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EDWARD BYRON REUTER, CONSULTING EDITOR

THE FAMILY

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THE FAMILY

Source Materials for the Study of Family and Personality

By

EDWARD BYRON REUTER

Professor of Sociology, University of Iowa

and

JESSIE RIDGWAY RUNNER

FIRST EDITION
SEVENTH IMPRESSION

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.
NEW YORK AND LONDON
1931

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PREFACE

The present volume is designed as an introduction to the serious study of family life. It brings together not merely a selection from the literature but a considerable percentage of the significant work that has been done. It gives an outline, a point of view, and a body of factual material that will orient the student in the field. The book was prepared to supply a real need for guidance. The family lends itself admirably to social study: it is concrete, typical, and in some of its aspects within the experience of the student. There are many courses offered but there has been no book at all suited to the needs of the classroom.

The materials here offered are designed to focus the attention upon the essential values and processes rather than upon family decadence, divorce, and other trivial or irrelevant matters. They are designed to furnish necessary data for the thought and judgment which an intelligent contemplation of the family situation requires. The organization falls into two main divisions: the account of the behavior which has resulted in certain institutional family forms and development under the conditions of the past; and an account of the nature of human beings from which this activity arises. In the concrete reality there are of course intimate and continuous interaction between the persons and their culture forms and an indefinite conditioning of each by the other.

In organizing the papers for publication in the present form, no attempt was made to regularize the spelling, punctuation, and typographical idiosyncrasies of the various publishers of the original articles. Some of the papers as first printed were rather heavily documented. We thought unnecessary to reproduce this documentation since the original printings are available to the occasional student who will wish to trace the source of the statements. In some cases the papers have been very materially reduced in length, but every effort has been made not to do violence to the author's thought.

We wish to acknowledge the courtesy of the authors, editors, and publishers who have given permission to reprint material previously published elsewhere. A detailed acknowledgment of indebtedness appears in the body of the book in connection with each paper quoted. We wish also to express our appreciation of the courteous and coöperative attitude of Miss Mary Humphrey and other members of the library staff

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of the University of Iowa toward our somewhat unusual demands. We are indebted to Dr. A. H. Woods, Director of the Psychopathic Hospital of the same institution, for reading the ninth chapter of the manuscript and giving us the benefit of his advice and criticism. Miss Doris Lorden read the entire manuscript and made numerous valuable suggestions. We acknowledge our indebtedness and express our appreciation.

E. B. R.
J. R. R.

HONOLULU, HAWAII,
IOWA CITY, IOWA,
December, 1930.

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THE FAMILY

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

In the past half or three-quarters of a century there has been more change in the external conditions of human existence in the Western World than in all the previous life of mankind. The world of the urban dwellers has come to be as unlike that of their grandparents as theirs was unlike that of their European ancestors at the beginning of the Christian Era. Within the space of an individual human life, man has elaborated a material culture that has become an end in itself and a major determinant of human destiny.

Within a century the population of the world has increased more than in all the preceding history of the race, and a disproportionately large part of the increase has been that of the peoples of European civilization. In the nineteenth century Europe increased in numbers from two hundred million to four hundred sixty-five million. In individual countries the increase was yet more rapid. Great Britain and Ireland increased from sixteen million to over forty million, Russia trebled her numbers, the Americas grew from twenty million to over two hundred million. In the past half century the increase continued. Between 1860 and 1910 the United Kingdom increased from twenty-nine million to forty-five million, Germany from thirty-eight million to sixty-five million. In the forty-year period from 1870 to 1910, European Russia increased from less than sixty-five million to over one hundred thirty-one million. In 1870 the population of the United States numbered roughly thirty-eight million; in 1920 it was over one hundred five million; and at the present time it is well over one hundred twenty million.

The conditions of life under which these increasing numbers live have undergone a corresponding change. In 1870 three-fourths of the American people were rural; the 266 cities and towns had a total population of eight million. Fifty years later there were 924 cities and an urban population of over forty-six million. Today, approximately 75 per cent of the population is urbanized, and the conditions of life in many small places is more highly urban than it was in the larger places a generation ago. The urban tendency is still strong and growing. The city populations are increasing at the relative and absolute expense of the rural, the while mechanical conveniences and mental characteristics of urban life become increasingly commonplace in the country. American life is being standardized with great rapidity on a pattern set by urban values.

The growth of population and its urbanization are typical. There have been equally radical and profound changes in the other external aspects of culture and in the physical basis of life. The first railroad in America was opened in 1830, but it was another forty years before there was a transcontinental line. Steamships replaced sailing vessels less than half a century ago. Other modern means of transportation and communication are of yet more recent origin. The general use, if indeed not the invention and introduction, of automobiles, airplanes, telephones, radios, and the other modern means of transportation and communication has come within the lifetime of the present generation. The hedonistic aspects of life have been standardized and mechanized. Recreations, sports, and amusements have been reduced to routine and common patterns. In every external aspect, American life is changing or has already completed the change from that of a simple provincial folk living upon the soil and close to nature to that of a sophisticated urban population dependent upon complex mechanism and elaborate organization for the means of life and the satisfaction of the human wishes.

The mechanization of the physical basis of life has been accompanied and followed by equally profound changes in psychological attitudes and in the social and moral order. In some cases these are obvious and immediate adjustments dictated by changes in the material culture. The routine of life of the industrial worker, for example, obviously is dictated by the needs of the industry. His type of mind is perhaps equally obviously a product of the machine. The pace and manner of life of the urban dweller, as his range of interests and habits of mind, are direct consequences of city life.

The growth of physical science and its industrial and other applications, by giving man an understanding of and an ability to control and manipulate much of his physical environment, changed his attitude toward the external world and destroyed or greatly weakened the basis of the traditional social order. The ability to control gave him a new sense of power and increased his confidence and self-respect. It has tended to make him a creative agent rather than a passive victim of external forces. Biological science and its applications in medical practice and sanitary engineering brought another large area of life into the realm of natural and understandable phenomena and gave support to the confident belief of modern man in his ability to control his own destiny. The reduction in the number of phenomena that are uncaused, hence uncontrollable, and to be accepted and endured, has shaken man's faith in supernatural causation as an explanation in any field.

The transition from a magical to a natural interpretation of reality has tended to undermine and disintegrate the institutional arrangements resting upon or capitalizing a supernatural order of explanation. The

increase in understanding and control has fostered critical attitudes that are most embarassing to many old and deeply entrenched social arrangements. The inherent tendency of all institutions is to develop a more or less rigid form and structure and a group of administrative functionaries. With institutional stability there is a progressive tendency to subordinate the welfare of individuals to the aggrandizement of the institution and the glorification of the functionaries. At the same time the life and strength of the institution depends upon group loyalties and habitudinal and sentimental behavior. The growth of rational attitudes tends to break the circle by recognizing institutions as secondary and instrumental.

The changes in the material culture and psychological attitudes have had a profound influence on family life and organization and on the sex and familial habits of the population. The changes in family have been greater perhaps than is generally realized. It has lost many of its traditional functions and much of its prestige; much of its content and vitality is gone.

The idea of home and family is rather closely bound up with the most powerful of the human sentiments. There is, in consequence, a strong and general tendency to idealize the institution. There is a rather general unwillingness to accept the position that the form of the family institution is a function of the total social and economic order. The fact that no particular form is more normal or natural than another, that each is natural and normal under the conditions that produced it, has not been palatable. People prefer to believe that the traditional single-type monogamic family is a fixed and enduring form, that its origin was somehow different from that of other institutional forms, that it will persist in spite of environing circumstances, and that ultimately it will become the universal form. This emotionally conditioned social attitude has operated to keep the external form and appearance of the institution relatively fixed, while the institution itself has been undergoing rapid and profound changes.

In the recent decades there has been no significant change in the marriage rate. Approximately the same proportion of marriageable women are wives as has been the case for the past half century. The age of marriage has not changed appreciably. But if the attention be turned from these external aspects to the presumptive purpose of the marriage union, the facts are strikingly different. The fertility of marriages has declined sharply and steadily. In the United States the birth rate, which stood at about 35 for a period of over two centuries, has declined abruptly to less than two-thirds its former level. From a similar high level, the Swedish rate dropped to 16.15 in 1928. These are typical of the countries of Western European civilization. In the same period the amount of divorce increased yet more strikingly. In England

and Wales there were 568 divorces in 1901 and 2,859 in 1928; in Germany the number was 8,680 in 1900, in 1925 it was 34,105; and there has been a similar increase in the other industrialized countries. Moreover, divorced people do not remarry as frequently as was formerly the case. Within the family there has been a very general loss of function; the preparation of food, the construction of clothing, the schooling of children, and various other traditional types of work have passed more or less completely out of the family unit. As an institution for the care and rearing of children it is proving progressively inadequate. The increase of juvenile delinquency is sufficient evidence of failure in one of its traditional functions. The growing tendency of social workers and of the courts to invade the family and assume charge of the children is a more or less public admission of its failure. The adolescent excesses, the flouting of the conventions and traditional standards of behavior, so notorious in the present decade, is another concrete evidence of the inadequacy of the family framework to comprehend the needs of youth. The inarticulate unrest of middle-class American women may best be understood as a protest against institutional patterns within which it has become increasingly difficult to satisfy the human wishes and lead a tolerable existence. It is perhaps unnecessary to continue the enumeration. The ill working of the institution, its failure to function in the traditional way, is too obvious to be ignored.

Much of the discussion expresses unformulated fears and reflects reactionary and highly conservative attitudes. Many persons "view with alarm" the changes in family life and organization already accomplished or in process. They look upon the family as a, perhaps as the, fundamental social institution and fear that any serious modification of the traditional form will bring disaster to the whole social and moral order. The facts are seen completely out of perspective. The desire is to reinstate the traditional patterns and to suppress the symptoms of disorganization. In much of the popular and semipopular writing the fear of family dissolution appears as a superficial optimism—a romantic escape from reality. The overtone of all this writing is that the family is in danger and must be preserved. The same fear of family disintegration is the animus back of much legislation dealing directly or indirectly with the institution. Attempts to secure and enforce uniform marriage laws, to strengthen divorce laws, to strengthen and enforce antibirth control legislation are examples of efforts to meet a problem that appears menacing by suppressing the incidental symptoms. Most of the ill-considered eugenic laws are in the nature of legislative panaceas. Numerous organizations operating on a quasi- or pseudoscientific level—child welfare stations, parent education organizations, character education institutes, family research stations, and the like—are motivated by fear of change and a desire to preserve or reinstate the old and familiar arrangements that are apparently crumbling to ruin.

The verbal and other behavior of the reactionary social and moral reformers, as well as that of the personally maladjusted who flout the institution and the traditional code of sex behavior, are essentially unintelligent reactions. They are emotional responses on a common sense level.

There is of course much interest, discussion, and work that is on a highly reputable level. There is, or at least there is coming to be, a change in the old policy of denying that anything can be wrong with the institution itself, and a disposition on the part of an increasing number of people frankly and fearlessly to face the reality. College and university courses on the family increase in number and popularity and, in spite of occasional misfortune, face the reality in an objective way. The universities and research foundations are supporting a considerable number of organizations for child welfare and family research and publicity. A paper by Mr. Eliot in the final chapter of this book enumerates and characterizes these various organizations.

Changes in the family form and organization are inevitable and to be desired. Like other institutions, the family organization at any given time is in more or less perfect adjustment with the total situation in which it developed and of which it is an integral part. In so far as other aspects of the culture change there must be a reciprocal change in the family institution, else it cannot perform adequately its essential functions in the new social organization. The American single-type of home and family was fairly adjusted to the needs of a pioneer and rural life and folk. It is of course inherently unreasonable to expect that the institutional form could be transplanted and function smoothly in an urban and industrial society. It is of course patent that it does not do so. From the simple economic point of view, its inefficiency makes its continuance in the city environment a prohibitively expensive luxury. From the point of view of personality it is equally at fault. The removal of all work from the home has left women of the middle class without occupation and without a basis on which they can maintain their human self-respect. To refuse to recognize that the family must change in a changing social order is stupid; to oppose its change is futile.

It should perhaps be equally obvious that there is little prospect of establishing any stable family institution of the traditional sort. The changing modern world is the result of the development of physical science and the consequent growth of mechanical invention which made possible the control and utilization of natural power. It is in the nature of material culture to be accumulative and at a progressively accelerated pace. There is every reason to believe that the material accomplishments of the next generation will as greatly surpass those of the present as those of the present surpass those of the past. Any institutional organization adapted to the present stage of development of the industrial

arts would be as inadequate for the future as the single-home rural family of the past is in the modern urban society. Stability of sex and family life will be found, if they are to be found at all, in a radically different direction.

Presumably a satisfactory family unit would provide the best care for children, furnish a humanely satisfying affectional relationship, and contribute to the personality development of parents and offspring. In America the family traditionally has been delegated the task of rearing children; it has assumed the task of caring for the aged and infirm; it has been the socially sanctioned device for regulating sex behavior; it has been responsible for the vocational and moral instruction of children; it has performed various economic tasks; it has been the center of social life and recreation; and it has functioned in various other ways. Any real study of the family must be directed at its analysis from the point of view of the values it conserves and the functions it performs. Intelligent social behavior is concerned with the satisfaction of essential human needs and the preservation of human values. The family is valuable in so far as it performs necessary functions better than they may be performed elsewhere. But like every organization and institutional arrangement, it is secondary to personality and is socially significant only in so far as it contributes to human welfare and personal development. So long as the traditional family performs essential functions better than they can be performed elsewhere, it will have a secure place among the human institutions. When it cannot do so it has no place in the social arrangements of a civilized people. It must frankly be recognized that in its institutional form the family is simply a piece of machinery. As such it may be valuable, useless, or vicious depending upon whether it promotes or hinders the accomplishment of human purposes. Intelligent society will use and perfect it or discard it depending upon its efficiency in the performance of necessary functions.

The traditional American pioneer type of family organization is apparently unworkable in modern urbanized industrialized society and it will become progressively less adequate as the culture changes and develops. So far as the family is an integrated part of the inclusive social organization, changes in its form and organization are inevitable. The choice is merely in the way in which the changes come about. They may come, as in the past and in the present, in spite of sentimental and conservative opposition, at the cost of great personal suffering and failure. On the other hand, changes in the family institution may be planned, deliberate, and rational adjustments that will fit it better to serve the actual and anticipated human needs in a changing social order.

Chapter II

THE FAMILY IN TRANSITION

The family institution as an abstract and generalized concept is peculiarly difficult to grasp. With certain specific families almost every one is familiar through membership or observation, or both. But these concrete experiential data are difficult to state in general terms. Each person is so close to the few families he knows, and his observation is so colored by sentiment and biased by tradition, that he cannot, without great effort, get them into perspective. But a real understanding involves just this ability to see the abstract and universal elements in the concrete and particular case. It is necessary to see the concrete family as an integral part of a larger social whole, and to do so it is necessary to translate the information of observation and experience into generic terms.

When the person gives attention to the immediate family of which he is a member, he sees a father and a mother, perhaps brothers and sisters, and possibly other related persons living in the household. He recognizes each as a distinct personality, and knows the general manner in which these personalities interact with one another. He is quite familiar with their mutual antagonisms and loyalties, with the tranquilizing or disturbing effect which they may have each upon the others. He knows the functions which each performs, or is supposed to perform, in behalf of the family group. Also he may sense, perhaps dimly, the fact that these habitual attitudes and services are modified more or less by the outer circumstances in which the family finds itself. The interactions may be of one sort in the big roomy house on the farm but of a very different nature when the same family moves into a city apartment. The blood relationships are the same, but the institutional aspects of the family and the interdependent relationships of the members are changed. In case the economic status of the family is altered—if it either loses or acquires wealth—the habitual interactions will be modified, and the family organization will undergo change in the process of accommodation to its new economic status.

The materials in this chapter are organized to show in somewhat generalized terms the nature of the environmental influences which act upon modern American families and to indicate the characteristic trends of thought which have accompanied changes in the outer circumstances. The family in its prevailing form is an outgrowth of and an accommoda-

tion to these two sets of forces. In so far as it is able to serve individual human needs, it must reconcile the inner and the outer aspects of life. It must adapt and adjust itself to the changes in thought and culture.

In the first paper in this chapter, Mr. Cutler analyzes briefly and pointedly the new family setting; an environmental setting unlike anything that has existed in the world heretofore. Along with the new external environment there has developed a new manner of thought. The scientific attitude of mind has become the ideal and, in a manner and in some fields, something of a reality. In the reading from Mr. Bruno the significance for family life and organization of this new attitude is indicated and emphasized. Mr. Chapin, in the following paper, shows that the prevailing attitudes, the non-material side of the culture complex, have not changed to correspond with the enormously rapid changes in our material culture. There has been, as he says, "a lag of family *mores* in the social culture." The result is a disharmony in the social order—a serious lack of adjustment between the different aspects of the culture, and a widespread maladjustment between persons and the culture. The institutional form of the family is very imperfectly adapted to the changed social order. This has led many persons to the position that there is something radically wrong with the family; it has led others to the belief that there is something wrong with the people who are members of the family. In any case there is a very general agreement that there is something seriously wrong with the present situation. Mr. Lindeman shows that there has come into being a rationalized, though concerted, effort to harmonize the family institution with the new economic world order. This movement has both inner and outer manifestations. On the one hand there is created a new attitude toward the child in the family; on the other hand there is a persistent attempt to revive and reinstate the waning material functions of the family by study in household economy. This was a vague move in the direction of a "scientific" adjustment, a first dim realization that the social environment might be manipulated intelligently in the direction of increased human welfare.

It is the general consensus of intelligent opinion that institutions should be of such form as best serve the human needs. That, in the long run, is group welfare. The perfect adjustment of institutional forms to human satisfactions is an ideal. But aside from unattainable ideals, it is necessary to know what are the specific needs that an institution is designed to serve before it is possible intelligently to revamp the institutional forms better to serve these needs. The family apparently has a more or less definite and fundamental function to perform in human life and welfare. The nature of this function is analyzed by Mr. Lee. In a sense he attempts to formulate the attitudes toward the family which would be helpful in bringing about a workable adjustment. The old attitudes are no longer appropriate, they do not belong

to the modern order. Many of the traditional functions of the family are gone. What have we left? Mr. Lee formulates an ideal.

Taken together and in sequence these readings show something of the nature of the problems connected with the modern family. The final paper by Miss Van Waters gives concretely the manner in which various factors operated in the case of one more or less typical family. Here is the case of a good rural family in process of disintegration in the new urban setting. The father alone retains intact the culture heritage of the old home; each of the other members has acquired a new complex of attitudes and behavior patterns. The old organization is broken down and there is present no basis for a new integration.

1. *The Changing Home*[1]

A pessimistic view of monogamous wedlock is now current, and it receives confirmation from what appears to be an obvious interpretation of pertinent facts. It is true that the divorce rate in this country is presumably very nearly, if not quite, the highest shown by any people. It is also true that the average number of persons per family has been steadily declining decade by decade during the last fifty years, even though exceptionally large families have been added to the population in recent years through the fecundity of the foreign-born women. This large number of divorces and the rapid increase in the divorce rate, together with the noteworthy tendency in the native element in the population to commit "race suicide," seem, obviously enough, to warrant not a little misgiving as to the durability and permanence of monogamous wedlock.

But do these facts, and others of a similar nature that are now available, tell the whole story? It may be that we shall find on examination that it is a case of erroneous inferences drawn from detailed facts seen out of perspective. It may be that we are concentrating our attention upon symptoms and overlooking the seat of the difficulty. Perhaps our interest in individuals and their tribulations blinds us to great social and industrial changes now in progress of which these individuals are unwilling and, for the most part, unwitting victims. Surely it is a time when, if ever, serious consideration should be given to the history of human marriage and to the factors which determine the nature of the family as a social institution.

It is our purpose to examine the general assumption, inherent in all of the pessimistic interpretations, that the permanence of monogamy rests upon the perpetuation of a particular type of home and of family life.

[1] Adapted from CUTLER, J. E., Durable Monogamous Wedlock, *Am. Jour. Sociology*, vol. 22, pp. 226–237, September, 1916.

In the discussion of the vicissitudes of the modern family, speakers and publicists commonly separate themselves into two groups. One group is concerned with the home as the dwelling place of the family and urges "the housing question" as the vital issue in community welfare. The center of concern for this group is the complete disappearance of the single-family residence in the older sections of our great cities. The other group is concerned with the interrelations and the mutual responsibilities of the members of the family unit. The center of interest for this group is the rising divorce rate and the tendency toward "race suicide." It is perhaps unfortunate that these two groups are so sharply differentiated, assuming themselves to have nothing in common, when both evidently have what is essentially a common interest—namely, the perpetuation of the advantages which are believed to inhere in monogamous wedlock.

For our present purposes, it is convenient to follow this line of demarkation and to distinguish two component parts of the home: the family and the dwelling. Both are undergoing marked change and modification at the present time and both are involved in the question of the durability of our standard form of the marriage institution.

Our traditional idea of what constitutes a home is rarely a topic of conversation nowadays and we are quite unconscious of the fact that it produces a bias in our minds. To most American citizens home, no doubt, still means, traditionally at least, a house occupied more or less permanently by a single family (husband, wife, and children), with an adjoining plot of ground at the disposal of the residents. It depends upon the economic and social status of the individual whether this single-family dwelling be conceived of as a mansion, or as a cottage or bungalow, and whether the area of land surrounding the dwelling be large or small. But there is agreement that this single-family dwelling constituting a home is, or ought to be, owned by the family occupying it and that the adjacent land may furnish supplies for the family.

Such a household serves as an economic and social center. Economically it is largely self-supporting and self-sufficient. Food supplies and raw products are obtained from the land, and the members of the family carry on the necessary processes of manufacture and exchange, both sexes sharing in the work. This household is also a social unit. It serves as a meeting place for the neighborhood gatherings. It is the place where the young people meet socially and where courtship may happily proceed under parental supervision.

This we may properly call the Colonial type. It is splendidly typified in the home of George Washington on the banks of the Potomac. A visitor to Mount Vernon gets an impression of unity, completeness, economic self-sufficiency, and social efficiency—an impression that it was a place which served admirably as a center of peaceful and restful

domesticity. Usually it is not without a sigh of regret that the visitor returns to one of our modern cities. Cherished by our traditions, glowingly pictured in our finest literature, enshrined in our hearts is this Colonial type of the American home. Popularly, at least, it is the standard, the ideal form of the American home.

But we find that an increasing proportion of the population is coming to live under urban conditions; and in the cities the single-family dwelling is becoming surprisingly rare. For perfectly obvious and valid reasons it is being replaced by terraces, double houses, flats, apartment houses, tenements, and lodgings. Many families—there is reason to believe that it will soon be a majority of all the families—are now living in these multiple dwellings, owning no residence and possessing no land. They have a right to use a balcony, a porch, or part of a veranda, some stairs and a hall, a section of the basement or the attic, and the public streets. There is no place for the children to play without disturbing the neighbors or obstructing the traffic on the streets.

There is little chance for peaceful domesticity in these multiple dwellings. The streets are noisy. Some of the neighbors keep unseasonable hours and have vociferous pets. Others are amateur musicians. There are also pianolas, piano players, and victrolas. Vacations are necessary in order to avoid nervous breakdowns, and these vacations must be spent away from home. Sundays and holidays must be spent in an automobile or on a trolley car. Isolated security, rest, and recuperation are not to be found at home. All must go away when they are in search of pleasure and recreation.

The domestic arts are now largely factory processes. There is almost no sex division of labor in the household, for there are left to it none but the "sweated trades." To contribute to the support of the family it is necessary for both sexes to work away from home and become wage earners. No longer is the household a self-sufficient unit, either socially or economically.

And these multiple dwellings in our cities are not satisfactorily adapted to the domestic needs of families. It is argued that people sleep in the dark, and that therefore a bedroom needs no window. Children are a nuisance in the multiple dwelling; therefore we make no provision by means of which they may be less of a nuisance. Non-resident owners and absentee landlords are not primarily interested in building and maintaining ideal American homes. When people build houses for other people to live in and maintain them as an investment for immediate dividends, these dwellings are not likely, in the ordinary course of human events, to be the best possible places for families to live.

It is evident that the modern family is suffering from unsatisfactory living conditions, but it is also plain that the Colonial type of home is an anachronism today. We must concern ourselves with a new type, or

types, and we must consider a larger unit. We must put into the meaning of *home* something of its old Teutonic sense when in the form *Heim* it meant a village, or a community.

To get a satisfactory modern home in our cities it is necessary to establish standard building and maintenance regulations. The housing question and broad-gage city planning are matters to be taken seriously. Comprehensive building codes, particularly housing codes, are to be drafted and enacted, and their enforcement insisted upon. And when we undertake not only the correction but the prevention of bad housing conditions, we shall find that we have to begin with the growing villages and the enlarging suburbs, and draw largely upon the police power of the state. If state factory inspection is necessary to protect the interests of people at work, we have no reason to be surprised if it be true that state housing inspection is necessary to protect the interests of people in their homes.

In a number of ways the conception of a larger domestic unit is already finding expression and taking tangible form. There was a time when the provision of a water supply was an individual household matter. For an ever increasing number of households it is no longer an individual or private matter at all. If the homes are to have an adequate, pure, and safe supply of water, it must come through intelligent and far-sighted community action.

Where isolated dwellings prevail, each household may confidently be expected to dispose of its waste matter in a satisfactory manner. Under modern conditions this is impossible and some kind of a sanitary system and organization must be devised which will perform this service for every household and all of them together.

Our food supply comes from widely scattered sources, produced under varying conditions and handled by numerous transportation agencies. We buy our provisions, meats, fruits, and prepared foods of the retail dealer. We buy and eat on faith; we cannot know. Here is a modern city that gets its milk supply from half a dozen different states and thousands of farms. The individual household cannot possibly know about the purity and the quality of the milk that it uses. We must develop some community agency for taking care of this matter, some system of inspection that will be adequate and dependable.

The proper care of the sick members of the family is impossible in these modern dwellings. We are obliged, therefore, to take an interest in hospitals and their management. We discover that the modern hospital has a new and peculiar function, a community service, which was foreign to the work of the old-time hospital.

In brief, though we move slowly, because of our failure to discern the anachronisms in some of the standards and ideals which we cherish, we are learning that all the advantages of multiple dwellings are not to

be secured at their maximum value without intelligent and persistent community action. We are learning, too, that there is such a thing as public health, and that it bears a vital relation to the health and welfare of the members of the individual household.

Thus do the new types of dwellings modify our traditional views of domestic life. Equally important changes are to be noted in the organization of the household and of the family itself.

In the Colonial type of home the family formed a fairly stable unit. The relations and mutual responsibilities of husband, wife, and children are well understood. The family was patriarchal in organization, its headship being vested in the husband, who bore without protest the duties and the responsibilities of that position. Children were, both economically and socially, an asset, and they enjoyed all the advantages of being an asset instead of a liability. The school merely supplemented the home in the education of the children. There was a well-established sex division of labor. The women did practically all the spinning, dyeing, weaving, and sewing. They had general charge of the preparation of the food supplies and did much of the brewing and baking. The status of women was not questioned; it was in harmony with the customs and traditions of the time. The wife was subservient in a gladsome, womanly way to the head of the family. Only the unmarried spinster occupied an uncertain status, attested to by the fact that she has been popularly called an old maid.

In the modern family all of this has been changed; the relations of husband, wife, and children are no longer so completely patriarchal in character. The wife is much less subservient to the husband; not infrequently the bride stipulates that the word "obey" shall be omitted from the pledge in the marriage ceremony. A new order of things has altered the relation of woman to the institution of marriage.

In the marriage institution we really have a case of antagonistic cooperation. Neither party wants to enter such a permanent relationship unless there are distinct advantages to be gained. New ways of earning a living, therefore, make necessary a readjustment in the relations of the two parties. At the present time a revolutionary readjustment is in progress. A new alignment for the sex division of labor is being worked out. The entrance of women into wage-earning occupations gives them a stronger economic position, and hence the terms of the marriage relation are being revised.

The fact that modern manufacturing plants can do the work of the domestic arts more cheaply means that women cannot, if they would, all remain at home, spinning, weaving, making house furnishings, and preparing meals for a family. Some women, it is true, are still living under conditions which do not permit them to engage in remunerative

work. It is indicative of a change in the status of women that at present a part of the women are wage earners and a part are not.

It cannot be doubted that, as time goes on, a larger and larger proportion of the women must necessarily work for wages in factories, stores, and offices. And they are, as a matter of fact, now entering practically all the branches of the modern factory system and the business world. They are also establishing businesses of their own and they are entering the professions. The unmarried spinster is happily no longer the traditional old maid; she is achieving an assured status as a business and professional woman.

What is new about this situation is not that women are working. Women have always worked. The new fact is that women are working for wages; they are becoming wage earners. It was not so very long ago that men began to work for wages. Some important consequences followed that change. Now women are working for wages and still more important consequences are at length beginning to be recognized. It is becoming apparent that a new type of home and of family life is necessary. The old is no longer possible.

All that may be involved in the development of a new type of family life cannot be determined in advance, and opinions differ considerably at present regarding the possible advantages to be gained. There can be no question, however, that current tendencies warrant certain inferences.

If the married women go out from the home to work for wages, that seems to mean less care of the home, less care of the young children. No substitute has been found for a mother's care of her young children, but it is becoming clear that the educational agencies and curricula must be much more closely related to the needs of the members of the family. The boys cannot work with the father. The girls cannot work with the mother. Neither the boys nor the girls have any adequate means, directly through the family relationship, of choosing or of learning a useful occupation. It is incumbent on the educational leaders to provide practical and effective vocational education and training in the schools, along with a considerable amount of vocational guidance. It is urged that emphasis needs to be placed upon the education of boys as home builders and income earners, while girls should be educated as home makers and income spenders. There are strong reasons, some of which have been referred to by implication, for insisting upon the education of girls as income earners. And it is evident, even to the casual observer, that both boys and girls might profit from instruction and training as income spenders.

The modern home seems, on the whole, not to be giving to the children the very valuable moral training which was possible in the Colonial type of home. Agencies outside the home must therefore assume a larger

measure of responsibility for this essential moral training, at any rate until the family as a societal unit becomes much more stable than it is at present. Both the church and the school are now with some deliberation and insight undertaking this task, and there is the promise of gratifying results, although here again the failure to discern anachronisms is a serious handicap.

If the girls and young women go out from the home to work for wages, the tendency is for them to be bound less closely to the home and to their parents. They come to feel more or less independent, and their social life no longer centers in the home. Instead, it centers in dance halls, moving-picture shows, theaters, and parks—public places of amusement. Hence it is necessary to exercise supervision over public places of amusement. In this matter of recreation we are facing a serious community problem, particularly serious because so few people as yet recognize the fact that it is a community problem. To seek fun is a perfectly normal and wholesome human experience. In our dance halls and pleasure resorts the young people are seeking the fun which is not easily obtainable in their homes as now constituted, and they are being exploited for gain, often to their utter ruin and the desolation of future homes.

When both sexes are working side by side for wages, it becomes all the more important that the conditions of employment should receive serious consideration. We are now forced to concern ourselves with child labor, the minimum wage, and legislation with reference to the employment of women. We must also know what the incidence of the risks of modern industry is upon the family and what is involved in the development of a proper and satisfactory system of social insurance. It is scarcely the part of wisdom to let the hazards of life fall most heavily on the weakest individual members and families of the social group, without any attempt to utilize the sound principles of insurance to distribute these risks widely throughout the whole group.

Again, it may be repeated, attention must be directed to matters of community welfare. A rural population, sparsely settled on the land, has become a dense population in an industrial environment. The family is no longer an isolated societal unit; it has become a constituent part of a complex and intricate community life. The cross-currents of this community life, if it be poorly organized and its potency misdirected, tear the family asunder. Those who would conserve the family need to concern themselves with the disordered social and industrial conditions which impinge upon a normal and wholesome life for husbands, wives, and children.

In general, the woman has had more to gain from wedlock than has the man. It is not surprising, therefore, that the woman has usually got the worst of the bargain. She has, for various reasons, been the

weaker party, and hence not in a position to dictate terms; she has generally accepted the larger measure of the disadvantages. Our existing laws on domestic relations represent an attempt measurably to safeguard the woman in recognition of her weaker position and her handicaps. As she gains a position of economic independence, she has less need of statutory guardianship in the domestic relation and the basic terms of wedlock must be altered somewhat in her favor. Chivalrous attention and care are no longer the full measure of compensation for the burden of childbearing which falls the more heavily on her. She is insisting that she shall determine whether and how often she shall assume that burden.

The issue at stake here is whether the long-established property right in women shall continue to prevail. There is little doubt what the outcome will be ultimately, but no one can measure the amount of misunderstanding and recrimination, of abject human misery for numbers of people of both sexes, that will attend the determination of the issue. The great task which the man faces is the curbing of his masculine possessiveness; the great task for the woman is the intelligent assumption of the duties and responsibilities which go with her altered position.

The nature of the family as a social institution is not dependent upon ecclesiastical pronouncement, royal edict, or legislative enactment. There are some things you cannot force a society to do, any more than an individual. You cannot by legislation, or by any form of compulsion, force men to be ambitious, to be energetic, or to be good and honest and true. No more can you by legislation compel a society to maintain an ideal marriage institution. It has never been true that the standard form of wedlock has had no departures from it. In between the simplest pairing arrangement of short duration and pair marriage for life we find numerous variations in the family relations of the sexes, and these variations are to a greater or lesser degree always present. Side by side with polyandry and with polygyny, monogamy is found. Where group marriage prevails, other forms are not wholly absent. Monogamy (pair marriage for life) has never succeeded, even with the powerful sanction of Christianity behind it, in obtaining the unvarying adherence of all classes and every individual member of society.

The marriage institution is distinctly a social institution, one that is controlled by the customs, standards, and ideals of society. It lies in the *mores*. Its existence, its continuance, and the terms on which the marriage relation may be dissolved are really determined by the conditions of life, and by the standards and ideals which characterize the society in question. If wedlock is regarded as merely a social convenience, at a time when conditions are in many ways unfavorable to the maintenance of high-grade family life, as is true at present, divorce, or something which is practically the same thing, will be common. If wedlock has a solid basis in mutual interests for the parties concerned,

and especially if, in addition, it is regarded as a holy union to be dissolved only by conditions extremely unfavorable for its continuance, then divorces and separations will be rare.

The family as a societal unit is now in a period of transition, a period of essential and thoroughgoing readjustment. The acute condition of the servant problem indicates this, as does also a number of other matters frequently discussed at dinners, bridge parties, and afternoon teas. Most people are at present giving their attention to the symptoms of this transition. They are studying desertions and divorces, when they ought to be studying the marriage institution and the family. They are seeking a remedy for divorce and for the social evil, when they might much more profitably be seeking a new basis for the stability of the family in accord with a higher status for the woman and be devoting themselves to the initiation and perfection of measures of community action that are essential to the maintenance of a modern home that will give to all its members a maximum of satisfaction. Wedlock must yield a profit in satisfaction of interests of the parties concerned, and there must be mutual advantages for the two sexes in order that the marriage institution shall be stable.

Some changes in the basic relationships of the family and of the home are inevitable and necessary at the present time, whatever the cost. It is certain that the cost will be heavy, measured in terms of human suffering and misery, but we can scarcely doubt that in the long run the gain will overbalance the loss—unless we have ceased to have faith in humanity. Ida M. Tarbell came close to stating correctly an essential truth, when she said recently:

> The human heart does not change. It demands its mate, always has, always will; and the mated will find a corner to themselves where they can sit by their own fire and rear their own brood. Their corner may be a flat and not a cottage, their fire may be a gas log and not a bundle of sticks, their dinner may come in from the corner in cans and be heated and not cooked, the wife may vote, and the husband may give himself a score of liberties an earlier generation would have frowned on, but what has all that to do with the foundations of life? These are but the fluctuations in ways and expressions which each succeeding generation surely brings.

Durable monogamous wedlock is not dependent upon the perpetuation of the Colonial type of home; nor is pair marriage for life conditioned upon the maintenance of the patriarchal form of the family. A study of the history of human marriage shows that this institution has in the past undergone many changes and modifications. Just now another notable change is in progress. Monogamous wedlock is not threatened with extinction, nor is its durability fatally impaired; but it is undergoing an essential and wide-reaching adaptation, to new life conditions. Prominent as a factor in this adaptation, perhaps the most prominent factor of all, is the change in the status of women.

2. *The Rise of the Scientific Attitude*[1]

Two world-wide movements have occurred within the recent past which may rightly be called revolutions; one is so called, the industrial revolution. Of that, and the stresses which it has placed upon the family, we have heard a good deal. We are certain to study it more closely and to neutralize such unfortunate effects as it may have created. But of the second, and to me the more important of the two revolutions, little has been said, although it underlies the entire world; that is, the rise and growth of the scientific spirit as it results in the rationalizing of conduct. While in past times the family has varied widely from place to place, and at different periods, conformity to a particular form was enforced with fair rigidity in each of them. There are—or were—few social controls which acted with greater inflexibility, even to the point of severe personal discomfort or death, than the controls which enforced sexual and marital conduct. This enforcement, however, rested in the hands of impersonal but none the less real social forces: customs, traditions, religions, systems of morals, public opinion, and, to a slight extent, law. Back of them all, however, there rested authority. The prescribed behaviors were enforced because, as was said, they were right. They were not discussed. It was impious to call their validity into question. One who violated their sanctions was ostracized. All of this was highly automatic and fairly uniform. Nor should it be forgotten that even yet in the field of sex and marital relationships the customs and taboos of society are widely enforced.

But the field of behavior will never again be so largely subject to the arbitrary rule of authority. The scientific spirit has led men to question the basis of all beliefs as well as of all matter. Almost within the life of this generation reason has taken the place of authority as the guide to behavior. When the reason for sex or marital acts is to be found in their appeal to the individual judgment, it is obvious that people will show less uniformity than when they act in response to vigorous authority. One does not need a profound knowledge of psychology to predict that in such a situation decisions would be made, very largely, not in accordance with the abstract merits of the case but in accordance with desire. One with any intelligence can usually find a good reason for doing the thing he wants to do. To the first advocates of the rational basis of ethics, the substitution of reason for authority appeared as the enfranchisement of the human soul. If men were free to create the morality they needed, there was no reason, it was argued, why the millennium should not immediately be ushered in. It is no dis-service to reason to point out the fallacy of any such expectations; to point out that while such a result, somewhat modified perhaps, might happen in many individuals, there is

[1] Adapted from BRUNO, FRANK J., The Meaning of the Conference, *Family*, vol. 8, pp. 266–267, December, 1927.

nothing contained in such a program to insure that such a result would take place universally. If there were time, it would be instructive to follow this road, bordered by authority on one side and reason on the other; to show how reason has ever been contemptuous of authority, looked upon its ideas as superstitious and its customs as accidents, while authority has ever striven to silence the voice of reason.

Far be it from one drilled in the scientific method of approaching questions to throw discredit upon the use of intelligence in this field of human activity. It is enormously superior to the blind government of traditional authority. It contains great promises of future possibilities. But it has not been an unmixed gain. You remember one of the oft-quoted passages from the Bible, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

This is not a particularly clear statement, but whatever its original intent, it has an eloquent lesson here. It says, freedom may be gained only by finding the truth. Our way has been to place freedom first. The quotation puts truth first, and freedom as a sequence. But when freedom comes first, there is nothing to prevent it from being merely unrestraint, which has neither social nor other value. Freedom to do as one chooses does not insure that the free spirit will find the truth to guide it. Freedom which comes from the mastery of a skill, such as freedom to play a piano, is won; it comes only by hard work. Freedom to play the piano, considered merely as lifting the ban against touching it, may produce hideous discords. Robert Park described the hobo somewhat along this line; he says in "The City":[1] "He [the hobo] has gained his freedom, but he has lost his direction."

3. *The Lag of Family Mores in Social Culture*[2]

We live in a dynamic and not a static world. Geological strata are eroded by the ceaseless action of rain, ice, heat, winds, the attack of microorganisms as well as by the eruption of volcanoes and the shattering effects of earthquakes. Similarly there is a change in social stratification although the form of change is dissimilar. Great changes have occurred in our industrial system, or in what may be called our material culture, while our non-material culture has remained practically static. Today the *mores* of the monogamous family and the *mores* of the Christian religion are much as they were in the agricultural economy of the eighteenth century. Whereas in modes of producing consumers' goods, the motor tractor, the steam-power looms, and the electric printing press are radically different from the primitive machines of the eighteenth

[1] PARK, ROBERT E., The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Behavior in the City Environment, *Am. Jour. Sociology*, vol. 20, pp. 579–583, 1915.

[2] Adapted from CHAPIN, F. STUART, The Lag of Family Mores in Social Culture, *Jour. Applied Sociology*, vol. 9, pp. 243–247, May, 1925.

century. The manufacture of woolen garments has been revolutionized since 1700 by the introduction of automatic machinery driven by steam power. Yet the creed and ritual of the orthodox church has hardly changed. Why have the changes been more considerable and more frequent in material culture than in non-material culture? There are two chief reasons: first, because inventions and discoveries have been applied to manufacturing production; second, because the test of an experiment with a new method in material culture is decisive and impersonal. These two considerations do not apply to the levels of non-material culture such as religious and family *mores* in anything like the same degree as on the level of material culture. Compare the definite advantages of steam power over horse power with the uncertain results of trial marriage as against strict monogamy.

Now this failure of non-material culture to change as rapidly as material culture changes creates cultural lags and results in discord and dissatisfaction. Some say the church is out of date because it fails to face the issues of public ownership of natural resources, the taxation of incomes and inheritances, and other questions of industrial society—for the church is still adapted to the conditions of a primitive agricultural economy under which it originated. We say that our schools are behind the times because they do not supply technical and vocational training in anything like the extent needed in an age of machinery.

Let us inquire into the conditions of change in material culture. Sudden changes (by invention) in material culture are due to the fruition of a quiet process of fermentation of thought in related fields which have reached a favorable cultural threshold. As a great deal has been written about this phenomenon, I shall merely stop long enough to summarize the matter in general terms. Basic sciences must first supply the discoveries which permit new combinations and applications of scientific knowledge and practical technique. The inventions are inevitable, given the antecedent conditions of a favoring cultural threshold. This coincidence of favoring cultural occurrences as such, a combination of circumstances as the creation of additional markets in the new world, the invention of machinery, the discovery of steam power, and the discovery of new resources of coal and iron, causes a sudden expansion of material culture so that it grows and elaborates by leaps and bounds until it far outdistances the slower changing non-material culture, and the lag between the two levels becomes painful and constitutes an acute social problem.

Changes in material culture have revolutionized the family as a home environment, as a place of work, as a place of recreation, and as a center of protection. The changes have taken the form of splitting off the original functions of the family and breaking down its old system of *mores*. Unfortunately this splitting off process has been going on without much conscious guidance because there has been little depth to our

knowledge of (1) permanent social values of family solidarity, or (2) of which social changes were relatively beyond the individual's control and which could be collectively controlled. Our attitude has been passive observance alternating with indiscriminate interference.

The family was an economic institution as well as a biological and affectional. It possessed recreational, educational, and protective as well as economic functions. The woman's duties of spinning, weaving, sewing, preparing food, and gardening were as economically important as the man's different activities. Divorce was consequently infrequent because it disturbed these fundamental and supplementary economic and industrial activities. The family afforded a place where boys learned their trade, and where girls were trained to be skilled housewives. Owing to its settled abode and definite resources in property, dependent kin were easily protected and cared for.

In the simple and stable village community of the eighteenth century, family *mores* and public opinion exercised a fairly satisfactory control over marriage. Common-law unions might be happy affairs with adequate provision for the child. Marriage could be a personal affair since it must follow the grooves of custom and was at all times subject to the control of neighborhood gossip. Stable residence, home industries, and dowry practices guaranteed economic security.

Today the family is no longer the stable social unit for the socialization and control of the child that it once was, and this is chiefly because changes in the social-economic environment have taken away from the family its former undisputed prerogatives. The factory system of machine manufacture brought about the extensive utilization of unskilled workers in the manufacture of complex products once done only by skilled handicraftsmen. This has been accomplished by specialization or minute subdivision of tasks. Decline in home industries such as spinning, weaving, and by-employments has accompanied the expansion of the factory system. Congested urban living has made the home garden impossible. There is little place for the playtime of children. Homes become rented dwellings, or more likely, flats or tenements. The city population is preponderantly a migratory, shifting, and propertyless people.

The effect of these new conditions on the family *mores* has been tremendous and often disastrous. Employment is largely outside the home in factory, business, or commercial enterprises. Wage-earning women leave their children at day nurseries and the birth rate has declined. The requirements of the factory, business, and the professions are so technical that special public provision is made for education and training outside the home. We have manual training and mechanical schools, and commercial and business high schools. With the decline of home trades and the domestic arts, courses in domestic science given

through the public schools replace home training. Meals are bought outside the home at the cafeteria or restaurant, and manufactured canned goods or cooked foods may be had at the bakery, drug store, or delicatessen. The stuffy and unattractive city flats drive children out of the home in search of recreation, only to find no play space. Commercialized recreation has responded with the public dance hall, the soft-drink parlor, the pool room, and the movie palace.

Every social worker is familiar with the clash of old- and new-world family *mores* that takes place in the immigrant home. Earlier protective and disciplinary functions have been taken out of the home. Compulsory education laws with the attendance officer are now part of the modern city's educational system. We have child-labor laws and factory inspectors, the juvenile court and probation officer, and other children's protective agencies with their staffs of specialized social workers. With no permanent place of abode, the urban family lacks resources for the care of aged dependents, few light tasks are to be done, and the wage system leaves little marginal income. Hence we find homes for the aged, pension systems, and public relief. The family physician has almost disappeared and the clinic, dispensary, hospital, and sanitarium provide medical care outside the home.

Machinery has entered the home to save the domestic drudgery that remains, so the housewife with few or no children, who remains at home, may find time heavy on her hands with consequent emotional conflicts and neuroses. Woman, released from home responsibilities, seeks responsibilities outside the family in varied occupations, the professions, the club, in civic activities, and has gained her economic freedom. These facts, taken together with others, have made the marriage union less stable and divorce more frequent.

4. *First Efforts toward Adjustment*[1]

Sociologically considered, one of the chief aspects of the modern world is the growing insistence that institutions shall serve human needs. Before the genesis of social institutions was understood, the emphasis was contrary: human beings were expected to adjust themselves to institutions.

Rationalization of social institutions is usually accompanied or followed by increased attention to externals. For example, when the church came to be regarded as a social rather than a divine institution, religionists came to be preoccupied with secular functions. The church was called upon to purify politics, to battle against vice and crime and poverty. The shift of interest was, in one sense, at least, from personal to environmental factors. People still talked about souls but gave increasing attention to bodies.

[1] Adapted from LINDEMAN, EDUARD C., Newer Currents of Thought on Parent Education, *New Republic*, vol. 51, pp. 172–174, July 6, 1927.

In the case of the family, the results of rational attitudes were twofold: (*a*) intense activity in the direction of household economy, and (*b*) a new valuation of home and family objectives in which the child was elevated to a primary position. Looking backward at these two movements—both of which are still represented as contemporary currents—it is not difficult to discover cause and effect relationships. Both the new glorification of the child and the increased attention devoted to the material aspects of the home may now be viewed as compensations for the older sanctions which rationalization had dispelled. And, from this point of view, it is not surprising that the compensatory reaction was mixed with a peculiar kind of fear, fear of family disintegration, and therefore evoked emotional responses; but it also occurred at the time when science in its applied forms was coming to enjoy extended vogue, and consequently technological resources were sought. During the latter part of the last century and early part of this one, these two currents of thought exerted a powerful influence upon American education. Courses in home economics were introduced in universities and colleges, and, latterly, in high schools and the grades, with the aim of making the business of home-making and home management a technical affair. The central assumption of this movement, in so far as it was educationally conceived, was that adults who undertook marriage and child rearing could no longer depend upon their instinctive natural equipment for an adequate performance of the task; they were, in fact, told that their functions were scientific, not instinctive.

Originally, these new studies were referred to as "cooking" and "sewing" courses, but they soon expanded into full four-year curricula in which attention was given to chemistry, biology, bacteriology, sociology, psychology, etc. In the order of their development it may be said that these new departments of education gave attention to: (*a*) the technology of home-making and child rearing, including applications of science to the attendant problems; (*b*) the esthetics of the home, including various household arts; (*c*) the sociology of the family, including also other related social problems; and (*d*) the psychology of the child and of family relations. These are, of course, crude classifications, but they may serve to indicate something of the nature and development of this phase of education. This development was obviously not uniform; in one section of the country, emphasis came to be placed upon the so-called "cultural" or "esthetic" aspects, whereas in another, household management or the technology of home-keeping became dominant. The entire movement gained impetus in 1914, when the federal law known as the Smith-Lever Act led to the employment of some 2,000 county home-demonstration agents. The Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 appropriated another $3,000,000 of federal funds (to be supplemented by state and local resources), one-half of which is being used for vocational home-economics training in secondary schools. It is doubtful if any specialized branch of study has

ever projected itself so rapidly and extensively into our educational system.

But a problem for which education is presumed to be the solution is not solved when its related subject matter is introduced into the curriculum. Indeed, curricula have a curious habit of hardening into stereotyped forms—a habit of solidifying into the vested interests of the academic world. Are the problems of marriage, the family, and the home what they were when this movement began? Have the courses of study kept pace with developments in the sciences, with changes in the modern world, and with evolving values? And has anything like a balance between the factors of human nature, society, and science been maintained?

In the first place, it appears that the so-called "age of the child" has run its course. Adults are once more beginning to make claims on their own behalf; the primary objective of the family may still be conceived to be the production of sound children, but parents are commencing to demand some benefits during the process. If sound and happy children are to be produced through the sacrifice of parents, the family will, patently, become an unbalanced institution. The passing notion, born out of a fine but misdirected sentiment, relegated parents to the function of supplying a suitable environment or background for their children. This was as inimical to decent and wholesome family life as the preceding notion, which regarded children as economic assets, as new units of labor who were at some time or other to pay back the debt owed their parents. The current trend seems to indicate that neither sacrifice nor exploitation is a fit symbol for the family process.

The structural or institutional form of the family group is disintegrating. It is probably this feature which leads many observers to fear—or to hope—that the family itself is in decay. Conceived as a structure, a form within which ordinate and subordinate units exist, the family becomes one kind of social phenomenon; conceived as a process, a set of movements or interrelations between human beings, it becomes an event of different caliber. The clue to the structural concept of the family is some sort of law and order; the clue to the second conception, namely, that of the family as process, is some sort of expression, self-revealment, which leads to creative relationships. The structural family may take advantage of the technologies for the purpose of achieving increased orderliness and efficiency; the process family can succeed only if it entertains, in addition, personal objectives which go deeper than mere efficiency. The clash between these two ways of conceiving the family—and therefore of conducting its affairs—will, no doubt, continue, but there is considerable promise in the fact that an increasing number of people are beginning to view the family in socio-psychological rather than legal-structural terms. Experiments of the future should help to teach us

how to make of family life an exciting adventure in the dual process of self-expression and group integration, rather than a dull though efficient way of getting meals cooked, beds made, and order maintained. Indeed, these apparently homely tasks may themselves take on new meaning and importance when viewed in the context of livelier values.

There appears to be a growing feeling that the family as a social unit or event may change considerably, but that the fundamental basis of family life, namely, its place in the ongoing evolutionary process, is not likely to change greatly either in degree or extent. Back of the household and its management, back of psychology and education, and back of the esthetic impulses which surround family living, stands the biological fact of two sexes intermingling in the perpetuation of the race. This, so many insist, is the primary fact which needs to be brought fully into consciousness. In one sense, this trend represents one of the rhythms of the age-old environment *versus* heredity debate. In another sense, this discussion now goes forward within a new context. Sex has at last been lifted from the transcendent area of mystery and placed upon the level of discussion.

This is a fact of more meanings than most adults are willing to grant. Its implications reach all the way from illegal but consistently practised birth control to a subtle kind of sublimation in which sex comes to be an almost perverted topic for casual conversation. It thus happens that the very time at which we have achieved a certain degree of frankness in matters of sex sees us also drifting toward a variety of vulgarity and impotency. However, it is still too early to prophesy in regard to what the new interpretation and use of sex will do to us and to family relations. The family is biological, and any form of education which pretends to minister toward the improvement of home, family, and children will need to give increased attention to the sociological, psychological, and ethical issues which flow from this fact. Unfortunately, whenever this significant fact is translated into educational terms, the old and fruitless battle over heredity and environment is revived. The result is usually overemphasis of one or the other without recognition of their synthetic interrelationship. We are parts—and creative parts—in the evolutionary stream, but the direction of that stream is determined by the environmental resistances or accommodations afforded by its banks, its environment.

5. *A Statement of an Ideal*[1]

The form of the family is largely determined by tradition, by law, by convention, and by religious sanction. All these are the product of

[1] Adapted from LEE, PORTER R., Changes in Social Thought and Standards Which Affect the Family, *Nat. Conference Social Work*, 1923; printed also in *Family*, vol. 4, pp. 103–111, July, 1923.

slowly maturing human experience and the instinctive reactions of human beings developing, throughout their history, constantly more definite forms of social control. An institution so founded, with the authority of the ages behind it, is not lightly to be modified. It is not my purpose to suggest what particular modifications in the form of the family are desirable. I wish rather to call attention to a phase of our responsibility which, in our sound desire to conserve the best in our heritage from the past, is too easily overlooked. I believe that in our effort to maintain the integrity of the family, we do not sufficiently consider the extent to which, under modern conditions of thought and life, its integrity is assailed by some of the traditions and sanctions which have safeguarded it in the past.

Let us take as our ideal for the family that it is based upon monogamous marriage founded upon love between man and woman and entered upon with an assumption in favor of permanence. This is an ideal to which perhaps every school of thought would subscribe. To consider whether changes should not be made in our present form of the family is not necessarily to challenge this ideal; but it may very well be to challenge the adequacy of some of our historical methods of safeguarding it.

Let us begin with comradeship, a phase of human experience which must be studied chiefly in a succession of commonplace incidents. Married life means to most people at the present time permanent companionship which at its best may become comradeship. Is comradeship in the present day, in marriage or elsewhere, an easier thing to achieve than it formerly was, or a more difficult? In human experience does it become easier or more difficult for people to live together? When two persons undertake to live with each other they take their courage in their hands. As the days pass into weeks and the weeks into months and the months into years, their foibles, their weaknesses, their prejudices, and their sterling qualities as well stand out in bolder and bolder relief. Considered simply as a problem of getting along together the selection of a housemate is almost wholly an experiment. Its success depends upon many factors, of which that almost intangible thing—compatibility—is among the most important.

Is the problem of comradeship easier or more difficult within marriage than outside? Easier beyond question because of the love interest in which our ideal marriage, at any rate, has its roots. But at this point modern experience presents a new complication. The interests of human beings whose correlation is so essential a factor in comradeship tend to become crystallized later and later in life. The interests which go most deeply with human beings in the sense of possession are cultural, vocational, and avocational. To a large extent these interests in the form in which they persist through life are the product of maturity. Education, professional training, the higher demands of skilled work, tend to prolong the period of preparation. Many interests do not become fixed until

the period of preparation is over, and one is more or less settled in the direction in which he wishes to go. Ordinarily the interests of mature years do not become crystallized until possibly the late twenties. This is the age, in other words, at which the nature of one's lasting comradeships is likely to be more firmly based. Young men and young women, however, do not and should not wait until the late twenties before they fall in love. And however much economic considerations may be driving us into late marriages, this tendency cannot but be deplored by those who believe in the right of youth to love and in confining its deepest expression to the marriage relationship.

We may well believe that compatibility between man and wife is essential to family life. We may believe that marriage as an institution is so important to the welfare of society that men and women must be urged to achieve compatibility at whatever cost. We do ourselves a wrong, however, if we do not recognize that the growth of human comradeship is a bigger problem than it ever has been. The love of man and woman simplifies the problem but marriage intensifies it—since comradeship may be more difficult of achievement on the part of those who feel themselves driven by circumstances to achieve it. We have taken as our ideal of the family the monogamous marriage, which is based upon love and entered upon an assumption in favor of permanence. That ideal can be retained by the race only if it recognizes the increasing difficulty of attaining it in our present social arrangements and adapts its forms of legal, religious, and conventional sanction to that fact.

Another characteristic of modern thought which has a bearing upon family life is its attitude toward authority. There is a widespread feeling that human beings in these times show an increasing disrespect for authority. Some writers will have us believe that disrespect for law, if not more widespread, is at least more conspicuous. It is suggested also that many of the older sanctions, religious and conventional, command a lesser degree of allegiance from the present generation than was true in the past. The growing independence of children of the present day, representing a relaxing of parental authority, is an illustration of the same thing. Certainly in the field of politics men have become increasingly restless under traditional forms of authority: autocratic governments are overturned completely, and representative governments have in recent years experienced more frequent changes in tenure.

If we turn from institutions claiming a measure of authority over groups of persons to the human being himself, what attitude toward authority shall we find? I am inclined to think that most human beings like authority. Men like to be led. They like to take cues from others. They like to find a doctrine formulated which they can follow. They like the security that comes with realizing that there is authoritative backing for that which they believe.

In order to reconcile these apparently paradoxical assumptions, suppose we analyze a bit the nature of authority. There is a kind of authority that goes with status. The president, the king, the priest, the teacher, the manager, the parent, the policeman carry authority regardless of the qualifications of the person who holds the office. Whatever the source of such authority, it is recognized generally and traditionally receives respect. This is constituted authority, if we may spread a bit the strict meaning of this phrase. It is the authority of the office. An unworthy incumbent may lessen the respect accorded it but cannot wholly destroy it. It is authority in which the subject not only acquiesces but in many of the illustrations mentioned the authority is given as a result of his deliberate act.

Constituted authority, however, is not the only type which human beings follow. The guide, counselor, and friend is usually an authority, but he does not derive his authority from his status. Rather, he derives his status from his authority. Civilization has become so complex that no man can be an authority with respect to all matters that are vital in his life. In politics, in finance, in health, in recreation, in religion, in philosophy, in his vocation, he needs outside assistance. Anyone whose judgment in any one of these fields he respects may be to him an authority. Authority in this sense is not constituted. It is rather inherent in the wisdom and understanding of the individual. Inherent authority is the authority of experience and learning, leading to judgments which less experienced, less learned persons are willing to follow. Inherent authority is the authority of those whose lead we follow without any compulsion to do so.

I am inclined to believe that the growing disrespect for authority is disrespect for authority which is constituted but not inherent. Men are no less willing than they ever were to accept leadership, to be told what to do, but they are increasingly restless when advice or instructions come from persons who have only a constituted right to give them and no inherent authority with respect to them. Political dissatisfaction is not so much due to unwillingness to be controlled as it is unwillingness to be controlled by those who do not combine with the constituted right to control the inherent authority which makes the control wise.

What bearing has this upon the family? The family is a less formal organization than the state, the church, or an industry. Nevertheless, it is an organization, and within the family parents occupy the position of constituted authority. Happy is the family in which the constituted authority of parents is also inherent, in which the respect of children may be gained not merely because children must obey their parents but because with regard to the important issues of life the judgment of parents has earned respect. Both tradition and law grant parents almost complete control over their children. Just now there is a deepening of

interest in the whole subject of the relationship which should exist between parents and children, which goes far beyond the mere question of control.

It is none too soon for this interest to show itself. In the education of children there has been very little which fitted them for the art of parenthood. Most of the contributions toward home making have been in terms of labor-saving machinery, budgets, and mastery of the domestic arts. We have gone serenely along in the belief that the solidarity of the family group under the leadership of parents could be preserved on the old basis of parental control and such measure of companionship as an assortment of human beings could spontaneously achieve. In the meantime, more and more of us have been educated, deeper and deeper have sunk ideas of liberty and self-expression. All of which has been approved by our philosophers and deliberately fostered by our leaders. No one would claim that we have yet achieved an undue capacity for independent thought, but the result of the process of education and the result of our struggle for liberty have nevertheless tended toward independent thinking. Whatever else a desire for independent thinking and for the selection of one's own authorities may lead to, they have clear indications with regard to the organization of family life. If respect for parents is an important element in holding the family together, that respect must not only be accorded by children—it must also be won by parents. It is not possible in this brief discussion to consider what this means in terms of the education of parents. We need only suggest that respect is ordinarily accorded those whom one feels to share one's own interests and to some extent to have an authoritative judgment regarding them. The authority of a father over his son totters on its foundation when the son asks for assistance with his arithmetic lesson and is met by complete indifference. It totters only slightly less when the child is met by cordial interest and abysmal arithmetical ignorance. The interests of childhood are not the interests of the adult or *vice versa*. Nevertheless the two have points of contact, and authority in the household hinges very largely upon the success of the parents in making their leadership attractive at these points of contact.

It may be too much to expect that middle age or old age can ever wholly appreciate the point of view of youth, but we can no longer be content with a philosophy of family life which makes it one of the first responsibilities of parenthood to secure in children the greatest measure of conformity with adult standards. The yearning for authoritative leadership on the part of youth can be satisfied only by authority which is inherent. The whole trend of our education, the whole atmosphere of modern life is toward the acceptance of inherent authority, and toward the distrust of any authority, however firmly constituted, which is not also inherent.

This discussion cannot omit the effect which the present outspoken interest in sex is likely to have upon the family. This development has given many people a feeling of grave apprehension lest its consequences be entirely disastrous. It has given many others a faith that out of it will grow a saner attitude toward family life and a greater measure of security for the family ideal in which we believe. Neither apprehension nor faith alone is a completely satisfactory starting point for action if it is possible to put facts at their service. We are far from knowing the whole truth about sex. What we do know, whether revealed by experience or by philosophy or by science, is not enough to justify abandoning entirely either apprehension or faith in regard to the future.

Nevertheless we do know more about sex than any previous generation knew. Psychiatry, tentative as it is, and the study which lies behind the movement for birth control, for a more righteous attitude towards illegitimacy, have taught us something. Traditional attitudes toward sex will not be continued unless they survive the honest appraisal of newer facts and judgments based upon these facts.

We know that the sexual instinct is among the most powerful in human nature. Of all human instincts it has been the most persistently kept under cover and the most rigidly disciplined. As a result it may be that it is, in proportion to its power, the least well understood; and if it is the least well understood our attitude toward it may be the least intelligent.

What are some of our traditional attitudes toward sex? The belief is general that sex is essentially indecent. The common attitude is that even within marriage sexual relations between men and women are a concession to animal nature and justified only by biological necessity. From the most widely accepted moral point of view sexual intercourse is legitimate only when its purpose is procreation. Finally, our civilization has pinned its faith to a program for the control of the sexual impulse in which fear and repression and insistence upon self-control with no adequate appreciation of its cost are leading factors.

These are no new attitudes. It may well be that whatever success the human race has had in organizing its sexual nature is due to them. In practice, however, it is clear that they are being steadily relaxed. To many people the relaxing of these attitudes marks an inevitable tendency toward complete moral degeneration. It must be admitted that here and there a voice is raised in favor of the complete abandonment of all moral standards as the soundest social philosophy. As between no moral standards whatever and moral standards too rigid for present-day needs there could be no hesitation in making a choice. Better to trust blindly the experience of the race through the ages than to abandon it wholly in order to follow the impulse of the moment.

I do not believe that we are confined to these alternatives. I think, on the contrary, that an honest facing of the facts gives good reason to believe that the relaxing of some of our traditional attitudes toward sex will mean a sounder moral standard for the future.

Certainly in many specific directions our practice does not conform to these traditional attitudes. The practice of birth control, in spite of its being hedged about with legal restrictions, has become widespread among persons whose moral standards cannot be questioned. Moreover, the movement to modify the legal hindrances to voluntary parenthood grows in momentum and its adherents are neither the unintelligent nor the immoral. Very slowly we are coming to have a different attitude toward illegitimacy. Illegitimacy as a social problem has in the thinking of the past been rooted in immorality. The traditional attitude toward women and children tainted with illegitimacy has been dictated by our traditional feeling of the essential indecency of sex; and modification of that attitude indicates a change in our thought about sex. Despite efforts to check it, divorce is increasing and it is noticeable that the greatest increase is in divorces secured on the initiative of women. Current newspapers, magazines, and books indicate how widespread among the present generation is the discussion of sex.

All these evidences of a change in our attitude toward sex may be interpreted as having sinister significance. This, however, is not a complete interpretation. Certainly the drive for sex education not only has the soundest of arguments behind it but to thousands of human beings for whom life has been complicated through ignorance it suggests the possibility of a saner outlook upon existence for the newer generation which an older generation achieved only after the most terrific struggle, if at all.

The current interest in sex cannot all be bad. If we have sufficient honesty and courage to face facts we shall discover that, however much good may be credited to our traditional safeguards around the subject of sex, they must be charged also with a considerable measure of evil. In common knowledge they have been responsible for no small measure of marital unhappiness. The family physician, the confessor, the guide, counselor and friend long preceded the psychiatrist in coming to a realization of the terrific problem of adjustment within married life which sex imposes. What has been a burden to be borne it is reasonable to expect that sex education, psychiatry, and a saner attitude toward the biological nature of man may succeed in lightening. We are learning also through the revelations of psychiatry the terrific cost of our traditional program for the control of the sexual impulse. Repression and fear as a basis for the organization of oneself are a foundation of sand. How much of human unhappiness, how much of the sense of failure, how much of the antagonisms which lead to open strife among men are due to these

repressions we do not know, but modern psychological science affords ample reason for seeing a cause and effect relationship between them.

Our traditional attitudes toward sex are based upon a conception of society in which marriage is the normal state for adult human beings; and no other conception of society would meet our highest ideals. The fact is, however, that marriage as the correlative of love between man and woman to some extent grows more difficult under modern conditions. Economic considerations tend more and more to lead to the postponement of marriage. No reliable statistics have been compiled as to the rate of increase of unmarried persons. The tendency, however, at certain points is distinctly noticeable. Professional life and the exigencies of far-flung industrial organization make it necessary for more and more persons, both men and women, to establish themselves in new communities or to lead an almost nomadic existence. School teachers, social workers, nurses, traveling salesmen and other business representatives, groups constantly growing in numbers, more and more find themselves living under circumstances which certainly do not simplify the question of finding a mate. To the extent to which neighborliness has declined in American city life the problem of developing acquaintances for newcomers is intensified. If acquaintance is difficult, marriage is still more difficult. There have always been human beings who have successfully negotiated celibacy, but celibacy is not normal and in the nature of things it never can be normal. An increase of celibacy may well be as grave a matter of social concern as an increase in sexual immorality. Once more we must recognize that the maintenance of an ideal is today a bigger problem for human beings than it ever was before.

From still another point of view the adequacy of our traditional attitudes toward sex may in the light of recent experience be challenged. There are differences of opinion as to the form which sex education should take. There is little disagreement as to its importance. The purpose of sex education must be either to teach youth the truth about sex as a natural function, as natural as any other biological function, or to teach him how to control his sex impulse, or both. If both, the validity of the arguments for control must be made as apparent to him as the truth about sex. But our traditional arguments for the control of the sex impulse are the product of ages when we did not know as nearly as we do now the truth about sex. Every other form of education, if it is good education, has for its purpose the development of some capacity in the boy or girl and the provision of opportunities for its use. In the case of sex education alone we endeavor to reveal to youth the truth about one of his most fundamental capacities and we then tell him that only under certain restricted circumstances must it be used, and not for many years after he has come to understand it.

There are the soundest biological and ethical arguments for the control of the sex instinct, the reasonableness of which even youth may be expected to understand. We must recognize, however, that we cannot give him both knowledge of his sex nature and the reasons for its control, without his giving sex a place in his scheme of things. Under traditional moral standards, sex outside of marriage has had no legitimate place in the scheme of things. So drastically has convention enforced this standard that even a normal consciousness of sex interest has meant for the conscientious person a feeling of guilt. The results of education in knowledge of sex and acceptance of standards of self-control inevitably mean for youth a consciousness of sex interest. If we believe in sex education we must be ready to lift from youth this burden of guilt.

I am advocating neither free love nor sexual promiscuity. I am advocating an attitude toward sex that will uphold monogamous marriage. I am pleading for recognition of the formidable nature of the task of self-control and for recognition of the fact that to be conscious of a sex instinct which needs to be controlled need not in itself involve a feeling of moral guilt.

In the face of increasing marital unhappiness, of an understanding of the bad effects of the repression of the sex instinct, in the face of an increase in enforced celibacy, in the face of a widespread conviction that sex in some of its phases has never been adequately understood and not always sanely safeguarded, those of us who are interested in maintaining an ideal of family life would do well to consider whether our traditional attitudes toward sex do not need considerable modification, if that ideal is to be safeguarded. I am not one of those who believe that sex is essentially indecent. To regard the experience through which the richest of spiritual gifts comes to men and women, the gift of children, as indecent in itself is abhorrent to every fundamental sense of decency. I am not one of those who believe that indulgence of the sexual instinct is a concession to animal nature legitimate only when its purpose is procreation. Under the refining influence of the human spirit seeking its way upward, beauty has been found in every function of the human personality. If once we could free ourselves of the dead load of fear we should find all of us, as indeed many of us have done already, beauty in the sex relationship in and for itself. This is not an argument for the relaxing either of self- or of social control. It is an argument rather for an honest search in the light of modern knowledge and modern thought for new bases of self-control which will preserve our ideal of family life. Sex is at the foundation of family life. Sex influences family life as long as it lasts. It must be admitted that we have made little effort to understand it. It has been accepted as a biological necessity. That it could have in the development of human beings any spiritual significance whatever, men have never been ready to admit. Another generation may find that a

saner attitude toward sex within marriage, with implications that are spiritual as well as biological, has given them a saner attitude toward the whole problem of sex in human life, and a sounder basis for its control.

One cannot consider the effect of changes in social thought and standards upon the family without considering the effect of those changes upon the whole range of human life. Throughout human history there has been a steadily maintained tendency toward the development of the human being to think and act for himself. The growth of scientific knowledge, the development of a wider and wider range of interests in life, and the tremendous spread of education have given him some of the equipment necessary for this responsibility. The equipment thus far has been inadequate and it will continue so for a long time to come. Nevertheless, leadership by fiat and constituted authority alone is losing its hold upon men. This does not mean that men are losing their faith in ideals. The ideals of liberty, of religious experience, of service, and of family life are as sound as ever. Coming generations of men, however, are likely to ask of their leaders that the social arrangements designed to protect these ideals be adjusted to the facts of life and to the justifiable faith of the individual man in the inherent soundness of his own judgment.

6. *A Family in the New World*[1]

The little room in which the juvenile court cases are heard is still, the mother and her three daughters are waiting for a decision. On the wall hangs a quotation from Julia Lathrop:

> No child should be removed from its own home unless it is impossible to make the home safe for the child, or his continuance in the home safe for the community.

The Referee is thinking how this amazingly simple statement should be applied. Can this home be made safe for Bertha, Edith, and Jean? Bertha is thirteen. Her lips are daubed with paint. She has been arrested for selling box lunches on the street corner. Edith is fifteen. She had just been brought back from a runaway match with Arthur, a young saxophone player, whom she met at a penny dance. She is scowling defiantly at her father. Jean is seventeen; she smiles in a self-satisfied way, is a marvel of sophistication, and has the manner of one who is waiting for some tiresome screen comedy to end. When she was arrested at two in the afternoon she was in bed in an untidy little apartment that bore the signs of a wild party the night before. Jean works at a soft-drink parlor and has evaded the truancy officers for four years.

The mother is a large good-looking woman of forty-six, dressed in a tight lavender silk gown. Her hair has just been marcelled, and her heels are three inches high.

[1] Adapted from VAN WATERS, MIRIAM, Parents in a Changing World, *Survey*, vol. 57, pp. 136–140, November, 1926.

"Why did these girls get into trouble?" asks the court.

"I've already told you," says the mother, "their father wouldn't support them. As to food, yes, he would buy them food, but Jean never had clothes good enough to go to school in. Mr. G never thought a woman had to have any clothes. That's why I left him."

Clearly, she and the girls have clothes now. And it is evident, as she said, that Mr. G is not the man to appreciate them. He is a carpenter, steady, patient, methodical, with large hands that make heavy gestures as if he were unconsciously boring a hole with a gimlet.

"I have raised four sons and these girls, and never been in a court in my life. I gave my family a good home. All I ask is that they act right. My wife left me because I won't stand nonsense in my home."

"Will you take them back?" asks the court.

"I'll take Bertha back," says the father, "she is the only one who pays any attention to what I say."

To hear a single case is like diving into a deep pool. For the moment all the world is shut out. It is just this particular tangle of human relationships caught in this swirling eddy. Then one rises to the surface and becomes conscious again of the skyline, and of all that surrounds the pool. A case is judged against a background of all that we know of contemporary family life and morals, and of all that we, in our ignorance or wisdom, suppose they were in the past or ought to be now.

For example, this family: It started thirty years ago from healthy native stock in Missouri. There was an eighty-acre farm; a roomy house with an avenue of lovely trees. Seven children were born. Substantial meals were cooked. Birthdays and Christmas were celebrated. Neighbors called. The family went to church and to picnics. No one would dream of starting a scandal against any member; the father worked, the mother drudged, the children went to school, the sons married girls everyone knew. Then the eighty acres were subdivided, the mortgage paid off, and the family moved to California. They had money enough to start a new home. But they wished to look around first.

The mother, in looking around, evidently had seen a good deal. She finally consented to move into a bungalow court. It was built on half a city lot and ten families lived in it. There was not a tree, nor an extra atom of space, nor a second of privacy night or day for any one. Meals were merely anything "hasty and tasty" that could be picked up at the corner store. Each member of the family started living furiously on an independent schedule. The mother got work in a millinery store so she could have some spending money. In the evening she went to a beauty parlor or for rides to the beach with her "business" friends. At first she took the girls with her, but soon they had friends of their own. The three girls between them could name over twenty boys they went with regularly; that is they could give their first names, such as Red,

Slick, Spike, Tex, Slim, and Babe. The boys took the girls to "the show." It had to be the show, because the father did not approve of dancing. When the girls began to come in at one and two o'clock in the morning he began to express angry doubts. But, he was baffled by such mysteries as, "the differential or something broke down" (the father did not drive a car); or "we decided to stay all night with our girl friend, only her mother had company, so we came home."

The father took to upbraiding the mother. He spent his energy in reiterating his idea of what a respectable home ought to be. She agreed that things were not as they used to be, but she was not prepared to say they were worse.

"I told Mr. G," she asserts, "I have come to the time of life when the most important thing to me is my health. I am not going to stay cooped up here," I said, "and the girls oughtn't to either. They need a little fun. I don't want my children to be any different from the others on this block." I told him, "I have slaved all my life. Now you shut up."

Finally the mother got a job selling real estate. Then she left home and took up an apartment of her own. She was making more money than the father. Jean left home too; as she explained it to the court, "We were down to the beach with a bunch of fellows and it got late, and I knew father wouldn't understand it, so I just stayed away."

It is not so much that habits of food, shelter, recreation, and moral behavior have undergone a complete transformation in this family within four years; something of deeper significance has occurred. The parents have lost the power to influence their children. This loss bewilders and saddens the father, but it acts as a strong dose of freedom to the mother.

"Well I have done everything a mother can do. I've preached to them and warned them against the boys and drinking. Now, if they get into trouble it is their own fault." Visibly, the mother has cast off responsibility. She wishes now to live her own life. It is clear that if Bertha, Edith, and Jean are to be brought up respectably they must be removed from this "home."

Before we reproach these parents let us ask ourselves why human beings no longer submit to routine without reflection; why "duty" no longer calls forth the old unquestioning response.

Because we are human, certain things must get done: food, shelter, sleep, play; fighting, mating, learning to live together; acquiring skills, expressing abilities, adjusting to nature; helping others or impressing our will upon them; finding something to worship—these great tasks confront all generations.

Today, for some cause, we have started asking: Are we doing these things in the best way?; or, Is our way the only possible way? The rapid accumulation of scientific knowledge, the pressure of economic and social changes—all these lead us to be tolerant of new solutions and doubtful

of the wisdom of our traditional solutions. The increased "freedom" given to youth is only another way of saying that we do not expect them to settle down or to become stabilized early; rather we welcome a longer period of experimentation.

No system of family life and morals can survive that does not enhance the welfare of the individual and give him a sense of happiness. The length of survival of unsatisfactory family relationships depends, among other things, upon the opportunity given its members to become articulate. Mrs. G became articulate as soon as she moved into a neighborhood where it was no disgrace for a woman to wear pretty clothes or to leave her husband.

The juvenile court now gives Bertha, Edith, and Jean opportunity to become articulate. None of them wishes to go home. They face the future as individuals, not as daughters, or sisters dependent on the family group for nourishment and protection; "being with strangers" has no terrors for them. It is not that they have been badly treated. The family is no longer necessary; it has lost the only primary wealth that is possessed by the family—affection—which is only another way of saying that the growth-impulse in this family has come to an end.

Bertha, Edith, and Jean presumably will be cared for. Today parents share their responsibility for good or ill results in the lives of their children with many other forces. The behavior of other parents and their children enters in, and the ideas of conduct held in the neighborhood, and environmental and industrial conditions. So does the amount of scientific knowledge available in the world at the time, the social resources that are present in their own community: school, court, church and social agency; the use, or disuse of mechanical inventions; the state of municipal, county, and national politics; the degree of good will in the currents of life about them. These forces always change. They ebb and flow in different combinations so that the total human situation which confronts the parent and the child is never twice alike.

This is why we hesitate to give any specific instruction to parents, lest they might come to believe in a rule-of-thumb knowledge that can be applied without love and without critical judgment, and this is why we hesitate to condemn parents who have apparently failed. We must ask: Have their own fundamental needs been met?; or, Have struggles for fulfillment so crippled them that it is no longer possible to demand responsibility toward their children? Or the institutions into which they have poured their lives may be cracking and breaking down. Perhaps it is intuitive wisdom that keeps them from attempting to force their children into the same molds.

Biologically speaking, "we all exist for the sake of our possible offspring," but what of it? What does this stark physical law mean to Eloise and John who would like to "try marriage," as they have tried so

many other things together; for example, the roller coaster? There is nothing irreverent in the comparison. The roller coaster is an institution. It is licensed by the city. As one pauses to look down at the flimsy skeletons bridging the gulfs of that dizzy flight it seems incredibly dangerous. Yet one is allowed to buy a ticket. Other couples are trying it. Thousands do it every day. It cannot be so very unsafe, or "they" would not allow it. It has the sanction of being permitted in a world that regulates all activities.

There is an accident; people are killed on the roller coaster. You cannot forget the expression on the faces of the survivors, the amazement, the rebuke.

So it is with marriage; another institution licensed by the state. Eloise and John have expected a thrill, which however dangerous, startling, or difficult, would somehow be safe, since so many people are permitted to try it. The same expression of amazement and rebuke is on their faces when they come to court when the family institution has collapsed.

There are children, theirs. These have suffered a good deal in the collapse; one is "nervous" and has an anxious, fearful face; the other is stolid and stares at his parents with hostility. Yet as parents go these young people have done fairly well by their children, the housing, feeding, and discipline have been so-called "standard."

Parents are not accustomed to think in biological terms. It would be impossible for them to understand what the scientist means when he says, "We all exist for the sake of our possible offspring." If Eloise and John could be articulate they would express dissatisfaction with a world that viewed the mere perpetuation of our species as enough. "Life should be worth living for us; we are willing to do our duty, though we cannot get along together; we would even make sacrifices, but we would like to feel they are worth the effort," they seem to say.

They wish to know that tangible results in happiness can be attained. If family life does not furnish it, they will try something else, in the spirit of the amusement seeker who has been cheated or injured and who says "never again."

Yet because they have no adequate view of what happiness really is, nor where to place the blame for their failure, they seek the divorce court with the express purpose of trying it again. One who attends a divorce court for the first time, with fresh eyes and without prejudice, is often startled to find it a happy place. Each contestant appears to have a plan in mind, the fulfillment of which has been long postponed and is now about to come true. The observer is surprised also to see that in most cases each one thinks primarily of self and later, if at all, of children and family.

This is the reverse side of that individualism in art, business, science, social life, and morals which has given us our "progress." The growth of the individual may be satisfying to himself and yet make a contribution to the welfare of the community; or it may take some irresponsible spurt and become unwholesome.

This process is not unlike what little we know of cancer. From a supposedly good home suddenly emerges the "black sheep."

Many critics of the modern family have lost perspective. They say our family life is disintegrating, but we ought to know what opportunity they have had for observing family life in the past, and how much they know of successful families today. For example, a recent writer on Woman's Future and the Future Woman assumes that we are in the midst of "universal physiological depravity." The "hundreds of thousands of commercial and voluntary corporations whose whole energies are directed toward taking the home arts out of the hands of women," the activities of social workers who have brought about a condition of affairs so that "everything that is best in the nation, all those elements on which the successful survival of our race depends, are being penalized for the sake of the defective, the lunatic, the cripple, the incurable, the half-witted, and the blind," fill the author with horror. He assumes that we have lost health. It never occurs to him to ask whether individuals were ever healthier than they are now. The fact is that the few comparative statistics that we have indicate at least a ten-year increase in the average life span and a marked improvement in health.

So with family life. There have always been many kinds of families in a single cultural status. Young Ishmael and Hagar setting out into the desert, while Sara and her son Isaac stay at home in respectability and comfort show how great the variation can be. Praiseworthy parental behavior in the seventeenth century would be punished today in the juvenile court, as De Schweinitz notes of the Rev. Thomas Fuller, who in "Good Thoughts for Bad Times" wrote in 1642: "Lord, what faults I correct in my son, I commit myself. I beat him for dabbling in the dirt, whilst my own soul doth wallow in sin; I beat him for trying to cut his own meat, yet am not myself contented with that state Thy Providence hath carved unto me. I beat him for crying when he is to go to sleep and yet I fear I myself shall cry when Thou callest me to sleep with my fathers." What an ignorant and cruel father-son relationship.

It is probable that many of the families who come to the juvenile court today show an improvement over some families that were deemed good a few generations ago. Untrained observers in court cases seeing only the faults of parents, their ignorance, weakness, confusion of mind, selfishness, neglect, tyranny, indifference, or cruelty come to the conclusion that parents are necessary evils. In the children they see only offense

and follies. To such a viewpoint the court is a sordid evidence of family breakdown. The American juvenile court, however, is a democratic institution with certain clinical, confessional, and educational facilities that make it a social resource used by many families as a means of self-preservation. A father brings his children to court because their mother has deserted them. A mother can no longer cope with the complexities of city life and brings her fifteen-year-old daughter who is becoming wayward. A girl of thirteen reports that her mother stays out all night, and that her father beats the younger children. Here we see not so much the decadence of family life, but the family struggling to endure in the midst of social changes that tax the wisdom of the strongest.

The court has the power to make and to unmake families, and the way in which it exercises this function shows the prevailing legal and social views of desirable family life, and how much the state expects from the family.

An eleven-year-old boy in the state of Washington was taken from his parents and placed out for adoption in another family because he had been taught by his parents to refuse to salute the flag. Here the state obviously thought the family relationship less important to conserve than the ceremonial of patriotism.

An erratic, itinerant auto-camp enthusiast persisted in dragging his boys, aged eight and ten, about the country, depriving them of school and home. Finally the judge of the Juvenile Court ordered them placed in a foster home. The father came in to register his complaints with the probation officer. The father met a little girl crying in the waiting room, and asked her what was the trouble. She told him she had always lived with her aunt who had just lost her custody on an appeal, and she was to be sent to her father who was a "horrid missionary." (It was alleged that the aunt had committed perjury.) "Ach! you stop crying. You don't know what trouble is," said the old man, and they both paused in their private grief to console each other and to wonder at the strange logic of courts which broke one family and reunited another.

When parents seek to state their specific problems in court, or habit clinic, they ordinarily fall into two groups: parents who wish to make the child fit into the home, and parents who wish to make their home fit for the child. The first have confidence in their skill and righteousness in the matter of child guidance. They trust the present mold of family life and differ only as to methods; whether force, or seduction, or patient training in morals is best adapted to their goal. The second group sees the child as the latest and best product of evolution and believing more or less consciously that "the progress of our race has been a progress in youthfulness" strives to adapt the whole scheme of family life to youngest members.

SUGGESTED READINGS

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Chapter III

POINTS OF VIEW

The literature of the family is large, valuable, and intensely interesting. The institution has been approached by many scholarly as well as by many impressionistic writers and from a wide variety of points of view. There is, however, almost nothing in the literature over ten years old that has any very direct significance for the present-day American family. The modern situation is unlike anything that has existed previously. And it is only within a decade that social science has perfected a method for studying fruitfully contemporary culture growth and personality development. The earlier writings, except for certain works of fiction, do not approach the problem of the influence of the institutional patterns and norms upon personality and its development.

There is a large and scholarly body of literature dealing with the family as a biological unit and with the biological aspects of the family unit. Edward Westermarck's "The History of Human Marriage" is a comprehensive comparative ethnological study from a biological evolutionary point of view. Elsie Clews Parsons' "The Family," Havelock Ellis' "The Psychology of Sex," and E. Crawley's "Mystic Rose," to mention only a few examples, are concerned with sex, marriage, and the natural family. Numerous biological, ethnological, medical, and psychological works deal wholly or in part with the family as a biological unit in human reproduction. In the growing body of eugenic literature the family is conceived chiefly or exclusively in its biological aspects. In spite of the great value and interest of the work done from this point of view, it is little or not at all pertinent to an understanding of the family and its present disorganization. The modern family is only incidentally a matter of the biology of sex. There are, to be sure, various matters of biological interest associated with marriage and family, and it is a valuable and necessary procedure to subject these to scientific analysis. But such interest should not be confused with a study of the family as such. There is perhaps always a biological element in the family complex. But this is incidental to the organization of the persons, not a matter of central interest.

Many writers have made an historical approach to the study of the family with results valuable and interesting in themselves. The forms that the institution has assumed in different times and places, the stability of these forms, and their modifications in changing cultures make an

enlightening chapter in the social life of peoples. L. H. Morgan's "Ancient Society" contains a peculiarly important chapter on The Growth of the Idea of Family. J. J. Bachofen's "Das Mutterrecht," J. F. McLennan's "Primitive Marriage," and Sir John Lubbock's "The Origin of Civilization" are of great historic interest. G. E. Howard's "A History of Matrimonial Institutions" is a monumental work of unique worth but its elaborate and detailed tracing of legal forms is perhaps of more value for an understanding of the legal behavior of peoples than for an analytic understanding of the family itself. Miss Willystine Goodsell's volume on "The Family as a Social and Educational Institution" is a useful preliminary volume. But the modern American family is unlike anything in the history of the world and it is changing in response to conditions and forces of recent origin. The student will of course desire to familiarize himself with the standard works of historic interest as well as the historic method of approach. This is an indispensable item in scholarly orientation. But, while unfortunate, it is none the less true that the history of the family has not a suggestion to make nor a ray of light to shed upon the modern situation.

There is a very large body of impressionistic writing on the family and related matters that has a moral, sentimental, romantic, or other bias that reduces its value by destroying its objectivity. Much of fiction and poetry and of religious and moral teaching displays a fine appreciation of home and family, of filial affection and mother love. It embodies, expresses, and idealizes the prevailing *mores*. It treats the family as a natural and divinely sanctioned institution and addresses itself to the problem of individual adjustment and conformity to the standards. Of a somewhat similar value is a large amount of purely romantic literature dealing with the love antics of adolescents. So far as this is related to the family, it tends to glorify the marriage state and to make the achievement of that status a measure of success and, for women specifically, the chief or only purpose in life. It is a concrete expression of naïve human attitudes toward an emotionally entrenched culture pattern. As a source of family study this literature is valueless because it refuses to face reality and fails to comprehend the real human problems. Some considerable body of popular writing is an obvious attempt to capitalize the general sentiments toward romantic attachment, marriage, home, and family. The popular attitudes sometimes bias work that is presumed to be on an entirely different plane. A recent book by a college professor widely advertised as a textbook for college classes is pitched on the same level as the columns of advice to the lovelorn that find a place in the daily press.

There is also a very large body of sqcio-political writing concerned with family reform and uplift. This often displays a somewhat morbid interest in the disorganization of the institution and in its failure to

perform its traditional functions. The institutional disorganization is seen as a problem in the political sense, that is, as a problem demanding administrative attention. This writing deals chiefly with symptoms and commonly exaggerates the disorder as a justification, background, and basis for launching a program of reform. In some cases the point of view is conservative; norms are assumed and standards are uncritically accepted. What is good, right, and socially and humanely desirable are treated as known, and effort is directed to bolstering up the institution, repressing variant behavior, and bringing individuals into conformity with institutional norms. In other cases the initial bias is toward a modification or destruction of the conventional standards and the inauguration of a new regime. Free love, trial marriage, and various other panaceas are advanced as substitutes for the traditional order and as solutions of the problems posited. The conservative and the radical proposals are fundamentally alike; they differ only in the type of reform proposed. In both there is a failure to appreciate causal relations and understand social processes, consequently inappropriateness is an almost universal characteristic of the treatment proposed and the reforms advocated.

In the decade since the European war there has been a beginning of scientific study. Various research organizations have been heavily endowed and have carried on some research and published some studies. The results to date have been somewhat disappointing. In most cases the work has hardly reached a scientific level. Most usually it has taken the form of anthropometric, psychometric, and other tests and a statistical treatment of collected data. In some cases the activity has amounted to little more than a sponsoring of mother conferences, parent education, and other forms of social work. This sort of activity may, in some cases, be a concession to the man on the street who finances the work and demands tangible "results" of an order that he can understand. But this is more often an excuse than an explanation. For the most part it is a virtual confession of failure. It shows an inability to grasp the scientific as distinct from the political—practical—problems and an inability to isolate, define, and attack them apart from moral preconceptions and practical consequences. At a recent conference of scientific specialists called for the specific purpose of defining family problems and methods for their study, the results were wholly negative. Almost the entire discussion was biased by a warm and generally unrecognized therapeutic overtone which prevented any clear visualization or definitive statement of the problem in its setting.

The family is a part of a complex reality and, as such, involves facts and processes that are proper object matter for study by various scientific disciplines. The facts of sex are matters of biological interest and concern, the economist has an interest in the institution as a productive and consumptive unit, the statistician finds in it grist for his mill, and so for

the various biological and social sciences. But none of these is interested in the family as such—there is no science of the family. Miss Jocher's paper on Methods of Research in Family Study emphasizes the fact that each science has something to contribute to an understanding of the relationship. The student of the family will utilize and organize from that point of view the pertinent findings of the various sciences.

The paper by Mr. Burgess we are disposed to regard as perhaps the most significant single contribution that has been made to a fundamental analysis of the family. It sees the family as a living thing, the form and vitality of which depend upon the interaction of its members. This gives an abstraction on a truly scientific level which makes possible a fruitful type of research—a research directed toward fundamental processes rather than toward superficial phenomena.

Mr. Arnett's paper shows the biological interest and point of approach to family study. It traces the evolution of provisions for the care of offspring in various stages of organic development.

The doctrine of social evolution is in large part an analogue of the theory of organic evolution. It posits, usually by implication, the present status, generally somewhat refined and idealized, as the goal toward which cosmic forces have been tending through the ages. All other and earlier conditions thus automatically become inferior; they are seen as steps in the evolutionary series. The paper by Mr. Todd gives an appreciation of modern virtues and exemplifies an evolutionary approach to family study.

The ethnological point of view is represented by Mr. Smith in the fifth paper and the economic point of view by Mr. Zimmerman's paper on the family budget as a research tool.

The final paper by the Rev. Herbert McNultie Wyrick expresses an attitude that is held by many good men.

1. *Methods of Research in Family Study*[1]

Among the major fields of research in the social sciences the family has recently taken an important place. So varied are its aspects, so complex its relationships, and so numerous its contacts—touching every phase of society—that it would be quite impossible for a sociologist, an economist, an historian, a physiologist, or a specialist in any narrowly confined field to make a complete study of the family or even of a family. There is probably not a discipline in the social sciences that would not consider the family legitimate for research in its own special field; and in more than one instance will be found what may be termed "overlapping" fields of interest. In a consideration of the need for coordination of the

[1] Adapted from JOCHER, KATHARINE, Methods of Research in Studying the Family. *Family*, vol. 9, pp. 80, May, 1928.

social sciences, no better example can be found. The rise and development of the primitive family may well be held by the anthropologist as his particular province, while the social historian will be interested to trace its later growth and ramifications. And the family today—its organization and disorganization, its place and functions as a primary group in the social structure, the individuals who compose the family and their varying relationships one to another, the factors entering into heredity, the vast number of economic and legal problems involved, and a host of other aspects too numerous to enumerate here—command the attention of the economist, the sociologist, the psychologist, the biologist, and the jurist. The family, too, is well adapted to the various methods of approach in research—the descriptive, the anthropological, the historical, the biological, the psychological, the case history, the experimental, the statistical—each of which, alone or in combination, may be used advantageously in studying its origin, development, organization, status, and problems.

Long conceded to be a fundamental institution of basic importance in the social structure, any symptoms of change or disorganization in the family are soon noticed, discussed, and not infrequently "agonized over." Unfortunately, calm, impartial, unbiased investigation and unprejudiced scrutiny of the actual facts and attitudes mark a much later stage in the development of thought and method. Thus, while the apparently changing status of the family has for some time given rise to much discussion and agitation, "shaking of heads," and "wringing of hands," it is only very recently that scientific research methods have been applied and an effort made to determine, if possible, the underlying factors that are making for disorganization or reorganization of the family. And as yet, only the surface has been scratched. Tradition and sentiment which surround and envelop the family probably more than any other social institution, not excepting the church or private property, have united to retard scientific investigation of it. Willystine Goodsell in her "History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution" gives three reasons for the lack of progress in scientific research in this field:

1. The close association of the family with the tenderest and deepest experiences of our lives.
2. The belief of many in the Western World that the present monogamic form of the family is the only possible solution of the problem of wholesome sex relations and of the proper care and maintenance of the offspring of such relations.
3. A hesitancy and unwillingness to discuss such topics as prostitution, social diseases, and divorce, which definitely affect and influence family life.

But the rapidly changing status of the present-day family, with its evident maladjustments, is breaking down the wall of prejudice and is making way for the scientific study of the family and family relations.

2. *The Sociological Approach*[1]

Nine years ago I gave for the first time a course on the family. There was even then an enormous literature in this field. But among all the volumes upon the family, ethnological, historical, psychological, ethical, social, economic, statistical, radically realist, or radically idealist, there was to be found not a single work that even pretended to study the modern family as behavior or as a social phenomenon. It has been studied as a legal institution but it had not been studied as a subject of natural science, *i.e.*, (as Professor Park once said of the newspaper), in the way in which the biologist studies the potato bug. So far as I know, the description by Professor Thomas of the large family group among the Polish peasants was the first study of the family as a living being rather than as a dead form.

Because of this lack of social psychological studies of the family, the work of the course was planned upon two principles. The first was to select from the literature of psychiatry [illegible] and sociology, statements of concepts that [illegible] research in family life, as sexual instinct, [illegible] response, monogamy as in the *mores*, birth control as [illegible] conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. The second [illegible] from all possible sources, case studies of family life. [illegible] from the works of ethnologists, from histories of ma[illegible] toms, from biography and autobiography, from fiction, fro[illegible] records of social agencies, from any source where realisti[illegible] family life might be secured. In addition, my students hav[illegible] several hundred case studies, which often, with more c[illegible] detail, describe their own families.

In reading these cases, reflecting upon them, and [illegible] them, certain facts began to emerge and finally to [illegible] clear form. The first was that in spite of the [illegible] ences between individual families or [illegible] groups, there was a family [illegible] essential characteristics [illegible] the same. And what [illegible] familial sentiments whi[illegible] maintain the relationships [illegible] husband and wife and parents and children. The role of the mother, for instance, we immediately recognize as basically the same, despite the apparent superficial differences in the care of children among Eskimos, Turks, or Englishmen.

My next discovery was a sudden perception of the tremendous difference between the modern family and the family of the past. How many of us realize how modern a phenomenon is the small family of

[1] Adapted from BURGESS, ERNEST W., The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities, *Family*, vol. 7, pp. 3–6, 8–9, March, 1926.

father, mother, and children emancipated from the control of the wider kinship group of grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins? Do we perceive that it is to be found as a typical specimen perhaps only in cities, and particularly in the urbanized areas of our very largest American cities? The small family group in apartment houses or residential hotels is, no doubt, the most notorious illustration of effectual detachment from the claims of kinship. The absence in the city home of "the spare bedroom," that famous institution of the countryside, serves as a convenient defense against invading relatives.

At the same time, the family in modern life is undergoing changes and modifications which can hardly be appreciated or understood except in the perspective of the past or by an opportunity for comparison with a contemporary organization of the large family in process of disintegration, such as China affords. But, as the large family was organized in the interests of the older generation to resist change, and so to perpetuate the family pattern, the modern family is exposed to change since it begins in a certain sense anew with every marriage and is thus at the mercy of the new romantic notions of the younger generation.

In contrasting the small family of these city areas with the kinship or large family group—whether in ancient Israel, Greece, or Rome, or in contemporary India, Japan, or China, or even with the large peasant family of Poland or Russia, or with the kinship clans of American rural communities—differences are at once apparent. The large family group tends in every culture to be impressed in one standardized form; while within the same culture the small family tends to exhibit a variety of patterns. Already in American society are to be found the following patterns classified by size of family: the childless family or the so-called "companionate"; the one-child family; the two-child family; the family with three or more children. And these are not merely biological or economic classes, they are in large part determined by custom, or by new fashions in the folkways. Dr. Mowrer has even classified areas of the city by types of family life, the non-family areas with their Hobohemian and [illegible] as a Social [illegible]nters, areas of the so-called "emancipated" family in the [illegible]rogress in s[illegible]egions; the patriarchal what family life is or ought to be. The roles [illegible]alitarian family areas of mother, and the good child enter powerfully in de[illegible]lled "dormitory" which each member holds of his place in the world of fa[illegible]

In a stable, homogeneous society, ideas of family life and the rôles of its different members are relatively fixed and constant. In changing society composed of heterogeneous elements, familial attitudes are almost inevitably in a state of flux. Instead of a common pattern of family life intrenched in tradition and crushing out all impulse to variation by the sheer weight of universal conformity, our American society presents what at first sight seems to be a chaotic conglomeration of every conceivable pattern of family organization and disorganization, from the

Next I found peculiarly revealing a classification of families by the pattern of personal relationships between husband and wife and parents and children. Two contrasted patterns soon presented themselves: the highly integrated family and the unintegrated or loosely integrated family. These in turn might be subdivided into several varieties. Upon analysis it was found that the highly integrated family possessed one or more of the following traits: elaborate ritual, rigorous discipline, sentimental interdependence; stimulating cooperative activities or objectives; while the unintegrated or loosely integrated family had little or no ritual, exerted slight control either through discipline or sentimental attachment and its members were only in small degree unified by common family aims to which individual purposes were subordinated. The typical orthodox Jewish family has in marked degree all the traits that are positive for the highly integrated family. The Puritan family, stigmatized by the younger generation as the Puritanical family, is a conspicuous illustration of integration through the characteristics of rigorous discipline and dominant family objectives.

This study of the patterns of personal relationships in family life led directly to the conception of the family as a unity of interacting persons. By a unity of interacting personalities is meant a living, changing, growing thing. I was about to call it a superpersonality. At any rate the actual unity of family life has its existence not in any legal conception nor in any formal contract but in the interaction of its members. For the family does not depend for its survival on the harmonious relations of its members, nor does it necessarily disintegrate as a result of conflicts between its members. The family lives as long as interaction is taking place and only dies when it ceases.

In a recent work on "Family Disorganization," Dr. Ernest R. Mowrer points out that interaction as a principle of family life applies not only to intercommunication within the family but to the relations which the family sustains to the environing society. He says:

> The sociological conception of the family as a unity existing in interaction has two chief aspects. It signifies, first of all, that the family is an interplay of personalities rather than [illegible] filial instincts. [illegible] It is well to realize that even the least [illegible] of [illegible] ions may become so impersonal and mechanical [illegible] in the American [illegible] of a secondary instead of a primary group.

In his penetrating paper, Prof. [illegible]mily [illegible] I have illuminating explanation of the influence of conflicting conceptions of family life. The modern husband conceives the rôle which his wife should play in the family in the likeness of his mother (a sociological adaptation of the theory of the mother image) while the wife thinks of her rôle as a realization of some embodiment of the new woman.

What family can be found in which this very natural divergence in family ideals has not been the crux of a conflict, perhaps slight or perhaps

conception of familial relations is recognized by the community, the family acquires an institutional character. This is what is meant by the family as a social institution. A family that had no conception of its rôle in the community, or of the responsibilities of its individual members would not be an institution, perhaps not even a family. It is just these natural relationships of family life, the obligations and responsibilities spontaneously assumed in family interaction, which the community seeks first through custom and then through law to define, to make contractual, and to enforce. But everywhere, and always, by those who are dealing with problems of family life it is paramount to recognize that the family as a reality exists in the interaction of its members and not in the formalities of the law with its stipulations of rights and duties.

Often too the family is thought of as a mere collection of interacting individuals rather than a unity of interacting persons. Herein lies the value for research of the technical distinction, made by Professor Park, between the individual and the person:

> The person is an individual who has status. We come into the world as individuals. We acquire status, and become persons. Status means position in society. The individual inevitably has some status in every social group of which he is a member. In a given group the status of every member is determined by his relation to every other member of that group. The individual's self-consciousness—his conception of his rôle in society, his "self"—is based on his status in the social group or groups of which he is a member.

This definition of the person as an individual with status has thrown a flood of light upon family interaction. The members of the family do react to each other as individuals and that is important. But they react to each other as persons and that is also important. For every person has, with more or less awareness, a conception of his rôle not only in society but in all groups of which he is a member. Not only does the person have a lively conception of his own rôle in the family, but he has a sense of the rôles of all the other m[illegible]rogress of the family and notions of what family life is or ought to be. [illegible]he good father, the good mother, and the good child enter powerfully in de[illegible]g the conception which each member holds of his place in the [illegible]ily life.

In a stable, homogeneous societ[illegible]tions of ourselves and of others which Dr. Burrow regards as nefarious [illegible]usions, seem to many of us [illegible] very substance of human nature and personality. Surely our r[illegible] our instincts, and our endocrine secretions are not the distinctive c[illegible]r-istics of human n[illegible]ure, no matter how greatly they influence it. [illegible] is human nat[illegible] the capacity to have social images, to put onese[illegible] in the othe[illegible]e and look at oneself, so far as one is able, in t[illegible] mirror[illegible] of othe[illegible]rsons? Cooley has defined hu[illegible]

patriarchal kinship groups of our southern mountain highlands to the free unions of our Greenwich villages. Hardly a day passes but the public is shocked and outraged by some new form of wild and reckless behavior, particularly of youth in revolt no longer regulated by customary controls.

But these random and aimless variations away from the basic pattern of family life are not, as some believe, an indication of the future of family life and sexual relationships. They are only the symptoms in the present, as in similar times in the past, that society is undergoing change. When an equilibrium is reestablished a new pattern of family life will emerge, better adapted to the new situation, but only a different variety of the old familiar pattern of personal relationships in the family.

The general currents of the social influences affecting the family can, however, be outlined. The passing of man's dominance, the emancipation of woman, and her entrance into all fields of economic, social, and civic life, parenthood by choice, the transition from the homestead family to the home in the small apartment or the hotel—these are only a few of the influences affecting family interaction in new and disturbing ways. More intangible but even more dynamic are the subtle changes taking place in our conception of the family and of the rôle of its members. It is only by contrast that we realize the revolutionary nature of the changes in our attitudes, as for example the difference between the attitudes of the Sicilian immigrant and the native American toward divorce.

In Little Sicily in Chicago, Dr. Mowrer found not a single case of desertion or divorce recorded in the Court of Domestic Relations or in the Superior or Circuit courts. An Italian social worker in this district reported that she had never known a *bona fide* case where a Sicilian husband deserted his family, although this is one of the areas where poverty abounds. Divorce or desertion does not enter into the thought of the Sicilian as a conceivable solution for family difficulties. His prevailing code of conduct, his *mores*, and his religious sentiments effectually exclude any evasion of family responsibility afforded by desertion or the divorce courts. But separation and divorce, once under the ban of Americ[illegible] *mores*, have now, at least for certa[illegible] to tacitly received the [illegible] of the community. [illegible] enters as a [illegible] almost absent.

severe, and how interesting it would be to know the different solutions that have been worked out.

In a recent brilliant article on Social Images *versus* Reality, Dr. Trigant Burrow defines social images in terms of what Professor Cooley has called "the looking-glass self," but he challenges the reality of these social images or rôles as natural phenomena:

> Each of us occupies a position professionally, politically, economically, personally. There is one's relationship to one's wife, to his child, to his mother, his friends, his servants, and to every class and condition of people. In all these relationships the individual is constantly measuring his behavior according to the estimate of those in front of him. All of them give back his personal image in the social mirror they present to him. To the servant we play master; to royalty we play the slave. The more we consider this self-reflective tendency the more we may realize how readily we fall into this, that, or the other characterological rôle in response to the image or rôle that is unconsciously being played opposite us.

Dr. Burrow regards these images or rôles as illusions:

> What is called the mother image is but the sum of the impressions reflected by the mother from the social environment about her. The mother image bears no relation whatever to the mother organism and our impression of this early impression of our childhood is totally unconnected with the personality from whom we receive it . . . The image we unconsciously cherish is not the image of the mother's personality. It is the image of the social suggestion that has surrounded the mother. For I think we must ultimately come to see that the child automatically replaces the biological reality of the parent organism with the *social image* that is artificially reflected to him by the parent.

Our "mother image," according to Dr. Burrow, is an illusion, the reality is the biological organism. But, speaking of illusions, is not the biological organism as a mother even more of an illusion? How is it possible for a human being to be a mother without some notion of the rôle of a mother, which is just what a social image is? All her natural [illegible] her affection for her children compel her to function as a mother. [illegible] highly conscious of herself as a mother the moment she [illegible] when her own

nature as "sympathy and the innumerable sentiments into which sympathy enters, such as love, resentment, ambition, vanity, hero worship, and the feeling of social right and wrong."

For the study of human nature, personality, and groups like the family, the basic reality is just this social image, this conception of one's rôle in the family, in the congenital group and in the community. Intimate studies of family life reveal that the actual problems of human beings center, in general, around the struggle to realize our conceptions of our rôles.

For it is in his social images, his memories, his wishes, his dreams, his illusions, his faiths that a human being really lives. Take from him his social images of motherhood and brotherhood, of truth and justice, of immortality and God, and life would not be worth living. Yet, for these social images, the so-called illusions of home and country, friendship and honor, humanity and right, man has always been willing to put forth the utmost effort, to make the most heroic sacrifices, even to life itself.

However, in dealing with human rôles as the social reality of personality, it is necessary to regard them not as absolutes, but as relative to the social situation. Changes in life conditions render time-honored rôles obsolete. Where is the grandmother with her black bonnet of the last generation? Where is the ideal that a woman's place is confined to the home? Why is it that the rôle which made the mother as a girl the belle of the village leaves her old-fashioned daughter a wallflower at a dance? Why is it that the father who in the country was the center of all the activities of the family, economic and cultural, seems in many city homes to be reduced to the negative rôle of saying "no" to the plans of the other members of the family?

Then too, even the personal rôles of family life may become so formal and mechanical that they lose the spontaneity and the human quality that originally and essentially belonged to them. Are Parents People? is the impertinent phrasing of this question in the title of a recent motion picture. Or a similar reaction against the formalism that may ossify familial rôles and sentiments was some time ago expressed in the flippant lines of a ragtime song, "They say the family is an institution, but who wants to live in an institution?" It is well to realize that even the least institutional of institutions may become so impersonal and mechanical as to take on the characteristics of a secondary instead of a primary group.

The scientific study of the family is still in its infancy. I have attempted briefly and I know inadequately to touch on certain of the aspects of family life that, in the studies which we have made, have seemed to be important for future research. These are first, to push further the effort to describe, analyze, and classify the patterns of family life; second, to recognize that the family as a going concern depends more on the natural unity that arises and develops through

the personal interaction of its members than upon any attempt to enforce the family obligations which the law imposes; and third, to test the assumption that the family as a reality inheres in the conception which society and its members have of it and of their rôles as husbands and wives, parents and children.

3. *The Biological Evolution of the Family*[1]

The object of this study is to set forth some of the conditions of the care and provision for offspring and to follow out, in a general way, the widening stream of interest in the welfare of progeny as shown by any preparation of the parents for them. This presupposes in a general way what is meant by home. Home in general, and in the wide sense of the word, is the place where offspring are born and pass through the stage of helplessness to that degree of maturity whereby they are able to gain their own subsistence. It centers around the spot selected by the mother and on her precision, erring or unerring, depends the continuation of the species. The conditions of the environment necessary for the life of the protozoa are comparatively simple. The short period of birth, if it may be so called, since the two organisms produced are exactly similar, except in size, to the parent, renders the food of the parent suitable for the offspring. The environment in which the parent thrives well is especially suited to rapid multiplication of offspring.

A few instances may be noted where eggs are even deposited, apparently, without any provision on the part of the animal as to the future of its species, yet nature in her workings is not prolix, and the law of parsimony is everywhere predominant. Many insects deposit their eggs where they feed because their larvae are able to feed on the same. Brauer's Classification is based on the similarity or dissimilarity of the food of the larva and imago.

The vast body of life of the ocean is one in which the different forms are ceaselessly feeding on one another. It is a basin of food, of which the countless offspring are evidence. Among the vast majority of its life the offspring can subsist beside the parent, and the one condition necessary is, that the number is great enough that one, of each sex, out of the 9,000,000 eggs laid by the cod, for example, may reach the procreation period. The monotony and density of marine life, save for the effort to escape being destroyed, is so great that the least limited sphere of activity and neurotic development is called forth.

The selection of some particular place for the eggs, and especially the concealment of them in some way from enemies marks a great

[1] Adapted from ARNETT, L. D., Origin and Development of Home and Love of Home, *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. 9, pp. 324–364, March, 1902.

advance. The long journey of the salmon from the sea, costing the adult its life, shows how necessary it is for the eggs to be deposited in their proper place and what a sacrifice the individual makes for the species.

In the lower forms of life the process of egg laying can be little less than a reflex in response to favorable environment. No doubt the first traces of the care of eggs is the result of a structural arrangement and as such has gradually been developed in response to its need. The female Cyclops carries her eggs in an external pair of ova sacs. The female lobster is provided with two leaflike swimmerets to which the eggs are attached. During the breeding season these swimmerets are covered with a sticky substance which glues the eggs fast until they hatch. Espinas in his studies of animals has noted that the first care on the part of the parent is the female. She alone exercises this, where it is present among the crustacea and insects. While care by the male begins among the fishes and can be traced to a varying degree through the orders of amphibia and birds. Among the Siluroid family of fishes the female Aspredo carries the eggs in the soft integument on the lower part of the body.

At the time of propagation the integuments of the lower side of the trunk assume a soft and spongy texture. After the eggs have been deposited by lying over them she attaches them to her and presses them into the soft parts. When the eggs have hatched the abdomen becomes smooth again . . . Interest in the welfare of the eggs is much more frequent in the male than the female among fishes, and the line of protection is generally some method of carrying them.

Among amphibia there are similar adaptations. The ova are placed by the male on the back of the female Surinam toad, where the softened integument forms a receptacle. The male, Alytes obstetricans, carries the eggs entwined about his hind legs and retreats to a burrow for safety, coming out at night in search of food. He may even give his unborn wards a bath occasionally to ensure their safe hatching. Near the time when the young tadpoles come forth he betakes himself to the water.

What shall we call this interest in the egg? Is it love? If it is not it is the basis for it. Whether we call it love or not, it represents an industry that is so vital among intermediate forms of life, that they will often sacrifice their own life in defence of their treasure.

Nest building represents an adjustment of life to environment for the better care and protection of progeny, and oftentimes the nest offers a means of protection for the parent. It represents also an extrasomatic state whereby external substances are utilized as a protection for the period of infancy. The first approach to it is perhaps found in the burrowing instincts of certain marine forms, and, like some of the other anomalies of this lower fauna, the burrow is constructed for the concealment of the mature individual.

Burrows in wood and in the earth, by land animals, are more properly retreats in the sense of houses. They represent places of safety for the adult and are fitted out with nests for the young. Perhaps one of the extreme necessities for the burrow, in the case of many animals, is to afford a safe place during the hibernating period. A few of the reptiles and the tortoises burrow for this purpose.

The ants and the termites, in comparison to their size, are the most extensive burrowers. According to McCook the first act of the fertilized queen is to go apart and found a new formicary. In doing this she does not cease her work until she has excavated a gallery from two to six inches in depth. Then comes the duty of rearing and providing for the first brood of workers, and it is probable that her share of the work of gathering food and excavating does not cease until the family is well increased in numbers. The excavation is soon enlarged into a network of winding tunnels.

In attempting to classify the constructive activities of animals no sharp and fast lines can be observed. The molding of the nest from some pliable material represents an advance in the line of invention. The placing of things together for a definite end is one step, but when a definite arrangement and shape are to be accomplished with these materials the advance is still greater. Whether the female carries a psychic model as a part of her dowry, whether it is the result of experience, or whether it is merely a reflex are questions that have been debated in this connection.

One of the Myriopods (Julus terrestris) when about to lay her eggs constructs a nest out of a mortar that she mixes. After burrowing down a short distance in the earth, she begins to form small pellets by moistening the bits of earth with the fluid from her salivary glands. "She works up these bits of earth with her jaws and front legs." When they are of convenient size and shape she places them together. The completed nest is shaped like a hollow sphere, the inside being smooth while the outside is rough. The nest is about the size of a small nut. She lays from 60 to 100 eggs through the opening left at the top and then she seals the little chamber with moistened earth and leaves them to their fate.

The simplest forms of loosely constructed nest may be observed among the amphibia. The female alligator piles up some sticks and leaves near the bank of the stream. When the eggs have been deposited in this heap she lies in watch near by. The eggs are covered slightly but are incubated by the sun's rays.

Excepting the four genera, comprising the megapodia, birds exert more or less care of incubating and feeding the young. In fact the uniformity is greater, in this respect, than in any of the other classes of vertebrates. Some classification is usually made in studies of their

nesting habits. The division selected by Sutherland will serve for this treatment. He divides them into three groups: first those of a low degree of intelligence, comprising the Ratitae or running birds; a medium grade consisting of the lower half of the Carinatae or keel-breasted birds; and a third grade of superior intelligence consisting of the upper half of the Carinatae, including the Passerines, birds of prey, etc.

Among those of the first class the ostrich, for example, merely digs a hole in the sand where the eggs are deposited. A large part of the duty of incubation falls to the lot of the male bird, and in most cases he looks after the care of the young. The rhea and cassowary have similar habits. The second class includes birds like the barnyard fowl, pheasant, quail; marine birds as the petrel, gannet, penguin, etc., and other birds exercising little care in nesting as the pigeon, snipe, woodcock, etc. These comprise a great number of the avifauna and represent an advance in the structure of the nest, using sticks and grasses or perhaps some mud for building, and lining it with some soft material and often with feathers.

The third grade represents the highest class of bird life. Among these the male and female, usually, both take part in building the nest, and the male takes his share of incubating and of feeding the young. In this group are found such birds as the orioles with their intricately woven nest, swinging from the end of some branch. The humming birds delicately conceal theirs on the side of some limb; the parrots may accept some burrow in a tree; the birds of prey build massive nests, usually in the tallest trees or on some elevated inaccessible place; the sparrows and thrushes conceal theirs in the grasses or among the bushes.

If the ovum, instead of being extruded when it is ripe, hatches within the oviduct of the parent, the chances of destruction, compared with any external position it may have, are lessened. How such a process could have arisen might be explained from the habits of certain oviparous reptiles. A constrictor kept in confinement gave birth to a family of living young. The explanation being that the eggs were retained, one by one, near the cloacol aperture until the young emerged. The retention was perhaps induced by finding no suitable place to deposit them. This represents the first stages of one of the great economic processes of nature. Its maximum perfection is found in the complex intra-uterine development of the human race. The oviduct as a depository for unripe ova is common among some fishes (180 species according to Sutherland); and to a lesser extent among the amphibia as a whole, while about one-half of the reptiles are viviparous.

The marsupial represents an imperfect stage, yet a great advance. The young are brought forth at the completion of their ovarian development and placed by the mother in an external pouch. The lacteal food is forced into their mouths by special muscles surrounding the mammae. The soft fur-lined pouch affords a portable nest for the young. Among

the mammals above the marsupials the ova is supplied with little food and upon hatching a union is established between the parent and offspring by means of the foetal membranes of the latter.

The mode of development leading to the formation of the womb represents a constructive process on the part of the female for the young, but destructive in its general effects on the parent—the sacrifice of her body for the food and shelter of the young. Among some insects the sacrifice is even greater if less perfect in its general completeness. The female scale insect extrudes her eggs and the dried shell of her body forms the covering and protection for them. The cochineal insect becoming full of eggs dies, and thus protects her offspring, encased within her body. So important is species and so great is the struggle for survival that every superfluous element is sacrificed, and only the highest possible economy fulfills the requirements of nature. Such an advance is that along the line of viviparous development. With the life of the female goes food and shelter for the young, and among the highest mammals and man an intelligent care whose influence in molding the nature of the young according to that of the species makes up one of the greatest forces of life.

The thread of love that kindled in the mother's breast of some low type of life widened in different directions, but first of all it was imparted to the offspring. It grew from generation to generation until self-hood was recognized in like type and sociability made possible. This social instinct, if we may so call it, is found among the lowest forms and may even have had its birth in the animal colonies, as the polyp or coral. But many of the free-swimming marine forms of the same species unite in great number for search of food. Bluefish, salmon, herring, shark, cod, etc., travel and live in shoals. Insects migrate in swarms, as the locust, or butterfly; or live in colonies, as termites, ants, or bees. Birds, as terns, sea gulls, penguins, swallows, quail, crows, buzzards are sociable, and those that migrate collect in large numbers; even different species associate at this time. Mammals, as deer, elephants, buffaloes, monkeys, live in herds; or horses, cattle, and sheep, in droves; or beavers and prairie dogs in colonies. In fact, as Krapotkin says, it is easier to name the exceptions among animals that do not live in associations of some kind than those that do, the cat tribe practically being the only exception. The teaching of Darwin was that "the struggle for existence" is inclusive and covers the whole field of animal life, activity and endeavor, and that associations of animals, of whatever kind, while they find pleasure in society and escape many dangers, is merely to carry on this warfare in a wider and a more perfect condition. But the fittest are also the most sociable animals, and sociability appears as the chief factor of evolution both directly by securing the well-being of the species while diminishing the waste of energy and indirectly by favoring the growth of intelligence. Espinas, in his valuable contribution to the study of animal societies

recognizes two kinds of social relations: (1) the organically connected colonies of animals, as the coral, (2) those associations whose origin is found in the desire for reproduction. The period of association varies in different animals, but for the higher vertebrates the existence of permanent bands and organizations becomes more frequent and serve wider purposes.

Another condition of animal life now generally recognized by students of sociology is termed animal marriages. It represents the period that the male and the female of any one species live together. This may be for life as is thought to be the case among some birds, as the bald eagle. Among other species of birds it is kept up for one or more seasons. Since most of the birds live in pairs, Snider recognizes in these unions the "first decisive instances of monogamy in nature." The mammals present less sharply defined traits for pairing and many of them, while sociable, exhibit only a common interest in the welfare of the herd. They are for the most part, as the seal and many of the monkeys, polygamous. The higher apes and the gorilla, simang and orang-outang, show decided tendencies to live in pairs and to continue the family relation in bands after the young are matured.

The social nature of the animal, as thus briefly set forth, and his so-called "marriage state," sets before us the basis for the social nature of man and the possibility of the permanence of the human marriage relations.

The social nature of the animal has found its supremacy in man, and the imperfect and irregular marital relations have found their permanence in the family. Marriage and family have grown up together, the permanency and the duration of the length of the union depending on the helplessness of the young and the amount of care needed. No definite time, as the limit of the marital relations, could be adopted, and no state of promiscuity, as is now generally disregarded by recent writers, would be compatible for the proper care of offspring. The marriage relation is a growth from within outward, radiating ever about the one central point, the best preparation of the young to meet the requirements of the environment and to propagate the species.

The period of infancy was pointed out by Fisk as having a wide meaning in the evolution of the race. He thinks that while this alone makes possible the education of the sentiment of love, it has also created man's social nature and fits him for living in societies. A few instances will point out the significance of this period. The offspring of the ungulate or hoofed animal is able to walk almost as soon as born. The weasel or the badger are blind for a fortnight after birth and stay with the mother for two months or more.

According to Wallace the orangutan attempts to walk at the age of about one month, and lifts itself up by holding to objects. Previous to

this time it lies on its back, helpless, rolling from side to side. It tries to grasp but is scarcely able to guide its fingers. The babe, the most helpless of all young, begins to walk at from twelve to fifteen months and needs at least eight years of care.

The period of helplessness is the opportunity for the mother. Her fund of feeling finds expression in a thousand ways. Scott thinks that care for the young "grows out of the care of the individual for its own body, and that the offspring which has been for a time a portion of herself, is defended by the mother with a fervor which arises almost directly from the interest of self-preservation."

Among some animals care may be prompted by a desire to get rid of the uneasiness caused by overburdened udders. "The unrelieved pressure in the mammary gland of a mother animal robbed of her young," says Geddes and Thomson, "is no doubt largely concerned in prompting her to adopt young ones not her own."

In regard to care, and especially the period of infancy, Fisk noted that in general the "duration of the feelings which insures protection of the offspring is determined by the duration of the infancy."

Of the three elements of the mind, feeling and sympathy are primordial in their development. These are the characteristics of motherhood. Modern civilization, with the great store of tradition and learning, imposes new conditions on the individual. Cognition tends to be supreme and feeling, the virtue of femininity, is subordinated. The conditions of true motherhood are imperiled by the transition from the sphere of feeling and emotion to that of cognition. The question raised by Griggs is whether the biological basis of human existence is a sufficient foundation for the vast superstructure of life. Higher education of women brings this danger to the home.

Another danger that Bryce thinks higher education brings for the home is individualism. That is the desire of each person to do what he or she pleases, to gratify his own or her own tastes, likings, and caprices; to lead a life which shall be uncontrolled by another's will. The nervous system grows more irritable, he thinks, and there is greater friction, and for this reason temper is a growing cause of menace.

Wake notes, also, "that as a result of the development of the intellectual faculties which constitute the chief element in individuality, the desire to escape the cares of a family may lead to disinclination for marriage, if even there is not a repugnance to it." Carpenter in reflecting on the course of evolution and the voluntary sterility of certain classes of society women, remarks that "sometimes it seems possible that a new sex is on the make—like the feminine neuters of ants and bees—not adapted for childbearing, but with a marvellous and perfect instinct for social service, indispensable for the maintenance of the common life."

4. *The Family Factor in Social Change*[1]

The family has been able to render distinctive services to social evolution because of its essentially social character. It is social to the very core, social by origin, by basis, by evolution, and by function. While conceiving that the family in its lowest forms, whether animal or human, is biological or psychological, it is impossible to define the family either by history or function in terms of pure biology. It gets us nowhere to say that the family instinct through ages of refinement bred the various social and civic virtues, for even if there really were such a thing as the "family instinct," and it could be reduced to biological terms, such as those of physiology or chemistry, it would still not explain the various outworkings of that impulse into social life generally.

Some idea of the inherent soundness and strength of the family as a human institution is uncovered when we stop to consider the handicaps it has had to overcome in the course of its development. If it has had to struggle against such odds for its own life and continuity, is it to be wondered at that it has not contributed even more largely to social development? Bear in mind the bestiality and irrationality which still discolor our human clay at least in so far as sex is concerned, then think back to those twilight times when manners were even less refined and animality less tamed. Remember that the family has always been a problem of "antagonistic cooperation," an attempt to impose some higher harmony upon the natural instinctive opposition between self-assertive, self-centered mates or between selfish little beasts and their only slightly less selfish parents. Consider that human nature is prone to dodge its responsibilities and to evade issues created by its own self. The age-long struggle to enforce parental responsibility upon the male and to check his tendency to fly away after the act of propagation will illustrate sufficiently what I mean. And think of the strain on patience and imagination required for sex mates, ancient and modern, to live through a quarrel. How the evolutionary pathway is strewn with murder, desertion, and divorce. How difficult too for parents to see ahead for their children. How feeble the memory powers of primitive parents. How domestic idealism must have struggled and how it still struggles against the lust of possession. Isn't struggle for control of the family purse still a strong factor in domestic tragedy? Then look at another handicap. How many mothers can go on the witness stand and swear truthfully that they never for an instant entertained a feeling of repugnance or even positive hatred for their children? How many would confess utter boredom with them? How many resent the constant pulling and tugging by children to reduce parents to their own level? How many wives and husbands never for an instant experience a pang for freedom lost through

[1] Adapted from TODD, ARTHUR J., The Family as a Factor in Social Evolution, *Family*, vol. 3, pp. 106–109, July, 1922.

permanent marriage and children? If you will study primitive life you will never cease to wonder, I am sure, how we happen to have any people left in the world today, to say nothing of any families. It actually seems sometimes that the mortality rate must exceed the birth rate—so keen is the sword of death among savage peoples. The witlessness and incapacity of savage parents are almost incredible. Hygiene is unknown; dietetics a hideous mockery; parental discipline a roaring farce or a tragedy of blood and iron. That anybody survived is, I sometimes think, the crowning tribute to the resistant form of the human frame. Suppose you cap all these difficulties with just one more (and that by no means modern although exploited by current novelists). Try to estimate the centrifugal force of the love of variety, the desire for experiment, the tendency to grow stale even in love, the feeble powers of concentration most of us possess, and you will discover so-called "dangerous ages" in the family situation whether you think of a given time or locality or of the whole evolutionary history of the domestic institution.

When you consider these inner disruptive forces and when you think of the vicissitudes through which humanity as a whole must have passed even during its last fifty thousand years or so, you will be in a position to revalue the toughness, the resiliency, and the tenacity of the family institution. You can restate domestic life in terms of "strength of materials."

As a matter of fact any human agency able to resist such a siege of disintegrating forces would by that very process and achievement of resistance have contributed largely to history. But we can be more specific. We do not have to go far in the study of social life to discover the services of the family to human progress and to the day-by-day workings of our social organization. The biological service of the family is perhaps the easiest to isolate. From this standpoint the family is simply an extended placenta and that in no mere metaphorical sense, for it has been and still is indispensable as a conserver of child life. Through securing to the child an increasingly extended period of infancy, organized family life permitted it to absorb its social inheritance and to elaborate its mental outfit. Likewise on account of this extended period of infancy it postponed proportionally the period of sexual maturity. It also tended to cut down a high and wasteful birth rate. These points represent the form in which John Fiske's theory of the contribution of the family is usually presented; but as a matter of fact the obverse side of the theory is clearer if not more significant. That is to say, the lengthened period of infancy contributes to social development, but at the same time this lengthened period of infancy could only have happened in and by reason of a developed social organization.

The social contributions of the family in the economic field are also significant. They take the form of specialization of occupation, division of

labor. The domestic arts became the industrial arts. This is true not only of such things as agriculture, textiles, metal working, leather working, and cookery, but also such less tangible but equally vital things as the arts of wise consumption and saving. Social discipline has been secured also through the family for both children and parents. The virtues of sympathy, tenderness, self-denial, mutual aid, obedience, foresight, and courage while not wholly due to family life, have been reinforced and stimulated by it. The same thing is true of education. While the family has not been the sole or even the chief educator, it has always been an extremely important element in the educational machinery of a normal social group. The stability of social organization is also enhanced by family life, partly because of the tendency toward a settled mode of life which always appears with the responsibility for a brood of young, helpless children. Family organization through stabilizing and promoting the idea of private property has acted as a conservative force in social life.

It is unnecessary to assume the prophetic rôle to predict that the family has much to contribute yet by way of social value. Remember, for example, that the idea of "home" is distinctly modern—home as contrasted with the old Chinese ideograph "pig under the roof," or with the Greek concept of an economic and procreative center, or with the medieval idea of a fortress or castle.

Look about and observe whether this ideal has attained its upper limit; you will see what a job the family has ahead of it yet. Consider, too, that love in its finer sublimated sense is a modern growth. Likewise comradeship as an abiding, permanent, domestic ideal is just beginning to register itself. Real partnership as a dominating ideal is scarcely farther along.

5. *The Ethnological Approach*[1]

The study of the family as a social institution may be approached from several points of view, namely, the sociological, the psychological, the historical, and the ethnological. Each method makes a certain contribution to the study of this basic institution in society. In this discussion the ethnological approach will be considered.

In brief, ethnology may be considered a comparative study of peoples in their physical, psychical, and cultural aspects. By common consent, as it were, this study has been limited to the groups which are on a low cultural level. To these groups it is, then, that we turn for our data in this approach to the problem.

This method makes possible a scientific study wherein a disinterested examination of the facts is a prime necessity. There are fewer prejudices

[1] Adapted from SMITH, WILLIAM C., The Ethnological Approach to the Family, *Jour. Applied Sociology*, vol. 8, pp. 102–107, November, 1923.

in studying the primitive family because it is not so close to us and we do not have our emotions touched so easily. This is more akin to a study of the family life of the chimpanzee or the ostrich.

It is practically impossible for a man to take a scientific attitude toward his grandmother, sweetheart, or mother-in-law. To expect a native Californian to take an impersonal, objective attitude toward the Japanese, or a typical Southerner to react toward the Negro in this manner would be placing one's credulity to an unduly severe test. But either one could prepare a treatise on the Dyak, the Hottentot, the Garo, the Lushai, the Mikir, or the Karen without any strong emotional coloring, because they are so far removed. Prior to 1860 there was practically no literature dealing with the family which was of any value; it was largely of a hortatory nature. In 1861 Bachofen's notable book, "Das Mutterrecht," appeared, in 1865 McLennan's "Primitive Marriage," and in 1878 Morgan's "Ancient Society," as well as a number of other books in this same field. These works dealt with primitive groups. The materials for Morgan's treatise were drawn largely from American Indians who were heathen outside the pale and so there was no feeling about studying them. The likelihood is that if Morgan had endeavored to make a similar study of the Mayflower descendants in Boston the situation would have been a quite different one. It was found to be a safe procedure, however, to study the Indians and other backward groups and this stimulated other students.

Ethnological data reach farther back into antiquity than the written records of history. Historical records, as a matter of fact, give us information about times when the scale of civilization was already comparatively high—but scarcely anything more than that. Since record keeping is a relatively recent development in social evolution, historical data, consequently, leave us in the dark in regard to the origin and early development of social institutions. With this the sociologist cannot be satisfied, and so he turns to the ethnologist for a considerable fund of information which the historian cannot provide. Many of these facts are secured from our contemporary ancestors, the various backward tribes of the present day.

The ethnological approach makes possible a genetic study. This makes it possible to see how the institution has developed from simple beginnings. Such a procedure is an indispensable prerequisite to an adequate understanding of any institution. We cannot plunge into the middle of a complex situation and comprehend it in all its ramifications. The zoologist does not begin by placing a cross-section of a giraffe's neck under the microscope but turns to the simple unicellular amoeba from which he gradually works up. The psychologist likewise turns to the child and even to the white rat for data which he is unable to secure from a study of the behavior of adults, but which he needs in order

to fathom the mental processes of the human adult. In like manner it is impossible to deal with many problems which vitally touch the modern family without taking the genetic developmental point of view. To illustrate we may take as a concrete case the matter of prostitution. Many take the position that this practice is perfectly natural and cannot possibly be eliminated. A study of groups on the lower cultural levels leads us to the generalization that this practice is inversely proportional to the civilizational level of the group. "It does not seem, however," notes Westermarck, "that prostitution is common among unadulterated savages. In some cases it is expressly said to be due to contact with foreigners." There are many instances where contacts with groups on higher cultural levels have resulted in social and moral disorganization of the backward groups. Further scrutiny of these groups brings to light the conditions under which such practices are absent. We find that marriage takes place at an early age. It is not postponed on account of economic conditions as in the case of civilized men. Furthermore, all persons marry, even though it may mean polygyny or polyandry. "There are only two men in Bontoc," writes Jenks, "who have never married . . . , and both are deaf and dumb." According to the *mores* of these groups marriage is expected. "One man," notes Brown, "was mentioned to me as being a bad man because he refused to take a wife after he had reached the age when it was considered proper for a man to marry." The industrial life in these areas is simple and all are supplied, in a rough way, with the necessities of life. There are no department stores or factories where girls work at wages so inadequate that many are practically forced to supplement their income in questionable ways. Young women in simple groups do not have to exert themselves unduly and even sell their virtue in order to provide finery, because the men wear the ornaments and do the painting. This practice is more in accord with what we find in nature; among the birds the males wear the fine feathers.

Wherever we may turn, we find that it is impossible to gain an intelligent comprehension of many practices and problems without a consideration of origins. A genetic study is the best preparation for an adequate appreciation of conditions as they are. A knowledge of how certain practices came to be and why they have continued is the first step toward constructing a satisfactory theory of what should be and of what may be developed. Any reform measure based on such a foundation is destined to be more efficient than one which rests on mere speculation.

A genetic study will reveal that the family is not unchangeable like the law of the Medes and Persians, but rather that it has gradually developed into its present form through the lapse of ages. The popular idea seems to be that the present form of the patriarchal family has been handed down from heaven in a sealed package from which there has been

and should be no variation. Such a study will give us an idea of what has taken place, of the progress that has been made.

Certain persons, when they consider the large amount of divorce and family disorganization of the present day, declare in no uncertain terms that the institution of the family is going to the scrap heap and that there is absolutely no hope for it.

A study of this nature tends to make us optimistic. It will show that the family has persisted through all sorts of conditions. The family has made changes and even now we may confidently face the future with the assurance that changes will come which will carry us beyond the present conditions. A careful consideration will, however, make it evident that things move slowly, and that any change in this fundamental institution must come at a snail's pace. We must make haste slowly to produce any results of lasting value. Blue-sky laws forced through on a wave of sentiment will not meet the situation. A genetic study gives us an idea of the unvarnished original nature at the base of our domestic institutions, without the paint, powder, and conventions of the present day. With this foundation laid bare before us, we can more safely develop rational programs for the future.

There are, however, certain disadvantages inherent in the ethnological method of studying the family. Much of the data is unsatisfactory. A great deal of the information we have has been furnished by travelers who have had a mere passing acquaintance with the people described. Many of these writers have not been trained observers and as a result their reports are deeply colored by their opinions and prejudices. The sources of error which enter into the literature in this field have been quite adequately set forth by Professor Faris.

In dealing with the great mass of information in this field it is particularly easy for the person with a preconceived notion to select facts which bolster up his position and disregard the cases which do not fit. This accusation has been brought against Westermarck's "History of Human Marriage," which is the outstanding treatise with the ethnological approach. But on the other hand, where it is possible in this manner to construct a position easily, it is also true that by a less friendly use of the same materials the theory may be confuted. Ethnological data have their defects, but even in historical records we find weaknesses. Should we make an historical study of the legal aspects of marriage and collect all the laws that have been placed on the books, we would not necessarily have a true record of the situation, because a number of the statutes did not represent the prevailing opinion and became dead letters. In addition to these unsatisfactory materials, however, we now have some excellent monographs which have been prepared by careful students. Notable in this group are such studies as those of Rivers and of Spencer and Gillen. The serious objection to these studies is that they were

made several centuries too late, after these groups have changed too much. Yet in spite of certain serious weaknesses, the ethnological method can make a great contribution to a better understanding of the modern family.

6. *The Family as an Economic Unit*[1]

The two most important contributions to sociology which were achieved by the use of the budget as a tool for analysis were made by Frederic LePlay and Ernst Engel. LePlay made the family the unit for his system of sociological study and the budget the primary or starting place in his study of the family. He said at one time, "All the acts which constitute the life of a workingman's family result more or less directly in an income or an outlay." He stated further that the scientist who makes a complete analysis of the factors affecting the income and expense of a family possessed a complete knowledge of that family. By the use of this method of analysis, LePlay and his followers gave a logical classification of societies according to their types of family organization and were able to explain the process which made one society "patriarchal" and another "particularist." The further ramifications of the studies explained the transition of some societies from one type to the other, and the additional social characteristics which were associated with and were inevitably the product of the family type or of the same forces creating the family type. These associated social factors included such things as the type of government, size and type of social organization, and the *esprit de corps* and initiative of the whole society. The important difference between the particularist and the patriarchal types of families was in form of social organization. In the one, the family considered the child as the ultimate purpose, and in the other, the children were trained to consider the family and its destiny as their final and most important object in life. While we may not agree with all that LePlay said and did, we must recognize that he was able to make valuable use of the budget as a tool for analyzing societies. I believe that a modified version of LePlay's method will make valuable contributions in the field of rural sociology. It may enable us to measure and understand some changes in family and social organization which seem to be correlated with the urbanization of a population.

The next important contribution to sociology by the use of budgetary studies was that of Ernst Engel. He took some of the original data of LePlay, some from the studies of Ducpetiaux, and additional material from the Belgian studies of 1886 and 1891 and by a proper statistical analysis was able to picture the configurations of the wage-earners'

[1] Adapted from ZIMMERMAN, CARLE C., The Family Budget as a Tool for Sociological Analysis, *Am. Jour. Sociology*, vol. 33, pp. 903–907, May, 1928.

budget with a rise in the social scale. He stated his law in two forms, the first of which is now largely neglected, although it is really the more important for sociology. The first form was that the importance of food in the budget was the best single index of the social position of the laborer. The second form was that an increase in income was associated with declining proportions of the budget spent for food, about the same proportions spent for clothing, rent, fuel and light, and an increasing proportion for education, health, recreation, and amusement. Since Engel's time students have busied themselves primarily with the second statement of his law, and have in some cases and for some classes found that the proportions to different budgets are different for different social groups. An illustration is the study by the Federal Reserve Bank of all its employees who drew salaries of less than $5,000 in 1919. An increase of income was associated with the same proportions spent for food. However, to this time no one has abrogated the real principles of Engel's law as first implied—a rise in social scale among wage earners is associated with a diminishing perspective of the physiological needs and an increasing perspective of non-physiological needs. Furthermore, this principle has now been found to apply to the farm laborer or rural wage earner and to the salaried classes in cities. The Minnesota studies have found that this physiological and non-physiological type of budgetary competition, while it exists, is not the primary competition in the budgets of Minnesota farm families.

If a careful analysis is made of the significance of the sociological phase of Engel's law or laws, it may be recognized as an important addition to sociology. We are now talking about "social mobility" and its effect upon the individual. From the standpoint of vertical social mobility up the economic scale, this sociological statement of Engel's law enables us to understand some of the things that happen to the individual. His income increases, the perspective of physiological needs diminishes in mental space, and a greater proportion of the sum total of the behavior is about the so-called "non-physiological" desires. Non-physiological behavior is more subject to variation than the other. This is shown by the smallness of correlation coefficients which are always found when we try to find the factors which determine this behavior.

Some of the mental strain of mobile and of urban populations is explainable by this statement of the findings of Engel and of the differences in budgetary behavior of farm and urban peoples. This statement does not deny the effects of selection and of other factors. A rise in the social scale increases the amount of choice which an individual must make, and this choice involves mental strain. Persons who are not social climbers or social fallers get adjusted to certain standards of living and their habitual modes of life solve the matter of choice for them. Furthermore, the urbanization of a population changes its budgetary behavior

from that about "land" to numerous situations which involve choice to a greater degree.

The failure of sociologists to express much interest in social analysis by use of budgetary concepts since the days of LePlay and Engel has caused us to lose much of this interpretation. Furthermore, a failure to use the budgetary concept for analysis of farm and urban and different social strata will handicap us in our attempts to understand society.

7. *Another Point of View*[1]

The American home, the cornerstone of civilization and religion, is threatened. The perils that menace the home threaten the nation. The strength of a nation, especially a democracy such as ours, is in the intelligent and well-ordered homes of the people. The home is the best security for civilization. In the homes of America are born and trained the children of America. From them go out into our national life American men and women. They go out with the stamp of home life upon them. Only as our homes are what they should be, can we expect the right type of citizens.

What are some of the present-day factors that tend to break home ties and to destroy the home, the cradle of our religion, and our civilization?

The home is in peril because many women of the middle and upper classes of our country are shirking the duty of motherhood. An American society woman went to Europe with her husband, who was seeking to regain his health. With great difficulty she was persuaded to leave her two pet dogs behind her, and to give her undivided attention to her husband. On arriving in Paris she found a message awaiting her, conveying the awful tidings that one of her precious puppies was dead. She left her husband to the tender mercies of a French nurse and fled back to New York to be reunited with her precious dog. What a meeting that must have been! And what a meeting afterward when she joined in Paris her dying husband, this time in the company of her never-to-be-separated poodle!

Doctor G. Stanley Hall says, "Good parenthood, in all that noble term involves, is the supreme end of man." The family does not exist for selfish ease. It is an ordained means for the progress of the race. American men and women must accept the sacrament of parenthood and raise a family for the kingdom of God. A childless home is either a great misfortune or a great crime. The Protestants of America have families of less than three children. The Catholics have more than four to a family. When the cradles of American Protestants are empty, and the cradles of the Catholics are full, we can expect only one result in the future. A prominent Catholic said, "If we can keep the Protestants

[1] Adapted from WYRICK, HERBERT MCNULTIE, The Preservation of the American Home. *Homiletic Rev.*, vol. 95, pp. 479–481, May, 1928.

asleep a few years longer, America is ours." It has been predicted that if the Protestant people of America, because of love of ease and the loss of the sacrificial spirit, refuse to bear children, in three more generations the Eastern half of the United States will be negligibly Anglo-Saxon and Protestant and largely Catholic and of foreign stock.

Many women today permit the claims of society to destroy their home life. The Bible gives us a picture of the society woman in the person of Lot's wife. When God called Lot to leave Sodom because of the wickedness of the city, he was willing to go, but his wife wanted to remain. Sodom's gay nights, its dances, its laughter, and its entertainments appealed to her society-loving nature. In her unwillingness to depart, she looked back and became a pillar of salt. A pillar of salt is the correct symbol of many a society woman of today. All the sweet blood of many a noble woman's heart has become brackish by the self-centered social life she lives. The fascination and the glow of social life seems to capture the imagination of women as it does not of men. Too many American women regard society as the be-all and the end-all of existence. How true is the Scripture which says, "She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth"—dead to all the higher interests of life, to the cries of needy humanity, to the claims of Christ and of the Church, to the happiness of her own home!

Let us restore the homes of America to their pristine glory and moral power. Let us establish them on a Christian foundation. Let Christian ideals pervade them. Let a Christian atmosphere fill them. Let the spirit of Christ find expression in the lives of those who compose the family circle. Then the home will be rescued from the perils that threaten it, and our great democratic and Christian civilization will be safe for the future.

SUGGESTED READINGS

1. FLÜGEL, J. C.: "The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family," 1921.
2. HOWARD, G. E.: "History of Matrimonial Institutions," 1904.
3. JENNINGS, H. S.: "The Biological Basis of Human Nature," 1930. Chap. XI, The Biological Basis of Marriage and the Family.

Chapter IV

THE HISTORY OF THE FAMILY

In its lowest terms and barest elements, the family is a mother-child relationship. Its essential function is the care and rearing of children. As a natural biological unit it is an outgrowth of the helplessness of the young, and it normally lasts through the period of infancy and childhood. The family in this sense is universal among human beings and exists in every animal species where the young are born immature and require attention in order to survive. It is found in well-defined forms quite far down in the organic scale, and among the birds and mammalian forms it is universal. It differs somewhat in character and duration from one species to another but in every case it performs the same essential function. In every case the type of family developed is obviously adequate to insure the survival of the species.

Very often there is a more or less permanent association of the parents and the family appears to consist of the father, mother, and children. This is also sometimes found among the animals rather far down in the evolutionary scale. It is, however, not the usual thing among the higher animals and does not prevail among the forms most nearly related to man. The male is not an essential part of the family group and very frequently has not been so considered. The relation of the parents is chiefly a matter of sex and marriage which are not a necessary part of family life. The two things, sex association and the care of children, are distinct and independent values. The fact that they are commonly associated in the present customs of Western peoples should not mislead the student to infer that they of necessity or always go together.

The natural family exists among all peoples and in all times. It performs a work that must be done if mankind is to survive beyond the living generation. Among human beings the mother and child are always members of a larger group. In addition to the animal type of family unit, every human group has developed a system of social practices and taboos concerning women and children. These practices and social rules, together with a justifying body of rationalization and idealization and the structural machinery for enforcement and perpetuation, constitute the family institution. Some institutional complex always grows up and comes to regulate the performance of the biological function.

The care and rearing of children does not require a specific type of institutional organization and, in its development from the mother-

child type, the family has assumed numerous forms. These are to be understood as in some part accidental in origin. In a given set of circumstances any one of several forms may serve the needs equally well. The one that comes to prevail may do so through some accident of historic circumstance rather than because of any inherent superiority. In other cases the characteristic form may be a very definite and close adjustment to the environmental circumstances. The patriarchal organization, for example, was quite obviously, in its origin, an accommodation to a definite type of economic and social order that gave great power and exaggerated importance to fighting men. The single-type American family organization is a form obviously well adapted to the pioneer conditions under which it flourished.

It is necessary to guard against the spontaneous tendency of the common mind to evaluate in terms of the known. The naïve person tends to accept the familiar as the normal and to build an hierarchy of divergent forms in terms of approximation to the familiar. But no one form of the institutional family may be said to be more normal or natural than any other, and no one form in itself may be said to be superior to others. Each is a product and a part of the total social situation in which it was produced and could not have been other than what it was. It is of course possible to evaluate the different forms, but any such evaluation must be in terms of the given culture complex. One form may function in its complex better or not so well as another form functions in its supporting complex. But it is not permissible to evaluate one form in terms of another taken as a norm.

The fundamental family needs and activities of men are everywhere much the same. The behavior of the New York clubman, the European peasant, the Australian Bushman, and the American farmer is curiously uniform. Similar needs find similar satisfactions. In their several ways peoples seek to satisfy the same human longings and arrive at institutional arrangements that are basically alike. But the external conditions of life in different times and places are sharply different and, in its outer aspects, in its form and organization, the family differs with time and place. In the long run the outward form and structure become more or less well adapted to the conditions in which the group finds itself. In a given situation the behavior patterns and institutional norms are roughly uniform; the activities assume a common form or pattern. They become customary, conventional, traditional, and ultimately idealized.

Each group is so emotionally predisposed toward its own familiar patterns and practices as to be in general unable to appreciate others that may serve the needs better or equally well. Moreover, the external aspects and patterns become interwoven in such close and intricate ways with the economic, political, religious, and other phases of the social structure that any change in family forms involves reciprocal changes all

through the social order. Because of this sentimental preference for the familiar and traditional and the inertia consequent upon the structural form and interrelations, a given arrangement may persist long beyond its period of usefulness. In the present-day world, for example, the single-family pioneer type persists in the presence of a rapid urbanization and industrialization of the population. That the form is not perfectly adapted to the new conditions is evidenced by its very general disorganization and frequent failure.

The relation of the institutional form of the family to the other aspects of the culture complex is made clear in the readings which follow. The first by Mr. Tylor contains a statement of his theory of the relation of exogamy and the maternal family system. It presents the matriarchal system as a definite and ordered product of social conditions, shows its advantages and disadvantages, and the factors in its breakdown and replacement. Mr. Sumner's paper is, in a sense, a continuation of the preceding one. He looks upon the paternal family as a later form and as a development from the maternal form and is disposed to treat the transition as the greatest single event in the history of civilization. A chief value of the statement lies in the effort to see the form of the family and the position of women as inevitable products of the working of natural factors, as necessary adjustments to more or less impersonal forces.

1. *The Matriarchal Family System*[1]

The recollections of the older among us go back to a generation before there was any serious disturbance of the belief that the primitive family life of mankind was of patriarchal type. In its simplest form, the family was held to have consisted of the father with his wife or wives, and their children living under his control and bound together by common descent from him; this small group expanding in successive generations into larger groups, when the younger families remained under the headship of the eldest ancestor, unless and until they separated from the parent stock and set up independent households. A social framework of this kind was indeed the only one which fitted into general ancient and modern history. Its liveliest pictures were drawn from the traditions of ancient manners in the Bible, whence we have the word "patriarch," the Greek designation of the heads of the twelve tribes of Israel in I Chron. 27:22. So far as society in the great ancient nations of the East and West was known, it was laid out more or less rigidly on such lines, and though modern European life did not conform to the stringency of paternal power belonging to old Roman law, it plainly bore the impress of the ancient order in the position of the male line as to authority, descent, succession, and inheritance.

[1] Adapted from TYLOR, EDWARD B., The Matriarchal Family System, *Nineteenth Century*, vol. 40, pp. 81–96, July, 1896.

It gave the scholarly world a shock when thirty years ago the Scotch advocate, John Ferguson McLennan, published in his book on "Primitive Marriage" a theory intended to upset the received patriarchal views, which had just been set forth with especial force and strictness in Maine's "Ancient Law." McLennan brought forward a collection of evidence as to ancient and modern peoples accustomed to trace their descent not on the father's but the mother's side. This custom he argues to be a relic of the primitive state of the human race, when as yet there was no fixed marriage, so that paternity was not recognized as a social tie, but maternity furnished the only relation on which kinship could be founded and the family held together. This work brought into notice an earlier treatise on Mother-right, the Swiss jurist Bachofen's "Mutterrecht," in which a similar doctrine had been propounded. The theory of primitive matrimonial anarchy thus set in circulation was in after years supported with much learning and ability, the evidence adduced in its proof being on the one hand the accounts of matrimonial lawlessness in the lower and even the higher grades of civilization, and on the other hand certain systems of relationships supposed to have originated in such an unregulated state of society. These doctrines gained so much acceptance that primaeval "promiscuity," a stage of development of human races when there was no such appropriation of women to particular men as constitutes civilized marriage, came to be considered almost as a fact established by anthropology. Since then, however, a reaction has set in before which the theory is likely to be transformed, or to pass away altogether. The arguments which have brought about this result are that uncultured man, whose present organization of family and tribe scarcely avails under favorable circumstances to keep up their numbers, was unlikely in past ages to have existed and increased in a still less organized state; that men so fierce and jealous as savages could hardly have multiplied in a social condition which nowadays would break up in a flight or murder; and, finally, that a confused use of terms for relationships is no proof of the relationships themselves being ignored. I do not propose to expatiate on this subject, as to which I have little to add to what has been written by Maine, Darwin, Westermarck, Letourneau, and Starcke. My concern is with the history and meaning of the great ancient maternal system, which McLennan in his argument on primitive marriage first brought into prominent notice through its characteristic practice of reckoning descent rather on the female than the male side. It is not surprising that he should have looked upon this rule as the very principle of the maternal system.

Before entering on the causes which have brought about the rule of female descent, an exacter statement is needed, lest this rule should be supposed to imply that there are any tribes known in the world who take no note of kinship except on the mother's side. As we have just seen,

the human race is by some conjectured to have existed at first in this state of pristine ignorance, before they reasoned out the fact that they were related to their fathers as well as to their mothers. To this theory of a legist, a zoologist would probably reply that mutual recognition and kindness between the male and female parents and their offspring appear too far down in the animal world for rudimentary ideas of paternity to be accounted a human discovery. As for peoples within the range of our knowledge, not only are ideas of parentage much the same all the world over, but, so far as can be ascertained, all languages have words denoting kinsfolk both in the male and female lines, which implies that kinship in both lines is taken account of. When necessary, savages define particularly, using such terms as "he whom I have begotten," "he whom I have borne," according as the father or mother is speaking. But the habit of mankind in ordinary talk is for both parents to use the same word, as with us both say "my son," "my daughter," or for both sexes "my child." The importance of this practice seems to have been overlooked from its obviousness, but it has much significance, showing as it does that father and mother recognize the relation between them and their children as so similar that they habitually use the same word for it. Thus the thought of physical kinship passes into what may be called social kinship, referring not to the physical tie, but to the position in the family . . . So far as appears, the family systems of the world not only recognize both male and female kinship, but with this recognition comes that of family rights and duties. Thus the family system, which the late eminent legal anthropologist, Dr. A. F. Post of Bremen, describes in his textbooks as "parental"—that is, combining the influences of both parents—belongs in its beginnings to early stages of culture, extending onward till it reaches its fullest development in modern civilized nations. All, then, that can be properly meant by saying that a patriarchal tribe follows male and matriarchal female kinship, is that their social arrangements, such as membership of the family and clan, succession, and inheritance, are framed on the one line rather than the other.

