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Indian Nationality

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INDIAN NATIONALITY

INDIAN NATIONALITY

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1920

TO
MY WIFE

INTRODUCTION

We have in these days suddenly come to a crucial stage in the impact of western ideas and western methods upon the ancient civilisation of India. For in the midst of innumerable other claims upon our thought, we are called upon to form a judgment upon the vital question in what ways and under what conditions the political system and methods of the West can be made applicable to the needs of India. That is no easy question. It is not a mere question of political machinery. It strikes far deeper than that; for the concepts of modern political liberalism must inevitably produce in India, as in all countries in which they have been applied, a profound and far-reaching social revolution. How deep the question goes may best be appreciated if we ask ourselves what have been the dominant and operative political conceptions of the West, especially during the last century, and how far they are in accord with the deep-rooted convictions and habits of thought of India.

I take it that these dominant conceptions have been four. The first is the idea of Individuality as something supremely valuable, something possessing such an inherent sanctity and such inalienable rights that all formal restraints upon its self-expression not necessary for the safeguarding of other individualities should be jealously regarded. Now, although this high valuation of individuality has its roots deep in the history of western civilisation, though it is present in the thought of ancient Greece, and is, indeed, inherent in Christianity, the religion of western civilisation, it has always had to

struggle against other and powerful conceptions: against the strength of ancient customs which tended to fix a man's life and duties in accordance with his birth, against the traditions of the feudal order, against the doctrines of religion preaching self-immolation as the highest of duties, against the claims of the State demanding the utter subordination of the individual. Even to-day there are many and healthy protests against the more extreme expressions of individuality; in one aspect Socialism is such a protest, though in another its claim is that the communal organisation of the material circumstances of life is primarily needful as a means of giving more real freedom to the individual. Nevertheless the worship of Individuality is one of the chief factors in the political life of the West; it has always been so, but most potently since the French Revolution. In the West, we think of Society as a complex of individuals; we assume that, as units in Society, each individual must be regarded as of equal value; we trust to individual energy for the main driving force in our economic and intellectual life; and we are eager to do all we can to release this potent force from all needless restraints.

The second dominating political conception of the West is the conception of the Laws which hold Society together, not as something imposed by external authority, but as representing the will and conscience of the mass of individuals of whom Society is composed, and as therefore properly subject to be changed by their will; and we hold that those laws which govern the relations of individuals with one another, and with the State, should be the same for all. This conception also has its roots far back in the history of western civilisation; it has always been more or less clearly one of that civilisation's *differentiae*. Nevertheless this conception has had to struggle, through the centuries, against other views of Law, and against many hostile forces; and it was only during the nineteenth century that it won its triumph.

The third dominating conception of the West is the conception of the Nation as the surest foundation for the organisation of the State; and the Nation we think of as a body of people bound together by such a multitude of common interests and common thoughts that they easily and naturally understand one another, that they are conscious of 'belonging together,' that they readily accept and submit to a common body of laws and a social order, and that they will be ready, as if by instinct, to subordinate all merely sectional interests or ambitions to the common welfare in case of need. The 'patriotism' of the Nation is for us the cement that holds the State together without the application or threat of brute force, which is always necessary in non-national States. The conception of the Nation is the latest-born and also the least obvious and natural of the distinctive conceptions of western civilisation. It is quite modern in its development; the theory of it only began to be expounded in the nineteenth century. It is a mode of political organisation which has been unknown over the greater part of the earth's surface and during the greater part of human history; for it could not arise except in those societies in which the unifying conditions necessary for its existence had already grown up—a common or dominating language with the body of ideas which it conveys; a sense of racial unity, or at least the absence of any fixed and formal barriers between one section of the community and another; a common body of fundamental ethical ideas; above all a common body of traditions, formed by a long habit of co-operation in success or in disaster. And these factors of nationhood do not naturally or inevitably grow up together.

Out of these three distinctive features of western civilisation there has gradually grown up, as the best mode of expressing them all, the system of national self-government through representative assemblies, which is the fourth of the distinctive political conceptions of the West. Such a mode of government can only function well

in a society which is effectively united as a nation, since only a body of men fundamentally homogeneous can be effectively *represented*, as in a microcosm, by a small assembly, or can have what Rousseau calls a General Will. It loses much of its meaning unless the idea of Law as representing the will of the community, capable of being altered by that will, and applicable to every member of the community equally, is generally accepted. And it must be largely unreal unless, in the society which adopts it, the individual (whose vote is the foundation of the whole system) is regarded as the real unit and basis of society. Consequently the system of national self-government has been a thing of very recent development, and has a long history only in that nation in which the national sense was longest-rooted — the English nation.

Universal as its triumph seems to be to-day, the system of national self-government is still insecure, and is everywhere the object of criticism. The chief sources of its insecurity are two. In the first place there is a tendency to go back upon the acceptance of the individual as the unit of society, and to regard economic groups as being for many purposes the real units which ought to be considered; this tendency finds a crude expression in the Soviet system of Russia, of which there are less crude echoes in other lands. In the second place, there is in some quarters a reaction against the Nation as the essential basis of political organisation, and a tendency to assert that there is less real homogeneity between the various classes and interests in a single nation than between the members of the same class in different nations. Whether these forces hostile to the effective working of the parliamentary system will lead to its downfall or not, remains to be seen. We dare not prophesy; because the system itself is so recent, everywhere save in the English-speaking lands, that we have as yet insufficient experience of its working to justify dogmatism.

When we are called upon to consider how the political

machinery of the West (which has grown up as a means of satisfying the fundamental political conceptions of the West) can best be applied to India, we are bound to ask ourselves how far India shares these fundamental political conceptions of the West; and if, or in so far as, she does not share them, how this is likely to affect the working of a system which regards them as axiomatic.

To begin with, it is very manifest—the fact comes out clearly enough in Mr. Gilchrist's book, though it is not specifically dealt with—that individuality does not command, and has never commanded, such respect in India as it does in the West. Self-suppression, not self-expression or self-development, is still, as it has always been, the highest ideal of the best Indian minds: that is the real meaning in the statement that India is 'more spiritual' than the West. The doctrine of the equal value of every individual (which even in the West is rather an aspiration than an expression of fact) is fundamentally inconsistent with the very basis on which Hindu society is organised, and is flatly contradicted by the one outstanding characteristic of the Hindu religion; though it is entirely in accord with the teachings of Mohammedanism. Far from freeing individuality to the utmost practicable extent from restraints upon its expression, India dictates almost every detail of the individual's life in accordance with the rank into which he is born, and (as Mr. Gilchrist shows) life becomes all but impossible to any man who dares to defy these restrictions. Not freedom but inherited obligation is the key-note of that society; and its real unit is not the individual, but the family, and that larger and strictly exclusive family, the caste. Individual initiative, in which the western world puts its trust, is in India restrained by a multitude of inhibitions; and that is one main reason why India has been handicapped in competition with the West. On the economic side, the West emerged with difficulty from a stage in which occupational groups rather than isolated individuals were the real units, and, as we have

seen, there is in some respects a tendency to go back towards the occupational group as the real unit. In India the occupational group (in the form of caste) has for many centuries been organised with a strictness never known in the West; and in spite of the adaptability which the system has shown, it is to-day scarcely less rigid than it was in the past. Mr. Gilchrist has put together in an interesting way the relevant facts which bear upon this subject.

Again the western conception of Law as representing the common will, capable of being modified freely by that will, and applicable to every member of the community equally, has never been accepted in India—or, indeed, in the greater part of the world. Like the Saxon or the Bavarian in the sixth century, the Indian citizen is born into one body of law or another, and must always be judged by it in most of the relations of life; and these distinct bodies of law are not open to be altered freely by any legislative authority. The body of Mohammedan law rests upon the will of God as declared in the Koran, and cannot be altered. The body of Hindu law, though it is more elastic and can be changed by interpretation, equally rests ultimately upon the sacred books, and cannot be changed in fundamentals. When Mr. Patel introduced his bill to legalise inter-caste marriages (that is to say, to allow the children of such marriages to be treated as legitimate), the whole argument turned upon the question whether the Sacred Books, truly interpreted, did or did not permit such marriages. That is the final determinant; and both sides would agree that the edict of the early and divinely inspired lawgiver is final if its meaning is unmistakable. Hence in India there is, and there can be, no single body of uniform law in regard to social and personal relationships; and in that vast sphere law-making in the western sense is unthinkable. No representative assembly whatsoever can conceivably legislate upon such matters. The most powerful despots in the past dared not attempt to do so. For Law in India is not the expression of the

will of the community as a whole; it is something imposed from without, ultimately divine in its sanctions.

Thirdly, the idea of the Nation never existed in India until it was rendered possible by the external unification brought about by British rule, and until the formulae of western nationalism were spread abroad. This is not to say that there is not a real unity in India for which the term 'Nationality' may (in the absence of any other word) form the most convenient expression. But it is a unity of an altogether different kind, and rests upon altogether different bases, from that homogeneity which is implied when we speak of a 'nation' in the West. Almost all the elements which go to produce the homogeneity of nationhood in the West are lacking in India. There is no unity of language, except that which is provided by the use of a foreign tongue by the educated classes—a condition of things corresponding to the use of Latin in mediaeval Europe. There is an infinite multiplicity of races, far greater than in any European country, greater even than in Europe as a whole; and while in Europe the obliteration of all formal barriers between the various elements of the nation has been the essential condition of nationhood, in India these barriers are elaborated and maintained by the system of caste to a degree unknown in any other region of the world. There is not even a fundamental unity of ethical conceptions, for the conflict of ideals between Hinduism and Mohammedanism is immeasurably sharper than any religious differences in the West. Hence the real unity which India possesses is of a wholly different order from the kind of unity implied by the term 'Nation' in the West; and, since that is so, the use of the same term to express it is apt to lead to confusion and loose thinking.

This is, no doubt, what is in the mind of Sir Rabindranath Tagore when he protests against the forcing of India into the mould of the nation: not only does he feel that India is not a nation in the western sense, but he dislikes (as do many Westerns), many aspects of western

nationhood, and many ethical and political consequences which seem to flow from it. He is, in short, unwilling to admit that the western conceptions which I have tried to define have an absolute validity. He thinks of them as the outcome of purely western conditions. He sees that they are, in their full development, of very modern origin, and that they are by no means unquestioningly accepted even in the West. And he doubts whether any but ili consequences can follow an attempt to force the ancient and slowly changing society of India into the Procrustean moulds of the momentary western fashions.

Now, when we are asked to consider—not whether the political machinery developed by the West to express its fundamental political conceptions *can* be applied in India, but—how and under what conditions they *shall* be applied, it would seem to be not unimportant that we should keep these deep differences between Indian and western conceptions in view. Is it best to act as if India were exactly like England, and to proceed accordingly, or is it best to accept the facts of India as it is, and to try to shape the institutions of a united India in accordance with these facts? Ought we to assume that the individual *is* the unit in India as in the West, and therefore rest everything upon the individual voter? Or ought we to assume (as the European countries did when they organised their first parliaments *on a communal basis* as assemblies of estates) that the religious and social groupings of India are facts of profound moment which statesmanship cannot afford to disregard, and which must be wrought into the political structure if that structure is to be stable and really representative of Indian life? Ought we to assume that India is a nation in the western sense? Or ought we to admit that the very real unity of India is of quite a different order from that of a western nation, and try to find for it an appropriate form of expression? These are very difficult and very important questions, not to be solved by the mere repetition of formulae drawn from the political theorists of the nineteenth century which

are already beginning to be untrue even of western countries. It is not for me to try to answer them. But they have to be answered in practice, and that very promptly. The future welfare of one-fifth of the human race depends upon their being answered wisely. And what the answer shall be depends in part upon the people of England, who have next to no knowledge of Indian problems, and in part upon the educated classes in India, who have for two generations been concentrating all their best abilities upon the study of the West, and have shown for its methods and ideas an altogether exaggerated veneration.

In face of this tremendous responsibility which rests upon our generation, it is above all needful that we should know, and should ponder, the relevant facts which bear upon the problem. Every book which helps us to do that is a public service, and ought to be recognised as such; and although I am but poorly qualified to deal with these momentous questions, I was glad when my friend Mr. Gilchrist asked me to write an introduction to his book, because the invitation gives me the chance of trying to show how important is the task which he has undertaken. He has dealt with the complex problems surrounding the question of Indian Nationality, and in doing so has necessarily touched upon the other aspects of the problem which I have tried to survey above. His work is, I believe, the first attempt to present in a single view the multifarious aspects of an extremely complex and vitally important subject, and thus to afford to intelligent readers the materials for forming a sane judgment upon it.

Doubtless there will be many readers who (like myself) will not be wholly satisfied either by Mr. Gilchrist's conclusions or by his methods of presentment. That is inevitable in any discussion of a theme so thorny, and Mr. Gilchrist himself would scarcely hope, or indeed desire, that it should be otherwise. His aim is to challenge thought, and to present honestly the relevant

materials for an intelligent opinion. And I am sure his readers will feel, as I do, that Mr. Gilchrist's book, on an extremely difficult subject, is honest; that it brings together, in instructive collocation, a large body of relevant facts; that it does not slur over difficulties, or doctor the facts in order to invite a predetermined conclusion; and that it earnestly endeavours to present with fairness not only conflicting opinions, but conflicting tendencies in the life of the Indian peoples. A book of which so much can be said is a useful contribution to sound thinking based upon knowledge; and there never was a time when English readers, or Indian readers, stood more in need of the help which such books can give.

RAMSAY MUIR.

PREFACE

THE series of studies entitled 'Indian Nationality' aims at setting forth the fundamental facts of Indian social, religious and political life, and their possible bearing on Indian responsible government. The subject is so wide, and its ramifications so many, that I make no claim to exhaustive treatment. The conclusions, like most conclusions on similar premisses, are tentative. Finality of judgment on such questions is possible only after the events have happened. My object is to give bases for judgment, not to lay down final laws. Such conclusions as I do give, I do not expect to find universal acceptance. The subject is difficult not only in itself, but also because it is liable to interpretation from preconceived ideas and racial, religious and political bias. But from whatever point of view the subject may be approached, one thing is certain —the need for exact thinking on exact facts. The Indian political atmosphere, for both Indians and Europeans, has for long been poisoned by inexact thinking, due either to ignorance of Indian conditions, or the wish to slur over unpalatable facts. On the one hand, there are the extreme Indian nationalists whose western theories of democracy too often conveniently forget the real character of the Indian population. On the other, there are the old bureaucratic Die-hards, whose loyalty to the service system or desire for efficiency forgets the necessary result of their own work. It would indeed be a poor commentary on our education if India did not show some signs of self-expression. Indian nationalism is really the result of the very efficiency which is the pride of the Indian services.

The peculiar character of these studies may be explained by their origin. The main part of Chapter I was delivered as two Extension Lectures in Calcutta University in 1915–1916, and published in the Calcutta University Extension Lectures. They have been completely revised to harmonise with the times. The later chapters really arose from a suggestion thrown out when the first lectures were delivered—namely, that someone should work out the bearings of nationality on India. Later the subject was taken up by myself, with the intention of giving a series of lectures, an intention which was not carried out owing to my departure on furlough. The fact that the studies were all originally intended to be separate lectures delivered at considerable intervals will largely explain the construction, particularly the frequent repetition of salient points.

The substance of most of these studies has been published in the *Calcutta Review*, to the proprietors of which I am much obliged for permission to republish. For help in reading the proof-sheets, and for valuable suggestions all the way through, I owe a deep debt of gratitude to my wife, and to my friend, Mr. R. S. Knox, late Professor of English Literature in the University of Calcutta.

R N. GILCHRIST.

November 1919.

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INDIAN NATIONALITY

CHAPTER I

NATIONALITY: ITS MEANING, APPLICATIONS AND VALUE

I

HISTORICAL writers of future ages, especially historians of culture, will undoubtedly have to ascribe very considerable importance to the nineteenth century. Even contemporary observers, though their view is necessarily limited, can say with comparative safety that the nineteenth has contributed more to civilisation than any other century; and granted that the view of a present-day writer cannot extend beyond that frontier of time which will not exist for posterity, nevertheless such a writer with a casual glance can bring before his mind a list of very notable contributions to culture made by that century, contributions which will have an essential part in giving guidance to the future development of society. If one were asked to select the most important and most abiding elements of development in the nineteenth century, one would not be far wrong in answering in one word—Revolutions. Every schoolboy nowadays is familiar with the phrase 'Industrial Revolution.' That revolution has, in the space of a few generations, completely transformed our ways of living. It has profoundly affected the greatest and the smallest, the most cultured

and the most rude. That revolution, brought about by inventions and the use of machinery, with the resultant growth of big cities, huge industrial and commercial enterprises and easy trans-continental communication, is so familiar to us moderns that we readily forget that it is a modern development. It is an established fact, essentially a nineteenth-century product, and the modern world has been conditioned in most of its relations by it. The Industrial Revolution, too, has been a parent revolution—with a large and ever-increasing family of noisy, unruly small revolutions.

Side by side has gone another revolution. Its origins were almost contemporaneous with the origins of the machinery revolution, and its course has been interlinked, both in causes and effects, with the other. But it has not had the honour or benefit of being definitely christened, and therefore clearly demarcated from other revolutions. It may well be called the Political Revolution; and this Political Revolution is nothing else than the introduction into the field of practical politics of the principle of nationality. Greek, Roman, English, and French Revolutions are mere incidents as compared with this master revolution. It has been practically a universal political earthquake, and the gigantic European struggle (as the physicists would say) was a semi-localised seismological disturbance of great magnitude. Revolutions, then, I think we are justified in saying, are the chief contributions of the nineteenth century to the course of culture: on the one side, the Industrial Revolution—machinery and its results—mainly material; on the other, the Political Revolution—nationality and its results—mainly spiritual.

The active principle of nationality is little over a century old: but nationalities lived and fought before then. The peculiar geographical position of our own country led to national fusion centuries ago, though even to-day in the British nation are several clearly marked nationalities. Before the nineteenth century

several modern nations had been established on a basis of nationality—notably France, Holland, and Spain. But till the end of the eighteenth century nationalities as such were completely ignored in high politics. Kingdoms were regarded as so much territory, transferable at will by the owner-monarch. The old mediaeval notions of Rulership and Ownership were conjoined in the dynastical wars of the eighteenth and previous centuries. Princesses carried monarchies as their wedding portions, with the result that under one monarch might be the most heterogeneous collection of races, creeds, and civilisations. Nationality—now a sacred spiritual principle—was then unborn; we may almost say that before the nineteenth century nations were not born. State battled with state, but behind the states was not the spontaneity of unified will-power which really makes a nation. How then did the principle of nationality emerge?

Besides the general rise in enlightenment and the growth of individual independence characteristic of the last two centuries, there are two historical events which may be marked out as bringing about this new idea. The one was the Partition of Poland: the other the French Revolution. Both of these movements were intimately connected with the rights and position of dynasties. Poland had an elective kingship, but the neighbouring states had autocratic hereditary monarchies, which were, as her neighbours considered, endangered by the close contiguity of the democratic principle of election. Poland was therefore divided by an act which stands out as one of the most immoral in history. The division was followed by oppression, and oppression in the case of the Poles (and in many other cases) merely fanned the flame of nationality. The French Revolution was not primarily a matter of nationality; France was already settled on lines of nationality. The discontent was social primarily, but the national idea went hand in hand with the social. The Revolutionists showed scant respect for dynasties, testified by their beheading

a king. They threw the old social order to the winds, and, in their new statement of principles of political life, they learned from Poland and declared for the rights of nationality. The theory of nationality in fact flowed directly from the theory of the Revolution. Rousseau's theory of the *volonté générale* implied the doctrine of the rights of nationality. John Stuart Mill held that one could hardly know what any portion of the human race should be free to do, if not to determine with whom to associate themselves in political union. Rousseauism gave impetus to both democracy and nationality, and the recognition of the triumph of democracy in France was at once a powerful fillip to nationality. At the time, the effects of the new spirit were meagre if not quite negative. Less than a generation later the Congress of Vienna re-mapped Europe with a ruler and set-square, irrespective of national boundaries. But France still led either by her own revolutions or by her sympathies. Greece, Bohemia, Italy, the Magyars fought, bled and won or lost on national principles. Though the national support for Italy and Greece especially could not be misjudged, England was a passive observer for years and years. In August 1914 the gospel of Mazzini was at last accepted in real earnest.

Before proceeding to the national issues of the recent war, I must first try to settle a very vexed question, viz., What is nationality? Nationality is a very refractory term to bring within the limits of a clear definition. Several causes contribute to this difficulty. Firstly, the term is vague in itself. Nationality is not something fixed, something on which one can lay one's finger. Secondly, in scientific books and papers on the subject there is considerable confusion of terminology, especially regarding the words 'nation' and 'nationality.' This long-standing confusion in English is, especially in text-books, often made more confounded by an additional source of trouble, which comes from Germany. In the German language there is a word *nation* which does not

express the meaning of the same English word. The English equivalent for the German *nation* is *nationality*. The English word *nation*, in spite of the old casual practice and the argued persistence of some writers (e.g., Willoughby in his 'Nature of the State'), has definitely a political signification, which the Germans denote by the word *volk*, which is usually translated into English as *people*. The English word *people* (as also the French *peuple*) has its nearest German equivalent in *nation*, the English word *nation* having its parallel in the German word usually translated people. The Germans have etymology on their side in the ethnic sense of their word *nation* (from *natus*, born). But the English language has given *nation* and *nationality* distinct meanings, and there is no reason to confuse issues simply because of etymology. Science demands as exact definitions as possible, and if on the one hand popular usage is vague and often wrong, on the other hand there is no reason to divorce scientific from popular usage in words, except (as in the present case to a certain extent) when absolutely necessary.

In English there are several terms very near in meaning to nationality, and, as a preliminary, it is necessary to clear the air by mentioning them and marking them off from each other. The words I refer to especially are *race*, *state* (and *government*), and *nation*.

Race is a term used to represent certain broad distinctions between men. We speak, for example, of an Englishman differing from a Chinaman by race. The science of races, Ethnology, has its own methods of determining races—craniometry, &c.—but for our present purposes we may simply say that race shows a broad distinction based on the features and languages of mankind. Race has no political signification. The term *state* is used to denote the sovereign unity of a number of people settled on a fixed territory and organised in one government. *State* is the idea of which *government* is the actual fact. *Nation* is very near in meaning to state: the former

has a broader signification. It is the state *plus* something else: the state looked at from a certain point of view—viz., that of the unity of the people organised in one state. Thus we speak of the *British Nation*, meaning the British people organised in one state and acting spontaneously as a unity. On the other hand we should hesitate to speak of the Austro-Hungarian *nation*, though we can speak perfectly correctly of the Austro-Hungarian *state*. There was not that requisite unity of spirit in the old Austro-Hungarian union to make it a nation. This distinction of nation and nationality is of paramount importance largely because it has not been observed till quite recently in the literature on the subject. John Stuart Mill, whose chapter on Nationality—in his 'Representative Government'—is a *locus classicus*, gives a good lead to thinkers by giving clear ideas on both the subject and name of nationality; but even in Mill the distinction between nation and nationality is not brought out. Though T. H. Green, the profoundest of English modern political thinkers, does not deal directly with the subject of nationality, he gives in his 'Principles of Political Obligation' one or two very apposite passages regarding the meaning of the word nation. 'The Nation,' he says, 'underlies the state,' and, again, he characterises the state as 'the nation organised in a certain way.' He also points out that the members of a nation 'in their corporate or associated action are animated by the certain passions arising out of their organisation.' Till recently nation and nationality have been used interchangeably; but it is far better to use them—indeed many present-day scientific writers do—as two separate terms. As yet the unfortunate thing about their separation is that they have to share the common adjectival form 'national.' They both have the same root *natus*, born (which shows a racial substratum of meaning), but the one, *nation*, has definitely become political in meaning; the other, *nationality*, while it also has a certain political content, lays emphasis on the root meaning

of common birth and other common elements (language, traditions, &c.) usually accompanying common birth. Nationality is a spiritual sentiment or principle arising among a number of people usually of the same race, resident on the same territory, sharing a common language, the same religion, similar history and traditions, common interests, with common political associations, and common ideals of political unity. Territory, race, language, history and traditions, religion, common interests, common political associations, common hopes of political unity—these are the elements on which nationality is based. They are the elements of nationality, be it noted, not nationality itself, which is a spiritual principle supervening when some or all of these elements are present. Not all of these elements taken together, not any one of them nor any combination of them will make nationality. Not one of the elements is absolutely essential; nor are all of them taken together essential. But every nationality has as basis some of them. It must never be forgotten that the basis is of no avail whatsoever unless the spiritual principle or sentiment grows on it as ivy on a tree. The physical element *must* be accompanied by the spiritual; otherwise there is a body but no soul.

Our distinction of state, nation and nationality may now be made clear by saying that the nation is the state *plus* nationality. Every nationality either has been a state (as the Scots), or aspires to be a state, whether a new state or the rehabilitation of a previously existing state (as the Poles or Czechs before the war). A nationality may be none the less real though it does not wish to become a complete organic state. Scotland, for example, does not wish severance from the British nation. The cry for Scottish home rule is confined to a few faddists: yet the Scotsman is one of the most distinct persons in the world as regards his nationality. It may be said, however, that a nationality which rests on its past glories and does not wish to be a distinct state is in

the process of being lost, or of being fused in a greater whole. The Scots may be said to be in the process of fusion in 'British' nationality. The Americanism 'Britisher' already supplants to a large extent, to members of other nations at least, the older distinction of English, Scottish, and Welsh. The preservation of nationality depends on the preservation of the social and political institutions of the populations forming the nationality. These may be preserved without absolute autonomy. A federal system, which harmonises the desire for self-government with the fact of dependence on a wider state, may fully satisfy national needs.

I have mentioned in detail the chief ingredients of the national mixture, but I must indulge in some further explanation and illustration. Common residence on common territory is a very usual accompaniment of nationality, but it is by no means either essential or universal. A population living together, definitely settled on a given territory, will naturally tend to have a uniformity of culture and experiences, or conversely, a population living in the cyclopean 'dispersed state' will more likely form groups with different experiences and purposes, and thus prevent the growth of the 'friendship' so essential to national fusion. Continued residence on a fixed territory is rightly set down by most writers as one of the first elements of nationality. It is essential, indeed, to the growth of nationality, but it is not essential to the continuance of national feeling. A nomadic tribe cannot form a nationality so long as it is nomadic; but if it settles down for a long period and develops, it may become distinctly national. If this nationality by any chance resumes its wandering, quite probably it will preserve its nationality. A glance at the existing nationalities of the world will show, firstly, that most nationalities have a given territory, the territory and nationality giving their names to each other (Scotland for the Scots, Denmark for the Danes, France for the French, &c.). Secondly, there are many nationalities distinctly marked as such

which have not achieved this ideal of a country of their own (as the Slovaks, Slovenes, and Ruthenians in Austria-Hungary before the war). Thirdly, several nationalities are scattered throughout the length and breadth of the world. This last point shows that common residence on common territory must not be regarded as either a universal characteristic of nationality, or essential to its vitality. Migration does not affect nationality. An Englishman, Scotsman or Irishman is English, Scotch or Irish from China to Peru. The Jews have preserved their nationality in spite of their dispersion. The Czechs, till they achieved nationhood, were as active nationally in the United States as in Bohemia, their home. So also were the Slovaks. One of the biggest and most clearly marked European nationalities, the Poles (though they have still a Poland), were and are almost as dispersed as the Jews; yet the Pole keeps his nationality in alien environment, even to the third and fourth generation. Dispersion may very easily lead to extinction of nationality, especially if the members of the nationality come into contact with a more virile culture. A weak nationality always tends to be swallowed up by a stronger. Its culture disappears, or is assimilated by the stronger one. Unless the numbers forming a nationality are sufficiently strong to transplant their own home lives, their nationality is in a parlous state. The United States furnishes a good example of how cultures are fused. The descending generations of Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenians or even Germans very frequently become thorough-going Americans.

One of the most universal fundamentals of nationality is community of race. This unity of race is indeed characteristic of most nationalities, but here again one must not be too ready to make it an unqualified necessity of national solidarity. For one thing modern races are so mixed that it is difficult to say what is one race and what is another race. Even the science of races, Ethnology, gives no undisputed theory of races. Opinion on many racial questions among experts is, in even leading questions,

confusedly divided. The racial bond of nationality, however, need not be so exact as the science of races demands. Belief in a common origin, either real or fictitious, *is* a bond of nationality. Every nationality has its legendary tales of its non-historic origins, whether it be the Patriarchs of the Jews, or Hunyor and Magyor of the Huns and Magyars, or the well-known stories of Greece and Rome. Scientifically speaking, a nationality cannot be regarded as a pure family descent. The origins of clans or tribes may, with a considerable degree of truth, be ascribed to some single progenitor, but national feeling cannot emerge without some intermixture of blood. The *ius connubii*, or right of intermarriage, must as a rule precede it. A notable instance presents itself before one's eyes in India. The caste system, which is endogamous, is essentially non-national. The essence of the Indian caste system is separation; the essence of nationality is solidarity. Were nationality dependent on this *ius connubii* alone, there could be no real nationality in India; but, of course, as I have just pointed out, no single ingredient of the list given above is essential to nationality. Race-unity is one of the strongest bonds, not because of the ethnological signification of race, but because it implies the further unities of common language, common traditions, and common culture. Were the real race issue to be the criterion, some of the most distinct of modern nationalities would at once break up the theory. The English and Scots are, to a fair extent, ethnologically the same, but they are distinct nationally. Germans and English, Dutch, Danes and Scandinavians are racially more or less homogeneous (teutonic), but one does not need to use many words to indicate the distinction of their nationality. The United States—the most interesting study in nationality in the world—is racially very diverse, but nationally 'American' or 'Yankee.'

Community of language, traditions and culture are closely connected with community of race. Language and race usually go together. The old Bohemian word

jaksy meant both language and race, and even modern Ethnology uses terms which strictly belong to linguistic divisions. The word Aryan, for example, is, properly speaking, a linguistic term, though, in spite of Max Müller's weighty protests, it is universally used to designate the 'race' of people using Aryan language. So it is with terms such as Ural-Altaic and Finno-Ugrian, used to distinguish 'races.' Most writers on nationality have laid great emphasis on the necessity of common language. Fichte, for example, one of the chief apostles of German nationality, declared that nationality was a spiritual thing, a manifestation of the mind of God, its chief bond of union being language, for language is developed from and connected with common experiences, interests, and ideals. That is the reason why language is so important. It really forms the basis of the other elements. Community of interests or ideals is no bond of unity unless they can be understood, and language is the vehicle of understanding. Most of the recent European national movements turned largely on national language, e.g., the Polish and Bohemian movements. The obverse is seen in the German and Magyar policy of suppression of languages of subject nationalities. That language alone must not be taken as a determinant of nationality, however, is shown by the United States, which uses the English language but has its own nationality, and again by Switzerland, in which there is one nationality and three distinct languages.

This community of language, implying common intercourse, common culture, and, as is usually the case, accompanying a real or fictitious common origin and common history, is the mother's milk of nationality. 'Ad connectendas amicitias tenacissimum vinculum est morum similitudo.' The greatest barriers to intercourse between peoples used to be mountains and seas. These are now overcome, but there remains the barrier of language, and in this connection the modern world witnesses two diametrically opposed tendencies. On the

one hand, many zealous people believe, and try to translate their faith into fact, that there should be one universal language. In the west the new language of Esperanto found favour for years; but it seems to be pining towards an early death. On the other hand, this is the age of nationality, and one of the chief planks in all nationalist platforms is language. Bohemia for the Czechs means a Czech language for a Czech people. The national movements of the Slovaks and Slovenes and other small nationalities mainly turned on language. How far civilisation benefits by the multiplication of smaller languages and nationalities is a question which demands separate treatment.

Religion, again, is an important basis of nationality, but history provides many examples of nationality forming in spite of religious differences. An important distinction must be kept in mind in this connection. National union, other things being equal, is not likely to be strong and lasting where there are fundamental differences in faith, as between Christianity and Mohammedanism. Nationality may develop in spite of difference of *sect*. The Serbo-Croatian national movement is a case in point. The Serbs are mainly Orthodox, the Croats, almost to a man, are Roman Catholic. The language of Serbs and Croats is the same (though written in a different script), their traditions and culture are similar, but their religious sects are distinct. None the less, even though the new territorial arrangements do not make one 'Greater Serbia,' the bridge of union has been built in spite of sectarian differences. In Greater Serbia, however (which includes Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia-Slavonia), there is an odd half-million of Moslems who must either migrate from a unified Serbia-Croatia or be content to remain a hostile minority. The Magyars and Turks, sons of the same legendary father, are racially the same, with close affinities in language; but their religious separation into Christians and Moslems has for ever destroyed hopes of national reunion. Religion can

undoubtedly be a strong incentive to national feeling. The identification of Protestantism with patriotism, for example, made England defeat Spain in the time of the Armada. The State and Church for many centuries of Western history were so much interrelated that the finest logicians of the time could not satisfactorily demarcate their spheres. Their affairs were inextricably connected, so that in mediaeval and early modern times state wars were church wars and church wars state wars. The conjunction of church and state meant very intense patriotism; and in the modern world, where the church has, relatively to the state, receded to the background, patriotism is based on other and new ideals. Yet this also must be noted that religions, either as a whole or in their sects, are powerful agents of dissolution. Indian nationality, in particular, is interesting from this point of view.

Political union either past or future is one of the most marked features of nationality, so marked indeed that of the various unities it may almost be said to be the only essential. A nationality lives either because it has been a nation, with its own territory and state, or because it wishes to become a nation with its own territory and state. Most of the vocal nationalities of the modern world depend for their national vitality on the fact that they aspire to nationhood. The extreme expression of this tendency is the cry 'one nationality, one state'—an aspiration which, if carried to its logical extreme, is dangerous and deleterious. The feeling of nationality, in fact, often emerges only through opposition of the ideals of a subject unified population to those of its masters. Misgovernment is a prolific parent of nationality. On the other hand, a population living for a considerable period under one state, if that state is tolerant in its ideas and practice, tends to become one nationality. A prominent example is the United States, where peoples of many different nationalities have been fused in the one American nationality. The terms German-American,

Czech-American, and the like, indicate the process of fusion. The population of the United States is composed largely of immigrants who in the first generation are pure Englishmen, Scotsmen, Germans, Poles, Magyars, or Czechs. Their children become political half-castes, and the third and fourth generations lose their parental prejudices and become pure Americans. Common political union is the most powerful, though not the only agent, in such a fusion. The subject of the connection between state and nationality is a very large and complicated one. For our present purposes it is sufficient to note that political union and nationality are very closely—almost indissolubly—connected.

Common interests are likewise closely connected with the development of nationality. A population which is clearly marked off from others by characteristic commerce and industries tends to develop a characteristic nationality. These interests need not be merely commercial. They may be diplomatic. Common interests are rather aids towards strengthening union than fundamental agents of union by themselves. They have had their importance in conjunction with other elements more than by themselves. They have played their part in nationalities such as the Dutch and Belgian, but, were they the sole determinants, Holland and Belgium would probably not exist at all. They were obvious considerations in the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707, but they are quite discounted in North America, where the material interests of the United States and Canada are very much the same. With the co-operation of other agents, we see it working in the British Colonies, where distinct colonial nationalities in the Australians, South Africans, &c., are visibly developing.

Such is a hasty sketch of the elements of nationality. But it is merely a summary. Nationalities are based on some of the above factors. In cases, as in the United States, absorption, to put the matter in a word, accounts for a change of nationality. But something further must

be added. Nationality is a spiritual thing formed by common ideals acting on a number of minds. Its natural basis may be one element or a combination of elements: in itself it is essentially spiritual, usually seeking its physical embodiment in self-government of some form. Self-government once attained, the national ideal becomes no longer an ideal but a realised fact, and is therefore dormant, to be revived by some external danger to the state. The various 'unities' given above are the chemical elements of the protoplasm; the ideal gives the life. It is necessary to emphasise this, for many theorists have tried to sum up nationality in one, some or all of these 'unities.' Certain writers have argued that the economic motive (common interests) is the main bond of nationality. Economic forces have played their part, a powerful part, in moulding new nationalities, and states have not been blind to the importance of this force. The Germans, for example, tried to supplant Polish nationality by 'planting' Poland with Prussian peasants; but history, instead of teaching how economic forces have made nationalities, shows rather how nationalities have lived in spite of economic forces. A *Zollverein*, as Renan finely says, does not make a *patrie*.

Nationality may exist before national ideals are definitely talked of in the press or on the platform. The consciousness of social union emerges from the natural fact of social grouping, but only gradually does the natural self emerge as a definite group force as distinct from other group forces. From the lowest form of tribal group consciousness the feeling of community develops till, in more advanced forms of social organisation, it is complex and difficult to analyse. The child is born into his social group, and gradually assimilates the particular customs, traditions, mannerisms and mental outlook of his group. He feels a pride in his own characteristic culture, even though it may be only parochial. His culture is his own: he rejoices in it, and feels as a personal insult any slur cast on his own community. Nationally, thus, the

individual becomes a type living in a society of such types, and to preserve his community he is willing to surrender himself for the general good. Not every individual, of course, is as intensely national as this. But national feeling always has the double aspect of altruism and egoism, each of which aspects may go to extremes. The extreme of egoism leads to the desire of domination, to the pride of type which insists on the imposition of its *Kultur* on everyone else. This, in part at least, is the explanation of the German imperialism which led to the war. The extreme of altruism takes the form of an exaggerated, nervous, unreasoning patriotism resulting in sacrifices superficially noble but in reality wasteful.

II

Having settled (as far indeed as the subject admits of settlement) the theoretical side of nationality, let us look for a few moments at the national object lesson as presented to us in the recent European conflict. Racially, the lines of the conflict are pretty clearly marked. On the eastern side is the vast country of Russia, peopled by a more or less racially homogeneous population, the Slavs. In the Slav population of Russia, however, are many elements either only half-slav or directly non-slav. But the Russian nation to all intents and purposes is slavonic, the Russians being usually called Northern Slavs, to distinguish them from the southern slavonic peoples of the Balkans. Of the mid-European powers the Germans are racially teutonic and are even more homogeneous than the Russians; while the quondam Austria-Hungary presented a most indiscriminate mixture. Austria itself is mainly German, i.e., teutonic, with mixtures within its borders of neighbouring stocks. Austria and Hungary as a whole are a racial and national welter. In the north-east are the Czechs or Bohemians, a slav people, as also are the Moravians their neighbours. South of Bohemia in the northern and eastern counties of Hungary are two

more slavonic peoples—the Slovaks and the Ruthenians or Little Russians; while common to Russia, Austria, and Germany are, of course, the Poles—racially slavonic.

The chief race in Hungary itself is the Magyar, brothers of the famed Huns and cousins of their late allies, the Turks. But one great province of the old Hungary, Transylvania (as also is the Russian province Bessarabia) is inhabited by the Rumanians or Vlachs, a mixed Latin race, akin to the Italians and French. South of Austria and south-west of Hungary are several provinces, peopled by races alien to their recent masters. In the whole of the south-east corner of the Union, including Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavonia and most of Carinthia, Carniola, Istria, and Styria there live the Slovenes and Croats—all southern slavonic peoples, as also are the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgars, the last-named being slavonic by culture but not by origin.

In Italy, again, in the west we meet the Italians and in France the French, both Latin by race. The racial name of our own people it is not easy to venture, but we may dismiss them by the rough designation of Anglo-Saxon (teutonic).

Such is a rapid survey of the racial lines. I have omitted many racial peculiarities such as the Wends and Kashubes in Germany (slavonic); the Letts and Lithuanians; and I cannot here enter into the question of how far the Prussians are teutonic or slavic. Precisely to determine the numerous races in Russia besides the Slav—Tatars, Finns, Esthonians, and the various cousins and second cousins of the pure Slavs—would lead me into intricate ethnological and historical labyrinths. My purpose here is to give a general review of these racial units from the point of view of nationality.

The nation is the ideal of nationality: but it must be remembered that as soon as the ideal is reached, another ideal takes its place. The sentiment of nationality remains a sentiment when a nationality has become an independent political unit, but it ceases to be an ideal.

For some of the great nations of the West nationality had ceased to have a political meaning before the war. The Russian, British and French nationalities had long since achieved their essential nationhood. The nineteenth century saw the political unification of Germany, though not quite on grounds of nationality; and in all these cases, the ideal of nationhood once reached, the activities of the nations had been turned to other ideals, the working out of which in one case led to the recent disastrous struggle. But implicated in the struggle, and depending on it largely for their future development, were several nationalities who aspired to become—or re-become—nations.

The lines of nationality in the great war correspond fairly closely to the racial lines, with one or two notable exceptions. Among the Slavs there were several internecine wars, chiefly due to the fact that the Austro-Hungarian state, which had within it a very considerable slavic population (Czech, Moravian, Slovak, Ruthenian, and Pole on the north-east, and Slovene and Croat in the south-west), was at war with the centre of all slavdom—Russia. The Serbians and Bulgars—both southern Slavs—also fell out, though not for the first time. The Turks naturally fought on the same side as their kinsmen, the Magyars of Hungary. Both Magyar and Turk are Ugrians of the Ural-Altaic stock. Racially the same, they still speak a similar language, but their modes of life have been totally rent asunder by their respective adopted religions. Of the other warring peoples the struggle was mainly between Latin and Teuton—the Italians, French, and Belgians against the Teutons (and company), while the Latin Rumania joined in the later stages of the struggle. Britain added to the struggle the element of racial variety, while Japan from another continent matched the Mongolian with the Caucasian. Of the later entrants to the struggle, the Portuguese are a mixed race. Latin by language and civilisation, they are a mixture of the old Iberians, Romans, Arabs, and Africans.

The Greeks are also very mixed. The Greeks themselves naturally cling to the idea that they are descended from the ancient Hellenes, a fancy which Byron and Victor Hugo used with much effect. But the modern Greeks are really a mixture of the old Hellenic stock, with Slavs, Vlachs, Turks, and Italians. One of the most remarkable things about Greek culture is the absorptive power of the old Hellenic civilisation—an excellent example of a superior culture imposing itself on conquerors. We have spoken above of the United States, and we cannot here go into the various questions affecting those nations which broke off relations with Germany because of her high-handed breaches of international good-manners.

One of the most interesting of the above-mentioned nationalities is the Serbian, with its kinsmen beyond the Danube and in the rugged heights of Montenegro. Serbia is a compact nation, glued together by ties of race, language, and religion (the Serbs are Orthodox Greek Church), common history, political and economic, and common cultural traditions. The history of Serbia is not a stainless one, but it is heroic. Through centuries of oppression under a foreign yoke the Serbs preserved their identity till once more in the nineteenth century they emerged an emancipated people. Their history of suffering and fortitude was played, as it were, in a single act on their own stage in the early days of the war. The Serbs have attained nationhood, indeed, but their relations over the Danube, living by the Save and Drave, for long had their desires for national unity completely frustrated by their union with the Austro-Hungarian state. These relations, the Croats and Slovenes, are like the Serbs, slavic peoples. The Serbs and Croats speak the same language and have similar cultural institutions. Their one difference is sect: the Croats are Roman Catholic, the Serbs Orthodox. There are in all about four million Croats, so that they formed a not inconsiderable proportion of the total population of the Austro-Hungarian union.

The Slovenes (who are to be distinguished from the

Slovinci or Kashubes, also a slavonic people, whose centre is in Germany, near Danzig, and, from the Slovaks, just as the Serbs must be distinguished from the Sorbs or Wends of Lusatia, in Germany) are far less numerous than the Croats, the Slovenes numbering only one and a half millions. Their home is in the districts of Carniola, southern Carinthia, Styria, and northern Istria, their chief centre being Laibach. They also stretch into north-east Italy. They have preserved their identity for about fourteen centuries, and to-day they have an active national life, shown in their not inconsiderable literature as well as in literary, social, and political organisations. Their aspirations, like their language and race, are Croatian and Serbian.

What we may call Greater Serbia would include territory stretching northwards to the river Drave as her north-eastern boundary, almost to Graz on the north and the Italian frontier on the north-west. The big and important provinces of Herzegovina, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Croatia-Slavonia, and parts of Istria, Styria, Carniola, and Carinthia are, by national bonds, mainly Serbian; on the other hand, nationality has forced Serbia to cede part of her territory to the Bulgarians. The new Jugo-Slav state for various political reasons is not actually part of Serbia, though its sentimental connection with Serbia practically makes it an extension of Serbia itself. It is too early yet to predict whether the political force of the League of Nations will be strong enough either to prevent or make their union.

The other Slavs involved in the struggle are divided into several nationalities, the most outstanding of which are the Poles. The Poles have behind them one of the most glorious and at the same time most unfortunate histories in Europe. Till the defeat of Germany their original home was divided between three states—Russia, Germany, and Austria; but the Poles themselves are spread all over the world, the United States in particular having provided them with a harbour of refuge. A

talented people, the most talented of all the once-subject European nationalities, by their political mismanagement —a record of internal quarrels, jealousies, and treacheries— they made themselves the prey of eager neighbours. Although the Poles ceased to be a nation over a hundred years ago, they certainly never ceased to be a nationality aspiring to their old power and greatness. Oppression and despair were their lot—a lot which made them known to the world as anarchists, conspirators and murderers. But their national fires never ceased to burn, and to-day the Polish nationalist has his ideal within his grasp. Safeguarded by the League of Nations the new Polish state now has a chance to prove itself among the nations of the world. It is to be hoped that the unfortunate auspices of its origin—the necessity for a port and the erection of favourable military boundaries, implicating large numbers of non-Polish citizens—may not lead to a repetition of its previous misfortune.

During its years of German rule, German Poland was the centre of many Prussian experiments, the aim of which was to kill Polish nationality by transplanting Prussian peasants to Polish farms. Huge sums of money were expended by Prussia for this object, but the result was that more German peasants became Poles than Poles became German peasants. The Polish language—which flourishes at its highest in the Universities of Warsaw and Lemberg—Polish modes of life, Polish art and music, Polish traditions lived in spite of oppression, and the Poles never for a moment lost their national ideal. Buffeted by their own passions and their alien masters, they were helpless till the great war. At the beginning of the war they looked to the great slav mother to help them. They had indeed little to thank Russia for in the past, but their prospects seemed to lie more in some sort of federal union with Russia than in independence. In Galicia they had a more comfortable home, not because of the natural benignity of the Magyar-Austrian rulers, but because the Austro-Hungarian ' ramshackle monarchy ' had to play one

nationality off against another. The League of Nations, following the complete break-up of all their neighbours, gave the Poles an independent state once more, a much more pleasing result than the earlier years of the war seemed to make possible.

Another nationality which at one time seemed likely to find its salvation among the Russians is the Ruthenian. The Ruthenians inhabit parts of Galicia, Bukovina, and the Carpathian district. They number about three millions. They are of the same stock as the 'Little Russians' of the Ukraine. Though relatively insignificant in numbers they have a very distinct nationality, shown by the national movement in language and literature. The Ruthenian intellectual centre is in Lemberg, at the University of which some lectures are delivered in the Ruthenian or Little Russian language. The Ruthenians themselves used to demand equal treatment there with the Poles, but in Lemberg more toleration was accorded to the Little Russian language than in Russia herself. Only by accident were the Ruthenians ever severed from Russia. The provinces which are their home were first joined to Lithuania; then they went to Poland, and thence, at the partition, to Austria. Their future at present depends on the solution of the Russian problem. The Ruthenians unfortunately are both politically and economically under an alien yoke: their upper classes are Poles, their middle class Jews or Germans. By religion the Ruthenians are Uniate Greeks.

