West extended to the communists freedom of speech, press, and assembly provided there was no violence and no incitement to direct action. In eastern and southern Europe, and in many of the colonial regions of Africa and Asia, agitators continued to be arrested upon identification as communists. In one respect the Komintern proved a boon to European and American politicians: the blame for divers national ills could readily be placed at the door of the "scheming Reds." It was amazing, the number of disturbances that were traced, often without any clues, to "the long finger of Moscow."

At the outset the Third International and the Soviet Government worked in close harmony. Russia contributed funds to

the cause and encouraged every effort to foment disorder. Beginning with 1921, however, the cooperation was less pronounced. By this time many members of the All-Union Communist Party and the Russian Government had come to the conclusion that the gains of the Revolution must first be consolidated at home before any further major step could be taken. They realized that Russia was dependent upon the capitalist world for manufactures and technical advice, and they knew that these essentials would be available only if they could promise in return a cessation of Bolshevik propaganda. Consequently the supply of funds was curtailed, if not entirely stopped, and special efforts were made to convince other countries of the totally independent status of the government and the International.¹ The continued presence of the latter in Moscow was explained on the ground that no other state would tolerate the establishment of world communist headquarters within its borders.

For the sake of trade or other concessions the Soviet Government, over the vehement objections of the International, frequently has ordered its representatives abroad to check Bolshevik propaganda. On occasion the Komintern has scolded the state for its domestic compromises with the hated bourgeois system, but these reprimands are lightly treated by the leaders who, like Stalin, have come to feel that the only worth while communist propaganda is the success of the Russian experiment. For the present, at least, they regard the fulfillment of successive five-year plans as far more vital than world revolution. The Komintern therefore places its chief hope for victory in the next war. Just as the last great conflict made possible a workers' triumph in Russia, so, it is expected, the next will lead to a universal proletarian dictatorship.

b. CONFLICT AND TRUCE, 1918-1924

From 1918 until 1921 the policy of the Soviet Government in foreign affairs was to promote world revolution, use Russia as a: base from which to launch the onslaught against the whole capitalist regime, and aid Bolshevik uprisings wherever they

¹ The annual Komintern budgets in recent years have amounted to less than one million dollars. It still is true, however, that a number of high officials in the government simultaneously occupy ranking positions in the International.

might occur. Special efforts, moreover, were made to convert the oppressed masses of Asia to communism in the hope that they might then be united, under Russian leadership, in a gigantic crusade against capitalism and imperialism.

To arouse sympathy for their cause among the Orientals, the Bolsheviks denounced the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 which had divided Persia into foreign spheres of influence, gave up most of the special privileges and concessions which the tsarist governments had acquired in China, surrendered all extra-territorial and financial rights in Turkey, and encouraged the Afghans to resist British control. In September, 1920, they called together at Baku the First (and only) Congress of the Peoples of the East. Almost 1900 delegates, representing nearly two score nationalities, were present at the gathering, and numerous optimistic resolutions were passed. Since the deputies, however, represented only certain elements in their respective countries, and not the governments, little practical progress was made toward the formation of an Oriental communist alliance. Neither Turkey, nor Persia, nor Afghanistan, nor China "went Red," and even in India, the communists failed to gain control of the anti-British movement.

As 1921 drew on, capitalism in the West seemed more solidly entrenched than ever, while attempted pure communism had failed even in Russia. Hence, coincident with the adoption of the New Economic Policy, the Soviets, convinced of the need to consolidate their power at home and improve the Russian economic situation, were ready to enter into a truce with the bourgeois^world. The latter, made confident by its successful resistance to radical propaganda and anxious to "do business" with Russia, was equally willing to negotiate.

The first fruit of the new attitudes was a provisional Anglo-Russian trade agreement signed on March 16, 1921. Pending the conclusion of a formal peace treaty between the two countries, this convention provided for the resumption of normal trade and commercial relationships subject to the mutual renunciation of propagandist activities. Russia promised to desist from inciting Asiatics against the British, while England agreed to raise her blockade of Russian ports and help in the clearance of Russian waters from mines sown during the years of anti-Bol-

shevik intervention. Each government pledged itself not to requisition merchandise imported from the other's domains. The diplomat who represented Russia in the negotiations for this treaty was the able engineer and business man, Leonid Krassin.

In England, Lloyd George hoped that the agreement would aid in the much-needed revival of British industry by attracting some of the foreign orders which the Soviets soon expected to place. Other Englishmen were skeptical, and some hopefully looked forward to the first Soviet treaty violation. The Russians apparently were glad to have made so auspicious a beginning in the reopening of international relationships. Before the end of the year Russia had completed similar trade pacts with eleven other states, including Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Italy, and Czechoslovakia.

Although Russia had automatically been accorded *de facto* recognition* by the countries which thus signed conventions with her, she still was not a member in good standing of the family of nations. Full diplomatic relations were not yet restored and most of the treaty signatories merely exchanged with her semi-official and commercial representatives. The flow of capital into Russia, moreover, remained wholly inadequate to meet the needs of Russian economy. The chief reason for this continued western aloofness was the fact that the Bolsheviks, on January 21, 1918, had repudiated Russia's foreign debts, totalling some eight billion dollars.

In October, 1921, therefore, George Chicherin, the commissar for foreign affairs, notified the powers that his government, though in no way bound to honor the debts incurred by the former regime, was ready to discuss the matter at an international congress simultaneously with the questions of Russian recognition and the extension of foreign credit facilities. After some hesitation, and then chiefly through the efforts of Lloyd George, Russia was invited to attend a European economic conference at Genoa. Some of the western statesmen apparently felt that the Chicherin note and the inauguration of the Nep,

¹ *De facto* recognition means recognition of a government as actually existing, with no implication as to whether or not its existence is legal. *De jure* recognition implies recognition of rightful and legal existence.

with its partial restoration of private trading, signaled a reversal of Soviet policy — the setting-in of a "Russian Thermidor."

The conference opened in April, 1922, with all Russia's creditors present except the United States. Several weeks were spent in negotiation, but no agreement could be reached. The lenders demanded (1) that the repudiated debts be recognized; (2) that due compensation be paid the foreigners whose private property in Russia had been nationalized; and (3) that a juridical system be set up to protect and enforce all future contracts. The Russians held out for (1) complete cancellation of Russia's war debt; (2) the immediate granting of large foreign credits; and promised (3) to recognize the pre-war foreign obligations provided the Allies accorded Russia damages to the extent of fifty billion francs for the destruction caused by them during the period of intervention. Discussions on these points were renewed at The Hague in June, but again without result.

One concrete achievement there was at the Genoa Conference : Russia and Germany, to the dismay of the former Allies, signed the Treaty of Rapallo.¹ This document not only secured for the Moscow Government *de jure* recognition by a Great Power, but also provisionally freed Russia of her German debts, opened the way to eventual commercial agreements and credit extensions, and somewhat lessened Soviet dependence upon the good-will of London and Paris. The unsettled condition of affairs in the Reich in 1923, however, for some time prevented the development of important further Russo-German political or economic relations.

Meanwhile there had come about a threatened break with England. Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon in 1923 accused the Bolsheviks of violating their promise not to spread anti-British propaganda in the Orient, insisted on compensation for the execution of one and the imprisonment of another British subject during the civil war, and demanded the withdrawal of two Russian notes which he regarded as "studied affronts." A complete rupture in relations was averted when the Soviet authorities, while denying any propagandist transgressions, accepted the other stipulations of the Curzon note.

Thus at the end of 1923, Russia had secured *de jure* recognition

¹ See p. 191.

only from Germany and a few minor states. She therefore announced that henceforth previous unconditional recognition would be expected from any country which desired to discuss trade, concessions, or debts. As an inducement she offered a "prize" in the form of an especially favorable commercial treaty to that Great Power which first accorded recognition. Premier Mussolini in Italy, who was more interested in trade than legal niceties, determined to benefit by the offer and at once arranged for conversations with Russian representatives. Although he promptly informed the Italian Parliament that he recognized the Soviet Union, he proposed to withhold a formal declaration to that effect until he could be sure of "a good trade treaty."

While the Italo-Russian *pourparlers* were in progress, the British elections of December, 1923, resulted in the elevation to the premiership of Ramsay MacDonald, leader of the Labor Party. On February 1, 1924, the MacDonald Government extended to Russia unconditional *de jure* recognition. This news spurred the Italians to quicker action and the authorities at Rome formally recognized the Soviet Union six days later. Negotiations for special commercial treaties were thereupon pushed with both Great Britain and Italy. Between February and September, 1924, eight other countries (Norway, Austria, Greece, Sweden, the Hejaz, China, Denmark, and Mexico) also recognized the Bolshevik Government, and in October, France followed suit. Diplomatic peace between the proletarian and capitalist states at last appeared to have been effected.

C. TORTUOUS DIPLOMACY, 1925-1932

The good fortune which attended Russian foreign endeavors in 1924 did not last into the following year. A treaty concluded with England in August, 1924, respecting a debt settlement and commercial credits, was thrown out by the Conservative government of Stanley Baldwin which succeeded the Labor ministry. Efforts to negotiate a trade agreement with France came to naught, chiefly because the Bolsheviks frowned upon the importation of luxuries — the main item in French exports. Even the link with Germany seemed to be weakened when the latter

signed the Locarno Pact, which was regarded in Moscow as the result of a British conspiracy against Russia.¹

Fearful lest an overwhelming European bloc be formed against her, the Soviet Union now sought to conclude a series of non-aggression pacts with near-by countries. The first such development, it will be recalled, was the signing in December, 1925, of a treaty of friendship and neutrality with Turkey. Four months later a similar covenant was signed at Berlin with Germany, and before the end of 1926 the U.S.S.R. had concluded similar agreements with Lithuania and Afghanistan.

These events annoyed the Conservatives in England and the Poincare group in France. Anglo-Russian friendship was further strained by the action of the Bolshevik trade unions (not the government) in contributing funds to aid the participants in the great British strike of 1926. In February, 1927, Chamberlain warned Moscow that diplomatic relations would once more be severed unless the anti-British propagandist activities in both Europe and Asia ceased. Then, quite unexpectedly, the British police raided (May 12) the private offices of Arcos, Ltd., the Soviet trading corporation in London. The excuse for this action was the belief that the Russians were in possession of secret documents which had recently disappeared from the British War Office. Although the papers in question were not found, Downing Street declared that sufficient evidence of illegal activities had been uncovered to warrant the termination of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. Parliament so voted.

Not until October 3, 1929, when a second Labor Government was in power, was diplomatic intercourse resumed. Meanwhile Russian purchases from England had fallen from 110,702,000 roubles in 1924-1925 to 45,112,000 roubles in 1928-1929. They rose again, in 1929-1930, to 78,925,000 roubles.

The same year that witnessed the rupture in Anglo-Russian relations saw a crisis in Franco-Russian affairs. The French, despite their official recognition policy, adopted an unfriendly attitude towards Moscow. They were vexed by Russia's con-

¹ Foreign Secretary Chamberlain was known to be worried over the support given by Russia to the Chinese communists, who were strongly anti-English. Other Conservative leaders, such as Winston Churchill and Lord Birkenhead, delivered anti-Russian tirades. Birkenhead was reported as having referred to the Soviet authorities as a "junta of assassins and plunderers."

tinued ban on the importation of luxuries and by their inability to redeem the Russian bonds which had been purchased prior to the summer of 1914. The Russo-German *rapprochement* frightened them, and they chose to regard as an affront a statement made in Russia by the Russian Ambassador to Paris, to the effect that he would regard it as his duty in case of a foreign war against the Soviets to encourage the soldiers and workers of the bourgeois states to join the Red Army. In 1927 Poincare rejected a Soviet offer regarding debts and credits, and demanded the recall of the ambassador, Christian Rakovsky. In this year, also, the Chinese Nationalists raided the Soviet Embassy in Peking and the Russian Ambassador to Poland was assassinated by an exiled White. This murder was only the most serious of several attacks on Soviet officials abroad by emigres.

Such incidents naturally caused uneasiness in Moscow and further attempts were made to ensure security against united European action. Non-aggression treaties were negotiated with Persia and Latvia, the Kellogg Pact was signed, and a number of Russia's neighbors were induced to adhere with her to the Litvinov Protocol (February, 1929). Not long after, Russia helped to bring about a reconciliation between her friends, Fascist Italy and Turkey, and in 1931 renewed a favorable trade treaty with the former. An arrangement also was made (1931) with Germany whereby the government of the Reich guaranteed to German industry a Russian credit of about \$75,000,000. This was in addition to a similar credit guarantee which had been accorded the Soviets in 1926 after the negotiation of the Berlin Treaty.

It was now the turn of France to become worried. The Paris Government was alarmed at the growing Russian-German-Italian-Turkish friendship and disgruntled over France's inability to capture a profitable share of Russian foreign trade.¹ In 1930, therefore, Paris essayed to build up a European federation against Russia. She raised the cry that the Bolsheviks were "dumping" their goods upon foreign markets in order to break down the western economic system, and she advocated the formation of a Pan-Europa minus Russia. In October, 1930, all Russian im-

¹ In the first six months of 1930 Russia sold to France about \$17,500,000 worth of goods and purchased in return less than \$5,000,000 worth.

ports into France were placed under a licensing system which made it possible for the government virtually to abolish such imports, and soon thereafter Belgium inaugurated a similar measure. The cry of dumping was quickly taken up in other countries, notably the United States and England. In 1931 interested parties who objected either to Russian sales competition or to the Soviet economic system agitated vigorously for embargos on Russian shipments, especially of wheat, timber, and cotton. From France there also emanated a proposal to organize an international financial and economic boycott against the U.StS.R.


Then there came about another change in the attitudes of Russia and the European states towards each other. Moscow became suspicious of the anti-communist tactics and speeches of the Hitlerites in Germany, who pronounced a Russo-German war inevitable. Germany suffered severely from the world depression and hence was growing less valuable as a Russian customer. It was therefore felt that greater efforts might be made to secure the advantages of increased trade with both France and the United States. The states of western Europe, on the other hand, which quickly discovered the futility of economic conferences, particularly grain conferences, in which Russia was not represented, now regarded prosperity as more important than prejudice. The path to a reorientation of international policies seemed cleared at a Geneva Conference of 1931 which deliberated upon the feasibility of a European union. At this gathering the center of the stage was occupied by Maxim Litvinov, Who had succeeded Chicherin as commissar for foreign affairs. His moderation created a favorable impression and he aroused some enthusiasm for a plan to negotiate an economic non-aggression pact between capitalism and sovietism.

Although this suggestion was not adopted by the conference, the door was opened for further individual developments. France, especially, seemed to reverse her former stand. She was anxious to destroy the solid front of those states — Germany, Italy, Russia, and Hungary — which were clamoring for a revision of the peace treaties. In addition, she wanted Russian oil, for she had long been troubled by the circumstance that the United States and Great Britain had vast oil reserves while she

had almost none. A Franco-Russian oil agreement would therefore be of prime importance and comfort to Paris. As a first sign of the new development, a Franco-Russian treaty of neutrality and non-aggression was initialled in 1931 and signed in 1932.

Meanwhile relations between Russia and the League of Nations had also undergone an improvement. At first the Soviets would have nothing to do with the League, professing to consider it as a superweapon of capitalism against communism. By May, 1927, however, Russia was ready to participate in a Geneva Economic Conference held under League auspices, and in 1928 and 1929 she sent representatives to preparatory disarmament conferences. At the gathering of 1928 the Soviet delegate startled his audience by proposing the complete abolition of all armies and navies, but the suggestion was generally regarded as a Bolshevik scheme to make the world powerless to resist Red encroachments. In 1932 Russia participated in the Geneva Disarmament Conference and endorsed every important move to reduce armaments — an important factor when it is remembered that the Red Army is one of the largest in the world.

In 1932 the United States remained as the only major power which refused to recognize the U.S.S.R. Washington persisted in its determination to have no dealings with a government which it accused of failure to fulfill international obligations (Russia's American debt amounted to several hundreds of millions of dollars plus interest) and attempts to subvert democracy in other lands. Since Russia bought far more from the United States than she sold, Moscow could well afford to wait. In 1930 Russia's purchases in the United States totalled about \$150,000,000 while her sales amounted to only one-fifth of that sum. In the first six months of 1932, however, there were almost no Russian purchases in America, though huge orders were placed in Germany, Italy, and England. In September, 1932, it was reported that the Aluminum Company of Canada, Ltd., controlled by the American Mellon interests, had come to a barter agreement with Moscow whereby \$1,000,000 worth of aluminum products was to be exchanged annually for an equivalent amount of oil. By the end of 1932 an important section of American business men had come to look with favor upon closer economic and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.



THE BALKANS.

CHAPTER XIX

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

EUROPE'S "WITCHES' CAULDRON"

Notorious for generations as "the sore spot of Europe," the region popularly known as the Balkans continues to be characterized by a restlessness and an instability unparalleled on the Continent. To the turbulence, feuds, and corruption which were the heritage of centuries of Turkish misrule, the last eight or ten decades have added the disturbances created by the conflicting Near Eastern policies of the Great Powers and the rivalries of half a dozen Balkan nationalisms. National lines are not clear-cut in Balkania, which for hundreds of years served as a convenient channel of entry from Asia into Europe for many and varied peoples. But the virus of nationalism is none the less strong. Each group, each racial mixture, has, or thinks it has, proud traditions and heroic legends, and a mission to fulfill. Too often these missions clash.

The restive Balkan peoples, in a sense responsible for the World War, suffered severe hardships during the conflict and occasioned bitter tilts at the Peace Conference. Since 1918, moreover, the confusion and disorder have abated hardly at all. Indeed, nationalist demands have become more unreasonable, irredentisms have grown fiercer, governments have been overthrown at record rates, new chains of hostile alliances have been formed, and intrigue and violence appear to be no less common than they were in the days of Ottoman oppression.

The story of one of the Balkan states, Albania, has already been considered. We turn now to the recent developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Jugoslavia.

RUMANIA

Rumania chose her side well in the war and was duly rewarded in the peace negotiations. When the boundary lines were

finally adjusted, the kingdom comprised an area of 122,282 square miles — more than twice the pre-war figure. Land was secured from both the former ally Russia and the ex-enemy Austria-Hungary. The latter gave up Transylvania, most of Bukowina, and part of the Banat of Temesvar. From Russia was taken Bessarabia after a local council, said by the Soviets to have been packed, voted for union with Rumania.

The Bolshevik Government refused to recognize this annexation, and even Rumania's friends were slow to acquiesce. In October, 1920, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan at last became parties to an agreement acknowledging Rumanian sovereignty over the region, but the treaty was not to have legal force until ratified by three of the signatories. Russian opposition delayed the process of ratification, which did not occur until 1922 in England, 1924 in France, and 1927 in Italy. Meanwhile, the uncertainty of ratification and the fear of a possible Russian attack drove Rumania into defensive alliances with Poland (1921, 1926, 1931) and France (1926). Shots have several times been exchanged by the military patrols which police the opposite shores of the boundary-forming Dniester River.

The census of 1930 showed 18,000,000 Rumanian subjects, including over 4,000,000 non-nationals. There are among the inhabitants 1,500,000 Transylvanian Magyars, 1,000,000 Bessarabian Ukrainians, 750,000 Germans, an equal number of Jews, and 250,000 Bulgarians. The problem of minorities consequently is serious, especially since the Rumanians have long been notorious for their discrimination against non-national elements. In 1919 Rumania agreed to sign a minority treaty only after the Allies presented as an alternative the surrender of some of her recent territorial gains. The treaty doubtless has been of value in shielding the minorities against mistreatment, but complaints of injustice have been frequent and loud, notably among the Magyars.

Particularly objectionable to the Hungarians was the land legislation. Despite the passage of moderate expropriation laws in 1864, 1889, and 1907, about half of the arable land in Rumania in 1914 was held by a few thousand large proprietors. Some of the big estates comprised as many as 40,000 acres, while a million small farms measured less than 25 acres apiece. To remedy

this situation and to appease a discontented peasantry, legislation was passed in 1917, 1918, and 1921 providing for the confiscation of 5,000,000 acres from the large holdings, plus all the arable crown lands and the entire landed properties of absentee and foreign owners. Private estates of more than 2500 acres of arable land were to be cut down according to a scale, so that no farm of more than 1250 acres would remain. Compensation was provided through fifty-year national bonds carrying 5% interest. The farming land thus acquired by the state was to be distributed among the peasants on easy terms and at 65% of the expropriation price.

The maximum size of estates in the newly annexed territories was fixed at a level considerably lower than that for the "old kingdom." Thus, in Bessarabia private holdings were not to exceed 250 acres, in Bukowina 625 acres, and in Transylvania about 300 acres. The Magyars were the chief losers in the case of Transylvania, for here almost 80% of the holdings in excess of 200 acres were in their hands. So rapidly were these laws put into effect that the largest Rumanian farm in 1924 measured only 1235 acres, and by 1932 ninety per cent of the land was controlled by small peasant proprietors.

Without question the lot of the peasants has been bettered by the revised agrarian situation, particularly since progress has simultaneously been made in the organization of cooperatives for the improvement of cultivation and the purchase of tools, seeds, and livestock. The use of primitive methods, however, is still widespread and the peasantry as a class is very poor. Some discontent has arisen from the practice of the government of sending people to settle on expropriated lands far from their native villages.

The application of the land reforms to Transylvania precipitated an international dispute which disturbed eastern European relations for an entire decade. By the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, Magyars who lived in Transylvania and who wished to retain their Hungarian citizenship rather than become Rumanian nationals were allowed to opt, that is, express a choice to that effect within one year. Optants were given permission to keep their holdings in Transylvania. When, therefore, Rumania passed laws expropriating the estates of foreigners, the Magyars

objected to the League of Nations that this action could not apply to their properties which were guaranteed by an international treaty. "The dispute turned upon the question of Rumania's sovereignty over her territories as against rights of foreigners created by international sanction."

The quarrel was made more serious by Magyar charges that the Rumanian officials were unfair in their appraisals of Transylvanian estates and that compensation was being paid in depreciated bonds. It was also pointed out that many once wealthy Hungarian landowners, such as Premier Count Bethlen, were impoverished as a consequence of the land laws.

The kingdom of Hungary espoused the cause of its loyal optants and appealed to the League Council for intervention. The League strove from 1923 to 1928 to settle the dispute, but Rumania persistently refused to recognize the jurisdiction of either the League or the World Court in what she considered a purely domestic affair. In 1928 the League despairingly washed its hands of the matter and urged the disputants to negotiate directly. The quarrel dragged on until 1930, when it was settled at The Hague (January) and Paris (April) conferences on eastern reparations. An agreement known as the Brocchi Plan was accepted whereby the leading Allies, Hungary, and some of the other central and eastern European states agreed to contribute directly or indirectly to a common fund for the reimbursement of the dispossessed optants. The credit for devising and adopting this compromise solution to the problem belongs chiefly to Italy and England.

Unfortunately the settling of the optants' dispute failed to pave the way for a genuine Rumano-Hungarian *rapprochement*. A strong Hungarian irredentist movement to recover Transylvania, and bitter Magyar memories of the looting of Hungary by Rumanian soldiers in 1919 still barred the way to the establishment of friendly relations. As a member of the Little Entente, moreover, Rumania was virtually pledged to help prevent the restoration of the Habsburgs regardless of the wishes of the Magyars, and to uphold the provisions of Trianon. The situation obviously was not conducive to peace.

Land reform in Rumania was followed by political reform, and in 1923 a new constitution was adopted. Although patterned

after its predecessor, it incorporated a few important changes in the direction of democracy and tolerance. The old three-class system of voting was abolished, universal suffrage was granted, Jews were made eligible for citizenship, and provision was made for parliamentary representation of minorities. The privilege of holding rural land was reserved to Rumanian citizens, and sub-soil resources and forests were declared the property of the nation. The Chamber was to be elected for four years by the entire voting body, but the Senate was to contain life and *ex officio* as well as elected members. The government is not of the "responsible" type, since the king may appoint and dismiss ministers without regard to the wishes of parliament. The monarch also has a suspensive veto.

Before the war there had been two principal parties in Rumania, the Liberal and the Conservative. The latter represented the wealthy, landed, pro-German aristocracy. The Liberal Party advanced the interests of the banking, commercial, and industrial groups, and was opposed to foreign economic or financial control in any form.¹ Although pro-Ally from the beginning of the war, the Liberals, who happened to be in power, postponed Rumania's entry into the conflict until Allied chances of victory seemed good and until a satisfactory bargain had been struck. Thanks to the ability of its leaders, Jon C. Bratianu and his sons, Jon and Vintila, and the support of the rulers Carol I (1866-1914) and Ferdinand (1914-1927), the Liberal Party ruled the country with but few interruptions from 1866 to 1928.

After the war the Liberals for a time seemed exceptionally firmly intrenched. Not only had they led the country to eventual victory, but the rival Conservative Party had disappeared entirely, for the landed aristocrats had been discredited by their pro-German sentiments and crushed by the break-up of the large estates. Yet the continued reign of the Liberals was destined soon to be challenged by a new and powerful opposition

¹ In 1924 the Liberals secured the passage of a mining law which made it imperative for foreign mining and drilling companies to dispose of at least 50% of their stock to Rumanians. The act was aimed especially at the foreign oil companies which were exporting great quantities of oil without regard to the future welfare of Rumania. Such legislation naturally made foreign investors wary and for a time the kingdom suffered from a lack of much-needed foreign capital.

group, since the assignment of property and the extension of suffrage to the peasants brought about a veritable political revolution.