Which of these two systems may we reasonably consider as the earlier in history? The claim of the patriarchal system to have belonged to primitive human life has not merely long acceptance in its favor, but I venture to think that those who uphold it have the weight of evidence on their side, provided that they do not insist on its fully developed form having at first appeared, but are content to argue that already in the earliest ages the man took his wife to himself, and that the family was under his power and protection, the law of male descent and all that belongs to it gradually growing up afterward on this basis. The starting point of this doctrine belongs to zoology, in observation of the anthropomorphous species, certainly nearest to man in body and probably in mind. The few and hurried glimpses by hunters and naturalists of the

life of the higher manlike apes in the depths of the tropical forests are full of instruction. The full-grown male and female orangs and gorillas have been seen with young ones so far grown up as to indicate that their family life lasts beyond a single pairing season into a more stable union. The male orang-utan passes the night in the fork of a tree hard by the commodious nest lined with dry leaves, occupied by his mate and their young. This agrees with the wonderfully human account from the other side of the world of the old male gorilla seen sleeping crouched against a great tree trunk, ready to defend from the leopards his wife and children in the nest. Such observations go far toward justifying an inference that already below the human level the rudiments of the paternal family system had instinctively shaped themselves. The value of such facts may be measured by the impression which they made on Darwin, leading him to declare as most probable that man aboriginally lived in small communities, each with a single wife, or if powerful with several, whom he jealously guarded against all other men. During the human period, so far as we know it, the social order shadowed forth in beast life has been carried on, enforced by reason and language, organized with the inheritance of developed culture, but holding still to the lines first traced by instinct for the rearing of offspring, where the nourishment and care of the young fall especially to the mother, and protection especially to the father. However the human race may be classified in stages of culture, whether from the lower to the higher Stone Age, and thence on to the Bronze and Iron ages, or from savage life supported by wild fruit or game to agricultural and pastoral prosperity, or from the condition of the roaming family to that of the settled nation, the paternal system is to be found in strong if not exclusive prevalence. Indeed, among the lowest nomad bands of savages of the desert or the forest, no known social bond but that of rough paternal grouping, such as actually appears, would seem even possible. From these lowest levels and far on in culture, we meet with pictures of the fighting tribes whose habit and glory is to carry off wives in combat with their enemies around, and there are peoples among whom, at peace and at home, it is usual for the strong man to take by main force the wife of his weaker neighbor. By the civilized mind such practices are held as proof of social rudeness and antiquity. From the present point of view their interest lies in the obvious fact that they work into the paternal system, and no other. To the theory of primordial men a little lower than the apes, men among whom the father was of so little consequence that it did not matter who he might be, what sharper contrast could be seen than the actual savage bringing home wives at the risk of his own life, and holding them with spear and club against all rivals? Among the great ancient and modern nations within the range of history, the paternal system becomes so dominant as to be taken for granted, and the existence of any other rule seems extraordinary. As

Herodotus thought of the female descent among the Lykians, that in this they agreed with none other among mankind, so Montesquieu remarks that it is almost everywhere received that the wife passes into the family of her husband, and mentions as exceptional that in Formosa the husband goes to the wife's. The system we modern English live under, far as it is from allowing the ancient extreme power of males, yet carries the stamp of male descent and authority. Thus modern civilization nowhere disowns the type of paternal society, but brings down to our time the record of continuity, which goes back through law and religion into the region of instinct conducing to the maintenance of the species. I touch these points in order to range our ideas. So familiar to us are patriarchal family institutions, that they need only be referred to as belonging to common knowledge. From their well-known features, their principle of formation is seen to be due to the relative positions of the parents. The father, as defender and leader, has control over the family formed of the wife he has taken and their children, so that descent from him tends to become the main tie of kinship, and inheritance of his property and succession to his authority is guided along the male line.

In examining the rival family system known as the "matriarchal" or "maternal," far more particular description is needed, being as it is neither sufficiently known nor understood. Let us notice first that if patriarchal society were defined merely as a system of kinship on the father's side, such a definition must be set aside as hopelessly defective and misleading. Yet through lack of full knowledge, the matriarchal system has been thus treated. Europeans, who in such countries as West Africa have met with the law of inheritance through the mother, have explained it offhand by remarks on matrimonial laxity and the convenience of following "the safer side." The facts available to McLennan left him little choice but to adopt this current error. The most essential part of the present argument is to make it clear that the matriarchal system is one framed for order, not disorder. For this purpose descriptions will now be given of some of its most complete types which have lasted on into modern times.

Malay life, notwithstanding centuries of Hindu and Moslem influence, has kept much of the maternal system once generally prevalent. In an ancient form this has notably lasted on in the Padang Highlands of Sumatra, of which a Dutch controller, Verkerk-Pistorius, has published a lively description. There the traveler, following the narrow muddy paths among dense tropical vegetation, comes on villages of long timber houses almost hidden among the foliage. Built on posts, adorned with carved and colored woodwork, and heavily thatched, these houses duplicate themselves into barrack-like rows of dwellings occupied, it may be, by over a hundred people, forming a *sa-mandei* or motherhood, consisting of the old housemother and her descendants in the female line, sons and

daughters, daughters' children, and so on. If the visitor, mounting the ladder steps, looks in at one of the doors of the separate dwellings, he may see seated beyond the family hearth the mother and her children eating the midday meal, and very likely the father, who may have been doing a turn of work in his wife's rice plot. If he is a kindly husband, he is much there as a friendly visitor, though his real home remains in the house where he was born. To the European the social situation wears a comic aspect, as when the Dutch controller describes the *chassez-croisez* which takes place at dusk when the husbands walk across the village from their own homes to join their wives and families. The man's brothers and sisters and sisters' children are the heirs to whom, not to his own children, his property will go when he dies. The mother's elder brother is guardian of her children, and the brother of the eldest grandmother is the *mamak*, ruler of the whole family settlement. The larger group, consisting of a number of such families, is the *suku* or clan which is held together likewise by descent on the mother's side, and by the rule of exogamy acting as a bar to marriage between men and women of the same clan. This Malay account may be supplemented by the Jesuit missionary DeMailla's description of maternal marriage in the island of Formosa. This is the source of Montesquieu's remark in the *Esprit des Lois*, and I may add that, if it had received the notice it deserves, it might long ago have placed the study of maternal institutions on a sounder basis. The Formosan youth desiring to marry makes music day by day at the maid's door, till, if willing, she comes out to him, and when they are agreed, the parents are told, and the marriage feast is prepared in the bride's house, whence the bridegroom returns no more to his father, regarding his father-in-law's house as his own, and himself the support of it, while his own father's house is no more to him than in Europe the bride's home is henceforth to her when she quits it to live with her husband. Thus the Formosans set no store on sons, but aspire to have daughters who procure them sons-in-law to become the support of their old age. The hill tribes of Formosa are head-hunting Malays, and though their maternal family system is now dying out, the old Malay law forbidding intermarriage within the clan remains in force.

My own personal knowledge of the maternal community belongs to one of the most picturesque experiences of my life, on a visit made in 1884, under the auspices of the American Bureau of Ethnology, to the Pueblo Indian district on the Californian border. On the high barren plains of soil, below the steep cliffs of the mesas or plateaus, or on this higher ground itself, in places of vantage may be seen in this region the pueblos (*pueblo* is the Spanish word for town; Latin *populus*), where the agricultural tribes fortified themselves against the attacks of the fierce Navajos and Apaches. Built of adobes or mud bricks, reminding the traveler of the villages of the Sahara, a pueblo such as that of Zuni rises

stage above stage, presenting a dreary aspect of mud terraces, and ladders leading up and down to give access to the half-lighted rooms inhabited by families. In the living and cooking room, round the wood fire, the inmates might be seen sitting assembled in the evening, fathers, mothers, and children, so that one might suppose oneself visiting a huge lodging house of the European sort, till one understood the relationships. Enquiry would show that while in a family dwelling the mothers are related together in the female line, and therefore, of course, belong to the same clan, and their children after them, the fathers are not bound together by such ties, and need not be of the same clan, only they must not be of the same clan as the wives. Though the husband takes up his abode in the wife's family dwelling, during her life and his good behavior, he belongs still to his own family, perhaps three terraces off, up two rude pole ladders, and down a trapdoor. How much milder and kindlier the conditions of these people are than what we associate with the name of savages may be well judged from the idyllic record of life among them by Mr. Cushing, in the *Century Magazine* of 1883. He describes how the Zuni girl, when she takes a fancy for a young man, conveys a present of the thin hewe bread to him as a token, and becomes his affianced, or, as they say, "his to be"—how he sews clothes and moccasins for her, and combs her hair out on the terrace in the sun. When all is settled, with the beginning of his residence with her his married life begins. "With the woman rests the security of the marriage ties; and, it must be said, in her high honor, that she rarely abuses the privilege; that is, never sends her husband 'to the home of his fathers,' unless he richly deserves it. Much is said of the inferior position of women among Indians. With all advanced tribes, as with the Zunis, the woman not only controls the situation, but her serfdom is customary, self-imposed, and willing absolutely. To her belong, also, all the children; and descent, including inheritance, is on her side."

Although examples of the maternal family are few in number in modern times, perhaps not exceeding twenty peoples, yet the important point has now been made out that they are to be found in all the great regions of the barbaric world. With and around them, moreover, are found twice or thrice as many imperfect systems, which appear from their fragments of maternal rules to belong to the period of transition into the new paternal stage. Meanwhile, the accounts already given of maternal family life are sufficient for beginning the search for its social causes.

It will be already evident that these describe an organized form of society, contrasting in its whole type with the patriarchal. The term "matriarchal" was an improvement on earlier definitions, but takes it too much for granted that the women govern the family. It is true that in these communities women enjoy greater consideration than in barbaric patriarchal life, but the actual power is rather in the hands of their broth-

ers and uncles on the mother's side. On the whole, the terms "maternal" and ' paternal" seem preferable. Some eight years ago, in working out a method of investigating customs statistically by ascertaining the frequency of their combination with other customs, so as to arrive at indications of their origin and purpose, I applied this method to the study of laws of marriage and descent. It then appeared that the cause of the maternal system was connected with the custom of the father's residence in the wife's family. I find this inference strengthened by passages showing that the Danish anthropologist, Dr. C. N. Starcke, had come to a similar opinion about the same time, and that Dr. Post admits the principle. While restating it as agreeing with the facts, I have now to seek the fundamental motive of the maternal family one stage deeper. The Padang and Kasia families show that the maternal system may exist without the husband's residence in the wife's house. He may be only a visitor, but the essential point is that the wife remains in her own family, the obvious consequence being that the husband cannot take the position which belongs to him in patriarchal life. If, then, we can ascertain why families keep the married daughters instead of letting the husbands take them away, we shall arrive at an ultimate cause of the maternal system.

For this purpose the Malay islands offer instructive examples. In this region the paternal system is now prevalent, under which the wife is purchased from her family and goes to her husband's house, where her children take family descent and property in the male line. But even where this paternal rule is general, the older maternal custom is kept up also, coming into force where circumstances furnish a sufficient cause. Thus the rule is usual that till the whole *jujur* or purchase money is paid, the husband is only (so to speak) maternally married, remaining in the house of his wife, to whom the children belong. In some islands the law is that foreigners are admitted only to this maternal marriage. Forbes describes the resulting combination in Sumatra, where the traveler may visit dwellings where one or more sons have brought home purchased wives, and their sisters have taken in husbands to live with them, so that paternal and maternal marriage, with their accompaniments of male and female descent, may be found peaceably together under one thatch. The maternal form of marriage known as *ambil-anak*, or "taking a child," especially comes in where a family ends in a daughter; a young man is taken in as a husband, and the property goes down for a generation in the female line, after which the family returns to the paternal system.

Here the examination of maternal marriage has suddenly brought us into contact with a habit or law which appears again and again across the globe in countries whose social systems are as different as can be from the maternal type. It may be called the custom of the heiress-husband. The Japanese marries ordinarily on a patriarchal footing, but the reverse

system is recognized when the *iri muko*, or incoming husband, marries the daughter of the house to which he succeeds in the wife's name. But his place seems not an honored one, to judge from a proverb quoted by Daigoro Goh, in a paper read before the Japan Society, "If you possess one *go* of rice, do not become an incoming husband." It is enough to mention three of the well-known European examples. In the south of France, the inferiority of the heiress-husband is pointedly marked by Cordier's comparing him to a Malay maternal husband. In Germany he has a recognized name, *erbtochtermann*, from which I take the term "heiress-husband." Lastly, let us notice what happens among ourselves when the husband of an heiress goes to live in her house and takes her surname, the children in fact deriving both name and property from the mother. Here, notwithstanding that the husband's position is assured by the law of the land, the maternal family system otherwise holds, though veiled by paternal forms, and its mysterious strangeness as a remote barbaric institution fades away when it is seen to be brought about by practical reasons in modern civilization.

It thus appears that various social reasons may lead to maternal rather than paternal family life. But such as have been mentioned, though intelligible, are too narrow to account for the presence of the maternal system, complete or partial, among almost half the known peoples of the lower culture. We are led to look for some world-wide influence at work in periods early in time and civilization, though probably far removed from the primitive state of mankind. Now it has been seen that the maternal Malay, Indian, and American tribes described have the custom of exogamy, by which a people is divided into intermarrying classes or clans, no man or woman being permitted to marry within his or her own. It at once suggests itself that the maternal system and the exogamy thus associated with it are in some way connected by causation, and this expectation is confirmed by the fact that the same combination is certainly or probably general among the other fully maternal systems mentioned. Moreover, it prevails in a majority of the peoples, some sixty in number, among whom the maternal rules partly remain.

Thus statistical argument tends forcibly to connect the maternal system with exogamy. While maternal peoples are exogamous, exogamous peoples are not necessarily maternal, but may be either maternal or paternal, clanship being reckoned on the mother's or father's side accordingly. In order to ascertain the meaning of these facts, it will be well to enter briefly into the nature and origin of exogamy or marrying-out, which was shown by McLennan, the pioneer of the whole problem of primitive marriage, and to whom, indeed, exogamy owes its name, to be one of the great institutions of the ancient world.

Exogamy may be defined in general terms as a custom of classing a people into two or more divisions, usually by real or supposed kinship,

either male or female, marriage within the division being forbidden. The simplest arrangement is that of Melanesia, where there are but two intermarrying divisions, each reckoned to be descended from one mother. More often there are a number of clans, which may be subdivisions of two original clans, and the prohibition of marriage may be within the single clan or the clan-group. To this arrangement are apt to belong the so-called "totems," which are names of animals, plants, etc., connected with religion and serving to indicate descent and clanship. Thus among the Wyandots there are recorded two groups of clans whose totems in the female line are (1) Wolf, Bear, Beaver, Turtle; (2) Deer, Snake, Porcupine, Hawk. Without more detailed description, it is clear on the face of the matter that such exogamic rules are not contrived to prevent marriage between kinsfolk, inasmuch as they only take account of one line of descent, prohibiting the remotest unions on the mother's side, while allowing the nearest on the father's, or *vice versa*. Indeed exogamy has to be worked in combination with a law of incest; thus in Melanesia the children of a brother and a sister, being of different classes, might marry so far as the rule of exogamy is concerned, but custom forbids such a marriage. Evidence that the reason of exogamy is not moral but political has been collected by me in the paper already referred to. The explanation there put forward, that the purpose of systematic intermarriage between clans is to bind them together in peace and alliance, is a theory which has the merit of not being ingenious, being simply drawn from what is said by natives who live under exogamic rule, and by foreigners who have observed its results. Thus in the Iroquois league it acted, in the words of L. H. Morgan, "to break up the spirit of perpetual warfare which had wasted the red race from age to age"; and Munzinger depicts the Bogos of Abyssinia as closely bound together by reciprocal marriages, "so that internal war is almost impossible." To this evidence I will only add here that of the Rev. W. Yate, a missionary among the Maoris who was troubled by their incessant destructive wars. Their habit was to marry within the family circle, but he encouraged them to marry their sons and daughters in different and even hostile tribes, with the result that from enemies they became friends. There is something suggestively prehistoric in this story of a Wesleyan missionary teaching exogamy to the New Zealanders. The theory which it illustrates has not received general acceptance among anthropologists, but is advocated by two most thoroughly versed in barbaric law. Professor Kohler, laying stress on the influence of exogamy in promoting brotherly relations, accounts thus for the tendency of peoples at a certain stage of culture to become exogamic, and the late Dr. A. H. Post comments on it to similar effect as a means of protection against blood feud and war. Modern culture has outgrown and almost forgotten exogamy, but doubtless there was a time in the peopling of the globe when small half-settled

hordes, threatened with extinction by intertribal war, found in such compulsory intermarriage their most effective protection, and the means of consolidation into coherent nations. Such social results, even if not representing the complete reason of exogamy, have at any rate contributed to its prevalence, which again must have promoted the maternal system, as may be seen from the following considerations.

While mankind live in small unsettled hordes, keeping to themselves and unfriendly to their neighbors, they tend to marry within their own borders, in a close community which the mutual removal of wives from one household to another hardly disturbs. When, however, population becomes more dense and fixed, and families and clans have more defined property and interests, the manner in which intermarriage takes place, especially that made compulsory by the rule of exogamy, raises most serious questions. There are two alternatives: either for the wife to remain in her own home, or to be taken by her husband to his home; according to which of these customs prevails, the family will be prone to become maternal or paternal. Let us now consider the first or maternal case. Here there is no loss to the wife's family, who retain her and her children, gaining at the same time help and defence from the husband. Thus the tendency of exogamous peoples to be framed on maternal lines is practically dictated by self-interest, and works easily from being absolutely just between families, a merit which even savages can well appreciate. There is no proof that at any period the maternal system held exclusive possession of the human race, but the strength with which it kept its ground may be measured by its having encompassed the globe in space, and lasted on from remote antiquity in time.

Against the advantages of the maternal system, however, two evident disadvantages must have told heavily from the first, under the stress of which it has long declined, and soon must disappear. The instinctive attraction which shapes the paternal family among the higher mammalia continually reasserts itself, while the maternal husband emancipates himself from his inferior position whenever the social pressure is removed, and he can become a paternal husband. Among the matriarchal Pueblo Indians, the Hon. J. W. Powell has given me an account how parties leave the villages and go forth to camp on distant spots where some small stream makes the arid alkaline soil cultivable. The consequence is that the wives and children fall under the control of the husbands and fathers, and the first step is taken in the transformation from mother-right to father-right. The complete change is not unknown to modern history. It is probable that, like other Algonquin tribes, the Ojibwas in old times lived under the maternal system, though now, partly at least through white men's influence, they have come over to paternal institutions. I well remember falling in with a party of them on their way to a prayer meeting, and enquiring of a girl what was her totem, to which she

answered that she was a Beaver. "Then," I said, "your mother was a Beaver"; but her reply was, "No, it was my father." They all seemed as much surprised at being thought to count clanship on the mother's side as I was to find that the customs of their forefathers had become strange to them.

In the marriage systems of the barbaric world, when classified in a series, the evidence of this change gradually taking place appears in the various modes of overcoming the resistance of the family to being despoiled of their daughters. Elopement belongs to all grades of civilization. The capture of wives by robbery or in open war is as ancient, though it has not now the glory which belonged to it among the fierce warriors of the Pampas, whose highest virtue lay in slaying their enemies and carrying off their wives; or among the Homeric captors of Briseis and Chryseis, or the host of Sisera, gone forth to divide to every man a damsel or two. But far more effective than violence in converting family rule to the father's side was the introduction of friendly and equitable means of compensation. The obvious practice of exchange is often remarked on among the natives of Australia, where women of different families are exchanged as wives by their brothers. From Australia to Greenland the custom prevails of betrothing children in infancy, and there are even made, as in the Malay Islands, speculative contracts before the children are born. This widespread practice shows us families already intermarrying voluntarily for the benefit of alliance, as clans do compulsorily on a larger scale in full exogamy. Again, few customs strike the civilized modern reader as more quaint than the pretense of wife capture in wild countries, as where the Kalmuk bridegroom rides with his armed friends to tear the bride from her people, who meet the sham attack with a sham resistance, till she is carried off with shouts and firing of matchlocks; of course her price has been bargained for beforehand. That this fierce formality is a survival of real warlike capture is no doubt a true explanation so far as it goes, but it has a practical meaning besides. It does justice between weaker and stronger groups; for as soon as the rule is admitted that resistance is to be merely formal, the weaker gains the power of equitable retaliation. Next comes acquisition of the wife by service in her family. When this takes place, after the couple are man and wife it is, in fact, a reduction to moderate limits of the lifelong maternal service, as where in Darfur the husband stays a year or two in the wife's house, and they hardly let him go then. If the service comes before the marriage, as is common, for instance, in the Malay Islands, and familiar to us in the story of the patriarch Jacob, the transaction becomes simply one of payment in labor. If evidence is needed to show that we are here on the track of change from maternal to paternal, and not the contrary, it will be found in the fact that the man's residence in the woman's family may be for the rest of his life, or for any shorter period

down to the morrow of the wedding. But he habitually begins in his wife's house and ends in his own, whereas for the couple to set up in the husband's house and remove to the wife's is almost unknown. Last comes actual purchase for goods or money—a custom as much above low savagery as below high civilization—which improves on rougher methods by estimating the current value of personal attractions, and the pretensions of a rich and powerful family, for their daughter's hand. These different modes of matrimonial agreement, obviously concluded between the families rather than between individuals, do not, however, practically shut out personal inclination or aversion. It is found practically not easy to capture an unwilling damsel, whether it is a Tatar who gallops after her across the steppe, or a Kamchadal who has served his years faithfully, but failed to please after all.

It would be irrelevant to go further into the development of marriage laws, when they pass into new phases in advancing culture, though keeping up lingering survivals, which testify to their descent from the age-long transformation from maternal to paternal. Such are, it may seem, the ideas of close relationship with the mother's brother among the modern Arabs, the horse race at a Breton wedding where in old times there would have been a sham capture, or the gifts of medals as wedding souvenirs in France, which replace the mediaeval treizaine or thirteen coins, which again seem to come down from the Frankish marriage by the shilling and the penny (*per solidum et denarium*).

Further than this I must not go in the history of society. It is enough if I have given some reason to think that the two great regulations of early civilization, matriarchy and exogamy, have nothing about them fantastic, outrageous, absurd, but are the practical outcome of the practical purposes of people like-minded with ourselves. Moreover, in such enquiries as the present there come before us abundant illustrations of that regularity of human action which makes it possible to deal with it by scientific methods. It may be, for the present at least, too difficult to construct a philosophy of history; but the anthropologist has the easier task of classifying customary thoughts and acts, which recur in distant times and places with high definiteness. Thus the maternal family and the system of exogamy, of which the instances may be scheduled out from Asia, Africa, America, are formations whose regularity reminds us of crystallography and chemistry. In virtue of their compact order they belong to natural history, and that to natural science. They belong, indeed, to a region of natural science in which knowledge penetrates more deeply than elsewhere into the meaning of nature. This is due to the happy combination that the anthropologist is himself also a man. All human beings are in body and mind so much of one pattern that each can judge others by reference to his own understanding, intention, and will, and by the consciousness conveyed by language. If a

classic dryad could tell his experience, would not a botanist be grateful for knowledge, now out of his reach, of the true inwardness of a tree? Could we hear from the voice of a sun-god about the impulse and purpose of the solar system, we should learn what is dark to the astronomer. But what is mere fancy about botany and astronomy is commonplace everyday fact to the anthropologist, who works a whole stage nearer to ultimate truth than do students who have more doubtfully to translate symptoms into inferences. Directer evidence of personal consciousness stands open to those who have to reason on the thoughts and acts of men like themselves, which might have been their own.

2. *The Transition to the Patriarchal Family*[1]

We currently speak of the "institution" of marriage. We also use marriage instead of wedding, nuptials, or matrimony. The result is confusion. A wedding or even nuptials occur as a ceremony or festival, on a day, and as the commencement of wedlock or matrimony. Wedlock may be an institution, but a wedding is not. A wedding lacks the duration or recurrence which belongs to an institution. It does not provide for an enduring necessity. It has no apparatus for the repeated use of the same couple. Wedlock is a permanent relation between a man and a woman which is regulated and defined by the *mores*. It brings the pair into cooperation for the struggle for existence and the procreation and nurture of children. Wedlock therefore forms a family, and a family seems to satisfy our idea of an institution far better than marriage or matrimony. The family institution existed probably before marriage. A woman with an infant in her arms is what we see as far back as our investigations lead us. She was limited and burdened in the struggle for existence by her infant. The task of finding subsistence was as hard for her as for a man. The infant was another claimant of her time and labor. Her chance of survival was in union and cooperation with a man. Undoubtedly this gives us the real explanation of the primitive inferiority of woman. They needed the help of men more than men needed women and if a union was made it was made on terms of which the woman got the disadvantage. It certainly is a great mistake to believe that the women were put down because the men were physically stronger. In the first place the men are not always stronger; perhaps it is, as a rule, the other way.

H. H. Johnstone says of the Andombies on the Congo that the women, though working very hard as laborers in general, lead a very happy existence; they are often stronger than the men and more finely developed, some of them having splendid figures. Parke, speaking of the Manyuema of the Arruwimi in the same

[1] Adapted from SUMNER, WILLIAM G., The Family and Social Change, *Pub. Am. Sociological Soc.*, vol. 3, pp. 1–15, December, 1908.

region, says that they are fine animals, and the women very handsome. They are as strong as the men. In North America an Indian chief once said to Hearne, "Women were made for labor; one of them can carry, or haul, as much as two men can do." Schellong says of the Papuans in the German protectorate of New Guinea that the women are more strongly built than the men.

Kubary says that the man has the right to beat his wife but the women are so robust that a man who tries to do it may well find that he will get the worst of it. Fights between men and women are not rare in savage life and the women prevail in a fair share of them. Holm mentions a case where a Greenland Eskimo tried to flog his wife but she flogged him. We hear of a custom in Southeastern Australia that fights between the sexes were provoked when . . .

there were young women who were marriageable but were not mated, and when the eligible bachelors were backward. The men would kill a totem animal of the women or the women would kill a totem animal of the men. This led to a fight of the young men and young women. Then, after the wounds healed they would pair off and the social deadlock would pass away.

Another case, from higher civilization, shows how the woman was weakened by considerations of another kind. Sieroshevski, a Pole, who lived for twelve years among the Yakuts, says that he knew a Yakut woman who was constantly abused by her husband although she was industrious and good natured. At last the European asked her why she did not fight. He assured her that she would succeed and he argued with her that if she would once give her husband a good beating he would not misuse her any more. She, however, answered that that would never do. Her husband's companions would deride him as the man whose wife beat him and their children would be derided by the other children for the same reason. She would not do anything which would produce that consequence and would make her worse off. This case has many parallels.

The status of women was generally sad and pathetic in savage life, but we may accept it as an established fact that that was not because she was physically inferior to man but that it was due to inferiority in the struggle for existence on account of maternity. In the family the man often tyrannized over the woman, and the woman came into the family unwillingly, driven by a greater necessity, but the family was not a product of force. It was a product of contract. It was controlled by the *mores* which soon established notions of the right way to behave and of rights and duties which would be conducive to prosperity and happiness.

In this primitive society the family became the arena in which folkways were formed and taught, traditions were handed down, myths were invented, and sympathies were cultivated. The mother and the children were in the closest association and intimacy. The instruction of example

was the chief instruction, without spoken command or explanation. It makes little difference whether we think of a family in a horde or of a monandrous family of Australians or Bushmen. The children learned from their mothers the usages which were domestic and familiar, which underlie society and are moral in their character. At puberty the boys went with their fathers into the political body and became warriors and hunters. Then they were disciplined into the life of men and left the family. They got wives and founded families, but the father, in his own family, was an outsider and a stranger with few functions and little authority.

Mohammed gave approval to the father-family which seems to have been winning acceptance in his time. Islam is founded on the father-family. In the Koran women are divided into three classes in respect to marriage: first, wives, that is, status wives with all the rank, honor, and rights which the name implies; second, concubines, that is, wives of an inferior class, in a permanent and recognized relation but without the rank and honor of wives; third, slaves, whose greatest chance of happiness was to "find favor" in the eyes of their master or owner. This classification of the wives was also a classification of the mothers and it produced jealousy and strife of the children. Only men of rank and wealth could have households of this complex character. Those of limited means had to choose which form of wife they would take. The full status wife could make such demands that she became a great burden to her husband and it appears that the Moslems now prefer concubines or slaves. In Mohammedan royal families the jealousies and strifes of children, where the son of a slave might be preferred and made heir by the father, have reduced kingdoms and families to bloodshed and anarchy.

In general, in the mother-family, the family must have lacked integration and discipline. The Six Nations or Iroquois had the mother-family in well-developed form. Each woman with her husband and children had a room about seven feet square in the "long house." This room was separated from others inhabited by similar families, not by a partition but only by a pole three or four feet from the floor over which skins were hung. Each family shared fire with another family opposite. Evidently privacy was only imperfectly secured. Any man who did not bring in what was considered his fair share of food supply could be expelled at any time. A husband had to satisfy not only his wife but all her female relatives if he was to be in peace and comfort. He could withdraw when he chose but he must leave his children which belonged to his wife. He must also keep the peace with all the other husbands in the house, while it is easy to see that frequent occasions of quarrel would occur. In short, the man had constant and important reasons to be dissatisfied with the mother-family. He always had one alternative; he could capture a woman outside the group. If he did this he distinguished himself by military

prowess and the woman was a trophy. He was not limited in his control of her or their children by any customs or traditions and he could arrange his life as he pleased. We should expect that great numbers of men would try this alternative but it does not appear that many did so. If they had done so they would have speedily introduced man-descent and the father-family. As we well know uncivilized men do not freely reflect on their experience or discuss reforms or speculate on progress. They accept custom and tradition and make the best of it as they find it. The change to the man-family was brought about by some great change in the conditions of the struggle for existence or by the invention of a new tool or weapon used by the men or by war with powerful neighbors. This much, however, can be said with confidence about the family under woman-descent: It was the conservative institution of that form of society in which traditions were cherished and education was accomplished. It did not encourage change or cherish reforms. It preserved what had been inherited and protected what existed.

Probably the change from mother-family to father-family was by far the greatest and most important revolution in the history of civilization. This was so because the family, especially in primitive society, is such a fundamental institution that it forces all other societal details into conformity with itself. Miss Kingsley, speaking of the Negroes of West Africa, describes societal details as follows:

> The really responsible male relative is the mother's older brother. From him must leave to marry be obtained for either girl or boy; to him and the mother must the present be taken which is exacted on the marriage of a girl, and should the mother die, on him and not on the father, lies the responsibility of rearing the children. They go to his house and he treats and regards them as nearer and dearer to himself than his own children, and at his death, after his own brothers by the same mother, they become his heirs.

These details are all consistent with the mother-family and perfectly logical deductions from its principles. There never was any such thing as woman-rule if by that it should be understood that women administered and conducted in detail the affairs of house or society, directing the men what they should do or not do; but the women of the Iroquois regulated the house life, they owned the land, in the only sense in which Indians could conceive of landowning, because they tilled it, they established the reputation of warriors and so determined who should be elected war chief in any new war, and they decided the treatment of captives. Women, however, never made a state, and war, so long as the woman-family existed, was always limited and imperfect. It was never decided whether a man must fight with his wife's people or go back to the clan in which he was born and fight with that. War was oftenest about women, or about blood revenge. It was, as among our Indians, a raid

and not a persistent campaign. It was mean, cowardly, savage, and marked by base bloodshed.

Much of this seems strange and inverted to us, because our society has long been on the father-family. The state has long been the institution, or set of institutions, on which we rely for our most important interests and our notions of kinship, of rights, of moral right or wrong, and our ways of property, inheritance, trade, and intercourse have all been created by or adjusted to the system of man-descent. We can see what a great revolution had to be accomplished to go over from woman-descent to man-descent. Christian missionaries now often find themselves entangled in this transition. In West Africa the native tie between mother and children is far closer than that between father and children. The Negro women do not like the change which white culture would bring about. In native law husband and wife have separate property. If white man's law was introduced, the woman would lose her property and would not get her husband's. The man also objects to giving his wife any claim on his property. At the same time he does not want the children saddled on him. It seems to him utter absurdity that it should be his duty to care more for his wife than for his mother and sister. At every point, in going over to the father-family, there is a transfer of rights and power and a readjustment of social theory.

In the long history of the man-family men have not been able to decide what they ought to think about women. It has been maintained that woman is man's greatest blessing and again that she is a curse. Also the two judgments have been united by saying that she is a cheat and a delusion. She looks like a blessing while she is a curse. Each of those exaggerated views supported the other. Every blessing may appear doubtful, under circumstances; every curse will sometimes appear to be a blessing. What was most important about both these views was that man was regarded as independent and complete in the first place and the woman was brought to him as a helpmeet or assistant; at least as an inferior whose status and destiny came from her position as an adjunct. That was the position of woman in the man-family. We have abandoned part of the harshness of this construction of the status of woman and all the unkind deductions from it. The moral inferences, however, remain, and we regard them as self-evident and eternal. Loyalty to her husband is the highest virtue of a woman and devotion to her family and sacrifice for it are the field of heroism for her. We speak of the Christian family as the highest form of the family and, in our literature and our current code the Christian family is considered as furnishing women with their grand arena for self-culture and social work. I cannot find that Christianity has done anything to shape the father-family. The Old Testament tells us hardly anything about the Jewish family. In Proverbs we find some weighty statements of general truths, universally accepted,

and some ideal descriptions of a good wife. The words of Lemuel in Chap. XXXI are the only didactic treatment of the good wife in the Old Testament. She is described as a good housekeeper, a good cook, and a diligent needlewoman. Such was the ideal Jewish woman. In the New Testament there is no doctrine of marriage, no description of the proper family, and no exposition of domestic virtues. Down to the time of Christ it appears that each man was free to arrange his family as he saw fit. The rich and great had more than one wife or they had concubines. The Talmud allowed each man four wives but not more. In fact at the birth of Christ among Jews, Greeks, and Romans, all except the rich and great had one wife each, on account of the trouble and expense of having more. Yet, if circumstances, such as childlessness, seemed to make it expedient, anyone might take a second wife. Therefore it became a fact of the *mores* of all but the rich and great that all practiced pair marriage and were educated in it.

Christianity took root in the lowest free classes. It got the *mores* from them and in later centuries gave those *mores* authority and extension. This is the origin and historical source of the Christian family. The Pharisees are credited with introducing common sense into domestic relations. They made the Sabbath an occasion of "domestic joy," bringing into increasing recognition the importance and dignity of woman as the builder and guardian of the home. They also set aside the seclusion of women at childbirth, in spite of the law. A leader of the Pharisees introduced the *Ketubah*, or marriage document, "to protect the wife against the caprice of the husband." The Shammaites would not allow a wife to be divorced except on suspicion of adultery, but the Hillelites allowed more easy divorce for the "welfare and peace of the home." The ancient Romans practiced pure monogamy but after they developed a rich leisure class, in the second century B.C., they practiced luxurious polygamy. The traditions which came down into the Christian church were confused and inconsistent and various elements have from time to time got the upper hand in the history of the last 1,900 years. Gide says:

> In a word, the law of the gospel accomplished a radical revolution in the constitution of the family. It broke domestic tyranny and recomposed the unity of the family by uniting all its members under mutual duties. It elevated and ennobled marriage by giving it a heavenly origin, and it made of marriage a union so intimate and so holy that God alone can break it.

This is a good literary statement of what is generally taught and popularly believed, but it is impossible to verify it. We cannot tell what was the origin of our modern pair marriage, but it grew up in the *mores* of the humble classes in which Christianity found root. In the first centuries of the Christian Era the leading classes at Rome went through rapid corruption and decay, but the laboring classes had little

share in this life. Christian converts could easily hold aloof from it. During the first four centuries Christians believed that the world was about to perish. Evidently this belief affected the whole philosophy of life. Marriage lost sense and the procreation of children lost interest. This may be seen in I Cor. 7. It also helps to explain the outburst of asceticism and extravagant behavior such as the renunciation of conjugal intimacy by married people.

Paul also, as is well known, discusses the renunciation of marriage, but he speaks with remarkable restraint, and urges objections. John of Asia Minor appears in tradition as the apostle of virginity, and the glorification of virgins confirms this view of his. But it is something quite different from this when false teachers are said in the Pastoral Epistles to hinder marriage. Procreation as such was considered sin, and the cause of death's domination. Christ came to break away from it. Hence, on the other hand, we have the idealizing of Christian motherhood. Woman fell into sin but shall be saved through child-bearing. Sexual impulse is a foul frenzy, something devilish. Stories of the lust of the devil and his companions after beautiful women make up the gnostic romances. The horribleness and insatiableness of the sensual passions are illustrated by all sorts of terrible tales.

It may indeed have happened, as the Acts of Thomas report, that bride and bridegroom from the very marriage day renounced wedlock, and man and wife separated from one another. In particular, the continually recurring narratives of a converted wife avoiding common life with her unbelieving husband seem to be taken from life. We have the express witness, not only of Christian apologists, but also of the heathen physician Galen, that among the Christians many women and men abstained all their life from the intercourse of sex. It is not possible for us to estimate the actual spread of this kind of absolute renunciation.

On the one hand the women are little thought of. In the Clementine homilies (3:22) it is expressly declared that the nature of woman is much inferior to that of man. Women, except the mother of Clement, play almost no rôle in this romance.

Professor Donaldson shows the error of supposing that Christianity raised the status of women.

It is rather a formulation due to dogmatic than historical interests to assert that the worth of women came to recognition first in Christianity and in Christianity from the very beginning.

Renan says that Christianity, in the second century of the Christian Era, "gave complete satisfaction to just those needs of imagination and heart which then tormented the populations" around the Mediterranean. It offered a person and an ideal. It made no such demand on credulity as the old mythologies which had now lost their sense. It joined stoicism in hostility to idols and bloody sacrifices and the faith in Jesus superseded ritual. Renan thinks it a wonder that Christianity did not sooner win control, but at Rome, all the civil maxims were against it. The latest

scholars also recognize the strong rivalry between Christianity and Mithraism.

Tertullian (born A. D. 160) was an extremist among Christian ascetics, but he was one of the ablest and most influential men of his time. Addressing women he says:

> Woman, thou shouldst always be dressed in mourning and in rags, and shouldst not offer to the eyes anything but a penitent drowned in tears and thus shouldst thou pay ransom for thy fault in bringing the human race to ruin! Woman, thou art the gate by which the demon enters! It was thou who corruptedst him whom Satan did not dare to attack in face (man). It is on thy account that Jesus Christ died.

It was the doctrine of the church fathers who lived about 400 A. D. that marriage is a consequence of original sin, and that, but for the first sin, God would have provided otherwise for the maintenance of the human species. "Let us cut up by the roots, "said Jerome, "the sterile tree of marriage. God did indeed allow marriage at the beginning of the world, but Jesus Christ and Mary have now consecrated virginity." Virginity thus furnished the ideal in the church and not honest wedlock.

Juvenal and Tacitus give us pictures of Roman (heathen) society in the first centuries of the Christian Era which would make us doubt if there was any family at all, but some of our later historians have well pointed out that we ought not to take the statements in Juvenal and Tacitus as characteristic of all Roman society.

Let me quote two or three passages from Dill about Roman women of the empire:

> Tacitus, here and there, gives glimpses of self-sacrifice, courageous loyalty, and humanity, which save his picture of society from utter gloom. The love and devotion of women shine out more brightly than ever against the background of baseness. Tender women follow their husbands or brothers into exile, or are found ready to share their death. Even the slave girls of Octavia brave torture and death in their hardy defense of her fair fame. There is no more pathetic story of female heroism than that of Politta, the daughter of L. Vetus . . . Vetus himself was of the nobler sort of Roman men, who even then were not extinct. When he was advised, in order to save the remnant of his property for his grandchildren, to make the emperor chief heir, he spurned the servile proposal, divided his ready money among his slaves, and prepared for the end. When all hope was abandoned, father, grandmother, and daughter opened their veins and died together in the bath . . .
>
> The Bohemian man of letters (Juvenal) had heard many a scandal about great ladies, some of them true, others distorted and exaggerated by prurient gossip, after passing through a hundred tainted imaginations. In his own modest class, female morality, as we may infer from the Inscriptions and other sources, was probably as high as the average morality of any age. There were aristocratic families, too, where the women were as pure as Lucretia or Cornelia, or any matron

of the older days. The ideals of purity, both in men and women, in some circles were actually rising. In the families of Seneca, of Tacitus, of Pliny, and of Plutarch, there were not only the most spotless and high-minded women, there were also men with a rare conception of temperance and mutual love, of reverence for a pure wedlock, to which S. Jerome and S. Augustine would have given their benediction. Even Ovid, that "debauchee of the imagination," writes to his wife, from his exile in the Scythian wilds, in the accents of the purest affection . . .

Dion Chrysostom was probably the first of the ancients to raise a clear voice against the traffic in frail beauty which has gone on pitilessly from age to age. Nothing could exceed the vehemence with which he assails an evil which he regards as not only dishonoring to human nature, but charged with the poison of far-spreading corruption. Juvenal's ideal of purity, therefore, is not peculiar to himself. The great world was bad enough; but there was another world beside that whose infamy Juvenal has immortalized . . .

From the days of Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, to the days of Placidia, the mother of Honorius, Roman women exercised, from time to time, a powerful, and not always wholesome, influence on public affairs. The politic Augustus discussed high matters of state with Livia. The reign of Claudius was a reign of women and freedmen. Tacitus records, with a certain distaste for the innovation, that Agrippina sat enthroned beside Claudius on a lofty tribunal, to receive the homage of the captive Caractacus. Nero emancipated himself from the grasping ambition of his mother only by a ghastly crime. The influence of Caenis on Vespasian in his later days tarnished his fame. The influence of women in provincial administration was also becoming a serious force. . . . Thus Juvenal was fighting a lost battle, lost long before he wrote. For good or evil, women in the first and second centuries were making themselves a power.

The Christian emperors made the dower of the wife not simply the property of the two spouses. It was the endowment of the new household, a sort of reserve fund which the law assured to the children which they would find intact in spite of the ruin of their family, if it should occur. The dower was offset by the gift *propter nuptias* which the man must give. The law also provided that the dower and the gift *propter nuptias* should be equal and that the spouses should have the same rights of survivorship. These seem to be distinct improvements on the dotal system, but that system has dropped out of popular use in modern times and the advantage of this legislation has been lost with it.

The family was more affected by the imperial constitutions of the fourth century which enacted the views and teachings of the clergy of that time. Constantine endeavored to put an end to concubinage, and the power of mothers over their children as to property and marriage was made equal to that of fathers. It appears that the collapse of the ancient society and the decay of the old religion with the rise of Christianity and Mithraism with new codes of conduct and duty produced anarchy in the *mores* which are the everyday guides of men as to what they ought

to do. On the one side we find asceticism and extreme rigor and then by the side of it, in the Christian church, extravagant license and grotesque doctrine. What element conquered, and why, it seems impossible to say. The society of Western Europe emerged from the period of decay and rejuvenation in the twelfth century with some wild passions and dogmas of commanding force. Overpopulation produced social pressure and distress with the inevitable tragedy in human affairs. The other world was figured by unrestrained imagination, and religion went back to primitive demonism. Out of this period came the canon law.

Of all civil institutions, marriage is the one which the canon law most carefully regulated, and this is the idea from which all its prescriptions were derived; *viz.*, marriage is a necessary evil which must be tolerated, but the practice of which must be restrained.

The doctrine of this law is that "woman was not made in the image of God. Hence it appears that women are subordinated to men and that the law meant them to be almost servants in the household." From this starting point the law went on rationally although it contained two inconsistent ideas, the merit of wedlock and the merit of celibacy. The product of such inconsistency was necessarily base. Some parts of the literary record which remain to us would lead us to believe that the whole society was brutal and vicious, but when we think of the thousands of families who died without ever making a mark on the record we must believe that domestic virtue and happiness were usual and characteristic of the society. The best proof of this is presented by the efforts at reform throughout the fifteenth century and the vigor of the reformation of the sixteenth century. The hot disputes between Protestants and Catholics turned chiefly on the doctrine of the mass and on sacerdotal claims but they contained also an element of dissatisfaction with inherited *mores* about marriage and the family. The Protestants denounced the abuses which had grown up around the monasteries and the gratuitous misery of celibacy. They, however, lost the old ideas about marriage and divorce and the Catholics denounced them for laxity and vice. At the Council of Trent, in 1563, the Catholics made a new law of marriage, in which they redefined and strengthened the ritual element. Out of all that strife and turmoil our modern family has come down to us.

The churches and denominations are now trying to win something in their rivalry with each other by the position they adopt in regard to marriage and divorce and the family. The family in its best estate, now among us, is a thing which we may contemplate with the greatest satisfaction. When the parents are united by mutual respect and sincere affection and by joint zeal for the welfare of their children, the family is a field of peace and affection in which the most valuable virtues take root and grow and character is built on the firmest foundation of habit. The

family exists by tradition and old custom faithfully handed down. Our society, however, has never yet settled down to established order and firm tradition since the great convulsion of the sixteenth century. Perhaps the family still shows more fluctuation and uncertainty than any other of our great institutions. Different households now differ greatly in the firmness of parental authority and the inflexibility of filial obedience. Many nowadays have abandoned the old standards of proper authority and due obedience. The family has to a great extent lost its position as a conservative institution and has become a field for social change. This, however, is only a part of the decay of doctrines once thought most sound and the abandonment of standards once thought the definition of good order and stability. The changes in social and political philosophy have lowered the family. The family has not successfully resisted them. Part of the old function of the family seems to have passed to the primary school, but the school has not fully and intelligently taken up the functions thrown upon it. It appears that the family now depends chiefly on the virtue, good sense, conception of duty, and spirit of sacrifice of the parents. They have constantly new problems to meet. They want to do what is right and best. They do not fear change and do not shrink from it. So long as their own character is not corrupted it does not appear that there is any cause for alarm.

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Chapter V

THE HISTORY OF MARRIAGE

Marriage and family life are frequently, perhaps generally, associated; sometimes they are quite intimately related. The consequent tendency of popular thought is to assume that they are related in their nature if, indeed, they are not identical. The literature is somewhat confused. The materials included in this and the preceding chapter give abundant evidence that even the scholarly writers do not always make careful distinctions and sometimes do not even observe the distinctions that they make.

The family, as Mrs. Runner shows in the first reading, is an organization that grows up as a result of the helplessness of the child. In its simple animal form it is the association of the mother and offspring during the period of immaturity. From this irreducible minimum it may be extended to include other individuals, frequently a large number of individuals, and it may be a more or less permanent arrangement. But whether it is a simple mother-child unit or a large group of related individuals and whether it be of brief or long duration, its essential function is always the care and rearing of offspring. In the literature discussion sometimes refers to the simple biological unit. In other cases it refers to the external institutional relationships that result from the fact that the mother-offspring group is always a part of a larger social group and are defined in law or custom. Still other writers, as Mr. Burgess in the paper in the second chapter, assume the natural family unit and the formal institutional structure and emphasize the unity dependent upon the interaction of the personalities within the prescribed circle. It is not always clear whether a given writer has in mind a biological unit, a legal concept, or a sociological unity.

Marriage on the other hand is basically a sex relationship and has no necessary relation to or interest in offspring. It is a type of association between men and women. It is in general a socially approved organization of the affectional life of the adult persons. As described in the reading from Mrs. Parsons, marriage may take varying forms—monogamous, polygynous, polyandrous, or some combination of two or more simple forms.

Clearly marriage and family are different and separable things; neither is necessary to the other. Family may exist without a continued sex association; the affectional relation may flourish apart from the

family life. Indeed, it is legitimate to raise a hypothetical question as to whether or not the work of rearing children might not be more efficiently performed apart from the love life of parents, and whether or not the affectional life of men and women might not be on a somewhat higher plane if it existed apart from family compulsion and standardization. But the point important here is not a discussion of such questions but a recognition that family and marriage, while commonly and closely associated in the culture complex, rest upon different bases and function to quite different ends.

A good deal of energy has been expended in the effort to show that a permanent monogamous marriage is superior to any of the competing forms. The student would do well in this connection to read Herbert Spencer's chapter on Domestic Institutions, which contains his defense of monogamy, since his position is the one commonly echoed in the moral literature. Often these writers appear to be totally unaware of the source of the doctrine they hold so firmly and expound so eloquently. But the effort to show the superiority of this type of sex companionship has not been conspicuously successful. The form of marriage grows up and is defined in the customs and folk practices of the group. The members of every group come to have a warm emotional preference for the type that happens to be familiar and they tend to look upon other forms as morally reprehensible and socially injurious. The student should also remember that, while there is generally one form of marriage in a given society that meets with general social approval, all types of unions will be found to exist. In present-day American society the permanent pair marriage is the socially sanctioned relationship but there is in the society a good deal of celibacy, polygyny, polyandry, and promiscuitv.

1. *Marriage Defined*[1]

Marriage has been defined as "a union of the male and female which does not cease with the act of procreation but persists after the birth of the offspring until the young are capable of supplying their own essential needs." It becomes immediately apparent that, in this sense, marriage is by no means confined to the human species. Monogamic marriage is very common among the birds, although it is not a universal practice. Indeed birds are frequently cited as ideal examples of harmonious cooperation between the sexes in the work of providing a suitable environment for the rearing and training of the fledgelings. Together the male and female build the nest, gather the food, and teach the young.

Among the higher mammals the relatively prolonged union of marriage is rather rare. With most of them the function of the male ends with procreation, and it is up to the female to feed and protect the offspring—sometimes it even becomes necessary for her to protect them against the

[1] From RUNNER, JESSIE R., The Family Heritage (unpublished manuscript).

attacks of the father himself. However, it is interesting to note that a marriage relation exists among some of the manlike apes. Travelers vouch for the fact that the orang-utan, gorilla, and chimpanzee males sit on guard at the base of the trees in which they have built nests for the pregnant females. They are essentially the defenders, although they also assist with the feeding of the young.

The above facts help somewhat in an understanding of the origin of marriage. It is certain that the sexual instinct is in itself insufficient to account for any permanent tie. So intermittent a desire could too easily be satisfied outside the marriage bond to make it the basis of any enduring family life. It must also be remembered that primitive woman, like the female ape, is nearly, if not quite, as large and strong as the male. It is probable that the origin of marriage lies in the helplessness of the newly born offspring, as well as in the need of the mother for protection at that time. Perhaps it could be called a "survival" characteristic, inasmuch as natural selection might have eliminated those stocks in which the male refused such protection. It is for this reason that the statement is frequently made that "marriage has its source in the family rather than the family in marriage."

2. *The Forms of Marriage*[1]

Marriage may exist between one male and one female (monogamy), between one male and two or more females (polygyny), between one female and two or more males (polyandry)—each husband may also have more than one wife—and between a group of males and a group of females (group marriage).

Among the lower animals sexual intercourse, whether lasting or not until the birth of offspring, is usually between one male and one female; but, as we have seen, among many mammals and some birds polygyny is found. Polyandry is very rare. Very little is known in detail about the matrimonial habits of animals lower than man. We shall therefore turn at once to the forms of human marriage.

In group marriage the men are or are considered kinsmen and the women kinswomen. (Where the common wives are not akin, the marriage is usually referred to as a polygynous type of polyandry.) Group marriage is, as a rule, combined with individual marriage, *i.e.*, intercourse between one woman and one man may be usual, and intercourse with the other group husbands or wives only occasional.

In both polygyny and polyandry there may be a subordination among the wives or husbands to a superior wife or husband. In this event the system is frequently known as female or male concubinage. Where this distinction is made in polygyny, the position of the so-called "concubine"

[1] From PARSONS, ELSIE CLEWS, "The Family," pp. 137–141, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912.

is always inferior to that of the wife. In this sense, in the monogamous system of modern civilization, cohabitation without marriage ceremonial is also called "concubinage." Economic, political, or age inequalities or disabilities may, in a monogamous system, lead to concubinage taken in this sense. This non-legal relation is, however, from our point of view, a marriage relation. We shall also use the term "wife," instead of concubine, in referring to all the women in a polygynous marriage. Rank among the wives is variously determined. The superior wife is commonly the first or the eldest wife; less commonly, the lastly acquired wife. She may also be the one, as we have seen, for whom a bride-price has been paid in distinction to the wives who have been otherwise acquired. She may be of equal rank with her husband, whereas the other wives are of inferior rank. The fact of having borne children also affects the rank of wives. The first place may be accorded the wife who has first borne a child. Again, the husband's will may alone determine the rank of his wives. More commonly, however, his preference interferes with a customary subordination. In some cases, if the superior wife fail in the proper performance of her duties, she may be superseded by an inferior wife. Sometimes a woman's younger sisters or female cousins accompany her as supplementary wives. Sometimes she owns female slaves whom she herself presents to her husband. The number of wives may be restricted or unrestricted. In the former case, the number may vary for different classes in the same community. The taking of a second wife may require the consent of the first, or it may be allowed only when the first wife is barren, or has borne daughters only, or has misbehaved, or is diseased.

Each wife may or may not have her own dwelling or, in case of a common dwelling, her own fireplace. The wives may even live in different villages, or, among insular peoples, on different islands. Their common husband may, where they live separate, live with each in turn, or he may live with the head wife and merely visit the others as his business or fancy take him to the places where they live.

In Nair polyandry, the wife lives with her mother and male kinsfolk, and is visited in turn by her husbands. In Thibetan polyandry, the husbands are brothers. The wife is commonly thought of as belonging to the eldest brother. She is loaned by him to the others, who live with him. This is properly a form of male concubinage. Sometimes a younger brother will act as supplementary husband in the absence of the husband proper, his elder brother. The covenant of brotherhood sometimes leads to practical polyandry as a developed form of sexual hospitality. Through the practice of child marriage, where the husband is a child and the wife an adult, her father-in-law may live with her until his minor son is grown. Properly speaking, this is probably not a polyandrous arrangement; it is rather an unstable form of monogamy, as father

and son are probably not the husbands of the same woman at the same time. Accounts are uncertain on this point.

It should be noted that, as in the case of a limitation of polygyny, more than one form of marriage may exist in the same community at the same time. Polygyny, for example, may be a prerogative only of the chiefs or rich men of a group.

Numerical disproportion between the sexes, due to female infanticide, religious celibacy, constant warfare, an excess of male births, special economic conditions—*e.g.*, absence of men on hunting or trade expeditions, etc.—is a factor in polygamy. Customs of conjugal abstinence at stated periods and desire for children are also factors. Economic inequality is, however, the chief factor of polygamy. In the many communities where a chattel character attaches to women, inequality in possessions means inequality in the number of wives, wives being classed among the most valuable forms of private property. Plurality of wives may also indicate social importance in communities where other forms of economic inequality are not especially marked. In polygynous communities, therefore, there is a tendency for the poorer people—*i.e.*, the great majority of the people—to be monogamous. Poverty and a high market price for wives may also lead to polyandry.

Marriage terminates through death or separation. In some communities marriage is thought of as continuing after death, and widows are expected to accompany their husbands to the world of spirits. In other cases, widows are not allowed to remarry. Again, their families or second husbands may be obliged to give the original bride price or a stated amount of property or fine (*reipus*) to the heirs of the deceased husband at their remarriage. A period of mourning is prescribed for widows in almost all communities, and during this period remarriage is forbidden or condemned. A mourning period for widowers, during which remarriage is disapproved, is a more infrequent practice.

Duration of marriage in the lifetime of the married persons seems, to a great extent, to be dependent upon its form. Where monogamy prevails, it is often accompanied by forms of promiscuity or by readily obtained divorce. Polygamy satisfies, to a certain extent, the desire for variety to which transiency of sexual relationship is often due.

3. *The Development of Marriage Ideals*[1]

The task which I have assigned myself is that of tracing the historical forces which have changed, and which are changing, our ideals as to the status of married women. We shall deal with motives, not ceremonies, and shall see that these have been as varied as the aspects in which woman has been viewed.

[1] Adapted from SCHROEDER, THEODORE, The Evolution of Marriage Ideals, *Arena*, vol. 34, pp. 578–589, December, 1905.

We will begin with Ancient Greece, where several different classes of women were recognized, as each supplying a social need. It will be seen that the ideal of Plato, caused by his sexual inversion, ultimately became the Christian ideal; and with the addition of the frenzy of fanaticism, an unanticipated result was achieved in the mad hatred and degradation of woman and marriage. The next most potent influence was a reactionary one, and came from the chivalric love intoxication of mediaeval knighthood. The third change of ideal was produced by our industrial reorganization, which transferred most of the household occupations to the factory. Next we come to our present transitional state, wherein economic pressure furnishes the dynamics, and it is believed will compel the acceptance of an economically independent wifehood as the future ideal. To amplify these suggestions, and more specifically to point out these causes and trace their operation and consequences is the mission of this essay.

Demosthenes, in his oration against Neara, described the sexual life of the Athenians in these words: "We marry a woman in order to obtain legitimate children, and to have a faithful warder in the house; we keep concubines for our service and daily care; and *hetaerae* for the enjoyment of love."

The *hetaerae* (or kept women) were the only women of Greece who enjoyed at the same time "freedom, education, accomplishments, and contempt." They were the constant companions and often the instructors of the great men of their time, and models for the great artists. Their lives are better known to us than those of the matrons.

Among the wives there was a well-recognized distinction between the economically dependent and the independent ones. The former were hardly more than head slaves of the Grecian households, with little or no freedom, and were looked upon as but the master's concubines, and as such, were commonly bought and sold. These conditions did not attend the higher types of marriage. The most sought and most envied position for the Greek woman of that time was an economically independent wifehood.

Writing upon this subject, the Rev. John Potter, late Archbishop of Canterbury, has this to say: "So common became the custom for women to bring portions to their husbands, that some made the most essential difference between 'wife' and concubine to consist in this, that wives had dowries, whereas concubines were usually without." Hence, men who were content to marry wives who had no fortune, commonly gave them an instrument in writing acknowledging the receipt of their dowry. The rest of their distinction was chiefly founded on this, that she who had a dowry thought it a just title to greater freedom with her husband, and to more respect from him, than such as owed their maintenance to him . . . In consideration of her dowry, she had the privilege, when her

husband was impotent, of consorting with his nearest kinsman, and under special circumstances, even with others.

Our Bishop also informs us, that among such, divorces were easy and were usually, but not always, granted on the same terms to men as to women. When a woman was divorced, the husband must return her dowry. Polygamy was prohibited, but within the monogamic family stirpiculture was practiced with the consent of the married couple and encouraged by public opinion. Adultery (which of course did not include these permitted relations) was most cruelly punished. The result of so natural a marital code, in which the right of the offspring to be well born was esteemed of more consequence than a husband's vanity-tickling sex monopoly, made the glory of Greece to consist in the physical and intellectual superiority of its people. When a woman of another country said to Gorgo, the wife of Leonadas, "You of Lacedaemon are the only women in the world who rule men," she answered, "We are the only women that bring forth men." With such women, motherhood was a right, not a duty.

The same substantial equality of the sexes found expression in their religion. In the old Greek and Roman Pantheons, the goddess was quite as conspicuous as her divine consort. In their temples, we find officiating priestesses as well as priests, and in their festivals, there was as much glorification of the feminine in nature as of the seemingly masculine qualities. "The Gospel according to the Hebrews," which was in use as late as the second century of the Christian Era, taught the equality of the feminine in the godhead and also that daughters should inherit with the sons.

During the Pagan Empire, Rome had conditions, which, in their legal aspect, very much resembled those of Athens. Even then "One might see the Emperor's wives honored with the titles of August Mothers of their country. Some of them had place in the Senate, governed Rome and the Empire, gave audience to Embassadors, and disposed of posts of employments. Others were consecrated priestesses, and even exalted to the rank of Goddesses."

This, then, brings us to our first, if not our chief problem. What were the forces, and whence came they, which destroyed these superior features of the marriage ideals of these pagans, and in the Dark Ages reduced all Christian wives to the status of chattel slaves?

Going back to about 400 B. C. we find, at the extreme of Greek ideals, two boldly contrasted and equally dangerous tendencies. On the one hand were the excessive sensualities of the degenerating mysteries of phallic worship; on the other, the equally salacious asceticism of the philosophers, among many of whom pederasty was a glorified vice. Among the victims of this sexual inversion, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were conspicuous.

The Apostle Paul was born in the free city of Tarsus, whose population was largely Greek, though within the Roman Empire. "Recent his-

torical investigation teaches that Paul's father was of Greek nationality, and his mother of Jewish." The schools of Tarsus, attended by Paul, equaled those of Alexandria, Athens, and Rome, and here he undoubtedly studied the Greek philosophers. This education in the Greek classics was possibly supplemented by his instruction under Gamaliel. Being afflicted with epilepsy, quite necessarily St. Paul possessed a foundation of sexual hyperestheticism. He boasts that he is unmoved by the temptations of women.

Whatever the cause, Paul became possessed by the perverted opinions of Plato, as has been shown by his very scant tolerance of marriage. The only other apostle upon whom the ascetic ideal made any great impression was St. John, whom Jesus undoubtedly had in mind, when he spoke, with evident sympathy, of those "eunuchs who made themselves eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven's sake." All the remaining apostles were married men.

The teachings of St. Paul and St. John are the beginning of Christian asceticism, and through their popularity, Plato's "celestial love" and many of his mysticisms were adopted into Christianity. "Of the early influence of this [Platonic] philosophy upon Christianity, there exists distinct evidence in the opening verses of St. John's Gospel, which are pure Platonism in language and thought; and it is not, perhaps, too much to refer all the disputes which divided and disturbed the infant church, to a contest between those, who in forming their religious creed, adopted and those who rejected more or less of the new philosophy. In recognition of this men like Erasmus call Plato "a Christian before Christianity."

The first effective organized impetus toward the Christian acceptance of the ascetic ideal came with the opening of the second century, through Montanus, whose following was impelled to asceticism by a desire to glorify the martyrdom of their prophet. He had suffered involuntary emasculation by irate husbands, who felt themselves injured by his unexcused trespasses within their families. Through the added sexual enthusiasms engendered by voluntary suppression, the frenzy of fanaticism grew apace. In A. D. 385, celibacy during life was made compulsory for the priests of the Western churches. About this time monachism as an institution and celibate orders of the church were first founded. By a natural law, every increased success in sex suppression resulted in more numerous and more vivid erotic hallucinations, in which women always appeared as the supposed instruments of Satan for the tempting of priestly virtue. Thus evolved to their acute stages the misogyny and erotophobia of the Dark Ages, with their resultant witch burning and like horrors.

Under the influence of clerical suppression of the natural, sexual perversions abounded, and the church became saturated with an ever intensifying hatred of women. The Pauline doctrines, that husbands

should rule over wives, and that "it is a shame for a woman to speak in the church"; that "it is good for a man not to touch a woman"; that "he that giveth her in marriage doeth well, but he that giveth her not in marriage, doeth better," became then the dominant thought of Christianity.

As this Christian erotophobia grew, womanhood suffered more and more of religious degradation. Tertullian denounced woman as "the gate of hell"; St. Bernard called her "the organ of the devil"; St. Anthony said: "The woman is the fountain of the arm of the devil, her voice is the hissing of the serpent"; St. Bonaventure denounced her as "a scorpion, ever ready to sting, . . . the lance of the demon"; St. Cyprian saw her as "the instrument of the devil"; St. Jerome as "the gate of devil, the road of iniquity, the sting of the scorpion"; St. John Damascene labeled her the "daughter of falsehood, a sentinel of hell, the enemy of peace"; St. Gregory the Great adds: "Woman has the poison of an asp, the malice of a dragon"; St. Chrysostom announces that "through woman the devil has triumphed . . . Of all wild beasts, the most dangerous is woman."

Many of the saints would not look upon a woman, nor allow one to look upon them, not even a sister or a mother. Women who presumed to enter churches with uncovered heads were denounced. On the celebration of the anniversary of Saint Simeon, women were wholly excluded from the church, which was built around the pillar upon which he mortified the flesh. Because of their impurity, a provincial council, in the sixth century, forbade women to receive the eucharist into their naked hands. For like reason, they were not permitted to sing in church choirs, and eunuchs were put in their stead.

At the council of Macon (A. D. 585), fifty-nine bishops taking part, it was a matter of serious discussion whether or not women had souls. By a majority of one it was decided that they had. In the seventh century one Christian sect taught that females could not be resurrected, but that they could and would be transformed into men before their entrance into their final exaltation. A thousand years afterward it was still a matter of ecclesiastical debate whether the native American women possessed souls. In the Greek Christian Church of Russia women were not classified as human beings until the time of Peter the Great. These are the lingering consequences of that madness which came from adding religious zeal to the unnatural ideals developed in Plato, from his psychosexual disease.

The phobia of the monks, through sympathetic imitation, was transfused into the masses as an all-pervading misogyny. When the church had established that association with woman "was unclean," her religious and social equality were synchronously destroyed. When it became currently accepted that woman was but an instrument of Satan to tempt

their virtue, that was the kindling of the witch-burner's fire. So, also, when dominant ecclesiastics asserted that woman was as soulless as the lower animals were supposed to be, and "the most dangerous" of wild beasts, her degradation as a chattel slave was quite inevitable.

By the tenth century, woman's subjection as a chattel slave was complete. Her husband-owner could mortgage, sell, or kill her, just as he could any other live chattel. No wonder, then, that thousands of women were driven into monasteries, as the only place offering even a little freedom, economic independence, and respectability.

The same crime was more severely punished, if committed by a woman, than if committed by a man. The wife's rebellion against her husband was punished as treason. President Roosevelt still esteems it akin to treason for the sex slave in marriage to refuse to render sex service. Before the Mothers' Congress, speaking of the deliberately childless wife, he said: "Such a creature merits contempt, as hearty as any visited upon the soldier who runs away in battle." The deserter before a foe is killed. Does Mr. Roosevelt's "contempt as hearty" mean that he desires also to inflict the death penalty on married women who have deliberately limited their offspring to a number less than their utmost physical capacity? That is the logical inference.

In England, as late as 1814, a husband sold his wife at public auction. There is a record of the sale of a polygamous wife in Utah as late as 1850. Even in 1892 the New York courts decided that the service of the wife belonged to her husband as a matter of right, and that she could not recover for it, even if holding his written promise to pay. Thus she is still his legal slave.

"Toward the close of the fourteenth century, hardly a woman could be found in Europe who could read her native language."

Even the erudite Erasmus doubted whether learning was a suitable accomplishment for her, and all lesser clackers echoed his sentiment for centuries. Even to this day, some belated victims to tenth-century ideals still deplore female education.

We have now seen how Christian denunciation of marriage as impure, and of women as subordinate and vile, produced a wifehood of chattel slavery. This necessarily involved that rendering sex service had become a woman's slave duty to her husband owner. Under our present partial emancipation and enlightenment, husbands lack the courage, publicly, to insist upon this as their personal right, but instead, ask for it for themselves in the name of a class, nation, or race, which every such man feels himself in duty bound to save from its imminent danger of extinction. As formerly he demanded a slavish slave, so now he demands a "womanly woman," one who joyously defends and meekly submits to the male imposition of economic dependence, intellectual inferiority, a dual standard of morals, and female duties. Motherhood, as a right, has vanished,

and motherhood as a duty is still preached by the benighted as the highest mark of female virtue.

Other forces have contributed to the persistence of this ideal. The tribal chiefs and war lords, needing soldiers for slaughter, rediscovered their advantage in making breeding a virtue. Napoleon needed "food for cannon," so when the brilliant but barren Madame de Staël asked him: "Who is the greatest woman?" he said: "She who has borne her husband the greatest number of children." Frederick the Great, in 1741, wrote: "I look upon women as a herd of deer in the zoölogical gardens of a great lord; their only duty is to propagate and fill the park." President Roosevelt still endorses this ideal as the highest, for womankind, when he says that "the willfully barren woman has no place in a sane, healthy, and vigorous community," and adds, before the Mothers' Congress, that "There are exceptional men and exceptional women who can lead, and ought to lead, great careers of outside usefulness, in addition to . . . not as a substitute for . . . their home duties." Until the zoölogical garden of her great lord and master is full of deer, and these adequately cared for by her, woman may not even aspire to a career of other usefulness, without forfeiting her right to live in a "sane, healthy, and vigorous community"! It is quite incomprehensible, how women with any education can sit calmly under—or even applaud—such degrading denial of an equal opportunity for the exercise of other than their breeding capacity and its incidents.

The demands of the war lord helped to kill the motherhood of privilege, and from its corpse raised the ghastly motherhood of patriotic duty, which refuses to recognize any amount of social uplifting as an equivalent substitute for her sex service. The continued advocacy of this ideal, after the war lord's motives ceased to operate, has the appearance of a compromise between the ascetic ideal and an insatiable lust, where cowardice and stupidity induce a vociferous apology for overgenerous self-indulgence.

Perhaps the most potent thralldom which perpetuated this new ideal came again from the church. In celibate, priestly eyes, "marriage is something unholy and unclean," to use the words of Origen. Sometimes it was explained as an unavoidable evil, and at others, magnanimously endured as "the thorny bush from which has come the rose virginity." The sentiment of St. Hieronymous ultimately prevailed. He said: "Marriage is always a vice; all that we can do is to excuse and to cleanse it." To minimize and excuse the "vileness," marriage must produce virgins. Therefore the duty to procreate, which was the price of permitted "impurity," became as extravagantly overvalued as was the evil to which it justified an exceptional concession. The motherhood of privilege, which was already succumbing to the motherhood of duty to a military despot, now yielded also to the motherhood of religious duty to God.

Thus the husband-master of a sex slave in marriage, not caring or daring to repudiate the whole of the ascetic ideal, yet seeking a moral justification for a wife's compulsory gratification of his sensual appetites, secured the aid of both the church and the state, and all these still seek to limit a woman's activities, to coerce propagation and its incidents. All are united to laud her compulsory sex submission as a virtue.

Even to this day, in probably every state in the Union, the law still recognizes the husband's ownership of his wife's body. Even if the law were changed, economic dependence and a perverted public opinion, which in consequence of such dependence prates of "wifely duty," would still compel submission; and all this, because the Bible says: "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands in all things."

The Christian ascetic ideal had now run its full course, from religious misogyny to spiritual inequality, to the denial of her possessing a soul, to her enslavement as a husband's chattel. In short, through the influence of Plato, Christian asceticism destroyed motherhood as a right and created the motherhood of duty, primarily to her husband, secondarily, and in modern times, hypocritically, to the state and to her God.

Ecclesiastical authority was unable wholly to suppress or pervert the human sex nature. Under the pretense that marriage must be purified and excused, the priests now sought to keep it under their control. Under the influence of such ideas of the "vileness" of marriage, it was early prohibited to perform the ceremony within church edifices. Though many, like Jerome, had said that the duty of a husband was "incompatible with the duty of a Christian," yet in the ninth century it was argued that an act of the church could validate marriage; and in 1085 Pope Hildebrand VII declared matrimony a sacrament, and the Council of Trent, in the sixteenth century, was the first church council to declare matrimony one of the seven sacraments of Catholicism.

Many authorities had declared for divorce and remarriage upon varying grounds. St. Ephiphanius allowed divorce for any crime. Justinian forbade divorce unless both parties desired to enter a monastery. St. Gregory the Second, and others, blessed with infallibility, authorized bigamy. In response to Boniface (A. D. 726), he answered that when wives were incapacitated by infirmity, men, if unendowed with continence, might marry again. This theory was adopted in 752 by the Council of Vermeria or Verbery. Pepin, the French king, with the French prelacy, was present in this assembly. The Gallican clergy allowed the privilege of repudiation and subsequent wedlock to those who married slaves pretending to be free; and to men whose wives were guilty of certain contumacy. To keep sexual relations under priestly control, marriage with heretics was, in the twelfth century, prohibited, and such marriages could be repudiated and remarriage allowed. The Council of Trent in

the sixteenth century, for the first time, authoritatively declared marriage indissoluble.

When the priests made marriage a "sacramental authority to live unchaste," though its religious sacredness was thereby grossly overestimated, it was yet recognized as religiously semirespectable, and this was the first step toward our growing sanity upon the subject of sex.

Monks and priests, in their mad desire to discredit marriage, came to an evergrowing exaltation of the alleged virginity of the mother of Jesus. Mariolatry grew apace. In the fifth century, a mere recognition of Mary's good fortune in her maternity began to change to acts of homage. The first feast of the Immaculate Conception was celebrated in A. D. 1134, and at the ecumenical council of 1849 the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary was first authoritatively promulgated, although her worship had long existed. "True Catholics no longer pray to Jesus, except through Mary," so declare Romanist authorities.

Many, like the great Dominican ascetic and mystic, Suso, when meeting a woman, stepped respectfully aside, though their bare feet must tread the gutter or thorns. But this was done, not to exalt woman, as such, but rather to discredit married women by exalting the Virgin. Suso said: "I do this to render homage to our Holy Lady, the Virgin Mary."

While by contrast with the Virgin idol this was intended as a reflection on the generality of women, it undesignedly brought about, among laymen, that worshipful attitude toward women which was characteristic of that chivalric love of mediaeval knighthood. Thus the priest unconsciously sowed the seed of chivalry, for the homage he paid to women, for the sake of a dead virgin, was soon imitated by laymen, for the sake of a live lover. On the part of those who "sigh like a furnace," this led to that mad apotheosis of love passion which found its public expression in the poetry and songs of the troubadours and glee-maidens, and the special code of sex ethics which was administered by their Courts of Love.

They seem to have esteemed love far higher than religion or virtue, or any restraining influence. In their Laws of Love, it was laid down that "Marriage cannot be pleaded as an excuse for refusing to love; that it is not becoming to love those ladies who only love with a view to marriage; that nothing prevents one lady being loved by two gentlemen, or one gentleman by two ladies; and that love cannot exercise its power on (between) married people."

No wonder, then, that every court lady esteemed it necessary, as a point of amorous etiquette, to have a troubadour in her train, and that he, in silly proof of the madness of his devotion, often suffered the greatest bodily macerations. All this but furnished added evidence of how extremes beget extremes. As the monks and priests overestimated the

sinfulness of love, so to the same extent did the knighthood of bachelors overvalue the ethical potency of love passion. Even to this day, a large mass of people still judge unauthorized sexuality to be immoral *per se*, and another large mass determine its ethical status by the degree of intensity of the love passion which prompts it. Both are equally wrong, because they alike ignore the essential factor of social utility as an ethical criterion.

This chivalry developed among the only people outside the clergy who had any influence, and therefore supplied a new element in the future ideal of marriage. The harshness of the old slavery was ameliorated. The husband, imitating or competing with the knight, must at least seem to be a generous and benevolent master, granting favors, though imposing duties and denying equality. The wife must be a willing and dutiful serf, whose chief virtue must be the inexpensiveness of her keeping and the absence of even a longing for equalities of opportunity and liberty. Although this marital chivalry was but a verbal exaltation and an empty ceremonial idolatry of women, it served a useful purpose in initiating a reaction against the dominant ascetic misogyny.

More and more the wife ceased to be a mere slave who served wine to her husband's guests, and oftener was allowed a seat at his table. Gradually those old legal discriminations against women and wives, which had their origin when the wife was a chattel, are being supplanted by more enlightened statutes. Gradually, social customs are according a nearer approach to female equality. Gradually, the more liberal churches are recognizing woman's equal rights, not only in the pews, but even as preachers. Gradually, a few are seeing the injustice in the continued denial of political equality; and still later will come the insistence upon marriage ideals which now seem new—but are not—in which the wife will be economically independent of her husband, intellectually the equal of her husband, politically with the opportunities of her husband, and morally as free and as responsible for herself as is her husband, with no sexual duties, but with privileges, and the recipient of an equal wage for the same labor.

All the remaining inequalities by which women are discriminated against find their sole justification in her economic dependence during marriage, which is the potent remnant of her slave condition, about which clusters that public opinion which excuses all the continuing wrongs to women and seeks to conceal them under a meaningless verbal exaltation. So she has become "the queen of the kitchen stove." The influence of the church in the matter of shaping marriage ideals is waning. Organized bigotry cannot cope successfully with the silent industrial and economic forces which compel readjustment.

During the later Middle Ages, while the actual chattel character of woman's slavery was disappearing, all of its incidents remained. A

"gentleman" could have no occupation, except to fight and to love. The wife was a drudge. She could and did shear sheep, spin yarn, weave the cloth, and make the clothes. While the quality of livelihood and "protection," which her lord and master furnished her in return, was never measured by the quality or quantity of her drudgery or progeny, there can be no doubt but that she never received from him as much as the market value of her labor. In one sense she was dependent, because her husband alone determined the compensation for her services; yet there can be little doubt that, except in rare cases, the balance was so much in her favor that more often it could be said that her husband was living upon her labor than that she was an idle dependent upon his.

This has been changed in a very large measure by our industrial development. Where nearly all were peasant, millions are now city folk. The shepherd is far removed from the throng. The homemade wooden shoes, sandals, and moccasins have been replaced by the factory-made shoe. Spinning is no longer a fireside occupation. The stockings which were commonly knit by our grandmothers are now factory made. The old ancestral hand loom does not compete with child labor running machines. Sweatshop clothing and fashionable tailors have removed the disgrace, which, until recently, attached to the woman who could not make her own and her family's clothes. The cooking, and even the washing, are largely and often better and cheaper done at the bakery, the cannery, the hotel, and the laundry, than within the domicile.

One by one, the occupations of the house have been removed to the factory. Only in the rural districts do any of them remain. Even the care and education of our children is now better done by trained nurses and kindergartners and by professional pedagogues than could possibly be done by most mothers. Except where dire economic necessity compels it, married women have not followed their work when it left the home. This, then, brings us to a condition where there are thousands of women of the miscalled better classes who live in boarding houses and hotels, in idle ease, or in homes where they are figureheads, posing as their husbands' exalted head servants, but whose only ambition in life is to be accredited with respectability, and whose only occupation is to render service, mostly barren, to the husbands who furnish support as compensation.

Such wives are not chattel slaves, but willing dependents. They are not the drudging house servants of old, nor the co-laborers of their husbands, as in our rural population. They differ in no essential from the kept woman, unless we have so low an estimate of the marriage state that we call the ceremony the essence, and a carelessly misplaced "respectability," the final test of marriage morals.

These women have neither the freedom nor the relative intelligence of the *hetaerae* of Greece. Doubting their ability for self-maintenance,

or unwilling to assume its labors, when the methods of discredited women are quite adequate to insure a husband's generosity, economic and social pressure induce them to submit meekly to a double standard of morals when it does not lessen the luxury of their own support. The same conditions combined with the great mental indolence, make them ever willing to tickle their husbands' vanity by a worshipful attitude toward their mediocre intellect.

Thus it has come to pass that with a large section of our public the wife's economic dependence, intellectual inferiority, submission to a double standard of morals, and the acceptance of support in compensation for a fruitless service have come to be a part of our marriage ideal, and, I fear, is the predominant ambition of even those married women who do work.

We hear "eminently respectable" people speaking of girls as "well married," meaning only thereby to indicate that they have made an advantageous bargain for their future support in idleness. These conditions seldom find duplications in past history. This situation has perhaps been unavoidable, and represents the remnants of our former female chattel slavery partially adjusted to our modern industrial conditions.

The course of evolution is never completed. The still "respectable" marriage ideal just portrayed, and the other contemporaneous ideals, mark a transition in which the chief compelling force will be economic pressure, and its influence must now be pointed out.

These anomalous ideals of the past century did not long pass without being vigorously challenged. Years ago Phillips Brooks wrote: "Self-support is as much the duty of a woman as a man. Servile dependence in money matters is no longer deemed honorable."

With the granting of equal educational opportunities to women, and a growing—but still restricted—business chance, there have come into being large numbers of women who decline to marry except on terms of equality to themselves. Men of the same class have not so numerously adjusted to the new conditions. The woman of capacity, not compelled to enter matrimony as a business offering support, and seldom able to find a suitable man who shares her advanced ideals, declines to marry at all. As a result, the much envied "bachelor girl" has replaced the formerly despised "old maid." From such conditions were unavoidably evolved the ideals of an economically independent wifehood so vigorously defended by an increasing number of women.

Among the peasants and unfortunate classes least influenced by the *bourgeoise* opinion, the wives have always remained the co-laborers of their husbands. These women, besides raising their families, have done much of the sewing and drudgery of their more fortunate and less prolific sisters. Among the very wealthy, women have their separate estates,

and enjoy independence and equality to as high degree as they are capable of appreciating. Indeed these often have reversed the conditions, by taking a male dependent as a spouse. This is notoriously true of those American heiresses who purchase foreign titles, to which the acquisition of an impecunious husband seems a mere incidental detail.

It is precisely in that large and pretentious middle class, falsely claiming to be the bulwark of our marriage morals, that we find the largest number of wives accepting and longing for support in idleness. Notwithstanding their comparative poverty, they, more than all else, love to imitate the ostentatious, wasteful, and idle luxury of their wealthier sisters. They can discover no easy road to the goal and retain their respectability, except by selling themselves in marriage. This condition is receiving vigorous bombardment, not only from progressive thinkers, but also from certain reactionaries, who are seeking a return to ideals of the latter Middle Ages, where fecundity was the measure of the married woman's respectability.

However, our moral progress is very seldom the result of conscious effort to arrive at moral truth. The very great majority of mankind acquire ethical concepts solely by the process of making a virtue of their necessities. The arguments of Phillips Brooks and Charlotte Gilman, and the declamations of Theodore Roosevelt and the Mother's Congress, will have influence only in so far as they supply a defense to wives for the doing of what they must do, even without a defense.

It is economic pressure which will compel our acceptance of an economically independent wifehood as an ideal. As our industries are now organizing, competition among employers is rapidly disappearing, and the competition among employes is likely to become ever more keen. This means that an increasing number of families will be compelled to enter the ranks of those wherein the wife must contribute toward the family maintenance, or submit to the family's dissolution. Likewise an increasing number of young women will find themselves confronted with a choice between celibacy and a married life in which they continue to be productive workers.

So long as the marriage relation implies a difference of financial and moral responsibility, so long will there exist between men and women a double standard of necessities and morals. Under the pressure of adverse conditions the provider naturally, if not justly, to some extent measures the necessities of his dependent wife by his own financial surplus over personal necessities and pleasures, and never by the market value of the services rendered by his "helpmate." Thus it is, that the wife's allowance usually increases as her household and motherhood service decrease, with the growing prosperity of the husband. With disappearing prosperity, the wife's ability to adapt herself to her source of supplies becomes ever more difficult.

Reinforced by the transmitted ideals of the Dark Ages, the average husband's peculiar sense of justice, or his vanity, demands of a dependent wifehood, as the price of benevolence in his economic mastery, that he shall be the exclusive owner of her body and mind, and so long as he believes in his own dominance, under the influence of temptation, he will deny reciprocity in these respects.

Now we come to a tracing of the operation of the economic pressure in its remolding of our ideals of the marriage state. We shall here discover how necessity is compelling, in the middle classes, an acceptance of the ideal of an economically independent wifehood.

The married man, with a dependent wife, applying for a position of trust with but a small salary attached is silently discriminated against, because the temptation to keep up the required social bluff of family life on a small salary so increases the moral risk of his employment as to make him an unsafe servant. These motives of the employer do not always become known to the rejected applicant and almost never to the public. However there are exceptions.

The press dispatches recently announced that the Corn Exchange National Bank of Chicago had posted this notice: "Employes of this bank receiving a salary of less than $1,000 a year, must not marry without first consulting the bank officials and obtaining their approval." The reason assigned was that "It is nonsense for a man to attempt to care for a wife and family with an annual income of $1,000. We would feel ourselves partly responsible for any misery which might follow, if we approved of such a course." The clear imputation is that an economically dependent wife, to a husband with small salary, is a direct inducement to embezzlement, and prudent business men are unwilling to assume the moral risks.

All this but makes it clear that economic and social pressure are compelling the abandonment of our present ideals which, without clearer moral vision, we refuse voluntarily to relinquish. Thus we will arrive at a legalized, easily dissoluble monogamy, into which woman will enter on terms of perfect equality as to her economic, moral, religious, and political status, and her compulsory maternity will be replaced by the enlightened motherhood of privilege, in which the right of the child to be well born will be the paramount consideration. The realization of this ideal, toward which we are tending, is still far off.

4. *The Growth of the Romantic Impulse*[1]

"Falling in love" is, with Americans, the natural, expected, and, above everything else, the proper prelude to marriage. On the other hand, "love before marriage" has been tabooed by all peoples in the past

[1] Adapted from BURGESS, ERNEST W., The Romantic Impulse and Family Disorganization, *Survey*, vol. 57, pp. 290–294, Dec. 1, 1926.

and is frowned upon by the overwhelming majority of contemporary societies as foolish, shameless, even indecent. We are so committed to the idea that marriage is legitimate only when it is the culmination of a romance that a candid inquiry into the merits of marriage systems which make no provision for courtship is, to say the least, not easy. Courtship is, as a matter of fact, a natural phenomenon; it is a type of behavior that man shares with the lower animals. May we not, therefore, regard the attempt to limit the free choice of mates as, in some sense, a crime against nature?

At any rate, the conviction that marriage is but the formal sanction, which society is bound to give, to a deep and mystical experience—an experience so intimate and personal that any attempt to scrutinize or question it must be regarded as an impertinence—has assumed in the United States, and elsewhere in comparatively recent years, the character of a social dogma. As such it has played the rôle of a psychic censor, inhibiting inquiry not only into the nature of the marriage relation, but into the sources of the present alarming increase of familial disorganization, disclosed even by the most external measures, such as the court records reported by the United States Census. There was, for example, one divorce to every 6.9 marriages in 1924, as contrasted to one divorce for every 17.1 marriages in 1890.

In two original if not in all respects scholarly volumes,[1] Henry T. Finck has proposed and elaborated the audacious thesis that romantic love "is a modern sentiment, less than a thousand years old, and not to be found among savages, barbarians, or Orientals." Certainly in the Orient today, except where Occidental culture has penetrated, society does not encourage romance in connection with, nor as a prelude, to marriage.

In Japan, as in China and India, parents emphasize practical considerations—social status and economic standing—and ignore, on the whole, sentiment and personal preferences in arranging the marriages of their children. How completely the individual may accept marriage as a family affair rather than as a personal matter is delightfully portrayed in "A Daughter of the Samurai," the autobiography of a Japanese girl who became an American woman. Etsu Inagki Sugimoto was betrothed at thirteen:

> There was a meeting of the family council, the largest that had been held since father's death. Two gray-haired uncles were there with the aunts, besides two other aunts, and a young uncle who had come all the way from Tokyo on purpose for this meeting. They had been in the room a long time, and I was busy writing at my desk when I heard a soft "allow me to speak!" behind me, and there was Toshi at the door, looking rather excited.

[1] "Romantic Love and Personal Beauty," 1887; "Primitive Love and Love Stories," 1889.

"Little Mistress," she said, with an unusually deep bow, "your honorable mother asks you to go to the room where the guests are." I entered the big room. Tea had been served and all had cups before them or in their hands. As I pushed back the door they looked up and gazed at me as if they had never seen me before. I made a low, ceremonious bow. Mother motioned to me, and I slipped over beside her on the mat.

"Etsu-jo," mother said very gently, "the gods have been kind to you, and your destiny as a bride has been decided. Your honorable brother and your venerable kindred have given much thought to your future. It is proper that you should express your gratitude to the Honorable All."

I made a long, low bow, touching my forehead to the floor. Then I went out and returned to my desk and my writing. I had no thought of asking, "Who is it?" I did not think of my engagement as a personal matter at all. It was a family affair.

Not alone in the Orient, but in ancient Greece and Rome and, indeed, among modern European peoples, marriage is still more a matter of family arrangement than of personal choice. Matrimony begins and continues in feelings and attitudes of respect between husband and wife, rather than love.

Yet, although romantic love has become but lately the first consideration in *marriage*, nevertheless, the thesis of its recent origin as the basis of association between men and women cannot be accepted.

Romantic love, or something closely akin to it, was seen in Athenian life, but not in the relations of husband and wife. Indeed, "a wife," according to Menander, "is a necessary evil." "The tender, unselfish solicitude for the welfare of the beloved was felt sometimes by men for promising lads; the enthusiasm of passion was sometimes kindled by a gifted courtesan, educated by the conversations of the great men of her time." The *hetaerae*, skilled entertainers in dancing and music, were not infrequently friends of statesmen, artists, and philosophers. Most famous of all was Aspasia, the companion, mistress, and, finally, the wife of Pericles.

In Cicero's day there arose in Rome, under Grecian influences, a new type of woman, the woman of *cultus*. "More and more the notion gained ground that a clever woman who wished to make a figure in society, to be the center of her own *monde*, could not well realize her ambition simply as a married woman. She would probably marry, play fast and loose with the married state, neglect her children, if she had any, and after one or two divorces, die or disappear . . . " The *hetaerae* of Greece and the women of *cultus* of Rome were forerunners of the "new woman" of our time.

The origin of romantic marriage has often been attributed by scholars to the chivalrous knight and the courteous lady of feudal society. But the love of the lady of the castle was not, as was due, for her liege and

lord, her husband, but was bestowed upon some gallant knight, or wandering troubadour, or adoring poet.

A more tenable theory derives the romantic basis of modern marriage from the social life of royal courts in the seventeenth century, particularly from that of France. The brilliance of the court with its punctilious etiquette and freedom of morals attracted an outer circle of ladies in waiting and courtesans, sometimes of gentle birth, not infrequently of lowly origin, who by their loveliness of face and figure, charm of manner, or vivacity of mind, might well evoke the grand passion in courtier, nobleman, or king. The romance thus engendered might terminate in a temporary alliance, or in a long attachment as mistress, or even in permanent union in marriage. Louis XIV, *le grand monarque*, matrimonially allied with the Hapsburgs, had a succession of mistresses, the last and most famous of whom, the Marchioness de Maintenon, born in prison and reared in poverty, he secretly wedded, although he never raised her to the throne vacated by the death of his queen. Most romantic of all was the dizzy rise of the illiterate daughter of a Lithuanian peasant on the uncertain stepping-stones of masculine favor: the bride of a Swedish dragoon; the war prize of a Russian general; the purloined favorite of a prince; the mistress and then wife and consort of Peter the Great; and finally, after his death, Catherine I, the regnant empress of the Russias.

In the next century in France with its highly artificial social life developed to a degree of perfection previously unknown the art of *politesse* as a basis of social intercourse between the sexes.

The *liaisons* of its ladies were only one phase of this new and daring adventure of women into the realm of masculine literary, philosophic, and political interests, invaded before only by the *hetaerae* and courtesans.

While in that same eighteenth century in England the intellectual "ladies of blue stockings" were unromantic not only in their marriages but also in their associations with the great men of their time, the meteoric career of five or six ladies of the demimonde fascinated and shocked the nation. But fashions in the demimonde of fair and frail ladies and gallant and spirited gentlemen changed—and the romantic association rose in esteem.

[By 1769] it had ceased to be the mode to make a *fille de joie* a universal toast. Now the man of spirit flaunted his own mistress, and a score of famous *liaisons*, dating from this time or a little later, indicate a variation from the previous custom. Lord Sandwich and Martha Ray, Lord Seaforth and Harriet Powell, Lord Engremont and Rosalie Duthe—these are among the most famous alliances of that period. The change was salutary in another respect, for the patron often married his paramour.

In the past the romantic impulse and matrimony were disassociated. True, mad infatuations on occasion have led into happy married life, but

these are the exceptions that might be taken to prove the rule. And unfortunately in many of these instances the wife before marriage had been a notorious woman. In the Old World romance was kept apart from marriage because of its seeming incompatibility with any prudent consideration of family interests. Therein lies the unique interest in the attempt in the New World of America to reconcile the romantic impulse with family well-being.

It is in the United States that perhaps the only, at any rate the most complete, demonstration of romantic love as the prologue and theme of marriage has been staged. The explanation lies not far afield. The relaxation of parental control over courtship has changed marriage into a romantic adventure instead of a serious and responsible undertaking in which not merely the family but the state was concerned.

The natural setting for romantic love is freedom of choice, but that is not all that is implied. The meaning of the term "romantic" gets its essential nuances in a contrast with the terms "conventional," "formal," "decorous," and "constrained." For the romantic impulse manifests itself in feelings and sentiments that are profoundly personal and imperious. In its more passionate expression it knows neither limits nor restraints, but possesses the lover so completely that reputation, honor, truth, and loyalty seem as nothing to the smile of the loved one. It is the essence of romantic love that it is unlimited and unrestrained, and the consequence is that it releases all the other elementary passions, jealousy and revenge, so intimately associated with it. That is one significance of the proverb, "All is fair in love and war."

Naturally, then, romantic love tends to consider the person, not the type, and personal traits, as beauty, charm, individuality, rather than family wealth and social standing. Accordingly, love overcomes, or seeks to overcome, all the barriers of wealth, class, and culture. The romantic aspect of courtship is heightened wherever an attempt is made to limit freedom of choice, as when parental opposition results in an elopement.

There seems to be no doubt that romantic love has, from an early period, been accepted as the sole basis for marriage by practically all classes in this country. In his "Social History of the American Family" Arthur W. Calhoun gives unmistakable evidence in the decades after the Revolutionary War of the "non-commercial character of American marriage" and of "carelessness as to social rank." In the United States as nowhere else in the world has headstrong and heedless youth literally exemplified the amusing admonition of Gilbert and Sullivan:

> Never mind the why and wherefore,
> Love can level ranks, and therefore.

The public appetite is insatiable for news of marriage, with or without the parental blessing, of a scion of millions with a servant maid; of a

Harvard graduate with a chorus girl; of an heiress from New York's most exclusive social circle with a self-made song writer whose boyhood was spent on the East Side.

The romantic impulse as it finds its expression in love-making and marriage in this country has had a history in which at least three main trends may be distinguished: the termination of romance with marriage and its conversion into conjugal affection; the formulation of the doctrine that the validity of marriage inheres in the continuance of romantic love; and a widespread reaction against romantic love and the emergence of a cynical attitude toward courtship and the marriage institution.

At first, and typically in rural communities, romance parallels courtship and terminates with marriage. The convention is maintained, however, that "they live together happily ever afterward." No one will deny that in the open country, in villages and towns, husband and wife, with few exceptions, "live together ever afterward," whether happily or not, but probably more happily than their city cousins. The romance of courtship mediates the early adjustments of married life and remains an enthralling memory in the family annals. Before the advent of the automobile, courtship and marriage took place in the country within a small geographical area where "everyone knew everyone else." For a youth to escort a girl home from evening service at church on three successive Sundays made him her "steady." Engagement and then marriage almost inevitably followed. With marriage, the newly wedded couple "settled down," the husband to the regular round of farming, the wife to the routine of the activities of the house and garden. Their common interests centered in the management of the farm and the rearing of children.

Ernest Mowrer, in "Family Disorganization," explains why the family in rural America absorbed practically all the interests of both husband and wife. Outside of marriage there was no career for women.

> In the rural environment of the New World the family was an essential economic unit. The wife played the part of a partner in wresting a livelihood from the soil. Woman found her true sphere in the home as a wife and mother. Spinsterhood was feared because there was no place for the single woman except the status of a household drudge. The prime motive in marriage was to have a home—to be economically secure.

The industrial revolution, the growth of cities, the increase in leisure time, and the forward strides in popular education could not but have their effect upon marriage and the family. The taking of work out of the home and the consequent economic and social emancipation of women served in one way or another to heighten the emphasis upon romantic love, not only before but after marriage.

Romance no longer was taken for granted. It became the theme of a vast literature. The "best sellers" of E. P. Roe, Laura Jean Libbey, and

Harold Bell Wright had an enormous influence in defining, particularly for rural districts, romantic notions of courtship and marriage. The love stories in popular magazines, with a circulation running into hundreds of thousands, have tended more and more to "play up" the stimulating and the exciting in the adventure of love. The daily newspapers have followed suit with thrilling and sensational "true" stories from "life." Finally the motion picture portrays romance, with all the semblance of reality, so that the stars of the screen have become the models for millions of devotees. Significant also is the appearance of the so-called "problem" novel and "problem" play with the discovery that the real issues in romantic love arise after rather than before marriage. All this interest and reflection, although largely based on vicarious experience, crystallized into a popular philosophy.

The central idea of this prevalent doctrine was that love and love alone was competent to bring together in marriage the persons best fitted to establish a family. Supreme happiness was to be found in marriage, but only with the predestined loved one. The theory of the "soul mate" soon was elaborated to include belief in "love at first sight" and in the necessity of meeting and marrying one's affinity for the fullest expansion of one's personality or the accomplishment of one's best work.

Naturally there was, even where passion was deep and sincere, disillusionment, notoriously when romantic impulses led to unions of persons with widely different cultural backgrounds and philosophies of life. It became only too evident that in many marriages even if respect remained, the romance faded. The affinity theory was modified to demand either the continuance of romantic love in marriage or the dissolution of marriage.

"Incompatibility of temperament," while not a legal ground for divorce, gained wide popular sanction, especially in cities, as a justification for dissolving an existing union in order to pursue ideal happiness in a new matrimonial venture. Rudolph Valentino, who in his acting symbolized to the public *par excellence* the romantic conception of love. is reported to have made this confession of his faith:

> I set out in the belief that I had achieved union with my ideal mate, and I thought there could be no greater happiness for a man than to be united to his soul mate. I soon realized that marriage and the artistic temperament could not harmonize and I lived in hell for the days in which I could not adjust myself to the extent of regaining my freedom. I pray you may never suffer as I have suffered. You may think it strange that I should have risked a second [marriage], but I was under the delusion that it would be different, and for some weeks everything suggested that I was right. This is the way that fate mocks us artists and it was not long until I realized that the second marriage was going the way of the first.

The popular philosophy of romantic love was always more or less tempered by common sense. But certain social reformers and advanced

thinkers carried this doctrine to its logical extreme of "free love." "As a guiding principle of morality, the unity of marriage and love must be maintained," declares Ellen Key, the ablest exponent of these new ideas. In her "Love and Marriage" may be found all the familiar articles of faith of romantic love, rationalized and emotionalized in support of "love's freedom," "the right of motherhood," "free divorce," and "a new marriage law."

> Those who belong to each other come together in the end; those whom chance parts, never belonged to each other . . . There can be no other standard of morality for him who loves more than once than for him who loves once only; that of the enhancement of life.
>
> In our time ethical obtuseness betrays itself first and foremost by the condemnation of those young couples who freely unite their destinies. When one soul has found another soul, when the senses of both have met in a common longing, then they consider that they have a right to the full unity of love.

The theories and conclusions of such radical idealists have had little or no influence upon the masses of mankind, but they powerfully affected the small but influential group of the intelligentsia. Many individual attempts were made to demonstrate the validity of this rational program, as in experiments in New York's Bohemia, Greenwich Village, where social conditions were most favorable. In "Love and Greenwich Village," Floyd Dell pays a tribute to the enthusiasm, courage, and intellectual conviction with which these social rebels sought to carry out their unconventional program.

> We met each other at the Liberal Club and became good friends. We were very fond of talk. We talked over everything in the wide world . . . And incidentally, of course, we agreed in disbelieving in marriage. We considered it a stupid relic of the barbaric past, a ridiculous and tyrannical convention. We were altogether enchanted with each other's enlightened opinions.
>
> One evening, as Rosemary and I talked, there came in the midst of our intellectual discussion, a pause—a moment in which we gazed at each other in one of those silences that can end only in a kiss. And a moment later we knew—what anybody else, no doubt, could have told us all along, that we were in love.
>
> The occasion seemed to demand a pledge of some kind. And so, instead of promising, in the old-fashioned way, to be true to each other, we promised in a more modern fashion, that each would be true to himself. "And," said Rosemary "when the time comes, and one of us falls in love with somebody else, we won't lie about it. We will tell each other, and part. Freely, and without regrets or recriminations!"
>
> These were our vows—to be courageously candid in our expected and inevitable unfaithfulness. For we knew, intellectually, that the time would come when we would no longer love each other. Instinctively, we could not believe it—to speak of such a thing at a time like this was secretly a hurt to our deepest feelings. But we believed in facing the facts. We were reasonable, intellectual,

modern young people. And—there is no doubt about it—we felt superior to the common run of mankind.

It was true that our relationship would be condemned by nasty-minded people. However, we knew scarcely any nasty-minded people. Our friends were all modern young people like ourselves, many of whom, secretly or openly, had dispensed with ceremony in their love arrangements. And we had no anxious relatives to come snooping around, asking to see our wedding certificate. Moreover, being poor, we were obscure; no one in New York would care how we lived; the reporters would not camp on our doorstep asking for interviews on "free love." It was not necessary for us to pose on the one hand as martyrs to an ideal, nor on the other to skulk about in secret rendezvous under the disguise of false names and a wedding ring. We need neither argue about our conduct, nor lie about it. We could be lovers openly and fearlessly.

Regretfully the exvillagers of the story confess the failure of their romance because they found in it, to their surprise, all, or nearly all, the problems of institutional marriage, and also other problems. Finally, after several similar disillusioning episodes the exvillagers find happiness in marriages based upon comradeship and common interests.

The Greenwich Village experiment marks the ebb of American romanticism. No environment more propitious for the success of so radical an experiment could have been asked for. Its failure convinced the participants, if we may put credence in Mr. Dell's narrative, that romantic adventures in free love did not realize the promised enhancement of personality without at the same time entailing losses that offset or more than counterbalanced the gains.

These losses in disillusionment and in more tangible values naturally fell more heavily upon the women than upon the men. For one thing, these unions were predicated upon the absence of children, and if a child arrived, its interests and that of its mother had not been provided for.

Love in Greenwich Village suggests another interesting conclusion. The free unions seem to have been successful to the degree that the doctrine of free love was held as a matter of theory rather than of practice. Mr. Dell tells an astounding story, under the title A Piece of Slag, of the shattering of a union through an audacious although sincere attempt to submit the theories held by the lovers to the acid test of experience.

The romantic impulse by itself and unsupported by other sentiments and interests is not, it seems, sufficient to maintain the permanence of even a free union. The disillusioned rebels against society, themselves completely freed from conventions, have sought—each in his own way—a substitute or a supplement for the romantic impulse, and it seems to have been found in the comradeship and the mutuality of interests of married life.

This conception of a new basis for marriage upon something more than a mere love adventure has been excellently stated by Elton Mayo:

Adolescent love is an event; married love is a situation. The first is a critical phase of development, the second is sustained romance. Love for the wife implies an inability to conceive of life without her. For both man and woman the domestic atmosphere should hold rest, and understanding, and sympathy.

The exaggerated wonder of adolescence at the mysterious revelation of the loved one represents a stage of development that cannot be perpetuated. The irregular union is committed to the hopeless attempt to perpetuate this atmosphere—an attempt which invariably fails. The few that apparently succeed do so by reason of the fact that they become marriages in fact if not in law; the woman, as a novelist has said, ceases to be herself an adventure and goes with the man upon a joint adventure. The necessary condition of a continued intimacy of living for a man and woman is the development of an external and objective group of interests. These interests tend gradually to minimize, if not to supplant, the mutual preoccupation with each other of two lovers on a honeymoon. To the young and ardent I have no doubt that middle-aged matrimony seems unduly monotonous. To those who are middle aged and happy it seems to hold a serenity and a complexity of interest that compare well with the passing fevers of youth. If for no other reason, this apparent monotony might be justified by the single consideration of the disastrous effect which any alternative situation has upon the growing child.

The reaction against the romantic conception of marriage is largely confined to the intellectuals, whether conservative or radical; there has been, as yet, no corresponding popular revolt against romantic doctrines. There are symptoms, however, even here, of a coming explosion of the romantic dogma; among others, the restlessness of modern women, the insurgency of youth, a growing interest in getting at the underlying causes of family disorganization.

Of all these symptoms, the results of the new freedom of youth are most alarming to parents and to the public alike. In speech, in manner, and in attitude, boys and girls still in the teen age show heedless disregard for convention; a contempt for the advice of their elders or, worse yet, a smug indifference to it; a sublime faith in their own opinions about life and conduct; and a cynicism for "the sacred things of life" that shock the older generation and render its occasional efforts at intervention futile, if not absurd.

This attitude of youth does not represent any intellectual reaction against the doctrine of romantic love, but it may involve skepticism, if not cynicism, about love and marriage, which is likely to cause real and permanent loss because of the close interdependence of personal development with family life. For this additional reason the formulation of a new conception of a workable basis for family life is imperative. But parents and other representatives of the older generation find it difficult if not impossible to talk with the younger generation. "It is not so much what young people do, but the revolutionary and outrageous things they say, and the smart and smug way in which they say them," is the

exasperated comment of many an older person. The very mothers who found the advice of their own mothers helpful in affairs of the heart are bewildered and helpless in their few and vain attempts to advise their daughters.

Mrs. Wilberforce confided in her own mother the progress of her early love affairs. She was guided in them by the older woman's advice. Vivienne (her daughter), with a long procession of admirers, rarely speaks of any of them, except in the most casual tone. Once or twice, in sentimental bewilderment, she has turned to her mother for counsel and during the ensuing interview has given rather than taken advice. Mrs. Wilberforce becomes dumb and horribly ill at ease when her daughter listens to her, smiles and says; "Oh, mother, you're so awfully mid-Victorian!" Mid-Victorianism, inability to keep up with the times, are things Mrs. Wilberforce dreads above all others. She has grown accustomed to permitting Graham and Vivienne to express, unchallenged, beliefs she considers revolutionary, to do things she believes unwise, because of a fear that protest will make them regard her as they look upon grandma. Her constant dread is that her children will consider her old fashioned and reactionary.

It follows that the youth of our time is not likely to accept without question the counsel of age. The change in attitude even of the cultivated people described by Mr. Dell who have passed through the experiences of radical romanticism, disillusionment, and cynicism to a reconstructed philosophy of life will probably not be entirely convincing to young people of today. They will not cease to demand the autonomy of youth in working out their personal problems, and, as far as they are concerned, no problem is more personal than marriage.

The emancipation of youth, like the emancipation of women and the freeing of the slaves, is a situation which must, I am forced to conclude, be recognized, whether or not we approve of it. For its acceptance is a precondition of any communication with, or assistance to, the younger generation. In the long run, the only way any of us learn is by experience, and it has always been the function of the older generation to transmit its experience to the younger generation. The rapidity of social change in the last decade has become so great, however, that the experience of the past, at least in the details of conduct and morals, is of little or no use, and probably only a hindrance, to modern youth. Youth must solve its own problem of love and marriage and it must be largely in the light of its own experience, with whatever of perspective that experience gives.

In the accumulation of this experience, and in rendering it available to the adolescent and the youth, parents, teachers, social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, and sociologists can function, not as the moral preceptors of youth, but as fellow students of the complex and complicated problem of life.

This résumé of the role of the romantic tradition in love and marriage should not be taken as implying or prophesying its future disappearance from family life. Quite the contrary. The romantic impulse is an inveterate human trait which seeks expression in every field of man's activity, particularly in the love life. Its expression in courtship and marriage will continue. But there is even now every indication that the *doctrine* of romantic love as the supreme if not the sole *raison d'être* of marriage and the family is being replaced by the conception that romance, comradeship, and mutuality of interests, in due and perhaps changing proportions, are all necessary for satisfying relationships in courtship and marriage.

5. *Common-law Marriage*[1]

According to popular view, common-law marriage simply means living in adultery. The man and woman are not referred to as husband and wife merely, but as common-law husband and common-law wife. And even lawyers are constantly using these terms. As was said by the Supreme Court of New York: "The term 'common-law wife' is not one known to the law, and the law looks with no favor upon the connection indicated by it." But common-law marriage, the subject of this article, is as much a marriage as one attended with the utmost solemnity in those states where common-law marriages are recognized. This statement may be well illustrated by reference to a decision of a District Court of the United States in 1918. A man in Minnesota signed a contract of marriage in duplicate and sent both copies to a woman in Missouri. One copy she retained and the other she returned signed to the man in Minnesota. The parties were not in the presence of each other when the agreement was executed and never thereafter lived together. The man was killed on a railroad and the woman brought suit against the company as widow of the deceased. She recovered. There is ample authority for the statement that the decision would have been the same had the agreement been oral or even made over the telephone. A great number of cases arose during the war where American boys in France married girls in this country by such an exchange of consent.

The common-law marriage may be contracted in two ways: (1) *per verba de praesenti*, that is, by present consent to become husband and wife, and (2) *per verba de futuro*, that is, by an agreement to become husband and wife in the future, followed by carnal intercourse. The theory of the latter is that the carnal intercourse is the consummation of the previous agreement to marry in the future.

The common-law marriage gets its name from the common law of England. Strictly speaking, it is inaccurate. Marriage in England was

[1] Adapted from KOEGEL, OTTO E., Common-law Marriage, *Family*, vol. 4, pp. 172–174, November, 1923.

cognizable only in the spiritual or ecclesiastical courts and these courts administered the canon law or law of the Roman Church. Prior to the year 1563, when the *Decretum Reformatione* of the Council of Trent was passed, the canon law recognized consensual marriages in the forms referred to. The decrees of the Council of Trent, however, were never received in England, consequently informal marriages remained in force until 1753, when they were abolished by Act of Parliament. The basis of the jurisprudence of this country is the common law of England and, as no ecclesiastical tribunals were tolerated by the colonists, marriage and other subjects appertaining to the ecclesiastical courts in the mother country were considered as part of the common law of the new country. Hence common-law marriage is marriage good by the common law.

While the methods of contracting so-called "common-law" marriage above mentioned are admitted by text writers and some courts, most American courts have rejected the canon-law doctrine entirely and adopted a spurious doctrine which they call common-law marriage. No American court has expressly upheld a marriage *per verba de futuro cum copula*. Only six states have upheld a marriage contracted by mere words couched in the present tense without more. What most courts require is present consent followed by cohabitation or an assumption by the parties of the marital relationship. This, however, when analyzed, appears ridiculous. The parties must presently agree to become husband and wife and then they must live together as such. After they have done these things they are married by virtue of the spurious doctrine of so-called "common-law" marriage. A doctrine that requires two persons to be guilty of the crime of fornication a number of times before they create the legal status of matrimony is absurd. Yet this is exactly what is required in a number of American states. Again, where will the line be drawn? When do the parties cease to be fornicators, and just when does the sublime institution of matrimony begin? What about the legal presumption that intercourse illicit in its inception will be presumed to continue to be illicit? These and many other questions confront one upon investigation of this subject.

The state of the law on this subject is much confused. Very slight evidence of an intent to change the *status personarum* is required. The Supreme Court of Alabama has said that it is not necessary that the parties believe themselves "married in the eyes of the law," and they do not. Lord Stowell said they may doubt the validity of their marriage, and most of them do. Lord Stowell also said that secrecy is perfectly consistent with an informal marriage.

During the World War there was within the organization of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance the largest court of domestic relations in the world. The enlisted men in the military and naval service were compelled to support their families while in service unless granted exemp-

tion for good cause shown. More than 110,000 men claimed exemption from supporting their wives and children. Out of this number were many hundreds of alleged common-law marriages. A great many cases of alleged common-law marriages were also presented under the insurance and compensation features of the War Risk Insurance Act. There is no doubt that the War Risk Insurance Bureau considered more cases of alleged common-law marriage, yes, many times over, than are contained in all the reports of adjudicated cases put together. I am in a position to say that most of these alleged marriages are but meretricious relationships, for the convenience of the parties alone, and in a large percentage of cases the reason no formal celebration of the marriage was had is because one or the other, and in many cases both, of the parties were already married but not divorced from a former spouse. There is nearly always a ghost in the closet. Moreover, very few, if any, of these persons really believe they are married. If we adopt as a *sine qua non* to the validity of these marriages the belief of the parties that a divorce is necessary to dissolve the relationship (and it is necessary), then there are no common-law marriages. We have already seen, however, that they need not believe themselves married "in the eyes of the law." And few if any of these persons believe their children are legitimate. In fact, nearly all believe that "common-law marriage" and "living in adultery" are synonymous terms. And if the New York court was correct in its definition of "common-law wife," most lawyers believe the same, as lawyers invariably designate these persons as common-law husband and common-law wife.

The usual argument advanced in favor of these unions is that they render the children legitimate. This was the brief argument of the Supreme Court in 1878. But the fact is overlooked that a great number of these unions are not and were not intended to be permanent. The parties just "quit" as they call it, and then go through a marriage ceremony with someone else. If the first union is held a marriage in order to legitimate the children, the children of the subsequent formal union must be bastardized.

In connection with the proposed reform abolishing common-law marriages I would make this important suggestion: The statute should provide that where the parties attempt a valid ceremonial marriage, but because of the existence of an impediment can effect no valid marriage, as where the divorce from a former spouse is illegal, and continue the marital relationship after the impediment is removed, as where the divorced spouse dies, they should be deemed to be legally married effective from the date the impediment is removed. Alaska, Iowa, and Massachusetts seem to be the only states in which such provision has been made.

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Chapter VI

THE FAMILY INSTITUTION

We conceive of social institutions as having had their origin in the activities of individual men in response to their felt needs. These needs were of two kinds: at the lowest level of continued existence it was necessary to escape the destructive forces of nature and to satisfy the imperative appetites. By trial and error and fortunate accident a survival adjustment was achieved and maintained. The repetition of successful efforts and the consequent formation of habit gave a working adjustment to the environment. Successful individual activity, through copy and repetition, became the usual or universal practice of the associated members of the horde.

These folk practices had of necessity a certain degree of internal consistency. The values, the objects of human effort, being the creation of human need, were interrelated from the point of view of human satisfaction, and behavior toward these values assumed forms that were at least not obviously contradictory. The adjustments worked out were not of necessity the best nor the only possible solutions of the problems of existence. Often they were obviously not the best and in some cases they were positively injurious. But they were adjustments and in their totality they formed a more or less coherent and integrated body of practice that characterized the group.

The familiar ways of acting toward given values and common situations appeal to individuals as natural behavior. In the table included in the first reading in this chapter, for example, Mr. Chapin has listed some of the characteristic types of human behavior which have resulted in four basic social institutions. These are simply the ways in which things are done, the ways in which people act. They are accepted much as are other uniformities in the environment. They hardly come within the realm of the deliberate and conscious except in the event of divergent behavior. In such case they are looked upon as the way in which people ought to act. Divergent and non-conforming behavior attracts attention and excites fear, disapproval, and anger. The usual ways thus come to have the moral sanction of the group. They are looked upon as normal and right and are thought to be necessary to group welfare. These customary norms come presently to have a divine sanction; a main function of religion has always been to give supernatural approval to group customs. The final step is idealization. This is the point at which the

ideal of individual conduct is behavior in conformity with the prevailing standards.

The body of group practices toward a group of related values together with their rationalizations, especially when there has been developed a machinery for their enforcement and propagation, is what is meant by an institution. It is an organization of values and attitudes that has become more or less standardized.

Any body of organized social practices is thus highly resistant to change. It exists in the habits of individuals and in the group tradition. In each there is inertia and a tendency for the familiar patterns to be perpetuated. The child is always born into such an established group and his habits formed in accordance with its patterns. There are also the positive factors of fear and sentiment which operate to uphold the existing arrangements. The known is safe and its discomforts are discounted. The inertia of habit and the emotional resistance to change may be so great that social practices persist to the point of positive disutility. For example, certain groups with infanticide customs continue the practices even when changed environmental conditions make an increase of numbers an outstanding need of the group. Food taboos are often observed to the great discomfort or even starvation of individuals or groups. Wherever social practices have reached an institutional stage and developed an administrative machinery there is developed a new and powerful internal resistance to change. The group of specialized persons required to perform the institutional rites, and the livelihood of these people, comes to depend upon the perpetuation of the institutional status. These and other beneficiaries of the order struggle valiantly for the preservation of the institution and their consequent sinecures. Any particular institutional organization becomes intimately bound up with other parts of the social order; it supports and is supported by the other institutions. Any change in the aspect or function of one institution tends to disorganize the whole complex, it results in changes in the total integrated social order.

Changes that come about in the institutional order are seldom planned, deliberate, and intentional; generally they are little or not at all rational. Changes ordinarily come through the neglect of individuals to observe the traditional forms or through their violation of the taboos. Such behavior is, in general, individual effort to satisfy needs and gratify wishes that are thwarted by institutional arrangements. They are numerous in proportion to the failure of the institution to make possible the satisfaction of the needs for which it was in the first instance organized. Violations of the institutional forms are seldom designed to weaken the institution.

In the present society a tendency to these violations is conspicuously present, and notoriously so with regard to the family institution. This

doubtless arises in part from the conflict of individual motives with social functions of which Mr. Bruno speaks. The one essential institutional and social function of the family must always be understood as the care and rearing of children, but it is very likely that the motive underlying the inception of many individual modern families is based upon very different objectives. It becomes quite necessary at the present time to distinguish clearly between marriage and family relationships. The family is always an inherent potentiality of marriage, but there is an increasing tendency under modern conditions for them to separate into two quite distinct forms of behavior. At the same time that children have become a great economic liability, the home has been deprived of all those secondary functions, discussed by Mr. Ogburn, which have made it in the past a field of satisfying and fruitful activity. Thus it happens that although the basic social function of the family is quite unchanged, the human motives have been altered by the new environing conditions. The older institutional form is found in a state of flux which must be expected to persist until human behavior has once more become stabilized and standardized in an adjustment of need to circumstance.

However, quite apart from any consideration of determining motive, the existing family is still a chief instrumentality for the development of personality not only in the children but perhaps in the adults as well. Mr. Burgess' famous phrase describing the family as "a unity of interacting personalities" has regard for these reciprocal reactions of children upon parents as well as of parents upon each other. His paper on The Family and the Person, included in this chapter, serves to indicate the manner in which the mechanisms of family life operate to the production and modification of personality. The excerpts from the adolescent life history show in concrete detail something of the inner meaning of the relationship in the life and development of a child. The institutional family is seen to be something much more than the vague and mystical concept that some writers on the subject would seem to make it appear. It is a very definite and concrete form of human association and activity, forming and modifying life responses in its members by means of quite specific and intelligible processes.

1. *The Nature of Social Institutions*[1]

Man is not only a tool-making animal, he is an institution-making animal. There have been many definitions of institutions and in a general way we know what we mean when we use the word. Some students have found it important to distinguish between the function

[1] Adapted from CHAPIN, F. STUART, A New Definition of Social Institutions, *Social Forces*, vol. 6, pp. 375–377, March, 1928.

of an institution and its structure. Allport has attempted an analysis of political institutions and comes to the conclusion that " . . . social structure from the psychological standpoint is reducible to common and reciprocating attitudes of individuals and variations in such attitudes as to both content and degree of generality." Thus the structure of a social institution is reduced to a form of behavior. It is obvious, of course, that social institutions are significant as they influence or express human behavior, but the social institution is also a culture complex and this unity of characteristic human behavior and associated culture complex is sufficiently definite so that we recognize such different institutions as the family, the state, religion, industry, and a host of lesser forms.

In order to give body to the idea or concept of the social institution, let us consider in order some of its characteristics.

First, a social institution arises out of and as a result of repeated groupings of interacting human individuals in response to elemental needs or drives (sex, hunger, fear, etc.).

Second, common reciprocating attitudes and conventionalized behavior patterns develop out of the process of interaction (affection, loyalty, cooperation, domination, subordination, etc.).

Third, cultural objects (traits) that embody symbolic values in material substances are invented or fabricated and become the cue stimuli to behavior conditioned to them (the idol, cross, ring, flag, etc. are charged with emotional and sentimental meaning).

Fourth, cultural objects (traits) that embody utilitarian values in material substances are invented or fabricated and become the means of satisfying creature wants for warmth, shelter, etc. (buildings, furniture, etc.).

Fifth, preserved in oral or written language, externally stored and handed down from one generation to the next, there is description and specification of the patterns of interrelationship among these elemental drives, attitudes, symbolic culture traits, and utilitarian culture traits.

These five traits just enumerated are all capable of objective treatment and some have been quantitatively measured (the attitudes). They appear in combination and are always interdependent in a functional sense. Taking the family as an illustration of the institutional complex, it may be conceived in the words of Burgess "as a unity of interacting persons"; and by this he means that the unity of interacting personalities is a living, changing, growing thing. But this dynamic aspect of the institutional complex does not deprive it of the attribute of structure, a term which " . . . may properly be applied to the fabric of relations and prescribed positions with which societal functions are permanently connected." We are now prepared to consider the structural aspect of social institutions, since this phase of the phenomena possesses great cultural significance.

We may say that the structure of a social institution consists in the combination of certain related type parts into a configuration possessing the properties of relative rigidity and relative persistence of form, and tending to function as a unit on a field of contemporary culture. This definition is consistent with those of Burgess and Sumner just quoted. It differs from these in that it attempts to specify the varied attributes of the complex whole. Let us explain precisely what is meant by "type parts."

Four main type parts which combine to produce the configuration or cultural concretion known as the social institution are:

First, common reciprocating attitudes of individuals and their conventionalized behavior patterns.

Second, cultural objects of symbolic value; that is, objects charged with emotional and sentimental meaning to which human behavior has been conditioned.

Third, cultural objects possessing utilitarian value; that is, material objects that satisfy creature wants.

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Type	Parts of structure	Family	State	Religion	Industry
I	Attitudes and behavior patterns.	Love Affection Devotion Loyalty Parental respect	Devotion Loyalty Respect Domination Subordination Fear	Reverence Awe Fear Loyalty Devotion Subordination	Fair play Loyalty Cooperation Conflict Workmanship Thrift
II	Symbolic culture traits....	Marriage ring Crest Coat of arms Heirloom	Flag Seal Emblem National anthem Army, navy	Cross Ikon Idol Shrine Hymn Altar	Trade-mark Patent sign Advertising emblem
III	Utilitarian culture traits...	Home equipment Personal property	Public buildings Public works Warlike equipment	Church buildings Cathedral Temple Sanctuary Altar	Stores, shops Factories Ships Railroads Machinery
IV	Oral or written specifications.	Will Marriage license Genealogy *Mores*	Treaties Constitution Charter Laws Ordinances *Mores*	Creed Doctrine Hymn Bible Sacred book *Mores*	Franchise Licenses Contracts Partnership papers Articles of incorporation *Mores*

Fourth, oral or written language symbols which preserve the descriptions and specifications of the patterns of interrelationship among attitudes, symbolic culture traits, and utilitarian culture traits.

The significance of these elements of the institutional complex will be made clear when we apply them as criteria to analyze the institutions of the family, the state, religion and industry. In every case the principle will be more convincing if a particular family, a specific religious denomination, some localized state unit, or a definite industrial enterprise is kept in mind. The preceding table offers an analysis of four great human institutions in terms of the four "type parts" which we have defined above.

The list of examples of each type part is, of course, not complete since only enough examples are given to clinch the point to be illustrated. Moreover, the categories overlap and one example may appear in two or more classes. Thus the hymn may set forth in writing certain desired attitudes and behavior patterns, but it has also high symbolic value. The army has symbolic value and also includes utilitarian culture traits (such as ordnance) used in warfare. Inherited personal property is used in the home, but regarded as an heirloom, it has great sentimental value involving family pride and devotion. This analysis helps us understand the justification for speaking of "old families" in contrast to the average and less colorful biological group. The essence of the old family is the continuity of its tradition and cultural possessions. Obviously the germ plasm of the old family is no more ancient than that of the unknown or nameless family. But in the case of the old family we find that certain attitudes have become traditional, a certain crest has become symbolic and an emblem of success, certain articles of household furniture or real property have been passed down almost intact for generations, and the family history is a matter of public knowledge either in oral tradition or written records.

2. *Function versus Motive in the Family Institution*[1]

Judge Parker, speaking before the U. S. Chamber of Commerce recently on business ethics, made the interesting distinction between economic function and economic motive. He pointed out that economic activities have reasons for their performance—they serve a useful purpose, but that the motives which lead people to engage in these activities may be quite different in their nature. Advertising has both an economic function and an economic motive. The function is to facilitate distribution; the motive which leads to advertising is gain. Obviously, these two may not coincide. When they do not, the economic function may be

[1] Adapted from BRUNO, FRANK J., Family Social Work, *Family*, vol. 6, pp. 141–144, July, 1925.

temporarily obscured or even defeated. It is worth while to pursue Judge Parker's distinction a little farther. The economic function of trade is, I suppose, to furnish goods; the economic motive of trade is profit. It is quite conceivable that the motive may under certain circumstances not only fail to "furnish goods" but actually hinder the process of furnishing them. On the other hand there is something inexorable about real economic functions. Sooner or later they win out, because of their inherent fitness for living, but a conflict between motive and function, before function has won out, produces suffering and economic maladjustment. One has only to look about him at economic activities, keeping in mind that economic function is to furnish goods and economic motive is profit, to recognize that these two forces—function and motive—are in a state of what my economics teacher used to call movable equilibrium, ever changing, ever attempting to adjust themselves to each other; yet always in conflict, and in that conflict producing some disastrous consequences. One of the words popular not so long ago in social work—maladjustment—is significant of this economic conflict. Of course, this explanation is simpler than the facts. For instance, economic processes are cooperative. The motives of all those engaged in the process may not be identical; occasionally they are opposed. Nor do the same groups always have the same motives. In production, the motive of the employer leads him to crowd for greater production; the motive of the employed, to limit production. In distribution, the parties exchange places. Yet in this double conflict and inversion of position caused by changing motives, the economic function remains the same. And I suppose it could be shown that, as motives led the participants in the economic processes to vary from the requirements of economic function, there was economic waste, and—what is more important to us—somebody suffered.

When we transfer this consideration to our own special field, that of social relations, a somewhat more careful analysis must be attempted. It is also true that we are probably on not quite so certain ground, as the general science of sociology has not been so successful in defining its concepts as the special social science of economics has been.

Social case work must assume as its major responsibility the task of determining whether men are successfully meeting the demands of the functions they are called upon as social beings to perform, and to aid them to a more successful participation when they have failed. (Success and failure are of course relative terms.) But social functions do not exist in the abstract, however convenient it may be to discuss them as if they did. An individual as a social being enters into certain relationships with others; he participates in joint activities with other individuals. For purposes of clarity, these joint activities may be called "social institutions." Illustrations of them are trade (which we have discussed

above and which is a social institution, although for purposes of special treatment it has been segregated into a science by itself, economics), the state (which is similarly treated in political science), the church, the family, the school, the community, and so on. As a social being, one is to be judged by the success with which he participates in the activities of one or more of these social institutions. Again, each of these institutions has a function or, more accurately, functions; and, in addition, individuals are induced to participate in these social institutions by a variety of motives, which may or may not lead the individual to act in harmony with the function of the institution. It should be said here that it is not necessary that the motive which leads to participation should make the individual conscious of the function of the institution. In fact, a good deal of successful functioning in social institutions is secured by wholly irrelevant motives: fears, taboos, customs, superstitions, public opinion.

One of the causes of the crises in social institutions today, and one which accounts for the rise of social work, is that the automatically acting motives, which the long history of the race selected into its behavior for their survival values, but without the conscious and intelligent cooperation of individuals, are gradually breaking down in the destruction of the simpler homogeneous communities of our ancestors. We are laboriously striving to substitute intelligent and purposed motivation for these older customs; but because we know so little of the real functions of social institutions and of the way by which the individual may successfully participate in them, our progress is slow, halting, and with many uncovered spots. There is a thoroughness in natural selection, even if it is slow and tremendously costly, which intelligent selection does not at present approximate. There are so many and unexpected factors. This is even true in the physical realm. We breed a bulldog for certain qualities and discover he is highly susceptible to pneumonia. It does not make much difference in a bulldog but it is a different matter when in the institution of the community we find that drinking alcoholic liquors has certain serious consequences in our complicated society, and we use the power of the state to ban it. Instantly a crop of socially injurious behaviors springs up unexpectedly. Or in a less debatable field, economics, we introduce the factory system into the institution of trade, aimed greatly to increase productivity. And it does. But look at what it brought with it of social problems in the last 150 years. A great deal of legislation during all that time has been directed toward correcting those unexpected results of modifying a social institution. On the other hand, sometimes one gets singularly complete results from such intelligent attempts to create a new social control. Ten years ago in Minnesota it was very common for a deserting or non-supporting husband to say that no one could compel him to support his family. A few well-thought-

out laws, rigorously enforced, have taught such men that the state has this power.

The dilemma of the thoughtful student and worker in the field of social relations is that he cannot rest inactive while much of the social organism is losing its roots in custom and tradition; nor can he change its bases, or the methods of enforcing its requirements, without danger of paying a high price in dislocation elsewhere.

As this is not a paper on social reform but on social case work, I merely will add dogmatically that the only present solution is to adopt a tentative attitude both with regard to what are the successful functionings of social institutions, and how men can be best induced to approximate them, as they change their bases of action from automatic habits, enforced by customs, to intelligently directed behavior.

The social institution in which we are interested is the family. This does not mean that in our social case work we do not or should not consider the members of the family in their relationships to other social institutions. If we give special emphasis to the institution of the family it is because either no one else is doing so in the field of social effort, or because its primary nature forces us to take it into special consideration as we treat an individual as a social being. However it may be, the family is the social institution of primary interest to us.

It would be an interesting task to list what has been said regarding the function of the family. May I be dogmatic and say, for the sake of brevity, that the family is a social institution primarily. Biologically it is not necessary. Economically it has serious disadvantages—for the woman at least—in spite of the popular adage that two can live more cheaply than one. For the permanent monogamous family, there is little need in hygiene, psychiatry, or psychology. The institution of the monogamous family has been selected into our psychosocial environment because of its social survival value when tested by society's need to preserve its gains—its social heritage. The function of the family may therefore be described as the vehicle for the transference of social heritage from one generation to its successor. The first chapter of Graham Wallas' "Our Social Heritage" dramatically symbolizes the content of social heritage. It is enough to remind you that it consists of all the customs, institutions, skills, learning, and culture of the race. If each generation had to learn it anew, there could be no social, although there might be biological, progress. We should be in about the same status as the animals, with only an inelastic and sharply limited instinct to guide us. The biologists of the last century pointed out how the greatly lengthened period of childhood of the human young permitted an extent of time for training possessed by no other animal. That of course is true, but the more inclusive fact they did not point out: that there must be a method for insuring this training on which the continuity of civiliza-

tion depended. As you stop to consider it, you can see that the family is as perfectly fitted to fulfill that function as any conceivable social contrivance. We know now that the plastic mind of the child is molded by the attitude of the adults about it, that affection toward it plays a large part in developing its own self-integration and sense of self-respect. This point is so well known that it is not necessary to elaborate it. What is not so generally recognized is the unique manner in which the institution of the monogamous family fits this need. You remember Miss Byington's definition of a family—as good a definition as I know—the affection of a man for a woman, of a woman for a man, and of them both for their children. Children born into such a relationship have the highest probability of receiving whatever their parents—the representatives of the previous generation—have to transfer to them. No external urging will ordinarily be necessary; on the contrary the strongest possible wish of the parents is to give all they can to their children. If such transference costs high in effort, if the adults must suffer pain and spend resource which makes a deep inroad upon them, this type of relationship gives the greatest possible assurance that the price will be paid. It could also be shown that not only content but kind of heritage is assured by this relationship of deep and lasting affection. Mrs. Sheffield, at one of these conferences, pointed out this aspect of the situation when she said that the mother is the priestess of the family, interpreting to the child the mysteries of life—handing down to it all that her predecessors had found valuable in facing the dread, unanswerable question which life presents—of hope, of faith, of devotion, of reverence. On the other hand, the father is the interpreter of the great world outside the home. While of course the family is not the only institution which insures this transference of the gains of civilization to each new generation—as school, church, and community at least have valuable parts to play in this task—yet its place is unique among them as, for the first years, it is the child's only source of those gains and it continues to bear an especially close relationship even after it begins to be influenced by these other institutions.

When we compare this quite clearly defined function of the family with the motives which lead to participation in the institution, the source of much serious conflict is at once apparent. Affection, passion, economic support, economic advantage, social prestige—these and other motives lead to the formation of families. It must be apparent that some of these motives have little reference to the function of the family, and some of them are directly antagonistic. As pointed out above, in the preindustrial era, when communities were smaller, homogeneous in membership, and simpler in organization, other controlling forces were effective in compelling a certain rough conformity between function and behavior, by superimposing apparently accidental controls; fear of public

opinion, custom, taboos, ostracism, and even poverty. Monogamous families continued not because men and women were more constant in their affection than they are now, and realized the tremendously important function they were assuming, but because the man and woman concerned did not dare do otherwise.

Now that those external restraints are being removed, men and women dare do otherwise, that is, that the conflict between function and motive in the institution of the family is no longer inhibited, it comes out in all sorts of weaknesses which are appearing in the family structure. Take for illustration one of the motives—passion. There is nothing in it as a motive to insure the formation of a stable family. Released from the restraints of custom it is finding its satisfaction—as it always has whenever released—in various forms of heterosexual relationships; relationships that are analogous to successive polygamy in divorce and to promiscuity in prostitution. I am not here arguing for or against divorce (although I have no such scruples in arguing against prostitution), I am merely pointing out an illustration of the way the function of a social institution may be defeated when its motive does not coincide with its function.

3. *A Unity of Interacting Personalities*[1]

The historical family has been recognized by all students in the social sciences as an institution; indeed, as the original institution. In comparison, other institutions, as the school, the church, industry, and even the state, may be regarded as subsequent and derivative.

Historically, as these and other institutions have evolved, the family has lost one by one its original collective activities, until the question may be raised whether the modern family is any longer an institution. Is it now anything more than a mere unity of interacting personalities?

Certainly the modern family of husband and wife and three, two, one, or no children, living in a rear apartment on the tenth floor of a skyscraper apartment in New York City, is a family in a somewhat different sense from the large Chinese kinship group of grandparents, married sons and their wives and children, sixty-odd in number, living for twenty generations in one large household, worshiping the same ancestral gods, and obedient to the one recognized family head. The Chinese family seems, at first glance, to be an institution in a degree and in a sense which the modern family is not.

Psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who by reason of their treatment of behavior problems of individuals have been led into the study of family relationships are preconditioned to treat, as they do, of family life as a state of emotional harmony or of emotional conflict of its component

[1] Adapted from BURGESS, ERNEST W., The Family and the Person, *Pub. Am. Sociological Soc.*, vol. 22, pp. 133–143, December, 1927.

individuals. Count Hermann Keyserling, of the school of wisdom (who is not a psychiatrist but a philosopher), in his article The Correct Statement of the Marriage Problem, defines marriage as "essentially a tragic state of tension."

These two cursory references are sufficient to indicate the large group of biologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, and others who look upon the modern family as a collection of individuals temperamentally compatible or incompatible, emotionally in harmony or in conflict.

It is evident that an institution means more than mere temperamental or emotional solidarity. The family as an institution is the form of relationships between husband and wife, parents and children, sanctioned, if not prescribed, by society. These rôles that constitute the family are, in fact, cultural patterns, and, like all cultural patterns, have a history and are subject to social change. At the same time these familial rôles are idealized by the members of the family. The stern but just father, the loving and prudent mother, the dependable and honest son, the dutiful and virtuous daughter are ideals toward which conduct is directed and by which shortcomings are measured.

Thus it comes about that the family as an institution performs what seems to be a double function, but what actually is a unitary function. The family still remains the chief social agency both for transmitting the cultural heritages from the older to the younger generation and for the development of the personality of its members. It is, indeed, in the circumstances of this cultural transmission and in the interaction of the family and its members with the environing community that modifications and conditionings of the personality of all the members of the family take place. Herein for the family lies the significance of the definition by Thomas of personality as "the subjective aspect of culture."

It is not only that in the family its members assume rôles consistent with the cultural tradition, and in which they feel a vested personal interest, but the family itself sets up claims and obligations which tend to become sacred and to transcend the rights and even the individuality of its members.

This brief introductory statement is preliminary to the presentation of a life history in which the influence of the family in its interrelations with the community upon the development of the personality may be more concretely stated and perhaps more simply and clearly defined. One document was selected in preference to reading extracts from several documents in order to give a longer perspective of personal growth. Clues to interpretation, however, are derived in part from similar and different cases. The following life history is that of Marie, the daughter of a German-American family who lived in several culturally different communities, some German-American, and others native American. The interaction of the family and its members to these variable cultural

environments provides the setting for the personal development of the child.

The first childhood memories often focus upon conflict situations. Not infrequently the young child takes an attitude of objectivity or even levity toward objects and ideas that to the adult are sentimental or sacred.

This seems to me to be my first clear memory of my mother: My father had driven to town, nine miles away, and Mother and I were having lunch together. I said or did some naughty thing and my mother told me that God would see me. I said that I'd pull down the blind and then He couldn't see.

"Oh, but He sees everything. He can see through the blind."

I looked up into the sky. In my imagination I saw an old gray-bearded man with human attributes. I took a superior attitude toward my mother, and thought how could anyone be so stupid as to believe that He could see through a blind? I wondered if she *really* believed it; I didn't think so.

I felt detached from this young and rather pretty creature sitting across the table from me. There was none of the feeling toward her that poets sing of.

This detached, almost perverse, attitude of the child toward its mother and the culture of its group is an expression perhaps, of what the Calvinistic theology defined as "the innate depravity of man."

The way in which the discipline imposed by the family is mediated by affection is revealed in the first recollection of her father:

The first memory of my father was when, one time, I took a hatchet and started to chop at one of the porch posts. I knew that I shouldn't, but I thought they wouldn't know that I knew that I shouldn't. I was playing that I was in a forest cutting down trees. My father nearly spanked me. I remember his black hair and those brown eyes. I was somewhat afraid of my father, and yet I felt like a pal with him also.

The nervousness and German mannerisms that annoyed me so much a little later did not bother me at this period. I thought my father was a pretty fine daddy.

How the person's conception of his rôle is created not so much by his own behavior but by the reaction of the members of the family toward it is revealed by certain oft-repeated family anecdotes.

This story my father told with pride:

"We never let anyone frighten her of the dark or anything else if we can help it. You see, she goes any place now in the dark. One night after dark we missed her, and there she was out in the granary piling handfuls of wheat out of the bin onto the floor." After hearing this told, of course I was never afraid; at least I would not let myself be.

I think I was quite an egotistical little thing. I felt superior to my mother; I felt real pals with my dad. I played quite an important rôle and I knew it.

The appearance of the second child, may unless the situation is skilfully and sympathetically handled by the parents, create a crisis for the older child.

The following impression of my mother and father I remember vividly: I was over four. It was dusk. They were sitting side by side on a lounge, holding hands, I think, when I came into the room. They asked me if I didn't want a little brother. I was embarrassed. I said I thought I did, but I felt uneasy and left the room.

When I was five my brother came. Now the tables turned. It developed later that he was a paralytic. He was always ill. He cried a very great deal. My mother was not well. We had a "hired girl" all the time. At first I *demanded* attention. Once I asked my mother to comb my hair. She did not have time right then. "But you simply have to!" I shrieked at her, and she proceeded to tame me down.

Mother is naturally undemonstrative. I remember sometimes standing by her chair and wanting to put my arms around her, but being afraid that she would not pay any attention, or worse still, that she would not understand and ask me to run away. One day when I was seven I made some remark that drew from her, "Why, don't you think I love you?" I wanted to cry. I didn't know what to say. At last I said, timidly, without resentment, "No!" I think she sensed some of the situation, for she said, with real warmth, "Why, of course I love you!"

What a relief! I was happy for days! Did my intense love for children and the lavish affection I bestowed upon them in my adolescence grow partly out of the memories of this situation? I have always said that no child should go hungry hearted around me. I have thought it was because I understood.

Even the preadolescent child makes comparisons between its family and the others in the community. The feelings of inferiority or superiority of the child are bound up with the status of its family.

I saw that my home was different from others, but everything was always spotlessly clean. We did not have all the nice little things that give the home touch. I had a little playroom upstairs, and here my chum and I fixed up things to my heart's content. This should be charming like other homes.

In comparing my family with other families I felt at once proud and humble also. My father took his place among the leading farmers. I was always proud of that, but his emotional mannerisms and his broken English annoyed me before my friends.

This conflict, which I am sure every child of an immigrant feels, had begun.

The new adjustments in adolescence have caused it to be designated as a period of stress and strain. In this case a new change of residence of the family into another and an American community intensified the personal and social maladjustments. Conflicts between standards and ideals of the family and the values of the community lead to emotional disturbances, confusion, and restless, anomalous behavior.

When I was twelve we bought a little ranch near Y, a little town of about five thousand inhabitants. There was a mortgage on it; we guarded this secret very carefully.

My parents seemed to be disturbed because I had no girl friends my own age. They showed this in the form of teasing. I wished that I had a girl friend, too, but I didn't know how to make friends with any of the girls. They all had their chums. They were nice to me, and sometimes went to see one another on Sunday afternoons, tame formal calls, no spontaneity.

This period became one of tears, storm, and stress. I wept over the least little thing; my mother did not understand what made me act so strangely. My father began to get disgusted with me at times and let me know it, and then I wept more than ever.

The village was one of the "toughest" places in which we had ever lived. Whenever any of us girls had to go by a place where young fellows were grouped together, the boys would make remarks. I was terribly sensitive over this, and it was not the least of my worries.

Sometimes when I wept I felt that I should like to die. What was the use of living? What was I heading for? At last a dream began to formulate. I should like to be a teacher; I loved children. Everyone remarked about my hold on them. I remember the day the idea became very real to me. I was given to daydreaming, anyway, but this day was different. I walked as in a haze all day. I saw the profession with all the ardor of a romantic and idealistic adolescent. In my eyes it was not ordinary now—it was glorified.

I guarded my secret carefully. It was almost too sacred a thing to discuss. Finally I told my mother that I should like to go to work to earn some money. I wanted to go to high school. Falteringly I said I'd like to be a teacher. To my joy she was pleased. I believe she had been worrying more over me than she let me see, for she had always said, "I shall see that my daughter has an education. She shall not have to get married."

My parents did not want to let me go; they said they could still afford to send me to school; but I finally prevailed and I went to a near-by state institution to work. My father was displeased with the type of men and women with whom I worked and soon saw that I came home. I had earned about seventy-five dollars. In the summer I picked grapes.

My father wanted to have me help with the corn, which was much easier, but I felt that I must earn money. It was not customary in that locality for children to go to high school, and I felt that if I wanted to go I must help myself.

Finally the grand day came and I started to high school. I was nervous about it. I was slight and undeveloped physically, and although I was sixteen, I passed for one of the little thirteen- or fourteen-year-olds. This made it possible for me to enter into the school life quite freely.

Since many of the other freshmen were from out of town also and were strangers, I soon made friends. I soon became enthusiastic about high-school life and wanted to enter into it. When the class was organized, I found myself on a committee. Since there were over a hundred in the class I felt happy over even this small distinction. But the committee always met after school and I had to take the car home even before three. Now that I was going to high school, I had to hustle up my work at home to get it all finished.

I helped my mother with the washing and ironing on Saturday and with all the mopping and cleaning. I felt very keenly my responsibility for helping my mother. Soon I was placed on another committee, and here I was also unable to serve. I was always too busy. I realized that I must be content with only a formal education.

I owed my help to my parents. In my scholastic standing I always excelled. I did not tell any of my friends that I wanted to become a teacher. Perhaps they might think that I would not have the ability.

I did tell my class teacher. I knew that she was fond of me; but she said, "No, I don't think you should go into teaching. I think that you are too nervous." It was as if someone had given me a mortal wound—*me*, with all my dreams; didn't my attitude count for something? She herself had some definite nerve trouble and could not hold a class's attention. Soon my money was nearly all gone. I would never be successful as a teacher probably, so why waste my parents' money? I decided to stay at home.

I said nothing, but just simply didn't get ready to go to school one morning. My mother came out into the kitchen about 8:30 and found me there finishing up the work. "But why are you here?" I told her that I was going to quit. I had no more money. "Why, of course you haven't. I knew it wouldn't last very long; but now that you have started to school you go on and finish." And she proceeded to give me one of those talks that played such a vital part in my life during this period when I was so unadjusted. To this day my mother holds my admiration for this ability. I would feel that the whole world was against me, and before she would get through with me I could face anything. So calmly and wisely she saw my problems. Sometimes I needed disciplining, and her talks usually toned me down. I felt at the time that she did not understand all the high-school problems. Very often at this period I did feel horribly misunderstood. At times I resolved that when I grew up I should be the friend of every adolescent girl. This I still hold as a hobby. I was working rather hard; I was commuting nine miles to school; I was ambitious in my studies.

Marie goes to school, but has no time for social activities. She must assist with the household work.

I helped my mother a great deal. I worried over the financial situation. I probably suffered from malnutrition. Very often I was so tired that I did not feel life worth living. One day someone said something about how joyous were the days of youth, and I flared back, "Huh, if the rest of life is worse than this, I'm sure I don't want to live!" This sort of thing perplexed and worried my mother.

Finally, one day, I discovered an article in the *Ladies' Home Journal* on adolescent girlhood. There I was, all described, and it said that this was only a period of adjustment. This was a great relief. I had thought that I should always be as I was now.

In high school my art and English teacher was my idol. She had a keen mind, a charming personality, and was the most popular instructor of the school. I decided to ask her if she thought I could ever become a teacher. I put it off as long as I could, and, finally, on the last day of school, at noon, I went up timidly

and asked her. She was busy, but she took time for me. "Why, I think you would make an excellent teacher." She asked me to come back again in the afternoon; then she gave me a long talk on personality development. I was in the clouds again and determined now that I would go through with anything that was reasonably within my ability.

In this account of adolescent unadjustment four points should perhaps be made: First, there is the crystallization of a vocational life goal out of the main trends of her attitudes and interests. This solved her problem by giving direction and meaning to her life. Then, as in many other cases, it is the mother who understands, not completely, but in the light of her own girlhood experience. So, also, she gained from reading the article on adolescence the realization that her personal problems were not unique but universal, and not insolvable. Finally a sympathetic teacher who personified her ideal gave her the encouragement and inspiration necessary to put forth every effort to achieve her goal.

The persecution of German-Americans in the World War solidified the family and brought to the daughter a sense of cultural unity with her parents.

This life history is, it must be admitted, an incomplete, and in all probability an imperfect, record of the unfolding of the person in the family and community environment. It is only the person's own story of the memorable events in his career, to the exclusion, no doubt, of many other incidents and circumstances. What, then, is the value, if any, of such a document, or of documents like these, when they must be discounted at once as fragmentary and subjective?

I must confess that I cannot answer all these objections in a fashion that would be convincing to you, nor even to myself.

Yet, admitting all these and other criticisms that might be raised, there is a certain type of knowledge or understanding that comes from the examination of personal documents which one does not obtain in dissertations on the origin and nature of personality, nor from psychological, psychiatric, or psychoanalytic classifications of personality types.

This life history, taken as a whole, does throw much light on the actual process by which a child comes to self-consciousness and obtains a conception of his rôle, first as a member of the family and then as a participant in the wider life of the community.

The dialectic of personal growth, however, as pictured in this life history, is widely different from the celebrated abstract definition of it made by J. Mark Baldwin. The achievement by the person of self-consciousness in the family situation is no logical consistent process, as described here. What is suggested by this case is quite the opposite. Before the person arrives at some stable conception of his rôle—before, as we say, "his character gets set"—he is subject to the play of many diverse and conflicting impulses. The great variety of attitudes and the

wide range of random, mischievous, and even devilish, behavior in children is suggestive both of the possibilities of personality development in children and of the order which the conventional discipline of the family imposes upon the chaotic tendencies to behavior in the young child. Out of the child's own struggle with his conflicting impulses and wishes within first the code of family life, and then with the conflicting patterns of the freer community life, does he assume a rôle and achieve some coherent consistency in his behavior.

It becomes obvious, then, why the ordering of a child's behavior is a comparatively simple matter where the *mores* of the community are of one pattern with the standards of conduct of the family, and the reason why the problem of personal organization always becomes more acute with the degree of divergence between familial and communal ideals.

This and similar life histories give a picture of the family and the interrelations of parents and children which departs widely from the legal definitions of the rights and duties of parents and children, and is scandalously at variance with our cherished ideals of family life. For in the law and in the *mores* the obligations of the members of the family are defined in their external and formal aspects with reference to what are regarded as norms of familial behavior.

This conventional schematization of familial interrelationships is not to be dismissed as unimportant. To the contrary, it is an expression of our deepest sentiments and of our most profound convictions of what family life ought to be. But as a matter of fact, these moral and legal conceptions of the family are totally different from what family life actually is. This life history does give us a sense of family interrelationships that are living and changing, of family bonds that loosen and tighten, and of shifts and mutations of attitudes rather than the static and permanent ordering of relationships of affection and duty subsumed under the conventional theory of the family.

It is interesting to speculate upon the way in which psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts would label this case. Interpretation by instinct has indeed gone out of fashion. Freud doubtless would point out evidence for the Electra complex; Jung might well enter it as an introvert type; Adler would start his analysis from feelings of inferiority. Kretschmer would perceive the schizoid type. Others would place emphasis upon this or that glandular type.

These classifications are all helpful, no doubt; but they seem arbitrary, mechanical, and even somewhat irrelevant when compared with the process concretely set forth in this document by which the person, out of cultural conflict of the family with the other groups in the community, out of warring impulses in his own bosom, out of shameful experiences and praiseworthy endeavor, out of lonely reverie and social contacts, organizes his life and directs it to some goal of achievement.

This life history, as well as other life histories, seems to show how little we have reckoned with the flood of feelings and emotions, impulses, and ideas that color and give individuality to our lives, especially in childhood.

Then, even more important, is the fact, which all of us realize when once our attention is called to it, that, particularly as children, many or most of our multitudinous impulses never eventuate in our acts. They find expression but in play, in daydreaming, or in a great variety of attitudes that to adults may seem inexplicable, amusing, perverse, or diabolical. Certainly in the mind of the child a world of events is transpiring which are beyond the perception of even the most sympathetic and discerning outside observer.

Most important for the understanding of the process of personal development is a recognition of the rôle of these uncompleted acts. In the uncompleted act the person is thrown back upon himself. These conflicts and maladjustments, distressing and painful as they are, provide the situations necessary for the development of the subjective life of the person. As one reflects over his past life is it not significant that the attention is fixed upon conflict situations? It is in these that the child and the youth works out slowly and painfully a conception of his rôle in society and a philosophy of life about which his impulses become organized and his character becomes formed.

This inner life of the individual, of unexpressed impulses, of concealed memories, and of secret ambitions, seems to him private and personal, the essential nucleus of his personality and of his individuality. And so, at least to the sociologist, it actually is. What constitutes the intensity of the problem of the child is its isolation, its loneliness, its feeling that its own subjective life is unique. No matter how objective the child is in many realms of his activities, there always are those regions of life which are mysterious, where he gropes as in the dark, where he feels confused and bewildered.

A first clue to the understanding of one's self and to the solution of the enigma of one's relation to others seems to be the perception, as in the case of Marie, that one's problems are not unique, but are common to others. Through this human finding the person not only tends to obtain mastery over his own experience and problems, but he begins the discovery of the world about him. He is able to sympathize, to enter into the feelings and attitudes of other persons. Through making his own adjustments and in solving his own problems he acquires a skill in detecting and in assisting others in their problems.

Finally, in life history materials we may expect to discover the conditions under which mutations in personality occur, as in religious conversion, or, as in the case of Marie, of secular conversion to teaching as a vocational career. These critical experiences, to use the phrase of W. I. Thomas, are not, so this case indicates, bolts out of the blue, but rather

the crystallization of trends of impulses, aptitudes, and interests which are then projected in some organized form into the future. The significance of further knowledge of personality mutations is only too evident to need elaboration.

The life-history method is in its infancy. Attempts doubtless will be made to standardize the technique of securing and interpreting them. It is to be hoped, however, that this method will not become so formalized and the interpretations of cases so abstract that the unique value of the personal document will be lost. For in the life history is revealed, as in no other way, the inner life of the person, his moral struggles, his successes, and failures in securing control of his destiny in a world too often at variance with his hopes and ideals.

4. *The Family as an Institution in Modern Society*[1]

In this article there is presented a number of facts of a statistical nature that show changes in the family as a social institution in the United States. Some of these facts have been collected during the past years while others are the result of recent researches undertaken for this article. The collection of this material yields a very impressive picture of the family though, perhaps, a somewhat distorted one. These facts were not selected with any particular care that they be representative of all aspects of family life. Such facts were taken wherever they could be found whether representative or not. It was thought best to limit this article to a presentation of facts, leaving their interpretation to the reader.

Not every adult today forms a family. Of the total number of men and women who had reached forty-five years of age in the United States in 1920, one in ten (10.4 per cent) has never married. There are of course very few people who marry after forty-five years of age for the first time. So high a percentage of single men and women is in marked contrast to the behavior of man in primitive society where the unmarried adult is all but unknown. That about one out of every ten persons never marries is in itself an interesting comment on our human nature or else on our human institutions, as well as being a commentary on the scarcity of families. In the agricultural life of earlier times in America, there was not so large a percentage of those who had never married. There was a census taken in New Hampshire in 1773 which collected data from which it is possible to estimate perhaps rather accurately the percentage of women sixteen years old and over who were married at the time the census was taken. There were 66.7 per cent of the women over sixteen married. In 1920, the percentage was 63.7 per cent for the United States as a whole. The scarcity of marriage in modern times is further shown by the very

[1] OGBURN, WILLIAM F., The Changing Family, *Pub. Am. Sociological Soc.*, vol. 23, pp. 124–133, 1928.

probable fact that at the age period when most persons are found married only about five out of every six are married.

For the age period from forty-five to fifty-four, when there are the most persons reported married, one out of every five males (19 per cent) is not married, that is, is single, widowed, or divorced; while for women for the age period of maximum marriage, thirty-five to forty-four years, also one out of five is not married. Of course more than five out of six have formed families, but the families have become broken by death, separation, or divorce.

There is thus a large percentage of broken families. This is most noticeable by the prevalence of widows, for one in ten (11.1 per cent) of all females over fifteen years of age are widows, while of those forty-five years of age and over about one in six are widows (15.3 per cent), and for those sixty-five years old between one-half and two-thirds of all women are widowed. The widowed men are about half as numerous.

Another bit of evidence regarding the proportion of homes that are broken comes from a special census study of Rochester, N. Y. Among all the women in Rochester in 1920 who have been married, and hence who may be said to have formed homes of some sort, the homes of one out of every five have been broken by death, separation, or divorce. These are all the homes taken as actually found and hence are for all ages. Rochester is probably not exceptional among our large cities.

City life which is greatly increasing as the years go by has a discouraging influence on the formation of families, marriage being discouraged about 10 per cent. And for the ages beyond twenty-five years, where the age distributions are the same, in the country 163 men out of 1,000 will never have been married while in the city there will be 206. The group of single in cities is thus about one-quarter larger. Among women over twenty-five years old, the group of women, single, in cities per one-thousand will be two-thirds larger than in country districts with the same age distribution. These facts are for the United States in 1920.

While there is a large percentage of single men and women today as compared with primitive life or as compared with earlier agricultural conditions, yet the percentage of the population single is now decreasing, for the percentage who have never married has declined from 36.9 per cent in 1890 to 35.3 in 1920 as measured when the age distribution is the same.

Once the family is formed it is supposed to be the center of the affectional life as between husband and wife, parents and children, and among children and relatives. This is not so much the theory of the family on the continent of Europe, in the Orient, or among primitive peoples as it is in the United States. That the family is not always the center of affectional life in the United States today is indicated by various facts.

For instance, about 2.5 per cent (2.56 per cent) of all births were illegitimate. This proportion existed in 1926, a year when birth-control

information is said to have been very widespread in the United States. We do not have statistics of sexual intercourse, but the statistics of venereal diseases (like the statistics of illegitimacy) are indicative that sexual life is by no means confined to husband and wife, since most venereal disease is contracted in illicit sexual contacts. In 1918 to 1919 about 1 out of 18 men examined in the army had venereal diseases in varying degrees of intensity. Not all men who have sexual intercourse outside marriage contract venereal diseases, nor do such acts always result in the production of offspring, so that statistics of illegitimacy and of venereal diseases are low indices of illicit unions. Thus affection (of a sort) does take place to a considerable extent outside the limits of the family.