To the north and east of Hungary are some interesting nationalities, most of which were sufficiently vigorous in pre-war days to make them thorns in the side of the Austro-Hungarian Union. Bordering on Germany, in the north of the Union lies the province of Bohemia or Czechy, inhabited by Czechs, who overflow the borders of their native habitat into both Austrian and Prussian Silesia. The Czechs are numerous in Vienna itself; they have also spread into the district of Volhynia in Russia, while they have crowded in thousands to the United

States, where they have many newspapers and magazines in their own language. In fact language has been the most prominent element in the Bohemian national movement. Despite the opposition of the Austrian authorities, the Czechs succeeded in establishing their language in both lower and middle schools, while in the University of Prague, Czechy has a sound intellectual centre. The Czech University was established in 1882–4. Czech nationality is a very real thing; the claims of the Czechs to their own political organisation are founded not only on race, language and religion (the Czechs are mainly Roman Catholic), but on a splendid history, in which stands prominent the name of John Hus.

The outbreak of the great war gave to the Czechs the chance of independent political life. Their pre-war political efforts were often spoilt by internal party dissensions. Fanned by the war, the latent national fires of the Czechs and their neighbours the Slovaks burned so bright that an anti-Central Powers army was actually formed out of Czecho-Slovak material. After the many vicissitudes of the war these nationalities, like the Poles, have come into their own, under the aegis of the new League of Nations.

In the northern counties of Hungary, surrounded in the west and south by Moravians and Poles (both their blood-relations), as well as by Germans in Lower Austria and Silesia, on the east by the Ruthenians (also their kinsmen), and on the south by Magyars, their arch-enemies, live the Slovaks, a population of two and a half million souls, cousins to the Czechs. The Slovaks are a quiet, slow peasant people who have been goaded to union natural enough in itself by the misrule and contempt of their Magyar masters. Their historical lot has been unfortunate, if not inglorious. They seem to have come to their present home about the fifth or sixth century: certainly in the seventh they were part of Samo's Empire. Avars, Turks, Moravians dominated the Slovaks at different periods; till finally the Magyars became their

masters in the early tenth century, and masters the Magyars remained till the end of the war. It says much for the Slovaks that after ten centuries of Magyar rule they have preserved their national identity. The Magyars persecuted the Slovaks as systematically as the Germans did the Poles and Danes. The Slovak language was rigorously suppressed in schools and churches; Slovak children were ruthlessly carried away from home influences and magyarised. All the time the Magyars were looked on by the Slovaks as the Greeks regarded foreigners —as barbarians. But rigorous oppression led merely to bitterness in the Slovak heart. Many national institutions sprang up, mostly to be suppressed on discovery by the Magyar rulers. According to the authorities the Slovak language is particularly rich in song-literature, and the efforts to preserve it are a blessing to literature in general; and, now that the existence of the language is not a danger to Magyar policy, the literature of the world will be enriched. The Slovaks, like the Czechs, Moravians and Poles in the years of oppression sought refuge in the United States. Czech and Slovak, now that state boundaries are readjusted, have practically coalesced. The Slovak language is closely akin to Czech; in fact the Protestant Church (the Slovaks are mostly Lutherans) uses Czech where and when possible.

The Czechs, Moravians, Poles, Slovaks, and Ruthenians have all been drawn together by the ties of common oppression. The Central European Powers and the Turks were the most systematic and ruthless oppressors of small nationalities in the world. Had even the Imperial Russia—regarded with haughty contempt by the Germans as a semi-barbarian power—been animated by similar vindictiveness and cruelty, her Empire could not have lasted, for, besides the Finns and Poles, there were many potential nationalities in the Tsar's dominions. Certainly if Britain had pursued a German policy in regard to subject nationalities, this war would have found her even more ramshackle than the Austro-Hungarian Union. Perhaps

the most systematic oppressors in Europe—if it is possible to discriminate among degrees of badness—are the Hungarians or Magyars. The various nationalities summed up in the opening sentence of this paragraph were embittered and unified by the Magyars, the oppressions of whom kindled rather than extinguished the fires of nationalism. The Magyars are kinsmen of the Turks. Both are of the Ural-Altaic stock; they speak a kindred (Ugrain) language. The Magyars are a non-Aryan race who have been in Hungary for over ten centuries. They have had an eventful history, and now have rather a unique position. They originally won their country from the Slavs, and may be called the ancient and hereditary enemies of the Slavs. Their geographical position makes them (with the Rumanians) an effective wedge between the northern and southern branches of the slav peoples. The Magyars, although they form only about one-half of the total population of Hungary, are by far the most compact of the peoples of Hungary, and, as a result, rule the country. Their capital—Pesth—is the centre of hard theories and still harder officers. Fate matched them well in the Austro-Hungarian Union with the Austrian Germans, and the exigencies of war matched them even better with their cousins by blood and brothers by policy—the Turks and Bulgarians.

The other part of the wedge is Rumania, inhabited by a people alien in both race and language to their Ugrain and slav neighbours. The Rumanians are a Latin people, speaking a Latin language. They are known often as Vlachs, from the name of one of the Rumanian provinces (Wallachia). There are many Vlachs in Greece. They also call themselves Aromani, or Romans, but the Greek attitude towards the Vlach settlers, who are mostly shepherds or farmers, is seen from the Greek word *blachos*, which means either a shepherd or an ignorant, uncultivated rustic. They boast their descent from the Roman soldier settlers of Dacia and surrounding frontier provinces from the time of Trajan

and Hadrian. Their Latin blood must be well mixed with slav and Ugrain elements, for Rumania has been a highway of conquest and has been submerged by various waves of barbarian or semi-barbarian peoples. After a short and somewhat unfortunate career in the great war, the Rumanians are likely to secure more satisfactory national boundaries, though at the time of writing the great war settlement has not been reached.

Ungrateful Bulgaria, inhabited by a people slav in culture but non-slav in origin, owes its nationhood to the great slav mother, but she threw in her lot with her hereditary enemies, the Turks—perhaps the most ludicrous of all the war alliances. The Albanians, again, the oldest of the European peoples in South-East Europe, a race of hardy, lawless mountaineers, were on the fringe of the war. The Albanians are supposed to be the remnants of the old Illyrians. Farther south, and in another continent, is the nationality of the Armenians, a mixed people, the tales of whose sufferings during the last half-century, and especially during the recent war, would wring tears from a stone.

My tale of nationalities is almost finished, but I must mention two other sources of national agitation, perhaps the best known of all to the ordinary observer. The French of Alsace-Lorraine and the Danes of Schleswig were both under the alien yoke of Germany. The Danish question has not been very prominent of late years; but the Alsace-Lorraine question has rankled in the French breast since 1870. Germany—in particular Prussia—spared no means to extinguish the national feelings of Alsace-Lorraine and North Schleswig. Expropriation, suppression of the French and Danish languages (and, of course, also the Polish in East Prussia), and many other methods were tried and failed. Alsace-Lorraine and North Schleswig remained as anti-German as when Bismarck seized them, and they have again come into their heritage.

III

The modern world is the age of large states, of nation states as contrasted with the smaller states of mediaeval times. The city-state of Greece and Italy is to us modern people a curiosity of history. Small states are held in slight esteem by most people nowadays, whether of the German big-state school or not. There is something imposing in an empire: to be a citizen of a big empire strikes a nobler chord in one's being; it seems to give one a fuller and more perfect civic life. The ability of a large state for economic and cultural expansion seems indefeasibly to argue for the abolition of small states. Large states indeed have obvious advantages—so obvious that the man in the street is too ready to give unqualified approval of them. Reflection, however, makes one pause. Why, it may be asked first, did two of the greatest political thinkers of the world (Aristotle and Rousseau) at very different historical stages of the world support the small city-state? The Greek city-state was a self-contained state like a small modern municipality, but it provided the model for the world's greatest thinker; and still more does it give one food for thought when one considers Rousseau's partiality for the old city-state, for in Rousseau's work lies one of the chief sources of the modern river of nationality.

The state, said Aristotle, should be *eusynoptos*, easily contained in a single view, just big enough for one town crier to summon everyone to the common meeting place. Every citizen should know every other citizen. Every citizen also should be at once legislator, judge and, in his turn, a public executive officer. Athens was Aristotle's practical ideal, and the ancient Athens was one of the chief centres from which our modern culture radiated. The throbbing civic life in which every citizen was an active agent was reflected in an equally active literary, philosophical, rhetorical and artistic life. No form of government has contributed more to

civilisation than the city-state; no philosopher has given us a higher ideal of life in general, and civic life in particular, than Aristotle, the philosopher of the city-state. Aristotle might fairly be accused of a patriotic bias in supporting the city-state. But no such bias can be ascribed to Jean Jacques Rousseau, the finest modern political thinker, the prophet, priest and king of the French Revolution and modern democracy. Rousseau lived in the age of the powerful French centralised monarchy. His own state, not in one, but in many paths of life, was *facile princeps* in Europe. The vision of Athens, of Sparta, and of Florence—and have not Florence and the Italian city-states given more than their share to civilisation?—fascinated the French thinker who, more than a score of centuries after Aristotle, pleaded once more for that polity which is neither too great nor too small, having a population of neither ten nor a hundred thousand. Even Rome, the centre of the biggest empire of olden days, started life as a city-state, and the great boast of a Roman citizen during all the centuries of her existence and through all her provinces, near and far, was 'civis Romanus sum'—an imperial boast implying the particular stamp of Roman-ness which came from the city of Rome herself. What civilisation would have lost without the small city-state one dares not reckon. And so it is with smaller nationalities and states. Each has its own contribution to the sum-total of human culture and well-being; if it has not, then it should be absorbed—I am no believer in the *absolute* rights of nationalities—by stronger, more advanced nations. Every nationality that can justly claim to be a nationality should be allowed to develop in its own way, provided that way is not adjudged by the consensus of civilised opinion to be antagonistic to the common weal of humanity.

Everyone looks forward to a time when man will live in unity and peace; but such a unity will be a dull one if it is not a unity of many diverse elements. The progress of civilisation is not likely to be a progress to

uniformity but to versatility, to unity indeed, but to unity in diversity or versatility. The world would be dreary indeed were all the peoples therein reduced to the uniformity of pattern which Germanism demands. Were everyone to act in the same way under given conditions, to think similar thoughts, to read the same books, to live and sin in the same way, civilisation and culture would lose much of their meaning. Civilisation has its meaning from variety; its unity is the silver cord of uniformity drawn through the diversity of culture. The richer the diversity, therefore, the fuller the unity. So it is with national and international unity. Each nation, each nationality can contribute its quota to civilisation, and the ultimate solution of things whatever it may be—federalism in some form I suppose—must take this into account. There is a substratum of community in the world already, but the various temperaments, traditions, customs and religions of the world have so differentiated men that among the multifarious differences there are part-units which, by their existence and continuance, contribute their own virtues to the excellence of the sum-total unity. The vitality and meaning of progress depend on this development of various aptitudes, and these aptitudes, the history of civilisation has shown, require proper media of development and expression. A simple example will show my meaning. Consider what Europe would lose were her smaller nations absorbed by greater states. Were Denmark, Holland and Belgium incorporated in the German Empire (as the Pan-Germanists demand) and disciplined to German modes of life and thought, western civilisation would lose an incalculable amount. The Dane, the Dutchman, the Belgian each has his national contribution to civilisation—whether it be his literature or his agricultural organisation, as the Dane; his cleanliness, his farming, his commerce and his theology, as the Dutch; or his industry and culture, as the Belgian. What would become of Polish music, art and anarchy were Poles made Prussians? The human

spirit lives and works in inscrutable ways: but one thing we can say of it from the standpoint of our present study —nationality is a centre of its effort. Impair the mainspring, and the unity of the mechanism is gone. Statehood or nationhood is, so to speak, the frame in which the machine of culture weaves its web. Nationalities therefore that are capable of becoming states *should* be states, either fully self-contained states or the 'states' of a federal union. Nationality in itself is an incomplete organism; it aspires to the completeness of independence in a state of its own; and if that aspiration has the necessary inherent vitality, it should not be smothered by alien force.

The ideal of nationality must not be too readily accepted as absolute. I have given the qualification 'if that aspiration has the necessary vitality'; and in that qualification lies the difficulty. How are we to judge when any given nationality is capable of bearing state responsibilities of its own? The only possible answer is that the smaller and less advanced nationalities must be content to accept the standards of more advanced nations, but, even thus qualified, the ideal of nationality by no means claims the universal support of historians and philosophers. Lord Acton, one of the greatest historians of the nineteenth century, combated it with the vigour and warmth that one might regard as characteristic of the perfervid nationalist.

> Nationality [he says, in his 'Essays on Liberty'] does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the state. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind. There is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, or more subversive or more arbitrary than this.

Lord Acton's bitter criticism of nationality was based on the same grounds as I have advanced for the preservation of nationalities. I have just argued that as groups

of men differ among each other, the individualities of these groups should as a rule be preserved. Each group has some distinguishing genius of its own which should be given free scope for development. Humanity will benefit by the preservation of group idiosyncrasies. These group contributions to the common good of humanity must, however, develop through their own institutions and government. Independence, history teaches us, is a necessary medium for full and free development. Small groups, therefore, should be allowed to cultivate their own morals and institutions; if they cannot do so, if their culture is submerged by a stronger culture, these small groups have no claim to independent existence. But Lord Acton is unnecessarily severe on the modern theory of nationalism. He starts from the presupposition that modern nationality if carried to its logical extreme must mean a confusing number of states, each of which will be based on a self-destructive sameness. His view arises from too great emphasis on the discreteness of nations. Let me quote two passages, both from the above-mentioned 'Essays':

The combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of civilised life as the combination of men in society. Inferior races are raised by living in political union with races intellectually superior. Exhausted and decaying nations are revived by the contact of a younger vitality. Nations in which the elements of organisation and the capacity for government have been lost, either through the demoralising influence of despotism, or the disintegrating action of democracy, are restored and educated anew under the discipline of a stronger and less corrupted race. This fertilising and regenerating process can only be obtained by living under one Government. It is in the cauldron of the state that the fusion takes place by which the vigour, the knowledge and the capacity of one portion of mankind can be communicated to another. Where political and national boundaries coincide, society ceases to advance, and nations relapse to a condition corresponding to that of men who renounce intercourse with their fellow men. The difference between the two unites mankind not only by the benefits it

confers on those who live together, but because it connects society either by a political or by a national bond, gives to every people an interest in its neighbours, either because they are under the same Government or because they are of the same race, and that promotes the interests of humanity, of civilisation and of religion.

And again:

If we take the establishment of liberty for the realisation of moral duties to be the end of civil society we must conclude that those states are substantially the most perfect which, like the British and Austrian Empires, include various distinct nationalities without oppressing them. Those in which no mixture of races has occurred are imperfect; and those in which its effects have disappeared are decrepit. A state which is incompetent to satisfy different races condemns itself: a state which labours to neutralise, to absorb, or to expel them, destroys its own vitality; a state which does not include them is destitute of the chief basis of self-government. The theory of nationality is, therefore, a retrograde step in history. It is the most advanced form of the revolution, and must retain its power to the end of the revolutionary period, of which it announces the approach.

Lord Acton takes an extreme view. The individual cannot develop in isolation: each individual is *social* as well as *individual*. So it is with groups. National isolation would doubtless be as subversive of civilisation as Lord Acton feared. But the very essence of national development is that *humanity* should benefit by the education of the genius of groups. Nations as well as nationalities are in this respect like individuals. They are not segregated units but part of a wider whole. The recognition of this shows how nationality and imperialism may quite harmoniously be conjoined. They seem opposites, but they are capable of reconciliation. How they are to be reconciled in actual fact is the chief problem of political organisation at the moment. Most thinkers see it in some form of federalism, whereby the union of humanity will be reconciled with the desires of individual groups for self-government. Self-government once

achieved, of course, nationality as an active principle and as an ideal practically ceases, for nationality flourishes most strongly where there is a certain alien element in government to call it forth.

I have pointed out that the French Revolution was the parent of the twin children, nationality and democracy. The doctrine of the *volonté générale* implies the right of the people to choose what form of government they want. The doctrine obviously also implies the more fundamental choice of what combination of people are to choose a form of government. As Lord Acton says, ' to have a collective will unity is necessary and independence is requisite in order to establish it. Unity and nationality are still more essential to the notion of sovereignty of the people than the cashiering of monarchs or the revocation of laws.' To connect nationality with the French Revolution emphasises one of its aspects, indeed, the destructive aspect; but we are more concerned here with its constructive aspect. The nineteenth-century wars in general, and the recent European war in particular, may make the casual thinker conclude too rashly that national forces are pre-eminently destructive. They *are* destructive—destructive of dynastic influences, of alien mis-government, of barriers in the way of self-expression. But the destruction is only a means to construction. Alien elements must disappear before an organism can have free life. Thus nationality demands freedom from shackles in order to choose its own medium for the development of its own type of life. Each group is to choose for itself what form of government it considers necessary for the growth of its indigenous institutions. Historically, this has led to the disappearance of divisions within certain groups, and the raising of powerful barriers between others. Italy was united by contrast with Austria, but even in Italy Cavour found internal difficulties which were surmounted only by expert statesmanship. The same is true of Germany, where Bismarck had to use the force of Prussia to secure the unity of Germany the passion for which

Napoleon had awakened, and which the jealousies of German Princes and Grand Dukes threatened to smother. The smouldering ashes of nationality in Greece, Serbia, Rumania and Bulgaria were fanned to flame, with the result that new independent states were established from the remains of the Ottoman Empire. Poland and Bohemia have lived to see the rehabilitation of their past self-sufficiency; while Croats and Slovenes, Ruthenians and Slovaks have achieved union with their kinsmen in Serbia and Russia respectively.

These things in themselves show how from a principle which shattered the accepted theories of Europe have grown organised stable governments. But, it may be argued, is not Lord Acton justified in his criticism of nationality as the opponent of progress? There is undoubted truth in the contention that to subdivide the world into as many self-contained states as there are nationalities or racial groups would be a retrograde movement. Valuable as the Greek city-state has been for civilisation, no one, in spite of Rousseau, would argue that a rejuvenation of the municipal politics of ancient Greece or mediaeval Italy would be advantageous to-day. 'Local development,' as says Mr. C. D. Burns in his 'Political Ideals,' 'tends to become village politics, and the effort to maintain the soul of a nation often results in producing a segregate barbarism.' Many nationalities have benefited by, nay, even their very existence as nationalities has been secured through, government by an alien state. To honeycomb the world with endless varieties of governments, languages and cultures, with no respect to their virtue or virility, would be distinctly to frustrate the obvious purposes of civilisation. One example—a universal nationalist 'platform'—will show my meaning. Most modern nationalist movements lay much stress on, if indeed the whole movement is not centred in, national language. The cry of Bohemia for the Bohemians implied the establishment of the Czech language as the national and official language of Bohemia.

The Polish, Slovak, Ruthenian, Croatian and Slovenian national movements all owed much to language. It is a question, by no means easy to decide, how far many so-called 'national' languages should be encouraged. In Europe many languages, despite a certain inherent virility, might with advantage be allowed to die a natural death. The Welsh, Gaelic and Slovene languages have a certain historical and literary value: but would not civilisation gain by their extinction? What literature will lose, humanity will gain, for the interests of humanity are furthered not by the raising but by the abolition of barriers of communication. Take an example from Bengal. Surely it is not in the best interests of India that the Khasi, Munda and Oraon languages should be raised into vernaculars, even for the purpose of matriculation at Calcutta University. To let these languages which are relatively barren of indigenous literatures die and be replaced by the more virile Bengali, Hindi or Urdu, or the still more virile English, would be no loss to culture and a distinct gain to India and the world generally. Further, national movements in language often meant a certain amount of artificial effort, well meant indeed, but futile. Such effort had far better be spent in the study and development of greater, more universal languages, languages which are more likely to be effective means of communication between greater numbers of human minds.

Nationalities, then, may prosper under alien government, in fact alien government may provide the only condition possible for national development. For the turbid nationalism which makes non-interference part of its gospel, but which has not the necessary vitality to justify its claim, one can have but little sympathy. The basis of nationalism—the demand of a will to express itself—must be understood to be the demand of a good, wholesome will with sufficient moral stamina to make it a real will. It cannot under any conceivable circumstances be a good thing for humanity that the better

should suffer by bolstering up the worse. The history of policy shows examples of how weak and inefficient nations are buttressed by the stronger support of others to make them buffer states and the like; but the good of humanity and the aims of policy are not always commensurate.

Nationality, again, sometimes tends to become loud-voiced and obstreperous. The name for this is chauvinism, a term borrowed from France, the history of which country shows how nationalism may run riot. This chauvinism in France at one stage of her history led to the extra strong development of provincialism. This provincialism of nationality endangers one of the chief arguments of the supporters of the principle, one nationality, one state. Many modern writers support this principle on the plea that, if it is realised, it will mean the end of war. They point out that most of the big wars of last century have been at root wars of nationality, which is undoubtedly true. Were each nationality master of its own destinies then one of the chief incentives to war would disappear. But nationality, it must be remembered, is an ideal only so long as it is unrealised. When nationality receives nationhood, the old ideal is replaced by a new one. Provincialism thus tends in cases to be replaced by a most aggressive imperialism. An obvious example is Germany. Till 1870 Germany was too busy achieving national union to bother about the *Deutschland über alles* idea. But with national unity reached, and a rapidly increasing population and commerce, Germany began to dream wild dreams of world domination, the disastrous results of which are now so evident.

Nationality has been the source of many wars, it is true, and respect for nationality would undoubtedly prevent wars of this kind. Nationality is a matter of sentiment and will, and where nationalities are fit to express their will—provided, of course, that will is a good one—they should be allowed to do so. Napoleon III, in his plebiscite, gave an obvious solution to this problem.

The plebiscite, whereby the will of a community is known, is, if properly worked, a sound instrument for the determination of national boundaries. If Alsace-Lorraine *wills* to be under the French Government; if North Schleswig *wills* to be under the Danish; if Holstein *wills* to be German; if the Ruthenians and Slovaks *will* to be independent, why should not their wills be realised? The pride of nations of course is the reason why they are *not*; but Germany and Austria have expended more thinking and more effort in suppressing at one time and appeasing at another the national claims of peoples within their state boundaries, than would have built many Kantian systems and several fine mercantile fleets. Wasted efforts on the one side, and blasted hopes on the other, with noble impulses and natures moved to crime and anarchism (as in the case of the Poles), are the result. Nationality rightly understood is an ennobling aspiration: but it must be neither premature nor chauvinistic. Quiet, orderly development within itself till it has attained the full bloom and vigour of healthy manhood is its salvation.

To denounce nationalism because it is opposed to the interests of humanity is similar to denouncing individual peculiarities because they are opposed to morality. No individual is exactly the same as another. But variations of conduct do not destroy morality. They rather make it. Uniformity of conduct in the moral life would mean mechanical observance of rules, the very opposite of the spontaneity which is characteristic of the moral life. So it is with nationality. The interests of humanity and nationality, far from being mutually exclusive, are really correlative. The nationality or nation, by developing its own character, adds to the meaning of humanity. Nationalism is dangerous when chauvinistic, when it sets up against others claims which these others cannot accept or which they consider antagonistic to the interests of humanity. Just as private individuals sometimes assert themselves in such ways as to

land them in the jails or law courts, so nations go to war. The public claims of nations are like the private claims of individuals. The claims are rights when they are recognised as necessary for the general good. The so-called rights of nationality and the rights of individuals in this respect are alike. Neither is an absolute right. They are both governed by the rights of morality and humanity. Whereas the individual, if he destroys, or tries to destroy, a system of rights, is imprisoned or ejected from his social order, nations or nationalities have no tribunal save public opinion which may, or may not, crystallise itself into organised force.

Variety in national types arises, as does variety in individual types, from environment. One does not expect exactly the same ways of thought or behaviour from, say, a Bengali, Greek and Scotsman. Climate, racial circumstances, history—all mould the characters of the individuals and the nationalities concerned, but to exaggerate the differences at the expense of the sameness in human nature is a grave error. It is as erroneous, too, to denounce nationalism because evil effects spring from national feelings. If it is inglorious to look on rich and prosperous nations feeding at the expense of poor and weak nationalities, it is noble to look on the heights of devotion and self-sacrifice to which national sentiment make man attain. It is as noble, too, to see the soul of a nation—a soul quiescent because never disturbed—stirred by some great national crisis or catastrophe, as at the beginning of the great war.

It is both the task and duty of modern constructive politicians to gauge the national forces which seek an outlet into nationhood. The line between good and bad national feelings is not easily drawn. The nobler impulses of national feelings, impulses which lead to self-immolation for a public cause, are not far removed from the lust for gain or the more brutal fighting instincts of man, and may as easily lead to war. The cry of oppression is often due to a fancied abundance of ills which to a sober

imagination do not exist. In India, for example, a large section of the *intelligentsia* at present is in a state of national neurasthenia, a state of sensitiveness so acute as almost to baffle the constructive efforts of most skilled political specialists of the day. One thing may be said with certainty, that whatever national feeling does exist in India is neither so oppressed nor strangulated that it is prevented from the obvious duty of improving the country and people. In a country where great riches are the offset of the most crushing poverty, where art, literature, industry, commerce and the art of government offer vast fields for effort, national forces have an outlet unequalled in any of the so-called oppressed nationalities in the world. Public spirit properly directed in India would go far towards establishing the *vertu* of nationality on which real nationhood is founded. The nervous energy lost in the noising of real or fancied ills would often be better spent in the more prosaic domains of village co-operation, of education, sanitation, and the more elemental spheres of law and order. Internal development is the crying need of India, and while one cannot denounce the very natural nationalism of the politically minded classes, one cannot but deplore the disproportionate effort spent on destructive criticism of all that savours of government when so much in other directions is crying out for the intensive expenditure of public spirit. But if the so-called extreme nationalists are wrong, the extreme reactionaries are as wrong. The real, and it may be added most difficult, function of a 'foreign' government these days is to judge the depth and value of national forces, to harmonise the national strings. If too much effort is wasted on fancied ills, the duty of the politician is to see that the national voice is not speaking to a deaf ear. National neurasthenia must receive therapeutic treatment, otherwise it may develop into lunacy. At its best national feeling is noble and inspiring; at its worst it is revolutionary and destructive. It is for the powers that be to use the best in as balanced

a way as possible. India has much to contribute to humanity, and that contribution will never benefit the world unless the spontaneity of Indian life and character is given the freest play consistent with peace and order.

Hitherto I have spoken mainly of the *ethos* of individual nationalities. Nationality suggests something far more promising. May there not be an inter-group or international *ethos*? In our everyday life we conduct ourselves according to the dictates of conscience, on the moral side, and according to the rules of expressed law, on the social or political side of our lives. In every community there is a body of rules by which men guide the daily routine of their lives. These rules become part and parcel of our nature; we obey them instinctively. The actual law of the state does not cover these rules, or, as they may be called, the social habit-code of a community.[1]

Each community, whether it be village, nationality or nation, has its social habit-code, and that social habit-code is expressed in various ways—in churches, schools, and other social organisations. The community wills that these organisations should exist; and these organisations are symbols of a collective will, whether good or bad. The social habit-code is the basis of what we may call the *realised will* of the community. The best institutions will result from the best habits. As Rousseau puts it, there is a general will in each community, which will, if it is a true one, always works for the general good. Taking up the Hegelian standpoint, we may apply this to the state. The state to Hegel is the *summum bonum* of the individual. It represents the fulfilment of his mind. It is the end which the nature of the individual has carved

[1] See Haldane, *Higher Nationality*, where he uses the German word *Sittlichkeit* to denote this social habit-code. *Sitte* is the German word for 'custom' and *Sittlichkeit* means the body of customary rules existing in any community. The *Sittlichkeit* always tends to be reflected in the laws. Thus as the *Sittlichkeit* is high or low will the law and general principles of civil conduct vary. Where the *Sittlichkeit* is high and noble, we have an advanced form of civilisation; where it is low, a debased form.

out, and in it his own mind is reflected. It is the embodiment of his social habit-code, and as such it is the bond of union between him and others. The state to Hegel is not government, which is only a manifestation of the state: it is the individual writ large in his volitional life; it is, in its laws and political institutions, the embodiment of the general will.

It follows, unless there is a general will outside the state, that states are merely a number of self-centred entities, each absolute in its own sphere, owning no allegiance to anyone or anything. Its own general will and its own common good are sufficient for it; whence, as there are no common institutions flowing from a general will, international law, treaties, &c., are no more than individual acts of will on the part of individual communities, who may hold to them or break them as they like. States are, according to this view, merely so many individuals in the state of nature, as imagined by contractualist thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. The recent war and its causes seem to lend very considerable validity to this argument; conventions and treaties have been regarded as scraps of paper. The large body of the humane customs of war, which, according to Hegel, *can* exist, in spite of the individuality of states, have been suddenly cast to the four winds by Germany. International 'law' has been proved to be helpless, without either organisations to enforce it, or an international general will behind it. But these results are superficial. Let us go deeper, to first principles in fact, and ask 'What is the end of the state?'

The state, as Aristotle pointed out, exists for the good life. It exists to enable man to live the best life possible, or, to put it in the language of Green, it exists to maintain a system of rights existing among men to the end of the fullest and freest development of the powers and faculties of man. The state, thus, is a moral agent, for it subserves a moral end. Morality cannot be severed from the highest end of the state, for the best type of

life, for which the state exists, is inevitably connected with will and character. Moral goodness need not be, in fact it *is* not, the whole of the best life; but it is the major portion of it. To perform my ordinary moral duties as a brother, son, teacher, or labourer, *because they are duties*, is to be moral, and it is a part of the supreme end, the complete good of man. Other things, such as the pursuit of scientific truth, are also elements in the supreme good of humanity, but they are not primarily moral, but morality is a condition of them. The moral qualities of a chemist—his will to undergo physical pain and mental disappointment, for example—are pre-essential to his discovering new elements. Where the will and character have to play their part there is morality, and these are both implicated in the end of the state, the best life for mankind; so we conclude, the state is a moral agent.

This may be expressed in a way which makes the theory consistent with the 'nature' theory given above. A state, it is true, can determine for itself and by itself what is good for it; but we must carefully gauge the meaning of 'good.' An individual good is a good for the self and for others. It is not a selfish good: it is part of a common good, recognised as such by other people, a fact which follows from the essentially social nature of man. The state, generally speaking, is a people unified, looked on as one or as an individual, and, as we have seen, it is a moral agent; from which the conclusion comes that its moral good is a common good. Each state, indeed, chooses its own type of good, but that good really implicates its relations with others. Moral good and state good are different ways to one goal—complete goodness. The one, moral good, implies the living of the moral life; the other, state good, implies the frame in which the moral life can be lived. It is when the state good becomes one-sided that war is possible: in other words, it is when one part of the good is over-emphasised (so as to make it an evil) that war is possible. In Germany

many leaders of thought have preached complete goodness, but in these latter days self-interest has been substituted for complete goodness, and this self-interest is the root cause of the war.

To say that the state is a moral agent is not to identify state action with moral action. The state maintains the conditions of the moral life. Morality is free, and no government can force men to be moral. It cannot implant good dispositions as it can build a prison or hang a malefactor. The state should, as Green points out, limit its action to removing obstacles in the way of free morality. Beyond that, its direct action is powerless.

The state is thus a moral agent, but is it a moral agent in the sense that it has duties beyond itself? The state is inextricably bound up with the morality of its own citizens. How does it stand as regards other states? The moral duty of an individual implies that other individuals have a say in its performance. Is this truth applicable to the state? We constantly hear in high politics of such and such being 'beyond the sphere' of some particular state; or that 'the interests of such and such a state are not affected' by something or other. Phrases like these seem to give colour to the idea that state is a discrete entity, each state 'naturally' distinct from and opposed to every other state. This, however, is the equivalent fallacy of interpreting *vis naturae* as 'natural force' instead of natural right, a fallacy so admirably pointed out by Green as pervading the political philosophy of Spinoza and many of the social contract writers. The essence of a right is that it arises from the nature of man, and is recognised by other men as necessary both to his and their own development as moral agents. So it is with the state. Its end is the fullest development of its citizens. As such its citizens have duties towards it and it has duties towards its citizens. It must also have the necessary means to fulfil its functions: independence, strength, wealth, and so on. Its strength may lead to war, which may be justified by the very end of the state's existence.

But, it must be kept in mind, its strength and wealth are *means*, not *ends*. Their intrinsic value is not in themselves but in their object, the perfect development of men. When a state increases its strength or its wealth at the expense of the character of its citizens, it is *ipso facto* wrong. If it makes war, or breaks its word and thereby breaks its duty to itself, as the condition of the good life of its citizens, then it is active immorally. No state is an end in itself, and it is only because this view of the state is not carried out in practice that wars are possible. At present, unfortunately, the philosophic view of things is ruled out for partial views. As Aristotle would have put it, minor ends are exaggerated into supreme ends.

Wars are possible because of a lack of patriotism. This seems a paradox, but a moment's consideration will show its validity. From what we have seen above, it is clear that states have an aim, the best life of man. Hence true patriotism is love of and action for this end. Obviously then the main duty of a state should be to improve itself, and, if its energies are properly taken up in this direction, it will have little time to make war. A state can ill help its members to live better by killing them off. This does not mean that all wars are wrong; but it implies that in every war there is a wrong done somewhere. War is necessary because states have not a proper view of the true good. At present, states are independent units, with their own particular life, and they do not readily agree to accept the dictates of other states. War is the deciding factor in disputes, but surely, as Green argues, war, which destroys so much life, and the good of mankind is meaningless without living men, points to a wrong existing somewhere. Somebody has sinned. In the great war, for example, the Allies held that they were fighting for the good of humanity against ill-founded force theories of Germany. That does not argue that war in itself is right, but that Germany was wrong. Had Germany given her attention to the highest end and its realisation,

instead of magnifying self-interest into the supreme end, what a service she would have done to humanity! Had her *good* will been as effective as her *bad* will has been, her services to humanity would have been incalculable. But within Germany there was not perfect state organisation. The Prussian *Junker* ruled in his own interests, and these interests demanded war. Oppression, religious feuds, economic or political greed may be causes of war, and all these point to a wrong adjustment of ends to actualities. In a community which is perfectly organised there will be no desire to make war, so that war really arises from defective organisation, or, in other words, because states are not states in the true sense.

We may sum these points up by saying that, firstly, at present states are independent and war is the only judge between them; secondly, that states are moral agents, with duties to themselves and others; thirdly, that in the perfect state there is no room for war, for war arises from mistaken notions of the true end, and consequent defective organisation. It comes to pass because of a lack of true patriotism. These conclusions suggest an obvious corollary. Is it not possible for a real international general will to arise? I cannot here work out this fascinating suggestion in detail. Before the war, thinkers pointed to many things as likely preventives of war. Modern facilities in communication, modern highly organised international commerce, university communication, international socialism, the humaner spirit of modern diplomacy, these and other things were regarded as heralds of the peaceful millennium. But suddenly, in August 1914, all these things seemed merely to provide food for the god of war. But the war itself was not without suggestion.

In the first place there were in the struggle two distinct alliances, Germany and Austria on the one side, Britain, France and Russia on the other. (The lesser warring states I omit for the present.) My point is that during the last few years this struggle was more or less foreseen, and common aims and ideals have made the various allies

have a common understanding and sympathy; they have been developing a *modus vivendi* which, though it is more a matter of policy at present, indicates much potentiality for the future. In fact the better and purer elements in diplomacy have for centuries been trying to develop a common international will. The most encouraging result of recent tendencies is shown by the *entente cordiale*—a mutual understanding which, though it lacks written state-treaties, is a sufficient basis for common action between France and England. Is there not a common Franco-British will strong enough to prevent future wars between these nations? And is it not so between Britons and their kinsmen across the Atlantic? Common economic motives of course form no sufficient basis for a common will which must be essentially spiritual, but there are agencies at work which should unite nations even more and more. The international settlement which has grown up during the last few generations between the chief nations of the world has no doubt received a sad blow by the recent war; but the very disapprobation of civilisation for the grave international or inter-social 'breaks' of Germany may help all the more to establish a common inter-social code of manners hereafter. The inter-social organism in its development will suffer many diseases; but it will emerge a stronger and more healthy body when the poison is expelled. It is not too much to predict that this severe lesson will produce among nations—after a short lapse of years—a will to live in harmony; and, just as the civic will of a community issues into the law of the state, the real sanction of which is merely the joint-will of the state-members, so the inter-civic will of nations must produce an inter-civic or international law, the strength and sanction of which will be simply the inter-social common will.

We are all familiar with Tennyson's lines—

> Till the war-drum throbs no longer and the battle flag is furl'd
> In the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World.

Perhaps the poet himself did not measure the depth of his words; but they are replete with meaning and suggestion. The Parliament of Man—elected by the votes of the inter-nations—the voice of the inter-social will—the lawgiver of all men, its force and sanction being the spontaneous desire of all that it should exist as the common organ; and the Federation of the World—Federation, the hope of the future, the form of government which will reconcile the present warring opposites, which will rule every state and allow every state to rule itself at the same time, the first form of the international government, whereby the diverse elements of mankind may prosper within the unity. Experience has shown us how federation may pass into nationalism in Germany and the United States: the inter-social equivalent is merely the welding of mankind into a harmonious union, working for the perfect unity of an internationalised mankind.

And, with Grotius, let us say—

May God write these lessons—He who can alone on the hearts of all those who have the affairs of Christendom in their hands and may He give to those persons a mind fitted to understand and to respect Rights, divine and human: and lead them to recollect always that the ministration committed to them is no less than this that they are the Governors of Man, a creature most dear to God.

CHAPTER II

INDIAN NATIONALITY: RACE AND LANGUAGE

I

Now that the Montagu-Chelmsford Report has let us know where we are in matters of government organisation and policy, it may be of interest to examine some of the bases on which the future scheme of things is to rest. Whether for good or for evil, the Report accepts as fundamental the political value of responsible government, the fulcrum of modern democracy. Recognising the dangers of transplanting a late development of the West into an essentially aristocratic country, it surrounds democratic institutions with a hedge of caveats and reservations. But running through all this hedge is a definite political aim—complete responsible government within the British Empire. The first measure of this responsibility is to be given tentatively. A Commission is to examine periodically the working of the new institutions and extend or retract as the necessities of the case may demand; but sooner or later the aim of complete responsibility, or, in other words, complete self-government within the British Empire, is to be realised. 'We wish,' says the Report, 'to attain complete responsibility where we can and as early as we can.' 'The progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of one British Empire'—this, the classic pronouncement made in the House of Commons on August 20, 1917, sets the seal on the political fate of India.

The Report, a masterpiece of both original and comparative politics, opens up several suggestive lines of inquiry. Not the least important of these is the question of Indian nationality. The general question of nationality I have already examined at some length in the opening chapter. To prevent ambiguity in nomenclature, I must repeat some definitions given there. Nationality may be defined as a spiritual principle or sentiment arising among a number of people who are united by bonds of race, language, religion, culture and customs, political antecedents and common purposes. These bonds are not all present in every sample of nationality. In every nationality some combination of the bonds is present. Nationality is not to be identified with the bases on which it rests. It is neither a sum nor a compound of its elements. Just as the chemical analysis of a cell does not explain life, so the elements of nationality do not explain nationality. It is a sentiment, a spiritual principle, something which exists, but which cannot easily be defined. Its components, too, vary from sample to sample, and, though some occur more frequently than others, it is difficult to say that any one is essential. The fact of nationality is definite. Not only is it a unifying sentiment, but, since the French Revolution, it has proved a potent instrument of practical policy. To it modern Germany and Italy owe their being, and in it lies one of the root causes of the great war. The rights of nationalities are the first plank of the allied peace programme, and the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, the Magna Charta of India, is the practical manifestation in India of a policy now accepted by the leading forces of civilisation.

The parallel of Magna Charta is no mere rhetorical figure. What King John signed at Runnymede was no new law. The Great Charter was a document reciting the governmental rules existing in the common consciousness, though not officially recognised, and demanding that government should be managed according to them. These rules, it is true, were English rules for English people.

In our new Charter for India the recognised rules of modern advanced forms of government are to be applied, progressively, to India. The seedlings of the notions of democracy, self-determination and nationality, brought by western education, are to be faithfully tended till they reach maturity. Can we say, as Bishop Stubbs does of the English Charter, that the Indian Charter is the act of a united nation? Are our Indian clergy, barons and commons for the first time thoroughly at one? What basis have we for regarding the Report as the focus of Indian unity or representative of a national soul?

Let me again utter a caveat against confusion in terminology. Nation must be demarcated from nationality. The nation is the *organised* force of a people; it is, as Sir Rabindranath Tagore has it, the 'aspect of a whole people as an organised power.' Nationality is primarily a sentiment of unity, not an organisation, though it is also used to designate the people united by common sentiment. Unfortunately the English language is not yet sure of the distinction. Some use nation and nationality as synonymous terms, preferring nation-state to connote what I have defined as nation. We must be clear on this point before we proceed. I use *nation* here to mean the organised will-power of a people. It implies a people united in sentiment and organised in a state with a definite government. Nationality is the sentiment of unity prevailing among peoples like the French, Czechs, or Rumanians, who, because they are so united, are also designated by the term nationality. Nation and nationality may coincide in actual fact, but where such coincidence exists the difference in idea between nation and nationality continues. The nation is nationality *plus* the state. Nationality, till it becomes a nation, is stateless.

The goal of India is the modified nationhood which exists in the Colonies. Full nationhood cannot properly be said to belong to the self-governing colonies. Though they are not independent states, they enjoy a far greater measure of autonomy than prevails in the semi-autonomous

units of a federal state. In most of the normal functions of government the Responsible Colonies are independent. Legally, the British King-in-Parliament is supreme; actually, in several essential functions of government, particularly the management of foreign affairs, the Home Government is supreme. Nevertheless, the ideal of complete national independence has never been seriously voiced in the Dominions. Isolated instances of extreme nationalistic views, it is true, exist, just as the idea of complete severance from Britain has sometimes been ventilated in India. National feeling, however, though not separatist, is distinctly noticeable in the self-governing Dominions; and ever since the Colonies began to show signs of intense national development the British Government has recognised that nationality, autonomy, and empire go hand in hand. Every encouragement has been given to the development of national self-reliance in the Colonies, and, supreme though the British Parliament is, the obligations of the Colonies to the mother country have been left to the honourable sentiments of the Colonies themselves, and not prescribed by law. British colonial policy has been founded on free will and self-determination. Neither in commerce nor in matters of war and peace has the British Parliament imposed statutory duties on the Colonies. Underlying this policy of freedom has been the theory that local autonomy is the strongest bond of imperial unity. Many thinkers, however, both English and Colonial, have doubted the continued virtue of autonomy as the strongest link in the imperial chain among later generations, for whom the ties of the home country may be slackened by a greater intensity of local patriotism, and the indulgence of the mother country may have the appeal only of a cold historical fact. The common loyalty to the Crown which at present gives life to the imperial organism, it is held, requires definite institutional ties, such as imperial ministers in the Cabinet of the United Kingdom, or a general federal constitution.

Whatever may lie in the future, the facts of the present are clear. In Australasia, South Africa and Canada exist distinctive types of what we may call an imperial personality. In the Empire there is a distinct unity in the midst of a very great diversity. This diversity, first forcibly brought home to British statesmen in the rupture with the New England Colonies, is now encouraged and cultivated. When the lesson underlying the Declaration of Independence had been learnt, colonial policy, after petty attempts at repression, expanded into the liberal channels of which responsible government is the maximum development. Behind the autonomy or responsibility it is possible to detect a new national type. New conditions of life, new environments and new climates have developed in the Colonial the peculiar national stamp of their countries. The terms Canadian or Australian by no means mean merely Britons who had travelled to and worked in Canada or Australia. They imply individuals who have a culture and institutions of their own, whose ways of life and problems of government are distinct from those of anyone else. They imply, in short, the idea of nationality—colonial nationality it may be, but still nationality. Their antecedents, customs, political institutions, interests, language, religion and political purposes are one, and by birth or adoption they are sentimentally attached to their particular countries. They have a strong colonial loyalty, which, as the great war has shown, co-exists with an equally strong imperial loyalty.

The fact that the Colonies now possess considerable armaments of their own, and are free to join in or stand out from military enterprises of the United Kingdom, places them on a higher status than is usually understood by the word 'colonial.'

Countries which have the power to supply themselves with effective protection or even with substantial protection [says Professor Keith in his 'Imperial Unity and the Dominions'], may justly claim that they have outgrown a colonial status, may resent the phrase 'our Colonies' used fondly of the dominions

by the average inhabitant of the United Kingdom, may insist that the title Dominion or Commonwealth should be replaced by kingdom, and may even seek to compel the abandonment of the term colonial as applied to self-governing possessions or, more properly, countries.

No greater mistake could be made than to regard the 'Colonial' as an emigrant Briton. He is an Australian- or Canadian-born citizen whose traditional and territorial ties are definitely of his own native country. This has long been evident in the national movement in the Colonies. Examples are not wanting of distinct divergence of view between colonials of the first generation or emigrants, and 'native' colonials. It may be remembered that in the early days of the war considerable feeling was raised in the Colonies by the unjust statement, believed in certain quarters, that the rally to the Imperial flag in the Colonies was a rally of those who were British, not Colonial, by birth. Professor Keith, in discussing the legal aspects of naturalisation and nationality, points out the same thing.

While British nationality is in one sense indivisible, there is an inevitable tendency to make a distinction between British subjects in regard to their connexion with the United Kingdom or a Dominion. The term British is often applied in the Dominions to natives of the United Kingdom, and the terms Canadian, Australian, New Zealander, South African, and Newfoundlander, are regularly applied to the classes of British subjects born in these Dominions, or identified with them by residence. In Australia there is a strong Australian native movement, which consists not of aborigines, as might be supposed, and as newly-imported Governors are most unjustly credited in the popular mind with a desire to believe, but persons who being Australians were also born there. The use is significant, as it proves that there is felt to be need of a term to distinguish between the Australians by adoption and those by birth.

The grant of autonomy to the Colonies is meant not only to encourage colonial nationality but to strengthen imperial relations. The same attitude has now been adopted towards India. Two quotations will show the

present position without further remarks. The first is from 'Imperial Unity and the Dominions,' by Professor Keith, who, though now Professor of Sanskrit in Edinburgh University, was for a considerable time in the inner circle of the Colonial Office. The second is paragraph 180 of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.

