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CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT
OF GERMANY

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W. TUDOR JONES, M.A., D.Phil.

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CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT OF GERMANY

BY

W. TUDOR JONES

M.A., D.PHIL.

VOLUME II

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TO
MY OLD FRIEND
J. T. WALLEY

P R E F A C E

THIS second volume deals, on the whole, with younger writers than those of the first volume. An exception is made in a few cases on account of the omission of several older writers inadvertently passed over in the first volume.

In the present volume several branches of human thought and activity have, unfortunately, been omitted for lack of space. These are such branches as Mathematics, Psychology, Logic, Sociology, the Philosophy of Rights, Literature, and Poetry. I have had to crowd such a vast array of important matter into a brief chapter which does not present anything more than a bare epitome of these important works.

The magnitude of the material dealt with in this volume has made it necessary for me to obtain help not only from the actual works of the authors, but also from interpretations and histories of the actual works themselves. I have found much assistance from many quarters in this respect. The interpretations of such works as those of Überweg, Becher, Marck, Eisler, Siebert, as well as the contents of the *Kantstudien* and the *Logos*, have proved of great value. But I may state that I have worked at the actual sources themselves for many years. The volume is offered, in the main, to those who have been unable to find a leading pathway to a position whence a bird's-eye view of the most important scientific, philosophical, and religious thought

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of the Germany of the present day could be obtained.

I have to thank my valued friend Mr. J. T. Walley, M.A., sometime Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, for his great kindness in wading through the proofs and in making several valuable suggestions.

W. TUDOR JONES

June 1931

CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT OF GERMANY

CHAPTER I

ORIENTATION AND MAIN MEANINGS OF THE VARIOUS CURRENTS OF THOUGHT

IN the first volume an attempt was made to sketch the development of certain sides of the philosophical thought of Germany during the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth centuries. Several contemporary writers were dealt with on account of their close affinity with the great systematic thinkers who had preceded them. In the present volume an attempt will be made to show the relation of present-day writers to past thinkers, and, more, to show the important modifications, as well as the new tendencies, which have been woven into the works of such thinkers. Lack of space precludes the possibility of doing more than dealing in a general way with the vast work that is being now accomplished in Germany in the various branches of science, philosophy, sociology, and religion. It is hoped that the work will at least serve as a guide to the fuller interpretations to be found in German treatises on these subjects, as well as to some of the most important works of present-day thinkers who are undoubtedly giving a new and unique orienta-

tion to so many of the most fundamental problems of the past—an orientation which, indeed, may be said to constitute a philosophy which takes into account important aspects of the universe and of life which have hitherto been neglected. Of course it is absolutely impossible for any thinker to cut himself away entirely from what has been said before. If he were to attempt to do so, he would be quite rightly set down as a person who has no real qualifications to speak on the subject. Thus, in the present volume, I shall endeavour to show how present-day thinkers have grouped themselves together into various Schools; how each School has something in common; and how also every member of each School has presented something which is unique.

One of the first things that strikes us in most of the philosophical Schools is the break-up of the old Speculative Metaphysics. Much of the speculative metaphysics of Hegel has passed away, especially the portion of it which touched the borderland of revealed religion. But, on the other hand, as will be shown later, a great revival of Hegelianism is occurring in Germany—a revival which deals with certain fundamental conceptions of Hegel in relation to the development of the consciousness of man. But the tendency, in the main, has been to keep close to the verified conclusions of the various sciences, bearing in mind, at the same time, that such conclusions are not all-inclusive, and that they deal rather with what is true concerning the physical universe than with what is

true concerning man's nature in its many and varied manifestations.

It was pointed out in Volume I how many of the older Neo-Kantians were anxious to keep in very close contact with the conclusions of the Natural Sciences which had been pouring in during the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the present century. They all knew the significance of such conclusions and also knew their limitations. This fact compelled them to move very warily within the domain of Philosophy and to avoid creating a system of thought based upon mere analogy. Still they were all conscious that however closely related "things" and "thoughts" were there were fundamental differences between them. They sought to investigate these differences without discarding any of the conclusions of the sciences. Their field of endeavour became of necessity narrower than the field of a speculative Metaphysics which could ignore the conclusions of the various sciences and so construct a theory of the universe and of life without regard thereto. They knew their Kant too well to give an unbridled rein to thought on its imaginative and volitional side. They were conscious that if as much attention was paid to the "knowing mind" as was paid to objects in the external world, Philosophy might render as good an account of itself in its interpretation of "thought" as the various Sciences had rendered in connection with "things." Thus the Neo-Kantians rejected every form of a *Ding an sich* in so far as the external world was concerned. Their main

object was the working out of the functions and implications of logical thought. Something of the same nature was actually happening within the domain of Physics. Physicists in their investigations had to work with concepts of a mathematical nature. It is true to say that Physicists were not until recently aware of what they were doing. The new conceptions of Relativity have made it abundantly clear that physical reality has to be fitted into conceptions which, as far as can be known, have no *physical existence*. It will be shown at a later stage how all this has an important bearing on the Philosophy of Mathematics and Physics. Mathematics and Physics have thus entered into the domain of Philosophy in a way they have never done before. Their present development has reached a stage which rules out the postulate of an external world which is independent of thought. At the present moment a closer union than had hitherto been the case has been established between the more "idealistic" Physicists and the Neo-Kantians, and it is now practically certain that the union will become still closer in the future. But the work of the Neo-Kantians lies, in the main, within the realms of a Theory of Knowledge and of Logic, whilst the object of the investigations of Physics lies in the external world and in the conceptions of Space and Time as these form substrata of our knowledge of the physical world.

Alongside of the Neo-Kantian School just mentioned we find another Neo-Kantian School, or, as it is often termed, the South-West or Baden School.

Its present-day "head" is Heinrich Rickert. This School is also often termed the School of Values. Much of its teaching, as Rickert has recently pointed out in his brilliant book on Kant, goes back to Kant himself. Perceptible, too, is the influence of Lotze and Windelband, especially within the domain of Values. This School emphasises the necessity of denying any *Ding an sich* external to ourselves. All that exists is, to us at least, to be found in consciousness. But consciousness is shown to be capable of a very real and a very comprehensive evolution. It is capable of passing into domains of Thought and Values which are over-personal in their nature, or, stating it otherwise, man is capable of creating, and raising himself up to, a transcendental world. Truth is thus viewed not as any kind of replica of objects in the external world, but is rather the building up of a reality of thought. This is so not only with regard to the individual's own life but also with regard to the Natural Sciences and Mathematics. We arrive consequently at the conclusion that a world of transcendental thought actually exists (or subsists) alongside of the existence of the physical world.

The task of Philosophy, according to Rickert and his followers, is to investigate the laws and functions of logical thought, and to show that such laws and functions arise from the unity and potentiality of consciousness. Sensation and Perception, true as they are concerning the initial stages of the process, have, at the advanced stages, to be left behind. That does not mean that Sensation and

Perception have no function to perform. But the function operates only in the initial stages: the function is only an initial stage to an interpretation of the world in a conceptual form. Here there is no denial but an affirmation of an external world, though it is shown that beyond the elementary stages of Sensation and Perception man passes into a transcendental world.

Much connected herewith belongs to the province of Theory of Knowledge and Logic, but the Transcendental School passes beyond this to the domain of Ethics. One of the fundamental doctrines of the Ethics consists in a renewed emphasis upon Kant's *Sollen* (Ought) and the constant need of differentiating it from the *Sein* (what is). The Kantian morality of *obligation* and the possible worth of human life now receive a more secure and fixed content, a character less in the nature of a postulate than with Kant, and, as well, a more idealistic and social direction. Religion is now regarded as not consisting in anything dogmatic or metaphysical, but in the social and ethical meanings and values of life. This aspect is only a continuation of what was initiated by the earlier Kantians of this generation, such as Cohen and Natorp.

The South-Western or Baden School, as already pointed out, has been influenced by Lotze and Windelband, especially in connection with the conception and the function of Values. The chief representatives of this School at present are Rickert, Lask, Cohn, Bauch, Hönigswald, Leser, Herrigel, Krüger, and others.

This School investigates the System of Values and Norms; and the investigation has proceeded so far as to set forth universally valid Norms and an over-individual and transcendental *Sollen* (Ought). The meaning of these Values and Norms is to be discovered in the reality of Culture and Civilisation, and only thence do they derive their reality and significance. On account of the fact that Culture and Civilisation are taken as the fields of investigation, a differentiation has been made between the Sciences of Culture and Civilisation and the Natural Sciences. This differentiation was emphasised by Windelband, but it has remained for Rickert to work it out in detail. The Natural Sciences deal with what is "general" and with "laws"; the historical or cultural Sciences deal with individual actualities in so far as these, in their relation to cultural values, possess historical significance.

The present-day Marburg School is concerned with the mathematico-natural Sciences; the Windelband-Rickert School takes to History. The teaching of the latter is a Philosophy of Value and Culture. Of course there are important divergencies amongst the various members of every School. For instance, Lask goes much farther than his teacher Rickert in advancing his conception of Values in the direction of Platonism; indeed, the reality of a spiritual world reaches a point which is not far removed from Theism. Bauch, on the other hand, pays a great deal of attention to the mathematico-natural Sciences and shows that the conceptual constructions of these form a Reality which is other than

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the subjective conceptions of any individual. Indeed, he would go so far as to say that such a Reality has in some manner which cannot be made entirely explicit an existence (or subsistence) of its own. Bauch carries farther the moral obligation of Kant's Categorical Imperative by means of a hypothetical Imperative founded upon the moral claims of the Values of Culture and Civilisation. The Values often differ in many respects because men differ in capacities, etc. He is compelled to go so far as to state that the possibility of the realisation of the Values has as its presupposition something of the nature of the Godhead.

Krüger, another member of the School, keeps close to Kant in his views of Ethics. All forms of Eudemonism must be discarded. According to him, Value is something other than the life of pleasure and passion. The sole condition of Value is that it is *unconditionally worthwhile*. We value, then, in a true sense by means of the function of the Value itself. The ethical ideal claims that man, in the highest sense, is a being of worth. Through Values other tendencies in the nature of man are brought into activity and organised. Krüger sees that human nature is so formed psychologically, and consequently he views Psychology as the fundamental discipline of Philosophy.

The *Marburg and the Baden Schools* discard the psychological foundation of Philosophy as well as all forms of psychological *a priorism* and over-empirical elements which are supposed to be present as a kind of ready-made inheritance in the nature

of man. On the other hand, the *Kant-Friesian School*, represented by the late Leonard Nelson and by Rudolf Otto, has attempted to revive certain important aspects of the teaching of Fries in a psychological way, that beneath the illumined and clarified confidence of reason there is to be found certain *a priori*, immediate, and non-sensuous knowledge in the form of intuition. Otto has worked out this point of view in his *Philosophy of Religion* and in the *Holy*.

(1) **The Empirico-Positivistic Direction.**—In modern times the chief representative of this School was Ernst Mach (cp. Vol. I on Mach). The number of his followers seems to be increasing. Ostwald has also played an important part with regard to a similar point of view (cp. Vol. I on Ostwald). Ostwald views Energy as the fundamental substance of the universe; it is out of it that matter has originated, and energy transforms itself into what is psychical as well as into all the sequelae of the psychical. There is, according to him, a transformation of energy from the physical to the psychical and from the psychical to the physical. Even the Theory of Values and the Philosophy of culture and civilisation can be treated on a basis of Energetics; and the Categorical Imperative itself needs Energy in order to be realised.

Ziehen is also working, from a psychological point of view, in a similar direction. By means of what is termed Reduction of Sensations, Perceptions, etc., in the way of the Natural Sciences we can arrive at the fixed workings of the "Given" which

obey the Laws of Nature. Ziehen would not go so far as to assert that this comprises all we can know. By the side of the physical aspect in the process of sensation we find a parallel law of ideas. And it is thus that ideas and sensations are united.

Other writers, allied in many respects to the Empirico-Positivistic School, are Cornelius (cp. Vol. I), who presents a Positivism which has certain affinities with Kant. E. von Aster, in his able book on the Theory of Knowledge, keeps very close to the Natural Sciences, but presents a Nominalism which possesses strong idealistic characters. I have tried to show in Volume I that Adickes represented a kind of Empiricism but that he was not satisfied that it covered the most important demands of life. He consequently finds it necessary to adopt a form of Metaphysics which has value as a subjective kind of Faith.

This subjective kind of Faith has been worked out, as will be shown more fully later, by Vaihinger in great detail. Vaihinger is the founder of the *Kantstudien*, and Professor in Halle. He has reached a very advanced age, and is greatly respected by all who have had the privilege of knowing him. He is best known to thinkers outside Germany as the author of the Philosophy of the *Als-Ob* (As If). This work is of a positivistic character and is in a great measure based on the idea of the Postulates found in Kant. He shows the absolute necessity of "fictions" in life. "Fictions" are not falsehoods; they are rather the *probable*, the *possible*, but not the *certain*. They have no object to correspond to

them, at least in the sense that they can be *certain* of the object. Still, everywhere in knowledge and life such "Fictions" have to be employed, especially for the practical purposes of human life. Vaihinger shows that such "Fictions" are often contradicted by empirical facts of the surrounding world. Yet, at the same time, no progress can be made without using them. They have to be used in even such an exact Science as Mathematics. Even our theoretical fundamental conceptions, the Categories, the Euclidean conceptions of Space, the infinitely small in Physics and Biology arise from the employment of useful "Fictions." Our nature through and through is of such a fictional character. When we turn to our ethical and religious ideas, such as Freedom, Obligation, etc., it is the same. These "Fictions" enable us to construct the world of science as well as the world of ideas. The precursors of Vaihinger in this region of speculation are Lange and Nietzsche. Even Simmel (cp. Vol. I), in spite of the strong metaphysical character of his later writings, was aware that there was no known object to correspond to our highest ideas, ideals, and aspirations. He emphasised the fact that some of the truest thoughts which have helped the human race on its upward march are those thoughts which have served useful purposes; they are the truth selected in the struggle for existence. There is no space here to show that Vaihinger's point of view has been subjected to serious criticism by many members of the various other Schools which have been enumerated above.

(2) **Conventionalism.**—The representatives of the “Conventional” point of view are closely allied in their Theory of Knowledge with Positivism and Fictionalism. Probably a good deal of the work on this subject in Germany is based on that of Henri Poincaré in France. The point of view is represented in Germany especially by S. Becher and H. Dingler. It is taught by these that the “Laws of Nature” are *conventions* which mean nothing more than arbitrary, intentional, and simple resting-places and fundamental principles of our own individual thought, and are not based upon mere ordinary experience. Conventionalism thus moves away from Empiricism and becomes something akin to an *a priorism* of the Kantian kind. Dingler designates his own standpoint as anti-empiricism. It cannot be said as yet that this point of view is capable of creating a School, but it is certainly giving an idealistic colour to many of the conceptions of the Natural Sciences, especially the Sciences of Mathematics and Physics.

(3) **“A Priori” Knowledge.**—Great interest is being shown at present in what may be termed knowledge *A Priori*. This is due to the revival of certain Aristotelean and Scholastic tendencies first worked out by Bolzano and later by Brentano. The subject has been further developed in our day by Meinong in his theory of the object, and by Husserl in his Phenomenology. Brentano, influenced by Bolzano, has exercised a very great influence on the Philosophy of the present day. He ascribed to all psychical activity an *intentional*

direction towards an object. He divides objects into Presentations, Judgments, and Phenomena, which are liked or disliked. Corresponding to these three kinds of psychical activities (or objects) are the three ideals of the Beautiful, the True, and the Good; and the investigation of the material relevant to these three activities constitutes the aims of the philosophical sciences of Aesthetics, Logic, and Ethics. These three ideals can further be conceived as a unity, and when they are so conceived they form the Ideal of Ideals or the Godhead. By means of *inner perception* these psychical objects are conceived in a form of *immediacy*.

Many thinkers in Austria and Bohemia have been deeply influenced by Brentano however far removed they may be, in many respects, from assenting to his conclusions. And the influence of Brentano has passed from the domain of Philosophy to that of Sociology and Politics. Two statesmen—von Hertling and Masaryk—are pupils of Brentano, and have carried much of their master's teaching, especially on its socio-religious side, into the life of the people.

Meinong (cp. Vol. I) has dealt with objects in the general sense of what they *mean* in the form of *pure thought*. He has dealt, of course, with objects which are *real* in the external world, but he has passed far beyond this stage, namely, to objects which are *non-real*, e.g. imaginary numbers. The *Gegenstandstheorie* passes beyond experience in the sense that it enquires (as is the case with Pure Mathematics) concerning what is known of the

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nature of the object in an *a priori* manner quite apart from the *existence* of the object. Thus by virtue of the nature of *red* and *green* there is known, in an *a priori* manner, that they are necessarily different. And this fact has nothing whatever to do with the *existence* of *red* and *green*. Meinong shows that this is exactly the case with Mathematics as well, for Mathematics is a part of the *Gegenstandstheorie*. There are here also evident truths formed by virtue of the very nature of Mathematics which are quite independent of the *existence* of anything that is to be found in the physical world. Here, then, we obtain a presentation of an *a priori* very different from that presented by Kant.

In many respects certain leading aspects of Husserl's *Phenomenology* (cp. Vol. I) are closely allied to Meinong's *Theory of the Object*. Husserl, in his important volume (1929) on *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, has stripped Psychology and Empiricism of many of their pretensions to reach the final meanings of things. Amongst other things, Husserl deals with intuition, but it is not intuition in the ordinary sense. His view of intuition is a form of immediacy which actually belongs to the intrinsic nature of man. Such an intuition is always the judge of all the "thematic" constructions of mind, and this it is which grasps the real nature of everything that is presented to it. Of course such an "original immediacy" passes into judgment and is capable of endless development, but it is *it* that accomplishes this development; it is *it* that

grasps the essence (*Wesen*) of what is presented to the human mind. Husserl further shows that intuition conceives *a priori* the real nature of what is presented. By a process of what is termed "Reduction" the *Wesensschau*, i.e. an intuition of the real nature or essence, forms *Eidetic Sciences*, i.e. sciences of essences. It is true that such sciences are connected, at least in their initial stages, with empirical objects, but as the "thematic" (or conceptual) constructions grow, the "reductive" process grows as well until sciences of "ideal being" are formed. This is brought about by means of an original activity which is the inheritance of the human consciousness, and is termed the *Noesis*; and this activity forms various "themes" concerning objects, which "themes" are termed the *Noema*. By means of the interaction of the *Noesis* and the *Noema* a transcendental world—a world of "ideal being"—is formed; and the process of the construction of such a world never comes to an end. It is a tower which has to be built from Earth to Heaven. This world of "ideal being" is timeless, and is independent of its connections in so far as these are merely *aspects* of a totality formed by the *Noesis* constructing its *Noemata*. Husserl (following Kant) calls such a world the world of "*Bewusstsein überhaupt*"—the world of consciousness itself.

Very remarkable transformations are taking place through this teaching of Husserl. I have attempted to show the significance of some of this teaching in Volume I, and shall deal with the most important of the younger writers at a later stage in the present

volume. The astonishing progress of Phenomenology in so many directions shows without a doubt that Husserl has discovered methods of attacking a vast number of problems in the domains of Theory of Knowledge and Logic which are destined to overthrow some and modify many more of the most important conclusions of the Kantians and Neo-Kantians.

(4) **Critical Realism.**—Attention was called in the first volume to the marked elements of Realism present in the writings of thinkers like Riehl, Külpe, Volkelt, and others. These all insist on the existence of an external world outside consciousness and independent of consciousness, and such a world, they claim, is known within limits. They affirm that Critical Realism is not necessarily inconsistent with a measure of Idealism. As will be seen at a later stage, tendencies emphatically realistic in character are to be found in the writings of the two most important thinkers of Husserl's School of Phenomenology—Max Scheler and Martin Heidegger. These two thinkers go farther in some respects in the direction of Realism than even Külpe and Volkelt. Scheler and Heidegger claim that consciousness, although it is capable of forming a content which is other than that yielded by ordinary bodily or psychical contact with a physical world, is yet an actual part of the cosmic process. It is not legitimate, they assert, to separate consciousness from such a process and regard it as something different from the elements of the cosmos which have given it being. This point, however, must be

postponed until we come to deal with the works of Scheler and Heidegger.

(5) **Psychological Science.**—For many years, since the time of Wundt and Fechner, Psychology has occupied the constant attention of many German thinkers. Much work of importance has been done on the physiological and the psychological sides by Wundt's pupils, Busse, Ebbinghaus, Jodl, Kafka, Lipps, Pfänder, Störring, Witasek, Elsenhans, and others. Within the course of such a limited space as is at my disposal it is impossible to deal with this vast field. But it may be pointed out that many writers on this subject have shown the necessity of introducing psychological knowledge into domains hitherto untouched. Becher, for instance, emphasised the fact that special factors of life are of a psychical kind. Experience shows how memory, understanding, imagination, feeling, etc., are able to reach goals or ends of their own. Something of this kind is produced by all forms of life. Hence material processes are seen to be influenced by psychical processes. A kind of teleology seems undeniably to be present in psychical processes and a reality of their own has to be conceded to them; they cannot possibly be merely the results of physical elements and processes. Following this clue Becher concludes that something of the nature of an over-individual psychical quality seems to work in Nature, especially in that domain of Nature which includes Life. This over-individual spiritual "essence" seems to be present in the development of life from its simplest beginnings right up to the

highest forms of culture. It may make itself effective in the moral life in the forms of a selfless love and the promptings of conscience. Something of all this, according to Becher, may be present in the electrons, atoms, molecules, etc. They may be of a psychical nature. Although such a conclusion cannot be scientifically proved with regard to the physical constituents of matter, still there is no other hypothesis which fits so well with the fact of the unity of Nature as the theory just enumerated. If this is so, then there is a hierarchy of psychic powers working in the universe.

Several aspects of the Philosophy of W. Stern have a similar bearing. The other elements of Stern's teaching will be dealt with at a later stage. Stern labours to disprove the mechanism of the universe, and places a peculiar kind of *personalism* over against it. He stretches the conception of the term "person." He conceives as "a person" everything which, in spite of the multiplicity of its parts, expresses a particular kind of unity, and is self-active and works towards *ends*. According to Stern, atoms, molecules, cells, etc., are *persons*. Over against the *person* stands the *fact* which is a sum of many parts, but has no special unity and does not bring forth any unitary or purposive self-activity. A *person* is an active, purposive unity; a *fact* is a passive, mechanical, non-purposive aggregate. With Stern the mechanical consideration of the world is placed beneath or at a lower level than the teleological and "personal" consideration. As we shall see at a later stage in dealing with Stern, the *persons*

that constitute reality form a *hierarchy*. Thus the molecule stands above the atom, the cells above the molecule, the organism above the cells, the family above the individual, the "striving-unity" of a people above the individual, and above this, half-asleep as yet, the *human organism as a whole*. These orders, or grades, of lower and higher *persons* culminate in a highest, all-comprehensive *Divine Person*. The process of the world is thus an eternally creative unfoldment of the *Divine All-Person*.

(6) **The Non-Rational.**—Rudolf Otto, Leonard Nelson, Richard Müller-Freienfels, George Mehlis, Hermann Schwarz, Nicolai Hartmann, are the most important writers who have emphasised the non-rational side of the world and of human life. With the exception of N. Hartmann these writers show that a knowledge of this non-rational side of the world and of ourselves is possible by means of intuitive self-feeling. With Hartmann the non-rational means what has not been as yet made clear concerning the nature of the world, but which discloses more and more of its hidden content to the enquiring mind of man. Schwarz, on the other hand, lands us in a kind of mysticism.

Another writer, who is very difficult to classify, is Count Keyserling. His books deal mainly with the best modes for the development of human life. Life is viewed by him as an Art and not as a Science, and it has to be shaped in accordance with wisdom.

The writings of Dilthey (cp. Vol. I) have exercised a great influence on the development of the idea

of the non-rational elements in life. Dilthey was no religious mystic, but there is much of what may be legitimately called a "positivistic mysticism" running through his writings, especially in his views on the concept of "understanding" (*Verstehen*). Dilthey bases his teaching upon experience. By experience he means the whole of the psychic-spiritual nature of man in its development. It is in the life of man and its various phases that the religious, poetical, imaginative, and philosophical views of the world have their roots. The philosophical view of the world aims at universality, but, at the same time, it remains rooted in the individual and his sphere as well as in the non-rational phase of man's own life. Thus there are *Types* of views concerning the universe and life. He differentiates the Naturalistic Type, the Active Idealism of Freedom, which belong to Plato and Kant, and the more contemplative Type of Objective Idealism which is represented in modern times by Spinoza and Schopenhauer. The truer view of the universe is consequently rooted in the *individual* and *historical* life. But, on the other hand, it has to be borne in mind that human life is in large measure *non-rational* in its nature, and brings forth *non-rational* views concerning the universe and life. Dilthey would like us to *understand* all these views, but not to seek for an absolutely valid view either of the universe or of human life. The problem of *understanding* (*Verstehen*) is shown by him to be at the heart of the mental sciences. In the Natural Sciences, on the other hand, we strive to know objects which

stand over against us and to explain the laws of such effects. In the mental sciences—in Psychology (in its most general aspects) and History, for instance—we *understand* the mental and spiritual by virtue of our own experiences and reflections. *Understanding* rests, then, upon our own experiences, but leads us beyond the limits of the subjective life into the region of the “general” and “total” within the life of the spirit. In opposition to a descriptive and analytical Psychology Dilthey presents a teleological and structural Psychology of the psychic-mental-spiritual life. He thus describes, analyses, and finally *understands* what is happening within consciousness when it is unfolding itself teleologically.

This point of view of Dilthey has exercised a great deal of influence on the development of Psychology by means of its description of the difference between the Analytic Psychology which deals with the way a human being knows and the structural evolution of consciousness itself in the meaning, value, and significance which is thus formed as an actual and ever-growing experience of man concerning the universe, society, and himself. Dilthey gave a start to the new trend of Psychology in the form of *Denk-Psychologie* (Thought-Psychology). We shall see farther on the great importance of such a point of view in the way culture and civilisation, as well as unique personalities, have operated in the creation of a world of the spirit.

(7) **The Sciences of History, Culture, Civilisation, and Education.**—The work of Dilthey has

been carried farther by Eduard Spranger, Theodor Litt, and many other young writers, whose works will be dealt with at a later stage.

(8) **Biological Direction.**—Since the time of Fechner there has been a strong tendency amongst certain biologists to establish a *theory* of Biology just as a theory of Physics has been established. Such attempts have been noticed in Volume I in reference to the works of Reinke, Becher, and Driesch. This tendency has greatly increased during the past few years from the sides of the biological and the philosophical sciences. R. F. Francé, an eminent biologist, has dealt with the life of plants and has shown, in an experimental way, the striking similarities between the functions and habits of plants and the life of man. The struggle with the environment and its consequent modifications of the organism are visible everywhere. The conclusion is inevitably pressed upon one's mind that there is some psychical power at work, something very real although it does not reveal itself to the senses. But there is revealed to the senses the *effects* which such a power is capable of producing on the life of plants.

This subject has also formed a great part of the work of Julius Schaxel, Professor of Experimental Biology in Jena. He is of opinion that all the sciences of the present day are undergoing great transformations. Physics and Chemistry have already passed from the realm of experiment and practice to a stage where they are at least significant partial interpretations of the universe. Psychology, at the present moment, finds itself handing on many of its contri-

butions to Metaphysics in the form of a *Psychology of Thought*. In other words, these various sciences are transforming their traditional forms of thought and theories into something which is more psychical, mental, and even spiritual. The machine theory is passing away, at least in so far as it leaves out of consideration, as in the past, all factors which are not purely mechanical and chemical in their nature.