Once a family union is formed, that it does not always go well with affection is evidenced by divorce. The prevalence of divorce is very evident from the annual figures published by the U. S. Bureau of Census, showing the number of divorces and the number of marriages. In 1926 there were 10 divorces to every 66 marriages performed. Indeed, it is almost certain that of the marriages contracted in 1926 more than 10 in 66 will wind up in the divorce court. It may be as high a frequency as one in five if the divorce rate continues to increase. There are a good many husbands and wives that are separated though not divorced. In interpreting these facts it should also be remembered that many divorced persons remarry and may find a more satisfactory state of affection. However, according to the study of Rochester, N. Y., referred to previously, among all the married women of Rochester with husbands living, 1 in 17 were in reality separated from their husbands without being divorced or were divorced. Divorce and separation may separate a parent from a child as well as from a mate. Of the divorces granted in the United States only about one-third report that children are affected. However, in the Rochester study, a little over one-half (55 per cent) of the married women separated or divorced from their husbands had children. Separation or divorce means the destruction of affection, it is presumed, between the mates but not necessarily so between parents and children.

Indeed only a very small proportion of young children appear to be separated from at least one parent despite the fact that death and loss of affection disrupt so many homes. There were only about 284,000 such children being cared for in institutions. The children placed out in foster homes would add to this number. Through widows pensions 121,000 children were enabled to be with their widowed mothers.

Affection is of course not the only aspect of family life, despite the fact that in the United States marriage appears, at least in current literature, to be contracted almost wholly on the basis of affection.

The family has always performed important economic functions. Indeed, in the past a rather large amount of the total production of foods and manufactured articles was produced by families in households. We know of course that spinning and weaving have left the homes for the factories, but there are certain statistics that indicate that other economic functions are being lost to the family. For instance, since 1900 (to 1920), the number of waiters in the United States more than doubled (increased 113 per cent) while the population only increased a little over one-third (39 per cent). The number of waiters increased, therefore, about three times as fast as the population. At the same time the number of domestic servants has actually decreased 15 per cent. During the same period the number of restaurant keepers has increased 158 per cent, about four times as fast as the population increased or about three and one-half times as fast as the urban population which grew 46 per cent during this time. The services of the home in feeding the population are shifting rapidly to outside agencies. Man is less dependent on the wife for food.

There are other statistics to show the decreasing preparation of food in the home. The product of bakeries in the United States increased 60 per cent (in stable money) during the decade from 1914 to 1925 while the population probably increased less than 15 per cent during that time. The number of delicatessen dealers increased from 1910 to 1920 by 43 per cent or three times as fast as the population. Canning and preserving also seems to be done less in the home, for from 1914 to 1925 the number of persons engaged in canning and preserving fruits and vegetables increased 37 per cent while the value of the product (in 1914 dollars) increased 100 per cent, a very marked growth for only 11 years.

In the washing of clothing and household linen, one notices a similar shifting of function from family to industry taking place at the present time. The number of launderers and laundresses not working in laundries decreased from 1910 to 1920 by one-quarter, while the amount of work done in laundries (as measured in values of money of the same purchasing power) increased from 1914 to 1925 by 57 per cent, despite the fact that the value of washing machines and allied paraphernalia increased in value from 1919 to 1925 by nearly three times. (The total amount sold, however, was small.)

The value of sewing machines for both factory and home sold in 1925 has not increased as compared with the sales in 1919, which probably means that the sales for use in the home have declined. The number of factories making sewing machines, the number of wage earners, and the amount of horsepower used have all declined markedly since 1919.

The loss by the family of the occupations cited in the preceding paragraphs means a loss by the women of the home of part of their occupa-

tions. This movement is correlated with the increase in the number of women who work outside the home for money, especially married women. For instance among all women at work outside the home, in 1890, 10 out of every 72 were married while, in 1920, 10 out of every 42 were married. Thus, today, nearly one out of every four women at work outside the home is married. Another very interesting fact is that in 1920, 1 out of every 11 married women worked for pay outside the home while 30 years previous only 1 in 22 married women was gainfully employed. These statistics of married women working for pay are dramatic testimony of the changing status of the home. The movement is swift and still going on.

Another possible index of the declining functions of the family is the increase in the number of multifamily dwellings. Such flats or apartments are usually smaller than houses, without yards or much play space. Quite generally the heating is done by some one other than a member of the family. They are, therefore, a symbol of fewer household duties. In the United States, in 1920, of the total building permits issued for dwellings of all sorts, 2.3 per cent were for multifamily dwellings while in 1928 (first six months), 8.7 per cent were for multifamily dwellings. The increase in apartment houses is, therefore, now much more rapid than the increase in the number of single-family dwellings. The building permits for a multifamily dwelling provides for many more families than does a permit for a single- or two-family building.

Therefore, the significance of the building permits for these types of buildings must be interpreted with this fact in mind. For instance in the first six months of 1920 the permits for multifamily dwellings took care of 35 per cent of the families provided for in all building permits while in the first six months of 1928 multifamily dwellings provided for 61 per cent of the families who occupied newly constructed homes. Thus nearly two-thirds of the new homes (for which building permits were necessary) are in apartment houses.

Of course the family is not simply an economic institution. The bringing up of children is thought by many to be its reason for being. "What is a home without children?" However, there are many families that never have nor never will have children. A sample of about 2,000 families of the past generation collected by Professors Ross and Baker, showed one in six of these completed families as never having had any children born. Perhaps today a larger proportion of similar families will always be childless. Family duties are reduced greatly where there are no children. These duties are less also where there are few children than when there are many, for the children grow up and pass out of the home. In Rochester, N. Y., in 1920 of the women who had been married, 3 out of 10 had no children living with them. The average number of children per family was 2.8 children.

Another piece of evidence as to the number of children born is the following. If reproduction and mortality rates for the different ages remain as now in the United States, then 10 women will bear 14 girl babies, (and of course approximately 28 children) during the course of their lives. Not all of these children will live; perhaps 10 per cent or more will die in early childhood. Women in general will have two or three children only to rear. The time for rearing so small a number is of course only a small part of the length of married life.

Of these few children, more and more of their education takes place outside the home. In 1850 only 45 per cent of young people five to twenty years of age were attending school, while in 1920 there were 65 per cent. The schools keep the children away from their homes longer today also. In 1870 the average number of days of school attended was 78 while in 1926 it was 136. The schools are also taking the children from the home at younger ages. One in six of the children between five and six years of age are in schools now. Teachers are from certain viewpoints substitutes for parents. Since 1870 the number of parents has tripled but the number of teachers has increased six times.

Formerly the home was quite a center for much of the recreation that the people enjoyed. Today recreation is increasingly outside the home, with the exception of the growth of the radio. There are several illustrations of this trend. The most noticeable is the development of motion pictures. In 1910 there were 9,480 motion-picture theaters in the United States, while in 1928 the number had more than doubled, there being 20,500. The baseball attendance at the big league games is certainly around 12,000,000 a year. Grantland Rice further estimates the total football attendance at from 25,000,000 to 30,000,000 a year, while 1,000,000 play tennis and about four times that number, *viz.*, 4,000,000, play golf. Such rough estimates are simply illustrative in a general way of the enormous development of sports and recreation outside the home. The change of the location of the home from the farm and village to the city has greatly restricted the play space and this movement has been accompanied (somewhat tardily though) by an increase in space for parks and playgrounds. For instance, 127 cities in the United States having a population of 30,000 or more have increased their parks and playgrounds as measured in acreage by eight times from 1880 to 1926.

The family has always performed in varying degrees the function of protecting its members. The man was the protector of the women and children. The state has now taken over this function. Dueling has been practically abolished. In 1920 there was one policeman (constable, sheriff, or detective) for every 220 families in the United States. This tendency is still growing for, in 1910, there was one such policeman to every 240 families. The total number of such police, guards, watchmen,

soldiers, marines, firemen, officials, and inspectors have increased 70 per cent from 1910 to 1920. While the state as a protector is growing, the protective function of the family is declining. That families do not protect their own children adequately is shown by the number of juvenile delinquents. In 1920, 0.15 per cent of all children ten to seventeen years of age were in institutions for juvenile delinquents, not perhaps a large percentage, yet large enough to mean that many families are not adequately caring for their children. In one large city (in cities there are more juvenile delinquents than in the country) 0.22 per cent were in institutions and 0.65 per cent were brought before the courts, while 4.86 per cent of the children ten to seventeen years old were investigated for reported offenses by the police.

Indeed the state has developed so strongly this function of protection that it protects the family against itself. Such is in part the meaning of the child-labor laws which are now on the statute books of 48 states. These laws protect the children from parents as well as from employers. Similarly the compulsory education laws, in force since 1909, in 48 states are in part a protection of children against the inadequate protection of certain families.

Nearly all old people and widows, especially those with young children, need protection. Formerly grown-up children and relatives were a sort of insurance. But now with so few children and with relatives so far away (due to the mobility of labor), this protection is very limited.

To a certain extent insurance takes the place of this earlier protection by family kin. The growth of insurance in the United States has been enormous. In 1926 the amount of insurance of all kinds was thirty times as great as it was in 1870, that is, at about the beginning of our great industrial expansion. The insurance system would have grown even if families had remained large and if the members had always lived near by. Nevertheless the great development of insurance is a substitute for former protection by the living members of the family.

The statistical evidence presented in the foregoing paragraphs is evidence selected in good part because of the nature of existing statistics. Yet it does show a marked loss of functions by the family, particularly the economic, educational, recreational, and protective functions. And what is quite interesting is that the loss of these functional activities is continuing today without, in general, much if any tendency to slacken. It is usually fairly safe to project statistical series into the future for a short time, where the trend is marked. The changing family will probably continue to experience a further decline of functions. It is not so clear that the affectional function is declining, but certainly the statistics show that all is not well with the affectional situation of family life today.

5. *Legal Aspects of the Modern Family*[1]

The great range of subject matter and of interest indicated by the title of this paper requires a limitation of the discussion either by way of selecting certain aspects of the subject or by way of dealing with many aspects in a rather general manner. The latter process has been chosen because it seemed that perhaps a comprehensive view might have its special value for a group of workers necessarily so absorbed in the particulars of family case work that they are seldom tempted into the intricate and often forbidden pathways of the law.

The following paper, therefore, will assume the form of general and, on the whole, categorical statement with the understanding that multiplication in data and elaboration in detail would serve to substantiate or to interpret but are not necessary to secure correctness of impression.

The first point to be made is that within the fairly recent past a radical change has been brought about in the legal relationships existing within the family group, that is, between husband and wife on the one hand and parent and child on the other, and in the relationship between the group as a whole and the community of which it is a part.

The change has been far greater than has been recognized generally. This is partly because an attempt has been made to bring the law into accord with moral and ethical judgments of the community, and even great legal commentators have often alleged that the two were always identical and have so given an erroneous impression of the actual legal situation. For example, the legal non-entity of the married woman was veiled by the gracious suggestion that she was under "coverture." Lord Bryce characterizes Blackstone's reference to her status as "sleek optimism" not to be justified! And the commentators spoke elaborately of the duty of the father to "maintain, educate, and protect" his child; when as a matter of fact he could not educate, there being no schools; his duty to protect gave him simply a defense in case of certain action against him, and his duty to maintain consisted chiefly in an obligation not to let his child come on the poor rate. Kent, for example, the great American commentator, who saw that only by the provision of ample school facilities could the parental duty be performed, speaks of the duty "as of imperfect obligation in the eye of the municipal law but of very great importance to the welfare of the state."

As a matter of fact, the relations of husband and wife, of father and child, were in the earlier law those of power without corresponding legal responsibility.

The principle that power held by one individual over another is to be exercised as a trust is a modern principle. And just as the warden of the

[1] Adapted from BRECKINRIDGE, SOPHONISBA P., "The Family and the Law," pp. 290–297, Nat. Conference Social Work, 1925; *Jour. Social Hygiene*, vol. 11, pp. 385–392, October, 1925.

prison took his fees, so in earlier times the guardian of the minor and the husband who had his wife "under coverture" took the gains incident to the relationship.

The common law of the family group can be stated briefly. Marriage suspended the legal existence of the wife and gave to the husband rights in relation (1) to her person so that he could determine the domicile, (2) fix the standard of life, (3) discipline her, and (4) command her services marital and domestic, or if she rendered services for pay to another, claim her earnings. In the matter of property he took (1) her personal goods in ownership, (2) her real property for use and control. When children came, he was entitled to their custody, to determine their education and care, while she, entitled, in the words of Blackstone, "to reverence and respect," lacked all authority. In return, he was under a duty to supply her with necessaries, that is, those things suitable to the station in which he placed her, and to keep the children off the poor rates. This was the law of a very rough and rude community and became nothing less than unendurable when the intricacies of family relationships multiplied.

"Well, she's my wife, ain't she? . . . It is no matter what I done to her . . . Look 'ere, 'as a man a right to his own wife an' children, you tell me that!" In these words Galsworthy sets out the amazement of the young husband and father who is astonished at a social worker's suggestion that he owes any duty.

"I know what the law says. A man owns 'is wife, an' 'e owns 'is children."

In this terrible story, "Demos," Galsworthy reveals some of the ugliness and brutality of that law in its effect on the conditions of women's lives and on the habits of men's thoughts. Escape was found by the well-to-do through appeal to equity, theoretically the keeper of the king's conscience in behalf of the weak and helpless but in fact often the refuge of the rich and powerful. Through equity, a scheme was worked out for protecting a married woman who came into the matrimonial relationship with property "settled upon her" for her separate use or acquiring such goods after marriage by will or deed. In the same way, equity maintained the ultimate right of the state to discipline fathers; but, in general, the courts could and did enforce the rights of fathers rather than their duties.

From this summary it is perhaps clear that the statement of the law of status created by marriage requires considerable elaboration involving as it does reference to two systems of courts, law and equity. The same thing was true with reference to the termination of the relationship. While the law of marriage was all too simple, perhaps, since doubts were resolved in favor of legitimacy, divorce required the action of the ecclesiastical courts, and, if absolute, of Parliament itself. Here again the position of the rich was far more favorable than that of the poor.

In the United States it was impossible that a legal situation like that should last; and from 1847 to 1848 on, there was a steady stream of legislation in the various states giving to married women their so-called "property rights" and continuing in them, with reference to that property, the acting capacity enjoyed by the unmarried woman, the *femme sole*, as she was known at law. Along with these acts went also acts giving to mothers some rights in relation to their children, the so-called "equal guardianship" laws, though in relatively few states are they really equal in terms and in fewer probably are they equal in the interpretation given them by the courts. These acts bestow new rights on the wife and mother and to that extent limit powers hitherto exercised by the husband and father. They do not, however, in themselves lay new affirmative duties on him toward either his wife or child. Nor do the married women's property rights laws generally lay duties on her toward her husband or recognize the unity of the family and lay on the wife other obligations than those related to her new rights. The direction in which this development occurred is undoubtedly due (*a*) to the fact that the escape from the restrictions of the common law was found by the way of ingenious devices of the lawyers who had in mind the difficulties of the well-to-do; and (*b*) to the fact that, while in general the same court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction in behalf both of married women and of children, it did this by an appeal to two different sources of authority, one an ancient general right claimed by the king to right the wrong of certain groups who had elsewhere no remedy, and the other in part at least to powers exercised over land and in certain specific ways generally described as of equitable character; so that the interests of the mother and of the child were never consolidated, as it were, into one body of equitable family law.

And, yet, any attempt to bring to all children the benefits of modern social organization, to secure for them some share in the surplus resulting from the reorganization of industry, to get them into school or bring about for them the possibility of decent urban life could only reveal both the necessity of securing the cooperation of parents and the impossibility of securing that cooperation from all parents as a voluntary expression of parental and especially paternal responsibility. Hence, legislation enabling interested persons with the authority of the public agency to enforce that moral parental responsibility, which the commentators treat as so obvious and so universal, is embodied in the acts authorizing the separation from their families of neglected and vagrant children, and providing for the establishment or recognition of industrial and reformatory schools, allowing the court to order payments by the father for the support of his child even when deprived of his child's companionship, and in the so-called "abandonment, non-support, and contributing to dependency and delinquency" laws, which turn failure to maintain a home

at a level making for independence and good conduct into an offense against the criminal law.

The most universal and conspicuous attempt at bringing to bear on the home these modern standards of family relationship is found, of course, in the juvenile court legislation. For laws recognizing the principles of specialized treatment of certain groups of children have been enacted in every state, and courts have been authorized to become, through their probation staff, public assistant parents, as it were, dealing with delinquent children and those about whose lives are found factors of demoralization, as a wise parent would wish to deal and as a competent parent would be able to deal.

But these are not the only points at which the older situation has been changed. There are the factory acts that, from the first, placed restrictions on the rights of parents to utilize the labor power of their young children; and the compulsory attendance laws that place on the parents positive duties involving a considerable expense and setting for many families a new standard of comfort and of physical and mental well-being. And there are three other bodies of legislation to which attention must be directed briefly before the tale is ended.

The common law did not know the process of adoption, but in all the commonwealths the right of the natural parents to surrender and the right of foster parents to acquire by appropriate and formal action the rights of a parent in a young child have been recognized by statute.

So far, reference has been made only to family groups already established, without asking, "When is a family a family?" But in that connection it should be noticed that the law with reference to marriage is one of the subjects in which extensive revision has been found necessary. The Commissioners on Uniform Laws have drafted a model act, and securing its enactment is one of the important objects of the women's clubs and other social and civic groups which have become alarmed at the increasing lightness with which the matrimonial bonds are assumed and broken. And Lord Bryce says of the divorce legislation of the United States, it is "the largest, strangest, and perhaps the saddest body of legislative experiments in the sphere of family law which free self-governing communities have ever tried." The importance of the laws governing marriage and divorce has, of course, been especially called to the attention of family welfare workers through the research and publications of Miss Richmond and Mr. Hall, and their appeal for recognition of the essential brutality of the law now operative in many states is fresh in the consciousness of all members of this division.

And finally, for this review, reference of the briefest kind must be made to the legislation directed toward the improvement of the status and condition of the child born out of wedlock. Of the barbarity of the old law and of the difficulties and intricacies of the undertaking to modify

and amend it, none knows better than do the members of the Family Welfare Division.

Obviously there has been expended an enormous volume of energy in securing the enactment of these laws which must be obtained in each commonwealth and by Congress for territory under the jurisdiction of the United States. The interest has been stimulated from various sources, *e.g.*, the feminists, the legal reformers, social workers, etc., and the effort therefore has been characterized sometimes by an accidental and haphazard aspect. Often laws have not been fitted into each other and this, together with the differences that have characterized the attitude of the courts toward the original law and its varied amendments, has led to the establishment in many states of Children's Code Commissions, looking to the codification of the law so that at least that portion affecting child care might take on unity, sequence, and comprehensiveness.

From this cursory enumeration it is clear that a very complicated and difficult task is in process of being worked out; namely, that of revolutionizing the legal character of an institution peculiarly delicate and difficult to alter, offering the resistance of conservatism and subject to the inhibitions generally characterizing those in possession of power and authority which others are seeking to limit or abolish.

Probably it is obvious also that the changes desired involve not only statutory enactment altering rights and duties, but the development of fine social and administrative devices to supplement parental effort or replace deficient parental care. In the great Wellesley case to which the student turns, the court pointed out that, although there might be in the court the authority to interfere between parent and child, the judge lacked agencies through which he could learn what was the right course to pursue (provision for what we should call the initial or antecedent investigation), and there were no such resources for treatment as, for example, the supervising probation service or provision for placing in foster homes or in appropriate institutions the children of neglecting parents. The development of those agencies, then, is a task essential to the fulfillment of the new legal purpose. What is involved in bringing this about can be realized only by those who have attempted to obtain first the private and then the public support for an adequate probation service. And yet neither the juvenile nor the domestic relations court can fully accomplish its work without such an agency to assist in the two ways indicated by the court in the Wellesley case referred to. The probation service, too, is probably more fully developed than the agencies for psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, gradually becoming recognized as equally important; and suitable institutional provision lags behind both.

And so far as these agencies have been set up, they are available usually only in restricted areas, the large cities, and only in the cases

of the poor. For in a way the situation has been reversed; and, whereas equity in the older days dealt only with the children who had special forms of property, today the most important modification and extension of equity—the juvenile court—is substantially available only in behalf of the children of the poor. This is due, however, to the limitations not of the jurisdiction but of the personality and courage and often of time and energy of the court's agents. There is no inherent difficulty preventing the juvenile court through its probation officers from offering care and supervision to the child from the home rich in material goods but poor in the essential factors of sound child care.

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Chapter VII

TYPES OF FAMILY ORGANIZATION

The family organization may be conceived as an adjustment of three different and relatively unrelated factors. The physiological sex needs, one of the most imperative of the native appetites, brought men and women into temporary association. The fact of maternity severely handicapped the woman in the struggle for existence. It increased her work and burden at the same time that it decreased her capacity. Unwilling to sacrifice the child, she attached herself to man for support for herself and child. To the situation, man responded in a typically chivalric way. He took advantage of the woman who attached herself to him and forced her into a subordinate status. The specific sex and economic arrangements resulting from chance and circumstance became in time the customary and accepted forms of behavior. They were assumed to be natural and right, and there grew up a machinery for their administration. The family is rooted in human physiology, economic necessity, and social tradition; it is, in a sense, a socially sanctioned compromise between the natural polygamous nature of human beings and the economic requirements of existence.

Both in its origin and in its development, the family is a pragmatic institution. Its origin was absolutely prosaic, an animal response to helpless offspring and a sex and economic adjustment between men and women. The performance of its essential function is not dependent upon its institutional aspects. Its external form has in general been an accommodation to environmental conditions, to other aspects of culture, and to the general state of development of the industrial arts. The paper by Mrs. Parsons, quoted in an earlier chapter, described the generalized types of the institution prevailing among the present-day peoples.

The institutional form is in large measure a creature of circumstance. In an old society with a consequent high degree of cultural homogeneity the personal, family, and group standards are nearly or quite the same. Moreover, there is likely to exist a degree of cultural stability that permits of divorce and family disruption without personal demoralization or social disorder and without involving personality and behavior problems of children.

As a medium for the rearing of children, there is much that might be said for the Samoan type of family life as Miss Mead presents it.

R. L. Stevenson has given his word for the charm and integrity of the finished product—the adult personalities resulting from the training. The Samoans seem to have hit upon a kind of family form, rather better suited than most, for bringing the individuals into harmonious adjustment with their environment and with each other. With a set of standards and traditions as far removed from those of the Western World as well can be, one must still be struck by the tone of simple contentment in familial matters, as contrasted with the tensity and self-consciousness of present-day American family life.

In sharp contrast to the simplicity and freedom of the large Samoan family is the Chinese type of great family. It is illuminating to perceive how different in final form and influence are these two large family types. The Chinese children, one conceives, as bound irrevocably by group habit and long tradition of family ceremony and ritual. Yet it is possible that even within this ancient family form, there is or has been a group cohesiveness and uniformity which tends to have a stabilizing effect upon the children, unknown to the transitory society of the Occident. But it is safe to prophecy that the family cohesiveness of the Chinese is doomed under the cumulative influence of the Western type of thought and economic organization.

That in the long run, the family form must inevitably adapt itself to the outer environing conditions in which it finds itself, is admirably illustrated by Mrs. Young's paper on The Reorganization of Jewish Family Life in America. The distinct and well-integrated type of family, which the Jews in Europe have maintained almost unchanged for many centuries, undergoes a catastrophic disorganization when transplanted to the American environment. The norms and standards, conceived by the Jewish elders as representing the utmost in idealism and morality, become completely demoralized within a single generation. The type of behavior which brought the older Jewish family life into being no longer is congruous with reality. At the cost of great individual suffering, a new family form is growing up, tending toward an adjustment of manner of life to economic and social circumstance.

1. *The Samoan Family*[1]

Conditions in some primitive societies present a strong contrast to these present-day American ones. In the Samoan Islands the natives live in great patriarchal households embracing fifteen to thirty individuals; to all of these the household grants status and security. Women retain a right in their parents' lands and can return home whenever they are dissatisfied with their marriages. Divorces are frequent and involve neither economic instability for mother and children, nor any disorganiza-

[1] Adapted from MEAD, MARGARET, Broken Homes, *Nation*, vol. 128, pp. 254, 255, February, 1929.

tion of the large households in which the parents resided. Authority is vested in the titled head of the household, an old man who usually belongs to the grandparent generation; tenderness and fostering care are shown by every adult woman to the young and weak of the household. Children do not form strong affectional ties with their parents; instead filial affection is diffused among a large group of relatives. Residence in the same household with one's parents is not obligatory and many children live with uncles and aunts. In such a society divorce does not threaten the serenity of the child. Divorce does not mean a broken home, but only separated parents and the pleasant necessity of visiting. It adds to the number of households in which the child will be especially welcome. As all Samoans love to go avisiting and even very young children can wander from one relative's household to another, this is simply an additional advantage. A little girl of twelve, both of whose parents are remarried and living in different villages, will weigh solemnly the different advantages of mother's home, father's home, and the home of aunt and uncle in which she resides, balancing more work in one place against less food in another. And a child does not depend upon the relationship between its parents to give it earnest of the value of sex happiness; the private lives of aunts and uncles and cousins are all equally open books to them. I spent months in constant association with the children of three Samoan villages, many of whom were the children of divorced parents. I found no evidence that those children were in any way injuriously affected.

Among the Southwest Indians in the pueblo of Zuni the child is assured security in a society in which divorce is frequent by another social device. Here the maternal household, consisting of a woman, her daughters, and her daughters' children, is the nucleus of the social organization. The women own the houses and a man always retains the right to go home to the house of his mother or sister. In these matrilineal households husbands come and husbands go, but the household has a continuity of its own which no divorce can disturb. And the household places the child in the community.

Where the community is organized into clans, as among the Dobuans of Melanesia, social stability comes from membership in the mother's clan. All the members of a village belong to the same clan and one is forbidden to marry into one's own village. The young married couple live alternately in the village where everyone is a relative of the wife and the village where all are relatives of the husband. When a divorce occurs the whole village turns against the stranger, who goes home to his or her village. The children live peacefully as members of the maternal household in the mother's village, owing authority to their mother's brothers whose natural tie with their sister's children is subject to no divorce decree.

Perhaps as important as the difference between the organization of the family among these primitive peoples and ourselves is the fact that among primitive peoples the standards of each family and the standards of the entire community are one. In matters of belief, in morals, and in manners, the community reinforces the home and cooperates with the parents in handing down a common tradition to all the members of the next generation. Economically the child is dependent upon a much larger kinship group, emotionally it is dependent upon a whole circle of relatives, morally it derives its sanctions from the entire community.

Obviously American life cannot imitate these customs of other much more primitive cultures. We shall not shift the burden of family responsibility upon the natural ties binding brother to sister, reconstruct society along maternal lines, nor move the headship of families up into the grandparent generation, which is not subject to marital ups and downs. It does not seem likely that we will reorganize our economic and residential habits so that great aggregations of kin will live under one roof and divide the parental responsibility. Still less is it possible to construct homogeneous communities where the background and standards of each family are identical with those of its neighbors. Complexity of civilization with its complexity of choices has come to stay. Yet if one of the great injuries which divorce or death of a parent can do to an American child is to shatter its home, is there any remedy for our children's liability to this particular misfortune?

The recognition that the marriage of two people is a very tenuous basis of security, subject to rupture from death and divorce, should dictate a policy of child training through which the dependence of the child upon this possibly ephemeral home is minimized. A primitive society where large relationship groups shelter all the members, and the whole society is of a piece, can afford its children a prolonged infancy without fear that any accident will render them defenseless. Complex modern society, in which the only security is based upon the union of two young and often ill-assorted people, cannot afford so to prolong the dependence of the younger generation. It must rather acknowledge its inferior facilities for giving complete economic and spiritual aid and comfort to the young and so encourage them to stand as early as possible upon their own feet.

2. *The Chinese Family*[1]

To Occidentals the word "family" connotes a group of people consisting of husband, wife, and children. This, however, is not true in China. A typical Chinese family, as Maclagan puts it, "might consist

[1] Adapted from Wu, Ching-Chao, The Chinese Family, *Am. Anthropologist*, vol. 29, pp. 316–318, July, 1927.

of father, mother, sons, daughter-in-law, and grandchildren." To have five generations living under one roof is not rare in China because of the custom of early marriage.

After the death of parents, the brothers may break up the family and live separately. They may still live together in the same household if they choose to do so, in which case authority is vested in the eldest brother. He is responsible for the maintenance of every member of the family and has the right to demand that other members of the family turn their earnings into the common purse to be used for the current expenses of the whole family. In practice, his authority is not absolute. Important questions of the family are not decided by him alone, but by the concurrent opinion of all the adult male members of the family.

The Chinese family is seldom an independent unit, but a member of the greater family. In the Chinese village, families bearing the same surname live together. The members of the greater family generally number hundreds and sometimes thousands. They have a common ancestral temple which is the center of their social and religious life. Whenever a person of the greater family dies, a tablet made of wood bearing his or her title and name is put in the shrine of the ancestral temple. The ceremony of ancestor worship is conducted in the ancestral temple, usually on certain festivals and on the anniversary of the birth and death of each ancestor. The ceremony is rather simple. Every family brings dishes and wine to the ancestral hall, putting them on the table. Then every member of the family, facing the table, makes three bows to the imagined spirits of the ancestors. At the same time incense and paper money are burned.

In the ancestral temple, many big tablets of honor hang on the wall. They may be compared to monuments of western countries. On each of these tablets are recorded the honorable and admirable deeds of the worthy members of the ancestral temple. For example, a man of high political achievement will, at his death, be honored by his fellow kinsmen by having his name and deeds recorded on the tablet. Such monuments have, it is believed, a powerful stimulating influence on the minds of the children who hear the stories of their great ancestors after each rite of ancestor worship.

The greater family is well organized. A board of elders consisting of the oldest member of each family is in charge of the greater family affairs. At a certain time of the year a regular meeting of the board is held. Among other things, the birth of a male child and marriages are recorded at this time. These will later on be transferred to the genealogical record which is made of two parts: first, diagrams of names, second, biographies. The genealogical record is revised generally every sixty years, so that new names and biographies may be added thereto. After the revision, the record is printed and distributed among the families.

The board of elders also takes care of the property which belongs to the greater family as a whole. The income from the property is used to defray the expenses of ancestor worship as well as for educational and philanthropic purposes.

To illustrate the last point the case of the *Van* estate may be cited. In the twelfth century a member of the *Van* greater family established an estate consisting of farm lands, farming implements, a granary, and some living houses. The objects of the estate were to relieve the members of the greater family from poverty and destitution, to encourage the education of the young, to reward virtue, such as filial piety and virtuous widowhood, and to maintain the solidarity of the greater family. Certain persons in the greater family received special grants under specified conditions. They were students pursuing or preparing for a literary career, aged persons, and widows.

The board of elders also has judicial power. When there is a dispute between two families, they refer the matter to the board for decision. The board of elders then calls a meeting in which not only the elders of the board but all influential members of the greater family take part. The two parties present their claims and arguments, and, after discussion, persuasion, and compromise, a certain agreement is brought about. Such agreement has the sanction of public opinion of the greater family, and the contesting parties generally abide by it.

The punishments which the board of elders can impose on the members of the family are of various sorts. It is said that in some parts of China the board of elders has the power of using capital punishment. This, if not untrue, is extraordinarily rare. In general, for misdemeanors, the punishment ranges from reproach to dismissal from the ancestral temple.

Such is the general feature of the Chinese family. For the last few decades changes have been going on in this system. The conditions which bring about this change are contact with the West, the slow but sure emancipation of woman, and the industrial revolution. The trend is evident; but what final shape the Chinese family will in the future assume, is, as yet, very hard to tell.

3. *The Family in the Communistic Sect*[1]

Observation and study of a communistic sectarian group like Amana should yield conclusions in regard to the effect of communism upon family organization. The Amana family is the typical small family group with overtones of the large family due to a high rate of intermarriage within the community, but its function both as an economic unit and as an agency for social control is influenced by cooperative industry and the joint ownership of property.

[1] Adapted from CHAFFEE, GRACE E., The Isolated Religious Sect as an Object for Social Research, *Am. Jour. Sociology*, vol. 35, pp. 627–628, January, 1930.

The wider claims of the community are recognized in many subtle ways. Each individual member of the family, women and older children as well as men, has a community function and participates directly in community undertakings. Each has status in his own right rather than through membership in a family group. Each is responsible in his corporate activity to community rather than to family authority. This confers upon the individual a certain freedom and sense of personal worth and dignity. The system of allowances relieves him from the pressure of family oversight and criticism of expenditure. The surety of his inheritance in the holdings of the community compensates him for the absence of a separate family economy and inheritance rights. The community kitchen removes from the home many of its traditional activities.

It would seem as if the individual and not the family were indeed the unit of social organization at Amana, and that the situation would approach that of the American urban family. This, however, is not the case. As an institution for the training and control of children, the Amana family is unique. In spite of the employment of both parents in community offices, their prestige and authority are unimpaired. The kindergarten, the school, and the community are organized to assist the parents in producing the kind of children Amana wants as citizens.

Informal methods of control, such as spontaneous gestures of disapproval and gossip, are used by the whole community. The parent need only remind the child of this state of affairs and he will obey. It is not a personal matter between the parent and child.

All formal methods of control, down to expulsion from the community, are in the hands of the elders. In case of a violation of the *mores*, the parents are held responsible jointly with the children and suffer a reduction in religious status. If a young person leaves the community, the mother is compelled to go to church with the girls for six months, while the father suffers a similar punishment. This system of joint accountability promotes a close, sympathetic relationship between parents and children, and exercises an added restraint upon the young people. There is, however, no feeling of vindictiveness against the elders. The pressure of community opinion and the prestige of the spiritual leaders make for acceptance. Somehow the situation is inevitable and must be borne. Parents and children alike are responsible to the community.

In other aspects as well, community control seems to strengthen familial attitudes. Both husband and children accommodate themselves to the demands made by the community upon the mother, and are proud of her accomplishment. There is often a sympathetic sharing of the task. Likewise, the work of the home that ordinarily devolves upon the mother is the joint affair of the whole family. Although the control of marriage is nominal and official rather than actual in most instances, divorce and illegitimacy are almost unknown.

A certain division of authority and control among the parents, the child, and the community, seems implicit in the Amana system. In spite of the freedom of the individual and his economic function, however, the pattern of family life is patriarchal. The position of woman is distinctly inferior. The man is the head of the family and of the community, in spite of the fact that one of the *Werkzeuge* was a woman. The force of religion and the German tradition tend to perpetuate this type of family organization. Final conclusions in regard to the effect communism may have upon family life can be drawn only after a study of situations in which economic communism operates without the extraneous factor of religious control which characterizes the Amana Society.

4. *The Accommodation of an Immigrant Family*[1]

The Jewish family arrives in America with a distinctive culture, a set of social attitudes and values which are deeply rooted, long cherished, and sanctioned by the religion and the *mores* of the group. The Jews of Europe—and especially those of Russia and Poland—having been isolated for long periods, because of legal restrictions upon residence, vocation, and religion, developed a highly organized closely knit social and religious life, open to relatively few outside influences.

In Europe the Jewish family is an institution strongly governed by tradition in which the rights of the family are supreme. The family group takes great responsibility for the individual, and he in turn is expected to conform to family traditions. From earliest childhood Jewish youth in Europe participate in family ceremonials and festivals in which the history and tradition of the group are rehearsed; all members are effectively united in spirit and thought at frequent intervals by family ritual. The sons attend *cheder* and Talmud Torah (religious schools) in which the mastery of the sacred books, the history, and the written tradition are stressed. These religious schools are age-old institutions and have for long been the seat for Jewish learning among both the rich and the poor. We rarely find a Jewish immigrant who was not educated in Hebrew in the old country. Not to have such a training classifies one as a *grobber jung* (a boor).

In America the isolation of the group is largely broken down, but immigrant families, nevertheless, remain in close contact with their fellow countrymen. In America . . .

> The Jews lead a life distinct from that of the surrounding nations not merely in religious observance but in every other sphere of human endeavor and aspirations. They confine their social intercourse for the most part to themselves;

[1] Adapted from YOUNG, PAULINE V., The Reorganization of Jewish Family Life in America: A Natural History of the Social Forces Governing the Assimilation of the Jewish Immigrant, *Social Forces*, vol. 7, pp. 238–243, December, 1928.

they organize their own education, support their own charities, pursue their intellectual ideals, though into the midst of all this collective activity echoes and elements of the national life around them penetrate slowly and subtly . . . The atmosphere is charged with the Jewish spirit, the environment is studded with Jewish institutions, synagogues, great and small . . . little private schools tucked away in back rooms, religious courts of judgment, libraries, baths, hospitals, theaters, clubs for working men, for boys . . . these and countless other institutions make up the compact variegated fabric of the modern Ghetto . . . The influence from without penetrates slowly, subtly, inevitably, bringing the Jews into the outer world . . .

The vigor of the communal life of an immigrant group depends largely upon its social environment; a hostile environment tends to develop a strong communal spirit, in extreme cases a closed community. In view of his past experiences the Jew generally regards himself very fortunate in the American environment, and, therefore, the influences from without have been penetrating the lives of the Jews in America and "luring them into the outer world."

The Jewish child in America grows in a complex of social relationships which may vary somewhat in different local groups but many similarities are to be found. Here the child is placed at an early age in an environment which is characterized by detachment from the simpler primary group relations, and the high degree of mobility encourages his "escape" from family and communal control.

The children may attend religious schools until the age of six or eight, but after this age they must attend public school, and if they continue both their religious and secular education at the same time a conflict usually arises. The *cheder* is a religious institution representing a definite set of social values; the public school represents a cosmopolitan group and tends to wean the child away from his old culture. The school cannot set itself to make better Jews; its prime function is to make better American citizens. The children learn a new and different moral code through their associations at public school. They begin to live simultaneously in two different worlds: their home, their religious, and communal life represents one culture, and the public school and the larger community represent another.

The English-speaking child of immigrant parents has access to a world of experience from which the latter are excluded. The English language is a strange vehicle of expression to the parents, and American institutions and traditions remain foreign to them. To the child, however, the English language is a native tongue. He learns it during his childhood simultaneously imbibing American customs which become second nature to him at an early age. The parents learn English because of dire necessity. They speak it with an accent, using foreign enunciation and gestures, which symbolize "Europe" to the child's mind; his parents

are "old timers," "greenhorns." The American born child is likely to judge his parents' intelligence by their faulty use of the English language.

We speak English, but that is not the language of our home. It is the aim of every Jewish father to pass on the traditions, the history, the ethics of the Jewish race to his children. Our boys do not understand Jewish sufficiently, and the father no longer finds intercourse possible with his sons. *Much is left unsaid.* The Jewish philosophy of life is not handed down to our children who are growing up with a remote idea of what Judaism stands for. They become a curious combination, an ethical hybrid, which does not function in the Jewish home. (A Jewish father.)

There is a wide difference between the European and American methods of social control. In the traditional home life of Jewish immigrant families the father is the head of the family group and is highly respected. Because of the long period of time required for Talmudic training the sons do not become economically independent at an early age, the father very frequently retaining his authority over his children even until they are married. In America on the other hand the industrial life of the child of immigrant parentage begins early. He becomes wise in the ways of the world while still very young. In many respects he is much more efficient and much better prepared to compete in the economic world than his father. He is an important element in the home because of his success in the economic life in America. Jewish children of immigrant homes break over the frontier lines in every direction and achieve success in the professional and business worlds alike, in spite of competition and many obstacles, not the least of which is prejudice, while their fathers continue to labor under great economic pressure, in inferior lines of industry. They are small merchants, small shopkeepers, factory workers, peddlers, etc. A small percentage of immigrant Jews gradually ascend the economic ladder of success, but the vast majority continue to struggle for an existence. However, the sons rapidly become white-collar men and steadily progress in the economic and social worlds. As soon as the child becomes a wage earner he gains a sense of independence, and parental control is considerably lessened. Hand in hand with this sense of independence goes a sense of inferiority because of the maladjustments in the business world due to language handicaps, religious observances, lack of industrial training, dislike for manual labor.

Our time and energy are taken up earning a living. The immigrant parent finds himself a negative factor in the lives of his children. We are glad that the industries and schools train our children. We depend on American institutions to give them a better chance in life, and then we quarrel with the consequences. (A Jewish father.)

The authority of the parents is also frequently relinquished to the American offspring because the immigrant parents have a secret admira-

tion for their emancipated children, who are the first ones in the home to represent American democracy to their parents. The mothers particularly look upon them with great pride and welcome the newer family ideals which command greater respect for women than traditionally enjoyed by them in the old country. Their burden of rearing a large family and earning a living for it at the same time is greatly decreased by the children's capacity and chance to help in the support of the family. In the old country she is an important economic factor while the husband is often a Talmud student.

The father is no more the "patriarch of the home." During the holidays the children have perhaps the only chance to see their father washed up, in holiday attire, sitting at the head of the table, relaxed and peaceful. They accept him temporarily as the authority and the head of the household. (A Jewish social worker.)

We simply have to recognize the potentialities in our children, and stand back and boost them. They develop initiative and power and leave us far behind them. We encourage them in their studies. There is a great scholarship tradition among us Jews, but our children grow away from us beginning with their entrance into the public schools. We secretly admire them because they are American citizens. They sense their importance and become further alienated from our customs. (A Jewish mother.)

Many parents make a desperate effort to adopt some American customs, but they are rarely emancipated from the old group in the first generation. Their attitudes, their philosophy of life remain hyphenated, and they find themselves seriously handicapped when they seek to gain status in American groups. Their accent, their mannerisms, their inability to understand American jokes (to appreciate to the full the humor of "Andy" or "Skeezix") their failure to observe the niceties of polite conversation, their indifference to American forms of sport, and the whole character of American life give them a feeling of strangeness and discomfort.

We help our children in their efforts to become Americanized, but having little experience we fall victims to the cheapest kind of Americanism. We find ourselves without the powerful force of custom, and there is nothing in its place but an empty heart. (A Jewish mother.)

You cannot avoid a gap between the American-bred child and his immigrant parents. When the child comes home from school in his bright sweater, in his rough pants, his dirty face perspiring, from a vigorous game of ball, he looks like a wild Indian to his parents. At school he is just the thing. The child does not understand inconsistencies. The parents shrink from his appearance. At school he is a hero. (A Jewish father.)

Jewish family life is intimately associated with religious life through ceremonials, dietary laws, and so on. Among the Orthodox Jews an inevitable conflict results over Sabbath keeping. Orthodoxy is very

inconvenient, intolerable to persons who have not been bred into it. The situation may often become a source of irritation to the children.

My father is Orthodox, European. He wants me to go to *shuhl* (synagogue). I see nothing in it, and we begin to fight. Hell and Heaven can't live together, and I keep out of his way as much as possible. (A young Jewish boy.)

The old traditional controls tend to break down under the conditions of American life before the new controls are firmly established. This results in an interval during which no systematic code prevails. This is the "danger period" during which much personal disorganization tends to occur. Some immigrants never come under the control of the American code after losing their native-culture code.

Take the parents who for one reason or another are willing to sacrifice their heritage and old customs. They only superficially discard their old habits. They are too old and inflexible to adopt any other customs, and they start to drift. They lose their self-respect, and a conflict in the home is the result. I have been through it, and we have not regained our balance as yet. (A Jewish father.)

The degree of change and adjustment to the new environment depends largely on the nature and extent of the outside contacts made by the Jewish home in America and on the intelligence of its members. The individual persons of the immigrant home frequently travel from one cultural world to the other, and some degree of reorganization of home life is inevitable. Time smooths out a great many differences. Accommodation within the home occurs as soon as the opposing elements become accustomed to dealing with each other satisfactorily in spite of their many differences. The parents are inclined to adapt themselves to the changed conditions and the resultant new life, as soon as the children become rooted in the economic world. Thus with the children independently established a certain prestige attaches, and the entire family basks in the glory of the reflected sunshine of success. The wide gulf between parent and child is forgotten and seemingly bridged.

Believe me times have changed. My boys make twice as much money as my husband did when we were married. We are too old to change. Our children are wiser and more independent. I can't say: "Look here, Jack, you can't run around and think as you please." All the young people are ahead of their parents these days. There is no use fighting with them all the time. You might as well give in and make them realize they are welcome in the home, and they can keep in contact with a little bit of Jewishness. (A Jewish mother.)

It is important to note that a process of accommodation and readjustment to Jewish home and communal life occurs on *the part of the child* as he grows older and begins to seek recognition in other groups. Parents and children seem to meet each other half way in their process of adjustment. While they have the same civil privileges and encounter no legal

restrictions they find it frequently impossible to conceal their origin. The attitudes of the other people are such that they compel them to realize that they are Jews, and that they belong "where they come from." Even in such cosmopolitan groups as the school the second generation Jew encounters some antagonism. He looks upon school as his chief road to success and higher status. The success motive, the energy, the reverential attitude toward learning and the scholarship tradition, the superior ability are factors in the conflict.

We have to recognize their ability. They are mentally alert, colorful, intelligent. They have taken the leads in various activities because of their ability. Mentally the Jewish children are the backbone of my class, but they can be an insufferable nuisance because of their constant desire to distinguish themselves, and that's why they are not very popular among the other groups in school. (A non-Jewish teacher.)

SUGGESTED READINGS

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2. KEYSERLING, COUNT: "The Book of Marriage," 1926. The Indian Ideal of Marriage by Rabindranath Tagore; The Chinese Conception of Marriage by Richard Wilhelm.
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Chapter VIII

SOME NUMERICAL RELATIONS

An understanding of the family in the social order is facilitated by a certain amount of purely formal and factual data. The papers by Mr. Dublin and Mr. Ogburn, when taken together, give a fairly adequate view of the external facts and relations. We have supplemented these papers by additional statistical information that can readily be thrown into tabular form.

1. *The Measurement of Family Well-being*[1]

The family, that tottering old institution, as some cynics depict it, is still the very foundation of our civilization. It continues to determine our individual as well as our national well-being. The family provides both nature and nurture for the individual; it is the source of continuity and the carrier of tradition for the state. That is why the family has always been zealously protected by organized authority, including church and state. Every tendency toward change in the form of family structure has been fought by them tooth and nail. One would expect, therefore, that both official and private agencies would make the family the unit of observation and note carefully every variety of family organization and would provide a wealth of information on its development.

But, probably because of the highly intangible values involved, the problems of family well-being have resisted stubbornly and effectively the introduction of any attempt at measurement and of appraisal. There are almost no sound facts upon which a constructive social program may be built. Yet there is already, thanks to the newer ideals of social work, a growing interest in facts underlying family life. It is now realized that if social work is to become truly scientific and to be based upon principles rather than random feelings of generosity and pity, it must be guided by the same methods of accounting and the same criteria of success and failure that are applied to other human activities.

A serious difficulty arises at the very beginning because of the varied conceptions of the family. There is first the "natural" family which, in its simplest form, consists of parents and their unmarried children, whether living at home or away. Under this head we must distinguish between complete and incomplete families, and these may be still further

[1] From Dublin, Louis I., The Great American Family, *Survey*, vol. 59, pp. 267–269, Dec. 1, 1927.

divided into broken and unbroken families. As against the natural family, there is the "economic" family, an aggregation of persons living under the same roof and sharing the same table, though not necessarily united by ties of blood or marriage. The state has found it possible to record the facts for the economic family only. As a result, we find in the census returns every variety of family unit represented though the great majority are true natural families. Despite this drawback, census figures do throw considerable light on the present organization of the family; especially with regard to the trend in family organization, and we have no choice but to use them.

According to the census of 1920 there were 24,351,677 families in the United States, and in 1927 there are probably close to 27,500,000. Since the total population is now about 117,000,000, the average number of persons in the family group is 4.3.

The size of the family has decreased slowly and regularly from the beginning of our national history. Families with seven or eight children were the rule in the early period, but by 1850 the average number of persons in the census family was 5.6. The largest families are found in the southern states, the smallest on the Pacific Coast. Other geographical areas show very little variation from the average. There is a widespread tendency throughout the country for the rural family to be larger than the urban family. In 1920, the figures were 4.5 and 4.2 persons, respectively. The size of the family varies with the prevailing industries, the housing facilities, the religious affiliations, and even with the racial traditions of groups of people. It would be very interesting to know the size of families in the various sections of the country classified according to color and nativity of the parents, but, unfortunately, these figures are not available. We do know, however, that immigrant families are larger than those of native stock.

Families are formed through the institution of marriage. In 1925 there occurred in the United States 10.2 marriages per thousand of population; and as each marriage involves 2 persons, one marriage was recorded that year for every 50 people in the country. Our marriage rates have always been and still are relatively high as compared with other countries. England and Wales in 1924 showed a marriage rate of 7.7 per thousand; Germany in the same year, an even lower figure, 7.1. But both these rates undoubtedly reflect the post-war excess of women of marriageable age. Opportunities for marriage in America are very favorable, because of the age and sex composition of the population and the excellent economic conditions prevailing. Marriage rates reflect quickly the state of well-being of the people, the rise and fall of employment, and of wage levels.

The highest marriage rates for the country are in the area which includes Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi; the lowest in

the New England states. Considering individual states, Florida shows the highest rate and Delaware the lowest. Although the marriage rate may be expected to vary it is difficult to reconcile the 80 marriages in Florida for each thousand unmarried people fifteen years of age and over, with the Delaware figure of only 18 for the same age group. Rural life influences the marriage rate favorably; city life apparently causes a diminution of about 10 per cent in the marriage rate.

Marriage registration for the country as a whole began in 1887. In that year, the marriage rate was 8.7 per thousand of population. By 1900 it had risen to 9.3, and since 1905 the crude marriage rate has remained above 10 per thousand. There can be no doubt that the marriage rate has slowly but consistently increased during the last 40 years. In an extremely interesting paper, W. F. Ogburn has recently shown that in 1920 about three-fifths of all persons fifteen years of age and over were married, and, of those forty-five years of age and over, 90 per cent either were or had at one time been married.

In the early age groups, there are more married women than men; among older people, the situation is reversed. The steady increase in the marriage rate has been manifest at every age division of life after the fifteenth year; but accompanying this increase has been a slight increase in the average age at marriage, as the Massachusetts figures show. In 1910 the average age at marriage for males in that state was 29.0 years; in 1926 it was 29.5 years. For females, the average age at marriage in 1910 was 25.7 years; in 1926, 26.1 years.

Another tendency which influences both the marriage rate and the age at marriage is the sex ratio, or the proportion of women to men in a given place. The highest rates of marriage are found in areas with an excess of men; and manufacturing cities especially show a high proportion of marriages because of their large male populations. Where women are found in large numbers, there is not only a low marriage rate but a decided postponement of the age of marriage. Discussing this point, C. T. Brunner shows that the ratio of men to women is determined by the industrial character of a district. Where the main industries call for men's labor, as in mining and shipbuilding, the proportion of males to females is high and the marriage age of the women is low; where the demand for female labor is strong, wages are low, there is a low proportion of men to women, and a high marriage age for women.

Great significance attaches to the age of marriage. The trend toward delayed marriage has caused a wider spread between the biological age for marriage—or the age at which sex impulses become strong and the procreative capacity develops—and the economic age of marriage, or the time when it becomes financially possible for the male to assume family responsibilities. Consequently serious problems have arisen, involving such fundamental questions as the double standard of morality, com-

panionate marriage, the dissemination of contraceptive knowledge, and the like. All these problems of social ethics are quite beyond our province here and we mention them only in passing to show the deeply significant implications involved in marriage statistics.

If families are formed through the institution of marriage, they are continued through the medium of births. Birth rates are, therefore, a significant factor in determining family stability. At the beginning of the Republic, the population increased at a rate of about 3.5 per cent a year. This was due largely to the very high birth rate and to the comparatively low death rate. In the earlier years, birth rates of 50 per thousand probably occurred. By 1880, the birth rate was still close to 40 per thousand, or nearly twice as high as it is now. Since then, there has been a fairly steady decline in the birth rate and at the present time, it is only about 21 per thousand.

Even the present low birth rate would be still lower were we not reaping the benefit of the relatively high birth rates of past decades, which gives us a disproportionate number of persons in early adolescent and middle ages. If we eliminate from our consideration the rural and southern half of the country, we may say that a very large part of our birth rate is the result of recent immigration. Were it not for this factor, our birth rate would unquestionably be the lowest in the world. The tendency of the birth rate is still downward. Just how far the decline will go, it is difficult to say. Contraceptive knowledge is rapidly spreading to all classes of society. This fact, coupled with the declining number of immigrants who are, for the most part, young people, will undoubtedly slow up the rate of increase, and we may look before very long to a stationary population. It requires close to four children per mother for the population to reproduce itself. If the present policy of restricted immigration and the sentiment favoring small families continues for a few more decades, we shall have arrived at a point of a stationary population. But this whole tendency may shift when the public realizes the direction in which we are going.

As against the formative influence of marriage, there are two disintegrating forces which destroy families, namely, death and divorce or separation. The mortality rate here has always been low as compared with that of other countries. The American people were recruited from hardy stock; and after the country was settled, conditions of life were, on the whole, conducive to longevity.

In the earlier years of the Republic, the rates were higher in the cities than on the farms and plantations, although in the South, malaria could often be counted on to increase the mortality. The general death rate of those years was about 20 per thousand. When, as often happened, epidemics of various diseases, such as smallpox, yellow fever, and cholera prevailed, it shot up to 30 and even 40 per thousand. But note

the great improvement which has taken place as shown by the rate of 18.1 per thousand for 1918, the year of the unprecedented influenza epidemic.

The death rate has fallen at least 40 per cent during the last 40 or 50 years. In 1900, the first year of official death registration, the rate was 17.6 per thousand. During the following quarter century, it had fallen 33 per cent, a truly remarkable achievement. The early years of life show the most phenomenal saving. Infant mortality is now only half what it was 25 years ago when 1 out of 5 babies born died before reaching the first birthday. Now we find fault when 1 out of every 14 infants dies in the first year of life. The mortality of preschool children, of children in their teens, of adolescents, and of young adults, has shown large but unequal improvement. Not nearly as many young or even middle-aged people die as the result of tuberculosis as did formerly. Typhoid fever, diphtheria, and scarlet fever are rapidly diminishing and promise to become as rare as yellow fever and cholera. The outlook for the future is promising indeed.

The reduction in mortality has, of course, lengthened the average duration of life, or what is technically called "the expectation of life at birth." In 1840, the average person could count on only 40 years; but gradually the expectation had crept up and is now about 58 years, making a gain of almost 50 per cent in this comparatively brief period. One point must be made clear, however. The death of numbers of babies and young people before they more than taste life has been prevented to a great degree. Who can estimate the increased wealth and happiness this has brought to the American people?

Death is the great disintegrating force of family life, especially when the father or the mother is taken. It is, therefore, highly encouraging to note a much reduced mortality among young married people as shown by New York State statistics. For married men in the age group twenty-five to thirty-four years, the rate has fallen from 4.9 per thousand in 1909 to 1911 to about a third of that figure in 1924; in the next age group, thirty-five to forty-four years, during the same period it fell from 7.4 per thousand to 2.7. Similarly 15 years ago, the death rate for married women was 5.8 between the ages of twenty-five to thirty-four, and in 1924 had fallen to 1.9; in the thirty-five to forty-four year group, it was reduced from 7.1 to 2.8 per thousand. It is especially the loss of young parents which has the direst consequences upon family well-being, throwing every normal activity of the family out of gear and ushering in a whole series of calamites which taxes every resource of the community. Only a comparatively short time ago, the premature death of parents caused untold numbers of previously self-respecting families to become dependent upon charity. Now the routine of social agencies has been shifted from relief of the aged, the sick and the down-and-out to more constructive

effort, such as health conservation and higher living standards for the great body of wage earners.

While death has become increasingly less important as a cause of family disintegration, the break-up of families by divorce has become more and more frequent. In 1925 with the highest divorce rate ever recorded in the United States, there were 175,449 divorces, or one divorce for every seven marriages performed in that year. In 1887 when divorce registration was started, there was 0.5 divorce per thousand population. This figure increased to 0.6 in 1897; to 0.9 in 1906; to 1.1 in 1916; and to 1.5 in 1925. There is now 1 divorce a year to each 135 married couples.

Undoubtedly the presence of children holds the family together. Children are relatively rare in families broken by divorce. There were no children in 57 per cent of the divorced families; 7 per cent made no report; and in the remaining 36 per cent there was an average of 1.8 children. In 19.7 per cent of all these divorced families, there was one child; in 9.4 per cent, two children; in 3.8 per cent, three children; and in only 3.1 per cent of the total divorced cases were there four or more children.

As related to the married population, the divorce rate was highest in Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. In 1925 there were 6.5 divorces per thousand married population in that area. The lowest rate of 1.5 divorces was recorded in the Middle Atlantic states. There is, however, considerable uncertainty as to the value of these figures because of the ease with which individuals can obtain divorces in states and countries other than those of their usual residence. In Nevada it is notoriously easy to obtain a divorce and therefore the 1925 divorce rate of 34.7 per thousand married population reflected only the laxity of the divorce laws. Among the highest recorded rates for individual states were those of Oklahoma with 7.9 divorces per thousand population; Oregon with 7.6, and Texas with 7.4. In both New York State and the District of Columbia, the rate was less than 1 per thousand married population—the low point in divorce frequency. There is uniformly more divorce in the cities than in the rural areas.

The increasing frequency of divorce is one of the major problems of modern life. Little attention has as yet been directed by social workers and by students generally to the causes which make for divorce, possibly because this evil is still largely concentrated among the well-to-do. But such tendencies always percolate into other economic classes; what is the fashion in one class is soon copied by all the rest. In any case, substitutes for divorce are already very much in evidence among those who can not afford the luxury of travel to states with easy divorce laws or to foreign countries. Our courts of domestic relations have an immense calendar of cases of separation and of desertion which are to all intents and purposes the same phenomenon as divorce because they represent the disintegra-

tion of the family with the consequent hardships and handicaps for minor children.

This condition will in all probability continue or get worse unless the community develops a better understanding of the importance of the family in our modern life. Certain tendencies are distinctly adverse to the creation and maintenance of the family and these, for the most part, go unchallenged by the socially minded. These include the movement of people from the farms to the cities, the employment of very young persons and their consequent drifting away from their homes, the almost prohibitive cost of domestic service, the increasing popularity of the small apartment and, most important, the approval of childless or, at best, two-child families.

A conference of governors for the adoption of uniform divorce legislation by all the states is obviously needed. But more important still would be the creation and widespread distribution of a constructive and sympathetic point of view on the significance of the family in the modern state and of the true place of divorce in family life.

This discussion of the facts of the family has been meager and desultory. At every point, we are thwarted by the lack of trustworthy information. It is much to be regretted that the official agencies entrusted with the compilation of facts of our organized community life have missed their opportunity to bring together a continuous series of data which would indicate the trends of the modern family. There must be a very definite shift in the emphasis of our official statistics from the individual to the family as the social unit for purposes of both tabulation and analysis.

A primary need is a statement from the results of each of the future decennial censuses of the population of the United States on the number of natural families, supplemented by appropriate classifications according to the nativity, parentage, and color of the head of the family. Following the precedent of other countries, it may be well also to secure for each natural family the year of marriage and the ages of the wife and husband at marriage. And in order to determine the degree to which the natural family achieves its primary aim of maintaining the population of the country, it may be well to secure facts on the number of children ever live-born to the marriage and on the number of such children surviving the census day. If these facts were provided on the enumeration schedules of the next census, and if suitable facilities were established for the tabulation and publication of the results, we should have a statistical foundation for the consideration of family problems in the United States such as England and Scotland possess.

Social agencies which come in contact with families may also perform a distinct service in the collection of family facts. Data on the natural families cared for by them should become available from this source

indicating the relationship of family members to the head of the family, the number of family members by age, the duration of marriage, and the number of children ever live-born and who are now either dead or alive. The committees on statistics of the several states and national organizations of social workers may well take into account these items of family case work and outline a statistical program which will be in general agreement with a plan developed for official registration. What is needed at the present time is a revival of interest in family statistics and a well-considered plan for their collection and use to make possible an intelligent program for the well-being of the family, our basic social institution.

2. *Eleven Questions Concerning American Marriage*[1]

Marriage has been said to be one of the three great events of life—birth, marriage, and death. Perhaps not every one would accord marriage so high a rank. It is sometimes the butt of merriment in the theater; but humor has a way of appearing in the most tensely serious situations of life. In the scale of the importance of things, marriage ought to rank at least as high as, say, the tariff. But the libraries probably would show many more shelves of scientific books on the tariff than on marriage. And certainly in the legislative halls the flow of words has been more voluminous on the tariff than on marriage. However, the worthiness of marriage as a problem of scientific study is rapidly according it a place of considerable dignity. No doubt the growing strength of the voice of women in matters that count will be one of the things that will bring the problems of marriage, the family, and the child to the fore in the coming century.

Marriage is important because it is probably more closely related to that elusive thing we call "happiness" than any other social institution, unless it be perhaps the church. Our economic organization brings us physical comforts and material well-being, but it does not always bring happiness. At least one is not impressed by the intense happiness that one meets among one's wealthy acquaintances. The close relation of marriage to happiness is attested by the common phrases, "a happy marriage," and "an unhappy marriage." Marriage has been so conceived by the dramatist, the essayist, and the novelist. Probably most of the writing on the subject of marriage has been done by these groups, but it ought to be the province of science as well as of literature. It is to be hoped that in the future it will be the concern of the physiologist, the psychologist, and the sociologist as well.

Marriage is so broad in scope, with so many sides, that no one book can hope to cover it completely. The province of this paper is limited to

[1] From OGBURN, WILLIAM F., Eleven Questions Concerning American Marriages, *Social Forces*, vol. 6, pp. 5–12, September, 1927.

information about marriage that has been objectively and statistically obtained for the United States. The merit of such an objective treatment is that it presents information with a certain precision, completeness, and reliability. And although this treatment does not answer some of the questions about which we are most curious, these definite facts throw a good deal of light on some of the points.

Most persons think of marriage as being a desirable condition, yet there seem to be bachelors and spinsters who appear content, at least so far as external signs show; and also, as we all know, there are unhappy marriages. But we wish to know the general rule, not the individual case. Statistics throw some light on this question.

For instance, the death rate of single men is nearly twice as great as the death rate of married men. And since one generally considers that ill health is related to death, it would thus seem that married life is more healthful than single life for men. While it may be argued, that it is not marriage that is more healthful, but rather that it is the healthy men who marry, the death rate is also nearly twice as great for the widowed and divorced men who have once been married. But again, some widowers and divorced men remarry, and it may be that it is the healthier ones who remarry. Yet, on the other hand, there is not much difference between the death rate of single women and married women. Would marriage select the healthy men but not the healthy women? Why is there so much difference between the death rates of single men and married men, and yet so little difference between the death rates of single women and married women?

So also there appears to be more insanity among both single men and single women than among married men and married women when their ages are the same. And so, also, crime seems to be more prevalent among the single than among the married, at equal age periods. It is not absolutely proved that in general the single life is more conducive to crime and insanity than is married life, for the factor of selection may enter. The statistics in general, however, lead to the presumption, though they do not prove it, that marriage is a desirable state with regard to these social conditions of death, crime, and insanity.

All primitive peoples have the institution of marriage, and apparently it has always existed in one form or another. Furthermore, among primitive peoples it is very rare to find an old adult who has never married. Yet in the United States in 1920, about 1 in every 10 persons over forty-five years of age had never married. Could there have been a biological change in man's sexual capacities since the days of his primitive life? Is civilization more artificial in this respect? Is it a matter of selfishness? Or have the economic and social conditions affecting the family changed? Of those over fifteen years old, about 6 out of every 10 are married. The age period at which most persons are reported married is

from thirty-five years to forty-five years. At this age period 80 per cent are married. This means that 20 per cent are, at the ages of maximum marriage, living in the unmarried state, as single, widowed, or divorced.

Society is much interested in the breaking of marriage by divorce. Marriage is frequently broken by death, but death is partly beyond man's control. Separation, frequently leading to divorce, is also a cause of the dissolution of marriage. Furthermore, the happiness of marriage is broken at times, even when couples continue to live together. Yet divorce is the peculiar concern of society, partly because it is usually undertaken with the idea of forming another family group through a remarriage.

The fact that in 1924 there was one divorce granted to about every seven marriages performed indicates that divorce is very common. Moreover, the chances of a marriage entered into in 1924 being broken by divorce may perhaps be nearer one to five or six than one to seven. There were in 1924 about fifteen to sixteen times as many divorces as there were in 1870, and yet the population is only about three times as large.

The causes of divorce are of two sorts: the immediate inciting causes recognized as legal grounds for divorce, and the more fundamental causes that lie in the nature of society or in human nature. Court records give us little information about these basic causes, for many of them are found in the decline in various functions of the family. The family used to be the economic unit in the older agricultural society, but now these services have passed to the state, the factory, the restaurant, and the store. The protective function has passed in large measure to the state, the courts, the school, the health boards, etc. Recreation is still a home affair to a slight extent, but it has become largely commercialized. The religious function has passed largely from the home, due to changes in the nature of religious beliefs and creeds. The school is taking younger and younger children, and there are fewer and fewer of them. The loss of these functions is still going on, and there seems no immediate prospect of their being restored, unless, perchance, some modern invention, such as the distribution of power by electricity, restores the home industries and other functions. All these functions were ties or bonds that helped to keep the members of the family together. As these ties weakened, more divorce and separation were perhaps to be expected, since the only tie remaining intact was the affectional function. The affectional tie seems to be variable in our original nature or by its conditioning, so that there is a problem of mismating, and in this case readjustments may take place by the methods of divorce. This whole problem of the psychological and physiological aspects of mating has been little studied, but as its nature becomes better known, marriage may become more stable.

The most important of the immediate causes for divorce as shown in the divorce records are cruelty, desertion, and adultery, named in the order of their frequency. Cruelty is becoming more and more a ground for divorce, and, on the surface, the husband is more often the offending party. About two-thirds of the divorces are granted to wives, due to the nature of the laws and of the position of man in society. The presence of children tends to hold the family together, for only a small percentage of couples divorced report having children. Cities that have lower birth rates have slightly more divorces, and those that have larger percentages of the population married in the earlier years of adulthood have slightly more divorced persons. Either early marriage or divorce might be the causal factor.

In cities one finds the economic functions as well as other functions of the family greatly reduced from what they are in the rural districts. And since the divorce rate is greater for cities than for the agricultural regions, there seem to be no signs of a slackening of the increase of divorce in the United States.

One wonders whether there is a natural limit. Presumably, if divorce were unrestricted by laws or by social disapproval, we should still have an organized family with a fair measure of stability, more certainly in middle and late life. Any natural or mathematical limit to the divorce rate seems rather far removed, and it is quite conceivable that the increase may continue for some time.

Marriage has, no doubt, a somewhat different significance for women than for men. Formerly, man in choosing a wife chose a business partner as well, but this is not so much the case today. Now man chooses a wife as a mate, but to a woman a husband means not only a mate but a livelihood. Thus, marriage would seem to be more important for woman than for man. In the early years of the marriageable ages there are more women than men married. As to the cause, it may be that man has to postpone marriage for economic reasons, whereas woman does not—indeed, she may for economic reasons be interested in marrying early. Some evidence is presented later to show that the employment of women postpones marriage, though it may be that employment selects a type of woman who would postpone marriage in any case. Not only do women mature biologically somewhat earlier than men, but in our society sex expression is less inhibited for men than for women. There is the so-called "double standard of morality."

The percentages of women married are greater than of men for ages under the age period thirty-five to forty-four years, and the percentages of men married are greater after the age period forty-five to fifty-four. Of men over sixty-five years old, two-thirds are married; while of women over sixty-five years of age, only one-third are married. The death rates for men and women in the later years of life do not differ greatly, yet

there are twice as many widows as widowers. It seems that there is a tendency for the older men and widowers to marry young women. The fact that older men are in an advantageous position for undertaking matrimony on economic grounds may explain in part the excess of older married men. Moreover, the statistics indicate that the younger women are more desirable than the older widows. The reasons, therefore, for the earlier marriage of women and the later marriage of men seems to be a mixture of biological and economic conditions.

Other interesting facts regarding the differences between men and women as to marriage are shown in the influence of the sex ratio upon marriage. Our cities vary a good deal in the proportion of men to women. Some of the eastern and southern cities have excesses of women, while many western cities have large excesses of men. At first thought there would appear to be the largest percentages of the population married when the sexes were equal in numbers, but that is not the case. The maximum percentages married are when there are excesses of men, around 120 men to 100 women. Why is this? The answer may be sought in certain other peculiarities of the relationships between the sex ratio and marriage. For instance, the percentage of men who are married depends upon the supply of women. Thus, when there are 60 men to 199 women, 77 per cent of the adult males are married; but when there are 180 men to 100 women, only 67 per cent of the men are married—a decline in percentages married of 10. For the same sex ratios, of course, the percentages of women married increase. For instance, when there are 100 women to 60 men, 55 per cent of the women are married; but when there are 100 women to 180 men, then 89 per cent of the women are married—an increase in percentages married of 34. Can we not say, therefore, that in marrying women are much more dependent on the supply of men than men are on the supply of women? Why is this so? Is it due to physiological reasons? Or to economic and social reasons? This greater variability seems to be in harmony with the theory that man takes the initiative in proposing marriage.

The age of marriage is an important matter. It is important because of the difference between the biological age for marriage and the economic age for marriage. The capacity to produce and bear children develops shortly after puberty; so also do sex impulses become strong at this time. Most primitive peoples marry before twenty years of age, many at fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen years. It therefore seems physiologically natural to marry in the teens.

On the other hand, it is questionable whether young people are socially prepared for marriage so early in life. More and more time is needed for education. In our complex society certain wisdom is needed for handling the problems of family and marriage. Then, too the economic burden of marriage falls largely on the young man, who often is not prepared to

support a wife until he has obtained an increased income, which frequently comes only with maturing years. It thus comes about that in our society the economic age for marriage and the biological age for marriage do not coincide, particularly with the young man. There is naturally some variation with economic classes and occupations.

Of the young men eighteen years old, only 1 in 37 was married in 1924, while among the young women 1 in 5 was married. Of the men twenty years old, one-eighth were married, as compared with three-eighths of the women of that age. Between twenty-five and twenty-six years of age, one-half of the men were married, and two-thirds of the women. Thus there is considerable postponement of marriage beyond a suitable biological age for beginning marriage. There are, no doubt, many social consequences of such a postponement about which it would be interesting to speculate.

There are in the United States, in addition to whites, two large racial groups—the Negro and the Indian. Neither the Negro nor the Indian as a group lives under primitive conditions, and the social and economic position of the Indian is further removed from the whites than that of the Negro. The Indian is largely engaged in farming, while there are a good many urban Negroes. With age distributions the same, there are larger percentages of Indians married than Negroes, and larger percentages of Negroes married than whites, though the differences are slight. The percentages are 63.2 for Indians over 15 years of age, 61.2 for Negroes, and 59.6 for whites. Thus there is only a slight difference. With the same age distribution, the native white stock has 61.4 per cent of those fifteen years old and over married, the white immigrants, 60.9; but the American-born children of immigrants for the same ages have only 54.2 per cent married.

This smaller percentage of those married of the native whites of foreign or mixed percentage is true of the city and of the rural districts, and in different regions and for each age period. Particularly does this class postpone marriage. Of these sons and daughters of immigrants over forty-five years of age, 14.4 per cent have never married, while only about 9 per cent of other whites over forty-five years of age have never married. Only 29 per cent of the children of immigrants, twenty to twenty-four years of age, are married, while 42 per cent of the native white stock of the same ages are married. Why is there this relative tendency of the children of immigrants not to marry? We have found no answer, but it has been suggested that they postpone marriage in order to better themselves in the social and economic scale; the men postpone marriage because of the economic burden, while the women wait for economic improvement.

The Negroes are a different race, with different traditions from the whites, and one might expect peculiarities in the status of marriage among

them. Negroes, in general, are common laborers and farm laborers; and what is perhaps more significant for marriage, a great many Negro women work outside the home before and after marriage, and may be said to be economically independent. It should also be said, however, that the Negro strives to adopt the culture pattern of the whites.

Early marriage is more frequent among Negroes than among whites. Nearly one-third of all Negroes between fifteen and twenty-five years of age are married, whereas only a little over one-fifth of the whites at these ages are married. Are differences in social and economic incentives the cause? Early marriage, however, does not seem to be so noticeable among Indians.

There is a smaller percentage of older Negro women married than of older white women, and there is a very large percentage of Negro widows. When the age distributions of the whites and the Negroes are the same, there is among Negro women fifteen years old and over about 1 widow in every 5 or 6 women, whereas among white women there is about 1 in 10. A particularly large percentage of young Negro women are married. Can the economic independence of Negro women account for both the early marriage of Negro women and the small number that are found married in later life? Among white women in rural districts a large percentage will be found married, because, it is argued, of their economic function. The Negro woman has also an economic function, but Negro women are perhaps paid in money wages more frequently than white women in rural districts.

The largest percentages of the population are found married in the southeastern states, and the smallest percentages in New England. Why should there be this difference? This is true particularly for the rural regions, but it is true also for urban districts, and includes the native whites in both urban and rural districts. It cannot be explained on the basis of proportion of the sexes. Is this difference due to climate? Boys and girls are supposed to mature slightly earlier in warm climates, and there are many more early marriages in the South than in New England. Yet climate does not give a satisfactory explanation; for in the east north-central states there are large percentages of the population married, while in the southern states of California, Arizona, and New Mexico there are small percentages married. If the difference is to be explained on the basis of custom and tradition, one wonders how the different traditions came about.

In general, there seem to be more married persons in relation to the population among peoples with simple cultures than among peoples in highly civilized nations. Our grandparents are generally considered to have married earlier in life than young people do today. Hence, it seems natural to infer that there is less marriage today than formerly.

This may be true, but since 1890, the date of the first publication of full statistics of marital conditions, marriage has increased, and so also has early marriage. In 1890, 55.3 per cent of the population fifteen years old and over were married; in 1920, 59.9 per cent were married. This increase is, in part, due to the fact that there are more older people in the United States today than there were in 1890, owing to adult immigration, a diminishing birth rate, and the prolongation of life. However, if the age distribution had been the same in 1920 as it was in 1890, there would have been 56.8 per cent married as against 55.3 in 1890. This increase would still have been greater if our cities had not grown more rapidly than our rural districts. The percentages of single and widowed have decreased, but the percentage of divorced has increased. This increase has been marked in the age periods from fifteen to thirty-five; for in the older age periods there has been a decrease since 1890. Why there has been this decrease is not clear, but it is perhaps due to causes operating a generation or so ago. The increase in early marriage has occurred despite the prolonged period of schooling and the keen competition for wealth. This increase has occurred both in urban and in rural districts.

Cities are a comparatively modern phenomenon. During the period of history, agricultural life has been predominant. In the rural districts women have had many economic functions; but it is in the cities that we find the greatest decline in the family functions, particularly in the economic functions of the wife. It is important, therefore, to ask what influence city life has on marriage. In cities (over 2,500 inhabitants), 57 per cent of the population fifteen years old and over were married in 1920, while in rural districts (under 2,500 inhabitants), 63.5 per cent were married, when the age distribution was the same. One might say, therefore, that city life discourages marriage by about 10 per cent.

The rural districts seem especially favorable to married women. Among 1,000 rural women there are 17 per cent more married women than there are among 1,000 urban women. Fifty-three per cent of the men in the United States live in cities, and 56 per cent of the women. The city seems to attract single women and widows. Fifty-four per cent of the single men live in cities, and 59 per cent of the single women. Of women twenty to thirty-four years old, 58 per cent live in cities; while of women of other age groups, only 54 per cent live in cities, which would indicate a preference on the part of young women for the city.

The scarcity of single women in rural districts is further noted by the fact that out of 1,000 women twenty-five years old and over living in rural districts, only 93 are single, while out of 1,000 city women of the same age group, 158 are single—an increase of 68 per cent over the group of single women living in rural districts.

Can the difference be explained on economic grounds? Is it because the economic function of the women in the country lies in the home, while

in the city her economic service is often outside the home? Would these differences in economic functions also explain the fact that 206 out of 1,000 urban men twenty-five years old and over are married, whereas in the country there are only 163 men out of 1,000 of this age group who are single?

The development of manufacturing is a great characteristic of our age. One wonders what the specific influence of manufacturing is on marriage. Manufacturing, as judged by comparisons of manufacturing cities with other cities, seems to increase marriage slightly, and more particularly, early marriage, but in part because it attracts young men. Cities that are manufacturing centers have the largest percentages of married women, when the percentage of women employed is the same from city to city. There are also fewer widows and smaller percentages of the population divorced in manufacturing cities. The employment of women seems to postpone marriage and result in slightly fewer women married.

One is also curious to know whether birth control influences marriage. Some persons argue that it does, because then there is not at once the economic burden of children. Others argue that it encourages sexual intercourse outside of marriage, and hence operates against marriage. Cities with lower birth rates have larger percentages of young people married, when the ages of the wives are approximately the same from city to city.

It is thus indicated that birth control may encourage marriage.

As to the influence of economic factors on marriage, it is thought that in a given community when there is an increase in income there are more marriages. The fact that there are more marriages in business prosperity than during business depression fits in with this hypothesis, as does also the fact that rapidly growing cities (growing presumably because of economic opportunities) have larger percentages of married people. On the other hand, where class standards of living have been worked out, poorer groups may have larger percentages married than groups with higher living standards. Cities with higher incomes seem to have a very slightly lower percentage married.

3. *Factors Affecting Marital Status*[1]

Once marriage has been consummated, its preservation has been a major interest of society. It is strange, however, in view of this fact, that so little concern has been given to the encouragement of persons to contract marriage. This lack of interest in encouraging marriage may be due to the fact that it is not known that the state of marriage and certain desirable social conditions are associated; or, to express it differ-

[1] From OGBURN, WILLIAM FIELDING, Factors Affecting the Marital Condition of the Population, *Pub. Am. Sociological Soc.*, vol. 18, pp. 47–59, December, 1923.

ently, that certain undesirable social conditions are found associated with the absence of marriage as noted not only among the single but also among the widowed and the divorced.

That the death rate of single, of widowed, and of divorced men is about twice as great as the death rate of married men was shown by Willcox for New York State in 1912. He also showed a lower death rate for married women of New York State except at the age period from twenty-five to twenty-nine years old. The British data for females, however, show a greater death rate for married women during the child-bearing period, and after forty-five years of age the greater death rate oscillates back and forth between the married and the unmarried. Health, it is remembered, is thought to be correlated with a low death rate.

Criminals committed to penal institutions are drawn in larger percentages from the single, the widowed, and the divorced classes than from the married. The percentages of single and divorced men sentenced to prisons were, according to 1910 figures for the United States, about four times as great as the percentages of married men sent to prison. These comparisons, however, are not on the basis of a standard age. But if the criminals sent to prison had come from each age group in the same percentages of married, single, widowed, and divorced as existed for each age group in 1910, there would have been more married and less single, widowed, and divorced among the prisoners than were actually committed. Hence, when the age factor is considered, larger percentages of prison commitments of men come from the single, the widowed, and the divorced classes than from the married. The statistics of women prisoners committed yield the same general picture in regard to marriage.

Similar conclusions hold for the relation of insanity and the unmarried. When the age factor is considered, as in the case of the criminals just cited, the data for the United States in 1910 show that larger percentages of commitments of insane persons come from the single, the widowed, and the divorced classes than from the married, both among men and women.

So also the data on paupers in governmental institutions in 1910 show the unfavorable social condition of not marrying. When the age factor is considered, as in the cases of crime and insanity, larger percentages of paupers are found to come from the single, the widowed, and the divorced classes than from the married, for both men and women. It seems probable that this relative scarcity of pauperism among the married as contrasted with the unmarried is due not only to the presence of a marital help meet, but also probably to the presence of children to contribute to the support of the parents.

This association of crime, insanity, pauperism, and ill health with the unmarried status gives new significance to statistics of marriage. Large percentages of the population married may thus be interpreted as an

index of favorable social conditions. The knowledge of these correlations lends greater importance to an inquiry into the causes of marriage. Such an inquiry was part of the research undertaken in the preparation of a monograph for the U. S. Bureau of Census on the Marital Condition of the Population of the United States, and the results of this inquiry are the subject matter of this paper.

The percentage of a population who are married is dependent on the age distribution of the population. For instance, there are smaller percentages of persons married under thirty years of age than over thirty (see following table). So a population with a larger percentage of middle-aged persons will have a larger percentage married than will a population with a large percentage of young persons under thirty years old. For instance, in 1920, 59.5 per cent of the population of the United States fifteen years old and over were married, while in 1890 only 54.3 per cent were married.

Age group	Percentage of each age group who are married in United States, 1920
15 to 19	7.3
20 to 24	40.6
25 to 29	66.0
30 to 34	76.5
35 to 44	80.0
45 to 54	77.8
55 to 64	70.1
65	49.4

There has thus been an increase in 30 years of 4.6 per cent of the population married. But this increase may be due to the fact that there are smaller percentages of young persons in 1920 than there were in 1890. For in 1890, 41.1 per cent of the population fifteen years old and over were under thirty years old, while in 1920 there were only 38.5 per cent. In fact, if, in 1920, there had been the same age distribution that existed in 1890, only 56.8 per cent would have been married instead of the 59.9 per cent, other factors being as they were in 1920. Thus the increase in age of the population from 1890 to 1920 accounts for 3.1 per cent increase of the 4.6 per cent increase in percentages married during this period. The age of the population is therefore a very important factor in determining the percentages married.

One ordinarily thinks that if there are 100 men to 100 women in the population there will be a larger percentage married than if there were more than 100 men or less than 100 men to 100 women. This is not true, however. The ratio of the sexes which yields the greatest percentage married is as high as 115 or 120 men to 100 women or higher. For very

high sex ratios, of, say, over 200 men to 100 women there is a decreasing percentage married for increases in the sex ratio, as shown from the data on Japanese where there are huge excesses of men. Most of the communities of the United States have sex ratios under 120. For these communities an increase in sex ratio of 10 means an increase of around 1 per cent married.

$Y = 42.24 + 0.16X$ for percentages over fifteen years old, married, for 107 cities, whites, range of sex ratio 80:120

$Y = 60.16 + 0.10X$ for percentages over twenty-five years old, married, for 170 cities, range sex ratio 60:190

where

Y = percentages married
X = number of males to 100 females

Hence many communities have larger percentages married because they have more men.

Another interesting fact is that as the number of men in proportion to women increases, the percentages married among the men decrease much less rapidly than the percentages married among the women increase.

$$X_1 = 67.55 - 0.08X_3$$

and

$$X_2 = 19.58 + 038X_3$$

when

X_1 = percentage males over fifteen married
X_2 = percentage females over fifteen married

and

X_3 = sex ratio

in

107 cities, range sex ratio 80:120

In other words marriage among men is less affected by changes in the sex ratios than marriage among women. It is possible that this difference may be due in part to the economic dependence of women; biological differences may however operate as a cause.

The percentage of the population married depends also upon the composition of the population as to racial and cultural groups. There are four groups making up the great body of the population of the United States for which the census presents data as to marital condition. These are the native whites of native parentage—sometimes called native stock; foreign-born whites—usually spoken of as immigrants; the native whites of foreign or mixed parentage—who may be referred to as the children of immigrants; and the Negroes. There are also some Indians and a few Chinese and Japanese.

The percentage married among the native stock is 59.7 per cent and is about the same for the United States as a whole as the percentage married among the Negroes, 60.0 per cent. The immigrants have a much larger percentage married, 68.6 per cent. This high percentage is due largely to the fact that there are such small percentages of very young persons among them. But, of course, in studying the effect of immigration on the percentage married, the age distribution of the immigrant is irrelevant. On the other hand, the percentage married among the children of immigrants is small, 52.4 per cent. This tendency not to marry among the American-born offspring of immigrants is not due to age, nor to urban and rural influences, nor to locality. If therefore a state or a city has a large percentage of immigrants, for this reason the percentage married tends to be high. But if there is also a large percentage of the children of immigrants, the percentage married tends to be small. In many states and cities these two influences offset each other in about equal degrees.

The percentage reported married among the Indians is 59.3. Among the Japanese 65.4 per cent are married and among the Chinese there are 51.3 per cent married. The percentages married among the Orientals is probably peculiar to this country, being affected chiefly by the sex and age distribution.

The growth of the cities has operated to postpone and prevent marriage. Among the urban population of the United States 58.3 per cent are married while in the rural population 61.8 per cent are married. Classed as urban populations are the inhabitants of communities in number 2,500, and over, while communities with less inhabitants are classed as rural.

The difference in percentage married between farmers and city dwellers would probably be somewhat greater, therefore, than the differences between urban and rural communities. This greater percentage married in rural areas is true of every age period and of men as well as women, and is not to be explained on the basis of sex ratio.

The development of manufacturing has during the past century given rise to the great growth of cities, and has in this indirect and general sense been responsible for a decrease in percentage married. But manufacturing may be looked at in a more specific sense. Cities vary from those that are supported almost exclusively by trade to those whose populations are largely employed in factories. The manufacturing centers as contrasted with the trade centers seem to encourage marriage. A good index of manufacturing is the percentage of the population ten years old and over gainfully employed who are engaged in manufacturing and mechanical industries and in mining. The coefficient of correlation for 170 selected cities between the percentages of the population twenty-five years old and over who are married and the percentage engaged in

manufacturing is +0.24 with an error of 0.07. The cities which have more manufacturing have, therefore, on the average, slightly larger percentages married. This influence of manufacturing in increasing marriage seems to operate to a certain extent through the sex ratio of men to women.

Manufacturing centers have larger ratios of men to women; and where there are larger ratios of men to women there are up to a certain limit larger percentages married. If all the cities had the same sex ratios the correlation between manufacturing and marriage would be only 0.10. Holding the racial and nativity factors constant does not affect appreciably the correlation.

Does the employment of women tend to discourage or postpone marriage? Some data collected by the Census Bureau throw light on this question, though one would hardly expect the influence of the factor of the employment of women, whatever it may be, to affect greatly the percentages married in recent years in the United States. Though its influence may be small, the question has a certain human interest.

It is true that cities that have the largest percentages of women gainfully employed also have the smallest percentages married. The correlation for the 170 cities between percentages of women twenty-five years old and over married and the percentages of females ten years old and over gainfully employed is −0.66; and this correlation is high when the age and race factors are respectively held constant. But this fact may throw no light whatever on whether the employment of women discourages their marriage. It may only mean that most women who are gainfully employed are unmarried, which we already know from various studies of employment. It is conceivable that even if employment of women encourages marriage there might be a correlation of −0.66 between the percentage of women married and the percentage of women employed, but only, it is thought, if there was a migration of unmarried women to the centers of employment of women. For if employment of women encouraged their marriage, and after marriage they lived in the same city (which is, in the main, the probable tendency) then, without immigration of unmarried women, we should expect a positive correlation between percentage married and percentage employed.

We should like to know, therefore, what the correlation is between percentages of women married and percentages of women employed when the migration of unmarried women to cities is constant. A low sex ratio of males to females is for the cities studied probably roughly correlated with the immigration of women to the cities. When the sex ratio is held constant, then, the correlation between the percentage of women married and the percentage of females employed drops from −0.66 to −0.48. When the cities all have the same sex ratio, which may be roughly correlated with the immigration of unmarried women, there is still a nega-

tive correlation between the employment of women and the percentage of women married. There may of course be other factors and sex ratio may be only a very rough index of migration, but it should be noted that this partial correlation coefficient of −0.48 is still quite high and other factors would have to be very powerful or the sex ratio would have to be an exceedingly rough index of migration to bring the correlation down to zero. This evidence points to a probably discouraging influence of employment of women on their marriage.

There is one other source of evidence we have studied. We have data, used originally for another purpose, to show for each city what percentage of the married women, fifteen to forty-four years old, are very young, *i.e.*, fifteen to twenty-four years old, and what percentage are young, *i.e.*, fifteen to thirty-four years old. When the sex ratio is held constant, the correlation between the percentage of married women, fifteen to forty-four years old, who are fifteen to thirty-four years old with the percentage of females ten years old and over who are gainfully employed is −0.01, practically zero; but the correlation between the percentage of married women, fifteen to forty-four years old, who are fifteen to twenty-five years old with the percentage of females who are gainfully employed is −0.17. This correlation is a little smaller than three times its error, but it is negative. In other words, when the sex ratio is the same from city to city, cities which have more employment of women have on the average slightly smaller percentages of married women who are very young, though not smaller percentages of slightly older married women. This evidence then indicates that employment of women delays slightly the marriage of women.

The investigation shows an interesting relationship between the birth rate and the percentage married. For the 170 cities, there is a slight negative correlation, −0.10, between the percentage of adult women, over twenty-five years old, who are married and the birth rate per 1,000 married women, fifteen to forty-four years old, when the age of the wife is held constant. Also this further interesting correlation, when the age of the wife is held constant, the correlation between early marriage, *i.e.*, the percentage of women fifteen to twenty-four years old who are married, and the birth rate is −0.45.

Why should there be a negative correlation between the percentage married and the birth rate? At first glance one thinks there should be no correlation between the percentage married and the birth rate. The birth rate is per one thousand married women, and is therefore independent of the number of married women. This interpretation seems sound if we think of the cause being marriage and the result the birth rate. But if we look at the data the other way, namely, the cause being the birth rate and the result being the marriage, there is a possible relationship. What we have then is that cities which have a lower birth rate

have also, for this reason, larger percentages married. But how could a lower birth rate in cities cause a higher marriage rate? Such a causal relationship is plausible if the lower birth rate is caused by the wider knowledge and use of birth control methods.

Most students of the phenomenon of the falling birth rate attribute it to the spread of birth control. So we think it is probable that the differences between the birth rate in different cities may be due to differences in the practice of birth control. Of course, there are many factors affecting the birth rate. These may be thought of as of two kinds: those operating without the practice of birth control and those operating through the practice. Factors acting without the practice of birth control are food, climate, race, and age of marriage.

I have seen no evidence that proves the effect of food, climate, and race. As to the age of marriage, we have endeavored to correct for this factor by holding constant the age of the wife. Religion, morals, economic pressure, etc., undoubtedly affect birth rates, but it is thought that these factors operate through the use or non-use of birth control. This being the case it is not necessary to hold those factors constant in partial correlation, if we are only interested in inquiring whether birth control encourages or discourages marriage.

Our data then indicate a probability that birth control encourages marriage, a conclusion somewhat contrary to the opinion held by some religionists and moralists. The probable influence of the birth rate on marriage is greater for the marriage of young persons under twenty-five years old than for older persons. This result may be due in part to the recency of the spread of birth control.

The relationship of income to marriage is varied and complex. At least two concepts, though, should be distinguished. The first is where the income varies in a given community with inhabitants of a definite set of habits and an already developed personality. If with such inhabitants the income is increased, we might expect an increase in marriage, though perhaps not. The other concept is of different communities or social classes where the income differs, but where this influence of income has already worked itself out in the course of time into customs and standards of living and also into the habits that shape personality.

In such a case it is not clear what the most probable guess would be as to whether the higher income level would be with a larger or smaller percentage married. Much would depend on the nature of the social system and the size of the income. Thus the middle class might have fewer married than the richer classes or the poorer classes, and rural communities with lower incomes have larger percentages than urban communities with higher incomes.

These two different relationships between income and marriage should be borne in mind as we approach the different types of data which follow relating to income and marriage.

One index of the level of income in different cities is the percentage of the population paying income taxes; for the correlation on the basis of states between per capita income (including also those whose income is lower than the income tax level) and the percentage paying income taxes is +0.70. The relationship between the percentages married in different cities and the percentages paying income taxes is very slight, −0.17 for adults over twenty-five years old and −0.24 for young persons under twenty-five years, with an error of about 0.07. The slight correlation is, however, negative, indicating that the higher the percentage paying income taxes the lower the percentage married.

We have worked out similar correlations on the basis of states as well as cities. For 37 states the correlations between the percentage married and the income per gainfully employed person is not significant when age and the urban-rural factors are held constant.

So also no significant correlations are found when the correlation is on the basis of the urban parts of the states and the rural parts of the states. The states are too few in number and the units too complex to make the data from the states worth much.

That cities with larger percentages paying income taxes have on the average slightly smaller percentages married is not incompatible with the idea previously advanced that income levels in different communities or social classes influence marriage indirectly through different standards of living, customs, and types of economic life.

Quite in contrast to this conclusion is the high positive correlation between the business cycle and the marriage rate pointed out by Hooker, Davis, Ogburn, and others. The correlations are around +0.80, indicating a marked tendency to marry in times of prosperity. In this case we have business prosperity meaning increased income and employment with customs, habits, personalities, and other factors of community life the same. It is as though the same group of individuals have increased income and employment with the result of increased marriage.

Other possible evidence bearing on the relation of income and marriage is the correlation between the rates of growth of cities and the percentage married, which is positive though low, showing that the more rapidly growing cities have on the average slightly larger percentages married.

The correlation for early marriage is 0.36 and for percentages married, over twenty-five years old, is +0.26, when the factor of excess of married men over married women or married women over married men is held constant. These correlations have meaning for the relation of income and marriage, only if the rapidity of growth of cities is due to a differential

income advantage over other cities growing less rapidly. We have no proof of this point but such a causal effect is not improbable from the argument, in which case increased economic opportunities and advantages would seem to increase marriage somewhat for a given group of persons of developed personalities and habits even if they moved to communities with different standards of living and customs.

Crime, insanity, pauperism, and death are found less frequently among the married than among the single and also than among the widowed and divorced.

Regarding the influence of various factors on marriage the conclusions are as follows:

The age distribution of the population is a powerful factor affecting the percentage married. Middle-aged and older persons are found married in larger percentages than young persons or very old persons.

The greater the number of men in proportion to the number of women, the larger the percentage married, up to a point well beyond the equality in numbers of the sexes. As the excess of men becomes very large the percentage married decreases.

The composition of our population as to race and nativity also affects the percentage married. The influence of immigrants is to increase the percentage married, largely because of their age distribution, and of the American-born children of immigrants to decrease it. The influences of the native whites of native parents and of the Negroes are very nearly the same.

The effect of cities is to decrease marriage.

Manufacturing cities as compared with trading cities have on the average slightly larger percentages married, this influence operating partly through the sex ratio.

The employment of women seems to postpone and to slightly discourage marriage.

Certain evidence indicates that the probable influence of birth control is to increase marriage slightly, particularly among the young.

The relation of income to marriage is complex. Business prosperity greatly increases marriage. The more rapidly growing cities have slightly larger percentages married. Cities with larger percentages making income-tax returns have on the average slightly smaller percentages married.

4. *The Excess of Births over Deaths*[1]

BIRTHS, DEATHS, AND EXCESS OF BIRTHS OVER DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1918 TO 1927

Rates per 1,000 population in the birth registration area

Total birth registration area	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927
Births	24.6	22.3	23.7	24.3	22.5	22.4	22.6	21.4	20.6	20.6
Deaths	18.3	13.0	13.1	11.7	11.9	12.4	11.8	11.8	12.2	11.4
Excess	6.3	9.3	10.6	12.6	10.6	10.0	10.8	9.6	8.4	9.2

5. *Marriage and the Death Rate of Males*[2]

DEATH RATE OF MALES CLASSIFIED BY AGE PERIODS AND MARITAL CONDITION

Age period	Never married	Married	Widowed and divorced
20 to 29	6.6	4.2	12.0
30 to 39	12.9	5.9	14.1
40 to 49	19.5	9.5	17.3
50 to 59	28.7	17.0	30.5
60 to 69	51.0	31.9	48.6
70 to 79	101.4	72.7	96.0
80	204.2	205.1	315.7

6. *Marriage and the Death Rate of Females*[2]

DEATH RATE OF FEMALES CLASSIFIED BY AGE PERIODS AND MARITAL CONDITION

Age period	Never married	Married	Widowed and divorced
20 to 29	4.7	5.7	9.4
30 to 39	7.4	6.3	9.5
40 to 49	10.0	8.2	12.1
50 to 59	19.9	14.5	18.8
60 to 69	31.1	28.1	38.2
70 to 79	82.2	61.4	87.2
80	279.8	194.8	268.9

[1] "Statistical Abstract of the United States," p. 85, 1929.

[2] *Thirty-third Ann. Rept.*, N. Y. State Dept. Health, 1912.

7. *Marriage Rates in Selected Countries*

MARRIAGES PER 10,000 POPULATION OF SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1886 TO 1895, 1896 TO 1905, AND 1927

Country	1886 to 1895	1896 to 1905	1927
Austria	78	80	74
Belgium	75	83	95
Denmark	70	73	76
England and Wales	75	79	79
France	73	76	83
Hungary	89	85	96
Ireland	45	51	
Irish Free State	..	..	43
North Ireland	..	..	54
Italy	76	72	75
Japan	..	..	80
Netherlands	71	76	71
Norway	64	64	61
Switzerland	71	76	72
United States	91	93	101

8. *Marriage Rates by Geographic Divisions*[1]

MARRIAGES AND MARRIAGE RATES IN THE UNITED STATES BY DIVISIONS, 1928

Division	Number of marriages	Marriage per 1,000 of		
		Total population	Population 15 years of age and over	
			Total	Unmarried[1]
United States	1,182,497	9.85	14.43	36.16
Geographic divisions:				
New England	59,814	7.23	10.11	23.45
Middle Atlantic	211,108	8.37	11.93	29.09
East North Central	233,261	9.35	13.24	34.05
West North Central	121,452	9.16	13.30	33.09
South Atlantic	165,275	10.25	16.12	40.66
East South Central	121,853	12.94	20.57	54.30
West South Central	150,724	12.77	20.09	52.92
Mountain	45,607	11.66	17.47	44.24
Pacific	73,403	10.42	13.90	33.64

[1] Single, widowed, and divorced.

[1] Bur. Census, Marriage and Divorce, p. 6, 1928.

9. *Marriage by States*[1]

NUMBER OF MARRIAGES PER 1,000 OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, BY DIVISIONS AND STATES, 1924 TO 1928

Division and state	1928	1927	1926	1925	1924
United States	9.85	10.12	10.27	10.30	10.42
Geographic divisions:					
New England	7.23	7.56	7.66	7.87	8.19
Middle Atlantic	8.37	8.76	9.01	8.83	8.93
East North Central	9.35	9.51	9.69	9.73	10.02
West North Central	9.16	9.20	9.33	9.56	9.53
South Atlantic	10.25	10.85	11.21	11.10	11.02
East South Central	12.94	13.15	12.90	12.93	12.49
West South Central	12.77	12.83	12.74	13.02	13.34
Mountain	11.66	10.33	9.82	9.82	10.21
Pacific	10.42	11.57	12.12	12.21	12.57
New England:					
Maine	7.77	7.92	8.07	7.91	8.15
New Hampshire	10.52	10.65	10.18	10.11	10.17
Vermont	8.50	7.85	7.96	8.43	8.76
Massachusetts	6.78	7.17	7.29	7.54	7.82
Rhode Island	7.14	7.76	7.69	8.30	8.46
Connecticut	6.99	7.37	7.65	7.80	8.38
Middle Atlantic:					
New York	9.90	10.39	10.70	10.33	10.21
New Jersey	7.62	7.55	7.72	7.69	7.84
Pennsylvania	6.86	7.31	7.51	7.50	7.85
East North Central:					
Ohio	8.69	8.84	8.36	8.09	7.93
Indiana	12.90	13.05	12.94	11.90	11.84
Illinois	10.78	11.00	11.46	11.28	11.72
Michigan	8.12	8.08	9.05	10.80	11.92
Wisconsin	5.40	5.76	5.77	5.65	5.66
West North Central:					
Minnesota	8.54	8.69	8.94	9.06	9.06
Iowa	8.46	8.68	8.65	9.06	10.28
Missouri	10.52	10.63	10.78	11.18	11.46
North Dakota	6.66	6.20	6.17	6.83	5.77
South Dakota	9.57	8.63	8.71	9.67	9.50
Nebraska	7.05	7.02	6.98	5.90	3.12
Kansas	10.72	10.83	11.12	11.51	11.72
South Atlantic:					
Delaware	4.73	4.75	4.62	5.07	5.26
Maryland	14.99	15.67	16.35	16.31	16.45
District of Columbia	9.60	10.26	10.44	11.00	10.74
Virginia	8.31	8.71	8.47	8.72	8.91
West Virginia	10.65	11.37	10.95	10.82	11.41

[1] Bur. Census, Marriage and Divorce, p. 7, 1928.

NUMBER OF MARRIAGES PER 1,000 OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, BY DIVISIONS AND STATES, 1924 TO 1928.—(*Continued*)

Division and state	1928	1927	1926	1925	1924
North Carolina	7.27	7.66	7.94	8.30	8.38
South Carolina	13.43	13.78	13.13	12.67	11.70
Georgia	9.49	9.60	9.07	9.06	10.60
Florida	12.78	15.57	21.60	19.92	15.14
East South Central:					
Kentucky	11.38	11.91	11.33	11.24	11.08
Tennessee	13.46	13.53	13.25	13.63	12.97
Alabama	11.21	11.63	11.92	11.89	11.39
Mississippi	16.90	16.55	16.03	15.76	15.33
West South Central:					
Arkansas	14.14	13.89	14.84	15.50	15.30
Louisiana	9.45	10.31	10.81	10.66	11.20
Oklahoma	11.74	12.02	11.65	12.15	11.87
Texas	13.91	13.72	13.16	13.38	14.07
Mountain:					
Montana	10.56	9.76	7.46	7.44	7.90
Idaho	8.49	8.43	8.44	8.26	8.95
Wyoming	7.32	7.54	8.10	8.45	9.73
Colorado	11.07	11.14	11.29	11.16	11.70
New Mexico	12.35	12.11	11.54	11.16	11.69
Arizona	13.50	10.80	9.16	9.16	9.47
Utah	11.01	10.95	10.56	11.29	10.54
Nevada	53.85	30.98	15.86	14.49	13.94
Pacific:					
Washington	11.87	12.04	11.58	11.88	11.87
Oregon	8.45	8.27	8.08	8.10	8.21
California	10.30	12.07	13.13	13.18	13.75

In 1928, as compared with 1927, the marriage rate per thousand of the total population decreased slightly in the United States as a whole. This decrease was not general throughout the states, however, as increased rates were reported by 16 states.

The striking variations among the different geographic divisions, and among the different states, in the marriage rates for the five years shown in the table doubtless are in considerable measure the results of differences in the age, sex, and race composition of the population, in the proportion of urban and rural dwellers, and in the prevailing social and economic conditions. Such differences probably go far toward explaining the high marriage rates in the southern and far-western divisions, as compared with the rates in the other divisions. To a considerable degree, however, the variations in marriage rates are due to differences in the extent to which the marriages reported represented marriages of non-residents, as discussed in the next section of this report.

In 1928, the laws of 10 states made provisions for an interval between the application for a license to marry and the actual date of the ceremony for all candidates, and in two additional states a similar law applied to candidates under twenty-one, or to non-resident women. These states are the six of the New England group, New Jersey of the Middle Atlantic, Michigan and Wisconsin of the East North Central, Delaware and Georgia of the South Atlantic, and California of the Pacific. Laws of this nature tend to discourage marriages of non-resident couples, as is evidenced by the fact that, with one or two exceptions, the rates shown for these 12 states are lower than those for the states adjoining them.

On the other hand, the changes in rates from year to year shown by some states result from changes in the legal requirements governing the issuance of marriage licenses, as in California, Michigan, and Nebraska. The change in the laws of California, discussed in a previous paragraph, was enacted in July, 1927, and a somewhat similar change requiring that five days rather than three elapse between the posting of the application and the issuance of the license was made in the Michigan laws in 1925. Nebraska passed a law in 1923 requiring that notice of application be posted 10 days in advance, with the result that the rate of marriages per thousand of the population decreased from 9.35 in 1922 to 3.12 in 1924 when the law was repealed. Or these changes may result from a sudden influx of population, like that into Florida in 1924 and 1925. Such an influx doubtless changes somewhat the composition of the population in respect to age, marital condition, etc., and it certainly renders more difficult a reliable estimate of the population upon which to base marriage rates.

Marriages of Non-residents.—The very high marriage rates for a state or county are sometimes due to the fact that the marriages reported include the marriages of non-residents who come there to be married, either because of the relatively lenient marriage laws or because of a desire to avoid publicity.

The migration of couples to areas other than those in which they reside, for the purpose of being married, has resulted in the growth in this country of a considerable number of so-called "Gretna Greens"—places noted for the large numbers of marriages performed and for the ease and promptness with which non-resident couples may secure licenses and be married. Many of the Gretna Greens are small towns in the border counties of states that have relatively lenient license laws, and others, in counties adjacent to large cities, to which many couples go to avoid publicity.

10. *Marriages and Marriage Rates*[1]

NUMBER OF MARRIAGES PER 1,000 OF THE POPULATION, BY SINGLE YEARS, 1887 TO 1928

Year	Population	Marriages	Year	Population	Marriages
1928	120,013,000	9.85	1907	87,455,366	10.71
1927	118,628,000	10.12	1906	81,458,750	10.47
1926	117,136,000	10.27	1905	80,085,511	10.04
1925	115,378,000	10.30	1904	78,727,805	9.92
1924	113,727,000	10.42	1903	77,455,534	10.15
1923	111,693,000	11.01	1902	76,183,191	9.80
1922	109,893,000	10.32			
			1901	74,843,971	9.57
1921	108,445,000	10.73	1900	73,539,779	9.32
1920	106,422,000	11.98	1899	72,303,090	9.00
1919	105,003,065	10.95	1898	70,985,186	8.81
1918	103,587,955	9.65	1897	69,772,335	8.92
1917	102,172,845	11.20			
			1896	68,485,189	8.96
1916	100,757,735	10.68	1895	67,110,923	8.92
			1894	65,765,975	8.60
1915	99,342,625	10.14	1893	64,471,119	8.97
1914	97,927,516	10.47	1892	63,115,603	9.15
1913	96,512,407	10.58			
1912	95,097,298	10.56	1891	61,131,603	9.19
1911	93,682,189	10.20	1890	59,941,396	9.05
			1889	58,256,373	9.11
1910	92,267,080	10.28			
1909	90,691,354	9.89	1888	57,007,689	8.85
1908	89,073,360	9.63	1887	55,667,252	8.67

It is a well-known fact that the marriage rate responds quickly to changes in economic conditions, increasing in periods of prosperity and decreasing after a commercial crisis or during hard times. The slight drop in the marriage rate in 1893 and the striking decline in 1894 undoubtedly reflect the influence of the financial panic of 1893; the reduced rate in 1904 probably reflects the recurrence of a financial depression during the first part of that year; and the sharp decline in the rate in 1908 doubtless reflects the influence of the then prevailing financial depression. Likewise, the decline in the marriage rate in 1921 and 1922 may be attributed in part to the commercial depression of 1921; and the decline since 1924 in part to the depression existing in certain industries during the period covered by the reports. To some extent, however, the declines in the marriage rate in recent years have been but the natural regression from the abnormally high rates of 1917, 1920, and 1923.

[1] Bur. Census, Marriage and Divorce, p. 5, 1928.

11. *The Age of Marriage*[1]

PERCENTAGE MARRIED OF EACH AGE GROUP IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1920 AND THE INCREASE OR DECREASE OF PERCENTAGES FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1890 TO 1920

Age, years	Percentage married, 1920	Increase (+) or decrease (−) in percentage of the population 15 years and over in each age group, 1890 to 1920
15 to 19	7.3	−3.1
20 to 24	40.6	−2.4
25 to 34	71.0	−0.4
35 to 44	80.0	+2.2
45 to 54	77.8	+2.0
55 to 64	70.1	+1.4
65 and over	49.4	+0.7

12. *Nativity and Marriage*[2]

MARITAL CONDITION OF PERSONS FIFTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND OVER, BY MAJOR CLASSES AND SEX

Marital condition	Native white		Foreign-born white, per cent	Negro, per cent
	Native parentage, per cent	Foreign or mixed parentage, per cent		
Males	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Single	35.5	45.1	25.6	32.6
Married	58.9	50.8	67.6	60.4
Widowed	4.6	3.4	6.0	5.9
Divorced	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.8
Unknown	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3
Females	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Single	28.4	37.0	14.1	24.1
Married	60.4	54.0	69.7	59.6
Widowed	10.2	8.3	15.5	14.8
Divorced	0.8	0.7	0.5	1.3
Unknown	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2

[1] GROVES, E. R., and W. F. OGBURN, "American Marriage and Family Relationships," p. 159, Henry Holt & Company, 1928.

[2] Statistical Abstract of the United States, p. 23, 1929.

13. *Marriage, Urban and Rural*[1]

MARITAL CONDITION OF PERSONS FIFTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND OVER FOR 1910 AND 1920

Population	1920, per cent of total				1910, per cent of total			
	Single	Married	Widowed	Divorced	Single	Married	Widowed	Divorced
Urban:								
Males	35.5	58.9	4.6	0.7	40.0	54.7	4.2	0.5
Females	29.0	57.6	12.2	0.6	32.8	54.6	11.6	0.7
Rural:								
Males	34.7	59.5	5.0	0.5	37.5	56.8	4.8	0.5
Females	25.2	64.3	9.8	0.6	26.6	63.3	9.4	0.5

14. *The Changing Marital Condition*[2]

MARITAL CONDITION OF THE TOTAL POPULATION FIFTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND OVER OF THE UNITED STATES, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920

Marital condition	Percentage distribution of							
	Males 15 years of age and over				Females 15 years of age and over			
	1890	1900	1910	1920	1890	1900	1910	1920
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Single	41.7	40.2	38.7	35.1	31.8	31.2	29.7	27.3
Married, widowed, or divorced	58.1	59.4	60.8	64.6	68.1	68.6	70.0	72.5
Married	53.9	54.5	58.8	59.2	56.8	57.0	58.9	60.6
Widowed	3.9	4.6	4.5	4.8	11.0	11.2	10.6	11.1
Divorced	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.8
Marital condition not reported	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1

[1] Statistical Abstract of the United States, p. 44, 1929.

[2] Bur. Census.

15. *Marriage Annulments*[1]

ANNULMENTS CLASSIFIED BY CAUSE, 1928 AND 1927

Cause	Percentage distribution	
	1928	1927
All causes	100.0	100.0
Abandonment	3.4	2.6
Bigamy	27.0	28.3
Consanguinity	0.3	0.5
Coercion and duress	2.0	1.7
Fraudulent representation	31.8	33.0
Illegal marriage	2.4	2.7
Insanity	2.0	2.7
Under legal age	26.4	27.1
All other	0.2	0.1
Not reported	4.5	1.3

Over 85 per cent of all annulments in 1928 were for 3 causes—bigamy, under legal age, and fraudulent representation. It is plain that fraudulent representation is a general term under which might be included almost any kind of misrepresentation or concealment, and the explanation certain county officials made of their returns reveal that annulments returned as granted for fraudulent representation do, in fact, include other of the causes listed in the table. Whenever possible these causes have been classified, but because of the large number of cases in which the specific kind of fraudulent representation was not returned, it is safe to assume that the rates for each of the other specified causes should be slightly higher than those shown in the table, while those for fraudulent representation should be correspondingly lower. Marriage of divorced persons before the decrees of divorce became effective account for most of the 104 cases of illegal marriage.

[1] Bur. Census, Marriage and Divorce, p. 44, 1928.

16. *Divorce Rates of Selected Countries*

THE NUMBER OF DIVORCES AND THE DIVORCE RATE FOR CERTAIN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1900 AND 1927

Country	Census year	Number	Per 100,000 population	Census year	Number	Per 100,000 population
Austria	1900	179	1	1927	5,350	85
Belgium	1900	705	11	1927	2,351	31
Denmark	1901	411	17	1927	1,904	55
France	1901	8,864	23	1927	18,487	45
Germany	1900	8,680	15	1925	34,105	54
England and Wales	1901	568	2	1928	2,859	7.3
Japan[1]	1898	93,949	215	1927	50,626	79
Switzerland	1900	1,053	32	1927	2,500	62
United States	1900	55,502	73	1928	192,342	160

[1] For explanation of this change see *Am. Jour. Sociology*, vol. 36, p. 435, November, 1930.

17. *Marriages and Divorces*[1]

NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES, AND THE RATIO OF DIVORCES TO MARRIAGES WITH PERCENTAGES GRANTED TO HUSBAND AND WIFE, CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, 1889 TO 1928

Calendar year	Marriages, number	Divorces			Number of divorces per 1,000 marriages
		Total number	Granted to husband, per cent	Granted to wife, per cent	
1889	531,457	31,735	35.1	64.9	60
1890	542,537	33,461	34.7	65.3	62
1891	562,412	35,540	35.1	64.9	63
1892	577,870	36,579	34.4	65.6	63
1893	578,673	37,468	33.6	66.4	65
1894	566,161	37,568	33.4	66.6	66
1895	598,855	40,387	33.3	66.7	67
1896	613,873	42,937	33.6	66.4	70
1897	622,350	44,699	33.0	67.0	72
1898	625,655	47,849	33.4	66.6	76
1899	650,610	51,437	32.9	67.1	79
1900	685,284	55,751	33.4	66.6	81
1901	716,621	60,984	32.8	67.2	85
1902	746,733	61,480	32.6	67.4	82
1903	786,132	64,925	32.8	67.2	83
1904	781,145	66,199	33.5	66.5	85
1905	804,787	67,976	32.7	67.3	84
1906	853,290	72,062	32.5	67.5	84
1916	1,040,684	112,036	31.1	68.9	108
1922	1,134,151	148,815	32.0	68.0	131
1923	1,229,784	165,096	32.2	67.8	134
1924	1,184,574	170,952	31.5	68.5	144
1925	1,188,334	175,449	30.1	69.9	148
1926	1,202,574	180,853	29.5	70.5	150
1927	1,201,053	192,037	29.0	71.0	160
1928	1,182,499	192,342	28.6	71.4	166

[1] Statistical Abstract of the United States, p. 91, 1929. Statistics for annulments were collected for the first time in 1926, when 3,825 annulments were reported representing 1 marriage annulled to every 47.3 marriages terminated by divorce. In 1927, 4,252 annulments were reported, representing 1 marriage annulled to every 45.2 marriages terminated by divorce.

18. *Divorce and the Duration of Marriage*[1]

DIVORCES CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO DURATION OF MARRIAGE, 1887 TO 1928

Number of years married	Number of divorces, percentage distribution							
	1928	1927	1926	1925	1924	1923	1922	1887 to 1906
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Less than 1	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.6	2.1
1	7.8	7.9	7.9	8.2	7.7	7.4	8.6	3.1
2	8.6	8.7	8.9	8.6	8.1	9.4	10.1	6.8
3	8.5	8.7	8.7	8.2	9.2	10.1	8.7	8.1
4	8.1	7.9	7.6	8.5	9.3	8.0	7.9	8.2
5	7.3	6.9	7.8	8.3	7.1	7.2	6.8	7.6
6	6.1	7.0	7.4	6.2	6.4	6.3	5.7	7.0
7	6.1	6.5	5.5	5.6	5.5	5.1	4.9	6.3
8	5.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.5	4.4	4.7	5.6
9	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.0	3.8	4.2	4.3	4.9
10 to 14	14.5	14.4	14.2	14.4	15.1	14.9	14.9	18.0
15 to 19	8.4	8.3	8.3	8.5	8.4	8.5	8.6	10.1
20 and over	10.1	10.1	10.0	10.0	10.2	10.0	10.1	12.1

19. *Divorce and Children Affected*[2]

DIVORCES GRANTED CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF CHILDREN AFFECTED, 1928

Number of children affected	Percentage distribution		
	Total divorces	Granted to husband	Granted to wife
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
None	56.6	63.6	53.8
1	20.5	14.8	22.8
2	9.5	7.3	10.3
3	3.9	3.2	4.2
4	1.7	1.4	1.8
5	0.8	0.6	0.8
6	0.3	0.3	0.4
7	0.2	0.1	0.2
8	0.1	0.1	0.1
9 or more			
No report as to children	6.5	8.5	5.7

[1] Bur. Census, Marriage and Divorce, p. 33, 1928.
[2] Bur. Census, Marriage and Divorce, p. 41, 1928.

20. *Divorce by Legal Cause*[1]

Causes of Divorce.—The classification of the causes of divorce, which has been the same since 1926, conforms to that for earlier investigations so far as concerns the major causes; in addition it presents the combinations of causes and the minor causes in greater detail. The terms under which are included the most important of the reported causes may be briefly defined as follows:

Adultery.—Includes this cause only.

Cruelty.—Includes cruelty, extreme cruelty, repeated cruelty, intolerable cruelty, intolerable severity, cruel and abusive treatment, cruel and inhuman treatment, cruel and barbarous treatment, attempt to take life, indignities rendering life intolerable, excesses and outrages, treatment endangering reason, treatment injuring health, violence endangering life, etc.

Desertion.—Includes abandonment, absence for a period of years, willful desertion, utter desertion, etc.

Drunkenness.—Includes habitual or continued drunkenness, habitual or continued intemperance, habitual or continued intoxication, habitual use of opium, morphine, chloral, or other like drugs, etc.

Neglect to Provide.—Includes non-support, willful neglect, refusal to provide, failure to provide, etc.

The relative importance of the respective causes for divorce is affected, of course, by the fact that certain of these causes are not legal grounds for divorce in every state. For example, the percentage of divorces granted for neglect to provide doubtless would be much larger were neglect to provide a legal cause for divorce in all states. On the other hand, the percentage of divorces granted for adultery probably would be considerably smaller were adultery not the only cause for absolute divorce in New York, and one of but a few causes for absolute divorce in some other states.

[1] Bur. Census, Marriage and Divorce, p. 25, 1928.

20. *Divorce by Legal Cause*

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF DIVORCES FOR EACH SPECIFIED CAUSE, BY PARTY TO WHOM GRANTED, 1887 TO 1928

Cause and party to whom granted	1928	1927	1926	1925	1924	1923	1922	1916	1887 to 1906
All causes, total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Granted to Husband	28.6	29.0	29.5	30.1	31.5	32.2	32.0	31.1	33.4
Granted to wife	71.4	71.0	70.5	69.9	68.5	67.8	68.0	68.9	66.6
Adultery:									
Granted to husband	45.1	45.9	46.7	49.0	48.8	49.4	51.9	54.9	59.1
Granted to wife	54.9	54.1	53.3	51.0	51.2	50.6	48.1	45.1	40.9
Cruelty:									
Granted to husband	22.2	21.4	21.7	21.7	22.8	23.3	23.2	19.2	16.1
Granted to wife	77.8	78.6	78.3	78.3	77.2	76.7	76.8	80.8	83.9
Desertion:									
Granted to husband	41.7	41.6	42.2	43.3	43.4	43.8	43.2	42.3	42.5
Granted to wife	58.3	58.4	57.8	56.7	56.6	56.2	56.8	57.7	57.5
Drunkenness:									
Granted to husband	7.2	7.1	6.7	7.4	8.6	10.8	7.8	7.4	9.4
Granted to wife	92.8	92.9	93.3	92.6	91.4	89.2	92.2	92.6	90.6
Neglect to provide:									
Granted to husband									
Granted to wife	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Combinations of causes:									
Granted to husband	13.0	15.9	13.4	13.7	15.1	14.9	17.0	15.4	16.1
Granted to wife	87.0	84.1	86.6	86.3	84.9	85.1	83.0	84.6	83.9
All other causes:									
Granted to husband	26.3	27.7	28.0	26.9	33.4	37.6	33.9	33.3	31.0
Granted to wife	73.7	72.3	72.0	73.1	66.6	62.4	66.1	66.7	69.0

21. *Divorce by Divisions and States*[1]

NUMBER OF DIVORCES AND DIVORCE RATES BY DIVISIONS AND STATES, 1928

Division and state	Number of divorces	Divorces per 1,000 of the	
		Total population	Married population
United States	195,939	1.63	3.99
Geographic divisions:			
New England	8,046	0.97	2.39
Middle Atlantic	16,420	0.65	1.58
East North Central	51,435	2.06	4.79
West North Central	23,839	1.80	4.38
South Atlantic	14,584	0.90	2.36
East South Central	16,419	1.74	4.47
West South Central	32,246	2.73	6.96
Mountain	10,912	2.79	6.96
Pacific	22,038	3.13	7.16
New England:			
Maine	1,315	1.65	3.87
New Hampshire	706	1.55	3.66
Vermont	396	1.12	2.63
Massachusetts	3,646	0.85	2.13
Rhode Island	707	0.99	2.49
Connecticut	1,276	0.77	1.87
Middle Atlantic:			
New York	5,293	0.46	1.10
New Jersey	3,170	0.83	1.97
Pennsylvania	7,957	0.81	1.99
East North Central:			
Ohio	14,643	2.15	4.88
Indiana	7,885	2.48	5.54
Illinois	15,703	2.12	5.02
Michigan	10,531	2.29	5.25
Wisconsin	2,673	0.91	2.27
West North Central:			
Minnesota	2,844	1.04	2.73
Iowa	4,076	1.68	3.96
Missouri	10,089	2.86	6.68
North Dakota	461	0.72	2.02
South Dakota	750	1.07	2.77
Nebraska	1,538	1.09	2.67
Kansas	4,081	2 22	5.19
South Atlantic:			
Delaware	185	0.76	1.76
Maryland	1,976	1.22	3.00
District of Columbia	101	0.18	0.45

[1] Bur. Census, Marriage and Divorce, p. 17, 1928.

Division and state	Number of divorces	Divorces per 1,000 of the	
		Total population	Married population
Virginia	2,952	1.15	3.04
West Virginia	2,071	1.20	3.07
North Carolina	1,609	0.55	1.52
South Carolina			
Georgia	2,174	0.68	1.78
Florida	3,516	2.49	5.99
East South Central:			
Kentucky	4,610	1.81	4.50
Tennessee	4,985	1.99	5.02
Alabama	3,817	1.48	3.94
Mississippi	3,007	1.68	4.38
West South Central:			
Arkansas	4,498	2.31	5.84
Louisiana	1,913	0.98	2.59
Oklahoma	7,762	3.20	7.96
Texas	18,073	3.29	8.41
Mountain:			
Montana	1,376	2.51	6.22
Idaho	1,032	1.89	4.73
Wyoming	748	3.03	7.41
Colorado	2,362	2.17	5.13
New Mexico	715	1.81	4.80
Arizona	1,062	2.24	5.71
Utah	1,022	1.92	5.08
Nevada	2,595	33.52	83.19
Pacific:			
Washington	4,554	2.87	6.63
Oregon	3,053	3.38	7.67
California	14,431	3.17	7.24

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Chapter IX

INTERPRETATIONS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

Until very recently human behavior was not thought to be a fit, if indeed a possible, subject for scientific analysis. Only within the past few years has there been any effort to discover, or even any notion that it might be possible to discover, generalizations in regard to human behavior which would permit deductions as to cause and effect sequences. So long as man identified himself with the divine, he regarded his behavior as self-instituted and his response to outer stimuli as essentially irrational. Just as long as possible he cherished the idea that he was Godlike—a cause unto himself. Now, however, with the extension of the scientific attitude to human phenomena as a part of the natural world, human behavior has become subject to scientific analysis and, to a limited extent, to scientific control.

At the present time the interpretations of the facts of human behavior vary with the investigator. There is little uniformity of expert opinion as to the ultimate basis of activity causation. Although this confusion of final interpretation exists, there is general agreement that the data can be analyzed and is of sufficient regularity to allow the formulation of universally valid generalizations.

The readings in this chapter represent the ideas of some of the more important investigators of human nature. Although their terminologies differ, it is possible that their root ideas may not be so divergent as they at first appear. Each has accepted as his original data the observed facts of behavior from which he has drawn what seemed to be the significant inferences concerning the causes involved. The papers by Dr. Kenworthy and Dr. Adler may be taken as representative of the newer developments of the somewhat common-sense psychoanalytic point of view. The individual's urge for "satisfaction" and "power" is the central point of the theories. Behavior is regarded as symptomatic and there is little effort to reduce it to a fundamental set of processes by the more rigidly scientific method. This has been the task of other groups of investigators. In his paper, included in this chapter, Mr. Thomas has analyzed the nature and source of human satisfactions into four social wishes, and in his introduction to "The Polish Peasant in Europe and America" he has made an effort to draw usable generalizations from the specific behavior in given social situations. Dr. Forsythe and Mr. Frank, attacking the problem from the physiological point of view, develop a

thesis in terms of the fundamental biological processes. The increasingly popular theory of the Behavioristic school, represented in the paper by Mr. Watson, and the Gestalt or Configuration theory, presented here by Mr. Koffka, may be regarded as efforts to explain human behavior as a function of the whole life process, psychological, biological, social, and moral.

1. *Satisfaction as a Motive*[1]

Since it would be folly to attempt within the scope of a paper such as this to cover the whole field of psychoanalytic concepts in mental hygiene, I am going to ask the privilege of confining my remarks at this time to the field of mental hygiene embracing those early years of experience characterized as the childhood period. As we progress, however, it will become evident that the problems of which I speak contain the root processes and beginning deviations later evidenced in the adult neuroses and psychoses, as well as those multiple personality variations from the so-called "patterns" of normal emotional and social adaptation, categoried so habitually as delinquents, psychopaths, criminals and the like.

We have assumed as our task in this field of social psychiatric practice, the understanding of cause and effect relationships as they are reflected in the behavior of individuals. It is necessary to improve our treatment in the handling of problems of unadjustment, and to develop a sufficiently fine technique in these treatment processes to make possible a more complete understanding, not only of what the purpose of the behavior is for the individual, whether good or bad, moral or immoral, social or unsocial, but also to seek the causal roots of these purposive impulses. Since we look upon behavior as only a symptomatic response to the needs and strivings induced in the individual as a result of life experience, we must cease to treat behavior *per se* as the primary disease issue and look upon it as a concomitant symptom-complex, the effect rather than the cause, just as we now look upon the chills, fever, strawberry tongue, and skin eruption of scarlet fever as the outward manifestations of a specific and primary infection. To carry the scientific analogy still further, the knowledge and study of emotional and mental failures of adaptation will furnish us with just as specific tools for prevention of personality unadjustment as the refinement and use of the Dick test bids fair to assist us in the prevention and final elimination of the scourge of scarlet fever. The need for understanding the use of certain behavior patterns in the responses of the child and of the adult has led of necessity to a recognition of the psychological mechanisms utilized by the individual in the service of the economy of his personality. It is through the recognition of these recurring patterns of reaction and the use we make of them in interpreting

[1] Adapted from KENWORTHY, MARION E., Psychoanalytic Concepts in Mental Hygiene, *Family*, vol. 7, pp. 213–221, November, 1926.

behavior, even during childhood, that the analytic concepts have most conclusively effected and shaped the mental hygiene movement.

Professor Freud early discussed, in his interpretation of the findings in the study of adult neurotics, the mechanisms employed by the individuals through the unconscious utilization of which the patient sought a solution of his conflict with reality. These mechanisms of projection and introjection, which will be considered in more detail later, definitely furnish the patient with opportunities to express through his symptomatic behavior the feelings, desires, and strivings which are consciously unacceptable to him.

The purpose of the neurotic symptom-complex becomes evident then, when we realize that through the utilization of these patterns of introjection or projection the individual is permitted to express and satisfy the cravings and wishes which otherwise would be unacceptable to him and to society. The fact that the roots of these neurotic processes are found without exception in the childhood period has provoked workers in the field of childhood problems to use the wealth of knowledge furnished by Freud and his followers, and to work toward the development of a technique of understanding which will not only assist us in handling the problems of unadjustment as they arise in childhood but also to assist us in working out a program for the prevention of later breakdowns.

From the knowledge and experience furnished by these analytic contributions, I have developed during the past four years the "ego libido method" as my students are prone to call it, a method of evaluation of experiences, emotional, physical, intellectual, and social, during the life contacts of the child. We have used this method for the past year or more at the Bureau of Children's Guidance in the study, diagnosis, and treatment of all of our cases. For those of you who have sat in upon our conference discussions, the approach will be familiar. This method of evaluation and interpretation is dependent on a knowledge of all the facts and experiences gleaned from our study of the individual through the social history survey of the environmental background, comprising the psychological study of the child himself, and the estimate of his intellectual equipment, with its abilities and disabilities; the physical examination, including not only an estimate of his organic structure and growth, but especially the glandular integration and function, as well as the careful noting of disease and operative experiences; and finally the gaging of the child's attitudes, biases, interests, and enthusiasms in relation to himself and his experiences.

To facilitate your understanding, there may be some point in furnishing you with a working glossary of the classifications used. While I have purposely chosen simple and familiar terms of expression, the interpretative values need to be specifically noted. In the use of the term "positive," I give to it the specific value of "satisfying," implying then

that, if an experience is positive, it possesses emotional elements of satisfaction, that is to say, it is something to be desired. By "negative" is implied the opposite side of the picture from "positive"; in other words, if an experience is negative, it is unsatisfying; hence, relatively speaking, it tends to become undesired. By "constructive" I mean that the value of the constructive experience for the individual possesses, whether consciously recognized or unconsciously determined, a progressive or constructive growth opportunity leading toward integration and maturity. Bearing in mind that our ideal for growth represents the continuous progress toward stable adult integration, any experiences which tend to assist in this integrative process, whether conscious or unconscious, I consider in this thesis as constructive. The obverse of this, the destructive experiences, then become identified with those trends in the daily contacts which tend to interfere with progress and integration. Since nothing in the organic world remains fixed and static, if an experience does not tend to lead to a constructive growth process, it is bound to produce, relatively speaking, a destructive or disintegrating force, which interferes with the continuous growth of the organism. This fact is a biologically accepted one in terms of physical growth and structure and can be paralleled by the dynamic impulse in the personality structure toward constructive integration or the obverse destructive lack of integration, and finally toward disintegration.

To indicate briefly the basis upon which the interpretation of the child's patterns of response or symptomatic behavior is built, may I ask you to recall the early discussion of the so-called "pleasure principle," described by Professor Freud in his interpretation of certain of the underlying impulses which activate the life purpose of the individual from the time of birth, or even before birth. For if one recreates the picture of the intrauterine period of life, we see the embryo during the stage of complete omnipotence, surrounded by the protective body of the mother, furnished through her circulation the warmth, the nutritional products, and oxygen components for organic growth and comfort without effort or struggle of any kind. A pattern as complete and pleasurable as this product of a sensory experience *in utero* must needs be recognized as a strong determinant for future strivings. The reliability of this concept is illustrated all too frequently in the evidence furnished in the neurotic and psychotic regressions in which the behavior and emotional patterns of these diseases furnish evidence of a wish to recreate the comfort, satisfaction, and release from responsibility so characteristic of that early period of complete dependent omnipotence.

With this intrauterine period as a universal beginning pattern, we are then led to conceive that every experience of the individual, from the time the life process begins, takes on a feeling value of one kind or another for the individual. To reduce these feeling reactions to simple terms,

we are safe in concluding that every experience, either simple or complex, important or unimportant as it may seem, takes on either a pleasurable or unpleasurable tone. Relatively speaking, then, we can describe the reactions of an individual to any given experience as predominantly positive, or satisfying; or predominantly negative, and unsatisfying. Bearing in mind the original source of the pleasurable or satisfying experience, the intrauterine, it is easy to see that all humans are prone to seek a constant repetition of experiences colored by these positive satisfactions through the recreation of the infantile destructive patterns. This is an important concept to gain, for through our ability to recognize the emotional or feeling values which an individual is prone to experience in the light of his personal life contacts, it is possible so to organize his program of daily experience, beginning with the first few weeks of life, that the feeling values he creates will be predominantly satisfying, though the emphasis is placed from the beginning through careful direction upon the constructive satisfactions rather than on the destructive ones.

This approach, you will see, is not new, for the creation of healthy habit patterns in the early months and years has long been recognized as important. The contribution furnished by this method of evaluating each new experience in terms of the destructive or constructive elements is evident when one realizes the opportunities for creating in the daily program of the growing child healthy, satisfying, constructive growth privileges for the child, mentally, physically and emotionally. That is to say, if the daily experiences which are satisfying have a predominance of constructive rather than destructive elements, it is possible to wean the child from the tendency to recreate patterns of a destructive or regressive, satisfying nature, and to assist him in laying down habits which are constructive and which will lead him to establish patterns of response of a progressive and more integrated sort. This early integration holds opportunities for mental health and adult emotional maturity for the future. It will further be recognized that, relatively speaking, the usual response to the negative, unsatisfying contacts in one's experience would be undesired and unsought. The exception to this rule is found in children or adults who, when conditioned through repression and inhibition of the positive source of satisfaction, utilize this negative or unsatisfying approach as a compensation. This explains the frequent assertion that if the child can't get attention by being good (*i.e.*, in a way acceptable to society), he will frequently seek to get attention by using the opposite type of behavior, namely, by being bad.

In his original studies of adult neurotics, Professor Freud found a universal disposition of these "sick" individuals to recreate through the neurotic symptoms many of the infantile sources of pleasure, which in themselves during the early months and years of life are an accepted pattern of response in the baby. That these infantile values are not a

part of the conscious adult experience will be evident to you all if you try the experiment of explaining to the neurotic person in simple language, understandable on his intellectual level, the real infantile source of his symptoms. Without any noteworthy exceptions, this adult person will respond to your intellectual ministrations by a violent denial of the reliability of your deductions. All too frequently the social worker or teacher who has gleaned a little insight into the source of neurotic patterns, in the overenthusiasm inherent in the possessorship of a little knowledge, utilizes just this method of approach. The ineffectiveness of this procedure can only be adequately appreciated when we realize that the sole basis upon which neurotic and psychotic symptoms are forthcoming is through the failure of the mechanisms of repression; that is to say, only through the medium of intense intrapsychic conflict of which the patient is not more than partially aware does the capacity for inhibition and suppression finally become overwhelmed, and the symptom-complex of the neurosis and psychosis begin to unfold; and all too frequently these changes in the personality occur without any conscious understanding, insight, or capacity for control on the part of the patient.

In the light of our knowledge that suppression and denial, with its concurrent conflict, is prone to produce only a disappearance of the tabooed wishes from conscious overt expression, whether the suppression or denial is derived from the personal conscience of the individual himself or from members of the social group, we see the destructiveness of repression in the pathological sense and come to realize even more forcibly the importance of the handling which the child receives in those early years. The relatively healthy and constructive experiences which come from normal, healthy parental relationships, where the emphasis and direction of the habit formation and early patterns are so well consolidated even in the first few months of life, as we have already noted, makes for a continuous progressive growth process of the child's personality and a continuous integration toward mature adulthood.

But all too frequently we find, in the study of these early years, evidences of unhealthy handling on the part of the adults who possess the right to wield authority over the child. The repressive, negative, unsatisfying, destructive patterns, which too frequently result from unwise oppression and authoritative control without the tempering of love and understanding, tend to produce the distorted experience of personality growth, so that the delinquent, neurotic, psychotic, criminal, and allied problems of unadjustment are made.

The fact that this is an indisputable truth makes it all the more urgent that we habituate ourselves to evaluate each new experience of the early years in the child's life to determine, in our plans for his training and education, whether each new contact and departure from the old scheme of things has a relatively constructive or destructive value for him.

In our attempts to shape his patterns of desire in these early months and years, we must know (as we have said before) whether the experiences, either constructive or destructive, possess a predominance of positive, satisfying qualities for him or whether these positive values are outweighed by too many negative ones. For we have already recognized the satisfying but destructive value for the individual contained in the impulse to seek a re-creation of the earliest experiences which contain the positive, pleasurable elements of infantile satisfaction. To reiterate, our plan for handling and treatment, either as a preventive or curative measure, must have satisfying, positive elements contained therein.

Since the original patterns of this regressive impulse are laid down in the biological *anlage* or structure of those intrauterine days, we can sense the dynamic force which underlies this pleasure-seeking pattern. This then should be our most effective guide in shaping treatment processes.

Our objective evaluation of the behavior of the child or adult in his blind search for pleasure will lead us to but one conclusion: that our job as social psychiatric workers and educators must be primarily directed toward the reshaping and redirecting of this impulse to repeat for pleasure, so that the patterns of repetition are translated into terms of behavior, which fall predominantly upon the progressive, constructive, although satisfying side of the picture. In order that we orient ourselves completely in the understanding of these dynamic impulses common to all humans, it is patent that a more specific method of evaluation of these satisfying and unsatisfying, constructive and destructive trends, must be made. Since we are concerning ourselves with the early beginnings of the life processes, it is but natural that our investigation should lead us back to the consideration of the two main streams of human activity, described in detail by many earlier writers but best evaluated by Professor Freud and his followers under the caption of the "sex" and "ego" instincts. For our purposes in the understanding of the life experiences of the child, it is easier and will confuse us less if we think of the manifestations of the sex instinct as primarily of a love nature. For in all those first early years of a child's experience, any impulse of sexlike nature manifests itself in a dissociated and unconnected fashion apart from the function of reproduction, as has been indicated in our description of the omnipotence and satisfactions enjoyed in the intrauterine period. The child not only brings to his first days and weeks of life a wish to be warmed and fed, but he responds with some show of satisfaction and pleasure to the loving care which is given him, even though his response of pleasure possesses no other outward manifestation of satisfaction than a snuggling down and a recreation of sleep. If we evaluate this reaction in the light of the positive satisfying patterns, we immediately assume that our method of treating him is pleasing to him and that his desire for comfort is unthwarted because of the love colorings which get injected into our

relationship with him. That this is an important part of those early days and months is indicated by his irritation and displeasure when anything interferes with his continuous, comfortable program. For example, the irritation in waking, to find himself cold, wet, and hungry, he displays by uncontrolled crying if through the source of his parental attention his dissatisfaction is not immediately remedied. The possibilities of his irritation and negative feelings during these early months are manifold. The extent to which this pattern can unfold when a child has the early months complicated by physical irritations and handicaps, resulting from intestinal colic, middle-ear infection, infectious disease, and so on, points to the degree of negative emphasis which can be created in the child's emotional patterns through this more or less chronic source of physical dissatisfaction. In the past, the emphasis of the parent and the nurse has been largely in the direction of the physical health and care of the child, and too little appreciation has been given to the emotional reactions. As we have already suggested, one source of dissatisfaction arises from within the child himself in response to pain and suffering; but, more important perhaps both from negative and positive sources of the emotional patterns, are the kinds of attitudes and emotional values which are placed upon the care of the child during the infantile dependency period, during both normal healthy growth as well as during disease episodes, by the adult contacts.

As an index of how much even the health and life processes of the child seem dependent on the loving which it receives, are the figures of the high mortality rate among foundlings who are cared for in institutions and nursing homes where the hygienic equipment, scientific methods of feeding, isolation from infectious disease contacts, and careful medical and nursing care are given. Comparing the opportunities for physical healthiness and hygienic handling which these children get in comparison to those of children of the same age born in crowded, dirty, ill-ventilated homes, with no scientific methods of nursing, one would be likely to choose the former as an ideal kind of treatment experience for the baby. As a matter of fact the potentialities of continuous life and growth are much greater for the child in the dirty home. That this need for love seems to be the necessary constituent for the chemical processes of the life force would seem to be evident; and those highly trained, impersonal, and scientific workers, who like to play with the idea that the future child will become the product of the scientific laboratory for child rearing, must needs, if they wish successful growth of the child to result from their experiment, perfect also a sympathetic love virus for daily injection. If one gets a reaction of wilting and dissatisfaction in the child torn loose from the parental love objects, it is not hard to imagine the relative possibilities for dissatisfaction which the unwanted child will find, even though he has the doubtful advantage of living in his family group. The multi-

plicity of the negative unsatisfying responses in the child's life experiences in such a setting can only be suggested. The refusal of the mother to render care when it interferes with her pleasure, the punishment and deprivation which the parents frequently perpetrate—not because the child deserves this treatment, but because his presence interferes with their program—would require, if the time permitted us to enlarge upon it by illustrations of actual case records, many hours for discussion. In this discussion one chapter would be consumed in the enumeration of the possible destructive experiences which come to the children of intelligent and loving parents who delegate their children for care to the nurses, governesses, and hired helpers whose primary interest all too frequently is to keep the child quiet and make it presentable for inspection.

If space permitted it would be well to dwell upon the many other negative destructive possibilities on the love as well as the ego side of the child's experience; for such experiences as the loss of a parent, the coming of another brother or sister, the jealousy of the father, parental incompatibility and quarreling, the presence of unfriendly critical adults in the home, contacts with unsympathetic teachers, the lack of normal companionship and satisfying social contacts, the influence of physical handicaps and limitations, reactions to failure, problems of authoritative pressure, the strivings and repressions in response to problems of authority which become so frequently a part of the adolescent growth and desire for freedom—these experiences will suggest to you a few of the potential problems which need to be understood in order that future generations may profit by the failures of parents in the past in their methods of handling their children.

If the array of the negative, unsatisfying, destructive possibilities in the love and ego experiences of the child overwhelms us, a very brief survey of the potential, positive satisfying but destructive factors will provoke this question: with all the negative destructive opportunities on the one hand and the satisfying positive but destructive opportunities on the other, how does it happen that any of the human barques manage to steer their course between the Scylla and Charybdis of human experience to the harbor of so-called "normality"? The answer to this in our present stage of parental understanding would be, all too frequently, that it happened in spite of the parental handling rather than because of it. In passing, in order to orient ourselves, we should take note of such satisfying though destructive elements as too prolonged feeding, the use of the pacifier, permitting the child to sleep in the bed of the mother or to room with the parents, indulgence in special food whims, prolonged dependency with maternal attention, help in feeding and dressing beyond the early years, worry and anxiety of the mother which interferes with the normal kind of physical and social activity, withholding of outside contacts through the desire to retain the companionship and love of the

child, resentment and jealousy toward the child's love, or friendly relations outside the family group, and a multitude of other possibilities which suggest the extent to which we need to know the intimate details of child-parent contact if we can hope to influence and shape the healthy, progressive trends of growth.

In the organization of a preventive and educational program for the parents and teachers who desire to furnish the child with opportunities for growth in a constructive, progressive fashion, emphasis must be laid upon creating possibilities for gaining the sense of security and satisfaction needed by the child in the early months, but with an eye toward weaning him in a way which is acceptable to him so that he may relinquish more specific infantile sources of pleasure and accept the satisfactions both on a love and ego level which make for progressive integration and molding of a personality capable of meeting the issues of reality and gaining satisfaction from the challenges contained therein.

Perhaps the reconstruction of the more familiar ambivalency of human emotions as exemplified in the love-hate, pleasure-pain feelings will clarify my meaning for you. As a matter of fact, in the evaluating process, the simplest method to use in determining whether a given experience belongs on the constructive or destructive side of the page, is to ask the question of ourselves, will this experience, in the light of our knowledge of this individual and his life contacts, serve to assist him in reaching out for a constructive, progressive growth process, or will the emotional impulses derived from his experience have the opposite effect and produce in him a tendency to withdraw from growth and progress, and tend to create in him a desire to hang on to the infantile satisfactions on either or both the libido and ego levels of experience?

We have again come to recognize that the behavior manifestations of the individual are but a symptomatic outcropping of the expression of his needs. The behavior of an individual then at any given point in his career is conceived as a definite response to the demands placed upon him through the medium of his biological, physical, intellectual, and emotional equipment, plus the sum of all his life experiences. This leads us to the necessity of evaluating his behavior reactions also, in exactly the same way as we do the environmental and experiential contacts. That is to say, we must determine whether his symptomatic responses are constructive or destructive and whether they are satisfying or unsatisfying to him. Here we come to the understanding of the "mechanisms of human behavior." In other words, through this evaluation we are able to interpret the purpose of a given behavior problem, whether good or bad, social or unsocial, in the economy of the given individual's experience, and we are led for the first time to a comprehensive interpretation of the purpose of the delinquent and criminalistic, asocial behavior of individuals, as well as the purposiveness of neurotic

and psychotic reactions. Here again we utilize our understanding of the projective and introjective types of response mentioned earlier as a contribution of Professor Freud. The introjective reactions which lead the individual to withdraw and turn in, in a subjective attempt to seek satisfaction and comfort, represent his solution to his problem.

We have already mentioned the fact that in childhood as well as in adulthood, the tendency to turn in or to regress toward the level of more complete infantile emotional satisfaction is present. This introjective process, the original satisfying pattern of which we have already suggested as being found in that comfortable dependency of the intrauterine period, is a common experience for us all. In periods of illness we find it easy to sink or to regress to a dependency level. When a physical disease creates an excuse for care, it is simple for most of us to recreate, at least to a degree, some of the same satisfactions of emotional dependency and complacency which made up such a large part of our first relationship with the parent love object in the early months.

Anything which threatens the individual's security—such as the loss of the mother love object through illness, death, or at an earlier period the coming of a new brother or sister, if the child is unprepared for this new experience by a readiness to get positive satisfaction through more grown-up channels of expression—may produce a withdrawing from the more grown-up to the more familiar infantile levels of response.

This kind of reaction is illustrated by Jack, a manly little fellow of three and a half. From the age of two the boy had dressed himself, had fed himself and cared for his own toilet needs successfully. He was fearless, unafraid of the dark; he would complacently bid his mother good night and would make no stir until morning.

Following the advent of the baby brother whose coming had been unheralded, he reacted first by an intense display of jealousy and a wish to shut the baby out of the picture. He asked each new and admiring visitor to take the baby home with her. When this method of disposal failed, he suddenly seemed to lose all his former ability to do things for himself. When dressing he would sit for hours with his shoe in his hand, asking that it be put on for him, and when told to do so for himself, his usual retort was "Jack can't, Jack is only a baby." Baby talk which had been relinquished early suddenly reappeared; he seemed unable to care for his own toilet needs, developed a series of food dislikes, demanded that he have a bottle like the baby because he couldn't drink from the cup and, as a final touch to this regressive introjective pattern, he developed night terrors, waking with loud screams, shaking with fear and wild with anxiety, the only solution for which was the coming of some member of the family, a substitute for the mother, to sleep in the room with him until morning.

In the light of our knowledge of the sequence of events, we see clearly the cause and effect relationship of the boy's behavior. Treatment of the symptoms by spanking or other authoritative handling, so frequently

employed by parents in an attempt to create a more receptive attitude toward the new baby, would only suffice to make the rift between the child's love security of old and the relative insecurity of the present reality more painful; on the other hand, opportunities permitted by the parents to recreate the baby dependency again would have been destructive and regressive.

Only the evaluation of the purpose of this unconsciously determined behavior on the boy's part, and the knowledge of how one must recreate or preserve for him the security and positive satisfaction which he craves, at the same time we create constructive opportunities for building a more grown-up relationship to reality, points a solution for the problem. The child must be brought up to accept the baby as his own, although he shares him with the mother and father. Through this kind of treatment, and this alone, can we hope to bring about in children a constructive disappearance of these unhealthy trends of jealousy and other destructive infantile regressions.

Relatively speaking, all degrees of intensity of reaction, from the simple temporary regressions of the moment, common to us all, to the more profound devastating examples of regression such as are found in neuroses and psychoses of adulthood, are created by just such destructive patterns of positive and negative experiences during this early formative period. It might be well at this point, however, to caution against the use of too frequent generalizations. In actual practice one should evaluate each new experience of the individual and his reaction to it in the light of all that has gone before. It is an accepted fact that we meet the challenges of daily living, multiple as they are, primarily with the attitudes and emotional colorings which are consciously as well as unconsciously determined by the degree of healthy and unhealthy integration of our personality.

This explains how we can find such varied types of healthy and unhealthy behavior in the various members of a family group, in spite of the fact that essentially the same hereditary constituents have played their part in creating the original biological equipment of all the members of the family. The old time concept that every family must have its black sheep in the fold provokes a need for a new kind of interpretation of what constitutes the making of the black sheep, and all too frequently we find the explanation in the destructive emotional trends of the growing period of childhood handling, rather than in the accumulation of all the bad inheritance from both sides of the family reposited in this one ewe lamb.

This introjective type of response is perhaps better understood because of the contribution of the years of analytic study of the neuroses, and later of the psychoses; but the future progress of social psychiatric study of the opposite type of reaction, that is to say, the projective types of

response, bids fair to add just as complete a chapter in our understanding of the overt explosive types of behavior, found in the asocial, predelinquent, delinquent, and criminal careers, the roots of which are also found in the childhood period.

This projection type of response, the manifestations of which lead to a discharge of the irritations against the offending objects or their substitutes in the immediate or remote environment, is illustrated by the tantrum episodes of the child who is denied the piece of candy, the extra dessert, the additional chapters of the book, or the proverbial trip to the circus. The success of this method of getting what he wants when he wants it furnishes him with an effective weapon which he may retain through his whole existence. The fact that age may foster discretion in his use of this weapon may lead to the shading of the tantrum into a mood, but this is no reason for losing sight of the original purposive value or its root processes in childhood.

For in the adolescent or post adolescent, as well as the adult years, evidences of projective behavior are not wanting. The man who reacts to his wife's irritability at the breakfast table by grouching the entire morning at the office, the boss who takes the head off his office boy because his opponent wins the golf tournament, the boy who reacts to a cranky teacher or demotion in school by truancy, the child who is exposed to too oppressive discipline and authority and who reacts by running away—these represent the utilization of the same type of mechanism for solution of the problem just as, broadly speaking the bolshevik who blows up the employer's shop or the desperado who seeks his satisfactions by heading the best organized gang in the country.

2. *The Striving for Superiority*[1]

You are rightly expecting me to set before you what is perhaps a novel point of view, and I may define my attitude by giving you as an alternative title, The Feeling of Inferiority and Its Consequences. To me it appears that every child and every human being, for some reason, is continually striving to answer questions, to overcome difficulties, to solve riddles, and to develop himself in some degree toward a self-satisfying completion, the full achievement of his life purpose. No matter what may be the age of an individual, you will find tendencies which have their beginnings—if one may venture to use the phrase—in the dawn of life, and which, by their persistence, ever demand a development to a higher level. Such tendencies can only exist if there be a goal, and I will endeavor to put before you what, to my mind, this must be.

[1] Adapted from ADLER, ALFRED, The Cause and Prevention of Neuroses, *Jour. Abnormal and Social Psychology*, vol. 23, pp. 4–11, April–June, 1928.

In the face of reality, we must always define our position and form a conception of our relationship to our environment, which conception involves and determines our standards of behavior, our attitudes, and our demands. Whatever is revealed in the character of a human being, there is always manifested this persistent demand for greater development and a continual striving for the achievement of a certain goal. One may instance the wish of a child to become a coachman, or that of an adult to become a physician or a judge. In every walk of life, in every situation where the problems of living are being attacked, there is to be observed this striving for superiority, this striving for power; and you can properly understand the particular reaction of the moment only if you realize the existence of this fundamental undercurrent. A symptom can only properly be distinguished and recognized when it is defined as an incidental object in the general current of the striving toward a goal of superiority. The goal of a normal man is easily appreciated, and we can realize that he has, in the main, three great problems to solve.

The first of these is the ambition to mix with and be accepted by others. This is the problem of social relationships, the desire for fellowship, to take some place in the world of men. The approach to other men takes devious routes, but if we fail to find the actual social ideal of any one individual, we can yet judge by how much he falls short of the normal achievement in regard to this first question of life. For example, he may have no friends, or he may not interest himself in societies or in social functions, or he may have a positive distaste for companionship. You can, in this way, measure approximately the failure of achievement in this direction, and it is noteworthy that in the case of the neurotic, the degree of failure is usually very marked. So, as you can imagine, he must have another goal, and, in consequence, he is always trying to escape from the right, the normal aim of social life.

The second problem which is always before us, and which cannot be avoided without increasing the difficulty of solution of the first, is that of occupation, and the two are not wholly separated. The problem of occupation resolves itself literally as—how can I be useful for the whole of mankind? Every occupation, so called, is a beginning of this trying to be useful, to live on the useful side. To be useful induces a feeling of great confidence and well-being, and the person who feels useless is always more or less shy, he feels himself isolated, and finds great difficulty in carrying out his work. As I have already remarked, this leads us to suspect the presence of another goal.

The third problem of life is that of sex. People live together in two sexes, and so an aim with everyone is to unite with someone of the opposite sex as a partner. This solution is the normal one; it is the normal goal for everybody. The degree of failure of achievement of this natural solution will always betray to what extent the problem is being evaded.

If you ask what reason there can be for such an evasion, I reply that throughout the whole world there is one reason for it: it is a lack of self-confidence, a lack of courage; in the mind of the individual concerned there is the idea that he cannot reach this goal. You will realize this if you consider your experience of neurotic subjects. The question at once arises as to how it has happened that some people—many people—have such a fear, so much so that they are averse to trying to solve this problem in the natural way.

I come from work in the pathological field, and in connection with psychological questions I have always noted that one of the most important reasons for such a lack of courage is the existence of an organic burden in childhood. Delicate children differ very much from the healthy in their view of the world, because they suffer from organic deficiencies and defects; they do not eat and assimilate as easily, they cannot see or hear so well, they have troubles due to abnormalities of the endocrine glands. To such children the world is a great difficulty, an embarrassing problem, yet in the first years of their life they must arrive at some answer. The attention the child has to give in his little life to the world shapes for him his style of life. He experiences the difficulties and the burdens of his own body, and these make a great impression on him. The investigation of the adult life of such children convinces me that these burdens are remembered.

I hope I may succeed in presenting the matter so that you may see how the whole attitude throughout life is based on what takes place and what is the equipment in childhood, in short, on this feeling of personal inferiority, and that in the case of children burdened with physical defects and deficiencies it is greatly intensified. We have to remember that these defects, in many cases, are inherited, and, therefore, there arises the question of the relation of inherited defects to the development of the character. However, the character is not everything. Even the normal child suffers in a difficult situation, and if he has disturbances of vision or hearing, or some similar disability, he feels he cannot bear it. In all cases there is a relationship between the child's defects and the particular problems that confront him in life. I have come to another conclusion also. In considering the lives of children in general, it appears to me that there are two situations which are peculiarly inimical to normal development. One of these arises where the child is made to face greater difficulties, in which case there is a greater feeling of inferiority. The other is concerned with the process of "spoiling," for then the child is much worse than before. Such a child is always leaning on another person. He lives in a symbiotic manner, like a parasite, and he receives everything from others. As a consequence he cannot develop a normal style of life, for he is always demanding and receiving, and he never feels the necessity for using his own powers. If a child, or an adult, never

attempts to stand alone, he always lacks confidence and courage, and we are justified in regarding such spoiled children as not properly prepared to meet the constantly changing situations of life.