Professor Keith says:

The eradication of the adjective Colonial from the English speech is doubtless impossible, but it is common ground with all responsible statesmen that all possible steps must be taken to further the national life within the Empire of the self-governing Dominions. Nor is it doubtful that this end is to be obtained in one way only, the encouragement of the greatest autonomy in self-government coupled with the creation of closer bonds of union between the several parts of the Empire as a whole. The first part of this proposition is self-evident; any check to the growth in self-reliance of the peoples of the Dominions would be a calamity; but the second part is not less indisputable. No Dominion could possibly by whatever extension of its national life be as great as the British Empire; even if Canada possesses the most highly educated, the most hardworking, and the most intelligent of the people of the world, nevertheless in organic connexion with forty-five millions in the United Kingdom and five millions in Australia they may hope to reach yet a higher destiny than can await them as Canadians only. Canada herself and the Commonwealth represent aggregates of independent units, nor can any one doubt that the life in Canada and the Commonwealth is fuller and better than that of the units from which they have emerged could have been: even five years have done not a little to broaden the outlook of South Africa, and the difficulties of the task should not make us despair of any solution for the problem of the self-governing portions of the British Empire other than the loose alliance which some believe is all that is possible.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report says:

We have reason to hope that as the result of this process [the new scheme of government] India's connexion with the Empire will be confirmed by the wishes of her people. The experience of a century of experiments within the Empire goes all in one

direction. As power is given to the people of a Province or of a Dominion to manage their own local affairs, their attachment becomes the stronger to the Empire which comprehends them all in a common bond of union. The existence of national feeling, or the love of, and pride in, a national culture need not conflict with, and may indeed strengthen, the sense of membership in a wider Commonwealth. The obstacles to a growth in India of this sense of partnership in the Empire are obvious enough. Differences of race, religion, past history, and civilisation have to be overcome. But the Empire, which includes the French of Canada and the Dutch of South Africa—to go no further—cannot in any case be based on ties of race alone. It must depend on a common realisation of the ends for which the Empire exists, the maintenance of peace and order over wide spaces of territory, the maintenance of freedom, and the development of the culture of each national unity of which the Empire is composed. Those are aims which appeal to the imagination of India and, in proportion as self-government develops patriotism in India, we may hope to see the growth of a conscious feeling of organic unity with the Empire as a whole.

To foster national feeling by means of responsible government or autonomy is thus a central axiom of both Colonial and Indian policy. In each case not only is it necessary for itself, but is counted on as an imperial asset. Before dealing with the imperial side of the question in India, however, we must first consider whether there is, or will be, an Indian unity analogous to the unity of Canada, Australia or New Zealand. It is not my purpose at present to examine closely the question of Colonial nationality. Were I to do so I could not exclude the Union of South Africa, which might present a much closer analogy than the other self-governing Dominions. Neither time nor circumstance enables us to form a judgment on recent South African policy. The fusion of two distinct nationalities after a bitter war is not the work of a day. The native population, the difference between colonials of the second and subsequent generations, and the influx of immigrants also add to the complexity of the South African problem. It is not surprising that the

outbreak of the war raised considerable anti-British feeling in parts of the Union; but even those separatist tendencies seem to have been severely discredited by the defeat of the Nationalists in October 1915.

II

An obvious method of testing Indian nationality is to grind it in the usual mill—to examine, that is, the normal 'unities' of nationality as applied to India. It must be remembered that these unities vary exceedingly from example to example of nationality, and, though the normal bases of western nationalities may be absent in India, other elements may exist, some of them applicable to India alone. Certainly we shall find glaring discrepancies and surprising analogies, but in our final construction it may be possible to trace certain threads which, woven together, may serve to bind the various antagonisms of India together at no very distant future.

One of the most common bases of national solidarity is community of race. In many western nationalities the racial bond is a belief in a common origin. Though this belief may not have survived in any definite form in old-established nationalities, it has been in most cases a powerful factor in their actual composition.

The belief in a common origin is in all probability a survival of the patriarchal type of society. Although the patriarchal family was not universal among primitive peoples, sufficient evidence exists to convince us that in the development of the state the patriarchal system had considerable influence. With the extension of the family to a series of families or tribe, the oldest male, originally the father of the family round which others were grouped, was the head or ruler. Whatever modifications this patriarchal type of government underwent in various places, the fact is clear that the patriarch was a ruler, and that kinship was a necessary element in early civic life. Kinship or blood-relationship, in fact, was so essential

that often early peoples adopted the legal fiction of adoption in order to secure the advantages of civil society. The bonds of kinship were often purely fictitious, but the very fact that legal fictions were necessary shows the power of kinship as an element in early social organisation.

The natural fact of descent was further strengthened by primitive religion, or rather superstition. Primitive peoples live in a spirit world: all their thoughts and actions are conditioned by the possible good or evil acts of spirits. One of the forms such superstition takes is the worship of the spirit of the departed, or ancestor worship. Judging from the evidence available, not only from the past, but from the primitive peoples actually existing to-day, we may reasonably conclude that the worship of the patriarchal ancestor led to a monarchical form of government. Monarchs, once established, must, of course, have done all in their power to encourage the custom on which their own security of tenure depended. The worship of ancestors, moreover, naturally extended to the first ancestor or original head of the monarchical house. Sanctified by the lapse of time and the heroic stories of tradition, the early ancestor, or ancestors, became the tribal gods. Tribes not fortunate enough to have the ancestry necessary for the imposing pageantry of their neighbours evolved the simple expedient of inventing ancestors, round whom gradually the halo of religion and tradition became as genuine as that of the other.

In the ancestors or early monarchs were centred both the loyalty and devotion of the tribe. There was no separation, as now, between religion and political allegiance. Church and State were one, separate neither in fact nor in idea. The result was, naturally, a loyalty combining both the religious and civic force of early man. Nowadays we often find political allegiance at variance with religious—as in Ireland—but in early communities reverence and loyalty were one. The full force of the early

mind or soul was concentrated on his co-extensive Church and State.

These stories of common origin are frequently found in western societies. Sometimes the common ancestor is a god, as Zeus, or simply a real or legendary personality, as Hunyor or Magyor. Everyone is familiar with the Bible story of the creation of the world, of the sons of Noah and the Patriarchs. Early literature is filled with stories of heroes and gods—or rather god-heroes—whose exploits, more often imaginary than real, were the material on which early civic loyalty was fed.

The modern sciences of Anthropology, Ethnology and Comparative Philology, it is true, have made severe inroads into such national beliefs. By anthropometry and the comparative study of languages and institutions these sciences are able to mark off racial groups, and a study of the boundaries of modern nationalities reveals considerable discrepancies. However pure the early Zeus-descended Greeks were, for example, the modern Greek nation (which is coterminous mainly with the Greek nationality) is racially mixed to a very high degree. The Germans and British are largely racially homogeneous, but they are distinct nationally. So are the Scots and English, while the Americans, racially much divided, are one nationally.

The chief point of the racial bond, however, is not either its agreement or disagreement with western national boundaries. With the advancement of civilisation other considerations—common ideas, common purposes, and so forth—replace the natural basis. This process, of course, will also take place in communities relatively less advanced, when they advance. The importance of the racial bond is in the *origin* of nationality, in the creation of a feeling of solidarity, which once existent may be still further strengthened by idea-elements as the communities advance.

Applying the race test in Indian nationality, what we find is a total absence ot common origin and common physical characteristics. From the point of view of race

alone India could be a series of nationalities but not a single nationality. Not only is there a number of clearly defined racial groups in India, but even in what is usually regarded as homogeneous groups there is a considerable amount of race mixture. Thus the possibility of national fusion might be seen to be present at least in one large group of the Indian population, the Hindus, in the story of the common origin in Brahma. This story, however, ideal origin though it be, is more of the type of a general origin in God than the particular origin of a civic group. Furthermore, whatever its truth, whether it is *a posteriori* explanation of the established fact of caste, or a purely religious doctrine, it is no basis for the solidarity of Hindus with the many millions of non-Hindus.

Ethnology, moreover, has so far controverted the theory as an account of the origin of caste as to show that among the Hindus themselves there are very distinct lines of racial cleavage. Whatever the truth of Risley's theory of the origin of caste, the very fact that he adopted an ethnological basis to explain the origin of caste is sufficient to show the importance of racial division in the Hindu community. The subject of caste, however, and its place in national development we must consider later on. It is sufficient for our present purpose merely to state the basis of Risley's conclusions—first, the correspondence which can be traced between gradations of caste and ethnological type; second, the development of mixed races from stocks of different colour; and third, the influence of fiction. Nesfield, indeed, in his study of castes in the North-West Provinces and Oudh, proceeded on the basis of the racial unity of the Hindus, but whether by the test of anthropometry, or, as suggested by Sir Edward Gait, of pigmentation, his theory has been exploded.

Apart from the racial distinctions in Hinduism itself, several distinct racial types exist in India. In his Census Report of 1901 Sir Herbert Risley gives seven distinctive types, exclusive of the Negritos of the Andamans. These types are: (1) Turco-Iranian, of the North-West Frontier;

(2) Indo-Aryan, of the Punjab, Rajputana, and Kashmir; (3) Scytho-Dravidian, of Western India; (4) Aryo-Dravidian, of the United Provinces and Bihar; (5) Mongolo-Dravidian, of Bengal and Orissa; (6) Mongoloid, of the Himalayan areas; (7) Dravidian, of South India, the Central Provinces, and Chota Nagpur. Risley's classification, though it has been questioned in several particulars, is representative. The criticisms passed upon it by ethnologists and philologists have not vitiated the general fact of racial division, though they have questioned the truth of several of Risley's details. The race division, in fact, is obvious, not merely to the scientific investigator but to the man in the street. The difference between Pathan and Santal, Sikh and Madrassi, Ghurka and Mahratta, Rajput and Bengali cultivator is too glaring to escape the notice of even the most superficial observer.

Nor is colour a bond of unity. Though the various peoples of India may be generally designated 'coloured,' there is so much variation in the colour—from the fair inhabitants of the North-West and the yellow Mongolians, to the dark, almost black, indigenous tribes in Southern India—that colour is less a guide in India than any other country in the world. Colour, moreover, has proved itself a separatist more than a unifying element. One of the fundamental elements in the race theory of caste origin is race-purity. The higher castes belonging to a different race have prevented intermarriage to preserve their racial pride of place. The caste system from this point of view is the most rigid colour-bar in the world. That the colour element is at least to some extent founded on fact is obvious from a comparison of the higher castes, particularly the Brahmans, in Bengal, with the lowest. The fair Brahman, not only in stature and cast of countenance, but also in colour, differs greatly from the Sudra. Not only so, but it is well known that the average Bengali possesses a discrimination in personal pigmentation which the European often entirely fails to appreciate.

These racial divisions of India, as in most instances

of racial cleavage, are accompanied by equally marked distinctions in traditions, language and culture. Whatever the unity, therefore, of separate sections of the population, there is no unity of the population as a whole. The Mohammedan, differing radically in his religious views and tracing with pride his ancestry back to the great Arab and Moghul conquerors, is not likely ever to claim kinship with the pacific Hindu. The Mahrattas or Rajputs will not own a common parentage with the South Indian Dravidians or the primitive Mundas and Oraons. The hill-men, again, who, if they are not so numerous, have great prestige in war, will not fraternise easily with the more lethargic plainsmen. The physical types vary not only physically, but also culturally. They represent different stages in culture just as their head measurements or colour vary. The student of Ethnology, therefore, did his view not extend beyond the range of his own science, would regard the unity of India as impossible of realisation. Not only would he find the ethnological and cultural groups so different that a comparison of India not only with a single state, even were it Austria-Hungary, but with the continent of Europe as a whole, would be misleading; but, tracing the history of his racial groups, he would find that race had been directed towards separation rather than consolidation.

Race, therefore, does not help us in finding a common basis of Indian unity. As already pointed out, however, in advancing or advanced communities the natural basis of race tends to be superseded by spiritual or ideal elements. How far these other elements have superseded or are likely to supersede the great diversity of races is the subject of a later part of this enquiry.

III

The differences of race in India are very largely reproduced in language. Race, language and culture are closely interconnected, but the connection by no means

amounts to identification. Both Sir Herbert Risley and Sir Edward Gait, in the Census Reports of 1901 and 1911 respectively, particularly mention the danger of founding Indian racial theories on linguistic facts. The existence of unwritten languages, the vitality of which is feeble, often leads to their complete disappearance; the weaker give place to the stronger. In North India, for example, the previously spoken Munda dialects have disappeared before the spoken and written Indo-Aryan languages. Unwritten languages in India die readily. Numerous examples exist of aboriginal languages disappearing almost wholesale. Sir Edward Gait quotes the examples of the Nagas and Kukis of Manipur becoming Hindus and adopting the Manipuri dialect, and the hill-men of Burma who descend to the plains becoming Shans or Burmese in the course of a single generation.

Though there are examples of racial and linguistic mixture, the same general truth is applicable in language as in race, viz., that in India there is a collection of nationalities without a single nationality for the whole. The great importance of language as an element of nationality, and the peculiar position of India in this respect, demand a fairly detailed treatment of this 'unity.' Language is not only important as the vehicle for the expression of common cultural, social and political ideas, but it fosters a loyalty of its own. Many of the modern nationalist movements in Europe—such as the Polish and Czech—turn largely on language. The Polish and Czech languages are the palladium of nationalist feeling, and not only do the Poles and Czechs keep their languages active in their own countries but they carry them to America, where by magazines and newspapers the national flame is fanned and kept alive. Every nationality is proud of its own literature, whether it be for heroic tales, folk-lore, or songs, and every national literature has some merit which it can contribute to the sum-total of human culture.

The chief value of language as a national bond is that it is the medium for the common understanding of political

and social ideas. It may be regarded as a condition of the successful operation of the other elements. Common political aspirations are of little value among a population which cannot communicate with each other. The existence in large American factories of groups of nationalities who cannot understand each other's language has prevented the extensive operation of trade unions. Much more so does the lack of a medium of common expression stand in the way of political union, which is a much wider, more complicated matter than mere industrial union. The political value of language, as a centre of loyalty for a particular nationality, may be seen in the attempted suppression of Polish and French by the Germans in the non-German territories of East Prussia and Alsace-Lorraine.

That language is not a universal test of nationality is shown by the use of English in America and England. However much the jealousies of these two nations may have been observable in the past, the existence of a common language is bound to make an international *rapprochement* between these countries more easy than would be possible were there no common medium of expression. War, whether civil or international, between people speaking the same language has always been unsavoury. The open-arm reception of the Americans by the British on the advent of the Americans to the war was undoubtedly an emblem of mental relief after the somewhat difficult period when the American position in the war was not clearly defined.

The general linguistic position in India, as given in the last Census Report, shows that 233 millions or 74·3 per cent. of the people speak Indo-Aryan languages, 63 millions or about 20 per cent. speak Dravidian, and 13 millions or about 4 per cent. speak languages of the Tibeto-Chinese family. Austro-Asiatic languages are spoken by about four and a half million people. These general linguistic families are divided into numerous sub-families with almost an infinite number of dialects, a considerable

number of which claim over a million speakers. One of the most noteworthy facts about language is the great variety spoken in one province. Bengal is an exception, as over 90 per cent. of the people in the province speak Bengali. In Assam 50 per cent. speak Bengali, 20 per cent. speak Assamese, while nearly one hundred other languages are spoken by the remaining fraction of the population. In Bihar and Orissa the majority (about 65 per cent.) use the Hindi and Bihari dialects; 20 per cent. speak Uriya; Mundari, Santali, &c., are spoken by the remainder. The most widely spoken language in Bombay is Marathi and even then it is used by only 40 per cent. Gujerati is spoken by 28 per cent. and Sindhi by 13 per cent. of the people. Two-thirds of the Burmese talk Burmese, and innumerable other dialects are spoken in varying proportions. In the Central Provinces and Berar the majority (55 per cent.) speak Hindi dialects, 31 per cent. speak Marathi, and here again we have numerous less known dialects spoken by small percentages of the people. In Madras the same incongruous elements appear: 41 per cent. speak Tamil, 38 per cent. Telugu, while the others speak Malayalam, Uriya, Canarese, and Hindi. In the Punjab and the United Provinces 45 per cent. speak Western Hindi, 32 per cent. Eastern Hindi, 20 per cent. Bihari and 3 per cent. Central Pahari.

The question of a common language is undoubtedly one of the most important political issues awaiting solution in India. National unity, if it is to be more than the 'ramshackle' unity of Austria-Hungary, where the oath of allegiance is (or rather was) administered in eight different languages, must have a common medium of expression. Up to the present the common medium has been English, but with the growth of nationalistic feelings in India, there is a considerable body of opinion in favour of the adoption of an Indian language. As I shall show, the leaders of Indian opinion do not favour such a course; but there is not the slightest doubt that with the liberalising

of institutions the demands for more 'Indianness' in language will become more and more insistent. It is to be hoped that the bitter linguistic conflicts which have marked the recent history of Austria-Hungary will not appear in India, though unfortunately in India even more ground for bitterness exists.

At the present moment the tendency is not towards Indian nationalisation, but local nationalisation. The simple facts of the census show the non-existence of 'Indianness' in language. The nationalistic demands are not all-Indian but local. Naturally such a demand should make itself felt most in the provinces where there is most linguistic homogeneity, and that is exactly what has taken place. In Bengal, where 90 per cent. of the population speak Bengali, many people, not only Bengalis but Europeans, favour the development of a completely vernacular educational system, even to the extent of a vernacular university. That the question of vernacular universities is not a merely academic problem is shown by the recent creation of the Urdu Osmania University in Hyderabad, a province with considerable homogeneity of language and religion. The extension of this principle might easily lead to political complications. That politics and language are closely connected in India needs little demonstration, and that the political element is increasing is amply proved by the difficulties encountered in the Language Census in 1911 as compared with 1901. Sir Edward Gait found that in addition to the normal difficulties of enumerating the people according to language—

> another [cause], having its origin in political considerations, has given more trouble than heretofore. Amongst many educated Hindus, there is a tendency to belittle the great differences which actually exist between the different parts of the Empire; and it is sometimes alleged that there is only one language spoken throughout Northern India. . . . The Gaekwar of Baroda recently asserted [he continues] that he had never yet met a native of India who could not understand easy Hindi. He was

thinking presumably of Northern India, but even there, there are many millions of uneducated villagers to whom Hindi, be it ever so easy, is quite unintelligible.

From Macaulay's day up to the present the existence of English as the common medium of expression has been an axiom of Indian education. The primary purpose of English was not political, but educative. The dissemination of western ideas had to be accompanied by the western language for reasons other than political. The vernaculars, though they were to be encouraged, were not considered fit vehicles for western notions. A new world of ideas and facts had to be accompanied by a new language. This new language, spreading all over India, inevitably became the agent of new political ideas; it led to new political institutions; it discovered a unity which had not before been recognised, and English was the emblem and medium of expression for that unity. The new language, moreover, was so acceptable to the people that its existence as the official and common language of India soon became stereotyped.

The official view of the Government of India may be judged from a debate which took place in 1915 in the Imperial Legislative Council on the question of teaching through the medium of the Indian vernaculars. The Educational Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council, Sir Harcourt Butler, in summing up the debate, gave the official view in a terse sentence: 'I may say at once that to dethrone western culture or restrict English education would commend itself neither to the Government nor this Council.' In August 1917, at a conference held in Simla on the same subject—a conference summoned partly as a result of the Council debate—Lord Chelmsford affirmed the Government view in these words:

Sixty-three years have elapsed since the date of Sir Charles Wood's despatch and English education has taken firm hold upon the country. It is surely out of the question now to talk of going back on the established lines of our educational system.

The interest of the educated classes is centred in English. English is on the high road to become, if it has not already become, among the educated classes the *lingua franca* all over India. English is required in all the public administrations of the country. While I have much sympathy with those who deplore the neglect of the vernaculars, is it not obvious that the substitution at this time of day of vernaculars for English is beyond the bounds of practical politics, even if the Government were willing to consider such a policy? . . . . Again, the very multitude of the vernaculars presents a practical difficulty for which I have never seen a satisfactory solution propounded. Moreover, with each generation English will come more and more to be learnt not in the schools but in the every-day intercourse of the home. This larger question is not now before you, but in view of what has been urged elsewhere, I have briefly enumerated some of the patent objections to a reversal of the present policy.

The 1915 debate in the Imperial Council is an interesting revelation of the attitude of the Indian leaders on the question. It shows a deep-rooted feeling in India against the substitution of vernaculars for English in higher education. Though most of the members of the Council, both official and non-official, strongly supported the teaching and development of the vernaculars, there was almost complete unanimity on the position of English as a national medium. The Resolution, though it led to much purely pedagogic discussion, elicited some interesting pronouncements from the leaders of the various provinces.

The mover of the Resolution, Mr. Rayaningar, after quoting many authorities on the subject of teaching through the vernacular, and refusing many possible arguments that might be brought against him, summarily dismissed the national argument in these words:

Then there remains the last objection, that the proposed measure will interfere with the unification of the Indian peoples. Sir, to my mind the objection appears to be meaningless. Sometimes people hazard opinions and say that but for different languages, Indians will be one Nation. I very much doubt

the soundness of that opinion. What about our different castes and creeds? If all these differences disappear, I daresay the difference of language too will disappear.

The sweeping facility with which these sentences brush aside the fundamental questions of Indian national unity was met with very strong opposition by most members of the Council. Mr. Dadabhoy bluntly told the Council that there might be some justification were the Resolution backed by a strong public opinion, but that support, he said, was entirely lacking. Mr. Ghaznavi, in combating the Resolution, brought the nationalist position into strong relief. Some people say that as we condemn the compulsory Germanisation of Poland, so we should resent the imposition of English as a compulsory medium of instruction in India.

But [said Mr. Ghaznavi] India is not Poland. If there had been one common vernacular throughout India, no Indian would have opposed the making of that vernacular the medium of instruction not only up to the matriculation class, but right up to the end of a student's college career. In India, where a diversity of language and creed prevails, it is the earnest desire of all patriotic men to push forward the knowledge of English, which is alone the *lingua franca* between all sects of her educated sons. English is the medium of communication not only between Indians and the British, but also amongst themselves, both at the Congress and on the Moslem League platforms, as well as on all occasions when Indians from different parts of the country assemble together. Therefore, any step taken to retard it must be regarded as a decidedly retrograde measure.

Mr. Surendranath Banerjee, while conceding the sentimental value of the Resolution, pointed out that in Bengal alone there were some twenty vernaculars at various stages of development, and that the introduction of vernacular education would lead to confusion more confounded. Raja Sir Muhammad Ali Muhammad Khan regarded the Resolution as highly retrogressive.

Since the advent of British Rule in India [he said] its greatest achievement has been in the field of education, and it is through

that education alone that India has under the beneficent guidance of its administrators achieved the consciousness of its being an important unit of the British Empire. By coming in contact with Western civilisation and all that is ennobling in it, India's standard of life has risen. All these results, Sir, have been achieved because the medium of our education has been a language of Macaulay and Burke.

Sir Fazulbhoy Currimbhoy expressed himself in strong terms thus :

The feeling is very strong in Bombay in favour of the present system of education, and any attempt to introduce into the schools there the Honourable Mover's scheme of compulsory vernacular education will cause alarm which might easily develop into discontent.

And later he said :

With English at a discount in our high schools, all hopes of the disappearance of local narrowness based upon linguistic differences of the people of this great continent and of their unification into a common, hylozoic whole must be at an end.

Pundit Madan Mohan Malaviya in making out a case for vernacular instruction was careful to avoid the national arguments. He was in favour rather of a co-development in vernacular and English education.

While we acknowledge, and fully and gratefully acknowledge, the good that has come to our country through English education [he said], we feel, those of us at least who are more in favour of the Resolution than against it, that the policy of keeping up all the arrangements necessary to enable our youth to acquire a high degree of knowledge of the English language and literature, does not conflict with the policy of promoting to the fullest extent the natural or proper use of the vernaculars of the country for the instruction of the people.

The imperial as well as the national value of English was mentioned by Sir Ibrahim Rahimtulla :

Every one of the non-official members who has taken part in the debate has recognised the great necessity of promoting English education, and I think it is universally recognised that

one of the greatest boons which the British connection has conferred upon the people of India is the provision of English education.

Later he speaks of the common language as a boon

which has made possible not only the various provincial and all-India organisations, but also this or other legislative assemblies to which we come to represent the views of the Indian people in the official language before the highest officials in the land.

The most slashing as well as the shortest of the speeches came from Bengal. Rai Sita Nath Ray, Bahadur, opposed the motion in no uncertain language :

I beg to oppose my Honourable friend's resolution with all the emphasis I can command. Does he want to envelop us in the gloom and darkness which prevailed in the country during the time when Lord Macaulay came to this country and which his great educational policy was instrumental in dispelling ? It was Lord Macaulay who laid the foundation of that enlightened educational policy which has done so much to spread the culture, the enlightenment, and the science of the West. We owe a deep debt of gratitude to Lord Macaulay for his bold and persistent efforts in insisting that English, and English alone, should be the medium of imparting education in this country. Where would we have been, where would have been this boasted and enlarged reformed Council, but for the high education acquired through the medium of the English language ? Does my friend wish that the thousand and one languages which prevail in the country should be the media of instruction for learning Science, Mathematics, Engineering, Medicine and Law of the West, which can only be learned through the medium of English ? Does my friend want to produce a Babel of confusion ? It is a surprise to me that, in this twentieth century, such a resolution could have been conceived, far less seriously brought forward for acceptance in this august assembly.

I have given these excerpts at some length to show from the mouths of representative leaders of various parts of India how the English language, whatever its merits or defects as an educational instrument, is regarded as a common political bond. Sir Herbert Risley

in his 'People of India,' after a study of Sir George Grierson's exhaustive analysis of the linguistic problem involved in a Census Report, drew a similar conclusion. 'It is possible indeed,' he says, 'distant as the prospect now appears, that English after all may stand the best chance of becoming the national language of India.' Whatever may be in the future, the fact is that English *is* the only national language of India. It is the official language; it is the medium of communication for educated classes throughout India; it is in varying degrees a household language; it has to a certain extent reached the vocabularies of the lowest classes. It is, too, the common language of the press, the political platform, and the universities, and last, but by no means least, it is the imperial language, the language through which not only the Indians can make their thoughts, aspirations and work known to the Empire, but the language through which the forces of Empire are made known to India. It is, moreover, the language of the United States of America, to which not a few modern Indians owe their enlightenment—scientific, social and political. It is, finally, a language which, with French and perhaps German, will remain a world-language; a language which those whose vernacular is not English will continue to learn as part of their general education, just as the average Briton learns French; a language which if used and encouraged in India will open doors for India for the egress or ingress of ideas and facts when the vernaculars would isolate and obscure the people from all save those drops in the ocean of culture who call themselves oriental scholars.

The place of English as the common language might well be questioned if it could be demonstrated that any Indian language could take its place as a common language. The last Census Report shows something like 150 distinct languages, over twenty of which were spoken by more than a million of people. The situation therefore is, as Risley mentions, far more complex than in the old Austrian Dominions. The claims of Urdu or Hindi as a common

language are frequently put forward. These languages, indeed, might serve for Northern India, even though Hindus and Mohammedans might fail to agree over the script; but it is not easy to see how the people of Bombay, Madras and Bengal would favour them, with their new scripts and alphabets, before the already common English. Each vernacular has its particular elements of beauty and strength, and each commands the loyalty of its own people. The value of English as the common language lies not in its inherent virtues as a language, but in the fact that it is neutral.

> It is perhaps conceivable [says Risley] that one of the many dialects of Hindustani might in course of time become established as the vernacular of the whole of India, though the linguistic jealousies of Hindus and Mahomedans as to the script and vocabulary of the language will not readily be appeased.

Sir Edward Gait, in the 1911 Census Report, complains that the language returns were vitiated by political bias in the Punjab and the United Provinces, where the Mohammedans claimed that Hindus spoke not Hindi but Urdu, leading to considerable confusion in the returns.

The census returns, however, are plain enough on certain fundamental facts of language. It is inconceivable that the sixty-three million South Indians, constituting one-fifth of the entire population, will abandon their Dravidian speech for the Indo-Aryan languages of the north. Though a large proportion of these may know a little Hindi, their knowledge of Hindi is not as extensive as their knowledge of English. Nor, again, will the Bengalis readily sacrifice their language and literature to make Hindi a national language, when, along with Bengali, they can enjoy the benefits of English. The relation of English to any one Indian language, in short, is practically the same as the relations of the Indian languages to each other. From the point of view of any one language, both English and other Indian languages are 'foreign.' Each vernacular appeals to the home

loyalty and intimate feelings of its users. Nor do the classical languages offer any easier solution.

The day is far distant [says Risley] when the Ramayana of Tulsi Das will lose its hold over the peasantry of Upper India; and when the Hymns of Tukaram will cease to be household words in the Maratha country. Nor do the classical languages of India supply a bond of union which may form the basis of a common nationality. The tendencies of Sanskrit writing are hierarchical rather than national, while their contemplating and metaphysical tendencies are absolutely at variance with the actively militant spirit of the Arabic and Persian classics on which Indian Mahomedans are brought up. It is difficult to imagine any form of symbolical interpretation or intellectual compromise by which the quietest philosophy characteristic of the Hindu scripture could be reconciled with the fiery dogmatism of the Koran, or to conceive how two races looking back to such widely different literatures could be brought to regard them as the common heritage of one united nationality. We can only conclude therefore that in India, so far as can be at present foreseen, the development of the national idea is not likely to derive much support from popular speech on learned tradition.

It must be remembered, too, that in India the multiplication of vernaculars is to a certain extent artificial. In Calcutta University, for example, a student has to pass in a vernacular in the matriculation examination. This has led to the recognition of the vernaculars of many primitive tribes, and as such recognition means examinations, and examinations need books, books must be written. Often these vernaculars, when their leaders apply for recognition, have little literature save translations of the Bible, but as translations are easy and the adoption of a book as a text-book is profitable, new literatures grow easily.

Sir Edward Gait, in both his Bengal and All-India Census Reports, shows the natural tendency of many vernaculars to die out. He says:

In reviewing briefly the local extent of the different languages spoken in Bengal it has been repeatedly stated that a non-Aryan tribe has already abandoned or is gradually giving up its own

native language. Occasionally it is replaced by another non-Aryan dialect, as in the case of the Oraons of some parts of Ranchi, who speak Mundari, or of the Kharias of Keonjhar, who speak Oraon, but more frequently it is an Aryan tongue which ousts it. Thus the Hindu refugees in Western Nepal carried with them their language which, after gradually supplanting the original Khas, is now steadily gaining fresh adherents at the expense of the various hill dialects current in Nepal. The Koches of Northern Bengal have completely forgotten their own dialect and know only Bengali. The Bhuiyas, even in Keonjhar, have no recollection of their tribal language, and the Bhuiyas have abandoned theirs, save only in the Chota Nagpur plateau and in Midnapore. The Chakmas have given up Arakanese and now use a mongrel dialect of Bengali, which they write in an old form of the Burmese character. The Maghs of Tippera and Noakali have forgotten their own language altogether and those of Chittagong are gradually following suit. In the Sonthal Parganas the Mal Paharias know only broken Bengali, and in Hazaribagh and Ranchi a kind of Magahi is spoken everywhere as a *lingua franca*, and is gradually ousting the tribal dialects even in the family circle.

What was true of Bengal, Sir Edward Gait ten years later, in his All-India Census Report, found true of India. In the last report on Bengal Mr. O'Malley questions these conclusions in certain particulars, but he agrees that where a higher culture has both come into contact with and influenced a lower, the language of the latter tends to disappear.

The reverse—that is, the absorption of an Indo-Aryan language—never happens. Sir Edward points out the reason—namely, that they are the languages of a superior civilisation. The stronger indigenous tongues however, such as Tamil and Telugu, are not yielding to Indo-Aryan tongues. In Northern India, the Indo-Aryan tongues have made such rapid progress that Risley concluded that the disappearance of the non-Indo-Aryan dialect is only a matter of time.

The cause of the disappearance of languages in India presents an illuminating parallel in the case of English.

The adoption of new languages is due to a variety of causes. Conquest, as in the case of parts of the Roman Empire, and in modern times Alsace-Lorraine, may result in the adoption or the imposition of the language of the conquerors. More frequently a language disappears by a process of absorption, the result not of conquest but of friendly intercourse, particularly in the realms of commerce and higher ideas. Thus Greek at one time was the prevailing language in the non-Greek countries of Asia Minor and Egypt. In such an instance the language which has the greater virility or which is easier gradually supersedes the other, sometimes adopting apposite words or constructions from it. Utility is often the determining factor in the fate of a language. A language which is more widely understood is more useful, especially in the interlinked modern world, for commerce, science and the ordinary purposes of communication. In small European nations children have to learn in schools the languages of all their stronger neighbours. Dutch children, for example, learn German, French and English. Non-written languages, again, tend to disappear before written languages, and dialect before a standard language.

These various processes have all operated in India. The Aryan conquerors of India imposed their language on the conquered peoples, and the adoption of the Aryan language by part of the people spread gradually to others. The unwritten languages of the conquered disappeared before the written Aryan language. The Aryans brought new ideas, new customs, new implements, which, having no names in the indigenous language, were given their Aryan designations. The conquered, too, found it useful and profitable to know the language of their masters, a language which, moreover, was the means of expression for a higher type of civilisation and religion.

Sir Edward Gait gives a striking instance of how a language of a superior civilisation overcame the language of the conquerors. In the early days of the thirteenth century the Ahoms began their conquest of Assam.

Little by little they subdued the whole province. All-powerful though they were, in less than four centuries we find them employing Hindus as diplomatic agents, and using the Sanskrit language on their coins, &c. Later their kings embraced Hinduism, and at the present day in Sanskrit scarcely a trace of the Ahom language is to be found.

The artificial preservation of languages, however laudable patriotically, does not conduce to the unity either of nations or of mankind. In a paper communicated to the First Universal Race Congress, Professor Margoliouth, though not holding a high opinion of language as a national bond, strongly deprecates the unnecessary multiplication of languages from the point of view of the future well-being of the world. Differences of language isolate peoples, and no language is worth preserving artificially either for patriotic or literary purposes. 'Literary masterpieces,' he says, 'take care of themselves.' Either men will learn a language for the masterpieces it contains or interpreters will do the work for them. To multiply languages is similar to changing railway gauges on a through route. 'The advantage to Europe and mankind of a common language would be infinitely greater than any loss which could be sustained through the abandonment of a national language.' Just as in railway construction the principle of the expenditure of the least capital and energy should prevail, so in language, the gauges should be made to suit the country which has the greatest mileage and the largest amount of rolling stock.

English has not been imposed in India; it has been chosen. It is not the language of conquerors imposed on the conquered. Were it so the present high development of the vernaculars, with the active encouragement of the Government, would not exist. The claims of the English language lie in its own virility, and its utility for the manifold purposes in India. It will continue to exist along with the vernaculars, the combination of the two being emblematic of the triple allegiance which every Indian

owns—loyalty to his province, the emblem of which is his vernacular, loyalty to India, the national 'unity' of which is the English language, as it is also of the third loyalty, to the British Empire. As a language it has a greater mileage and larger rolling stock than any Indian vernacular. Hindu or Urdu, the claims for which as national languages are most frequently heard, are, relatively to the English language, only languages in the making. They have constantly to borrow from the West terms for which they have no way, or only a clumsy way, of expressing. 'English,' as Mr. Coldstream wrote recently (in the *Journal of the East Indian Association*), 'is spreading enormously so that Urdu must start or has started late in the race.' Indians must be bilingual, many of them multilingual before they are unilingual, but as Professor Margoliouth points out, 'when once man has become more generally bilingual, when there is a recognised language for international and cosmopolitan communication of all kinds, the way towards unification of language will at least have been indicated.'

The reality of the English language as a real factor in the life of the Indian peoples must depend on new or improved methods in education. Many educationists, disgusted with the present position, would far prefer genuine education in the vernacular, were it possible, to the present *kacha* English education. The present results, however, may be prevented by the removal of the causes. Sir Herbert Risley, in discussing this subject from the point of view of nationality, considered that with the dying off of the older non-English educated generation, English would spread from the school and University into the family. In Madras and Bengal this is partly true, and a similar process is observable in Northern India, where vernacular education has a greater hold. Risley had great hopes of the direct method in teaching which, he said, might make Indian children use English as well as they do French in Chandernagore and Pondicherry. Apart from this everyone who has to do with teaching

in Bengal knows the vast difference in boys who are educated in homes where the father or brothers are English-educated from those for whom English has no part in the ordinary household language. At present there is a very marked tendency for merely the adoption of English words without the corresponding sentence structure. With intensified teaching the sentence structure might follow. Risley's example of 'ap'nar theatricals boro tedious hobe,' though it may not show the 'right road to a real command of either language,' is at least indicative of a tendency which, if it does not end in the adoption of the English language in its Dublin purity, may lead to the creation of an Indian-English which may serve the purposes of national unity.

To judge from the present condition of English teaching in Bengal it is not surprising that there should be a growing antipathy to instruction through a foreign medium. In the schools and colleges the students are taught English so imperfectly that they are driven to all sorts of uneducational contrivances in order to pass examinations, particularly to cram-books and the memorising of passages. English is not taught in such a way as to give a free flow to ideas. It is perfectly pathetic to see the average student mentally searching for nouns and conjugating verbs before he speaks or writes his ideas. A foreign language can be successful as a medium of instruction only when the translation process becomes unconscious. It is impossible, of course, entirely to supplant a vernacular by a foreign medium, but it should be far easier than it is for the average Bengali student to express what in themselves are foreign ideas in the language through which these ideas are conveyed. As English is at present taught and assimilated, ideas are literally throttled before they can be expressed. Entangled in the net of an ill-taught language, the student flounders among his ideas, giving them either a partial or wrong setting, and is much surprised when his efforts are condemned. That facility with the language that does not dam the current of ideas is the attainment of only a

few of our best students, and far from progress being evident, the unfortunate experience both of others and myself is, to put it in an Irish way, that progress is backward. Till English is better taught, therefore, a prejudice natural enough in itself will become more and more marked, and the absence of a vernacular universally acceptable as an all-Indian language will mean the growth of linguistic provincialism and separatism at the expense of Indian unity.

Still another point requires notice. In the new governmental system it will be obvious that for the sake of Indian unity the Government of India must preserve a proper balance between local and central in the matter of language. So many separatist elements exist in other directions that it would require only a very slight stimulus to break the existing bond of linguistic unity. A province like Bengal, for example, with a dominant and strong vernacular, if left to itself in this matter, might easily claim the complete vernacularisation of education as a national right, relegating English to the place of a compulsory second language. Not only do the extracts which I have given from the speeches of prominent politicians, but also the general principles underlying the future position of India, make it imperative that the English language, instead of falling into a second-rate position, should continue as the Indian language, at least till such time as some vernacular can efficiently take its place.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report in discussing the causes for a change of government pointedly remarks that '*we* have created an *intelligentsia*' which now requires new outlets for its political activity. The minds on which the new forms of government are to be based are essentially products of western education through the medium of English. Western political and social ideas, coming to a country with vastly different traditions and institutions, are now, naturally enough, to be followed by western political institutions. Whatever success may have attended these institutions in the West, it seems reasonably clear that their success in India will depend on the

continuance of the type of mind which has caused them This implies the continuance of the vehicle through which the lessons of the West have been taught. Whatever the development of the Indian vernaculars, very few, if any, of them can easily or adequately express ideas which are foreign to them, and, even if they could, they would not form a united language for India. The Leagues, Congresses, Reports, Memorials, Speeches, Demands--all these are of a new India, educated in English ideas in the English language. One might very well doubt the existence of Legislative Councils, either provincial or imperial, the National Congress, and even the new Great Charter itself, had all the mind-force behind it, voiced in resolutions, demands, &c., been presented to the Government of India or the India Office in the vernaculars of the speakers or writers. English has given positive conviction of unity where the vernaculars would have given as positive conviction of diversity.

Though the Montagu-Chelmsford Report rejects the name 'federal' as indicating the government-to-be of India, nevertheless the result will be in the main a federal system. The essence of federalism is not that provinces or states surrender rights, but that both central and provincial governments should have certain powers definitely guaranteed by a definite constitution. Alexander Hamilton and Sir John Macdonald achieved in one way the federalisation of the United States and Canada; the makers of modern Brazil and Mexico performed a similar task in another way. The form of government, not the *foedus* or pact, is the central essential of a federal system, whether that system be an evolution, as in the United States, or a devolution, as in Mexico. The 'innateness' of powers or delegation of powers is equally immaterial to federalism. What *is* material is the division of powers between central and local with definite constitutional guarantees. Such a division the Montagu-Chelmsford Report proposes to make, and it is a subject of more than ordinary importance in the matter of education and

nationality. The federalism, or modified federalism, which is to exist will mean the granting of very considerable constitutional powers for the provinces. In a normal federal union education is largely provincial. In the United States, for example, the general supervision of education lies with the Department of the Interior. The main function of this Department is the collection of information and statistics, circulated to the states to promote systematisation in education. The real onus of educational organisation lies with the State Superintendents of Education. In India, however, the analogy of the United States Government omits the vital fact that in the United States federalism was a natural evolution; in India very largely it is a super-imposition, an *a priori* solution to racial, religious and governmental problems. In the United States the fact of unity existed before the act of unity; in India the act of unity exists before the fact of unity. In the Government of India, therefore, lies the fundamental duty of encouraging unity, and as the unity depends on a type of mind produced by western education imparted through the English language, the Government of India must keep to itself a large amount of legislative control in education, the pivot of the new democracy. In this matter it would be fatal to allow the provinces rope enough to strangle the central government. In the first flush of newly-found power, which, as the Report has decided, is to be provincial, the natural result will be intense interest in provincial affairs or provincial nationalism. From intense provincialism to separatism is not a difficult step. Particularly easy would it be in the case of language where a most natural issue of the new national feeling would be the intensification of the already existing feeling in favour of the complete recognition of 'national' languages as the medium of teaching in all grades.

The apparently disproportionate space devoted to the discussion of the element of language will find its justification later when I speak of the constructive side of Indian

nationality. Language, as I hope to show, will not only help to make a united India, but a united India in a united British Empire. Everyone is familiar with Strachey's paradox that the first thing to know about India is that there is no India. In his elaborate analogy of society and the organism Herbert Spencer found in language the connecting link in human society equivalent to the 'nerve sensorium' or head in the human body. In India ideas and institutions, as Spencer might have said, tend to be 'discrete,' to be units without unity. In a common language, and all that a language means, will be found at least one element of Indian unity, and, if that language be English, an element in the wider unity of the Empire and mankind.

CHAPTER III

RELIGION : HINDUISM AND MOHAMMEDANISM

In the previous chapter I examined the national 'unities' of race and language. I proceed now to examine in turn the other bases of nationality, the first being religion.

According to Sir Edward Gait's division in the last Census Report (1911) the religions of India may be divided into five main classes: Indo-Aryan, Iranian, Semitic, Primitive and Miscellaneous. Of these the Indo-Aryan branch, which includes Hindus, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists, claims 232,570,993 adherents, Hindus being 217,586,892 in number, Sikhs 3,014,466, Jains 1,248,182, and Buddhists 10,721,453. The Iranian (Parsi) religion numbers 100,096; the Semitic, including Mohammedan, Christian and Jews, numbers 70,544,482, of which 66,647,299 are Mohammedan, 3,876,203 Christian, and 20,980 Jews. The Primitive or Animistic religions have 10,295,168 adherents, and minor religions (Miscellaneous) have 37,101.

Before proceeding to examine the political bearings of the different religions, I must first mention some notable features in the religious classification of India. One of the most important things to note is that with the exception of Mohammedanism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Judaism, no absolute line of religious demarcation can be drawn. There is no definite Hindu creed. The word *dharma*, which is usually translated religion, refers more to conduct than to belief. The *dharma* of one individual is different from the *dharma* of another, not

because he believes in this or that god or book, but because he lives in this or that way. It is of little consequence to a Hindu whether a meat-eater believes in Christ or Mohammed. He is a meat-eater, a man from whose hands the Hindu cannot take water. It is of no importance to a high-caste Hindu whether a sweeper professes himself to be a Hindu, or actually is a Moslem or Christian; he is an outcaste, whose touch defiles. Among the lower classes many people who never heard the name of Christ are called *Kristans*, because they do things which only the *Kristan* sahibs do. They do not observe the rules of caste, therefore they belong to the casteless Christians.

To the Hindu, therefore, the theory of religion is not of the first importance. Provided that the individual concerned observes the proper caste ceremonial, it does not matter which god or how many thousands of gods he worships. Tolerance in matters of religious belief is accompanied by a corresponding intolerance in matters of conduct. This point is of considerable importance in the political study before us. It is popularly believed that Hinduism as a religion is a close corporation, that, as contrasted with Mohammedanism and Christianity, it is non-proselytising, non-missionary. Hinduism *is* a close corporation, but not in religious belief. It is a close *social* corporation. There are innumerable millions of actual or possible gods in the Hindu pantheon. The individual worshipper may choose whom he will as his gods, but his social actions are closely circumscribed by the strict rules of his caste.

In Hinduism there are innumerable sects, but these sects are so vague that it would be incorrect to speak of Hinduism as a religion of sects. Only a small number of Hindus belong to definite sects, and it is questionable if many of those could tell clearly wherein their particular sect differed from other sects. In the Census of 1901, in one province, only one Hindu out of nine, and in two others, only one in four and one in five, respectively, declared that they belonged to a particular sect. In the

1911 Census the number of persons belonging to a certain sect rose to three times the number recorded in the previous Census, but Sir Edward Gait explains this by the fact that the sect in question happened to be mentioned in the instructions to the enumerators as a type of the answer expected under the heading. When, however, a sect adopts a programme of social or political change a definite cleavage is established in Hinduism. Thus Buddhism, by renouncing the supremacy of Brahmans, Jainism, by denying the authority of the Vedas, and Sikhism, which, led by Guru Gobind Singh, repudiated many Hindu caste scruples and aimed at political power, have become distinct religions. In India the Buddhists are very few, only about one-third of a million; the balance of the 10·7 millions lives in Burma. The boundary lines between Jainism, Sikhism and Hinduism, which are usually regarded as distinct religions, are by no means clear. Thus Sikhism and Jainism share with Hinduism the belief in *karma* and metempsychosis. The Jains also employ Brahmans in domestic ceremonies, but they are limited to twenty-four saints. Many Jains actually call themselves Hindus, but the real Jain is easily discoverable by certain tests, whereas it is almost impossible to lay down tests to discover *pucca* Hindus.

Hinduism is closely related to both Sikhism and Jainism. In Hinduism itself there is the greatest variation of type; in fact neither Hindus themselves nor scholars who have studied Hinduism have been able to give a universally acceptable definition of Hinduism.

> When a man tells me he is a Hindu [said Sir Alfred Lyall] I know that he means . . . religion, parentage and country. Hinduism is not exclusively a religious denomination, but denotes also a country and, to a certain extent, a race. . . . Hinduism is a matter of birthright and inheritance . . . it means a civil community quite as much as a religious association. A man does not become a Hindu, but is born a Hindu.

Quoting these remarks, Sir Edward Gait, in the 1911 Census Report, gives a very instructive analysis of the

various opinions of leading Indians, consulted by Census officers regarding the distinguishing marks of Hinduism. Incidentally it may be remarked that, in the words of the Census Report—

> The enquiry generated a certain amount of heat, because unfortunately it happened to be made at a time when the rival claims of Hindus and Mahommedans to representation on Legislative Councils were being debated, and some of the former feared that it would lead to the exclusion of certain classes from the category of Hindus, and would thus react unfavourably on their political importance.