This state of things is exemplified by Ludwig Bertalanffy of Vienna in his important book *Kritische Theorie der Formbildung*. He shows the possibility and the need of a creation of a theory of Biology which will transform altogether the Metaphysics of the Universe and of Life. On the other hand, several philosophers of eminence, such as Max Scheler, Richard Kroner, and Nicolai Hartmann, discern the importance of paying increasing attention to the new theories which biological science is setting forth concerning the meaning of the phenomena of life in the plant, animal, and human worlds. It is certain that this teaching will exercise great and permanent influence on the philosophical thought of the future whatever new discoveries are made in the realm of physical matter. The result will be the formation of an independent science of Biology. Biology is not as yet an independent science; it must make continual reference to descriptions of the behaviour of the various aspects of matter in its physical forms. This, as already stated, will not and cannot be discarded, but a *theory of form and structure* as well as *meaning in itself*, and not as that meaning is related to what is *below* itself, is now

actually being brought into being. Thus there will be established a kind of a Theory of Knowledge of Biology which will place the science on its own basis, in the sense pointed out above, and which will elucidate the meaning of that most real quality which is termed life in a way that has never been done before.

Many other eminent biologists, such as Max Hartmann, are labouring in the same direction.

(9) **Newer Psychological Direction.**—It has already been hinted that Psychology is in process of complete transformation. The science was in a great degree confined in the past to an investigation of the happenings within the individual consciousness and of the relations of body and mind. This work will have to be continued. But writers are beginning to see that what is happening in the individual mind passes beyond itself; becomes capable of forming connections which are over-individual. Such a fact as this proves that the quality which *does* this must mean *more* than an individual possession, something whose meaning and significance are not exhausted in what is happening within the individual as an individual. Dilthey had already shown that there is such a Psychology as that which has as its objects thoughts, processes, and connections, and which places ends before itself and realises them. Stern has worked out a Psychology of Development, and Driesch has shown the connection of Biology and Psychology, whilst Otto Spann and Litt have interpreted how Psychology has to include new *principles* of meanings concerning "Totality," "Form," and "Structure." Spann,

indeed, has formed a doctrine of Categories in relation to the work of Psychology.

Here may be mentioned the great work of Felix Krüger in connection with Psychology, and especially with the *feelings*. The feelings of man have not in the past been subjected to an exact psychological investigation. The result is that vast possibilities of feelings present in man do not exercise hardly any power on mind. If they were properly understood they could be of immense importance in the heightening of the life of man. Krüger's great work deserves to be interpreted, translated, and published in all the countries of the world, and it is with regret that I have to leave it on one side—for the present at least.

(10) **Sociological Direction.**—During the past decade probably more attention has been paid in Germany to Sociology than to any other subject. Great and important work towards the creation of a Science of Human Society had been done before the war by such men as Dilthey, Simmel, Werner Sombart, and many others. The younger generation of thinkers has taken the matter up with no little skill and fervour. Scheler in the latter part of his life gathered round him a band of thinkers—old and young—to write on the Sociology of Knowledge. The results appeared in 1924, and they constitute a very remarkable contribution. I regret that space does not allow me to deal with this matter in the manner it deserves. I am obliged to confine myself to the mere outline of the contents.

Scheler himself deals with the problems of a

Sociology of Knowledge. He shows how various anthropological and mental factors have operated in the history of civilisation, and how necessary it is to be as exact in such a science as we now are in the realms of the Natural Sciences. This part of the volume is nothing less than a presentation of a "civilisation-cosmos" which will have as its goal the dominion of mankind, from the highest mental and spiritual standpoints, over all that is living and non-living in the world of nature which offers resistance to be conquered and transformed unless combined human efforts are directed towards such obstacles. There is, as he points out, some kind of order and teleology in the cosmos and in human society. A good deal, by means of united effort, can be done to increase the former or at least to turn it in new directions; and even more can be done by the "creation" of a spiritual dynamic which will bring into being hidden cosmic activities of individuals as individuals, and of individuals as a society, and which aim at ends which are true for all and good for all.

How to expand this Sociology of Knowledge into an actual Theory of Knowledge has been the work of such men as Luchtenberg, Wm. Jerusalem, Stoltenberg, Leopold von Weise, and others.

Further than this, the problems of Knowledge have relations with History, Rights, and Industry. These questions are subjected to a minute examination by Hashagen, Honigsheim, Spindler, Vollrath, and several other writers.

The whole matter is carried farther by showing the need for the "conversion" of individuals to such ideals as are presented in the volume. Thus we are thrown back upon the individual for the cultivation of his life so as to partake in this task of the true redemption of himself and of humanity. The creation of some great and permanent "fashion" or "atmosphere" is needful. Mittenzwey shows how a true knowledge of the deeper meaning of Psychoanalysis can be of great help. We have to understand our own nature before we can be converted to such an undertaking as the redemption of mankind. Plessner deals with the need for propaganda in the Universities for the creation of the highest ideals of Sociology. He looks upon the work of the Universities, as they are now constituted, as doing little more than touching the externals of the life of the spirit. There is great need of calling up the deeper feelings to counterbalance the routine of the Present.

One of the most significant attempts of modern times has been made by George Lukács in his work on *History and Class-consciousness*, to present a philosophical Socialism. Much of Lukács' presentation is based on the teaching of Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, as was the case with Marx himself. But Lukács deals with the subject of Socialism from the standpoint of Hegel's conception of self-consciousness. The idealistic Metaphysics of Hegel is transformed into realistic Sociology. The whole of reality that we know, or ever hope to know, consists of historical presentations, events, and

meanings. History is thus the universal reality. The classes of men are the vehicles of History; they are the creators of the meanings and values of the world of human society. So many of these meanings and values are capable of further development. Man has to perceive clearly what these shall be and become absolutely convinced that they can be realised in the *future*. The future should be constantly kept in view.

(11) **Characteristic Tendencies of Philosophy in General.**—Changes of great importance are at present in operation not only in connection with the various branches of Philosophy but also with the nature of Philosophy in itself and with the fundamental importance of conserving what is deemed to be of essential value in the philosophies of the Middle Ages, of Kant, and of Hegel.

In connection with the Middle Ages (including aspects of the teaching of Bolzano and Brentano), the School of Phenomenology is paying great attention to such teaching.

(a) The Neo-Kantians of the present generation have been greatly influenced by Windelband and Rickert. Rickert's teaching may, indeed, be designated as the foundation of the whole movement. Eugen Herrigel, Professor in Erlangen, in his *Urstoff und Urform* deals in a very able manner with the doctrine of Philosophical Structure. His problem takes the form of an exact definition of a Theory of Knowledge which has needed certain modifications since the days of Kant and even since the days of Lotze, though keeping close to some of the essential

results which they both reached concerning the *way of knowing* and also concerning the logical processes which are at work in placing *what is known* within its proper "field." Herrigel shows that Logic in its formation of over-logical or transcendental meanings and values creates something, on the one hand, which seems to arise from the very nature of existence. But, on the other hand, what we are only certain of is that this fact is a possession of the individual himself. One can never be certain of the *objectivity* of the creations formed by reflective thought, though one is sure that all-important ingredients of their formation have come from the world without. But although one is not sure of the *objectivity* of the most comprehensive and significant meanings of the Universe and Life, still such meanings, though *subjectively* formed, do constitute what has proceeded from the universe and what has proceeded from ourselves in the manner of meaning, value, and reality. The whole result, then, is that we are in a position, in a metaphysical way, to relate the *non-absolute* meanings of subjectivity with an *absoluteness* of being or existence.

(b) Important work is being done with regard to the *Neo-Hegelian* movement. It is of interest to notice that some of Rickert's pupils are the pioneers of this movement. Hegel's teaching had largely dropped out of sight in Germany before the close of the last century. There were some few exceptions, as I have attempted to show in the first volume. Stronger traces of Hegel are to be seen in Pfeleiderer,

Kuno Fischer, Adolf Lasson, and some others. But the return to Kant has been so emphatic from the latter quarter of last century to the first quarter of the present century that it is true to state that Hegel did not enjoy much consideration in the philosophical thought of Germany.

A change has come, and there are many signs that the teaching of Hegel is being seriously studied anew. Georg Lasson has edited an edition of the complete works of Hegel, and Hermann Glockner has followed with another complete edition. Glockner, a Privatdozent at Heidelberg, has started an interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy. His Introduction to the complete edition contains a brilliant exposition of Hegelianism, whilst another small volume—*Der Begriff in Hegels Philosophie*—shows that the author has become a propagandist for the extension of Hegel's teaching. This small work deals very clearly with such weighty problems as the following: the transformation of the idea of the concept; the concept in its original, logical significance; the idea as an over-logical structure of the concept; spirit as a metaphysical root of the idea; consciousness; contradiction and its overcoming; Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis or the One and the Other, the Whole and the One. These, as well as other fundamental conceptions of the Hegelian Philosophy, are worked out by Glockner in a very clear manner.

At a later stage in this volume it will be shown that strong Hegelian influences are to be found in the teaching of Richard Kroner and partly in that

of Nicolai Hartmann, especially in his view of "objective spirit."

(c) *Phenomenology*.—The writers of the School of Phenomenology are becoming so numerous that it would require a whole volume to describe the extensive ramifications of the teaching that are at present taking place.

The late Adolf Reinach, whose early death was a great loss to Philosophy, in his writings dealt with a great variety of problems from the central point of view of Husserl's Phenomenology. "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts" deals with the juristic doctrine of the principles of rights. The ordinary idea is that rights have grown up on the soil of human history in an inductive, empirical, *non-a priori* manner. Reinach denies this assumption and shows that rights, promises, pledges, etc., are qualities which are the original possession of man, and thus every Philosophy of Rights is only an interpretation of this original quality. He goes on to show the relation of this interpretation of such an original quality with the development of communities and States. His main inference is that man is the possessor of an inheritance which has not its origin in *nothingness* but in *feelings* which concern all the relations of mankind. What appear as Rights are a development of an original potentiality which is the actual inheritance of man. Thus there is in man's nature something of fundamental importance which is a *right of its own*, which in every sense is independent of Nature, independent of human knowledge, and

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independent of all the *factual* development of the world.

Practically all the important members of the School of Phenomenology emphasise such an inheritance of man and conclude that this must actually exist as a quality of the cosmos. This original inheritance is traced in all the various fields of human activity.

Pfänder points to the original inheritance as revealing itself in the varied *Dispositions* of man. Geiger indicates its presence in aesthetic enjoyment; Scheler in conduct (Ethics); Hedwig Conrad-Martius constructs an *Ontology* of the real external world; Geiger exhibits its presence in the unconscious and in psychical reality; Hering in the nature of the Idea; Linke points out its existence in the nature of real consciousness; Gerda Walther finds that on the borderland of Husserl's Phenomenology there are rich fields which must be entered through the gate of Phenomenology. These fields are full of good things. One may start in telepathy and be led, step by step, to the actual experience of Deity.

Such results are exercising a profound influence on the thought of Germany at the present day, and are destined to do so increasingly in the future. Husserl probably never dreamt of the extent of the expansion of his point of view.

CHAPTER II

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM

(a) NEO-KANTIANISM AND CRITICAL IDEALISM

EMIL LASK

LASK was a pupil of Rickert at Freiburg and became one of his assistants. He fell in the Great War, and his early death was much lamented. It is universally agreed that he had a mind of a rare order, and, young as he was, his contributions to Philosophy are of extreme importance. His works have appeared in three volumes, with an introduction on his life and work by his old teacher Rickert.

Lask shows in his *Logic of Philosophy* and in the *Doctrine of the Judgment* that within the domain of Logic problems arise which compel us to pass beyond Logic proper and to form some kind of System concerning the Science of Logic itself. In other words, the problems are those of a general philosophical System, and can only be answered by the further development of such a System.

His System of Logic in particular and of Philosophy in general stands in the most intimate relation with the idea of a view of the universe. He points out that to deal with the ordinary problems of Logic in an individual and subjective manner leads to a blind alley. The connections of the problems pass legitimately beyond this to an interpretation

of the universe—an interpretation which, though tentative and fragmentary, has to be taken into consideration. The results obtained in this way may be designated in the words of Rickert as “lonely meditation.”

Lask points out that our emphasis should be laid on the *objective* world as it is, and bear in mind the rôle of the knowing subject in a “serving” relation to it. Knowledge will not suffer in this way of giving ourselves up to the existence and meaning of objects. It is true that there is a sharp opposition between sensuous existence and non-sensuous validity. In the former case the object is of an empirical kind; whilst in the latter case the object is that of philosophical knowledge. Both forms of knowledge have the same kind of *Structure*. If the object is of an empirical character it is logically, or in other words categorically, formed, and this means that in such a formation there is at work something, termed the category, which in itself does not belong to sensuous existence but to the world of non-sensuous validity. It is exactly the same with regard to philosophical knowledge. It has to be formed in precisely the same logical way. The *Form* of that portion of sensuous existence which gives us the object of philosophical knowledge constructs, on its side, the material in the mode of its *Form*.

It may then be stated that the main aim of a Logic of Philosophy is to grasp the valid *Form* of sensuous existence as object of philosophical knowledge. Thus the problem of the Categories must be extended from the sensuous sphere to the non-

sensuous, for it is in this way alone that the domain of Logic is made limitless. We can thus pass to Form of Form *ad infinitum*. The conception of *Form*, which, in a superficial way, appears as superfluous, becomes capable of extension to the domains of problems of a non-logical character, such as those of Ethics and Aesthetics. This fact, if borne in mind, will protect us from the mere intellectualisation of Ethics and Aesthetics, and will explain the possibility of valid knowledge within these disciplines. The ethical and aesthetic Forms with which the philosophical sciences have to deal are not themselves problems of Logic but *difficulties* which present themselves to human beings—difficulties which can only be cleared up by the science of Logic which makes possible a knowledge of them. Thus this shows the right of Logic to extend its use over all the domains of thought, and to protect us from reducing the content concerning any object to an empirical level or from over-rationalising the non-rational content of thinkable objects.

Lask makes great attempts to reconcile the objectivity and the subjectivity of our knowledge. This is so with regard to our knowledge of the external world. He shares with Husserl and his School the conviction that we perceive the external world in a form of immediacy. This immediacy, it is true, is only a beginning—only an initial stage in our knowledge of the external world. But even at this level the sensuous world appears far more significant if it is perceived immediately in itself as it is than if we denied such a possibility of perceiving it.

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Here Lask was very anxious to overcome the subjectivity of Kant on the level of Perception although he was willing to follow a great deal of Kant's teaching concerning what follows Perception. In Lask's nature there were aesthetic and mystical elements which continually prompted him to recognise the actual objectivity of physical reality as well as the objectivity of thought in a non-sensuous world of its own.

Lask proceeds to show that in the evolution of thought a real transformation takes place—a transformation which penetrates more and more into the realm of the non-sensuous. Starting from the presentation of objects in the external world man passes to a knowledge of them; from every initial knowledge of objects he passes to the results obtained by the reflective consciousness upon itself in its ever-growing content of meaning, value, and significance. Lask did insist on the constant necessity of turning to the Category, which meant for him the real formative function which enables all that is valid to be brought within a *plan* of life.

Lask was anxious to show that what we are experiencing from the external is not merely our own subjective expression. There is a *Something* that exists over against the experiencing subject, but it only becomes an experienced truth when it comes to a subject. There is in the subject what may be termed a personal experience of reality. How can this be? The answer given is that as there is a correspondence between such an external reality which impinges upon us and our inward conception

of it, the correspondence testifies to the *an sich* (in itself) of Reality.

Lask was drawn to the significance of human life and to the place of religion within it. The way to the development of life in the direction of religion was viewed by him as a relation of man to things, to persons, and to himself. Of course, it is self-consciousness that enables us to proceed in this way. Every increased familiarity with the deeper contents of value found in self-consciousness brings forth a very real kind of *autonomy* into the life of the individual. The contemplative life is capable of withdrawing from familiar and easy external and internal objects. It is able to hold in front of us aspects of Value which have their existence in themselves, and which have no counterpart in the physical or intellectual world. By such contemplation man becomes the possessor of some strange form of a timeless life. In the last resort it is this extra-practical region of life—entirely non-sensuous in its nature—which explains every meaning and every act which the practical life must take. In all this, *something* more is present than the mere subjective personality itself.

GÜNTHER JACOBY

Jacoby is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Greifswald, and, as he is young, only a portion of his work has as yet been accomplished. But enough has appeared to show him to be a thinker of some importance, especially in the domain of Ontology.

He attempts to show that the Ontological prob-

lem is neither a problem of the Theory of Knowledge nor of Metaphysics. The actual existence and continuity of all things (*Sein*) are valid and independent of knowledge and its functions. This is especially the case with regard to all form-relations upon which the content and meaning of our conceptions concerning Reality are constructed. But Reality has to be *conceived* in order that we may obtain its meaning. And in the conception of Reality there is a necessity for practical conceptions; and the particularity, the practical use, and the theoretical foundation of such conceptions should be presented in as clear and simple a manner as possible. But this is not all that should be presented. There is also a need for an ever deeper *theoretical* foundation and illumination of the *grounds* of all that is presented to the mind in order that such a knowledge may serve as a most general basis of all the sciences which deal with the universe and life. It has to be borne in mind that the crucial problems of all the sciences are of a deeper nature than can be satisfactorily answered by either Theory of Knowledge, Logic, or Metaphysics. According to Jacoby, Reality is not a content of knowledge but constitutes its own existence and domain. Jacoby does not present any ready-made Ontology, but seeks the "moment" or aspect of the Real in what *exists*. He distinguishes three kinds of Reality, i.e. an external Reality, an immanent Reality of consciousness, and a transcendent sphere of Reality. Within external Reality, i.e. the *Given* in Perception, there arise, on account of the varied characteristics of the objects,

many different systems of Reality which are in manifold relations to one another, and which thus constitute different *structures*. These relations are not causal or active in themselves so as to be able to create structures or to form systems, but they allow themselves to be brought into such structures or systems in an *ideal sense*. With regard to the Reality of consciousness there are to be found therein two essential character-systems upon the foundation of which two kinds of relations to the external world are formed—the ontological structure of things which present themselves to consciousness and the psycho-physical relations of the things in their presentation to consciousness. The difference between these dual modes of presentation is of special significance, and has to be taken into account in connection with the whole immanent ontological conception. The first mode shows that something is *given* us; and it is what is given that is to obtain a meaning by us. Thus the first mode differs radically from the second mode—the psycho-physical relation—which shows not *what* is given us but *how* it is given us. The psycho-physical relation is thus impotent to explain the immanent ontological Reality, and so has to give way to the acceptance of a world of Perception and of a consciousness of a transcendent Real.

Jacoby develops the logical foundation of transcendental Ontology. Here he deals with the object of pure Logic and shows the difference between the logical Real and the ontological Real. It is true that in both cases real and logical existences prove them-

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selves to be *realities* independent of the knowing consciousness. It is the knowing consciousness that becomes aware of both, but they both form *objects* for the knowing consciousness. The two different kinds of objects distinguish themselves from each other through the development of a particular kind of structure in each and through the independence which each possesses. Considerations concerning the difference between the form of Judgment in the Copula and concerning Judgments of Existence show at once the independence of the logical and the ontological from each other. Jacoby's point of view here is that both of these points of view have to be worked out. In the logical system he deals with the *Ansichbestand*, i.e. with what originates of itself in consciousness, and shows how this unites with the *Systematic* already present in consciousness, i.e. how it shapes the material into a System more and more coherent and comprehensive. In the ontological System, on the other hand, the attention is directed outwards towards the external world so as to form a System which becomes synthetic in an ever wider manner.

ERNST CASSIRER

Cassirer is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Hamburg. He was a pupil of Cohen and Natorp, and their teaching has deeply influenced him. He may be designated as a Neo-Kantian who has adopted the standpoint of Cohen, although he takes a far wider view regarding the problems of Philosophy in their relations to Natural Sciences

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and Mathematics. He is also Editor of a splendid edition of Kant's works. His teaching may be considered as a kind of Idealism of Methodology. He states that every epoch possesses a system of general conceptions and presuppositions by means of which it controls and unifies the multiplicity of the material which offers itself to observation and experience. The forms of Judgment are motives of thought which have an effect upon all the manifold material which presents itself to mind and which engages itself in the creation and formulation of ever new Categories.

Cassirer states, in connection with the functions of Logic, that Logic should certainly pass from its Formal level to the problem of *Meaning*. The problem of *Meaning*, however, is closely allied with the problem of *Form*. It is only by taking this fact into account that the doctrine of the Concept can be sufficiently grounded and understood in its development. Much help can be obtained for this important work by observing the mode of the development of the Concept in the domains of Mathematics and the Mathematical Sciences, though these domains in no manner exhaust the region of investigation. The union of Form and Meaning offers means for the construction of important and indispensable *Paradigma*. Of course the development of the Concept within the domains just mentioned does not include the whole of its development. Materials from many other quarters offer themselves to the mind and have to be taken into consideration. The regions of *theoretical Meaning* are many and varied. The

science which we designate as Logic is obliged to take into account the material found in all regions, for otherwise the material cannot have any meaning, value, and significance. Logic is thus a *πρῶτον δεκτικόν* for all thought, judgments, and conclusions.

Cassirer shows that in our search for the general or universal in thought we shall not succeed unless we take into account the meaning of each particular as it presents itself to us. Every particular in this way is of essential significance. Although the meaning of the particular has to become subservient to the general which is present at any one moment in thought, still the particular is not passive but is capable of modifying, or limiting, or expanding the general. No general or universal is to be won if one starts from the empty forms of thought and tries to isolate this from the content. The general or universal can only be won by means of the consideration of the objective meaning and the objective binding of thought. Of course Cassirer does not mean anything "spatial" in this respect. A truly general Logic can only be raised upon a transcendental Logic, i.e. upon a Logic of "objects of thought." The understanding of all this is a matter for a Theory of Knowledge. And this Theory of Knowledge deals not only with the "Form" of concepts and ideas but with the "Value" of Knowledge both in its objective meaning and also its objective validity.

In regard to the objectivity mentioned above, he means certainly the objectivity which is present as

a *content* in the constructions of the mind itself. This *content* is present in the domain of idealistic mathematical objects; it is present (from a Kantian point of view) in relation to all things which present themselves to the senses and to consciousness. Somehow a "whole," a "world," "a mental and spiritual cosmos," is built *within*. All this that is found "within" has to be dealt with in various ways by man; all this has to be placed in order and valued. Thus, according to Cassirer, there arises the need of something more than Formal Logic to be brought into use. It is true that when we examine objects from the standpoint of Logic we abstract ourselves from the objectivity of the physical world, but we are to take into consideration what comes from the physical world in all its manifold aspects. Though we fail to know *how* we know objects, it is certain that we do know them or can know them. And Logic deals not only with what is *formal* within the mind but with the meaning of all perceptual objects as well. Logic thus shows the immanent meaning and the inner arrangement or order of all that is presented to a rational being. It is nothing "Formal-Universal" on the other side of the difference of the structure of objects.

Cassirer emphasises the place of attributes or properties (*Merkmale*) as the starting-point in the theory of the concept. The *Merkmale* connect themselves together; their nature allows them to be tied together in groups as it were; and this happens not by means of the content of the *Merkmale* alone, but also by virtue of the *interest of thought itself*. This

grouping or binding gives a structure and a shape to the logical concept. Indeed, it is the concept which forms the *Merkmale* themselves. Such a view as this of any object is closed, according to him, to the naïve mind. The *Merkmale* which the naïve mind happens to possess are thus very different from those possessed by the trained mind. Cassirer goes on to show that the ever truer development of the concept constitutes more and more our understanding of the world without and the world within, and forms consequently the cardinal problem of systematic Philosophy. And, according to him, such a doctrine of the concept becomes the very point around which Logic, Theory of Knowledge, Language, and Psychology of Thought (*Denkpsychologie*) should revolve.

The concept thus develops into ever greater significance and fruitfulness; it passes beyond differentiating and binding (although it will still have to occupy itself with this kind of work) to an activity for the setting, fitting, and determining of ever new *Merkmale*. The *Merkmale* enable us to differentiate material of a very varied nature instead of allowing it to mix in the mind with material different in its nature to itself. For instance, the world of mythical thought is very different in its nature from the world of scientific thought. Both the two worlds certainly obey the same binding laws of the mind, but if both are allowed to enter without any more ado what a chaos the human mind would be in! Cassirer would conclude, then, that we should call up and cultivate ever farther the *Merk-*

malen by means of logical thought. If we do this, we bring into consciousness material of the most varied nature, view it in accordance with the theoretical work of the mind, and place it in the category of what is of a similar nature to itself. Proceeding thus, we shall become aware of the vast variety of the material which offers itself to us, but, at the same time, we are able to weave it all into different structures and types within human experience. The result will be that such human experience becomes ever deeper and richer, and the consciousness as it proceeds becomes more and more convinced that the process will never come to a terminus.

RICHARD HÖNIGSWALD

Hönigswald is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Breslau. His most important work lies in his interpretation of the Renaissance and in his contribution to *Denkpsychologie*. It is in the latter that the more significant part of his work appears.

He points out that there are three kinds of Psychology. In the first place, we find the psychological investigation of the elements of consciousness approached from classical, experimental, and special angles. In the second place, there has arisen, in a scientific way, the *structural* Psychology of Dilthey and of his pupil Spranger, the object of which is to understand the *inner life as meaning*; and, in the third place, there is a critical Psychology which examines the nature of thought itself. Hönigswald, in several of his works, deals with the third aspect—

the nature of thought. In his *Grundlagen der Denkpsychologie* he attempts to work out the historical points of view, the conceptions, and the methods by means of which the psychical can become an object of a psychological science. The question is asked, How is Psychology as a Science possible? In order to answer this question he sees that the starting-point must be Epistemological. The results obtained in this way are psychological in their nature, and aim at determining the strife which exists to-day with regard to the exact meaning and aims of Psychology. His analysis of the "loss of the thread in speech" shows it to be impossible that impossibility of *thought* should grow out of presentations, associations, and apperceptions. But this impossibility constitutes only the beginning for further fundamental knowledge. The isolating of psychical processes is conditioned by the presupposition that every experience is "knowable knowledge." He further shows the close connection between psychical experience and Time. This connection produces an important Structure (or formation). The stream of the psychical experience and of Time is such that it forms constant experience of a Present which may be designated as Timeless.

Hönigswald protests against Psychologism, and shows that it can be overcome only by means of Psychology itself. But such a Psychology is *Denkpsychologie*, i.e. it is a Psychology of Principles. What springs from the Principles is infinitely more important than what is generally presented by empirical or associational or apperceptual Psy-

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chology. It is necessary to bear constantly in mind that the *whole* psychological nature of man has to be taken into consideration; and thus in order that it may be understood and known so as to yield Principles which will more and more accurately interpret man's nature in ever greater fulness and completeness. Even the unconscious can only *mean* something when it is brought more and more into the realm of exact knowledge and not allowed to be a subject of speculation and analogy.