If you inquire into the goal of such children, *i.e.*, those with organic deficiencies, or those who have been spoiled, you will find that their aim is to overcome the difficulties of life in the most complete fashion. They are not satisfied with that to which the normal child aspires; for them there must be no less than the complete command of the situation, an absolute security, and their demands upon others are unlimited. You will agree that this is a habit, or an attitude, which does not make for happiness in our life upon this earth. If you ask your nervous patients you will find, very often, that they have begun in such a way, as spoiled children, and the two types I have mentioned are very often connected. Sometimes it is impossible to educate the delicate child without spoiling it, and better methods are needed. As a rule, the custom is that, as regards education, no distinction is made between the abnormal and the normal child who has the normal goal, which is to mix with others, to be useful, to give and not always to receive and to demand. For the abnormal as well as for the normal child, however, new situations must continually arise. With every change the child, as it were, makes an experiment in adaptation, and it is obvious to the observer, as it no doubt is to the child, that the experiments are mainly unsuccessful, for children such as we have in mind are not capable of independence, of working with others for a common usefulness. As a consequence, the abnormal child will always be torn with conflicts.

I may describe a third type, the hated child, the child who grows up without warmth and love, very often illegitimate, or at any rate unwanted, and it will be apparent to you that for such a child the world is to a great extent comparable to an enemy country. He meets with nothing but enmity; kindness and love are unknown to him, and he experiences nothing but insult and attack. It follows that children of this type develop what may be termed a defensive attitude; they have no desire to join in with the efforts of others, and they have no wish to be useful in a hostile community. Thus, they also are always in a situation of conflict.

The general reactions of the third type are the same as those of the first and second; they are unhappy in school, in work, and in love, and they always feel restricted. The only satisfaction for them is to be superior to every other man, to conquer, to be the first, to be Godlike in their power and domination. They have no patience, opposition irritates them, and they feel that by any means they must defend themselves, justify themselves morally, and shine in the highest sphere. To accomplish this they adopt the only possible course of restricting their environment, for they cannot hold complete sway in the whole of society, where

they feel that their efforts are being curtailed. They evade occupation, and they evade love; their eccentricities are always signs of evasion, but those signs, or we may say symptoms, of the attempt to escape the solution of the three questions of life are not always obvious, for patients as well as others will justify their attitude to themselves by rationalizations. I have never met a man who frankly said, "I do not want to mix with others," but I have met many people who told me, "I cannot go into society because the people are so bad; the people around me cannot appreciate me, and they are distasteful." I have never seen such a man frankly avoiding occupation; he will only say, "I am tired, I cannot sleep, I have a headache," or "I have symptoms which hinder me from making up my mind in this matter." Another will say, "This occupation is not good enough for me; I must have something better; I have not a good memory," and so on, while another may say, "I cannot concentrate." There are always justifications for evasions, but we physicians know there are no real reasons for such symptoms.

Now I should like to say a few words about the appearance of symptoms. Symptoms do not arise suddenly in a night. There is always a long period of development which can be traced back, often to childhood, and I have found that the history of the case invariably indicates such antecedent situations as we have considered in the three types of children. For instance, the spoiled child will always tend to cling to the individual who spoils him; as a rule this is the mother, and commonly these tendencies are apparently prompted by anxiety. With nervous people this symptom is always in the foreground, for they are always attempting to justify the carrying out of their wishes to command other persons on the grounds of their anxiety. People who cannot be alone, who have agoraphobia, command and require that another person shall be with them, and this other person must obey—his life must be ruled and ordered by the patient. If the neurotic person has a headache, all the family must be silent, must obey, must take care not to irritate. There is constantly this striving for superiority and for domination by any means, however petty, and we can understand some of these symptoms, because they are nurtured and developed in childhood. In some cases the symptoms derive from a condition of emotional tension, and to thwart such a patient induces an almost inconceivable reaction of depression, even to the extent that there may be an attempt at suicide. Even in their play such individuals are very deeply moved emotionally, and it is only by realizing their life aims that we can appreciate the subjective disturbance.

The foregoing is a short description of the tendencies among nervous persons. In every single reaction you can recognize the attitude to life if you have previously grasped the distortion of the personality. I am in agreement with the whole current of medicine only when I insist that we cannot treat symptoms; we can but treat the individual, and, in this

matter, to be of any help you must change the attitude to life of the whole individual. So long as the patient persists in his morbid attitude, you cannot get rid of the symptoms. It is not sufficient to treat the consequences of a fault; we must go deeper, and perhaps I can show you, by relating one or two cases, what I mean.

I will cite the case of a young woman, twenty-six years of age, in good bodily health, who has been suffering considerably for about a year with agoraphobia and depression. She dated the onset of her trouble as a year ago in time, but, as is usual, on inquiring more fully I found that the symptoms really originated in a change of her life situation. When I asked this young woman what had happened a year before, she said that she had then become a mother for the first time. The connection is not at once obvious, but it is very clear that such an event is full of possibilities in the hands of a spoilt person. Such an individual always aspires to be the center of attention; the coming of the child of her own makes the difficulty the greater for her, and sometimes neurotic symptoms will commence from the time of the first confinement. In this case, however, that was not all. When I hinted at the point, she told me this story: "I like my husband very much, and he likes me also. He went away to Paris three days after my confinement. He amused himself there, and I have intended going to Paris in spite of him. I was very angry." Another point was that this woman had, as very often happens, a very annoying and foolish mother-in-law. She was a very critical woman, and the young wife was the spoilt child, the only child of very weak parents, who could not tolerate this new situation. She often cried and became very angry when her husband showed a disposition to differ with her. They frequently quarreled in spite of the love they had for each other. It appeared to me that when the child came, and the husband went off to Paris, she felt that the time had come to reinforce her own position. She no longer felt herself to be in command, to be the first and most important person and first in her husband's love. The husband loved the child very much, and took a great interest in it, while she became more and more irritable and also very depressed. It was clear to me that what she did then was a repetition of what she had done in her childhood: she aimed at being the center of attention, and if she were displaced, then she developed anxieties, so she suffered from an anxious depression and forced the husband to be with her always—an indication which enables us to understand her actions. She could not go on a tram, and she could not travel by train, but she could drive in a car. The point of that is easily seen if one bears in mind the underlying aim. In the train or in the tram the passenger is one of many: definite stopping places are arranged and individual rights must be subordinated to the rules laid down, but with a private car the stopping and the route can be controlled, therefore people constituted like our patient always

feel they can travel by car. This little characteristic is typical of the whole attitude to life. There is the feeling of superiority, the Godlikeness, the desire to dominate, to be always first. Such signs should always be carefully noted, they are very informative, and indicate clearly in what direction the general attitude of the patient is tending. This woman came into the sanitarium, which is often in itself an extenuating situation, because to be in a sanitarium is to command much weight of sympathy. The whole family is probably much more amenable when one is in a sanitarium. While she was there our patient improved considerably, but when she returned to her home she had a bad relapse. It appears that in the sanitarium she found a physician whom she regarded as a very charming man; he flattered her, and was always attentive to her; she responded to him, and she regarded herself as on close terms of friendship with him. When she left the sanitarium she wrote him a letter full of kind thoughts and good sentiments, to which she had no reply, and from that time her symptoms increased, for she then became convinced that she could no longer make an impression on other men. In her phantasies there was always the fear that she had lost the capacity of attraction for men. She had never put the matter to the test of experience, but she always complained of such fancies, especially as they were accompanied by sexual irritation, and these irritations gave her a new reason for feeling depressed. By this time she had built up a guilt complex, concerning which she was very reticent; she had spoken to no one about it except myself. Still, she always felt guilty about it. This guilt complex could feasibly have been the cause of her depression and her illness, but if it be closely examined, it is clear that it constituted an excellent tool for overcoming the husband. She was in a menacing mood, for she said, "I could betray my husband, because he has left me, because he does not now flatter me as he used to, and is not so attentive to me." In the logical sequence of events it is only one more stage to the betraying of the husband, and the actual breaking of the marriage tie. I have always found this breaking up of the marriage tie to be an act of revenge against the partner.

In other directions, too, there were further indications of her attitude to life. For instance, if she had a quarrel with her husband her feelings would be expressed. She dreamed once on these lines: "Once I was going shopping with my friend, and I met this physician but he did not want to greet me." I read this to mean that after this quarrel she had the desire to meet the physician. She held back, not because she was too chaste, or too modest, but only because she feared she could not make an impression on him. So, though she was a very beautiful woman, she had lost her self-confidence. Her whole demeanor shows that she feared defeats and rebuffs. There was, in fact, a feeling of great inferiority. She said, "I am only sure when I am with my parents or with similar people, when

I feel this great warmth, this great love. I have been defeated by my husband, and now I have been defeated by the physician, so now I can only command in a restricted field, that is, in my family circle, where I can dominate my husband through my agoraphobia, and by means of my depression."

As time is short, I will conclude briefly. The development of such an attitude to life can be prevented. The best course is to begin in childhood, to avoid spoiling the child, and not to overlook deficiencies in various organs. The aim should be to make the child independent, to make him free, to give him enough self-confidence and courage. It would be my last word that every effort should be made to give such children enough courage to develop their social feelings, to be useful, and not to be terrified by the other sex, and if this could be done, there would be no more nervous adults. If the patient has reached adult age, he must be reeducated and given a fresh start. The patients must be approached with affection; the attitude of the physician must be parental. They must be stirred to the depths of their personality; they require honest and frank handling and no demands should be made upon them; one should simply seek to strengthen their courage, so that later they may feel independent.

In the treatment it is of the greatest importance to find out what mistake has been made in the past, to show what has been to blame for their neurotic attitude to life, to expose the connections between that attitude and the symptoms. The symptoms always fit the case. The nervous patient can be understood only if it be recognized that his behavior harmonizes with his symptoms. When he has been convinced about this, then his personality will change, and with the change will come a new determination toward life; his neurotic tendencies can then be said to have been cured.

3. *The Behaviorist Point of View*[1]

Man is an animal born with certain definite types of structure. Having that kind of structure, he is forced to respond to stimuli at birth in certain ways (for example: breathing, heart beat, sneezing, and the like; a fairly full list I shall give you later on). This repertoire of responses is in general the same for each of us. Yet there exists a certain amount of variation in each—the variation is probably merely proportional to the variation there is in structure (including in structure, of course, chemical constitution). It is the same repertoire now that it was when the genus homo first appeared many millions of years ago. Let us call this group of reactions man's "unlearned behavior."

[1] Adapted from WATSON, JOHN B., What the Nursery Has to Say about Instincts, "Psychologies of 1925," pp. 1–11, Clark University Press, 1926.

As a corollary from this, I wish to draw the conclusion that there is no such thing as an inheritance of capacity, talent, temperament, mental constitution, and characteristics. These things again depend on training that goes on mainly in the cradle. The behaviorist would not say: "He inherits his father's capacity or talent for being a fine swordsman." He would say: "This child certainly has his father's slender build of body, the same type of eyes. His build is wonderfully like his father's. He, too, has the build of a swordsman." And he would go on to say: . . . "His father is very fond of him. He put a tiny sword into his hand when he was a year of age, and in all their walks he talks sword play, attack and defense, the code of duelling and the like." A certain type of structure, plus early training—slanting—accounts for adult performance.

Let me start by saying that man to the behaviorist is a whole animal. When he reacts he reacts with each and every part of his body. Sometimes he reacts more strongly with one group of muscles and glands than with another. We then say he is doing something. We have named many of these acts—such as breathing, sleeping, crawling, walking, running, fighting, crying, etc. But please do not forget that each of these named acts involves the whole body.

We must begin, too, to think of man as a mammal—a primate—a two-legged animal with two arms and two delicate, mobile hands; as an animal that has a nine months embryonic life, a long helpless infancy, a slow developing childhood, eight years of adolescence and a total life span of some three score years and ten.

We find this animal living in the tropics almost without shelter; going naked; living upon easily caught animals and upon fruit and herbs that require no cultivation. We find him in temperate regions, but dwelling here in well-built, steam-heated houses. We find the male always heavily clad even in summer, wearing a hat upon his head—the only naturally protected part of his body. We find the female of this species dressed in the scantiest clothes. We find the male working frantically (the female rarely) at almost every kind of vocation, from digging holes in the ground, damming up water like beavers, to building tall buildings of steel and concrete. Again we find man in arctic regions, clad in furs, eating fatty foods, and living in houses built of snow and ice.

Everywhere we find man, we find him doing the strangest things, displaying the most divergent manners and customs. In Africa we find the blacks eating one another; in China we find men eating mainly rice and throwing it toward the mouth with dainty chopsticks. In other countries we find man using a metal knife and fork. So widely different is the adult behavior of the primitive Australian bushmen from that of the dwellers in internal China, and both of these groups differ so widely in behavior from the cultivated Englishman, that the question is forced upon us: Do all members of the genus homo, wherever they are found

in biological history, start at birth with the same group of responses, and are these responses aroused by the same set of stimuli? Put in another way, is the unlearned, birth equipment of man, which you have been in the habit of calling "instincts," the same wherever he is found, be it in Africa or in Boston, be it in the year 6,000,000 B. C. or in A. D. 1925, whether born in the cotton fields of the South, in the Mayflower, or beneath the silken purple quilts of European royalty?

The genetic psychologist—the student best qualified to answer this question—hates to be faced with it because his data are limited. But since he is forced to answer, he can give his honest conviction. His answer is yes, within the limits of individual variation, man is born with the same general set of responses (let us wait before we call them instincts, though) regardless of the station of his parents, regardless of the geological age in which he was born, and regardless of the geographical zone in which he was born.

But you say, is there nothing in heredity; is there nothing in eugenics; is there no advantage in being born an F. F. V.; has there been no progress in human evolution? Let us examine a few of the questions you are now bursting to utter.

Certainly black parents will bear black children if the line is pure (except possibly once in a million years or so when a sport or "mutant" is born which theoretically may be white, yellow, or red). Certainly the yellow-skinned Chinese parents will bear yellow-skinned offspring. Certainly Caucasian parents will bear white children. But these differences are relatively slight. They are due among other things to differences in the amount and kind of pigments in the skin. I defy anyone to take these infants at birth, study their behavior, and mark off differences that will characterize white from black, and white from black or yellow. There will be differences in behavior but the burden of proof is upon the individual, be he biologist or eugenist, who claims that these racial differences are greater than the individual differences.

Granting individual variation in structure, we could find no real proof that man's unlearned repertoire of acts has differed through the ages or that he has ever been either more or less capable of putting on complex training than in 1925. The fact that there are marked individual variations in structure among men has been known since biology began. But we have never sufficiently utilized it in analyzing man's behavior. Tonight I want to utilize still another fact only recently brought out by the behaviorists and other students of animal psychology, namely, that habit formation starts in all probability in embryonic life, and that even in the human young, environment shapes behavior so quickly that all of the older ideas about what types of behavior are inherited and what are learned break down. Grant variations in structure at birth and rapid

habit formation from birth, and you have a basis for explaining many of the so-called "facts" of inheritance of "mental" characteristics.

Our conclusion, then, is that we have no real evidence of the inheritance of traits. I would feel perfectly confident in the ultimately favorable outcome of careful upbringing of a healthy, well-formed baby born of a long line of crooks, murderers, thieves, and prostitutes. Who has any evidence to the contrary? Many, many thousands of children yearly, born from moral households and steadfast parents, become wayward, steal or become prostitutes, through one mishap or another of nurture. Many more thousands of sons and daughters of the wicked grow up to be wicked because they couldn't grow up any other way in such surroundings. But let one adopted child who has a bad ancestry go wrong and it is used as incontestable evidence for the inheritance of moral turpitude and criminal tendencies. As a matter of fact, there has not been a double handful of cases in the whole of our civilization where records have been carefully enough kept for us to draw any such conclusions—mental testers, Lombroso, and all other students of criminality to the contrary notwithstanding. All of us know that adopted children are never brought up as one's own. One cannot use statistics gained from observations in charitable institutions and orphan asylums. All one needs to do to discount such statistics is to go there and work for a while, and I say this without trying to belittle the work of such organizations.

I should like to go one step further tonight and say, "Give me a dozen healthy infants, well formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select—a doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant chief and, yes, even into beggar man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors." I am going beyond my facts and I admit it, but so have the advocates of the contrary and they have been doing it for many thousands of years. Please note that when this experiment is made I am to be allowed to specify the way they are to be brought up and the type of world they have to live in.

Where there are structural defects that are inherited, as apparently is the case in certain glandular diseases, in "mental" defectives, where there is intrauterine infection as in syphilis and in gonorrhea, troublesome behavior of one kind or another may develop early and rapidly. But some of these children haven't the structural possibilities to be trained—as when fundamental connections in body and brain are lacking. Again, where there are structural defects more easily observed as in deformities, loss of digits, extra digits, etc., there is social inferiority—competition on equal grounds is denied. The same is true when inferior races are brought up along with superior races. We have no sure evidence

of inferiority in the Negro race. Educate a white child and a Negro child in the same school—bring them up in the same family (theoretically without difference) and yet when society begins to exert its crushing might, the Negro cannot compete.

The truth is society does not like to face facts. Pride of race has been strong, hence our Mayflower ancestry—our Daughters of the Revolution. We like to boast of our ancestry. It sets us apart. We like to think it takes three generations to make a gentlemen (sometimes a lot longer!) and that we have more than three behind us. Again, on the other hand, the belief in the inheritance of tendencies and traits saves us from blame in the training of our young. The mother says when her son goes wrong—look at his father, or his grandfather (whichever one she hates). What could you expect with that ancestry on his father's side? And the father, when the girl shows wayward tendencies—what can you expect? Her mother has always let every man she came in contact with make love to her. If these tendencies are inherited we can't be much blamed for it. Traits in the older psychologies are God-given and if my boy or girl goes wrong, I as a parent cannot be blamed.

The behaviorist has an axe to grind, you say, by being so emphatic. Yes, he has—he would like to see the presuppositions and assumptions that are blocking us in our efforts to spend millions of dollars and years of patient research on infant psychology removed because then, and only then, can we build up a real psychology of mankind.

4. *The Configuration Point of View*[1]

That mind develops, individually during any person's life, racially in the history of mankind, and phylogenetically in the evolutionary series of the animal kingdom, is today a truism. What we are interested in is *how* this development takes place. To give concrete substance to our discussion of this problem we shall make a survey of the different stages of mind by considering what mind is able to do. In this attempt we find no great difficulty in grouping our material. Restricting ourselves to the sphere of the vertebrates, we can roughly distinguish three types of behavior—using this word without any theoretical bias—and can exemplify these types by a number of instances:

Type I.—a. Sneezing and coughing; the reaction of the pupils of the eye to light; eye movements of fixation.

b. The suckling of the new-born infant; the pecking of a chick just broken from the egg; the building of nests; lastly the entire life of ants or bees.

Type II.—The behavior of animals in certain kinds of experiments of the puzzle box or maze type, and in the tricks we see performed in vaudeville shows.

[1] Adapted from KOFFKA, KURT, Mental Development, "Psychologies of 1925," pp. 129–143, Clark University Press, 1926.

Type III.—The behavior of chimpanzees as observed in the experiments of Dr. Kohler; or to select another instance out of an indefinite number, your behavior in attending this lecture or mine in preparing and delivering it. Our classification, whatever its theoretical bearing may be, is not entirely arbitrary; for psychology has named each of these three types. We call the first reflexive and instinctive activities, the second trained or drilled performances, and the third intelligent achievements. For brevity's sake I shall sometimes refer to them simply as reflexes and instincts, training, and intelligence.

These three types evidently represent different stages of mind and we may expand each of them so as to include all possible stages in our scheme. Then the problem of mental development reduces itself to the problem of the connection between these three behavior types. Which is the original type of behavior and how have the others grown out of it? We can, for our purposes, discriminate two main theories of mental development, one being unitarian, and deriving all behavior from one fundamental type, that of the reflex I*a*, while the other is pluralistic and maintains an essential difference between the three types; the higher ones being, in the course of evolution, added to the lower ones.

Let us examine the first of these theories. It starts with the assumption that our behavior type I*a*, the reflex, is the original type and it uses a very popular description and explanation of the reflex. Reflexes as very simple and comparatively regular responses to definite stimuli are explained by the hypothesis that they are the function of a very simple apparatus, the reflex arc, consisting of afferent and efferent neurones, and the connection or bond between them, which in this way connects the situation and the response of the organism. Thus this conception of the bond is the starting point of this view of mental development. But it is more. It is the supreme principle by which this theory achieves an admirable simplicity. For according to this view every action of an organism is explicable in terms of such connections—in other words, every action carried out by an organism is determined solely by the bonds or connections involved. The original connections and, consequently, the original reaction tendencies go far beyond the realm of mere reflex action, embracing the entire so-called "instinctive activity."

Now instinctive and even most of reflexive activity appears to be highly adjustive; the animal does what is good for it in its environment. But from the point of view of this theory this adaptiveness is not a property of these actions themselves, but is instead, a mere impression which they give to the onlooker. The actions are not determined in any way by the intrinsic nature of the situation, but altogether by these preexisting bond devices. The situation enters only as the agency which turns the key, presses the button, makes the machine go. But, like a real machine,

the animal can only act according to the preestablished system of bonds, whether such an action be adequate to the circumstances or not.

The connection between situation and response is therefore purely contingent and consequently we do not know why a certain situation affects a certain pathway, we can only state that it does do so. We ought then to be able to change the response to a constant situation by merely changing the bonds involved in such a pathway.

What this really implies will become evident when we take up a few of our initial instances. The theory means that a chick newly escaped from the egg pecks at a grain, seizes, and swallows it, not because this is the sensible response to this particular situation, but because its neurones are connected with each other in such ways as to secure these reactions in this sequence. If we were able to change these connections the animal would, for instance, first make the swallowing and then the pecking movement. Or, another example, taken from Watson's experiments on babies. If in a dark room we introduce a bright spot, the baby turns its eyes towards this spot and fixates it. It does so, merely because of its innate connections without regard to the situation, and again by shifting those connections we ought to be able to change this response in such a manner that, for instance, the baby would be made to look toward the left when the bright spot appears on the right. This experiment happens to have been performed, though, naturally, not with babies but with monkeys. Marina dissected the inner and outer muscles of the eyes of monkeys and connected them crossways. An impulse sent to contract the external muscle of the right eye ought now to result in a movement toward the left and *vice versa*. Consequently, in our experiment the monkey should react just as we have predicted; it should look to the left when a bright spot appears at the right. Speaking more generally all the monkey's eye movements in the horizontal should have been the reverse of normal. In reality, however, nothing of the kind took place. As soon as the wounds healed the animal moved his eyes just as normally as it did before the operation. That means that in spite of the changes made in the devices, the movements continued to be performed so as to produce the same sort of achievement.

Thus the conception of a merely contingent connection between situation and response breaks down even at the reflex level. And we are left with the problem: how can a certain result, rather than a reformed system of devices, determine organic movements? Without the slightest leaning toward vitalism we shall have to face this problem. But before we do so, let us turn to the explanation of our second type of behavior, training, which according to this theory is the only way in which learning takes place.

It is the pride of this theory that it has been able to explain acquired behavior in the same terms which it employs for original behavior. This

extension of the explanation is not so difficult as it may appear at first sight. The only assumption required is that in animals which are able to learn, the original bonds are not absolutely fixed but may be modified according to specific laws. What this means is best explained by an example taken from Thorndike's experiments. He puts a hungry cat into a cage, the door of which is shut but can be opened by turning a lever, and before the cage he places some enticing food. The first time in the cage the cat will make all sorts of movements which have nothing to do with the lever, but in the course of its aimless movements it may accidentally strike this lever, and by this action achieve its escape and the possession of the coveted food. In a later experiment, say the tenth or twentieth, the cat will turn the lever without any other movements, as soon as it has been placed in the cage. It therefore appears that the cat acquired a new reaction towards the old situation. But speaking strictly from the point of view of this theory, the effect of learning is rather of a negative than of a positive kind. For, according to this view, any one of the innumerable reactions which the animal made in the first experiment was connected to this particular situation by bonds of neurones. We cannot assume as a rule that a situation has only one set of bonds connecting it with one single response; instead we must believe that every single situation possesses a great number of different connections of varying strength and directness leading to very different reactions. The process of learning consists, then, merely in strengthening certain sets of bonds and weakening all the others. The chief laws by which this result is to be achieved are those of frequency, recency, and of effect. While the two first are readily understood, the law of effect requires a few words in explanation. It embraces the fact that it is the appropriate, the successful act that survives, and expresses this fact by saying that such connections as have led to satisfaction gain an advantage over such as have not done so.

Like original behavior, acquired behavior, then, is determined by devices, taking place over neurone bonds which have undergone some change but which, this change once completed, are determinants of action just as exclusive as were the originally effective bonds. Consequently the relation between situation and response remains contingent, and all learning proceeds by chance. Again we ought to be able to change the reactions by shifting the connections, but if we do so, we get the negative result previously reported because the acquired activity continues unaltered. Of course the law of effect was meant to modify this point and to account for progress in mental development. But as it stands it fails to achieve this task, since in reality it is not a law of effect, but a law of satisfaction which is a very different matter, because the satisfaction is not the satisfaction of success, but something which follows success without having any meaningful connection with it. Thus,

according to Thorndike's own teaching, when in the previously described experiment the cat has learned to turn the lever it does so, not because it understands what the turning of the lever means, but because this particular movement, belonging among the original responses to the situation of being confined—in which situation the existence of the lever is absolutely immaterial—has in many cases led to satisfaction by giving the animal freedom and food. For this reason the movement is stamped in, and this particular set of bonds between the initial situation and the particular movement is therefore strengthened to the detriment of other connections which at start were just as ready as this one. Just as the existence of the lever was immaterial for the production of the movement to turn it, so now this movement is immaterial to the pleasure derived from the tasting of the food. Chance made the movement with the lever, and chance, in the arbitrarily contrived situation of the puzzle box, connects the striking of the lever with freedom and food. Thus this law of satisfaction is not a law of effect, for which reason it has been a sore point in the theory, even from the beginning. Satisfaction comes after the critical event, after the movement which it is assumed to stamp in; therefore it must have a retroactive force. It is not only difficult to explain how such a backward force can be exerted, but once retroaction is granted we have to state how far back this force will reach. Why should it extend precisely to the really relevant movement when the animal does not know that this movement is relevant?

More recent observations have shown that it is the effect and not the subsequent satisfaction which is the determining factor in learning. In Kohler's experiments one of the apes, after solving a particularly difficult problem in order to secure some bananas, did not interrupt this newly invented procedure to taste his booty, but continued to fish with his new tool to get all sorts of useless things after all the bananas had been collected.

We have used the phrase: a situation calls for a reaction. What does this mean? When before the eyes of an animal we put food inside an open box the animal will enter the box and fetch out the food. This situation does, so we may say, call for a certain reaction. But is this not simply an instinctive reaction? If we grant this, what have we gained? If we have given up our understanding of instinct as a ready-made set of neurone-bond devices, how does this name help us in understanding these factors? But does our term, "the situation calls for," do any more? With this question in mind let us glance at certain experiments in which the animal solved problems under natural conditions in a situation that revealed openly all the parts necessary to the required achievement. Tomorrow Professor Kohler will report at length upon his experiments to which I have just referred. Therefore I shall only mention here some very general features of his results. His chimpanzees

solved their problem not by trial and error; the correct solution was not slowly and painfully selected out of a number of inexpedient movements, the correct activity began abruptly from a stage of deliberation, continued in an unbroken curve and took place always with regard to the relevant part of the situation. It was not a product of chance, neither were these actions instinctive. What then remains?

Shall we have recourse to the pluralistic theory mentioned in the beginning and assume that a new factor, the intellect, must be the cause? To do so would, on the one hand, be equal to a renunciation of a theory of development; on the other hand, it would not even be an explanation of the facts. To ascribe an action of our first type to instinct is no more an explanation than to attribute an action of the third type to intellect.

There remains but one other possibility. The situation forces the animal to act in a certain way, although the animal possesses no pre-established special devices for the act. How is this possible? I shall develop the answer to this fundamental question by the help of a concrete and well-known instance which has become precipitated into a proverb, *viz.*, the burned child shuns the fire. Fortunately Dr. Watson has taken this change of behavior out of the sphere of mere arm-chair psychology by providing us with experimental evidence on the subject. His experiments, which he performed with an infant beginning the 105th day of his life, showed that at first the burned child did not shun the fire at all, but would grasp for it again and again although it came so near the flame that it flexed its fingers and withdrew the hand. The change seems to have come very suddenly. On the 220th day the child, instead of grasping for the flame, slapped at the candle and afterward reached for it but a single time. How can we understand this transformation in the response? To state that the stimulus, candle, is originally connected with several responses, among them being those of grasping and slapping, and that the first of these became weakened by dissatisfaction, is quite inadequate. The suddenness of the change and the new reaction which superseded the old one are left entirely without an explanation. In other words, why did this fortunate infant, instead of simply shunning the fire, slap at it?

If we use common-sense psychology we would say: the infant slaps at the candle because he has learned to dislike it, just as he grasped for it at first because it looked so attractive to him. This common-sense explanation is essentially different from the behavioristic explanation in one point: it connects the action not with the stimulus but with the perception of the stimulus, and the change of reaction with a change in the perception. An attractive object calls for one kind of behavior, a repulsive object for another. Thus we meet again our initial problem: a situation calls for something. And now we see that the situation does call for something, if at all, not as a stimulus, but as a perceived, phenom-

enal situation. We see further that the relation between stimulus and phenomenal situation is not univocal, because the same stimulus may evoke different perceptions. Since this fact is abundantly confirmed by scientific experimental psychology it would seem as though we could afford to accept our common-sense explanation. Couched in scientific terms, it would run like this: Our direct responses to stimuli are receptor processes which in many cases will be on the mental, perceptive level; such a direct response is, however, only the beginning of the total response; the perception issues in action according to its constitution, the action is a natural continuation of the perceptive process and is determined by it and not by preestablished connection bonds. Change of response to a constant stimulus does not take place by alternation in the function of ready-made devices, but is a result of a change in the perceptive process produced by the stimulus. Lastly, a stimulus upsets an equilibrium on the receptive side of the system; this upset equilibrium results in a movement which tends to bring the system to a new equilibrium and consequently the reaction must vary with the way in which the equilibrium was disturbed, that is with the receptor process, with the phenomenal situation.

Let us return then to our burned child example. The transformation that took place in this case may be called one of meaning; the attractive candle became repulsive. By calling this change a change of meaning we designate the fact that the perception of the candle points beyond itself in one of two directions. Originally the flame was attractive, that is, it appeared to the child as an object toward which something had to be done; afterward it became repulsive, that is, it appeared as an object against which action should be taken. In both cases the perception had the character of incompleteness, and a change has taken place in the specific nature of this gap. In other words, experience, in this case, does not create meaning but transforms meaning; which implies that meaning itself is not a product of experience—mental development does not lead from the meaningless to the meaningful, but from one kind of meaning to another kind of meaning. Mind without a meaning we should never expect to encounter.

This example has made us acquainted with the process of change of meaning. We have not yet exhausted this example for now we can raise the question of how this transformation came about. Why had so many repetitions of the experiment no effect and why did the result appear so suddenly when it did come? Again our answer is given in terms of a description of the event. What happens all along in the child's mind? Or, if you prefer to ignore the existence of the mind, use instead the concepts we have just introduced in the case of the chick. At first the infant sees the attractive flame and reacts correspondingly; then the child feels pain and withdraws the hand. According to the theory of association

and the law of dissatisfaction—which is the reverse of the law of satisfaction—this occurrence ought to be sufficient to establish in a very short time in the child's mind, or in its organism, an association between the sight of the flame and the withdrawing of the hand. But to all appearances it does not do so. As long as the occurrences in the child's mind are not changed, no transformation of the response will take place, because the flame remains desirable. Only when the pain comes, not merely after reaching for the flame but from the flame itself, can a transformation take place. Now the flame itself thwarts the wish of the child, it ceases to be an attractive and becomes a repulsive object. This transformation of meaning is therefore the consequence of another process of change. Flame and pain were at first two different things: one plus one. Afterward they grow together and become a unit. The two have ceased to be two and have become one.

Here we find another process of transformation which we may well call unification. Another example of simple unification is furnished by an experiment performed by Buhler, with a method developed in animal psychology, upon his own child. A piece of rusk was placed slightly out of the infant's reach, with a string attached to it which came within reaching distance. Before the end of the tenth month, the child was not able to secure the rusk by means of the string. While vainly reaching for the rusk it would push the string aside. String and rusk were two different objects calling for different reactions. Later on, when the child pulls the string and secures the rusk, string and rusk are no longer one plus one, but now form a unity in which the string is a subservient part. This achievement has been ascribed not to training but to intelligence. Change of meaning gave us the clue that meaning was an original property of the receptor processes. Can we take a similar clue from the process of unification? Or is unity of a manifold always the product of experience?

To cut a long story short, we find at the beginning, in our most elementary reactions, even at the level of the reflexes and instincts and again in training and in intelligent performances, unitary, articulate, meaningful wholes; to which we apply the name of *gestalt*, configuration, structure. Development starts, not with chaos or with a multitude of mental elements without order or meaning but with structures, however primitive their character may be. Development proceeds by transformation of such structures. Gradually, by a number of smaller or larger leaps and bounds, we achieve different orders, different articulations, different meanings. I have just tried to sketch a few of the main processes which occur in this development in very general outline. The picture has to be completed. We must apply our general principles to concrete cases, we must study the different achievements in this genetic sequence, and must learn to understand how one achievement facilitates or even

makes possible another achievement. This task, though its actual execution is just in the beginning, falls outside the scope of this lecture. One problem, however, I must take up: what is the cause of these transformations? Our answer, naturally, can be only very general. Wherever change occurs the phenomenal situation aroused by the real situation is incomplete, unstable, It tends to become stabilized. But whether it can become so depends upon the kind of situation and upon the individual organism. We call an organism that succeeds in filling the gap clever, and one that does not stupid, but it is obvious that these terms are always relative to the situations; for there are many situations in which all of us are utterly stupid.

The last reason then for all these changes lies in the original processes themselves. All processes not stationary exert pressure upon the system to become stable; if the system can yield to this pressure, then the result is achieved.

We can express these facts in still another way. Wertheimer was the first to state a law, which has served as a good guide in our experimental research and which has been given theoretical support by Kohler. This law, the law of precision, maintains that any configuration will become as perfect as the prevailing conditions admit. Vague as it seems in this formulation, it has a definite meaning in several concrete instances and will become more and more defined the further psychology progresses. In the closing words of this lecture I shall indicate an application of this law and thereby supplement in a casual way the picture I have drawn of mental development.

So far I have been almost exclusively concerned with what may be called "intellectual" achievements. But what of the moral side of mind; what of a man's character and personality? Must these escape our scheme of development? I think not. The behavior of an organism shapes configuration also in time. Not only the simultaneous but the successive is also structured. The larger these wholes and the greater their unity, articulation and meaning, the more perfect is their *gestalt*, the more personality will they express.

Is the theory so sketchily drawn before your eyes unitarian or pluralistic? It is pluralistic inasmuch as it embraces an indefinite number of different structures and many forms of configurative changes; but it is not pluralistic in the sense of assuming a number of separate faculties like those of reflexes or instincts, training and intelligence. It is unitarian, not in reducing every process to the mechanism of neural bonds or associations, but in its attempt to give ultimately an explanation of development by means of the universal law of *gestalt*.

5. *The Human Wishes*[1]

The variety of expressions of behavior is as great as the variety of situations arising in the external world, while the nervous system represents only a general mechanism for action. We can, however, approach the problem of behavior through the study of the forces which impel to action, namely, the wishes, and we shall see that these correspond in general with the nervous mechanism.

The human wishes have a great variety of concrete forms but are capable of the following general classification:

1. The desire for new experience.
2. The desire for security.
3. The desire for response.
4. The desire for recognition.

1. *The Desire for New Experience.*—Men crave excitement, and all experiences are exciting which have in them some resemblance to the pursuit, flight, capture, escape, death which characterized the earlier life of mankind. Behavior is an adaptation to environment, and the nervous system itself is a developmental adaptation. It represents, among other things, a hunting pattern of interest. "Adventure" is what the young boy wants, and stories of adventure. Hunting trips are enticing; they are the survival of natural life. All sports are of the hunting pattern; there is a contest of skill, daring, and cunning. It is impossible not to admire the nerve of a daring burglar or highwayman. A fight, even a dog fight, will draw a crowd. In gambling or dice throwing you have the thrill of success or the chagrin of defeat. The organism craves stimulation and seeks expansion and shock even through alcohol and drugs. "Sensations" occupy a large part of the space in newspapers. Courtship has in it an element of "pursuit." Novels, theaters, motion pictures, etc., are partly an adaptation to this desire, and their popularity is a sign of its elemental force.

When eleven years old Walter McDermott was brought to court in company with three other boys, accused of breaking a padlock on a grocery store and attempting to enter the store at 4 a.m., Mar. 3, 1909, and also of breaking a padlock on the door of a meat market and stealing 36 cents from the cash till. Put on probation. August 19, 1910, brought to court for entering with two other boys a store and stealing a pocketbook containing $3. He admitted to the officers he and his company were going to pick pockets down town. He is the leader of the gang . . .

Sent to St. Charles. Ran away Mar. 17, 1913. By breaking a window got into a drug store, with two other boys, and stole a quantity of cigars and $1.61. Having taken the money, he gave one boy 10 cents and another 5 cents. He gave away the cigars—eight or nine boxes—to "a lot of men and some boys."

[1] Adapted from THOMAS, WILLIAM I., "The Unadjusted Girl," pp. 3–6, 9–13, 17–23, 30–32, 36–40, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1923.

Spent the money "on candy and stuff." Committed to John Worthy School . . . Oct. 27. His conduct has improved greatly; released on probation . . .

December 23, 1913, accused of having broken, with an adult boy (nineteen), into a clothing store and filled a suit case they found in the store with clothing and jewelry. Caught in shop. The officer said, "He would like to imitate Webb. He would like to kill some boy." According to his own confession, "It was six o'clock at night. I was going to confession. I met a boy and he said, 'Come out with me.' About nine o'clock we came to a clothing store, and we walked to the back, and seen a little hole. We pulled a couple of the laths off and as soon as we got in we got caught." But the officer said that previous to this they had burglarized a butcher's store and took from there a butcher's steel, and bored a hole in the wall with it. Committed to John Worthy School. Released June 26, 1914 . . .

July 19, shot in a back alley twice at a little boy and once hit him. Broke with two other boys at night into Salvation Army office, broke everything he could and "used the office as a toilet room." Next day broke into a saloon, broke the piano, took cigars. Before this, July 14, broke a side window of a saloon, stole $4 and a revolver. At the hearing Walter said about shooting the boy: "That boy was passing and I asked him for a match, and I heard this boy holler. I took a revolver off (his companion) and fired a shot and hit the boy." His mother testified that he had spent only three nights at home since the time of his release from John Worthy School. He was arrested after the first offense, but escaped from the detention home. Committed to John Worthy School . . .

Released after Mar. 26. Committed a burglary in a grocery store, Apr. 7. Shot a man with a revolver in the left arm April 4. Held up, with three other boys, a man on Apr. 11, and robbed him of $12. Caught later, while the other boys were caught at once. Held to the grand jury, found not guilty and released June 16, 1915.

Vagabondage secures a maximum of new experience by the avoidance of the routine of organized society and the irksomeness of labor to which I will refer presently. In the constitutional vagabond the desire for new experience predominates over the other wishes and is rather contemplative and sensory, while in the criminal it is motor. But the discouraged criminal is sometimes a vagabond.

There is also in the hunting pattern of interest an intellectual element. Watson does not note curiosity among the instincts because it does not manifest itself at birth, but it appears later as the watchful and exploratory attitude which determines the character of action—whether, for example, it shall be attack or flight. The invention of the bow and arrow, the construction of a trap, the preparation of poison indicated a scientific curiosity in early man. Activities of this kind were interesting because they implied life or death.

The man who constructed the poisoned arrow visualized the scene in which it was to be used, saw the hunt in anticipation. The preparation for the chase was psychologically part of the chase. The modern

scientific man uses the same mental mechanism but with a different application. He spends long months in his laboratory on an invention in anticipation of his final "achievement." The so-called "instinct for workmanship" and the "creative impulse" are "sublimations" of the hunting psychosis. The making of a trap was a "problem," and any problem is interesting, whether the construction of a wireless or the solving of a puzzle. Modern occupations or "pursuits" are interesting or irksome to the degree that they have or have not a problematical element . . .

Pasteur's first scientific success was in the study of crystallization, and in this connection he became particularly interested in racemic acid. But this substance, produced first by Kestner in 1820 as an accident in the manufacture of tartaric acid, had in 1852 ceased to appear, in spite of all efforts to obtain it. Pasteur and his friend Mitscherlich suspected that the failure to get it was due to the fact that the present manufacturers of tartaric acid were using a different tartar. The problem became then to inspect all the factories producing tartaric acid and finally to visit the sources from which the tartars came. This was the quest, and the impatience which Pasteur showed to begin it reminds us of a hound tugging at the leash. He asked Biot and Dumas to obtain for him a commission from the Ministry, or the Academie, but exasperated by the delay he was on the point of writing directly to the President of the Republic. "It is," he said, "a question that France should make it a point of honor to solve through one of her children." Biot counseled patience and pointed out that it was not necessary to "set the government in motion for this." But Pasteur would not wait. "I shall go to the end of the world," he said. "I *must* discover the source of racemic acid," and started independently. I will excuse you from following this quest in detail, but in a sort of diary prepared for Mme. Pasteur he showed the greatest eagerness to have her share the joy of it. He went to Germany, to Vienna, to Prague, studied Hungarian tartars. "Finally," he said, "I shall go to Trieste, where I shall find tartars of various countries, notably those of the Levant, and those of the neighborhood of Trieste itself . . . If I had money enough I would go to Italy; . . . I shall give ten years to it if necessary." And after eight months he sent the following telegram: "I transform tartaric acid into racemic acid. Please inform MM. Dumas and Senarmont." He had made his kill.

The craftsman, the artist, the scientist, the professional man, and to some extent the business man make new experience the basis of organized activity, of work, and produce thereby social values. The division of labor which removes the problematical from the various operations of the work makes the task totally unstimulating. The repudiation of work leads to vagabondage and to the antisocial attitudes described below:

We have in New York at present, and have had for some years past, an immense army of young men, boys between fifteen and twenty-six, who are absolutely determined that under no conditions will they do any honest work. They sponge on women, swindle, pick pockets, commit burglary, act as highway-

men, and, if cornered, kill, in order to get money dishonestly. How do they dispose of the vast sums they have already stolen? Gambling and women. They are inveterate gamblers.

And similarly, among women we have the thief, the prostitute, the blackmailer, the vamp, and the "charity girl."

2. *The Desire for Security.*—The desire for security is opposed to the desire for new experience. The desire for new experience is, as we have seen, emotionally related to anger, which tends to invite death, and expresses itself in courage, advance, attack, pursuit. The desire for new experience implies, therefore, motion, change, danger, instability, social irresponsibility. The individual dominated by it shows a tendency to disregard prevailing standards and group interests. He may be a social failure on account of his instability, or a social success if he converts his experiences into social values—puts them into the form of a poem, makes of them a contribution to science. The desire for security, on the other hand, is based on fear, which tends to avoid death and expresses itself in timidity, avoidance, and flight. The individual dominated by it is cautious, conservative, and apprehensive, tending also to regular habits, systematic work, and the accumulation of property.

The social types known as "bohemian" and "philistine" are determined respectively by the domination of the desire for new experience and the desire for security. The miser represents a case where the means of security has become an end in itself.

Mamie Reilly's mother viewed with increasing regret the effect of premature care and responsibility on her daughter. Mamie had been working five years since, as a child of thirteen, she first insisted on getting a job. "She's a good girl, Mame is, but y'never seen anything like her. Every pay night reg'lar she'll come in an' sit down at that table. Now Ma,' she'll say like that, 'what *are* you goin' to do? How ever are y' goin't make out in th' rent?' 'Land sakes,' I'll say, 'one w'd think this whole house was right there on your shoulders. I'll get along somehow.' But y' can't make her see into that. 'Now, what'll we do, how'll you manage, Ma?' she'll keep askin'. She's too worrisome—that's what I tell her. An' she don't care to go out. Mebbe she'll take a walk, but like's not she'll say, 'What's th' use?' Night after night she jest comes home, eats 'er supper, sits down, mebbe reads a bit, an' then goes t' bed."

3. *The Desire for Response.*—Up to this point I have described the types of mental impressionability connected with the pursuit of food and the avoidance of death, which are closely connected with the emotions of anger and fear. The desire for response, on the other hand, is primarily related to the instinct of love, and shows itself in the tendency to seek and to give signs of appreciation in connection with other individuals.

There is first of all the devotion of the mother to the child and the response of the child, indicated in the following passage from Thorndike.

All women possess originally, from early childhood to death, some interest in human babies, and a responsiveness to the instinctive looks, calls, gestures, and cries of infancy and childhood, being satisfied by childish gurglings, smiles, and affectionate gestures, and moved to instinctive comforting acts by childish signs of pain, grief, and misery. Brutal habits may destroy, or competing habits overgrow, or the lack of exercise weaken these tendencies, but they are none the less as original as any fact in human nature.

This relation is of course useful and necessary since the child is helpless throughout a period of years and would not live unless the mother were impelled to give it her devotion. This attitude is present in the father of the child also but is weaker, less demonstrative, and called out more gradually.

In addition, the desire for response between the two sexes in connection with mating is very powerful. An ardent courtship is full of assurances and appeals for reassurance. Marriage and a home involve response but with more settled habits, more routine work, less of new experience. Jealousy is an expression of fear that the response is directed elsewhere. The flirt is one who seeks new experience through the provocation of response from many quarters.

In some natures this wish, both to receive and to give response, is out of proportion to the other wishes, overdetermined, so to speak, and interferes with a normal organization of life. And the fixation may be either on a child or a member of either sex. The general situation is the same in the two cases following.

I am the unhappy mother of a dear little son, eight years old. You ask the cause of my unhappiness? I ought to be happy with such a dear treasure? But the answer is, I love my child too much. My love to my son is so great so immeasurably deep, that I myself am worthless. My own person has not a trace of worth for me. I am as it were dead to all and everything. My thoughts by day and by night are turned toward my child. I see nothing in the world except my beloved child. Nothing exists for me except him. Every one of my thoughts, every desire and wish that awakens in me, turns around the child of my heart. I am nothing. I do not live, I do not exist. I forget myself as I forget all and everything in the world. I go around the whole day without eating and feel no hunger. I forget that I must eat. I go around often a whole day in my night clothes because I forget that I have to dress. With soul and body, with mind and spirit I am wrapped up in my child. I have no thought for myself at all.

If clothes come to my mind, I am thinking of a new suit for my boy. I am nothing. And if I think of shoes, I imagine a pair of little shoes on the feet of my dear little boy. I myself am the same as dead. If I go to the country in the summer, I come home on account of my child. I myself do not exist. Every enjoyment in life, every happiness to which I give a thought is connected in my mind with my little boy. I myself am as if I were never at all in the world. The child is everything—my soul and my spirit, my breath and my life. He

is the air I breathe. I am nothing. I don't consider myself, I don't think of myself, just as if I had never been in the world.

And so it is when my child is not well, then he has perhaps scratched his finger . . . Oh, how I suffer then. No pen in the world can describe the terrible despair I feel. I live then as it were in a cloud, I cannot at all understand how my soul then remains in my body. My pain is then indescribable, greater than any can understand . . . When my child is well again and his round, rosy cheeks bloom like the flowers in May and he is joyous and full of life and leaps and dances, then I myself look as if I had just recovered from a fever sickness.

Tell me, I beg you, dear editor, what can such a mama do that her dear child shall not become a lonely orphan. For I feel that I cannot continue long as it is. My strength is not holding out and a time must come when no strength to live will remain in me.

I beg you to advise me, dear editor, how to stop loving. It is perhaps a ridiculous question but for me it is a very sad one. It is almost a question of life and death. It is so. I love a person who is not in a position to return my love. It is certain that we can never be united . . . My love is hopeless but I cannot give it up. I run after the person I love, I follow his steps, knowing that it will do me no good. I have simply attached myself to an innocent person and distress him. My conscience tells me that it is not right. I suffer needlessly and I make suffering for another, but I simply have no inclination to stop.

I cannot live without my lover. When I don't see him at the expected moment I am wild, and I am ready to commit the greatest crime in order to accomplish my purpose. He runs away from me and I chase after him. When he goes away to another city I feel sure that I cannot live another twenty-four hours without him. I feel like throwing myself from a roof. I feel that I am capable of doing any evil deed on account of my love.

Do not think, dear editor, that I pride myself for having such a feeling. No, I do not compliment myself at all. I am provoked with myself, I am ashamed of myself, and I hate myself. How can a person be such a rag? I argue with myself, how can I permit my mind to have no control over my heart? But my arguments with myself do me no good at all. It is work thrown away. I can love no one except him, the only one who has captured my heart and soul. I cannot even entertain the thought of ceasing to love him. It is simply impossible.

By what name would you call such a person as I am, dear editor? Perhaps I have gone out of my senses. So give me a word of advice as to how I may become sane again. I neglect everything in the world. Nothing remains in my thoughts except him. Without him everything is dark.

He is also unhappy on account of me. I don't let him breathe freely. He might have been happy with another, but I give him no chance. I disturb his life. I will add that this condition has gone on now for several years and there is no prospect of its ending.

Dear editor, give me an advice before I commit a deed after which marriage is impossible. I wait for your wise advice. Perhaps you will be my savior.

The varieties of love in women are greater than in men, for we are to include here not only physical passion but parental feeling—that fund of emotion which is fixed on the child. The capacity of response to the

child, mother love, is notorious and is painfully evident where the mother has no thought left for anything but the child. The mother is one who does not refuse. She does not refuse the breast to the lusty child even when she is herself ailing. And while this feeling is developed as a quality of motherhood it is present before motherhood and is capable of being transferred to any object calling for sympathy—a doll, a man, or a cause.

A touching expression of response from a man, a devotion to a parent as deep as mother love, is found in a letter of the psychologist William James, written to his father from England when the death of the latter was anticipated.

My blessed old Father: I scribble this line (which may reach you, though I should come too late) just to tell you how full of the tenderest memories and feelings about you my heart has for the last few days been filled. In that mysterious gulf of the past, into which the present will soon fall and go back and back, yours is still for me the central figure. All my intellectual life I derive from you; and though we have often seemed at odds in the expression thereof, I'm sure there's a harmony somewhere and that our strivings will combine. What my debt to you is goes beyond all my power of estimating—so early, so penetrating and so constant has been the influence.

You need be in no anxiety about your literary remains. I will see them well taken care of, and that your words shall not suffer from being concealed. At Paris I heard that Milsand, whose name you may remember is in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* and elsewhere, was an admirer of the "Secret of Swedenborg," and Hodgson told me your last book had deeply impressed him. So will it be . . .

As for us, we shall live on, each in his way—feeling somewhat unprotected, old as we are, for the absence of the parental bosoms as a refuge, but holding fast together in that common sacred memory. We will stand by each other and by Alice, try to transmit the torch in our offspring as you did in us, and when the time comes for being gathered in, I pray we may, if not all, some at least, be as ripe as you.

As for myself, I know what trouble I've given you at various times through my peculiarities; and as my own boys grow up I shall learn more and more of the kind of trial you had to overcome in superintending the development of a creature different from yourself, for whom you felt responsible. I say this merely to show how my sympathy with you is likely to grow much livelier, rather than to fade—and not for the sake of regrets.

As for the other side, and Mother, and our all possibly meeting, I can't say anything. More than ever at this moment do I feel that if that were true all would be solved and justified. And it comes strangely over me in bidding you good-by how a life is but a day and expresses mainly but a single note. It is so much like the act of bidding an ordinary good night.

Good night, my sacred old Father! If I don't see you again—farewell! a blessed farewell. Your William.

It is unnecessary to particularize as to the place of response in art. The love and sex themes are based on response, and they outweigh the

other themes altogether. Religion appeals to fear, fear of death and extinction, and promises everlasting security, or threatens everlasting pain, but in the New Testament the element of response, connected with the concrete personalities of Jesus and Mary, predominates. Any hymn book will contain many versified love letters addressed to Jesus.

In general the desire for response is the most social of the wishes. It contains both a sexual and a gregarious element. It makes selfish claims, but on the other hand it is the main source of altruism. The devotion to child and family and devotion to causes, principles, and ideals may be the same attitude in different fields of application. It is true that devotion and self-sacrifice may originate from any of the other wishes also—desire for new experience, recognition, or security—or may be connected with all of them at once. Pasteur's devotion to science seems to be mainly the desire for new experience, scientific curiosity; the campaigns of a Napoleon represent recognition (ambition) and the self-sacrifice of such characters as Maria Spiridonova, Florence Nightingale, Jane Addams is a sublimation of response. The women who demanded juvenile courts were stirred by the mother feeling whereas the usual legal procedure is based on the wish to have security for life and property.

4. *The Desire for Recognition.*—This wish is expressed in the general struggle of men for position in their social group, in devices for securing a recognized, enviable, and advantageous social status. Among girls dress is now perhaps the favorite means of securing distinction and showing class. A Bohemian immigrant girl expressed her philosophy in a word: "After all, life is mostly what you wear." Veblen's volume, "Theory of the Leisure Class," points out that the status of men is established partly through the show of wealth made by their wives. Distinction is sought also in connection with skillful and hazardous activities, as in sports, war, and exploration. Playwrights and sculptors consciously strive for public favor and "fame." In the achievement of Pasteur and of similar scientific work there is not only the pleasure of the pursuit itself, but the pleasure of public recognition. Boasting, bullying, cruelty, tyranny, "the will to power" have in them a sadistic element allied to the emotion of anger and are efforts to compel a recognition of the personality. The frailty of women, their illness, and even feigned illness, is often used as a power device, as well as a device to provoke response. On the other hand, humility, self-sacrifice, saintliness, and martyrdom may lead to distinction. The showy motives connected with the appeal for recognition we define as "vanity"; the creative activities we call "ambition."

The importance of recognition and status for the individual and for society is very great. The individual not only wants them but he needs them for the development of his personality. The lack of them and the

fear of never obtaining them are probably the main source of those psychopathic disturbances which the Freudians treat as sexual in origin.

On the other hand society alone is able to confer status on the individual and in seeking to obtain it he makes himself responsible to society and is forced to regulate the expression of his wishes. His dependence on public opinion is perhaps the strongest factor impelling him to conform to the highest demands which society makes upon him.

The following case indicates a desire for response, but the details show that the girl feels keenly the lack of recognition. The response is desired not for itself alone but as a sign and assurance of comparative worth.

I am in despair, and I want to pour out my bitter heart. When I have once talked out my heart I feel better afterwards.

Dear editor, why can I not find a boy to love me? I never make a hit with young people. I never have any success with them. I associate with young people, I like them, they like me, but nobody ever runs after me. No boy is crazy about me. All my girl friends are popular with young men. Every single one has a boy or more who is in love with her and follows her steps. I alone have no luck. Do not think, dear editor, that I am burning to marry; it is not yet time for that. But the thought that I am left out makes me very wretched. It distresses me and it hurts me to my soul's marrow to know that no one desires me, that people are indifferent toward me. Oh how happy I should be if somebody would love me, if somebody would come to see me. It must be such a sweet pleasure to feel that some one is interested in you, that some one comes to see you, comes to you especially, on account of yourself. Oh, why can I not have this happiness!

When I go to a party and when I come back I feel so low and so fallen. Young men crowded around my companions like flies around honey. I alone was an exception. I have not a jealous nature, but no other girl in my place would feel otherwise. Can you show me a way to win a boy's heart? What sort of quality must a girl possess in order to attract a young man?

It is true I am no beauty. But what do all the girls do? They fix themselves up. You can buy powder and paint in the drug stores. My companions are not more beautiful than I. I am not sleepy. When I am in the company of young people I am joyous, I make myself attractive, I try my best to attract attention to myself. But that is all thrown to the dogs.

Dear editor, if you only knew with how much care I make my clothes. I go through the great stores to select out the most beautiful materials. I annoy the dressmaker to death until she suits me exactly. If it happens that a hook somewhere on the dress is not in the right place, or a buttonhole has a single stitch more or less than it should have, I have the greatest distress, and sharpest heartache.

When I go somewhere to a dance I am full of hopes, my heart is beating with excitement. Before leaving the house I take a last look in the mirror. When I return home I have the blues, I feel cold. My teeth grind together. So much exertion, so much strength lost, all for nothing. A boy has talked to me, another

boy has given me a smile, still another boy has made me a little compliment, but I feel that I am not near and dear to any one. I feel that my face has not been stamped on the heart of any one.

From the foregoing description it will be seen that wishes of the same general class—those which tend to arise from the same emotional background—may be totally different in moral quality. The moral good or evil of a wish depends on the social meaning or value of the activity which results from it. Thus the vagabond, the adventurer, the spendthrift, the bohemian are dominated by the desire for new experience, but so are the inventor and the scientist; adventures with women and the tendency to domesticity are both expressions of the desire for response; vain ostentation and creative artistic work both are designed to provoke recognition; avarice and business enterprise are actuated by the desire for security.

Moreover, when a concrete wish of any general class arises it may be accompanied and qualified by any or all of the other classes of wishes. Thus when Pasteur undertook the quest described above we do not know what wish was uppermost. Certainly the love of the work was very strong, the ardor of pursuit, the new experience; the anticipation of the recognition of the public, the scientific fame involved in the achievement was surely present; he invited response from his wife and colleagues, and he possibly had the wish also to put his future professional and material life on a secure basis. The immigrant who comes to America may wish to see the new world (new experience), make a fortune (security), have a higher standing on his return (recognition), and induce a certain person to marry him (response).

The general pattern of behavior which a given individual tends to follow is the basis of our judgment of his character. Our appreciation (positive or negative) of the character of the individual is based on his display of certain wishes as against others and on his modes of seeking their realization. Whether given wishes tend to predominate in this or that person is dependent primarily on what is called "temperament," and apparently this is a chemical matter, dependent on the secretions of the glandular systems. Individuals are certainly temperamentally predisposed toward certain classes of the wishes. But we know also, and I shall illustrate presently, that the expression of the wishes is profoundly influenced by the approval of the man's immediate circle and of the general public. The conversions of wild young men to stable ways, from new experience to security, through marriage, religion, and business responsibility, are examples of this. We may therefore define character as an expression of the organization of the wishes resulting from temperament and experience, understanding by "organization" the general pattern which the wishes as a whole tend to assume among themselves.

The significant point about the wishes as related to the study of behavior is that they are the motor element, the starting point of activity. Any influences which may be brought to bear must be exercised on the wishes.

We may assume also that an individual life cannot be called normal in which all the four types of wishes are not satisfied in some measure and in some form.

6. *The Basis of Choice as between Satisfactions*[1]

In studying the emotional manifestations of very young infants it is difficult and not always possible to identify the particular emotion which is being displayed. Degrees of intensity are readily enough recognized, but for the time being detailed expressions of feeling such as later characterize the various emotions are not to be looked for, and the view put forward here is that the principle of the development of the simple into the complex, the less specialized into the more specialized, holds with regard to emotions as to other evolutional phenomena, *i.e.*, that out of a primary active affective state develop the more specialized emotions.

This specialization whereby emotional energy becomes directed into special channels is the outcome of differences of motive associated with successive emotional disturbances, and serves essentially to give expression to these motives. Not until an infant has gained at any rate a short experience of extrauterine life can its feelings become linked with motives which aim at the relief of the physical states provoking the feelings. But once this stage has been reached special expressions of feeling which are specific for the associated motive will be displayed.

Following these lines, the two emotions first to find special expression are love and hate.[2] The relation between these and fear will be more readily seen when we come to discuss anxiety and irritability, and for the present we may concern ourselves in seeking out the earliest manifestations of love and hate.

No one, I suppose, who is familiar with infants will maintain that a newborn child brings with it any affection for its mother, whom indeed it does not know and does not learn to know for several weeks. And yet before long the mother comes to be the chief object of her child's love. But equally its affections may be bestowed vicariously on a nurse. From this it appears that its affections are won, not by the mother qua mother, but in return for the maternal functions she performs. And of these the

[1] Adapted from FORSYTH, DAVID, The Rudiments of Character, *Psychoanalytic Rev.*, vol. 8, pp. 134–138, April, 1921.

[2] Jealousy (= love + fear) is a much later development, as is anxiety (= love + fear) or irritability (= love + hate), while of course the finer or more complex shades of feeling appear later still; no infant could evince, for example, veneration, chagrin, guiltiness, etc.

chief and type is suckling. The infant comes to love its mother in so far as the latter relieves its hunger.

Affection, or love, then, is the feeling bestowed on an object which can satisfy a bodily want—that is, which gratifies desire, relieves tension. But as it is against all probability that feelings of love are first called into existence only after an infant has learned to know its mother, we must seek to identify the earlier objects on which these feelings are bestowed. Love of the mother can be nothing but a transference of love of the mother's nipple and its stream of warm milk pleasurably stimulating the oral zone.

It is equally plain that not all an infant's affections will be concentrated on the peripheral object stimulating this zone, for similar conditions obtain in the other nutri-excretal areas. These are in a position to obtain a corresponding hold on the affections. The original objects between which an infant's love is distributed are then milk, urine, feces, breath. Herein we detect a potential source of grave psychical anomaly. For according as one or other of these objects happens to receive more than its usual share of affection, the future psychical development will be modified even profoundly. Thus an infant which comes to love milk best, transfers this affection in due course to the mother and becomes throughout its childhood, adolescence and perhaps, adult life, most deeply influenced by the mother and all she stands for; while another infant whose love goes to, *e.g.*, feces, is relatively little influenced by the mother to whom therefore it appears difficult and perverse. In truly a literal sense, feces, and in lesser degree, urine and breath are the outstanding rivals of a mother and the influences that gather behind her; and experience shows that children in whose emotional life the associated zones come to fill too large a share are the most difficult to train and present the most serious anomalies of temperament in adult life.[1]

At this point it is necessary to draw an important distinction between these primitive love objects. Milk is an object external to the child; it is not always available as soon as it is needed, and it is forthcoming only with the cooperation of factors which are outside the infant. As a love object, therefore, it secures the direction of the infant's affection to conditions external to itself. This "extroversion" of love gradually leads the child to take more and more interest (through the mother) in the outer world, and makes it emotionally responsive to external impressions; such a child is said to be affectionate or even sensitive.

[1] In one such case, the mother, finding her child growing unresponsive, redoubled her efforts to stir its affection; but, failing, let her own affection turn more and more to her second child. Later, she became hostile to the elder and finally had it sent away. These changes in her feelings are precisely what might occur in a woman who is losing her lover to a rival. In the former case, though no psychologist, she appeared unconsciously to recognize the influence of a rival in her child's love.

In the case of feces, on the other hand (the same applies to urine) the love object is internal, and is forthcoming without the intervention of any outside factor. It serves therefore to direct and attach the child's affection to conditions within itself—to "introvert" the affection.[1] In these circumstances a child is able to take less than usual interest in objects around; it is preoccupied with its excretory functions, and is emotionally unresponsive to maternal and other influences outside it. It cannot be readily brought under (external) control, and, looking for its chief pleasure to an object coming from within itself, resists attempts in this direction (obstinacy). No longer sufficiently dependent on its environment it fails to develop a proper sense of its relations to the outer world, and its ideas of personality—its ego sense—suffer in consequence.

Here we seem to be on ground made familiar to us by early cases of dementia praecox (paraphrenia). In this disease the earliest symptoms may be recognizable in children two years old, and traced in their history even earlier; the characteristic symptoms are extreme introversion with consequent failure of emotional reaction to the environment, insensibility to external influences including that of the mother, difficulty of control generally, and negativism.[2] Inasmuch as the factors producing dementia praecox may be operative within the first year or two of life and the outstanding feature of the disorder is introversion, it is necessary to look for the chief primitive love object elsewhere than in the mother's milk; and the striking way in which the otherwise complete detachment of such a child may be quickly replaced by absorbed interest, even by tense excitement, at the sight of bath taps, waste pipes, water-closet plugs, and other products of the plumber's skill points significantly to one (or both) of the excretions as the love object.

While love is the feeling bestowed on any object which relieves tension and later on any object from which this relief comes to be expected, occasions arise when the love object is not forthcoming. At these times, and especially when the tension mounts to pain, the feelings of love, deprived of the desired or expected outlet, are dammed back and, surging in another direction, produce the emotional state of anger; and this, so soon as the mind can identify an object as the cause of the injury, is projected as hate on to the aggrieving party. Hate, therefore, implies preexisting desire, the expected gratification of which is frustrated. It

[1] Extroversion as a function of the mouth zone reminds us that the special senses of sight and hearing (not to mention taste and smell) are anatomically grouped round this zone and are physiologically in its service; psychologically, as the two organs of external projection, they are responsible for carrying the development of extroversion to its highest cultural level. On the other hand, the anal zone, with its function of introversion, can have no biological need of any special sense to put it in touch with the outer world, and, of course, has developed none.

[2] The state in which external suggestions are resisted or even provoke contrary

indicates disappointed love and goes to that object which can but does not relieve tension. The relation between love and hate is of the closest; they are interconvertible (ambivalency), two manifestations of the same psychic energy, and the intensity of the love need is the measure of the reaction of anger.

7. *The Nature of the Expression of Choice*[1]

This paper is an outline of a theory of personality development viewed as a product of the learning process. More specifically, it is an attempt to sketch the personality as the outcome of the individual's learning how to manage his physiological tensions, under the tutelage of parents and other adults who present him with various tensional problems, in their efforts to mold his behavior into the socially sanctioned patterns.

This theory is offered, not as an explanation or rationalization but as a program for research, a plan for the further study of personality development. For the sake of brevity and clearness the exposition will be made rather dogmatically, and will follow the order of the child's development, showing chronologically the kind of tensional problems he faces, the several varieties of "solutions" he may work out, and the operation of the learning process in this development. It is hoped that the meaning of the terms "tension," "tensional problem," "solution," and the nature of the learning process, as understood by the writer, will be made clear in the course of the discussion. It may be desirable to state here, however, that the writer's conception of learning is not limited to the memorizing of verbal symbols or the acquisition of overt behavior patterns; learning is to be considered as the process of structural and functional modification wherein the organization of internal process and of overt behavior is achieved. Growth may be viewed as the process of changing dimensions, while development is the molding and patterning of that growth into specific structures and activities through the operation of the learning process.

An organism may be viewed as a structure engaged in the capture, storage, and release of energy. The human organism at birth is probably the least organized functionally of all the mammals, and this deficiency is exhibited not alone in its helpless condition and inability to execute movements beyond a few reflexes, but more significantly, in highly unstable physiological processes or functionings. Literally speaking, the human infant is not yet organized, in the sense of having its various structural and functional units or parts integrated into a coordinated structure or unvarying sequence. The relatively stabilized organism of maturity is something which the child, during its prolonged infancy, must achieve. And as we shall have occasion to point out later,

[1] Adapted from FRANK, LAWRENCE K., The Management of Tensions, *Am. Jour. Sociology*, vol. 33, pp. 706–722, March, 1928.

this prolonged infancy, exhibited physiologically in fluctuating processes, is paralleled by a prolonged infancy exhibited psychologically in varying reactions and intermittent behavior. Whatever the child learns implies a dual modification, of physiological factors (structure and process) and of overt behavior, for the overt activity is instrumental to the physiological conditions, and *vice versa.*

The infant is confronted with his first tensional problem shortly after birth, when physiological hunger appears, in the rhythmic contractions of the stomach accompanying the fall of blood sugar. These contraction tensions are usually relieved by the maternal ministrations at recurrent intervals, but the child must learn to sustain these tensions or to diffuse them (by crying, fretting, or other overt activity) until the feeding period arrives. This problem demands a physiological adjustment, with a regularization of nutritional process, uniform utilization of blood sugar over the period between feedings, and the concomitant functional adjustments, as well as the learning of the overt activity described. To a considerable extent the child must also learn the unvarying sequence of processes involved in digestion, at least to the extent of developing a straight-forward sequence of metabolic processes, a task not so automatic as many assume, as any mother will testify, since only the sucking and swallowing reflexes are prepared.

The frequency of regurgitation, of intestinal disturbances and malfunctioning of the sphincters and valves of the digestic tract are evidences of the unorganized situation in the young infant. And it is clear that he learns to handle his food by repeated trials in which he frequently develops various idiosyncrasies of digestion. The achievement of competent digestive functions is a matter of organizing the several structures and their processes into a coordinated sequence of operations.

Indeed, the regularization of the nutritional processes and the management of hunger tensions is a major problem for the infant and young child. The number and variety of "feeding problems," both physiological and psychological, exhibited by young children is ample evidence for this statement and for the importance assigned it in the development of personality.

The hunger tensions and their management are usually made more acute for the child at the time of weaning and of the introduction to solid food. For then the infant is faced with the necessity of learning to use novel stimuli to relieve his hunger tensions. If he is wisely handled at these times, he may achieve a wholesome solution, but the clinical records reveal an astonishing number of children who have made the transition with difficulty. This problem is more or less a prototype of subsequent tensional problems, in that the child, who has learned to use a certain stimulus to relieve his tensions, is now required to relinquish

that stimulus and to learn to use other stimuli. This substitution of a novel stimulus for the customary (or biological) stimulus is, of course, one of the essential features of learning, and it describes the physiological learning as well as the psychological. For in substituting a new situation, stimulus, or event, the child must learn how to establish a new sequence, or, to put it in another way, must make this functional or behavior response a consequent to a new antecedent. Moreover, the new stimulus may be not only different in kind, such as one foodstuff for another, but also different in order of time, *i.e.*, the new stimulus may be the antecedent of the original stimulus, and the learning will then be in the nature of getting ready for the response to the more remote or deferred stimulus. The whole process of development is conditional upon the capacity to make these substitutions, or, as we have said, to learn to make a given functional or behavior response to a new structure or event, either within the organism or in the environment.

This process of substituting a new for an accustomed stimulus is difficult largely because the period of learning involves a prolongation of the tensions, the release of which is the focus of the child's activity. In starting a child on solid food, for example, he is offered substances for which he has no learned method of handling; indeed, he scarcely has learned to swallow non-liquid food, and so is inclined to reject it. While he is tentatively tasting and trying to swallow the solid food, the unrelieved hunger tensions increase his irritability toward the strange food and also his efforts to obtain the customary liquids. He must sustain these tensions until he has learned to swallow the solid food and discovered its use as a stimulus to relieve his hunger tensions. This learning can be greatly facilitated by wise handling which assists the child in meeting this trying situation, by giving him such soothing and reassurance as will enable him to endure these prolonged tensions.

We cannot here describe the variety of solutions the child may offer to these problems of hunger tension, or the manner in which the child's other learning is affected by his hunger tensions; it is enough here to note their occurrence during the early life of the child and their importance in his later development.

In hunger and pressure tensions we have situations in which the child must learn to respond to present situations by preparing for their consequences, which means again that he learns to manage his recurrent organic tensions by definitely working out the sequence of his functions and his behavior to make provisions for their later adjustment.

As we shall see later, the child is increasingly faced with this problem of learning to respond to present situations in terms of their consequences, which means that his behavior must become increasingly instrumental, or, in other words, he must learn to sustain tensions while he is achieving the duly sanctioned opportunities and means for their release.

One process in the child which is functionally complete and efficient at birth is the sympathetic reaction or so-called "emotional response." Under stimulation, such as shock and the blocking of activity, the sympathetic division of the vegetative nervous system is stimulated into action, thus initiating a series of physiological changes: a quick visceral spasm, followed by a progressive relaxation of visceral tone, accelerated pulse and respiration, alteration in circulation from visceral to peripheral, and release of glycogen from the liver into the circulation. All of these changes are in the nature of preparations for the exertion of flight or fight, and they operate to raise the tonicity of stripped muscle and to make available the energy resources of the organism. This condition of "panic," however, is inhibitive of any discriminative or adjustive reaction to a situation, and so is rarely useful in social behavior where learned patterns of response must be employed.

The liability to this panic and to the release of the suddenly available energy in activities such as retreat from contacts with other persons, violent attacks upon persons or things, and so on, gives rise to tensional problems which we may group under the term "emotional reactions." The essential features of this problem, considered from the viewpoint of the child learning to live in group life, are, first, to inhibit the progressive development of the sympathetic reaction beyond the initial visceral spasm, so that he may escape that cumulative panic and its expression in non-sanctioned behavior; second, to learn some form of motor activity more or less adequate to such emotional-producing situations, so that he can deal with those situations whenever they recur. Whatever increased tonicity may be evoked by such situations will then be channeled into some form of overt activity specifically addressed to the requirements of that situation.

This problem of emotional management is exceedingly difficult because the sympathetic reaction is both primitive and powerful and so resists modification. Moreover, the child does not ordinarily learn either to inhibit his sympathetic reaction (or panic) or to develop an adequate motor pattern, such as a technique addressed to the situation, except with the aid and collaboration of others. For if, concurrently with the emotional stimuli, some soothing or reassuring stimuli, either auditory or tactual or both, are received, the progressive development of the sympathetic reaction may be checked and, with further practice, inhibited or at least restricted to the initial visceral spasm or "start." Then if the child is helped to acquire a motor pattern for dealing with such situations he can face their occurrence with some show of adequacy. Such motor patterns, in early infancy, may be of the simplest, such as learning to shout when exposed to a shock, provided they offer to the child some overt reaction to the situation and thereby give him both an outlet for any sudden rise in tensions and an alternative to the panic. Of course,

the general physiological condition of the child will play a large part in such learning, since many children find it exceedingly difficult to sustain their tensions long enough to permit the acquisition of motor patterns into which those tensions can be diffused.

The importance of this problem of emotional management arises from the fact that failure to inhibit the panic reaction may operate to compromise the child's future learning in situations of the same or similar character as the panic-producing situation. For after a child has once been thrown into panic, a recurrence of the original situation (or portion thereof) will revive the panic and to that extent render learning of motor techniques impossible. So again the intervention of other persons appears necessary to enable a child to escape from his emotional reactions. The threshold to emotional stimuli can be raised by practice, as we see in the various occupations and professions where individuals are taught to handle emotion-producing situations with a specific technique, such as soldiers, firemen, butchers, undertakers, surgeons, nurses, and so on. What we call the secularization of life (or progress) is just this development of techniques for meeting situations which previously evoked reactions of an emotional type.

Another variety of tensional problems facing the child arises from the physiological instability of the human infant which is exhibited in recurrent conditions of general bodily hypertonicity or hypotonicity. It seems probable that these conditions and their alternations are generated by the fluctuations in the balance between the sympathetic and parasympathetic (vagus) divisions of the vegetative nervous system; as one or the other is dominant, it will set the tone (mood) of the whole organism and to that extent render it tensionally disturbed.

What takes place apparently may be described in this way: The infant undergoes these fluctuations which leave him tensionally disturbed, but he is restored to more or less of an equilibrium by the tactual stimulation received from the mother. In this respect the human infant is like the young of all land mammals in requiring cuddling and mothering (*cf.* the licking of cubs). This tactual stimulation is obtained from close contact with the mother's person, especially during breast feeding, when the infant receives both nutritional and tactual stimulation. It should be noted that the mother usually accompanies these tactual ministrations with soothing auditory stimuli, thus providing the essentials for conditioning the child to use auditory stimuli in place of tactual stimuli as sources of adjustment. Thus when the infant is weaned and more or less suddenly deprived of access to the mother's person (although her mothering may be otherwise continued), he is partially prepared to use the auditory stimuli of approval and reassuring words as substitutes for tactual stimuli. If he is successful in meeting this problem he will learn then to use auditory stimuli as sources of adjustment and to accept

them from an ever widening number and variety of persons. Concomitantly he will develop a susceptibility to auditory stimuli of a disapproving and threatening character. In this process we see the beginning of the individual's dependence upon the verbal reactions of others to his behavior, which plays so large a part in social relationships and the personality development of later years. Gestures and facial expressions of others are likewise implicated.

If the infant is denied mothering and breast feeding, or is upset nutritionally so that the equilibrium between the two divisions of the vegetative nervous system is unduly disturbed, he may then be unable to achieve complacency and so have his learning of other tensional adjustments profoundly compromised. He may also learn to use various forms of tensional diffusing, such as thumb sucking and masturbation, or "tics," under these conditions. If he is not thrown off by the parents, especially the mother, he may fail to learn the use of verbal approval and disapproval by others and so escape this preparation for living in the group. As we shall see later, the ability to deal with other persons is essential to life in a group, and in all probability may be traced back to the manner in which the child solves this problem.

It may be remarked that what is termed a "mother fixation" is probably just this continued dependence upon the mother as the unique source of these auditory, if not tactual, stimuli for adjustment. It may be further noted that in adult mating there is a revival of the susceptibility to tactual stimulation, dormant or suppressed since childhood, which may thereby become one of the principal sources of tensional adjustment in both the male and female. It seems clear that this tactual susceptibility plays a large rôle in the achievement of satisfactory sexual relations. *Per contra*, tactual idiosyncrasies are frequent among those with personality difficulties, which suggests the possibility that they are initiated by the failure to make this substitution in early childhood.

To a greater or less extent, then, each child will have to learn to use auditory and visual substitutes for the tactual intimacies of infancy, and thereby be directed to the world of things and people around him, wherein his increasing strength and mobility favor an ever widening exploration. Thus he gradually learns to use these new opportunities for achieving adjustment and so begins the process of his socialization.

We may, then, say with some confidence that the period of childhood and youth should be occupied with active achievement of ever more remote tensional releases, since the period of adult life demands the capacity to work for deferred goals if the individual is to meet the requirements of earning a living, mating, and family life. In other words, the period of growth is the period for learning tensional management, or the ability to sustain, diffuse, and, when necessary, to defer the release of

tensions according to the exigencies of social life and the tasks of maturity. Not a little of this tuition is received in play or games where the youth learns sustained exertion and increased capacity for deferred consummations. Indeed, pleasure appears to be just this heightening and prolongation of tensions (to a critical point), so that the release is enhanced through the postponement or summation. The quality or intensity of a consummation appears to be a direct function of the preparatory activities essential to its achievement. But, as in all other features of personality development, the individual may become engrossed in the tensional management and so renounce the consummation or release.

Since the naïve response of the infant is to release his tensions at the first opportunity, the ability to sustain tensions and to diffuse them into overt activity must be learned. Moreover, this learning requires the active participation of another person, usually an adult, who can interpose between the child and the immediately available tensional releases, or otherwise persuade him to defer such tensional adjustments. The process of release of tensions, however, is itself subject to modification by learning, for not only does the child, in releasing tensions according to adult requirements, become conditioned to very specific stimuli and situations, but he also learns to vary the degree of tension release upon such occasions.

It must be clear that the manner in which a child responds to these incessant attentions from adults, submits to the frustration of immediate consummation or tension release, "sublimates" or "diffuses" his accumulated tensions into overt motor activities, and adapts himself to the specialized regimen of life which is his family portion is a total organic modification making demands upon all of his resources. The strain and stress of this tuitional program are both continuous and severe, and any constitutional or physiological deficiency or weakness will soon become apparent. Unless the child can muster sufficient physiological energy to meet these demands he must compromise somehow and some way in order to survive. It is this process of individual adaptation to the demands of the family which gives rise to the idiosyncrasies of the personality as revealed in the child's patterns of tensional management. And it must be remembered that these solutions are all begun in early childhood, when these problems are first encountered.

It is customary to remark upon the formative influence of the child's early years, but the precise manner in which this influence is exerted has not been made clear. There is no doubt that the early motor patterns disappear, as in the use of a bottle, or creeping and the like, so that this remark cannot imply a persistence of the pattern or activity itself. In the writer's view, the essential process may be described as follows: Since the young child reacts to the world of things and people as obstacles to, or sources of, tensional adjustment, each such reaction or response

will bring a tensional change which thereby becomes established as the recurrent response to all subsequent appearances of that situation or stimulus. Thus every experience will leave the child in a specific tensional condition. Consequently, the child necessarily will approach all new situations with the tensional condition arising from immediately prior experiences in other situations or from the already experienced stimuli present in that novel situation to which he has learned to respond with a given tensional condition. It follows, then, that he will learn from a novel situation in accordance with his then tensional condition, which means that he will respond selectively to that novel situation, ignoring therein whatever is incongruous with the tensional condition he brings to it. So experiences are cumulative and each tensional change learned by the child operates to condition his subsequent learning, thus giving the personality development that appearance of inevitable direction and trend which is so difficult to interrupt or divert.

Thus it is that the early tensional solutions of the child continue to dominate his approach to all subsequent situations unless some definite reorientation is given him through shock or the intervention of others. Our previous comments upon the significance of the child's early reactions to the several kinds of tensional problems may, therefore, be understood in the light of this selective characteristic of the learning process. Moreover, it seems clear that any temporary or prolonged failure to maintain these tensional "solutions," as previously learned, will largely influence the child's ability to continue his learning at that original tensional level. So an illness may initiate an entirely new trend in personality, while the escape from some physiological handicap may bring a new energy, and with it the beginning of a new trend of learning.

When adolescence does arrive we have not merely the appearance of a new kind of tensional problem, but also the beginning of a new period of growth with an accompanying loss of physiological stability. Thus the adolescent is faced with new demands just as his painfully acquired resources of established physiological rhythms are being disorganized preparatory to the attainment of adult stature and functions. So adolescence is indeed a period of storm and stress, wherein the previously developed personality is to be seriously tried.

The specific problem presented to the adolescent is to learn how to sustain and diffuse the accumulating sexual tensions, definitely refraining from using the otherwise available stimuli to their release, either in the person of others of like or unlike sex or in autoerotic practices. At least this is the problem formally set by Western European society, although in the Orient and in primitive communities the period of deferred consummation may be much shorter. The rationale of continence for youth has been the necessity of restricting mating to the adults who were competent to fend for themselves and their families, since otherwise there

would be an increase in the number of dependents (infants) upon the group resources, with no increase in the number of contributors. It is apparent that by damming up the sex tensions in the youth he is put under the greatest possible stimulus to new activity, achievement, learning, and other forms of diffusing his tensions.

It is pertinent here to remark that the social life is primarily a patterning of behavior and of human relationship so that the individual is forced to achieve something as a preliminary or mode of approach to his tensional releases or consummations. This is brought about by the establishment of obstacles to immediate approach to tensional releases and by the exaction of concomitant or consequent obligations and efforts when such consummations are used. The social life, therefore, is a method for accumulating tensions in an individual person and then directing those tensions into some achievement as a price for the permission to release those tensions in some consummation. As we have said earlier, the major emphasis of the child's preparation for adult life is upon the learning to defer tensional releases and to deal with present situations with reference to their consequences, in the way of achieving remoter tensional adjustments and minimizing the price or penalties, natural and social, incurred by using such tensional releases.

The operation of this restriction upon sexual release is different in the male and in the female. Moreover, the female, with the additional physiological organs and functions of menstruation, gestation, and lactation, experiences tensions and their adjustments which the male entirely escapes. So we should expect, and we do find, that the female learns from her life experiences very different lessons from those acquired by the male. Moreover, the female, unlike the male, must face the possibility that the sexual consummation may be not only a goal, but the beginning of the achievement of another objective, in conception, childbirth, and lactation. The male sexual tensions are apparently more exigent in their rhythmic recurrence than those of the female, which seemingly are more pervasive and physiologically more diffused. Our ignorance of sex functions, however, must make every statement we make a purely tentative guess. It is difficult, for example, to reconcile the prevalent notion of a lesser sexual interest in woman with the extraordinarily greater capacity for the orgasm if and when she does achieve it.

We must be content here to point out the tensional problems of sex as nearly as we can at present reveal them. In so far as there are sexual tensions which are denied release by parental oversight and teaching, the youth and maiden must learn to sustain those tensions and to diffuse them in the myriad sublimations and diffusings of adolescence. The problem is, in its outlines, not unlike that of hunger tensions, where the child must learn to refrain from taking the food freely exposed to his gaze. In so far as the parental tuition in sexual questions is liable to

all manner of overemphasis and distortion, the lessons learned by the youth are not infrequently quite complicated and unwholesome; for when the child's naïve approach to a tensional release is thwarted or blocked by the adult, there is a possibility of establishing a negative conditioning which will be permanent and incapable of being removed in adult life by the recognized social sanctions. Moreover, if the blocking operates to turn the child into the use of some substitute, as in homosexual or autoerotic practices, or in the various forms of sexual vicariates which become established as permanent patterns for tensional release, we may see the youth turn aside from other activities and forego the achievement of a mate, with all the consequences and concomitants of this atypical adjustment. What the so-called "normal," adult solution offers is the opportunity to obtain tensional release in a person of the opposite sex who will find reciprocal tension release in the mutual relationships and responses of mating. But to achieve such a normal wholesome adjustment calls for sustained efforts and abilities and a plasticity which is not common.

In their adolescent learning the young man and young woman acquire their basic patterns of response to the opposite sex and thereby prepare themselves, well or ill, for the adult mating. In their efforts to enforce continence upon the adolescent, the parents frequently resort to the practice of deprecating sex relationships altogether, with the result that they create a most unwholesome shrinking from the opposite sex, thereby rendering the achievement of adult mating exceedingly difficult, especially for the woman. In this problem of sex tensions the child receives his introduction to adult life, and in most cases experiences for the first time enormous pressure to conformity of which his parental instruction has been but a foretaste. The greater frequency of failure in the management of sexual tensions is to be considered as arising from the fact that the achievement of "normal" consummations involves direct, personal relationships which are the most difficult art the child must learn.

This brings us to the process of socialization which the child must undergo as preparation for life in the group. Toward this all the problems of tensional management are directed, for the essential characteristic of group life is found in the group-sanctioned patterns for tensional management. That is to say, social life is congregate living which concentrates all the various stimuli to tensional releases, such as food and sex, within the group; but this very abundance of such stimuli has made necessary the establishment of prohibitions upon the direct approach to, and use of, these stimuli, since otherwise the members of the group would be continually interfering with each other. Thus there has developed what the anthropologists call culture or group patterns of behavior, whereby each group regulates the activities of its members

and imposes upon them the observance of certain taboos and the use of prescribed practices for raising, setting aside, and transferring those taboos in order to attain to the tensional adjustments.

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Chapter X

SEX AND MORALITY

The sex and social relations of men and women are questions of great popular interest and of some personal and social significance. The association of the sexes is in itself a value. The nature of such association is a critical factor in the growth of personality. The relation may lead to the birth of offspring and so become a matter of social interest. It may have other consequences of personal or public concern. The type of relationships permissible has differed with time and place but is everywhere more or less definitely defined in the *mores* and regulated by neighborhood gossip and moral taboos. The old Sanscrit story retailed by Mr. Crawley is rich in suggestion not only of the intimate bearing of sex companionship upon human happiness but of the tendency of the folk mind to evaluate personality and character in terms of traditional conceptions.

In themselves and apart from their consequences the relations of mature men and women are matters of a purely personal nature, matters of concern only to the participating individuals. But custom and convention exercise a rigid control over the actual situation. The permissible relations as defined in the *mores* show wide variations from group to group. The statement by Mr. Russell in the second reading may be taken as expressing a modern liberal point of view.

But it is in civilized groups only that the relations of men and women are recognized and treated as private. Historically, and in a measure contemporaneously, the regulation of sex experience, especially of women, has been a major objective of the moral code. These social rules are of customary origin and, like other folk standards, are products of time and circumstance. In part they are an expression and outgrowth of primitive sex fears and taboos, in part a rationalization and enforcement of folk practices of accidental origin, and in part a set of more or less disguised economic arrangements. The types of marriage arrangements to which people subscribe and from which they hold any deviation to be grossly immoral are, in their details, nearly or quite as numerous as the independent groups. The traditional type of marriage, regardless of what the form may be, is looked upon by the members of the group habituated to it as the only decent and virtuous arrangement. Sex practices, apart from marriage, show the same diversity of approved and forbidden patterns. Sex codes and moral standards furnish no guide to ethical

behavior, they merely reflect the traditional practices of the group. Ethical behavior is something apart from moral conduct and in sex relations the two are often sharply opposed.

The paper by Miss Miles and Mr. Terman raises a question as to how far the traditional and customary sex differences in the modern social order are an expression of, or in accord with, organic sex differences. The later discussion by Mr. Dunlap assumes to answer the question and undertakes to define the organically determined differences in emotional response and overt behavior. These questions are in a sense basic to a rational code of sex behavior. It may perhaps be that the same code is not possible for the two sexes.

1. *Man and Woman*[1]

In the beginning, when Twashtri came to the creation of woman, he found that he had exhausted his materials in the making of man, and that no solid elements were left. In this dilemma, after profound meditation, he did as follows: He took the rotundity of the moon, and the curves of creepers, and the clinging of tendrils, and the trembling of grass, and the slenderness of the reed, and the bloom of flowers, and the lightness of leaves, and the tapering of the elephant's trunk and the glances of deer, and the clustering of rows of bees, and the joyous gaiety of sunbeams, and the weeping of clouds, and the fickleness of the winds, and the timidity of the hare, and the vanity of the peacock, and the softness of the parrot's bosom, and the hardness of adamant, and the sweetness of honey, and the cruelty of the tiger, and the warm glow of fire, and the coldness of snow, and the chattering of jays, and the cooing of the *kokila*, and the hypocrisy of the crane, and the fidelity of the *chakrawaka*, and compounding all these together, he made woman and gave her to man. But after one week, man came to him and said: Lord, this creature that you have given me makes my life miserable. She chatters incessantly and teases me beyond endurance, never leaving me alone; and she requires incessant attention, and takes all my time up, and cries about nothing, and is always idle; and so I have come to give her back again, as I cannot live with her. So Twashtri said: Very well; and he took her back. Then after another week, man came again to him and said: Lord, I find that my life is very lonely, since I gave you back that creature. I remember how she used to dance and sing to me, and look at me out of the corner of her eye, and play with me, and cling to me; and her laughter was music, and she was beautiful to look at, and soft to touch; so give her back to me again. So Twashtri said: Very well; and gave her back again. Then after only three days, man came back to him again and said: Lord, I know not how it is; but after all I have come to the conclusion that she is more of a trouble than a pleasure to me; so please take her back again. But Twashtri said: Out on you! Be off! I will have no more of this. You must manage how you can. Then man said: But I cannot live with her. And Twashtri replied: Neither could you live without her. And he turned his back on man, and went on with his work. Then man said: What is to be done? for I cannot live either with her or without her.

[1] From CRAWLEY, ERNEST, "The Mystic Rose," Horace Liveright, Inc., 1927.

This extract from a beautiful Sanscrit story illustrates a conception of the relations of man and woman, which often recurs in literature. The same conception, due ultimately to that difference of sex and of sexual characters which renders mutual sympathy and understanding more or less difficult, is characteristic of mankind in all periods and stages of culture. Woman is one of the last things to be understood by man; though the complement of man and his partner in health and sickness, poverty and wealth, woman is different from man, and this difference has had the same religious results as have attended other things which man does not understand. The same is true of woman's attitude to man. In the history of the sexes there have been always at work the two complementary physical forces of attraction and repulsion; man and woman may be regarded, and not fancifully, as the highest sphere in which this law of physics operates; in love the two sexes are drawn to each other by an irresistible sympathy, while in other circumstances there is more or less of segregation, due to and enforced by human ideas of human relations.

2. *Sex Morality*[1]

In all ages and nations positive morality has consisted almost wholly of prohibitions of various classes of actions, with the addition of a small number of commands to perform certain other actions. The Jews, for example, prohibited murder and theft, adultery and incest, the eating of pork and seething the kid in its mother's milk. To us the last two precepts may seem less important than the others, but religious Jews have observed them far more scrupulously than what seem to us fundamental principles of morality. South Sea Islanders could imagine nothing more utterly wicked than eating out of a vessel reserved for the use of the chief. My friend, Dr. Brogan, made a statistical investigation into the ethical valuations of undergraduates in certain American colleges. Most considered Sabbath breaking more wicked than lying, and extra-conjugal sexual relations more wicked than murder. The Japanese consider disobedience to parents the most atrocious of crimes. I was once at a charming spot on the outskirts of Kioto with several Japanese socialists, men who were among the most advanced thinkers in the country. They told me that a certain well beside which we were standing was a favorite spot for suicides, which were very frequent.

When I asked why so many occurred they replied that most were those of young people in love whose parents had forbidden them to marry. To my suggestion that perhaps it would be better if parents had less power they all returned an emphatic negative. To Dr. Brogan's undergraduates this power of Japanese parents to forbid love would seem

[1] From RUSSELL, BERTRAND, Styles in Ethics, *Nation*, vol. 118, pp. 497-499, Apr. 30, 1924.

monstrous, but the similar power of husbands or wives would seem a matter of course. Neither they nor the Japanese would examine the question rationally; both would decide unthinkingly on the basis of moral precepts learned in youth.

When we study in the works of anthropologists the moral precepts which men have considered binding in different times and places we find the most bewildering variety. It is quite obvious to any modern reader that most of these customs are absurd. The Aztecs held that it was a duty to sacrifice and eat enemies captured in war, since otherwise the light of the sun would go out. The Book of Leviticus enjoins that when a married man dies without children his brother shall marry the widow, and the first son born shall count as the dead man's son. The Romans, the Chinese, and many other nations secured a similar result by adoption. This custom originated in ancestor worship; it was thought that the ghost would make himself a nuisance unless he had descendants (real or putative) to worship him. In India the remarriage of widows is traditionally considered something too horrible to contemplate. Many primitive races feel horror at the thought of marrying anyone belonging to one's own totem, though there may be only the most distant blood relationship. After studying these various customs it begins at last to occur to the reader that possibly the customs of his own age and nation are not eternal, divine ordinances, but are susceptible of change, and even, in some respects, of improvement. Books such as Westermarck's "History of Human Marriage" or Muller-Lyer's "Phasen der Liebe," which relate in a scientific spirit the marriage customs that have existed and the reasons which have led to their growth and decay, produce evidence which must convince any rational mind that our own customs are sure to change and that there is no reason to expect a change to be harmful. It thus becomes impossible to cling to the position of many who are earnest advocates of *political* reform and yet hold that reform in our moral precepts is not needed. Moral precepts, like everything else, can be improved, and the true reformer will be as open minded in regard to them as in regard to other matters.

Muller-Lyer, from the point of view of family institutions, divides the history of civilization into three periods—the clan period, the family period, and the personal period.† Of these the last is only now beginning; the other two are each divided into three stages—early, middle, and late. He shows that sexual and family ethics have at all times been dominated by economic considerations; hunting, pastoral, agricultural, and industrial tribes or nations have each their own special kinds of institutions. Economic causes determine whether a tribe will practice polygamy, polyandry, group marriage, or monogamy, and whether monogamy will be lifelong or dissoluble. Whatever the prevailing practice in a tribe it is thought to be the only one compatible with virtue, and all departures

from it are regarded with moral horror. Owing to the force of custom it may take a long time for institutions to adapt themselves to economic circumstances; the process of adaptation may take centuries. Christian sexual ethics, according to this author, belong to the middle-family period; the personal period, now beginning, has not yet been embodied in the laws of most Christian countries, and even the late-family period, since it admits divorce under certain circumstances, involves an ethic to which the church is usually opposed.

Muller-Lyer suggests a general law to the effect that where the state is strong the family is weak and the position of women is good, whereas where the state is weak the family is strong and the position of women is bad. It is of course obvious that where the family is strong the position of women must be bad, and *vice versa*, but the connection of these with the strength or weakness of the state is less obvious, though probably in the main no less true. Traditional China and Japan afforded good instances. In both, the state was much weaker than in modern Europe, the family much stronger, and the position of women much worse. It is true that in modern Japan the state is very strong, yet the family also is strong and the position of women is bad; but this is a transitional condition. The whole tendency in Japan is for the family to grow weaker and the position of women to grow better. This tendency encounters grave difficulties. I met in Japan only one woman who appeared to be what we should consider emancipated in the West—she was charming, beautiful, high minded, and prepared to make any sacrifice for her principles. After the earthquake in Tokio the officer in charge of the forces concerned in keeping order in the district where she lived seized her and the man with whom she lived in a free union and her twelve-year-old nephew, whom he believed to be her son; he took them to the police station and there murdered them by slow strangulation, taking about ten minutes over each except the boy. In his account of the matter he stated that he had not had much difficulty with the boy, because he had succeeded in making friends with him on the way to the police station. The boy was an American citizen. At the funeral, the remains of all three were seized by armed reactionaries and destroyed, with the passive acquiescence of the police. The question whether the murderer deserved well of his country is now set in schools, half the children answering affirmatively. We have here a dramatic confrontation of middle-family ethics with personal ethics. The officer's views were those of feudalism, which is a middle-family system; his victims' views were those of the nascent personal period. The Japanese state, which belongs to the late-family period, disapproved of both.

The middle-family system involves cruelty and persecution. The indissolubility of marriage results in appalling misery for the wives of drunkards, sadists, and brutes of all kinds, as well as great unhappiness

for many men and the unedifying spectacle of daily quarrels for the unfortunate children of ill-assorted couples. It involves also an immense amount of prostitution, with its inevitable consequence of widespread venereal disease. It makes marriage, in most cases, a matter of financial bargain between parents, and virtually proscribes love. It considers sexual intercourse always justifiable within marriage, even if no mutual affection exists. It is impossible to be too thankful that this system is nearly extinct in the Western nations (except France). But it is foolish to pretend that this ideal held by the Catholic Church and in some degree by most Protestant churches is a lofty one. It is intolerant, gross, cruel, and hostile to all the best potentialities of human nature. Nothing is gained by continuing to pay lip service to this musty Moloch.

The American attitude on marriage is curious. America, in the main, does not object to easy divorce laws, and is tolerant of those who avail themselves of them. But it holds that those who live in countries where divorce is difficult or impossible ought to submit to hardships from which Americans are exempt, and deserve to be held up to obloquy if they do not do so. An interesting example of this attitude was afforded by the treatment of Gorki when he visited the United States.

There are two different lines of argument by which it is possible to attack the general belief that there are universal absolute rules of moral conduct, and that any one who infringes them is wicked. One line of argument emerges from the anthropological facts which we have already considered. Broadly speaking the views of the average man on sexual ethics are those appropriate to the economic system existing in the time of his great-grandfather. Morality has varied as economic systems have varied, lagging always about three generations behind. As soon as people realize this they find it impossible to suppose that the particular brand of marriage customs prevailing in their own age and nation represents eternal verities, whereas all earlier and later marriage customs, and all those prevailing in other latitudes and longitudes, are vicious and degraded. This shows that we ought to be prepared for changes in marriage customs, but does not tell us what changes we ought to desire.

The second line of argument is more positive and more important. Popular morality—including that of the churches, though not that of the great mystics—lays down rules of conduct rather than ends of life. The morality that ought to exist would lay down ends of life rather than rules of conduct. Christ says: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"; this lays down one of the ends of life. The Decalogue says: "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day"; this lays down a rule of action.

Christ's conduct to the woman taken in adultery showed the conflict between love and moral rules. All his priests, down to our own day, have gone directly contrary to his teachings on this point, and have shown

themselves invariably willing to cast the first stone. The belief in the importance of rules of conduct is superstitious; what is important is to care for good ends. A good man is a man who cares for the happiness of his relations and friends, and, if possible, for that of mankind in general, or, again, a man who cares for art and science. Whether such a man obeys the moral rules laid down by the Jews thousands of years ago is quite unimportant. Moreover a man may obey all these rules and yet be extremely bad.

Let us take some illustrations. I have a friend, a high-minded man, who has taken part in arduous and dangerous enterprises of great public importance and is almost unbelievably kind in all his private relations. This man has a wife who is a dipsomaniac, who has become imbecile, and has to be kept in an institution. She cannot divorce him because she is imbecile; he cannot divorce her because she affords him no ground for divorce. He does not consider himself morally bound to her and is therefore, from a conventional point of view, a wicked man. On the other hand a man who is perpetually drunk, who kicks his wife when she is pregnant, and begets ten imbecile children, is not generally regarded as particularly wicked.

A business man who is generous to all his employees but falls in love with his stenographer is wicked; another who bullies his employees but is faithful to his wife is virtuous. This attitude is rank superstition, and it is high time that it was got rid of.

Sexual morality, freed from superstition, is a simple matter. Fraud and deceit, assault, seduction of persons under age, are proper matters for the criminal law. Relations between adults who are free agents are a private matter, and should not be interfered with either by the law or by public opinion, because no outsider can know whether they are good or bad. When children are involved the state becomes interested to the extent of seeing that they are properly educated and cared for, and it ought to insure that the father does his duty by them in the way of maintenance. But neither the state nor public opinion ought to insist on the parents living together if they are incompatible; the spectacle of parents' quarrels is far worse for children than the separation of the parents could possibly be.

The ideal to be aimed at is not life-long monogamy enforced by legal or social penalties. The ideal to be aimed at is that all sexual intercourse should spring from the free impulse of both parties, based upon mutual inclination and nothing else. At present a woman who sells herself successively to different men is branded as a prostitute, whereas a woman who sells herself for life to one rich man whom she does not love becomes a respected society leader. The one is exactly as bad as the other. The individual should not be condemned in either case; but the institutions producing the individual's action should be condemned equally in both

cases The cramping of love by institutions is one of the major evils of the world. Every person who allows himself to think that an adulterer must be wicked adds his stone to the prison in which the source of poetry and beauty and life is incarcerated by "priests in black gowns."

Perhaps there is not, strictly speaking, any such thing as "scientific" ethics. It is not the province of science to decide on the ends of life. Science can show that an ethic is unscientific, in the sense that it does not minister to any desired end. Science also can show how to bring the interest of the individual into harmony with that of society. We make laws against theft, in order that theft may become contrary to self-interest. We might, on the same ground, make laws to diminish the number of imbecile children born into the world. There is no evidence that existing marriage laws, particularly where they are very strict, serve any social purpose; in this sense we may say that they are unscientific. But to proclaim the ends of life, and make men conscious of their value, is not the business of science; it is the business of the mystic the artist. and the poet.

3. *The Origin of Sex Differences*[1]

Obvious differences between the sexes expressed in behavior and not readily traceable sociologically have been attributed to basic anatomical, physiological, and psychological origins. Differentiation between groups representing the sexes can usually be made on the basis even of fragmentary data in any of these three divisions of human development, and such differentiation may have a fair degree of accuracy. Even the individual members of sex groups may generally be assigned to their proper classification by such means, though with a certain margin of error, which will usually be largest for the psychological, less great for the general physiological and anatomical features, but not insignificant even in the case of those indexes of sex development called "sex characters," whether secondary or primary. Even in that one aspect of development, the endocrine, which lies at the base of sex structure and function, no complete dichotomy has been demonstrated; even here no absolute line of demarcation can be drawn. Mixed or androgynous types may, it seems, appear even with respect to gonadal secretions, so that gonads of both sexes may be present in the same individual, or interstitial cells producing autocoids of one sex may be perversely produced in the organ characteristic of the other. Within human beings such extreme *Zwischenstufen* are rare, but they are known to exist, and they emphasize by their presence the range of distribution of sex characters in the human species from the normal masculine to the normal feminine. Because the endocrine basis of sex has been demonstrated, a

[1] Adapted from MILES, CATHARINE COX, and LEWIS M. TERMAN, Sex Difference in the Association of Ideas, *Am. Jour. Psychology*, vol. 41, pp. 165–169, April, 1929.

basis definitely prepotent during its period of activity, and because its effect upon structure and function in general has been demonstrated, there is a tendency to attribute sex differentiation in general to this origin. Furthermore, since a genuine and obviously fundamental difference has been demonstrated in this regard, and since other and secondary aspects of development appear to be conditioned by it, an inclination naturally arises (*a*) to look for further and often more remote differences that might prove as essentially diagnostic, whether as primary or secondary features, because of their being definitely the result of the demonstrated endocrine differentiators; and (*b*) to look for further and other differences as essentially diagnostic which may be due to some now obscure, but equally potent, differential causes.

Interest at present does not lie in demonstrating a superiority of one sex with corresponding inferiority of the other; for instance, current writers are not trying to prove an infantile type of woman or a primitive savage type of man, or again a feeble-mindedness or mental weakness of woman and a brutal and tyrannical strength of man. Rather, the concern is with an evaluation of the available, experimentally demonstrated findings which may contribute to an understanding of present development under existing conditions, and may also in part suggest the possibilities of future development under modified conditions. The problem is peculiarly complex because social conditions, the weight of tradition, and the pillars of custom maintain an equilibrium now that is not necessarily according to Nature's original construction plan. What we are able at best to ascertain is a series of sex differences as they appear under the present scheme of things; with perhaps some comprehension of the degree to which they are essential or fundamental as we see their deviations or fluctuations under more or less systematically modified conditions.

Some at present assume the existence of a masculine mind and a feminine mind, and to this point of view the researches of Havelock Ellis and others may appear to give support.

> The masculine method of thought is massive and deliberate, while the feminine method is quick to perceive and nimble. Girls are aided by a better memory and a variety of emotional and moral qualities which involve a greater docility. Boys, however, possess other qualities which contain the promise of ultimately greater intellectual development. Men are better able to apply what they have learnt; men are very much more inclined to supplement what they have learnt by reflection or further independent investigation . . . Women dislike the essentially intellectual process of analysis . . . Women dislike rigid rules and principles and abstract propositions, they feel that they can do the right thing by impulse without needing to know the rule. These characteristics, by which on the average women seem to be marked in relation to men, are probably correlated with instinctive and emotional qualities which may fairly be regarded as organic.

But again . . .

The facts are far too complex to enable us to rush hastily to a conclusion as to their significance. The facts, moreover, are so numerous that when we have ascertained the precise significance of some one fact, we cannot be sure that it is not contradicted by other facts. And so many of the facts are modifiable under a changing environment that in the absence of experience we cannot pronounce definitely regarding the behavior of either the male or female organism under different conditions.

Briefly stated, the prevailing view of scientific investigators is perhaps this: a masculine and a feminine reaction type may be differentiated and contrasted under existing conditions. The differences are perhaps correlated with organic factors, but are not inevitably so, for all of our data are gathered under such and such conditions and the influence of possible modifications of these is often, perhaps usually, doubtful or unknown.

Two problems are presented to the investigator in the field of sex differences: (*a*) to determine the facts of difference under the customary conditions of the present social order; and (*b*) to push back the boundaries of the obscure situations which offer variations from the present order and so, if only suggestively, to indicate the trends which educational or social modifications would or could bring about. The first problem has to do with determining the differences as they exist, the second with determining their essential or fundamental quality by tracing them to their origins.

In the field of analysis of sex differences, anthropology and sociology give consideration to large typical behavior differences indicating traditional and social modes. Psychology, however, is limited at present to detailed study of small behavior differences indicating as far as possible central tendencies in the individuals concerned. The former, the sociological and anthropological studies, are descriptive; they illuminate our own customs and prejudices and often show the social origins of our assumptions and beliefs. The latter are analytical and experimental, and they attempt to unravel the complexity of individual mental patterns and procedures that condition behavior. The association of ideas, with its implications for the building up of interests; memory, with its significance for learning; imagination, essential to invention, are examples of mental complexities subject to examination wherein discerned sex differences have practical as well as theoretical significance. The first of these is the subject of the present discussion and review. Methods of examination which investigate mental organization directly through introspection have given no positive, but rather a negative aid to our problem. Their analyses and conclusions are important for the study of the adult normal mind, and from them we incline to the dictum of Brissac that "Souls have no sex." It may be that more extensive studies of this character would indicate sex differences. The studies that have

been carried on by equally trained observers of both sexes give as yet no indication that this is to be anticipated.

4. *Psychosex Differences*[1]

In considering the affective characteristics of the sexes we must revert to a consideration of primary psychological sex differences, since these are found in the fields of feeling, emotion, and desire. The profound changes which take place at puberty, and which significantly differentiate the male from the female in so many anatomical details and in important physiological respects, are controlled by the hormones of the testes and ovaries. This control is exercised in part through the thyroid, pituitary, adrenal, and perhaps other glands, upon the functions of which the products of the genital glands exercise an influence. It is possible that the whole glandular life is influenced by the sex glands, and it is at least certain that the important endocrine glands above named are affected. Further, we know that endocrine glands in general, and especially the ones named, exercise a powerful effect on the general emotional life of the individual. It is, therefore, extremely probable that along with the differentiation of growth and function controlled directly and indirectly by the sex glands, there is also a differentiation in the emotional life of man and woman; but our experimental knowledge is at present not sufficient to indicate the details of this differentiation, hence we must depend on more general information, which is, frankly, more suggestive than reliable.

We have reason to assume that the sexual desires and emotions and the sexual sensitivity of the man and woman (the primary psychological characters of sex) are different. Aside from their intrinsic characters, the sex desires and emotions differ in their excitability and in their temporal courses; and these are highly significant differences.

In discussing sex desire, it must be understood that while we here use the term in a very literal sense (and in fact, because of that literalism), we do not restrict it to the narrow application to desire for sexual stimulation or for the activities which we will below designate as "specific." Just as we uniformly designate all characteristics which are peculiar to the female, or to the male, as sex characteristics, whether they are characteristic of the sex organs or secondary characteristics, such as differences in stature, in form, and in bony development, so also, and for the same reasons, we designate any desire, which is determined as to its object by the differentiation of the sexes, as sex desire. If the man at any time desires feminine society, in a way in which he does not desire masculine society, that desire is literally a form of sex desire, since it is determined by the sex of the object, as well as by his own sex. The sex desire in such

[1] From DUNLAP, KNIGHT, "Social Psychology," pp. 34–42, 49–51, The Williams & Wilkins Co., 1925.

a case may be simply for association with women at the tea table. This is really a common-sense usage of the term sex; and it is fully justified by the fact that such desires are intimately associated with the primary life of sex and controlled thereby. When a man has such social sex desires, it is because he is male in the full sense of the term; he would not have the mental characteristics of the male any more than he would have the secondary anatomical characters if he had not the primary sex characters. When, on the other hand, the effeminate boy prefers to associate with girls rather than boys because of his effeminacies, his desire for feminine society is not truly sexual.

These considerations must be understood, or the whole intent of the discussion below will be seriously misapprehended. The definitions to be given for the several types of sex desire must be carefully considered, and further references to those types always understood in the light of the definition.

Among the forms of sexual desire we may distinguish:

a. Generalized personal desire. A man or woman may be "interested" in individuals of the other sex, without the selection of a particular individual who is desired above all others. The desire in this stage is for the society of individuals of the other sex, that is, the desire may be said to be "social" in the narrow sense of the term. Analytically, the desire is for general stimulation by individuals of that sex: visual, auditory, and olfactory stimulation as well as tactual and kinaesthetic. There is desire also for common stimulation and common activity, and these are very important parts of the total desire. The man desires not only to see and hear the woman and to touch her, but also to engage in the same activities in which she engages. In walking, playing games, and dancing with a woman, the man satisfies desires of various of these types. He is not only stimulated by her, visually, acoustically, and tactually, but he is also stimulated by the same stimulus which stimulates her, and he acts with her. Moreover, a very important factor is added in the knowledge that the stimulation arising from her is intentionally directed toward him. Yet in many cases, there is minor satisfaction in the stimulations when he is merely with her in the society of others, and she is neither talking directly to him nor displaying herself visually for his particular benefit. A man's satisfaction in viewing a beautiful woman on the street or on the stage, or in listening to a beautiful voice, or in viewing a statue or painting may be of this generalized sexual sort; and the same holds true for the woman. There is no thought of specific sexual relations in this plane of desire.

b. A higher state of desire tending to a higher form of satisfaction (or more serious dissatisfaction as the outcome may be) involves a particular person, and may be designated as particularized personal desire. In this case, we say the individual is "in love." The personal desires of

the lover are toward the loved one, and it is her society (or his society), her stimulation, and common stimuli and common activity with her, which are preeminently desired. Sometimes love excludes the generalized desire entirely, and the man in love has no more and no different kind of desire for society of other women than for the society of other men. Sometimes, however, the generalized desire coexists with the particularized; or rather, the tendencies coexist; for the man really in love does not desire woman while he is desiring the woman; and the converse holds true for women.

c. In the form of sex desire which may be called specific, the act of coitus is in the forefront of consciousness, or details directly connected with coitus are focal; the desire is primarily for the act itself; and the stimulus desires and common activity desires are merely such as conduce most effectively to the completion of the act.

These three types of sex desire grade into one another through many stages. The individual whose personal desire is generalized, particularizes, of course, during the time when an individual of the other sex is available; but the particularization endures only while he or she is stimulated by that individual, and any one of a large class of individuals may be substituted one for another. He desires to dance with, talk to, or otherwise associate with the particular woman who is available, but would be just as desirous of and just as well satisfied with any one of a number of women of the same general type, and sometimes of a wide range of types. In some cases where there is actual particularization of a more personal sort, the particular desire is little stronger than the general. The man, for example, is somewhat in love with one woman, desires her more strongly than other women, and derives more satisfaction from her society; yet his desire for any other woman of the same general type may be nearly as strong.

Finally, the personal desire shades gradually into the specific and *vice versa* in a temporal way; and there is a gradation of blends of the two at definite times. Very often, the particularized desire begins in the personal form, and grows in time into the specific; and frequently that which commences as relatively specific desire for a given individual grows in time into a comprehensive personal desire.

The most important sex difference in desire is that in the man it is more uniform in type, in woman more diverse. The difference may best be brought out by describing male desire.

In man, sex desire is frequently present in a highly specific form without any particularization and with a minimum of even generalized personal desire. In such cases the desire may be ideationally vague, with no thought of definite object or means of satisfaction, although affectively vivid, and is usually called sex excitement. Moreover, personal sex desire in man passes very easily and quickly into the specific form, with-

out requiring intermediate activities, such as caressing. Furthermore, man seldom loses the general desire for long periods of time, but is, during most of his life, no matter how definitely he particularizes, "susceptible" to women generally. There are, of course, individual variations in these respects; and a few individuals may differ widely from the general type; but the overwhelming majority of men differ only mildly in type of desire, however much they may differ in respect to its gratification. Finally, the liability to sex desire of the several types is constantly present, subject to no times or seasons, although it is possibly a little greater in the spring and early summer than at other times.

In women, on the other hand, there is a wider range of types, and the great majority of cases differ markedly from the male type. In these cases, specific desire is less apt to arise except from the particularized personal form; in many cases it seldom or never arises except in this way, and is less apt to occur in the vague specific form. Moreover, personal desire does not pass so automatically into specific but requires the intermediate stimulation of caressing. The woman, in many cases, must have personal desire for the man, involving finally the desire to be tactually and kinaesthetically stimulated by him; and these stimulations arouse the specific desire.

When the woman's personal desire becomes particularized, although the general desire is seldom completely lost, it lessens or decreases more markedly than it does in man; to a degree so small usually that it precludes her particularization upon another man until she loses her particularization upon the first man.

The preceding description applies to a certain range of types of women only, although that range probably includes the majority. There are others who are in type like the average man; and still others who go to the other extreme of never having any specific desire; an extreme which is seldom if ever approximated by any man except he be mentally or physically defective or seriously diseased. Between these two wide extremes all gradations in feminine type are represented.

In many women, and perhaps in all, sex desire is dependent upon and varies with the menstrual cycle. At a certain phase of the cycle, it is less easily aroused, and at another phase is much more easily aroused, or occurs spontaneously in the specific form. In other words, there is in the human female an oestrous cycle, like that of the lower animal female, and with the same period as the menstrual cycle.

It must not be supposed that on the average the sexual desires of the man are any stronger than those of the woman, although the conditions of arousal may be different. It is even possible that the reverse is true; and it is certainly true that in very many women the desires, when fully aroused, have a violence far surpassing that of the average man. This is

a point which it is especially important that the woman should know for her protection.

The development of sexual desire in the woman is far more a matter of education, through sexual stimulation and sexual experience, than is the case with the man. In many women the desire is very slight until developed by repeated stimulations and experiences, and may thereafter be powerful and easily aroused. In many others the desire is never developed to a very high level, even though they may be married for years, and to some of them sexual intercourse eventually becomes intensely repugnant. In most of these cases, the conditions of intercourse have been abnormal through absence of the appropriate psychological details, frequently because of the dense ignorance of the husband.

As regards sexual emotion and feelings aside from desire, there are differences between man and woman which it is not important to discuss here. There are also definite differences in sexual sensitivity, which are tied up with the differences in desire and emotion. We have gone far enough into the subject to show that extreme and important affective differences probably exist, and exist in a realm which we know to be of great consequence for the entire emotional life. For we know that changes in the sexual affective life influence profoundly the whole emotional life: witness the changes in moods, in excitability, and in general emotional responses which occur conspicuously in the menstrual cycle of some women and probably of many.

If the total emotional life of man differs profoundly from the total emotional life of woman, then, in spite of equality in perceptual, intellectual, associative, and reflective capacities, it cannot be expected that the two sexes will perform alike. Their interests will be different, and their distribution and fixation of attention will perhaps be different. And if such were not the case, it would seem that the family, the most important of all social groups, and the most coherent, would not be possible.

The cyclic variability of woman's emotional life (which is true on the average although it may not be true of all cases), and its greater personalization, are the most important points in which it differs from that of the man. The variability undoubtedly interferes severely with the success of many women in vocations in which initiative and self-direction are required, and may be the basis for her lesser aptitude for problem solving. Business and professional life offer their opportunities and make their demands without regard to the lunar month, and the woman is sometimes in the mood to respond to them, sometimes not. Hence, "woman's work" has been predominantly along those lines which offer no progress, and which, like housework, can be periodically neglected, or which, like stenography, are so standardized that the routine requirements are definite and have to be met, moods or no moods. For, where there is an objective requirement which must be met, and is not too severe,

the individual will by extra effort measure up to it for a short time regardless of mood and lowered vitality. The woman can force her work, just as the drunken man, or the asphyxiated or drugged man, can make for a short time as good a record on many mental and physical tests as he can normally, because the task is mechanical and he feels the need of accomplishing it. Yet, it is probable that just as tests have been designed in which the deficiencies of those individuals can be shown, so tests can eventually be applied to the woman which will show her cyclic variations in initiative due to the emotional cycles.

The personal tendency of woman's emotion has also its effects in her performances. It has many times been said that woman fails as a surgeon and succeeds as a nurse, because of personal solicitude and sympathy for the patient; and this impression is doubtless correct as far as it goes. The successful surgeon must remove the appendix from his patient as impersonally as he cuts a bone out of his steak. But, of course, in view of the extreme variability of woman, we may expect to find some who are as impersonal in their affective life as the most impersonal man.

Qualitative or intensive affective differences between men and women are hard to find. Woman, on the average, has not been shown to be gentler or sterner, more optimistic or more pessimistic, more irritable or more placid, than man. She seems to hate, love, fear, worry, rejoice, no more or less deeply than does man. We cannot say that maternal emotions are more intense than are paternal. In some of these respects, moreover, although the individual variations in women may be no greater than those in men the distributions may be different. A recent investigation on the likes and dislikes of men and women has brought out the indication that woman is relatively stronger in her dislikings, man in his likings. These are matters of secondary desires and aversions, of course, and it is not certain yet that it is generally true. Yet certain commonplace observations, especially in regard to foods, seem to bear out this conclusion. The results of wider experimental work on this point will be important.

Much of the widespread misinformation concerning the psychology of women and much of the injustice to which women are subjected are due to the failure to understand the difference between the development of sexual responsiveness and of sexual desires and emotions in the two sexes, and the greater rôle played by education in the woman. The man's desires and responsiveness develop more spontaneously; that is to say, the internal stimulations and the common types of social stimulation to which men are rather uniformly subjected develop a responsiveness and type of desire which vary somewhat from man to man, but are sufficiently well developed in all but a very few individuals. On the other hand, although the variation in women is greater than in men, for the larger group of women, neither internal nor general social stimulations will

develop either responsiveness or desire in its characteristic form without more specific types of stimulation supplied by the male. In such cases, the sexual responses are of the general personal type, and sex desire is limited to that category, until more specific desires and responses are aroused through caressing. Many women of profound passionate capacity live half of their lives without realizing the tendencies lying latent within them, and are astounded at the revelations which even these preliminary forms of sex experience bring about. Some women even do not develop their full capacities until several years after marriage has been entered. Whether this significant difference between men and women is really essential, or whether it is due to the differences in the training of boys and girls from childhood up, remains to be determined. The important fact is that the differences exist at present and must be taken into account. Many curious and conflicting misstatements concerning the differences in the sex desires of men and women have undoubtedly been based on data obtained from small numbers of women in one or the other of the stages of sexual development, in which mere chronological age plays a minor part. But undoubtedly also, the individual variations in women, under the same conditions of experience and training, are very great.

After the psychological sex life of the woman has been once developed, she is a different person, and her personal problems, previously rather simple, become much more like those of the man. The woman, therefore, who achieves her sex education without marriage is in a peculiarly unfortunate position, a prey not only to the enormous force which has been liberated in her life, but a prey also to the large group of males who constantly seek to play upon these forces. The attitude which men frequently take toward the inexperienced woman, namely, that the responsibility for her actions rests upon her alone, if she consents to sex relations, can therefore have no palliation except on the assumption that such men are densely ignorant of the psychology of woman. The fact is that in few cases can she possibly know beforehand the consequence of the step which she may contemplate. It is not necessary to assume anything essentially wrong in sex experience, or even in promiscuity; the serious ethical problem grows out of the psychological facts, together with the fixed definite conventions of the social system from which no individual can escape.

On the other hand, the more fully the woman or girl understands this situation the more capable she is of protecting herself. Knowing that once having entered upon a new realm of experience, no return to the former security is possible; that the complexities of the new life are such that she cannot evaluate them in advance; and that society is so organized that woman is put at every possible disadvantage in dealing with these complexities, she is not apt to entertain lightly an experimental attitude. Further, the young woman should know the awakening of

her sex desire is a smoothly progressive process, beginning in details that may seem to her not in the least dangerous, but grading by small steps to a culmination in which she has no further control, and that she cannot foresee the point at which control will be lost.

5. *The Restrictions on Sexual Choice*[1]

Whether or not sexual choice has been as important a factor in evolution as has sometimes been claimed, its importance as a social factor is great—greater, probably, than we as yet surmise; for from this point of view the subject has never been adequately examined. At present we shall merely review some of the data useful in such a study.

Among mankind, as among the lower animals, incidents of courtship commonly indicate the nature of the traits which are prized in mating. The accepted suitor is frequently he who excels in purposive tests of strength, speed, cunning, etc., or he whose presents are the richest, or whose display of wealth or social distinction is the most alluring. Betrothal and marriage ceremonial may be similarly suggestive of preferred conjugal characteristics. In this connection regulations of the bride price based on the rank of the groom's father, on the bride's previous condition of maidenhood, widowhood, etc., on her personal traits, appearance, strength, etc., are significant. Widows, for example, in view of their acquired skill in domestic work, sometimes bring a higher price than virgins. Virgins, on the other hand, may, where chastity has a distinctly marketable value, sell for more than widows.

We should note that the struggle that goes on between members of the same sex for desirable mates is not limited to the first period of courtship. It continues throughout the mating period of life, although it is to a considerable extent conditioned by social usage in regard to the form and duration of sexual intercourse as well as by a number of other restrictions upon sexual choice which we shall soon consider. A man may have to fight to keep as well as to get his wife. She may be captured or through magic charmed away from him or she may voluntarily leave him for another. A wife may on her side have to contend with other women both in and out of wedlock for her husband's favor. He may cast her off or merely neglect her.

Among human beings the play of sexual choice is limited at all times by a great number of impersonal social or quasi-social checks. Even among the lower animals sexual choice is limited to choice within the same variety of species and to particular groups within the species, according to specific distribution. It is unnecessary to do more than refer to the prejudice that obtains in all communities against sexual intercourse between human and non-human beings (one form of so-called "sodomy")

[1] From PARSONS, ELSIE CLEWS, "The Family," pp. 161–168, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912.

as a proof that similar restrictions likewise exist in the human species. Although there are probably no pure races in existence, nevertheless abundant evidence of aversion, as well as of indifference, to racial intermixture does exist. Added to these restrictions upon sexual choice are a great number of restrictions based (1) upon ideas of consanguinity and affinity; (2) upon locality; (3) upon separation of the sexes; (4) upon economic, cultural, and political differences; (5) upon parental ownership; (6) upon group or class control; and (7) upon the age of the bride or groom.

1. There is probably no human society in which sexual choice is not more or less restricted by consanguineous relations. Sometimes these restrictions are endogamous, requiring marriage within the kin, sometimes they are exogamous, prohibitive of marriage within the kin. As we shall see later, the notion of kinship is very different among different communities. The restrictions correspond to, but are never quite identical with, these notions of kinship.

There is almost always, for example, an aversion to marriage in the ascending or descending line, and yet in the matronymic or patronymic group father or mother, as the case may be, may not be reckoned of the same kin as the child. Again, in the endogamous group, brother-sister marriage is, as a rule, not customary. Endogamous or exogamous restrictions upon maternal or paternal uncle-niece or aunt-nephew or cousin marriage may exist irrespective of other endogamous or exogamous rules. Under ethnic organization, endogamous and exogamous rules commonly coexist in the same group or federation of groups. Similar although less formal restrictions exist in civil society. Marriage, as we have seen, may be forbidden both within an inner circle and without an outer circle of consanguinity. The clan, or phratry, to give another widespread example, may be exogamous and the tribe endogamous. Cross-cousin marriage, or marriage between cousins belonging to different totem clans or phratries may be required, whereas marriage between cousins belonging to the same totem clans or phratries may be forbidden. Adoption, fosterage, milk brotherhood, sponsorship, and affinity (connection through marriage) are frequently assimilated to blood relationship so that the relations to which they give rise are prohibitive marriage relations. Not uncommonly sons and brothers inherit the wives of their deceased relatives. Where, in another stage of conjugal relationship, widows inherit property, they may be married by the relatives of their deceased husband to keep the property within the kinship group. In Thibetan or brother polyandry and in North American or sister polygyny, sexual choice is, of course, partly restricted by affinity. Analogous restrictions are seen in the *levirate* or *niyoga* and in the substitution of a female relative for a barren or deceased wife.

2. In communities where social relations in general tend to be based less and less upon common blood, marriage restrictions of blood kinship

begin to diminish. In the passing of the blood tie into a territorial tie, for example, district endogamy or exogamy may be assimilated to kinship endogamy or exogamy, the inhabitants of the same locality being reputed and actually being in large part akin. For example, marriage within the clan, if the clan is scattered, may be allowed where marriage within the tribe, if the tribe is a local unit, is forbidden. District endogamy may also combine with economic class endogamy as in serfdom. Lack of freedom in general to move from one place to another—a condition which to a greater or lesser extent applies to the members of all communities—is, of course, a check upon sexual choice.

3. The segregation or separation of the sexes, which also to a greater or less extent characterizes all communities, is an analogous check. At puberty or, in many cases, before this period, boys and girls are commonly separated. They not infrequently sleep and eat in different places. Their occupations are differentiated. As we have already noted, both before and after marriage a greater or less degree of avoidance of one sex by the other may be practiced. The seclusion in general of women may be particularly marked. Pertinent in this connection is the fact that the custom of one sex, almost always the male, taking the initiative in courtship is also a check on the sexual choice.

4. In communities where economic, cultural (religious and intellectual), and political classes or castes are differentiated, marriage between members of different classes or castes is, as a rule, forbidden or discouraged. Irrespective of classes or castes, marriage between two given families or within sets of families may be customary. Different classes in the same community may have different marriage restrictions. Brother-sister marriage practiced exclusively by royal or noble families is a case in point. Again, the priestly class is frequently precluded from marriage, less frequently from all sexual intercourse. When not forbidden to marry, priests may in a polygynous community be limited to one wife or their choice may be limited to women of a certain kind, *e.g.*, to virgins. Forms of political or military celibacy may also occur.

5. An important restriction upon sexual choice we have already referred to in considering the subjects of age at betrothal and marriage and of wife purchase. We have learned that parental ownership precludes to a great extent the possibility of sexual choice on the part of girls, and to a less extent on that of youths. The bride price, the service of an able son- or daughter-in-law, affiliation with an influential group, are among the motives of the vicarious sexual choice of parents. Where marriage by purchase is well developed, the custom of negotiating a marriage through *marriage brokers* is very general. These agents may or may not be kinsmen or kinswomen. A high bride price is, as we have seen, a factor in postponing and therefore a restriction upon marriage. As it is not uncommonly thought derogatory to the woman's family to

marry her off for less than the customary bride price, female as well as male celibacy may even result from an inelastic, so to speak, bride price. The custom of female infanticide has even been alleged by those practicing it to be due to the fear of not obtaining an honorable bride price for the maiden.

6. The parents' right of choice may be inherited, or may be shared by other male kinsmen. Under group rule by elders, village community, feudal, or monarchical systems, this right may be shared or wholly usurped by the group elders, village council, chief overlord, or king.

6. *Extramarital Friendship between Men and Women*[1]

Friendship between men and women is rather a new thing in the history of the world. Friendship depends upon equality and choice, and there has been very little of either in the relations of the sexes, up to the present. A woman does not choose her male relatives, nor is she according to archaic family laws their equal; motives other than personal choice might lead her to become a man's wife; wholly impersonal reasons might place her in the relationship of kept mistress. Only in her rôle of paramour was there any implication of free choice; and even here there was no full equality, not even of danger. None of these customary relationships of the past can be said to have fostered friendship between men and women. Doubtless it did exist, but under difficulties.

Family bonds, however, are being more and more relaxed, women are no longer the wards of their male relatives, and friendship with a father or brother is more than ever possible. Further, the free personal choice which marked only the romantic amours of the age of chivalry is now popularly regarded in America as essential to any decent marriage, while the possibility of divorce tends to make free choice something besides a mere youthful illusion. More than ever before, husbands and wives are friends.

At the same time the intensity of friendships between people of the same sex appears to be diminishing. This intensity, in its classic instances, as in Greece, we now regard as an artificial product, the result of the segregation of the sexes and the low social position of women. As women become free and equal with men such romantic intensity of emotion finds a more biologically appropriate expression. Friendships between people of the same sex must today compete on the one hand with romantic love and on the other with the more fascinating though often less enduring friendships which can now be enjoyed between men and women. Neglect of these latter opportunities is coming to be regarded as a kind of spiritual cowardice, or at least as a failure in enterprise.

[1] From Dell, Floyd, Can Men and Women Be Friends? *Nation*, vol. 118, pp. 605–606, May 28, 1924.

The influences of the machine age, so destructive to fixed authoritarian relationships, appear to foster the growth of friendship between the sexes; so much so that we may expect it to become, in its further developments, a characteristic social feature of the age that lies immediately before us.

Friendship will become a more and more important aspect of marriage itself; but, except in the effects of its wider spread, this will hardly be a new thing—we have friendships between husbands and wives now. Nor will extramarital friendships between men and women be precisely a new thing. What will be new, furnishing us with an interesting theme for sociological speculation, are the conventions which will gradually come into existence to give social protection and dignity to extramarital friendships.

Conventions are, doubtless, always rather ridiculous, inevitably a shackle upon the free motions of the soul, being imposed by fear. But it will be remembered that we, in America, with a vast amount of freedom of intersexual association, have thus far only begun to dispense with the locks and bars and whippings and chaperons which were the appurtenances of a physical segregation of the sexes; the vast paraphernalia of psychic segregation, including sexual taboos which hark back to the primeval darkness, are with us still. Our minds are habituated to unreasonable fears in all matters concerning the relations of the sexes. For a long time, extramarital friendships of men and women may be expected to be hedged about with elaborate and specific permissions, for the sake of keeping them under social control. Yet these conventions may be very convenient; and however irksome they may seem to the free spirits of a future day, they may still be such as would appear to us generously libertarian.

Today, in the absence of such conventions, it does not suffice that a man and woman, too well married to be afraid of extramarital friendships, grant them to each other by private treaty; relatives, friends, and neighbors do not fail to be duly alarmed. Extramarital friendship exists in an atmosphere of social suspicion which a few conventions would go far to alleviate.

As an example in a different field, the convention with regard to dancing may be adduced. If dancing were not a general custom, if it were the enlightened practice of an advanced few, how peculiar and suspicious would seem the desire of Mr. X and Mrs. Y to embrace each other to music; and how scandalized the neighbors would be to hear that they *did!* No one would rest until the pair had been driven into an elopement.

We build huge palaces for the kind of happy communion which dancing furnishes; we tend more and more to behave like civilized beings about the impulses which are thus given scope. We are less socially hospitable to the impulses of friendship between men and women.

In friendship there are many moods; but the universal rite of friendship is *talk*. Talk needs no palaces for its encouragement; it is not an expensive affair; it would seem to be well within the reach of all. Yet it isn't. For the talk of friendship requires privacy—though the privacy of a table for two in a crowded and noisy restaurant will suffice; and it requires time. Such talk does not readily adjust itself to the limitations of the dinner hour. It is a flower slow in unfolding; and it seems to come to its most perfect bloom only after midnight. But, unfortunately, not every restaurant keeps open all night. It is satisfied with two comfortable chairs; a table to lean elbows on is good, too; in winter an open fire, where friendly eyes may stare dreamily into the glowing coals—that is very good; hot or cold drinks according to the season, and a cigarette—these are almost the height of friendship's luxury.

These seem not too much to ask. Yet the desire for privacy and uncounted hours of time together is, when considered from that point of view, scandalous in its implications; quite as much so as the desire of Mr. X and Mrs. Y to embrace each other to music. However, Mr. X and Mrs. Y do, under the aegis of a convention, indulge their desire and embrace each other to their heart's content with the full approval of civilized society; and it seems as though another convention might grow up, under the protection of which Mr. X and Mrs. Y might sit up and talk all night without its seeming queer of them.

Queer, at the least, it does seem nowadays, except under the conventions of courtship; friends who happen to be married to each other can of course talk comfortably in bed. These bare facts are sufficient to explain why so many men and women who really want to be friends and sit up all night occasionally and talk find it easy to believe that they are in love with each other. They find it all the easier to believe this, because friendship between the sexes is usually spiced with some degree of sexual attraction. But a degree of sexual attraction which might have kept a friendship forever sweet may prove unequal to the requirements of a more serious and intimate relationship. Disillusionment is the penalty, at the very least. Society could well afford to grant more freedom to friendship between men and women, and save the expense of a large number of broken hearts.

It is worth while to wonder if a good deal of "romance" is not, after all, friendship mistaking itself for something else; or rather, finding its only opportunity for expression in that mistake. Among civilized people, after the romance has ended, the friendship remains. It may perhaps have been worth while to imagine oneself in love, in order to enjoy a friendship; but it seems rather a wasteful proceeding.

Yet those who, taking a merely economical view of the situation, attempt to enjoy such friendships without becoming involved or involving others in such waste, may with some embarrassment discover—what

Mrs. Grundy could have told them all along—that friendship and sexual romance may sometimes be difficult to relegate to previously determined boundaries. Friendship between the sexes may, if only for a moment, seem to demand the same tokens of sincerity as romantic love. Does not this fact threaten the traditional, jealousy-guarded dignity of marriage?

Perhaps it does. At present, in any conflict of claims between a marriage and a friendship, there is "nothing to arbitrate"; marriage has all the rights, friendship none. If the rights of friendship are to be at all considered and protected, marriage may have to yield something. It may not be good manners for husbands and wives to be jealous of the quite possible momentary exuberances of each other's friendships; it may be that such incidents will be regarded as being within the discretion of the persons immediately concerned, and not quite proper subjects for inquiry, speculation, or comment by anybody else.

And this might have an effect unsuspected by those whom such a prospect of liberty would most alarm today. When a moment's rashness does not necessarily imply red ruin and the breaking up of homes, when sex is freed to a degree from the sense of overwhelming social consequences, it may well become a matter of more profound personal consequence; and with nothing to fear except the spoiling of their friendship, men and women in an ardent friendship may yet prefer talk to kisses.

But what if they do not? A complete answer to that question, from the Utopian point of view, would take us far afield from the subject of friendship; yet some further answer may seem to be required, if only by way of confessing to Mrs. Grundy that the problem is not so simple as it may seem. Well, then, out of many possibilities which the future holds, I offer this one for what it may be worth. Such friendships, let us agree, tend to merge insensibly into romantic sexual love. But if marriage may be conceived as yielding some of its traditional rights, extramarital romance may well be called upon for similar concessions. The first thing that extramarital romance might be asked to surrender would be its intolerable and fatuous airs of holiness. Yes, "holiness" is the word—a holiness all the more asserted by such extramarital lovers because their relations are likely to be taken disrespectfully by a stupid world.

Oh, unquestionably, if you ask them, never was any legal and conventional love so high and holy as this romantic passion of theirs! Its transcendental holiness calls for sacrifices. So they sacrifice themselves—and, incidentally, others—to it. Anything less, they feel, would be cowardly. They must not palter with these sacred emotions—not even by the exercise of their dormant sense of humor! So it is today. But perhaps in a future where extramarital romance is made room for with a tender and humorous courtesy, it may give up these preposterous and solemn airs, and actually learn to smile at its illusions—illusions

which will still give the zest of ultimate danger to relationships of merely happy and light-hearted play. Thus life will continue to be interesting.

As for the talk of friendship, my Utopian speculations uncover for me no respect in which the thing itself can be improved upon. The circumstances can be made happier, the attitude of society can foster it; but the talk of friendship has already reached a splendid perfection beyond which my imagination is unable to soar. At its best it has, despite its personal aspect, an impersonal beauty; it is a poignant fulfillment of those profound impulses which we call curiosity and candor; it serves human needs as deep as those which poetry and music serve, and is in some sense an art like them. The art exists, and it remains only for the future to give it an adequate hospitality.

7. *A Study of Sexual Morality*[1]

In making a comparative study of forty women with whose personal lives I have become thoroughly familiar, it has been possible to generalize somewhat, though it is always difficult to assert absolute determinate causes for sexual downfall or control, because femininity is intricate in its complexity or contradictory in its characteristics, and many factors play upon or influence the sexual life. Subtleties of personality, sexual appeal, economic pressure, the letting down of standards, unwise sex education or the lack of it (suggestion or ignorance), reaction to excitement, beauty, environment, religion, stimulants, or repression—these, and many other elements, must all be given due consideration.

If we designate the normal woman as a woman of sexual inexperience before marriage, happily married, her full powers, mental and physical, developed evenly after marriage, we must with this standard as a basis reckon with every complication of individuality in sorting the sex stories of women, good or bad, who are honest enough to talk of themselves. I am doubtful about using the words "good" and "bad." The responsibility of definition is great in using descriptive terms which may require qualification.

In the study of sexual morality it is important to remember that it is characteristic of femininity to give, of masculinity to take. Let us then consider that sex is composed of three elements: (1) physical desire and satisfaction; (2) mental demand and a supplementing of individuality—as Browning puts it, "all that a woman adds to a man"; (3) a realization of the existence of the spiritual relation which can only in part be analyzed or comprehended.

The sensitive, the refined, the highly developed have this third quality in marked degree. The further one goes down the intellectual scale,

[1] Adapted from SMITH, EDITH LIVINGSTON, A Study in Sexual Morality, *Jour. Social Hygiene*, vol. 2, pp. 527–537, October, 1916.

the less likely one is to find it influence the sexual life. Thus goodness and badness are relative terms, and our standard, such as it is, a shifting one. Convention and license both cover facts of life it is best to know, and it is our duty to determine where women of today reveal their true natures, whether repressed by restraining ties or demoralized by economic independence.

In general, women may be grouped under two headings:

1. Emotional women who are physically awakened early, mental understanding and interpretation of sex coming later.

2. Intellectual women with mental realization of sex, who are either sexually cold or who have complete physical control.

Under the first group come the girls who go wrong once and stop, the reasons being largely fear of pregnancy, knowledge of venereal disease, terror of all that women must give, physical revulsion of feeling when the maternal instinct is aroused, or sincere shame at having given way to abandon. Such girls often marry later—as widows marry; they understand men and are all the more appealing. They may become prostitutes (if they do not stop), either professional or semiprofessional. Under this group we may also place the very sensitive good women who have physical satiety with mental revulsion of feeling (some of the unhappy wives), the changeable who fall in love many times physically, real love coming later, prostitutes who become weary of evil, good wives who turn to lovers. The latter are generally those, who from monotony of virtue with stress of feeling, or monotony of marriage without love, break the traces.

Under the second group may be classed many good women whose maternal instinct is very strong, sometimes overdeveloped. Their physical craving is to love and kiss children, and they may hate or merely tolerate men. Often such women do not marry. If married they make very commonplace wives, are sometimes frigid, and in this event are frequently the cause of marital discord. Under this group come also many women of the adventuress type, the pervert, and the calculating prostitute who is the mistress of the rich man. In such women, good or bad, the sexual feeling may be aroused but mental control is dominant. It is interesting to note in passing that frigidity in women is often accompanied by keen intellectual powers. It is questionable, however, from the viewpoint of individual attainment, whether the barrenness of an emotionless personality with such intellectual force compensates for the capacity for feeling which the emotional woman has who is keenly alive to the possibilities of her nature.

In the sheltered classes, the first type marry young and impulsively and are very happy or very unhappy in marriage. In the unprotected classes, they are the victims, willing or unwilling, of many types of men. In the sheltered classes, the second type seldom go wrong. In the

unprotected classes, they may do so. Women in the second group are often very beautiful but not as a rule of the human, feminine type.

With these observations in mind the following questions may be considered:

1. What is the comparative value of protection for girls, *i.e.*, chaperonage, as a preventive of sexual immorality?

2. Is there danger to the chastity of girls who are out in the industrial world?

3. What is our responsibility for present-day conditions and how are we meeting them?

It should be pointed out that, with the possible exception of one woman, none of the women considered in this study were feeble-minded in the general acceptance of the term. All were capable of self-analysis and the types were varied—from women of simple education to women of brilliancy and social standing, and what is more important, women with an hereditary background of self-restraint. A culminating point of moral recklessness, physical license, or mental crisis as a direct result of sex complication was realized in each of these lives. In other words, there were sex experiences before marriage or emotional conflicts after. We have tried to analyze the chief governing force responsible for these occurrences but have come to the conclusion that, in many cases, any one of the several factors might equally well have had the emphasis placed upon it.

Certain contributing causes for immorality might be termed "accessories after the fact." Economic pressure, for instance, is a very strong governing force; but seldom, if ever, is it the only reason for letting down the bars of restraint. A previous sexual experience has almost always paved the way, or close intimacy with others who are having such experiences, *i.e.*, suggestion. The same is true of love of finery as a reaction against grinding poverty, or the exhilaration of sympathy after periods of unhappiness.

On the other hand, sexual hunger during the period of adolescence and at sporadic intervals in a woman's life is the chief accessory before the fact. With many persons this is an overwhelming intoxication bordering on irresponsibility but without mental disorder. Emotion's potentiality forestalls stability of character as physical development precedes mental appreciation. Thus many a girl working in factory or shop stumbles upon the path of her immaturity in yielding to sexual fascination and her craving is fed with the bitter fruit of knowledge. Emotional yearning, passionate exultation, and a generous impulse are but the expression of her awakening physical nature. She is a child, untutored, and like a child she obeys her instinct which is to bring gifts to the object of her adoration. Is it strange that she gives herself, when, with senses stirred, masculinity entices, commands, and possesses? Are we sure of the

accuracy of our word "morality" that we call this result of Nature's untaught awakening "sin," that we permit young girls upon the slippery ground of sexual temptation and point to them as fallen?

Other reasons for sex irregularities we may call "principals" remembering always that the lines of demarcation blur a little as individuality meets the issue of sexual temptation.

We believe then that no special cause or group of causes should be set apart by students of sociology as dangers which, if obviated, will avert the moral evils we are facing. The best we can hope to do is to determine tendencies and out of accumulated experience create counterforces for good to check an evil which is but a part of the changing social conditions of the times.

We give below a statement of the chief reasons why these women seemed to deviate from a normal sexual life. We say "seemed" for we are firmly convinced that sexual tempests are likely to occur and do occur in the lives of the majority of women, except the sexually cold, only the world does not know about them.

REASONS FOR SEXUAL ADVENTURE, UNHAPPINESS OR UNFAITHFULNESS

Crowded home conditions; street life	2
Bad or perverted; good intelligence	3
Atmosphere; sex experiment; moonlight, rural walks	2
Emotional type; physical contact and inexperience	5
Drink	2
Mental excitement; spirit of adventure	4
Unhappy homes; love of sympathy and understanding	5
Strong sex appeal to men (with or without affection)	4
Loneliness; economic pressure	2
For fun; ignorance of sex	3
Mismated (married women or mistresses)	7
Sexually cold but good-natured	1
	40

We append a suggestive but necessarily incomplete list of governing forces for good or evil in the sex life of women in general and this group of women in particular. With this as a guide it may be well to take certain life stories and try to show how the reasons given above are influenced or nullified by contradictory factors. Then, in recapitulation, we may hope to determine what counterforces might have been brought to bear and thus sum up the strength and weakness of our present-day control.

Governing Forces in Sex Development

Loneliness, repression, depression, emotion, and sexual hunger. (Closely associated with this, as a force, may be listed, atmosphere, *i.e.*, flowers, perfumes, sense of beauty, luxury, and the security of isolation).

Religion. (A safeguard or a temptation.)

Fear. (A valuable weapon but the cause of much sex antagonism and misunderstanding.)

Economic pressure. (Under this heading one may list poverty, drudgery, monotonous economy, jealousy of others' belongings, and vanity.)

Hero worship. (A mental and physical power under which heading one may list admiration of masculine strength and sexual thrilling to masculine authority.)

Sex education. (Good if it gives understanding and proper balance and is woven in with other education and mental development; harmful if it stimulates sex curiosity without giving real information and without developing reverence which begets spiritual interpretation and mental restraint.)

Stimulants. (Under intoxicants one may list drink, drugs, music, wind, and many other elements of nature, dancing, and rhythm.)

Suggestion. (Influence of others for good or bad.)

TYPICAL LIFE STORIES

A. 38. American woman, forty-five years old, married. Husband is a prosperous real-estate broker, a member of many clubs, a churchwarden, director of several corporations, a typical business man of the type termed "successful," a good citizen "without one redeeming vice."

She is a beautiful woman, albeit tired and faded. Her hair is prematurely white, her youthful face with deep-set brown eyes has a wistful contradictory appearance. Has many sides to her nature, can play ball with her boys as well as she can preside at a meeting. Is a good companion, has many friends, and leads a busy life as head of a prosperous household. Has five children, four boys and one girl. One would not guess that she is an unsatisfied woman; her friends all think her life ideal and, in a sense, she does not deny it. This in substance is her view of married life though not literally word for word:

I suppose there can never be a school for marriage—how could there be—yet how sad it is that everyone must begin at the same place to work out the same problem. I had a good father and mother. They did not understand me but that was probably more my fault than theirs; I never confided in my mother overmuch. My father considered my mental progress at all times and I owe him much for the manner in which he made me think for myself, strengthened my views, and guided my education. When I left finishing school I played in society for two years and many of the men I met interested me, though none compelled me. I had never been given any clear conception of what marriage should be in the ideal sense. I knew vaguely that the man I married must be in my own class, good and honorable, and rich enough to maintain a dignified household. I had more of a vision of love at sixteen than at twenty-six, the year I married, though I was sure I loved my husband and I do—that is, he is as much a part of my life as my religion or my household conventions. He is wholly a product of civilization and I discovered too late there is an element of the savage in most women. They wish to be captured—possessed—not in the sense the suffragists talk about; it is really a sense of self-abasement, for it is the adoration of an ideal. They wish to love a man in the open—a fighter, a victor—rather than the men we know who have their hearts in money making and play at being men. Perhaps it cannot be remedied. It is only a bit of wildness that will never be tamed in women, but it makes for unhappiness just the same.

My sex life had never been dominant. I had a commonplace adolescence with physical longings and sensations which were not explained to me and which

did me no harm. My relation with my husband was perfectly orthodox, and vaguely I longed for something different. My husband was shocked at any demonstration on my part. If I was impulsive and threw myself in his arms he straightened his tie before he kissed me. Once at our cottage in the mountains I suggested that we spend the night in the woods. I saw a possibility of our getting nearer each other physically and spiritually if we could get out in the wilderness away from the restraints and niceties of our luxurious household. That was the first time I ever felt like a traitor. He told me quite sternly to go to bed, I was not a wild Indian and could not act like one. I went to the nursery for the night and snuggled close to my little boy and was glad he was young and slender and hoped he would never grow fat and complacent. I had noticed for the first time that my husband was growing stout, like any other churchwarden.

Since that time I have never been wholly happy. It was not the foolish incident, it was the fundamental principle underlying our civilization. Our babies came rather closely together and I was glad that the mother element in me needed to be uppermost. My husband was perfectly content with life, I satisfied him at dinner parties, I could dress well and talk well, managed the household money to advantage and was at hand—tame, quite tame—when he wished to kiss me. I do not mean to sound sarcastic and bitter. It is not what my husband is which troubles me, but what he is not; I think I speak for many women. I am more mated to the vision of what my children's father might have been than to the good kind man whom I teach them to love and respect.

Perhaps you have guessed I am coming to a confession. I met the man in England two summers ago but he is an American and is in this country now, a friend of ours whom we both see quite often. Something in both of us flared the very night we met. He and Lawrence (my husband) get along famously, they both believe in many of the same ideals and discuss kindred subjects, but my brain and his supplement each other in a way which is hard to explain. I did not mean to love him. It is an upper stratum of myself; I love Lawrence; I mean I belong to him, am part of his very being and he of mine, but I am myself when I am with this other man, and I refuse to think what a different self it might have been had I known him before. The very morning after I faced the awful fact that I was thinking of a man other than my husband, Lawrence put a bouquet at my plate at the breakfast table. It was a red geranium, a tiny pink rose, and some leaves of striped grass. Poor Lawrence.

Our adventure in love came rapidly. He understood me perfectly and I knew that he cared. We have never told Lawrence for we do not intend to do anything more that is wrong. He has spent several evenings at the house when Lawrence was away. There was no deception about this—it just happened and we have talked and kissed and faced life in the open. We decided quite calmly, and without passion, that we would have each other entirely just once. I wanted the complete vision of what my love could mean. If it is wrong I cannot think so, at any rate I would not give up the memory of that time. It was only once and it was a year ago. We both knew there could be no continued sex relation. When I have an opportunity I kiss him and he, me. Lawrence never kisses my lips so they belong to him. He has helped me to be more patient and understanding of my life as it has been and must be. I have my children

and must live out the life for their sakes and for Lawrence who loves me, tamed and domesticated.

If life could be—what it would mean to give him a child, but life in its entirety cannot be—for me. Probably that is the creed of many women.

A 14. American woman, thirty-six years old, only child; dark brown hair and eyes, slender graceful figure; nervous, clever, original. Father died when she was very young, mother when she was twelve years old. Father had been a clever business man, wild in his youth, drank some. Paternal grandmother had eloped with his father. This grandmother was a quiet mysterious woman whose passionate nature had spent itself so that in older life she had much of the charm left without the unrest. A 14 surmised vaguely some mystery about her grandmother but she had never heard the real story. As a child she (Patty we will call her) was naughty and impulsive. Her mother was a stolid soul who did fairly well with her small daughter. They had plenty of money so she had every advantage. She had early sexual feelings but no sex education. She was full of emotion, alive to every fancy, rushing headlong into every new whim. Her mother treated these tantrums with quiet tolerance. Patty was spoiled but lovable and the quiet children liked her as well as the tomboys. There was something boyish about her slight figure, something old and wise in her wonderful brown eyes. The rest of her face was elflike, not at all beautiful, but she had a pretty manner and was a child to be noticed. When her mother died she stood out alone among the girls of her set, a figure unique. In her simple black frocks she seemed like a breeze masquerading as a silence. She was almost grotesque, "pathetic" her elders called her, "odd" the other girls thought her, but there was not one of them who did not respect her extra excitement, her wilder dances, her lack of apparent grief after her mother's death. They all understood it was her way of letting no one know she felt badly. She would wipe away a few tears; then rush headlong into the next wickedness of which she could think.

Patty went to live with her mother's sister—a woman, passive, unimaginative. Her household would have been depressing to any normal girl—to a gypsy like Patty it was prison. Her uncle was a lawyer, fat and pompous, and there were two maiden aunts, silent, dull, and conventional. None of Patty's friends cared to visit this household; it was generally understood that Patty come to see them—an arrangement all liked better. In reality all the family tried to make their little charge happy, to get into her atmosphere instead of dragging her into theirs. One might as well have tried to make an inset of a French play in the Bible. She soon began to be daft about the boys (thirteen to fifteen years old). She danced well and was always the center of a group wherever she went. Her adoration of boys was harmless enough, impartial, and unrestrained. She did not confine herself to the social register of the town in which she lived and finally it was whispered that Patty had picked up a student on the street, that she had his picture and he hers, that she took walks with him after school. This was a distinction in flirting that was both horrible and admirable. Patty was ashamed in her heart but carried off the situation with bravado. Some of her girl friends felt vague forebodings but, knowing nothing of real danger in sex matters, laid it to Patty's unconventionality, and watched her in awe. Naturally her aunt heard of her goings on and she was sent to the same school she had been attending but as a boarder. This worked well for the first year but she was in

endless scrapes and escapades, and the second year the principals of the school decided she was a demoralizing influence, dear child though she was.

At sixteen she was a dreadful flirt, a fairly good student, and an adept at every kind of sport. About this time she made friends with a girl whom all the girls knew, but only slightly. There were rumors about her family which the girls heard long before their elders but knowing nothing of real facts they kept their surmises to themselves—gossiped and wondered. Patty spent much time at this girl's house and her aunt did not interfere. Soon stories began to be whispered. Boy students went to call on the girls and stayed very late. Patty always stayed with this girl when her parents were away. The servants in the house knew the facts of the case and had been bribed to keep still. All of Patty's friends were desperate but loyal. No one would tell on her. Patty kissed the boys and ran after them. Olive, her friend, did worse things—but what? Led by this wholly bad girl Patty was living the life of a willful, passionate, little harlot, her heart wholly rebellious, her keen sex instincts wholly aroused. Class protection saved her for a long time. None of the boys quite dared to seduce her but as time went on there were plenty of people who believed the worst and finally she let herself go completely. Soon after she became pregnant. Before this her aunt had stopped her friendship with Olive but when she became quiet, wild eyed, and shy no one could believe the awful truth. The news spread like wildfire and Patty left the town. One of the boys was anxious to marry her but she admitted she was not sure which of three boys was the father of her child and said she would not marry anyone. She lived in the country with some good people and motherhood woke all the emotions of her best self. The baby lived only a short time and she came to her home town to visit her aunt, apparently for the purpose of being confirmed in her old church. She was the same fascinating girl with a sudden dignity of womanhood that amazed everyone. People talked of her bravery in facing them all and no one would have dared to be anything but nice to her. Even the gossips realized that Patty was something of a person after all. She went abroad after this, studied, and traveled. She was as talkative as ever and did every wild and impetuous thing which struck her fancy but with a contradictory element of reserve too elusive to explain. Her chaperon, who knew nothing of her past, often commented on the fact that Patty could manage the men—no one presumed to take liberties with her.

