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

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SELECTED ESSAYS OF SCHOPENHAUER

EDITED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION, BY

ERNEST BELFORT BAX

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PREFACE.

THE following selection of pieces from the two volumes of Miscellaneous Essays, called by Schopenhauer "Parerga and Paralipomena," have been made with a view of meeting the taste alike of him that is specially interested in philosophy and of the "general reader." Some of the essays included in this present volume have been translated before by Mr. Bailey Saunders, and published by Messrs. Swan Sonnenschein, & Co. I may state that the renderings here given have been made without any reference whatever to Mr. Saunders's work, which I have purposely abstained from consulting. In translating the German author, my aim has been to combine as strict a literality as was possible with a retention of the flavour of the original style in equivalent English idioms. At the same time I have always leant rather toward the side of over-literality than that of mere paraphrase. The introductory memoir and sketch of Schopenhauer's philosophy will, it is hoped, serve to render the meaning of some passages clearer than they would otherwise be to a reader who might take the book up without any previous knowledge of the system to which they belong, in its general aspect.

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THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCHOPENHAUER.

THE great literary exponent of modern Western pessimism, as he is usually deemed, was born in the old Hanseatic town of Dantzic, the 22nd of February, 1788. He was of Dutch descent on both sides. His mother, Johanna Schopenhauer, subsequently became a novelist of considerable, though ephemeral, note. It was by a mere fluke that the subject of our sketch, Arthur Schopenhauer, was not born in England. His father, a Dantzic merchant of considerable means, had all the eighteenth century enthusiasm for English institutions, and the additional connection with Englishmen, which residence in the commercial towns of the Baltic brought with it, especially at that time. He was accordingly anxious that his son should be born on British soil, and to this end undertook a tour with his wife, having London as its goal, in the summer of 1787. Before the time of birth arrived, however, Johanna was seized with a violent longing to return home; and accordingly the future philosopher was ushered into the world, by birth as well as by parentage, a German. The only revenge the old merchant could take upon fate was in the name of his son—Arthur—which was bestowed on account of its cosmopolitan character, at least as regards the three leading nationalities of Western Europe.

In 1793 the old "free town" was annexed by Prussia, a circumstance which involved the departure of the

Schopenhauers. For father Heinrich Schopenhauer was possessed with great ideas of Hanseatic independence, and the stern municipal republicanism which attached to it. They settled at Hamburg, where Heinrich set up a new business, which he conducted for twelve years. It was here that Arthur Schopenhauer spent his *lehrjahre*. Old Heinrich Schopenhauer destined his son to follow his own calling. In pursuance of this idea young Schopenhauer was educated. In 1797 he was taken by his father to Paris, and subsequently boarded in the house of a merchant of Havre, Grégoire by name, where he remained for two years, being educated in companionship with the son of his host. At the expiration of this time he returned to Hamburg, attending a private school for three years. Schopenhauer junior had, however, never taken kindly to the idea of a mercantile career, and his wishes now definitely turned towards literature, his tastes in this direction being fostered by the literary society he met at his father's house, and to which his mother was greatly addicted. His father, after much entreaty, gave his partial consent, and thought of purchasing a canonry for his son; but the project fell through, and he reverted once more to his original idea, obtaining the son's reluctant acquiescence by the bribe of a lengthened sojourn in France and England, to be enjoyed first.

Early in 1803, accordingly, the family took their departure from Hamburg for Calais and London. While in London, Schopenhauer was placed at the boarding-school of a clergyman at Wimbledon. He found the mechanical discipline extremely irksome to him, and, more than all, the religious training imparted in this establishment. There is a passage in one of his letters in which he indicates his disgust, in no measured language, of the atmosphere of cant and hypocrisy which at that time, and for long after, permeated every department of English life,

which concludes: "When will the light of truth burn through these darknesses?" He recurs to the subject several times in the course of his miscellaneous writings, and always in the same strain of inexpressible loathing and contemptuous indignation. At the end of the year the family left England for Paris, touring their route, during the early part of 1804, through provincial France to Switzerland, and ultimately to Vienna. In September young Arthur found his way with his mother alone, his father having gone back to Hamburg, to his native place. Here he entered the office of a Dantzic merchant, and seriously endeavoured to fulfil his pledge to his father at the desk. After a few months, however, he changed the Dantzic office for a Hamburg one; but every month made it more and more apparent that his heart was not in the ledger, the number of moments stolen from business during business hours, in the interest of his books (other than ledgers), were such as to lead to serious remonstrance on the part of his superiors.

Just at this time an event occurred, however, which broke up the Schopenhauer household. On the fifth of April, 1805, his father, who had for some little time previously shown signs of aberration or failing of intellect, was found in the canal, having precipitated himself from the upper story of an overhanging building, the universal suspicion being that the case was one of suicide. This was a great blow to Arthur, who, in spite of their disagreement on the knotty point as to the choice of a profession, was devotedly fond of his father. Though now more or less free to follow his own inclinations, he did not do so immediately, but went back to the drudgery he abhorred, solely, as it would seem, to show his respect for the dead. For two long years he endured it. His mother after a few months—the business complications tending the realization of the effects of her late husband having been settled,

and being in consequence possessed of a sufficient income—improved the situation by retiring to Weimar, which was then at its zenith as the literary metropolis of Germany. She here became an associate of the circle which centred in Goethe, and began her career as a novelist. Differences between the mother and son became manifest in the course of correspondence, but did not prevent the former at length giving her consent to a final renunciation of the counting-house. At the beginning of 1807, therefore, Schopenhauer began to devote himself seriously to study. In June he settled at Gotha, and, although in his twentieth year, did not disdain to take his place in the *gymnasium* of that town with a view to acquiring a thorough classical training. A lampoon on one of the masters compelled his retirement, however, and he went to join his mother at Weimar. In the latter place he pursued his classical studies, but became more than ever estranged from his mother. It soon became impossible for them to live in the same house. Arthur's inadaptability to the somewhat ceremonious etiquette of the Weimar *salon* did not tend to improve matters. The petty spite which only too often displayed itself at a later stage in his gibings at the academical philosophers of his time, at this period found vent in jealousy of the literary renown of his parent. The disgust at the frivolity which was indicated, as it seemed to him, in his mother's conduct, and more especially at the ease with which he thought the memory of his father had been forgotten, no doubt contributed to this; but we must in the main ascribe Schopenhauer's conduct to his constitutional failing. On attaining his majority, and with it the small income of some thousand thalers (£150), Schopenhauer determined to enter the University of Göttingen. He here enrolled himself as a student of medicine, not so much with a view to practising, as for the sake of having a faculty. He attended for over a year

most of the classes in physical science. It was not till some months later that his distinctive leaning towards philosophy showed itself, when he began to attend the lectures of Schulze, the author of "Ænesidemus," and a great man in his day.

Schulze advised him to study Plato and Kant, advice which he religiously followed for some time, to the neglect of other thinkers. In the summer of 1811 Schopenhauer went to the newly-established University of Berlin; here he attended Schleiermacher's lectures on the History of Philosophy, the following year he also heard Fichte. Already at this time his hatred and jealousy of Academic Philosophy and philosophers began to show itself. Fichte especially came in for his attacks, as may be seen from his student's note-books of the lectures. These exhibit the silly petulance which too often disfigure his later work. In 1813 came the disastrous campaign of Napoleon in Russia, and the attempt of North Germany to shake off the power of the invader. After the battle of Lutzen Schopenhauer left Berlin, reaching Rudolstadt, a small principality adjoining Weimar. Here he wrote his first book, "The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason." Its appearance occasioned the joke on the part of his mother, that the title sounded as though it would only interest apothecaries, to which Arthur made the retort, that it would be read when all her romances were forgotten. It was a thin volume, and at the time created no notice. Shortly after the publication, Schopenhauer had the rashness to try the experiment once again of living with his mother at Weimar. This visit proved the occasion of a final rupture with Johanna Schopenhauer, whom he never saw again. At Weimar at this time, however, he entered upon a closer acquaintance or friendship with Goethe than he had done previously. The special occasion of it was his strongly expressed sympathy for Goethe in his squabble

with the Newtonians on the subject of the celebrated "theory of colours" (*Farben lehre*).

Proceeding northward to Dresden, Schopenhauer developed his optical theories as well as his general philosophy in the latter town during the ensuing months. It was here that his pessimism became accentuated and formulated. Schopenhauer claimed to be the first modern who had dealt philosophically with the sexual impulse, which was one of the turning points of his philosophy, the sexual act being the typical illustration of the affirmation of the Will-to-live. But of this more anon, when we come to speak of Schopenhauer's philosophy in general. The belief in the inherent possibility and the practical necessity of a philosophy had already begun to lead him to plan out a coherent system. It was of a different nature from the contemporary academical systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in that, while no less than theirs purporting to be a metaphysic, it was nevertheless not like theirs founded on a logical deduction, but claimed to have grown together piece by piece as the fruit of observation and reflection on the phenomena of nature and man. Schopenhauer, in other words, took his stand on a different side of the "critical" philosophy of Kant to that of his contemporaries of the chair. Kant's division of the first part of the "Critique of Pure Reason" into "The Transcendental Æsthetic," and "The Transcendental Dialectic," was the basis of a divergence of view in German philosophy, of which the antithesis between Schopenhauer and Hegel is the most salient expression. While the philosophers of the "chair" took their stand on the Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic, Schopenhauer took his on the Transcendental Æsthetic. For the former, the formal activity of thought—the category or concept—was the ultimate principle and starting-point of philosophy. With

Schopenhauer, on the contrary, this was not ultimate, but derived from the, for him, deeper, non-logical principle of Will. Art thus, in a sense, stood nearer philosophy than science with Schopenhauer. "Art," he writes at this time, "is not, like science, merely concerned with the reasoning powers, but with the innermost nature of man, in which each must count merely for what he is in reality. Now this will be the case with my philosophy, for it is intended to be philosophy as art." . . . . "The mere faculty of discovering the sequence of conceptions, the combining, in short, of antecedents and consequents, though it may make a great scholar and scientist, will never make a philosopher, just as little as it will make a poet, a painter, or a musician." Schopenhauer was at this time largely occupied with a perusal of the works of the French materialist writers of the last century, especially of Helvétius. The Upanishads in a Latin version also absorbed a good deal of his time, and contributed much material towards his own philosophy. He speaks of it as the noblest reading in the world, and as his highest consolation.

By 1818 the great philosophical work was already all but finished, and Schopenhauer wrote to the publisher Brockhaus, of Leipsic, offering it to him as the exposition of a new philosophical system. Terms were arranged, and an edition of eight hundred copies agreed upon. But Schopenhauer chafed at the delay of the printers, and this finally culminated in the writing of a discourteous and quasi-libellous letter to Brockhaus, demanding a portion of the honorarium, and calling upon him to name a date for the completion of the publication "with all the sincerity of which he was capable." Brockhaus declined to act otherwise than in accordance with the terms of the agreement. He also wrote further letters to Schopenhauer, abusing him in well-set terms for what he deemed his insulting conduct, which letters remained unanswered by

the latter. The volume saw the light towards the close of 1818, being dated for the following year, and bearing the title, "The World as Will and Presentment," in four books, with an appendix containing a criticism on the philosophy of Kant. The work proved a failure, as the "Fourfold Root" had done; and Schopenhauer some years afterwards, on demanding an account as to the sale of his book, received a reply that a great part of the edition had been disposed of as waste paper.

Before the book had issued from the press Schopenhauer was in Italy, refreshing himself with the southern sun, after his four years' labour on what he deemed his life-work. It was a time of all others when a re-awakened interest in archæological research generally, and especially in that of the classical lands, was making itself felt—the time of Niebuhr and of Von Humboldt, of Thorwaldsen and of Bunsen. But Schopenhauer sympathized with none of these. The researches into the origins of Christianity which occupied his college friend at Göttingen, Bunsen, had no attractions for him. Just as little did he care for the new conceptions of history which were dawning, and which found their first expression in Niebuhr's demolition and partial reconstruction of the earlier Roman history. To Schopenhauer, for whom the valley of the Ganges was the one and only original source of the religious instinct, Christianity was unspeakably abhorrent. Historical research was uninteresting to him for the simple reason that he admitted no philosophy of history, no law in history, not even a tendency, but the mere fortuitous play of individual desire and caprice, substantially the same at one time as at another, and differing only in the superficial forms of its manifestation. For classical literature and art, on the other hand, he had a keen enthusiasm, an enthusiasm which had its obverse side in the systematic depreciation of mediæval art, especially Gothic architecture. Italy

was, just at this time, "the fair land of exiles" from the conventionalities of society in the more northern countries of Europe. Byron, Shelley, Scott, and other lesser lights of English imaginative literature, were languishing, rhapsodizing, or sight-seeing in Venice, Florence, Rome, and elsewhere. Goethe had only recently been there, and there were plenty of other Germans, intoxicated with the "romantic" movement now springing into life, with whom Schopenhauer had the opportunity of quarrelling. He kept a diary during all this time, in which were set down sundry reflections on life and things of the partly platitudinary and partly paradoxical nature, so characteristic of all the meditations of our Neo-Buddhist on things in general.

At Naples he received a letter from his only sister, who was a few years his junior, containing a report of the publication of his book, and also the welcome information that Goethe, in spite of his general repulsion to purely speculative literature, had dipped into it, and discovered two passages to his liking, one in the fourth part, which contained Schopenhauer's views on art, and the other a passage in which he proclaims self-realization as the end of life. While at Milan, on his return home, a less welcome letter from his sister reached him, containing the information that the Dantzic house, in which his mother and sister had invested their means, had failed. Schopenhauer, who was himself involved to the extent of 8,000 thalers in the affair, was at first sympathetic, and prepared to stand by his relatives. But on hearing that they had precipitately agreed to accept the first offer made, of a composition of thirty per cent., he became disgusted, and not even the satisfaction he might have derived from seeing therein a confirmation of his theories as to the business incapacity of women, sufficed to prevent an enduring rupture. He himself resolutely stuck to his guns, refusing anything less than seventy per cent. down in settlement of claims. This

he communicated to the firm indicated, in a letter, in which he states it to be his duty to defend his patrimony, at the same time justifying his attitude on quasi-philosophical grounds. He did not oppose the action of the other creditors, and hence the agreement with them was signed in the summer of 1821. The following month he sent in the first of his acceptances, and in less than a year all his three bills were paid up with interest. The amount gained or saved by his dexterous manipulation was partially lost afterwards, however, through an unlucky investment in Mexican Bonds.

Schopenhauer next went to Heidelberg, and from thence to Dresden to arrange his affairs, the hope inspiring him all the time of obtaining a university appointment. Just now the universities were regarded by the governments of Germany, in the full flood of the reaction represented by the Holy Alliance, as hotbeds of sedition. This made little difference to Schopenhauer, whose want of appreciation of history was only equalled by his contempt for politics and all public movements. For him the individual was all in all. The political atmosphere therefore was no hindrance to his applying, as he hoped with success, for a post of the kind. He first turned his attention to Berlin, and in writing to one of the professors there on the subject, he declares that what interests him alone are the things which concern every man at all times and in all places, and that so long as he has the means and opportunity of study, and of elaborating his ideas and communicating them to the world, he is satisfied, no matter what the outward circumstances of his age and country may be. To Berlin accordingly he went, and after the usual formalities—presentation of copies of his books, a lecture delivered before the Senate, followed by an oral examination—he was admitted to the post of *privat-docent* or extraordinary professor. Thus empowered, in the summer semester of 1820 he began a course of lectures on philosophy. This, like his books,

proved a complete and utter failure; his audience dwindled to nothing before the end of the term, and Schopenhauer never again tried his luck in this direction. He was perhaps partly himself to blame for the so completely disastrous collapse of his scheme, inasmuch as he had tried conclusions with the great philosophical giant who was then at the height of his renown. Schopenhauer was literally crushed beneath the weight of Hegel. The former had had the temerity to choose the lecture hour of his famous colleague for his own course. From this time forward dates the bitter and malignant attitude of Schopenhauer towards the great master of speculative thought. The silly ebullitions of spite which recur again and again, in season and out of season, marring the pages of Schopenhauer's Essays, and more than one specimen of which will be found in the following pages, are so puerile as to excite nothing else than pity for the man of unquestionable power who could descend to them. It is only fair to say that Schopenhauer, possessed as he was with a morbid mania of suspicion, probably really believed his failure to have been due to the machinations of his arch-enemy, as he considered the author of the "Phænomenologie." As a matter of fact it is extremely improbable that Hegel ever once gave so much as a passing thought to the obscure *privat-docent* and his course, so far as jealousy was concerned.

A review of his book in the "Litterateur-zeitung" of Jena next drew Schopenhauer into a furious squabble with the editor. In the course of the year 1821 he fell into a dispute subsequently ending in an unsuccessful litigation, this time not with any academical or literary opponent, but with a friend of his landlady. He complained to the latter on one occasion of having found three strange women conversing immediately outside the two rooms he occupied, and received the assurance that such a thing should not occur again. A few days afterwards, on returning home

from his walk, he found the three women again in the same position. He ordered them to retire, but one of them, a seamstress, who occupied a room at the top of the stairs, refused. Schopenhauer thereupon went back into his room, and after waiting a few minutes returned to the charge, and finding her still in the same position, he seized her by the waist and violently flung her out, at the same time using an expression more energetic than parliamentary, and following up her ejection by flinging after her the work she was engaged on, together with the implements of her calling. The case, which came into court, and was defended by Schopenhauer himself, was decided in his favour after the lapse of some months. The plaintiff however appealed, and Schopenhauer, who wished to get away to Switzerland and Italy, did not stop for the hearing, and was condemned undefended to a moderate fine. After being absent in Italy during the whole winter, he returned northwards, making a lengthened stay at Gastein, and in August he was back at Dresden, remaining there some eighteen months, and occupying himself the while with sundry literary projects, including a translation of Hume's philosophical works, albeit this never got beyond the preface. In the spring of 1825 he was recalled to Berlin to square accounts with the redoubtable spinster, who had recently set up a fresh claim against him, on the ground of permanent disablement from gaining her livelihood, having been a consequence of the assault committed three years previously. She now demanded a regular yearly allowance as indemnity. The case had gone against him, and the previous October he had been condemned in costs, and ordered to pay the woman fifteen thalers a quarter (about £9 a year) towards her maintenance. His immediate object in going to Berlin now was to get the verdict reversed. In this he was unsuccessful, and after some months of litigious vexation the decree was made

final in March of the following year. The woman herself, who was over fifty years of age at the time, might have furnished Schopenhauer with the theme for a dissertation on the toughness of constitution possessed by the sex, or as he might have put it, on the strength of the manifestation of "The Will-to-live" enshrined in the female body. Among other illnesses, she was prostrated by the cholera when it appeared in North Germany a few years later, and while strong men around her were succumbing in some cases to what were apparently much lighter attacks, she recovered, and survived for many a long year to enjoy the receipt of the pension allotted to her by the law. But last of all this woman died also, and on receiving official information of the fact, Schopenhauer inscribed on the notice-paper the significant and appropriate words, *Obit anus abit onus.*

Schopenhauer continued, notwithstanding his defeat in the law-courts, to reside in Berlin for some years, leading a solitary life, a favourite dog (he was devotedly attached to animals) his only companion. He dined regularly at the table d'hôte of the Hotel de Russie, music and the drama forming his chief relaxations during the time. Among various other literary projects, he entertained an idea of translating Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," "Prolegomena," and "Critique of Judgment" into English, his knowledge of which language was perfect. This too, however, after the passage of sundry letters between Berlin and London, fell to the ground. In the summer of 1831 the cholera appeared in Berlin, one of its victims being, as is well known, Schopenhauer's great rival Hegel. Schopenhauer, who had a constitutional horror and terror of infection, fled precipitately from the capital on the approach of the enemy, and sought refuge in Frankfort-on-the-Maine, which he never again quitted for any length of time so long as he lived. Our thinker, who had a distinctly superstitious vein in him, which, moreover, in no way con-

flicted with his philosophy, believed himself warned in a dream that he should die of cholera if he remained.

On his arrival in Frankfort a feeling of isolation, and consequent melancholy, owing to the sudden change from familiar scenes, induced him to renew a correspondence with his sister. Both mother and daughter had now quitted Weimar, and Adele—such was the name of the sister—had taken, like her mother, to the production of light literature. But though a desultory correspondence was resumed, he none the less remained estranged as before from his two relatives as far as personal intercourse was concerned. The next year, 1832, Schopenhauer removed for a few months to Mannheim, which for some reason he thought he should prefer to Frankfort as a place of residence. The change, however, proved not to his liking, and he returned to Frankfort. Among his remains were found an accurately drawn up *pro* and *contra* account respecting the two places, in which Frankfort wins because of its greater life and facility of amusement, its able dentists and "less bad physicians," and last, but not least, its "more Englishmen." This, like many other of the memoranda and notes of Schopenhauer, is written in the English language. His life-work henceforward was amplifying, commentating on, and illustrating his philosophy as embodied in his "chief work," as he is fond of terming it. In his philosophy, as he repeatedly says, he found occupation, instruction, and recreation—the fullness of life—in short, his happiness, in so far as such was possible to him.

For years his daily round was a perfectly regular one. He rose at half-past seven, took his bath, at that time a rare luxury in Germany, dressed, prepared and drank his coffee, gave instructions to his housekeeper not to interrupt him till noon, and settled down to three or four hours' work, which he considered enough for continuous intellectual application, whether in reading or writing.

At twelve o'clock he knocked off, took a turn at practising on his flute, and at one o'clock dined at his hotel, which was at first the "Englischerhof," and in later years the hotel "Zum Schwanen." He seldom talked during or after dinner, except when an especially cultivated or appreciative guest happened to be sitting beside him. After dinner he returned to his domicile, took his coffee, and slept for an hour. He then read *belles lettres* till four o'clock, being widely versed in English and French novelists. At four, or a little after, Schopenhauer started for his constitutional, accompanied by his dog. There had been a succession of these dogs, mostly poodles, since his student days. The poodle used to be called by the children of the neighbourhood *young Schopenhauer*. Occasionally, though rarely, an acquaintance took part in these strolls. The philosopher walked rapidly, so rapidly that few could keep up with him, for two hours on end. When alone, he often stopped suddenly for a moment, if an idea struck him, in order to note it down. On his return at six o'clock, or thereabouts, he visited the reading-room, where he regularly perused "The Times." At half-past eight he took his supper, which consisted of a cold collation and half a bottle of light wine. He then lit his long German pipe, and read for an hour. Directly after he went to bed, always believing in a long night's rest. To the obvious taunt which might have been applied to him that he did not carry out his own ascetic ideal, he would have replied that this could with no more reason be required of the philosopher than of any other man. If the philosopher by his insight could intellectually grasp the ideal of life and set it down in theory, this did not imply any greater obligation to realize it in his own person than in the case of anyone else. He who drives fat oxen need not himself be fat. The sculptor who produces a beautiful form may himself be a Silenus. And conversely, we do not expect an Adonis, just because he is an Adonis, to be also a Phidias.

Schopenhauer published in 1836 a small volume on "Will in Nature." This was his first literary production of any consequence since the completion of "The World as Will and Presentment" in 1818. In it he collected various recently discovered facts of physical science that he thought corroborated the central positions of his philosophy, which he always contended could be arrived at by an inductive process. The new work, like its predecessors, failed to arrest, much less to secure, public attention. He was much disgusted at being known as the son of the novelist Johanna Schopenhauer, rather than as the author of the great philosophical system which should for ever solve the riddle of life. In 1838 a learned society at Drontheim, in Norway, offered a prize for the best essay on the question, "Whether the freedom of the Will could be proved on the testimony of consciousness?" Schopenhauer at once competed, and early in the following year he received intimation that his essay had won the prize. His delight at having, after so many failures, at last secured a measure of success, if not with the greater public, at least with a learned body like the Swedish Academy, knew no bounds. So elated was he, that he at once set about competing for another prize for an essay on "The Foundations of Morality," which had been offered the previous year by the Royal Danish Academy of Copenhagen. The essay having been duly finished and sent in, its author confidently awaited the news of a second success, and was intensely disgusted when he was apprized of the fact that his work had been rejected on the grounds that it contained no adequate discussion of the relation of metaphysics to ethics; that the alleged proofs of sympathy being the Foundation of Morality were insufficient; and lastly, which was worst of all, that eminent philosopers had been treated without due respect. Who these philosophers referred to were may be imagined. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel became more

than ever the incarnation, for him, of deceit, sophistry, and low conspiracy to ignore him. The existent professors of philosophy, who had mostly drunk at these fountain heads, were carrying on, he was sure, the work of the arch-villain Hegel. Both treatises were published in one volume in 1841, at Frankfort, with the title "The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics." Three years after this the second edition of "The World as Will and Presentment" was issued from the press, without much change, except in the appendix on the Kantian philosophy, where his views on the relative merits of the first and second editions of the "Critique" were for the first time set forth. The important new feature was the addition of a commentary o.. the whole in the form of a second volume, which actually exceeded the first in bulk.

The days of 1848 brought Schopenhauer's anti-political and anti-social side into prominence. He was desperately frightened lest he should lose his means in a general overturn. His essentially individualist impulses, and his views as to the functions of the "superior person" in the economy of human life, naturally led him to hate the populace—the *sovereign canaille*, as he called it. He saw from his window the erection of barricades on the bridge over the Maine, and his room was on one occasion used by a party of Austrian troops as a citadel from which to open fire on the insurgents in the street below. The disturbance in the even tenor of his life, caused by the events of the revolution, naturally intensified Schopenhauer's bitterness towards it; for an egoist he was and remained, from first to last. We are not surprised, therefore, that he left a large part of his fortune to the surviving relatives of those who fell on the reactionary side. The general break-up, however, of the previous conditions of German life, both material and intellectual, of which the revolution of 1848 was an indication, told in favour of Schopenhauer's literary

claims. Disciples and admirers now began gradually to drop in. First of all came the old "councillor" of Magdeburg, Dorguth by name, who was the earliest to call public attention to Schopenhauer in an exaggerated estimate of his claims, embodied in a pamphlet, the first of a series in the same style which ran on up to Dorguth's death in 1854. More important was the acquisition of the popular writer on philosophical subjects, Julius Frauenstädt. The latter became the most useful and enthusiastic exponent of Schopenhauer's views, as well as for many years his adviser in practical matters relating to publishing, &c. In newspaper and review Frauenstädt was untiring in asserting his master's claims to recognition, and in expounding and defending his philosophical positions. His chief literary work in this connection was his "Letters on Schopenhauer's Philosophy." But Schopenhauer, now advancing to old age, was more than ever difficult to get on with; and a rupture of three years in the personal relations between master and disciple occurred, which was only terminated a few months before the death of the former. Adam von Doss, a Bavarian lawyer, also entered upon a vigorous correspondence with Schopenhauer. Lintner, the assistant editor of the "Vossische Zeitung," was converted by a perusal of the "Parerga," and paid especial attention to the theory of music contained in Schopenhauer's system. He also collaborated with Frauenstädt, after Schopenhauer's death, in a work, the main object of which was to defend the personal character of the master against aspersions which had been thrown upon it. In 1853 the well-known article of John Oxenford, the English dramatic critic, entitled "Iconoclasm in German Philosophy," was published in the "Westminster Review," and Schopenhauer was for the first time introduced to the British public. Other friends there were whom Schopenhauer won, the most important being Dr. David Asher, who was

attracted by the pessimist's musical speculations while a teacher at Leipsic, and who subsequently became connected with the publishing firm of his name; and last, but not least, his biographer, Dr. Gwinner.

It was the "Parerga and Paralipomena," which was published in 1851, that first gave Schopenhauer a reputation with the general public. This, his last important work, was the first to attain any immediate success. It was nevertheless declined at the outset by three publishers in succession, and, as it was, his only payment for the copyright consisted in a dozen copies of the book. The strange conglomeration of literary odds and ends on things in general "caught on" almost at once, and led to a republication of the essay on "Will in Nature"; to a third edition of "The World as Will and Presentment"; and shortly before his death, in 1860, to a re-issue of "The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics." Schopenhauer's chief pleasure in his old age now became reading favourable notices of his own works. His appetite for public applause was voracious. Admirers were frequently attracted to the new philosophy by special points. To some it was his musical theories; to others, those on sexual love; to others, again, his views on mesmerism and hypnotism. But the incoming throng of adherents, admirers, and interested readers was almost entirely composed of the class known as "persons of general culture." The Universities still remained closed to him, and few of those specially trained in them took any interest in the new pessimism or its exponent. One day he received a visit from an officer stationed at Magdeburg, who informed him of the existence of a society of admirers among the military of that city. The officer stated that he himself had read nothing else but Schopenhauer for the past three years. In fact, in the last few years of his life, Schopenhauer had become a celebrity whom the curious passing through Frankfort desired to

see. In 1855 he sat for his portrait to a French painter. The next year he was painted by a German artist, a native of Frankfort, while a little later his bust was modelled by a young lady artist of Berlin. Still the evidences he obtained of his renown did not keep pace with his vanity. He could never read enough about himself. He repeatedly laments that so much that had been written about him must be escaping his notice. The first indication of any academic interest in him was furnished by the University of Leipsic, which in 1857 offered a prize for the best critical essay on his system. About this time Schopenhauer saw his friend Bunsen for the last time. The short visit the latter paid to Frankfort seems to have been the occasion of a pleasant revival for both parties of old student memories. The summer of 1860 showed considerable evidences of the results of old age. Schopenhauer's strong constitution no longer stood him in good stead. Palpitation of the heart forced him to modify his constitutionals. An attack of inflammation of the lungs, from which he but slowly recovered, left him for a long time prostrate. Recurrent seizures of faintness seemed to indicate something radically wrong with his heart. Finally, on the morning of the 21st of September, 1860, after having risen and partaken of his breakfast as usual, he was found lying back dead on the sofa by his medical attendant, who had come to pay what for some time now had been his regular morning visit.

Schopenhauer has attracted as much interest by his personality as by his writings. As is sufficiently obvious, his was a character of peculiar inadaptability to circumstances. Few people could have got on with him, and, as a matter of fact, he scarcely had an intimate friend throughout his life. The least suggestion of derogation from the most extravagant of his personal claims sufficed, especially in his later years, to inspire him with the keenest resentment.

Schopenhauer was, in short, as perfect a type as we could well have of the completely self-centred egoist. Not that he lacked genuine zeal for truth, or devotion to philosophy. But these things were inseparable with him from zeal for the applause and recognition of his own work, and devotion to his own personality as such. That Schopenhauer was not destitute of a certain sense of humour his writings show. But certainly there was something lacking in his feeling for the ridiculous, or otherwise he could never have penned the comically arrogant passages concerning himself which he has done. It is a susceptibility to the comic side of things which alone saves the man of greater ability than the average from the expression of exaggerated estimates of his own powers. An excessive personal sensibility, leading at times to moroseness, an irritability of temper which exaggerated trifles, and a personal vanity of huge proportions, must, in short, be admitted as fundamental characteristics of the founder of the neo-pessimism. These things were associated with a timidity, a scenting of danger from afar, which, though it may have been, as it is with many, purely constitutional in its origin, yet was in his case unquestionably fostered and nourished by the excessive habit of self-concentration above alluded to. Schopenhauer was in a constant state of alarm as to his personal safety. He fled from the very name of an infectious disease. He was so afraid of fire that he would only live on the ground floor of the house; and his fear of reverse of fortune was so great that he was in the habit of concealing important business papers and other valuable property, lest it should be stolen, under the harmless label of "*materia medica.*" Still there can be no doubt whatever as to the sincerity of Schopenhauer's belief in his own mission, as the exponent of a new philosophy, or rather as the expounder in the definite formulæ of Western thought of the old semi-poetical philosophy of the East.

The Philosophy of Schopenhauer.

As he is never tired of insisting, Schopenhauer's philosophy is based upon the criticism of Kant. As already hinted, there were two distinct possibilities of speculative development contained in the Kantian metaphysic. Kant had divided his system into Transcendental Æsthetic, Transcendental Analytic, and Transcendental Dialectic. The first contained an exposition of the conditions of pure sensibility. These were for Kant the subsuming of the blind sense impression, the resultant of the unknown thing-in-itself under the forms of space and time. But to the completed phenomenon of so-called common-sense reality —to the object known as such—another element was necessary, that, namely, of the pure activity of thought, working through certain categories tabulated by Kant, and deducible from the ultimate unity of the consciousness. The exposition of the pure thought-conditions—as opposed to those of pure sense—are set forth and discussed in the second part of the "Critique," which Kant terms "The Transcendental Analytic." These two first parts of the great work, since they deal, not with the completed reality as we find it, but with the conditions which that reality presupposes—with the elements which go to the making of that reality rather than with the reality as a whole—these two first parts of the "Critique" are called by Kant the "Theory of Elements" ("*elementarlehre*"). The remainder of the book consists in the so-called "Transcendental Dialectic." This no longer deals with the elements which go to the making or determination of reality in consciousness, but with the ideas or assumptions which the mind is compelled to super-impose on these, and which hinge on the conceptions of the soul as a simple substance, on the world as infinite in time and space, and on God as

the self-containing principle of all reality and all possibility of reality. The Sensibility, therefore, the faculty of receiving impressions from without; the Understanding, the faculty of working up these impressions into a coherent world of objects; and the Reason, the faculty of carrying on the process of thought-activity beyond the given world of phenomena created by the synthesis of sensibility and understanding, constitute for Kant the tripartite division of consciousness in general, or knowledge, in the widest sense of the word. Kant designated his system, therefore, as "Theory of Knowledge," inasmuch as it was an investigation into the conditions under which alone all knowledge is possible.

Now while Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, especially the first and third, had taken their stand in the main upon the element of direct thought-activity deducible from the synthetic unity of the consciousness, and had thus postulated thought or intelligence as the ultimate principle of all reality, Schopenhauer thought he was able to deduce the active, formative principle of the world from something still deeper, from a principle which was itself *a*logical, non-conscious—albeit the source of consciousness—a principle he identified with the so-called thing-in-itself, and the sense-impression which, according to Kant, was its result. This principle he further identified with Will, understanding by Will all *nisus*, all impulse, of whatever character. The intelligence is, therefore, a secondary principle, entirely subordinate to the thing-in-itself, or Will, which manifests itself in all Nature, being substantially the same whether in gravitation or in human desire. Will is for Schopenhauer the *matter*, the intelligence, the *form* of Reality, but the two elements are everywhere distinguishable in consciousness. In Schopenhauer's first work, "The Fourfold Root," he had endeavoured to establish the proposition that all the Kantian categories are ultimately deducible from that of Cause, and

that this is itself a mode of the Will. "Adequate Cause" is divided by Schopenhauer into a principle of being, doing, acting, and knowing (*essendi, fiendi, agendi,* and *cognoscendi*). The law of Adequate Cause expresses the ordered connection between all our presentments, as determinable *a priori*, by virtue of which nothing can be self-existent and independent of other things, but in order to be an object for our consciousness it must stand in connection with the totality of phenomena. But the manner of this connection differs according to the nature of the object. Every presentment which can become object for us falls under one or other of four classes. The first class of possible objects of presentment is that of the completed empirical perception. The primary form of this perception Schopenhauer makes, following Kant, to consist in space and time, the forms respectively of the outer and of the inner sense. In this class of objects it appears as the law of causality in the narrower sense of the word. Schopenhauer calls it the law of the adequate cause of becoming (*principium rationis sufficientis fiendi*). A change in any object or objects presupposes another, upon which it has followed, with absolute necessity. Such a sequence is what we commonly call cause and effect. The forms of causality in this sense are mechanical cause, organic irritability, and psychical motive. The first form, in which action and reaction are equal to one another, governs the inorganic world with its mechanical processes, the second governs the organic world with its physiological processes, and the third governs the world of thought and conscious action. The second class of possible objects for a subject are constituted by concepts or abstract presentments. This is the class concerned with the adequate cause of *knowing* (*principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi*), which proclaims that if a judgment is to express an intelligent proposition it must have a sufficient reason, hence it is termed true, truth consisting either in the

logical and formal correctness of judgments, or in their adequacy for expressing a sensuous perception, which, in so far as it is based on experience, constitutes empirical truth. The third class of objects for the presentative faculty is constituted by the formal element of the completed presentments, namely, the *a priori* given intuitions of the forms of the external and the internal sense, *space* and *time*. As pure perceptions they are distinguishable from the completed objects of perception. They have the characteristic that all their parts stand in one relation to each other, in respect of which each of them is conditioned by the other. In space, this relation is called position; in time, sequence. From the latter *number* is directly deducible. The law according to which parts of time and space are determined is termed by Schopenhauer the law of the adequate cause of being (*principium rationis sufficientis essendi*). The fourth and last class of possible objects for the faculty of presentment has its basis in the immediate object of the internal sense, the subject which wills, but which is at the same time object for the faculty of presentment, though an object of a unique kind, being only given to the internal sense, and, therefore, manifesting itself, not in space, but in time alone. In respect of Willing, the law of cause presents itself as the law of sufficient reason of action, or as the law of motivation (*principium rationis sufficientis agendi*). In so far as motive is the external condition of an action it belongs to causes of the same kind as those mechanical ones considered under the first class of objects of possible presentment. In this last class, therefore, the circle is complete, since in it the first class merely evinces itself as ultimately the same thing viewed from the external side only. For motives are known to us not only from without like other causes, but also from within, and in them, therefore, we have the key to the mystery of the innermost meaning of all other kinds of causation. Motivation is

simply causation seen from within. Such is, in brief outline, the subject-matter of Schopenhauer's first philosophical work. Those desirous of further information respecting it may consult the English translation, which forms one of the volumes in Bohn's Philosophical Library.

Schopenhauer's "chief work," "The World as Will and Presentment," is divided into four sections, of which the first treats of The World as Presentment, in the sense of empirical reality, the object of science; the second, of The World as Will, that is, the will-to-live; the third, of The World as Presentment, so to say in its second intention, as Platonic Idea, the object of art; the fourth, lastly, of The Will in its second intention, as purified from the lust of life, and turned as it were against itself. The volume ends with an appendix on the Kantian philosophy.

"The World is my Presentment." This proposition, with which the first book begins, applies, says Schopenhauer, to every living and knowing being, albeit in man alone does it appear in the form of a reflective or abstract thought. The sundering of consciousness into object and subject is the only form under which any presentment, be it perceptive or conceptive, is possible or thinkable. The world means simply the totality of objects existing in and for a subject, of perceptions for a perceiver, in short, of presentments; the whole world and all that can possibly belong to it is subject to this condition; it is only *there* for a subject, it is only a determination of a subject. The essential and universal forms of the object belong, however, to the subject, as Schopenhauer with Kant insists, and may, therefore, be distinguished *a priori* in consciousness. The principle of adequate cause, as expounded by Schopenhauer in the book above noticed, and at less length here, is the general expression which embraces all forms of the object. Materialism errs, in that it ignores the fact in question. The only valid standpoint consists in the

recognition of the complete relativity involved in all presentment and in all thought. From this complete relativity, amounting with Schopenhauer to a dualism, Schopenhauer infers the *prius*, or root-principle, to be something other than intelligence or knowledge. The separation of subject and object, and the law of cause which it implies, involves us in an antinomy or contradiction. For although metaphysically the existence of the world is dependent on its being known by living beings, yet, physically, these latter are themselves just as dependent on a chain of physical events, of causes and effects, into which they enter as a mere link. This antinomy finds its solution in the assumption that the World as Presentment, that is, as sundered into subject and object and subordinated to the principle of cause, is only its external side, and that its innermost being, its kernel, its root, in short, the "thing-in-itself" of Kant, is what we term, with reference to its most direct and immediate manifestation, *Will*.

The second book treats of the objectivation of the *Will*. The body is presented in a double manner to the subject of knowledge, first as a mediate presentment, or object among other objects, and subordinated to the law of causation, and secondly as that immediately known to each. The act of the will and the movement of my body are not two different conditions standing in the relation to each other of cause and effect, but they are simply the same thing viewed from a double side. The action of the body is simply the act of will objectified. The question as to whether the remaining phenomena of the world, as known from the external side only, are acts of will or not, is really identical with the question as to whether they are reality or illusion. To answer it in the negative amounts to a solipsism. This is indeed a sceptical sophism which cannot be refuted, but, on the other hand, it is a theory which no one holds outside a mad-house. Hence we are

perfectly justified in assuming that the phenomenon manifested in the being or action of our own body is a key to that of all other phenomena in nature, although *they* are only given in presentment from the outer side. This means, that could we strip off their character of presentments in an intelligence, of objects for a consciousness, what remained over would be identical with that which in the case of our body we term Will. The Will considered as thing-in-itself is entirely distinct from the same Will as phenomenalized, objectivized, or presented in consciousness, and is not subject to the conditions of the latter, which conditions merely touch its objectivity. The will considered as thing-in-itself is one and indivisible, though its objective manifestations in the phenomenal world are infinite. But these infinite manifestations, in so far as they are double-sided like our own organism, and therefore real, are of a mixed nature, and hence do not express the element of objectivity or outwardness in its purity. The latter is only to be found in the pure idea, which is at the root of every class of phenomena, that is, in the system of Ideal types, which constitute the successive stages in the objectivation of the Will, as more or less confusedly reproduced in the particular phenomena in which they express themselves. The most general forces of matter, such as gravity, impenetrability, &c., represent the lowest phase of the objectivation of the Will. Physical, chemical, and organic forces supervene on these, and represent successively higher stages in the objectivation. Each stage contests its place in space and time with the one below it This applies not only to the more important stages, but also to the subordinate ones; for example, every higher form of life has to battle for its place in nature with those below it. As a consequence, it only expresses so much of the idea as it has the force left in it to do after this conflict has been decided in its favour. Time

and space as the *principia individiationis* have no immediate influence on the ideas, which as *pure objects* stand over and above the particulars or individuals in time and space which more or less adequately, more or less inadequately, embody them.

This doctrine is the basis of Schopenhauer's "theory of art," and is set forth in the third book of "The World as Will and Presentment." As we have seen, at one pole is the Will as pure Subject; at the other is the Presentment as pure Object. Between these two positions—these two modes of the noumenon or thing-in-itself—lies the phenomenal world, with its participation in both, under the conditions of Time, Space, and Causation in its four forms. The idea (the Platonic Idea, as Schopenhauer sometimes calls it), notwithstanding that it is not subject to the conditions of time and space, and the categories of cause, is nevertheless a form of knowledge—indeed, the most universal form of knowledge—it is *Presentment in general.* We can only attain through individual things to a knowledge of the ideas they represent, in so far as a change takes place in us—*i.e.*, in the percipient or subject of knowledge itself, by which the latter, in so far as it is absorbed in the apprehension of the idea, ceases, *pro hac vice*, to be individual, and becomes universal. This form of knowledge belongs exclusively to the objectivation of the will in its higher stages. In the first instance, the intellect, or faculty of knowledge, is entirely there in the service of the Will. But as the faculty of apprehending the idea it is emancipated from this service, the pleasure experienced in æsthetic contemplation being, Schopenhauer contends, will-less in its origin and nature. The capacity for abstracting the intellect from the service of the Will is the exclusive appanage of Man. With the animals the intellect always remains the slave of the appetites—that is, under the complete sway of the Will-to-live. Hence they

are incapable of æsthetic contemplation. For the art-consciousness demands that we should regard the Object presented apart from its *why*, its *wherefore*, its *how*, and its *when*. In doing so, we approach the pure Platonic idea—the ideal type of the Object considered in itself. The Subject for the nonce is emancipated from its ordinary desires and impulses, apprehensions and interests, and becomes, so to speak, raised to a higher potency of consciousness. It is conscious no longer of the individual thing, but of the eternal form.

The different branches of the fine arts represent the different stages in the objectivation of the Will. The lowest stage is that of architecture, which embodies the idea of gravity, and the forces deducible from it—in short, it expresses the Platonic idea of what appears in the phenomenal world as mechanics. As we rise in the scale, the natural forces expressed become more complex, and the idea conveys with deeper meaning and greater precision the truth of human life. For example, painting, which deals directly with individuals or particulars, treats them only as the representatives of a class. They are for the artist not individuals, but types. The highest achievements of painting are to be found in mediæval catholic art, which portrays the figure of the saint in whom the Will-to-live has died, and who has therefore already attained to a foretaste of Nirvana. The same with poetry: the highest manifestation of the poetic art is in tragedy.

Music stands on a different footing from the other arts, inasmuch as it does not represent any one stage of the Will's manifestation like them, but is the direct embodiment of the Will's objectivity in general. Hence the peculiar effect, unlike that of the other arts, which music produces on minds susceptible to it. In music we have the purest expression of the free play of emotion and impulse, undetermined to any specific subject-matter. Schopen-

hauer carries this idea out with much ingenuity as regards both harmony and melody, the different registers, cadences, rhythms, &c. Joy and sorrow, pure and simple, is, in short, the burden of music. There is no material, as in the other arts, which covers this central fact up, overloading it with detail which obscures the real issue, but all is here directly and obviously reducible to the blind impulse which Schopenhauer terms "The Will-to-live."

The fourth and last book of the "World as Will and Presentment" treats of the Will-to-live as turning against itself, as recognizing its own futility and denying itself. This can only be attained by means of the insight that all life issues in sorrow and pain; that the evil of the world outbalances the good, and does so not accidentally but necessarily. All Willing, Schopenhauer is fond of pointing out, implies want, and all want implies suffering. Hence so long as the Will is affirmed so long are evil and suffering affirmed. The root of all life being Willing, and all Willing implying the want of something which is not, as soon as one want is satisfied another arising by the very necessities of the case, it follows that the Will in us must be destroyed annihilated, before the blessed state of the extinction of all Willing, and of the consciousness, which is in the service of the Will, can be attained. A partial and temporary satisfaction may be acquired by the transformation of the Will into pure objectivity, as in the art-consciousness. But this is not enduring. We cannot continue in this state for long, we are continually forced back into that world in which the intellect, the intelligence, is in the service of the Will.

Hence the final solution of the problem of life is to be found, not in æsthetics, but in ethics; it is to be found, in short, in asceticism. The destruction of the individual life is one thing, that of the Will-to-live is another. In the first it is the phenomenon only which

perishes, leaving the noumenon, the thing-in-itself, or Will, remaining intact, and continuing to realize itself immediately in another individual. For this reason suicide is no solution of the difficulty, for the Will is affirmed in the very act by which the life is destroyed. On the other hand, once the Will is finally negated, the continuance of the mere phenomenonal life for a time is quite a secondary matter. The consequence of this, namely, self-starvation, the absention, as in the case of the Hindoo yogis, from all action on one's own behalf tending to preserve life as being the highest expression of an ascetic morality, is obvious, and Schopenhauer does not shrink from it. The great turning-point in the negation of the Will-to-live is the triumph over the sexual impulse, the impulse which directly leads to the affirmation of the Will in new individuals. The final stage is the triumph over the Will-to-live as expressed in the instinct of self-preservation, that is, in the desire for the continuance of the immediate personality concerned. The Hindoo ascetics above all, and after them the Trappists, are Schopenhauer's ideal. The end of Schopenhauer's philosophy is the complete extinction of Will, and, as a natural consequence, of life itself, in all human beings, which is, therefore, the ultimate goal of all existence. The Will perishes, and the root of consciousness being cut away, it withers and dies. The blessed state of consciousless, Will-less extinction, the great Nothing to which all Nature points, is then attained. Schopenhauer speaks of "the dark impression of that Nothing, which looms as the final goal behind all virtue and holiness, which we fear like children the darkness." "Instead of seeking to evade it," he concludes, "as even the Indians do by myths and meaningless words, or the Nirvana of the Buddhists, we recognize the fact freely that what remains after the complete abolition of the Will is for all those who are immersed in the Will assuredly nothing. But

conversely, for those in whom the Will has turned against and denied itself, this our so very real world, with all its suns and galaxies, is also—nothing."

The above is a brief, and therefore necessarily extremely condensed, exposition of the leading principles of Schopenhauer's philosophy. Its merits and its defects are not far to seek for the philosophical student. Many, and sometimes deep, are the insights which we come across in all Schopenhauer's writings. The ingenuity with which he fits his own acute observations on men and things, on Nature and art, into his system, is sometimes quite startling. This is especially noticeable in the third book of "The World as Will and Presentment," which contains his theory of art. It is, in fact, on the artistic side that Schopenhauer has most directly influenced the world. His power in determining the theories of Richard Wagner, and thus indirectly in revolutionizing modern dramatic music, are well known, although it is curious to note that Schopenhauer himself did not appreciate the earlier works of Wagner, which were the only ones with which he was acquainted.

The ethical side of Schopenhauer's system has mainly served as a quasi-philosophical stalking-horse for the somewhat nebulous *fin de siècle* pessimism which is the characteristic note of the modern "man of culture." It has been expanded and developed by many a *littérateur*-philosopher, its most systematic latter-day exponent being Eduard Von Hartmann. Schopenhauer's purely literary merits as a writer of German are so great, that his books have penetrated into circles where no other philosophical literature obtains access. He has remained what he was when he first began to be read, the popularizer of philosophy for the general reading public. His theory is comparatively easy of apprehension by the man of average general education, who is not altogether destitute of speculative faculty

or cravings, but who does not want the trouble of the arduous and sustained labour necessary to the thinking out of the metaphysical problem in all its bearings, or to the adequate comprehension of a thinker like Hegel. Schopenhauer's boasted clearness, on the other hand, is often the mere clearness of superficiality. As it has been justly observed, a mere specious illustration often serves the purpose of an argument. It is a similar superficiality, wearing the appearance of depth and knowledge of life, and taking its cue from the plausible but limited generalizations respecting what is known as "human nature" derived from observations of motives of men in the present day, and during the short span of time we term history, which is responsible for the cynicism so fashionable nowadays with the man of the world. To the latter any other attitude than that of cynicism and disbelief in "human nature" is evidence of mere infatuation, enthusiasm, or some other amiable weakness. Your man of the world is just as little able to entertain the suspicion that his cynicism is merely a passing mood, having its origin in himself, and in the particular phase of society which has given him birth, as the ancients were to conceive the possibility of the antipodes. To such an attitude of mind the pessimism of Schopenhauer is satisfactory, as supplying it with a quasi-philosophical justification. The denial of all progress and of any coherent development in human affairs, the natural consequence of the postulation of the individual as his own final *telos*, and the assertion in the most accentuated form of the introspective ethics, which has throughout history been the idealogical accompaniment of individualism in material things, all this is eminently congenial to the modern "cultured" man of the world.

In metaphysics Schopenhauer represents an important, and, as far as it goes, a well-grounded protest against one tendency of the contemporary philosophy of his time, and

especially of Hegel—the tendency, namely, to hypostatize the mere thought-form or category. Kant, in his deduction of the conditions under which all knowledge is possible, had started from the primitive "unity of apperception," as he termed it, as expressed in the self-conscious act, "I think." This, which with Kant was merely one side of a somewhat loosely connected theory, became with Fichte and with Hegel the keystone of the whole. While with Kant it had remained formal, with his successors it had become material as well—the root-principle of the Concrete or Real. In the "I think," stress was laid with them, as with Kant, on the "think." This is most noticeable in Hegel, where the "I" is a mere determination of the Concept, *i.e.*, of thinking. Now Schopenhauer caught at this one-sidedness, as it appeared to him, of the academic philosophy, and stoutly affirmed the principle that thought, or the logical, the "intelligible" principle in the constitution of reality, presupposed and was dependent on an *a*logical principle, which was identical with the thing-in-itself of Kant, which Hegel had eliminated from his system; that this was further identical with the Subject or "I" from which concepts and the consciousness they bring with them proceed—with the "I" which "thinks"—and that this "I" itself was merely another name for what under its most generalized aspect we term Will.

The above is really the special significance of Schopenhauer's system from a purely metaphysical standpoint. His opposition to the principle with which Hegel started, combined with the general bent of his mind, induced Schopenhauer to reject the greatest of all results of the German classical philosophy—a result to be found in germ in Kant, which was carried a step further by Fichte, and was perfected by Hegel—namely, the dialectical method. He was deeply impressed with the advantages of induction, which he believed could be applied

to philosophy. This he had taken on as a part of his reaction against German thought, and of his prepossession in favour of the English empirical school. For him, therefore, the method which traces the unfolding of reality through contradiction and its resolution, was nothing but sophistry and a juggle of words, designed with the object of throwing dust in the eyes of the German learned public. Schopenhauer's quasi-inductive method of supporting his main thesis gave him the opportunity of bidding for popular applause by that introduction of illustration and plausible analogy, which has already been alluded to. The severe logical analysis of the academic thinkers was altogether repugnant to Schopenhauer's turn of mind. When he believed he had hit upon a deep metaphysical truth, he cast about him for facts in Nature which he might use in support of it. As a consequence, to the philosophical student trained on another method, the continued reiteration of the one fundamental proposition, all things are Will, in a form but little varied in itself, and merely reinforced from various sides, is somewhat wearisome, and is sometimes suggestive of Thales and his well-worn dictum, "all things are water."

At the same time, one cannot deny to Schopenhauer a certain genuine impartiality in the pursuit of truth. This is proved by the fact that his independent thought sometimes leads unconsciously to conclusions in flagrant opposition to his own sentiments and antipathies. Take for instance his utterances respecting the existing social system to be found in odd corners of his essays, or his arguments against "prescription" in vol. i., page 380, of "The World as Will and Presentment," and remember the bitterly reactionary sentiments of Schopenhauer in social and political matters generally. Mood is also a powerful factor in influencing Schopenhauer's utterances on various subjects of practical interest. He can sometimes work himself up

into a state of vehement indignation, as when referring to English pietism and American negro slavery.

Notwithstanding the metaphysical truth enshrined in Schopenhauer's rehabilitation of the *a*logical element in knowledge—experience, or reality—as against the panlogism of Hegel and the academical school, and notwithstanding the wonderful suggestiveness of many portions of his work, especially his theory of art, it will be soon apparent to the attentive student that the coherence of the system, as a system, is very superficial. There is a good deal of unexplained residuum in it. Schopenhauer never seems quite clear as to the distinction between *abstract* and *concrete*, between *element* and *whole* or *thing*. For this reason, notwithstanding his protestations of Monism, his system really seems like a Dualism. According to his statement, the Will as thing-in-itself would seem to be not merely a basal element, but itself a *concrete*, a *thing* in the literal sense of the word. On the other hand, Presentment *as* Presentment seems to have likewise an independent existence. Thus, in the Platonic idea, the object of art, it exists apart from the Will, inasmuch as the element of Willing, as such, disappears, which would seem to contradict the assumption that the essence of the thing-in-itself is Will. Then, again, Schopenhauer never really gets over the difficulty involved in his ethical doctrine, according to which the Will-to-live can turn against and negate itself. This implies, look at it as we may, on Schopenhauer's principles, the destruction of a substance. The objection Schopenhauer himself was not unaware of, and in dealing with it he practically admits *willing* to be the mere attribute of a substratum in itself unknowable. Yet, again, the individualism of Schopenhauer's ethics involves some further difficulties. The one Will which is the soul of all things is in itself indivisible; it is merely as object or phenomenon, as realizing itself in the conscious indi-

vidual, under the forms of space, time, and causation, that the element of number enters into it. If this be true it cuts away the root of Schopenhauer's introspective-individualist ethics. For it is either wholly present in each individual or not. In either case the negation of the Will-to-live within him, as conscious and deliberate act on the part of any one individual *as* individual, cannot possibly affect the *noumenon* or thing-in-itself, which is identical in all individuals. To admit that it could do so would be to admit that very solipsism, that denial of reality as expressed in Willing to external things, against which Schopenhauer protests when discussing his theory of knowledge. No act of the phenomenal, conscious individual, on the principles of Schopenhauer's metaphysics, can in the least affect the root-principle of the Will which *ex hypothesi* manifests itself equally in all individuals. So long as one is left who dies unconverted, that is, without having of definite purpose renounced the Will-to-live, all things remain as they were before, since there can in this sense be no question of degree as to the affirmation or denial of the Will. Either it is all there, or it is completely and absolutely abolished. Whether it survives and is affirmed in the consciousness of one individual or of a thousand trillions of individuals, cannot make the slightest difference in the case of that for which plurality in the last resort has no meaning. The only way out of this difficulty for Schopenhauer, and that a not very successful one it must be admitted, would have been to have postulated the act of renunciation as performed once for all by the deliberate and unanimous consent of all conscious beings, and to have held this out as the goal of history. But to have done so would have been to surrender the individualism which covers Schopenhauer's whole ethical theory, and to have got again into line, albeit in an opposite direction, with the notion of human evolution and historical pro-

gress, and for this the individualism of Schopenhauer's temperament was too strong.

As regards the whole question of Pessimism *versus* Optimism, it is extremely difficult for the man of to-day to realize that the problem involves an antinomy, and is therefore unanswerable, simply because it is wrongly stated. The problem is stated in terms of individual feeling as measured by quantity, while its subject-matter really transcends individual feeling, and is incommensurable. It is asked, Does the amount of pleasure experienced by the organic individual—an average individual being assumed—exceed, on the whole, the sum of pain experienced by the same individual or not? It is further asked with reference to the said individual, Does this in the natural course of things tend to become greater or less? The question then arises as to quality, expressed in the well-known conundrum whether the pig happy would be preferable to Socrates miserable. In all these ways of putting the problem, it is the organic individual, the present conscious unit, (and his immediate pleasures or pains,) which is alone taken into consideration. Looked at in this way the question is answered by different persons differently, according to character, circumstance, mood, &c., and each, whichever side he takes up, can find support in plausible illustrations. An array of facts can be adduced in favour of the one side or of the other. In all this, however, the real gist of the question is more often than not missed. All the time, moreover, the assumption is made that the organic individual is the self-sufficient and final arbiter in the matter. Viewed from this point of view it cannot be denied that pessimists have the best of it as a general rule, but their assumption, like that of the consistent sceptic as to the reality of the external world—that solipsist who so often reappears in the history of philosophy—is given the lie to by the facts of existence, not-

withstanding plausible, and from one point of view unanswerable, theoretical arguments. The average conscious being *does* prefer existence to non-existence. This is a fact which remains to be explained. The philosophical pessimist, like Schopenhauer, explains it on the theory of illusion. The illusion has first to be pierced and seen through by the intellectual insight before emancipation from the illusion is possible. The answer to Schopenhauer as regards such an explanation might be, that when it is seen through intellectually the illusion is clung to notwithstanding. Schopenhauer himself is a case in point, for judged of from his purely individualistic point of view it is no mere *argumentum ad hominem* to taunt him with his own character and life as a disproof of his theory. It would surely not be unfair to assume that the man who, on his own showing, had more than any other man in Western Europe, by dint of intellectual insight, seen through the delusion as to the worth of life, and recognized self-destruction through ascetic privation as its highest end, ought to have practically realized his doctrine in his own person. That precisely he of all men had perhaps more than usual regard for the preservation of his own life under conditions of the greatest material comfort he could obtain, while those who have followed out the ascetic ideal to its practical consequences have been in many cases, perhaps in most cases, ignorant persons, actuated avowedly only by superstitious motives, certainly does not lend any colour or support to the theory on which Schopenhauer insists, to wit, that intellectual conviction of their futility tends to lead men to the renunciation of the pleasures of life, and ultimately life itself.

May not the strength of the practical conviction that life is worth living, in defiance of all theoretical proofs that it is not, afford evidence of the inaccuracy of Schopenhauer's assumption that pain is positive and pleasure negative, and

also some confirmation of the fact that the significance of the individual is not exhausted within the limits of his own personality? This latter point is brought out more particularly by a consideration of the question of *quality* in pleasure or happiness. From the standpoint of pure Hedonism, that is, of a theory which merely balances pleasures and pains quantitatively, there can be no doubt whatever the choice must be in favour of being a contented swine rather than a discontented genius. Similarly *à fortiori* it must be quite plain that the greatest sum of animal enjoyment conceivable for the healthy man may possibly, nay, will probably, be greater in amount for the individual who experiences it than the highest amount of pleasure to be derived by the man of correspondingly vigorous intellectual powers and refined tastes from intellectual things. But yet we have an unshakable conviction, the reverse of which is, in fact, taken seriously, unthinkable, that there is something preferable in the one to the other; that the difference of quality upsets all calculations based on mere quantity—in other words, that the question of mere pleasure and pain, taken in the abstract and referred to the individual also regarded abstractly, simply involves us in a circle from which there is no escape, but which does not get us any further forward in the solution of the problem of human life taken in the concrete. Mere pleasure or happiness, considered abstractly, may for practical purposes be regarded as a proximate end, and, in a similar way, the individual considered in himself, and apart from the social life and progress into which he enters, may also for practical purposes be regarded as a proximate end to himself. But we must never forget that so long as we regard things in this way we are dealing with abstractions which appear very differently when viewed from the standpoint of the meaning of the world and human nature considered as a real synthesis. In proportion as

this proximate aim assumes the form for us of a supreme end, we are living on a lower plane, since we are unmindful of the point of view from which the individual personality becomes a mere component or element of a larger whole. This position is most fully seen in the personality which we describe as criminal, or immoral in the true sense of the word, that is, anti-social. But it is also characteristic in a lesser degree of the commonplace man of the world. The aim of the introspective morality, the morality, that is, whose sign-manual throughout history is the ideal of personal holiness, as attained through the mere negation of the individual, his impulses and desires, has been to change this *per saltum* by means of asceticism. But in asceticism the egoistic point of view is not really abandoned, but is merely inverted. Self-denial for self-denial's sake belongs intrinsically just as much to the egoistic attitude as the mere self-indulgence of the libertine. In both cases the individual is viewed as end, that is, he is considered abstractly. The really higher point of view which transcends both these attitudes alike, is that which recognizes the personality and its immediate pleasure and pain as indeed constituting a proximate or immediate end, that is, a necessary stage, which, though not ultimate, is none the less an essential element in any higher end to which we may aspire; and which further recognizes that the only lasting and effective manner in which what we may term the *abstract* egoistic instincts can be abolished is in the identification by the sheer necessity of circumstances of individual pleasure and pain—in short, individual interest, in the narrower sense, with the interest of the whole of human society. The lower or anti-social impulses, then, so to speak, abolish themselves. To borrow Schopenhauer's phraseology, the affirmation of the Will-to-live in the individual becomes absorbed in, and identical with, the affirmation of the Will-to-live of

humanity as a whole. The strain of antagonism between the two, which from the lower standpoint seemed absolute, disappears. This is a stage, however, at which the ethical and economical problems intersect. I merely refer to it here as indicating the fallacy of estimating pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappiness, in terms of quantity merely, and with exclusive reference to the individual. Whether the abolition by the transformation of social conditions of the antagonism at present existing between individual and social interest is the prelude to a cycle of evolution, the end of which will be the transference of the characteristics of personality from the organic individual to the social individual (as we may term it), understanding by this a given society in its collective capacity, is a question which, extravagant and even incomprehensible though it may seem to many, nevertheless forces itself irresistibly upon one in reflecting on the problem as to the meaning of human life as we know it, and which opens up a vista of unknown possibilities, before which arguments drawn from our own limited data shrink into nothing.

On the question as to the tendency of progress towards an increase of happiness or the reverse, many reflections may be and have been made. The observation of the limited period passed through between the younger world and to-day, seems to indicate rather a change in the distribution of the relative happiness and misery of the world than any increase or diminution of either. The case seems to be expressed by such a fact as this, for example: the hardships of the mediæval serf, the acute and devastating epidemics of the Middle Ages, the ever-present possibilities of fire and sword, the torture-chambers of the feudal castle and of the inquisition, the recurrent famines continually imminent in one locality or another—all these things have been mitigated, and some have passed away altogether. But they have been replaced by the ever-present mass of

misery of the present day, as represented by the proletariat of our large towns, and by all that our modern polarization of the extremes of wealth and poverty implies. Similarly, the naïve exuberance of animal spirits and unrestrained enjoyment of the Middle Ages, work-days and holidays alike, has vanished, and its place has been taken by the subdued bourgeois equanimity of the suburban villa, or the vapid inanities of the London season and its drawing-rooms. Still, all this affords us no valid grounds for the induction as regards future change, the conditions of which must necessarily be entirely different.

The fact is, the antithesis between what in its most comprehensive aspect we designate by the words *good* and *evil* must continue in some form or shape, since they are elements mutually implicated in every *Real*. As to the increase or decrease of the one relatively to the other, we can only judge indirectly; the state of the case being, that all specific, that is, realized evil, necessarily passes away—that what is permanent is merely, so to say, the abstract category, *evil-in-general* undetermined to any specific content. But although at first sight the same is true of the opposite, namely, of the *good*, yet the case is not precisely identical, for while the preponderance of the specific or concrete evil to be eliminated appears at the beginning of a cycle of progress, or of a specific dialectical movement of evolution, the preponderance of "the good" attained through its elimination, as expressed in the *reality* of the cycle in question, invariably appears as the end and completion of that cycle. This implies, as will be readily seen, a "point" in the evolutionary process, as always given in favour of the "good." It implies, that is, that the trend of progress is towards the "good," though the approximation may be entirely of an asymptotic character. A reflection of this kind may indeed destroy extravagant optimism, and cause the youthful enthusiasm of those who are satisfied with nothing less than a perfection, which,

when closely viewed, is simply meaningless, because abstract, and hence in its nature unrealizable, to be "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." Yet for the more sober-minded enthusiast it is none the less a consolation the more valuable as resting on a philosophical truth which cannot be taken away from him, to feel that the end of every evolutionary cycle implies an increase of happiness as against its beginning. This good, or happiness, it is true—this victory of Ormuzd over Arhiman—is not enduring, inasmuch as its very conditions contain the *nidus* of a further and distinct evil of its own, unknown before, and which sooner or later makes its presence evident. But, nevertheless, in spite of this, the fact remains that in the r .oment of realization there is a positive and real increment of good or of happiness over the opposing principle. The old "evil" is destroyed, the new is as yet unrealized. To this process of the continual absorption of specific evil or misery in infinitely changing shape, by good or happiness, also in infinitely changing shape and on a progressively higher level, we can assign no end.

The foregoing are considerations which Schopenhauer might have seen but did not, and which, if he had seen, would certainly have modified his philosophico-ethical conclusions.

SKETCH OF A HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE IDEAL AND REAL.