Further, he attempts to raise Psychology to the level of an exact science of Principles. Psychology will thus become a science which determines the place of all scientific knowledge and all the implications thereof in so far as these are related to the consciousness of man. Thus the various branches of Psychology now in vogue can only deal with the diverse aspects of man's nature, and cannot reach the totality of that nature. They must all bring their contribution to the more general and comprehensive Principles—Principles which have been formed by taking into account the most comprehensive points of view that were possible to be taken. Such considerations do not suggest that any particular psychological mode of investigation should be discarded, but they do suggest that it should be condemned if it claims to be all-inclusive. And all the various pathways of investigation are capable of being reflected upon so as to show that they are only elements or aspects of a science of Psychology. No real science can come into existence save by such a process. As things are constituted at pre-

sent, Psychology is in a somewhat unhealthy condition, and it is really wellnigh impossible to know what it is aiming at. The regions of investigation are growing wider and wider, and the means of communication between the various "fields" are becoming more and more difficult. It is well, then, to bear in mind that Hönigswald's point of view consists in the need of a creation of a real synthesis of all the various fragmentary sides of Psychology so as to form as far as possible the actual beginning of a new science of *Denkpsychologie*.

He shows (cp. *Die Skepsis in Philosophie und Wissenschaft*) that "Doubt" plays an all-important part in every branch of knowledge. Unless critical "Doubt" enters chaos enters into all forms of knowledge. But it is absolutely necessary to bear in mind that man is capable of passing beyond the bare facts of the world and their meaning into a domain of *validity*. Validity involves everywhere a process—a process not of a temporal but of a logical nature. Validity remains as a Standard and Criterion of what unfolds itself in the process. To deny such a relation between validity and process means nothing less than to deny that "progress" and "change" are possible in knowledge and valuation. Consequently, in the domain of the thoughts and actions of human life, just as in the domain of Mathematics, there are ideal Standards which give a meaning, value, and significance to all that is presented to man, and which form the very means which enable him to create a pathway farther and ever farther towards a goal which seems to have no end.

BRUNO BAUCH

Bauch is a pupil of Windelband and Rickert, and succeeded Liebmann as Professor of Philosophy in Jena. When Privatdozent at Halle he was, in conjunction with Vaihinger, editor of *Kantstudien*. His early writings dealt, in the main, with Kant. During the past few years two important volumes of his give us his own standpoint concerning the meaning of the universe and of human life. These volumes are *Wahrheit, Wert, und Wirklichkeit* and *Die Idee*. The former volume on *Truth, Value, and Reality* consists of over 500 pages of closely printed matter and covers an encyclopaedic field. The latter volume on *The Idea* is, in a sense, a continuation of the former. It leads us to the realm of a transcendental idealism which constitutes a very real kind of religion. The two works have been so enthusiastically received in Germany as to mark out Bauch almost as a prophet whose mission it is to unveil the meaning of some of the deepest problems of Philosophy and the bearings of these upon knowledge, human life, and human destiny.

The former volume is divided into four portions. The first part is occupied with the validity of truth; the second shows that the *real* is dependent upon its structure-forms; the third deals with the conception of Value; and the fourth shows the relation of the domain of Value to the domain of reality.

Bauch's range of enquiry is extremely extensive, but he has laboured intensively in every part of it. He has welded the dominant features of the teach-

ings of such men as Plato, Kant, Lotze, Frege, Windelband, and Rickert into a remarkable whole.

He shows that in our ordinary experience we make the simple assumption that the *real* as *real* is independent of the experiencing subject. But in ordinary experience likewise we meet with *other* objects which do not exist in the same way as the so-called real objects exist. In works of Art, for instance, what are real are the masses of marble, the pigments, the musical notes, etc. But the mass of marble has been transformed into a thing of beauty; the "togetherness" of the musical notes has formed a symphony. Thus two different attitudes or modes of relation towards an object are possible which we may describe as Thought and Knowledge. Thought is knowledge when it thinks that which it thinks in such a way as the object is. Thought has always an object, but it is only in knowledge (in the Judgment) that it directs itself towards its object. Before stating his own ideas on this matter, Bauch examines the standpoints which have been adopted by ancient and modern scientific and philosophical thinkers. Probably it is the close study of Plato and Kant which have influenced him most. Lotze, Frege, Windelband, and Rickert have also helped him to bring Platonic and Kantian conceptions into close connection with modern science and modern philosophy. By his intimate knowledge of the doctrines of Lotze, Windelband, and Rickert he has been able to pass from the problems of Psychology to those of the Theory of Knowledge, Logic, and Values; whilst Frege, for his part, has taught him

in a very clear way the relation of Concept and Function.

We thus see in what manner Bauch has prepared himself for his unfoldment of the treatment of some of the most important problems of Philosophy.

The difference pointed out above between the "having" of an object in thought and the "directing" of thought upon an object has to be taken into consideration or else no clearness can be obtained. Thought is always thought *of something*—of an object. But thought may possess an object without being directed towards the object in the sense that the subject may be indifferent whether the object actually exists or not. When thought has objects such as Pegasus, or the numbers 2, 3, 4, etc., this simply means that it accepts such objects just as they appear. But when a person thinks of Pegasus, knowing it to be a poetical symbol, or when he thinks that $2 = \frac{4}{2}$ or $2 > 3 > 4$, or when he places the eagle in the place of Pegasus, or when he thinks $\frac{4}{2} = 3$ he sets his "having" of objects either in correct or incorrect relations. It is in *relations* that thought can become knowledge. The relating thought is the Judgment, and it is only by constantly turning to the Judgment that we are able to speak of the truth or the falsity of things. As already pointed out, thought to be thought must have an object, but it is only as Judgment that it can be directed towards or over-against its object. It is certainly true that we can seek the teleological significance of thought in other directions, and Bauch proceeds to show these other directions.

There is a fundamental difference between "having" the object, on the one hand, and "directing" the mind upon it in its relations, on the other. The Judgment has to be designated as a relating thought-process.

According to Bauch, the Judgment is the necessary relation and function of thought. There are actual and logical Judgments. The actual Judgment presents the problem in its "Is." The question has to be asked, what this "Is" itself is? what means the copulating itself, of which the copula is only a symbol? The copula possesses a peculiar metaphysical character. It does not denote a mere collection or aggregate of things but an interweaving of things which belong together in contradistinction to all forms of aggregate. In this relation there lies an objective "moment" (or element) in the Judgment. "A is B" signifies that a relation of an actual order between A and B arises. This relation is not a relation for itself, but a relation of something to something. Within the actual Judgment there is present a "will-moment"—a specific act—which operates over-against the bare process of presentations and ideas. In this act of the actual Judgment the decisive "moment" is the attempt of the actual Judgment to grip the logical Judgment. When the actual Judgment is able to pass beyond itself or, in other words, beyond the "copula-level" it recognises *Value*. There is no space here to show how Bauch exhibits the ineradicable connection between Logic and Ethics. But from what the Judgment is capable of doing in the above instance we do not obtain the *full* work of

the Judgment. The Judgment is capable of passing into *meaning*. Consequently, in the Judgment value and reality meet; in the *meaning* of the Judgment we obtain an inter-domain between value and reality. This inter-domain is of such fundamental importance that it has to be conceived as really *objective*. This, of course, does not imply an empirical objectivity but an objectivity of the very nature of thought itself.

The logical Judgment is capable of *Structure*. It is on account of this fact that what is termed 'Truth' obtains its formation and shaping.

Bauch's doctrine of the Category is based in a large measure upon the work of Ed. von Hartmann. By Category he signifies that whereby the Judgments and Functions of Thought are ordered. He states that in order to apprehend the meaning of the Categories the notion of the "relation of validity" must be held fast. Category is a "relation of validity" so far as such a relation determines the object. No object is to be freed from the Category, and the Category itself is not to be freed from any object. But true as this is, the validity of the object is something *beyond* the object in its physical sense or in an intellectual, naïve sense. It is true that the *material* must not be left out of the Categories by knowledge, but it is also true that the *validity* must always obtain its legitimate place.

Bauch shows that although judging thought may be designated as actual Judgment, this cannot be said of the *Concept*. The Concept as well as the Judgment belongs indeed to that domain of thought

in which Truth lies. But though we may speak of a false Judgment it is senseless to speak of a false Concept. The real function and nature of the Concept is, however, revealed in the Judgment. The Concept has affinity with the relation which exists between the general and the particular. The Concept is the *general* condition of the *particular*. It proceeds from below upwards and from above downwards. The particulars unite into the general, and the general in its turn interprets the particulars. For instance, a Series of Numbers are not merely something which stand accidentally next to one another, but they form a *connection*. They are united as members of a totality, and thus we find them obedient to a law of logical continuity. But logical continuity is conceptual. The empirical character, though not ceasing to exist, has to be supplemented by a conceptual reality. And for this reason Bauch pays a great deal of attention to the Concept and its function in the *genesis*, often from empirical material, of the *Idea* which has a reality of its own.

He proceeds to the methods which are employed in the perpetual development of the Natural Sciences. In the first place, it is shown how attention must be continually paid to the "grounds" of things. In this respect the main Proposition is brought into connection with other Propositions, and in so far as it is conditioned and known by these other Propositions in so far as it "founded" or "grounded." Thus the *factual* order of investigation is not itself the important process but the *connection* of the content of relations. We thus see that without the presence

and the continual employment of the logical Judgment no progress is possible with regard to the development of the Natural Sciences.

Consequently, in the development of the Natural Sciences *experience* and *method* have constantly to be applied. In the first place, an immanent method resolves *actuality* into factors and relations. But alongside of this process a scientific *theoretical* method is necessary, which investigates the conditions and possibility of experience itself, and which may be designated, in the language of Kant, as the *transcendental method*. But the two methods do not proceed independently of each other. The second method grips the first method. We thus discover a *Structure* in such a double scientific method. The *inductive* process has to be constantly present in the first method, whilst in the apprehension of the results of this *inductive* process, by means of the theoretical results of this *inductive* process, a constant activity of the *deductive* process is in operation. Both methods constitute the constructive building up of a Structure of Thought as well as of a Structure of the Universe in the form of Thought.

Bauch goes on to show that the result of this unceasing work constitutes the unfoldment of the rationality of things. But this is not the end of the matter, for however far we proceed along this road we find an "inconceivable as yet" at the back of all such rational unfoldment. This *non-rational* is always present as a continual background. Its significance must not be taken as a mere *denial* but rather as *limitation*. The "inconceivable as yet" is thus not

simply a negation but has a positive meaning in the sense of *limitation* in so far as one has proceeded in the investigation; and the "inconceivable as yet" has also a positive meaning in the sense of *possibility* in so far as no investigation need come to a terminus.

When Bauch passes to the investigation of the methods of Science and History he follows, in the main, the lines of his old teacher, Rickert. Rickert has drawn a sharp distinction between scientific and historical methods. There is also a distinction in Bauch's teaching, but it is not so sharp or so deep as in Rickert's. Bauch distinguishes between the "explanatory" and the "descriptive" methods which should be employed in connection with the Natural Sciences, but he shows, as Rickert does, the presence of a *generalisation* which connotes both the "explanatory" and the "descriptive" aspects.

Bauch's teaching approximates very closely to Rickert's when he deals with the fact of the transformation of the qualities of the Sciences, Art, etc., into *Values of Culture and Civilisation*. The temporal Values of Culture and Civilisation can be objective in so far as they can be grounded in timeless pure Values. This does not mean anything cosmically real that lies at the back of the universe, but it does mean what is most universal as personal experience in its own present moments. Such present moments are lifted out of the flowing stream of Time.

He shows that Nature, on the one hand, and Civilisation and Culture, on the other, though not in the same way, are still both real. Neither can constitute the whole of reality—reality is more

comprehensive than either. We cannot, of course, know what reality is in a factual sense alone; it is only in a conceptual sense that we are able to state anything concerning it. Thus in the progressive unfoldment of the meaning of the universe and of man the highest criterion is nothing external but internal. It is in the *Idea* that all the fragmentary material of Science and History comes to a focus.

At a later stage, Bauch passes on to the place of Values in life. It is by conceiving and realising more and more the Values found in the different spheres of Nature and History that man can become the possessor of timeless experiences and can grasp the meaning of reality. Such experiences and such meanings of reality, constantly realised in the deepest mind and will, constitute, in an inward manner, the highest form of reality. And it is towards such a goal that the whole life of man should be set. The Values are to be formed theoretically. This is obligatory on us in order that we may possess more and more illumination concerning their nature. But they must pass beyond this to the ethical life of man. In so far as Values are known and realised, in so far do they form *Truth* for us. *Truth* is thus, in its strongest link, a Value that is clearly known and realised by some aspect or other of human life. Bauch has combined certain fundamental aspects, imperfectly depicted in this sketch, of the Physical and Mental Sciences into a great system.

His later work on *The Idea* carries this system farther to the borderland of religion. The book is simply brilliant. Bauch proceeds to show that in the

last resort *the self and its content constitute the only true reality*. He borrows something from Plato's *Doctrine of Ideas*, but works out further conclusions of his own. He shows that the Philosophy of the Present, if followed to its final goal, leads to some such conclusion concerning the reality of the self and its inseparable contents and ideals. Indeed, it may be said that Bauch has, under the impulsion of his own thought, arrived at a kind of Theism which regards what is happening in the deepest nature of man, in the endeavour to attain to ever higher Values, as a Logos that is timeless and eternal.

He closes both the volumes described here with a plea that his message should be *known* and should be *realised*. The true betterment and real redemption of mankind lies, according to him, along some such line of advance.

JONAS COHN

Cohn has been for many years Professor of Philosophy in the University of Freiburg in Breisgau. His field of investigation is very extensive, and includes works on Aesthetics, Psychology, Ethics, the Theory of Knowledge, and the Theory of Dialectics.

With regard to Aesthetics, Cohn considers it to be a critical science of Values, and the contribution of Psychology to it is only that of a subsidiary science which partially shows how Aesthetics is formed and experienced. As regards "form" and "experience," Aesthetics has Value in its own

right, and can also claim a universal validity. The Beautiful is found wherever expression reveals itself in "form."

In his work on the "Theory of Knowledge" he exhibits strong affinities with Rickert's teaching on this subject; but in later years he has tended more and more in the direction of Hegel. This fact is clearly seen in his important work on *The Theory of Dialectic* (1923). He regards the "Theory of Knowledge" in the first instance as the science which investigates what is valid or presupposed concerning Knowledge in itself and concerning any particular kind of Knowledge. Thus he confines his enquiry to the *logical* genesis of Knowledge; and from the results attained in this way he passes on to the "grounds" of Knowledge. He finds the fundamental "grounds" of Knowledge to be dependent upon Values and Ends. The true nature of immanence consists in the fact that all that can be known must be based on the conditions of the *forms* of Knowledge. All that is known stands under the conditions of the "knowing forms" of the knowing self. By stating this Cohn implies, however, that such a knowing self is not the psychological, individual self but a self that is a pure subject of Knowledge—an ideal self which is a norm and an aim of knowledge.

In his very instructive work on *The Meaning of Contemporary Culture* (1914) he shows that such a view of the self as has been designated above has not only a theoretical value but also practical consequences of the highest importance. He points out that in the very act of knowing the individual strives

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to free himself from his individuality. In the attempt to free himself in this manner he raises himself to the level of an over-individual self; and such an over-individual self can never be a mere subject but becomes *consciousness itself*, developing its own inner world. This point of view reminds one of Kant's *Bewusstsein überhaupt* and of Rickert's *erkenntnis-theoretische Subjekt*. The pure self, according to Cohn, has no metaphysical existence. "Thinghood" and "unity" are characteristics of this self which itself is no thing. He shows, further, that it is a characteristic of the self to possess a power which enables it to extend the possibility of knowledge. Man thus can become the possessor of a reality and of a personal experience other than are to be found anywhere else in the material world. This ideal reality of personal experience passes from the logical to super-logical ends or goals, and it is this fact which constitutes the domain of Values. By "domain of Values" Cohn understands the conclusions of the inward conceptions which present the connective and convincing meanings which are presented to the Judgment in its ever constant upward and fuller connections. *Truth* is thus the leading Value of the domain of knowledge. The Judgment is true when it represents the conclusion of the mind concerning what actually occurs amongst objects, whether the objects be inward or outward.

Cohn in his work on *Dialectic* proceeds, in the main, on the lines of Hegel, but his *Dialectic* is logical and not speculative as was largely the case with Hegel. *Dialectic* is not confined by Cohn to the

theoretical life or applied exclusively to the formation of general concepts. He employs it also in dealing with the practical life of man. He shows that no decisions can be formed and be carried out unless we take into account the doctrine of *Contradiction*. The *Contradiction* is not confined merely to the domain of Yea and Nay. If it were so, there might be nothing more than the affirmation or negation of what already exists. Consequently, *Contradiction* could not in this manner extend and deepen the realm of knowledge. *Contradiction* goes deeper: it constitutes, as a result, a synthesis of opposing materials of the Judgment, and thus extends the domain of knowledge and, also, of life's ideals and goals.

Cohn, having laid the foundation of his teaching in some such manner as this, develops it into a Philosophy of human life, right up to the domain of religion. He sees the necessity of freeing the self from its narrow, unreflecting groove; and it is this which constitutes one of the main tasks of the present day. This freeing of the self is a freeing from an externally imposed and traditional religion which may mean little more than unintelligible phrases for the individual. It means freeing the self so that it may enter into a religion which will enable it to understand something of the meaning and significance of knowledge and of the Norms of knowledge. The individual, when he has undergone an essential experience of this freedom, passes beyond mere feeling and mere acceptance of a religion of authority and becomes a conscious personality.

Cohn shows that such a conscious personality becomes a genuine reality in the inner life which breasts the mere drifting current of time and custom. Such a personal experience does not merely relate to itself. It sees also its material in human society and in its daily calling. But the view presented above enables the man to be conscious of himself as a *person* apart from all that comes to him from without. Man does actually find much of the material necessary to the development of his own personality in the world of human society. He can in society create new forms of feeling, aims, and ends of life for himself, and, what is also of fundamental importance, he can view all these forms of life as offering material and as constituting a domain for the development of a life which does not cease to grow, and which finds its highest satisfaction in personal piety; and, ultimately, indeed, in God. Personal piety, according to Cohn, does not mean a mere belief in a personal Deity or any merely external god, but rather consists in the accumulation, valuation, and personal possession of all that is most worthy and best in the worlds of nature, knowledge, and society. There should be present here some form of what may be termed *worship*.

Cohn views Christianity in this manner as offering material of imperishable value. We are obliged, he states, to take such a view in connection with the life of the Founder. But many accretions have to be removed, and the *kernel* should be set forth in clear relief, as was the case in the lives of the disciples.

He states that, speaking generally, the self has

lost its anchorage. It has to find it again. Mankind has to find it in the directions mentioned above, and with the conviction that larger and more distant horizons will come into view as man mounts upward. All goes to show that an eternity of meaning and value lies in front of us. Cohn states that he felt himself bound to present such an aspect of life, and which in reality is the carrying farther of what is imbedded in the various branches of Philosophy.

HERMANN SCHWARZ

The earlier works of Schwarz deal with aspects of the Theory of Knowledge. At that period he could be described as a critical realist. He taught, namely, that the things which we perceive *are* as they are perceived. But he comes into line with the great idealists when he shows that Perception is directed towards a consciousness of transcendence which lies beyond the immediate material which is presented to consciousness.

His Ethics are idealistic and normative in character and rest upon a Psychology of the Will. The Will has to be differentiated from mere want or desire. Schwarz would say that the effort to possess the things we merely want or desire in a natural sense is not worthy of the name of Will. In human nature is to be found the fact of *preference*. This *preference* is of an analytic and a synthetic kind. It is analytic when it directs itself towards such relations of "better and worse" as present themselves. The *preference* is synthetic when the person's *own*

act shows where the "Better" lies. He emphasises the fact of the constant need of differentiating the natural laws of desire and the normative laws of the Will. With regard to the former, man moves on the line of least resistance, whilst in connection with the latter man moves towards what is above himself.

Schwarz gives an important place to Psychology in its investigations concerning the contents and functions of consciousness. The value of empirical Psychology lies in the fact that it does give some valid explanation, however incomplete it may be, of the way in which the various elements of consciousness behave as well as the way in which they come to a unity or whole. We can isolate these elements just as we can isolate the parts of the body; but the complete body is something quite other than the sum of all the parts that compose it. It is the same with what is termed consciousness or soul. Consciousness has its elements—its parts—but it is not only the totality of the parts but something which binds the totality together. The individual cannot say: "I have feelings of pleasure and pain; I have sensations, perceptions, and ideas"; but, "I *am* the united sum of all particulars and of all complex ideas and feelings."

Schwarz shows that the Will of man is an active energy which is self-determined. This energy of the Will must not be confused with the physical energy which operates in the universe. Physical energy can be measured and by use is dissipated. The Will, on the other hand, never weakens but rather strengthens by use.

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Human beings are more than a ready-made kind of beings. The Will must have something to work upon. In consciousness itself there is present the energy and capacity to be governed by what is purely spiritual, and to be able to reach norms and ideals which are far beyond any ordinary actual situation. We thus see that Psychology in all its forms does not exhaust the meaning and significance of human personality. Thought is able to dictate the course of life for itself and to pass beyond every natural level and all the mechanism of sense-experience and association.

Schwarz shows that consciousness, if it is to unfold, must constantly set up goals and ideals outside itself. These are already in the world, and they are, as it were, waiting to be carried to a still farther stage of development. We can, if we open our spiritual eyes, see mighty forces at work. Consciousness is able to apprehend these, and to realise them as its own. Thus a heightening and deepening of consciousness can constantly take place, which lifts man far above nature and time. What is all this but a proof that consciousness has ascended far above its psychic inheritance? And who can say that there are limits to its evolution? This life of the soul cannot be confined to the realm of merely *cognitive* ideas, but has to call up its own energy of Will to the realisation of all the highest and holiest that can be known; and such a process never seems to have a finite or final goal. One of our great duties to-day, according to Schwarz, is to discover the dignity and potentiality of the soul, and perpetually

to fill this soul with the highest qualities of the world of the spirit.

ARTHUR LIEBERT

Liebert is Professor of Philosophy in Berlin and also editor of the *Kantstudien*. His greatest work is *Geist und Welt der Dialektik*. He shows how we live in a generation of a decisive and far-reaching Metaphysics. We are obliged to take into account the necessity of an actual creation of Metaphysics, and to make clear the real presuppositions which are to be included in the renaissance of such. Connected indissolubly with the nature and contents of such a Metaphysics are meanings and values which have infinitely more significance than what they are as individual interpretations. They constitute the meaning and value of the universe and of life. Science, History, and Philosophy have all-important contributions to make as well as an all-comprehensive synthesis to form with regard to the Metaphysics of the Present and the Future. Liebert shows that in such a creation the dialectic of Plato and Hegel, and especially of Kant, must be taken into account.

Liebert has demonstrated with great clearness in his book on *How is Critical Philosophy Possible?* that no Philosophy is possible without dialectic. Dialectic is, according to him, neither a mere form and method of thought nor a meta-empirical existence; it is neither a bare concept nor the hypostasis of such a concept in the shape of a formation, nor a scientific knowledge of a transcendent reality. It is

a concept *and* an existing actuality (*Sein*), and both these belong together in an inseparable and mutual connection on the one hand, and in a dialectical manner on the other. Thus there are present elements which are united and elements which are opposed to one another. And it is by taking these full facts into account that it is possible to form a Metaphysics of Knowledge and of Life which will stand on permanent foundations. Consequently, Liebert attempts the great task of unifying, by means of the most comprehensive synthesis, correlation and antinomy. The two poles, though two, lie within the same dimension.

He makes a further advance in urging that such a dialectic is present in the Theory of Knowledge, as well as in "rationalism" itself—i.e. in the meanings and values which man possesses concerning everything he comes in contact with. He views the possibility of reconciling various views concerning the meanings and values of human life, however contradictory these may appear on the surface and a good deal beneath the surface. If we descend still farther, something like the absolute Logos such as is present in Hegel's Logic will show that the seeming contradictions on the surface are united as one at their root.

Liebert thus, in the higher development of his theme, views all things that present themselves to man in the form of a *scale*. In the positive sciences we find seemingly irreconcilable problems. For instance, we find the problems of objectivity, phenomenology, empiricism, etc. These are opposed

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to one another; they are saturated through and through with a dialectic. But, as already hinted, there is not only a Logos of the positive sciences but also a Logos-immanent present in man. And both the positive sciences and the Logos-immanent constitute different steps in the dialectical self-development of the rational spirit of man. It is true that Liebert is not able (and no one else is able) to bring about a complete reconciliation of the opposites and contradictions, but he is able to justify the presence of a synthesis which includes the one as well as the other. It is true that the contradictions will continue to exist, but it is also true that man on the higher levels is able to reconcile some of them; and the human spirit in the ever-onward march of its thought increases the reconciliations and decreases the contradictions. And even when this fails the contradictions are seen in the light of a world which is infinitely rich in varieties of all kinds, and these varieties can often rest together in peace and contentment without completely merging in one another.

WILHELM STERN

Stern is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Hamburg. His earlier writings dealt with Psychology, especially the Psychology of Childhood and the various studies allied to it. It is also worth while calling attention to his work on what he terms "Individual Psychology," i.e. the doctrine of the varieties of psychic functions in different indivi-

duals. Its object is the discovery and description of these varieties, and the exhibition of them as forms of the psychical elements, laws, functions, and dispositions which are presented in General Psychology. Further, he investigates the manner in which the special elements form themselves into *types*, and the various *types* into totalities; and then, finally, he investigates the manner in which these types contribute in various proportions and degrees to form diverse qualities in different individuals. Psychology is thus an analytic and, as it were, particularistic isolating study of psychical phenomena, and accordingly stands in contrast to all that is included in the domains which deal with human personality as a *whole*. Still, the results disclosed by this analytic knowledge extend to all the domains of life. Individual Psychology thus provides a basis for the way in which the individual proceeds in *gathering* knowledge (*Psychognostic*); and for the way in which the individual *reacts* upon knowledge and the world (*Psychotechnic*). It may be thus stated that the form of Psychology which the individual possesses constitutes the manner in which he views himself and the world, and in which he reacts upon all he comes in contact with. Stern thus shows that Psychology consists in the manner in which each individual accepts impressions into his own nature as well as in the manner the individual deals with such impressions. Of course, outside all this, there is a vast field of the meaning, value, and significance of the impressions which constitutes the *actual content and meaning* of the impressions; and this kind of material,

whether it comes from the external world or from ideas, forms the *object* of the Psychology.

At a later period Stern turns his attention to the problems of the Theory of Knowledge and even strives for a presentation of views of the universe and of life. In this presentation influences such as those of Leibniz, Kant, Herbart, Lotze, and Wundt are discernible. The teaching of Stern in this respect may be designated as Critical Personalism. The teaching, though in many respects *realistic* in character, is, on the whole, of a strong metaphysical nature. He differentiates this Metaphysics from the Metaphysics rejected by Kant. As Stern uses the term, Metaphysics is not itself a science but is a presupposition of Science; for the *a priori* of every science, according to him, is of the nature of a metaphysical belief. As this Metaphysics does not claim to be a science, it need not ignore the domain of Values—a domain that lies outside the work of the particular sciences. When, therefore, Metaphysics deals with the domain of Values it will not attempt to rationalize Values; it will not attempt to deduce the *valid* found in religion, morality, law, rights, art, and so forth, from the logical connections of Thought; it will rather conceive of the *valid* from the standpoint of an *over-logical* connection of *meaning*. Such a connection of meaning is something that, in the super-rational concreteness of its existence and coherence, is “believed in.” It is only on such grounds that the rational work on this material can begin. The metaphysics presented here, then, means a “belief-seeking” concerning the mean-

ing of the "super-rational valid." Such a "belief-seeking" must be conceived not as being stable or as having a *final* validity, but as something that is in eternal flux and conscious of its own incompleteness. This "belief-seeking" in an existing and valid world constitutes the very essence of Metaphysics (*Metaphysik überhaupt*). In this respect, Metaphysics can claim validity for all times, cultures, and philosophical convictions. But, on the other hand, the *content* of Metaphysics cannot claim the same absolute validity. It only approaches to such absolute validity in connection with its object of an existing and valid world, but it can never bring forth the actual discovery of the infinity of Cosmic-Being and Cosmic-Value.