The Bratianus antagonized many people by their extreme economic nationalism which deprived the country of necessary foreign capital, by their high tariff policy which reacted injuriously on the farmers, and by their indirect taxation schemes which placed the heaviest burden on the poorer classes. Further opposition came from the people in the newly acquired territories. For the first eight years after the war the government was controlled by groups representing the "old kingdom," although the latter included less than half of the population of Greater Rumania. This situation was owing largely to King Ferdinand's insistence upon appointing such ministers as he wished, without reference to the desires of the large peasant, Transylvanian, and Bessarabian contingents in parliament. When the opposition showed signs of becoming too strong, an electoral law was passed (1926) which gave control of parliament to the party that polled 40% of the votes, and disbarred from the legislature any party which obtained less than 2%. When it is remembered that the party in power nearly always wins the elections in Rumania, the significance of the law becomes apparent.

In order to protest more effectively against these injustices, Dr. Julius Maniu, an able speaker who had had considerable experience in the Hungarian Parliament before the war, organized the several dissident groups into a National Peasant Party, with a progressive foreign and domestic program. The party believed in continued adherence to the Little Entente, friendship with all neighbors, and close cooperation with the League. At home it advocated decentralization, responsible government, abolition of the use of force and coercion in elections, state aid to farmers, more enlightened labor laws, full development of the natural resources, and a cordial reception to foreign capital.

The party's great opportunity came with the deaths of King Ferdinand and Jon Bratianu in 1927. Although Vintila Bratianu succeeded as the head of the ministry, he was not able to exert the same degree of control as had his brother, and huge protest meetings, parades, and anti-government demonstrations were held throughout the kingdom. On May 6, 1928, two hundred

thousand peasants held a convention in Transylvania and under Maniu's leadership passed a resolution demanding Bratianu's retirement. The Liberals remained in power some months longer, but Bratianu's inability to secure a foreign loan led to his resignation in November. Maniu, now elevated to the premiership, immediately ordered elections. In December his party elected over three hundred deputies, to thirteen for the Liberals and a few for the minor parties.

A new spirit was apparent in the type of legislation that now was passed, for Maniu made a definite attempt to place Rumania, as he said, "on the constitutional basis which brought prosperity to the western states." The censorship of the press was lifted, the military law which still prevailed in some parts of the realm was abolished, the size of the gendarmerie was reduced, anti-Semitism was suppressed, and foreign capital was invited. Between 1929 and 1931 railways and public works were built, educational opportunities were extended, a large foreign loan was secured, and the currency was stabilized at 167 lei to the dollar. In April, 1931, the party, in spite of its favorable record, was forced out of power by King Carol II. To understand this move it is first necessary to go back to another story.

In December, 1925, Rumania was stirred by the actions of Crown Prince Carol in renouncing his right to the throne, deserting his second wife, Princess Helen of Greece, and going to Paris to live with his mistress, Mme. Magda Lupescu. Since Carol, who had early achieved notoriety for his instability, was disliked both by his mother, Queen Marie, and by the Bratianus, his elopement was made the occasion for the passage of a new act of succession (January 4, 1926). The law disbarred Carol from the throne, designated his five-year-old son Michael as crown prince, and provided for a council of regency in the event that King Ferdinand should die before his grandson came of age.

Ferdinand died in July, 1927, and young Michael became king, with the queen mother and the Bratianus dominating the regency council. Late in 1928, however, as has been indicated, Maniu and his National Peasant following obtained control of the ministry. Since the Bratianu Liberals were unfriendly to Carol, the National Peasants were, on the whole, inclined to favor his return and accession to the throne — provided he became recon-

ciled with Helen, who had divorced him in 1928 and who steadfastly refused to have the marriage annulled. The exiled prince, incidentally, was popular with the army.

It was not altogether surprising, therefore, that Carol should have alighted in Bucharest on June 6, 1930, after an airplane trip from Paris, and two days later have been proclaimed King. In the National Assembly, Vintila Bratianu's was the only vote cast against his enthronement and recognition as king *de jure* since 1927. Michael was invested with the title of Crown Prince and made Grand Voyvod of Alba Julia. With the death of Viiltila Bratianu in December, 1930, it appeared as though the last remnant of official opposition to Carol had vanished.

In October, 1930, Maniu surrendered his leadership of the National Peasant Party and retired from politics. The ostensible reason was ill health; the probable cause was disagreement with Carol over the latter's family difficulties. Each passing month made reconciliation between Carol and Helen seem more remote, until she was finally exiled. Mme. Lupescu, on the other hand, began to spend much of her time in the kingdom, usually not far from Carol. Although the army continued loyal to the king, the National Peasant Party was inclined to frown upon his undignified escapades. In April, 1931, accordingly, the ministry was ousted and a new government organized under Carol's former tutor, Professor Nicola Jorga. The latter, a prominent historian, a prolific writer, and member at one time or another of half a dozen parties, ordered new elections in June and placed himself at the head of a National Union ticket.

The National Union professed to be a non-partisan group in favor of efficiency and economy, and opposed to the party system as being corrupt and harmful. Specifically, the Unionists advocated a balanced budget, the establishment of an agricultural credit bank, economies in administration, wider educational facilities, improvements in the national defense and the transportation system, support of the League of Nations, and in general a return to prosperity and stability. There was much violence during the campaign and the premier's group naturally won. The National Union held three-fourths of the seats in the new chamber.

During the course of the next twelvemonth, Carol and Jorga

ruled under a dictatorship thinly disguised behind the veil of a parliamentary majority. Both men proved themselves vacillating, impulsive, fond of publicity, and strongly partisan. In spite of the energetic suppression of unrest and opposition, conditions rapidly went from bad to worse. The world economic depression did not improve matters, and the governmental deficit increased at an alarming rate. A number of attempts to reach favorable economic agreements with neighboring states failed because of national jealousies displayed by one side or the other, and any hope of additional foreign loans was blasted by the publication on June 1, 1932, of a report on Rumanian economic conditions by the French financial expert, Charles Rist. The report criticized the government for habitually exceeding its income, for recklessly launching expensive public works and assuming farmers' debts, and for overstating all government departments. On the day preceding the publication of the document, the Jorga ministry, having failed in its program, had resigned. A National Peasant government under Alexander Vai'da-Voevod was formed after some delay, and new elections were called for July.

As was, perhaps, to be expected, the National Peasant Party emerged victorious at the polls. It won 277 of the 387 seats in the house and captured 45% of the popular vote. Dr. Vaida-Voevod continued as premier for a time, but in October, 1932, gave way to Dr. Maniu who had recently returned to politics as chief of the National Peasant Party. His action gave some promise of a more democratic future for Rumania.

BULGARIA

South of Rumania, and bordering also on Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, is the state of Bulgaria. Under King (or Tsar) Ferdinand, Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers and, as we have seen, paid for the misstep in the Treaty of Neuilly. The latter deprived the country of considerable territory, limited its army to a small volunteer force, required it to make certain coal and livestock deliveries to the former enemies, and burdened it with a heavy reparation debt. The financial indemnity was originally set at 2,250,000,000 gold francs payable over a period of thirty-seven years. Because of

the poor economic condition of the kingdom, however, this sum was reduced by three-quarters in 1923 and the payments distributed over sixty years. After serious earthquake losses in 1928, this arrangement, too, proved unworkable, and a further cut was made simultaneously with the granting of a League of Nations stabilization loan of \$27,000,000 at seven per cent. The whole question was reopened once more at the Hague and Paris conferences in 1930, on which occasions a "final" settlement was evolved whereby Bulgaria contracted to pay a total of 415,243,808 gold francs in thirty-six annual installments.

The population of Bulgaria numbers 5,825,000; its area is 39,814 square miles. Approximately 85 % of the subjects are of Bulgarian origin, and in general they are a hard-working peasant class which has neither wasted time complaining about defeat nor resorted to diplomatic legerdemain in order to obtain a reduction of its obligations. Possessing relatively poor land, dependent upon crude methods of farming, hampered by a none-too-successful system of community ownership of pasture and woodlands, and having very little industrial life, the Bulgarians yet made every effort to fulfill the treaty requirements. In 1927, to their satisfaction, the last vestiges of Inter-Allied control were removed.

Partial improvement in Bulgaria's economic status might conceivably be forthcoming if the kingdom were provided with a direct outlet to the sea. When the Allies deprived Bulgaria of her Aegean coastline in 1919, they promised to arrange for a satisfactory outlet through foreign territory, and at the Lausanne Conference of 1923 the possibility of making a Greek port available to Bulgarian producers and shippers was discussed. In 1924 a Greco-Bulgarian treaty was drawn up, assigning a narrow Greek Corridor to Bulgaria under League supervision and authorizing the building of a port at Kavala on the Aegean for her use. Nothing definite came of this proposal since the Bulgarians insisted on complete ownership of the corridor, while the Greeks turned a deaf ear to any schemes involving territorial cessions. There the matter rested in 1932.

In 1918 Ferdinand abdicated and was succeeded by his son, Boris III. The new ruler was popular, being generally regarded as a democratically minded young man more anxious to establish

automobile speed records than to interfere with his ministers. In 1930, aged 36, he married Princess Giovanna of Italy.

Bulgaria is governed under her old constitution of 1870 as amended on several occasions. The assembly, or *Sobranje*, is a unicameral body elected for four years by universal suffrage. No bill can become law without the king's consent. About four-fifths of the population belong to the established Greek Orthodox Church, which is controlled by a Synod of Archbishops. In 1870, chiefly for nationalist reasons, the Bulgarian Church was separated from the mother church at Constantinople. The patriarch in the latter city excommunicated the Bulgarian clergy for this defiance, but in 1929 the ban was lifted.

Perhaps the most remarkable post-war development in Bulgaria was the rise of the "Green" socialists, agrarians who favored state aid to farmers and social legislation, but were opposed to the confiscation of private property. Prominent among the leaders of the Greens was Alexander Stambulinsky (1878-1923), a peasant by birth, and a man who spent three years in prison for threatening King Ferdinand with personal violence if Bulgaria joined the Central Powers. Coming into power after the war, he signed the peace treaty for his country and then devoted himself to the introduction of sweeping political and economic reforms.

The program of the Agrarian Party, and of Stambulinsky in particular, included the following points: (1) friendly relations with the neighboring countries; (2) punishment by fines and jail sentences of the politicians who had plunged the kingdom into war; (3) strict fulfillment of all treaty obligations in order to remove foreign control as quickly as possible; (4) state aid to farmers and the expropriation of crown and church lands and large private estates, the soil thus acquired to be distributed chiefly among the thousands of refugees who were pouring into Bulgaria from the ceded territories; (5) passage of laws limiting profits and taxing incomes and luxuries; and (6) compulsory, uncompensated labor of men, women, and children on public works and civic enterprises because of the national shortage in man power and money, and the treaty restriction against conscription.

Gratifying headway was made in the fulfillment of these

policies between 1919 and 1923, but the harsh and dictatorial methods employed by Stambulinsky created numerous enemies. He was interested solely in the welfare of the peasant class, and in order to carry out his plans he manipulated elections, arrested opposition leaders, closed universities, defied the Church, and established a strict censorship of speech and press. On one occasion he assured an audience that the Agrarian Party would "keep at the head of national affairs until the country is rid of the old and pernicious parties, until the peasantry and the working classes get rid of their parasites, the lawyers, bankers, profiteers, idle politicians, and mischievous doctrinaires."

The opponents of the regime included leading representatives of the military, the bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia, as well as some of the more moderate Agrarians. In some quarters Stambulinsky was considered to be as radical as the Russian Bolsheviks, and the nationalists disliked his conciliatory attitude towards the former enemies. In June, 1923, he was overthrown by a *coup d'état*, and a White government of professors, lawyers, and generals, headed by Alexander Tsankov of the University of Sofia, came into power. The new cabinet was supported by a Democratic Entente which represented all the political parties save the Agrarians and the Communists. Within a few days after his ousting, Stambulinsky was assassinated, and for the next two and a half years the bourgeois government, employing much the same methods that had made the Greens unpopular, undid a large portion of his work.

Had the peasants rallied at once to the armed support of their champions, they might well have regained control of the situation. As it was, they were taken completely by surprise, were slow to organize, and in the end resorted merely to reprisals and assassinations. The government, of course, struck back with equal vigor and attempted to exterminate the opposition leaders. Worst among the numerous outrages that took place, was the explosion of a bomb in the Cathedral of St. Nedelia in Sofia (April, 1925) during the funeral services of a general who had been murdered by terrorists. The bomb, which was said to have been released by communists, killed 150 people and endangered the entire cabinet, which was present to honor the officer's memory.

By the end of 1925, although a semblance of order had been restored with the aid of the army, it was fairly obvious that the Tsankov Government could not last much longer. A new bourgeois ministry took office in January, 1926, headed by Andrei Liapchev, a Macedonian leader of the Democratic Entente. This cabinet favored cooperation with the League and with the neighboring states, financial and educational reforms, a balanced budget, reclamation, extensive public works, local autonomy, and conciliation with the opposition. Thousands of political prisoners were released, the censorship of the press was lifted, and exiles were permitted to return.

Although political murders and outrages ceased as a consequence of these policies, a good deal of discontent remained. The people were restless, and in the winter of 1928 there were rumors of a peasant march on Sofia. The moderate Agrarians now adopted constitutional opposition tactics, being joined, shortly, by the Democrats, National Liberals, and Radicals.¹ The four parties eventually united to form a coalition known as the National Bloc, and in the elections of June, 1931, succeeded in defeating Liapchev and the Democratic Entente. By previous agreement, the victors divided the spoils, the Democrats obtaining 50% of the state offices, the Agrarians 25%, the Liberals 15%, and the Radicals all the rest. In October, 1931, the Democrat, Nicola Mushanov, became premier and minister of foreign affairs. One year later he found it necessary to reorganize his cabinet but was able to continue in office.

The course of Bulgaria's post-war foreign relations has been determined chiefly by the ramifications of the Macedonian question. Macedonia is a region of indeterminate boundaries including the fertile valleys of the Vardar and Struma rivers and situated partly in Greece, partly in Bulgaria, and partly in Serbia. For centuries the area was under Turkish rule, but before the war it was claimed on historical and linguistic grounds by all three of the states mentioned. Each of these carried on a vigorous propaganda campaign in Macedonian churches and schools to convince the two million inhabitants that they really belonged to this or to that nation. The Bulgarians appeared to enjoy the

¹ The Radicals advocated woman suffrage, state aid to the poor, and the introduction of the referendum.

greatest success in these efforts and acquired control over a large part of the province as a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. The Peace Conference of 1919, however, assigned most of the area to Greece and Yugoslavia, allowing Bulgaria to retain only a small corner. Almost immediately thousands of Macedonians began to flee from their new Greek and Yugoslav overlords and pour into Bulgaria. The latter was regarded by them not merely as a likely place of refuge, but as a base from which agitation for Macedonian autonomy or even independence might be carried on.

The unification and independence movement has been directed by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, a society founded in the last decade of the nineteenth century, and led by one Ivan Mihailov. The members of the I.M.R.O. are grouped into armed bands of *cojnitadjis* whose methods are terrorism and guerilla warfare along the international frontiers. The Bulgarian army is so small that the comitadjis can act with virtual impunity while keeping the government in constant dread of unpleasant border incidents. Lately, the problem of Greek Macedonia has become less pressing as the land vacated by the emigrating natives has been quickly taken up by the Greek refugees who were rendered homeless in consequence of the Greco-Turkish population exchange. But in Yugoslavia the situation remains fraught with danger, for there the I.M.R.O. is determined to block all attempts at "Serbifying" the Macedonians.

In 1922 Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania united in sending a vigorous "warning to Bulgaria to check the disorders along the Greco-Bulgarian and Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontiers. Two years later the government at Athens complained of the mistreatment of some Greek nationals in the Bulgaro-Macedonian village of Voden. The protest apparently had the wrong effect, for soon thereafter the Greek mayor of the village was murdered. By way of reprisal a Greek army officer ordered the shooting of seventeen Bulgarians. A crisis in these border troubles was reached in October, 1925, when a clash between frontier outposts resulted in the despatch of an entire army corps to Bulgaria by the Greek Minister of War. Within five days the invaders occupied seventy square miles of territory. The authorities at

Sofia offered no military resistance and appealed to the League of Nations for protection.

The Council assembled immediately and ordered the Greeks to recall their troops from Bulgaria, under the supervision of a commission of British, French, and Italian officers. Then, having averted certain war, the Council sent a commission of inquiry to investigate the origin of the conflict and recommend action. In November this body reported that neither party to the dispute had appeared to act with premeditation, but that the Greek Minister had been hasty in ordering the invasion without proper and prior investigation of the circumstances. The commissioners therefore suggested that Greece, instead of receiving the indemnity which she was demanding, be required to pay Bulgaria the sum of \$220,000 for material and moral damages. The Council accepted these decisions, as did the disputants, and by March, 1926, Greece had paid up the last instalment of the fine. The peaceable outcome of the affair was not only a decided victory for the League, but it paved the way for a better understanding between Bulgaria and Greece. The latter came to realize that the government of King Boris was not to blame for the border incidents, and in 1927 and 1929 Greco-Bulgarian treaties of commerce and friendship were signed. Simultaneously, a number of long-standing financial and property-right quarrels were adjusted.

Meanwhile, in 1926, some of the comitadjis had crossed from Bulgaria into Yugoslavia and there attacked a town. Once more Yugoslavia, Greece, and Rumania jointly protested. Bulgaria expressed her regret for the incident, explained her physical inability to check the activities of the Macedonians, and invited her neighbors to cooperate in the better regulation of the frontiers. This offer was regarded favorably and friendly conversations were begun, but all harmony was dissipated when the comitadjis killed a Serbian general before the year was over. This time Yugoslavia determined to act, especially since she was further irked by the growing friendship between the Bulgarians and her rival, Fascist Italy. For more than a year, consequently, the Bulgarian frontier was closed, while raids and assassinations continued apace.

The royal dictatorship which was established in Yugoslavia

in 1929 regarded the boundary difficulties in a less serious light and reopened the frontier. This action opened a path for further negotiations, and in 1930 the two countries adopted a protocol which regulated the control of the borders, settled some bothersome land disputes which were the heritage of the peace treaty, and provided for the settlement of future disagreements by peaceful arbitration.

The signing of the Bulgarian treaties with Greece and Yugoslavia, and the fact that the Macedonians themselves have split into two opposing and bitterly hostile factions, the Mihailovists and the Protogerovists, has somewhat lessened the immediate danger of war in this region. However, if the revolutionaries should reunite, or if one group should subdue the other, and if the interested statesmen should allow themselves to be swayed by emotionalism and nationalism rather than guided by reason, the Macedonian question might lead to renewed outrages, diplomatic crises, and international rivalries in the future as it did in the past. The outlook for Bulgaria is not altogether reassuring.

GREECE

In 1917, it will be recalled, Premier Eleutherios Venizelos, with the aid of the Allies and against the wishes of King Constantine, had led Greece into the war. Then, at the Peace Conference, he had secured for his country numerous territorial awards, at least on paper. Not unnaturally, he expected a cordial reception upon his return home from Paris. Yet, for a variety of reasons, he had come to be generally disliked. It was common knowledge that his advent to power in 1917 had been based on forceful Allied support, and his action in compelling the king to abdicate in favor of the young Alexander had never been popular. Apparently some of the people also bore in mind that Venizelos' policies had already plunged them into three wars, in 1912, 1913, and 1917-1918, and they were not especially desirous either of waging a fourth conflict in order to make good the claims acquired in Asia Minor by the Treaty of Sevres, or of becoming the pawns of England and France in the Entente's schemes regarding the Near East. To make things even worse for Venizelos, Alexander died in 1920 from the bite of a pet monkey, whereupon his

huge and genial father, Constantine, immediately announced his readiness to return from exile.

Hence it was not surprising that the Venizelists should have been badly defeated in the elections of November, 1920, and that a plebiscite held in the following month should have resulted in the recall of Constantine by an overwhelming vote. The premier discreetly left the country, passing on to the returned ruler a war against the Turks under Mustapha Kemal. Not only was Constantine forced by circumstances to continue this struggle, but his position was made precarious when the Allies refused to recognize his government and cut short the flow of supplies and ammunition which had been made available to Venizelos. In fact, the French, who just then happened to be angry with the British, rendered secret aid to the Kemalists. Constantine therefore was blamed for the resulting Greek debacle at Smyrna, the threatened loss of Thrace, and the coldness of the Allies. The military men consequently asked him to quit, and after a demonstration led by Colonel Plastiras, he abdicated a second time (September, 1922). The throne went to his eldest son, George II.

Venizelos was recalled to salvage from the Turkish imbroglio what he could at the peace conference of Lausanne (1923). He had to give up Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, and agreed to a compulsory exchange of populations with Turkey. Greece was thus left with an area of 49,912 square miles, about half of which had been added since 1912. As a result of the exchange of peoples, more than 1,000,000 refugees were dumped into the land from Turkey, bringing the total population up to 6,200,000 in 1932. The lot of the refugees was miserable, since Greece found it almost impossible to provide the necessary food, clothing, and shelter for the incoming thousands. Some relief was afforded by the League of Nations Settlement Committee under the chairmanship of Henry P. Morgenthau, former American Ambassador to Turkey. By 1930 about 145,000 families had been settled on land in Thessaly and Greek Macedonia, but many still remained homeless and dependent upon charity. Up to 1932 the total cost of providing for these unfortunates had exceeded \$70,000,000.

One of the hardest diplomatic problems arising from this enforced uprooting of so many people, was the liquidation of the

ensuing property disputes. This controversy between Greece and Turkey was not smoothed out until June, 1930, at which time a convention was signed whereby the two countries reciprocally renounced the claims of their exchangeable refugees against each other and agreed to permit the Turks in Western Thrace and the Greeks in Constantinople to remain where they were. In addition, Greece undertook to pay Turkey \$2,125,000 for the confiscation of land belonging to "non-exchangeable" Turks. With these hindrances to cordial relations removed, the two peoples, in October of the same year, concluded a treaty of friendship, arbitration, neutrality, and naval parity.

Although only one-fifth of the land surface of Greece is arable, the chief occupation of the people is agriculture. Beginnings have been made in the exploitation of the fairly rich mineral resources. As in the case of a number of other European states, extensive programs of reforestation were inaugurated, and a number of American companies were engaged to work on reclamation projects, particularly in the region of the Vardar River. Of historic Mt. Olympus the authorities hope eventually to make a national park somewhat on the style of the ones in the United States.¹ The public works undertaken required large funds, but the international credit standing of Greece was good and little difficulty was encountered in contracting loans. In 1927 the drachma was stabilized at 1.2977 cents and in 1928 a national Bank of Greece opened its doors for business.

The reign of George II was notable chiefly for confusion and unrest. An extreme censorship prevailed, there were frequent military executions, and the quarrels between the royalists and Venezelists, a majority of whom soon betrayed republican sympathies, became more and more vindictive. Finally, in December, 1923, after a Venezelist victory at the polls, the king and queen were requested to leave the country while parliament decided upon the future form of government. Admiral Paul Koundouriotis was appointed regent and in the following March the national legislature deposed the dynasty and declared a

¹A picturesque aspect of Greek life is furnished by the autonomous monastic republic of Mt. Athos. This region, occupying 121 square miles, is ruled by a Greek governor, is exempt from taxation, and is the inalienable property of the score of Orthodox monasteries which are there located. Women are not permitted to visit the little state.

republic. This action was upheld in a plebiscite of April, 1924, by a vote of more than two to one, and the regent became provisional president.

Political life under the republic proved to be no less turbulent than under the monarchy. Koundouriotis was ousted from control after a short time by General Theodoros Pangalos, who in turn was driven from power by General Condylis. Then Koundouriotis asserted himself once more and maintained a precarious hold on the presidency until December, 1929. In the latter month he resigned because of ill health and was succeeded by Alexander Zaimis who, at the time of his election, was president of the Senate and had been eight times prime minister. Since the new executive was duly chosen by the parliament, it appeared that the republic was on a tolerably firm footing. King George, however, who has never officially abdicated, set up his residence in Bucharest, apparently awaiting an opportunity to return and place himself at the head of the remaining royalists.

Meanwhile Venizelos, who had again left the country and retired to his native Crete, once more returned, in 1928, and led the Liberal Party to victory in an election which was characterized by violence and the kidnapping of candidates. For the fifth time in his career the veteran became premier. He remained in power for almost four years, until May, 1932, and achieved a number of important reforms. A semblance of order was restored, public works were pushed with vigor, agriculture was aided, the educational system and public health administrations were improved, workmen's insurance legislation was discussed, a final debt settlement was effected with the United States and a new refugee loan obtained, and more friendly relations were established with the neighboring states and the former Allies. Venizelos appeared to be much in favor of a Balkan federation as a step toward the fulfillment of Briand's Pan-Europa scheme, but nationalist jealousies constantly intervened to block progress in this direction.

Despite everything that the government could do, the economic prosperity of the republic after 1930 declined rapidly. Foreign trade decreased and unemployment increased until finally the premier decided upon a suspension of foreign debt payments and the utilization of the money thus saved in the further con-

struction of public works. Such measures, however, were at best of temporary value, and Venizelos retired without having solved the economic riddle. It was a reflection of the unsettled European conditions that a period of seven months elapsed before the appointment of another relatively stable government, again under Venizelos.

The foreign relations of post-war Greece were troublous. The difficulties with Turkey over the terms of the peace treaties and with Bulgaria regarding the Macedonian situation have already been mentioned. Contacts with Italy and Yugoslavia were equally disturbing for a time. Italian control of the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean since the close of the Turco-Italian War in 1912 gave rise to a Greek irredentist movement of sizable proportions, inasmuch as the islands are inhabited largely by Greeks. For strategic and nationalistic reasons, however, the Italians have persistently refused to surrender this possession, particularly since Greece has little to offer in exchange. More serious was a rupture in the relations between the two states in 1923 when some Italian army officers aided in the delimitation of a boundary between southern Albania and northern Greece.