DESCARTES is rightly deemed the father of modern philosophy, and this in a special, as well as a general sense, inasmuch as he placed the reason on its own feet by teaching men to use their own brains, in the place of which the Bible had previously served on the one hand, and Aristotle on the other. But in a more special and a narrower sense he was this also; since he was the first to bring the problem upon which philosophy has mainly turned to consciousness—the problem of the Ideal and Real—*i.e.*, the question as to what in our knowledge is objective, and what is subjective; in other words, what might be ascribed by us to other things, and what we must ascribe to ourselves. Images do not arise in our brain as it were arbitrarily from within, nor do they proceed from the connection of our own thoughts—hence they must spring from an external cause. But these images are immediately known to us—*they are given.* Now what relation do they have to things existing completely separate from, and independent of us, and which are in some way the cause of these images? Have we any certainty at all that such things exist? or even if this be so, that the images afford us any clue to their nature? This is the problem, and in consequence the main endeavour of philosophers has been for the two past hundred years to separate by a correctly-drawn line of cleavage—the Ideal,

i.e., that which belongs solely to our knowledge as such, from the Real, *i.e.*, that which exists independently of it, and thus to determine the relation of each to the other.

Certainly neither the philosophers of antiquity, nor yet the schoolmen seem to have arrived at a clear consciousness of this fundamental problem of philosophy, although we find a trace of it, as Idealism, and even as the doctrine of the Ideality of time, in Plotinus, in Enneas III., Lib. VII., cx., where he teaches that the soul has made the world by its transition from eternity into time. He there says, for instance, *οὐ γάρ τις αὐτοῦ τούτου τοῦ πάντος τόπος, ἡ ψυχή.* (Neque datur alius hujus universi locus, quam anima) also *δεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἔξωθεν τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβάνειν τὸν χρόνον ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν αἰῶνα ἔχει ἔξω τοῦ ὄντος.* (Oportet autem nequaquam extra animam tempus accipere, quemadmodum neque aeternitatem ibi extra id, quod ens appellatur.) Here it will be seen we have a distinct statement even of Kant's ideality of time. And in the following chapter *οὗτος ὁ βίος τὸν χρόνον γεννᾷ· διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἅμα τῷδε τῷ πάντι γεγονέναι, ὅτι ψυχὴ αὐτὸν μετὰ τοῦδε τοῦ πάντος ἐγέννησεν.* (Haec vita nostra tempus gignit: quamobrem dictum est, tempus simul cum hoc universo factum esse: quia anima tempus una cum hoc universo progenuit.) Nevertheless, this problem clearly recognized, became the specially characteristic subject of *modern* philosophy after the necessary reflection had been awakened in Descartes, who was impressed with the truth that we are immediately limited to our own consciousness, and that the world is given us merely as presentment (*Vorstellung*). With his well-known dubito, cogito, ergo sum, he sought to accentuate the sole certainty of the subjective consciousness in contradistinction to the problematical nature of everything else, and to declare the great truth that the only real, and unconditionally *given*, is self-consciousness. Strictly considered, his celebrated proposition is the equivalent of that from

which I started, "The world is my presentment." The only difference is, that his proposition accentuates the immediateness of the subject; mine, the mediateness of the object. Both propositions express the same thing from two sides. They are the "reverses" of each other, standing in much the same relation as the law of inertia and that of causality, as expounded by me in the preface to my "Ethics." ("The two ground-problems of 'Ethics,' treated in two academical prize essays by Dr. Arthur Schopenhauer." Frankfurt-am-Main, 1841, p. xxiv; 2nd edition, Liepzig, 1860, p. xxiv.) Certainly, since his time, Descartes' proposition has been often enough repeated, owing to the mere feeling of its importance, and without a clear understanding of its special sense and purport. (See Descartes' "Meditationes," Med. ii. p. 14.) He it was, then, who discovered the chasm which lies between the Subjective or Ideal, and the Objective or Real. This insight he clothed in the form of a doubt as to the existence of the outer world; but by his inadequate solution of this doubt —to wit, that the good God would not deceive us—he showed how deep and difficult to solve the problem was. Meantime, this scruple had been introduced into philosophy by him, and could not fail to continue to work disturbingly till its final settlement. The consciousness that without thorough knowledge and understanding of the distinction which had been discovered, no certain and sufficient system would be possible, has been from that time ever present, and the question could no longer be shirked.

In order to solve it, Malebranche invented his system of occasional causes. He grasped the problem in its whole range more clearly, seriously, and deeply than Descartes ("Recherche de la Vérité," Livre III., seconde partie). The latter had accepted the reality of the outer world on the credit of God; and it was curious enough that while the other theistic philosophers sought to demonstrate the

existence of God from the existence of the world, Descartes, on the contrary, determines the existence of the world from the existence and trustworthiness of God—it is the cosmological demonstration turned round. Even here, going a step farther, Malebranche teaches that we see all things immediately in God. This is certainly to explain an unknown by a still more unknown. Moreover, according to him, we not only see all things in God, but God is the sole activity therein, so that physical causes are only apparently such—they are mere "*causes occasionnelles*." ("Rech. d. l. Vér.," Liv. VI., seconde partie, ch. iii.) We have here, therefore, in all essentials, the Pantheism of Spinoza, who seems to have learnt more from Malebranche than he did from Descartes.

Altogether, one might wonder that Pantheism did not gain a complete victory over Theism even in the seventeenth century, seeing that the most original, the most beautiful, and the most thorough-going European presentations of it (for assuredly none of them will bear comparison with the Upanishads of the Vedas) all saw the light in that age, to wit, Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Scotus Erigena, the last of whom, after he had remained for many centuries lost and forgotten, was recovered at Oxford, and in 1681, four years, that is, after Spinoza's death, for the first time saw the light in print. This seems to prove that the insight of individuals cannot produce its effect, so long as the spirit of the time is unripe for its acceptance, for in our days, Pantheism, although only presented in the eclectic and confused *rechauffé* of Schelling, has become the dominant mode of thought with scholars, and even with persons of ordinary culture. This is because Kant had preceded, and with his overthrow of theistic dogmatism, had prepared the ground, in consequence of which the spirit of the time was ready for it, as a ploughed field is ready for the seed. In the seventeenth

century, on the other hand, philosophy forsook this path, and arrived accordingly on the one side, at Locke, for whom Bacon and Hobbes had prepared the way, and on the other at Christian Wolff, through Leibnitz. These two were dominant therefore in the eighteenth century, especially in Germany, although latterly only in so far as they had been absorbed by syncretistic eclecticism.

The profound conception of Malebranche gave the immediate occasion to Leibnitz's system of *harmonia praestabilita*, the widely extended fame and high consideration of which in his time, affords a confirmation of the fact that it is the absurd which makes the easiest success in the world. Although I cannot pretend to have a clear notion of the monads of Leibnitz, which are at once mathematical points, corporate atoms, and souls, yet it seems to me unquestionable that such an assumption once decided upon might serve to spare us all further hypothesis for the explanation of the connection between Ideal and Real, and to settle the question in the sense that both are already fully identified in the monads (for which reason, in our days, Schelling, as originator of the system of identity, has displayed a particular relish for it). Nevertheless, it did not please the eminent philosophizing mathematician, polyhistor, and politician to use it for the purpose; but he saw fit to specially formulate a pre-established harmony to this end. The latter furnishes us with two totally distinct worlds, each incapable of acting in any way on the other ("Principia Philos," § 84, and "Examen du Sentiment du P. Malebranche," p. 500, sq. of the "Œuvres de Leibnitz," published P. Kaspe), each the entirely superfluous duplicate of the other, but both of which, once for all there, run exactly parallel, and keep time with each other to a hair; the originator of both having from the first established the exactest harmony between them, so that they proceed thenceforward in the

most beautiful manner. We may observe, by the way, that the *harmonia praestabilita* may perhaps be best made comprehensible by a comparison with the stage, where very often the "*influxus physicus*" is only apparently present, since cause and effect are connected simply by means of a pre-established harmony of the stage-manager; as, for instance, when the one shoots and the other falls *a tempo*. Leibnitz has presented the matter in its monstrous absurdity in the crassest manner, and in brief, §§ 62, 63 of his "Theodicy." And yet with the whole dogma he does not even have the merit of originality, since Spinoza had already clearly enough presented the *harmonia praestabilita* in the second part of his "Ethics," *i.e.*, in the 6th and 7th propositions, together with their corollaries, and again in P. V., prop. 1, after he had in the 5th proposition of P. II., stated in his own manner the so very cognate doctrine of Malebranche, that we see all in God.[1]

Malebranche is, therefore, alone the originator of this whole line of thought which Spinoza as well as Leibnitz, each in his own way, has utilized and modified. Leibnitz, indeed, might very well have dispensed with it altogether, since he has already forsaken the simple fact which constitutes the problem, *i.e.*, that the world is given us immediately as our presentment, in order to substitute for it the dogma of a corporeal world and a spiritual world, between which no bridge is possible; at the same time interweaving the question of the relation of our presentment to the things in themselves with that of the possibility of the motion of the body by the will, and then

[1] "Eth.," P. II., prop. 7: *Ordo et connexio idearum idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum.* P. V., prop. 1: *Prout cogitationes rerumque ideae concatenantur in Mente, ita corporis affectiones, seu rerum imagines ad amussim ordinantur et concatenantur in Corpore.* Also P. II., prop. 5.

solving both together by means of his *harmonia praestabilita*. ("Système nouveau de la Nature," in Leibnitz; "Opp. ed. Edmann," p. 123; Brucker, "Hist. Ph.," tom. iv., p. ii. 425.) The monstrous absurdity of his assumption was placed in the clearest light even by his own contemporaries, particularly by Bayle, who showed the consequences which flowed from it (see also in Leibnitz's smaller writings, translated by Huth, anno 1740, the observation on page 79, where even Leibnitz himself is obliged to expose the preposterous consequences of his own doctrine). Nevertheless, the very absurdity of the assumption to which a thinking head was driven by the problem in hand, proves the magnitude, the difficulty, the perplexity of it, and how little it can be got rid of, and the knot be cut, by its mere repudiation, such as has been ventured upon in our days.

Spinoza again starts immediately from Descartes, hence, at first in his character of Cartesian he even retains the dualism of his teacher and assumes accordingly a *substantia cogitans* and a *substantia extensa*, the one as subject the other as object of knowledge. But later, when he stood on his own feet, he found that both were one and the same substance viewed from different sides; on the one side conceived as a *substantia extensa* on the other as a *substantia cogitans*. This is as much as to say that the distinction of the thinking and extended, or soul and body, is an unfounded one and therefore inadmissible; so that nothing more ought to be said about it. He nevertheless retains it, since he is untiring in repeating that both are one. To this he adds, as it were by a mere *sic etiam* that *Modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res* ("Eth." P. II., prop. 7, schol.); by which he means that our presentment of bodies and these bodies themselves are one and the same. The *sic etiam*, however, is an insufficient transition to this, since it does not by any means follow

from the fact that the distinction between mind and body or between the presenting and the presented is unfounded, that the distinction between our presentment and an objective and real, existing outside the same—the main problem, that is, that was started by Descartes—is also unfounded. The presenting and the presented may be perfectly well homogeneous, and yet still the question remains how I am with certainty to infer from presentments in my head as to the existence of beings in themselves that are independent of the former. The difficulty is not that on which Leibnitz (*e.g.*, "Theodic," Part I. § 59) would make it mainly turn, to wit, that between the assumed souls and the corporeal world as between two wholly heterogeneous kinds of substances no sort of reciprocal action could take place —for which reason he denied physical influence; for this difficulty is merely a consequence of rational psychology and only requires to be discarded as a fiction, as is done by Spinoza; and besides this, there is the *argumentum ad hominem* against the maintainers of this doctrine, that their own dogma that God, who is a spirit, has created and continuously governs the corporeal world implies that spirit can act immediately on bodies. The abiding difficulty is rather the Cartesian, that the world, which is only given us immediately, is simply an ideal world, a world, that is, consisting of presentments in our brain; while we, over and above this, undertake to judge of a real world existing independently of our presentment. Spinoza then, in so far as he abolishes the distinction between *substantia cogitans* and *substantia extensa* has not solved the problem but, at most, rendered physical influence again admissible. But this is insufficient to solve the difficulty for the law of causality is demonstratively of subjective origin. But even if it sprang from external experience it would still merely appertain to the ideally given world that is in question. Hence, in no case can it furnish a bridge be-

tween the absolutely objective and the subjective, but it is rather, merely the band which connects phenomena with one another. (See "Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," vol. ii. p. 12.) And nevertheless, in order more nearly to explain the above adduced identity of extension and presentment, Spinoza postulates something which is contained alike in the view of Malebranche and Leibnitz. In accordance with Malebranche, namely, we see all things in God: *rerum singularium ideae non ipsa ideata, sive res perceptas, pro causa agnoscunt, sed ipsum Deum, quatenus est res cogitans*, ("Eth." P. II., pr. 5); and this God is also at the same time the real and active principle therein, even with Malebranche. The mere fact, however, of Spinoza affixing to the world the name Deus explains nothing, in the last resort. But at the same time there is with him, as with Leibnitz, an exact parallelism between the extended and the presented world: *ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum* (P. II. pr. 7), and other similar passages. This is the *harmonia praestabilita* of Leibnitz; only that here the objectively existing world and the presented world are not entirely separated as with the last mentioned, merely corresponding to one another by virtue of a *harmonia* regulated in advance and from outside, but they are really one and the same. We have here, therefore, in the first place, a thorough-going Realism in so far as the existence of the things exactly corresponds to their presentment in us, both being one; we cognize accordingly the things in themselves—they are in themselves *extensa* as they appear as *cogitata;* in other words, in our presentment of them, they appear as *extensa* (here, too, it may be remarked, by the way, is the origin of Schelling's identity of the Real and Ideal). All this is, properly speaking, based on mere assertion. The exposition is already rendered unclear by the ambiguity of the word Deus which is used in a wholly improper sense; hence, it loses itself in obscurity and

comes in the end to *nec impraesentiarum haec clarius possum explicare.* But the want of clearness in the exposition arises always from a want of clearness in the understanding and thinking out of the philosopher. Vauvenargues said very truly, *la clarté est la bonne foi des philosophes* (see "Révue des deux Mondes," 1853, 15 Aout, p. 635). What in music is the "pure section" is in philosophy complete clearness, which is the *conditio sine qua non* without the fulfilling of which everything loses its value, and we are compelled to say *quodcumque ostendis mihi sic incredulus odi.* If, in the ordinary affairs of practical life one has to carefully avoid misunderstanding by clearness, how much the less ought one to express oneself incomprehensibly in the very abstruse, difficult, and wellnigh impenetrable subjects of thought, which constitute the problems of philosophy? The obscurity complained of in the doctrine of Spinoza, is owing to his not proceeding in a straightforward manner from the nature of things as he finds them; but from Cartesianism, and accordingly from all sorts of traditional conceptions, such as *Deus, substantia, perfectio,* etc., which he was concerned to bring in a roundabout way into harmony with truth. He often expresses the best ideas only indirectly, continually speaking *per ambages* and almost allegorically, as in the 2nd part of the "Ethics." On the other hand, Spinoza expresses an unmistakable *transcendental idealism* amounting to, at least, a general recognition of the truth clearly expounded by Locke and still more by Kant, as to the real distinction between the phenomenon and the thing itself, and the recognition that only the first is knowable by us. As instances of this may be consulted, "Eth.," P. II. prop. 16, with the 2nd corollary; prop. 17, schol.; prop. 18, schol.; prop. 19; prop. 23, where it is extended to self-knowledge; prop. 25, which expresses it clearly, and finally as *résumé*, the corollary to prop. 29, which distinctly says that we can neither know

ourselves nor the things, as they are in themselves, but only as they appear. The demonstration of prop. 27, P. III., expresses the matter the clearest, at least in the beginning. Respecting the relation of the doctrines of Spinoza to those of Descartes I may recall here what I have said on the subject in the World as Will and Presentment: vol. ii., p. 639 (3rd ed. p. 739). The fact of his starting from the conceptions of the Cartesian philosophy, has not only been the occasion of much obscurity and misunderstanding in the exposition of Spinoza, but he has thereby been led into many flagrant paradoxes, obvious fallacies, and indeed absurdities and contradictions. In this way his doctrine which contains so much that is true and excellent has acquired a highly undesirable addition of simply indigestable matter, so that the reader is divided within himself between admiration and vexation. But, in the aspect considered here, the chief fault of Spinoza is that he has drawn his line of cleavage between the Ideal and Real, or the Subjective and Objective world, from a false standpoint. *Extension*, namely, is in no wise the opposite of *presentment*, but lies wholly within the latter.

We perceive things as extended, and, in so far as they are extended, they are our presentment. But whether, independently of our presentment, anything is extended, or indeed whether anything exists at all is the question and the original problem. This was solved later by Kant, and in so far, with indisputable accuracy, in the sense that extension or space lies entirely in the presentment; in other words, that it depends on the latter, inasmuch as the whole of space is its mere form; and therefore, independently of our presentment, no extended can exist, and most certainly does not exist.

Spinoza's line of cleavage is accordingly drawn wholly on the ideal side; he has taken his stand on the *presented* world, regarding the latter, indicated by its form of exten-

sion, as the Real, and therefore as existing independently of its possibility of presentment, *i.e.*, in itself. He is on this ground, therefore, quite right in saying, that that which is extended and that which is presented—*i.e.*, our presentment of bodies and these bodies themselves —are one and the same (P. II., prop. 7, schol.). For assuredly the things are presented as extended and are only as extended, presentable—the world as presentment and the world in space is *una eademque res;* this we can fully admit. But were the extension, quality of the things-in-themselves, our perception would then be a knowledge of things-in-themselves, which is what he assumes, and in which consists his Realism. Since, however, he does not ground or prove this, to wit, that our perception of a spacial world involves a spacial world independent of this perception, the fundamental problem remains unsolved. This arises, however, from the fact, that the line of cleavage between the Real and Ideal, the Objective and the Subjective, the Thing-in-itself and the Phenomenon, is not correctly drawn. On the contrary, as has been said, the cleavage, being in the middle of the Ideal, Subjective, Phenomenal side of the world—that is, drawn through the world as presentment—splits the latter into the extended or spacial and our presentment of the same, whereupon much trouble is taken to show that both are only one, as indeed they are.

Just because Spinoza holds entirely by the Ideal side of the world, inasmuch as he thought to find the Real in the extended belonging thereto, and as, in consequence, the perceivable is the only Real *without* us, and the knowing (*cogitans*) is the only Real *within* us, so he, from another side, casts the only true Real, the Will, into the Ideal, which he makes a mere *modus cogitandi*, even identifying it with the judgment. As to this consult "Eth." P. II., the proofs of the props. 48 et 49, where we read: *Per voluntatem intelligo affirmandi et negandi facultatem;* and again:

Concipiamus singularem aliquam volitionem, nempe modum cogitandi, quo mens affirmat, tres angulos trianguli æquales esse duobus rectis, whereupon the corollary follows: *Voluntas et intellectus unum et idem sunt.*

Spinoza has, generally, the great fault of purposely misusing words for the designation of conceptions which throughout all the world bear other names, and of taking from these the meaning which they everywhere have. Thus he calls "God" what is everywhere termed "World;" "Justice" what is everywhere termed "Power," and "Will" what is everywhere termed "Judgment." We are fully justified as regards this, in recalling the Hetman of the Cossacks in Kotzebue's "Benjowskij."

Berkeley, although certainly later, and with the knowledge of Locke, went logically farther in this problem than the Cartesians, and was thereby the originator of the proper and true Idealism, that is, of the knowledge, that that in space which is extended and which fills it, in short, the perceivable world generally, can only have an existence as such, in our presentment; and that it is absurd, and even contradictory, to attribute to it a further existence outside of all presentment, and independently of the knowing subject, and thereby to assume a matter existing in itself.[1]

[1] With laymen in philosophy, to whom many doctors of the same belong, one ought never to use the word "Idealism," because they do not know what it means, and carry on with it all sorts of nonsense. They understand by "Idealism" at times "Spiritualism," and at times something or other which is opposed to Philistinism, and are confirmed and strengthened in this view by ordinary men of letters. The words "Idealism" and "Realism" are not anything and everything, but have their fixed philosophical meaning. Those who mean something else should employ another word.

The opposition of "Idealism" and "Realism" concerns the Known, the Object, while that between Spiritualism and Materialism, concerns the Knowing, the Subject. (Modern ignorant muddlers confound Idealism and Spiritualism.)

This is, indeed, a true and deep insight, but his whole philosophy consists in nothing else. He hit upon the Ideal and separated it completely; but he did not know where to find the Real, about which he troubled himself but little, expressing himself respecting it only occasionally, piecemeal, and inadequately. God's Will and Omnipotence is with him the immediate cause of the phenomena of the perceivable world, *i.e.*, of all our presentments. Real existence only accrues to knowing and willing beings, such as we ourselves are; hence these constitute, together with God, the Real. They are spirits, that is, knowing and willing beings, for willing and knowing he regarded a inseparable. He has this also in common with his predecessors, that he regards God as better known than the present world, and deems a reduction to him an explanation. His clerical, and, indeed, episcopal position laid altogether too heavy chains on him, and limited him to a narrow circle of thought with which he could never come into conflict. Hence he could go no farther, but true and false had to learn to mutually accommodate themselves in his head as well as they could. This remark, indeed, may be extended to the works of all these philosophers, with the exception of Spinoza. The Jewish Theism, unamenable to any test, dead to all research, and hence appearing really as a fixed idea, planting itself in the way of truth at every step, vitiates them all; so that the evil which it produces here in the theoretical sphere, may be taken as a pendant to that which it has produced throughout a thousand years in the practical—I mean in the shape of religious wars, inquisitions, and conversions of nations by the sword. The closest affinity between Malebranche, Spinoza, and Berkeley is unmistakable. We see them all proceeding from Descartes, in so far as they retain and seek to solve the fundamental problem presented by him in the form of a doubt as to the existence of the outer

world; concerned as they are to investigate the separation and connection of the world which is Ideal, subjective or given solely in our presentment, and the Real or objective, which is independent of it, and, therefore, existing in itself. As we have said, therefore, this problem is the axis on which the whole of modern philosophy turns. Locke distinguishes himself from these philosophers in that, probably because he stands under the influence of Hobbes and Bacon, he attaches himself as closely as possible to experience and the common understanding, avoiding as far as may be hyperphysical hypotheses. The *Real* is for him *Matter*, and without turning his attention to the Leibnitzean scruple as to the impossibility of a causal connection between the immaterial, thinking, and the material, extended substance, he at once assumes physical influence between matter and the knowing subject. In this he proceeds with rare deliberation and honesty so far as to confess that possibly knowing and thinking substance itself might also be matter ("On the Human Understanding," L. IV., c. 3, § 6). This it was, which procured for him later the repeated praise of the great Voltaire, and in his own time, on the other hand, the malicious attacks of a cunning Anglican priest, the Bishop of Worcester.[1] With him the

[1] There is no church which dreads the light more than the English, because no other has such great pecuniary interests at stake, its incomes representing £5,000,000 sterling, which is more by £40,000 than those of the whole of the remaining Christian clergy in both hemispheres taken together. On the other hand, there is no nation which it is so painful to see thus methodistically stupefied by this most degrading superstition than the English, who outstrip all the rest in intelligence. The root of the evil is that in England there is no ministry of public instruction, for which reason the latter has remained hitherto in the hands of parsondom, which has taken care that two-thirds of the nation shall not be able to read and write; and which even from time to time ventures with the most ludicrous impudence to yelp at natural science. It is, therefore, a human duty to infuse into

Real, *i.e.*, Matter, generates in the knowing subject by "Impulse," that is, contact, presentments, or the Ideal (*Ibid.*, L. I., c. 8, § 11). We have here, therefore, a thoroughly massive Realism, calling forth contradiction by its very exorbitance, and giving occasion to the Berkeleyan Idealism, whose special origination is, perhaps, to be found when Locke at the end of § 2 of the 31st chapter of the 2nd book with such a surprising absence of reflection, says, among other things: *Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion and Rest, would be really in the world, as they are, whether there were any sensible being to perceive them or not.* For as soon as one considers the matter one must recognize the above as false, in which case the Berkeleyan Idealism stands there and is undeniable. In the meantime Locke does not overlook the chasm between the presentments in us and the things existing independently of us, in short, the distinction of Ideal and Real; in the end, however, he disposes of it by arguments of sound but rough common sense, and by appealing to the sufficiency of our knowledge of things for practical purposes (*Ibid.*, L. IV., c. 4 et 9), which obviously has nothing to do with the question, and only shows how very inadequate to the problem Empiricism remains. But even his Realism

England light, rationalism, and science, through all conceivable channels, in order that these best fed of all priests may have their handiwork put an end to. When Englishmen of culture, on the continent, display their Jewish Sabbatarian superstition and other stupid bigotry, we ought to meet it with unconcealed mockery—*until they be shamed into common sense.* For it is a scandal for Europe, and should be tolerated no longer. Hence one ought never, even in ordinary life, to make the least concession to the English ecclesiastical superstition; but, wherever it puts in an appearance, to meet it immediately with a most energetic protest. For the effrontery of the Anglican priests and their votaries is even, at the present day, quite incredible, and must be banished to its own island, that it may thus be compelled to play the rôle of the owl by day whenever it ventures to let itself be seen on the continent.

leads him to limit that in our knowledge which involves the Real, to the qualities inhering in the things as they are *in themselves*, and to distinguish these from our mere knowledge of them or from that which merely pertains to the Ideal—terming the latter accordingly *secondary*, but the former *primary* qualities. This is the origin of the distinction between thing-in-itself and phenomenon, which becomes so important later on in the Kantian philosophy. In Locke, then, we have the true genetic point of connection between the Kantian doctrines and the earlier philosophy. The former were stimulated and more immediately occasioned by Hume's sceptical criticisms of Locke's doctrines; while, on the other hand, they have only a polemical relation to the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy.

The above *primary* qualities, which are exclusively the determinations of the things-in-themselves, and which hence appertain to these outside and independently of our presentment, resolve themselves entirely into such as cannot be thought away, namely, extension, impenetrability, figure, motion or rest, and number. All the remainder are recognized as *secondary*, that is, as creations of the action of those primary qualities on our organs of sense, and consequently as mere feelings in these; such are colour, tone, taste, smell, hardness, softness, smoothness, roughness, etc. These, therefore, have no similarity whatever with the quality in the thing-in-itself which excites them, but are reducible to the primary qualities as their causes, such alone being purely objective and really part of the existing things (*Ibid.*, L. I., c. 8, § 7, seqq.). Our conceptions of these latter are therefore really true copies, which accurately reproduce the qualities that are present in the things-in-themselves (l.c. § 15). I wish the reader joy who really feels here the *reductio ad absurdum* of Realism. We see then that Locke deduces from the nature of the things-in-themselves, whose present-

ments we receive from without, that which accrues to the action of the nerves of the sense-organs, an easy, comprehensible, and indisputable consideration. But Kant later on made the immeasurably greater step of also deducing what belongs to the action of our brain (that incomparably greater nervous mass); whereby all the above pretended primary qualities sink into secondary ones, and the assumed things themselves into mere phenomena, but the real thing-in-itself, now stripped of these qualities, remains over as an entirely unknown quantity, a mere χ. This assuredly requires a difficult and deep analysis, and one which has long to be defended against the attacks alike of misunderstanding and lack of understanding.

Locke does not deduce his primary qualities of things, and does not give any further ground why only these and no others are purely objective, except that they are indestructible. Now if we investigate for ourselves why he declares some qualities of things which work immediately on the sensibility, and consequently come directly from without, not to be present objectively, while he concedes objectivity to those which, as has since been recognized, proceed from the special functions of our intellect, we find the reason to be that the objectively-perceiving consciousness (the consciousness of other things) necessarily requires a complex apparatus, as the function of which it appears, and consequently that its most essential ground-determinations are fixed from within. In this way the universal form or mode of perception from which alone the *à priori* knowable can proceed, presents itself as the warp of the perceived world, and accordingly appears as that which is absolutely necessary, unexceptional, and in no way to be got rid of; so that it stands as the condition of everything else in its manifold variety. This is admitted to be, immediately, time and space, and that which follows from them, and is only possible through them. In themselves

time and space are empty. If anything is to come within them, it must appear as matter, that is, as an activity; in other words, as causality, for matter is through and through simply causality; its being consists in its action, and *vice versâ;* it is but the objectively-conceived form of the understanding for causality itself. ("On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Cause," 2nd ed., p. 77; 3rd ed., p. 82; as also "World as Will and Presentment," 2nd ed., vol. i., p. 9, and vol. ii., pp. 48, 49; 3rd ed., vol. i., p. 10, and vol. ii., p. 52.) Hence it comes that Locke's primary qualities are merely such as cannot be thought away—a fact which itself clearly enough indicates their subjective origin, as proceeding immediately from the construction of the perceiving apparatus—and he therefore holds for absolutely objective precisely that which, as function of the brain, is much more subjective than the sense-feeling, which is occasioned, or at least more directly determined, from without.

In the meantime it is interesting to see how through all these various conceptions and explanations, the problem started by Descartes respecting the relation between the Ideal and the Real becomes ever more developed and clarified, and the truth thus promoted. It is true this was favoured by the circumstances of the time, or, more correctly, of nature, which, in the short space of two centuries, gave birth to and ripened half-a-dozen thinking heads in Europe. By the gift of fortune, in addition, they were enabled, in the midst of a grovelling world struggling after advantage and pleasure, to follow their noble calling undisturbed by the yelping of priests, or the foolish talk and caballing of the contemporary professors of philosophy.

Now Locke, in accordance with his strict empiricism, had deduced the knowledge of the causal relation from experience, while Hume did not dispute, as he ought to

have done, this false assumption, but immediately overshot the mark by the observation, correct in itself, that experience can never give us anything more than a mere sequence of things upon one another, sensibly and immediately, and never a proper consequence and action—*i.e.*, a necessary interconnection. It is well known how the sceptical objection of Hume was the occasion of Kant's incomparably deeper investigations into the subject, which led him to the result that space and time, no less than causality, are known by us *a priori*, that is, lie in us before all experience, and hence belong to the subjective side of knowledge. From this it follows farther, that all those primary, that is, absolute qualities of things, which Locke had assigned to them, since they are all composed of pure determinations of time, of space, and of causality, cannot belong to the things-in-themselves, but to our mode of knowledge of the same, and consequently are to be counted to the Ideal and not to the Real. The final consequence of this is that we know the things in no respect as they are *in themselves*, but solely in their *phenomena*. The Real, the thing-in-itself, therefore remains something wholly unknown, a mere χ, and the whole perceivable world accrues to the Ideal as a mere presentment, a phenomenon, which nevertheless, even as such, in some way involves the Real, as thing-in-itself.

From this standpoint I, finally, have made a step, and believe that it will be the last; because I have solved the problem upon which, since Descartes, all philosophizing turns, in that I reduce all being and knowledge to the two elements of our self-consciousness, in other words, to something beyond which there can be no further principle of explanation, since it is the most immediate and therefore ultimate. I have called to mind, what indeed results from the researches of all my predecessors, which I have here noticed, to wit, that the absolute Real or the thing-in-itself

can never be given us directly from without, in the way of mere presentment, since it is inevitably in the nature of the latter only to furnish the Ideal; while, on the contrary, since we ourselves are indisputably Real, the knowledge of the Real must in some way or other be derivable from within our own nature. And in fact it here appears, in an immediate manner in consciousness, as *will*. The line of cleavage between the Real and the Ideal falls therefore, with me, in such wise that the whole perceivable and objectively-presented world, including every man's body, together with time, space, and causality, in other words, together with the *extended* of Spinoza, and the *matter* of Locke, belongs as presentment to the Ideal. But in this case the Will alone remains as the Real, and this the whole of my predecessors, thoughtlessly and without reflection, had thrown into the Ideal as a mere result of presentment and of thought, Descartes and Spinoza having even identified it with the judgment.[1] Ethics is therefore with me directly and incomparably more closely knit to metaphysics than in any other system, and thus the moral significance of the world and of existence is more firmly fixed than ever. But Will and Presentment are fundamentally distinct, inasmuch as they constitute the ultimate and basal opposition in all things in the world and leave nothing remaining over. The presented thing and the presentment of it are the same, but only the *presented* thing, and not the thing *in itself*. The latter is always Will, it matters not in what form it may appear in presentment.

[1] Spinoza, l.c.; Descartes, "In meditationibus de prima philosophia," Medit. 4, p. 28.

APPENDIX.

READERS who are familiar with what has passed for philosophy in Germany, in the course of the present century, may perhaps be surprised not to find mentioned in the period between Kant and myself, either the Fichtean Idealism or the system of the Absolute Identity of the Real and Ideal, since they seem specially to belong to our subject. But I have not been able to include them, simply because, in my opinion, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are no philosophers, inasmuch as they fail in the first requirement of the philosopher, earnestness and honesty of research. They are mere sophists; they wanted to seem and not to be, and have sought, not the truth, but their own interest and advancement in the world. Places from governments, honoraria from students and booksellers, and as means to this end as much sensation and effect as possible from their sham philosophy—such were the guiding stars and inspiring genii of these disciples of wisdom. Hence they have not passed the entrance-examination, and so cannot be admitted into the honorable company of the thinkers of the human race.

Meanwhile, they have excelled in one thing, and that is, in the art of turning the head of the public and of making themselves pass for what they were not, which requires talent, indeed, but not philosophical talent. That they were incapable of effecting anything solid in philosophy was owing, in the last resort, to the fact that their *intellect was not free*, but remained in the service of the *Will*; and in this case, though the intellect can indeed achieve much for this or that purpose, it can do nothing for philosophy any more than for art. For these lay down as their first

condition, that the intellect should act on its own account, and during the time of this activity should cease to be in the service of the will, that is, to have the objects of one's own personality in view; but when it is itself active, simply of its own motion, it, in accordance with its nature, knows no other purpose than the truth. Hence it does not suffice, in order to be a philosopher, which means lover of wisdom (this being nothing else than truth), to love the truth in so far as it harmonizes with one's own interest, or with the will of superiors, or the dogmas of the church, or the prejudices or tastes of contemporaries; as long as one remains in this position, one is only a φίλαυτος and no φιλόσοφος. For this title of honour is well and wisely conceived, in that it implies that one should love the truth earnestly and with one's whole heart, and therefore unconditionally, without reserve before everything, and in case of necessity even to the defiance of everything.[1] The reason is to be found in the fact above indicated that the intellect has become *free*, in which case it does not even know or understand any other interest than that of truth; the consequence being, that one then acquires an irreconcilable hatred against all lying and deception, no matter what garb they may wear. In this way we are not very likely to get on well in the world, but all the more in philosophy. On the other hand, it is a bad auspice for the latter, if proceeding avowedly from the investigation of truth, we begin, thereupon, to say farewell to all uprightness, honesty, and thoroughness, and are only concerned to make ourselves appear what we are not. In this case one assumes, like the above three sophists, now a false pathos, now an artificially high earnestness, now a mien of infinite superiority, in order to dazzle where one despairs of being able to convince; one writes without consideration, because, only thinking of writing, one saves one's thought up for the purpose of writing; one seeks now to inculcate palpable sophisms as demonstrations, now to

propound hollow and senseless logomachy for deep thoughts; one invokes intellectual intuition or the absolute thought and self-movement of conceptions; one challenges expressly the standpoint of "reflection," that is, of rational thought, straightforward consideration, and honest presentation, in other words, the proper and normal use of the reason generally; one expresses a boundless contempt for the "philosophy of reflection," by which name is designated every connected course of thought which deduces consequences from principles, such as has constituted every earlier philosophy; and accordingly, if one is only provided with sufficient audacity, and encouraged by the pitiable spirit of the age, one expresses oneself in some such manner as follows: "It is not difficult to see that the mode of stating a proposition, adducing reasons for it and refuting its opposite in the same way, by reason, is not the form which truth can assume. Truth is the movement of itself within itself," etc. (Hegel, preface to the "Phenomenology of the Mind," p. lvii., in the complete edition, p. 36.) I think it is not difficult to see that whoever puts forward anything like this, is a shameless charlatan, who is anxious to befool simpletons, and who observes that he has found his people in the Germans of the nineteenth century.

If accordingly, under pretence of hurrying to the temple of truth, one hands over the bridle to the interests of one's own person, which looks sideways towards altogether different guiding stars, such for instance as the tastes and foibles of contemporaries, the religion of the land, but especially toward the purposes and hints of the governing powers—Oh, how then can one expect to reach the high, abrupt, bald rock on which stands the temple of truth? One may easily attach to oneself, by the sure bond of interest, a crowd of genuinely hopeful disciples, hopeful, that is, for protection and places, who may apparently

form a sect, but really a faction, and by whose united stentorian voices one may be proclaimed to all the four winds as a sage without parallel—the interest of the person is satisfied, that of truth betrayed.

All this explains the painful feeling which seizes one, when, after the study of real thinkers, such as have been above described, one turns to the writings of Fichte and Schelling, or indeed to the audaciously daubed nonsense of Hegel, produced as it is with a boundless, though justified, confidence in German folly.[1] With the former one had always found an honest investigation of truth, and as honest an endeavour to communicate their thoughts to others. Hence he who reads Locke, Kant, Hume, Malebranche, Spinoza, Descartes, feels himself elevated and pleasurably impressed. This is effected by contact with a noble mind, which has thoughts and awakens thoughts. The reverse of this takes place in reading the above-mentioned three German sophists. A straightforward person who opens one of their books and then asks himself whether this is the tone of a thinker who would teach or of a charlatan who would deceive, cannot remain five minutes in doubt about it; so much does everything here

[1] The Hegelian sham wisdom is the true millstone in the head of the student in "Faust." If one wishes intentionally to make a youth stupid and completely incapable of all thought, there is no more approved means than the industrious study of the original works of Hegel; for these monstrous piecings together of words, which abolish and contradict one another, so that the mind torments itself in vain to think anything thereby, till it finally collapses exhausted, gradually destroys its capacity of thinking so completely that from that time forward hollow phrases count with it for thoughts. Add to this, the fancy accredited to the youth by the word and example of all persons in authority that the above logomachy is true and lofty wisdom. Should a guardian ever be concerned lest his wards should become too clever for his plans, he may avert this misfortune by inculcating an industrious study of the Hegelian philosophy.

breathe of dishonesty. The tone of quiet investigation characterizing all previous philosophy is exchanged for that of unshakable certainty such as is common to charlatanry of every kind in all time, but which in this case claims to rest on immediate intellectual intuition, or on thought which is absolute, that is, independent of the subject and its fallibility. From every page, from every line, speaks the endeavour to hoodwink, to deceive, the reader, now by dazzling to disconcert him, now by incomprehensible phrases and flagrant nonsense to stun him, now by audacity of assertion to befool him, in short, in every possible way to throw dust in his eyes and to mystify him. Hence the feeling which discovers itself in the transition in question in respect of the theoretical, may be compared with that which in respect of the practical he has, who coming from a society of honourable men, finds himself in a haunt of swindlers. How worthy a man, in comparison with such, is that Christian Wolff, so undervalued and ridiculed by these three sophists! He had, and furnished real thoughts, but they only word-images, and phrases for the purpose of deceiving. The truly distinguishing character of the philosophy of this whole, so-called, Post-Kantian school, is dishonesty, its element is the blue ether and personal ends its goal. Its exponents are concerned to *seem*, not to *be*,—they are therefore sophists, not philosophers. The mockery of future generations, extending itself to their votaries, and then oblivion, awaits them. With the tendency of these persons, as above indicated, is connected, we may say in passing, the scolding and abusive tone which, as an obligato accompaniment, pervades all Schelling's writings. If this were not so, if honesty rather than pretentiousness and emptiness had been at work, Schelling, who is without doubt the most gifted of the three, might at least have occupied the subordinate rank in philosophy of an eclectic of passing service. The amalgam

which he prepared from the doctrines of Plotinos, of Spinoza, of Jakob Böhme, of Kant, and of the natural science of modern times, might for a while have filled the vacancy produced by the negative results of the Kantian philosophy, until a really new philosophy had come forward and properly afforded the satisfaction required by the former. He has more particularly used the natural science of our century to revive the abstract pantheism of Spinoza. Spinoza had, without any knowledge of nature, philosophized out of abstract conceptions, and, without knowing the things themselves properly, had erected the edifice of his doctrines. To clothe this dry skeleton with flesh and blood, and, as well as might be, to communicate life and motion to it by the application of the natural science which has since then developed, although often done with a false application, is the undeniable service of Schelling in his philosophy of nature, which is also the best of his multifarious attempts and new departures.

Just as children play with weapons intended for serious purposes, or other tools of grown-up persons, so the three sophists we have under consideration have dealt with the subject here treated of, thus furnishing the grotesque pendant to two centuries of laborious investigations on the part of serious philosophers. After Kant had more than ever accentuated the great problem of the relation between the self-existent and our presentments, and thereby brought it much nearer its solution, Fichte starts up with the assertion that there is nothing behind the presentments, these being no more than products of the knowing subjects, of the Ego. While seeking in this way to outbid Kant, he produced a mere caricature of the latter's philosophy, inasmuch as, by the continuous application of the method so much vaunted by these three pseudo-philosophers, he abolished the Real altogether, and left nothing but the Ideal remaining. Then came Schelling, who, in

his system of the absolute identity of the Real and Ideal, declared the whole distinction of no account, and maintained the Ideal to be also the Real, that both were one. In this way he attempted to throw again into confusion what had been so carefully, and, by a process of such slow and gradually developed reflection, separated. (Schelling, "On the Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the Fichtean," pp. 14-21.) The distinction of Ideal and Real is crudely denied, in imitation of the above criticised error of Spinoza. At the same time, even the monads of Leibnitz,—that monstrous identification of two absurdities, namely, of the atoms and of the indivisible original and essentiall, knowing individuals, termed souls—are again brought forward, pompously apotheosized, and pressed into the service. (Schelling, "Ideas for the Philosophy of Nature," 2nd ed., pp. 38, 82.) Schelling's philosophy of nature bears the name of the philosophy of identity, because, walking in the footsteps of Spinoza, it does away with three distinctions which the latter had also done away with, to wit, that between God and the world, that between body and soul, and, finally, that between Ideal and Real, in the perceived world. The last distinction, however, as has been above shown, in the consideration of Spinoza, in no way depends on the two others. On the contrary, the more it is brought into prominence, by so much the more the two others are rendered doubtful, for while it is based on a simple act of reflection, they are based on dogmatic demonstrations, which Kant has overthrown. In accordance with all this, metaphysic was identified by Schelling with physic, and hence, to a mere physical-chemical diatribe, the high-sounding title of "concerning the world-soul" was affixed. All those properly metaphysical problems, which untiringly impress themselves upon the human consciousness, were to be silenced by a crude denial clothed in strong assertions.

Nature is here just because it is, of itself and through itself; we bestow upon it the title God, and therewith it is disposed of, and he who asks for anything more is a fool. The distinction between subjective and objective is a mere invention of the schools, like the whole Kantian philosophy, whose distinction of *a priori* and *a posteriori* is also of no account, our empirical perception of itself supplying us with the things-in-themselves, etc. Let the reader consult "On the Relation of the Philosophy of Nature with the Fichtean," pp. 51 and 57, as also p. 61, where ridicule is expressly heaped on those "who are astounded to find that not is nothing, and cannot sufficiently wonder that anything really exists." We see, therefore, that with Herr von Schelling everything seems to explain itself. At bottom, however, this sort of talk is only a veiled appeal in pompous phraseology to the so-called sound, but more correctly rough, understanding. For the rest, I may recall here what I have said in the second volume of my chief work, at the beginning of chapter xvii. Significant for our subject and very naïve is the passage on p. 69, in the book of Schelling's just quoted from: "Had empiricism completely attained its object, its opposition to philosophy, and therewith philosophy itself, as special sphere or kind of science, would disappear; all abstractions would dissolve themselves in the direct, 'friendly,' perception; the highest would be the sport of pleasure and innocence, the most difficult easy, the most senseless sensible, and man might read joyfully and freely in the book of nature." This would certainly be very nice! but it is not the case with us. Thought does not let itself be shown the door in this manner. The serious old Sphinx with its riddle lies immovably there, and does not dash itself off the rock because you explain that it is a spectre. As, therefore, Schelling himself observed later that the metaphysical problem cannot be got rid of by dictatorial assertions, he

gives us a genuinely metaphysical essay in his treatise on freedom, which is, however, a mere piece of imagination, a *conte bleu*, whence it comes that the style, whenever it assumes the tone of demonstration, has a decidedly comical effect.

By his doctrine of the identity of the Ideal and the Real, Schelling has accordingly sought to solve the problem, set going by Descartes, dealt with by all great thinkers, and finally accentuated in the strongest manner by Kant, by cutting the knot, that is, by denying the opposition between the two. With Kant, from whom he professed to start, he came in consequence into direct contradiction. Meanwhile he had at least held fast the original and special sense of the problem, which concerns the relation between our *perception* and the being and essence in themselves of the things which present themselves in the former. But because he got his doctrines chiefly out of Spinoza, he adopted from the latter the expressions *thought* and *being*, which designated the problem very badly, and gave occasion later on to the maddest monstrosities. Spinoza had attempted, with his doctrine that *substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quæ jam sub hoc jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur* (ii. 7, Sch.), or, *scilicet mens et corpus una eademque est res, quæ jam sub cogitationis, jam sub extensionis attributo concipitur* (iii. 2, Sch.), to abolish the Cartesian opposition of body and soul; he may also have recognized that the empirical object is not distinct from our presentment of it. Schelling adopted from him the expressions *thought* and *being*, which he gradually substituted for those of *intuition* (perception), or rather intuited (perceived), and the thing-in-itself ("New Journal of Speculative Physic," vol. i., 1st article, "Further expositions," etc.). For the relation of our perception of things to their *being* and *essence* in themselves is the great problem whose history I have here

sketched; that of our thoughts, *i.e.* conceptions, is a different one, for these are, quite obviously and undeniably, mere abstractions from that which is perceptively known, having arisen through the arbitrary thinking away, or letting fall, of some qualities, and retention of others; and to doubt that this is so would ever occur to any reasonable man.[1] These conceptions and thoughts, which constitute the class of *non-perceptive* presentments, never have therefore an immediate relation to the nature and being of the things-in-themselves, but are always mediate, that is, under the mediation of perception; it is the last-mentioned which on the one side furnishes for them the matter, and on the other stands related to the things-in-themselves, that is, to the unknown true nature of the things which is objectivized in perception.

The inexact expression borrowed by Schelling from Spinoza was used subsequently by the spiritless and tasteless charlatan Hegel, who in this respect appears as Schelling's *hanswurst*, and distorted, so far as to make thought itself, in the narrower sense, namely, as conception, identical with the nature of the things-in-themselves. That, therefore, which is thought *in abstracto*, should, as such and immediately, be one with that which is objectively present in itself, and logic should, accordingly, be the true metaphysic; in which case we should only require to think or to let our conception have free course in order to know how the world without is absolutely constituted. As a natural consequence, every brain-phantasm would be at once true and real. Since, therefore, "the madder the better" was the motto of the philosophasters of this period, the absurdity in question was supported by a second, to wit, that it was not we who thought, but that the conception alone and without our help completed the thought-process, which

[1] "On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Cause," § 26.

is therefore called the dialectical self-movement of the conception, and counts for a revelation of all things *in et extra naturam.* But this humbug was based upon another, equally resting on the misuse of words, and which was, indeed, never clearly stated, though it undoubtedly lies behind. Schelling had, according to Spinoza's procedure, entitled the world "God." Hegel took this in its literal sense. Now since this word properly signifies a personal being, embracing, together with other qualities altogether incompatible with the world, that of omniscience, this was also transferred by him to the world, in which it could naturally obtain no other place than in the empty head of men who only require to give their thoughts free play (dialectical self-movement) in order to reveal all the mysteries of heaven and earth, as in the absolute gallimathias of the Hegelian dialectic. One art this Hegel has certainly understood, namely, how to lead the Germans by the nose. But that is no very great one. We see with what tricks he was able to hold the learned world of Germany for thirty years. That the professors of philosophy still treat these three sophists seriously, and hold it for important to assign them a place in the history of philosophy, happens only because it belongs to their *gagne-pain,* in that they obtain thereby material for elaborate dissertations, verbal and written, on the history of the so-called Post-Kantian philosophy, in which the opinions of the said sophists are elaborately expounded and seriously considered. From a reasonable point of view, one has no business to concern oneself at all with what these persons, in order to seem something, brought to market, unless it were that it should be deemed desirable for the scribblings of Hegel to be kept in the chemists' shops as a physically active vomitive, the disgust they excite being really quite peculiar. But enough of them and their originator, whose glorification we will leave to the Danish Academy of Sciences,

which has recognized in him a *summus philosophus*, in its sense of the word, and hence requires him to be treated with respect, a fact brought out in the judgment appended to my prize essay on the foundations of morality, as a lasting memorial, and which, no less on account of its acuteness than of its memorable honesty, deserves to be rescued from oblivion, if only that it furnishes a remarkable confirmation of Labruyère's beautiful saying: *Du même fonds, dont on néglige un homme de mérite, l'on sait encore admirer un sot.*

FRAGMENTS OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

Section 1.

On the Same.

TO read, instead of the original works of philosophers, all sorts of expositions of their doctrines, or history of philosophy generally, is as though one should get some one else to masticate one's food. Would anyone read the history of the world if it were possible for him to behold the interesting events of ancient times with his own eyes? But, as regards the history of philosophy, such an autopsy of the subject is really possible for him, to wit, the original writings of philosophers; in which he may none the less, for the sake of shortness, limit himself to well-chosen leading chapters, especially inasmuch as they all teem with repetitions, which one may just as well spare oneself. In this way, then, he will learn to know the essential in their doctrines, in an authentic and unfalsified form, while from the half-dozen histories of philosophy annually appearing he merely receives as much of it as has entered the head of a professor of philosophy, and, indeed, as it appears there. Now it is obvious of itself, that the thoughts of a great mind must shrink up considerably in order to find a place in the three-pound brain of a parasite of philosophy, from which they emerge again clothed in the

contemporary jargon of the day, and accompanied by his sapient reflections. Besides this, it must be considered that the money-making history-writer of philosophy can hardly have read a tenth part of the writings which he reports. Their real study demands the whole of a long and laborious life, such as formerly, in the old industrious times, the brave Brucker devoted to them. But what can such persons, who are detained by continuous lectures, official duties, vacation tours and dissipations, and who, for the most part, come forward with their histories of philosophy in their earlier years, have thoroughly investigated? Add to this, that they are anxious to be pragmatical, and claim to have fathomed and to expound the necessity of the origin and the sequence of systems, and even to judge, correct, and dominate over the earnest and genuine philosophers of former times. How could it be otherwise than that they should copy the older ones, and each other, and then, in order to hide this, make matters worse by endeavouring to give them the modern tournure of the current quinquennium, pronouncing upon them, likewise, in the same spirit? On the contrary, a collection of important passages and essential chapters of all the leading philosophers, made by honest and intelligent scholars, conscientiously and in common, arranged in a chronologically-pragmatic order, much in the same way as formerly Gödicke, and, after him, Ritter and Preller, have done with the philosophy of antiquity, although much more completely—in short, a universal chrestomathy accomplished with care and a knowledge of the subject—would be very useful.

The fragments which I here give are at least not traditional, that is, copied; they are, rather, thoughts occasioned by my own study of the original works.

Section 2.

Pre-Sokratic Philosophy.

The Eleatic philosophers are the first who became conscious of the opposition between the perceived and the thought, *φαινόμενα* and *νοούμενα*. The latter alone was for them the true being, the *ὄντως ὄν*. Respecting this, they maintain that it is one, unchangeable and immovable; not so, however, with the *φαινομένοις*, that is, with the perceived, appearing, empirically given, of which it would have been absurd to maintain anything of the kind—hence the so misunderstood proposition refuted by Diogenes in his well-known manner. They already distinguished, therefore, between *appearance*, *φαινόμενον*, and *the thing-in-itself*, *ὄντος ὄν*. The last-mentioned could not be sensuously perceived, but only comprehended by thought, and was accordingly known as *νοούμενον* (Arist., "Metaph.," i., 5, p. 986, et "Scholia," edit. Berol., pp. 429, 430, et 509). In the "Scholia to Aristotle" (pp. 460, 536, 544, et 798), the work of Parmenides, *τὰ κατὰ δόξαν* is mentioned. This, then, would have been the doctrine of the phenomenon, physics, which would, without doubt, have implied another work, *τὰ κατ' ἀληθείαν*, the doctrine of the thing-in-itself, or metaphysic. Respecting Melissos, indeed, a scholium of Philoponos says: *ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀληθείαν ἓν εἶναι λέγων τὸ ὄν, ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν δύο* (should be *πολλὰ*) *φησὶν εἶναι*. The opposition to the Eleatics, and probably called forth by them, is Herakleitos, who taught the ceaseless movement of all things, as they taught their absolute immobility. He took his stand, therefore, on the *φαινόμενον* ("Arist. d. Cœlo," iii. 1, p. 298, edit. Berol.). He called forth thereby as *his* opposite, Plato's doctrine of Ideas, as appears from the statement of Aristotle ("Metaph.," p. 1078).

It is noteworthy that we find the comparatively few

main propositions of the Pre-Sokratic philosophers which have been preserved, numberless times repeated in the writings of the ancients, but very little beyond them; as, for instance, the doctrines of Anaxagoras, of the νοῦς and of the ὁμοιομερίαι; that of Empedokles, of φιλία καὶ νεῖκος and the four elements; that of Demokritos and Lukippos, of the atoms, εἰδώλοις; that of Herakleitos, of the continuous flux of all things; that of the Eleatics as above explained; that of the Pythagoreans, of the numbers, of metempsychosis, &c. It may well be, therefore, that this was the sum of all their philosophizing; for we find also in the works of the moderns, *e.g.*, of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and even Kant, the few fundamental propositions of their philosophies numberless times repeated; so that all these philosophers would seem to have adopted the motto of Empedokles, who may also have been a lover of the sign of repetition, δὶς καὶ τρὶς τὸ καλόν (see Sturz., "Empedocl. Agrigent.," p. 504).

The two dogmas Anaxagoras started stand in close connection. πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν is, namely, a symbolical designation of the dogma of the *homoiomeroi*. In the primal chaotic mass, accordingly, the *partes similares* (in the physiological sense) of all things were present in their completeness. In order to their differentiation, and to their combination into specifically distinct things (*partes dissimilares*), it required a νοῦς to arrange and to form them, who, by a selection of the elements, reduced confusion to order, since this chaos contained the most complete mixture of all substances ("Scholia in Aristot.," p. 337). Nevertheless the νοῦς had not brought the first separation to complete perfection, and therefore in everything was contained the elements of everything else, although in a lesser degree: πάλιν γὰρ πᾶν ἐν πάντι μεμίκται (*Ibid.*).

Empedokles, on the other hand, instead of the numberless homoiomeroi, had only four elements, from which the

things proceeded as products, not as with Anaxagoras as educts. The negating and separating, that is ordering, rôle of the νοῦς is, according to him, played by φιλία καὶ νεῖκος, love and hate. Both of these are very much better. For here not the *intellect* (νοῦς) but the *will* (φιλία καὶ νεῖκος) has the ordering of things assigned to it, and the variety of substances are not, as with Anaxagoras, mere educts, but real products. While Anaxagoras makes them realized by a separating understanding, Empedokles does so by a blind impulse, *i.e.*, a knowledgeless will.

Empedokles is altogether a thorough man, and his φιλία καὶ νεῖκος has for its basis a deep and true *apperçu*. Even in inorganic nature we see the elements unite and separate, seek or flee from each other, according to the laws of elective affinity. But those that show the strongest disposition to unite themselves chemically, which can only be effected in a state of fluidity, assume an attitude of the most decisive electrical antagonism when they come into contact with one another in a solid state—now they separate in opposed and mutually hostile polarities, now they again seek and embrace each other; and what, I ask, is that polar antagonism which appears throughout all nature in the most diverse forms, other than a continually renewed quarrel, upon which the earnestly-desired reconciliation follows? So φιλία καὶ νεῖκος is everywhere present, and, according to circumstances, first one and then the other displays itself at different times. We ourselves even may be immediately impressed in a friendly or a hostile sense with any human being that comes near us—the disposition to either is there and waits on circumstances. It is only prudence that induces us to tarry on the indifference-point of impartiality, which is also, be it said, the freezing-point. In the same way, the strange dog which we approach is ready at once to adopt the friendly or the hostile key, and changes easily from barking and growling to wagging, and

vice versâ. What lies at the foundation of this all-penetrating phenomenon of the φιλία καὶ νεῖκος is assuredly, at bottom, the great primal opposition between the unity of all natures, according to their being in themselves and their complete distinction in the phenomenon, which has for its form the *principium individuationis*. Similarly, Empedokles recognized the doctrine of atoms, already known to him, as false, and taught on the contrary the infinite divisibility of bodies, as Lucretius tells us (lib. i., v. 747, &c.).

But above all things in the doctrines of Empedokles, his decided pessimism is noteworthy. He has fully recognized the misery of our existence, and the world is for him as much as for the true Christian a vale of sorrows, Ἄτης λειμών. He compares it, indeed, like Plato later, to a dark cavern, in which we are immured. In our earthly existence he sees a state of banishment and misery, and the body is the prison of the soul. These souls were once in a state of infinite happiness, and have through their own fault and sins reached the present wretchedness, wherein they, by sinful conduct, more and more entangle themselves, getting involved in the circle of metempsychosis; while, on the contrary, by virtue and moral purity, to which the abstinence from animal food belongs, and by renunciation of earthly enjoyments and wishes, they may again attain to their previous condition. Thus the same primal wisdom which constitutes the basal thought of Brahmanism and Buddhism, and even of true Christianity (by which is not to be understood the optimistic Jewish-Protestant rationalism), was also brought into consciousness by this ancient Greek, who completes the *consensus gentium* on the subject. That Empedokles, whom the ancients throughout designated a Pythagorean, received this view from Pythagoras is probable, particularly as at bottom it is shared by Plato, who was also under the influence of Pythagoras. Empedokles declares his

adherence most distinctly to the doctrine of metempsychosis, which is connected with this view of the world. The passages in the ancients which, together with his own verses, bear witness to this conception of Empedokles, are to be found collected, with great industry, in Sturzzi, "Empedocles Agrigentinus," pp. 448-458. The opinion that the body is a prison and life a condition of suffering and purification from which we are released by death, if we are but quit of the soul-wandering, is shared by Egyptians, Pythagoreans, and Empedokles, together with the Hindoos and Buddhists. With the exception of metempsychosis it is also contained in Christianity. Diodorus Siculus and Cicero also bear witness to the above views of the ancients. (See "Wernsdorf de metempsychosi veterum," p. 31, and "Cicero fragmenta," p. 299 ["Somn. Scip.," 310, 319, ed. Bip.]) Cicero does not indicate in these passages to what philosophical school they belong, but they would seem to be remains of Pythagorean wisdom.

In the remaining doctrines of these Pre-Sokratic philosophers there is also much that is true to be pointed out, of which I will give some illustrations.

According to the cosmogony of Kant and Laplace—which has received a practical confirmation, *a posteriori*, in the observations of Herschel, and which Lord Ross is concerned, to the consolation of English clericalism, again to render doubtful by means of his giant telescope—the planetary systems form themselves by the condensation of slowly coagulating and then revolving luminous nebulæ, and thus, after thousands of years, Anaximenes is justified when he declared air and vapour for the primal elements of all things ("Schol. in Arist.," p. 514). At the same time, also, Empedokles and Demokritos received confirmation, for they, like Laplace, explained the origin and constitution of the world from a vortex δίνη ("Arist. Op." ed. Berol., p.

295, et "Scholia," p. 351), at which Aristophanes ("Nubes," v. 820) mocks as a blasphemy; just as do the English priests to-day over the Laplacian theory, they being anxious respecting their benefices, as they always are when a new truth comes to light. Our modern chemistry indeed carries us back to the Pythagorean philosophy of numbers: *τὰ γὰρ πάθη καὶ αἱ ἕξεις τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι παθῶν τε καὶ ἕξεων αἴτια, οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον, τὸ ἐπίτριτον, τὸ ἡμιόλιον* ("Schol. in Arist.," p. 543 et 829). That the Kopernican system was anticipated by the Pythagoreans is well known; it was even known to Kopernicus himself, who drew his chief ideas from the well-known passage on Hiketas, in Cicero's "Questionibus Acad." (ii., 39), and from Philolaos in Plutarch, "De placitis Philosophorum" (lib. iii., c. 13). This important insight was afterwards rejected by Aristotle, in order that he might put his whims in the place of it, as to which, see below, § 5 (compare "World as Will and Presentment," ii., p. 342 of the 2nd ed.; ii., p. 390, 3rd ed.). Even Fourier's and Cordier's discoveries on the heat in the interior of the earth are confirmations of the doctrines of the ancients *ἔλεγον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι πῦρ εἶναι δημιουργικὸν περὶ τὸ μέσον καὶ κέντρον τῆς γῆς τὸ ἀναθάλπον τὴν γῆν καὶ ζωποιοῦν* ("Schol. in Arist.," p. 504). And in consequence of these discoveries, the crust of the earth to-day is looked upon as a thin layer between two media (atmosphere and hot fluid metals and metalloids) whose contact would occasion a conflagration that would annihilate that crust, also confirming the opinion in which all the ancient philosophers agree, and which is shared even by the Hindoos ("Lettres édifiantes," édit. de 1819, vol. vii., p. 114) that the world will finally be consumed by fire. It is also deserving of mention that, as may be seen from Aristotle ("Metaph.," i., 5, p. 986), the Pythagoreans, under the name of *δέκα ἀρχαί*, had conceived the *yn* and *yang* of the Chinese.

That the metaphysics of music, as explained by me in

my chief work (vol. i., § 52, and vol. ii., chap. 39), must be regarded as an exposition of the Pythagorean philosophy of numbers, I have already shortly indicated, and will here somewhat further explain—presupposing, at the same time, in the reader an acquaintance with the passages referred to. In accordance with the above, *melody* expresses all movements of the will such as are made known in human consciousness, that is, all affections, feelings, &c.; *harmony*, again, denotes the ladder of the objectivation of the will in the rest of nature. Music is, in this sense, a second reality, which runs entirely parallel with the first, although it is of quite another kind and character, so that while it has a complete analogy it has no similarity with it—music, as such, existing only in our auditory nerves and brain. Outside these, or in itself (understood in the Lockean sense), it consists in mere relations of tones, directly, that is, in respect of quantity, in rhythm, and in respect of quality, in the intervals of the scales, which rest on the arithmetical relations of vibrations; in other words, numerical as it is in its rhythmical element, so is it also in its harmonic element.

The whole nature of the world, therefore, as well of the microcosm as of the macrocosm, may be certainly expressed by mere numerical relations, and is, therefore, reducible to these. And in this sense Pythagoras was right in placing the proper nature of things in numbers. But what now are numbers? Relations of succession whose possibility is based on time.

When one reads what is said about the number-philosophy of the Pythagoreans in the "Scholia to Aristotle" (p. 829, ed. Berol.), one might be led to the supposition, that the use of the word λόγος in the introduction to the gospel ascribed to John, so strange and mysterious and verging on the absurd, as also the earlier and analogous passages in Philo, originate in the Pythagorean philosophy

of numbers, from the signification, that is, of the word λόγος in the arithmetical sense, as numerical relation, *ratio numerica*. Such a relation constitutes, with the Pythagoreans, the innermost and indestructible essence of every being; in other words, its first and original principle ἀρχή; whence of everything might be said, ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος. It should be noted also that Aristotle says ("De Anima," i. 1): τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔννλοί εἰσι, et mox: ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος εἶδος τοῦ πράγματος. One is also reminded here of the λόγος στερματικος of the Stoics, to which I shall shortly return.

According to Jamblichos' biography of Pythagoras, the latter owed his education chiefly to Egypt, where he remained from his twenty-second to his fifty-sixth year, and, indeed, to the Egyptian priests. Returning in his fifty-sixth year, he had conceived the project of founding a kind of priestly state, in imitation of the Egyptian temple hierarchies, of course, with the modifications necessary to Greeks; and though he did not succeed in this in his fatherland, Samos, he did, to a certain extent, in Krotona. Now, as Egyptian culture and religion, without doubt, came from India, as is proved by the sanctity of the cow, together with a hundred other things ("Herod.," ii., 41), this would also explain the regulation of Pythagoras respecting abstinence from animal nourishment, especially the prohibition of slaughtering oxen (Jambl., "Vit. Puith.," c. 28, § 150), as also the consideration for all animals which is enjoined; similarly, also, his doctrine of metempsychosis, his white robes, his eternal mystification, which gave rise to symbolical modes of speech, and even extended itself to mathematical theorems; yet, again, the foundation of a priestly caste, strict discipline and much ceremonial, the worship of the sun (c. 35, § 256), and many other things.[1]

[1] It may be well to remind the reader that Schopenhauer's statements as to the origin of Egyptian civilization are in no way

His most important astronomical principles he had also from the Egyptians. Hence the priority of his doctrine of the inclination of the ecliptic was disputed by Œnopides, who had been with him in Egypt. (Consult, as to this, the conclusion of the 24th chapter of the 1st book of the "Eklogues of Stobæos," with Heeren's note from Diodorus.) For the rest, when one looks through the elementary notions of astronomy collected by Stobæos from all the Greek philosophers (especially lib. i., c. 25), one finds that they have produced mere absurdities, with the single exception of the Pythagoreans, who, as a rule, are quite correct. That this is not their own invention, but comes from Egypt, is not to be doubted. The well-known prohibition of Pythagoras respecting beans is of purely Egyptian origin, and merely a superstition derived from thence, since Herodotus (ii., 37), relates that in Egypt the bean is considered unclean and abhorred, so that the priests will not even tolerate the sight of it.