But at the same time Metaphysics, in its innermost nature and meaning, is obliged to form itself into a *System*; it has to develop its validity and significance on all the sides of science and of the sphere of values. Consequently, every significant metaphysical System is a standpoint of a partial *repose* in the midst of the eternal quest for the Absolute, and can in consequence form a basis for the knowledge and valuation of the time or the age, and can thus form a kind of equilibrium between the movements of the times for a certain period. It is in some such a way as this that Stern frames his metaphysical System which is termed Personalism.

In succession to the above, Stern turns to his *a priori* theory of Values. The ground which he takes is expressed as follows: "I believe in the

objective worthful." Out of this belief springs the fundamental category of Values. The statement expresses a necessary relation of subject and object. In this relation is included a *self* believing in Value and in an object possessing Value. Thus the sphere of Values possesses a subjective and an objective pole. The subjective *value-apriori* is expressed: "I value, therefore I am"; the objective *value-apriori* states: "There are Values." When we consider the certitude of the self we find that it does not rest, as Descartes thought, in bare thought—that is to say, in the apprehension of a meaning and reflection upon it in itself. The self has to proceed farther than this; it has to possess the capacity and the desire to observe, to recognise, and to create Values. In a belief in Values there is found a self that relates itself to the world; it knows itself and emphasises itself in a cosmos which is full of meaning. Thus the self, in the very act of valuing anything in the cosmos, values itself at the same time. The belief in Value is a belief in self-value. The result is, then, as follows: "I value, therefore I am Value."

Stern shows that within the Values there exist a series of *functions* to be distinguished. Consequently we gain a phenomenology of Valuing which finds its counterpart in a phenomenology of Values. It is of importance to bear in mind that this Phenomenology is not identical with a Psychology of the same. A Psychology of Valuing is of course justified, seeing that it is of importance to know what psychical processes are active in the process of valuing, whether these take the form of feeling, will, and

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so forth; but this enquiry into the processes is distinct from valuing itself. Though valuing is a function of the subject himself, it is of importance to bear in mind that such a function refers to a valuing object and thus is something beyond the bare subject and actually exists in a "trans-subjective world of being" (*in eine transsubjektive Seins-Welt*). The result is that a distinction has to be made between primary acts of valuing or the observations of the Values and secondary acts of the estimation of valuing.

The observations of the Values mean a placing before ourselves of a worthful existence which seems to the subject to be free from any contradictory elements. This setting (or observing), which may be designated as an original valuing, reveals itself in three stages. In the first stage there is an immediate or intuitive apprehension (*Erfassen*) of something which seems valuable, or, in other words, of something which consists not in a mere renunciation of the subject to the "Given" but in an assured belief in the *significance* of the object for the subject. This belief is a "Yea-saying" to the quality that is in the object *for* the subject, and has in itself, at this stage, no suspicion of a possible opposition between affirmation and negation. The result of this is a non-contradictory *over-affirmation*. Much of human life, in its preliminary stages, is passed on this uncritical level.

The second stage in the "setting" is more intensive. It is an acknowledgment and appreciation of some quality or qualities in the object as constituting

a "good" for the subject. Here there is something more at work in the subject than a mere acceptance of what seems significant in the object. It is now acknowledged that certain qualities in the object have claims on the subject. The subject therefore views this quality or these qualities not merely as "existing" but as "valid." The subject acknowledges here not only what he can realise in a ready-made kind of way but what is an Ought (*Sollen*) for him—an Ought which can only be realised by means of a certain *activity* within the subject himself.

Thus we pass to the third stage which states how this "creation" on the part of the subject can take place—how the *Sollen* (the Ought) can become a *Sein* (or an actual experience). At the first stage, the Value was a *Sein* (or an existing object) of a lower order of existence than the *Sein* which now comes into actual existence by calling forth an activity which was not called forth on the initial level.

Stern goes on to show that there are contradictory Values, but the contradiction is overcome by the inward nature of the Ought as it reveals itself more fully to the mind, and as the mind puts forth renewed efforts for the realisation of something that it is ceaselessly creating for its own personality. Value at its highest levels is thus not any kind of substance; it is not some actually existing reality which can be obtained in a simple way. It may be of this nature at its initial level, but, as already pointed out, we are not thereby taken very far. Value presupposes something that

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is its vehicle or carrier. The individual is such a vehicle or carrier. And the progress of the revelation of the Values and of the activity of the carrier is infinite. There is no inkling of the whole process coming to a terminus. In this result Values are *self-values*. All that are not self-values may be designated as alien values.

But Values consist in being something other than self-values. The carrier of the Values—man—has many interests and is not of a simple nature. He is a *whole* who possesses a multiplicity of “moments” or phases within his life. The self-values cast a light over all these phases and colour all the objectivities of the individual. Everything now that is objective is coloured and stamped by the illuminating power of the self-values. Further, in so far as the individual is viewed as a self-carrier of Values, he requires *means* to realise his own personality, and these *means*, which may be objects, processes, energies, etc., receive a Value. Such Values are designated by Stern as “Service-values” or factual-values.

He shows that the various Values, in the order pointed out above, have not only an individual but also a cosmic significance. The Value-in-itself as a possession of the self is the highest value-category upon which all the others depend. In it the *belief* in Value and in the *existence* of the Value unite. Self-valuation may thus be designated as “meaning and significance *in themselves*.” We are obliged to confess that they are this *in themselves*. Thus they *are* in reality what they are *in themselves*. The enquiry, then, into the nature of realised self-values

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is an enquiry into the nature of *true being*. Stern proceeds to show that the explanation of all this is to be obtained by means not of a transcendental but of a concrete Idealism or Personalism. According to him, a genuine "being or existence" that is at the same time a personal self-value can only be *concrete*. The Idea as an abstraction never possesses a real validity; the Idea as validity can only derive its vitality from the concrete. From this Stern goes on to show that there are necessary modes of arrangement of Values. Within the concrete "being or existence" there must be lower and higher arrangements of the different provinces from which Values can be gathered into the self. The self has to perceive and to be active; it has to deal with Values which are clarifying, creative, alien, and factual. Everywhere, if things have to pass beyond their mere existence, they have to come before the bar of the conscious, judging, personal self and obtain there their significance. The conclusion arrived at is consequently that only *persons* can have self-value, and that all *persons* have more or less such self-value.

By *person* Stern understands such an existing being who, in spite of the variety of its parts, constructs a characteristic and valid unity, and in spite of the functions of the parts reaches or attains a unitary end-striving activity. By *person* is not only meant a being who is conscious; the essential characteristics of a *person* are totality, activity, life, and striving towards ends. A *person* is thus a self-determining unity.

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Alongside of the presence of Values as individual Stern recognises genuine, personal, self-valuing *communities* that engender and show forth their Values *in themselves* because they develop as totalities in their immanent and directive activities. By such he means families, races, mankind, etc.

Stern views the varied aspects of human life, and shows how all these aspects obtain their meaning and significance in the self-determination of individuals. He concludes that the personal being of each individual consists in this self-determination which receives its material and unfolds its meaning by virtue of its own inner potentiality. Thus *personality* consists in a very large measure in self-valuation. But it has to be borne in mind, as he points out, that external things and events exercise often a deep influence upon personality without self-consciousness having to engage in any active process of valuation. A part of the life of each individual is lived on the level of what Stern designates as particular *Lebnisse*, i.e. psychical experiences in distinction from personal experiences. These *Lebnisse* consist in relatively isolated and unconscious formative sections of life as, to take one example, in the way the *temporal continuity* of life expresses itself. In this example we have a potential disposition or feeling of *duration* which seems to be a unity under the form of a personal *entelechy*, and lying beneath the ideation-level of our life. This disposition or feeling seems to possess a kind of "nearness" or immediacy to something of cosmic significance. It has often such deep and lasting

effects upon man's character and religion that we are obliged to grant it this cosmic significance. On account of this fact Stern finds a warrant for stating that character reveals in a fuller manner the cosmic nature of man than the intellect is capable of doing. These *Lebnisse*—these dispositions or feelings—can be formed into a synthesis which fills every *present moment* with Past and Present. From the Past, heredity, memory, use, custom, experience, etc., form the contribution of what has been; whilst from the Present instinct, preparatory elements, predisposition, intention, purpose, plan, etc., make their contribution to the formation of our Future.

Much space is devoted by Stern to giving an account of what he terms the *Introzeption* of human life. This means the *point* within personality where central and extra-central Values come to a focus. When this takes place the self realises its *essential Cosmic Values* and brings all other Values to the test of these. Man is thus raised from a "punctual" to a cosmic level, and the whole process of such unfoldment is to continue without coming to any termination.

(b) NEO-HEGELIANISM

RICHARD KRONER

Kroner is Professor of Philosophy at Kiel. Along with Georg Mehlis he founded the well-known philosophical journal the *Logos*. He was a pupil of Rickert, but in his new book on the *Self-*

realisation of Spirit he departs widely from the Neo-Kantianism of his old master in the direction of Hegelianism. Kroner's Hegelianism becomes more pronounced in this book than in his previous volume *From Kant to Hegel*. He lays great stress on the origins, forms, and significance of the Philosophy of Culture and Civilisation. He examines the philosophical meaning of the Present Day as well as the dialectical Philosophy of Mind or Spirit in a form which recalls Hegel's Absolute Idealism. The question is asked by him in how far, in the most significant tendencies of our time, is a *Philosophy of Meaning* capable of being developed into a System which will constitute a synthesis embracing a "mental and spiritual cosmos" which, in its turn, will bring various elements to such a unity as will prove to be of the greatest service to mankind. Before this problem can be solved it is necessary to look on it as one of *meaning*. This meaning has to be examined and its dialectical "ground" made evident. Kroner attempts to accomplish this task by looking, in the first place, upon man as a being who possesses a nature capable of shaping, fashioning, and realising the materials which are to be found in the realms of Nature and Mind. Everything that is presented cannot be accepted indiscriminately; something has to be accepted and something rejected. In other words, the world around us and the self within us offer elements of diverse value. It is absolutely necessary to think out this fact very clearly. The "Whole" which we must arrive at in a true Philosophy of Culture is

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not the "Whole" that is offered by Nature and Mind separately, but a "Whole" that has been explicitly judged as possessing value in both domains. But something more than Thought is required in order to reach the self-realisation of spirit. Culture is really Culture, and deserves its name only when it *deals* with what is presented to it by Nature; and meaning in a really true sense is only meaning when man more and more realises himself. What needs to be borne in mind is the fact that a whole or totality must be apprehended, and that this whole or totality is found only in "moments" or special personal experiences of the individual self. Thus Kroner takes into account the presence of what is presented from the outside as the meaning of the various forms of external reality, and shows the need of constructing a *system of a Reality of Meaning*. This Philosophy of Meaning, as a Philosophy of Mind or Spirit, including Culture and Civilisation and the valuing of what is presented by the physical and human worlds, will solve the metaphysical problem in so far as it can be solved at all. Thus Philosophy of Meaning and Metaphysics will become an inseparable unity. What is necessary, what is all-inclusive, can only be sought in the spirit of man because the spirit alone is aware of what is *external* and of what is *internal*. The conception and realisation of the whole problem of man's development consists in viewing things in this manner; and it is thus that the paradoxes which present themselves to the spirit of man can be solved. When spirit is thus realising itself by means

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of its total activity in ever new directions and in connection with ever new problems it overcomes the contradictions within its own nature, realises itself more and more, and develops its essential nature by means of inner conceptions.

We thus see that according to this principle of Absolute Idealism the spirit realises itself in the degree it views the possibility of such a realisation as a work of its own and as an ever greater "becoming" of self-consciousness. The various stages of a Reality of Meaning are thus stages in a gradually increasing realisation of consciousness. But the complete reconciliation of consciousness with what it realises is a distant goal. Reflection continually steps in and brings fresh contradictions into view. These, however, are resolved by the awakening consciousness. There is thus a partial *fruition* of consciousness; but again contradictions arise, problems loom large on the horizon, and the *quest* is once again taken up until it issues in an ever more complete fruition. The process goes on in this way without coming to any fixed barrier. It is at once seen that the *final* goal is not visible, but still, without entering on such a course there is no possibility of perfecting the consciousness of man. It is the unfoldment of this consciousness that has brought into being all that is best in man's nature; it is this that has created civilisation, morality, and religion. If man's nature is to mean anything in the way of a real development it has to proceed on such a course, for if it does not proceed it is bound to remain close to the level of the animal. Man's

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nature seems somehow to have been so formed that it must proceed on such a course if it is ever to unfold its possibilities. Kroner views such an entrance into this road of development as a fundamental metaphysical conception of consciousness. This is the *Urphänomen* (the original phenomenon) which includes within itself the seed and the formation of the whole course of development; this is the dialectical unity of *meaning* and *existence* (*Sinn und Sein*). Reflection must then at all times turn its attention towards the aims of the self-uniting power of consciousness and of its capacity of overcoming ever new contradictions.

What is then happening within the content of the reflective and total consciousness constitutes the true unfoldment and development of man's nature. This work of man's nature is theoretical and practical. Man's *reason* has to be at work constantly in order to *know* the meaning of things; man's *activity* has also constantly to be called up in order to *realise* what is known. Much that is to be known and valued is to be found in the world of Nature; much also is to be found in the human world around us and in our relations with it.

Kroner shows that we have to deal with the human world as it exists. And in this world of human society some things have to be accepted and some rejected. The world of mankind (or of Culture and Civilisation) is a complex world. It, too, in its turn, can never stand still, but must always be in a state of development. This does not mean, however, that it proceeds of itself from lower

to higher levels. This is so because such a world depends on what has been "incarnated" in human consciousnesses. Therefore it cannot proceed from lower to higher unless its *transcendent* quality becomes conscious to the individual self. In the first place, this fact becomes conscious in the way of the individual self coming to understand more and more clearly its transcendental "incarnation"; and, too, the individual self coming to view its transcendental world as something that is to be realised by its own efforts and coming to get itself soaked with the infinite significance of the issues that are at stake for the self. It is in so far as the individual consciousness judges and accepts what is of value in Culture and Civilisation that such Culture and Civilisation can enter into the individual consciousness as an actual possession of the individual.

There are many grades of human achievement in the various "worlds" which mankind has both by individual and collective activity created. Such "worlds" satisfy the various needs of human nature. Kroner points out the importance of the domains of business and technics. These are shown to constitute a "world" which has intimate connections with the satisfaction of the general instincts and desires of man. As much "meaning" as possible should be given to these. They should, as far as possible, be brought to the test of the individual consciousness or self, and be shown as capable of forming the further development of the spirit of man.

Above this level we find rational domains of

Culture, such as the Natural Sciences and Politics. Both these domains present material in abundance to the reflective consciousness. The deeper awakening spirit of man finds these domains full of contradictions, and it is its business, for the sake of its own development, to bring all the contradictory material into consciousness, reflect upon it, and value it. Here, again, may be noticed the process of selection and rejection. But, unfortunately, a process of selection and rejection may take place without the deepest and most convincing element in consciousness having much voice in the matter. Consequently the process of selection and rejection may mean little more to the development of the individual self than the changing of one form of tinsel for another. Hence there arises the constant need of bringing all to the deepest within ourselves—the deepest as revealed by means of clear reflection—and grant it the valuation obtained at such a depth. It is thus, as Kroner remarks, that the intuitive spirit operates and succeeds in bringing forth its ever greater concreteness and totality to expression and to validity right up to the domains of art and religion.

With regard to religion, Kroner shows that man is more than a reflective being. Man should take his whole life into account, do justice to the non-rational as well as to the rational elements of his nature. He has to become more and more conscious that what is happening within him is nothing other than an *evolution of spirit*. Although Kroner sees, of course, the necessity of paying heed to the Values

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which have been realised in the Past, his main object is to fix attention on the Present. For in the Present of every human being, when such a being is engaged in attempting to realise the highest meaning of the transcendental Values which present themselves to his individual consciousness, something Eternal and its timeless meaning are realised within the soul and constitute for man a *present timeless self-consciousness* which goes on unfolding without any consciousness of such an unfoldment coming to nought. Indeed, on the contrary, such a self-consciousness becomes more and more convinced of its own eternal and timeless nature. Although, as already stated, *Sein* and *Sinn* (the existential and the meaning) are found in consciousness, yet the evolution of spirit continually melts the *Sein* into *Sinn*—the existential into meaning. Such a meaning which is already present in man as transcendental thought, by means of the activity of spirit, becomes a real portion of man's spirit.

NICOLAI HARTMANN

Hartmann's teaching contains elements from both Kant and Hegel, so that it is not easy to classify him. He was a pupil of Cohen and Natorp at Marburg. At present he is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Cologne. In his earlier years he adopted the Neo-Kantian standpoint as presented by Cohen. During the past ten years his point of view has greatly changed in the direction of a combined realistic and idealistic Metaphysics and Ethics.

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He has made capable attempts to reconcile a mild form of realism with a metaphysics of knowledge. His three main works are *Characteristic Features of a Metaphysics of Knowledge*, *Ethics*, and the volume on *Hegel*.

In some directions, especially in his views on the Theory of Knowledge, he has been influenced by Husserl; and in the *Ethics* by Scheler. But he is far too able a man to be dependent upon anyone. Indeed, he may be described as one of the most brilliant young thinkers in Germany at the present day, and he is destined, I believe, to produce greater works in the Future than even in the Past.

The *Metaphysics of Knowledge* deals with a vast array of subjects. Indeed, there is scarcely a branch of philosophical knowledge upon which some fresh light is not cast. He shows that it is possible to pass from a Theory of Knowledge to a Metaphysics of Knowledge. This means that it is possible to pass from a critical examination of the factors which have to be used in our knowing of external reality, or in our knowing of ourselves, to the domain of Principles and Values which constitute the deepest meaning of life and existence. There are many such factors needing consideration in the examination of the principles of knowledge and in the formation of valid syntheses. To know the physical, to understand the inward, to give due weight to the non-rational which lies beyond every conclusion of the rational, to perceive the dominant *a priori* factors present in consciousness and which are absolutely necessary to be taken into account and used before

any knowledge becomes possible, to recognise the many forms of *Aporien* (difficulties) which are present in things and in ourselves—all these are set forth by him not only with a thorough knowledge of their significance in the history of human thought but also of their significance to him as an individual thinker.

The greater part of the *Metaphysics of Knowledge* deals with the antithesis of Subject and Object. Such an enquiry here is not to be confined within the narrow domain of ordinary Psychology. It extends to our knowledge of the *Ding an sich*, to the various transformations which take place in *a priori* elements of mind and *a priori* constructions of a logical kind. The ontological real is constantly made a subject of investigation. Hartmann in this respect has very strong realistic tendencies. He certainly insists on the need of constant reflection, but such reflection must have as its material what is to be found in the external world. Aspects of the external world are received by the mind; they are examined by the power of the logical mind, and thus yield us ideal knowledge. In the case both of the ontology of the real world and of the ideal world the process of knowing both never comes to an end. And Hartmann looks upon the ideal existence which becomes more and more the possession of the enquiring mind as constituting a spiritual reality. We are *obliged* to designate it as ideal being or existence.

Knowledge of what is *inward* and reflection upon it produce very remarkable transformations in the

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nature of knowledge itself. Knowledge, as it finds an increasing certitude and deeper layers within consciousness, becomes a very real kind of intuition. Human personality and the knowledge come, as it were, closer and closer together, or, in other words, they fuse. Of course the whole secret of this fusion does not lie within the domain of our knowledge of the physical world. With a fusion of more and more exact knowledge with the personality of man, man obtains a kind of *Schau* (Vision) into the very nature and heart of the object. This is so, too, with regard to the place which Values have in human life. By coming nearer and nearer to the mind, by being lived, some deep kind of *feeling* testifies to the worth and validity of what is presented in the *world within*. Intuition (or certitude) and "act-moments" of a new kind spring up. These are not in operation in the same degree in the preliminary stage of the process of knowing. It is certainly to be recognised that what the "outside" means in the "inside" of man enables him to realise and experience the most comprehensive forms of reality. The ideal sphere of being lies nearer to us than the real factual sphere, and it must never be forgotten that it is through this ideal sphere of our being that we are able, in an *a priori* manner, to know the real world.

Hartmann shows that although the ontological non-rational, non-knowable outside us reveals its nature only very gradually to the knowing nature of man, still it has to be remembered constantly that the cognitive in the subject, in its turn, has

elements of the *whole* in his own body, mind, and spirit. It is true that elements *from* the cosmos enable him to construct much of his theoretical life, still this is not the greater part of the story of the unfoldment of the life of man. The spheres of the real and the ideal worlds partially overlap, but their major remainders are distinct and separate. We shall see at a later stage how this important aspect appears in Hartmann's *Ethics*.

He has given much consideration to the meaning and value of the Categories. When dealing with the place of the Categories in History he shows that by Categories he does not signify historical thought or enquiry but "historical being or existence." This was also the interpretation of Hegel who designated such a reality as "objective spirit." Hegel envisaged such a "spirit" as a "Universal Spirit-Substance" realised by and in individuals. The substance takes historical shapes and succeeds in realising itself more and more. It works as an historical process which realises its own nature and which is beyond all human aims and passions.

Whilst rejecting a large portion of Hegel's teaching concerning "objective spirit" Hartmann allows it an undeniable kernel of reality. There is no doubt that we know more of the nature of what is termed the "common spirit" of a people than of the individuals themselves in a psychological way. While Psychology deals with material which arises from individual investigation, the "common spirit" of a people gives us an insight into the nature and meaning of the spiritual currents, tendencies, and

transformations which occur. The history of Rights, the Ethos, the Arts, Languages, Literature, etc., can be understood only in the light of a "common spirit." We may thus speak of the "spirit" of a whole nation, or we may speak of certain characteristics peculiar to any nation of which we may have sufficient knowledge. We may understand easily what we mean by the term "common spirit," but it is not at all easy to understand what it exactly is. Indeed, we know that the notion of an individual who exists and possesses qualities of mind apart from the "common spirit" is an abstraction.

Such a "common spirit" is possessed and carried forward by a collection of individuals, but it does not spring from them as individuals and it is not a mere collectivity. For instance, a Language is not the work of individuals as individuals but rather is the effect of possibilities of expression which are common to all individuals. The number of individuals is certainly a secondary matter.

The "objective spirit" is common to many individuals, but it is not confined to any one individual. For instance, the science of a time is never apprehended by any one individual, but there must be a division of labour in partitioned fields of the sciences if a co-ordination of the sciences is ever to take place.

The "objective spirit" constitutes a common domain which is already in existence when the individual enters into it. The individual is born within such a domain and grows in all the forms of his personality within it. The individual has to learn how to adapt himself to the domain. And

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this process of adaptation must be a long one in every human life. In part, we are conscious of the effort required, as is the case in the educating of ourselves. But, on the other hand, much is absorbed by the individual in an unconscious kind of way, especially by reason of our being obliged to live in a large measure a common life. It is then true to say that all our opinions, valuations, and attitudes towards life are from the beginning formed by means of the "common spirit" which dwells in our environment. It is in the light of what is revealed to each individual by means of the "common spirit" that each individual sees the world, human life, and human relations in all their fulness; and there is no other way by which the individual can know and realise them. And it is only when a man is reared amidst such an environment that he can grow beyond it and rise to something above the level of his environment.

Hartmann shows that in consequence of all this the "objective spirit" exercises an enormous power over every human life—a *driving*-power which urges him on and a *retarding*-power which keeps him revolving in the same atmosphere. Although the individual seems thus to be a mere fallen leaf driven by the wind—and, as has already been pointed out, this is true in a large measure of most people—still, on the other hand, the individual himself is a moving power within the objective spirit. His progress runs in a course other than that of his own personal whim or caprice, and yet it is individuals themselves who are thus moving,

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and they are moving even when they are unaware of the fact.

He shows, further, that this "objective spirit" is not a mere "universal," and that the mode of its being or existence is not that of any kind of essence (*essentia*). It is *Something* temporal which has its coming and going, its ripeness, and its downfall. In other words, it is *Something* historically real. We can see that this is so when we distinguish between a living and a dead Language, between a valid morality and one that has ceased to be valid, between a positive right and one that has ceased to be positive. The "objective spirit," in some such sense as this, is consequently an *individual spirit*. The "objective spirit" thus becomes the "individual spirit" without losing its own objectivity. All this is full of mystery, but we cannot doubt that it is true.

When it is asked concerning the origin, meaning, and objectivity of such a spirit we find that it is neither physical nor psychical but a particular spiritual-historical reality. When we look at its mode of existing or being we find that it is dependent upon an existence or being of a lower order—upon physical, psychical, and individual mental-spiritual being; it is "carried" by all these forces of the real. We cannot say that there is a spirit without a bodily organism in man. The "objective spirit" as well as the "individual spirit" must be viewed as a spirit called up, carried along, and dependent upon something the nature of which we do not know. Yet all this does not negate the *autonomy* of the individual spirit. It is certainly true

that neither its mode of being or existing, nor its special historical shaping can be understood from the connections which it has with lower strata. The "objective spirit" blossoms on the summit of the psychical and mental life just as this latter blossoms on the summit of the organic life. It is as little an effect of race and of the physical conditions of life as it is of a mere aggregate of individuals. It compels us to take it in its totality, and absolutely refuses to dissolve itself into elements. It is an original unity of a higher order. The noteworthy part of it is that it has no adequate consciousness of itself. But it comes near to the idea of a general or transcendental consciousness. Yet the objective spirit is not that. There is a consciousness of it, but this is *not itself*, but is a consciousness of an individual. We may say that the "objective spirit" has its consciousness not in itself but in us. But our own consciousness does not exhaust its content, and consequently the content must have its being somehow apart from us. Hartmann would say that it is essentially paradoxical to state that there *is* a spirit and that that spirit is not consciousness. Such a "spirit," not being merely a "subjective spirit," has no subject, and without a subject there can be no consciousness. The morality of an epoch, the mode of life, the rights of people—all these are neither consciousness nor persons. Hartmann shows how Hegel had seen this peculiarity of the nature of "objective spirit" in a very clear manner. Hegel pointed out that the "objective spirit" has no *Fürsichsein* (no being for itself or for

the self). Hegel thus did not call in any consciousness of a higher order to his aid—no *intellectus divinus* or *archetypus*. He found a consciousness of the “objective spirit” only with the individual. Hegel shows, further, in connection with the State, the necessity for the presence of leading men who have made the “objective spirit” their own, and who have added to it something essential of their own. It is only individuals who are thus capable of conserving the unity of the State. Sometimes such a possession is concentrated or focussed in one individual. The result of this part of Hegel’s and Hartmann’s teaching is that the political fortune of a people remains in a great measure an accident, subject to unknown powers. And the difficulty of furthering the fortunes of a people is due to the fact that it is only in a limited measure that the leader is able to co-ordinate and organise these powers; for outside himself and above him there does not seem to be anybody else capable of co-ordinating and organising the powers.

