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

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

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

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

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


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


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

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

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
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


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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

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**The Editors.**

# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 32 JULY 1954 No. 4

## LEADERSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS

*By W. Averell Harriman*

IT HAS now been seven years since the United States embarked upon a positive and active course of world leadership in time of peace with the object of preserving freedom and preventing another world war. The date that took place was March 12, 1947, when President Truman asked Congress to appropriate $400,000,000 for economic and military and advisory aid to Greece and Turkey and proclaimed what became known as the Truman Doctrine, namely that it is the policy of the United States to support free peoples who resist attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. Those who had long and anxiously awaited such an historical turning will never forget the elation of those days in the spring of 1947. To me the decision brought a sense of great relief. As recorded in the "Forrestal Diaries," I had witnessed with growing disquietude the evolution of Soviet policies and attitudes during the war and the period thereafter, and had become convinced that unless the United States used its great influence and resources to strengthen the war-wrecked countries of Europe and Asia, the increasingly plain Soviet plan to extend Communist control over them might well succeed. My misgivings about the future were now considerably alleviated, as the President's decision was quickly buttressed by broad bipartisan support in Congress and throughout the nation.

There was no time to be lost. The Soviet-Communist challenge was immediate, blatant and comprehensive; the free world was disunited and most of its members were extremely weak. The Soviet menace to Iran had been checked in 1946 by United Nations action, but in 1947 and thereafter threats in Greece and Turkey, the mounting Communist tide in Western Europe, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade and the Communist victory in China—these brought home that the

danger was both immediate and continuing. And Communist doctrine and the avowed intentions of Soviet leaders as underlined by Stalin's speech of February 9, 1946, left no doubt that the challenge to freedom and independence would stretch out indefinitely into the future. This was confirmed by the Communist attack in Korea.

One great American initiative followed another: the Marshall Plan, the Point IV Program, the Berlin airlift, the Military Defense Assistance Program, the North Atlantic Alliance and the unified NATO military build-up in Europe, the Pacific Pacts, and the successful resistance in Korea. There was little choice or conflict between short-range and long-range policies, for alliances, military strength and economic power had to be built up at once against both imminent and later dangers. Where there was conflict and choice, short-range considerations invariably prevailed, for a common military, political and economic shield strong enough to discourage immediate military aggression was necessary in order to gain time in which to create defenses against longer-range political, economic and psychological penetration.

In the closing months of 1952 the bell rang on round one of the cold war. As a consequence of the vigorous initiative of the United States, the frightful foreclosure of Communism had been prevented except in Czechoslovakia, where the government had been weak from the start because it contained Communists and lived under the shadow of the Red Army, and in China, where the will and capacity to resist had disintegrated. In Korea, the Communists had been thrown back to their original positions of assault in the north. In Indo-China, the indecisive war of seven years' duration continued without change; its intensification as a consequence of increased aid to the Communist side from China and the Soviet Union was still a year away. Elsewhere in the world, especially in Europe, the free nations had been strengthened, had drawn closer together and had taken a new lease on the future.

At the Communist Party Congress held in Moscow in October 1952, Stalin and Malenkov in effect admitted the failure of their plans to extend still further the frontiers of Soviet dominion by instigating early war with its major opponents and promoting immediate revolution in the West. They announced that the Soviet bloc was now so large, strong and self-sufficient that war was no longer necessary between Communism and capitalism,

that instead the Communist victory could be achieved over a longer period through relaxing immediate pressures in Europe, promoting political and military disunity in the non-Communist world and encouraging economic and social erosion and weakness there, while at the same time developing steadily the monolithic industrial and military strength of the Soviet Union.

International tensions lessened after the Moscow Congress. It was not that the West was disposed to trust the words of the Soviet leaders; the objective situation itself suggested that the Kremlin might be bowing to necessity. The Soviet admissions merely crystallized a feeling which was growing throughout the Western camp at this time that the military defense and political unity of the North Atlantic Alliance, the economic recovery of Europe and the power of the United States Strategic Air Force operating from new bases in Europe and North Africa were approaching a point in strength sufficient to discourage early military aggression or Communist subversion in Europe; and it was hoped that as a result the situation between East and West might be at least temporarily stabilized.

A profound change in world outlook thus occurred during the first half of 1953. Soviet pressures were in fact somewhat reduced, various small gestures were made towards Western opinion, and as a result everywhere in the non-Communist world there was a certain relaxation of apprehensions. This dramatic turning coincided roughly with the advent of new leadership in Washington and Moscow: the first change in political administration in the United States in 20 years, and the appearance of new leadership in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death in early March 1953. For a year and a half now, we have been living in a new phase of postwar affairs.

II

One of the outstanding characteristics of American policy during the last year and a half has been what might be called the short-cut approach, a studied effort to find new-looking and more comfortable ways of carrying our defense burdens. At the risk of exaggeration through brevity of treatment, it is perhaps permissible to mention a few of the short-cuts that have been tried.

The pace of the military build-up has been slowed down notwithstanding the increasing power of Soviet armaments, the repeated warnings of successive United States commanders of

NATO forces in Europe that our defenses there are still inadequate, and the increasing intensity of Communist aggression in Asia. This relaxation in effort seemed unjustified in 1953; the further reductions in our military budget in 1954 seem even more so. The Kremlin has turned on the sweet music of "peaceful coexistence" in Europe, while at the same time pressing forward in Asia. If there is one thing we should have learned about the Soviet Union it is that wherever there is localized weakness—military or social or political—it will be probed and exploited. Weakness anywhere can only be an invitation to further Communist adventures.

Underlying both our current defense policies and our diplomacy has been a preoccupation with the idea of strength through our possession of nuclear weapons. The idea, it would seem, runs something like this: Since we have the capacity for "massive retaliation" at times and places of our own choosing, we can afford to economize on diversified defense forces capable of waging conventional defensive warfare for limited objectives in widely dispersed locations. In the debate that has revolved about the doctrine of "instant retaliation" it has been pointed out—and I agree—that the idea that we, a peace-loving and democratic nation, will ever initiate offensive war, whether with hydrogen bombs or otherwise, is pure illusion. It is simply not in our character, our tradition, or within the limits of what is politically possible. As for atomic retaliation in the event of local hostilities, Secretary Dulles left the question open, hoping thus to exercise a deterrent force on Soviet Red Chinese aggression. But our overemphasis on atomic and thermonuclear weapons has alarmed even those who are confident that we will never in fact begin a war, since they see that it has decreased the strength of our conventional defense and the effectiveness of our diplomacy; and those who really fear that the policy means that we may indulge in wholesale atomic retaliation, in the absence of a direct attack upon us or our allies, are shocked and repelled.

In Indo-China we have found that defense policies and diplomacy based on the idea of strength through bombs are obviously inadequate. The end of hostilities in Korea had given notice that Communist pressures might well be increased in Indo-China. Yet we proceeded to cut back our military establishment generally and reduce our forces in the Far East. The idea of a defense pact for Southeast Asia had been thought about for some

two years, and now the rapid deterioration of the French position in Indo-China led to its sudden revival, just on the eve of the Geneva Conference. Our allies were prepared to consider the idea, but pointed out that it would require time to work out an accommodation of the interests of the various Asian nations whose participation in the pact would be vital to its success. In any case, the proposed pact could not by any stretch of the imagination save Dien Bien Phu. Thus, the United States came up sharply against the problem whether it should intervene directly in the Indo-Chinese war with the French alone (the British declined to consider action until after Geneva). We found that in looking for the short-cut we had neglected to see the nature of the woods we might have to traverse.

What the consequences of this essay in short-cut diplomacy may be for the fate of Southeast Asia it is too early to say, but the possibilities are grave. Our prestige and our leadership in world affairs have suffered a sharp setback. And even more serious may be the effects of the denouement of April and May upon the Western Alliance.

In an article on our own problems of leadership it is not possible to assess the mistakes which we think are being made by other countries. For example, it is clear to us that the French have been unrealistic in not assuring beyond question, some time ago, the independence of the Indo-Chinese states. Likewise, we find the British at times slow in moving to head off trouble that seems to us clearly in the making. Among allies there are always different and sometimes conflicting national and world interests, outlooks and judgments. It is the task of American diplomacy to help resolve these differences through negotiation rather than by announcing policies and expecting other countries to follow. There are times when our national interests require us to take a bold stand and ask others to follow, and then we must be prepared to go ahead regardless of who joins us. But when united action is required, leadership consists in bringing about agreement and common action. This often means that the leader forgoes political credit at home for initiating policy, but more effective action results.

It has long been apparent that the foundation of our security is unity with our allies—unity of spirit, purpose and action—and that such unity is the fruit of patient diplomacy based on mutual trust and understanding. The central objective of all-out

Kremlin policy is to divide the Western Alliance, to play off one of us against the other, to set us quarreling among ourselves, and thus to weaken us militarily, economically, politically and morally, while the Soviet Union, held brutally together in enforced unity, drives ahead with singleness of purpose towards world dominion. The crucial test of our leadership in world affairs is therefore the degree to which we are able to maintain unity in the free world. This requires more than bombs and boldness; it requires wisdom, moral attraction, sensitivity to the psychology of others, and willingness to compose differences except on moral issues.

III

At the present moment the acts and policies of the United States indicate only feebly that although the potential military danger remains undiminished, the main line of the active Soviet-Communist attack upon the free world shifted its emphasis a year and a half ago (Indo-China excepted) to economic, political and psychological ground, that this attack is powerful, dangerous and difficult to cope with, and that an intense mobilization of new effort is required. The prevailing philosophy of the Administration appears to be to rely largely upon the automatic functioning of the market to bring about economic growth in the free world. But the market is not doing the job. Social and political progress in the underdeveloped countries is likewise being left to the market at a time when Communist pressure and penetration is increasing. But only a more rapid advance than the market provides toward socially strong, democratic, national states can provide a successful defense.

In his report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program in September 1953, the President made clear that an additional strain is not to be imposed on the American economy for defense purposes and that we will not press our allies to carry increased defense burdens; that the defense build-up will go on; but that the burden of the slower and more steady defense build-up will be borne by economic growth. The long-range strategy of the Soviet Union for overcoming the West is explicitly based upon the assumption, stated by Stalin and Malenkov in 1952, that the free world will not be able to maintain in the years ahead a rate of economic growth comparable to that which will be forced in the Soviet bloc; that our margin of industrial and over-

all economic superiority will narrow; and that our capacity to defend ourselves and dominate the world economy will correspondingly decline. There is therefore this point of agreement, that the security of the free world depends upon maintaining a wide margin of economic superiority.

The increasing examination now being given to comparative rates of economic growth in the Soviet Union and the free world points inescapably to the conclusion that in this respect the Communist world is outstripping the free. The Soviet economy as a whole has been expanding for a considerable period at about 7 percent annually as compared to about 4.5 percent in the United States from 1946 to the middle of 1953. Comparisons between economic growth in the Soviet satellites and in the underdeveloped areas of the free world are even more striking. These high rates of economic growth, especially in industry, have of course been forced at the expense of agriculture, consumption and human welfare. But their implications both for Soviet military power and for the political attraction of the Soviet Union for underdeveloped free countries over a period of time are profound. To many of the proud and aspiring peoples of non-Communist Asia and other underdeveloped areas who are seeking national growth and strength, the industrial accomplishments of the Communist world seem like a miracle.

Today in many of the NATO countries of Europe economic expansion has slowed down to a walk, or has receded, compared to the rates of expansion under the Marshall Plan. In most of the underdeveloped countries the rate of economic expansion is extremely slow. And in the United States there is a recession instead of normal growth.

Whether the problem of building security is looked at from the point of view of maintaining the West's margin of industrial power for a defense base, or of promoting the free world's production of raw materials, or of maintaining an upward trend of economic, social and political development in countries as a bulwark against Communist penetration, one always comes back to the necessity for a high rate of economic growth in the free world accompanied by measures designed to assure that that growth shall result in social advancement and satisfaction, political stability through democratic institutions, and national dignity and strength. This last point is important. History shows that rapid economic growth in itself does not necessarily produce

stable, democratic societies. Unless economic growth is accompanied by growth of democratic attitudes, methods and institutions, as well as social justice, the result may not be an asset to free world strength. The West has much to offer to underdeveloped countries in the way of assistance that will increase the likelihood of over-all development along solid democratic lines.

During the last 25 years a great deal has been learned about what is needed to promote economic growth, social stability and democratic political development in the world and how to go about providing it. Here are a few of the more important things that are necessary:

1. *Maintenance of a high and expanding rate of economic activity in the United States.*

Not since the fall of Rome has one country so dominated the economy of the civilized world as does the United States today, and whereas Rome's dominion rested upon imperial control, ours rests upon sheer size. Ours is the master wheel of the world economic machine that determines the speed at which all others run. An extended decline in our economic activity can cause unemployment, financial crisis and political instability throughout the world. Economic expansion in the United States can provide a basis for world economic expansion.

The economy of the United States at the present time is failing to expand. Experience has shown that government policies and actions can promote economic expansion. Our government has appeared to believe, however, that a "readjustment" is needed as a matter of principle to keep our values, and our sense of values, sound. The subject is far too complex to be treated adequately here, but the question is raised whether we can afford to rely upon the automatism of the market to assure economic expansion at a time when not only our own well-being and security but that of the whole free world is at stake.

2. *Maintenance of a steady international flow of the world's raw materials at reasonably stable prices.*

With 10 percent of the free world's population, the United States accounts for more than half its combined gross national product. A sharp reduction in rubber-buying in this country can cause virtual economic collapse in Malaya; a speculative spurt in wool-buying here can cause serious inflation in Australia. Latin America's well-being and political stability depend to a high degree upon a steady flow of raw materials to the United States at

reasonable prices. Since a steady economic and social advance in underdeveloped countries is so important to our security today, it is imperative that we recognize the significance of the problem of raw materials and our responsibility, as the world's largest consumer, for maintaining a greater degree of stability in raw materials markets.

3. *Maintenance of a large and steady flow of capital from wealthy and industrially advanced countries to those in need of capital for development.*

The world has prospered only when there has been an adequate flow of capital for the development of resources and the expansion of production. The problem is peculiarly our responsibility because of the vastness of our accumulations of capital and the paucity of surplus capital in Europe following the devastation of two world wars. United States private capital is now flowing abroad for investment only in a trickle to the countries that need it most to build the foundations of social and political stability. It is flowing in substantial quantities only to Canada and a few oil-producing countries.

The three principal channels through which American capital may flow abroad now are private investment, the World Bank and the United States Export-Import Bank. The Government appears to be largely preoccupied with the encouragement of private foreign investment through offering greater incentives and through negotiating essential changes in the policies of other countries. To the extent that these measures can make private capital flow abroad, they are important forward steps. But there is scarcely an economist to be found who believes that the maximum of practicable encouragement can induce more than a moderate increase under circumstances now prevailing. In the countries which stand most in need of investment capital there exist factors which intimidate foreign investors—dangers of war, revolution and nationalization, and restrictions, actual or potential, upon profits, management and the transfer of profits. Meanwhile, American capital can find good profits from investment here in the United States. In spite of this, there is reason to believe—and limited experience has shown—that if grants, public investment and technical assistance pave the way in an underdeveloped country as part of sound development programs, then private investment can in time be attracted in much larger volume than otherwise would be the case.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, drawing its funds, as it does, from the private money market, has made an important contribution in this field; but it is obliged to insist upon standards of security and guaranteed return that have necessarily held it from participating in a large area of development needs. The U. S. Export-Import Bank was conceived primarily to promote American exports rather than as an instrument of the United States for foreign development. Its charter, its continuing legislative history, and the pressure upon it to tie loans to the purchase of supplies from the United States, make it difficult for the Bank to finance a balanced economic development abroad or promote multilateral international trade. The recent loan of $100,000,000 to the European Coal and Steel Community is an encouraging sign that some efforts are being made to extend the Bank's rôle. But it is clear, I think, that the charter of the Bank should be revised so as to give it authority to make loans in support of our foreign policies even though the repayment of them might have to be deferred in unfavorable circumstances.

Consideration was given in 1951 to putting the Export-Import Bank under a unified agency combining authority over all overseas economic operations, increasing the funds available to it, and revising its charter so as to make it a more effective instrument of the government in building social and economic and political strength abroad. There is a great deal to be said for doing that today under the Foreign Operations Administration, thus improving the integration of loans with grant and technical assistance. Freedom and security require a vast increase in the United States capital flow abroad for development, and in the period immediately ahead, if the job is to be done, public investment will have to lead the way.

4. *Provision of grants in aid—for the development of basic public services to health, education, agriculture and industry, and where necessary for the construction of basic facilities.*

The combined experience of the Economic Coöperation Administration and the Technical Coöperation Administration of the State Department has shown conclusively that grant aid, moderate in amount but considerably larger than that contemplated today, is necessary to make it possible for underdeveloped countries to (a) mobilize their own resources, (b) attract private capital from abroad, and (c) speed up the

process of economic development to a pace socially and politically acceptable. This was likewise the conclusion of the International Development Advisory Board (Chairman, Nelson Rockefeller) and of the committee (Chairman, Gordon Gray) appointed by President Truman in 1950 to study and report on Foreign Economic Policies. The conclusion is also shared by United Nations experts and buttressed by the investigations of a large number of students of the subject. There are definite limitations upon the amount of grant aid that can be used effectively in any underdeveloped country—limitations of technical skill, administrative competence and economic organization. But a carefully considered program of grant aid, moderate in amount, can act as a powerful "multiplier" of capital investment and technical assistance in promoting economic growth. The cost of an adequate world program of grant aid is less than we would be willing to spend in a single country for military defense should Communists be on the point of capturing control by military means.

The Government is today in principle terminating economic aid except as it supports directly military programs that could not otherwise be carried on in a few countries on the periphery of Red China or the Soviet Union. There are exceptions, of course—India being a case in point—but they are exceptions to a stated rule; and the volume of economic aid in these exceptional cases is, in my opinion, not enough. The attitude of the Government toward grant aid misses the point that our security requires a sharp speed-up in the rate of economic development throughout the free world.

One of the principal reasons officially advanced for terminating grant aid is that giving creates hostility rather than friendship toward the giver. This is nonsense. Some people make enemies in giving, others make friends; it all depends upon how it is done. It is true no one enjoys receiving aid from another; but if the giver manages to make the receiver feel he is a partner whose growing strength is important to his own welfare, and if he does not expect maudlin manifestations of gratitude, both giving and receiving can be attended by increased self-respect and friendship. Lend-lease had this great virtue. Likewise the Marshall Plan, which was based and administered on the proposition that the recovery of Europe was essential to American well-being and security. That these programs, which rank among the most statesmanlike and successful acts in American history, generated both strength for

the common good and friendship for the United States is overwhelmingly plain.

Our interest in giving other countries economic aid is that of enabling them to carry out agreed programs for mutual benefit, or it is based upon the disciplined expectation that economic aid will bring about a mobilization of local resources which will result in an increased independence and strength from which we cannot fail to benefit. It is inadmissible, of course, that our interest should be that of securing control over the policies and internal affairs of another country. But it is a very real question how we should go about seeing to it that governments receiving our aid carry out effectively the programs mutually agreed upon and that they adopt the internal policies necessary to that end. As a matter of principle we should insist that freely negotiated agreements should be carried out; and as a matter of amity we should offer advice and assistance as to how, in view of our experience with economic and social development, we think mutually agreed programs can most effectively be implemented. But again, it all depends upon how it is done. I know from my own experience that the officials of other countries do not resent—on the contrary, they appreciate—frank and even blunt private discussions of these matters. But these discussions must always be conducted as between equals, with full understanding and respect for the problems and compulsions of the other, and on the basis that getting a job done well is of mutual benefit. Above all, every effort must be made to avoid putting foreign leaders in the position of bowing publicly to American will. The art of diplomacy lies in inducing the leaders of other countries to come forward publicly with desirable ideas and proposals, rather than obligating them to support and defend policies publicly demanded by a more powerful country in return for favors granted. In this kind of diplomacy personal public credit may not accrue to the American negotiators, but it certainly advances American interests.

One other comment on this subject needs making. It is incumbent upon the leaders of other countries, if they are serious in their desire for economic aid, to give due regard to elementary political reality. Alliance or tested friendship, or in some cases simply publicly-observed neutrality in the East-West struggle, offers a basis which we should regard as adequate for

economic aid. But it is politically extremely difficult to extend economic aid to any country which our people think is continuing to show an unreasoning fear of outside influence, exhibiting its worst public manners to the country which is willing to help bolster its strength and independence, or demonstrating its greatest indulgence to the country which threatens to enslave it. Aid is a matter of mutual benefit; if the benefit is lacking in marked degree on one side it simply will not be forthcoming for long. We should nevertheless recognize that political attitudes do change, as we have demonstrated in our own history, and that with respect to certain countries we must proceed in the hope and expectation that fundamental interests will assert themselves and bring about more favorable attitudes.

5. *Provision of an increased flow of technical assistance of the Point IV type integrated with grant aid and investment programs.*

It is not necessary or possible within the compass of this article to argue the case for an expanded program of technical assistance. Today, technical assistance is being somewhat curtailed. I believe that this is a time when it should be increased, both through the United Nations and directly. Moreover, United States technical assistance is being subordinated wherever possible to support for military defense programs. The very name "Point IV," which had gained currency among the masses throughout the world as a symbol of hope and which was an asset of enormous value to the United States, is being consciously effaced.

6. *Reduction or removal of trade barriers.*

Trade restrictions are not coming down; instead, they have been wavering upwards. For well over a year, action to remove or reduce United States trade barriers was frozen while a commission appointed by the President under the chairmanship of Mr. Clarence Randall surveyed anew our foreign economic policies. The recommendations of the Commission with regard to tariffs, as well as with regard to other economic policies to promote our exports and world trade generally, are wholly inadequate in a time when our very survival depends upon how well the free world economy can be made to work. Yet even the mild recommendations of the Randall Commission, forwarded to Congress, met vigorous resistance, and the President has asked simply for a one-year renewal of the Trade Agreements Act.

*7. A concerted attack by regional defense organizations upon the problems of economic, political and social defense.*

The signers of the North Atlantic Treaty pledged themselves in Article II to eliminate conflicts in their economic policies and to undertake mutual economic coöperation for the promotion of stability and well-being. But up to now the major Powers in NATO have used that organization almost wholly as an instrument of military build-up without recognizing that the implementation of Article II was and is necessary to strengthen the economic and social foundations upon which military defense must rest. A number of proposals have been made in recent years looking towards the assumption by NATO of responsibility for planning and directing a common effort aimed at strengthening Atlantic and free world defenses in economic and social and political fields, comparable in scope and spirit to those that have characterized the building of NATO military defenses. These have not, however, been acted upon. Unless NATO and other regional defense organizations undertake increasingly the job of building the several kinds of defenses needed, it is difficult to see how the job can be done effectively.

To date, proposals for the building of an alliance for the defense of Southeast Asia have given no suggestion of the need for accompanying common military defense measures there with a concerted program for building up the economic and social strength of the area. Unless this is done, not only will it be more difficult to attract the membership of the countries of Southeast Asia, but any military defenses there may prove in the long run to have been built upon sand.

IV

In 1950, looking forward to the end of the Marshall Plan in 1952, and conscious of the rising danger of Communist penetration in the underdeveloped countries, the United States Government gave intense study to the kinds of long-range foreign economic policies that should follow the emergency postwar relief and recovery programs. The conclusions reached were along the lines suggested above. But the Korean War and the danger of imminent aggression in Europe upset all plans and calculations. The speculative scramble for raw materials shot up prices and adversely affected the terms of trade of the industrial countries. This, combined with the virtual doubling of defense

programs, temporarily threw the European Recovery Program off balance. The military program rapidly eclipsed concern for long-range economic policies, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951 marked no advance towards a transition from emergency to long-range economic policies and programs. The same overshadowing conditions prevailed in 1952, heightened by the effect of the national elections.

It would seem important to give renewed attention to these matters now. The underdeveloped countries fear contracting markets and declining prices for raw materials, with attendant social and political unrest. The economy of Western Europe is being partly supported by our military expenditures and by some economic aid to certain countries; but both of these are scheduled to fall away sharply next year. A collective world-wide effort is needed. But it will not be made unless the United States first recognizes the need and takes the lead in adjusting its own policies and in developing and organizing the program. Of all the countries in the free world, we alone have freedom of economic initiative and action. We are in the driver's seat of the world economic machine. We may not drive where the world wants to go or even where our own best interests suggest; but it is certain no one else can.

Within the past few months the affairs of men have been thrust into a new and sinister frame. We are now obliged to figure out how we must conduct ourselves in a world in which both we and those dedicated to our ruin possess hydrogen bombs of Armageddon power. As much as we would wish some quick solution through negotiations for a fool-proof contract, such appears unlikely under present circumstances and we must adjust ourselves to living in great physical danger for a long time to come. In this situation it is imperative that we re-appraise our acts as individuals and our policies as a nation to make certain that we do all that is humanly possible to diminish the possibility that the horrifying weapons now at man's disposal will ever be used for destructive purposes. Unless some system of control in which we have complete confidence is worked out, we must, of course, maintain and increase our capacity to retaliate powerfully in the event the bomb should be used against us or our allies. This means that we must strengthen our allies and our alliances and thus protect our bases around the world. But this is only the beginning of defense. It is pos-

sible that the consequences of nuclear warfare are now such as to decrease the likelihood—given the maintenance of retaliatory power—that it will be launched. But it does not mean any change in the Kremlin's design to dominate the world and destroy freedom. Soviet efforts to this end can be carried on and are being carried on with conventional weapons and the methods with which we have grown familiar. It is possible for these efforts to succeed in extending Soviet control over large parts of the world now free without any resort to nuclear warfare or indeed to aggressive military warfare of any kind.

We can frustrate this Soviet design by using our energy and great resources not only to strengthen military defenses throughout the free world, but to root freedom more firmly in economic development, rising standards of living, national dignity and the political and social conditions in which democracy flourishes. Doing this, our hope for the future lies in the belief that the attraction of freedom, strengthened in the non-Communist world, will in time undermine tyranny in its citadel and bring about changes in the Soviet Union that will remove the shadow of destruction from the earth.

# PUERTO RICO AND THE U.S., THEIR FUTURE TOGETHER

*By Luis Muñoz Marín*

PUERTO RICO needs to be "placed" afresh in the United States mind—placed not just geographically, but economically, culturally and juridically, so that the deeper political meaning of its relationships can be seen in new and correct perspective. Puerto Rican affairs have been moving full-steam ahead. The island is no longer a liability but a credit. It also is beginning to loom a little larger than its mere geographical size would indicate because it is beginning to contribute to the outside world—especially to the United States—something that is valuable and scarce today: understanding and good-will. Because of all this Puerto Rico has become politically interesting in eyes that until recently passed it over as geographically invisible.

To bring the picture into focus, the following facts must be established at the start: Puerto Rico is not asking for statehood. Puerto Rico is not demanding independence. Puerto Rico is dead-set against colonialism. In other words, Puerto Rico is developing a new pattern of political freedom.

The island is a political mutation—perhaps a cultural mutation too—unique in the American system, whether by "America" one means the United States or the hemisphere. It is a Latin American country composed of good citizens of the United States. How good they are as citizens is shown by their record in Korea, where a large percentage of casualties were Puerto Ricans, and by the fact that most Puerto Rican soldiers are volunteers. It is shown by the quick and effective way in which the people and the Government of Puerto Rico come forward to refute Communist propaganda that depicts the United States as an "imperialist colonial Power." It is shown by the fact that 81 percent of the voters of the island have declared that they do not ask independence. It is shown, finally, by the vigor with which both people and Government repudiate the handful of Nationalist fanatics that occasionally fire real bullets into the real world from the bastions of their utter fantasy.

How Latin American a country it is, is shown by its basic Spanish racial stock and creole population, its Spanish language and literature, its production of fine Spanish poetry, its rural folkways,

its folk-wisdom and the fact that it is not for statehood—federated statehood, that is—by 84 percent of the vote. Its position as a cultural frontier makes it a community of obvious use to the cause of freedom: apart from doing its duty to itself, it can advance understanding throughout this part of the world. There is no place south of Florida and the Rio Grande where the American from Maine or California feels more at home. And Puerto Rico is chosen by many Latin Americans who are exiled from their own countries as a residence well-suited to the spirit of a free man. A great republican poet of Spain, Pedro Salinas, who spent two years teaching at the University of Puerto Rico, wrote in his will (many years after leaving the island) that he wanted to be buried in Puerto Rico. Gabriela Mistral, the Chilean Nobel Prize winner, has said that Puerto Rico is the land where the stranger feels most at home.

The people that have given to others this gift of themselves have had a tough time economically. They have been whiplashed by poverty, almost defeated by a sense of hopelessness; and now they are having what some observers consider an almost miraculous awakening.

Puerto Rico has always been very poor. As its population increased by leaps and bounds through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became a place of little land, few natural resources, crowds of people. For a while the population growth was sustained by gradually bringing uncropped land into use. As the United States régime on the island got under way, the sugar industry expanded tremendously to supply the tariff-protected market of the United States—a free market for Puerto Rico almost from the very beginning of the relationship. The increase in production brought by this and other—but very few other—developments did not do much more than increase the numbers of the poor. It added somewhat to the size of the middle class, however, and brought upon the scene the first few millionaires. Such improvement as there was in the standard of living of the general population resulted mainly from the greater attention paid to education and public health.

Puerto Rico did have the great free market in the United States, and it did not have to pay federal taxes. It could not hope to reach even the most modestly decent standard of living without drawing upon these two advantages; yet until the 1940's neither imagination nor energy was applied to using them—except for

the benefit of sugar. But in the late thirties and early forties there was an awakening. A people that had been floundering in hopelessness began swimming towards the shore. Hope, indeed, became one of the natural resources of the people, and dedication to the salvation of the country an attitude not too unusual. Voters stopped selling their votes. Compliance with political pledges began to be something that could be really demanded of successful candidates for office. And there began to be a feeling that there was strength in the people that made hardship a training for abolishing hardship, rather than an illustration of the need to bow to ineluctable fate. The idea that something could be done by workers and businessmen and farmers and political leaders and teachers besides waving for help from a raft lost at sea began to catch on.

II

At least one of the causes of this great release of democratic energy was the fact that the incubus of the uncertain political status of the island was lifted off the public mind for the time being. For years the controversy over the contrasting objectives of independence and statehood had throttled economic and social thought—and political thinking also—for both the older and the newer generations. Both abstractions were inimical to the solution of Puerto Rico's many other problems. So the perennial issue presented to the people was tantamount to asking them the following obscure question: "What is your favorite way of preventing the solution of the vital problems of Puerto Rico?" With independence the free market would disappear. With statehood the federal tax collector would appear. But the premise was that aside from independence or statehood there was only the indignity of colonialism. Would you choose to eat your bread in shame or proclaim your dignity in hunger? The burden that that choice, assumed to be inexorable, put upon the soul of a decent, kind and proud people cannot easily be exaggerated.

The Popular Democratic Party, which came on the scene in 1938 with an economic and social program, realized that the vital day-to-day problems that Puerto Rico faced could not be tackled so long as this question of political status divided all economic and social groups. The new party therefore declared, early in the electoral campaign of 1940, that it would not consider the question of political status an issue in the elections. It would not interpret

votes cast in its favor as a mandate either for independence or statehood, but would take votes cast for the party simply as support for its specific economic and social proposals. To the degree that the dilemma of independence versus statehood was obsolete, this was realistic; although in another sense it was artificial, since the principles and relationships on which a people base their political freedom are of real spiritual as well as economic importance to them. To make the dilemma entirely obsolete a new kind of political pattern, based on economic and cultural realities as well as on human dignity, had to be created.

Many continued to argue that only by choosing one kind or the other of political status could the question be removed from political life. We of the Popular Democratic Party agreed that a choice would have to be made, but it need not be limited to those two alternatives. Some of us had begun to see that neither independence nor statehood would be an adequate expression of the Puerto Rican people, so that although it was true that the best way of ending the controversy over status was by solving it, the familiar dichotomy offered no solution, economically or culturally. Economically, there would inevitably remain the question of payment of federal taxes if statehood were chosen, and the question of the loss of the free market if independence were chosen. Cultural problems were no less difficult in this narrow framework, because of the different heritage and traditions of the Puerto Rican people, easily assimilated when they got into the great melting-pot, but not as a solid group in their densely-populated homeland. And independence was contrary to a deep current of non-isolationist feeling—which is also a cultural fact—that runs through Puerto Rican history; Puerto Ricans are capable of believing in almost any kind of free political expression of the brotherhood of man.

Thus the decision to detour around the roadblock of political status seems to have released the energies of the people—young and old—and to have turned them upon the achievement of the deep if less dramatic freedoms gained by self-reliance, education, security, economic fairness, administrative skill, productivity. Eventually it brought forth the political inventiveness Justice Frankfurter had called for many years before when he said: "One of the great demands upon inventive statesmanship is to help evolve new kinds of relationship so as to combine the advantages of local self-government with those of a confederated union.

Luckily, our Constitution has left this field of invention open."

On the platform of "No political status now; let's get to work on everything else," the Popular Democratic Party won the elections of 1940, the first in which it had participated, by a very slight margin in a three-cornered contest. In 1944 it triumphed by a large margin in a two-sided contest. In 1940 it had been supported by 38 percent of the voters; 64 percent supported it in 1944.

By then the economic program was well under way. There was (and still is) a big job to be done, but the modern instruments to do it with had been fairly well developed. An ambitious beginning had been made in industrialization, with five government-owned factories, not because the government wanted to go into the manufacturing business, but because private capital, with very few exceptions outside of sugar, did not seem to want to. Electric power had a model management organization and was increasing at a good rate. The landless *jíbaro* (countryman) was receiving his parcel of ground and with it freedom from the servitude of a squatter on another's land, and from some small part of his great poverty. A flexible minimum-wage law had been put into operation. The eight-hour day was a reality. Water was about ready to be supplied to town and country on an island-wide basis, instead of by tiny local aqueducts. New agricultural patterns, on an experimental commercial scale, were planned. (This began to be successful only later.) A low-cost housing program, largely on federal-guaranteed credit, was trying to make dents in the slums. Health was improving, life expectancy increasing. Up-to-date planning, budgeting, accounting and civil service procedures had been established and were in continuous process of improvement.

The result was that, though it had been realistic to keep the question of status dormant as a political issue in 1940, it was no longer realistic to avoid it by 1945. It was not possible to insist that a civilized people, with a Western tradition and a well-defined cultural pattern within that tradition, should permanently ignore the question of where they stood in the world, and on what moral basis; or that they could without detriment to their self-respect permanently recognize the validity of laws unauthorized by them, or the control by others of the policies that they might wish their government to follow. Obviously, the people of Puerto Rico, ruled by executives (no matter how able some were) appointed without reference to their will, by local laws subject to veto by that

executive, and by multiple laws of a Congress remote and not responsible to their democratic authority, could not consider (no matter how fair that Congress had practically always been) that the question of status had been more than temporarily ignored.

III

But what political status? A creative job, and a tough one, was ahead for Puerto Rico.

A political form had to be developed to fit the economic facts, the cultural realities, the free and yet non-nationalistic ideals of the people. It also had to meet the legitimate economic and military interests of the United States, as well as the broader interests implicit in the relationship. It had to demonstrate to the world the significance and the sincerity of the attitude of the United States in its dealings with this underdeveloped, civilized and freedom-loving community of the Latin world in the American hemisphere.

I have sought to make plain the truth that throughout its history Puerto Rico has been neither separatist nor assimilist. It was never so in Spanish times; and what it was then it is now. It endeavors to keep its own personality, its collective sense of itself, and it retains its loyalty to a broader political system, which is also, as I have indicated, a way of being loyal to a conception of the brotherhood of man. The position can perhaps be described as autonomist, as distinguished from both separatist and federalist.

Out of this tradition the commonwealth status evolved, the base and seed of it contained in Act 600 of the 1950 Congress, which fully recognized the principle of consent and approved that principle in a compact subject to agreement by the people of Puerto Rico. This status was originally a Puerto Rican creation, then it became a joint enterprise undertaken by the Congress of the United States and the people of Puerto Rico—imperfect in detail, as any first attempt at an arrangement must be which requires the agreement of a busy Congress and a remote electorate—but sound in principle, full of the sap of growth, destined to bring still a greater credit both to the big country and the small island.