It seemed to the Greeks that most of the disputed points were being decided in favor of Italy's protege, Albania. Whether or not this charge was true, four of the Italian commissioners were killed on Greek soil. An ultimatum, reminiscent of the Austrian one to Serbia in 1914, was immediately forthcoming from Rome. It demanded, among other things, an official apology, an indemnity of 50,000,000 lire, and the granting of permission to the Italian military attache to help in the apprehension of the assassins. The time limit for acceptance was twenty-four hours. Greece rejected a number of the demands as contravening her national sovereignty and appealed to the League for help.

Before this body could act, Italy bombarded and occupied the island of Corfu, inflicting casualties mainly upon some Armenian refugees who had been collected there. At the same time the Italians indicated their great displeasure at the apparent intention of the League to interfere in the controversy. Hence the League adroitly turned the matter over to the attention of the Council of Ambassadors at Paris. These diplomats, in due time, decided that Greece had been at fault in the murders, but

that the ultimatum had been too harsh. It was recommended, therefore, that Greece apologize, accord military honors to the dead, seek out and punish the murderers, and pay the indemnity of 50,000,000 lire. Italy, in turn, should evacuate Corfu. The suggestions of the ambassadors were accepted and relations between Italy and Greece gradually underwent an improvement. In a sense the outcome was a League victory, but it also showed fairly conclusively that that organization could not proceed as readily or as energetically against a large power as against a smaller state.

The chief Greek quarrel with Yugoslavia arose out of a treaty of 1913 between Greece and Serbia wherein the former had promised the latter a free zone in the port of Salonica. The World War forced the postponement of the final arrangements, but in 1923 a new convention was signed whereby Yugoslavia was given a fifty-year hold on a Salonica free zone covering 94,000 square meters. The area was to remain under Greek legal and police surveillance but to be under Yugoslav customs administration, and goods passing between the free zone and Yugoslavia were to be tax exempt. The accord went into effect in 1925, but it did not work well.

The Yugoslavs complained that the extent of the zone was too small to permit of the proper handling of cattle shipments, that the forty-eight-mile section of railway between Salonica and their frontier town of Ghevgheli was under inefficient management, that the speed of the trains was so slow as to result in damage to perishable goods, and that the freight rates were prohibitively high. Since Greece at this time was eager to secure an alliance with the neighbor kingdom comparable to the Greco-Serb pact of pre-war days, negotiations were reopened in 1926. Simultaneously the railway rates were reduced and a number of improvements effected in the train service. An agreement was arrived at which provided for the enlargement of the free zone by some 10,000 square meters, the appointment of a Yugoslav member to the board of directors of the railway, and the submission of all future disputes regarding the line to a French arbitrator. This convention, however, was never ratified, for the Greek Government which negotiated it was overthrown almost immediately thereafter.

The ill-will between the two peoples increased perceptibly until Venizelos returned to power in 1928. He visited Belgrade at the earliest opportunity and was responsible for another renewal of negotiations in 1929. This time success attended the endeavors of the statesmen and a compromise was accepted under which (1) the free zone remained confined to its original size; (2) the railway was to remain entirely under Greek direction; (3) Greece was to remit 20,000,000 gold francs to Yugoslavia to liquidate all claims of the latter's nationals on the road; (4) the train service was to be further improved and regularized; (5) the freight rates were to be lowered to a fair level; and (6) future disputes regarding either the zone or the railroad were to be submitted for arbitration to a jointly appointed referee or to the League.

Thus Greece hurdled the last serious obstacle which stood in the way of cordial foreign relations. Venizelos was quick to make the most of the favorable situation and concluded special treaties of friendship and conciliation with Italy in 1928, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in 1929, and Turkey in 1930. These documents did much to ease the tension in the turbulent Balkans.

JUGOSLAVIA

In the summer of 1917 a group of leading South- or Jugoslavs, representing Serbia and the southslavic provinces of Austria-Hungary, met at Corfu and signed a pact declaring their intention to form a new state, a "constitutional, democratic, parliamentary monarchy/" to be known as the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes." These peoples had never before been united in one state and each group was anxious to reserve certain special rights and privileges. It was agreed that the Serb dynasty should rule the kingdom and that an appropriate national flag should be adopted, although the three old flags might still "be freely hoisted on all occasions." Moreover, since the Serbs were accustomed to the Cyrillic alphabet, while the Croats and Slovenes used the Latin, it was stipulated that both forms of writing should be retained. Again, since most of the Serbs were Greek Catholics, while the Croats and Slovenes were largely Roman Catholic, and there were also about 1,600,000 Mohammedans, the equality of all three religions was to be guaranteed. As soon as possible

there was to be elected a constituent assembly by universal, secret, and direct suffrage. But the pact was silent as to whether the future form of government should be unitary or federal, and this omission was destined to cause great difficulties.

The new state was formed according to these precepts in 1918-1919, under old King Peter of Serbia. The actual ruler, however, was Peter's son, Alexander, who had been acting as regent for his father since 1914 and who became sovereign in his own right in 1921. As finally constituted, the kingdom included the former Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, and parts of Carniola, Styria, the Banat of Temesvar, and western Bulgaria, altogether comprising an area of 96,134 square miles. The population in 1931 numbered 13,900,000, of whom 46 % were Serbs and 37% Croats and Slovenes. There were also several hundred thousand Rumanians and half a million each of Germans and Magyars. The Croats were far more westernized than either the Serbs or the Slovenes, and the leading Croat city, Zagreb, is considerably more "modern" than the Serb capital, Belgrade.

Almost from the beginning of the independent existence of the Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom, the people were split into two factions on the question of what sort of central government to establish. One group, which chose to regard the new state as a Greater Serbia, favored a strongly consolidated, unitary government, with all authority emanating from Belgrade. The leading advocate of this view-point was the aged but energetic Premier Nicola Pashitch (1846-1926), the man who had been head of the government when the war broke out. The chief opposition to centralized control came from the Croatian Peasant Party led by Stjepan Raditch (1871-1928), a short, stout, nervous, near-sighted man, a prodigious speaker, fiery, and ready at all times to give up his life in the cause of Croat autonomy.

Each side advanced certain arguments. Pashitch remonstrated that the backward state of some of the regions acquired from Hungary made local autonomy preposterous. Moreover, he said, the Serbs, by sheer weight of numbers, would dominate the government anyway, and the fact might as well be given official recognition. Finally, the problem of reconstruction was so grave as to require the most patriotic and united action,

directed from one central point, Belgrade. Raditch turned a deaf ear to these pleas. He explained that the Croats had enjoyed a degree of autonomy under Austria and hence had every right to continue in control of their own affairs. He pointed out that the Croats as a group were more advanced than the Serbs and consequently should not be made subordinate to them. And he reminded Pashitch that the union of the Croats with the Serbs had been entirely voluntary, wherefore they were entitled at least to make their own local laws.

For two years the question raged, while the king refused to call elections for a constituent assembly until the outstanding boundary disputes should have been adjusted. At last, late in 1920, the long-awaited call for elections was issued. Raditch's Croatian Peasant Party elected fifty deputies, but, in compliance with his instructions, they refused to take their seats. The assembly therefore was made up largely of the moderate Democrats and Pashitch's Serbian Radicals. In 1921 the "Radicals," who were the bitterest opponents of federation and who really favored *conservative* domestic policies, managed to secure the adoption of a document which fulfilled their fondest hopes. Many of the moderates abstained from the final vote.

The constitution provided for a completely centralized system of government. Old provincial frontiers were erased and all local diets were abolished, to be replaced by a single national parliament, the unicameral *Skupshtina*. Universal suffrage was granted, but the people could elect only the members of parliament and a few local officials. The latter, moreover, were responsible to the central authorities. In the words of an experienced observer, the constitution thus vested undue power in the hands of an "incompetent clique" in Belgrade.

After the adoption of the constitution the most urgent domestic problem facing the Yugoslav people was that of "revision" of the document. Until 1924 the Croats refused to take any part whatsoever in the political life of the state. They boycotted parliament and hampered the administration wherever possible. Raditch himself spent most of the time either in jail or in exile. By 1924, however, he reached the conclusion that obstructionist tactics might be carried on more effectively from within parliament, and hence pennitted the Croat deputies to take their

seats. As a result, the Pashitch Government was forced to resign (March, 1924), and thereafter one short-lived ministry after another rose and fell, the monotony being enlivened by the vigorous epithets hurled by the deputies at one another across the floor of the legislative chamber. In despair, the king recalled Pashitch, who energetically proceeded to crush the opposition by having Raditch arrested on charges of high treason and conspiracy, and ordering new elections in February, 1925. The government resorted to all the strong-arm methods known to Balkan politicians for securing victory, but the Croats elected the same number of deputies as before. The opposition accordingly remained strong enough to defeat most of the government's bills.

After a brief stay in prison, Raditch once more decided to change his methods, this time letting it be known that he would recognize the constitution of 1921 and cooperate in parliamentary activity, provided his party were given representation in the government. The cabinet decided to accept his offer, and in November, 1925, he was released and became minister of education. Meanwhile, however, the personal element had entered the quarrel to such an extent that Raditch could not refrain from loading Pashitch and the other cabinet members with insults, until finally the partnership was dissolved. The death of Pashitch in December, 1926, failed to end the controversy and merely deprived the proponents of centralization of their ablest leader.

Confusion soon was transformed into chaos both within parliament and among the people. On several occasions the police had to be called into the legislative halls to end fighting among the deputies, and riots and outrages became more and more common in the streets. A climax was reached on June 29, 1928. On that day Raditch got up in parliament and launched an especially bitter attack against the government because it proposed ratification of the Nettuno Convention with Italy.¹ He complained that the convention was an Italo-Serb compromise drawn up at the expense of the Croatian peasants. Angered by these denunciations, a pro-government deputy arose, drew his pistol, and fired directly into the group of Croatian deputies.

¹ See p. 342.

Two of the latter died instantly and several, including Raditch, were wounded. Raditch succumbed to his injuries on August 8, and the dead leader became a saint and a legend.

The Croat deputies withdrew in a body from the Skupshtina. They met again at Zagreb and there resolved to disregard any laws which might be passed by the "rump" parliament at Belgrade. Then under their new chiefs, Svetozar Pribitchevitch and Vlatko Matchek, the Croats, joined by some Dalmatian deputies, threatened to set up their own legislature and act independently of the central authorities. In December, 1928, the Croatian people refused to participate in the celebration of the tenth birthday of the kingdom, and when a military governor was sent to find a solution for the whole problem, his call for the gathering of representative local councils went unheeded. Since the death of Raditch, parliamentary government had broken down completely. The situation was perilous in the extreme in view of the relative weakness of the kingdom and the circumstance that it was surrounded by a group of none-too-friendly states whose total populations were five times greater than its own.

In November, 1928, King Alexander went to Paris, ostensibly to visit some physicians, but certainly also to talk matters over with Premier Poincare, for the French, since 1927, had been his strongest and best allies. Upon his return, Alexander, on January 6, 1929, dismissed parliament, abolished the constitution, set up a strict censorship, suppressed all parties and party activities, forbade the bearing of arms and the holding of political meetings, and established a royal dictatorship which was to function through a cabinet responsible solely to him and headed by the reputedly ruthless General Pera Zhivkovich. The ministry included men from Serbia, Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, and Dalmatia, and the king, now an absolute monarch, announced that the various restrictions would be removed as soon as domestic order had been reestablished and friendly relations with the outside world restored.

Alexander, an energetic man and an able military officer, appealed to his subjects to forget their local prejudices and their Serb, Croat, or Slovene origin, and to remember only that they were all Yugoslavs. To give emphasis to this prayer, the official

name of the kingdom was altered by royal decree in October, 1929, and became simply Yugoslavia. The thirty-three former administrative divisions were wiped out, and instead nine new districts, or banats, named after local rivers, were created. In six of the banats the Serbs formed a majority.

On September 3, 1931, the king promulgated a new constitution. It restricted the formation of political parties, recognized the equality of the three major languages, and set up a bicameral Skupshtina, consisting of a Senate and a Chamber. The senators were to hold office for six years, half of the membership being appointed by the king, and the other half elected. The life of the Chamber was to be four years, its members being elected by all men and women over twenty-one. The central government was endowed with broad powers and the banats were to be ruled by governors appointed by and responsible to the king. An electoral law, passed some time later, stipulated that all voting should be oral and that the party securing a plurality of the ballots cast should receive two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber. The remaining seats were to be divided proportionally among the other parties, but no group with less than 50,000 votes was to be entitled to representation. As in Italy, there was to be only one national electoral list.

The first elections under the new system were held in November, 1931, and concerned the lower house only. The voting list contained the names of 1330 candidates, of whom 305 were to be chosen by the people. All the candidates' names in this instance were listed under the single heading of National Party, the first name being that of General Zhivkovich. The National Party was formed through a combination of the chief former parties, and of the 305 successful candidates, 145 had earlier been affiliated with the Serbian Radicals, 57 with the Democrats, and 28 with the old Croatian Peasants. Because of his great unpopularity even with the loyal Serbs, Zhivkovich was able to retain the premiership only until April, 1932. He then was replaced by his foreign minister, Dr. V. Marinkovitch, while the remainder of the cabinet continued unchanged.

The Croats strove to resist these wholesale attempts at "Serbi-fying" the government and the people. Despite the strictest surveillance their discontent was manifested on frequent occa-

sions, some of them voicing resentment even at the erection of a large monument at Serajevo to Gavrilo Princip, the murderer of Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Eventually a reign of terror was inaugurated among the Croats by a patriotic Young Jugoslavia society, *Mlada Jugoslavia*. Most conspicuous among the outrages committed by this group were the killing of the eminent historian, Professor Milan Sufflay of the University of Zagreb, in the streets of that city (February, 1931), and a brutal attack upon the equally prominent lawyer and Croat nationalist, Dr. Milo Budak, in June, 1932. These incidents did little to lessen the insistent demand for local autonomy.

Nationalist difficulties were not the only problems confronting the royal dictator. The peasants, who formed over eighty per cent of the population, were dissatisfied with the size of their holdings despite several efforts by the authorities to break up the large estates. The country lacked adequate outlets to the sea and suffered from a poor system of internal communications which made it hard to develop whatever mineral resources were available. Moreover, the kingdom was heavily burdened with debts, it having been made to assume the pre- and post-war obligations of all its component parts.

The foreign relations of Jugoslavia have already been considered in other connections. Mention has been made of her membership in the Little Entente, of her opposition to Habsburg restorations in Austria and Hungary, of her disputes with Bulgaria over the Macedonians, of her quarrels with Italy over Fiume and over the control of Albania and the Adriatic, and of her complications with Greece over a free zone in Salonica. Under the circumstances Jugoslavia has clung tenaciously to the alliance of 1927 with France, her friend, protector, and creditor. Really cordial relations between the kingdom and the other Balkan states would seem to depend in large measure upon the establishment of peace and harmony within its own borders.

CHAPTER XX

TURKEY FOR THE TURKS

FROM SEVRES TO LAUSANNE

Had the Turkish Parliament ratified the Treaty of Sevres as the latter was drawn up by the Allies and signed on August 10, 1920,¹ by representatives of the discredited Sultan Mohammed VI, the once resplendent Ottoman Empire would have been reduced to an insignificant region of desert and mountains tucked away in Asia Minor, far from the orbits of western diplomacy and western civilization. But Fate, or Kismet, as devout Moslems call it, decreed otherwise, and on this occasion Fate acted through the person of a young army officer named Mustapha.

This Mustapha was born at Salonica in 1880, of good family. After earning a scholarship to the secondary school at Monastir he ran away from this institution to take up a soldier's life at the Staff School in Constantinople. Here, in recognition of his superiority as a student of mathematics, one of his professors bestowed upon him the name of Kemal, signifying "perfection." Military life appealed to Mustapha and he developed into an excellent soldier, but he also became an inspired reader of French Revolutionary literature and an ardent antagonist of the autocratic Turkish governmental system. Though his revolutionary tendencies doubtless were known to the agents of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the police forbore to arrest Mustapha until his graduation. Then nothing more serious happened to him than a temporary banishment in the form of an assignment to a cavalry regiment in far-off Damascus. There the young officer found plenty of time to muse over the evils of misgovernment and to organize a secret political society called *Vatari* or "Fatherland."

During the Young Turk revolution of 1908 Kemal acted as chief of staff to Mahmud Shevket, commander of the army that marched on Constantinople and forced Abdul Hamid to grant a


¹See p. 131.

constitution. The rather muddled tactics and political intrigues of the Young Turk ruling body, the Committee of Union and Progress, induced Mustapha to devote his attention entirely to military affairs and reforms, and in 1910 he went to France to study the army manoeuvres in Picardy. On his return, he stopped for a while at Paris and was deeply impressed by the contrasts of West and East. He seems to have been especially struck by the relatively free position of women, the progressive civil and commercial life, and the general prevalence of literacy.

Kemal fought in Tripoli during the Turco-Italian War of 1911-1912 and proved himself to be one of Turkey's best generals in the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Although he opposed as premature his country's entry into the World War in 1914 and openly avowed misgivings as to Germany's eventual victory, Mustapha's reputation as an able leader was definitely established when it became known that he had played a conspicuous part in the defeat of the Allies at Gallipoli in 1915.

Under the circumstances it is not to be wondered at that Kemal was chagrined when the Allies successfully imposed on Turkey the Armistice of Mudros (October, 1918). The terms of this document were so drastic that the Committee of Union and Progress, which was popularly held responsible for the disasters of the war, fled the capital. Mustapha in anger laid down his command in Palestine and hastened to Constantinople, only to be ordered into Anatolia by the sultan, as Inspector-General in charge of the demobilization activities in an out-of-the-way area. He went, but used his commission to gather around him the nucleus of a new party, the Turkish Nationalist Party, and a make-shift military force, consisting at first, it was said, of " local Robin Hoods, Russian Bolsheviks, and Baku Tartars."

Meanwhile, in May, 1919, following a decision of England and France to forestall Italian imperialist enterprises in Anatolia, Greece was encouraged to land troops at Smyrna. The pillaging of this famous port so aroused patriotic Turks everywhere, that Kemal seized the opportunity to attempt to unite nationalists throughout the country. He called a Nationalist Congress to meet at Erzerum in July, 1919, for a discussion of the future policy of the Nationalist Party. Two months later a second and



MUSTAPHA KEMAL

more representative congress was convened at Sivas, which endorsed the resolutions of the Erzerum assemblage. At these meetings the basis was laid for the Turkish National Pact, a statement of principles adopted on January 28, 1920, by a Constantinople Parliament which, elected late in 1919, contained a large Nationalist majority.

The Pact listed six conditions without which "the continued existence of a stable Ottoman sultanate and society" was declared impossible. The first three articles dealt with the application of the principle of self-determination to all those areas of the old Ottoman Empire which still contained large numbers of Turks. The fourth article demanded the security of Constantinople but agreed to the opening of the Straits "to the commerce and traffic of the world." Article Five "confirmed and assured" the rights of minorities in Turkey, and the last article demanded the abolition of the foreign capitulations and all restrictions inimical to the country's "development in political, judicial, financial, and other matters." "It is a fundamental condition of (Turkey's) life and continued existence," read the document, "that she, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of her development."

The Nationalist members of the parliament were expecting too much when they thought that the Allies would permit them to proceed along the principles outlined in the Pact. Within less than two months after its adoption, an army commanded by the British General Milne marched into Constantinople (March 15, 1920), proclaimed martial law, arrested as many Nationalist deputies as could be found, and shipped some forty of them to Malta. Most of the Nationalist delegates who had escaped arrest hastened to the city of Angora in north-central Anatolia, there to set up a rump parliament under the name of Grand National Assembly. When the sultan now convened another parliament at Constantinople, the country had two governing bodies: one, subordinate to the sultan and maintained by Allied troops; the other, supported by the national sentiment of the Turkish people and protected by the desert and mountains separating Angora from Constantinople and the Allied forces.

The Angora Assembly opened its first session on April 23, 1920, and immediately elected Mustapha Kemal to be its president as

well as commander-in-chief of the "Nationalist army." Then, determined to "preside over the present and future destiny of Turkey, so long as her Caliph-Sultan and her Eternal City should remain under the dominion and occupation of foreigners/' the body undertook to draw up a new constitution for the state. On January 20, 1921, such a document, called Law of Fundamental Organization, was adopted. As amended in 1924 and 1925, this law vested the sovereignty of Turkey in the people as a whole and in their representatives sitting as a Grand National Assembly at Angora. The deputies were to be elected for terms of four years by the vote of all males over eighteen (changed in 1931 to twenty-one). The executive powers were vested in the president and a responsible cabinet, and the judiciary was to be appointed by the assembly. The constitution also outlined an elaborate program of social reform.

While the assembly was engaged in constitution-making, Kemal, at the head of the Nationalist forces, launched a campaign to clear the country of all foreign soldiers. In this undertaking he so covered himself with military glory as to win the title of *Ghazi* or "Conqueror." In September, 1920, after having come to a friendly agreement with Russia, Kemal invaded the recently established Armenian Republic of Erivan, routed the Armenian defenders, and soon reunited the provinces of Kars and Ardahan with Turkey.

Meanwhile three Greek armies, with some British naval support, had driven the Nationalists out of Thrace and pushed eastward into Anatolia as far as Ushaq. These victories, however, were soon counteracted by a number of unexpected diplomatic developments. The Greek Premier, Venizelos, who was chiefly responsible for these attempts on the part of Greece to take the territories assigned to her by the unratified Treaty of Sevres, was defeated in the parliamentary elections of November, 1920. English support, moreover, was becoming less enthusiastic and the French began openly to favor the Turks out of dislike for the Greek King, jealousy of England's advances in the Near East, and discouragement over the defeat of some French forces by Turkish Nationalists in Cilicia, northwest of Syria. Italy, finally, who herself coveted Smyrna, had never sympathized with the Greek venture. Accordingly an attempt

was made at London in February, 1921, to revise the Sèvres Treaty, chiefly at the expense of Greece. When it appeared that the demands of the Turks and Greeks could not be reconciled, the Athens Government, against the advice of the Allied Supreme Council, determined to enforce the original treaty on its own account. In May, 1921, the Allies formally proclaimed their neutrality in the ensuing Greco-Turkish War.

On July 10, 1921, the Greeks opened an offensive which enabled them to reach the Sakharía River, some fifty miles from Angora, before the end of August. Then the drive was spent and the Greeks were unable to make any further advance. From August 24 until September 16 the ill-equipped but inspired Turks held in check an enemy who outnumbered them at least three to one. After the Battle of the Sakharía, which was Kemal's greatest military triumph, the Greeks began a general retreat. They retraced their steps gradually and remained in occupation of a large section of Asia Minor for a whole year, but in September, 1922, they were forced to evacuate even Smyrna. Physical exhaustion, poor leadership, uncertainty of the situation at home, and seditious propaganda so weakened the morale of the Greeks that they found it impossible to withstand the constant pressure of the Turkish Nationalists who somehow managed to secure better equipment and whose enthusiasm increased as the campaign progressed.

When victorious Mustapha, in the flush of victory, proposed to cross the Straits and drive the Greeks out of Eastern Thrace, he once more came into direct conflict with the English. At the time of the Allied proclamation of neutrality in May, 1921, it had been stipulated that a specified area on either side of the Straits was to be considered as a neutral zone in which no fighting would be permitted. Now, fearing for the control of the Dardanelles, Lloyd George announced his determination to enforce this provision and prevent the Turks from fighting the Greeks in Thrace. Neither the French nor the Italians, however, cared to back the British Premier. On October 20, 1921, France had come to an agreement with the Kemalists whereby she withdrew from Cilicia and permitted a rectification of the northern boundary of Syria in Turkey's favor, while the latter promised to consider favorably the requests of certain French interests for

important financial and mining rights and a lease of part of the Bagdad Railway. Italy had likewise concluded (1922) an agreement with Angora, under which the Turks promised to give favorable consideration to some Italian applications for railways, mines, and public works in Asia Minor. Lloyd George therefore had to act alone and large British reinforcements were sent to the Chanak region to prevent a Greco-Turkish clash in the zone of the Straits.

For a time war seemed imminent, but the British commander eventually induced Mustapha to attempt a peaceful settlement of the controversy by conference. On October 11, 1922, an armistice was signed at Mudania. The Greeks were ordered immediately to evacuate and restore to Turkey all Thrace as far as the Maritsa River, and invitations were issued to Great Britain, France, the United States, Italy, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Russia, Japan, Greece, and Turkey to meet at Lausanne on November 20 for the purpose of revising the Treaty of Sevres to meet the new conditions. Turkey's peace treaty, apparently, unlike those of her allies in the World War, was to be one of agreement, not dictation. Less than three weeks before the first Lausanne Conference met, the Grand National Assembly deposed (November 2, 1922) Sultan Mohammed VI. But not until a full year later, on October 29, 1923, did the legislature declare the nation to be a republic and unanimously elect Mustapha as Turkey's first president.

At the Lausanne Conference the Turkish delegates, headed by Ismet Pasha, made it clear that they would not sign any treaty which restricted the economic or judicial freedom of their country. In consequence the gathering actually broke up in February, 1923, but sessions were resumed on April 24. Ismet maintained his firm stand, but Lord Curzon was replaced by the more conciliatory Sir Horace Humbold as England's chief delegate. The negotiations dragged on until July 24, and then came to an end only because the Turks had been able to secure virtually everything that they had demanded in their National Pact of 1920. Only the question of Mosul, that is, of the boundary between Turkey and British-controlled Iraq, was shelved for later settlement.