When we turn to Hartmann’s *Ethics* we find a vast ground covered and fundamental points of view presented in an original manner. Some of these points of view show the necessity of forming not only a theoretical system of Ethics of a purely intellectual character but also of taking into account the Ethos itself—the Ethos itself which is a reality behind and beneath every formulation of it in Ethics. It may be said that Nietzsche, too, emphasised this need. Nietzsche saw the limits of knowledge and insisted that behind every *intellectual theory* of life

there is present *life itself* with all its needs, aspirations and "forward view." But Nietzsche confined this work of Ethics to temporal conditions and consequently left out of account what is "timeless." This idea of the "timeless" is based very largely on the Philosophy of Hegel, and it is being interpreted anew by brilliant young thinkers in Germany, such as Hartmann himself, Kroner, Bauch, Herrigel, and many others. It will certainly be the subject of further development in the near future, especially in the Neo-Hegelian movement. The turning-point in connection with such a point of view came with Husserl and especially with Scheler. Hartmann has been greatly influenced by Scheler. They were close friends.

Hartmann does not slavishly adhere to any Ethical Theory of the Past, but addresses himself to the Present. He sees that there is a fulness of a human Ethos which has been handed down to us and which has but little influence on human lives. There is a need of a new Ethics of Values which will widen our glance (*Blick*), which will show the importance of Values and make clear the extent of the issues raised. This will create a new kind of attitude towards the facts, a new renunciation on the part of ourselves, and a new reverence before what is great and noble.

Hartmann deals with the Phenomenology, Axiology, and Metaphysics of Morals, and distinguishes between them. In connection with the first, the ethical phenomena are described; the tasks and methods of Ethics are discussed; and a criticism

of the traditional theories is given. Ethics as a science is not normative in any immediate, intuitive way, although Norms belong to its objects. It is only in a *mediate* manner, in so far as it widens and illumines the moral insight, that it influences the practical Norms. It is from the standpoint of Values and the *Sollen* (the Ought) that the structure of the ethical phenomena can be fruitfully investigated.

In connection with the second—the Axiological—part, we find the author dealing with Moral Values. He shows the relation of these to the totality of Values. Thus the Moral Values need a fundamental doctrine of Values for their basis and justification. The aim here is to present a Table of Values. A *complete* Table is, of course, impossible, but the author shows that although such a task is impossible, still it is possible to proceed very far towards such a goal.

The third part—the Metaphysical—is devoted to the problem of human freedom. Hartmann does not enter into the religious problem: every form of Theology is placed on one side.

When dealing with the problem of *Phenomena*, i.e. with the way objects—outward and inward—are known, Hartmann does not follow the same lines as Husserl. Husserl leaves out of consideration the place of ideas and meanings in his process of "Reduction." He believes that it is by such a process that man can penetrate to the very heart of things. Hartmann, on the other hand, emphasises *ideas* in connection with the meaning and application of

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Ethics. He sees that Values have arisen in history in an indefinite manner within the feelings of man; they have gradually emerged from darkness into the light of understanding and reason; and it is at this stage that they are discovered in the real sense of the word. The various phenomena with which human life has to deal are not to be found in isolation, nor out of relation to the life of man. When we examine the various ethical phenomena by themselves, or in their relations, we find that we cannot remain with the phenomena. In every phenomenon it is not only the phenomenon that is apprehended but the mind itself as well is driven by a kind of necessity to the domain of the existing, i.e. to the ontological domain. And we have to frame some provisional Metaphysics at least with regard to the problem *as a whole*. It is clearly seen that we have passed beyond any "metaphysical given" in all this. We are thus led to a kind of halt. But such a halt is not a final terminus. The *non-rational*, which is ever in front of us, yields some of its secrets to man's enquiring mind and will.

Hartmann does not trouble himself very much with the results of the particular Sciences in order to establish his system of Ethics. His field of enquiry consists in the phenomena which present themselves to man's life. He shows that the Will determines and creates Value, and not Value the Will. The Will is therefore not bound up with something that is *itself* valuable, for the "worthful" is nothing other than an expression of that upon which the Will directs its attention. Values are directing conceptions

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of the pure Will, but, of course, they have an existence in themselves. Such an existence comes to possess Value by means of the directivity of the Will.

Hartmann takes the standpoint of Phenomenology when he deals with the value of a good will. The central value of a moral will is value of *Intention*. He goes on to show how Values which the self intends and realises come to possess a kind of ethical *a priori* in the fact that in the realisations of the moral will an ideal sphere existing in itself (*an sich seiende ideale Sphäre*) has become the possession of the moral man, and this in course of time may be intuited independently of any process of experience. Values have thus an "ideal being in themselves," i.e. they belong, in the same way as mathematical and logical objects, to an ideal existing sphere. They may be designated as intuitive, comprehensible essences. Values are not realised; it is only the materials of Values that are realised. Values become principles of an Ethos through the fact that they pass beyond their own "essence" and their own "being for self" and enter into the fluctuating world of ethical acts. Thus they work *teleologically* in so far as they refer to persons and in so far as persons work within the domain of an ideal *Ansichsein*. When this happens the "quasi-personality" of societies gains an ever deeper meaning. When an individual works in this spirit as a member of society, he is not any longer a particular man with particular interests.

With regard to the freedom of the Will, Hart-

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mann states that in the midst of the many heteronomous determinants of the Will there is an *autonomy* which suffices as a foundation for self-determination, responsibility, blame, etc., and suffices as a vehicle of moral values and non-values. Without freedom truth can be given, for truth is quite thinkable independently of the thought of every person. But without freedom there is no possibility of *determining* in accordance with the thoughts of truth.

CHAPTER III

PHENOMENOLOGY

MAX SCHELER

SCHELER was educated at Jena under Eucken and Liebmann and had a brilliant career there. His Dissertation on the Transcendental Method in Philosophy was considered the best that had been offered for many years in the Department of Philosophy. He doubtless obtained his starting-point in Kantian Transcendentalism, but in the course of his development he went very much farther than Kant in the direction of showing the importance of physical and social factors as agencies operating in the evolution and development of man. He was an omnivorous reader in practically all the branches of science, philosophy, sociology, and religion. His mind was encyclopaedic in its nature, and yet he did not lose his own originality. At the time of his death he was Professor of Philosophy in the new University of Frankfort-on-the-Main.

At first we find him grappling with the problems of the evolution of mind in all their various forms. This, as already stated, was from the standpoint of Kant. Later he gravitated towards sociology and made remarkable contributions concerning the fundamental importance of social factors in the industrial, mental, moral, and religious progress of the human race. He showed how inheritance,

tradition, habits, and customs had exercised a fundamental influence on the history of human evolution.

Alongside with this his interest and powers of concentrated thought were directed towards the Phenomenology of Husserl, and he was able to carry this subject right into the domain of religion. His field of labour became wide enough to include the factors of science in their bearings on man in his relation to the Cosmos. In the small volume—*Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*—written shortly before his early death, he shows that physiological and psychological factors must be given a due place. When these are taken into account human life is appraised as being, as it were, a history of carrying farther qualities which are imbedded in the very nature of the Cosmos itself. These qualities come more and more to an awakening as the ladder of life from plant to man is mounted. Something is present in the life of the plant which cannot be reduced entirely to a mere mechanical and chemical process. Something *more*, in the form of instinct, is found in the life of the animal. And this, too, has to be taken for what it *is* and for what it is *capable of doing*. Both these forms of reality get transformed, in a way very largely inexplicable to us, into mind, meaning, and value. They constitute, at a level higher than the practical life, qualities which are the very *essentia* of man's nature. Scheler shows that all that is of significance in the biological, physiological, and psychological sciences points to the presence of a reality which, as it rises in the

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scale of being, becomes less and less "sensuous" and more and more "spiritual" in its nature. All this has to be taken *as it is*, for the very reason that it is all this which forms the essentials of life in its ascent. All this is in the Cosmos, for how otherwise could it be in man? Scheler thus was prepared to carry his Science and Phenomenology into the realm of a special kind of religion. This is clearly seen in his *Von Ewigen im Menschen*. He proceeded in some such way as follows:

It is necessary to take into consideration the standpoint of Phenomenology that *Intention* plays an all-important part in human life. The mind of man is not always directed towards objects in the external world. It is capable of being directed to the *contents* that are within itself, and such *contents* are in no kind of manner replica of what exists outside. And neither are they at all times a mere reflection of the connections and relations which the various elements of the mind have amongst themselves. The mind goes farther than all this. It *intends something*; *something* is an *object* to it, and this object is a conceptual one and, as it is *something*, it has its own reality. It has its own reality as it is in itself and not as it is in its origin in its close connection with something in the external world. There is thus within man a domain of *inward reality*. This inward reality is not only the inward meaning that is formed; it is also man's own mental and spiritual nature which forms every meaning or theme which exists in the mind. Consequently the content or theme of this inward reality is conceived

(using Husserl's term) by the *Noesis*, i.e. by man's own intrinsic mental and spiritual nature. It is this intrinsic nature of man that conceives what has meaning, value, and significance. It weaves the various aspects of its intentional object into a totality or whole. The content which the inner nature of man possesses is a content of meaning, or theme (the *Noemata*), which presents itself to the *Noesis*. The *Noesis* and the *Noemata* get fused together and a reciprocal process goes constantly on. The *Noesis* (the inherent, intrinsic nature of man) exercises its active powers and attends to its object; it enquires what it means and what value it has. This is Husserl's point of view, and Scheler accepts it; and such a point of view constitutes for both of them a *Wesensschau*, i.e. the seeing of the true nature of reality, analogous to the real *Schau* present in our perception of the external world. But Scheler proceeds farther than this. It is evident that there is a vast interval between the activity of the *Schau* in its initial stages, as apprehending an object in the external world by means of Perception, and its activity when apprehending the most comprehensive and universal principles and meanings which present themselves after the *Noesis* has perfected its work of constructing its *Noemata* or *Themes*. There is, too, a step beyond all this, and to take it is to enter into the domain of religion.

The question then confronts Scheler: Where have the *Noesis* and the *Noemata* come from? It is a question which must be faced if we are not to set any self-imposed limits concerning our relation

to the Cosmos. Precisely as Einstein and other Physicists attempt to grasp the meaning of the physical universe as a whole, so Scheler attempts to grasp something of the ontological nature of the most universal conceptions which present themselves to the deepest nature of man. Man dare not ignore this question, for ignoring it means nothing less than attempting to stifle the "cosmic feeling" of the *Noesis* of his nature. Even in the partial answers to this question such partial answers seem to possess cosmic value and significance. And certainly no complete answer can ever be given regarding the cosmic origin and eternal destiny of man's mental and spiritual nature. The process of *going on without viewing the whole of the goal has to continue*. The whole nature of the *Noesis* and the *Noemata* are so totally different from anything discrete offered by Perception that the question concerning their ultimate meaning can only be answered by the conviction that a Divinity (*Deitas*) actually exists in the universe. Scheler denies that we can know or experience this Divinity under the form of a Personal God. But we are driven towards the recognition thereof by the very qualities of our own nature. What is in us, in the form mentioned above, must be in the universe. The whole subjective content cannot be purely subjective, for it creates experiences which are beyond the ordinary and even intellectual experiences of life.

Lack of space prevents me from dealing with Scheler's important contributions to Sociology and Ethics. Scheler's *Ethics* is a work of great impor-

tance. It is constructed upon the basis of phenomenological experience. Its point of view in most respects is the opposite of the Kantian one. It deals with Ethics as a science of Values. The history of Scheler's work and life is many-sided. He fought his way through many obstacles and left behind him work that will not be forgotten for a long time. Along with his amazing versatility he seemed to possess some kind of unique intuition—some kind of power of seeing some far-away region towards which the highest conclusions of the mind and aspirations of man are tending.

OSKAR BECKER

Becker is one of the most prominent of Husserl's pupils. Husserl's Phenomenology is being applied to all kinds of subjects. Becker is applying it to Mathematics. In his *Mathematical Existence* he deals with the Logic and Ontology of mathematical phenomena. He shows that considerable extensions and modifications are required in the conceptions of the foundation of Mathematics. The accepted basic principles must be supplemented by the meaning of the existence (or, as we often say, reality) of mathematical phenomena. This *Seinsinn*—this meaning of the being or existence of mathematical phenomena—lands us in philosophical conceptions. Becker states that such a development is capable of creating a mathematical life just as an aesthetic life has been created. When this happens there is born an insight into the growth of Mathematics from the funda-

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mental nature of man. This does not mean the mathematical *Mysticism* of a Plato or a Leibniz, nor the mathematical *Criticism* of an Aristotle or a Kant. The material pertaining to the *grounds* of mathematics is capable of furnishing not only a partial explanatory aspect of the universe, but also a "magic" aspect such as has just been found, for instance, in the Quantum Theory.

The central problem of the Philosophy of Mathematics concerns the nature of mathematical objects. What kind of objects are numbers and entities of Geometry? Upon the answer to this question everything else depends. Mathematics is two-sided. It means, on the one hand, mathematical *thought*, and, on the other, the *object* of this thought. If emphasis is laid on the former it yields a Philosophy of Formalism; if emphasis is laid on the latter a Philosophy of Intuition is created. Becker decides in favour of Intuition.

He shows in *Zur Logik der Modalitäten* how a clearer and more comprehensive solution of the problems of Number and Time can prove of enormous help and significance in the formation of new conceptions concerning the universe and its relation to the deeper life of man. In order to reach such ontological conclusions one has to pass far beyond the empiricism of John Stuart Mill and others. For example, by Time we mean nothing empirical. Every empirical aspect of Time is nothing more than abstraction from *real* Time. This *real* Time, this inner psychical Time (the Time of personal experience), is generally not differentiated from the

naïve external world Time. In so far as man is concerned, his nature has reached a stage beyond that of simple "necessity" and its recurrence found in Nature, as well as beyond the level of the meaning of series of numbers and empirical Time.

Mathematics is of an *a priori* nature and is thus raised above all ontal (or empirical) facts (*Fakta*). Indeed, even the factual in existence itself, in the last resort, is no fact but an *a priori* ontological structure. In all this, man is not only able to pass beyond the naïve view of the world and of himself, but also beyond even the *mathesis universalis* which has proved of such great service. Man can pass from the Time of the astronomers, the chronologists, and the experimental psychologists, to the Time *in* which he not only lives his natural life but which constitutes the Time grounded in his own existence; which constitutes not a static side of things but an ex-static (ecstasy) experience. And who dares to say that such a possibility of existence coming to fruition in man can be defeated by any external, mechanical process? The final answer to the meaning and significance of man's deeper nature may be expressed in a few words: his personal experience is now the object in itself (*Objekt überhaupt*).

KARL JASPER

Jasper is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Heidelberg. He is known through two important works—*Allgemeine Psychopathologie* and *Psychologie*

der Weltanschauungen. He is a Doctor of Medicine as well as a teacher of Philosophy. It is with the latter of the two just mentioned works that I am dealing. The volume is of great significance, and attempts to weave into a comprehensive system man's relation to, and his status in, the universe. What is most characteristic about Jasper's work is that he combines in a very clear manner all the various branches of the physical, historical, mental, and religious sciences and blends them into a whole which casts a more complete light on the status and destiny of man in the cosmos than can possibly be obtained by any of these sciences taken singly. His use of the term Psychology is taken in a very comprehensive way. It includes an analysis of man's nature in all its various manifestations; it also includes the various syntheses which can be formed concerning man's status in the universe. Thus a Psychology of the view of the universe (*Weltanschauung*) is something that is total and universal; it deals not with particular aspects alone of the cosmos but with the cosmos as a whole. Such a *Weltanschauung* is not merely a knowledge of things; it also reveals itself in valuations, the formations of life, and the scale of values. In other words, when we speak of a *Weltanschauung* we mean *ideas*—*ideas* which are subjective in the form of personal experience, energy, and disposition, and also *ideas* which are objective in the sense that they are concerned with the nature of the physical world. It is necessary to do this because we are not only observers of a world which exists outside ourselves, but also

movers and shapers of the world. Man has to gather his material from all possible quarters, but he has to proceed farther and bring this material into systematic order. In other words, he has to bring his knowledge, his conclusions, and his experiences of things inward and outward into a focus.

By "order" is meant the effort which man makes to unify the impressions which pour themselves upon him or which he attends to. Before this can be done the *intention* of his mind and spirit has to be at work. And this *intention* (used mainly as Husserl uses the word) should never reach a stage where it can be said that man has solved the mystery of the world without or the world within himself. Every man thus appears as something infinite, to whom all that is external belongs or in whom all that is external is potentially present. But although his relation to the universe is thus evident, it is only by slow degrees that he is able to move from darkness to light. At the start he finds himself surrounded by the "mysterious" without and within. But by means of the power of *intention*, which is his possession, he is actually able to pass from darkness to light. The light, it is true, is that of the dawn. Still, just as is the case with the sun, the light increases. And such an increase does not reach any kind of finality except in so far as his physical body is concerned. It behoves man, then, to become *systematic* in his *intention*; but he must never allow any systematic conclusions to be railed in from the infinite remainder that has not as yet poured in its meaning to his *intentional* systematisation. The *intention* is of such a nature

that it must be allowed to proceed on its course of investigations and conclusions without resting at any final goal. Every conclusion is merely a *temporal* resting-place on the road of life in order to gather strength and refreshment for the farther journey. The question arises, What kind of *intentional systematic* is possible and is best? Here it is seen that not all things can enter into man's nature, and also that everything of that which does enter it cannot all enjoy the same status and function in the system which life produces. By means of reflection upon the universe and its relations to the individual we have to make distinctions between various domains, between higher and lower, and so forth. The gulf between subject and object is somehow actually bridged, although we cannot understand fully the way in which it is bridged. It is in the unity and ever further development of this "subject-object-unity" that the gradual cosmic evolution of human life takes place. In the stream of experience we discover an original phenomenon in the form of a subject standing over against an object. Our ordinary life takes for granted this disjunction of subject and object. But the mental part of life exhibits a disjunction of subject and object of a higher order than that arising out of our relation with objects in the physical world. On the mental level the objects are of the same nature as the *intention* which perceives them. And we can pass even beyond this to a contemplation in which subject and object are in coalescence in the form of mysticism. But speaking generally, it may be said that the disjunction of

subject and object is only overcome in the unity of the intentional idea.

Jasper proceeds to show the necessity not only of understanding the contents of our nature but also of understanding the special characteristics of the very centre of our nature itself.

In the section on the "Life of the Spirit" Jasper points out the need of valuing the material that is constantly presented to the individual in order that a "Table of Values" may be formed. This is absolutely necessary if the utmost development of personality is to take place. Further, it is necessary because existing things show an antinomian structure of sharp opposites. These antinomies are to be found on the sides of the subject and of the object. Thus there arises a constant necessity on the part of the subject to react upon its material in order that some kind of "*intentional cosmos*" can be formed within human personality. Besides this antinomian character of physical existence we discover within human nature itself what is termed *suffering*. Suffering and pleasure are indissolubly connected in human nature. It is evident that human nature is somehow an incomplete product. Suffering, pain, sorrow, and other facts of a similar kind found in man's nature testify that somehow and somewhere in his nature man is out of joint. Still, on the other hand, there is present in the nature of man pleasure, joy, hope, friendship, etc. Were there no reaction on man's part against the suffering-elements of life, we should be obliged to take a pessimistic view of the universe and of life. Such reaction, however,

produces an optimistic view of the universe and of life; the hostile elements are relegated to the background and the friendly aspects are brought into prominence. Thus an optimistic view comes into being. This active aspect of our nature constitutes the next step in our cosmic development. We are full of contradictions and limitations of all kinds. If we allow things to remain as they are, we cannot possibly take the next step forward and upward. If, however, we react in the line of the positive, optimistic qualities we certainly increase these qualities, and we are advancing towards a newer and higher form of existence which has its being within the personality.

Jasper emphasises the need of coming to a decision concerning which course we are going to take. There is an *Entweder-Oder* (an Either-Or) present in our life on which hangs the whole evolution of our personality. Further, man is forced inevitably to the conclusion that he is necessarily a *fragment*. The totality of his spiritual powers is strictly limited by the course of Time, and by spatial, historical, social, and other situations. But although only a fragment, he is not a fragment at rest: he is a fragment in unrest, and this implies that he is destined for something other than he now is. He cannot leave entirely on one side his concrete existence, but he can enter into the various "universals" which present themselves in the various phases of the world and of life. Though having for the most part to live a concrete existence, he is still capable of turning his *intention* to more abiding qualities—

qualities which appear timeless, and which seem to have an eternal meaning. He can certainly break the iron bars of the antinomy of life and escape into the "universe," and find there that he is in the presence of "ends" that recede farther and farther away until they are finally lost in a dimension which is beyond Space and Number and Time.

Jasper shows that both the way of the Idea and the way of Mysticism are necessary for this further evolution of human personality. The way of the Idea must be constantly trodden, for it is on it that the vague and indefinite passes into clearness; and, further, the way of the Idea can never cease to form an increasing and limitless clarity of meaning, value, and foresight. But this can only be attained by way of effort: only by sowing and reaping can we gather in our harvest. It is a toilsome work; but it has to be done before the "bread of life" can be found. And we must have this "bread" if we are to live in any real sense at all. So in constant alternation life must move from activity to contemplation and from contemplation to activity. It thus views its treasures in their wholeness and reads their meaning in what *was* and *is* and *is to be*.

ALEXANDER PFÄNDER

Pfänder has been for many years Professor of Philosophy at Munich. His earlier works were in connection with the meaning of the Will. The consciousness of the Will is a special case of the consciousness of *effort*. The ordinary psychological

way of conceiving the Will as merely a product of reason cannot be upheld. The Will-feeling is a feeling of tension, effort, and need. The Will in this sense seems to Pfänder to be something *original* in human nature; it means the conquest by the self of material which often resists conquest. In his work on Psychology he has subjected the phenomena of consciousness to a treatment closely allied to the Phenomenology of Husserl. In later years this tendency has become more marked in Pfänder. His important work on Logic has been subjected to a good deal of criticism by some traditional logicians, but undoubtedly it has shown many sides of the functions of thought in a new light. In his *Logic* he investigates Judgments, Concepts, the highest possible Propositions, and Conclusions. The whole treatment deviates in many ways from the traditional Aristotelean methods of dealing with the essentials of thought, and goes so far as to suggest corrections and additions to prior works on the subject. He shows the grave mistakes which writers on Logic had committed during the third quarter of the nineteenth century. These mistakes are in great need of removal if the science of Logic is to accomplish something more than juggling with the various materials of Formal Logic. Unless this work is done it is wellnigh impossible for Logic to fulfil its deeper obligations and functions, namely, to set forth the manifold phenomena and layers of thought in a way which will prove helpful to the other sciences. And one of the main functions of Logic should be to bring methods and results, in their

most comprehensive forms, to bear upon the investigations in all the branches of knowledge.

Pfänder has gravitated more and more during the past decade towards Phenomenology. Indeed, it may be said that he has a right to be considered, along with Husserl, as one of the founders of this new approach to the meaning of man's nature and the relation of that nature to the universe.

In the first volume of the *Phenomenological Year Book* (1922) he has an extremely important contribution entitled *Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen*. In the third *Year Book* (1926) the second part of this work appeared. Both parts are now issued as separate volumes. They seem to me to throw most valuable light on the *dispositions* of man in his relation to himself and to others. The psychological explanations of *what* is happening and *how* it is happening when one acts towards a friend or a foe, seem to possess great importance. The conclusion of these treatises is that, as human beings, we are far more dependent upon our feelings and the unexplored portion of our personality than we are apt to imagine. The real fountains of life—for good or for ill—lie deeper than the understanding and the active parts of our being. Indeed, we may go so far as to say that, in our understanding and active life we are only bringing into expression what has been caused by the feelings and dispositions of our nature; and such feelings and dispositions are the actual sources of man's relations in ordinary life. Such feelings and dispositions are capable of being guided by reason in ever new and higher directions,

but it has to be borne in mind that in all this the intellectual nature is not doing more than controlling the "steed" by a strong bridle; but we must never forget the fact that the steed and the bridle are not one and the same. There is an absolutely necessary connection between the two; and the two are required. As Phenomenology views the matter in some such light as this, it can be seen that it considers man's nature from sides which have rational, intuitive, and ontological qualities and significance. Pfänder seems to be wonderfully well equipped for unravelling the seen and the unseen strands of human personality.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

Heidegger was a pupil of Husserl at Freiburg-in-Breisgau, and in 1929 he succeeded his master as Professor of Philosophy there. His earlier work was an interpretation of certain aspects of the Philosophy of Duns Scotus in its relation to Phenomenology. Heidegger views man from a standpoint very different from that of Husserl. Less place is given to the psychological aspects of Phenomenology as well as to subjective thought. Husserl has his *Noesis* and *Noema*, i.e. the original nature of man's personality and the *themes* or constructions which this original nature of man is capable of forming from material in the external world and from conceptual material as well. Heidegger shuns every form of subjective idealism and constructs his whole philosophy of man and the universe upon a realistic

standpoint. This realism of his extends far beyond the relation of subject and object. Indeed, he takes it for granted that the object is known directly in an intuitive kind of way; and, indeed, it is in the same way that everything experienced by man is known.

Heidegger's great book, *Sein und Zeit* (*Being and Time*), first appeared in 1926, and has already reached a second edition. It is a volume of great length; and its object is no less than to give a philosophical interpretation of man and his relation to the universe. It has been felt by many eminent thinkers that the book presents serious difficulties for several reasons. In the first place, the author has discarded very largely traditional philosophical terminology, whilst, in the second place, he has created a terminology of his own, and even when he has not done so he has given the ordinary terminology certain meanings which it has never had before.

Before the book can be understood at all it is necessary to bear the above-mentioned facts in mind. The difficulty of giving a correct interpretation of the contents of the volume is increased when this is attempted in a foreign tongue. Probably no two readers will understand the book in a similar way. It is necessary, therefore, to give the German terms and translate them into English terms, although the terms must seem strange to thinkers who use the English language alone.

Man is *Dasein* (*Da-sein*), i.e. he is a *being here and now*. As such a *being* he is *in-the-world*, or, as the author continually points out, he is a being in the World of *Existence*. *Existence* means all that is known

to exist. Thus Existence includes more than man and less than the *All* of things. This *Existence* has a *horizon*, and beyond it is the *Seiende* (the being: not necessarily a person) that has brought *Existence* into being. This *Seiende*, in its turn, must have its *Sein* (or its being). Man, then, who is *Da-Sein* is related to *Existence*, to *Seiende*, and to the *Sein* of the *Seiende*. Man, further, has something of all these in his nature. In other words, his nature is *cosmic*. But he is not aware of what his nature consists of in any ready-made kind of manner. The reason of this is that he has *fallen*. He has come down from the *Sein* of the *Seienden* to *Existence*, and finally to *Dasein*. The result of his *fall* is that he is uneasy, not at home, full of anxiety, and has a conscience. That is the nature of man. Consequently his main object is to find his way back to his cosmic home—a home beyond his *Dasein*, beyond *Existence*, in the *Sein* of the *Seienden*. This constitutes the eternal destiny of man on his way back. It is then of extreme importance for him to know the best way home. According to Heidegger, what is in man must be in the *Sein* of the *Seienden*. That is all that can be said according to the author. Throughout the book there is not a word concerning what is either in or at the back of this *Sein* of the *Seienden*. This *Sein* of the *Seienden* is the further continuation of *Existence*, and it presents something of its meaning to man, just as *Existence* presents something of its meaning to *Dasein* (Man).

To return to the man finding his way home, we find that in a great measure he is an alien in the "World." With such cosmic possibilities in his

nature he cannot find rest so far away from his home; and, too, he cannot leave the world as it is. He learns to use tools; he tackles the material that is nearest to his hands; he has to mix and have certain relations with others, and thus forms a co-being, a co-operation with others. This fact has created a human society, and has brought civilisation, morality, culture, and religion into being.