The most significant aspect of the new status lies in the recognition that the arrangement is indeed founded on the principle of consent, expressed by a compact in the form of an Act of Congress

subject to the approval of the people of Puerto Rico at the polls. Another basic characteristic is the concept of association as distinguished from the historical idea of union, so far as states are concerned, and of possession, so far as unincorporated territories are concerned. It embodies association with the United States, not union among the states. These are the characteristics that clear the status of the former colonial character of "territory" or "possession."

In internal structure the Commonwealth is, in some ways, like a State of the Union and in some ways quite different. It originates in a compact. It makes and can change its constitution within the terms of the compact, which includes applicable principles of the Constitution of the United States. It is republican in form, as defined by custom in the United States and by theory at least in most of the countries of the hemisphere. It provides for separate legislative, executive and judicial branches, all arising from the sovereignty of the people; legislative faculty to override executive veto by a two-thirds vote, judicial review, periodic elections, a modern Bill of Rights. The constitution can be amended by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature and subsequent majority approval by the electorate. Members of the Supreme Court are designated by the Governor and Senate for life, subject only to impeachment by the Legislature, and the membership of the Court cannot be increased or decreased except by concurrence of the three branches, the Court itself proposing the change and the Legislature approving it by a law which requires the signature of the Executive. There is a Federal Court, with substantially the same jurisdiction as the Federal Courts in the States, and appeals from the Commonwealth courts can be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States essentially as in the States.

In several other ways commonwealth—*Estado Libre Asociado*, Associated Free State in the official translation approved by the Constitutional Convention—varies markedly from the status of the federated States. No taxes are collected for the benefit of the Treasury of the United States. There is no voting representation in the Federal Congress but rather a commissioner accredited before the Department of State who has a seat in the House of Representatives with all the privileges of a member excepting the vote. Much federal legislation, with the indicated exception of tax legislation, takes effect in Puerto Rico as in the States, but the Congress is not under obligation to extend the application of any law

to Puerto Rico, including, of course, grants-in-aid that are financially beneficial to the island. (Congress as a rule generously does make such laws applicable in most cases.) A last and profound difference is that while federated statehood is irrevocable, commonwealth status can be changed—we know that, morally, it will never be changed for the worse—although not unilaterally because of the nature of compact and the principle of consent.

May it be assumed that this relationship, created to free Puerto Rico from the statehood-independence strait jacket, is a permanent one? Unless by permanent we mean frozen, I say it is and should be permanent. If it freezes, if it doesn't grow according to its own nature, it may not be permanent.

Let us consider how it may grow. The principle of consent is one of its basic elements. It is present today in two forms: generic consent such as that given to federal laws not dealing with taxation, including, sight unseen, future laws; and specific consent such as that given by the people of Puerto Rico through their elected legislature to each law of the Commonwealth. The generic consent was given when the people went to the polls several years ago and voted to approve Act 600 of the United States Congress, the language of which fully recognizes the principle of consent and is imbued with the intention and nature of a compact.

The vast majority of the people are generally satisfied with this distribution of their consent as of now. They are the generation of voters that went to the polls and gave that consent. As time goes on it will probably be found that the area of general consent will seem altogether too broad to those that did not participate in the voting, and even to some that did: that will depend on the manner in which the outline of applicable future or even past federal legislation may jibe or clash with the Puerto Rican pattern. Also, I believe, time will tend to show that the extension of much of that legislation to Puerto Rico is unnecessary to the basic idea of association as distinguished from federated statehood. Under those circumstances it would appear that the reason for such ample delegation will be less understood as the voting generation which gave approval to it at the polls diminishes and recedes into the past.

At the proper time an evaluation could be made of what federal functions, instrumented by what kind of federal legislation, are essential to the fact of a permanent association based on common citizenship, and what functions are not essential. The criterion

should be that of the greatest possible self-government. The basic points of association could be spelled out in an Act of Congress agreed to by the Puerto Rican electorate, as now; all other federal functions and legislation could be extended to Puerto Rico at the Commonwealth's own request, or with its own specific consent in each instance. Obviously Congress would not be understood to have obligated itself to extend requested legislation.

It is not too simple a problem to work out in detail, but it is far from being an impossible one. Instances of the kind of federal functions which probably could not be left to specific consent but would have to be agreed to permanently, as of the essence of association, would be minimum wages, quota arrangements, common defense, political treaties. An instance of federal legislation running to no purpose in Puerto Rico that could be of interest to the United States would be the Labor Relations Act.

The general principles of this associated statehood recognize that this is a time for getting together and not for pulling apart; that where important cultural differences exist, such as language and historical background, the smaller unit should not participate in the government of the larger one, nor the latter wish its laws to rule in the former unless agreeable locally in each case, or contained in the basic instrument of Association as essential to its nature. Thus there would be not only "no taxation without representation" (as now), but also no legislation without representation—and without disturbing the composition of Congress. Taxation, after all, is not the only thing in the world that may require representation for legitimacy.

This is the potential of Commonwealth. From the United States and Puerto Rico viewpoints: Why not statehood? Why not independence? Legitimate questions both.

What the United States thinks of statehood for Puerto Rico can be easily gathered from the record of the Hawaii–Alaska debate which took place in the Senate last March. Statehood for Puerto Rico was definitely not favored by the opponents or by the advocates of statehood for Hawaii and Alaska. The reason given was explicit: different historical and cultural background. Puerto Rico, which is not asking for statehood, would as a state have two senators, six representatives. No Senator wanted that. Puerto Rico agrees. As between having influence of that kind on United States policy in general and having complete authority, within the terms of association, in fact and in potential growth,

over its own policy, it chooses the latter. We would not do so if we were Oklahoma, Arkansas or Delaware; but being Puerto Rico, we enjoy more real liberty that way.

Puerto Rico in its upsurge is an exemplification of the fine spirit of freedom in which the United States can deal with civilized people of different origin in their homeland. If Puerto Rico were nationalized as a State within the United States a large segment of local policy-making would shift to Washington where a handful of Puerto Rican congressmen would contribute slightly to a general policy. The olive in the Martini would become a drop of bitters or a shade of vermouth.

And why not independence? From Puerto Rico's viewpoint I have perhaps touched sufficiently on the subject. Free trade with the States has become a basic need for an economy developed for a half-century on that premise. There is also Puerto Rico's traditional non-isolationist sense of freedom. And there are the pride and affection that Puerto Ricans feel regarding the citizenship that they have lived with for 37 years, defended in war and honored in their practice of democracy in peace.

From the point of view of the United States there are military and commercial reasons—Puerto Rico buys $500,000,000 a year from the States—but probably such reasons are not nearly as important as the fact that Puerto Rico is today an eloquent indicator of the good faith of the United States.

There is a long-range United States interest expressed in the chosen relationship that is greater than either of those two interests. Puerto Rico has become a small but effective engine of understanding of and goodwill for the United States. Hundreds of Technical Assistance students, engineers, administrators, labor leaders from all over Latin America, Asia, Africa are with us every day, watching how things get done, acquiring a first-hand knowledge of how admirably the two great cultures of America work together in terms of freedom, respect, common citizenship, economic achievement. There is also a constant flow of distinguished men of letters, political leaders, teachers, journalists from Latin America and other regions who come to see what goes on. No matter how sincerely a man may have been bemused by propaganda aimed against the United States, the things that he sees in Puerto Rico and the realization that on five occasions within six years our people have voted overwhelmingly against independence, against statehood, against colonialism and in favor of this

joint experiment in statesmanship—this constitutes a massive answer to that propaganda. In this connection, the creative relationship that has been worked out between the American Union and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is an eloquent manifestation of a goodness and a greatness in the spirit of the United States.

# VIOLENCE ON THE JORDAN-ISRAEL BORDER

## A Jordanian View

*By Lieutenant-General J. B. Glubb*
*(Glubb Pasha)*

WHEN the United Nations prepared its plan for the partition of Palestine in the autumn of 1947, it drew the demarcation line in such a manner that the Arabs to be included in the proposed Jewish state looked like being very nearly as numerous as the Jews. This indeed was the principal problem which seemed likely to face the Jewish state when it came into existence on May 15, 1948. How were the Jews to run a "Jewish state" in which nearly half the inhabitants would be Arabs?

When the British Mandate came to an end on May 15, guerrilla fighting between Jews and Arabs had already been going on for some months, as the British forces gradually dwindled. On that date the fighting became general.

Both before and after the end of the Mandate, the Israelis seized every possible opportunity to get rid of the Arabs still living in the area allotted to the Jewish state. In some cases, massacre was resorted to, as in the Arab village of Deir Yassin, where the women of the village were massacred and their bodies thrown down the wells—one morning when most of the men of the village were away at work. One such incident went a long way, and the inhabitants of neighboring villages panicked and fled.

In the course of the fighting, the Jews captured a number of Arab towns and villages, some of which were in the area allotted to the Arabs under the United Nations partition plan. In many such instances, the civil inhabitants were driven out immediately by Israeli troops or were given half an hour to leave. In some cases, all the means of transport were seized by the Israeli army, so that the inhabitants were obliged to abandon all their possessions in their homes.

In general, the Israelis were most ruthless in driving out the Arab civil population from places in the coastal plain or near

Tel Aviv, then the Israeli capital. In northern Galilee, which they captured from the Syrian Army, they were far less ruthless, and most of the Arab inhabitants remained. Presumably the hilly district, far removed from vital strategic centers, was not considered to threaten the safety of the State of Israel.

It was in this manner that the Arab refugee problem came into existence. More than half the total number of refugees sought asylum in Jordan, which according to United Nations statistics now contains 450,000 refugees. The total number of inhabitants of Jordan is about 1,400,000. Thus it will be seen that the refugees constitute about one-third of the inhabitants of the country.

The general fighting in Palestine came to an end in July 1948. When all parties accepted the United Nations Armistice, the Egyptian Army was still in occupation of the Negeb (the Beersheba area) and of the Wadi Araba, the depression which runs from the Dead Sea down to the Red Sea. This area had been allotted to Israel in the United Nations partition plan, but the Israelis had failed to occupy it. On the other hand, west of Jerusalem and in northern Galilee they had occupied areas allotted by the United Nations to the Arabs.

In October 1948, the Israeli Army broke the United Nations Armistice and attacked the Egyptians. It is true that the Israelis claimed that it was the Egyptians who broke it. For 15 days before the battle began, however, the Israelis had refused to allow United Nations observers to visit the area in which their troops were concentrating. The Egyptians were taken completely by surprise, and suffered a serious reverse. The Israelis thereupon occupied the Beersheba area.

Few outsiders realize now that the whole of the southern part of Israel as it stands today was won, not in the general fighting from May to July 1948, but by a deliberate violation of the United Nations Armistice in October 1948. The Israeli Army had been able to increase its strength in the interval by consignments of arms received from behind the Iron Curtain.

Israel was to be guilty of one more breach of the United Nations Armistice. Jordan had been in military occupation of the Wadi Araba since the end of the British Mandate in May 1948, and in August 1948, as already mentioned, the United Nations had arranged an armistice. In the autumn, Jordan and Israel concluded a separate agreement of their own covering the Jerusalem

area, and representatives of the two countries met in Rhodes on April 3, 1949, to conclude a new armistice. While these direct Israel-Jordan negotiations were going on in Rhodes, suspicious Israeli troop movements were observed southeast of Beersheba. The Jordan Government cabled its delegation in Rhodes instructing it to ask for an Israeli explanation. The Israeli delegation vehemently denied any military movements. Three days later, however, while negotiations were still proceeding in Rhodes, the Israeli Army launched its offensive against the Jordan forces in the Wadi Araba, in defiance of the previous armistice agreements to which the Israel Government had subscribed, in contradiction of its own assurances given only three days before, and while its own delegation was negotiating with a Jordan Government delegation in Rhodes.

I do not refer to these past incidents in a spirit of recrimination. It is necessary, however, to understand the history of the problem in order to understand the obstacles to trust and reconciliation today.

The Israeli conquest of the Negeb (the Jews spell the word Negev) produced a new wave of refugees who sought asylum in Jordan. This was not the case, however, in the neighborhood of Beersheba; although that district was principally inhabited by Arab tribes, these were farmers despite the fact that they lived in tents. Homogeneous tribal communities like these did not panic and take to flight as did the individual citizens of the towns and villages further north. Israel took over control of the Beersheba area, but the tribes remained on their lands.

In the subsequent two years the great majority of these tribes were evicted by the Israeli authorities. Since such an eviction was contrary to the terms of the armistice signed at Rhodes it was not carried out by direct military action. The tribes were living and cultivating their own lands, but the Mandatory Government had not yet carried out complete land settlement of the area. Consequently individuals did not hold title deeds for their land, although the boundaries of tribal areas had been demarcated. This situation gave the Israeli authorities an opportunity. They began on various pretexts to move these tribes from place to place. They refused to admit the right of the tribes to ownership of tribal lands, and ordered them to live in other and less fertile areas. In some cases, tribes were allowed to plough and sow their land, and when the crop was above ground, the tribe

was moved to another area and the crop was harvested by the Jews.

By such means life was made economically impossible for the Beersheba Arab tribes. At this stage, hints were dropped that perhaps the tribesmen would be happier in Jordan. If the suggestion was not welcomed they were moved once more, perhaps to a rocky hillside where life was virtually impossible. Eventually when a tribe "opted" to migrate into Jordan, the Israeli Government was careful to secure a signature from the chief to the effect that they had migrated voluntarily. In this manner the Israeli Government succeeded in getting rid of most of the tribes of the Beersheba plains and in taking over their lands. There is no doubt that this action was contrary to the spirit of the armistice. It was carried out by making life administratively and economically impossible for the Arabs in question. The process was arrested only in 1952, when yet another tribe arrived at the border to cross into Jordan. The Jordan Government refused to admit it and appealed to the United Nations. The Israeli Government was obliged to allow it to remain.

The Beersheba tribes who migrated into Jordan were peculiarly unfortunate because the United Nations Relief and Works Agency at first refused to recognize them as refugees or to give them relief. As hostilities were not in progress, they were presumably regarded as immigrants into Jordan and not as refugees. Many of these people died of starvation in the ensuing year, before their status was admitted and they were granted relief.

Such, in outline, are the origins of the Arab refugee problem in Jordan. A few of the refugees came voluntarily just before the end of the British Mandate. The vast majority were violently driven out by the Israeli Army during the fighting in 1948. The Arab tribes of the Beersheba area were manœuvred out of their lands by making their lives economically impossible.

Let us now return to the refugees from the cities and villages of of the coastal plain and the foothills of Judaea and Samaria. When the fighting ended with the signature of the Israel-Jordan armistice agreement in April 1948, most of these refugees were huddled in camps or scattered in caves in the rocky hills of Judaea and Samaria. Many of them could actually see their homes and their farms, their cottages and their gardens. The great majority of them had fled in the clothes in which they stood, abandoning all their possessions in their houses. In a great

many cases, families had become divided. Old people unable to escape had stayed behind. A wife had fled with her children when her husband had been away at work, and so on.

A naïve idea also prevailed amongst Arab villagers when the armistice was signed that the troubles were over and they could now go home and resume their normal lives. As a result of this idea, and the other considerations just mentioned, no sooner was the Rhodes armistice signed in April 1949 than a number of the refugees walked across the armistice line into Israel and made for their homes. All or nearly all were unarmed, and their intentions were perfectly innocently to collect their possessions, to search for their relatives or just plainly to "go home." The presence of these Arabs in Israel had, however, caused the Jews one of their principal anxieties at the beginning. They had got rid of them by ruthless methods, and they were certainly not going to allow them back.

I am personally convinced that the Israelis here made a major psychological error. They determined to use ruthless methods to prevent any of the refugees from returning. These Arabs returning to look for their homes were at first almost entirely unarmed. A great number of them were shot dead, without question or answer, by the first Israeli patrol they met. Others were maltreated or tortured.

It is of course easy to be wise after the event. Even so, I cannot help thinking that many later troubles would have been avoided if the Israelis had at this stage used more self-control. If "infiltrators" had been arrested and charged before a magistrate with illegal entry, the result might have been more effective. For more than 10 years now, the Jews of Israel have relied almost solely on violence, apparently disregarding the lesson so often taught in history that violence inevitably breeds counter-violence. As might perhaps have been foreseen, Israeli violence did not put an end to "infiltration." Instead, the innocent attempts of the refugees to find their relatives or to collect their property, which could scarcely have been more than a nuisance, assumed the proportions of a problem.

When it became clear that the Israelis would shoot on sight any Arab who crossed the armistice line, the number of persons crossing with no evil intent decreased. But the few who for one reason or another still went did so fully armed, and if they saw Israelis coming they shot first. What might have been a passport

offense, a nuisance, was unnecessarily magnified by the brutal methods employed.

Not all so-called infiltrators were of this type, however. By occupying the Beersheba area down to the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel had severed the land passage joining Asia to Africa. The so-called Gaza strip, formerly a part of Palestine, was cut off from Arab Palestine and Jordan. There was no way of getting from Jordan, Syria or Lebanon to Gaza and to Egypt except by air, for such as could afford it. Those who could not pay for an air passage walked across the Israel-held Beersheba area in the hours of darkness. They did so for many reasons, but they did not do so to injure the Jews—merely because they had business on the other side. Some were engaged in perfectly legitimate trade, and drove pack animals loaded with rice, sugar or consumer goods. Some were smugglers. Some were traffickers in forbidden drugs. Some came from Gaza to Jordan to look for work. None of these persons who crossed the Beersheba area wished to attack the Jews, but Israeli patrols frequently intercepted and killed them. And as the numbers of killed increased, so did the numbers of embittered persons mount up. Men whose fathers, brothers, sons or even wives and daughters had been killed on the Gaza caravans longed for revenge. Some of them went back to kill a Jew to pay off the debt. Thus another comparatively harmless activity—crossing from Jordan to Gaza and back—had been handled with unwarranted ruthlessness.

The armistice line itself produced other varieties of "infiltration." In many cases, the line divided a man's home from his orchard. If he went out to pick an apple in his own garden, he was shot dead as an infiltrator. The little town of Qalqiliya lies on the foothills of the mountains of Samaria, on the edge of the coastal plain. Just to the west of the town this plain is thickly covered with luxuriant orange groves, on the produce of which Qalqiliya lived. The armistice line divided the town from its orange groves and thereby cut off its livelihood. At the first orange-picking season, many people of Qalqiliya went over the line, each man to pick his own oranges from his own trees. The Israelis concealed patrols in the orange groves and killed the pickers. The resulting incidents were described by the Israelis as armed incursions of bandits.

There were other sorts of "infiltration." A certain Arab family had remained in Israel, and they had a son 15 years old. The

boy refused to finish his education in Israel. He "infiltrated" into Jordan and went to college. At vacation times, he "infiltrated" back to Israel to see his parents. Or take another example. The women of the Moslem Arab tribes of South Palestine were used to being veiled and to wearing long sweeping skirts. They could not at once accustom themselves to wearing the European clothes and short skirts which were the only ones to be bought in Israel. Their husbands "infiltrated" to Jordan to buy them their traditional Arab clothes. Such examples could be multiplied almost indefinitely. Most of these cases were the inevitable result of the sudden violent bisection of a country which had been one for eight centuries. Inevitably all sorts of complicated problems and conflicting interests required settlement. Sub-machine guns and hand grenades did not provide an adequate solution.

When the Israeli Government discovered that shooting the infiltrators did not put an end to infiltration, they took refuge in military reprisals. These at first were on a small scale. A party of eight or ten Israeli soldiers would cross into Jordan and approach a small village; the first one or two persons encountered would be killed, and the patrol would return across the armistice line. Sometimes the patrols came across at night and threw hand grenades into the windows of houses, sometimes killing women and children in their beds. In these reprisals the Israelis almost invariably killed the innocent.

The Israeli Government, seeing that its reprisals by military patrols were not effective, did not apparently conclude that its policy was wrong. It decided to use more force. Platoon attacks by the Israeli Army became the order of the day. Against these military attacks on their villages, the Jordan authorities organized the National Guard to defend the villages. The Israeli platoon attacks were repulsed. The Israelis then stepped up their reprisals by using companies of infantry supported by mortars. The Jordan Government then began to put barbed-wire entanglements around frontier villages. The Israeli Army replied by using battalions, bombarding the villages with mortars and using detachments of engineers to blow a path through the barbed wire. Other engineers carried prepared charges, which they laid in the captured village and blew down the houses into heaps of rubble.

In the face of this situation, the Jordan Government has been saying the same thing for five years. The problem of the refugees,

it says, was not invented by the Jordan Government. One-third of the people in the country are refugees driven out of territory now held by Israel. It is fruitless to argue whether the refugee problem was created by British policy or by the United Nations or by Israel or by Jordan. The problem is with us. Jordan has never undertaken to prevent every person from crossing an imaginary line nearly 500 miles long. It is quite impossible to do so. Jordan, however, believes that the problem is a police problem. It believes that intimate coöperation between the police forces of the two sides is the essential, and that this coöperation must be carried out at the level of the local police officer. If persons who have illegally crossed the armistice line are to be apprehended, a rapid exchange of information is essential. If an infiltrator is located in Israel, the information should be telephoned to the Jordan police within an hour so that an attempt can be made to arrest the offender as he recrosses the border.

Jordan has constantly pressed for frequent meetings of police officers all up and down the border line. It is confident that by steady police coöperation of this kind, together with full exchange of information between the two police forces, infiltration can be reduced to a minimum. On one or two occasions when Israeli and Jordanian police officers on either side of the border have "got together," incidents in their area have virtually ceased, a fact which seems amply to confirm the Jordan thesis. But Jordan has been preaching for five years to deaf ears.

In the absence of coöperation from Israel, Jordan has made the most strenuous efforts to prevent civilians from crossing the line. A great many arrests have been made in the past five years, and many hundreds of persons are in prison on charges of infiltration. The whole border area is crisscrossed with police and army patrols at night. As a result of these energetic measures, infiltration has been reduced to very small proportions. General Bennike, the United Nations Chief of Staff, bore witness in his last report of Jordan's efforts to prevent infiltration.

In this connection, it is worthy of note that in international practice every nation is responsible for the prevention of illegal entry into its frontiers. If a Canadian citizen should enter the United States illegally, the Government of the United States does not make a diplomatic protest to Canada. It merely tightens up its own frontier precautions. Israel, however, claims on the contrary that Jordan is solely responsible for preventing Jordan-

ians from entering Israel illegally. Jordan constantly expresses her readiness to coöperate with Israel in doing so. But Israel, while refusing such coöperation in practical terms, claims that Jordan is solely to blame. In spite of this, Jordan, unaided by Israel, has almost put a stop to infiltration into Israel, although by international practice it is Israel which should be primarily responsible for the protection of her own border.

Against the Jordan plan for the decentralization of minor incidents so that they are handled by local police officers, the Israelis prefer that all incidents be dealt with in the Central Mixed Armistice Commission in Jerusalem. The number of complaints is, however, so great that the M.A.C. is often two months in arrears in dealing with them. From the point of view of police action, this is obviously absurd. If arrests are to be made, the police must receive information in a matter of hours—not weeks or even, as sometimes happens, months. Moreover, the Israelis have a habit of handing in a bunch of complaints, 20 or 30 together, and sometimes six weeks or more old. It seems unlikely that the Israeli police are so inefficient that this is the best they can do. Although such complaints are so out of date and so vague that they cannot be traced, the Israeli Government nevertheless adds them to its "statistics," which receive the maximum of publicity throughout the world.

Not only is the Mixed Armistice Commission overloaded with complaints, it works under another handicap also. It receives a good deal of publicity and the speeches made in it are often reported in the press. There is a strong impression that the Israeli speakers at meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission are really addressing the people of Israel, the United Nations or the American public rather than attempting to settle minor disputes up and down 500 miles of border. The accumulation of many hundreds of complaints provides the opportunity for an eloquent speech of indignation. If, as should have been the case, three-quarters of these incidents had been settled by the local policemen within a few hours of their occurrence, they would have produced no dividend in the way of world publicity.

It is not my intention, however, to deny that infiltration has taken place in the past and that thefts of farm animals, water piping and a few other items have occurred. The articles stolen are usually such as are left out in the fields at night. But reference to United Nations statistics reveals that a high proportion

of articles stolen are returned by the Jordan police. As against these thefts, Israeli Army patrols have an awkward habit of driving off Jordanian flocks of sheep. On the whole, the value of property lost by the two sides is often roughly the same. There is, however, a difference. Thefts from Israel by Jordanians are carried out by thieves, who are nearly all destitute refugees evicted from Israel. The looting of Jordan flocks is carried out by patrols of the Israeli Army.

The activities of the Israeli Army are not, however, limited to the occasional looting of sheep. Infinitely more serious, and in fact the root of the whole problem, are the military attacks on Jordanian villages carried out by units of the Israeli Army. The now notorious attack on Qibya village in October 1953 was only a peculiarly bloody example of the kind of "reprisal" attack carried out again and again by the Israeli Army for the past five years. In these attacks, men, women and children are slaughtered indiscriminately. Sometimes also the village is deliberately destroyed with explosives.

I do not arrogate to myself the right to pronounce on the moral aspect of such actions. But if I may adapt the famous epigram of Talleyrand, I would say, "These actions may or may not be crimes, but they are most certainly a mistake." Massacres of innocent people only make matters worse. As an Arab delegate recently said in New York, "Israel cannot shoot her way to peace."

One last word remains to be said. We have heard much lately of Israeli invitations to high-level meetings with Jordan, and of Jordan's refusal. This situation requires explanation.

As I have said above, Jordan believes that the problem of frontier incidents is one for the police. She believes that the solution lies under the hands of the two governments and is comparatively simple, namely: to stop using armies and to ensure police coöperation; and to decentralize the handling of minor incidents to local police officers on both sides. Jordan has found Israel completely uncoöperative towards these proposals.

Instead, Israel uses two weapons: set-piece attacks on Arab villages by the Israeli Army; and public statements on international platforms, offering peace and proposing high-level conferences, preferably in New York. The Jordanians are firmly convinced that such offers are purely political manœuvres made in order to gain publicity at Jordan's expense—particularly in America. "If the Israelis really want to stop incidents," say the

Jordanians, "they have only to order their police force to coöperate fully with the Jordan police."

One often reads statements to the effect that both Jordan and Israel are equally guilty of aggression. But it is essential to remember the point which I have made above, namely that the incidents on the two sides are different in nature. The incidents carried out by Jordanians are the work of destitute refugees, whom the Jordan Government is doing its very utmost to control. The incidents carried out by Israelis, however, are not the work of individuals but are acts of aggression carried out by the armed forces of the Israeli Government.

The Army of Jordan is better known to the world at large as the Arab Legion. In the five years which have elapsed since the Rhodes Armistice was signed in April 1949, not one single incursion into Israel-held territory has been either planned or executed or even connived at by the Arab Legion, or by any other armed force controlled by the Jordan Government. This is a fact.

# THE SEARCH FOR ANGLO-AMERICAN POLICY

*By Hugh Gaitskell*

GOOD relations between Britain and America have become one of the essential conditions of world peace. A real split between us would, I believe, open the road to war, and possibly to the defeat of Western democracy. On the other hand, so long as America and Britain remain in close alliance and friendly partnership, the danger of a world war is relatively remote. This is surely one lesson that we have learnt, albeit at heavy cost, in these last 30 years.

But there is also no doubt that Anglo-American relations have recently become badly strained. It is worth trying to examine dispassionately the reasons for this, in the hope that out of such examination will come better understanding, and out of better understanding, better relations.

Much has recently been written about the underlying causes—political, social and economic—which give rise to friction generally between Britain and America. This was the main theme of Mr. Attlee's admirable article in *Foreign Affairs* some months ago.[1] I do not propose to repeat it. My object is a narrower one —to analyze some of the major issues of foreign policy which at present confront Britain and America, to see what has gone wrong in the treatment of them, and to make a few suggestions for the future.

First, however, two preliminary points. The new world situation has involved Britain and America in a much closer alliance than ever before. This brings with it problems which simply did not arise so long as relations between the two countries were more distant. So many more questions have to be discussed together; so many more decisions have to be taken jointly. The more you have to try and agree, the more it is possible to agree. It is as if having lived in different cities in the past, two families now had to share the same house.

Even during the war there was friction, but it was largely cloaked by the need for secrecy, and greatly diminished by the

[1] "Britain and America: Common Aims, Different Opinions," by Clement R. Attlee, *Foreign Affairs*, January 1954. I would also mention two other recent contributions—an article by Lester Markel in *The New York Times* of June 14, 1953, and a *Daily Mirror* pamphlet, "Anglo-American Partnership," just published in London.

fact that we were fighting side by side in the emotional atmosphere of a hot war. Today the alliance has to be carried on in a cold war without that atmosphere. The strains are much greater.

Secondly we have to work this alliance under democratic conditions. Totalitarian Communism has a great advantage here. The Iron Curtain countries do not argue in public; with the exception of China, the others probably do not argue with Russia at all. The Kremlin decides. Between the democracies, on the other hand, not only are there continual arguments, but these are frequently carried on in public, with all the opportunities thereby presented for stimulating ill feeling and bad blood.

Demagogues in both America and Britain take full advantage of their freedom to exploit the mutually hostile feelings which exist in the two countries. They often do so, not with any malicious intentions, but for internal political reasons. When an American Congressman attacks Britain, or a left-wing Socialist denounces America, it is mostly because he thinks it will make him popular or win him votes or strengthen his position in his party. But speeches of this kind, eagerly picked up in the press of the two countries because they are "news," can do much harm to good relations between us, and sometimes, because public opinion is influential, directly affect foreign policy.

Another handicap is the restriction which democracy imposes upon its leaders in conducting their policy towards other nations. When Mr. Molotov goes to an international conference he can take whatever line he chooses without regard to public opinion. As Foreign Minister, so long as he carries with him the support of the effective dictator of Russia, he has nothing to fear. How different is the position on the democratic side! Even in Britain, where owing to the two-party system and party discipline the government can generally be sure of carrying its own view, it must all the time watch the reaction of the public and think in terms of a future general election.

The United States Government suffers much greater disabilities. Although an administration does not have to fear actual defeat or dismissal, it is often in a very weak position because of its peculiar relations with Congress. To an outsider, at least, this weakness seems to derive from the Constitution, according to which the administration is not the whole of the government but only its executive arm. Moreover, the legislature, which technically shares the responsibility of government, is an indepen-

dent body, expecting to play an important part in the formulation of policy, and yet not tied to the government, like the British House of Commons, by strict party discipline. It is hard enough for a government which has full control of the legislature at home to conduct a foreign policy in coöperation with other countries. It becomes infinitely more difficult when there is no certainty at all that such control exists. Moreover, it is not always clear where the responsibility lies for presenting foreign policy. The members of Congress—especially the Senate—make declarations which are treated as having great weight, though they seem often to be made without even the information, much of it secret, upon which foreign policy has to be based. No wonder American policy sometimes seems to us in Europe a rather incoherent affair.

But these difficulties do not in themselves explain the changes in Anglo-American relations, and in particular the increasing friction which has recently occurred. I believe that this friction is due largely to basic misunderstandings about different points of view held by each country, of which the other was not aware until the march of events suddenly, as it were, tore the veil aside. It is best of all to have no disagreements, but if they exist—and some are inevitable—the harm they do is greatly diminished if they are fully recognized and known in advance. The real shock to friendly relations is when you find that your partner is not what you thought he was.

There is a danger of this kind even in connection with the most generally accepted principle of common foreign policy—the idea of "collective security;" and confusion on the subject is not confined to one country, but exists in both.

There are two distinct versions of this idea. There is first the idea of extending to the international scene the maintenance of law and order observed within any one state. The picture is that of a criminal nation which commits aggression being dealt with by *all* the other nations. In its simplest and most abstract form there is some kind of judicial procedure by an "impartial" body, as well as an "international police force."

Ideas of this kind still have a very wide appeal in Britain. When people speak of having faith in the United Nations to preserve peace, they are thinking on these lines. Unfortunately the ideas have little relevance to the real problems of today. In the United Nations, the existence of the right of veto means that the

Security Council is hamstrung whenever one of the major Powers is itself an alleged aggressor, or sides with the alleged aggressor. Nor would the problem be solved merely by the abandonment of the veto. For this would not mean that everyone would obey a majority decision. Such a decision would have some standing if the majority were large enough, but it would not have that flavor of absolute righteousness which the earlier ideas of collective security through unanimous action really embodied.

Because of the obvious weaknesses and unrealities in these earlier ideas, a new conception has now emerged. On the whole, both Britain and America accept this new conception, but with some divergencies. The official British point of view about the United Nations is that it is now really a forum, that it should accordingly be universal, that the veto rule must be preserved, and that it cannot really be regarded as an effective instrument of collective security. Such security is to be found instead in regional defense pacts, which are provided for in the Charter, even if they are not exactly part of the United Nations machinery.

The United States, on the other hand, has more hope, I judge, of the United Nations as at least a potential instrument of collective security, though only on the basis of majority decisions. This preference for at least an "old-fashioned" look is no doubt because the American public opinion prefers it that way, though whether after Korea this is still the case remains to be seen. There are many in England who share this preference for collective security being carried out through the United Nations, but majority decisions do not altogether satisfy them. They have, rather, a lingering hope that somehow or other the original conception of collective security can be restored. They do not like the idea of group against group, alliance against alliance; they want to see at least some kind of judicial flavor, some element of impartiality, introduced into the proceedings. For this reason, they often favor bringing the so-called neutral states into the picture, since precisely because of their neutrality they bring back the idea of detached judgment in place of the clash of world forces.

At the same time most British people, realizing the difficulties, have come to accept the necessity of regional defensive pacts. The parties of the Left in Britain became quite accustomed to this from 1935 onwards, when, following the fiasco of Abyssinia, it became obvious that the League of Nations was useless as an instrument for maintaining peace. In the postwar period, the

principle of NATO has been questioned by practically nobody in Britain except the negligible Communist Party; and there is a widespread understanding of the important part which the building up of the strength of the West has played in deterring Russia from further aggressive moves in Europe.

Indeed, it can be said with confidence that in the field of collective security NATO has been an outstanding success. The only serious source of friction associated with it has sprung from the handling of the German problem. It is worth pausing for a moment to consider the reasons.

This problem was bound to be exceptionally difficult because of its complexity, and because of the strong passions which it rouses. The extraordinary confusion of motives in almost all European countries for supporting or opposing German rearmament and E.D.C. has left too clear a field to emotionalism. But could not this have been anticipated?

Looking back, many of us feel that it was a great disadvantage that the problem of a revived Germany and her relationship to Western Europe should have first been approached via the issue of rearmament. The year 1950 was a dangerous one, and it was natural that the threat of Soviet aggression in Europe should lead to a demand for German rearmament. It is understandable that the American defense chiefs should have refused to commit American troops to Europe without a clear understanding that they were eventually going to be supported by German forces in the line. At the same time, one cannot but feel that too little understanding was shown in America of the positively traumatic significance which German rearmament had for millions of people in France and Britain. Had American leaders been aware of this they might not have pressed the military argument so far. As things have turned out, that argument does not look very impressive today. For, three and a half years later, there are no German forces in the line, the tension in Europe has diminished and the strength of the West has greatly increased. But because the original arguments for German rearmament appear so wholly discredited, the case for it now is correspondingly weakened; and by association of ideas, if not in strict logic, the proposal for E.D.C. itself is heavily undermined.

There would probably today be a far better chance for the acceptance of E.D.C. if the problem had arisen not because the United States took the initiative in forcing the other countries in

NATO to accept German rearmament, but because Germany, already recovered from the war, took the initiative in requesting from the Allies her independence and freedom once again. There might then have been negotiated some such arrangement as is in fact envisaged in E.D.C. The rest of Europe would have known that the alternative was probably a German national army in the fairly near future. They might then have realized, as they do not today, that unless they were prepared to back Germany in a subordinate position indefinitely the choice must indeed become one of German freedom to have her own national army or her voluntary incorporation in some European system. It is possible, even if the French reject E.D.C., that a second chance to approach the problem in this way will emerge. If so, it is profoundly important that it should be taken, and that it should not be thrown away by any premature insistence by the United States that Germany should forthwith become a member of NATO.

After this brief comment on the specific problem of Germany, I return to the more general issues of collective security. What stands out is that, apart from NATO, it has hardly been applied at all. There is the sixteen-nation declaration about Korea; and there are the series of pacts made by the United States in the Western Pacific, including the ANZUS Pact. But no collective security arrangements have existed for the two most dangerous areas outside Europe: the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Only now, when at last there is a dawning realization of the implications of Communist domination extending southeast and southwest from Indo-China, have the Western Powers begun to consider seriously what might be done in Southeast Asia. In the Middle East the only progress made has been the Turkish-Pakistan Pact, which by military standards amounts to extremely little.