The Census analysis revealed the most extraordinary divergence of opinion among Hindus themselves as to the essentials of Hinduism. Some looked on Hinduism as a mere matter of country, saying that everybody in India who is not a Christian or Mohammedan is a Hindu. The basis of this view is the connection between the words Hindu and Indus, the name Hindu having been given by the Moslem invaders of India to those who lived near the Indus. Obviously this does not explain why those living in India as far from the Indus as London is from Greece are Hindus, nor does it give the slightest clue to the explanation of what are now obvious essentials of Hinduism, viz., caste, with the supremacy of the Brahmans, and the sacred nature of the cow. Others, again, said that Hindu denoted a particular race, being the equivalent of Aryan. From this point of view the four original castes were the parent stock of all the present castes. The holders of this view accordingly classified Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists as Hindus, and excluded from Hinduism such as the Bhils, Todas and Mundas. The race test for caste is utterly impossible. Not only are many of the same stock as the Hindu upper castes Moslems or Christians, but a very large proportion of Hindus in Madras and Bengal are Dravidian or a mixture of Mongols and Dravidians. Anthropometrical tests prove conclusively that racial homogeneity is not characteristic of Hinduism. Others

gave religious creed as the crucial characteristic, but there was little agreement as to what was the essential element in the Hindu creed. Every adherent of Mohammedanism and Christianity can at once put his finger on the essential points of his religious creed. Not so the Hindu. Some say that *karma* and metempsychosis are essential; some say the Vedas are the Hindu Bible; some say all the Hindu scriptures, excluding the Tantras. In actual practice what happens is that if a Hindu is a member of a caste, and if he observes his caste rules, he is a Hindu whatever may be his theology.

In the Census of 1911 ten points were laid down to test the orthodoxy of Hindu practice in relation to the acceptance by general opinion as well as by the castes themselves of the name of Hindu. These tests were given to Provincial Superintendents of Census operations, with instructions to prepare a list of all but the minor castes which *qua* castes (1) deny the supremacy of the Brahmans; (2) do not receive the *mantra* from a Brahman or other recognised Hindu guru (3) deny the authority of the Vedas; (4) do not worship the great Hindu gods; (5) are not served by good Brahmans as family priests; (6) have no Brahman priests at all; (7) are denied access to the interior of ordinary Hindu temples; (8) cause pollution, (*a*) by touch, (*b*) within a certain distance; (9) bury their dead; and (10) eat beef and do not reverence the cow.

These tests, when applied, revealed a very large number of partly assimilated Hindus. In Bengal, Behar and Orissa fifty-nine castes, of which seven are over a million strong, do not conform to all the tests, and fourteen beef-eating castes are denied entrance to temples. In the Central Provinces and Berar one quarter of the total number of Hindus deny the supremacy of the Brahmans and the authority of the Vedas. More than half do not receive the *mantra* from a recognised Hindu priest, and a third are denied access to the temples; a quarter cause pollution by touch; a seventh bury their dead; and two-fifths eat beef. In the Punjab about one-quarter of the

total Hindu population cause pollution by touch, and these also are denied the ministrations of good Brahmans and entrance to the temples.

Enough has been said to show the extraordinary diversity possible within the term Hinduism. No other religion in the world could accept as adherents people with so many differences in both tenets and customs. Hinduism is a facile religion; its embrace is capacious. But Hindu India is a land of antinomies. Toleration in religious profession co-exists with the most rigid social intolerance in the world. Universalism in religion in practice is the narrowest particularism. Yet in a sense the intolerance is the outcome of toleration. In India the racial problem was met not by extirpation, but by toleration, as Sir Rabindranath Tagore says (in his 'Nationalism'):

> Her caste system is the outcome of this spirit of toleration. For India has all along been trying experiments in evolving a social unity within which all the different peoples could be held together, while fully enjoying the freedom of their own differences. The tie has been as loose as possible, yet as close as the circumstances permitted. This has produced something like a United States of a social federation, whose common name is Hinduism.

Though Hinduism and Mohammedanism are ordinarily regarded as antagonistic, it may be noted that in the lower classes the boundary line between Hindus and Mohammedans is by no means clear. There are many Hindus of the lower classes whose Hinduism contains a considerable flavour of Mohammedanism. Thus the Hindu followers of the Panchpiriya cult worship five Mohammedan saints. Hindus frequently make pilgrimages to Mohammedan shrines. On the other hand, many Mohammedan converts from Hinduism have preserved much of their old Hinduism. Thus the Malkhanas of the Agra District, who are of Rajput, Jat or Bania descent, are half Hindu and half Mussulman. They worship in both temples and

mosques; they have Hindu names and are endogamous, but they practise circumcision, bury their dead, and eat with Mussulmans. They use the salutation Ram, Ram, but prefer being addressed as Mian Thakur. In Gujarat the Matia Kunbis call in Brahmans for ceremonial purposes, but follow the Pirana saint Imam Shah, and the Sheikhadas employ both Hindu and Mohammedan priests. Some tribes, as the Ahirs, are partly Hindu and partly Mohammedan.

Many similar instances exist. The great majority of Indian Mohammedans were originally Hindus, and Hindu customs have survived in spite of the fact that converts are as a rule antagonistic to their original faith. The inter-connection of Moslem and Hindu customs is seen also in the prevalence of caste among Mohammedans, about which I shall say more later. Although, strictly, a Hindu cannot be a Hindu unless he is born one, in actual practice the Hindu system is able in some way or other to expand itself by the inclusion of non-Hindus. Every year a considerable number of Hindus, especially of the lower classes, go over to Christianity or Mohammedanism, and no Hindu once he leaves Hinduism can return. Nor can the Christian-born or Moslem-born become Hindus. Individual conversion to Hinduism is as a rule impossible. Hinduism, however, expands by the conversion of communities, and the accretion of communities more than makes up for the defection of individuals. The process is thus described by Sir Edward Gait in the 1911 Census Report:

> An aboriginal tribe in an environment where Hindu influences are strong comes gradually and half unconsciously to adopt ideas and prejudices, to take part in Hindu festivals, to attend at Hindu temples, and to pay a certain amount of homage to the Brahmans. Some degraded member of the priestly caste, or perhaps some Vaishnava Gosain in search of a livelihood, becomes their spiritual guide; and as time goes on, the difference between them and their Hindu neighbours, in respect of their social customs and outward religious observances, becomes less

and less marked, until at last they are regarded by themselves and their neighbours as regular Hindus. The change takes place so slowly and insidiously that no one is conscious of it. There is no formal abandonment of one ritual for another. Sometimes it happens that a tribe is thus divided into two sections, the one Hinduised, the other still Animistic. In such cases open proselytisation often takes place among the unregenerate. The theory seems to be that the latter have lapsed from a higher state, and the Hinduised section of their community make no difficulty in admitting them after they have performed such ceremonies of purification as may be prescribed by their spiritual preceptors.

Conversions from Hinduism are chiefly to Mohammedanism and Christianity. There is always, of course, a number of Hindus who pass to the volatilised Hinduism called Brahmoism. Among the lower classes of Hindus there is every year a considerable number of defections owing to conversion either to Christianity or Mohammedanism. In the 1911 Census there are no definite indications of the number of conversions, but in both Risley's Census and Sir Edward Gait's 1901 Census for Bengal there are interesting figures and deductions. Risley points out that the figures show a tendency among Mohammedans to increase at a relatively quicker rate than Hindus. The reasons for such an increase he gives as the more nourishing diet of the Mohammedans, the freedom of Mohammedans from the *damnosa hereditas* of infant marriage enforced by social ostracism, the more reasonable marriage age of girls, fewer widows, and the removal of the ban on widow marriage. Conversion to Mohammedanism is due to several causes. Among the educated classes conversions are due to the missionary enterprise of the *moulvis* who persuade the Hindus that the purity and simplicity of the Koran are more acceptable than the tangled Hindu theology. Conversions, however, are more usually due to social reasons. Hindu widows may escape widowhood by marrying Mohammedans, and many Hindus who fall in love with Mohammedan women

change their religion in order to marry. Mohammedanism also provides an outlet to the lowest Hindu castes. There are numerous examples of the so-called depressed classes whose treatment by higher caste Hindus has driven them to the more convenient shelter of Mohammedanism or Christianity. In Hinduism there is a constant upward tendency in caste movements. High castes wish to be higher castes, low castes wish to be high castes, and pariahs or the casteless wish to be admitted to some kind of caste, however low. If the caste pretensions of the lower grades are not admitted by the higher, the lower castes may snap their fingers at authority and simply call themselves Mohammedans or Christians. A Brahman cannot then turn them off the road and heap his many insults on them with impunity. Mohammedanism is also a haven for those Hindus who wittingly or unwittingly have so offended their caste that return to their old status is possible only after very high fines or other severe penalties.

The purpose of what I have just said is to show that the fundamental antinomy of India, Hinduism and Mohammedanism, does not offer the same difficulty to natural fusion as is commonly believed. That the two religions do present a formidable barrier to union no reasonable man can deny, but that the barrier is insuperable is a conclusion unjustified by the premisses. Superficially, it is true, the antagonism seems so great that only an *ingenium perfervidum Indiae* can see beyond it a clear way to national fusion. On the one hand in India there are 217·5 millions of Hindus, whose very name betokens their ownership of India; on the other hand there are 66·6 millions of Moslems, who, to the Hindus, are exotics. Hinduism is the most rigid autocracy history has ever seen; Mohammedanism is based on the democratic equality of men. Mohammedanism is a fiery faith, intensely missionary; Hinduism is a philosophy of compromise, with an essentially close social system. Moslemism is monotheistic; Hinduism polytheistic and pantheistic. The political basis of Mohammedanism is

the Koran, the law of the Prophet, demanding an extra-territorial allegiance to the Khalif. Hinduism is non-political; it is social, based on the caste system, and centred in the supremacy of the Brahmans.

That these antitheses appear in the ordinary life of the people needs little demonstration. At its lowest the antinomy appears in the many riots which occur at the Bakr-Id or Muhurram festivals, when the sacrifice of the cow by the Mohammedans is as a red rag to the Brahmany bull. Regrettable though these disturbances are, and though they may be the result of uninformed fanaticism, nevertheless they have a theoretical religious justification. They are undoubted indices of opposed points of view in the two religions, though with more education and mutual forbearance these riots may in time completely disappear. At its highest the antinomy is seen in the speeches and writings of political leaders. The Hindu writer or politician almost invariably speaks of the future India as a Hindu India. I could fill this book with quotations from speeches in various Councils and Congresses, from pamphlets, books and articles, in which Hindu speakers or writers envisage a future India for the *Hindu* Indians. The preponderance of the Hindus in numbers, their inherent connection, even in name, with India, perhaps make pardonable such a one-sided view; but it is difficult to understand the same point of view in the work of such a judicious historian as Sir John Seeley. Seeley, in the fifth lecture of his 'Expansion of England' (second course), speaks of Brahmanism providing the germ out of which sooner or later Indian nationality might spring. He expresses surprise that nationality founded on Brahmanism has not developed long ago. The Mohammedan invasions provided the impetus for unity, but Brahmanism did not unite India against the invader. Hinduism, in fact, has never been electrified nationally by the spark of danger. 'One touch of Danger makes the whole world kin,' as Mr. Israel Zangwill says in his 'Principle of Nationalities.' But

danger did not awaken Brahmanism to unity and strength. Why? Seeley answers thus:

> Brahmanical powers have risen in India. A chieftain named Sivaji arose in the middle of the seventeenth century, and founded the Mahratta power. This was a truly Hindu organisation, and, as its power increased, it fell more and more under the control of the Brahman caste. The decline of the Mogul Empire favoured its advance, so that in the middle of the eighteenth century, the ramifications of the Mahratta confederacy covered almost the whole of India. It might appear that in this confederacy lay the nucleus of an Indian nationality, that Brahmanism was about now to do for the Hindus what has been done for so many other races by their religion. But nothing of the kind happened. Brahmanism did not pass into patriotism. Perhaps its facile comprehensiveness, making it in reality not a religion but only a loose compromise between several religions, has enfeebled it as a uniting principle.

Yet Seeley, even with the Mohammedans in their present position in India, still admits the possibility of union through Brahmanism, and even Risley, who criticises him, seriously considers the religion of the Arya Samaj as a potential 'national' religion.

The one-sided view of Sir John Seeley—a view, be it noted, which is given in the same essay as says that the population of India is divided between 'Brahmanism and Mohammedanism'—is typical of much of the nationalist literature of India. While in actual practice the representatives of the communities act with excellent accord on the Legislative Councils, it seems next to impossible for Hindu political writers to balance their claims with those of the Mohammedans. This water-tight compartment attitude is of course fostered by the political organisations of the times At present the elections to the Legislative Councils are necessarily held by communities, with the natural result that minorities look upon themselves as class minorities. Their whole attitude is to guard their own interests, the chief purpose, indeed, for which the present electoral system exists. Communal

representation in any country is an element of national cleavage, and in India its inevitable result is the perpetuation of already existing differences. The 'bond compounded of community of race, religion and language,' of which the Montagu-Chelmsford Report speaks, cannot come from the separation of communities. As the position is in India, communal representation may be a passing necessity, but as long as it exists it will block the vista of complete Indian national union.

On the other hand, even with communal representation, not every question that arises in the Legislative Councils is a sectarian or minority question. The great majority of measures are Indian measures. In their details special arrangements may have to be made for communities. Thus in the often debated question of universal education, the question itself is all-Indian, but in its application special arrangements would have to be made for Hindu *patshalas* and Moslem *maktabs*. On these general questions, Hindus, Moslems, and, for that matter, Christians, Parsis and Buddhists, meet on a common *Indian* platform. Nothing more illustrates the need for the neutral moderating power of Britain, which in these Councils holds the balance between the various communities of India, the chief of which, to judge by the writings of many of its leaders, is too apt to envisage the political future of India as a future for itself alone.

Before trying to weave together the threads of Mohammedanism and Hinduism, let me first make some remarks about religion in general as a factor in the disintegration or consolidation of mankind. Other things being favourable, people professing the same religion tend to union, people professing different religions tend towards disunion. Among existing nationalities similarity of religious faith is only ancillary to more potent bonds of union. The Christian faith has not welded the Christian world into a homogeneous whole, nor the Moslem faith the Moslem world. Sometimes sectarian differences in the same religion are as separatist as are different religions.

The main separatist elements, however, obviously are race, history, language, political and commercial interests. One of the least essential of national unities, an accidental accompaniment of nationality, a strengthener, but not a maker of national union, is religion as such. In its true sense it is above nationality. It transcends inter-racial or international boundaries. It is a common meeting ground for all minds, all creeds, all races. But religion is narrowed into theology, dogma and ritual. It is the 'handmaid of theology.' It provides the sanction of 'religious' institutions and creeds and so becomes racial and separatist. But if religion or creed is not an essential 'unity' in nationality, it is also a non-essential in separatism. As in unity, so in separation, it is ancillary. The great religious wars and crusades of the world have not been purely religious. Religion, or creed, has only strengthened other motives. Worldly motives have instigated wars of religion, and religion has made the wars more bitter or fanatical than otherwise they would have been. The Moslems, when first they burst on Europe, were no doubt inspired by the religious desire to extirpate the infidel, but behind it was the economic desire for food.

What other motive [say Professor and Mrs. Rhys Davids, in a paper to the Inter-Racial Problems Conference], unless it were the driving consensus of hunger could have availed so to stir and urge the different sections of the Semitic race hither and thither under the common banner of one prophet, athirst to fling the world on its knees before the throne of one God?

What is true of the Moslems is equally true of Christians. Economic motives have always played a considerable part in wars as well as conversions. Never has any religious war, as say the authorities just quoted, approached the spiritual plane of the one host or the other in the Holy War dreamt of by John Bunyan.

It needs [they say] a child's simple faith to people the camps of Crusaders or Covenanters with hearts burning with the white

purity and single-mindedness of a Joan of Arc. It is as impossible to imagine the first Christian going forth sword in hand to slay unbelievers as it is to picture a Buddhist, first or last, taking up arms against his fellow-creatures.

Economic motives thus underlie much of the so-called religious animosity of man. Equally notable is the easy transition from race-hatred to religious animosity. Religion is merely a cloak to physical repulsion, and when physical dislike is whetted by successful commercial rivalry the religious animosity seems magnified, whereas religion bears the blame for a result for which it has little or no responsibility.

When the Christian [say Dr. and Mrs. Rhys Davids] sheathing the sword prays for all Jews, Turks, infidels and heretics, he confesses these as most needing escape from damnation who are not only aliens but who are or were the embodiments of success in business on the one hand and, on the other, of aggressive restlessness and Asiatic institutions. The Spaniard might live side by side with the Moslem ; the French and Teuton could not. And, further, where there has been aggression in the name of religion *within* national borders, the anger of orthodoxy may always be traced at least in part to motive due to enmity of a political, social and economic nature.

Religion, therefore, is not so much a discordant element in itself but a cloak for other discordant elements. Race hatred, economic jealousy, political and social quarrels acquire an added zest when they wear the war-paint of religion. It is true that religion in itself has a certain individual tendency, the tendency which when translated into action produces hermits and recluses. This, however, is far from being a cause of political disunion. The man who as far as possible withdraws from the conventions and ties of society is not likely to be a war leader or prophet of nationalism. Religion in its true sense makes for consolidation, and even in India, amid the millions of Hindu gods, amid the differences of Moslems, of Christians, amid exclusive races, castes and creeds, a common basis of unity

has been preached by Nanak, Kabir, Chaitanya and others who proclaim one God for all in India.

In India the two leading religions are so opposed both in creed and religious institutions that it may seem almost hopeless to find a meeting place for national fusion. The amorphous body of doctrine, ritual and social organisation which makes up Hinduism is a glaring contrast to the clear-cut, well-defined Moslem doctrine of the Koran. The religious doctrines, the theologies of the religions, are markedly different, as are the respective rituals. In doctrine alone it seems hopeless to seek union. From what I have already said it will be obvious that the impact of one religion on the other has left its mark on each. Large sections of the community are partly Hindu and partly Moslem. Conversions take place from Hinduism to Moslemism, and as we shall see later, caste has affected Moslems as well as Hindus. The late Justice Ranade (in his 'Essays') tells us that Moslem civilisation, with its central idea of equality, exerted a considerable liberalising effect on Hindu customs and usages. Moslem thought has absorbed some of the best elements in Hindu idealism, and Moslemism as well as Christianity has encouraged the development of the modern theistic tendencies of Hindu thought. It is nevertheless inconceivable that either should swallow up the other, or that they should both meet on the neutral ground of Christianity. Christianity has affected both religions deeply, but the forces against mass conversion are too powerful to be overcome.

There thus seems little hope for those idealists who hold that in doctrine some *modus vivendi* for Hinduism and Mohammedanism may evolve. Such an evolution is almost unthinkable. Mohammedanism has a long and glorious history, a clear-cut doctrine and an elaborate system of religious education. In numbers it is, in India, weaker, but it is conscious of its millions of co-religionists in other parts of the world. It is an aggressive faith, full of life, and shows absolutely no signs of succumbing to

any other religious influence in India. It is, moreover, a political as well as a religious faith. Hinduism, though not well defined in doctrine, commands the devout allegiance of its followers. Flexible and adaptive in its doctrine, it has been reinforced by the new Indian nationalism. This nationalism, as undefined as Hinduism itself, has been particularly noticeable in the organisation known as the Arya Samaj.

I cannot here give a detailed account of the Arya Samaj. For such an account of the movement and of similar movements I must refer the reader to a book published recently called 'Modern Religious Movements in India,' by Dr. J. N. Farquhar, whose 'Primer of Hinduism' and 'Crown of Hinduism' are excellent books from which to study Hinduism as a religion. The Arya Samaj was founded in the last seventies by Dayananda Sarasvati, who was born in 1842 in the state of Kathiawar, and died in 1883. He spent the whole of his life in trying to re-establish the ancient faith of Hinduism. To re-establish Hinduism as the religion of India involved the eradication both of Mohammedanism and Christianity—an object which deeply involved the Samaj in politics. Pandit Dayananda's object was to bring modern Hinduism back to the four Vedas. He called on Hindus to reverence Brahmanism and the *Smriti*, and to return to the real Vedic fountain-head of their religion. Just as the watchword of Luther was 'Back to the Bible,' the watchword of the Pundit was 'Back to the Vedas.' Implicitly contained in this doctrine was the political doctrine of India for the Indians, or rather the Hindu Indians. As Dr. Farquhar says, if we combine these doctrines, we have the principle both religious and political that the religion of India as well as the sovereignty of India ought to belong to the Indian people; in other words, Indian religion for the Indians, and Indian sovereignty for the Indians.

To accomplish these two things the Pandit regarded as essential—first, the reform of Hinduism, by the return to the Vedas, thus uprooting the accumulated superstition

of centuries and the Brahmanical hierarchy; and, second, the extirpation of Christianity and Mohammedanism. To carry out its objects the Arya Samaj advocated reform in Hindu customs and the spread of education. At Lahore it founded and maintains the Dayananda Anglo-Vedic College, and in the Punjab and United Provinces it has several secondary and primary schools, five of which receive grants from the Education Department. Its chief religious institution is the Gurukulu at Hardwar. It also takes an active part in the education of girls and has a Vedic Salvation Army, the model of which is the Christian Salvation Army.

To the Western thinker who considers that Hinduism is wavering before the wave of Western ideas which have come through Western education I commend the following eloquent testimony of Risley (in his 'People of India'), a testimony delivered after the exhaustive analysis of the Census Reports from every point in India:

> . . . the supremacy of Hinduism as the characteristic religion of India is not as yet seriously threatened. The Animistic hem of its garment may, indeed, be rent off, and its fragments parted among rival faiths. But the garment itself, woven of many threads and glowing with various colours, will remain intact and continue to satisfy the craving for spiritual raiment of a loose and elastic texture which possesses the Indian mind. It has often been said that the advance of English education, and more especially of the teaching of physical science, will make short work of the Hindu religion, and that the rising generation of Hindus is doomed to wander without guidance in the wilderness of agnosticism. This opinion seems to lose sight of some material considerations. Science, no doubt, is a powerful solvent of mythology and tradition. . . . But the human mind is hospitable and the Indian intellect has always revelled in the subtleties of a logic which undertakes to reconcile the most manifestly contradictory propositions. Men whose social and family relations compel them to lead a double life, will find little difficulty in keeping their religious belief and scientific convictions in separate mental compartments. . . . A religion which has succeeded in absorbing Animism is not likely to strain at

swallowing science. The doctrine of *karma*, which in one of its aspects may be regarded as a sort of moral totalisator, infallibly recording the good and bad actions of men, admits of being represented, in another aspect, as an ethical anticipation of the modern determinist doctrine that character and circumstance are the lords of life; that the one is a matter of heredity and the other a matter of accident, and that the idea of man being master of his fate is no better than a pleasing fiction conjured up by human fantasy to flatter human egotism. Nor is this the last refuge of Hinduism. . . . It also touches (by the doctrine of *Bhakti* or ecstatic devotion) the emotions by the beatific vision it offers to the heart and the imagination. . . . And a religion which rests on both philosophy and on sentiment is likely to hold its ground until the Indian temperament itself undergoes some essential change.

Theologies, then, do not provide a meeting place. Where, then, are we to find the necessary basis of unity? To my mind it lies in (*a*) general toleration, and (*b*) the social and political life of the people.

General toleration of all religions is one of the characteristics of modern political development. Up to the present the West has gradually been throwing off the shackles of the Church *versus* Empire wrangles of mediaevalism. The State and Church are now both in theory and fact being rapidly separated, and in the newest communities, such as the United States and the British Responsible Dominions, the State tolerates every religious denomination. Even in England, with its State Church, Moslemism and Hinduism are allowed to exist. One of the cardinal tenets of British rule in India is religious toleration, seen in the publicly professed religious neutrality of the Government of India. The right to worship in any way the individual desires exists in India within the necessary limits that open immorality or dangerous practices should not be permitted." The Government of India thus, from the very beginning, has freed itself from the internecine strifes of religions. In some respects, it is true, the Government has departed from strict neutrality, as in the case of giving a guaranteed

number of posts in government service to Moslems. This policy, however, is not in origin religious; it aims at giving fair play to a community which in matters educational is somewhat backward. In general it is true to say that the Government of India is in religious matters neutral. In measures affecting religious or ritualistic observances, the greatest pains are taken to test the feelings of the respective religious communities. The Government, moreover, holds the balance between the communities, and if need arose, would prevent any undue encroachment by the one upon the other.

So manifold are the duties of the Government of India, and so trusting are the people in government, that in India, more than any community in the world, the civic aspect of life is given a chance against all others. The Indian has great faith in government: most people say too great faith, for he trusts too much to government and too little to himself. What is popularly known as the *ma bap* attitude of the people is due simply to the fundamental fact that government is the maintainer and adjuster of the rights of the people. This, the basic fact of the state and government, is the best provision possible for the development of Indian national feeling. Religion cannot provide the basis; but it can be given a position such as will not interfere with the working of the political basis. If religions fight because of the fanaticism bred by opposed doctrines or customs, or if they are cloaks to racial or economic feuds, they may be superseded as agents of unity or difference by what is the true basis of the state. Nationality will develop in India not because Hindu, Moslem, Christian and other theologies will fuse, or merge into a new faith, but because a system of rights will be established which will guarantee to the various religious communities their various rights of worship. Nationality may thus develop in spite of religious differences.

The second basis, and to a certain extent it only supplements the first basis, is the social and institutional life of

the people. To give even a summary of the meeting points of the social elements in Hinduism and Mohammedanism is impossible here. I have already referred to the actual interconnections of the religions. In discussing caste I shall have to say more of the purely social effect of caste on Mohammedans. There are many other, and more important, instances of how Hindus and Mohammedans act together in full accord without any material differences arising from religious creed.

In the first place we may note intermarriage. Some of the Moghul Emperors, as is well known, had Hindu Empresses. Rajputs and Moslems have intermarried. The Kasbatis of Gujerat, nominally Mussulmans, marry Hindu wives. The Molesalams, who are partly Hindu, intermarry with Moslems. A recent Jam of Nawanagar had a Mohammedan wife, whose son was declared successor to the throne. The wife of the late Nawab of Junagadh was a Hindu, and her funeral was attended by large crowds both of Hindus and Mohammedans.

Secondly, there are innumerable instances of the intermingling of customs. The Gaekwars of Baroda wear in their childhood the symbols of Mohammedan mourning during the Muhurram. The Gaekwars proceed in the Id processions with the Moslem devotees to the mosques. In Poona, a Hindu centre, the tabuts, which are imitation mausolea in memory of the death of Husain, the grandson of the Prophet, are carried in procession by the Hindus.

Thirdly, in industrial life, we find that the artisans are Mohammedans, the raw material being produced by Hindus. In factories, in building—in all kinds of manual labour, in fact—Mohammedans work side by side with Hindus. Even in crime (as in the case of the notorious Pindaris) they work amicably. In the Calcutta riots of 1918-19 the origin may have been due to Moslem causes, but the Hindu *budmashes* were only too ready to join in for the plunder.

Fourthly and chiefly, there is the community bred of political and politico-social life. From the smallest local bodies to the Imperial Legislative Council, even the Secretary of State's Council, Hindus and Mohammedans work together without religious friction. In the Native States we find a Hindu Prime Minister in Mohammedan Hyderabad, a Mohammedan Prime Minister in Hindu Jaipur, and also a Mohammedan Chief Justice in Hindu Baroda. Hindus and Moslems meet in national and other congresses. Questions such as the separation of the judicial and executive powers, education, and Indians in South Africa affect both communities. Even religious and social reform has known a meeting at Delhi, where such diverse leaders as Syed Ahmad Khan, Dayanand Saraswati, and Keshub Chandra Sen met to confer on common purposes. Hindus and Mohammedans have joined in common philanthropic bodies. The Seva Sadan, for example, has a Moslem branch. The Co-operative Societies have brought the communities together for a common economic purpose. There are such clubs as the Orient Club in Bombay and the Lumsden Club in Amritsar, or the Calcutta Club in Calcutta, where the communities meet in perfect social amity. Hindus have even returned a Moslem member to the Imperial Legislative Council. Hindus frequently propose Moslems for election as officials.

I could quote pages of extracts from speeches of members of either community, such as the Aga Khan and the Maharaja of Darbhanga, a most orthodox Hindu, pointing the fact, and inculcating the duty of unity, but I think I have already said sufficient to justify the conclusion that *rapprochement* between the communities already exists. The opinion is frequently expressed that the creation of such institutions as the Benares Hindu University or the proposed Aligarh University will encourage diversity. Let me quote an extract from a speech in the Imperial Legislative Council, which expresses such a fear and at the same time gives the solution.

The Honourable Mr. Ghuznavi, in the discussion on the Benares Hindu University Bill, said:

. . . I should only like to say at the present moment that there is some amount of feeling in the country that neither a Hindu University nor a Mussulman University will be of any real advantage to the people, because I take it the desire of true Indian patriots is above all else to bring about the unification of the two great communities of this country, namely, the Hindus and Mussulmans, and a Hindu University and a Mussulman University will I am afraid tend to produce *ultra* Hindus and *ultra* Mussulmans. But [continued the speaker] *if my Hindu friends in this Council, the promoters of this University and the Hindu public outside, are enamoured of their University, and if they are satisfied with the constitution which the Government has been pleased to grant them I for one wish them all joy.*[1]

Similar doubts were expressed at the same meeting by the present Vice-Chancellor of Bombay University, Sir Chimanlal Setalvad, so that the doubts came from both communities. The italicised remarks of Mr. Ghuznavi characterise the mutual tolerance of Hindus and Mussulmans in public bodies. Friction is most exceptional. In my own experience of a University and College where both Hindus and Mohammedans are taught, instead of intolerance I have always noted the greatest readiness on the part of either community to accommodate itself to the wishes of the other in respect of matters of religious observance.

I may also note in passing that the Benares University received cordial support from other communities, such as the Parsis and Christians, represented on the Imperial Legislative Council. The Government of India was severely criticised in many quarters for giving its consent to the Bill. I do not pretend to know the inner workings of the Government of India, but to me it seems that, granted that religion is not the basis of unity for India, and that unity will develop in spite of religion, it is ridiculous to attempt to suppress institutions which will

[1] The italics are mine.

encourage the highest development of both religions. If the sectarian Universities carry out the purposes of their foundation honestly they will undoubtedly add to the culture of India. It would be as ridiculous to suppose that these Universities, were they political institutions, would *not* prevent the development of Indian national feeling.

Many English observers of Indian politics readily point out the object lesson of Ireland, where there is only a difference of sect, not of religion. If sectarian differences can be so separatist, *a fortiori* how can we expect fusion in India, where not only religion but language, customs, political antecedents and much else are different ? The British Government has failed to unite Ireland, how can it expect to unite India? These and similar questions I must leave to a later part of these studies in Indian nationality. In the meantime I may say that in Ireland it is obvious that religion is not the only point of divergence between England and Ireland, and that the British Government has not the same problems in India as in Ireland. In some respects the problems of India are more difficult ; but in one respect they are much easier, and that is in religion. The Government of India is neutral in religion, and it occupies a distinct place *as a government*, i.e., as a dispenser of justice or a maintainer of a system of rights, a fact which will enable it, while holding the balance in matters religious, to become more and more the object of the *political* minds of Indians. By holding the balance the Government will also enable the two communities to put their own houses in order—the Mussulmans to heal their differences, the Hindus to adapt their social system to the new political needs.

Religion, I repeat, is the central antinomy of India. But religion lives in harmony with religion under the aegis of a neutral government. As the process of intellectual enlightenment moulds the religious, intellectual and social lives of the citizens of India, we may reasonably hope for the advent of the mutual amity and toleration

for which Sir Rabindranath Tagore pleads so earnestly in his 'Nationalism.' By perfecting their own systems in the shelter of the *pax Britannica* the religions can not only add to the sum of the world's culture, but mutually act and react on each other in the process of fitting into the Indian whole. In the meantime, when the higher verities of religion cannot be understood by an unenlightened proletariat, clashes will appear and blood be spilt. The evolution will nevertheless continue, the only real danger being undue haste in political reconstruction. A system of rights does not grow up in a day, but it may be destroyed in a day. In India to 'force the pace' of political development would mean complete ruin to all the forces which are at present working for good.

The creation and maintenance of a system of rights require the recognition, either explicit or implicit, of rights; in other words, the notion of citizenship must underlie the state. That the ideal citizenship is wanting in India is only too evident; it is recognised in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report (paragraph 229) in their reconstruction of the Indian political frame, where it is said, 'Division by creeds and classes means the creation of political camps organised against each other, and teaches men to think as partisans and not as citizens.' I have spoken of creeds, but I have not yet given an intensive analysis of classes. This leads me to a discussion on a subject cognate to the main subject of religion, the subject of caste, which, though intimately connected with religion, is so vital that it must be treated as a subject in itself. In examining the various facts and relations of caste I have, of course, to confine myself mainly to Hinduism, but the Hinduism I shall speak of is not Hinduism as a religion but as a social system. In speaking of Hinduism as a social system, the central fact of which is caste, I shall have further occasion to speak of Hindu ideas of nationality as distinct from Indian nationality.

CHAPTER IV

CASTE

I

COUNTLESS writers on India have described caste in more or less detail, but few have departed from the normal course of description to try to fathom the question of caste and nationality. Of the few whose views of caste go beyond the mere social stratification of Hindu society, only one has made a real attempt with any constructive result to show the relations of caste and nationality. That one is the late Sir Herbert Risley, who, as Census Commissioner for All-India in 1901, received ample opportunity to view the Indian kaleidoscope from a favourable vantage point. Admirably equipped with an excellent classical, historical and anthropological education, a balanced judgment and a facile pen, Risley is second to none in his description of facts and his arrangement of premisses and conclusions. His reflections on Nationality and Caste, published in his 'People of India,' are given after the most complete survey of racial, linguistic, religious, social and educational facts and tendencies yet produced in, or for, India.

As I have already pointed out earlier in these studies, Hinduism is a socio-religious system—two distinguishing features of which are the caste system and the supremacy of the Brahmans. The supremacy of the Brahmans is really an element in the caste system. The Brahmans are spiritual teachers and expounders of the law. They are also the apex caste of the social system.

Caste, in the words of Sir Herbert Risley, may be defined as a 'collection of families bearing a common name, claiming a common descent from a mythical ancestor, human or divine; professing to follow the same hereditary calling, and regarded by those who are competent to give an opinion as forming a single homogeneous community.' A caste is an endogamous group. The member of a particular caste must marry a member of the same group. Hypergamy, whereby the woman of one caste may marry a member from the next higher group, but may not 'marry down,' is allowable to a certain extent, but on the whole it is true to say that caste is an exclusive marriage group. Intermarriage between castes is forbidden.

I mention the fact of endogamy because it has a very direct bearing on our central subject. Many observers of Hindu society have found it wellnigh impossible to picture a unified Hindu people, far less a unified India, where the Hindus are so hermetically sealed off from each other. The exclusive groups and sub-groups of Hindu society by their very nature breed an almost fanatical loyalty to the group. The group is a small world or miniature nation in itself. It has its own blood, its own rules and observances, its own government. The caste group produces a caste loyalty. From the nature of the caste, citizenship in Hindu society is primarily citizenship of a caste or family. The sentiment of unity or solidarity is a matter not of a province or nation but of a caste. To the Hindu the influx of aliens or the danger of invasion is of small importance provided it does not endanger his caste. He is governed morning and night, sleeping and waking, by rules of caste. Rigidly caged within its walls, he must guard his cage from encroachment, for what affects his caste affects him. Other caste-members share the same sentiments. They may work together and speak together if caste rules permit, but above all they must preserve their ceremonial mutual exclusiveness. They must eat only with whom caste

rules permit; they may take water only from those who do not defile; they must marry and give in marriage those whom the rigid rules of caste allow.

Sir Herbert Risley drew particular attention to the barrier of endogamy in the development of Indian nationality. 'No one writing in Europe,' he says, 'would imagine that people who were capable of conceiving the idea of national unity had not long ago passed the stage at which restrictions on intermarriage could form part of their code of social custom.' This, the 'physiological aspect of the question,' has been noted by more than one observer. In the growth and progress of the Roman Empire the feeling of solidarity, though not owing its chief influence to the mixture of blood by intermarriage, was doubtless helped by the *ius connubii*. The world socio-imperialism for which Sir Rabindranath Tagore pleads is in some important respects comparable to Roman political-imperialism. Whereas the Romans allowed the right of intermarriage not only among the Roman classes themselves but also between Romans and conquered peoples, the Hindu admits such a right only to very rigidly circumscribed castes or caste groups. Not only is the right of intermarriage forbidden by Hindu custom, but the groups cherish that which is the very negation of communal feeling—namely, an actual physical repulsion to each other. Denied the rights of marriage and commensality, and regarded as actually polluting to the touch of higher castes, the lowest castes can scarcely be expected to find a blood basis of unity or a basis of common sentiment with the higher castes. Even the natural love of home and country may seem to be only a shadowy bond of unity where those in authority are able to carry class distinctions so far that the lowest classes dare not walk on the same road as the highest, nor dare touch their fellow-countrymen more highly favoured by birth, without involving the risk of eternal damnation. A society where the intermixture of blood between citizens leads to outer darkness both in this

world and the next cannot normally be expected to unite in the bonds of mutual love and respect necessary for common national feeling.

Sir Comer Petheram, when Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University, brought this to the notice of the students of his time.

It should be borne in mind [he said] by those who aspire to lead the people of this country into the untried regions of political life, that all the recognised nations of the world have been produced by the freest possible intermingling and fusing of the different race-stocks inhabiting a common territory. The horde, the tribe, the caste, the clan, all the separate and often warring groups characteristic of the earlier stages of civilisation, must, it would seem, be welded together by a process of unrestricted crossing before a nation can be produced. Can we suppose that Germany would ever have arrived at her present greatness, or would indeed have come to be a nation at all if the numerous tribes mentioned by Tacitus or the three hundred petty princedoms of last century, had been stereotyped and their social fusion rendered impossible by a system forbidding intermarriage between the members of different tribes or the inhabitants of different jurisdictions? If the tribe in Germany had, as in India, developed into the caste, would German unity ever have been heard of? Everywhere in history we see the same contest going forward between the earlier, the more barbarous instinct of separation, and the modern civilising tendency towards unity, but we can point to no instance where the former principle, the principle of disunion and isolation, has succeeded in producing anything resembling a nation. History, it may be said, abounds in surprises, but I do not believe that what has happened nowhere else is likely to happen in India in the present generation.

Sir Rabindranath Tagore, a member of the society of which he speaks, says practically the same thing (in his 'Nationalism'). Speaking of Indian nationalists he says:

Nationalists say, look at Switzerland where in spite of race differences the people have solidified into a nation. Yet, remember that in Switzerland the races can mingle, they can

intermarry, because they are of the same blood. In India there is no common birthright. And when we talk of Western Nationality we forget that the nations there do not have the physical repulsion, one for the other, that we have between different castes. Have we an instance in the whole world where a people who are not allowed to mingle their blood, shed their blood for one another, except by coercion or for mercenary purposes? And can we ever hope that these moral barriers against our race amalgamation will not stand in the way of our political unity?

Intermarriage may be called one of the natural or physical bases of nationality, but with the growth of enlightenment the physical elements tend to be replaced by the spiritual or intellectual. Endogamy in Hindu society is a bar to national unity, not in itself, but because it is emblematic of the lack of a spiritual basis, and how far the counteracting influence of other national unities may overcome this natural barrier is another question. But the rigid caste marriage-system itself shows signs of breaking down. The recent attempts by both Mr. Bhupendranath Bose and Mr. Patel to legalise inter-caste marriage, though they evoked many protests from the orthodox Hindus, at the same time found much sympathy in Hindu society. The recent Bill of Mr. Patel in particular showed the war between conservatism and liberalism in Hinduism.

It is beyond my present purpose to analyse the various theories of the origin of caste, but I must make some reference to them for purposes which will be apparent later. Briefly stated, the theories of the origin of caste are five—namely, the Indian theory, Sir Denzil Ibbetson's theory, Nesfield's theory, Senart's theory, and Risley's theory. The Indian theory is contained in the Institutes of Manu, and, therefore, is the orthodox Hindu view. Brahma, the progenitor of the whole world, caused the Brahmans, Kshatriyas, the Vaisyas and the Sudras to issue from his mouth, arms, thighs and feet. To each of these four original castes were assigned its particular

duties. The Brahmans were to teach, study, perform sacrifices and receive alms; the Kshatriyas were to be soldiers, to protect the people; the Vaisyas were to trade, cultivate, and lend money; the Sudras were to serve the three higher castes. From these four castes grew the other castes by a series of crossing, first between members of the original groups, and afterwards among their descendants.

The Indian theory proves to us that about the second century of the Christian era there existed in India a highly developed social organisation, with groups of various kinds—tribal, national and occupational. The idea of the four castes, moreover, is not original to Manu. It exists in earlier law books, and it is not improbable, as Risley suggests, that the Brahmanical theory of caste is only a modified version of the division of society into four classes—priests, warriors, cultivators and artisans—which appears in the religious literature of ancient Iran. The old Iranian tradition, coming to India in some way, fascinated the law-writers by the assertion of the supremacy of the priests, who found in it a theory adaptable to Indian social conditions. Risley gives evidence of similarity between the Iranian classes and the Manu theory which is so striking that it is impossible to believe that the two were unconnected in origin, even although the Aryans may not have been the channel which brought the idea to India.

Sir Denzil Ibbetson's theory, contained in the 1881 Census Report for the Punjab, is summed up in these words:

> We have the following steps in the process by which caste has been evolved in the Punjab: (1) the tribal divisions common to all primitive societies; (2) the guilds based upon hereditary occupation common to the middle life of all communities; (3) the exaltation of the priestly office to a degree unexampled in other countries; (4) the exaltation of the levitical blood by a special insistence on the necessarily hereditary nature of occupation; (5) the preservation and support of this principle by the elaboration from the theories of the Hindu creed or cosmogony of a

purely artificial set of rules, regulating marriage and intermarriage, declaring certain occupations and foods to be impure and polluting, and prescribing the conditions and degrees of social intercourse permitted between the several castes. Add to these the pride of social rank, and the pride of blood which are natural to man, and which alone could reconcile a nation to restrictions at once irksome from a domestic and burdensome from a material point of view; and it is hardly to be wondered at that caste should have assumed the rigidity which distinguishes it in India.

Sir Denzil Ibbetson's theory contains most of the possible elements in the origin of caste. His theory is more a suggestion of causes than a cut-and-dried theory, and, as will presently be seen, other writers who have given definite theories have merely segregated one of the elements from Ibbetson's list and regarded it as the main or determining cause. This theory is an excellent recognition of the universal nature of the general idea of caste. In India the general idea has undergone several adaptations owing to the peculiar circumstances of the country, and its rigidity is explained largely by the intervention of the clever priests who drew up the caste rules. Like the other theories which I mention, Sir Denzil's theory to my mind fails to trace the real cause of the ceremonial rules made by the priestly caste.

Nesfield's theory, contained in his 'Brief View of the Caste System in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh,' is that caste is based solely on occupation. The order of social precedence in the castes is determined by the relative stages of culture to which a particular occupation belongs. Endogamy and other rigid caste customs he ascribes to the Brahmans, who, to safeguard their own position, found it advantageous to start them. Recent anthropological work in the direction of showing the power of priests in earlier social organisation tends to confirm Nesfield's remarks about the Brahmans, but to base caste on occupation alone is justified neither by the caste system as it is nor by the comparative study of

similar institutions. Occupation might explain certain general divisions in caste, but it does not explain either the elaborate sub-division of castes or the various ritualistic observances which accompany caste-division. Nor, again, does the mediaeval trade-guild or the modern trade-union parallel explain caste. Trade-guilds were exclusive to the extent that they accepted as members only those craftsmen who were qualified *by their craft* for membership. The guilds, too, found it in their interest not to encourage outsiders to qualify for membership. Trade-unions are tending more and more to erect barriers between one branch of a trade and another branch of the same trade. But trade unionism, although it has many rules as rigid as rules of caste, is not exclusive in the same way as caste is. The birth-qualification and the ritual, so characteristic of caste, were not essential to trade-guilds, nor are they a mark of trade-unionism. Above all, endogamy, the crucial test of caste, is alien to both trade-guilds and trade-unions. Even if occupation were the original cause in caste formation, the Brahmans, to whose ingenuity Nesfield ascribes endogamy, must have had some idea of division on principles other than occupation alone. Occupation alone thus does not explain caste, but that it is an element in caste-formation is clear from the fact that new castes are actually formed at the present time on an occupational basis. Occupation is one among many elements in the process of caste-making. It is not, to my mind, the original cause: it is rather an element which easily fitted into a scheme of things which had another cause. Occupation is the *causa impulsiva* of many modern castes, but it is not the *causa remota* of caste itself.

Senart's theory, contained in his 'Castes in India,' is interesting not only in itself but for the careful parallel he draws with the social customs of Greece and Rome. He argues that caste is a result of the struggle for existence of Aryan institutions in India. Aryan peoples had all some sort of caste system. In Greece, Rome and India

there are parallel institutions, the family, φρατρία, and φυλή in Greece; the *gens*, *curia*, and tribe in Rome; the family, *gotra*, and caste in India. The similarities in Greece, Rome and India extend even to detail. In marriage the γένος, gens, and *gotra* were similar, endogamy prevailing to a certain extent in each. In Rome plebeians had to fight a long battle before they were granted the *ius connubii* with patricians; in Athens the members of a φρατρία had all to be of the same blood-group. In Rome hypergamy existed just as it does in India. The Roman *confarreatio* was the equivalent of the Punjab *got kanala*, the marriage meal, by partaking of which a wife is transferred from an exogamous group to that of her husband.[1] The caste restrictions regarding food, Senart points out, were also common, as were funeral ceremonies and exclusion from caste or temples.

Senart does not give any one theory of the origin of caste. Like Sir Denzil Ibbetson, he believes that many factors operated. In Risley's summary,

> Distribution over a wide area, tending to multiply groups, contact with the aborigines, encouraging pride of blood, the idea of ceremonial purity, leading to the employment of the indigenous races in occupations involving manual labour, while the higher pursuits were reserved for the Aryans, the influence of the doctrine of metempsychosis, the absence of any political power to draw the scattered groups together, and the authority which the Brahmanical system gradually acquired—

these are the elements in Senart's theory.