Man has *anxiety* concerning the whole of his life. This *anxiety* is often found connected with *fear*, and this fear is the result of his *fall* through such infinite distance. Fear arises when this World—the World of *Existence*—impinges so heavily upon him, and when he views nothing beyond *Existence* or this World. He views himself, when he forgets his ancestral home, as a being who will sooner or later meet *Death*. *Death* creates fear when man's thoughts and convictions do not pass beyond *Existence* to the *Seienden* and the *Sein* of the *Seienden*. But when he does pass in thought and conviction, fear concerning *Death* gives place to *courage*, for he now feels convinced that as he has safely arrived here all the way from the *Sein* of the *Seienden* he will return safely home through the gate of *Death*.

Heidegger does not, of course, map out, in any speculative manner, what is beyond *Existence*—beyond *Death*; but he does show that what has been pointed out above has to be taken into consideration before the real nature of man, as well as the real nature of the cosmos, can be understood. He shows that there is nothing speculative in his views concerning man, but what is actually true concerning

the cosmic story of his life—where he has come from, what he is, and where he is going.

The author pleads that this story of man demands placing in this light. When it is thus placed sorrow will be turned into joy; interest without waning will be found connected with all things right up from the things nearest to our hands to the ever greater questioning of what constantly reveals itself beyond the horizon of *Existence*, where the *Sein* of the *Seienden* is. Man, then, has to pass from ordinary life to such a questioning of the Universe, and such a questioning never comes to a terminus, because the *Sein* of the *Seienden* includes what was and is and is to be.

We are thus led by Heidegger to an existential idealism which is extracted out of the Structure of *Existence* and out of a Metaphysics of thought based upon *Existence*, as well as upon what appears above the horizon of *Existence*. In this way the meaning of the life of man gains in fulness, and life becomes more and more genuine and finds more and more a constant repose in the midst of all things. To attain this is to attain the best, for it opens widely every door to man.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIOLOGY

MAX WEBER

WEBER was Professor at Heidelberg. His studies were so many-sided that he was considered by competent judges to be one of the most versatile men of his generation. The findings of Jurisprudence, Philosophy, History, Social and Political Economy, and Religion were all familiar to him. His main object was to seek for the philosophical grounds of Civilisation and History. He took up some of the main problems of Karl Marx in order to present them in a profounder way than was possible for Marx himself. He saw that an answer thereto was to be obtained from the Logic of History as this has been developed by Rickert. He thus gained an insight into the historico-logical theory of the constitution of the "historical object."

In connection with his work on Sociology, Weber aimed at a true understanding of the meaning of *human relations*. The evidence connected with this problem is a qualitative one. The actual connections and regularities of human relations have to be understood. Of course there are certain kinds of experiences which do not enter but rarely into our ordinary normal experiences. For instance, we cannot understand the religious "ecstasies" of certain people unless we have been through the experiences ourselves; but none the less there is a sense in

which such experiences can be partially understood by comparing them with the experiences which we ourselves possess in a rational way. In so far as Sociology is a subject to be understood, it deals not only with the physiological, psychological, and pathological aspects of origins but far more with feelings, desires, inclinations, and other qualities. Of course there is present in these qualities a psychical "givenness," but this has to be *understood*. The "inner" side of human relations has constantly to be taken into account. We thus pass beyond Psychology in our interpretation of a "conceptual Sociology." The *rational* and the *non-rational* processes have to be *understood*. It is not only ordinary routine experiences that are dealt with by Sociology, but also the sudden outbursts of a *non-rational* nature which are found in collective life, such as may be witnessed in religious revivals, panics on the Stock Exchange, etc.

Sociology does not only regard the *motives* of trade or business as exhibited when men employ various forms of effort in order to obtain satisfaction for themselves, but it also attempts to determine the "non-understandable" motives which are at work. In so far as this latter aspect is understood at all in so far alone can it be seen why the rational motives pursue divergent routes and lead to such different results.

We thus find ourselves confronted with various Types of Sociology. Weber classifies such Types somewhat as follows: (a) There is the *normal* Type which deals with rational elements which are

obvious. (b) There is the *subjective* Type which is directed towards a rational End. (c) There is the Type which is more or less conscious of rational Ends and more or less directed towards these Ends by virtue of a uniformity of meaning. (d) There is the non-rational Type which still consists of those who are in some kind of understanding connection, as individuals, with one another, although they are not at all clear concerning the nature and meaning of the bonds that unite them. (e) There is the Type constituted of those who only partially understand what they are seeking; but even the non-rational elements present here form an unbroken link, so that we find the members of this class working in ways which, if not identical, are still very similar. (f) Finally, the entire process itself which is in operation constitutes a Type which binds men together.

In all this Weber shows that there are various grades of a *rationale* of rightness in all such efforts, and these grades vary from the empirical to the ideal.

The individual man is attracted to societies of various kinds by virtue of his desire to attain a life which possesses qualities which are absent from his present life. He is drawn into relations with friends; he is drawn into relations with people of foreign nationalities—people who are very different from himself in their modes of life and ideals. He has thus to adapt himself to such people. The *content* that is thus formed constitutes a kind of a very real ideal world, and exercises a great and often

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a permanent influence upon human life. Thus it may be said that *something very real* is being created between different individuals, and that this "something" forms a bond of union between them. They are *now not against* but *for* one another. This union doubtless does not touch what is deepest in human nature, but at the same time it is something which enables friendly relations to be formed; and such relations are often capable of a larger significance than relations on merely the "business-plane." The relations do not constitute solidarity, but they are factors which tend in the direction of a creation of solidarity. There can enter into the world of business more and more of this "understanding" of the parties who are engaged in transactions with one another. The gain that would accrue from this, if it increased to a very large extent between people of various nationalities, would prove to be very great, and would have results of a far wider significance in business transactions than exist at present.

Apart from business, Weber shows that the same principle of understanding one another holds true in all the relationships of life. The more this happens the more will a spiritual principle of relations be established between narrower and wider groups. In course of time such relationships become stabilised. The stabilisations may only hold between various classes with the same interests, but even this is much in the history of a social world which is subject to so many opposing tendencies. And even though the union may be only between classes,

still in each class certain principles of rectitude, honour, justice, and similar qualities come to the surface until at last they are intuitively apprehended and realised in the lives of individuals.

This way of development is capable, according to Weber, of going far towards the creation of something like a genuine religion. The essential contents of agreement become norms and ideals, and such norms and ideals become often connected with the practical affairs of life. It is the reaction to these norms and ideals that will then clarify and illumine many empirical situations which otherwise would remain in a confused state. A rational ideal order thus comes into existence; it forms a very real intuitive experience of man; he never questions its reality although he may often not live up to its standard. The validity of the ideal of understanding one another, in all its contents, is then something more than understanding *about* things. In a real understanding of this ideal order we *live* in its contents. The contents become life and experience, whilst to be satisfied with merely explaining such an ideal is to shift it from the level of *living* it right down to the level of saying something about it, and this we are capable of doing without any radical change taking place in our nature.

Weber shows that this higher synthesis does not fall upon the individual in any immediate manner. But it is a tremendous gain if we are forced to believe that even the most empirical relations of human beings are capable of being transformed into norms and ideals such as have been mentioned

above. In order to obtain a permanent place for such ideals and norms in individual and collective experience it is absolutely necessary that the centre of gravity should lie upon a co-understanding of what can be built up from the customary, from what is actually lived, from what is drawn into life, and from what perpetually repeats itself.

Of course the very *opposite* of this can be built up, and this means the "wildness" in man. Our efforts should be directed towards the construction of the rational, co-operative aspects of human nature. Every branch of human learning and human activity is capable of being built up in a unified way and of presenting the consequences which will accrue from true and good individual and collective efforts of all kinds.

Important work on Sociology has also been done by F. Tönnies, Werner Sombart, Paul Tillich, Otto Spann, Georg Lucas, and many others, but the consideration of this work has, for the present, to be postponed on account of lack of space.

CHAPTER V

PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

EDUARD SPRANGER

SPRANGER is a Professor of Philosophy in Berlin and has done work of great importance in elucidating and carrying farther Dilthey's idea of *Verstehen* (Understanding), and in his presentation of the forms of human life.

He seeks to investigate the foundations of the Science of History, and to construct a Philosophy of History and Culture and Civilisation (*Kultur*). Further, he seeks to build up a mental and scientific Psychology, and on this basis to erect a new system of Education. In all this he passes beyond the relativity of Dilthey, and is more allied to the post-Kantian German metaphysicians. He, too, like Dilthey, has his theory of Types. He interprets the life of the human spirit teleologically. He regards this life as a life which is capable of being understood only from the standpoint of values. These constitute various Types, such as the scientific, the aesthetic, the social, and the religious; and each one of these Types shows a particular *Structure* of the human mind and spirit. Man has to dedicate himself to one or more of these *Structures*; indeed, he seems predestined to do so. Each individual has to find out his aim in life and work *intensively* within the limits of that particular *Life-Structure* to which

he devotes himself. Man thus creates Forms of Life (*Lebensformen*). Such *Lebensformen* are not an individual experience. The values embodied in the Types are a very real kind of metaphysical power. Thus Spranger's Type-Psychology becomes a Metaphysics of Values and Culture. He works out such a Metaphysics with great clearness until it becomes a norm and standard for individuals and nations.

THEODOR LITT

Litt is Professor at Halle and stands very close to the teaching of Spranger. He has interpreted in a new way the relation of the individual to society. He has already proved himself to be one of the most influential young writers about the nature and function of Education. He is one of the founders of the new important Journal entitled *Characterology*. The existence of such a Journal had become a necessity both for himself as well as for many other prominent teachers. They saw that the time had arrived for a closer union of knowledge and life—a union which in course of time has to become permanent if any real and lasting progress is to take place amongst individuals and nations. Science, Philosophy, Mathematics, and Art have hitherto given very little help in the development of the deep and universal elements of personality. These branches of knowledge, according to Litt, had developed in a one-sided rationalistic atmosphere, and hardly any attempt had been made to connect the knowlege with the actual life of the individual

in order that it might form a "character" which could not possibly look upon the ideal life of man as merely something that is only to be known, whilst life was starving for the want of the very sustenance which this very knowledge was capable of giving. George Simmel also, just before his death in 1918, had a vision of the great gulf which exists between knowledge and life. In his final book on *Life* he pointed out and clearly explained the need of a union between knowledge and life. He showed that human life is capable, by the very nature of thought, and by the nature of its own inner activity, of becoming more than *ordinary* life; that it can pass beyond itself; and that, although it may not be possible to prove this scientifically, in a material and practical way, the validity of such enormous questions, such as the meaning and significance of death, immortality, and religious experience, still a clear and deep knowledge, coupled with the demands, claims, and aspirations of life, can lead the individual to a realm where he can obtain something which is very real and true concerning the metaphysical and religious significance of human existence.

Litt has developed such a point of view, and has shown what enormous gains would accrue to the individual and to society from its adoption and application to the education of the young and even of those who have passed the stage of youth. And this teaching, when viewed in the light of the needs of man, is shown to lead the individual to a world of ideas, ideals, aspirations, and realisations which are

far beyond all forms of experiences found in the ordinary world of human society as it now exists. Litt shows, further, the mutual relations of knowledge and life. He sees that the two have to be taken into constant account. He sees, further, that ideas based merely upon life on the line of its least resistance have no solid foundation; and thus life is apt to translate itself into shallow forms of romanticism or of superstition. On the other hand, to hold formal and logical principles up as something merely to be *known* and not to be *lived* leads into a dry rationalism which smothers the deepest needs and aspirations of man. Herein consists the danger of knowledge in the abstract and as something which necessitates the man to regard it as entirely problematic in its nature and character. Knowledge certainly is problematical, but when life follows some of its clues the barriers are pushed farther back; faith emerges from the depths of the personality and convinces the individual that the non-rational which lies beyond all rationality already attained reveals constantly something of its own meaning, value, and significance. The old rationalism had recognised that Knowledge is endless with regard to its problems, but it had not recognised that Knowledge has depths which are not revealed unless it is brought into direct relation with life. Litt shows the possibility and, indeed, the necessity of creating a Metaphysics of History (cp. Litt's *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart und ihr Einfluss auf das Bildungsideal*). It is pointed out also by thinkers like Liebert and others that in order to inaugurate such a Philosophy of Life we must seek

to interpret anew and in a deeper way the categories of historical reason. This, as we have already learned, was one of the main objects of Dilthey. In many quarters Germany seems to be taking up this matter in a very serious manner. And it is perhaps safe to conclude that, if anything, this alone will save the nations of the world from drifting back into indifference and, indeed, scepticism regarding the possibilities of human nature as well as from blotting out many of the fundamental distinctions which have created civilisation, culture, morality, and religion.

EMIL UTITZ

On similar lines as Litt, Emil Utitz is working. He, too, shows how far away from life various forms of Philosophy and Pedagogic are. They enter but rarely into the warmth of man's deeper feelings and rarely satisfy his higher needs. He shows how we are constantly dealing with what does not pertain to life's *essentials*. Certainly it is necessary not to give up in any manner whatever the methods which have succeeded in bringing into existence the sciences and philosophies of the Present. These methods have succeeded in giving us new and more profound interpretations of the universe and life. But all this may happen, and does happen, doubtless, in a great measure without touching the dispositions, the strength, and the joy of life. Such constituents as are capable of being grounded and cultivated in the nature of man—and especially of the young—should be immediately taken into account if we are

to deepen, clarify, and heighten the various values of knowledge and give a new orientation to life.

We find, further, a number of writers who have shown the importance of certain aspects of Psychology in their bearings on the education of human personality. It is not necessary to deal in any detail with the Psychology of S. Freud as it is so well known in the English-speaking countries of the world. The whole subject as dealt with by Freud is of too one-sided a character to form a comprehensive guide to the nature and development of human personality. Besides this, the subject is of too difficult a character to be brought within the understanding of the mind of the young; and of too delicate a character to be presented without, in some important respects, causing more harm than good. Freud has doubtlessly done great work in showing the need of coming to an understanding with the unconscious self. Perhaps he has done this in a clearer way than any other writer of this or of any other generation.

C. G. JUNG

When we turn to the works of C. G. Jung and his pupils in Germany and Switzerland we seem to be treading on more fruitful ground than is the case with Freud. Jung grapples with the *whole* personality of man. He seeks to complete Psycho-Analysis by means of a synthetic method to which he gives the name of "transcendental function." By this he means the relation of the conscious and the uncon-

scious—a relation which must not be that of an antinomy but of a polarity or union of the two forms of consciousness into one form so as to obtain a unified proportion and greater completion of the *one* personality. In so far as the Western World is concerned, Jung believes that very little help can be obtained from the Eastern methods of viewing personality on account of the fact that, speaking generally, the Eastern mind views personality, on its deepest side, in too quiescent a manner. In the highest development of human life—when life reaches the domain of religious experience—the personality is apt to fall into this quiescence which paralyses the practical and intellectual powers of life. He calls attention to the possibilities which are imbedded in the depth of human nature, and which, by means of the constant practise of concentration of attention upon such possibilities, may be radically transformed from the state of “knowing” to that of “being.” The object of life should not be to turn back into a state of consciousness which is quiescent and which ignores the conflicts of life, but the real object of life should consist in the constant affirmation of the individual that he is capable of overcoming whatever is troublesome in human life in so many ways and also capable of fighting for the higher things which can bring insight and peace to the whole personality. We only vegetate in the realm of the unconscious alone, and are thus apt to become helpless human beings in a world which presses heavily upon us by means of its unseen forces, and which thus demands constantly in-

creased power on our part to meet and to conquer the conflicting situations and emergencies that continually arise. Jung's teaching deserves to be dealt with in greater detail, but as the space at my disposal is so limited I am compelled to be brief.

F. SEIFERT

Jung's pupils are carrying his teaching from Switzerland to Germany and applying it in connection with the life of the young. One of the most instructive of the younger writers is F. Seifert of Munich. He shows that it is quite clear that there is an abiding conflict between two "wills," as it were, in the human consciousness. On the one side we find the plane of contents, aims, and so forth; and on the other the plane of the unconscious direction of the life. This is evident in the lives of individuals and of nations. Below the life of civilisation, culture, morality, and good will, there spring up at intervals, quite suddenly, the unconscious qualities which are brutal and bestial. Seifert shows the need of constantly placing over-against the "principle of might" the "transcendent function," i.e. the union of what the unconscious and the conscious have agreed upon as constituting what is rational and what has meaning, value, and significance. The two sides of human nature have to melt together in the production and realisation of the aims which are the highest and best in the life of to-day. The great function of Education should be the production of such qualities or "moments," for it is in them alone

that the reality of *freedom* emerges and becomes a genuine, personal, and original part of the individual.

When something of this character happens in the life of the individual we have passed beyond the mere knowledge of the reciprocal effects of the conscious and the unconscious. Such reciprocal effects only show what man is in his *natural state*; they also show that things are happening without any controlling power to understand them and guide them. In other words, the "transcendent function" is absent; and when it is absent the individual has not arrived at the conception of himself as a *person* and, at a further stage of development, as a *self*. Jung has presented this in a similar manner. It is true that the individual himself has to accomplish this ascent, and consequently the "function" may be designated as "immanent" as well as "transcendent." This is so because the individual must obtain the *material* for development in an *over-individual* way; and consequently the "function" must be conceived as transcendental. And transcendental Philosophy has abundantly proved the validity of this. The "transcendental function" thus not only appertains to a world perceptible to the senses, but also to a world which reason has created as over-individual and transcendental. There is no need to point out that such a creation has no relation with anything in space. It is this "over-individual" and "transcendental" which thus constitutes the most important truth for man. One has to bear constantly in mind that some kind of reconciliation must take place

between what is "outward" and what is "inward" in man—between what is *presented* to the individual and what the individual is in himself. If this reconciliation does not take place, the individual is placed between "hammer and anvil"—between material presented to him from the external world and the unconscious cravings of his nature—cravings which have not as yet been illumined, subdued, and directed so as to give him true and lasting satisfaction.

It is evident that Jung and Seifert view such a standpoint as constituting the only means for the genuine salvation of the individual—of every individual. Both seem to show that such a mode can form a genuine cosmic (or religious) experience for man. But the immense problem that lies in front of us is to discover the ways and means by which an increasing number of individuals will respond. Probably the response will be limited for a long time to come, and probably it is best prepared for by the personal contact of those who possess it with those who do not possess it. In any case, such teaching seems to be of immense importance in the development of great qualities in man—qualities which can transform his life, which can bring into being a reconciliation between the unconscious and conscious sides of his nature, and which can give him a "forward view" of life that can never get lost.

RAOUL RICHTER

Richter was Professor of Philosophy in the University of Leipzig and died at an early age. He was

greatly influenced by Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Wundt whose pupil he was. In his conception of Voluntarism and Ethical Idealism he follows Wundt. He shows that when a deeper investigation is made concerning the conceptions of truth and reality every form of sceptical reflection will pass away, for such a scepticism can only apply to the stage of a dogmatic-realistic view of the universe. There is a justification for scepticism within such a "field" of investigation, for it is step by step, by a constant process of rejection and acceptation, that truth can be found. In this sense there is a relativity present in all knowledge with the exception of the *a priori* valid knowledge of logically fundamental propositions. It is necessary to distinguish between grades of certitude and probability. Truth may be designated as the characteristic of a Judgment finding itself in ever closer union with thought and experience. An absolute truth independent of all Judgment has no meaning. There is only relative truth—only truth for someone—which at the same time may possess universal validity. Value, too, in its turn, is relative, for it continually presupposes a feeling and willing nature which desires it as an aim, and wills it as an end. In spite of this there are Values which hold universally, and consequently a Methodology and Logic of Values are possible, which estimate and arrange lower values under the dominion and control of higher ones. The conservation of the higher values is characteristic of *morality*. And the quest and fruition of human life do not terminate with this, for the very reason that

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there does not seem to be any obstacle in thought and experience, when at their best, to carrying such Values to a still more cosmic domain. Richter would thus lead us to something like God. God for him is the living, over-personal cosmic apperception which man possesses, perhaps as a God constantly developing and "becoming." All that has been created, and especially the chief organ of creation—Man—work towards such a creation and its eternal growth.

GEORG MEHLIS

Georg Mehlis was for many years Assistant Professor at the University of Freiburg-in-Breisgau. He is the founder and was the first editor of the *Logos*. He is well known as a writer of distinction on the Philosophy of History and on Mysticism. He cannot be classified with the religious thinkers dealt with in the present volume as his basis for religion is far wider than that of Christianity. Mehlis finds that the conclusions of logical and historical thought lead inevitably to some form of religion as a theory and as an experience.

He points out that the question of the actual meaning and significance of the "Concept" is the fundamental question of every Logic which does not confine itself to the mere relations of Terms and Propositions. The Concept has to be examined in regard to knowledge and the conditions and the grounds of knowledge. The Concept is the meaning-principle which transforms the mere life and the mere world into a life of reason and a world of

reason. The question concerning the meaning of *Concept of the Concept* deals with what dwells within all Concepts and which always clothes itself in new formations. The Concept itself has to deal often with material in the physical world, but when a Concept of this Concept becomes active it comes to possess a metaphysical existence. And such a metaphysical existence and content has now, for the time being, passed beyond its relation to physical existence to its relation with itself and what lies still in front of itself, and what does not exhaust itself until it comes to something like the conception of God. Concepts which deal with the *finite* have no absolute position, and it is wrong for the individual to place a barrier in front of the inherent right of the Concept to proceed farther and ever farther on its course. In proceeding in such a manner the Concept is doing nothing more and nothing less than transforming its possibilities into actualities concerning the real meaning and significance of its own nature and of the universe.

The Concept is the power in man which grants him *stability* in the midst of the constant flow of the inner stream of experience. We could never understand what things are if experience consisted in nothing more than an experience of a constant flow. It thus seems that the Concept in its deepest reality belongs to a dimension of life and existence other than that of the ceaseless flux of things. In the flux of things there are no differentiations, no higher and lower, no knowledge of origin or good, no real meaning given to the world or to life. But in the

pure sphere of thought, where thought deals with *contradictions* on the one hand, and *connections* on the other, it is possible for the logical imagination to find a reconciliation which is metaphysical in its nature, and which constitutes a domain of Values which play a decisive part in the life of man.

In his important article in the *Logos* (*Band XII; Heft I*) Mehlis gives a very clear presentation of the meaning and value of Mysticism. He is aware of the effects of a sane Mysticism which views the All of things *sub specie aeternitatis*. He looks upon Mysticism as a power which overcomes the limits of the soul and which finds its home in the saving love of God. It is, at least, certainly true that Mysticism is a form of the religious consciousness in which the gulf between the ultra-rational Godhead and the pure soul is bridged so that man comes into a union with and enjoyment of the Godhead.

HANS VAIHINGER

Vaihinger is Professor Emeritus at Halle and the Founder of the *Kantstudien*. His main work is *The Philosophy of the "Als Ob"* ("As If"), which first appeared in 1911, and which has been translated into English. His *Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* has great value, and his small book on Nietzsche has become a classic.

In *The Philosophy of the "As If,"* Vaihinger's teaching may be designated as Idealistic Pragmatism. The influence of Lange on him is clearly discernible, whilst Kant's Postulates have also con-

tributed to the formation of the grounds of the work. He shows the necessity for "conscious fictions" as indispensable foundations of scientific progress, aesthetic pleasures, and practical beliefs. The necessity of dealing with the various sides of knowledge from the biological, psychological, teleological, and voluntary points of view is emphasised. He agrees with Kant that in order to understand and master any given object it is necessary to employ a system of categories whether we are conscious of their employment or not. We conceive of things as substances with qualities, and consequently "falsify" the "given" in order to become masters of it and to rule and order it. In this manner we step beyond what may be termed the "real" of things. What is termed "true" concerning anything is a quality of our world of presentations and ideas only in so far as we are able to understand, to reckon with, and to handle the thing. Thus these qualities are not in the thing but in ourselves; and what is in ourselves, which enables us to master the "given" thing, is purely subjective and idealistic. The result is that our conceptions are means to *action*, and consequently cannot constitute any knowledge of absolute reality which, in its turn, is unknowable. The categories are thus "fictions" of theoretico-practical use, but are without value in themselves; they are purely subjective and necessary only in a practical sense. The categories are thus useful means to meet and overcome many of the difficulties of the world around us; they are rooted in our practical needs which determine their number and their special

function; they belong to our psychical nature, and are analogies in accordance with which all happenings and events are to be conceived, and they arise out of our inner experience. Thus all knowledge, in so far as it is something other than a knowledge of co-existence and succession, is only analogical, and rests upon analogical apperception. Thus things, forces, causes, and even the self are "fictions." They are necessary and useful "fictions," for by means of them we are able, though only in a scientific-poetical manner, to master the world and to advance knowledge. It is through a kind of legitimate error that thought is able to master the "given," and, further, able to correct, transform, and eliminate some of its "fictions" as well as turn some of them towards higher goals.

When the *Philosophy of the "As If"* first appeared in 1911 it was subjected to a great deal of criticism in Germany. This was not because the teaching was too empirical in its character, but because Vaihinger was far from clear in his description of the true nature of thought and reality. His unwillingness to grant reality to the mental side of man's nature and to the conceptions which mind is capable of forming seemed to many of his critics to be based upon a false assumption. Even Vaihinger himself admits that we cannot proceed without "fictions," and "fictions" with him mean qualities of mind which we cannot prove by means of anything corresponding to them in the universe, but which have to be used on all the levels of life from the level of naïve perception right up to the idea of God.

EBERHARD GRISEBACH

Grisebach is Professor in the University of Jena, and belongs to the younger generation of writers. His earlier works dealt with the interpretation of some of the leading thinkers of his own country. Later, he made important contributions to the newer meanings and aims which should enter into the educational world. Lately his important book entitled *The Present* (*Gegenwart*) appeared. The volume deals with the main inner and outer problems of the present day. He sees the need for the founding of a new Ethics—an Ethics which shall commence in the School and be taught as a reality. The same conception needs application to the State, to Culture, as well as to our views of the Universe. Grisebach shows the principal crises which are to be discovered in all the departments of life—in the school, family, state, church, culture, education, and our views of the universe. He pleads for an intense concentration upon every present moment of life in contradistinction to memory of the past or to hopes of the future.

It is the intensification of the *continual present* that constitutes the true development of life.

GEORG SIMMEL (*continued from Vol. I*)

Certain aspects of the Philosophy of Simmel have been dealt with in Volume I, but I have felt that it should be supplemented by a short sketch of his opinions with regard to the nature and meaning of human society. In this respect Simmel approaches

Dilthey. In his earlier works Simmel shows strong evolutionary tendencies of a "positivistic" kind, and attempts to carry into the world of human society the Principle of Selection which Darwin had shown to be operative in the physical world. This aspect is strongly represented in his great book on *Sociology*. In this book he distinguishes between a formal and a philosophical Sociology. The former deals with the effects of the natural environment, customs, habits, institutions, and so forth, upon man. The latter deals with the Theory of Knowledge—with the analysis of the factors of knowledge—and with metaphysical questions. In a brilliant way he deals, at a later period, with the place of Theory of Knowledge in the Science of History. He mainly follows Kant in this matter. Kant had emphasised the place and function of *a priori* elements in natural science. He had shown that natural science does not construct a knowledge out of a ready-made kind of reality (i.e. the physical world) outside itself, but that the understanding, in accordance with its *a priori* forms, builds up a construction of the *meaning* of nature. Simmel shows that it is so, too, with regard to the world of human relations which constitute the meaning and significance of History. The factual material has to be built up by means of definite forms, by means of selection, syntheses, valuation, and so forth. It is thus alone that the reality and meaning of History are obtained. But Simmel shows that these *Forms* are not absolute mental and spiritual ideas which are independent of the events which are occurring in the human world.