It is not difficult to see why there have been such delays in extending collective security to these parts of the world. In the first place, the peoples of the Middle East and of South Asia are neither linked as closely with each other or with the West as are the peoples of Western Europe. It is very much harder to persuade them to join together in an alliance of their own, and, for a variety of reasons, even more difficult to persuade some of them to be closely linked with the Western democracies.

Secondly, these may fairly be described as "colonial areas." They include specifically colonial territories, such as Malaya, Borneo and Indo-China; territories which until recently were col-

onies, such as Indonesia, India and Pakistan; and territories—in the Middle East especially—where the relationship between the country in question and one or more Western Powers is or was akin to the colonial relationship. The existence of this colonial-type relationship makes it harder to build collective security in an area, partly because in some cases the peoples in question are actively campaigning for their independence, partly because even when they have their independence they are suspicious of the previous colonial Power, and partly because there is some reluctance on the part of the present or previous colonial Powers to share their responsibilities and their influence with others. For all these reasons it was difficult for Britain to guarantee a French colony such as Indo-China, for example, while for a long time the French themselves showed no enthusiasm for other Powers coming upon the scene. In the Middle East, Great Britain proposed joint action, but only reluctantly, and after a good deal of opposition from her own diplomatic and military circles, who were not too pleased at the idea of America playing an active part in an area which had been for so long a sphere of British influence.

Special reference must be made to the problem of India. Although the grant of independence came just in time to make possible friendly relations between India and the United Kingdom, and with this the maintenance of important ties between the two countries, nevertheless the Indian Government—and the same is true of Pakistan and Ceylon—are opposed in principle to what they call "colonialism." Their friendship for Britain, and possibly their greater knowledge of the real problems, causes the criticisms to be somewhat muted in the case of Malaya, and to be concentrated all the more on other colonial Powers such as France and Holland.

This opposition to colonialism is combined in the case of India with a neutralist foreign policy. Having won her independence so recently, India takes a leaf out of America's book and would like to see a new Monroe Doctrine applied to the sub-continent. She does not wish to take sides in the cold war; she wishes to continue her economic development without having to carry the heavy burdens of defense. She feels that she can trust the vast mountain barriers and deserts which surround most of her frontiers to serve as an adequate protection, and she is inclined to take a much more optimistic view of the intentions of Communist China than do the Western Powers. For Britain, this constitutes a special prob-

lem. If the Commonwealth is to maintain its unity, Britain cannot easily carry out a policy in South Asia to which India is strongly opposed. On the other hand, this does not mean that India must have a veto on any kind of security arrangements which may be arrived at.

The United States itself was for long very cautious about accepting commitments on the mainland of Asia—other than in Korea. For example, Britain was excluded from the ANZUS Pact, not because of any objection on the part of Australia and New Zealand but because if Britain were a signatory the United States would automatically have been committed to the defense of Malaya, Hong Kong and any other British Colonies in the area covered. Two and a half years later, American policy has apparently swung right over towards full collective security, covering almost any part of the mainland of South and Southeast Asia. The fact that this change has been so recent, however, inevitably makes some of the other potential partners a little suspicious as to whether American opinion has really accepted it.

It is hardly surprising in the light of all this that when trouble develops in these areas, the alliance does not stand up to it well. As the Indo-China situation deteriorated, the Western allies found themselves in a position where nothing whatever had been planned in advance, where no commitments had been expected, where a policy of hope and drift had been almost deliberately pursued, and where accordingly the greatest scope for misunderstanding was allowed to exist. Precisely the same situation would almost certainly happen if the Communists managed to stir up trouble in the Middle East. For instance, if as at one point seemed only too likely, Persia had gradually come under Communist control, it is more than doubtful whether any one of the Allies would have acted in time to prevent the loss of the territory, with very grave consequences to the whole strategic situation in the Middle East and indeed to the future war potential of the West. On the other hand, had the countries as well as the governments concerned thought out these possibilities and faced up to them, then it is at least possible that sensible security arrangements might have been arrived at—though this would have been far more difficult in any case than the establishment of NATO.

There lies behind all this an even more basic problem which the democracies have not really yet faced. In the policy of containing Communist imperialist aggression, exactly what line or

lines are the Western Powers prepared to hold, and how can they accept the obligation to do so in a manner which will be acceptable to public opinion in their countries? This fundamental issue comes out most clearly in the great debate which has been going on continuously in the United States for the past two years—though something of the same kind has also been happening in France and Britain. In all three countries, the Governments are under great pressure to try and find a policy which allows the people who elected them to have it both ways—to have their cake and eat it too.

There is a general desire to check Communist aggression. But there is also a crusade to reduce taxation, which in fact can only be done by cutting back the defense program. There is an even greater unwillingness to commit American troops to fighting anywhere outside Europe and the American continent. Are these things compatible?

In attempting to solve the problem Americans have recently brought forward two propositions. The first is that the Asians should fight their own battles, though with plenty of help from the West in munitions and equipment. Outside of Korea this idea has been received nowhere with any enthusiasm. Moreover, it offers only too much scope for Communist propaganda, since it can be represented as an American scheme to employ Asian mercenaries to fight their own battles against Communism. It is extremely doubtful whether, until anti-Communist feeling has developed much further than it has so far in Asia, such a policy is likely to succeed.

The second proposal, more recently put forward, is that of "massive retaliation," implying that if there is aggression then the United States will come in, but only by atomic air attack. This policy has even less chance of success than the first. It simply could not be carried out for geographical and physical reasons in some territories, of which Indo-China is an obvious example, unless what is meant is that there would be an out-and-out atomic war on the whole of China.

But this brings out even more clearly the second great objection to it, which is the fear that massive retaliation by the United States on China would produce a massive Russian and Chinese retaliation on all the allies of the United States and possibly on the United States itself. This fear, which of course has been enormously enhanced by the explosion of the hydrogen bomb, makes

it quite impossible for the allies of the United States to accept the policy; and indeed it is extremely doubtful whether the American people themselves, when really faced with the alternative, would have seriously contemplated it. But the mere announcement of this new American policy, which has had to be so rapidly discarded, had very bad effects on America's relations with her allies. It certainly frightened them more than her enemies. A little more consultation would have avoided this.

If it has been difficult to organize collective security outside Europe, even greater difficulties have confronted the alliance in what may be described as "collective diplomacy"—*i.e.* negotiation by the Western democracies, acting as a group, with the Communist nations. The inherent complications which confront a number of nations, even when closely linked by defense pacts, in negotiating as a group with the monolithic totalitarian dictatorships, are greatly aggravated by certain basic differences in the American and Briton. For example, the American attitude to the Communist Powers is one of extreme hostility. There is in the United States a virtual anti-Communist crusade. Possibly the change from isolationism was acceptable to American public opinion only on this basis, in which case it may not be so easy to maintain it in more "normal" peacetime conditions.

Undoubtedly, however, the war in Korea played a great part in exciting public opinion. While the fighting continued, and heavy American casualties were occurring, it was natural to think of the Chinese Communists as the enemy and easy enough to extend this conception to the whole of the Soviet and her satellites. "Why," I was asked a year or two ago in the United States, "do you persist in trading with the enemy?" My reply that neither Britain nor the United States was officially at war with anybody, and certainly not with Russia, was received with a look of blank incomprehension. With this kind of background, any American Secretary of State is bound to approach a proposal to negotiate with the Communists extremely gingerly. He must at all costs avoid giving the impression to his American public that he is being soft or surrendering to the enemy. Moreover, there will be plenty of people in prominent positions who will do their best to stop him by banging doors and slamming windows even before the negotiations begin. In addition to all this, there also exists some suspicion of diplomacy as such, natural enough in a country with a long record of isolationism. The old traditional

fear that the foreigners will be too clever, and that Uncle Sam will be done down by intrigue and deceit, still lingers on.

In Britain, on the other hand, the same anti-Communist feelings have never been so strong or so widespread. There is a cool recognition of the danger of Communist aggression; and at home both the Labor Party and the Trade Unions take a firm line to prevent Communist infiltration. There is an understanding that we are fighting Communism in Malaya; and there was very general approval for our participation in the Korean war. But, because of the relatively small number of British troops involved, Korea was never really looked on in Britain as a hot war. Perhaps it might have made for better Anglo-American relations if the British forces in Korea had been increased and American troops had taken over some of Britain's responsibilities in other parts of the world.

The difference in our attitude to China is well known. There are not a few who, while willing to condemn China for entering the war in North Korea, honestly feel that General MacArthur's advance to the Yalu River was as much a cause of this as the imminent defeat of the North Korean forces. Behind these lingering doubts about the significance of Chinese aggression, there is also the hope that China might be detached from Russia, or at least that there will be rivalries between China and Russia which it should be the business of the Western Powers to try to exploit.

There is, too, the conviction that however much we may disapprove of the Communist dictatorship, we should not get ourselves into the position of trying to impose democracy upon the world, that a war to do anything of this kind would in fact settle nothing, that however regrettable from some points of view it may seem, and particularly to those unfortunate people living behind the Iron Curtain, we just have to accept coexistence with the Communist Powers as a necessary part of our policy. With all this background, the British statesman, in order to reassure public opinion, has to think of showing not that he can be tough, but on the contrary that he really is trying to reach a settlement with the Communist Powers.

Our attitude to diplomacy is also rather different. We have had to practise it over the centuries. We know that it is necessary, and that it is a pretty delicate business. So there is a fairly widespread disposition to leave the Government with room to ma-

nœuvre, provided there is no fundamental disagreement on policy.

Finally, it seems to us obvious that negotiations are necessary, and that we cannot just stand pat and refuse to talk, not only for the reasons mentioned, but for two others. First, where actual fighting occurs or is very likely to break out, then unless we are prepared for a purely military solution, negotiation is a necessity; and we may have to reject the purely military solution either on the grounds that we have not got the power to win, or that even if we do win it will not solve anything. Secondly, we have to negotiate if the existing situation is seriously unstable and unacceptable to our friends. They need to be given confidence that we are trying our best to help them. That is why we cannot just refuse to negotiate on, for example, Germany or Austria or Trieste. We have to reassure our friends and we have to anticipate trouble.

With all these difficulties it may seem surprising, not that relations between America and Britain sometimes become strained, but that the alliance survives at all. Yet it would be a great mistake to be complacent. The chief credit for the strength of Anglo-American partnership goes to the Kremlin. If Soviet foreign policy became more subtle, better informed, more patient—and there are some signs of this now—it might very easily weaken that partnership to danger point. It is worth considering, therefore, what can be done to counter this. What are the lessons to be learnt from the experience of the past five years? I single out only two; but both are important.

First, there is an urgent need for both governments to do more thinking ahead, and to do it together. Even if this reveals difficulties, it is far better that they should be brought to the surface now than be allowed to emerge suddenly later on. At worst, familiarity with their existence will diminish the harm they do to good relations; and at best, discussion may lead to their disappearance. There should therefore be continual joint discussions on long-term policy. These discussions should be at first completely private. Otherwise the fear of being misunderstood by public opinion will be a completely inhibiting factor. They should be conducted through "the normal diplomatic channels" by trusted senior civil servants and ambassadors who can keep in touch with and reflect the views of their government. At a later stage they may call for "ministerial" talks; and, what is even more important, they may involve the preparation of public

opinion for some important policy move. For in foreign policy particularly it is the duty of governments to lead, not abjectly to follow, the prejudices of the day.

What sort of subjects? It would be easy to make a long list. But four questions especially seem to me to call for urgent joint examination. First, what is to be the policy of the occupying Powers to Germany if France rejects the E.D.C.? It is well understood that this question cannot be discussed in public until France has made her decision, because of the effect it might have on that decision. But this should not prevent frank private conversations with a view to reaching some agreement. A failure to do this may lead to confusion, embarrassment and serious public disputes later on.

Secondly, is it really impossible to hammer out a joint policy for the Middle East? We all understand the difficulties, but we should also not forget the dangers.

Thirdly, assuming "coexistence," what is to be our policy toward Communist China? This is, of course, the most explosive subject. But that should mean not that it must be ignored, only that it must be handled with care. Under what conditions, for example, would the United States recognize Communist China? What is the long-term policy for Formosa? How do we envisage relations developing between Japan and China? What sort of relationship should we like to see between them?

My fourth is more general. If the policy of "containment" is accepted, just what lines are we really prepared to hold? And what arrangements are needed so as to ensure that we can hold them?

It would of course be foolish to expect that in such vitally important questions, which in turn lead on to others, clear-cut agreements can easily be reached. But the effort should be made nonetheless—and made sincerely. A few casual talks will not be enough.

My second conclusion really follows from the first. If discussions on long-term policy are to be fruitful, then those who take part in them must be able to speak with authority. This implies both that the administrations must have the necessary power, and also that there must be some continuity in foreign policy. Neither object is very easy to achieve under democratic conditions. In theory at least parliaments are supreme, and can reject what governments propose; and a new government may

wish to escape from commitments entered into by its predecessor.

Nevertheless in Britain this is not really a major problem. Party discipline and the two-party system normally ensure that the government can carry the legislature with it. Parliament, to be sure, must be kept informed and given a chance to express its views; and those views must be taken into account by the government. But subject to this a British Government has a fair measure of authority in foreign affairs. As for continuity, there is a tradition that commitments entered into by previous governments must be accepted, though this does not mean that no changes in policy are possible. There is no "bipartism" arrangement, and the Opposition retains and will always retain its freedom. But in practice in postwar Britain there has been so far a large measure of agreement. The Conservative Government took over and carried on the policies of the Labor Government; and what they have done has met in the main with the approval of the Opposition, despite the fact that it has been done by Conservatives.

Of the situation in the United States I speak with diffidence. But to a foreigner the problem appears much more difficult. Earlier in this article I referred to its constitutional aspect, and especially to the relationship between the Administration and Congress. This certainly seems recently to have exercised a very hampering effect on the freedom of the President and Mr. Dulles to conduct foreign policy. One has the impression, too, that the McCarthy witch hunting has inhibited the members of the foreign service from expressing their minds freely on policy. It is not for an Englishman to tell Americans how to solve their own political problems. I can only say that from our point of view we should welcome a greater unity in the thought about United States foreign policy and in the presentation of it, and my impression is that until this is achieved, both as between the Administration and the legislature and as between the parties, the working out of a common policy between Britain and America will continue to be gravely handicapped.

# JAPAN TACKLES HER PROBLEMS

*By John D. Rockefeller, 3rd*

THE Japanese economy today is in difficulties, and they are increasing. While there are many encouraging elements in the situation, a continuation of present trends cannot go on indefinitely without serious consequences. Thus time is a real factor in the situation.

Japan's economic structure, like that of any great nation today, is composed of many complicated and interrelated parts and hence does not lend itself to simple generalizations. Possibly the easiest way to show this is to outline a few of the difficulties which struck me in the course of a recent visit.

At the present time approximately one-half of all that Japan earns from her exports is needed to pay for indispensable food imports. In 1953 she paid out nearly $600,000,000 to foreign countries for food while her total exports were approximately 1.2 billion dollars. During 1954 imports of food are likely to be even higher because of poor harvests, due to adverse weather conditions in the 1953–54 crop year. The cost of feeding her 87,000,000 people thus imposes a very heavy priority burden on the national economy. Despite intensive agricultural practices, and yields which are among the highest in the world, Japan must still import 20 to 25 percent of the food her people consume.

The one-sided character of Japan's trade with certain important countries is another of Japan's difficulties—one that is greatly magnified by current limitations on exchange convertibility. For example, currently Japan buys about $105,000,000 worth of goods from Canada and sells only $15,000,000 worth in that country. She buys more than $700,000,000 from the United States but sells only $258,000,000 worth to us (of course, special receipts in the form of U. S. Government and troop spending more than offset this imbalance in commercial trade). In the Philippines and Australia the story is the same: Japan spends almost $50,000,000 in the former and receives $24,000,000 for her exports, while she buys $175,000,000 worth from Australia and sells $9,000,000.

Japan's foreign trade is the life-blood of her economy. Her economic viability depends upon her being able to export a sufficient volume of goods and services to provide the foreign ex-

change needed to buy essential imports. To accomplish this she must both increase the volume of her exports and attempt to balance her trade within each of the several currency areas. Since Japan is one of the most important buyers of the world, it is not unreasonable to suggest that if the Japanese market is to continue and grow, those who trade with Japan must buy substantially from her as well as sell heavily to her.

A result of Japan's present economic difficulties is that, beginning last year, she was obliged to draw on her reserve of foreign currency. This reserve had reached a peak of more than one billion dollars in 1952, but is now down to about $700,000,000 and faces further inroads this year. An important factor in this decline is the unfavorable trend of Japanese trade with the sterling area. Exports from Japan to this area fell from $613,000,000 in 1951 to $335,000,000 in 1953, while imports to Japan rose from $473,000,000 in 1951 to $568,000,000 in 1953. Thus a favorable balance with the area of $140,000,000 in 1951 has now been transformed to a deficit of $233,000,000. Another reason for the depletion of the exchange reserve was the 1953 boom in domestic consumption in Japan. While Japan's total exports were slightly lower than the two preceding years, imports were nearly $500,000,000 larger. A further factor is the need for increased imports of food. In 1954 the exchange fund may fall to $500,000,000—the minimum which some Japanese consider possible for sound trade operations. It will be remembered that the fund was originally built up largely through special procurement for Korea by the United States and the United Nations, and from troop spending, which taken together ran at a rate of approximately $800,000,000 annually from mid-1950.

The final indication of the seriousness of Japan's economic outlook is the increasing difficulty her manufacturers are having in meeting price competition in foreign markets. Before the Second World War, Japanese exports were largely raw silk and cotton textiles. With the development of the many other new fabrics the silk market has been all but lost; and as the underdeveloped countries become better able to meet their own textile needs, the total international cotton textile market is shrinking, and this just at a time when Japanese, American, British and Indian competition is becoming more keen.

Japan has been trying to meet this situation by making an important shift in her exports. Today the emphasis is on

heavy industry and chemicals—steel, ships, machinery, cement, chemical fertilizers—to mention a few. But in the sale of these products Japan often finds it difficult to meet the prices of her foreign competitors. For example, West Germany has been a severe competitor for the South and Southeast Asian markets in steel, machinery and equipment, while Italy has been underselling Japan in chemical fertilizers. The Japanese are generally thought of as a nation of low-cost producers, and in the textile field they still are. But in heavy goods and chemicals Japan is a higher-cost producer than her major competitors.

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These, then, are some of the problems which confront the Japanese people and which Americans must understand. It seems clear that the increase of Japan's exports is the key to the situation. Such exports must be won in competitive markets. There are a variety of factors which make it far more difficult for Japan today to maintain her position in international competition than was the case in the past.

Generally speaking, Japan's industrial plant needs to be modernized. According to data submitted to the International Bank by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 60 percent of the plant facilities in the caustic soda industry are more than 20 years old; and 80 percent in cement manufacture, 35 percent in machine tool manufacture, 36 percent in open hearth steel and 80 percent in power generation are likewise out of date. Moreover, as a result of the war and the occupation, Japanese businessmen have been somewhat delayed in the adoption of certain efficient modern business techniques. Cost accounting, for example, is not widely utilized. Corporate expenses, particularly for executive personnel, are often high. And though the pay per man is low throughout industry, the manpower cost per unit of production is high.

There have been other developments which, though constructive in themselves, complicate the picture. The postwar unionization of Japanese labor and the passage of protective labor legislation such as the Labor Standards Law are clearly social gains, yet they have increased the cost of labor. In principle, higher paid labor should be more productive, but productivity in Japan has not increased proportionately, since there has not been commensurate investment in modern equipment. For example, the man-

hour requirement in smeltering a ton of pig-iron is double that of Britain and seven times that of the United States. Then too, the postwar breaking up of large Japanese industrial units, whatever its ultimate merit, has raised production costs. This is particularly true during a period when plants have been operating at less than capacity. Some reamalgamation has occurred in the last two years but not enough to affect production costs significantly.

On top of these developments has come inflation, with all the problems which it brings. Two may be noted in particular. Domestic inflation, which tends to make the home market more profitable than foreign markets, has deterred manufacturers from making an aggressive effort to seek wider foreign outlets. The extent to which Japanese prices outrun those of competitor nations may be seen in the following table:

INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES[1]

(1948 = 100)

| | 1950 | 1951 | 1952 | 1953 | 1954* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Japan | 193 | 268 | 273 | 277 | 288 |
| West Germany | 94 | 112 | 114 | 111 | 110 |
| Great Britain | 120 | 146 | 149 | 150 | 149 |
| Italy | 90 | 103 | 97 | 96 | 97 |
| United States | 99 | 110 | 107 | 105 | 106 |
| India | 109 | 120 | 105 | 107 | 109 |

* January 1954

Furthermore, inflation has created a shortage of both working capital and fixed capital, and the average interest for a short-term commercial bank loan is 10 percent. As a result, short-term credits extended by banks to industry have been used for long-term capital purposes, which means that the loans must be frequently renewed. Lack of capital and high interest rates are among the most serious of Japanese economic ills. Before the war industry by and large generated its own capital for expansion.

Depletion of limited natural resources, particularly significant in the cases of coal and timber, is a further handicap. Operating conditions in coal mining have worsened considerably since World War II; more and more of the mining is done under the ocean and at uneconomic depths 300 meters or more below the surface. And linked with the lack of natural resources are the problems resulting from the loss of certain areas which had become an

[1] *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, United Nations, April 1954, Table 50.

integral part of the prewar Japanese economy. This loss has intensified foreign trade difficulties by increasing the need for imported food, by reducing outlets for consumer goods, and by necessitating the import of essential raw materials from more distant sources at greater costs for transportation.

Finally, I should mention the discrimination that has been practised against Japanese goods in foreign markets in the postwar period. Japan is a member of no trading bloc; tariff barriers and lack of most-favored nation treatment are serious handicaps to her. In the prewar period, foreign-exchange earnings by Japan in any currency were generally convertible, and this permitted a certain flexibility and manœuvrability in trade which is now lacking.

This cataloguing of problems is by no means complete. Some are problems with which Japan can and must deal herself, as the Japanese are becoming increasingly aware. Their Government has under way an austerity program which includes curtailing budget expenditures, cutting back imports and reducing government investments. At the same time the central bank has taken firm action to tighten credit and reduce the supply of money. In addition, shifts in taxation have been undertaken to curtail domestic buying.

This program is well conceived. The objective is to end inflationary pressures, reduce prices and restrict home consumption. A further aim is to encourage exports at lower prices, and by restricting unessential imports to bring about a better balance in the country's external payments. This is a courageous approach to Japan's economic problems. If the Government is to carry it out, much fortitude must be shown since it is bound temporarily to diminish the artificial and inflated economic well-being of the Japanese people in favor of a better adjustment of Japan's international economic position. In the long run, of course, the Japanese people will greatly benefit, for their Government is taking steps that will go a long way towards putting the economy on a basis which will enable it to compete effectively for world markets.

Simply stated, Japan's immediate economic problem is to increase her foreign exports to the point where withdrawal from her exchange reserve will cease. Her somewhat longer-range problem is further to build up her exports to offset the very substantial temporary assistance which she has been receiving from funds

provided by procurement for the United States armed forces and by troop spending. Until both of these objectives have been accomplished, a substantial proportion of Japan's foreign exchange resources will depend upon non-commercial considerations.

To express the foregoing in terms of dollars for the year ending March 31, 1954, we must note that Japan's imports totaled $2,242,000,000 while her exports were $1,244,000,000, leaving a trade gap of $998,000,000. In short, Japan's commercial trade is out of balance by approximately one billion dollars. Largely through funds provided by United States procurement and troop spending, the over-all balance of payments deficit is brought down to $313,000,000, the amount drawn from the foreign currency reserve fund. Since the outside assistance cannot be counted on indefinitely and since the foreign currency reserve is limited in amount, the needed increase of one billion dollars in commercial exports seems a necessary goal which Japan must strive to attain during the next several years.

III

As has been already stated, the problem of Japan's economy is complex. Many factors have bearing on it: economic, political, and psychological; international as well as national. In the international field, two should be noted particularly—the question of reparations, and the problem of Indo-China.

For many months now Japan has been negotiating with the governments of the Philippines, Indonesia and Burma concerning the settlement of reparations claims. Very substantial sums have been requested. The Philippines originally asked for 8 billion dollars and Indonesia 17 billion. While Burma never officially specified a figure, the amount informally indicated was proportionately high. These sums, while understandable from the point of view of the war-damaged countries, are considered by the Japanese to be unrealistic in terms of Japan's ability to pay. From the point of view of all concerned, settlement of these negotiations is important so that normal political and economic relations can be resumed. Understandably, however, progress toward a settlement is slow.

The three countries have been pressing Japan for substantial cash payments. Japan on the other hand has placed the emphasis on meeting these obligations through the performance of services. Pending a final solution it is understood some progress is being

made in the development of interim proposals. For example, negotiations are being carried on in the Philippines whereby Japan would assist that country in growing rice, aiding the Filipinos to increase the acreage given to rice and the production per acre. A very considerable contribution might be made in this way by the Japanese, since in Japan the average production of rice per acre is three times that in the Philippines. Increased food output would not only save the Philippines valuable foreign exchange but also provide Japan with another source of rice supply. Closer economic collaboration among the Asian countries is clearly to the advantage of all concerned. As a result of the Second World War and modern communications, the people of Asia recognize that it is possible for them to have a better life through their own efforts. Their leaders are working for this under great difficulties. A dynamic expanding foreign trade offers one of the most hopeful and important means of attainment.

I must at least mention a second international problem which has bearing on Japan's future, both economic and otherwise —Indo-China. That problem is in an acute phase as I write these lines, and the future is still uncertain. However, as I came away from the Far East in March, it was my strong feeling that what happens in Indo-China is of vital importance to all of Asia. Japan will not be spared from the impact of developments there. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated on March 29, 1954: "Southeast Asia is . . . the so-called 'rice bowl' which helps to feed the densely populated region that extends from India to Japan. It is an area that is rich in many raw materials such as tin, rubber, oil, iron ore. It offers Japan a potentially most important market and source of raw materials. . . . Under the conditions of today the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community."

IV

Three national factors affecting Japan's economy require special mention. There are four main parties struggling for political dominance in Japan today—the Liberals, the Progressives, and the Left and Right Wing Socialists. The trend of recent elections has been such that no one party has had a majority. Currently there has been talk of a merger of the Liberal and

Progressive Parties. Those who advocate such a merger believe that it will strengthen the hands of government to deal with the complex problems confronting it. In this connection it must be remembered that with a worsening economic situation the opportunity for the extremists increases.

Overpopulation is, of course, an ever-present domestic problem. As has often been pointed out, the total area of Japan today is slightly less than that of the state of California, and only 16 percent is arable. If California were as densely inhabited as Japan, her population would be 93,500,000, or 60 percent of the present population of the United States. In this connection it is interesting to note that the birth rate in Japan is now lower than that in the United States (in 1953 it was 21.5 for Japan compared to 24.7 for the United States) while the death rate is about the same (8.9 for Japan compared to 9.6 for the United States). Furthermore, Japan's birth rate has been declining in recent years. However, in absolute numbers the population is increasing by more than 1,000,000 a year, which suggests that before too many years the total for the four islands will reach 100,000,000. To feed, clothe and sustain such a population Japan must obviously have an expanding foreign trade.

Finally there are the psychological factors. Recently in Tokyo I spent an interesting evening with several Japanese who emphasized the fact that Japan is still in the process of regaining the confidence and self-respect which she lost as a result of the war. There is still a feeling of sensitivity and insecurity. Sovereignty was regained two years ago, and the Japanese very naturally are keen to stand on their own feet. At the same time, they recognize that for some time they must by necessity look to the United States to a certain extent for security and economic assistance.

In this situation many Japanese see—or rather feel—elements of conflict, which cause considerable concern and unhappiness, not to mention a sense of frustration. One often hears criticism in Japan to the effect that the United States is exerting undue influence in Japanese affairs through the presence of U. S. troops, and because of the American attitude on Japanese rearmament and trade with the Communist mainland. This situation is one which it is most important for Americans to understand. It must be remembered, for one thing, that many in Japan have been relatively out of touch with the rest of the world for 15 years or

more. As a result the information which they have available and on which they must rely in forming opinions does not always portray accurately current conditions in today's rapidly changing world. With the increasing exchange of peoples and publications between Japan and other countries the situation is improving, but its existence must be recognized.

Another element in Japan's present mood is the fact that all basic decisions were made for the Japanese people during the war years (and for some time before) and that this reliance on a central authority continued during the Occupation. Now, after only two years of regained sovereignty, the Japanese are faced with many very difficult problems. It is not surprising that at first there may be some hesitancy in tackling problems for which others carried the responsibility for so long.

One hears considerable talk about anti-American feeling in Japan today. To understand it one must bear these psychological factors in mind. It is not directed at the American people as individuals but rather at policies of the United States, which many Japanese feel infringe on their sovereignty. Under the circumstances, it would be much more surprising to me if there were little or no anti-American feeling than that there should be a considerable amount of it. One must remember also that every irritation or grievance that can in any way be attributed to the Americans is magnified and propagandized by an aggressive minority in Japan.

## V

As has been suggested, the crux of Japan's present problem is the need to find about one billion dollars more of commercial exports, and thus to attain a viable economy. This amount will be adequate to protect her exchange reserve and gradually to replace the temporary and special aid which she has been receiving. Looking ahead, however, we must recognize that such an amount will not be nearly enough to meet the needs of Japan's rapidly growing population or to make possible the increased standard of living for which the people are so naturally striving.

The task of meeting immediate needs as well as providing a base for future growth is formidable but not insurmountable. Three of the many elements of strength upon which to draw stand out particularly.

First, Japan with her demonstrated genius for production, her

capacity for hard work, her inherent thrift and her competence in world trade has in the past proved her ability to earn her own way unless barred by discriminatory restrictions. In the years since the war her businessmen and workers have made substantial and impressive progress towards increasing production and trade.

Second, the strength of free economies lies in the fact that they are based upon the concept of expansion and growth. National economies so oriented are expanding, not static. The recent spectacular growth of the Canadian economy is an outstanding example of this principle at work. As these economies grow they will be able to absorb imports on a scale which now would appear impossible of achievement. Japan can benefit greatly from such growth.

Third, more than a billion people on this side of the Iron Curtain live in the areas that are classified as "underdeveloped." If the nations that are relatively advanced economically have the wisdom to help these peoples to realize their inherent potentials, the scope for enlarging economic production and trade will be more than enough to accommodate in full measure Japan's needs and aspirations as well as those of other nations whose economies depend on foreign trade. This will, of course, take many years to accomplish.

While, as has been said, Japan alone can find the answer to some of her problems, there are others which depend for their solution on the understanding and coöperation of other countries. This applies particularly to the expansion of foreign trade. A relatively small expansion in total world trade would provide Japan with an opportunity to achieve her required additional export volume. A concerted effort on the part of all countries to achieve currency convertibility, a reduction of trade barriers, progressive elimination of trade and exchange controls, and the like, should make possible a considerable expansion of world trade over the next few years. If this is done, and if simultaneously Japan takes the necessary steps to increase efficiency and productivity, to introduce modern techniques and procedures, to restrain further inflation and generally adopts such other measures as may be necessary to make her products truly competitive in world markets—then there is no need to be pessimistic about the future of Japan.

Japan's problem is the concern of all the members of the com-

munity of nations. Their individual and joint interests will be best served by the attainment of an effective solution; favors and charity are not involved. Unless we can fashion a world economy which offers each member nation an opportunity for genuine economic progress—a dynamic upward trend that is translated into continuingly improved living standards for the masses of its population—we cannot hope to achieve either the security or the better life to which all peoples aspire. If each country does its part, the situation can be realistically met without undue burden on any one.

Among the countries of the Western World, Japan looks to the United States to take the lead in this critical period. Obviously Americans have given much thought to Japan's problems and our relationship to them over the past few years. However, I wonder if it might not be helpful to us as of today to ask ourselves a few questions. Just what is the specific responsibility of the United States toward Japan in relation to her current economic problems? What can and should be done about this responsibility and by whom? What is the rôle of government, business and non-profit institutions? Sound answers to these questions are necessary if our leadership is to be effective.

I believe in the Japanese people and in their future. The situation which they face today is a very challenging one. Given reasonable understanding and support from the outside, I have every confidence they will rise to meet it. They are an educated and industrious people who have proven their capacities in the past. Their primary concern today is, I believe, security and peace. They can, and in my judgment will, make a substantial contribution to the community of nations.

# THE SPLIT BETWEEN ASIAN AND WESTERN SOCIALISM

*By David J. Saposs*

THE dominating ideology in the international labor movement in the West is still Socialist, but a Socialism with a new look. Marxism has been discarded, although more by force of circumstances than conscious design, and the movement is still influenced by some Marxian reasoning; but, in general, Western Socialism has ceased to be class conscious and become reformist. It seeks the welfare state, but not revolution. The growing Christian (predominantly Catholic) labor movement in Western Europe has also arrived at maturity, and its social philosophy is likewise oriented toward the welfare state.

The old controversy over the interpretation of Marx was not revived in the labor movements in continental Europe after this war, as it was after World War I. This tacit abandonment of Marxism became fully apparent when the Socialist International was revived as a permanent organization in Frankfurt during the summer of 1951. The program and pronouncements of the convention used none of the Marxian terminology so characteristic of prewar Socialist literature, and this momentous omission was not challenged in the discussions there. The 1952 Milan Conference of the Socialist International followed the precedent established at Frankfurt, and at the 1953 Stockholm Conference it was repeated. Such clichés as the materialistic or economic conception of history, exploitation of the workers, expropriating the expropriators, the class struggle, are no longer mentioned. The former sacred tenet that the workers are the class chosen to fulfill the holy mission of bringing about the inevitable capitulation of capitalism has fallen into limbo. The central theme of the new official pronouncements revolves about problems of social justice, economic planning, full employment, democracy and human rights. Emphasis is placed on the need to avoid deflation with its consequent depression and unemployment, and, of course, on the rôle of the trade union movement in promoting social justice.

To be sure, differences exist on policy, with the British Socialists still clinging to nationalization, the Germans featuring "co-determination" in industry and the Scandinavians empirically emphasizing efficiency and production, with better distribution

of the proceeds. But the Communists are the only group within the Western democracies still consistently quoting Marx—albeit hyphenated to Lenin and Stalin—and talking revolution, often obfuscated by their need to adapt their pronouncements and activities to the changing tactics of Soviet foreign policy.

In Asia and other underdeveloped areas, however, the situation is different. A deep schism seems to be developing in the world Socialist movement, led by the Asian Socialist parties. The separatist group revealed itself at the 1951 congress of the Socialist International in Frankfurt; and at the succeeding Milan Congress this group announced the intention of organizing an independent Asian Socialist movement. Its Congress convened in Rangoon in January 1953. European Socialist notables, including Clement R. Attlee, attended as fraternal delegates and urged the conference to remain an organic part of the Socialist International, arguing strongly against the formation of a separate Asian Socialist Conference. Notwithstanding the prominence of these fraternal delegates from the Socialist Parties of the Western democracies and the eloquence of their appeal, their advice was not heeded. A separate and independent Asian Socialist Conference was formed. The only concession made to the Socialist International was the proviso that the affiliates with the Asian Socialist Conference could retain affiliation with the Socialist International if they desired. It was further announced that the Asian organization would undertake to maintain close contact with the Socialist International, but it was emphatically stipulated that the Asian Conference would have no organic connection with the International.

The new Asian organization differs basically from the Western-oriented Socialists, although its thinking has not yet been clarified. Many of its adherents, like the left-wing Socialist Party of Japan, feature revolutionary radicalism and hail Marx as their true prophet. With mild reservations they regard Russia as the Socialist fatherland, uncritically accepting its claims of accomplishments and looking to it for inspiration. Such left-wing elements point to the United States and the capitalist world as the enemy; Soviet interpretations of events and accusations against the Western democracies are unquestioningly supported. Similarly, this faction supports all proposals made by the Communists for ostensibly improving relations between the East and the West.