Risley's own theory, for which, like the other theorists, he finds parallels in many other communities, is based on the fact that conquering races coming into India in

[1] For further information on this point, the student is referred to W. Warde Fowler's article 'Confarreatio: A Study of Patrician Usage,' in the *Journal of Roman Studies*, June 1916. Works of a general character which may be consulted on the wider question are Sir J. G. Fraser's *Golden Bough*, and *Totemism and Exogamy*; Crawley's *Mystic Rose*; Professor Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage*, and *Marriage in Morocco*; and Hartland's *Primitive Paternity*.

various waves, found wives among the local races, but, to preserve their pride of blood, kept the inferior races at arm's length in other matters. A similar development is seen in South America, where negroes intermarry with negroes, and the various half- or quarter-races with themselves, but are forbidden by law to marry with the white races. The Burghers of Ceylon are another example. In the early days of the Dutch occupation of Ceylon the Dutch colonists married Singalese wives, but in time this half-breed community came to look on themselves as superior to the indigenous Singalese; and they now form practically an endogamous caste by themselves. Similar instances exist in India at the present time. Working on these premisses, Risley gives the outlines of the process in the formation of the Hindu caste system. When the second wave of Indo-Aryans, homogeneous in stock, first poured into India, they did not bring their women, but found wives among the indigenous peoples of India. Subduing the Dravidians by force of arms they captured women according to their needs. After they settled in India—being cut off from their homes by distance and the conditions they had made for themselves—they gradually bred enough women to make further intermarriage with the conquered peoples unnecessary. Their pride of blood remained with them, and once they had females enough they formed a superior community with a rigid marriage-bar. As their numbers grew, the younger men again set out on the war-path, and, in imitation of their ancestors, repeated the process. Viewed thus, at the root of the whole system is the pride of race based on colour or warlike ability, ultimately crystallising into endogamous caste.

The caste system once started was strengthened by the fiction that people

> who speak a different language, dwell in a different district, worship different gods, eat different food, observe different social customs, follow a different profession, or practise the same profession in a slightly different way, must be so unmistakably

aliens by blood that intermarriage with them is a thing not to be thought of.

The growth of the caste instinct was also stimulated by certain peculiarities of the Indian intellect; in Risley's words:

> Its lax hold of facts, its indifference to action, absorption in dreams, its exaggerated reverence for tradition, its passion for endless division and sub-division, its acute sense of minute technical distinctions, its pedantic tendency to press a principle to its furthest logical conclusion, and its remarkable capacity for imitating and adapting social ideas and usages of whatever origin.

The myth of the four castes was first evolved by some speculative Brahmans and, aided by the natural imitativeness of Hindus, it soon spread through Hindu society and, in the working out of the many other gradations, was helped by the philosophic doctrine of metempsychosis and *karma*.

Among the various theories of the origin of caste one peculiar fact is to be noted. Each writer is able to support his case by copious historical parallels in other countries and among other peoples. All this points to the universality of certain aspects of caste, a universality which, as the Roman jurists might have argued, marks caste as an inherent element in nature. In India caste has taken a distinctive form, a form which has prevented the development of a Hindu nationality, or nation. While in Persia, Greece and Rome national unity evolved, and evolved in more than one way, and at more than one period in history, India has continued nationless. The unity of India has not gone beyond the caste. This Senart ascribes to the fact that the Indian never rose to the idea of *patrie*. Just as among the Greeks the idea of the city-state was the highest development—the nation-state was not dreamt of—so in India the notion of citizenship stopped at the caste.

My purpose in bringing forward these theories is to

bring out the universality of many of the leading features of caste. The caste system as it is to-day is characteristic of India, and of India only. Arising in the prehistoric days before the arrival of the Aryans in India, it is merely a particular application of a general theory. The animistic aboriginals, worshipping the elemental forces of nature, transmitted to the higher civilisation of the Aryans living examples of what in earlier days was characteristic of Aryan civilisation, but of which at the time of contact only certain survivals existed in the Aryan culture itself. The Aryans, with a pride both of culture and race, and possessing among themselves the class distinctions common to all mankind, gladly accepted the animistic ideas of the aboriginals and applied them to human institutions. The most educated class took to itself the pride of place, and gave to that place the sanction both of civil and religious law. In the course of time other things entered as creative agencies in the caste system—such as occupation and race-purity, with endogamy.

For the establishment of a caste system what is primarily necessary is the *idea* of caste. The idea of caste, originating in the way suggested, under the extremely favourable medium offered by the peculiar conditions of India, provided in the course of time the iron frame into which the modern plan of caste was fitted. As applied by the thinking Aryans, the idea found favour among the aboriginal animists who, seeing spirits in stones, trees and rivers, were only too ready to apply the same idea of spirit-emanation to the human body or to objects touched by the human body. Conversely, the incoming peoples were only too ready to adopt a ready-made instrument found *in situ* for the preservation of race superiority and the dominance of the enlightened classes.

The existing theories of caste seem to me to fail by laying too much emphasis on the mechanical aspect of caste. The mechanical explanations of either race or occupation or a mixture of the two do not explain many of the existing elements in caste. They do, it is true,

explain certain facts of caste formation, but they do not get behind caste. The idea of caste in some form is universal. Class distinctions are the form it has taken most usually, distinctions based on birth, social position, religion, or the possession of wealth. In Hindu society, strictly speaking, it is based on birth and birth alone. The wealthiest Sudra is only a Sudra as compared with the penniless Brahman. But why is the wealthy Sudra untouchable? Why is water taken from the wrong hands poison to the Brahman? Why dare not the untouchables of Madras come within a certain distance of the Brahman? Why cannot higher castes even touch what has been touched by the lowest castes without ceremonial pollution? Why does the high caste doctor place tissue paper on the arm of a low caste patient when he is feeling his pulse? And why in every action of his waking and sleeping life is the Brahman so circumscribed by scriptural ceremonial? Why is bathing, or the 'washing away of sin,' so important in these ceremonies?

To me the answer seems to lie in the idea of spirit emanation, so common in all early societies. Before the Aryan advent in India the idea of spirit emanation was universal, and in one form it survives in the various totemistic groups of modern India. The very survival of totemism in India for so many centuries shows the strength of the powers on which it is built. Totemism, as Sir J. G. Frazer points out, is a semi-social, semi-religious system by which the individual considers himself as having some integral relation with his totem or group symbol, a connection so intimate that he will not kill, eat, or even injure the totem. The notion at the back of it all seems to be the idea of spirit community. Risley, though he does not apply his idea to caste formation, suggests this solution when he calls Hinduism 'magic tempered by metaphysics.'

The idea of spirit emanation or magic, therefore, seems the fundamental idea of caste. It was supplemented in the course of its development by other influences, such

as occupation and race. Clever law-givers, like the clever priest-kings of other early communities, clothed the original idea with a vast amount of historical, semi-historical or purely fictitious material, gradually building up a pseudo-legal system which in time became so ingrained among the people that it worked mechanically by itself.

The arguments from the comparative study of social development I must leave with a reference to that vast mine of information, Sir J. G. Frazer's 'Golden Bough,' or the smaller volume 'Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship.' In these volumes much light is thrown on early society, particularly on the part played in the development of early political society by magicians. I commend especially to those interested those parts of the 'Golden Bough' which deal with homœopathic and contagious magic, and leave the readers to compare in their own minds the facts of magic with the ceremonialism of Hinduism. But to continue this fascinating subject further would take me too far from my central theme.

The caste system, to my mind, is simply an application of animism or spiritism to society. In totemistic tribes the totem is the centre of good and evil, the consequent object of worship and the home of spirits. The spirit idea, translated into society, gives social strata, each of which contains its particular spirit. The spirit of the highest class is the all-powerful and all-beneficent spirit. It resides in the Brahmans, for whom the reverence and help of the others are therefore necessary. This spirit must not be defiled either by direct corporeal touch or by the intermediate method of objects touched by, and therefore containing, the lowest spirits; nor must it come into contact of any kind with the emanations from these lowest spirits.

It seems reasonable to conclude that what has been a stage of development in all communities, and has subsequently disappeared before other ideas and institutions, may follow a similar course in India. The Indian caste

system, it may be pointed out, has lasted so long that it has become ingrained not only in the characters of the people but in their laws and institutions. That is undoubtedly true. The basis of Hindu law is laid in codes (chiefly the code of Manu) which recognise, and legislate for, caste; but law is only a reflexion of the mental attitude of a people. Class legislation has disappeared in other countries. It has, however, left survivals in many forms, just as has the earliest culture of which the laws are emblems. Customs die slowly, but even in unfavourable media survivals tend to linger on. It cannot of course be argued that, because in origin customs were the same in all communities, in the same way they will all disappear. It is almost impossible to think of a casteless India. Caste is a primal fact of life, and it is inconceivable that any sudden social movement will be able to sweep it away. But in caste there may be those adaptations possible which will allow that solidarity to develop which is necessary for national union.

II

So much for the origin of caste. It is far beyond my present purpose to give a detailed account of how modern castes are formed. I must, however, bring to notice those features of caste formation which have a bearing on Indian nationality.

Caste, once formed, is rigidly exclusive, but that caste is capable of extension is shown in a variety of ways. Generally speaking there are seven types of caste: tribal, functional or occupational, sectarian, cross, national, migratory, and castes formed by changing occupation. Tribal castes arise when a tribe gradually adopts the usual caste rules and accepts some of the most salient points of Hinduism. This usually happens with the indigenous animistic tribes. Such castes naturally come at the tail end in caste precedence. Large numbers of castes have been formed in this way, such as the Dosadhs of Behar,

the Ahirs of the United Provinces, the Bagdi, Koibarta, Pod and Rajbansi-Kochh of Bengal, and the Nayar, Vellala and Pariah of Madras.

The functional type of caste is so common that it is popularly regarded as the chief type. Each caste has its particular traditional type of work, the caste always prescribing the limits, and often the methods, of the work. As members of a caste leave for new types of work, they leave the old caste and form a new caste. The caste is the Indian trade-union, and a most rigorous union it is, though its main object is not to raise wages. It does not allow caste 'blacklegs.' If the members break caste they must expiate their sins by fines or expulsion; if the work is different from the caste-work they must form a new caste. Such, at least, is the theory.

In this connection it is very important to note the relations between the actual and nominal caste functions of some of the castes, particularly the Brahmans. Nothing illustrates more clearly the adaptability of Hinduism to new conditions than the way in which the Brahmans, the purest in blood, the proudest, the most privileged of the castes, have given up their traditional callings. The Brahman by caste-rights is a priest, a teacher, and a receiver of alms. The Bengal Census Report of 1901 shows that only 17 per cent. of the Bengal Brahmans and a mere 8 per cent. of Behar Brahmans were priests. In 1911 over all India less than one-fifth of the total number of Brahmans followed any sort of religious calling at all. In the Bengal report for 1911 Mr. O'Malley points out that the Brahmans live mainly by agriculture. In West and Central Bengal the number of agricultural Brahmans, whether landlords or tenants, is double that supported by priesthood; in North and East Bengal a quarter, in Behar one-seventh, and in Orissa and Chota Nagpur only one-tenth support themselves by religious callings. The rapidity of the change may be judged from the fact that a Sub-Judge near Burdwan recently said to a friend of mine that his village

supported thirty Brahmans when he was a boy, whereas it now supports only two.

What is true of the Brahmans is equally true of other castes. In 1901 the Chamars, whose traditional occupation is leather-working, all, save 8 per cent., had left their caste calling to act as cultivators or labourers. The same Census shows that two-thirds of the Kayasthas, by tradition writers, were farmers, and that 65 per cent. of the Telis (oil-pressers) had gone over to other employments. In 1911 a similar tale is told, showing that as time goes on the tendency to leave the traditional caste occupation is intensified. The only castes who 'stick to their lasts' are those engaged in agriculture. Even the weavers show a tendency to leave their hereditary occupations. The 1911 Census, in spite of the intervening period of active *swadeshi-ism*, showed a smaller number of weavers among the Jolahas and Tantis than in 1901.

From the figures two conclusions may be drawn: first, that with the changing conditions of India, caste has proved flexible and adaptable; and, second, that castes with a low status leave their traditional callings for other work considered less menial. In Krishnagar, for example, the sweepers have gone almost *en masse* to work as railway coolies or surfacemen.

Sectarian castes originate in sects founded by religious leaders very much in the same way as Christian sects arise. The sect once founded organises itself on a caste basis. In his Census Report for 1901 Risley quotes as an instance of this the Lingayat sect of Bombay and South India, which then had over two and a half million members. The Lingayats were founded in the twelfth century by a religious reformer who proclaimed the equality of all who received the eightfold sacrament ordained by him. By the seventeenth century this sect had begun to organise itself on caste lines, making endogamous groups with caste gradations exactly opposite to the teaching of the founder. The Lingayats actually presented a petition to the Government of India protesting against the 'offensive

and mischievous' order to include them all in one caste. It would be difficult, says Risley, to find a better example of the 'essentially particularist instinct of the Indian people, of the aversion with which they regard the doctrine that all men are equal, and of the growing attraction exercised by the aristocratic schemes of society which their ancient traditions enshrine.'

The same tendency is observed to-day in both Brahmoism and Christianity. Both these creeds theoretically renounce caste, but even in them the innate particularist tendency of the Hindu comes out. In Christianity there may be found in places a caste division based on the clean and unclean castes of Hinduism. The early Portuguese missionaries in the west of India recognised and provided for this. 'Caste' churches have been known, and many caste observances introduced into Indian Christian ceremonies. Generally speaking the Christian Churches strongly oppose the introduction of the caste flavour into Christianity, but often the instinct has proved too strong. In India, as Risley says, 'race dominates religion; sect is weaker than caste.' No matter what the religious profession of the Hindu or the ex-Hindu, his social system always veers round to division and sub-division, to endogamy and exclusiveness.

The effect of caste on Moslemism is very marked, particularly in Bengal. A large proportion of the Bengali Mussulmans were originally converts from Hinduism, and many of the caste prejudices of their earlier religion have remained with them. Theoretically all Moslems are equal. There should be no caste at all, and in certain respects, such as the acts of worship where the Moulvis and Mullahs give their ministrations to all, there are no distinctions. In social matters, nevertheless, the Hindu caste restrictions are very noticeable. The main basis of distinction is occupational. Thus there are the Jolahas, weavers; the Nikaris, fishermen; the Kulus, oil-pressers; the Naluas, bamboo-mat makers; the Dhobas, washermen; and the Hajjams, barbers. These Moslem caste

groups have practically the same rules governing marriage and commensality as Hindus have.

Cross castes are exemplified by the Shagirdpeshas of Bengal, who are the offspring of Kayasth immigrants and women taken by them from lower castes as concubines. The offspring have formed new castes, according to the caste of the father, with the usual caste rules of endogamy, &c. The Khas of Nepal are another example. They are the descendants of mixed marriages between Rajput or Brahman immigrants and Nepalese women. The Khas are classed as Kshatriyas, having received their high status from their high-caste fathers. The Sudras of Eastern Bengal and the Rajbansi Brahmans of Chittagong, who are supposed to be crosses between Burmese fathers and Bengali mothers, the Vidurs of the Central Provinces and the Borias of Assam all are examples of cross castes.

Particular note must be made of the so-called national castes, of which the Newars and Marathas are examples. To the Marathas reference has already been made in connection with the general subject of religion. The Marathas are divided in Bombay into the Marathas and Maratha Kunbis, the former being hypergamous to the latter. The highest class of Marathas is supposed to consist of only ninety-six families, who claim to be Kshatriyas. Their claim to be higher than the Kunbis seems due to their having won high positions and wealthy estates at the break-up of the Mogul Empire. The Newars are a mixed mongoloid people comprising both Hindus and Buddhists, each divided into castes. The Newar Hindu higher castes are divided on governmental lines with the priests first, members of the royal family next, ministers and officials following.

Migratory castes are formed by castes leaving their original homes and settling in other parts of India. Such castes are regarded by their own people as having been polluted by contact with foreigners, and when they want to take wives from their own people they find that they have to go a step down the social ladder or pay very

highly for marriage in their own group. In time these castes develop a fellow-feeling and marry only among themselves, taking a new caste name, which usually indicates their territorial origin (such as Barendra or Tirhuti). Thus Behar castes settling in Bengal are forbidden the rights of intermarriage with Bengal castes of an equivalent status. In time the traces of the original caste-cause disappear, and the caste takes its place in the recognised local social strata.

Castes formed by a change of custom arise from neglect on the part of the original members to observe the ordinary rules of their original caste. Thus the Babhans or Bhuinhar or Bhumihar Brahmans of the United Provinces and Behar are supposed to have dropped in the Brahman scale by leaving the traditional priesthood in order to be farmers or zemindars. At the present day the most usual cause of caste-formation in this way is widow-marriage. Castes may raise themselves, as have the Ayodhya Kurmis of Behar, by prohibiting widow-marriage. The process is simply that the caste, recognising that widow-marriage is unorthodox, refuses to intermarry with castes who do allow widow-marriage, adopts a new name indicative of their new orthodoxy, and steps up a rung on the social ladder. The distinction between Jats and Rajputs is based on widow-marriage, as also that between many other castes throughout India.

CHAPTER V

CASTE (*continued*)

FROM the short account of caste given above, it will, I think, be clear that caste is practically an instinct of Hindu life. The tendency to divide and subdivide has as yet proved stronger than any movement of religious and social reform. Brahmoism, Christianity and Mohammedanism have all to some extent given way to caste. New movements proclaiming the equality of men have in time turned on their founders and rent them, the victory always coming to caste. English education has affected but not uprooted it. Railway travelling, where all castes, touchable or untouchable, must mix, has shorn it, at least for travellers, of some of its traditional scruples. In many other ways it has given up its outward ceremonialism, but in the essential matter of marriage it reigns supreme. The power of social ostracism compels all Hindus, whatever their professed theories of caste, to bow before its rules. To be turned out of caste means far more to a Hindu than social degradation does to an Englishman. An Englishman who offends the social standards of etiquette or good breeding may still go to the same barber, the same church and meetings, and the laundry will not refuse his washing. To be outcasted in Hindu society is to be boycotted in every way. The priest will not attend the outcast else he himself will suffer; the washerman will not accept his clothes or rupees; the barber will not shave him; his personal servants will leave him; his daughter will not find a

husband—all these and many more evils ensue if an individual is thrown out of his caste. It is not surprising therefore that the most 'advanced' Hindus look upon transgression of caste rules, even though they consider such transgression to be in the higher interests of the moral law or humanity, with considerable timidity.

It will also be gathered from what I have said that the ideas of Indian nationality and caste are largely mutually exclusive. One implies separation; the other consolidation. Caste in itself is the closest union in history, but unfortunately it co-exists with so many divisions that it is impossible to look forward to a time when India will know only one caste—Indians. And not only has Hinduism to heal its own divisions but it has to fuse with Mohammedanism, Christianity and the other religions of India.

Sir John Seeley considered Brahmanism the germ out of which might possibly develop an Indian nationality; but even from the Hindu point of view alone it would be more feasible to imagine the development of one of the national castes, especially the Marathas, into an Indian caste. If the Marathas had spread their tentacles all over India and forced other castes and religions to organise on a national basis they might have succeeded in unifying India. As it is, these are localised in one part of India, and have themselves become entangled in the caste net. To regard either a caste or a group of castes as likely to unify India, therefore, is chimerical. The only possible solution to the national problem is for caste to adapt itself to the new idea, and caste has already proved so flexible in other matters that it does not seem too much to hope that it will also adapt itself to nationality.

Nationality is a new idea to Hinduism. Mohammedanism *is* national. Hinduism is not national, or is only national in the embryonic stage. It has barriers to surmount which do not exist in Mohammedanism, and these barriers it must surmount before it reaches the political

completeness of Mohammedanism. The problem of Hindu nationalism is therefore distinct from either Indian nationalism or Mohammedan nationalism. Before Indian nationality is possible, the possibility of Hindu fusion must exist in order to place it on the same political plane as Mohammedanism. Though both Christians and Mussulmans have succumbed to certain caste influences, caste is not inherent in their social systems as it is in the Hindu, and the central teaching of each of these religions is diametrically opposed to it. It may be presumed, therefore, that, if the Hindu house sets itself in order to suit the newcomer nationality, it will not be difficult for the other communities to admit one who to them is by no means a stranger.

The conception of nationality in Hinduism has been borrowed from the West. The Hindu (Sanskritic) languages of India have no word even to correspond to our 'nationality.' The word that is used (*jati*) is really the equivalent of *genus*, as in the Sanskritic phrase 'manushya jati,' the genus man. The influence of western political thought has widened the meaning of *jati* so that we have now phrases like 'Hindu jati' for Hindu nationality, or 'Bharatiya jati' for Indian nationality. But nationality is not indigenous to Hinduism; it is imported.

Why, it may be asked, is not nationality a natural evolution in Hindu political life? The reason seems to be that either the idea did not develop in Hinduism or that it was repugnant to Hinduism. In my analysis of caste origins and development I have pointed out that though there are many universal elements in the social evolution of Hinduism, there are other elements belonging to Hinduism alone. In the absence of these particular elements it may reasonably be supposed that the political evolution of Hinduism might have followed the recognised lines of the Aryan West. But these characteristic elements filled the Hindu social system with so many rigid compartments, so many caste rules and reservations, that they completely checked the development of the Hindu peoples

into a homogeneous nationality. They placed a full-stop on the evolution of Hindu political society, and this full-stop is only now being changed into a semicolon when there is every chance of the West making a big step forward from nationalism to internationalism.

It must be remembered that India for centuries developed a civilisation of her own without any appreciable influences from outside. Endowed by nature with remarkable geographical unity, India for centuries was cut off from the West. The only doors open to India from the West were the Indian Ocean and the inhospitable mountains of the North-West. By both these ways, it is true, certain influences found a way into India. Traders from Africa and Arabia and Mussulman invaders from the North-West came and went. It was not till the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the Indians really began to feel what the West meant. Historically the two most important events in bringing new ideas to India were the great Moghul Empire and the advent of the East India Company. With the break-up of the Moghul Empire, the East India Company assumed command, but it was only in the last century that the Company and its successor, the British Government, took upon itself to educate India. With that education came the political idea of nationality—an idea which, even in the West, is a nineteenth-century product.

During the many centuries of its existence, Hinduism, which under other conditions might have been fluid, solidified. To this solidification many factors contributed —climate, the physical and mental character of the people, the 'facile comprehensiveness' of the doctrine propounded by the religious teachers, the supremacy of the religious teachers, and the ignorance of the masses. What we are concerned with here, however, is the present, not the past. The past interests us only so far as it provides lessons for the present or future. That the past does provide hopeful object-lessons I have already to some extent shown. The origin of caste shows

us caste as a universal element in society, and the development of caste has shown us the flexibility of caste when called on to meet new conditions. From the origin of caste, its growth, and the circumstances surrounding them we may reasonably look on caste as an arrested political development. The Hindu political synthesis stopped at race, and is now only finding an exit therefrom. Race, one of the chief bases of caste, was a problem in India unparalleled in history, and it was solved in a peculiar way. With the intervention of other causes, caste, the solution to the racial problem, went far beyond its intention. Its method of evolution shut out the development parallel to that of the West. But with the influence of the West that evolution *mutatis mutandis* may yet run its course.

I have spoken, as everyone else who has studied caste has spoken, of the rigidity of the caste system, of its aristocratic nature and of its apparent injustice. To attempt to join the democratic idea of nationality with the system which of all systems in the world seems the negation of liberty, equality and fraternity, may seem to many a hopeless task. To my mind, nevertheless, the idea of nationality within Hinduism does not seem impossible. It may, of course, be retorted that as a non-Hindu I cannot appreciate the strength of Hindu bonds, but I can at least describe, and, as far as I can, draw deductions from what seem obvious enough characteristics of Hinduism. To brace up my own weakness, I shall reinforce my conclusions with the opinions of those who ought to know the subjects of which they speak.

The first line of argument I have already dwelt upon. By a comparison of parallel social and political institutions it may reasonably be concluded that the Hindu social system is an arrested form of political development. By an analysis of Hindu society as it is, one can detect, in spite of an extraordinary rigidity of structure, a certain fluidity and flexibility. The very conditions underlying the formation of certain caste-types, such as the migratory,

occupational and those formed by change of custom, show that caste rests on a fairly fluid basis. Once formed, it is true, the caste tends to be inexorable; but that it can be formed at all shows the possibility of change and adaptability to new conditions. Nationality is a new idea, bringing new conditions. May not Hinduism be sufficiently receptive to accept a new idea and accommodate itself to the conditions which the new idea demands?

Such receptivity does not really necessitate the abolition of caste for the attainment of nationality. It implies only the *adaptation* of caste to nationality. In other words, those elements of caste which are antagonistic to the new idea must disappear. Their disappearance, therefore, will depend on the battle between these elements and nationality. Which will be stronger? Caste, which though it has existed thousands of years, has had continually to modify itself to suit new conditions? Or nationality, which in the space of half a century has so completely upset the traditions of the country that it is now on the verge of responsible democracy?

That the flexibility of Hinduism is not confined merely to the process of caste formation may be seen by a glance at Hindu law. Hindu law is founded on a number of codes, the best known of which is the code of Manu. It is partly a legal, partly a religious system of law. Whatever be the dates or whoever the writers of the Hindu codes of law, they all belong to an early stage of society. Thus in the laws of Manu there are no laws regulating the ownership of land or conflicts between individual members of a family. But the laws of Manu, ancient and honoured though they be, have not placed any barrier in the way of legal advance. They made room for custom, and the Brahmans, the Hindu interpreters of law, made full use of custom and interpretation to make the law fit new conditions. The Brahmans formally altered the law by writing commentaries on the older codes, and in these commentaries they engrafted new customs on the old rules. The authority of these commentaries as law

depended, as in other legal systems, upon the learning of the writers; but once accepted they were sources of new law, made by the Brahmans themselves, even although the Brahmans in making their new laws bewailed the disappearance of the old customs and the arrival of the new. With the advent of the British *Raj* the influence of custom continued, and with the scientific organisation of a judicial system, custom has been largely supplemented by judicial decision or precedent. Hindu law, therefore, has accommodated itself to new conditions by allowing both custom and precedent to act as law-givers. Sir William Markby, who, in addition to being Reader in Indian Law at Oxford, was for many years a Judge in the Calcutta High Court, in his 'Elements of Law,' brings this out in these words:

> The British courts in India and especially the European Judges have been accused by some of paying too much, and by others of paying too little, attention to the commentators. As a matter of fact the courts in India have innovated very largely, and it is not a little remarkable that modern Hindus who will not tolerate any interference with their law by a legislature have always accepted with deference the decisions of our tribunals even when they have been counter to popular feeling. This is especially so with the decisions of the Privy Council, but all the British courts have from the first been liked and respected.

The same authority compares the progressiveness of the Hindu law with the unprogressiveness of the Moslem law. The Moslem law, founded on the Koran, deals more with the ordinary facts of life than do the Hindu codes. The Koran, moreover, does not admit of any modification of its precepts. In certain particulars, it is true, such as in the matter of money-lending, modification has taken place, but on the whole 'Mohammedan law seems to have become so unprogressive that it is impossible for a nation to advance under it.'

Another line of argument is the evidence of the power of liberal thought in Hindu society itself. In all societies advance is preceded by the asking of questions. In the

early stages of political development much was done by the simple word *why*. When leaders in a community or the community itself begin to ask questions about its existence, its laws and its institutions, the basis of advance is laid. Where institutions seem unreasonable, unjust or out of date, the liberal thought of a community tries to alter them. Liberalism has always to fight and beat conservatism or reaction. There is always a body of thought which considers that what was good for our fathers is also good for us and therefore that we should leave things as they are. In modern Hinduism it needs little demonstration to show how these forces are working. On the one hand there are the Brahmos, who have rejected Hinduism, but who wish both in name and in fact to identify themselves with the interests of India. On the other hand there are the conservative *pandits* and Brahmans who have much to lose in the break-up of the old system. In Hinduism itself, apart from Brahmoism, there is a vast body of liberal opinion which recognises the necessity for reform in Hindu society, but at the same time does not wish to destroy the essentials of Hinduism. The liberal thought of Hinduism appears in many ways—in periodicals, speeches, proposed laws (such as Mr. Patel's Bill to legalise inter-caste marriages), and organisations.

For an account of the organisations for reform I again commend the reader to Dr. J. N. Farquhar's 'Modern Religious Movements in Hinduism.' Apart from such anti-caste movements as the Brahmo Samaj and the Prarthana Samaj, it is particularly noticeable that the Arya Samaj, the most vigorous of all pro-Hindu movements, violently opposes caste. Numerous other purely Hindu organisations also denounce caste.

One of the most pronounced movements in modern Hinduism Dr. Farquhar calls Religious Nationalism, a movement which practically coincides in time with the present century. (Dr. Farquhar dates it from 1895, the year of the commemoration of Sivaji, the Maratha, from which so many disastrous results followed.) This

nationalism has taken many forms. In one form it was seen in anarchism, the theoretical basis of which was that Hindu civilisation in all its branches is superior to either the British or the Mohammedan, and that therefore it is the duty of Hindus to extirpate the foreigner. In another form it was seen in the *swadeshi* movements which demanded Indian products for Indians and the exclusion of foreign manufactures. Another manifestation of Hindu nationalism was the organisation of Reform Societies in Hinduism itself. Notable in their propaganda was the new attitude adopted towards the outcastes. The late Mr. Gokhale, one of the best type of Hindu nationalists, expressed that new attitude in these words:

I think all fair-minded persons will have to admit that it is absolutely monstrous that a class of human beings with bodies similar to our own, with brains that can think and hearts that can feel, should be perpetually condemned to a low life of utter wretchedness, servitude and mental and moral degradation, and that permanent barriers should be placed on their way so that it should be impossible for them ever to overcome them and improve their lot. This is deeply revolting to our sense of justice. I believe one has only to put oneself mentally into their places to realise how grievous this injustice is. We may touch a cat, we may touch a dog, we may touch any other animal, but the touch of these human beings is pollution. . . . Moreover, is it, I may ask, consistent with our own self-respect that these men should be kept out of our houses and shut out from all social intercourse as long as they remain within the pale of Hinduism, whereas the moment they put on a coat and a hat and a pair of trousers, and call themselves Christians, we are prepared to shake hands with them and look upon them as quite respectable? No sensible man will say that this is a satisfactory state of things.

Mr. Gokhale was a man of action as well as a thinker. The Servants of India Society, the headquarters of which are at Poona, was established by him to carry out social and religious work in India. The society is open to all religions. Its one object is service to India as a whole. The Arya Samaj and many other organisations made

social reform an important ' plank ' on their ' platform.' The demand for universal education is another common element in the new nationalism and it is frequently accompanied by practical efforts, shown in the collecting of funds and founding of schools and colleges.

In fine art, music and poetry Hindu nationalism has also found an outlet. In art the national movement was headed by Mr. E. R. Havell, the Principal of the Government School of Art in Calcutta. Aided by Mr. Abanindranath Tagore he founded a school of Indian painters in Calcutta, which has certainly added to the world-store of art. Considerable advance has also been made in Indian music.

In literature there has been a very marked revival. In one form it is shown in the intensive studies of modern Indian literature. In Bengal the University of Calcutta has just established a full post-graduate course in Bengali language and literature, and there are many workers in the field. Supreme among modern Bengali *littérateurs* of course is Sir Rabindranath Tagore, who has had the unique distinction of receiving the Nobel prize for literature. Sir Rabindranath is not only a *littérateur*; he is a practical educationist with very individual ideas. His school at Bolpore in Bengal, where about two hundred boys are educated, combines modern education with the best religious teaching of Hinduism. In his poetry, especially in the ' Gitanjali,' Sir Rabindranath breathes that pure modern spirit of Hinduism, which cannot but raise the highest hopes for the culture on which it is based, even among its detractors. To his ' Nationalism ' I shall have occasion to refer later.

Though in its extreme form Hindu nationalism has led to many disastrous occurrences, detestable alike to Europeans and the best-minded Hindus, it is capable of much positive good. In its best aspects we see it in social service and social reform, art and literature, and it is in such a form that the movement gives definite evidence of the ability of Hinduism to rise to the heights which

new political forms will demand. In recent years the cry 'Back to Hinduism' has not meant return to the old *dolce far niente*; it has meant the extraction from Hinduism of powers latent in it but hitherto dormant. It is the demand for Hinduism to stand on its own legs, the demand for action and positive service. The wonderful results that have already shown themselves in the very short period of active Hindu nationalism leads one to hope that, with the attainment of a self-reliant manhood, Hinduism may have many more good things to give. The new political aroma of responsibility in government may further permeate the temple and lead to new ideals and action. There is much to be hoped for in the balanced development of a religious and social system which has produced the Tagores.

One aspect of Hindu religious nationalism, indeed, is less hopeful. Several of the recent Hindu religious reformers have allowed their love for and faith in Hinduism to overstep the limits of tolerance. Arising in many cases from an antipathy to western civilisation and the Christian religion, these movements have developed into a blind praise of Hindu civilisation and at the same time a vicious denunciation of everything non-Hindu. Thus Ramkrishna and Vivekananda, his disciple, though holding that all religions are good and that everyone should stick to his own religion, proceeded to denounce everything western in favour of Hinduism. The founder of the Arya Samaj, likewise, though he preached Hindu reform, also preached the necessity of the extirpation of both Mohammedanism and Christianity. The results of this lack of balance are too fresh in the minds of modern observers of India to need recapitulation. The preaching of a pan-Hindu India could only have one result, and that result modern Indian (as distinct from Hindu or Moslem) politicians are only now becoming able to overcome. The result was to awaken the forces of pan-Islamism.

This is the supreme danger in Indian nationality. In a previous chapter I pointed to the possible solution of

this danger—a danger which is vital and which no reasonable person can overlook. The Hindu revival, it is true, rejoices at present in the full flush and vigour of youth. The mellowness of years may soften down its intolerance. Beside it in India lie the smouldering fires of an aggressive faith, fires which may be fanned by the cyclonic enthusiasm of its neighbour. With the watchful British Government to prevent undue exuberance on the part of either there may be room enough in India for two revivals, but a clash of nationalism in religion will inevitably put back the clock of national unity. It would take a very long period indeed for the antagonistic faiths to draw sufficiently into the shell of toleration to let the new basis of common rights join what they dissevered. But it may be assumed that the good sense of both political and religious leaders will prevent such a storm.

Still another line of argument may be derived from the movements among castes themselves. Learning the truth of the maxim that unity is strength, the various castes are organising themselves as castes. The first of the caste organisations was the Kayasth organisation, which held its first conference in 1887. Many similar organisations, from the Brahmans to the lowest castes, have been started since. The objects of such organisations are to defend caste privileges, to settle caste questions, and to encourage Hinduism as a religious faith. Quite frequently the castes present memorials to the Government on special points concerning their privileges. A very important part of their work is social reform. Many Hindus look on the caste conferences with horror, regarding them as merely stereotyping differences which should be allowed to lapse. A glance at the resolutions of caste conferences shows that the castes take up their attention with matters such as the age of marriage, marriage expenses and funeral expenses. Most of the conferences pass resolutions supporting universal education and female education.

The lower castes in particular are extremely keen on

bettering their social position. The Bengal Namasudras, a very low caste, meet regularly in conferences and are trying with considerable success to elevate their position. Recently I heard of the Nasasudras in a village declaring themselves practically the equals of the Brahmans, and, moreover, they decided to take various steps to let the Brahmans know it! The Bengal Baruis have formed a company with ten rupee shares and a full organisation to spread education and improve the social position of the caste. The Mahars of Bombay, as told by Dr. Farquhar, met in November 1910 in conference and memorialised Lord Crewe, then Secretary of State for India, for the return of certain privileges that their fathers in the Indian army had enjoyed before them. The memorial is a very significant one as coming from 'untouchables,' and I quote certain passages from it (I take them from Dr. Farquhar's book):

As British subjects we cannot, we should not submit to ordinances which are entirely foreign to British ideas of public justice and public honour. We are sick of the bondage which the barbarism of Hindu customs imposes upon us; we long to enjoy the perfect freedom which the British nation and the British Government desire to offer impartially to all those who are connected with them as British subjects.

We would, therefore, earnestly appeal to the Imperial Government to move on our behalf. We have long submitted to the Jagannath of caste; we have for ages been crushed under its ponderous wheels. But we can now no longer submit to the tyranny.

'Our Hindu rulers did not recognise our manhood and treated us worse than their cattle; and shall not that Nation which emancipated the Negro at infinite self-sacrifice, and enlightened and elevated the poorer people of its own commonwealth condescend to give us a helping hand?'

The kindly touch of the Christian religion elevates the Mahar at once and for ever socially as well as politically, and shall not the magic power of British law and British justice produce the same effect upon us even as followers of our own ancestral faith?

No words of mine could show more clearly how new ideas of right are superseding the old usages of Hinduism.

It is important to mention these democratic tendencies in order to remind us that nationality is a handmaid of democracy. Hinduism, an essentially aristocratic social system, is, according to the pronouncement of policy in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, to co-exist with a fairly advanced form of democratic government. It has been pointed out by more than one writer, for example Sir Henry Cotton in his 'New India' and the late Mr. A. M. T. Jackson (quoted by Risley), that caste is perfectly consistent with a monarchical or an aristocratic form of government. Sir Henry Cotton, in sketching a future political organisation for India, pictures a number of small monarchically governed states with a body of 'patrician aristocracy' between the kings and the common people. Internal order would be secured by a patriciate accustomed to control and leading, presumably the direct descendants of the Brahmans. The late Mr. Jackson shows the connection between caste and kingship in the old Hindu political system. The king, uniting legislative, executive and judicial functions, was at the head. He was assisted by an advisory council chosen from the leading castes. In the community each function was carried out by a separate caste and the king had to enforce the caste rules. Government was likewise a caste function—a fact which reacted on the community in two ways. First, as the art of government was a matter of caste, only one caste was interested in government; public spirit thus had little chance of developing. Secondly, the caste, being very specialised, had to be efficient; otherwise the social structure would have fallen to pieces.

Commenting on this, Risley remarks that the monarchy was able to guard against tyranny by castes. He might have given the example of Ballal Sen, who actually regrouped the castes and was supreme over even the Brahmans. 'But,' asks Risley, 'can democracy safeguard the community against tyranny?' He thinks that party government in India will be by castes, and that the caste party system will have the finest party organisation in

the world. 'Caucuses,' 'bosses,' and so forth, are already at hand in caste, and voting would be controlled by the perpetual fear of caste penalties. Had Risley seen even ten years more of the working of the Councils of Lords Morley and Minto he would have known that what he feared was completely illusory. Caste is not the mainspring of the Indian party system as it is, nor is it likely to be in the Indian party system that will be. That caste does influence certain forms of government is seen in municipal government, where caste compulsion is sometimes exercised on municipal commissioners. Over-zealous commissioners in a municipality sometimes find it difficult to get the services of a barber or washerman.

The various caste movements of which I have spoken are democratic. Even the highest castes, whether intentionally or not, are democratic, for they all insist on education, and education is the sledge-hammer of democracy. Education has become almost a fetish in India. Few meetings can be dismissed without presenting a memorial to Government advocating the extension of education in some form or other. With the extension of education, as in other countries, will come democratic ideas, and the disinterested resolutions of the Brahmans are all the more laudable, for surely, if perhaps slowly, they are cutting the grounds of privilege from under their own feet.

Caste organisations are thus important from two points of view: first as indicating tendencies to reform, and secondly, in adopting recognised political methods of organisation. In themselves caste organisations are no more inimical to national fusion than are trade-unions —perhaps they are even less so. The organisations are simply an example of the adaptability of Hinduism. They are new forms of social organisations started to meet new political and social conditions.

An important point to note in the caste system in Hindu society is that caste is *necessary*. At present caste is the cement of the Indian social structure. To

abolish it by a ukase would mean the complete disintegration of Hindu society. It is a habit of reformers both Indian and foreign to denounce caste as an unrestricted evil. No one, even the devoutest Hindu, would deny that caste is vitiated by many evils, but it is as well to remember that for Hindu society caste is necessary and so far is good. To uproot an institution which is almost an instinct would shake Hindu society to its very foundations. As a social system it is stronger than either religion or sect, yet reformers who would never dream of upsetting the religion of Hinduism speak glibly of eradicating the 'poison' or 'cancer' of caste. Caste is the basis of Hindu society. It fixes social precedence, the rules of marriage, of eating, of drinking, of worship, of a hundred other things, and last, but not of least importance, it is the primary unit of government in India. The caste *panchayat* is the most fundamental form of representative government in India, and that caste *panchayat* combines in itself the legislative, judicial and executive functions of government. It lays down the laws of caste; it pronounces judgment in cases where the law is broken, and the punishments it carries out are severely deterrent judgments with no uncertainty. The caste *panchayat* is one of the completest organs of government that exists, and as the fundamental organ in Hindu society must continue till its purpose is served by other forms of government.

A full account of the various types of caste government is given by Mr. O'Malley in the 1911 Census Report for Bengal, Behar and Orissa. Only a few points in that description concern me here. Under the East India Company there was a Caste Cutcherry which heard and decided caste cases. The Governor appointed the president, and it will be remembered that one of the points brought by Burke against Warren Hastings was his appointment of the *teli*, Cantoo Babu (Krishtokanto Das) as president of the Cutcherry. Though the caste Cutcherry was abolished long ago, many of the Feudatory Chiefs of

Orissa still adjudicate in caste matters. Those chiefs even have the power to outcaste Brahmans. In the organisations of individual castes often the local Rajah or the chief zemindar is president, with final powers of appeal.

In British territory the Government takes no direct part in caste affairs. It affects caste in two ways indirectly: first, by means of judicial decisions or precedents laid down in the courts, and secondly, by means of the ordinary organisations of government. Thus if the caste is able to convict a man of theft in the *panchayat* the culprit may be handed over to the police, or punished by the caste. In dealing with the various matters concerning caste rules the *panchayats* frequently encroach on the jurisdiction of the criminal and civil courts; in fact Mr. O'Malley quotes several cases in which the caste has actually forced complainants to the civil authorities to withdraw their complaints and settle the matter by the caste council. Nevertheless the courts are appealed to in many cases, particularly those—(1) where the caste council itself hands the matter up to the magistrate; (2) where the caste council cannot enforce its decisions and has to appeal to the magistrate; (3) where the magistrate's court is regarded as a court of appeal against the *panchayat*; (4) where a caste member may refuse to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the caste council and proceed against it. Sometimes *panchayats* prefer to place the responsibility of deciding difficult cases on the magistrate's shoulders and do not even collect evidence for a caste trial. Sometimes also they are frightened that the accused may prosecute them, especially where corporal punishment has been inflicted. It is also a source of comfort to *panchayats* to know that if they frame a proper charge and can prove it the magistrates will punish a recalcitrant caste man who refuses to obey caste law. Even though this may lead to false charges, the heroic justice of an accused being punished for *something* appeals to the caste.

Another point to be noticed in caste government is the tendency among the higher and better educated castes to confine themselves to purely social matters. Thus in Bengal the caste meetings of Brahmans and Kayasthas are almost entirely confined to the discussion of sea voyages and the eating of forbidden food, intermarriage between sub-castes, widow marriage and immorality on the part of females. Matters which fall within the domain of criminal law are left to the civil authorities concerned.

The evidence from caste government is similar to that deduced from caste organisations. The caste *panchayats*, *sabhas* or *samitis*, whatever they may be called, are tending, as education advances, to take up their attention with purely social matters. In civil and criminal affairs they are looking over the hedge of caste to the greater government beyond. A new basis of government is replacing the old basis, and this new basis is *political* government, not *social* government. As local self-government develops, the caste member will look still more to new organisations to help him in his time of trouble. He will appeal not to the caste *panchayat* but to the magistrate or police. This is definite enough proof of the gradual change in the meaning of the word 'community.' Hindu citizenship up to now has been essentially of the family or caste. The intensity of that citizenship is well known, and it is a universal law of human association that the intensity of civic feeling varies in inverse ratio to the size of the community. Except at times of great national danger, family feeling, the feeling centred in the smallest group, is the most intense type of communal feeling; and the intensity of that feeling lessens as the group grows wider. The same is true of Hinduism. Hitherto family and caste have dominated the Hindu's civic feeling; but now we find him going beyond his home and caste to the wider community abroad; nor need his wider view destroy his more intimate affections.

In connection with both language and religion I have

pointed out the peculiar position occupied by the British *Raj*. It acts as the neutral holder of the balances. The same is true in the case of caste. The Government of India is non-religious: it is also casteless. In the quotation from the Bombay Mahars' memorial there is an excellent index of how a caste appeals from its own society to the neutral tribunal. Not only caste conferences, but the various social reform conferences present their memorials to Government, trusting that the benign *Raj* will give due consideration to their claims. All this is clear evidence of the supersession of caste rule or Hindu social rule by the rule of the state. It is the transition from the caste *panchayat* to government of the western type. It is either explicitly or implicitly the recognition of an organisation based on the common purposes of India—an organisation whose duty it is to give an impartial ear to everyone and to deal out impartial laws for the common good. It is, moreover, the recognition of rights as the basis of civil society, not caste rights, but rights of units in a community which has millions of others similarly demanding rights. It is the appreciation of a new basis of rights outside of and distinct from caste: it is the instinct of a true political society.

We may pursue still more lines of evidence. The diffusion of education in modern India has not followed the traditional caste grooves. Education is not confined to the priestly and other high castes. It is spreading to the very lowest; and among the higher castes the extent of education does not vary directly with the social precedence of the castes. The educational results of the last Census revealed:

In Southern India the Brahman leads the way, but elsewhere this is not so. In Bengal he is surpassed by the Baidya, Subarnabanik and Agarwal; in the United Provinces by the Kayastha, Agarwal and Sayid; in Behar and Orissa by the same communities and the Karan; and in the Punjab by the Khatri, Agarwal and Arora. The castes that compete with him most closely are either writer castes like the Kayastha, and Karan,

or trading castes such as Agarwal and Khatri. As a rule the high castes stand at the top and the low castes at the bottom, but a great deal depends on their occupation. The Rajput, or warrior caste, often has a smaller proportion of literate persons than many communities of much lower social status; while low castes such as Teli, Shaha, Kalwar and Pod often take a much higher position than would be expected from their social rank. In some cases this has been because they have adopted trade as their means of livelihood for which a knowledge of reading and writing is almost essential. In others it is accounted for by a recent rise in their material position which has not yet had time to affect their social status.

The statement that the diffusion of education tends to vary with the social precedence of the different castes must be qualified by the remark that it refers only to a given locality. Low castes in advanced provinces often have a larger proportion of literate persons than high castes in backward ones; many Sudra and even lower castes in Bengal have a larger proportion of literate persons than the Brahmans of the Punjab or the United Provinces. It is also worthy of note that some of the depressed castes are now making rapid progress. A notable instance of this is furnished by the Paraiyans of Madras who have now nearly three times the proportion of the literate persons that they had only ten years ago.

These are the results of education of all kinds. In English education there is considerable diffusion, though in this case it is confined mainly to the higher castes. In the higher castes in Bengal nearly two-fifths of the Baidya males and one-fifth of the Brahman and Kayastha males are literate in English. The most remarkable thing about the figures of English education is that the proportion of English-knowing persons all over India increased by 50 per cent. in ten years and the rate of increase is as marked for females as it is for males. Since the last Census Report the advance has been even more rapid, a fact which the next Census will assuredly show.