Under the terms of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey recovered all

Eastern Thrace as far west as the Maritsa River, including the city of Adrianople (now Edirne). In addition, she was permitted to recover the bridgehead and railway center on the west bank of the Maritsa, at Karagach, in satisfaction of reparation claims against Greece. Constantinople was restored as an integral part of the Turkish state, but the zone of the Straits was demilitarized and opened to the ships of all nations, no matter what their cargo, in time of peace and, when Turkey was a neutral, in time of war. In the event of Turkey's belligerency, enemy vessels might be kept out of the Straits, but not so neutral vessels.

In the Aegean Sea, Turkey retained Imbros, Tenedos, and the Rabbit Islands, while Dodecanesia, Rhodes, and Castellorizo were definitely ceded to Italy. Most of the remaining Aegean islands went to Greece. The Syrian boundary agreed upon with France in 1921 was confirmed. Sentiment dictated the granting in perpetuity to England, France, and Italy of a small "Anzac Area" on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Here the three powers may appoint custodians to watch over the graves of the soldiers who died in the fateful campaign of 1915, but the region may never be built up or fortified.

Turkey gave up all claims to Libya, Egypt, the Sudan, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian kingdoms, and recognized England's annexation of Cyprus. In return for Turkey's promise to introduce judicial reforms and adhere to the same provisions regarding the rights of minorities as had the other eastern European countries, the capitulations were abolished, all Allied claims for reparation arising out of the World War were renounced, the foreign control of customs was lifted, and no restrictions were placed on Turkey's military, naval, and air forces. A supplementary Greco-Turkish convention provided for the compulsory exchange of Turkish subjects in Greece for Greek subjects in Turkey, and another stipulated the demilitarization of the Greco-Bulgarian-Turkish frontier in Eastern Thrace. Turkey was left with an area of about 295,000 square miles, the size of Texas and South Carolina combined, and with a population of over 13,000,000. At peace with the world for the first time in many years, Turkey could at length proceed to set her house in order.

THE TURKS, THE GREEKS, AND THE KURDS

The Turkish Nationalists were eager to oust from the republic, especially from its Asiatic part, all peoples who were not "Turks." Since the largest group of non-nationals in 1923 consisted of Greeks, the Angora and Athens governments had agreed at Lausanne upon a wholesale exchange of populations on the basis, primarily, of religion. This proposal was commended as a solution of the Greco-Turkish minorities problem by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen in his capacity as supervisor of Near East Relief for the League and was carried out under the supervision of a specially appointed Mixed Commission.

The actual process of this exchange occasioned untold sufferings. It frequently was difficult to decide whether a family should be considered as Turkish or Greek, particularly where the original migration had taken place a century or more ago. Besides, there were many Orthodox Christians in Anatolia who knew only Turkish, and there were many Moslems residing in Greece who spoke not a word of Turkish. Official mismanagement, traditional cruelty, and neglect were often in evidence, for the racial and religious hatreds did not allow of humanitarian and just treatment in all cases. Fraud and corruption were common and official carelessness often resulted in the transplanting of mountaineers onto plains or the transference of plainsmen and farmers to the mountains.

Altogether about 1,000,000 people were sent to Greece and 400,000 to Turkey. The misery of the Greeks was alleviated somewhat by the circumstances that the American Near East Relief concentrated particularly on Greek aid, and that the Athens Government, because of Greece's membership in the League of Nations, was able to appeal for League assistance. The property disputes arising from the exchange continued to embitter Greco-Turkish relations until June, 1930. Then, as we have seen,¹ a compromise agreement was reached, to be followed in a few months by the signing of a treaty of friendship. In the meantime the Turks had passed a law forbidding the immigration for purposes of settlement of any large group of foreigners.

After the ousting of the Greeks, the chief remaining obstacle

¹ See p. 562

to Turkish national homogeneity were the million or more Kurds inhabiting the former Armenian provinces and Kurdistan, in the eastern part of the republic. These relatively primitive tribesmen, whose language is more akin to Persian than Turkish, are still imbued with the spirit of clan allegiance rather than that of Turkish nationalism. The Kurds long were among the most unruly of the sultan's subjects and they have continued to be restless under the new Turkey, especially since the Lausanne Treaty shattered hopes of independence which had been held out to them by the Treaty of Sevres. In February, 1925, when the Turkish authorities arrested a few Kurds on the charge of sedition, the discontent crystallized into open revolt. The uprising was quickly put down, not without cruelty, and in June the rebel leader was executed.

The incident really appeared to increase the solidarity of the state as a whole. Loyal Turks rallied to the support of the central government and the latter seized the opportunity to strengthen its military control in the country, to silence a more or less critical Constantinople Press, and to abolish the offices and distinctive costumes of the sheikhs, dervishes, and other religious or semi-religious functionaries who still played a prominent rôle in Turkish life.

Another serious Kurdish uprising occurred in 1930 and the government found it necessary to despatch fifty thousand men and numerous airplanes against the rebels. During the course of the revolt the Turkish Government accused the Persian authorities of laxity in the patrolling of the border between the two countries and of permitting the Kurds to retreat into Persian territory. In 1931 friction between the two powers increased when some Kurds attempted to cross from Persia into Turkish territory. Early in 1932, however, the Turco-Persian boundary underwent a slight adjustment which was of mutual advantage. Aside from the potential threat of a Kurdish nationalist movement, Turkey now was free from any minority or irredentist troubles.

KEMAL, THE DICTATOR

As president of Turkey, Mustapha Kemal determined to abolish outworn institutions and methods and to raise his country

to the level of western civilization. In bringing about this transformation he adopted an admittedly dictatorial policy, and a goodly number of shootings and hangings accompanied the march of reform. The Turks, however, had long been accustomed to arbitrary and harsh measures, and Kemal's methods appeared neither novel nor especially frightful to them. Eventually a majority of the people came to endorse the dictator-president's policies and resort to official violence became less frequent.

One of the chief reasons for Mustapha's success was the fact that he customarily took just one big step in advance at a time. Reforms succeeded one another at moderate intervals and in this way the opposition never became so formidable as to crystallize into open resistance. Nevertheless there were some plots to assassinate the dictator and overthrow the republic. The most serious of these were uncovered in the region of Smyrna, in 1926 and again in 1930. Each time the leading conspirators were summarily executed.

In Turkey, as in Italy, nationalism transcended the desire for liberty or democracy. So powerful was this spirit that, again as in Italy and Russia, there was only one political party until August, 1930, the Nationalist People's Party. Its President-General is Kemal who, in 1927, was given the right to name all its electoral candidates for the assembly. In consequence of this arrangement, foreigners came to speak of Turkish elections as "selections," particularly after Kemal had once remarked: "Unity is essential, and there can be no rival theories, and no rival parties."

In August, 1930, Mustapha permitted Ali Fethi Bey, a prominent liberal politician, to organize a parliamentary opposition party. Fethi Bey thereupon formed the Liberal Republican Party which advocated a less pronouncedly nationalistic administration, a lessening of state interference in business, and greater freedom of speech and press. In October the Liberal Republicans in the assembly were able to muster only twelve votes on a motion of no confidence in the government, and Fethi Bey dissolved his party. His little band of followers, however, continued in association as "Independents."

As a result of the parliamentary election of April 24, 1931, the People's Party captured 304 seats in the Grand National Assem-

bly, all the candidates having been nominated by Kemal. The remaining 13 seats fell to Independents. General Ismet Pasha, who had been Mustapha's chief of staff during the Greco-Turkish War and who represented Turkey at the Lausanne Conference, continued in office as premier, a position to which he was first appointed in March, 1925. Mustapha, who had been unanimously reelected president for four years on November 1, 1927, was unanimously reelected for a third term on May 4, 1931.

RELIGIOUS CHANGES

When the Grand National Assembly abolished the sultanate in 1922, it did not simultaneously abolish the caliphate, that is, the sultan's spiritual leadership of the Mohammedan world. Though Mohammed VI was deposed as sultan on November 2, 1922, he continued to be caliph until November 18, when, upon his flight from the country, the assembly elected his cousin, Abdul Mejid, to be caliph in his place. The new "Commander of the Faithful" had no direct political power, but since he was a leading member of the Osman dynasty and since the assembly had declared the Turkish State to be "the emplacement on which the caliphate stands," it was virtually impossible for devout Moslems to dissociate his office from its traditional political implications. An Osman caliph, therefore, was an incongruity in the new Turkey. Accordingly, on March 1, 1924, the assembly abolished the Turkish caliphate and exiled all the members of the former ruling family.

The abolition of the caliphate had a wide significance in the Moslem world as a whole. By depriving themselves of a caliph, the Turks at the same time deprived all Mohammedans of a spiritual leader. It was true that even before the World War many non-Ottoman Mohammedans, such as the schismatic Shiahs in Persia, had ceased to recognize the caliphate, yet the office and its prerogatives were not at all empty shadows. Indeed, it was evident soon after the Turkish pronouncement that there was no lack of aspirants for the vacated honor. The king of the Hejaz, the king of Egypt, the sultan of Morocco, and the Aga Khan of Bombay, all indicated their willingness to assume the title. But despite, or perhaps because of, this general scramble, the caliphate remained an unappropriated

dignity. To the protests that came from non-Turk Moslem camps, Kemal issued the following reply:

The dream of the centuries cherished by the Moslems, that the caliphate should be an Islamic Government including them all, has never proved realizable. It has become rather a cause of dissensions, of anarchy, of war between the believers. Better apprehended, the interest of all has made clear this truth: That the duty of the Moslems is to arrange distinct governments for themselves. The true spiritual bond between them is the conviction that "all believers are brethren/"

In conformity with KemaPs policy of enacting only one major reform at a time, the revised constitutions of April, 1924, and October, 1925, still assigned to Mohammedanism the place of a state religion. Then, in April, 1928, the National Assembly unanimously passed an act deleting from the constitution the article which declared Islam to be the state religion. Hence Mohammedanism is tolerated in Turkey now in exactly the same way as any other religion is tolerated. Officials, upon assuming office, no longer swear by Allah, but simply on their honor and by the republic. No special privileges are to be derived from confessing to the Moslem faith, although the fact that most of the officials are Moslems does lend a certain prestige to that particular creed.

Minor changes in the religious ritual followed. It is no longer necessary to remove one's shoes prior to entering a mosque. Many of the mosques now have pews and music is permitted at services. When it is recalled that only a few years ago such things as these were anathema, were capital offenses, it is clearly evident how strong a hold Mustapha has over the minds of his people and how ardently the Turks desire to become "modernized." It should be noted, however, that a serious religious outbreak occurred in the winter of 1930-1931 at Menemen, near Smyrna, where a group of dervishes unsuccessfully attempted to restore the caliphate.

THE POSITION OF WOMEN

Second in importance only to the changed attitude towards religion, and perhaps really but a phase of this modified outlook, was the altered status accorded Turkish women. A series of **laws enacted in 1925 abolished legal polygamy, required the**

registration of marriages, and gave the president the power to grant divorces. Actually, except on farms, where most of the work was done by women, the economics of the situation had made polygamy much less general an institution in even the old Ottoman Empire than is usually imagined. But the practice is sanctioned in the Koran and was widely followed. Formerly, too, a Turk could divorce his wife by repeating three times the formula, "I divorce you," but at present Turkish women have marriage rights similar to those of the women in most of the western countries. President Mustapha Kemal almost immediately made use of his newly granted divorce power to dissolve his own marriage with Latife Hanum, to whom he had been married only three years. Latife is a wealthy, cultivated, and European-educated woman and one of Turkey's leading feminists. Apparently her tendency to mix into politics was largely responsible for the incompatibility that existed in the Kemal household during the time she was first lady of the land.

Civil marriages were made obligatory after September 1, 1926, though these might be supplemented by religious ceremonies. The legal age limit for marriage was placed at seventeen for women and eighteen for men. The wearing of the veil was made optional and western clothing was introduced, so that Turkish ladies, unless they themselves so wish, no longer need resemble "coffin-shaped bundles of white linen." A demand arose for education for women and girls, and the foreign schools soon found it difficult to accommodate all the new seekers after knowledge. Women were permitted to engage in all the occupations that are open to their sisters in the West and women's clubs and societies became popular. In the summer of 1929, following numerous petitions by the Union of Turkish Women, the right to vote in municipal elections was extended to women, and in the following year women were permitted to hold municipal offices.

An outstanding example of the new Turkish woman is Halide Edib, the first Turkish lady to receive a university degree, a distinguished writer and novelist, professor of western literature at the University of Istanbul, aide-de-camp to Kemal in several military campaigns, and a Turkish Jane Addams in the matter of social work. Following some differences with Mustapha over political policy, she left Turkey and became a popular lecturer

in foreign countries. Her *Memoirs* and other written works are excellent records of Turkey's struggles, foreign and domestic, during those trying years when the republic was in process of formation.

LEGAL REFORM AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS

The changed conditions of life in Turkey made imperative the scrapping of all the old law codes, the *Sheriat* or Holy Law included. In 1926, therefore, the parliament adopted three new codes: civil, penal, and commercial, based, respectively, on those of Switzerland, Italy, and Germany. Three years later a new penal code, patterned more closely after the German, went into effect. The adoption of these western legal systems was of considerable international importance in view of the abolition of the capitulations in 1914 and the confirmation of this action in the Lausanne Treaty. The new Turkish judiciary comprises some seven hundred courts headed by a Supreme Court with a bench of thirty-two members. These judges are grouped into several sections dealing with the various types of cases that may be appealed from the courts of the first instance. The ministry of justice is responsible for discovering any just grievances which the people may have and for keeping the nation informed of the latest legislative and judicial enactments.

One of the most difficult problems confronting the Turkish Government has been that of educating the people. School attendance is compulsory for children from seven to sixteen, but the shortage of money, teachers, and school buildings has prevented the full enforcement of the law. There were twice as many primary schools in existence in 1932 as in 1914, though the elementary school population still was less than 500,000 in a total population of 13,700,000. The number of, and attendance at, secondary schools is, of course, proportionately smaller, and university conditions are not yet particularly encouraging. Nevertheless, by 1932 the national illiteracy was said to have fallen from 85% to 42%.

The Gregorian calendar and the twenty-four-hour clock were adopted in 1926, and in May, 1928, a law was passed providing for the introduction of the Latin alphabet over a period of fifteen years. Newspapers were ordered to abandon the old

Arabic type within eight months on pain of suppression. The publication of books printed in Arabic characters was forbidden after January 1, 1929. The European numeral system came into general use from June 1, 1929, and a law of March, 1931, provided for the introduction of the metric system by January 1, 1933-

All government officials, as well as the heads of banks and business houses, were ordered to attend special state schools for several hours a day, there to study from the new "abc" books. By the end of 1932 virtually all official correspondence and educational materials were in the Latin script. All Turks under forty years of age were made to take lessons in reading and writing, and after May 31, 1931, certificates of literacy were in general required for the enjoyment of "the rights of citizenship." It was an unmistakable sign of the new Turkey that the government radio station was used to further these schemes. On one occasion the government broadcast, in substance, proclaimed: "The Ottoman language died with the Ottoman Empire. Its Arabic characters prevented our language from developing independence. It was by historic accident that we ever adopted them. We have struggled against them and our language and literature have lost force in the struggle. They are unfitted for the needs of expression in modern civilization. Wherever technical terms are used — in banking, commerce, science, modern philosophy, psychology, medicine — new characters are a necessity."

A new official dictionary was published late in 1929. It contained only words (to the number of about 24,000) that were definitely Turkish in origin, not Persian or Arabic. Severe restrictions were placed on the teaching of religion in public or private elementary schools, and in 1932 a plan was worked out to compel all Turks to adopt regular surnames. As a definite "symbol of intellectual liberation" the wearing of the fez or turban — the distinguishing mark of pious Moslems — was prohibited.

"EFFICIENT TURKS FOR TURKEY"

In answer to a question regarding his opinion of the leaders of the Turkish Republic, a Bulgarian diplomat is reported to have

said, "They are working as we never thought Turks could work." During the days of the sultans, relatively few Turks concerned themselves with trade, commerce, or industry. The masses, when not required to do military service, generally preferred to labor in the fields — if they were not too lazy. Hence "business," as such, came to be almost a monopoly of the other racial groups in the empire, particularly the Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. But with the advent of the republic a new spirit became evident. The Nationalists wanted to have in Turkey nothing but Turkish labor, capital, ownership, and production. The obstacles to the fulfillment of such a program were enormous, but the pressure of economic circumstances soon led to the gradual rise of a commercial middle class whose nucleus was a group of the refugees from Greece, some of whom had there been engaged in trade. Since, however, the great majority of the people still are engaged in agriculture, the government has also taken pains to make efficient farmers of the Anatolian peasants. The progress thus far has been slow, but encouraging.

Commercial treaties have been signed with many countries, including Russia, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States. Vast farm areas have been settled with government aid in Anatolia. Special government departments have been created to study agriculture, commerce, shipping, and industry. The government has subsidized agriculture by the free grant of cattle, plows, and even houses to deserving and hard-working families. Like Mussolini, Kemal has his own model farm on which he works with rolled-up shirt sleeves, driving his own tractor. Agricultural production has been further encouraged by such measures as the exemption from taxation of all grain used by the peasant families for their own needs. The good will of the peasantry has been secured by the reduction of the term of compulsory military service to eighteen months.

In 1929 the National Assembly voted a huge appropriation for a consolidated public-works program to extend over twelve years and to include railway, port, irrigation, reclamation, and highway construction projects. Swedish engineers have been employed to supervise the completion of these works. Infant industries have been stimulated by the adoption of a protective tariff system from October, 1929, the leading industrial develop-

ments being textile factories, cotton gins, sugar refineries, and saw-mills. From 1928 to 1931 the value of Turkish manufactures increased from \$20,000,000 to \$50,000,000. A considerable amount of the machinery used in the factories and on those few farms where primitive methods of soil cultivation are no longer in use, must, of course, be imported. The leading Turkish exports are tobacco, fruits, cereals, and cotton, but the further development of transportation facilities will doubtless make possible a profitable exploitation of enormous reserves of chrome ore, zinc, coal, copper, antimony, and petroleum.

There has been a tendency in Turkey, probably in the interest of efficiency, to establish state control over a number of important industries. The government has secured ownership of most of the railways and a large portion of the mercantile marine. It possesses tobacco, salt, gunpowder, and alcoholic-beverage monopolies, and has established factories to supply the clothing needs of the army and navy. The creation of state cooperatives is being seriously considered. A batch of concessions has been granted to foreigners, chiefly for the sake of getting additional capital and expert advice, but the authorities have been careful in each case to safeguard Turkey's political and economic independence.

A number of Turkish cities have been rapidly increasing in size. Angora, for example, whose name was officially changed in 1929 to Ankara,¹ had a population of 5000 when the World War came to a close. In 1932, its population was almost 80,000. Naturally the increase in this instance was stimulated largely by the new political importance which the city assumed. Kemal connected the capital with the sea by rail, undertook a vigorous campaign to annihilate the mosquitoes in the surrounding swamps, instituted reforms in sanitation, roads, police protection, and living conditions, and in general supervised the beautification of the city. Even statues, hitherto considered idolatrous, have been erected — of Kemal and other heroes. The building of movie houses and jazz palaces has kept pace with the construction of trolley lines and sewer systems.

¹ Turkish nationalism has prompted the change of numerous place names to their purely Turkish form, often to the great inconvenience of foreigners. Constantinople now is called Istanbul, and Smyrna, Izmir.

Despite the numerous economic advances which have just been indicated, Turkey has not yet learned to know the meaning of prosperity. A succession of poor crops, the inertia of some of the people, and the hesitancy of the government to fall back into the clutches of western finance by borrowing from foreign bankers, have retarded material progress. More recently, when the harvests have been better, the decline in the price of agricultural products in the world markets has had an equally unfortunate influence. Until 1930 the trade balance was consistently adverse.

In the years 1931 and 1932 strict economy became the watchword of every government department. Civil service staffs and salaries were cut, and drastic import quotas were fixed on foreign products. Attempts were made to mobilize the whole nation for a campaign of thrift and all citizens were urged to eschew as far as possible imported goods. Ghazi Mustapha himself set an example by wearing Turkish homespun clothes and drinking linden tea instead of coffee. To balance the budget in 1932 it was found necessary to impose income taxes of 30% on small incomes and 43% on incomes of more than \$3600 per annum. Slight improvements in the economic situation were registered in this year through the conclusion of especially favorable commercial and financial treaties with Russia and Italy.

TURKEY'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The harsh treatment meted out to Turkey after the World War by the Allies and the adverse decision rendered by the League in the Turco-Iraq boundary dispute of 1925, made the Turkish Nationalists highly suspicious of the West. This situation was in part responsible for the close post-war relations which developed between Turkey and Russia, the latter country being the only one with which Turkey had a treaty of friendship and arbitration prior to 1928. Such a treaty, containing a mutual pledge of neutrality and non-aggression, was signed in 1925 and renewed in 1928 and 1930. Late in 1928 there were rumors of a proposed Afro-Asiatic alliance, favored by Russia, between Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and Egypt. Nothing positive came of this, chiefly because Turkey was too much interested in her program of westernization to think seriously of any entanglement with decidedly oriental countries.

Eventually the communistic activities of the Russians had an unfavorable reaction in Turkey. In July, 1929, twenty-four Turks were sentenced to prison for having carried on communistic propaganda and in the following month Mustapha made a speech in which he threatened "destruction" to all persons engaged in politically subversive enterprises. The resulting estrangement with Russia, combined with the friendly attitude now adopted by some of the western powers who were bent upon weakening Bolshevik influence in Turkey, gradually induced the latter to look with increasing favor upon membership in the League. In 1927 the Permanent Court had rendered a favorable award to Turkey in a dispute with France over responsibility for the collision of the French steamer *Lotus* with a Turkish ship. In the following year a treaty of friendship was signed with Italy and in June, 1929, a new agreement with France was reached whereby the Turco-Syrian frontier was once more revised to the advantage of Turkey. Her suspicions at last removed by these and other incidents, the Turkish Republic, in July, 1932, accepted an invitation to join the League.

Under the terms of the Lausanne Treaty the pre-war debt of the Ottoman Empire was to be distributed among the various areas that had been part of this empire in 1912, but that had been detached as a result of the Balkan Wars and the World War. By an agreement of June, 1928, with its bondholders, the Turkish Republic agreed to pay 62.25% of the total Ottoman debt as of October, 1912, and 76.54% of the debt incurred by the governments of the sultans after that date. The agreement was ratified by the Turkish Assembly on May 15, 1929.

Turkey has been active in the promotion of a movement for Balkan confederation. Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Rumania, and Jugoslavia have several times been approached with the suggestion that such an arrangement be concluded in the interests of political harmony and economic fellowship. From October 20 to 26, 1931, the Ankara Government played host to a Balkan Conference at which delegates from all these states assembled to discuss such matters as the creation of a Balkan customs union and the negotiation of a series of interlocking non-aggression pacts. The chief positive accomplishments of the gathering were the establishment of an Inter-Balkan Chamber of Com-

merce and an Inter-Balkan Tobacco Bureau at Salonica. The most serious obstacle to the fruition of the Turkish plan would appear to be the temptation for Rumania and Jugoslavia to await the possible formation of a Danubian Federation with Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

The relations between the United States and Turkey for some time after the war were peculiar. Although the two countries had never declared war upon each other, diplomatic and commercial relations had been severed and a new treaty arrangement had to be effected. A Turco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce, signed at the Lausanne Conference, was debated for several years in the American Senate and finally rejected in January, 1927. The opponents of ratification mustered a number of doubtful arguments, claiming that the treaty did not fulfill Wilson's award to Armenia (an arrangement which had been part of the defunct Treaty of Sèvres), that it failed to confirm the extraterritorial rights which had been granted to the United States by a treaty of 1830 (all other powers had recognized the abolition of the capitulations), and that it did not uphold the American nationality of certain naturalized ex-Turkish subjects (a stand which Turkey under international law was at full liberty to take).

In the meantime, Turkey had placed an especially high tariff on imports from all countries with which she had no treaty agreements. Economic interests eventually began to outweigh diplomatic considerations and a Turco-American *modus vivendi*, providing for the restoration of diplomatic and consular relations, was concluded on February 17, 1927. In the following May, the high commissioner who had represented American interests in Turkey since 1919 was replaced by an ambassador. The agreement has since been renewed on several occasions. Commercial treaties, providing for "most-favored-nation" treatment, were signed by the two countries in 1929 and 1931.

The changes wrought by the Turkish Nationalists in the development of their country have been truly astounding, but their task is far from ended. "We must work much more," said Premier Ismet Pasha, in 1931, "We must work a thousand years."

CHAPTER X X I

CHINA AND JAPAN

THE COURSE OF REVOLUTION IN CHINA

Not quite three years before the outbreak of the World War, the western world received the startling news of a successful revolution in the largest and in many respects most conservative of Asiatic empires: China. The Manchu dynasty which had ruled China since 1644 was ousted from power and the empire was converted into a republic, bearing, at least outwardly, the ear-marks of a European parliamentary system.

For centuries China had been in a state of political, economic, and intellectual backwardness, while the West had been advancing by giant strides toward world supremacy. China's government under the emperors had been corrupt and rotten; her social development, retarded. Education had been confined to the few, and had been wholly out of tune with the requirements of a modern age. Famines, pestilence, and floods had wreaked havoc. Worst of all, the foreigners, the "barbarians," had been able to exploit, chiefly for their own benefit, China's natural wealth and resources. Instead of guarding the land, many officials had pandered to the invaders, granting them concessions, monopolies, tariff control, and leaseholds, and permitting them to set up their own laws and courts on Chinese soil.