However, such left-wing Socialists have resisted the Communist efforts to take over their parties, and, so far, have maintained their independence. They have no open relations with the Cominform and its affiliates, differing in this respect from the Nenni Socialists in Italy, for example. On the other hand, they are devout champions of revolutionary radicalism, seeking the overthrow of the present social order and its replacement by a Socialist society. In Japan, the right-wing Socialist Party reflects the prevailing national sentiment which believes in a strong domestic police force, but it opposed Japanese rearmament and does not want the government to lean toward the United States and the other Western democracies.

In some Asian countries—Burma and India, for example—Socialists tend to blend their doctrine with the prevailing religious or social philosophies, most of them steering clear of Marxism and revolutionary radicalism and advocating an advanced program of social reform, stimulated by the existing feudalism. Thus they emphasize land reform, anti-imperialism and national independence, to be attained through moderate means. Like the more extreme faction, however, they too are friendly toward Russia. Even the more moderate elements, influenced by Communist anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist propaganda, which is reinforced by their own suspicion of the motives of the West (particularly the United States) and by their fear of offending their Communist neighbor, China, are inclined to equate Russia with the United States. Neutralism in international affairs is their watchword. The Asian Conference disapproved of Communist totalitarian policies, such as the use of force, denial of freedom and negation of human rights, but the tendency is to regard these features as transitory and incidental. Even the moderates tend to accept the professions of accomplishment by the Communist countries at face value, hoping that they themselves can achieve their objectives without resort to brutality.

Thus both wings of the Socialist movement in Asia are neutralist. Some, as in Burma, are primarily influenced by their juxtaposition to Communist countries; others in India are still operating under the spell of Gandhi. Their conceptions of neutrality sometimes transcend normal understanding. Recently the Socialist Government of P[illegible] refused economic aid from the United States so that its [illegible] ld not be compromised. However, it proposes [illegible] economic treaty with

Soviet Russia. This same Government has deported deserting Chinese Communist army personnel that claimed political asylum in Burma, justifying this inhuman action by the contention that its neutral policy forced it to deny political asylum to offenders against "a friendly nation," notwithstanding that these soldiers were returned to certain death. But such neutralists were horrified at the execution of the Rosenberg atom spies in the United States.

Such states of mind can be only temporary, although it is clear that the Asian Socialist Parties of both right and left are determined to separate themselves from the movement dominated by the Western democratic Socialists. The left wing, which clings to the doctrine of the overthrow of capitalism, by revolutionary means if need be, predicates its doctrine on Marxist reasoning and tempers its neutralism by being "neutral against" the United States in favor of Russia. The right wing sponsors moderate procedures and immediate social reform with emphasis on particular Asian problems. It is not critical of Russia and is more readily attracted by Soviet claims than is its Western Socialist counterpart. However, it favors accepting Western economic and technological assistance, with no military or diplomatic alliances. It considers itself a firm adherent of democracy.

The Communists are using the Asian neutralist Socialists to their advantage, but whether they will capture them is questionable. They seem to be making headway in Japan, both with the left-wing Socialists and the principal trade union organizations; the Sohyo trade-union group shifted from "neutralism" to "world-wide collaboration of peace forces," the line now advocated by the Communists, and some of its leaders even declared that Soviet Russia and China were the forces making for peace. However, when leaders of the left-wing Socialist Party criticized this attitude as contrary to neutralism, the Sohyo spokesman retreated. On the whole, it does not seem likely that the Communists will capture the Asian Socialist Conference.

The determination to maintain a separate organization is rationalized by the Asian Socialists on the ground that Asia is confronted with problems which differ from those of the rest of the world. They point out that Asia is primarily agricultural and underdeveloped, that it still . ff from imperialism and colonialism, and that these [illegible] which the Western World does not understand: [illegible] organization, the Asians

say, can they cope with the particular problems of the Far East.

This rationale, as well as many of the current demands of the Asian Socialist Conference, highlight the contrast with the conditions that generated the Western Socialist movement in its earlier stages. Socialism in the Western countries was founded on an emerging industrialism, and it adapted its principles, policies and tactics to the expansion and growing stability of capitalism. On the other hand, most of Asia and the other underdeveloped countries of the world still operate under feudalistic customs and régimes. Insofar as there is an emerging industrialism, it is based primarily on plantation and extractive industries closely allied to agriculture. Nevertheless, the thinking of Socialists in these countries is complicated by their desire to seek salvation through industrialism. Some of these countries have enacted most advanced social legislation, as recommended in I.L.O. conventions, but little effort is made to enforce these laws.

Politically, the Asian Socialists, in common with the rest of the population in Asia, are still thinking in colonial and semi-colonial terms; their reactions are chiefly based on past experience, influenced by resentment at the fact that they are either still linked to Western countries, or obligated to them. They know that they are economically dependent on Western capital, equipment, technological know-how and supervisory skill, but psychologically they are disturbed at having to accept such assistance. Hence, in emphasizing immediate demands for social improvements, the Asian Socialist Parties have nationalistic, racial, economic and political issues uppermost in their minds. Their pragmatic demands are limited primarily to the solution of agrarian problems and those related to agriculture, such as stimulation and regulation of cottage industries, use of small machines in manufacturing as well as in agriculture, cheap power development. Even the few that look to industrialism for ultimate salvation find it necessary to fall in line with those who stress these immediate demands in order to alleviate pressing social evils.

In contrast, the Socialist parties of the Western democracies, with a rationale stimulated by an emerging industrialism, called for social and labor legislation that would promote the interests of the new wage-earning class—demands for sanitary working conditions, proper light in the factories, accident prevention, workmen's compensation, maximum hours of labor and minimum wages, abolition of child labor, special protection for women

workers and social insurance. They also sought to promote better living conditions through housing programs, price controls and food subsidies, and consumer coöperative movements. In time the Asian Socialists will probably adjust their program accordingly.

There is little or no prospect for the old-fashioned revolutionary radicalism in countries and areas with a highly stabilized social structure and a mature industrialization, where workers enjoy "status" and a feeling of belonging. In the viable Western democracies, the small residue of Socialists still attracted by the siren-call of revolution will gravitate, if they have not already done so, toward the Communist movement. It should be noted that the Communist movement has been rapidly losing ground in the countries enjoying a relatively stable social structure—Western Europe (except France and Italy), Australasia, North America. In Italy and France, the Communists seem to be gaining in the political field, and, judging from elections of representatives to works councils, are either retaining their strength or gaining in the industrial field. Outside of these exceptions there are few regions where the Communists have succeeded in maintaining their position. In general their strength has so receded that they are a minor element in the labor movement.

Even in Japan in the recent election the Communists polled only 700,000 votes and elected only one member to the Lower House of Parliament; but there they are growing stronger in the unions. They made a more formidable showing in the first election in India and are a considerable threat to the Congress Party in many areas—a development that has alerted the dominant political organization to the necessity of seeking alliances with other non-Communist elements. On the whole, open Communist strength is receding in effectiveness in the democratic world. It is naturally more difficult to gauge its conspiratorial and surreptitious activities. Since the Catholic trade-union movement, in common with the Canadian and American labor movements, is clearly committed to an advanced program of social reform and some form of the welfare state, the labor movements of the Western democracies are drawing closer together ideologically.

Thus three political internationals operating in the labor movement are likely to emerge as a result of the new developments—the Western group, the Communists and the Asian neutralists. The last-named, in a sense a "third-force" group, will probably

have a strong appeal to the people in other underdeveloped countries, such as Africa and Latin America. It should prove to be a rival of the Communists, in that it will appeal to the outspoken anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, race-conscious elements, who shy away from aligning themselves with either the Western-oriented movements or the totalitarian forces behind the Iron Curtain. Though there seems little danger that it will be captured by the Communists, it might be tempted to collaborate with them, and it may experience defections. It will, however, be playing the Communist game indirectly, and will thereby render a serious disservice to the democratic world. It will no doubt prosper in underdeveloped areas, particularly among peoples who are still laboring under the shell-shock of colonialism and imperialism, and who have suffered from discrimination because of color. The ultra-radical element which used to be temperamentally attracted to syndicalism in the West, and which thrived in the countries with the most unstable social structures, might also gravitate toward this group.

Eventually, the relations of the Communists to this neutralist group are certain to become strained. At present, Asian Socialism is an obstacle to the strengthening of democratic forces; but it is also a barrier between the Communists and the masses. If the Communists come to believe that the neutralism of the Asian Socialists is hindering them more than it is helping them, they are bound to turn on it, as they have on other movements which they have failed to direct or control.

# THE POLITICAL VACUUM IN GERMANY

*By Karl Jaspers*

THE Germans seem to be an enigma. How is it possible that in poetry, music, philosophy, science, technology they should have made such a large contribution to the intellectual wealth of mankind and yet should have permitted Hitler to create a criminal state and overwhelm the world and themselves in disaster? Those who admit their efficiency, their industriousness, their conscientiousness, their soldierly qualities, are the more astounded at the indifference with which they seem to take everything. But though their political unreliability is shocking, they constitute a material force which appears to be indestructible; and in the present state of the world that force is needed. The hope is that through the development of democracy in Germany this force may become purer, more Westernized, increasingly governed by principles of freedom. But do the Germans think in a democratic way?

Imperial Germany in Bismarck's time was governed by liberality and sound legality. Economic life, science and arts, literature and poetry were all free; parties and movements could be freely formed. The majority of people had a sense of security. Statistics at the end of the century showed an annual increase of wealth. Social problems, it is true, caused anxiety; but the tremendous economic progress steadily improved everybody's standard of living. Most people lived confident in the belief that things would go on getting better and better without any catastrophe. Even the Social Democrats had, in actual practice, abandoned their revolutionary Marxist ideas.

One thing, however, was not clear. The glorious freedom prevailing in private affairs was accompanied by political unfreedom. Pseudo-constitutionalism gave the pretense, through the elections for the Reichstag, that power was shared. The noise of speeches and campaigns disguised the fact that nothing important was being decided. Actually, the German people lived happily in an authoritarian state. Policy was made by the government; they trusted that it was good. Bismarck had directed his policy toward a lasting peace in Europe. It had been self-willed but it had worked to Germany's advantage. Of course there was also grumbling and apprehension, but that was only temporary.

The civil service was clean. The social priority of the army flattered the nation's pride in power. Life had splendor, and the government poured sanctification from above.

This state of affairs was the apparently excellent product of the authoritarian state which had been in existence since the Thirty Years' War. By a tradition of many centuries the individual German was satisfied that his rôle was restricted to private affairs in the widest sense of that term. As he had no share individually in world politics nor any knowledge of them he felt no responsibility. Whatever the government did, he did not feel that he had done it. He did not feel guilty about a war or about any actions or orders of his rulers in the course of it. He obeyed, and his obedience sprang from a sense of duty. Obedience was a moral value as such. This, however, created a double standard: he was identified with the power of the state, he enjoyed the pride of power, but he had no responsibility.

When Germany obtained parliamentary democracy in 1918 it was a result of her military and political collapse and not—as it had been in Western countries—the product of grave struggles within the state. German democracy was not a moral and political achievement but the symptom of a collapse; it was simply a way out of impotence. Though its growth was attended by fallacious and sentimental hopes, the new parliamentary democracy did not derive from the political thinking of the people. With Germany's economic revival it was taken over by the parties, and these became mere groups of interest. The majority regarded the situation as uncomfortable and deplored its lack of glamor. Though the existence of the parties was looked upon as merely accidental, elections were decided with reference to them rather than clear political issues or personalities. People went to the polls out of a vague impulse and for selfish material interests. They obeyed, as usual: but they resented obeying disreputable figures. Due to the misery of unemployment, which after 1929 hopelessly increased, more and more people were in a state of mind to yield to a magician promising everything, to a pied piper who while leading them to ruin seemed to lead them to glory. But this was by no means an inevitable development. Unimpeachable men like Ebert and Brüning did their best for the honor of Germany but never succeeded in casting a comparable spell. The reasons they failed are many. One certainly is the fact that their sober planning, their common sense, their patience and

their moral reliability remained unrecognized by so many of us Germans, and that even where they were recognized they failed to satisfy the demand for superhuman qualities.

After the unconditional surrender of 1945 came a strange hopeful interlude. The occupying Powers governed through the best Germans they could find. Their intention seemed to be that the Germans should acquire political education through their own experience in civil government, starting with municipal administration and slowly progressing higher, the external controls meanwhile being gradually and cautiously lifted. The occupying Powers had liberated us but they had not made us free. We were to obtain freedom for ourselves—not by force and rebellion, but through political self-education. Perhaps the procedure would have been politically sound if the occupying Powers had openly admitted that they possessed actual sovereignty. We might then have proceeded with our self-education while they guaranteed security outside. Such a course would have been possible for the victors, who respect human rights and want freedom everywhere. But they were afraid of what they call colonial administration. Since in their eyes man is by nature born free, they thought that any nation could without any interval plunge successfully into free political thinking if only it were given a chance. They therefore impatiently prescribed parliamentary democracy for Western Germany. To us, however, this political freedom meant merely a shift of government to the parties and in some instances to the same politicians who had been in office before 1933. The plan by its nature required a slow development of perhaps 10 or 20 years; instead, a form which had already failed with the parliamentarians in 1933 was revived. Within a short time constitutions were worked out for regional and federal governments and the occupying Powers then quickly rushed them to a vote. But those constitutions were not rooted in the mentality of the people. They did not require the participation of the people in discussion, and to this day they are practically unknown to the people. Thus the people voted on something they did not know. It was the old story: since basically the whole thing is not specifically your business, you stick to the things you know. You work, you suffer and if it becomes too much you grumble. You have hardly any idea of the meaning of a constitution. You wish to be "governed decently;" but it does not occur to you that you cannot count on that unless you are politically active yourself.

Thus self-education in political democracy never in actual fact began in Germany. The present parliamentary democracy is a democracy which was forced upon us—or, put in more flattering terms, it is a democracy which was conferred upon us by the grace of the victor. It has not grown out of our own work. East Germans and West Germans are not separated by different ideologies of their own but as a result of different decisions of the victors for the specific regions which they occupied; in the one case they originated in the idea of freedom, in the other in the idea of totalitarianism.

In Western Germany, so far as the mass of the population is concerned, one cannot speak about a new democratic way of thinking. It is true that various Germans have expressed themselves on the basic ideas of democracy, on the legal state, on liberalism. Authors have tried through the press, sometimes in imploring terms, to lead us toward responsible thinking. But there should be no illusions, I believe: they were and they are voices in the desert, heard by some, but dying away on the whole like monologues in an empty room. There is as yet no effective political thinking which derives from within and stands the test of everyday life. Perhaps the inclination toward such thinking has even decreased in recent years.

These developments coincided with a phenomenon which in itself was very satisfactory for Germany. Western Germany experienced the "economic miracle." Sparked by American aid, German efficiency and industriousness achieved the unexpected economic boom. This, however, has had the effect of further slackening the urge toward political thinking. A growing sense of satisfaction sets the prevailing tone in spite of the ruins, in spite of the sufferings of those who have no part in the material improvement, in spite of the refugees from the East of whom only a small (though increasing) part have been integrated and can share in the general success. Thus the restoration of the old parliamentary democracy, of its parties and party leaders, became the pattern for the new Germany in all other fields. The past was continued—fundamentally without much enthusiasm, though with great external activity, and based on an intellectual level which meanwhile had on the whole deteriorated.

To the question as to what is left of Hitler's times today the answer must be, I believe, that it is almost surprising how completely Hitler himself has been forgotten. A few die-hards and

scoundrels aside, there does not seem to be any considerable number of Nazis. The majority of Germans want to be governed authoritatively but decently. Hitler was a terrible disappointment. But the fact that a restoration of the Nazi régime seems unlikely at present is not by itself enough ground to feel reassured. The swamp of intellectual, moral and political confusion, the uncertain and unreliable soil on which Hitler and his associates flourished, is still there. We therefore can but watch anxiously to see what will be the final German attitude toward the relics of National Socialism. To the extent that they are not firmly denounced either in the abstract or when it comes to choosing personnel there is evidence of that same continuing political vagueness of which I spoke above. On a higher intellectual level, too, a basic idea which is politically calamitous has by no means been extinguished. In principle Hitler is denounced but not the idea of the great leader as such. The subject is not of current interest and one does not talk about it. But those who have lived through 1933 and have seen the reactions of professors, students, the middle class and even workers know that there is something in our people which believes in the great leader, whether he be an imperial monarch or a charismatic hero of the people. It can be traced in our classic literature. The sober and realistic understanding that Man is always governed by Man and that every human leader needs to be controlled seems hard to attain.

II

The average German, then, trusts authority; the business of authority, he assumes, is to handle politics and relieve him from thinking about them. He expects that this authority, which derives from God, as the expression used to be, will lead him well, and he demands that it should not disappoint him. If he is disappointed, however, it has never as yet been his desire to share the responsibility but to obtain a better authority.

As we look back at German history we see that since the seventeenth century democratic ideas have never moulded the form of the state. Instead, political ideas have yielded to force, mechanical arrangements or mere fatigue. There is an enormous gap between the great political concepts of Kant and Baron von Stein, of Mommsen and Max Weber, and the political reality which was determined by Bismarck's successful foreign policy and his suppression of domestic democratic tendencies. The pos-

sibilities of German democracy lie sleeping. A people which has been obedient for centuries cannot be expected to become democratic all of a sudden.

Here I must note, however, that the meaning of democracy is felt, understood and expressed in different ways in different Western countries. In all of them democracy is linked with the idea of the legal state and liberalism, but not in equal degree. There is recognition that the people are sovereign and that they are entitled to take part in politics, but there are wide variations in the manner and extent of this participation. In some cases the people take a constant interest in public affairs, helped by current information in the press and by their statesmen; in others their coöperation may be reduced to rare elections in which the voters hardly know what they are called upon to decide. Popular participation in politics may be part of daily life, reflected in the general attitude, in the acceptance of joint responsibility, in equal rights, in neighborliness; or politics may remain outside daily life due to the emphasis on hierarchies or because political intercourse consists of giving and obeying orders. As a logically defined term democracy will always be unsatisfactory. For democracy is the historical reality of the community shaped by the origins and great decisions of its ancestors.

My statements must not be misunderstood as the expression of hopelessness, but are to be taken as they are intended, as a warning against illusion. Truthfulness is the condition for all improvement.

In the first place, people should beware of the idea that there is such a thing as a recognizable national character and that it rules out certain eventualities. It is impossible to define the political character of a people precisely and to state just what is going on inside it; no matter how many factors are taken into account, there will always be others, some of them contradictory. The full nature and power of a trait are indefinable. The hidden or the contemptible, the accidental or the ridiculous, may be the seed of some dominant trait of the future. The predetermination of an event cannot be deduced by constructing attributes of national character. What possibly may be and what is really going to be remain open.

This is a fact to the German who has lived his life among Germans. I have always been aware of the variety of elements active

in the German people—a people of many peoples held together by nothing, outside the language, except various episodic formations of states. However much one may know about the present intellectual situation in Germany and the political forces at work there, it still is not enough to permit any prediction. I know that for half a century I have practically always been wrong about the political future. The unpredictable, which is perhaps even stronger in us Germans than in other peoples, worries both ourselves and others. Foreigners and Germans alike were surprised by what happened in 1933. Suddenly in community after community people who had until then been disreputable failures became the masters. Notorious criminals began to run the country. Now most Germans were doubtless as reasonable, industrious and decent before 1933 as they are today. Of course, there was a considerable minority of obsessed persons in 1933, but actually the Nazis came to power through a chain of accidents which seemed at the time to represent either an irresistible turn of history or satanic fate. They advanced to power at first through disguised illegalities (disguised, because even Hitler knew that the Germans would trust only what seemed a legal and orderly transfer of power) and finally through a series of bluffs and acts of blackmail (which impressed a minority as proofs of their leader's glorious superiority). And then—it is another fact which is surprising and should not be forgotten—not everybody followed, but the majority did.

It must not be assumed that the German political characteristics described above are innate or hereditary. The people of Holland and Switzerland, for example, are so much like us that a Frisian from northwest Germany feels more at home in all important respects in Holland than he does in Upper Bavaria; and a German from the Black Forest feels more akin to the Swiss than to the Pomeranians. But this kinship with the Dutch and the Swiss immediately disappears where political thinking and political judgment are concerned. After the devastation of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was re-shaped on authoritarian lines by a state which was in a desperate situation and found a means of salvation in the systematic action of European princes and without the knowledge of the helpless people involved. In those days, and up to the beginning of the First World War, the Prussian civil service was clean, reliable, unselfish and devoted, but firmly convinced of the fact that the ruler is entitled to the

obedience of his subjects. The Dutch and the Swiss, on the other hand, have preserved their old freedoms from the Middle Ages and have shaped them into modern freedom. It was their own doing and their own luck. They kept up heroic opposition against absolutist countries like Germany, France and Spain which tried to usurp their powers; and in this resistance they formed the basis of their own freedom.

What has been brought into being and formed by history is carried on by tradition, not by biological heredity. It is born slowly and it changes slowly. In view of historical analogies, the German people cannot be expected to change suddenly; but they should be encouraged to do so in the long run, beginning with an inner revolution in the thinking of the individual. Those in Germany who know what is needed—and they still are only a few—are working for such a change.

III

What should be done in our situation? Perhaps a few points can be made for the sake of German freedom. The active statesman must restrain his public speech in view of the effect which it might have on current events. A mere writer who is thinking only in the sphere of possibilities is not hampered by such considerations.

Most Germans still cover up memories of the past which on the contrary should be looked at and thought through. It does not help to try to blot out what has happened and what has been done. The things that one tries to forget stir from below and hamper the attainment of a reasonable understanding of the present. The present economic miracle encourages German self-deception; almost it seems as if the years 1933 to 1945 had never existed. To my mind it is wrong to say that a line should be drawn under the past, that people should forget, should start over again, should look solely ahead because that is the course of nature and only so is life possible. My answer is that that is not Man's destiny at all. Man is more than nature and accident. The more he remembers, the more he realizes what he has done and experienced, the more determinedly he accepts his responsibility and the deeper he searches into what has been and what is, the more Man he is.

If doing away with illusions is the condition for a revival of political thinking, we Germans still have a great task ahead of us.

I cannot describe it in these pages but I can draw attention to it.

First, a few rough facts of which every German should be aware. We owe our freedom not to ourselves but to the Western Powers who, in alliance with Russia, defeated Hitler's Germany. We have received aid from the Western victors to an extent unique in history, and it is this aid which has made Germany's reconstruction possible. We stand, a tiny Power, in a moment of world history when the future freedom of mankind will be determined. In this situation national interests have not by any means lost their importance, but they must yield to the claims of a higher interest. The demand for "sovereignty" has become absurd, the bestowal of "sovereignty" undignified make-believe. All the German political parties lack a basis of genuine belief. The Social Democrats, for example, though in actual practice and occasionally even in words they have denounced Marxism, in theory still cling to their old-fashioned world of ideas and lack the strength to formulate clear convictions and express them. Interests hide behind ideological symbols which, in fact, nobody takes seriously. It is an encouraging fact that there are men who understand all this and who work patiently for the recognition and practical application of political ideas. But they remain anonymous even in their own parties, and not one of them has as yet been able to influence the general attitude or the course of events. They are the hope of the future.

It seems to me particularly dishonest that the cry for German unity should have a double meaning. Every German must be depressed by the thought that millions of German-speaking people in the East, by a common spiritual tradition as akin to us as the Western parts of Germany are kin to each other, must live under the terror of totalitarianism. Their youth are being made over in complete isolation from the West, with the result that in a few decades in spite of a common language two different peoples may have developed. The question arises whether the majority of the Germans in the West are not perhaps taking a rather indifferent attitude toward this development, whether they do not fail to visualize what it means to live in falsehood, material misery, error, silence and distrust. It might naturally be expected that West Germany would be willing and eager to welcome all Germans from the East who want to come and would accept them in the West with immediate and equal rights, on the theory that it is human beings that count, not territories.

There are reasonable arguments against this point of view: the consequences of adopting it would be favorable to the Bolshevists; the extraordinary should be neither asked nor expected. At the same time, however, it should be realized that solidarity of the kind I am speaking about did not develop in Germany. And this fact throws light on the way in which the West of Germany is concerned about the East of Germany. The cry for reunification and liberation of the East is powerful; indeed it is supported unanimously by all Germans in the West. But they are far from unanimous on the fact that reunification is not the only way to bring about the liberation of the East. Liberation might also be brought about even if two German states existed. The cry for unification is more closely related to a desire for power than to solidarity; it is the expression of a longing for the past glory of a great Reich.

History and the consequences of our own political doings have now confronted us with duties more important than breathing false life into the ghosts of the past. The question of East German liberation should be approached the other way around: if political unification with the West should become a necessary measure for the liberation of the East Germans, then it should be taken. But by making unification as such our goal, we just repeat the mistake we made in the nineteenth century at the prime of our cultural and economic life, when the cry was for unity first, then freedom. It was argued that once we have unity (and with it the power of a mighty empire), freedom would follow in due course. Today we know that it never did, and that unity has political and moral value only if it is based not on power alone but on freedom and on the struggle for inner political freedom.

German political life cannot derive dignity from the Bismarckian concept that absolute sovereignty is a nation's ultimate goal, but only from an attitude which relates all decisions to the central question presented alike to us and to all other nations by the world situation today—is there to be freedom on earth or not? Only so will it be determined what place the essential is to have in political life.

The German who works toward these goals can proceed only within the framework of parliamentary democracy—not without it, not outside of it, not by destroying it. The infinitely hard thing is to breathe democratic life into the formal democracy

that was forced upon us. What should have been its basic constituent must now belatedly be roused within it.

IV

The main question which will decide our democratic future and our freedom, both at home and abroad, is that of the new German army. In view of the total loss of freedom which threatens us from outside, rearmament is a hard necessity. In contrast to former days, German youth now has no inclination toward military service. Nobody wants a war. Yet there are strong pressures to rearm. The regular officers of the Hitler era push forward into public life, anxious to rehabilitate themselves while building a new army. America wants German rearmament because without it no secure dam for the protection of Europe can be created. The European countries favor it for the same reason, despite misgivings about reviving an army which has proved once before that it can achieve the inconceivable. Among the German people themselves additional confusion has been caused by what they have been told from abroad. In 1945 they heard that every military activity must cease altogether, once and forever, and that it was wrong even to have a future military aim in view. Now they hear that military activity should be revived, indeed that it is a necessity, and that it would be morally wrong to try to evade the realities of the situation by adopting a "without me" attitude.

Rearmament cannot be discussed parenthetically. Yet a few of the possible dangers which it represents for the democratic system of thought should be called to mind. Would not the spirit of the Hitler army, through its many regular officers who are still available today, kill at the start all chance for the creation of a German political spirit? Would it not be disastrous for German freedom and indeed for world freedom if the new German army were not built up in radical denunciation of the spirit of the Hitler army and after a conscious break with that tradition? Must not the new army discard that tradition in favor of the soldierly spirit of Gneisenau and Scharnhorst and the old Moltke? In this connection it should be realized that the German military spirit lost its dignity under Hitler. Nobody who owed his position to Hitler and had served him could save his honor except by sacrificing his life as did General von Treskow and others. The discussion of the oath to Hitler which con-

tinues to this day proves the disintegrating effect of National Socialism. In the Hitler era there of course were a few regular officers who both by their acts and their refusals to act gave proof of a character which would qualify them to help build a new army. But they cannot be picked out objectively, and probably some of them would even shy away from such a task. On the other hand, the new German regular officer should not be trained by the regular officers of Hitler's army. But how otherwise? At one time in the eighteenth century Prussian army instructors helped the Americans to build up their army. Would it not be possible for American and Swiss instructors to train the new German soldiers and officers now? That would take too long, I am told, the matter is too urgent. Doubt is also expressed whether the spirit of an army in the old sense can be revived at all. Instructors for the mechanized modern army are totally different from the officers of the past; Hitler's officers were efficient technicians, and so would be useful.

At this point I am overcome by terrible pessimism. Whoever wishes to save the possibility that there will be democracy and liberalism in Germany should find a way to free those people and forces who would start at the beginning and build up, in a technical age, a spirit that is soldierly and yet humane. They would not build on the immediate past—except as something to push away from—but on centuries-old memories of German and Western honor, finding new forms to suit the new conditions. When I imagine how, in the framework of a European Army, German contingents might be trained in France and French contingents in Germany, what possibilities for mutual sympathy and esteem might flourish as a result of direct contacts on a basis of equality, how the spirit of democracy would develop naturally —this dream seems to me the most natural thing, and still a dream.

A German national army trained by and in charge of Hitler officers would, I think, be unreliable. I fear it as a German, and I understand the fears of others. May not all Germany's chances for democracy be put in jeopardy? What has happened before should not be forgotten. The right road to German rearmament is to be found only by German democrats. I am convinced that they exist. I do not attempt to say concretely what course they should follow, since I lack sufficient information. But I believe everybody should realize that this is not just one political

problem among others, but that with it the future of German democracy, of German freedom and of German integration in the Western World will be decided. The world situation permits no delay, and political thought is pressed to find immediate solutions. On the other hand, the development of a moral and political standard for a people requires time, and political thought in that sense must look far ahead. The urgent problem arises from the threat of totalitarian power; the long-range problem is the self-education of released spirits in the transformation of the technical world. The way in which the urgent problem is solved will decide the long-term problem also.

It is proper to add that Chancellor Adenauer seems to me to be on the right road both as regards the question of the European army and in his general conception of world politics. He has not expressed himself on the practical steps to take for the construction of the army. The critical investigation of each of these steps must not stop. Among the Chancellor's associates support should be given to those who stand firmly against the claims of the regular officers of the Hitler army and against American support of such claims in the urgent and merely military interest. The potentialities of democracy and how they are to be utilized must be studied, while avoiding undignified appeals to national pride and false desires for prestige. The guiding idea should be freedom in Germany and in the world, and every decision should be weighed in that light.

# THE GOLD COAST

## An Experiment in Partnership

*By Barbara Ward Jackson*

THE government returned to power in the Gold Coast after the general elections being held in June 1954 cannot fail to be something of a test case for the whole of Africa. In the entire continent, it is the third independent government composed entirely of Africans. Otherwise only Ethiopia and Liberia enjoy that status. It is the first independent African administration to be set up in an area once ruled by a European colonial Power. These factors alone would give the experiment some special significance. Since, however, the crucial question throughout Africa is now and will be for decades to come whether or to what degree the African can take responsibility for his own destiny, the Gold Coast experiment has more than the simple interest of novelty. It will inevitably be watched by Africans and by non-Africans as the proving ground of African maturity.

The comparisons made are, it is true, likely to be misleading and the judgments not always soundly based. In Africa, one region varies from other regions as greatly as in any other continent. But since in such crucial areas as South Africa or—to a lesser extent—in Central Africa, the issue has been fixed so firmly on a White-Black basis, local differences tend to be left to one side. The Gold Coast has become a symbol. Achievements and failures will be judged in this strong and often misleading light.

The present government is the successor to the government elected in 1950 as a result of the first general elections conducted under adult suffrage in the Gold Coast. The successful party, the Convention People's Party, came to power under somewhat unexpected circumstances. Its leader, Dr. Nkrumah, had been called back to the Gold Coast from his studies abroad—in the United States and Britain—to act as Secretary to the solidly established middle-class African nationalist party, the United Gold Coast Convention. This group contained most of the colony's educated and politically conscious leaders, men who confidently expected at some point to be given a measure of responsibility by the British. But for younger men such as Dr. Nkrumah, the tempo of progress seemed intolerably slow. They determined

to put greater pressure on the British. When the older organization hesitated before their impatience, they split the U. G. C. C., formed their own Convention People's Party and began to work for mass support among the people. In 1948 and 1949, they organized boycotts and strikes which resulted in some violence. It was settled British policy to extend the area of self-government in the colony. The disorders, if anything, speeded up the process of transferring a measure of power. A constitution introducing elective government was introduced, and at the elections the C.P.P. swept the country. Dr. Nkrumah, serving at that moment a prison sentence for his part in the disorders, was released and placed at the head of the new government. In his cabinet three ministers were still British—those for Finance, for Justice and for Defense and External Affairs—and the Governor presided at cabinet meetings; yet it became clear that the British Government intended—and the Governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, was determined—to secure a genuine transfer of responsibility. The African Ministers learnt that the decisions would be theirs. From the first they were compelled to exercise power.

They began their task of government under the normal contradictions and varied conditions of national well-being. Their country is, by comparison with other underdeveloped areas, extremely wealthy. Its annual budget of some $112,000,000 for a population of under 5,000,000 can be measured against neighboring Nigeria where a population six times as large produces roughly the same scale of national revenue and outlay. The core of this wealth is African-owned and African-produced. An African introduced the cocoa bean into the Gold Coast and the entire farming of the crop is in the hands of peasant farmers. They sell their beans to an African-controlled Cocoa Marketing Board which negotiates as a single sales agency with chocolate producers overseas. World demand, sustained by Britain's sweet tooth and America's lively birth rate, has steadily exceeded supply since the war. An average prewar price of cocoa of about $160 a ton has risen to a postwar figure fluctuating somewhere between $500 and $850 a ton. Forward sales early in 1954 even reached the phenomenal figure of over $1,100 a ton. Since cocoa production varies each year between 210,000 tons and 240,000 tons, the Gold Coast has received for some years past an export income of about $165,000,000 from cocoa alone. Add to this figure the proceeds from exports of gold, manganese, diamonds

and lumber, and the annual export figure is nearer $200,000,000.

This degree of wealth is undoubtedly an effective cushion to the possible shocks of political and social experiment. Yet, as other wealthy producers of primary products have discovered, wealth alone is not enough. The Gold Coast is not the only underdeveloped area to profit by the postwar boom in primary prices. Some Latin American and Southeast Asian countries have known comparable affluence. The oil revenues of many Middle Eastern countries resemble to a certain extent the high financial returns earned by the Gold Coast. Yet it cannot be said that Persia, say, or Cuba or Malaya has drawn unequivocal benefits from its riches. Of the Gold Coast on the contrary it can be said that it has.

The reason lies not so much in the fact of wealth as in its distribution and in the financial policy with which it has been managed. The Gold Coast Government has avoided the two most common weaknesses to be found among primary producing countries. Unlike the ruling governments of Persia or Cuba, it has succeeded in distributing the gains from booming world prices among a very wide section of the population—among the small farmers of the Gold Coast who with their families make up over half the population. It has also prevented the rise in export income from translating itself into strong internal inflation. In this achievement it is perhaps unique. Not even an old-established democratic government such as Australia's was able to overcome the inflationary tendencies of the doubling in world wool prices after Korea.

Of these two achievements, the first, the wide distribution of income, is the African government's good fortune. When African ministers first began to have the decisive say in Gold Coast policies—after the elections of 1950—they inherited a society without European plantations and large white estates and one in which the land itself was still nominally owned by tribal groups and farmed by individual families. No land had been alienated to foreign settlement, as in French North Africa or Central Eastern Africa. No large Asiatic minority had come in to take over petty commerce and block an important line of advancement to the African. The reason for this absence of foreign infiltration certainly cannot be counted among West Africa's assets. The climate is hot, humid and exhausting, and until well into this century yellow fever claimed the life of the missionary, the trader

and the administrator and effectively discouraged any would-be settler. The end result is, however, a homogeneous African population and a land-owning peasantry. It is these small African farmers who profit most by the rise in postwar cocoa prices.

The mastering of the inflationary tendency in high export prices must, however, be put directly to the credit of the government. After 1950, although the Finance Minister was British and the financial advice offered to the Cabinet was put forward by government officials all drawn from the British colonial service, there was never any doubt that the African majority could have refused the proposed financial policy and insisted on one which, in the short run, might better have served their political interests. It is common form in all democracies that the electorate dislikes taxes and controls and infinitely prefers the chance of high monetary income even though the certainty of inflation follows. On the Gold Coast, however, a policy of extreme financial conservatism has been followed. The price for cocoa actually paid to the farmer has been held in the neighborhood of $350 a ton and the balance has been retained by the Government, either on its own account or through the Cocoa Marketing Board, to create reserve funds for the development of the economy. As a result of these decisions—which were certainly not taken in order to curry favor with the large and influential farming class—the Gold Coast must have the largest reserve for productive investment of any of the world's underdeveloped areas. At least $300,000,000 has been set aside to back the currency and to create reserve development funds and this reserve is increasing at present so rapidly that the current expenditure of capital does virtually nothing to deplete it. Yet the program for capital expenditure drawn up to cover the period from 1951 to 1956 calls for outlays of just on $200,000,000, a fair part of which has already been spent.