When twenty-three she lost her heart to a man ten years her senior, a strong character with a dominant personality. When he told Patty he loved her, she flung herself in his arms and told the whole story rapidly, truthfully, without thought of the consequences. He held her close while she sobbed and quieted her as no one had ever quieted Patty before. "Hush dear" he said. "Of course it was necessary to tell me; we will never speak of it again. I know how much you need me. You have always needed me. I think I can make you happy."

Patty ends the story by saying that in this man she found the refuge which was her salvation. Though intellectually her superior, her husband is stimulated by her active mind. Their sex relation is perfect. She has plenty of friends, both men and women, and he loves and admires her. Their home is comfortable, secure. They have two lovely children—a boy and a girl.

This woman realizes the faults of her nature. In looking back she thinks she flew blindly as a bird would fly, yet never without a subconscious realization

of her folly. Her impulses were merely stronger than her control. She thinks she is probably more dependent upon a sex life than many women, yet intellectually she has developed wonderfully and is really a splendid woman, albeit too nervous, oversensitive, and frail.

A 27. Prostitute (semiprofessional), also a stenographer, thirty-five years old; fair hair, slightly grey and waving about temples; keen, sensitive face; big grey eyes; sad mouth, fine and firm; very white teeth; doesn't smile often. Works in an office as private secretary, fairly happy in work, and her employers trust her. Had good antecedents; father was a lawyer, man of strong feelings and emotions, something of a scholar; liked people within his home but had little social life outside. Wife was a quiet person with pretty face and little imagination who adored him and looked on his work from afar.

She knew nothing of sex during childhood and did not understand how hard it was for her father to live his life with no personality to give him inspiration. Instinctively he turned to her as she was alive to every issue, keen and eager to be a man and do a man's work, in every other way essentially feminine. She had a brilliant mind (untrained) and rather a frail body. Went to school in home village and to near-by city for lessons with tutors, studied music especially. Her mother died when she was sixteen. She had few girl friends; most of her acquaintances were men, friends of her father. She kept the house with one old Scotch maid, and learned many housewifely duties.

When she was twenty years old a college professor came to visit her father. He was fifteen years her senior, strong man with stern face, and of vivid personality and he played the violin like a master. As she played the piano and sang they soon made friends over their music, though she feared the man because of his superior age and strength and the possibilities of his nature, being unable to analyze the subtle effect she feared. Her father was engrossed in his books in the evenings and left them alone with their music. This man was her father's friend but he soon taught her the full power of her emotional nature. Music became merely the introduction to the balcony with the music of the wind sighing through the trees and the man's sensuous kisses on her lips. He did her no physical harm but she idolized him and lived in the dream of what their life would be in the fulfillment of their love. It seemed more wonderful to keep it a secret. She did not tell her father. With the summer he went abroad and in two months came the announcement of his marriage to a woman he had known many years. Her father did not see the connection between this news and her sudden decision to go on the stage, which her singing teacher had wished her to do. She was a favorite in a minor part in musical comedy when she strained her voice. Her father died suddenly about this time. While on the stage she was immoral in an unhappy sort of way. She met a young artist whose struggles for success aroused her pity and motherly instinct. With the memory of her faithless lover uppermost she plunged into a passionate realization of sex, more to drown her feelings than anything else. She roused the best in this boy, made a man of him, and steadied him. With her sexual tempests there came an aftercalm when she forbade any familiarity. This was not studied but an instinct. She hated men, yet they fascinated her, and she them.

She studied stenography and worked as private secretary in a theatrical company. She tried to face life with work as her only outlet, but the restlessness of her grief made her crave excitement. She made friends easily but her sexual appeal made it difficult for her to fit into a commonplace social atmosphere. She married the artist to the girl he loved, after a terrible struggle to make him realize it was not herself he loved. Later he came and thanked her. "The quiet women make the best wives," he said, "but my wife would not have loved me if you had not made me into a man. She cannot, however, give me what I get from you. I wish I could come to you once in a while."

She said yes, and he came. That was five years ago and is why she calls herself a prostitute. Her women friends have no idea, she is not the quiet, dignified woman she appears to be, and men, many of them married men, want her for their own. She has no use for the man about town; only the man with brains or talent fascinates her at all. She says, "I suppose everyone would think me a sinner; I am. I deliberately let a married man stay with me for a time. It is an art. I have learned to know their troubles. They tell me they are unhappy with their wives, wish to go away, are desperate with the monotony of existence. It is generally that they are not sexually mated, or the wife has no sex attraction. Of course she loves him, and he her. I give them what they need. It is weary for the brain to understand men, it is harder on me mentally than physically. I control them only because I have self-restraint. I send them away soon. They are furious; they storm and rage and threaten they will go to some other woman. What do I care? They know it and I send them back to their wives. They will go to her; they would not go to any other woman. That is where I do good. This sex business is a strange thing. I am a missionary prostitute. I only do this once in a while, when I think a man needs me and he is one who will come under my influence. I know I have managed to avert the downfall of several households. If the wives knew? Never mind; they don't. I am not coarse; I can be a comrade to a man and doubt if I harm him. I make him sin in the general acceptance of the term, the common interpretation of God's commandments. How do we know God didn't mean us to use all the powers he gave us? How could I use mine when the woman in me is drowned in a memory?

"I love sex for itself; but love? I loved one man. I hate myself for my weakness but I love him still. One day I met his children on the street with their nurse. I deliberately went to the college town where he lives. I made friends with the nurse and held the baby in my lap and pretended it was mine. Why should women love so and why should it be given them thus to suffer?

"I have never become pregnant. It is a fancy of mine but I like to believe I would have had children if I had married the man I love. Perhaps nature has been kind in my case."

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Chapter XI

FAMILY LIFE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

The development of personality is the standpoint from which the social and institutional aspects of a society are to be evaluated. It is the major objective in any human social order. Whatever arrangements contribute to the development of wholesome personalities are socially desirable; whatever makes for personal disorganization and demoralization, except as transition stages to a more efficient life organization, is socially undesirable.

The personality is determined and developed through contacts and experiences. So far as the individual participates in a social situation it becomes a part of his self. He is a different person as a result of each significant experience. What these significant experiences are, in the case of the free adult person, depends upon what he is at the time. His contacts, aside from catastrophe, are determined by his existing interests and habit patterns. These, in turn, are the product of his social past. In the life of the child contacts are largely prearranged. The milieu in which he is placed and the groups in which he acquires and holds membership are not matters of his choosing; they are parts of the social situation into which he comes at birth. It is this "dynamic environment," as Miss Burleigh calls it in the first paper, with its unavoidable contacts and experiences, that determines the nature and direction of personality development.

In the personality development of the child, the family is perhaps the most important shaping influence. It is of course only one element of the social heritage, only one of a number of groups that influence the child; the school and the play groups are also very important. But the family is first in point of time and, during the more plastic and impressionable years of child life, provides almost the only stimulations and patterns to which he is exposed. Both the psychoanalysts as represented in this chapter by Miss Neumann and Dr. Myerson and the behaviorists for whom Mr. Brown and Miss Blanchard speak, agree in regard to the determining influence of these early experiences. The family is not only the earliest set of influences in the life of the child but it provides the most uniform social environment in his experience. This uniformity is a matter of first importance in the formation of habit patterns which, once fixed, tend to persist and to operate as independent factors in the selection of later contacts and experiences. In the family the child also has more

contacts and these contacts are more intimate than elsewhere. The number and nature of the contacts are of great significance especially in the development of the emotional character. Mr. Burgess' paper is an incisive analysis of the way in which the family and the home in general determine the social and economic status as well as the educational opportunities and the vocation of the child. These are most important in their immediate effects as well as in the fact that they become independent factors in determining adolescent and adult contacts and experiences.

The original differences between individuals in intellectual capacity and emotional disposition doubtless have important determining effects upon personality development, as is recognized in the paper by Miss Blanchard and at several other points in the chapter. By original endowment the child has certain, and often definite, intellectual possibilities and limitations; he may have certain more or less unalterable emotional characters; he may be endowed with special vocational talents; and in other ways his original and hereditary characters are items in personality development. The native predispositions should not be denied but the student should at the same time be on his guard against the very general tendency to exaggerate their importance in personal development and behavior.

1. *Environment Is Dynamic*[1]

Environment, according to Webster's Dictionary, is "(1) Act of environing. (2) That which environs; the surrounding conditions, influences, or forces." In other words, environment is dynamic. It does things to the individual.

Walter Lippman points out in his "Public Opinion" that most people form little pictures in their minds of persons and of situations. Reference to these persons or situations calls to mind these pictures, and very often on such pictures judgments are formed.

There is a large number of people in the community who think of environment as composed of only such things as economic and social status, their judgment being based on outward appearances alone. They are apt to ask themselves, are these people desirable for us to know? If wealth and social position appear in the picture their question is answered in the affirmative and on this basis the evaluation of the environment is also formed.

What may be included in the "conditions, influences, or forces" which surround the child? Economic status? Yes; what the parents are able to give the child in the way of educational advantages and social and cultural opportunities has much influence on the child. Social

[1] BURLEIGH, EDITH N., What Is Environment? *Family*, vol. 8, pp. 317–318, January, 1928.

status? Yes; first through the stimuli which the child receives from the family, and second through the stimuli which he receives from society outside the family because of its evaluation of the family status.

These things which are ordinarily considered to be the environment have little direct effect upon the individual; at best they affect him indirectly.

When we come to evaluate what in his surroundings influences the child most, we are immediately confronted by the problems of the social relationships of the child.

These social relationships begin in the home in earliest infancy and continue to be most potent forces in the whole life of the individual.

Every infant begins life as an asocial being, fully occupied with acquainting himself with his environment and how he can satisfy his wants. His reaction patterns are the outcome of the conflict between these egocentric strivings and the environmental influences which are brought to bear upon him. There is constant interaction between the child and his environment. Not only does the environment affect the child, but he affects the environment and this in turn affects him again.

Most important in the child's life are the relationships in the family. First, those of the father and mother to each other. It is not enough for the father and mother to conceal their differences from the children, they must adjust or remove these differences. Second, those of the father and mother to the group of children—their children. Third, those of the father to the child and of the mother to the child, and those of the child to each parent. Fourth, those of the child to his individual brothers and sisters.

It is these relationships which give form and direction to the child's love, to his hate, to his fears. It is out of these relationships that crippling jealousies and envies may emerge, crippling not only to his happiness but to his efficiency, and not only in the present but in the future.

When a child has had no opportunity to develop love for others through being loved himself, fear and hate will play a more prominent rôle and are apt to fill his life, preventing him from making happy adjustments to the people and situations he has to meet.

All these emotional and social patterns are molded first from the intimate relationships of the family.

Whether he succeeds or fails in his social adjustments outside the family, in the neighborhood, or at school, depends upon the adequacy of the social patterns developed within the environmental forces of the family.

A child in his behavior generally finds his models in the accustomed behavior patterns first of the other members of his family, then of the adults among his relatives whom he admires, or in the neighborhood, or

at school. Some of his companions serve as his models also. From these patterns, which often influence him both directly and indirectly, he acquires his attitudes toward authority, for instance. If his parents are critical of the school and his teachers, he reflects this attitude by rebellion or antagonism. If he feels that his parents are fair in their judgments of others or of his own mistakes and misbehavior, the child gets an attitude of fair play which he carries on in his own relations with the people he meets. Whether he considers the rights of other people depends more upon his experience in his family than upon oft-repeated precepts. His attitude toward work may be a repetition of that of his parents. Even his sense of humor is largely dependent upon the family mood. In ways of gaining his own ends he is much influenced by the patterns set by the other members of the family. In fact, emotional reaction patterns are constantly before him in the family life and his habits of reaction are influenced inevitably by these moods.

Few people are analytical or objective enough to understand their own environment. It is perhaps too much to expect them to have the ability to pass accurate judgment on the influences which have molded the lives of others.

When we come to a fuller appreciation of these dynamic forces, these emotional experiences, environment will cease to be limited to purely economic and social factors.

2. *Undefined Hereditary Impulses Conditioned by the Environment*[1]

It is a long established fact that a child does not possess human nature at the outset, but equally important is the fact that he does not have a world in which to live. Both human nature and the world in which he is to live must be acquired through experience and both have a simultaneous development.

The family is the first world in which the child will normally live and it has to be acquired through experience. It is in the process by which a child acquires a family in which to live and develops human nature that one must look for an adequate explanation of the diverse patterns of behavior in the same family.

It is obvious that no one can develop a personality or acquire a social world without the human organism. The important thing about the human organism for the development of human nature is the undefined activity that may be socially defined. Dr. Faris has said: "The important thing about human heredity movements for the development of human behavior is their unorganized quality." Professor Cooley said: "Roughly speaking, then, the heredity of the other animals is a mecha-

[1] Adapted from BROWN, LAWRENCE G., The Development of Diverse Patterns of Behavior Among Children in the Same Family, *Family*, vol. 9, pp. 35–39, April, 1928.

nism like that of a hand organ; it is made to play a few tunes. You can play these tunes at once, with little or no training; and you can never play any others. The heredity of man on the other hand is a mechanism more like that of a piano. It is not made to play particular tunes; you can do nothing at all on it without training, but a trained player can draw from it an infinite variety of music." As far as the development of personality is concerned the organism of an infant one hour old is little more than a bundle of undefined activity which may be socially defined. This takes place through interaction in the family where attitudes arise and the individual becomes a person.

Perhaps no phase of the undefined activity in the organism is more important for acquiring a family as a world in which to live and for the development of personality than the birth cry and the subsequent random vocalizations. We are not interested here in a detailed discussion of language but we are interested in the discussion of random vocalizations and their social definition as a language, as they may help to explain how diverse patterns of behavior can be developed out of the undefined activity in the organism.

Let us think for a moment of a hypothetical child. If this child is born into or adopted into an English-speaking, American family we know that the random vocalizations of the child will be socially defined as the English language. No matter what nationality this child may be, German, Italian, Japanese, or Hottentot, he will speak the English language through the social definition of his random vocalizations. Furthermore, we know that the English he will speak will be provincial, southern, eastern, northern, or western, depending upon the geographical location of the family he is attempting to acquire as his first world. Still further we know that the English he speaks will be characterized by the peculiarities of speech of the family in which he lives—nasal tones, and so on.

Another aspect of the process includes the definition of the vague hunger impulse in the organism of the child. This vague hunger impulse will be defined by the food habit systems of the American family of the particular location where he happens to live. But we know that this undefined activity, this hunger impulse, could have been defined with equal facility by the food habit systems of the Chinese, Italians, French, or Japanese. Not only will our hypothetical child develop the food habit system of the American family but it will even develop certain food predilections and aversions peculiar to that family or peculiar to the experience of the child with food.

We can make other predictions concerning the child in the process of acquiring a social world in which to live. The undefined sex impulse may be defined in a manner regarded as normal or abnormal by the standards of society. This sex impulse may be defined and satisfaction realized in a monogamous marriage or it may be defined as any of the multi-

farious forms of perversions. As an undefined sex impulse it is neither normal nor abnormal, but its social manifestations may be pathological or may have social approval. True, the sex impulse may not be defined in the family but it is discussed here because it has a name as a particular form of undefined activity, and thus we have language symbols to utilize in our discussion.

So language develops from random vocalizations, food habit systems are built up out of the vague hunger impulse, and sexual satisfaction is realized in the form in which the undefined sex impulse is defined. These may be regarded as examples of the process by which a child develops human nature and acquires a world in which to live. As this undefined activity is defined, certain objects in the social heritage take on meaning and become a part of the social world of the individual and attitudes are integrated into the personality for the development of human nature.

These examples of undefined activity in the organism are important but there is other undefined activity of a less specific nature which is just as significant for the development of personality. Though it is less specific, we may assume that there is other undefined activity that is the basis of religious habit systems and all other habit systems that make up personality patterns. A useful analogy is that of a great river like that of the Mississippi. It is full of undefined activity and random potentialities. It can be defined, however, to operate mills, float logs, irrigate arid land, generate electricity, carry boats, and numerous other things. So it is with the undefined activity in the organism of the child. It can be defined in a variety of ways as the child develops personality and acquires a world in which to live.

The biological process furnishes this undefined activity but the social process decides how it shall be defined. The capacity of this undefined activity is contingent upon heredity but heredity does not decide which person will be a law-abiding citizen and which one a criminal. That is, behavior patterns turn out to be the social definition of the undefined activity in the organism of the infant.

Going further into the process by which a baby acquires a family, we find that there is not a single object in the world of the baby at the outset. Without objects he has no attitudes and without attitudes he does not have personality behavior patterns. So the baby does not have a family at the outset but he is well equipped to acquire it, much better equipped in some cases than the family is to acquire him, because he is not encumbered with traditions, as is the family. At first the baby does not have a mother but she is likely to be the first object that arrives to satisfy his needs when he cries. This at first is her rôle as far as he is concerned. He has attitudes concerning her as an object integrated into his personality, not mother attitudes, for, carefully speaking, she is not a mother until he has acquired a language and he has a symbol for her.

Each new experience with his mother results in new attitudes and the redefinition of his mother as an object of the world he is acquiring. Then in some situation quite early a self-feeling arises. He is blamed, praised, or punished. Then he has acquired himself as an object which is just as important as the acquisition of other objects. Self comes to him as an object of his world through experience, that is, through the reaction of his mother to him. This defines his rôle as far as his mother is concerned. At the same time or a little later he goes through the same process of acquiring a father as well as brothers and sisters. The process is the same, but the experience with each one and the consequent attitudes are different.

He has defined all these objects in terms of the response he thinks he can get from them. He discovers his rôle defined through the attitudes of others. He cannot develop a behavior pattern unless people act toward him as though he were a certain type any more than a beggar can be a beggar unless people act toward him as though he were a beggar.

Cooley classifies objects as personal and impersonal. We have discussed the personal objects, mother, father, brothers, sisters, and self. But there are, also, impersonal objects that must be experienced and defined in acquiring a family in which to live. Ritual, religion, manners, ceremonies, morals, and etiquette are some of these. They must be defined and become objects of his world so that he will know how to act toward them, and they seem just as important for the development of personality patterns as do the acquisition of the personal objects.

When a child has acquired a family it proves, as Dr. Burgess has said, to be a "unity of interacting personalities" where approval and recognition are much desired. The child may be regarded as in the family, when he has attitudes toward himself and the group and when the family has attitudes toward him. This mutual play of attitudes defines the rôle of each member and each member gets recognition on the basis of the rôle he plays. So it devolves upon each member to play a rôle that will lead to recognition and it is incumbent upon each member to develop a personality that he can sell to others on the basis of recognition if not approval. We live in a social heritage where it is customary to seek a group where one can have both recognition and approval. If he is forced, in developing behavior patterns, to choose between recognition and approval, he is likely to become pathological in his behavior.

If one turns to the study of the persons who have some defect he can more clearly see the working of the process of acquiring human nature and a world in which to live. Those familiar with the life of Helen Keller are aware of the tremendous difficulty she had to acquire a world in which to live. Bereft of the senses of hearing and sight which, with other senses, are really the connecting link between the undefined activity in the organism and the social heritage, she struggled to acquire a world in

which to live. Here one gets all the processes greatly magnified and can study them as one studies minute organisms under the microscope. Equally revealing is "Experiences of a Little Man." The objects he tried to acquire to make up the world in which he was to live were not made for him, and try as he would it was difficult to acquire his world.

Evidence of the definition of rôles in a family is seen in the child who feels compelled to prove that he is equal to others or at least is able to do many things. "Do you know what I can do?" he asks. "I can run as fast as you can. I can turn a summerset, but Bobby can't, he is too small. I can't read but I am going to school as soon as I am old enough and then I will learn to read everything." All these and many more statements that one hears are concrete evidence that there is a rôle to play based on the desire for recognition. The struggle to fill a rôle for which a child is poorly equipped or the struggle against a certain rôle are also important situations for studying the processes by which human nature develops.

The process of acquiring a family is a different matter for the second or third child. As he acquires his family and discovers that it is a unity of interacting personalities he discovers that his older brother, Tommy, has his rôle already defined and has recognition and approval on the basis of it. In many cases the second or third child, Billy, sees the definition of this rôle and attempts to gain recognition and approval on the same basis. What usually happens is that he soon discovers that he is known only as Tommy's brother. If he develops a different pattern he gains recognition and is Billy Jones, not just Tommy Jones's brother. Usually the definition of his rôle will not permit him to copy the pattern of his brother even though he may desire to do so at the outset. The following resumé of a case reveals this situation and shows how behavior patterns develop.

Mrs. Jones, mother of Nellie and Mary Jones, was rather self-sufficient in her home, doing all the baking and sewing for her family. She was known in the neighborhood as one who could perform both these tasks in a superlative fashion. Her baking and her needle work have been decorated each year at the county fair with blue ribbons. She received a great deal of recognition from relatives and friends and when the first child, Nellie, a daughter, was old enough to use a needle she was given daily instructions. Perhaps it is not a significant fact, but this daughter greatly resembled the mother's family. Once she had learned to make crude articles of wear for her doll she was taken to the kitchen for her first lesson in baking a sponge cake.

The second child in the family was a boy but the third was Mary, a girl. By the time she was old enough to toddle about the house and make daily requests for something to do Nellie was seven years old and already her needlework and culinary efforts were being placed before women of the neighborhood and receiving a great deal of praise. When relatives and friends had a meal in the Jones home they were informed that Nellie had prepared this dish, or baked this pie or cake. Family reunions were gala occasions for Nellie, because she was always praised. Equally attractive were occasions when her mother entertained clubs, especially

clubs composed of women who brought along their needlework. Nellie sat with them and sewed. Her handiwork was passed around the room and admired. She was told repeatedly that she was to be just like her mother, an excellent cook and a skilled seamstress. Her rôle received this continued definition and finally her work was taken to the county fair along with that of her mother's, where she too won prizes.

Mary, the second daughter, continued looking for a chance to show her ability and on bake day was given a chance to make little cakes. She learned to make dresses for her doll. Her work suffered in comparison with Nellie's, but it was just as good, if not better than that of her sister's when Nellie was the same age. Despite her efforts her work was never brought out to be admired by the women of the neighborhood along with that of Nellie's. One day she brought out a little blue dress she had made for her doll and with some reticence showed it to a maternal aunt. The mother contrasted the work of the six-year-old child with that of the thirteen-year-old. The aunt said, "Well, Mary, I am afraid you will never be able to sew like Nellie. It just seems that Nellie was born to be a good cook and a good seamstress. You are like me, Mary, I could never learn to sew." Mary turned finally to her father, but while he sympathized with her and patted her on the head he did not praise her. He said to her: "What if you can't sew and bake, you can be Daddy's outdoor girl and help him. How would you like to have a horse to ride?"

Following this experience with the maternal aunt, Mary put her doll in the back corner of the bottom drawer of her dresser and seldom played with it again. Turning to life outside the house Mary was soon known as the "tomboy" of the family. Her uncles praised her for her tomboy antics. She followed her father about the farm and often openly rebelled when her mother forced her to do housework. Each day she achieved some new accomplishment in outdoor life. By the time she was ten years old she could ride well enough to win the riding contest at the county fair for girls her age. Her recognition in this rôle was much greater than that accorded Nellie for her needlecraft at the same fair.

Another noticeable difference in behavior patterns appeared. While Nellie cried if she soiled or tore her dress, Mary did not seem to care how tattered and dirty her frock became. Nellie never wanted to get her hands dirty but Mary seemed perfectly happy if her hands were covered with mud.

It was not long before Mary's father was telling the other members of the family and the occasional visitors how well Mary could ride. "She can ride as well as her brother," her father would say. Mary learned to swim a few strokes during the week before a family reunion held at her grandmother's on Sunday. She excelled her brother the same week at target practice with a 22 rifle. The fact that neither Mary nor her brother were expert at all made very little difference to Mary. She had done better than he had. At the reunion some of the cakes and pies had been baked by Nellie but Nellie did not have the spot light alone; Mary shared it with her. As a matter of fact she crowded Nellie out of the picture. She was no longer just the younger sister of Nellie Jones, she was Daddy's outdoor girl, the champion shot of the Jones family. This became Mary's pattern of behavior.

At the present time both girls are married. Mary's pattern of behavior has changed more than Nellie's. Mary no longer places the emphasis on outdoor

life, although she enjoys it. She gets a great deal of recognition from her husband for her cooking—which she learned after she was married. On bake day she gets up and has her baking all done by the time the others are ready for breakfast. Her husband is almost extravagant in his praise of her cooking.

This case, brief as it is, shows how the definition of the rôle of a person in the process of acquiring a family and human nature results in the development of a behavior pattern. The importance of the social situation is seen in the change of behavior pattern of Mary once she was married and her rôle redefined.

3. *Family Tradition and Personality Development*[1]

Professor Freeman and his associates of the University of Chicago have just completed an interesting and significant study of the effect upon intelligence of children of rearing them in foster homes. They find that the intelligence of the adopted child is very markedly higher than if it had been reared by its natural parents, far higher than most psychologists and students had previously been prepared to admit. They also report that brothers and sisters when reared in the same foster family showed closer resemblance in intelligence than when reared in separate homes.

While the findings of this study throw new light on the old question of the relation of heredity and environment, its major significance may well lie in causing us to reconsider the rôle of family life in personal development in all of its aspects, emotional, mental, and social. The part played by the family in the emotional growth of children, particularly with reference to maladjustments, has been stressed repeatedly by psychoanalysts and psychiatrists. At the conference on family life in Buffalo last October, Prof. W. F. Ogburn, as a sociologist, emphasized the unique place of the family in providing for the emotional development of its members. In fact he asserted that the essential function of the family inhered in relationships of affection about which it is organized and through which it endures.

The study of the changes in the intelligence of adopted children suggests that in addition to the expression of affection, the family has an equally great function as a medium for the transmission of the cultural heritage. For certainly it is not so much in affection as in cultural level that foster homes are superior to those of the natural parents.

By family tradition is meant the handing down from generation to generation of culture within the home. The word "culture" has a well defined use in the literature of anthropology. It includes not only customs but material objects as well, like tools, ornaments, and utensils. But from the standpoint of personality development the so-called "non-

[1] From BURGESS, ERNEST W., Family Tradition and Personality Development, *Nat. Conference Social Work*, pp. 322–330, 1928.

material" objects of culture are the more significant, as gestures, manners, languages, folklore, literature, social standards, art, and religion.

It is at once evident that within any modern society the differences in cultural level between families is far greater than the difference in cultural levels between societies. For example, it is doubtless true that in the United States certain individuals have lived out their allotted three score years and ten without having used one thousand different words, while there are many persons who within a year have spoken or read ten or twenty times that number. The child who is born or adopted into a 1,000 word family is certainly at a disadvantage on an intelligence test, all other factors being equal, when compared with a child who has been reared in a family with a 10,000 word vocabulary. More important than the number of words is the meaning of words, and their construction into idioms that express attitudes and customary behavior.

It is through case studies of personality development that the rôle of family tradition may be concretely portrayed.

As Prof. Robert E. Park has pointed out, "man is not born human." Personality, in so far as it means one's rôle in society, is an achievement. The case of Frank Radcliffe clearly shows how the father shaped his son in his own cultural image.

After eleven years of married life, my mother introduced me into the Radcliffe family, as member number three. My parents had waited a long time, and I was more than welcome. Although my mother was only 31, my father was then 51, and this was just about the greatest thing that could have happened to him. He worshipped me from the start, and like other long-wanted first-born, I was king and ruler of the house.

My memories of these early days are very few, but with one big exception, and those are memories of my father. My play life, my school, and even my mother fall back into the shadows. I loved my mother, it is true, but my father stands out most clearly, and it was he who shaped my life.

My earliest memories are of sitting in my father's arms in front of the stove of an evening, and of his singing me to sleep. He used to sing Way Down upon the Swanee River, Darling Nellie Gray, and other lullaby songs, many with a Negro dialect added. I would lie in his arms for a long time listening, and trying to play with the ends of his long mustache. Several years later he began to tell me stories and to read to me. Most of the stories were of Indian fights, and of pioneer adventures, and I would ask for the same stories over and over again. In these early years a regular ceremony was developed. First my father had to sit and read to me, generally for a good share of the evening. Then he would undress me, and get me ready for bed. His next step was to go into the kitchen and prepare me a glassful of weak grape juice. After having my drink he would take me to my bed, and standing beside the bed, swing me a specified number of times in his arms, and finally let me fly head over heels into bed. If he did not swing me the required number of times, he had to go through the procedure all over again. Once in bed he would lie down beside me in the

dark, put his arms around me, and tell me another good Indian story. Following this I cuddled close to him and repeated the Lord's prayer. I then gradually drifted away into slumber land, but he never left me until I was asleep. This kept up until I was nine or ten years old.

How I did love my father! Even yet, he is one of my fondest memories. Sometimes thoughts of how I would feel if I lost one of my parents would come into my mind. I always thought I would rather lose my mother than my father, if it was a case of losing either of them. I loved my mother, but somehow, she was different. She never read to me or told me stories. Sometimes she would become cross, and once or twice slapped me. Most of all, she would sometimes insist on my doing things I didn't want to do. Father always did as I wished, and I became angry when opposed. It was mother who called me in at night, when I wanted to play outside for a while longer. It was mother who imposed any discipline. Father seemed more like a comrade and playmate.

Another way in which my father greatly influenced me was in the matter of family pride and of race prejudice. Despite the fact that he had lived in America all his life, father was English to the backbone. He always referred contemptuously to "Dutchmen," "Wops," "Hunks," and "Dagoes." He was proud of the Radcliffe family, and I soon became proud of it, too. While the family claimed to be entirely democratic, it was only democratic in thinking of itself as being on the same level as noble or rich man. There was much family pride, and a close family organization. The grandfather and grandmother, their nine children with their husbands and wives and children formed a group of between thirty and forty people. Every Christmas the entire group gathered at the old homestead for a big reunion, and thus family organization remained intact. Quite a bit of control was assumed over the various members, but when it came to a quarrel with outsiders, a Radcliffe was always upheld, whether he be right or wrong.

As I look back upon these early years I see more and more the way my family environment shaped my life. From my father I acquired a taste for literature and a hungering for knowledge. Along with it came family pride, racial prejudice, and a sarcastic tongue. It was not until I went away to college that I really became Americanized, and stopped being pro-British. According to my wife, I am still English in all of my characteristics and actions.

Both of my parents were churchgoing Methodists, and my mother was very devout. I grew up in the church, and that was the only place I was ever taken except to visit friends. I liked to go to church, for there I met other children, I was given recognition in little church plays, and I had every opportunity in the world to torment other people and make myself a nuisance. This close contact with the church turned my thoughts to religion, and I was early told of heaven and hell and who went to each place. I thought it over, and decided I would not be very bad or very good. I would just have a good time, and therefore would not go to either place after I died. This viewpoint toward religion lasted till I was thirteen.

Three weeks before my twelfth birthday, and a few days before Christmas, my father was taken sick with pneumonia. I thought there was no cause for worry, and neither did anyone else. My only thought was that probably I would not get as many Christmas presents this time. A week later my father died.

My mother to support us bought a small rooming house. For two years we struggled along, trying to make both ends meet. When all of our rooms were filled we had an income large enough to pay our payments on the house, to pay taxes, and to live. When part of our rooms were vacant we had long periods of worry, and oftentimes we wondered where the next dollar was coming from.

Just before my father had died I had begun to run with a gang, and to enjoy the company of other boys. Here in the rooming house district I found myself a stranger in a strange land. The street on which we lived was very cosmopolitan and many nationalities were represented. Rooming houses stretched from one end of the street to another. There was no community spirit and practically no neighborly visitation. People did not buy homes on L Street to really live—they bought there to make money in the rooming-house game. And people on the nicer streets a little farther south disdained to mix very intimately with the cosmopolitan group on L Street. I finally found one boy chum, and we were together quite a little for three or four years.

The high school where I attended was a very large school, and a student could very easily slip in and be forgotten. I was one of those who was forgotten. Many of the boys came from well-to-do families, were well dressed, and drove their own cars. I had none of these advantages. Being forgotten in school did not bother me during the first two years. My main interest was still in books, and I became a regular bookworm and daydreamer. After a year I got a job "hustling sheets" on a corner, and this took up my time on afternoons. I did not associate with other newsboys, but I did hear my share of dirty stories from men who bought papers.

It was impossible to live in a house with a number of men of all nationalities very long without coming face to face with sex. One roomer taught me masturbation, and I practiced it quite extensively for about a year. Some of the men would tell dirty stories of their own experiences when I was around, and these stories made such an impression that I can still remember them. I never told my mother, and she never found out my bad habits. I would ask her for information on sex matters but she would turn the questions aside. She did not seem to know just how to inform me. But I was not to be denied. I got hold of the old family doctor book, and read it on the sly every opportunity I got. Much of it was not understandable, but I picked up quite a little. My information was added to by stories told by men, out of which I would try to dig scraps of real information. Another help was in the custom of small foreign children of both sexes to appear on the streets without much clothing.

We continued to go to church every Sunday, and my religious consciousness began to reawaken. I heard preachers preach about "hell fire," and exhort people to get saved. My old plan to go to neither place became untenable, as I realized that I must go either way. I became frightened. I would listen to an evangelistic appeal and then come home and pray and try to get "saved." The question of religion was uppermost in my mind. Billy Sunday came to town and held a series of revival meetings, and mother and I went to a number of them. One Sunday afternoon I was sitting with an adult friend from our church when the appeal was given. He asked me if I would like to go forward and give myself to Jesus. I replied that I would, and up I went. This was a serious step to me, even if I was only thirteen years old. I began to read a chapter in the Bible every

day, and to pray more. In looking through the doctor book I found a description of something which was just like what I was doing (masturbating) and it was called a secret "sin." If it was a sin, and I had never thought of it that way before, I must stop it if I was to be a Christian. I prayed about it, and quit. I also tried to stop thinking about sex matters, and I was fairly successful. I also tried to be more kind and Christlike in every way, but it did not seem to me that I was very successful. In recent years a number of my father's folks told me that at about this time I changed from a very bad boy into quite a good boy. They never knew about my "conversion." In the face of this evidence, I believe that my emotional religious experience did have rather marked effect on my conduct.

During this period I did not go out with girls. I used to look with longing eyes at one or two, and have idealistic love affairs with them in my daydreams. I would do the same with heroines in books I read. It was a very idealistic type of love, and in these daydreams about girls sex never entered in. Most of my daydreams were about adventure, especially in soldier life. G. A. Henty's war stories were still my favorite, and I would imagine myself as a soldier leading in some dangerous adventure.

My mother and I were drawn closer together after my father's death, and I got to really know her. I found that she was not nearly as intellectual as my father, but that she was utterly unselfish, a true friend, and one that I could trust. I took great delight in earning money selling papers and in turning it over to her, though she never asked it of me. We became almost like pals during these days.

This case brings out into sharp relief the way in which the subjective life of the person, his desires, and his attitudes become culturally conditioned. It also raises the question of what is the relation between the culture of the family and the culture of the environing society. In moving into the rooming-house district Frank is thrown into contact with influences in conflict with his family tradition and his former neighborhood surroundings. It is the church, and to a lesser extent the school, in this instance, that crystallize the trend of personality development into a philosophy of life and into certain governing principles which Thomas and Znaniecki term "life organization."

In the patriarchal family, as in ancient Israel and modern China, powerful factors make for the continuity of the family tradition. Even with the modern family much of this cultural continuity is maintained. In the professions especially there is the succession from father to son, as in the law, in the ministry, and in medicine.

Certain brief cases may be presented to indicate the different ways in which the tradition is transmitted and modified in the modern American family.

When I was a little boy my father's father used to take me on his knee and tell me stories of the battles he had been in, or some one of his brothers or uncles. He told how from the wars of the Seminole Indians straight down to the Spanish American War our family has always acquitted itself with honor on the battle-

field. My grandfather's sword which he carried in the Civil War for four years is my choicest possession. I can see him now proudly showing me the wounds he received in the first battle of Bull Run and marks from a terrible hand to hand sword duel at the Battle of Gettysburg. It has always been an honor in our family that we have always answered the call of our country upon first notice. When we declared war against the central powers in 1917 I enlisted within four days and the telegram I received in reply to my announcement from my father is one of the few things I have had from him since a boy of ten that has ever shown me the depth of his feeling toward me.

It would be interesting to know how far the potential strength of militarism in this country rests upon family tradition.

Often the cultural attitude implanted in the child is a frustrated ambition of a parent, as the mother who brought her daughter up to go to college and become a teacher as she herself had planned but circumstances prevented. Or the parent may have aspirations of a great career or noble service for the child.

Before I was born my mother dedicated me to God in case I should turn out to be a man, and she interpreted this to mean that I should enter the ministry. Going to a university widely known for its unorthodox teaching was a severe shock to this faith and promise, yet it remains unshaken. My mother is fairly well satisfied now that she knows that I shall enter some kind of educational work, though I still think she feels that her debt to the Lord will not be fully paid unless I enter the ministry. I am firmly convinced that this attitude of hers, linked as it is with my earliest childhood memories and teachings, has had a controlling effect upon my life. On several occasions I have nearly entered business, for example, and have always at the last moment given it up, my decision in each case being determined by some unconscious feeling, and not by rational considerations.

In this last case it seems plausible to infer that influences outside of the family came into conflict with the tradition implanted in his thought of himself by his mother. Often the family, or the father and mother as the guardians of the family tradition, have to meet these conflicts with outside influences. How the imputed superiority of the family, and indeed the family tradition, may be used, though not always successfully, to control the behavior of the members of the family is evident in the next case.

In the general atmosphere of our home was the feeling that we, the Kimballs, had a history and status superior to the Johnsons and Martins and others who lived near by. We had both English and Welsh blood in our veins. This fact was appealed to when Scott, the oldest son, desired to marry the Martin girl. There were certain things which the neighbors might do but which a Kimball would never stoop to do, as the drinking of alcoholic liquors and smoking.

But when Scott was fourteen he began to use tobacco, "on the side." It was the custom in this community to chew as well as smoke, and he took up both these

habits. Father talked with him. One argument was that he was spoiling the family record, since neither father nor his father nor any of father's brothers had ever used tobacco. Scott argued in justification that it was no worse for him to use tobacco than for father to raise it. He also called attention to his maternal grandfather, after whom he was named, who used tobacco.

The family as an institution exists not only to transmit, but also to interpret, modify, and recreate the cultural heritage. This function and its relation to the personality development of its members is well stated by Helen Bosanquet:

> The mind of the child is . . . deeply rooted in the family as its center; his earliest words, ideas, modes of thought are those he gathers from parents and brethren, and each day he takes back to them the new words and ideas which he gathers in the outside world, and they again are molded and interpreted by the family. He recounts his exploits, tells of his companions and teachers, is subjected to praise or criticism, and listens to similar narratives from other members; and next day he returns to the outside world to collect fresh material to be thrown into the family mold. Even in families where there is less than the normal share of affection, the habits formed in this way are so strong that they do not break without some special stress being put upon them.

But what is the practical bearing of our consideration of these cases of the rôle of family tradition in personality development? First of all these cases show that the life organization and the character of the person take their first and often permanent form under the impress of the family cultural heritage. Secondly, these cases reveal that conflicts between parents and children, as well as mental and moral conflicts within the person, are almost always the result of the clash between family and community standards. Clifford R. Shaw, of the Institute for Juvenile Research, is now engaged in a highly interesting and thoroughgoing study of just this cultural conflict between family and community traditions as a factor, and perhaps the decisive one, in juvenile delinquency. Accordingly, these cases disclose the close relation between personality problems and problems of community organization. In dealing with the person and the family it is always important for us as social workers to find out what are the cultural values cherished by the family and its members, what efforts they are making to realize them, and what frustrations prevent their achievement. Those of us who are engaged in neighborhood and community work have a special interest in the study of the interrelations and the conflicts between family traditions and community standards. For the work of all institutions with a cultural motivation like the school, the church, the settlement, and the playground deal essentially with the character formation of their members and at the same time with the social standards and traditions of the community. The fuller recognition of this cultural function will, I believe, provide the basis needed for a more vital approach to group work with persons and families.

4. *Mechanisms of Personality Development in the Family*[1]

The intellectual and emotional traits of the individual, which in their complex interrelationships make up what we call personality, are essentially different in the possibilities for development that they offer. With a few exceptions, the intellectual status of the child is fixed at birth and cannot be changed materially by his own efforts or those of others. Hereditary influences predetermine what general education and vocational levels lie within the reach of the individual. Environmental factors, except for malignant disease processes, can operate only within a limited scope. Heredity fixes the ultimate capacity for achievement and decides for all time whether the individual may aspire to a professional career or must be content with skilled artisanship or common labor. Within these general limitations, the experiences at home and school, the warping effects of social situations in general, may play a part in the selection of the particular vocation or occupation. One person of low-average intelligence becomes a bricklayer and another a carpenter because of economic opportunities opening differently for the one than for the other, or because of influences brought to bear upon their choice by family and friends. The highly intelligent group separates into lawyers, physicians, scientists, authors, and various other learned professions, in part according to special native abilities, but also in part according to the environmental stimuli that are brought to bear upon them. But no amount of environmental manipulation can change the artisan to the scholar unless his intellectual capacity was originally high enough for this latter achievement to be within his power.

In its emotional aspects, the personality is far more pliable. To realize to how great a degree external forces operate in shaping personality, it is only necessary to recall the studies of the conditioned reflex by Pavlov, Krasnogorski, Mateer, and others, and investigations of the conditioned emotional response by Watson and subsequent workers, as well as the contributions of physiological psychology—with particular reference to the work of Cannon—and the mass of data accumulated by psychoanalysis concerning the origin and development of emotional reactions. These different branches of modern psychology have one point in common: they all emphasize the importance of the earliest years of life in personality development. Because so many modifications of the original emotional responses take place in infancy and early childhood, the family situation is of paramount importance in any attempt to interpret personality from a genetic standpoint.

In the controlled environment of the laboratory, it has been demonstrated that the formation of conditioned reflexes and conditioned emotional responses begins even before the child is able to walk and talk.

[1] Adapted from BLANCHARD, PHYLLIS, The Family Situation and Personality Development. *Mental Hygiene*, vol. 11, pp. 15–21, January, 1927.

Some of the earliest learning of the child is of a non-intellectual type, taking place at a stimulus and response level in connection with the visceral functions and with the emotions of fear, anger, and love. In the uncontrolled environment of the home, this process goes on as effectively as it does in the laboratory, although there are no trained observers to record it. But its significance for personality development is unimpaired by the lack of attention. Upon the way in which the emotions are modified in infancy and early childhood depend many of the personality trends that will characterize the mature individual.

Originally, according to experimental findings, the young child shows emotional reactions to a very limited number of stimuli. He fears a loud sound or the sudden removal of support; he becomes angry when his movements are hampered; he displays signs of erotic pleasure when tickled or caressed. Through conditioning experiences, in ways with which we have become familiar in the psychological laboratory, these emotions are gradually extended to include many other stimulus situations. In the intimate association with parents and other members of the family, love, fear, or anger may be called out as a result of experiences that are undergone at their hands. If some one response is continually evoked, it is likely to crystallize into a habitual reaction and to color the attitude toward other individuals in the wider social group outside the home. The conditioned emotional responses are not limited to the specific situations in which they are first set up, but are characterized by the capacity for wide transference. Just as the infant in the laboratory who is conditioned to fear a rabbit without further experience transfers this fear to all furry objects, so the child in the home who has been given reason to fear some one of the adult individuals there shows the same fear toward strangers.

The attitudes formed at this early stage of life become integral factors of the mature personality. The child who is subjected to many experiences that call out the fear responses develops a timid, fearful attitude toward the world. He comes into the possession of an inferiority complex, to use the psychoanalytic terminology, which dominates his personality. The final result may be either of two types: the submissive, retiring personality, which is a direct expression of a feeling of inferiority, or the overaggressive, dominating personality, which is at bottom only an attempt to escape from inferiority feelings through compensatory activities. There is, too, the possibility of a definitely pathological personality development as a consequence of the feeling of inferiority. Here the individual escapes from the necessity of facing social situations by a retreat into a neurotic state of semi-invalidism.

Quite different will be the personality trends characterizing the child whose early experiences have been predominantly those of love. His history has been of a kind to condition him to expect only pleasant-

ness at the hands of others. He regards society trustfully and has abundant confidence in himself, because he has never learned to have any other attitudes. He readily becomes a "good mixer," friendly toward new acquaintances, and inviting their friendliness in return. At school he is popular; in business relations he is eminently successful; yet he may not be any more brilliant intellectually than some of his fellows who are foredoomed to failure in analogous situations because of inferiority complexes developed in their childhood. Yet the much-loved individual, if there has been too great a surfeit of this emotion in his childhood life, has also within his personality potentialities for maladjustment. He may be so "spoiled" by his early experiences that he expects more than his just dues from society, and is unable to understand why other associates are not as willing to render him homage and service as were his parents.

Still another type of personality evolves in the case of the child whose treatment at the hands of his family is such as to call forth frequent outbursts of rage. He grows suspicious of all intentions toward his person and his habitual attitude is likely to be sullen or defiant. He is ever ready to resent restraint and to rebel against authority. In extreme instances, he may feel that the entire social group is pitted against him, and therefore himself becomes resistive to all the rules and regulations of organized society. When his attitude is carried to this extreme, he has developed abnormalities that may have an outcome in mental disease or in delinquency.

For normal personality development, it seems probable that all the emotional experiences of the child should be enriched within certain reasonable limits. The individual entirely surrounded by love becomes too trustful and confident; he lacks the caution that comes from a modicum of fear experiences, and the vigor to fight for himself in the economic struggle for existence which he would gain from a healthy glow of anger. G. Stanley Hall long since pointed out that anger and fear were, equally with love, stimulants to desirable personality traits and socially valuable activities. It was also his profound belief that no one of the emotions should be permitted to atrophy, and there seems at present no valid reason for negating this point of view. Fear, anger, and love have been so intensely a part of the life experience of almost every one of us that we naturally demand of our fellows that they display capacities for all these feelings. The person who seems incapable of fear may excite from us professions of admiration, but secretly we feel that he is somewhat peculiar; the individual who never displays any tendency to anger, no matter how great the provocation, is inevitably classed as a weakling; the human being incapable of love and devoid of sympathy and affection can never be pictured other than as a monster. For the normal personality emotional excesses and emotional deficiencies are

alike ill adapted to the demands of civilization and the standards of the social group.

Personality traits are developed not only by the conditioning of the emotional responses, but also by the child's imitation of the behavior patterns which he observes in those about him. Expressions of love, which are the usual manifestations of social approval, are dear to the heart of the child. He soon learns that he can bring these out very often by doing those things that he sees done by the adults who share his environment. Added to the desire for approval as shown in loving tones and caresses is a natural tendency to imitation, which is not peculiar to the human species alone. This double motivation incites the child to pantomime the attitudes that he sees in the parents until they are woven into the habit system that controls his own behavior and have become an integrated factor of the whole personality. The dissatisfied, complaining mother passes on to her child her own chronic discontent. The cheerful, self-controlled mother endows her child with an optimistic, self-sustained personality. By similar processes of social heredity, many different traits are taken over from the parents by their imitative children to an extent that justifies the comment of Watson to the effect that parents create their children after their own image.

There are still many persons who refuse to regard the emotional aspects of the personality as so infinitely modifiable as the foregoing illustrations indicate. Some of them are devoted adherents to the theory of the dominance of the chromosomes over all phases of racial and individual development; others cannot accept the importance of family influences upon the personality when children born and brought up in the same home, and therefore supposedly subjected to similar environmental stresses, often present such markedly different types.

No one is in a position to deny the potency of heredity, but certainly recent psychological data would indicate that we have been confused between biological and social heredity in describing the origin and nature of the emotions. Laboratory findings give relatively conclusive evidence as to the conditioning of the emotional responses through environmental influences, and clinical psychology adds pragmatic conclusions to the same effect in citing case after case in which the personality and the behavior traits of children have been radically changed as a result of modifications of parental methods of training. On the other hand, the same laboratory studies reveal many individual variations as to the rapidity and permanency with which conditioned emotional responses are established. Many variables are undoubtedly involved, and the hereditary make-up of the individual is probably not the least important of these.

Adler focused his whole theory of the inferiority complex upon the assumption of constitutional organic defects, and felt no need of calling

upon conditioned emotional responses to supplement his hypothesis. The reasonable position would perhaps be that fear responses are more readily evoked and more permanently established in physically weaker individuals, so that feelings of inferiority are indeed more readily built up in such cases, but by the method of the conditioned response. Some such middle ground as this is nearer the truth, as far as we can see it at present, than an extreme leaning to either side of the old controversy concerning heredity and environment.

Differences in the quality of the biological inheritance are only one set of factors that may offer an explanation of the personality differences shown by siblings. Other variables that directly affect the formation of conditioned emotional responses are the age of the child, the level of intelligence, the intensity and duration of stimuli, the number of repetitions of stimuli, and so forth. Within the family many opportunities for variation are afforded. Brothers and sisters are seldom treated alike, distinctions being continually made on the basis of both sex and age. Moreover, it is not the totality of the environmental experiences, but the unit situations of which it is composed—each one acting as a conditioning stimulus for one emotion or another—that shape the child's personality. Thus, a certain experience may become associated with fear for one child and with anger for that same child's brother or sister, because slightly different circumstances enter into the situation in each case.

In the preceding pages, only a few of the many ways in which the family situation may affect personality development have been suggested. The emotional relations with other members of the family group and the way in which they mold the personality have been entirely neglected. Psychoanalytic literature, however, has made us quite familiar with the rôle of father and mother complexes, jealousy of siblings, and other emotional reactions of a similar nature in the personality development and social adaptation of the individual. The more definite psychopathological personality trends that appear in phobias, sex perversions, and other abnormal states also offer a wide field for consideration.

5. *The Child in the Unstable Home Situation*[1]

Unstable homes are the raw material of every case worker's job, whether we come across them in a legal aid society, a family agency, the child-caring field, the juvenile court, or a child-guidance clinic. An unstable home situation includes, but goes beyond, the limits of a broken home. In truth, many an unbroken home menaces the normal development of personality in equal degree, and in the same manner, *i.e.*, by tearing down the child's feeling of security.

[1] From NEUMANN, FREDERIKA, The Effects on the Child of an Unstable Home Situation, *Nat. Conference Social Work*, pp. 346–353, 1928.

From the moment of birth, the individual has to fight a constantly recurring sense of insecurity. We start from the one common loss, that of the comfort and security felt before birth; from then on each one of us strives to build up his own unassailable individuality. This is built up through his contacts with the reality outside of himself, the reality of things and other persons, and is torn down through these same outside contacts. Although these experiences are grouped into individual patterns for each one of us, yet there are certain typical stresses which call forth a greater striving for recognition on the part of the developing ego. Some of these stresses are the exploits of a rival playmate, the beginning of the school career, the arrival of a new brother or sister, and anything which seems to the child to deprive him of the love and care of his parents. The way in which these stresses are met, the constructive or destructive opportunities for winning recognition open to the child, determine the pattern for many of his adult responses to similar situations, as we well know. It behooves us, then, to see that the child has plenty of opportunities to win attention for good behavior rather than for bad, to see that the experiences that build up his feeling of adequacy outweigh those that tend to tear it down.

A feeling of security is quite the opposite of a feeling of dependency, of being protected. Security is a product of belonging, of affection, of adequacy, of independence, and is not born of being catered to, of having work done for us. Normally the greatest blow to security is the entire removal from the parents, either through death, hospitalization, or community action. In this last instance there is a double blow to be borne. Not only is the child deprived of the love and protection of the parents, but these parents are considered unworthy to take care of him. They have symbolized power and goodness, and now an outsider is trying to subvert these ideals. No matter if we do try to soften the blow, to sell the idea of removal by what are really subterfuges (mother is sick and cannot take care of him, etc.), what child beyond the earliest years does not see through these arguments and, at least unconsciously, absorb the idea that is in our own minds, with its consequent confusion of emotional values. If our conceptions of right and wrong, our conscience, and that superconscience which some call God, emerge from our conception of the parental ideal, what is going to be the effect on a child whose parental ideal is thus overthrown in his formative years? The idea of parental authority once assailed, with the consequent confusion of moral and ethical ideas which were based on it, why should we be surprised if a "problem child" results?

Further, what is the effect on the child who has his sense of security and his conception of parental power assailed, not once, but many times? The effect of this instability of home situation on a group of foster home children will be brought out in more detail later. At present we wish

to touch on an outgrowth or another phase of the need for security, namely, the child's dislike of being different from others. Although when we have reached chronological maturity we may make a virtue of emotional necessity and pride ourselves on being different and unconventional, a child has a profound respect for the conventional behavior of his group. To be secure in his group he must be like it. And in spite of our present-day discussions on the changing family, the norm of our present Western civilization is still the family consisting of child and both parents. The child in the foster home is *per se* different from his fellows. This difference may be softened, although perhaps never entirely overcome, if the foster home placement is an enduring one, but the records of child-placing agencies are only too full of replacements. That even the most careful placing technique cannot entirely avoid this situation is shown by the case of one boy we know who in his eleven years of life has been legally adopted twice, both placements being terminated by the death of one of the adoptive parents. This contingency could certainly not have been foreseen, but it has just as certainly had a disastrous effect on the boy's personality. It will be seen that we are defining instability of home situation in terms of breeding a feeling of insecurity in the sense just developed and a feeling of difference.

We have stated that the children we are immediately discussing are facing their first placement or have already had to make this adjustment. In the first group, those who have just left their own homes, we come across three types: first, those who have not heretofore presented any serious behavior or personality problems; second, those whose problems are characterized by overt misbehavior which can best be defined as imitative of their environment; and third, those whose actual symptomatic behavior may duplicate that of the second group, but is complicated by personality difficulties. Although at a first glance all of the homes from which these children have come may seem to us to have been unstable, we are compelled to change our minds on a closer view. Analysis of the whole situation brings to light factors in it that made for emotional security. The children in these two groups may come from homes in the poorest, most congested districts. Their parents may have given them little supervision, but there has been affection. There may have been bootlegging, poor housekeeping, any one of the many home situations so distressing to social workers, who judge them by the standards of their own backgrounds and conventions. But in the sense we have been developing this is not an unstable home, for it is, perhaps unfortunately, like nearly all the homes in that particular child's environment. He does not feel different from his social group; he does not feel insecure in his family group. His misbehavior does not spring from any deep emotional confusion; it is the natural product of his environment. We may make our position clearer by briefly quoting one such situation.

Robert and John are brothers, sons of divorced parents. The mother has been promiscuous but the home has been physically satisfactory and the mother has kept the boys' faith in her. They are likeable, helpful, dependable youngsters. Here the boys' attachment to the mother and to each other seems to have been the stable element in the situation; also the fact that the difference between her moral standards and those of the neighbors does not seem to have become apparent to the children.

When we now come to the point of placing these children we naturally find that we have an entirely new problem in our hands. Some, of course, because of the absence of coddling and overprotectiveness so far absent in their homes, have developed a degree of independence, initiative, and self reliance which will materially help them to adjust to a new situation and not to be overwhelmed by it, unless they are summarily thrust into a new way of living where initiative and self-reliance in children are not highly valued. But for many placement means the removal of the security which has been at the bottom of the absence of difficulties. The child has built up a feeling of recognition; he is establishing a feeling of himself against a circle of other familiar personalities. Now he is uprooted and has to try himself out against an entirely new set of personalities; he has to win a new place for himself, for recognition he must have at any cost. The stresses in foster home life will be touched on in more detail later.

We return now to that group distinguished by personality difficulties rather than misbehavior, or rather those whose misbehavior may take the same overt form as that displayed by the foregoing group, but is more dangerous from a mental hygiene standpoint because it has its roots in a fundamental feeling of insecurity and difference. It does not impress us as a natural imitation of behavior normal to environment, but has about it that play for attention, that desperate effort to gain recognition, so integral a part of the personality striving against a feeling of insecurity. These are the children in whom stealing, undesirable gang activity, destructiveness, etc., are bound up with a resentful attitude, who have difficulty in getting along with other children, have fears, or perhaps an irritating air of superiority. Some of these children show no overt misbehavior; they are rather characterized by listlessness, solitary play, lack of initiative, and non-aggressiveness, perhaps despondency. Interestingly enough, some of these children are referred without any statement of their difficulties; outwardly conforming and obedient, they are not recognized as problem children. In these homes we find parental desertion, family disagreements and quarrels with the inevitable inner pressure on the children to take sides, relief by a charitable agency, mental disease, or a high degree of neurosis in the parents, or a reaction on the part of the child to illegitimacy.

Barbara, aged sixteen, seven years ago was placed in the home of a wealthy, childless couple who wanted a daughter to educate. Her own background had been poor and included an institutional placement, and she had been old enough at the time to remember all this. Her foster parents now complained that she was too interested in boys and was often disobedient. To the psychiatrist Barbara tells, after admitting all the advantages the foster parents have given her, that during all these seven years they have often reminded her that they have given her a home and that she is not duly appreciative. Although not guilty of any overt misdemeanor, they took her to the detention home for her Easter vacation "to teach her a lesson," although immediately on her return home they presented her with an expensive fur piece. It is interesting that they have never considered adopting her, although her parents are dead.

Another fact that brings home to the foster child the instability in his own situation and deepens his sense of difference is the presence in the home of an own child or an adopted child. With the best will in the world some favoritism cannot be avoided, especially if this child is younger. Even if this favoritism miraculously is absent, the presence of the other child is a constant reminder to the foster child of what he is missing. As one boy, removed from a home undesirable in every respect, exclaimed, "Other boys can live with their mothers. I don't see why I can't." To a social worker who compares the previous home conditions and deprivations of many of these children with the advantages and real affection given them in many foster homes, their misbehavior often seems unwarranted unless we remember that they have not the wide experience of an adult or a supervisor of foster-home children on which to base their comparisons; they compare their situations with those of children in normal homes.

What makes for special difficulty in the group of children who have to move on through a succession of homes is their inability to attach the love usually given to the parents to any other substitute. Sometimes, if the placing agent remains the same over a long period, she can give the child the stable love outlet he needs. If his supervisor changes, as well as his home placement, he is poorly off indeed. Denied normal love outlets, he is driven to find more satisfactions for his ego. If, because his assets are perhaps limited and his previous training poor, he fails to find satisfactory ways of gaining recognition, but is driven to misbehaving, he will probably need to have another home found for him; and, convinced that he is a bad boy, the vicious circle will recommence.

Not every broken home is an unstable home, nor is every home unstable that falls below the social standards set by the community. While the children from these homes indulge in certain overt misbehavior, treatment is more a question of finding better outlets, cultivating constructive interests, or giving certain habit training. It is often a problem

in community work. The really unstable home situations are the ones that prevent the child from building up a feeling of adequacy, that accentuate his feeling of difference from the normal, and therefore call for an exaggerated striving for recognition in order that he keep his ego intact. These call for our best technique in individual treatment in order that an adequate love outlet and constructive ways of winning recognition be provided.

6. *The Conflict of Generations*[1]

Sentiment glorifies the home as the sweetest place on earth, generalizing as if there were "the home" and not a large assortment of very different kinds of homes. While it is true that some homes are the locus and the source of tender feeling, it is just as true that discord is as common as love in homes. By an understandable kind of paradox, there is some bond of union in the most divided homes while on the other hand there is a secret division in the most united ones. The reason for this duality of feeling is simple enough—love springs from the parent-child relationship, while discord and antagonism arise from the struggle of the two generations for power and supremacy. This struggle becomes acute at and beyond puberty because until this time the dependence and physical inferiority of the child bring into the field mainly the parent-child relationship.

At puberty there is rapid physical and mental development. The child becomes about as tall as the parent and in the average is physically superior, surely in beauty, and generally in strength. He or she no longer is in awe of the parent, and it is only dependence or affection which holds the child. As important as the physical equality is the rise to mental equality. It is easy to say that the parent is superior in mentality but is it really so? The passing of years may bring wisdom but much more often it brings prejudices, set habits, a preoccupation with narrowly practical affairs, and a forgetting of history, geography, literature, and so on. Since the average adult rarely reads good books but settles down to a mental diet of the daily newspapers, the *Saturday Evening Post*, and the *Literary Digest*, it is no wonder that his son or daughter, if in high school or college, secretly regards him as ignorant, for that is exactly what he is. Of course the child has had no experience, is raw, crude, often blatantly arrogant and superior, and this calls into play an antagonism which strains the parent-child relationship, and which in the extreme cases breaks it up, leading to open or covert estrangement. It is a wise parent who knows how to meet the cocksure age of his children.

It is not to be forgotten, or covered over by any idealistic delusions, that the exercise of power is extraordinarily sweet. To many people the

[1] MYERSON, ABRAHAM, The Conflict between the New and the Old Generations, *Family*, vol. 3, pp. 163–165, November, 1922.

one situation where they exercise power is over their children. It may be good for the child to obey unquestioningly, as is insisted upon by so many parents—I am not so sure that the wisdom of the parents merits this obedience, and further I am sure that many parents are reluctant to give up this tribute to their power and wisdom. But in the history of modern childhood there comes a time when the authority of the parent—that is, his right to power—is first questioned, and then silently or openly rebelled against. When the child reaches adult life an adjustment has usually been made by both parent and child on the basis of the full equality of the latter, but in the interim the struggle between the old and new generations has been acute.

While this is true of all types of homes it is greatly accentuated in the case of the immigrant home. Here we have other factors at work—factors which are of great importance to those interested in the family. The immigrant may or may not accept American customs, habits, and ways of acting, but his child almost invariably does. Often coming from a crude civilization, with coarser habits, the parent's personal appearance and his alien ways arouse conflicting emotions and attitudes in the child. There is the conflict between two cultures, a foreign culture and the American. Nor is the parent with his foreign habits ready to concede the superiority of American ways—he is as apt to sneer at and frown upon them, apt to chide and punish the child for his "crazy American" habits and attitudes. On his side the child may find himself ashamed of his parent, perhaps ashamed that he is a Sheeny, a Wop, or a Hunkie. In the history of every immigrant child there is a period when he hated himself for being ashamed, and found in himself a conflict which only time adjusted.

In the immigrant group which I know best, the Russian Jew, all the foregoing has added to it a religious schism. The adult is apt to be orthodox, tenaciously wedded to the immemorial rites and customs of the Jews with their deep racial-religious significance, is apt to feel that Judaism is essentially bound up with a thousand and one traditional ways of doing and thinking, which the child takes very lightly, if he does not reject them. The immigrant is apt to be thrifty, even parsimonious, to despise athletics, sports and similar amusements, to frown upon intercourse of an intimate kind with the Gentile; his child is sporty, loves good things and good times, enters into athletics, and passes through a stage where he attempts to enter into fellowship with the Gentile. Such differences break into the immigrant Jewish household with a tragic effect, and the Jewish child is the more often driven into the street as a result.

I do not mean to say that in every household the schism between parent and child becomes serious. Not at all. There are parents whose wisdom and love bridge over the challenge of the rising generation, who lift their children into equality gladly, and with a graceful recession of

their ego; there are children whose parental love grows into comradeship almost without a hitch or a break. Just as there are parents who are cruel, intolerant, or jealous, so there are born rebels among the children, throwing off all authority and discipline. But there are many homes, and especially where two alien cultures meet (and I may say parenthetically that each generation is really something of an alien culture to the other), where there is present no such character problem, where the trouble lies in a lack of adjustment of two generations, one to the other, where challenger and challenged need an intermediary personage to break down the wall of difference through the effecting of a compromise. It is very difficult for parent or child to take the first step, for pride is highest when aroused by our nearest.

I have sketched, very briefly, the familial civil war as if both parents were united against the child. Rarely is this the case; more often there is a division of the parents, a silent or open union and support of the child by one parent. It is the father who is perhaps more commonly affronted by the child, but it is not at all unusual for him to be indulgent, to give way to him (and especially her), while the mother finds the ways and manners of the child intolerable (more often the daughter). In this somewhat Freudian situation there is the explanation of some divorce suits, many hasty marriages, and many runaways.

Within the walls of the home, where rising and receding generations meet, one finds love and sympathy, unselfishness and devotion. Indeed these flourish there as nowhere else. But we who are to face life candidly must not forget that in the same bosoms where these tender and noble feelings grow the opposites too are found, that rivalry and the competitive feelings range themselves, secretly or openly, against the nearest and dearest. As the young grow they face their elders critically and with covert or open challenge, and many of those who are so viewed cannot stand the inspection. Out of this situation, and as naturally as the love between parent and child, arises the war of the generations.

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Chapter XII

THE INTERACTION OF PARENT AND CHILD

The present chapter continues consideration of personality development from the point of view of the more specific relations of parent and child. So far as there is a family in the sense of a "group of interacting personalities," that is, in anything more than a formal institutional or biological sense, it is the complex of relationships that exist between the parents, between the children, and between the parents and the children. These relations are not merely the means to family life, they are in a very literal sense the essence of family life.

Mrs. Fisher's paper might, with propriety, have been included in the preceding chapter. Its emphasis falls on personality as well as upon parenthood as a mechanism of its development. Intellectual maturity and integration of personality come as a result of the assumption of responsibility. In modern society there are many individuals whose personality and character do not develop beyond an adolescent stage. This is notoriously true of many protected and pampered women, although immaturity is not limited to them. Very many youths have their first contact with real life and face their first real responsibility when they become parents. For the first time they must do something for a child instead of being children for whom something is done; they develop an interest in reality and engage in their first creative activity. Parenthood brings responsibilities that change the boy and girl into the man and woman.

The family life and parent-offspring relationship is terminated in the animal world when it has served its term of usefulness. In human society there is a common tendency to prolong the relationship far beyond the point where it is socially or personally advantageous. It is frequently, especially in the case of girls, a matter of pathos, the overprotection and extension of the period of dependency that prevents personality and character development. It is sometimes a vampire relationship, either in a physical or in a psychological sense. There might be mentioned in this connection the article by Miss Richards on Practical Aspects of Parental Love listed in the bibliography at the end of this chapter. The parents may live on the labors of children or they may project their ambitions and compensate for their failures through direct or insidious manipulation of the life organization of their offspring.

A certain degree of antagonism between parents and children is a normal and wholesome situation. The desire of the child for freedom and

the spontaneous but selfishly sentimental tendency of parents to shelter the child and prolong the period of infancy are opposed in nature. The development of diverse interests leads to a normal disintegration of the parent-child group.

It is perhaps not out of place in this connection to call attention to the fact that, in spite of the widespread sentiment that it should be otherwise, the members of the family group are rather rarely friends. Count Keyserling, whose book on marriage is cited in the bibliography, is probably right when he speaks of the family relationship as "an antagonistic cooperation." Brothers are so seldom close friends that the exceptions attract popular comment; the friends and confidantes of girls are most often not their sisters. Daughters and sons are often on more confidential and sympathetic terms with other mature persons than with their parents. Were it not for the strength of other bonds, partly material and financial but largely those of tradition and social pressure, the family group would dissolve as the children approached maturity as completely as does its animal prototype.

Antagonisms between parents and children in some cases create problems whose obvious and only solution is a premature family dissolution. The origin of chronic antagonisms as well as of other unfortunate psychic effects is perhaps to be found in the insistent intimacies so nearly unavoidable in the small family group. The petty but persistent irritations due to interference with activity as well as the resentment aroused by parental lack of respect and consideration for the rights of children grow into persisting antagonisms and dislikes. It is this, rather than actual physical mistreatment that separates the child from the parent; like dogs, children are often pathetically loyal to those who most abuse them. Children are curiously sensitive and parents are curiously inconsiderate. Humiliation is a most painful and persistent state of mind and may give rise to violent hatred of the person whose behavior produces the humiliation. Miss Van Waters considers this the greatest source of irreconcilable family conflicts.

1. *The Education of Parents*[1]

For some weeks I have had before me the subject Educative Influences of the Home suggested to me for my share of the discussion of parents and homes for this number of *Progressive Education*. It has had an unexpected effect upon me, and rather a disconcerting one. I have made repeated and faithful efforts to see in the phrase "educative influences of the home" the orthodox and traditional meaning—for of course the implication is that the "educative influences" are exerted upon the children by the home and parents. I have tried energetically to summon

[1] FISHER, DOROTHY CANFIELD, How Children Educate Their Parents, *Progressive Education*, vol. 3, pp. 279–282, October, 1926.

to mind all the various forms of educational pressure which might be and are applied to children by earnest and ingenious parents. But it's no go. To my ear, that traditional meaning of the phrase gives forth but a thin, pleasant tinkle compared to the orchestral, cosmic significance which rings out richly when one interprets it as meaning the educative influences of home and children upon parents.

My pen has made several beginnings of a conventional article on what parents may do for their children's education in the home; but in what it has written, there is a flat sort of small complacency, the self-righteous, self-conscious priggishness sure to accompany the attempt to uplift others, even if (perhaps especially if) they are one's own flesh and blood children. I give it up. One must follow one's light where it leads, and mine, ever since reading that suggested subject, has shone full and strong upon the overwhelmingly educative influences of children and home upon parents. There will be plenty of other writers in this number, far more technically learned than I, who will discuss the other side of the question. There is certainly room for one impassioned statement of the debt of gratitude parents owe for the education given them by their children.

Consider for a moment who and what parents are at the beginning of their careers as mothers and fathers. They are most of them immature, egotistic, raw, spoiled children, whom society has not been able to "educate" in any real sense of the word; at whom life has not been able to get, through the thick barrier of protection set up around the young; in whom the most careful training has been able only to plant the barest germs of what we know as "character." Their ideal of life, expressed or subconscious, is the childish, shallow unrewarding one of doing as they like, and leaving somebody else to take the consequences. They have been (I speak of course only of the majority of cases) cherished more or less wisely, protected more or less completely, looked out for by their families. In the back of their minds has always been the feeling that if things got too bad, or difficulties too steep, or the water too deep, one could always fall back on the older generation. What else was it there for? The "independence" of which youth is so fiercely proud and jealous, in ordinary normal cases, is a fair-weather, non-waterproof affair, that likes to "walk in golden slippers in the sun," but likes to keep, unavowed, in a dusky corner, the serviceable umbrella of certainty that the older generation will come to the rescue if really needed; furthermore, that dull, useful, middle-aged folk deserve no thanks for such service since that is patently their only excuse for existence.

All this is quite right and proper. To take care of the younger generation is one, probably the most vital, excuse for the majority of the older. If babies, children, and young people were forced consistently and literally to take the consequences of their own actions, few of them would ever come to maturity. To know that someone will expect as a matter of

course to come to the rescue if one shows signs of really going under and drowning is a necessity during the period of youth, when the immature powers of the growing human being are genuinely inadequate to take care of him in a very complicated and dangerous world. But it is hard to give it up voluntarily, as all the modern psychiatrists will tell you, repeating in new and fashionably learned words the old-granny wisdom of the ages. In fact it is almost impossible to give it up voluntarily. Society and life are obliged to snatch that soft pillow forcibly from under the heads of maturing human beings, to set them up on their feet, give them a push, and tell them to go it alone.

About the only thing modern society seems to be able to do in this line is to enforce economic independence. Most American brides and grooms on their marriage day expect to be financially self-sufficing. Beyond this, most of them still have a fixed (though quite unconscious) expectation that life will continue to provide somebody to look out for them. Generally each naïvely expects the other is going to do this, and is wounded to the heart's core to find that a contemporary has no gift for the self-abnegating paternal and maternal attitude. Usually, exactly at this very critical moment, along comes Nature holding in her capable hand the lever which is to pry them out of childishness into maturity. She does not show it to them barely and crudely. They have no idea what is happening to them. With a shrewd eye to dramatic effect and a matchless adroitness in working up to a climax, she stage sets the scene with excitement, suspense, anxiety, emotional and physical tension. Then the Great Event of all the ages takes place with heart-stirring alarums; and there are these two spoiled children potently shoved off the unwholesome, calcium-lighted, cramped, center of the stage position which they have feverishly struggled to keep as the only endurable situation in life, off into the "great open spaces" of real life, into the path which leads to the blessedness of selflessness. Educative influences of the parents on the children, forsooth! Rare and unusual souls can educate themselves, but the great majority of ordinary human beings would be unbearable if they had no children to bring them up!

The educative influences on parents of a home with children in it is not temporary, but goes steadily on from birth of the first baby. There are so many phases of it, I cannot begin even to enumerate them. Perhaps next in importance to the irresistible thrust with which children push their parents from dependence on the older generation into being the older generation itself, from concentration on themselves to self-forgetting thought for others, is the rich supply of strong, vital, primitive satisfaction which they bring to parents. We have so few strong, vital, primitive satisfactions left! The world seems bent on sterilizing all our older deeper impulses. At least the aim of our civilization seems to be to drain out the sap which pours up from Mother Earth into them and to

replace it with intellectual self-consciousness. It does the race no harm to have, still existing, widespread and rather universal, one of our deep, old, instinctive emotions and joys, hot and alive, like our physical hearts. Its throbbing, primitive rhythm furnishes for many people the only inspiriting marching song that ever comes into their lives to lift their weary feet out of futile and dreary plodding. The twentieth century does its best, for instance, to rob the race of the nourishing daily bread for the spirit of consciously useful and creative labor. To push a button, swing a lever forward or back, tap the keys of a typewriter, adjust one screw in a complicated machine, sell something to somebody who does not wish or need it, drive a car there and back—such are the "creative" activities to which our bold, energetic race is doomed—the race whose pulse is still beating strong and fast with the only recently vanished excitement of defending its cave from saber-toothed tigers, and fighting for its life against mastodons. No excitement now except the hand-me-down ready-mades of the movies; no sudden piercing fears and hopes—only the slow, wearying ache of economic uncertainty, the chronic dull anxiety about getting and holding a job. No apparent danger, no apparent sense of vivid, immediate usefulness in the button-pushing, lever-swinging, key-tapping eight hours of boredom. What a taproot of vitality for such lives is physical parenthood, thrust down, as it is, into the rich soil of old, old accumulations of human instinct and experience! There is excitement for you! And heart-shaking emotion! And danger—real danger—to be averted from something precious! And responsibility, saving, not to be escaped personal responsibility! And such a vivid immediacy of usefulness connected with every one of the infinitely varied activities of parenthood! Yes, bringing up babies is not at all a bad substitute for fighting saber-tooths.

I have not spoken at all yet of what is perhaps the greatest single element brought by children into a home—certainly the greatest single element of which the parents and all onlookers are clearly conscious—the element of interest. Every modern, progressive educator of children puts the "interest element" on a pedestal. He does little, really, save repeat in varying formulae, the excellent aphorism that children will not and cannot learn anything unless their interest is aroused. Well, neither can grown-ups! They are exactly like children in this matter. Once their interest is fully aroused, they can learn and do learn forty, a hundred, times more than under the slogging blows of the severest "discipline" imposed from without. But "interest" is a difficult thing to arouse in varying temperaments, as any educator of youth can testify. In the case of parents, Nature supplies this invaluable spark. Our natural, primitive, physical, human instinct toward youth and children, in the majority of cases, pours "interest" into human hearts like a Niagara of potential power, which modern "parent education" is just beginning to harness up

to do some work. The interest of a few people in any group can be aroused by skillful treatment to study history; of others to study the harmonizing of colors; of others to study the working of the gas engine. But for the majority of the race, there exists in parents' hearts, ready-made by ages of inheritance, the liveliest, full-blooded, lasting interest in how to do the best thing for children.

Now an "interest in life" is admittedly the most priceless and irreplaceable blessing, far tougher and more lasting a possession than fortune or renown, more even than sacred health. It is also by common acclaim the most potentially educative force in human growth. What can parents ever do for children which outweighs this?

But let me stand aside now to give way to the other writers who are to help give direction and shape that Niagara-like interest and to go on with the work of turning its primitive formlessness into steady, intelligent purpose.

2. *The Rewards of Parenthood*[1]

There is a new conception of parenthood abroad in the world today which is going to make a different world tomorrow if it continues to grow at its present rate of speed. I can remember a world thirty years ago when I, a child in that world, found nothing attractive in the traditional picture of a woman's part in life. There was no thrill, no challenge, no promise of recognition and reward. The thought of having children, or bringing them up, or creating a family, far from presenting an alluring possibility of adventure and achievement, a field in which expert skill and knowledge might find expression, loomed before me as a fate to be avoided if possible, the crushing end of all individual development.

Why we were so easily convinced that working with money, with atoms, with germs, with plants, with bugs, with tools, with books, with paints, clay, sounds or what not were all obviously more professional, more difficult, more interesting, or more valuable to society than working with children, I am sure I do not know, unless we did so confuse cooking, scrubbing, sewing, with child care and because our badly organized domestic life has always allowed those occupations to prevent the rearing of children from being the mother's first and most important task. Perhaps too the fact that no *bona fide* educational institution held in respect by men included any professional or technical training for this field, not housekeeping, mind you, but child rearing, may have had something to do with it.

It was part and parcel of that world of thirty years ago, which was so blinded to the importance of human behavior as a possible field for scientific research and practical control, and which was so unaware of the

[1] Adapted from TAFT, JESSIE, What It Means to Be a Foster Parent, *Progressive Education*, vol. 3, pp. 350–354, October, 1926.

place of the child in that field, to look upon the dependent child as an unmitigated burden, the institution as the only tolerable solution of the problem and to think of all children as somehow owing the parents a debt of gratitude which a lifetime would hardly suffice to repay. Every parent, just by virtue of being one, was entitled to love and respect, was always right, and, if the children failed to respond to his training, could not be held responsible. There were ungrateful children born into the world in those days, children who did not appreciate their parents and who somehow managed to develop most undesirable character and habits in spite of good training. These were the bad children mysteriously born into the world to humiliate and torment good parents. You may see them today sitting in the reception rooms of child guidance clinics waiting to be made over so their parents may have an easier life. At least, that is what the parents have in mind. Whether or not the clinic will be able to do anything with the problem depends largely on whether those parents can reverse their idea of why they came.

Despite the fact that the old ideas and practices still linger in far too many places, those who look back upon the development of the last twenty or thirty years in medicine, public health, social work, education, law, psychology, sociology and psychiatry may see a new conception of the relations of parents to children slowly taking form. There are many fields today which consider the child, his entrance into life, the way he is trained as an infant, the kind of education he gets, the interests and attitudes he acquires as the very basis and hope of any social control. We have come to realize that one thing is fundamental in any kind of reform, getting at people when they are young.

From these various quarters we see developing a new psychology of the individual and a new conception of what it means to bring up a child. Far from requiring no training and no technique, the job of the parent, particularly the mother, becomes the most difficult and the most important, as well as the most creative and rewarding work the world has to offer, work in which the unprepared, unenlightened, uninterested parent cannot hope to succeed except by accident.

You can see what this means to our whole conception of the dependent child and the basis on which he is placed with a foster parent. Physical birth, flesh and blood connection have ceased to be the important factors in our newer vision of the parent's job. Bringing up a child, not bearing it, is what counts; how much security you can give it, how much stability and confidence, how much physical vigor, how many wholesome attitudes and useful habits, how many creative interests, how much ability to stand on its own feet. Loving a child because he is flesh of your flesh is not all important but how effective and intelligent your love is in equipping him for life. Love, ignorant and blind, may hamper his development and ruin his happiness. The test of the value of parental affection lies

not in the fact of blood relationship but in the kind of child it rears. By their fruits ye shall know them.

Thus parenthood has been taken out of its conventional setting and lies open to anyone who conceives of it as a job worthy to be done, carrying within it its own rewards, not rewards of assistance with housework or farm, not rewards of support in old age, or obedience and gratitude, but the reward of having some conscious part in the growth of a human being, of adding to your own resources an ever deepening interest which age cannot dim.

But, you say, surely you do not imply that taking a dependent child from an agency will guarantee the experience of a real parent. My answer is yes, provided you have the right attitude toward children; yes, provided the agency has a professional staff which is expert in the delicate task of selecting a particular child for a particular home; yes, provided you are willing to have yourself and your own situation examined as carefully as the child has been to determine your fitness for each other; and again yes, provided you are open minded and are willing to be guided at first by someone who understands what it means to adjust foster parent to foster child. There are all kinds of dependent children just as there are all kinds of children who are not dependent and all kinds of homes. You and I might want a child of sensitive make-up with a mind equal to college training, Mr. Smith wants just a good wholesome average kid who will go through high school and be a credit to his father in business, while Mrs. Jones wants a healthy sensible little girl like herself, a steady, practical body who will be satisfied with common-school education. Only the trained worker is in a position to know both family and child well enough to combine them.

Provided the agency can supply the suitable child, what are the problems of any foster parent?

First there is one tremendous disadvantage under which many foster parents labor and one great advantage which they often possess over real parents. The disadvantage lies in the fact that any dependent child who has not been in one home from birth has suffered a shock to his confidence in life; he has a basis for fear and for compensatory striving to bolster up his security and make himself feel as safe as possible which the own child hopefully escapes.

It is essential for any prospective foster parent, especially if he takes an older child, to appreciate this disadvantage so thoroughly that he will wait patiently, as long as it takes, perhaps a year or two, for the basis of confidence, the sense of really belonging, to be established. In the meantime he must be alert to the effect of the lack of security on the child's conduct. Instead of being ready with reproof, criticism, and sharp insistence on immediate change, all of which only reinforce the fundamental fear and increase the need for the unpleasant behavior, he will be

ready with encouragement and praise for every sign of progress and will do all in his power to use only positive means, identifying himself with the child, not holding it off for condemnation and giving it from the start the realization that they have taken each other for better or worse and must work it out together.

One of the shocks which lies in store for the completely inexperienced foster parent, whose ideas about children are theoretical and who has considered his own individual development and comfort without restriction for a good many years, is the discovery that one has to learn to like having children. It is like any other new job, it demands a new technique and new control. He finds himself quite unprepared. All of his habits of living are broken up. These new ways do not come easily. He has to stop and think at every turn. Everything, even the simplest routine of life, has become problematical. Now this is a very disturbing experience. Nobody can enjoy it steadily. There will be periods of exasperation, of wonder at one's folly in giving up a comfortable existence for chaos, periods of hating the strange intruder and wishing he were in Halifax. If only the new foster parent isn't too upset by himself and the fact that far from loving a child he simply despises it, there is hope ahead. Time is the great worker of miracles and nowhere is it more of a factor than in this mutual process of adjustment between foster parent and foster child.

The flesh and blood parent goes through a similar process but he is held to it by the fact that there is no escape and his tenderness has had a chance to grow slowly to meet the growing complexity of his situation. The foster parent and the foster child know that theirs is a situation from which escape is possible, so they require much more determination and encouragement to live through enough time to come to the period when interest is far greater than desire to be free. Nobody has any idea of this "time" factor unless he has been through it himself or has worked with people who have.

The next prerequisite for the foster parent is the capacity to look at himself and the child and the problems which arise objectively. Here is where the foster parent has a real advantage. The own parent needs to be objective with his child just as much as anyone, but because his own emotions are so much more involved he finds it far more difficult. No one is in the proper frame of mind to be intelligent about a problem if his feelings are so strong he cannot think, cannot even see what is there to think about, but must get rid of his own joy or his own pain in some impulsive way, however unsuitable or ineffective.

Now, the foster parent, at least for some time, is not so personally identified with the adopted child. From the start his relation to the child has been more voluntary and conscious, subjected more to analysis and thought. His ego is not so immediately hurt when he finds his child

unworthy. He is in a position to learn that this is a problem demanding thought rather than emotion, and intelligent experiment rather than punishment. He can easily begin to reap his reward in the interest of the process, even his failures will have a meaning for the next attempt.

Why should anyone subject himself to such discipline? Because parallel to the difficulty of the problem is the satisfaction of being able to solve it at least partially. It is a never ending, always increasing, deepening interest, a source of infinite variety and enrichment of experience, the only stake we have in the life of the next generation, and worth as a fulfillment of self all that it costs in self-sacrifice.

3. *Family Antagonisms*[1]

In the library of the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston there are carefully preserved two copies of a book by Cotton Mather, published in 1695, on the most modern of themes, "Help for Distressed Parents" . . .

It is a shock to realize that it was necessary to warn our New England ancestors of evil courses in the days of their ungodly childhood. But that the children of 1695 behaved in a manner "afflictive unto their parents" we can readily believe. For reasons which psychiatrists and sociologists are now pointing out to us, parents are usually afflicted by the actions of their children. It is our human way of walking on two feet—the foot that goes forward and the foot that holds back. It is only when either process is to long or too short, too abrupt or too uneven, that the march gets us nowhere.

Today when parents are unusually afflicted by their children we think of examining the parents themselves.

In spite of all the great disciplines in the world children are still to be found unhappy, restless, insecure and without guidance. Catholics, Jews, Protestants, Quakers, Unitarians, scientists, artists, social workers each have a philosophy of life which, applied to their children, would result in family relationships different from those we see today. The parent-child relation evidently presents fundamental difficulties, for all these followers of great ideas have "trouble with their children" and when in trouble they tend to use identical methods. Children of labor leaders, emancipators, radicals who would go to jail for free speech or self-determination, are as likely to have dominant, possessive parents as the children of Methodists or Republicans.

There are more than nineteen ways of being a bad parent. Each situation in family life is unique, a dynamic meeting of forces, personal-

[1] Adapted from VAN WATERS, MIRIAM, "Parents on Probation," pp. 61–99, copyright, New Republic, Inc., 1927. Reprinted by permission.

ities, and material surroundings in a way unheard of before and impossible to repeat. Each situation has its own laws which must be mastered with due regard for the eccentricities of all concerned. This is one of the reasons why parenthood is an exacting and exciting art. The effects of blundering may be different, just as the effects of the application of any "good" rule may be bad unless we have applied it with an intense human curiosity which makes us responsive to all that is going on at the moment—the state of the weather, the child's nerves, whether his father is rushing to catch a train. Still, we can detect certain habit patterns of bad parental behavior which tend to be repeated. Some of these show up more plainly in juvenile court than elsewhere. Many are found in every good neighborhood.

William was fourteen, very tall and awkward, an only child. His father was a college teacher. His mother worked in a doctor's office. At eleven, William began to take money from his parents and was whipped. About once a month he stole a dollar or so. His parents gave a dinner and he took five dollars from the purse of a guest. There was a terrific family scene in which William was told that he was a common thief and would be turned over to the police if it happened again. This was in August. In September, William entered high school. He had no brilliant sweater like the other boys, no running pants for the gym, no spending money for anything. At home his father never looked at him; for three weeks he had not spoken, even in blame; his mother did not notice the holes in his socks, but then she never had. It was the football season, and William wanted a locker and a leather helmet. One day he went into the girls' locker room. He felt excited and foolish. He noticed a door ajar, pushed aside an absurd green silk blouse, opened a vanity case and stole three dollars. The janitor caught him. Open mouthed and sheepish he "confessed" it to the principal, the vice-principal, the girls' gym teacher, the boys' gym teacher, two filing clerks and the registrar.

He comes of such a good family we will send him home, was the verdict.

His teacher went with him and waited till seven in the evening for his parents to come. William's father calmly went to the telephone and called the police.

After three weeks in jail William was turned over to the juvenile court. The judge said to the father: "So often youngsters steal and when they have learned their lesson, get over it. We will just send him home." But the father said, "Not to my home. I wash my hands of him."

However, the judge did send William home. He placed him under the supervision of Mr. Collins, a kindly man on the Board of Education, a bachelor who had a knack with children. Thereafter William went to the City Hall every day after school. He sat on the edge of his chair,

looking miserable and waiting till Mr. Collins had opened his mail. Then they would talk.

"Well, how are you?"

"I'm pretty well."

"Got a job yet?"

"No."

Mr. Collins got him a job as messenger and William rushed about town like a young hound. After six weeks, Mr. Collins missed fifteen dollars from his desk. William admitted at once that he had taken it. Unfortunately the money was spent, for shows, a book on electrical engineering, innumerable ice-cream sodas, a fountain pen, a pair of gym shoes, and some candy. Mr. Collins sent him home, but he lost his job. In a week William was back. It was February.

"See here, William, you need a new suit of clothes."

"I know it," said William dully.

"Well, I'll stand you to some clothes. You can pay me back $2.50 a week. Then there is that $15. It will take you to vacation time."

William emerged from the store in a completely new outfit from the skin out. He got a new job. He lived at home, not as a son but as a lodger, a shadow, an invisible element. In June he burst into Mr. Collin's office after running all the way from home.

"Mr. Collins, I think—I am not sure—but I think tonight as he was going out the door my father smiled at me."

This was eighteen months ago. Now William is a steady young fellow with an average school record. He has not stolen again.

From many points of view we feel that the college professor was a bad parent. Leaving out of account William's drab home life, the absorption of his parents in their adult pursuits, their failure to give him spending money or to clothe him properly, we face the fact that the father lacked orientation in the modern world. He should have known that science has something to say when a child steals. He should not have repudiated him when he clashed with the accepted standards of his class and position. He should have sought guidance and assisted in his son's recovery. He should have been willing to apply his concept of natural law, cause and effect, in dealing with a problem which baffled him not because of its intrinsic difficulty but because of his own chagrin and pride. He did not call in the police when a refractory liquid in his chemical laboratory went wrong, but in the case of his only son he appealed to force, partly because his emotions were aroused, partly because he was entirely ignorant of progress in the science of human behavior. Nor would he smile until he felt sure the problem was solved. He was unwilling to take the risk. He was living in the twentieth century in chemistry and in the age of tribal magic in human relations.

A parent is bad if he is not orientated in the modern world.

Mrs. Abbot kept a clean home. Her children were well behaved, Tom eight, Sara four, and Ruth fifteen. Ruth went to high school. Mrs. Abbot was a favorite with her neighbors, who were always dropping in for card parties. The excitement was not in the cards but in the conversation. Mrs. Abbot loved to talk about young people. She told the neighbors that Mary Morrison was so tough she had to be sent away to a reform school. (Mary was in the county hospital having her tonsils out.) Mrs. Abbot believed that the man who ran the soft-drink parlor at the corner sold bootleg to the high-school boys and that the girls danced half naked on the tables. When Emma, aged sixteen, came to the juvenile court for running away from home, she said that her boy friend's mother had been over to Mrs. Abbot's.

"Mrs. Abbot told her I was the worst girl in the neighborhood. His mother told Fred, and he told all the gang. Fred laughed at me and said, 'You've sure got a bad reputation. Mother says I mustn't go with you.' Now I had never gone the limit, but they all kept teasing me, so when Fred got sore when I wouldn't go with his boy friend, I just thought I'd step out to show them I wasn't afraid. Now I'd like to go into a private family. I can't make good back at home with Mrs. Abbot talking about me."

One day at high school Fred was called into the principal's office to explain why he had been absent one afternoon. He had driven a party of girls to the beach, he said, and talked frankly about it until they sent for his mother. She said she did not believe it was possible; if Fred had done it, it was the girls' fault. She repeated the stories she had heard at Mrs. Abbot's. Fred admitted that the girls coaxed him. "How many girls are not all they should be in this school?" asked the principal. Fred said he did not know of a girl who wouldn't let him kiss her.

That night at Mrs. Abbot's there was a great party and the beginning of a vague, insidious scandal about the high school; that eighteen girls had had to leave last year because of "trouble," that 70 per cent of both boys and girls drank, that a larger number were immoral. The neighbors were puzzled and a little thrilled. Personally, they did not know of a single girl "in trouble," but an atmosphere of anxiety and suspicion settled over the school community.

One evening when Mrs. Abbot went upstairs she found Ruth missing. She reported to the court that the girl had been kidnapped by a gang of bootleggers and white slavers. Ruth was found in half an hour at the corner store drinking an ice-cream soda. By this time, however, Mrs. Abbot had told the police her entire story of the high school. It took three weeks of patient investigation and several court hearings to follow each thread of gossip to its source. When it was all over, out of a school population of 2,000 emerged half a dozen young people who kept late

hours, many who "petted," a few boys and girls who occasionally smoked and drank, a feeble-minded girl who wrote objectionable notes, three who had run away from home and were on probation. All the rest—the dark stories of promiscuity, abortions, illegitimate babies, habitual drunkenness—were utterly without foundation. Many of the girls and boys had boasted of things which never happened and "confessed" to experiences they had lived through only in imagination.

Ruth suffered the most. She is a pale, wistful child with a self-conscious manner, who remains on the fringe of any group. What little prestige she had has disappeared. She is conspicuous, yet unpopular with students and teachers. Mrs. Abbot is hardly satisfied with the investigation. She thinks it is still possible that "these things" are going on "under cover."

A parent is bad whose imagination is colored by an uncritical belief in the vague rumors of scandal about young people. Such parents have no sense of proportion, are ready to accept the worst because it fits in with their theories. They are the largest contributing factor to the breakdown of reputation, even of their own children.

The neighbor agreed to come in and sit with Edith's mother. This was no hardship to the neighbor because the mother was attractive. She had earned her own living for years. Unusually well read, she had the gift of vivid speech. There was really no reason why she should be known to everyone as Edith's mother except that she expected it. Her own personality had an individual flavor like the tang of a mountain apple.

"Well Edith just had to go to this dinner. She did not wish to go, of course; she has refused so many—some day Edith will be a mighty unhappy girl. She can't have her mother always."

Edith is twenty-three, an only child. When she married, it was understood that the mother would not lose her daughter; on the contrary, her retinue merely was to be augmented by the presence of Arthur. Both young people worked downtown and the mother kept house for them. All went well until they began to take on outside interests in the evening. With Arthur it was business, with Edith night school. Then, for the first time in her life, the mother took to her bed. She was ill and faint and could never be left alone at night. The doctor agreed that she must stay in bed, for although he found no organic disease, she had lost weight rapidly and had become fatigued and pale.

Edith responded to this situation with an eagerness she had never shown to Arthur. Never strong before, she now had the strength of two. She kept her job and ministered to her mother. She never went anywhere.

Six months passed and the doctor said jokingly he could not tell which was the patient. The mother began to have a faint color in her cheeks and Edith was like wax. Arthur did nothing about it, for all three and the doctor were busy observing their concept of filial piety in the face of that exacting religion—an invalid parent.

The daughter's attentions to her mother were variously described by the neighbors as "beautiful" or "too bad," according to viewpoint. Edith developed fears. Her mother might faint while she was gone, or stop breathing, or become despondent and run away.

One day this parent woke up. The diet of devotion had not grown any thinner but her appetite demanded something more. She embraced a new religion, sent her doctor and her children packing. Wistfully she began the task of regaining her hold on life. She cannot explain that the trouble lay in the fact that she had always dreaded marriage for Edith and when it came "it swept her off her feet." She is in reality not a bad parent now.

A parent is bad who does not face the idea of family formation for the next generation.

It is impossible to think of human beings without characterizing them. "There is not much to Ethel." "John is exactly like his father." "Louise is stubborn." If we stop to think of the various ways in which we characterize children we see that almost always it is in terms of their fancied response to ourselves. We do not observe them in their own being. Hence we call children shy, studious, wistful, frank, weak, unfeeling, egotistic, sensitive, not because they are these things but because we interpret their behavior in terms of our own emotion. We are no more skilled in the prerequisites of observation of children than we are in taking deep-sea soundings. Child observation requires a special kind of eye and some training. But in this field we all think we are experts. In other scientific observations our errors do not affect the material in any way, which goes on being a star or protoplasm; but when a child is falsely observed and classified wrongly by someone with no understanding he may be injured. Many an adult feels all his life he has been playing a part forced on him in youth by some such label as "evasive" or "happy go lucky."

A woman whose strength and simplicity and wisdom have served hundreds of needy folk was called in her childhood "a little mouse" because she was a grave and silent child. It was not timidity but thoughts that kept her quiet. She resented this all her life.

Evidence of the effect for good or bad of such interpretations of a child's personality is often seen in court. Perhaps the commonest example is the parent who maintains her child is entirely without feeling. "She has no sense of remorse. Nothing that I say has the slightest effect." The mother has not read the signs correctly. The lip has quivered before

it set, the throat has swollen before it tightened, the entire body is eloquent. But to the parent who is looking for words or sobs, "Jane is now and always has been phlegmatic."

A parent who makes a faulty characterization of a child is likely to produce bad results.

If one judges from court-room impressions one is likely to fall into the belief that the bad parents—or those likely to be called that carelessly—are the ones who inspire the most love. The child of the woman who drinks too much is so often passionately loyal. Perhaps there is a deeper layer in the child-parent relationship which we do not understand. So often what we call a bad home situation has no bad effect upon the child, and again things may appear well yet the child shows distress.

A throng of child-custody cases comes to mind. Take one in which the father accuses the mother of immorality. There is evidence that would justify removing the child, but the erring parent is given another chance. Outwardly, the mother submits to conventions, accepts supervision, her neighbors respect her; but something is wrong and the child reveals it mutely. Loss of appetite, change of posture, a "frozen" attitude, night terrors, delinquencies, and many other symptoms of emotional difficulty present themselves. And just as recent studies show that disorders in nutrition may be traced, not to the physiology of the child but to the overanxiety of the parent, so in court we may trace delinquencies in young children to the emotional strains they undergo in adult company.

In contrast, in these other cases where children really thrive with parents who break laws, violate customs, and appear unfit you suspect there is at work after all some hidden integrity of personality which shelters the child from witnessing the conflict, if there is one. It may be better for a child to live with this doubtful sort of parent than with the overscrupulous, harassed, worried, apprehensive parent who would seem on first sight to be a better influence. "Wholesome neglect" is sometimes better than too much attention in the concerns both of the body and of the spirit of children.

For older adolescents there is no reason to shrink from exposure to reality. But the young child should not share the moral, religious and social struggles of his parents. Let them present a sound front to the child.

A parent is bad who cannot shield a child from premature exposure to adult anxiety or perplexity.

4. *The Parental Influence*[1]

All those whose business it is to listen to the troubles of children are surprised to observe how few of them hold grudges. It is not merely

[1] Adapted from VAN WATERS, MIRIAM, "Parents on Probation," pp. 169–204, copyright, New Republic, Inc., 1927. Reprinted by permission.

that the child commonly feels no ill will toward the parent who has injured him, the injury seems to have left no trace. It has faded out of mind before the bruise is healed. For this reason it is extraordinarily difficult to give children of unkind parents any adequate legal protection. Ninety-nine times out of one hundred, the child witness in a case of parental cruelty before the juvenile court insists on going home. The incurable loyalty of children to unworthy adults is often the despair of the social worker.

An eleven-year-old boy whose father was a garbage collector was made to work daily from 4 until 8 A.M. and from 7 until 10 P.M. He was beaten and underfed. When reported by the school department the court found him twenty pounds underweight, heavily marked with cuts from a leather strap and in need of medical care. He was placed in a foster home. The father got a lawyer and appealed the case. The proceedings took about twelve weeks. So swift is the restorative process in the body and mind of a young child that when the boy came again before the court he was no longer useful as evidence. He had regained his lost weight. He was smiling and happy. He wished to go home. Those who imagine that human emotion works logically would have predicted that here, if anywhere, was a case when a child would say, I would rather die than go home. He had nothing against his foster home. But it was evident that his own home gave him something that the mere kindness and plenty of the foster home could not furnish, and that all the social workers in the world would fail to supply. Like a devotee to some exacting religion after a brief enforced rest returning gladly to his duties as soon as his wasted body is repaired, so the child thanked his benefactors courteously but was eager to depart. Freedom from pain and hunger were not to be weighed against other more urgent needs. I was licked only when I needed it, is the usual answer in court cases against cruel parents.

Antagonism of a child to a parent is founded on nothing so tangible as physical injury.

The mother cat is a good mother. For several weeks all the time not given to licking her fur, eating, and staring goes to the kitten with intense satisfaction to both. Then comes a day when the maternal paw strikes out in earnest, and the lubberly, overgrown kitten is given to understand that this cuff is no interchange of pleasantries. If he does not take himself off there are menacing growls and mutterings. His nursing days are over. No cat ever had a mother complex. But this beneficent arrangement whereby among animals when the young no longer *need* mothering the mother ceases to mother, cannot be called in any human sense antagonism as we find it between parent and child. With animals the relationship has ceased to exist. There is no compromise, and no aftermath of yearning for its reestablishment.

Because of the social nature of the family, its necessarily anxious concern with education, manners, and morals, we shall always find some degree of antagonism between parents and children. It is not infrequent and may be considered normal. Antagonism easily flows out of a close relation where so much is at stake, a relationship based not on choice but necessity. The antagonism which a child experiences in his struggle for emancipation may serve as spur to a wholesome independence. As all great religions have been begun in heresy, so the entry of the individual into new crafts, professions, new modes of thought and action must often begin in a feeling of bitterness between child and adult.

The antagonism with which we are concerned here is something deeper, more baffling and more sinister. It lies at the root of what we may call insoluble family problems. We may glimpse it in court in such acts as continued running away, persistent refusal to return home, marked defiance, but especially in expressions of coldness and dislike, not only in actions and words, but in mute evidence from the body itself, when in the presence of the parent the child shrinks from a caress, shows pallor, or change of color, muscular tensions, a changed voice and posture. Some of these cases of antagonism have been studied individually.

The first impression we receive is that the antagonism is based on what we might call nothing at all! Not the child shivering on the worst bed in the house, discriminated against, eating what is left, getting blows, reprimands, and injuries is the one most likely to fall victim to the insidious disease of antagonism; on the contrary we find it more frequently among children who seem well off from the skin out and who are hard put to find any tangible ills to complain of.

A social worker is mystified when a girl who seems to have a good home and has taken her chances for a week or so among the average unlovable set of human beings found in the average detention home declares that she prefers it, or the state school, in fact anything which may befall her rather than a return to the parental roof. The social worker's first reaction is to blame the home. "Something is wrong, we will wait and see." Since most children prefer bad homes to good institutions or "private families," there must be something extraordinarily the matter with a home "I would rather die than go to." So there is, but it is nothing the social worker can discover by an ordinary social investigation. The social worker then turns to foster parents. They receive the girl with expectant sympathy but usually soon return her to the court. "She is impossible." Then the social worker says: "I supposed Nellie's mother was hard and unfeeling and unjust, but I guess she knows her child better than I do."

The court faces a blank wall. The girl will not live at home, if she is forced to return she runs away. Often she cannot get along in any other home; she is too young to work, and it appears unjust "to commit" her,

for "she has not done anything." Her growth as a human being requires the family relationship, yet when this food is put in her mouth it does not nourish her.

Emma is an attractive high-school girl of seventeen. She is vigorous and athletic, has a musical voice and sings in her church choir. Her father died when she was seven, her mother married again after three years of struggle to make a living as a saleswoman. The mother is a quiet woman, self-effacing and rather vague in manner. She makes all of Emma's clothes and does all of her own housework. She complains that Emma does not help her, yet she gives her no responsibility and ridicules her awkward attempts. The stepfather is a maker of eyeglasses. He reads a great deal and has little to say around the house. Emma has a half brother of eight who is happy and causes no trouble. Emma came before the court for running away from home. She had been out with a party of young friends and had overstayed her leave. When she returned at two in the morning both her parents were sitting up. Emma's face was flushed and her wind-blown bob disarranged. Her mother said nothing, but her stepfather, contrary to his habit said a great deal. He ended with:

"This is final. I will not have a streetwalker in my house."

In court Emma refused to go home. It was proved to the satisfaction of everyone that the girl was not "delinquent." The stepfather invited her back, but Emma was cold and deaf and blind to his request. The mother was asked how she felt. "Emma may come home, of course, if she likes." Her hand went out in a tentative gesture toward the girl, and Emma drew back sharply, her whole body became stiff and unyielding. It was obvious that Emma bore no ill will toward her stepfather. She was merely indifferent toward him, but toward her mother she showed an antagonism that went to the roots of her being, although it had never before been expressed in words. It was not merely that her mother had failed to defend her against an unjust accusation. Emma appeared to resent most her mother's silent self-effacement in the presence of her mate. "She never listens to what I say. She won't even argue. She has her own opinion, and it's always what *he* thinks. With my little brother it is the same. She won't say he can't do anything; she waits until my father comes home; then he just looks at her, and she makes up her mind so that nothing us children say or feel or do has the slightest effect. It gets on my nerves. I would not go home again if I stayed in jail a year."

Doubtless there are other factors but one stands out more clearly than the rest; it is the mother's domination by an invisible government. She has been too self-effacing in her rôle as parent. The girl has come to believe that it makes no difference to her mother if the children are at

home or elsewhere. Response has somehow dried up. There is a tense solemnity in the atmosphere of the home, as if everything were settled years ago and young life there was an impertinent sacrilege. Emma is almost old enough to start life independently, but she has had no training in social intercourse. She is without faith in adults. Nothing seems worth while to her. She rarely expresses herself and seems skeptical of the words and deeds of others. She is healthy and intelligent and her personality contains many assets but she cannot put them to cooperative uses. For so many years she has borne a futile grudge that recovery will be difficult without expert assistance.

Many would say that Emma had an ordinary case of jealousy against her stepfather. It is more complex. Jealousy in the presence of stepparents is common but it is easily dispelled by affection and interest. Occasionally a mother will enlist the sympathy of a child by her exuberant love of the new mate.

A little girl who had been removed from the custody of her mother and went away willingly because she realized that her mother was an unfit guardian wrote her father during vacation: "I have just had a long letter from mother. Isn't it too bad her husband died?"

Prolonged antagonism causes serious damage to the personality of the child. It creates an underdrift that cannot be turned aside by a change of environment or placement in a "normal family" with certified standards as to food, beds, air space, cleanliness, discipline, a marriage license, and a permit to keep children.

Gail's is the type of personality of which it is said, "She cannot be reached." She is fourteen years old but she looks two years older. When she came to the court because of "incorrigibility" she was sent at once to a girls' school. She is tall and strong but has a stooped posture. She plays ball well, but she could not make the team because she is always bickering over trifles. In any group she remains on the fringe. She does not seem to react like anyone else. Once when she won the high jump and her name was mentioned in student-body meeting she turned pale, her eyes filled with tears, she seemed not so much embarrassed as irritated. Another time she had designed a poster for a play. It was a strikingly beautiful thing with an unique use of planes and color. When a visitor spoke of it, Gail was made to get up and show herself. Long after the attention of everyone had flown on to something else Gail sat in her corner on the floor her chin dropped on her chest, her body pasted flat against the wall like some primitive bas-relief meant to express utter failure, fatigue, and self-pity.

At first sight her appearance attracted the interest of adults; her black eyes, with dark circles underneath, her tomboy swagger, appealing, intelligent face made them long to help her. The gym teacher insisted

that Gail be made captain of the Girl Reserves so that she could "develop responsibility." In the tennis tournament Gail claimed the best racquet and used it all the time. She was harsh and arbitrary in her dealings with the girls, unfair in her decisions, argumentative, dictatorial, affected in manner, supercilious, selfish, and exceptionally skilled in making cruel remarks, often bored, always indifferent, "only happy when someone else was in tears."

As her teachers came to know her better they disliked her; they could not help it. She aroused a vague antagonism spontaneously. Even her clothes were irritating, those strange, tight, sleeveless, little, child gimpes sewed unto full long skirts. To be sure her mother had outfitted her with these infantile garments, but there was the sewing room in which girls who cared could correct parental mistakes in clothes. They began to say of Gail: "She gives the appearance of a bright intelligent girl, but the better you get acquainted with her the more you question her intelligence. What makes her look so blank? Her eyes have a film over them sometimes. She is sleepy. You cannot wake her up in the morning. She pays no attention in school. She does not respond to the efforts of those wishing to help her. Though not easily detected in falsehood, she gives the impression of lying and insincerity. She is uncommunicative and evasive, does not seem particularly interested in anything, an extremely difficult child to talk with, everything has to be pumped out. She is so sullen and discontented." This feeling on the part of the teachers was the reason why Gail "got nothing out of school." The psychologist gave her an intelligence rating of superior normal, but she made no academic progress. Her music teacher refused to give her lessons because she was so insolent.

For some time the teachers had noticed that Gail was "queer" about love. She had an antipathy to being touched. She did not seem capable of feeling affection; she objected to caresses; her attitude toward them was the same as if they had been blows. She was "crazy about animals," and lavish in hugs, kisses, pats, chokings, and shakings of puppies, but she took no care to feed, water, or bed them. There was something in her attitude that saddened true animal lovers, she seemed so indifferent to their feelings, so filled with a sense of greedy possession, so incapable of the joy of observation.

It was also remarked that Gail had, as it were, a tiny, hidden hair-trigger spring, or button, which if touched or innocently brushed against would cause an explosion. She could not bear the least criticism. The mildest show of authority filled her with some strange reaction as if she had been poisoned by a deadly chemical. Her teachers began to be a little afraid of her. They said, "She is incapable of remorse. She has no sense of right and wrong. She simply cannot see why anyone has a right to prohibit her from doing whatever she chooses."

One teacher was baffled: "She seemed to sort of like me. Then one afternoon she was sitting doing nothing and I asked her a question, just a remark. At first she seemed confused, as if she did not know what she wanted, then she got terribly angry as if she were going to strike me."

Gail had been one of the children who said in court, "I would rather die than go home."

The home was a neat one with trim box hedges and rows of flowers. Her father had been an engineer, but, as his wife's lawyer said, "he had given up a good job and become a day laborer to avoid the payment of alimony. He hated his wife that much." At the time of the divorce Gail was four and her father was already an old man. She was "given" to her young mother who had shown almost no interest or affection for her daughter until the lavish display in court which made even her witnesses say: "She is claiming the child to spite Joe." Gail slipped in and out of boarding homes until she was eight. Then her mother dropped out of sight.

Gail today speaks of this illusive parent as if she were the embodiment of all that is gracious, tender, and exquisite to look upon. She carries a picture of her mother about with her but there is nothing in that picture which would identify it with the gorgeous image that Gail has created.

On her desertion by her mother, Gail was sent to live with her father and stepmother. The stepmother was born in England. She was a small, very thin, worn-looking woman with a scant, stringy bob. She was about forty-nine when Gail went to live with her. Her whole body was tense and expressive of strains. She was overanxious about her housework and her duties in regard to Gail. She was zealous about unimportant details. Someone described her desire for affection as pathetic. Her caresses were awkward and repressed.

Gail started to school. In her own mother's company she had lived happily, she had no idea why the court "took her away." It was true her mother came to see her rarely, but when she did, and especially on those scarlet occasions when she visited her mother's flat, she had a good time. There was noise, plenty to eat and drink, and lots of daddies. Gail recounted these jolly adventures to the English stepmother and to her school friends. At ten she was expelled. They tried another neighborhood. From the age of eleven Gail was regarded as incorrigible. She was "moody, quarrelsome, impudent, disobedient, negative, lazy, dirty, spiteful, and stupid." Her father and stepmother, however, treated her kindly, watched her closely, denied themselves necessities to pay for her music lessons. They were strict but never impatient. When Gail was brought to court for running away it was shocking to see her cold dislike, her positive, matured, unchildlike resolve to escape from these gentle, bewildered parents. It was as if some stream long shut up

had suddenly spilled over the dam. It was quiet but invincible. She said they were too old, she could not bear to have them handle her. She would rather sleep in the hen house than with her stepmother. She simply *hated* them both. That was at the age of thirteen.

Fourteen months later the court faced the same stony barrier. Gail *hated* her teachers, those kindly folk in the school who had approached her problems with knowledge and skill.

She was then placed in an excellent private family where she is today. Her verbal behavior has "improved"; she will say of the seven-year-old son, "I hate him . . . no I don't, I just don't like him." But this is merely a concession to public opinion. In reality Gail does not feel differently. In telling of domestic life in her new home she said the man and wife quarreled, drank, fought, and threw corncobs at the dinner table. This was not so much a lie as a hopeful wish, for if Mr. and Mrs. S. really enlivened their home in such a manner Gail knew social workers well enough to know she would not long be left there.

There was only one place where she made no complaint. When she was in the detention home she was contented. She liked it for the same reason soldiers sometimes like the army: she knew what was expected, there were no decisions, and there were periods off duty—in non-institutional, or civilian life, so to speak, people were always interrupting. If you looked out of the window, they said "What are you looking at?" If you were silent they said, "What are you mad about now?"

In the detention home Gail's chief occupation was daydreaming. The trouble "on the outside" was that the dream world was continually being spoiled by intruders. She was like an artist who is trying to paint a picture and is annoyed and harrassed by interruptions. It may have been a little unfair to Gail but the map of her dream country was pilfered from her when she was off guard. A social worker, skilled in such occupation obtained it from snatches of talk, diaries, letters, reveries, and a story Gail wrote about another "little girl whose mother was allowed to bring her up as she pleased."

The phantasy which came to light by these means was built around a mother, extremely beautiful, rich, easy in manner, and loving. Her father was also beautiful and loving, a dark slim Spanish beauty; he was always being raided by the police for loose conduct and was successful in outwitting and outriding them. In this home there were shy, stolen kisses from fascinating parents, life under high pressure, excitement, parties, deeds of adventure, exquisite clothes in strong colors, carelessness, generosity, and speed.

Nothing could have been more remote from this phantasy than the humdrum world Gail was supposed to live in. Her own parents were sordid, neglectful and selfish; her stepmother aged, unattractive,

strict, exacting, unpleasant to caress, lacking in imagination, geared too slow for any flights, timid, and unsophisticated.

All children live in daydreams. We win them forth by interest in the objective world. Sometimes this interest seems to grow in the child spontaneously; sometimes it must be reinforced by the skillful manipulation of objects to make them attractive. When the dream world touches the real world at some points one enriches the other, but in Gail's case they were so utterly opposed that one world would have to be annihilated before she could live in peace. The phantasy was appealing and the actuality had little to recommend it. Her aged father and stepmother did not seek to interest her in other children, books, pets, games, or household responsibilities. The objective facts of her world were too unwieldy and too utilitarian. The contrast between them and her dream was so great that it made her hate her parents, and all those who stood in lieu of parents, teachers, friends, foster parents, and social workers.

Antagonism in its most blasting form takes its root in phantasy. We recognize this when we say that a fancied slight rankles more deeply than an injury. The lonely child, separated by misfortune from his parents, placed in an atmosphere which is uncongenial emotionally, becomes hurt. He repairs the damage by creating a dream. If skillful parents, grandparents, or foster parents can give the necessary time and personal attention to satisfy the child's love wants and gradually to turn his attention to the delights of the outside world of facts, objects, and personalities, antagonism does not arise, even if the child has been deprived of those dearest to him.

Antagonism in the child develops partly as a feeling of irritation at being interrupted while repairing an unsatisfactory world. The child is further hampered in finding an outlet by being an inferior, always supposed to be on duty. Instead of the relief a man may get in a fiery outburst if some nagging woman breaks in on his work, the child accumulates a slow stream of rancor, suspicion, and ill will. Antagonism is a growth that matures slowly underground. When some children say, "We would rather die than go home," they mean, "We would rather live in our phantasy country, seated on a dungeon floor, than go home where you people not only are not lovable, but keep interrupting and pretending to understand our thoughts when you do not."

As in preventive medicine we have long known that little neglected bodily ills predispose the body to disease, so in the field of mental health we are learning that petty discords cannot safely be allowed to accumulate. Many parents pride themselves on a happy home life because there is no open catastrophe. Let the circumstances change ever so little and the peace and security of the home is swept away. A mother was applying for state aid in behalf of herself and a fourteen-year-old daughter.

The mother and father were divorced. He had been paying for the support of the child until stricken with tuberculosis. When the girl came before the court she flatly refused to go home. The mother appeared greatly relieved. "That suits me. Now I can go out and work. There is never any peace for me as long as Elsie is at home." Elsie admitted she was trying and impudent. She admitted bad language. "Why do you talk to your mother this way?"

"Well, anybody would—I can't be insulted. She once called me a huzzy." Elsie was a robust girl with yellow curls hanging around her shoulders. She was eager to go to her new "boarding home." "Just ask my mother one thing," she pleaded with the court, "ask her to let me cut my hair." The mother said she would never consent. The girl began to cry. "She wants to put me into the movies, she thinks I am some Mary Pickford—but I'd crack the camera." The mother flushed. "You may do what you please with this girl. It is true I would like to see her in the movies, and I have taken pride in her appearance, but she is no daughter of mine." That afternoon the probation officer took the girl out for a hair cut, and she returned radiant with a sweetheart bob. It may sadden some mothers to know that she is amply contented in her new home. It is not so much the hair. The mother had married late in life. She had become an old maid before her child was born. Petty discords over hair, clothing, table manners, and other trifles had dissolved the bonds between mother and daughter before the court consented to the separation.

Antagonism does not usually exist in homes where father, mother, and two or three children live and work together. It flourishes in broken homes, among children of divorced parents, children who have been adopted, and is frequently found in an only child of aged parents. Fussiness and anxiety on the part of the mother are predisposing causes. Emotional tensions which block the flow of affection and make the mother uncomfortable lessen her value as a giver of comfort. "Comfortable" mothers do not have antagonistic children.

Outside interference is another source of danger. After the death of a husband a woman turns easily to a brother, uncle, guardian, or adult male friend for advice. Children resent this even when the relationship is no closer than that of friendly counselor. When the mother of a girl of seventeen consulted an elderly friend about her oil investments, the girl pleaded with her mother to put him out of the house. He continued to come and took a lively interest in all the concerns of the household. The girl eloped with a man who had not received his final decree of divorce. The mother filed a petition to bring the girl to the attention of the court and insisted that she be sent to the state school until twenty-one. Mother and daughter plunged into civil warfare. The mother sold the girl's clothes and the diamond ring her lover had given her.

The daughter instituted suit to have her mother removed as guardian of the estate. She was successful. A house servant was employed as a detective by the mother to watch the girl. The break was complete. In this case the girl was sufficiently mature to start life on her own account. Her antagonism did not extend to other individuals or groups.

Clarice is sixteen. She is bitterly antagonistic to both parents and refuses to live with either of them. She is a tight lipped, self-contained young person. For a time it seemed that she would succumb to a "crush" on a woman neighbor to whom she went for comfort and for gossip on the shortcomings of her parents. But this infatuation passed harmlessly and Clarice is earning her living as a school girl in a private family. She is hard working, conscientious, one has nothing to complain of in her unless it is an invincible self-righteousness. She is an only child. Only children suffer not only from too much adult attention but from too much leisure to devote to their own emotional difficulties. Clarice's parents differed over religion. The father was a member of a recognized church; the mother became devoted to a new sect. They argued incessantly. Clarice became for both the never dying conscience. She weighed them and came to the conclusion they were wrong. Unconsciously they had permitted and encouraged their daughter to assume the rôle of judge and arbiter. Her childhood ended abruptly. Parental differences in religion may be devastating to a child if they become the main theme of family life.

Jane is a rebel against all authority. She comes from a long line of military ancestors. Her mother died when Jane was eight and she was raised by an indulgent maternal grandmother. Jane is vivacious and pretty. Her grandmother returned her to her father when she reached her teens. She was too much of a problem. She flirted with undesirable young men, sailors, park loungers, and taxi drivers. She did not care for correct society. Her father had remarried a hard-working young school teacher and had four children. This home was unbearable to Jane. She ran away and became seriously delinquent. Her father gave her a hard whipping. From that time on Jane became a dangerous character. She is saturated with hate. She has a bad effect on any group in which she is placed. She corrupts younger children, takes the joy out of life when she is with girls of her own age, bears tales between adults, spreads gloom and disloyalty wherever she goes. She has no close friends. Her influence is peculiarly sinister in that she disrupts any social group. Even strong-minded individuals appear to lose energy and begin to question the worth-whileness of their efforts when Jane is around. Jane is very unhappy but she derives some satisfaction from observing this destructive influence at work. After some catastrophe she appears flushed with excitement and more self-confident.

The elements in her situation appear to be as follows:

An ever present, much talked of family tradition of military prestige and honor. This tradition stressed deeds of gallantry among the male members of the family and charm among the women. The only exception was the case of Jane's mother who died before she was thirty, and for some reason was disliked by her own mother, and considered childish, flighty, and unworthy by her husband. After her death she was never mentioned to Jane except occasionally by the earnest young stepmother who cautioned Jane not to be like her mother.

The family status had decayed under modern conditions. Economic pressure, coupled with change of public opinion about military glory caused the family to live in the past and to judge the present harshly. When Jane reached adolescence the modern world offered her only the cheapest thrills and attractions. When she responded to them she became a disgrace and scandal, and there followed the use of violence by the father in correcting Jane and the infliction of humiliation. The inevitable result is the growth of a warped personality.

Of all the conditions favorable to the development of antagonism the infliction of humiliation ranks first. Ridicule, sarcasm, petty slights, the meeting of emotional warmth with coldness and misunderstanding, the tactless reprimand, appear trivial as weighed against the balance of a home life which may contain a well-ordered household, earnest behavior codes, and the satisfaction of material wants. But the child, particularly the child deprived of the companionship of other children, nurses these humiliations in lonely hours, feeds them with dreams and reveries until they become large and absorbing grudges. If antagonism began and ended in the home, it would be a small problem, but it extends to all other forms of human intercourse and constitutes the most baffling of social problems—a warped personality, incapable of integration (at least in the present state of our knowledge) with any social group.

5. *A Freudian Interpretation of Egocentrism*[1]

Fifteen years ago and more, George Herbert Mead was teaching his students in social psychology that the conscious self arises as a result of its own social responses and that it continues to exist as a social process, an index of its changing social relationships. Today we are barely beginning the struggle to make concrete the implications of that statement. So elusive is the material, so varied, so rich, so individual, that one can but wonder whether it will ever be possible to know enough of the detail of the process we call personality to bring it under anything approaching scientific control.

[1] Adapted from TAFT, JESSIE, The Effect of an Unsatisfactory Mother-daughter Relationship upon the Development of a Personality, *Family*, vol. 7, pp. 10–17, March, 1926.

The psychologists, except where they have joined forces with psychiatry and social case work, are getting at the problem as scientifically as possible through the conditioned reflex, experiments with animals and, to a very limited extent, with newborn babies. They are extending their measurement of mental abilities to the youngest baby, they are developing tests of character traits, of emotional make-up, tests to tell you the kind of person you are and what complexes you have. They are upsetting all their previous concepts of instinct and emotion and trying to look at the human being denuded and unformed without a preconception of what he ought to do or be in the presence of any particular stimulus.

Be that as it may, the purpose of this paper is to make real some of the difficulties which confront one who is interested in understanding personality in action from the point of view of possible modification or, shall we say, case treatment and to suggest some of the subtleties of material in which we quickly become involved when we try to make concrete our theories about the social nature of the self.

There is perhaps no better vehicle for such a discussion than an account of one's experience in attempting to interpret the personality of a particular person, in this case a girl who was nearly thirteen at the time she became troublesome in school and was brought to the attention of school counselor and psychologist. There was nothing scientific about the situation. It was limited by the function of a school counselor, the time she had to give, what the family would bear, and the applicability of the interpretations to the immediate solving of the problem.

Mary R was reported to the school counselor of a public school in March, 1924, for taking money from the pocketbook of one of the girls in her class. While the investigation of this theft was still pending, she took four Red Cross magazines from a classroom and, when on the point of discovery, tried to put the guilt on another girl. A little later she was discovered ransacking the drawer of a teacher's desk. When brought to account for these misdeeds Mary gave various reasons for her behavior, none of which had any basis in fact. She also admitted that once before when she was in the 4th grade (she was then in 7B) she took five Eversharp pencils. The mother completed the picture with the story of having found a number of things in Mary's school bag and clothing for several weeks, things for which she could not account and which she had forced Mary to return to school—things such as a wooden spoon from cooking class, bobbins from machines, cardboard wrapped with silk thread. The mother stated that Mary quite often took things from her brothers and sister, things which could be of no value to her and often where she possessed duplicates. She had frequently discovered her going through her bureau and desk drawers and she has known her to take small sums of money found about the house.

One of the reasons why it is hard to study such a case is that the attention of everyone—family, teachers, even the case worker—is caught by the spectacular behavior. Everyone wants something done to stop the stealing, as if the mere fact of discovery made its cessation more important. It takes a good deal of determination on the part of the psychologist, removed as he may be from the practical situation, to detach his own interest from these outstanding events and to forget that he is supposed to interpret and correct a particular bit of behavior. Except for its inconvenience to society, the stealing is no more important than any other symptom as an expression of personality. This anti-social form of adaptation might be altered only to give place to a substitute expression perhaps no more desirable from the viewpoint of the individual's welfare, while the fundamental difficulty, the organization of the personality itself, remained untouched.

Until stealing can be related to the development of this girl's personality, our understanding of it is incomplete, although we succeed in removing it as a symptom.

For orientation one needs first a picture of Mary and her family as the worker sees them through her interviews and observation:

Mary's home background is decidedly above average as middle-class homes go. The father is a skilled mechanic who has always worked steadily, has earned a fair living, has been faithful to his wife, and is really fond of his family. He is a young man, healthy, good looking, quiet, easy going, and with no bad habits. The children are fond of him and he enjoys playing with them of an evening. He takes a share in their physical care, such as bathing, dressing, and feeding, but has little real responsibility for the home. The training and discipline are left almost entirely to the mother who is the dominant member of the household. His one weakness has been for gambling and taking chances. Once he used money belonging to his firm. He was able to replace it and only lost his job as a result, but his wife insisted that he never work again where he handled other people's money. He still enjoys buying lottery tickets and chances and Mrs. R can see this tendency coming out in Mary.

The mother herself is very much a person, a dignified, fresh-faced, young woman with a frank, open attitude which disarms criticism. She is intelligent and conscientious, and struggles to maintain the rather conventional but high moral and social standards under which she was brought up. She devotes herself earnestly to the care of a family of five children, of whom Mary is the oldest. When Mary was first referred there were in the family a new baby, a boy of two, Clara (six), and Philip (nine). The house is small and without adornment but comfortable. There is an atmosphere of harmony and evidence of planning for the children's welfare. They have the run of the house and order is not maintained at the expense of their play. Mrs. R is perhaps over-

anxious about the children, goes to school to see the teachers, and takes Mary's behavior far more seriously than her husband does. It is she who takes all the initiative in bringing Mary to the psychologist. She is overworked, has borne children rather rapidly and is worn out with her futile efforts to reform Mary. She has used every form of correction—reasoning, scolding, shaming, whipping, threatening. She has even spoken of putting her away and painted her fate in the next world. Much of this she realizes was unwise but she felt the honor of the family to be at stake.

Mary herself is an uncanny child with a pale, thin, pointed face and a body so slight and huddled as to give the impression of being dwarfed. Mary, with her furtive, watchful eyes, her hoarse, frightened voice often subdued to a whisper, her nervous, rapid movements and her perpetual expression of fear and suspense, makes a striking contrast to her frank, comfortable, good-looking mother. No other child in the family presents such a strange appearance. Philip is quite handsome and fairly well grown. He is polite, manly, and appeals to everyone. Clara looks a little more like Mary but is free and friendly in her contacts. The little ones all seem to be wholesome, jolly, ordinary youngsters.

The mother describes Mary as a nervous child full of fears, very prying and curious, the kind of child who drives one wild with her questions and her continuous flow of talk about her own interests and the pressure of her intense desires to go, to do, and to possess. There is always something Mary is asking for. She is one large want and nothing satisfies that want long. No sooner has she obtained a desired object than she ceases to care about it and transfers her interest to a new end. She is always in the process of seeking or striving for the next thing. She craves personal adornment and stylish clothes but takes poor care of what she gets. She is personally neat and clean always. Her mother says she doesn't get dirty even at play. She can do efficient work about the home, such as getting an entire meal if her interest happens to be aroused, but ordinarily she is not very reliable or responsible and has to be followed up with constant reminding. She loves to take authority over the younger children when the mother is away but does not manage them well. She teases and bosses and breaks up their games. She is always afraid that she will not have everything the other children have. She is markedly without affection which the other children show. Mrs. R thinks Mary really cares for no one but herself. She is nicest to the little baby and she is very dependent on her mother, but there is no genuine love for any of them. She is entirely absorbed in her own particular desire of the moment, a new dress, a wrist watch, Girl Scouts, movies, a trip, or whatnot. She craves attention, but when given it becomes unbearable in her boundless hunger for more. She

has no special friends among other children and when she plays with the girls of her own age shows no particular leadership. As a younger child she was quite contented to play by herself. Now she loves to join a club but she does not remain long, changing her group affiliations often. She has been very sensitive to the criticism which her behavior brought upon her from children and teachers and tried to avert suspicion from herself by putting it upon other girls in quite a deliberate way. She is afraid of punishments and screams wildly when whipped, but this is soon over and there is no evidence of remorse or resentment. She is apparently upset over the unpleasant consequences of her acts; not because she has been guilty of them. She is untruthful whenever a situation seems to demand it, either for self-defense or to gain an end. At school, previous to the stealing, she had not been conspicuous for misconduct or for the quality of her work. She began to fail in some studies about the time she was referred for behavior and had to be tutored. The mother is much distressed over what she considers Mary's failure to do creditable work. Her other children have stood well above the average. Mary used to but now she shows absolutely no interest and never seems to have her mind on her studies. She has to be nagged all the time. Philip on the contrary is a shining example.

Psychometric tests of all three older children show that as far as tests are concerned they have about equal ability, falling in the upper average group with unusual memory spans and, on the part of Mary particularly, superior ability with concrete material. There is no reason for poor school work as far as native intelligence goes.

It is noteworthy that, despite her good ability, Mary shows no genuinely constructive interest. She seems to have no projects which she pursues over a period of time, nothing she is making, no plan she is carrying out because of some idea of her own, except for schemes for getting her own way, going somewhere, or gaining possession of some coveted object. Yet she does not use or value the things she apparently desires intensely. Nor has she, as far as one can see, the kind of curiosity which leads to intellectual pursuits. In spite of her avidity, she does not seek knowledge. School work means nothing to her but the possibility of success or failure.

Here we have a girl in early adolescence, who stands out in her family as different, difficult, unloving, and unlovable. The parents have a constant struggle to maintain toward her the same loving attitude they have for the other children. They are put on the defensive by her insistent demands, her watchful care of herself, her determination to have her own needs gratified at all costs, her jealous measuring of what the brothers and sister receive. The mother in fleeting moments of insight will admit that she cannot love Mary as she does the rest, but she quickly adds, "I do more for her than any of the others." There is no doubt

that Mary by her behavior commands almost as much anxious attention as all the rest put together.

An interesting light is thrown on Mary's character by her reaction to sex introduction. It was noted early in the work on the problem that Mary's stealing episodes at school had happened to coincide with periods when Mrs. R had gone to the hospital to be delivered. Mrs. R admitted that she had never had the courage to tell her children anything about sex. She had always maintained that the doctor brought the baby. She was not very happy about her own sex life; she felt that she had had too many children and that her husband disregarded her entirely in his demands. She could conceive of sex as being a happy, beautiful part of some lives but it was not so with her. She felt ashamed with the sex relationship and could not bear to tell her children; moreover, she didn't know how to tell them. She was willing to let someone else discuss sex with Mary and agreed to let Mary come to her with all she learned. She recalled that Mary had asked questions which she evaded and had brought home information from a playmate, which the mother had told her never to mention again.

As soon as the subject of sex is broached to Mary and she becomes convinced that it is safe to show her interest, her curiosity becomes uncontrollable. She breaks forth in a stream of questions, many unrelated to sex, but all symbolic of her consuming desire to know what has been concealed from her. Step by step she presses the psychologist back to beginnings until the great object of her search is reached: What does the father do? When this has been answered to her satisfaction, her exulting triumph over her parents is unconcealed . . . She showed none of the ordinary adolescent emotion about sex, she had no apparent interest in it on her own account, no shame, no disgust, just joy in finding out at last what her parents had tried to hide from her. She had won out.

For a time Mary talked to her mother a good deal about the things she had been told, looked at pictures in a book, satisfied every curiosity and then lost interest in it completely.

How much this gratification of her desires had to do with the cessation of the stealing one cannot say, but the fact remains that there has been no offense at school and nothing startling at home since March, 1924, when this conversation took place. The personality, however, is unchanged, the consuming hunger for possessions is unabated and the lack of objective interest in other people remains the same, except that Mary has taken on many of the characteristics of adolescence. She lives in the hope of some recognition on the part of older boys, whom she worships from afar. She has ideas about society and thinks about the life in big hotels as something to dream of. She is preparing herself for appearance in the movies and reads everything she can find on how to become beautiful. Recently she went through some kind of an elaborate

starch bath following directions to the letter, in order to improve her appearance. All of this, however, has the same quality of complete absorption in herself and a compelling drive to get something for that self, with unawareness of the impression this makes on other people and blindness to their feelings and interests.

The question which now arises is, how was such a personality as this evolved? What were the social relationships which determined such a lack of response, such a turning away from persons, such a concentration upon the ego combined with failure to develop real ego power and a more acceptable ego ideal. We surely do not believe that such personality organization as this is simply born with the individual. It cannot be if we really mean what we say when we talk about the self as arising in a social situation.

Granted that Mary was not born with a ready-made self, is there any reason to doubt that the processes of response to social stimuli, which would ultimately result in what we call self, began at least from the moment of birth if not before? And would anyone seriously question that the infant's first possible relationship is ordinarily with the mother?

If we wish to understand Mary, then, we do have to go back to the nature of the situation in which her first patterns of response were laid down. There seems to be no period of life which we have so completely discounted as the first three years, particularly the first year, in our assumption that nothing happens then which matters, except possibly regarding physical health. Certainly we seldom think of it as effecting social attitudes or the type of personality appearing later and, even when we admit theoretically that this period has a determining influence, we fail pretty completely to fill it in with any concrete detail. Aside from psychoanalytic literature which is too technical and too far in advance of most of our thinking to be convincing, I know of only one place where any attempt is made to state the concrete experiences of a baby with their emotional and social implications. This is an article on the Rudiments of Character, by David Forsyth.[1] While Forsyth is an analyst, he has managed to make the baby's first contacts with life pretty real, whatever one's reaction to psychoanalytic interpretations may be.

However foolish it may seem, however helpless we may be for lack of material, and however unused to regarding it, it seems to me we have to face the fact that to every human being the first vitally important outside object is the mother's breast, and that the particular kind of nursing experience a baby has is bound to affect his relation to the mother and thereby to all who come after her. Next in importance to satisfying of hunger come the excretory functions and all the possibilities they afford of sensory pains and pleasures, of concentration of interest on themselves, of exercise of power, and control, of experiences of failure, shame,

[1] *Psychoanalytic Rev.*, vol. 8, No. 2, April, 1921.

and inferiority, of varying kinds of contacts with father and mother in the process of training to socialized habits.

It is with full realization of how unequipped we are as yet to analyze these early experiences, how little material we have on them, and how inadequate are the bases for interpretations, that I venture to give you what material we were able to gather on Mary's early background and to suggest some of the possibilities of its connection with her personality as we now see it.

Mary arrived during the first year of the marriage, quite contrary to all Mrs. R's ideas. She had planned on a year in which to become adjusted. As she looks back on it now, she realizes what a very difficult period it was. While she loves her husband and insists that he is the kindest man and a good father, much better than most, she has not forgotten her picture of the man she thought she was marrying. The first two years were years of disillusion. When asked what it is she minds most about Mr. R, she hesitates, and then says impulsively, "If you really want to know, it's his lack of refinement. He'd just as soon eat in his shirt sleeves as not and he'd rather go without shaving than to shave. He doesn't care how he looks. I wasn't brought up that way. Now Philip is refined in his tastes like my family. Mary is more like her father; but he loves the children, he isn't like her that way. He's very good to them and took more care of Mary than I did the first year."

The birth was very hard, as so often happens with the unfortunate first baby. Mrs. R had hemorrhage after hemorrhage and was so wretched for several months that much of Mary's care fell upon the father. Mary was breast fed for three months and was then put on condensed milk. Breast feeding was an unpleasant thing for Mrs. R. There was for her none of the intimate union of mother and child which makes of nursing a unique and satisfying experience to many women. It was something to be dreaded and cut short because of the pain. At three months, then, Mary was deprived of her first, none too satisfactory love object and went through eight months of a bottle which was equally unsatisfactory. She had colic, she was so undernourished that growth was retarded, and so constipated that bowel movements caused bleeding and were stubbornly resisted. Finally it was necessary to resort to enemas for every movement and to this day, says the mother, Mary has to be urged to go to the toilet.

The unhappiness of this period was increased by the fact that it was just at the time of Mary's birth that Mr. R became involved in his speculations with his firm's money and lost his job. When you realize how all this went against Mrs. R's strongest beliefs and aspirations for herself and her family, you can easily see that Mary's first social situation was full of pain, fear, anxiety, and deep emotional distress. Mary

did not feel the support of a united father and mother. Mary was the center of attention but it was attention of a strained and anxious variety. As it was not possible for Mrs. R to find much joy in her baby because of the quality of fear or discomfort involved in every aspect of her care (for Mary was a sickly, crying, troublesome child from the first and the mother herself too ill to want to look after her), so it must have been impossible for Mary to find pleasure in her first possibilities of social response. Every contact Mary had with her mother must have been more or less associated with pain—which prevented her from going over to food and the mother who supplied it as her chief source of comfort, safety, and satisfaction. And the mother says that Mary, until she was twelve, never did care anything about food. It was a problem to make her eat.

If the baby finds the feeding process lacking in joy-giving qualities, what is there left upon which his interest may fasten except his own activities of urination and defecation? These have far less immediate relation to a social object. They concentrate attention upon functions which do not so easily transfer the interest of the child to mother or father. The fact that they become the center of attention for parents, because of the physical care involved and the anxiety to train the baby early to good toilet habits, may only add to the child's resistance to parents or absorption in himself, if great tact and wisdom are not used in thus interfering with these important sources of pleasure and power. Certainly in Mary's case where every bowel movement was a contest between herself and her parents, associated with determined resistance, final defeat, and pain on her part and painful emotion on theirs, there were few possibilities for any positive or constructive relationships through this medium.

One can hardly doubt that the two first years of life, deprived of normal food satisfactions and characterized by a relation to parents on the side of training to toilet habits which was almost hostile, had a determining effect upon the character of the child subjected to such social experience from birth.

While one would not for a moment assume that we have all the data or that what we have is entirely reliable, it is nevertheless interesting to note some of the possible connections between Mary's personality as it is now showing itself and her early experiences. One can see in the failure to find satisfaction in food and in the mother's inability to respond positively to the nursing situation a source of Mary's estrangement from people, her lack of tenderness, her inability to trust herself to another person, her unusual lack of social sensitivity and responsiveness. Why she did not find in the father a secondary love object is more difficult to see because we have not sufficient data, but one might venture a guess that his state of mind was not very happy or suited to give assurance to a sick baby, since he was out of a job, disgraced, and subject to reproach

from his wife. Moreover, it is not likely that he found sickly, crying Mary and her enemas any more a source of pleasure than the mother did. The fact that Mary at the present time does not seem to turn to her father to any extent is possibly accounted for by her lack of feminine charm and lovableness which might cause him to single her out for attention, and the fact that he is less important in the family line-up than the mother, and so less desirable in Mary's eyes.

The concentration of attention on her own bodily functions rather than on social objects might account for the fact that Mary's personality has been organized about her own ego; but it is not so easy to see why, with all her intensity of ego drive and her quite good ability, Mary has not developed interests and techniques and acquired control over outside objects which would gratify her hunger for personal recognition and power. She seems capable of considerable achievement. Why are all her activities so futile, so meaningless? Why has she not set up an idea of herself which is more in line with social standards? Why must she collect things, acquire possessions just for the sake of getting them; why does she gain no satisfaction in using them, in constructing or creating?

Would it be too far-fetched to see a parallel to this present use of her energy in the peculiar nature of her infantile experience with defecation and toilet training? We have to remember how much of her craving for satisfaction must have sought outlet through that channel since the food interest was blocked and how early constipation and the enemas deprived her of freedom with regard to her own functions. Interest, instead of being divided as with many children between process and product, was concentrated on retention at all costs and resistance to the parents' will. She never cooperated with the mother in her own training, never got compensation for giving up infantile privileges by the sense of power in self-control and the feeling of achievement which comes from pleasing the mother. There seems to be in these circumstances the possibility of an injury to the ego development corresponding to the crippling on the side of social response which has been reinforced all through her young life by the lack of affection from parents, by her unsuccessful rivalry with the better loved brothers and sister, by her lack of physical strength and beauty, by the taken for granted ideas of her personality which are held before her constantly by the other members of the family, and by her lack of standing and importance in the home.

Mary is like one frantically seeking for something satisfying, finding her only comfort by continually proving to herself that she can gain possession, that she can collect and hoard and retain as she once held back feces. She seems to get satisfaction in situations which are partly painful, not only to herself but to other people, as were those early struggles with constipation and enemas. It may be significant to note here that Mary has had since early childhood a habit of picking at her

fingers until they are raw and bleeding. Not long ago she had her whole hand seriously infected from this source. No attempt to correct this habit has ever had any success until recently Mary, in her desire to be beautiful, began to wear gloves at night to protect them from herself.

Mary is willing to hurt other children; she seems to be unrestrained, in her desires to tease, torment, and injure, by any thought of how she is making the other person feel. Her reaction to the sex information was quite characteristic. Its chief value to her seemed to be the power it gave her over her parents. They were discovered and defeated, for once she was superior; she knew. One cannot help wondering how much of her stealing has been due not only to her need for possessing and collecting but to an unconscious wish to punish her parents who were deceiving and tricking her and (even more unconsciously) who stood between her and the satisfying of her earliest desires.

If our analysis has any truth, the problem of social treatment in this case would seem to be how one can find for this unlovely personality, organized pretty completely about the ego, some method of detaching satisfaction from this bare fruitless process of resisting, holding, collecting, winning out, and transferring it to a more positive interest in actual achievement, in production, in an exercise of power and assertion of self which is more constructive and valuable personally and socially. How can Mary's ego ideal be put on a higher plane socially? That it would be possible to give Mary the experience of transferring completely to another human being, after her early conditioning, seems to me rather unlikely, yet no one can say what adolescence and sex may contribute to alter her interests. What one fears is a use of sex which will merely gratify her desire for power, possession, and ability to wound. Possibly the only form of treatment really applicable is to try to find some socially valuable use for Mary's drive in its present form, such as a better knowledge and skill in dressing, more rational attention to looks, the intelligent handling and use of money, display of self in entertainments and play, in dancing, athletics, or club organization, collecting more valuable material in legitimate ways. One might even be able to show her that triumph over classmates in terms of better marks would be possible.

The social worker has tried very hard to change the mother's attitudes and methods with Mary. She has helped to improve her school work and has seen to it that she got as much favorable attention from teachers as possible. She has brought in as many new activities and opportunities as possible. There has been improvement. Mary has lost some of her look of fear and suspicion. She is freer, she is better looking, she is not so uncanny, she does not steal publicly.

That the outlook for the future is good as far as reorganizing Mary's personality is concerned one would certainly hesitate to say. On the basis of our present knowledge and skill, one would be justified in doubt-

ing whether Mary will ever be anything but unloving and unlovable. Is there any way to reeducate completely the self which has been built up chiefly by its negative responses to social situations, by its resistances and resentments and rejections?

From such a picture as this, one can only turn to the constructive possibilities presented to parents into whose keeping is given that first social situation and the responses out of which the personality may receive its determining organization.

It is for science, social science, to uncover enough sureness of interpretation of these hitherto unnoticed and unrecorded facts of infancy to be able to put into the hands of intelligent, conscientious parents some knowledge, some technique, some control over their inevitable function, the conditioning of the personalities of their children.

6. *The Projection of Parental Ambition*[1]

In certain studies of personality adjustments, especially as they concern child-parent relationships, I have come across one aspect of this family situation which, though informally recognized by some investigators, has not, to my knowledge, received any special attention. I refer to the projection upon children of their parents' own ambitions. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss certain features of this problem. Frequently these projections are directly stimulated by the desire of the parents for social recognition which is correlated with a distinct ego expansion on their own part. More noteworthy perhaps are those cases which reveal a direct projection of thwarted ambitions of the parents upon their offspring. In both types of projection it is the parent not the child who determines the course of the life organization.

We are all agreed in recognizing the fact that the human being lives not unto himself alone but is at all times, more or less, under the influence of some particular group of his fellows, be it family, play group, occupational confraternity or some other sort. Moreover, it has been well pointed out to us that the family, as well as other groups, may be thought of as a configuration of interacting units. One may say that ideally in a well-balanced family these interrelating members should be thought of as in a multiple circular response condition. There would be an interplay of personalities one with the other—the give and take of coequals. It is rarely true, however, that a family of parents and children so organizes itself. This type of mutual influence is more apt to exist in play groups and is especially likely in so-called "congenial" groups of intimates—those interesting but little-studied groups of two, three, or four persons united in close bonds of friendship. Very frequently the

[1] YOUNG, KIMBALL, "Source Book for Social Psychology." Reprinted by permission of and special arrangements with Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., authorized publishers.

circularity of the family group resolves itself into other forms of interstimulation. The natural circularity is broken at a number of points by attitudes of authority, domination, and sense of superiority of parents toward children, of elder children toward younger, or of near relatives toward children. In other words, various kinds of stoppage arise to the free play of person on person in the family such as might exist and does exist in other sorts of socializing groups. Very often in families, in fact, the relationship of parent to child is more in the nature of linear than circular response. The father or mother commands, the child obeys. Very little reciprocal stimulation is permitted. Even in question-answer intercourse the domination of the elder over the younger member of the family prevents the most wholesome learning process of analysis and discovery from taking place in the child. This condition of dominance is probably less common today than in other societies organized about different cultural norms than our own. Yet it still persists, particularly in reference to the younger children. The whole "reality of authority" of which Miller writes is too frequently induced by a linear stimulation.

In the case of projection of ambitions upon children we find just this change from natural circularity to linear relationship. In place of gradual arousal and development of ambitions out of more normal family relationships, out of the stimulation of play groups and school experience, there is a cutting across this process when the parent projects this personal ambition upon one or more of his own children. The child, instead of developing his talents and interests out of innate trends and through normal development in various social media, is brought under the domination of a fixed idea of the parent. Too often the parent has harbored some unfulfilled desire or ambition for fame, money, education, social status, or whatnot which is worked over onto the child.

We know full well that parents live in their children quite as do the children in them. "Identification," as it is often called, is by no means a one-sided affair. Not long ago in discussing a certain regimen for children with a mother, she remarked regarding some indulgences she had granted them, "If I have to have the children, I don't see why I shouldn't enjoy them." It has, of course, been long recognized that many mothers derive a distinct erotic pleasure from nursing their babies. But we should not imagine that any pleasure which a mother may take in her children ends there. It is evident everywhere that women do look upon their children as their own in a very intimate—dare one say selfish—sense in which their own delight in caring for, playing with, and planning for the child becomes highly significant for themselves. They see themselves in their child. And it is as a more favored child that they envisage themselves in their child. How common is it to hear the remark, "I had to suffer (this or that) and do not intend to let my own children go

through what I did," or "I did not have much and I want my boy to have the best there is to be had."

Not only mothers but fathers find tremendous satisfaction in watching over and planning for their children. Whether the father is at the outset instinctively drawn to his own child or not is an academic question which has not been settled. We may, I believe, confidently assume marked individual differences in fathers in their interest in their own infants. Yet certainly it is usual among families of our own cultural area, at least, for the father to begin to pay attention to the child at about the time the child's interest in him begins to be reflected in the child's behavior.

Thus, for parents there is afforded them in their children an easy duplication of another childhood and youth, wherein their own ambitions, plans, and desires may be thrust upon the next generation. The motives for this projection vary greatly, for the particular type of ambition projected on the child depends, certainly, upon the specific history of the parent. Since a "good" identification concerns a one-to-one relationship, it is usual for one member of the family to be selected to play the rôle the parent lays down, though this is not always the case. A projection may take on a very generalized form for a whole family of children, just as it may take on a generalized form of a leader thrusting his wishes upon his group.

In order to indicate more concretely the mechanism of projection, let us turn our attention upon some illustrative examples drawn from a number of varying situations. The following cases are cited as merely suggestive of this entire problem, which merits more careful study than I have been able to give it. None of these cases is especially startling. Psychometric tests have not been administered except in two instances. Elaborate case histories have not been obtainable, especially on the side of the parents, but the main features are clear enough for our purposes. We shall run through a gamut of instances drawing out samples which will reveal various aspects of the problem at hand.

One of the commonest types of ambition projection is found at present in the somewhat hyperstimulated interest in precocious children. Anxiously ambitious mothers and fathers of the bourgeois classes, in particular, upon discovering through mental tests high abilities in their children are often given over to intense concern with the educative process. We have, of course, such historical examples as the severe regimen of James Mill for his son. Those who read between the lines here may find some evidence of the father's vital interest in giving his son that completely thoroughgoing instruction which he lacked in his own early years. The child in this instance took the regimen with ultimately great benefit to society and it is not to be supposed that projections of this sort are altogether harmful. Certainly they are not when they follow the

capacities and interests of the child. And still John Stuart Mill recognized the utter unnaturalness of his own intensive, concentrated tutorage.

Today, in certain intellectual circles where the parents have risen from social-economic classes below them, many of us have seen some unfortunate practices revealed in forcing the process of education. Through special classes, tutoring, cajoling, and sheer domination, capable children are being pushed through their elementary education at a high rate of speed, not always to the advantage of the child, but distinctly to the enhancement of the parents' own ego. The sense of superiority evident when Mrs. X relates that little Mary made two grades last year or that the latest psychological test revealed an I.Q. of 175 for Johnny is all too clearly patent to the keen observer as an instance in which the parent's own ego ambitions are being fulfilled—whatever meaning it may have for the child.

In a certain case well known to the writer this whole attitude has been most clearly shown. There is no doubt that Clara B is a very capable child. But it is also evident that the mother, who has had a rather stultified life with a mediocre professional man, has identified her own cravings for fame in the possibilities of her daughter. The child has been kept under an intense regimen of reading and writing. The mother looks forward to a great literary career for her daughter. The child is the object of considerable overstimulation to literary production by the parent. As one psychologist who worked with the child remarked, "One moment in Clara's life in which she was left *laissez faire* to form a mental association of her own was a moment lost in the eyes of her mother." I do not wish to create the impression that I am unsympathetic with the selection and special education of superior children, but without doubt the forcing of the process may prove detrimental to the more normal development of the child while affording an unfortunate stimulation to the parent's own ego expansion.

A second type of projection is that growing out of social ambitions of the parents in which the child is of ordinary or perhaps mechanical ability when the parents wish the child to go through the regimen of higher education because it is demanded by the social status of the family. There is frequently a complete myopia to the realities with a good deal of emotional conflict developed in the family situation. The following short history illustrates this well.

The family of Paul H is decidedly middle class. The father is a successful business man, domineering and coercive. Both parents are extremely ambitious for their children, two of whom are already in college. They wish to see their children have the currently accepted opportunities of their social set. A college degree is rather more a mark of social distinction for this family than an introduction into cultural and professional training. Paul, who is just under sixteen, has not done well in the classical high-school course, although his mental capacity

is adequate enough. The boy has no interest in his subjects. Rather he possesses a distinct liking for the vocational training which he has had in night school which he has attended for some months past. Having fallen down in his stipulated course he has persuaded his father to permit him to attend night school for a time. The father is anxious for him to try again to finish the foreordained routine. The boy dislikes to return to it and has begged his father to permit him to prepare himself to become an expert plumber and steam fitter. Such a suggestion is anathema to the father and to the other members of the family. The father is furious to think that one of his children should contemplate being just an "ordinary worker." Paul is reticent in the presence of his father but has distinctly strong emotions on the whole matter. He recently consulted one of his instructors in the vocational school for advice. The instructor, however, has not been able to make any impression, so far, on the father. The boy is steady in his habits and up to the present has shown no antisocial trends. He is becoming thoroughly disturbed over the treatment by his father and has flirted with the idea of leaving home. He has thought of joining the navy in order to escape parental pressure and in order to secure the vocational training which he wishes. And some weeks ago he asked the naïve question of the above-mentioned instructor, "Do they ever take boys at the state industrial school if they just want to go there to learn a trade?" He had heard vague facts about boys being committed to the state institution and of how they received vocational education there. He has phantasied this institution as a place of escape where he could fulfill his own ambitions.

The whole situation is still unsettled. The boy is becoming intensely unhappy, the father seems even more persistent. So far the father has been unapproachable. He refuses to face the reality. It is inconceivable to him that his son should not follow the patterns of behavior which he has laid down. It is a case of fixed idea or stereotyped ambition accompanied by much emotionality. The son must go to college. Nothing else will do. The disgrace of having a son an ordinary plumber is terrible. The family status demands otherwise.

The outcome of this situation is unknown. We are making an effort to reach the core of the father's personality sufficiently to enable him to see the reality. As for the boy, some sort of escape plan seems to be formulating itself. Just what direction this will take we are unable to say. An effort is being made to prevent any foolish gestures, but where there is such inflexibility on the part of the father, it becomes difficult to suggest an altogether healthy vocational and personal regimen for the son.

Turning now to a discussion of those projections in which the unfulfilled wishes of the parents are more evidently thrust upon the children, let us examine a number of illustrative cases to point out some of the features of family relationship in this more serious kind of influence of parent upon child.

The following history deals with a combination of thwarted ambition coupled with an unhappy marriage.

The mother of Louise M married when she was very young. This had meant for her the foregoing of three desires: (1) a college education; (2) the study

of music in which she had a great interest; and (3) experience as a teacher. The marriage proved an unhappy one with considerable conflict between parents. Two children were born, one a son "much like his father" whom the mother "could influence very little," the other a daughter who became the "pride" of the mother's life. For Louise the mother wished all the things which her own inhibited life had lacked. The girl was forced to take music lessons, although she was not musically inclined. She was also sent to college quite as much because the mother had failed to secure this privilege as for any other reason. Moreover, the mother decided the daughter should be a school teacher as she had once wished to be.