Between 1898 and 1900 there had occurred two movements, both unsuccessful, to remedy the outstanding abuses of the Manchu regime and to curtail the activities of foreign imperialists. In 1898 a group of optimistic and patriotic intellectuals influenced the young Emperor Kwang Hsii to launch a sweeping reform program, but because of their very radicalness, these reforms were foredoomed to failure. China was too backward to be modernized overnight by a bundle of edicts, and turmoil and reaction followed the sudden attempt at widespread reform. During the period of reaction, the authorities, inspired by the

sexagenarian Dowager Empress, turned the popular dislike of "foreignism" into a concerted move to oust the "barbarians." The resulting Boxer Rebellion, however, merely provoked a brutal international punitive expedition and led to the extortion of an indemnity.

As the twentieth century wore on, and as the Chinese became aware of the remarkable transformation wrought by the westernization of Japan, an increasing number of Chinese students went abroad to study. Especially was this true of many of the young men and women who lived in southern China, the region which had been last subdued by the Manchus and which had most frequently come into contact with the Westerners. At first thousands of students went to Japan, which was relatively close and whose language was similar to Chinese. But the Japanese schools often exploited the poor preparation of the students and eventually many of the latter preferred to seek education elsewhere. Some of them came to the United States, particularly after Washington remitted some of the Boxer indemnity money and the sums were applied toward scholarship funds. The number of such Chinese students in the United States rose from 6 in 1898 to 106 in 1905, 650 in 1910, and 1500 in 1918.

Their foreign contacts and observations slowly but surely inspired these young people — some of them future leaders of China — with a fervent national spirit. The defeat at the hands of Japan in the war of 1894-1895 and the aggression of the foreigners helped to disseminate this spirit among the merchant and business classes and the professionals. The Manchus had never entirely lost their foreign aspect in the eyes of the Chinese intelligentsia, and a powerful secret agitation, dating from the late 1890^s, had for its object the overthrow of the former conquerors.

Sensing this widespread discontent, and spurred by the example of Japan who in 1904-1905 astonished the world by her stand against Russia, the Manchu Government inaugurated another reform program (1905). The old-fashioned literary examinations for governmental posts were abolished and replaced by tests in political science, economics, and history. A seven-year plan of constitutional reform was outlined in 1906, and provision made for the eventual calling of a national assembly. Before

much progress in this direction was registered, the throne fell to Pu-yi, a boy three years old. The regent, father of the emperor, was a conservative politician who attempted to halt the reform movement and who dismissed from the emperor's council Yuan Shih-kai, China's ablest military organizer.

The reformers and agitators throughout China now renewed their activities and a national assembly actually was convened at Peking in 1910. Although it was dismissed early in the following year, the assembly had induced the government to issue a decree summoning a parliament in 1913. The year 1911 witnessed several threatening anti-dynastic outbursts. There were troop mutinies, movements for local autonomy, and violent reactions to the continued granting of concessions to foreigners. In despair, the regent recalled Yuan, but the latter, finding it impracticable to oppose the strong revolutionary groups in the south, advised the abdication of the Manchus. On February 12, 1912, this suggestion was adopted and the Manchu regime came to a pitiful end after almost 270 years of rule. Pu-yi, however, was allowed to retain the title of emperor, and until 1924 he continued to reside in one of the imperial palaces.

Meanwhile, on January 1, 1912, a revolutionary assembly at Nanking had elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen president of a provisional republican government. Dr. Sun (1866-1925) was a patriotic and capable scholar who, because of his radical ideas, had been forced to spend a considerable portion of his life in exile. As one of the founders and leaders of the *Kuomintang*, or Nationalist Party, he had spent most of the period since 1895 organizing Young China into an energetic association bent on achieving political and economic reform.

Sun believed that his country, which included one-fourth of the world's population and contained abundant mineral and agricultural resources, was destined to play a leading part in human affairs. He knew that the Chinese people would have to be aroused from the national lethargy into which they had fallen under Manchu control and that there must be no new oppression to take the place of the old. In 1924 he summed up his ideas regarding China's future in a series of lectures on the "Three Principles of a People." These principles, the *San Min Chu I*, for which the new China was to strive, were Nationalism, Democ-


racy, and Livelihood (economic equality). Sun pleaded for his people "the right to live" and "the right to a living."

At the time of his election to the provisional presidency, Sun agreed that, for the sake of unifying the country, he would soon retire in favor of Yuan Shih-kai, who had come into control of northern China. This arrangement was completed on February 15, 1912, and Yuan thus became the first president of a united Chinese Republic. Friction soon developed between the northerners led by Yuan and the southerners under Sun. The former group favored the setting up of a strong executive and a weak parliament or no parliament at all. Sun and the Kuomintang preferred a democratic system with broad franchise privileges, a weak executive, and a powerful parliament.

The Kuomintang deputies in the parliament (convened April, 1913) persistently voted against Yuan and his policies. The mutual ill-will increased steadily and in July, 1913 — after the president had concluded an unpopular "reorganization loan" of £25,000,000 with a consortium of bankers from Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and Japan — an attempt was made to oust Yuan. This "Second Revolution" was easily crushed, and in November, Yuan expelled from parliament all members of the Kuomintang. In January, 1914, the whole parliament was dissolved and Yuan commenced a dictatorial rule which lasted, at least in the north, until 1916. Then, after an unsuccessful effort to found a new imperial dynasty in his own person, he died (June, 1916).

Yuan was succeeded by Vice-President Li Yuan-hung, who supported the republic and reassembled the parliament, but who was unable to establish his dominance. The country was split over the questions of participation in the World War and the further granting of foreign concessions. The central authorities found it virtually impossible to collect taxes and hence China's mineral and industrial resources were being given outright to foreigners in return for loans which were promptly squandered. Between 1909 and 1914 Japan alone advanced to China about \$50,000,000. An additional \$190,000,000 was loaned in the period 1914-1918.

In June, 1917, the parliament was again dissolved, and in the following month a group of monarchists attempted to restore the Manchus. Late in 1917 the Kuomintang and a majority of



SUN YAT-SEN

the dismissed parliamentarians set up at Canton a Southern Constitutionalist Government in opposition to the northern government at Peking. The confusion was increased by the activities of a dozen military leaders and governors (*tuchuns*) who used their armies to further private ambitions which ranged from simple brigandage to attempts at controlling all China and who did most of the local tax-collecting. The Canton Government claimed to be the legitimate representative of the people, but the authorities at Peking obtained both recognition and funds from the foreign powers who were still hunting concessions and privileges.

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

Japan, it will be recalled, declared war on Germany in August, 1914, and soon thereafter captured the area about Kiao-chau which Germany in 1898 had leased from China. To carry out this project, Japan had landed her troops on neutral territory more than one hundred miles from the German leasehold. Not only had China's neutrality thus been violated, but the Japanese soldiers, had been billeted upon the native peasants and the latter were cruelly treated. When, after the fall of the German strongholds, the Chinese asked the Japanese to retire, the latter replied, on January 18, 1915, by presenting to President Yuan a list of twenty-one demands. These demands, divided into five groups, were calculated to make of China a Japanese protectorate. The preoccupation of the Great Powers of Europe with the World War ailorded Japan, in the words of one of her publicists, "the opportunity of a thousand years" to solve the Chinese Question.

The demands were handed to the Chinese President on Japanese War Office stationery which, it is said, was watermarked with machine guns and dreadnoughts. Yuan was warned to maintain the utmost secrecy regarding the transaction, but its general import leaked out and soon was discussed in the Peking-newspapers. Upon inquiries from abroad, the Tokyo Foreign Office issued a denial that any demands impairing China's sovereignty had been formulated, and published an expurgated list which contained only a brief outline of eleven of the points. Thereupon the Chinese Government revealed a full list of the demands, and Japan, driven into a corner, responded by announc-

ing that the omitted demands had only been "requests." Simultaneously, however, Yuan was informed that the requests had the force of demands.

The United States and other powers protested that they would not recognize any Sino-Japanese arrangement which violated their own treaty rights, but on May 25, 1915, after a threat of war by Japan, China finally signed two treaties. The documents embodied a modified version of the original demands and paid some respect to China's sovereignty, but contained clauses which provided for their going into force on the date of signature. Since the Chinese Parliament never ratified them, the treaties have consistently been regarded as invalid by the people of China. Japan was given special rights in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, options on the construction of all railway lines in these provinces, and ninety-nine-year leases of the South Manchurian and Kirin-Changchun railways, options on all loans, the right to develop coal and iron projects, and a number of other economic concessions. The Kuomintang objected violently to the conclusion of the agreements and proclaimed its intention never to recognize them.

CHINA AND THE WAR

From the outset of the European conflict, China had feared that Japan would take advantage of the situation to establish her control in China. The Peking Government therefore had twice attempted (1914, 1915) to join the Allies, but each time the Japanese had been able to prevent such action. Japan had no desire to see China recruit an efficient army, mobilize her resources, or participate in a general peace conference. After the signature of the Sino-Japanese treaties of May, 1915, Peking once more evidenced anxiety to join in the World War, but Tokyo successfully continued to object until 1917. Then Japan, for good reasons, reversed her policy.

The tactical position in 1917 of the Allied Powers was critical. Hence special efforts were made to secure additional help, not only from the United States, but from the Far East. The eastern countries had thus far done little to aid the Allied cause, for China had remained neutral and Japan had virtually confined her activities to the capture of the German leasehold and the

sale of war materials. It was hoped that Japan might be induced to lend naval assistance in the conveying of vessels through the Mediterranean and that China might supply coolies to labor behind the lines, and turn over to the Allies the German ships that were interned in her harbors. A brisk exchange of notes was therefore undertaken between the respective national capitals.

In February, 1917, a secret treaty was signed between Japan and England whereby the former promised to despatch some war vessels to the Mediterranean and the latter agreed to support the claim of Japan to Shantung and the German Pacific islands north of the equator at the peace conference. France undertook similar obligations with respect to the Japanese claims (March, 1917) in return for Japan's promise to encourage China's participation in the war and the cancellation of all German rights and concessions in the Chinese Republic. A few days later Russia subscribed to an agreement of the same type and Italy announced that she "had no objections regarding the matter."

Immediately upon the conclusion of these bargains Japan altered her former tactics and urged China to break off relations with Germany. The United States, after her entry into the war in April, likewise suggested to China that relations with Germany be severed. The Peking Government, moreover, was annoyed at the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare and the drowning of five hundred coolies through the sinking of a French ship which was transporting them to France to work in munition and war-material factories. On August 14, 1917, the authorities at Peking declared war on both Germany and Austria-Hungary. Thereupon the Canton Government also issued a declaration of war.¹

China's participation in the war had little effect on the outcome of the struggle, though the interned German ships were seized and chartered to the Allies. After the war, however, China

¹ On November 2, 1917, the United States and Japan concluded an interchange of notes known as the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. Renewed mutual assurances were given that the so-called "Open Door" would be respected in China, that is, equal opportunities for commerce and industry would be upheld for the nationals of all countries. The United States recognized that Japan had "special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous." This agreement was cancelled in April, 1923, at the behest of the United States.

was entitled to representation at the Paris Conference, and President Hsu Shih-chang, elected in October, 1918, by a group of northern military leaders, chose an able delegation drawn from South as well as North China. There was a fair degree of unanimity as against the foreigners among the Chinese plenipotentiaries at Paris.

Sino-Japanese difficulties developed at the conference as soon as Japan presented her claims to all the former German rights and concessions in Shantung. To this the Chinese delegation, reenforced by a steady flow of telegrams from home and the news of a general uprising, offered strenuous objections. Neither side was willing to compromise, and at one stage the Japanese declared that since the region had been conquered from Germany, it would be necessary to obtain the right of free disposal from that country before Shantung could be returned to China.

President Wilson for a time upheld the Chinese view, but Lloyd George and Clemenceau insisted that they were bound by the secret treaties to back Japan. Besides, the Japanese delegates announced their intention to abstain from signing the peace treaty unless their wishes were met. Eventually the Japanese had their way, acquiring Shantung and mandatory rights over all the former German colonies north of the equator. Thereupon China withheld *her* signature from the Versailles Treaty, later concluding a separate peace agreement with Germany. China became a member of the League of Nations by virtue of her adherence, against the wishes of Japan, to the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

When the news of these events reached China, it was greeted with violent demonstrations. Student Unions were formed throughout northern and southern China, scores of protest parades were held, and Japanophile members of the government at Peking were attacked as national traitors. The merchants and bankers subscribed whole-heartedly to the agitation, and resort was had to China's most powerful weapon — the economic boycott. The resulting decline in her foreign trade seriously worried Japan, and according to a promise made at Paris (1919) to Wilson, she started negotiations for the return of Shantung to

China. The latter rejected the offers that were made and appealed to the world for sympathy and help, financial and diplomatic. Foreign loans, however, were out of the question, for China's credit standing had entirely fallen away. At this point (1921) President Harding issued invitations to eight powers to attend a conference at Washington on the limitation of naval armaments and the settlement of outstanding international problems in the Pacific and Far East.

There were several motives for calling this gathering. The American State Department was anxious to check the race in naval armaments with Great Britain and to end the quarrel between China and Japan. In addition, the United States was aware that in 1921 there would come up the question of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance which had been extended in 1911 for a decade. The State Department had also noticed with considerable inquietude that the Far Eastern policies of Great Britain and Japan were harmonious and that England was gradually disregarding the principles of the Open Door, principles which had been dear to American business men and diplomats since their formal enunciation in 1900 by John Hay. It was hoped that the conference might forestall any united Anglo-Japanese action injurious to the interests of the United States.

Invitations to the parley were extended to all states, except Russia, which had interests in the Far East: Great Britain, France, Italy, Portugal, Holland, Belgium, China, and Japan. All governments except the last willingly responded to the call. Japan agreed to participate only on condition that there would be no discussion of matters that were "of sole concern to certain particular powers" or that might "be regarded as accomplished facts."

The Conference sat from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922, and concluded seven treaties. Two of these, as has been indicated, dealt with naval disarmament; the remaining five, with Pacific and Far Eastern questions.¹ Two additional treaties, one each dealing with Shantung and Yap, were signed outside the Conference but by powers represented therein.

¹ The naval treaties not only provided for a limitation of armaments, but for restrictions on fortifications in the Pacific. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan agreed to a maintenance of the status quo in the defenses on a number of their insular possessions and naval bases. In some regions, such as the Aleutian Islands, fortifications were entirely banned.

Two Four-Power treaties were signed, between Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States. In the one the powers concerned pledged themselves "to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean." If these rights should be threatened by the aggressive action of any other power, the contracting parties, in the second treaty, agreed "to communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient methods to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet "the exigencies of the particular situation." The treaties were to remain in force for ten years but were subject to automatic renewal unless terminated by any signatory on twelve months' notice.

Contrary to popular views at the time, the guarantees embodied in the document did not oblige the signatories to protect one another's holdings in the Far East. They did, however, bring about a lapse of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This factor, incidentally, was highly pleasing to Canada and Australia, two dominions which had been more than a little concerned over England's exact obligations under the alliance in case of a war between Japan and the United States.

All the powers at the Conference signed a Nine-Power Treaty which guaranteed the territorial integrity and independence of China and reiterated the principle of the Open Door. The signatories promised "not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territories." Whether this article bound the powers themselves as well as their nationals, was not said. China pledged herself not to "exercise or permit unfair discrimination of any kind" on Chinese railways, particularly with respect to passenger or freight charges. The powers undertook to respect China's rights as a neutral in time of war. The treaty doubtless registered an advance in China's international status, but it applied only to the future and did not check the activities of established vested interests.

A second Nine-Power Treaty granted China greater control of her customs tariff than she had enjoyed in the past, and a Six-Power Treaty allocated the cable lines in the Pacific which had

formerly belonged to Germany among the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, and China. The remaining documents signed at the Conference were negotiated separately between China and Japan and the United States and Japan.

The Sino-Japanese agreement provided for the release of Shantung and all former German property rights therein to China in return for a monetary compensation reimbursing Japan for the railway and other improvements which she had fostered since 1914. In December, 1923, twenty-two months after the signing of the treaty, the Shantung Peninsula was restored to Chinese control. Because of a series of unfortunate international "incidents/' however, Japanese soldiers were again sent to Tsinan and other parts of Shantung Province in 1927, 1928, and 1929.

The treaty between Japan and the United States concerned Yap, a former German possession which, over the protests of President Wilson, had been assigned as a mandate to Japan. Washington was anxious that the island be internationalized since the oceanic cables that converged at Yap formed one of the two American channels of communication with China and the only one with the Dutch East Indies. Especially vexing to America was the fact that the Japanese proceeded to move the Shanghai end of one of the cables to another island, Naha. At the Conference an agreement was reached which guaranteed the economic rights of American citizens in all the Japanese Pacific mandates and permitted Americans to land and operate a cable from Guam to Yap "or any cable which may hereafter be laid or operated by the United States or by its nationals connecting with the island of Yap."

It is difficult to evaluate the work of the Washington Conference. Regarding China it can be said that the principle of the Open Door was once more subscribed to by the Great Powers, that no new disabilities were imposed, and that a certain amount of lost autonomy was restored to the republic. Shantung was reacquired, and China given a breathing spell during which, if she had the capacity, she might rebuild her weak national structure. The signature of the Sino-Japanese conventions was followed by the adoption in Japan of a so-called "friendship policy" towards China which lasted until the spring of 1927. The moderate Minseito party under the leadership of the conciliatory

Baron Shidehara attempted to harmonize the interests of China and Japan without force or intrigue. However, when this group was replaced in power (April, 1927) at Tokyo by the Seiyukai party under Baron Tanaka, recourse was once more had to a "positive policy" and aggressive imperialistic methods.

The naval and defense arrangements concluded at the Conference greatly eased the tension in the relations between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, and enabled these powers, at least for a time, to devote their energies to matters other than the preparation for a Pacific war. It was unfortunate that Russia had not been invited to the parleys, for the Soviet Union is an important Far Eastern power and one whose cooperation would seem to be essential in any permanent decisions regarding Pacific relations.¹

EDUCATION IN MODERN CHINA

The internal history of China from 1919 to 1927 was conspicuous chiefly for the administrative confusion which prevailed in every province of the land. Scores of generals, with combined forces totalling 1,300,000 men or more, ravaged country and towns and laid waste much of the natural wealth of the republic. In addition there were catastrophic floods and famines, fanatical anti-foreign outbursts, and political quarrels between republicans and communists. Out of the turmoil, however, there emerged two definite phenomena: a substantial progress in education and an organized nationalist movement.

Under the old régime education in China had been reserved for a small minority. The written language contained thousands of ideographs and was exceedingly difficult to learn. After the revolution of 1911 and especially after 1919, a number of efforts were made to increase literacy. At first a group of reformers attempted to introduce a phonetic alphabet of only thirty-nine symbols, but this, for various reasons, proved unworkable. Then Dr. Hu Shih, an American-trained scholar and philosopher, launched a movement to substitute in literature the colloquial language of the country for the ancient literary forms.

In order the quicker to popularize the vernacular (*Kuo YU*)

¹The Washington treaties did not go into effect until the summer of 1925, France being the last country to ratify them.

as a literary medium, Hu Shih and the other leaders utilized it in the composition of poems, essays, novels, histories, and general works of high literary merit. In January, 1920, the ministry of education at Peking was induced to order the use of Kuo Yu textbooks in the first two years of primary school instruction. Later it was provided that all government documents be written in this popular form.

Another American-trained student, James Y. C. Yen, inaugurated (1922) a Mass Education Movement which aimed at familiarizing the illiterate masses with about one thousand of the simplest and most commonly used Chinese ideographs. To teach these ideographs to the peasants and laborers, four easy readers were devised, and the lessons so arranged that the information could be mastered by spending on them one hour a day for four months. The volumes cost only five cents a copy and by 1928 fourteen editions had been printed. Thanks to this project, millions of persons who might otherwise have remained illiterate, learned to read.

A further step in Chinese educational development was the increasing attention devoted to foreign works on history, politics, government, economics, philosophy, and literature. The Commercial Press of Shanghai, a business established at the close of the nineteenth century by an enterprising group of Chinese, published a library containing vernacular translations of two thousand of the world's masterpieces. The complete set was priced at the relatively moderate sum of one hundred dollars (gold).

Despite the widespread enthusiasm for education, there was a decided shortage of school facilities, because of inadequate funds. In 1923, the last date for which fairly reliable figures are available, about six million children attended the elementary schools. The missionary schools cared for an additional half-million pupils. But almost nine-tenths of the boys and girls of school age received no formal instruction. In 1929 there were thirty-four governmental universities and colleges and sixteen technical high schools.

The advances made in education were accompanied by the gradual emergence of the students as an important factor in the agitation for liberation from foreign restrictions and the shackles

of tradition. In 1919 the most serious attacks on the Versailles Treaty and on the officials who proposed to endorse it were led by students. The same was true of many of the later patriotic demonstrations. Yet, although these activities heralded an awakening China, the westernization of the land could hardly be brought about solely by the clamorings of an earnest but impatient Youth. The spirit displayed by the emancipated young men and women was highly encouraging, but it required mature leadership. Some direction was given to the students' movements by the Nationalist Party, especially after the latter extended its control over the educational system of the republic.

KUOMINTANG VICTORIES AND PROBLEMS

We have seen that in 1917 the Kuomintang and a group of nationalistic southerners had established at Canton a Constitutional Government. This administration steadfastly opposed most of the moves undertaken by the northern government at Peking which continued to function under the guidance of foreign imperialists. Led by Dr. Sun, and inspired by his principles, the Nationalists devoted themselves for several years to the task of bringing the north under the sway of the Kuomintang and unifying the country, mainly through the use of force and propaganda. Considerable support for this endeavor was forthcoming from Soviet Russia, which power had surrendered most of the special privileges acquired in China by the officials of the tsars and was eager to assist in the fight against western capitalism. An able Russian diplomat, Michael Borodin, was despatched to China to win the confidence of Sun and his associates, a mission which he fulfilled with eminent success. Simultaneously Russia had an ambassador at Peking.

In January, 1924, a Kuomintang Congress at Canton extended party membership to all Chinese communists who were ready to accept the Kuomintang principles. Four months later, Peking signed an agreement with Moscow whereby the latter gave up Russia's extraterritorial rights in China, remitted the unpaid balance of the Boxer indemnity, promised not to spread communist propaganda in Chinese territory, and pledged the restoration of Mongolia (occupied since the Boxer Rebellion) to the republic. Another treaty, signed on the same day (May 31),

provided that the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, a Sino-Russian enterprise conceived in 1896, should remain under the joint control of the two states until such time as China could redeem the entire line "with Chinese capital." In June, 1924, Sun established the Whampoa Military Academy, along lines devised by Borodin. Soon thereafter a staff of Russian military officers arrived in China to train the Nationalist forces. The ablest of these soliders was General Blucher, alias Galen.

With the approach of the year 1925 there became evident a rift in Kuomintang ranks. The moderate or right wing members of the party were out of sympathy with the aims of the communist left wing and wanted to end the close relationship with Russia. Dr. Sun was able to hold the two camps together despite their opposing views, but after his death in March, 1925, the breach widened beyond repair. In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, who had succeeded Sun as leader of the Nationalists, broke off relations with the Russian communists and began to persecute the communist members of the Kuomintang. Later in the year relations also were strained between Russia and the Peking Government because of the propagandist activities of Bolshevik agents in China.

Just prior to the break with the Russians, the Nationalists had succeeded in extending their control over nearly all China. This remarkable achievement, though of only temporary duration, was accomplished in part through the military ability of Chiang, in part because of the aid rendered by the Russian advisers, and in part through a well-organized propaganda campaign aimed at the northerners and the foreign imperialists. The fruits of the victory, however, were spoiled by the fierce struggle which had developed between the factions of the Kuomintang.

The communists tried to discredit Chiang and to force his hands by the commission of excesses, the most serious instance being the "Nanking Affair" of March, 1927. After the capture of the city by Nationalist forces, the left wing elements, according to a prearranged scheme, viciously attacked the persons and property of the foreign residents. The powers naturally demanded restitution and Japan landed several thousand soldiers to protect her extensive interests in Shantung. In the end the

doings of the communists reacted to the advantage of Chiang, whose support came increasingly from the commercial class and industrial leaders.

As a result of his successes, Chiang was able in April, 1928, to establish a Nationalist Government at Nanking. Two months later Kuomintang troops captured Peking and abolished the northern government. The name of the city was changed from Peking (Northern Capital) to Peiping (Northern Peace), and Nanking became the new national capital. On October 3, 1928, the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang promulgated an Organic Law for the National Government of China. The Law was to be executed under the supervision of the committee, which thus virtually became the government of the republic. The highest administrative unit in the land was to be a Council of State, and on October 10 the committee elected Chiang to be chairman of the first such council, an office equivalent to that of president of China. Having undertaken to satisfy the claims of the powers regarding the Nanking Affair, the Nationalist Government before the close of 1928 secured official recognition from most of the western states and Japan.

Chiang faced a difficult task as president of China.¹ He invited German and American experts to assist in the reorganization of the country and he strove earnestly to unite the Chinese nation in a powerful state. The continuing need, however, to lead his troops in battle, interfered seriously with Chiang's plans. The constant scenes of disorder and the ravages of floods and famines had enabled the Chinese communists greatly to increase their numbers, and now they massed all their strength against the Nanking regime in an attempt to replace it by a soviet system. Chiang waged almost uninterrupted warfare against the communists, who had established some governmental control on a soviet basis south of the Yangtse, and in addition had to deal with rival military leaders who hoped to turn the confusion to

¹ Chiang was born in 1886, the son of a merchant. He obtained a military education and attended the Tokyo Military College. During the crucial days of 1911 and 1912 he commanded a force of revolutionary soldiers and from 1913 to 1920 was secretary to Dr. Sun. After acquiring some financial experience in a stock exchange he went to Russia to study recent military developments. In 1924 he became director of the Whampoa Military Academy and several years later succeeded Sun as leader of the Nationalists.

advantage and acquire control of one or more valuable Chinese provinces.