Since financial policy is perhaps the most pervasive influence in any society and inflation one of the most insidious temptations of popular government, the fact that in the last three years the Gold Coast Cabinet has steered its country through a continuous export boom, undertaken a large program of domestic expansion and yet kept the cost of living steady must be counted a not inconsiderable achievement. It has been matched by other acts of statesmanship. Few people knew, for instance, when Dr. Nkrumah took office whether they would have to deal with a young

man skilled in nothing but agitation or whether there were statesmanlike qualities to be discovered once responsibility was squarely his. In a similar but later experiment in British Guiana, it became obvious almost at once that the local leaders preferred speechmaking and rabble rousing to hard work and sober administration. On the Gold Coast in 1950, there was at least a chance that such men as Dr. Nkrumah or his two closest associates, Mr. K. A. Gbedemah and Mr. K. Botsio, might show a similar lack of grasp upon the essentials of responsibility and leadership. There were rumors of Marxist influence, of vague plans for a Union of Socialist Republics in West Africa. Would they, like the British Guianese leaders, be no more than the Trojan horse of Communist infiltration?

In the event, the outcome of three years' hard experience in the field of administration has shown that the Prime Minister and his colleagues have a very real interest in the concrete problems of government. Moreover, their experience led them early this year to determine that there was no place for Communists in the vital services of the country—in administration, in police or defense, in education or propaganda. In February of this year, in the Assembly, the Gold Coast Prime Minister quoted with approval the words of the former British Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, when he said: "Experience both in this country and elsewhere has shown that membership and other forms of continuing association with the Communist Party may involve acceptance by individuals of a loyalty which, in certain circumstances, can be inimical to the State." To this Dr. Nkrumah added the rider: "The warning seems to me to apply with even greater force to a young and rising nation like our own." Not content with excluding Communists from the Public Service, the Convention People's Party also expelled from its ranks members suspected of combining membership in the C.P.P. with affiliations with Moscow.

Communism, however, is not the only potentially disintegrating force with which untried political administrations have to deal. Men new to office and new to power, handling for the first time large sums of public money and placed in a position where their decisions affect the financial interests of powerful commercial and industrial groups, run the risk at least of being exposed to the temptations of bribery and graft; and there are not many countries in the world, least of all among the new nations, that

can claim complete immunity from an occasional fall from strict virtue in this field. Here, again, however, the Gold Coast Government, faced with accusations that its ministers had been guilty of malpractice, displayed political fearlessness and judgment in refusing to stifle the charges and in bringing them before a judicial Public Commission of Inquiry. After exhaustive interrogations, the Commission discovered only very minor cases of corruption on the part of three junior members of the government involving sums minute in comparison with the development funds spent during their period of office. The men were instantly dismissed and two of them sentenced to a period of imprisonment. In fact, the most unfortunate feature of the whole affair was hardly the issue of bribery itself but the extent to which certain sections of the press abroad, particularly in Britain, played up the accusations and contrived to present a picture of the African administration riddled with graft. This malicious prejudging of the issue undoubtedly shook the confidence of many Africans in the sincerity of Western support for their efforts at self-government and undid some of the work done in the Gold Coast itself to evolve a new type of partnership between the races.

On the side of the Gold Coast Government, the handling of corruption—like the handling of the Communists—must be counted a sign of political levelheadedness not always found in more advanced communities. Coupled with a sane and conservative economic approach, it must be allowed to stand as a good augury for the next phase of political advance which opened with the latest general elections. The new Cabinet has no British Ministers. The Governor no longer presides at Cabinet meetings. His powers are reduced to a residual responsibility in defense, foreign affairs and internal security. British advisers and officials remain, but in all essentials the African Cabinet now carries the burden of government alone.

It would be unwise and indeed unfair to minimize the difficulties which the African leaders face and which may well increase in the next decades. Leaving on one side—important though they are—such disadvantages as the debilitating climate and the heartrending problems of health in a malarial and parasite-ridden area, the sympathetic observer can hardly be less than obsessed by the problem of manpower. The Gold Coast aspires to development, to a higher standard of living, to economic advance. Yet

perhaps only now is there realization of the extent to which such progress depends upon a trained and educated professional, technical and administrative class. Indeed, one could go so far as to say that the experiment may fail without a stable administrative framework.

There has been a measure of education in the Gold Coast for over a century. Devoted missionaries came out in the nineteenth century in the knowledge of almost certain death—one sees their pathetic graveyards buried, forgotten, in the bush—and laid the foundations of an educational system. An enlightened Governor, General Sir Gordon Guggisberg, built Achimota College in the 1920's and paved the way to higher education and to the establishment of a full university in the Gold Coast shortly after the last war. Yet today the educated community is still very small—and not always sympathetic to the present government. Technical competence, outside the popular fields of medicine and law, is rare. The plain truth is that the skills and techniques of the community do not yet match either its aspirations or its present and potential wealth.

The African ministers have given further evidence of their objectivity and common sense in this delicate field of trained manpower. It is easy enough to satisfy popular nationalism with the cry "Africa for the Africans" and naturally, in the first enthusiasm of independence, the cry is heard. But Dr. Nkrumah and his colleagues are more interested in genuine results than in the parrot cries of propaganda and they realize that for another generation, while education of every kind is intensified in their country, they must rely upon the assistance of officials and technicians from abroad.

It is to some extent this need that explains the readiness of the Gold Coast to remain a member of the British Commonwealth. The colonial official in the field is a devoted and faithful servant. The "Government agent" as he is called today is the man-of-all-work of his district, counsellor, friend, arbitrator, keeper of the peace, adviser to chiefs, father of the poor. In the capital itself, Accra, the colonial civil servant has shown in the last three years that his service and devotion are given as readily to an African as to a British minister. Above all, the support and guidance secured to the African cabinet in the past three years by the skill and resource of the Governor and the three British ministers have been of such quality as to convince the Africans

that the British are genuinely ready to help them to make a success of their experiment. Confidence and good will have been created where in 1950 there was distrust and turmoil. These are the forces behind the Prime Minister's decision to invite colonial officials to remain and serve in the Gold Coast with the guarantee of promotion without prejudice of color and conditions at least as good as those which they enjoyed in the past. When one considers the African rejection of "colonialism" on the one hand and the changed status of the British official on the other, the number of British civil servants who will remain is a monument to the good sense and good will shown on both sides.

Even so, the problem is only very partially solved. It is not simply the administrative structure that is at stake. A modern community demands more doctors, more teachers, more research workers, above all, more experts in the field of expanding agriculture and laying the basis for a measure of industry. The Gold Coast has a particularly big development project in the shape of the Volta River Scheme for hydroelectric power and aluminum production. Were it to be carried through, an investment approaching half a billion dollars would be made over the next decade. In order that Africans should take a full part in the development of their own resources they would need a great expansion of their trained technical manpower at every level of responsibility. Even so, a large gap would still need to be filled by experts from abroad.

These conditions would obviously place the greatest strain on the new relationship of confidence which is being built up between the two races. The African—like his brothers in Asia and Latin America or any underdeveloped area—is faced with the need to accept the presence in his country of overseas administrators and technicians developing his resources, and to display restraint and understanding in a situation which any agitator would find only too easy to inflame. The Western nations, on the other hand, if they are serious in their intention of extending technical assistance and of maintaining such essential ventures as the Point Four programs, have to realize that more is at stake here than the provision of funds or the temporary seconding of manpower. What is needed is a new type of expert and technician who sees in work overseas among underdeveloped communities a career and a life work at least as absorbing and as worth-while as such a career once appeared to the old colonial civil servant. The relationships will be

more testing and delicate in these days of aroused African—or Asian—nationalism. But the rewards of friendship, understanding and successful work might be even greater.

This aspect of technical assistance has received little or no serious attention in the West. The Gold Coast, by reaching independence by an accelerated route, by offering so wide a field for development and by needing manpower so much more urgently than capital, is perhaps the first underdeveloped area to pose the problem of Western assistance in terms not of money but of men. On the answer evolved in this case may turn the final relationship of Asia and Africa with the Western Powers. The age of imperialism is dead in the West. But what is the new age of which the Gold Coast is one of the first harbingers? The groundwork of good will and confidence has been laid there. What is built on them now depends fully as much on the vision and dedication of the West as on the patience and maturity of the new African leaders.

# TURKEY JOINS THE WEST

*By George C. McGhee*

THE successful visit to the United States in February of this year of President Bayar of Turkey, at President Eisenhower's invitation, has highlighted one of the most significant political events of our times—Turkey's emergence as a full and responsible member of the Western alliance. The increasingly close relations which started with the initiation of large-scale American aid to Turkey in 1947 have created a bond of confidence and respect between both the governments and the peoples of the two countries and have revealed a remarkable similarity in national aims and policies. Until fairly recently there existed a certain amount of anti-Turkish sentiment in this country. It arose largely out of the Ottoman Empire's association with the Central Powers during the First World War and its handling of the Armenian problem, but it was reinforced by some misinterpretation of Turkish history and a good deal of ignorance about events there since 1919. Today the American attitude is quite changed. Turkey is rightly considered one of our most reliable partners, and few nations enjoy so much prestige in this country. When in February 1952 the Grand National Assembly of Turkey voted 404 to 0, with one abstention, to accept the invitation to membership extended by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an era ended for Turkey and a new one began. Once and for all, Turkey had become an integral part of Europe and the West.

The impact of this event, together with the simultaneous adherence to NATO of Greece, has had a marked effect upon the balance of power between the Soviet bloc and the free nations of the world, extending beyond the Balkans and the Caucasus to the whole strategic complex of the cold war. The free world's gain in strength at any point on the 20,000 mile Russian perimeter inevitably lessens the availability of Russian forces for aggression at all other points. No longer can the Soviets hope for Turkish neutrality in the event of a major world conflict. No longer is there any possibility that they can invade the Middle East without engaging the Turkish divisions standing ready at the Erzurum line—now linked, through an agreement announced February 19, 1954, to the Pakistan forces to the east. Despite the vulnerability of Iran, an easy Soviet victory in the Middle East

is blocked. Russia is confronted with the necessity of allocating a substantial portion of her forces available for a drive against Western Europe to the neutralization of Turkish forces and bases. Adherence to NATO placed Turkey's 19 newly-equipped and well-trained divisions and also her moral and physical strength—enhanced by a remarkable national unity and abundant natural resources—squarely behind the Western alliance. The West has found a reliable ally, much of whose territory lies within the otherwise shifting sands of the Middle East.

Turkey's union with the West, marked also by participation in the Council of Europe and the O.E.E.C., is not the result of temporary convenience or opportunism. It can be described as the result of a meeting of two historical trends operating upon Turkey and the West. In one sense the Turks have caught up with the West, in the other the West has caught up with Turkey. The trends might be summarized as follows: the West, and particularly the United States, attaining for the first time a realization of the true nature of the threat of Soviet Communist aggression and a determination to protect themselves against it, have been brought to the position which the Turks had reached in the course of almost 300 years of intermittent conflict with Russia. During this same period, the Turkish people, freed from the rule of the Sultans and the burdens of empire to concentrate on their adopted homeland of Asia Minor, have emerged as a nation state and entered the full stream of Western progress in the development of their natural resources and their democratic institutions.

II

There is perhaps an inevitable tendency toward collision between peoples who inhabit a harsh northern land such as the Russian plain and those who live in adjacent and inviting lands and climate such as those bordering the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. The tendency is enhanced in this case by a spectacular coincidence of geography. The narrow lands facing the Bosporus, the Dardanelles and the Marmora Sea control the only outside access to the Black Sea, which is in effect a vast inland waterway for those who border it and the terminus of great rivers which penetrate deeply into Russia and Central Europe. The importance of this gateway led to the establishment there of the great Byzantine capital of Constantinople, for more than a thousand years one of the most important cities in the Christian

world. Constantinople was also the traditional center of the Orthodox religion, adopted by the Russians in the tenth century. Both for its natural advantages and as a symbol of prestige, Constantinople inevitably became an object of desire for the Russians.

Russia came late on the European scene, and was not in a position to challenge the Ottoman Empire until well after the peak of Ottoman power, which began to decline in 1683 with the failure of the Turks to make good their second siege of Vienna. This siege kindled a crusade against Turkey which resulted in an alliance among Austria, Venice, the Pope, Poland, Russia, Malta and Tuscany. It was in 1677, six years before the siege of Vienna, that the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa had led Turkey into the first war with Russia, which was occasioned by Cossack raids. Although the Turks were successful in the beginning, they were later obliged to relinquish most of the Ukraine and give the Cossacks trading rights in the Black Sea. From this point on the decline of Ottoman power gave the Russian Tsars an opportunity to expand to the south and southwest. Russian efforts to create a "third Rome" came in conflict with Constantinople as the seat of Orthodoxy. Their ultimate objective, however, was always the control of the Straits. Catherine the Great hoped to establish at Constantinople an "Emperor of the East," in the form of her young grandson, whom she christened Constantine.

Since 1677 the Turks have fought 13 wars with Russia, all of which have followed a similar pattern: in pursuit of her ambitions, Russia has resorted to overt aggression, alliances with Turkey's enemies alternating with offers of alliance with Turkey herself, construction of spheres of influence over buffer states, encouragement of independence movements, and subversion of religious and other minorities. This is the pattern of Soviet behavior today. In many of its wars Turkey was defeated by Russia and lost territory. In none, however, was she totally defeated or occupied, nor did she lose the Straits.

The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 did not alter the geography of southern Russia, nor did the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1923 change the basic lines of Imperial Russian policy. It did add to that policy of expansion the dynamic drive of Soviet Communism, and armed the state with new and more effective totalitarian methods.

The new Turkey was created in 1920 by Kemal Atatürk, one

of the great leaders of all times. Finding himself opposed by the European Powers, Atatürk took advantage of Russian offers of assistance (the Bolshevik Government claimed then to have renounced the imperialist ambitions of Tsarist Russia) and, on March 16, 1921, signed the Treaty of Moscow with the Soviets. Good relations between the two states were strengthened by the official visits of statesmen and military commanders. When Turkey was involved in the Mosul dispute, relations with Russia were further improved by the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed in 1925 in Paris, and subsequently renewed in 1935 for another ten years. Each party undertook to abstain from participation in alliances, coalitions or hostile actions of any kind directed against the other.

Even during this period, however, the Turks were suspicious of Russian objectives. Although there was apparent cordiality in the official relations between the countries, there was little unofficial contact between their peoples. Some Russian financial and technical help was given to Turkish industrialization, notably through an $8,000,000 credit negotiated in 1934 and used largely in building and equipping the Kayseri Cotton Textile Factory, but there was little Soviet influence in the arts and few students went from Turkey to the Soviet Union. The Turkish régime allowed Marx and Lenin to be read within the country but consistently opposed domestic Communism and imprisoned active organizers.

The true nature of Soviet intentions was revealed at the time of the uneasy Nazi-Soviet alliance at the beginning of the Second World War. On November 25, 1940, Molotov, in commenting on the draft treaty which Ribbentrop had presented to him on November 13, stated among other demands that within the next few months the security of the Soviet Union would have to be protected by "the establishment of a base of land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within the range of the Bosporus and Dardanelles by means of a long term lease." A definition of the Soviet sphere of interest in the Middle East also stipulated that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf be recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." This was Stalin's price for coöperation with Hitler. The shock that it gave the German Government was responsible in part for the attack on Russia on June 22, 1941.

It was not surprising that on March 19, 1945, shortly before the

termination of hostilities in Europe, the Soviet Government served notice of its intention to denounce the 1925 Treaty. The Turks were advised on June 7 of the price that would be extorted for the renewal which they desired. First, the frontier with the Soviet Union must be revised, with the Kars-Ardahan district, acquired by the Russians at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and retaken after the First World War, ceded again to the Soviet Union. Second, the Soviet Union would have to have an agreement as to the principles which would govern a revision of the Montreux Convention looking toward "joint defense" of the Turkish Straits, with the Soviet Union having bases in the Straits at least in time of war and with advance preparations to be made in time of peace. The Soviet Union also desired to detach Turkey from her British associations and to conclude a treaty similar to those which the Soviets were signing with the states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper, to whom Molotov presented these demands, flatly rejected them without even referring the matter to his government. The Ambassador's position was promptly confirmed by Ankara and in subsequent diplomatic conversations the Turks stood firm.[1] A representative comment in *Vatan*, an independent Istanbul journal, was that "the whole world views the latest changes in Soviet policy with suspicion. If there is a possibility of influencing Soviet policy, this can be accomplished only through the unity and firmness of the free world. Otherwise, the Soviets will attempt to trap, one by one, the nations they succeed in separating from the free nations of the world, and they will thus assume the initiative."

The leaders of the Turkish state of today have left behind them the methods of the past, but it is impossible for them to forget the lessons of the past. The present Foreign Minister of Turkey, the distinguished historian Fuad Köprülü, has in his veins the blood of the Grand Viziers Köprülü who saved the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century. Turkish pride and self-confidence derive both from Turkey's present strength and from the consciousness that the Ottoman Empire was the most powerful of its

[1] An interesting postscript to this episode was added on May 31, 1953. As part of its so-called "peace offensive" following the death of Premier Stalin, the Soviet Government presented the Turks with a note officially withdrawing the demands of June 7, 1945. The Turks replied on July 18, after a calculated delay, expressing "satisfaction" that the U.S.S.R. stated it had no claims on Turkey and adding that the Turkish Government "considers it necessary to underline" that the question of the Black Sea Straits is "regulated by the provisions of the Montreux Convention."

time. They help to form the Turkish attitude toward the Soviet Union, which might be described as being correct but absolutely firm. Although the ever-present Soviet threat constitutes the dominant factor in Turkish foreign policy, fear of the Soviet reaction does not influence the conduct of internal affairs or the choice of measures the country deems appropriate for its defense. The Soviets have been left in no doubt of Turkish determination to resist any demands which constitute infringement on Turkish independence or integrity, if necessary by force. There are no threats and no bluffs, but nothing is taken for granted. There is no swapping of performance for promise.

The content and tenor of Turkish replies to Russian demands have reflected this attitude. On August 7, 1946, the Soviet Government proposed that a new régime for the Straits be established under the Black Sea Powers alone, with defense assumed jointly by Turkey and Russia. In a firm rejection drafted by the present Turkish Ambassador to the United States, Feridun Erkin, then Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Office, the Government of Turkey insisted that it had fulfilled its responsibilities under the Montreux Convention with "correctness carried at times as far as a fanaticism disregarding even purely Turkish interests." The note further stated: "From the national point of view the Soviet proposition is not compatible with the inalienable rights of sovereignty of Turkey, nor with its security, which brooks no restriction."

The correctness of Turkish behavior toward the Soviet Union is illustrated by the fact that Turkey alone, among the non-satellite countries, sent an official representative to Stalin's funeral. True, the Russians were so surprised that transportation arrangements were not made in time to permit the representative to reach Moscow until after the funeral; but then as always Turkey observed the proprieties. There are virtually no unofficial relationships between the two countries. The Soviet-Turkish border is the most sterile in the world. There is no trade across it and no movement of persons except that of an occasional official. The activities of the large Soviet Embassy in Ankara are scrupulously watched. Communism as such is illegal in Turkey and there is probably a lower percentage of Communists there than in any country in the world. Those found are effectively dealt with.

The Turks have not hesitated to participate in legitimate collec-

tive security arrangements with the United States and the other Western allies. Fear of Soviet reaction to their adherence to NATO was greater among the Western nations than in Turkey herself. The country took the lead in the creation of the tripartite Treaty of Friendship and Coöperation with Jugoslavia and Greece signed on February 28, 1953, and has openly stated its desire to have this treaty take the form of a military alliance. Nor has there been any reluctance to accept American military equipment and aid in training of troops. Military bases have been built with assistance from both the United States and NATO, in the face of deliberate Russian misrepresentation as to their purpose.

The Turkish attitude is perhaps best shown by the reaction to the United Nations' request for help in repelling the aggression of the North Koreans. Turkey had at that time received no commitments from the Western Powers for her own defense, but on July 22, 1950, the Turkish Government announced that it was sending a brigade of 5,000 men to Korea—the first to respond to the appeal after the United States. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes stated at the time: "It is only by way of a decision similar to ours, to be arrived at by other freedom loving nations, that acts of aggression can be prevented and world peace can be safeguarded. A sincere attachment to the ideals of the United Nations requires a belief in this basic principle."

Relations between Turkey and the United States have developed harmoniously not only because both have the same basic attitude toward the issues of the cold war, but also because Turkey has no colonies or areas of special political or economic interest and has no desire to recover territories that once belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Hence she is able to take what might be described as a symmetrical attitude with respect to world problems. Some of our Western European allies do have such areas of interest in Asia and Africa, and their policies toward them are superimposed upon common policies arising out of the cold war. The cross-currents of these sometimes conflicting ties in North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and China create problems in relationships with Americans which do not exist in the case of the Turk.

American understanding of the problem of dealing with the Soviet Union, in the sense mentioned above, seems now to have caught up with that of the Turks. The Turks have also shown us

that it is possible to live in equanimity, without yielding, alongside an implacable enemy. They have been able to do this because they maintain a high degree of military preparedness and a strong national unity. "Why didn't you ask *us* about the Russians?" they frequently say. "We could have told you about them. Our attitude toward them did not change during and after the war because *they* did not change. Indeed, they have been the same for the hundreds of years that we have known them."

III

There is another independent factor which has in recent years helped bring Turkey into alignment with the West, and particularly the United States: the development of political, social and economic concepts and institutions corresponding closely to those of the West. These ideas and institutions have a strong indigenous Turkish flavor, as would be expected from a proud and independent people.

Although it was Atatürk who was primarily responsible for the decisive turn to the West, the seeds of Western thought and influence were actually planted much earlier: The Ottoman Empire reached its height in the time of Suleiman I, known as "The Magnificent" in the West and the "Law Giver" in Turkey. Under Suleiman the Empire was one of the best administered of the time. It was marked by great religious tolerance. The Christian population in Morea, for example, preferred Turkish rule to that of the Venetians, and some Hungarian villages voluntarily chose Ottoman rule. During Suleiman's reign the Turks had many contacts with the West, particularly with France. In 1536 the French Ambassador, Jean Delaforet, negotiated a treaty between France and the Ottoman Empire, by which certain economic and judicial privileges, the "Capitulations," were granted to France. Capitulations were also signed with Great Britain in 1578, and in 1580 the British sent their first Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. Although the Capitulations later developed into a disastrous institution for the Empire, the large foreign trading communities which they fostered permitted the introduction of Western ideas and institutions. The first printing press was established in Turkey in 1728. Selim III, 1789–1807, was a passionate admirer of French culture. The first real Westernization began under Mahmud II, 1808–1839. In addition to army reforms, a medical school was opened by experts from Europe, a number of students were sent

to Europe (a great innovation), and a newspaper and official printing office were established. In 1838 a Council of Popular Instruction was formed. These reforms were continued under Abdul-Mejid I, 1839–1861, under whose rule was prepared the Tanzimat, a vast plan of reforms which changed Turkey from a medieval to a modern state. It offered all Ottoman subjects equality before the law regardless of race or creed; all were granted equal protection of life, dignity, honor and goods; it established the right of trial by due process of law, levy of uniform taxes, and payment of all officials by salary.

Under the revolutionary "Young Turk" movement which grew up in opposition to the oppressive rule of Abdul Hamid, 1876–1909, the concept of nationalism became for the first time an important political factor in Turkey. There was, at the same time, an awakening of intellectual life, largely as a result of the introduction of French language and culture. As the great Turkish feminist writer and patriot Halidé Edib said in her memoirs, "Modern Europe was furnishing a new current of thought and was creating a new spirit in Turkish writing." Turkish drama, representing the rising Turkish nationalism, flourished under French guidance. The British influence was felt in diplomacy and political thought, and gave great impetus to reform. Later, German influence became an important factor in the economic, scientific and military fields. American influence was principally exerted through educational institutions, Robert College having been founded in 1863.

These early movements, all inspired by Western sources, provided the spiritual base for Atatürk's New Turkey. Under his powerful leadership, Western laws, dress and customs were adopted on a large scale and in a short time. The Constitution created by the Kemalists and adopted on April 20, 1924, was inspired by the ideals and institutions of Western democracy, though Turkey remained under one-man rule, as Atatürk considered it must during a formative period. At his death in 1938 the Presidency was assumed by his distinguished deputy, Ismet Inönü, head of the Republican People's Party which Atatürk had founded. In 1945 Inönü took positive steps to give Turkey the substance as well as the form of a democracy by promulgating laws giving full rights to opposition parties. The Democratic Party was founded in 1945 by Celal Bayar, one of Atatürk's most gifted and devoted followers who had succeeded Inönü as

Prime Minister in 1937, and Adnan Menderes, a dynamic organizer, together with a group including Refik Koraltan, present President of the Grand National Assembly, and Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü. On May 14, 1950, the Democrats were brought into office by an overwhelming majority; almost 90 percent of eligible voters cast their ballots.

The fact that the party in power, after being voted out of office, acquiesced gracefully in the popular will, proved that Turkey had become a democracy in practice as well as in form. Since 1950 the Turkish people have shown an increasing determination to retain their newly gained political power, and there appear no significant elements in Turkey which seek to deny them this right. Turkey is one of the few countries in which true political democracy, as known in Western Europe and the United States, has been successfully transplanted. The orderly elections held on May 2, 1954, which returned the Democrats to power by another large majority, give further evidence of the stability of that democracy.

Turkey's economic development and institutions were brought into conformity with the pattern established in Western Europe and in this country more slowly. The Turks, of course, inherited a tradition of centralized authority in economic as well as political matters from the days of the Sultan. Under early Ottoman rule private individuals were not, in general, allowed to accumulate wealth or land except at the pleasure of the Sultan, to whom it normally reverted at death. Initiative in economic matters lay with the Sultan and his ministers. During this period Anatolia, the heart of the present Turkish state, was only one part of a great empire which was run not for the benefit of the Turks living in Anatolia but by and large for the Sultan and the international group surrounding him. The Anatolians furnished most of the soldiers for the Sultan's army and paid most of the taxes which gave him funds to hold together a costly domain. But the Sultan was more preoccupied with the tribute paid to him by Cairo and Baghdad than by the development of Anatolia, and as a consequence this vast area, rich in minerals and natural resources, which had supported in earlier times a much larger and more prosperous population, languished. Lands that had been the granary of the Roman Empire lay fallow and neglected.

When Atatürk came to power, Turkey was lacking in capital and technical skills. Atatürk had a strong desire to encourage

foreign investment capital in the development of Turkey's resources, but he had to work within the narrow framework of the commercial clauses of the Lausanne Treaty and under an Ottoman debt settlement which imposed heavy financial responsibilities on the new Turkey. His government was, moreover, reluctant to accept long-term loans from abroad, since it feared a repetition of the kind of tutelage to which the Ottoman Empire had been subjected; although foreign short-term business credits were accepted, the only long-term loans were those made by the Swedish Match Company and the Soviet Union. Attempts were made to cover imports by increasing the value of exports, mainly in raw materials. The limited efforts made to attract foreign capital, however, met with little success. In 1924, a semi-public institution, the Iş Bank, was established to help finance industrial enterprise. A 1927 law gave government assistance to industry, but even so private enterprise seemed to bring meager results.

Turkey was badly hit by the worldwide depression of the 1930's, which affected the market for her agricultural production and raw materials. Since initiative was not forthcoming from other sources, the country's leaders embarked on a policy of state enterprise. In 1933 the Sümerbank was created with a capital of £20,000,000 (Turkish) to establish, finance and manage industrial units in certain fields, designated in a Five Year Plan proclaimed early in 1934. In 1937 the Etibank was similarly created to facilitate mining and power development.

Under "étatism" Turkey made substantial economic progress; perhaps, considering her situation, no progress could have been made otherwise. With time, however, the limitations inherent in state enterprise became increasingly apparent. The emergence of a business group willing and able to accept economic risks and responsibilities had contributed substantially to the election of the Democratic Party in 1950 on a platform giving maximum encouragement to free enterprise and foreign investment. Pursuant to this platform there was enacted on August 1, 1951, a foreign investment law which, although deficient in several respects—in particular with respect to the limitation of conversion of earnings into foreign currencies—offered considerable impetus to foreign investment. A number of foreign firms invested in Turkey under this law, American firms among them. The Government also encouraged private initiative by abandoning the

match and salt monopolies and by opening investment in sugar refineries to coöperatives and private businessmen. A start was likewise made in selling government-owned industry, but, of course, it is far more difficult to return industry to private hands than to take it over. Private investment was further encouraged by the establishment in 1950 of the Industrial Development Bank, in coöperation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

It became increasingly apparent, however, that the 1951 law did not offer adequate incentive to foreign investors. Following a study by an American Mission headed by Mr. Clarence Randall, a new law was passed by the Grand National Assembly on January 18, 1954, by a vote of 248 to 35. This "Foreign Investment Encouragement Law," as it is called, permits unlimited conversion of earnings as well as initial invested capital, and is considered one of the most liberal foreign investment laws existing in any country. To it was added on March 7, 1954, a law giving expression to the policy adopted by the Turkish Government two years earlier which permits companies, foreign as well as domestic, to participate in the development of Turkish petroleum resources. The statute was drafted with the assistance of an American expert, Mr. Max Ball, and compares favorably with the laws of other countries, such as Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, which have attracted large-scale foreign investment in petroleum. At least ten of the international oil companies have already expressed interest in taking concessions under it, and the first permit to explore for oil under the new law was issued to the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company on May 6, 1954. Indeed, Turkey may be said to have become the first country in the world to "denationalize" oil. It is the policy of the Turkish Government to offer strong economic incentives to the individual (in agriculture, through price supports), but otherwise to remove government intervention in business to the maximum extent possible. The Turks, indeed, give evidence of devotion to the principle of free enterprise hardly less strong than is displayed by Americans.

During the four years since the inception of this policy, the Turks have seen their faith in the free play of economic forces indicated by remarkable progress. In his message to the Assembly on November 1, 1953, President Celal Bayar pointed out that grain production totalled 13,600,000 tons in 1953, an in-

crease of nearly 100 percent over 1950. Turkey had in fact risen during this period from the position of importer of grain to that of the fourth largest grain exporting nation in the world. Cotton production, President Bayar reported, was 165,000 tons for 1952 compared to 104,000 tons at the end of 1949. Tobacco production was estimated at 120,000 tons in 1953 as against 82,000 tons in 1951. Deposits in Turkish banks were 117 percent greater in June 1953 than three years earlier, and credit extended by banks showed an increase of 123 percent. Foreign trade was a spectacular 300 percent higher in 1953 than in 1949, largely as a result of increased grain exports. The draft budget for fiscal 1954 anticipated a balance of income and expenditures, as contrasted with an 11 percent budgetary deficit for 1950 and a 6.5 percent deficit for 1953, all after United States defense contributions.

The United States has made a great contribution to this achievement, first by assistance through the Marshall Plan and later through the Mutual Security Program and Foreign Operations Administration. As of June 30, 1953, grants under these programs aggregated $261,500,000 and loans $140,200,000. American aid has, however, served mainly to spark an indigenous effort on the part of the Turks. There were some 3,000 tractors in Turkey in 1948, for example, and 7,600 were subsequently imported under American aid; but the remainder of the 36,000 operating in 1953 were imported and paid for by Turkey. At the end of 1953 the United States Government had made a total contribution of $27,602,000 toward Turkish road development by providing machinery and experts from our Public Roads Administration; but the equivalent of some $293,000,000 drawn from the Turks' own resources was spent on roads during this same period. The result is a network of some 13,000 miles of all-weather road which, as much as anything else, has made possible the large-scale increase in agricultural production which underlies the country's progress.

Despite this remarkable increase in national production and export, Turkey has nevertheless run a persistent foreign exchange deficit in recent years, creating large debts to the European Payments Union and to Turkey's commercial suppliers in Europe. This has been the result of a policy of maximum investment, both of domestic resources and in imported capital goods, as a means of increasing the rapid expansion of the Turkish economy. This policy has been disturbing to many financial experts, in-

cluding those of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development which is engaged in financing projects there amounting to some $60,000,000. It was Turkish reaction to the reluctance of the Bank to proceed with additional large projects until steps were taken to better Turkey's general financial position which resulted in the recent closing of the Bank's office in Ankara. The Bank's existing loan program in Turkey was not, however, disturbed.

Great advances have also taken place in Turkey in recent years in the field of education, although illiteracy is still high and many years will pass before all villages have elementary schools. There has been an average annual increase of 833 in the number of elementary schools opened each year during the past three years, with an average annual gain of 134,000 pupils. An average of 62 new secondary schools and three new lycées were also started each year during the same period. In 1953, $15,214,000 was allocated to the universities in Turkey, as contrasted with $9,107,000 in 1950, and construction has also been started on a new university in eastern Turkey, the first outside Istanbul and Ankara. Two less encouraging developments, however, have been evidences of a disturbing increase in religious reaction, which led, on July 27, 1953, to the dissolution of the Nation Party and a slowing down of the trend toward governmental neutrality in religious affairs; and the passage on March 9, 1954, of a Revised Press Law, which has been interpreted in certain aspects as restricting the freedom of the press enjoyed in other countries.

All in all, the performance of the Turks has been remarkable. In a short period Turkey has been transformed, in one of the most peaceful revolutions of all times, from an Eastern, authoritarian state to a democracy comparable in essential elements to the Western democracies. The people of Turkey and their government have been brought into close harmony with their Western friends, particularly the United States. A. E. Yalman, the publisher of *Vatan,* summed it up not long ago by quoting the quizzical comment of a Turkish innkeeper in eastern Turkey: "It's strange how well we seem to get on with the Americans. It's almost as if we had become relatives."

# CANADIANS ARE DIFFERENT

*By Miriam Chapin*

AMERICANS, or as some Canadians choose to call them, Usonians, are sometimes surprised when they come to visit or to live in Canada that Canadians are so different from themselves. They expect French Canadians to be foreign. But English Canadians? They look like Americans, they speak English much as they do, but they neither act nor think in precisely the same way. Why not? There are good historical and contemporary reasons. Those same reasons occasionally lead to differences in domestic and foreign policy which astonish and even irritate Americans.

For one thing, Canada is a country that cherishes diversity, not conformity. It contains a great variety of people, very few of whom are Indians or Nelson Eddys in red coats. Canada applies far less pressure on people to live like their neighbors than does American society, probably because it has been divided from the start between two big national groups, and there has been room in the interstices for other groups like the Gaels of Cape Breton, the Jerseymen of the Gaspé, the Ukrainians of Saskatchewan and the native Indians to retain something of their original characteristics. The circumstance that there are many kinds of Canadian is not a barrier to nationhood, but an enrichment of it. In the next ten years Canada expects to take in 2,000,000 immigrants, who will help build a new nation.

The factors that have gone to shape Canada vary in importance from province to province, but they operate to some extent in all. First comes the French struggle for recognition as an equal partner within a bi-national state, equal in language rights, in wages, in political power. There is the English tradition of law and order, of civil rights, of loyalty to the Crown without subservience. There is the frontier to the north, forbidding yet tempting to the adventurous and greedy. And there is the presence of another nation with far greater wealth and power along 3,000 miles of boundary. No such influences permeate the United States. Indeed it is remarkable that Canadians are as much like Americans as they are, that they understand so well even the traits they don't like in their neighbors.

French Canada is far more than Quebec. Its third of the popu-

lation may soon be a half, for it includes more young people who will have children than does English Canada. Soon there may be a French majority in New Brunswick, not to be denied its political power. There are strong French minorities in Nova Scotia (Acadians) and in eastern Ontario where they have spread over the border from Quebec. St. Boniface in Manitoba is a center of French culture, and all the western provinces are plagued by the separate school agitation, the appeal for state-supported French Catholic schools. Everywhere the French carry with them their Latin, Roman Catholic culture, shaped by the Church and by rebellion against it. Yet it is a Latin culture modified by its North American environment, in language, art, music, cuisine, behavior. French Canadians are no alien, immigrant group. They are older, more rooted in Canada, more severed from their motherland, than the English. Canada is, because of them, an older nation in some ways than the United States, with a more continuous culture. Montreal had theater and literature when Chicago was a swamp. The French effect on Canadian politics has been to make all provincial governments more independent of the federal power than American state governments, because Quebec regards itself as a nation. In external policies, all French Canada drives vehemently toward an independent Canada, independent first of Britain and then of the United States. English Canadians may dislike and distrust their French brethren, but they are Siamese twins; they have to reckon with each other, and seek unity against any pressure from without.