Thus we find him moving on a mid-path between Empiricism and Metaphysics.

As he grew older, Simmel leaves, in a very large measure, this relativistic aspect behind, and at the close of his life he feels that there is something in History and in human life which transcends this aspect. He now sees the possibility of the individual life becoming conscious of its own creativeness. Life is now viewed as passing beyond the barriers of its natural state. In its deepest needs and aims life is capable of passing beyond its ordinary limits; and in so far as it is capable of doing this in so far alone has it meaning and value. The gradual and ceaseless realisation of this signifies in his view a transcendence of life. Man now passes to something more than a mere natural, human life; he leaves behind him subjective and psychological experiences and enters into the domain of objective truths and absolute norms. But Simmel is careful to show that what is objectively (not in space but in consciousness) and absolutely striven for is largely conditioned by what is subjective and relative. Still, life passes undoubtedly beyond the initial stages of the empirical and factual. In so far as it does this man becomes the possessor of "more life" and of something "more than life." Some kind of metaphysical existence or subsistence is taking root in his deepest personality, and the process of growth can continue without end. The unique experiences that are formed in the individual in this manner lift him above the belief that Death can mean the final goal of human spiritual endeavour and experience. For although the goal of

such endeavour and experience is hidden from us, still it is a fact that the truth and value and significance of the moral obligations which have revealed themselves as the essentials of life are realities of a *dimension* of a higher order of being than the realities of the physical world which are so full of accidents and shortcomings, and which do not call up the deepest possibilities which are imbedded in human nature. Had Simmel lived longer he would have doubtless devoted more time and worked more than ever to show the need of experiencing and cultivating the metaphysical side of our nature.

CHAPTER VI

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

(a) CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY

To anyone acquainted with contemporary philosophical movements in Germany it is clear that, in many directions, strenuous and very able attempts are being made to elaborate a Philosophy which is not entirely constituted by the final interpretations of the Physical Sciences, Psychology, Theory of Knowledge, Logic, and Ethics, but is rather a Philosophy of Religion which has its own special foundations. It is true that help has to be obtained from the above-mentioned disciplines, but they are not of themselves competent to give a satisfactory account of the nature of man and his relation to the universe. The need for such a Philosophy of Religion is felt by many able Catholic teachers in a number of the Universities of Germany, as well as amongst many of the clergy within Catholicism and Protestantism. We shall deal with the Catholic movement first and afterwards with the Protestant one. Both Churches, in a very large measure, are determined to found a Philosophy of Religion which shall not ignore natural and mental science.

Such a Philosophy is an attempt to find a theoretical warrant for religion, on the one hand, and thus arrive at a general view of the universe; and, on the other hand, to find an "emotional" warrant, and thus arrive at a general view of life.

The inauguration of this all-important work within the Catholic Church was made by Pope Leo XIII in his Encyclical *Aeterni patris* of 1879, when the study of the Philosophy of St. Thomas was ordered as a standard study for the clergy. It may be stated that such a recommendation curtailed the various attempts at Modernism which were in vogue at the time. In any case, an open road was constructed for the clergy, and the benefits of travelling on this road have already proved very great. This does not mean that progress ceases when we deal with a great personality of the Past. Sometimes, and certainly so with regard to St. Thomas's teaching, there are elements in his work of perennial value. With the Protestants of Germany, Kant is regarded as a "prince of thought" just as Aquinas is regarded by the Catholics. It would be a great mistake to consider the present Neo-Thomistic movement as a passing fashion. The ontological problems raised and partially solved by St. Thomas are many of the problems which were partially solved by Plato and Aristotle. They are problems which both the Neo-Kantians and the Phenomenologists of Germany are tackling within the domain of Philosophy proper. When the same problems, in practically the same way, are faced by the Church, we are justified in the belief that the Theology of the Future will become more and more scientific and philosophical. Many worthy representatives in Germany are, at the present moment, striving to obtain from considerations of the nature of the universe and of human life a religious inter-

pretation which is in an important degree based on the actual discoveries and conclusions of Science, Psychology, Logic, and Metaphysics. Instances of such an interpretation are to be found in the works of Hageman (*d.* 1905), von Hertling (*d.* 1918), Wilmann (*d.* 1921); and, amongst living writers, Bäumker, Dyroff, Geyser, Gutberlet, Mausbach, Switaliski, Wust, Przywara, and others. Lack of space compels me to confine myself to a few of these authors, but they all deserve an exhaustive treatment.

CLEMENS BÄUMKER

Bäumker, a theological Professor at Munich, has described with remarkable knowledge and fineness of style the enormous importance of the Christian Philosophy of the Middle Ages, and has stressed the need of taking up once again its chief problems and testing their solution in the light of contemporary metaphysical conclusions. In a brilliant way he traces how the various streams flowed together, and give us even to-day valid interpretations of the universe and life—interpretations which though not constituting the whole meaning and significance of religion, yet form a solid foundation of intellectual truth which justifies the further construction of religious experience upon it.

The Philosophy of the Middle Ages, by uniting Knowledge and Faith and also Theology and Philosophy, constructed views of the universe and life which possess the seed of further development.

CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT OF GERMANY

Here are to be found transcendental truths which seem to issue from the very nature of the ceaseless development of Thought; here are Values of the individual and social life shown as realities which have brought into existence and have conserved all that is true and good for man; here is the present life of ours in its natural state viewed as a torso, and a life capable of arising out of its natural state presented—a life which is, in its turn, capable of endless development within the world of spirit. The Theology of “revelation” in the older sense sheds, as it were, its leaves more and more, and new buds of a philosophical and metaphysical character take their place. There is no space here to show how St. Thomas discerned the need of this transformation, and how brilliantly he elucidated a great deal of the “theological grounds” and set theology to rest on “grounds” which are, at the same time, realistic and idealistic in their nature. It is the same with all the branches of Philosophy. Metaphysics and the Theory of Knowledge come to the foreground; Psychology and Ethics pass from their elementary stage and put on a metaphysical character. The attention is likewise turned from the object to the subject, not to the subject in its own emptiness but to what is happening when objective impressions receive their peculiar, subjective stamp. And, further, the native *a priori* Forms of the mind are shown to be actual “essences” which belong to man as a birthright. These *Forms* work upon the material that is present and transform it from its “mere existence” so that

it becomes a real, conscious, and active portion of the mental and spiritual nature of man.

Alongside of all this, emphasis was laid by the Middle Ages on the necessity for the development of all the branches of the various Sciences and on the need of showing the importance of cultivating the practical and technical aspects of life. As Bäumker shows, this fact is confirmed by the works of such men as Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, and many others. The movement initiated by these men shows that men saw that a comprehensive view of the world and of life was absolutely necessary in order to cultivate the various embryonic kinds of experience found in human nature. Thomas himself had so many naïve and practical characteristics in his life, and these characteristics existed in peace alongside his wonderful metaphysical and religious conclusions and speculations.

When we take all this into account we see the enormous significance of the message of Pope Leo XIII. The message is destined, within and without Germany, to produce a powerful and lasting influence on Catholic thought and life. The message does not mean a mere return to a verbal acceptance of the Philosophy and Theology of the Middle Ages. If Leo XIII meant the message to be this, he meant what can never happen. The current of thought is like that of a deep and wide river: it can never be turned back towards its source. By its own inner momentum it flows towards the ocean. The waters which were once on the mountain are now lost and found in the ocean.

Signs are not wanting, though the change of the point of view has as yet been slow, that full advantage is being taken by many eminent Catholics to equip themselves in the "drill" of the Physical and the Mental Sciences. Unfortunately, space does not allow me to deal with more than a few representative leaders.

JOSEPH MAUSBACH

Mausbach is Professor in the Catholic Faculty of the University of Münster. He is well versed in the biological, psychological, and metaphysical literature of the Past and the Present. His works are very numerous and deal with ontological problems in the light of the above-mentioned descriptions. I must confine myself to one of his last works—*The Existence and Nature of God*. In this book he deals with the whole question from purely scientific and philosophical points of view. The book shows a very wide and exact acquaintance with some of the most important conclusions of Science and Philosophy. Mausbach wishes to indicate what consequences flow from the biological and philosophical sciences with regard to the question of the meaning of the Cosmos. He starts by tracing the conception of End in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages. Next he comes down to Kant's examination of the teleological proof of God. This is followed by a minute examination of the concepts of Order, Aim, and Law. Accepting the conclusions of some eminent natural scientists he shows that Order, Aim, and Law are to be found in the physical

universe. He shows how *lower* ends serve the production of *higher* ends in Nature itself. His main purpose is the conclusion that there is a "planner" behind the plan. Something similar is suggested by Jeans in his *Mysterious Universe*.

Next, an examination is made of the origin, nature, and teleology of organic life. Here Mausbach, in the main, accepts the conclusions of the neo-vitalists. In all living organisms there is a factor present which cannot be reduced to mechanical and chemical elements. He views the various processes of life and their ascent right up to man as marks of a *principle* working in all things and that has its roots in Spirit. In other words, creative wisdom is the cause of life. He lays great emphasis upon the presence of teleology in organic life. This, he tells us, is in accord with some of the best experimental work in Physics, Biology, and Psychology. He passes on to show the ascent of life from the level of the vegetative in the plant to the level of spirit in man. And he arrives at the conclusion that the creative cause of life can only lie in a thinking and willing Spirit; and that the actual teleological character of all forms of life, endeavouring to complete their own cycle and reach their own goal, is due to the same original creative Spirit.

When one turns to the "Index of Names" at the close of Mausbach's book quoted above one finds dozens of the most important scientists of the Past and the Present. No scientist or philosopher could be more detached in viewing the whole matter than Mausbach is. And I am not aware that any

warnings are being issued from high quarters that his method of the present will not do for the future.

ERIC PRZYWARA

Przywara is a Professor of Theology in the Catholic Theological Faculty of the University of Munich. The scope of his knowledge of the history of the philosophical sciences of the Past and the Present is simply astonishing. He is equally at home in the whole history not only of Catholicism but also of Protestantism. Amongst his extensive learning it is not quite easy to discern what his own particular point of view is. He has already, though comparatively young, done much to show the significance of the teaching of the Fathers from Augustine onwards with regard to their contributions respecting the creation of a Philosophy of Religion in general and of the Christian Religion in particular. In his volumes on *God* and on *Religionsphilosophie Katholischer Theologie* he proceeds as follows. The problem of a Philosophy of Religion is a twofold one. In the first place it deals with the religious element which is found in Philosophy, and in the second place with the philosophical elements which have to be incorporated in the Cultus, Morality, and Dogmas of the Church. The former task can be accomplished only by taking into consideration the whole domain of Philosophy; whilst the second task has, as its subject-matter, the discussion and interpretation of what is to be found in the particular

theology of the Church. He wishes to show what is common in the two domains. In other words, the problem is directed towards a "metaphysical Something" found in subject and object and in their correlation. It is in this manner that the two domains unite, and thus include the union of Philosophy and Theology as *one organism* as, he states, has been the case in the Catholic conception throughout the ages.

The problem of religion has a twofold aspect. One is the aspect of the *Sosein* of religion; the other is the *Dasein* of religion. The first aspect—the *Sosein*—means the presence of a *truth in itself* apart from its reference to anything existing outside ourselves. The second aspect means the presence of a truth in the mind, which has been brought into it by means of one or more of the senses from some object which exists in the external world. Both sides have to be taken constantly into account. The *Sosein* problem means the relation of man to God by means of the various contents of man's nature; the *Dasein* problem means the relation of man to God by means of man's realisation of the actual though partial meaning of the universe.

The *Sosein* problem has as its starting-point the consideration of consciousness. This consideration happens concerning the fact of the *strain* (*Spannung*) of consciousness in two ways. On the one side the strain keeps the consciousness within its own enclosure, but the opposite strain draws the consciousness away from its immanence and directs it towards an Actuality or Being independent of the

enclosed individual consciousness itself. On the level of the Theory of Knowledge it may be stated that, in the first place, this consciousness of man is a consciousness of a self in the double sense of an inner personal presence within himself and of the independent existence of an ideal or real object. In the second place, consciousness is a consciousness of a concrete self, i.e. it is not a consciousness of a "self in itself" in the sense of a transcendental self of its own alone. This would mean a soliptic Philosophy but not an immediate "givenness." Consciousness means an awareness of an individual human self that experiences itself in the double tension or strain of Body-Mind and Individual-Society. Viewing the matter in this way, we obtain a double consideration of the problem of Religion, i.e. Religion from the consideration of the consciousness of the self and from the consideration of the concrete itself. This idea is worked out by Przywara in great detail in the light of some of the most important conclusions of Greek, Mediaeval and Modern philosophical thinkers. Unfortunately there is no space to show fully how the author develops his theory; and we ought to explain that his peculiar phraseology, often outside the philosophical current of the age, is difficult to fix exactly. But it may be stated that his whole attempt is to base the eternal reality and necessity of Religion upon what is being "given" from the side of the universe and from the side of the inner unfolding of meanings and values within man's own inner life. There are, on account of the tension, constant

reciprocal effects in the life of man between *Sosein* and *Dasein*—between the inward and the outward.

Przywara, especially in his volume on *God*, points out the impossibility of man ever being able to fathom the nature of God. There are limitations peculiar to our nature which prevent us from exhausting the deepest meaning of the universe. But we are certain that *Something was, is, and will be*—*Something in us and beyond us*. And here the author calls in the aid of an *analogia entis* in connection with our conviction of this real, eternal Something—God. He shows what has already come to light within the consciousness of a good, noble, and able man. Such a man has received all from the universe. There must be present in the universe all that is best here on earth, and infinitely more than is here. The Eternal Reality is not alien to us: something of Him is in us; He is near to us and yet infinitely far from us. What we possess, though at the best only in a small degree, compels us to conclude in the way of an *analogia entis* to a Reality that has brought the universe into being. And in the universe there are grades of Reality from matter to spirit. There exists in the universe what the universe *is* and *means*.

Przywara shows how Christianity manifests to us the Being of God under the form of a Divine Personality. He passes beyond the intellectual level to the level of what is termed Faith. Faith with him is not a leap in the dark; it is not something towards the presence of which knowledge has made no contribution. Knowledge, on its higher, trans-

cidental levels, has made its contribution towards the birth of Faith. Faith is the setting in activity of this contribution of knowledge and aspiration and directing it towards goals which seem to have no terminus. Faith starts as a belief in our own best qualities, always remembering that these are not our own—that they have been *given* us by the Reality of the universe. It is not we who create the Reality of the universe, but it is the Reality of the universe, or God, that has created us; and all our own creation of our personality is made up of potentialities which have been *given* to us.

The Person of Christ, with its inexhaustible fulness of life, is a tangible proof to us of God. Who can plumb the depths of His life? As a Logos of God He has revealed the cosmic nature of Reality. It is by virtue of the Standards, Values, and Experiences which Christ had that man, too, can find and experience life everlasting within himself.

The author is doubtless fashioning a religious synthesis from the essentials of the Philosophy and Theology of the Past and the Present which will yield an important result not only for his own Church but for Protestantism as well.

Teaching of this kind, as presented by such leading thinkers as Mausbach and Przywara, is as yet far from popular, but there are abundant evidences that it is on the increase. The result will be that Catholic Theology will shed almost unconsciously more and more of the old teaching and assimilate more and more the new. Further, in so

far as the newer teaching has bearings on the religious life of the individual, much of the contents of the teaching will filter into mind, feeling, and will. Thus aids for the religious development of life will be found to lie not in any external belief which is now imagined to exist in some external region and has only to be accepted passively by the mind on the authority of the Church, but in the very nature of man himself as a being who is capable of ascending from the level of sensuous perception to the level of a transcendental universe of meaning and value, and even by means of the *analogia entis* mentioned above to that of mystical communion with God—a communion which includes a foretaste of eternal life and a certitude that such a life can progress without limit in this world and can pass triumphantly beyond the gates of death.

The substance of the above is found in the various volumes which are now being issued for the laity, entitled *Der Katholische Gedanke*, and written by eminent priests and professors such as Rademacher, Morin, Grabmann, Reinhardt, and others. These volumes deal with such subjects as *God, Mysticism, The Secret of God in the Soul, The Life and Teaching of St. Thomas*, and so forth. All these volumes take little for granted; the centre of gravity of the teaching lies in the possibility of man's nature being able to rise from the level of ordinary life to the level of Christian experience; and the various results of the Natural Sciences, the Theory of Knowledge, Psychology, Transcendental Logic, Ethics, and Metaphysics are called in as

aids for such an achievement. There are no visible signs of opposition to this Neo-Catholic Movement; and as much of the content of the teaching has its roots in the Philosophy of St. Thomas it looks as if the Movement will be allowed free play. If this happens, such teaching is bound to cause radical transformations in the theology and in the whole position of the Roman Catholic Church.

(b) PROTESTANT PHILOSOPHY

It cannot be doubted that Protestantism has meant infinitely much in the development of Modern Germany in almost every way. To deal with every aspect of this development would be beyond the scope of this volume. I must confine myself to a brief account of some of the most weighty factors regarding the Philosophy of Religion as it has been presented by a number of Protestant thinkers during the twentieth century. In the first volume I dealt with five of the most important leaders of the religious *a priori* School: Pfleiderer, Siebeck, Class, Eucken, and Troeltsch.

In a religious sense Protestantism has always emphasised the partial necessity of Freedom in matters of religious belief in contradistinction to the principle of Authority found in Catholicism. The so-called Liberal Protestantism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has accomplished brilliant work in presenting views of Christianity which do not come into conflict with any modern intellectual conclusions, and which, on the whole, have kept intact the essentials of the Christian Religion. The great works of theologians of the nineteenth century have even their value to-day in two kinds of ways. Men such as Fries, Schleiermacher, Rothe, Ritschl, and others produced work which, in many respects, has permanent worth. And, too, the value of such work has influenced their successors although much of the original

teaching required modification. These early teachers made contributions of such fundamental importance that these have actually laid to some extent the foundations of contemporary theological teaching. And with regard to the work of the early writers themselves, their indebtedness to the immortal services rendered by Kant and Hegel to religious thought must not be overlooked.

ALOIS EMANUEL BIEDERMANN

Biedermann was born in 1819 and died in 1885. An account of his teaching was omitted from the first volume owing to the fact that in that volume I was dealing mainly with religious teachers who based religion upon some postulate *a priori*. Biedermann is in line with those modern religious teachers who have attempted to show that there are common domains in Philosophy and Religion. For instance, it is possible to picture to ourselves the relation between science and religion by means of a geometrical figure. The centre is the self; the circle of investigation is the world around us; and this world is present for the self; religion and science, each in its own way, constitute a circle of meaning which can attain greater completion if the effort to bring about such an approximate completion is continued. Now, this very same world relates itself for the self, on the one hand, and such a relation is constituted in *thought*, and, on the other, the relation is constituted in *faith*. Faith relates itself to a revealing God, but it does not do this apart from

the world. Faith or belief in God relates itself to God as He (as *Something*) reveals Himself in the meaning of the world. For Faith, the *Great Unknown* may remain *beyond* the world, but an actual relation to such an unknown *Something* can be formed by man; and this constitutes an attempt to read what is in the world in the light of what brought the world into being. The relation is thus not only a *personal, individual* one, but an attempt to explain the world in a more comprehensive way than is at all possible for any empirical science to do. And every science on its empirical side is unwilling to pass beyond what is present in the actual world, and leaves out of account the original presuppositions which alone make even an empirical knowledge possible. Consequently, when the *whole* nature of man is taken into account we find that, in a *theoretical* sense, there is a fundamental place for religion. And, on the other hand, in the *personal* dealings with his own nature, man finds in religion possibilities and actualities coming into being and into activity which would never awaken in any other way. Biedermann, in this manner, shows the need of considering the cosmological and ontological aspects which belong to any full understanding of man's nature. In this respect there is much in the Philosophy of Heidegger—Husserl's brilliant pupil—which reminds us of Biedermann.

The activity of the spirit of man in its relation with objective Reality may be designated as *thought* in the general sense of the word. Such an activity, when it investigates the *conditions* and *laws* of this

experience of consciousness, is *thought* in a definite sense, and it is in this manner that what is termed science is formulated.

The question of the *objective truth* of consciousness cannot and ought not to be ignored. In the final resort one is somehow obliged to conclude that an *autonomy* comes into being which would have been impossible unless we were not dependent entirely on *things*. *Things* and the *contents of consciousness*, however closely allied they may be to each other, undoubtedly seem to be distinct. The examination of the content of consciousness and the admission that it possesses cosmic significance results in a theoretical interpretation of the universe and of man which is not covered by any science. And thus theoretical religion takes shape. But the matter only *begins* here. For as we find *present* here an *immediacy* which is *absent* from every purely scientific investigation, religion acquires its autonomy and validity. Having reached assurance concerning the substantiality of "Grounds," the individual proceeds to the further development of these "Grounds" as means in the further advancement of his own life. Biedermann shows that enormous consequences follow from such a point of view with regard to the meaning of the universe and of man. A *super-sensuous* world has now made its reality and claims convincing to the individual. The autonomy of this *super-sensuous* world grows in extent as it proceeds on its course. It is true that the individual must return to the natural world and extract the meaning therefrom, but he is now aware that a life is un-

folding within his nature which is not conditioned entirely by the course of the physical world. There need be no conflict between scientific and religious interpretations of the world and of human life. Religion means only carrying farther the contents of consciousness and the aspirations which arise from the depths of consciousness than Science and Philosophy either need or can do. A Philosophy of Religion takes up the problem of the contents of consciousness at the very point where Science has reached its terminus. It is obliged to do this or else the contents and aspirations of consciousness will for ever remain in darkness as to the eternal destiny of man. Thus the *theoretical* convictions of consciousness become more and more independent, and this independency proceeds on its course not by ignoring the meaning that scientific and philosophical constructions and interpretations reveal, but by making them subservient to the ever-growing and ever-convincing experiences of man that become more and more certain of an actual existence of cosmic significance that is unfolding within himself.

JULIUS KAFTAN

Kaftan views religion as the only power which is capable of revealing the *whole* spirit of man because in it alone do knowledge and the guidance of life meet. Indeed, the two belong indissolubly together and condition each other. Faith, which in its nature is knowledge of God, has its roots in inward experience; and, again, this inward experience is deter-

mined and formed by its faith in God. In the idea of the *highest good* both become united, and it is this highest good which decides concerning the being of God. Knowledge by itself cannot include this experience of God. Knowledge is confined to the material investigated by the sciences, and it remains, in this respect, an ever more and perfect progressive understanding of a "given" reality. But where the deeper life of man is concerned there is a difference. When we deal with this deeper life we find something that makes all cognition subservient to the spirit of man. In other words, knowledge and the ordering of life meet. Thus we find in the Christian Religion the unbroken unity of knowledge and morality. But it cannot be said that this is the sole content of religion. Indeed, it is only within a particularly limited portion of the life of the spirit of man that knowledge and morality exert their influence, whilst the other portions may remain untouched. It may be said that the unity of the spirit of man cannot be realised without the thought of the Absolute; and it is religion, and it alone, which constitutes this sphere of the Absolute.

When we deal with theoretical thought alone man's thought of the Absolute loses its anchorage and becomes a mere means of proving or disproving things. It is only in the sphere of religion that thought has significance for the *whole* of the life of the spirit. The Absolute is nothing other than the expression, conceivable by means of *abstract reflection*, of what is termed the nature of God. By the word "God" the religious man means the

highest absolute Values and the highest absolute Power. The essence of Faith is that it includes the highest Value and the highest Power at the same time in one whole. There cannot be a doubt that religion is actually the sphere of the Absolute in this sense. It is in such a belief or faith as this that the unity of the spirit of man can be discerned; and it is a unity which is verified by the very consciousness itself as a further remove from the ordinary objects and events of the physical universe and even of the intellectual life; and further still, within consciousness at this deepest level a conviction springs into being that man is moving in, and is being moved by, some cosmic spiritual current that has elements of Eternity in it here and now, and that these elements will continue without ceasing.

CARL STANGE

Stange shows that a theoretical investigation into the forms of knowledge leads inevitably to the problem of religion. It is common to all religious ideas that they offer an answer to the question whether sensuous experience constitutes the whole of reality. Thus an answer to the question of religion lies *beyond* the confines of sensuous knowledge.

It is of importance to bear in mind that the concepts of experience include *more* than theoretical elements. There are "moments" or aspects in our consciousness which do not belong to the concepts of cognition although these fall within the domain

of *experience*. When religion is conceived as experience, the term experience must be understood in its widest possible sense so that it may not refer to cognition alone, but also denote a *fact* which lies beyond the knowledge and its conditions. We are also obliged to take into account the relation of the *outer* and the *inner* materials which are found within experience. These two kinds of material do not constitute two circles which are entirely outside of each other. Rather the world of particular *things* corresponds to our *outer* view; the world of the *self* corresponds to our *inner* view. But, as already pointed out, these two worlds do not exist independently of each other. The *self* belongs to both of them. There is not only an *inner* but also an *outer* view of the *self*.

It is a mistake to view the self and external things as two separate worlds and so to conclude that the impressions which the self receives from external things and events are merely an objective mirroring of these things and events. And, on the other hand, the self as a mere object of our *inner* view is just as much an abstraction as the *things* of the *outer* view are. The immediate reality experienced by us is both *an inner and an outer view*. Our own being, consisting of conscious self and body, cannot be conceived apart from both. The body has to be conceived by the self, and the self is obliged in doing this to conceive what is outside itself. Stange shows that the process in which we experience this dual mode of our being is termed Will. The Will is thus the situation of our con-

sciousness in which both domains—the inner and the outer—are linked together in unity. The Will itself is not knowledge but a presupposition of knowledge. Whilst it conditions the connection of inner and outer it thus conditions the connection of understanding on the one hand, and sensuousness or material existence on the other. The Will is consciousness without reference to the distinctions of Logic. Our logical thought is the separation of a particular function of our consciousness. But it must be borne in mind that in our immediate connection with external and internal reality there is no such separation. All *knowledge* of reality is at the same time *experience* of reality, and such *experience* of reality is possible because consciousness is not merely a theoretical quality but also a practical activity.

With the conception of *practical* experience an entirely new pathway is opened for man. If experience in a theoretical sense is unable to *solve* but only able to *state* the problem of religion, the possibility remains that experience, in a *practical* sense, may be able to do so. And this practical experience is able to do by bringing the contents of theoretical experience into its own domain. Thus what is *stated* by theoretical experience can be realised by practical experience. Consequently, “knowing about” the problem can pass into *being* what we know about.

Man in his enquiries about the meaning of religion does not rely solely upon his theoretical knowledge but upon the unity of knowledge and will. The question of religion is not some single

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particular function of human consciousness, but is human consciousness as a *whole*, or, rather, is the *whole man*. Stange therefore comes to the conclusion that the totality of reality does not allow itself to be determined by means of the *concept* alone but by means of what can be personally experienced when the original power of will, which is the possession of man, operates upon everything which has meaning, value, and significance, in order that everything which seems to possess these qualities in the light of the clearest knowledge should be realised by the individual. In so far as the individual does thus the content of his personal experience increases and deepens, and every kind of material is transformed into a spiritual reality which constitutes the perpetual unfoldment of his self-consciousness. Is all this to be defeated by the physical process of the world? Or is it the perpetual uprising of a spiritual reality which belongs to a dimension other than the course of the physical world? The consciousness that lives on the level of the former cannot answer the question. The consciousness that lives on the level of the latter is convinced of the everlasting reality of religion.