In the 1911 Census a very interesting analysis was made of the castes of Government servants. In Bengal, Behar and Orissa, of 2305 gazetted appointments held

by Indians, four-fifths are held by Hindus and one-fifth by Mohammedans, and of the 1523 held by Hindus about eight-ninths were held by Brahmans, Kayasthas and Baidyas. In the United Provinces, of 420 appointments the Mohammedans held 150, Jains and Christians 23. Of the 248 held by Hindus, 91 were held by Brahmans, 81 by Kayasthas, and the rest by other high castes. In the Central Provinces, Brahmans, though they form only 3 per cent. of the population, held more than half the posts occupied by Hindus.

These figures show several things. In the first place they show the great adaptability of the Brahman caste. The Brahmans, the hereditary expounders of the Hindu law and scriptures, by caste priests, have readily accommodated themselves to the new conditions of government. They are a very highly educated caste in English education, whatever their education in the Hindu law and scriptures may be. It may fairly be said that they uphold that reputation for cleverness which is given to them by the theorists on the origin of caste. The figures also show much diffusion of education among the other castes, and the remarkable strides that English education is making. Everyone engaged in education in India is familiar with the fact that nowadays only one type of education is appreciated by all Indians, and that is English education. In Bengal vernacular education is rapidly dying simply because of the lack of demand. No Bengali parent will send his son to a vernacular school where an English school is accessible. Demands have even been made for the teaching of English as a regular rule in primary schools. The importance of this English education, of course, from our present point of view is that English is the vehicle of western political ideas.

Another line of argument may be derived from what may be called general sociological laws. Hindu society must in time respond to the usual influences which affect men in society. The factors which enter into the formation of the individual psychological state of man by

their collective action may be summed up, in the words of Professor Sergi of Rome, thus :

Hereditary characteristics, physical and psychological, which appear as instincts.
Suggestion in all its forms, proceeding from family and social life.
Imitation, or the tendency to imitate unconsciously deeds and actions of the social community.
Educability and tendency to be moved by human influence.
Gregarious tendency, or a tendency to follow the paths traced by others in social conduct and to obey.
Sociability, a characteristic developed very early in man.

It is needless for me to enlarge on these factors. By implication with what I have already said they have worked, and are working, in Hindu society. Hindu society as a whole for centuries showed great resistance to change —a resistance which in many respects has given way. Since the impact of western civilisation on Hindu civilisation the time has been so short relatively to the age of Hindu civilisation that one hesitates to form a final judgment. With things as they are, however, it is difficult not to conclude that the tendencies so obvious in the higher classes will filter down to the lower, and that the adaptability of Hinduism in the past will repeat itself in the future.

Were I to continue giving examples of the malleability of Hinduism I could give numerous instances of the breakdown of the anti-national elements in Hinduism. In particular it would be easy to trace the connection between Christian ideas and some of the modern movements in Hinduism. Recently in Krishnagar it was announced by a Hindu that, to celebrate the conclusion of the war, Christians would assemble in the church, Moslems at the mosques, and Hindus at the temples for public worship ! This is merely one of the many emblems of the reception by Hinduism of ideas which have completely altered its horizon. It would of course be as easy to point to Hindu elements in the Indian Christian Church,

but my point here is to prove the fitness not of Christianity, but of Hinduism for nationality. The ability of Hinduism to respond to new stimuli may also be seen in the *volte-face* of Hindu society regarding travel abroad. The same intensified national consciousness which produced the idea of *swadeshi-ism* also recognised that foreign training was necessary for commerce and industry. Foreign travel, however, is a caste offence: theoretically it involves the penalty of outcasting and very rigorous ceremonies for reinstallation in caste. The caste scruples however have bowed before necessity, and the England-, America- or Japan-returned Hindu, if he so wishes, is received into caste without difficulty.

Another argument is the comparative. Is there any historical parallel where caste, or an approximation to caste, has disappeared in front of national feeling? One such parallel exists—Japan—and peculiarly enough Japan exercised an enormous influence on Indian national feeling for a reason other than social—namely, her victory over Russia. The victory over Russia really is not half so important from the Indian point of view as Japan's victory over herself.

The Japanese parallel rests on the division of Japanese society into sections whose broad distinctions suggest the exclusiveness of caste. The Testament of Iyeyasu—Iyeyasu was a great Shogun of the early seventeenth century—contains a description of the Japanese caste-system. Under the Japanese feudal system society was divided into three groups: first, the Throne and court nobles (the Mikado and *Kuge*); second, the military class (*buke* or *samurai*); and thirdly, the common people or *heimin*. In the Tokugawa era in which Iyeyasu lived these lines of cleavage were insisted on very strictly. The Mikado was looked on as divine, so divine indeed that only his wives and chief officers of state were allowed to look on him. The transaction of public business was left to the magnates, or Shoguns, and the *samurai*. The court nobility or *kuge* was a close family corporation, each family tracing

its descent to some previous Mikado. The *kuge* occupied by right of heredity most court offices, though they received little or no pay for their work. After them came the military class or *samurai*, who had hereditary revenues and held administrative posts. Below these came the *heimin*, who had no social status at all; they were not allowed to carry swords, and their revenues depended on what they earned by their own labour. These *heimin* were divided into husbandmen, artisans and traders, the most respectable being the husbandmen. The husbandmen were allowed to carry a sword, but only one, the *samurai* being allowed to carry two. The artisans, who among others included sculptors, lacquer-workers and armourers, were next in social status. Traders were the lowest of all recognised classes. Outside these classes were the *eta* and *hinin*. The *eta* were looked on as defiled; the *hinin* were mendicants who performed tasks like the Indian Doms. Both these were the equivalents of Indian Pariahs. They were given the most menial occupations, and were forbidden to intermarry with any save their own class. They lived in separate hamlets and could not eat with the higher classes. In addition to these classes there was within them the *Kumi* organisation whereby five or more families were organised under a headman who ruled the *Kumi* in the interests of peace and order. Behind the *Kumi* were the clans and tribes.

The break-up of the Japanese caste system is a matter of recent history. The pariah classes were admitted to the rank of the *heimin* in the Meiji era (in October, 1871). The various events connected with the liberal movements in recent Japanese history cannot be given here, but I must extract from them those points which are of immediate interest to our subject.

The chief forces in bringing about change were: first, political, arising from the ambition of the southern clans to seize power from the Tokugawa; secondly, loyal, arising from the training of the *samurai* and the history of the country; thirdly, religious, arising from the revival

of Shintoism; and fourthly, national, arising from foreign intercourse.

The political causes are mixed up with the existence of the Shogunate and the Japanese system of feudalism. The aims of the leading reformers were partly ambitious, partly democratic. The *samurai* of the Satsuma clan, for example, were credited with the idea of seizing the reins of government. In order to achieve their main object of union with other clans of the south they went so far to dispel distrust among the other clans as to insist on a promise by the restored Emperor that a deliberative assembly should be formed. Out of this promise arose modern Japanese representative government.

The object of the reformers at first was merely national unity. Soon they recognised that under a system of territorial feudal autonomy such union was impossible. For unity a national system of law was essential to replace the varied types of feudal law. To secure the unity the feudal chiefs of the Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen clans publicly surrendered their fiefs to the Emperor. This example, which was speedily followed by others, was a remarkable sacrifice, for a national cause, of the power of the larger clans. Some ascribe the movement to the personal ambition of the local *samurai* who hoped to benefit under the new régime. What actually caused the movement was an intense wave of patriotic feeling in which selfishness was engulfed by patriotism.

The first form of government was representative of the various clans and guaranteed the position of the *samurai*; but gradually the *samurai* lost their privileges, with their special revenues. As it became clear that in the new system there was no place for them the *samurai* in 1873 were deprived of their privileges. Although the act of deprivation was actually carried out by a government they had helped to establish they did not complain. Many, even before the ordinance of 1873, voluntarily stepped out of their class into the ranks of farmers and tradesmen. They recognised that their swords must be turned into

ploughshares and ungrudgingly gave up their fine heredity for the good of their country. The *samurai* were, in our Indian parallel, Brahmans of Brahmans, but they stepped down to be Vaisyas, even Sudras, without complaint. Few nations can provide a similar act of noble self-sacrifice.

The Japanese Reform movements were faced with dangers similar to those of India. New ideas, new forms of government had suddenly come on the scene, but there was not sufficient basis to build on. The Japanese accordingly began to equip their country in such a way as to fit themselves for their new responsibilities. In the army, navy, railways, education, medicine and fine art Frenchmen, Englishmen, Germans, Italians and Americans were called in to help, their services being necessary only till the Japanese themselves could do the work. Efficiency was called in to protect democracy.

The revival of Shintoism was also an important element in Japanese nationalism. Shintoism, the primitive religion of Japan, had been absorbed in Buddhism about the ninth century, but in the seventeenth century a revival of the old religion took place, led by some illustrious scholars and publicists. The political purpose of this revival was to encourage revolt against the cleavages of feudalism by inspiring the Japanese people with one faith. Shintoism was responsible largely for the 1867 restoration, but later, after its disestablishment, it again gave way to Buddhism.

Shintoism is a type of ancestor worship. The spirits of the dead guide and rule the living. Every action, every thought of the individual is governed by the dead, who therefore must be honoured before the living. The rules of the dead too are immovable and must be rigidly obeyed. Such a religion implies implicit obedience and a spirit of self-discipline. The same spirit of obedience marks the *samurai* whose absolute obedience to rule and self-sacrifice in front of duty are their finest traditions. Japan thus by religion and tradition was able to overcome a caste system which might have proved a far stronger

disuniting force than was the feudal system in the West. But, as Risley says, Japanese nationalism did not originate in the theoretical sentiment of a literate class which might or might not have worked down to the lower strata of society.

India has much to learn from Japan in self-discipline and efficiency. Risley, in reference to Japanese discipline, says :

> To my mind the most striking among the many evidences of the diffusion of the spirit of unity in Japan is to be found in the extraordinary secrecy maintained during the war with Russia. The correspondents of foreign papers, ready to pay any price for news, saw one division after another vanish into space, but no foreigner could find out where the troops embarked, where they would land or what was their ultimate destination. At a time when the issue of the contest hung upon the command of the sea two great battleships were lost by misadventure, and the disaster was concealed until its disclosure could no longer imperil the national existence. These things were known to thousands, but the secret was safe because all classes were inspired by the passionate enthusiasm and self-devotion which the Shinto religion has developed into an instinct, so that the low-born coolie is as fine a patriot as the *Samurai* of ancient descent.

And we may conclude with Risley—'When India can rise to these heights of discipline and self-control India may rival Japan.'

CHAPTER VI

SIR RABINDRANATH TAGORE'S 'NATIONALISM'

PERHAPS I have expanded unduly the study of Hinduism and nationality, but my study cannot be complete without a reference to Sir Rabindranath Tagore's recent book called 'Nationalism.' As the finest representative of Hinduism before the world, he speaks with an authority which commands immediate respect. Sir Rabindranath does not confine himself to Indian nationalism. He speaks of nationalism in general and of its bearings on particular states and peoples, but by far the most interesting of all is his application of modern nationalism to India.

Sir Rabindranath is bitterly opposed to nationalism—a fact which reminds one forcibly of the Roman Catholic historian, Lord Acton. To the Roman Catholic the word 'nationality' is taboo. To Sir Rabindranath nationalism is detestable, but for different reasons. To nationalism he ascribes the blame for many of the evils of western culture, and with great eloquence he pleads for India working out her own destiny in her particular way. Western nationalism is political. India's problem is not political; it is social.

This, the keynote of Sir Rabindranath's appeal, is a conclusion from a study of caste, for he speaks of Hindu, not Indian society. We have, it is true, a political problem in India—an imported problem—but before that problem is approached, the social problem must be solved.

India [he says] has never had a real sense of nationalism. From the earliest beginnings of history India has had her own

problem constantly before her; it is the race problem. Each nation must be conscious of its mission and we in India must realise that we are trying to be political, simply because we have not yet been finally able to accomplish what was set before us by our providence.

Nationalism in India, therefore,

is a great menace. It is the particular thing which for years has been at the bottom of India's troubles. And inasmuch as we have been ruled and dominated by a nation that is strictly political in its attitude we have tried to develop within ourselves, despite our inheritance from the past, a belief in our eventual political destiny.

This 'eventual political destiny,' he trusts

will not be reached by way of armament firms or by cut-throat commerce. In Europe, where the racial problem has been solved, nationalism has taken the character of political and commercial aggressiveness. . . . For on the one hand they [*i.e.* the people of Europe] had no internal complications, and on the other, they had to deal with neighbours who were strong and rapacious. To have perfect combination among themselves and a watchful attitude of animosity against others was taken as a solution of their problems. In former days they organised and plundered, in the present age the same spirit continues and they organise and exploit the whole world.

Sir Rabindranath recognises the good of the western contact with India, but

Europe has her past. Europe's strength therefore lies in her history. We in India must make up our minds that we cannot borrow other people's history, and that if we stifle our own we are committing suicide. When you borrow things that do not belong to your life they only serve to crush your life.

India, therefore, must follow her own destiny. Her aspirations are not material like those of the West.

Our ideals have been evolved through our own history and even if we wished we could only make poor fire-works of them because their materials are different . . . as is also their moral purpose. If we cherish the desire of paying our all to buy a

political nationality it will be as absurd as if Switzerland had staked her existence on her ambition to build up a navy powerful enough to compete with that of England. . . .

We must know for certain that there is a future before us, and that future is waiting for those who are rich in moral ideals and not in mere things. And it is the privilege of man to work for fruits that are beyond his immediate reach and to adjust his life not in slavish uniformity to the examples of some present success or even to his own prudent past, limited in its aspiration, but to an infinite future bearing in its heart the ideals of our highest expectations.

No words of mine can do justice to the incisive eloquence of Sir Rabindranath's denunciation of caste, but the caste system he thinks is an honest attempt to solve the chief problem in India.

Be it said to the credit of India [he says] that this diversity was not her own creation; she has had to accept it as a fact from the beginning of her history. In America and Australia, Europe has simplified her problem by almost exterminating the original population. Even in the present age this spirit of extermination is making itself manifest in the inhospitable shutting out of aliens by those who themselves were aliens in the lands they now occupy. But India tolerated differences of races from the first and this spirit of toleration has acted all through her history.

Wherein has India failed? She failed to realise that in human beings 'differences are not like the physical barriers of mountains, fixed for ever—they are fluid with life's flow, they are changing their courses and their shapes and volume.' India recognised differences, he says,

but not the mutability which is the law of life. In trying to avoid collisions she set up boundaries of immovable walls, thus giving to her numerous races the negative benefit of peace and order but not the positive opportunity of expansion and movement. She accepted nature where it produced diversity, but ignored it where it used that diversity for its world-game of infinite permutations and combinations. She treated life in all truth where it was manifold but insulted it where it

was ever moving. Therefore life departed from her social system and in its place she is worshipping with all ceremony the magnificent cage of countless compartments that she has manufactured.

The West has dealt with the racial problem by ignoring it and this is the source of anti-Asiatic agitation.

In most of your colonies [he says] you only admit them [Asiatics] on condition of their accepting the menial position of hewers of wood and drawers of water. Either you shut your doors against the aliens or reduce them into slavery. And this is your solution of the problem of race-conflict. Whatever may be its merits you will have to admit that it does not spring from the higher impulses of civilisation, but from the lower passions of greed and hatred. You say this is human nature—and India also thought she knew human nature when she strongly barricaded her race distinctions by the fixed barriers of social gradations. But we have found out to our cost that human nature is not what it seems but what it is in truth; which is in its infinite possibilities. And when we in our blindness insult humanity for its ragged appearance, it sheds its disguise to disclose to us that we have insulted our God. The degradation which we cast upon others in our pride or self-interest degrades our own humanity and this is the punishment which is most terrible because we do not detect it till it is too late.

Sir Rabindranath protests against the idea frequently held by modern Hindu politicians that Hindu society has come to a final completeness in its social and spiritual ideals, and that Hindus are now free to employ all their activities in politics. It is impossible to 'build a political miracle of freedom upon the quicksand of social slavery,' or 'to dam up the true course of our own historical stream' by borrowing power from the source of other peoples' history.

Those of us in India [he says] who have come under the delusion that mere political freedom will make us free have accepted their lessons from the west as the gospel truth and lost their faith in humanity. We must remember whatever weakness we cherish in our society will become the source of danger in

politics. The same inertia which leads us to our idolatry of dead forms in social institutions will create in our politics prison-houses with immovable walls. The narrowness of sympathy which makes it possible for us to impose upon a considerable portion of humanity the galling yoke of inferiority will assert itself in our politics in creating the tyranny of injustice.

Hindu social restrictions are still tyrannical—

so much so as to make men cowards. If a man tells me he has heterodox ideas, but that he cannot follow them because he would be socially ostracised, I excuse him for having to live a life of untruth in order to live at all. The social habit of mind which impels us to make the life of our fellow beings a burden to them where they differ from us, even in such a thing as their choice of food, is sure to persist in our political organisation and result in creating engines of coercion to crush every national difference which is the sign of life. And tyranny only will add to the inevitable lies and hypocrisy in our political life.

We have already seen how Sir Herbert Risley feared the tyranny of caste in the party organisation of an Indian democracy. Sir Rabindranath goes still deeper, striking the rock-bottom truth that political life is only a part or manifestation of moral life. Sir Rabindranath in these words reminds us of the core of all democracy, that it rests on individual minds and that its virtue depends on the virtue of these minds. Personality is of more importance than politics.

Below the denunciations of western nationalism and Indian nationalists runs the pure current of the worship of humanity. Sir Rabindranath's ideal is a social or moral, not a political ideal. He pleads for a society as an expression of 'those spiritual aspirations of man which belong to his higher nature,' or, as he says of the Japanese, a 'civilisation of *human* relationship.' The political relationship is an 'eruptive inflammation of aggressiveness.' In the West, where the political relationship has reached its acme, the 'furies of terror came back to threaten herself and goad her into preparations of more and more frightfulness,' and the western nations are not satisfied

till the bloodhounds of Satan bred in Europe are domesticated in other lands and 'fed with man's miseries.' He seeks a humanity which does not suffer from the 'dipsomania of organising power,' a freedom greater than political or national freedom, for is 'the mere name of freedom so valuable that we should be willing to sacrifice for its sake our moral freedom'?

The idea of the Nation is an anæsthetic under the influence of which the whole world 'can carry on its systematic programme of the most virulent self-seeking without being in the least aware of its moral perversion,' and 'the Nation has thriven long upon mutilated humanity.' The great war has lifted the veil and the West stands face to face with her own creation, and those of no nation can still cherish the hope that,

> when power becomes ashamed to occupy its throne and is ready to make way for love, when the morning comes for cleansing the blood-stained steps of the Nation along the highroad of humanity, we shall be called upon to bring our own vessel of sacred water—the water of worship—to sweeten the history of man into purity, and with its sprinkling make the trampled dust of the centuries blessed with fruitfulness.

Such is a brief summary of Sir Rabindranath's position. His sympathies are universal. He is moved by the spirit of humanity. He is searching for an ideal which, excluding the ugliness of modern civilisation, will include the highest moral impulses of man. He is, in short, seeking for the perfect moral whole of the world. Such an idea, of course, is not peculiar to India. It occurs in the philosophies of the West in even a far more thoroughgoing form than in India. From the Stoics, and even before the Stoics, it has been part of the regular stock-in-trade of western philosophy. Yet the idea is peculiarly fitted to Hindu thought, which favours the international or universal idea more than the national or particular idea. The very word *swaraj*, usually translated self-government or political independence, is really a philosophical term implying that high spiritual state in which

the individual feels himself at one with the universal. The root *swa*, which means self, applies equally to the individual being or to the universal. In Hindu metaphysics the individual is one with the universal. So, again, there is the conception of *Narayana* which may apply either to God or Man, to Divinity or Humanity, just as in Christianity the conception of Christ is identified with humanity at large. In Hindu thought *Narayana* or the universal exists in every particular—the individual, family, clan, tribe or nation. Isolation is thus in theory impossible, for the touch of *Narayana* makes the whole world kin.

For social and political reasons too its appearance in the national literature of India is natural. In the national race India has started late, and to make up the huge handicap may well appear a hopeless task. The handicap is evident chiefly in those western developments which Sir Rabindranath condemns—political organisation and industrialism. He of course will find a large body of western thinkers joining hands with him in his denunciation of many national excrescences in the West. The wars, strikes, class discord, secret diplomacy, international deceit, and such like, are by no means beautiful, but no western thinker hopes that these are the summit of western civilisation. May not only Sir Rabindranath but all Indian nationalists hope that India may be spared these evils of western nationalism! But if the Indian nationalist wishes nationalism then he must take it with its bad as well as its good.

Say what we will, if India is to be a nation she must be able to survive in a system of nations. Till all nations and all individuals are perfectly moralised there is no place in the globe for a people which is content to sit down and contemplate either its past, present or future glories. The present world is a world of action: it must do *puja* to the great god of Efficiency. This Sir Rabindranath recognises. His *Gitanjali* is inspired with the best religious feelings of Hinduism, but is far from expressive

of listlessness, pessimism or active inaction; and in another place he writes:[1]

It won't do for us to cut off all intercourse with the rest of the world or be boycotted by them and sleep away our days after swallowing an extra handful of rice. We can be men only by adopting a policy of mutual give and take with the whole world. The race which will refuse to do so cannot survive in these days. Our food and wealth, religion and activities, knowledge and thought must all be made fit to bring us in touch with the entire globe. That which will merely pass current in our own family or our own village simply will not do. The whole world is knocking at our door crying, 'I have come.' If we do not respond to the call we shall be accursed, none can save us. There is no passage left by which to go back within the ancient parochial bounds.

To reach the moral ideal by a short cut is impossible. Perfection comes through imperfection, as does unity through diversity. A long process of moral apprenticeship is necessary both to India and the West before the national can become the international, the immoral the moral, the ugly the beautiful. Sir Rabindranath's ideal is sublime indeed, but its existence will not enable India to jump clear of the hurdles in social evolution. India, indeed, is favourably placed. Possessing her own history and culture she has come in contact with both the good and evil of the West. Nor has the West been less unfortunate in her contact with India. But the contact has been but for an hour in the ages of eternity. The way is very long before the East and West can cast off the bad and mingle the good alone.

The British Government in India, again, is to India the hothouse in which the indigenous plants may grow.

What should we do [asks Sir Rabindranath] if for any reason England was driven away? We should simply be the victims of other nations. The same social weakness would prevail. The thing we in India have to think of is this, to remove those

[1] Quoted from *The Modern Review*, December 1918.

social customs and ideals which have generated a want of self-respect and a complete dependence on those above us, a state of affairs which has been brought about entirely by the domination in India of the caste system, and the blind lazy habit of relying upon the authority of traditions that are incongruous anachronisms in the present age.

For good or for bad this same government is trying to fit India to take her place among the national communities of the world. She is, in a word, trying to make India politically, industrially and educationally efficient—and by efficiency in these matters is meant self-completeness. It is no doubt a matter of bitter concern to many Indians that her government services, her commerce and her industries are largely manned by foreign men and capital. But what do the Commissions on Education, Industries, Public Services, Decentralisation mean, but that the Government is aiming at efficiency in India in order to make India self-sufficient in the community of nations?

There is much more behind this necessity of the British *Raj* as caused by caste than meets the eye. It is a necessity arising out of the peculiar character of Hindu thought. Hindu ethical thought teaches the virtue of self-renunciation as the foundation of real happiness. Earthly wealth does not produce happiness, for the things of the earth are unreal, illusory. The good Hindu must disregard the pleasures to be got by wealth; in fact one of his duties is the giving away of wealth and resting content with the minimum necessities of life. The ideal he seeks after is liberation from the trammels of life. Life is only a preparation for something higher. So too in religion, the ultimate reality can be apprehended only after a long training. Few can grasp the principle of the universe at once; the mind must grasp it by degrees. Hindu religious consciousness evolves towards the ultimate reality. So too it may be said of society. The social structure at any period is merely a stage on the way to the ideal life, the life of complete freedom or self-subjection.

From this point of view caste is a stage in evolution,

theoretically justifiable on the ground that the weakness of men makes rigid differences necessary for the realisation of ultimate happiness. The social differences place the Brahman, who has the most perfect insight into things, at the top, and others, whose grasp of final reality is less clear, at the bottom. Thus caste is made rigid by religion for the sake of the ultimate truths of religion; therefore the Sudra rests content with his status because his final blessedness or knowledge depends on his status.

Hinduism combines with an intense conservatism in practice a complete liberalism of theory. Presumably the liberal theory will be quite at home with more liberal practice, for that is the tendency of modern Hindu movements. There is, however, a very strong body of Hindu political thought which has turned this liberalism into intolerance—one might say almost fanaticism.

This tendency owes its origin to what we may call the political renaissance of Hinduism, its prophets being Dayananda Sarasvati, Ramkrishna and Vivekananda. By elevating Hinduism these preachers either directly or indirectly accused other religions of corresponding unworthiness. The distinguishing mark of Hinduism—spirituality—they saw in a process of disintegration because of what they invariably called the materialism of the West. They summoned Hinduism back to its heritage, cursing the dangerous intruders who were luring the spiritual Hindus away from their temples into the shop and counting-house.

To the good Hindu righteous indignation at such a religious and social calamity is perfectly permissible, but it is difficult to understand why spirituality even in the Hindu sense of renunciation of worldly pleasures should be claimed as an exclusive asset of Hinduism. Even the West is spiritual. It has its religion, and its religion teaches the duty of renunciation and of self-abnegation and that this life is only a march on a much longer journey. And just as do the Brahmans, the religious teachers of the West give up worldly wealth the better to serve their

God. Just as do the great majority of Hindus, the great majority of the Christian West seem to place the perverted aim of money-making first, but that they do so is, just as in the case of Hindus, because they have fallen from grace. But even money-making is spiritual, for few in the unspiritual West are graceless enough to make money-making an end in itself. It is a means to higher ends.

Every religious system is weak on the practical side. It is given to few to have either the spiritual insight or the self-command that the founders of the great religious systems of the world possessed. It is given to many to know better and do worse, and these many belong to all religions. True, the materialism of the West is dazzling, ostentatious, glaring. It contrasts strongly with the pacific placidity of the Hindu. But it is not the *religion* of the West.

I for one frankly confess that I fail to understand Hindu spirituality when it is iterated in the phrase 'spiritual nationality.' Wherein does the distinguishing mark of spiritual nationalism lie? All nationality is spiritual: to that extent I can comprehend. But wherein does the differentia lie in the spirituality of Hindu nationality? I can quite appreciate the spirituality of Hindu life, but even then *spirituality* is frequently used when *ritualism* or *ceremonialism* would be more applicable. The Hindu is intensely ritualistic: every act of his life is religious in the sense that it has some sanction from the laws of the whole Hindu system—a system which is both religious and social. I can appreciate, too, the beauties of the Hindu family system where the self-renunciation which is the characteristic of Hindu spiritualism is often beautifully manifested. I can—and everyone in India whose home is as many thousands of miles away as mine—can sympathise with the anger of the good Hindu when he sees the forces of competition breaking up the dearest unity of his life—his family. But the forces that drive the Briton to foreign lands are not altogether material. True, he may go to make a living, but he also goes to live a life.

The very circumstances of his exile may so deepen his spirituality that he may often seem to harden his heart.

Let us come to closer grips with spiritual nationality. If spirituality to the Hindu means other-worldliness or renunciation of the pleasures of life, then a nationality which is spiritual must be one the distinguishing feature of which is indifference to the material goods of this life. Its differentia must be other-worldliness. What does this imply? It implies either that the component elements of the nationality, i.e. individuals, do not place the same stress as do western individuals on industrial and commercial life, or that the individuals in the nationality are, as compared with those of other nationalities or nations, more given to the spiritual or religious life, as distinct from the material life. Both these implications have important practical bearings.

For in the first place, if India is to exist among a scheme of nations then she must compete with other nations. In Rome you must do as the Romans do. If commercialism or industrialism are the props which support, or the lures which attract, nations, whether of the East or West, then India must prepare herself for self-support; she must prepare her own props, or she must be a lure. Commercialism means wealth, wealth means power—in ships and arms—and India without wealth could do nothing but allow the newcomer to walk over her spiritual, but prostrate, body. Well then may Hindu nationalists pray for nationalism within the British Empire, for only with its power to protect can develop that peculiarity of Hinduism, spirituality. It may be deplorable. But it is true.

Or spiritual nationalism may mean a political organisation where the life of contemplation is possible. Is not this a dangerous approximation to the philosopher-kings of Greek thought? And the parallel is closer, for does not the traditional function of the Sudras make them strongly like the φύσει δοῦλοι? But the Greek city-state has gone and, despite Rousseau, no one pretends

that it can survive in the modern scheme of things. That it cannot survive may, of course, be a justification of Sir Rabindranath Tagore's hatred of the present political systems of the West. Even in the West it might under new conditions be able to survive, and these conditions may be brought about by a League of Nations. But it is inconceivable that any national spirituality should rest on a basis of *φύσει δοῦλοι*, and Sir Rabindranath himself is a strong advocate of social justice in the matter of caste.

For a full examination of Sir Rabindranath's attitude we must go deeper. What does the political relationship he hates so bitterly really mean? The political relationship is a type of social relationship. Both are moral relationships. Man expresses himself in various ways, in the family, the church, the trade-union, or in the state. The supreme form of union is the state, or political union. It is the condition of the free enjoyment of other forms of union. But the state is not an end in itself. It subserves a moral end, the full and free development of mankind in a social whole. Far from being immoral, it is a fundamental moral necessity, resting on the minds of moral units or individuals. Political union in itself is not wrong, but the minds on which it is based may not be perfectly moralised. It is not because of political union that men are greedy or murderous or cruel; it is because men are not good. The fact of association in a particular way, indeed, may rouse passions among men which otherwise might remain dormant, but that is the fault of men, not of association. War, the worst result of nationalism, may be immoral, but war is the result of evil minds; and it may even be a moral necessity, as in the great European War, for apart from war, the world was in danger of being engulfed by a vicious ideal. Nevertheless, the blame of the war is traceable not to the state as such but to a particular type of mind which forced war.

Were men sufficiently enlightened morally not to need organisation, war would not happen. But they are not. Men must live in states and be organised in some way,

and not till everyone is perfect will the ill-feelings and bad results that come from organisation die away. At our present stage of moral attainment the state and government are essential, and our duty as good citizens of a state and good members of the human race is to perfect ourselves and others in order that with us the state may be perfect.

And what do industrialism and commercialism imply? They too are expressions of the nature of man. With the growing complexity of society there are the growing needs of men. These needs vary from age to age and from country to country. Industries and commerce do not rise up out of nothing. They arise to meet man's needs. As human needs grow and become more diversified so do industries. The desires of man are not all good and the industries to supply bad desires may not be good. But they *are*. If they are bad there are bad men who require bad things; and it behoves us to teach them better things. Armament firms, for example, arise to enable men to deprive each other of the fundamental right of man, the right of life. Where men are perfectly moralised there will be no need for armament firms. But as long as I cannot trust my neighbour to respect my right to life and property I shall keep instruments of destruction. I have not the slightest intention of killing my neighbour or of burgling his house; therefore he is to blame if I by my custom encourage other men to make guns and cartridges. But if my neighbour is as good as I am the armament firm will fail as far as we are concerned.

The making of money, again, is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end. Wealth in general is necessary to ethical development in a society. The Greek citizens were able to live lives of contemplation because their manual work was done by slaves. The Greek citizens, indeed, could grow in grace, but what of the slaves? They were instruments, or, rather, animals. They served their masters as do horses or bullocks. Their moral development did not count. But slavery is gone never

to return. Equal chances of development are given to all normal individuals, and one form of the development is money-making. It is simply a medium of self-expression. To deny the quality of spirituality to money-making, therefore, is little better than to divorce spirituality from religion. The latter may be on a higher plane than the former, but they are aspects of one thing and certainly not mutually exclusive. Money-making, the western materialism, gross in some respects though it be, is part of the spiritual process on the way to the ethical ideal.

I have tried to show that in Hinduism there is no real reason why nationality may not develop. I have also shown that one aspect of Hindu thought is more international than national. If nationalism is an index of spirituality then the West possesses more signs of internationalism than Hinduism, for while Hinduism theoretically admits the international ideal, it has not yet reached the national. The West is showing very considerable signs of passing from nationalism to internationalism. A large section of modern socialists is as hostile to nationalism as either Roman Catholics or Hindus. These socialists, too, have made considerable headway in international organisation. And before our eyes to-day we see the slow but sure outcome of the many socialising forces of the last century—forces of commerce, trade-unions, universities, 'high society,' of thought—in the League of Nations. True, it has come through the most devastating war in history, but even the ugliness of war may eventually be justified by the beauties of perpetual peace.

I cannot here prolong the debate between nationalism and internationalism or continue to demonstrate the meaning of political organisation among mankind. I must return to my main thesis—Hindu nationalism. The value of Sir Rabindranath's doctrine is that it recognises the fundamental truth that in Hinduism the solution of the national problem depends on the prior solution of a social problem. I have tried to show that

the social problem is in the process of solution and that this process is consistent with the development of real nationality. The exact relation of Hindu, or the wider Indian, nationality to the future unity of humanity is another problem. The present problem, whether it be for the good or evil of either India or humanity, is national. Every indication that we have at present of the inwardness of Indian nationality points to the future indebtedness of humanity to a culture capable of real contributions to the culture-force of the world; but the exact direction of those contributions and the exact niche they will fill in the temple of humanity is for the future to decide.

Let me now sum up. Caste, the crucial test of Hindu society, is, with its conservatism, its endogamy and its exclusiveness, a formidable barrier to Hindu and Indian solidarity. It is, as Risley calls it, a 'congenital instinct, an all-pervading principle of attraction and repulsion entering into and shaping every relation to life.' It has persisted so long that it may appear eternal. The Abbé Dubois, indeed (in his 'Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies'), was so impressed by the unchanging nature of caste that he concluded that the Hindus must be the oldest people in the world. It has resisted change. Dynasties have come and gone, but Hinduism has survived. Even the antagonistic Abbé was constrained to admire its persistence, for—

> these same Hindus [as he says], who did not dare to complain when they saw their wives, their children, and everything they held most dear, carried off by these fierce conquerors [the Mohammedans], their country devastated by fire and sword, their temples destroyed, their idols demolished; these same Hindus, I say, only displayed some sparks of energy when it became a question of changing their customs for those of their oppressors. Ten centuries of Mohammedan rule, during which time the conquerors tried alternately cajolery and violence, in order to establish their own faith and their own customs amongst the conquered, have not sufficed to shake the stedfast constancy of the native inhabitants.

That the 'stedfast constancy' has been affected since the Abbé's days is obvious to-day; but caste is still 'the king of men.' That its anti-national elements are everlasting, however, is more than either facts or tendencies prove. In its inflexibility there is flexibility: in its iron discipline there is adaptability. Its exclusiveness is not absolute, and the theory of its existence is not too conservative to admit change. Affected by the contiguity of other peoples and cultures it has already somewhat softened its rigour. To what extent the volcanic power of universal education, industrialism and political organisation will further test its adaptability remains yet to be seen. All indications that we now possess show that caste can accommodate itself both to new ideas and new institutions. With more enlightenment its rough corners will disappear. If the effect of education on the masses is what it has been on the classes, we may conclude that caste and the new forms of government are not mutually exclusive. The new political forms, indeed, may be affected by characteristic Hindu ideas, but the trunk of nationality will prove stronger than the creeper of caste.

It is impossible to say what elements may go first. Endogamy, which Risley and others regard as so inimical to national unity, is already in danger, but I can conceive political unity even without the removal of endogamy. Intermarriage doubtless would fuse blood, but the fusion of blood will not in itself lead to the fusion of ideas. Nationality is a sentiment: it is spiritual, not physical. The removal of endogamy would subserve national unity only in so far as it would lead to spiritual or sentimental union. What is necessary for national fusion is the removal of the bars which make the lower classes taboo to the higher classes. The right of intermarriage could not do this. 'Marrying up' or 'marrying down' is as ingrained in democratic England as in aristocratic India. What will remove the bar is a conception of a common good for India based not on the good of a class or caste,

but on the good of all, and it is exactly in this channel that the strongest social movements of Hinduism are running. Enlightened Hindus recognise the injustice and unreasonableness of the existing social chasms. They see the ridiculous nature of the scriptural or quasi-scriptural injunctions of pollution, and are striving to give their more unfortunate fellow-beings a human status such as they themselves possess.

Then, again, there is the need for co-operation and mutual help, a lesson gradually being learnt. It would be ridiculous to expect new ideas of communal service to develop all at once. Citizenship in Hindu India has up till now been the citizenship of the family and caste. Patriotism has been loyalty to a group or sect. With a widening horizon the Hindu is gradually appreciating the existence of a new type of citizenship, a citizenship which does not conflict with the intenser feelings of family or caste. This new citizenship only alters the old perspective; it does not abolish it. It gives new relationships in life and a new meaning to the community. It alters the meaning of rights and duties alike, but does not supersede what the traditions of the Hindu tell him to love and respect.

The substitution of new forms of government, again, particularly in local self-government, will gradually raise the self-respect of the individual Hindu. It must not be expected that new forms of government will at once make him a good citizen. The process will be gradual and must be accompanied by an education which will enable the ignorant to understand the primary relations of things. Nor will his intenser patriotism to the family yield quickly to the vaguer interest of the district, province or Empire. To him as to everyone else the intensity of his interest in the community will vary in inverse ratio to the extent of the area. Gradually, however, with new institutions he will appreciate the new basis of rights. Democratic institutions will bring democratic ideas. Even now equality before the law is appreciated by the unlettered

ryot. When he has a vote, and can use that vote without fear of consequences, he will still further feel himself to be a man with a stake in an interest which is beyond his family and caste.

But democracy must not kill caste. Caste is necessary as the basis of Hindu society. To abolish it without replacing it would be to superimpose Bolshevism on autocracy. It would mean ruin to Hindu society. Even when it is replaced, caste will not be killed. Only those essentials must go which stand in the way of greater development. Its institutions will survive, for no institution so deeply ingrained can be killed in a day. Were it for nothing else than its picturesque historicity caste should survive. Its survivals will likely tend to be those general class distinctions universal in human society, but at the same time there will be a large mass of concomitant variations peculiar to the habits and thought of Hinduism.

A new system of common rights, the appreciation of new ethical ends, a new citizenship based on the common welfare distinct from family welfare, the good of all in front of the good of the individual—these are the bases on which the new Hindu nationalism will build.

One word more. In the development of Hindu nationality other elements must enter. The great mass of influences from the West, the co-existing culture of Mohammedanism and of other religions—these must fuse with Hinduism before *Hindu* nationality can become *Indian* nationality. It is of less than no avail—it is positively harmful—to hark back to what may be fundamental unity of India in the past and to decry the facts of the present. What is necessary is balance. Extremism, resulting in wholesale condemnation of everything non-Hindu, will only raise to antagonism what otherwise may lie dormant. Here again the path of salvation lies in forgetting differences and concentrating on unity, in leaving the religious life to its own and not mixing it up with the political. The

balance, too, of the moderating, non-religious, casteless power of the British Government is necessary till the realisation of complete responsibility is made possible by the new basis of rights. Equable development will extract the best from all the cultures of India and let them be added to the world's store of good.

CHAPTER VII

ROME AND INDIA

In the previous chapters I have examined race, language and religion as national 'unities' of India. In examining them I have mentioned the constructive possibilities of each. The final construction of Indian unity depends ultimately on the various political unities. I do not propose to examine the various sub-headings of the more general 'political' unities separately. To do so would mean much unnecessary repetition, for the unities of political history, of traditions and culture, of political and commercial interests, are inextricably bound up together. They may best be examined without any specific separation. The unity of traditions and culture, indeed, is contained by implication in what I have already said on religion and caste. Another unity—geographical unity—will be mentioned in its apposite place later.

It is unnecessary for me to furnish the historical evidence that India till the advent of the British *Raj* possessed no unity of political history. The many centuries of Indian history are honeycombed with the rise and fall of dynasties, factions, sects or invaders. From the times of Asoka—the nearest approach to all-Indian unity before the British—to the organisation of India under Britain, we find a complete lack of adhesion. The course of these centuries is marked by attempts here and there at personal or sectarian supremacy, but in no case was there an attempt at Indian unity. If invaders found resistance in one part they easily found support in another.

Mohammed Ghori was resisted by Prithiraj, but the Indian enemies of Prithiraj were only too ready to help the invading conqueror. If, as with the Marathas or the Sikhs, success attended military force, the results of victory were destroyed by the growth of factions. A handful of English merchants and soldiers became supreme over three hundred million people because the people were not united and their jealousies could be used to further the interests of foreigners.

In dilating on the weaknesses of India we must not forget that India is a sub-continent, and in the days of foreign conquest the communications were so bad that conjoined action by India might have been as reasonably expected as joint action by Europe against Asia or Africa. Common sentiment, moreover, could not be expected where the basis of common sentiment was wanting. The common Indian sentiment we know to-day is a result of British rule in India, for only by the organisation which followed British rule were the new bases of unity able to supersede the previously existing elements of diversity.

The effect of British rule in India as an agent in national fusion can best be brought out by a comparison between the methods of the Roman Empire and the British *Raj* in India. The parallels, as we shall see, are exceedingly significant, even though many centuries have elapsed since Rome made her Imperial experiments. The parallel was suggested by Sir John Seeley in several essays in his 'Expansion of England,' and later was more completely worked out by Lord Bryce in his first essay in his well-known 'Studies in History and Jurisprudence' on 'The Roman Empire and the British Empire in India.' Lord Bryce's Essay, written after a tour in India in 1888–9, though many of its general theories are still true, is an excellent index of the extraordinarily rapid political development of India in the last thirty years. Many of Lord Bryce's statements about India, though perhaps true of India as she was thirty years ago, are completely inapplicable to India as she is now. Sir Herbert Risley

also uses the parallel, in his 'People of India,' to illustrate particular developments in India.

One of the most noteworthy points of comparison between the Roman Empire and the British Indian Empire is the way in which both Rome and England helped to unify various types of civilisation and culture. The Roman Empire, spreading over what was then looked on as the civilised world, carried with it Roman ideas and institutions, particularly in law and the organisation of government. Long before the imperial hand of Rome began to grasp outlying areas of the east and west, different types of culture had already taken root, particularly the Phœnician and Greek. Rome by her conquests linked up the various cultures, producing a certain uniformity of law and political organisation amid a great diversity of language, thought and custom. In the east—the regions surrounding the Euxine and Mediterranean seas—the Greek language, with its literature and thought, had become very powerful, and it was not uprooted by Rome. Rome gave an official language, a uniform law and organisation, but side by side with Roman institutions there flourished the previously existing languages, thought, art and literature. With the advent of Christianity came a new unifying force. Up till then to the diversity of race, language and the rest were added the differences of religion. Gradually Christianity made headway as a unifying religion, so that Rome, when her empire broke down, was in a fair way towards establishing not only a world state but a world nationality. Diverse though the subjects of Rome were, by raising the lower to the plane of the higher she was welding them together into a single nation. The failure of Rome to repel the northern tribes and the Arab peoples—over whom the Roman sway had either been unreal or non-existent—led to the dissolution of Rome. The dissolution of Rome did not destroy her civilisation. Her language, law and organisation persisted, but in time not one, but many nations grew up on her ruins. Charlemagne at one stage, Napoleon

at a later, and Germany recently, attempted to succeed where Rome had failed. Napoleon was the chief instrument in creating the nationalism of modern Europe, and Germany, by forcing the world into the great war, has, so to speak, caused nationalism to boil over into internationalism.

The Roman example contains many obvious parallels to the British Empire in India. The British Government in India exists in a sub-continent containing many varieties of religion, language and culture. It has unified India and given India a new language which, however, has superseded the vernacular only for official purposes and for higher education. The Indian languages, literatures and arts flourish alongside English: they receive much encouragement from the British Government in India. English law has supplemented native law and in many cases superseded it. Western forms of government organisation have been introduced. In one respect there is a marked difference, but the end is the same. In the Roman Empire the unifying force of Christianity tended to supersede the diversity of religion, the process being stopped by the breakdown of the Empire itself. In India the Government is neutral in religious matters. It is also the moderating power between the various religions of India.

In a part of these studies dealing with religion I have already pointed out that the future of Indian nationality must depend on the supersession of religious differences by political unity. In Rome the advance of Christianity automatically solved the question of religion, but in India no such simple solution seems possible. On this point Lord Bryce makes certain remarks which are worth quoting as indicating an effete point of view.

> One must always remember [he says] that in the East religion constitutes a bond of union and a dividing line of severance far stronger and deeper than it does in Western Europe. It largely replaces that national feeling which is absent in India and among the Eastern peoples (except the Chinese and Japanese) generally.

Among Hindus and Musulmans religious practices are interwoven with a man's whole life. To the Hindu more especially caste is everything. It creates a sort of nationality within a nationality, dividing the man of one caste from the man of another, as well as from the man who stands outside Hinduism altogether. Among Muslims there is indeed no regular caste . . . but the haughty exclusiveness of Islam keeps its votaries quite apart from the profession of other faiths. The European in India, when he converses with either a Hindu or a Musulman, feels strongly how far away from them he stands. There is always a sense of constraint because both parties know that a whole range of subjects lies outside discussion and must not even be approached. But [the writer goes on to say] the native Christian feels himself more in sympathy with his European rulers *than he does with his fellow subjects* of the same race and colour as himself.[1]

Lord Bryce had not seen the co-operation in national councils of Hindu, Moslem or Christian, nor had he foreseen the national movement (the Indian Church for Indians) in Indian Christianity itself. But his conclusion, tentative though it be, is even more amazing:

Here I touch a matter of the utmost interest when one thinks of the more remote future of India. Political consequences greater than now appear may depend upon the spread of Christianity there, a spread whose progress, though at present scarcely perceptible in the upper classes, may possibly become much more rapid than it has been during the last century. I do not say that Hinduism or Islam is a cause of hostility to British rule. Neither do I suggest that a Christian native population would become fused with the European or Eurasian population. But if the number of Christians, especially in the middle and upper ranks of Indian society, were to increase, the difficulty of ascertaining native opinion, now so much felt by Indian administrators, would be perceptibly lessened, and the social separation of natives and Europeans might become less acute to the great benefit of both sections of the population.

The Roman Empire was built up by conquest: so at least in part was the British Empire in India. At the

[1] The italics are mine.

outside of their imperial career the Romans never dreamt of conquering the world, but as their gains grew so did their lust for Empire. The British Government in India is also the result of conquest, but not the conscious conquest of Empire. The origin of the British *Raj* was a commercial company and even at the passing of the East India Company Act in 1784 the liberal statesmanship of Pitt was strangely intermingled with commercial politics.

India [he said] has at all times been of great consequence to this country *from the resources of opulence and strength it affords.* The reorganisation of the Government was made necessary by the disastrous events in America [he continued], by which losses, the limits of the Empire being more contracted, the remaining territories become more valuable.

He went on to show how—

the legislature has now an opportunity to consult about the means the most likely to reconcile and secure the interest of the people of this country, of the people of India, and of the British constitution, so far as it may be affected by the connection with India.