In college Louise fell in love much as coeds are likely to do. She wished to discontinue her education and to marry. Although the mother now admits that she had nothing against the young man who courted her daughter, in fact she (now) says she rather liked him, she refused to permit the marriage. Louise was to her mind too young. She herself had married too early which had spoiled her own life, and she simply would not allow her daughter to duplicate her own sad experience. The marriage must be indefinitely postponed and Louise continue her education until she might teach. The young man was unwilling to defer matrimony in this indeterminate manner while the daughter, obedient to the mother's wishes, began teaching school not long after only to make a rather miserable failure of it all. Louise has been utterly unhappy. She is now at home doing nothing in particular, broken in spirit and unable to organize herself for any kind of valuable activity.

Here is an unfortunate situation indeed. The mother, hiding behind current rationalizations, of course, wished her daughter to have the best of an education and professional preparation. Then, when confronted with a wish on the part of the daughter for the most natural step in her life, marriage, the whole emotional conflict of the mother's marriage, her own realization of blocked ambitions and unhappy life came to the fore to lead her to prevent it. There is illustrated in this case a common feature, no doubt, of many of these family histories. Had the mother's own married life proved a wholesome one, had her relations with the father been satisfying, it is extremely doubtful if the projection would have assumed such an overpowering influence in the mother's reaction to her daughter, if indeed the projection would have developed at all. But having failed at the level of marriage, the mother herself was thrown back, for emotional balance, upon her earlier wishes for an education and for professional status. These wishes being denied their fulfillment in her, they are fastened upon the daughter with whom the mother has identified herself. With the coming of the probability of marriage for the daughter before these projected ambitions had been worked out at all well, from the mother's angle, an even more intense crisis arises. If Louise is permitted to marry, it means that the projection will fail. An important hope for the mother's balance will be gone. She can not face it. The daughter complies, only herself to be disintegrated emotionally thereby.

Thus the vicious circle of parent-child relationship is completed, and none of the participants is satisfied. The drama ends not in a *dénouement* but in a stalemate.

In the following instance, we see the play of phantasy where there is no basis in fact for it.

The father in this family was something of a rake in his youth and although he came of a family of some wealth, he is at present a person of only moderate means. He is now a hard-working, sober-minded, business man. The family consists of two girls and two boys. It is John, the younger of the boys, now twenty-two, who is our concern. Both parents are great lovers of music and one of the father's sisters has attained some very favorable notice as a vocalist in eastern musical centers. The father feels very keenly the fact that he missed an opportunity for a musical career and has tried to make a musician out of the younger son. Very early John was put to studying violin. From the outset the father took the keenest delight in his son's musical education. It soon was evident that the boy had little interest and no talent in music. He had no appreciation of the art whatsoever. Yet, the father persisted. In fact, he developed a distinct phantasy that his son had the making of a genius. The father's talk centered around music. He paraded his own knowledge of classical music and conversed in season and out about great musicians. Money was rather lavishly spent first on one teacher and then on another. When the father's finances failed to meet the needs, a bachelor uncle was infected with the father's belief and also contributed funds. The social aspect of the whole matter was at times pitiful. On the least provocation the father insisted that the boy play in the presence of company. John not only disliked the entire musical regimen, but these public performances were especially galling. Friends of the family shook their heads over the futile efforts of the father to force the son into a talent for which he was distinctly unfitted. Still the father remained oblivious to the reality.

After nine years of costly education the true facts of the situation were brought home to the father by the son's absolute refusal to continue the farce. It was alike a tragedy for father and son. The father is deeply grieved and has retired into himself in an unhappy manner. John's playing, his future as a musician was so much on his mind that now the father has lost all enjoyment in any form of music. The whole subject has become strictly taboo in the family. I regret that the narrative breaks off at this point. I have no data on the situation in the past two years and do not know just what solution John has made following his revolt from authority.

This case raises another aspect of the entire parent-child relationship namely, the antagonism which the child developed as a defense mechanism against the parent's projection. While competent persons were certain that John's playing was very poor indeed, one can not be certain but that even this might have been different had not the entire regimen been thrust upon him from above. As the boy saw he was getting nowhere, as the father's domination became even more evident, the disgust

with the whole affair grew apace until in sheer desperation in late adolescence the break was made.

If a projection should be subtly handled, if the child's own capacities fit the career laid down by the parent's phantasy, if in normal development the child can assimilate the projection, no harm, but good may come of it. The difficulty, of course, is that these projections are surcharged with such emotion that the parent can not proceed wisely in most instances. The more intense the thwarted ambition, the less likelihood there will be for a sane solution of it through another person.

The next case is also one involving a musical career in which there was not revolt, but certainly nothing but very mediocre success.

The mother in this instance was given over in girlhood to daydreaming about a great future for herself as a singer and a dancer, even though she lived in a pioneer town in the Southwest. She was insatiably ambitious for social distinction and all the accoutrements which go with it: fashionable clothes, companionship with the élite, and so on. Even in this remote western town, she developed an affected speech, hunted the dictionary for multisyllabled words and tried to "high brow" her neighbors. She cultivated the mechanisms of fine manners and would have lived continuously in the realm of full-dress suits and evening gowns had her Cinderella dreams come true. Upon the completion of her high-school education her parents desired to send her to a very good girl's school in her own state, but the daughter would not hear of it. She insisted on attending a first-class eastern finishing school and her parents complied with her wishes. But the girl's own social and professional future as she had dreamed it was to be rather thoroughly cut short. During her first Christmas vacation at home, one of the town youths courted her with such vigor and success that the young lady did not even return to finish her first year away from home. She was married very shortly and settled down in her own neighborhood.

The salary of her husband could not set up and maintain such an establishment as she had phantasied. But when their son, Arthur, was born he was from the outset dressed in extravagant clothes and surrounded with whatever luxuries could be had. When the boy came of school age, instead of sending him to the public school, the mother arranged a tutor for him despite the father's disapproval. From this time until he passed the entrance examinations into high school, he was guarded very carefully. He was not permitted rough play with other boys and when his father purchased him a Shetland pony the mother was much displeased. Arthur was kept in spotless clothes; he always dressed and deported himself like a gentleman.

Besides his regular education, he was given intense training along musical lines. He was kept steadily at the piano for long hours. In fact, the mother completely dominated his life organization in almost every particular.

His development in high school was somewhat more normal since here he was forced into contact with other groups than the family. Yet he was taken to and from school every day in the family car. His dress still revealed his difference: he wore Windsor ties instead of the conventional four-in-hands and "always kept his hair scrupulously combed" as one of his acquaintances later remarked.

The usual freedom of adolescence was not permitted him. In this open country where boys were given to range riding and wholesome outdoor life, he was never allowed to escape the pattern laid down for him by his omnipresent mother. He secretly envied his boy friends and confided his dislike for his music and the home regimen to some of those in whom he had confidence. He longed to join them in their play but did not dare.

Under the driving influence of his mother, Arthur became a capable pianist and a fair vocalist. When his college days arrived, he must, of course, follow "family" traditions (that is, those made by the mother) and no other place would do but Harvard. He did creditable enough work and also continued his musical education. Today he is located in New York in a position in which he can make some use of his musical training. He is to outward appearance a very cultured, well-bred man of high polish. His mother continued to urge him to extend his musical education and force of circumstances almost demand. that he do so. He secretly dislikes his work. Music is not his deepest interests And yet he feels that it is too late to take up the training for another profession. He stands today a young man under thirty facing only a mediocre success in a field for which he is not altogether unadapted, but which certainly is not claiming his truest interest. He is becoming more and more restless internally. He finds himself more and more in a mental quandary. He fears to break into a novel field and yet finds his present profession growing more and more distasteful.

In this case, the internal revolt is developing very slowly, where the capacity for the special education was just sufficient to make a tolerable success, but not enough to capture the whole concern of the man. Again one wonders, if the mother had not been so insistent, if the boy had been less a hothouse plant, whether or not his professional career even in such a field as music would not have been more wholesome. There is no open revolt as yet. What another twenty years may show of anxiety neurosis, or lesser maladjustment, or escape into some more profitable profession, we do not know.

The last family drama which I shall narrate is perhaps less common than the others, but it is fraught with greater misapplication in some ways than all the others. And it again illustrates the nature of a fixed idea on the part of a parent in contradiction to the most patent reality.

The father is a very wealthy and prominent person in one of our major industrial cities. He was educated in a well-known eastern school. His wife is a very pleasant, cultured person who plays a minor part in this family tragedy. The father, it seems clear, has wanted to fulfill in his son the cultural and economic ambitions of his own youth. He has wished his son's preparation for a profession to be easier and more luxurious than anything he could have, even though his own youth was not a hard one. There is also a very considerable amount of desire for maintenance of social superiority through his child.

There are two boys in the family, both of them feeble-minded. One of them is already in an institution. The second boy, George, has a "middle moron intelligence" to use the phrase of a very competent psychologist who examined

him. George is a docile, sweet-dispositioned boy with the usual small chatter about automobiles, movies and the like, but years of tutoring and high-grade instruction in private schools have not been able to prepare him for college. The father was determined that his son should master Latin and the other requisite subjects in order that he might enter a certain professional school and was furious at the diagnosis of the psychologist that his son had reached the limit of his educability. In truth, the father's whole manner toward the accumulated evidence of teachers, psychologists, and friends has the air of a certain compulsive trend in himself. He pounded on the table in anger at the suggestions of the psychologist. He has attempted to coerce the boy into learning, but coercion does not produce nicety of mental associations. He has threatened the authorities of the private school to whom he had given large sums of money if they did not educate his boy as he thought fit. The judgment of experts and of common sense make no impression on him. He has a definite fixed idea, almost an obsession about his son. It is a distinct mental image that bears no relation to reality. It is almost paranoic in its violence.

And a gentle personality of low mentality must suffer through it all. There is no evidence of antisocial trends. It is a tragedy without a single redeeming note. The drama is still in process. What the outcome will be we can not say. It is evident that the boy has reached a saturation point so far as training goes. Whether the father can be brought out of his delusional system is not so certain.

Although I have by no means exhausted the variety of ambition projection in family situations, these few histories indicate the essentials of the problem in a tentative way. Projection, well handled, is perhaps more or less natural in a society of open classes where there is intense desire to improve the family status in each succeeding generation. While the case histories cited above are all of persons of older American stock, there is no doubt also a good deal of this sort of thing in certain immigrant families. Furthermore, in my own experience the majority of the cases have involved the projection from mother to daughter or from father to son. They tend to follow the same sex rather than to cut across from one sex to another. Whether this is universal in a large number of instances, it is, at the moment, impossible to say. The projection with its accompanying identification may in these cases have additional deep-rooted sexual features which are not evident on the surface. Of these suppositions, however, I have no proof in my own cases.

The problem of projection in parent-child relationships is self-evident. The more spontaneous development is interrupted to give place to the formulation of life organization in terms of patterns possessed by the parent that may not be altogether wholesome and sound for the child.

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Chapter XIII

THE FAMILY AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER

In the earlier agrarian economy production was everywhere managed on a group or family basis. The individual functioned as a member of the group and had status largely in terms of his or her productive efficiency. The work of each member contributed to the supply of economic goods and supported all. There was a generally simple division of labor and distribution of tasks but all cooperated to a common end—the support and welfare of the familial organization. The family remained the producing unit after a developing commerce and industry began to supplement pastoral and agricultural activities in the support of population. So long as the fabrication of goods for the market was on a handicraft basis, the producing unit was the family and the individual remained secondary to the group.

The development of the modern industrial order destroyed the family as the producing unit. Power-driven machinery brought the factory system with its large-scale production of standardized units. This in turn resulted in economies in the purchase of raw materials and in the distribution of fabricated goods. The center of industry passed from the home to the factory. Certain types of productive activity tended to remain in the family. The preparation of foods, the serving of meals, the construction, repair, and laundering of articles of clothing are important among activities that have in some measure resisted standardization and have remained family functions. This has been due in some part to the fact that certain productive activities could be performed efficiently by the family unit. But for the most part sentiment, tradition, and inertia have led to the retention of functions in spite of economic inefficiency.

The destruction of the family as a unit in production tended to free the individual. Men and women worked outside the home as individuals. In this capacity they were to some extent freed from dependence upon the family unit. For the first time women had some choice as to manner of life. It became possible, as it had never been before, for them to live without marriage.

The change in the status of women from economic dependence and consequent compulsory early and permanent marriage has had far-reaching effects on the family institution, and it is destined apparently to result in certain revolutionary changes in the social order itself. The

number of married women who work outside the home is large and increasing. Special attention might be called to *Bulletin* 30 of the Women's Bureau on The Share of Wage-earning Women in Family Support. Every advance in the independence and self-respect of women further undermines the position that home and family adequately provide for and circumscribe all their proper interests. That the activities of all women should be limited to the domestic ritual and routine is a position that fewer and fewer women are willing to accept. The writer in the introductory issue of *The Gentleman's Home Journal* quite realizes the economic absurdity of the conception that "woman's place is in the home." This article is also significant from the point of view of sex and family morality. It shows the devastating moral and personality consequences of the doctrine of female dependence and inferiority.

The freeing of women incident to the industrial development and the capitalistic organization of society is tending to bring a somewhat more just and rational attitude toward the bearing and rearing of children. The responsibility for bearing and rearing children has consequences of first importance for the character and personality development of the parents. Doubtless, there are also certain human satisfactions that parents derive from their association with children. But there is also no doubt that children are a serious economic burden as well as a heavy handicap to achievement in any field of endeavor. The economic cost of rearing a child in decent comfort and surroundings and providing him with an elementary education is approximately ten thousand dollars. Moreover the assumption of a family is an insuperable obstacle to woman's achievement in other realms of human interest.

But children are an asset to the social group; they must be reared if the society is to continue. Mrs. Hollingworth's paper suggests some of the ways in which women and families have been induced to bear the burden of child production and education. The cheap and tawdry methods become increasingly unworkable with the increase of individualism, intelligence, and freedom of women. When the now declining birth rate falls to a sufficiently low point, the burden of rearing children will shift from the family and the woman to the organized society which is the sole recipient of the benefits. At this point, and probably not before, there will be a basis for a tolerable economic family organization.

Incidentally, it may be remarked, when this stage is reached—and not until it is reached—the eugenic improvement in the society will be a possibility. Organized society can have as many children as it desires, and children of any hereditary stock that it desires, when it is willing to assume the financial burden that their rearing entails and to reward the mothers for the services they perform and for the personal sacrifices they make.

1. *The Family as an Economic Unit*[1]

Although the volume of poverty in this country has diminished greatly during the last decade, social workers, of all people, do not need to be informed of its continued existence and of the problems which it creates. Society, through its poor law, has recognized its obligation to preserve life after it has once been brought into the world, while the almost universally accepted principle of the living wage assumes that industry should provide those whom it employs with at least the basic physical necessities of life. Yet, despite this intellectual and moral acceptance of the principle that from one source or another the physical needs of life should be provided for, we are still, in practice, far from our goal.

Broadly speaking, there are two main classes of the poor, namely, those who are in poverty because they are unable to be employed, and those who, though employed, receive such low wages as not to meet their fundamental needs. The first group includes such classes as widows with dependent children, the aged, the handicapped, and the unemployed. Such assistance as has been given these groups has come primarily from public or private charity rather than from industry. On the other hand, while members of the second groups have been assisted sometimes by outside charity, in the main their economic problem has been recognized as one which industry itself should solve.

The laborer, it has been justly said, is worthy of his hire; and industries that use up men's vitality should at least return them command over sufficient sources of energy to renew their strength. Otherwise, an industry is parasitic and draws from its workers more than it gives back. This principle of a minimum wage which industry should pay its workers has been legally adopted for both men and women in Australia, and for the most underpaid industries in Great Britain. It was a belief in this principle which led a dozen American states to enact minimum-wage laws for women, while during and following the war it was admitted also that the principle applied with equal validity to men.

In this humanitarian movement certain assumptions have become so universally adopted that they have guided both the practical tactics and the immediate objectives of the movement. Perhaps the two most important of these assumptions are: first, that every adult male should be paid enough to support the so-called "normal" family of five, consisting of husband, wife, and three dependent children under fourteen; and second, that every woman should be paid enough to meet the costs of her living away from home, but with no allowance for dependents.

The two main reasons which have been advanced in support of using the family of five as the standard by which to measure the adequacy of

[1] Adapted from DOUGLAS, PAUL H., The Living Wage and Family Allowance Systems, *Nat. Conference Social Work*, vol. 53, pp. 305–317, 1926.

men's wages have been: first, the belief that the average family was, in fact, of this size; and second, the belief that it was necessary for a married couple to have at least three children in order merely to maintain the population at a given level.

The fact that our census showed the average household in 1890 to be composed of 4.9 persons has been frequently cited as proof of the typical character of the so-called "standard" family. It has not been as frequently observed that this average had fallen in 1920 to only 4.3 persons, while many have also failed to note that the census includes in a household all who keep house together under one roof. Hotels, boarding houses, prisons, and institutions are counted as individual households. If the average number of persons in the average family is therefore 4.3, the average in the economic family would be still less. It is true that the researches of Dr. Dublin and Dr. Lotzka have shown that the average fertile family now needs to have 3.1 children if the population merely is to be kept at a constant figure; but this neither means that all three of these children will be dependent at any one time, nor that any of them will be dependent upon the parents throughout life.

The fundamental bases which have been relied upon to demonstrate the representative character of the family of five are therefore of more than doubtful validity. There are a number of studies which establish quite clearly the unrepresentative character of the so-called "standard" family of five. Bachelors certainly do not have families of five to support; yet over 26 per cent of all the adult occupied males in Great Britain in 1921 were unmarried, while in 1920, 28 per cent of all the men in this country were in this class. Here is a group, therefore, of approximately one-quarter of the working force, who, far from having four others to support, are not even married.

How typical, then, of married couples is the family of five? The British and Australian censuses of 1921 give us for the first time an answer to this question. In Great Britain statistics were collected from nearly 7,500,000 families covering the number of living children under sixteen years which each had.

This shows that at the least a third of the families which stated their composition had no dependent children under sixteen years, while a fourth had only one child, and over a sixth but two. Seventy-eight per cent of the families had less than the so-called "standard" family, and only 10 per cent actually had such a family. Twelve per cent, on the other hand, had more than three children. If we take all the employed males as a whole, including both bachelors and married men, only a little less than 8 per cent would have the family which is regarded as typical; slightly over 82 per cent would either have no dependent children at all or would have but one or two; between 9 and 10 per cent, however, would have more than the standard family.

These results are in the main borne out by the Australian census of 1921, which collected full data upon the number of children under fourteen who were dependent upon householders.

Such American studies as that of the U. S. Bureau of Labor in 1901, the Illinois Health Insurance Commission in 1918, and of the U. S. Coal Commission of such a universally prolific group of workers as the coal miners all tend to indicate that the distribution of relative family responsibility in this country is not greatly dissimilar from that in England and Australia.

The essential weaknesses of the assumption that the family of five is typical can be shown by the fact that if each of the 28,200,000 adult males who were employed in this country in 1920 had been paid enough to support such a family, we would thus have been providing for no less than 141,000,000 people. But since there were only slightly less than 106,000,000 people in the country in that year, this would have meant paying for over 35,000,000 fictitious wives and children. But even this is an understatement, for there were 6,200,000 adult women and 6,300,000 juveniles of sixteen years and over who were gainfully employed. Assuming that these workers merely provided for their own maintenance, which is, on the whole, an appreciable understatement, this would mean that not more than 93,000,000 persons were, at the most, dependent upon the men who were gainfully employed. To pay each of these men enough to support a family of five would in reality, therefore, mean paying for no less than 48,000,000 phantom wives and children.

It is this padding of the figures with so many millions of non-existent dependents which has given the impression that industry could not afford to pay the living wage that was demanded of it. From rather extended computations which I have made of the records of each of the 356 manufacturing industries of the country, it appears that had every dollar of the profits and interest earned in 1919 been devoted to raising wages, the average per capita increase would have been but $379. This would have brought the average annual earnings of the employed to only $1,537, and, if allowance is made for the lesser wages of women and juveniles, would have enabled men to receive on the average approximately $1,700 a year, which was the approximate amount needed to support a family of five on a subsistence-plus standard at that time in the industrial cities. Yet such a wage as this would not have permitted: first, any differential payment to the more skilled; second, any allowance for saving; or third, any added return on capital. All three of these payments are, however, necessary in our economic society, and the first two would be indeed necessary in virtually any society. It would therefore have been impossible in 1919 to have paid to all labor the wage that was customarily claimed as a minimum. This does not mean that it would have been impossible to have paid a wage adequate to support those who were

actually dependent upon the workers in manufacturing, for, from my computations, this could have been done at an expenditure of $10,500,000,000, or 12 per cent less than the amount actually expended for wages. This would have left a very appreciable balance for differential wages.

The probable inability of industry to pay to all the sums which the advocates of the living wage have demanded has been due, therefore, to the fact that they have been asked to support many millions of non-existent dependents. The single men have fought, therefore, either consciously or unconsciously (if we may mix our metaphors) behind the petticoats of their married brothers, and have used the latter as stalking-horses in the attempt to secure for themselves a wage that would be adequate for a family of five. Such a wage would, as a matter of fact, meet the precise needs of only a little less than 10 per cent of the male workers, while it would pour vast and less needed surpluses into the hands of that 80 per cent who had less than this number of children. To the 50 per cent or more who have no dependent children at all to maintain, the surplus would be particularly great.

Yet, while such a wage as this would more than meet the basic needs of four-fifths of the adult workmen, it would be less than enough for a tenth of the families. And the significant fact about this tenth is that they include nearly 40 per cent of all the children. The entire burden of supporting the children of the country is concentrated on approximately 50 per cent of the male workmen, while the burden within this 50 per cent, in turn, is primarily concentrated on those with the larger families. Thus, in England 34 per cent of the families that stated the number of children (25 per cent of the total number of male workmen) had but one child, and the children in these families formed but 18 per cent of the total number. The remaining 25 per cent of the workers were compelled, therefore, to support over 80 per cent of the children. Nearly 40 per cent of the children in England were in families where there were four or more.

Nearly two-fifths of the children would therefore be insufficiently provided for were the family-of-five wage to be paid, and it is of course precisely the children that we want primarily to protect. Enough has been said, I think, to indicate the essential inadequacy of the family-of-five standard as the basis for minimum wage payment. The numbers who are dependent upon adult workmen, indeed, vary so widely that it is impossible to adapt their needs to any Procrustean bed. No uniform system of wage payment, as a matter of fact, can meet the needs of all the families.

Does this mean that we must abandon the doctrine of the living wage? Certainly not. It merely means that we must attack the problem in the light of the realities both of family composition and the ability of industry to pay. If this is done it will be seen that the only

adequate way in which this principle may be realized is to recognize the fact that just as the needs of workers are not uniform, but variable, so should the minimum wage not be uniform, but should vary according to the needs of the worker and his family. In other words, the minimum income should vary according to the size of the family by granting extra allowances to those with dependents. There are at least four main ways by which this may be done, namely: first, by industry; second, by the state; third, by trade-unions or other associations of workers; and fourth, through a system of social insurance. While all of these systems have substantially the same ends, they differ widely as regards the methods used and possibly as regards the ultimate results which would follow from their adoption.

1. First, the system of payment of the allowances by industry is the predominant form which the movement has thus far taken, and is the one which is widely used in Europe, and especially in France. In the latter country over three million workers are employed where allowances for children are paid, and this system is almost universally employed in government service, in the mines, on the railways, and in the textile and metal trades. The total amount paid out in allowances by all these agencies last year has been estimated as amounting to over 700,000,000 francs.

The natural query that will be raised about such a method as this is as to whether it will not lead to men with children being discriminated against in being given employment. If employers must pay very much more for men with four children than for bachelors, will they not discriminate against the former in favor of the latter? Will not the plight of the man with a family be worse, therefore, than it now is, for is it not better to be employed steadily at inadequate wages than to be guaranteed adequate sums when one works, but still not to be employed at all? This difficulty has been met in France, however, by the creation, during the last eight years, of over 180 equalization funds which now include over 10,000 industrial establishments and 1,200,000 workers. The fundamental principle of these funds is that the cost of the allowances paid for the dependents of a workman shall not be an exclusive charge upon the firm that employs him, but instead shall be spread over all the firms that are members of the fund. Thus, if a yearly allowance of $100 per child were to be made in a fund where 10,000 workmen with 12,000 dependent children were employed, the total annual cost of the allowances would be $1,200,000. This might be assessed upon the members of the fund in four ways, namely, according to: first, the number of workmen employed; second, the number of man-hours worked; third, the amount paid out in wages; fourth, the amount in value of the product. If the first method were used, the annual assessment per worker would be $120, and each employer would pay this sum multiplied by the average

size of his working force during the year. Under any system he would pay as much for a single man as for one with a family, and there would hence be no temptation for him to give preference to the former in employment.

The French funds are of two main types, the industrial, and the regional. Industries such as textiles which employ more than the average proportion of women and juveniles generally try to avoid regional funds and to form separate funds of their own. This is done in order to escape from paying for the greater number of dependents of the male employees engaged in the heavier industries.

A very valuable feature of the work of those funds has been the growing emphasis upon social service and medical assistance. Family visiting of some sort was soon found to be necessary in order to verify the statements of dependency which were filed. This has been broadened in many cases to include medical advice and service. Twenty-two funds, by the beginning of 1925, had instituted a system of visiting nurses, while eleven had special child health services with prenatal advice and care. In Lyons more than two hundred beds in various hospitals were used by the funds, while the Nantes district fund had its own rest-cure retreat.

The French funds have unquestionably accomplished a great deal, but their effectiveness has been marred by two defects:

First, the amount of the allowances has been very much less than the cost of maintaining a child. In 1925 the average monthly allowance paid by the funds for the first child was only 19 fr.; for the second, the average was 29 fr.; for the third, 42 fr.; and for the fourth, 50 fr. Even in the case of the fourth child this was, of course, insufficient. Taking the funds as a whole, the amounts paid out in allowances amounted to only a little over 2 per cent of the wages bill.

Second, the control of the funds is exclusively in the hands of the employers, and the allowances have, unfortunately, been used on occasion to penalize strikes. Thus, at Roubaix-Tucoing, which is the second-largest fund in France, men who are on strike now lose their allowances not only for the time actually lost but for the remainder of the month as well. This feature of the funds has been very properly attacked by the trade-unions, although the latter have now come to favor the principle of family allowances as such. Neither of these two defects is of course inherent in the system, and both should be guarded against.

An interesting question which is raised by such a system is as to whether its adoption calls for a readjustment of the existing basic wage. If we take the position that the workers should be guaranteed only a given minimum, and if the allowances are adequate to meet the expenses of maintaining dependent children, then there would seem to be no reason why single men should be guaranteed more than enough to maintain them plus an adequate allowance for the future expense of equipping a home.

This would amount approximately to half the cost of maintaining a family of five. Thus, if the cost of supporting such a family were $1,600, the basic minimum for the bachelor would be $800. Such a sum should be the minimum for women as well, since a single woman needs as much as a single man. It is only, indeed, by abandoning the assumption that all men have dependents to support that we can establish the minimum for women's work on an equality with that of men. Since bachelors now receive on the whole considerably more than this minimum, savings might be secured if their basic wage were reduced to this level. The savings effected in this way might be sufficient to meet the entire extra cost of the allowances not only for the children, but also those which would be needed for wives and adult dependents by the establishment of such a low minimum. Such a reduction as this, however, would only be possible if the plan were to be almost universally adopted. If only a minority of establishments were to undertake it, a majority of the single men would probably leave the plants and go to other concerns where they could earn a higher basic wage. The original firms would therefore find their working force to be increasingly composed of those with families, and in consequence their costs would increase. It is probable, however, that their labor costs would not increase in proportion to the amount paid out in allowances, because some single men would be willing to accept for a time less than they could secure elsewhere. They would be willing to do this because of the knowledge that they would be protected when married. Family allowances would then indeed seem in some manner as a deferred wage.

In practice, however, it would be difficult for individual firms, or even for any considerable number of firms, greatly to decrease the wage scale. Such allowances as are made will therefore come primarily as net additions to what has been paid out in the past, rather than merely representing a redistribution of the existing wages bill. Trade-unions might very well add such a system to their list of demands when new contracts are being negotiated, as some of them have come to ask for unemployment insurance.

2. Second, influential groups, such as the labor bodies of continental Europe and Australia, have proposed, as a substitute for the payment of allowances by industry, outright grants for the children by the state. Such a measure, indeed, was passed in 1921 by the lower house of the New South Wales Parliament. The chief arguments for this method seem to be: First, that the state allowances will be added to the existing wage scales, and consequently there will be no necessity of lowering the present basic rate of wages. In practice, however, such a payment would render many with dependents, whose incomes had been raised above the subsistence-plus level, willing to accept a lower base rate, and this would in turn force a reduction of the general level. Second, it is also urged that

a state system could shift the expense of the family allowances to the wealthy by means of progressive income taxes, whereas under the industrial system any increase in total costs would be passed on to the workers in the form of increased prices. While there is a certain element of truth in this position, it should be remembered that if this plan were to be adopted in the United States, the grants would tend to be made by the states or counties, and that the revenues of these bodies are not drawn primarily from the wealthy classes. It is, furthermore, possible that an increase in real wages might not cause a commensurate increase in costs; while even if costs did increase, the burden would be shifted to the wealthy to the extent that the latter purchased the goods that were produced. Third, a system of state grants would protect a much wider group of families than could be covered by any industrial system. The latter can, in the main, cover only wage earners, and at best, salaried workers, while the former could also include self-employed persons such as farmers, small handicraftsmen, small merchants, and professional workers, whose families frequently need protection more than do those of the more skilled employees. This wider inclusion of state grants is, of course, true, and it constitutes a real advantage.

It would be all the more difficult to make the industrial systems inclusive if they were purely voluntary. Firms joining the funds would tend to put themselves at a competitive disadvantage as compared with those that stayed outside, and this would serve as a deterrent to keep many firms from granting such allowances.

The French funds, which have developed without formal compulsion, are frequently cited to prove that compulsory action by the state is not necessary. The rapid growth of these funds during 1920 and 1921 was, however, caused at least in part by the fear that if the allowances were not paid voluntarily a compulsory state system would be imposed.

Yet, despite these advantages of state grants, there are several very serious defects. The most important of these are:

First, it would pay allowances to the children of the willfully idle who were not seeking employment, and hence would encourage shiftlessness. This is by no means true where the allowances are paid by industry, for then they are granted only to those who are actually employed, or at the most, to those who are honestly seeking suitable employment but are unable to find it. But state endowment would subsidize the unworthy poor. It may well be argued that even in such cases the children should not be made to suffer because of the defects of their parents. There is small question, however, that even under fairly careful supervision the fathers of such children would tend to use part of the money in order that they might be idle for a longer period. It would seem to be better, therefore, to care for the children of these families by trying to place them in

better homes than to try to maintain them where they are. Second, in the present state of American politics there would be real danger that it would be used by those in power for political purposes. Political prestige could be secured by informing the families that the allowances were paid because of the personal interest of the mayor, while those who supported opposing political factions might be disciplined by the taking away of the allowances on the ground that they were not being properly spent. As municipal and state administration improves, this danger will decrease, but it is a real barrier to governmental grants at present. Third, there is also a great advantage in having such matters managed by private bodies rather than by the state. In this way a great deal of spontaneity and interest is attained which would be lacking if the state were to pay out the sums. It should be pointed out here that even if the state were to require industry to pay allowances, the administration of the funds could still be left in private hands. Few, moreover, will fail to recognize that whatever may be the merits of state payments as compared with those by industry, there is little prospect of securing such grants from the state. Our tradition that each man should be responsible for the maintenance of his own dependents is too strong to be superseded within any reasonable length of time. For the present, at least, the proposal for state endowment is therefore only an academic, rather than a practical, issue

3. Third, it is possible for the workers' organizations to set up their own funds and to collect assessments from their members. Thus far, I know of only one such fund, namely, that set up in 1924 by the Catholic trade-unions of Belgium. There is no reason, however, why other unions should not organize similar funds.

4. Fourth, it has been proposed by some, and most notably by Joseph L. Cohen in his recent "Family Income Insurance," that family allowances should be made a part of the general system of social insurance and paid for through contributions of the employers, the employees, and the state. Family allowances would, therefore, form one part of a unified system in which health, unemployment, and old age insurance would be integrated. The chief advantage which Mr. Cohen claims for this method is that it would utilize the already existing machinery of social insurance which has been built up in England. But although this may be a strong argument in its favor for Great Britain, it does not have great force for the United States, where there is no general system of social insurance.

However much men may differ either about the ultimate direction of the movement or as to precisely which one of these four methods is most desirable, all who approve of the principle of family allowances at all will agree, I believe, that what is needed above all is experimentation. The only logical place in which such experimentation can take place is in industry, and for some time to come at least the question as to the ulti-

mate superiority of one method to another will not arise as a practical issue.

The more important issue is, however, whether the general principle should be approved; and it is to this that I should like to turn. The primary purpose of such a system is, of course, to lessen poverty; and this, of course, it would do.

That it is the children in the large families who now suffer most from poverty is very clearly indicated by two recent studies by the New York Association for the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor and the Philadelphia Jewish Welfare Society. Out of 5,693 families assisted by the former organization in 1924, 45 per cent had four or more children, and no less than 72 per cent of the children assisted were in such families. Of 192 families studied by the Jewish Welfare Society of Philadelphia, 47 per cent were of this size, and they included 71 per cent of the children who were aided. Since not more than 12 or 14 per cent of the families in these cities are probably of this size, it is clearly evident that the incidence of poverty in this group is from three to four times the average proportion for all of the families as a whole. Since the earnings of but few heads of working-class families are sufficient to support three children, we should also include this group. When this is done we find that 63 per cent of the New York families and 86 per cent of the children to whom assistance was given were in this class. There can be but little doubt therefore that our present system of wage payments falls with greatest weight upon those with three or more children, because of the failure of their income to rise commensurately with the increase in the number of their dependents, and it is precisely this group who would be assisted by the family allowance system.

The family allowance plan would also have a beneficial effect upon the relations between the sexes. Whatever the system used, it is highly desirable that the allowances should be paid to the mother of the family rather than to the father. This would at once make it more certain that the money would be spent in the interest of the children, and, by making the wife more independent financially of the husband, would greatly strengthen her position.

The payment of such allowances would, moreover, serve to relieve the strain which working-class families now experience when their needs rise rapidly through the coming of children. Men who have become accustomed to a relatively high standard of living as bachelors are seldom willing to discontinue all their little luxuries when they get married or when the children begin to come. Many men weaken under the strain of a stationary income with rising family costs, and desert their wives. The economic necessity for this would be removed under a family allowance system.

What, then, are the objections to the family allowance system, and how valid are they? The most important is, of course, that it would lead to an undue expansion of population from the very classes which are least desirable socially. The force which holds population in check, it is said, is the fact that since one's income does not increase when children are born, there is an economic incentive not to have them. The fewer the children, the more the economic pleasures and comforts which can be enjoyed by the parents. But if this barrier is removed and maintenance is provided for every child that is born, there will then be little or no incentive to reduce births. The fears of Malthus will be confirmed, and society will multiply rapidly from those very classes where men with lower natural ability have congregated because of their failure to advance in life.

Such an argument as this, however, does not take into account the fact that for many families now living in poverty the provision of a physical minimum (and the guaranty should not be for much more) would make them want comforts which they now cannot hope for. In order to rise in the social scale such persons might indeed limit their families even more rigidly than they do now. Then, if men's desires outran a subsistence or subsistence-plus standard, the addition of another child would occasion a greater disparity between what the parents had and what they wanted. Thus, if to maintain the new child on the scale desired would cost $400, while the allowance amounted to only $200, then the whole family would have to reduce its scale by a total of $200.

Since the material desires of most men outrun their existing standard of living, the payment of family allowances such as has been proposed would not remove the economic barriers to an increase in population, although it might lower them.

Another force which would continue to restrict births is the growing reluctance of women to bear and rear children. In the days of Malthus this was not considered as a barrier to population growth, but it is today; and since it is based upon a distaste for pregnancy and childbirth and for the drudging labor of bringing up a family, it would continue to be effective under a family allowance system. Finally, there is, of course, the movement for birth control, which, as it seeps down through the population, will afford to the men and women of the working classes the opportunity of limiting their families to a degree which they cannot now do.

But it will be objected that the unskilled laborers (who are assumed to be greatly inferior in innate ability) will not be swayed by these motives, but will instead multiply at an even more rapid rate than at present, and will thus hasten the swamping of civilization by the less fit. Most of the menace caused by this differential fecundity would be removed, however, if the 5 per cent or so of the population that are social defectives were prevented from reproducing their kind. If this were done we would

probably not need to fear any appreciable lowering of the mental level of the race. It should, moreover, be recognized by those who fear the dangers of overpopulation that it is possible to limit the number of children for whom the allowance would be paid. The maximum number of children supported in one family might, for example, be fixed at four or five, or the allowance paid to all children beyond the third might be tapered down.

Another objection that is frequently advanced is that such a plan will arouse the virulent antagonism of the bachelors, who will object to the married men receiving more than they do. It can, however, be pointed out to the single men that their married associates will not be receiving more for themselves, but that the added sums will merely be devoted to meeting some of the added costs which a child entails. If the allowances were sent to the mothers, the feeling of the unmarried that they were being discriminated against would be still further lessened. Both bachelors and married men would continue to compete in the shop for differential payments above the minimum, and if a member of the former group were abler than one of the latter, he would receive more.

A third objection which is sometimes offered by friends of the labor movement is that in the present weak position of organized labor it would be seized upon by employers as a means of strengthening their bargaining position, and hence would still further swing the balance of power in favor of the employers. Such critics as these should realize, however, that it is just as possible for trade-unions to initiate such a plan as for employers, and that it can be included in a joint agreement just as effectively as certain progressive unions have included a provision for unemployment insurance.

Finally, the plan seems to be signally adapted for government employees, for teachers, ministers, social workers, and other salaried workers. The fear of a differential birth rate need not operate here, for more rather than fewer births are desired from such groups. At least two industrial concerns, namely, W. H. Ludens and Company, of Reading, Pa., and the Columbia Conserve Company, of Indianapolis, have adopted modifications of the plan for their wage earners, while it is applied more informally by a number of concerns, and most notably by banks, for their salaried workers. There is a great need for further experimentation along these lines in this country, for it will be largely through concrete examples that we will be able to decide whether or not we approve of the system, and if so, what methods of administering it we favor.

2. *Mothers in Industry*[1]

The job of being a mother in a workingman's family can be divided into at least three distinct phases: physical, psychological, and economic.

[1] Adapted from BERRY, GWENDOLYN HUGHES, Mothers in Industry, *Annals Am. Acad. Political and Social Sci.*, vol. 143, pp. 315–323, May, 1929.

The first of these three functions, childbearing, may occupy a relatively short period of a woman's life, or it may extend to middle age, depending on the number and frequency of births, and on her age at marriage. Child training and education, the psychological aspect of motherhood, continue practically from the birth of her first child through the adolescence of the youngest.

The economic responsibility of the wife in this social group begins at marriage and continues as long as the home exists. This phase of her activity consists of managing the household, spending the money income of the family, and contributing a share toward her own support and that of her children through production in the home.

Each of these three functions of motherhood are constantly undergoing changes in response to the currents of social and economic movements. The tendency toward smaller families and improved obstetrical technique are reducing the physical burden of motherhood. The greater emphasis on child health, education, and child psychology in comparatively recent years is increasing the number of agencies outside the home assisting the mother in meeting her responsibility for child culture. At the same time, these same agencies may be increasing the work of the mother somewhat by imposing higher standards upon her.

The most marked and continuous changes, however, are probably to be found in the field of economics. The mother's economic function in the home is encroached upon whenever a labor-saving device is adopted and whenever a factory product is substituted for a homemade article. The mother's contribution as a producer is reduced, while the demand of the family for a money income to buy the new commodity is correspondingly augmented.

In the years preceding the introduction of the factory system the home was the workshop in which most of the commodities consumed by the family were made. In rural communities practically everything the family ate or wore could be produced by the labor of its members. The mother, with the assistance of her daughters, carried on all the processes of spinning and weaving as well as tailoring. She cured meat, preserved fruits, churned butter, baked bread, manufactured soap and candles, to mention but a few of the manufacturing processes for which she was responsible. Mother and children were thus able to contribute services which had a very definite economic value in family support. The husband's labor alone was not expected to provide for all the needs of the family. Apparently no question was raised in those days as to the propriety of the mother's economic function.

With the growth of towns and the development of the factory system, however, production by women and children in the home has been greatly reduced. The husband's contribution to family support, meantime, has changed from commodities ready for immediate consumption to money

wages. Whether the money income earned by the father is less or greater than his former contribution in kind is not known. The fact remains that while he did not support the family alone during the period of household production, it is tacitly assumed by those who question the employment of mothers that his money wage should today support both him and his family.

Although the decrease in home manufacture can best be illustrated by the contrast before and after the so-called "industrial revolution," it must be remembered that the process still continues. As her duties in the home are cut down the mother's economic function is becoming specialized outside of the home. The change in the married woman's activities from undifferentiated, jack-of-all-trades production in the home to a standardized job in the workshop is apparently going on rapidly. In 1920, according to the Fourteenth Census of the United States, the actual number of married women employed was almost four times the number employed in 1890, while the number of single, widowed, and divorced workers only doubled during the same period. The employment of married women has thus increased about twice as much during the last three decades as that of all other women.

The struggle to live on the husband's wage alone, in most industrial families, is a failure. A canvas of nearly 12,000 families in six industrial sections of Philadelphia in 1918 showed that the majority, 55 per cent, relied on income from other wage earners or from lodgers. Only 6 per cent of this entire group was of the conventional statistical type, husband, wife and three children under sixteen years of age, supported by the husband alone.

Families not supported by the father alone, as a rule, turn first to the wages of children (18.6 per cent), next to the wages of the wife (17.7 per cent) and third to income from lodgers (15.9 per cent). This canvass of almost 12,000 homes showed that in only 7.5 per cent of the total number was more than one of these sources of supplementary income utilized.

Wage-earning mothers are only specializing in one of the three chief functions which their job has always implied in the less fortunate economic groups. If they are to meet this responsibility to their families today they are practically forced to go out and earn money because they cannot make up the deficit by pinching and scraping at home. Housework now has become largely service, manufacturing has passed into the factory.

If the mother does not follow her job into the factory and bring in her share of the income in that way, or engage in some home industry, such as taking in lodgers, she throws a large part of her economic responsibility upon her husband. He thus becomes responsible for his own support as well as for the support of another adult and the children. But calling a man's wage a family wage cannot make it so.

"Why did you go back to work after you were married?" was one of the questions put to a group of 728 working mothers in Philadelphia. "My husband wasn't making enough," answered the largest group (29 per cent); "My husband was dead," came next (22 per cent); followed by, "My husband was sick" (14 per cent); "He left me" (13 per cent); "He wouldn't support me" (11 per cent); and "I'd rather work" (11 per cent).

These answers show clearly the measure of success which has met the husband's attempts at supporting his family. The great majority of these wives, under varying degrees of economic pressure, undertook the partial or entire support of their families while the husband was living.

Those who said they worked because the husband was not making enough fall into two classes: first, those who find the husband's wage inadequate only when an emergency arises and, second, those who are forced to work to meet even the ordinary running expenses of the household.

Among the emergencies which sent mothers to work while their husbands were working were dependent relatives coming to live with the family, or the purchase of new furniture. Sickness of members other than the husband, however, is the emergency arising most frequently.

The other women in this low-income group can never make ends meet on what the husband makes. When the wife says that times are hard, or that her husband is not earning much, it is impossible to judge where the trouble lies. It may be that her standard of "much" is too high, or that her husband is not being paid enough, or that he is not worth any more than he is getting. A day laborer of forty, with three children under nine years of age, a dependent father and a weekly wage of $22 cannot, perhaps, be said to be underpaid by industry, but his situation certainly raises the question of the proper basis of family support.

This low-income group includes also a few husbands who, according to their wives, never did steady work. The usual comment of the visitor on such cases is, works, but spends money on drink.

The women who answered "I'd rather work" when asked why they became wage earners excite an interest out of proportion to their number. These 79 women were eager to emphasize the point that they were not forced to work out, they chose to do so. Their reasons include (*a*) a chance to earn extra money to spend as they pleased, (*b*) an opportunity for wider and more stimulating contacts as well as a means of raising the standard of living, (*c*) as a means of filling in time not occupied by housework and (*d*) to help husband.

Those who work to help husband are principally concerned about buying a home or putting money in the bank. The women who expressed this joint sense of responsibility were largely foreign born. They came, for the most part, from southeastern European countries where industrial-

ization is not so advanced as here. They have been accustomed to a social and economic order in which the family is still the unit of production as well as of consumption.

These 79 women did not rush into industry in order to evade their responsibilities at home. Rather, they worked that they might make what they regarded as a greater contribution to family life. The woman who goes into industry under these circumstances, however, is relatively rare. It is estimated that on the basis of the survey of 12,000 homes and this intensive study of 728 mothers, in the most highly industrialized sections of Philadelphia, only between 1 and 2 per cent of mothers with children under sixteen years of age, and with working husbands, go into industry from choice.

In reviewing the reasons given by these 728 mothers for going back to work after marriage, it is apparent that in their experience at least, wage earning is intimately connected with the responsibility the husband is able and willing to assume. The husband, in turn, is limited by (*a*) a wage scale that does not permit adequate family support; (*b*) by premature death with nothing laid by for the future of his family; (*c*) prolonged ill health of a serious nature; (*d*) an undeveloped sense of responsibility which points to mental or emotional instability under an excessive economic burden. In addition the wife's experience in industry as a girl, and her preference for such employment instead of housework, was the deciding factor for one woman in every nine visited.

A deficit in the family income which the husband cannot meet is clearly indicated in the experiences of the mothers just considered. The explanation of such a deficit can readily be found in changes in our system of production which have deprived the family of a large part of the mother's economic contribution in the home. Cutting off the mother's opportunity for family support at home throws an undue burden upon the husband. Wage earning outside the home is undoubtedly a woman's most remunerative way of sharing responsibility for family support with her husband.

What happens to a mother's home duties when she undertakes to help her husband earn the money income of the family? Who carries on the rest of her economic function, home management and housework? What substitutes is she able to provide for her services at home? The further experiences of 728 mothers in Philadelphia industries will at least partially answer these questions.

The wage-earning mother does not necessarily give up her position as home maker when she enters industry. Five principal expedients have been used by these 728 mothers in combining home making and industrial employment: first, they limit their work-a-day responsibilities through part-time employment in industry; second, they practically eliminate their housekeeping duties by boarding with another family;

third, they secure assistance from outside the household; fourth, they transfer their housekeeping duties to relatives who share their homes; fifth, they call upon other members of the immediate family, husband or children, to cooperate with them in doing the housework. Only 1 in 25 (a total of 30 mothers) attempted to work all day and manage the household alone.

Can the woman who works outside of her home to discharge her economic obligation to the family, successfully carry on the other aspects of her job as mother? What of child life in these homes? Always, in considering the working wife as mother, it must be remembered that the standards of motherhood in the economic and social levels she occupies may be far below those generally accepted. Her shortcomings in this respect can be viewed more tolerantly when it is recalled that "running the streets" is frequently regarded as sufficient recreational outlet for the children in her neighborhood, that meal time and bed time are variable, that general standards of discipline, health, and education leave much to be desired.

The experience of these 728 mothers is far from conclusive as to the relation of wage earning to successful maternity. The medical data furnished are relatively meager and unsupported by clinic records. Furthermore, no comparable body of facts relating to mothers who are not and never have been so employed outside the home are available as a control group. The most serious obstacle is the great difficulty of isolating wage earning as a factor. Employment of mothers is so closely associated with economic insufficiency that it cannot well be considered apart from poverty.

One of the most serious indictments brought against wage earning by married women is that it reduces the birth rate. The facts gathered from the canvass of 12,000 Philadelphia homes, already mentioned, suggest that women who work have smaller families because they could not work if they had more children. Almost one-third of the married women without children were gainfully employed, but this proportion decreases steadily as the family grows in size, leaving less than one in six gainfully employed where there were five children or more. The lower birth rate may thus be the cause rather than the result of wage earning by mothers. Another point to be borne in mind in defense of the working mother: she does not work when her children are in their infancy. Of a total of 1,817 living children reported by these 728 working mothers, only 30 were under one year of age.

The most outstanding evidence of the relation of wage earning to the quality of maternity lies in the proportion of prenatal deaths reported before and after the woman resumed gainful employment. Of all the pregnancies occurring before the women went to work, 8 per cent are said to have resulted in a prenatal death. Of the total number of

pregnancies reported after wage earning was resumed, 17 per cent were reported to have terminated as miscarriages or stillbirths. Is this difference due to wage earning? How much of it can be explained by the mother's more vivid recollection of recent events?

The known facts surrounding the child deaths in these families do not suggest any relation with the industrial employment of the mother.

Complete physical examinations of these children in comparison with similar returns for an equal number of children in the same neighborhoods whose mothers do not work would give a fairly accurate indication of the relation between employment of mothers and child health. All that is known of the health of these 1,817 living children is what the mother observed and reported to the visitor. According to these admittedly incomplete data, only 8 per cent were either ill or suffering from health defect on the day of the visit. It is likely that only the more obvious and serious defects were mentioned. When it is considered that many of these children would not have enough to eat if the mother did not earn, it may betray a slightly prejudiced point of view to look for a relation between employment and poor health.

When the mother is away from home all or part of the working day she must make some provision for the care of the children. She cannot save up this responsibility and meet it all at once in the evening or over the week-end. Two-thirds of the 300 and more children under five years of age are looked after by an adult who lives in the home. The other hundred cases are divided equally among neighbors who run in, day nurseries, and neighbors who take the children into their own homes. For the group from five to ten, the proportion cared for by relatives at home has decreased somewhat, and almost one child in six is left without oversight, except by older children, after school hours. Almost half of the children from ten to fifteen years of age have no adult supervision outside of school hours. The child care problem in the home of the mother who goes out to earn, therefore, is not primarily one of infancy, but of late childhood and early adolescence. These mothers evidently believe that when a child is old enough to dress himself, to avoid being run over in the street, and to get his own lunch, he is fully capable of taking care of himself outside of school hours.

Wage earning by the mother of a family undoubtedly puts an additional burden on every member of the family, including even the younger children. They are forced to assume a greater responsibility for their own well-being than children in more prosperous homes. As they become able to help with the housework, they are pressed into service whenever possible. While their neighbors are playing in the streets, these children are helping at home. They seem to be initiated into household duty by way of marketing, then by preparing their own lunches at noon, and eventually by taking a hand in all the work of the household except sewing

and washing. These household duties, unless too heavy, need not be a hardship to the child. He learns more or less regular habits in this way and is forced to cultivate a certain sense of responsibility and self-reliance. The complaint is frequently heard that in the city the child of today is being robbed of his rightful heritage because he is given no work to do with his hands and is therefore more susceptible to the influence of the gang, the movies, and whatnot.

In attempting to evaluate the working mother's success in carrying out her function of child rearing, we are dealing with intangible values which are very difficult to measure. All that can be said is that the mother apparently does her best to fulfill her duty to her children in this respect. It is very seldom, practically never, that one of these mothers has broken up her family and "put away" any of her children. Their training and general oversight she turns over largely to relatives who live with her or to the children themselves as they get older. The testimony of the mother, which has been the only source of evidence considered here, must be supplemented from other sources, the school, the church, the community house, the court, to name but a few, before the full story of the price paid by childhood for the comforts and necessities purchased by the mother's earnings can be told.

3. *The Economic Costs of Rearing a Family*[1]

The duty of society as a whole, of our varied civilization in fact, to pay its share in the replacement of the raw material of which civilization is composed is much more far reaching and vital than the mere replacement or keeping up the labor supply. The existence of the state, the existence of society, of civilization, the perpetuation of the race, is much more essential than that any particular industry or all industries should have an ample supply of workers. In these days we can substitute machines for men in industry, but we cannot substitute machines for men in our political or our social structure. We have utterly failed so far to invent a machine which will use and pay cash down for the products of other machines, and so all along the line. We have not invented a machine that fulfills the duties that man owes to society or the obligations that he alone can meet toward civilization itself. Admittedly one of the serious problems which the ages have never solved, growing out of all our civilizations—ancient or modern, oriental or occidental—has been the problem of the rich and poor.

We have always associated the idea of the poor with large families, and we have always associated the idea of the rich with few or no children. In the poor sections of the cities the streets swarm with the little ones who are not only to be the labor supply of the next generation but the citizens

[1] Adapted from STEWART, ETHELBERT, A Family Wage Rate *vs.* a Family Social Endowment Fund, *Social Forces*, vol. 6, pp. 121–125, September, 1927.

of the state and the members of society. In their hands are to fall the questions that exercise and disturb our type of civilization. They are to handle the problems that confront the human race.

Now in our idea that the poor have most of the children and that the rich are essentially childless, have we not put cause for effect? The poor do not have children because they are poor, they are poor because they have children. The rich are not childless because they are rich, they are rich because they are childless. It is the cost of rearing a family. Take two boys starting with equal prospects, equally good situations and income. They marry at the same time and get an even start in life. In one case at the end of the first marriage year a child is born. Let us say that every two years thereafter a child is born until there are five children. In the other case the couple remain childless. Let us suppose these two young men have a wage or salary income of $2,500 each. Now let us see what happens.

The childless man, presuming equal economy and thrift in each party, saves his money and puts it in a bank. The other expends his money in the necessary expense growing out of the birth and care of a child. In a comparatively few years the childless man has accumulated $1,000 with which he can begin to make profitable investments, so that his savings are earning a very appreciable addition to his salary income.

According to Dr. Louis I. Dublin, Statistician of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, who has carefully worked this matter out, it costs $7,238 to rear a child to the age of eighteen, this on the standard of living of a family with an income of $2,500 a year. Let us make it even money, $7,200, and it must be understood that this is exclusive of the $1,100 which the public pays to educate that child in the public schools. The net cost to the parent is $7,200 per child at the age of eighteen. If this bare sum of money without any investment or any income therefrom be considered, the man with five children has invested $36,000 in cash in his family, which sum in and of itself would in the old days before we began measuring fortunes by billions have been considered a respectable fortune. At any rate it would lift him out of the ranks of the poor. On the other hand, the childless man has not only saved this $36,000 from his salary but he has had an opportunity to use it as cash capital during a period of 27 years from his marriage to the time the other man's fifth child would be eighteen years old. His capital has accumulated, in other words, for 27 years plus the interest or dividends on that growing capital. If extremely fortunate in his investments he may with this sort of a start become what is called a very rich man.

If it be objected that the figures quoted from Dr. Dublin are based upon a family income too high to be of consequence to the world in general or even to the United States taken as a whole, my answer is this—Dr. Dublin's figures show practically that the cost of rearing a child to the

age of eighteen on a given standard of living equals the earnings of practically three years of a man's life. If three children must be maintained to keep up the present population of the race, then nine years of each man's life must be given to the maintenance of the *status quo* of population. Now as the income of the man decreases the standard of life will decrease, not the number of children, until a point is reached where the standard of living is so low that the food supply of the woman interferes with and obstructs her fecundity—where a decrease in population will follow as the result of poverty or underfeeding of the married female population. The number of years' work that the child costs the wage earner or father does not materially change, even though his income reaches a level where his children are so underfed that they do not develop into valuable citizens and are frequently not sufficiently robust that the girls are reproductive. I think it is conceded that the mother will feed her children whether or not she has enough to eat, and that thus eventually she will starve herself into a state of sterility. I am of course not able to produce elaborate statistics to prove this theory mathematically, but I doubt if anyone who has mingled much with the extreme poor will raise the question. Another thing—as the earnings of the father decrease below a certain point the death rate of children increases and fewer of those born are raised to maturity.

Now what has happened is that one man has invested his total savings for himself, the other has invested his total savings, at least for a period of twenty-seven years, in the production of the raw material of civilization, in the raw material of national growth and national prosperity, and in the raw material of the very existence of the human race. He has done much more than merely provide for the replacement of labor in industry. He has provided for the replacement of the raw material of everything that constitutes mankind and all of the institutions of mankind.

It might be well also to consider the social gain that would come from an increase in marriages if young men and women could marry with a feeling of assurance that if children came their whole plan of life would not be wrecked by the increased cost due to their coming before financial preparation could possibly be made for them.

It might also be well to consider the better children that would result from the absence of worry on the part of the prospective mother who realizes the rapid approach of an expense not provided for in the family budget. The cost of being born, estimated at $250, causes an anxiety in the mind of the mother which reflects upon the unborn child, and frequently does it a damage which is sometimes socially very much more than the cost of being born.

We are told that we must feed our babies milk from "contented cows," and that milk from dairy herds that are worried and pestered from any

cause will make our babies sick. It is probably fully as important that we have babies from contented mothers to start with as that we feed these babies milk from contented cows after they have arrived.

It might be well also to consider how far the working of mothers outside the home is a detriment to the child which would be obviated by this social allowance.

The public has recognized its interest in these children to the extent of an expenditure of $1,100 each in the education of the child when the child is produced. In other words, in the United States we are willing to spend $1,100 each on the children as raw material to prepare them for better citizenship and to be more efficient workers, using that term in the broadest social sense and not exclusively in the industrial sense. But so far we have not been willing to pay a cent for the raw material to educate. That entire cost has been thrown upon the parents along with a sort of contempt for them because they have become poor enriching the world.

In a few instances society has in a most meager and inconsequential way tacitly at least recognized that the bringing into the world of a number of children was a public service. Income-tax exemption by a most charitable view may be considered as doing this, though as a matter of fact the tax exemption was put in simply because the taxing powers realized that a man with a large family could not pay, not because he ought not to pay.

To summarize, then, I am unalterably opposed to a difference in industrial-wage rates as between the married and the unmarried, as between the family of three and the family of five, because I believe that every man should earn enough to enable him to marry and rear a family of five if he wants to, and that every married man should receive a wage which will enable him to save up against the day when he will have a family of five or more. For this reason I am not enthusiastic about a family wage while you call it a wage and assess it against an industry or even a group of industries. I am, as has already been clearly demonstrated I think from what is said above, very much in favor of social allowance by which our political and social institutions will pay for the replacement of the race to those who are replacing the race. There is no reason, there is no justice why the man who is keeping up our social structure, our very civilization itself, should be penalized for his loyalty to the race and for his willingness to shoulder the burdens which others shirk. Not only is this a gross injustice, but as I see it it holds for the future a serious danger. Whatever may have been the situation in the past there is no use to ignore the inevitable fact that not only the theory but the technical knowledge connected with the doctrine of birth control is growing and will eventually become universal as a possibility—scout it, rail at it, legislate against it as you will. When this becomes true men and women will simply refuse

to become poor for the public welfare, and the race will either have to pay for its existence or cease to exist.

4. *The Wish and the Cost*[1]

For five years I have been teaching English in a large city high school. My husband teaches science in a private school. My salary is above $3,000 a year. Because of longer training and consequently shorter term of service my husband receives approximately $2,500. Our combined resources allow us an interesting life in accordance with our tastes. But can we have a baby?

I figure that I must stop teaching—at any rate for a year. Then there can be no certainty of any future plans to return. This will reduce our income from approximately $5,500 to the neighborhood of $2,500. A luxury we should never consent to relinquish is expert medical attention. My friends who have babies in the style in which I should wish to have mine tell me that the baby proper costs $1,000 including specialist, hospital, and nurse for one month, but excluding any subsequent medical attention, the expenses entailed in an even slightly larger establishment, a competent child's nurse provided I return to teaching, and a hundred et ceteras. Do a bit of mental arithmetic and discover why we gasp to think of the idea.

Naturally standards of living must be considered in this case. I speak from the point of view of our present *modus vivendi* which, in spite of a skimp here and there, is quite satisfactory, allowing us a part-time maid, entertainment of our friends, the intellectual pursuits in which we are interested, and last year a tourist-class trip abroad. "How extravagant!" says one reader. "How meager and impossible!" says another. Yet we are like other people in so many ways that our circumstances and interests must coincide with those of many other couples.

So much for our economic problem. It is comparatively easy in solution since it lends itself to approximate mathematical calculation. The ethical aspect demands consideration. I warn the reader ahead of time that the ethical side of the question simply completes the circle of reasoning and leaves us again with pencil in hand.

I am told that the longer we wait the more selfish we shall grow and the less inclined to have children. Rarely, if ever, do people definitely set out to establish a family out of complete selflessness. It is on my selfish days that I most desire to have a child to fondle and teach who might one day return our love with gratitude. It is on my conceited days that I desire to have a child who shall be better trained than my neighbor's children. It is on my proud days that I desire the child who may be the

[1] From HOLBIN, JANE SHEPPARD, Shall We Have a Child? *Survey*, vol. 57, p. 310, Dec. 1, 1926.

envy of many parents in physical feature, intellectual attainment, and moral courage. On occasion I also hear the whisper of the world: "You, the intelligent, are the ones who should have children to make this world a better place." On that day I smugly believe I have a mission and am puffed up with the self-satisfaction of knowing I possess the physical apparatus to assist in populating this funny world. Is any one of these motives wholly divorced from selfish feelings? Yet we shall be accounted selfish if we deliberately refrain from having children.

Indeed, I rather judge us unselfish in sacrificing the joys children give to parents to pay their way for the trouble and worry they may cost. We are unselfish because we deliberately relinquish those joys rather than produce a human life for which we could not provide our standard of material comfort and intellectual opportunity. At least ideals and inspiration we can give in good measure, but of what profit are they to the economically handicapped individual unless he be a genius? We arrive at our point of departure.

Doubtless we shall be accused of mixing motives, conjuring excuses, and hiding behind false virtues in calling ourselves unselfish when we possibly appear unwilling to sacrifice our modest luxuries and some of our comforts for a family. My husband had to face a childhood of hard work out of which physical weakening has come to offset any moral strengthening which might or might not have resulted.

He does not wish to confront our child with the same struggle. My luxuries have always been few, but I have never had to face any material want or worry. I am certain that I have not the courage ever to do so. I feel safe in speaking for both of us, therefore, when I say that if a child meant real sacrifice of what we have set up as material, intellectual, and social standards for ourselves and our children, we should no longer be desirable parents. The sentimental virtue of sacrifice would last until the irksomeness of petty saving had strained our dispositions to the ultimate discomfort of all concerned. It is at this point that the opposites, selfishness and unselfishness, nearly coincide.

You may ask, what of the maternal instinct? I mean the maternal instinct as differentiated from the mere urge of reproduction. This force is ever present and ever potent. Were it not for the compelling urge of that instinct, to have or not to have would hardly be a question. The problem would resolve itself into one almost as simple as that of deciding whether or not to buy a car or take a trip abroad.

The problem is so involved in a tangle of circumstances, motives, instincts, and ideals that solution seems well-nigh impossible. At the present time thus our problem stands. Time dances merrily on oblivious of us growing older each day as we pause ruefully on the path of least economic resistance, sacrificing the joy of parenthood rather than our standards of life for the child we should glory in having.

5. *The Control of Women*[1]

Again, the breeding function of the family would be better discharged if public opinion and religion conspired, as they have until recently, to crush the aspirations of woman for a life of her own. But the gain would not be worth the price.[2]

In this quotation from Ross we have suggested to us an exceedingly important and interesting phase of social control, namely, the control by those in social power over those individuals who alone can bring forth the human young, and thus perpetuate society. It is necessary that at the very outset of this discussion we should consent to clear our minds of the sentimental conception of motherhood and to look at facts. Sumner states these facts as well as they have ever been stated, in his consideration of the natural burdens of society. He says:

Children add to the weight of the struggle for existence of their parents. The relation of parent to child is one of sacrifice. The interests of parents and children are antagonistic. The fact that there are or may be compensations does not affect the primary relation between the two. It may well be believed that, if procreation had not been put under the dominion of a great passion, it would have been caused to cease by the burdens it entails.

This is especially true in the case of the mothers.

The fact is that childbearing is in many respects analogous to the work of soldiers; it is necessary for tribal or national existence; it means great sacrifice of personal advantage; it involves danger and suffering; and, in a certain percentage of cases, the actual loss of life. Thus we should expect that there would be a continuous social effort to insure the group interest in respect to population, just as there is a continuous social effort to insure the defense of the nation in time of war. It is clear, indeed, that the social devices employed to get children born, and to get soldiers slain, are in many respects similar.

But once the young are brought into the world they still must be reared, if society's ends are to be served, and here again the need for and exercise of social control may be seen. Since the period of helpless infancy is very prolonged in the human species, and since the care of infants is an onerous and exacting labor, it would be natural for all persons not biologically attached to infants to use all possible devices for fastening the whole burden of infant tending upon those who are so attached. We should expect this to happen, and we shall see, in fact, that there has been consistent social effort to establish as a norm the woman whose vocational proclivities are completely and "naturally" satisfied by childbearing and child rearing, with the related domestic activities.

[1] From HOLLINGWORTH, LETA S., Social Devices for Impelling Women to Bear and Rear Children, *Am. Jour. Sociology*, vol. 22, pp. 19–29, July, 1916.

[2] Ross, E. A., "Social Control," 1904.

There is, to be sure, a strong and fervid insistence on the "maternal instinct," which is popularly supposed to characterize all women equally, and to furnish them with an all-consuming desire for parenthood, regardless of the personal pain, sacrifice, and disadvantage involved. In the absence of all verifiable data, however, it is only common sense to guard against accepting as a fact of human nature a doctrine which we might well expect to find in use as a means of social control. Since we possess no scientific data at all on this phase of human psychology, the most reasonable assumption is that if it were possible to obtain a quantitative measurement of maternal instinct, we should find this trait distributed among women, just as we have found all other traits distributed which have yielded to quantitative measurement. It is most reasonable to assume that we should obtain a curve of distribution, varying from an extreme where individuals have a zero or negative interest in caring for infants, through a mode where there is a moderate amount of impulse to such duties, to an extreme where the only vocational or personal interest lies in maternal activities.

The facts, shorn of sentiment, then, are: (1) The bearing and rearing of children is necessary for tribal or national existence and aggrandizement. (2) The bearing and rearing of children is painful, dangerous to life, and involves long years of exacting labor and self-sacrifice. (3) There is no verifiable evidence to show that a maternal instinct exists in women of such all-consuming strength and fervor as to impel them voluntarily to seek the pain, danger, and exacting labor involved in maintaining a high birth rate.

We should expect, therefore, that those in control of society would invent and employ devices for impelling women to maintain a birth rate sufficient to insure enough increase in the population to offset the wastage of war and disease. It is the purpose of this paper to cite specific illustrations to show just how the various social institutions have been brought to bear on women to this end. Ross has classified the means which society takes and has taken to secure order, and insure that individuals will act in such a way as to promote the interests of the group, as those interests are conceived by those who form "the radiant points of social control." These means, according to the analysis of Ross, are public opinion, law, belief, social suggestion, education, custom, social religion, personal ideals (the type), art, personality, enlightenment, illusion, and social valuation. Let us see how some of these means have been applied in the control of women.

The first means of control to which I wish to call attention in the present connection is that which Ross calls "personal ideals." It is pointed out that "a developed society presents itself as a system of unlike individuals, strenuously pursuing their personal ends." Now, for each person there is a "certain zone of requirement," and since "altruism

is quite incompetent to hold each unswervingly to the particular activities and forbearances belonging to his place in the social system," the development of such allegiance must be

. . . effected by means of types or patterns, which society induces its members to adopt as their guiding ideals . . . To this end are elaborated various patterns of conduct and of character, which may be termed "social types." These types may become in the course of time personal ideals, each for that category of persons for which it is intended.

For women, obviously enough, the first and most primitive "zone of requirement" is and has been to produce and rear families large enough to admit of national warfare being carried on and of colonization.

Thus has been evolved the social type of the "womanly woman," "the normal woman," the chief criterion of normality being a willingness to engage enthusiastically in maternal and allied activities. All those classes and professions which form "the radiant points of social control" unite upon this criterion. Men of science announce it with calm assurance (though failing to say on what kind or amount of scientific data they base their remarks). For instance, McDougall writes:

The highest stage is reached by those species in which each female produces at birth but one or two young, and protects them so efficiently that most of the young born reach maturity; the maintenance of the species thus becomes in the main the work of the parental instinct. In such species the protection and cherishing of the young is the constant and all-absorbing occupation of the mother, to which she devotes all her energies, and in the course of which she will at any time undergo privation, pain, and death. The instinct (maternal instinct) becomes more powerful than any other, and can override any other, even fear itself.

Professor Jastrow writes:

. . . *charm* is the technique of the maiden, and *sacrifice* the passion of the mother. One set of feminine interests expresses more distinctly the issues of courtship and attraction; the other of qualities of motherhood and devotion.

The medical profession insistently proclaims desire for numerous children as the criterion of normality for women, scornfully branding those so ill advised as to deny such desires as abnormal.

As one example among thousands of such attempts at social control let me quote the following, which appeared in a New York newspaper on Nov. 29, 1915:

Only abnormal women want no babies. Trenchant criticism of modern life was made by Dr. Max G. Schlapp, internationally known as a neurologist. Dr. Schlapp addressed his remarks to the congregation of the Park Avenue M. E. Church. He said, "The birth rate is falling off. Rich people are the ones who have no children, and the poor have the greatest number of offspring. Any

woman who does not desire offspring is abnormal. We have a large number, particularly among the women, who do not want children. Our social society is becoming intensely unstable."

And this from the *New York Times*, Sep. 5, 1915:

Normally woman lives through her children; man lives through his work.

Scores of such implicit attempts to determine and present the type or norm meet us on every hand. This norm has the sanction of authority, being announced by men of greatest prestige in the community. No one wishes to be regarded by her fellow creatures as abnormal or decayed. The stream of suggestions playing from all points inevitably has its influence, so that it is or was, until recently, well-nigh impossible to find a married woman who would admit any conflicting interests equal or paramount to the interest of caring for children. There is a universal refusal to admit that the maternal instinct, like every other trait of human nature, might be distributed according to the probability curve.

Let us turn next to public opinion as a means of control over women in relation to the birth rate.

In speaking of public opinion Ross says:

Haman is at the mercy of Mordecai. Rarely can one regard his deed as fair when others find it foul, or count himself a hero when the world deems him a wretch . . . For the mass of men the blame and the praise of the community are the very lords of life.

If we inquire now what are the organs or media of expression of public opinion we shall see how it is brought to bear on women. The newspapers are perhaps the chief agents, in modern times, in the formation of public opinion, and their columns abound in interviews with the eminent, deploring the decay of the population. Magazines print articles based on statistics of depopulation, appealing to the patriotism of women. In the year just passed fifty-five articles on the birth rate have chanced to come to the notice of the present writer. Fifty-four were written by men, including editors, statesmen, educators, ex-presidents, etc. Only one was written by a woman. The following quotation is illustrative of the trend of all of them:

M. Emil Reymond has made this melancholy announcement in the Senate: "We are living in an age when women have pronounced upon themselves a judgment that is dangerous in the highest degree to the development of the population . . . We have the right to do what we will with the life that is in us, say they."

Thus the desire for the development of interests and aptitudes other than the maternal is stigmatized as "dangerous," "melancholy,"

"degrading," "abnormal," "indicative of decay." On the other hand, excessive maternity receives many cheap but effective rewards. For example, the Jesuit priests hold special meetings to laud maternity. The German kaiser announces that he will now be godfather to seventh, eighth, and ninth sons, even if daughters intervene. The ex-president has written a letter of congratulation to the mother of nine.

Since its beginning as a human institution, law has been a powerful instrument for the control of women. The subjection of women was originally an irrational consequence of sex differences in reproductive function. It was not intended by either men or women, but simply resulted from the natural physiological handicaps of women, and the attempts of humanity to adapt itself to physiological nature through the crude methods of trial and error. When law was formulated, this subjection was defined, and thus furthered. It would take too long to cite all the legal provisions that contribute, indirectly, to keep women from developing individualistic interests and capacities. Among the most important indirect forces in law which affect women to keep them childbearers and child rearers only are those provisions that tend to restrain them from possessing and controlling property. Such provisions have made of women a comparatively possessionless class, and have thus deprived them of the fundamentals of power. While affirming the essential nature of woman to be satisfied with maternity and with maternal duties only, society has always taken every precaution to close the avenues to ways of escape therefrom.

Two legal provisions which bear directly on women to compel them to keep up the birth rate may be mentioned here. The first of these is the provisions whereby sterility in the wife may be made a cause of divorce. This would be a powerful inducement to women who loved their husbands to bear children if they could. The second provision is that which forbids the communication of the data of science in the matter of the means of birth control. The American laws are very drastic on this point. Recently in New York City a man was sentenced to prison for violating this law. The more advanced democratic nations have ceased to practice military conscription. They no longer conscript their men to bear arms, depending on the volunteer army. But they conscript their women to bear children by legally prohibiting the publication or communication of the knowledge which would make childbearing voluntary.

Child rearing is also legally insured by those provisions which forbid and punish abortion, infanticide, and infant desertion. There could be no better proof of the insufficiency of maternal instinct as a guaranty of population than the drastic laws which we have against birth control, abortion, infanticide, and infant desertion.

Belief, "which controls the hidden portions of life," has been used powerfully in the interests of population. Orthodox women, for example,

regard family limitation as a sin, punishable in the hereafter. Few explicit exhortations concerning the birth rate are discoverable in the various "words" of God. The belief that family limitation will be punished in the hereafter seems to have been evolved mainly by priests out of the slender materials of a few quotations from Holy Writ, such as "God said unto them, 'Multiply and replenish the earth,'" and from the scriptural allusion to children as the gifts of God. Being gifts from God, it follows that they may not be refused except at the peril of incurring God's displeasure.

The education of women has always, until the end of the nineteenth century, been limited to such matters as would become a creature who could and should have no aspirations for a life of her own. We find the proper education for girls outlined in the writings of such educators as Rousseau, Fénelon, St. Jerome, and in Godey's "Lady's Book." Not only have the "social guardians" used education as a negative means of control, by failing to provide any real enlightenment for women, but education has been made a positive instrument for control. This was accomplished by drilling into the young and unformed mind, while yet it was too immature to reason independently, such facts and notions as would give the girl a conception of herself only as future wife and mother. Rousseau, for instance, demanded freedom and individual liberty of development for everybody except Sophia, who was to be deliberately trained up as a means to an end. In the latter half of the nineteenth century when the hard battle for the real enlightenment of women was being fought, one of the most frequently recurring objections to admitting women to knowledge was that "the population would suffer," "the essential nature of woman would be changed," "the family would decay," and "the birth rate would fall." Those in control of society yielded up the old prescribed education of women only after a stubborn struggle, realizing that with the passing of the old training an important means of social control was slipping out of their hands.

A very long paper might be written to describe the various uses to which art has been put in holding up the ideal of motherhood. The mother, with children at her breast, is the favorite theme of artists. The galleries of Europe are hung full of Madonnas of every age and degree. Poetry abounds in allusions to the sacredness and charm of motherhood, depicting the yearning of the adult for his mother's knee. Fiction is replete with happy and adoring mothers. Thousands of songs are written and sung concerning the ideal relation which exists between mother and child. In pursuing the mother-child theme through art one would not be led to suspect that society finds it necessary to make laws against contraception, infanticide, abortion, and infant desertion. Art holds up to view only the compensations of motherhood, leaving the other half of the theme in obscurity, and thus acting as a subtle ally of population.

Illusion is the last of Ross's categories to which I wish to refer. He says:

In the taming of men there must be provided coil after coil to entangle the unruly one. Mankind must use snares as well as leading strings, will-o-the-wisps as well as lanterns. The truth by all means, if it will promote obedience, but in any case obedience! We shall examine not creeds now, but the films, veils, hidden mirrors, and half lights by which men are duped as to that which lies nearest them, their own experience. This time we shall see men led captive, not by dogmas concerning a world beyond experience, but by artfully fostered misconceptions of the pains, satisfactions, and values lying under their very noses.

One of the most effective ways of creating the desired illusion about any matter is by concealing and tabooing the mention of all the painful and disagreeable circumstances connected with it. Thus there is a very stern social taboo on conversation about the processes of birth. The utmost care is taken to conceal the agonies and risks of childbirth from the young. Announcement is rarely made of the true cause of deaths from childbirth. The statistics of maternal mortality have been neglected by departments of health, and the few compilations which have been made have not achieved any wide publicity or popular discussion. Says Katharine Anthony, in her recent book on "Feminism in Germany and Scandinavia," 1915:

There is no evidence that the death rate of women from childbirth has caused the governing classes many sleepless nights.

Anthony gives some statistics from Prussia (where the figures have been calculated), showing that

. . . between 1891 and 1900, 11 per cent of the deaths of all women between the ages of twenty-five and forty years occurred in childbirth . . . During forty years of peace Germany lost 400,000 mothers' lives, that is, ten times what she lost in soldiers' lives in the campaign of 1870 and 1871.

Such facts would be of wide public interest, especially to women, yet there is no tendency at all to spread them broadcast or to make propaganda of them. Public attention is constantly being called to the statistics of infant mortality, but the statistics of maternal mortality are neglected and suppressed.

The pains, the dangers, and risks of childbearing are tabooed as subjects of conversation. The drudgery, the monotonous labor, and other disagreeable features of child rearing are minimized by the social guardians. On the other hand, the joys and compensations of motherhood are magnified and presented to consciousness on every hand. Thus the tendency is to create an illusion whereby motherhood will appear to

consist of compensations only, and thus come to be desired by those for whom the illusion is intended.

There is one further class of devices for controlling women that does not seem to fit any of the categories mentioned by Ross. I refer to threats of evil consequence to those who refrain from childbearing. This class of social devices I shall call "bugaboos." Medical men have done much to help population (and at the same time to increase obstetrical practice!) by inventing bugaboos. For example, it is frequently stated by medical men, and is quite generally believed by women, that if first childbirth is delayed until the age of thirty years the pains and dangers of the process will be very gravely increased, and that therefore women will find it advantageous to begin bearing children early in life. It is added that the younger the woman begins to bear the less suffering will be experienced. One looks in vain, however, for any objective evidence that such is the case. The statements appear to be founded on no array of facts whatever, and until they are so founded they lie under the suspicion of being merely devices for social control.

One also reads that women who bear children live longer on the average than those who do not, which is taken to mean that childbearing has a favorable influence on longevity. It may well be that women who bear many children live longer than those who do not, but the only implication probably is that those women who could not endure the strain of repeated births died young, and thus naturally did not have many children. The facts may indeed be as above stated, and yet childbearing may be distinctly prejudicial to longevity.

A third bugaboo is that if a child is reared alone, without brothers and sisters, he will grow up selfish, egoistic, and an undesirable citizen. Figures are, however, so far lacking to show the disastrous consequences of being an only child.

From these brief instances it seems very clear that the social guardians have not really believed that maternal instinct is alone a sufficient guaranty of population. They have made use of all possible social devices to insure not only childbearing, but child rearing. Belief, law, public opinion, illusion, education, art, and bugaboos have all been used to reenforce maternal instinct. We shall never know just how much maternal instinct alone will do for population until all the forces and influences exemplified above have become inoperative. As soon as women become fully conscious of the fact that they have been and are controlled by these devices the latter will become useless, and we shall get a truer measure of maternal feeling.

One who learns why society is urging him into the straight and narrow way will resist its pressure. One who sees clearly how he is controlled will thenceforth be emancipated. To betray the secrets of ascendancy is to forearm the individual in his struggle with society.

The time is coming, and is indeed almost at hand, when all the most intelligent women of the community, who are the most desirable childbearers, will become conscious of the methods of social control. The type of normality will be questioned; the laws will be repealed and changed; enlightenment will prevail; belief will be seen to rest upon dogmas; illusion will fade away and give place to clearness of view; the bugaboos will lose their power to frighten. How will the social guardians induce women to bear a surplus population when all these cheap, effective methods no longer work?

The natural desire for children may, and probably will, always guarantee a stationary population, even if childbearing should become a voluntary matter. But if a surplus population is desired for national aggrandizement, it would seem that there will remain but one effective social device whereby this can be secured, namely, adequate compensation, either in money or in fame. If it were possible to become rich or famous by bearing numerous fine children, many a woman would no doubt be eager to bring up eight or ten, though if acting at the dictation of maternal instinct only, she would have brought up but one or two. When the cheap devices no longer work, we shall expect expensive devices to replace them, if the same result is still desired by the governors of society.

If these matters could be clearly raised to consciousness, so that this aspect of human life could be managed rationally, instead of irrationally as at present, the social gain would be enormous—assuming always that the increased happiness and usefulness of women would, in general, be regarded as social gain.

6. *The Complete House Husband*[1]

We believe the time has come when the men of our country need, and will warmly welcome, a journal whose chief ambition is to raise the standard of their home making, and elevate this profession to the place it merits above all others. It is a fact supported by unquestionable evidence, that we are entering into a period of transition, which is to witness the entrance of women in ever larger numbers into activities hitherto carried on by men; and there must be a corresponding increase of men who are finding new freedom and self-expression in the work of home making, not to say housekeeping. Already, out of 678 occupations, only 38 have not been invaded by women; and the only occupations in which women workers are not increasing more rapidly than men are cooking and millinery. The drift of men toward the home-making crafts is already on.

[1] Adapted from Extracts from the Introductory Issue of *The Gentlemen's Home Journal*, *World Tomorrow*, vol. 6, p. 390, December, 1923.

The question for us men is simply this: what are we going to make of our opportunity? Comes to us men the call to bring up our children according to the highest standards, make our homes places of repose and inspiration, and, through the humble ministrations of our daily toil, uplift the whole community by our efforts. In the hands of us men lies this beautiful gift of opportunity, and it is for us to show that we shall not be found wanting.

To this end *The Gentlemen's Home Journal* means to do its share. It believes in men; it has confidence in the idealism which quickens their everyday duties and casts over them the glory of loyal service to country, community, and home!

How I Increased My Wife's Earning Power 50 Per Cent

By a Modern Husband

So many times I think we men fail to appreciate the significance of little things—things that are hardly noticeable, just of themselves, but the effects of which on the lives of our dear ones are far reaching and sometimes even crucial.

It was so with Genevieve and me. Night after night, when she came home from the laboratory, where she gave herself to the daily grind with that abandon which characterizes everything that Genevieve undertakes, she would drop into the nearest chair with a sigh, and answer my questions about the day's work with the most perfunctory, if not irritable, replies. For months this went on, growing worse all the time. Coupled with this state of mind, Genevieve disclosed the disturbing possibility of a failure to obtain the raise in pay toward which we had been looking, oh so hopefully, all these many days. A cold fear gnawed at my heart, and try as I might to keep it out, it crept into my housework. Despite my masculine pride and my love for Genevieve, nothing I could do seemed to be of any help. Like her, I became irritable, and before long the meals began to be late, and even the flowers wilted and remained in their vases like the withered blossoms of our dreams.

And then, one day, a light broke on my soul as from a heavenly beacon. How glad I am that we were saved in time!

It was the little things, I suddenly saw, that were wearing Genevieve down—things that amounted to nothing, one by one, but which when multiplied as indeed they were, raked her sensitive spirit like so many teeth in a harrow. And how ashamed I was, as I began to see and count them up! What were they, do you ask? The things that other husbands, without doubt, have permitted to go on multiplying in their home making, unintentionally of course, but none the less with devastating results.

First, the door that creaked on its hinges at her very entrance. The hallrack riotously filled with hats and coats and not one empty peg. The couch cover, always awry from the frolics of our two young children. The remoteness of slippers, cigarettes, and matches. The mantel clock that jangled when it struck, because I had neglected to have it fixed. My two days' beard which gave me habitually a skin she did not love to touch. And—to my shame be it said that I never knew about it till I read the advertisement—a frequent halitosis, of which, one day, in her discreet way, she told me.

But that is all past now. I need only say that our house is changed, that I am a different man, and Genevieve, full of vigor and jollity, has already had her pay raised once and expects another raise ere long. Mayhap, some day, she will get that long-hoped-for vacation, and I shall be able to feel the blessed touch of three pairs of hands, instead of two, clinging to my trousers as I go about my household tasks rejoicing.

7. *Work and Its Alternatives*[1]

Industry begins to recognize that it cannot function in a vacuum and that it is linked with the home even though it may not engage in large-scale welfare work, including home-health visitation, recreation, vacant lot gardens, and the like. Not the least pressing reason for this recognition is the large number of employed married women. How large this actual number is it is difficult to determine, for the authorities do not all agree. According to one estimate, employed married women number about one million or 20 per cent of the total. The census of 1920 estimated nearly two millions and indicated that the number is increasing. Miss Ross[2] concludes that 40 per cent of the total of employed women are or have been married at some time or other. It is estimated that from 1890 to 1920 the percentage of married women gainfully employed nearly doubled. But this estimate must be somewhat qualified if it is to be used as indicating a phenomenal increase; for while the percentage of all single, widowed, and divorced workers remained about the same according to the censuses of 1910 and 1920, the percentage of employed married women actually dropped from 10.7 per cent of the total in 1910 to 9 per cent in 1920.

It should also be remembered that the largest proportion of employed married women is found in the age groups from fifteen to twenty-four years. Such a fact as this, of course, sheds much light on the primary purpose of married women's employment. At the same time the insufficiency of these statistics shows the need for more careful reporting and analysis of statistics for the divorced and widowed by ages, and also the presence of children if any.

In the present discussion we shall ignore the married women in distinctly professional work because their case has been frequently and ably handled and because they for the most part are seeking to "express themselves" and to obtain their freedom by boarding or otherwise avoiding a household establishment, or by avoiding children, or by using some other woman's services, they cannot be said to contribute much if anything toward a solution of the bigger, more general problem of married women's work.

[1] Adapted from TODD, ARTHUR J., Some Industrial Management Aspects of Married Women's Work and Their Bearing on The Family, *Family*, vol. 8, pp. 88–91, May, 1927.

[2] *Survey Graphic*, December, 1926.

This is not a new problem, for the great mass of women have always worked more or less outside of their homes. The contributions of woman to the industrial arts reveal this clearly enough. The case is all the stronger if women be credited with the invention of and early responsibility for agriculture. Nevertheless one of the marks of modern so-called "civilization" is a sharp division of labor between men and women, and modern industrialism, by taking gainful industry almost entirely out of the home, is still further intensifying that distinction.

In popular terminology, therefore, woman has become known as the "home maker," but I hope that the time is coming when this title can be legitimately shared by both men and women. Meanwhile apparently a large number of women must be both outside wage earner and home maker.

Why do married women work? Because they must or think they must; because they want to improve the standard of living for the family (and this is true especially of younger women); because they are wanted by industry or by other women who want to express themselves in a career.

The economic effect on the home of this outside work depends upon:

a. How much time is given.

b. The woman's social status (widow, husband incapacitated, grown-up children, young children, no children).

c. Competition with men, "dumping," flooding the labor market, marginal wages.

d. Grade of job and whether it pays enough to permit employing a home substitute.

e. Skill of woman and whether she chooses the job for which she is best fitted.

f. Whether she stays long enough on the job to acquire skill and perquisites.

g. Whether she is able to benefit by organization and group action.

h. Whether her work permits or forbids her home to enjoy indirect income, *i.e.*, public subsidies to wages, enjoyment of public education, recreation, culture.

Authorities are by no means agreed as to how many married working women are responsible only for themselves or how much they must contribute to the support of dependents. Rowntree and Stuart find in England that 88 per cent of all working women are responsible only for themselves, 12 per cent are responsible for 0.71 of an adult in addition. In the United States the two or three studies so far made by the Women's Bureau of the U. S. Department of Labor seem to indicate a different situation. It is quite evident that this part of the problem requires much more intensive study in order to bring out the facts divorced from any special pleading or emotional bias.

So far as industrial management is concerned, perhaps the most obvious problem of the married woman worker is the nursing mother. She may be given time off with pay or with maternity insurance before and after childbirth; she may be given time off from the daily job to nurse her child; or the management may provide a day nursery for itself

or subsidize one in or near the plant. Here again opinion of personnel managers, charity workers, and biologists is so diverse that much further research is necessary.

Married women workers come in for their share of the general managerial concern about labor turnover. The figures so far have not been kept usually in such a way as to reveal sex or marital status, but in some industries voluntary "quits" show home duties as the largest reason given by women. The Hood Rubber Company in 1921 found less labor turnover among the married whether men or women. This would of course be the case if women are working through necessity or if they are working with such a definite objective as providing better standard of living, better education for their children, and so on. On the other hand, it need occasion no great surprise to find that married workers, both men and women, show a higher absence rate from their employment. The Hood Rubber Company's experience showed that widowed and divorced females lose 154 per cent more time, and married females 175 per cent more time than single males (married men lose 2 per cent more than single men). The rate of absence increases for women over the age of thirty. Many industries agree in the experience of Saturday absenteeism particularly among married women. This fact may have a very decisive bearing sometimes upon the proposal for a five-day week.

In general, women workers are absent more frequently on account of sickness—in some cases 75 per cent more. There are usually no separate figures for married and unmarried women but it is safe to presume that pregnancy and childbirth increase the rate for the married. This particular phase of married women's employment registers itself in several managerial problems. Frequently fellow employees protest against the presence of a pregnant woman and demand that she be excluded from the shop. This is particularly true among the foreign born who have brought with them a good many folk superstitions clustering around the phenomenon of birth. Programs of health insurance should include maternity insurance and industry would be wise for its own sake in fostering this form of insurance. Meanwhile the effect of certain industrial poisons, particularly lead, has forced itself upon the attention of industrial management and industrial hygienists.

The married woman sometimes constitutes a problem to industrial management in the matter of hours, overtime, and night work. In almost every case where legislation has been proposed to limit women's hours an objection has been registered by certain industries employing both men and women. It is not necessary that a shop employ mixed sections of men and women to be concerned over the problem of having different standards of working hours for the sexes. It would be equally easy to tie up a shop if certain key sections employing women exclusively were limited, say, to an eight-hour day while other sections employing

men were working on some other schedule, for modern production methods require balanced sections in order to preserve a steady, continuous flow of work through the shop. In such a contingency, either women must be eliminated or the hours of men equalized with those of the women. The problem is intensified in seasonal industries with peak seasons requiring overtime and even night work. On the other hand the effect of uncertain hours, night work, and overtime is unmistakably bad on the home, and in such cases there is a cumulative evil effect which reacts adversely on both the home and the job.

Women tend to be assigned to less skilled jobs, but when they "stick" and work along in the same sections as men they may become equally skilled and equally well paid.

On week work they are usually paid less but on piece work they may earn more than men in the same section. Married women are preferred for some industrial jobs, for example, as industrial nurses. In general, married women are not directly penalized, and are not fired if they marry. Some women are successful as foremen but others tend to stiffen into grenadiers, to imitate the dress and manners of men, to be conservative and hard boiled.

There is no evidence to show that the fact of married women's employment has any decisive effect on men's wages other than that of woman's labor in general. In the future it may have a much more apparent effect if industry, having been cut off from immigrant labor, appeals to the great reserve forces of married women. There are no definite figures to show whether married women are less disposed to organize than the unmarried; the general impression, however, is that they are. Hence they may hinder labor organization and leadership and may be used to keep men in line and to fight unionism. Also on account of their lack of union discipline they may indulge in impromptu unauthorized strikes.

The inverse ratio between family income and infant mortality has been pretty clearly established, particularly by a series of studies made by the federal Children's Bureau. The scanty figures available also appear to indicate that infant mortality jumps when the mother is employed outside the home. A third problem arises however. If women work because they have to work and if infant mortality rises greatly, does it rise higher than it would have risen if the family income had not been increased by the amount of the woman's earnings? This is a question we can not answer because figures are lacking. Hence a very fascinating problem lies open for research.

The home and the factory are united frequently by a vicious circle of domestic handicap. Where the woman is a widow or with a husband incapacitated, or with children in trouble, or where the family is involved in a sex triangle, this trouble reacts upon the woman's capacity as an employee and frequently radiates through a whole shop and reverberates

back upon the home in reduced earnings, worry, loss of skill, which may compound itself still further and finally result in discharge for poor work, "trouble making," or irregular attendance.

Industrial management as well as social progress should be concerned with what becomes of the children of working women during the employment period and any welfare policy of an employer must be determined partly by those facts. Part of the children die as a result of enforced neglect; the survivors may be deposited in day nurseries, or parked with the neighbors, or left to their own devices, or left with husbands out of work or partly laid up, or with elder members of the family. There is a tendency in some localities for schools to receive children of working women before and after hours. In more than one instance the removal of such a school has caused great hardship in a working-class neighborhood. If women with children are to work outside the home, this function of the school may receive a much wider encouragement and development. The way has already been pointed by such experiments as the Montessori School at Hull House which was a combination of day nursery and Montessori classes.

A final problem emerges. What are the alternatives to outside work for a married woman? So far as I can see they are:

a. To have a husband who can afford her.

b. To accept the lower standard of living provided by a husband's wages.

c. To eke out the family income by keeping boarders, lodgers, or some other equivalent scheme. These methods too frequently add but little to the real income of the family and have the disadvantage of crowding the home, disturbing its privacy, and even introducing moral and physical sickness.

d. So-called "home work" as it has been practiced, cottage industry, tenement industry, or still more directly the sweatshop.

e. Home work in a Utopian system of decentralized motive power under proper public inspection conforming to public standards of health and employing both husband and wife under the home roof. This is a dream and not a fact. Perhaps even a bad dream.

f. A family wage (repudiated by both British and American labor organizations and by eugenists like Paul Popenoe).

g. State subsidies, mothers' pensions, endowment of motherhood or child endowment, along the lines on which New South Wales has begun to experiment.

h. Maternity insurance and more generous workmen's accident compensation or other forms of industrial insurance not yet worked out.

i. Part-time industrial employment for both husbands and wives, permitting a new division of labor both inside and outside the home. This has a certain Utopian sound but may be more in line with industrial actuality than some of the other alternatives frequently proposed.

8. *Forty-six Cents per Day*[1]

Gladys Caldwell met us at the door of her four-room cottage in the mill village. It was one of a row of dingy cottages out in Poinsett,

[1] From BLANSHARD, PAUL, How to Live on Forty-six Cents a Day, *Nation*, vol. 128, pp. 580–581, May 15, 1929.

across the meadows at the edge of Greenville, just beyond "nigger town." I had said to one of the strikers from the Poinsett cotton mill:

I want you to take me to one of your homes where a woman keeps the house going for the wages that most of you are getting. I would like to talk to a woman about washing and doctor bills and milk, and I want to see her house. Do not take me to a widow with five or six starving children. I can find such people in New York. What I want is the story of how you normal, strong people live on your average wages of $12 a week.

Gladys Caldwell invited us in. We sat by a tiny fireplace in her front room, which was also her bedroom. On the walls were a picture of Jesus and a calendar. In the room were a bed, a trunk, and a dresser; in the room opposite were a trunk and a bed; in the back corner room was a bed; in the kitchen were a table, a bench, and an oil stove. In the four rooms there were four chairs. The house had no plaster, no rugs, no heating stove.

As she talked Mrs. Caldwell was vivacious and eloquent, with flashing brown eyes and flashing white teeth. From time to time she spit snuff into the fireplace with perfect nonchalance and marksmanship. Her husband came in before we were through, a big, upstanding man, strong and steady eyed. He is thirty, she is twenty-nine.

Here is Gladys Caldwell's story as it found its way into my notes:

Yes, I have a husband and five children. I'm a weaver, at least I work in the weave room fillin' batt'ries. I get paid by the day. No, I don't mind tellin' you about how I live. It's bad enough and we mill folks have stood enough without kickin'.

I get up at four to start breakfast for the children. When you got five young'uns it takes a while to dress 'em. The oldest is nine and she helps a lot. The others are seven, five, four, and three. What do we have for breakfast? Well, we usually have bread and butter and syrup. No, we don't get any sweet milk. We get a gallon of buttermilk every day from Mrs. Rochester for twenty-five cents. The children like it; they don't take much to sweet milk. They ain't used to it.

After I've got the children dressed and fed I take 'em to the mill nursery, that is three of 'em. Two go to school, but after school they go to the nursery until I get home from the mill. The mill don't charge anythin' to keep the children there. I couldn't afford it anyway. We have breakfast about five, and I spend the rest of the time from five to seven gettin' the children ready and cleanin' up the house. That's about the only time I get to clean up. Ruby washes the dishes. Ruby is nine.

My husband and I go to the mill at seven. He's a stripper in the cardin' room and gets $12.85 a week, but that's partly because they don't let him work Saturday mornin'. They put this stretch-out system on him shore enough. You know he's runnin' four jobs ever since they put this stretch-out system on him and he ain't gettin' any more than he used to get for one. Where'd they put the other three men? Why they laid 'em off and they give him the same $12.85 he got before.

I work in the weavin' room and I get $1.80 a day. That's $9.95 a week for five and a half days. I work from seven to six with an hour for dinner. I run up and down the alleys all day. No, they ain't no chance to sit down, except once in a long time when my work's caught up, but that's almost never.

At noon I run home and get dinner for the seven of us. The children come home from school and the nursery. We have more to eat at noon. We have beans and baked sweets and bread and butter, and sometimes fat-back (fat bacon) and sometimes pie, if I get time to bake it. Of course I make my own bread.

It takes about $16 a week to feed us. We get nearly all of it at the company store with jay flaps. They are the slips that the company gives you for buying groceries with after you've worked all day. Then you can get your groceries right away and don't have to wait until the end of the week for your pay. If we didn't have 'em some of the people would starve before the end of the week shore enough. I get my butter from Mrs. Rochester. She sells it for fifty cents a pound and we use half a pound every other day.

After dinner I wash the dishes and run back to the mill. We don't have any sink but there's a faucet with runnin' water on the back porch and a regular toilet there, too. You can see we have electric lights, but we don't have any heatin' stove. I cook with an oil stove and we have these two fireplaces.

When the whistle blows at six I come home and get supper. Then I put the children to bed. There's a double bed here and a double bed in that other room and a double bed out in the back room. That's for seven of us. The baby's pretty young. I 'spose all of the children'll go into the mills when they get a bit older. We'll need the money all right. Yes, my father and mother were mill workers, too, and they're still livin' and workin'. He gets $18 a week and my mother gets about $3 a week for workin' mornin's. There was four of us children in the family. My husband's father and mother worked in the mill, too.

We've moved five times since we was married—that's eleven years ago. It don't cost much to move when you move a little way. We ain't been outside of South Carolina. They ain't nothin' in movin' from one mill to another in the long run. When we moved here from Woodside, just over the fields there, it cost us $2.50 a load for the two loads.

I rode around right smart when I was single, but I ain't been on the train more than once a year since. My husband reads a book once in a while but I don't get time. I went through the third grade in school and then I went to work in the mill. I was nine years old when I started work at No. 4 in Pelzer. My husband didn't go to school neither but he managed to pick up readin' and he reads books. Yes, we take a paper.

When supper is over I have a chance to make the children's clothes. Yes, I make 'em all, and all my own clothes, too. I never buy a dress at a store. I haven't no sewin' machine but I borrow the use of one. On Saturday night I wash the children in a big wash tub and heat the water on the oil stove. Then I do the week's ironin'. I send the washin' to the laundry. I just couldn't do that, too. It costs nearly $2 a week. Our rent in this house is only $1.30 a week for the four rooms and we get water and electric lights free.

I always make a coat last seven or eight years. My husband gets a suit every two years but he ain't had one for the last six years. He got an overcoat

about four years ago. Things have been pretty hard. I like the movies but I haven't been to one in about six years now. Not since the children was young.

Maybe my children ought to get away from the mill village, but if they went anywhere they would go back to the farm and there ain't no use doin' that. The farmers haven't got it as good as we have.

I don't get time to go to church. My husband goes to the Methodist Church. Most everybody goes to church here. Sunday's about the only day I get to rest any. Seems as if I just have to have a little rest then.

I press my husband's clothes. He half-soles the children's shoes and all our shoes. See those! Those soles on my shoes came from the dime store and cost twenty-five cents for the pair. He puts 'em on with tacks. I make a dress for myself about every six or seven months out of cloth I buy in town. It costs about twenty-five cents a yard.

We been lucky about sickness. The children ain't been sick at all for years. When the doctor comes he charges us $2.50 a visit, but right now that the strike is goin' on the doctors is callin' for nothin', and the barbers is cuttin' the men's hair for nothin'. They's pretty much with the strike.

There's one colored doctor over here but he don't come to see anybody. Some of the folks goes to see 'im for sores and such like. They say he's a herb doctor, but as fur as deliverin' babies is concerned I never heard of him deliverin' a white baby. Let's see, my babies cost $25 except the first one and that cost $30. 'Taint every doctor will do it for that. I never had any trouble. I worked up to two months before, mostly, an' I went back when the children was about four months old. The nursery'll take 'em when they're three weeks old. I had to hire a colored girl when the babies come. That cost $7 a week.

Birth control? What's that? . . . Oh! Sure, we'd be glad to have that if it didn't cost no money. Yes, that's my address.

Once I mashed my thumb in the mill. I was out for two months with it and I didn't get anythin'. I went to pull a loom and the handle on the lever slipped because the gear was too tight and it mashed my thumb. The company don't pay anythin' for a thing like that.

Usually I get to bed between ten and eleven at night.

9. *The Lady and Her Leisure*[1]

Miss Anita Loos in "Gentlemen Prefer Blondes" has, with a felicity altogether charming, and a sociological penetration altogether devastating, stolen most of my thunder. There is very little more to say. About all the humdrum economist can do is wander among the wreckage, pile the debris into heaps, and tell objectively what Miss Loos has described, with far greater acuteness, subjectively. True, the dull fellow must shift the incidence a little. The waste of women to him is not so much the profession of the beautiful gold digger—prostitution and its allied trades was an old story when civilization first rose on the banks of the Euphrates—but rather the economic behavior of the lady in her moments of leisure.

[1] From CHASE, STUART, Wasting Women, *Survey*, vol. 57, pp. 268–270, Dec. 1, 1926.

Particularly and specifically he would examine "shopping" in its wider social aspects. For shopping is not confined to ladies whose moral codes are piquant, but to the great bulk of women who have been thrown, by the convulsions of the going economic system, clear of the necessity of doing anything useful. We might roughly set the line at ten thousand dollars a year. Women whose means of support from husbands, relatives, lovers, trust funds, exceed this amount, stand as it were on the brink of the delightful abyss of shopping; and most of them take the plunge. Than which nothing could be more human, and, in the last analysis, more wasteful. For shopping, alas, does not stop with the ladies above the ten-thousand-dollar line. They erect standards which are followed, class by economic class, down to the ten-hundred-dollar line—adulteration increasing inversely with the income level. Wrist watches from Tiffany come at last to wrist watches in the five- and ten-cent stores. It is probable, furthermore, that there is more waste in the imitations than in the real thing.

Waste, as I choose to define that ambiguous word, is, from the economic point of view, any employment of man power (which includes woman power generically), or any use of natural resources, for the satisfaction of ends which do not satisfy. We all must have the necessities of life and we would like, and ought to have, the comforts. Modern technology has brought comforts within the reach of all potentially, if not actually. We like to express our personalities in our dress, in our house decorations, in our manners, in a hundred ways. There is no reason why we should not do so. Many of us like music, the theater, good books, exhibitions of painting, artistic things generally. We ought to have more of them. I hold no brief for a strict utilitarian definition of waste. Waste comes into the picture with superluxuries, sheer swank, artificially and commercially stimulated fashion changes, and with the blind effort of keeping up with the Joneses, when the Joneses know a good deal about money but nothing about taste.

From the economic point of view, there are four main channels which give rise to loss, leakage and friction in the time and activity of women. They are, *seriatim:* idleness; overconsumption; unintelligent consumption, "shopping"; an inefficient domestic plant, misdirected effort.

Idleness need not detain us long. It is limited to a relatively small group as compared to the total population of the United States. There are some ten million women in industry and while they are idle from time to time due to cyclical and seasonal unemployment, this is a factor which affects men equally with women, and is a general item of industrial waste which does not concern us here. There are some twenty million housewives, the great bulk of them engaged day and night on the most incessant and remorseless activity known to *homo sapiens.* For them no vacations, no eight-hour laws, no specified and protected working conditions. As

Art Young has depicted, it is more often than not the mother who is over the hot stove all day while pa is down in the nice cool sewer. Finally the income-tax returns report a small group, about 300,000 persons, with incomes of $10,000 or over.

In this group are a certain number of women who are idle from the economic standpoint. For the goods and services which society furnishes them, they furnish nothing, and often worse than nothing, in return. Many women of means are excellent housekeepers, sound educators of their children, useful members of their community. But perhaps an even larger fraction—particularly in that critical period when the children have grown up or have gone away to school—is idle in the full economic sense of the term. They bridge, they run up prices of early American furniture and Sandwich glass, they raid Europe, they talk—my God, how they talk—they putter around, they have been known to pet, they dress, dress, dress. They are the chief support of the flourishing industry of the higher astrology, among whose ornaments was Oom the Omnipotent, the Yogi from Kansas, whose career through the drawing rooms and boudoirs of New York is still a spicy memory. And, by virtue of their idleness, they set the level of shopping which holds in subjection thirty million of their sisters the country over, from beautiful gold diggers to scullery maids and heavy-footed Scandinavian farm wives, spelling out Sears Roebuck catalogues amid the level and unending wheat.

What the economic structure loses from the sheer fact that these women are idle—say 200,000 of them—is something of course, but it is only a drop in the bucket as compared to the waste which their conspicuous consumption, as Veblen put it, entails. Suppose we light a cigarette, settle more comfortably in our chair, and slowly turn the pages of one of the great handbooks of fashion, which, in order to float their advertising, contain a picture or two, a story or two, and a verse or two, buried somewhere in their equatorial sections.

Vanity Fair will do, or *Harper's Bazaar*, or *Vogue*. Here in the advertising pages, the appeal to overconsumption is direct, naked—the word is used advisedly—and unashamed. If one were to seek the single document which best expressed the culture complex which crowns a century of steam power, one would not need to go further than this solid sheaf of pulp wood.

It your motor car has a long and haughty hood, and your clothes bear Paris labels, and your home is eloquent of faultless taste, here you will find your sort of foot wear.

Here are M. Corday's superlative lipsticks, and M. Corday's *toujours moi* perfume. Here is a lady tall as only a futurist painter can make her in a writhing curve of white ermine against a black and silver tropic night.

Cheerio—Here's to the Players who animate the Game—the Game which animates the Audience—the Audience which animates Smart Sports Clothes which animate Altman's Sportswear Department with reproductions of models from Worth, Lanvin, Jenny, Regny, Goupy, Marital et Armand, Chanel!

Beneath the shining, supple undulation of Eugene permanent waves.

Panama sandals gay with hand-painted flowers.

Curvfit, a razor for a woman, her very own, made especially to fit the curves of the body.

The revealed knee must now be covered with lovely silk.

Fisher bodies.

You can never have Perfect Ovals and Half Moons if you neglect to shape the Cuticle.

Certain fortunate women take the world's best automobile for granted, as they do gowns and jewels from Rue de la Paix . . . the mellow glow of old masters on their walls . . . the friendship of famous people. The Rolls Royce moves as gracefully through a world of social prominence as they do themselves.

A provocative Parfum! Voluptuous! Exotic! Imbued with all the glamour of the Orient.

Pearl necklaces up to $200,000. Single pearls up to $20,000.

For the boy between two and six, you may find striped broadcloths or striped silk pajamas from England with tailored dressing gowns to match. You will see silk-lined bathrobes of red and white or blue and white checked flannel, or dressing gowns of silky Rodier fabrics. Fastidious young women of the same age may have their body waists and panties of pink crepe de Chine, discreetly embroidered. As for the babies, from Normandie carriage sets of embroidered lace and net to their dresses from Belgium and France, all is elegance.

The latest development in this age of specialization is New York's resolution to make stockings to individual order. Measurements will be taken in the shop (by girls we are carefully informed) and in three weeks stockings will be delivered that are guaranteed to fit every curve and dimple.

For the exotic, there is *Midi-Cinq* in a small vial with a glass stopper to run along your cigarette before it is lighted to give forth an exquisite perfume.

That all of these advertised things are waste, it would be nonsense to assume. Many represent sound comforts, many give expression to the buyer's personality, many are genuinely artistic and beautiful—in themselves. But the total effect is neither art nor the expression of individual personality nor comfort nor convenience—it is pecuniary emulation. The best advertising copy is snob copy, though the snobbery is seldom direct but delicately implied. These arresting pictures, these glowing sentences, have just two basic messages: Buy me and knock 'em for a row of goals; buy me and keep up with the procession!

In addition to the man power and materials which pecuniary emulation and conspicuous consumption waste—including not only the shopping of the rich but the imitation and adulteration all down the line—

there are certain by-products of the process which the student of caste cannot fail to note. There is the pressure on husbands to make money, more of it and more of it, lest milady falter in the remorseless march. This leads to an attitude not overscrupulous as to how the money is made, and what is worse, sometimes crucifies a potential artist or scientist or statesman or musician upon a cross of gold. That George F. Babbitt is the ostensible ideal of the American husband is clear enough; that he is the real ideal is not so clear. Even Babbitt himself, in his cups, looked wistfully back to the day he was orator of his college class.

There is again the almost limitless damage that wealthy women can do when they give way to philanthropic yearnings. Again, as in the case of the consumer versus shopper, we must distinguish between the woman who is neighbor to her community and the charity gadabout. There may be more degrading symbols than Lady Bountiful, but such have never come to my attention. As the ninth generation of a New England family, I had rather be cut with sharp knives than be patronized. And somehow, perhaps wrong-headedly, I feel that this ought to be the universal attitude. It is shopping not in duvetyn but in human beings.

Finally we have the waste of women's labor in the home—the bent backs, the sunken eyes, the fatal deliveries, the tired hands, which never need to have been had an age of applied technology given half the attention to a kitchen sink that it gave to a bomb fuse. Depreciation of mill machinery is spread on all the books of account, but depreciation of overworked mothers is never reckoned. True, the movies and our popular newspaper poets never fail to give mother her due in lush and heavy sentiment, but sentiment is a poor handmaiden around an ill-ventilated and ill-designed house. Up to ten years ago, no engineer apparently had ever got nearer a kitchen than the dining room. Right lately some attention is being paid to it, but the benefits to date have flowed almost altogether into the homes of the well-to-do who hire help to work in their kitchens anyway. For nineteen out of the twenty million, the house is fifty years behind the technical arts, and the waste of sheer muscle would defy a dozen Niagaras.

Hildegarde Kneeland of the Bureau of Home Economics in the Department of Agriculture has outlined the main leakages in domestic economy as follows, the supporting comments being mine:

1. *Excess Capacity and Duplication of Equipment.*—20,000,000 cook stoves; laundry equipment only used once a week; cooperative nursery failures.

2. *Inefficient Equipment Due to Small Production Units.*—Most kitchen stoves are, in the words of H. G. Wells, "unintelligent lumps of iron." Oil stoves and many furnaces and gas stoves have a scandalously low thermal efficiency.

3. *Mishandling of Equipment Due to Untrained Workers—Particularly Household Servants.*—It has been found that brides with a nice sense in selecting a personality perfume or even a body by Fisher are not always so happy in their selection of cooking utensils and cleaning equipment.

4. *Waste of Fuel and Supplies Due to Small Units and Untrained Management.*

5. *Inefficient Delivery of Household Supplies.*—Half-loaded milk wagons, grocery wagons, ice wagons competing up the same streets, boosting delivery costs. The city of Rochester found that a unified milk delivery service would save the consumer nearly three cents a quart on milk.

6. *Inefficient Purchasing of Supplies Due to Lack of Standards for, and Training of, Housewives.*—The United States Government tests the great bulk of the products which it buys in the laboratories of the Bureau of Standards. The result is a saving of at least $100,000,000 a year on textiles, building materials, foodstuffs, office supplies, clothing, disinfectants, cleaning equipment, what not. If these tests could be made available to the domestic consumer the country over, they might go far to undermine the blah of advertising as the sole guide to the housewife's purchases. Billions could be saved by consumers by this technique.

7. *Elaboration of Standards.*—Service plates, table layout, starch, silver, linen, china, hangings—all the useless paraphernalia involving extra cleaning and care which "nice" people demand. This over and above utility and art.

8. *Inefficient Cleaning Methods.*—Little is known concerning the relation between cleaning processes and health. It is now largely a matter of ritual especially in dusting and polishing. Typical house construction greatly increases the labor of cleaning.

9. *Maladjustment between Work and Individual Aptitudes of Household Workers.*—Square pegs in round holes. It is assumed that all women are born housekeepers; an assumption so unwarranted as to lead to untold friction and waste. When one contemplates the digestions which have been ruined, the children who have been spoiled, the husbands who have become bilious and embittered, the wives whose nervous mechanism has collapsed—all because women have been jammed in the home (themselves assisting) who do not belong in the home, one wonders if there is not more waste here than in all the gigantic mechanism of shopping. Gentlemen may prefer blondes—but not always in the kitchen and the nursery.

There are, in conclusion, four things which will go far to abate the waste of women. First, more equality in income levels, tending to break down economic class distinctions and so achieve some surcease in the blighting struggle to keep up with the Joneses. Second, more knowledge generally diffused as to the real utility and durability of the goods we buy—more laboratories and less competitive advertising. As women buy 90 per cent of all articles for ultimate consumption, the gain will be chiefly in their sphere. Third, the application of science and technology to the home—its construction, its heating, ventilation, cooking devices, cleaning apparatus and particularly the possibilities of cooperation in child care, food preparation, laundry services, with other homes in the same community. And finally, a wider diffusion of the new and shattering conception that all women are not born home makers but have equally valuable gifts for other fields may deflect many a square peg from a round hole, lighten an incalculable load of current unhappiness, and make tens of thousands of useful rather than wasted lives.

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Chapter XIV

THE STATUS OF WOMEN

The literature bearing upon the position of women in the modern world is full of contradictions and absurdities. The actual status of women and the family is likely to be in pretty close accommodation to the general cultural conditions of life, while the body of sentiments and attitudes is colored and conditioned, when not altogether determined, by the standards of an earlier generation. Much of the writing is sentimental and, particularly when it touches upon motherhood, frequently maudlin. It is highly impressionistic. There is a very general disposition to ignore individual and personal variations, forget class, economic, social, educational, and other differences, and treat women as such. It expresses a rich variety of biases and a highly complicated body of primary and secondary rationalizations. In reading the papers included in the chapter, the keen student will discover various inconsistencies in arguments and conclusions, lapses in objectivity, and shifts in viewpoint.

The division of labor in primitive society, as brought out by both Mr. Thomas and Mr. Westermarck, was in general accord with inherent sex differences. Because of her physiological specialization for the child-bearing function, woman was relatively sessile and disposed toward agriculture and industrial activities. Her type of mind corresponded to her type of work. The more active, violent, and intermittent activities, as hunting, fighting, and protection of the group, fell to the men. The aggressive psychology and cooperative technique incident to these occupations carried over to the relation of the sexes and led to the domination of women by men. The actual status and treatment of women varied with time and place but that she was generally abused there is no reason to believe.

Throughout the ages woman has been a worker. In early life everywhere her contribution to the common economy was as large and as indispensable as that of man. In most places in the world she is today a useful member of society. In the biblical panegyric on the household virtues, quoted as the first reading in the present chapter, woman is praised and valued for her industrial usefulness. Obviously, in this barbarian culture, she was secondary to man and her subordinate position is clearly defined in this expression from the *mores*. She is a useful, not an ornamental, member of the social group. Throughout most of European society, as well as in the Orient, she has labored side by side with man in

the common family work. In the pioneer and rural life of America she was valued for this industry rather than for her charms; all members of the family group worked together in the common family interest.

The change of function and the loss of independence and of usefulness had its beginning, so far as the middle-class women and families are concerned, in the industrial revolution and the dominance of the capitalistic organization of society. This separated the family in work and interest. Man was more and more separated from the home; women were more and more restricted to the home and the domestic routine. This led, in the nineteenth century, to the idea, still vital in some levels of society, that "woman's place is in the home." This on the one hand is to assign all women to the same work and interests—a virtual denial of personality to the sex—and on the other hand it makes the assumption that, because of the accident of sex, all women are competent as mothers. When woman ceased to be a producer she became a dependent. The entire support of wife and family was thrown upon the man, and marriage, perhaps for the first time in the world, became a serious economic burden. Law and religion sprang to its support and propagated and enforced a new idea—that the support of women and children was a natural obligation and duty of man.

With their change in status, their loss of function and independence, women developed a new psychology. In the circumstances, marriage came to be regarded as a means of livelihood. As parasitic, they developed the necessary psychological and personality traits. Dependent upon men, they developed a technique for the control of men; they ceased to have character and developed the characteristics pleasing to men. Coyness, prettiness, modesty, the cult of bodily purity, charm, ornamentation, and the like got their best and most absurd expression perhaps in the early Victorian ideal of a helpless and clinging parasite. The whole feminine repertoire of the "lady" as distinct from the capable and occupied woman was an accommodation to the needs of the situation. Women of the former class ceased to be personalities and became satellites.

This dependent passive rôle was of course rather sharply opposed to natural disposition. Human beings are by nature active; passivity in the presence of stimulation is always painful. The much discussed restlessness of modern free women is a result of her loss of contact with reality; her preoccupation with trivialities is a consequence of the absence of serious occupation.

The tendency for women to return to industry and to become economically independent carries with it another shock to the marriage and family institution. The early conception of the family as an economic unit disappeared with the coming of industrialism. Men, when rational and honest have never pretended that the monogamous marriage that followed was a satisfactory condition; at best it was a social status to be

endured. For women, it made marriage a career; she looked forward to perpetual dependency; her sex function was her means of support.

As women become self-supporting they become self-respecting. On contact with reality they develop objective and individualistic attitudes that replace the personal and subjective attitudes that the dependent status engendered. With the development of self-respect in women, the marriage relation must and will change; self-respect is not compatible with the traditional arrangement. The future holds a possibility that an increasing percentage of marriages may be free and voluntary unions of equals.

Special attention should be directed to Mr. Watson's objective statement concerning the cause of the paucity of achievement of women, as contrasted with Mr. Wieth-Knudsen's sweeping assumptions of inherent sex inferiority.

1. *The Virtuous Woman*[1]

Who can find a virtuous woman? for her price is far above rubies.

The heart of her husband doth safely trust in her, so that he shall have no need of spoil.

She will do him good and not evil all the days of her life.

She seeketh wool, and flax, and worketh willingly with her hands.

She is like the merchants' ships; she bringeth her food from afar.

She riseth also while it is yet night, and giveth meat to her household, and a portion to her maidens.

She considereth a field, and buyeth it: with the fruit of her hands she planteth a vineyard.

She girdeth her loins with strength, and strengtheneth her arms.

She perceiveth that her merchandise is good: her candle goeth not out by night.

She layeth her hands to the spindle, and her hands hold the distaff.

She stretcheth out her hand to the poor; yea, she reacheth forth her hands to the needy.

She is not afraid of the snow for her household: for all her household are clothed with scarlet.

She maketh herself coverings of tapestry; her clothing is silk and purple.

Her husband is known in the gates, when he sitteth among the elders of the land.

She maketh fine linen, and selleth it; and delivereth girdles unto the merchant.

Strength and honor are her clothing; and she shall rejoice in time to come.

[1] Prov. 31: 10–31.

She openeth her mouth with wisdom; and in her tongue is the law of kindness.

She looketh well to the ways of her household, and eateth not the bread of idleness.

Her children arise up, and call her blessed; her husband also, and he praiseth her.

Many daughters have done virtuously, but thou excellest them all.

Favor is deceitful, and beauty is vain: but a woman that feareth the Lord, she shall be praised.

Give her of the fruit of her hands; and let her own works praise her in the gates.

2. *The Status of Women in Preliterate Societies*[1]

Among many uncivilized peoples the hardest drudgeries of life are said to be imposed on the women; all the heavy work is performed by them; their life is an uninterrupted succession of toil and pain. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of these and similar statements; but, however correct they be, they hardly express the whole truth. In early society—just as among ourselves—each sex has its own pursuits. The man is responsible for the protection of his family and its support. His occupations are such as require strength and ability: fighting, hunting, fishing, the construction of implements for the chase and war, and the building of huts. On the other hand, the principal occupations of the woman are universally of a domestic kind: she procures wood and water, prepares the food, dresses skins, makes clothes, takes care of the children. She, moreover, supplies the household with vegetable food, gathers roots, berries, acorns, and, among agricultural savages, very commonly cultivates the ground. Cattle raising is generally a masculine pursuit, because it has developed out of the chase. Agriculture, on the other hand, originally devolves on the woman, because it has developed out of collecting seeds and plants. Thus the various occupations of life are divided between the sexes according to definite rules. And though the formation of these rules has undoubtedly been more or less influenced by the egoism of the stronger sex, the essential principle from which they spring lies deeper. They are, on the whole, in conformity with the indications given by nature itself.

There is nothing for which savages and barbarians have been more commonly blamed than the apparently cruel practice of using their women as beasts of burden. As M. Pinart (quoted by Dr. Nieboer) remarks, with special reference to the Indians of Panama, it may indeed seem strange to the superficial observer that the woman should be charged with a heavy load, while the man walking before her carries nothing but

[1] Adapted from WESTERMARCK, EDWARD, The Position of Women in Early Civilization, *Am. Jour. Sociology*, vol. 10, pp. 409–412, 415–421, November, 1904.

his weapons. But a little reflection will make it plain that the man has good reasons for keeping himself free and mobile. The little caravan is surrounded with dangers: when traversing a savannah or a forest a hostile Indian may appear at any moment, or a jaguar or a snake may lie in wait for the travelers. Hence the man must be on the alert, and instantly ready to seize his arms to defend himself and his family against the aggressor. A similar observation has been made by Dobrizhoffer. He writes:

> The luggage being all committed to the women, the Abipones travel armed only with a spear, that they may be disengaged to fight or hunt, if occasion requires.

Moreover, whatever may have been the original reason for allotting a certain occupation exclusively to the one sex, any such restriction has subsequently been emphasized by custom, and in many cases by superstition. It is a common belief that, if a man does a woman's work, he himself will become effeminate; besides, he will be laughed at and called a woman. Among the Beni Ahsen tribe in Morocco, the women of the village where I was staying were quite horrified when one of my men was going to fetch water; they said that they could not allow him to do so, because the fetching of water was a woman's business. So, also, among the Bakongo, a man would be much ridiculed by the women themselves if he wanted to help them in their work in the field.

It is obvious that this division of labor in savage communities is apt to mislead the traveling stranger. He sees the women hard at work and the men idly looking on; and perhaps it does not occur to him that the latter will have to be busy in their turn, within their own sphere of action. What is largely due to custom is taken to be sheer tyranny on the part of the stronger sex, and the wife is pronounced an abject slave of her husband, destitute of all rights. Yet, as a matter of fact, the strict differentiation of work, however burdensome it be to the woman, is itself a source of rights. It gives her authority within the circle which is exclusively hers. In the house she is very commonly an autocrat. Even where she is said to be the slave of the husband, custom may prevent him from parting with a single household article, without first asking the permission of his wife. Nay, in early society women are sometimes the only landowners. As already said, they till the ground, they sow the corn. The soil, therefore, in certain cases is regarded as theirs.

The supreme authority which, among many savage peoples, the husband is said to possess over his wife, appears thus to be considerably modified by circumstances which have generally been left out of consideration by the generalizer. And we must distinctly and emphatically reject as erroneous the broad statement, often met with, that the lower races, taken as a whole, hold their women in a state of almost complete subjection. Among many of them the married woman, although in the

power of the husband, is known to enjoy a remarkable degree of independence, to be treated by him with great consideration, and to exercise no small influence upon him. In several cases she is even stated to be his equal, and in a few his superior.

It will perhaps be argued that savages live in polygamy, and that polygamy is degrading to the wife. But to this may be answered that many savages are strictly monogamous, and that among the majority of them polygamy is an exception. Almost everywhere it is confined to the minority of the people, the vast majority being monogamous. Moreover, where there are many more women than men in a community—and this is not infrequently the case among uncivilized peoples, owing to war and other causes—it is questionable whether, under savage conditions of life, polygamy does not become a necessity. It is also worth noticing that among polygamous peoples the women themselves sometimes approve the custom. Livingstone tells us that some Makalolo women, on hearing that a man in England could marry but one wife, exclaimed that they would not like to live in such a country; they could not imagine how English ladies could relish our custom, for, in their way of thinking, every man of position should have a number of wives, as a proof of his wealth. In equatorial Africa also, according to Winwood Reade, the women are the stoutest supporters of polygamy: "If a man marries, and his wife thinks that he can afford another spouse, she pesters him to marry again, and calls him 'a stingy fellow' if he declines to do so."

Again, it will be objected that most savages purchase their wives, and that this means that the woman is treated as a piece of property. But we must certainly not conclude, as some eminent sociologists have done, that where women are exchangeable for oxen or other beasts, they are "of course" regarded as equally without personal rights. The bride-price is a compensation for the loss sustained in the giving up of the girl, and a remuneration for the expenses incurred in her maintenance till the time of her marriage. It does not *eo ipso* confer on the husband absolute rights over her. There are peoples among which the husband's authority is almost nil, although he has had to pay for his wife. Moreover, where the *bona fide* marriage by purchase prevails it is considered disgraceful for a woman to be given away for nothing. In Morocco it would certainly mean that the girl is considered good for nothing. When I told my Moorish friends that in Christian countries a man pays no money at all for his wife, but, on the contrary, often gets money with her, my friends apparently got the idea that our estimation of the female sex is very low indeed, and that our men are very greedy.

To sum up: Among the uncivilized races the position of women varies. Among some it is undoubtedly very bad; among others it is extremely good; and, generally speaking, it is much better than it is commonly supposed to be. We now come to a very important problem, but one

extremely difficult to solve: Why are women treated so differently in different societies?

It has been suggested that the social status of women is connected with the system of tracing descent. As is well known, among many of the lower races kinship is reckoned exclusively through the mother. This means that a person is considered a member of his mother's clan, not of his father's, and that property and rank succeed in the female line; for instance, that a man's nearest heir is not his own, but his sister's son. In a few exceptional cases the system of maternal descent even implies that a man's children are largely in the power of their maternal uncle. But this system does not imply that the mother is the head of the family; and, however, it may be originated, no sociologist nowadays believes in Bachofen's theory that the system of tracing descent through the mother is a consequence of the supremacy of women. But Dr. Steinmetz, the well-known Dutch sociologist, has tried to show that the husband's authority over his wife is, broadly speaking, greater among those peoples which reckon kinship through the father than among those that reckon kinship through the mother only. The cases examined by Dr. Steinmetz, however, are too few to allow of any general conclusions, and the statements concerning the husband's rights are commonly so indefinite and so incomplete that I think the evidence would be difficult to produce, even if the investigation were based on a larger number of facts. When I compare with each other peoples of the same race, at the same stage of culture, living in the same neighborhood, under similar conditions of life, but differing from one another in their method of reckoning kinship, I do not find that the prevalence of the one or the other line of descent materially affects the husband's authority. Nothing of the kind is noticeable in Australia, nor, so far as I know, in India, where the paternal system among many of the aboriginal tribes is combined with great or even extraordinary rights on the part of the wife. And among the west African Negroes the position of women is, in all appearance, no less honorable in tribes like the Eboes, among whom inheritance runs through males, than in tribes which admit inheritance through females only.

According to another theory, the position of women and the degree of their dependence among a certain people are largely influenced by economic conditions. With reference to the North American aborigines, for instance, the observation has been made that where the women can aid in procuring subsistence for the tribe they are treated with more equality, and their importance is proportioned to the share which they take in that labor; whereas in places where subsistence is chiefly procured by the exertions of the men the women are considered and treated as burdens. Thus, the position of women is exceptionally good in tribes that live upon fish and roots, which the women procure with a degree of expertness equal to that of the men, whereas it is among tribes that live

by the chase, or by other means in which women can be of little service, that we find the sex most oppressed. Dr. Grosse, again, emphasizes the low status of women not only among hunters but among pastoral tribes. "The women," he says, "not being able to take part in war, possess nothing which could command respect with the rude shepherd and robber." Among agricultural peoples, on the other hand, Dr. Grosse adds, the position of the female is generally higher. The cultivation of the ground mostly devolves on the woman, and among peoples that chiefly subsist by agriculture it is not an occupation which is looked down upon, as it is among nomadic tribes. This gives the woman a certain standing, owing to her importance as a food provider.

Now, in these generalizations there is no doubt a great deal of truth; but they do not hold good universally or without modification. Among several peoples that subsist chiefly by the chase or the rearing of cattle the position of women is exceedingly good. To mention only one instance out of many, Professor Vambery observes that among the nomadic Kara-Kirghiz the female sex is treated with greater respect than among those Turks who lead a stationary life and practice agriculture. Indeed, the general theory that women are more oppressed in proportion as they are less useful is open to doubt. Commonly they are said to be oppressed by their savage husbands just by being compelled to work too hard; and that work does not necessarily give authority is obvious from the institution of slavery. But, at the same time, the notion, prevalent in early civilization, that the one sex must not in any way interfere with the pursuits of the other sex, may certainly, especially when applied to an occupation of such importance as agriculture, increase the influence of those who are engaged in it. Considering, further, that the cultivated soil is not infrequently regarded as the property of the women who till it, it is probable that, in certain cases at least, the agricultural habits of a people have had a favorable effect upon the general condition of the female sex.

It is often said that a people's civilization may be measured by the position held by its women. But at least so far as the earlier stages of culture are concerned, this opinion is not supported by facts. Among several of the lower races, including peoples like the Veddahs of Ceylon, the Andaman Islanders, and others of a very backward type, the females are treated with far greater consideration than among many of the higher savages or barbarians. Travelers have often noticed that of two neighboring tribes the less cultured one sets an example in this respect to the other. "Among the Bushmen," says Dr. Fritsch, "the women are life companions; among the Kaffirs they are beasts of burden." Lewis and Clark even affirm that the status of women in a savage tribe has no necessary relation to its moral qualities in general:

> The Indians whose treatment of the females is mildest, and who pay most deference to their opinions are by no means the most distinguished for their virtues . . . On the other hand, the tribes among whom the women are very much debased possess the loftiest sense of honor, the greatest liberality, and all the good qualities of which their situation demands the exercise.

That the condition of women, or their relative independence, is no safe gage of the general culture of a nation also appears from a comparison between many of the lower races and peoples of a higher civilization, like the Chinese, Hindus, Hebrews, and civilized Mohammedan nations. Among these peoples the married women are, or have been, much more subjected to their husbands than they are among many, if not most, of the uncivilized races. The great religions of the world have had a tendency to treat women as inferior beings. They attach much importance to ceremonial cleanliness; nothing unclean must approach the deity. And women are regarded as unclean.

It is pleasant to note that, even where the position of the female sex from a legal, religious, and social point is disgracefully low, the women, in spite of their physical weakness, are not quite unable to influence the men, and even to make their husbands tremble. They have in their hands a weapon, which is invisible to the superficial observer, but which is powerful enough to give them a secret authority which may be very considerable. They have their curses, and they have their profound knowledge of magic. Being commonly invested with a certain mystery, they are supposed to have the command of mysterious magic powers. It is said in the Laws of Manu, the mythical legislator of the Hindus, that a man ought to be kind to the women of his house, because otherwise they may burn the whole house with their fury, that is, with their curses. And during my stay among the country people of Morocco, Arabs and Berbers alike, I was often struck by the fear which the women inspired in the men. A woman is looked upon by them as quite a dangerous being. First, a man may be sure that, if he maltreats his wife, she will have the support of the other women of the village, whereas he himself will not be equally supported by the other men. But the chief danger is of a supernatural kind. For instance, the wife only needs to cut a little piece of donkey's ear and put it into the husband's food. What happens? By eating the little piece the husband will, in his relations to his wife, become just like a donkey; he will always listen to what she says, and the wife will become the ruler of the house. It is better, therefore, to treat her with kindness than to provoke her anger. In Mohammedan countries married women also derive much influence from the children's affection for their mother. We must not look upon the Oriental woman only as a wife; we must also take into account her position as a mother. The Berbers of the Atlas have a saying—attributed to their great sage, Sidi Hammu—which indicates the feelings of the men both

toward women in general and toward their mothers. Sidi Hammu said: "Oh you women, you seed of the oleander tree, I should like to burn all of you, if my mother were not one of you."

3. *Why Women Are So*[1]

When, in the course of time, sexual reproduction eventuated in a mammalian type, with greater intimacy between mother and offspring and a longer period of dependence of offspring on the mother, the function of the male in assisting the female became social as well as biological; and this was preeminently so in the case of man, because of the preeminent helplessness of the human child. The characteristic helplessness of the child, which at first thought appears to be a disadvantage, is in fact the source of human superiority, since the design of nature in providing this condition of helplessness is to afford a lapse of time sufficient for the growth of the very complex mechanism, the human brain, which, along with free hands, is the medium through which man begins that reaction on his environment—inventing, exterminating, cultivating, domesticating, organizing—which ends in his supremacy.

It is plain, therefore, that species in which growth is slow are at an advantage, if to the care and nourishment of the female are added the providence and protection of the male; and this is especially true in mankind, where growth is not completed for a long period of years. In this connection we have an explanation of the alleged greater variability of the male. Instead of an insignificant addendum to the reproductive process, he becomes larger than the female, masterful, jealous, a fighting specialization—still an attaché of the female, but now a defender and provider. This is the general condition among mammals; and among mankind the longer dependence of children results in a correspondingly lengthened and intimate association of the parents, which we denominate marriage. For Westermarck is quite right in his view that children are not the result of marriage, but marriage is the result of children. From this point of view marriage is a union favored by the scheme of nature because it is favorable to the rearing and training of children, and the groups practicing marriage, or its animal analogue, have the best chance of survival.

But the evolution of a courageous and offensive disposition had naturally not resulted in an eminently domestic disposition. Man did the hunting and fighting. He was attached to the woman, but he was not steady. He did not stay at home. The woman and the child were the core of society, the fixed point, the point to which man came back. There consequently grew up a sort of dual society and dual activity. Man represented the more violent and spasmodic activities, involving

[1] Adapted from THOMAS, W. I., The Adventitious Character of Woman, *Am. Jour. Sociology*, vol. 12, pp. 33–41, July, 1906.

motion and skillful coordinations, as well as organization for hunting and fighting; while woman carried on the steady, settled life. She was not able to wander readily from a fixed point, on account of her children; and, indeed, her physical organization fitted her for endurance rather than movement. Consequently her attention was turned to industries, since these were compatible with settled and stationary habits. Agriculture, pottery, weaving, tanning, and all the industrial processes involved in working up the by-products of the chase were developed by her. She seems to have been the first to domesticate animals—beginning, perhaps, with man. She built her house, and it was hers. She did not go to her husband's group after marriage. The child was hers, and remained a member of her group. The germ of social organization was, indeed, the woman and her children and her children's children. The old women were the heads of civil society, though the men had developed a fighting organization and technique which eventually swallowed them up.

From the standpoint of physical force, man was the master, and was often brutal enough. But woman led an independent life, to some extent. She was, if not economically independent, at least economically creative, and she enjoyed the great advantage of being less definitely interested in man than he was in her. For while woman is more deeply involved physiologically in the reproductive life than man, she is apparently less involved from the standpoint of immediate stimulus, or her interest is less acute in consciousness. The excess activity which characterizes man in his relation to the general environment holds also for his attitude toward woman. Not only is the male the wooer among the higher orders of animals and among men, but he has developed all the accessories for attracting attention—in the animals, plumage, color, voice, and graceful and surprising forms of motion; and in man, ornament and courageous action. For primitive man, like the male animal, was distinguished by ornament.

Up to this time the relation of man to woman was the natural development of a relation calculated to secure the best results for the species. His predacious disposition had been, in part at least, developed in the service of woman and her child, and he was emotionally dependent on her to such a degree that he used all the arts of attraction at his command to secure a relation with her. In the course of time, however, an important change took place in environment conditions. While woman had been doing the general work and had developed the beginnings of many industries, man had become a specialist along another line. His occupation had been almost exclusively the pursuit of animals or conflict with his neighbors, and in this connection he had become an inventor of weapons and traps, and in addition had learned the value of acting in concert with his companions. But a hunting life cannot last forever; and when large game began to be exhausted, man found himself forced to abandon his

destructive and predacious activities, and adopt the settled occupations of woman. To these he brought all the inventive technique and capacity for organized action which he had developed in his hunting and fighting life, with the result that he became the master of woman in a new sense. Not suddenly, but in the course of time, he usurped her primacy in the industrial pursuits, and through his organization of industry and the application of invention to the industrial processes became a creator of wealth on a scale before unknown. Gradually also he began to rely not altogether on ornament, exploits, and trophies to get the attention and favor of woman. When she was reduced to a condition of dependency on his activity, wooing became a less formidable matter, and he even began to negotiate for her and purchase her from her male kindred. In unadvanced stages of society, where machinery and the division of labor and a high degree of organization in industry have not been introduced, and even among our own lower classes, woman still retains a relation to industrial activities and has a relatively independent status. Among the Indians of this country it was recognized that a man could not become wealthy except through the possession of a sufficient number of wives to work up for trade the products of the chase; and today the West African youth does not seek a young woman in marriage but an old one, preferably a widow, who knows all about the arts of preparing and adulterating rubber. Among peasants, also, and plain people, the proverb recognizes that the "gray mare is the better horse." The heavy, strong, enduring, patient, often dominant type frequently seen among the lower classes, where alone woman is still economically functional, is probably a good representative of what the women of our race were before they were reduced by man to a condition of parasitism which, in our middle and so-called "higher" classes, has profoundly affected their physical, mental, and moral life.

On the moral side, particularly, man's disposition to bend the situation to his pleasure placed woman in a hard position and resulted in the distortion of her nature, or rather in bringing to the front elemental traits which under our moral code are not reckoned the best. In the animal world the female is noted for her indirection. On account of the necessity of protecting her young, she is cautious and cunning, and in contrast with the open and pugnacious methods of the more untrammeled male, she relies on sober colors, concealment, evasion, and deception of the senses. This quality of cunning is, of course, not immoral in its origin, being merely a protective instinct developed along with maternal feeling. In woman, also, this tendency to prevail by passive means rather than by assault is natural; and especially under a system of male control, where self-realization is secured either through the manipulation of man or not at all, a resort to trickery, indirection, and hypocrisy is not to be wondered at. Man has, however, always insisted that woman shall

be better than he is, and her immoralities are usually not such as he greatly disapproves. There has, in fact, been developed a peculiar code of morals to cover the peculiar case of woman. This may be called a morality of the person and of the bodily habits, as contrasted with the commercial and public morality of man. Purity, constancy, reserve, and devotion are the qualities in woman which please and flatter the jealous male; and woman has responded to these demands both really and seemingly. Without any consciousness of what she was doing (for all moral traditions fall in the general psychological region of habit), she acts in the manner which makes her most pleasing to men. And—always with the rather definite realization before her of what a dreadful thing it is to be an old maid—she has naïvely insisted that her sisters shall play well within the game, and has become herself the most strict censor of that morality which has become traditionally associated with woman. Fearing the obloquy which the world attaches to a bad woman, she throws the first stone at any woman who bids for the favor of men by overstepping the modesty of nature. Morality, in the most general sense, represents the code under which activities are best carried on, and is worked out in the school of experience. It is preeminently an adult and a male system, and men are intelligent enough to recognize that neither women nor children have passed through this school. It is on this account that, while man is merciless to woman from the standpoint of personal behavior, he exempts her from anything in the way of contractual morality, or views her defections in this regard with allowance and even with amusement.

In the absence of any participation in commercial activity, and with no capital but her personal charms and her wits, and with the possibility of realizing on these only through a successful appeal to man, woman naturally puts her best foot first. It was, of course, always one of the functions of the female to charm the male; but so long as woman maintained her position of economic usefulness and her quasi independence she had no great problem, for there was never a chance in primitive society, any more than in animal society, that a woman would go unmated. But when through man's economic and social organization, and the male initiative, she became dependent, and when in consequence he began to pick and choose with a degree of fastidiousness, and when the less charming women were not married—especially when invidious distinctions arose between the wed and unwed, and the desirably wed and the undesirably wed, woman had to charm for her life; and she not only employed the passive arts innate with her sex, but flashed forth in all the glitter which had been one of man's accessories in courtship, but which he had dispensed with when the superiority acquired through occupational pursuits enabled him to do so. Under a new stimulation to be attractive, and with the addition of ornament to the repertory of

her charms, woman has assumed an almost aggressive attitude toward courtship. The means of attraction she employs are so highly elaborated, and her technique is so finished, that she is really more active in courtship than man. We speak of the man as the wooer, but falling in love is really mediated by the woman. By dress, behavior, coquetry, modesty, reserve, and occasional boldness she gains the attention of man and infatuates him. He does the courting, but she controls the process. *Er glaubt zu schieben, und er wird geschoben.*

The condition of limited stimulation, also, in which woman finds herself as a result of the control by man of wealth, of affairs, of the substantial interests of society, and even of her own personality, leads woman to devote herself to display as an interest in itself, regardless of its effect on men. In doing this she is really falling back on an instinct. One of the most powerful stimulations to either sex is glitter, in the most general sense, and the interest in showing off begins in the coloration and plumage of animals, and continues as ornament in the human species. It is true that the wooing connotation of ornament was originally its most important one, and that it was characteristic of man in particular; but woman has generalized it as an interest, and as a means of self-realization. She seeks it as a means of charming men, of outdoing other women, and as an artistic interest; and her attention often takes that direction to such a degree that its acquisition means satisfaction and its lack discontent. Sometimes, indeed, when a woman is married and knows that she is "sped," she drops the display pose altogether, tends to lose herself in household interests, and to become a slattern. On the other hand, she often makes marriage the occasion of display on a more elaborate scale, and is pitiless in her demands for the means to this. A glance at the windows of our great stores shows that men have organized their business in a full appreciation of these facts. Dressing, indeed, becomes a competitive game with women, and since their opponents and severest critics are women, it turns out curiously enough that they dress even more with reference to the opinion of women than for men.

> The land hath bubbles as the water has,
> And these are of them.

It would, of course, be absurd to censure woman too greatly for these frailties, and it would be very unjust to imply that all women share them. Some women, in adapting themselves to the situation, follow, apparently, a bent acquired in connection with the maternal instinct, and become true and devoted and grand to a degree hardly known by man. Others, follow a bent gotten along with coquetry in connection with the wooing instinct, and having no activity through which their behavior is standardized, become difficile, unreal, inefficient, exacting, unsatisfied, absurd. And we have also the paradox that the same woman can be the two things

at different times. There is therefore a basis of truth in Pope's hard saying that "Women have no characters at all." Because their problem is not to accommodate to the solid realities of the world of experience and sense, but to adjust themselves to the personality of men, it is not surprising that they should assume protean shapes.

Moreover, man is so affected by the charms of woman, and offers so easy a mark for her machinations, as to invite exploitation. Having been evolved largely through the stimulus of the female presence, he continues to be more profoundly affected by her presence and behavior than by any other stimulus whatever, unless it be the various forms of combat. From Sampson and Odysseus down, history and story recognize the ease and frequency with which a woman makes a fool of a man. The male protective and sentimental attitude is indeed incompatible with resistance. To charm, pursue, court, and possess the female involve a train of memories which color all afterrelations with the whole sex. In both animals and men there is an instinctive disposition to endure a great deal from the female. The male animal takes the assault of the female complacently and shamefacedly, "just like folks." Peasants laugh at the hysterical outbreaks of their women, and the "bold bad man" is as likely to be henpecked as any other. Woman is a disturbing element in business and in school to a degree not usually apprehended. In her presence a man instinctively assumes a different attitude. He is, in fact, so susceptible as seemingly, almost, to want to be victimized, and, as Locke expressed the matter, "It is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving wherein men find pleasure to be deceived."

This disposition of men and the detached condition of women have much to do with the emergence of the adventuress and the sporting woman. Human nature was made for action, and perhaps the most distressing and disconcerting situation which confronts it is to be played on by stimulations without the ability to function. The mere superinducing of passivity, as in the extreme case of solitary confinement, is sufficient to produce insanity; and the emotion of dread, or passive fear, is said to be the most painful of emotions, because there is no possibility of relief by action. Modern woman is in a similar condition of constraint and unrest, which produces organic ravages for which no luxury can compensate. The general ill health of girls of the better classes, and the equally general post-matrimonial breakdown, are probably due largely to the fact that the nervous organization demands more normal stimulations and reactions than are supplied. The American woman of the better classes has superior rights and no duties, and yet she is worrying herself to death—not over specific troubles, but because she has lost her connection with reality. Many women, more intelligent and energetic than their husbands and brothers, have no more serious occupations than to play the house cat, with or without ornament. It is

a wonder that more of them do not lose their minds; and that more of them do not break with the system entirely is due solely to the inhibitive effects of early habit and suggestion.

4. *The Effect of Changing Economic Conditions upon Women*[1]

It has become the fashion for writers discoursing on the social problems of our times to attribute the very evident difficulties and dissatisfaction in modern marriage to women's growing capacity as wage earners, and to their interest in occupations and activities, gainful or otherwise, outside the home. Such an explanation entirely ignores the fact that the notion of considering woman's special activities to be limited entirely to the domestic routine and to the social graces has had a very brief existence in the history of European civilization. The period just passing, in which married women were solely occupied in the unproductive labor of the home or else, if wealthy, lived completely idle lives of ease and social pleasures, having no contact with their husbands' business affairs, dates only from the late seventeenth century, the Restoration period in England.

Prior to that time, the domestic drudgery, the cooking, cleaning, mending, looking after the children, was performed by the unmarried girls and even the young men apprentices in the family business were often partly occupied in the routine domestic work of the household. The wife was left free to take her responsible share in the family industry. Even among the upper classes, the women were busily occupied in the management of affairs and often carried on the husband's business during long absences, or concerned themselves with the affairs of their estates and even of government. The hardy, vigorous women of the Elizabethan period were fully occupied in productive labor, performing their share in all that concerned the welfare of the family.

If the profound changes that occur in human society can be accounted for solely by surface movements, then it would be nearer the explanation of modern marriage difficulties to say that the seeds of these difficulties were sown when men began to go outside the home for their occupations and interests. It is only about three hundred years ago that the development of modern industrialism began to draw men into the class of wage earners and to make it necessary for them to pursue their labor on the premises of the capitalist. Before that time all business and industry were carried on in the home. The workshop or accounting room was an adjunct of the home, and man's business was a family affair in which the wife was as actively occupied as was the husband. In the highly organized craft guilds as late as the seventeenth century, wives were rated as their husbands' partners; they were members of the guilds and recognized

[1] Adapted from HINKLE, BEATRICE M., Changing Marriage, A By-product of Industrialism, *Survey*, vol. 57, pp. 286–289, December, 1926.

as possessing the right to work in that craft or business. On the husband's death the business was inherited and carried on not by the son but by the wife.

A study of the records of the later sixteenth century, the Elizabethan period, and on into the eighteenth century, reveals an attitude respecting woman's labor far different from that of the nineteenth century. There was no talk of woman's place in the home, nor was labor given a gender. No form of work was claimed particularly by men as their special prerogative and therefore closed to women by reason of their sex. In that period all work of whatever sort was woman's work as long as she was willing and able to do it. We read in the records the names of women in the carpenter trade, the mason's guild and other building crafts. They were largely represented in the textile industries; they were printers and book publishers; the retail shops were to a great extent in their hands. and in agriculture they worked equally with men. The fact that all business was conducted as a family enterprise rendered the labor of the wife and often the children an important and necessary part of the whole. Consequently, although the wife legally had no separate existence apart from her husband, she partook equally in the conduct of their affairs and contributed her full share to the economic life of the family. Practically all adult women were married and the questions that trouble the individual today hardly appear to have existed at that period.

The fact is that when the efforts and interests of two or more people are focused upon a common object, in this case the family welfare, there tends to be developed through mutual dependence and the help each contributes to the other, the strongest bond of which man is capable. That is why the early Puritan marriages of our country seemed more satisfactory and permanent, in spite of the hardships of those times, than the marriages of today, for there existed a mutual need of one for the other during the pioneer days, and the conception of individual happiness and well-being as an important factor apart from the family, scarcely existed.

With the development of capitalistic organization the individual gradually became the important factor in labor, displacing the former concept of the family as the unit, and in the general upheaval produced by the industrial revolution the women were left behind . . . Education played an important part, but no provision was made for women to be educated or specially trained to meet the new conditions. They were simply forgotten or disregarded. Their own skill was of a practical common-sense sort, with experience as their chief contribution instead of technical knowledge. This was entirely adequate when the business was conducted in connection with the home and the wife added her abilities to the common fund, but under the new conditions there was no place for her.

Thus began the separation of husband and wife as business partners and instead of a common work in which each participated for their mutual benefit, they were henceforth to travel separate ways.

The idea that men should support their wives and families commenced to gain ground, for prior to the seventeenth century and even during that period, this conception did not exist. Marriage in this earlier period was a condition that added to a man's economic welfare instead of being a burden upon it as has existed so markedly in our time.

In various fields, bit by bit, work which formerly belonged exclusively to women was taken away from them. An example of what was happening in general can be shown by what occurred in a particular profession belonging by long custom and general concensus of opinion to women. Midwifery had always been in the hands of women until in seventeenth-century England it attracted the particular attention of men, physicians and surgeons. It was introduced as a special study into the university, and forthwith a law passed that no one could practice midwifery without having taken the course and received a degree from the university. But women were not admitted to the university! Therefore, in one stroke their ancient calling was to be taken away from them without redress. Even the domestic industries with which women had occupied themselves inside the home, all the ancient tasks concerned with the providing of food and clothing for the family needs, began to pass into the clutches of industrialism.

When the man prospered and wealth grew, the wife was relieved of all economic responsibility. She became the spender instead of the producer and slipped easily into the rôle of a dependent, living a life of ease and pleasure.

This unequal division of labor, by which women were shut away from contact with their husbands' activities and limited to unproductive domestic toil or else to lives of ease and idleness, served to widen the breach between the sexes. An artificial standard was set up which ruled that there were certain God-appointed laws determining the proper sphere of woman, and that her interests and capacities were of a totally different character from those of men and belonged wholly to the domestic life. This convention and habit of life grew and became crystallized; women became more dependent and helpless until there was fully inaugurated the tradition of the nineteenth century that woman's place was in the home, regardless of the condition of the home; and that any effort on her part to help herself and her children, either through education or gainful occupations, was imitating men and a reflection on her sex.

Women passed from an important life—overburdened, it is true, with the greatest responsibilities and creative toil added to heavy child-bearing, but nevertheless fully satisfying all their powers—to a new

cultural condition in which they were limited to the most uninteresting form of routine domestic work. From this drudgery they hoped to escape as soon as possible into the ranks of the idle and pleasure loving. Thus began the era of the parasitic or kept woman.

The capable happily occupied wife of the earlier centuries became completely displaced and the delicate clinging-vine type took her place as the ideal to be achieved. The peak of this absurdity was reached when in the early Victorian period the desirable type of femininity was the ethereal, fainting, weak, and helpless woman who clung to the man to protect and care for her. In psychological language one can call this manifestation nothing less than a great regression on the part of collective woman begun when man entered upon the new industrial era and she remained behind. While man was marching toward an intenser individualism, woman was sinking back into a deeper collectivism, held in the grip of a tradition making for irresponsibility and weakness. Thus there took place a complete reversal of the cultural ideals and customs of the former centuries with regard to women.

In our own country, all these great cultural changes which took several hundreds of years to effect in England, were passed through very rapidly. Owing to the primitive condition of life in America, all phases were experienced briefly in rather extreme forms. Before any one attitude could become too firmly organized, however, the next condition was upon us. This accounts for the increasing freedom and opportunity which women enjoy in this country and also for the greater individualism manifested among American women.

However, in general terms it has taken nearly two hundred years for women to follow the example of men in their exodus out of the home into the business world and to demand their right to a place in this domain on equal terms with them. Now again, after the long period of exclusion from the world of industry, women are resuming their former position by entering into all kinds of industrial and general business activity.

It must not be ignored that now, as always, economic necessity and business needs have operated in the greatest degree to bring the modern situation to pass, and not solely the efforts of women themselves. Further, women have become as indispensable to the business life of the present as they were to the life of the Elizabethan period. Think what would happen if in New York City alone, all the women employed outside the home should suddenly decide to remain in the home. The problem we need to examine is not whether in order to save marriage, women must be returned to their homes, for that suggestion is purely academic; they will not go back but will continue to take their position in increasing numbers as responsible persons in all that concerns their economic and social life.

The real question is, what effect is this activity producing on women and how can marriage be adapted to the new conditions and attitudes developing from it?

We must recognize that although it is no new thing for women to contribute their share in industry to the family upkeep, a great difference does exist between wives and husbands working together in industries carried on in the home and women leaving home to work independently for themselves as men have done, or to assist the family by work entirely apart from that of their husbands. Actually it appears to be the final action needed to complete the destruction of the old conception of the family as the unit—a conception abandoned long ago by the men when the capitalistic system replaced family industry, and only held tenaciously by women as long as they were unable to partake in the new individualistic methods.

Those who imagine that the difficulties of marriage, so obvious today, are a modern phenomenon and that they can be explained by the activity and unrest of the modern woman, are mistaking an effect for a cause. As long as the fact continues to be ignored that monogamous marriage is a great human problem quite unsolved as far as individual happiness and satisfaction are concerned, little of value will be contributed by present-day discussions.

Merely because society chose to be blind and deaf to the actual status of marriage as it affected both men and women, the unsatisfactory situation was not thereby rendered non-existent. To be sure, its greatest hardships have been borne by women who, because of their numerous children, their legal infirmities, and their mostly inarticulate and non-self-conscious state, were dependent and helpless. That is the reason perhaps that now, on account of their new-found consciousness of themselves and their dawning individualism, women appear to be the active agents in the modern disruption of marriage.

Under the social conditions from which we are just emerging, marriage inevitably grew to be regarded by women as a means of livelihood. It is quite impossible to estimate the number of marriages held together and endured in the past by reason of the social demand or because of the economic dependence of the women and children upon the man.

Men have never pretended that monogamous marriage was for them a satisfactory condition. It was a social status that had to be accepted, but both by favoring laws and by individual action it was made to interfere as little as possible with the husband's desires and privileges.

Modern industrialism has produced a condition which has allowed the situation to come to the surface and be rendered articulate. It has given large numbers of women an opportunity to become independent of men and marriage as a means of livelihood. Marriage as a means

of support has lost in popularity immensely since women discovered they are capable of supporting themselves at less cost to their self-respect. It has changed the significance of marriage itself.