As if it were not sufficiently occupied with domestic affairs, the Nationalist Government in the summer of 1929 was confronted with a serious international problem: a quarrel with Russia. Ostensibly the dispute concerned Bolshevik propagandist activities in northern China. Basically it was the result of an attempt by the governor of Manchuria, Chang Hsueh-liang, to gain complete control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to oust the Russians from the territory under his jurisdiction.

In June and July, 1929, Russian consular offices in a number of Manchurian cities were raided and hundreds of Russian officials and employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway were arrested and either imprisoned or deported. Russia retaliated by arresting about one thousand Chinese merchants who happened to be in the Soviet Union. Diplomatic relations were severed, troop movements were begun, and some minor battles occurred in which the Russians triumphed with ease. Moscow was insistent that her rights under the treaty of 1924 as half-owner of the railroad be restored.

At the height of the crisis the United States and forty-one other co-signatories with Russia and China of the Kellogg Pact reminded the disputants of their obligation to settle the quarrel by peaceful means. This move apparently had little effect on the parties concerned, and Russia merely expressed amazement that the United States "which by its own will has no official relations with the Soviet, deems it possible to apply to it with advice and counsel." Fortunately the Russians and Chinese did find it practicable to reach a peaceful agreement (December, 1929) whereby the *status quo ante* was reestablished and provision made for the calling of a special conference to settle all causes of dispute. There the matter rested when a serious Sino-Japanese conflict occurred in September, 1931.

ECONOMIC STAKES IN MANCHURIA


China has long been a tempting field for western and Japanese financial investments and business enterprises. Billions of dollars have been poured into the land through the purchase of government bonds, the construction of railways, and the erection

of factories, plants, warehouses, and missionary establishments. It has been estimated that of the total value of foreign monetary stakes in China, Great Britain controls 37%; Japan, 34%; Russia, 10%; and the United States and France each 5%. A lucrative foreign trade has been developed, the average annual value of China's sales and purchases abroad totalling about \$1,400,000,000.¹

Among the most promising sections of China from the economic point of view is Manchuria. Situated in the northeastern part of the republic, this exceedingly valuable region, with an area of more than 380,000 square miles and a population of 29,000,000, has of late assumed a tremendous importance in international affairs. The land grows numerous crops in abundance and the subsoil resources include large quantities of coal, iron, gold, silver, lead, copper, and asbestos. About three thousand miles of railways traverse the territory and make possible the expeditious shipment of products to the sea coast. In 1928 Manchuria alone was responsible for almost one-third of the commodity exports of China and about one-fifth of the imports. Chang Hsueh-liang, who became governor of Manchuria in 1928, was one of the richest men in China. Though virtually an autonomous administrator, he maintained a benevolent front towards the authorities at Nanking.

The Kuomintang Government regarded Manchuria in a special light. The region was looked upon as a vital outpost of Chinese culture. It was hoped that the steady migration of Chinese peasants into the area would emphasize this aspect. Between 1923 and 1929, some 4,700,000 Chinese entered Manchuria, by rail, by boat, or on foot, to take advantage of the fertile land and the relative freedom from domestic turmoil. Many of these immigrants returned southward after they had

¹The United States has some \$155,000,000 invested in factories and plants in China and about \$43,000,000 in missionary establishments. Americans also hold Chinese railway bonds with a par value of \$41,000,000, and have considerable interests in the oil and steel businesses of the country. American exports to China in 1929 amounted to \$125,000,000, and imports from China to \$165,000,000. Although the trade relationships between the United States and Japan are at present more substantial than those between the United States and China, the potentialities in the latter case are enormous since the population of China is more than five times that of Japan. Herein lies one of the chief reasons for the strong support given by Washington to the maintenance of the Open Door.



Courtesy of the New York Times

accumulated modest savings, but at least half of them became permanent settlers. At the end of 1931 the Chinese inhabitants formed about ninety-five per cent of the population. Nanking, of course, encouraged this latest of "people's wanderings" and at the same time was anxious to restrict as far as possible the encroachments of foreigners in the area.

Most of the world's industrial powers, however, had interests of a financial or business nature in Manchuria. Russia and Japan, indeed, felt that they had special rights. As we have seen, the Soviet Government is half-owner of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a line which, more than a thousand miles long, offers the most direct route from the west to the Siberian port of Vladivostok. The Bolsheviks, moreover, exercise considerable authority in Outer Mongolia, a wild region just west of Manchuria. The fierce and skillful horsemen who inhabit Outer Mongolia could no doubt oppose effective guerilla resistance even to a well-equipped modern army, for the terrain is unsuited to the use of tanks and heavy guns.

The Japanese, too, have control of a railroad, the South Manchurii Railway. This line, which is seven hundred miles long, terminates at the Japanese-controlled port of Dairen through which passes more than half of the foreign trade of Manchuria. All along the road, the railway company has erected cities and towns and built modern projects which have substantially enhanced the worth of the region. Not the least important item in the railway's business has been the transportation of a large share of the Chinese migrants to and from Manchuria.

The foreign banking business of Manchuria is almost a monopoly of Japanese firms, and early in 1932 Japanese investments in the area totalled one billion dollars. Large as were her financial holdings in Manchuria, Japan had even more important reasons for desiring general recognition of her paramount interests in the territory. For an understanding of these motives it is necessary to survey the economic position of the empire.

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

At the middle of the nineteenth century Japan was a medieval country, cherishing feudal traditions and anxious to avoid all contact with the West. Before the close of the century, how-

ever, Japan had been "opened" by importunate Westerners seeking new trade outlets, and the Nipponese were imitating the intruders' methods and adopting their business views. With the coming of modern industry to the islands, there soon developed the same pressing needs which earlier had induced the western powers to launch their campaigns for overseas expansion. Industrialized Japan began to seek sources of cheap raw materials for her factories, markets for her surplus manufactures, fields for the investment of her accumulated capital, food for her workers, and outlets for her surplus population.

During the World War, economic conditions in Japan took an unusually favorable turn. The Allies bought enormous quantities of war materials, new Japanese trade contacts were established in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, and Japanese ships were chartered to handle a considerable portion of the world's ocean commerce. Between 1913 and 1918 the aggregate horsepower employed in Japanese industry doubled and the number of factory workers was increased by half. In consequence of these activities Japan enjoyed a total favorable trade balance for the period 1914-1918 of more than two billion dollars.

After the war there came a gradual slump. The former belligerents were able to reengage in the manufacture of peacetime goods and compete once more in the struggle for foreign markets. Since foreign trade by this time had come to be the backbone of Japanese prosperity, normally accounting for one-third of the country's total external and internal commerce by value,¹ any appreciable decline in exports was sure to have a serious effect on the economic condition of the country.

For some years after the armistice, Japan's export figures remained at a relatively high level because America, in her new-found prosperity, became a heavy purchaser of silk. In an average post-war year silk yarn comprised 40% of the value of Japanese exports, and more than 85% of this was shipped to the United States. With the increasing popularity of rayon and other silk substitutes, however, and then the appearance of the world depression, there was a notable decline in the demand for silks and other products of Japanese manufacture. Compared with 1929, Japanese raw silk exports in 1930 suffered a loss of

¹ In the case of the United States the ratio is approximately one to ten.

18% in quantity and about 45% in value. In an attempt to lower production costs, Japan abandoned the gold standard in December, 1931, but the results were disappointing in so far as they concerned any enlargement of foreign sales.

In 1930 the area of the Japanese Empire, including Korea, was 265,000 square miles, or slightly larger than that of Texas. Its population was 92,000,000. In Japan proper (area, 148,700 square miles; population, 65,000,000) more than 40% of the people derived a meager existence directly from the soil, only one-sixth of which can be cultivated. The unemployed numbered about 1,000,000, and the national debt, having doubled in the decade since 1920, stood at some \$3,000,000,000. Under the circumstances it is easily comprehensible why Manchuria, with its plentiful resources, undeveloped opportunities, geographic nearness, and strategic location should have assumed a tempting aspect in the eyes of Japan. The work which was begun in 1915 with the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands, it seemed to her statesmen, must now be completed. The year 1931 appeared highly favorable for this undertaking.¹

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT, 1931-1932

Conditions in China in 1931 were turbulent, as usual. The right and left wing members of the Kuomintang exchanged accusations of self-interest and treachery, and despatched military forces against each other. Famines and floods continued to deprive millions of food and shelter. Communist propaganda was rife and local military chieftains nonchalantly revived their bandit activities. Foreign interference added to the confusion, particularly in Manchuria, where Chang Hsueh-liang resisted further penetration by the Russians and the Japanese.

Elsewhere in the world the governments were preoccupied with equally numerous, if less violent, problems. Unemployment, agrarian difficulties, tariff barriers, radical movements, tax relief, debt moratoria, security, disarmament, elections,

¹ There is considerable doubt as to the value of Manchuria from the standpoint of Japanese colonization, for the climate appears to be too cold in winter for Japanese settlers. In 1932 the latter numbered only about 250,000, forming less than one per cent of the Manchurian population. The argument regarding Japanese settlers seems to be advanced mainly for foreign consumption.

these were the matters which demanded the attention of the Westerners. Japan, therefore, pressed by many of the same problems, felt the moment ripe for the realization of her "legitimate rights" in Manchuria. There seemed little likelihood that the western powers would interpose forceful objections even if they did profess disapproval of Tokyo's plans. For a variety of reasons, the Japanese army now took the lead in the Manchurian venture.

In Japan the army and navy departments, unlike those in most countries, are virtually independent of the civil authorities. Their leaders may approach the emperor directly, without the regard for ordinary cabinet procedure which is mandatory upon other ministers. The defenders of the land enjoy by tradition considerable influence over the ruler who, in fact, looks upon the empire as his personal domain. Suffering only a few casualties during the World War, the Japanese army emerged after the armistice as one of the leading military units in the world, and as one of the proudest.

The army had long been suspicious of the civil government and especially of the parliamentarians. It saw little good in the system of ministerial responsibility which dated from 1918, or in the privilege of universal suffrage which had been proclaimed in 1925. The military men regarded many of the politicians as intriguing and selfish individuals who were interested solely in the welfare of certain business men, bankers, and bondholders. They, on the other hand, professed to be particularly interested in the well-being of the farming and laboring classes from which came most of the recruits, and they claimed that the country's difficulties might easily be alleviated at once by the conversion of Manchuria into a great agricultural colony and a busy industrial development. Actually the army worked hand in hand with another group of bankers and industrialists, namely, those who had financial stakes in Manchuria. Indeed, the head of the South Manchurian Railway was a member of the Japanese military command. A successful military venture, incidentally, would shed additional glory upon the proud warrior class.

During the years 1930-1932, the military clique succeeded in wresting the political control **from** the civil government. A

section of "Big Business," it is true, feared possible western economic retaliation against Japanese aggression, but millions of the people were induced by national pride and personal poverty to take sides with the army. Numerous societies of a "fascist" type were organized and there was a popular demand for the achievement of economic security and prosperity through the use of blunt force rather than by the negotiation of vague treaties.¹

Unfortunately for China, there occurred in 1931 two incidents that provided the Japanese army with an excuse for removing the whole Manchurian question from the sphere of diplomacy to that of armed hostilities. First, the honor of the army was violated by the murder in Inner Mongolia of a Japanese captain, and then, on September 18, a short stretch of the South Manchurian Railway line was damaged by explosives. It has not been proved conclusively who was responsible for the explosion, but the Japanese troops who guarded the railway accused Chinese soldiers of the deed. Without so much as prior notification to the Tokyo Foreign Office, the Japanese military machine was set in motion and a wide area of Manchuria placed under occupation.

The Chinese soldiers rapidly withdrew before the advancing Japanese forces and the Nanking Government appealed to the world for help. The diplomats at Tokyo quickly recovered from their surprise and came to the support of the military by pointing out that the governor of Manchuria had violated a Sino-Japanese treaty of 1905 by building a railroad paralleling the South Manchurian. Japan had said little or nothing about this while the line was building, but now the complaints were heard that the road constituted a military threat to Japanese interests and would deflect considerable Sino-Manchurian traffic from the South Manchurian Railway and the port of Dairen to the Chinese-controlled railway and ports.

While China appealed her case to the League of Nations and the United States, the Japanese troops, under the guise of efforts

¹ Between February and May, 1932, fanatical patriots in Japan assassinated a leading banker, an ex-finance minister, and a premier. The last was shot down in his home by a group of young cadets and army officers who later voluntarily surrendered to the police. They claimed to have committed the deed as a patriotic protest against the selfish and "traitorous" governmental policies inspired by the wealthy commercial interests.

to end the banditry and disorders which were jeopardizing legitimate business, extended the area of occupation at a rapid rate. In September, 1931, Japan had been in direct control of about 1400 square miles of territory and 800 miles of railways in Manchuria. By January, 1932, the area of control had been widened so as to include about 200,000 square miles of land and 2000 miles of railways. Special efforts were made to undermine the power of Chang Hsueh-liang and to foment local separatist movements. Loyal Chinese officials were replaced by friends of Japan.

On March 9, 1932, the army crowned its achievements by setting up in Manchuria a new state called Manchukuo. Mr. Henry Py-yi, the same who had abdicated the Chinese imperial throne, was selected to head the state which was patently under Japanese tutelage and protection. Within the next three months two Japanese banks lent Manchukuo \$10,000,000, while the monetary cost to Japan of the army's manoeuvres from September, 1931 to May, 1932 was \$62,000,000.

Japan's activities, as was to be expected, exerted a unifying influence upon Chinese politics. In December, 1931, a reconciliation was effected between the Nanking authorities and a rival government which had been set up at Canton by a group of left wing members of the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek resigned as head of the Council of State in order to make the process of *rapprochement* somewhat easier, but he retained an influential voice in the affairs of China. Anti-Japanese student outbreaks again became frequent occurrences and Chinese residents in foreign lands began to send home sums of money to bolster the nation's defense against the invaders.

After the extension of the Japanese occupation to Mukden and other large Manchurian cities, the Chinese people once more resorted to their/irriost powerful weapon, a nation-wide economic boycott. Since China normally was, after the United States, the best customer of Japan, taking one-fourth of the latter's exports, the boycott caused havoc to Japanese industry. Japanese imports into China from September to December, 1931, were 65% lower than those for the corresponding period in 1930. Imports in January, 1932, were 68% less than those in January, 1931. Most of the Japanese textile mills in northern China had

to close their doors, while Chinese managers and employees gave up their jobs in Japanese firms, and the Japanese shipping concerns, which had controlled more than a fourth of China's coastwise and river traffic, either suspended business or continued to operate at a loss. The Japanese banks in China found their services spurned and small Japanese shopkeepers were ruined.

In January, 1932, the Japanese residents of Shanghai, the chief foreign trade center of China, called upon the Tokyo Government to suppress the anti-Japanese movement by a display of naval force. The navy welcomed this opportunity to follow the example of the army in the pursuit of glory and, incidentally, to retrieve some of the domestic prestige which had been lost at the time (1930) of Japan's adherence to the London Naval Treaty. War vessels, therefore, were despatched to Shanghai as a means of forcing the Chinese to buy Japanese goods. Economic warfare was to be combated with naval warfare.

Within a few days Japanese marines were landed at Shanghai and ordered to occupy those parts of the city which were inhabited by large groups of Japanese. In the fulfillment of this command the marines inevitably clashed with the local Chinese garrison. Shots were fired and the Battle of Shanghai was precipitated. The resistance of the Chinese to the invaders was labelled "aggression" by the latter and the Tokyo diplomats strove valiantly to convince the world of the evils of China's militarism.

To the surprise and chagrin of the Japanese troops, the Chinese soldiers, led by a young general named Tsai Ting-kai, held their ground around Shanghai for thirty-four days. Then, overwhelmed by the superior equipment of the foe and the arrival of heavy Japanese reinforcements, they began a retreat. Apparently the Japanese had under-rated both the courage and fighting ability of the Chinese when the latter really had a cause, and over-rated their own prowess. The approach of the rainy season put a stop to the battle and in May, 1932, negotiations were completed which provided for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and the ending of the boycott.

During the fighting there was a serious possibility that one or more additional powers might become involved in the conflict. Shanghai contains large foreign settlements and there was

danger that shot or shell might fall into a neutral area and harm the person or property of western nationals. Luckily no major international incident occurred and the armed hostilities remained a Sino-Japanese affair. On the other hand, neither the League of Nations nor the United States was able to mediate the dispute. Tokyo, in fact, skillfully played off Geneva and Washington against one another.

For a time rumors were rife concerning a possible Russo-Japanese imbroglio over Manchuria. The Soviet Union was worried by the extension of Japanese influence into the northern part of the region and in the direction of Mongolia. A quarrel loomed when Manchukuo took over China's interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway and when it appeared that France, who had originally supplied some of the capital for the building of the line, might be spurring the Japanese to fight the Russians. Moscow was gripped by a veritable "war fever" and from two to three hundred thousand Red troops were massed along the Siberian-Manchurian border. This show of Soviet force apparently had a restraining influence upon the Japanese and any overt act was avoided. Nevertheless Tokyo hesitated to accept a Russian offer for a non-aggression pact even in return for a favorable oil agreement.

On December 10, 1931, the Council of the League appointed an international commission of five, under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton, to investigate the whole Sino-Japanese situation and propose possible solutions.¹ While the commission, which contained one member each from England, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States, was at work, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson announced that the United States henceforth would refuse to recognize the legality of any situation or treaty resulting from action taken in violation of the Kellogg Pact. However, this Stimson Doctrine, as it came to be known, failed

¹ At one stage of the difficulties it was proposed among the western powers that a general economic boycott be declared against Japan on the ground that the latter was acting contrary to the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 and in violation of her obligations under the Kellogg Pact. Nothing came of this suggestion, since the virtual state of war resulted in the placing of large Japanese orders for cotton and munitions, and Chinese orders for textiles in several western countries, especially Great Britain and the United States. Economic conditions in 1932 did not permit of such voluntary relinquishment of urgently needed business.

to elicit cooperative endorsements from the European powers and hence appeared to have little immediate importance.

On September 15, 1932, seventeen days before the Lytton Commission made public its report, Japan offered an affront to the League by officially recognizing the state of Manchukuo. The motive behind this act was evidently to confront the League with *SL fait accompli* and then to say "What's done, is done." The procedure called forth a sharp rebuke from the president of the League Council, who happened to be Eamonn de Valera, when he called that body to order on September 24.

Recognition was accorded through the instrument of a Japan-Manchukuo Protocol wherein the former Chinese domain, in return for an endorsement of its "independent" status, promised Japan a long series of listed and unlisted favors, including the right to station her troops at any desired point in Manchukuo. Western reproaches were answered with defiant proclamations by the Japanese military commander in Manchuria, meekly reechoed by the Tokyo Foreign Office. It is interesting to note that the Japanese yen dropped during these months to less than half of its par value.

The Lytton Report proved to be a calm and measured document which carefully avoided hurting the sensibilities of any of the contending parties. In brief, it expressed grave doubts whether a government-inspired boycott was a "legitimate weapon of defense against military aggression by a stronger country"; recommended direct negotiation between China and Japan, with neutral observers, for the settlement of all outstanding difficulties; suggested that China set up in Manchuria an autonomous government which would merely acknowledge Chinese suzerainty; proposed the creation of a foreign-instructed Chinese gendarmerie; urged the reform of the courts and the eventual abolition of foreign extraterritorial rights; observed that great benefit would result from the unification of all railway lines in China, including the South Manchurian Railway; and advised the employment of a sufficient number of foreign political and financial experts.

The commission further recommended that a special conference be arranged where China and Japan might conclude three treaties: (1) a treaty dealing with Japanese interests,

particularly in Manchuria; (2) a treaty of conciliation, arbitration, and non-aggression; and (3) a commercial treaty which would encourage Sino-Japanese trade and check future organized boycott movements against Japan. Although the U.S.S.R. did not take part in the formulation of the report, the commission suggested that Russia be invited to sign the treaty of non-aggression.

In November, 1932, the League Council voted to refer the report for action to a special December meeting of the League Assembly. The latter then referred the matter to another committee, which was to recommend a solution of the dispute early in 1933. While these deliberations were in progress, Japan penetrated Jehol Province, which, lying southwest of Manchuria, was believed to contain large oil reserves and controlled a lucrative opium trade.

CHAPTER XXII

THE UNITED STATES

TROUBLOUS TIMES

In the election of 1916, as we have seen,¹ Woodrow Wilson defeated Charles E. Hughes for the presidency of the United States. The victorious candidate polled about six hundred thousand votes more than his rival. On the same occasion the Democratic majority in the Senate was cut from sixteen to twelve and in the House the balance of power fell to a small group of independents. With the close of the World War came a further decline in the popular appeal of the Democratic Party and a diminution of confidence in its leader. There was a reaction, on the one hand, against the progressive policies fostered by the first Wilson administration — policies expressed in the passage of such legislation as the Clayton Anti-Trust Law, the Federal Reserve Act, and the Underwood Tariff — and on the other, against the autocratic powers which the government had exercised during the war. Indeed, as a consequence of the congressional elections of 1918, the Republicans obtained control of both branches of Congress.

The blame for the high cost of living, popularly known as the "H. C. L.," which followed upon the period of war, was placed upon the Democratic administration. The end of the conflict and the cancellation of government contracts running into billions of dollars partially disrupted the economic system of the country. Yet the manufacturers, who had become accustomed to reaping profits of from fifty to several hundred per cent, refused in the early post-war years to be satisfied with more moderate returns. "Profiteering" continued, and, for a time, became worse. Labor, skilled and unskilled, was equally insistent upon keeping wages up to and above the inflated war level. And the consumer had to pay the piper, for the purchasing power of the dollar of 1914

¹ See p. 41.

was only forty-eight cents in 1920. The class that suffered most from these circumstances probably was the salaried group — the professionals and clerks whose salaries were fixed for long periods in advance.

Furthermore, the truce under which the government had forced capital and labor to operate during the war now came to an end and the pent-up energies of the opposing groups broke loose with astonishing force. While the capitalists once more were willing to let "the public be damned," the coal miners, for example, were ready to let it freeze. The year 1919 witnessed almost 3400 major strikes. At the same time Attorney-General Palmer, with an eye, perhaps, to the next presidential nominating convention, evoked so energetic a zeal in tracking down members of various radical organizations that even staid citizens were gripped by a veritable "Red Scare."

Many Americans, in addition, were dissatisfied with the trend of affairs at the Peace Conference. Some felt that the treatment accorded Germany was too severe. Others believed that the United States was once more truckling to British interests and that England was reaping most of the benefits of the war. Irish sympathizers thought Wilson negligent of the aspirations of Erin, while friends of Italy and of Greece were dissatisfied with the treatment accorded these states. There was decided opposition, in some quarters, to that portion of the peace treaty which dealt with the League of Nations, and a number of leading Republicans resented their exclusion from the Paris Conference. Hence, when Wilson placed the Versailles Treaty before the Senate (July 10, 1919) with a request for ratification, the prospects for acquiescence were slight.

The Senate soon split into four main groups over the question of the treaty, and in particular of the League. Wilson's Democratic followers favored ratification without amendments. Other Democrats, eventually led by G. M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, proposed acceptance with certain mild reservations. The majority of the Republicans, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and a personal opponent of the President, insisted upon more sweeping amendments. The "irreconcilable" Republicans, led by W. E. Borah of Idaho, opposed America's entering a League of Nations in any form.

The main public attacks on the treaty were directed against the League Covenant, especially on the article which granted League membership to England's self-governing dominions and on Article Ten, which guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of the member states. The President strove to make clear that nothing could happen in the League Council without American assent since the vote had to be unanimous, and that all League obligations were "moral" rather than "legal." His antagonists, however, stigmatized Article Ten as an infringement on the right of Congress alone to declare war and to authorize the use of the military forces of the United States.

Some of the opponents of the treaty so misinterpreted Article Ten as to lead many people to believe that the League could force Congress to send American soldiers to fight in the deserts of Africa or the jungles of Indo-China. Thus, *Harvey's Weekly* declared: "If Article Ten be interpreted to mean anything, that meaning necessarily is that we engage to send our armed forces wherever and whenever a super-government of foreigners sitting in Switzerland orders us to send them." Senator L. Y. Sherman of Illinois somehow arrived at the conclusion that: "The League will embargo our commerce, close our exchanges, destroy our credits, leave our merchantmen rotting at the pier, shut the Isthmian Canal, order Congress to declare war, levy taxes, appropriate money, raise and support armies and navies, and despatch our men to any quarters of the globe to fight and die, because an alien Executive Council has willed it." Some patriots, who apparently overlooked America's participation in the World War, professed to see in any association with the League a dangerous departure from the country's traditional policy of aloofness.

Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that the treaty, both with and without reservations, should have failed of ratification when brought up for vote in November, 1919, and again in March, 1920. Some weeks before the second vote, Wilson, who suffered a paralytic stroke while on a tour of the country in September, 1919, had recommended that the elections of 1920 be made "a great and solemn referendum" on the League.