The British Government of India is an accident. When the early colonists set out from England to America and Australasia they took with them the idea of a new England. They settled in territories where opportunities existed for living freer or more profitable lives. The territories were vast, fertile, and, save for nomadic tribes, unpopulated. The climate was favourable, and the colonists settled in their new lands, established new government for themselves and gradually built up a new *imperium in imperio.* Even although the Canada or Australia we now know is not a mere transplanted England, the bonds of unity have proved strong enough to call every able-bodied Canadian or Australian to the defence of the Empire in her time of peril. India, however, is in no sense a colony. The Englishman in India lives in a strange land among a strange people. India is not his home.

His interests in India are either commercial or political, and after his day's work he returns to his own people. He is a governor by accident. He came to India as a trader and by the strange forces of circumstances became its ruler. But he has not colonised India. When he found India he found it densely, if not over-populated. He found strange customs and religious practices, absolutely preventing him from intermarriage with the people. He found, too, a climate which soon killed off the weak and made the strong eager to make their fortunes quickly and return to their own land. His trading enterprises gradually led to political interest, intrigue and power, and soon he found himself a soldier as well as a trader. (The soldier-trader became a conqueror, and the conqueror became the ruler.) Gradually the functions of the ruler were differentiated from those of the trader. The East India Company became Her Majesty's Government, under which countless new companies have arisen to trade but none to rule. (And ultimately the ruler, having done his work as a ruler, is to hand his functions over to the people over whom he has ruled.)

We may here remark that Rome as well as Britain conquered to save herself. Rome, for example, seized Sicily to repel Carthage: Britain seized India or parts of India to repel her European enemy, France; but in repelling France she ultimately had to take upon herself the defence of India against other actual or possible enemies. It is questionable, if the future complications of the trading company had been foreseen, whether the seventeenth and eighteenth century English statesmen would have shouldered the task of India. The very ease with which India came under British sway may have blinded them to the future of what proved the biggest imperial task in history. In any case it is well to remember, with Sir John Seeley, the important fact that India was not conquered in the old barbaric sense of the word 'conquered,' nor did India ever become a possession in the sense that colonies are possessions. (The British

conquered India by the help of Indians. It is inconceivable, had there been a united India, that a mere handful of traders could have assumed complete control of a country with over three hundred million inhabitants. When the East India Company conquered India its chief enemy in India was not the Indians but the French, and only by an accident of history did an English East Indian, and not a French East Indian corporation become the master of India. This historical point is worth remembering to-day. India as such has never had a quarrel with Britain leading to defeat and conquest. The British *Raj* is the result of conquest—but not the conquest of India as a whole. (It would be more correct to call the British rule in India the result of three processes: peaceful penetration, diplomacy (or perhaps better, political intrigue), and military supremacy.) The last was always achieved by the help of Indians. Certainly the brute force of military strength has not been the only determining factor in either the establishment or the preservation of British rule. Further, it was the fate of India to feel the first real grip of Britain when the ideas born of the French Revolution were in the air. Clive and Hastings, wonderful though they were as soldiers and administrators, had to cope with Burke. The spirit of freedom which reigned in England at the end of the eighteenth century did for the liberty of the Indo-British institutions what the lessons the English administrators learnt in India could never have done. From the very outset of what may be called the political career of the East India Company, on the top of the essential intolerance of Hindu customs and the aggressiveness, political and religious, of Mohammedanism, was placed a layer of liberalism and toleration equally foreign to both the indigenous religions and social practices.

Another basis of comparison exists in what we may call the peace programme of the Romans and that of the British in India. Whenever the Romans conquered a territory they proceeded to organise it. For military purposes, chiefly for the defence of their frontiers, they established

means of communication which were useful for peace as well as for war. The same is true of England in India. Just as the Romans were great road-makers, the British are the leading shipbuilders and shipowners in the world. For the various dominions the sea routes are guarded; and in India the British have made railways, roads and canals for strategic, commercial and social purposes.

> If India were to relapse into barbarism [says Lord Bryce], the bridges would after a while perish, and the embankments would in time be swept away—but the rock-cuttings and the tunnels would remain, as the indestructible paving stones of the Roman roads, and majestic bridges, like the Pont du Gard in Languedoc, remain to witness to the skill and thoroughness with which a great race did its work.

In modern India strategic communications are relatively insignificant as compared with the great trade arteries. The defence of India, of course, must always come before the development of India, but in the last half-century communications for the development of industries and commerce, and for the good of the people (particularly the prevention of famines) have overshadowed military or naval communications. Peculiarly enough, the erection of means of defence has, both in India and out of India, been frequently criticised as a wasteful application of public resources. The strain on the Indian purse, due to the railway policy of Government as a whole, is by no means slight; but whatever it may be, the defence of the existence of India is obviously the first call on Indian resources. In India, as in other countries, before the war a relatively long period of immunity from serious attacks encouraged the peculiar attitude—an attitude which suddenly changed with the events of August 1914—that all railways which are not directly remunerative are unjust burdens on the taxpayers of a country. Rome suffered from no such false ideas of security. Her communications were primarily defensive, but their secondary purposes, commercial and social, secured what

the railway and sea-routes have helped to secure in India —a sense of Imperial unity.

Communications have had no small influence in helping to develop an Indian as distinct from an Imperial unity. Just as the Roman roads helped greatly to knit the Roman Empire together, so communications in India have helped to break down racial and caste barriers. They have made possible the various Indian, as well as provincial, meetings, congresses and councils. It may seem ridiculous to compare mere Roman roads with railways, telegraphs and cable systems, but the results are in many senses similar. Not only has Indian unity been largely helped by the rail and telegraph, but by the cable and steamship the Imperial bond has been strengthened. Little unity was possible in the days when Governor Hedges took six months to go from Calcutta to Delhi, or when the journey to Britain was about a year in duration, making it impossible for either the Englishman in India or the Indian himself to follow the developments of European or Imperial politics. Unlike Rome, which was situated in the centre of her empire, Britain is separated by thousands of miles from the nearest of her dominions; but while Rome could communicate with her provinces only by messenger, England can speak by wire or wireless.

Communications have a far more vital bearing on nationality. Just as in Rome the excellence of communication helped to develop a high standard of internal peace, so in India the whole country has come under the sway of law and order.

> Let anyone think [says Lord Bryce] of the general state of the ancient world before the conquests of Rome, and let him then think of the condition not merely of India after the death of Arrungzeb, but of the chief European countries as they stood in the seventeenth century if he wishes to appreciate what Rome did for her subjects or what England has done for India.

In the best days of the Roman Empire the roads and seas were safe, safer even than they were in the sixteenth

to the eighteenth centuries, when highway robbery, piracy and private war were common. As Bryce points out, Southern and Western Europe on the whole would seem to have enjoyed better order under Hadrian and the Antonines than was enjoyed till the nineteenth century.

Great as was the order under Rome, still greater has been the transformation in India.

> Nothing [says Lord Bryce, speaking from personal experience, an experience which many other travellers to India have echoed] surprises the visitor from Europe so much as the absolute confidence with which he finds himself travelling unprotected across this vast country, through mountains and jungles, among half-savage tribes whose language he does not know, and that without seeing, save at rare intervals, any sign of European administration.

The existence of peace and order in British India, as well as in the Native States, is important for our present study insomuch as it provides the condition of regular, uninterrupted political development. No development is possible where there is a lack of security either for person or property. How far such a lack of security prevented the growth of Indian citizenship before the advent of the British is another question. A people accustomed to periodic invasions, to thieving raids or dacoities, to the Thugs or to the Pindaris, could scarcely be expected to develop that sense of community of interest which is now so notable. Lack of sound communications and lack of peace and order without doubt kept Indian national feeling in the background just as potently as their existence has stimulated the modern sentiment of national unity.

In another respect Rome furnishes an interesting parallel—a parallel unfortunately incomplete because of her fall. Once the Roman Empire was established on a stable basis, the Romans proceeded to organise their provinces for the good of the local populations. In ancient empires as a rule conquest was looked on as a means towards the end of power or riches. The conquerors used the conquered either as slaves or mercenaries for their

armies, and found riches by seizing the movables of the countries or by taxing the people. The Romans, far from enslaving or molesting the people, tried to give them good government. As the *kudos* of Rome grew, so did her ideas of imperial duty. In the Empire it would have been easy for her proconsuls to enrich themselves at the expense of the people over whom they ruled; indeed, they might have broken from Rome completely and declared their own independence. The strong arm of the central power in Rome prevented excesses. There are many instances, the best known being the case of Verres (which gave us Cicero's 'In Verrem'), in which Rome called her servants to account for maladministration. Such instances increased under the Empire. The Emperor was able to deal more promptly and more effectively with maladministration than the Republic, and in practice proved more solicitous for the good of his subjects than was the previous plural executive.

The parallel in India is too well known to need detailed description. The early days of English administration in India were by no means free from rapacity and corruption. Just as Rome used to bring erring proconsuls to justice for maladministration, so did the English Government. From the days of Clive the actions of the servants of the Company were subject to close scrutiny by the House of Commons. In 1773 a law was passed making offences committed against natives of India punishable in England. In 1784 a special court was established to try offences committed in India. Then came the trial of Warren Hastings with the well-known English equivalent to Cicero's 'In Verrem.' In 1784 was established the Board of Control, and in 1858 the Government was brought directly under the Crown.

Nothing in India has contributed so much to the contentment of the people as a whole, and to their appreciation of the civic value of the British *Raj*, than the constitutional system by which the public and private rights of the Indians have been determined. In this, as in the

foregoing matters, there is ample material for comparison between the Romans and the British in India.

In her early days Rome confined her citizenship strictly to citizens of Rome. The Roman was a Roman by birth and as such became a Roman citizen. Foreigners, no matter how long domiciled in Rome, were *peregrini* and absolutely barred from the pure caste of *civis Romanus*. Roman citizenship was a privilege of the highest order: to be a Roman was to be a Brahman of Brahmans. In course of time, as Rome became a commercial centre, the rigid caste bar of Roman citizenship began to break down. The *ius civile* or civil law had to admit side by side with itself the *ius gentium* or the law of nations. At first the *ius civile*, administered by Roman courts for Roman citizens, was looked on as immeasurably higher than the *ius gentium*, administered for the foreigners by the *praetor peregrinus*. With the growth of Rome, first as an Italian power and latterly as a world Empire, the foreigners came to enjoy privileges similar to the Romans themselves. The *ius gentium* came to have a higher status, particularly after it was looked on as synonymous with the *ius naturale* or universal law of nature. The foreigner grew in grace in the eyes of the Romans as did the law applicable to foreigners. Rome admitted them to citizenship—first gradually, ultimately *en bloc*. In the early stages of relaxation of Roman civil rights only the neighbours of Rome were admitted, sometimes only as military allies, not as equal citizens. Private civil rights were granted before public rights, such as the right to vote for the assembly or to be elected to office. By the time of Julius Caesar practically all the inhabitants of Italy had become Roman citizens, and the process had been carried partially to certain citizens outside Italy. The privilege of citizenship was also conferred on individuals. Under the Flavian Emperors the process was accelerated, and in the third century an imperial edict made all Roman subjects full citizens. Before the citizenship was conferred on all, the Emperor could appoint anyone he pleased

to public office, such appointment bringing with it the grant of citizenship. Before her fall Rome had thus opened her once exclusive doors to all her subjects. How far the enjoyment of citizenship would have welded the empire into a single whole is problematical. The fall of Rome herself destroyed the fountain-head of a possible nationality, and led, after many centuries of struggle, to the existence of many nations and nationalities.

In the case of India there are certain similarities. The English in India found a country already thickly populated, giving little room for colonisation in the true sense of the term, even had the climatic conditions been suitable. They found there a number of peoples living under different legal systems, and the course adopted by the newcomers was peculiar to the circumstances they found. Before the English came to India there were two leading legal systems—the Moslem and Hindu. Both these were mainly religious. They were also personal, not territorial. The law was applicable only to the individual members of each community. Certain Mohammedan penal rules, it is true, were universally applied, but they were so sporadic and inexact that a new penal code had to be introduced. Both Moslem and Hindu law were lacking in many respects. They were most highly developed in matters concerning family relations, inheritance, and, in the case of Moslem law, *wakf* or pious foundations.

In addition to Hindu and Moslem religious law the English found a large number of purely local customs relating to land revenue, forest administration and the like. They also found a rather inchoate body of customary principles governing trade and commerce and the transfer of property.

The nature of the indigenous law of India reflected to a great extent the political life of the communities. They were semi-theocratic, with private predominating over public relations. This aspect of the Hindu community in particular is still observable. The Hindu is

primarily a citizen of a family or caste, and only recently have his views extended beyond these boundaries to the citizenship of a *patrie*.

What the incoming English did was to follow the line of least resistance. They applied English law to themselves and the Indian indigenous law to Indians, according to their creed. With the creation, in 1773, of the High Court at Calcutta the English lawyers proceeded to apply English law both to Indians and Englishmen, but this was stopped by the Declaratory Act of 1780, which made the old system of Indian law for Indians and English law for Englishmen compulsory.

From time to time the English legislature made statutory modifications in the indigenous law, particularly where punishments were regarded as inhumane or barbaric (such as stoning and mutilation), or where customs were not in accord with modern ideas, as in the Bengal Suttee Regulation of 1829 and the Indian Slavery Act of 1843.

The great contributions the English made to the existing legal system were direct legislation and codification. Direct legislation was at first carried out without Indian representation, but in the course of time the legislation concerning India came to be less English and more Indian. The significance of this in the development of Indian nationality is supreme. From legal disorganisation arose unity of law and the organisation of a legislature, or rather legislatures. Both in law and law-making India, as distinct from parts of India or sections of Indians, became a reality. With the introduction of English education and its rapid spread, law and law-making more and more came to fit into the needs of India and the will of Indians. The basis was laid for the common Indian consciousness necessary for an Indian nationality.

The expansion of British civil rights has taken place very much on the Roman parallel. In England herself private civil rights applied to all citizens long before public

civil rights. Even at the present day the right of voting or of being elected to public office is restricted either by a property qualification or by a religious bar. Both these disabilities are now almost extinct, but they are interesting reminders of the pre-1832 days and of the days before disabilities were removed from Jews and Roman Catholics. It may be said that to-day manhood suffrage is the rule of England and womanhood suffrage is in the process of development. When an Englishman goes to another part of the Empire both private and public civil rights are conferred on him only if that part is so constituted that the Englishman may enjoy the rights as a citizen of the territory concerned. In the early days of English migration the Englishman took with him his private rights and his right to office, but he left his right to vote behind in England. Similarly in the territories he conquered the private rights and the right to be elected to office passed to the inhabitants of the new territory, but, like the Englishman himself, these inhabitants had no right to vote. What happened in New England and Canada also happened in India.

In India the Englishman recognised the private civil rights of the people. The Indian came to have the same rights as the Englishman except so far as his own law (Hindu or Mohammedan) modified these rights, particularly in his favour. Simply by the application of existing English legal principles the Indians came to be equal before the law as between different sections of themselves and as between themselves and Europeans. Not only so, but from the same principles flowed the eligibility of Indians for all posts under the Crown. Before the days of Legislative Councils in India Indians could be elected to the House of Commons, or be appointed to the highest posts in England or India, including the Governor-Generalship. Colour, birth and religion are ruled out by the Indian Act of 1883 as bars for public office. As Bryce points out, it ' did not require any statute to establish what flowed from the principles

of our law.' The same principles apply, of course, to other British dominions, whether self-governing or not.

The right of voting, just as in England itself, has grown slowly in India: in fact the Act following the Montagu-Chelmsford Report will be the equivalent of the first English Reform Act of 1832. The years 1815 to 1855—what Professor Ramsay Muir in his recent book 'National Self-Government' calls the 'Era of Liberal Revolutions'—freed England from many hereditary prejudices and unprogressive constitutional dogmas, but it was reserved to a later stage for the English liberalism to transport itself to India. The Queen's Proclamation of 1858, indeed, is an excellent example of the prevailing liberal attitude, but the development of free institutions came somewhat later. After the reforms of 1832 the grant of free government to other parts of the Empire followed as a matter of course. The 1837 rebellion in Canada, the result of which was the famous Durham Report, was the occasion of one of the boldest political experiments in history. To grant self-government to a country which had recently been in rebellion would have seemed madness to the great majority of eighteenth-century statesmen. Yet the liberal forces of the time were strong enough to justify the adoption of the Durham principles as a practical issue of dominion politics. It represented the extreme swing round from the repressive colonial policy immediately following the American War of Independence: and no one can deny the success of the experiment.

The process continued through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. The grant of the South African constitution a few years after a bitter war was another of its bold strokes. It was only natural that the same current should flow to the shores of India. As in the cases of other countries the tardy English political conscience, however honest, was pricked by a violent upheaval, the Mutiny. To thinking Englishmen it was obvious long before 1857 that a country like India could not continue to be ruled indefinitely by a trading concern or a Board

of Control. True, the Company government had been marked by great liberalism both in thought and action. It had established considerable uniformity in law, judicial organisation and government. Its principles were the principles of British honesty and justice, but its position was an anachronism and an anomaly. Lord Palmerston's Act of 1858, with the Queen's Proclamation, was the first real charter of modern Indian liberty.

From the Queen's Proclamation to the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, I need only refer to the various Acts of the British Government establishing executive and legislative Councils, the Acts organising the central and provincial Governments, the rapid advance of education, the development of India industrially and commercially, the admission of Indians to the Government services and the highest Councils of the land, the many manifestoes concerning local self-government, and the rapid development of self-governing institutions themselves.

The admission of Indians into the public services of India on equal terms with Englishmen offers yet another basis of comparison between England and Rome. The Romans used to employ the natives of their provinces in subordinate posts, but they did not reserve the highest posts for Romans. The boast *civis Romanus sum* was applicable to all the Empire. As Bryce points out, in the third century of the Christian era a Gaul, a Spaniard, a Pannonian, a Bithynian, a Syrian called himself a Roman.

> The interests of the Empire [as Bryce says] were his interests, its glory his glory, almost as much as if he had been born in the shadow of the Capitol. There was, therefore, no reason why his loyalty should not be trusted; no reason why he should not be chosen to lead in war, or govern in peace, men of Italian birth. So, too, the qualities which make a man capable of leading in war or administering in peace were just as likely to be found in a Gaul or a Spaniard, or a German from the Rhine frontier as an Italian.

The great war has proved that though an Indian is not an Englishman, he is a member of the British Empire. When Lord Bryce spoke of the differences in the grades

of employment of Englishmen and Indians, of the Indian and British Army, of the exclusiveness of the King's Commission in the Indian Army, he had not seen an Indian created a member of the British Cabinet, or the King's Commission made available to Indians, or the Indian armies fighting for the defence of the Empire. The war in many ways has brought home to India its sense of imperial citizenship. Apart from the contributions of India to the war, and the opening of doors hitherto closed to Indians, the very fact of Germany's oppressive desires has shown to Indians the value of her place in a scheme of imperial defence.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, apart from its importance as a constitutional document, marks a definite stage in the political history of India. As a summary of the effects of English rule in India and as a guide to future organisation it is both an effect and a cause. As an effect it shows how the infiltration of western ideas and institutions has affected a people alien in blood, religion, social organisation and political traditions from its rulers. These institutions have come from above, not from below. They have been imposed on India as the result of western experience. They have been created to solve questions of government organisation on the analogy of the West. Alien institutions, alien education, alien ideas have been brought to India to solve Indian problems. In India we seem to perform the impossible task of building downwards.

As a cause, the Report is the foundation of a completely new type of government—namely, an executive responsible to an Indian legislature. The desire for such government comes both from below and above. If it is true that the Indian politically minded classes desire responsibility in government it seems equally true that the great majority of Englishmen conceive responsible government to be the solution of Indian difficulties. Responsibility in government is new in India only in name. If we analyse the recent history of the Government of

India, we shall find that one of the keynotes of its being has been responsibility to a legislature for the good of India; so, be it noted, the introduction of responsibility in India is not the initiation of responsibility, but a change of its locus of responsibility. Responsible Government for India dates from the Act for the Better Government of India, the promulgation of which was the occasion for the historic Proclamation of 1858. The introduction of responsibility may best be given by an extract from Lord Palmerston's speech when he introduced the Bill:

> The principle of our political system is that all administrative functions should be accompanied by ministerial responsibility, responsibility to Parliament, responsibility to public opinion, responsibility to the Crown, but in this case the chief functions in the Government of India are committed to a body not responsible to Parliament, not appointed by the Crown, but elected by persons who have no more connection with India than consists in the possession of so much India stock. . . . As far as regards the executive functions of the Indian Government at home, it is of the greatest importance to vest complete authority where the public have a right to think that complete responsibility should rest, and that whereas in this country there can be but one governing body responsible to the Crown, the Parliament, and to public opinion, consisting of the constitutional advisers of the Crown for the time being, so it is in accordance with the best interests of the nation that India, with all its vast and important interests, should be placed under the direct authority of the Crown, to be governed in the name of the Crown by the responsible ministers of the Crown sitting in Parliament, and responsible to Parliament and the public for every part of their public conduct, instead of being as now administered by a set of gentlemen who, however respectable, however competent for the discharge of the functions entrusted to them, are yet a totally irresponsible body whose views and acts are seldom known to the public, and whether known or unknown, whether approved or disapproved, unless one of the Directors happens to have a seat in this House are out of the range of Parliamentary discussion.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report thus marks a stage in the liberalising of the Governments of the Empire.

The Report itself is admittedly only a stage towards the grant of complete responsibility, such responsibility being meant, as I remarked at the very opening of this study, to develop an Indian nationality within the British Empire.

The whole course of the legal development as well as the growth of free institutions in India is in complete accord with English ideas. It is well to remember this in these days when we hear on all sides that the Government is 'forced' to grant 'concessions.' 'Concessions of this kind are not 'forced': they are the natural outcome of English legal and political ideas, and the best proof of it is that England granted the beginnings of these 'concessions' long before an Indian press or platform agitated for them. If free institutions are good in themselves, and if thanks are due for them, the thanks are due to Britain, not to modern politicians. Municipal Government, Legislative Councils, democratic organisations generally, equality before the law, and the eligibility of Indians for the highest posts of this land or of Britain (for an Indian Vakil may quite legally become Chief Justice of England), were granted not as forced or semi-forced favours, but as logical results of a legal heredity and of modern liberal ideas.

Since 1858 India has had the inestimable benefit of possessing a Government responsible to the British House of Commons—a House more likely to take a liberal view of Indian affairs than a contemporary chamber elected on similar lines in India would have been. For half a century India secured the benefits of a benevolent despotism which, whether it wished it nor not, was tempered by the prevailing spirit of liberalism in England.

The results of the liberal movement in English politics are reflected in the social and political movements in India, particularly in the National Assembly of India known as the Indian National Congress. From its foundation in 1885 this Congress has been a sort of unofficial Indian Parliament. The Congress has a no mean history. Many of the best types of Indian patriots—some of them

English by birth—have presided over its meetings, and that its unofficial voice has been effective is proved amply by a comparison of the Resolutions passed and the political developments that have taken place. Although at times it has been at complete variance with official views, the Congress is recognised officially—indeed it was recognised by Lord Lansdowne soon after its initiation—and its records will prove intensely interesting to the future Indian historian who tries to trace the relations between law and public opinion in India.

The same liberalism has shown itself in a quickening of the national conscience in many other directions, in social service, in educational work—the intense eagerness both to give and receive education is one of the most notable marks of Indian nationalism—in co-operation with the officials for the good of the people, as in the co-operative credit movement, in local self-government, in the legislative councils, and manifold other ways. Extreme nationalism has unfortunately at times passed into anarchy or lawlessness, but it will not be by showing its worst, but by showing its best, that Indian nationality will prosper either in India or out of it.

Another comparison—and one which requires more detailed treatment—is the encouragement of indigenous institutions, especially popular government, by the respective Empires. The Roman territories, as Bryce points out, were of three kinds: first, those which before passing under the sway of Rome had been despotically governed by their own princes, such as Egypt, Macedon and Pontus; secondly, those which had been either monarchic or oligarchic tribal principalities; and thirdly, small self-governing communities like the Greek cities. In the first two types there was no question of local self-government when the Romans took them over, for there had been no self-government before. Where Rome found self-governing institutions as a rule she allowed them to continue, though the strength of the central authority usually reduced them to a singleness of pattern. These cities were placed

under the provincial governor, who regulated taxation and directed the criminal and higher civil procedure. Representation was not introduced in spite of the opportunities that existed for the representative system.

In India the English found certain indigenous self-governing institutions, but in the early stages of British government these were not supplemented by the creation of representative institutions on the model of the West. In this connection it is interesting to note the remarks of Lord Bryce and to contrast them with the modern position of India. The British in India show the interesting contrast that while the Romans were despots at home and abroad, the English are despots in India and democrats at home.

India [he says] is ruled despotically by the English, not merely because they found her so ruled, but because they conceive that no other sort of Government would suit a vast population of different races and tongues divided by the religious animosities of Hindus and Musulmans, and with no sort of experience of self-government on a scale larger than that of the village councils. No more in India than in the Roman Empire has there been any question of establishing free institutions either for the country as a whole, or for any particular province. . . . The truth is that, though a few intelligent men, educated in European ideas, complain of the despotic power of the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy —the people of India generally do not wish to govern themselves.

And again he says:

The English govern their own country on democratic, India on absolutist, principles. The inconsistency is patent but inevitable. It affords an easy theme for declamation when any arbitrary act of the Indian administration gives rise to complaints, and it may fairly be used as the foundation for an argument that a people which enjoys freedom at home is specially bound to deal justly and considerately with those subjects to whom she refuses a like freedom. But everyone admits in his heart that it is impossible to ignore the differences which make one group of races unfit for the institutions which have given energy and contentment to another more favourably placed.

The contrast is also true of the Philippine Islands, a 'more obtrusive inconsistency' because it came from the American Republic, which proclaimed far more loudly than the English ever have done that the consent of the governed is the only foundation of a just government. The Philippine Islands have travelled far since Viscount Bryce wrote these words, and further still has India since he said:

> The Government of India by the English resembles that of her provinces by Rome in being thoroughly despotic. In both cases whatever may have been done for the people, nothing was or is done by the people . . . there is in India no room for popular initiative, or for popular interferences with the acts of the rulers from the Viceroy down to a district official.

So quick has been the change in India that Lord Bryce's remarks seem more applicable to an ancient Egyptian despotism than to modern democratic India.

The subject of local self-government in India is of so great importance that it demands treatment at greater length. At the basis of all local government in India lies the village. The Indian village varies from province to province, but in the great majority of cases it consists of the village site, with its tank and cattle stand, its houses and surrounding fields, each of which if cultivated is marked off from the other. As a rule there is a certain amount of pasture land and woodland for wood-cutting. In some parts of India, notably Assam, Eastern Bengal, and on the west coast of Madras, the village is really a number of separate houses, without the compactness of organisation characteristic of the normal village. The village has its own organisation and rules, and its own officials.

The villages according to Baden-Powell's division may be divided into two main classes: the *ryotwari* village, the head of which is the *patel* or *reddi* or hereditary headman; and the joint or landlord village of the United Provinces and the North-West generally, the head of which is the village *panchayat* or group of heads of the leading

families. The *panchayat* in many villages has been superseded by an individual such as the *lumbardar*, with whom the local government can have direct dealings. This village (as described by Sir Henry Maine in his 'Village Communities') is really the property of a small oligarchy of proprietors who owe their position either to descent or to an original grant by a native ruler. Under the village authorities are a host of functionaries, who exercise their authority according to caste rules, such as the watchman or *chaukidar*, whose duties are connected with police administration, the collection of statistics of mortality, and such like, the barber, washerman, carpenter, cobbler and potter. There is also an accountant in the village whose function is to keep, or make up, the accounts for revenue administration.

The Indian village is an essential part in Indian administration. The officials—the president of the *panchayat*, the *lumbardar*, the *chaukidar*—whatever they may be, have direct dealings with Government, and are as a rule paid small salaries. They are responsible for the local maintenance of law and order, for the collection of revenue, for giving information regarding crops, diseases and other items of local interest. The village never evolved what we now call municipal government. Both in Hindu and Mohammedan India the village chief official was a direct agent of the central government. Local self-government in the sense that we now speak of municipalities as self-governing institutions is not indigenous to India.

The village, with its peculiar type of government, is indigenous to India. It is one of the most permanent institutions in India. In the words of Lord Metcalfe:

> The village communities are little republics, having nearly everything they can want within themselves, and almost independent of foreign relations. They seem to last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds revolution; Hindu, Pathan, Mughal, Maratha, Sikh, English, are all masters in turn, but the village communities remain the same. In times of trouble they arm and fortify

themselves: a hostile army passes through the country: the village communities collect their cattle within their walls, and let the enemy pass unprovoked. If plunder and devastation be directed against themselves, and the force employed be irresistible, they flee to friendly villages at a distance, but when the storm has passed over, they return and resume their occupations. If a country remain for a series of years the scene of continued pillage and massacre, so that the village cannot be inhabited, the scattered villagers nevertheless return whenever the power of peaceable possession revives. A generation may pass away, but the succeeding generation will return. The sons will take the place of the fathers, the same site for the village, the same position for the houses, the same land will be reoccupied by the descendants of those who were driven out when the village was depopulated; and it is not a trifling matter that will drive them out, for they will often maintain their post through times of disturbance and convulsion, and acquire strength sufficient to resist pillage and oppression with success. This union of the village communities, each one forming a separate little state in itself, has, I conceive, contributed more than any other cause to the preservation of the people of India through all the revolutions and changes which they have suffered, and is in a high degree conducive to their happiness, and to the enjoyment of a great portion of freedom and independence.

Local self-government of the modern type, both urban and rural, is vastly different from the indigenous village government. It is the result of British ideas of government and as such exotic to India. The Presidency towns, under Royal Charter, possessed some type of municipal government from the earliest days of the Company. Municipal administration on a larger scale was attempted in 1842 when an Act was passed, applicable to Bengal, to enable the inhabitants of 'any place of public resort or residence to make better provision for purposes connected with public health and sanitation.' In 1850 an Act was passed making the Bengal principle operative over the whole of India. Both Acts were permissive. In the 1842 Act two-thirds of the householders had to apply for the operation of the Act before it could be enforced. Only

one town asked for it, and when the collector tried to collect the taxes allowed under the Act, the inhabitants not only refused to pay but prosecuted the collector for trespass! Under the 1850 Act a large number of municipalities were formed with more success. The Commissioners, however, were mostly nominated. The elective principle was not yet tried.

The real starting point of municipal government is in the Resolution, passed in 1870, by Lord Mayo's Government which declared that:

> Local interest, supervision and care are necessary to success in the management of funds devoted to education, sanitation, medical charity, and local public works. The operation of this Resolution in its full meaning and integrity will afford opportunities for the development of self-government, for strengthening municipal institutions, and for the association of Natives and Europeans to a greater extent than heretofore in the administration of affairs.

New municipal acts followed, extending the democratic principle. The most extensive policy of local self-government was adopted by Lord Ripon's Government. In the Resolutions of 1881 and 1882 and the Acts of 1883 and 1884 the prevailing principles of local self-government were laid down. The constitution, powers and functions of local bodies were much altered. The principle of election was extended, and freedom from official control was made real by establishing sounder financial bases for the municipalities and allowing the election of unofficial chairmen.

A similar evolution marked rural self-government. Although it started later, rural self-government has extended widely. The principles governing it are substantially the same as those governing urban self-government.

The present policy of the Government of India in matters of local self-government dates from Lord Ripon's Resolutions and from the Royal Commission on Decentralisation, which presented its report in 1909. Since the Commission two important Resolutions have been pub-

lished by the Government, one dated April 28, 1915, the other May 16, 1918. The 1915 Resolution is a review of the findings of the Royal Commission, and it makes certain definite recommendations which may be summed up in the elective principle, non-official control, and real financial powers. In the Resolution, the Government clearly defines its attitude towards self-governing local institutions. The result of the limited experience of India in local self-government, the Resolution said, on the whole justified the policy out of which local self-government arose.

> The degree of success varies from province to province [the Resolution said] and from one part of a province to another, but there is definite and satisfactory evidence of the growth of a feeling of good citizenship, particularly in the towns. The spread of education is largely responsible for the quickening of a sense of responsibility and improvements in the machinery. . . . On all sides there are signs of vitality and growth.

The Resolution remarked also on the difficulties to be surmounted before local self-government could really be secure. Apart from difficulties connected with revenues—

> the indifference still prevailing in many places towards all forms of public life, the continued unwillingness of many Indian gentlemen to submit to the troubles, expense and inconvenience of election, the unfitness of some of those whom these obstacles do not deter, the prevalence of sectarian animosities . . . all these are causes which cannot but impede the free and full development of local self-government.

More interesting for, and more integrally connected with, our present subject is the Resolution of May 16, 1918. It was issued after the pronouncement of August 20, 1917, and is the present policy of the Government of India in local self-government. It insists on the necessity of making local self-government a reality. So long as local bodies are throttled by official intervention they will not be able to take to themselves the seriousness and responsibility of government of any kind. The Government proposed

a continuation of the liberal policy of Lord Ripon, and concluded with the following weighty remarks:

It is hoped that by the adoption of the policy indicated in this Resolution a substantial advance may be made in the direction of a more developed and more liberal form of local self-government. It is probably in the sphere of local self-government more than in any other that the changes which are now being effected in India will touch the great mass of the population. If the local administration is freed in the manner proposed from undue official guidance, a vast number of persons should feel themselves for the first time placed in effective control of the matters which affect their every-day life, and the local bodies will be invested with opportunities not hitherto enjoyed by them of improving the conditions of the populations entrusted to their charge. The duties of the local bodies cover most of the activities upon which the essential welfare of the country depends. They have the care of the public health and all the circumstances upon which that health depends: they control elementary education: they construct and maintain local buildings and communications and they touch the life and convenience of the people at every point. In the development of their interests and the extension of their responsibilities the self-government of the country will secure a very real and important advance, and it is on the increased experience to be gained in the administration of local civic affairs that the country must to a large degree rely for the expansion of its self-dependence in the sphere of central government.

One of the most important things in the policy of the Government of India from 1882 downwards has been the insistence on local self-government as a training school for a wider responsibility. In Lord Mayo's Resolution of 1870 this idea, as I have shown, was brought to light, but it is in the 1882 Resolution of Lord Ripon's Government that we have its first clear expression. This Resolution says:

It is not primarily with a view to improvement in administration that this measure is put forward and supported. It is chiefly desirable as an instrument of political and popular education. His Excellency-in-Council has himself no doubt that, in course of time, as local knowledge and local interest are brought to bear more freely upon local administration, improved efficiency

will in fact follow. But at starting there will doubtless be many failures, calculated to discourage exaggerated hopes, and even in some cases to cast apparent discredit upon the practice of self-government itself. If, however, the officers of Government only set themselves, as the Governor-General in Council believes they will, to foster sedulously the small beginnings of the independent political life, if they will accept loyally and as their own the policy of the Government, and if they come to realise that the system really opens to them a fairer field for the exercise of administrative tact and directive energy than the more autocratic system which it supersedes, then it may be hoped that the period of failures will be short, and that real and substantial progress will very soon become manifest.

The same ideas have been repeated in subsequent Resolutions, the most recent of them of May 1918, which presents the current policy thus:

. . . the object of local self-government is to train the people in the management of their own local affairs and that political education of this sort must, in the main, take precedence of considerations of departmental efficiency. It follows from this that local bodies should be as representative as possible of the people whose affairs they are called on to administer, that their authority in the matters entrusted to them should be real and not nominal, and that they should not be subjected to unnecessary control, but should learn by making mistakes and profiting by them. The present policy, therefore, must be one of the gradual removal of unnecessary government control and of differentiating the spheres of action appropriate for Government and for local bodies respectively.

In this connection we may note the first proposition of the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, that there should be as far as possible complete popular control in local bodies, and the largest possible independence for them of outside control. This proposition must be read with its argument (Section 188 of the Report), which runs thus:

There are obviously three levels at which it is possible to give responsibility in Government: in the sphere of local bodies, in the provinces, and in the Government of India. Since one man cannot serve two masters, in proportion as control by an

electorate is admitted at each level, control by superior authority must be simultaneously relaxed. The process cannot go on at one and the same pace on all levels. The Secretary of State's relaxation of control over the Government of India will be retarded, if for no other reason, by the paramount need for securing imperial interests; the Government of India have the fundamental duty to discharge of maintaining India's defence; the basic obligation of provincial Governments is to secure law and order. As we go upwards the importance of the retarding factors increases; and it follows that popular growth must be more rapid and extensive in the lower levels than in the higher. The functions of Government can thus be arranged in an ascending scale of urgency, ranging from those which concern the comfort and well-being of the individual to those which secure the existence of the state.

It is interesting to note that in the meantime the village *panchayat* was left by the Government of India to provincial governments with a number of general recommendations, the spirit of which shows how far western has superseded the indigenous organisation. The Decentralisation Commission recommended that the village *panchayats* should receive certain definite powers, but that these powers should be cautiously conferred. They agreed that the varieties of local organisation should be preserved, but that the extension of powers should follow the proved ability of the village to bear the powers. The *panchayats*, they recommended, should be placed under the district authorities, and the members should be informally selected, with the headman president *ex officio*. They should have certain powers both in civil and criminal petty cases, with considerable revisional powers given to the higher courts. The *panchayat* was to look after local sanitation and elementary education, but it was not to have taxing powers, as these would make it unpopular. Its revenue was to be derived from part of the land cess, grants from higher authorities, and various fees.

The Government of India, in their 1918 Resolution, modified these recommendations in the direction of introducing the representative system, in giving voluntary

powers of taxation to *panchayats*, and in other minor matters. The whole modern history of the village community shows how far it has either been modified or superseded by the exotic ideas of western organisation in local government.

The importance of the village community as a basis for national fusion has been pointed out by more than one writer. Risley, for example, considered that the orderly development of the indigenous germs of self-governing institutions should be the aim of Indian nationalists. Only by the development of self-governing institutions can the Indian get the common experience necessary to mould the somewhat vague Indian personality into national character.

> National apprenticeship [as Risley says] must be based upon facts, not fancies, and must extend to the masses of the people. A mere top-dressing of idealism will not make a nationality, and [continues the same writer] the people must be drawn together by the common interests which would be created by a genuine form of popular self-government. This should be built from the bottom as the basis of two indigenous institutions—the village community and the village council—the common property of the Aryan people both in Europe and in India.

Reconstruction on these lines in Risley's opinion offers the best prospect of realising the national idea, and of controlling the separatist tendencies of caste.

The Indian system offers a very pointed contrast to local self-government in England. In England, after the middle of last century local bodies sprang up with great rapidity—sanitary boards, school boards, charity boards, road boards, &c. These boards, till the institution of the Local Government Board in 1871, were subject to no central control. At the same time the municipalities were widening their powers and strengthening their positions, so that by the time bureaucratic control tried to make itself felt England was honeycombed by innumerable local authorities. Owing to the overlapping of areas or functions, the result was frequently ludicrous. In Britain the national conscience organised self-government for itself. The Govern-

ment came last, not first in the process. In India the Government has led all the way along. It has organised local bodies, and, one might say, almost pleaded with the people to rule themselves. The contrast is indeed great, for, as Professor Ramsay Muir points out in his recent 'National Self-Government'—

> It is profoundly characteristic of Britain, and an evidence of the strength of the self-governing spirit by which the whole community was permeated, that the organisation of the British society for common purposes proceeded not from the top downwards but from the bottom upwards.

This points a moral. In India the self-governing spirit had to be extracted by the central Government. The Government of India has repeatedly declared that local self-government is a training-school for the wider end of national self-government. But as yet we are only at the beginnings of the institutions which it is trusted will ultimately fit the people for completely responsible government. The prospect of an independent legislature in Simla or Delhi is far grander than the efficiency of a *mofussal* district or municipality; but it is to the less showy *mofussal* that we must look for the real success of an independent central legislature. It is easy to make responsible government glow with high-sounding phrases like 'national liberty' or 'independence': it is not so easy to 'turn to' in the pettier politics of the district or division. But it is in the district and division that the common interests of citizenship can first be recognised, that the elementary lessons of national self-government can be learnt. It is useless to speak of a free country where there is not the spirit of freedom. Freedom cannot be secured by organisation alone. A free people is not necessarily a people subject to no foreign domination or a people in the enjoyment of a parliamentary or responsible form of government. That the citizens of a country where foreign domination is absent may not be free is shown by Germany, and that mere responsibility in government is not the only index of freedom

is shown by the United States, where there is much freedom but a non-parliamentary form of government. Freedom depends on the spirit of a people, and if the nineteenth century teaches us that self-government goes hand in hand with nationality, it is also true to say that where self-government is either impossible or only in the experimental stage, that nationality is not fully developed.

That local self-government in itself is not the mainspring of nationality is proved by France, with its centralised system. In India devolution has been adopted consciously as a means of political education. Among the many antagonistic elements in India the erection of a system of self-government on what has proved a permanent entity in Indian social life—even though that entity itself has been modified in the process—seems to offer the safest solution to the problem of responsibility in central government. Among the many liberal institutions that have come to India from Britain, perhaps none better shows the good faith of English liberalism in government than this conscious creation of a political instrument which is meant ultimately to supersede its creator.

The development of local self-government is thus of supreme importance in Indian nationality. Lacking in the standard elements of nationality, Indian nationality must depend mainly on the development of a civic sense among the people. The mere existence of a system of rights involving equality before the law, it is true, will go far towards developing a consciousness of unity. To the average citizen such a system of rights is more passive than active, for it is the exception and not the rule for citizens to go to law. The active co-operation of the individual citizen in the work of the community is much more important. By using his vote, by being elected to a local body, however small, by making laws, however circumscribed, the individual feels not only personal responsibility but national responsibility. He feels he has a stake in his country, and that he is an active agent in making the destiny of his country. At the same time he must

recognise that the same truth applies to his fellow citizens who vote or who are elected to local bodies. Whether they are Hindu, Moslem, Buddhist, Christian or Brahman, they are all citizens working for a common purpose. The purpose may indeed be local, but the individual will recognise that similar purposes are to be served by the Provincial Assembly or the Central Assembly. Explicity or implicity the general good of the community, the good of India as a whole in this way comes to exclude sectarian or caste narrowness.

Nor, again, can the people be unaffected by the very liberalism which has given them self-government. This in time must have its effect on the intolerance bred of religious animosity and caste prejudice. Differences in faith or social status will not debar individuals from agreement on matters of public policy, and gradually it must dawn on the people as a whole that their life has a public as well as a private side. Privately they may worship as they choose or think as they choose: publicly they must preserve the general system which guarantees their private rights. Above all with their constitutional limitations in power, the local legislators and citizens generally will be taught their proper place in a wider whole. They will be taught to reason why they should have this power and not that power, and by the use of the simple word *why*—the watchword of progress—they will gradually understand their place in a province, a country and an empire.

To local self-government, therefore, we must turn for the extraction from the Indian of the spirit which will conquer particularism and give the victory to the general good of India. That the process will be a long one no one can deny. The civic spirit which is essential for nationality can scarcely be expected to develop in one or two generations when behind it are centuries of family, caste, faction and religious politics. It will moreover only grow where the medium of growth is favourable, and such a medium needs the presence of a moderating power. At present the

moderating power is the Government of India, which is mainly British in composition. As time goes on the British character of the government will diminish as the virtue of the Indians in government increases, until ultimately the British connection as a determinant in the ruling power will disappear.

CHAPTER VIII

CRITICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE

HITHERTO I have given many premisses and a few conclusions. I now proceed to gather my various strings together. The conclusions reached have roughly been these. Indian nationality at present is in the making. It does not possess the standard bases of existing nationalities. Race, language, religion, common history and common culture are either absent as unities of nationality, or they provide elements of disunion which other elements must supersede. In general it is true that what we have called the natural elements of nationality tend, with the advance of enlightenment, to be superseded by the spiritual elements. In India therefore the future of nationality seems to lie with the 'unities' of common sentiment resting on common rights and common organisation.

One unity India undoubtedly does possess—geographical unity. Few countries in the world have so clearly defined boundaries. On the north, north-east and north-west are ranges of mountains which cut off India distinctly from the rest of Asia. Though, particularly in the north-west, these mountains have not proved barriers to invasion, they do mark off clearly the territory whose name is India. Provided with a sea boundary on the east, south and west, India is geographically self-contained. But geographical unity at its best is but a poor bond of nationality. In Great Britain, the Iberian Peninsula, and in Italy geography and nationality tally, but in the United States, France, Germany and Russia geography is no determinant at all.

Still, with other things, geography helps to weld a people together, and in India the nationalist may only be too glad to seize what elements of unity the country does possess.

Sir Herbert Risley points out another element of nationality not unconnected with geography. The fact that India is self-contained geographically and that it is fairly uniform in climate has produced an Indian personality—'an Indian character, a general Indian personality which we cannot resolve into its component elements.' It is true that from Madras to Kashmir and from Bombay to Calcutta there is a sameness of manners, customs and mental outlook, but it is questionable if the similarity is more than that, say, between an Italian and a Spaniard. Certainly there are marked differences in character, as between the Sikh and Bengali, or the Punjabi Mohammedan and Tamil. Still we may say with Mr. Yusuf Ali, whom Risley quotes, that there is a certain underlying uniformity of life from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin.

It has recently been pointed out by Babu Radha Kumud Mookerji, in his Essay entitled 'The Fundamental Unity of India,' that India was recognised as a geographical unit and as a motherland long before the advent of the British *Raj*. Its history as a unit goes to remote antiquity: the writer gives considerable evidence to prove his point. But his whole treatise is compiled from the Hindu point of view, and his concluding sections, on the future contribution of Indian nationality to the sum total of the world's good, are vitiated by the fact that he overlooks the present political composition of India.

These two unities have been in existence as long as India herself has existed, but they have proved of small avail in making Indians either a nationality or nation. Difference of race, difference of religion, the irruption of conquering invaders, the existence of many languages making intercommunication difficult, the very size of the country itself, all these causes have neutralised the effects of geographical or personal unity.

The fact remains that Indian nationality is—or will

be when completed—a product of British rule. How British rule has brought nationality into being I have already shown. By providing the twofold means of communication in railways, steamboats, the telegraph and cable, and in a common language it has given India a oneness she never before possessed. By establishing a uniform system of law and fostering indigenous institutions it has given the Indians individually and collectively, of whatever religious or social status, a ground for self-respect individually and nationally. By introducing self-government both locally and centrally, it has given to India a near approach to political, if not to legal, sovereignty. By being in India at all Britain has whetted the national desire for national autonomy, a desire which unfortunately has been marked by many untoward incidents and much ill-feeling. She has laid down the principles of western administration, which, however superficial they may be now, will become real as the people appreciate their virtue. It can hardly be expected that purity in public life can grow all of a sudden in a country where intrigue and corruption prevailed for centuries from the court down to the meanest public servant. Democracy, unfortunately, has not proved itself free from similar evils in the West, and it is one of the graver problems of future statesmanship whether a natural predisposition in the East should not be circumscribed by law before it is able to poison the public life of the future.

The supreme contribution of Britain is that she has laid the true basis of an Indian state, in common interests, common rights and a common ideal. The intensity of nationality will grow as the people of India are able to appreciate their common rights. Rights arise from common purposes mutually recognised, but as yet these common purposes have been mainly confined to the family, the caste or the religion. The widening of the mental horizon which will connect these purposes with the state will depend on the growth of enlightenment and the character of the state itself. The state is organised in government, and, irrespective of its

personnel, that organisation must continue to serve the people of India. I have given instances of how the state or political aspect of life has already superseded social or religious differences. With the fuller appreciation of their civil rights by the people as a whole, the tendency already started may be expected to continue and be intensified.