Formerly the major purpose of marriage was to provide suitable conditions for the production and rearing of children. The family was the important factor just as it is to the birds that mate to reproduce themselves and build their nests to provide a place for their offspring. Large families were an asset and marriage was little concerned with the individual happiness of its members. In industrial society today large families are no longer an asset but a debit. The problem of nations now is how to limit the growth of population instead of to increase it. Therefore the founding of a family is not the dominant purpose of marriage today. Instead it is the personal satisfaction and completion of the individuals concerned.

These changed conditions have served to force the individualistic attitude upon the women, for one of the greatest effects on women of labor outside the home is to render them more conscious of themselves, and to awaken them to a sharper realization of their own outline. From an intensely personal and subjective attitude, entirely absorbed in the family, which has been characteristic of women's psychology, they have been forced by the demands of modern industry to a more objective and impersonal state.

It is safe to say that those who have done most for the growth of industrialism had no realization of the by-product which would arise from its development—the beginning of the awakening and individualization of women, the first step in emancipation from their age-long psychic bondage.

It is this change in women that is affecting marriage so profoundly. It is practically impossible to create a satisfactory adult relationship when one person is entirely dependent upon the other, and that other is forced to carry the sole economic responsibility for the lives of both as well as of the family. Neither is it possible for people to give much thought to relationships when they are consumed by endless toil to obtain the necessities of life. Mutual responsibility and mutual consideration are the necessary basis for any relationship, and the marriage relation is no exception.

For the first time in the history of mankind the economic condition is such that both men and women can consider their individual happiness and welfare as superior to the maintenance of the institution. Actually, what we are witnessing today is the diminution of the value and power of the institution as such, and in its place, the demand on the part of the individuals for a personally satisfying life. The great problem is, how is this to be brought about?

5. *Women and Work*[1]

How much truth are the women telling in their biographies? At best biographies reveal mainly superficialities. It is curious that human beings know so little about themselves. We almost never tear ourselves apart to see how the parts work together. It is so much easier to tear other people apart. We learn from infancy to lay blame for failure upon parents, home life, associates, early economic conditions. If we win through it must be because of some innate, instinctive virtue in us that will not be downed by adversity. This all comes out in the biographies. One is struck by the failure on the part of almost all of the women to pay tribute to the very adversities of the environment. Nearly all of them actually quarreled with it—magnified its hardships. "What rot," says the behaviorist who believes that all individuals are made, not born, "the very sorrows and tribulations these women passed through were the conditioning stimuli which forced them on their way." Probably under what they would have considered a favorable environment most of them would have reached the age of fatness and forty and never been heard of—I speak freely, since I know none of the ladies.

The second thing that strikes one about these brief life histories is that the women were all restless—seeking something. What were they striving for—happiness? No, happiness apparently has gone out of fashion, it is not a present-day desideratum. We ask people today how many cars they have, whether they live in the town or the country or both, whether they play golf, tennis, or bridge, but we never ask whether they are happy or not. I doubt if very many children or adults today would understand what you meant if you did ask them, and I insist that happiness can be defined objectively in behavior terms, that it is a mode of behavior. These women were too modern to seek happiness; they sought what? Freedom. So many hundreds of women I have talked to have sought freedom. I have tried to find out diplomatically but behavioristically what they mean. Is it to wear trousers? Is it to vote; to hold office; to work at men's trades; to take men's jobs away from them; to get men's salaries? Does their demand for this mystical thing called "freedom" imply a resentment against childbearing—a resentment against the fact that men's sex behavior is different from women's (but not so much any more)? I rarely arrive at a reasonable answer. The analysts claim that they can by psychoanalysis get at the truth about women. I make no such rash claim. I can read women only after making careful observations of their behavior over long periods of time. Then I put two and two together like any other scientist. When a woman is a militant suffragist the chances are, shall we say, a hundred to one that her sex life is not well adjusted? Marriage as such brings

[1] WATSON, JOHN B., The Weakness of Women, *Nation*, vol. 125, pp. 9, 10, July, 1927.

adjustment in only approximately 20 per cent of all cases, so poorly have men and women been taught about sex. Among the 20 per cent who find adjustment I find no militant women, I find no women shouting about their rights to some fanciful career that men—the brutes—have robbed them of. They work—they work like a man (than which nothing better can be said about work)—they often quietly achieve careers. Most of the terrible women one must meet, women with the blatant views and voices, women who have to be noticed, who shoulder one about, who can't take life quietly, belong to this large percentage of women who have never made a sex adjustment.

The biographies as a whole strikingly confirm the view that militancy passes as soon as the woman, by the trial and error process, finds sex adjustment. Then they cease to hunt for freedom, they lose themselves in their work. Surely the only freedom worth striving for is complete engrossment in activity, be that activity writing a play, washing infant's clothes, or losing oneself in the sway of passion.

The great weakness of women (who seek careers) is that they have never been trained to work like men. I mean trained so from infancy. Men are brought up in the tradition that men must work. They get it in their youth in gang activities and later in sports. They learn from boyhood that they must support their families and that to do so they must establish technique for work—habits of work—and that they must endure fatigue to harden their muscles; they must learn to do everything well enough to compete. They are trained in their infancy in habits of manipulation; women are not. They used to be in the fine art of needlework—only look at the samplers of the eight- to twelve-year-olds. They were trained to weave and spin and cook and make their own dresses. Then the fashion changed—women had to be ladies, pretty ornaments. Their sphere was in the home. Now the picture is changing again. Mothers are beginning to train their girls in habits of manipulation. Women's customs have changed so rapidly that work traditions have never had a chance to soak in. Hence few women have achieved greatness.

I have never believed that there were any insuperable difficulties which keep women from succeeding. They have strength enough to paint, yet there has never been a great woman painter. They have strength enough to play the violin, and yet there has never been a great woman violinist. They have endurance and strength enough to become great scientists, and yet one can count on fewer than the fingers of one hand the women scientists who have achieved real greatness. During the past thirty years thousands of women have taken the degree of Ph.D. and yet scarcely a dozen have come to the front.

Not being trained from infancy to the tradition of incessant manipulative work they drop out of the race as soon as they get comfortable.

Marriage is usually the shady spot that causes them to lie down and rest. And when they fail in that, as 80 per cent do, restlessness again sets in, but now it is too late to go back and take up the threads of the old career. Most women who had aspirations for a career have tried to eat their cake and have it too. A career is a jealous all-consuming taskmaster.

Marriage as such should be no barrier to a career. Apartment hotels, which can be found in every town where a woman could have a career, have freed married women without children almost completely. The having of children is almost an insuperable barrier to a career. The rearing of children and the running of a home for them is a profession second to none in its demands for technique.

The behavioristic moral—and we must have morals—is: Women do not like to work (neither do men). There is no natural "instinct" to work. Biologically speaking the hungry animal reaches up and pulls down a banana, reaches out and grasps his female (*or vice versa*); his hunger adjusted, he rests and sleeps. Work habits are the result of civilization and competition. If you want your children to have careers, be they boys or girls, teach them from infancy habits of manipulation, skillful technique, endurance. Work must become "first nature"; "second nature" is not enough. And along with it teach them (or have them taught if you are a Puritan) what to expect in the realm of sex.

6. *Marriage and Careers*[1]

It has been said very often in the last few years that it is undesirable for the educated men and women of America to have small families of children, while the less educated part of the population, with perhaps more limited natural endowments, and certainly lower standards of living, were having families two or three times the size. The responsibility for the smaller sized family has often been laid at the door of the educated woman herself, who has been accused of failing to see her social obligation and of declining to marry, or if she did marry, of refusing to do her part in bearing and rearing a sufficient number of children.

This present article is not concerned with the truth of the above assertions. In fact, for the sake of the argument, we shall take for granted that they are true. Namely, that the families of educated people are smaller than is desirable in proportion to the families of men and women of lower standards. Also, we shall take for granted that the social condition of the modern woman has some influence on this state of affairs, and that maternity is often set aside by her for some other activity which, for some reason or other, seems more desirable. We are neither

[1] Adapted from WEMBRIDGE, ELEANOR ROWLAND, The Professional Education of Women and the Family Problem, *Jour. Social Hygiene*, vol. 6, pp. 181–193, April, 1920.

concerned with arguing these premises, nor with attacking or defending the state of mind which makes them true. It is merely our object to explain, from conversations with many women on the subject, why they feel as they do on the matter, and to make an attempt to suggest a way out.

Apparently, it is not enough to exhort women to change their point of view. The mass of educated women, which is increasing year by year, is by no means an unconscientious group. They do not need exhortation but an intelligent understanding of their problem. Such understanding alone can bring about a reorganization of public opinion which will make possible the adaptation of families to the new conditions of American life.

What is the situation of the modern educated woman? By "educated" I mean the woman who has had college training, or its equivalent; the woman from the technical school, the art school, the business college, the normal school, and institutions of all kinds, whether strictly vocational or otherwise. Any one who has kept in touch with women's colleges in the last few years knows that an increasing stress is being put upon training girls of all economic levels for "jobs." It is not alone the girls who *must* earn their living, but the girls who do not *need* to, who are demanding training that will fit them for an independent life. The war has only accentuated this tendency. Work in the War Department consisting of the selection of women for educational service in hospitals, and later experience with a large organization dealing with young women and girls, has only more strongly impressed on me the conclusion of previous years, that the girl of the present century looks upon the ability to take care of herself, in at least one respect, exactly as does her brother; namely, that she wants to be able to earn her own living, and to earn it well. Moreover, every educational movement influences her in the same direction. Every girls' college has vocational experts come and outline this and that profession or business, and fellowships for advanced study naturally rouse the ambition of the woman who receives them, to make good, and to be a credit to her college.

The outcome is that every year more trained women are being turned out upon the world, able to earn their own living, eager for an independent life with some goal ahead toward which they can aim. What shall this goal be? Marriage should be her goal, is the prompt answer of one group. Expertness in her vocation, is another. An expert job, but a willingness to drop it at once if she is able to marry, is still another. Choose early whether you will marry or not marry; then train deliberately for one future or the other, is a fourth. Every one of these types of advice has been acted upon by women of my own acquaintance. To my mind, every one of them has fatal drawbacks, which furnish at least a partial reason why the family is in its present state.

The difficulty with the first advice is twofold. There is no self-respecting way that a woman can have marriage as a goal, even if she wanted it to be. Women of the type who make it their goal, or mothers who devote their lives to marrying off their daughters, are still, as they always have been, ridiculous. Moreover, there is no way to educate for marriage. That women should know the rudiments of housekeeping, cooking, sewing, budget making, expense accounts, adult and child hygiene, careful buying, and wise investing is very true, but it holds true whether she marries or not. She must live in any case, and she will need most of this knowledge if she keeps house with her parents, or with a woman friend, as well as if she lives with a husband. In the latter case, as in the former, the amount of time that she will have to spend handling this domestic problem with her own hands depends very largely on the income. To be an adequate mother to her children, it is quite as necessary, perhaps, that she have sufficient training in psychology and sociology to guide their adolescent years as it is that she know physiology enough to handle certain of the physical hygiene problems of their babyhood. What then is the specific education for marriage, and if there were such, is there any certainty that the woman who has been so trained will marry? On the contrary, in certain sections of the country it is arithmetically certain that many women will not and can not, because there are not enough men to marry. And more than that, the modern woman is inclined to be a romantic person. She insists upon falling in love before she marries. Now the emotional fact of falling in love is like the wind—"it bloweth where it listeth." It is perfectly possible, as in Heine's poem, for the "palm tree and pine" to be forever prevented from meeting each other. If she does not meet the man she loves, the modern educated woman, as I have known her, absolutely refuses to marry any one. If she does meet him, she marries him just as women have always done.

As for choosing deliberately at an early age whether you are to marry or not, it is to my mind absolutely out of the question. It all depends! On the other hand, to learn any professional job well while constantly arguing with oneself, why bother, perhaps I shall never have to earn my own living, is fatal to any workman-like results. One must do one's work, and find the work where one can express oneself, just the same whether one is a man or a woman. Therefore many women are now refusing to accept any of the advice suggested above, and are trying out a new scheme altogether. Moreover they are not trying it in order to avoid marriage or childbearing. They are trying it as the only method that has not been tried of meeting a new situation.

No woman knows whether she will marry or not. Every thoughtful woman wants training for economic independence if she does not marry. Having had the training and the skill to support herself and do a good

piece of work which society needs, it has occurred to her to keep on doing it married as well as unmarried. The actual situation is that despite all the stories of men made rich by the war, the average educated business or professional man (which is the kind that the average educated woman marries) has not been made rich by the war. On the contrary, he has become steadily poorer. It is not only perfectly possible, but even usual for gifted, well-trained men to find it very difficult to meet the present cost of living and support a wife and family. It is so difficult in fact, that frequently they cannot afford to do it unless the wife brings something to the task besides her work in the home. In the old days it was a dowry. We have outgrown that system, and the high-spirited men and women of today would both resent a return to it. More than that, no man likes to suggest that his wife be a wage earner as well as himself. He probably never would suggest it. He would prefer not to marry. But the woman of today is herself suggesting it, not from his point of view but from her own.

Why should I cease to be economically independent and useful, and give up all the skill I have been at so much pains to learn, just because I marry? Is there any possibility of women's work ever being taken seriously, unless trained women use their mature experience to carry out, after marriage as well as before, the work which needs to be done in society, and which without them is not done, or is poorly done?

Is there any real reason then why women, married or unmarried, cannot or should not carry on the professional ideals which are so enthusiastically preached to them in their college days? Is there any reason why their husbands should not welcome this frank partnership in social ideals and in wage earning? If it was not a hindrance to their love in courtship, is there any reason why it should be such in their married life? On the contrary, would they not have added interest in life, and be able to marry sooner, and live more comfortably because both of them have a vocational as well as a family life, and an increased rather than a diminished income? Moreover is there any possibility of raising the level of women's work until the emotional demands of the professional woman on the one hand, and the professional skill of the well-trained, happily married woman on the other, are both united and utilized in a social order which welcomes the skilled help of all women and not merely that of the immature girl before her marriage, or of the more mature woman only as long as she will sacrifice all intention of marriage?

We are speaking now of the well-trained woman, who has had the opportunity to earn her living, who has professional ambition to improve her skill, and who is of definite value to society in the sense that she is doing something that very much needs to be done. However few there may be of such women, relative to the whole population, there are more of

them being turned out of the colleges and technical schools every year, and the number is increasing so rapidly that it represents not only a growing army, but one whose growth is stimulated by every device of technical, vocational, and professional training and advice. This is a condition and not a theory!

I do not think that any solution is ever arrived at by trying to avoid an issue. There is no royal road to learning, to skill, or to expert opinion. If a woman is to be a good teacher, lawyer, business woman, dietitian, nurse, administrator of any undertaking, she has got to know her business, stick to it, and be interested in promoting it. If she has her mind perpetually on some other thing, whether marriage or anything else, she will be second rate or worse. Because she has heretofore so often had her mind on something else, she has supplied so much of the unskilled and underpaid labor of the world. On the other hand, when she applies her mind absolutely to her job, she is accused of preferring her work to marriage. Why should she have to choose? Why cannot she have both? Could men face any such alternative?

Suppose that we accept the full implications of the modern education of women, and foresee a future when women shall be exactly as well educated as men, as interested in their work, as well paid, and when the administration of the more important professional undertakings is in the hands of the best-trained people, regardless of whether they are men or women, married or unmarried. There is no doubt that such a state of society is exactly what the higher education of women is heading for, and that unless it is possible to combine it with marriage, women are being continually trained for something that they cannot do, or else there will be a segregated class of educated women unhappily trying to combine what can never be combined.

Let us admit that this new race of women has the highest ambition, that the money they earn is in no sense "pin money," but their income, the legitimate price of high-grade work, that they come to marriage with heads or hands as skilled as those of their husbands, and that their work is as valuable to society. Moreover, they are not anxious to work after marriage, just for the sake of a little occupation, or to get out of their homes, or to avoid housework, or for a little spending money, or any other trivial reason. They are anxious to work after marriage as before because they are able to do a good piece of trained work which society needs, and they are satisfied only with adequate payment to which the work is entitled. They like to be able to furnish their husbands and children with necessities and luxuries that could not otherwise be afforded, and they have the same joy in achievement that men have, or that they themselves had before they were married. They refuse to admit that the whole scale of human motives and professional values ceases to operate with a woman when she marries, and they train their daughters, as they

do their sons, for an economic independence that will operate with both whether they choose to marry or not.

Furthermore, it will make marriages for love, independent of financial considerations, far more possible than they have been before in history! What are the objections to such a point of view? Why has it not been agreed to long ago? In fact, if one concedes anything to women at all, why must not everything be conceded, or the whole scheme of their education and their training in dignified wage earning be called a failure?

There seem to be two main difficulties in the adjustment of really skilled work for married women, and at first their adjustment seems impossible. The first is the question of childbearing; the second difficulty is the balancing of the rival claims of the husband's and the wife's professions, provided the two demand different places and residence, different modes of life, different hours of work, and so on, all of which is more than likely to be the case. At first sight these two obstacles apparently stand so squarely across the path of independent achievement for married women, that it seems hopeless to try to move them. On the other hand, it is always an advantage to reduce a complex of difficulties to a few, and I confidently believe that these two, serious as they may be, are the only reasons which are important. All the others are due to custom, prejudice, or to a sentimental conservatism and timidity. These are the obstacles of nature. But since they are such, they must remain to be reckoned with in any society, regardless of its locality or stage of social development.

The question stands thus: Can a woman of ability who has acquired competence or distinction in some professional field keep this position and at the same time bear children? Can the program of the eugenist be combined with the modern professional woman's program? Can she count upon sufficient stability of location to build up her own field and at the same time be adaptable enough to shift it if the demands of her husband's calling require it? Or must she be a mere casual, odd-job worker, if she works at all? Obviously if she marries, she does so for the purpose of living with her husband. There can be no other motive than this. For the trained woman is free to remain unmarried unless she marries for love. If then their professions require different places of residence, which shall make the sacrifice?

It is obvious that in most cases the man's profession must be the most stable. At the birth of their children, he must be responsible for her and for the children. His business standing cannot therefore be jeopardized when so much depends upon it. If he were likely to have illnesses from time to time, the situation would be reversed. It is not a matter of the superiority of one profession or one sex over the other, but a practical matter of the continuity and safety of the income, qualities which are generally dependent on health. With rival claims for location, therefore,

the woman's work, as the one more likely to be interrupted, must in most cases give way, and she must try to establish her place in whatever station she finds herself, even though she may have to start afresh and build up her professional reputation all over again.

The way out has often been suggested that the man and his wife should have the same profession, for then they could practice it together in the same locality. Sometimes this might be possible. But in these days of travel, the chances are quite as good that the Arizona mining expert who must live in the vicinity of his mine will fall in love with the bacteriologist from a New York medical laboratory, who could not be within five hundred miles of any one requiring her specialized services. In fact, it is more than likely that their very differences of interest might attract them to each other. The wife, skilled in one specialty, would then be obliged to abandon it apparently forever, or at least for so long a period that her technique would be very much impaired. That the wife could find something useful to do wherever she might be placed is undoubtedly true. She might even find something to do in her own line, and she might be of material professional benefit to her husband in some cases. But we are not planning for makeshifts. We are trying to make a program wide enough to fit the next hundred years of women's education. No man could accomplish much in law, medicine, research, administration, engineering, or any other profession or business that one can name, if his work must shift to wherever his wife had to live, and the same will hold true of the truly professional woman.

Nor is another suggestion, which is often made, adequate to meet the situation; namely, that all women should specialize in the arts which may be practiced at home, and thus be independent of their locality. Any one with literary or artistic ability might, for instance, practice it as well in one place as in another, and she would have a great advantage in this respect over women otherwise trained. Any one who can train herself in such independent callings should by all means do so.

Unfortunately, however, only a small proportion of women are gifted in that way. Most women, like most men, are more socially dependent in their work. They are employed, as are men, in the industrial, educational, or professional world, where they have to build up their reputation, where they must be in a particular place at a particular time, and where they must keep steadily at their task if they ever hope to make a success of it, or if their judgment is to be of any technical value.

Of the two main difficulties to a woman's independent work, this one of keeping steadily at her chosen profession, with the capacity to have her moves directed by the demands of that work rather than by the demands of her husband's work, seems to me a more obstinate difficulty than the matter of childbearing, although many might reverse the emphasis. My reason for placing the emphasis thus is the fact that I have known

many married women, without the care of children, who still suffered from the handicap of having lost their position upon marrying. Failing to find new ones after marriage in any way commensurable with the old, their skill and ambition declined. Perhaps they might have managed better somehow if they had tried hard enough. But in most cases experts must go where they are needed, or if they are not able to, they must content themselves with subordinate positions wherever they happen to be. Beggars cannot be choosers. Actresses and concert performers have had children and continued to flourish. But they had to be able to go before their public when and where it wanted them.

We must grant then, that the married woman, and for that matter any woman, because she may shift from the unmarried to the married class at any time, has a heavy handicap against doing important work that can be in any way compared with men's work for thoroughness, accumulated experience, and expert knowledge. She can never be a success at any work unless she has interest, skill, and experience; and the conditions of married life, children, and the paramount importance of her husband's work, make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get an adequate amount of any one of the three requisites. If the average family is or should be four children, and if approximately two years were taken off for each child at the least, eight years away from one's profession before the age of forty-five pretty much puts one out of the race. Yet has even this ever been really tried? Moreover, has the whole problem ever been attacked by women from the inside? Has any one ever tried to develop a set of women's professions, not modeled exactly on men's professions, but upon the necessities of the case? Take for instance the problem of the care of young children. How scientifically has it been treated from this point of view? In the first place, all modern life seems leagued against children. Apartment houses do not want them. There is no trained help to take care of them which is available for any but the very well-to-do. For the mother to stay in constant attendance, in person, means that she literally can do nothing else. She cannot go anywhere with her husband. If she is at home with the baby she cannot be outside with her older children. If she is to keep well, she must, if possible, have some kind of help, and curiously enough she can usually secure only the type of person to help with the child, who is constitutionally absolutely uninterested in babies and about the least able of any one in the world to look after them properly. As in so many of women's trades, the task of child nursing instead of being reinforced by instinct runs counter to it. What would be the relief of thousands of mothers of average means, if instead of an uneducated, heedless young nursemaid, they might intrust their children for certain hours every day to trained young married women with babies of their own! To such women, little babies are a matter of absorbing instinctive interest, and

such emotional attraction coupled with specific training would make the ideal combination to run a community nursery. There are few such nurseries today, save some for the factory mother's children and a few which developed during the war, for the benefit of mothers engaged in war work. But no one can say that they might not be the great new development in baby culture—a development which would make it possible for children to have far better early care than their parents are now able to give them. Such a nursery would not be just a makeshift substitute for the mother, but would be, on the contrary, a valuable trained collaborator with the mother, as the good kindergarten and public school teacher later on is indispensable in the child's development.

Here opens a whole new profession for young married women with children and training, which may become of inestimable value to other women in the same condition. Another undeveloped profession for women is the whole field of community kitchens, whereby food can be sent ready for the table to families which cannot obtain adequate help. There are successful pioneers at this work in various cities, and these kitchens have been hailed as life-savers by the families who profited by their service. One woman said to me as she approached her wedding (a woman who had had extensive training and success in domestic management), "I feel positively foolish to come down to feeding one man and myself, when I could handle the food problem for a hundred people exactly as well, and enjoy doing it." She went on further to say that she could actually feed hundreds of people better than she could two, for she was used to large buying, large kitchens, specialized help—and incidentally was used to being well paid for it. Is it not desirable in these days when food is so difficult to get to retain that woman as a public benefactor, so that others beside her husband could benefit from the training that the public schools, the normal school, and the technical school had been giving her for ten years? Here then are two professions—the trained cooperative care of young children below the school age, and the preparation of food on a large scale—which have hardly yet been touched. Instead of having the food of the family prepared and the children cared for by the mother exclusively, which is getting to be physically impossible, or by the kind of help that one is now able to get for it, one would see these two important matters handled by women trained for the purpose, who were themselves married, and so fully understood the problem, and who by cooperation could reduce the price to the average family's means. The other mothers would then be free to supplement the family income by their own work, whatever that might be, on a system of part-time work. A part-time system is a field of production which has hardly been worked at all. Because a married woman cannot give an eight-hour day to her wage earning, does that mean that she could not give four? How about a half day in the public school for

the married woman who was a successful teacher before her marriage? There are many undertakings in which two half-day women could more than accomplish what one could do in a whole day, and yet it has not been tried, because part-time workers have not been taken seriously. I can think at this moment of many wives of hard-worked husbands, husbands who have been obliged at stated intervals to take long rests from sheer physical exhaustion over the labor of supporting a growing family, who with such a system could give a half day's skilled, highly useful, well-paid work, and thereby refresh their minds, somewhat stale with housework, and be of financial service to their husbands as well. Such service under the present system their husbands would be too proud to accept, but is there any reason why they should be? I cannot believe that this type of genteel pride will outlive this generation. One cannot predict what may be done in the development of any of these new devices in women's work which may be adapted to marriage, for as yet it is an uncharted map.

7. *Woman and Her Control of Man*[1]

The woman author is not content to pocket the thousand years of compliments in her honor, nor is she at all eager to deck out her own heroines with all these excellent qualities, but to make up for it she pitches into Man in a way which, while not exactly confirming him in his inborn conviction that she is a sort of angel (even though she be one of the fallen), frequently exhibits Man as a devil, or oftener still as an abortion who, in spite of centuries of effort, can never raise himself to the heights necessary for a comprehension of her greatness; Man predestined by his folly and immorality to cause her constant annoyance, or at the best to act the clown in his futile attempts to get something more out of life with her than food, children, and promotion.

From Clara Raphael, through Amalie Skram, and Karin Michaelis, down to lesser, though yet noisier, imitators, whose names need not be mentioned, we find this type arising in the last century; the literary woman who uses her pen to bewail Woman's hard lot in life. Made of higher and finer stuff, unsurpassable in purity of thought and delicacy of feeling, good and wise, tender and sympathetic, altogether beyond the comprehension of Man's low intelligence and stunted emotional life, she drags out her holy existence by the side of some bandit or idiot, whom she was once foolish or angelic enough to trust. And it is not only her literary heroines that have such a bad time; no, it is Woman's universal lot to suffer, to drudge at home in everlasting monotony, to bear a monstrous number of children, all forced upon her, occasionally with the exception of No. 1, by an animal spouse, whose only god is his belly

[1] Extracts from WIETH-KNUDSEN, K. A., "Understanding Women," pp. 14–19, 42–44, 271–275, Elliot Holt, 1929.

(note the feminine sayings: "The way to a man's heart is through his stomach"; "A well-furnished table is the only way to tame the brute"), and whose life is passed more or less lazily and ineffectively in all kinds of license and amusement, in revelry, drinking, and infidelity. But, God be praised, the hour is approaching for the complete dethronement of the former lord of creation. Bit by bit she has wrung from him his prerogatives in every social, economic, and legal sphere: economic freedom and independence, married or unmarried; the franchise; the right of election; professions and offices of almost every kind; the principle of equal wages—in fact, the only things now lacking are complete parental authority over the children born in wedlock (she has always had it over those born outside it) and admission to the priesthood and to commissions in the army; then Man's power will be broken everywhere, and then—ah! then the sweet hour of vengeance will strike. And though we have not yet been told in what this vengeance will consist, it is immediately obvious that it must be boundless for so many crimes committed by so despicable a creature as *homo sapiens;* and as the advent of this St. Bartholomew's Night cannot be long delayed, we shall soon see what form the revolution will take, and while restraining our curiosity, may suitably employ the interval in our investigation of why the white man still regards and treats his womenfolk with such high esteem. For we can already understand, from what has been said above, that it is not a reciprocation called forth by any corresponding general or innate feeling on her part.

In this connection it is worth pausing to remark that a general feeling of this sort, of respect, devotion, readiness to serve, gentleness and kindness, admiration amounting to love—nay, to self-sacrifice for Man—is to be found among women in many races outside Europe, and even in Europe it is not entirely extinct. I cannot forget the observations I made on the Albanian frontier during the first Balkan War (Turkey against Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro). In November, 1912, a couple of thousand Montenegrins were besieging Scutari—hopelessly, because the town was covered by two impregnable mountain fortresses and they themselves were badly clothed and equipped, without heavy artillery; bravery and marksmanship could not accomplish it alone. Their commissariat and transport service also left much to be desired, and several times a week I saw long columns of women crossing the mountains that divide Montenegro from the Boiana valley (in which Scutari lies) on their bare feet through the ice-cold water from the thawing mountainsides, now along muddy roads, now over hard rocks, day after day dragging on their backs sacks of provisions, asses' hams, black bread, and coffee, to their husbands, brothers, and sweethearts who lay in the marshes around Scutari. A section of this female transport was permitted, like myself, to return in King Nikola's steamer—the only one in Montenegro—across a corner of Lake Scutari to Rieta in Montenegro.

Twelve women sat with me on the after deck. In spite of all their hardships not one of them showed a trace of any depression or discontent; the older ones were calm and collected, the younger cheerful and lively. As I was writing my notes I happened to drop my fountain pen on the deck and it rolled down into the cockpit. Instantly all the women jumped up, young and old, and dashed headlong into the cockpit, where they fought furiously for the honor of getting hold of my pen. One of the younger ones secured the prize and handed it to me with a happy smile. We did not understand each other's language, of course, and even if I had known hers I should have been speechless with astonishment at the incident, to which I did not attach nearly so much importance as perhaps may be thought. I am not a Northern European for nothing, and therefore unaccustomed to such treatment; if I had had a Northern woman by my side I should pretty quickly have picked up the pen myself, and been quite happy if she hadn't called me "clumsy" or something worse.

Far more pronounced than this even, as many of us know, is Woman's respect for Man in the Eastern civilizations, and this is far from being associated, as most people think, with any bad or cruel treatment of women. Frau M. von Kamphovener gave a lecture in February, 1923, to the German Oriental Society in Berlin on the Turkish woman's life before and after marriage—usually monogamous, but frequently as a member of the harem, which every Western woman enters with a characteristic blend of horror and itching curiosity. Frau von Kamphovener knows the whole system, from many years' observation, and was of an entirely different opinion. According to her evidence, marriages in Mohammedan Turkey are more harmonious than here. The education of children (even though—or because—the sons are early removed from the mother's charge) and the position and treatment of the wife are superior to those obtaining among monogamous Christian Armenians. European, and particularly American women, who doubtless hold the record for contempt and exploitation of Man, have endeavoured, hitherto without success, by inoculations of Feminism to drag the Turkish woman out of the slough of degradation in which she is supposed to exist. Frau von Kamphovener was gratified that the Turkish woman had been able hitherto to defend her naïve and healthy soul against this propaganda, which—whatever else one may think of it—has not in any case shown itself capable of making the poor white woman happy, but probably in time will succeed in making the happy Turkish woman unhappy.

As a general rule we find that the farther we go to the east and south—to Indian, China, Polynesia—the stronger becomes Woman's primitive delight in submitting body and soul to a man, and priding herself on serving him. An old friend of mine, the daughter of a clergyman, married to a highly placed Norwegian official in China, told me some years ago

how this phenomenon had always aroused her profound astonishment, when, for instance, she watched Chinese family life on the rivers from her bungalow in the evening. Junk after junk glides slowly down the broad, silent stream, carrying cargo, and usually steered by the woman standing aft. One child clings to her skirts, two more are playing on deck, she carries the fourth on her back, the fifth is at her breast, the sixth evidently on the way; with calm confidence she steers the boat safely through a mass of craft and other obstacles. What a picture of feminine bondage and degradation! But why does she laugh all over her face, showing her strong, sound teeth? Why do her eyes beam when she turns them on her husband, sprawling lazily under the awning? Why is she wild with delight every time he condescends to give her a glance of approbation? My Norwegian friend had questioned the Chinese women, just as the Japanese doctor questioned me, and she had never been given any answer but this: "Is there anything more delightful than to have a husband? Ought I not to be glad to have a husband at all, and ought I not to do all I can to keep him pleased with me?"

Man's intellect is compounded of three main elements: his fabulous delight in and capacity for observing everything in his natural surroundings, whereas the normal woman's interest and talent for observation are confined to the persons immediately surrounding her, especially her husband and children. In the next place, Man has the outstanding power of comparing all his observations and extracting therefrom the most surprising results, whereby he discovers coherence and meaning in a world which to Woman is commonly nothing but a chaotic jumble of events. Finally Man, or at any rate every man above the average, can use this basis to create something entirely new for the service and support of the race in its struggle for existence, whether it be new implements, new machinery, new physical and chemical discoveries, or new production in the sphere of poetry, literature, sculpture, architecture, or music. As this is fairly generally acknowledged—although the world has long ceased to deduce any practical consequence therefrom (*e.g.*, in forbearing to treat a man so meanly or to allot him such poor conditions of existence as to deprive him of the opportunity or desire to continue this work, equally indispensable for all parties, men, women, and children)—we shall not dwell upon it, but merely emphasize the agreement of this result with the localization of certain intellectual powers by modern cerebral anatomy. It now seems certain that the revision of sense impressions, the comparing of separate elements of observation, the creation of new combinations, and the imaginative faculty are centered preeminently in the anterior and superior part of the head, in entire agreement with the results we found in the last section, according to which the region of the forehead, the temples, and the dome of the crown were as a rule more strongly developed in Man than in Woman.

To this it is frequently objected that Woman's strength lies in the inner, domestic sphere and the work belonging to it, and that her supremacy in these departments shows that her intelligence in some respects is equal to Man's. But this is correct only in the sense that she can as a rule cope with these tasks with the comparatively low degree of deliberation and precision they demand, but it is not correct if it is meant to imply that she can do the domestic work better than Man, supposing that for some reason or other he takes a hand in anything usually pertaining to the mysteries of housekeeping. We all know, of course, that a middling man cook is better than a middling female cook; that a good chef is very much better than a good female cook; that a woman dressmaker is only serviceable for everyday things, while a man, a ladies' tailor, has to be called in when it is a question of a costume which in taste, cut, make, and fit are to be something out of the ordinary; that a good manservant is far better than an efficient maidservant, and so on. But people do not see, or not sufficiently clearly, the corollary of all these observations, which is that *a superior intellect can apply itself to anything*, great or small, difficult or easy; that wherever applied it benefits everybody and everything; and that a man, as soon as he puts his attention and his will to it, can do any kind of work, domestic included, much better and more quickly than a woman—that it bores him more than her is quite another matter; he certainly does it more rationally, so long as it is necessary.

The fact is that the character of monogamous marriage, instituted and maintained chiefly in the interests of Woman, of the children, and of society, and especially the favored position actually enjoyed by the wife—whose strength is greater the worse she is and the better the husband—cannot possibly be appreciated by any man who has not experienced it, and least of all by a young man at the age when most marriages are contracted. He will set his mind at rest with the thought that this "equality" will no doubt assure him as a decent man and her as a gentle and loving woman an existence at any rate tolerable, and as a rule even the strongest warnings will make little impression upon him, as upon all young people. The tragedy of all pedagogues is the impossibility of bringing home the lessons of life to the young—unhappily they will and must acquire for themselves, except where the principle of authority is followed.

This again means that marriage in its present juridical aspect is a trap laid by the Feminists with the "eternal feminine" as bait; a trap from which only the few can escape who are rich enough to pay the price—the keeping up of two establishments; but scarcely one in a hundred can do this, especially as the woman has the right to half the joint estate, even though she has not contributed a penny, and even though she has done all she could to ruin the man materially as well as morally. The others,

that is, practically all, are forced to put up with their lot—of slaving day and night for a woman of whose true nature they had no knowledge until after marriage, the more so as the whole feministic spirit of our age falsified their education by conjuring up an image of Woman utterly different from the reality.

And when, on the first opportunity, this woman's true nature asserts itself and tries to appropriate the control not only of the children and joint fortune, but also of the husband's work, his person and his interests, even when, as is generally the case, she is totally unqualified to understand them—then one of two things happens:

If he is a *Man*, he shows fight; but in that case she can sooner or later break his resistance, and that by means which no law can touch, even though they are so contemptible that no man would think of using them toward the vilest of women. For instance, she has only to rob him of regular sleep, and then even the greatest man is soon done for. How this can be managed in married life may be read in Strindberg's "Confession of a Fool," where his wife coerces him by introducing animals into their bedroom, which, as is well known, is intolerable to higher natures, but by no means a sufficient reason for obtaining a divorce without expenses that would last a lifetime. And there are hundreds of other methods against which the husband is utterly defenceless, and which the grasping woman is quick to discover and has no hesitation in employing.

The man who in such circumstances preserves his energy, his morale, his self-respect and his manly worth, and keeps up his opposition till the day arrives,—if it ever does arrive,—when he can afford to free himself from marriage—well, he must be more than a hero, far greater than a victorious general; and yet he will be looked at askance, wronged and annoyed by friends and foes alike, as a supposedly hard-hearted egoist, for turning out his wife and perhaps his grown-up children, who will have the sympathy of the world, which does not know, and will never find out, that they too were used by her early and late as factors in the fight against him.

Do not tell me that I am setting up a bogy, an exaggerated picture made up of insignificant exceptions. In the course of a lifetime I have seen too much male misery and female depravity in modern marriages, in Denmark, Germany, Norway, and Sweden, to let myself be talked over. And where conditions are apparently harmonious or at least tolerable, they have as a rule become so because the husband, for the sake of a quiet life, has had to abandon the fight at the very outset. Most unpleasant, perhaps, are the cases where the man is not conscious of his misery; that is, where his suppression in the family has come about so slowly, though consistently, that his supersession and its consequences are not apparent to himself. Many men are therefore greatly offended when they discover that their neighbors regard them as henpecked, since

they have become so in the same way as a frog is roasted alive if you put it in a frying pan and warm it so gradually that the growing heat does not reach its center of consciousness.

But the other case is the normal one: the male type of good ordinary intelligence, character, social standing, and income—he soon discovers that marriage is no safe place for him and his activities unless he capitulates every time the wife disagrees with him and lets her have her own sweet will. Thus he is quickly demoralized, performs his most obvious and unavoidable duties in a perfunctory way, and submits with growing indifference to the feminine domination to which existence, at any rate in Scandinavia, is now subjected in virtue of the modern adaptation of monogamy and its maintenance chiefly at his expense. Divorce legislation is to such a degree in his disfavor that he can usually be forced to pay his wife one-third of his yearly income, even if it can be proved that from the start the woman did all in her power to ruin their married life.

8. *Changing Conditions and Changing Mothers*[1]

No one questions that conditions have changed, but there is a curious misunderstanding as to the nature of the change. The observer who sees women of his acquaintance taking jobs or going into politics or club work, says to himself that women are branching out, that whereas in the past they were content with being merely mothers, today they are trying to be individuals as well. Now women are undoubtedly trying to overcome certain traditional handicaps of sex, and to keep these from blocking their individual development, but our great-grandmothers are grievously slandered by such a belittling of their social and economic importance as the above statement of the change implies. For in addition to bearing anywhere from two to twenty children, they performed in the home countless economic functions that are now performed in factories. You and I order our bread from a store, and our vegetables and our fruit and our meat. Our grandmothers baked the bread themselves. They made the yeast with which it was set to rise, and not so long ago many of them ground the wheat from which the flour was made. They grew the vegetables and fruits, and canned or pickled or dried them for winter use. They cured their own meat, made their own hams and sausages, chopped their own firewood, carried in their own water from the well. You and I buy our dresses, most of them at any rate, from a store. Our mothers made practically all of them in the house. And our great-great-grandmothers actually spun the thread and wove the cloth out of which eventually they were to be made. These two lost functions of women—the providing of food and clothing—have alone given rise to two of the greatest of modern industries which employ millions of workers through-

[1] Adapted from PARSONS, ALICE BEAL, How Changing Conditions Change Mothers, *Progressive Education*, vol. 3, pp. 295–299, October, 1926.

out the world. The work is still done, that is to say, but it is no longer done in the home.

In other words, until the development of modern industry women bore their fair proportion of the work of the world. Since its development their economic contributions have grown less and less important until today the only important one left them is the bearing and tending of children. For the first time women in general are believed to be justified in being exclusively mothers. And when the observer sees women branching out into outside jobs of one sort or another, he sees them endeavoring to regain the economic usefulness they had in former generations. But because the whole industrial structure of the world has changed in the last hundred years, the only way the majority of women can regain their traditional usefulness is by giving up some of the last of their traditional occupations, a paradox that greatly complicates the problem.

Now from the standpoint of the children, is it preferable that the mother permit the chance operations of the industrial system to deprive her of the major part of her economic usefulness so that she may have the very great joy, when it is a joy, of being constantly with them; or that she should rearrange the mechanism of her home and possibly sacrifice two or three of the hours she now has with her children, in order to regain her lost usefulness?

Let me begin by saying that I think this question must be individually answered, and that it would do just as much harm to create a situation in which all mothers must make the second answer as it has done to try to create a situation and social prejudice that would force all mothers to make the first. Also that it is quite conceivable that the most fortunate solution would be found for various undecided women if they chose one course for a year or two and then changed to the other, since such a change would increase their zest and hence their usefulness for both.

The woman hesitating over her decision finds that mothers with jobs are the targets of many writers who believe that a working mother and a neglectful mother are synonymous terms. One of these recently summed up most of the current objections in a series of sketches called Six Mothers. In the first she endeavored to disarm suspicion as to her impartiality by presenting a home-staying mother who crushes her children's individuality by injudicious attention. And in the second she takes a non-working but bridge-playing mother who leaves her children to the mercy of servants. The other four sell their heritage for the pottage of jobs. Apparently it has not occurred to the writer that she has in all six sketches described mothers who would never in any case give much personal attention to their children; that as far as the child is concerned it makes no difference whether the mother's hobby is putting up jam, or making the pies her husband's mother used to make, or play-

ing bridge, or going to foreign missionary societies, or being a pillar in the church, or writing a novel. Any of these hobbies can effectually take her attention off her children, and none of them need to do so—not even an office job that lasts from nine until five.

I could easily match Miss de Lima's six foolish mothers with six others, all of them working women, whose children suffer from none of the various types of neglect she describes. And I could add another six horrible examples from home-staying mothers. Yet this would prove nothing either for or against home-staying mothers, except, that like Miss de Lima, I had stacked the cards. It would, however, prove without any question, at all, that every woman who happens to bring children into the world is not necessarily fitted even to love them intelligently, much less to know how to supervise their health and play and friendships and work and tempers and enthusiasms—a discovery that has led the modern schools to undertake functions that the older ones never thought of venturing upon, and that is one of the causes of the creation of schools for little children. Motherhood, if we mean by the word something more than the physical act of bringing a child into the world, is not a divine attribute with which women are endowed by the accident of sex. We cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, and we cannot make a good mother out of a stupid, inefficient, or chronically discontented woman.

And this conclusion brings us, by a circuitous route, very close to our question. For if the present conditions of life for the home-staying mother tend to dull the edge of her intellect, to take the zest from her body, to make her listless or apathetic, or discontented, or moody, or inefficient—and we know that in many cases they do all these things—they tend also to make her an unsuccessful mother. And if the efficient performance of an outside job would, on the other hand, tend to keep her intelligence active and her ambition alive and to make her happy, it would to that extent make her a better mother, provided she is capable of being a mother at all, and would compensate a hundredfold for the very real but daily diminishing difficulties of making the hours of her work away from home jibe with the hours her children spend in school and in afterschool supervised play. Many women are acutely dissatisfied with the truncated lives they are at present living, and for these the above seems to me to indicate their choice.

But mothers endowed with this species of constructive discontent are not the only ones concerned. All women who are exclusively mothers run a risk of becoming pathological in a way that will disadvantageously affect their children. There are few more dangerous people running around loose than the individual who tries to get all of his or her emotional satisfactions, all his sense of life, from another. Yet where else is a mother to live but in her children if she is exclusively a mother? Sooner

or later the child, if he is to save his soul alive, must declare his independence of the mother. This can be accomplished easily if the mother has a life of her own; if she has not it is the signal for an emotional guerrilla war that often ends only with the death of one or the other miserable combatants. I have a shrewd suspicion that more individual tragedies arise from rapacious motherhood than from almost any other one cause.

This particular danger the child runs from the non-working mother seems to me enormously to outweigh the danger he runs of emotional disturbances from a feeling that his mother neglects him in going out of the home. The feeling that she neglects him, if it is a normal reaction, will arise either from the fact that other boys' mothers stay home while his goes to work; or from the fact that the mother is really more interested in her work than in her son. If the first very superficial cause is to blame, it can easily be shown in all its foolish triviality by a mother who is on terms of real intimacy with her son. If the mother is really more interested in her work than in her son, I suspect that she is the sort of woman who subordinates personal relationships to other things, and who, if she were at home, would be more interested in bridge or a flirtation or in housework, than in her son. Many mothers, of course, who are supremely interested in their children, at one time or another permit temporary preoccupations—and these are just as likely to be concerned with housework as with an outside job—to distract their attention from their children, and the mother who discerns in her child a hurt sort of jealousy may well ask herself if she has not been doing this.

The child's jealousy may, however, be an abnormal reaction. There exists between many children and their parents a pathological intensity of feeling manifesting itself in jealousy and sullen possessiveness, and when this is the cause of the child's emotional distress about his mother's outside job, the sooner both parent and child restore their relationship to normal the better for both.

The physical care of children has become a very specialized thing. Intelligent mothers do not prescribe for their children's diseases. They engage the best doctor they can for that. Miss de Lima, in common with less intelligent critics of the working mother, implies that, when the mother works from nine until five, seeing at most two or three hours less of her children of school age than she would if she stayed home all day while they stayed in school, various sinister diseases attack the children that they would not otherwise have had. She evidences in this connection running ears, intestinal disorders, and contagious diseases of various sorts. This objection is so obviously a sentimental fallacy that it would not be worth mentioning here if it were not that it has often been unreflectingly urged.

Because a mother works she is not necessarily mentally deficient, and if she were her presence in the home would help her children very

little. Yet one must suppose a mother to be mentally deficient if the mere fact of her leaving the house in the morning at the time the children do, and returning an hour or so later, can be thought to make her neglect a running ear that otherwise she would attend to. Or that the same circumstance would expose the child to contagious diseases he would not otherwise catch. Or that the mother's eating her noon meal in a restaurant near her office while the child eats his at school, would be likely to result in intestinal disturbances that would not occur if the mother ate at home alone while the child ate at school. Working fathers manage to breakfast and dine with their children. Working mothers can do the same. In fact they are much more likely to wish to dine with their children than the home-staying mother, who, after her lonely day, is eager to go out to dinner and habitually does so, leaving the child to a nursemaid. To see preventable defects and illness running rampant we have only to go to some remote country district, where the children still spend more time with their mothers than modern developments permit elsewhere, but where the proper medical advice is lacking.

The whole discussion about working mothers is in fact heavily weighted with sentimentality. The opponents of the working mother invariably assume that mothers are in the habit of spending the greater part of the day with their children. Yet we all know that the very laws of the country make this impossible, and that all children are legally compelled to spend the greater part of the day in school—a period that already very closely corresponds with the mother's working hours and that might by slight social readjustments be made to correspond exactly. It is true that this leaves Saturdays and the children's summer holidays unaccounted for. But the recently secured Saturday half holiday in summer is yearly being extended backward and forward. It is probable that a little combined social pressure will soon make it a year-round custom. The public school children's holidays last only a trifle over two months. I believe that it is infinitely easier to evolve some community scheme for outdoor care of the children during the usual school hours at this time, than it is to endure the social and psychological maladjustments that spring from keeping woman in the house throughout the year in order to have her there these two months. In case the social solution does not appeal to a given mother, there are many individual ones. Certain industries, to take only one example, find work slack during the summer. They would be only too glad to give a two months' leave of absence to those working mothers who are unable to make other arrangements for their children's holidays.

I have also left unaccounted for the children under school age. The new tendency to have the schools take children at two—a tendency by the way, that developed with the children's needs in mind rather than with the mothers'—could, and I have no doubt very shortly will, be developed

school age before going back to work. With the small proportions of the American family, this would not take so many years out of her working life as we might at first suppose. This method would be as desirable for some women as it would be undesirable for others.

As a rule children are much happier in school than they are playing around under some adult's feet and being constantly reproved, even by the most patient of mothers, for failing to adapt themselves to a world to which they don't yet belong, while the mother who finds herself suddenly transferred from an active life to the supervision of one, two, and seldom more than three children, rejoices at first in the joys of an unaccustomed leisure, and of watching the developing lives, but after a short time is far too often almost inevitably demoralized by it. The depth of her demoralization is often measured by her capacity for more taxing occupations. And we cannot hope that a woman demoralized by the disuse, or the very partial use, of the faculties with which nature endowed her, can successfully help the child to solve those thousand and one complex difficulties that attend his hopeful but unsteady and inexperienced progress through the wilderness of life.

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Chapter XV

THE NATURE OF FAMILY DISORGANIZATION

It is a possible and a very usual procedure to approach the discussion and study of the family from the point of view of its disorganization. When this is the point of approach, the institution in its familiar form in the culture is taken for granted and is used as the standard for comparison and judgment. The intellectual problem is the very simple one of apprehending the pattern and noting the variations from it. The practical or administrative problem is that of devising ways and means for bringing personal behavior into line with the conventional standards.

A somewhat more real and significant approach is to study the family itself rather than its failures. It is far more difficult to understand why family groups so frequently remain together than it is to understand why they sometimes disintegrate. The latter presents no real problem at all, except from an administrative point of view. But the origin of the institution, the structure it has developed and the functions it has performed in different cultures, its relations to other institutional arrangements in different societies, the changes it has undergone in response to changes in the culture and social organization, its success and failure in different times and places to serve acceptably the needs of people, are all real and important matters of human interest.

But a study of institutional origin, structure, and function, while more significant than a study of disorganization, does not deal with the fundamentals of reality. It is concerned with instrumentalities rather than with processes, with form rather than with essence. It is useful and necessary but it is preliminary rather than final; it prepares the way for fundamental scientific analysis. It is only the latter that can furnish any basis for an intelligent control and reconstruction of the institution itself.

Family disorganization must of course be seen as a natural and inevitable consequence of a changing social order. It is as desirable as it is inevitable. The institutional form has no virtue in itself, it is simply an instrument in the service of human needs. These needs remain much the same with changes in time and place, but they must find their satisfaction in radically different types of social orders. The institutional arrangements adapted and adequate to a given social order are, because of that very fact, unadapted and inadequate in a different order. As the social order changes the institution must undergo corresponding change else

it becomes an obstruction rather than a means to human satisfactions. It is only as there is progressive and continuous disorganization that there can be continuous reorganization on planes progressively more adequate to human need.

But institutional disorganization involves always some degree of personal disorganization and a larger or smaller amount of demoralization and failure. On the other hand, institutional forms, being instruments to serve needs in a given social situation, are of necessity and always obsolescent when they are not obsolete. Moreover, by the very fact of their structural aspects, institutions resist change and, in a changing society, are inadequate in proportion to the elaborateness of their structure. The family failure and personal demoralization variously featured in the following papers are evidences and consequences of the inadequacy of the traditional family organization in a rapidly changing world.

1. *The Study of Family Disorganization*[1]

No problem in the modern world, perhaps, is fraught with such pathos, such tragedy, and such universal interest as the disorganization of family life. And yet in no field of social relations is there a greater dearth of accurate information than exists concerning the steps which might be taken to prevent the heartaches of which each divorce speaks so eloquently.

This dearth of accurate information is even more astounding because of the increasing literature devoted to the rehabilitation of family life. As the family has seemed about to disintegrate, programs and plans for its reorganization have appeared in numbers. Some seek to counteract the disintegrating forces with new rules of conduct and new ideals; others advocate clearing the ground for an entirely new institution.

There are, of course, such volumes as Brandt, "A Study of Five Hundred and Seventy-four Deserters and Their Families"; Willcox, "The Divorce Problem: A Study in Statistics"; Lichtenberger, "Divorce: A Study in Social Causation"; Eubank, "A Study of Family Desertion"; Colcord, "Broken Homes"; Patterson, "Family Desertion and Non-support"; and Thomas and Znaniecki, vol. V, "The Polish Peasant in Europe and America," which present from different angles disinterested accounts and studies of family disorganization. Although each of these makes a contribution to our understanding of the disorganization of the family, no one of them, nor all of them together, supplies anything approaching an adequate basis for preventing domestic conflict. Each of these studies, however, has cleared a portion of the ground for the

[1] Adapted from MOWRER, ERNEST R., The Study of Family Disorganization, *Family*, vol. 8, pp. 83, 85–87, May, 1927.

introduction of a more adequate method of studying family disorganization, a necessary prerequisite to any attempt at treatment.

Another difficulty of prime importance in the study of domestic discord needs to be considered. Students of family disorganization have not always carefully distinguished between the legal concepts, divorce and desertion, and the sociological concept, family disorganization. They have often assumed a constant relationship between divorce and desertion on the one hand and family disorganization on the other. When it comes to measuring the extent of family disorganization by using the figures of divorce and desertion it is obvious that this assumption leads to fallacious conclusions.

Divorce, for example, is one thing in Nevada, where the business men of Reno capitalize the lax divorce laws of the state; another thing in New York, where adultery is practically the only cause; and still quite a different thing in South Carolina, where it occurs only by act of legislature. Desertion, likewise, varies from place to place. If a man leaves his wife without support in a city where there is a charity organization to which she appeals for financial aid, that may be called "desertion," though not in the legal sense. But if a husband fails to support his wife and there is a law which penalizes his failure to support her, that is "non-support," or "desertion." If there is no charity organization nor any court-enforced law against non-support, then there will be no "desertion" in that area, just as there is no divorce in South Carolina.

There is also a further difficulty presented in the use of data from records of courts and social agencies. The temptation is for one to assume a categorical conception of family disintegration, rather than to recognize the relative disorganization of all families. Family disintegration, thus, is likely to imply, and probably does in the minds of most persons, a static conception of family relations. A "disintegrated" family is one which has lost all unity, *i.e.*, a marriage relationship which is only a family in terms of the past—its identity having been lost by the complete differentiation of attitudes of its members. Family "disorganization," on the other hand, implies a relative differentiation of interests and aims of its members in comparison with another or other family groups.

It is, in fact, this tendency of the family to lose its unity which is of primary importance in the control of family disorganization. An understanding of the disintegration of the family, on the other hand, may be of no use because the process of disorganization has been completed and nothing can be done about it. But to understand the way in which families become disorganized, not as a group phenomenon but in terms of the interaction of the principals in the case, necessitates an appreciation of the changes in relations between husband and wife which are typical of disintegrating families. This conception of family disorganization as a

process necessitates, however, a clearer definition of the essential character of the family relationship than is found in the bulk of the studies of family disorganization.

The family is not merely a group of individuals living in close proximity, as formal studies of divorce and desertion seem to assume. It is also an organization of attitudes and ideals which each family develops independently and which characterizes the family as a cultural group. Family pride, family prejudice, the jokes and proverbs intelligible to no outsider, and the hopes and ambitions that distinguish families from one another help to make up what may be called the "family complex." It is this identification of interests which makes of the family a cooperating unit, felt by its members and recognized by the community. The unity of the family lies, in other words, not in any formal obligations which the law imposes, but in the interaction between its members.

The establishment of a family is the process of building up organized attitudes in which all concur. Family disorganization represents the converse process in which the family complex breaks up and the ambitions and ideals of the individual members of the family become differentiated.

Family disorganization may be defined, then, so far as it concerns the relationship between husband and wife, as that series of events which tends to terminate in the disruption of the marriage union. It is, in other words, the individualization of behavior in marriage relations, as contrasted with family organization, which is the tendency toward identification of behavior in those relations.

The disintegration of the family may be thought of, accordingly, as the loss of family consciousness, *i.e.*, a disintegration of the familial attitudes which make up the family complex. Divorce and desertion are but forms of family disintegration, and indicate the completion of the process of family disorganization, *i.e.*, that series of events leading to the breakdown and discontinuance of the family relationship. Such a definition necessitates in many ways not only a reformulation of what are pertinent data to be included in case histories, but also how these data are to be interpreted.

Professor Burgess, in his course on the family, has introduced the concept "family tensions" into the analysis of family disorganization. A type tension, I take it, is a typical situation in which domestic discord may arise—the situation being described in terms of the attitudes of the marriage group. The basis of the classification used by Professor Burgess seems to be the assumption that interaction between husband and wife occurs within certain spheres of interest in each of which there may be either accord or tension. Thus for each type tension there is also a type accord. Professor Burgess has used the following sevenfold classification: economic, sex, health, respect, cultural, temperamental, and pattern of life. My own classification (which I have discussed at length in my book)

is somewhat simpler—possibly too simple—being only fourfold: incompatibility in response, economic individualization, cultural differentiation, and individuation of life patterns.

Mere classification of tensions, however, is not sufficient but only preliminary to the discovery of sequences of events or processes. While each type tension represents, presumably, a process, or group of processes, it does not describe, and so does not explain, the sequence of events tending to culminate in family disintegration.

I have in my book, "Family Disorganization," attempted to show how typical sequences of behavior-events may be abstracted out of cases of domestic discord. This method of interpretation may be illustrated by the sequence in the diary of Miriam Donaven:

Type of Case: Husband and wife with different conceptions of the rôle of a wife (Miriam's conception of the rôle of a wife is Bohemian—a woman should be able to do anything a man does. Alfred's is conventional—"the mother image").

Response Tension (Miriam's failure to realize in marriage the romantic ideal).

Process of Compensation:

1. Development of technique to secure response (Miriam goes to work—steals for her husband).
2. Attempts to secure response outside marriage (attentions of other men).
3. Resort to stimulation:
   a. Sensuous (escapades, drink, dissipation, automobile rides).
   b. Sensual (a possibility).
4. Breakdown of morale (shock and disillusionment upon learning of husband's past life).
5. Reorganization of philosophy of life (adoption of philosophy of life of a lower order—relations with numerous men).

In addition to a description of sequences of events as part of the interpretation of family disorganization, may be added ecological analyses and interpretations in terms of attitudes and wishes.

The study of family disorganization may thus be said to have progressed from analysis of static data presented in the form of divorce and desertion statistics to an analysis of dynamic data presented in terms of social interaction. The approach has changed from a discrete or atomic conception of human relations in domestic discord to a continuous or organic conception. The method has shifted from the statistical to the case study.

To what degree it will be possible to reduce the description of processes of family disorganization to a quantitative statement in the future one can hardly predict. All science is ever trying to become quantitative, and theoretically may be expected to become so ultimately. In the study of family disorganization, however, as in the study of other social problems, it may be expected that much of the analysis will remain in qualitative terms for some time to come.

If, for the present, there is more promise in qualitative rather than in quantitative analysis of family disorganization, it would be expected that case histories would offer the most adequate materials for study. So long as the concepts with which one has to deal in the explanation of family discord are not readily measurable, the statistical method, when utilized, compels one to turn to the measurement of events which lend themselves readily to mathematical treatment and then to depend upon the interpretation of the data to give a more comprehensive, and therefore more precise, explanation of the phenomenon. Thus the introduction of the statistical method complicates rather than simplifies the analysis of the problem.

It seems only reasonable, then, to look for the present to the objective analysis of case studies for the most useful description of causes of family disorganization. These descriptions of typical processes in family discord should furnish a basis for more adequate treatment of family disorganization, both preventive and remedial, than has been possible under past methods of study, and ultimately give such definitions of concepts and descriptions of processes as may be reduced to measurement and treated statistically.

2. *The Ecology of Family Discord*[1]

Throughout the Western World, and especially in the United States, the sentimental attitude toward marriage has glorified this ceremony until it has become the crowning event of one's life. To break the union, which had its beginning before the marriage actually transpired, represents in many cases the destruction of a romantic picture for which no satisfactory substitute ever is found.

Statistics of divorce and desertion are cold. They offer little help in understanding the factors which have brought about crises in the marital ventures of so many persons. What good does it do the social reformer or the distracted wife, whose husband is unfaithful, to know that in Chicago, for example, there were 6,094 divorces granted in 1919; 2,661 cases heard in the Court of Domestic Relations in 1921; one divorce to five marriages in 1924; and so on? Such statistics give no clue to the cause of the family conflicts which they indicate.

The simplest method, perhaps, of getting at the causes of domestic conflict which tends to terminate in family disintegration, is to study the social life of an area in comparison to that of another or other areas. Thus if the divorce rate is higher in the United States than in Europe,

[1] MOWRER, ERNEST R., City Life and Domestic Discord, *Survey*, vol. 57, p. 298, December, 1926.

the conventional explanation is in terms of the differences in the cultures of these two geographical areas. But cultural differences in the population do not conform nicely to political or other artificial boundaries, such as state or county lines. Differences in divorce rates by states, for example, indicate the diversity of legal restrictions rather than differences in manners, customs, religion, ideals, standards of living, and so on. If, however, one selects an area within which the terms upon which a divorce may be secured are constant, a state or a city, one may assume that the legal factors represented in cases of family disintegration are the same, and therefore may be neglected so far as a comparison between parts is concerned. Let us take, for example, the city of Chicago.

Chicago, like every large city, is made up of many areas—residential neighborhoods, industrial communities, immigrant colonies, rooming-house districts—all tending to have their distinctive cultural characteristics, diverse by racial and national origin, by economic status, by marital conditions and by cultural type. These cultural differences of city areas are reflected in the activities and interests of the people. Standards of all kinds vary from neighborhood to neighborhood. What is considered moral in an expensive residential district, for example, may be judged immoral in an immigrant colony.

But how do these parts of a city become differentiated? What are the forces making for segregation? What determines the boundaries of communities? How does this process of differentiation affect the family? In what way is family disorganization related, first, to the different ways of living represented by these different communities; and second, to the forces making for the differences between one community and another?

It is said that cities grow like trees, adding new rings at the outer edge and rotting at the core. Yet the growth of a tree is simple compared with that of a city where the processes of expansion are many and complicated.

As the city grows, there is not merely an increase in the number of buildings, an expansion over a larger territory, or a multiplication of avenues of communication. A process of segregation and differentiation also takes place which gives character to its areas. Institutions and residences spread out in all directions from the center tending always to find the most advantageous position. People are drawn, likewise, by their interests to the neighborhoods especially favorable for survival and success.

Extension of transportation lines not only draws the outer areas of the city toward the business center in time but it draws business out of the central areas as well. As a result there grows up a series of sub-centers which tend further to break up the community into areas bounded

by thoroughfares, railways, street-car lines, bus lines, elevated lines, etc. The city becomes, thus, a network of intercrossing barriers dividing areas each of which has its own peculiar characteristics. These characteristics act as a magnet in drawing those social types of people which are appropriate and repelling those which do not fit. Thus there are family and non-family areas, areas of the rich and the poor, racial areas, occupational areas, and cultural areas. Even the age and sex distribution varies for different areas.

Systems of communication, the newspaper, the telephone, the telegraph, and the radio also have a profound influence upon the growth of a city. They tend to counteract differentiation and segregation upon the basis of external characteristics, such as race, and substitute for these, or accentuate, the more subtle interests, such as aesthetic interests and philosophies of life.

Another factor in the growth of the city is that of industrial expansion. Industries are likely to locate along the rail- and waterways; light manufacturing just outside the district taken by business; and heavy manufacturing at outlying points. The zone of light manufacturing constantly encroaches upon the area held for residential purposes and thus lowers its value for residence. This causes a selection by this area of those elements in the population, who, because of their poverty, cannot find a foothold elsewhere; or who, because of low repute, cannot remain securely in the more favored neighborhoods.

On the other hand, the location of heavy manufacturing at outlying points builds up colonies of workers about the factories, while the managers live outside these districts. Retail stores and other small business ventures tend also to grow up in these subcenters, producing, in so far as family life is concerned, the same differentiation of areas which characterizes the city as a whole.

Thus in the growth of the city, the communities become differentiated —first, in terms of structure which operates as a selective force in the distribution of population; second, in terms of institutions which come to serve the differentiated local groups. The result is to give to the city a wide variety of cultural areas which mold even family life into a diversity of forms.

With reference to family life, five types of family areas may be found in Chicago: non-family, emancipated, paternal, equalitarian, and maternal. Each of these is closely correlated with a certain kind and amount of family disorganization.

The non-family areas are to be found in the center of the city, in and adjoining the central business district—in Chicago, the Loop. They tend to be one-sex areas—predominately male—such as Greektown, Chinatown, and Hobohemia.

The areas of emancipated family are the districts of rooming houses and kitchenette apartments and residential hotels. The so-called "emancipated" family feels itself freed from the conventions which have been the anathema of feminism. There are no children, or very few; relations with the neighborhood are casual, of the "touch and go" sort; the interests of both husband and wife lie outside the home; both are employed for the most part, though not necessarily.

Paternal family areas are those of the workers, characteristic of the tenement areas and the immigrant colonies, such as the Ghetto and Little Sicily, where the husband rules the home. The families are large. The interests of the wife are confined to the affairs of the home and the care of the children.

The equalitarian family areas are the residential districts wherein live the middle and professional classes. Here there are children, though families tend to be small. There is the maximum of equality in the relationship between husband and wife. The wife has interests outside the home, delegating the care of the children largely to a nursemaid.

The maternal family areas are those of the commuter, primarily the neighborhoods of the upper *bourgeoisie*. These outlying districts are characterized by single houses, typically bungalows, and large yards. There are children here also. The wife tends naturally to become the head of the family, at least so far as neighborhood relations are concerned, for the husband is absent from home most of the twenty-four hours. Any interest taken in the affairs of the community falls to the wife.

In a city the size of Chicago these five different types of areas tend to take an idealized form of concentric circles. The first or innermost circle is that of the non-family areas—the downtown business district. The second circle represents the paternal family areas. In this area land values are high, but the buildings are not adapted to the uses to which the land will eventually be put by the invading commercial and industrial development. Until the invasion is complete, low rents make this district a favorable location for immigrant colonies, rooming houses and vice. The emancipated family is found here also, though it is hardly characteristic. In fact, the areas of the emancipated family tend to lie along the boundaries of other areas, following the lines of rapid transportation.

The third circle is that of the equalitarian family areas. This is the true apartment area where the family may move from time to time but is likely to stay within the same general community for a considerable length of time. Transportation is by surface cars, elevated railways, automobiles, motor coaches, subways, and steam railways. Beyond this is the outer circle of the suburbs or the maternal family areas of

single houses where the automobile and the commuters' special are the chief means of transportation.

How may the varying characteristics of these different family areas help to explain disorganization in the family life within them?

In seventy communities in Chicago, family disintegration shows a range from no cases at all during 1919, the year studied, to 68 broken marriages per 10,000 of population. (Chap. V, "Family Disorganization," discusses the source of these data and gives a detailed table of rates.) This means that within Chicago there is as great a range in the practice of family disintegration as in the whole of the United States, excluding Nevada. And yet here the legislative and administrative factors are constant while for the United States much of the diversity of rates may be explained in terms of differing legal codes and practices. Those communities with the highest rates of family disintegration tend to form an innermost zone, with a diminution in the rates as one goes out from the center of the city until a band of communities is reached in which family disintegration is infrequent. Obviously, the distribution is not perfect—lines of rapid transportation create mobility in certain outlying communities and increase the rate of family disintegration. Certain immigrant colonies, on the other hand, though centrally located, because of religious taboos against divorce do not show the amount of family disintegration one might expect otherwise.

Chicago communities may further be classified with reference to the prevailing form of family disintegration, as areas of divorce and desertion; areas of desertion; areas of divorce; and areas of neither divorce nor desertion. These also tend to be found in zones in the order named, proceeding from the center of the city outward.

Comparison of this classification of family disintegration with the earlier one of family areas reveals a correlation between the maternal family areas and the communities in which there is no family disintegration; the paternal family areas and communities with only desertion; the equalitarian family areas and communities with both divorce and desertion, as well as those areas in which there is divorce only. The emancipated family, being an interstitial group, ecologically, cannot be said to be correlated with any particular group of communities classed with reference to family disintegration, though divorce is prevalent.

These findings reveal not only the great disparity between the rate of family disintegration in one part of the city and that in another, but also the regularity with which family disintegration is associated with certain forces producing mobility, such as the expansion of industrial organization, the extension of money economy to an increasing number of the interests of life, the increase in communication, and the breakdown of neighborhood contacts, with its accompanying disappearance of the restrictive force of neighborhood opinion. The degree to which these

forces diminish as one proceeds outward from the center of the city has never been adequately studied. Yet these differences in the factors of "location" seem to be closely related to the prevalence and type of family disorganizations.

In the outlying sections of the city are found conditions very much as one finds them in the country. The family as we know it today developed under rural conditions where contacts were intimate and family status fixed. The center of the city represents the other extreme—casual and formal contacts in which one's dress and "front" determine one's status. The significant thing is that the situation at the center of the city represents only an exaggeration of what one finds in all the areas between the two extremes.

The tendency is for contacts in all areas of the city to become impersonal. The family has not yet adapted itself to this change in social relations and accordingly we see its disorganization on every hand. There are, of course, indications that a new type of family organization is appearing which has adapted itself to the conditions of city life. How prevalent this new form of family relationship has become and how able it will be to withstand the disorganizing forces of city life cannot be said at this time. Statistics of family disintegration show only those cases in which there was a failure to adapt the family relationship to city conditions.

The current cannot be stemmed, as so many reformers seem to think, by going back to old ways and old customs. The only line of progress lies in the direction of an objective study of city life through first-hand investigation without too many presumptions regarding the nature of the problem being studied. The problem of the disorganization of the family is only a part of the disorganization generally prevalent in the city. The family has come to the city from the country and has been disorganized in its journey. It cannot and will not become organized by returning to the country, but only by working out new habits, new points of view, new ideals, adapted to the complicated and shifting conditions of city life.

3. *Community of Interest as a Basis of Family Solidarity*[1]

I should like to begin the discussion of Professor Groves' paper by a reference to another contribution, on much the same subject, made at Buffalo by a speaker at the Conference on Family Life in America Today. At that conference, Professor Ogburn showed how, although one after another of its earlier functions have been shorn away from the family, it nevertheless still retains one indispensable function—that of furnishing the affection needed by the developing personality.

[1] Adapted from COLCORD, JOANNA C., Community of Interest as a Basis for Family Solidarity, *Social Forces*, vol. 6, pp. 577–579, June, 1928.

I found myself wishing, as I listened to that paper, that Professor Ogburn had defined a little more closely what he meant by affection. It is a word which embraces many facets of meaning. Just what, within its compass, are we to think of as factors in family life which no other institution can supply?

I believe that the central factor is community of interests. The individual must have somewhere a group who cares about what happens to him; and this caring must be more vital than the loose and casual interest of a group of friends or a fraternal organization. (Might it be pointed out in passing that the pledges of mutual defense and support exchanged in fraternal organizations are probably a formal attempt to imitate the natural bonds of offensive and defensive alliance within the family?) The life of this group must be so bound up with the individual's that it is a matter of the deepest importance to them what he does or becomes.

This factor is included in or related to family affection, but it can exist independently of the rather vague and tempered emotion which the word calls up to our minds. Affection is hardly compatible with prolonged strife within the family group, but community of interests can and often does survive the disappearance of all recognized forms of affection. A deeply critical attitude toward one member, while it cripples that individual's personality, is not incompatible with a deep underlying sense that the critics are so critical simply because they care so vitally. The last factor to vanish, in the disintegrating family, is this very unity of interest And I believe that this fact explains why this is so often the social worker's point of attack in attempting the treatment of family disorganization. We speak of it as an appeal to the sense of responsibility, but it is more than that; it is an attempt to reawaken a sense of the interdependence of the members of a family group.

Briggs had a series of cartoons a few years back in which he showed the homecoming at night of the followers of various daily occupations. The office boy would be shown recounting how he got the better of a pushing salesman, and what the boss said in approbation; the telephone girl repeats the words with which she rebuked the "fresh guy," to her mother's adoring praise, and her kid brother's half-jeering approval. Real folks they were, giving their egos a chance to expand a little in the genial atmosphere of home. And in his later series, "Mr. and Mrs.," who can doubt the essential unity of interests of Joe and Vi, even though domestic discord seems to be a weekly visitor to their home?

At its best, the family is not only the group that cares what happens to its members; it is the place where the ego, wounded by competitive contacts with the world, can get renewal of strength. True, undiscriminating praise and admiration at home can be carried so far as to create a real fissure of personality in its contrast with the world outside. But

a certain amount of praise and partisanship is a necessary stimulus to the development of a healthy egotism. The man who knows, unconsciously, that his mother is always going to see his best side, excuse his mistakes, see him head and shoulders above all his competitors, will be heartened by this knowledge even though he knows it is an amiable delusion. And he will have a subconscious incentive to live so as to keep that delusion intact.

But even when this element is lacking, when home is a place of recrimination and faultfinding, the solid earth does not shift under our feet so long as we are positive that the family group is emotionally tied up with our concerns. If that is lacking, manifestations of casual affection become meaningless, praise and approval mere formalities. Many of us, I am sure, are familiar with that widespread terror of childhood, the fear lest our parents are concealing from us the fact that we are not really their own child, but adopted! Something of the same feeling of homelessness in an unfriendly world results when we become convinced that those belonging to us no longer share vitally in our concerns.

A book which should be read by social workers and sociologists alike, for the picture it gives of stable *versus* unstable family life, is William McFee's "Casuals of the Sea." In the contrasted portraits of the Goodriches and the Browns, we see the latter, vigorous, acquisitive, with an aim which never by any chance exceeds their grasp, narrow of vision and restricted in ideas—and yet so bound together by an unquestioning loyalty to the family and all that belongs to it that, within the limits they have set for themselves, they are a successful and perfectly functioning group. Their vastly more interesting and agreeable cousins, the Goodriches, full of ideals and vague impulses of affection, lose touch with each other as soon as they have turned the corner, and except where the Browns come forward to offer them an occasional temporary haven, drift on the winds of adversity to certain shipwreck, singly and alone.

Another point I should like to make is the length of the process of family rebuilding. I am sure Professor Groves realized that also, but the process as he described it sounded swifter than it generally is. Courtroom reconciliations are notorious for their brevity; it's the period of aftercare that counts. Pretty constant encouragement for from one to three years is about the only effective treatment from the social case work point of view. There is not time to give illustrations of this, but I have a number, in which the treatment ranged all the way from training a Polish peasant woman to adopt American standards of home-making, introducing musical evenings into the home, restraining another wife from flaunting her superior knowledge over her husband, moving a family to lessen the undesirable intervention of relatives, and teaching an immigrant husband, who had omitted the process, how to court his wife.

4. *Marriage Incompatibility*[1]

The scientific study of the processes involved in marriage incompatibility, or family disorganization, is still in its infancy, in spite of the abundance of contributions to the subject. This paper is an attempt to apply the results of research in this field to a specific case of marriage breakdown as a means of clarifying our approach to case analysis.

It has become a commonplace observation that the family is a social group whose members constitute a "unity of interacting personalities." In other words, the normal expression of the unity of a family takes the form of an integration of its members into a social group. Husband and wife, through marriage, form such a group, and the basic solidarity and continuity of the group's existence, whether children are born to the union or not, is primarily based upon the stability of the marital relationship. The stabilized family as a unity of interacting personalities possesses the following characteristics:

1. The subordination of the members to a common objective. This common objective may be chiefly economic, it may center about the education of the children, if these exist, it may concern the realization of a social ideal of mutuality of attitudes between its members, it may be conceived as service to the state or to the deity, or it may be directed toward the preservation of family traditions and social status.
2. The conscious cooperation of its members to realize the common objective.
3. A reciprocity of personal services by which each member becomes dependent upon the other members, the entire group representing an interdependence of activities of an intimate and mutual character.
4. A coordination of the rôles of the members of the family in terms of obligations and privileges, such that each member assumes a positional relationship or status to every other member which defines his duties and permits, within limits, the personal satisfaction of wishes.
5. Participation of the family in a social or communal world by which the family plays a rôle and secures a positional or status relationship of prestige in reference to other families.
6. A consensus of emotional attitudes in which each individual member more or less harmoniously relates his life to that of every other member and to the group as a whole. In relation to other members the attitudes are those of affection, sympathy, and respect; to the group as a whole the attitudes are those of loyalty, pride, and responsibility.

The disorganization of a family is a process which destroys its unity. It takes the form of a conflict in attitudes, constituting a condition of tension and strain in the relationships between the members, and more especially between husband and wife. The effect is partial or complete. If complete, the family disintegrates. Family disorganization as a process involves, at one or more points, the following aspects:

[1] Adapted from KRUEGER, E. T., A Study of Marriage Incompatibility, *Family*, vol. 9, pp. 53–60, April, 1928.

1. The common objective disappears and individual aims are substituted, by choice or necessity.
2. Cooperation ceases.
3. Mutual services tend to be withheld.
4. The rôles of the members are no longer coordinated and defined.
5. The status of the family in its social world undergoes a change.
6. Emotional attitudes become antagonistic or are replaced by attitudes of indifference.

The term "tensions" is now commonly used to express the causative factors in family disorganization. A tension in its sociological sense is, in reality, a tension or conflict *situation* which breeds certain attitudes between persons in the groups. Thus an economic tension is a situation in which the economic factor is the source of conflicting attitudes between husband and wife.

A number of attempts have been made to classify tensions in order to secure classes or type tensions which might be useful in diagnosis and in analysis of cases. As is true of any classification, types are always abstractions, and the number and kind secured will depend upon the point of view of the investigator. Meroney has four tensions with numerous subclasses, Burgess has seven, and Mowrer is satisfied with four general types of family tensions. This paper, in the effort to gain concreteness and to escape oversimplification, suggests a classification of thirteen tensions.

This classification seems more useful than those which reduce their terms to more abstract and inclusive classes in that it permits the location and description of tensions in a greater variety of situations, although it loses somewhat in the matter of exclusiveness of items. The thirteen tensions are (*a*) economic; (*b*) occupation; (*c*) response (sex); (*d*) control (positional relationship of members to each other); (*e*) status (positional relationship of the family in social participation); (*f*) culture; (*g*) philosophy of life; (*h*) temperament; (*i*) health; (*j*) individual capacities and abilities; (*k*) appetites and habits; (*l*) personal behavior pattern; and (*m*) age.

The terms used in the above classification are not meant to suggest metaphysical forces. They are only convenient labels which locate causal factors. Moreover, the particular way in which the factor operates must be further determined by analysis of the individual case. For example, a cultural tension is one in which the husband and wife represent diverse cultural patterns of behavior. These patterns involve such matters as food and its preparation, religion, manners, and traditional attitudes between racial and nationality groups. If a Jew marries a Gentile, a Norwegian marries an Italian, or a Frenchman marries an American, we may expect conflict situations due to cultural differences in the training of the husband and wife.

The problem of classification is complicated and made difficult by the fact that tensions are interrelated and sequential in character. An economic tension as a problem of sheer poverty, of the equal earning of income and sharing of expenditures between husband and wife, or of economic status as compared with other families may create a conflict of attitudes which involves such other tensions as occupation, control, social status, individual capacities and abilities, and culture. Response relations of sex and affection frequently have their source in health and age problems, or, in turn, are sources of conflict in occupation, control, and culture. A classification of tensions must, therefore, include the concrete factors which lead to a conflict of attitudes, and leave to case analysis the statement of the sequential and integrative relationships between factors. Tensions, therefore, do not operate in isolation, but in an integrated set of tensions, to which the term "constellation" has been applied. The sequential character of tensions has been noted by certain authors. Attempts have also been made to characterize a constellation of tensions by indicating the dominance of some one tension.

I wish, however, to restate the problem in more complete form. In the analysis of any case of marriage incompatibility, the first step consists in the discovery of the more immediate tensions which seem to be present. The next step is to secure a detailed life history of the premarriage social background of each of the principals, and a social record of the marriage relationship. From this data it will be possible to construct a time series of concrete events and situations which reveal conflicts of attitudes between husband and wife, and to state the significant cultural and individual factors which have operated in these situations. When obtainable, medical and psychological records may prove valuable, and in some cases it will be possible to have examinations made. It should be remembered, however, that the latter data are significant only in so far as the conditions they reveal are factors in creating a conflict of attitudes. The third step consists in the analysis of all the foregoing data to bring out:

1. The entire constellation or configuration of tensions operating in the case.
2. The tensions which cumulatively have gradually become more intense.
3. The circular interplay upon one another of tensions which intensify each other.
4. The sequential relationship of tensions in which one or more tensions lead to other tensions.
5. The rise and disappearance of tensions.
6. The combination of certain tensions within a general configuration or constellation which decisively and conclusively interplay to dominate the process of disorganization. These may be called primary tensions.
7. The tensions which play a minor or subordinate role in creating conflicting attitudes. These may be present in the early stage of the process, or come into existence as by-products of the primary tensions. These may be called secondary tensions.

The emphasis in the above statement upon the interplay of tensions permits the analysis of the process of disorganization in terms of an interrelated and sequential set of factors; or, in other words, a statement of a process which is predictable and capable of verification. Such analysis takes into account the essentially organic nature of relationships within the family in dynamic terms of growth and change, as opposed to the atomic and static conception of the marriage group, and provides a basis for intelligent treatment.

The following case study is presented in narrative form. This is by intention. Descriptive materials are interwoven with the narrative at points where they seem most likely to give the reader a vivid picture of the situation. Non-technical language has been used in the narrative to preserve its reality and to prevent, as far as possible, the introduction of the investigators' opinion. Lack of space has prevented the introduction of much first-hand or raw material. In any case study, the persons involved should have the right to be heard, and in their own words. I have selected a family case in which children are present, but in which the problem is clearly and solely a matter of incompatibility in the marriage relationship. Moreover, in this family the children are not behavior problems.

No new methods were used in acquiring the data for study. The interview and observation were relied upon to yield materials. It is doubtful that the use of the stenographic report method in group interviewing is advisable in dealing with family cases. Confidential interviewing will probably remain as the most useful method in dealing with all unadjusted persons. The writer, in addition to interviewing various persons and making observations, sat as friendly advisor with the judge of the juvenile court when the principals repeatedly carried their troubles to him.

The Cross Case

Mr. and Mrs. Cross live in one of the south-central states. They are of Anglo-Saxon parentage, of native southern stock, with rural social backgrounds. They were married fifteen years ago. They have four children, a girl of fourteen, a boy of twelve, a girl of eleven, and a boy of nine. Mr. Cross is now thirty-nine years old; Mrs. Cross thirty-four years old. At the time of marriage their ages were twenty-four and nineteen years, respectively. Neither Mr. Cross nor Mrs. Cross show any physical or mental abnormalities, nor do their individual histories reveal any physical disabilities or prolonged illnesses. In fact, both Mr. and Mrs. Cross are intelligent, healthy, and robust individuals. Mr. Cross has no bad habits, in the common-sense use of the term. He does not drink, he has not been known to gamble, and there is no evidence of sex irregularities of conduct.

Mr. Cross was born on a farm, the only male child among seven children. His father owned a productive 200-acre farm. His mother died when he was six, but the family remained well organized under the direction of the father, who was a man of recognized ability and genial personality. The son received an elementary school education and up to the time of his marriage remained at home working with his father in the care and management of the farm.

Mrs. Cross was also born on a farm, in a neighboring county. She was the third oldest of four children, two boys and two girls. The family was financially and socially of a status comparable to Mr. Cross's family. The cultural backgrounds of both families were very similar. Mrs. Cross received an elementary school education, the last year of which (eighth grade) was received in a town of some five thousand population, thirty miles from the farm. Mrs. Cross, her younger sister, and her mother spent the last school year in this community. Mrs. Cross says she learned how to dress well and how to adjust herself to town ways during this year away from the farm. After completing the grades Mrs. Cross remained on her father's farm until she married Mr. Cross.

Mrs. Cross met Mr. Cross during a series of protracted meetings held in a small community near Mrs. Cross's home. Mr. Cross, at the instance of a distant kinsman, visited his kinsman, and attended the meetings. Mr. and Mrs. Cross became acquainted during the meetings, fell in love with each other, and two months later were married. Both speak of their courtship as romantic, and to both it remains a pleasant memory over against the subsequent years of incompatibility and conflict. That the courtship situation had a modern tinge is seen in the remark which Mrs. Cross made after her first introduction to Mr. Cross: "There's the man who is going to be my husband."

After marriage Mr. and Mrs. Cross lived on Mr. Cross's father's farm, his father and six sisters removing to a house built on the farm near the old home. The management of the farm fell largely upon the shoulders of the son. Two years later the father died, leaving the farm entirely in the hands of the son, except that his sisters retained a share each in the estate. Mr. and Mrs. Cross lived on this farm seven years, during which period their four children were born.

Mr. Cross, without his father's supervision, failed to make farming a success. He seemed to lack managerial ability, and was forever buying new machinery and running heavily into debt. He was always behind in his store accounts and seemed to buy without discrimination and judgment. His attitudes toward these years on the farm largely took the form of blaming Mrs. Cross for lack of cooperation and poor household management.

Mrs. Cross's story of those seven years pictures herself as occupying a subordinate rôle to her husband. She had no control over finances,

did little of the buying, and had no voice in expenditures or in the management of the farm. She seemed to conform to the rural *mores* of recognizing the supremacy and authority of the husband in all matters. She tells a story of keeping up her household without assistance, caring for her children, and doing the cooking, washing, and cleaning. In addition to this, she did the chores in the barn, milking and feeding the cows, and caring for the poultry and pigs. At feeding and milking time she would take the youngest child in his cab and proceed to the barn to do the chores. In addition to this, upon demand of her husband, she assisted in the fields when farm work was rushing.

Mrs. Cross's attitude toward this period of her marriage reveals a growing discontent and sense of injustice. She said that Mr. Cross would never assist her in the home, was continually nagging and complaining about his food, about the children, about her reluctance to assist in the fields, and about their debts. Mrs. Cross had a little money left her upon the death of her father which she refused to give to Mr. Cross because she felt that it would be soon dissipated. In his complaints Mr. Cross was supported by his sisters, none of whom were married, who felt that Mrs. Cross dressed better than was necessary, put on superior airs, and was failing to help her husband make a success.

Mrs. Cross's attitudes toward their sex life centered largely upon the frequency with which children were born, and Mr. Cross's unwillingness to deal with the problem. She felt that Mr. Cross displayed rather constant passion, but she considered this natural and submitted herself upon the demand as a part of her rôle in marriage. She did feel, however, that her husband should reckon with the fact that he could not afford a large family, and she herself felt indisposed to face the worry and work involved.

After seven years on the farm and a growing incompatibility in the home, Mrs. Cross suggested moving to the local town in which Mrs. Cross owned a house and lot given her by her mother. In this way she hoped to rid herself of the oppressive work on the farm, the loneliness of farm life, the criticism of her husband's sisters, and the steadily accumulating load of debts. She expected her husband would get work in the town and, with nothing to manage, stay out of debt. Mr. Cross sold his share of the farm, paid off his debts, but to Mrs. Cross's deep chagrin, bought another farm, heavily mortgaged, lying on the edge of the community.

Now came four years more of struggle against debt and increasing deficits. Mrs. Cross refused to work on the farm. She had a little money of her own which permitted her to dress well; she made friends, participated in the general life of the community, and gave herself to the rearing of her children. Looking back in retrospect to this period her husband finds nothing to complain of in her conduct except that she was

of no help to him and would not share her money with him. During this period Mrs. Cross solved, in some fashion, the matter of childbirth, although her husband neither then nor throughout their marriage seemed interested in the matter.

The relationship between husband and wife in town was no better than on the farm. Quarreling, faultfinding, and nagging went on, but Mrs. Cross was no longer wholly subservient and submissive. She began to oppose her husband, to complain of his inability to be businesslike in his affairs; and to criticize his judgment. Mr. Cross, in turn, tried to bring Mrs. Cross under control, to make her obey his wishes. He was dictatorial in household affairs, criticized his wife's interest in clothes, upbraided her for unwillingness to work, and was jealous of her friends. He did not consult her in business affairs, but expected her to acquiesce in his judgment. Mrs. Cross was always in the dark concerning the future of the family. She tried to reason with her husband and attempted to assist him in his planning, but without success. She possessed an ability superior to that of her husband to manage and direct the family's economic life, but was balked in most attempts to exercise the ability.

They had bought the farm when war prices of land were at the peak. As time went on, land values dropped, farm prices slumped, and Mr. Cross soon found himself heavily in debt with no outlook for recovery. Mrs. Cross permitted the home to be mortgaged. At the end of four years the mortgages were foreclosed, and the house and farm were both lost, together with what little money Mrs. Cross possessed. They were now penniless. Mrs. Cross alone seemed able to see a way out and suggested that they remove to a large city some fifty miles away. This they did.

Mr. Cross became a car inspector's helper in the railroad yards. Being a new man he served a year or more as an extra. His wages did not average $20 a week and he was frequently laid off for a week or more at a time. Mr. Cross suggested that they take in boarders and, although somewhat opposed to the idea, Mrs. Cross agreed. Mr. Cross secured four railroad men as boarders.

Mrs. Cross took to city life with avidity. She liked its bigness, the press of the people, the excitement of shopping, the pleasure of going to the movies, and the opportunity of making new friends. Mr. Cross liked the city well enough, but found that he was more than ever unable to control Mrs. Cross. He did not make enough money for the family's needs, but taking in boarders seemed temporarily to solve the financial situation. It also kept Mrs. Cross from making contacts outside the family and forced her to assist with the economic problem. It gave Mr. Cross an opportunity to exercise his authority and to maintain his domination of the household.

Mrs. Cross did most of the purchasing for the family needs, but on credit. Mr. Cross insisted on paying the bills; he furnished Mrs. Cross little or no money. Bills, however, were never met promptly, accounts were allowed to run with partial payments, until they became too large. Credit would then be shut off, and garnishment of the husband's salary followed. The cost of such legal collections merely used up more money. Mrs. Cross was not extravagant in her buying, but the lack of any system of correlating income with expenditures worked havoc.

Mrs. Cross began to upbraid her husband for not paying bills and for his unbusinesslike methods. She hated poverty. She was restless under her husband's domination of the family's affairs. She felt helpless in dealing with the situation. She tried to get Mr. Cross to let her handle all household financial matters but failed. Mr. Cross gave her no money to purchase the clothes she wanted. She got money for this purpose from her mother, and managed to keep up her personal appearance. This infuriated her husband the more. He insisted that the money should have been given to him to solve the debt problem. He accused his wife of willful extravagance and unwillingness to cooperate with him. "I am doing all I can to provide for the family. She does nothing, and makes it hard for me," was his explanation. "He seems to think that a woman has no rights, that I must give in to him, follow his advice, and turn over every cent to him. He has already used up what little money I had. I can't say he is lazy. He is willing to work. We could manage to get along, if he would pay his debts. And then he wants to decide what I should wear, insists upon laying off work to go with me to buy my clothes. I am getting tired of being in debt, of taking orders, of listening to nagging," was the way Mrs. Cross saw things.

Matters became worse when Mr. Cross became jealous of one of the boarders, and suspicious of his wife's fidelity. He came home at unexpected hours, in the effort to find evidences of his wife's guilt. One night he made the excuse of paying a coal bill, and left the house only to hide in the shrubbery to watch the house. Slinking around the house he found suspicious signs. The boarder's shade was down and he could see his wife in the bedroom with the children. He tried the back door. It was locked. He kicked and pounded it until it was opened, and then accused his wife of love-making, and ordered all of the boarders out of the house. This made Mrs. Cross furious with indignation.

Mrs. Cross is physically attractive, very blonde, with smooth skin and wavy chestnut brown hair. She is buxom, lively, smiling, ready in speech, self-assertive but friendly in manner. Men like her, and she likes men. Indeed, she seems to prefer contacts with men, although she has many friends among women. There was no evidence, however, that she permitted liberties or that she had broken with the *mores* of early training.

Mr. Cross is slow of speech and somewhat quiet in manner. He is not aggressive, makes friends readily, but is inclined to limit his social intimacies to his family. He has a good reputation as a workman and his fellow workmen like him. He is in no sense a leader, however. In appearance he is tall and even handsome. He usually dresses neatly. One of his traits consisted in retailing his family troubles to casual acquaintances, to his fellow workmen, and to strangers. This angered his wife, because it made the family situation a public scandal and hurt her pride.

After the expulsion of the boarders from the home, Mrs. Cross told her husband that it was up to him to support the family. He insisted that she find work. She refused. Things dragged on for several years, with intermittent reconciliations and eruptions. During this period store accounts accumulated until there seemed no way of meeting them. Mrs. Cross received money from time to time from her mother and from an uncle, and managed to buy clothes for herself and the children. Mr. Cross became more abusive. He often struck Mrs. Cross, when she defied him. His suspicions concerning her infidelity grew. He watched her closely, and she knew that he did. Sex contacts between husband and wife, however, did not cease. In fact, they increased. According to the story of Mrs. Cross, her husband became excessively passionate and almost violent in his approaches. When she at times tried to escape him, he pursued her, throwing household articles and coal at her. At first she seemed disposed to make out a case of repulsion and abhorrence of her husband's sex activity, but finally admitted that she did not greatly resent his sex excesses. She seemed still to consider herself, in some respect, duty bound to submit to him, and gave evidence that he was still sexually attractive to her. She felt, however, that his violence was uncalled for. Her attitude is seen in the remark: "He seemed never to be satisfied, I often became worn out, but I could have stood it, if only he had provided for us as a man should provide for his family, and if he had stopped his eternal nagging, faultfinding, and being suspicious."

Matters reached a breaking point when Mr. Cross began to force Mrs. Cross to get work. Electric light and gas bills were allowed to go unpaid until meters were turned off. Rent was several times left unpaid, and agents threatened eviction. Finally, in desperation, Mrs. Cross took the children, left her husband, rented some rooms, and got a job with a company selling women's wear. Her business ability soon attracted the attention of the company. She became district manager with thirty saleswomen under her charge, and had supervision of a territory of twelve counties. Her net earnings exceeded $300 a month.

There now followed some months of repeated attempts at a reconciliation, both on the part of the husband and of others. Mr. and Mrs. Cross both approached the judge of the juvenile court for advice. These

interviews were lengthy and thorough attempts were made to get at the source of incompatibility. Both parties were admonished as to their failings, and Mr. Cross was warned that his attitudes and activities could only lead to disaster. Finally the judge asked the principals to appear together in his chambers at which time they were reconciled, and for several months lived together. Mrs. Cross continued her work, but refused to turn her money over to her husband. She insisted that he had to meet household expenses out of his own earnings. Mr. Cross became bitterly opposed to Mrs. Cross's occupation and accused her of meeting men while ostensibly going about her business. Finally, however, all the old difficulties came to the surface again, and Mrs. Cross once more took the children and left Mr. Cross.

Now followed some six months of effort on the part of Mr. Cross to prove his wife guilty of misconduct. He set traps for her, hired detectives to shadow her, interested the police in watching her, and finally offered a fellow employee $50 to become intimate with Mrs. Cross. Probably Mr. Cross had no idea of going further than showing that his wife was susceptible to love-making. Mrs. Cross discovered this latter plan and felt that the point of irreconcilability had been reached. Some months later she instituted divorce on the ground of non-support and cruelty, and was granted a degree. Mr. Cross was assessed $50 a month for the support of his children.

A word must be said concerning the children of this family. No delinquency or misconduct has appeared in the behavior of the children. They are well behaved and display evidences of integration in the family in spite of the incompatibility of the parents. They favor the mother, but have not abandoned contact with the father. Mr. Cross gives them gifts, probably partly because he loves them, and partly because he is anxious to justify himself. The family, minus the father, seems to have established a well-organized group life. For a period of several months after the divorce it was necessary for the mother to place her children with child-caring institutions.

The mother gave up her work with the sales company when she received a small legacy at the death of her mother. With this money she made the initial payment on a small three-apartment house, and with the apartment and room rentals, the court assessment for the children, and the earnings of the oldest boy who peddles papers and works in a nearby drug store after school hours, the mother manages to keep the children in school and make small payments on the house. The father lives in a rooming house, continues to work steadily, but feels lonely and depressed much of the time. He recently became acquainted with a divorced woman who has two adolescent children, owns a house, and has an income of $100 from the assessment made by the court for the support of the children. In interviewing Mr. Cross it seems apparent that he is as

much interested in revenge upon Mrs. Cross as he is in finding security and response in this new relationship.

The more immediate or primary tensions which led to family disintegration in the above case of marriage incompatibility are (*a*) economic, (*b*) control, (*c*) individual capacities and abilities, and (*d*) status. These four tensions form an interrelated series and must be analyzed as such if we are to understand the disorganization process.

The economic situation in this family constituted the central problem leading to disorganization. The husband's inability to provide adequately for his family and to achieve economic independence was a constant source of conflict between husband and wife. This economic situation was greatly aggravated by the presence of a control tension. A study of the life histories of the principals and of the complete social record of the marriage brings an important fact to light. Both husband and wife had the same rural background, in which the patriarchal conception of family organization is the accepted pattern. The husband, according to this pattern, conceived himself as the head of the family and superior to his wife, and expected his wife to submit to his control and direction. He wanted her to contribute to the financial support of the family, but to have no voice in the expenditure of money or in the financial plans of the family. The husband's economic failure probably accentuated his unwillingness to share the family management with his wife. The attitudes of the wife were at first consistent with the husband's attitudes, but they show a gradual emancipation from the traditional conception of the wife's position or status in the family. The wife's emancipation, in this case, is due partly to contacts stimulating an interest in leisure and freedom from drudgery, in dress, and social participation, and partly to the economic failure of the husband which forced the wife to attempt the rôle of directing the welfare of the family. There is every indication that the husband loved his wife and wanted desperately to keep her. On the other hand, he felt that his self-respect demanded that he remain the authoritative head of his family.

The economic and control tensions were further aggravated by a tension centering about individual capacities and abilities. The wife as contrasted with the husband shows superior capacities of intelligence, judgment, and management, as evidenced by her success in her first business adventure and in the reorganization of the family's economy after her divorce. The wife's anger and scorn toward her husband's impractical ways and lack of judgment show clearly that she was conscious of her husband's disabilities, and the husband's bitterness and his opposition to his wife's plans show that he knew she considered herself superior. We have in the case, thus far, an irreconcilable situation in which an inferior husband and a superior wife find it impossible to

rationalize their respective positions in reference to the family pattern which places the husband at the head of the family.

The fourth tension, status, completes the group of primary tensions operative in the Cross case. The wife was deeply sensitive to public opinion and gossip; she disliked, extremely, the publicity her husband gave to the family difficulties. The husband seemed insensitive to public opinion, probably assuming that the public would approve his position. In this the husband still conceived his world in rural terms. The wife, on the other hand, seems to have taken over the middle-class and city attitudes in which front, fashion, and status become vital considerations to the individual. The husband's more or less public impeachment of his wife's moral character was an immediate cause of the final break in marital relations.


A study of the factors of culture, philosophy of life, temperament, health, appetites, and habits, personal behavior pattern, and age reveals no conflict of attitudes except those centering about personal behavior patterns. The husband was more or less introvertive and the wife decidedly extrovertive. The husband approached his financial problem with little or no insight to practical necessities; the wife, on the other hand, was decisive and direct in all her activities.

No tension is present concerning the husband's occupation. The wife is quite satisfied with her husband's means of making a livelihood. A conflict of attitudes, however, arose over the wife's occupation. The husband felt that his wife's opposition to him could only be due to the fact that she was becoming interested in other men. He imagined that her occupation furnished unusual opportunity for clandestine meetings.

The response tension in this case centers about the wife's opposition to the rapid birth of children, the husband's suspicion of infidelity on the part of his wife, and the tendency in the husband toward excess. The first of these sex tensions disappeared after the family removed from the farm. The second vitally affected the unity of the family, as we noted above, but is more significantly a problem of control and status than of sex. The third did not greatly disturb marital relations. Indeed it is apparent that the wife continued her response relations with her husband long after she lost her respect for him, and after he had accused her of immoral conduct. It is a striking fact that often sex relations can continue without conflict in spite of the existence of other serious tensions. Perhaps we too frequently read into a case the attitudes of an educated middle-class group toward sex relations, and assume that response relations are always disturbed when attitudes of respect and admiration cease.

The constellation of tensions in the Cross case may be listed as follows: (*a*) economic, (*b*) control, (*c*) individual capacities and abilities, (*d*) status, (*e*) personal behavior pattern, (*f*) occupation, and (*g*) response.

Of these, the primary tensions are those of (*a*) economic, (*b*) control, (*c*) individual capacities and abilities, and (*d*) status; the remainder are secondary tensions. The interlocked and interrelated and circular character of tensions is strikingly illustrated. The sequence of tensions begins with economic tension, extends to control and individual capacities and abilities, develops tensions of status and response, intensifies the economic and control tensions, spreads to tensions of personal behavior pattern, status, occupation, and response, further intensifies the control tension, and ends in a status tension. This sequence may be schematically represented by the following diagram:



5. *The Economic Type of Tension*[1]

Let me present them to you: Mr. and Mrs. John Conroy of Detroit, or Buffalo, or Philadelphia, or St. Louis, or any other typical American place that you prefer.

Mr. Conroy is a skilled mechanic, receiving a modest but fairly comfortable wage. At forty-two he is a sober, quiet, staunch American of the backbone of the nation type. He works regularly, honestly, and intelligently. He pays his debts and minds his own business. He is a good husband and father. All of his wage goes into the support of his wife and children and savings for old age. He has some friends, but his duties of keeping the house repaired come ahead of convivial pleasures.

When wife or children have been ill, which was not often to be sure, he has stood by with monumental patience. He likes quietness and good order in everything. He goes to church sometimes, but he does not care much for the new fangled ways in churches. Doctrinal or ecclesiastical disputes do not interest him and he does not choose to put his small amount of leisure into church social activities.

Mr. Conroy is not an experimenter with life. He keeps to the well-worn grooves of hard work, honesty, sobriety, and self-respect.

Similarly, at forty Mrs. Conroy is a solid character. She married at twenty. Before that she had helped at home with the big family and the mother who was not well. Since then she has been occupied with establishing her home, having her two children, raising them and looking after Mr. Conroy's needs. She is a quiet, methodical, and kindly woman.

An excellent housekeeper, Mrs. Conroy kept her house "a model of neatness," as folks used to say. She washed, ironed, and scrubbed.

[1] Adapted from DEARDORFF, NEVA R., A Puzzle in Cross Words, *Survey*, vol. 59, pp. 288–290, December, 1927.

She cooked, baked, and canned. She sewed, mended, and darned. Though her house was not artistic or flooded with sunshine, it was almost surgically clean and in perfect order. The Conroys' was the most comfortable home in the drab middle-class neighborhood in which they lived.

The Conroy children, Edward, eighteen, and Martha, sixteen, were well behaved and unspoiled. Like their parents, they were conscientious, obedient, quiet, and industrious. None of the family was loquacious.

Everything about the Conroys suggested that they lived according to a plan. And certainly that was true of their finances. The Conroys found early that their circumstances required that they go in debt. Married very young with no affluent relatives, they had first bought their furniture on credit. No sooner was it paid for than the babies came and bills accumulated but were systematically paid off. After they had been married about eight years it was decided that they should buy their home. A couple of years of scrupulous economy, and they had enough to make a small initial payment. After that they were embarked on the building and loan scheme which required eleven years to pay off the debt. When Martha was twelve a piano was installed in their little parlor and Edward soon began helping toward the payments on it. The Conroys' affairs come to your attention when all of these various debts have been paid except about three hundred dollars still owing on the house.

Naturally these years of enforced thrift have created deeply ingrained habits, attitudes, and aspirations. But these are not identical with the different members of the family. Uncomplaining and frugal, Mr. Conroy has come to long for freedom from a sense of debt and insecurity. He looks forward eagerly to the day when the last payment will be made. Mrs. Conroy, also frugal in her habits and patient with all the restrictions of her life, has a somewhat less defined but almost stronger wish for a change from the years of routine administering of the household and family affairs. She does not want to do very differently from what she is doing, but somehow she wants a little more zest in life—a little fresh sap in the tree of her existence. She has not become consciously discontented, she regards herself as a successful wife and mother. She appreciates the good qualities of her husband and children.

But six months before you meet the Conroys a wholly unforseen situation had arisen, with effects cruelly devastating to the peace of mind and the tranquillity of their home. A distant and aged relative of Mrs. Conroy's had died, leaving her, as the mark of the gratitude of a lonely soul for trivial kindnesses, a little life insurance policy amounting to three hundred dollars. The Conroys had had no intimation of such a windfall. When the insurance company's representative called one evening to make the necessary inquiries for identification, they were taken quite unawares.

But while the agent lingered in their comfortable Morris chair and enjoyed with them the pleasurable event, Mr. and Mrs. Conroy's minds silently but rapidly adjusted to the new situation. Mr. Conroy saw himself in the office of the building and loan secretary clearing up the mortgage and receiving the deed to the property. Mrs. Conroy saw herself entering the big savings bank a few blocks away, opening an account in her own name and thereafter drawing the modest interest which the bank advertised. Mr. Conroy had always attended to the more important business affairs of the family. She had handled the household money, but this was all so carefully designated that she served only as a sort of forwarding agent. The elements of choice and chance were at a minimum in her department. Now she was to know in a small way the gratification of that sense of power which money brings.

Mr. Conroy's face was relaxed and genial, Mrs. Conroy's keyed up with excitement as they bid the agent goodnight.

At just that moment their happiness ended. No sooner were they alone than their wholly divergent purposes toward the three hundred dollars were expressed—almost simultaneously. Mrs. Conroy learned to her utter amazement that her husband had already decided regarding its disposal. It was to remain in her individual possession only long enough for her to endorse the check. Mr. Conroy could hardly believe his ears when he seemed to be hearing his wife refuse to apply this money to the project on which he had been slaving for so many years.

For the first time in their lives they sat up arguing far into the night, and the longer they argued the more convinced each became that his position was impregnable. Mr. Conroy pointed out that all he had ever made had gone into paying their expenses and acquiring their possessions. Had not his whole life been devoted to providing? That she would not likewise contribute when she could was unbelievable to him. Mrs. Conroy made it plain that she, too, had contributed all her time and strength to making a home for them and she expected to go on giving all of her time as long as she lived. Surely the contribution of all her time and effort was sufficient. She could see no reason why they should now suddenly depart from the program they had laid out for themselves. They had not counted on getting this money and they could surely go on as they had in the past, paying off the mortgage in the regular way.

Mr. Conroy anxiously asked if there was anything that Mrs. Conroy needed or wanted that she did not have. How did she plan to spend the money? She had nothing in mind that she especially wanted. There would doubtless be things that she would like to do or to buy with the interest but perhaps she would just let it accumulate.

The more each one rehearsed his case the clearer it became to him that he was invoking a principle of human right or justice. Like statesmen the world over, Mr. Conroy pointed out—not in these words, to be

sure—that his plan was only that of reason, of common sense, and of fairness to the group which shared common ends. Like the true capitalist-individualist, Mrs. Conroy stuck by her point that her personal ownership of this money was taking nothing away from the group that it had had before or had expected to get. For the group now to take it away from her personal dominion and ownership was unnecessary and destructive of a satisfaction in life which she had come to see she deeply craved. Of course she loved Mr. Conroy as she always had, and it was inconceivable to her that, if he loved her, he would not immediately see her position in this matter.

Well, there you are. You meet the Conroys six months after this night. They have debated the issue pro and con all during this time. Driven on by deep forces within them—the very rigidity which their long years of discipline had created was an element of no small importance—they see the cleavage of opinion between them grow more and more distinct. It enters all of their other relations like a slow poison. Mrs. Conroy becomes more and more religious; Mr. Conroy conceives a distaste for religion. It puts an element of strain into all of their habitual relations about money. They become self-conscious and censorious with each other. The children are drawn in and made miserable by this queer new tension between their father and mother. Presently Mr. and Mrs. Conroy begin to question whether they are still caring enough for each other to give sanction to their marital relations. Each asks himself whether he has ever really known the other through and through even though they have lived together for twenty years.

The check had been deposited temporarily in Mr. Conroy's account but neither one ventured to use it as he had planned on that first evening when the news came.

At the end of six months they are so worn down with their sickening unhappiness that they reach a decision to live apart. They seek legal advice as to the formal disposition of ther possessions and Mr. Conroy's legal obligation for the support of Mrs. Conroy. Renting part of the house will bring in enough income so that they need not live together.

6. *The Response Type of Tension*[1]

Up to March 6, when she killed Clifford Bleyer and ended her own life, Mrs. Randall of Chicago was one of the innumerable American folk whose conduct is very much their own affair. She was a high-school graduate with a fairly wide circle of acquaintances, but she was practically undistinguished and anonymous. Then she fired her deadly revolver, and publicity turned on her, lapped up the details of her tragedy, her personal

[1] Adapted from HACKETT, FRANCIS, The Diary of Mrs. Randall, *New Republic*, vol. 22, pp. 185–188, April, 1920.

situation, the facts of her whole career. Those facts were no longer seen as human. Like a face revealed under grim metallic light, they were beheld in the devouring vision of the popular American press, with the kindly rays of human feeling left out. She and her friends had crossed the line that divides black and white. In the black anonymity she would still have been white. In the white she had become black, a marked figure.

To dilate on this figure, so helpless, is almost inevitably indecent. Robbed of their personalities, Mrs. Randall and the man she killed can scarcely be discussed without cruelty, and certainly to no purpose. But there is one excuse for examining this tragedy, and that is the fact that since she married in 1911 Mrs. Randall kept a fairly regular diary which has just been published in the Hearst papers. This diary she wrote with some vague idea of publicity. It is her apologia, and as an apologia invests her career with values not newspaper-like, but lifelike. Because these values are lifelike, the diary can well be considered for the illumination it throws on a pitiful and unnecessary tragedy.

Simply on the evidence of her diary, Ruth Vail Randall seems to have been a quite usual type of American city girl. She is described by a clergyman as "accomplished and charming," and she calls herself "cultivated and beautiful"; but letting these fine words pass she may justly be concluded to have been at least ordinarily attractive and ordinarily cultivated in the popular sense. At twenty, or a little under it, she married a youth of twenty-one called Norman Brown Randall. He was an inconsequential clerk in a Gas Company. Soon "Norm expected to be kicked out of the gas company," and goes to work for the telephone company. Then, still apparently a clerk, he goes to work for the steel mills. He is not very successful. In the words of the schoolgirl diary, "My husband has a hatred of work"; so Mrs. Randall also goes to work. She folds circulars "at $7 per." She works at a cheap department store. She works at Mandels. She learns china painting. She poses for a corset company. She becomes a "movie actress." She sells patriotic flags. She does war work. And, at the end, she is about to be set up in the mail-order powder business. All of these activities, however, are forced and perfunctory. She is obviously exploited by those sexual show cases, the department stores. She never really developed a vocation. She never becomes a business woman. She always spends more than she earns.

What the diary reveals most of all is the ideals with which this young American girl starts out. She is practically a child when she begins her diary—a dewy, naïve girl with the simplest of desires to make good with her husband and the simplest of faith in God. Her notes are punctuated with prayers: "Oh God, make me not hasty in speech or deed; God, please wake him up; my boy kissed me, thank you, God; I love my

husband, so help me God." But practically the same, except for the absence of reverence, is another allusion. "There have been big things since I wrote in this book. Folding circulars at $7 per. Poverty is hell. My husband has a hatred of work. Oh, bluebird, where are you?" The Bluebird is her daydream, or one of her daydreams.

But her great daydream, of course, is Love. She has come up to marriage as society comes up to war—with the belief that marriage, like war, will somehow purge everything and lead to happiness ever afterward. She comes to it, that is to say, as a young crusader. And within a few weeks after the beginning of the crusade her young clerk, Norm, begins to offend against her pattern of love. He returns home dead tired from the gas company. She is armed with all the old incantations, "bear and forbear"; "it takes time for two young people to know each other"; "a woman must dress for her husband, not her woman friends." But piercing through these shibboleths is her exigent demand for a Prince Charming. She weeps herself to sleep because her gas clerk is cross as a bear after night work. "I must be petted every minute he is with me." Sometimes her hopes mount. "Last Sunday he loved me quite as fiercely and devotedly as a masterful mate should." But this exaltation does not last. The Prince Charming is human, cheap, dull. "This a.m. we had words about money. I wish we could not have a single cross word." "Dec. 9. Gave Norm $2 and he got a derby. He looks fine: awfully happy." "Dec. 12. He is breaking my heart by his cross words and indifference. God, please wake him up."

"I need gentle words and strong arms to sooth me," she confesses to her diary. Instead, "Norm is so busy cutting articles from the newspapers concerning baseball and the President he does not care to spend his precious time kissing me." And his folks! "Norm and I have decided we are altogether indifferent to one another . . . Last night we sat in the dark and he opened up on the grandeur of his folks. I don't like my mother-in-law any better than she likes me. I hate her. She is mean and despising—hateful and whining and spiteful." What, then, is to be done? The youngster tries to reach her husband. He shrugs her "soft talk" away. She weeps, "lonely all day." "Do we need money, a child, or simply to be rid of his folks?" These are passionate questions, but swiftly she trips to another plane. "Shoes, corset, and a feather for Xmas." "Darn it anyway, I am tired of behaving like a stuffed angel around his parents. Wish we were out of town so all we could do is to write to our relatives." "I dread and long for motherhood," one entry, and the next, "The last three weeks I have been making dandy layer cake. Ma foi."

She was infinitely more sensitive than her husband. She had needs beyond his means. But what was there in her to stabilize her? She had a mind and a will that were swimming round in a soup of sensibility.

She was ignorant not only of men and sex, but ignorant of work and every kind of interesting creativeness, ignorant of self-support, ignorant of any world outside the movies, popular novels, Sunday newspapers, and love. Once, in one of her daydreams, she pictures her tragic poverty. "I just looked out the window and saw a negro go by driving a red racer. Here am I cultivated, beautiful, a beggar—while a man as black as night runs an auto." This was movie-patter, quite in keeping with another outburst, "Norm is unclean . . . Dear God, dost thou not ever understand and realize that it means as much to women as to men to love what is pure." Dear God—that is to say, dear Bluebird, or Dear Teddy Bear. Her God is simply a cart spring for the rough road of reality.

She lists the books that she reads at this period, before Norm is out of work and begins to drink; the most sentimental novels possible. Then, in her mood of "a year from now, shall I be here to write it at all," "The Streets of Ascalon," "The Penalty," "The Net," "Old St. Paul's." And later, after their first fight, "The Woman in the Alcove," "The Leavenworth Case," "The Three Musketeers," "The Illustrious Prince," "The Masqueraders," "The Black Tulip."

The fight she mentions is an actual physical fight with her husband. First, she flirts with another man, after declaring "I feel sad and neglected and lonesome." Norm comes in "dead drunk and crying for me." He gets violent and packs his things to leave. Later he decides to stay. Her birthday, like most of her passionately observed anniversaries, is a blow for her. He is cool, thoughtless, hardened. Made jealous again, he hits her. "Exciting time. Our first fight. I came out with a scratch." Then a toy gesture, "Next time Norm strikes me I wish God to let me drop dead at his feet."

For nearly five years this jungle life goes on, until finally the separation is completed and another man appears. He is a Jew called Les, from whom she receives a little money. But "Les believes in neither God nor man, only mothers." She does not reveal any great intimacy with him, or anyone else, until she meets Clifford Bleyer, "the first nobleman I've met yet."

The divorce of her own parents and the sensational life of her sister seems to have paved the way for Ruth Randall's transition from wife to mistress. She dressed up her secret life as "a marriage pact according to our own ideas," but it was certain, once she was economically dependent on herself, that she would have to live off the men for whom specifically she had been reared and trained. It was her profession, and her only profession, to be a kitten. After a time she became Mr. Bleyer's exclusive kitten. He kept his wife and two girls on the north side of Chicago, and his kitten on the south side; and he gave her not exactly a living wage but those gifts and doles and rent and gratuities that are so often the feminine equivalent of a living wage.

In love, however, Ruth Randall continued frantically to believe, and from the day she met her "nobleman" to the day she killed him she pressed against the edge of her cruel circumstance as his mistress. The mistress situation is, of course, not uncommon in America. In convenient cities like Chicago and Boston and Philadelphia and New York, innumerable men who can afford it keep up two homes and succeed so long as there is enough practicality and sophistication all round. But Ruth Randall's peculiar tragedy was to have an ideal of soaring love to start with and never enough power outside sex to sustain it. Her life was trained to bloom as one flower, an American beauty rose of love, and the very first time this beauty of hers proved inadequate she was destroyed. She had no other interest in life, no other capacity for life. Love was not only her ideal, it was her bread and butter, her stock in trade. Had she started out with the well-off advertising man, Clifford Bleyer, instead of Norm, she would still have been a kept woman whose worst fate would have been to bore Bleyer into infidelity in a very few years.

The immense suffering endured by Bleyer and Mrs. Randall is written in every line of her diary. The woman illustrates with each detail her longing for "companionship, mental and spiritual camaraderie—some one to help me live outside of myself." At Christmas Bleyer gives her a clock and a hat. She is irrationally angry. She wanted a ring. She taunts him with her interest in other men. There is a tornado of his jealousy. He fails to come to her; she rings up his father, his home, suspects him of infidelity, tortures him, tortures herself, discovers every resource of pride and pain.

And he meets the situation by getting drunk as often as possible. He is charmed by her very greatly, and her demand is so fierce that he keeps returning to her and yielding to her, but he cannot give up his married life for something so casual, so slight, so febrile, as Ruth Randall. She cries out that he does not respect her. She clamors for him when they are separated, wails for him, pleads for him beyond reason. Then she tries to steel herself. "The book is filled with moans. I have written so many times that I cried because Cliff did not kiss me good night. I don't cry now." And then she cries, not hard enough because non-existent outside some man.

"I cannot hold Cliff except by talking business," she moans. And then, "I must be cold." And then, "I'll crawl on my knees to him.' And then, "if only I had a chance to be honest." And at last, their sentence to death, written from the very beginning, "my common sense tells me Cliff is through, and my heart will not listen to my mind."

Before Mrs. Randall admitted that the end of their relation had come she looked ahead to a certain career with other men on the same terms She was not yet thirty, and she was almost hardened enough to see th

possibilities of exploiting these greedy, vain, jealous, brutal creatures who had played with her in the jungle of their desires. But, "I will never know another—never. I told Cliff just that. He thinks I'm only talking . . . There is a limit to human endurance. I have almost reached it. I am mad, mad. I have held myself in for so long! Not a tear, not a sigh, not a spark of anger. Only quick despair and madness. I can feel myself slipping. My mind is going. It is a blank except for the tormenting thoughts I have. If only I could forget. Complete oblivion would be a blessing." Oblivion—and revenge.

"A great moral lesson," one teacher says, "is to be derived from this tragedy." The lesson is not stated. "Lessons of good citizenship and duty to one another," proclaims a lawyer. A lesson, declares Dr. Ballou, especially in regard to the interstitial gland.

It is better, perhaps, not to sermonize. But it seems to me that hardly anything is so tragic as to live thus defenselessly on the Vesuvian slopes of love. With many people the tragedy is not so complete or so patent, the neurosis is not so terrible. At any rate, the glare of publicity is not fixed on them.

But the romantic tradition for men and especially for women leads almost certainly to a fostering of this drunken, jealous, brutal, feral life. It is the life of thousands of Americans, mainly women, fed by the newspapers, the movies, popular fiction, popular education, popular religion. We decorate the bull with flowers, and we still worship the bull.

My own feeling that this is needlessly one sided, that Mrs. Randall might have been saved, is dependent on the rather simple conviction that wives should not be kept women. They should be able to earn their own living, able to quit their Randalls and even their kitten-making Bleyers if the sexual experiment is not successful, and quit them without being committed on worse terms to a similar experiment. This is the only ready institutional protection that young girls can have. It does not ensure happiness or anything of the sort. It does not guarantee a more stable or interesting life than many sensible and acquiescent married dependents now have. But it puts the incident of sex on something more like an equal plane for men and women.

It is by no means certain that the majority of high-school girls want this. Ruth Randall vaguely resented "insults" to her status as woman, but she craved for a Prince Charming and candy and flowers. These things can exist, of course, without dependence, and so far so good. But in the United States the training of girls for dependence is still the common fact. Broadly speaking, we have still to give young girls a reasonable chance to escape from the jungle. We do not yet honestly guarantee women their liberty, equality, and fraternity.

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6. WILLCOX, WALTER F.: "The Divorce Problem: A Study in Statistics," 1897.

CHAPTER XVI

DIVORCE AND DESERTION

The legal dissolution of the marriage contract is not in itself a matter of great interest nor of much importance. It is simply the formal social and legal recognition of a prior fact—that a family has ceased to exist.

The legal provisions in regard to separation and divorce are on the whole very unenlightened and socially unfortunate. They are designed in general to discourage separation by making divorce difficult and humiliating. The legal grounds are such that in most states escape from an intolerable union may be had only at the price of scandal, vulgarity, slander, and false testimony.

The major facts as well as the prevailing confusion of thought are set forth in the following papers. Mr. Mowrer brings out the fact that the legal grounds for divorce are little or not at all related to the causal factors in family dissolution, and points the way to more profitable lines of research. Miss Bromley's paper and that of Mrs. Gerould may be taken as expressing socially and morally enlightened points of view. These papers also give a partial explanation of the very backward state of law and public sentiment. The statement by Bishop Fiske gives what is perhaps the conventional and most usual and respectable point of view toward divorce: it is viewed with alarm and at the same time that there is an absence of ability and of desire to understand the situation, there is the proposal and disposition to repress and control by the very means that have been most effective in the degradation of sex and marriage relations. Mr. Eubank makes a well-defined statement of a conservative and popular point of view. Mr. Holzberg carries the argument a step further and describes the working of a law that grants divorce on application.

The last two papers by Mr. Liebman and Mr. Patterson deal with the extent, cause, and consequences of desertion—called the "poor-man's divorce."

1. *Divorce and Popular Prejudices*[1]

In every Occidental country, people still find their liberties curtailed by laws that sprang from religion alone; by laws, that is, whose social warrant is theological. Even in the United States, where we have never

[1] Adapted from GEROULD, KATHARINE FULLERTON, Divorce, *Atlantic Monthly* vol. 132, pp. 460–466, October, 1923.

since we were a nation, had an established church, we live in a welter of religious taboos made law. For the religious taboo, overthrown by a laxer generation, reappears disguised as a prejudice; and many of our statutes are expressions of prejudice rather than statements of principle scientifically or socially arrived at. We have remaining with us, as individual citizens, some of the inconveniences of a theocratic past, though none—absolutely none—of the moral ease of theocracy.

The question of divorce is not simply a legal matter; it is a social question, about which every adult member of our modern community may have an opinion. I say "may have"; perhaps I should say, "may have if he can." None of our laws or statutes derives more directly from ecclesiastical influence than those concerning divorce; and about nothing else, really, are we in such a complete mess. South Carolina, I believe, grants no divorces at all; some states only on "statutory grounds"; others, one seems to make out, for almost anything. In Hawaii—one of our territories—leprosy is sufficient ground for divorce with the privilege of remarrying. There used to be states that granted divorce for "incompatibility of temper"—certainly as reasonable ground as any. I do not pretend to know the precise variations of the divorce laws. I know only, like everyone else, that they do vary—amusingly, perplexingly, or shockingly, according to your point of view. I know—like everyone else—that people are always agitating for uniform divorce laws. I know that all sorts of groups feel that we exist, legally, in an absurd and disgusting confusion about both divorce and marriage. It is so big and perplexing a question that even the people who advocate this or that adjustment do not really pretend that their suggestions will solve the problem. Mitigation is all that anyone seems to hope for. He would be hardy indeed who should venture to propose a solution.

I fancy that it is still true that in most sections of America the fact that a man or a woman has been divorced—especially if he or she has remarried—is something to be set down, until further information comes in, on the debit side of the account. In some American worlds, people have achieved a state of mind in which one's divorce is of no more moral significance than the color of one's eyes; but these worlds are still few, and, in comparison, small. The prejudice is lessening all the time; and I wonder if there is left any group of individuals, large enough to count as a social group, which does not know and receive and like certain divorced and remarried people. I fancy not. Yet it can still be said, I think, that divorce, as such, is looked at askance. Most people, if pinned down, would probably say that in their opinion certain circumstances justified divorce absolutely, but that promiscuous and light-minded divorcing shocked them. A good many people, too (apart from Roman Catholics, I mean), draw a definite distinction between a divorce which is a mere legal separation and a divorce with remarriage.

In other words, there is still a deep conflict between the civil law and the ecclesiastical—the latter of which remains as a prejudice in the minds of many people for whom it has ceased to have the force of a taboo. Most Americans had thrown over the church—whether Catholic or Anglican—before they ever landed on these shores. There was Catholic Maryland, and there was Anglican Virginia; but the main stream of American civilization, as it happens, has been Protestant and Nonconformist. As far as I know, the Protestant sects have never elevated marriage into a sacrament, since they have acknowledged, in the theological sense, no sacraments at all. The position of Rome has been, for many centuries, uncompromising, of course. Marriage is a sacrament, and does not admit of divorce on any grounds. The Anglican position is wavering; but the stricter Anglicans admit divorce with remarriage no more than Rome. Episcopalians who wish to divorce and remarry must do it under the protection of the civil law and the dissenting clergy.

Logically speaking, if you consider marriage not in the light of a sacrament but in the light of a civil contract, you must permit remarriage, as you must permit an individual who has dissolved, legally, one partnership, to form another if that be to his interest. If, on the other hand, anything of the sacramental idea still inheres in your view of marriage, you cannot quite stomach remarriage during the lifetime of the divorced wife or husband. The average dissenting Protestant, though he does not believe, and never did believe, that marriage is a sacrament, still has echoes in his mind of "whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder." The Protestant sects may have no theological principles against divorce—the mere fact of our divorce laws shows that they have not had—but even Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians have not escaped those early centuries of church history, when the sects lay silent and unperfected in the womb of Rome. The Puritan threw over the sacramental idea, lock, stock, and barrel; he threw over the celibacy of the clergy; he threw over the indissolubility of marriage. But he could not throw over that vaguer and more powerful thing, the Christian attitude to sex. Nor did Saint Paul—whom he greatly reverenced—help him to do so.

We shall hardly get at the heart of this conflict about divorce without realizing that the prejudice against divorce derives from asceticism; and that Rome, which is as usual logical and uncompromising, practically admits it. I am no theologian; but I believe it can hardly be questioned that on the subject of sex the church took its attitude early and never abandoned it. To quote Milton: "It was for many ages that marriage lay in disgrace with most of the ancient doctors, as a work of the flesh, almost a defilement, wholly denied to priests, and the second time dissuaded to all, as he that reads Tertullian or Jerome may see at large." In the eyes of those who shaped dogmas and policies, celibacy was holier

and more acceptable to God than marriage. Rome has never pretended anything else; and all Catholic dealing with marriage is based on the ascetic ideal. The church admits with Saint Paul, "It is better to marry than to burn"; but it never allows the married to forget that they fall short in sanctity of the deliberately and successfully celibate. It is the spiritually inferior who take unto themselves wives and husbands.

It was necessary to show the genesis of popular prejudice against divorce in order to get at the reasons why that popular prejudice not only is weakening but also is ceasing to be effective. This is one contemporary phenomenon that cannot be attributed to the influx of foreign population; for most of our immigrants bring with them either Catholic or Jewish prejudices, if not definite beliefs. It is not the guests of Ellis Island who are divorcing all over the place. It is either the Americans themselves, or the really Americanized. You can blame the inferior stocks that have deluged our country for much corruption of the body politic and the social system, but you cannot accuse them of giving us the divorce habit.

If you leave to one side special religious convictions, which cannot be embodied in law in any country which practices religious freedom, you have left two aspects under which any citizen may legitimately consider the divorce question: scientific and social. Let us leave the scientific side of it to the biologists and anthropologists. It is the social and personal aspect of the matter that more directly and legitimately concerns us.

Only, I think, if you are still living with the ascetic ideal, will the notion of divorce in itself shock you. Otherwise you will echo John Milton. Is marriage a thing to be apologetic about; to be penalized; to be confessed as a weakness? Or is the Occidental world outgrowing the Christian attitude to sex? You have got to make up your mind about that before you can make up your mind about divorce. In that pursuit of happiness to which the Declaration of Independence tells us we have a right, does the pursuit of a happy and satisfactory conjugal relation have a place? If it has not, why do we not tighten up the divorce laws and abolish the several Alsatias? If it has, why not make the divorce laws decent—at present they are not, in most states—and make it possible for two people who are unhappy to part legally and remarry more happily without dragging either one through the mire of scandal? If it has, why penalize "collusion"; in other words, why do your best to prevent people's divorcing when both of them want to? The cry against divorce on the score that in most divorces one person is sacrificed becomes absurd enough when you realize that only on the basis of one person's wanting it and the other person's not wanting it is a divorce obtainable at all.

The only psychological—I do not say religious—excuse for making divorce impossible, or even difficult, is a cynicism which believes that

almost any two people who have once chosen to come together will be as happy in that as in any other combination. I find, I may say, that cynicism fairly prevalent among my own acquaintance. There is a tendency among civilized people, who live "above the law," to underrate the sensitiveness of the average man, whose weaknesses laws are designed to control. Did you ever know anyone who admitted that laws existed to control him? Moral snobbishness abounds among thinking people. Laws, that is, are framed to take care of the potentially criminal classes. The argument of intelligent people against easier and more decent divorce is usually based on a complete contempt for the romantic or spiritual quality of the average marriage. Save for the more outstanding cases of infidelity, cruelty, or neglect, they consider that those two people might as well continue to be yoked together because they would do no better yoked otherwise.

Then they play, as their trump card, "duty to the children." If it is humanly possible, two people who have children should remain together for the children's sake.

In the vast number of cases, married people who are not happy together, but who have children, will stay together, out of sheer economic necessity. In these days, it is only a rich man who can afford separate establishments; and many a man must stick to an unloved wife because he cannot afford to give her the alimony that the courts would certainly allow her. It is cheaper to bring children up under the same roof with both parents than to make any sort of division whatever. The economic difficulty may, I think, be trusted to take care of the great majority of cases.

When the children are used as an argument, however, it is not on economic, but on social or sentimental, grounds. And there, I believe, the pleaders are wrong.

The courts can be trusted to see to it that, in any given divorce, the children are considered. It is usually the "innocent" party to the divorce who is granted the custody of the children. Usually it is the father, of course, who is the support of the family. There are plenty of exceptions, but that may be taken as the rule. If he gets the divorce, he goes on supporting his children at home. If the mother gets the divorce, the father is sure to be mulcted of as much money as possible to enable the mother to bring them up.

This is not the place to discuss the evils and disgraces of alimony. Some provision for alimony must be made in the laws, or dangerous impunities would be created. Only an enlightened and educated public opinion, which shall react on the judges of the land, can ever give assurance that alimony should be ordered with any degree of decency and justice.

How any self-respecting woman, whose husband no longer desires her presence in his household and who is no longer rendering him any of the services in payment of which the wife is supported by the husband, can take alimony, unless she is physically incapacitated from earning her bread, one does not see, any more than one "sees" the average breach-of-promise suit. Or how, if she takes it on the excuse of providing for their children, she can reconcile it with her conscience to nurture those children in hostility to the parent who is paying for them. It would seem that in many cases—not in all—custody of the children should be awarded to the parent who supports them. But, as I say, only an enlightened public opinion can take care of the alimony question.

As for the "duty to the children" as a sentimental argument against divorce, it is probably less to the interest of real sentiment than most arguments. We all remember the pathetic rôle of Maisie in "What Maisie Knew," passing shuttlecock fashion from one vituperative parent to the other. "She was a ready vessel for bitterness; a deep little porcelain cup in which biting acids could be mixed." A child who divides its time between divorced parents who hate each other is in sorry case. But that it is in less sorry case than the child who lives with two undivorced parents who hate each other, I have come, after many years, to believe absolutely. This is an important matter, for nowadays the welfare of children is the one point on which all reformers agree. Since the child is made the most frequent argument against divorce, it is well to consider the validity of that argument.

They make, usually, one of two statements, if not both of them: first, that any child needs both a father and a mother to bring it up properly; and that it is disillusioning to the child—an abnormal situation which is morally bad for it—to grow up with its parents separated. The first consideration is practical; and there is no doubt that a child gets its best preparation for life if the father and mother can cooperate harmoniously in the task. A child should have, ideally speaking, the formative influence both of the adult man and the adult woman. No question about it. Yet children are successfully brought up, all the time, by one parent, when they have been deprived by death of the other. The burden is heavier on the remaining parent than on the child itself. If, that is, parents are right minded and faithful. It is safe to say, I think, that the value of cooperation depends largely on its being harmonious; and why two people who long to get rid of each other should be harmonious about the bringing-up of their children, I do not see.

As for its being disillusioning to the child to be brought up by one parent—or even by both parents alternately, as occasionally happens—knowing that the other is living, somewhere else, it would seem to be self-evident that for a child to witness constant friction is more disillusioning than for it to witness occasional friction or to hear about the friction

second hand. I can, indeed, imagine cases where two married people agree to disagree, keeping up a perfect civility in formal relations, arranging their lives so that they seldom see each other and then only in company. But those cases presuppose great wealth, spacious lives, a multiplicity of social interests; a scale of living, in other words, far above the average, never to be considered anything but exceptional. Most homes are terribly intimate places. A child is always unfortunate whose parents do not get on with each other, because its views of the relation of marriage are bound to be queer. One of the most important things for any child to acquire is a sense of the normality and beauty of the marriage relation. But it will never be acquired by a child living in a home where there is no love between the parents. It may be said that it will not be learned by any child who lives with one parent who has repudiated the other. Perhaps not often; but at least it has a better chance of respecting one parent than if it lives under conditions where it is difficult to respect either.

The point is that nothing can be more unlucky for a child than to have the spectacle of the unfortunate marriage daily thrust upon it.

The sentimental argument—not the practical one, which will take care of itself—of the children is probably based on false premises. Ought one then to say: let all people divorce freely who for any reason wish to? However much one may romantically incline to answer yes, it should be kept in mind that to make divorce entirely easy will lead to many divorces in which there is not much point; perhaps to so many divorces that we shall be, socially, in a very inchoate condition.

The fact that you cannot, in most states, get a divorce without mud slinging is a disgraceful fact. Yet if we have "divorce on demand," are we not going to have half the married folk in the country divorcing in some moment of impatience or weariness? In such a case, would not marriage be robbed of all its dignity? There can be no law of any sort that will cover all cases properly, that will not work hardship to individuals. And just as the alimony question can be decently resolved only by educating public opinion, so can the divorce question be only so resolved.

In the superstate, laws would be discreet and delicate, because the citizens themselves would be discreet and delicate. But as it is, laws must take care of the moral thug. Alimony exists to cover the case of the man who would, if alimony were not granted or grantable, callously marry, and forsake, one woman—and one set of children, probably—after the other. But the mere fact that alimony is there leads a lot of women to take indecent advantage of it in cases that are quite other. Many, if not most, states provide divorces on the proof of horrors perpetrated. Therefore a lot of people have to commit perjury every year—preferring perjury to domestic unhappiness. It is, in all conscience, a

mess. Many lawyers will not touch divorce cases at all, because the subject is so unsavory.

2. *The Christian Attitude*[1]

America is rapidly becoming a land of Mormons. The law forbids continuous polygamy, but we are substituting for it consecutive polygamy. To draft a figure of speech from days of horse-drawn vehicles, we do not drive in matrimonial pairs, but driving tandem is an increasingly popular custom.

For the most part, the Christian churches of America have been doing very little until recently to stem the tide of divorce which has made this country a disgrace to civilization. With the exception of the Roman Catholic and the Episcopal churches, remarriage of the divorced has too often and too easily received the blessing of the church as well as the sanction of society. But at last the leaders of organized Christianity have begun a movement to check the evil, and many religious denominations and other associations have banded together to secure a uniform federal law bringing into line those states which are lax in their marriage laws, while allowing individual commonwealths to raise the bars against divorce still higher than the national standard, if they so desire.

In this movement for the correction of an evil scandalous in its proportions, it is not competent, of course, to lay emphasis wholly on the law of Christ. Christian morality is necessarily higher than state morality; its compelling power comes through voluntary acceptance of the higher law; it must not depend for obedience upon the power of civil authority. While faithful Christian teaching may do much to quicken the conscience of the nation, its authority and influence are necessarily limited when dealing with conditions which arise in a society for which the word of Christ is not "the last word." The state's appeal must be based upon the conception of marriage as a social institution, not simply as a church sacrament or ordinance.

It is the purpose of this article to show, briefly, the seriousness of the present situation and then to suggest that permanence in the marriage relation is the law of nature as well as the law of grace.

First, the seriousness of modern conditions in America. In spite of iteration and reiteration, the alarming increase in divorce has not yet been brought home to the conscience of the nation. It was not until 1876 that we had any authoritative information in regard to divorce in the United States. In that year the official reports of the Bureau of the Census showed 122,121 divorces for the ten preceding years. Subsequent reports show an increase for each decade alarming in its rapidity. In

[1] Adapted from Bishop CHARLES FISKE, Marriage: Temporary or Permanent?, *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 138, pp. 303–306, September, 1926.

1886 the divorces for ten years were 206,595; the next decade showed 352,363; the next 593,362; the decade ending in 1916 showed 975,728—a total of over 2,250,000 divorces in a half century, with 4,500,000 divorced persons, and nearly 1,700,000 minor children left fatherless or motherless as a result of the law's laxity.

And the figures are still mounting tragically. The latest census report shows an increase of divorce in one year of more than 11 per cent over the previous year. In 1922 the proportion of divorces to population was 136 for every 100,000 of population, as against 112 six years before. There were 2 divorces for every 15 marriages—the exact figures in 1922 being 1 divorce to every 7.6 marriages. The increase is indicated more clearly when we learn that just five times as many divorces in proportion to population were granted in 1922 as were granted in 1870. In Canada, among a people very similar to our own, there were in 1916 only 57 divorces, as against 112,036 in the United States; that is, in proportion to population we had 120 divorces granted as against 1 in Canada.

The record in some states is nothing less than appalling. Nevada reached the lowest depths, granting 1,000 divorces—to many people, of course, having only temporary residence—as against 900 marriages. In 1922 this record of Nevada—10 divorces to 9 marriages—had some close followers: Oregon, 1 to 2.6; Wyoming, 1 to 3.9; Montana, 1 to 4.3; Arizona, 1 to 4.7; Oklahoma, 1 to 4.8; Idaho, 1 to 4.9; Ohio, 1 to 5.2; Nebraska and Indiana, 1 to 5.4; Kansas, 1 to 5.7; Michigan, 1 to 5.8.

Lest it should be supposed that westward the course of divorce takes its way, we note that Texas has a record of 1 divorce in less than 4 marriages, Maine 1 in less than 6, Florida 1 in less than 7, and Rhode Island 1 in less than 8. In the nation the record for 1922 was 165,139 divorces, with freedom of remarriage to 330,278 persons.

To permit the marriage relationship to assume such an experimental character involves results even more serious than the broken vow. Civil law has set up the machinery for unmarrying a wife from a husband and a husband from a wife; but that machinery cannot in fact be successful until it also succeeds in unfathering or unmothering the child who is the fruit of the union so dissolved. For the child to remain neither unfathered nor unmothered, after the husband has been unwifed and the wife unhusbanded, is indeed a glaring contempt of court! Yet it is the sort of contempt the courts have not succeeded in avoiding. After the arguments for divorce have all been presented, the presence of one child effectively confutes them. The child not only presupposes the family; it compels the family. It is the outward and visible sign of an actual relationship between the father and the mother. The state may conceivably repeal the Christian marriage law; it cannot repeal the child.

From the point of view of social and legal complications, the diversity of state laws presents a ghastly situation. Fifty-two causes for divorce

are listed, not counting those for which an annulment of marriage may be secured. In twenty-seven states there is no provision for a divorce *a mensa et thoro*—that is, a legal separation without annulment of the bond. Such a separation has always been recognized ecclesiastically as a lawful and sometimes a necessary remedy for marriage difficulties, but in these states such relief can be had only by a divorce *a vinculo* with remarriage allowed, and indeed, to all intent, encouraged. One of the judges of the Supreme Court of New York State recently put the matter clearly when he said: "The finality of divorce is hideous. Separation holds the possibility of reconciliation. Divorce precludes it." In the same statement he protested against the evils of alimony as a contributing cause in provoking divorce proceedings: "Alimony represents the sanction of divorce by the law and society; it places a premium on selfishness, slothfulness, idleness, and immorality."

Conditions moral and legal have now reached such a pass that not only have churches and welfare organizations united in an effort to secure federal legislation and a uniform divorce law as a minimum of local permission to annul marriage, but the American Bar Association has joined in the demand. At best this regulation will but partially solve our problem. Three things are needed in addition: First, we need a clear statement of the law of Christ and a rallying of the Christian churches of America to a courageous determination not to countenance any departure from it. This will mean turning over to the civil officials all marriages contrary to Christ's law. Second, there will be necessary, as a part of the uniform law now demanded, certain safeguards against hasty marriage; and, with this, faithful instruction by Christian pastors as to the seriousness of marriage, in the effort to check hasty alliances. Third, for those who do not accept the law of Christ as final, or for those who accept it as a spiritual ideal rather than a specific commandment, we need fuller consideration of the social value of permanency in the marriage bond as a prerequisite to any degree of domestic happiness or contentment.

The law of Christ is plain: "Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her: and if she herself shall put away her husband, and marry another, she committeth adultery." There can be but two questions as to the teaching.

1. Is it the *law* of Christian marriage or the *ideal* of Christian marriage? It is only on the assumption that Christ was not legislating, but was pleading for the highest and the best, that any Christian could possibly minimize the teaching. Certainly those who accept His teaching as having divine authority cannot possibly evade the issue, though others, who regard Him only as a great teacher, may perhaps consent to the alteration of His precepts to meet new situations in a new age.

2. The other question deals with an apparent exception or allowance in the report of the words of Christ elsewhere, where the record is: "Every one that putteth away his wife, *saving for the cause of fornication,* maketh her an adulteress." It is the uncertainty of interpretation here which has led the Episcopal Church to allow, under very stringent conditions, remarriage of the innocent party in a divorce for adultery. Even that exception is further safeguarded by the provision that a clergyman may always decline to solemnize a marriage—a proviso which permits those to decline to officiate under the canon who believe that the exception is grammatically applicable only to "putting away" and cannot be applied to the remarriage. The Roman Catholic Church allows no exception; though, as a matter of fact, in its interpretation of what are known as "the Pauline injunctions" (covering the marriage of unbaptized persons) its actual practice is not beyond criticism. Other Christian churches have more lenient standards. There is not time or occasion here to explain them; suffice it to say that in many parts of the country the ministers are not much, if at all, in advance of the social and ethical standards of the community and are quite ready to marry anyone whom the state permits them to join together—and even where some have scruples there are "marrying parsons" galore, if the contracting parties desire more than a civil ceremony.

We need, therefore, full and courageous presentation of the Christian ideal of marriage; nothing else can so effectively stay the tide of consecutive polygamy. The real reason for laxity of manners and morals is the failure of the churches to teach consistently and continuously the facts of Christianity and the morality of Christianity. The ignorance of multitudes as to the simplest outlines of Christian truth is amazing. Preaching has become "arid liberalism" for the cultured in the more educated sections and "acrid literalism" elsewhere. The result is that those inside many churches know little of the Christian story and less about Christ's moral demands, whereas others have been driven away from the church entirely; the latter, once they cease to live on the inherited religious precepts of a past generation, lapse into a modified paganism.

3. *A More Liberal Attitude*[1]

Possibly there is gloomy comfort in noting that family disruption is nothing new. Centuries ago Rome found herself engulfed in a tidal wave of domestic breakdown. Seneca cuttingly commented that there were certain persons in Rome who recorded the passing of the years not by the calendar, but by husbands. Martial, who would have made a great newspaper "column conductor" had he been living in our day, tells of a

[1] Adapted from EUBANK, EARLE EDWARD, When Marriage Fails, *World Tomorrow,* vol. 10, pp. 274–277, June, 1927.

woman who had had ten husbands. Juvenal reports another who, in the brief space of five years, had married and divorced eight men—an average of somewhat less than eight months to each. The record case, however, is that given by St. Jerome of a woman married to her twenty-third husband, she herself being his twenty-first wife.

The family, says Edward Westermarck, is as old as the human species; it has existed from the beginning of the race and has been found everywhere. But if man has always had a strong desire to mate, he has also upon occasion had an equally strong desire to escape from his mate. Provision for the severing of domestic ties has therefore been as widespread as the provision for creating them.

Whatever judgments we may form concerning family disintegration must be in the light of its appearance as a universal phenomenon in human relations.

Recognizing that circumstances and conditions sometimes arise under which it is best not to continue the marital bond, the questions before us in this paper are, *how* and *when* should marriage be broken. The first of these is primarily a question of jurisdiction and authority: who shall decide so grave a question? The second is a question as to what conditions should warrant the authorization of a decree: what are the grounds which justify the breaking of marriage? Let us consider these in turn.

Upon Whom Should Authority Rest for the Divorce Decree?—In the past, four positions have been taken in regard to this question, of which any others are but variations.

The first position gives the power of decision to the dominant member of the union, usually, but not always, the husband. Often this power was absolute, the other member having the privilege neither of hearing nor appeal. Moses permitted the husband to "put away" his wife. The distinguished Swiss scholar, Bachofen, in his volume "Das Mutterrecht" gives many groups among which the tables were reversed, the decision resting in the hands of the wife.

A growing sense of justice eventually led to a softening of this absolutism. While the determination of divorce was still allowed to one or the other, it was hedged about with certain conditions without which divorce would not be countenanced by the group, which somewhat protected the weaker member. The principle, however, remained the same, *viz.*, that the decision as to divorce rested with the head of the family.

The second position was that taken by the Church when it became the dominant voice in Western civilization. Marriage, it declared, was a sacrament, divinely ordained; therefore, divorce was not a matter to be decided by any secular voice. "What God hath joined together let no man put asunder." As a divine institution both the entering into and the dissolution of marriage must be decreed of God, whose decisions are

rendered through the instrumentality of the church, His especially designated agency among men. Throughout the Middle Ages in Europe this was the accepted authority; and among Catholics the church is still regarded as having the final word in the matter.

The third position is that society itself, rather than the individual, or any group within society, shall have jurisdiction over marriage and divorce. Expressing itself through law and government, the state embodies society in its legally authoritative form. The will of the individual must therefore be subordinated to that of the state.

The fourth position is that marriage, like any other contract, is primarily a matter of agreement between two parties concerned. Mutual consent may dissolve other contracts; it should be allowed to dissolve the marriage contract.

The present law of Soviet Russia is a combination of the third and fourth. While recognizing the practical necessity of officially recording marriage and divorce in the courts, it holds that where there is mutual consent it is mandatory upon the state to grant the decree. Where divorce is sought by one but not by both the court must still grant the decree, but may define the terms of readjustment in regard to property or children.

Marriage considered as a purely personal contract dissoluble by mutual consent is being urged by an increasing minority of people as one way of dealing with domestic difficulties. Havelock Ellis, Bertrand Russell, H. G. Wells and others declare that society is not involved unless there are children, and that where there are no children the law need take no cognizance of marital relations. From the standpoint of some of the most thoughtful students of sociology this is untrue. Society is as much concerned with the attitudes and behavior of its members as it is with the fact of offspring. Whatever affects individual thought and action also affects society, and is therefore socially significant and properly subject to group control.

What a sublime inconsistency, moreover, for the state, which examines most carefully into one's qualifications before granting him a passport for a summer trip abroad, or for casting a ballot, or for setting up in a place of business, to say of so grave an act as marriage that it may be terminated at the will of the contracting parties, and that the state should exert no judgment!

Upon What Conditions Should Divorce Be Granted?—When we come to the question of the grounds that justify the granting of a divorce we encounter an even wider range of opinion than in regard to that of jurisdiction.

The most absolute position possible is that of South Carolina, which permits divorce for no cause whatsoever. This position is held by many religionists. Granting that there are circumstances which may make it

inadvisable and even wrong for husband and wife to continue the impossible task of living together, they still maintain that absolute divorce should not be allowed, but only legal separation—*divortium a mensa et thoro*. While the Roman Church occasionally declares that certain marriages are null and void because improperly contracted, her official position through the centuries has consistently been that she can approve no dissolution that permits remarriage. This was the law in England until the reform acts of 1858.

The first step away from this extreme position was that taken by certain of the post-Reformation bodies, which granted divorce on only one ground, the "scriptural" ground of infidelity. This is the law in New York today. The principle underlying this concession was this: that while the bond should not be severed at all such an act does in reality break the relationship. In such a case, then, divorce merely recognizes and legalizes the *de facto* status of an already broken marriage bond.

Since the Reformation, however, and especially in Protestant countries, the civil statutes have increasingly taken a more generous attitude. This has manifested itself in two ways. First, by the enlargement of the legal grounds. The major additions are those of cruelty, desertion, drunkenness, and non-support; but various others have been added until the total number of different items to be found among our forty-eight states is about fifty.

The second way is in the interpretation and administration of the law. A number of judges virtually take the position of the Russian law, *viz.*, that when a couple are agreed that they do not want to remain man and wife the judge has no moral right to deny a decree of full and unconditional divorce. "Incompatibility" becomes a blanket term to cover almost any degree of displeasure in each other, from the most trivial lovers' quarrel to extreme cruelty. Where the bench interprets and administers the law in such a way it is obvious that we have a situation virtually equivalent to divorce by consent.

Returning to our query let us again ask, when—if ever—should marriage be broken? Shall we agree with the conservative extremists who answer: Never! Marriage is a divine institution, not to be broken under any circumstances? Shall we agree with the extremists at the other pole, that marriage should not be insisted upon a moment beyond the point where either member desires freedom? Or is there some in-between point on which we can fairly cast anchor?

Perhaps an answer is to be found in redefining the functions of the family. As I see them, there are four fundamental objects which marriage seeks to fulfill:

First. The propagation of the species. While of course biologically children may be born as well out of wedlock as within, it is safe to assume that as a general rule those born of unmarried parents are unwanted.

That accidental and undesired children are often born of married parents is true; but in general the thoughts of those who wed are "childward."

Second. The protection and care of the members of the family, and especially of the offspring. The experience of the race has found no adequate substitute for the home. The home as an economic entity, and as a group of persons united by affectional bonds of peculiar strength, gives an interest and a security which is rarely found in any other relationship. Because of this the whole trend of modern social service in regard to the care of dependent children is to find for them a foster home when a parental home is lacking.

Third. The socialization of the members of the family, and especially of its children. The family is a little social world of its own. Here, more effectively than anywhere else, are to be learned those elementary but basic lessons in adjustment of persons to one another, and in the fine art of living together, without which that peculiar complexity known as human society could not continue. Once more, we are confronted with the age-long experience of mankind that no effective alternative for the family can be found in this socializing process.

Fourth and most important of all, spiritually considered: The life enrichment of the members of the family. This function could not come to fruition so long as women and children were considered as mere property. Not until emancipation gave women a status of equality with their mates, and their own altered attitudes, together with educational opportunity, made it possible for them to be companions of their husbands, could this fourth objective be attained. One of the glories of modern civilization is the creation of a situation in which men and women upon marriage can become spiritual comrades and coequal participants in a fellowship of the fruits of affection.

The four functions of marriage above listed may be reduced to this single statement: The purpose of the human family is to bring into being, to conserve, and to develop human personality. It is impossible, of course, to define this mysterious and elusive thing, just as it is impossible to define life itself; but we recognize it as that element in the human being which gives validity to his existence. In spite of its limitations and defects, which are all too apparent, the family more adequately fulfills this great, complex purpose than does any other human institution. As such it is in truth "divine," being born of "the nature of the world and of man." And marriage is the formal expression of individual and social sanction of family life.

When, then, may marriage be broken? Only at the point where its continuation is a genuine, irremediable and permanent violation of the personalities of its members. Not otherwise!

Generalizations as to when this point has been reached should be guarded with care. Ordinarily there would seem to be *prima facie*

evidence to that effect when either member of the union seriously neglects the responsibility of care and protection; when either persistently refuses to live with the other; when there is genuine cruelty or outrage; and when there is infidelity. One does not need to look far, however, for evidence of the fact that many times a plausible justification along these lines is written into the records when there is no such justification in fact. This state of affairs is so notorious that students of divorce statistics do not pretend to accept them at face value upon this point, but sharply distinguish between real and alleged grounds of divorce.

These listed do not constitute the area which is ordinarily debated, however. The point of honest perplexity is in the border-line cases, where there has been no overt act of faithlessness nor abuse nor neglect, but where there is a sustained unhappiness in their life together. Here no general statement can be made. Certainly we cannot insist that those who find marriage a permanent misery, whatever the cause, shall continue the form of an intimate fellowship which does not in truth exist. Yet a too ready acceptance of the situation as hopeless, without a persistent and conscientious effort to change the condition, is responsible for many an unwise and unjustifiable decree of release. Here is where our social attitudes and whole social organization exhibit great weakness. Education as to the responsibilities of wedlock, and individual character building to fortify the human spirit against yielding to the strain which marriage inevitably involves; these should both precede marriage and continue through it. If and when, in spite of this, incompatibility arises no such drastic action as divorce should come until there has been every possible effort to bring about adjustment, either through removing the cause or rising superior to it. Some courts of Domestic Relations are now successfully experimenting with marriage adjustment. A wise and experienced counselor can often act as an adjudicator between man and wife, and lead them into a harmony which, through ignorance or unwillingness, they would be unable to reach alone. Here is an almost untouched field which merits further extension. Certainly the evidence is conclusive that it is not wise or expedient to leave the final decision to the husband and wife alone, for their sense of grievance and their biased attitudes preclude fair judgment.

4. *Divorce on Application*[1]

No question concerning the Soviet Union has received so much attention in America as has the subject of marriage and divorce. Philippics condemning these relations as free love and the nationalization of women on the one hand have been countered on the other with paeans of praise characterizing the marital status in Russia as heaven on earth.

[1] Adapted from HOLZBERG, JULIUS, Divorce in Russia and America, *Nation*, vol. 128, pp. 734, 735, June, 19, 1929.