ADOLF VON HARNACK

In our own generation the name and fame of Adolf von Harnack are not likely to be forgotten. He was not a philosopher in the ordinary sense of the word although it must be remembered that he was well versed in the whole history of philosophical

thought. He devoted his long and strenuous life to the minute examination and reinterpretation of the *sources* of Christianity. His *History of Dogma* is a monumental work on this subject and probably supersedes everything that has been written there-upon during the whole of the nineteenth century. Along with his *Wesen des Christentums* (Eng. Trans. *What is Christianity?*), his *History of Dogma* has exercised an incalculable influence on the minds of the clergy as well as on the minds of a multitude of laymen everywhere.

The volume on Christianity is a simple and sublime work. Its real object was to show the need of a return from dogmas and theories to the human-divine life of the Founder himself. Harnack's main purpose was to set forth the life of the Founder as an ideal pattern for all mankind to follow. Fundamental as Harnack considered this message to be, ten years after the first appearance of the book he felt that the contents were not complete without supplementing them by certain cardinal theories to be found in St. Paul's Epistles, and, further, by adding certain important elements from the teachings of Kant and Ritschl. Harnack's main object in doing this, in his important address before the International Congress for Free Religions (1910), was to show the *cosmic* significance of the Christian religion in a *theoretical* way and its personal significance in touching the spiritual development of the human soul.

By his charming and unconventional personality Harnack endeared himself to all who were fortunate

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enough to come into personal contact with him. To those who only knew his works he proclaimed the eternal nucleus of the Christian Religion as a treasure which must never get lost.

H. H. WENDT

Wendt was for many years Professor of New Testament Theology in the University of Jena. His works on *The Teaching of Jesus* and on *Christian Doctrine* have exercised a great influence upon free Christian religious thought. His views on the Philosophy of Religion were based upon Kant and Ritschl. Indeed, it may be said that most of the leaders of free Christianity have the firm conviction that a synthesis of the ideas of these two thinkers is a profound necessity. No one did more than Wendt and his colleague, Weinelt, to show the need of presenting Christian Theology in such a manner. Until then Theology will come into continual conflict with the conclusions of Science and Philosophy. Wendt's own wonderfully beautiful life and influence were a daily proof of his firm grip on Eternal Realities. He was a rare soul—an incarnation of learning and piety combined in a unique manner; and he can never be forgotten by anyone who had much to do with him, as the present writer had.

WILHELM HERMANN

Hermann was for many years Professor of Theology at Marburg. His point of view was in many respects

similar to Harnack's, but he emphasised more than Harnack the need of a philosophical basis for religion, and even felt that the Christian Religion should be supplemented by such a basis. This tendency may be discovered in a comparatively early book of his—*The Communion of the Christian with God*—and the tendency increased in his later years. He adopted more and more the Kantian difference between what is *rational* and what is *non- or ultra-rational*. He showed that both belong to the nature of man, and that both have their place in the fuller completion of religious experience. In so far as religion is concerned, Kant had shown that rational proofs could not be obtained, just, indeed, as they could not be obtained in regard to many other important elements of life. As it is necessary to look upon religion as constituting the highest and most important element of life, we have to turn, as Kant turned, to such Postulates as God, Freedom, and Immortality. Human life is incomplete without taking them into account. Hermann thus differentiates religious belief and faith from rational scientific and philosophical knowledge. The former (belief and faith) belong to the *non- or ultra-rational element in life* as well as to the *non- or ultra-rational element in knowledge*. But this non-rational element profoundly affects human life and brings hidden possibilities into activity, and, as well, brings new cosmic horizons within the ken of human personality. According to Hermann this fact appears to denote that the presence of the non-rational is something cosmic, and only enters into human life

in certain ways and under certain conditions, namely, when we become aware of needs, ideals, and aspirations which can never be satisfied by rational means. Of the presence of this non-rational element in the nature of man, whenever he desires a more comprehensive meaning and significance for his life and whenever he desires to relate himself to the cosmos, there cannot be two opinions. Perhaps what constitutes the non-rationality of this experience in man is the fact that the experience cannot be confirmed by correlating it with objects in the natural world or with any object of thought, for even often in objects of thought there are present factors from the natural world which have entered to form at least a part of the substratum thereof. The substratum of *religious* experience has then its objects in a world *beyond*—in God.

Great stress is laid by Hermann on the fact that, in so far as Christianity is concerned, the Founder has the *value* of God. Hermann is here reasserting one of Ritschl's main contentions with regard to the real meaning of Christianity. Hermann admits that such a belief does not constitute an entire answer to the problem of man's relation to the cosmos, but it does constitute an all-important step which must needs be taken in order that some kind of *cosmic* view which lies *beyond* the Christian *facts* may enter into life.

HEINRICH SCHOLZ

Scholz is known as a mathematician, theologian, and philosopher. He was, until lately, for several

years Professor at Kiel. He deals with the Philosophy of Religion from the standpoint of thought and mysticism. He is Kantian in so far as he shows the need of Postulates in connection with the development of personality. He shows that, for instance, the belief in God can only rest upon the mystical experiences of highly gifted men. The "Godhead" experienced by such men is different from the "Absolute" of philosophical speculation. According to him, there are no philosophical proofs of the truth of religion. The utmost we can say is that such supposed proofs are *not unconnected* with the most comprehensive thought.

On the other hand, in opposition to Scholz, there are a large number of Protestant writers who ally themselves with Catholic writers in stating that religion must justify its existence in the sight of metaphysical thought. They feel convinced that a bridge can be built and must be built between knowledge and faith.

In his work entitled *Religionsphilosophie* Scholz examines the problem of religion from all possible points of view, and finds that a complete answer cannot be found from either a theoretical or a practical point of view. In order to understand the real significance of religion we must approach it from both angles, and we must likewise pay attention to the nature and function of the human self-consciousness. Positivism (including modern Pragmatism) has confined itself almost entirely to the empirical side of life and is consequently deficient in value when enquiry is made concerning the

meaning of the universe and life. The Kantian conception of religion has certainly value on its theoretical side, but is defective on the practical side by reason of the fact that the practical side is on a less solid and valid ground than the theoretical side.

There must, therefore, be some other more significant mode of approach to the problem of religion than either of the two ways mentioned above.

In human life there is a consciousness of God. In the light of the most exact knowledge which has been cast on human consciousness it is not possible to consider our consciousness of God as a result of a mythological impulse. As there is such consciousness of God, therefore there must be a phenomenon *sui generis*. But it has constantly to be borne in mind that such a phenomenon is not a ready-made kind of quality which does its work and realises its goal without the attention of the most earnest thought being directed upon it. This earnest thought has to be constantly affirmed so that its value and significance may arise from the depth of human nature, and thus bring man into *cosmic* relations and unfold within him *cosmic* experiences. All this means an ever greater clarity of our consciousness of God. Thus possibilities are revealed for man in his relation to the *Ground* of the Universe which he can never realise in any other way. Consequently we have to start with the *self-feeling* of the religious consciousness if we are ever to know what genuine religion means; and it is our further task to interpret this self-feeling. If this is so, the most

comprehensive answer as to the real nature of religion can evidently not be found in the theoretical work of reason upon *external* material or in the *ordinary* practice of life within its limited daily experience. An experience of another kind than that which fits us for our daily activities is necessary. This unique kind of experience is something more immediate and intimate in the conscious life than can ever be brought about by means of ordinary experience. Thought and its conclusions can be present in man without man's *whole* personality being aware of itself, and certainly without the personality having any kind of inkling of its own cosmic significance. Thought often says "No" with regard to any cosmic significance concerning man's nature; and when it says "Yes" the "Yes" is conceived as being no more than thought itself which, in its turn, has no objectivity corresponding to it. But, in religion, we are seeking for something more. And, as already pointed out, what is sought is found in experiences of a special, original kind. Scholz emphasises the fact that the experience is an *unusual* one, and is of a *hypothetical* character. Our task is to make religion understood as a product of such an experience.

Scholz goes on to show that this fundamental religious experience is a *trans-cosmic fact* of an incalculable content and value which has to be experienced more and more in a personal way. It is practically impossible to express the meaning of this in physical or conceptual terms. The Divine in man's nature is thus to be personally experienced

as a *trans-cosmic real fact* of an incomparable content and value. It is difficult, and indeed wellnigh impossible, to express completely in forms of thought an experience which includes elements which are beyond the conceptual. We can only express this imperfectly in a conceptual manner, and we have to let the religious experience speak for itself. But reason helps us to express the Divine by means of the category of the sublime and all-powerful. It further helps us to form a scale of values with regard to the religious content.

The trans-cosmic character of the Divine may be described as a non-earthly Power before Whom we bend. When, then, religion speaks of the God-head it means a *fact* which is brought into being by means of the fundamental categories of the Unearthly, of the Sublime, and of Eternal Values. By means of the category of the first of these we obtain a *phenomenological* view of Ultimate Being; by means of the category of the second we obtain an *ontological* view; and by means of the third category we obtain something of the character of Ultimate Being. In dealing with such matters, we expect, of course, difficulties, but we dare not shrink enquiry except at the peril of losing the trans-cosmic experiences of life. As human beings, we are, as Scholz points out, in a comparatively unknown land. We are only acquainted with the bare outline of its nearer regions. Our strength and faith in what is in front of us are to be found in the *last and final presuppositions* of our understanding and feeling nature. It is certain that life lived in the fear of the

Lord and in the strength of the living God is a mighty experience. We can either obey the dictates of the deepest convictions and feelings of our nature or live on a level which obscures them. If we choose the former, we carry a responsibility within ourselves which involves the constant possibility of enormous transformations within our own nature. And this responsibility will arise ever anew. Perhaps it is this responsibility—this never-ceasing expansion and deepening of the soul—which makes human life absolutely worthful within domains and dimensions otherwise unattainable. And perhaps also we never ascend so high as when we do not know how far we are going, and into what deeps we must enter in order to view and experience the light which illuminates itself as well as the darkness around it.

AUGUST DORNER

Dorner is Professor of Theology in the University of Königsberg. There are very few theologians in Germany who are as conversant with modern philosophical thought as Dorner. His main point of view, in his massive volume on the *Metaphysics of Christianity*, is to show the need of inaugurating a religious science of Principles—Principles which are partially *a priori* in their nature and partially capable of endless development. The construction of such Metaphysical Principles will give an ideal world to man, and this ideal world will consist of what is true concerning man's own nature, on the one hand, and concerning the cosmos, on the other.

Dorner declares that there is strong opposition to the construction of a Metaphysics of Christianity both within and without the Church. Still, on the other hand, there is an urgent need for such a Metaphysics, and there are enough elements and principles in the New Testament itself for its actual establishment. A Metaphysics which is formed outside Religion in general and Christianity in particular leaves out of account the most fundamental needs of man and can consequently have only a partial meaning and significance. Metaphysics, as it is generally taken, does not touch the greatest problems of life; it remains satisfied with the presentation of material of thought which can be woven into various syntheses and totalities, but it has no direct dealings with the enormous significance of the facts presented in Christianity as to the progress and destiny of the human soul.

Dorner thus makes no apology for publishing his volume on the subject—a volume which includes 665 pages of closely printed matter. Unfortunately, in a sketch like the present one, justice cannot be done to the volume. The volume is, I believe, the most comprehensive one extant on this subject, and the author's wide and exact acquaintance with the various constructions of philosophy renders him a safe guide who is not building at the expense of the philosophical interpretations of the Past and the Present. But, as already hinted, the intellectual conception of the Christian Religion, devoid as it is of a metaphysical construction, is wavering in every possible direction, and is only too inclined

to gather fragments of information from scientific and philosophical quarters to fill the lacunae of ancient theories concerning man and the universe.

The following are amongst some of the main theses which Dorner proposes to put in place of the creeds and dogmas of the Past. And it may be stated that these were a Metaphysics of their day. There is, then, a necessity for a Christian Metaphysics which will work against the mere historicity of Christianity and against the so-called supernatural and mythical elements which have grown around the nucleus of Christianity and which have a tendency to smother the vitality of this nucleus. There is, further, a need for opposing the view so prevalent in many quarters to-day which affirms that the essence of Christianity can be discovered by means of individual Psychology.

The most fundamental conception of the Christian Religion is the relation of God and man. To make this conception clear—at least as clear as it can be made—is not the work of mere fancy or an imagination destitute of truth as its foundation. It is well to bear in mind that *true knowledge* is one of the basic elements in Christianity. The *actual* nature of the experience which takes place in the relation of man to God is of course not the same as the *intellectual account* of such an experience. But an intellectual account of such a relation can prove of great help; indeed, it becomes a necessity to form objective ideas and standards which can prove helpful to those who have never entered into the mystical experience itself. Such ideas and standards

can become fixed and constant norms for mankind. Mankind is often obliged to *know* these before it can profitably *use* them.

Fundamental questions concerning the nature of God as well as concerning the best meanings that can be attached to such all-important qualities as the unity of God, His Eternity, His Love, Holiness, Righteousness, Wisdom, and so forth, have to be made objects of investigation. These and many other qualities are not mere words. The qualities were realised in a superhuman measure by the Founder of Christianity; and His message was that we, too, can become, in our deepest nature, something more than "merely human." It is constantly to be borne in mind that such qualities were realised in the life of the Founder; they were realised, too, in lesser fulness in the lives of His disciples, and they have been realised in the lives of innumerable personalities ever since. Reverence and love to the Founder are qualities in the human beings who possess them which belong to the realm of personal religious experience, and they are to be distinguished from the Metaphysical Principles which only make intellectually clear what Christianity is. Dorner then states that these Principles become means of illuminating the darkness of the world and of human life if they are personal experiences within the deepest soul. He shows, further, the emphasis which is laid by the Founder and by St. Paul upon such experiences as confession of sin to ourselves, the nature of sin in itself, and the conviction of the rebirth of the personality.

With regard to the conception of Teleology in Christianity, Dorner states that it has two forms. One form teaches the end of the present order of the world and the supposed coming of another order from on high. He shows that such a point of view is purely speculative and has no foundation. It is probably an accretion which crept into Christianity from extra-Christian sources. The other form can be accepted as an element of great importance in the Metaphysics of Christianity. It means no less than that this earthly life of man is a *segment*, which none the less has *value* and is capable of endless development. There is much in this second form in accordance with certain modern scientific and philosophical conceptions of teleology. A study of certain aspects of Modern Physics and of Transcendental Logic is enough to prove this.

On this account Dorner points out that Christian and rational Metaphysics unite when we penetrate deeply enough into the nature and significance of the Principles common to both. Thus, from an *intellectual* point of view, there is no dualism between philosophical knowledge and piety.

Christianity, it is true, is a life, a practice, a labouring "in the vineyard of the Lord." But it is dangerous to ignore the intellectual warrant and the demand therefor. If such a warrant is ignored practice may crumble away into what is petty and insignificant, and, consequently, the worker does not know where to find the power which he has lost. There is a constant need for a return to what Christianity really means with regard to the nature

of the world and of life in their cosmic setting. It is no mean thing, as Dorner shows at the close of his remarkable book, that we are able to determine in an intellectual way the nature of Christianity and to prove that its presuppositions are true and correspond to the genuine nature of man. It is only by realising such a fact as this that we come to possess a religion of freedom. It is consequently a great gain when such a Metaphysic takes the place of dogmas of the Past. This Metaphysic lays greatest emphasis not on what is mysterious or incomprehensible, but on what is *ethical* in its nature and on the possibility of this *ethical* element leading to union with God. Further, it is of fundamental importance to bear in mind that the *ethical* element in man is not an individual possession but implies by its very nature relations with God and with Society. Its aim is the growing realisation of a redeemed humanity. But once again it must be stated that a religion with such universal significance must possess as its foundation and background a fully developed knowledge of the *truth* of its own contents. Thus the Faith in what *is to be* is reconciled with the Truth of what *actually is*.

GEORG WOBBERMIN

Professor Wobbermin is well known as the author of a number of volumes dealing with the Philosophy of Religion. In many respects, his point of view is similar to that of Dorner. With regard to his

theoretical view of religion, he is indebted to Kant, whilst his standpoint concerning *religious experience* is based upon the teachings of Luther and Schleiermacher. He has rendered great service to religion by his investigations concerning the religious *a priori* found in the nature of man. He has further shown in a clear manner the absolute nature of Christianity in spite of its historical relativity. Besides this, he insists on the need of recovering the spiritual experience of Luther and the Reformation concerning the reality of "conversion." Unless this recovery becomes a fact it cannot be said that man has plumbed to the depth of the significance of the Christian Religion. According to him the Psychology of Religion undeniably reveals the presence of a religious *a priori* in man.

KARL HEIM

If we conceive the nature of things under the image of an infinite series of *relations* without taking into account their perspective central setting, we are hopelessly entangled in contradictory forms of experience. We cannot pass beyond the mere Here and Now, and can gain but little insight into the abiding nature of things. We are too apt to seek after the nature of Reality in the events of Space and Time; and if we are merely scientific in temperament and training we only extend this scientific conception to the infinity of Space and Time. Our own particular self, as it exists to such a vision, appears like a "wanderer" on an endless road.

The result of this is that the self is regarded as something that can possess nothing more than a subjective meaning and significance. Heim very properly shows that it is impossible for us to know who we are and what we are, and what we are meant to be in that manner. But if we take our stand upon the independent category of *destiny* and see in this the key to the understanding of the universe and of life we are driven to conclusions very different from these. The innermost nature of Reality reveals itself in the fact that the individual sees himself as an existence apart from the spatial and temporal scene, and as a central point around which everything is crystallised. The self, in moments of such awareness of its own isolation, stands entirely alone in Eternity. His own self seems now to the individual to stand out in bold relief from the spatial and temporal process; it seems to have issued from Eternity. The fact that the "clothing" of this existence belongs to a spatial and temporal order is a secondary matter. This "clothing" is only the temporal form of an eternal setting. Our existence has thus, like the head of Janus, a double face. One face is turned towards the spatio-temporal series, but the other face is turned towards Eternity. This latter face belongs to a dimension quite beyond the spatio-temporal series. There is no alternative to this conception of man in this way. We are limited in a large measure by the earthy form of our existence; but that which lies beneath leads us to the conviction that there is an order of things beyond exclusive relations; and it is the

consciousness and realisation of this higher order which constitutes within us certitudes spanning the whole of Reality.

The two "faces" stand over against each other and are often engaged in strife. Each affirms that it alone possesses the key which opens every door to reality. The former "face" takes its stand upon *reflection*—a reflection which is abstracted from the non-rational and ultra-rational elements in our nature. It decides everything without taking these all-important qualities into account. The second "face" takes its stand upon *destiny*, abstracts itself from the rational possibilities which are at hand and enclosed within the spatio-temporal order, and fixes itself upon the ground of the non-rational, ultra-rational, intuitive actualities of its own being.

Which of these two standpoints is the right one? Heim declares that the decision must be made. We are obliged to choose. But we must remember that *something is choosing*. If the decision is on the *reflective* side we must view ourselves as a psychological event or incident and therefore as a link in a causal chain. But on the other side we seem to be an effect of a super-temporal destiny, and therefore subjects of "Predestination," "Grace," and influence of the "Holy Spirit." The decision on this side is something which is apart from its psychological form of appearance and which has returned to the original, eternal "Grounds" of its own nature. Here we stand before something stupendous that we cannot explain in its entirety but which we can

more and more experience as our eternal life and destiny.

FRIEDRICH GOGARTEN

The dialectic Theology of Gogarten carries farther the work of Kierkegaard, the great Danish thinker, and links this to the Theology of Luther and the Apostle Paul. His main object is to present Christianity in accordance with the spirit of the Reformation. Gogarten feels that the world has in a very large measure lost the consciousness of God. And this tragedy has come about to a great extent by reason of an over-insistence on the capacity of man himself to know God. Man has thought that by means of his own powers he can ascend and know the Divine. But this whole process is merely subjective; and the result is that the man sometimes thinks and even feels that he has something like God, whilst at the very next moment he may think and feel that all is no more than his own subjective idea projected out beyond the universe. Gogarten shows that the full power of religion can never be obtained in such a way, and that the world must turn in a contrary direction. It is not from *our* minds alone that we become conscious of God, but it is from God that everything begins and finishes (*ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ*). We have simply to believe that God exists and then wait patiently upon the event. Nothing very much happens until we believe this, but when we believe this we ourselves and everything else appear in a new light. We have passed

from a fruitless subjectivity regarding the Highest Reality to a Transcendent Reality. This leap into the Transcendent is absolutely necessary if we are to have dealings with God and see ourselves and all other things with His eyes. Religion, viewed as something that can be realised by means of the exercise of the subjective mind, is wandering in darkness. We are on the "line of death" on this level. We are like birds in cages vainly beating their wings in order to escape. The *door* must be opened by *Someone else*. When man makes the "plunge" he has passed from death to life, from quest to fruition. He now lives a life which is on the other side of his empirical and conceptual experiences.

Gogarten shows that before a man takes the "plunge" he must become aware, not indeed of any kind of capacity belonging to himself, but of his own nothingness and nakedness. Without taking the "plunge," do what he will, he will for ever fail to find God and immortal life. Thus ideas, ideals, the meanings of science, philosophy, and history, however much utility or value they may possess, can never confer on man the certitude and the power of God working within his own soul. But, on the other hand, when man accepts the standpoint of St. Paul and Luther—the standpoint of *Faith*—"nothing doubting"—then God speaks to him and he enters upon his eternal inheritance.

KARL BARTH proceeds on lines similar to Gogarten. As the teaching of both is so alike and my space so limited I cannot develop further the doctrine of either.

RUDOLF OTTO

Otto has been for many years Professor of Theology in the University of Marburg. He became known first of all as an interpreter of Kant and Fries. He was one of the first to show the importance of the teaching of Fries in the domain of a Philosophy of Religion. Along with this *general* Philosophy of Religion he saw the need of keeping constantly in view the Christian Religion on account of its unique presentation not of a general view of the universe and of life, but of a certitude of the revelation of the Divine as realised in the life of the Founder. In addition to this, another element comes prominently forward in Otto's teaching, namely, the Psychology of man's nature on its religious side. His work on the Mysticism of the East is closely allied to this psychological aspect.

The *general* aspect of his teaching is to be found in his *Philosophy of Religion*.¹ This important book presents the rational grounds of the teaching of Fries, whilst this same teaching is carried backward to certain elements in the teaching of Kant, and forward to the further development of Fries's doctrine by some of the great German theologians of the nineteenth century.

Besides this work, Otto has published many important articles in various theological and philosophical journals. They have all a bearing on religion. The psychological and mystical aspects of his teaching are set forth in his book entitled *The*

¹ Issued in the summer of 1931 by Williams & Norgate.

Holy—a volume which has passed to fifteen editions in the course of a few years, and which has carried Otto's name and fame to the uttermost parts of the globe.

Religion, according to him, is grounded in the rational and non-rational nature of man. If we enquire what religion is, probably the best answer we can obtain is that given by Schleiermacher in the statement that religion is the personal observation of, and insight into, the deeps of consciousness itself. This means that man becomes aware of that domain of the life of his inner spirit, and lifts up what is most significant in his life, and thus differentiates it from other forms of experiences which he possesses. In doing this, the individual has certainly to exercise his understanding and reason, but if religion did not mean something more than the conclusions of reason the individual would be in the position of knowing something *about* religion, but his inmost nature would remain untouched. Religion uses understanding and reason in order to discover what lies beneath them as a potential inheritance of human nature. The history of religion is a history of the rousing into life of these hidden possibilities of the human spirit. The evolution of religion means the emergence from darkness to light of the cosmic nature of human existence.

Otto believes that certain elements in the chief works of Kant, one-sided as they are in many respects concerning the essential nature of religion, are still capable, when the essentials are separated from the

accidentals, of presenting truths of fundamental importance with regard to this matter. The philosopher Fries saw this and attempted, with great success, to bring these elements to notice. This work of Fries, according to Otto, was carried further by Schleiermacher and others during the first half of the nineteenth century.

We need to enquire how religion and religious conviction originate in the rational spirit itself; by what kind of capacity and disposition religion and religious conviction proceed; and what claims to validity all these elements possess. This kind of work is part of the proof that the rational spirit of man is capable of possessing knowledge and truth. This kind of work has been designated, since the time of Kant, as a critique of reason. A part of the critique of reason shows us how knowledge and truth are attained in the domains of Nature and the Natural Sciences. A part also of the critique of reason deals with the nature of consciousness itself, its forms, its laws, its content, and its continual flux. This difficult material has to be brought into some kind of order; no aspect of it should be neglected; and not only should the aspects which pertain to the physical world and the ordinary life of the day be considered and elucidated, but also the aspects which are present as desires, anxieties, aspirations, ideals, and so forth, must be dealt with and new meanings extracted from them. When this is done we have passed to the realm of *Principles*, and such a realm of *Principles* constitutes a Metaphysic of Religion. We are then only pro-

ceeding in the same way as the natural, mental, and moral sciences have proceeded. They all aim at presenting fragments not only as they exist in isolation but as they are found in syntheses, or, in other words, as they are found in their togetherness and wholeness.

Otto, in the presentation of his material in this way, proceeds on strictly scientific lines. One of his great merits is that he is unwilling to accept the valuation of any phenomenon from its superficial appearance. He possesses very remarkable ability to probe into the depths of human consciousness, to bring up what is there and clarify its meaning.

He sees that the need for unity, wholeness, and togetherness is urgent with regard to the various psychical and mental dispositions of man's nature. There is, as he also shows, the need for a constant process of selection and rejection—something has to be incorporated into the unity and something has either to be relegated to a secondary place or excluded from the disposition.

Otto shows that just as we cannot evolve the *rational* ideas and ideals out of sense-perception, so we cannot evolve the *non-rational* aspects (or "moments") of life out of the *rational* aspects. These non-rational elements or "moments" lie deeper than pure reason and constitute our category of the "holy," i.e. of what the mystic terms "the ground of the soul." Of course we are obliged to form *ideas about* all this, but we must always remember that the *religious experience itself* is not a mere

idea, but *is what it is*, i.e. it is *a consciousness of the soul and a feeling of a contact with the soul of the universe*. The soul possesses the power of creating religious experience out of itself. Such a potentiality of the soul has its own direct vision which runs between sense-perception and rational truth. It receives illumination in certain ways from both, but undoubtedly it constitutes an *essence* which is deeper and more significant than both.

Otto emphasises the presence of *Ahnung* (which is distinctive and essential in the teaching of Fries) as constituting the true nature of the religious consciousness.¹ He shows that *Ahnung* forms some of the essentials of the religious life. *Ahnung* is a desire, an anxiety, a longing, a foretaste, often a certitude that the soul needs be brought, can be brought, is brought into ever closer relationship with the Infinite Ocean of Love.

Otto's work is of great and lasting significance on three sides. He has brilliantly shown the insufficiency of Naturalism as an interpretation of the universe; he has shown that the most universal conclusions of reason lead in the direction of what is essentially spiritual; and, finally, he has shown how the presence of this mysterious *Ahnung* is a psychological fact, and that in it are imbedded possibilities of cosmic and eternal significance. It is not often that we find the powerful quality of mind, together with a deep mystical intuition, com-

¹ In a conversation once with Harnack I asked him how he would define the nature of religion. His reply was in the way of Fries and Otto. "Religion," he said, "is *Ahnung*."

bined in the same person. They are so in the personality of Otto, and it is this fact that gives his books such originality and such an appeal to the deepest aspirations of the human mind and heart.

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