That the doctrine of Pythagoras is a decided pantheism is proved as conclusively as briefly by a sentence of the Pythagoreans, preserved by Clement of Alexandria, contained in the "*Hortatio ad gentes,*" the Doric dialect of which points to its genuineness: *Οὐκ ἀποκρύπτεον οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀμφὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν, οἱ φασίν· Ὁ μὲν Θεὸς εἷς· χ᾽ οὗτος δὲ οὐχ, ὥς τινες ὑπονοοῦσιν, ἐκτὸς τᾶς διακοσμήσιος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν αὑτᾷ, ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κύκλῳ, ἐπίσκοπος πάσας γενέστος, κρᾶσις τῶν ὅλων· ἀεὶ ὤν, καὶ ἐργάτας τῶν αὐτοῦ δυνάμιων καὶ ἔργων ἁπάντων ἐν οὐράνῳ φωστῆρ, καὶ πάντων πατήρ, νοῦς καὶ ψυχωσις τῷ ὅλῳ κύκλῳ, πάντων κίνασις.* (See "Clem. Alex. Opera," tom. i.,

borne out by the results of recent research. The coincidences mentioned by Schopenhauer might be extended to most early civilizations, and do not by any means give colour to the far-fetched hypothesis of the borrowing of the ancient Egyptian culture from India. The Egyptian civilization is undoubtedly of greater antiquity than the Indian.—TR.

p. 118, in "Sanctorum Patrum Oper. Polem.," vol. iv., Wirceburgi, 1778.) It is good, namely, to convince oneself at every opportunity that, properly speaking, Theism and Judaism are exchangeable terms.

According to Apuleius, Pythagoras got as far as India, and was even instructed by the Brahmins. (See Apuleius, "Florida," p. 130, ed. Bip.) I believe, nevertheless, that the assuredly considerable wisdom and knowledge of Pythagoras consisted, not so much in what he thought, as in what he learnt, was not so much his own, that is, as of foreign origin. This is confirmed by a saying of Herakleitos ("Diog. Laert.," lib. viii., c. 1, § 5). Otherwise he would have written it down in order to rescue his thoughts from oblivion; while, on the other hand, what was learnt from abroad was safe enough at the fountain-head.

Section 3.

Sokrates.

The wisdom of Sokrates is an article of philosophic faith. That the Platonic Sokrates was an ideal and therefore poetical person, who enunciated Platonic thoughts, is perfectly clear, but in the Xenophontic Socrates there is not precisely very much wisdom to be found. According to Lukian ("Philo. Pseudes," 24), Sokrates had a fat belly, which does not belong to the signs of genius. But it is just as doubtful as to the high mental powers of all those who have not written, and hence also of Pythagoras. A great mind must gradually recognize his calling and his position toward humanity, and consequently attain to the conviction that he does not belong to the flock, but to the shepherds—to the educators, that is, of the human race. But from this the obligation becomes clear not to

limit his immediate and certain action to the few which chance brings into his neighbourhood, but to extend it to humanity, in order that it may reach the exceptions, the elect, in the latter. But the only organ with which one speaks to humanity is writing; verbally one addresses only a number of individuals, and therefore anything so said, remains, as far as the human race is concerned, a private matter. For such individuals are generally a bad soil for the best seed, which either does not influence them at all, or else what it produces rapidly degenerates. The seed itself, therefore, must be preserved, and this cannot be done through tradition, which is falsified at every step, but solely through writing, the only true preserver of thoughts. Add to this, that every deep-thinking mind necessarily has the impulse, for the sake of its own satisfaction, to retain its thoughts and reduce them to the greatest possible clearness and definition, and consequently to embody them in words. But this is only perfectly attained in writing, for the written delivery is essentially different from the verbal, since it alone admits the highest precision, concision, and the most pregnant brevity, thus becoming a pure ektypos of thought. In consequence of all this, it would be a marvellous conceit in any thinker to wish to leave the most important invention of the human race unutilized. For this reason, it is hard for me to believe in the really great intellect of those who have not written. I am rather disposed to hold them to have been mainly practical heroes, who effected more by their character than by their brains. The majestic authors of the "Upanishads of the Vedas" have written, though the "Sanhita of the Vedas," consisting as it does merely of prayers, may originally have been only verbally propagated.

Between Sokrates and Kant many parallels may be drawn. Both reject all dogmatism; both profess a com-

plete ignorance in matters of metaphysic, and make their speciality the clear consciousness of this ignorance. Both maintain that the practical, that which man has to do and to forbear, is, on the other hand, perfectly certain of itself without any further theoretical foundation. Both had the fortune, that their immediate successors and declared disciples broke away from them precisely on these principles, and, elaborating a metaphysic, established thoroughly dogmatic systems; and further, that these systems turned out very diverse, and yet all agreed in maintaining that they started from the doctrines of Sokrates or Kant, as the case might be. As I am myself a Kantian, I will here notify my relation to him in one word. Kant teaches that we cannot know anything beyond experience and its possibility. I admit this, but maintain that experience itself, in its totality, is susceptible of an explanation which I have endeavoured to give by deciphering it like a writing, and not, as with all earlier philosophers, by undertaking to transcend it by means of its mere forms, a method Kant had proved to be invalid.

The advantage of the *Sokratic method*, as we learn it from Plato, consists in that the foundation of the propositions, which are intended to be proved by the collocutor or opponent, are admitted singly before their consequences are seen. Since, however, in a didactic delivery in continuous speech, consequences and grounds are able to be seen at once, one would attack them if they did not please one. Meanwhile, among the things which Plato would impose upon us is this—to wit, that by means of the application of this method, the Sophists and other fools had in all innocence let Sokrates prove to them that they were such. This is incredible; it is much more likely that, at the last quarter of the way, or as soon as they noticed what he was driving at, they would, by manœuvres denying what had previously been said, intentional misunderstandings

and such other tricks and dodges as are employed instinctively by dishonesty desirous of justifying itself, have spoilt the artificially-planned game of Sokrates and torn his net, or they would have become so rude and insulting, that he would have found it advisable to save his skin betimes. For why should not the Sophists have understood the method by which everyone can make himself equal to everyone else, and for the moment bring himself to the level of the greatest intellectual eminence—namely, insult? The low nature indeed feels an instinctive inclination to this as soon as it begins to detect intellectual superiority.

Section 4.

Plato.

Already in Plato we find the origin of a certain false dianoiology, which is put forward with a secret metaphysical purpose, namely, for the behoof of a rational psychology and a doctrine of immortality depending on it. It has proved itself again and again as a deceptive doctrine of the toughest vitality, dragging on its existence as it has throughout the whole of ancient, mediæval, and modern philosophy, till Kant, the all-destroyer, finally knocked it on the head. The doctrine here referred to is the rationalism of theory of knowledge with its metaphysical purpose. It may be summed up shortly as follows: That which knows in us is an immaterial substance, fundamentally distinct from the body, called Soul; the body being a hindrance to knowledge. Hence all knowledge through the senses is deceptive, the only true, accurate, and certain knowledge being that which is free and removed from all sensibility (*i.e.* from all perception), in other words, *pure thought*, or that which functions exclu-

sively by means of abstract conceptions. For this instructs the soul entirely by its own methods, and consequently will work best after it is separated from the body, that is, after we are dead. In such wise, therefore, dianoiology plays into the hands of rational psychology to the benefit of its doctrine of immortality. This doctrine which I have here summed up, we find fully and clearly in the "Phædo," chap. x. It is somewhat differently conceived in the "Timæus," from which Sextus Empiricus expounds it very precisely and clearly in the following words: Παλαιά τις παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς| κυλίεται δόξα περὶ τοῦ τὰ ὁμοῖα τῶν ὁμοίων εἶναι γνωριστικά. Mox: Πλατὼν δὲ, ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ, πρὸς παραστασιν τοῦ ἀσωματον εἶναι τὴν ψυκην, τῷ αὐτῷ γένει τῆς ἀποδείξεως κέχρηται. Εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασίς, φησι, φωτὸς ἀντιλαμβανομένη, εὐθύς ἐστι φωτοειδὴς, ἡ δὲ ἀκοη ἀέρα πεπληγμένον κρίνουσα, ὅπερ ἐστι τὴν φωνὴν, εὐθὺς ἀεροειδὴς θεωρεῖται, ἡ δὲ ὄσφρησις ἀτμοὺς γνωρίζουσα πάντως ἐστι ἀτμοειδὴς, καὶ ἡ γεῦσις χυλοὺς, χυλοειδής· κατ' ἀναγκὴν καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰς ἀσωμάτους ἰδέας λαμβάνουσα, καθάπερ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πέρασι τῶν σωμάτων (that is, pure mathematics) γίνεταί τις ἀσώματος ("Adv. Math.," vii., 116 et 119). (*Vetus quædam, a physicis usque probata, versatur opinio, quod similia similibus cognoscantur.—Mox: Plato, in Timæo, ad probandum, animam esse incorpoream, usus est eodem genere demonstrationis: "nam si visio," inquit, "apprehendens lucem statim est luminosa, auditus autem aërem percussum judicans, nempe vocem, protinus cernitur ad aëris accedens speciem, odoratus autem cognoscens vapores, est omnino vaporis aliquam habens formam, et gustus, qui humores, humoris habens speciem; necessario et anima, ideas suscipiens incorporeas, ut quæ sunt in numeris et in finibus corporum, est incorporea.*")

Even Aristotle admits this argument, at least hypothetically, where, in the first book of the "De Anima" (c. i.), he says that the separate existence of the soul would be

thereby constituted if any manifestation in which the body had no part accrued to it, and that such a manifestation seemed above all things to be Thought. But if even *this* is not possible without perception and imagination, it cannot obtain without the body (*εἰ δέ ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν φαντασία τις, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι*). Yet Aristotle does not even admit the above conditions, which are the premisses of the argumentation, in so far, namely, as he teaches, what was later formulated in the proposition, *nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensibus*. (See, as to this, "De Anima," iii., 8.) Even he saw, therefore, that all that is purely and abstractly thought has first borrowed its entire material and content from the perceived. This also disturbed the Schoolmen, and hence, even in the middle ages, men endeavoured to prove that there are pure cognitions of reason—that is, thoughts having no reference to any images; in other words, a thought which draws all its material from itself. The efforts and controversies on this point are to be found collected in Pomponasius, who derives his main argument from them. In order to answer the requirement spoken of, the *universalia* and the cognitions *a priori*, conceived as *æternæ veritates*, had to serve. The development which the matter received through Descartes and his school I have already explained in the elaborate observation appended to the § 6 of my prize essay on the foundation of morals, in which I have adduced the valuable original words of the Cartesian De la Forge—for one finds the false doctrines of a philosopher as a rule expressed the clearest by his disciples, since these are not, like the master himself, concerned to keep in the background as much as possible those sides of his system which might betray its weakness, inasmuch as they have no fear about it. But Spinoza opposed to the whole Cartesian dualism his doctrine *substantia cogitans et sub-*

stantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quæ jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur, thereby showing his great superiority. Leibnitz, on the other hand, remained exquisitely on the path of Descartes and orthodoxy. But this again called out the, for philosophy, so thoroughly healthy endeavour of the excellent Locke, who finally plunged into the investigation of the *origin of conceptions*, and made the phrase *no innate ideas*, after he had carefully expounded it, the foundation of his philosophy. The French, for whom his system was worked out by Condillac, proceeded much farther in the matter on the same basis, inasmuch as they put forward and urged the proposition, *penser, c'est sentir*. Taken absolutely, this proposition is false, but there lies this truth in it, that all thought in part presupposes feeling as ingredient of the perception which furnishes for it its material; in part it is no more than feeling conditioned by corporeal organs. As the latter, namely, is conditioned by the nerves of sense, so is the former by the brain, and both consist in nervous activity. Yet even the French school does not hold closely by this proposition, but only with a metaphysical—in this case a materialistic—purpose, just as their Platonic, Cartesian, Leibnitzian opponents had only held the false proposition that the only accurate knowledge of things consists in pure thought, also with a metaphysical object, in order thereby to prove the immateriality of the soul. Kant alone leads us away from both these false paths, and from a quarrel in which neither party, properly speaking, proceeds honestly to the truth. The two sides both profess dianoiology, but their attention is really turned to metaphysic, and hence they falsify the dianoiology. Kant says: "Certainly there is a pure knowledge from reason, that is, cognitions *a priori*, which precede all experience, and consequently also a Thought, which does not owe its material to any knowledge by

means of the senses." But even this knowledge *a priori*, although not drawn *from* experience, has only worth and validity for the *sake* of experience; for it is nothing else but the awareness of our own *knowledge-apparatus* and its *modus operandi* (brain-function), or, as Kant expresses it, the form of the knowing consciousness itself, which receives its material primarily through the empirical knowledge, with which it is connected by means of the sense feeling, and without which it is empty and useless; whence his philosophy is termed the "Critique of pure Reason." Therewith all the above metaphysical psychology falls to the ground, and with it falls all Plato's pure activity of the soul. For we see that knowledge without the perception which is brought about through the body has no material, and that therefore the knowing subject, as such, is nothing but a mere empty form without the presupposition of the body, even setting aside the fact that all thought is a mere physiological function of the brain as digestion is of the stomach.

If then, accordingly, Plato's doctrine of isolating knowledge and keeping it pure from all communication with the body, the senses and perception, is shown to be purposeless, mistaken, and even impossible, we may, notwithstanding, regard my doctrine, that only the intuitive knowledge kept pure from all community with the will attains the highest objectivity, and therefore perfection, as the true analogue of the same. Respecting this I refer the reader to the third book of my chief work.

Section 5.

Aristotle.

The main characteristic of Aristotle may be said to have been pre-eminent acuteness, combined with circumspection, power of observation, many-sidedness, and want of depth. His conception of the world is tame, although acutely worked out. Depth of thought finds its material in ourselves; acuteness has to receive it from without if it is to have any data. But at that time the empirical data were, on the one hand few, and on the other false. For this reason the study of Aristotle is nowadays not very profitable, while that of Plato remains so in the highest degree. The want of depth complained of in Aristotle is naturally most apparent in his "Metaphysic," where mere acuteness will not, as elsewhere, suffice; hence, in the latter, he is least satisfactory. His "Metaphysic" is, for the most part, a conversation as to the philosophies of his predecessors, which he criticises and refutes from his standpoint, mostly from isolated sayings, without penetrating their meaning, and somewhat like one who breaks windows from the outside. He propounds few or no dogmas of his own, or at least not in a connected manner. That we are indebted to his polemic for a great part of our knowledge of the older philosophies, is an accidental service. He is most hostile to Plato precisely where Plato is entirely right. The "ideas" of the latter return like something which he cannot digest again and again into his mouth; he is resolved not to admit their validity. Acuteness suffices in the empirical sciences; hence Aristotle has a pre-eminently empirical bent. But inasmuch as, since his time, experience has made such progress as to stand to its then state in the relation of adult age to childhood, the empirical

sciences cannot, to-day, be directly very much advanced by the method and the specially scientific attitude which characterized him and was started by him, though indirectly they may be. In zoology, however, he is still, at least in some respects, of direct use. His empirical bent in general gives him the disposition to continually dissipate himself. He is apt, accordingly, to spring so easily aside from the line of thought which he had begun, as to be almost incapable of following out any line of thought for long and to the end, in the capacity for which consists precisely the faculty of deep thought. On the contrary, he is always starting problems, but only touching them, and proceeding at once, without solving them or even thoroughly discussing them, to something else. Hence his reader often thinks, "Now it's coming," but it does not come; and hence it often appears, when he has stirred a problem and followed it out a short way, that the truth has been hanging upon his lips, when suddenly he is off to something else and leaves us in doubt. For he cannot keep to anything, but springs from that which he intended to something different which occurs to him at the moment, as a child lets a toy fall in order to seize another it has just seen. This is the weak side of his intellect; it is the vivacity of superficiality. It is the explanation of why, although Aristotle was a highly systematic head, since from him proceeded the separation and classification of the sciences, nevertheless his exposition is throughout deficient in systematic arrangement, and we miss therein a methodical progress, namely, the separation of the dissimilar and collocation of the similar. He deals with things as they occur to him without having previously thought them out and sketched a clear plan of them; he thinks with a pen in his hand, a method which, though it is a great facility for the writer, is a great grievance for the reader. Hence the planlessness and insufficiency of

his exposition; hence the reason why he comes back a hundred times to the same thing, simply because something foreign to it had come in between; hence the reason why he cannot keep to a subject, but goes from the hundredth to the thousandth; hence it is that he leads, as above described, the reader, anxious for the solution of the problem mooted, about by the nose; hence it is that, after having devoted several pages to a subject, he begins his investigation suddenly from the beginning with λάβωμεν οὖν ἄλλην ἀρχὴν τῆς σκέψεως, and this six times in one work; hence the motto, *quid feret hic tanto dignum promissor hiatu*, applies to so many of the exordiums of his books and chapters; hence, in a word, is he so often confused and unsatisfactory. In exceptional cases he has certainly done things differently, as, for instance, the three books of "Rhetoric," which are throughout a model of scientific method, and indeed exhibit an architectonic symmetry which may well have been the original of the Kantian.

The radical antithesis of Aristotle, alike in his mode of thought as also in his exposition, is Plato. The latter holds fast to his leading thought as if with an iron hand, follows out its thread, be it never so thin, in all its ramifications, through the labyrinths of the longest dialogues, and finds it again after all episodes. One sees from this that he had fully and ripely thought out his subject, and had planned an artistic arrangement for its exposition, before he started to write. Hence, every dialogue is a planned work of art, all of whose parts have a well-thought-out connection, though it is often purposely hidden for a time, and whose frequent episodes often lead back, unexpectedly and of themselves, to the leading idea, after it has been made clear by them. Plato always knew, in the full sense of the word, what he wanted and intended; although for the most part he does not carry through the problems to a decisive issue, but is satisfied with their thorough-going

discussion. We need not much wonder, therefore, if some accounts, especially in Ælian ("Var. Hist.," iii., 19, iv., 9, &c.), state that between Plato and Aristotle considerable personal want of harmony was displayed; also that Plato now and then spoke somewhat disparagingly of Aristotle, whose unsteadiness, flashiness, and levity, though it was connected with his polymathy, was quite antipathetic to Plato. Schiller's poem, "Breadth and Depth," may be applied to the antithesis between Aristotle and Plato.

In spite of this empirical mental attitude, Aristotle was, nevertheless, no logical and methodical empiricist; hence he had to be overthrown and driven out by the true father of empiricism, Bacon of Verulam. Anyone who wants to properly understand in what sense and why the latter was the opponent and conqueror of Aristotle and his method, has only to read the books of Aristotle, "De degeneratione et corruptione." Here he will find a true *a priori* treatment of nature, one which seeks to understand and explain its processes from mere conceptions; a particularly bad instance is furnished in l. ii., c. 4, where a chemistry is constructed *a priori*. Bacon, on the other hand, appeared with the advice not to make the abstract, but the perceptual experience, the source of the knowledge of nature. The brilliant result of this is the present high state of the natural sciences, from which we look down, with a piteous smile, on these Aristotelian vexations of spirit. In this respect it is very remarkable that the above-mentioned books of Aristotle disclose, quite plainly even, the origin of scholasticism; indeed the quibbling, word-juggling method of the latter is already to be met with there. For the same purpose the books "De cœlo" are also very useful, and therefore worthy of being read. Even the first chapters are a good sample of the method of seeking to determine and to know the essence of nature from mere conceptions, and the failure is here obvious. It is there proved to us in

chap. viii., from mere conception and *locis communibus*, that there are not several worlds, and in chap. xii. it is similarly speculated as to the course of the stars. It is a logical reasoning from false conceptions, a quite special nature-dialectic, which undertakes, from certain universal axioms, which are supposed to express what is reasonable and proper, to decide *a priori* what nature is and how it must act. In seeing such a great, indeed stupendous, intellect such as, after all said and done, Aristotle remains, entangled so thickly in errors of this sort, which maintained their validity till a few hundred years ago, it is pre-eminently plain to us how very much humanity owes to Kopernicus, Kepler, Galilei, Bacon, Robert Hook, and Newton. In chaps. vii. and viii. of the second book, Aristotle expounds to us his whole absurd arrangement of the heavens: The stars cleave fast to the revolving hollow globe; sun and planets to similar nearer ones; the friction of revolving produces light and heat; the earth stands, it is expressly said, still. All this might pass if there had not already been something better; but when he himself, in chap. xiii., presents to us the entirely correct views of the Pythagoreans on the form, place, and motion of the earth in order to reject them, it can hardly fail to arouse our indignation. This will rise when we see from his frequent polemic against Empedokles, Herakleitos, and Demokritos, how all these had much more correct insight into nature, and had even attended to experience better, than the barren talker that we have before us. Empedokles had, indeed, already taught a tangential force arising from revolution and acting in opposition to gravity (ii., 1 et 13, also the "Scholia," p. 491). Far removed from being able to estimate this at its true value, Aristotle does not even admit the correct views of these ancients on the true significance of above and below, but here also takes his stand on the vulgar opinion which follows the superficial appearance

(iv., 2). But we have further to bear in mind that these his views found recognition and circulation, superseding all that was earlier and better, and so became, later on, the foundation of Hipparchus, and afterwards of the Ptolemaic cosmology, with which mankind had to content itself till the beginning of the sixteenth century, to the great advantage, doubtless, of the Jewish-Christian religious dogmas, which are at bottom incompatible with the Kopernican cosmology. (For how should there be a God in heaven when there is no heaven?) Theism, when seriously meant, necessarily presupposes the division of the world into heaven and earth; on the latter men run about, in the former sits the God who rules them. But if astronomy takes the heaven away, it has taken the God with it also; it has, that is to say, so extended the world that there is no room left for God. But a personal being, such as every God must necessarily be, who has no place, but is everywhere and nowhere, can merely be spoken of, but not imagined, and therefore not believed in. To the extent, accordingly, to which physical astronomy is popularized, theism must wane, however much it may have been impressed upon men by an unceasing and pompous preaching. The Catholic Church rightly recognized this at once, and accordingly persecuted the Kopernican system; as regards which it is childish to wonder and shriek over the crushing of Galilei, for *omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui.* Who knows whether a secret knowledge, or at least presentiment, of this congeniality of Aristotle to the doctrines of the Church, and of the danger averted by him, did not contribute to the overweening adoration of him in the middle ages? Who knows whether many a one, stimulated by his accounts of the older astronomical systems, had not secretly penetrated these truths long before Kopernicus, who, after many years of hesitation, and with the intention of separating himself from the world, finally ventured to proclaim them?

Section 6.

Stoics.

A very beautiful and pregnant conception with the Stoics, is that of the λόγος σπερματικός, although more complete accounts respecting it than those which have come down to us might be desired ("Diog. Laert.," vii., 136; "Plut. de Plac. Phil.," i., 7; "Stob. Ecl.," i., p. 372). Thus much is clear, however, that what was understood thereby was that which in the successive individuals of a kind asserted and preserved its identical form, inasmuch as it passes over from the one to the other; as, for instance, the conception of the species embodied in the seed. The *Logos spermaticus* is accordingly the indestructible element in the individual, that, namely, through which it is one of a species representing and maintaining it. It is that by virtue of which the death which annihilates the individual does not touch the kind, which makes the individual continuously present in spite of death. Hence we might translate λόγος σπερματικός as the magical formula which at all times calls this form into the phenomenon. Nearly related to it is the conception of the *forma substantialis* of the Schoolmen, through which the inner principle of the complex of all the qualities of every natural being is thought; its antithesis is the *materia prima*, the pure matter, destitute of all form and quality. The soul of man is just his *forma substantialis*. What distinguishes both conceptions is, that the λόγος σπερματικός accrues solely to living and procreating beings, but the *forma substantialis* to inorganic beings also. The one refers, moreover, directly to the individual, the other directly to the kind; both, on the other hand, are obviously related to the Platonic idea. Explanations of the *forma substan-*

tialis are to be seen in "Scotus Erigena de Divis. Nat.," lib. iii., p. 139 of the Oxford edition; in "Giordano Bruno, della Cosa," dial. 3, p. 252 seqq, and developed at length in the "Disputationibus Metaphysicis" of Suarez (disp. 15, sect. 1), that genuine compendium of the whole scholastic wisdom, where one should seek its acquaintance rather than in the bald placidity of soulless German professors of philosophy, the quintessence of all shallowness and tediousness.

One chief source of our knowledge of the Stoic ethics is the very complete presentation of them preserved for us by Stobæus ("Ecl. Eth.," l. 2, c. vii.), in which one may flatter oneself that one possesses, for the most part, verbal extracts from Zeno and Chrysippos. If this be correct, it is not calculated to give us a high opinion of the spirit of these philosophers, seeing that it is a pedantic, pedagogic, eminently bald, incredibly empty, flat and spiritless exposition of the Stoic morality, without force and life, and without valuable, striking, or noble thoughts. Everything in it is deduced from mere conceptions, and not drawn from reality and experience. Mankind is accordingly divided into σπουδαῖοι and φαῦλοι, virtuous and vicious; to the former is attributed everything good, to the latter everything bad, all things appearing in consequence black and white, like a Prussian sentry-box. Assuredly these dull school-exercises will not bear comparison with the energetic, powerful, and well-thought-out paragraphs of Seneca.

The dissertations of Arrian on the philosophy of Epictetus, composed some four hundred years after the origin of the Stoa, give us no reliable information as to the true spirit and the special principles of the Stoic ethics, for the book is unsatisfactory both as to form and content. Firstly, as regards the form, one misses in it every trace of method, of systematic treatment, and even of orderly

progression. In chapters tacked on to one another without order and connection, it is untiringly repeated that one should pay no attention to anything that is not the expression of our own will, and that therefore everything that otherwise moves men should be regarded completely without interest; this is the Stoic ἀταραξία. That, namely, which is not ἐφ' ἡμῖν would also not be πρὸς ἡμᾶς. This colossal paradox, however, is not deduced from any principles at all, but the most extraordinary opinion of the world is required of us without any ground being given for it. Instead of this we find endless declamations in ceaselessly recurring phrases and turns of expression. For the consequences of these wonderful maxims are expounded in the most complete and vivid manner, and we accordingly have described how the Stoics make something from nothing at all. Meanwhile, everyone who thinks differently is unceasingly abused as a slave and a fool. But one hopes in vain for the indication of any clear and adequate ground for the assumption of this remarkable mode of thought, although such would have more effect than all the abuse and declamations of the whole thick book. As it is, it is a true Capuchin's sermon, with its hyperbolic descriptions of the Stoic apathy, its incessantly repeated panegyrics of the holy fathers Kleanthes, Chrysippos, Zeno, Krates, Diogenes, Sokrates, and its abuse of all who differ from them. To such a book is certainly suited the planless and desultory nature of the whole contents. What the heading of a chapter indicates is only the subject of its beginning; at the first opportunity a jump is made, and, as far as the *nexus idearum* is concerned, we pass from the hundredth to the thousandth. So much as to form.

As regards the content, it is the same; and even if we overlook the fact that the foundation is entirely wanting, it is at all events not genuine and thoroughly Stoical, but

has a strong foreign admixture, which smacks of a Christian-Jewish source. The most undeniable proof of this is the theism which is to be found on every side and is also the support of the ethics; the Cynics and the Stoics act here on behalf of God, whose will is their guiding-star; they are devoted to him, hope in him, &c. The genuine original Stoa is quite foreign to all this; God and the world are there one, and nothing is known of a God who thinks, wills, commands, and provides for men. Not alone in Arrian, however, but in most of the heathen philosophic writers of the first Christian century, we see the Jewish theism, destined ere long to become a popular creed in Christianity, already peering through, just as to-day there peers through the writings of scholars the pantheism native to India, which is also destined hereafter to pass over into the popular belief. *Ex oriente lux.*

For the reasons above given, the ethic here expounded is not purely Stoical. Many of its maxims are, indeed, mutually incompatible, hence no ground-principles common to it can be mentioned. In the same way Cynicism is entirely falsified by the doctrine that the Cynic should be such chiefly for the sake of others, namely, in order to act upon them by his example as commissioned by God, and in order by mixing in their affairs to guide them. Hence it is said, "In a city where there were only wise men, no Cynic would be necessary;" and, in the same way, that he should be healthy, strong, and cleanly, in order not to repel people. How far is this from the self-satisfaction of the old genuine Cynics? It is true Diogenes and Krates were the domestic friends and advisers of many families; but that was secondary and accidental, and in no wise the purpose of Cynicism.

Arrian has therefore entirely lost sight of the properly fundamental idea of Cynicism as of the Stoic ethics; indeed he does not even seem to have felt the need of

them. He preaches self-renunciation because it pleases him, and perhaps it only pleases him because it is difficult and opposed to human nature, while in the meantime the preaching is easy. He did not seek for the grounds of self-renunciation; hence one thinks, now one is listening to a Christian ascetic, now again to a Stoic. For the maxims of both often concur, but the principles on which they rest are quite different. I refer the reader in this matter to my chief work (vol. i., § 16, and vol. ii., chap. xvi.), where for the first time the true spirit of Cynicism as of the Stoa is systematically expounded.

The inconsistency of Arrian presents itself, indeed, in a ridiculous manner, in that he, with his countless times repeated description of the Stoic, always says: "He blames no one, complains neither of Gods nor of men, scolds no one," while at the same time his whole book is throughout conceived in a scolding tone, which often descends to abuse.

Notwithstanding all this, there are here and there genuine Stoic thoughts to be met with in the book, which Arrian or Epictetus had derived from the ancient Stoics; and similarly Cynicism is in some of its features tellingly and vividly depicted. In places there is also much sound common sense, as well as descriptions, drawn from life, of man and his doings. The style is easy and flowing, but very bald.

That Epictetus' "Encheiridion" is also composed by Arrian, as A. Wolf assured us in his lectures, I do not believe. It has much more spirit in fewer words than the dissertations, is instinct throughout with sound sense, has no empty declamations, no ostentation, is concise to the point, and moreover written in the tone of a well-meaning friend giving his advice; while, on the other hand, the dissertations speak mostly in a scolding and execrating tone. The content of both books is, on the whole, the same; only

that the "Encheiridion" has very little of the theism of the dissertations. Perhaps the "Encheiridion" was Epictetus' own compendium, which he dictated to his hearers, but the dissertations the manuscript copied from the free discourse by his commentator Arrian.

Section 7.

Neoplatonists.

The reading of the Neoplatonists requires much patience, since they fail entirely as regards form and style. Far better than the others in this respect is Porphyry. He is the only one who writes clearly and connectedly, so that one reads him without repulsion.

The worst, on the contrary, is Iamblichos, in his book "De Mysteriis Egyptiorum," which is full of crass superstition and crude demonology, besides being conceited. He has, it is true, another as it were esoteric opinion on magic and theurgy, but his statements concerning this are only flat and insignificant. On the whole, he is a bad and turgid writer, limited, distorted, grossly superstitious, confused, and unclear. One sees plainly that what he teaches has by no means arisen from his own reflection, but that they are foreign, often only half-understood, but all the more strenuously asserted dogmas; hence, also, he is full of contradictions. But the book in question is now denied to be by Iamblichos, and I am inclined to agree with this opinion when I read the long extracts from his lost works preserved by Stobæus, and which are incomparably better than the book "De Mysteriis," containing as they do many good thoughts of the Neoplatonic school.

Proklos, again, is a dry, bald, insipid talker; his commentary to Plato's "Alkibiades," one of the worst of the

Platonic dialogues, which, moreover, may be ungenuine, is the baldest, most diffuse piece of insipidity in the world. Over every, even the most insignificant, word of Plato's there is endless talk, and a deep meaning is sought therein. What by Plato was said mythically and allegorically is taken in its literal sense and in a spirit of rigid dogmatism, everything being twisted into the superstitious and the theosophical. It is, nevertheless, not to be denied, that in the first half of this commentary some very good ideas are to be met with, though they probably more strictly belong to the school than to Proklos himself. It is a highly important proposition that closes the *fasciculum primum partis primæ*: *αἱ τῶν ψυχῶν ἐφέσεις τὰ μέγιστα συντελοῦσι πρὸς τοὺς βίους, καὶ οὐ πλαττομένοις ἔξωθεν ἐοίκαμεν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν προβάλλομεν τὰς αἱρέσεις, καθ' ἃς διάζωμεν* (*animorum appetitus* [*ante hanc vitam concepti*] *plurimam vim habent in vitas eligendas, nec extrinsecus fictis similes sumus, sed nostra sponte facimus electiones, secundum quas deinde vitas transigimus*). This certainly has its root in Plato, and approaches Plato's doctrine of intelligible character, standing high above the dull and narrow theories of the freedom of the individual will, that can always do thus and otherwise, with which our professors of philosophy—the catechism for ever before their eyes—content themselves up to the present day. Augustine and Luther, for their part, had called in aid election by grace. That was good enough for those God-given times, when people were ready, if it pleased God, to go to the devil in God's name; but in our time refuge can only be taken in the aseity of the will, and it must be acknowledged that, as Proklos has it, *οὐ πλαττομένοις ἔξωθεν ἐοίκαμεν.*

Plotinos, finally, the most important of all, is very unequal, and the various "Enneads" are of extremely diverse value and content; the fourth is excellent. Exposition and style are, however, for the most part, very bad with

him; his thoughts are not ordered nor previously considered, but he writes them down just as they come. Porphyry in his biography tells us of the loose careless way in which he set to work. . Hence his bald tedious diffuseness and confusion often overcomes all patience, so that one wonders how such stuff could have come down to the modern world. He usually has the style of a pulpit preacher, and as the latter sets forth the gospel, so he sets forth the Platonic doctrines. At the same time, what Plato has said mythically or half metaphorically, he drags down to intentional prosaic seriousness, and chews at the same thought for hours without adding anything to it from his own resources. In this he proceeds authoritatively, and not demonstratively, speaking throughout *ex tripode;* explains the matter as he thinks it to be, without attempting to lay any foundation for it. And yet there are great, important, and pregnant truths to be found in his works, and these he certainly understood himself, for he is by no means without insight; for which reason he undoubtedly deserves to be read, and richly rewards the patience necessary thereto.

The explanation of these characteristics of Plotinos I find in the fact that he and the Neoplatonists generally are not properly philosophers, are not original thinkers, but that what they expound is an alien, traditional doctrine, notwithstanding that it has been well digested and assimilated by them. It is, namely, Indo-Egyptian wisdom, which they sought to embody in the Greek philosophy, and as a suitable connective tissue—a conduit or menstruum for this—they use the Platonic philosophy, especially those parts of it which branch off into the mystical. To the Indian origin, through Egypt, of the Neoplatonic dogmas, the All-One doctrine of Plotinos testifies directly and unmistakably, as we find it admirably presented in the fourth "Ennead." Even the first chapter of the first book of the

latter, *περὶ οὐσίας ψυχῆς*, gives in great brevity the ground-doctrines of his whole philosophy of the *ψυχή*, which is originally one, and is only sundered into many by means of the corporeal world. Particularly interesting is the eighth book of this "Ennead," which shows how the *ψυχή* has reached this state of multiplicity by a sinful striving. It carries, accordingly, a double guilt; firstly, that of its descent into this world, and secondly, that of its sinful deeds in the same; the former it expiates by its temporal existence generally, the latter, which is the less important, by transmigration (c. 5). This is obviously the same thought as the Christian original sin and particular sin. But above all worthy of being read is the ninth book, where, in chap. iii., *εἰ πάσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ μία*, from the unity of the above world-soul, among other things, the wonders of animal magnetism are explained, especially the phenomenon even now observed, that the somnambule hears a softly spoken word at the greatest distance, though this, of course, requires a chain of persons standing *en rapport* with her. With Plotinos, moreover, there appears, probably for the first time in Western philosophy, the Idealism already long current in the East, inasmuch as it is taught ("Enn.," iii., l. 7, c. 10) that the soul has made the world in its process from eternity into time with the explanation: *οὐ γάρ τις αὖτου τοῦδε τοῦ πάντος τόπος, ἢ ψυχὴ* (*neque est alter hujus universi locus, quam anima*), while the ideality of time is expressed in the words: *δεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἔξωθεν τῆς ψυχῆς λαμβάνειν τὸν χρόνον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν αἰῶνα ἐκεῖ ἔξω τοῦ ὄντος* (*oportet autem nequaquam extra animam tempus accipere*). That *ἐκεῖ* (hereafter), is the opposite of *ἐνθάδε* (here), and a very favourite conception with him, which he more nearly explains by *κόσμος νοητός* and *κοσμος αἰσθητός*, *mundus intelligibilis et sensibilis*, also by *τὰ ἄνω. καὶ τὰ κάτω*. The ideality of time receives, in chapters xi. and xii., very good elucidation. Attached thereto is the beautiful explanation, that

we, in our temporal condition, are not what we ought to be and might be; hence, that we always expect better things of the future, and look towards the fulfilment of that which is wanting to us, whence arises the future and its condition time (c. 2 et 3). A further confirmation of the Indian origin is afforded us by Iamblichos ("De Mysteriis," sect. 4, c. 4 et 5), in his exposition of the doctrine of Metempsychosis, where also may be found (sect. 5, c. 6), the doctrine of the finite liberation and salvation from the bonds of birth and death, ψυχῆς κάθαρσις, καὶ τελείωσις, καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως ἀπαλλαγή, and (c. 12) τὸ ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις πῦρ ἡμᾶς ἀπόλυει τῶν τῆς γενέσεως δεσμῶν, in other words, the promise contained in all Indian religious books, which is designated in English by *final emancipation* or salvation. In addition to this there is, lastly (a. a. o., sect. 7, c. 2), the account of an Egyptian symbol which represents a creative God sitting on the lotus; obviously the world-creating Brahma sitting on the lotus-flower, corresponding to the navel of Vishnu, as he is frequently represented, *e.g.*, in Langles, "Monuments de l'Hindoustan," vol. i., ad p. 175; in Coleman's "Mythology of the Hindus," tab. 5, &c. This symbol is extremely important as a sure proof of the Hindu origin of the Egyptian religion, as, in the same respect, is the report also given by Porphyry "De Abstinentia," lib. ii., that in Egypt the cow was holy, and might not be slaughtered. Even the circumstance related by Porphyry in his life of Plotinos, that the latter, after he had been for many years the disciple of Ammonius Saccas, had intended going with the army of Gordian to Persia and India, but was prevented by the overthrow and death of Gordian, indicates that the doctrines of Ammonius were of Indian origin, and that Plotinos had intended, at last, to acquire them more purely from their source. The same Porphyry furnished a complete theory on Metempsychosis, which is conceived entirely in the Indian spirit, although impregnated with the

Platonic Psychology; it is given in the Stobæos "Eclogues," l. i., c. 52, § 54.

Section 8.

The Gnostics.

The Cabalistic and Gnostic philosophies, with whose originators, as Jews and Christians, Monotheism stood in the forefront, are attempts to get rid of the flagrant contradiction between the production of this world by an almighty, all-good, and all-wise being, and the sadly deficient construction of the same world. They introduce, therefore, between the world and the world-cause a series of intermediate beings, by whose fault a decline, and thereby the world, has arisen; hence they roll off the fault, as it were, from the sovereign on to his ministers. This proceeding had already been indicated in the myth of the fall, which is in every way the culminating point of Judaism. These beings are, with the Gnostics, the πλήρωμα, the æons, the ὕλη, the demiurgos, &c. The series was lengthened at pleasure by each Gnostic.

The whole proceeding is analogous to that whereby, in order to modify the contradiction involved in the assumed connection and reciprocal action of a material and immaterial substance in man, physiological philosophers have sought to interpose mediate essences, such as nervous fluidity, nervous ether, vital spirits, and so forth. Both seek to hide what they are not able to abolish.

Section 9.

Scotus Erigena.

This remarkable man affords us the interesting spectacle of the struggle between recognized and apprehended truth and local dogmas, fixed by early indoctrination and grown beyond the reach of all doubt, or at least of all direct attack, side by side with the endeavour proceeding from a noble nature to reduce to harmony, by some means or other, the dissonance which had thus arisen. This can indeed only happen, in so far as the dogmas are turned, twisted, and where necessary distorted, until *nolentes volentes* they fit into the recognized truth, which remains the dominating principle, but is, notwithstanding, obliged to go about in a strange and uncomfortable garb. Erigena knows how to carry out this method, and his great work, "De Divisione Naturæ," is a complete success until at last he has to make up his account with the origin of evil and of sin, together with the threatened pains of hell, when he comes to grief, more particularly in the optimism which is a consequence of his Jewish Monotheism. He teaches in the fifth book the return of all things to God, and the metaphysical unity and indivisibility of all humanity, and even of all nature. The question now arises, where does sin remain? It cannot be with God. Where is hell, with its endless pains, such as have been promised? Who is to go there? Humanity is saved, and that in its entirety. The dogma here remains unconquerable. Erigena writhes miserably through diffuse sophisms, which turn in the end on words, and is finally driven to contradiction and absurdity, especially since the question as to the origin of sin has inevitably crept in, and yet the latter can neither lie in God nor in the will created by him, since otherwise God

would be the originator of sin, which last point he sees clearly (see p. 287 of the Oxford *editio princeps* of 1681). He is now driven to absurdities: sin must have neither a cause nor a subject: *malum incausale est . . . penitus incausale et insubstantiale est* (*Ibid.*). The true cause of this stumbling-block is, that the doctrine of the *emancipation* of humanity and the world, which is obviously of Indian origin, presupposes the Indian doctrine according to which the origin of the world (this Sansara of the Buddhists) is itself evil, proceeding, namely, from a sinful act of Brahma, which Brahma, again, we ourselves are, for the Indian mythology is everywhere transparent. On the contrary, in Christianity this doctrine of the emancipation of the world had to be based on the Jewish Theism, where the Lord not only made the world, but afterwards found it very good: πάντα καλὰ λίαν. *Hinc illæ lacrimæ:* hence arise those difficulties which Erigena fully recognized, although he, in his age, did not venture to attack the evil by the root. Meanwhile he has the Hindustanic mildness. He rejects the eternal damnation and punishment asserted by Christianity. All creatures rational, animal, vegetable, and lifeless must, according to their inner essence, in the necessary course of nature, attain to eternal happiness, for they have proceeded from the eternally good. But only for the saints and righteous is the complete unity with God, *Deificatio.* For the rest, Erigena is sufficiently honest as not to hide the great embarrassment in which the origin of evil places him; he expounds it clearly in the passage quoted in the fifth book. As a matter of fact, the origin of evil is the rock on which Theism, no less than Pantheism, splits, for both imply Optimism. But evil and sin, both in their fearful magnitude, are not to be explained away, while the threatened punishments for the latter only increase the former. Whence all this, now, in a world which is either itself a God, or the well-intentioned work

of a God? If the theistic opponents of Pantheism exclaim against it, "What! all evil, terrible, abominable entities are God?" the Pantheists may reply: "How! all these evil, terrible, abominable entities have been produced by a God *de gaieté de cœur*." We find Erigena in the same difficulty in the other work of his which has come down to us, viz., in the book, "De Predestinatione," which nevertheless is far inferior to the "De Divisione Naturæ," and where he appears, not in the character of philosopher, but of theologian. Here also he plagues himself miserably with contradictions having their ultimate ground in the fact that Christianity is founded on Judaism. But his endeavours place them only in a still clearer light. God is all, all and in all, and has made all; thus much is fixed, "consequently also sin and evil." This inevitable consequence has to be got rid of, and Erigena finds himself necessitated to put forward the most miserable word-juggles. If evil and sin are not, then nothing is—not even the devil! Or else free-will is to blame for it. God has indeed created this, but created it free, and therefore it concerns him not what it does afterwards. For it was *free*, that is, it could act so and otherwise; it might therefore be just as well good as bad. Bravo! but the truth is that free being and created being are two mutually destructive and therefore contradictory qualities; hence the assumption that God has created beings, and has at the same time imparted to them freedom of will, is as much as to say that he has created them, and at the same time he has not created them. For *operari sequitur esse, i.e.* the effects or actions of any possible thing can never be anything else than the consequences of its nature, which is only known through them. Hence a being, in order to be free in the sense here required, must have no nature, that is, must be nothing, or, in other words, must both be and not be at once. For what *is* must also be *something*; an

existence without essence cannot even be thought. If a being is created, it is created as it is created, and therefore it is badly created if it *is* badly created, and badly created if it acts badly, *i.e.*, its effects are bad. As a consequence the guilt of the world, which is just as little to be explained away as its evil, always shifts itself back on its originator, and Scotus Erigena, like Augustine before him, is pitiably occupied in endeavouring to relieve him of it.

If, on the other hand, a being is morally free, it cannot have been created, but must have aseity, that is, must be an original thing existing by virtue of its own power and completeness, and not referable to another. Its existence is then its own act of creation, which unfolds and expands itself in time, exhibiting once for all the distinct character of this being, which is, nevertheless, its own work, for all of whose manifestations the responsibility rests upon itself alone. If, now, a being is responsible for its action—if it is to be accountable—it must be free. Thus, from the responsibility and imputability which our conscience declares, it follows very certainly that the will is free, but from this, again, that it is the original thing itself, and hence, that not merely the action, but also the existence and essence of man are his own work. Respecting all this I refer the reader to my treatise on the freedom of the will, where it will be found completely and irrefutably expounded. For this reason the professors of philosophy have sought, by the most complete silence, to boycott this crowned prize-essay of mine. The guilt of sin and evil necessarily falls from nature back on its author. But if the latter is Will manifesting itself in all its phenomena, the guilt has come back to the right man; if, on the contrary, it is a God, the origin of sin and evil contradict his divinity.

In reading Dionysius Areopagita, to whom Erigena so often refers, I have found that the former is in every

respect his prototype. The pantheism of Erigena, as well as his theory of sin and evil, are to be found, in their main features at least, already in Dionysius, although Dionysius only indicates what Erigena has developed, expressed with boldness, and expounded with fire. Erigena had infinitely more genius than Dionysius, but Dionysius had given him the material and the direction of his reflections, and consequently prepared the way for him. That Dionysius is ungenuine does not affect the question, since it is indifferent what the author of the book "De Divinis Nominibus" was called. As he, in the meantime, probably lived in Alexandria, I believe that, in a roundabout way unknown to us, he was the channel through which a drop of Indian wisdom may have reached Erigena, since, as Colebrooke has observed in his treatise on the philosophy of the Hindus (in Colebrooke's "Miscellaneous Essays," vol. i., p. 244), the proposition III. of the "Karika of Kapila" is to be found in Erigena.

Section 10.

Scholasticism.

I should place the properly distinctive character of Scholasticism in that its chief criterion of truth is Scripture, to which one may always appeal from every conclusion of reason. To its specialities belongs, that its style has throughout a polemical character. Every investigation is soon transformed into a controversy, whose *pro et contra* generate new *pro et contra*, and thereby furnish its material, which without it would soon run dry. The hidden ultimate root of this speciality consists, however, in the antagonism between Reason and Revelation.

The reciprocal justification of Realism and Nominalism,

and thereby the possibility of the so long and obstinately fought-out quarrel, may be rendered intelligible in the following way.

I call the most diverse things *red* if they have this colour. Obviously *red* is a mere name by which I designate this phenomenon, no matter where it appears. In the same way all common notions are mere names to designate qualities appearing in diverse things. These things, on the contrary, are the actual and real, so that *Nominalism* is obviously right.

On the other hand, when we observe that all those actual things, of which alone reality can be predicated, are temporal, and consequently pass away while the qualities, as red, hard, soft, life, plant, horse, man, which these names signify, continue to exist irrespective of this, and consequently are always there, we find that the qualities which these names designate by means of common conceptions, are conceived through their indestructible existence, and therefore have reality, which is consequently to be attributed to the conceptions, and not to the particular being, whence it follows that Realism is right.

Nominalism leads directly to Materialism, for after the removal of all qualities matter alone remains in the last resort. If conceptions are mere names, and the singular things the Real, their qualities as partaking of their singular nature would be transient. There remains, therefore, as that which continues, which is real, only matter. But, strictly speaking, the justification of realism above given does not belong to it, but to the Platonic doctrine of ideas, of which it is the extension. The eternal forms and qualities of natural things, εἴδη, it is which subsist through all change, and to which therefore a reality of a higher kind is to be attributed than to the individuals in which they display themselves. On the contrary, this cannot be conceded to the mere abstractions, which are not per-

ceivable. What, for example, is the Real in such conceptions as "relation, difference, separation, injury, indeterminateness," &c.?

A certain relation, or at least a parallelism, of appositions is discernible when one places Plato against Aristotle, Augustine against Pelagius, the Realists against the Nominalists. One might even assert that there is a certain kind of polar repulsion of thought manifested here, which, by a most extraordinary coincidence, expressed itself for the first time, and most decisively, in two very great men, who happened to be contemporary, and to live near each other.

Section 11.

Bacon of Verulam.

In another and more specially definite sense than that indicated, the express and intentional antithesis to Aristotle was Bacon of Verulam. The former, namely, had for the first time systematically expounded the correct method of attaining from universal to particular truths, in other words, the way downwards, which is the same as the syllogism, the *organum Aristotelis*. On the other hand, Bacon exhibited the way upwards, in so far as he expounded the method of attaining from special to general truths. This is induction in contradistinction to deduction, and its exposition is the *novum organum*, which expression, chosen in opposition to Aristotle, says in effect, —"It is quite a different manner of attacking the subject." The error of Aristotle, or rather the error of the Aristotelians, lay in the assumption that they already possessed all truth—that truth, namely, is contained in their axioms, to wit, in certain *a priori* propositions, or propositions which count for such, and that, in order to gain

particular truths, deduction from the former is all that is necessary. An Aristotelian instance of this is given in the books "De Cœlo." Bacon shows, on the contrary, with justice, that the above axioms did not have such a content, that the truth did not lie at all in the system of human knowledge at that time in vogue, but rather outside it, and that therefore it was not to be developed from it, but had to be introduced into it, and that as a consequence universal and true propositions of a great and rich content had first to be won through *induction*.

The Schoolmen, led by Aristotle, thought, we will in the first place establish the universal; the particular will flow therefrom, or may afterwards find a place therein as it can. We will, therefore, first of all establish what accrues to the *ens*, to the thing *in general*. The speciality of particular things may afterwards be gradually added, and of course through experience, but the latter can never alter anything in the universal. Bacon said, rather, we will in the first instance learn to know the individual things as completely as possible, then we shall at last know what the thing in general is.

Meanwhile, Bacon is inferior to Aristotle in so far as his method, leading upwards, is never so accurate, certain, and infallible as that of Aristotle, leading downwards. Indeed, Bacon himself has, in his physical investigations, set aside the rules of his method as given in the "New Organon."

Bacon's attention was chiefly turned to physical science. What he did for this, to wit, beginning from the beginning, Descartes did immediately afterwards for metaphysics.

Section 12.

The Philosophy of the Moderns.

In the arithmetic books the accuracy of the solution of an example is wont to be announced by the balancing of the same, that is, by the fact that no remainder is left. With the resolution of the riddle of the world it is similar. All systems are sums which do not balance; they leave a remainder, or, if a chemical simile be preferred, an unresolved deposit. This consists in that, if one draws a correct conclusion from their premisses, the results do not answer to the real world lying before us, but rather that many sides of it remain on the hypothesis quite inexplicable. Thus, for example, with the materialistic systems, which make the world arise from a matter possessed of simply mechanical qualities and in accordance with their laws, neither the complete and remarkable adaptability of ends to means in nature, nor the existence of consciousness in which this same matter is first presented, agree. This then is their remainder. With the theistic systems, on the contrary, and not more so with the pantheistic, the overweening physical evils and the moral obliquity of the world cannot be brought into harmony. These, therefore, stand over as a remainder, or lie as an unresolved deposit. It is true that in such cases there is no lack of sophisms, or, where necessary, of mere words and phrases in order to cover up such remainders, but such devices will not hold water for long. Individual errors in the reckoning are then sought for, since the sum will not balance, until finally it is obliged to be confessed that the starting-point has been wrong. If, again, the thorough-going consequence and harmony of all the propositions of a system be accompanied at every step by a

similar thorough-going harmony with the world of experience, without any discord being audible between the two, this is the criterion of its truth, the required balancing of the arithmetical sum. In the same way, if the starting-point has been false, it is as much as to say that from the beginning the matter has not been seized by the right end, whereby one is afterwards led from error to error, for in philosophy, as in many other things, everything turns on whether one seizes it by the right end. But the phenomena of the world which have to be explained present countless ends to us, of which one only can be the right one; they resemble an intricate tangle of thread, with many false end-threads hanging from it. He who finds out the right one can disentangle the whole. But one there is which disentangles itself easily from the others, and from this it may be known that it is the right end. One may also compare it to a labyrinth, which offers a hundred entrances, opening out into corridors, all of which, after various long and intricate windings, finally lead out again, with the exception of a single one, whose windings really take us to the centre, where the idol stands. If one has hit upon this entrance one will not fail to find the way, but one can never attain to the goal by any other. I do not conceal my opinion that only the Will in us is the right end of the thread-tangle, the true entrance to the labyrinth.

Now Descartes proceeded on the example of the metaphysics of Aristotle and the conception of substance, and therewith we see also all his successors accommodate themselves. He assumed, however, two kinds of substance, the thinking and the extended. These were supposed to act on one another through the *influxus physicus*, which soon proved itself to be his remainder. It took place, namely, not merely from without inwards, in the presentment of the corporeal world, but also from within outwards, be-

tween the Will (which was unhesitatingly assigned to thought) and the actions of the body. The closer relations between these two kinds of substance were the main problem on account of which such great difficulties arose, and in consequence of which men were driven to the system of *causes occasionelles* and of the *harmonia præstabilita*, after the *spiritus animales*, which had sufficed for the matter with Descartes, would no longer serve.[1] Malebranche, for instance, holds the *influxus physicus* for unthinkable; but in this he does not take into consideration that the same thing is assumed without question in the creation and direction of the corporeal world by a God who is also a spirit. He replaces it therefore by the *cause causionelle* and *nous voyons tout en Dieu*—here lies his remainder. Spinoza, also, treading in the footsteps of his teacher, proceeded from the above conception of substance just as though it were a given thing. He nevertheless declared both kinds of substance, the thinking and extended, for one and the same, whereby the old difficulty was avoided. For this reason, however, his philosophy was chiefly negative, hinging on a mere negation of the two great Cartesian antitheses, for he also extended his identification to the other antithesis erected by Descartes, God and the World. The latter was nevertheless, properly speaking, a mere mode of teaching or form of presentation. It would have been too offensive to have said straight out: "It is not true that God has made this world, but it exists by its own perfection of power;" hence he chose an indirect phrase, and said: "The world itself is God;" to main-

[1] For the rest, the *spiritus animales* occur already with Vanini, "De Naturæ Arcanis," dial. 49, as a well-known thing. Perhaps their originator is Willisius ("De Animæ Brutorum," Geneva, 1680, p. 35 *sq.*). Fleuron, "De la vie," ii., p. 72, ascribes them to Galen. Even Iamblichos in Stobæos ("Eclog.," l. i., c. 52, § 29) quotes them pretty clearly as a doctrine of the Stoics.

tain which would never have occurred to him, if, instead of proceeding from Judaism, he had started straightforwardly from nature itself. This phrase served at the same time to give his doctrines the appearance of positivity, though they are at bottom merely negative; and he therefore leaves the world unexplained, in that his doctrines issue in: "The world is because it is; and is as it is because it so is." (With this phrase Fichte was accustomed to mystify his students.) The deification of the world, arisen in the above manner, did not admit of any true ethics, and was, besides, in flagrant contradiction with the physical evils and the moral recklessness of this world. Here, then, is Spinoza's remainder.

The conception of substance from which Spinoza starts, he regards, as already said, as something given. He, indeed, defines it according to its ends, but he does not trouble himself as to its origin. For it was Locke who, shortly after him, propounded the great doctrine that a philosopher, who wishes to deduce or demonstrate anything from conceptions, has in the first place to investigate the origin of such conception; for its content and what follows therefrom is determined entirely by its origin, as the source of all knowledge attainable by means of the same. But had Spinoza investigated the origin of this conception of substance, he must have found at last that it is simply *matter*, and therefore that the true content of the conception is nothing other than its essential and *a priori* assignable qualities. Indeed, everything attributed by Spinoza to his substance finds its confirmation in matter, and only there; it is uncaused, that is, causeless, eternal, singular, and unique, and its modifications are extension and consciousness, the latter, of course, as the exclusive quality of the brain. Spinoza is therefore an unconscious materialist, yet the matter, which, when carried out, realizes and empirically confirms his con-

ceptions, is not the falsely-assumed and atomistic matter of Demokritos and of the later French materialists, which has none but mechanical qualities, but a correctly-conceived matter, with all its inexplicable qualities attached to it; for this distinction I refer the reader to my chief work, vol. ii., chap. xxiv., p. 315 sqq. (3rd ed., p. 357 sqq.). This method of assuming the conception of *substance* unnoticed, in order to make it the starting-point, we find already with the Eleatics, as may especially be seen from the Aristotelean book "De Xenophane," &c. For Xenophanes also proceeds from the ὄν, that is, from substance, and its qualities are demonstrated without its previously being questioned or its being asked whence he has his knowledge of such a thing. If this had been done it would clearly have appeared what he was really speaking about, that is, what perception ultimately lies at the foundation of his conception and imparts to it reality, and in the end it would have been seen to be matter only, of which all that he says is true. In the following chapters on Zeno the coincidence with Spinoza extends itself even to the style and the expression. One can therefore scarcely refrain from assuming that Spinoza had known and used this work, since at his time Aristotle, even though attacked by Bacon, still stood in high reputation, and good editions with Latin version were to be had. In this case Spinoza would be a mere resuscitator of the Eleatics as Gassendi was of Epicurus. We see once more, then, how extremely rare in any department of thought or knowledge is the really new and wholly original.

The above procedure of Spinoza on the conception of substance, moreover, rests, especially in its formal aspect, on the false assumption which he had taken over from his teacher Descartes, and he in his turn from Anselm of Canterbury, to wit that *existentia* could proceed from *essentia*, *i.e.*, that from mere conception an existence could be de-

duced which would accordingly be a necessary one; or, in other words, that by virtue of the nature or definition of something merely *thought*, it should be necessary that it should be no longer something merely thought, but something really existent. Descartes had applied this false assumption to the conception of the *ens perfectissimum*; but Spinoza took that of *substantia* or *causa sui* (which latter expresses a *contradictio in adjecto*); see his first definition, which is his πρῶτον ψεῦδος in the introduction of the "Ethics," and then proposition 7 of the first book. The difference between the basal conceptions of both philosophers consists almost entirely in expression, but their employment as starting-points, that is as given, is with the one as with the other founded on the mistake of making a perceptual arise out of an abstract presentment; while in truth all abstract presentment arises from the perceptual, and is therefore based on the latter. We have here, therefore, a fundamental ὕστερον πρότερον.

Spinoza encumbered himself with a special difficulty by calling his one and only substance *Deus*, for since this word was already in use for the designation of quite another conception, he had continually to fight against misunderstandings which arose from it; the reader, instead of the conception assigned to it by Spinoza's first explanations, always attaching to it that which it otherwise signifies. If he had not employed the word he would have been relieved of long and tedious expositions in the first book. But he did so in order that his doctrines might find less opposition, an object in which he nevertheless failed. In consequence, a certain double sense pervades his whole exposition, which one might in a manner term allegorical, especially as he adopts the same plan with one or two other notions, as already observed (in the first essay). How much clearer, and consequently better, would his so-called Ethics have turned out if he had

spoken straightforwardly what was in his mind, and called things by their name; and if he had presented his thoughts, together with their grounds, in an upright and natural manner, instead of making them appear laced-up in the Spanish boots of propositions, demonstrations, scholia and corollaries, in a garb borrowed from geometry, which, instead of giving to philosophy the certainty of the former, loses all significance as soon as geometry, with its construction of conceptions, ceases to stand inside it, whence the motto here applies, *cucullus non facit monachum.*

In the second book he expounds the two modes of his one substance as extension and presentment (*extensio et cogitatio*), which is obviously a false division, since extension exists only for and in presentment, and ought therefore to have been, not opposed, but subordinated, to the latter.

Spinoza everywhere expressly and emphatically sounds the praises of *lætitia*, and sets it up as condition and sign of every praiseworthy action, while he rejects unconditionally all *tristitia*—although his Old Testament might have told him, "Sorrow is better than laughter, for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made glad" (Ecclesiastes vii. 3)—he does all this merely for love of logicality, for if this world is a God, it is an end to itself, and must glorify and rejoice at its own existence—*saute marquis! Semper* merry, *nunquam* sad! Pantheism is essentially and necessarily optimism. This compulsory optimism forces Spinoza to many other false consequences, among which the absurd and very often monstrous results of his moral philosophy take the first rank, rising indeed in the sixteenth chapter of his "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus" to true infamy. On the other hand, at times he leaves the consequences out of sight, where they would have led to correct views, as for instance in his as unworthy as false deliverances about animals. ("Eth.," pars

IV., appendices, cap. 26, *et ejusdem partis*, prop. 37, *Scholion*). He speaks here, as a Jew knows how, according to the first and ninth chapters of Genesis, so that we, who are accustomed to purer and worthier doctrines, are overpowered by the *fœtor judaicus*. Dogs he seems not to have known at all. To the monstrous proposition with which the twenty-sixth chapter referred to opens, *præter homines nihil singulare in natura novimus, cujus mente gaudere et quod nobis amicitia, aut aliquo consuetudinis genere jungere possumus*, the best answer is given by a Spanish literateur of our day (*Larra, pseudonym Figaro* in "Doncel," c. 33), *el que no ha tenido un perro, no sabe lo que es querer y ser querido* (He who has never kept a dog does not know what it is to love and be loved). The cruelties which, according to Colerus, Spinoza for his amusement and amid hearty laughter was accustomed to practise on spiders and flies, coincide only too well with the propositions here attacked, as also with the chapters of Genesis referred to. Notwithstanding all this, Spinoza's "Ethica" is without doubt a mixture of false and true, of the admirable and the bad. Towards the end, in the second half of the last part, we see him in vain endeavouring to make himself clear to himself. He cannot do it, and therefore nothing remains for him but to become *mystical*, as happens here. But in order not to be unjust to this certainly great mind we must consider that he had too little before him, hardly more than Descartes, Malebranche, Hobbes, and Giordano Bruno. The basal philosophical conceptions were as yet insufficiently worked out, the problems inadequately ventilated.

Leibnitz started similarly from the conception of substance as a given thing, but kept chiefly before him the fact that it must be *indestructible*. For this purpose it must be simple, since everything extended is divisible, and hence destructible; it was, consequently, without exten-

sion, and therefore immaterial. There remains then no other predicates for his substance than the spiritual ones of perception, thought, and desire. He assumed a number of such simple, spiritual substances, which, although they are themselves unextended, lie at the foundation of the phenomenon of extension; hence he defines them as formal atoms and simple substances, and bestows upon them the name *monads*. These, therefore, lie at the foundation of the phenomenon of the corporeal world, which is, accordingly, a mere *appearance* without proper and immediate reality, such merely accruing to the monads, that remain within and behind it. The phenomenon of the corporeal world is, notwithstanding, on the other side, in the perception of the monads (*i.e.*, those that really perceive, which are very few, most of them continuously sleeping) brought about by virtue of the pre-established harmony, which the central monad produces entirely alone and at its own cost. We here get somewhat into the dark. But, however this may be, the connection between the mere thoughts of these substances and the really and in itself extended, is regulated by a pre-established harmony of the central monad. Here one might say all is remainder. Meanwhile, in order to deal justly with Leibnitz, we must remind the reader of the way of regarding matter, which Locke and Newton had made current, whereby namely matter exists as absolutely dead, purely passive, and will-less, merely endowed with mechanical forces, and only subordinated to mathematical laws. Now Leibnitz rejects the *atoms* and the purely *mechanical* physics in order to put in its place a *dynamical*, in all of which he prepared the way for Kant. (See "Opera," edit. Erdmann, p. 694.) He recalls in the first place the *formas substantiales* of the schoolmen, and attains accordingly to the insight, that even the merely mechanical forces of matter, besides which, at that time, scarcely any others were known or

admitted, must have something spiritual at their foundation. But he did not know how to make this clear to himself otherwise than by the extremely unhappy fiction that matter consisted of simple souls, which were at the same time formal atoms, and which, although existing for the most part in a state of unconsciousness, nevertheless possessed an *analogon* of the *perceptio* and the *appetitus*. This consequently misled him, so that he, like all the rest, made Knowledge the foundation and *conditio sine qua non* of everything spiritual rather than Will, the priority due to which I have been the first to vindicate, everything in philosophy being thereby turned round. In the meantime Leibnitz's endeavour to base spirit and matter on one and the same principle deserves recognition. One might even find therein a presentiment as well of the Kantian as of my own doctrines, but *quas velut trans nebulam vidit*. For his Monadology is based on the idea that matter is nothing in itself, but merely phenomenon, and that therefore the ultimate ground of even its mechanical action must not be sought in the purely geometrical, that is in what belongs to the phenomenon, such as extension, motion, figure, &c., and hence that impenetrability is not a mere negative quality, but the manifestation of a positive force. The opinion of Leibnitz we have praised is expressed most clearly in some of his smaller French writings, as the *Système nouveau de la nature*, &c., which are collected from the "Journal des Savans" in the edition of Dütens, in the edition of Erdmann, and in the letters, &c. (Erdmann, pp. 681-95.) There is also to be found a well-chosen collection of cognate passages of Leibnitz on pp. 335-40 of his "Smaller philosophical writings, translated by Köhler and revised by Huth," Jena, 1740.

But we see throughout this whole chain of strange dogmatic theories one fiction continually being brought to the support of another, just as in practical life one lie makes

many others necessary. At the bottom of it lies Descartes' division of all existence into God and world, and of man into spirit and matter, to the last of which everything else is counted. To this must be added the error, common to him and to all philosophers who have ever yet been, of placing the final ground of our being in knowledge rather than in will, in other words, in making the latter the secondary, and the former the primary. These, then, were the original errors against which nature and the reality of things protested at every step, and to save which, the *spiritus animales*, the materiality of animals, the occasional causes, the seeing all things in God, the pre-established harmony, the monads, optimism, and all the rest of it, had to be invented. With me, on the contrary, where things are seized by the right end, everything fits in of itself, everything appears in its proper light, no fictions are required, and *simplex sigillum veri.*

Kant was not directly touched by the substance problem—he had got beyond it. With him the conception of substance is a category, that is, a mere form of thought *a priori.* By this, in its necessary application to sensible perception, nothing is known as it is in itself; hence the being which is at the foundation of bodies no less than of souls is in itself one and the same. This is his doctrine. It paved the way for me to the insight that each one's body is only the perception of his will arising in his brain, a relation which, extended afterwards to all bodies, resulted in the resolution of the world into Will and Presentment.