The backbone of English Canada is Scottish, dour, thrifty, law-abiding, with a streak of sentimentality and a love for song. Religion and soldiering are part of their tradition, along with the security of the common law. English Canadians regard a professional army career or one in the Church as a more natural destiny for a youth than Americans do, or did until recently. In the States the churches have influence, in Canada they have power. Anglican and United (Methodist and Baptist) Churches as well as Catholic hold much property and expect to have their say in all public matters. There is little revivalism; the Churches are literally established bodies. They are represented on school commissions and concerned with education. Premiers of two provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan, are clergymen. As for the Army, officers are prevalent in politics, and social gatherings shine with uniforms, regimental armories are centers of amusement in peacetime, high-

schools and colleges stress military drill. All this is part of the heritage of empire. Canadians turn out by the million for a royal tour, and display their devotion to the young Queen, while being notably hardheaded about loans to her Government. And as for hardheadedness, there is far more of hard steady drinking and less of drunkenness than in parallel social circles below the border.

The firm English Canadian grounding in civil rights is basic. It does not always prevail in practice, but it is latent in mind. When it pops out in private life, it can be disconcerting. Once when I was standing in line to buy concert tickets, I saw a man I knew far ahead of me. I dashed over and asked if he would buy my ticket. "Why, no," he said, "that wouldn't be fair to the others!" After some peevish reflection, I concluded he was quite right, and just being Canadian.

Canada has no Bill of Rights, though Tory M.P.'s have vigorously urged passage of one. The Liberals refuse it, claiming it is unnecessary. During the 1946 spy arrests, very conservative journals found bitter fault with violations of civil rights committed by the Minister of Justice, who is now Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent. *Toronto Saturday Night,* favorite reading of Canadian business, calls for the defeat of the so-called Garson amendments to the Criminal Code. (Mr. Garson is Minister of Justice in the present Liberal Government.) It says they were drafted too hurriedly at the instance of the State Department, that they could be interpreted to make it treasonable to refuse obedience to an R.C.M.P. officer, and to make treason punishable by death. It is this stubborn clutch on the tradition of English common law that impels Minister of External Affairs Pearson to say there is no law under which Dr. James Endicott, head of the Canadian Peace Congress, can be prosecuted for accusing U.N. troops of waging germ warfare. So, because there is no law, he won't ask the Justice Department to act. His own wishes are irrelevant.

As a rule, except for a few mayors and gold-mine magnates, who are jubilant examples of free expression, English Canadians are quiet folk. They have a vast tolerance and even enjoyment of the flamboyant individuals who crop up among them, but they seldom emulate them. Women are apt to express few opinions outside the topics of babies and housekeeping, which doesn't mean they don't hold them. The farther west you go, the more women you find working in politics, in unions, taking an interest

in world affairs and ready to talk on them. Canadians call themselves stodgy, and perhaps they are, but well-balanced is a prettier word, and quite as accurate.

One reason why they have not developed a national literature, while French Canadians have the brilliant beginning of one, is perhaps the same moderation. Another is that they formerly looked too faithfully to English example and approval, and now do to American. They failed to follow the one or gain the other, for their writing is never more than good second-rate. The one effulgent exception, Stephen Leacock, flared up in his young manhood and then slumped into comfortable conventionality in his chair of economics at McGill. Canadians have an uneasy sense that they ought to have more culture, so instead of paying their writers and painters enough to live on, they set up a Royal Commission to wander up and down the land finding out why they haven't one. All the time it is there, growing, timidly and crudely.

The west in Canada was never such a frontier as it was in the United States. It never meant to Canada a gradual surging conquest by pioneers, a mass movement of settlers into wilderness, year by year. Canada had no Oregon Trail; its Rocky Mountain rampart was too harsh a barrier, its winters too icy. Canada's gold rush came much later than California's; it drove to the Yukon, with little residue of settlement. The west was opened first by the fur companies, dotting down their isolated posts, anxious to cultivate the Indians for trade, not to wipe them out to make room for farms. Settlers were discouraged. It is less than a century since the railroads pushed through, dragging after them settlers to supply freight for them to carry. Except in the Peace River Valley, settlement was all organized by one big company or another. There were no Indian wars; the worst fights were with Louis Riel's Metis, the halfbreeds, long after the American West was carved into peaceful states. The Metis fought the railway and the Scots who threatened their ranges, but not the white man as such. So the Canadian West still has big open spaces, and its settlers—mostly Slavic—came from a later tide of immigration than Nebraska's. Nor has it any smoldering embers of Indian wars.

Canada's present frontier is the Yellowknife and the Mackenzie, Ungava and the caribou barrens. It is a chance for a lonely job with some big company, or a gamble with miserable death to make a fortune. Now it is becoming a source of great wealth, but

only for those with capital to invest in exploration and development. It is a treasure to be guarded, but not yet a place for a man to make a home. Canadians look with misgiving on the way the United States has stripped its own mines and forests. They now have a government committee, appointed without fanfare, to see to preserving theirs and advise on civil and military use.

Three-quarters of Canada's population lives in a hundred-mile-wide strip along its southern edge, a strip broken by several stretches of wild country. A traveller has to dip into the States at least twice on a drive from Halifax to Vancouver. One looks at these gaps and wonders what does hold this sprawling country together. American influence is intense, through books, movies, magazines, tourists, investment. The only magazine circulating all across Canada in both languages is *Reader's Digest* (Selections). *Time* and *Life* are in every doctor's office. Sunday papers claim it is of no use to print book reviews, because anyone who wants to read them will buy the New York Sunday editions, printed on Canadian spruce, and skinning more acres each week. The movie houses in downtown locations are part of American chains. Importation of crime and sex comics is forbidden, but they pop up illegally or in Canadian editions from American plates. French Canadian writers complained to the Massey Commission on Arts and Letters that American syndicated short stories are used in translation by Quebec newspapers instead of original work by local authors. "The Americans even want to teach us about *l'amour,*" they mourned. Labor unions, except Quebec's Catholic Syndicates, are affiliated to the A. F. of L. or the C.I.O. American investment comes to more than 6 billion dollars, in branches of American firms, in whole Canadian companies owned in New York, in American stockholding in Canadian-run firms. The Hudson Bay Company set up regulations to keep out the flood, and keep itself British. There is an obvious question whether a nation of 15,000,000 persons living cheek by jowl with one ten times its size can maintain its individuality. Switzerland, faced with the same problem, has succeeded. Canadians mean to try.

What does make Canada a nation? A lingering faith in the Commonwealth, even among French Canadians, who prefer slow steps toward independence within the wonted bonds to a swift slide into dependence on the United States; a liking for government action when necessary, such as the baby bonuses and the old-age pensions, which seem to Canadians the merest common

sense, not creeping Socialism; a grudging but growing, almost incredulous belief in their ability to make a life of their own, shaped to their desires. The decision to dig their own Seaway was a tremendous thrill to all Canada. The United States has now joined in, but the initiative was Canada's. It is no accident that the Minister of Transport who has been determined that Canada should go it alone is a French Canadian.

In a physical sense, the railroads and the airlines, not the highways, tie Canada together. On them you can go from Atlantic to Pacific with no change at a halfway point, as in Chicago. The Canadian Pacific was a British enterprise, and still has headquarters in London, though nearly half its stock is now in American hands. The Canadian National is plain Canadian, the remarkable product of national necessity, the longest railroad in the world, serving every province. It started corporate existence as a ramshackle hodgepodge of bankrupt lines which the government of the day reluctantly took over. Other small lines have gone broke and been loaded on its tottering back, like the Temiscuata in Quebec; when Newfoundland joined Confederation, the Canadian National Railways found itself endowed with that narrow-gauge line, which wanders like the Toonerville trolley through that bleak land. In earlier days when new prairie land was to be opened up, when a mine wanted a branch to cart out ore, the C.N.R. would be told to send out a line, until it now looks like a spiderweb all over the West. Nobody dreamed of making it show a profit, or of seeing its trains run on time. The Government paid the deficit each year, and the inherited financing was as intricate as the branch lines.

But four years ago the Government handed Donald Gordon, its universal choreboy, the job of running the C.N.R. And lo, by dint of a lot of small changes, by a sort of inspired horse-sense financing, the railway has come up with a profit, little but astounding. More than that, Canadians begin to feel proud of it. New stations, new hotels, new diesel engines, new uniforms on the personnel, plain talk to the public about its own railroad, add up to making the system a Canadian asset. So is Trans-Canada Airlines, and Canadians grinned very cheerfully when their Government stood up to the United States authorities and won out in a squabble over running a through line to Mexico City by way of Tampa. All these things give an increment of national pride, a feeling of individuality to the "man in the street."

In daily life, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is the most conspicuous and omnipresent of the agencies which make for unity. For 16 years it has presented a unique Canadian compromise between state and private radio. A separate organization reporting to Parliament, not to the Cabinet, it is government-supported except for some advertising revenue, and is run by a Board of Governors appointed by the Government from the various provinces. Its news broadcasts, political talks by party representatives, service programs such as the farm broadcasts, and B.B.C. transcriptions, are unsponsored. Its relay stations reach the most remote villages. Twice a day the man in British Columbia and the man in Newfoundland listen to the same news bulletin, as factual and unslanted as the Canadian Broadcasting Company can make it. On Wednesday nights all Canada can, if it pleases, hear an evening of classical music and drama, free of any commercial. The C.B.C. is often excoriated for its sins, accused of being dictatorial, highbrow, pettifogging. But it makes Canada what it is, and Canadians have that kind of radio because that is the kind of radio they want. The Gallup Poll recently gave it majority approval.

No television was allowed in Canada until, after three years' study, the Canadian Broadcasting Company was ready to put it on, in spite of the anguished howls of the private stations which think they could make more money if it would get out of their way. Canadian TV for Canadians, the C.B.C. decreed, and it decides not only what programs it will produce, but which American ones it will buy.

Three evenings a week for half an hour a young man from Nova Scotia plays records and talks over this radio in a gruff voice, referring to himself as Old Rawhide. He has built a national following by making fun of anything he chose, including top government officials and the C.B.C. itself. When it was rumored he might be taken off the air, letters inundated the station. One of Rawhide's favorite targets is Kate Aitken, who shares radio distinction with him. In that curious profession of women's commentator, which radio has created and passed on to television, she rushes off by air for five days in Japan or New Guinea, and rushes back to tell Canadians all about them. Coast to coast, Canadian women get the same daily dose of cooking directions, travel, beauty hints, and advice on love. They like her, but her approach would not please Americans.

The C.B.C. makes for one kind of unity, the railroads for another. But the political framework, which Quebec says is a pact between equal sovereignties, while English Canada calls it a union, has been slow in assuming its full rôle. Taking from England the theory and practice of ministers' responsibility to Parliament, it gradually learned under Mackenzie King to think nationally, to balance interests from Cape Breton to Vancouver. The Prime Minister governs only by virtue of being the leader of his party. Louis St. Laurent, as a French Canadian who has won popularity in the West, has carried forward possible understanding between the halves of his country. When he is opposed, it is not for being French.

The Right Honorable Vincent Massey is the first Canadian to represent the Crown as Governor-General. All but the most intransigent Tories (they wanted another Englishman to succeed Alexander) were pleased by his appointment, since it marked a stage in the attainment of independence from England. Adoption of a Canadian flag is expected to come next. Mr. Massey is a very rich (farm machinery), very intelligent, very solemn man, who takes his functions with the greatest seriousness and never looks as if he felt in the least absurd in the fancy hat and gold lace he wears to make his ceremonial visits to cities and receive dignitaries. Some of his older friends are said to have been taken aback when in reply to letters beginning, "Dear Vince—," they received a screed opening, "His Excellency the Governor-General commands me—." But Canadians rather expect their Governor-General to be like that; they like some ceremony in public life, and Mr. Massey is secure and at home in Canada. Besides, he speaks beautiful, polished, fluent French, and to French Canada his formality seems appropriate.

The provincial premiers of Canada are more striking figures and, as a rule, better known than the governors of states. Besides Tom Dewey and maybe Shivers of Texas, how many governors outside your own state do you know? Most Canadians could name at once Joe Smallwood of Newfoundland, Duplessis of Quebec, Manning of Social Credit of Alberta, and Douglas of C.C.F. Saskatchewan. They could not only name them, but associate them with particular policies. Canadians see nothing undesirable about keeping a man in office for many years, if they like him and he is doing a good job. So premiers and mayors are apt to last a long time. They have a chance to see projects

through, to impress themselves on their bailiwicks and on the whole country.

This stability, this liking for protocol, this reluctance to abandon the well-tried for the experimental, combined with a willingness to experiment boldly in certain fields of social welfare, sometimes exasperate Americans. Yet they are valuable traits in present North America. Living with them leads to appreciation.

But few Americans know Canada well enough to reach that stage of understanding. In fact many don't know it at all. A group of college seniors from upper New York State came to Montreal last spring on an exchange visit. They were asked a few questions about Canada. Only four out of 32 knew the name of the Prime Minister; estimates of the population varied from 2,000,000 to 100,000,000; nobody at all got Premier Duplessis' name right. How, then, could they be expected to grasp the causes and effects of Canadian attitudes on such matters as NATO or the recognition of Communist China—mere trifles on which their lives and the lives of their children might some day depend?

Newspapers give more and more data about Canada, but little basis on which to evaluate their meaning. Yet Canada's divergencies from the United States are too important to be ignored, or blithely brushed aside. Scottish stubbornness and French pride might one day join in a resentful blend. Those who judge only from the headlines and expect Canada to follow blindly on whatever path the United States chooses are doomed to bewilderment, if not disappointment. Without any doubt, there is friendship in Canada toward the United States, but friendship is not always best shown by a submissive dogging of footsteps. Nor will Canada's be so shown.

*THE FUTURE IN RETROSPECT*

# THE RESIDUE OF PARETO

*By Crane Brinton*

TRATTATO DI SOCIOLOGIA GENERALE. By Vilfredo Pareto. 2 vols. Firenze: Barbèra, 1916. English translation: The Mind and Society. Edited by Arthur Livingston; translated by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston with the advice and cooperation of James Harvey Rogers. 4 vols. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935.

PARETO has never been widely read in the United States. Even during the 1930's, when the admirable English translation of the "Sociologia Generale" edited by the late Arthur Livingston came out, there was no more than a flurry among the reviewers. Pareto's big book does indeed continue to be read by professional students of human relations. As an "anti-intellectual," as perhaps "the Karl Marx of the bourgeoisie," his name at least is part of the miscellaneous furniture of the minds of educated Americans. He deserves a better fate.

For Pareto today does not seem old-fashioned, dated, in the way that another great systematic general sociologist, Herbert Spencer, does. The two have a great deal in common; both had scientific and technical training—Pareto was an engineer, and Spencer almost an engineer—both were brought up in the strict secularist faith of the Enlightenment, both believed in individual freedom, above all in economic life, and both feared and distrusted the encroaching democratic state. Both wrote ponderously and at length, so that for the ordinary reader the task of reading them is a formidable one.

The task is hardly worth while today for Spencer, unless the reader wants to try to relive Victorian intellectual history. For Spencer, faced toward the end of his life with the evident errors in his earlier prognosis of evolution from the "militant" to the "industrial" society, from status to contract, from state intervention in economic life to complete laissez faire, could only rail at his contemporaries for their blindness and wrongheadedness, could do no more than preach against their sins. Pareto, who was only 20 years younger than Spencer, and who regretted the state and prospects of the Western World in 1900 at least as much as did Spencer, made a real effort to understand why his contem-

poraries were behaving as they did. This attempt to understand confirmed him in the belief that nineteenth-century theories of Evolution and Progress were wrong, at least in their application to human societies, and wrong at bottom because most human beings, even in the enlightened West, are quite incapable of living up to the best plans the reformers have prescribed for them. His study of general sociology became one of the most important documents in the twentieth-century revision of earlier optimistic faith in rapid "linear" social progress. In short, Pareto is one of the leaders of the badly but probably irretrievably named attitude toward human nature we call "anti-intellectualism." We are in 1954 still struggling with the problems the anti-intellectualist movement has set us. Pareto is therefore still worth the great difficulty of reading him. He must unfortunately be read in all his length, for unlike Mr. Arnold Toynbee, he has had no simplifier and condenser.

Pareto's broadest generalization about man's fate need interest the modern reader only as an indication of contemporary revulsions from the concept of linear social evolution. Though Pareto dressed this generalization up in some very abstract concepts of equilibrium taken from natural science, it amounts to one more cyclical philosophy of history. According to Pareto, Western society has tended to move from a state in which the innovators, the entrepreneurs, the "foxes," set the tone, to one in which the tradition-bound, the sound, simple-minded landed aristocrats, the bureaucrats—both military and civilian—the "lions," set the tone. Pareto's explanations of the complex changes in human group-behavior which set up this cycle and keep it moving are subtle and persuasive. The specific conclusion he arrives at is that by the late nineteenth century a period of maximum domination of the foxes was coming to an end, and the reign of the lions was preparing. In the nineteenth century freedom to experiment had led to a maximum of economic productiveness, to a society in which the career open to talent was as open as it ever had been, and better rewarded, a society enjoying a maximum of individual freedom and a minimum of restrictive action by the state and by lesser associations, perhaps also for many individuals a maximum of risk and adventure, and a minimum of security.

Pareto liked this society, but he saw it giving way to another and quite opposite kind of society. Increasing democracy, far

from leading to increasing individual liberty, seemed to him an entering wedge for the ultimate rule of the lions, for the return to power of the soldier and the bureaucrat, for the deadening of experiment and initiative, for the lessening of the total productive power of the society but the increasing security of most men —their psychological security at any rate, if not their material prosperity. Something like state Socialism Pareto thought was on its way in the West. The new Socialism would not be an improved nineteenth-century society, with universal security added to universal prosperity; it would not be the classless society of Marxist preaching; it would, indeed, be a kind of return to the twelfth century—a rather more hygienic twelfth century, perhaps even a rather more prosperous one, but certainly an age of faith, decorum, and the less exciting virtues. Pareto clearly believed that this transition would not come without violence, and, in particular, not without international wars and revolutions. But he does not dwell on this prospect with the fond horror of a real prophet of doom like Mr. Sorokin.

Pareto is not even clear as to whether his cycle is a series of spirals reaching ever higher, or merely a swinging back and forth of a pendulum. His heart was not really in this grand philosophy of history, which one suspects he brought out largely to annoy the believers in assured linear Progress. And of course we are in no position 30 years later to test the accuracy of his analysis. For whether we are on a spiral, a pendulum, or a fine straight line tending upward as all good charts should, the fact is that we as contemporaries cannot place ourselves in any such scheme; we simply do not yet—and perhaps never may—understand the social process well enough to see just where we are in its course. Much of what Pareto predicted has indeed come to pass; the state everywhere "interferes" with the individual far more than it did in 1900. Yet it is by no means certain that in the West at least there is in the mid-twentieth century any less chance for the individual who has a new idea, for the inventor, the innovating artist, the engineer, the entrepreneur, than at the beginning of the century. The total wealth of the West is greater than ever before, in spite of its rather more equal distribution. Our intellectuals complain about the deadening uniformity of modern life, but hardly any more vigorously than did the intellectuals of the heyday of individualism in the Victorian Age. If ours is to be an age of lions, there are a lot of foxes about and seemingly thriving.

The heart of the big book on general sociology is, however, the analysis of human group-action summed up by Pareto in his concepts of the "residues" and the "derivations." Here indeed he deserves the epithet Mr. Max Lerner found for him in a review of the English translation in 1935—"The Bentham of the irrational." Pareto, it should be noted, did not claim to be a psychologist. He had indeed trouble with his labels, and made use of terms like "instinct" which might lead an unwary reader to assume that he has theories about what makes an individual behave as he does. Actually Pareto leaves the study of drives, urges, impulses, libidos and the id to the professional psychologist. As a sociologist, he is interested only in the observable behavior of men in groups; and he has to use as evidence a good deal of purely symbolic behavior, language, ritual, customs and the like. In analyzing that behavior he finds it convenient for purposes of understanding to divide it into three classifications—never forgetting that in real social life the three are usually inextricably mixed. First there is rational or "logico-experimental" action, of which the easiest understood is the kind the economist studies and which indeed he can study with mathematical tools; but Pareto, who was earlier a very distinguished mathematical economist, turned to sociology just because he became convinced that so much of social action must escape the economist. The other two classes then are both "non-logico-experimental"—the "residues" and the "derivations." What Pareto meant by these by no means transparent terms is best brought out concretely.

In the fifth century B.C. a group of Greek sailors sacrifice to Poseidon before setting out on a voyage. A thousand years later, perhaps in the same spot, a group of Greek sailors, now Christians, pray to the Virgin before setting out on a voyage. The sentiments—the "residues"—involved are clearly the same, or very nearly the same, in both instances. There are in Paretan terms several different kinds of residues here, though that expressing a need for divine or at least superhuman aid in face of possible danger is perhaps uppermost. This residue, indeed, would not be greatly changed if we brought the incident down to today, when compass, naval architecture, radio and much else have robbed the sea of so much of its terror. Most of us still can hardly approach an airplane trip without some feeling of need for at least psychological reassurance.

The derivations are of course the ideas, the theories, held about

Poseidon and the Virgin respectively, and perhaps for skeptical moderns, about luck or even about the relation between the individual and actuarial statistics. They vary, even though the systematist can certainly discern similarities in the cults. What is, however, crucially important is that from the point of view of the true believers, the participants in the ritual, the two systematic theological derivations are simply worlds apart. You cannot normally believe in *both* Poseidon and the Virgin.

One more concrete instance should bring out clearly the fact that Pareto is no naïve anti-intellectual, that he says nothing so foolish as that ideas, theories, "derivations," are powerless to affect human group-behavior, that one set of ideas is as good as another, that ideas are peripheral, part of the "superstructure," mere froth on the surface of the great wordless waves of society. Here is an example from the memoirs of Talleyrand—himself, incidentally, a good Paretan in practice. The Prussian army, led by Bluecher, was advancing on Paris after Waterloo. The Prussian general, Talleyrand learned from observers, was especially incensed at the existence in Paris of a Pont de Jéna, commemorating the disastrous and, to many Prussians, disgraceful defeat of the Prussian army by the French in 1806. Bluecher was determined to blow up this particular bridge—not for military purposes, for the war was over, and he had no intention of blowing up any other bridge in Paris. Talleyrand at once took steps to change the name of the bridge to Pont de l'Ecole de Guerre, since it led from the right bank to the War School on the left. Bluecher arrived to find no longer a Pont de Jéna, so he blew nothing up. The story as Talleyrand tells it is almost certainly incorrect in many details, notably in assigning to himself the almost exclusive credit for saving the actual bridge. But its central facts—that Bluecher at least thought of blowing up a bridge because it was named after the battle of Jéna, that the name of the bridge was changed before or shortly after Bluecher arrived in Paris, and that he did not blow up the bridge—are quite clear.

In the Paretan analysis, the mere name "Pont de Jéna" is a derivation in this instance, a simple one, hardly a theory or a proposition, but still a name filled with certain obvious, indeed quite logical and rational associations. The residues involved in Bluecher's behavior—and no doubt large numbers of his officers and men shared the sentiments expressed in the residue—are, as they almost always are, quite complicated. Certainly a major

residue here is one which Pareto called "persistence of aggregates," the residue at the bottom of traditional conservatism, a residue strong in Prussian officers and often expressed in a touchy patriotism. The real value of this example, however, is not in distinctions among specific derivations and specific residues, but rather in the relation between residues and a derivation. Here is evident the kind of minimal importance—an instrumental rôle in actual social change—Pareto always admitted for the derivations. By changing the mere name of the bridge, by manipulating a derivation, by yielding indeed in a sense, but not by any abject surrender, Talleyrand was able—to use rather barbarous but at least quite clear terms from social-scientese—to "deactivate" certain of the Prussian's sentiments which when active were injurious to the best interests of France.

He was not able, and according to his memoirs did not even try, to remove or change the Prussian's sentiments, or their expression in his residues. And indeed it is somewhat a challenge to those who, like most of us Americans, have been brought up in a belief in the power of the idealistic word to change human sentiments to ask, How would you have "reasoned" with Bluecher? It seems pretty clear that it would have done no good —would probably have done harm—to have pointed out to Bluecher that his sentiments expressed in just that way at least were petty, that the economic value of the bridge was far greater than any satisfaction to Prussian pride its destruction might bring, that the proposed act was not in accord with the Kantian Categorical Imperative, or with Christian ethics. Another idealistic course—proudly retaining the name Pont de Jéna—would almost certainly have meant loss of the bridge.

In fact any conceivable line of reasoning, even the most abstract and "idealistic," that could be taken in a case of this sort would involve some appeal to the residues. It is one of the great strengths of Pareto's system that, though for purposes of analysis he finds it convenient to distinguish between derivations and residues, he realizes, as naïve anti-intellectuals do not, that in social action the two are always associated, in varying proportions and strengths indeed, but always in association. By temperament and training—in which one must include a desire to *épater le bourgeois*—Pareto inclined to minimize the rôle of high ethical ideas in transforming group-action. He did not hold, however, that even such ideas are dispensable or powerless or unimpor-

tant. Among his residues he included what amounts to a residue compelling men to make just this kind of derivation, to hold high ethical ideals, and to believe they can live up to these ideals.

The bulk of the four volumes of Pareto in English translation is taken up with an elaborate classification, a taxonomy, of the residues and the derivations. With the derivations, which Francis Bacon had already analyzed as "idols" and with which we are all familiar as "rationalizations," Pareto has no great trouble; but he found it necessary to divide the residues into six classes, 26 subclasses, and 25 further subdivisions. Now the test of any such systematic classification is its use, as Pareto well knew. By his own standards of natural science, he has failed as a taxonomist, for no one uses his system in the daily routine of work, as a botanist still uses much of the system of Linnaeus. The late L. J. Henderson made a valiant attempt in a Harvard seminar on concrete sociology to train his students in the regular use of the Paretan system, but he has had no successors.

If, however, Pareto's classification of residues and derivations has proved unwieldy and unusable, if indeed neither the term "residue" nor the term "derivation" has caught on with the public in the way some of Freud's terms have caught on, the underlying conception is part and parcel of the way many mid-century students of human relations approach their work. We need not use that often disputable word "influence." Pareto's direct influence has perhaps been slight, especially in this country, though by no means negligible, as the mention of names like Talcott Parsons, George Homans, James Burnham, N. J. Spykman, perhaps even George F. Kennan, would indicate. It is rather as one current in the broad stream of contemporary revision of the eighteenth-century—and, one must admit, the nineteenth—estimate of the potentialities of radical reform of group-behavior that Pareto's work survives. It should be worth while following up the implications of his work in a concrete problem very much before us today, that of "colonialism."

Pareto would most certainly classify the proposition, that the existing system of colonial dependencies of Western nations in Africa, Asia, Oceania and Latin America is unjust and anachronistic and should be terminated by the immediate granting of complete independence to all colonial peoples, as a derivation not in accord with what he with characteristic heaviness called "logico-experimental" fact, or reality. He would, indeed, have

poured on those who maintain this proposition the kind of scorn he reserved for people he called the "virtuists" and others call "do-gooders." But once he had got rid of his spleen, and settled down to the work of analysis, he would conclude that from the subjective point of view of the native leaders against colonial rule, the spreading among their own people of a belief in the unjustness of the colonial system is indeed a useful derivation; and that the spreading of a belief in this proposition among the Western colonial rulers themselves or at least among Western peoples would be an even more useful derivation from the point of view of these native leaders. From the point of view of the interests of the Western peoples, and indeed from the point of view of all interested in the peace and prosperity of the world, he would conclude that this proposition is on the whole a harmful one, an ideal so unreal in its estimate of the ability of most colonial peoples to rule themselves in this kind of world—the One World of *fact,* the One World of modern industry—that the attempt to achieve it would be disastrous for all concerned.

The residues, as always, would give Pareto more trouble than the derivations, for he did not really succeed in classifying them at all effectively. He would certainly recognize that among the native peoples themselves strong sentiments in favor of independence and group self-esteem, sharpened by the events of the last 50 years, have been so far activated that no sensible Western statesman or publicist could afford to disregard them or attempt to suppress them and return to simple nineteenth-century "imperialist" methods of direct or indirect rule. Among the Westerners themselves, he would recognize the existence of a strong current of anti-imperialist feeling among liberals everywhere, and somewhat vaguer and more widespread feeling of bad conscience about the past of Western imperialism among many other Westerners. In particular, he would have to admit as a very powerful residue indeed among Americans a strong sentiment against all forms of colonialism. Since like most lovers of irony, he was not above *Schadenfreude,* Pareto would undoubtedly enjoy to the full the current plight of American liberals forced to support wicked France in Indo-China—forced, indeed, to egg her on to a firmer stand.

In the Paretan analysis, then, and from the point of view of the Westerner, we are faced, not with a simple conflict between our ideals and our interests as the intellectualist, whether "real-

ist" or "idealist," sees such a conflict, but with a most complex one in which ideals and interests and sentiments are inextricably mixed on both sides of the dilemma—and among both Westerners and natives. In such an analysis, the first conclusion must be that no immediate practical solution of the problem is possible. For nothing can effect a radical change in widespread residues, nothing can root them out rapidly and entirely, nothing, in short, can really reform them in a generation or so. The statesman and the social scientist can study them, can try to estimate their strength, can indeed—to lapse once more into social-scientese—take the kind of measure that may activate some and deactivate others. Like the physician, these seekers after the health of the body politic may indeed find that their therapeutic measures have unforeseen consequences, that the residues respond unpredictably to manipulation by means of the derivations they administer. But, again like the physician, they have to do something, for the patient demands it. One of the residues Pareto specifically names is a residue that demands that there be political action. Pareto by temperament would agree with Hippocrates —and with Burke and the anti-planners generally: "Do no harm"—do not interfere where you do not fully understand, for Nature is wiser than you are. But he also knew that the patient wants the pill, or even the operation, and that sometimes one has to give in to the patient.

He would not, then, advocate letting the colonial problem alone. He certainly would advocate neither complete and immediate independence, nor a quite impossible return to strict control of the colonies. One imagines that he would prefer wherever possible the sugar-coated pill of trusteeship, skillfully administered, with a sound additional dose of Point Four. In less metaphorical terms, he would try to preserve as long as possible the real control in the hands of good Western administrators who could distinguish carefully between the demands of Westernized native intellectuals and the needs of the masses, but who would by no means unnecessarily antagonize the intellectuals, who would rather play skillfully on the residues he recognizes as their basic motivation. This would be a hard task, and perhaps an impossible one as the world now is. It is perhaps made somewhat easier by the fact, now patent even to liberals at home in the West, and beginning to be apparent to some of those curious mirror-images of Western liberals who hold power in countries

like India, that for "undeveloped" peoples all over the world the alternative to Western imperialism is not in fact complete independence from the West, but Russian imperialism.

Yet no one who knows the West, and especially that now dominant part of the West, the United States, can hope that the foregoing analysis of the colonial problem, or a similar analysis of the problems of race relations in the United States, of "free enterprise" versus "planning," of world federation, and of many more, will be at all acceptable to that powerful current in American public opinion that drives toward idealistic solutions. We are an impatient people, impatient above all in our idealism. On the wave of recent material prosperity, and with a record of genuine achievement in easing up some of the traditional tensions in Western society, we are reluctant to accept the Paretan position that it is quite impossible to eliminate *all* such tensions. We find him tired instead of cautious, cynical instead of realistic, a man so proudly aloof from common men that he misses the spiritual forces that unite common men—in America, anyway—in the democratic way. Behind him we see his fellow countryman Machiavelli; and we know that Machiavelli is no prophet for the countrymen of Jefferson.

It is tempting to see, in this really powerful and widespread American feeling of dislike for anything in words that sounds like the Machiavellian tradition in politics, evidence—in Pareto's own terms—of a strong set of residues which have served our people well. Of course we *do* make our compromises. We do not carry our idealism in the matter of colonialism to the point of Robespierre's famous "let the colonies perish, rather than a principle." To foreigners, we seem indeed to have inherited that British capacity for preserving both our sense of virtue and our material possessions intact which so irritated generations of Europeans against *perfide Albion* in the last few centuries. The subject is one that tempts to irony; unkind foreigners have suggested that we do indeed accept Robespierre's maxim—only with the emendation, "the colonies of others."

Yet we have in the last few years gone a long way in curbing our idealistic impatience in international relations. What Pareto's work now puts before us most clearly is this: Can we adapt the principles and the sentiments (in Paretan terms, the derivations and the residues) developed in the long years when we were outsiders, indeed "colonials," in world politics to our needs now

that we have become insiders and responsible leaders? Pareto, though he does not say much directly about Americans, clearly held, with many Europeans of his cast of thought, that we could not—at least not without ceasing to try to be a democracy. At bottom, he believed we take the word too much for the deed, in others as well as in ourselves. Yet he may be wrong. Pareto himself greatly admired the ruling classes of Rome and of Britain at their best. But neither a Roman nor a British gentleman could be a conscious and avowed Machiavellian, nor indeed a Paretan. They had, for one thing—and a most important thing it is—to be simpler-minded than these subtle Italians, less analytical, less conscious of the gap between the real and the ideal.

Yet the basic challenge thinkers like Pareto set those of us brought up in the American tradition remains to trouble us, and nowhere more clearly than in the field of international relations. Perhaps one can dismiss phenomena like the Ford peace ship in the war of 1914, or plans for abolishing national sovereignty by fiat, as not really central. It is harder to forget the Kellogg-Briand peace pacts, and even some more recent examples of the belief in a nice agreement, duly signed. It is harder to forget the numerous publicists who, in telling us that we must not compromise with evil, seem really to mean that evil will yield to good words—or if not to words, at least to good force. To such dangerous nonsense, Pareto is at least an antidote—like all antidotes, dangerous also, and not to be taken in excess.

# FINLAND STANDS GUARD

*By John H. Wuorinen*

IT IS a measure of the steadiness of the character of the Finns that elections for the Finnish Parliament seem the most predictable in the world. There are no landslides. A loss or gain of a seat or two by this or that party is news. In the elections of March of this year, the Social Democrats gained one seat, the Agrarians two, the People's Democrats (the label under which the Communist Party operates) came out with exactly the same number as in 1951, the Conservatives lost four, the People's Party (successor to the Progressive Party) gained three, the Swede-Finns lost two. But even so, some predictions were upset; the Communists had been expected to lose seats in this election. And so sensitive is the area inhabited by these steady-going people that students of East-West relationships scan all information from Finland to determine whether "no news" is good or bad news.

It is good news that Finland is still staunchly on guard. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union exerted no pressure on the Finns. The election campaign coincided, in part, with the Four Power Berlin Conference, where the Soviets made plain that they have every intention not only of holding on to all Communist gains in Europe and the Far East, but of pressing their aggressive designs. The proposal for a "European" security pact that would include the U.S.S.R. but exclude the United States was accompanied by intransigence toward Germany and Austria and intensification of the attack on Indo-China in keeping with the customary Communist tactics of global war, cold and hot. Yet, significantly perhaps, when the Russians were probing everywhere else, they were content to let their northern flank rest quiet. It is also important to remember that Finland stands guard there alone.

In the conflict between East and West, Finland has by now come to occupy a special position. Defeated in the two-phase war of 1939–44 caused by two Soviet attacks, the Finns were left by the acquiescing Western Allies to accept, unaided, Russian armistice and peace terms whereby Finland was to be crushed without military conquest. Economic chaos caused by territorial losses, severe reparations and conspiracy engineered by Finnish Communists were to do the trick. But neither the economic blood-letting of reparations payments (amounting, if total costs were

included, to some $900,000,000 by the time the last delivery schedules were met in September 1952) nor the endeavors of the Communists had sufficed to bring the nation to heel.[1] Despite immense difficulties, the Finns managed to observe the onerous provisions of the peace treaty, solved a gigantic displaced persons problem involving more than one-tenth of the total population of the country, and maintained a standard of living high enough to sustain confidence in the future. Independence was also saved; tenacious adherence to the ways of democracy preserved self-government and freedom despite Soviet pressures, and demonstrated the strength that resides even in a small nation determined to remain its own master.

Meanwhile, the dike against domestic Communism held firm. The Communists lost a substantial part of their influence between 1945 and 1951: in 1945 they captured 49 seats in the national legislature; in 1951, the figure stood at 43. While the Communists held important Cabinet posts till 1948, they were included in no Cabinet after that date. During these years they also lost control of the national trade union leadership.[2] It was thus abundantly clear that while her position was far from secure, Finland was not a hostage in the hands of the Soviets.