Early in June, 1920, the Republican Nominating Convention

met at Chicago. Four presidential "possibilities" held the spotlight: Herbert Hoover, famous as wartime Food Administrator; General Leonard Wood, an associate of Theodore Roosevelt; Senator Hiram Johnson of California, "irreconcilable" but progressive; and Governor Frank Lowden of Illinois, a friend of the farmers. When it was evident that the deadlock between these men could not be broken, a "dark horse" was selected — on the principle, it was said, that "any good Republican can be nominated . . . and can defeat any Democrat." The choice fell on Warren Gamaliel Harding of Ohio, whose nomination was actually decided upon in a private meeting of Senator Lodge and other party leaders. The selection appears to have been influenced by the fact that the "genial standpatter" had no national enemies and would be easy to control in office. The platform arraigned the Wilson administration and proposed the reaching of a world peace agreement "without the compromise of national independence."

The Democrats met at San Francisco on June 28. A three-cornered contest developed between former Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, who, as Wilson's son-in-law, was nicknamed the "crown prince"; Attorney-General A. Mitchell Palmer, of "Red Scare" fame; and Governor James M. Cox of Ohio, who eventually secured the nomination. The party platform advocated "the immediate ratification of the treaty without reservations which would impair its essential integrity." The Socialist Party for the fifth time nominated Eugene V. Debs, who at the time was serving a sentence in the Atlanta penitentiary for his pacifistic activities during the war.

The outcome of the campaign of 1920 was influenced by all the political and economic factors which have already been mentioned, as well as by some additional important elements. The voting was affected, in one way or another, by (1) the return of the railways to private ownership under favorable conditions through the Esch-Cummins or Railway Transportation Act of 1920; (2) the fact that millions of dollars' worth of national property was visibly going to waste through the rotting, in the Hudson River and elsewhere, of hundreds of ships that had been built at enormous cost to meet war emergencies; (3) the ratification of the Eighteenth or Prohibition Amendment and the

passage (1919), over Wilson's veto, of the Volstead Act, which defined as "intoxicating" any liquor containing more than one half of one per cent of alcohol; and (4) the ratification of the Nineteenth or Woman-Suffrage Amendment.

Neither of the candidates was well known to the people. Mr. Cox had been three times governor of Ohio, was editor of the *Dayton News*, and was a corporation lawyer. Mr. Harding was editor of the *Marion Star*, had been lieutenant-governor of Ohio, and had been in the United States Senate. Harding had considerable popular appeal as a candidate. He was plain, kind-hearted, religious, and — in the words of a friend — "the best fellow in the world to play poker with all Saturday night." In his slogan, "A return to normalcy," he well expressed the sentiment of a great many people who were tired of reform crusades and who "wanted a rest from ideas that might develop into causes."

The League, it seems, played a relatively minor part in the campaign, being greatly overshadowed by a general discontent and the feeling that "our own yard is enough to worry about." Harding straddled the issue, saying, in effect, that he opposed the League but favored a league, a "free association of nations." The Republican candidate won by a plurality of seven million votes. For the first time since the Civil War, a state which had seceded, Tennessee, "went Republican."

Four months after the election, Woodrow Wilson left the White House, tired, ill, repudiated.

"THE RETURN TO NORMALCY"

President Harding, himself knowing little of the conduct of foreign relations, entrusted the affairs of the State Department to the more experienced Charles E. Hughes. One of the new Secretary's first tasks was to bring to a close the technical state of war which still existed between the United States and Germany, Austria, and Hungary. President Wilson, in May, 1920, had vetoed a joint resolution which was meant to end hostilities without waiting for the formalities of a treaty agreement. In July, 1921, Congress re-passed and Harding signed this resolution, which declared the war "to be at an end," and reserved to the United States all the rights and privileges accruing to her under the unratified Peace of Paris. A few months later the

peace treaties of Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest were signed and ratified, the United States in each case being guaranteed "all the rights and advantages stipulated" for her benefit in the German, Austrian, and Hungarian treaties with the Allies.

Once in office, Harding, realizing that the members of the League of Nations would hardly listen to any American proposal to disband that organization and form a new one, dropped all talk of his "free association of nations." So completely did the Republican administration try to forget the League that for almost six months no American reply was sent to the notes and communications which its Secretary-General sent to Washington. The American Ambassador in London was "instructed to inform the League's authorities that as the United States had not joined the League she was not in a position to answer letters from it." Not until the situation was exposed in the *New York Times* did the State Department send even the most formal acknowledgments of League notes.

Beginning in 1922, the attitude of the American Government towards the League changed sufficiently so that "unofficial observers" were sent to attend conferences "where matters of concern to the United States were under consideration." Such conferences were the ones on the Opium Traffic, on Customs Formalities, and on Communications and Transit. Despite his indifference to the League, President Harding urged membership in the World Court on condition that the United States be given an equal voice with other countries in the selection of judges. This proviso was necessary since the United States had no representation in the League Assembly which elected the judges. The President died before Congress acted on his suggestion.

Even more frigid than her relations with the League during these years were America's relations with Russia. Secretary of Commerce Hoover insisted that under the Bolshevik economic system Russia could expect "no real return to production." Hence she would "have no considerable commodities to export and, consequently, no great ability to obtain imports." Under these circumstances it was felt that there existed no motive for making diplomatic arrangements to facilitate the exchange of goods with Russia.

There were two spheres, however, in which the United States preferred not to remain aloof: naval construction and Pacific and Far Eastern relations. The naval rivalry between England and the United States, inaugurated by the American building program of 1916, seriously threatened harmonious relations between the two peoples. Neither could well afford the expense involved or the bitter spirit engendered. The matter was made even more serious and broader in scope by the Anglo-Japanese alliance which, it was feared, might well become a menace to American Pacific interests. The question of the status of all Far Eastern territories might therefore profitably be discussed. Accordingly a nine-power conference was held at Washington from November, 1921, to February, 1922, and, as we have seen, several agreements were reached on the limitation of naval armaments and on Pacific and Far Eastern problems.¹

It early became evident that in domestic matters President Harding, by "a return to normalcy," meant a return to the policies of William McKinley and Mark Hanna, apostles *par excellence* of Big Business and Conservatism. In 1921, Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon, a wealthy Pennsylvania banker, proposed a drastic cut in the income-tax rate — particularly on the higher incomes. He recommended reducing the surtax on the largest incomes from 65% to 25%. Congress, apparently not yet ready for so normal a state, merely repealed the excess profits tax and fixed the surtax maximum at 50% (1921), and then passed (1922) a Bonus Bill for the war veterans. Harding vetoed this measure on the grounds that it contained no provision for raising the necessary money; that the soldiers never expected a bonus for their services until the American Legion, founded in 1919, proposed the idea; and that the government had been sufficiently liberal in the allotments and in the compensations made for disabilities. In the same session Congress passed the high Fordney-McCumber Tariff to supersede the moderate Underwood Act of 1913. The law authorized the President, after due investigations by a Tariff Commission, to increase or decrease the scheduled rates up to 50% if it could be

¹ See pp. 206 and 602. The United States in 1921 made it plain to Great Britain and France that American oil companies were not to be excluded from a share in the oil concessions of the Near Eastern mandates.

shown that the existing duties did not equalize the cost of production in the United States and the competing foreign countries.

In 1922 the road back to normalcy was partially blocked by the strikes of 600,000 coal miners and 300,000 railway shopmen. There was considerable violence in both instances, and Attorney-General Harry M. Daugherty secured from a Chicago judge a sweeping injunction against the railwaymen, which virtually forbade all the activities of the trade union officials. Much of the disorder was charged to radicals and professional agitators and hence the public was not especially sympathetic to the cause of the workers.

Meanwhile Congress was becoming acutely aware of another problem, the economic plight of the farmers. During the war the process of farm industrialization had advanced at an unprecedented rate. The wartime food needs had made it profitable to devote every available acre of land to cultivation, and the farmers consequently borrowed heavily in order to buy more land and more machines. In 1919 the entire farm crop of the United States was valued at \$16,000,000,000, as compared with \$6,000,000,000 ten years earlier. After the war, however, the American farmers found themselves saddled with a mortgage debt of more than \$4,000,000,000.

Even in the heyday of war prosperity the average farmer realized little more than six per cent on his total investment. Hence when the prices of wheat, corn, cotton, and cattle experienced precipitate declines in the general business slump that followed 1919, the farmers were in a desperate situation. Though they had developed some fairly satisfactory marketing and purchasing cooperatives, they had no organization for regulating production or fighting price deflation. Wheat toppled from \$2.14 a bushel in 1919 to \$.93 a bushel in 1923. The situation was similar with respect to other farm products[^] Freight rates, on the contrary, continued to be excessively high and local tax rates remained at a level three times that of 1912. And the interest payments had to be met or the mortgages would be foreclosed.

In their despair the farmers turned to the government for relief. A congressional Farm Bloc was created (1921) to represent the interests of the western farmers who cared little about

the tax revision, shipping subsidies, or immigration bills which were the chief worry of the eastern legislators. A number of farm relief measures were passed between 1921 and 1923, designed chiefly to cut speculation in grain, to make available additional agricultural credit facilities, and to tax agricultural imports. However, in the face of increasing competition from Canadian, Australian, and eventually, Russian grain, these measures failed to solve the country's agricultural problem.

In June, 1923, the Hardings started on an ill-fated tour across the country and a visit to Alaska. The President was not in good health when the trip began and he fell seriously ill in Alaska. He was returning home when death overtook him in San Francisco, on August 2. The exact cause of his death was not satisfactorily established, but there was reason to believe that it might have been brought about, directly or indirectly, by certain deeds of official corruption in the years 1921 to 1923 which eclipsed even the notorious happenings of the Grant administrations.

One of the first scandals to be uncovered grew out of the practices of Charles R. Forbes, Director of the Veterans' Bureau and friend of Harding. According to the report of a Senate Investigating Committee, the record of Forbes' activities in his official capacity was one of "almost unparalleled waste, recklessness, and misconduct," costing the government some \$200,000,000. For his misdeeds, Forbes was sentenced to a term in Leavenworth Prison.

Another investigating committee, headed by Senator Wheeler, discovered that Attorney-General Daugherty, also a friend of Harding and appointed mainly for services rendered during the campaign, had surrounded himself in the Department of Justice with disreputable characters and had failed to prosecute grafters and leading bootleggers. When Daugherty denied the committee permission to search his department's files for further evidence, President Coolidge dismissed him (March, 1924).

The greatest scandal involved the leasing of some government oil reserves. It appeared that Harding had signed an order permitting Secretary of the Navy Denby to transfer to Secretary of the Interior Fall the administration of the petroleum reserves set aside at Elk Hills in California and Teapot Dome in Wyoming

under Presidents Taft and Wilson for the use of the navy. Fall was prominent as an opponent of friendly relations with Mexico and as a man "who affected a cowboy pose and a fine contempt for reformers and conservationists." In 1922, Fall, without calling for competitive bids, leased the Teapot Dome reserves to Harry F. Sinclair and the Elk Hills reserves to Edward L. Doheny. In each case the government was to obtain an exceedingly moderate royalty on the oil secured.

Soon the smell of oil was detected on official garments, and Senator Walsh of Montana headed a committee of investigation which discovered an amazing trail of corruption. It developed that Sinclair had contributed heavily to Republican campaign expenses in 1920; that Doheny had "loaned" Fall \$100,000 without security and without interest in 1921; that some time later Fall also had received a loan of \$25,000 from Sinclair, and that he had accepted valuable gifts from other oilmen. Then he had prudently resigned early in 1923 before the scandals were made public, and had retired to a large ranch purchased with the "loans." The following year Denby also resigned so as not to embarrass the government over his inattention to *ihet* public interest.

In 1924 the government instituted proceedings against Fall, Doheny, and Sinclair for cancellation of the leases and conviction for bribery and conspiracy. The government won its first point in 1927 when the Supreme Court voided the leases and ordered the return of the reserves. Meanwhile, of course, five years had elapsed in which the lessees had made huge profits. In its other suits the plaintiff was not so successful, perhaps because these were not pressed so industriously. Both Doheny and Sinclair were able to convince juries that they were not guilty of conspiracy or fraud, but that they had acted out of patriotic motives. They maintained that the oil was being drained away by people who had sunk wells near-by, that the terms were favorable to the government, and that, after all, undeveloped oil reserves were not much good to the navy. Sinclair, however, blundered by hiring private detectives to shadow his jurors and by refusing to answer certain questions of the Senate committee. For this contempt he had to serve a three months' jail term in Washington. Fall, after several trial ad-

journments, was convicted in October, 1929, and sentenced to one year's imprisonment and a fine of \$100,000. The jail term eventually was served but the fine remained unpaid.

This "crime wave" in the years following the war was not confined to officialdom. Private crimes came to be everyday topics of conversation and the official misdeeds merely reflected on a large scale what happened privately on a smaller scale. In 1921 there was said to have been one major bank robbery per day throughout the country, while one automobile out of every twenty-two in Chicago and out of every thirty in New York was stolen. "Burglary-insurance rates in American cities were from fifteen to twenty times as high as in England" and "the homicide rate of the United States was sixteen times that of England and Wales." Machine guns and sawed-off shot guns were among the weapons employed by post-war criminals. The custom of levying tribute under threat of violence was revived as a widespread source of illegal income under the name of "racketeering." Seemingly, a number of the murders perpetrated in the United States, as well as many of those committed in Europe, were the work of men who received their initial training in the use of firearms while serving their countries during the war.¹ And the public, which for years had been reading daily accounts of wholesale killings by shells, bullets, gas, grenades, and bayonets, was but little shocked to see as familiar sights in the streets of the larger cities, armored cars for conveying money and valuables.

"SAFE AND SANE" POLITICS

Not much was known in the United States about the man who, on August 3, 1923, took the oath of office as Harding's successor. Calvin Coolidge was born in Vermont, in 1872. A graduate of Amherst College, he began the study of law in Northampton in 1897, and then, having entered politics, gradually rose from one office to the next, finally becoming governor of Massachusetts. Quiet, thrifty, industrious, and staid, Coolidge never shocked anyone by advocating strange or radical things; nor did he ever hold back when he saw the majority moving in a definite direction.

He first attracted some national attention when, as governor

¹ This situation is poignantly set forth in Remarque, E. M., *The Road Back*, 1931.

of Massachusetts, he had to cope with the Boston policemen's strike of 1919. He called out the state militia to restore order and informed the policemen that "there is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime." Estimates differed widely as to the precise part which Coolidge played in the settling of the strike, but his friends, at least, hailed him as "the silent man of iron," and his party bestowed the vice-presidential nomination upon him in the following year. Though a favorite subject with cartoonists and jokesters, Coolidge was able to maintain an unruffled calm in the face of both lavish praise and unvarnished abuse. He "was dull and insistent as duty itself" and he "thoroughly approved of the Ten Commandments."

Coolidge retained his predecessor's cabinet unchanged, and in his first message to Congress, in December, 1923, made economy his keynote. In harmony with this stand, he vetoed a second Bonus Bill which was passed by Congress in 1924 and which provided for a system of prepaid insurance policies, with the principal going to the holder at the expiration of twenty years. This time the bill was passed over the president's veto. -In the same year the income tax was further reduced, and a highly restrictive immigration law, the National Origins Act, was adopted. The measure, which did not become fully effective until 1929, discriminated in favor of immigrants from the countries of northern Europe, limited the total number of annual entrants to about 154,000, and excluded entirely immigrants who were ineligible for citizenship, that is, Asiatics. This last provision gave rise to much foreign, particularly Japanese, ill-will.

Coolidge secured the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1924. General Charles G. Dawes, of reparation fame, was selected as his running mate. The Democratic candidate was John W. Davis, a "dark horse" conservative from West Virginia, who received the nomination after 102 ballots had failed to break a deadlock between William G. McAdoo and Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York. Davis' connection with the house of J. P. Morgan doubtless was a liability to his cause from the point of view of the general public.

A third party, the Progressive Party, headed by Senator

"Fighting Bob" LaFollette of Wisconsin, also entered the lists in 1924. It attracted some "insurgent" Republicans and discontented progressives and intellectuals who wanted to register a vote of protest against the conservative smugness of both the large parties. The Progressive Party, however, polled less than five million votes and died with the election. Aided by such popular slogans as "Keep Cool with Cal," "Coolidge or Chaos," and "Coolidge and Economy," the President swept the polls, receiving 54% of the total vote and a plurality of over seven million ballots.¹

The second Coolidge administration was marked by little startling domestic legislation. The national debt was reduced, the surtax was lowered to 20%, and slight reductions were made in the tax on lower incomes. A few laws to aid agricultural production and marketing were passed and a large amount of money was voted for Mississippi flood control. The McNary-Haugen Bill for the relief of the farmer, which, among other things, proposed a fixed, domestic price for grain, was vetoed as being economically unsound.

The enforcement of Prohibition continued to be one of the government's most difficult tasks, involving, as it did, an attempt to change the habits of some millions of people by law. Moreover, a good deal of profit was derived from violations of the law by bootleggers and smugglers, and a leading racketeer boasted that in one year his organization had spent \$30,000,000 to check law-enforcement activities. Although such criminals operated in almost every conceivable field, they were interested chiefly in the profits to be gained from the illegal manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks.

The public lack of interest in politics during these years may, perhaps, be gauged from the circumstance that the *Chicago Tribune* sold 50,000 more copies on the day after Gene Tunney won the world's heavy-weight boxing championship from Jack Dempsey, than on the day after the congressional elections of November, 1926.

¹ The years 1924 to 1926 witnessed a slight clearing of the political stage through the deaths of several of the older leaders. Roosevelt had died in 1919, and in 1924 both Wilson and Lodge died. In 1925 death claimed LaFollette and W. J. Bryan and in 1926, Eugene V. Debs, Samuel Gompers, and "Uncle Joe" Cannon, long the leading conservative in the House.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1923-1929

During the administration of President Harding, the foreign policies of the United States were concerned chiefly with a liquidation of the immediate political problems raised by the country's participation in the World War and rejection of the Versailles Treaty. After 1923, however, the trend of foreign affairs was shaped by a realization among Americans of certain recent and vital changes in their national financial position in the world.

Up to 1914, Europe had been "the world's banker." The total foreign investments of Great Britain, Germany, and France on the eve of the war had amounted to about \$35,000,000,000, while those of the United States had totalled about \$2,600,000,000. As a consequence of the war and its aftermath, the situation underwent a striking transformation. In 1928 the total value of American private loans in foreign countries was more than \$13,000,000,000, and by 1930 the figure had climbed to \$16,600,000,000, of which \$5,100,000,000 was invested in Europe. At the same time, the European war debts to the American Government amounted to an additional sum of \$11,000,000,000. In 1927 the interest payments to American citizens on private loans to foreign governments, municipalities, or companies, reached the enormous figure of \$740,000,000. It may be noted here, too, that America's foreign trade in the five-year period 1924-1928 averaged about \$9,000,000,000 annually. The gross tonnage of the American merchant fleet in 1928 was 14,540,000.

American citizens naturally expected their government to protect these vast interests abroad, and Washington, in general, was ready to assume the obligation.¹ In a speech in 1925 the Secretary of the Navy, explaining the responsibilities of the administration before a group of business men, said: "To defend America, we must be prepared to defend its interests and our flag in every corner of the globe. . . . An American child crying on the banks of the Yangtse a thousand miles from the coast can summon the ships of the American navy up that river

¹ The government was inclined to look with disfavor on three types of loans: those for such unproductive enterprises as armament expenditures, those to countries that had not funded their American war debts, and those that might be used to develop foreign-owned raw-material monopolies to the disadvantage of American consumers.

to protect it from unjust assaults." Similarly, President Coolidge, though he believed that "in peace there lies the greatest opportunity for relief from burdensome taxation," soon made it equally plain that America's overseas investments would receive adequate protection.

In 1927, during the course of serious political disturbances in Nicaragua, five thousand sailors and marines, as well as several squadrons of airplanes, were despatched to the republic, ostensibly to protect American lives and property, but also, it appeared, to prevent a group of liberals, sometimes called bandits, from overthrowing the conservative regime of President Adolfo Diaz. The sympathies of the American State Department were with the conservatives, for these had been friendly to the United States ever since 1912, granting her a naval base, control of the Nicaraguan customs, bank, and railways, and the right to build a Nicaraguan canal. Coolidge was severely criticized for his methods by liberal public opinion throughout the United States and Latin America, and eventually he sent Colonel Henry L. Stimson to Nicaragua to see if a peaceful settlement could be reached.

Stimson effected an agreement between a portion of the liberals and the conservatives whereby the former were to cease fighting and surrender their arms at ten dollars apiece, and new elections were to be held in 1928 under American supervision. Another section of the liberals, led by General Augusto Sandino, rejected this solution and continued to wage a guerilla warfare against the conservatives and against American property and lives. Sandino became particularly active in the spring of 1931, after an earthquake in Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, and successfully eluded capture by the American marines and Nicaraguan National Guard.

More serious than the intervention in Nicaragua was a Mexican imbroglio which arose out of the interpretation and possible retroactive force of the Mexican land laws passed under authority of the constitution of 1917. This document vested the ownership of land and subsoil resources in the Mexican nation, but permitted the latter to transfer its rights to private Mexican citizens or even to foreigners, if these agreed not to call on their governments for protection in any dispute over such rights. In

1926 the president of Mexico issued regulations which, among other things, required all owners of land who had secured their titles prior to the promulgation of the constitution of 1917 to exchange these titles for new fifty-year "concessions." A number of American oil companies, fearing for their interests, organized an Association for the Protection of American Rights in Mexico to carry on propaganda against the land decrees. The passage of some Mexican anti-clerical laws which aimed at nationalizing the property of the Catholic Church, made the propaganda work easier.¹

The American State Department denounced the regulations as infringements of American property rights, but the Senate, in January, 1927, voted 79 to 0 to arbitrate the questions in dispute. A few days earlier, however, Coolidge had maintained that American property rights required no arbitration, and Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, who had succeeded Hughes in 1925, had accused Mexico of spreading Bolshevik propaganda in the United States and Central America, and of aiding the Nicaraguan revolutionists. Fortunately no overt action was resorted to and the administration appointed the tactful Dwight W. Morrow to be ambassador to Mexico. Some time later Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, hero of the first non-stop flight from New York to Paris (May, 1927), and Will Rogers, Oklahoma cowboy comedian, went to Mexico on successful "good-will tours."

Morrow tried to see the view-point of the Mexican officials and as a result was able to convince them that the United States had no desire to disrupt the amicable relations which had been established between the two governments after the settlement of the foreign debt question in 1923. Both sides compromised. The American companies agreed to lay their cases before the Mexican Supreme Court and the latter declared unconstitutional (November, 1927) some of the most obnoxious land and oil laws.

In 1927 the Washington authorities also became worried over the safety of American lives and property in and around Nanking, Tientsin, and other important cities in China. The activities of both the Chinese Nationalists and the communists were a source of great danger to foreigners, and the United States,

¹ In 1925 the holdings of Americans in Mexico were estimated at \$1,280,000,000.

following the example of several other countries, despatched a fleet and a detachment of marines to the scene. (Socony Hill was the name of the place at which the foreign residents of Nanking had gathered for their defense.) When the Nationalists appeared to have established their control and promised adequate protection, the American forces were gradually withdrawn.

To complete this survey of American relations with weaker countries, mention must be made of the Pan-American Conferences held at Santiago, Chile, in the spring of 1923, and at Havana, early in 1928. At the former conference the United States rejected the offer of the Latin-American states to assist in the interpretation and application of the Monroe Doctrine. At the latter, a resolution proposing that "no state has the right to intervene in the internal affairs of another" was withdrawn owing largely to the opposition of the United States. The Havana Conference provided for another gathering to be held at Washington in December, 1928, for taking steps to adjust international disputes peacefully. The second assemblage, on January 5, 1929, accepted two conventions for the arbitration and conciliation of all disputes except those "not controlled by international law." Ratification proceeded slowly.

In the relations between the United States and Europe the question of the Inter-Allied debts played a conspicuous rôle, especially since American opinion was itself divided on the subject of collection.¹ Among the arguments advanced by those who favored collection were the following: (1) collection was essential to uphold the sanctity of contracts as a fundamental principle of business ethics; (2) cancellation was unfair to American taxpayers because the war bonds had to be retired whether or not Europe paid; (3) full payment was necessary to restore confidence in Europe's good faith, since the European countries were not taxing themselves as heavily as they might and large sums were being spent on campaigns in North Africa and the Near East and on the upkeep of huge armaments.

Those who favored cancellation maintained that: (1) since the United States entered the war late, lost few men, and spent

¹ In 1928 the total funded indebtedness to the United States of Great Britain, France, and Italy was about \$11,000,000,000. Of the original debt about 70% was incurred during the war and 30% after the armistice.

relatively little money, she might well consider the debt money her contribution to the cause; (2) the United States became enormously wealthy as a result of her wartime activities and should be content with her new business contacts and markets; (3) moral arguments, such as that regarding business ethics, could never satisfactorily settle questions of world controversy such as the debt problem; (4) American manufacturers would suffer if the country were flooded with foreign commodities without the sale of which Europe could not pay the debts; (5) insistence upon collection was causing ill-will against the United States, whereas cancellation would increase international harmony.

A third group of opinion favored some form of conditional cancellation. The debts, it was said, offered an opportunity for ensuring world peace and saving millions of lives and considerable property at the cost of a few billions of dollars which at best were paid in small instalments. The debts might be cancelled on condition that the respective beneficiaries guarantee to use the money thus saved for educational or economic, but not military, purposes. Again, the Allied debts and German reparation might be reciprocally cancelled; or, finally, the dismantling of existing armaments might be made a condition of cancellation.