The conception of substance, however, which Descartes, true to Aristotle, had constituted the leading conception of his philosophy, and with whose definition, accordingly (although in the fashion of the Eleatics), Spinoza also starts, proclaims itself, when subjected to more rigorous and honest investigation, as a higher but unjustified abstractum of

the conception of *matter*, which, by the way, also includes the supposititious child, *immaterial substance*, as I have already explained in my "Criticisms of the Kantian Philosophy," pp. 550 sqq. of the 2nd ed. (3rd ed. 528-31 sqq.). But apart from this the conception of *substance* is invalid as the starting-point of philosophy, because it is in all cases an *objective* one. Nothing objective is, for us, more than *mediate;* the subjective alone is the *immediate*. This must not be passed over, therefore, but must be made the absolute starting-point. Descartes has certainly done this; indeed, he was the first who recognized it, and hence with him a new epoch in philosophy opens. But he does it merely preliminarily at the first starting off, after which he at once assumes the absolute objective reality of the world on the credit of the veracity of God, and from this time forward philosophises in an entirely objective manner. In this he is guilty, in addition, of a noteworthy *circulus vitiosus*. He demonstrates the objective reality of the objects of all our perpetual presentments from the existence of God as their author, whose veracity does not admit of his deceiving us. But the existence of God himself he demonstrates from the innate presentment which we are supposed to have of him as the all-perfect being. "*Il commence par douter de tout, et finit par tout croire*," says one of his countrymen of him.

It was Berkeley who first showed himself in true earnest with the subjective starting-point, and who irrefutably explained the indispensable necessity of it. He is the father of Idealism, which is the foundation of all true philosophy, and which has since then at least been universally retained as a starting-point, although every successive philosopher has made his own modifications and variations of it. Thus even Locke started from the subjective, in that he ascribed a great part of the qualities of bodies to our sense-impression. It is to be observed, however, that his reduction of

all *qualitative* difference, as secondary qualities, to merely *quantitative*, to wit, to size, figure, position, &c., as the sole primary or objective qualities, is at bottom the doctrine of Demokritos, who similarly reduced all qualities to the figure, composition, and position of atoms; as may be clearly seen from Aristotle's "Metaphysics," book i., chap. 4, and from Theophrastus' "De Sensu," chap. 61-65. Locke was, in so far, a resuscitator of the Demokritean philosophy, as Spinoza was that of the Eleatics. He also really paved the way for the succeeding French materialism. By his preliminary distinction between subjective and objective elements in perception, he led directly up to Kant, who, following his direction and track in a much higher sense, was enabled to sunder the subjective purely from the objective, by which process indeed so much accrued to the subjective, that the objective only remained as a kind of dark point, a something not farther recognisable—the thing in itself. I have now reduced this to the being which we discover in our self-consciousness as Will, and I have therefore again returned to the subjective source of knowledge. It could not happen otherwise, for, as already said, the objective is never more than the secondary, namely a presentment. Hence, therefore, we must not seek the innermost kernel of our being, the thing in itself, without us, but within us, in other words, in the subjective side, as the only immediate. To this must be added that with the objective we can never attain to a point of rest, to an ultimate and original point, because we are there in the domain of *presentments*, and these are altogether and essentially subordinated to, and have for their form, the *law of causation* in its four aspects, for which reason every object falls under and presupposes the requirements of the former. For instance, an assumed objective absolute carries with it the destructive questions, Whence? and Why? before which it must give way and fall. It is otherwise when we

sink ourselves in the still, albeit obscure, depths of the subject. Here we are certainly threatened with the danger of falling into mysticism, and we must therefore only draw from this source what is actually true, compassable by each and all, and consequently undeniable.

The *Dianoiology*, which, as the result of investigations since Descartes, was current until Kant, may be found *en résumé* and expounded with *näive* clearness in Muratori, "Della Fantasia," chaps. 1-4 and 13; Locke there appears as a heretic. The whole is a nest of errors, by which it may be seen how very differently I have conceived and presented it, after having had Kant and Cabanis for predecessors. The above entire Dianoiology and Psychology is based on the false Cartesian dualism. Everything must now in the whole work, *per fas et nefas*, be reduced to it, including many correct and interesting facts which are introduced. The whole procedure is interesting as a type.

Section 13.

Some further observations on the Kantian Philosophy.

There is a passage in Pope which would be very suitable as a motto for a critique of pure reason. It was written about eighty years earlier, and says: "Since it is reasonable to doubt most things, we should most of all doubt that reason of ours which would demonstrate all things."

The true spirit of the Kantian philosophy, its leading idea and true sense, may be conceived and presented in many ways. Such various modes of expressing the matter are adapted, according to the variety of mind, to open out to this one or that the true understanding of these deep and therefore difficult doctrines. The following is one

more attempt of this nature, in which I seek to infuse my clearness into Kant's depth.[1]

Mathematics is based on perceptions, on which its demonstrations support themselves; but because these perceptions are not empirical, but are *a priori*, its doctrines are apodeictic. Philosophy, on the contrary, has, as the given element from which it proceeds, and which imparts to its demonstrations necessity (apodeicticity), mere *concepts*. For it cannot at once stand on the footing of simple empirical perception, inasmuch as it undertakes to explain the universal, not the particular, of things, its object being to lead beyond the empirically given. There remains nothing for it, then, but universal concepts, in so far as these are not perceptual or purely empirical. Such concepts must then furnish the foundation of its doctrines and demonstrations, and it must start from them as from something present and given. Philosophy is accordingly *a science from mere concepts*, while mathematics is a science from the *construction* (perceptual presentment) of its concepts. Strictly speaking, however, it is only the demonstrations of philosophy which proceed from mere concepts. This cannot, like the mathematical, proceed from a perception, because such would have to be either purely *a priori* or empirical; but the latter gives no apodeicticity, and the former furnishes only mathematics. If it intends, therefore, to support its doctrines by any sort of demonstration, this must consist in the correct logical consequence from concepts at its foundation. Things had gone quite smoothly in this direction throughout the long period of Scholasticism, and even in the new epoch founded by Descartes, so that we see Spinoza and Leibnitz pursuing this method. At last it occurred to Locke to investigate the origin of

[1] I remark here, once for all, that the pagination of the first edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason" which I here quote from, is also appended to the Rosenkrantz edition.

concepts, the result he arrived at being that all universal concepts, however abstract they may be, are derived from experience, that is, from the existent, sensuously perceivable, empirically real world, or else through inward experience such as the empirical self-observation of each offers, in short, that their whole content is derived from these two, and consequently can never furnish more than what outer or inner experience has placed there. From the foregoing it ought in strictness to have been inferred that they can never transcend experience, that is, can never lead to the goal; but Locke went, with the principles derived from experience, beyond experience.

In elaborate antithesis to his predecessors, and by way of correction of the Lockean doctrines, Kant showed that there are indeed some conceptions which make an exception to the above rule, that is, which do not spring from experience. But that these are at the same time partly derived from the pure, that is *a priori* given intuition of space and time, and partly constitute the special functions of our understanding itself, for the sake of their use in the experience which regulates itself according to them. Their validity only extends accordingly to possible experience of which sense is always the medium, inasmuch as they are only determined to generate this in us, together with its regular course; in other words they, themselves contentless, receive all material and content solely from *sensibility*, in order thereby to produce experience—but apart therefrom have neither content nor significance, inasmuch as they are only valid under the pre-supposition of perception resting on sense-feeling, and refer essentially to this. It follows from the above that they cannot supply us with clues to lead us beyond all possibility of experience, and from this again that metaphysics as the science of that which lies beyond nature, that is, beyond the possibility of experience, is impossible.

As now the one element of experience, namely, the universal, formal, and regulative, is knowable *a priori*, and therefore rests on the essential and regulative functions of our own intellect, while the other, namely the particular, material, and accidental, arises from sense-feeling, it follows that both are of subjective origin. Hence it also follows that experience, in its totality, together with the world presented therein, is a mere *phenomenon*, that is, something which, directly and immediately, is only existent for the subject knowing it. But this phenomenon, nevertheless, points to a *thing in itself* lying at its foundation, but which, as such, is absolutely unknowable. These are the negative results of the Kantian philosophy.

I must here call attention to the fact, that Kant speaks as though we were only perceiving subjects, and had no datum outside the presentment, while we certainly possess another in the Will within us, which is *toto genere* distinct from the former. It is true he also took this into consideration, yet not in the theoretical, but only in the practical philosophy, from which with him it is quite separated, in other words, simply and solely in order to establish the fact of the pure and moral significance of our action, and thereupon to found a moral faith, to counterbalance our theoretical ignorance and the impossibility of all theology which follows therefrom.

Kant's philosophy in contradistinction, and indeed in antithesis to all others, is also designated as *transcendental philosophy*, or more accurately, *transcendental idealism*. The expression "transcendent" is not of mathematical, but of philosophical origin, since it was familiar to the scholastics. It was first introduced into mathematics by Leibnitz, in order to designate *quod algebrae vires transcendit*, that is all operations, which common arithmetic and algebra do not suffice to complete, as, for instance, to find the logarithm of a number, or *vice versâ*, or to find the

trigonometric functions of an arc, purely arithmetically, or *vice versâ*, and generally for all problems which are only to be solved by a calculus carried out to infinity. But the schoolmen designate as transcendent, such concepts as were more universal than the ten categories of Aristotle, and even Spinoza uses the word in this sense. Giordano Bruno ("De la Causa," &c., dial. iv.), calls those predicates transcendent which are more universal than the distinction of corporeal and incorporeal substance pertaining to substance generally. They concern, according to him, those common roots in which the corporeal is one with the incorporeal, and which is the true original substance; he even sees in this a proof that such must exist. Now Kant understands by *transcendental*, in the first place, the recognition of the *a priori*, and therefore the merely formal in our knowledge *as such*, *i.e.*, the insight that such knowledge is independent of experience; indeed that this prescribes the unalterable rule, according to which it must proceed—such insight being at the same time bound up with the understanding why such knowledge is and accomplishes this, to wit, because it constitutes the form of our intellect, and is, in consequence, of subjective origin. Only Criticism of Pure Reason is, accordingly, transcendental. In opposition to this he calls transcendent the use, or rather the misuse, of the above purely formal element in our knowledge outside the possibility of experience; which he also terms hyperphysical. *Transcendental*, therefore, means in short, "before all experience," *transcendent*, "beyond all experience." Kant it will be seen only admits Metaphysic as Transcendental Philosophy, that is, as the doctrine of the form contained in our knowing consciousness as such, and of the limitation thereby disclosed, by virtue of which the knowledge of things in themselves is impossible for us, since experience can furnish nothing but mere phenomena. The word "*metaphysical*" is, however,

not synonymous with "transcendental." Everything that is *a priori* certain, but which concerns experience, is termed by him metaphysical, whereas the doctrine that it is only on account of its subjective origin, and as purely formal, that it is *a priori* certain, is alone called transcendental. Transcendental is the philosophy which brings to one's consciousness that the primary and most essential laws of this world which is presented to us have their root in our brain, and for this reason can be known *a priori*. It is called transcendental, because it passes beyond the whole given phantasmagoria to its origin. Hence, as already said, the criticism of pure reason, and especially the Critical (*i.e.*, Kantian), philosophy, is alone transcendental;[1] metaphysical, on the other hand, are the "foundations of natural science," also those of the "doctrine of Virtue," &c.

The conception of a transcendental philosophy, however, may be taken in a deeper sense, if one undertakes to concentrate therein the innermost spirit of the Kantian philosophy, and somewhat in the following manner. That the whole world is only given us, in a secondary manner, as presentment or image in our head, as brain-phenomenon, while our own Will is given immediately in self-consciousness, and hence a separation, or indeed an opposition exists between our own existence and that of the world—all this is a mere consequence of our individual and mere animal existence, with the abolition of which it falls away. But until then it is impossible for us to get rid in thought of that fundamental and original form of our consciousness, which is implied in the separation of subject and object, since all thinking and presenting presupposes it. Hence we count it for the all-essential and fundamental nature of the world, while it is in reality only the form of our animal

[1] The "Critique of Pure Reason" has transformed ontology into dianoiology.

consciousness and the phenomena occasioned by the same. But from this arise all those questions, as to beginning, end, boundary, and origin of the world, our own continuance after death, &c. They rest accordingly on a false assumption, which attributes to the thing-in-itself what are only presentments occasioned by an animal, cerebral consciousness, and assumes this to be the original and ultimate nature of the world. Such is the sense of the Kantian expression—"all such questions are transcendent." They are, indeed, not merely subjectively, but in and for themselves, that is objectively, susceptible of no answer. For they are problems which wholly disappear with the abolition of our cerebral consciousness and the opposition based upon it, and are, nevertheless, stated as though they were independent of it. For example, he who asks whether he continues after his death, sets aside, *in hypothesi*, his animal brain-consciousness, and asks, notwithstanding, as to the existence of something which presupposes this, inasmuch as it rests on its form, namely, subject and object, space and time—to wit as to his individual continuance. Now philosophy, which brings all these conditions and limitations, *as such*, to distinct consciousness, is *transcendental*, and, *in so far as it vindicates for the subject, the universal ground determinations of the objective world, it is transcendental Idealism.* It will gradually be seen that the problems of Metaphysics are only in so far insoluble, as a contradiction is contained in the questions themselves.

Transcendental Idealism, in the meantime, does not dispute the *empirical reality* of the existing world, but says only that it is not unconditioned, since it has our brain-function, from which the forms of perception, time, space, and causality arise, for its condition, and that therefore this empirical reality itself is only the reality of an appearance. If a multitude of existences manifest themselves therein, of which one is always passing away and another is arising,

and we know, that only by means of the percept-form of space, plurality, and only by means of that of time, destruction and origination, is possible, we recognize that such a process has no absolute reality, *i.e.*, that it does not belong to the beings-in-themselves, which manifest themselves in that appearance. If we could withdraw these forms of knowledge, as glass from the kaleidoscope, we should have, to our astonishment, a single and enduring world before us, untransitory, unalterable, and amid all apparent change, perhaps even right down to its individual determination, identical. In accordance with this opinion, the following three propositions may be stated:—

(1) The sole form of reality is the actual; in it alone the real is immediately met with and contained in its completeness and fulness.

(2) The true Real is independent of time and therefore, in every point of time, one and the same.

(3) Time is the percept-form of our intellect, and hence foreign to the things-in-themselves.

These three propositions are at bottom identical. He who clearly sees their identity, no less than their truth, has made great progress in philosophy, inasmuch as he has grasped the spirit of transcendental Idealism.

How rich indeed in consequences is Kant's doctrine of the ideality of space and time, dryly and tastelessly as he has expounded it. On the contrary, nothing results from the pompous, pretentious and purposely incomprehensible jargon of the three notorious sophists, who have drawn off from Kant the attention of a public that was unworthy of him. Before Kant, it may be said, we were in time, now time is in us. In the first case time is *Real*, and we, like everything else that falls within it, are consumed by it. In the second case time is *Ideal*, but lies in us. The question respecting the future after death thus at once collapses. *For if I am not, time is no more.* It is

only a deceptive illusion which shows me a time proceeding without me, after my death. All three divisions of time, past, present and future, are similarly my product, belong to me and not I to one any more than to another of them. Again, another consequence which may be drawn from the proposition that time does not belong to the essence of the things-in-themselves, would be this, that in one sense the past is *not* past, but that everything which has ever really, ever truly been, must still be, since time only resembles a stage-waterfall, which seems to stream down, but, being simply a wheel, never moves from its place. I have already in my chief work long ago compared, in a manner analogous to this, space to a glass cut into facets, which shows us that which exists singly in countless reproduction. If undeterred by the danger of becoming visionary, we plunge still deeper into the matter, it might appear to us as though, by a very vivid presentation of our own remote past, we received an immediate confirmation of the fact, that time does not touch the true being of things, but is only interpolated between their being and us as a mere medium of perception, after the removal of which all would again be there; as also, on the other hand, our true and living faculty of memory, in which this long past maintains an unwithered existence, bears witness to something within us that does not alter, and consequently, which is not within the domain of time.

The main tendency of the Kantian philosophy is to place before us the complete *diversity of the Ideal and Real* after Locke had already broken ground. In the first place one can say, the Ideal is the perceptual figure displaying itself spacially, with all the qualities perceivable in it, while the Real is the thing by, in, and for itself, independent of its being presented in the head of another or its own. But the boundary between them is difficult to be drawn, and yet it is precisely this upon which the question turns.

Locke had shown that everything in the former which is figure, colour, sound, smoothness, roughness, hardness, softness, cold, heat, &c. (secondary qualities) are merely *Ideal*, and therefore do not belong to the thing in itself, inasmuch as the being and nature of the thing is not given therein, but only its *action*, and indeed a very one-sided definite action, an action, namely, on the quite specifically determined receptivity of our five sense-organs, by virtue of which, for instance, sound does not act on the eye, nor light on the ear. The action of bodies on the organs of sense consists in that it sets the latter in a state of activity peculiar to them, almost in the same way as when I pull a thread which sets a mechanism in play. As the Real, which belonged to the thing in itself, Locke left standing, extension, form, impenetrability, motion, or rest, and number, which he therefore termed primary qualities. Now Kant demonstrated, subsequently, with infinitely superior insight, that even these qualities do not belong to the objective nature of the things or to the things in themselves, and therefore cannot be absolutely *Real*, since they are conditioned by space, time and causality, and that these in their turn, according to their whole order and construction, are given us before all experience, and are exactly known; and hence that they most reside in us preformed, as much as the specific kind of the receptivity and activity of each of our senses. In accordance with this I have said that these forms are the part taken by the brain in perception as the specific sense-feelings are of the respective sense-organs.[1] Even according to Kant the purely objective, the nature of things which is independent of our presentment and its apparatus, which he calls the thing-in-itself, that

[1] As it is our eye which produces green, red, and blue, so it is our brain which produces time, space, and causality (whose objectivised abstractum is matter). My perception of a body in space is the product of my sense and brain function with χ.

is, the properly Real in contradistinction to the Ideal, is something totally distinct from the figure which presents itself to us in perception and to which, inasmuch as it is independent of space and time, properly speaking, neither extension nor duration is to be attributed, although it imparts the power of existence to all that possesses extension and duration. Spinoza has comprehended the subject in its general aspect, as may be seen from "Eth.," p. ii., prop. 16, with the 2nd coroll.; also prop. 18, Schol.

The Lockean Real, in opposition to the Ideal, is at bottom matter, stripped indeed of all its qualities, which he casts on one side as secondary, that is as conditioned by our sense-organs, for it is, *per se*, an extended, &c., existent, of which the presentment in us is the mere reflex or copy. As to this, I may recall that I (in the "Fourfold Root," 2nd ed., p. 77; 3rd ed, p. 82, and at less length in "The World as Will," &c., Presentment, 2nd ed., vol. i., p. 9, and vol. ii., p. 48; 3rd ed., vol. i., p. 10; vol. ii., p. 52) have explained that the nature of matter consists simply in its action, that matter is nothing but causality, and that conceived as such every special quality, that is, every specific kind of action, is abstracted from it, so that it remains action or pure causality, deprived of all the other definitions, causality *in abstracto;* to which place, for a more thorough understanding of the matter, I ask the reader to refer. But Kant had already taught, although it was I who gave the first correct demonstration of it, that all causality is only a form of our understanding, and therefore, only exists for the understanding and in the understanding. We see then the supposed Real of Locke, matter, in this way retreats entirely into the Ideal, and therewith into the subject, that is, exists only in the presentment and for the presentment. Kant, by his presentment, certainly deprived the Real, or thing-in-itself, of its materiality, but with him it remained a completely unknown χ. I have at

last demonstrated the true *Real*, or the thing-in-itself, which alone has a real existence independent of the presentment and its forms, to be the *Will* in us, which had been hitherto inconsiderately reckoned to the *Ideal*. It will be seen, therefore, that Locke, Kant and I stand in close connection, inasmuch as we represent in the space of nearly two hundred years, the gradual development of a coherent, unified, process of thought. David Hume may be considered as a connecting link in this chain, although properly speaking, only so far as the law of causality is concerned. In respect of his influence I have to complete the above exposition with the following.

Locke, no less than Condillac, and the disciples who trod in his footsteps, have elaborated the fact that the feeling which enters into an organ of sense requires a cause of the same outside of our body, and that the differences of such action (sense-impression) also presuppose differences in the cause, whatever these may be; whence the above indicated distinction between primary and secondary qualities proceeds. With this they end, and an objective world in space stands ready made for them, composed of things in themselves, but which are colourless, odourless, soundless, neither warm nor cold, &c., and nevertheless, extended, figured, impenetrable, movable and numerical. But the axiom itself, by virtue of which the transition from the inner to the outer, and accordingly the whole derivation and installation of the things-in-themselves has taken place, namely, the law of causality, they, like all earlier philosophers, have assumed to be self-evident, and requiring no proof of its validity. Upon this point Hume directed his sceptical attack, inasmuch as he placed the validity of this law in doubt. For experience, from which, according to this philosophy, all our cognitions are derived, can never supply us with the causal connection itself, but only with the mere succession of states in time, in other

words, never with a consequence, but only with a mere sequence, which, as such, must always be accidental, and never necessary. This argument, so antagonistic to common sense, yet not easily to be refuted, occasioned Kant to investigate the true origin of causality, which he found to lie in the essential and innate form of our understanding itself, that is, in the subject and not in the object, since it was not first brought to us from without. But by this the whole objective world of Locke and Condillac was drawn back into the subject, since Kant had shown the clue to it to be of subjective origin. For the rule is now found to be just as subjective as the sense-impression, according to which it is to be conceived as the effect of a cause, which cause it alone is, that is, perceived as the objective world. For the subject merely assumes an object without itself in consequence of the peculiar characteristic of its intellect, which to every change presupposes a cause, and therefore only projects it, as it were, out of itself in a space prepared for this purpose, this in its turn being a product of its own original construction, as well as of the specific impression on the sense-organs, at the instance of which the whole procedure takes place. The above Lockean objective world of things-of-themselves, had therefore been changed by Kant into a world of mere phenomena in our knowledge-apparatus, and this the more completely, since the space in which they present themselves, as also the time in which they pass, was proved by him to be undeniably of subjective origin.

But with all this, Kant, no less than Locke, allowed the thing-in-itself to exist, *i.e.*, admits something to exist independent of our presentments, which only furnish us with phenomena, and which lies at the foundation of these phenomena. Here, then, lay the Achilles' heel of his philosophy, which had, by the demonstration of its inconsequence, to forfeit the recognition it had already obtained

as being of unconditioned validity and truth; but in the last resort it was, nevertheless, unjustly treated in this respect. For certainly the assumption of a thing in itself behind the phenomena, of a real kernel under so many shells, is in no wise untrue. The denial of it would be indeed absurd. It is only the way in which Kant introduced this thing-in-itself, and sought to unite it with his principles, which was faulty; at bottom it was only his exposition (this word taken in its most comprehensive sense) of the matter, and not the matter itself, which succumbed to his adversaries. In this sense it might be maintained that the argumentation made valid against him was, strictly speaking, addressed only *ad hominem*, not *ad rem*. Assuredly the Indian proverb finds an application here: "No lotus without a thorn." Kant was guided by the deeply-felt truth that behind every phenomenon a being in itself lies, from which it receives its subsistence; in other words, that behind the presentment something presented lies. But he undertook to deduce this from a given presentment itself by the addition of certain laws known to us *a priori*, and which, because they are *a priori*, cannot be deduced from something independent and distinct from the phenomenon or presentment; and hence for this purpose one must strike out another way. The inconsistencies in which Kant involved himself by the fallacious path he had taken in this respect, were demonstrated to him by G. E. Schultze, who, in a clumsy and diffuse manner, expounded the matter, at first anonymously in "Aenesidemus" (especially pp. 374-81), and subsequently in his "Critique of Theoretical Philosophy" (vol. ii., p. 205), against which Reinhold took up Kant's vindication, although without any special result; so that *haec potuisse dici, et non potuisse refelli* has its application.

I will here clearly set forth once for all in my way the truly essential of the matter that which lies at the root of

the whole controversy independently of Schultze's way of conceiving it. A strict deduction of the thing-in-itself Kant has never given, but he has inherited it from his predecessors, especially Locke, and has retained it as something, the existence of which was not to be doubted, since it was strictly self-evident; indeed, he was bound to do this to a certain extent. According to Kant's discoveries our empirical knowledge contains an element which is demonstrably of subjective origin, and another element of which this is not the case; the latter remains therefore objective, there being no ground for holding it to be subjective. Kant's transcendental Idealism denies, accordingly, the objective nature of things or their reality as independent of our perception, in so far as the *a priori* in our knowledge extends, but not farther, because the ground for the denial does not reach farther. What lies outside he allows to remain, that is, all such qualities of things as cannot be constructed *a priori*. For the whole nature of the given phenomena, namely, of the corporeal world, is in no wise determinable by us *a priori*, but is merely the universal form of its phenomenon, and this may be reduced to space, time, and causality, together with the totality of the laws of these three forms. On the other hand, the indeterminate residuum present throughout all these *a priori* existent forms, in other words, that which pertains to chance, is precisely the manifestation of the thing-in-itself. Now the *empirical* content of the phenomena, *i.e.*, every closer determination of the same, every physical quality appearing in them, cannot be known otherwise than as *a posteriori*. These empirical qualities (or rather their common source) remain therefore the thing-in-itself, as the manifestation of its special nature through the medium of the above *a priori* forms. This *a posteriori*, which in every phenomenon appears, as it were, clothed in the *a priori*, but yet imparting to every

being its special and individual character, is accordingly the *matter* of the phenomenal world in contradistinction to its *form*. Now, since this matter is in no way deducible from the forms of the phenomenon inherent in the subject, so carefully sought out by Kant and so certainly demonstrated by the sign of *a priority*, but rather remains after the abstraction of everything flowing from these, thereby proving itself a second perfectly distinct element of the empirical phenomenon, and a foreign addition to these forms; and at the same time, since it proceeds in no wise from the caprice of the knowing subject, but rather stands in opposition thereto—for these reasons, Kant did not hesitate to leave the *matter* of the phenomenon to the thing itself, and therefore to regard it as coming wholly from without, on the assumption that it must come from somewhere, or as Kant expressed it, have some ground. But as we cannot isolate such qualities as are known only *a posteriori*, nor conceive them as separated and purified from those which are certain *a priori*, but on the other hand, as they always appear enveloped in these latter, Kant teaches that we can know the existence of things in themselves, but nothing else about them; we can know *that* they are, but not *what* they are. The nature of things in themselves remains therefore, for him, an unknown quantity, an χ. For the form of the phenomenon clothes and hides the nature of the thing-in-itself in all cases. We can say this at most—since the above *a priori* forms accrue to all things as phenomena, without distinction, proceeding as they do from our intellect, but the things at the same time show considerable diversity—that which determines this difference, that is, the specific variety of things, is the thing-in-itself.

Looked at in this way, Kant's assumption and presupposition of the things in themselves, notwithstanding the subjectivity of all our forms of knowledge, seems to be

perfectly justified and well grounded. It is, nevertheless, shown to be untenable when its only argument, namely, the empirical content in all phenomena, is narrowly tested and traced back to its origin. It is certain that in empirical knowledge and its source, perceptual presentment, there is a *matter* which is independent of its form, which is known to us *a priori*. The next question is, as to whether this matter is of objective or subjective origin, since only in the first case can it ensure for us the thing-in-itself. If we pursue it, therefore, to its origin, we find this nowhere else but in our *sense-impression*. For it is a change occurring in the retina of the eye, in the nerves of the ear, or at the ends of the fingers, which induces the perceptual presentment, and thus first sets in play the whole apparatus of our forms of knowledge, which lie ready *a priori*, the result being the perception of an external object. On the change being felt in the sense-organ, *the law of causality* is at once applied by means of a necessary and indispensable function of the understanding *a priori*. The above, with its *a priori* certainty and necessity, points to a *cause* of this change which, since it does not stand in the arbitrary power of the subject, appears to it as something external. This quality receives its significance primarily by means of a form of space, which is added by the intellect itself for the purpose, the necessarily presupposed cause thereby appearing perceptually as an object in space bearing the alterations effected by it in our sense-organs, as though they were properties of the thing-in-itself. This whole process may be found adequately and thoroughly expounded in my treatise on the "Law of Cause," § 21. But the sense-impression, which constitutes the starting-point of the process and furnishes undeniably the whole matter of empirical perception, is something altogether subjective, and as the entire knowledge-forms, by means of which the objective per-

ceptual presentment arises out of this matter and is projected externally in accordance with Kant's correct demonstration, are no less of subjective origin, it is clear that the matter, as well as the form of perceptual presentment, arises from the subject. Our whole empirical knowledge is accordingly resolved into two elements, both of which have their origin *in ourselves*, namely, in the sense-impression and in the forms given *a priori*, that is, in the forms embedded in the functions of our intellect or brain, time, space, and causality, to which Kant had added eleven other categories of the understanding, demonstrated by me, however, as superfluous and inadmissible. If the above be correct, perceptual presentment and our empirical knowledge resting on it, in truth furnish no data for conclusions as to things in themselves, and Kant was not justified on his principles in assuming such. The Lockean philosophy, like all earlier philosophies, had taken the law of causality as absolute, and was thereby justified in concluding from the sense-impression to the existence of real things external to and independent of us. This passage from the effect to the cause is, however, the only way to attain from the internal and subjectively given to the external and objectively existent. Kant therefore, after he had vindicated the law of causality for the knowledge form of the subject, found this way no longer open to him. He had himself, moreover, often enough warned us against making a transcendent use of the category of causality, that is, a use extending beyond experience and its possibility.

In point of fact the thing-in-itself is never to be arrived at in this way, nor otherwise by that of pure *objective* knowledge, which always remains presentment, and as such has its root in the subject, and can never furnish anything really distinct from the presentment. But the thing-in-itself can only be arrived at by shifting the standpoint, that is, by instead of, as previously, starting from that

which *presents*, once for all starting from that which is *presented*. But this is only possible in one single thing which is attainable by us all from within as well as from without, and is thereby given in a double manner: it is our own body which, in the objective world, exists as presentment in space, and at the same time proclaims itself as Will in our own self-consciousness. Thereby is furnished the key at once to the understanding of all its actions and motions produced by external causes (here motives), which without this internal and immediate insight into its essence, would remain just as incomprehensible and inexplicable as the changes occurring according to natural laws and as manifestations of natural forces, in those other bodies which are only given to us in objective perception; and hence to that of the permanent substratum of these actions, that wherein these forces have root, to wit the body itself. This immediate knowledge, which each one has of the nature of his own phenomenon, given him like all others only in objective perception, must thereupon be transferred analogically to the remaining phenomena, which are really the only ones that can properly be said to be given, and becomes then the key to the knowledge of the inner nature of things, or, in other words, of the things-in-themselves. One could only attain to this by a way quite different from pure objective knowledge, which remains mere presentment, by taking the *self-consciousness* of the subject, which always appears as animal individual, to aid, and by making it the exponent of the *consciousness of other things, i.e.*, of the perceptive intellect. This is the way which I have followed, and it is the only right one, the narrow gate to truth.

But instead of men striking out this way, Kant's exposition was confounded with the essence of the subject, and it was believed that with the former the latter was refuted; what in reality were mere *argumenta ad hominem*, were believed accordingly to be *argumenta ad rem*, and in con-

sequence of these Schultzian attacks Kant's philosophy was declared untenable. The field was now open for the sophists and wind-bags. The first to set up in this line was Fichte, who, because the thing-in-itself had come into discredit, straightway proceeded to construct a system without any thing-in-itself, and therefore rejected the assumption of anything but what was our presentment pure and simple, making the knowing subject all in all, or at least making it produce everything from its own resources. For this purpose he did away at once with the essential and valuable in Kant's doctrines, the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori*, and thereby that between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, inasmuch as he declared everything to be *a priori*, while being naturally without any proof of such a monstrous assumption, he offered us partly sophistical and partly absurd sham demonstrations, whose futility hid itself under the garb of depth and of the assumed incomprehensibility arising therefrom. He laid claim, moreover, openly and audaciously, to intellectual intuition, in other words, to inspiration. For a public destitute of all power of judgment, and unworthy of Kant, this certainly sufficed. Such a public held self-assumption for excellence, and immediately declared Fichte to be a much greater philosopher than Kant. At the present day, indeed, there are not wanting philosophical writers who are anxious to foist the false fame of Fichte, now become traditional, on to the new generation, and quite seriously assure us that what Kant merely attempted Fichte had accomplished, and that he was properly the right man. These gentlemen, by their Midas-judgment, expose their entire incapacity to understand Kant, and indeed lay bare so palpably their deplorable ignorance, that it is to be hoped the rising and finally disillusionised generation will guard themselves from destroying their time and brains with the countless histories of philosophy and other writings produced by

them. I take this opportunity of recalling a little work, from which it may be seen what impression Fichte's personal appearance and ways made on an unprejudiced contemporary. It is called the "Cabinet of Berlin Characters," and appeared in 1808 without indication of place of printing; it is said to be by Buchholz, but as to this I am not certain. With it may be compared what the jurist Anselm Von Feuerbach, in the letters issued in 1852 by his son, says about Fichte; as also "Schiller's and Fichte's Correspondence," 1847; from all of which a correct idea may be formed of this sham philosopher.

It was not long before Schelling, worthy of his predecessor, trod in Fichte's footsteps, which he nevertheless forsook in order to proclaim his own invention, the absolute identity of the objective and subjective, or the Ideal and Real, which would imply that all which great minds like Locke and Kant, had, with incredible expenditure of acuteness and consideration, separated, should be again dissolved in the broth of his said absolute identity. For the doctrines of the two former thinkers may be very suitably designated as those of the *absolute diversity of the Ideal and Real, or of the subjective and objective.* But now things went farther from confusion to confusion, by Fichte having introduced incomprehensibility of speech, and having put the appearance of depth in the place of thought, the seeds being scattered which were to result in one corruption after another, and finally in that total demoralisation of philosophy, and, through philosophy, of all literature which has appeared in our day.

After Schelling followed a philosophical creature of ministers, the great philosopher Hegel, manufactured from above with a political but miscalculated purpose, a flat, commonplace, repulsive, ignorant charlatan, who, with unparalleled presumption, conceit, and absurdity, pasted together a system which was trumpeted by his venal ad-

herents as immortal wisdom, and by blockheads really taken for it, whereby such a perfect chorus of admiration arose as had never before been known.[1] The extended intellectual influence thus violently acquired by such a man had as its consequence the ruination of the learning of a whole generation. The admirer of this pseudo-philosophy has the mockery of posterity in store for him, a mockery which is already preluded by the delightfully audible laughter of neighbours. For should it not sound delightful to my ears when the nation, whose learned caste has for thirty years spurned my labours as worth nothing and less than nothing, not even a passing glance, should have the reputation among its neighbours of having revered and even deified throughout these thirty years, as the highest and most unheard-of wisdom, what is wholly bad, absurd, nonsensical, and subservient merely to material ends? I ought, I suppose as a good patriot, to go my way in the praise of the Germans and of Germanism, and rejoice to have belonged to them and to no other nation? But it is as the Spanish proverb says: *Cada uno cuenta de la feria, como le va en ella* (Everyone reports respecting the fair, according as it has fared with him there). Go to the Democolacs and get yourself praised. Well-developed, unwieldly, minister-bepuffed, nonsense-mongering charlatans, without intellect and without merit, such as these belong to the Germans, not men like myself! Such is the testimony which I have to give them in parting. Wieland (Letters to Merck, p. 239) calls it a misfortune to be born a German; Bürger, Mozart, Beethoven, and others would have agreed with him; I also. It rests upon the fact that *σοφὸν εἶναι δεῖ τὸν ἐπιγνωσόμενον τὸν σοφόν*, or *il n'y a que l'esprit qui sent l'esprit.*[2]

[1] The reader may refer to the preface to my "Fundamental Problems of Ethics."

[2] Nowadays the study of the Kantian philosophy is of especial

To the most brilliant and meritorious sides of the Kantian philosophy, belongs incontestably the *Transcendental Dialectic*, by which he has so far rased speculative theology and psychology from their foundations, that since then no one has been able, even with the best intentions, to set them up again. What a blessing for the human mind! For do we not see, throughout the whole period from the revival of the sciences to Kant, that the thoughts of even the greatest men receive a twist, indeed are often completely distorted, in consequence of these two absolutely sacred presuppositions, which cripple all intellect, which are removed from all investigation, and therefore dead to it? Are not the first and most essential convictions respecting ourselves and all things twisted and falsified, if we start with the presupposition that everything is produced and ordered from without, according to the notions and preconceived purposes of a personal and therefore individual being? In the same way the fundamental essence of man is assumed to be a thinking essence, and to consist of two wholly heterogeneous parts, which have come together and been soldered together without knowing how, and had to accommodate themselves to each other as well as they could, in order to be again for ever severed, *nolentes volentes?* How powerfully Kant's critique of these fancies and of their grounds has acted upon all the sciences, is obvious from the fact that since then, at least in the higher German literature, these presuppositions appear only in a figurative sense, and are no longer seriously made, being left for popular literature and for the professors of philosophy, who earn their bread

use in teaching us how low, since the "Critique of Pure Reason," philosophical literature has sunk in Germany—so much do his profound investigations shame the recent crude twaddle, in perusing which one might fancy one saw on the one side hopeful theological candidates and on the other barbers' assistants.

by them. Our works on natural science keep themselves especially free from them, while, on the contrary, the English, by aiming at them in their modes of expression and diatribes, or else by apologies, lower themselves in our eyes.[1] Immediately before Kant, indeed, things were quite different in this respect; we see, for instance, even the eminent Lichtenberg, whose early education was pre-Kantian, in his treatise on physiognomy, earnestly and with evident conviction adhering to this antithesis of soul and body, and thereby injuring his cause.

He who has estimated the high value of the *Transcendental Dialectic*, will not find it superfluous if I here deal with it somewhat more in detail. In the first place, therefore, I lay before those who know and interest themselves in the critique of reason, the following essay on the critique of rational psychology, as it is presented in its entirety in the first edition—for in the following editions it appears castrated. The argument which is there criticized, p. 361, sqq. under the title "paralogism of the personality," ought to be quite otherwise conceived and therefore criticised. For Kant's certainly profound exposition is not only too subtle and difficult to be understood, but it may also be objected to it, that it assumes the object of self-consciousness, or in Kant's language, of the internal sense,

[1] Since the above was written things have changed with us. In consequence of the resuscitation of the time-honoured and already ten times exploded materialism, philosophers from the druggist's shop and dispensary have appeared, people who have learnt nothing but what belongs to their trade, and who quite innocently and naïvely, as though Kant had just been born, dispute over "body and soul" and their relation to each other, and indeed (*credite posteri!*) prove the seat of the said soul to be in the brain. Their audacity deserves the retort, that one must have learnt something to be justified in entering on such discussions, and that they would do more wisely not to expose themselves to unpleasant references to apothecaries' shops and catechism.

suddenly and without further justification, as the object of an alien consciousness, or indeed of an external perception, in order thereupon to judge it according to the laws and analogies of the corporeal world. Two distinct times are even allowed to be assumed (p. 363), the one in the consciousness of the judged, the other in that of the judging subject, which do not coincide. I would give the argument in question, from the personality, quite another turn, and present it accordingly in the two following propositions:—

1. One can establish *a priori* respecting all motion in general, no matter of whatever kind it may be, that it is primarily perceptible by the comparison with something resting; whence it follows that the course of time, with all that is in it, could not be perceived were it not for something that has no part in it, and with whose rest we compare its motion. It is quite true that we here judge according to the analogy of motion in space; but space and time must always serve mutually to explain each other. For this reason also we have to imagine time under the figure of a straight line in order to apprehend it perceptually, to construct it *a priori*. In accordance therewith, we cannot imagine that if everything in our consciousness at once and together moved forward in the flux of time, that this forward movement would nevertheless be perceptible, but in order to this we must assume something fixed, past which time with its content flows. For the perception of the external sense, this is accomplished by matter as the enduring substance under the change of accidents, as Kant also explains in the demonstration to the "first analogy of experience," p. 183 of the 1st edit. In this very place, however, he commits the insupportable blunder, already criticised by me elsewhere, and which contradicts, moreover, his own doctrine, of saying that it is not time that flows, but only the phenomena in time.

That this is fundamentally false is proved by the fixed certainty implanted in us all, that if all things in heaven and on earth suddenly stood still, time would continue its course undisturbed thereby; so that if nature were later on again to get under way, the question as to the length of the previous pause would be capable in itself of a perfectly exact answer. Were it otherwise, time would have to stand still with the watch, or when the latter got too fast, go along with it. But precisely this relation, together with our certainty *a priori* respecting it, proves incontrovertibly that time has its course, and therefore its essence, in our head and not outside of us. In the realm of external intuition, as I have said, the enduring is matter; with our argument from the personality the argument is on the other hand respecting the perception of the internal sense, in which that of the external is again taken up. I said, therefore, that if our conciousness with its entire content moved forward uniformly in the stream of time, we could not be aware of this motion. For this, then, there must be something in the consciousness that is itself immovable. But this cannot be anything other than the knowing subject itself which contemplates, unmoved and unaltered, the course of time and the change of its content. Before its gaze life pursues its course like a drama. We shall be sensible how little part it has itself in this course if in old age we recall vividly to ourselves the scenes of youth and childhood.

2. Internally in self-consciousness, or to speak with Kant, through the internal sense, I only know in time. But objectively considered, nothing permanent can exist in mere time, since such implies a duration, but this a simultaneity and this again space. (The justification of this proposition will be found in my treatise on "The Law of Cause," § 18, besides in "The World as Will and Presentment," 2nd ed., vol. i., § 4, pp. 10 and 11, and p. 531; 3rd ed., pp. 10 and

11, and 560.) Notwithstanding all this, I find myself as a matter of fact as the substratum of the same, which endures, that is, which ever remains, in spite of all change in my presentments, which is related to the presentments as matter is to its changing accidents, and consequently no less than the latter deserves the name of *substance*, and since it is not spacial and therefore unextended, that of *simple substance*. Since now, as already said, no permanency can take place in mere time by itself alone, but the substance in question is perceived on the other hand, not by the external sense and consequently not in space, we must, in order as against the flux of time to think it as permanent, assume it as something lying outside time and say accordingly, all object lies in time, but the specially knowing subject, not. As now outside time there is no cessation or end, we should have in the knowing subject a permanent, albeit neither spacial nor temporal, and therefore indestructible, substance.

In order then to demonstrate the argument from the personality, as thus stated, to be a paralogism, one should have to say that the second proposition of the same takes an empirical act to aid—to which this other may be opposed—that the knowing subject is bound up with life, and indeed with waking, that its continuance during both in nowise proves that it can exist apart from them. For this actual permanence, during the period of the conscious state, is far removed, even *toto genere* distinct, from the permanence of matter (the origin and sole realization of the conception substance), which we know in perception, and in which we discern *a priori* not merely its actual duration, but its necessary indestructibility, and the impossibility of its annihilation. Yet it is according to the analogy of this truly indestructible substance that we would wish to assume a thinking substance in ourselves, which would then be certain of an endless continuance. But apart from the

fact that this latter would be an analogy with a mere phenomenon (matter), the error which the dialectical reason, in the above demonstration, commits, consists in that it treats the permanence of the subject, throughout the change of all its presentments in time, like the permanence of the matter given to us in perception, and accordingly includes both under the conception of substance. Everything which it, although under the condition of perception, can predicate of matter *a priori*, especially continuance through all time, can be attributed to the pretended immaterial substance, and this although the permanence of the latter only rests upon the fact that it is assumed as existing in no time at all, let alone in all times, and as a result the conditions of perception, in consequence of which indestructibility is predicated of matter *a priori*, are here expressly abolished, especially the *spacial*. But on this precisely rests (as has been shown in the above quoted passages of my writings), the permanence of the same.

As to the demonstrations of the immortality of the soul, from its assumed simplicity and consequent indissolubility, by which the only possible kind of decay, the dissolution of the parts, is excluded; it may be said generally that all laws respecting origination, dissolution, change, continuance, &c., which we know either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, are only valid of the corporeal world given us objectively, and also conditioned by our intellect. As soon, therefore, as we depart from this, and talk of immaterial essences, we have no longer any justification for applying those laws and rules in order to maintain whether the origination and dissolution of such essences is possible or not, for here every clue fails us. In this connection, all such proofs of immortality from the simplicity of the thinking substance are invalid. For the amphiboly lies in that an immaterial substance is spoken of, and then the laws of material substance are interpolated in order to be applied to it.

In the meantime the paralogism of the personality, as I have apprehended it, gives in its first argument the demonstration *a priori* that something permanent must lie in our consciousness; and in the second argument it proves the same thing *a posteriori*. Taken altogether, it will seem that the truth which, according to the rule, lies at the foundation of every error, rational psychology included, has its root in the above. This truth is, that even in our empirical consciousness an eternal point can assuredly be shown, but only a point, and only shown *to be*, without the material for any further demonstration being derived from it. I refer here to my own doctrines, according to which that is the knowing subject which knows all, but is not itself known. We therefore conceive it as the fixed point past which time, with its presentments, flows, the very course of time being only known in opposition to something permanent. I have called this the point of contact of the object with the subject. The subject of knowledge is, with me, like the body whose brain-function it objectively presents, a phenomenon of the will, which, as the only thing-in-itself, is here the substratum of a correlate of all phenomena, that is, of the subject of knowledge.

If we now turn to *rational cosmology* we find pregnant expressions, in its antinomies, of the perplexity arising from the law of cause, perplexities which have from time immemorial forced men to philosophize. To emphasize this in another, clearer, and less complex manner than has been done by Kant, is the object of the following exposition, which, unlike the Kantian, is not merely dialectical, operating with abstract concepts, but which applies itself immediately to the perceptive consciousness.

Time can have no beginning, and no cause can be primal. Both are *a priori* certain, and therefore undeniable, for all beginning is in time, and therefore presupposes time, and every cause must have a previous one behind it, whose

effect it is. How, then, could a first beginning of the world and the things therein have ever taken place? (The first verse of the Pentateuch would seem a *petitio principii*, and this in the most literal sense of the term.) On the contrary, if a first beginning had not been, the real present would not be now, but would be long past, for between it and the first beginning we must assume some time, however limited, but which—if we deny the beginning, in other words, if we push it back to infinity—is also pushed back to infinity. But even if we assume a first beginning, this does not assist us in the last resort, for we have thereby arbitrarily cut off the causal chain, after which we shall immediately find mere time itself a difficulty. The ever-renewed question, namely, "why this first beginning did not take place earlier?" will follow it up farther and farther through time, whereby the chain of causes lying between it and us is carried up higher and higher, so that it can never be long enough to reach down to the actual present, and accordingly it will have always *not yet* reached the present. But this is contradicted by the fact that the present is really there, and constitutes indeed our only datum for the reckoning. The justification of the foregoing inconvenient question arises from the fact that the first beginning as such, implies no preceding cause, and therefore might just as well have occurred trillions of years earlier. For if it required no cause for its occurrence, it did not have to wait for any, and must accordingly have taken place infinitely sooner, since there existed nothing to prevent it. For as nothing need precede the first beginning as its cause, so nothing need precede it as its hindrance; it has, therefore, to wait for nothing, and never comes soon enough. It matters not in what point of time we fix it, we can never see why it should not have existed much sooner. This, therefore, pushes it ever farther back, for since time itself can have no beginning, there is always an

infinite time elapsed up to the present moment, so that the throwing backward of the beginning of the world is always endless, every causal chain from it to us proving too short, the consequence being that we never reach from it to the present time. Hence it comes that a given fixed point of connection (*point d'attache*), fails us, and therefore we have to assume such a one arbitrarily, but it always vanishes before our hands backwards into infinity. And so it also happens that when we posit a first beginning and proceed therefrom we never attain from it to the present time.

If, on the other hand, we start from the really given present we never attain, as already indicated, to the first beginning. For every cause to which we proceed must always be the effect of a previous one, which finds itself in the same case and can reach no end. The world is therefore now beginningless, like infinite time itself, in the contemplation of which our imaginative faculty is wearied, and our understanding receives no satisfaction.

These two opposite views may be compared to a stick of which one end, it matters not which, may be easily grasped, while the other extends itself for ever into infinity. The essential of the matter may be resumed in the proposition that time, which is absolutely infinite, must always be too great for a world conceived as finite. But at bottom the truth of the "antithesis" of the Kantian antinomy is confirmed thereby, for if we proceed from that which is alone certain and really given, the beginninglessness of time results. On the other hand, the first beginning is merely an arbitrary assumption, which cannot be united as such, with what we have said is the only certain and real, the present. For the rest we must regard these considerations as disclosing the absurdities ensuing from the assumption of the absolute reality of time, and consequently as confirmations of the main thesis of Kant.

The question as to whether the world is bounded in

space or is unbounded, is not *per se* transcendent, but rather empirical, since the question always lies within the realm of possible experience, the reduction of it to reality being only forbidden us by our own physical conformation. *A priori* there is here no demonstrably certain argument, either for the one or for the other alternative, so that the question really resembles an antinomy, inasmuch as with the one as with the other assumption considerable difficulties present themselves. A bounded world in infinite space vanishes, let it be ever so large, to an infinitely small quantity, and one asks what is the remaining space there for? On the other hand, one cannot conceive that no fixed star should be the farthest in space. It may be observed, by the way, that the planets of such a star would only have a starry heaven at night during a half of their year, during the other half a starless heaven, which would certainly make a very uncanny impression on the inhabitants. The foregoing question, therefore, may be thus expressed, "Is there a fixed star whose planets stand in this predicament or not?" Here it evinces itself as obviously empirical.

In my critique of the Kantian philosophy, I have shown the whole assumption of the antinomies to be false and illusory. With due consideration, however, every one will at once recognize it as impossible that conceptions, correctly drawn from phenomena and their *a priori* certain laws, should, when combined according to the laws of logic into judgments and conclusions, lead to contradictions. For if this were the case, contradictions would have to lie in the perceptually-given phenomenon itself, or in the regulative connection of its members, which is an impossible assumption. For the perceptual, as such, knows no contradiction at all; the latter term has in respect of it no meaning or significance, since it exists merely in abstract knowledge or reflection.

One can perfectly well, either openly or covertly, assume something and at the same time not assume it, in other words, contradict one's-self, but something real cannot at the same time both be and not be. The opposite of the foregoing, Zeno the eleatic certainly sought to prove with his well-known sophisms, as also Kant with his antinomies. I therefore refer the reader to my critique of the latter.

Kant's service to *speculative theology* has already been generally touched upon. In order to emphasize it still more I will now as shortly as may be, endeavour to make the essential of the matter as comprehensible as possible in my way.

In the Christian religion the existence of God is a thing pre-supposed and raised above all discussion. This is only natural, for it is essential thereto, and is in this case based upon revelation. I regard it therefore as a blunder of the Rationalists when they attempt in their dogmas to demonstrate the existence of God otherwise than from the Scriptures. They in their innocence do not know how dangerous is this amusement. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a science, and as such has no articles of faith. In philosophy, therefore, nothing may be assumed as existent, except either what is directly given in experience, or what is demonstrated by indubitable arguments. The latter people certainly long believed themselves to be in the possession of, when Kant disillusionized the world on this point, and so decisively demonstrated the impossibility of such proofs, that since then no philosopher in Germany has again attempted to resuscitate them. Herein Kant was perfectly justified, and what he did was of the highest service, for a theoretical dogma which presumes to stamp every one who refuses to admit its validity as a rogue, deserves once for all to be seriously put to the test.

The case of the assumed demonstration is as follows. Inasmuch as the *reality* of the existence of God cannot be shown by empirical reasoning, the next step should pro-

perly be to establish its *possibility*, in the course of doing which one would encounter enough difficulties. But, instead of this, its *necessity* was undertaken to be proved, *i.e.* it was undertaken to demonstrate God as *necessary essence*.

Now *necessity*, as I have often shown, is never anything more than the dependence of a consequence on its cause, in other words, the appearance or positing of the effect because the cause is given. To this end accordingly the choice lay between the four forms of the principle of cause demonstrated by me, and of these the two first only were found to be admissible. There arose therefore two theological demonstrations, the cosmological and the ontological, the first derived from the principle of the ground of Becoming (cause), the other from that of the ground of Knowing. The first seeks to establish the necessity referred to as *physical* according to the law of *causality*, inasmuch as the world is conceived as an effect which must have a *cause*. To this cosmological demonstration the assistance and support of the physico-theological is added. The cosmological argument is most powerfully expressed in the Wolffian version of it, which is as follows: "If any thing at all exists, there exists an absolutely necessary Being." By this is to be understood either that which is itself given, or the first of the causes through which it attains to existence. The latter is then assumed. This demonstration has obviously the weakness of being a conclusion from the consequence to the cause, to which form of conclusion logic refuses all claim to certainty. It ignores the fact which I have often pointed out, that we can only think any thing as necessary in so far as it is effect, not in as far as it is cause of another given thing. Besides, the law of causality when applied in this way proves too much. For if it would carry us from the world back to its cause, it does not allow us to remain by this,

but leads us further back still to the cause of the cause, and so onward and remorselessly onward *in infinitum.* This is involved in its very nature. We are in the position of Goethe's magician's apprentice, whose imp began indeed at command, but refused to leave off again. Add to this that the force and validity of the law of causality only extends to the form of things and not to their matter. It is the clue to the change of forms and nothing more; the matter remains untouched by all their coming and going, a fact which we discern before all experience, and therefore know with certainty. Finally, the cosmological demonstration is upset by the transcendental argument that the law of causality is demonstrably of subjective origin, and therefore merely applicable by our intellect to *phenomena,* and not to *things in themselves.*[1]

As already said, the physico-theological demonstration is given as a subsidiary aid to the cosmological, in order

[1] Looking at things realistically and objectively, it is as clear as the noonday that the world maintains itself. Organic beings subsist and propagate themselves by virtue of their own inward and original vital force. Inorganic bodies bear in themselves the forces of which physics and chemistry are the mere description, and the planets proceed in their course from inward powers by virtue of their inertia and gravitation. The world, therefore, requires no one outside itself for its subsistence, for it is *Vishnu;* but to say that this world in time with all its indwelling forces has not always been, but has been produced from nothing by a foreign power existing outside it, is a wholly superfluous supposition which nothing can confirm, more particularly as all its forces are bound up with matter, the origination and the destruction of which we cannot even so much as think. This conception of the world reaches back to Spinozism. That men in their uttermost need have everywhere conceived beings which control the forces of nature and their course, in order to appeal to such, is perfectly natural. Greeks and Romans, however, were content to leave the matter with the control of its own sphere by each divinity; it never occurred to them to assert that any one of them had made the world and the forces of nature.

that it should afford confirmation, substantiation, plausibility, colour, and form to the assumption introduced by the former. But it can only come in with the presupposition of the first demonstration, the explanation and amplification of which it is. Its procedure consists in that it raises the already presupposed cause of the world to a knowing and willing being, inasmuch as by induction from the many effects which may be explained by such a cause it seeks to establish this cause. But induction can at most afford strong probability, certainty never. Besides, as already said, this whole demonstration is conditioned by the previous one. But if one goes more closely and seriously into this favourite physico-theology, and tests it in the light of my philosophy, it is seen to be the carrying-out of a fundamentally false view of nature, which degrades the immediate phenomenon or objectivation of the will to a mere mediate one, and thus instead of recognizing in natural existences the original, primarily powerful, knowingless, and therefore infallibly certain action of the will, it explains it as something merely secondary, only produced by the light of knowledge and the clue of motives; and accordingly it conceives that which has been produced from within outwards as something becarpentered, bemodelled, and moulded from the outside. For if the Will as thing in itself, which is *not* in any sense Presentment, emerges in the act of its objectivation from its originality into Presentment, and we assume that what displays itself in this presentment is something brought about in the world of presentment itself; in other words, in consequence of *knowledge*, then certainly it appears only possible by means of an immeasurably perfect knowledge, a knowledge which comprehends at once all objects and their connection—in short, as a work of the highest wisdom. As to this point I refer the reader to my treatise on "Will in Nature," especially pp. 43-62 of the 1st ed. (pp. 35-54

2nd ed., pp. 37-58 3rd ed.), under the heading "Comparative Anatomy," and to my chief work, vol. ii., beginning of cap. 26.

The second theological demonstration, the ontological, as stated, does not take the law of causality, but the principle of the ground of knowledge as its clue, whereby the necessity of the existence of God becomes here a *logical* one. It is sought here, namely, to deduce the existence from the conception of God by a mere analytical judgment, in such wise that it is not possible to make this conception the subject of a proposition in which this existence is denied, by making such denial contradict the subject of the proposition. This is logically correct, but it is also a very obvious and only too transparent conjuror's trick. After having by using the concept "perfection" or "reality" as a handle to be employed as *terminus medius*, the predicate of existence is introduced into the subject it cannot fail that it is afterwards found there again, and is exposed by means of an analytical judgment. But the justification for establishing the whole concept is in nowise proved thereby; on the contrary, it is either excogitated in a purely arbitrary manner, or introduced through the cosmological demonstration, according to which everything turns on purely physical necessity. Christian Wolff seems indeed to have seen this, for in his metaphysics he has only made use of the cosmological argument, and expressly takes note of the fact. The ontological demonstration will be found carefully investigated and estimated in the second and third edition of my treatise on the "Fourfold Root of the Principle of Adequate Cause," § 7, and to this I refer the reader.

The two theological demonstrations mutually support each other, but cannot stand any the more on that account. The cosmological has the advantage that it takes account how it has come by the conception of a God, and

by its adjunct the physico-theological demonstration seeks to make this demonstration probable. The ontological, on the other hand, is quite unable to prove how it has come by its conception of the most real of all essences, and in consequence either alleges it to be innate or borrows it from the cosmological demonstration, and seeks to uphold it by imposing-sounding talk of the Being which cannot be thought of except as existing, whose existence lies already in its conception, &c.

In the meantime, we shall not deny the merit of acuteness and subtlety to the invention of the ontological demonstration if we consider the following. In order to explain a given existence, we point to its cause, in respect of which it then appears as something necessary, and this serves as its explanation. But this way leads, as already sufficiently shown, to a "*regressus in infinitum*," and can never, therefore, attain the something final which would furnish a fundamental ground of explanation. The case would be otherwise if the *existence* of any being could be really deduced from its *essence*, that is, from its mere concept or definition. For then, indeed, it would be known as something *necessary* (by which here as elsewhere is only meant that "which follows from its cause") without thereby being bound to any thing other than its own concept—in other words, without its necessity being merely transitory and momentary, itself being again conditioned, and so on, leading to an infinite series as is always the case with *causal* necessity. The mere ground of knowledge would then have transformed itself into a ground of reality, that is, into a cause, thereby excellently qualifying itself to serve as the final, and hence certain, point of attachment for all causal series, in which case we should have what we sought.

But we have seen above that all this is illusory, and it looks as if Aristotle himself had been desirous of avoiding such

a sophistication when he said, *τὸ δὲ εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία οὐδένι, ad nullius rei essentiam pertinet existentia* (Analyt. post. ii. 7).

Without troubling himself about this, Descartes, following Anselm of Canterbury, who had already led the way to a similar line of thought, posited the conception of God as one which fulfilled the requirement—Spinoza, however, that of the world as the only existing substance which could be *causa sui*, i.e., *quae per se est et per se concipitur quamobrem nulla alia re eget ad existendum*, conferring on the world so established the title God, *honoris causa*, in order to satisfy everyone. But it is always the same *tour de passe-passe*, which endeavours to palm off the *logically* necessary as a *real* necessary, and which, together with other similar deceptions, at last gave occasion to Locke's great investigation into the origin of concepts, with which the foundation of the critical philosophy was laid. A more detailed exposition of the procedure of both dogmatists is contained in my treatise on the "Principle of Cause," 2nd and 3rd ed., §§ 7 and 8.

After Kant by his critique of speculative theology had given the latter its death blow,[1] he had to seek to modify the impression produced by this, and to apply, as it were, a soothing medicine or anodyne; the procedure of Hume was analogous, who in the last of his, as readable as irrefutable, "Dialogues on Natural Religion," explains to us that the whole thing has merely been a joke, an *exercitium logicum*. In the same way Kant gave as substitute for the demonstration for the existence of God, his postulate of the practical reason, and the moral theology arising therefrom which without any claim to objective validity, so far as knowledge or the theoretical reason was concerned, should have complete validity in respect of conduct, or for the

[1] Kant discovered, namely, the alarming truth that philosophy must be something other than Jewish mythology.

practical reason, whereby a belief without knowledge might be founded—so that at all events people should have something in hand. His exposition, properly understood, says nothing else than that the assumption of a just God rewarding and punishing after death is a useful and sufficient regulative scheme for the explanation of the serious ethical significance felt to belong to our conduct, as also for the regulation of this conduct itself. He set up, as it were, an allegory of the truth, so that in this respect, which alone has any significance in the last resort, his assumption might take the place of the truth, even though theoretically or objectively it was not to be justified. An analogous scheme of similar tendency, but of much greater validity, stronger plausibility, and consequently more immediate worth, is the dogma of Brahminism of a rewarding or punishing Metempsychosis, according to which we must at some time be reborn in the form of every being that has been injured by us, in order to suffer the same injury. Kant's moral theology must be taken in the sense indicated, remembering at the same time that he himself dare not express himself so plainly as is here done on the real state of affairs, but in setting up the monstrosity of a *theoretical* doctrine of merely *practical* validity reckoned on the *granum salis* of the wiser sort. The theological and theosophical writers of a later time far removed from the Kantian philosophy, have endeavoured for the most part to give the matter the appearance as though Kant's moral theology were a real dogmatic Theism, a new proof of the existence of God. Yet it is not so by any means, but is only valid inside the moral sphere, merely for the assistance of morality, and not a straw's breadth further.

Not even the professors of philosophy allowed themselves to be satisfied with this for long, although they were placed in conspicuous embarrassment by Kant's critique of speculative theology, for they had from of old recognized it as

their special calling to demonstrate the existence and attributes of God, and to make Him the chief subject of their philosophising. When, therefore, Scripture teaches that God nourishes the ravens in the field, I must also add, and the professors of philosophy in their chairs. Even now-a-days, they assert with perfect coolness that the Absolute (well-known as the new-fangled title for God) and its relation to the world is the proper subject of philosophy, and to define this more closely, and to paint it with their imagination, exercises them now as before, for assuredly the governments which provide money for such philosophising desire to see good Christians and zealous Church-goers come out of the philosophical class-rooms. How must it then have suited these gentlemen of the lucrative philosophy when Kant upset the concept by the proof that all demonstrations of speculative theology are untenable, and that all cognitions concerning their chosen theme were simply impossible for our intellect? At first they tried to help themselves by their well-known method of ignoring, and afterwards by contesting, but this did not answer in the long run. They next threw themselves upon the assertion that the existence of God was indeed incapable of any demonstration, but that it did not require any; for it was obvious, indeed the most established fact of the world, which we could not doubt since we had a "divine consciousness" within us, our reason being the organ for the immediate knowledge of supernatural things, and our instruction on this point being derived immediately from it, whence it was therefore called *Reason!* (I earnestly beg the reader to consult respecting this my treatise on the "Principle of Cause," 2nd and 3rd edit., § 34, as also my "Fundamental Problems of Ethics," pp. 148-154, finally also my "Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy," 2nd ed., pp. 584-584, 3rd. ed., pp. 617-618.)

As regards the genesis of this divine consciousness we

have recently received a remarkable pictorial illustration, to wit, an engraving displaying a mother placing her three-year old child with folded hands and in a kneeling position against the bed, for the purpose of praying, certainly a frequent occurrence constituting the genesis of the divine consciousness. For it is not doubtful that when the brain in the earliest stages of its growth, and at the tenderest age is so moulded, the "divine consciousness" will grow as firmly imbedded in it as though it were really inborn. According to others the reason merely furnishes suggestions while others again possess intellectual intuitions. There were, still further, those who invented Absolute Thought, *i.e.*, a Thought by which man did not require to look around him at the things, but which determined in Divine Omniscience how they were to be once for all. This is undoubtedly the most convenient of all the foregoing inventions. They one and all seized upon the word "absolute" which is nothing but the cosmological demonstration *in nuce*, or rather so strongly compressed that it has become microscopic and invisible, and thus is allowed to pass unnoticed, and as such is proclaimed as something requiring no explanation. For in its true form it dare no longer show itself after the Kantian *examen rigorosum*—as I have already shown at greater length in the 2nd edition of my treatise on "The Principle of Cause," p. 36 (3rd ed., p. 37), and also in my criticism of the Kantian philosophy, 2nd. ed., p. 544 (3rd ed., p. 574). I do not know who was the first who fifty years ago made use of the trick of smuggling in under this comprehensive word Absolute the exploded and proscribed cosmological demonstration, *incognito*, but the dodge was well suited to the capacities of the public, for up to this day the word "absolute" passes current as true coin.[1]

[1] Schopenhauer in this and similar passages forgets that his own "Will," which is continually realising itself in the phenomenal

In short, in spite of the critique of the reason and its demonstrations, the professors of philosophy have never failed in authentic accounts of the existence of God and his relation to the world in the detailed exposition of which in their eyes philosophy properly consists. But in the words of the proverb, "copper money, copper wares;" this God requiring no explanation of theirs has neither hand nor foot, and for this reason they keep Him hidden behind a mountain, or rather behind a noisy edifice of words, so that scarcely a sign of Him is visible. If one could only compel them to explain themselves clearly as to what is to be understood by the word God we should be able to see whether it required no explanation. Not even a *natura naturans* (into which their God often appears to pass) requires no explanation since we find Leukippus, Demokritos, Epikurus, and Lukretius constructed a world without any such; and these men, with all their errors, were worth a great deal more than a legion of weather-cocks whose trade-philosophy turns round with the wind. But a *natura naturans* is a long way from being God. In the conception of such the truth is merely contained that behind the ever-fleeting and restlessly changing phenomena of the *natura naturata* an imperishable and untiring force must lie hidden by virtue of which the former is continually renewing itself, since it remains untouched by the dissolution of things. As the *natura naturata* is the subject of physics, so is the *natura naturans* that of metaphysics. This shows us that we ourselves ultimately belong to nature, and consequently, know less of *natura naturata* than of *natura naturans*—that we are the nearest and the clearest, and

world, is itself as much the "Absolute" as the "Idea" was to Hegel, the "Identity" to Schelling, or the "Universal Ego" to Fichte. His diatribes against the *word* "absolute" are merely illustrations of his frequent outbursts of somewhat childish spleen against the academical philosophers. [TR.]

indeed that we possess in ourselves the only specimen of it to which access can be obtained from within. Now inasmuch as a serious and exact reflection upon ourselves discloses the Will as the core of our being, we have in this an immediate revelation of the *natura naturans*, which we are accordingly justified in transferring to all other beings which are only one-sidedly known to us. We attain thereby to the great truth that the *natura naturans*, or the thing-in-itself is the Will in our own heart, while the *natura naturata*, or the phenomenon, is the presentment in our head. But even apart from this result it is sufficiently obvious that the mere distinguishing of a *natura naturans* and a *natura naturata* is not only not Theism, but is not even Pantheism; for even to the latter, if it is not to be a mere manner of speaking, the addition of certain moral qualities is necessary, which clearly do not accrue to the world, *e.g.*, goodness, wisdom, blessedness, &c.