II

The elections of 1945, 1948 and 1951 had turned primarily on domestic economic issues—taxation, rationing, price and wage regulation, relief measures, and so on. Questions of foreign policy had been conspicuously absent in the campaign, mainly because no important difference of opinion regarding foreign policy had emerged among the Finns and no one challenged the wisdom of a policy of avoiding everything that might arouse the enmity of Moscow.

The March 1954 election followed a split between the two largest parties, the Social Democrats and the Agrarians, who formed a coalition government in January 1951. By the summer of 1953 they were hopelessly divided by pressing economic difficulties caused by a decline in the price abroad of certain vital Finnish export commodities. The Socialists withdrew from the Government, whereupon the Premier, U. Kekkonen (Agrarian), attempted to carry on without a Parliamentary majority. He

[1] *cf.* John H. Wuorinen, "The Finnish Treaty," *The Annals*, The American Academy of Political and Social Science, May 1948.

[2] *cf.* Arthur Spencer, "Finland Maintains Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1953.

introduced a budget in September designed to reduce government expenditures, and offered tax relief for interests hardest hit by the drop in export prices. But by the beginning of November his Cabinet was in difficulties that ultimately led to defeat and resignation.

The attempt to form another coalition government failed, and an interim caretaker Cabinet of experts was accepted by all concerned. It took office on November 16, 1953, headed by Mr. S. Tuomioja, Governor of the Bank of Finland. The new Government was composed mostly of members of the liberal People's Party and of the Conservatives. It marked the first return to Cabinet posts of the Conservatives since the war. Contrary to some predictions, their comeback did not disturb Finland's relations with the U.S.S.R. The Tuomioja Government concluded a new trade agreement with the Soviets within some two weeks of taking office, and in February negotiated another pact which improved Finland's trade situation with the U.S.S.R. by providing for the payment in gold or in Western currencies for exports to the Soviet Union.

On the recommendation of the new Government, the date of elections for a new Parliament, which would normally have been held in July of this year, was advanced to March 6–7. The election campaign was in full swing for three months. Again internal issues held the center of the stage. Only the Communists attempted to underscore foreign policy; they contended that Finland's main problem was "friendship" with the U.S.S.R. or membership in the line-up of Western "imperialists." The other parties took the stand that had been generally accepted for years: Finland should remain outside all Big Power conflicts, must avoid measures and policies that might seem inimical to the U.S.S.R., and maintain normal, friendly relations with all countries. The Communists labored hard to recapture the ground they had lost between 1945 and 1951 and hoped to gain sufficient following to entitle them to ministerial portfolios. Moscow attempted no direct intervention; the election was fully free. Nor did the non-Communist parties fear to label the Communists openly as tools of a conspiracy designed to destroy democracy and to rivet a hateful dictatorship on the nation. The non-Communist press in Finland has been consistently and effectively critical of Communism ever since the last war, and in the weeks before the elections attacked the Communist Party program and candidates in strong terms. The Con-

servative Party inserted a large advertisement in the leading Finnish liberal daily enumerating and condemning a long list of Communist undertakings, especially those of the years 1945–48 when the "People's Democrats" held important Cabinet posts and controlled a substantial part of organized labor. And the attack on the Communists by the Social Democrats was especially skillful, persistent and undisguised.

Finland has a unicameral Parliament, to which members are elected by proportional representation, that devastatingly logical system of representative government which, almost everywhere in Europe, prevents one party from obtaining a majority. Coalition cabinets were the rule in Finland before 1939, and since the war no party has received a majority vote; the Social Democrats, the largest party, have never held more than 54 of the 200 seats in the Parliament. There have been no sharp swings of the political pendulum, and changes in relative party strength have been gradual and minor, except when a party has literally disappeared as happened in 1930 when the Communist Party was outlawed as a treasonable conspiracy.

When the ballots had been counted last March, it was shown that some 2,020,000 voters, or 80 percent of those registered, had gone to the polls. (The total population is about 4,130,000.) New and young voters appear to have turned out in larger numbers than usual. The new Parliament differs but slightly from its predecessor. Broadly speaking, there was a shift toward the left, illustrated by the loss of four seats by the Conservatives (from 28 to 24), the gain of one seat by the Social Democrats (from 53 to 54), the relatively substantial increase in the strength of the liberal People's Party (from 10 to 13 seats), and the fact that the Communists succeeded, contrary to preëlection surmises, in holding their 43 seats. The trend was also underscored by the unexpected increase of two seats in the strength of the moderate Agrarians.

There was a good deal of post-election comment in Finland to the effect that while the bourgeois parties had not captured control of the Parliament, they had scored well enough to prevent a "leftist majority" in that the Social Democrats and the Communists together hold 97 seats or four short of an absolute majority. But such interpretations are rather meaningless because of the incompatibility of the Social Democrats and the Communists. The Socialists have borne the main brunt of the anti-Communist

campaign for the past half-dozen years, and deep-seated animosities divide the two representatives of the "left" in Finland as elsewhere. They give every promise of retaining irreconcilable antipathies. To measure the results of the Finnish election in terms of a "balance" between "right" and "left" is a sterile exercise.

But the Communists' ability to retain their strength of 1951 was a real surprise. Part of the explanation lies in the way proportional representation operates: their popular vote was only slightly higher (some 15,000 votes) than the combined vote of Conservatives and the People's Party, yet they received 43 seats while the other two parties captured a total of only 37. The evidence of the past several years suggests, however, that the growth of Communism has been stopped and the perquisites the Communists enjoyed in 1945, when they held 49 seats, will not be recaptured.

This does not suffice, however, to explain the baffling fact that some 430,000 Finns voted Communist. The explanation is compounded of several additional elements. The first and perhaps the most obvious is that in the last election, as in earlier ones, the number of voters who chose the Communist ticket greatly exceeded the membership of the Communist Party. No official figures have been published showing how large the C.P. membership is, but it is estimated to be about 50,000. Apparently some 380,000 Finns who are not in the party voted Communist, in protest against something or somebody, or in the expectation that the Communists could be relied upon more than, say, the Socialists, to carry through measures considered important by the voter. Also, Communism still benefits to a certain degree from the prestige it enjoyed in Finland and elsewhere during the years immediately after the war, when it was the fashion among the Western allies to speak with confidence and enthusiasm about coöperation with the U.S.S.R. for peace and tranquillity in the world. The propinquity of the Soviet Union also lends it a certain amount of weight.

The party has likewise benefited from the fact that circumstances have made anti-Communist effort rather difficult. The Finns sincerely want to avoid everything that might arouse the enmity of the Soviets. While it has been easy enough to attack Communism and its Finnish followers in general—they have in fact long been attacked with skill and determination—it has not been possible openly to label the Finnish C.P. as a tool of the

U.S.S.R. and to fight it as a conspiracy serving the interest of a foreign Power. The Communists have therefore been able to function as a normal parliamentary political party and to enjoy the advantages of that status. The use of the label "People's Democrats" instead of "Communist Party" since 1945 also has had the effect of obscuring the distinctions between the Social Democrats and the Communists to the advantage of the latter in the minds of the more uncritical voters.

However, despite these and other advantages, the Communists failed in the 1954 election, as they have failed in every election since 1944, to obtain anything like mass support. They had to be satisfied with 21.5 percent of the seats in the legislature. Nor were they able to obtain concessions leading to ministerial posts after the election. The Cabinet negotiations were completed after the newly-elected Parliament convened on April 1, and when the results were announced on May 5, it was disclosed that the Communists had been completely ignored.

The new Cabinet is a coalition and therefore represents compromise arrangements. Headed by Premier R. Torngren, the leader of the Swede-Finn minority group that holds only 13 seats in the Parliament, it is composed, in addition to the Premier, of six Social Democrats, six Agrarians and one Conservative (the Minister of Justice). The parties represented in it, and the groups that are likely to support it, command some 75 percent of the seats in the Parliament. The Torngren Government is composed of men of tested talent and capacity, and promises a level of achievement substantially higher than that of some of its predecessors.

III

It is thus clear that as regards Finland herself, the 1954 election was significant primarily because it confirmed and continued a familiar order of things. The degree in which Finland's citizens participated gave a flattering measure of support to the most basic of all democratic processes, the free use of the secret ballot. The long established multi-party system underwent no real change, and the coalition cabinet that emerged in May conformed to a well-known pattern. The Communists were prevented from advancing beyond the limits imposed on them by the voters several years ago and have not the slightest chance of enticing the Finns to accept a "people's democracy" or of engineering a process

whereby Finland would "slide" behind the Iron Curtain. The election showed once again that the country's democratic institutions are unimpaired and functioning in full vigor. The Iron Curtain still runs to the east of Finland.

The very studiousness with which questions of foreign relations were avoided in the campaign, however, underlines the incontrovertible fact that they figured significantly in it. The outcome of the war and the subsequent conflict between the Western democratic world and Soviet imperialism have placed Finland in a precarious position. Clearly, the only threat to Finland comes from the Soviet Union. The Finns know that their neighbors on the west, the other Scandinavian states, as well as the whole Western democratic community of nations, are friends whose assistance might well be decisive in the event that the policy-makers in the Kremlin once again resort to military conquest in Europe.

During the ominous early years of the fulfillment of the reparations and related clauses of the treaty with Russia, Finland was subjected to various Soviet pressures, political as well as economic: the Kremlin's hostility to a foreign policy dictated by Finland's own preferences and interests was undisguised. In 1947–1948, for example, when Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland were considering the formation of a Scandinavian bloc free from all Big Power affiliation, the U.S.S.R. chose to see in the plan a potential anti-Soviet military coalition, and her opposition sufficed to keep Finland from participating in the discussions. Under normal conditions, Finland, which is Scandinavia's first line of defense against Soviet attack, would have been an active member of the group of northern states attempting to devise security arrangements for the area.

The high-water mark of Soviet influence was reached in April 1948, when, at Russia's suggestion, Finland signed a ten-year mutual assistance treaty. It provided in substance that, if Finland were attacked by "Germany or another state allied with her," or if the Soviet Union were attacked through Finland, Finland would fight, if necessary "with the assistance . . . of the Soviet Union or together with it." The question when the Soviet would actually assist was to be decided by "mutual agreement," and, if the possibility of a military attack emerged (within the meaning and area specified by the treaty), the two signatories were to "consult each other."

All Finns except the Communists were solidly opposed to the

conclusion of the treaty. In the circumstances, however, the Finns felt that they had no choice save to yield to the Soviet proposal, despite awareness of the record of the U.S.S.R. as a breaker of treaties and the knowledge that, if and when it became necessary to interpret the terms "attack," "assistance," "across the territory of Finland" and other key words and phrases of the treaty, the Russian rather than Finnish interpretation would prevail. The treaty was therefore ratified, and observers abroad prophesied that Finland would henceforth be solidly anchored to Russia's block of satellite states and more exposed than ever to Soviet interference in her internal affairs.

The past six years have shown that such surmises were off the mark. The Treaty remains, but despite the fact that since 1948 the Finns have fought domestic Communism to a standstill and completely freed themselves from the onerous reparations burden by making the last payments, on schedule, in September 1952, there have been no reinterpretations of the Treaty by the Kremlin. Meanwhile, Finnish-Soviet trade relations have improved and Finland's position as an exporter to the U.S.S.R. has been strengthened. Perhaps the best single illustration of the trend of the times is offered by the Soviet $10,000,000 loan to Finland, of February 1954, and the conclusion of an agreement which provides that henceforth Finnish trade balances will be paid by the Soviets either in gold or in Western currencies. (The loan, incidentally, roughly corresponds to the sum of the trade balance in Finland's favor at the time, and therefore may be considered a device for paying the sum involved.) But trade relations appear to be considered more desirable to the Soviets than an effort to subvert the existing Finnish political and social order. In 1953, the Soviet share in Finnish foreign trade came roughly to one-third. Some observers have seen in this circumstance an ominous threat and a deliberate Communist plan to destroy Finland's economy by isolating it from its traditional, vitally important Western markets and sources of raw materials. As soon as the U.S.S.R. has acquired a dominant position as a buyer of Finnish goods, the argument runs, the Finns will be exposed to economic strangulation and the country will thereupon fall victim to a Communist régime. But this prediction lacks foundation in fact. The recent growth of the Russian share in Finland's foreign trade appears to be only temporary, resting partly on an accidental combination of circumstances, and represents an actual increase

in Finland's foreign trade dependence on the East that is but a fraction of her total annual foreign trade. It is probably not more than $5,000,000 to $10,000,000.

The U.S.S.R. apparently also wants to keep Finland from moving toward a more open and active alignment with the West. It may well be that the hands-off policy of the past few years, and other modifications of earlier Soviet hostility, constitute recognition of a circumstance which developments in Finland have suggested for some time, namely, that Finland has moved farther and farther from the precipice at which she found herself from 1944–1948, and that her independent position has been strengthened in similar degree as the East-West conflict has become more acute.

## IV

It is also true that the Kremlin knows how to play a waiting game. Whether Finland's position will grow stronger or weaker during the years that lie ahead depends in large measure on circumstances beyond the control of the Finns. There is not the slightest doubt but that, if left alone to consult their own interests and preferences, they would undeviatingly pursue their pre-1939 policy of peace, neutrality and friendship toward all nations. They would identify themselves especially with the endeavors of their neighbors in the north, for by all criteria that have meaning, Finland belongs in the Scandinavian family of nations. In the world of blood and iron, however, which emerged after the Hitler-Stalin Pact and which still persists, her coöperation with her northern fellow democracies has perforce been cautious and restrained. A new and important organ of Scandinavian coöperation, the Nordic Council, was launched in Copenhagen on February 13, 1954, but though the Statutes of the Council provide for Finnish membership, Finland did not feel free to join. She was represented only by an observer, while the other members were represented by their Prime Ministers and other leading dignitaries. Under normal conditions Finland's participation would unquestionably have been active and conspicuous.

The same kind of caution and subtle isolation also characterizes Finland's position toward the larger Powers of the West. She has constantly shown her desire not to arouse Soviet suspicions in her relations with the West, especially since the East-West conflict has spread. The result has at times been behavior and idiom which

have invited the conclusion that Finland's leaders are no longer men unafraid to speak freely and stand erect among the free.

Such a conclusion disregards one of the basic realities of the whole situation. There has never been a pronouncement by a responsible statesman to indicate that Finland has been directly included in Western plans to contain or reduce Communist expansion in Europe. Never have the terms of Western measures of defense been defined in a way that specifically places Finland within the area that the U.S.S.R. can touch only at its own peril. In the grim and largely-silent contest for self-government, democracy and national survival which has been going on in Finland since the Finnish nation was brought to the brink of destruction by Soviet aggression, this circumstance has been and is of utmost importance.

Since the beginning of the war in Korea in June 1950, Western —and specifically American—defense commitments have been greatly expanded. They have not sufficed, however, to prevent significant Communist gains in Korea and Indo-China. Events now unfolding will show whether an analogous situation will emerge in Europe. It would seem that the Soviet menace in Europe is not likely to diminish as long as Communism registers victories elsewhere. On the contrary, it is likely to grow. In any event, the danger will continue to force the West to study its preparations for defense. There seems need for a more detailed and accurate definition of the areas that will be resolutely defended, and those that will be abandoned, if any are going to be abandoned. In the Scandinavian North the choice will involve Finland especially, but possibly Sweden as well. To abandon either would mean appeasement of a kind that might have fatal consequences. Considerations of morality and of military security suggest that a "No Trespassing" sign, boldly lettered and facing East, be placed along Finland's Soviet border, and that the line thus marked be openly recognized as a frontier to be defended and not as one at which accommodation of the aggressor begins.

# ANTARCTIC CLAIMS

*By David Winston Heron*

METEOROLOGICAL observation in the Antarctic is of great importance to long-range weather prediction throughout the Southern Hemisphere. The wild and frigid storms originating over the great glacial plateaus in the interior make themselves felt as far north as the Tropic of Capricorn: it has been estimated that the immense Antarctic ice-cap results in a difference of 10° Fahrenheit between the mean temperatures of the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. For this reason it is not surprising that in spite of the hardship and danger of wintering in the Antarctic, there are some eighteen weather stations maintained there throughout the year. The interesting fact is that fifteen of these establishments are concentrated within a radius of five hundred miles of Hope Bay, at the northeastern tip of Palmer Land, which reaches up from the Antarctic Continent into the southern Atlantic.

This compact arrangement is not primarily in the interest of science, although the Palmer Peninsula and its archipelagoes offer particularly interesting topography, weather and ocean currents, and are more accessible than any other Antarctic land areas. The primary reason for their concentration is a unique and anachronous contest of increasing intensity devoted, in effect, to the colonization of the last frontier continent. The principal competitors are Britain, Argentina and Chile, whose efforts have more than quadrupled the Antarctic population since the end of the Second World War. All three have claimed sovereignty over sectors in the American quadrant, with the peninsula and its islands as the main objects of contention.

The competition took a new turn on January 30, 1952, when, with a darkening storm moving in over the icy crags of the Trinity Peninsula, a British ship, the *John Biscoe,* anchored in the comparative shelter of Hope Bay. The *John Biscoe,* commanded by Captain William Johnson, is one of the ships assigned to the British Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey, and its mission to Hope Bay was to reëstablish a meteorological station first built in 1944 and destroyed by fire during the Antarctic summer of 1948–49. The British party discovered, without too much surprise, that there was a new Argentine establishment ashore a few hundred yards from the ruins of their base. After riding out the storm which lasted through the next day, they began to land their supplies and equipment. The naval officer in charge of the Argentine base, according to an account appearing in the London *Times* the following Monday, indicated that he would resist any attempt to land; and as the first load of supplies was deposited on the beach, a burst of machine gun fire crackled over the heads of the landing party. The unarmed Englishmen were shortly surrounded by Argentine riflemen who forced them to retire from the beach. The Argentine detachment returned their supplies to the ship.

The next day, Sunday, February 3, after consultations in Buenos Aires between the British Ambassador and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the zealous Argentine lieutenant was apparently instructed to hold his fire. The

*John Biscoe* party resumed its landing operations, and eventually the British base was reconstructed. There was a report of a ceremonial visit later by the Governor of the Falkland Islands aboard a small warship.

The shots fired on February 2, 1952, were the first incidence of violence in the course of the competition, and although the affair was not allowed to




become a *casus belli*, it clearly reflected the increasing determination of the Latin Americans to challenge the southernmost outpost of the British Empire. The affair has been treated as an unfortunate misunderstanding by both Britain and Argentina, but the use of firearms by the Argentine naval detachment may well mark the end of the era in which national differences were forgotten in the struggle against the violence of nature.

The seven specific claims to Antarctic sectors have all been made since 1908. On July 21 of that year Britain claimed the Falklands sector, the shape of which was altered by letters patent of March 28, 1917. On July 30, 1923, the Ross Dependency was claimed by Britain; France, on March 27, 1924, claimed Adélie Land, sector boundaries of which were more precisely defined in a decree of April 1, 1938. Australia's claim went into effect August 24, 1936; Norway's claim on January 14, 1939. Argentina's claim was made first in a letter to Britain on November 30, 1925. Chile's was in a decree of November 6, 1940. However, because of the inaccessibility of the interior of the continent —four-fifths of which is still unexplored even by air—and because even those strips of coast which have been charted are scarcely habitable, it has been necessary to define and justify these claims by the use of unique and legally questionable devices.

## II

The geographical delimitation of claims to Arctic and Antarctic territory has been facilitated by the invention of the Polar Sector, attributed to a Canadian Senator named Pascal Poirier. Poirier proposed it in 1907 as a device for proclaiming sovereignty over the Canadian Arctic, and it was adopted by the Canadian Parliament. It has since been used by England, France, Australia, Norway, Chile and Argentina in the Antarctic, and by the Soviet Union in the Arctic.

The sector is an arbitrary device, reminiscent of Alexander VI's Papal Bull of 1493 dividing the globe between Spain and Portugal. It has been traced to the doctrine of Continuity, invoked in past centuries to justify the extension of colonies into the hinterland where effective territorial control was neither possible nor necessary. Because of the need to control islands in or near territorial waters, the Continuity principle has been projected into the principle of Contiguity, used to justify claims to land separated by water from the territory of the claimant state. In the Antarctic, separated from the nearest inhabited continent by over 700 miles of high seas, even the doctrine of Contiguity cannot be applied without reservation.

The substantive justification for the claims themselves can in most cases be documented with legal precedent. This has been done, in general, by analogy with the European colonization of the Americas and Africa, where national sovereignty over *terra nullius* was established by satisfaction of three general conditions: discovery, publication and effective occupation.

The requirement of publication is satisfied by the issuance to a foreign government of any pertinent official document with the force of national law. It has little significance in the twentieth century, and has not caused any serious differences relating to Antarctic claims.

Satisfaction of the requirements of discovery and effective occupation, however, has been the subject of controversy ever since the British laid claim to the Falkland Islands Dependencies sector in 1908. This claim, made in letters patent July 21, 1908, illustrates the abstract quality of the sector. It blithely included some hundred thousand square miles of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego, "restored" in an amending decree nine years later, which removed the northwest corner of the Falklands sector. Since the Second World

War this controversy has been considerably intensified, particularly in the conflicting claims of Britain, Argentina and Chile in the American Quadrant, and their efforts to outdo one another in demonstrating their rights to territorial sovereignty.

One of the most interesting aspects of this contest has been the Latin American challenge not only to the British claims themselves, but to the first principle advanced in their justification: the legal validity of discovery rights. Discovery, particularly in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was, needless to say, a primary requirement for the claim of a European nation to colonial territory in the Americas, Africa and the islands of the Pacific. As such it was generally accepted in the nineteenth century codification of international law.

It has been given consideration in twentieth century writing on questions of territorial sovereignty in spite of the fact that only the Arctic and Antarctic coasts have not been accurately charted. When the Island of Miangas was awarded to the Netherlands in 1928, Max Huber, in his opinion as Arbiter for the Permanent Court of International Justice, acknowledged that discovery carried inchoate rights to sovereignty, but stated that they must be "completed eventually by actual and durable taking of possession within a reasonable time."[1]

Discovery, however, is explicitly advanced as justification for British claims to the Falkland Islands Dependencies in the Antarctic, and is at least implicit in the Norwegian, French and Australian claims to sectors of the continent in which their respective nationals have made significant discoveries. The United States, while not specifically denying the validity of discovery rights in the Antarctic, has maintained the official position first laid down by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes in 1924, that no nation can claim sovereignty over an area where effective occupation is not possible.[2]

In an exchange of notes with Britain in the summer of 1951, Argentina denied the validity of British discovery rights in the Antarctic, stating that effective occupation must be the test. Argentine claims to effective occupation, with reference to a weather station operated on Laurie Island since 1904, are in themselves a denial of effective British occupation.

Chile, during the same summer, denied the validity of British discovery rights even more categorically, charging that, "In fact discovery and scientific expeditions carried out in the Antarctic do not and cannot constitute any title over this region."[3] Chile makes no claim to discovery rights, but claims effective occupation since the establishment of a Chilean whaling station on Deception Island in 1906.

Both Argentina and Chile have refused the British offer to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. In making this offer, Britain expresses confidence in the validity of her Antarctic claims, and Chile and Argentina seem to exhibit a lack of confidence that they would be rejected.

[1] United Nations. Reports of International Arbitral Awards, v. 2, 1949, p. 845.

[2] U. S. Department of State. "Foreign Relations of the United States", 1924, v. 2, p. 519–20.

[3] The British notes and translations of the Chilean and Argentine notes appear in *Polar Record*, v. 6, no. 43, January 1952, p. 413–418.

The reasons given for refusing arbitration are various. In addition to their reluctance to weaken their positions by submitting to arbitration, they are aware that an international tribunal might support discovery rights to a certain extent. There is some question as to the effectiveness of the Chilean whaling station on Deception Island as a colonial outpost. The Falkland Islands, included in the Argentine claim, are manifestly an exception to the Argentine assertions of their own continuous and effective occupation of the whole sector. There are, in fact, a number of circumstances which weaken the Argentine and Chilean claims to continuous and effective occupation. Nevertheless Britain has found it necessary to defend her position in the colonization contest.

III

British discovery rights in the Falkland Dependencies sector have been subject for some years to a different type of challenge from still further north. Although the importance of discovery rights in international law seems to have diminished, the heroic stories of exploration still dominate the literature about the Antarctic, and the question as to who first laid eyes on the Antarctic mainland has received a considerable amount of attention. Whoever it was almost certainly gazed at the mountains of the peninsula known variously as Palmer Land, Graham Land or Tierra O'Higgins. This peninsula extends to within a day's sailing time of waters frequented by seal hunters as early as the first decade of the nineteenth century. It was partly the search for sealing grounds which took Captain Edward Bransfield of the British Navy south to the coast which he named Trinity Land in 1820. Captain Nathaniel Brown Palmer, of Stonington, Connecticut, who was with the American sealing fleet moored at Deception Island later in the same year, sailed south to investigate the line of mountains which he had sighted from Deception.

The British base their discovery claims on Bransfield's expedition. Palmer's expedition is the basis of American claims which have been made officially that "Palmer Land" was adopted by the U. S. Board of Geographical Names as the official name of the peninsula; a few articles asserting Palmer's discovery have appeared in government publications. Bransfield sighted Antarctic land almost a year before Palmer; however, Palmer's defenders base their claim on the assumption that what Bransfield saw was actually an island, and that Palmer was first to sight the actual mainland. The records of both expeditions are inconclusive, and for several years before the Second World War there was a heated argument between British and American geographers, led by Professor R. N. Rudmose-Brown of Sheffield University and the late Arthur R. Hinks, Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society, and by the late Professor William H. Hobbs of the University of Michigan. It was carried on in the pages of such publications as *Science, The Geographical Review* and *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*. The articles aroused considerable public interest in what had previously been an obscure issue.

Another effect of the Bransfield-Palmer controversy, however, was to call forth new contenders for the honor. No dissenting voice has been raised in

England against Bransfield's title, but a New England historian has discovered the log of a Nantucket whaling captain named Christopher Burdick who sighted land from a point close to the controversial peninsula, and identified it as the southern continent, which neither Palmer nor Bransfield had done.[4] This newly discovered log must certainly be treated as seriously as the secondary accounts upon which the titles of Palmer and Bransfield rest. Another contender has appeared since 1949, when Soviet Russian geographers devoted considerable time and effort to the examination of records of the voyage of Admiral Fabian von Bellingshausen, on which during the Antarctic summer of 1820–21 he discovered two large islands off the coast of the continent and sailed very close to the northern coasts of the Palmer Peninsula. As a result of these researches, the All-Soviet Geographical Congress concluded in 1949 that Bellingshausen, sailing in the service of Tsar Alexander I, was the discoverer of the Antarctic Continent.

It is unlikely that there can be any satisfactory answer to the question of who first discovered the southern continent. All existing claims have been based on controvertible evidence. Moreover, there is always a chance that an earlier account will be brought to light. The claims to Antarctic discoveries no longer seem able to satisfy the demands based on them. As a result, even those sector claimants whose assertions of sovereignty are associated with discovery are following the leads of Chile and Argentina. France, Australia and Norway (the last in conjunction with Britain and Sweden) have established winter stations within their sector claims during the last five years, and plan to continue maintaining them.

Admiral Byrd has announced that he is planning a new American expedition as soon as possible. If he is able to muster an organization comparable to "Operation High-Jump" in 1946–47, there is no doubt that he will cause the governments of Britain, Chile and Argentina some little concern. There are indications that "High-Jump," with its 13 ships and 4,000 men, served to remind the Chileans and Argentines that unfriendly control of the Palmer Peninsula would be a real threat to their security. Their recent official geographical publications show that they are taking their Antarctic claims quite seriously.

Beginning in 1948, the British have negotiated annual trilateral agreements with Chile and Argentina which have provided that none of the signatories will indulge in a provocative show of naval strength in the Antarctic seas. A bilateral agreement was concluded between Chile and Argentina in 1947, and an exchange of official observers has been conducted between Chilean and Argentine expeditions—indicative of united opposition to British claims. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 included the American Quadrant of the Antarctic in its mutual defense area. This treaty, in effect, applied the Monroe Doctrine to the Antarctic for the first time.

Meanwhile, there has been an increasing awareness of the potentialities of the southern polar area as a strategic land mass, as a potential source of mineral wealth and as a possibly valuable colony. It lends point to the Hope

[4] Edouard A. Stackpole, "A First Recognition of Antarctica." *Boston Public Library Quarterly*, v. 4, no. 1, 1951, p. 3–19.

Bay incident as a reminder that European claims to Antarctic sovereignty which have stood unloved but unmolested for a good many years are being challenged.

In the eventual solution of the Antarctic question the assertion of discovery rights will clearly play much less of a rôle than the establishment of effective control. Effective occupation, by a definition which goes back to the sixteenth century, and is found in such instruments as the General Act of Berlin (1885) and the Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye (1679), is exclusively unilateral. No more than one national authority can operate effectively and independently in the same area even though the number of persons and the amount of property involved be negligible.

The importance of effective occupation, the fact that to be effective it must be exclusive, and the fact that the joint tenancy of Hope Bay, for example, cannot be so regarded, combine to stimulate activity in the American Quadrant. It is perhaps significant that the machine gun has been introduced as an instrument of exclusion.

# RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*By Henry L. Roberts*

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## *General: Political, Military and Legal*

THE CENTURY OF TOTAL WAR. By RAYMOND ARON. Garden City: Doubleday, 1954, 379 p. $5.00.

Though writing in the first instance as a Frenchman to Frenchmen, M. Aron's very thoughtful and incisive analysis is of universal interest. Seeing the world in the midst of a chain reaction of wars, he seeks some way of mastering violence and yet preserving liberty. In the course of his argument he dissects neutralism and the Marxist climate of opinion.

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1951. By PETER CALVOCORESSI. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1954, 505 p. $10.50.

With this solid contribution to contemporary history the "Survey" returns to its annual basis, which was interrupted by the war, and includes again a section on Middle Eastern affairs. During the year, the author concludes, "the Communist part of the world, with its potential allies among the under-nourished and the foreign-governed, remained formidable, hostile and mysterious." And the Western Powers "seemed more inclined to wait upon events than to fashion them."

PROBLEMS OF STABILITY AND PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By QUINCY WRIGHT. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954, 378 p. $5.00.

Essays and papers by an eminent student of international law written between 1946 and 1952 on a wide variety of topics which relate in one manner or another to the title.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE WORLD REPUBLIC. By G. A. BORGESE. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, 328 p. $6.50.

A strange book, at times illuminating, at others quite opaque, in which the late Italian philosopher and literary critic argues, foretells, and urges the coming of a world government.

PRINCIPIA POLITICA. By LEONARD WOOLF. New York: Harcourt, 1953, 319 p. $5.00.

This is the third volume of the author's "Study of Communal Psychology" (the two first volumes, titled "After the Deluge," appeared in 1931 and 1939). It is not a systematic treatise but an extended essay, in part autobiographical, on the various political ideals and forces that have shaped Western society in the last 70 years. By and large the author writes from the old liberal position, familiar, decent, but somehow not quite satisfying.

WORLD POWER IN THE BALANCE. By TIBOR MENDE. New York: Noonday Press, 1953, 188 p. $3.00.

A discussion of the shifting map of world power, conceived of primarily in eco-

nomic terms, with special emphasis on the challenge presented by the non-European areas, the relative decline of Europe, and the Soviet-American competition.

PRELUDE TO WORLD WAR II. By GAETANO SALVEMINI. Garden City: Doubleday, 1954, 519 p. $7.50.

The core of this book, which was written some four years ago, is the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. Mussolini is revealed as gangster, but Professor Salvemini's chief targets are the British and French foreign offices, which he charges with more Machiavellianism and less blunder than they were probably guilty of. The earlier part of the book is a condensation of his "Mussolini Diplomatico" (noted here October 1952).

THE DECLINE OF NEUTRALITY, 1914–1941. By NILS ÖRVIK. Oslo: Tanum, 1953, 294 p. Kr. 16.70.

Although the core of this well-conceived study relates to the experiences of the United States and the Scandinavian Powers in the First and Second World Wars and the inter-war period, there is also a useful background of the development of neutrality from the eighteenth century.

RUSSLAND UND AMERIKA. By ERWIN HÖLZLE. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1953, 308 p.

A history of Russian-American relations from the eighteenth to the latter part of the nineteenth century.

ALLGEMEINE WEHRPFLICHT. By TORSTEN HOLM. Munich: Pohl, 1953, 313 p.

A translation of a Swedish study on universal military service, its origins, its function in modern times, and certain perils which it may engender.

GENERALS AND ADMIRALS. By JOHN CRESWELL. New York: Longmans, 1953, 192 p. $4.00.

The development of the system of command for amphibious operations, from Howard and Essex at Cadiz to the Second World War.

QUEST FOR A NORTHERN AIR ROUTE. By ALEXANDER FORBES. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 138 p. $4.00.

The author tells of his experiences in surveying, between 1940 and 1945, the archipelago of islands between continental North America and the Arctic Ocean, an area of increasing importance with the expansion of air power.

POLITICA COLONIAL. By José M. CORDERO TORRES. Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica, 1953, 800 p.

An extensive systematic treatise on colonial policy: the moral and political issues involved, the development of European colonialism, and future problems.

PUBLIC POLICY. Edited by C. J. FRIEDRICH and J. K. GALBRAITH. Cambridge: Graduate School of Public Administration, 1953, 292 p. $4.75.

This yearbook put out by the Graduate School of Public Administration of Harvard University—the resumption of a series interrupted by the war—contains a collection of studies on subsidy problems, the bureaucracy, comparative government and civil rights.

U.N.: TODAY AND TOMORROW. By ELEANOR ROOSEVELT and WILLIAM DEWITT. New York: Harper, 1953, 236 p. $3.00.

A popular and informal guide to the U.N. and its various activities.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1954. Edited by WALTER H.

MALLORY. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1954, 231 p. $3.75.

Again this dependable reference book (in its 27th year of issue) presents information about governments of all the countries of the world, and includes as usual the names of leaders of the government and political parties, party program summaries, and newspapers with their political affiliations and editors. It has been brought up to date as of January 1, 1954.

## *General: Economic, Social and Cultural*

THE FUTURE OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. By EUGENE STALEY. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1954, 410 p. $5.00.

This study is a pioneering effort of considerable interest. Focussing attention on the political implications of economic development, the author emphasizes that in the choice to be made by the underdeveloped areas may lie the survival of Western civilization. At the same time he points out the limited influence of economic aid on political and social development, and makes certain challenging observations concerning the nature of the Communist appeal in underdeveloped areas. Based on a careful survey of much of the literature in the field, the book is divided into three major sections: a consideration of the objectives of the Western World in the underdeveloped area; the Communist strategy in this area; and policy recommendations for the Western World.

DIE INDUSTRIALISIERUNG DER AGRARSTAATEN UND IHRE RÜCKWIRKUNGEN AUF DIE EUROPÄISCHE TEXTILINDUSTRIE. By WILHELM HILL. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1953, 349 p. Swiss Fr. 17.70.

This is a useful study of the growth of the textile industry in Japan, China, India and Latin America and its effect on the older textile industries in Western Europe. A brief concluding section discusses the ways in which European producers can best adapt themselves to the new situation.

APPROACHES TO COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT. EDITED BY PHILLIPS RUOPP. The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1953, 352 p. Fl. 9.50.

An international symposium, devoted to the problem of social and economic welfare in village communities in underdeveloped areas.

THE WORLD'S FOOD. By M. K. BENNETT. New York: Harper, 1954, 282 p. $4.00.

In this technical analysis of the interrelationships between population, diet and food potentials throughout the world, the Director of the Food Research Institute at Stanford is more hopeful of the prospects than are the Malthusians, of whom he is quite critical.

PREVIEW FOR TOMORROW. By BRUCE BLIVEN. New York: Knopf, 1953, 347 p. $5.00.

A popular survey of the future benefits science may have to offer in the fields of nutrition, conservation, medicine, engineering and psychiatry.

HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. By JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 1260 p. $17.50.

A posthumous publication of an uncompleted manuscript that Dr. Schumpeter had been working on for a decade before his death in 1950. Designed as a "history of the intellectual efforts that men have made in order to understand economic phenomena," it is a monumental if somewhat amorphous collection of analyses, expositions and insights into economic theory, history, sociology and related sciences.