Thus the cement of the Indian whole is a product of the British connection. The antagonisms of race, language, religion and social class are set off by a common government, equality before the law, a recognised system of rights, and organisations, both local and central, which help to bring before and keep before the people the common interests on which the state and government rest. Though the organised system of rights is frequently interpreted as a lack of rights, this is only an index of the existence of the rights. No law is perfect and no right absolute. The state is founded on the common recognition of rights, and if individuals protest against the laws which embody the rights, it only shows that they want a readjustment of the rights which the state exists to maintain. Foreign domination—or rather, the idea of foreign domination—is acceptable to no people, and in appraising the exaggerations of the press or platform and the hostility of the educated classes generally, we must put ourselves in their places and look at India from their point of view. The enjoyment of a far more perfect system of rights than India herself could have given is, as often as not, clouded by the shadow of a foreign government, but the fact remains that the rights exist, and under the proper conditions will continue to exist.

The political consolidation of the last half-century has been accompanied by marked activity in other directions, notably in commerce. As in matters of government, nationalism has been prominent in commerce, particularly in the historic *swadeshi* movement. I have had occasion before to note the vital importance of commerce in the future of India. If India is to be on a level with the self-governing British Dominions, and far more so if she is to

be independent, she must pay the price of either self-government or independence. That price is commercial and industrial efficiency. However far removed it may be from the pacific ideal of a large section of Indians, the ideal of efficiency must be followed, for among nations the race is to the swift and the battle to the strong. Either a strong alien arm or a League of Nations will be necessary to guarantee independence from interference in India if industrial and commercial efficiency is not followed. No amount of other-worldliness or spirituality or passive resistance or passive quietism will keep the modern commercial wolf from the door, not to speak of the possible imperial wolves of the future, if there is prey to be secured.

In this respect again Britain has come to the aid of India with capital—financial, mental and physical. Apart from private enterprise government has exercised every kind of ingenuity to develop Indian agriculture and industries. The most recent earnest of Government's intentions is the Holland Industrial Commission. Although the *swadeshi* flare burned down quickly, it taught a useful lesson—that modern business requires business training and business qualities. It is an impossible task to keep patriotic fires burning by feeding them with bad material, even though it is locally made. The fire may be big while it lasts, but it soon dies away if not properly stoked. The *swadeshi* failure showed that Indian capital is available and could be profitably used if properly managed. The lesson which Japan learnt has come home to India—that it pays to learn. The great Tata works are an excellent example of successful industrial work on the Japanese model.

As in government, so in business, real *swaraj* or *swadeshi-ism* does not imply that India is to employ no one born outside India. If Indians have not yet learnt to manage certain types of industries, they must pay to learn, and it will pay them to learn. Japan has profited by such procedure. Why should not Indians? It is no disgrace for a company with Indian capital to employ, say, English,

American or French engineers. The chauvinistic tendency of nationalism in commerce overreached itself, but while doing much harm it taught a useful, if dearly bought, lesson.

The great difficulty to be encountered in industry is the lack of the joint-stock principle. For joint-stock organisation the mainspring is mutual confidence. Such mutual confidence is notoriously lacking in India, and its development will depend on the qualities that are necessary for the growth of civic feeling—education and the recognition of common ends.

For the efficiency of the government services much will depend on public opinion. Mr. Bevan lays particular emphasis on this in his 'Nationalism,' where he points out that the reason of the uprightness of the average Englishman in India is that he is responsible to a definite public opinion. In the West it is needless to point out how the bar of public opinion judges the uprightness of public servants. In India such a public opinion is not yet evident. Were it evident anywhere it would be in the press, but in the peculiar circumstances of India the press is more an agent for English public opinion than for Indian. The British, not the Indian public servant is the defendant in the dock of the Indian press. With changing conditions of government, this, it is hoped, will change to a demand for purity in *all* public services.

The exact form of government which Indian nationalists demand cannot be determined with certainty. Sir Henry Cotton, as President of the National Congress at Bombay in 1914, pictured India divided up into separate states.

> The ideal of an Indian patriot [he said] is the establishment of a federation of free and separate states, the United States of India, placed on a fraternal footing with the self-governing Colonies, each with its own local autonomy, cemented together under the ægis of Great Britain.

Sir Henry Cotton's terminology is very inexact, but he presumably means that the India of the future is to be a

federal union under Great Britain. Sir Ibrahim Rahimtullah, in his presidential address at the meeting, in 1913, of the Moslem League expressed his idea of India's future thus:

> I am one of those dreamers who firmly believe that, given a sufficiently long spell of British rule in India, we are bound to become united as a nation in the real sense of the term. When that time arrives, as it is sure to do, we shall have qualified to rule the country ourselves and self-government will be absolutely assured to us. . . . No country such as India is, can for ever remain under foreign rule, however beneficent that rule may be, and though British rule is undoubtedly based on beneficence and righteousness, it cannot last for ever. . . . India must in the end be handed over to us by our guardians. I regard the connexion of England with India in the nature of guardianship over minor children.

Sir Ibrahim thus considers that when India has reached her majority she will be able to stand alone. This, however, is not the usual attitude of Indian politicians. The most usual demand is autonomy within the British Empire. There are of course several who demand absolute autonomy or complete severance of the British tie, just as there are 'absolute' nationalists in the self-governing Dominions. The preponderating weight of moderate and even of extreme Indian political thought favours the Imperial connection, the difference between moderates and extremists lying in their attitude towards the length of the period of tutelage. The word 'tutelage' scarcely represents either moderate or extremist opinion. What the Moderates think is that for the preservation of the Indian balance of power the British *Raj* is necessary for a considerable period. With the rapid spread of higher education and the admission of many Indians to the chief posts in Government the idea of tutelage is very naturally resented. Obviously no people can be expected to live an indefinite minority or learn interminable lessons without loss to their self-respect. The value of British justice, and the power of Britain as the holder of the balances, are,

at least to the average Indian educated mind, independent of mere political pedagogy.

To many Indians the present government is detestable because of the idea that India was gained by conquest. To be conquered, and to be told that you were conquered is not pleasant, but the idea of force in the British *Raj* is somewhat different from what is usually supposed. The proverb that empires live by the method they were won is amply disproved by the British *Raj* in India. The British conquered India, as we have seen, in various ways, but they have kept India not by brute, but by moral force. Viscount Bryce makes some amazing statements in this connection. The English in India he says are primarily soldiers.

> True it is [he says] that they went to India three centuries ago as traders. . . . The covenanted civil service, to which Clive, for instance, belonged, began as a body of commercial clerks. Nothing sounds more pacific. But the men of the sword very soon began to eclipse the men of the quill and account book. Being in the majority they do so still, although for forty years there have been none but petty frontier wars.

Society in India, he goes on, is military society, military first and foremost, though with an infusion of civilian officials, and in some towns with a small infusion of lawyers and merchants, as well as a still smaller infusion of missionaries. 'The traveller from peaceful England feels himself surrounded,' he concludes, 'except perhaps in Bombay, by an atmosphere of gunpowder all the time he stays in India.'

Lord Bryce's experience may have been unfortunate. Certainly his remarks no more apply to India now than they would do to Canada or Australia. If the position of Britain in India depended on gunpowder, then it is inconceivable that Britain would leave her fate in the hands of a meagre 75,000 English troops amid a population of 350 millions. The position of England in India depends on moral force, not brute force, and this moral force became

supreme through the peculiar circumstances of India. Lord Bryce himself in comparing Rome and Britain declares that both triumphed by force of character. Just as the strenuous and indomitable will of Rome overbore all difficulties in the way of Empire, so the resistless energy of the British carried them through.

> The English [he says] have impressed the imagination of the people by their resistless and their almost uniform success. Their domination seems to have about it an element of the supernatural, for the masses of India are still in that mental condition which looks to the supernatural for an explanation of whatever astonishes it. The British Raj fills them with a sense of awe and mystery.

Later, in the same Essay, he declares that the career of England in India has proved three things: first, that it is possible for a European people to rule a subject race on principles of strict justice, restraining the natural propensity of the stronger to abuse its power; second, that a relatively small body of European civilians, supported by a relatively small military force, can maintain peace and order in an immense population standing on a lower plane of civilisation and itself divided by religious animosities bitter enough to cause the outbreak of intestine wars were the restraint withdrawn; and third, that the existence of the system is compatible with an absolute separation between the rulers and ruled.

But this is quite different from the theory that brute force is the deciding factor in the British *Raj* in India.

That the force of Britain can only be legitimately used for the good of India is now an accepted theorem of British India politics. The position may be expressed in the technical language of Political Science in this way: that the political sovereignty of India tends more and more to be placed in India, while the legal sovereignty rests with the King-in-Parliament or the British legislature. Before proceeding to prove this, let me first explain the technicalities involved.

Every state is sovereign or all-powerful, both in internal matters and external matters. This sovereignty of the state may be looked at from two angles—one the legal, the other the political. The legal sovereign in a state is the person or body of persons to which in the last resort the law of the land ascribes supreme power. Thus in the British constitution the King, House of Lords and House of Commons, or the King-in-Parliament, comprise the legal sovereign. To the King-in-Parliament the law of the land ascribes final law-making authority. It is all-powerful so far as the law is concerned; as one well-known constitutionalist put it, the King-in-Parliament can do everything save make a man a woman or a woman a man; and legally, one may add, the King-in-Parliament could even do that. Behind the legal sovereign lies the political sovereign, or the sum total of influences in a state which mould law-making. The political sovereign is expressed by voting, by the press and platform. In Great Britain the law-making sovereign could legally compel every citizen to cut off his nose, but the power behind the law-making sovereign prevents it from passing any such law. The political sovereign is thus the force of national minds and as such controls the law-making bodies.

Applying these conceptions to the Empire, we find that in the self-governing Dominions the legal sovereign is the King-in-Parliament. The legislatures of all the Dominions are subordinate law-making bodies, but for the normal, everyday regulation of the lives of their citizens these bodies are practically supreme. Their legal sovereign, the British King-in-Parliament, delegated powers to them in such a way that they should make laws to suit themselves. In other words, they gave them constitutions which, while preserving the legal sovereignty of the King-in-Parliament, gave the local political sovereignty its own outlet.

The gradual liberalising of Indian political institutions has led to the gradual transference of political sovereignty to India. The legal sovereign of India is the King-in-Parliament, and for many years the political sovereignty

of India was located more in England than in India. A similar development characterised early British colonial policy. An English-elected House of Commons could legislate for the American settlements. The perfectly legitimate demand of the English-Americans for representation did not appeal to the contemporary English constitutionalists, but the American cause was stronger than English conservatism. The Declaration of Independence was the biggest lesson in liberalism England ever received, and, after a few years' petty spitefulness, she meted out liberal ideas and institutions with a very free hand. To preserve her Empire she kept in Westminster a nominal imperial sovereignty, but the actual exercise of power she transferred to the people on the spot: Canada, Australasia, South Africa all received constitutions which reserved for the King-in-Parliament legal sovereignty while giving political sovereignty to the people concerned. An exactly similar development has taken place in India. I have tried to point out how the liberalisation of India is really due to the liberal ideas of England. Ideas and institutions as yet unknown in India were given to India because the British ideas of politics demanded it. The political sovereignty of India in England thus gave the basis for the transference of political sovereignty to India.

More and more as time goes on the control of Parliament over India weakens. As in the case of the self-governing Dominions, Parliament is the legal sovereign of India, but is evidently eager to transfer the real power or political sovereignty to an Indian legislature, behind which is the Indian people.

I do not imply, of course, that the process is complete. It is going on, and the proposed new form of government is one of the chief signposts on the way. This has an important bearing on another question—the relation of the European officials to the Indian peoples. Being a servant of Government, I naturally write with some reticence on this very delicate subject, but to me certain conclusions seem obvious. In the first place, from a survey of the recent

history of the Government services in India it seems reasonably clear that the only position which the European Government servant of the future can occupy is that of a servant of the political sovereignty of India. To my mind this has been the case for many years, but the relation of master to subject which prevails in the average Indian mind has overshadowed the real function of the Government servant. In India the European is not a master, but a servant or agent of the Government of India, and as the Government of India exists to further Indian, not British interests, it follows that the European like the Indian Government servant is a servant of India, not of England. In cases it may be that individual officials rouse the ire of their fellow-subjects by high-handed or arrogant behaviour, but the fact remains that their true function is the service of India. There is little difference in this respect—save in the service system, to which Indians are admitted on equal terms with Europeans—between the position of the foreign servant in Japan and the British servant in India. Japan hires foreigners to do specific types of work for which Japan herself cannot provide. The Government of India hires men to do what the Indians cannot—or could not—do. How far the original idea of European government servants has outlived its usefulness is a matter I shall not discuss.

It may be noted that the new form of government proposed by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report will not materially alter the position of the Government servant. Under the present regime his functions are the very opposite of what is often ascribed to him—the function of oppressing Indians and of strangling Indian nationality. Up to the present his responsibility has been to a government imbued with the liberal ideas of the day as applied to India, and to his own conception of his duties. The only question for India, as well as for him, is whether the responsibility of an executive to a legislature will make him work against what he considers a better informed public opinion or his own better judgment. The onus of the new responsibility

from the point of view of India's good is thus not on the Government servant or the executive, but upon the legislature and ultimately on the people who elect the legislature, from all of which I might read morals on our educational system and its future. But I desist.

In all governments the chief object is to harmonise legal and political sovereignty. The same is true of India. In the future adjustment of political power and government organisation there are many difficulties. One of the chief of these is the continuance of the British, and therefore Imperial, connection. The moderate opinion of India looks upon the future of India as integrally connected with Britain. With the elimination of the British element in the public services in India it may be doubted if such a connection can be a real one. For a considerable time, of course, the connection must be real. It will be real until the decennial Commissions recommended by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report declare that complete responsibility be given to India in all matters. The British connection after the completion of the process of responsibility must depend on either one or both of (*a*) constitutional connection, (*b*) historic connection.

The constitutional connection of India with Britain must be on similar grounds as such connection with Britain and the present self-governing Dominions. At present in both these and in India the legal sovereign, the King-in-Parliament, maintains a common and integral connection. But legal sovereignty tends to became nominal, and some definite organisation of Empire must take its place. The war has seen definite approaches to such organisation in the presence of General Smuts in the War Cabinet, the constant consultation carried on between the British and Colonial Governments, the representation in the Imperial Parliament, in both Upper and Lower Houses, of the Colonies by such men as the late Sir George Reid (in the House of Commons), and Sir John Forrest and Sir Max Aitken, who were both raised to the peerage. India has had Indian representatives in the Commons, and now has an Indian

peer in the House of Lords and the Ministry. The constitutional organisation of Imperialism, however, is a matter not for India only but for all the Dominions. All I need say is that recent events show the sincerity of the British Government in representing India in questions of Imperial importance. Whether there is to be a scheme of Imperial federation, or whether there are to be permanent ministries in London to represent the Dependencies is a question beyond my present inquiry.

What is evident is that with the growing part taken in administration and policy by the Indians themselves, the British nature of the Government of India will necessarily decline. Such indeed is the inevitable result of the grant of responsibility. The responsibility to be given is responsibility to India, not to England, and as the responsibility develops the Englishman in India will become not a ruler but—if indeed he is necessary at all—a manager or administrative agent, an executor of the law, not a maker of laws. According to the recent Report, before complete responsibility is given to India the Government of India must prove its fitness as a ruler and as a moderating power, whatever the racial nature of the personnel of Government. Such proof must necessarily presuppose the clear appreciation on the part of Indians of the good of India, as distinct from the good of any part, sect or class of India.

All thinking Indians recognise, even amid the strife and turmoil surrounding a so-called alien domination, that withdrawal from the Empire would be disastrous for India unless either India were fit to compete politically and commercially with other nations, or the League of Nations were a reality. To break the Imperial connection would mean no British army and no navy, and unless her position were guaranteed by a League of other nations it is too much to expect that a country with the potentialities of India would go unmolested by the more enterprising nations of the world. Thus the continuance of the Imperial connection, were it for no higher motives than self-interest, is essential for India, but any real Imperial connection must

depend on higher motives. In spite of anarchism and such documents as the Rowlatt Report, one cannot but think that India will be actuated by higher motives imperially than the mere desire to secure the services of the army and navy of a power on which many Indians heaped contumely and hate. The lesson of the recent war points in another and more hopeful direction. When the present sores are healed, or to use Mr. Bevan's figure, when the iron frame is relaxed from the Indian body, it is inconceivable that a spirit of rancour should prevail either among Indians or among Englishmen. The future of a united India, for one thing, seems to demand the English language, and language has always proved a strong bond of unity. Nor, again, can there be absent from the Indian mind the idea of *guru* and pupil. The diatribes of the platform, too, are apt to forget the friendly relations of individuals of the two communities. One certainly does not like to think that either traditional friendship or gratitude should not be at least some bond in a future British Indian Empire.

The future of India, then, must lie with the Indians. The Roman parallel fails us in our future reconstruction of India, for obvious reasons. In the Roman Empire actual fusion of the peoples was possible. In India the dissimilarity between India and England is so great as to make fusion impossible. In the first place the Roman Empire offered no difficulties of climate. The Roman who went to the provinces was able to live there permanently without detriment to his health and vigour. Secondly, the Roman Empire did not know the 'colour-bar.' Thirdly, intermarriage was possible between practically all Roman subjects. In India, particularly among the Hindus, the ordinary social intercourse of the West is forbidden by the existence of caste. The social mingling which is the basis of good fellowship has taken place only among those whose caste scruples have departed, and in such cases the ordinary amenities of social life are conducted on a basis of complete equality.

Nor does history other than Roman provide a parallel from which we may learn. The Spanish dominion in South America did not present to the rulers the same problems as does India to Britain. In Spanish America the Spaniards planted themselves among races much their inferiors in civilisation, and ultimately founded Spanish dominions which became in time independent Republics with Spanish their official language. The Spaniards never set out to elevate the indigenous peoples. They kept the natives in a position akin to slavery. In India the people have never been enslaved: they have been systematically raised in status on the theory that in time they might rule themselves. This, though it has only recently been made an official policy, is the policy on which, implicitly, India has been governed since the Crown took the Government over from the Company. The reading of Indian history admits of no other interpretation. Though it has taken over half a century to make the idea explicit, the purpose of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report has been obvious during practically the whole of the nineteenth century.

The implication of what I have just said—that the British connection exists to provide the conditions of Indian national development—raises the vexed question of Time. The great majority of Indian opinion favours the gradual realisation of responsibility in government, but the date for the handing over of the reins of government has been fixed by some for some time within the next ten years. The time limit depends upon the rapidity of national development and the virtue of Indian governmental institutions. It would be criminal for a power like Britain to half train the people and then leave them to the chances of an internal anarchy—chances which are very great. The management—'management' seems a more apt word than 'rule'—of a neutral power seems to be necessary as long as the constructive agents of nationality have not placed the destructive elements in the background. How long that will take the wisest man cannot tell, but in a country where not ten per cent. of the people can read and write

it is obvious that ten years will scarcely suffice. Nor will reading and writing make nationality or produce national stability. There must be the realisation—it will be gradual—of the common interests inherent in citizens of the motherland. Patriotism nobly enough seeks the good of the *patrie*, but the Indian *patrie* up to now is realised as such by the minority who can appreciate the ideals of a *patrie*. Till enlightenment is general it is nonsensical to expect the calls of the *patrie* to appeal alike to the Khasis, Mundas, Madras Pariahs, the Sikhs, Newars, Pathans, and Bengali *bhadralog*. Unity even from the most obvious source—patriotism—will require to be instructed unity.

It may be said, further, that, with organisation in legal systems, the existence of separate customs and laws for the various communities in India in itself does not endanger national unity any more than do separate ecclesiastical laws for Anglicans, Nonconformists or Roman Catholics interfere with the unity of Great Britain. A more pointed parallel is the case of England and Scotland, which, though each has its own nationality, are united in the supernationality of Great Britain. With the union of Parliaments neither England nor Scotland gave up either its laws or its judicial organisation. Since the union, it is true, laws made in Westminster have applied equally to England and Scotland, save in specific instances such as education. The chief difficulty of nationality is not the organisation of separate legal systems, but the differences ending within the communities themselves. Here again Rome offers an interesting parallel. In Rome the subject peoples were largely united before they became part of the Roman Empire. In the East, for example, the Greek language and culture had joined peoples of various antecedents into a fairly homogeneous whole; Rome found a unity existing where Britain found diversity. The task of Rome in imperial unification was thus incomparably easier than the task of Britain in India.

Then, again, there are the many questions of actual organisation, the chief danger underlying which is, as Risley

says, the 'impatient idealism which insists upon beginning at the wrong end.' The extraordinarily rapid advance of democratic ideas in India, as well as the persistency of the Indian educated class in voicing these ideas, has tended to obscure the instability of actual democratic institutions. Democracy, of course, is not old in the West, but in the West its advance has been marked by at least relative security in its foundations. In India we are, in actual fact, only starting to lay foundations, while in ideas we are as advanced as the most advanced Radical in the West. Concurrently with the introduction of executive responsibility in Government, we have not yet been able sufficiently to test the virility of local self-government. We are in fact experimenting with the self-governing spirit without any clear ideas of where the experiments may lead us. Nor any more is it clear to see whither democracy is leading in the West. But, for good or ill, we are to introduce into India an instrument of government which, while giving more universal satisfaction than either autocracy or the rule of the middle classes, is by no means perfect even in its own native heath.

The future is dark, but the past points to dangers ahead, dangers which may be avoided by foreseeing statesmanship. The traditional British methods of accidental constitution-making are extremely dangerous in India. In a country where national bonds are sound and the popular temperament phlegmatic, there has been little danger in meeting crises as they arose. The very laws which guard the liberty of Britons, such as the Habeas Corpus Acts, were as often as not the casual results of temporary crises. But such accidental methods will scarcely apply to an India in the making. Far-seeing policy is necessary, not adventitious or time-serving measures. Many of our modern difficulties in India—as, for instance, in the vexed question of education—are due to the English habit of carrying on somehow, *efficiently*, perhaps, as a bureaucracy, but not *effectively*, as a government, for the good of the people.

And there are the dangers which I have already mentioned. There is the danger of chauvinistic nationalism in separate communities, a far more dangerous thing than chauvinism in India as a whole. There is the danger that surrounds the rights that have been established and the peace and order that do exist. There are the dangers of fanaticism, of caste divisions in Indian democracy, the danger that the higher castes may oppress the lower, and that oligarchy may have to give way to ochlocracy. There is the danger of faction, for the ecstatic antagonism to the government, characteristic of certain speakers and papers, does not promise well for that attitude when translated into the more prosaic domain of India party politics. There are the difficulties, too, of the organisation of the public services, especially the perpetuation of western standards for eastern necessities. Are the services in India so organised that, when the ideal of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report is fulfilled, they will become Indianised without an undue strain on the finances of the country or an undue gap between the emoluments of office and the current standards of life? Is not the whole service system an excellent example of the one-eyed policy which provides for to-day but takes no thought of the morrow?

It is impossible amid these various lessons and analogies to overlook one of the gravest problems of modern democracy—the attitude of organised labour. It is not without significance that the Welsh and Glasgow strikes should synchronise with one of the biggest strikes—the Bombay Mills strike—that India has ever known. Few Indian politicians have envisaged a future *Labour* India. That the Bombay mill-workers can prevail against the mill-owners is an index that organised labour can be powerful in India as well as in Europe. And may it not prove even more effective, for while it is difficult to secure unity among the educated classes, it seems fairly easy for labourers to unite? It would indeed be a remarkable solution to all these pages of facts and theories were the future India to

be so industrialised that race, caste, creed, politics and everything else were swallowed up in trade unions, and unions of trade-unions!

In his recent suggestive lecture on the 'Principle of Nationalities' (the Conway Memorial Lecture) Mr. Israel Zangwill classifies nationalities into Simple, Complex, Compound and Hybrid. Simple nationalities are those which have all the normal unities, such as Iceland, and, approximately, Italy. In Complex nationalities peoples of all races and religions fuse in a kind of political unity. In the Compound type the races forming the unity are isolated spatially and united federally (as in Switzerland), and in Hybrid nationalities the races are neither isolated nor united (as in the old Ottoman Empire). In reality these types tend to shade into each other, the first type being the class to which they try to reach. Mr. Zangwill deduces from this the law that all nationalities not simple are combinations of simple nationality, and into a secondary simple nationality fused from all the primary they all tend to pass. This is 'the law and life process' of nationalities. Nationality being a state of mind corresponding to a political fact, Mr. Zangwill explains the fusion by what he calls the law of contiguous co-operation—the law 'under which casual atoms are unified by mutual magnetism into a congregation, a corps, a team, a party, each with its peculiar group spirit.' The electrifying element is danger. 'Death was the seal of nationality that stamped it as sacred. If men would henceforth die for it, it was because men had died to give it birth. More binding than common blood in the veins is the blood that is shed in common.'

Indian nationality has not been welded by danger, nor by common blood spilt in a common cause. Its fight is with itself, and it is this fight which will shape its spiritual boundaries, and, again in Mr. Zangwill's eloquent phrases, 'In the fight with itself, with the oligarchs who would grind it or the prophets who would raise it . . . it establishes the true realm of its being, a realm for which if it be narrowed no geographical magnitude can compensate.'

Complex nationalities tend to become simple nationalities; simple nationalities in their turn by migration and by conquest tend to become complex; but the final process is towards simplicity. With Mazzini Mr. Zangwill regards the last phase of the national process as the unification of the State's religions and the oneness of Church and State. This is particularly true of Indian fusion, where the greatest antagonism of all is religion. The gradual elevation of the religion which places creeds in the background and the motherland first will produce the unity of Church, State and peoples. And are not there signs in India that the Motherland is greater than Brahman and Sudra, Punjabi and Bengali, Mohammedan and Hindu ?

CHAPTER IX

INDIAN NATIONALITY AND FEDERALISM

ONE question still remains to be touched—the future organisation of the Indian Government. At present the Government of India is organised centrally, though the existence of both provinces and Native States makes it appear like a federal union. The organisation of the Government on the lines of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, in spite of the fact that the Report itself rejects federalism, will make India more like a federal union than any other form of government in existence.

The normal pre-requisites of federalism are practically the same as those for nationality—unity in territory, language, political sympathy, common interests and ideals. Such unity may co-exist with certain local differences, but the differences in all cases must be such as not to endanger the unity. Granted, therefore, a prevailing desire for unity on a given territory, even though that desire may be marked by local varieties of thought, language and organisation, we may expect a federal form of government to be successful.

These normal pre-requisites in a rough way exist in India. Geographically India is a unit; there is a prevailing desire for Indian unity; and there is a common language. But along with these exist many differences. Though the provinces of India are organised primarily for administrative ends, they at the same time roughly coincide with racial or linguistic areas. Bengal, the most composite province of all, has a preponderating population of Bengalis, with 92 per cent. of the population speaking

the Bengali language. The most marked element of difference is religion; there is almost an equal division between Mohammedans and Hindus (to be exact, 52·2 and 45·2 per cent. respectively). This religious cleavage is almost universal in India, but generally speaking in other matters the provincial boundaries mark off distinct types of people and language. In some administrative units the chief factor in fixing boundaries has been administrative convenience, as in the North-West Frontier Province, but even where that has been the chief determinant, there exists as a rule a certain type of national or sub-national character. How strong the sub-national bond may be was seen in the anti-partition agitation in Bengal, where administrative convenience was beaten in a severe fight with nationality.

I have already quoted Sir Henry Cotton's vision of a future United States of India, but his remarks suggest local independent states as much as a federal union. The idea of local independence finds no voice in India itself. 'Bengal for the Bengalis' and similar maxims have been recognised to a certain extent by Government, particularly in Government provincial services, but the Government policy is not anti-Indian. India in this respect may aptly be compared with either Switzerland or Germany, where in perfectly successful federal unions there are distinct local varieties of people and government.

One of the chief benefits of the federal form of government is that it provides a unity where without it there might be independent states. In India at present the government is centralised, with a great deal of provincial devolution. The Decentralisation Commission and the Montagu-Chelmsford Report both insist on the necessity of Provincial devolution, but the latter Report does not recognise such devolution as amounting to federalism. The actual course of devolution has been marked by an appreciation of federal principles, particularly in the creation of provinces, each of which as far as possible contains its own people and its own language.

There is no essential difference in an organisation arising from a *foedus* or agreement and one created by a central government. The best known federal unions of the world comprise both types. The United States, the most perfect example of federalism, arose mainly by the pact process, but Brazil and Mexico are federal unions because a hitherto unitary government made them so. The Brazilian federation resulted from the process of dethroning Dom Pedro and proclaiming a United States of Brazil, a process ratified later by the constituent assembly in 1890. The Mexican constitution was adopted in 1857 on the model of the United States constitution simply as a method of organising Mexico. Even in the United States the modern form of union was completed by force, and the same is true of Germany. The method of creation, whether evolution or devolution, is not the essential point in federalism.

Federalism as an organisation demands:

(*a*) Constitutional powers for the central government and the local governments—such powers being as definite as human language can make them.
(*b*) The supremacy of the constitution.
(*c*) The existence of a judicial power to decide disputes arising anent the constitution.

Obviously where there are to be provincial and central governments each must have its own powers, and the constitution which demarcates those powers must be greater than either of the governments. What is the case in India?

In India up till now we have had a central government whose will (along with that of Whitehall) has given, or withheld, powers to the provincial governments. The centralised authority of the Government of India has been particularly prominent in financial matters, and as financial considerations determine the work of all departments, it is necessary to look into the financial relations of the central and local governments somewhat more closely.

In the early days of British government in India the three Presidencies were practically self-contained. In 1833 the Governor-General was given certain powers over Madras and Bombay, particularly in financial matters. This system, which made the central government supreme in financial affairs, save for small local cesses for roads and such-like, lasted till 1871. Local governments were financed directly from the purse of the Government of India. Even the smallest matters involving expenditure required sanction from the central government. With the growing functions of both governments such a system became ludicrous. The Government of India could interfere in the smallest matters of local concern and question every decision of the authorities on the spot. Naturally there was considerable friction. Not only so, but the provincial government that made most noise got most money. No motive for economy existed when the provinces could spend other people's money.

After many complaints from government secretaries, Lord Mayo took up the question in 1870–1. He settled certain standards of provincial income and allowed the provinces to manage matters for themselves within these limits. The weak point of Lord Mayo's settlement was that he gave little room for expansion to the provinces. This point was taken in hand by Lord Lytton's Finance Minister, Sir John Strachey, who, in the financial settlement of 1877–8, gave provincial governments powers to collect certain heads of revenue as well as to spend them to a given limit. The next steps were taken by Lord Ripon and his Finance Minister, Baring, who afterwards became Lord Cromer. In 1882 the first real advance towards federal finance was made. The Ripon-Baring settlement granted the whole product of some sources of revenue to provincial governments and a share in the product of other heads, including land revenue. Military receipts, customs, opium, salt, postal receipts and tributes were in the main allocated to the central government. Receipts by civil departments and from provincial public

works were mostly given to provincial governments. Where the division between provincial and central was against the provinces (and the divided heads were in equal proportions between the two) the provinces were to recoup themselves from the land revenue. In 1882 both war charges and famine expenditure were allocated as between central and provincial. War charges were to be paid by the central government (save in case of abnormal disaster, when the central government might have to call on the provincial governments to help), and the central government made a promise to take definite action in severe famines, to obviate the necessity of provincial governments keeping reserves for famine years.

During the next twenty years, owing to the fluctuations in provincial budgets caused by the abnormal expenditure of the Afghan wars, no great alteration was made. The Government of India guaranteed a minimum balance for each local government. Till 1904, with its quasi-permanent settlements, there were several departmental revisions of central and provincial expenditure, but the federal principle of Lord Mayo remained. By the quasi-permanent settlements the revenues assigned to a provincial government could not be altered by the Government of India save for Imperial exigencies, or if the limits set should prove unsatisfactory. The results of this settlement gave some of the real essentials of federalism to India. These results, in the main, were :

(*a*) That the Government of India retained in its own hands certain administrative services, the revenue derived from them, and a share of other revenues sufficient to meet their needs ;

(*b*) The remaining administrative services were handed over to the provinces, each provincial government receiving a source of income independent of the needs of the central government ;

(*c*) This income was a definite share of the revenue collected by the local government ; and

(*d*) The same shares of the chief sources of revenue were given to each province to *ensure equality of treatment.*

This last point—equality of treatment—though not an absolute essential of federalism, as is shown by the late German Empire, is a most usual accompaniment of federalism, and is almost necessarily the rule in all federalisms where the *foedus* aspect is prominent. Here in the 1904 Financial Settlement, we have the equality conceded to the provincial governments by the central government.

This settlement was succeeded by the 1912 permanent settlement which, while adjusting other points of secondary importance that had arisen in the meantime, only made the 1904 basis more secure. One of the points that had arisen was the policy of ' doles ' by which the Government of India gave grants from surplus revenue to provincial governments for set purposes. The 1912 settlement continued the system of grants for general purposes, but expressly renounced interference by the central with the local governments in the administration of the grants.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report goes still further. It makes a total separation between central and local heads of revenue, for says the Report (Section 201) :

If provincial autonomy is to mean anything real, clearly the provinces must not be dependent on the Indian Government for the means of provincial development.

And then—

Our idea is that an estimate should first be made of the scale of expenditure required for the upkeep and development of the services which clearly appertain to the Indian sphere ; that resources with which to meet this expenditure should be secured to the Indian government ; and that all other revenues should be handed over to the provincial governments which will thenceforth be held wholly responsible for the development of all provincial services.

This, conjoined to the fact that the provincial budgets are to be matters purely for the provincial legislative councils, gives the essence of federalism, at least so far as a comparison with existing federal financial structures shows.

The whole position now is different from what prevailed in the days of pure executive government. Legislatures have come into existence, so that we have a two-fold organisation common to almost all India—namely, in Delhi, the Governor-General's Executive Council and the Imperial Legislative Council; in the Provinces, the Governor's, Lieutenant-Governor's or Chief Commissioner's Executive Councils (where in existence) and their provincial legislative councils. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report makes these organisations still more definite, and it also gives the demarcation of powers necessary for the future government of India. The constitution of the new governments, as indeed of the present governments, will be written in an India Act of the British Parliament, which Act will be supreme till it is either amended or abolished, just like the Australian or Canadian constitutions.

The federal judiciary may be organised separately or federally as in the United States, or the hitherto existing courts may be used to adjudicate on federal matters, as in Germany.

It seems clear, therefore, that India even now possesses the essentials of federalism. In his evidence before the Decentralisation Commission, the late Sir Herbert Risley said:

> I should like to point out that you have not here the guiding factors which you have in certain other cases of federal government. Where you have a federal government which consists of so many sovereign states, these sovereign states gave up this and that and the other defined functions, and kept everything else. . . . This is not the case in India. The local governments were never sovereign and independent. From 1833 up to the time of the Strachey decentralisations the Government of India had everything in their own hands, and no local govern-

ment could create the smallest appointment without sanction. Since then the Government of India has surrendered many functions, but each surrender requires a separate order, since the residuary authority rests with the Government of India and not with the local government as is the case in most federations.

This shows a misunderstanding of federalism. Existing federal unions show two general types in respect to the division of powers. These types may be called the American (United States) and Canadian. In the United States, when the constitution was drawn up, the individual states were very jealous of the central government and insisted on a strict elimination of its powers, the balance being left to the states. The American type thus gives definite powers to the federal government, with indefinite powers to the individual states. This, hedged in by a constitution which can be amended with the utmost difficulty, has been one of the bugbears of American life. Yet it was widely imitated, even in the recently created Australian Commonwealth.

In the Canadian type the opposite theory prevailed—definite powers were given to the provinces, the balance being left to the federal government. The Canadian type is now generally recognised by constitutionalists as the more effective.

In India, where the centrifugal might conceivably prove stronger than the centripetal forces, it is clearly necessary to give as many powers as possible to the central government. Federalism is a system which tries to reconcile opposites: it tries to provide for as much autonomy in the parts as is possible in a larger whole. The line must be drawn somewhere between local autonomy and central unity, and in doing so the general principle must be observed that purely local interests should be matters for the provincial government, and interests common to the whole matters for the central government. Thus it is clear that in an independent state defence, customs, foreign relations and coinage should be federal subjects, and sanitation,

local self-government, roads and education matters for the provincial governments.

In India, however, the position is exceptional. The Government of India has as one supreme function the unifying of India. It must, therefore, keep in its own hands all those subjects, which, if left to provincial governments, could produce a complexity of organisation or policy which might endanger the unity of India as a whole. In discussing the national unity of language I have already quoted an example. Normally one might expect education to be a provincial subject, but in India the provinces conceivably might institute purely vernacular education in all grades. The Government of India must co-ordinate higher education in such a way that there will be a common medium of communication in India, an obvious political necessity, if it is not also an educational necessity. Local self-government again, though in the main it may be provincial, may require certain co-ordination as to policy in order to create the spirit of national unity.

So far so good. But there is in India a large number of Native States which may not easily fit into a federal union. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, in dealing with them, does picture the future India as a federation, though it refuses to countenance the term 'federation' as applying to British India. Hitherto in these pages I have used the term 'India' in a general sense, applying to the geographical unit so called. Strictly speaking a distinction must be drawn between India and British India, or that part directly under British rule, and the Native States or territories ruled over by Indian princes or chiefs *plus* British India. In speaking of a present or future Indian nationality it is necessary that the Native States be taken into account. As we shall presently see, the movements which have affected British India have to a greater or less extent also affected the Native States, so that what is true of nationality in British India is true of India as a whole.

A few general facts about the Native States must first

be given. In all they extend to some 824,000 square miles, with a population of about sixty to seventy millions. Much of the area covered by them is barren, as in Rajputana and Baluchistan, the position of these states being due to the fact that the rulers were driven by invaders to the less fertile tracts. On the other hand they comprise states like Mysore, Hyderabad and Baroda, which are as rich as any province in British India. There are over 650 states, but in size and importance, from the nineteen square miles of Lawa to the 80,900 and 82,698 square miles respectively of Kashmir and Hyderabad, they vary exceedingly. The Government of India controls 175 of them and about 500 are under provincial governments. The status of each territory may be tested by the particular types of law-courts. In British India the courts of law are established by parliamentary statute, as also are the powers of the respective legislatures. The courts in the Native States exist under the authority of the heads of the State. It may be that courts in Native States may be established by the Governor-General in Council, but these courts, their jurisdiction being part of the powers exercised by the states, are extra-territorial. As Sir William Lee Warner points out (in the 'Imperial Gazetteer'), the existence of such a court 'does not convert suzerainty into dominion.' The Privy Council has sometimes been appealed to to decide whether a particular territory is or is not in British dominion. In particular, it has been questioned whether the Crown possesses territorial dominion or only suzerainty over certain states such as Kathiawar and the Tributary States of Orissa.

Whether or not a so-called Native State is what it professes to be [says the above-mentioned authority] is a question of fact, which in the absence of legal decision must be settled by the present action of the British paramount power. If the persons who reside in the territorial area not being by birth or naturalisation British subjects are treated by the courts of India as foreign subjects it may be concluded that the country to which they belong is a Native State.

The Native States came into being in manifold ways—by partial conquest, by restitution of rights to former rulers after conquest of the existing rulers, by acceptance of the existing rulers to prevent further disorder, and by treaty. The large number of fragmentary States may be explained by the fact that they are most numerous where chaos lasted longest.

Because the Crown took over treaty obligations entered into by the East India Company, the position of the Native States is guaranteed by statute. In the Queen's Proclamation of 1858 their position was established in these words:

> We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native Princes as our own; and we desire that they as well as our own subjects should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.

The policy of British Government towards the Native States has changed from time to time. In the early days of British power the Company had to suit its policy to the necessity of the time. Their policy at first was that of non-intervention. They did not wish to undertake relations in India which might lead to difficulties with France as well as with India. They therefore made treaties with the Native Princes on the basis that these Princes had sovereign powers, and in war and conquest the Company kept under its control only such power as it considered essential for its own security. From 1813, when Lord Hastings become Governor-General, this policy was replaced by that of 'subordinate isolation,' and the establishment of British suzerainty over the whole of India. Lord Hastings, for various reasons, not the least of which were the depredations of the Pindaris, determined to settle the affairs of the Native States and fix their relations with the supreme government. In time this policy was replaced by the modern policy, which is that of union and co-operation with the Government of India.

At present the relations of the Government to the States may be summed up thus:

(*a*) The States by themselves conduct no foreign relations. The Government of India acts for them in their foreign affairs and guarantees them security from external attack. The States on their part are expected to co-operate with the Government of India in repelling attacks.

(*b*) The States have full control over their internal matters. The Government of India may step in if internal peace and order are threatened. On their part, the States are responsible for good government and the welfare of their people.

(*c*) As they are independent, the States must not interfere in matters outside their own jurisdiction. If the Government of India does not interfere in their affairs, they are expected not to interfere in matters within the jurisdiction of that Government.

The independence of the States has not by any means meant isolation from the ordinary currents of Indian life. The very opposite has been the case. In many of them the codes of criminal and civil procedure current in India have been adopted. Famine-relief, agriculture, irrigation, education have been introduced, on the lines accepted in India. Actual administrators often have been lent by the Government of India for the purpose of carrying out the schemes. The railways and telegraphs of British India pass through and serve the States. There is constant co-operation in police matters, as well as in such matters as customs and commercial intelligence, in which the States are as directly concerned as is the Government of India itself. In some of the States there are representative institutions, but practically all the reins of the Executive Government are held firmly by the hand of the ruling Prince himself.

Up to the present there has been no definite organisation

of the States as such. In recent years certain definite steps were taken to organise the princes in some sort of Central Council. Various institutions have been proposed. Lord Lytton proposed an Imperial Privy Council, a proposal which was abortive; Lord Curzon advised a Council of Ruling Princes; and Lord Minto an Advisory or Imperial Council of Ruling Princes. Lord Dufferin's institution of the Imperial Service Troops took more definite shape. Lord Hardinge and the present Viceroy have both summoned conferences of Princes, while the common interests of the war summoned the Maharajah of Bikaner to the War Cabinet and Peace Conference.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report makes suggestions vital to the future of the States. The Report in this respect frankly envisages a future federal India, but it advises caution. It says (Section 300):

> Looking ahead to the future we can picture India to ourselves only as presenting the external semblance of some form of 'federation.' The provinces will ultimately become self-governing units, held together by the central Government, which will deal solely with matters of common concern to all of them. But the matters common to the British provinces are also, to a great extent, those in which the Native States are interested—defence, tariffs, exchange, opium, salt, railways and posts and telegraphs. The gradual concentration of the Government of India upon such matters will, therefore, make it easier for the States, while retaining the autonomy which they cherish in internal matters, to enter into closer association with the central Government if they wish to do so. But though we have no hesitation in forecasting such a development as possible the last thing that we desire is to attempt to force the pace. Influences are at work which need no artificial stimulation. All that we need or can do is to open the door to the natural developments of the future.

The principles of the Report are not immediately of a federal nature; but they are such that the Native States in the future can fit in easily with a common federal organisation. The first vital reform the Report proposes is that all the States be brought together under the Government

of India. At present the Government of India has direct dealings with four large and one small state through the Resident, while about 150 States in Central India Agency, 20 in Rajputana and 2 in Baluchistan are under Agents to the Governor-General. Provincial Governments—Bombay has over 350, Bengal 2, the United Provinces 3, the Punjab 34, Burma 52, Behar and Orissa 26, Assam 16, the Central Provinces 15, and Madras 5—deal with the rest. Clearly if federalism is the future of India these States must be organised on some common basis, and the first step necessary is to give them the same status with regard to the central power. How far this will be the final solution is a very different matter. Whether the States may be retransferred to provincial governments with certain statutory rights when the final federal union is drawn up is a question which rests with future statesmanship.

To make the connection with the Government of India real, the Report recommends the creation of a permanent consultative body, to be called, for want of a better name, a Council of Princes. The main functions of this Council are to be the discussion of matters affecting the States and British India as a whole, and matters of Imperial concern. The Council is to have regular meetings. The Report also recommends a permanent standing Committee of the Council in order to advise the Government of India in matters affecting the States. To decide disputes between States themselves and between States and the Government of India, the Report also recommends Commissions of enquiry to be composed of a High Court judge and one nominee of each party concerned. This is a type of federal judiciary.

To bring the States into line with regard to the central government and to establish a central authority, even though it at first is only a consultative body, are distinct steps towards federalism; but for complete federalisation it is essential to connect the Native States in some integral way with the Indian legislature. This the Report proposes to do by providing means for joint deliberation between

the Council of State and the Council of Princes. The exact method proposed is not given in detail, but the approved federal method of representation in the second chamber is rejected as untimely : in the words of the Report (Section 311) :

> We have abandoned for the present all consideration of suggestions that the Ruling Princes, or some representatives of their order, should be members of the Council of State. Not only would this, at the present stage, infringe the doctrine of non-interference on the part of the Princes in the affairs of British India, but we are satisfied that few, if any, of the Princes themselves are ready for such a step.

The Report mentions that among some of the Princes a certain nervousness about the future effect of the reforms in the States is visible. In a future scheme of federation the States seem to stand exactly as they are. If India is federalised the Government of India, just as now, must conduct foreign relations and matters of general, as distinct from local or provincial, concern. The States, further, must have definite constitutional powers, which in a definite federal union might be clearer than the treaties, or treaties *plus* case-law, that at present exist. Federalism in all probability would strengthen the States by giving them an even more constitutional position than they have now, and the obligations of belonging to a federal government would not mean the sacrifice of any dignities or powers more than now. Just as the dignities of the ruling houses are guaranteed now so they would be in the State constitutions in a federal union.

The late German Empire provides an excellent parallel for the future Indian Empire. The German Empire was welded together out of different states and principalities, some of them very insignificant, but in the process of federalisation somehow or other the Kings, Princes, Grand Dukes, as the case may have been, were pacified, as well as their peoples. The sentiment of nationality, as well as the dangerous persuasiveness of Bismarck, had much

to do with the unity ultimately reached. The process of welding in India need not be marked by any blood-and-iron policy, but it should not be beyond the range of fair and reasonable statesmanship to produce finally in India a federal union which, while allowing historical states their rights and privileges, will not be so honeycombed with states as to make good government impossible.

To conclude, federalism in India, like nationality, seems to be in the making. The proposed organisation of British India is indistinguishable from a normal federalism, even though the process is one of devolution. The future proposed for all-India is confessedly federal; the Montagu-Chelmsford organisations are to be first steps towards the more complete union. The further question of Imperial Federation I need not raise here, for its issues lead far.

Federalism seems to offer the only reasonable organisation of Indian Nationality. With the unity of India there will continue the diversity of provinces. The Central Government more than in any country will have a difficult team to manage. There will be many reins requiring delicate handling, for the team will not pull together till well trained. But so much has been done in the past that we may look with confidence to the future efforts of India's trainer.

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