The administrations at Washington chose the path of collection. In the words of Coolidge, the Allies had "hired the money" and now they would be obliged to repay it with interest. Special agreements were reached with each debtor. The first settlement was arrived at with Great Britain, in 1923. Her payments were extended over a period of sixty-two years at a low rate of interest. Similar agreements, usually with even lower interest rates, were made with the other debtors, from Italy to Liberia. The most difficult arrangements were those with France, and a temporary embargo had to be placed on French loans before the Mellon-Berenger Agreement was drawn up in 1926. The French Parliament postponed ratification until 1929, paying merely the interest during the intervening triennium.

In December, 1924, Coolidge, following the example of Harding, asked the Senate to ratify the World Court Protocol. After much executive persuasion, the Senate, in January, 1926, agreed,

but with five reservations. The most sweeping condition was the second part of the fifth reservation. The Court shall not, it ran, "without the consent of the United States entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest." The members of the Court substantially accepted all reservations except this one, which would have given the United States a privileged position. The Senate paid no heed to the counter-reservations which were offered by the members of the Court, and late in 1926 Coolidge announced that he would cease to urge adherence.

In spheres other than that of the Court, the United States, during the Coolidge administrations, adopted a policy of increasing cooperation with the League of Nations. All the Leagued disarmament and economic conferences were attended by American delegates. Usually American participation involved the sending of unofficial observers to take part in the discussions and make suggestions, but the United States never bound herself to accept any of the decisions reached. Perhaps the best gauge of the extent of American participation was the bill of \$17,000 which the United States incurred in 1927 as her share of League conference expenses. This share was greater than that of any other participant save England. Hundreds of private American citizens worked for the League as salaried officials, while many Americans headed boundary, railway, and river commissions, and some were chosen as judges of the World Court. Beginning in 1926, the United States voluntarily deposited with the League Secretariat copies of recently signed treaties, a procedure required of all member states.

The United States also attempted during these years to join with Europe in efforts to establish world harmony on a firmer basis. In 1923 and 1929 American financial experts played a leading, though unofficial, part in the formulation of new reparation arrangements. In 1927 the Geneva Conference on the limitation of naval armaments was held at the suggestion of President Coolidge. Perhaps the greatest instance of cooperation with other powers was the signing of the Paris Pact in 1928 for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1928

In the summer of 1928 the customary presidential nominating conventions assembled. A flurry was caused in Republican ranks when Coolidge, whose name had again been mentioned despite the third-term tradition, handed to newspaper correspondents a slip of paper on which was written: "I do not choose to run for president in 1928." The statement occasioned some conjecture as to its real meaning, but the President eventually made it clear that he was not to be considered a possible candidate.

With Coolidge eliminated, it soon was evident that Herbert Clark Hoover would be selected. A successful mining engineer, with experience and contacts in several continents, Hoover had also been head of the American Commission for Relief in Belgium, United States Food Administrator, Secretary of Commerce for two terms, and chairman of the Mississippi Flood Relief Commission in 1927. His public record was clear and commendable, and he had won considerable respect abroad. He was nominated on the first ballot. Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas, Republican leader in the Senate, was chosen as running-mate.

The platform promised strict enforcement of Prohibition, farm relief, friendly international relations, and railroad, mercantile, and flood-control legislation. The usual praise of the previous administration's accomplishments was included. "Economy," read one sentence, "has been raised to the dignity of a principle of government." Prosperity was held up as a shining light of Republican achievement.

When the Democratic nominators convened, they were reminded by the keynote orator that "the brilliant record of our eight years of power [under Wilson] is as a splotch of glorious sunshine against the smutty background of eight years of privilege and crime." The Democratic platform, accordingly, stressed the corruption under Harding, denounced the Republican taxation policy, and complained that in recent years the anti-trust laws had been "thwarted, ignored, and violated." All this would be different under Democratic rule, it was stated, and in addition, water-power sites would be protected, labor receive fairer treatment, Prohibition be enforced, and a constructive foreign policy adopted.

In this convention, too, the nomination was decided on **the**

first ballot. Alfred E. Smith, four times governor of New York and well known as an able politician, a progressive administrator, and a determined fighter, was the ready choice. Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas was selected for the vice-presidency. Unfortunately for the harmony within Democratic ranks, however, Smith was a Catholic and a "wet." On both these counts he was sure to lose votes, particularly in the South and West.

The campaign was unusually exciting and attracted a surprisingly large vote. The extensive use of radio for speech-making and the presence of the religious and Prohibition issues roused millions from their normal political apathy. Hoover, a Quaker and a "dry" who considered Prohibition a noble experiment, was backed by the Protestant and temperance organizations of the country. Such bodies as the Ku Klux Klan — which had come into renewed prominence after the war as a "one-hundred-percentist," anti-Catholic, anti-Jewish, and anti-foreign, as well as anti-negro, association — also agitated against the Democratic candidate. Smith's lack of higher education, his close connection with Tammany Hall, and his limited knowledge of foreign affairs, militated against him, and Mrs. Smith appeared to be less popular with the women voters than did Mrs. Hoover. On the other hand, the Democratic candidate was supported by the many "wet" associations in the land and by a large number of liberals.

Hoover was victorious by a plurality of more than 6,000,000 votes, although 15,016,000 ballots were cast for the man from "the sidewalks of New York." The Socialist candidate, Norman Thomas, a Princeton graduate and at the time of the campaign a minister, received 267,000 votes. Smith carried only six Southern states, along with Massachusetts and Rhode Island. He lost his own state, New York, although the Democratic candidate for governor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, won easily. After the campaign the Republican triumph was attributed by a keen observer to "Prohibition, Prejudice, and Prosperity."

THE HOOVER ADMINISTRATION

The new President was known as a hard worker and a man with a **high** sense of duty. During his occupancy of the White House he gave ample evidence of his abilities as a planner and organizer,

but he soon showed himself to be a poor leader. It was said of him that "he could run a department or set of departments with great skill; he could organize forces to meet an emergency; but he could not direct a party, lead a parliamentary group, or guide public opinion." Rather impatient of criticism, he placed his chief trust in the advice of expert commissions, appointing more such bodies than any of his predecessors. In politics he proved to be a conservative, and in economic theory, a neo-mercantilist, favoring high tariffs and big business.

At the outset it appeared as though the Hoover administration might be highly successful. Both houses of Congress contained substantial Republican majorities, the cabinet was able, Republican political appointments throughout the land were generally free of scandal, and the country as a whole seemed to enjoy great prosperity. Yet the President was immediately confronted with some problems of overwhelming magnitude and was induced to call Congress in special session without allowing himself sufficient time to formulate legislative recommendations of his own.

In his inaugural address Hoover had pointed out the need for "limited changes" in the tariff, early farm relief, and stricter enforcement of the laws. The first two of these problems were referred directly to Congress for action (April, 1929). As a preliminary step in dealing with the question of law and order, the chief executive appointed a Law Enforcement Commission, under the chairmanship of former Attorney-General George W. Wickersham, to make a thorough survey of the crime situation.

By 1929 the "crime industry" had become so well organized that municipalities and even states confessed inability to cope with the dilemma. It was estimated (1931) that the annual cost of crime to the nation was at least one hundred dollars per capita, and probably more. A major portion of the crimes was connected, directly or indirectly, with the violation of the Volstead Act, but the racketeers, readily able to "buy protection," extended their activities to numberless other fields. Only a fraction of the criminals, many of whom were well known to the authorities, ever suffered arrest, and fewer still, conviction. Eventually the Federal Government itself found it easier to imprison racketeers for falsifications of their income tax returns than for violations of the prohibition or homicide laws.

The Wickersham Commission's report, therefore, was eagerly awaited, but the circumstances surrounding its publication early in 1931 detracted from its value. Rumor had it that the administration exerted pressure on the Commission to tone down its findings. The document displayed no sign of unanimity and was vague on some of its most important revelations. The President, moreover, informed Congress of his disagreement with several of the recommendations, particularly those which related to Prohibition. The net result of the labors of the Commission was disappointing, although two definite advances were made: (1) it was clearly established that Prohibition reform was urgently needed; (2) upon the advice of the Commission, Congress transferred the enforcement of the liquor laws from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Justice.

In the matter of the tariff, Congress disregarded the President's advice concerning "limited changes" and quickly engaged in wholesale "log-rolling." Senator Joseph Grundy of Pennsylvania, a notorious ex-lobbyist, vigorously maintained that campaign contributions should be repaid with tariff favors. The Fordney-McCumber Act was replaced by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff which lowered the rates on about 235 items and raised them on 890 items. Against the advice of a group of 1000 economists and of numerous experts representing both political parties, Hoover, in May, 1930, signed the bill, trusting to the Tariff Commission to uncover any injustices in the act. There was a storm of opposition throughout the country to the President's decision and foreign countries generally resorted to one form or another of retaliation. The foreign trade situation became worse instead of better.¹

The method adopted by the administration to provide farm relief was equally unsuccessful. In 1929 and 1930 Congress rejected several debenture plans whereby the farmers were to

¹ The high rates on manufactures tended to raise the price of home-made products, especially those which were needed by the farmer. Simultaneously, in consequence of a succession of good crops, the farmer continued to receive low prices for his produce despite the fact that the tariff also was designed to protect agriculture. Foreign countries, moreover, not only retaliated by raising their import duties on American manufactures, but cut down on their purchases of American grain in favor of that from the Argentine, Australia, Canada, or Russia. Hence the net result of the tariff was a serious loss of foreign markets and an alarming decrease in domestic buying power.

be aided by a kind of subsidy on agricultural staples. Instead, by an act of June, 1929, there was created a Federal Farm Board of twelve members, equipped with a revolving fund of \$500,000,000. The Board was to fight over-production, encourage the formation- of farmers' cooperatives, and form stabilization corporations for the several crops with power to buy and sell temporary surpluses in these crops. The measure, based on the hope that the grain surpluses would be temporary, was expensive and in reality tended to foster rather than discourage over-production. A drought in 1930 resulted in a slight rise in the price of farm products, but in 1931 the prices fell to new lows.

The isolationist attitude in foreign affairs which had more or less characterized the previous administrations, was abandoned by President Hoover and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson. In 1930 the United States became a party to the London Naval Treaty. Every effort was made to aid the cause of disarmament at the Geneva Conference. There was a steady exchange of notes with the League on the status of Manchuria, although the League failed to give endorsement to Mr. Stimson's announcement that the United States would not recognize any territorial changes effected in violation of the Kellogg Pact or other treaties. A more liberal recognition policy was adopted with respect to governments that came into power in Latin America through revolution, and the marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua.

Meanwhile, in October, 1929, the stock market in Wall Street had crashed. On the 24th of that month uneasy speculators dumped almost thirteen million stock shares on the market. The origins of the crash are traceable to the economic upheaval wrought by the World War. During the period of hostilities there had been a great inflation of prices. Except for a brief depression soon after the war, America continued to prosper in the 1920's, chiefly because of the wartime depletion of goods and the readiness of Europe and Latin America to place huge orders in the United States so long as credits were available and the American people were willing to invest in foreign bonds. In consequence there developed a risky speculative mania during which prices remained artificially inflated and enormous "paper fortunes" were made. Prices rose, industry expanded, and pro-

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duction increased without plan or precaution. Yet, at the same time, tariff walls were raised still higher, nations everywhere placed obstacles in the way of world commerce, and the questions of reparation and war debts continued to embitter international relations. It was inevitable that post-war deflation should eventually set in, and a financial break was sure to come as soon as American investors should become uneasy about their holdings and foreign purchases should be checked. After the crash in the United States, disaster quickly attacked Europe's weak financial structure, first, as has been shown, in Austria, then elsewhere, and the economic depression soon became world-wide.¹

The President's first public comment on the stock market situation characterized the latter as being merely the result of a wave of uncontrolled speculation in securities. He pointed out that the position of the banks was strong, that there was no undue accumulation of goods, and that fresh capital, "hitherto absorbed in stock market loans for speculative purposes," would now return to the normal channels of business. Hence the difficulty was temporary and recovery was close at hand. But when conditions became worse, and, indeed, affected the entire world (1930), Hoover explained that the crisis was of world magnitude and was caused by factors obviously beyond the control of the United States. In order to speed the economic revival, the President in 1931 proposed his international moratorium to be effective from July 1, 1931, to June 30, 1932. This action only emphasized the seriousness of the world's predicament and did little to restore confidence.

Energetic measures were taken to deal with the situation at home, for unemployment figures rose rapidly and by January, 1932, were estimated at seven million. Congress appropriated large sums for the construction of public buildings and highways. Unemployment relief committees were appointed by cities, states, and the nation, and funds were collected from charitably inclined persons throughout the land. Employed citizens were encouraged to "share their work" with less fortunate neighbors and there was an increasing demand for the five-day week. Relatively little progress, however, was made in this last connection. National and local tax rates were raised but the na-

¹ See pp. 178-184.

tional budgetary deficit at the end of 1932 was well over two billion dollars.

To ease the financial stringency which resulted from foreign gold withdrawals and private hoarding, Congress, in 1932, passed the Glass-Steagall Bill, which amended the eligibility provision of the Federal Reserve Act in such a way as to permit the use of certain government bonds as coverage for the issue of federal notes. Thus a portion of the banks' gold stock was released for business purposes. Groups of member banks, moreover, which had exhausted their collateral eligible for discount by Federal Reserve Banks and yet were in a solvent condition, were permitted to borrow from the Federal Reserve System on joint promissory notes.

Another bill, passed just before the Glass-Steagall Act, created a Reconstruction Finance Corporation with a capital of \$500,000,000 subscribed by the United States Government, and with power to issue obligations to three times that amount. The Corporation was authorized to lend money to fiscal and other institutions for purposes of "financing agriculture, commerce, and industry, including facilitating the exportation of agricultural and other products." All loans were to be for three years, and with the consent of the Interstate Commerce Commission money might be advanced to railroads. Later the resources of the Corporation were increased by \$1,800,000,000, to a total of \$3,800,000,000, and its lending powers were extended to include relief loans to states, for by this time financial breakdown threatened not only thousands of small companies, but even municipalities, counties, and states. Within five months of its creation, the Corporation had advanced a total of \$1,055,000,000, and by August 1, 1932, after seven months of operation, it had loaned \$784,000,000 to 4324 banks and trust companies.

Among other incidents of the depression was a march on Washington (1932) by unemployed war veterans from all over the United States demanding that Congress provide for the immediate redemption in cash of the bonus certificates. Congress disregarded the plea on the ground that payment of a cash bonus would place an enormous strain on the already weakened financial system of the country. The "bonus marchers" threatened to remain camped in Washington until their demands should

have been met, and the government eventually used troops to clear the city of the petitioners. Bayonets, sabres, and gas were used in the process, and though the casualties were slight, public opinion generally condemned the procedure.

In this atmosphere the country prepared for the elections of November, 1932. The Republican convention met at Chicago on June 14 and renominated President Hoover on the first ballot. Mr. Curtis was renominated for the vice-presidency. The Democrats also met at Chicago, on June 22. After a contest between the supporters of Alfred Smith and Governor Roosevelt of New York, labelled a "liberal" by his followers, the latter secured the nomination. John N. Garner of Texas, Speaker of the House (which had come under Democratic control in consequence of the elections of 1930), was selected for the vice-presidency.

The chief plank in each platform dealt with Prohibition. The Republicans favored what soon came to be known as a "wet-dry" plank which advocated a referendum on a proposed amendment providing for a limited form of state option, to be enforced with the cooperation of the federal authorities. The Democrats declared for outright repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. The Socialist Party once more nominated Norman Thomas who, it was expected, would poll a sizable vote through the support of intellectuals and persons who were dissatisfied alike with Hoover's conservatism and Roosevelt's vagueness.

The Democratic candidate swept the polls, carrying 42 states and securing a plurality of well over 6,000,000 votes. About 620,000 ballots were cast for the Socialist candidate, and the Communist Party, which before the election expressed great confidence in its growing popularity, polled only some 22,000 votes. Both branches of Congress also went to the Democrats, the House by more than a two-thirds majority.

BROADENING INTERESTS

One of the most important phenomena in post-war United States was the growing popular interest in travel, made possible by the blessings of prosperity. Whereas in 1880 a total of 50,000 Americans visited foreign parts, the figure in 1930 was 500,000. The expenditures of American tourists abroad in

1930 were estimated at \$800,000,000. There was an even greater increase in the amount of traveling and sight-seeing within the United States, a circumstance for which improved railway service, the development of the automobile and good roads, and the organization of air traffic, all share credit. In 1930 one person out of every five in the land owned an automobile. "A dynamic history of the post-war period," wrote an observer in 1925, "might give a volume or two to the automobile and a foot-note to affairs of state."

According to the census of 1930 there were almost 13,500,000 radio sets in use in American homes. The United States led the world in number of telephones, both business and private, and in the installation of most other types of modern conveniences. In many cases, however, families were enabled to purchase such objects only because of the vogue of the "deferred-payment" system. Persons frequently were tempted to buy luxuries which they could ill afford, lured by attractive advertisements and convinced by skillful salesmen that they would "never miss the two dollars per week." The consumption-credit movement artificially stimulated production during the days of prosperity and left a large surplus of goods on the market when the depression of 1929 began to curtail the buying power of the public.

There was an increasing interest in all fields of sport and millions of dollars were spent in the development of public and private playgrounds. "Spectators' sports," such as boxing and football, became amazingly popular. On occasion as many as 90,000 persons attended a single intercollegiate football contest and in 1927 the gate receipts in the Tunney-Dempsey championship prize fight were \$2,650,000. American enthusiasm over the Olympic Games of 1932 at Los Angeles was unprecedented, and the athletes of the United States succeeded in capturing a larger share of individual and team honors than those of any other nation.

Education came to occupy a more important place in American life. The college population grew rapidly after the war and in 1930 the total registration of students of all classes at Columbia University, the largest in the country from the standpoint of enrollment, was 33,144. Extension and home study courses became highly popular. Though the influence of "jazz" made

itself felt in many phases of public and private life, the people showed an increasingly discriminating interest in art, music, literature, and the theatre. "Book-of-the-month" clubs and "limited editions" series found numerous subscribers, and there developed a wide market for historical and biographical works as well as novels and reprints of classics. In 1927 the number of books printed in the United States was 227,500,000.

There developed a keen appreciation of scientific developments and discoveries. The newspapers found it profitable to carry special science sections as well as supplements on art, music, theatricals, and sports. More and more frequently was the Nobel Prize for scientific achievements won by Americans. And a triumph of the American enterprisers', designers', and builders' art was the completion of the Empire State Building in New York City in 1931. The building rises 102 stories and measures 1248 feet in height. It is the tallest structure in the world, and a symbol, perhaps, of American confidence in the future.

PART III

THE LATEST SETTING

CHAPTER XXIII

CROSSROADS

On November 11, 1918, the world celebrated the fourteenth anniversary of Armistice Day. As on all previous similar occasions, speeches were made everywhere in memory of the heroic sacrifices of the war, in honor of the "Unknown Soldier," and in praise of peace. Voice was given again and again to the hope for a warless future and an unending international harmony. Yet, to a calm observer, it was evident that factors of a wholly different sort were at work, factors of that selfsame kind which had led to catastrophe in 1914. The conclusion was unavoidable that the nations were rapidly approaching a crossroads from which one path gave hope of leading to a new world and the other, to a new world war.

As we have seen, nationalism and irredentism were to a considerable extent responsible for the coming of the war. And the Europe of today contains as many as, if not more, nationalist and irredentist danger zones than that of 1914. Germans, Austrians, Magyars, and Turks no longer oppress their neighbors, but the situation, on the whole, has been reversed, hardly improved. Irredentism still exists, only now it is German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Lithuanian as well as Italian. The principle of nationality is still being violated—in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Italy, and Yugoslavia. There are strong separatist movements in Spain and Belgium, and the Macedonians are clamoring for independence. In addition, the cry for self-determination has become disquietingly loud in the overseas possessions of the former Allies, in Syria, for example, and in India. Minorities treaties and mandatory obligations are a sign of advance over conditions as they were before the war, but in practice the advance has been relatively slight.

Furthermore, the spirit of nationalism appears to be no whit less exaggerated than in 1914. Parallel with the development of a certain amount of "international-mindedness" among the people of the world, there has arisen an unprecedented glorification of the state and nation, particularly among the various groups of "fascists." Each of the smaller nationalities which has come into its own since 1918 has added to the world stock of national jealousies, intrigues, and ill-will. Indeed, the lust to exercise sovereign power, often in complete disregard of the rights of others, seems to vary indirectly with the size of the state concerned. Rumania objects to being reckoned in the category of Balkan countries. Poland wants recognition as a Great Power. San Marino is angry because refused membership in the League of Nations as a sovereign, independent state!

If militarism and military alliances were factors in bringing on the World War, they must again help to bring on another armed conflict. The militaristic spirit gives every indication of being more widespread today than it was in 1914. It has gripped the United States as well as the European countries and has certainly become more powerful in eastern and southern Europe. Standing armies, too, have become more dangerous because they are more numerous. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania, China, all maintain military establishments that they can ill afford, while Germany, Italy, Austria, and Hungary supplement their relatively small official forces with large private armies. Military youth societies have become the fashion in many parts of Europe and the introduction of military training into the schools has become popular. In the fiscal year 1930-1931 the world, threatened with bankruptcy, spent between four and five billion dollars on armaments.

For a time it was believed that the downfall of Europe's leading autocracies would spell the end of militarism, secret diplomacy, and military alliances. But the new democracies and the dictatorships appear to be hardly less militaristic, though in some cases much less stable, than were the old imperial systems.

Although military alliances proved themselves to be wholly unreliable as a means of security in 1914, they are still regarded, in some quarters, as the chief protection against foreign aggression. Hence they still remain as a constant threat to world

peace. The Triple Alliance and Triple Entente of pre-war days have merely been replaced by three post-war "defensive" systems, centering, respectively, in France, Italy, and Russia. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan appear to be unattached as yet, but it is hardly conceivable that all or any of these powers can remain neutral in the event of another great war.

Economic rivalry and imperialism were given as a third fundamental cause of the World War. Such rivalry also exists today, in intensified form. In a very real sense the armistice of November 11, 1918, signalized the end of military hostilities and the outbreak of a disastrous world economic war. The years since then have witnessed the general levying of unprecedentedly high tariffs, the imposition of all sorts of import quotas, the wholesale passage of restrictive immigration laws, the development of highly organized "buy-home-products" movements, and the invention of most ingenious forms of economic discrimination and retaliation. There have been, of course, a few positive advances in the field of world economics since the war, such as the negotiation of a few "barter treaties" providing for an exchange of goods between the signatories, but the progress in this direction has been only moderate.

The attempts of each country to buy as little from and sell as much as possible to every other land, cannot last indefinitely. Under modern conditions no state is self-sufficient and no state can afford to cut itself off from every other country. Moreover, those states which have reparation dues or war debts to pay must be allowed to derive profit from foreign trade, else they cannot have a surplus left at the end of the year with which to meet these obligations.

To make the economic situation worse, the world may soon find itself paying the penalty for permitting technological improvements to continue apace without any effort to make the necessary social adjustments. The *laissez-faire* philosophy of the nineteenth-century economists has been adhered to in the face of entirely new economic facts, and complete economic disaster would seem to be inevitable unless some form of economic planning be introduced. Because of both the economic war and the absence of any systematic regulation of production and dis-

tribution, the world's figure for unemployment in 1932 reached the staggering total of about twenty-five million.¹

The dangers inherent in the economic situation were pointed out as early as 1920 by a group of engineers engaged in the study and analysis of America's industrial and agricultural growth. Coming during the days of prosperity, the warnings of the engineers that a new type of social and economic control was necessary to cope with the great technological developments of the post-war era went unheeded, although the scientists erred by only six months in predicting the crash of 1929. In the meantime, however, the economic war among the nations of the world has continued with increasing bitterness, and the difficulties engendered within each country have brought about a rapid growth of radical and revolutionary organizations of the communist, socialist, and fascist types.

There remains the question of international anarchy and secret diplomacy. Here there has been a decided improvement, in the creation of the League of Nations and the World Court, and the popularization of the conference method for the settlement of international problems. Between June, 1919, and June, 1932, almost fifty international conferences, attended by three or more powers, were held, and numerous questions that might have led to strife were discussed in an atmosphere of friendliness and compromise. But here too the advance has not been altogether reassuring. So long as the United States and Soviet Russia remain outside the organization of the League, the latter must of necessity remain weakened. Secret agreements, moreover, still flourish, and doubtless will continue to flourish as long as individual diplomats are permitted by their countrymen to bind entire nations by their own word.

It would certainly appear, after this hasty summary, that the

¹ In 1931 and 1932 the evils of this uncontrolled economy were forcefully brought out when the Department of Agriculture of the United States advised the cotton planters to destroy every third row of planted cotton in order to keep up the price of the product. And this at a time when perhaps millions of other Americans were freezing for lack of clothing or else depending on gifts from charity. The farmers in the West, moreover, were feeding their corn to cattle and burning their wheat as fuel, because they could not afford to ship their produce to market and because the price of wheat in the world market was lower than the cost of production. Similarly, millions of bags of Brazilian coffee were dumped into the sea, that it might continue to be profitable to raise the coffee bean.

world is once more "heading toward an abyss/' The path of reparation, debts, tariffs, super-nationalism, and widespread ignorance of conditions in other countries, can only be the path to destruction. On the other hand, there seems to be more than just a prospect of a happier future along the path which leads away from the factors which brought on the World War. Were the nations to wipe clean the slate of past wrongs, injustices, and mistakes, and start afresh with no memories of hate, the future might be brighter. The economic experts are virtually agreed on the need for an abolition of all heritages of the war. The politicians must be made to come to the same realization. Lastly, the teachers must bring up the new generation in a spirit of world-mindedness and international friendship, else the whole structure of western civilization may crumble.

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