NATIONAL INCOMES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By Hans Neisser and Franco Modigliani. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953, 396 p. $7.50.

This study deals with two problems: 1, how fluctuations in the domestic economy affect a country's external economic relations, and 2, what conditions in a country's international economic activities will maintain a desired level of national income. The elaborate use of economic methods has produced a book which will be of great interest to specialists. Some of them, it is to be hoped, will undertake to make its findings intelligible to laymen.

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR MOVEMENT. By Lewis L. Lorwin. New York: Harper, 1953, 366 p. $5.00.

A scholarly review of labor's efforts to coöperate and organize across national frontiers, leading up to the current struggle between the I.C.F.T.U. and the W.F.T.U.

THE CONFLICT IN EDUCATION IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. By Robert M. Hutchins. New York: Harper, 1953, 112 p. $2.00.

A plea for "liberal education" and a sharp criticism of much American theory and practice, the whole argument, of course, within the framework of Mr. Hutchins' philosophy of education.

LE COMMUNISME. By Dionys Mascolo. Paris: Gallimard, 1953, 565 p. Fr. 1200.

This French left-wing intellectual wrestles with Communism but keeps pinning himself to the mat. Interesting for its display of one aspect of the moral and intellectual crisis in the 1950's.

THE CULTURAL MIGRATION. By Franz L. Neumann and Others. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953, 156 p. $3.00.

Essays by Franz L. Neumann, Henri Peyre, Erwin Panofsky, Wolfgang Köhler and Paul Tillich on the complex process of intellectual acclimatizing undergone by European scholars in their migration to the United States.

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE. By Gerhart Saenger. New York: Harper, 1953, 304 p. $4.00.

Primarily a textbook which brings together approaches and methods in the human sciences which have been developed in recent years to meet the problem of social prejudice.

## *The Second World War*

THE HISTORIAN AND THE ARMY. By Kent Roberts Greenfield. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954, 93 p. $2.50.

The general editor of the monumental series now in progress, "United States Army in World War II," gives some most interesting observations concerning, and arising out of, that undertaking.

THE WAR IN FRANCE AND FLANDERS, 1939–1940. By Major L. F. Ellis. London: H.M.S.O., 1953, 425 p. 37/6. (New York: British Information Services, $8.75.)

This volume in the official History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, is primarily concerned with the operations of the B.E.F. in the campaign in the West in the spring of 1940. Attention is also paid to the Navy and R.A.F., which were instrumental in rescuing what was left of the defeated force, and the author has made good use of the German materials on the campaign.

NORTH-WEST EUROPE, 1944–5. By JOHN NORTH. London: H.M.S.O., 1953, 270 p. 10/6. (New York: British Information Services, $2.40.)

This volume in a British series of popular military histories of the Second World War deals with the progress of the 21st Army Group under Field Marshal Montgomery, for whose general strategic aims the author has the greatest admiration.

THE CONTROL OF RAW MATERIALS. By J. HURSTFIELD. London: H.M.S.O. and Longmans, 1953, 530 p. 35/. (New York: British Information Services, $8.00.)

This volume in the civil series of the official British History of the Second World War presents a comprehensive review of Britain's raw materials, the manner in which they were supplied, and the organization for their control.

KESSELRING: A SOLDIER'S RECORD. By FIELD MARSHAL ALBERT KESSELRING. New York: Morrow, 1954, 381 p. $5.00.

War memoirs of the German field marshal, successively Air Fleet Commander in the campaigns of 1939–40, Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, and, in the last months, Commander in the West. Of interest for his observations on the chances for an invasion of Britain, his views on Rommel, and his experiences with the Italian partisans. The German edition was noted here in January 1954.

SOTAPÄIVÄKIRJA VUODELTA 1944. By WALDEMAR ERFURTH. Helsinki: Söderström, 1954, 287 p. M. 600.

The diary of the German representative at Finnish military headquarters, covering the eventful year of 1944.

THE TIGER OF MALAYA. By LT. COL. AUBREY SAINT KENWORTHY. New York: Exposition Press, 1953, 112 p. $3.00.

An account of the actions and subsequent trial of Generals Tomoyuki Yamashita and Masaharu Homma.

L'AVENTURE DE LA FORCE X. By VICE-ADMIRAL GODFROY. Paris: Plon, 1953, 532 p. Fr. 1200.

The memoirs of the commander of the French eastern Mediterranean fleet in the Second World War. Quite a bit of documentation.

THE TIRPITZ. By DAVID WOODWARD. New York: Norton, 1954, 235 p. $3.50.

The central point of interest in this story of the German battleship is the fact that her mere existence—she saw practically no action—confirmed the old doctrine of the "fleet in being" and necessitated great diversions of British naval and air strength.

THE MIDGET RAIDERS. By C. E. T. WARREN AND JAMES BENSON. New York: Sloane, 1954, 318 p. $4.50.

The story of the British "chariots" and "X craft"—miniature man-guided submarine-torpedoes.

THE MAN WHO NEVER WAS. By EWEN MONTAGU. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1954, 160 p. $2.75.

The extraordinary story of false information planted on the body of a British officer who was then washed ashore on the Spanish coast—the whole scheme being designed to mislead the Germans on the forthcoming Sicilian invasion.

APPOINTMENT IN CRETE. By A. M. RENDEL. London: Wingate, 1953, 240 p. 15/.

Another cloak and dagger memoir—this time by a British agent in occupied Crete during the war.

THE ARMENIAN AMERICAN IN WORLD WAR II. By James H. Tashjian. Boston: Hairenik Association, 1953, 511 p. $6.30.

A chronicle of achievements, principally in the form of individual exploits.

## *The United States*

PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING POLITICS IN 1952. Edited by Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos and Ralph M. Goldman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954, 5 v. $17.50.

This enormous and valuable coöperative undertaking, prepared under the auspices of the American Political Science Association with the coöperation of the Brookings Institution and the work of many political scientists, is a detailed study of the whole presidential nominating process of both major parties in 1952, including the way the delegates to the conventions were selected in the 48 states. The first volume covers the pre-convention campaign and the two national conventions. The other four volumes proceed, state by state, to examine the selection process, the composition of the states' delegations, and their voting record. A unique source book.

THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT. By Sidney Hyman. New York: Harper, 1954, 342 p. $4.00.

A most useful contribution to our understanding of that unique, powerful, yet vulnerable institution, the American presidency. Well written, it is of particular merit in contrasting the responsibilities vested in the office with the real obstacles to their fulfillment.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE ORDEAL. By Frank Freidel. Boston: Little, Brown, 1954, 320 p. $6.00.

In this second volume of a projected six-volume biography Mr. Freidel deals with the years between the end of the First World War and Roosevelt's election as Governor of New York, years in which he was smitten with infantile paralysis and during which he began to climb the ladder in the defeated Democratic Party. Careful and balanced in his judgments, the author is no uncritical admirer: F.D.R. is seen as a natural politician, but one whom the personal and public events of that decade were propelling in the direction of the White House.

THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT. VOLUMES VII AND VIII. Selected and Edited by Elting E. Morison. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, 2 v. $20.00.

The two concluding volumes of this admirably edited series cover a period of greatest tumult and frustration for T.R.: his break with Taft, his unsuccessful campaign in 1912, and his hostility to Wilson and the latter's foreign policy during the First World War.

WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1910–1917. By Arthur S. Link. New York: Harper, 1954, 331 p. $5.00.

A compact but authoritative synopsis of one of the eras of great change and ferment, domestic as well as foreign, in American history.

PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE. Edited by Harry Elmer Barnes. Caldwell (Idaho): Caxton Printers, 1953, 679 p. $6.00.

Critical, indeed hostile, essays on the foreign policy of the Roosevelt and Truman eras, with greatest emphasis on the background of the Second World War, by some leading "revisionists:" the editor, William Henry Chamberlin, Percy L. Greaves, Jr., George A. Lundberg, George Morgenstern, William L. Neumann, Frederic R. Sanborn and Charles Callan Tansill.

THE TWENTY-YEAR REVOLUTION. By Chesly Manly. Chicago: Regnery, 1954, 272 p. $4.00.

A correspondent for the Chicago *Tribune* reviews with evident disapproval developments in American domestic and foreign affairs since 1933. His disenchantment, however, is not limited to the past: at the last he gives up hope for the Republican Party and advocates the founding of a new—the American—party. Isolationism redivivus.

THE FINAL SECRET OF PEARL HARBOR. By Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald (Ret.). New York: Devin-Adair, 1954, 202 p. $3.50.

Another statement of the argument that Roosevelt worked for and provoked the Pearl Harbor attack, resting largely on the failure of the commanders in Hawaii to receive the intercepted Japanese messages indicating a forthcoming assault. Nearly all the material has been threshed over before; the argument remains unpersuasive.

THE ATOMIC SUBMARINE AND ADMIRAL RICKOVER. By Clay Blair, Jr. New York: Holt, 1954, 277 p. $3.50.

The story of the origins and dispute concerning the nuclear-powered *Nautilus*; strongly partisan on behalf of Admiral Rickover, its chief proponent, and critical of the Navy bureaucracy.

THE SECRET WAR FOR THE A-BOMB. By Medford Evans. Chicago: Regnery, 1953, 302 p. $3.95.

A former training officer in the A.E.C. lambastes the handling of much of the atomic energy program since the war, especially with regard to security issues.

THE LATTIMORE STORY. By John T. Flynn. New York: Devin-Adair, 1953, 118 p. $1.00.

Largely derived from the inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations made in 1951–1952 by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. Less useful as a source than the latter's report on the subject.

McCARTHY AND HIS ENEMIES. By William F. Buckley, Jr. and L. Brent Bozell. Chicago: Regnery, 1954, 413 p. $5.00.

Not a biography, this is up to now the most serious pro-McCarthy analysis of the Senator's battle with the State Department and with existing governmental security arrangements. Occasionally critical of certain aspects of his performance, the authors are primarily concerned with upholding his rôle in the light of their own explicitly anti-Liberal political outlook. Two major premises of this outlook are the necessity to "get by our disintegrated ruling élite" and the justice of the supposition of pro-Communism rather than of innocence or foolishness in issues involving the loyalty-security program.

THE WEB OF SUBVERSION. By James Burnham. New York: Day, 1954, 248 p. $3.75.

Mr. Burnham's aim is to summarize the evidence which has been assembled concerning the extent of Communist underground infiltration, for the purpose of espionage or subversion, into the various agencies of the American Government in the 1930's and 1940's. Despite the doubts that arise concerning certain cases and their interpretation, the cumulative picture is an unpleasant one; the problem is real.

THE TEST OF FREEDOM. By Norman Thomas. New York: Norton, 1954, 211 p. $3.00.

Mr. Thomas' combination of moral insight and balanced judgment is again displayed in this discussion of means of preserving our freedom against the subversive and erosive inroads of Communism and the vigilante spirit.

CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM. By Leo Pfeffer. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953, 675 p. $10.00.

An extensive treatment of the relationship between State and Church in the United States. Prepared by a lawyer, it is strongest in its analysis of the constitutional issue and its presentation of case material; less satisfactory in its coverage of the historical and philosophical aspects of the problem.

THE AMERICAN ANARCHY. By Lionel Gelber. New York: Schuman, 1953, 212 p. $3.50.

A somewhat rambling discourse on the task of preserving American democracy in a period of massive organizations, with some side excursions into the domestic impact on foreign policy.

CIVIL RIGHTS IN IMMIGRATION. By Milton R. Konvitz. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953, 216 p. $3.50.

A critical evaluation of American immigration policy, broadly advocating a more liberal treatment of aliens, which the author feels can be achieved with all due attention to the security problem.

BREAKTHROUGH ON THE COLOR FRONT. By Lee Nichols. New York: Random House, 1954, 235 p. $3.50.

The heartening story of the passing of racial segregation in the American armed forces, a process hastened by the exigencies of the Korean War.

FORD: THE TIMES, THE MAN, THE COMPANY. By Allan Nevins with the Collaboration of Frank Ernest Hill. New York: Scribner, 1954, 688 p. $6.75.

In this full-dress and authoritative history of the Ford Motor Company, Professor Nevins carries the story to 1915, by which time the revolution to which Ford contributed so much was well under way.

SHIRT-SLEEVE DIPLOMACY. By Jonathan B. Bingham. New York: Day, 1954, 303 p. $4.00.

Mr. Bingham, who served as Deputy Administrator of Point Four from 1951 to 1953, writes well and effectively of that program: its rationale, the administrative problems involved, and a series of examples of Point Four in action.

DEFENSE AND THE DOLLAR. By Albert G. Hart. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953, 203 p. $2.00.

A technical study of the use of monetary and credit policies in the prevention and control of inflation. The third in a series of related studies on economic stabilization sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund.

THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY. By Ernest R. Bartley. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1953, 312 p. $5.00.

A legal and historical monograph on the controversy as a case study in American federalism.

AMERICAN WARTIME TRANSPORTATION. By Joseph R. Rose. New York: Crowell, 1953, 290 p. $5.00.

A monograph on the problems encountered and solutions achieved in American domestic transport, whether under the Office of Defense Transportation or not, in World War II.

## *Western Europe*

Y A-T-IL UNE CULTURE EUROPÉENNE? By Georges Bonneville. Paris: Éditions du Conquistador, 1953, 253 p. Fr. 400.

The author undertakes to ascertain the components of European cultural unity. He stresses the aristocratic and artistic traditions.

THE WILD PLACE. By Kathryn Hulme. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1953, 275 p. $3.75.

A sensitive and moving report, by an UNRRA field worker, of her five years' experience in European D.P. camps after the war. The title refers to Wildflecken, a former Nazi training center in Bavaria.

DER KAMPF UMS MITTELMEER. By Philipp Hiltebrandt. Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1953, 541 p.

An extended historical analysis of the Mediterranean as a principal locus of international conflict and competition, from the Phoenicians to the Second World War.

LA FRANCE À LA RECHERCHE D'UNE CONSTITUTION. By Louis Rougier. Paris: Sirey, 1952, 204 p. Fr. 580.

An examination, in part through comparisons with the American system, of what the author takes to be the principal flaw in the French constitutional system since the Revolution: the omnipotence of the legislative and the absence of adequate means of assuring the constitutionality of laws.

LUMIÈRE SUR LES RUINES. By Charles Léon Menu. Paris: Plon, 1953, 364 p. Fr. 795.

The author defends the fighting qualities and morale of the French troops of 1940 and places the blame for the disaster on inadequacies in equipment and poor leadership.

LA SOCIÉTÉ MILITAIRE DANS LA FRANCE CONTEMPORAINE (1815–1939). By Raoul Girardet. Paris: Plon, 1953, 329 p. Fr. 600.

An experiment in social biography: an examination of the career of arms in France since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

LE DRAME ÉCONOMIQUE ET MONÉTAIRE FRANÇAIS DEPUIS LA LIBÉRATION. By Lucien Laurat and Marcelle Pommera. Paris: Les Iles d'Or (Plon), 1953, 285 p. Fr. 660.

A vehement criticism of French economic and financial policy since the war. The villain of the piece is the trend toward "dirigisme."

NATIONALISATIONS ÉTRANGÈRES ET INTÉRÊTS FRANÇAIS. By Gilles Viénot. Paris: Office Juridique Français et International, 1953, 275 p. Fr. 3000.

An analysis of the French interests involved in the economic nationalization programs carried on in other countries after the war, especially in Eastern Europe.

LA PENSÉE ÉCONOMIQUE EN FRANCE DEPUIS 1945. By André Marchal. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1953, 240 p. Fr. 700.

A useful survey of the principal currents of professional economic thought in France since the war: the neoclassical, realist and sociological, mathematical, and observational.

INITIATION AUX FINANCES PUBLIQUES DES TERRITOIRES D'OUTRE-MER. By J.-C. Haumant. Paris: Éditions de l'Union Française, 1953, 324 p. Fr. 1170.

A technical handbook designed primarily for the use of French administrators.

LA FRANCE D'OUTRE-MER. By Noël Bernard and Others. Paris: Plon, 1953, 308 p. Fr. 900.

A symposium of essays on the present situation in France's overseas territories, mostly by former officials in the various areas.

FREEDOM AND WELFARE. Edited by George R. Nelson. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1953, 539 p.

This substantial volume, sponsored by the Ministries of Social Affairs of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, aims at giving a view of selected social patterns—labor relations, family welfare, health and rehabilitation, and social security—in their countries.

KONJUNKTURER OCH EKONOMISK POLITIK. By Erik Lundberg. Stockholm: Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle, 1953, 550 p.

A sound and thorough analysis of Sweden's economic policy since 1919; warns against over-faith in governmental financial controls, but recognizes need for broad and moderate state guidance.

CHANGING GREENLAND. By Geoffrey Williamson. New York: Library Publishers, 1954, 280 p. $3.95.

An Englishman who has traveled widely in Greenland discusses the very considerable economic and social changes taking place among the native Eskimos.

SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY IN POSTWAR GERMANY. Edited by Robert Slusser. New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1953, 184 p. $2.25.

This collection of papers by former Soviet officials includes articles on confiscation and dismantling, the Soviet administration, agricultural policy and the uranium mining operation in Saxony.

THE INWARD JOURNEY. By Doris Peel. Boston: Houghton, 1953, 241 p. $3.00.

An American journalist gives a sensitive rather than analytical report on a visit to East Berlin in 1951 and on her conversations with many young German Communists. Illuminating for its depiction of the moods and motives leading to the Communist fold.

DAS DEUTSCHE DOLLARPROBLEM. By Matthias Schmitt. Frankfurt: Gesellschaft zur Förderung des Deutsch-Amerikanischen Handels, 1953, 118 p.

A fairly detailed statistical analysis of Germany's dollar problem since the war, the effect of U.S. trade policy, the operation of American dollar aid.

DEUTSCHLANDS RÜCKKEHR ZUM WELTMARKT. By Ludwig Erhard and Others. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1953, 287 p.

A review of Germany's impressive comeback in world trade and commerce since the war.

BREMEN UND AMERIKA. By Ludwig Beutin. Bremen: Schünemann, 1953, 356 p.

A history of the commercial and other relations between the city of Bremen and the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

THE REBIRTH OF AUSTRIA. By Richard Hiscocks. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, 263 p. $3.50.

A useful though somewhat popular survey of Austria's vicissitudes and progress since the end of the Second World War. The author served as British Council Representative in Austria in 1946–1949.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. Edited by Doré Ogrizek. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953, 479 p. $6.50.

A most handsomely color-illustrated guide to the art, history and scenic attractions of the Iberian peninsula.

SPAIN RESURGENT. By Sir Robert Hodgson. London: Hutchinson, 1953, 260 p. 21/.

A diplomat, who served as British representative with Franco during the civil war, presents his outline of Spanish history in the twentieth century, paints a favorable picture of the present régime, and recommends the acceptance of Spain as a vital part of Europe.

THE SPANISH TEMPER. By V. S. Pritchett. New York: Knopf, 1954, 269 p. $3.75.

An eminent British literary critic treats personally but with much insight of the Spanish character and the Spanish landscape.

MOUVEMENTS OUVRIERS ET SOCIALISTES: L'ESPAGNE. By Renée Lamberet. Paris: Éditions Ouvrières, 1953, 204 p. Fr. 645.

A chronology of the Spanish labor and Socialist movements since the eighteenth century, with an extensive bibliography.

## *Eastern Europe*

TERROR AND PROGRESS—USSR. By Barrington Moore, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, 261 p. $4.50.

The author of the valuable study "Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power" (noted here January 1951) undertakes in this book to examine, coolly and lucidly, possible avenues of development of the Soviet system, in terms of the interaction of its various components. Between the extreme possibilities of a breakdown and of continuation without change, he indicates three possible lines of evolution: toward a further increase in the power of the party leadership, toward a rational bureaucracy of the technicians, or a reversion to certain traditional Russian patterns.

CITY PLANNING IN SOVIET RUSSIA. By Maurice Frank Parkins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, 257 p. $6.00.

A monograph, based perforce on Soviet sources rather than first-hand experience. Very useful and extensive annotated bibliography.

OIL IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Heinrich Hassmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 173 p. $3.75.

A compact and very informative survey of the Russian oil industry, its development, location and capacity It is a translation of "Erdöl in der Sowjetunion" (1951), to which the translator has added information through October 1952.

RUSSIA AND THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC. By Lionel Kochan. Cambridge (Eng.): Bowes, 1954, 190 p. 25/.

An able and well-documented account of the complex ingredients that went into Soviet-German diplomatic relations during the years of the Weimar Republic.

THE PROPHET ARMED: TROTSKY: 1879–1921. By Isaac Deutscher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954, 540 p. $6.00.

This first volume of his Trotsky biography is Mr. Deutscher's most satisfactory work in the Russian field. The raw materials for Trotsky's life are much more adequate than for Stalin's, the subject is more congenial to the author's temperament, and there is, of course, an exceptionally dramatic and tragic quality to Trotsky's career. The final tragedy is foreshadowed in the last chapter, "Defeat in Victory." A subsequent volume will cover Trotsky's later career in exile.

IN THE WORKSHOP OF THE REVOLUTION. By I. N. Steinberg. New York: Rinehart, 1953, 306 p. $4.00.

A personal account of the revolutionary years from 1917 to 1921, by a Left Socialist Revolutionary, Minister of Justice in the first and only coalition government permitted by the Bolsheviks.

MOSCOU SOUS LÉNINE. By Alfred Rosmer. Paris: Horay, 1953, 316 p. Fr. 600.

Pro-Leninist, anti-Stalinist recollections of Russia in the early 1920's, by an old French militant.

ARCHANGEL: 1918–1919. By Edmund Ironside. London: Constable, 1953, 219 p. 21/.

A record of the experiences of the British commander in northern Russia in the confused period of occupation at the end of the First World War.

THROUGH THE IRON CURTAIN VIA THE BACK DOOR. By U Kyaw Min. London: Benn, 1953, 287 p. 10/6.

The author, a Burmese industrialist, reports on his visit to the International Economic Conference held in Moscow in 1952.

A NEW SLAVERY: FORCED LABOR. Edited by Roger N. Baldwin. New York: Oceana Publications, 1953, 158 p. $2.50.

A survey, based on documents and personal accounts, of the system of forced labor in the Soviet Union, its East European satellites, Communist China and Jugoslavia.

TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: THE POLISH-CZECH EXAMPLE. By Dorothy W. Douglas. London: Routledge, 1953, 375 p. 25/. (New York: Grove Press, $5.00.)

A relatively detailed examination of the way in which the Polish and Czech economies have evolved toward "socialism of the Communist type." The political background to the evolution is glossed over in a thoroughly unacceptable fashion.

HUNGARIAN PREMIER. By Nicholas Kállay. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954, 518 p. $6.00.

The Premier under Regent Horthy from 1942 to 1944 tells of Hungary's vicissitudes in the Second World War—a small Power faced by a series of impossible choices. Although Kállay was unable to rely on documentary material, his dignified recollections are a valuable source to our understanding of the still largely unfamiliar history of the wartime Nazi sphere of control.

DIPLOMACY IN A WHIRLPOOL. By Stephen D. Kertesz. Notre Dame (Ind.): University of Notre Dame Press, 1953, 273 p. $4.75.

A well-documented account and analysis of Hungary's diplomatic struggle for survival between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia from 1938 to 1946. The author was formerly an official in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.

KIRCHE UNTER HAMMER UND SICHEL. By Nicolae Pop. Berlin: Morus, 1953, 147 p.

On the fate of the churches in Rumania—Catholic, Uniate and Orthodox—under the Communists.

WITHOUT LET OR HINDRANCE. By John Poels. London: Murray, 1953, 181 p. 12/6. (Hollywood-by-the-Sea, Fla.: Transatlantic Arts, $3.00.)

An amiable but not very important report on an automobile trip through Jugoslavia.

THE PRICE OF FREEDOM. By Dimitrios G. Kousoulas. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1953, 210 p. $4.00.

The author, a Greek who fought against the Germans in the Crete underground and later against the Communists, reviews the multitude of crises, invasions and conflicts suffered by his country in the last 15 years.

GREECE: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1939–1953. By Bickham Sweet-Escott. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954, 206 p. $4.00.

The most useful portion of this concise survey is the author's able handling of the economic and financial problems, for which he, a banker, is well equipped.

## *The British Commonwealth of Nations*

BRITAIN IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. By Sir Dennis H. Robertson. London: Allen and Unwin, 1954, 92 p. 7/6. (New York: Macmillan, $1.75.)

In most attractive and clear language one of Britain's leading economists gives a balanced and penetrating analysis of the sterling area, the dollar shortage, trade discrimination, and the problem of saving in the United Kingdom. Although the four lectures were delivered at the University of Virginia in March 1953, they have not lost their relevance.

LA POLITIQUE SOCIALE DE L'ANGLETERRE CONTEMPORAINE. By Jean Lhomme. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1953, 517 p. Fr. 1800.

A very solid investigation and exposition of British social policy, with special reference to wages, cost of living and employment. The book is introduced by a formidable statistical analysis.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN BRITAIN, 1918–1951. By D. E. Butler. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, 222 p. $4.25.

A useful analysis of Britain's parliamentary electoral system: its evolution since the First World War, the way it works, and the discussion concerning its revision.

STANLEY BALDWIN: AN EXAMINATION OF SOME FEATURES OF MR. G. M. YOUNG'S BIOGRAPHY. By D. C. Somervell. London: Faber, 1953, 135 p. 8/6.

In defense of the late prime minister and an attack upon a number of features of G. M. Young's recent biography of Baldwin (noted here July 1953).

THE TRIAL OF PETER BARNES AND OTHERS (THE I.R.A. COVENTRY EXPLOSION OF 1939). Edited by Letitia Fairfield. London: Hodge, 1953, 284 p. 15/. (New York: British Book Centre, $3.25.)

A well-prepared account of the trial for the act of sabotage carried out by members of the Irish Republican Army. Volume 77 in the Notable British Trials Series.

GENERATION IN REVOLT. By Margaret McCarthy. London: Heinemann, 1953, 276 p. 15/.

The autobiography of a Lancashire cotton worker who became a Communist, worked for the Comintern in Moscow, and broke from the movement in 1934.

COCKNEY COMMUNIST. By Bob Darke. New York: Day, 1953, 190 p. $3.00.

A London bus conductor's recollections of his 18 years in the Communist Party until his break in 1951.

CANADA: A STORY OF CHALLENGE. By J. M. S. Careless. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1953, 417 p. $3.50.

A popular but useful general history.

REFLECTIONS OF AN AUSTRALIAN LIBERAL. By F. W. Eggleston. Melbourne: Cheshire (for the Australian National University), 1953, 301 p. 29/6. (London: Angus and Robertson.)

Thoughts and observations on the Australian political scene by a prominent liberal politician and public servant. Very critical of the Labor and Country Parties, the author does bring to the fore many of the major political and economic issues which must be met.

AUSTRALIAN PASSPORT. By Colin Wills. New York: Roy, 1954, 113 p. $3.00.

Affectionate recollections of his own, his native land by an Australian journalist.

## *The Middle East*

A VILLAGE IN ANATOLIA. By Mahmut Makal. London: Vallentine, 1954, 190 p. 18/.

A translation of the main portions of two books ("Bizim Köy," Istanbul, Varlik, 1950, and "Köyümden," same publisher, 1952) vividly sketching village life in Central Anatolia. The author is himself a villager and the publication of his first book in 1950 created a great stir in Turkey because of the rather squalid conditions it depicts and because of its attacks on officials. Footnotes to this translation serve to balance some of the author's more exaggerated or one-sided statements.

LEVEL SUNLIGHT. By Maurice Samuel. New York: Knopf, 1953, 302 p. $4.00.

In part a memorial to Chaim Weizmann, but also a critical examination of the way in which some of the Zionist ideals went astray in the formation of the new state of Israel. Of particular interest on the immigration policy and on Israel's relations with American Jewry.

## *South and Southeast Asia*

PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN SOUTHERN ASIA. By Sydney D. Bailey. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations (in coöperation with the Hansard Society, London), 1953, 100 p. $2.00.

An essay on the functioning of the parliamentary system in the newly independent states of Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan.

LES INDES, L'INDE. By Albert Béguin. Neuchâtel (Switzerland): La Baconnière, 1953, 163 p.

Reportage, acute but at times unduly pessimistic, on a short visit to India.

## *The Far East and Pacific Ocean*

WESTERN ENTERPRISE IN FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: CHINA AND JAPAN. By G. C. Allen and Audrey G. Donnithorne. New York: Macmillan (for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1954, 291 p. $4.50.

A skillful examination by two professional economists of the impact of Western business and trade upon China and Japan and of the differing responses made by these two nations. Pleasantly free from the clichés that accompany so much writing on this subject.

MOSCOW AND CHINESE COMMUNISTS. By Robert C. North. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953, 306 p. $5.00.

A useful, sober and dispassionate historical analysis of the rise of the Chinese Communist movement, its ideological and political relations with Moscow, its victory and significance in the world scene. About half the volume is devoted to the period before 1935.

WITH GOD IN RED CHINA. By F. Olin Stockwell. New York: Harper, 1953, 256 p. $3.00.

A Methodist missionary's experience in Communist China.

SHANGHAI—KEY TO MODERN CHINA. By Rhoads Murphey. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 232 p. $4.50.

An interesting and scholarly inquiry into the growth of an "anomaly"—a great urban metropolis in the midst of an agrarian peasant civilization.

CHINA'S GENTRY. By Hsiao-tung Fei. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (in coöperation with the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1953, 289 p. $5.75.

Essays on rural-urban relations in pre-Communist China, originally appearing in the Chinese press in 1947 and 1948, by a well-known anthropologist who has remained in the country.

FABRIC OF CHINESE SOCIETY. By Morton H. Fried. New York: Praeger, 1953, 243 p. $4.25.

A detailed cultural anthropological study of Ch'uhsien, a community near Nanking, based on a year and a half's field work in 1947–48.

SALT FOR THE DRAGON. By Esson M. Gale. Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1953, 225 p. $4.00.

Personal reminiscences of China from 1908 to the Second World War.

FORMOSA BEACHHEAD. By Geraldine Fitch. Chicago: Regnery, 1953, 267 p. $3.50.

While a portion of this book is devoted to Formosa—its improvement under Chiang and its importance to the Free World—the greater part is a largely familiar critique of U.S. policy toward China between 1945 and 1952.

JAPAN AND AMERICA TODAY. By Edwin O. Reischauer and Others. Stanford: Stanford University Press (for the American Institute of Pacific Relations), 1953, 166 p. $3.00.

A symposium of papers and discussions on various aspects of contemporary American-Japanese relations, based on a conference held in Hawaii in January 1953.

JAPAN AND AMERICA. By Lawrence H. Battistini. New York: Day, 1954, 198 p. $3.00.

A rapid survey of Japanese-American relations since Perry, with a concluding chapter on present and future problems.

THE BROADER WAY. By Sumie Seo Mishima. New York: Day, 1953, 247 p. $3.50.

An American-educated woman's account of the war and postwar years in her country, with special emphasis on the changing status of women in Japanese society.

SEVEN YEARS IN TIBET. By Heinrich Harrer. New York: Dutton, 1954, 314 p. $5.00.

The experiences of a young Austrian who went to Tibet at the beginning of the Second World War, and remained until the Communists took over in 1950. German edition noted here in October 1953.

FROM THE DANUBE TO THE YALU. By General Mark W. Clark (Ret.). New York: Harper, 1954, 369 p. $5.00.

Largely General Clark's account of his activities in the Korean War. Some criticism of America's handling of that war and its armistice.

THE PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET FAR EAST. By Walter Kolarz. New York: Praeger, 1954, 193 p. $4.50.

A good study of Soviet policy in its various twists and turns toward the non-Russian inhabitants of U.S.S.R. in the Far East, by the author of "Russia and Her Colonies" (noted here April 1953).

AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD THE PHILIPPINES. By Shirley Jenkins. Stanford: Stanford University Press (for the American Institute of Pacific Relations), 1954, 181 p. $4.00.

A review of American-Philippine economic relations since 1945, with major emphasis on the Philippine Trade Act. The author, who paints a quite depressing picture, is critical of United States policy in this area.

## *Africa*

NATIVE ADMINISTRATION IN THE BRITISH AFRICAN TERRITORIES. PART V: THE HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES: BASUTOLAND, THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE AND SWAZILAND. By Lord Hailey. London: H.M.S.O. (for the Commonwealth Relations Office), 1953, 447 p. 22/6. (New York: British Information Services, $5.25.)

A companion to Lord Hailey's preceding four volumes (published in 1950–51) on native administration in the British African territories controlled by the Colonial Office.

COLOUR AND CULTURE IN SOUTH AFRICA. By Sheila Patterson. London: Routledge, 1953, 402 p. 30/. (New York: Grove Press, $6.00.)

A solid, scholarly study of the "status of the Cape Coloured People within the social structure of the Union of South Africa." The term "Cape Coloured" applies to persons of mixed race who have no roots in Bantu tribal life.

RETURN TO GOLI. By Peter Abrahams. London: Faber, 1953, 224 p. 12/6.

Personal observations on the racial question in South Africa, by an expatriate Johannesburg Negro.

WHO KILLED KENYA? By Colin Wills. New York: Roy, 1953, 111 p. $3.00.

A short but informative sketch of Kenya and the sources of its recent turmoil.

LE SAHARA FRANÇAIS. By Robert Capot-Rey. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1953, 564 p. Fr. 2000.

This second volume on French Africa in the series "Géographie de l'Union française" provides an extensive survey of the physical, human and economic geography of the Sahara. Good bibliography.

LES AFFAIRES DE LA TUNISIE ET DU MAROC DEVANT LES NATIONS UNIES. By Georges Day. Paris: Pedone, 1953, 134 p. Fr. 1000.

In this monograph the author argues against the competence of the U.N. to deal with the Moroccan and Tunisian problems.

LA PACIFICATION DU MAROC. By General A. Huré. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1952, 195 p. Fr. 750.

The posthumously published account, by the former commander of the French troops in Morocco, of the final stages in the pacification of that country in the 1930's.

ABD-EL-KRIM ET LES ÉVÉNEMENTS DU RIF (1924–1926). By Léon Gabrielli. Casablanca: Atlantides, 1953, 232 p. Fr. 690.

Posthumously published notes and recollections by a French colonial official who was closely involved in the Moroccan troubles in the 1920's.

## *Latin America and the West Indies*

THE CARIBBEAN: CONTEMPORARY TRENDS. Edited by A. Curtis Wilgus. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1953, 292 p. $4.00.

Papers on economic, social, literary and political trends prepared for the third annual conference on the Caribbean at the University of Florida.

HAITI: PRIMER ESTADO NEGRO. By Fulgencio Vidal y Saura. Madrid: Morata, 1953, 210 p. Ptas. 100.

Personal impressions of Haiti by a Spanish diplomat formerly stationed at Port-au-Prince.

ECUADOR: COUNTRY OF CONTRASTS. By Lilo Linke. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954, 173 p. $2.50.

BOLIVIA: A LAND DIVIDED. By Harold Osborne. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954, 144 p. $2.50.

PARAGUAY: A RIVERSIDE NATION. By George Pendle. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954, 115 p. $2.50.

These concise surveys of the land, history, politics and economics of Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay are part of a series on Central and South America now in progress under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

LES TROIS ÂGES DU BRÉSIL. By Charles Morazé. Paris: Colin, 1954, 198 p. Fr. 650.

An extended, informal but informative essay on Brazilian politics in their historical setting. The author, now at the Institut d'Études Politiques in Paris, taught for three years at the University of São Paulo.

MY MISSION IN LIFE. By Eva Perón. New York: Vantage Press, 1953, 216 p. $2.75.

A translation of her "La Razón de Mi Vida," published in 1951.

# SOURCE MATERIAL

## *By Ruth Savord*

## I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, 80 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations, International Court of Justice, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2966 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office:* 1262 New Hampshire Ave., Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

### Africa

NOTES on commerce and industry in Kenya. Nairobi, Government Printer, 1953. 51 p. 1s.
THE SUDAN, 1899–1953. New York, British Information Services, 1953. 58 p.
REPORT of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa. New York, 1953. 166 p. (General Assembly. Official Records: Eighth Session, Supplement no. 16.) $2.00.

### Aggression

REPORT of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 24 August–21 September 1953. New York. 1954. 15 p. (A/2638.) 20¢.

### Agriculture

AGRICULTURE in the Near East; development and outlook. Rome, FAO, 1953. 78 p. $1.00.
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

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