For the rest, Pantheism is a conception which destroys itself, for the conception of a God presupposes as its essential correlate that of a world distinct from him. If, on the other hand, the world takes over his *rôle*, there remains an absolute world without God, and hence Pantheism is only a euphemism for Atheism. But this last expression in its turn also contains a subreption, since it assumes at the outset that Theism requires no explanation, whereby it dexterously evades the *affirmanti incumbit probatio*, while it is rather the so-called Atheism that has the just *primi occupantis*, and has therefore to be first driven out of the field by Theism. I allow myself here the observation that men came into the world uncircumcised, and therefore not as Jews. But even the assumption of some cause of the world distinct therefrom is not Theism. Theism requires not only a cause distinct from the world, but an intelligent, a knowing and willing, that is a personal, in short, an individual cause; such a cause alone does the word God connote.

An impersonal God is no God at all, but merely a misapplied word, a misconception, a contradiction *in adjecto*, a shibboleth for professors of philosophy who, after having given up the thing, are anxious to smuggle in the word. The personality, on the contrary, that is, the self-conscious individuality which first knows, and then in accordance with the knowledge wills, is a phenomenon known to us solely from the animal nature which is present on our small planet, and is so intimately connected with this that we are not only not justified in thinking it as separate and independent, but are not even capable of doing so. But to assume a being of such a kind, as the origin of nature herself and of all existence is a colossal and daring conception which would startle us if we heard it for the first time, and if it had not by dint of earliest teaching and continuous repetition become familiar to us as a second nature, I might also say a fixed idea. Hence I may observe, by the way, that nothing has so well accredited to me the genuineness of Caspar Hauser as the statement that the so-called natural theology which was expounded to him did not seem to enlighten him as much as was expected. To which may be added that he (according to the "Letters of Count Stanhope to the schoolmaster Meyer") exhibited an extraordinary reverence for the sun. But to teach in philosophy that this theological notion requires no explanation, and that the reason is only the capacity immediately to comprehend the same and recognize it as true, is a shameless proceeding. Not only has philosophy no right to assume such a conception without the fullest demonstration, but it is by no means essential even to religion. This is attested by the religion which counts the largest number of adherents on earth, the ancient, highly moral, indeed ascetic Buddhism,—whose adherents now number three hundred and seventy millions,—a religion which also maintains the most numerous body of clergy of any—in-

asmuch as it does not admit such a conception, but rather expressly stigmatizes it, and is thus *ex professo*, according to our notions, atheistic.[1]

According to the foregoing, Anthropomorphism is an essential characteristic of Theism, and it is expressed not merely in the human form nor even in human affections and passions, but in the fundamental phenomenon itself, to wit, in the one will furnished with an intellect for its guidance, which phenomenon, as already said, is known to us only in animal nature and most perfectly in human nature, which is only thinkable as Individuality, and which when it is endowed with reason is called Personality. This

[1] The Zaradobura, the high priest of the Buddhists in Ara, in a treatise on his religion which he gave to a Catholic Bishop, reckons among the six damnable heresies the doctrine that a Being exists who has created the world and all things in the world, and who is alone worthy of worship. ("Francis Buchanan on the Religion of the Burmas," in "Asiatic Researches," vol. vi., p. 268.) It is mentioned in the same series, vol. xv., page 148, viz., that the Buddhists bow their head before no idol, giving as their reason that the Primal Being interpenetrates all nature and consequently is also in their heads. Similarly the learned Orientalist and member of the St. Petersburg Academy, J. J. Schmidt, in his "Researches in the domain of the Ancient History of Central Asiatic Culture" (Petersburg, 1848), p. 180, says: "The system of Buddhism knows no eternal uncreated single divine being existent before all time, and who created all things visible and invisible. This idea is quite foreign to it, and there is not the slightest trace of it to be found in the Buddhist books. Just as little is there a creation." Where, then, is the "divine consciousness" of Kant and those professors of philosophy who pervert the truth? How is it to be explained that the language of the Chinese, who constitute about two-fifths of the whole human race, has no expressions for God and creation? For this reason the first verse of the Pentateuch could not be translated into Chinese to the great perplexity of the missionaries whom Sir George Staunton tried to assist by means of a book which he entitled, "An inquiry into the proper mode of rendering the word 'God' in translating the Sacred Scriptures into the Chinese language." London, 1848.

is confirmed by the expression, "as truly as God lives;" He is indeed a living being, that is, one willing with knowledge. Hence a God requires a heaven in which he is enthroned and whence he governs. Much more on this account than because of the expression in the Book of Joshua was the Kopernican system at once received with distrust by the Church, and we find accordingly a hundred years later Giordano Bruno as the champion at once of this system and of Pantheism. The attempts to purify Theism from Anthropomorphism, notwithstanding that they are only meant to touch the shell, really strike at the innermost core. In their endeavour to conceive its object abstractly they sublimate it to a dim cloud-shape whose outline gradually disappears entirely in the effort to avoid the human figure; so that at last the whole childish idea becomes attenuated to nothing. But besides all this the rationalistic theologians, who are especially fond of these attempts, may be reproached with contradicting the Holy Scriptures, which say, "God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him." Let us then away with the jargon of the professors of philosophy! There is no other God than God, and the Old Testament is his revelation—especially the book of Joshua. From the God who was originally Jehovah, philosophers and theologians have stripped off one coating after the other, until at last nothing but the word is left.

One might certainly, with Kant, call Theism a practical postulate, although in quite another sense to that which he meant it. Theism is indeed no product of the Understanding but of the Will. If it were originally theoretical, how could all its proofs be so untenable? But it arises from the Will in the following manner: the continual need with which the heart (Will) of man is now heavily oppressed, now violently moved, and which keeps him perpetually in a state of fear and hope, while the things of which he

hopes and fears are not in his power—the very connection of the chain of causes which produce them only being traceable for a short distance by his intelligence—this need, this constant fear and hope, causes him to frame the hypothesis of personal beings on whom everything depends. It is assumed of such that they, like other persons, are susceptible to request and flattery, service and gift—in other words, that they are more tractable than the iron Necessity, the unbending, the unfeeling forces of nature, and the mysterious powers of the world-order. At first, as is natural, and as was very logically carried out by the ancients, these Gods were many, according to diversity of circumstances. Later on, owing to the necessity of bringing sequence, order, and unity into knowledge, these Gods were subordinated to one, which, as Goethe once remarked to me, is very undramatic, since with a solitary person one can do nothing. The essential, however, is the impulse of anxious humanity to throw itself down and pray for help in its frequent, bitter, and great distress and also in its concern for its eternal happiness. Man relies rather on external grace than on his own merit. This is one of the chief supports of Theism. In order therefore that his heart (Will) may have the relief of prayer and the consolation of hope, his intellect must create a God; and not conversely, because his intellect has deduced a God, does he pray. Let him be left without needs, wishes, and requirements, a mere intellectual will-less being, and he requires no God and makes none. The heart, that is the Will, has in its bitter distress the need to call for almighty and consequently supernatural assistance. Hence, because a God is wanted to be prayed to he is hypostatised, and not conversely. For this reason the theoretical side of the theology of all nations is very different as to the number and character of their gods; but that they can and do help when they are served and prayed to, thus much is common

to them all, since it is the point upon which everything depends. It is at the same time the birth-mark by which the descent of all theology is recognizable, to wit, that it proceeds from the Will, from the heart, and not from the head or the intelligence, as is pretended. This is implied also in that the true reason why Constantine the Great, as also Chlodowig, the king of the Franks, changed their religion, was that they hoped from their new god better support in war. There are some few races which, preferring the minor to the major, instead of gods possess mere spirits, who are prevented from doing harm by sacrifice and prayer. But the final result shows no great difference. The original inhabitants of the Indian peninsula and Ceylon, before the introduction of Brahminism and Buddhism, appear to have been such races, and their descendants would seem to have in part even now a similar cacodæmonological religion, like many other savage peoples. From this source springs the Kappuism which is mixed with the Cinghalese religion, Buddhism. In the same way the devil-worshippers of Mesopotamia, visited by Layard, seem to belong to this category. Intimately connected with the true origin of all Theism, as here expounded, and equally proceeding from the nature of man, is the impulse to bring sacrifices to his gods in order to purchase their favour, or if they have already shown such, to ensure its continuance or to buy off evils from them. ("Sanchoniathonis fragmenta," ed. Orelli, Lips., 1826, p. 42.) This is the meaning of every sacrifice, and hence the origin and support of every god; so that it may be said with truth the Gods live upon sacrifice. For precisely because the impulse to appeal to and to purchase the assistance of supernatural beings, as the child of need and intellectual limitation, is natural to man, for its satisfaction and requirement he creates God for himself. Hence the universality of sacrifice in all ages and with the most diverse

races, and its identity amid the greatest difference of circumstance and of intellectual development. Thus, for example, Herodotus relates that a ship from Samos through the exceptionally advantageous sale of its cargo in Tartessus, had acquired an unprecedented fortune, whereupon the Samians expended the tenth part of it to the amount of six talents on a large brazen and artistically worked vase, which they presented in the Temple of Here. And as a counterpart to these Greeks, we see in our days the miserable nomad reindeer Lapp, with figure shrunk to the dimensions of a dwarf, hiding his spare money in various secret recesses of the rocks and glens, which he makes known to no one except it be in his dying hour to his heir, and even to him there is one such hiding-place which he never reveals—that namely wherein he has secreted a treasure brought as a sacrifice to the *genius loci*, the protecting God of his territory (S. Albrecht Pancritius Hägringar, "Reise durch Schweden, Lappland, Norwegen, und Dänemark im Jahre 1850," Königsberg, 1852, p. 162). The belief in gods thus has its roots in egoism. In Christianity alone has the sacrifice proper disappeared, although in the form of masses for souls, of cloister, church and chapel-building, it is still there. For the rest, and especially with Protestants, praise and thanksgiving have to serve as the surrogate of sacrifice, and hence they are carried to the extremest superlative even on occasions which to the outsider seem little suited thereto—a proceeding analogous to that of the State which also does not always reward merit with gifts, but sometimes with mere testimonials of honour, thereby maintaining its continuance. In this respect what the great David Hume says deserves to be recalled: "Whether this god, therefore, be considered as their peculiar patron, or as the general sovereign of heaven, his votaries will endeavour by every art to insinuate themselves into his favour; and supposing him to be pleased,

like themselves, with praise and flattery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration which will be spared in their addresses to him. In proportion as men's fears or distresses become more urgent, they will invent new strains of adulation; and even he who outdoes his predecessors in swelling up the titles of his divinity, is sure to be outdone by his successors in newer and more pompous epithets of praise. Thus they proceed, till at last they arrive at infinity itself, beyond which there is no farther progress." ("Essays and Treatises on several Subjects," London, 1777, vol. ii., p. 429.) And again: "It appears certain that, though the original notions of the vulgar represent the divinity as a limited being, and consider him only as the particular cause of health or sickness, plenty or want, prosperity or adversity, yet when more magnificent ideas are urged upon them, they esteem it *dangerous to refuse their assent.* Will you say that your deity is finite and bounded in his perfection; may be overcome by a greater force; is subject to human passions, pains, and infirmities; has a beginning, and may have an end? This they dare not affirm, but thinking it *safest to comply with the higher enconiums, they endeavour, by an affected ravishment and devotion to ingratiate themselves with him.* As a confirmation of this we may observe that the assent of the vulgar is, in this case, merely verbal, and that they are incapable of conceiving those sublime qualities which they seemingly attribute to the Deity. Their real idea of him, notwithstanding their pompous language, is still as poor and frivolous as ever." (*Ibid.*, p. 432.)

In order to mitigate the heterodoxy of his "Critique of all Speculative Theology," Kant added thereto not only moral theology, but also the assurance that even though the existence of God had to remain unproven, it would be just as impossible to prove the opposite, an assurance with which many have consoled themselves, without observing that he,

with pretended simplicity, ignored the *affirmanti incumbit probatio*, as also that the number of things whose existence cannot be proved is infinite. He has naturally taken still more care not to bring forward the arguments which might be employed for an apagogic counter-demonstration when once one ceased to adopt a merely defensive attitude, and began to act on the aggressive. The proceeding would be somewhat as follows:—

1. In the first place the unhappy constitution of a world in which living beings subsist by mutually devouring each other, the consequent distress and dread of all that has life, the multitude and colossal magnitude of evil, the variety and inevitability of grief often attaining to horror, the burden of life itself hurrying forward to the bitterness of death cannot honestly be reconciled with its being the work of a united All-Goodness, All-Wisdom, and All-Power. To raise an outcry against what is here said is just as easy as it is difficult to meet the case with solid reasons.

2. There are two points which not only occupy every thinking man, but also which the adherents of every religion have most at heart, and on which the strength and persistence of religion is based; firstly, the transcendent moral significance of our conduct; and secondly, our continuance after death. When once a religion has taken care of these two points everything else is secondary. I will therefore test Theism here in respect of the first, and later on in that of the second point.

With the morality of our conduct Theism has a double connection, viz., one *a parte ante*, and one *a parte post*, that is, with respect to the causes and consequences of our action. To take the last point first; Theism indeed gives morality a support, albeit one of the roughest kind, one indeed by which the true and pure morality of conduct is fundamentally abolished, inasmuch as every disinterested action is at once transformed into an interested one by

means of a very long dated but assured bill of exchange which is received as payment for it. The God, viz., who was in the beginning the Creator, appears in the end as an avenger and paymaster. Regard for such an one can certainly call forth virtuous actions, but these are not purely moral since fear of punishment, or hope of reward are their motive, the significance of such virtue being reducible rather to a wise and well-considered egoism. In the last resort it turns solely on the strength of belief in undemonstrable things; if this is present no one will certainly stick at accepting a short period of sorrow for an eternity of joy, and the really guiding principle of morality will be "we can wait." But every one who seeks a reward for his deeds, either in this or in a future world, is an egoist. If the hoped-for reward escape him, it is the same thing, whether this happens by the chance which dominates this world, or by the emptiness of the illusion which builds for him the future one. For these reasons Kant's Moral Theology, properly speaking, undermines morality.

Again, *a parte ante*, Theism is equally in contradiction with morality, since it abolishes freedom and responsibility. For with a being which in its *existentia* and *essentia* alike, is the work of another, neither fault nor merit can be conceived. Vauvenargues says very rightly: "*Un être, qui a tout reçu, ne peut agir que par ce qui lui a été donné; et tout la puissance divine qui est infinie, ne saurait le rendre indépendant*" ("Discours sur la Liberté," see "Œuvres complètes," Paris, 1823, tom. ii., p. 331). Like every other thinkable being it cannot operate otherwise than according to its nature, and make known this nature in its operations; it is created as we here find it. If it acts badly this comes from the fact that it is bad, in which case the fault is not its own, but His who made it. The originator of its existence and its nature, to which we may add the circumstances in which it has been placed, is inevitably the originator of its

conduct and its deeds, which are as certainly determined by the former as the triangle is by two angles and a line. The correctness of this argumentation has been very well recognized and admitted by St. Augustine, by Hume, and by Kant, while others have glossed over and timidly ignored it, a point I have fully dealt with in my prize essay on the "Freedom of the Will," p. 67, sq. (2nd ed., p. 66, sq.) In order to elude this fearful and exterminating difficulty the freedom of the Will, the *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*, was invented, a theory which contains an utterly monstrous fiction, and was therefore long ago discarded by all thinking minds, but has perhaps never been so systematically and thoroughly refuted as in the work just quoted. If, notwithstanding, the common herd content themselves with freedom of the Will—even the literary, the philosophical, common herd—what matters that to us? The assertion that a given being is *free*, that is, under given circumstances can act thus and also otherwise, implies that it has an *existentia* without any *essentia, i.e.*, that it can *be* without being *something*, in short, that it at the same time *is* and is *not*. This, of course, is the acme of absurdity, but none the less, good enough for people who seek not the truth but their fodder, and hence will never allow anything to obtain which does not suit the stuff, the *fable convenu*, on which they live; ignoring suits their obtuseness better than refuting. And ought we to attach any weight to the opinions of such *βοσκήματα, in terram prona et ventri obedientia?* All that *is* is also something, has an essence, a nature, a character, in accordance with which it must operate. It must conduct itself (that is, act according to motive), when the external occasions arise which call out its particular manifestations. Whence it gets its actuality, its *existentia*, there also it gets its construction, its *essentia*, since the two, although distinguishable in conception, are not separable in reality. But that which has an *essentia*, that is, a

nature, a character, a construction, can only act in accordance therewith, and never otherwise. It is merely the precise moment, and special form and manner of the individual actions which are determined by the incoming motive. That the creator made man *free*, that he gave him an *existentia* without an *essentia*, in other words, an existence merely *in abstracto*, inasmuch as he left it to him to be what he would, is an impossible proposition. On this point I beg the reader to refer to § 20 of my treatise on the "Foundations of Morality." Moral freedom and responsibility, or accountability, necessarily presupposes *Aseity*. Actions are always based on character, that is, they proceed with necessity from the peculiar, and therefore unchangeable structure of a being under the influence and according to the measure of motive. Hence, if it is to be responsible, it must exist originally by virtue of its own power. It must, as regards its *existentia* and *essentia*, be its own work, and the creator of itself, if it is to be the true creator of its acts. Or, as I have expressed it in my two Prize Essays, its freedom cannot consist in its *Operari*, but must reside in its *esse*, for there it certainly is.

Since all this is not merely demonstrable *a priori*, but is clearly taught us by daily experience, to wit, that every one brings his moral character already complete into the world with him, and remains unchangeably true to it to the end, and since this truth is presupposed tacitly but certainly in our practical life, inasmuch as everyone bases his confidence or his misconfidence in another, once for all on the traits of character that other has manifested—this being so, one might wonder how, for about sixteen hundred years, the opposite has been theoretically asserted and taught, namely, that all men are in respect of morality originally the same, and that the great diversity of their conduct arises not from innate disposition and character, and just as little from accidental circumstances and causes,

but, properly speaking, from nothing at all which nothing at all receives the name of free-will. But this absurd doctrine is made necessary by another, in the same way, purely theoretical assumption with which it exactly hangs together, namely, that the birth of man is the absolute beginning of his existence, since he is created out of nothing (*a terminus ad hoc*). If now, under this presupposition, life is to retain a moral significance and tendency, these must have their origin in the course of it, and must indeed originate from nothing, just as the supposed man himself is from nothing; for every connection with a preceding condition, a previous existence or a timeless act to which, nevertheless, the immeasurable original and innate variety of moral characters clearly points, remains once for all excluded. Hence the absurd fiction of a free will. Truths, it is well known, all stand in mutual connection; but errors also are necessary to each other, just as one lie requires a second, or as two cards stood up against one another reciprocally support each other so long as nothing overturns them both.

3. On the assumption of Theism it does not fare much better with our continuance after death than with the freedom of the will. That which has been created by another has had a beginning of existence. Now that that which for an infinite time has not been, should from all eternity continue to be, is an outrageously bold assumption. If at my birth I have come from nothing and been created out of nothing, then it is the highest probability that at death I shall again become nothing. Endless continuance *a parte post*, and nothing *a parte ante*, do not go together. Only that which is itself original, eternal, uncreated, can be indestructable. ("Aristoteles de Cœlo," i. 12, 282, a, 25 fg., and Priestley, on "Matter and Spirit," Birmingham, 1782, vol. i. p. 234.)

Those, therefore, may certainly be anxious in death who

believe that before thirty or sixty years they were a pure nothing, and out of this nothing have proceeded as the work of another, for they have the difficult task of assuming that an existence so arisen, notwithstanding its late beginning, which has come about after the lapse of an infinite time, will, nevertheless, be of infinite duration. On the other hand, why should he fear death who recognizes himself as the original and eternal being, the very source of all existence, who knows that outside him nothing, properly speaking, exists at all—he who closes his individual existence with the saying of the Holy Upanishads, *hœ omnes creaturœ in totum ego sum, et prœter me ens aliud non est,* on his lips or even in his heart. He alone, can with logical consistency, die peacefully. For, as already said, *aseity* is the condition of immortality as of accountability. In accordance with the foregoing, contempt of death and the most complete indifference to, or even joy in dying, is thoroughly at home in India. Judaism, on the contrary, originally the sole and only pure monotheistic religion, teaching a real God-creator of heaven and the earth, has with perfect logicality no doctrine of immortality, and hence no recompense after death, but only temporal punishments and rewards, whereby it distinguishes itself from all other religions, though possibly not to its advantage. The two religions sprung from Judaism, in so far as they took up the doctrine of immortality, which had become known to them from other and better religious teaching, and at the same time retained the God-creator, acted illogically in doing so.[1]

[1] The Jewish religion proper, as it is presented and taught in Genesis and all historical books up to the end of Chronicles is the coarsest of all religions, because it is the only one which has absolutely no doctrine of immortality, not even a trace of it. Each king, and each hero or prophet, when he died was buried with his fathers, and therewith everything was finished. There is no trace of any existence after death, every thought of the kind being as if

That, as already said, Judaism is the only pure monotheistic religion, *i.e.*, one teaching that a God-creator is the

purposely banished. For instance, Jehovah's long eulogy on King Josiah closes with a promise of reward. This is as follows: *ἰδοὺ προστίθημί σε πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας σου, καὶ προστεθήσῃ πρὸς τὰ μνήματά σου ἐν εἰρήνῃ* (2 Chron. xxxiv. 28). And hence that he shall not live to see Nebuchadnezzar. But there is no idea of another existence after death, and thereby of a positive reward; instead of this it is a merely negative one—to die and to suffer no further sorrow. When Jehovah had sufficiently utilized and tormented his handiwork and plaything, he throws it away on to the dung-heap—that is its reward. Precisely because the Jewish religion has no immortality, and consequently knows no punishments after death, Jehovah can threaten the sinner who prospers on earth with nothing else except that he will punish his misdeeds in the persons of his children and children's children to the fourth generation, as may be seen from Exodus xxxiv. 7; and Numbers xiv. 18. This proves the absence of any doctrine of immortality. Similarly a passage in Tobias, iii. 6, where the latter begs Jehovah that he may die, *ὅπως ἀπολυθῶ καὶ γένωμαι γῆ*. Nothing more, there is no idea of an existence after death. In the Old Testament the reward promised to virtue is to live long on the earth (*e.g.* Deut v. 16 and 33); in the Veda, on the contrary, it is not to be born again. The contempt in which the Jews always stood among contemporary peoples may in great measure have been based on the poor character of their religion. What the Kohaleth says, ch. iii. v. 19, 20, is the true sentiment of Jewish religion. If sometimes, as in Daniel xii. 2, immortality is indicated, it is as an imported foreign doctrine, as is evident from Daniel i. 4 and 6. In the 2nd Book of Maccabees, ch. vii., the doctrine of immortality appears plainly as of Babylonian origin. All other religions, those of the Hindoos, as well Brahman as Buddhist, of the Egyptians, Persians, even of the Druids teach immortality, and also, with the exception of the Persian Zendavesta, metempsychosis. Even Greeks and Romans had something *post letum*, Tartarus and Elysium, and said:

> "*Sunt aliquid manes, letum non omnia finit*
> *Luridaque evictos effugit umbra rogos.*"
> Propert. Eleg. iv. 7, v. 1 and 2.

The essential element of religion, as such, properly consists in the

origin of all things, is a service which for unknown reasons it has been sought to conceal by continually maintaining

assurance which it gives us that our true existence is not limited to our life, but is infinite. This miserable Jewish religion not only does not do this, but does not even attempt it. For this reason it is the coarsest and worst of all religions, and consists merely of an absurd and irritating Theism which has, as its outcome, that the Κυριος who has created the world, desires to be honoured; hence he is above all things jealous of other Gods, and if sacrifices are made to them he gets enraged, and it goes badly with his Jews. All these other religions and their Gods are stigmatized in the Septuagint as *βδέλυγμα*; but it is the immortalityless, coarser Judaism which rather deserves this name. For it is a religion without any metaphysical tendency. While all other religions seek to illustrate to the people by symbols and parables the metaphysical significance of life, the Jewish religion is entirely immanent, and furnishes nothing but a mere war-cry in fighting other nations. The Jews are the chosen people of their God, and he is the chosen God of his people. And that need trouble no one else. On the other hand, the reputation cannot be denied to Judaism of being the only really monotheistic religion in the world; for no other can show an objective God the Creator of Heaven and earth. When I observe, however, that the modern European nations regard themselves to a certain extent as the heirs of this chosen people of God, I can no longer conceal my contempt.

For the rest, the impression the study of the LXX. has left upon me is a genuine love and inmost reverence for the *μέγας Βασιλεὺς Ναβουχωδόνοσορ*, even though he acted perhaps too leniently towards a people which had a God who gave or promised the territories of its neighbours, into the possession of which it came by robbery and murder, and afterwards built for this God a temple therein. Would that every people which has a God who makes "Lands of Promise" of its neighbours' territories, might speedily find its Nebuchadnezzar, and its Antiochus Epiphanes too, and that it might be dealt with without compunction!

[It may be desirable to remind the reader that much in the above note is based upon what we now know to be a fundamentally erroneous conception of the nature and meaning of early religion. So far from its being true, as Schopenhauer implies, that the essence of all other religions, except that of the Hebrews, lay in a doctrine of personal immortality—all modern research goes to

and teaching that all nations reverence the true God, although under other names. There is not merely much wanting in this procedure, but everything. That Buddhism, that is, the religion which, by possessing the greatest number of adherents is the most important on earth, is throughout expressly atheistic, is placed beyond a doubt by the agreement of all unfalsified testimonies and original documents. The Vedas also teach no God-creator, but a world-soul called Brahm (neuter), of which the Brahma sprung from the navel of Vishnu, with the four faces, and forming part of the *trimurti*, is merely a popular personification, in the very lucid manner of Hindoo mythology. It represents obviously the generation, the arising of beings, as Vishnu does their acme, and as Shiva does their de-

show that it is a notion which in all the most ancient forms of religion is either altogether absent, or at least entirely unimportant. The Jewish religion was by no means peculiar in this respect. It may be true, as Schopenhauer says, that the religious sentiment is largely based on the idea that the significance of the individual is not limited to his natural life, but Schopenhauer ignores the fact that early ethics and religion were *social*, not *personal*. The immortality, the true significance of the primitive man, lay in the larger whole of his clan, tribe, people, of which he formed an element. It was in this kinship, or group-society, that he in a special sense lived, moved, and had his being. "Future life" for him lay in the continuance and prosperity of the society. If he thought at all of any after existence of himself, it was only in a vague way, as "going down to his fathers," *i.e.*, joining the band of ancestral spirits who after death watched over the interest of the society as they had done in life. The belief in, much more the importance attached to individual immortality *for its own sake*, was of much later growth, and even among the oriental races is seldom traceable at all farther back than the sixth or seventh, or at most eighth century B.C. The Jews acquired it rather later than some other of these races, but that is all that can be said of them in this respect. Schopenhauer is also utterly unhistorical in assuming the later post-exilian monotheism of the Jews as belonging to them from the beginning.] [TR.]

struction. The generation of the world is moreover a sinful act, like the world-incarnation of Brahm. The Ormuzd of the Zendavesta has, as we know, Ahriman as his counterpart, and both have proceeded from the immeasurable time *Zervane Akerene* (if the ordinary view of this be correct). Similarly, in the very beautiful *cosmogony of the Phœnicians*, written by Sanchoniathon, and preserved for us by Philo Byblius, which is perhaps the original of the Mosaic Cosmogony, we find no trace of Theism or world-creation by a personal being. We see here, also, as in the Mosaic Genesis, the original chaos sunk in night, but no God appears commanding, "Let there be light! let there be this, and let there be that!" Oh, no! but ἠράσθη τὸ πνεῦμα τῶν ἰδίων ἀρχῶν. The spirit fermenting in the mass embodies itself in its own being, whereby a mixture of those original elements of the world arises (and arises, indeed, very effectively and significantly), from which, in consequence of the longing, πόθος, which, as the commentator correctly observes, is the Eros of the Greeks, it develops itself from the primeval slime, and out of this proceed, finally, plants, and last of all intelligent beings, that is, animals. For up to this time, as it is expressly stated, everything went on without intelligence; αὐτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐγίγνωσκε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κτίσιν. Thus does it stand, adds Sanchoniathon, in the Cosmogony written by Taaut, the Egyptian. A more detailed Zoogony then follows upon his Cosmogony. Certain atmospheric and terrestrial occurrences are described which really suggest the correct assumptions of our modern geology. At last, after heavy floods of rain, comes thunder and lightning, startled by the crashing of which intelligent animals awake into existence. "And there moves now on the earth and in the sea, male and female." Eusebius, whom we have to thank for this fragment of Philo Byblius ("Præparat. Evangel.," l. ii., c. 10), justly accuses this cosmogony of atheism, which it is,

incontestably, like all and every theory of the origin of the world, with the single exception of the Jewish. In the mythology of the Greeks and Romans we find, indeed, God as father of Gods, and sometimes also of men (although these were rather the potter's-work of Prometheus), but no God-creator. For that later a few philosophers to whom Judaism had become known, wanted to transform father Zeus into such, does not affect the matter; just as little as that Dante, without having sought his permission, identifies him without scruple in his hell with Domeneddio, whose unparalleled vengeance and cruelty is stigmatised and pictured (*e.g.*, c. 14, 70; c. 31, 92). Finally (for everything has been brought into requisition), the endlessly repeated statement that the North American Indians worshipped God, the Creator of heaven and earth, under the name of the Great Spirit, and hence were pure Theists, is entirely incorrect. This error has recently been refuted in a treatise on the North American Indians, which John Scouler read before a sitting of the London Ethnographical Society in 1846, and of which "l'Institut, Journal des Sociétés Savantes," sect. 2, Juillet, 1847, gives an extract. It says, "When we are told in reports on the superstitions of the Indians, about the *Great Spirit*, we are apt to assume that it designates a conception agreeing with that which we associate with it, and that their belief is a simple natural Theism. But this interpretation is very far from correct. The religion of these Indians is rather a pure *Fetishism*, which consists in magical practices and incantations. In the report of Tanner, who lived among them from childhood, the facts are trustworthy and remarkable, albeit very different from the inventions of certain writers. One sees from it namely, that the religion of the Indians is only a *Fetishism* similar to that which was formerly met with among the Finns, and is still among the Siberian tribes. With the Indians dwelling eastward of the Mountains the

Fetish consists simply of any object, it matters not what, to which mysterious qualities are attributed," &c.

In accordance with all this, the opinion here in question has to make way for its opposite, to wit, that only one very small and unimportant nation, despised by all contemporary nations, and living alone amongst them all without the belief in a continued existence after death, but nevertheless selected for the purpose, has possessed a pure monotheism, or the knowledge of the true God; and this, moreover, not through philosophy, but only through revelation, as was indeed suitable; for what value would a revelation have which only taught one what one knew without it? That no other nation has ever conceived such an idea must accordingly contribute to our estimate of the revelation.

Section 14.

Some Observations on my own Philosophy.

There is scarcely any philosophical system so simple and constructed out of such few elements as my own; a fact rendering it readily comprehensible at a glance. This results from the complete unity and consistency of its fundamental positions, and is certainly a favourable augury for its truth, truth being allied to simplicity ἁπλοῦς ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας λόγος ἔφυ. *Simplex sigillum veri.* My system might be signalized as *immanent dogmatism*, since its doctrines, although dogmatic, do not transcend the given world of experience, but merely explain *what the latter is*, by analyzing it into its ultimate elements. The old dogmatism overturned by Kant (and not less the air-bubbles of the three modern University-Sophists), is *transcendent* in that it passes beyond the world, to explain it by something foreign thereto:

it makes the world the consequence of a cause which is inferred from itself. My philosophy, on the other hand, began with the doctrine that cause and effect possess meaning solely within the world, and that only under the pre-supposition of it are there causes and effects; inasmuch as the principle of cause in its four modes is merely the most universal form of the intellect, and that in this alone, as its true *locus mundi*, the objective world exists.

In other philosophical systems, the consequence is reached through a chain of propositions. But this necessarily demands that the special content of the system be present in the very earliest of these propositions; whereby the rest, as derived from them, can scarcely appear otherwise than monotonous, poor, empty, and tedious, being simply a development and repetition of what was contained in the original premises. This unhappy consequence of demonstrative deduction is most felt in Christian Wolf; but even Spinoza, who strictly followed this method, was unable entirely to escape its drawbacks, although his genius knew how to compensate for them. My doctrines, on the other hand, do not, for the most part, rest on a chain of syllogisms, but immediately on the sensible world itself; and the strict consequence, as visible in my own, as in any other system, is, as a rule, not simply arrived at by a logical process, but is rather the natural agreement of doctrines, necessarily resulting from their being based, in their entirety, on intuitive cognition, *i.e.*, on the sensible perception of the one *object*, successively contemplated from different sides, or in other words, on the *real world*, which in all its phenomena is subject to the consciousness wherein it presents itself.

For this reason I have never had a care as to the mutual consistency of my doctrines; not even when some of these appeared to me inconsistent, as was the case for some time; for the agreement came afterwards of itself in proportion

to the numerical completeness of the doctrines; consistency in my case being nothing more than the consistency of reality with itself, which, of course, can never fail. This is analogous to when, on looking at a building for the first time on one side only, we fail to understand the symmetry of its parts, yet feel perfectly sure that it is not wanting, but will be visible to us on the completion of our view. But the above consistency is a perfectly certain one, because of its origination, and because it stands under the continual control of experience; while that which is deduced, and whose validity is derived from syllogisms, may easily be found false in some particular; should, for instance, a member of the long chain be ungenuine, loosely fitted, or otherwise faulty in its construction. My philosophy accordingly has a wide basis, on which everything stands immediately and, therefore, firmly; while other systems resemble lofty towers, where if one support breaks, the whole edifice falls to the ground. The foregoing may be summed up in the statement that my philosophy has arisen, and is presented, in an analytic rather than a synthetic manner.

I may adduce as a special characteristic of my philosophizing, that I seek everywhere to arrive at the foundation of things, and that I am not satisfied till I have found the ultimate given reality. This is in accordance with the natural bent of my mind, which renders it wellnigh impossible for me to rest in any more general and abstract and, therefore, undetermined knowledge, in mere conceptions, least of all in mere words; but drives me forward till I have the final basis of all conceptions and propositions which is always an intuitive one, exposed before me, and which I then must either leave as an ultimate phenomenon, or, if possible, resolve it into its elements, but either way, follow out the essential nature of the thing to its uttermost. On this account, it will be recognized one day

(though certainly not during my lifetime) that the handling of the same subject by any earlier philosopher is tame as compared with mine. Mankind has learnt much from me that will never be forgotten, and my writings will not pass into oblivion.

Theism also assumes the world to be the production of a Will—a Will that guides the planets in their orbits, and calls forth nature upon their surface. But theism, in childish fashion, places this Will outside the Universe, and only allows it to operate indirectly on the things, namely, through the medium of cognition and matter, in a Human manner; while with me the Will works not so much *on* things, as *in* them; they themselves being indeed naught else but its visible manifestation.

This agreement proves, however, that we cannot regard the original of things in any other light than as Will. Pantheism calls this ever-active Will that is in things by the name of God; an absurdity frequently and strongly enough exposed by me. I have designated it the *Will to live*; because this expresses the finality of our knowledge on the subject. The above relation of the Mediate to the Immediate presents itself also in the sphere of Morals. The Theists would have a reconcilation between what one does and what one suffers, and so would I. But they make this take place through the medium of time, and the interposition of a Judge and Avenger. I, on the other hand, immediately, since I demonstrate the same being in the actor and the sufferer. The moral consequences of Christianity to the most extreme Asceticism are present with me, but based on the reason and the connection of things; while in Christianity they are supported by mere fables. The belief in these is daily waning; people will, therefore, be forced to turn to my philosophy. The Pantheists can have no seriously-meant morality, since they regard every thing as equally divine and excellent. It has often been

made a reproach to me that in philosophy, namely theoretically, I have represented life as miserable and no way to be desired; it should be remembered, however, that practically, he who lays little store by his life is praised, nay admired, and he who is careful and troubled as to its preservation is despised. My writings had scarcely begun to awaken the curiosity of some persons before the question of priority arose with reference to my fundamental thought, it being represented that Schelling had once said, "Will is Being;" and anything else of this kind which could be adduced. With regard to this matter, it may be observed that the root of my philosophy is already present in the Kantian, especially in Kant's doctrine of empirical and intelligible character, but above all, in that whenever Kant brings the thing-in-itself nearer the light, it always appears through its veil as Will; a point to which I have expressly called attention in my "Critique of the Kantian Philosophy," and have said accordingly that my philosophy is no more than its complete thinking-out. It is not to be wondered at then, if the philosophizings of Fichte and Schelling, who equally started from Kant, also show traces of the same fundamental idea; although they there appear without consequence, connection, or development, and therefore may be regarded as a mere foretaste of my doctrines. But, in general, as regards this point, it may be remarked that every great truth before its discovery is announced by a previous feeling, a presentiment, a faint outline as in fog, and an unavailing attempt to grasp it; simply because the progress of the time has prepared it. It is, therefore, preluded by disjointed utterances. But he alone, who has recognized a truth from its causes, and thought it out to its consequences, developed its whole content, cast his eyes over the extent of its domain, and after this, with a full consciousness of its value and importance, clearly and connectedly expounded it, he alone is its originator. When

on the other hand, it happens on some occasion or other, to have been expressed either in ancient or modern times, with a half consciousness, almost as an utterance in sleep, and is hence to be found only if expressly looked for, it has little further significance, even though it stand there *totidem verbis*, than if it were there merely *totidem litteris*. Just as the finder of a thing is he, who knowing its value, picks it up and keeps it; and not he who chances to take it into his hand, and let it fall again; or, once more, Columbus is the discoverer of America, and not the first shipwrecked sailor the waves cast up there. This is precisely the meaning of the Donatian *pereant qui ante nos nostra dixerunt*. Had my critics desired to establish an effective priority against me on the strength of such chance sayings, they should have sought farther back when, for instance, they might have adduced Clemens Alexandrinus (Strom. II., c. 17): *προηγεῖται τοίνυν πάντων τὸ βούλεσθαι· αἱ γὰρ λογικαὶ δυνάμεις τοῦ βούλεσθαι διάκονοι πεφύκασι* (*Velle ergo omnia antecedit: rationales enim facultates sunt voluntatis ministræ* ("Sanctorum Patrum Opera Polemica," vol. v. Weissburghi, 1779; "Clementis Alex. Opera," tom. ii., p. 304); as also Spinoza: *Cupiditas est ipsa unius cujusque natura, seu essentia* ("Eth.," p. iii., prop. 57) and before: *Hic conatus, cum ad mentem solam refertur, Voluntas appellatur; sed cum ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, vocatur Appetitus, qui proinde nihil aliud est, quam ipsa hominis essentia* (p. iii., prop. 9, schol., and finally, p. iii. Defin. I., explic.) Hevetius remarks with great justice: *Il n'est point de moyens que l'envieux, sous l'apparence de la justice, n'emploie pour dégrader le mérite. . . . C'est l'envie seule qui nous fait trouver dans les anciens toutes les découvertes modernes. Une phrase vide de sens, ou du moins inintelligible avant ces découvertes, suffit pour faire crier au plagiat* ("De l'Esprit," iv. 7). There is one more passage in Helvetius I shall take the liberty of recalling, having reference to the matter

in question, the quotation of which I must beg the reader not to lay down to vanity and arrogance, but simply to bear in mind the justice of the thought expressed and consider whether or not something in it will be found capable of application to myself. *Quiconque se plaît à considérer l'esprit humain voit, dans chaque siècle, cinq ou six hommes d'esprit tourner autour de la découverte que fait l'homme de génie. Si l'honneur en reste à ce dernier, c'est que cette découverte est, entre ses mains, plus féconde que dans les mains de tout autre ; c'est qu'il rend ses idées avec plus de force et de netteté ; et qu'enfin on voit toujours à la manière différente, dont les hommes tirent parti d'un principe ou d'une découverte à qui ce principe au cette découverte appartient* ("De l'Esprit," iv. 1).

As a consequence of the old, irreconcilable war, that has everywhere and always been waged by incapacity and stupidity against intellect and understanding—by legions on the one side against individuals on the other—he who brings to light anything valuable and genuine has to fight a hard battle with incompetence, dulness, depraved taste, private interests and envy, all in that worthy alliance, respecting which Chamfort says: *en examinant la ligne des sots contre les gens d'esprit on croirait voir une conjuration de valets pour écarter les maîtres.* In my case there was, in addition, an unusual enemy engaged; the greater part of those, whose business it was to guide public opinion in my department, were appointed and paid to propagate and to laud to the very skies that worst of all systems—the Hegelian. But this cannot succeed if one is determined that the good shall produce its effect, even though it be only in a measure. The above may explain to my future readers the, to them, otherwise unaccountable fact, that I have remained as unknown to my own contemporaries as the man in the moon. It must be acknowledged, notwithstanding, that a system of thought which, in the absence

of any participation on the part of others, has been able to engage its originator throughout a long life unceasingly and cheerfully, and to spur him on to unremitting and unrewarded labour, possesses in itself a testimony to its value and its truth. Destitute of any encouragement from outside, the love of my work alone has through the many days of my life upheld my endeavours, and not allowed me to tire. I have, therefore, looked with contempt on the noisy celebrity of the worthless. For upon my entry upon life my genius laid before me this choice, either to acknowledge the truth, but therewith to please no one; or, like others, to teach falsehood with support and applause; and the choice was not difficult for me. Accordingly, the fortune of my philosophy was the opposite of that of the Hegelian, so entirely so, indeed, that one may regard them both as the opposite sides of the same sheet, according to the construction of both philosophies. Hegelianism, devoid alike of truth, clearness, and intelligence, nay, of human understanding, and in addition appearing in the shape of the most sickening Gallimathias that had ever been heard of, was a subsidized and privileged academical philosophy, consequently a species of nonsense which supported its author. My philosophy appearing simultaneously with it had, indeed, all the qualities which it lacked; but it was not cut out for any ulterior purposes, was not at all suited at that time for the chair, and, therefore, as the expression is, there was nothing to be made out of it. It followed then, as day follows night, that Hegelianism was the flag to which all ran, while my philosophy found neither applause nor adherents; but was rather with a uniform purpose completely ignored, treated with silence, and where possible smothered, because through its presence the above miserable game would have been spoilt, as shadows on the wall are by the incoming daylight. Hence I became the Iron Mask, or as the excellent Dorguth says, the Kaspar-Hauser

of the professors of philosophy: shut out from air and light that no one might see me, and that my natural claims might not be recognized. Now, however, the Man who should have been killed by the silence of the professors of philosophy is again risen from the dead, to the great consternation of the professors of philosophy, who do not know at all what face they shall assume.

ON PHILOSOPHY AND ITS METHOD.[1]

THE ultimate basis on which all our cognitions and sciences rest, is the inexplicable. Every explanation leads back to this by means of more or less intermediate stages; as in the sea the plummet finds the bottom, now in greater, now in lesser depths, but must nevertheless everywhere reach it at last. This inexplicable falls to the share of Metaphysics.

Almost all men unceasingly think they are this and this man (τις ἄνθρωπος), together with the corollaries which result therefrom. On the other hand, that they are Man in general (ὁ ἄνθρωπος), and the corollaries which follow from this, scarcely ever occurs to them, but is nevertheless the main point. The few who pay more attention to the latter than to the former proposition are philosophers. But the tendency of the others is reducible to the fact that they never see anything in the things except the particular and individual, and not their universality. Only the more highly gifted see more or less, according to the degree of their intelligence, the universal in particular things. This important distinction interpenetrates the whole faculty of knowledge so far indeed that it extends itself down to the intuition of the most every-day objects; hence, in the highly

[1] The following essays are from the second volume of the "Parerga and Paralipomena," and are headed "Detached yet systematically arranged thoughts on many different subjects."

gifted head these are other than in the ordinary head. This grasp of the universal in the particular, which always presents itself, is coincident with that which I have called the pure Will-less Subject of Knowledge, and have postulated as the subjective correlate of the Platonic Idea. This is proved because, when directed on the universal, the intelligence may remain will-less, while, on the contrary, the objects of the Will lie in particular things; for which reason the intelligence of animals is strictly limited to these particulars, and accordingly their intellect remains exclusively in the service of their will. The above direction of the mind to the universal is the indispensable condition of genuine achievements in philosophy, poetry, and in the arts and sciences generally.

For the intellect in the *service of the Will*, that is, in practical use, there are only particular things. For the intellect which pursues art and science, in other words, which is active for its own sake, there are only *universalities*, whole kinds, species, classes, *Ideas*, of things, for even the creative artist wishes to present the Idea, that is, the kind in the individual. This comes about because the Will is turned directly merely to individual things; these are, properly speaking, its objects, for these alone have empirical reality. Concepts, classes, species, can, on the contrary, become objects only very indirectly. Hence the common man has no sense for universal truths. But genius overlooks and misses the individual element. The compulsory occupation with the particular, as such, in so far as it constitutes the matter of practical life, is an irksome bondage.

The two first conditions of philosophizing are these: firstly, to have the courage to set one's heart upon no question; and, secondly, to bring all that which is obvious in itself to clear consciousness in order to comprehend it as

problem. Finally, in order, properly-speaking, to philosophize, the mind must be truly at leisure. It must pursue no purposes, and thus not be led by the Will, but give itself over undividedly to the teaching which the perceptive world and its own consciousness impart to it. Now professors of philosophy are concerned as to their personal use and advantage, and what leads thereto; there the serious point for them lies. For this reason they fail altogether to see so many obvious things, indeed do not so much as once come to reflection on the problems of philosophy.

The poet brings pictures of life, human character, and situations before the imagination, sets everything in motion, and leaves it to everyone to think into these pictures, as much as his intellectual power will find for him therein. On this account he can satisfy men of the most diverse capacities, even fools and wise men at the same time. Now the philosopher does not bring in the same way life itself, but the completed thoughts which he has abstracted from it, and demands that his reader should think just in the same way, and just as far as he himself, and his public is, in consequence, very small. The poet may therefore be compared to him who brings the flowers, the philosopher to him who brings the quintessence.

Another great advantage which poetical achievements have over philosophical is this, that all poetical works can stand without hindrance to each other side by side; while a philosophical system has hardly come into the world, but it contemplates the destruction of all its brothers, like an Asiatic sultan on ascending the throne. For as there can only be one queen in a beehive, so there can only be one philosophy on the order of the day. Systems are of as unsociable a nature as spiders, of which each sits alone in its web, and sees how many flies will let themselves be

caught in it, but only approaches another spider in order to fight it. Thus, while the works of poets pasture peacefully next each other like lambs, those of philosophers are born ravening beasts, and their destructive impulses are even directed primarily against their own species, like those of scorpions, spiders, and the *larvæ* of certain insects. They come into the world like the armed men from the seed of Jason's dragons' teeth, and have till now like these mutually exterminated each other. This battle has already lasted more than 2,000 years. Will a final victory and lasting peace ever result from it?

In consequence of its essentially polemical nature, this *bellum omnium contra omnes* of the philosophical systems, it is infinitely more difficult to obtain recognition as philosopher than as poet. The work of the poet demands nothing further from the reader than to enter into the series of the writings which amuse or elevate him, and the devotion of some few hours to them. The work of the philosopher, on the contrary, is intended to revolutionize his whole mode of thought; it requires of him that he shall acknowledge all he has learnt and believed in this department to be error, his time and trouble to be lost, and shall begin again from the beginning. It, at most, leaves some rudiments of its predecessor standing in order to build its foundation upon them. To this is added that, in every teacher of an already existing system, it has a professional opponent, and that sometimes even the state takes a philosophical system that pleases it under its protection, and by the help of its powerful material resources prevents the success of any other. Again, one must consider that the size of the philosophical public is proportioned to that of the poetical, as the number of people who want to be taught to those who want to be amused, and one will be able to judge, *quibus auspiciis* a philosopher makes his entry. It is indeed true, on the other hand,

that it is the applause of thinkers of the elect of all periods and all countries without difference of nation which rewards the philosopher; the multitude gradually learns to reverence his name on the strength of authority. In accordance with the foregoing, and on account of the slow but deep effect of the progress of philosophy on which the whole human race proceeds, since thousands of years the history of philosophers goes with that of kings, and counts a hundred times fewer names than the latter. Hence it is a great thing to procure for one's own name an enduring place therein.

The philosophical writer is the guide, and his reader is the wanderer. If they are to arrive together they must, above all things, start together; that is, the author must take his reader to a standpoint which they have in common; but this can be no other than that of the empirical consciousness which is common to all of us. Let him, then, grasp him firmly by the hand, and see how high above the clouds he can attain, step by step, along the mountain path. This is how Kant proceeds. He starts from common experience, as well of one's own self as of other things. How mistaken it is, on the other hand, to seek to start from the standpoint of an assumed intellectual intuition of hyperphysical relations, or processes, or even of a reason which perceives the supersensible, or of an absolute, self-thinking Reason. For all this means starting from the standpoint of not directly communicable cognitions, when therefore even at starting the reader does not know whether he is near his author, or miles distant from him.

Conversation with another, and serious meditation and inward contemplation of the things, is as a machine to a living organism. For only in the latter case is everything

cut from one piece, or as it were played in one key, whereby alone it can acquire clearness, intelligibility, and true coherence—in fact, unity. Otherwise, heterogeneous pieces of very different origin are stuck together, and a certain unity of movement is forced, which often unexpectedly stops. It is only oneself that one understands perfectly; others only half, for one can at most attain to community of concepts, but never to the perceptual point of view lying at their foundation. Hence deep philosophical truths are never brought to light by way of common thinking in dialogue. Such, however, is very serviceable as practice to the hunting up of problems, to their ventilation, and afterwards to the testing, controlling, and criticising of the proposed solution. Plato's dialogues are composed in this sense, and accordingly the second and third academies which issued from his school took on a more and more sceptical direction. As form for the communication of philosophical ideas the written dialogue is only serviceable where the subject admits of two or more wholly different or even opposite views respecting which the judgment of the reader shall either remain suspended or which, taken together, shall lead to a complete and accurate understanding of the matter. To the first case belongs the refutation of objections raised. The dialogue form chosen for this purpose must, however, be genuinely dramatic; in that the differences of opinion are laid bare to their foundations and thoroughly worked out. There must really be two speaking. Without this, it is, as is mostly the case, mere idle play.

Neither our knowledge, nor our insight, will be ever specially increased by the comparison and discussion of what has been said by others; for that is always like pouring water from one vessel into another. Only by the contemplation of things oneself, can insight and knowledge

be really increased; for it alone is the living source, always ready, and always at hand. It is curious to see how would-be philosophers are for ever occupied with the first method, and seem not to know the other at all, being always concerned with what this one has said and with what that one may have meant. So that they are, as it were, perpetually turning old casks upside down in order to see whether some drop may not have remained behind, while the living well-spring lies neglected at their feet. Nothing so much as this betrays their incapacity, or gives the lie more to their assumed mien of importance, depth, and originality.

Those who hope to become philosophers by the study of the history of philosophy ought to conclude from it that philosophers, like poets, are only born, and that, indeed, much more rarely.

A curious and unworthy definition of philosophy which even Kant gives, is that it is a science of mere concepts. For the whole property of concepts is only what has been placed in them after it has been begged and borrowed from perceptual knowledge, the real and inexhaustible source of insight. Hence a true philosophy cannot be spun out of mere abstract concepts, but must be founded on observation and experience, inner no less than outer. It is not by attempts at the combination of concepts such as has been so often practised, but especially by the sophists of our time, by Fichte and Schelling, and in its worst form by Hegel (in Morals also by Schleiermacher) that any good will be achieved in philosophy. Like art and poetry, it must have its source in our perceptual view of the world. Moreover, however much the head ought to have the upper hand, it must not be treated so cold-bloodedly, but that at last the whole man with head and heart should come into action, and be stirred throughout. Philosophy

is no algebraic formula. Vauvenargues is right when he says: *Les grandes pensées viennent du cœur.*

Considered as a whole, the philosophy of all times may be conceived as a pendulum which swings from side to side between Rationalism and Illuminism, that is, between the employment of the objective and subjective sources of knowledge.

Rationalism, which has for its organ the intellect, originally determined for the service of the *Will*, and therefore directed *outwards*, appears first as Dogmatism, as which it maintains a completely objective attitude. Then it changes to Scepticism, and becomes in consequence finally Criticism, which undertakes to settle the dispute by a consideration of the subject; in other words, it becomes transcendental philosophy. I understand by this, every philosophy which starts from the proposition that its nearest and most immediate object is not the world of things, but only the human *consciousness* of the things, and that this, therefore, can never be left out of consideration. The French call this rather inexactly the *méthode psychologique*, in opposition to the *méthode purement logique*, by which they understand, without more ado, the philosophy proceeding from objects, or objectively thought concepts, in short, Dogmatism. Having reached this point, Rationalism attains to the knowledge that its *organon* apprehends only the phenomenon, and does not reach the ultimate inner and original essence of things.

At all its stages, but most of all here, Illuminism asserts itself as its antithesis. *Illuminism*, which essentially turned inwards has as its *organon* internal illumination, intellectual intuition, higher consciousness immediately-cognising Reason, divine consciousness, &c., and which contemns Rationalism as the "light of nature." If a religion, it is *Mysticism*, its root-failing being that its knowledge is not

mediate; partly because for the internal perception there is no criterion of the identity of the objects of different subjects; partly because such a knowledge would have to be communicated by language, but the latter, which has arisen for the sake of the knowing faculty of the Intellect, as directed outwards by means of its own abstraction, is quite unsuited to express those internal states which are different from it, and which form the material of Illuminism. The latter must, therefore, construct a language of its own, which again, for the reason above given, does not work. Not being mediate a knowledge of this kind is undemonstrable, the consequence being that Rationalism again enters the field hand in hand with Scepticism. Illuminism is already discoverable in certain places in Plato; but it appears more distinctly in the philosophy of the Neo-Platonists, the Gnostics, in that of Dionysius Areopagita, as also in Scotus Erigena; among the Mahommedans in the doctrines of the *Sufi*; in India it is dominant in the Vedanta and Mimansa; but most distinctly of all in Jacob Bœhme, and all the Christian Mystics. It always appears when Rationalism has run its course without attaining its goal. Thus it came towards the end of the scholastic philosophy and in opposition thereto, especially among the Germans, as the Mysticism of Tauler, and the author of the "German Theology" amongst others. And, similarly, in modern times as opposition to the Kantian philosophy in Jacobi and Schelling, also in Fichte's last period. Philosophy, however, must be *mediate* knowledge, hence Rationalism. I have accordingly, at the close of my own philosophy, indicated the sphere of Illuminism as present, but have taken special care not to place so much as a foot upon it. On the contrary, I have not even attempted to give the final clues to the existence of the world, but only went as far as was possible on the objective Rationalistic path. I have left the ground free for

Illuminism to solve all problems in its own fashion, without its coming in my way, or having to polemicize against me.

Meanwhile a hidden Illuminism may often enough lie at the basis of Rationalism, to which the philosopher looks as to a hidden compass, while he only admits that he steers his course by the stars, that is, the external objects which lie clearly before him, and that he takes them alone into his reckoning. This is admissible, since he does not undertake to communicate the immediate knowledge, his communications remaining purely objective and rational. Such may have been the case with Plato, Spinoza, Malebranche, and some others; it does not concern any one, for it is the secret of their own breast. But the noisy invocation of intellectual intuition, and the barren narration of its content, with the claim for its objective validity, as in the case of Fichte and Schelling, is shameless and abominable.

For the rest, Illuminism is a natural, and in so far a legitimate, attempt to fathom the truth. For the intellect directed outwards, as mere *organon* for the purposes of the Will, and consequently merely secondary, is nevertheless only a part of our entire human nature. It belongs to the phenomenon, and its knowledge merely assumes the phenomenon, which is there only for its own sake. What can be more natural than that when we have failed to succeed with the objectivity-knowing intellect we bring into play our whole remaining being—which is also Thing-in-itself, and as such pertains to the true nature of the world, and consequently must bear within it the solution of all problems—in order to seek help from it, just as the ancient Germans, when they had played away everything else, finally staked their own persons. But the only correct and objectively-valid way of carrying this out is that we apprehend the empirical fact of a Will proclaiming itself

in our inmost being, and constituting our only nature, and apply it to the explanation of our objective, external knowledge, as I have accordingly done. The way of Illuminism, on the other hand, for the reasons above explained, does not lead to this goal.

Mere cleverness suffices for the sceptic but not for the philosopher. Meanwhile scepticism is in philosophy what opposition is in Parliament; it is as beneficial as it is necessary. It is always based on the fact that philosophy is not capable of evidence of such a kind as Mathematics; just as little as the man is capable of the tricks of animal instinct which are also certain *a priori*. Hence scepticism will ever be able, as against every system, to lay itself in the other scale. But its weight will at last become so little against the other that it will no more hurt it than the arithmetical quadrature of the circle, which is also only approximative.

That which one knows has a double value, if at the same time one admits oneself not to know *that which one does not know*. For thereby the former is free from the suspicion to which one exposes it if, like for instance the Schellingites, one proposes also to know what one does not know.

Every one forms certain propositions which he holds for true without investigation, declarations of reason. Such propositions he could not bring himself seriously to test, since this would involve his calling them in question for the nonce. They have come into this unshakeable credit with him because ever since he began to speak and to think he has heard them perpetually spoken of, and they have thereby become indoctrinated into him. Hence his habit of thinking them is as old as his habit of thinking at all; they have grown up into his brain. What is here

said is so true that it would, on the one hand, be superfluous, and on the other, of doubtful desirability, to substantiate it with examples.

No conception of the world which has arisen from an objective perceptual apprehension of things, and which has been logically carried out, can be entirely false; it is in the worst case only one-sided, as for instance complete Materialism, absolute Idealism, &c. They are all true, but they are equally so—consequently their truth is only relative. Every such conception is true, namely, only from a particular standpoint; just as a picture only displays a landscape from one point of view. But if one lifts oneself above the standpoint of such a system one recognizes the relativity of its truth, that is, its onesidedness. Only the highest standpoint which overlooks and takes into account all, can furnish absolute truth. It is true accordingly when I, for example, conceive myself as a mere natural product arisen in time, and destined to complete destruction—after the manner of the Koheleth.

But it is equally true that everything that was or will be, I am, and that nothing exists outside me. It is just as true when I, after the manner of Anakreon, place the highest happiness in the enjoyment of the present time, but it is equally true when I recognize the wholesomeness of suffering, and the nothingness, nay, the injuriousness of all pleasure, and conceive death as the object of my existence.

All this has its reason in that each view logically carried out is only a perceptual and objective apprehension of nature translated into concepts, and thereby fixated; but nature, *i.e*, the perceptual, never lies nor contradicts itself since its essence excludes any such thing. Where, therefore, contradiction and lie are, there are thoughts which have not sprung from objective apprehension—*e.g.*, op-

himism. But an objective apprehension may be incomplete and one-sided; it then requires completion, not refutation.

People are never tired of reproaching Metaphysics with its small progress in view of the great progress of the Physical sciences. Even Voltaire exclaims: *O métaphysique! nous sommes aussi avancés que du tems des premiers Druides* ("Mel. d. phil." ch. 9). But what other science has like it always had as a hindrance an antagonist, *ex officio*, a paid fiscal prosecutor, a king's champion in full armour, to attack it defenceless and weaponless? It will never show its true powers, never be able to make its giant-strides, so long as it is required of it with threats, that it shall suit itself to dogmas cut out with a view to the small capacity of the great mass. They first bind our arms, and then mock us because we cannot accomplish anything.

Religions have seized upon the metaphysical faculties of men, which they first of all lame by the early instilling of their dogmas, respecting which they taboo all free and unprejudiced expressions of opinion, so that free research respecting the most important and interesting of problems, respecting man's existence itself, is in part directly forbidden, in part indirectly hindered, being rendered subjectively wellnigh impossible by mutilation, and thus the most noble of man's faculties lies in fetters.

In order to make us patient under contradiction, and tolerant of views opposed to our own, nothing is, perhaps, more powerful than the remembrance how often we have successively held quite opposite views on the same subject, and have changed them repeatedly, sometimes indeed within a very short period, how we have rejected and again taken up, now this opinion, now its opposite, accord-

ing as the subject presented itself to us, now in one, now in another light.

In the same way there is nothing more calculated to procure acceptance with another for our contradiction of his own opinion than the phrase, "I used to think the same myself, but," &c.

A fallacious doctrine, whether founded on a false opinion or sprung from a bad intention, is only designed for special circumstances, and consequently for a certain time; but the truth is for all time, even though it may be misunderstood or smothered for a while. For as soon as a little light comes from within, or a little air from without, someone will be found to proclaim or to defend it. For since it has not originated in the interests of any party, every superior mind will be its champion at any time. It resembles the magnet which always and everywhere points to an absolutely definite part of the compass; the false doctrine, on the contrary, resembles a statue which points with the hand towards another statue, but once removed from it loses all significance.

What stands most in the way of the discovery of truth is not the false appearance proceeding from the things and leading to error, nor even directly the weakness of the understanding; but it is the preconceived opinion, the prejudice which, as a bastard *à priori*, opposes itself to the truth, and then resembles a contrary wind which drives the ship back from the direction in which the land lies, so that rudder and sail work in vain.

I comment as follows on Goethe's verse in "Faust":

> "What thou hast inherited from thy fathers
> Inherit it in order to possess it."

That which thinkers have discovered before us, it is of great service and value for ourselves to discover by our own means, independently of them, and before we know them, for one understands what one has thought out for oneself much more thoroughly than what one has learnt, and when one afterwards finds it with these predecessors, one receives an unhoped-for confirmation, speaking strongly for its truth, from an independent and recognized authority. In this way one gains confidence and assurance to champion it against every opponent.

When, on the other hand, one has found something first of all in books, and then attained the same result by one's own reflection, one never knows for certain that one has thought and reasoned this out oneself, and not merely been the echo in one's feelings, or one's speech, of these predecessors. But this makes a very great difference in respect to the certainty of the matter. For in the latter case it may happen that one has erred with one's predecessors owing to one's preoccupation with them, just as water readily takes to a ready-made course. If two persons, each for themselves, make a calculation and reach the same result, the result is certain, but not when the calculation has merely been looked-through by the other.

It is a consequence of the construction of our Intellect, sprung as it is from the Will, that we cannot help conceiving the world either as *end* or as *means*. The first would assert that its existence was justified by its essence, and was definitely preferable to its non-existence. But the knowledge that it is only a place of struggle for suffering and dying beings renders this idea untenable. Again, the infinity of Time already passed does not admit of its being conceived as means, for every end to be obtained would long ago have been accomplished. From this it follows that the foregoing application of the natural pre-

supposition of our intellect to the whole of things, or to the world, is *transcendent*, that is, it is valid *in* the world, but not *of* the world. This is explicable from the fact that it arises from the nature of an Intellect, which as I have shown has itself arisen for the service of an individual *Will*, *i.e.*, for the attainment of its objects, and hence being exclusively concerned with ends and means, neither knows nor conceives of any thing else.

When we look outwards, where the immeasurableness of the world and the countlessness of its beings display themselves to us, oneself as mere individual shrinks up to nothing and seems to vanish. Carried away by the immensity of mass and number, one thinks further that only the philosophy directed *outward*, that is, the *objective* philosophy, can be the right way, and to doubt as to this never occurred to the oldest Greek philosopher.

Let us now look inwards. We find, in the first place, that every individual takes an immediate interest only in himself, indeed that his *self* he takes more to heart than all else put together; which comes from the fact that he knows himself immediately but everything else only mediately. If one adds to this that conscious and knowing beings are thinkable solely as individuals, and that beings without consciousness have only a half, a mere mediate existence, it follows that all proper and true existence obtains only in the individual. If, finally, one considers that the object is conditioned by the subject, and that, therefore, this immeasurable outer world has its existence only in the *consciousness* of knowing beings and, consequently, is bound up with the existence of individuals which are its bearers, so much so that in a sense it may be looked upon as a mere equipment, an accident of the always individual consciousness; if one, I say, keeps all this in view one is driven to the opinion that only the philosophy which is

directed *inwards* proceeding from the subject as immediately given—in other words, that of the modern, since Descartes—is on the right way, and that the Ancients have overlooked the main points. But one first receives the complete conviction of this, when turning within upon oneself, one brings to one's consciousness the feeling of origination which lies in every knowing being. More than this, everyone, even the most insignificant human being, finds in his simple self-consciousness himself as the most real of all beings, and recognizes necessarily in himself the true centre of the world, the ultimate source of all reality. And does this ultimate consciousness lie? Its most powerful expression is to be found in the words of the Upanishad: *hæ omnes creaturæ in totum ego sum, et præter me ens aliud non est, et omnia ego creata feci* ("Oupnekh," i., p. 122), which is certainly there the transition to Illuminism, or indeed, to Mysticism. This is, therefore, the result of contemplation directed inwards; while that directed outwards shows us as the goal of our existence—a heap of ashes.[1]

Respecting the division of philosophy, which is of special importance with regard to its exposition, it should, from my point of view, be treated as follows:

Philosophy, indeed, has experience for its subject, but not, like the other sciences, this or that definite experience, but experience itself generally and as such, according to its possibility, its range, its essential content, its inner and outer element, its form and matter. That philosophy must

[1] *Finite* and *infinite* are concepts, having significance merely in respect of time and space, inasmuch as both these are *infinite, i.e.* endless, as also infinitely divisible. If we apply these two concepts to other things it must be to such things as fill space and time, and can participate in their qualities. From this it may be judged how great is the abuse which philosophasters have in this century carried on with these concepts.

assuredly have empirical foundations, and not be spun out of purely abstract conceptions, I have adequately explained in the second volume of my chief work, chap. xvii., pp. 180-185 (3rd ed., 199 *seq.*), and have given a short *résumé* of it above. Hence it follows further that the first thing which it has to contemplate must be the medium in which experience-in-general presents itself, together with its form and construction. This medium is presentment, knowledge, in short, intellect. For this reason every philosophy must begin with the investigation of the faculty of knowledge, its forms and its laws, as also its validity and limits. Such an investigation will, therefore, be a *Philosophia prima.* It falls asunder into the consideration of the primary, *i.e.*, perceptual presentments, which part may be called Dianoiology, or doctrine of the Understanding; and into the consideration of the secondary, *i.e.*, abstract presentments, together with the order of their treatment as *logic*, or doctrine of Reason. This universal part conceives, or rather represents, that which was formerly termed Ontology, and which was put forward as the doctrine of the most universal and essential qualities of things in general, and as such; inasmuch as what only accrues to things in consequence of the form and nature of our faculty of presentment—since all essences to be apprehended by the latter must present themselves in accordance therewith, whereby they bear certain characteristics common to them all—were held to be the qualities of the things in themselves. This may be compared to attributing the colour of a glass to the objects seen through it.