The divorce law is simplicity itself. Either party may obtain a divorce without stating any cause and without notifying the opposite party, simply by applying at the divorce bureau. The applicant gives his or her name, address, and various other descriptive information; his identification papers are then stamped and the deed is done. No courts, judges, lawyers, fees, or delays. The actual procedure itself takes five minutes, but in most of the bureaus that I attended the queue before the divorce counter made waiting about half an hour imperative. The husband or wife as the case may be is notified by the bureau of the divorce. There can be no cross-petitions or arguments. The divorce is granted as a matter of right. But whatever misgivings one may have in regard to the ease of divorce should be somewhat allayed by the rigorous and inexorable alimony laws. The term "alimony" is used here denoting the support of minor children, as alimony employed in the American sense of support of the wife alone is non-existent in Soviet Russia, with the few exceptions that shall be noted later.

When a divorce is granted and the applicant has children, the alimony case is then and there set down for hearing. These hearings usually come up within three to five days, all depending on the condition of the docket, but in no case in more than two weeks. At this hearing the court determines who shall have the custody of the children, how much alimony shall be paid, and by whom. Although the court may grant the custody to either husband or wife, in practice the wife is granted the custody in 95 per cent of the cases, as she is usually better fitted than the husband to undertake it. In considering alimony the court inquires into the earnings of the husband and what commitments he may have to his other dependents. In no case can the courts disappropriate more than 50 per cent of a person's earnings for any purpose or purposes whatsoever. While no specific rule is set, alimony usually amounts to between 25 and 35 per cent of a person's salary, providing he has no other dependents. Inasmuch as a divorced person may remarry and have other children, or in some way alter the status of his obligations, the amount fixed by the court is subject to review. While the law does not differentiate between man and woman in the payment of alimony, as a matter of actual practice the woman pays alimony in Russia as seldom as she does in the States. However, with various types of employment open to women and the attempts in the Soviet Union at her full emancipation and equality with man, this condition may alter with time and we may find that the new economic conditions of the woman will place her in the alimony-paying class.

Alimony dodging is almost unheard of in Russia, as the government deducts the money at the source of payment and gives it direct to the payee. And, of course, in peasant life one would hardly expect a peasant to run away and give up his farm in order to avoid paying alimony.

Alimony may be arranged by consent of both parties without court action, but the amount must be satisfactory to the authorities. Such consent alimonies are not very frequent, and I had to look through at least one hundred divorces before I found such a case on record, and, oddly enough, it was that of a lawyer who voluntarily agreed to give his wife 50 per cent of his earnings for the support of their child. The allowance is paid until the child is eighteen years of age.

The property owned by husband and wife before marriage is retained by each, and any wealth produced by their mutual labor is divided after divorce as the court decrees equitable. In the Soviet Union, however, a woman's endeavors and labors in the home are considered to be a part of the productivity. In the villages such a division is extremely difficult, as farms, farm implements, and live stock can hardly be divided without injury. Furthermore, many families including father, mother, sons, daughters, uncles, and other relatives work their farms together, and a divorce of one of these occasions an economic eruption affecting an entire family. Usually a money settlement is made in lieu of a division, and in other cases a percentage of the crop is given.

Alimony to the wife personally for her own support may be given in two cases: first, when her earning capacity is lost through physical inability to work, which inability originated during the marriage; and second, when she is out of employment. In the first case the court may grant alimony to her not exceeding one year and in the second not exceeding six months. Of course, if the wife is working and the husband is under the above limitations the court may grant alimony on a like basis to the husband.

Marriage is legal either by civil or common law. Accordingly, the only statistics one can obtain in Soviet Russia refer to the civil or recorded marriages alone, and one can only hazard a guess at the extent of common-law marriage. Generally speaking, common-law marriages in Russia are similar in theory to such marriages in England and America except that probably less proof is necessary to establish the marital state in Russia. Cohabitation, a common household, and a holding out to the world of a marital status are deemed the essentials of a common-law marriage. In Soviet Russia the fact of "holding out to the world" of the marital status is the most important, and it would be extremely difficult for a man who held out a woman as his wife later to repudiate her as such.

I made it a point to ask judges in Leningrad, Moscow, and Odessa who handle alimony cases their estimate of the number of common-law marriages; no figure that I received exceeded 25 per cent of the recorded marriages and most of the judges felt that they probably were not over 10 per cent. Inasmuch as a woman is always left with the children and the responsibilities when the husband deserts her, it is unquestionably

to her interest to have a recorded marriage. Otherwise the burden is upon her to prove the male parent, and further, if she desires a share of the wealth produced during their cohabitation, she would be faced with the necessity of proving the common-law marriage.

All church marriages must be preceded by a registered marriage and a registered certificate must be displayed before any priest, rabbi, or minister can solemnize a marriage.

It should always be borne in mind that the statutes in Soviet Russia are not construed as rigidly as ours and courts have the right to enlarge upon the law and to judge more freely as to the violation of its operation. In Leningrad, for example, although the law places no limitations upon either the number or frequency of divorces, I was told of a man who came five successive months for divorces and was subsequently arrested and sentenced to serve one year for disorderly conduct. There was also the story of a Communist who had been married twenty-five years. His wife had remained faithfully at his side through many years of exile in Siberia and through the bitter conflict, hardship, and famine of the revolution. In 1926 he suddenly disappeared, leaving his wife feeble and destitute. Later she received notice of his divorce. She appealed to the courts and was granted permanent alimony out of his wages, although the law itself made no special provision for such an alimony payment. He was also expelled from the Communist Party.

The most interesting case I have heard is the one about a man who desired to cohabit with but not to marry a pretty, young peasant girl living in the city. She professed her love for him but insisted that he marry her. Finally, after he had been unable to accomplish his desires without marriage, he acquiesced and married her. They shared the nuptial chamber one night and the following morning he gave her ten kopeks (five cents) and sent her home, laughingly telling her that he had what he wanted, and that under the law he could and would obtain a divorce that day. She complained to the authorities and he was arrested. The facts were clearly brought out in court and the judge sentenced him to two years imprisonment for rape, explaining that the defendant had accomplished his desire by subterfuge and it had had the same effect in Soviet law as if he had used physical violence. Such a case is indicative of the refreshing attitude of the interpretation of the laws in the Soviet Union.

5. *Legal Aspects of Divorce*[1]

There is probably no more striking example of that hypocrisy in government which has come to be one of our chief national characteristics than our divorce laws. As unenforceable as the Eighteenth Amendment,

[1] BROMLEY, DOROTHY DUNBAR, Civilized Divorce, *Nation*, vol. 128, pp. 608, 609, May 22, 1929.

they remain on the statute books of the several states as a sop to respectability, a pretense that marriage is indissoluble unless one of the parties is guilty of adultery, cruelty, desertion, drunkenness, or neglect. These grounds vary in different parts of the country, but the general rule holds good that one party must have committed a specific injury against the other without the latter's connivance. Indeed "an agreement between married people that one shall bring an action for divorce and the other fail to defend it, and especially upon a ground that is not a real one, is held a collusion to defraud the courts." (Schouler.)

Yet in the face of these laws divorce goes merrily on—to the tune of 146,069 undefended cases in this country in 1925, representing 84 per cent of the total number of decrees granted. Now if a case is undefended it may be assumed that the defendant is willing to be divorced, unless he or she has not been personally notified of the action or has no possible grounds on which to base a defense. In this connection Judge C. W. Hoffman of the Domestic Relations Court of Cincinnati found from an investigation in his court that at least 75 per cent of the defendants had valid grounds for a defense, but did not choose to stand upon them. Judges say, too, that a contest in court usually hangs upon the question of children or property, not the divorce itself. Certainly one knows from one's own observation that there is more often than not some sort of an agreement between husband and wife, tacit or otherwise.

Perjury is a necessary concomitant of all such collusion. For instance, if a husband has not actually deserted for the specified length of time, or has not been guilty of the alleged adultery or cruelty, the plaintiff and her witnesses must swear to false facts when they come to testify. We are told by Judge Harry A. Lewis, who hears a great many cases in Chicago, that 50 to 60 per cent of all decrees are obtained there on the fraudulent grounds of cruelty—"while as a matter of fact there was nothing but incompatibility which had become so unbearable that the wife would perjure herself in order to get relief."

Nor do the judges appear to be shocked by the prevalence of perjury. Not long ago I sat listening to the undefended calendar in a Chicago court where a fresh case was dispatched every five minutes. In the course of the proceedings I was amazed to hear the judge recess the court for five minutes, with the curt injunction to a lawyer who had a faltering witness on the stand, "to get his dates straightened out." In other words, the lawyer was to tell his witness exactly what to say, so that her testimony would tally with the claims made in the brief. Judges in the more conservative eastern states are likely to be less lax, but by their own admission they are helpless before the ever rising tide of perjury and collusion, Judge Callaghan of the New York Supreme Court having remarked not long ago that "it is almost impossible for a judge to prove collusion even though he strongly suspects its existence, for the

attorneys are always careful to satisfy every technical requirement of the statute."

The fact is that an increasing number of judges are cutting short corners and are simply granting divorce where they think divorce is due. Judge Hoffman of Cincinnati, after making a study of divorce, recently declared that "the divorce codes are not administered so much in the light of the laws prescribed by the statutes as in the light of the prevailing interpretation by the bench, the bar, and the community, concerning marriage." So it happens that in many of our states divorce by mutual consent is already a *fait accompli*. And yet when Judge Ben B. Lindsey suggested that it be legalized, the pillars of society cried out that such a law would cut at the very roots of marriage.

There is nothing new, of course, about this type of divorce. The Romans had it centuries ago, Napoleon incorporated it in his Code Civil, and today it is a part of the law of Russia, Austria (for non-Catholics only), Belgium, Rumania, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, Japan, and certain provinces of Mexico.

The Romans were the first to evolve the theory that "marriage is an equal partnership between husband and wife, depending for its inception and continuation upon the free will of both parties"—rather than upon any religious or civil sanction. "This truly high and altogether worthy conception of the institution"—to use Lord Bryce's phrase—encouraged a finer type of marriage than the Western world has known since it became Christianized. But as Roman life in general grew increasingly corrupt, marriage was used by the wealthy and ambitious as a means of pleasure and worldly advancement and divorce became more and more prevalent, especially since it required no legal procedure whatsoever. Yet to say, as some moralists do, that Rome fell because of her "free marriage" custom, is to confuse cause and effect, for as Lecky puts it: "A vast wave of corruption had flowed in upon Rome, and under any system of law it would have penetrated into domestic life."

The church, as it gained power, assumed control over every aspect of man's temporal life, and by the twelfth century it had established the canon that marriage was an indissoluble state and that divorce followed by remarriage was a sin to be punished by excommunication. As a consequence divorce by mutual consent was not heard of again in Western Europe until the eighteenth century ushered in a new philosophy of human freedom. In the middle of that century a mutual consent law was incorporated in the Prussian *projet* of Frederick II, and in 1792 the French Commune passed a law declaring that "facility in obtaining divorce is the natural consequence of the individual's right to freedom." Cataclysmic change was in the air, and it is not surprising that there were in the year VI more divorces than marriages in Paris. In 1804 this law was superseded by the new provision in Napoleon's Code Civil,

which required first, that the husband must be at least twenty-five years of age and the wife twenty-one; second, that the couple must have been married at least two years and not more than forty; and third, that the wife must not be over forty-five years of age. It is to be regretted that there are no statistics at hand showing the results of this law during the ten years that it was in effect. With the Restoration all divorce was wiped out, and was not again permitted in France until the latter part of the century, when the present law was passed. Less liberal than the Code Civil, it requires that one party must have wronged the other—a provision that was doubtless a concession to the church party. In practice, however, the judges interpret *injure grave* so liberally as to make it tantamount to incompatibility.

In England, even more than in France, one finds the stamp of the church upon the divorce code. Our own statutes are much more liberal, and yet we have taken over from the English common law the doctrine that makes collusion a bar to divorce. This is plainly a hangover of the days when the church enjoyed the prerogative of treating adults like children and of controlling every aspect of their daily lives.

It is in the Northern countries of Europe—where the church never held temporal sway—that we find a theory of marriage based on sociological rather than ecclesiastical doctrine. Today Denmark, Sweden, and Norway have a uniform marriage and divorce code which provides that divorce may be obtained either by a suit in court on one of the time-honored grounds, or by mutual agreement between the parties. The latter method involves no court procedure but is hedged about with certain safeguards. The couple must first discuss their differences either with the parish minister or a designated government official, and then, if they cannot be reconciled and have reached an agreement on the division of their children and income, they will be given a decree of legal separation for one year (in Denmark one year and a half). At the end of that time—if they again petition for a divorce and can present proof that they have remained apart—they receive their decree without further ado. No slandering of one by the other in court, no swearing to false testimony, no payment of large fees to lawyers.

The new code has been in effect in Norway since 1910 and in Denmark and Sweden since 1918, and no disasters have followed in its wake. In these countries divorce is not considered a burning question, and their rates are much lower than our own. Sweden in 1926 had only 0.29 divorces per thousand of the population, and Norway had 0.21, while Denmark, with its larger urban population, had 0.57 divorces to every thousand, which is still only a little more than a third of our national percentage of 1.52. It is significant that the majority of these decrees were obtained under the mutual consent provision. In Norway, for instance, only 13 per cent of the cases were tried in court. Society there,

we are told, would be quick to cast out the woman who had been so vulgar as to attack her husband openly for cruelty, or the man who had been so ungallant as to accuse his wife publicly of adultery. The Scandinavians as a whole do not frown upon divorce, but they expect people "to do the thing decently."

Analogies are dangerous, of course, and the experience of other peoples is no positive index of what our own experience would be. In all events divorce is bound to be more prevalent in this country than in Europe, where thrifty couples will think long before they divide up their small substance. At the same time there is no reason to suppose that a law similar to the Scandinavian would do anything more than equalize the opportunity for divorce in this country. As it is now, every couple who wants a divorce and can afford to pay the piper, gets one. If people go to Paris or Mexico they do so to avoid publicity and the boredom of residence in another state in this country. It is the poor, who cannot afford to move to another state or to pay fancy fees for detectives, who are prevented today from getting divorces.

It would be interesting indeed if some progressive middle-western or western state were to cast off the ancient shackles of religion and drop the prohibition against collusion. (Wisconsin and Kentucky now have provisions allowing divorce after five years' separation, but the period is so long that comparatively few decrees have been granted on this ground in either state.) With collusion off the boards, the way would then be open to the passage of a mutual consent law. Certain safeguards would be advisable, however; for the privilege of immediate divorce, as embodied in the Roman *mores*, in the French law of the Revolution, and in the Russian law of today, might only add to our native restlessness. A year's cooling-off period seems a wise provision, especially when there are children to be taken into account. And if a state wanted to be very cautious it might take a leaf out of the Code Civil and require that the husband and wife must be of a certain minimum age and must have been married at least two years. The latter provision would make it impossible for a couple to obtain divorce by mutual consent within three years of the date of marriage, and this would certainly be no inducement to hasty marriage.

Doubtless it would be necessary to educate people to obtain divorce by this civilized means, rather than by rushing into court and suing on grounds of cruelty or adultery. The latter method offers immediate heart balm, if invoked in those states that impose no interlocutory period. And it must be admitted that the great majority of divorce seekers do not flinch at the procedure, for even in states where desertion is a ground, cruelty is more often claimed in order to save time. There are, however, a goodly proportion of people—there were 32 per cent in 1925—who prefer desertion as the least objectionable method. They shrink from

airing their affairs in public, and many of them would not perjure themselves by swearing to false facts of desertion—if they saw any other way out of their dilemma. To this class of honest citizens divorce by mutual consent would be manna from heaven.

In the long run the system of mutual consent should have the effect of dignifying marriage and delaying divorce. For if a state made a determined effort to exterminate perjury from its divorce courts, those thousands of couples who now procure hasty decrees on specious grounds would be compelled to wait a year and obtain their freedom by the mutual consent method which would not require court procedure. In the long run the taxpayers would be saved thousands of dollars, and men and women would perhaps regain a little respect for the law.

6. *The Legal and Natural Causes for Divorce*[1]

Studies in divorce may consider the family from three fundamental aspects: (*a*) as a natural organization for response, (*b*) as a cultural group, and (*c*) as a legal entity. Studies in the past, for the most part, have treated the family only as a legal unit. Where the family has been considered as a legal unit, emphasis has been laid upon the institutional and legal aspects of its organization. The cure for the problem of divorce appeared always to be a matter of legislation or of administration. The human nature aspect of the problem was ignored.

As a natural organization, the family is the union of two human beings of opposite sex, with or without children, largely for the satisfaction which may be obtained by both in intimate relationship. In the human animal the desire for response is so strong that in every human society of which we know anything, the natural family has existed.

But a family is more than merely a natural organization. It develops within itself certain attitudes, sentiments, and ideals. That is, it develops a culture of its own beyond the culture of the larger community organization. The members of the family have a common feeling of oneness, a common consciousness of unity as over against other families and other cultural groups. Each family has its own universe of discourse wherein certain things have different meaning to the members of the family than to the outsider, due to a difference in past experience. The family, is then, a cultural organization as well as a natural organization for response. Both these phases will be considered in any study of divorce from the standpoint of human nature.

From the legal point of view, the family is a relationship between a man and a woman entered into according to a procedure established and defined by law—that is, through marriage—and includes the children which may be born or legally adopted into that relationship.

[1] MOWRER, ERNEST R., The Variance between Legal and Natural Causes for Divorce, *Social Forces*, vol. 2, pp. 388–392, March, 1924.

As the family relationship may be lawfully entered into only with the legal sanction of the group, in modern society, it is necessary likewise that before that relationship may be legally discontinued a decree of divorce must be secured. Just as through the marriage ceremony the sanction of the group is given to the relationship, so through divorce the group sanctions the discontinuance of that relationship.

In the final analysis, the family relationship is simply an organization of attitudes into what we may call the family complex, and the behavior centering about that organization. These attitudes assume the form of intimate identification and consensus between the members of the family, with a feeling of common purpose and of common interests. This we may call family consciousness. The breakdown in family life may be thought of, then, as a breakdown in family consciousness; that is, a disorganization of the familial attitudes which make up the family complex and the behavior resulting therefrom. Divorce becomes, then, nothing more than the recognition by the group, or state, that there has been a loss of identity between husband and wife, and that the family relationship has been terminated.

It follows that, if divorce is studied from the point of view of human nature, what will be of interest will not be the legal causes of divorce, but the attitudes leading to the breakdown in family consciousness, unless the two are identical. That is, the interest will not be in divorce *per se*, but in family disintegration. As the discontinuance of family relations is only recognized legally where divorce is granted, divorce is the simplest criterion of the breakdown in family consciousness and of family disintegration, but it is not the cause nor does the breaking off of family relations always lead to divorce.

The purpose of this article is to show that the law does not recognize as causes for divorce the natural causes of family disintegration. Thus our divorce laws become molds into which the discord arising in family relations must be made to fit before the state will sanction a discontinuance of that relationship. This being true any attempt to remedy the divorce situation will be abortive so long as that attempt is based upon studies of divorce in which legal causes are confused with the natural causes of family disintegration.

The material in this article was taken from a study of one thousand divorce cases tried in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. Two hundred were cases in which suit was brought in 1920, while the remaining eight hundred were filed in 1917. All records were taken from the files in chronological order, no selection of any sort being made. Suits brought on the charges of desertion, cruelty, and adultery lend themselves more readily to such an analysis as I wish to make; therefore, only these will be considered here. These three major causes include approximately 86 per cent of the cases; *i.e.*, 858 cases. However, in 311 of these it is

impossible from the records to find out anything more about the situation than the legal cause indicates. This leaves 542 cases for an analysis of what appears to be the natural causes so far as can be ascertained from the court records. The percental distribution of these cases follows: (1) desertion, 54; (2) cruelty, 29; and (3) adultery, 17.

In each of these 542 cases the certificate of evidence was read and the natural cause summarized in descriptive terms. These epitomes were then classified on a common-sense basis for each of the three major legal causes. While these epitomes do not in every case represent adequate description of natural causes for family discord, due to the meagerness of the evidence, they do show a marked contrast to the legal causes.

The certificates of evidence in 295 cases in which divorce was granted for desertion reveal nine types of situations. These type situations will be referred to hereafter as the natural causes of family disintegration. The distribution follows:

Natural causes	Number	Per cent
Financial tension	119	40.2
Desertion for another	39	13.2
Dissatisfaction with home or married life	32	10.9
Infidelity	31	10.5
Drink and cruelty	29	9.9
Refusal to leave old home	23	7.8
Irregular habits	13	4.4
Irregular work and drink	7	2.4
Forced marriage	2	0.7
Total	295	100.0

Forty per cent of the 295 divorces granted for desertion culminated out of the financial or economic tension in family relations. That is, breakdown in the family relationship between husband and wife arose out of refusal of the husband to support his wife, refusal of the wife to support herself or to give her husband money, indebtedness or business failure, or any other situation in which the tension centered about questions of finance, which did not lead, however, to acts of cruelty, but to desertion.

Wherever it is clear in the evidence that one party left the other to live with a third party, whether the charge of adultery may or may have not been included in the bill along with desertion, but in which there was no evidence brought to prove illicit relations, only desertion having been established, the cases have been included under "desertion for another." There were thirty-nine of these.

"Dissatisfaction with home, or with married life" includes those cases where the dissatisfaction arose over the community in which the

home was located, over the presence of kin in the home, or because the husband was not able to furnish the sort of home the wife was accustomed to. Here were included also those cases where one party became tired of married life for reasons not revealed in the evidence, and those cases where the desire to follow a vocation separated the couple, usually being a desire on the part of the wife to become an actress or chorus girl. These cases numbered thirty-two.

Cases of desertion in which the tension between husband and wife centered about the suspicion by one, whether founded upon fact or not, that the other was untrue to the marriage contract, but where there was no proof of immoral conduct, have been classed as "infidelity." All cases of jealousy, as long as there was no abusive treatment resulting therefrom, have been included under this characterization, bringing the total to thirty-one.

Under the class "drink and cruelty" are those cases in which the couple quarreled about the other's drinking. In some instances this disagreement over drink resulted in cruelty prior to desertion. Twenty-nine were of this type.

In certain cases where the husband went to some distant place, his wife refused to accompany him; or where he came to the United States without his wife, sending for her later, she refused to join him; or after leaving her old home community with her husband she became dissatisfied with the new home in a short time and returned to the old. Twenty-three are of such a nature and may be characterized as "refusal to leave old home."

Desertion resulting from "irregular habits" are those cases in which the tension centered around staying out late at night, gambling, and carousing. Late hours, in some instances probably led to suspicion that the offender was untrue to the other, in other cases simply to lonesomeness. Gambling and carousing meant, not only neglect of the wife, but often financial loss as well. There were thirteen of these cases.

"Irregular work and drink" indicates those cases where desertion was the result of discouragement from unemployment, irregular employment, or tension created by the refusal of the defendant to work regularly and refrain from drinking. There were seven of these.

The last class under desertion is "forced marriage" and includes only two cases where the husband married the wife through fear of the law after she had become impregnated by him, following which marriage he deserted her.

The 156 cases of cruelty fall into six types of situations, the distribution being as follows:

Natural causes	Number	Per cent
Financial tension	68	45.0
Drink	43	28.6
Jealousy, infidelity, etc	22	14.6
Excessive and unnatural sexual intercourse	12	7.9
Irregular habits	6	3.9
Total	156	100.0

Cruelty resulting from the "financial tension," sixty-eight cases, epitomizes those cases in which tension centered about the financial situation in the family as described under desertion, except that cruel acts were the direct result rather than desertion.

From the evidence it appears that in forty-three of the cruelty cases the inhuman acts were committed while the offender was in an intoxicated condition. "Drink" is used to characterize this situation.

Under "jealousy, infidelity, etc.," have been included twenty-two cases where cruelty was the result of tension centered about jealousy, and infidelity as defined under desertion. Whether adultery might have been made the ground for divorce in these cases, one cannot be sure, but the presumption is that it might have been.

"Irregular habits" epitomizes six cases in which the tension centered around irregular habits as described under desertion; *i.e.*, quarrels about one person staying out late at night, gambling, and carousing. These irregular habits probably were indicative of infidelity in some instances.

Three types of situations were revealed in the ninety-six cases of adultery as follows:

Natural causes	Number	Per cent
Illicit intercourse	55	57.3
Living with another as spouse	33	34.4
Venereal infection	8	8.3
Total	96	100.0

More than half of the adultery cases fall under the natural cause, "illicit intercourse." In these fifty-five cases the irregularity in the sex life of the individuals occurred while the couple were for all intents and purposes still living together, though one party may have been absent from home at the time. These irregular relations had been, in other words, more or less promiscuous. There had been infidelity but not abandonment of the marital relation.

The eight cases classed as caused by "venereal infection" represent practically the same situation as described for "illicit intercourse." The detection of infection by the other made the innocent party think

that his spouse had been untrue, though he may have contracted the disease before marriage. In both situations, however, the attitudes of the innocent person would be little different.

In the thirty-three cases epitomized "living with another as spouse," while from the legal point of view the act is just as serious as for the type "illicit intercourse," from the point of view of personal behavior there is an important difference. There had been abandonment of the marriage relation and entrance into a second family relationship, without, however, the sanction of the law.

That legal causes, in so far as the three major causes are concerned, are blanket terms has been demonstrated. But a classification which simplifies a mass of concrete material is not objectionable in itself. However, not only are desertion, cruelty, and adultery blanket terms, but they overlap. That is, the same type of situation may in certain instances lead to suit for divorce upon the ground of desertion, cruelty, or adultery.

Four hundred and sixty-six of the 542 cases just analyzed may be classified into types which overlap two or more legal causes as shown by the following table:

Natural causes	Total		Legal causes		
	Number	Per cent	Desertion	Cruelty	Adultery
Financial tension	187	40.1	119	68	
Infidelity, jealousy, illicit intercourse, venereal infection	116	25.0	31	22	63
Desertion for and living with another	72	15.5	39		33
Drink and cruelty	72	15.5	29	43	
Irregular habits	19	4.0	13	6	
Total	466	100.0	231	139	96

In 40 per cent of these 466 cases the tension centered about questions of economics, which are distributed between the two legal causes, desertion and cruelty. In 15 per cent there has been "desertion for another," or "living with another as spouse"—substantially the same situation in each instance—these represented by the legal causes, desertion and adultery.

While the evidence in the cases classed as "infidelity" is quite different from the legal point of view, from the evidence in the cases classed as "illicit intercourse," the first being circumstantial and the second testimonial, the situation in both classes is identical so far as attitudes are concerned. By combining these three groups one has 94 cases falling under the legal causes of desertion, cruelty, and adultery.

Nineteen cases have been classed as having culminated out of a situation where tension centered about certain irregular habits of one party. While these habits are usually expressed as gambling and carousing, they are in some cases reported in the evidence as staying out all night, or late at night, which probably in many instances represents infidelity. These situations culminated in divorces granted for both desertion and cruelty.

In the last class, amounting to over 15 per cent of all the cases upon which this summary analysis is based, and which have been classed under the epitome "drink and cruelty," the situation is substantially the same for both legal causes, desertion and cruelty.

This analysis of the situation culminating in divorce reveals that several types of situations are common for suits brought upon two or more legal grounds. That being the case, any reliance upon the legal causes for explaining the situations resulting in the disruption of family relations is misleading. In other words, the same type of situation may be indicated by two or more legal causes.

It has been demonstrated that there is a variance between the legal causes for divorce and the natural causes of family disintegration. Legal causes represent the standards to which family discord must be made to conform before the state will grant divorce and sanction the discontinuance of the marriage relationship. But those standards are not at all in conformity with the personal standards of great numbers of our population. Neither do they represent causes of family disintegration, but rather results of family discord. This distinction has been confused in too many of the studies of divorce and has resulted in many abortive attempts to deal with the divorce problem. Therefore it would seem to be desirable that any attempt to remedy the present divorce situation should be based upon studies of the natural causes of family disintegration rather than upon studies of the legal causes for divorce.

7. *General Aspects of Family Desertion*[1]

Desertion is variously known as the "poor man's divorce" or the "poor man's vacation." The rich man resorts to the divorce court. The poor man takes the law into his own hands. There are no reliable or complete statistics as to the amount of desertion. Divorce-court records show that it is the most frequent cause for divorce in the United States, but no safe conclusions may be drawn from such figures. The cause assigned in the pleadings is not always the real reason for seeking to untie the matrimonial knot, and "desertion" is the readiest and most convenient excuse which may be presented to the court.

[1] Adapted from LIEBMAN, WALTER H., Some General Aspects of Family Desertion, *Jour. Social Hygiene*, vol. 6, pp. 201–205, April, 1920.

The reports of social agencies indicate that 12.5 per cent of dependency is due to desertion. Twenty per cent of the children committed as public wards to private orphan asylums in the city of New York and elsewhere are the children of deserting fathers. The statistics, although incomplete, are sufficient to show that family desertion is so frequent and extensive as to require careful consideration and investigation, with a view to preventive and corrective treatment. Apart from the economic burden imposed upon a community which is called upon to support a deserted family, the social and moral effects upon the members of the family, especially the children, are indeed alarming.

Desertion threatens the stability of the home and depletes the moral vitality of the family, often directly affecting the children, whose conceptions become warped by the conduct of their father. Many deserted mothers try partly to provide for their children and are often employed for meager wages in unwholesome occupations, to the detriment of their own health; their children are, in consequence, often undernourished, neglected, and without the proper safeguards of parental supervision. One out of every two inmates of reformatories or industrial schools comes from a broken home. The children are committed for offenses of truancy, neglect, or juvenile delinquency.

The census statistics indicate that the wife deserts more frequently than the husband. Thus, in 1916, 23,082 out of a total of 74,893 divorces granted to wives, or 36.8 per cent, were for desertion, while 16,908 out of a total of 33,809 divorces granted to husbands, or 50 per cent, were caused by desertion. But these figures are misleading. Judges, lawyers, and social workers in touch with the problem know that the assigned reason for the divorce, namely, desertion, is but a convenience and a subterfuge. The more reliable statistics gathered by social agencies refute the inference that might otherwise be drawn from the census figures and demonstrate that desertion by the wife is not a very important social problem. Of 499 desertion cases which came under the care of the New York Charity Organization Society between 1906 and 1908, only 14 were deserted men. Of approximately 2,500 warrants issued during 1919 by the Domestic Relations Court of the city of New York, only 20 were for women. Of the 9,065 desertion cases handled by the Chicago United Charities from 1909 to 1915 inclusive, only 11 were cases of deserting women. Of the 9,900 cases handled by the National Desertion Bureau from 1911 to 1920, in only 11 was the wife found to be the deserter.

Dr. Earle E. Eubank's "A Study of Family Desertion" summarizes the matter thus:

> Between male and female on this point seems to be a difference of temperament. Where domestic affairs go wrong the woman is inclined to find relief in

tears and upbraidings; the man seeks to escape from the scene. Whether this distinction would manifest itself in this way if desertion were as easy for one as for the other, is a question. The fact is that at present desertion is not equally convenient to both. Social conventions, physical structure, the burden of children, and economic dependence are definite barriers which tend to hold the wife in the home, however much she may desire her freedom.

To determine the causes of desertion is as complex and difficult a problem as to determine the causes of marital unhappiness generally. Here, again, statistics are incomplete and unreliable. Court statistics are not illuminating, for the reasons before stated. It would require the joint services of a social worker and psychiatrist in each particular case to discover the determining cause or causes, since there may be more than one.

It was at one time thought that unemployment played a chief part, but in the experience of social agencies, it plays a subordinate part. It may be said generally that a deserter evades his moral and his legal responsibilities, not because he cannot provide for his family, but because he prefers to provide for someone else, or because, for any of a multitude of reasons, he finds his home distasteful. The major causative factors contributing to desertion in modern society may be said to fall under the five following heads: (*a*) sexual; (*b*) economic; (*c*) psychological; (*d*) psychopathic; (*e*) hygienic.

The following are typical cases under each of these categories (taken from the records of the National Desertion Bureau):

a. Sexual.—Mrs. X filed a complaint against her husband, who, she alleged, abandoned her and their two children in destitute circumstances and eloped with her friend, Mrs. Y, a widow. The Bureau located X in Boston, whence he was duly extradited. He pleaded guilty to the indictment. When interviewed, pending sentence, the following facts came to light: Mrs. X was sexually unresponsive toward her husband, who, after a time, became increasingly attentive to Mrs. Y. Strange to say, Mrs. X acquiesced in and even encouraged these intimacies, with resultant complications. The Bureau's psychiatrist concluded after examination of the parties that Mrs. X's attitude was due entirely to the sexual incompatibility of husband and wife. The facts were thereupon presented to the court, which suspended sentence, upon the promise of the defendant to provide for the separate maintenance of his dependents. The court appreciated the fact that X was not essentially vicious. For three years he has abided by the court's order of support.

b. Economic.—A deserter once stated, in his own crude way, that he left his family because of despair. He had to work hard; troubles beset him; a child took sick; and not knowing which way to turn, he took a leap into the dark and escaped. The wife solicited help from the relief agencies; one child was sent to a public hospital and the two others to a private orphanage, while the complaint of abandonment was referred to the Desertion Bureau. The man was located at Charleston, S. C. This was his second offense; he was indicted for abandonment,

extradited, and convicted. Upon being interviewed at the Tombs, he told the Bureau's representative that his desertion was due primarily to lack of steady employment, and that only fear of prosecution prevented him from writing home. He was contrite, pleaded for another chance, promising to receive and support his family and never to desert again. Sentence was suspended and the defendant was placed upon probation for a term of five years. He was helped to obtain employment and in a very short while the home was completely rehabilitated.

In the struggle for existence, the load gets heavier and heavier all the time, and then there comes to many the sudden desire to run away from it all and start afresh. They are prompted, perhaps more frequently than people believe, by the hope that they can better themselves by a fresh start and return to make those dependent upon them happy for life. A strange mixture of folly and cowardice!

c. Psychological.—Once a family man wrote a little improvised diary, of which the following is an excerpt: "This is the third time I wanted to go away. When Mary was out with the babies, I stuffed a few things into a handbag. I stepped out into the hall. Silently I crept down five rickety flights of stairs. On the ground landing a neighbor saw me and I stiffened up with fright. On the stoop I saw the janitor and my wife's cousin. I would be seen by them if I walked out with a valise, I thought. Perhaps I would redden or be nervous or act peculiar. So I unpacked the things and went into the cafe where I played cards."

This is the story of a man who came back. It throws a light on the mental processes of such a man; the merest incident changed his intent.

d. Psychopathic.—But there are men who are degenerately vicious. The case of Z is illustrative. Z had a wife and seven minor children. Although he was always able to provide for his family, he constantly endeavored to shift his responsibilities upon a charitable organization, giving one excuse or another. The wife had been so accustomed to short periodic abandonments that soon she was thoroughly pauperized. She would insist upon relief, although her husband was home or about the home. After much patience, it was finally decided to indict Z under the child abandonment law. The circumstances were unusually aggravating, in consequence of which the court imposed the maximum sentence, not less than one year or more than three, upon the defendant, and, in addition, fined him $1,000. It was then discovered that Z had over $1,000 in an out-of-town bank. When interviewed at Sing Sing by a representative of the Desertion Bureau, he refused to relinquish any part of the money in exchange for his freedom. The money was finally attached and Z was permitted his freedom. His last statement was that he could not understand why his wife and children could not work and thus maintain themselves. He was not thankful for his freedom. He sulked and said he would rather spend his life in jail than do anything for his little ones. "No one," he said, "has ever done anything for me." Soon after his release, he escaped to a foreign country. An examination of Z by a competent psychopathologist would have disclosed a positive connection between physical and mental deficiency in his make-up.

e. Hygienic.—B, a native of a small village in the interior of Russia, arrived in America seven years before his family. During the interim, he acquired some of the outward mannerisms and customs of his American friends. He ate in restaurants, was used to an occasional napkin, and his enforced solitude threw him into local theaters and dance halls, night schools, and labor circles, and thus

created his social background. When his wife arrived, he tried to "Americanize" her after his own fashion, but she, good woman, imbued with old-world ideas, huddled in an East Side tenement trying to make both ends meet on her husband's meager earnings, was unequal to the task. Time deepened the chasm between them. She could not depart from the slovenliness of her home and her person. Result—desertion. The man was subsequently located. Hygienic conditions in the home were improved, thanks to the patient efforts of a social agency which became interested in the rehabilitation of the family. A reconciliation was later effected.

This case may be paralleled in thousands of instances. A man with no resources for his leisure hours, a woman whose life is narrowed to hard work, children fretful and clamorous, all confined within a few small, dreary rooms—that is the condition in thousands of tenements throughout the great cities. It varies from day to day and in place to place only in being a little more squalid or a little more disagreeable. It is out of such dull domesticity that the desertion of families frequently arises.

8. *Social Significance of Desertion*[1]

The social significance of an unstable or an unhealthy family life is well illustrated in the problem of desertion. In both dependency and delinquency the effect is greatly to increase the social debtor classes. Dr. Devine in his "Causes of Misery" found 10 per cent of the 5,000 cases of dependency which he studied to be those of deserted women. The non-support cases were equivalent to 2 per cent of the whole, which would raise the total to 12 per cent. If we eliminate homeless men and single women from the total number of cases the role of desertion and non-support would show itself in a higher percentage. The increase in the social debtor groups is particularly noticeable in the case of children. The social cost of desertion must be viewed from the standpoint of both society and the child. For the latter it means the absence of a normal home and the non-fulfillment of the larger social functions of the family beyond the mere fact of biological reproduction.

To the state it means an increase in burden of taxation to support these children in institutions or homes. It also brings a serious problem of administration, for the care of dependent children is a vexed social problem. The large part played by desertion is illustrated in the following quotation taken from a report of the vice chairman of the Joint Executive Committee of the Children's Bureau of Philadelphia, which appeared in the Philadelphia City Club Bulletin for Feb. 12, 1913:

> We have been able to gather figures of institutional children to the number of 1,891. Of these 522 were desertion cases. This would mean 27 per cent, but of course if you take all the institutions of Philadelphia this would not be a true

[1] Adapted from PATTERSON, S. HOWARD, Family Desertion and Non-support, *Jour. Delinquency*, vol. 7, pp. 249–253, September, 1922.

proportion, because in the orphanages there is a very small percentage of desertion cases. So for the 10,000 children in institutions in this city, and there are over 10,000, I think 15 per cent would be a fair proportion to charge to desertion cases. If we reckon that these children cost $200 per capita for each year, which I think is pretty conservative, it makes the bill which the citizens of Philadelphia are paying for these dependent children, as a result of this one cause of desertion, amount to $300,000.

A comparison of this estimate with some more recent ones in other cities will show that it is rather conservative. Again, it must be remembered that this figure represents but one part of the social cost of desertion. Not only are there deserted children in institutions, but also deserted wives and children outside institutions and dependent upon outdoor relief. It is estimated by the present secretary for the Philadelphia Society for Organizing Charity that about 10 per cent of all their appeals come from the families of deserters. In 1916, out of 7,220 cases handled by this society 739, or 10 per cent, were desertion cases. In 1917, there were 692 cases out of a total of 5,105 cases or 13 per cent.

Desertion plays an important part in the matter of juvenile delinquency as well as in the matter of dependency. Sociologists are talking less about the so-called "criminal types" and more about the effects of the social environment. Except for those with a degenerate or psychopathic heredity the majority of criminals are made and not born. An unhealthy family life is a very favorable soil. One of the first things which strike even the casual reader of the records of the juvenile court is the high percentage of cases which come from broken homes. The study of a number of boys before the Philadelphia Juvenile Court in 1916 showed that in 244 cases out of 1,000, the boys had come from homes deserted by one or both parents. This represents a percentage of 22.4. The study of a number of cases in the Misdemeanants Court of Philadelphia in the same year revealed the fact that out of 868 cases, 8 women were divorced and 72 or 9 per cent were separated from their husbands. To what extent desertion was a result rather than a cause of these immoral lives we cannot tell.

One serious aspect of the problem of desertion and non-support is the attitude of society. The care of widows and orphans has been extolled for ages as the duty of all good people. The cause of deserted wives like that of illegitimate children has found fewer champions. Desertion could not formerly have been so serious a problem when there was little mobility of population. The possibilities have increased with the development of better means of transportation and the growth of huge cities in which one family hardly knows its own neighbors. The divorced woman may regain her place in society today and perhaps be granted alimony by the court for her support. The lot of the deserted wife is more precarious and pathetic, although her domestic qualities and sometimes her moral

virtues may be questioned. Widows may receive some aid from state pensions with which they can support their children and keep the family together. It is often desirable to keep the mother and children together in desertion cases. The same is often true of illegitimate children, which are frequently placed in foundling institutions where the rate of infant mortality is high. The state attempts to make the father of the illegitimate child contribute to its support, although in Philadelphia the court is appealed to by about only one out of every eight mothers of illegitimate children. The state fears the extension of its widow pension fund to deserted wives as well as to the mothers of illegitimate children. It does not care to subsidize the process. In Pennsylvania, however, the appropriations for the widows' pension fund is so small that only a comparatively small group can be reached. As but few widows can avail themselves of this state aid, there has never arisen the question of extending it to deserted wives. The possibility of securing support by remarriage is not open to them as it is to widows and widowers. The theory upon which society is going is to compel the deserting husband either to return or to contribute to the support of his family. To what extent we are succeeding will be discussed later. Desertion and non-support however, have been made criminal offences in practically all the states.

Although the causes of divorce and desertion may differ, there are many similarities. If any generalization is permitted it may be said that they are similar phenomena in different social strata. Broken family life in the so-called "upper" social classes frequently results in divorce. In the so-called "lower" economic and social classes it takes the more simple form of desertion. Indeed, desertion has been called "the poor man's divorce." Broken family life may be easily read in the rising divorce rate. Divorces are a matter of legal record. Thus, writers have been able to speak of the threefold velocity of the divorce rate. Desertion, however, is not always a matter of record and its rate is not so easily determined. Nevertheless, we believe that the same set of forces which reflect themselves in divorce appear also in the matter of desertion. Both divorce and desertion are indications of an unstable family life and of the process of adjustment. Both phenomena appear to an unusual extent in the cities. It is here that the social and economic ties which bind the family together become loosened. Because of the cumbersome legal process necessary, divorce takes considerable time and money. The divorce rate of a given year represents the rate of family rupture of some time past. This is not so true in the matter of desertion. Moreover, the legal grounds for divorce differ widely in the various states and are frequently so technical that the real causes of the shattered family life are concealed. This characteristic also is not so true of the records and procedure in the matter of desertion and non-support. Here the legal machinery is more simple and direct although not always effec-

tive. Desertion as one of the eleven causes of divorce in Pennsylvania is largely a legal fiction.

Much literature has appeared upon the institutions of marriage and the family. Only recently have there been attempted many studies of their pathological phases such as divorce and desertion. This may be attributed to the fact that although divorce is older than the Christian Era, its rapid increase is a modern phenomenon. The problem of desertion is almost as old as civilization and we find it mentioned in the famous legal code of Hammurabi, king of ancient Babylon. On the other hand it did not become the pressing social problem of today until the great urban development which followed the industrial revolution.

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Chapter XVII

BIRTH CONTROL AND EUGENICS

Attention has been called elsewhere to the fact that in the rearing of children the individual and group interests are often sharply opposed. In the modern industrial society a family of children is a heavy economic burden and seriously interferes with personal achievement. It is necessary, however, that each married woman produce on the average about three children if the population number is to be maintained by natural increase. But no society to the present time has been willing, as a group, to assume the financial burden of rearing the citizens it desires. It has in general not been necessary for it to do so. The economic dependence of women made early marriage necessary and all but universal. Moral sanctions and religious injunctions reinforced the folkways arising out of woman's dependent status. Art and literature rallied to the cause and threw a glamour of romance about motherhood and other related animal functions. Once within the marriage union children came to the woman as a matter of course and independent of the girl's personal volition.

The result has been in most times and places an amount of human life in excess of the means for its adequate subsistence. Intertribal struggles for the available means of life, famine, disease, and other positive checks on population growth maintained a balance between the procreative activities of men and the available resources of nature. Infanticide has been and still is a widespread human means for reducing the amount of starvation and intolerable misery. In some places and usually at a later time women discovered the possibility of relief through destruction before birth of the unwanted child. While this procedure lies outside the modern *mores* of the Western World it is still a common folk practice. In the present-day urban societies the number of abortions seems to be about as numerous as the number of live births.

For some decades a good deal of contraceptive information has been current in the favored classes of society. As a result the birth rates of these classes have declined rapidly. The extent to which such information is current in different groups is clearly reflected in the differential birth rates. The opposition to the dissemination of information that will bring family size within the control of the married pair has been general and violent. There can be very little doubt, as Mr. Field points out in the paper quoted below, that the spread of this information has

been greatly accelerated by the official opposition and the abuse and persecution of the Neo-Malthusian propagandists. Aside from the controversy concerning the effects of general information and rational action, which are adequately sampled in the papers quoted, techniques of contraception are rapidly coming to be matters of common knowledge in the American population. It is perhaps obvious that a knowledge of the means to voluntary parenthood places the marriage union on a new ethical level. But it also has far-reaching effects upon other phases of family and social life.

In the present and recent past the larger families have been reared by persons low in the social and economic scale. It is generally assumed, and it may be true though it has never been demonstrated, that this differential birth rate is selective in character and operates to lower the average quality of the racial stock. The whole question is covered in the reading from Mr. Thompson. It is perhaps socially unfortunate that the groups least able to give children a favorable environment should rear the larger number of children. This differential birth rate between economic and social classes declines as the spread of contraceptive knowledge makes it possible for the poor as well as the prosperous person to control the number of children in the family.

Attention should be called in passing to the conflict between the monogamous family ideal and the eugenic program for racial improvement. It is doubtless possible to make some minor improvements in the racial stock by preventing the reproduction of defective and inferior individuals where the condition is one of an heritable nature. It is quite probable that the struggle for existence in the early cultures eliminated a considerable percentage of the defective and natively inferior, and it is quite certain that infanticide as practiced among the Greeks, Romans, Chinese, and other peoples improved the quality by removing weak and defective individuals. But the selective removal of a small percentage of inferiors in each generation can have no appreciable effect on the average quality. In breeds of stock improvements are made by selecting a few superior males to be the fathers of the next generation. In human society it would be possible to improve the quality by the same method. A real eugenic improvement would be possible with a polygynous type of family; it is not a possibility with a monogamous family system.

1. *Publicity by Prosecution*[1]

The narrative that is sketched in the following paragraphs is but fragmentary. It deals with only a few conspicuous episodes during a century of opposition to the Neo-Malthusian movement. A number of the less memorable prosecutions in England and in America are passed

[1] Adapted from FIELD, JAMES A., Publicity by Prosecution, a Commentary on the Birth Control Propaganda, *Survey*, vol. 35, pp. 599–601, Feb. 19, 1916.

over without mention, though they have made their lesser martyrs and, perhaps, in their degree, would appear to have made history also, if the facts were known. The experiences of population reformers in Europe are not even considered here. The story really centers upon two principal occasions when the Anglo-Saxon passion for free speech encountered the restraints of Anglo-Saxon law. All in all, it is not a conclusive story, but it sets one thinking.

Systematic agitation in favor of birth control is commonly supposed to have had its beginnings in England toward forty years ago. The Neo-Malthusian movement of that period, provoked by the notorious prosecution of Charles Bradlaugh and Mrs. Annie Besant in 1877, sent its radical teachings so suddenly and widely through the world that they may well have seemed unheard of and unprecedented. But the Neo-Malthusianism of the seventies was in point of fact a revival—aggravated, not new. A propaganda of similar purpose was already active in 1823.

Malthus' Essay on the Principle of Population, 1798, had persuaded many of its readers that the great cause of the miseries of poverty was to be found in the insistent pressure of excessive numbers. Among the most convinced of these disciples was Francis Place, whose keen mind and remarkable political influence made him a leading spirit in social reforms of his day. Place was a workingman. His very youthful and very happy marriage had rescued him from the slums and made a man of him; but the needs of his growing family intensified the hardships of poverty. Fifteen children brought him intimate experience of the overpopulation against which Malthus had protested. On the other hand, his no less vivid experience of moral regeneration through marriage set him firmly against Malthus' expedient of deferred marriage as the means of keeping numbers down. He contended that, for the mass of mankind, prolongation of a nominal celibacy would mean the practical certainty of intolerable vice. Early marriages must, then, be made consistent with small families. The solution, as he saw it, lay in artificial limitation of the number of children.

This bold conclusion was announced by Place in 1822. The summer of 1823 saw a systematic attempt to distribute leaflets setting forth the new preventive of poverty. Place was apparently the prime mover in this propaganda; but there is evidence to suggest that he had the support or approval of some of the most earnest and distinguished men of his day, among them Robert Owen, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, and Jeremy Bentham.

The handbill presently aroused opposition, and the protest brought publicity. A certain Mrs. Fildes, of Manchester, received a package of the bills with a request that she aid in their distribution. Outraged and indignant, she reported the case to the attorney-general. Failing of satisfaction from that quarter, she appealed to Richard Carlile, archrad-

ical and bold partisan of unbefriended causes, asking of him the action which "so flagrant an attack upon the morals of the community" demanded, and expressing the hope that he would "expose the propagators of this infamous handbill." Carlile, for his pains in championing a free press, was at the time confined in Dorchester gaol. The Fildes correspondence was turned over to T. J. Wooler, editor of a radical journal called the *Black Dwarf*. Wooler did not approve the object of the handbill; but, feeling bound, in the cause of free discussion, to do justice to all sides, he published the complaint and the offending leaflet with it. A noisy outcry ensued. The "diabolical handbill" made violent enemies and found warm defenders. Before the flurry subsided, the teachings of the leaflet were said to have made headway among the industrial classes of London and the north.

Two years later, Carlile, at first hostile, was wholly won over. His tract, Every Woman's Book, an unvarnished argument for contraception, outdid anything that had appeared. The handbill episode had seemingly created a market for such writings; 1,500 copies of Every Woman's Book sold in a few weeks, 5,000 in the first eight months. But its best advertisement, according to Carlile, was the abusive hostility of William Cobbett. "Unintentionally or intentionally, Cobbett has raised a demand . . . even in Wales"; "the effect which Cobbett has produced with regard to the book has been to create a call for about fifty per day." Nor was the result of this notoriety merely an enhanced demand for Every Woman's Book. An echo of the indignation, as far away as New York, caused Robert Dale Owen to publish his views of birth control in his "Moral Physiology." Owen's book in turn seems to have prompted Dr. Knowlton's "Fruits of Philosophy." It was these two works which were to figure so prominently in the prosecutions of 1877 and 1878.

During the half century that elapsed between the writing of these pamphlets and their adventitious notoriety, the contraception propaganda lapsed from general notice. New books were written and the old books were still sold, but the circle of their influence was small. The most definite link between the two periods of agitation is the life of Charles Bradlaugh. Driven from home as a boy of sixteen, on account of his inclination toward atheism, Bradlaugh was taken under the roof of Mrs. Carlile, about 1850. Whether or not this association with Richard Carlile's family led him to share some of the views that had inspired Every Woman's Book does not appear. At all events, when Bradlaugh, ten years later, began to edit the *National Reformer*, his adherence to the Neo-Malthusian position was manifested from the start by the support and the space which he gave to his constant contributor G.R. (Dr. George Drysdale), author of the important Neo-Malthusian treatise, the "Elements of Social Science."

Bradlaugh's approval of this work was the alleged chief cause of the animosity which shortly arose between him and his coeditor, Joseph Barker. The quarrel, in which Barker denounced Bradlaugh as an advocate of "unbounded license," not only broke up the coeditorship but threatened a serious schism in the secularist following. What is more to the present purpose, it identified Bradlaugh with a group of convinced Neo-Malthusians; started lectures and lively discussion concerning the population problem; and considerably stimulated the sale of the Elements of Social Science. A free-thought lecturer at Glasgow evoked applause by declaring that "Mr. Barker had himself done more to circulate the book than any other party by his 'unbounded license' attack upon it, which was the surest way of obtaining an unbounded circulation for the work." One member of the audience seriously suggested that Barker was in collusion with the publisher of the "Elements" to promote its sales.

In 1876 "a disreputable Bristol bookseller" was prosecuted and convicted for selling copies of "Fruits of Philosophy," to which he had added indecent pictures. A second prosecution was then instituted against Charles Watts, at that time the publisher of the pamphlet, which had been openly on sale, without molestation, since about 1835. To the chagrin of his free-thought associates, Watts was induced to plead guilty of publishing an obscene book and was released under a suspended sentence. The character of the book, the legality of its publication, were not put to the proof of a verdict. Watts' action was more than a repudiation of "Fruits of Philosophy"; it amounted to a surrender of the right of free discussion.

For Bradlaugh and his coworker, Mrs. Besant, such an abandonment of the cause was impossible. Despite the fact that they did not approve the pamphlet in all its details, they republished it to test the right of publication. They took a shop and notified the police that at a stipulated time they should be present in person to sell the pamphlet. Detectives came and bought. In due course Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant were arrested and taken to the police court.

The trial was at first set for the Old Bailey, but Bradlaugh, who had no mean knowledge of law, succeeded in having the case removed to the Court of Queen's Bench, where it was tried before the Lord Chief Justice and a special jury. The solicitor-general appeared as chief counsel for the prosecution, though the identity of the responsible prosecutor was sedulously concealed. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant conducted their own defense. The trial began June 18, 1877, and lasted four days. An extraordinary degree of interest was aroused by the outstanding features of the case—the engrossing subject under discussion; the discriminating and sympathetic attitude of the Lord Chief Justice; the warmth or bitterness of partisan feeling toward the secularist cause; Bradlaugh's redoubtable personality; most of all, perhaps, the eloquence, the courage,

the astonishing poise of a woman, not yet thirty years old, who could for two days hold the admiring attention of the court to her defense of the morality of birth control. The court room was crowded with auditors, and to those who did not attend, the daily press offered detailed accounts of the progress of the case.

The publicity which attached to the whole prosecution, culminating in the trial, had not been slow in producing the effect which the prosecutors must least have desired. A widespread demand was aroused for "Fruits of Philosophy." In the days of its obscurity the pamphlet sold to the extent of about 700 copies in a year. For the three months interval between the arrest and the trial, the sales of the new edition aggregated 125,000—a number which would have satisfied the former demand for 180 years. Figures could hardly speak more emphatically. "That," argued Mrs. Besant, to the jury, "is one of the effects of trying in a free country to stop the sale of a book which has been uninterruptedly sold to the public for forty-three years." Even the solicitor-general was constrained to declare the whole proceeding a blunder: "a most unfortunate prosecution I admit it is, . . . a most mischievous prosecution in its character, and, probably, in its result . . . " The Lord Chief Justice, in summing up, went farther still. "There is one point," he said, "on which I think every one who has attended to the trial will cordially concur . . . that is as to the mischievous effect of this prosecution. A more ill-advised and more injudicious proceeding in the way of a prosecution was probably never brought into a court of justice."

The verdict in this trial was equivocal: "We are unanimously of opinion that the book in question is calculated to deprave public morals, but at the same time we entirely exonerate the defendants from any corrupt motives in publishing it." The court held that this must be regarded as a verdict of guilty; but the sentence which was imposed was never carried out. An appeal was taken on grounds of error, and in February, 1878, the higher court, ruling on a purely technical question, reversed the judgment of the court below. While the appeal had been pending Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant had ceased publication of "Fruits of Philosophy." As soon as the decision was rendered, however, they began again actively to distribute the pamphlet. Indeed, Bradlaugh went so far as to sue the police for recovery of some copies which they had seized. He won his point, regained possession of the pamphlets, and sold them, inscribed with the legend, "Recovered from the police."

The general sale went on, unopposed, until, after an intimation that no further prosecution would be attempted, Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant withdrew the book. They had made good their determination to publish it. Now that the publication was no longer contested they substituted what they intended to be a more suitable book—the "Law of Population," written for this purpose by Mrs. Besant.

The picturesqueness of the Bradlaugh-Besant trial almost eclipsed the closely allied case of Edward Truelove, bookseller. About the time when "Fruits of Philosophy" was confiscated, representatives of the Society for the Suppression of Vice raided Truelove's shop in High Holborn and seized copies of Robert Dale Owen's "Moral Physiology"—a pamphlet which had been sold in England for some forty-six years, and one of the most obviously well-intentioned items in all the Neo-Malthusian literature. Truelove was brought to trial in February, 1878, but the jury was unable to agree on a verdict. At a second trial, in May, he was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine and to serve a term of imprisonment. By that time the case against "Fruits of Philosophy" had failed, and the circulation of the "Law of Population" had begun. Truelove's conviction had no important effect in checking the campaign. On the other hand, this imprisonment of a man nearly seventy years old, and highly respected by his secularist associates, was an additional challenge and spur to the already militant propagandists.

A most important consequence of these trials was the vigorous activity of the Malthusian League. This organization had its start in May, 1861, as a result of Bradlaugh's suggestion of a society to support discussion, influence public opinion and overcome the prevailing neglect or misconception of Malthusianism. Aroused from comparative inaction by the prosecution of its founder, the league assumed a position of international leadership in the methodical diffusion of the Neo-Malthusian ideas. It published literature, held meetings in various parts of England, and presently began the regular issue of a monthly periodical, the *Malthusian.*

The effects of this crusade and of the personal influence of Dr. Charles R. Drysdale, president of the league, were soon felt in other countries. In Holland, especially, a lively interest in birth control was awakened, which led, in 1881, to the founding of the celebrated Nieuw-Malthusiaansche Bond.

The rapid decline of the birth rate, that disconcerting legacy of the nineteenth century began to show itself over the greater part of Western Europe, with striking simultaneity, in the late seventies and early eighties. In England particularly, as several careful studies have shown, the drop appears suddenly about 1878. The coincidence of this change with the propaganda called forth by the Bradlaugh-Besant trial is too significant to be ignored. The deeper causes of birth restriction were, of course, latent in general social conditions. The falling birth rate would have come, no doubt, in its own time, had the "Fruits of Philosophy" never been protested. But the ill-starred prosecution gave to slow-gathering forces instant and overwhelming effect. "Nothing has done so much for the popularization of the truths contained in the Malthusian Theory,"

wrote Dr. C. R. Drysdale, in 1878. "In the words of Prof. Alexander Bain, it has advanced the question by a quarter of a century."

It is often to be observed that colonies recapitulate in their rapid development much of the slower social history of their mother countries. New South Wales was not long in providing an interesting parallel to the events in England that have just been narrated. The birth rate of New South Wales, in the middle eighties, was, as it had been, high. But the literature of Neo-Malthusianism had already reached Australia, and in May, 1888, a bookseller named Collins was fined five guineas and costs for selling Mrs. Besant's "Law of Population." Collins appealed to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which, in December, 1888, handed down a two-to-one decision in his favor.

The opinion of Mr. Justice Windeyer in that case has become a favorite document of the Neo-Malthusians, for it amounted to a strong argument for the morality of birth control. Nor did Mr. Justice Windeyer, in his concern for the population problem involved, ignore the issue of free discussion. Referring with approval to the remarks of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in the Bradlaugh-Besant case he declared his opinion that "all prosecutions of this kind should be regarded as mischievous, even by those who disapprove the opinions sought to be stifled, inasmuch as they only tend more widely to diffuse the teaching objected to. To those, on the other hand, who desire its promulgation, it must be a matter of congratulation that this, like all attempted persecutions of thinkers, will defeat its own object, and that truth, like a torch, 'the more it's shook it shines.'"

The effect of such an opinion on Neo-Malthusianism in New South Wales was bound to be great. The Australian edition of the "Law of Population" has long since reached its hundredth thousand, although Mrs. Besant, after her conversion to theosophy, withdrew in 1891 her consent to the sale of the book. The birth rate of New South Wales dropped sharply in 1889, following the Collins trial, and through the next ten years fell off by nearly one-third. Here again is a significant coincidence. The falling birth rate would presumably have made its appearance sooner or later. The Collins trial precipitated its coming. By 1903 it had become so manifest that a royal commission was appointed to investigate its causes. This time, however, the authorities had learned discretion from experience. The detailed report of the commission was never made public, lest in its turn it should prove the means of depressing the birth rate still further.

Perhaps in the course of time Americans will also learn the lesson that mere denunciation of birth control characteristically defeats its own object. If we could be consistently medieval, if all the advocates of family limitation could be quietly spirited away, some progress might no doubt be made in stifling advanced ideas on the population question.

But as things are, our undiscriminating prosecutions result in an indiscriminate publicity. By a confusion of issues they force earnest defenders of free speech in general, to abet, often reluctantly, the particular doctrines of some extravagant pamphleteer. Thus Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant were led to circulate a book they could not wholly endorse; and thus today not all who defend the Sangers defend the Sanger pamphlet. What is worse, the attempt to suppress a radical movement ordinarily rallies to its support a flock of temperamental soldiers of fortune, fired with misguided enthusiasm, but ill informed upon the real question in dispute. Such an outcome must be unsatisfactory alike to enemies and to friends of birth control. There is too much notoriety and too little understanding.

The knowledge which has brought us power over human generation has brought with it one of the most portentous problems of modern society. Whether or not mankind shall be reproduced becomes in a new sense a question of volition, and consequently a question of responsibility. But the power to choose has come so suddenly that the sense of responsibility seems as yet inadequate. The new knowledge strains the old traditions. In other words, our problem of population involves a moral problem.

Alarmed by this situation, some persons demand a ban on knowledge. But the problem is not to be dealt with so summarily. There is no likelihood that it can be solved, in reactionary fashion, by exhorting the people to forget what they have learned and walk in the old ways, and by setting the police on them if they refuse. On the contrary, it is virtually inconceivable that the unsettling knowledge will be lost or the perilous power wholly relinquished. All over the world the trend of events has seemed to exclude such a possibility.

It thus becomes expedient to accept the knowledge, and to bend our efforts to working out new standards by which its exercise may be made to yield a clear preponderance of benefit. This is indeed no simple task; but its difficulties, viewed in a long perspective in which even now we begin to see them, may prove to be mainly difficulties of transition.

Meantime, the transition is none the less critical; for the numbers, and perhaps yet more the quality, of the race are at stake. If the readjustment is to be accomplished without excessive shock, it is imperative that the means of birth control should be made known wisely and temperately, and only so fast and so far as experience can bring with them the compensating influence of a readjusted sense of responsibility. The fanatical Neo-Malthusian, the bigoted prude, the hysterical patriot who sees national greatness only in swarming numbers, must all give way to someone more highly endowed with the saving sense of proportion, and hence better able to fit the power of birth control into a proper place among the constructive forces of civilization.

2. *The Necessity of an Adaptive Fecundity*[1]

Not long ago President Harding noticed in the photogravure section of a Sunday newspaper a picture of Mr. and Mrs. Domenico Zaccahea, of New York City, and their sixteen children; whereupon he wrote Mrs. Zaccahea congratulating her upon being the mother of such a splendid brood. The gesture won the President friends, no doubt, but did it strike a note which needs to be struck? The father of this family is a porter at twenty dollars a week. There is no evidence that he has unusual gifts to endow his children with. By complimenting him the President of the United States encourages our millions of commonplace citizens to court the gratitude of their country by begetting families of sixteen children. Is the country in need of them?

The other day I greeted a former student of mine who was born in 1830 when the world had had but half as many inhabitants as today. In her lifetime she has seen 850,000,000 of persons added to the human race.

The divine command, "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth," was uttered to seven people, who were all that remained of mankind. There are now a quarter of a billion times as many people as there were then. One can but wonder how much longer this emergency mandate is going to be considered as still in force.

Race suicide?

Since this phrase was launched twenty years ago, portentous bigwigs have been wont to send a chill down the spines of their hearers by picturing the enlightened stocks and peoples as headed for extinction because the full quivers of olden time are becoming rare. The clergyman with few children or none at all has felt entitled to thunder like a Hebrew prophet at couples who stop at three or four children whereas their grandparents gave the world ten or a dozen. Family restriction—which first showed itself in the vital statistics of France about the middle of the last century, became visible in England in 1878, began leaving its mark on Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Australia in the eighties, attracted notice in Italy, Hungary, and Finland just before the close of the century, and appeared in Germany and Austria in the last decade before the war—has been pointed to as if it were a spreading leprosy. No one stops to consider where these peoples would find themselves today if they had gone on having progeny in the old happy-go-lucky fashion.

Because it affords such a splendid text for Jeremiads and because a hot controversy has raged about the morality of certain restrictive practices, the shrinkage in the size of families has attracted an enormous amount of attention. Every thoughtful person has heard of it, has been urged to confront it as "a grave problem." On the other hand, few

[1] Adapted from Ross, Edward Alsworth, The Necessity of an Adaptive Fecundity," *Pub. Am. Sociological Soc.*, vol. 16, pp. 176–184, December, 1921.

but statisticians, life insurance actuaries, and public health officers have noticed the extraordinary lowering of the death rate which has been brought about in the last forty years. No one has viewed it "with alarm" or lifted a trumpet against it. It has stolen upon us quietly like a genial south wind in February, like a night drizzle after an August drouth. And yet in most countries, so far as population growth is concerned, it quite balances and neutralizes that shortage of the baby crop which has inspired so many gloomy prophecies.

The thing is as plain as the black and white squares on a chessboard. Take the fourteen European countries which have worth-while vital statistics running back for forty years or more. Compare their records for the half decade 1881 to 1885, with those of the last half decade before the war, *viz.*, 1906 to 1910. You will find that in nine of them the death rate fell farther than the birth rate; so that in 1910 their natural increase was actually greater than it had been a quarter of a century earlier before the forethought and prudence in the matter of family had given much evidence of its presence among the masses. Taking the average for the fourteen peoples, it appears that while the number of annual births per thousand of the general population was five less at the end of the period, the number of annual deaths per thousand was five and one-half less.

Impatient with the limitations of ink on paper, a certain yellow journalist used to wish, when he had something of great moment to communicate to the public, that he could "make a noise resembling thunder." The statistician laments that he cannot thunder to a public which admires families of the Zaccahea type that in the last quarter century for which we have complete statistics (1881–1885 to 1906–1910) the death rate of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Scotland declined about a fifth. That of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England and Wales, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland was lowered about a fourth. While that of Australia, Bulgaria, and Holland was reduced about a third. In the same period the mortality of the dozen chief cities of the world was reduced by more than a third.

Our own country has been tardy in collecting vital statistics. However, we have this most significant fact. In 1900 the death rate in our "registration area"—which then included two-fifths of the American people—was 17.6 per thousand of the population. In 1919 in a registration area which had expanded until it included three-fourths of us, the rate was 13—a reduction of a fourth in nineteen years.

Save our ingenuity in devising contrivances for blotting out human life, nothing in our time is so sensational as our success in vanquishing certain diseases. For example, in 1911 in the United States the deaths per 100,000 population from the fevers, including typhoid, typhus, and malaria, were only one seventy-third as numerous as the deaths from these causes in British India. These fevers are not tropical maladies and there

is no climate or geographic reason for the great prevalence in India. Old records show that these diseases played havoc in this country a century ago. The reason why they scourge us so little today is that public authority has stepped in and applied the discoveries of preventive medicine.

It is this agency that has chased from us those grisly servitors of Azrael, bubonic plague, cholera, yellow fever, and smallpox. Moreover, thanks to increasing personal and social appropriation of the fruits of medical advance, another four of his reapers, *viz.*, typhoid, diphtheria and croup, tuberculosis, and pneumonia have had their sickles dulled. Even at our present stage of knowledge, did the public but will it, they would have no more power over us than cholera has.

The progress of child saving alone suffices to offset a large part of the fall in the birth rate. Peeps into the infant mortality of the less-advanced peoples suggest that right down through history from a third to two-thirds of those born have perished in the cradle. A decade ago a quarter of the babies born in Hungary and Russia failed to live a year. In Chile in 1913 I found the loss to be a third, in some cities 47 per cent. Not long ago Moscow parents were losing half their infants within a twelvemonth. As for the Orient, the fate of its innocents is horrifying. In 1910 in the innermost province of China an American medical missionary with twenty years of practice gave me his opinion that from 75 to 85 per cent of the children born in his district die before the end of the second year. The first census the Japanese took in Formosa showed that half of the babies born to the great Chinese population there do not live as long as six months.

On the other hand, where the lessons of modern hygiene and medicine have been well learned, infants are saved with a success that our forefathers would have attributed to magic. Already there are perhaps a dozen peoples that are getting more than nine-tenths of their children through the first year of life. Our country is near the foot of this enviable class but, nevertheless, there are 25 American cities which save 19 babies out of 20. It is in New Zealand, however, that the wee ones bear a charmed life. In that happy land there are good-sized cities that lose the first year only 1 infant in 27.

That in our huge composite American population clogged with some extremely backward elements death should take, year after year, but 1 in 70 or 1 in 75 is an utterly new thing in the experience of peoples. Even if we were a stationary and not an expanding people, I suppose that only 1 in 50 or 1 in 55 would die in a twelvemonth. In all the life of our race extending over a thousand centuries and more the like of this has never been known. It behooves us to adapt our behavior to it as we adapt our behavior to artificial light or power machinery or the automobile. But we see these things, so we recognize at once the necessity

of conforming our conduct to them. On the other hand, most of us do not see this latter-day crippling of Azrael and therefore do not realize that any change in our standards of judgment is called for.

For example, through its first millennium and a half—during which its doctrines crystallized—the Christian Church was in the presence of a human mortality which must have been from two to four times that which we experience today. Naturally the church became fixed in the idea that overpopulation is nothing to worry about and in her inspired wisdom she branded as a sin the deliberate curtailment of conjugal fecundity. Can this position be maintained indefinitely into the future in view of the astounding success of modern medical science and sanitation in enabling people to live out a normal life term?

If only the good men who are so dogmatic in this matter would condescend to apply the test of arithmetic.

Conceive that as a people we came under the conviction of sin with respect to our current widespread practice of restricting the size of the family. Suppose that while keeping mortality down to 13 per thousand, our women would feel it their duty to emulate the prolificacy of the *Hausfraus* of Prussia during the decade before the war when the Kaiser constantly incited them to produce what turned out to be "cannon fodder." Ignore migration into or out of this country. Well, then, by the end of this century the United States would contain more people than all Europe does today.

Suppose again that while preserving human life with our present success we should for the next 78 years have children at the present rate of the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the Italians. In that case, the year 2000 would see the population of our country more than 500,000,000.

However, the Teutons taught us to stigmatize the Latins as "decadent," and there is, indeed, reason for suspecting that in these peoples a great many couples have no more children than they think they can provide for. Their upper class and *intelligentsia* are by no means careless multipliers. Let us turn, then, to the simple and unspoiled peoples of the Balkans. If American women should give themselves to childbearing with the whole-heartedness of the women of Bulgaria and Roumania, by the close of this century our country, if it kept its present mortality, would boast as many human beings as there are now in all Asia and Africa!

Go a bit further. Suppose that American womanhood rose still more nobly to the demands of their heaven-ordained destiny. Imagine that they bore children as freely as the secluded wives of British India or the women of Russia under Nicholas II. Of course, with so many babies in the population it would be hard to keep our low death rate. Then too, low mortality and big families simply do not go together.

Various studies show that families of more than nine are two or three times as likely to perish in their infancy as those born into families of less than five. Moreover, many women would have their lives cut short by excessive childbearing. There are settlements of the foreign born in our Middle West in which the typical woman dies trying to bring into the world a twelfth, fifteenth, or twentieth baby.

Nevertheless, imagine that with the aid of more skill and science we could hold our death rate down to 13 while the birth rate swelled to 48 per thousand. In that case our country at the end of this century would have a population equal to that of the entire globe at the outbreak of the World War!

Let us venture on another hypothesis. More than any people in the world the French Canadians realize what we are authoritatively assured is the Christian ideal in this matter of reproduction. Nowhere are women so submissive to the admonitions of their spiritual director, so resigned to the burden of children that is laid upon them. Hence a fecundity in certain parts of the province of Quebec which is not matched in any other part of the world where there is such a thing as vital statistics. In a year 55 babies are born per thousand of population—nearly two and a half times as many as in our "registration area."

To be sure, it is the graveyard rather than the nursery that is populated by these heroic sacrifices. Students of the Loyola School of Sociology and Social Service in Montreal have established that a baby born in that city is twice as likely to die in infancy as a Toronto baby, more than twice as likely to die as a New York baby, and four times as likely not to survive the first year as a baby born in Brookline, Mass. This, however, has really nothing to do with the matter of fulfilling one's duty in respect to reproduction.

Now if our people came to be as docile and devout as these *habitans* of French Canada, every couple willing to have "as many children as God sends," why then about 3,000 of those born among us this year would, as octogenarians, see our country peopled by 3,000,000,000 of human beings; that is, by thrice the population of Asia and Africa today with 70,000,000 folks thrown in for good measure. Of course no such numbers could be maintained here, but the calculation shows what we let ourselves in for if we take the Zaccahea family as our ideal.

Suppose that, instead of looking at the performance of other peoples, we should go to our ancestors for a standard. We do not know the birth rate or death rate of our great-grandparents, but we do know that through the 40 years intervening between the inauguration of George Washington and that of Andrew Jackson the natural growth of our population averaged 3 per cent a year. Should we equal their record for the remainder of this century the American people would then be two-thirds as numerous as the present inhabitants of the globe.

With such Matterhorns of prolificacy in full view, how mortifying appears the actual performance of American mothers. Even with the aid of the millions of big-family foreign born in our midst, their fruitfulness is only about a third of that of the French Canadians in the good old days and a mere half of what you find among the Slavic peoples. Our excess of births over deaths in only 70 per cent. Our natural growth of population is a little less than 1 per cent a year. Keeping this up for 78 years and ignoring immigration, we should come to the year 2000 A.D. with only 222,000,000 of population.

It is evident then that millions upon millions of American married couples—perhaps the majority of those of native stock—are in some degree slackers. They are regulating the size of their families and this by other means than marital abstinence. Nor is there any prospect that the situation will improve. For the death rate of our people will be brought still lower. In 20 years the experimenters, the doctors, the public health agencies, and the social workers have pulled it down more than a quarter. Perhaps they can pare it down another quarter in the next 20 years. Why even if there were no fresh conquests of disease, the mere putting into effect everywhere among us of measures which are now operating with success somewhere would reduce our death rate to 1 in 100 each year. So one need not strain his imagination in forecasting an annual mortality of 9 to 1,000 or even 8. But as more parents and grandparents round out their lives and death is well-nigh banished from the nursery, there will be fewer gaps in families to be filled and we shall see the annual baby crop shrink to 19 or even 18. Even then, however, our population will be growing as fast as it now is and certainly as fast as it is possible for it to grow without lowering our standard of living.

There is, then, ahead of us an endless vista of restriction of the size of families. We shall leave unused an increasing portion of that fertility which became established in our species long ago in order to meet a rate of wastage which no longer presents itself in civilized life. In China about all of human natural fertility is needed in order to balance deaths, particularly the excessive mortality of infants. In Southern and Eastern Europe about half of this fertility is now required to maintain numbers. In Central Europe a third. In Scandinavia, Great Britain, Australia, and the United States a fourth or less. Some of us will live to a time when a fifth or even a sixth of human reproductive power will suffice to keep up our population. To be sure, after several decades a stationary population would include such heavy contingents of the later age classes that the annual death rate would hover in the neighborhood of 15 and perhaps 30 per cent of human fertility would be required if numbers were to be maintained. Even then, however, the calling into operation of as much as half of the reproductive power of our race would be sheer madness.

Fewer births in sympathy with fewer deaths, in order that human increase shall not outrun wealth production, signifies that a new thing has come into the life of mankind, *viz.*, a fecundity that adapts itself to the economic prospect. In view of their miraculous victories over disease, adaptive fecundity is, indeed, the only safeguard of the enlightened peoples against the dismal fate of overcrowded China. If such deliberate limitation of family size is a sin, then what an appalling prospect of Divine displeasure opens up. For with further reductions in the mortality rate an increasing proportion of American parents, an increasing proportion of the members of the white race, an increasing number of the peoples of the globe, will either have to violate what they are assured is God's law or else multiply until it will be necessary to hang out on our planet the Standing Room Only sign.

3. *The Catholics and Birth Control*[1]

The teaching of the Catholic Church on contraception, or, as it is more commonly but inaccurately termed, "birth control," is reasonable and healthful, and is mindful of those elements that work for the best interests of society. Chief among these are a spirit of self-mastery, of conscious and willing sacrifice, an understanding of the place of the individual in the social cosmos, a realization of the ordered relations of body and soul.

The individual who successfully carries these into his personal life and relationships is the vital constructive force in society and the fiber of the state. He is putting into action what is essential to all human well-being, love of God and love of neighbor. This requires that he live faithfully according to all God's commandments and be ever ready to make personal sacrifices for the common good.

He who fails to make this the measure of his conduct is a weakness in society. His actions are characterized by a lack of self-control, a spirit of willfulness and self-love, a desire to avoid responsibility, and an inability to realize that the body must be governed by that superior faculty which marks off man distinctively from the animal world in the functions of which he participates.

Those who support artificial birth restriction and who hold that the gratification of sexual appetite is the central purpose in marital life are simply adhering to the view that the human being is primarily governed by his animal appetites rather than by his intellect. It is safe to assume that these persons do not truly understand the unselfish, spiritual love which is peculiar to human creatures.

The Catholic Church teaches that the artificial prevention of conception by mechanical, chemical, or other means is intrinsically evil.

[1] Adapted from WARD, PATRICK J., The Catholics and Birth Control, *New Republic*, vol. 59, pp. 35–37, May 29, 1929.

Since this is the universal moral law, it applies with equal force to Catholic and non-Catholic.

The declining birth rate in so-called "Catholic" countries is often adduced as evidence that Catholics practice birth control. A decline in the birth rate is not in itself evidence of contraceptive practices. There are, no doubt, Catholics who practice contraception. There are also Catholics who commit murder, robbery, and other crimes which are against the moral law.

Declining populations, in the sense of decreasing fertility, are characteristic of all Western countries during the past fifty years. In comparing one country with another, several factors have to be considered: age of population, female live births, emigration, etc. In 1910 France and Ireland had the lowest birth rates in Northwestern Europe, but by 1926 Ireland's birth rate was the highest in Europe, and the French birth rate exceeded that of England, Sweden, or Switzerland.

The church does not forbid the limitation of families under all or any conditions. In the family, as in other relationships, it expects its children to exercise prudence and foresight. It does not require child-bearing without regard to the health of the mother or to the family income. It simply teaches that if a limitation is placed on the number of children brought into the world it must be done through abstinence and continence. The Christian life surely requires the exercise of virtue as well as of wordly wisdom.

The effort made by the more extreme advocates of birth control to sweep away completely the present laws which prevent circulation through the mails and the importation across our borders or through our ports of contraceptive instruments, medicines, or literature, has not, I believe, the support of any responsible body of citizens in this country. The principal religious groups recognize the tremendous moral and social dangers inherent in the teaching and practice of birth control. The Methodist Church, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, Lutheran, and other denominations, are as steadfastly opposed to these changes in the law as is the Catholic Church.

The repeal of these laws would mean the open display and sale in drug stores of birth-control appliances and drugs, as is the case in other countries. It could not have other than a most degrading effect on the minds and habits of the people. The United States mails would be open to every kind of pornographic literature and advertisement.

This would be the effect of the Cummins-Vaile and similar bills. The American Birth Control League has stated it does not favor these sweeping changes, but proposes amending legislation to permit physicians legally to prescribe and use contraceptive appliances and to allow such appliances and information regarding them and their use to go freely

through the mails. The futility of restricting contraception to certain cases is dealt with later in this article.

The Catholic Church, with other Christian religions, upholds laws which defend public morality and well-being. The repeal or modification of the laws in question would put the state in the position of lending itself to a course of conduct which is morally and intrinsically evil. In other words, the information which birth controllers seek now to have disseminated is not simply that advocating birth control in general terms. This is published and carried in the mails under present statutes. What is desired is the distribution of instruments, drugs, and the specific information (instructions, clinical reports, photographs, diagrams, advertisements, etc.) showing actual ways and means of achieving contraception. The dissemination of this knowledge has the sole purpose of encouraging persons to practice contraception. Contraception is not a matter of choice with the individual, but is forbidden by the natural law which is binding on all men, regardless of their religious beliefs. The laws of the state must conform to the natural law. The state has an obligation to resist any movement which threatens its peace, stability, and general welfare.

There are those who urge contraception as a branch of preventive medicine. One group would make its medical application general, another would confine it to certain exceptional cases where morphological defect is present or where there may be abnormal or defective children. But the advocates of birth control in this limited field know very well that it cannot be so confined.

Birth control being essentially evil, no case can be supposed in which it would be right. But even in claiming that there are exceptional circumstances, birth controllers are in an untenable position. Morality cannot depend upon circumstances. Who is to judge when the circumstances are exceptional? In cases of ill health or physical defect it will be either the individual or the physician. Among doctors there assuredly will be, as there is now, wide division of opinion. In similar cases physicians will or will not recommend contraception according to their own personal attitude toward the practice. There are many doctors, and non-Catholic doctors too, like Dr. Howard Kelly, foremost gynecologist, who would place contraceptive practice side by side with prostitution. There will be, in every town, city, and village, doctors who will be known by their favoring or opposing contraceptive practices and their clientele will run accordingly. Such a state of affairs would ruin professional standards and ethics.

The matter will not stop with the opinions of doctors. Individuals will be judges in their own cause and that cause will assuredly not be judged merely on the grounds of physical ills. Poverty—a relative condition apart from destitution—will be advanced, as it is now, as one

justification. Social demands will be another. The pains and the cost of childbearing and rearing, even for healthy mothers, will be another. Married couples with an income from $2,000 to $20,000 can think up a thousand social reasons why they should limit their families by contraceptive methods.

On one side stands the teaching of the Catholic Church which insists on absolute continence, a by no means impossible practice, as against the use of artificial means to frustrate conception. But it does not stop there. It points a way, through the social teachings of the Gospel, for society to seek relief from undue hardships and from injustice. It urges a sound social reconstruction, calling forth to the task everything that is best in human nature, the heroic qualities in men, self-mastery, unselfishness, and sacrifice. These elements are essential in the preservation of the family, the home, the state, and the race.

On the other side are the teachings and practice of birth control. They aim at the removal of barriers in the way of abundantly satisfying physical love. They assume that sexual gratification is dominant in marital life and outweighs all questions of self-sacrifice and self-denial. They hold that continence is impossible for the average man or woman. The improvement of the general social condition is secondary, if a consideration at all. That the poor should practice birth control to alleviate their condition is on the assumption of a static wage value, which they can only try to equalize by reducing their numbers. A more deadly economic and social doctrine can hardly be imagined. Birth control, like other forms of unchastity, frustrates the divine plan of unselfishness among human beings, the criterion of all moral and social progress.

Generally the motives of those who practice birth control are the deliberate purpose of avoiding care and responsibility, and the increasing of material comforts. These become the theme of life not only for the parents themselves, but for the children who are permitted to come into the world. These children are conceived and reared on the principle that physical and material well-being and worldly progress are the paramount things in life.

Now, what does the church offer as an escape from this dreadful abyss of race suicide? First of all, it is essential that charity—love of God and love of neighbor—pervade every human relation. It is the sum of the commandments. Without it men's efforts profit nothing. The church teaches the practice of the Christian virtues, prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. Here is a whole life theme. That it is not merely an idealistic one is witnessed by the fact that, in modern materialistic America, the idea of wholesome Christian social service has been systematized, financially endowed, and carried to a point unsurpassed in any other country. It is founded in these Christian virtues.

In that direction lies a solution of many problems on which birth control parasitically propagates.

4. *Eugenics as Viewed by a Sociologist*[1]

Eugenics, according to Galton, is "the science which deals with the influences that improve the inborn or native qualities of a race, also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage." This science has of late begun to attract considerable attention, and, if I mistake not, is going to attract still more in the near future. There are three chief causes of this growing interest in eugenics at the present time. The *first* of these is the publicity given to the facts regarding the decreasing size of the family in the upper economic class and the consequent rapid dying-out of this class. The *second* is the insistence of the advocates of birth control that what we need in this country is a population of high quality rather than one of great numbers. The *third* is the publicity given to the conclusions arrived at by the intelligence testers. They now claim to be able to tell us just who is fit and who is not fit. They believe they can separate the wheat from the chaff in a very exact manner.

Because of this growing interest in eugenics it behooves us to study its tendencies carefully in order to determine whether the doctrines it expounds are worthy of the support of students of social science.

It is but natural that most of the recognized exponents of eugenics should be biologists. It is they who have made the scientific studies of heredity and who as a consequence have the greatest claim to competence when it comes to saying how the results of genetic investigation can be applied to the improvement of the human breed. If the biologist were content to do this, as a sociologist, I would have no quarrel with him. When, however, he begins to interpret history from the standpoint of genetics, and, further, when he prescribes the future form of social organization which we must develop if we are to breed a good stock, I feel that the sociologist not only has the right, but even that it is his duty to scrutinize the eugenists' policies very carefully. As a human ecologist, the sociologist is probably better fitted to pass judgment upon the social value of proposed programs of race improvement than the biologist. No human problem is purely a biological problem. Though man is subject to the same genetic laws as all the other animals, yet he can never be dealt with as merely an animal. When, therefore, the biologist comes to conclusions regarding man and his institutions which are manifestly based upon his studies of heredity among the lower animals, I do not feel bound to accept his views.

How the fabric of present-day eugenics is being woven out of these various beliefs and doctrines is easy to see. First we have a biological

[1] From THOMPSON, WARREN S., Eugenics as Viewed by a Sociologist, *Pub. Am. Sociological Soc.*, vol. 18, pp. 60–72, December, 1923.

doctrine of determinism in heredity translated into a doctrine of social determinism by the identification of human nature with heredity.

Then we have the assumption that success under our present organization of society is proof positive of the possession of the superior qualities upon which the future welfare of mankind depends. In addition it is claimed that we now have a method of examining people which enables us to pick out with almost unerring accuracy and at a very early age, without waiting for them to attain success, those who have these superior qualities. (And let us remember that in spite of all protests and qualifications made by the intelligence testers they really believe that they are testing natural inherited qualities, not knowledge acquired from experience.) Lastly, but underlying all, we have the assumption that the natural selection of earlier ages which is supposed to have been eugenic has been replaced within the last century or two by an artificial selection which is dysgenic. From this belief it is natural to conclude that we must launch a positive eugenics offensive if our civilization is not to decline.

The eugenics offensive now under way, aside from the well-established facts of genetics, rests, therefore, on three main assumptions which the human ecologist has a right to challenge. They are, to summarize again: (1) that human nature can be identified with hereditary traits and is, therefore, unchangeable; (2) that we can by means of intelligence tests and by watching their attainment of economic success pick out the superior people in our population; (3) that the processes of human selection are now artificial as contrasted with those existing previous to the last century or two, which were natural. The latter were eugenic, the former dysgenic.

It is not to be expected that the pseudoscientific popularizers of eugenics would either be aware that they were making any assumptions or that they would question their validity if they were so aware. But by no means all of the blame for the degeneration of eugenics from a science to a propaganda urging the blond Nordic to be more prolific, which is now in process in this country, can be charged to these pseudoscientists. A perusal of three or four of the best recent books on this subject will convince anyone that reputable biologists have contributed to this tendency, while we sociologists are by no means guiltless.

I have said above practically all I care to say regarding the first assumption, *viz.*, that human nature can be identified with heredity and the consequent belief in the unchangeability of human nature. This rests upon the failure of the eugenists to understand what social attitudes are and the processes by which they are developed. Furthermore, the whole of sociology is a challenge to this assumption.

The second assumption—that we can pick out the superior people in our population without difficulty—I wish to discuss in as detailed a manner as time will permit.

With regard to the reliability of intelligence tests as an agency fitted to select men of superior capacities, I shall set forth only two or three reasons why I have but little faith in them. In the first place the responses needed to assure one a high rating are so obviously dependent upon acquired experience that environment is certain to affect one's rating to a marked degree. This fact seems so clear when one examines the detailed results of these tests for himself that one can but wonder why the testers themselves persist in maintaining that they are measuring hereditary traits only, or "native intelligence" as they prefer to call it. It is of course true that unless one has the inborn capacity to acquire certain information and do certain things, he will never benefit by experience to the same extent as one who has this capacity. This fact is of great significance in enabling the tester to pick out the mentally deficient. But I cannot accept as having much validity the fine gradations of native general intelligence attributed to normal children and young people on the basis of test scores. When one finds that almost the best scores in the army tests were made by stenographers and bookkeepers one may surely be permitted to doubt the value of these tests to select superior ability.

Again, when it is found that there is a high degree of correlation between a high score and a good social status plus good schooling, the testers do not seem to draw the obvious conclusion that they are in part, at least, testing the social factors in the lives of the testees, but rather they consider it proof that the native intelligence is much greater in these higher social groups. Surely it is not misrepresenting the actual situation to say that the very point at issue, the one which needs most careful proof, is thus largely assumed. A high degree of correlation between two factors is generally looked upon as presumptive evidence that there is some causal relation between them. This principle seems to be entirely ignored by many of the mental testers.

In the second place supposing that the mental test can distinguish those people having in greater or less degree the native ability to do certain things, does it follow that what is distinguished is a fundamental hereditary difference (except in the case of those with extremely low scores) entering into all life's relations—one which will determine the individual's future in accordance with a prognosis made by the tester by the time a child is twelve years old? If native mental ability of any sort is tested it seems to me that it is the ability to get on in our present educational system. In other words, it is native ability of a rather highly specialized sort and not general ability or intelligence as is usually claimed. In the army tests this fact is recognized when it is said that these tests were devised and applied to select men who could be quickly educated to perform certain given tasks. But when the general social significance of the results of these tests is discussed this fact seems to be forgotten. Most people have the impression that if the army tests are to be relied

upon, we have a great concentration of native intelligence in the upper economic classes of our population and a very small amount in the lower economic classes.

In the third place, an examination of the results of the army tests as set forth by the actual data do not seem to me to give any warrant to the sweeping claims made for them as tests of general ability and fitness for the leadership of civilization. In the interpretation of the results one feels that most writers have not given sufficient weight to the qualifications contained in the statistical part of the report. One is tempted to think that many of the people who have helped to give publicity to the findings of the tests have never examined these findings with any degree of care. Certainly, if they have examined them carefully, they have brought to the task a bias which has prevented them from drawing the correct conclusions from them.

The sociologist is interested in human improvement and while he is unable to accept the view that human nature is unmodifiable, yet he is anxious to find the limits hereditary or native qualities place upon environment influence. Consequently, as a sociologist, I for one, welcome the studies of the eugenists showing where these limits are to be found. Every advance along this line is all to the good. I also welcome any method of testing human capacities which will lead to a more precise classification of men, both according to hereditary endowment and social adaptability. In improvement along this line lies our greatest opportunity to employ the human resources of society far more effectively than at present, for the benefit of all. But while I welcome every advance in eugenics and intelligence testing which will add precision to our efforts to control social processes, I do not feel we have sufficient proof for the very prevalent notion that people having high scores are the real superiors among mankind, and are the only ones fitted for the carrying on and improvement of our civilization.

Furthermore, with regard to the second part of the second assumption, *viz.*, that attainment of a position in the upper economic classes is proof of superior capacity, I feel that it is only an assumption and its truth needs to be proved. Just as I believe the attainment of a high score in the intelligence tests is dependent upon the possession of certain specialized endowments, so I believe that the attainment of a position in the upper economic classes is generally dependent upon the possession of certain specialized faculties. In fact, the faculties needed for attainment are so much alike in the two cases that one is disposed to wonder whether, unconsciously, the intelligence tests have not been devised to pick out those likely to succeed in the economic competition of our existing social system. It would not be at all strange if this were the case, and it would explain certain high correlation coefficients. Besides, it would greatly encourage us to hope that some time in the future mental tests of a differ-

ent nature may be devised which will measure other kinds of ability, and even general ability, if there is such a thing.

But let us look at what their success tells us about the more salient characteristics of the members of the upper economic classes, and see if we can come to any conclusion regarding their superior fitness as carriers of civilization. What qualities do they possess and how do these qualities enable them to adapt themselves to the social process?

Mental alertness of some kind is certainly required for the attainment of membership in the upper economic classes. Not necessarily mental alertness in all respects, because many men of great economic attainment seem almost impervious to new ideas and are quite lacking in that sympathetic imagination which would enable them to understand and appreciate the situations in which other people find themselves. Furthermore, they often show a surprising inability to understand the complexity of the forces which have brought them to the front, if the interviews with them and articles by them and about them in the *American Magazine*, and other popular periodicals, are a fair sample of their thinking. Surely we cannot conclude that their alertness is general; it is specialized and concentrated and, when coupled with tenacity of purpose, a second quality we would all grant to most of the economically successful, manifests itself in the acquirement by the individual of certain tangible goods which can be counted and valued by everyone. This second quality—tenacity of purpose—is probably not of as many varieties as is mental alertness, but whether it is admirable or n ot, depends upon whether it serves purely individual and selfish ends or whether it serves social purposes. Many successful people show that they are thick skinned, almost impervious to feelings and thoughts other than those of a personal and selfish nature. In such people tenacity of purpose may be distinctly antisocial, and its possession in a high degree instead of marking a man as superior may really indicate that he is so far degenerate. Many people showing the greatest tenacity of purpose are, in fact, degenerate because what was at first tenacity of purpose has become obsession. As such, therefore, tenacity of purpose does not mark a man as superior, although without much of this he will probably never succeed at anything.

Adaptability is a third quality of the successful. Again these people show specialized adaptability. They are generally rather quick to size up a business situation and to fit themselves into it, but the situation sized up is often only a part of the whole social situation, *e.g.*, a man may see the trend of development in his line of work before it is generally perceived and, by making his adaptation early, attain a marked degree of success. But all this implies only adaptation to one small phase of life. The same man may not adapt himself politically or socially, and generally, as has been amply proved, time and time again, does not adapt

himself in the only way nature cares about, that is, to secure survival. The upper economic classes as a whole have shown a great lack of ability to adapt their family life to a modern social organization, or what is of greater importance, lack of ability to adapt the social order to the needs of family life. These are certainly fundamental adaptations which man must make to prove that he is fit and the so-called "superiors" are the people who are failing most signally in making them.

It may be true that this failure is due to certain social conditions which these people encounter rather than to any lack of native capacity to make the adaptation, so that it shows unwillingness and perverted education rather than inability. But even if that is the case, it shows that they possess a type of mind rather easily seduced from following the instinctive tendencies calculated to secure survival, and have not yet developed the will to make a conscious adaptation which will secure it. In any event, nature says they are not fit in one fundamental respect and decrees their extinction.

To cite ambition, love of ease, love of luxury, and the desire to be unhampered in movement from place to place, as causes of very small families or childlessness, or failure to marry, may help us to understand why these classes are dying out, but they in no way alter the fact that they do not make certain fundamental adaptations. Nor does it in any way change the situation to recognize how the man and woman with a family are handicapped by the existing social order. It only points out some of the ways in which our social organization must be modified to remove these handicaps. In the meantime the failure to raise children and the failure to modify the social system so that families are not an unnecessary burden shows a great lack of adaptability in the upper classes, for they control the system. It seems to me, therefore, that we find ourselves in the dilemma that we must either admit the upper classes lack the power of making the most fundamental of all adaptations or that they are unwilling to make these adaptations, and in either case we must seriously question whether they are fit to carry our civilization on to better things.

Still another way of looking at the matter is that the upper classes have not found enough of real value in life to give them the courageous faith needed by those who would like to make the world a better place for the next generation to live in. (I assume in this discussion that the failure of these classes to reproduce themselves and to add to the population is voluntary.) People who have passed beyond the stage where reproduction is entirely uncontrolled, and who yet fail to reproduce, must certainly accept the charge of lack of abiding faith in the worthwhileness of life as a whole. In effect, though probably unconsciously, they say, "We find our daily life so engrossing and strenuous, and yet so little worth while that we do not care to participate in the larger more

enduring life of the race." I can but wonder whether people who thus confess a feeble interest in the future and who are so lacking in faith in life are really so superior that the direction of civilization can be safely intrusted to them.

Nature's answer is clear. She says they are unfit. She shows clearly that she prefers the lower classes who live simply, who reproduce more or less instinctively, who do not think about the future of the race or of civilization, but who are carrying the burden of the future in the rearing of children. We may call these people brutish, we may say that they are intellectually inferior, we may hold that they have not risen above the level of instinctive reactions, we may believe that they only carry the burden of the future because they know not how to avoid it, and because they do not feel it to be a burden, but they survive, and the future belongs to them. We may believe and prove to our own satisfaction that a civilization developed by such a people will be distinctly inferior to ours, but if Nature prefers it because we cannot, or will not, participate in the future by rearing children, we should have no fault to find with her. It simply means that we, and the civilization we have developed, are among those numerous experiments in which Nature continually indulges, and that we have failed to find sufficient of permanent value in life to make us willing and anxious to participate not only in the present but also in the future.

There is one other factor in the failure of the upper classes to adapt themselves, which should be mentioned. It is the lack of philoprogenitiveness. If this lack of love of offspring is due to some hereditary defect in the make-up of successful people, no power on earth can prevent their extinction. For this simply means that one of the prime essentials for securing survival is lacking among the intelligent people in the upper classes. Naturally they will die out. If, on the other hand, the lack of offspring is due merely to wrong social training which gives to ambition objects inconsistent with raising a fair-sized family, the remedy lies in so changing the social system that other objectives, not inconsistent with a healthy family life, will come to the fore. It seems to me the upper classes feel unconsciously that, perhaps, our present social order is not worth preserving, and, not knowing how or being unwilling to alter it radically so that there will be a place in it for family and children, they supinely await extinction. We face the necessity of deciding whether people who either do not possess a strong philoprogenitive tendency, or who smother it to attain immediately selfish ends inconsistent with family life, or who are unwilling to exert themselves to bring about fundamental changes in their social order, which they so largely control, are superior stock. In the face of these considerations, I do not believe we can blithely assume the superiority of the upper classes as a whole and base a sound eugenic program on this assumption.

The third assumption in the present eugenic offensive must be scrutinized in passing. It is the assumption that in ages past natural selection was eugenic but that today, *i.e.*, for perhaps a century, in a few of the more advanced nations, natural selection has become less and less operative until now it is replaced entirely by artificial selection which is dysgenic. The chief basis of support for this argument is the fact that modern medicine, and charity, both public and private, operate to keep alive and allow to propagate a class of inferior people who would have died under the more rigorous conditions of life existing in ages past. There is some truth in this contention, but we cannot fully accept the conclusions usually drawn. Modern medicine and charity do preserve many unfit, but this does not prove either that natural selection has ceased to operate or that it was eugenic in ages past.

In the first place, ever since man developed his first folkway, selection of human stock for survival has been more or less controlled. It is probably but little more controlled today than it was in ancient Greece. In Sparta a definite eugenics program was put into effect, and so far as history shows, it did not produce any very lasting or admirable results. The constant wars of the past were probably even more disastrous to the upper classes than the World War was. Such institutions as the Inquisition, and a celibate priesthood, and such great movements as the earlier crusades were all dysgenic as we understand that term. But all the while the type of people most fitted to survive under the existing social order have gone on propagating and we are their descendants. I can see no good reason to believe that the selection of today is less natural than it was two thousand years ago. It is probably somewhat less rigorous because of modern medicine and charity, but if the lower classes, and particularly the defective, benefit most from modern charity, the upper classes benefit most from modern medicine, and probably the unfit thus kept alive do not materially change the relative proportions surviving in these different classes. It is the differential birth rate which changes these proportions as anyone can readily see who studies mortality and natality tables.

People who wish to play so prominent a part in the affairs of their day that they do not find time for family and children, who are unwilling to partake of the struggles and hardships of the common lot are doomed to extinction. Those who can make the combination of satisfying their ambition and raising a fair-sized family will survive, and though civilization may change under their guidance, I do not see why we should be exercised for fear that it will not be Anglo-Saxon, or Teutonic. or Gallic, as the case may be. If we do not have children it will not affect us or ours, that the present social order which we call Western civilization, will have perished. The people who do survive and carry on will probably develop a civilization which will suit them better than ours.

If it is so organized that it has a place for the family and if it rests upon those virtues growing out of the intimacies of family and communal life, it will probably displace ours and survive much longer than ours has and thereby prove its fitness.

I have given above several reasons why I consider the present criteria by which it is thought superior stock can be selected are defective and inadequate. There is one other question I should like to raise because it seems to me that our attitude toward present eugenic programs will be very greatly affected by the answer we make to it. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that we can pick out the people of superior intellectual endowments with a fair degree of accuracy, are these people really those best fitted to develop a high type of civilization? Certainly most of us would not admit that the leaders in industry and commerce produced since the rise of modern industrialism are fitted to guide the destinies of the human race, nor would we admit that the professional classes, who are their satellites, are much better fitted to assume this hegemony. Whence comes then this great emphasis upon need of propagating from the intellectually superior classes? Does a faith in the beneficence of science necessarily imply a belief that the best possible civilization can be developed by giving predominance to the intellectually superior? Personally I do not believe that it does.

It may be that the intellectually superior are the vicarious sacrifice offered up by mankind in return for the benefits derived from their work. This is a very conceited or very charitable way of looking at the matter, depending upon the viewpoint of the observer—whether he is stationed within or without this class. In trying to take a long-time view of the processes of population growth it seems to me that a predominance of the intellectual in men and women today is generally leading to such abnormal modes of living and to such selfishness that this class has comparatively little to contribute to the spiritual enrichment of human life. Their very intellectual development seems to act as an insulating medium which shuts them off from the currents of life throbbing through the masses of mankind. As a consequence they do not really contribute anything to the spiritual life of the people whom they are supposed to be leading. They are not real leaders, and when the history of our times is written from the proper perspective these classes may be looked upon as a fungus growth upon our social order. Only here and there will there be an individual standing out as a beacon light on the pathway leading toward the spiritual emancipation of the common people, and such an individual will not be one hailed as a leader of these (*i.e.*, the upper economic) classes today.

If time permitted I should like to present for your consideration some of the facts which lead me to think that the intellectually superior have as a general thing been so seduced from natural modes of living and have

so insulated themselves from the common stream of human thoughts and sentiment that they are not fit spiritual leaders of mankind. But I can only stop to say that it seems to me history teaches this and observation of present-day social processes confirms it. Whether this need be the case in a society becoming self-conscious is another matter.

You may be wondering whether one who inclines to the views set forth above can have any rational eugenics program; whether this is not a counsel of fatalism or at least of *laissez faire*. It is not. It merely represents an effort to put certain of the processes of present-day population growth into a perspective where we shall see them at their true value, and where we may the better detect their tendencies. It is a counsel to study these tendencies without bias so that we may the better direct them.

Practically, a twofold program for the improvement of the quality of population is thoroughly consistent with the position taken in what precedes.

1. We should, as the eugenists have so repeatedly urged, make arrangements to eliminate those who have been proved defective. No more need be said of this phase of the matter.

2. We should so change our present social order that the raising of a fair-sized family by the members of all other (*i.e.*, other than the defective) classes of the population will not be penalized as at present and so that good opportunities will be given all children to develop their natural capacities. As for those supposedly intelligent people who *will not* respond to these changes by raising families (notice I say *will not*, not *cannot*), I feel that they thereby acknowledge their unfitness to participate in the only kind of civilization which can have any degree of stability, *viz.*, one based upon the family, and therefore they are of but little worth to mankind. Consequently, I do not view their sterility with any concern.

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Chapter XVIII

TRENDS OF CHANGE

In a sense each of the preceding chapters has had to do more or less directly with the trends of a changing family institution. In the earlier parts, however, the immediate attention was upon personal and institutional phenomena; the interest was in the nature, and the changing nature, of the family and in the accompanying and resulting types of character and personality organization. Something remains to be said concerning the trend of interest in family life and concerning the social and administrative activities incident to change and disorder.

It is perhaps unnecessary to argue the point that invention and discovery are inevitable. Man and nature being what they are, new combinations are made when the necessary preceding steps have been taken. It follows without fail that the utilization of a newly discovered fact disturbs the cultural equilibrium and necessitates more or less readjustment not only in the immediate field but throughout the whole social order. The cotton gin and one or two other related spinning inventions, for example, not only changed the particular industries immediately concerned but also the whole economic system and the political, social, and moral order. In the period of change and readjustment there is a confusion of standards and the amount of personal demoralization and failure is very great. The disorganization of the family in the modern world is pretty obviously and directly the result of invention and discovery in other areas of the culture. Such change and disorganization are inevitable. But in the period of transition to a new type of family in a new social order, the cases of personal maladjustment are very numerous. There has been developed in response to the problem of failure and personal misery an elaborate system of charitable and remedial work. Aside from the social work as such, there are various institutional developments that are also for the most part palliative in nature. The papers by Miss Bernard and Miss Davis indicate trends of this nature. They also make it abundantly evident that organized society has not faced seriously the problem of social change and personal maladjustment.

In certain quarters there is an optimistic belief that the present family disorder is a temporary condition, that the institution is in transition and will presently emerge on a new plateau of more perfect organization. There seems to be no evidence whatever in support of this position.

Scientific invention and discovery brought the present confusion. The only possibility of a relatively stable adjustment lies in the complete cessation of scientific invention and discovery. In such a case it is probable that in a relatively few centuries, possibly within a thousand years, a reasonably close and satisfactory adjustment would be worked out among the various elements of the culture. But there is no reason to expect any such happening; the exact opposite is the future that human society must face. It is in the nature of discovery not to cease but to proceed and to proceed at an accelerated rate. Every new invention makes possible and perhaps inevitable other inventions. And every invention means change in the social order into which it is incorporated. The prospect is for a progressive acceleration in the pace of social change. There is no new plateau of social stability within the human horizon.

There is not a remote possibility of reinstating the traditional family order or of establishing any other fixed and stable institutional form. The present transitional stage is to all intents and purposes a permanent condition.

In the situation, reliance cannot be placed on common sense, trial and error, adjustments, nor upon remedial techniques. If the material civilization resulting from scientific inventions and discoveries is not shortly to end in catastrophe, there must be developed a sociology adequate to the social need. There is at present no adequate social science and no public disposition to encourage its development. There is however a recognition in some quarters that science is the only profitable method of approach to family as to other facts of the social order. The paper by Mr. Elliot indicates the various organizations and groups interested in the family. Some of these are operating on a more or less genuinely scientific basis.

1. *Integrating the Carol Kennicotts*[1]

Married life for the majority of educated American women is either "aching comedy" or callous tragedy. If the woman is able to continue a lively intellectual interest and at the same time perform adequately the functions of parenthood, she may succeed in elevating marriage to the exalted levels of high comedy—a set of human relations in which the essential conflicts are resolved, integrated, creatively utilized. Few marriages persist on that level. Tragedy, it is true, is often concealed by farce and melodrama, by compromises downward which dull the ache and suppress the tragic consciousness of defeat. Married life may thus go on with a semblance of success but only in so far as the woman is content to play a tragi-comic role.

[1] From LINDEMAN, E. C., The Wife in the Modern Home, *New Republic*, vol. 45, pp. 130–132, Dec. 23, 1925.

Carol Kennicott and her battle with Main Street may still be regarded as adequate symbols for this phase of frustrated life. And it will be remembered that she was thoroughly beaten in the end. Nothing in that story of revolt is so pitiful as her rationalized capitulation to Main Street:

Carol: But I have won in this: I've never excused my failures by sneering at my aspirations, by pretending to have gone beyond them. I do not admit that Main Street is as beautiful as it should be! I do not admit that Gopher Prairie is greater or more generous than Europe! I do not admit that dish-washing is enough to satisfy all women! I may not have fought the good fight, but I have kept the faith.

Kennicott: Sure. You bet you have . . . Well, good night. Sort of feels to me like it might snow tomorrow. Have to be thinking about putting up the storm windows pretty soon. Say, did you notice whether the girl put that screw driver back?

Aspirations, the good fight, faith—storm windows, and screw drivers—and she had asked for the "greatness of life!"

Is marriage then to be considered as one of the irrepressible conflicts? Must the educated woman choose between mutually exclusive desires: self-expression through continuance of her intellectual interests or male companionship, home and children? Is a division of labor in which some women will elect the functions of wifehood and parenthood while others seek professional careers and intellectual independence inevitable? Must those who take the latter course also face the dilemma of deciding between complete exclusion of sexual experience and defiance of the conventions which are presumed to protect the integrity and sanctity of marriage? Childless marriages, although increasing, are not sufficiently numerous to constitute the norm and must consequently be excluded as clues to solution; no one supposes, even in a highly sophisticated and overpopulated world, that marriage without children is either a physiological or sociological answer. Besides, marriages based upon conscious non-reproduction have not been conspicuously successful in achieving the desired integration; in one sense they are an evasion of the issue.

Happily courage has been found with which to seek means of release and adjustment in the mood of scientific inquiry. Smith College has, with the assistance of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, inaugurated an institute for the coordination of women's interests. The collaboration of these two institutions—one designed to educate women and the other to conserve women's interests—is in itself a step of considerable significance toward coordination. What is needed, according to the formal announcement of this project, is "a new psychology of action . . . that shall integrate the woman's normal family life with a

genuine continuous intellectual interest, and thus conserve the attainments and powers reached in the work of the college."

It must be a positive affirmation and resolute inclusion of interests, not, as now, a deprecating, apologetic adjustment of two aims concededly warring with each other. This new psychology of action must also develop a specific technique of release and adjustment for the educated woman within the normal family life; what might be called an "intellectual economy." In addition to the specific experiments conducted in the environment of the college, graduates will be expected to cooperate by sharing their experiences with the institute. Thus experiment and demonstration under scientific control will be paralleled by the corrective experience of numerous participants. The method appears to be in harmony with modern tendencies in the social sciences and should result fruitfully.

If it does nothing more than induce a few hundred college women to become conscious of their behavior under the compelling adjustments of marriage, it will have justified itself.

Specifically, the institute proposes to experiment with cooperative enterprises which will release women from the drudgeries of home-keeping. It is assumed that a "mastery of the basic arts of family life" is essential and that this can be accomplished more readily if certain functions are transferred to a cooperative technique. Technical bases are for the most part already available, awaiting further application and demonstration. The institute's program becomes difficult when viewed as a phase of adult education. A proposal to change adult activity in significant directions must somehow become an adequate stimulus to the social process. The gateways toward release for most married women will be opened when cooperative activities replace time-wasting individual activities, but how is a cooperative enterprise to be set going in a social *milieu* which contains no sufficient or compelling cooperative stimuli? Presumably Smith College graduates are expected to supply this stimulus; if they do, it will be because their education has been directed along lines which induce cooperative ways of living. This is precisely the kind of education which most colleges fail to provide.

But the paradox persists: the purpose of these cooperative enterprises is to furnish releases for intellectual activities, but intellectual activities, if they are to have meanings above asceticism, need to be shared; we do not learn cooperative habits on one level in order to negative those habits on another. A cooperative nursery may afford the mother three or five or ten extra hours for something more educative, more creative, more self-expressive, than baby tending. She may, let us say, use these added hours to do what most college women insist marriage prevents, namely, "keep up her reading." But if she reads without sharing the experience of reading, she will find herself cut off

from participating relationships with the other mothers with whom she cooperates in the nursery. Roughly stated, how can an educated married woman sustain a continuous intellectual interest in a community which makes no functional use of her intelligence? No amount of "positive affirmation" will suffice to alter the fact that graduates of Smith College, like graduates of all institutions of so-called "higher" learning, are obliged to spend their married lives in dull American communities where the cultural standards are set by those who possess the most wealth—not the most intelligence. By implication at least, something profoundly regenerating must also happen to the culture complex of these communities if educated women are to find suitable soil and nurture for developing coordinated, integrated, unified personalities.

It becomes apparent that any movement looking toward a reorientation of the family—the institution which is assumed to be basic for our society—must necessarily exert pressure in many directions.

We have already seen that an attempted adjustment of a small group of college women demands a corresponding adjustment on the part of the college itself and also upon that of the neighborhoods and communities in which experiments are to be made. But the proposed institute includes in its program the professional married woman who not merely wants to continue her intellectual interests but who in addition wishes to maintain a vocational function outside the family. This, as the director of the institute recognizes, calls for a modification of the professions, and since the professions are meshed in our total economic structure, the conclusion must be that economic readjustments will be sought.

From this point onward one's concern for the relatively small number of college women who combine marriage and a profession begins to wane; into the picture looms that larger and perhaps more important body of uneducated married women who work, not because they have aspirations for careers or because of an urge to continue intellectual activities, but because they lack bread and shoes and money to pay the rent. If there is need for modification of the selected professions on behalf of a small number of college women, how much greater is the need for industrial modification in the interest of working mothers who merely have jobs—the mothers who, after all, bear by far the greater burden in childbearing as well as in productive labor. Present industrial organization does not aim to give employment to either women or men on terms which will be best suited for the development of their personalities; it exists to produce profits, and something bordering on a psychological and spiritual revolution must take place among those possessing economic power before this formula is reversed.

The Institute for Coordinating Women's Interests will be obliged to consider sooner or later the innumerable questions which the foregoing critical analysis raises. These questions are proposed, not as obstacles

or discouragements, but rather as signals and suggestions. The director of the institute advises a "modest and tentative" approach accompanied by "thrilling interest and humble minds"; the critic could ask no more. What is most to be admired at the moment is the courage which lies back of this venture. The institute is attacking a problem which probably is central to the major portion of civilized unhappiness. It deserves immediate applause and continuing encouragement.

2. *The Child Takes a Nurse*[1]

If the recent rise of the nursery school in England and the United States means anything, it means that the nurture of the young child, like spinning and canning and the teaching of the three R's a century ago, is ceasing to be solely a home industry. It is becoming a specialized occupation in a specializing world. It is the first glimmering of an educational revolution which may ultimately take most women out of the home, as the industrial revolution threw most workmen out of the crafts. For though the nursery school, by taking the child at the age of two, adds only four years to his education outside the home, they are four crucial years, the years in which the conscientious mother previously has found no adequate substitute for her personal care.

But it cannot be too strongly emphasized that this liberation of the mother for other work is only an incidental effect of the nursery school and not its cause. The nursery school did not originate like the day nursery to meet the need of mothers forced into industry or of those who wished to continue professional careers. Everywhere it has been a spontaneous, constructive enterprise for a better physical, mental, and emotional development of the child than the unaided home can foster. It has regarded itself as a necessary adjunct to mother care, rather than a substitute for it.

Indeed, by the English pioneers the nursery school is looked upon as the chief hope of salvaging childhood, as the only fundamental program of social rehabilitation. For in England the nursery school movement is not on the relatively new and desultory basis of that in the United States. It has been the subject of experiment for more than twenty years, and it has been a part of the national education system since 1918. Then, under the Fisher Act, Parliament authorized the nursery school for children between the ages of two and five, "to lay the foundations of health, habit, and responsive personality."

So it comes, perhaps, that the nursery school in the United States has little philanthropic connotation, but is thought of as an educational method applicable to all young children. On the other hand, the rela-

[1] Adapted from BARNARD, EUNICE FULLER, The Child Takes a Nurse, *Survey*, vol. 57, pp. 324–326, Dec. 1, 1926.

tively new movement here has none of the hearty, integrated self-confident character of the English one. It has no direct governmental backing, federal or local, and no coherence of management or spirit. Instead, from coast to coast, in town and metropolis, as if by spontaneous germination, small diverse nursery schools have suddenly sprouted independently into life; in Brooklyn, for instance, and Iowa, in Detroit, Boston, and California. Indeed, according to a perturbed professor of home economics in Kansas, there are now more than a hundred such schools where three years ago there were barely a dozen.

Yet amid this welter of small schools certain distinctive characteristics of the American movement do emerge. One of these is its scientific and pedagogic temper. Instead of being part of a social crusade, the nursery school here is more often a laboratory, either a research station to investigate children's growth and behavior or a demonstration center for parental or pre-parental education. Indeed, many of our nursery schools are wards of the colleges and serve the students as laboratories for both research and demonstration.

Look at them throughout the country, at Yale, Vassar, Smith, the University of Chicago, of Michigan, of Minnesota, and others of the land-grant colleges. Teachers College conducts two and the University of Iowa four separate nursery classes. Indeed, from an absolute ignoring of parenthood, the American colleges have suddenly become, directly or indirectly, hives of parental instruction. Soon no respectable college will be without its nursery school any more than without its physics laboratory. One by one in the last five years the colleges have opened their doors to two-year-olds, made their experiments, and vied with each other in broadcasting their findings through the books of their professors to the waiting parents outside.

And baby's gurgles and Johnny's tantrums have become not matter for petting or spanking but subjects for Ph.D. theses. Yet among the colleges there is as great variety of emphasis as of clientele. Some have started nursery schools in existing day nurseries; others have opened new schools for the children of the graduate students themselves.

Still more indicative of the strength of the movement perhaps are the cooperative schools set up by groups of young mothers here and there throughout the country, and the nursery school departments they are inducing private schools to open. Already, too, there is a faint knocking on the doors of the public school. Last year a group of child welfare workers and educators met to try to devise some plan by which nursery schools could be introduced into the New York system. Dr. Arnold Gesell of Yale is spokesman for another group which is calling for a "fearless, fundamental readjustment and extension of the American kindergarten, to include younger children and many nursery school functions."

Expense may long prevent this consummation, especially since our generally severer climate would preclude except in the South and West, the large open-air shelters adopted in England by Miss McMillan. Meanwhile the need grows more obvious with the growth of cities and the immense increase in our knowledge of child development. Doubtless the economic pressure on mothers and their desire, as shown at Smith, for continuing other interests will have its influence too. But with or without mothers' connivance, the nursery school in America, a constructive educational venture, is on its way.

3. *The Evolution of Mothers' Pensions*[1]

Roosevelt, the instigator of the movement for conservation of natural resources in the United States, was directly responsible for the incident which set an already existing notion favoring conservation of human as well as natural resources into rapid motion. Accepting the invitation of the President, about two hundred men and women met in the city of Washington, January, 1909, and held what was known as the "White House Conference on the Care of Dependent Children." The resolutions adopted by this conference were important in developing sentiment favoring widows' pensions and opposing the practice of placing dependent children in institutions, which were coming to be looked upon as places furnishing artificial, cold, inhuman surroundings, neither conducive to happiness nor suitable for the best mental, moral, and physical development of the child.

Previous to the acceptance of the principle of pensions to widows or to mothers whose husbands were incapable of supporting the family, several schemes for the care of dependent children were in effect. It was possible for the mother to work outside the home or else bring work into the home in order to support the family and keep it together. On the other hand, she could be relieved of the burden of support by placing the children in public institutions or in some private family.

Since 1909 we have had for dependents another plan of assistance besides institutional care and placement in foster homes. This type gives aid to the dependent family, and thus permits the children to remain in their own homes. The assumption upon which mothers' pensions have been based so far in this country is that it is poor economy to have a system operating in which children are being separated from their mothers for reasons of poverty only. It is felt that normal children can best be brought up in the home. Today there is even a shifting from the opinion that physically handicapped children can best be cared for in

[1] Adapted from DAVIS, ADA J., The Evolution of the Institution of Mothers' Pensions in the United States, *Am. Jour. Sociology*, vol. 35, pp. 573–576, January, 1930.

institutions to a belief that they are particularly in need of individualized care in understanding homes. Mothers' pensions aim to give sufficient aid to a family to make it possible for the mother to stay with her children and have time, energy, and patience to provide a suitable home, which may make possible such relationships between family members as may lead to a full development of personalities and to the desired discipline and control.

The mothers' pension system, by which is meant the maintenance of dependent children in their homes by means of public funds, arose in 1911 when Illinois passed the first law. Since then it has developed to such an extent that in 1926 there were laws in forty-two states authorizing grants to dependent families. It is true that California, for some years before, had allowed to institutions $100 annually for the care of orphaned children and $75 for dependent half orphans and abandoned children. Also, several states had made provision for furnishing books and clothing to needy children. Michigan and Oklahoma had gone so far as to pay for the support of the children.

The only federal legislation for mothers' aid is the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1923, which makes available to states federal funds for reducing maternal and infant mortality and promoting the health of mothers and infants. State activities under this act are concerned with the better care of infants to be achieved through the instruction of mothers. Its chief work has been done among isolated rural groups, whose need for medical and nursing service is more striking. The educational program is accomplished by lectures, informal talks, visual instruction, and distribution of literature, posters, charts, and diet cards. In 1926 only five states were not cooperating under this federal provision. There has been, however, wide variation in the personnel of administrative staffs in different states.

The rapid spread and development of the idea of mothers' aid suggests that in the matter of the care of dependents the states have felt that they could and should take some formulative stand in the matter of preventing poverty and separation of children from parents, especially since charity, which rarely deals with cases before there is destitution and degradation, has never been able to do adequate preventive work.

The forty-two state laws existing in 1926 varied widely in names, administrative programs, eligibility requirements, amounts, and determination of amounts of grants made, and the age of children included. But there was agreement that the purpose of the law is to provide regular public aid to mothers with dependent children; and that before eligibility can be established there must be children and lack of sufficient means of support.

4. *Research and Therapeutic Activities*[1]

Among the efforts under way for the maintenance of family integrity and standards, we shall omit at once all discussion of any of the normal institutions and services which provide the normal family with its normal plane of life. The church, industry, the health services, the schools, libraries, playgrounds, parks, and museums all help to keep normal people normal, but in their ordinary functioning they are not specializing in the pathological social problems of the family. We turn rather to certain movements which have of late been developing, spontaneously and often independently, in realization of the importance of these problems, and of the need for careful analysis of them as an essential to solutions.

The Eugenics Record Office (Cold Spring Harbor, N. Y.) has for years assembled more or less valuable data on families showing characteristics supposed to be hereditary and considered desirable or undesirable traits. The recently organized American Eugenics Society (New Haven, Conn.) publishes propaganda based on its own interpretations of these and other alleged facts of heredity. Being myself a backslider and skeptic in relation to many eugenic doctrines, I mention these agencies in fairness and refrain from further comment.

The American Social Hygiene Association (New York City) interests itself to a minor extent in eugenics, and the National Committee for Mental Hygiene includes in its scope the study of the heredity of tendencies to mental disease. The main objects of these two organizations concern family problems of quite other sorts.

Problems of attitude, character, and moral code in family life are being studied by the American Social Hygiene Association and affiliated local bodies from the standpoint of sex education; by the Religious Education Association of America (Chicago) from the standpoint of moral instruction; by the National Committee for Mental Hygiene (New York City) and its local societies, from the standpoint of psychiatry and child guidance; by the Child Study Association of America (New York City) from all of the above points of view with emphasis on parent-child relationships. All these agencies issue magazines, reports, pamphlets, and materials on child management. Certain publications of the Federal Children's Bureau (Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.) should also be mentioned in this connection.

Several important conferences and institutes on parental education and home problems have been held. The study groups on family problems being operated by the Child Study Association, by the Parent-Teacher Clubs, by the Y. W. C. A., and by the Methodist Episcopal Church, South (General Sunday School Board, Louisville, Ky.) are examples of a valuable form of service in the field of family morale, since

[1] From ELIOT, THOMAS D., Current Efforts in Behalf of the American Family, *Family*, vol. 9, pp. 87–94, May, 1928.

only through thousands of such small simple groups can the findings of the clinics and of research be, literally speaking, brought home.

Interests in the field of parental education have now been given a channel for coordination through the organization of a National Council of Parental Education. (Address care of The Child Study Association, *supra.*)

The National Council of Parental Education was organized a little over two years ago, following a five-day round-table conference on parental education. Its members are organizations and individuals actively engaged in child study and parental education, and the purpose of the organization is to coordinate the work of these various agencies and to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort.

More acute problems of family neglect, misbehavior, and domestic relations are being studied not only by the above organizations but by the National Committee of Visiting Teachers (New York City), the National Probation Association (New York City), the Institute for Child Guidance (New York City), the Bureau of Social Hygiene (New York City), the Intercity Conference on Illegitimacy (care of Miss Maud Morlock, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio), the local institutes of juvenile research and child guidance bureaus, and, of course, courts and other local agencies.

While organized charity still deals largely with economic problems, the new name "Family Welfare Society" symbolizes proudly its claim to serve the integrity of the family in other respects than income and plane of living. Cabot, Richmond, and other leaders in the field never cease to insist that the most essential functions of social case work are spiritual. The changing of family attitudes and habits is a project in character education. It is especially in this field and through the case-work agencies that the mental hygiene movement has contributed most to family integrity.

Certainly one of the chief problems of family social work is the dismembered home. There seem to be just as many children needing foster homes (the nearest substitute for a normal family pattern) as before mothers' pensions were invented. Domestic relations courts and morals courts still grind their melancholy grist. The Child Welfare League of America (New York City) seeks to standardize child placing, and the Child Welfare Committee of America (New York City) seeks to promote mothers' pensions—to preserve what is left of dismembered family patterns.

Illegitimacy and prostitution, considered as breaches of family pattern, are being dealt with in their legal aspects by the Intercity Conference on Illegitimacy and the American Social Hygiene Association.

The Institute for the Coordination of Women's Interests (Smith College), underwritten by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial

Fund, reports an interesting attempt to test out experimentally in a rather exceptional environment the various ways and means of mothering a child and keeping a job and possibly a husband at the same time. Whether, in this respect, women can have their cake and eat it too, is a problem in home economics, with a vengeance; but also, and more fundamentally, a problem of social psychology. There is no doubt about it that people who are obsessed with this dilemma present social problems in family life, and that the results of these demonstrations of nursery and home services will be valuable even if inconclusive. From another approach, the Merrill-Palmer School (Detroit) is coordinating women's interests by making of home making an educated profession.

The National Woman's Party, from a different approach than that of the League of Women Voters, has sought out grievances for women under existing laws, and seeks by law or by protest to remove them. The legal discriminations against the social interests of wives and mothers include matters of illegitimacy, adultery, prostitution, divorce, and rights of guardianship. The efforts of this group are, however, in defense of women as such rather than of the family as such.

On the size of the family, we find the American Birth Control League (New York City) and the Voluntary Parenthood League (New York City) insisting that parents have moral freedom in determining the number of children, and in the means of determining that number. On the other hand, the Roman Catholic Church and certain other groups insist upon the desirability of large families, upon the sinfulness of medical interference, and upon the possibility of economic remedies for the problem of the large or tired out family.

The general campaigns for public health and safety may be said to represent society's efforts against dismemberment by death. The field of bereavement as a problem of mental hygiene and social adjustment is as yet untouched except by the churches.

Movements concerned directly with problems of family income include, besides the charities (already mentioned), the American Association for Labor Legislation, the workmen's compensation and social insurance commissions, the Woman's Party (Washington, D. C.), movements for mothers' pensions (Child Welfare Committee of America) and for old age pensions (American Association for Old Age Security, New York City), and the National Consumers' League (New York City) which interests itself especially in the protection of working women and in minimum wage laws.

The outstanding organization in support of housing standards is, of course, the National Housing Association (New York City), which, year in and year out, has been attempting the solution of this family social problem from every angle. The American Institute of Architects (Brooklyn), through its bureau of domestic design; the Architects' Small

House Service Bureau (Minneapolis); and the National Conference of City Planning (New York City), through its zoning and suburban projects, and those industries which have been making garden cities out of "company towns," are also contributing to solutions in the field of shelter.

In cities like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, we have now the regional plan as well as the city plan.

In New York City and elsewhere, the Institute of Land Economics, directed by Prof. Richard T. Ely of Northwestern University, is working out valuable experiments in housing finance for the moderate income. There is here an opportunity, perhaps, for official cooperation with the home economics movement.

The health of the family may here be distinguished from the individualized practice of medicine on the one hand and the public health agencies on the other. Among the agencies for family health, one would certainly place the Federal Children's Bureau, operating under the Sheppard-Towner Act through state boards of health, to preserve the health of mothers and infants. Similarly, the Bureau of Extension of the Department of Agriculture is working upon rural living standards under the Smith-Hughes Act. The American Home Economics Association (Washington, D. C.) is obviously contributing tremendously to the improvement of standards in diet, sanitation, and "wife-saving" devices. In so far as good housing contributes to good health, the housing movement should be reiterated here as contributing to the solution of family health problems.

The American Social Hygiene Association must of course be named again among the most important agencies working upon problems of family health; also the mental hygiene movement, in that the mental health of a family often depends upon the interacting attitudes of its members.

Last, but not least, one should again mention the concern of the birth control movement for the health of mothers and children.

The Committee on Maternal Health (New York City) is a little known but important agency, established under the auspices of the New York Academy of Medicine to study scientifically the causes of sterility, the physical effects of birth control, and so on. After experimenting with clinics in New York City, it has recently opened in Baltimore a Bureau of Contraceptive Advice.

Little has been done to meet the important problem of the playless and the bored-to-death home. Its importance is recognized, however, by the Playground and Recreation Association of America (New York City), by the Chicago Recreation Training School (now amalgamated with Northwestern University), by the Illinois Institute of Juvenile Research (Chicago) which investigates and prescribes for the recreational

needs of its patients, by the Child Welfare Association (New York City), and the Child Study Association. All of these agencies offer valuable practical materials for propaganda or for home use. The recreation program of the National Congress of Parents and Teachers (Washington) stands strongly for the development of home play. The Congress has national and state chairmen for recreation. At present it utilizes the literature of the Playground and Recreation Association of America for parent-teacher associations and publishes material in the *Child Welfare Magazine*. The American Library Association (Chicago) through its children's and adult education work is contributing quietly but tremendously to the constructive use of home leisure. "Much of the emphasis on the part of the recreation people through the country lately in the selection of gamés taught and used on the playgrounds has been on selecting those games which will lend themselves to continued use in the homes and yards of the children after they have left the playgrounds." Let me recommend particularly in this connection the address of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., reprinted by the Playground and Recreation Association. Local recreation bureaus should provide not only supervised public play, but leaders and instructors for spontaneous neighborhood and family groups. Case work is needed for families who have forgotten how to play.

In so far as the socialized recreation of churches, settlements, recreation centers, museums, and parks makes possible wholesome amusement for the family *en famille*, these agencies may be included in our list. Churches have always laid down the law as to what amusements people must eschew (or must escape from home controls in order to enjoy!) but only of late have they assumed any degree of responsibility for guiding or providing family recreation in a positive manner. In this later policy the Roman Catholic Church is second only to the Church of Latter Day Saints.

On the negative side, many more agencies are at work, protecting the family in its problems of defense against demoralizing amusements. The women's protective division of the American Social Hygiene Association, the International Association of Policewomen (Washington, D. C.), and such local organizations as the Women's Protective Association of Cleveland, and the Juvenile Protective Association of Chicago (Hull House) are the most important.

Certain national organizations of more generalized objects have of late recognized the paramount importance of family problems, and, through committees, are actively entering upon projects of study, cooperation, or propaganda. Such are the General Federation of Women's Clubs (Washington, D. C.); the National League of Women Voters (Washington, D. C.); the Woman's Party (Washington, D. C.); the National Congress of Parents and Teachers, and several national church bodies, including the Y. M. C. A. and Y. W. C. A.

The committee of the National League of Women Voters include in their current program study and legislative efforts in the fields of mothers' pensions and child placing, eugenics, illegitimacy, maternal hygiene (Sheppard-Towner Act); control of sex offenders, prostitution, and venereal disease; causes for divorce, legal status of women, and marriage laws.

Several popular magazines, especially those devoted to women's interests, such as *Better Homes, Ladies Home Journal, Delineator, Good Housekeeping, Country Life,* carry columns and articles of secondary but useful character.

A three-day Conference on Family Life in America Today was recently held by the American Association for Organizing Family Social Work, to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the movement in this country. The spirit was not one of jubilation. Again and again fundamental questions were raised, only to remain questions until such time as social research with modern methods shall assemble and interpret the facts. This Buffalo conference appointed a committee charged with a study of these questions with a view to laying out a program of research.

This need has long been recognized, of course, but it is beginning to stimulate a surprising, though as yet totally inadequate, number of research projects in the United States.

In 1920 I wrote:

> Whether a change in the family code is desirable, . . . must eventually be determined through social research of a kind for which even the methodology is hardly developed—a case by case study of the sex experiences of all classes, correlated in a valid statistical way with some index of family and child welfare. Only in this way may be developed sufficiently objective social sanctions for present standards of monogamy . . .
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> There would remain, . . . questions of the effect of polygamy, successive or simultaneous, upon the subconscious, upon the aesthetic nature, upon emotional harmony, mental integrity and efficiency—all of these being questions of social psychology, subject only to inductive research for their final answer . . .
>
> If . . . we are to try the . . . course of strengthening "moral" education to the point of offsetting the removal of all motives of fear from "immoral relationships," we must base that moral education on facts independent of disease and tradition, facts which are available so far only in the haziest form . . .
>
> Only those ethical teachings which are based on scientific facts of body and soul can hope to influence beneficially the actual moral standards and behavior of coming generations . . .
>
> Until the many issues raised above can be faced and searched out, social hygiene agencies, however conservative and well supported, will necessarily be dodging logical issues of psychology and public education which, like the issues of legal control of prostitution, medical prophylaxis of venereal disease, birth control, and the economics of marriage, have in the past been dodged and are now accepted or are imminent. In so doing, these agencies may diminish their opportunity of social leadership in the sex and home life of the future.

In 1920 the Bureau of Social Hygiene was already undertaking its studies in the sex life of women, married and unmarried. Its earlier studies of prostitution are well known. The Philadelphia Conference on Parenthood had also made a study of the sex experiences of adjusted women.

The Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology (Northwestern University, Chicago) has published Thomas' "The Unadjusted Girl."

The American Social Hygiene Association has, of course, devoted much effort and support to research in problems of family morality.

The census is publishing important studies of marriage and divorce.

The Commission on Divorce of the Episcopal Church is attempting a national, non-sectarian study of The Causes and Conditions of Divorce. It is directed by Miss Dorothy W. Hughitt (63 E. Hancock Ave., Detroit). Two methods are being followed, the use of the questionnaire, and the study of records supplemented by personal interview. Family and child welfare agencies in Detroit and elsewhere are cooperating.

Dr. Mowrer of Northwestern University, author of "Family Disorganization," is making further studies under the Wieboldt Foundation.

The Russell Sage Foundation, Charity Organization Department (New York City), has been making for a number of years a study of marriage laws and their administration. It has printed three studies (American Marriage Laws, Medical Certification for Marriage, and Child Marriages) and has two others under way.

The Research Bureau on Social Case Work (Boston), now dissolved, published some valuable studies in the field of illegitimacy.

The Federal Children's Bureau offers us its useful series on illegitimacy and on mothers' pensions.

Valuable studies have come from members of the psychiatric and mental hygiene groups, and will doubtless be forthcoming from the Institute of Child Guidance.

The Judge Baker Foundation (Boston) is making studies in the effects of foster homes in the treatment of behavior problems, the results of which will be significant in the interpretation of parent-child relationships in unbroken homes.

The Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics offers occasional studies of family planes of living, but without the dynamic and intimate facts of attitude which case studies make possible. Dr. Leila Houghteling's last work, on Chicago family budgets, is of great importance. The study of Mothers Who Must Earn, done by Katherine Anthony for the Russell Sage Foundation, New York, and the later similar study, Mothers in Industry, done by Gwendolyn Hughes for the Philadelphia Conference on Parenthood, are also valuable. Important new housing studies are just being launched by the Institute of Land Economics

The studies made by the Committee on Maternal Health, both here and abroad, though not all accessible to the general public, are invaluable contributions to our knowledge of the hygiene of birth control. They are the most scientific studies yet made in the field. An analysis and follow-up of 1,000 cases is soon to appear.

The Eugenics Record office continues its special variety of research.

Family social-work agencies are having their records and technique analyzed for the testing of processes in family life and social work. The Merrill-Palmer School of Home-making is best known for its studies and work with preschool children, but it is also contributing to family research through its case studies.

The Parental Education Committee of the American Home Economics Association is cooperating with the Division of Economics of the Bureau of Home Economics of the U. S. Department of Agriculture in launching a study of family backgrounds of well-adjusted people and their families.

Several local and national bodies are cooperating to create in Washington a center for child study and parent education. Under the same committee, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation is sponsoring a study of home management in relation to child development. A survey of parental education in home economics curricula is also under way.

The Institute for the Coordination of Women's Interests is collecting case studies and statistics of families in which the educated mother carries on a vocation other than that of domestician.

The Bureau of Vocational Information has recently published a study of Marriage and Careers published by the Channel Bookshop, New York.

Miss Day Monroe and Dr. Hazel Kyrk, working under the American Home Economics Association and the Chicago Local Community Research Council, are developing valuable statistical data on the actual family and household patterns in various urban areas and classes.

A Commission on the Family in the Life of Today, organized in 1924 by the Education and Research Division of the National Board of the Y. W. C. A. (New York City), has carried out a unique study of family attitudes by the group discussion method. Studies of the attitudes of young business women toward family life are being made by representatives of the Religious Education Association and the National Board of the Y. W. C. A.

The Y. W. C. A. will soon publish a study of married women and work, and one on divorce.

The National Research Council has a Committee on Family Records and another on Problems of Sex. The Social Science Research Council has sponsored a few studies by individuals, which include family problems. The Social Science Research Council and the National Research Council

have done surprisingly little in this field. Unfortunately the line of demarcation between the fields of these two councils is so ill defined that very important subjects which, like the family, have both "natural science" and "social science" aspects, are in danger of falling between two stools.

Several research projects have gone forward under private or university auspices. Special studies of family influences upon children, etc., are being made by Dr. Smiley Blanton, Vassar; Prof. F. Stuart Chapin, University of Minnesota; Prof. Ernest Groves, University of North Carolina; Dr. Lydiard Horton, Boston; Prof. E. T. Krueger and Prof. Walter C. Reckless, Vanderbilt; Dr. C. Ford Langworthy, Chicago; Prof. W. F. Ogburn, Chicago; Dr. Harry S. Sullivan, University of Maryland; Dr. Henry B. Thomas, University of Illinois; Dr. W. I. Thomas, New School for Social Research; Dr. Miriam Van Waters, Los Angeles; Prof. Kimball Young, University of Wisconsin, and by several graduate students.

A list of important books on family problems recently published would be too great an addition to the bulk of this paper.

In 1924 the Religious Education Association devoted its annual conference to problems of the family. The Department of Christian Social Service in the National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America devoted a session of its fourth national conference to the family. Several other associations have followed suit.

Several liberal and technical magazines have published symposia or leading articles on acute family problems. The organ of the American Association for Organizing Family Social Work is itself called *The Family*.

Leading departments of sociology offer courses in the family. Vassar's new Institute of Euthenics recognizes it among its most important fields. The relation between the family and population problems is recognized by the Scripps Foundation for Population Research at Miami University.

A section on The Family has been established in the American Sociological Society and has steadily grown in importance. This year the entire annual meeting has been devoted to a topic which inevitably involves a discussion of family problems at many sessions.

Of course, many of the "studies" which appear have inevitably been made from the angle of special doctrines or interests.

Our study of the family has been like the old fable of the blind men describing the elephant. Each feels and interprets only the small part of the problem with which he is in direct contact, and thinks he is describing the whole.

Sociology should not monopolize the family, nor the problems of the family. We are coming to recognize that, at least in the social sciences, the problem, not the "subject," is the unit. To each real problem the academic subjects

offer each their characteristic approaches, representing the several abstract phases of a group of phenomena in reality inseparable.

Some day we may have, instead of departments of sociology, biology, or geography, units specializing on the race problem, the food problem, or the family, and including students of every aspect of the particular situation in its integrity.

An adequate symposium on the family would, it seems to me, include contributions from several academic and technical fields not always recognized as having such contributions, as well as from one or two whose exponents have occasionally assumed somewhat naïvely a preeminence in the exposition of the subject.

What is needed is the assembling and sifting of existing factual material, and the painstaking accumulation of masses of case studies. All the family problems listed in recent meetings boil down into the one great problem of family research. It is for this reason that Northwestern University, in its graduate work in sociology, hopes to develop a center for intensive and impartial family research.

Porter R. Lee has pointed out that, under present conditions, family integrity is, in some respects, threatened as seriously by tradition as by innovation. Both blind conservatism and blind experiment and revolt are dangerous here as everywhere. The question, then, is, can we find sanctions in facts and results to replace or include tradition? The basic approach in all our research must be practical. What things are sinister and why? This is not the cold-blooded research of the so-called "pure sociologist," any more than it is the biased research of the sentimental fanatic. Beyond the collection of facts must come careful thinking and analysis, and a philosophy of life based upon them.

5. *The Companionate and the Family*[1]

Because of the complication of institutions, new ones are sometimes able to arrive almost at maturity before their distinctiveness is generally observed. Under one set of conditions, human experience, aided somewhat by deliberate purpose, assembles an institution out of factors which work so smoothly together that the complex comes to be regarded as part of a "natural" order. These cooperating forces are, of course, designated by a single term, and with long use this term becomes hallowed. In the meantime, new conditions arise, the original ones pass away or become modified, and under the pressure of new realities the time-worn institution breaks up into two or more parts. There is a chaotic period, in which society makes a floundering attempt to treat essentially different institutions alike because they inherit the same name from a dead past. Then the facts have to be recognized, new terms found for what is new; these terms likewise gather sanctity with age and cover up the further changes

[1] From KNIGHT, M. M., The Companionate and the Family, the Unobserved Division of an Historical Institution, *Jour. Social Hygiene*, vol. 10, pp. 257–267, May, 1924.

which are taking place. "Family" is one of those words now coming under suspicion of covering two institutions already so distinct as to require radically different social treatment.

For the purpose of this brief discussion, we may call the state of lawful wedlock, entered into solely for companionship, and not contributing children to society, the "companionate," using the term "family" in its true historical sense, as the institution for regulating reproduction, early education, property inheritance, and some other things. These limitations are observed in order to make it clear that an actual and general condition is being dealt with, not a vague theory of what may be or ought to be. The companionate is one of our commonest institutions. We have been dealing with it as though it were a family, which it is not.

Throughout nearly the whole of human history, it has been possible to control reproduction indirectly, by blocking or permitting the expression of one of the most powerful instincts. The human race would cease to exist within a few decades save for a constant stream of new recruits, because it is composed of individuals all of whom wear out. Reproduction is as fundamental to the group as eating is to the individual. Without it, there can be no social value except of the most transitory kind. As Muller-Lyer and most of the more recent social historians have frankly recognized, there is probably no phase of the division of labor older or more basic than that founded on sex. Only half of the human race can bear and nurse the young, all the males being disqualified by their anatomical structure and physiological processes. Even with the enormous strides taken by Occidental society in sanitation, the most favored groups must still procreate at an average rate of something like three children per woman or decline in numbers. The period is not historically remote when the minimum rate was several times that figure, as it still is in a large fraction of the world. This enormous burden could never be shifted to men, whom reproduction costs practically nothing. Woman was and will be yoked to it biologically. Man had to be yoked socially to a share of it, by creating a division of labor in which he compensated for his physical incapacity to bear children by assuming a disproportionate part of the non-reproductive activities. The institution which grew up around this basic biological fact is the historic family.

Certain rites permitted people to live together, and nature quickly transformed this temporary companionate into a family in almost every case. The exceptions were so rare that there was little call for separate treatment. Thus the companionate was little more than an incident—a sort of novitiate—leading to the family, on which the survival of the group depended. This indirect control of reproduction has largely broken down, due to the increased understanding of physiological processes. In one group of cases, we still have the initiation ceremony leading to

the historic institution for reproduction and care of the young. In another, growing larger year by year, the same identical rites lead to a social unit which serves neither of these purposes—that is, the lengthy or permanent companionate.

It is problematical enough which of the historic customs, laws, and assumptions apply to the family itself since the industrial revolution has changed its economic basis. Most of the productive activities have been swept out of the home because they can be carried on better and more cheaply in the factory. A large part of the education of the young, including technical training as producers, has gone the same way. It could not be otherwise, since the society in which the child will have to move and work has grown far too complicated to be introduced to him by the actually narrowed machinery of the home. Inheritance, too, has hinged more and more on the individual will, and the business contacts of grown members of a family are often not such as could be intimately known to each other. The shrinkage of both death rate and birth rate in Western countries has further liberated the energies of women, and the limited opportunities for producing or earning at home have quite necessarily carried many women with families into regular employments outside. Finally, the family has quite generally become a heavy pecuniary burden, whereas it was quite as commonly a strong asset in the pre-industrial revolutionary days when it was the characteristic unit for economic production. Modern medical knowledge has made the companionate possible, but it is the break-up of the home as an economic unit which has made it desirable and hence so common. Economically speaking, always, the individual is forced to pay for the privilege of making a contribution to the social group, and at the same time shown a way of getting out of both.

The larger institutional groups which we vaguely call "society" have the most vital interest in reproduction. For that reason, society—the state, particularly—must play an important rôle in the fundamental shake-up of the family which is certain to come. Barring a sweeping change in the whole ethical and moral basis of our society, or a profound reconstruction of economic life, some way will have to be found to decrease the burden of reproduction, upon both men and women, or Occidental civilization may be decapitated by its own machinery. It is hardly possible to prevent the ablest strains of people from extinguishing themselves, if the family is to continue a handicap to an individual success which gets all the material rewards and social applause.

Recognition of the companionate as a distinctive institution has become fairly general only among the more radically minded. Inevitably, the more extreme socialists and feminists have taken their cue largely from the Russian experiment. This is a good thing in one way—it brings social renovation down from the clouds of vague theory into

an earthly setting. Over against this are disadvantages almost equally grave. To those with ready-made ideas, Russia is so far away, so big, so unfamiliar, and the excursion into communism there has had so little time to settle down into definite, variable social structures, that the Federated Soviet Republics often serve as a sort of Utopia whose actual existence may be asserted. Moreover, Russia is not a highly industrialized country, and her population problem is very different from that of the states on both sides of the North Atlantic in the past few decades. That Soviet Russia has been able to struggle on for a few years with amazingly little regulation of companionate or family does not necessarily mean that this is a good permanent policy for us.

Because the social conservatives and liberals have been inclined to regard the companionate as a family, the common radical assertion that it is no affair of the state's if people wish to live together without children has gone practically undebated. It seems to the writer to be not only debatable, but to bear all the earmarks of sophistry. These people have picked upon a few obviously absurd laws and customs applied to the companionate merely because of its historical descent from the family, and immediately jumped to the rash conclusion that all thoroughgoing regulations must be bad because these are. Of all the people in the world to take such a *laissez faire* attitude toward a vital institution founded upon the same instinct which must be depended upon for reproduction—that is, for group survival—one would expect the socialists to be the last. Presumably they will soon see this themselves, as some already do. One remarked to the writer recently that the socialists would cross this bridge when they came to it—that for the present, the main thing is to get rid of the unsuitable regulations, thus making way for some suitable ones.

To the common statement that a companionate should be dissoluble at once by the joint declaration of the two parties concerned, one condition might be suggested. This is that perhaps sufficient time should elapse after mutual denunciation of the partnership bond to make sure that a mere companionate, and not an actual family, is being dissolved. Three-quarters of a year, during which time the parties lived separately, would be sufficient—perhaps somewhat less. Divorce proper, disrupting a real family, is a different matter. As long as the family retains any of its educative functions, its dissolution is bound to be a concern of the social group. With the separation of church and state in the modern world, and the enormous increase in jurisdiction of the latter at the expense of the former, the conviction has grown and spread that divorce itself should be handled in a social-scientific way, not by categorical taboos. In medieval times, God joined people together, and man was dubious about his authority to tinker with such an arrangement, even when it turned out to be a mistake. Nowadays it is the state which

couples them, at the request of individuals grown far more conscious of their rights as such. What the state has joined together by request, it can put asunder by request, with due reservations about any consequences which may have ensued. The possibility that a companionate may become a family, the probability that families will generally be preceded by companionates for a long time to come, and the absolute necessity of families, give the state an indirect but a very vital interest in mating.

As parenthood becomes more strictly voluntary, it seems obvious that the state will have to take a more direct interest in its supply of raw recruits. It is already observable that the greatest sterility appears among the most successful strains, where the environment should be most advantageous for the young, and presumably the biological inheritance is better also. This is the slow social suicide commonly known as racial decay. Its possible cure lies partially within the realm of eugenics but not altogether. Our puerile and anachronistic treatment of both the companionate and celibacy is also responsible in part. It amounts to subsidizing voluntary sterility.

For example, in the United States we exempt a man from taxation on part of his income simply because he has a woman companion. The exemption in New York State is equally large. This is on the assumption that such a partnership is directly advantageous to the state, or to society at large, which it is not unless turned into a family. On the contrary, the shrewd and self-seeking individual who avoids children has often merely done society the disservice of withdrawing a perfectly healthy woman from production. Instead of remitting taxes, we, the people, might well impose a special fine—a sort of luxury tax. If this turned out to be remunerative to the state, perhaps the taxes of the actual families could be lowered in proportion.

This favoring of the family as compared with the companionate, which the nature of the two institutions and of our economic and social order demands, obviously should not be so designed as to put companionship mating at a disadvantage with respect to celibacy. There is little reason to doubt that the social health and morale of a mated population are far better than those of a largely unmated one. The sex instinct is too powerful to be completely repressed without objectionable effects upon the personality, from the standpoint of the health and happiness of the individual on the one hand, and his social reactions upon the group on the other. Moreover, since reproduction is sexual in the human species, any group which does not attempt to regulate sex relations invites destruction. The ideal situation to be kept in view must be the fewest possible individuals unmated and the greatest possible encouragement to turn the superior companionates into moderate-sized families—say with three or four children. While this paper is not about eugenics

as such, it is not out of place to make the side remark that every attempt to turn the family into a reasonably efficient social institution must regard negative eugenics as an essential goal.

What, then, is the obvious first step to take, the moment we can get general recognition of the fact that the companionate is an actual institution, needing regulation? If we agree that a celibacy which has always been more or less of a fiction in practice and is rapidly becoming a farce since the spread of birth-control information, is socially bad, the first desideratum must be to find and remove the obstacles which keep normal people from institutional mating. For those who are anarchistic and unsocial by nature, not from economic or other necessity, restraints will doubtless have to be found—on the same general principle that we make motorists keep to a particular side of the road and sometimes forbid unauthorized persons to bear arms. It seems patent that the main thing which keeps people out of the companionate now is a senselessly rigid lot of inherited laws and customs appropriate only for the family, and not entirely so for it in its modern form. A mere enumeration of some of the most important is about all that can be undertaken in the space available here. The laws are mere generalizations arising from the customs, attempting to apply them at essential points where moral suasion might fail.

First, there is the decreasingly successful attempt on the part of the state to preserve such a state of ignorance that the companionate may become a family, as in more primitive societies, even when the members do not wish it and cannot afford it. This is a terrific deterrent to open, lawful mating, and a mother of such spawn as social decay and prostitution. It is a species of public chicanery whereby the poor or ignorant individual is tricked by means of his instincts into making an unwilling contribution, at his own expense, to the social group. The well-informed and fortunate classes see through the hoax, and get off very lightly, at the expense of a society which thus sterilizes much of its best stock.

Then there is a group of abuses, perhaps even more important, growing out of the economic order. At the heart of the matter is the assumption that a woman should cease to be an earner and become a pensioner when she becomes a man's companion; that even though a family is studiously avoided, there should be the paraphernalia of a "home"—at his expense. There are a great many men, particularly in towns and cities, who can support themselves in comfort, and perhaps even nourish ambitions, but whose earnings are insufficient for two—to say nothing about a family. Many of them—I will be conservative and not say most of them—live in a state of mock celibacy, when they would be better off in every way if it were possible to enter a real give-and-take companionate. Many of the women they play with are also self-supporting. Some of these actually mate legally, in spite of a state of social

opinion which makes it a dangerous move. How dangerous? From the woman's point of view, it means pressure to give up her position and live on a fraction of his earnings, which often represents a cut in his previous standard of living. Whether he is conscious or unconscious of this cut, it is not a particularly good omen for the success of the partnership. From the man's angle, it means making two live on what one lived on before. It actually means the accumulation of an establishment with a lot of overhead expense, which probably removes any freedom of movement which he may have enjoyed. Moreover, he is tied hard and fast by law to the new set of pecuniary obligations.

Society and the law regard this companionate as a family. The assumption is that he owes this woman support, no matter how able she may be to support herself. If at all inclined to think, he knows there is a large chance that the partnership will break up—divorce statistics are convincing on that point. If it should prove unworkable, society and the law are going to assume that he owes her alimony, even if she goes back to her salary, quite uninjured as a producer by an institutional failure which may have been as much her fault as his, or more. It may prove costly even for him verbally to suggest a legal companionate if it should not materialize. She may sue him and collect a considerable sum, merely on the implied theory that he has obligated himself to support her, though she has suffered no damage of any kind and he has received no imaginable *quid pro quo*.

To put one aspect of the problem a little more positively, why should not the two members of a companionate be taxed by the state exactly as though the partnership did not exist? Why should it be considered a pecuniary institution? It might be left open to either or both parties to prove that their earning capacity had been necessarily lowered—for instance, in case one has been obliged to move to a different city at a lower salary in order that they may live together. The fact that people do become fond of each other in a complex emotional way, incorporating the strong factor of the satisfaction of natural desires, should be a sufficient incentive if only the absurd handicaps inherited from the family could be eliminated.

There is no use in sneering at or belittling the sobering but unnecessary truth that mating at present commonly means a cut in the standard of living of both parties. Harking back to the illustrative case of taxation, there is no question but that the able bodied and childless should bear a much larger share of the burden of the state than they do now. This is only another way of saying that children are a social rather than a personal asset in the present economic order, and those who do not make this contribution should bear a substantial equivalent at some other point. The tax on celibacy which has been so much discussed looks all right as far as it goes, but it does not meet the whole difficulty. Why

not make it simply a tax on childlessness, partially remitted up to the number which scientific study suggests as normal, treating celibates and members of companionates exactly alike in this respect?

While this paper is not at all exhaustive, it is perhaps sufficient to carry the main idea. Through all the sense and nonsense which is being published about the family, the fact is patent that something is wrong. So much scientific and technical progress has been made during the past two centuries that our social institutions have dropped out of the convoy and are wandering around in the swamps of ignorance and prejudice. The sickness of the family is only a symptom of a general maladjustment, due to the fact that we have created a new material environment so quickly that we cannot find our places in it.

Never was human society riper for general change, and yet there are poor reactionaries who want to live in the void we have just moved out of, instead of settling down in the potentially more habitable world we have created. We cannot reestablish the old family, founded on involuntary parenthood, any more than we can set the years back or turn bullfrogs into tadpoles. The family has definitely split into two parts, neither of which is like their common predecessor. They are related, they are both important, and they require regulation. The companionate is the more difficult to deal with for the moment, because more remote from anything we have experienced before. It can be regulated. It will have to be regulated. The first step is obviously to recognize its existence and attempt to get a good, square look at it.

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