The philosophy following upon such investigation is in the narrower sense of the word *Metaphysics*, since it not only teaches us to know that which is actually present, nature conceived in its order and connection, but it apprehends it as a given, though in some way, conditioned phenomenon, in which a being distinct from itself, in other

words, the thing-in-itself, displays itself. This it endeavours to learn more closely, the means thereto being partly the bringing together of outer and inner experience; partly the attainment of an understanding of the whole phenomenon by a discovery of its meaning and connection, to compare the reading of the hitherto indecipherable characters of an unknown writing. In this way it attains from the appearance to the thing appearing, to that which is hidden behind it, hence τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά. It may be divided in consequence into three parts:

Metaphysic of Nature,
Metaphysic of the Beautiful,
Metaphysic of Morals.

The deduction of this division, however, presupposes Metaphysics. For this points to the thing-in-itself, the inner and ultimate essence of the phenomenon, as our Will. Hence, after a consideration of it as presented in external nature, Metaphysic investigates its quite different and immediate manifestation in ourselves, whence proceed the Metaphysic of Morals. But, previously to this, the completest and purest apprehension of its external or objective phenomenon is taken into consideration which gives us the Metaphysic of the Beautiful.

Rational Psychology, or doctrine of the soul, there is not; for, as Kant has proved, the soul is a transcendent, and as such, an undemonstrated and unjustified hypostasis, so that the antithesis of "spirit and nature" is left for the Philistines and Hegelians. The essence in itself of the human being can only be understood in conjunction with the essence in itself of all things, that is, of the world. Hence Plato, in the "Phædrus" makes Socrates put the question in a negative sense: Ψυχῆς οὖν φύσιν ἀξίως λόγου κατανοῆσαι οἴει δυνατὸν εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως; (*Animæ vero naturam absque totius natura sufficienter cog-*

nosci posse existimas?) The Microcosm and the Macrocosm reciprocally explain each other, whereby they evince themselves as essentially the same. This consideration, connected with the inner side of man, interpenetrates and suffuses the whole of Metaphysic in all its parts, and cannot, such being the case, again appear separately as Psychology. Anthropology, on the other hand, as an empirical science has its justification, but it is partly anatomy and physiology, partly mere empirical Psychology, that is, a knowledge of the moral and intellectual manifestations and peculiarities of the human race, as also of the variation of individuals in this respect, derived from observation. The most important part of it is, nevertheless, necessary as empirical material to be taken up and worked out by the three parts of Metaphysic. What remains over requires fine observation and intelligent apprehension, indeed, a contemplation from a somewhat higher standpoint, I mean from that of a certain superiority, and is, therefore, only to be enjoyed in the writings of specially gifted minds, such as Theophrastus, Montaigne, Larochefoucauld, Labruyère, Helvetius, Chamfort, Addison, Shaftesbury, Shenstone, Lichtenberg, &c., but is not to be sought nor to be endured in the compendiums of unintelligent, and therefore intelligence-hating, professors of philosophy.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE ANTITHESIS OF THING-IN-ITSELF AND PHENOMENON.

THING-IN-ITSELF signifies the existent independently of our perception, in short, that which properly is. This was, for Demokritus, formed matter. It was the same at bottom for Locke; for Kant it was = x; for me it is Will.

How entirely Demokritus took the matter in the above sense, and hence belongs at the head of this exposition, is confirmed by the following passage from "Sextus Empiricus" (Adv. Math. l. vii. § 135), who had his works before him, and for the most part, cites verbally from them: *Δημοκριτὸς δὲ ὅτι μὲν ἀναιρει τὰ φαινόμενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, καὶ τούτων λέγει μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι κατ' ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ δόξαν· ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀτόμους εἶναι καὶ κενόν*, &c. (*Demokritus autem ea quidem tollit, quæ apparent sensibus, et ex iis dicit nihil ut vere est apparere, sed solum ex opinione; verum autem esse in iis, quæ sunt, atomos et inane.*) I recommend the reader to look over the whole passage where also the following occurs: *ἐτεῇ νυν οἷον ἕκαστον ἔστιν, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐ συνίεμεν·* (*vere quidem nos, quale sit vel non sit unumquodque, neutiquam intelligimus*), also: *ἐτεῇ οἷον ἕκαστον (ἔστι) γιγνώσκειν ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἔστι·* (*vere scire quale sit unum quodque, in dubio est*). All this is as much as to say: "We do not know the things as they may be in themselves, but only as they appear," and opens up the series starting from the most decided

Materialism but leading to Idealism, which closes with me. A surprisingly clear and definite distinction between the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon, even in the Kantian sense, we find in a passage of Porphyry which Stobæos has preserved ("Eclog.," L. I., c. 43, Fragm. 3). It says, Τὰ *κατηγορούμενα τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἐνύλου ἀληθῶς ἐστι ταῦτα, τὸ πάντη εἶναι διαπεφορημένον, τὸ μεταβλητὸν εἶναι*, &c. Τοῦ δὲ *ὄντως ὄντος καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ὑφεστηκότος αὐτοῦ, τὸ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἱδρυμένον· ᾗ σαύτως τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχειν*, &c.

As we only know the surface of the earth, and not the great solid mass of the interior, so we know nothing whatever empirically of things and the world, but only of their *phenomenon, i.e.*, their surface. The exact knowledge of this is Physics taken in its widest sense. But that this surface presupposes an interior which is not mere surface, but has a cubic content, is, together with the conclusions as to its nature, the subject of Metaphysics. To attempt to construct the nature of things in themselves, according to the laws of the mere phenomenon, is an undertaking which may be compared to the attempt to construct from mere surfaces and their laws the stereometric body. Every transcendent dogmatic philosophy is an attempt to construct the thing-in-itself according to the laws of the phenomenon which results similarly to that of attempting to cover two absolutely dissimilar figures with one another, which must always miscarry, since turn them as one will now this, now that, corner projects.

Inasmuch as every being in nature is at the same time a *phenomenon* and a *thing-in-itself*, that is, *natura naturata*, and *natura naturans*, it is capable of a double explanation, a *physical* and a *metaphysical*. The physical is always from the *cause*; the metaphysical always from the *Will*; for this it is which displays itself in consciousless nature

as natural force, higher up as vital force, but in animal and man receives the name Will. Taken strictly, in a given human being the degree and the direction of his intelligence, and the moral construction of his character, might possibly be purely physically produced, the first, viz., from the structure of his brain and nervous system, together with the circulation of the blood which affects it, the latter from the structure and combined action of his heart, cellular system, blood, lungs, liver, spleen, kidneys, intestines, genital organs, etc., but for this would certainly be requisite a much closer acquaintance with the laws which regulate the *rapport du physique au moral* than even Bichât and Cabanis possessed. Both would then be reducible to more distant physical causes, to wit, the structure of his parents, since these could only furnish the germ of a being like themselves, but not of a higher and better one. *Metaphysically*, on the other hand, the same human being must be explained as the phenomenon of his own perfectly free and original Will, which has created in him the corresponding intellect. Hence all his deeds, however necessarily they proceed from his character, in conflict with the given motive (and this again appears as the result of his corporisation), are nevertheless to be wholly attributed to him. Metaphysically, moreover, the distinction between him and his parents is not an absolute one.

All *understanding* is an act of *presenting*, and remains, therefore, essentially within the domain of *presentment*; but since this only furnishes phenomena it is limited to the phenomenon, where the thing-in-itself begins the phenomenon leaves off, consequently also the presentment, and with this the understanding. But its place is here taken by the *existent* itself, which is conscious of itself as *Will*. Were this self-consciousness immediate we should have a completely adequate knowledge of the thing-in-

itself. But because it is thereby rendered possible that the Will creates this organic body, and by means of part of the same an intellect, and finds and recognizes itself first through this, in self-consciousness as Will—it follows that this knowledge of the thing-in-itself is primarily conditioned by the separation of a knowing and a known, and then by the form of time, which is inseparable from the cerebral self-consciousness, and that it is hence not completely exhausted and adequate. (Compare chap. xviii. in 2nd vol. of my chief work.)[1]

With this is connected the truth presented by me in my

[1] The distinction between the thing-in-itself and the phenomenon may be expressed as that between the *subjective* and *objective* essence of a thing. Its pure *subjective* essence is the thing-in-itself, but this is no object of knowledge. For in order to be such it is essential that it should always be present in a knowing consciousness as its presentment, and what displays itself there is the objective essence of the thing. This is accordingly object of knowledge, but as such it is mere presentment, and as it can only become so by means of a presentment-apparatus which must have its own structure and the laws resulting therefrom, it is a mere phenomenon which must connect itself with the thing-in-itself. This obtains also where there exists a self-consciousness, that is, a self-cognizing I. For this also knows itself only in its intellect, *i.e.* its apparatus of presentment, and indeed through the external senses as organic form, by the internal as Will whose acts it sees as simultaneously repeated by that form as the latter is by its shadow, whence it concludes as to the identity of both and terms the result I. But on account of this double knowledge, as well as on account of the great proximity in which the intellect here stands to its source or root, the Will, the knowledge of objective being, that is, of the phenomenon, differs here much less from the subjective or thing-in-itself than in the case of knowledge by means of the external sense or the consciousness of other things in opposition to self-consciousness. For to this, in so far as the internal sense alone cognizes it, the form of time alone cleaves, and no longer that of space and time together, time therefore and the separation of subject and object is all that divides it from the thing-in-itself.

Essay on "Will in Nature," under the heading "Physical Astronomy," p. 86 (2nd ed., p. 79; 3rd ed., p. 86):—that in proportion to the clearness with which a process or relation may be comprehended, does it pertain to the mere phenomenon and not to the thing-in-itself.

When we observe and contemplate any natural being, as for instance an animal, in its existence, life, and action, it stands before us, in spite of all that zoology and zootomy teach respecting it, as an impenetrable mystery. But does nature, then, from mere obstinacy remain eternally dumb to our questioning? Is it not like everything great, open, communicative, and even naïve? Can its answer, therefore, fail from any other reason than because the question was wrongly put, was onesided, proceeded from false assumptions, or, perhaps, even contained a contradiction? For is it easy to think that a connection of causes and consequences could obtain where it must eternally and essentially remain undiscovered? *That* assuredly not. But it is unfathomable, because we search for causes and effects in a region to which this form is foreign, and hence we pursue the chain of causes and effects on an entirely wrong tack. We seek to attain the inner essence of nature, namely, which confronts us in every phenomenon on the lines of the principle of cause—whereas this is the mere form with which our intellect apprehends the phenomenon, *i.e.*, the surface of things, and we expect by this means to get beyond the phenomenon. But within the range of the phenomenon it is useful and sufficient. For example, the actuality of a given animal may be explained from its generation. This in the last resort is no more mysterious than the sequence of any other, even the simplest effect, from its cause, since even in such a case the explanation abuts ultimately upon the incomprehensible. The fact that in generation a few middle links in the chain

of connection fail us makes no difference essentially, for even if we had them we should still come back to the incomprehensible. All this is because the phenomenon remains phenomenon and does not become thing-in-itself.

The inner essence of things is foreign to the principle of cause. It is the thing-in-itself, and that is pure Will. It *is* because it wills and it *wills* because it is. It is the simple Real in every being.

The fundamental character of all things is perishability. We see everything in nature from the metal to the organism consuming and destroying itself, partly by its very existence, partly by conflict with something else. How could nature endure the maintaining of its form, and the renewing of its individuals, the countless repetition of its life process throughout an endless time without tiring, if its own innermost core were not timeless, and hence completely indestructible, a thing-in-itself of a kind quite other than its phenomena—a metaphysical thing quite distinct from the physical thing? This is the Will in ourselves and in all things.

We complain of the obscurity in which we live without understanding the connection of existence in the whole, and above all, not even of our own self with the whole; so that not only is our life short, but our knowledge is exclusively limited to it, since we can neither look backward beyond our birth, nor forward beyond our death, and hence our consciousness is but a flash of lightning that momentarily illumines the night. It would seem, indeed, as though a spiteful demon had closed up for us all further knowledge that he might enjoy our embarrassment. But this complaint is, properly-speaking, unjustified, for it springs from an illusion which is brought about by the fallacious opinion that the totality of things has proceeded from an *intellect*,

consequently, existed as mere *presentment* before it became real; and that accordingly having arisen from knowledge, it must be also accessible to knowledge, and penetrable and exhaustible by it. But, in truth, the matter stands rather thus, that all that which we complain that we do not know is known to no one, is indeed in itself not knowable, *i.e.*, not presentable. For the *presentment* in the domain of which all knowledge lies, and to which therefore all knowledge refers, is only the external side of existence, a secondary added thing, something that is, which was not necessary to the maintenance of things generally, in other words, of the world-whole, but merely to the maintenance of individual animal beings. Hence the existence of things in general and as a whole, appears only *per accidens* in knowledge and, therefore, in a very limited manner; it only forms the background of the picture in the animal consciousness where the objects of the Will are the essential, and occupy the first place. There arises now, by means of this accident, the whole world in space and time, that is, the world as presentment, which has no existence of this kind outside knowledge. Its internal essence, on the other hand, that which is existent in itself, is quite independent of this kind of existence. But since, as already said, knowledge is only there for the sake of the maintenance of each animal individual, so its whole structure, all its forms, as time, space, &c., are merely there for the purposes of such an individual. But the latter merely requires the knowledge of relations between particular phenomena, and in no way those of the nature of the thing and of the world-whole.

Kant has proved that the problems of metaphysics which disturb every one more or less, are capable of no direct, of no sufficient solution whatever, but are based in the last resort on the fact that they have their origin in the forms of our intellect, time, space and causality, while this intellect is merely designed to supply the motives to the indi-

vidual will, *i.e.*, to show it the objects of its willing together with the ways and means to attain them. When, however, this intellect is abusively turned to the nature of things-in-themselves, to the totality and the complex of the world, the aforesaid forms pertaining to it of the co-existence succession and causation of all possible things give birth to the metaphysical problems as, for instance, of origin and purpose, beginning and end of the world, and of one's own self, of the destruction of the latter by death, or of its continued duration in spite of it, of the freedom of the Will, &c. Let us conceive these forms as once abolished, and a consciousness of the things as, nevertheless, present—these problems would then be not, indeed, solved, but would have entirely vanished, and their expression would have no more meaning. For they take their origin entirely from these forms, which are designed not for the understanding of the world and of existence, but merely for an understanding of our personal ends.

This whole consideration affords us an explanation and *objective* justification of the Kantian doctrines, which were only justified by their founder from the *subjective* side, viz., that the forms of the understanding are merely of immanent, not transcendent, application. One might, instead of the above, also say the intellect is physical, not metaphysical, *i.e.*, as it has grown out of the Will as pertaining to its objectivation, it is there also only for its service; that this merely obtains *in* nature, and not in anything lying outside of it. Every animal possesses (as I have explained and substantiated in "Will in Nature") its intellect obviously only for the purpose of finding and obtaining its food, and its degree is determined thereby. With Man it is not otherwise, only that the greater difficulty of his maintenance, and the infinitely greater number of his wants has here made a much higher degree of intellect necessary. It is only when this is exceeded, through an

abnormity, that the perfectly *free surplus* remains over which is considerable, is called *genius*. In the first instance, such an intellect as this is truly objective only; but it can easily go so far that it may become to a certain extent even metaphysical, or at least endeavour to be so. For precisely in consequence of its objectivity, nature itself, the totality of things, becomes its object and its problem. For nature here first begins properly to perceive itself as something which is and yet might *not* be, or which might be *otherwise*, while in the ordinary, merely normal, intellect it does not clearly perceive itself, just as the miller does not hear his mill, nor the perfumer smell his shop. It seems to require no explanation; the intellect is involved in it. Only in certain clearer moments is it aware of it, and becomes almost frightened at it, but this soon passes off. How much such normal heads are ever likely to achieve in philosophy, however numerously they congregate, is easy to see. If, on the contrary, the intellect were originally and by constitution metaphysical, it could further philosophy like every other science, especially with united forces.

SOME WORDS ON PANTHEISM.

ONE might illustrate allegorically and dramatically the controversy carried on at the present time among the professors of philosophy respecting Theism and Pantheism, by a dialogue which took place in the pit of a theatre at Milan during the performance. The one interlocutor, convinced that he is in the great and celebrated Marionette Theatre of Girolamo, admired the art with which the director has arranged the marionettes and guides their play. The other says, on the contrary, "Not at all! That they were in the Theatro della Scala, that the director and his associates were playing themselves, and were concealed really in the persons before them; —and that the poet was also playing."

It is delightful to see how the professors of philosophy coquet with Pantheism as with a forbidden thing which they have not the heart to seize. Their attitude in this respect I have already described in my essay on "The university-philosophy," which reminds one of Bottom the weaver in "The Midsummer Night's Dream." It is, indeed, a sour piece of bread, the bread of the professors of philosophy! One has first to dance to the pipe of ministers, and when one has done that satisfactorily, one may still be fallen upon from outside by those wild men-eaters the real philosophers, who are capable of pocketing and running off with one, in order to produce one opportunely as a pocket-pulcinello to give zest to their expositions.

Against Pantheism I have chiefly this objection only, that it says nothing. To call the world God is not to explain it, but only to enrich language with a superfluous synonym of the word "world." Whether it says "the world is God," or "the world is the world," comes to the same thing. If indeed we start from God as the given thing to be explained, and say, "God is the world," there we have to a certain extent an explanation, in so far as we return from the unknown to the known; still it is only a verbal explanation. But if we start from the really given, viz., the world, and say "the world is God," it is as clear as daylight that we have said nothing thereby, or that at least *ignotum* is explained *per ignotius;* hence Pantheism pre-supposes Theism as having preceded it. For only in so far as one starts with a God, and therefore has him already in advance, and is intimate with him, can one finally bring oneself to identify him with the world, in order to put him on one side in a decent manner. We have not started impartially from the world as the thing to be explained, but from God as the given thing; after we did not know what to do with the former, the world had to take over his *rôle*. This is the origin of Pantheism. For on a first and impartial view it would never occur to anyone to regard the world as a God. It must obviously be a very ill-advised God who knew no better amusement than to transform himself into a world such as this: into a hungry world, in order there to endure misery, suffering, and death, without measure or end, in the shape of countless millions of living, but anxious and tormented beings, who only maintain themselves for a while by mutually devouring each other: *e.g.*, in the shape of six million Negro slaves, who daily on the average receive sixty million blows of the whip on their bare bodies, and in the shape of three million European weavers who, amid hunger and misery, feebly vegetate in stuffy attics or wretched workshops, &c.

That would indeed be a pastime for a God! who as such must be accustomed to things very different.

The supposed great progress from Theism to Pantheism, if taken seriously and not merely as a masked negation, as above suggested, is accordingly, a progress from the unproven, and hardly thinkable to the actually absurd. For however unclear, vacillating, and confused may be the conception which one associates with the word God, two predicates are at all events inseparable from it—the highest power and the highest wisdom. But that a being armed with this should have placed himself in the position above described, is an actually absurd idea; for our position in the world is obviously such as no intelligent, let alone an all-wise being, would place himself in. Theism, on the other hand, is merely unproven, and even if it is difficult to conceive that the infinite world should be the work of a personal, and therefore individual being, such as we only know from animal nature, it is nevertheless not exactly absurd. For that an almighty and, at the same time, an all-wise being should create a tormented world is always conceivable, although we may not know the wherefore of it. Hence, even if we attribute to him the quality of the highest goodness, the incomprehensibility of his judgment is always the refuge by which such a doctrine escapes the reproach of absurdity. On the assumption of Pantheism, however, the creating God is himself the endlessly tormented, and on this small earth alone dies once in every second, and this of his own free will, which is absurd. It would be much more correct to identify the world with the devil, as has been actually done by the venerable author of "The German Theology," inasmuch as on p. 93 of his immortal work (according to the restored text, Stuttgart, 1851), he says: "Therefore are the evil spirit and nature one, and when nature is not overcome there also is the evil one not overcome."

The Pantheists obviously give to the *Sansara* the name God. The Mystics, on the other hand, give the same name to the *Nirwana*. Of this, however, they relate more than they know, which the Buddhists do not do; and hence their Nirwana is but a relative nothing. The Synagogue, the Church, and Islam use the word God in its proper and correct sense.

The expression one often hears nowadays, "the world is end to itself," leaves undecided whether it is to be explained by Pantheism or by mere Fatalism, but allows it at all events only a physical and no moral significance, since on the assumption of this latter the world always presents itself as means to a higher end. But this notion that the world has only a physical and no moral significance is the most hopeless error that has ever sprung from the perversity of the human mind.

ON ETHICS.

PHYSICAL truths may have much external significance, but they are wanting in internal significance. The latter is the privilege of intellectual and moral truths, which have as their theme the highest stages of the objectivation of the Will, while the former have only the lowest. For instance, if we attain to certainty as to what is now merely supposition, to wit, that the sun at the equator produces thermo-electricity, this the magnetism of the earth, and this again the polar light, these truths would be of much external significance, but internally poor. Examples of internal truths are not only furnished by high and truly spiritual philosophizings, but also by the catastrophe of every good tragedy; also indeed by the observation of human conduct in the extreme expressions of its morality and immorality, in other words, of its evil and goodness. For in all this the essence appears whose phenomenon the world is, and at the highest stage of its objectivation brings to light its innermost core.

That the world has merely a physical, and no moral significance, is the greatest, the most pernicious, the fundamental error, the true perversity of opinion, and is at bottom that which faith has personified as Anti-Christ. Nevertheless, and despite all religions, which one and all maintain the contrary, and seek to explain it in their mythical fashion, this root-error never quite dies out, but

ever and again raises its head anew, till universal indignation compels it once more to hide it.

But certain as is the feeling of a moral significance of the world and of life, its explication and the unravelling of the contradiction between it and the course of the world is, nevertheless, so difficult, that it was reserved for me to expound the true only genuine and pure, and therefore everywhere and at all times operative foundation of morality, together with the goal to which it leads. In this I have the reality of moral progress too much on my side, that I need fear ever again to be superseded and displaced by another.

As long, however, as my Ethics remain unnoticed by the professors, the Kantian moral principle obtains at the universities, and among its various forms that of the "Dignity of Man" is now the most accepted. I have already exposed its emptiness in my essay on the "Foundation of Morality," § 8, p. 169 (2nd ed., 166). For this reason we say only thus much here on this point. If one were to ask on what this pretended dignity of man rested, the answer would come to saying that it rested on his morality. Thus the morality rests on the dignity, and the dignity on the morality. But apart from this, the conception of dignity seems to me to be only ironically applicable to a being so sinful in will, so limited in intellect, so easily injured, and so feeble in body as man:

> "Quid superbit homo? cujus conceptio culpa,
> Nasci poena, labor vita, necesse mori!"

I would therefore postulate the following rule in opposition to the aforesaid form of the Kantian moral principle: Do not attempt in the case of any man with whom you come in contact an objective valuation of him as to worth and dignity; hence do not take into consideration the badness of his will, nor the limitation of his under-

standing, nor the perversity of his ideas, for the first can easily evoke hatred, the last contempt against him; but bear in mind only his sufferings, his need, his anxiety, his pains. In this way we shall continually feel ourselves related to him, sympathize with him, and instead of hatred or contempt, experience that sympathy with him which is the only ἀγάπη to which the Gospel admonishes us. The standpoint of sympathy is alone suited to prevent hatred or contempt arising towards him, and not certainly the opposite one of seeking after his pretended dignity.

The Buddhists, in consequence of their deeper ethical and metaphysical insights, do not start from cardinal virtues, but from cardinal vices, as the antitheses or negations of which the cardinal virtues first appear. According to J. J. Schmidt's "History of the Eastern Mongolians," p. 7, the cardinal vices of the Buddhists are lust, idleness, anger, and greed. But probably pride ought to stand in the place of idleness, as given in the "Lettres édifiantes et curieuses," edit. de 1819, vol. vi., p. 372; envy or hatred being there added as a fifth. For my correction of the statement of the highly deserving J. J. Schmidt, its agreement with the doctrines of the Sufis, who were certainly under the influence of Brahmism and Buddhism, speaks strongly in favour. For these also postulate the same cardinal vices, and indeed very effectively, pairwise, so that lust appears related to greed, and anger to pride. (See Tholuck's "collection of blossoms from Oriental Mysticism," p. 206.) We already find lust, anger, and greed in the Bhagavat Gita (xvi. 21), postulated as cardinal vices, which attests the great age of the doctrine. Similarly in the "Prabodha-Chandrodaya," a philosophico-allegorical drama, extremely important for the Vedanta-philosophy, these three cardinal vices also appear as the three generals

of the King Passion in his war against King Reason.[1] As the cardinal virtues opposed to the above cardinal vices, modesty and generosity, together with mildness and humility, would result.

If we compare with these deeply-conceived oriental root-ideas of ethics the so-celebrated and so-many-thousand-times-repeated cardinal virtues of Plato, justice, bravery, moderation, and wisdom, we shall find them to be without a clear guiding root-conception, and therefore superficially chosen, and in part even clearly false. Virtues must be qualities of the Will, but wisdom belongs directly to the intellect. The *σωφροσύνη*, which is translated by Cicero *Temperantia*, and in German *Mässigkeit* (moderation), is a very indeterminate and ambiguous expression, under which many things may be brought, such as reflection, abstinence, holding one's head up; it comes probably from *σῶον ἔχειν τὸ φρονεῖν*, or as Hierax says in "Stobæus" (Flor. tit. J., § 60, vol. i., p. 134, Gaisf.) . . . *Ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν σωφροσύνην ἐκάλεσαν σωτηρίαν οὖσαν φρονησέως*. Bravery is no virtue at all, although it may sometimes be the servant or tool of virtue; albeit it is equally ready to serve the cause of the greatest unworthiness, being, properly speaking, a mere characteristic of temperament. Geuliux ("Ethica, in præfatione,") rejected the cardinal virtues of Plato and postulated these: *diligentia, obedientia, justitia, humilitas;* obviously a bad selection. The Chinese name five cardinal virtues: sympathy, justice, politeness, knowledge, and uprightness ("Journ. Asiatique," vol. ix., p. 62). "Sam. Kidd, China" (London, 1841, p. 197), calls them benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and sincerity, and gives an exhaustive commentary on each. Christianity

[1] "Krishna Micra, Prabodha-Chandiodaga, or, the Birth of the Conception, a theological-philosophical drama." Translated from the Sanskrit and introduced by a preface by Rosenkranz. 1842.

has no cardinal, but only theological virtues: faith, love, and hope.

The point at which the moral virtues and vices of men first part is the above antithesis of our fundamental attitude towards others, which either takes on the character of envy or of sympathy. For these two diametrically opposite characteristics every man bears within himself, since they spring from the unavoidable comparison of his own state with that of another; and accordingly, as the result affects his individual character, will the one or the other quality become his fundamental attitude of mind and the source of his conduct. Envy builds up the more firmly the wall between thou and I; for sympathy it becomes thin and transparent; sometimes, indeed, it is thrown down altogether, in which case the distinction between I and not-I vanishes.

Bravery, as discussed in the foregoing, or rather the courage which lies at its foundation (for courage is only bravery in war) deserves a closer investigation. The ancients reckoned courage among the virtues and cowardice among the vices; but the Christian moral sense, which is directed towards well-wishing and suffering, and whose doctrine forbids all enmity, properly indeed all resistance, does not involve this, and hence it has disappeared with the moderns. We must nevertheless admit that cowardice is not easily compatible with a noble character if only on account of the excessive concern for one's person which betrays itself therein. Courage is reducible to the fact that one willingly encounters evils threatened at the present moment, in order to avoid greater ones looming in the future, while cowardice does the opposite. Now patience is of the former character, since it consists in the clear consciousness that there are greater evils than the present ones which might be brought on by the violent flying from or warding off of these.

Courage would therefore be a form of *patience*, and because it is this which enables us to endure privations and self-conquest of every kind, so, by means of it, courage is at least akin to virtue.

But perhaps it admits of a higher mode of contemplation. One might reduce all fear of death to a want of that natural and therefore merely felt metaphysic by virtue of which man bears within himself the certainty that he exists just as much in all things, yes, in all things, as in his own person, the death of which need therefore little concern him. From this certainty, accordingly, arose the heroic courage and consequently (as the reader may remember from my Ethics) from the same source as the virtues of justice and human love. This certainly means seizing the matter from above; nevertheless it is not easily to be explained otherwise why cowardice appears contemptible, and personal courage, on the contrary, noble and sublime. For one cannot see from any lower standpoint why a finite individual who is himself all—is himself indeed the fundamental condition of the existence of the rest of the world—should not put the maintenance of himself before all else. An exclusively immanent, that is purely empirical explanation, inasmuch as it could only be based on the utility of courage, would be insufficient. From this it may have arisen that Calderon pronounces a sceptical but significant view of courage, when he denies its reality, and does this indeed out of the mouth of an old wise minister as against his young King:—

> "Que aunque el natural temor,
> En todos obra igualmente,
> No mostrale es ser valiente,
> Y esto es lo que hace el valor.'
>
> *La hija del aire*, P. II. tom. 2.

"For although natural fear is active in the same way in all men, one is brave in so far as one does not let it be seen,

and this indeed constitutes bravery." ("The Daughter of the Air," part. ii., A. 2.)

Respecting the above-mentioned differences between the estimation of courage among the ancients and among the moderns it must, however, be taken into consideration that the ancients understood by virtue, *virtus*, ἀρετή, every excellence, every quality praiseworthy in itself, whether moral or intellectual, or, indeed, merely corporeal. But after that Christianity had demonstrated the ground-tendency of life to be moral, moral excellencies alone were thought of under the conception of virtue. Meanwhile we find the earlier sense in the older Latinists and even in the Italian, as is proved by the well-known meaning of the word *virtuoso*. Learners ought to have their attention especially directed to this extended range of the conception Virtue among the ancients, as otherwise it may easily give rise to a secret perplexity in them. To this end I particularly recommend two passages preserved for us by Stobæus; the one apparently emanating from the Pythagorean Metopos in the first chap. of his "Florilegium," § 64 (Vol. i., p. 22, Gaisf.), where the capacity of each member of our body for ἀρετή is explained, and the other in his "Eclog. eth." I. II., cap. 7, (p. 272, ed. Heeren). It there speaks as follows .... σκυτοτόμου ἀρετὴν λέγεσθαι καθ' ἣν ἀποτελεῖν ἄριστον ὑπόδημα δύναται. (*Sutoris virtus dicitur secundum quam probum calceum novit parare.*) This explains why virtues and vices are spoken of in the Ethics of the ancients and find no place in our own.

Just as the place of bravery among the Virtues is doubtful so is that of avarice among the Vices. Only one must not confound it with the greed which is directly expressed by the Latin word *avaritia*. We will therefore for the nonce allow the *pro* and *contra* to be brought forward and heard, so that the final judgment may be left to each reader.

A. Avarice is not a vice, but its opposite, *extravagance*, which arises from an animal limitation to the present time against which the future, existing as it does merely in thought, can attain no power, and is based on the illusion of the positive and real value of sensuous pleasures. Future want and suffering are accordingly the price for which the spendthrift purchases these vacuous, fleeting, and often imaginary pleasures, or feeds his empty, brainless conceit in the posturings of the parasites who laugh at him behind his back, and in the astonishment of the common people and of those envious of his magnificence. For this reason one ought to fly from him as from one plague-stricken, and after we have discovered his vice to break with him as soon as possible; so that we may not have, later, when the consequences appear, either to help to bear them, or to play the *rôle* of the friends of Timon of Athens. In the same way it is not to be expected that he who has thoughtlessly run through his own fortune will leave untouched that of another when it comes into his hands; but as Sallust has very rightly put it, *sui profusus, alieni appetens* (Catil. c. 5). Hence extravagance leads not merely to poverty but through this to crime; the criminals from the well-to-do classes have almost all become so in consequence of extravagance. Truly does the Koran say (Sure 17, v. 29): "Spendthrifts are brothers of Satan." Avarice, on the contrary, has superfluity in its train, and when is this undesirable? But that must surely be a good vice that has good consequences. The avaricious man, namely, proceeds from the correct principle that all pleasures act merely negatively and that hence a happiness compounded of them is a chimera, and that on the contrary pains are positive and very real. Hence he denies for himself the former, in order the better to secure himself against the latter, so that *sustine abstine* are its maxims. And since he further knows how inexhaustible are the possibilities of misfortune, and how countless the paths of

danger, he takes his measures against them, in order, if possible, to surround himself with a threefold wall of defence. Who could say then where precautions against accidents begin to be excessive? Only he who knew where the tricks of fortune attain their end. And even if precautions are excessive, this mistake at most brings harm to himself, not to others. Will he never have need of the treasures he hoards up? In this case they will accrue at some time to the benefit of others to whom nature has given less forethought. That until then money has been withdrawn from circulation is no harm, for money is not an article of consumption; it is a mere representative of real, useful goods, not such itself. Ducats are at bottom themselves mere reckoning counters; it is not they which have value, but that which they represent, and this cannot be withdrawn from circulation. Besides, through his retention of the money, the value of that which remains in circulation is by so much raised. If, as is sometimes maintained, many misers at last come to love money directly for its own sake, so, on the other hand, and just as certainly does many a spendthrift love the spending and wasting of money for its own sake. But friendship, or, indeed, relationship with the miser, is not only without danger but desirable, since it may bring the greatest advantages. For at all events those nearest to him reap the fruits of his self-restraint after his death. But even during his life there is, in cases of great need, something to be hoped from him—more at least than from the penniless spendthrift who is helpless and in debt. *Mas dà el duro, que el desnudo* ("The hard-hearted man gives more than the naked") says a Spanish proverb. In consequence of all this, avarice is no vice.

B. It is the quintessence of the vices! If physical pleasures seduce man from the right path, his sensuous nature, the animal within him, is to blame. Carried away by ex-

citement, and overpowered by the impression of the moment, he acts without consideration. When, however, through bodily weakness or old age he has reached a stage at which the vices which he could never forsake, finally forsake him, in that his capacity for sensual enjoyments has died out, the intellectual appetite survives the fleshly, and he turns to avarice. Money, which is the representative of all the good things of the world—which is their *abstractum*—is now the withered stem to which his dead appetites cling, as egoism *in abstracto*. They regenerate themselves henceforth in the love of mammon. Out of the fleeting sensuous appetite a well considered and calculating appetite for money has developed itself, which like its object is of symbolical nature, and like it also is indestructible. It is the stiff-necked love of the enjoyments of the world, as it were outliving itself, the perfected inconvertibility, the sublimated and spiritualized lust of the flesh, the abstract focus in which all lusts centre, to which it is, therefore, related as the universal concept to particular things. Avarice, accordingly, is the vice of age, as extravagance is that of youth.

The *disputatio in utramque partem* just heard is assuredly suited to force as to the *juste milieu* morality of Aristotle. The following consideration is also favourable thereto.

Every human perfection is akin to a fault into which it threatens to pass over; and conversely every fault is akin to a perfection. Hence the mistake respecting a man in which we are often landed, rests upon the fact that at the beginning of our acquaintance we confound his faults with their kindred perfections, or *vice versâ*. The prudent man thus seems to us cowardly, the economical man avaricious; the spendthrift seems liberal, the discourteous man straightforward and upright, the blockhead endowed with a noble self-confidence, &c.

He who lives among men feels himself ever anew tempted to the assumption that moral badness and intellectual incapacity are closely connected, since they spring directly from one root. But that this is not so, I have conclusively shown in the second volume of my chief work, chap. xix., No. 8. The foregoing illusion, which merely arises from the fact that both are often found together, is entirely to be explained from the very frequent appearance of both, in consequence of which it often happens to them that they have to dwell beneath the same roof. But it is not to be denied, however, that they play into one another's hands to reciprocal advantage, whence is brought about the so unedifying appearance which only too many men offer, and the world goes as it goes. Stupidity is especially favourable to the clear exposure of falseness, meanness and malice; while prudence understands better how to conceal this. And how often, on the other hand, the perversity of the heart prevents man from seeing truths to which his understanding would be quite equal.

However, let no one be too proud, since every one, even the greatest genius, is unquestionably limited in some sphere of knowledge, and thereby proclaims his relationship with the essentially perverted and absurd human race. Each one bears something morally bad within him, and even the best, the noblest character, will surprise us at times by individual traits of badness, in order, as it were, to indicate its kinship with that human race in which every degree of unworthiness and cruelty occurs. For precisely owing to this bad within him, this evil principle, he was compelled to become a man. And for this same reason the world is exactly that which my true mirror of it has shown it to be.

In spite of all, however, the differences between men remain incalculably great, and many a one would be shocked if he saw another as he himself is. O for an

Asmodeus of morality who not alone made roofs and walls transparent to his favoured one, but the veil of the Presentment spread out over all falseness, hypocrisy, double-facedness, lying and deception, and who would let him see how little true honesty is to be found in the world, and how often, even where one least expects it, behind all the virtuous outworks, secretly and in the innermost recess unrighteousness sits at the helm. Hence come the four-footed friendships of so many of the better kind of men, for on what indeed should one refresh oneself from the endless deceit, falseness, and cunning of men if it were not for the dogs into whose faithful countenance one may look without distrust? Our civilized world is then only a great masquerade. One meets there knights, parsons, soldiers, doctors, advocates, priests, philosophers, and what not! But they are not what they represent themselves; they are mere masks under which are hidden as a rule money-makers. One will assume the mask of justice which he has borrowed from his advocate, merely in order to crush another; a second, with the same object, chooses the mark of public weal and patriotism; a third that of religion, of purity, of faith; many a one has for a variety of purposes donned the mask of philosophy, of philanthrophy, etc. Women have less choice; they mostly employ the mask of purity, of bashfulness, domesticity, and modesty. There are, moreover, universal masks with no special character, as it were, the dominos that one meets with everywhere. To this character belong strict integrity, politeness, disinterested sympathy, and grinning friendship. Manufacturers, commercial men, and speculators, only are, for the most part, hidden behind all these masks. In this respect the merchants constitute the only honourable class, for they alone admit themselves to be what they are; they go about unmasked, and, therefore, stand low in rank. It is very important to be taught early in

youth that one is living in a masquerade. For otherwise many things will be unable to be understood and come at; but one will stand before them puzzled, and the longest he who *cui ex meliori luto dedit præcordia Titan.* Such is the favour which baseness finds, the neglect which merit even the rarest and the greatest suffers from the men of its department, the detestation of the truth, and of great capacities, the ignorance of the learned in their own branch that genuine wares are almost always despised, and the merely apparent sought after. The youth should, therefore, be taught that in this masquerade the apples are of wax, the flowers of silk, the fish of paste, and all is trifling and jesting; and that of those yonder whom he sees so earnestly engaged with each other, the one gives nothing but false wares, and the other pays for them with counters.

But more serious considerations are to be brought forward and worse things told. Man is at bottom a wild, horrible creature. We know him merely as broken in and tamed by what we call civilization, and hence the occasional outbreaks of his nature shock us. But where and when the padlock and chain of legal order fall off and anarchy enters, then he shows himself what he is. He who in the meantime without this opportunity would like to inform himself thereupon, can acquire the conviction from hundreds of ancient and modern narratives, that man yields in cruelty and pitilessness to no tiger and no hyena. An important instance from modern times is furnished by the answer which the British anti-slavery Society received to its questions as to the treatment of the slaves in the slave-holding states of the North American Union from the North American Anti-Slavery Society in the year 1840: "Slavery and the internal slave trade in the United States of North America, being replies to questions transmitted by the British Anti-Slavery Society to the American Anti-Slavery Society in London, 1841." This Book constitutes one of

the heaviest indictments against human nature. No one will lay it aside without horror, few without tears. For what the reader has heard or imagined or may have dreamt, as to the unhappy state of the slaves or of human harshness and cruelty in general, will seem insignificant to him when he reads how those devils in human shape, those bigoted church-going, strict sabbath-observing scoundrels, especially the Anglican parsons among them, treat their innocent black brethren who by injustice and violence have come into their devil's claws. This book, which consists of dry but authentic and substantiated accounts, inflames all human feeling to such a degree that with it in the hand one could preach a crusade for the conquest and punishment of the slave-holding States of North America. For they are a disgrace for all humanity. Another example from the present time—for the past will not seem to many any longer valid—is contained in Tschudi's "Travels in Peru," 1846. In the description of the treatment of the Peruvian soldiers by their officers.[1] But we do not require to seek for examples in the new world, that reverse side of the planet. In the year 1848 it came to light that in England within a short space of time, there had been not one, but a hundred cases in which a husband poisoned a wife, or a wife a husband, or both together their children, or slowly tortured their children to death by hunger or bad treatment, merely to receive from the burial clubs the funeral expenses guaranteed to them in case of death, for which purpose they bought a child into several, sometimes as many as twenty of such clubs. See on this matter the "Times," 20th, 22nd, 23rd Sept., 1848, which journal merely on this account presses for the abolition of burial

[1] A most recent instance may be found in Macleod's "Travels in Eastern Africa" (2 vols., London, 1860), where the unheard of, cold, calculating, and truly devilish cruelty with which the Portuguese in Mozambique treat their slaves is narrated.

clubs. It repeats the same charge in the strongest manner on the 12th Dec., 1853.

Reports of this kind certainly belong to the blackest pages in the criminal annals of the human race, but the source of them, and of everything similar, is nevertheless the inner and inborn nature of man, this κατ' ἐξοχήν, this God of the Pantheists. There rests directly in every one a colossal egoism which overleaps the boundaries of justice with the greatest ease, as daily life teaches on a small scale, and history at every page on a large scale. Does there not lie, indeed, in the recognized necessity of the so anxiously-watched European equilibrium, the confession that man is a wild beast, which as soon as it has espied a weaker one near it, infallibly falls upon it? And do not we daily receive the confirmation of this in a small way? But to the limitless egoism of our nature there allies itself yet again the store of hatred, anger, envy, rancour, and malice present more or less in every human breast, and collected like the poison in the gland of the snake's tooth and only awaiting the opportunity to free itself, and then like an unchained demon to ramp and rage. If no great opportunity for it presents itself it will at last use the smallest, enlarging it by its imagination,

> "Quantulacunque adeo est occasio, sufficit iræ."
>
> *Juv. Sat.*, xiii. v. 183.

and will then carry things as far as it can and dare. We see this in daily life where such eruptions are known under the expression "to pour out one's gall on something." It has been observed, moreover, that when it has met with no resistance the subject of it finds himself much better after it. That anger is not without pleasure Aristotle has observed: τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἡδύ ("Rhet." I, 11, II., 2), where he also quotes the passage from Homer which declares anger to be sweeter than honey. But one does not devote oneself *con amore* merely to anger, but also

to hatred, which is related to it as the chronic to the acute disease.

> "Now hatred is by far the longest pleasure;
> Men love in haste, but they detest at leisure."
>
> BYRON, *Don Juan*, c. xiii. 6.

Gobineau ("Des races humaines") has called man *l'animal méchant par excellence*, which people take offence at because they feel it touches them. But he is right, for man is the only animal which causes others pain without any further object than that of doing so. The other animals never do it otherwise than to satisfy their hunger or in the heat of conflict. Although it is said of the tiger that he kills more than he eats, yet he strangles everything with the intention of eating it so that it is a case merely to be expressed by the French phrase *ses yeux sont plus grands que son estomac*. No animal ever tortures for the sake of torturing but man, and this constitutes the *devilish* character in him which is far worse than the merely animal. We have already spoken of the matter on a great scale, but on the small it is no less clear, as everyone has daily opportunity of observing. For instance, two young dogs are playing with one another—a peaceful and pretty sight—and a child of three or four years comes upon the scene; the child will almost inevitably strike in violently with its whip or stick and thereby show it is already *l'animal méchant par excellence!* Even constant purposeless teasing and mischief spring from this source. For example, if one has expressed one's dislike of something disturbing, or some other small unpleasantness, people will not be wanting who will bring it about for that very reason—*animal méchant par excellence!* This is indeed so certain, that one has to be careful of expressing one's annoyance at small discomforts; as also on the other hand, one's gratification at any trifle. For in the latter case they are likely to do as the jailor who as soon as he discovered that his prisoner

had completed the difficult task of taming a spider and found pleasure in it, at once crushed it: *l'animal méchant par excellence!* Hence all animals instinctively fear the look or indeed even the trace of man, the *animal méchant par excellence.* Instinct does not deceive here; for only man hunts prey which is neither useful to him nor injures him.[1]

There really resides in the heart of each of us a wild beast which only waits the opportunity to rage and rave in order to injure others, and which if they prevent it, would like to destroy them. Hence arises all the pleasure in fighting and war; and it is this which gives the understanding, its special keeper, always enough to do to overcome and to hold it in some measure within bounds. One may indeed call it the radical evil, with which those for whom a word takes the place of an explanation may be contented. But I say it is the Will to live which, embittered more and more by the constant sorrows of existence, seeks to lighten its own suffering by causing the same to others. In this way it gradually develops genuine malice and cruelty. One may also observe in this connection that as, according to Kant, matter only obtains by the antagonism of expansive and contractive force, so human society only exists through that of hatred or anger or fear. For the ferocity of our nature would probably make every one a murderer at once were it not mingled with the neces-

[1] Schopenhauer might have instanced in this connection the tendency of officialism, which is always eager to snatch at any excuse —some paltry abuse, real or imagined—for depriving the public of some little privilege which may happen to have been accorded. If access to some building or private grounds has been permitted, those regulating them will be certain, sooner or later, to pretend that because a small boy has perhaps on one occasion plucked a flower or scratched his name on a wall or a tree, that it is necessary the use of the building or grounds should be restricted or withdrawn.—TR.

sary dose of fear to hold it within bounds, and this again would make it the mock and plaything of every child if anger were not ready to hand, and keeping watch.

But the worst trait in human nature is the malicious pleasure in mischief which is nearly akin to cruelty, and indeed distinguishes itself therefrom only as theory from practice, and which appears generally where sympathy ought to find a place, sympathy, as its opposite, being the only true source of all genuine righteousness and human love. In another sense *envy* is opposed to sympathy in so far namely as it is called forth by the opposite occasion. Hence its opposition to sympathy rests directly on opportunity, and displays itself in feeling also as a consequence of this. Hence moreover envy, although to be condemned, is at least capable of an excuse and eminently human, while the mere pleasure in mischief is diabolical and its mockery the laughter of hell. It presents itself, as already said, just where sympathy should appear; envy, on the contrary, only there where no occasion for the latter exists, but rather for its opposite, and as this opposite it arises in the human breast, and is therefore in so far a human emotion; I fear, indeed, that no one will be found entirely free from it. For that Man in looking upon alien enjoyment and possession should feel his own want the more bitterly is natural and indeed inevitable; only it ought not to excite his hatred against the more fortunate, but precisely in this envy properly-speaking consists. But envy should least of all find a place where, not the gifts of fortune, or of chance, or the favour of others but where that of nature is the cause of them, since everything inborn rests upon a metaphysical basis, that is, has a justification of a higher kind, and is, so to say, of God's grace. But unfortunately with envy it is exactly opposite. To personal advantages it is most irreconcilable; hence understanding, and even genius, have at first to beg for forgiveness of the world, wherever they are

not in a position to venture prou[illegible]stice when we observe that the world. When, namely, envy has[illegible]al, and we shall begin by riches, rank, or power, it is often [illegible] pay the penalty of inasmuch as the latter sees, that in certain. The *malam* enjoyment, assistance, protection, advantage, *malam culpæ*. hoped for, or that at least by association with [illegible] intellec- illumined by the reflection of its importance and may [illegible]gusts enjoy honour. There is, moreover, always the hope of [illegible], sometime or other attaining these good things oneself. On the other hand with natural gifts and personal excellences such as, with women beauty, with men intellect, the envy directed upon them derives no consolation of the one kind or hope of the other, so that nothing remains for it but to hate those so privileged, bitterly and irreconcilably. Hence its only wish is to take revenge on its object. But in this it finds itself in the unfortunate position that all its blows fall powerless as soon as it appears that they have proceeded from it. Hence it hides itself as carefully as secret sins of lust, and is an inexhaustible inventor of devices, tricks, and dodges in order to mask and conceal itself so that it may wound its object unseen. The excellences, for example, which consume its heart it will ignore with the most innocent mien, it will not see them nor know them, it will never have noticed or heard of them, and will show itself a past master in dissimulation. With the greatest refinement it will entirely overlook the brilliant qualities which gnaw at his heart, seemingly as though they were insignificant, it will be quite unaware of them and have opportunely quite forgotten them. But it will above all things be concerned carefully to remove by secret machination all opportunity for these excellences to show themselves and become known. It will then eject from the darkness blame, mockery, contempt and calumny, like the toad that spits forth its poison from its hole. None the less will it enthusiastically praise insignificant men, or the

mediocre, or the bad, in the same class of achievement. In short it becomes a Proteus in stratagem in order to wound without showing itself. But what does it avail? The practised eye recognizes it notwithstanding. Its fear and flight before its object already betrays it, the object which stands by so much the more alone, the more brilliant it is. For this reason pretty girls have no female friends. Its hate without any occasion betrays it, a hate which breaks out in the most violent explosion at the least, often indeed, a merely imaginary, occasion. For the rest, however widespread its family may be, one recognizes it in the universal praise of modesty, that sly virtue invented for the benefit of flat commonplaceness, which nevertheless by the necessity that displays itself of sparing mediocrity brings it rather into the light. There can assuredly be nothing more flattering for our conceit and our pride than the sight of envy lurking and carrying on its machinations in its hiding-place. But one should never forget that where envy is, hate accompanies it, and one should guard against allowing the envier to become a false friend. His discovery is therefore of importance for our safety. One should therefore study him in order to be up to his tricks, for he is everywhere to be found, and always goes about *incognito*, or, like the poisonous toad, lurks in dark holes. He deserves indeed neither consideration nor sympathy, but let the motto be:

> "No mortal envy can appease;
> 'Twere best to scorn her at your ease,
> Thy fame and fortune are her pain;
> Thus in her torment find your gain!"

If, as we have here done, we keep human badness before our mind's eye, and feel inclined to be horrified at it, one must cast a glance at the misery of human existence, and again at the former, if one is shocked at this. We shall then find that they keep each other in equilibrium, and

shall become aware of eternal justice when we observe that the world itself is the world-tribunal, and we shall begin to understand why all that lives must pay the penalty of its existence, first in life, and then in death. The *malam pœne* appears therefore in agreement with the *malam culpœ*. From the same standpoint our indignation at the intellectual incapacity of the majority which so frequently disgusts us in life becomes dissipated. Hence *miseria humana*, *nequitia humana* and *stultitia humana* completely cover one another in this Sansara of the Buddhists, and are of equal amount. But if we once on special occasion keep one of these in mind and sample it specially, it then seems to exceed both the others in amount, but this is illusion and merely the consequence of their colossal range.

Everything proclaims this *Sansara*, but more than anything the human world in which, morally, badness and baseness, intellectually, incapacity and stupidity, dominate to a frightful degree. Nevertheless, there appear in it, sporadically perhaps, but yet surprising us ever, anew, phenomena of honesty, of goodness, of nobility, as also of great understanding of the thinking intellect, and even of genius. These never become quite extinct, they glitter at us like isolated shining spots from out the great dark mass. We must take them as a pledge that a good and saving principle is hidden in this *Sansara*, which can manifest itself, and fill and free the whole.

The readers of my Ethics know that the foundation of morals rests with me finally on the truth which has its expression in the Veda and Vedanta in the established mystical formula *Tat twam asi* (this art thou), which is pronounced with reference to every living thing, be it man or animal, and is there termed the *Maha-vakya*.

One may, indeed, regard conduct in accordance therewith, as for instance benevolence, as the beginning of

mysticism. Every benevolent action practised from a pure motive proclaims that he who practises it stands in direct contradiction to the phenomenal world in which other individuals are entirely separate from himself, and recognizes himself as identical with them. Every quite disinterested service is accordingly a mysterious action, a *mysterium;* and hence in order to give an explanation of it men have had to take refuge in all sorts of fictions. After Kant had removed from Theism all other supports he merely left it this one, namely, that it afforded the best explanation of the above and all mysterious actions similar to it. He admitted it accordingly as a theoretically unprovable, but for practical purposes valid assumption. But that he was altogether serious in this I am inclined to doubt. For to support morals by means of Theism is equivalent to reducing them to egoism: although the English, like the lowest classes of society with us, do not see the possibility of any other foundation.

The recognition above referred to, of one's own true essence in a strange individuality manifesting itself objectively appears especially clear and beautiful in those cases where a human being already hopelessly sacrificed, concerns himself with anxious care and active zeal for the welfare and rescue of others. There is a well-known story in this connection of a servant girl, who at night, in the courtyard, being bitten by a mad dog, giving herself up for lost, seizes the dog, drags it into the stable, and locks it up there that no one else might become its victim. Similarly that incident in Naples which Tischbein has perpetuated in one of his water-colour drawings. Flying before the lava as it streams towards the sea, a son carries his old father on his back; but as at last only a narrow strip of land divides the two destructive elements, the father tells his son to lay him down in order that he may save himself by running, since otherwise both would be lost. The son obeys, and as he goes throws a last parting

look at the father. This is represented in the picture. Of this kind also is the historical fact which Walter Scott depicts with masterly hand in "The Heart of Midlothian," chapter ii., where of two delinquents condemned to death the one who by his clumsiness had been the cause of the capture of the other, successfully frees him in the church after the death sermon, by vigorously overpowering the watch without making any attempt for himself. We may reckon also in this connection, although it may offend the occidental reader, the often reprinted engraving of a soldier already kneeling to be shot zealously driving back his dog, who is running towards him, with a handkerchief. In all cases of this kind we see an individual who is approaching his immediate personal destruction with complete certainty, thinking no more of his own preservation and directing his whole care and endeavour to the preservation of another. How could the consciousness more clearly express itself that this destruction is only that of a phenomenon, and is therefore itself phenomenon, while the true essence of the perishing being remains untouched, continues in the other, in which even now, as its action shows, it so clearly recognizes itself! For how, if this were not so, but if we had a being before us in the throes of real annihilation, could such a one by the supreme exertion of its last powers show such an intense interest in the welfare and continuance of another?

There are indeed two opposite ways in which to become conscious of one's own existence: firstly, in empirical intuition as displayed from the outside as an infinitely small being in a world limitless in time and space; as one among the thousand millions of human beings which run to and fro on this earth for a very short time, renewing themselves every thirty years; secondly, in so far as one sinks oneself within oneself and becomes conscious of being all in all and in very deed the only real being, which

sees itself again in the other given it from without, as in a mirror. Now the first mode of knowledge embraces merely the phenomenon mediated through the *principium individuationis*, but the other is an immediate consciousness of itself as the thing-in-itself—is a doctrine in which I, as regards the first part, have Kant with me, but in both the Vedas. The simple objection to the latter mode of knowledge is that it presupposes that one and the same being can be in different places at the same time. But although, from the empirical standpoint, this is the most palpable impossibility and, indeed, absurdity, it remains, notwithstanding, perfectly true of the thing-in-itself; because this impossibility and absurdity merely rests on the forms of the phenomenon which constitute the *principium individuationis*. For the thing-in-itself, the Will-to-live, is in every being, even the least—is present whole and undivided as completely as in all that ever were, are, and will be, taken together. On this is based the fact that every being, even the least, says to himself, *Dum ego salvus sim pereat mundus*. And in truth if all other beings perished, in this one that remained, the whole essence in itself of the world, uninjured and unlessened, would laugh at its destruction as at a play of jugglery. This is certainly a conclusion *per impossibile* to which one is equally justified in opposing the opposite that if any being, even the least, were wholly destroyed the whole world would perish with it. In this sense the mystic Angelus Silesius says:

> "I know that not one moment can God live from me apart
> If I to nothingness am brought, His spirit must depart."

But in order that this truth, or at least the possibility, that our own self may exist in other beings whose consciousness is separate and distinct from ours, may be seen to some extent even from the empirical standpoint, we

only require to recall to mind the magnetized *somnambules* whose identical I after they are awakened knows nothing of all that which a moment before they have themselves said, done, and suffered. The individual consciousness therefore is so entirely phenomenal a point, that even in the same I, two such may arise, of which the one knows nothing of the other.

Considerations, however, like the foregoing retain in our Judaized west a strange appearance; but not so in the fatherland of the human race, in that land where an entirely different faith dominates, a faith in accordance with which even to-day, after the burial, the priests before all the people and with the accompaniment of instruments chant the Veda Hymn which begins:

"The embodied spirit which has a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, a thousand feet, has its root in the human breast and interpenetrates at once the whole earth. This being is the world and all that was and will be. It is that which grows by nourishment and which confers immortality. Such is its greatness, and hence it is the most noble embodied spirit. The elements of this world constitute one part of his being and three parts are immortality in heaven. These three parts have raised themselves from the world; but the one part has remained behind and is that which (by transmigration) enjoys and does not enjoy the fruits of good and evil deeds," &c. See Colebrooke on "Religious Ceremonies of the Hindoos," in vol. v. "Asiatic Researches," p. 345 of the Calcutta edition, also in his "Miscellaneous Essays," vol. i., p. 167.

If one compares such hymns with our hymn-books it will no longer be wondered at that the Anglican Missionaries on the Ganges do such bad business, and with their sermons on their "maker"[1] made no impression

[1] "Maker" is the German "Macher," and like this appears often in composition, *e.g.*, watchmaker, shoemaker &c. Our

upon the Brahmin. He however who would enjoy the pleasure of seeing how forty-one years ago an English officer boldly and emphatically opposed himself to the absurd and shameless pretensions of these gentlemen should

"maker" (in French it would be rendered "*notre faiseur*") is in English writings, sermons, and in ordinary life a very usual and favourite expression for "God" which I beg the reader to note as supremely characteristic for the English conception of religion. But how the Brahmins trained in the doctrine of the holy Veda and the *Vaisia* which zealously follows it, as indeed the whole of the Indian people penetrated by the belief in Metempsychosis and mindful of it in every event of life—how they must feel when such conceptions are endeavoured to be forced on them, the educated reader may easily judge! To pass from the eternal Brahm which is in all and each, suffering, living and hoping for emancipation, to that "maker" out of nothing, is truly a severe requirement. They will indeed never be persuaded that the world and man are a machine made from nothing. With great justice the admirable author of the book eulogized below in the text, says on page 15: "The endeavours of the missionaries will remain fruitless; no Hindoo worthy of any respect will ever pay any attention to their exhortations;" similarly p. 50, "To hope that they, penetrated by these opinions, in which they live and move and have their being, will ever give them up in order to accept the Christian doctrine is, according to my firm conviction, an idle expectation." Also page 68: "And if to this work the whole Synod of the English Church were to put its hand it would assuredly not succeed except by absolute compulsion in converting one man out of a thousand of the whole Indian population." How accurate this prophecy has been is proved now forty-one years later by a long letter in "The Times" of November 6th, 1849, signed "Civis," which, as appears from the contents, emanates from a man who has long lived in India. It says among other things: "Not a single instance has become known to me that a man in India of whom we could in any way be proud has been converted to Christianity. I have not known one case that was not calculated to serve as a reproach to the faith which he accepted and as a warning to the faith which he renounced. The proselytes which have hitherto been made, few as they are, have merely served therefore to frighten away others from following their example." After this letter had been contra-

read, "The Vindication of the Hindoos from the Aspersions of the Rev. Claudius Buchanan, with a refutation of his arguments in favour of an ecclesiastical establishment in British India; the whole tending to evince the excellence of the moral system of the Hindoos; by a Bengal Officer. Lond. 1808." The author there explains with rare independence the advantages of the doctrines of the Hindoo faith over those of the European. The little work, which in German would fill about five sheets, deserves still to be translated, for it expounds better and more honestly than any other known to me the benevolent practical influences of Brahminism, its effect on life and on the people —very differently to the reports emanating from clerical pens which for that very reason deserve little credence, but agreeing notwithstanding with what I have heard verbally from English officers who have spent half their life in India. In order to know how jealous and furious is the Anglican Church, trembling for its benefices, at Brahminism, one should have heard the loud bellowing which some years ago the bishops raised in Parliament, continued

dicted there appeared in substantiation of it in "The Times" of November 20th a second signed "Sepaher," which stated: "I have served over twelve years in the Presidency of Madras, and during this long time I have never seen a single individual who had been converted even nominally from Hindooism or from Islam to the Protestant religion. I entirely agree therefore with 'Civis' and believe that almost all officers of the army will bear a similar testimony." Vehement contradiction followed this letter also, but I believe that if it did not emanate from missionaries, it did at all events from their cousins; at least the opponents were very godly. Hence if even all that they adduced was not without foundation, still I attach more faith to the unprejudiced witnesses quoted above. For with me as far as England is concerned the red coat obtains more confidence than the black, and everything which is there said in favour of the Church, that wealthy and comfortable sinecure of the penniless younger sons of the entire aristocracy, is *eo ipso* suspicious to me.

for months together, and as the East Indian authorities, as usual on such occasions, showed themselves unyielding, set up again and again, and all merely because the English authorities, as was only fair in India, displayed some external signs of honour toward the ancient venerable religion of the country—*e.g.*, that when the procession of the gods passed by, the watch with the officer at its head came out and saluted with a roll of the drum; also that a red cloth was furnished to cover the Car of Juggernaut, &c. The latter has really been done away with together with the pilgrim dues which were raised in connection with it in order to please these gentlemen. In the meantime the independent drivelling of these self-styling right-reverend holders of benefices and surplices over such things, together with the quite mediæval manner, which nowadays sounds so rough and brutal, in which they expressed themselves, also the bitter annoyance which it caused them that Lord Ellenborough, in 1845, brought back in a triumphal procession to Bengal and gave up to the Brahmins the Gate of the Pagoda of *Sumenaut* destroyed by Mahmud the Gahznewid; all this, I say, lets us suppose that it is not unknown to them how much the majority of Europeans who live long in India are predisposed in their hearts towards Brahminism and how they only shrug their shoulders at the religion, as at the social prejudices, of Europe. "That all falls off like scales after one has lived two years in India," said such a one to me on one occasion. Even a Frenchman, that very obliging and cultivated gentleman who about ten years accompanied the Dewardussi (*vulgo* Bayaderes) to Europe, as I was speaking with him respecting the religion of the country, exclaimed immediately with fiery enthusiasm, "*Monsieur, c'est la vrai religion!*" It is nevertheless extremely droll, by the way, to see the comfortable smiling self-sufficiency with which certain servile German philosophasters, as also some cut and dried

Orientalists, look down from the heights of their rationalistic Judaism, upon Brahminism and Buddhism. To such mediocrities I would seriously venture to propose an engagement with the apes' comedy at the Frankfort Fair, if indeed the successors of Hanuman would tolerate them amongst them.

I think that if the Emperor of China or the King of Siam and other Asiatic monarchs concede to the European power the permission to send missionaries into their lands they would be quite justified in doing so, only under the condition that they might send exactly as many Buddhist priests with equal rights into the European land in question, choosing for this purpose naturally those who were previously well instructed in the particular European language with which they had to do. We should then have before our eyes an interesting competition, and see which of them achieved the most.

Even the fantastic and sometimes quaint Hindoo mythology as it to-day, no less than thousands of years ago, makes up the religion of the people, is, if one goes to the root of the matter, only the allegorized (*i.e.*, clad in images, and so personified and mythisized as to be suited to the capacity of the people) doctrine of the *Upanishads*, which every Hindoo, according to the measure of his powers and education, either feels, or has a presentiment of, or seeing through it, clearly understands; while the coarse and narrow-minded English reverend mocks and blasphemes it as *idolatry*, in the belief that he alone is in the right box. The purpose of the Buddha *Sakya Muni*, on the contrary, was to separate the kernel from the shell, to free the high doctrine itself from all admixture with images and gods, and to make its pure content accessible and comprehensible even to the people. In this he succeeded wonderfully, and hence his religion is most excellent, and represented by the greatest

number of adherents upon earth. He can say with Sophocles:

> — Θεοῖς μὲν κἂν ὁ μηδὲν ὢν ὁμοῦ
> κράτος κατακτήσαιτ'· ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ δίχα
> κείνων πέποιθα τοῦτ' ἐπισπάσειν κλέος.
>
> *Ajax*, 767-69.

Christian fanaticism, which seeks to convert the whole world to its faith, is irresponsible. Sir James Brooke (Rajah of Borneo), who colonized and, for a time, ruled a portion of Borneo, delivered an address in September, 1858, at Liverpool, before a meeting of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel—that is, the centre of Missions—in which he said: "You have made no progress with the Mahomedans, and with the Hindoos you have made no progress at all, but are precisely at the point where you were on the first day on which you set foot in India" ("Times," 29th September, 1858). The emissaries of the Christian faith have nevertheless shown themselves very useful and praiseworthy in another direction, since some of them have furnished us with excellent and complete reports on Brahmanism and Buddhism, and true and careful translations of the holy books such as could only have been possible to have been done *con amore*. I dedicate the following rhyme to these worthy persons:

> "As teachers ye went thither,
> As pupils ye came hither,
> From the unveiled sense
> Fell what ye took from hence."

We may, therefore, hope that there will be a time when all Europe will be purified from Jewish mythology. The century has perhaps come, in which the peoples of Asia springing from the Japhetic stem will again receive the holy religions of their home, for after long wandering from the path they are again ripe for them.

After my prize essay on "Moral Freedom" it can remain doubtful to no thinking man that this is to be sought for nowhere in nature, but only outside of nature. It is a metaphysical fact, but in the physical world an impossibility. Nevertheless our individual acts are in no sense free. But the individual character of each is to be regarded as his free act. He himself is such, because he once for all wills to be such. For the Will exists in itself even in so far as it appears in an individual: it constitutes, that is to say, the original and fundamental Will of the same, independent of all knowledge, because preceding it. From knowledge it receives merely the motives by which it successively develops its essence, and makes itself known, or becomes visible; but it is itself as lying outside time, unchangeable so long as it exists at all. Hence each one, since as such he exists only once, and under the circumstances of his time, but which on their side appear with strict necessity, can never do anything else but precisely what he does now. The entire empirical course of the life of a man is accordingly, in all its events, great and small, as necessarily predetermined as the works of a clock. At bottom this arises from the fact that the manner in which the aforesaid metaphysically free act comes into the cognizing consciousness is a preception which has time and space for its form, by means of which the unity and indivisibility of that act displays itself as torn asunder into a series of states and events which follow the clue of the principle of cause in its four forms—and this is termed *necessity*. But the result is a moral one, viz. this; by that which we do we know what we are, in the same way that by that which we suffer we know what we deserve.

From this it follows further that the *individuality* does not rest alone on the *principio individuationis*, and hence is not through and through mere phenomenon, but that it has its root in the thing-in-itself, in the will of the indi-

vidual, for even his character is individual. How deeply its roots penetrate here belongs to those questions whose answer I do not undertake; but it deserves here to be borne in mind that even Plato in his way presents the individuality of each as his own free act, since he makes him to be born in consequence of his heart and character, such as he is, by means of Metempsychosis ("Phædr.," p. 325 *sq.* vol. x. ed. Bip.; "De legib." x. p. 106, ed. Bip.). Even the Brahmins on their side express the unchangeable determination of the inborn character mythically, in that they say that Brahma has in the generation of every man impressed his action and his suffering in written characters upon his skull, in accordance with which his course of life must follow. They point to the notches of the sutures of the skull bones as this writing. The content of it is a consequence of his previous life and conduct (see "Lettres Édifiantes," 1819, vol. vi. p. 149, and vol. vii. p. 135). This insight appears to lie at the foundation of the Christian (even Pauline) dogma of salvation by grace.

Another consequence of the above, which entirely confirms it empirically, is that all genuine merits, moral as well as intellectual, have not merely a physical, or otherwise empirical, but a metaphysical origin, are accordingly *a priori* and not *a posteriori*—that is, are innate, and not acquired, and consequently have their root not in the mere phenomenon, but in the thing-in-itself. Hence each one only accomplishes that which at bottom already in his nature—that is, in his innate nature—is irrevocably fixed. Intellectual capacities, indeed, require cultivation as many natural products require direction in order to be enjoyable or otherwise useful. But as here no direction can replace the original material, there also not. For this reason all merely acquired, learnt, affected qualities—in other words, qualities *a posteriori*, moral no less than intellectual—are,

properly speaking, ungenuine, empty appearance without content. Following as this does from a correct metaphysic, it is taught by a deeper glance into experience. It is evidenced, indeed, by the great weight which all lay on physiognomy and the external appearance—that is, the innateness of every man in any way distinguished—and hence by their eagerness to see him. The superficial, indeed, and for good reasons, the commonplace natures will be of the opposite opinion, in order to be able to console themselves in what they lack that it will come in good time. This world is, therefore, not merely a battle-ground for whose victories and defeats prizes will be distributed in the future, but it is itself already the last judgment in which each brings with him reward and shame according to his merits; and Brahminism and Buddhism, in so far as they teach Metempsychosis, do not know any thing different.

The question has been mooted as to what two men who had each grown up quite alone in the wilderness and who met each other for the first time would do. Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Rousseau have answered it in opposite senses. Pufendorf believed they would meet each other lovingly; Hobbes, on the contrary, inimically; Rousseau that they would pass each other by in silence. All three are right and wrong; for here precisely the immeasurable diversity of the innate moral dispositions of individuals would show itself in so clear a light that we should here have, as it were, the rule and measure of them. For there are men with whom the look of man at once excites a hostile feeling, inasmuch as their innermost being expresses itself "not I!" And others there are with whom this look at once excites friendly interest; their innermost being says "I once more!" In between there lie numberless degrees. But that we are in this chief point so fundamentally different is a great problem, indeed a mystery. Respecting this *a priority* of

the moral character, the book of the Dane, Bastholm, "Historical Contributions towards Knowledge of the Savage State" affords material for a variety of reflections. It surprises him that the intellectual culture and moral goodness of nations exhibit themselves as quite independent of each other in that the one is often to be found without the other. We shall explain this from the fact that moral goodness does not in any sense arise from reflection, the development of which is dependent upon intellectual culture; but directly from the Will itself, whose structure is innate and which is in itself incapable of any improvement through culture. Bastholm describes most nations as very vicious and bad. He has, on the other hand, from certain savage peoples the most generally excellent characteristics to report, as from the *Orotchyses*, the inhabitants of the island *Sawu*, the *Tumguses*, and the Pelew-Islanders. He then attempts to solve the problem whence it comes that particular races are so exceptionally good while all their neighbours are bad. It seems to me it may be explained from the fact that since the moral qualities of the father are hereditary, that in the above cases such an isolated race has arisen from one family and, therefore, sprung from the same ancestor, who happened to have been a good man, and has maintained itself unmixed. The English have often reminded the North Americans on the occasion of unpleasant incidents, such as repudiation of state debts, robber enterprises, &c., that they are descended from an English criminal colony, although this is only true of a small portion of them.

It is wonderful how the individuality of every man (*i.e.*, this determinate character with this determinate intellect) precisely determines like a penetrating die, all his actions and thoughts down to the most insignificant; in consequence of which the whole course of life, that is, the ex-

ternal and internal history of the one turns out so totally different from that of the other. As a botanist knows the whole plant from one leaf; as Cuvier constructed the whole animal from one bone; so from one characteristic action of a man one can attain to a correct knowledge of his character and thus, to a certain extent, construct him from it. Even if this action concerns a trifle it is possible, indeed it then often succeeds best, for in more important things people take more care, but in trifles they follow their nature without much consideration. Hence the accuracy of Seneca's saying: *Argumenta morum ex minimis quoque licet capere* (Ep. 52). If any one show in such things by an absolutely reckless egoistic conduct that just views of things are foreign to his heart, one ought not to trust him with a single groschen without adequate security. For who will believe that he who in all other matters which do not touch property shows himself daily unjust, that one whose boundless egoism everywhere peeps out from the small actions of ordinary life for which he is not called to account, like a dirty shirt out of the holes in a ragged jacket—that such a one will be honourable in matters of *meum* and *tuum* without any other impulse than that of Justice? He who is inconsiderate in small things will be without scruple also in great. He who leaves small traits of character unnoticed has himself to thank if he afterwards learns to know the character in question to his own disadvantage from the great. On the same principle one should also at once break, even with so-called good friends, if they betray, be it only in trifles, a malicious or bad or low character, in order thereby to avoid their bad turns on a larger scale, which only await the opportunity to produce themselves. The same applies to servants. One should always think, "better alone than among traitors."

The foundation and *propœdeutic* of all knowledge of men is the conviction that the conduct of man as a whole and

essentially is not guided by his reason and its dictates. Hence no one becomes this or that because he has the wish to be so, however strong it may be; but his action proceeds from his innate and unchangeable character, is more closely and in detail determined by motives, and is consequently the necessary product of these two factors. One may accordingly compare the conduct of men to the course of a planet which is the result of the tangential and centripetal force which accrues to it by the operation of its sun, the former force representing the character, the latter the influence of motives. This is almost more than a mere metaphor, inasmuch, namely, as the tangential force from which the motion properly proceeds while it is limited by gravitation is, taken metaphysically, the Will displaying itself in the body in question.

He who has understood this will also see that we, properly speaking, never have more than a supposition as to what we shall do in a future position of affairs, although we often regard this as an intention. If, for example, a man in consequence of a proposal has, with perfect honesty, and even quite willingly incurred the obligation upon the occurrence of certain events still in the future to do this or that, it is not by any means assured thereby that he will fulfil it unless he be of such a nature that his promise given, of itself and as such, would be always and everywhere a sufficient motive for him, in that it, by means of his regard for his honour, acted upon him as a foreign compulsion. But apart from this what he will do on the occurrence of those circumstances may, nevertheless, be foreseen with perfect certainty solely from a correct and exact knowledge of his character and of the external circumstances under whose operation he has come. This is indeed very easy if one has ever seen him once in a similar position; for he will infallibly do the same a second time, pre-supposing that on the first occasion he had known the

circumstances accurately and completely, for as I have often remarked: *causa finalis non movet secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse cognitum* (Suarez, "disp. metaph. disp." xxiii., sect. 7 *et* 8), what, namely, he has not known or understood the first time could not operate upon his will. Just as an electrical process stops, if some isolating body intercepts the action of a conductor. The unchangeability of character and the necessity of action proceeding from it impresses itself with uncommon clearness upon him who on some occasion has not conducted himself as he ought, inasmuch as he has perhaps failed in decision or firmness, or courage, or other qualities demanded by the moment. Now after it is over he knows and honestly regrets his wrong conduct and thinks, perhaps, "If only that occurred to me again I would act differently!" It does occur to him again, the same thing happens, and he acts again exactly as before,—to his great astonishment. (Compare "World as Will and Presentment," ii., p. 226, *et seq.*; 3rd ed. ii. p. 251, *et seq.*) By a long way the best explanation of the truth here under discussion is furnished us by Shakespeare's dramas. For he was penetrated by it and his intuitive wisdom speaks it *in concreto* on every side. I will, notwithstanding, here exemplify it in a case in which it stands out with special clearness, although without intention and affectation, since he as a true artist never starts from conceptions except obviously in order to satisfy the Psychological truth as he apprehended it perceptually and immediately, unconcerned that it would be by few rightly regarded and understood, and without any presentiment that in Germany dull and stupid persons were destined to appear who would elaborately explain that he had written his pieces in order to illustrate moral common-places. What I here refer to, is the character of the Earl of Northumberland which we see carried through three tragedies, without his appearing as a leading per-

sonage, but only in a few scenes which are distributed over fifteen acts, so that he who does not read with all his attention the character displayed between such long intervals may easily lose sight of its moral identity, notwithstanding the firmness with which the poet has kept it in view. He makes this Earl everywhere enter with noble knightly mien, use a language suited thereto, and has even put into his mouth at times very beautiful and even sublime passages, since he is so far removed from doing as Schiller does who is fond of painting the devil black, and whose moral approval or disapproval sounds through the very words of the characters portrayed by him. But with Shakespeare and also with Goethe each one, so long as he is present and speaks, is perfectly right even if he be the devil himself. Compare, in this respect, the Duke of Alva with Goethe and with Schiller. We make the acquaintance of the Earl of Northumberland already in "Richard II." where he is the first to stir up a conspiracy against the King in favour of Bolingbroke, afterwards Henry IV., whom he also (act ii., scene 3,) personally flatters. In the following act he suffers a correction because, speaking of the King, he simply said "Richard," but gives the assurance, however, that it was only done for the sake of brevity. Soon afterwards his cunning speech moves the King to capitulation. In the following act he treats him in the act of abdication with such hardness and contempt that the unhappy broken monarch for once loses patience and exclaims, "Devil! thou plaguest me already before I am in hell." At the conclusion he reports to the new King that he has sent the decapitated heads of the adherents of the former to London. In the following tragedy, "Henry IV.," he sets a conspiracy on foot in the same way as before, against the new King. In the fourth act we see the rebels united, preparing themselves for the great battle of the following day and waiting impatiently for him and his army division.

There comes finally a letter from him; he is himself ill and could not trust his men to any one else; they should, however, courageously continue and proceed bravely to the attack. They do it, but are considerably weakened by his absence, are completely beaten, most of their leaders are taken, and his only son, the heroic Hotspur, falls by the hand of the Crown Prince. Again, in the following piece, the "Second Part of Henry IV.," we see him plunged into the wildest rage by the death of this son and madly breathing out revenge. Hence he stirs up the rebellion afresh; the leaders of it assemble themselves once more. As these, in the fourth act, have to fight the decisive battle, and only await his joining himself to them, there comes a letter; he has not been able to collect sufficient forces, and will therefore, for the present, seek his safety in Scotland, but wishes their heroic undertaking from his heart the best success. Upon this they surrender themselves to the King under an agreement which is not kept and they perish.

So far, then, from the character being the work of rational choice and reflection, the intellect has nothing more to do with its conduct than to hold up motives before the will. But then it must, as mere onlooker and witness, observe how from its effect on the given character the course of life shapes itself, all the processes of which when correctly considered occur with the same necessity as the movements of a clock-work, on which point I refer my readers to my prize essay on "Freedom of the Will." The illusion of a complete freedom of the Will, which nevertheless obtains here, with every single action, I have there reduced to its true significance and its origin, and thereby indicated the active cause of it, to which I will only here add the final cause in the following teleological explanation of the above natural illusion. The freedom and originality which in truth alone accrue to the intelligible character of a man, the mere apprehension of which by the intellect is his

course of life, appear to attach to every particular action, and so the original work is for the empirical consciousness apparently repeated anew in every particular action. Our course of life receives thereby the greatest possible moral *νουτέθησις*, since all the bad sides of our character become in this way first really perceptible to us. Conscience, namely, accompanies every action with the commentary, "thou mightest act differently," although its real meaning is, "thou mightest be another man." Now since, on the one hand, by the unchangeability of character, on the other by the strict necessity whereby all the circumstances in which he is successively placed occur, the course of life of each is precisely defined from A to Z; but notwithstanding one life will in all its conditions, subjective as well as objective, turn out incomparably happier, nobler, and worthier than the other. This leads, if one does not wish to eliminate all justice, to the assumption axiomatic in Brahminism and Buddhism, that no less the subjective conditions with which, as the objective conditions under which each one is born, are the moral consequences of a previous existence.

Macchiavelli, who does not seem by any means to have concerned himself with philosophical speculations, is by virtue of a penetrating acuteness of his so unique intellect led to the following truly deep-thinking utterance which presupposes an intuitive knowledge of the entire necessity by which with given characters and motives all actions take place. He begins the prologue "Clitia" with it: "*Se nel mondo tornassino i medesimi uomini, come tornano i medesimi casi, non passarebbono mai cento anni, che noi non ci trovassimo un altra volta insieme, a fare le medesime cose, che hora.* ("If the same men re-appeared in the world as the same events re-appear, a hundred years would never pass without our finding ourselves again together, doing the same things as we are doing now.") A reminiscence, however, of

what Augustine says ("De Civitate Dei," libr. xii. c. 13) seems to have led him on to this.

The Fate (the εἱμαρμένη) of the ancients is nothing else than the assurance brought to consciousness, that all that happens is firmly bound by a causal chain, and therefore happens with strict necessity, and that accordingly the future is already perfectly fixed, is determined certainly and exactly, and that as little can be changed in it as in the past. It is only the foreknowledge of it that can be looked upon as fabulous in the fatalistic myths of the ancients, if we eliminate the possibility of clairvoyance and second sight. Instead of trying to set aside the fundamental verity of fatalism by stupid talk and empty evasions, one should rather try to recognize and to understand it clearly, for it is a demonstrable truth which furnishes us with an important datum for the understanding of our so enigmatical existence.

Predestination and fatalism are not in the main distinct, but only in that the given character and the determination of human action which comes from without, proceed, the former from a knowing, the latter from a knowingless being. In the result they are the same: that happens which must happen. The conception of a *moral freedom* is, on the contrary, inseparable from that of *origination*. For that a being is the work of another, but in its willing and acting is free notwithstanding, may be said with words, but not comprehended in thought. He, namely, who called it into being from nothing has thereby also created and determined its nature, that is, all its qualities. For one can never create without creating something—that is, a being precisely determined throughout, and in all its qualities. But from these qualities which are thereby determined flow afterwards with necessity its entire manifestations and defects, inasmuch as these are simply the same qualities brought into play, which only required a stimulation from

without in order to manifest themselves. As man is so must he act, and thus fault and merit cleave not to his individual acts, but to his essence and being. Hence Theism and the moral responsibility of man are incompatible, because responsibility always falls back upon the author of the being as the place where it has its centre of gravity. It has been in vain attempted to throw a bridge between these two incompatibilities by means of the conception of the moral freedom of man, for it always breaks down again. The free being must also be the original being. If our will is free our primary nature is so also, and conversely. Even the pre-Kantian dogmatism which would have kept these two predicaments asunder was compelled to assume two freedoms that, namely, of a first world-cause for Cosmology, and that of the human will for morals and theology. In accordance with this Kant also treats the third no less than the fourth antinomy of freedom.

In my philosophy, on the other hand, the straightforward recognition of the strict necessitation of actions involves the doctrine that, even in consciousless beings, that which manifests itself is Will, otherwise the action of this obvious necessitation would be placed in opposition to willing, if, namely, there were really such a freedom of individual action, and this were not rather as strictly necessitated as any other effect. On the other hand, the same doctrine of the necessitation of the act of Will renders it necessary that the existence and nature of man be itself the work of his freedom—that is, of his Will—and that the latter, therefore, has aseity. On the opposite assumption, all responsibility would, as already shown, be done away with; and the moral, like the physical, world would be a mere machine, which its outside artificer made to work for his amusement. Truths thus all hang together, require each other, complete each other, while error strikes itself against every corner.

Of what kind the influence is which *moral teaching* can have on conduct, and what are its limits, I have sufficiently investigated in my treatise on the foundation of Morality. Essentially analogous to this is the influence of *example*, which is nevertheless more powerful than that of teaching, and therefore deserves a short analysis.

Example acts directly, either hindering or promoting. The first when it determines the man to leave undone what he would willingly do. He sees, namely, that others do not do it, from which he infers in general that it is not advisable, in other words, that it must bring danger to his person, or his property, or his honour; to this he holds and gladly sees himself relieved from independent investigation. Or he sees that another who has done it has suffered evil consequences from it. This is the terrifying example. Example acts advantageously in two ways: either in moving men to do what they would gladly leave undone by showing them that its omission would bring them into some danger or injure them in the opinion of others; or it acts so as to encourage them to do what they would willingly do, but hitherto from fear of danger or disgrace have left undone; this is the seductive example. Lastly, example may bring to a man's notice something which would otherwise not have occurred to him. In this case it obviously acts directly only on the intellect; the effect on the Will is secondary and is, when it occurs, brought about by an original act of judgment or by confidence in him who sets the example. The entire very powerful effect of example rests on the fact that the man as a rule has too little faculty of judgment, often also too little knowledge to explore his way himself, and hence he is glad to tread in the footsteps of others. Every one will therefore be the more open to the influence of example the more he lacks the above two qualifications. The guiding star of most men is, however, the example of others,

and their whole conduct in great things as in small, is reducible to mere imitation; they don't do the least thing on their own judgment.[1] The cause of this is their horror of every kind of reflection, and their well-grounded mistrust of their own judgment. At the same time this bears witness to the surprisingly strong imitative tendency of man, as also to his relationship to the ape. But the mode in which the example acts is determined by the character of each; hence the same example can act upon one seductively and on the other repellently. Certain social mispractices which, not previously existent, gradually force their way, readily give us the opportunity of observing this. On first noticing something of the kind, one thinks, "Ah, how can he do it! How egoistic, how inconsiderate! I will certainly take care that I will never do any such thing." But twenty others will think, "Aha! he does that, I may do it also."

In a moral respect, example, like teaching, though it indeed promotes a civil or legal improvement, does not nevertheless further the inner, which is properly the moral, improvement. For it only acts as a personal motive, and consequently under the presupposition of receptivity for this class of motive. But it is precisely whether a character is more receptive for this or that class of motive which is decisive for its proper and true, but nevertheless always innate, morality. Example acts in general advantageously for the bringing into prominence of good and bad characteristics, but it does not create them, and hence Seneca's utterance, *velle non discitur*, holds good here also. That the innateness of all genuine moral qualities, of the good as of the bad, suits the doctrine of Metempsychosis, of the Brahminists and Buddhists, according to which, "The good and the bad actions of a man follow him from one existence

[1] Imitation and habit are the impelling motives of most of the actions of men.

to another like his shadow," better than Judaism, which rather requires that man should come into the world as a moral zero in order by virtue of an unthinkable *liberi arbitri indifferentiæ*, that is, as a consequence of rational reflection, to decide whether he wills to be an angel or a devil, or whatever else may lie between them,—this I know well enough, but do not trouble myself about it, for my standard is the truth. I am no professor of philosophy, and therefore do not recognize my calling to consist in, before all other things, making sure the fundamental ideas of Judaism even if these should block the way for ever to all and every philosophical cognition. *Liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*, under the name of "Moral Freedom," is a very favourite toy for the professors of philosophy which we must leave to them—the deep-thinking, the honest and the upright!

ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF OUR TRUE NATURE BY DEATH.

ALTHOUGH I have treated this subject thoroughly and in its connection in my chief work, I nevertheless believe that a small selection of separate reflections upon it, which always throw back some light on an exposition, will not be without value for many.

One must read Jean Paul's "Selina" in order to see how an eminently great mind becomes the victim of the absurdities of a false conception, which he will not give up because he has set his heart upon it, but is all the same perpetually disturbed by absurdities which he cannot digest. It is the conception of the individual continuance of our entire personal consciousness after death. Precisely the fighting and struggling of Jean Paul proves that such concepts compounded of the false and true are not, as is alleged, wholesome errors, but are rather decidedly noxious. For not only is the true knowledge—resting on the distinction between appearance and the thing-in-itself—of the indestructibility of our proper nature as untouched by time, causality, and change, made impossible by the false opposition of soul and body, as also by the raising of the whole personality to a thing-in-itself which must eternally exist; but this false conception cannot even be firmly held as the

representative of the truth, since the reason ever anew rises indignant against the absurdity lying in it, and then has to give up therewith the truth which is amalgamated with it. For in the long run truth can only subsist in its purity; mixed up with errors it participates in their fallibility as the granite crumbles when its felspar is decayed, although quartz and mica are not subject to such decay. It goes badly therefore with surrogates of the truth.

When in daily intercourse it is asked by one of those many people who wish to know everything, but do not want to learn anything, as to continued existence after death, the most suitable and indeed, in the first instance, the most correct answer is: "After your death you will be what you were before your birth." For it implies the wrong-headedness of the demand that a species of existence which has a beginning shall be without end, besides containing the implication that there may be two kinds of being and two kinds of nothing according with it. Similarly one might answer, "Whatever you will be after your death, even if it be nothing, will be just as natural and suitable to you as your individual organic existence is now, thus you will have at most to fear the moment of transition. Yes, since a mature consideration of the matter affords the result, that complete non-existence would be preferable to an existence such as ours. Thus the thought of the cessation of our existence, or of a time when we shall no longer be, ought, as far as reason goes, to trouble us as little as the thought of the time when we were not. But since the existence is essentially a personal one the end of the personality is not to be regarded as a loss."

To him, on the contrary, who on the objective and empirical path had pursued the plausible clue of materialism, and now full of alarm at complete destruction by death which confronts him therein, turns to us, we should perhaps

procure for him satisfaction in the shortest way and one most suited to his empirical mode of thought, if we demonstrated to him the distinction between matter and the metaphysical force which is always temporarily taking possession of it; as, for example, in birds, where the homogeneous formless fluidity as soon as it attains the requisite temperature, assumes the complicated and exactly determined shape of the genus and species of its bird. This is indeed, to a certain extent, a kind of *generatio æquivoca*, and it is exceedingly probable that the hierarchical series of animal forms arose from the fact that once in primitive times and in a happy hour it overleapt the type of animal to which the egg belonged, to a higher one. At all events something distinct from matter appears here most prominently, especially in that by the least unfavourable circumstance it comes to nothing. In this way it becomes explicable that after an operation that has been completed or subsequently prevented it can deviate from it without injury, a fact which points to a totally different permanence than that of the persistence of matter in time.

If we conceive of a being which knew, understood, and saw everything, the question whether we endure after death would probably have no meaning for such a one, since beyond our present temporal individual existence enduring and ceasing would have no significance, and would be indistinguishable conceptions. And accordingly neither the concept of destruction nor that of continuance, would have any application, since these are borrowed from time, which is merely the form of the phenomenon. In the meantime we can only think of the *indestructibility* of this core of our phenomenon as a continuance of it, and indeed, properly speaking, only according to the *schema* of matter which under all changes of its form maintains itself in time. If we deny it this continuance we regard our

temporal end as an annihilation according to the *schema* of form which vanishes when the matter in which it inheres is taken away from it. Both are nevertheless *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος*, that is, a transference of the forms of the phenomenon to the thing-in-itself. But of an indestructibility which would be no continuance we can hardly form even an abstract idea, since all perception by which we might confirm it fails us.

In truth however the constant arising of new beings and the perishing of those already existent is to be regarded as an illusion produced by the apparatus of two polished lenses (brain-functions), by which alone we can see anything. They are called space and time, and in their reciprocal interpenetration—causality. For all that we perceive under these conditions is mere phenomenon; but we do not know the things as they may be in themselves, that is independently of our perception. This is properly the kernel of the Kantian philosophy which, together with its content, one cannot too often call to mind in a period when venal charlatanry has by its stupefying process driven philosophy from Germany with the willing assistance of people for whom truth and intelligence are the most indifferent things in the world, and wage and salary the most important.

How can we suppose on beholding the death of a human being that a thing-in-itself here comes to nothing? That a phenomenon in time, that form of all phenomena, finds its end without the thing-in-itself being thereby affected is an immediate intuitive cognition of every man; hence men have endeavoured to give utterance to it at all times, in the most diverse forms and expressions, but these are all derived from the phenomenon in its special sense and only have reference thereto. Everyone feels that he is something different from a being who has once been created from nothing by another being. In this way the assurance

arises within him that although death can make an end of his life it cannot make an end of his existence. Man is something else than an animated nothing; and the animal also. He who thinks his existence is limited to his present life regards himself as an animated nothing. For thirty years ago he was nothing and thirty years hence he will be again nothing.

The more clearly one is conscious of the transience, nothingness and dream-like nature of all things, by so much the more clearly is one conscious also of the eternity of one's own inner nature. For only in opposition to this is the foregoing structure of things known, as the rapid motion of the ship one is on, is only perceived when one looks towards the fixed shore and not when one looks at the ship itself.

The present has two halves, an *objective* and a *subjective*. The objective alone has the perception of time for its form, and hence rolls ceaselessly forward. From this arises our vivid recollection of what is very long past, and the consciousness of our imperishability, in spite of our knowledge of the transience of our existence.

Everyone thinks that his innermost core is something that the *present* contains and carries about with it. Whenever we may happen to live we always stand with our consciousness in the centre of time, never at its terminations; and we might assume from this that everyone bore within himself the immovable centre of infinite time. This is, moreover, at bottom what gives him the confidence with which he lives on without continual fear of death. But whoever by virtue of the strength of his memory and imagination can recall the most vividly the long past of his own life, will become more clearly conscious than others of the *identity of the now in all time*. Perhaps, indeed,

this proposition is more correct taken conversely. But at all events such a clearer consciousness of the identity of all now is an essential requirement of the philosophic mind. By means of it we apprehend that which is most fleeting—the now—as the only persistent. He who is in this intuitive way aware that the present moment, which is the only form of all reality in the narrowest sense, has its source in *us*, and springs, that is, from within and not from without, cannot doubt of the indestructibility of his own nature. He will rather understand that by his death the objective world, indeed, with the medium of its presentment, the intellect, perishes for him, but that this does not touch his existence, for there was as much reality within as without. He will say with complete understanding: ἐγώ εἰμι πᾶν τὸ γεγονὸς, καὶ ὂν, καὶ ἐσόμενον ("Stob. Floril. Tit." 44, 42; vol. ii. p. 201).

He who does not admit this to be true must maintain the opposite, and say: "Time is something purely objective and real, which exists quite independently of me. I am only accidentally thrown into it, have only become participant in a small portion of it, whereby I have attained to a transient reality like thousands of others before me who are now no more, and I shall also very soon be nothing. Time, on the contrary, is the Real. It goes further without me."

In accordance with all this, life may certainly be regarded as a dream and death as an awakening. But then the personality, the individual, belongs to the dreaming and not to the waking consciousness, for which reason death presents itself to the former as annihilation. It is still, at all events from this standpoint, not to be regarded as the transition to a state entirely new and strange to us, but rather only as the return to our original one, of which life was only a short episode.

If in the meantime a philosopher should, perhaps, think

that he would find in dying a consolation peculiar to him alone, or at least a diversion, and that then a problem would be resolved for him which had so frequently occupied him, we can only say that it will probably fare with him as with one, who as he is about to find what he is seeking, has his lantern blown out.

For in death the consciousness assuredly perishes, but not by any means that which till then had produced it. The consciousness namely rests immediately on the intellect, but the latter on the physiological process. For it is obviously the function of the brain, and hence conditioned by the co-operation of the nerve and cellular system, though more directly by the brain, which is nourished, animated, and continuously agitated by the heart. It is by the artistic and mysterious construction of the brain as described by anatomy, but which physiology does not understand, that the phenomenon of the objective world and the trend of our thoughts is brought about. An *individual consciousness*, that is, a consciousness as such, cannot be conceived in an *incorporeal being*, since knowledge, the condition of every consciousness, is necessarily brain-function—for the simple reason that the intellect objectively manifests itself as brain. Now as intellect appears physiologically—that is, in empirical reality or in the phenomenon—as a secondary, as a result of the process of life, so it is also psychologically secondary in opposition to the Will which is alone the primary and ever the original. The organism itself is really only the Will displaying itself perceptually and objectively in the brain, and therefore in its forms of space and time, as I have often explained, especially in "Will in Nature," and in my chief work (vol. ii. chap. xx.). Since, then, the consciousness is not immediately dependent upon the Will, but this is conditioned by the intellect, and this again by the organism, there remains no doubt that consciousness is extinguished

by death, as also by sleep and swoons.[1] But let us be consoled! For what kind of a consciousness is this? A cerebral, an animal consciousness—one a little more highly developed than that of the beasts, in so far as we have it as regards all essentials in common with the whole series of animals although it attains its summit in us. It is the same, as I have sufficiently demonstrated, with respect to its purpose and origin—a mere μηχανή of nature, a means of knowing how to help the animal nature to its requirements. The state, on the contrary, into which death throws us back is our original state—that is, it is the state peculiar to our nature, whose original force displays itself in the production and maintenance of the life that is now ceasing. It is, in short, the state of the thing-in-itself in opposition to the phenomenon. Now in this primal state such an assistance as the cerebral, a cognition so extremely mediate, and for this reason merely supplying phenomena, is without doubt entirely superfluous; hence we lose it. Its disappearance is the same as the cessation of the phenomenal world for us, of which it was the mere medium, and can serve for nothing else. If in this our original state the retention of the animal consciousness were even offered us, we should reject it as the lame man who is cured does the crutch. He therefore who bemoans the loss in question of this cerebral consciousness, which is merely phenomenal and adapted to the phenomenal, is to be compared to the converted Greenlanders who did not wish for heaven when they heard that there were no seals there.

Moreover, all that is here said rests on the assumption that we cannot even conceive of a now-conscious state except as a knowing one, which therefore bears the root-form of all knowledge—the separation of subject and object,

[1] It would certainly be very pleasant if the intellect did not perish with death: one would then bring the Greek which one had learnt in this world all ready with one into the other.

of a knowing and a known. But we have to consider that this entire form of knowing and being known is conditioned merely by our animal, and hence very secondary and derived, nature, and is thus in no way the original state of all being and all existence, which may therefore be quite different, and yet not without consciousness. If then our own present nature, so far as we are able to trace it to its core, is mere *Will;* and this in itself is a knowingless thing; when through death we sacrifice the intellect, we are only thereby transplanted into our original consciousless state, which is therefore not simply consciousless, but rather above and beyond this form—a state in which the antithesis of subject and object disappears, because here that which is to be known would be really and immediately one with the knowing, and thus the fundamental condition of all knowing (which is precisely this opposition) would be wanting. Herewith may be compared by way of elucidation "The World as Will and Presentment," vol. ii. p. 273 (3rd ed. 310). The utterance of Giordano Bruno (ed. Wagner, vol. i. p. 287): "*La divina mente, e la unità assoluta, senza specie alcuna è ella medesimo lo che intende, e lo ch' è inteso.*"

Perhaps every one is now and then aware in his innermost heart of a consciousness that would be suited to an entirely different kind of existence than this so unspeakably beggarly, timely, individual one, occupied as it is altogether with misery; on which occasions he thinks that death might lead him to such a one.

If we now in opposition to this mode of contemplation which is directed inwards, again turn our attention outwards and apprehend the world displaying itself objectively, death will then certainly appear to us a passage into nothing: But birth also none the less as a proceeding out of nothing. The one like the other, however, cannot be unconditionally true since it only has the reality of the phe-

nomenon. That in some sense we should survive death is really no greater miracle than that of generation which we daily see before our eyes. What dies goes hence, where all life comes from, its own included. In this sense the Egyptians called *Orchus Amanthus*, which, according to Plutarch ("de Is. et Osir," c. 29), signifies ὁ λαμβάνων καὶ διδούς, "the taker and giver," in order to express that it is the same source into which everything returns and from which everything proceeds. From this point of view our life might be regarded as a loan received from death; sleep would then be the daily interest on this loan. Death announces itself without any concealment as the end of the individual, but in this individual lies the germ of a new being. Hence nothing of all that dies, dies for ever. But neither does anything that is born receive a fundamentally new existence. The dying perishes but a germ remains over from which proceeds a new being which now enters into existence without knowing whence it comes and why it is exactly such as it is. This is the mystery of the *Palingenesis* for the explanation of which the 42nd chapter of the 2nd volume of my chief work may be consulted. It appears from this that all beings at this moment living contain the true germ of all that will live in the future, which are thus to a certain extent already there. Similarly every animal existing in its full perfection seems to cry out to us: "Why dost thou complain of the perishability of the living? How could I exist if all those of my species which were before me had not died?" However much, therefore, the pieces and the masks on the stage of the world change, the Actors remain the same in all. We sit together and talk and excite each other and eyes gleam and voices become louder; exactly so others have sat thousands of years ago; it was the same, and they were the same. Just so will it be thousands of years hence. The arrangement owing to which we are not aware of this, is time

One might very well distinguish Metempsychosis as the passage of the entire so-called soul into another body—and *Palingenesis* as the decomposition and reformation of this individual, inasmuch as his Will persists and assuming the shape of a new being receives a new intellect. Thus the individual decomposes like a neutral salt, the basis of which combines itself with another acid into a new salt. The difference between *Metempsychosis* and *Palingenesis* which Servius the commentator of Virgil assumes, and which is shortly indicated in "Wernsdorffii dissertat de Metempsychosi," p. 48, is obviously fallacious and nugatory.

From Spencer Hardy's "Manual of Buddhism" (pp. 394-96 with which may be compared pp. 429, 440, 445, in the same book), also from Sangermano's "Burmese Empire" as well as from the "Asiatic Researches," vol. vi., p. 179, and vol. ix., p. 256, it appears that in Buddhism an exoteric and esoteric doctrine obtains regarding continuance after death. The former is Metempsychosis as in Brahminism but the latter is a Palingenesis much more difficult of comprehension, which is very much in agreement with my doctrine of the Metaphysical existence of the Will, of the merely physical structure of the intellect, and the perishability which accords with it. Παλιγγενεσία occurs in the Old Testament.

But if, in order to penetrate deeper into the mystery of Palingenesis we seek aid from the 43rd chapter of the 2nd vol. of my chief work, the matter, more closely considered, will appear to be that throughout all time the male sex has been the bearer of the Will, the female of the Intellect of the human race, whereby it receives perpetual subsistence. Every one, therefore, has a paternal and a maternal element, and as these are united in generation they are also separated in death, which is thus the end of the individual. This individual it is whose death we so much deplore with the feeling that it is really lost, since

it was a mere combination which irrevocably ceases. But we must not forget in all this, that the transmissability of the Intellect of the mother is not so decided and unconditioned as that of the Will of the father, on account of the secondary and merely physical nature of the intellect and its complete dependence on the organism, not only in respect of the brain but also otherwise, as has been shown by me in the chapter in question. I may mention here by the way that I so far agree with Plato in that he also distinguishes in his so-called soul, a mortal and an immortal part. But he comes into diametrical opposition with me and with the truth, in that he, after the manner of all philosophers who have preceded me, regards the intellect as the immortal, and the Will, that is, the seat of the appetites and passions, as the mortal part; as may be seen from the "Timæus" (pp. 386, 387, 395, ed. Bip.). Aristotle has the same idea.[1]

But though the physical may strangely and wonderfully rule things by procreation and death, together with the visible combination of individuals out of Will and Intellect and their subsequent dissolution, yet the metaphysical principle lying at its basis is of so entirely heterogeneous a nature that it is not affected by it, so on this point we may be consoled.

One can accordingly conceive every man from two opposite points of view: from the one, he is an individual beginning and ending in time, fleeting and transitory, σκιᾶς ὄναρ, besides being heavily burdened with failings and pains From the other, he is the indestructible original being which objectivises itself in everything existent, and may, as such, say, like the statue of Isis at Sais: ἐγώ εἰμι πᾶν

[1] In the "De Anima" (I. 4, p. 408), his real opinion escapes accidentally at the beginning that the νοῦς is the true and immortal soul—which he confirms with fallacious assertions. Hatred and love belong not to the soul, but to their organ the perishable part.

τὸ γεγονὸς, καὶ ὂν, καὶ ἐσόμενον. Such a being might indeed do something better than manifest itself in a world like this. For this is the finite world of sorrow and of death. What is in it, and what comes out of it must end and die. But what is not of it, and what never will be of it, pierces through it, all-powerful like a flash of lightning, which strikes upward, and knows neither time nor death. To unite all these antitheses is properly the theme of my philosophy.

Short Concluding Dialogue.

Thrasymachos. To be brief, what am I after my death? be clear and precise.

Philalethes. Everything and nothing.

Thrasymachos. There we have it! as the solution of a problem, a contradiction. The trick is played out.

Philalethes. To answer transcendent questions in the language created for immanent knowledge may certainly lead to contradictions.

Thrasymachos. What do you call transcendent and what immanent knowledge? These expressions are indeed known to me from my professor but only as predicates of Almighty God, with which his philosophy, as was only suitable, was exclusively concerned. If, namely, he remains in the world he is immanent, but if he sits anywhere outside it he is transcendent. Only look, that is clear, that is comprehensible! One knows what one has to hold by. But your old-fashioned Kantian artificial language no human being any longer understands. The time-consciousness of the modern world, from the metropolis of German science—

Philalethes (*aside*). German philosophical windbaggery.

Thrasymachos. —through a whole sucession of great men, especially through the great Schleiermacher and the giant intellect Hegel has been brought back from all that, or

rather, has been brought so far forwards that it has left it all behind and knows no more of it. So what do you mean by it?

Philalethes. Transcendent knowledge is that which proceeding beyond all possibility of experience seeks to determine the nature of things as they are in themselves. Immanent knowledge, on the other hand, is that which keeps itself within the bounds of the possibility of experience, and therefore can speak of phenomena. You as individual end at your death, yet the individual is not your true and ultimate nature, but rather merely a manifestation of it. It is not the Thing-in-itself, but only its phenomenon which displays itself in the form of time, and accordingly has a beginning and end. Your true nature in itself knows neither time, nor beginning, nor end, nor the limits of a given individuality, and hence it can be excluded from no individuality, but is there in each and all. In the first sense you become by your death nothing; in the second you are and remain all things. Hence I said that you, after your death, would be everything and nothing. Your question scarcely admits of a more correct answer in so short a compass than this one, which, however, certainly contains a contradiction; because while your life is in time, your immortality is in eternity. This may be termed therefore an indestructibility without continuance, which again results in a contradiction. But so it is when the transcendent has to be brought into immanent knowledge, for it sustains thereby a kind of violence, since it is misused for that to which it was not born.

Thrasymachos. Do you hear, without the continuance of my individuality, I would not give a single heller for all your immortality.

Philalethes. But perhaps we may still do business together. Granted I guaranteed you the continuance of your individuality but made it a condition that before its re-

awakening there was to be a perfectly consciousless death-sleep of three months?

Thrasymachos. That would do.

Philalethes. But since in a perfectly consciousless state we have no measurement of time it is quite the same to us whether while we lay in that death-sleep three months or ten thousand years had passed. For we must accept the one thing like the other on trust and faith, on awakening. It must therefore be indifferent to you whether your individuality is given back to you after three months or after ten thousand years.

Thrasymachos. In the last resort that cannot be denied.

Philalethes. But now if after the lapse of the ten thousand years you were forgotten to be awakened, I believe that when after so short an existence you had become accustomed to so long a non-existence the misfortune would not be great. But certain it is, that you could know nothing of it. And you would be quite consoled as regards the question if you knew that the secret machinery which maintains your present phenomenon in motion had not ceased one moment during those ten thousand years to produce and set in motion other phenomena of the same kind.

Thrasymachos. So? And in this way you think to swindle me out of my individuality by smooth talk, without my noticing it? I am not to be taken in in that way. I have stipulated for the continuance of my individuality, and no machinery and phenomena can console me for the loss of it. It lies closest to my heart, and I will not part from it.

Philalethes. You regard your individuality then as so pleasant, excellent, perfect and incomparable that there could be nothing preferable to it, and hence you would not like to exchange it for any other, with which it might be asserted that it was possible to live better and more comfortably.

Thrasymachos. But surely my individuality, whatever it is, is myself,

> "Nothing in the world is above me,
> For God is God and I am I."

I, I, I desire existence! This it is which concerns me and not an existence which has first of all to be proved to me that it is mine.

Philalethes.—But consider the matter! What is it that cries, "I, I, I desire existence," that is, not you alone, but everything, simply everything, that has a trace of consciousness. Consequently this wish in you is precisely that which is *not* individual, but common to all without distinction. It does not spring from the individuality but from existence generally, is essential to everything that exists, is indeed that *whereby* it exists, and will accordingly be satisfied by existence *in general* to which alone it refers, and not exclusively by any determinate individual existence. For it is not at all directed to the latter, although it always has the appearance of being so because it cannot attain to consciousness otherwise than in an individual being, and therefore always seems to have reference to such. But this is a mere illusion, to which indeed the crudity of the individual cleaves, but which reflection can destroy and free us from. That, namely, which so madly desires existence is merely *mediately* the individual! Immediately, and properly speaking, it is the Will to live in general, which is one and the same in all. Now since existence itself is its free work, is indeed its mere reflection—it follows that existence cannot escape it, but it is provisionally satisfied by existence in general, so far that is to say, as it, the eternally unsatisfied, can be satisfied. Individualities are the same to it, it does not really concern itself with them, although to the individual who immediately only perceives it in himself, it seems to do so. In this way it is brought about

that the individual watches over his own existence with a care which would not otherwise be, and thereby secures the maintenance of the species. Hence it follows that the individuality is no perfection but a limitation, and that to be quit of it is no loss but rather a gain. Do not cherish therefore an anxiety which would truly appear childish and altogether ridiculous if you knew your own nature thoroughly and to its foundation, to wit, as the universal Will to live, which you are!

Thrasymachos. You yourself and all philosophers are childish and quite ridiculous, and it is only for fun and pastime that a staid man like myself occupies himself for a quarter of an hour with this sort of fools. I have now more important things to do, so good-bye!

ON SUICIDE.

AS far as I see it is only the monotheistic, that is, the Jewish religions, whose votaries regard suicide as a crime. This is the more surprising as neither in the Old, nor in the New Testament is there to be found any prohibition, or even any decided disapproval of it. Teachers of religion, therefore, have to base their condemnation of suicide on philosophical grounds of their own, with which, however, it goes so badly, that they seek to supply what in their arguments lacks strength, by the vigour of their expressions of disgust, that is, by abuse. We have to hear, accordingly, that suicide is the greatest cowardice, that it is only possible in madness, and similar twaddle, or even the entirely senseless phrase that suicide is "wrong," whereas obviously no one has a greater right over anything in the world than over his own person and life. Suicide, as already remarked, is even accounted a crime, and with it is allied, especially in brutal, bigoted England, a shameful burial, and the invalidation of the testament, for which reason the jury almost always bring in a verdict of insanity. Let us before anything else allow moral feeling to decide in the matter and compare the impression which the report that an acquaintance had committed a crime, such as a murder, a cruelty, a fraud, a theft, makes upon us, with that of the report of his voluntary death. While the first calls forth energetic indignation, the greatest disgust, a demand

for punishment or for vengeance, the latter will excite only sorrow and sympathy, mingled more often with an admiration of his courage than with the moral disapproval which accompanies a bad action. Who has not had acquaintances, friends, or relations, who have willingly departed from the world? And are we to think with horror of each of these as of a criminal? *Nego ac pernego.* I am rather of the opinion that the clergy should, once for all, be challenged to give an account, with what right they, without being able to show any biblical authority, or any valid philosophical arguments, stigmatize in the pulpit and in their writings an action committed by many men honoured and beloved by us, as a *crime*, and refuse those who voluntarily leave the world an honourable burial—it should, however, be clearly understood that reasons are required, and that no mere empty phrases or abusive epithets will be accepted in place of them. The fact that criminal jurisprudence condemns suicide is no ecclesiastically valid reason, besides being extremely ridiculous. For what punishment can frighten him who seeks death? If we punish the attempt at suicide, it is the clumsiness whereby it failed that we punish.

The ancients, moreover, were a long way from regarding the matter in this light. Pliny ("Histor. Nat.," lib. 28, c. 1; vol. iv., p. 351 Ed. Bip.), says: *Vitam quidem non adeo expetendam censemus, ut quoque modo trahenda sit. Quisquis es talis, aeque morier, etiam cum obscoenus vixeris, aut nefandus. Quapropter hoc primum quisque in remediis animi sui habeat: ex omnibus bonis, quae homini tribuit natura, nullum melius esse tempestiva morte: idque in ea optimum, quod illam sibi quisque praestare poterit.*" He also says (lib. 2, c. 7; vol. i., p. 125): "*Ne Deum quidem posse omnia. Namque nec sibi potest mortem consciscere; si velit, quod homini dedit optimum in tantis vitae poenis*, etc. In

Massillia, and in the island of Chios, indeed, the hemlock was publicly handed to him who could give sufficient reasons for leaving life ("Val. Max.," l. ii. c. 6, § 7 et 8).[1] And how many heroes and wise men of antiquity have not ended their lives by a voluntary death! Aristotle indeed says ("Eth. Nicom.," v. 15) that suicide is a wrong against the state, although not against one's own person. Stobæus, however, in his exposition of the Ethics of the Peripatetics, quotes the proposition (Ecl. eth. II., c. 7, p. 286): Φευκτὸν δὲ τὸν βίον γίγνεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἄγαν ἀτυχίαις· τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄγαν εὐτυχίαις. (*Vitam autem relinquendem esse bonis in nimiis quidem miseriis, pravis vero in nimium quoque secundis.*) And in a similar way, p. 312: Διὸ καὶ γαμήσειν, καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι, καὶ πολιτεύσεσθαι etc., καὶ καθόλου τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ μένειν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ πάλιν, εἰ δέοι, πότε δι' ἀνάγκας ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι, ταφῆς προνοήσαντα, etc. (*Ideoque et uxorem ducturum, et liberos procreaturum, et ad civitatem accessurum*, etc. *Atque omnino virtutem colendo tum vitam servaturum, tum iterum, cogente necessitate, relictarum*, etc.).

We find suicide celebrated by the Stoics as a noble and heroic deed, as might be confirmed by hundreds of extracts, the strongest being from Seneca. Again, with the Hindoo, as is well known, suicide often occurs as a religious action, especially as widow burning, also as immolation beneath the wheels of the Car of Juggernaut, as self-sacrifice to the crocodiles of the Ganges, or of the holy pond of the temple, and otherwise. In the same way, at the theatre, that mirror of life, where we see for example in the celebrated Chinese piece "L'Orphelin de la Chine"

[1] On the Island of Chios it was also the custom that the aged should voluntarily put themselves to death. See "Valerius Maximus," lib. ii. c. 6; Heraclide. Ponticus, "Fragmenta de Rebus Publicis," ix.; Ælian, "Var. Hist.," iii. 37; Strabo, lib. x. cap. 5, § 6, ed. Kramer.

(trad. p. St. Julien, 1834,) almost all the noble characters end by suicide without its being anywhere indicated, or its occurring to the onlooker, that they have committed a crime. On our own stage, indeed, it is not otherwise, *e.g.*, Palmira in Mahomet, Mortimer in Maria Stuart, Othello, the Countess Terzky. Is Hamlet's monologue the meditation of a crime? It says certainly that if we were sure to be absolutely destroyed by death it would, considering the structure of the world, be unconditionally to choose. "But there lies [*sic* tr.] the rub." The reasons, however, against suicide which have been put forward by the clergy of the monotheistic, that is, Jewish religion, and the philosophers who accommodate themselves to them, are feeble sophisms easy of refutation. (See my "Treatise on the Foundation of Morals," § 5.) Hume has furnished the most thoroughgoing refutation of them in his "Essay on Suicide," which first appeared after his death, and was immediately suppressed by the shameful bigotry and scandalous priestly tyranny of England, for which reason only a very few copies were sold, secretly and at a high price, so that for the preservation of this and of another treatise of the great man, we have to thank the Basel reprint: "Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul, by the late David Hume. Basel, 1799. Sold by James Decker, pp. 124, 8vo." But that a purely philosophical treatise coming from one of the first thinkers and writers of England, refuting the current reasons against suicide, had in its native land to be smuggled through like a forbidden thing, until it found refuge abroad, redounds to the greatest shame of the English nation. It shows at the same time the kind of good conscience the Church has on this question. I have pointed out the only valid moral reason against suicide in my chief work, vol. i. § 69. It lies in that suicide is opposed to the attainment of the highest moral goal, since it substitutes for the real emancipation from this world of

sorrow, a merely apparent one. But from this mistake to a crime, such as the Christian clergy seek to stamp it, is a very long way.

Christianity bears in its innermost essence the truth that suffering (the Cross) is the true purpose of life; hence it rejects, as opposed to this, suicide, which antiquity, from a lower standpoint, approved and even honoured. The foregoing reason against suicide is, however, an ascetic one, and as such only applies to a much higher ethical standpoint than that which European moral philosophers have ever occupied. But if we descend from this very high standpoint there is no longer any valid moral reason for condemning suicide. The extraordinarily energetic zeal of the clergy of the monotheistic religions against it, which is supported neither by the Bible nor by valid reasons, must rest, it would seem, therefore, on a concealed basis. Might it not be that the voluntary surrender of life is a poor compliment for him who said *πάντα καλὰ λίαν*? Once more, then, it would be the obligatory optimism of these religions which arraigns suicide in order not to be arraigned by it.

We shall find on the whole that as soon as the terrors of life counterbalance the terrors of death man makes an end of his life. The resistance to these terrors is nevertheless considerable; they stand as it were as warders before the gate of exit. There is no one living perhaps who would not have made an end of his life if this end were something purely negative, a sudden cessation of existence. But there is something positive in it—the destruction of the body. This frightens men back simply because the body is the phenomenon of the Will-to-Live.

Meanwhile the struggle with these warders is not so hard as a rule as it may seem to us from afar, and indeed

in consequence of the antagonism between intellectual and corporeal sufferings. When, for instance, we suffer corporeal pain severely and continuously, we are indifferent to all other trouble; our recovery alone seriously concerns us. Just in the same way severe mental sorrows make us unsusceptible to corporeal—we despise them. Even if they acquire the preponderance, this is a welcome diversion to us, a pause in our mental suffering. It is this which makes suicide easier, inasmuch as the corporeal pain associated with it loses all importance in the eyes of one tortured by excessive mental suffering. The above is especially noticeable with those who are driven to suicide through a purely morbid but none the less intense melancholy. It does not cost such persons any self-conquest, they do not require to form any resolution, but as soon as the keepers provided for them leave them for two minutes they quickly make an end of their life. When in disturbed, horrible dreams, anxiety has reached its highest pitch, it brings us of itself to awakening, and therewith all these horrors of a night vanish. The same thing happens in the dream of life, where also the highest degree of anxiety compels us to break it off.

Suicide may also be regarded as an experiment, a question which we put to nature, and to which we wish to compel the answer, to wit, what change the existence and the knowledge of man experiences through death. But it is a clumsy one, for it abolishes the identity of the consciousness which should receive the answer.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE AFFIRMATION AND NEGATION OF THE WILL-TO-LIVE.

IT is to a certain extent to be understood *a priori*, that is to say, it is obvious of itself, that that which now produces the phenomenon of the world must also be capable of not doing so, and therefore of remaining at rest—or, in other words, that to the present διαστολή there must also be a συστολή. If the first be the phenomenon of the Will-to-Live the other will be phenomenon of the non-Will-to-Live. This will be moreover essentially the same with the magnum Sakhepat of the Veda doctrine (in the "Oupnekhat," vol. i., p. 163), with the *Nirvana* of the Buddhists, also with the ἐπέκεινα of the Neo-Platonists. As against certain silly objections I may observe that the negation of the Will-to-Live in no way involves the destruction of a substance, but the mere act of not-Willing—that which hitherto has willed wills no more, since we know this Being, the Will, as thing-in-itself merely in and through the act of willing, it is impossible for us to say or to comprehend what it is or does after having given up this act. Hence the Negation is for us who are the phenomenon of the Will a passage into nothing.

Between the ethics of the Greeks and the Hindoos there is a sharp opposition. The former (with the exception of Plato) has for its object to facilitate the leading of a happy

life, *vitam beatam*. The latter, on the contrary, the liberation and emancipation from life altogether—as is directly enunciated in the very first proposition of the Sankhya Karika.

A similar, and, owing to its operating by means of the senses, a stronger contrast will be perceived on contemplating the beautiful antique sarcophagus of the gallery of Florence, whose reliefs represent the whole series of the ceremonies of a wedding from the first offer until the time when Hymen's torch lights the way to the Thorus, if one at the same time calls to mind the Christian coffin with its black hangings in token of grief, and with the crucifix on the top. The opposition is in the highest degree significant. Both wish to console in death, each in an opposite way, and each with justice. The one signifies the affirmation of the Will-to-Live which life throughout all time undoubtedly remains, however rapidly its forms may change. The other indicates by the symbols of sorrow and death the negation of the Will-to-Live, and the emancipation from the world where sorrow and death reign. Between the spirit of Græco-Roman heathenism and that of Christianity is the special opposition between the affirmation and negation of the Will-to-Live—as regards which Christianity in the last resort is right.

My philosophy stands in the same relation to all the ethics of European philosophy as that of the New Testament to the Old, according to the ecclesiastical conception of this relation. The Old Testament, namely, places man under the domination of the Law which nevertheless does not lead to emancipation. The New Testament, on the other hand, declares the law insufficient, indeed breaks away from it—Romans vii., Galatians ii. 3. It preaches, on the contrary, the dominion of Grace which is to be attained through faith, love of one's neighbour, and complete denial of oneself. This is the way to emancipation from

evil and from the world, for assuredly, in spite of all rationalistic-protestant misrepresentations, asceticism is peculiarly the soul of the New Testament; but this is precisely the negation of the Will-to-Live, and the above transition from the Old Testament to the New, from the dominion of the law to the dominion of faith, from justification through works to salvation through the mediator, from the dominion of sin and death to eternal life in Christ, signifies *sensu proprio*, the transition from the merely moral virtues to the negation of the Will-to-Live. All the philosophical Ethics which have preceded me have retained the spirit of the Old Testament with its absolute (*i.e.*, foundationless and goalless), moral law, and all its moral commandments and prohibitions to which tacitly the ruling Jehovah is added in thought, however diverse may be the forms and statements of the matter. My ethic, on the other hand, has basis, purpose, and goal. It first of all demonstrates theoretically the metaphysical basis of Justice and human love, and then points out the goal to which these, when fully accomplished, must finally lead. At the same time it admits straightforwardly the undesirability of the world, and indicates the negation of the Will as the way towards emancipation from the former. It is therefore really conceived in the spirit of the New Testament, while the rest hold in their entirety by that of the Old, and accordingly issue theoretically in mere Judaism—"naked despotic theism." In this sense my doctrines might be called the true Christian Philosophy, however paradoxical this may seem to those who do not go to the root of the matter, but remain standing on the surface.

He who is capable of deeper thinking will soon see that human desires cannot first begin to be sinful at that point where they, fortuitously crossing one another in their individual directions, occasion evil from the one and malice

from the other, side; but that, if this be so, they must be originally and in their very essence sinful and accursed, and that consequently the entire Will-to-Live must itself be accursed. The horrors and misery with which the world is full are then the necessary result of the sum of the characters in which the Will-to-Live objectifies itself, to which the circumstances occurring in the unbroken chain of necessity supply motives—in other words, are the mere commentary on the affirmation of the Will-to-Live (compare "German Theology,"[1] p. 93). That our existence itself implies a fault is proved by death.

A noble character will not readily complain of his fate, but rather what Hamlet boasts of Horatio will be true of him:

> "For thou hast been
> As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing."

And this is explicable from the fact that such a one, recognizing his own being also in others, and therefore as sharing in their fate, beholds almost invariably round about him harder fate than his own, for which reason he cannot bring himself to complain of the latter. An ignoble egoist, on the other hand, who limits all reality to himself, and regards others as mere wraiths and phantasms, will take no interest in their fate, but will devote his whole attention to his own, great sensitiveness and frequent complaints being the result. It is precisely this recognition of oneself in an alien phenomenon from which, as I have so often proved, justice and human love directly proceed, which leads finally to the surrender of the Will; for the phenomenon in which this Will presents itself is so distinctly in a position of suffering, that he who extends himself to all such can no longer will its continuance—just as one who takes all the tickets in a lottery must necessarily

[1] Deutsche Theologia, Edited by Franz Pfeiffer, Stuttgart, 1851.

suffer great loss. The affirmation of the Will presupposes the limitation of self-conscientiousness to one's own person, and reckons on the possibility of a favourable career in life from the hand of fortune.

If in our conception of the world we proceed from the thing-in-itself—from the Will-to-Live—we shall find as its kernel, as its greatest concentration, the act of generation which presents itself as the first thing, the point of departure; it is the *punctum saliens* of the world-egg, its mainspring. What a contrast, on the other hand, if one proceeds from the empirical world, the world of presentment, which is given us as phenomenon! For here the aforesaid act presents itself as an altogether individual and special one of subordinate importance—indeed, as a covert and secret bye-concern which only creeps in; a paradoxical anomaly, affording frequent material for laughter. It might even strike us that the devil only wanted to hide his game thereby, for coition is his currency, and the world his kingdom. For who has not remarked how *illico post coitum cachinnus auditur Diaboli?* which, to speak seriously, rests on the fact that the sexual desire, especially when by fixation of a particular woman it is concentrated into the passion of love, is the quintessence of the whole rascality of this noble world, for it promises so unspeakably, infinitely, and extravagantly much, and performs so contemptibly little.

The share of the woman in generation is, in a certain sense, more innocent than that of the man; in so far, namely, as the latter gives the Will to the being about to be procreated, the Will which is the primal sin, and hence the source of all wickedness and evil, whilst the woman gives the knowing faculty which opens the way to emancipation. The act of generation is the World-focus, inasmuch as it says: "The Will-to-Live has affirmed itself anew." In this sense a well-known Brahmanic saying

laments: "Woe, woe! The Lingam is in the Yoni." Conception and pregnancy tell us, on the other hand, "To the Will is given once more the light of the Intellect," by means of which, it can again find its way out, and thus the possibility of emancipation appears once more.

From this is to be explained the significant phenomenon, that while any woman surprised in the act of generation would like to sink into the ground for shame, yet notwithstanding she will wear her pregnancy without a trace of shame, and even with a kind of pride. Since in every other case an infallibly certain sign is regarded as equivalent to the thing signified, so here every other sign of the completed coitus shames the woman in the highest degree; pregnancy alone does not do so. This is to be explained in that, as above said, pregnancy in a certain sense brings with it, or at least affords the prospect of, a purgation from the guilt which has been contracted in the coitus. Hence the coitus bears all the shame and disgrace in the matter, while the pregnancy which is so nearly related to it, remains pure and innocent, and indeed to a certain extent honourable.

The coitus is chiefly the affair of the man, pregnancy wholly that of the woman. From the father the child receives its Will, its character; from the mother its Intellect. The latter is the emancipating principle, the former is the binding principle. The symbol of the continuous existence of the Will-to-Live, in time, in spite of all increase of light through the Intellect, is the coitus; the symbol of the light of the understanding, and indeed in the highest degree of its clearness, which is ever anew allied to this Will, keeping up the possibility of emancipation, is the renewed birth of the Will-to-Live as Man. The sign of this is pregnancy, which goes about therefore in frankness and freedom, and indeed in pride, while the coitus slinks away like a criminal.

Some of the Church fathers have taught that even marital cohabitation should only be allowed when it occurs merely for the sake of the procreation of children, ἐπὶ μόνῃ παιδοποιίᾳ as Clemens Alex. (Strom. l. iii. c. 11) says. (The passages referring to the subject will be found collected in P. E. Lind. de coelibatu Christianorum c. 1). Clemens (Strom. iii. c. 3) attributes this view to the Pythagoreans. This is, however, strictly speaking, incorrect. For if the coitus be no longer desired for its own sake, the negation of the Will-to-Live has already appeared, and the propagation of the human race is then superfluous and senseless, inasmuch as its purpose is already attained. Besides, without any subjective passion, without lust and physical pressure, with sheer deliberation, and the cold-blooded purpose to place a human being in the world merely in order that he should be there—this would be such a very questionable moral action that few would take it upon themselves; one might even say of it indeed that it stood in the same relation to generation from the mere sexual impulse as a cold-blooded deliberate murder does to a death-stroke given in anger.

The condemnation of all unnatural sexual pleasures is based on the opposite ground; since though by these the impulse is satisfied, that is, the Will-to-Live is affirmed, propagation is eliminated through which alone the possibility of the negation of the Will is maintained. From this is to be explained that it was not before the appearance of Christianity, whose tendency is ascetic, that pederasty was recognized as a deadly sin.

A cloister is an assemblage of human beings who have embraced poverty, chastity, obedience (*i.e.*, the surrender of the individual Will), and who seek through living together to lighten partly the existence itself, but still more this state of severe renunciation, since the sight of those holding like views and surrendering themselves in a similar manner

strengthens their resolution and consoles them, inasmuch as the companionship of common living, within certain limits, is suited to human nature and affords innocent recreation amid many severe sacrifices. This is the normal conception of the cloister. And who can call such a society a union of fools and idiots, as one must do according to any philosophy but mine?

The inner spirit and meaning of the genuine cloister-life, as of ascetism generally, is this: That one has recognized oneself as worthy and capable of a better existence than ours is, and desires to maintain and strengthen this conviction by despising what this world offers, by casting away from us all its pleasures as worthless, by awaiting the end of this our life deprived of its empty bait in rest and confidence, in order that when at last the hour of death comes we may welcome it as that of emancipation. Saniassism has entirely the same tendency and significance, as also the monasticism of the Buddhists. Certainly in no case does practice so seldom conform to theory as in that of Monasticism, simply because its fundamental conception is so exalted, and *abusus optimi pessimus*. A true monk is a being in the highest degree honourable. But in by far the majority of cases the cowl is a mere mask, behind which there is as little of the real monk as there is in one at a masquerade.

The notion of devoting and surrendering the individual Will entirely and without reserve to that of another is a physical means of facilitating the negation of one's own Will, and therefore a suitable allegorical vehicle of the truth.

The number of regular Trappists is indeed small, yet notwithstanding this the half of mankind consists of *unwilling Trappists*. Poverty, obedience, lack of all enjoy-

ments, or even of the most necessary comforts, often combined with compulsory chastity, or one brought about through defect, is their lot. The distinction is merely that the Trappists conduct the thing of their own free choice, methodically and without hope of betterment, while the other class are to be reckoned to that which I in my æsthetic chapters have designated by the expression δεύτερος πλοῦς; to effect which nature has already sufficiently taken her measures through the fundamental principles of her order, particularly if one reckons to the evils directly springing from the latter those others which the dissension and malice of man produce in war and in peace. But precisely this necessity of involuntary suffering for eternal salvation is expressed in that saying of the Saviour (Matth. xix. 24): "εὐκοπώτερόν ἐστι κάμηλον διὰ τρυπήματος ῥαφίδος διελθεῖν, ἢ πλούσιον εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰσελθεῖν." ("Facilius est, funem ancorarium per foramen acus transire, quam divitem regnum divinum ingredi.") Those there are who have taken their eternal salvation with great seriousness, have voluntarily chosen poverty when fate had denied it to them, and when they had been born in wealth. Thus Buddha, Sakya Muni who, born a prince, willingly took to the beggar's staff; and Francis of Assisi, the founder of the mendicant orders, who as a young gallant at the ball where the daughters of the notables were sitting together, when asked: "Now Mr. Francis, will you not soon find a choice amongst these beauties?" replied, "I have selected for myself one much more beautiful!" "Who?" "La poverta!" Upon which he soon afterwards left everything, and wandered through the land begging.

He who through such considerations has realized how necessary to our salvation sorrow and suffering mostly are; he will recognize that we should envy others not so much on account of their happiness as of their unhappiness.

For the same reason the stoicism of the view which defies fate is indeed a good armour against the sorrows of life, and serviceable for making the present better to be borne; but it stands opposed to the true salvation. For it hardens the heart. How shall this latter be bettered by suffering, if, covered by a strong coating, it does not feel it? For the rest, a certain degree of stoicism is not very rare. It may be affected and turn out to be *bonne mine au mauvais jeu.* Where, however, it is genuine, it arises mostly from mere feelinglessness, from a lack of energy, brightness, sensibility, and imagination, which are requisite to a heartfelt sorrow. The phlegma and heaviness of the Germans are especially favourable to this kind of stoicism.

Unjust or malicious actions are, in respect of those who perform them, signs of the strength of the affirmation of their Will-to-Live, and accordingly of the distance which separates them from the true salvation which consists in its negation, and therewith in emancipation from the world; and hence of the long school of understanding and of suffering which they have to pass through before they reach it. But in respect of him who has to suffer through the above actions, they are, although physically an evil, metaphysically a good, and at bottom a benefit, since they help to lead him to his true salvation.

World-Spirit. Here then is the measure of thy labour and thy suffering; for this must thou exist as all other things exist.

Man. But what have I from existence? If I am occupied I have trouble; if I am unoccupied tedium; How canst thou offer me for so much labour and so much suffering such a miserable reward?

World-Spirit. And yet it is an equivalent for all thy

troubles and all thy sorrows; and it is this precisely by reason of its emptiness.

Man. Indeed? That really exceeds my powers of comprehension.

World-Spirit. I know it. (*Aside.*) Ought I to tell him that the value of life consists exactly in that it teaches him not to wish for it? For this highest dedication life itself must prepare him.

If now, we can, through considerations such as the above, that is to say from a very high standpoint, see a justification for the sorrows of mankind, this does not extend to the animals, whose sorrows, caused indeed in great measure by human beings, but also without their co-operation, are considerable. (Compare "World as Will and Presentment," 3rd ed., vol. ii., p. 404, seq.) The question therefore arises: Wherefore this tormented anxious Will in such thousandfold shapes without the freedom of emancipation which is conditioned by reflection? The suffering of the animal world is to be justified merely from the fact that the Will-to-live, because out of itself in the phenomenal world, finds nothing to hand, and since it is a hungry Will must devour its own flesh. Hence the scale of its phenomena, each step of which lives at the cost of another. For the rest I refer the reader to my "Contributions to the Doctrine of the Suffering of the World," in which will be found demonstrated that the capacity for suffering in the animal is much less than in the man. What might be added further than this might appear hypothetical or even mythical, and may thus be left to the private speculation of the reader himself.

ON THE METAPHYSICS OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND ON ÆSTHETICS.

AS I have entered with sufficient thoroughness in my chief work into the subject of the Platonic ideas, and their correlate the pure subject of knowledge, I should consider it superfluous to return to it again here did I not bear in mind that this is an investigation which has never been undertaken in the same sense before me, for which reason it is better to hold nothing back which might at some time be welcome by way of elucidation. In this I of course assume an acquaintance with the previous discussions.

The true problem of the Metaphysics of the Beautiful may be very simply expressed: How is satisfaction and pleasure in an object possible without any reference of the same to our Will?

Everyone feels that pleasure and satisfaction in a thing can only, properly speaking, arise in their relation to our Will, or, as people are fond of expressing it, to our purposes; so that pleasure without excitement of the Will seems to be a contradiction. Nevertheless the Beautiful as such obviously excites our satisfaction, our pleasure, without having any reference to our personal ends, that is, to our Will.

My solution has been that in the Beautiful we always apprehend the essential and original forms of living and lifeless nature, in other words, Plato's Ideas of it, and that

this apprehension has for its condition, its essential correlate, the *Will-free Subject of Knowledge, i.e.*, a pure intelligence without objects and purposes. In this way the Will vanishes entirely out of the consciousness on the entry of an Æsthetic apprehension, and Will alone is the source of all our sorrows and sufferings. This is the origin of the satisfaction and the pleasure which accompanies the apprehension of the Beautiful; it rests therefore on the withdrawal of the whole possibility of suffering. Should it be objected that the possibility of pleasure would also be abolished thereby, it should be remembered that, as I have often explained, happiness, contentment, is of a *negative* nature, merely the end of a suffering, and that pain is, on the contrary, positive. There remains therefore on the disappearance of all Willing from consciousness, the state of pleasure notwithstanding, that is, the absence of all pain, and here even the absence of the possibility of it, inasmuch as the individual is transformed into a pure knowing and no longer willing Subject, and, nevertheless, remains conscious of himself and his activity as such. As we know, the World as Will is the first (*ordini prior*) and the World as Presentment is the second World (*ordini posterior*). The former is the World of longing, and therefore of pain and thousandfold woe. But the latter is in itself essentially painless; besides containing a noteworthy spectacle significant throughout and at least amusing. Æsthetic pleasure consists in its enjoyment.[1] To become pure subject of knowledge means to be quit of oneself. The pure subject of knowledge enters in when one forgets oneself by sinking oneself entirely in the perceived objects, so that they alone remain in the consciousness. But because, for the most part,

[1] The complete satisfaction, the final quietude, the really desirable state, is only presented to us in imagery, in the work of art, in the poem, in music. From this, however, one might acquire the confidence that it must be existent somewhere.

men cannot do this, they are incapable of the purely objective apprehension of things, which constitutes the gift of the artist.

If, however, the individual Will leaves the faculty of presentment with which it is accompanied, free for a time, and dispenses it entirely for the nonce from the service for which it arose and exists, so that it leaves on one side its care for the Will or its own person, which alone is its natural theme, and hence its regular occupation,—yet, notwithstanding this, does not cease to be energetically active and to clearly apprehend the perceptual with full attention,—it will then become perfectly objective, that is, will become the true mirror of the object, or, more accurately, the medium of the objectivation of the Will, which presents itself in every object, whose innermost nature now stands out in it the more completely and exhaustively as the perception is longer kept up. In this way only arises with the pure subject the pure object, *i.e.*, the complete manifestation of the Will appearing in the perceived object, which is precisely the Platonic idea of the same. But the apprehension of such, demands that, in the contemplation of an object, I should really abstract from its place in time and space, and thereby from its individuality. For it is this place, which is always determined by the law of causality, which places me as individual in some sort of relation to the said object; hence only by getting rid of this place the object becomes *idea*, and at the same time I become pure subject of knowledge. For this reason every painting, by the very fact that it fixes for ever the fleeting moment, and thus takes it out of time, gives us not the individual but the idea, that which endures amid all change. But the condition of the change supposed in subject-object, is not only that the knowing faculty is withdrawn from its original servitude and is left entirely to itself, but also that

it remains active notwithstanding with its whole energy, in spite of the fact that the natural spur of its activity, the impulse of the Will, now fails it. Here lies the difficulty, and in this the rarity of the thing; because all our thinking and doing, our hearing and seeing, by its nature stands always mediately or immediately in the service of our countless personal ends, greater and smaller, and accordingly it is the Will which spurs on the knowing faculty to the carrying out of its function, without which impulse it is at once wearied. Moreover the knowledge awakened by this impulse is quite sufficient for practical life, and even for the special sciences, which are always directed to the relations of things and never to their special inner nature; hence all their cognitions proceed on the clue of the principle of cause, which is the element of relations. Everywhere, therefore, where the question hinges on the knowledge of cause and effect, or other forms of ground and consequence, that is, in all branches of natural science and of mathematics, as also of history or of inventions, etc., the knowledge sought for must be a *purpose of the Will*, and the more eagerly it strives after it the sooner it will be attained. Similarly in affairs of State, in war, in the business of finance or trade, in intrigues of every kind, and so forth, the Will must first compel the intellect by the intensity of its longing to strain all its powers, in order, in the case in question, to get on the exact track of all its grounds and consequences. It is indeed astonishing how far the spur of the Will can drive a given intellect beyond the accustomed measure of its powers. Hence, for all distinguished achievements in such things, not merely a clever or well-balanced head, but also an energetic Will is required, which must first impel the former to the laborious strain and restless activity without which such achievements are not to be carried out.

Quite otherwise is it with the apprehension of the objec-

tive original nature of things which constitutes their Platonic Idea, and must be at the foundation of every achievement in the fine arts. The Will, namely, which was there so requisite and, indeed, indispensable, must here remain entirely out of play; for here that only is valid which the intellect achieves by itself, and out of its own resources, and which it produces as a free-will offering. Here everything must go of itself; the understanding must be active without purpose, and consequently without Will. For only in the state of *pure cognition*, where the Will and its purposes, and therewith the individuality, is quite removed from the man, can that purely objective perception arise in which the Platonic Ideas of things are apprehended. But it must always be such an apprehension that precedes the conception, that is, the first intuitive knowledge, which afterwards constitutes, properly speaking, the true material and kernel, or as it were the soul, of the genuine work of art, of a poem, or, indeed, of a true philosophy. The unpurposed, unintentional, and, indeed, partly unconscious and instinctive character which has always been observed in works of genius, is the consequence of the fact that the primal artistic knowledge is separate and independent—a Will-free, Will-less knowledge. And precisely because the Will is the true man, one ascribes this knowledge to a being distinct from him—to wit, to a genius. A knowledge of this kind has, as has often been explained by me, not even the principle of cause for its clue, and is in this respect the antithesis of the first. By virtue of its objectivity the genius perceives by *reflection* all that which others do not see. This gives him the capacity as poet, of describing nature so realistically and vividly, or as painter of portraying it.

In the carrying out of the work, on the other hand, where the communication and presentation of what is already known is the aim, the Will can and, indeed, must

be again active, inasmuch as a purpose is present. The principle of cause therefore dominates here once more, in accordance with which artistic means are properly subordinated to artistic ends. Thus the painter is occupied with the correctness of his drawing and the treatment of his colours; the poet with the arrangement of his plan, and subsequently with expression and metre.

But because the intellect has sprung from the Will it presents itself objectively as brain—that is, as a part of the body which is the objectivation of the Will. Because the intellect is originally determined to the service of the Will the activity natural to it is of the kind above described, when it remains true to the natural form of its cognitions expressed by the principle of cause, and is brought into and maintained in activity by the Will, the original element in man. On the contrary, knowledge of the second kind is for it an unnatural and abnormal activity: it is conditioned, therefore, by a distinctly abnormal and hence very rare excess of intellect, and of its objective phenomenon, the brain, over the rest of the organism, and beyond that which the purposes of the Will demand. Just because this excessive intellect is abnormal the phenomena arising from it at times resemble madness.

The understanding is therefore untrue to its origin, the Will. The intellect which has arisen merely for the service of the Will, and with almost all men remains in that service, in which and in its product its life is consumed, is in all the arts and sciences illegitimately used; and in this use is placed the progress and the honour of the Human Race. In another way it can even turn itself against the Will, inasmuch as in the phenomena of holiness it abolishes the latter.

For the rest, the above purely objective apprehension of the world and of things which, as their primal cognition lies at the foundation of every artistic, poetic, and purely

philosophical conception is, as well on objective as on subjective grounds, only a passing one, partly because the requisite strain of attention cannot be maintained, partly because the course of the world does not allow of our remaining throughout, like the philosopher, according to the definition of Pythagoras, passive and indifferent spectators therein, since each must co-operate in the great puppet-play of life, and almost always feels the wire by means of which he is connected with it and is set in motion.

As regards, however, the *objective* of such æsthetic perception—in other words, the Platonic Idea—this may be described as that which we should have before us if Time, the formal and subjective condition of our knowledge, were removed, like the glass out of a kaleidoscope. We see, for example, the development of bud, blossom, and fruit, and are astonished at the active force which never wearies of carrying through this series anew. This astonishment would leave us if we could recognize that in all this change we only have the one and unalterable Idea of the plant before us, which, as a unity of bud, blossom, and fruit, we are incapable of perceiving, but are obliged to cognize by means of the form of time, whereby the Idea is expounded to our intellect in those successive states.

If one considers, that poetry, no less than the plastic arts, invariably takes an *individual* for its theme, in order to portray such with the greatest exactness, with all the specialities of its individuality down to the most insignificant; and if we then look back on the sciences which work by means of *conceptions*, each of which is represented by countless individuals, inasmuch as it determines and indicates the speciality of its whole kind once for all, we might on this consideration be inclined to regard the pursuit of Art as insignificant, small, and even

childish. But the essence of Art supposes that its one case answers for thousands, since what it intends by the careful and detailed portrayal of the individual is the revelation of the *Idea* of its kind. So that, for example, an event, a scene of human life described accurately and fully, that is, with complete presentment of the individuals involved therein, brings the Idea of humanity itself to our knowledge in all its clearness and depth. For, as the botanist plucks a single flower from the infinite wealth of the plant-world, and then dissects it in order to demonstrate to us the nature of the plant as such; so the poet takes from the endless confusion of the tide of human life, everywhere on-rushing with ceaseless motion, a single scene, and sometimes even merely a mood or feeling, in order to show us what the life and being of man is. For this reason we find the greatest minds—Shakespeare and Goethe, Raphael and Rembrandt—esteem it not unworthy of themselves to present and realize for us a not even striking individual in his whole speciality, down to the smallest detail, with the greatest accuracy and the most careful industry. For only perceptually is the special and particular grasped. I have defined poetry, for the above reason, as the art of setting the imagination in play through words.

If one desires to feel immediately, and thereby to become conscious of what an advantage perceptual knowledge as the primary and fundamental has over the abstract, as Art reveals more to us than any science can do, one should contemplate either in nature, or through the medium of Art, a beautiful and mobile human countenance beaming with expression. What a much deeper insight than any words, or than the abstractions they indicate, into the essence of man, and indeed of nature generally, does not this give us? It may be remarked here, by the way, that what for a beautiful landscape is the sudden bursting

forth of sunshine from the clouds, such for a beautiful face is the appearance of its laughter. Therefore, *ridete, puellæ, ridete!*

That, however, which makes a *picture* more readily than a reality convey to us the apprehension of a (Platonic) Idea,—in other words, that by which the picture stands nearer the Idea than the reality does,—is, generally speaking, this, that the work of Art is an object which has already passed through a subject, and is hence for the mind what animal nourishment—the already assimilated vegetable—is for the body.

But more closely considered, the matter rests upon the fact that the work of plastic art does not, like the reality, show us something which only once exists and never again, —the combination, namely, of *this* matter with *this* form, which combination constitutes the concrete, the true individual,—but that it shows us the form *alone*, which, if only given perfectly and on all its sides, is the Idea itself. The picture leads us, therefore, directly away from the individual to the mere form. This separation of the form from the matter of itself brings the presentment nearer the Idea. Every image is such a separation, whether it be picture or statue. Hence this separation, this severance of the form from the matter, belongs to the character of an æsthetic work of art, because its object is to bring us to a knowledge of a (Platonic) *Idea*. It is *essential*, therefore, to the work of art to give the form alone, without the matter, and to do this indeed openly and avowedly. Herein lies the true reason why wax figures make no æsthetic impression, and are therefore not works of art (in the æsthetic sense); although when well made they produce a hundred times greater illusion than the best picture or statue can do; and hence, if illusive imitation of the Real were the purpose of Art, they would have to occupy the first rank.

They seem, however, to give not merely the form, but the matter as well, and hence produce the illusion that one has the thing itself before one. Thus, unlike the true work of art, which leads us away from that which exists only once and never again, *i.e.*, the individual, to that which is there continuously through endless times, and in endless number, in short, to the mere form or Idea; the wax figure gives us apparently the individual itself, that, namely, which exists once and never again, yet without the only thing which lends to such a transitory existence its value—to wit, without life. Hence the wax figure excites a shudder, its effect being that of a stiff corpse.

One might imagine that it was only the statue which gave the form without the matter, but the painting the matter as well, inasmuch as by means of colour it imitates the matter and its structure. This would only mean, however, the form understood in a purely geometrical sense, which is not what was here meant. For in a philosophical sense form is the antithesis of matter, and embraces, therefore, colour, surface, texture, and, in short, all qualities.

The statue certainly is the only thing which gives the geometrical form alone, displaying it in an obviously foreign matter—marble, thereby clearly isolating the form. But the painting, on the other hand, gives no matter at all, but the mere appearance of the form, not in the geometrical but in the philosophical sense above stated. The form itself is not even given by the painting, but the mere appearance of the form, to wit, the mere effect on one sense, that of sight, and even this only from one point of view. The painting, therefore, does not so much as produce the illusion that one has the thing itself, *i.e.*, form and matter, before one, the deceptive truth of the painting always standing under certain admitted conditions of its mode of presentment. For example, the picture, through the un-

avoidable falling away of the parallax of our two eyes, shows the things as a one-eyed person would see them. Thus even the painting only furnishes the form, while it only presents the effect of the latter one-sidedly, that is, for the eye alone. The above reasons why the work of art raises us more easily than the reality to the apprehension of a (Platonic) Idea, will be found expounded in the second volume of my chief work (chap. xxx., p. 370; 3rd ed., p. 420).

The following is akin to the foregoing considerations, in which, in the meantime, the form is again to be understood in a geometrical sense. Black copper-plate engravings and etchings bespeak a nobler and more elevated taste than coloured engravings and water-colours, though the latter appeal more to the less cultivated taste. This is obviously on account of the fact that the black representations give the *form* alone, as it were *in abstracto*, the apprehension of which is (as we know) intellectual, that is, a matter of the contemplative understanding. The colour, on the other hand, is merely a matter of the sense-organ, and, indeed, of a special arrangement in it (qualitative divisibility of the activity of the retina). In this respect one may compare the coloured copper engraving to rhymed verses, the black to those merely metrical; see as regards these, the relation between them given in my chief work (vol. ii., chap. xxxvii., p. 427; 3rd ed., p. 486).

That the impressions which we acquire in youth are so significant, and that in the dawn of life everything appears so idealistically, arises from the fact that then the individual makes us first acquainted with its kind, which is quite new to us, and that in consequence every individual represents its kind for us. We accordingly apprehend in it the (Platonic) Idea of this kind, which beauty, as such, essentially is.

"Beautiful" ("*schön*") is undoubtedly connected with the English *to show*, and ought therefore to be *showy*, that which is to be seen, *what shows well*, what displays itself well; in short, the strikingly visible, and therefore the clear expression of significant (Platonic) Ideas.

"Picturesque ("*malerisch*") means at bottom the same as "*beautiful*" ("*schön*"); for it is attributed to that which displays itself in such wise, that it clearly proclaims the Idea of its kind. It is for this reason suitable for the representation of the painter, which is directed towards the portrayal, the setting forth, of the Ideas which constitute the objective in the Beautiful.

The Beauty and grace of the human form, in combination, are the clearest visibility of the Will on the highest stage of its manifestation, and therefore the highest achievement of the plastic art. Meanwhile, assuredly, as I have said (*Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. i., § 41), every natural thing is beautiful; for instance, every animal. If this does not appear obvious to us with some animals, it is because we are not in a position to consider them purely objectively, and thereby to apprehend their Idea, but are led away from it by some unavoidable association of thoughts, mostly in consequence of an obtrusive similarity, *e.g.*, that of the apes with man, whereby we do not apprehend the Idea of the animal, but only the caricature of a man. In the same way the similarity of the toad with filth and slime seems to act. This does not, however, suffice to explain the unbounded revulsion, the horror and loathing, which comes upon some persons at the sight of these animals, as with others at that of spiders; which would seem rather to have its foundation in a much deeper and more mysterious metaphysical connection. The circumstance that formerly these animals have been wont to be used for sympathetic cures (and evil charms), that is, for

magical purposes, confirms this opinion. Thus the fever is driven away by a spider enclosed in a nut-shell, and worn round the neck of the patient till it is dead; or, in the case of great danger of death, a toad is laid in the urine of the patient, in a well-closed receptacle, and at midday, precisely at the stroke of twelve, is buried in the cellar of the house. The slow torture of such animals demands, nevertheless, a punishment from eternal justice. This, again, affords an explanation of the assumption that he who practises magic makes himself over to the devil.

Inorganic nature, in so far as it does not consist in water, when it displays itself without anything organic, has a very sad and depressing effect upon us. Instances of this are to be found in districts which merely afford barren rock-scenery, especially the long rocky plane without any vegetation near Toulon, through which the road to Marseilles leads; the African deserts furnish such instances on a larger scale and much more impressively. The sadness which this impression of the inorganic makes upon us arises from the fact that the inorganic mass exclusively obeys the law of gravity, according to the direction of which everything lies. On the other hand, the appearance of vegetation pleases us directly and in a very high degree; but naturally the more, the richer, the more varied, the more extended, and the more it is left to itself. The most immediate ground of this lies in that in vegetation the law of gravity appears as superseded, inasmuch as the plant-world lifts itself in an opposite direction to that of gravitation. Therein the phenomenon of life proclaims itself as a new and higher order of things. We ourselves belong to it; it is related to us, it is the element of our existence. Our heart is therefore opened by it. Primarily, then, it is its erect attitude which delights us at once in the plant-world; hence a cluster of

trees gains immensely if a pair of straight fir-trees shoot their tops out from its midst. On the other hand, a pollard has no longer such an effect upon us; a tree grown crooked less than a straight one: the low-hanging branches of the weeping-willow, succumbing as they do to gravity, have procured it this name. Water does away with the sadness of its inorganic character, to a great extent, by its great mobility, which gives it an appearance of life, and by its continual play of light; besides which, it is the primal condition of all life, In addition to this, what so delights us in the appearance of vegetable nature, is the expression of rest, peace, and satisfaction which it bears; while animal nature mostly displays itself before us in a state of unrest, of distress, and indeed of conflict. Hence it is that it succeeds so readily in transforming us into the state of pure cognition which frees us from ourselves.

It is surprising to see how vegetable nature, in itself of the most commonplace and insignificant character, immediately groups and displays itself beautifully and picturesquely, when once it is removed from the influence of human caprice. Thus it is with every spot which is removed from, or which has not yet been reached by, cultivation, even though it only bears thistles, thorns, and the commonest meadow flowers. On the other hand, in cornfields and market-gardens the æsthetic of the plant-world sinks to the *minimum*.

It has long been recognized, that every work intended for human purposes—thus every utensil and every building—in order to be beautiful, must bear a certain similarity to the works of Nature; but the error lies in thinking that this must be a direct one, and must lie immediately in the forms, so that pillars should represent trees, or even human figures; or vessels should be shaped like shells, or snails, or the calices of flowers, and that

everywhere vegetable or animal forms should appear. The similarity ought, on the contrary, to be not a direct but an indirect one, *i.e.*, should lie not in the forms, but in the character of the forms, which may be the same even with a complete difference in the forms themselves. Buildings and utensils should accordingly not be imitated from Nature, but created in the spirit of Nature. This is the case when every thing and every portion of a thing answers to its purpose so directly that it at once proclaims it; which occurs, insofar as it achieves it by the shortest route and in the most simple manner. This obvious adaptation of means to ends is the character of the product of Nature; the Will it is true, in this case, works from within outwards, and has mastered the whole of the matter; while in the human work, acting from without, it attains its object and expresses itself through the medium of the perception, and even of a conception of the purpose of the thing, and then through the overcoming of an alien matter, a matter, that is, which originally expressed another Will; but notwithstanding this, the given character of the product of Nature may be retained therein. Ancient architecture shows this in the exact proportion of its part or member to its immediate purpose, which it naïvely expresses in this manner, and in the absence of all purposelessness—in direct opposition to the Gothic architecture, which owes its dark and mysterious appearance precisely to its many purposeless ornaments and nick-nacks, inasmuch as we attribute to them a purpose unknown to us; or, indeed, any completely decayed style of architecture which, affecting originality, plays with the means of art whose ends it does not understand by all sorts of unnecessary twists and arbitrary frivolities; and the same applies to antique vases, whose beauty arises from the fact that they express in such a naïve manner what they are intended to be and to achieve. The same with the other uten-

sils of the ancients. One feels with them, that if Nature had produced vases, amphora, lamps, tables, chairs, helmets, shields, armour, &c., they would look like that. On the other hand, look at the richly-gilded porcelain vessels, together with the female dress, &c., of modern times, which, in that it has exchanged the style of antiquity, already introduced, for the miserable rococo style, has exposed its contemptible spirit, and branded itself on the forehead for all time. For this is by no means a small thing; but it stamps the spirit of our age. A confirmation of it is given by its literature, the mutilation of the German language by ignorant ink-slingers, who, in their brazen impudence, treat it in the same way as Vandals works of art, and are allowed to do so unpunished.

The origin of the fundamental idea for a work of art has been very accurately described as a *conception*, for just as procreation is to the origin of man, so is it the most essential to it. And like the latter, it requires not so much time as opportunity and mood. The Object in general, namely, exercises, as it were, as male, a continuous act of procreation on the Subject, the female. This is, however, only fruitful at particularly happy moments, and with favoured subjects. But when it is so, there arises out of it a new, original thought, which lives on. And just as with physical procreation, its fruitfulness depends much more on the female than on the male side. If the latter (the Subject) be in a receptive mood, almost every object now falling within its apperception will begin to speak to it, *i.e.*, to create in it a vivid, penetrating, and original thought. Hence, at times, the aspect of an unimportant object or event has become the germ of a great and beautiful work. As, for example, Jacob Boehme, by the sudden glance at a tin vessel, was thrown into a state of illumination and introduced into the innermost depths of Nature. Everything

turns at last everywhere on one's own force; and as no food or medicine imparts vital force, or can replace it, so no book or study can supply the original mind.

An improvisator is a man who *omnibus horis sapit*, inasmuch as he carries about with him a complete and well-assorted magazine of commonplaces of every kind, which does prompt service for every want, according to the circumstances of the case and the opportunity, and affords *ducentos versos, stans pede in uno.*

A man who undertakes to live by the grace of the Muses, I mean from his poetical gifts, strikes me as being like a girl who lives by her charms. Both alike profane, for base livelihood, what should be the free gift of their innermost. Both alike suffer an exhaustion, and both will probably end disgracefully. Do not therefore degrade your muse to a whore, but let

> "I sing, as sings the bird
> Who in the branches dwells
> The song that from his throat is heard,
> Reward that richly tells,"

be the motto of the poet. For poetic gifts belong to the holidays not to the working-days of life. Hence, even if they should be felt to be somewhat oppressed and limited by an occupation which the poet carries on at the same time, they may still prosper along with it; for the poet does not need great acquirements and learning, like the philospher; indeed, poetic gifts are condensed by the former just as they are diluted by too much leisure and by being carried on *ex professo*. The philosopher, on the contrary, cannot well carry on another occupation for the foregoing reason; and since money-making has other and well-known drawbacks to philosophy, on which account the ancients made it the mark of the sophist in opposition to

the philosopher, Solomon is to be praised when he says: "Wisdom is good with an inheritance, and rejoiceth a man under the sun."

That we have the *Classics* of antiquity, *i.e.*, minds whose writings pass down through thousands of years in the undiminished glow of youth, is largely attributable to the fact, that with the ancients the writing of books was not a livelihood occupation. But by this alone is the fact to be explained that there are no bad works of those Classics alongside of the good ones—since they did not, like even the best of the moderns, after the spirit had evaporated, carry the phlegm to market, in order to turn it into money.

Music is the true universal language everywhere understood. Hence it is ceaselessly spoken, with much seriousness and zeal, and a significant and telling melody soon finds its way round the globe; while one that is poor and says nothing is soon hushed, and dies out—which proves that the content of melody is very easily comprehensible.

It speaks, nevertheless, not of things, but simply of weal and woe, which are the sole realities for the Will. Hence it says so much to the heart, while to the head it has *directly* nothing to say, and it is an abuse if this is required of it, as happens in all programme-music, which is therefore unconditionally to be rejected, even although Hadyn and Beethoven have been led astray by it—which Mozart and Rossini, to my knowledge, never were. For expression of the passions is one thing, painting of things another.

The grammar of this universal language is also regulated in the most precise manner, although only since Rameau laid the foundation. On the other hand, to decipher the lexicon, I mean the undoubted significance of its content, above referred to, *i.e.*, to make comprehensible to the

Reason, if only in general, what it is that music says, in melody and harmony, and what it is talking about, this no one has ever attempted to do, until I undertook it—all which proves how extremely little men are disposed to reflection and thought, and with what absence of consideration they go through life. Their object is everywhere simply to enjoy, and that with as little expenditure of thought as possible. Their nature is responsible for this. Hence it appears so comical when they think they must play the philosopher, as may be seen in the case of our professors of philosophy with their magnificent works, and the uprightness of their zeal for philosophy and truth.

Speaking generally and popularly, one may venture to say music itself is melody, to which the world is the text. But its special meaning was first given in my exposition of music.

The relation, however, of the musical art to the specific exterior always imposed upon it, such as text, action, march, dance, religious or secular festivity, &c., is analogous to the relation of architecture as fine art, that is, art directed to purely æsthetic purposes, with the real buildings which it has to erect, and with the utilitarian purposes of which, therefore, it has to attempt to combine its own. This it does, in that it accomplishes these under the conditions which the former impose upon it, and accordingly produces a temple, a palace, an emporium, a playhouse, &c., in such a way that it is at once beautiful in itself and suitable for its end, and indeed proclaims this end itself through its æsthetic character. Music stands in an analogous though not equally unavoidable servitude to the text, or to the other realities imposed upon it. It must, in the first place, adapt itself to the text, although it does not require the latter, and indeed without it could move much more freely. Yet it must not only accommodate its every note

to the length of its word and its meaning, but assume throughout a certain homogeneity therewith, and bear the character of the end arbitrarily imposed upon it, and accordingly be ecclesiastical, operatic, military, dance music, &c. But all this is as foreign to its nature as human utilitarian considerations are to purely æsthetic architecture; and hence both have to subordinate themselves to the foreign conditions imposed upon them. This is almost always unavoidable in architecture, but not in music, which moves freely in the concerto, the sonata, and above all in the symphony, its noblest arena, on which it celebrates its saturnalia.

The false path whereon our music is bent is analagous to that which was pursued by the Roman architecture under the later emperors, where the overloading with decorations, partly concealed and partly perverted the simple and essential proportions. It offers, that is, much noise, many instruments, much art, but very few clear, penetrating, and comprehensive ideas, in the shallow, say-nothing, melodyless compositions of the present day; the same taste, again, allows itself to be pleased with the unclear, aimless, nebulous, incomprehensible and senseless literary style, the origin of which is to be sought chiefly in our miserable Hegelism and its charlatanry. In the compositions of the present time more account is taken of harmony than of melody. I am, on the contrary, of the opposite opinion, and hold melody to be the kernel of music, to which harmony is related as the sauce to the roast meat.

Grand opera is not properly a creation of the pure artistic sense, but rather of the somewhat barbaric notion of the production of æsthetic pleasure by means of a heaping up of appliances, by the simultaneity of totally distinct impressions, and the strengthening of the effect by the increase of the operative masses and forces. Music, on the

contrary (as the most powerful of all the arts), is capable by itself of completely occupying the mind receptive to it. Its highest productions indeed, in order to be adequately apprehended and enjoyed, require the whole undivided and undistracted attention, in order that it may surrender itself to them, and sink itself in them, so that it may really understand the incredible inwardness of its language. Instead of this, during the performance of a highly complicated opera music, the mind is acted on through the eye by means of a brilliant spectacle, fantastic images, and gay impressions of light and colour, in addition to which the plot of the piece occupies it. By all this it is drawn away, distracted and deadened, and thus rendered as little as possible receptive for the holy, mysterious, inward language of tones. In this way, therefore, the attainment of the musical purpose is directly counteracted. In addition to these things comes the ballet, a spectacle often more directed to lasciviousness than to æsthetic pleasure, and which besides, by the narrow range of its materials, and the monotony arising therefrom, soon becomes to the last degree tedious, and thereby contributes to exhaust the patience—especially since by the wearisome repetition, often lasting a quarter of an hour, of the same inferior dance-melody, the musical sense is fatigued and deadened, so that, for the musical impressions of a more serious and higher character which follow, there is no more receptivity left.

It is possible, although a purely musical mind does not require it, notwithstanding that the true language of tones is self-sufficient, and demands no outside help, that it may be associated with and superimposed upon words, or even an action, carried out visibly, in order that our perceptive and reflective intellect, which does not like to be entirely idle, may obtain an easy and analogous occupation. In this way, indeed, the attention is more firmly riveted

on the music, and follows it better; for a perceptual image is to that which the tones proclaim in their universal imageless language of the heart, as the schema or as an example is to a universal concept; such indeed may enhance the impression of the music. It should nevertheless be held within the limits of the greatest simplicity, for otherwise it directly counteracts the main musical purpose.

The excessive heaping up of vocal and instrumental parts in the opera acts indeed in a musical way, yet the enhancement of the effect from the mere quartette to the orchestra with its hundred parts, does not bear any proportion to the increase of the means. For the chord cannot have more than three, or in one case four, notes, and the mind can never apprehend more at once, no matter by how many parts in different octaves these three or four notes may be given. From all this it is explicable how a beautiful well-rendered music of four parts often more deeply moves than the whole opera seria, whose quintessence it furnishes, just as the drawing is sometimes more effective than the oil-painting. What, however, depresses the effect of the quartette chiefly is, that the extension of the harmony, that is, the distance of two or more octaves between the bass and the lowest of the three upper parts, such as from the depths of the double bass, is always at the service of the orchestra, is wanting, though the effect, even in this case, is immensely enhanced if a powerful organ with a pedal reaching to the lowest point of audibility plays the ground bass throughout, as is the case in the Catholic church at Dresden. For only in this way does the harmony produce its full effect. But speaking generally, simplicity, which is usually attached to truth, is an essential law of all art, of all that is beautiful, of all intellectual representation; at least it is always dangerous to depart from it.

Strictly speaking, one might call the opera an unmusical invention for the sake of unmusical minds, into which music has to be first impressed by a medium foreign to it; for instance, as the accompaniment of a long spun-out vapid love story and its wishy-washy poetry; for the opera will not bear a condensed text full of intellect and thought, because the composition cannot attain to such. But to seek to make music merely the slave of bad poetry is a false path, which Glück largely traversed, and hence his opera-music, if we except his overtures, is not at all enjoyable apart from the words. One might even say the opera has become the curse of music. For not only must the latter bend and accommodate itself in order to be suited to the course and regulated procedure of a tasteless fable; not only is the mind withdrawn and distracted from the music by the childish and barbaric magnificence of the scenery and costumes, by the tricks of dancers, and the short skirts of ballet-girls; no, but even the song itself often disturbs the harmony, inasmuch as the *vox humana*, which musically regarded is an instrument like any other, will not co-ordinate and accommodate itself to the other parts, but tries to dominate absolutely. In the case of the soprano or alto, indeed, this does very well, because in this case the melody accrues to it essentially, and by nature. But in bass and tenor solos, the leading melody belongs mostly to the high instruments, in relation to which the song stands out like an unduly loud harmonic part which the melody seeks to outstrip. The accompaniment is contrapuntally transferred to the upper register, quite against the nature of music, in order to impart the melody to the tenor or bass voice, the ear, notwithstanding, always following the highest notes, namely, the accompaniment. I am really of the opinion that solo-arias with orchestral accompaniment are only suited to the alto or soprano, and that the men's voices should therefore only

be employed in duet with the former, or in pieces of many parts, unless they sing without any, or with a mere bass, accompaniment. Melody is the natural privilege of the highest voices, and must remain so. Hence it is, that when in an opera a soprano-aria follows on a forced and artificial baritone, or bass-aria, we are sensible at once of a satisfaction at the accordance of the former with nature and art. That great masters like Mozart and Rossini know how to mitigate, or indeed to overcome, the above obstacle, does not get rid of it.

The sung mass affords a much purer musical pleasure than the opera, because there the words are mostly unperceived, or, by endlessly repeated hallelujahs, glorias, eleisons, amens, &c., are reduced to a mere *solfeggio*, in which the music, only retaining the general ecclesiastical character, moves freely, and does not, as in the operatic song, find itself compromised in its own sphere by miseries of every kind. For this reason it can here develop all its forces unhindered, inasmuch as it has not the depressing puritanical or methodistical character of Protestant church-music, which makes it, like the Protestant morality, crawl on the earth—but soars freely with its great wings, like a seraph. Masses and symphonies alone give unalloyed and perfect musical enjoyment, while in the opera, music tortures itself with the shallow drama and its pseudo-poetry, and seeks to get on as well as it can with the alien burden which has been laid upon it. The mocking scorn with which the great Rossini at times has treated the text, if not exactly to be commended, is genuinely musical. But grand opera altogether, inasmuch as with its three hours' duration it more and more blunts our musical susceptibility, while at the same time the snail's course of a mostly very vapid action puts our patience to the test, is in itself essentially of a wearisome nature. This defect can only be overcome by the extraordinary excellence of the particular

performance, and therefore in this department only the masterpieces are enjoyable, and everything mediocre is abominable. The endeavour ought to be made to concentrate and contract the opera more, in order to limit it, wherever possible, to one act and one hour. In the full consciousness of this, they hit upon the bad device in the "Teatro della Valle" in Rome, at the time I was there, of making the acts of an opera and a comedy alternate with each other. The longest duration of an opera ought to be two hours; that of a drama three hours, because the attention and strain of mind required by the latter holds out longer, since it tires us much less than the ceaseless music, which at last becomes a nervous torture. For the foregoing reasons the last act of an opera is, as a rule, a penance to the audience, and a still greater one to the singers and musicians. One might accordingly think to have before one, here, a numerous assembly met together for the purpose of self-discipline, and following it out with endurance to the end, for which each has long silently sighed, with the exception of the deserters.

The overture ought to prepare us for the opera in announcing the character of the music, as well as the course of the action; this however should not be done too explicitly and plainly, but only as we foresee coming events in a dream.

A vaudeville may be compared to a man who parades in clothes which he has picked up second-hand; every article has already been worn by another, for whom it was made, whom it fitted, and by which we notice, moreover, that they do not belong to each other. It is like a harlequin's jacket, made of rags cut from the coats of honest people and sewn together,—a true musical monstrosity which ought to be forbidden by the police.

It is deserving of note, that in music the value of the composition outweighs that of the performance, while of tragedy it is exactly the converse which holds true. Thus a thoroughly good composition, if only moderately well (provided it be cleanly and correctly) performed, gives us more enjoyment than the most admirable rendering of a bad composition. On the other hand, a bad theatrical piece, executed by the very best players, has much more effect than the most admirable piece played by bunglers.

The function of an actor is to portray human nature according to its most varied sides, in a thousand widely differing characters, all however resting on the common ground of *his* individuality, which is given once for all, and never quite to be extinguished. On this account he must be himself a capable and quite complete specimen of human nature, or at least not so defective or deteriorated that, as Hamlet's expression has it, "He would seem not to be made by Nature herself, but by one of her journeymen." Notwithstanding this, an actor will better portray a character the nearer it stands to his own individuality, and best of all, one which coincides with the latter; hence even the worst player has one *rôle* which he plays well, for in it he is like a living face among masks.

A good actor requires (1) that he be a man who has the gift of being able to turn his inside outwards; (2) that he has sufficient imagination to conceive fictitious circumstances and events so vividly, that they move his innermost being; (3) that he possess intellect, experience, and education in a degree adequate to enable him sufficiently to understand human characters and relations.

"The struggle of man with Fate," which our vapid, hollow, puffed-up, and sickly-sweet modern æsthetes, for about fifty years past, have unanimously proclaimed as the universal theme of tragedy, has for its assumption the

freedom of the will, that fad of all the ignorant, together with the categorical imperative whose moral purposes or commands have to be accomplished in spite of fate; in all of which the aforesaid gentlemen find their edification. But besides this, the above-assumed theme of the tragedy is a ridiculous conception, if only because it would be a battle with an unseen opponent, a fight in a fog, against which, therefore, every blow struck would hit the air, and into whose arms one would fall in attempting to evade him, as happened to Lajus and Œdipus. Fate, moreover, is all-powerful, and hence to fight with it would be the most preposterous of all rashness, so that Byron is perfectly justified in saying—

> "To strive, too, with our fate, were such a strife
> As if the corn-sheaf should oppose the sickle."
>
> *Don Juan*, v. 17.

Shakespeare also understands the matter so—

> "Fate, show thy force: ourselves we do not owe;
> What is decreed must be, and be this so!"
>
> *Twelfth Night*, act i., the close.

Which verse it may be said, by the way, belongs to those extremely rare cases in which poetry gains by translation—

> "Jetzt kannst du deine Macht, O Schicksal, zeigen;
> Was sein soll muss geschehn, und Keiner ist sein eigen."

With the ancients, the conception of fate is that of a necessity hidden in the totality of things, which without any consideration either for our wishes or prayers, our guilt or desert, guides human affairs, and draws together by its secret bond even things outwardly most independent of each other, in order to bring them whither it will, so that their apparently fortuitous coincidence is in a higher sense necessary. As now by virtue of this necessity everything is pre-ordained (*fatum*), a foreknowledge of the same is possible through oracles, seers, dreams, &c.

Providence is the Christianized fate, in other words, fate transformed into the purpose of God directed towards the good of the world.

I regard the æsthetic purpose of the chorus in tragedy as, firstly, that side by side with the opinion which those chief persons who are agitated by the storm of passions have of things, that of quiet disinterested reflection should also come to a hearing; and secondly, that the essential moral of the piece displayed successively *in concreto* throughout its action, should at the same time be proclaimed as a reflection thereupon *in abstracto*, and consequently in brief. Acting in this way, the chorus resembles the bass in music, which, as a continuous accompaniment, allows us to perceive the fundamental note of each single chord of the progression.

As the strata of the earth show us in their impressions the forms of life of a world long past, which preserve throughout countless thousands of years the trace of a short existence, so the ancients have left us in their comedies a true and lasting impression of their bright life and activity, an impression so clear and exact, that it gives the appearance as though they had done it with the object of leaving as an inheritance to the latest posterity at least a lasting picture of the beautiful and noble existence whose transitoriness they bewailed. If we again fill out these hulls and forms, which tradition has delivered to us, with flesh and bone by the presentation of Plautus and Terence on the stage, this brisk life of the long past will again rise up before us, in its freshness and brightness, just as ancient Mosaic floorings, when wetted, stand out again in their old colours.

The only genuine German comedy which has proceeded from the nature and spirit of the nation, and which

portrays it, is, with the exception of the isolated instance of Minna von Barnhelm, the drama of Iffland. The characteristics of these pieces are, like those of the nation which they so truly depict, more moral than intellectual, while the opposite might be alleged of the English and French comedy. The Germans are so rarely original, that one ought not, when once in a way they are so, to pitch into them as Schiller and the Schlegels have done, who have been unjust to Iffland, and have even gone too far against Kotzebue. In the same way people are unjust to-day towards Raupach, while they spend their applause upon the trivialities of the most wretched twaddlers.

The drama generally as the most complete mirror of human existence, has a three-fold climax in its manner of apprehending it, and hence in its purport and pretensions. At the first and the most frequent stage, it stops at the merely interesting. Persons require our sympathy in pursuing their own purposes which are similar to ours. The action proceeds by means of the intrigue, the characters, and chance, wit and jest being the spice of the whole. At the second stage the drama is sentimental; sympathy with the hero, and indirectly with ourselves, is excited; the action becomes pathetic, but returns nevertheless to rest and satisfaction at the conclusion. At the highest and most difficult stage the end is the *tragical*. Severe suffering, the misery of existence, is brought before us, and the nothingness of all human endeavour is here the final result. We are deeply moved, and the revulsion of the will from life is excited in us, either directly or as the accompanying harmonic note.

The drama of political tendency coquetting with the momentary whims of the sweet populace, that favourite product of our modern *litterateurs*, I have naturally not taken into consideration; such pieces soon lie, often in the

following year, as dead as old almanacks. But this does not trouble the *littérateur;* for the appeal to his muse contains only one prayer: "Give us this day our daily bread."

Every beginning is difficult, it is said. In the dramatic art, however, the opposite holds good, every ending is difficult here. This is confirmed by the numberless dramas of which the first half goes well enough, but which then become obscure, halting, uncertain, especially in the notorious fourth act, and finally peter out either in a forced, or in an unsatisfactory end, or in an end which everyone has long foreseen—occasionally, indeed, as in "Emilia Galotti" —in one which produces indignation and sends the onlooker home disgusted. This difficulty of the winding up rests partly on the fact that it is always easier to entangle affairs than to disentangle them; but partly also upon the fact, that at the beginning we leave the poet *carte blanche*, while at the end we make definite demands upon him. It has that is, to be either altogether happy or altogether tragical whereas human affairs do not readily take so decisive a turn. Then, again, it must work out naturally, correctly, and in an unforced manner, and yet in one foreseen by nobody. The same applies to the epic and the romance. It is only more apparent in the drama, owing to the more compact nature of the latter, which increases the difficulty.

The *ex nihilo nihil fit* applies also to the fine arts. Good painters have real human models to stand for their historical pictures, and take for their heads real faces drawn from life, which they thereupon idealize, either according to their beauty, or their character. Good novelists, as I believe, do the same; they base the persons of their fictions upon real human beings of their acquaintance, which serve them as *schemata*, which they idealize and complete in accordance with their purposes.

A romance will be of a so much higher and nobler kind the more of *inward* and the less of *outward* life it portrays, and this proportion will accompany all gradations of the romance, as a characteristic sign, from "Tristram Shandy" down to the roughest and most eventful knight or robber story. "Tristram Shandy," indeed, has hardly any action at all, but how very little has the "New Heloïse" and "Wilhelm Meister"! Even "Don Quixote" has comparatively little, and that unimportant action, tending more particularly to jest; and these four romances are the crown of the whole department. Let us further consider the wonderful novels of Jean Paul, and see how much of inward they make to move on the narrowest foundation of outward life. Even the romances of Walter Scott have a considerable overweight of inward over outward life; and the latter, indeed, is only brought in with the object of setting the former in motion, while in bad romances it is there for its own sake. Art consists in the fact, that with the smallest possible expenditure of outward life, the inward is brought out into the strongest relief, for the inward is properly the object of our interest. The task of the novelist is not to narrate great events, but to make small ones interesting.

I confess candidly that the great reputation of the "Divina Commedia" seems to me exaggerated. The excessive absurdity of the fundamental conception certainly has great part in this, for in consequence of it, in the "Inferno," the most repulsive side of the Christian Mythology is brought vividly before our eyes. Then, again, the obscurity of the style and of the allusions contribute their share:

> Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur, amantque,
> Inversis quæ sub verbis latitantia cernunt.

At the same time, the often almost laconic terseness and

energy of the expression, and still more, Dante's incomparable strength of imagination, are in the highest degree remarkable. By virtue of this, he imparts to the description of impossible things a realistic truth, which is akin to that of a dream; for since he can have had no experience of these things, it would seem as though he must have dreamt them, in order to be able to paint them with such life-like and obvious exactness. On the other hand, what shall we say when, at the close of the eleventh canto of the "Inferno," Virgil describes the breaking of the day and the setting of the stars, forgetting all the while that he is in hell, and under the earth, and that not before the close of this section will he *quindi uscire a riveder le stelle?* One finds, again, the same absurdity at the end of the twentieth canto. Are we to suppose that Virgil carries a watch, and hence knows what at the moment is going on in heaven? This seems to me a still more serious *lapsus* than the well-known one respecting the ass of Sancho Panza of which Cervantes allowed himself to be guilty.

The title of the work of Dante is both original and striking, and scarcely admits of a doubt that it is ironical. A comedy! Truly the world would be that—a comedy for a god whose insatiable lust for revenge and studied cruelty glutted itself in the last act with the endless and purposeless torture of the beings which he has wantonly called into existence, because, forsooth, they had not turned out according to his mind, and because in their short life they had done or believed otherwise than as he desired. As against his unspeakable cruelty, moreover, all the crimes so severely punished in the "Inferno" would not be worth talking about; indeed, he himself would be far worse than all the devils which we encounter in the "Inferno," inasmuch as these only act in his service, and by virtue of his power. Father Zeus, therefore, will hardly covet the honour of being identified with him without ceremony, as strangely

enough occurs in some places (*e.g.*, c. 14, v. 70; c. 31, v. 92); and indeed is reduced to absurdity in "Il Purgatorio," c. 6, v. 118: "O sommo Giove, che fosti in terra per noi crocifisso." What indeed would Zeus say to it? ὦ πόποι! The Russo-Slav character of the subjection of Virgil, of Dante, and of everyone to his commands, and the trembling obedience with which his ukases are everywhere received, is, to the last degree, repulsive. This slavish spirit is, however (c. 33, v. 109-150), carried so far by Dante himself in his own person, that he completely divests himself of honour and conscience in one case, which he notwithstanding relates with pride. Honour and conscience, namely, count for nothing with him so soon as they in any way interfere with the cruel decrees of Domeneddio. Hence the promise firmly and openly given by him, in order to obtain a confession, to pour a drop of assuagement into the pain of one of these deliberately-planned and cruelly-carried-out tortures; after the tortured one has fulfilled the condition stipulated for by Dante, the latter, in a manner destitute of honour and conscience, openly and cynically breaks his promise *in majorem Dei gloriam*. This he does, considering that any lessening of the pain imposed by God, even where, as here, it only consists in the wiping away of a frozen tear (although it was not expressly forbidden to him), would nevertheless be altogether inadmissible, and hence he omits to do it, notwithstanding the zeal with which only a moment before he had promised and vowed it. In heaven such things may be the custom, and may be praiseworthy, I know not, but on earth he who acted in this way would be termed a rascal. We may see here, let it be observed by the way, how badly it goes with any morality which has no other basis than the will of God, since then, as rapidly as the poles of an electromagnet may be changed, evil may become good, and good evil. The whole "Inferno" of Dante is, properly speaking,

an *apotheosis of cruelty*, and in the last canto but one lack of honour and conscience is celebrated in an outspoken manner—

> "That which is true, in every place
> I speak with unashamed face."

For the rest the matter would be, for the created, a Divina Tragedia, and indeed without any end. Even though the prelude which precedes it may be here and there merry, it is nevertheless an altogether vanishing quantity as against the endless duration of the tragical part. One can hardly fail to think, that for Dante himself a secret satire lurks behind this doubtful world order, for otherwise it would require a quite peculiar taste to amuse itself with the painting of monstrous absurdities and never-ending hangman's scenes.

For me, my beloved Petrarch goes before all other Italian poets. In depth and intensity of feeling, and in its direct expression, which goes to the very heart, no poet in the world has ever excelled him. Hence his sonnets, triumphs, and songs are incomparably dearer to me than the fantastic farces of Ariosto and the frightful trivialities of Dante. The natural flow of his language, coming straight from his heart, speaks quite otherwise to me than the studied, and indeed affected, word-parsimony of Dante. He has always been the poet of my heart, and will remain so. That the super-excellent "present day" undertakes to speak disparagingly of Petrarch, confirms me in my opinion. A superfluous confirmation of it may be obtained by comparing Dante and Petrarch, as it were, in their domestic attire, that is, in prose, if we place in juxtaposition the beautiful books, so rich in thought and in truth, of Petrarch, *de vita solitaria, de contemtu mundi, consulatio utriusque fortunæ*, &c., together with his letters, with the fruitless and tedious scholasticism of Dante. Finally,

Tasso seems to me not worthy to take his place as a fourth beside the three great poets of Italy. Let us endeavour as posterity to be just, even though we are unable to be so as contemporaries.

That with Homer things always receive the predicates which pertain to them all round and absolutely, but not those which stand in any connection, or which have any analogy, with what is going forward—that, for example, the Achaians always appear as the armour-clad, the earth is always termed the life-nourishing, heaven the wide, the sea the wine-dark—this is a trait of objectivity in which Homer stands alone. Like nature herself, he leaves the objects unaffected by human events and moods. Whether his hearers rejoice or grieve, nature goes her way undisturbed. To subjective men, on the other hand, when they are sad, the whole of nature seems gloomy, &c. But it is not so with Homer. Amongst the poets of our time Goethe is the most objective, Byron the most subjective. The latter only speaks for himself; and even in the most objective styles of poetry, such as the drama and the Epos, he describes himself in the hero.

Goethe is related to Jean Paul as the positive pole to the negative.

Goethe's Egmont is a man who takes life easily and must suffer for his error. But by way of compensation. the same character of mind allows him to take death easily. The people's scenes in "Egmont" are the chorus.

Let me be permitted here a conjecture respecting the masterpiece of Shakespeare, a conjecture which is indeed very bold, but which I wish to lay before the judgment of real scholars. In the celebrated monologue, "To be, or not to be," is the expression, "when we have shuffled off this mortal coil," which has been always found obscure

and puzzling, and never been properly explained. Ought not "shuttled off" to have originally stood there? This verb itself does not exist any longer; but the sense would be, "when we have unravelled this coil of mortality, when we have worked it off." The slip of the pen might easily arise.

In Venice, in the Academy of Arts, there is a picture under the fresco, painted on linen, which represents the gods as enthroned upon clouds beside golden tables, and on golden seats, and below, the guests hurled down, despised and insulted, into the depths of night. Goethe certainly saw this picture at the time when, on his first Italian journey, he wrote "Iphigenia."

History, which I always think of side by side with poetry as its opposite (*ἱστορουμένον—πεποιημένον*), is for time what geography is for space. The latter is, therefore, as little as the former, a science in the proper sense, inasmuch as it has for its object not universal truths, but only particular things—respecting which point I refer the reader to my chief work, vol. ii., chap. xxxviii.

It has always been a favourite study with those who like to learn something without undergoing the strain demanded by the sciences properly so called, which bring the intellect into requisition.

But it is more than ever beloved in our own time, as proved by the countless history books yearly appearing. He who, like myself, cannot avoid seeing in all history the same thing continually,—just as in the kaleidoscope, at every turn the same things always recur under other configurations,—will not be able to share this passionate interest, although he will not blame it. It is only the attempt of some to make history a part of philosophy, or indeed to constitute it philosophy itself, in that they

imagine it can occupy the same place, that is tasteless and absurd. As an explanation of the special attraction of history for the greater public of all times, social intercourse as it is current in the world may be regarded. It consists, namely, as a rule, in that someone narrates something, and thereupon someone else narrates something else, under which condition everyone is certain of the attention of the rest. As here, so also in history, we see the mind occupied exclusively with the particular as such. As in science it raises itself, so also in every elevated conversation the mind raises itself to the universal. This however does not deprive history of its value. Human life is so short and fleeting, and spread over such countless millions of individuals, who plunge in crowds into the ever open maw of the monster, oblivion, ever awaiting them, that it is a very praiseworthy endeavour to save something of it, the memory of the most important and the most interesting, the leading events and prominent persons, from the general shipwreck of the world.

From another point of view one might regard history as a continuation of zoology, for while with the entire series of animals the consideration of the species suffices, with man, on the contrary, because he has individual character, individuals also, in conjunction with the individual events which condition them, have to be studied. From this the essential imperfection of history directly follows, as the individuals and events are countless and endless. By the study of them, the sum of that which is to be learnt is in no wise lessened by all that one has learnt. In all sciences, properly so called, a completeness of knowledge is at least to be looked forward to. If the history of China and India stood open before us, the endlessness of the material, the mistakenness of the way, would reveal itself, and would compel the student to see that one must recognize in the one, the many; in the single case, the rule; in the know-

ledge of mankind, the activity of peoples; but not that one must heap together facts to infinity.

History from one end to the other relates simply of wars, and the same theme is the subject of all the oldest works of art, as also of the newest. But the origin of all war is the desire to thieve; hence Voltaire justly says, *Dans toutes les guerres il ne s'agit que de voler.* So soon, namely, as a people feels an excess of force, it falls upon its neighbours, in order that, instead of living by its own labour, it may appropriate the result of theirs, be it merely such as is already existing, or be it that of the future in addition, to be acquired by subjugating them. This furnishes the material for the world's history and its heroic deeds. In French dictionaries, under the word "*gloire*," artistic and literary fame should first be treated of, and then under "*gloire militaire*" there should merely stand *voyez butin.*

It would seem in the meantime, as though two very religious peoples, the Hindoos and the Egyptians, when they felt an excess of force, did not for the most part employ it on robber campaigns, or heroic deeds, but on buildings which defy milleniums, and which make their memory honourable.

To the essential imperfections of history above indicated must be added, that the historic muse Klio is as through and through infected with lying as a street prostitute is with syphilis. The new critical investigation of history endeavours, indeed, to cure this, but only overcomes, by means of its local applications, particular symptoms breaking out here and there, with which moreover much quackery is mixed up to increase the evil. This is the case more or less with all history—the sacred excepted, as is obvious. I believe that the events and persons in history resemble those that have really existed about as much as the portraits of writers on the title-pages of their

books do for the most part, the authors themselves; in short, that they have only something of the outline, so as to bear a feeble resemblance, often completely perverted by *one* false feature, there often being no likeness at all.

Newspapers are the second hands of history. But the second hand is mostly not only of baser metal than the two others, but goes seldom correctly; the so-called "leading articles" are the the chorus to the drama of contemporary events. Exaggeration of every kind is as essential to journalism as to the dramatic art, for as much as possible must be made out of every occurrence. Hence all journalists are, by virtue of their handicraft, alarmists; this is their way of making themselves interesting. They resemble therein little dogs, who when the slightest thing stirs immediately set up barking loudly. One has accordingly to measure the attention one pays to their alarm trumpet, so that they may not disturb our digestion, and we should know once for all that the newspaper is a magnifying-glass, and this even in the best case, for very often it is nothing more than a mere game of shadows on the wall.

In Europe the history of the world is even yet accompanied by a quite peculiar chronological sun-dial, which in pictorial representations of events allows us to recognize every decade at the first glance. It stands under the leadership of the tailor. (For example, an alleged portrait of Mozart in his youthful years, displayed at Frankfort in 1856, I at once recognized as ungenuine, because the costume belonged to a period twenty years earlier.) It is only in the present decade that it has got disturbed, simply because our own day does not possess originality enough in order, like every other, to invent a mode of dress peculiar to itself, but merely exhibits a masquerade in which people go about as living anachronisms in all sorts of costumes of previous periods long ago laid aside. Even

the age immediately preceding had such originality as was necessary to invent the dress-coat.

More closely viewed the matter stands thus. As every man has a physiognomy in accordance with which we provisionally judge him, so every age has one which is not less characteristic. For the spirit of every time resembles a sharp east wind, which blows through everything. Hence we find its trace in all action, thought, writing, music, and painting, and in the flourishing of this or that art. It impresses its stamp upon anything and everything; thus, for example, we must have the age of phrases without sense, as also that of music without melody, and of forms without end and purpose. At best it is only the thick walls of a cloister which can prevent the ingress of this east wind, provided, that is, that it does not blow them down. Hence therefore the spirit of a time imparts to it its outward physiognomy. The architectural style always plays the ground-bass to this; in accordance therewith all ornaments, vessels, furniture, implements of every kind, are modelled; and lastly, even the costume, together with the manner of trimming the hair and beard.[1] The present age, as has been said, bears upon it the stamp of characterlessness by its want of originality in all these things. But the most lamentable thing is, that it has chosen the rough, stupid, and ignorant Middle Ages chiefly as its model, from which it occasionally passes over into the time of Francis I. of France, and even of Louis XIV.

[1] The beard as a semi-mask ought to be legally prohibited. It is besides, as an indication of sex in the fore-front of the face, obscene, and this is why it pleases women. It was always the barometer of mental culture with the Greeks and Romans. Among the latter Scipio Africanus was the first who shaved himself (Plin. N. Hist., l. vii., c. 59), and under the Antonines the beard ventured to show itself again; Charles the Great did not tolerate it; but in the Middle Ages it culminated in Henry IV. inclusive. Louis XIV. abolished it.

How will its external side, preserved in pictures and buildings, impress itself upon posterity? Its commercial *demokolaks* dub it, with characteristic sounding name, "modern times," as if the present κατ' ἐζοχήν were a present which had been prepared for by all the past, and finally attained. With what reverence will posterity regard our palaces and country-houses, erected in the most miserable *rococo* style of the time of Louis XIV.? But they will scarcely know what to make of the counterfeits and daguerreotypes of shoeblack-physiognomies with Socratic beards, and of the mashers in the costume of Jewish hucksters, which were current in my youth.

To the thorough-going tastelessness of this age may be reckoned that, in the monuments which are erected to great men, they are displayed in modern costume. For the monument is erected to the *ideal*, not to the *real* person; to the hero as such; to the bearer of this or that quality; to the originator of such works or deeds; not to the man as he struggled in the world, with all the weaknesses and faults which belong to our nature clinging to him; and just as these should not be glorified, so also his coat and his trousers as he wore them should be as little commemorated. But as ideal man let him stand there in human form, dressed simply in the manner of the ancients, that is, half naked. Thus only is he suitable for sculpture, which, since it turns upon the mere form, demands the complete and undeteriorated human form.

And as I am talking of monuments, I will further observe that it is a striking want of taste, indeed an absurdity, to place the statue upon a pedestal from ten to twenty feet high, where no one can ever clearly see it, especially as it is generally of bronze, that is, blackish. For seen from a distance it is not distinct, but if one approaches, it rises so high up, that it has the clear sky for a background, which dazzles the eye. In the Italian

towns, especially in Florence and Rome, the statues stand in great number in the open places and streets, but all on quite low pedestals, in order that they may be distinctly seen; even the colossal statues on Monte Caballo stand on a low pedestal. Thus the good taste of the Italians maintains itself here. The Germans, on the contrary, are fond of a high tradesman's stand, with reliefs in illustration of the hero represented.

My opinion on the collection of paintings of the old Netherland school of Boisserée, now in Munich, may find a place at the conclusion of this æsthetic chapter.

A genuine work of art does not require, in order to be enjoyable, the preamble of a history of art. With no class of paintings, however, is this so much the case, as with those here in question. We shall at all events first rightly estimate their value when we have seen what painting was before Johann van Eyck,—the style, namely, which proceeded from Byzantium, that is, on golden ground in distemper, the figures without life and motion, stiff and rigid, with massive aureoles containing the name of the saint. Van Eyck as a real genius returned to nature, gave to the paintings a background, to the figures a life-like attitude, demeanour, and grouping, to the physiognomies expression and truth, and to the folds accuracy. In addition to this, he introduced perspective, and attained in technical execution generally the highest possible perfection. His successors remained partly on this path, as Schoreel and Hemling (or Memling), and partly returned to the old absurdities. Even he himself was obliged to retain as much of these absurdities as was, according to ecclesiastical opinion, obligatory; he had, for instance, still to make aureoles and massive rays of light. But one sees he has eliminated as much as he could. His relation accordingly to the spirit of the time is always a fighting

one, just as with Schoreel and Hemling. They are consequently to be judged of with reference to their time. The latter is responsible for the fact that their productions are chiefly pointless, and often tasteless, always stale and ecclesiastical, as for instance "The Three Kings," "The Dying Virgin," "St. Christopher," "St. Luke painting the Virgin Mary," &c. In the same way it is the fault of their time that their figures hardly ever have a free and true human attitude and mien, but throughout make the ecclesiastical gestures, to wit, the forced, studied, humble, crawling movements of the beggar. To this must be added, that the above painters did not know the antique; and hence their figures seldom have beautiful faces, mostly ugly ones, and never beautiful limbs. The perspective of the atmosphere is wanting; the perspective of the line is for the most part correct. They have all drawn from nature, as it was known to them, for which reason the expression of their faces is always true and honest, but never has much point; and not one of their saints has a trace of that sublime and preternatural expression on the countenance, of true holiness, which the Italians alone give—before all, Raphael, and Correggio in his earlier pictures.

One might impartially criticise the paintings in question thus: they have for the most part great technical perfection, in the representation of the real, of heads no less than of drapery and material, almost as much as was attained long afterwards, in the seventeenth century, by the Netherland school proper. On the other hand, the noblest expression, the highest beauty, and the truest grace, remain foreign to them. But since these are the end to which technical perfection is related as means, they are not art-works of the first rank; indeed they are not unconditionally to be enjoyed, for the imperfections adduced, together with the pointless subjects, and the completely

ecclesiastical gestures, have always first of all to be deducted, and set to the account of the time.

Their chief service, although only with Van Eyck and his best pupils, consists in their illusive imitation of reality, attained through a clear glance into nature, and an iron industry in elaboration, as also in the vividness of their colours, a service exclusively peculiar to them. With *such* colours no painting has been done either before them or after them; they are burning, and display the highest energy of colour; hence these pictures, after well-nigh four hundred years, look as if they were painted yesterday. If only Raphael and Correggio had known these colours! But they remained a mystery of the school, and are therefore lost. They ought to be chemically investigated.

ON THINKING FOR ONESELF.

AS the richest library unarranged is not so useful as a very moderate one well arranged, so the greatest amount of erudition, if it has not been elaborated by one's own thought, is worth much less than a far smaller amount that has been well thought over. For it is through the combination on all sides of that which one knows, through the comparison of every truth with every other, that one assimilates one's own knowledge and gets it into one's power. One can only think out what one knows; hence one should learn something; but one only knows what one has thought out.

One can only apply oneself of set purpose to reading and learning, but not to thinking proper. The latter must, that is, be stimulated and maintained, like fire by a draught of air, by some interest in the subject itself, which may be either a purely objective or a merely subjective one. The latter is only present in the case of our personal interest, but the former only for thinking heads by nature, for which thought is as natural as breath, but which are very rare. For this reason it is so little the case with most scholars.

The distinction between the effect which thinking for oneself, and that which reading has upon the mind, is inconceivably great, hence it perpetually increases the original diversity of heads, by virtue of which a man is

driven to the one or to the other. Reading imposes thoughts upon the mind which are as foreign and heterogeneous to the direction and mood which it has for the moment, as the seal is to the wax on which it impresses its stamp. The mind suffers thereby an entire compulsion from without, to think now this, now that, for which it has no desire, and no capacity. In thinking for itself, on the other hand, it follows its own natural impulse, as either external circumstance or some recollection has determined it for the moment. Perceptual surroundings, namely, do not impress one definite thought upon the mind as reading does, but merely give it material and occasion to think that which is according to its nature and present disposition. Hence much reading deprives the mind of all elasticity, as a weight continually pressing upon it does a spring, and the most certain means of never having any original thoughts is to take a book in hand at once, at every spare moment. This practice is the reason why scholarship makes most men more unintelligent and stupid than they are by nature, and deprives their writings of all success; they are, as Pope says—

> "For ever reading, never to be read."
> POPE, "Dunciad," iii., 194.

Scholars are those who have read in books; but thinkers, geniuses, enlighteners of the world, and benefactors of the human race, are those who have directly read in the book of the world.

At bottom it is only our own fundamental conceptions which have truth and life, for it is they alone that one thoroughly and correctly understands. Alien thoughts that we read are the remnants of another's meal, the cast-off clothes of a strange guest.

The alien thought arising within us is related to our own

as the impression in stone of a plant of the early world is to the blooming plant of spring.

Reading is a mere surrogate for original thought. In reading, one allows one's own thoughts to be guided by another in leading strings. Besides, many books are only good for showing how many false paths there are, and how seriously one may miss one's way if one allows oneself to be guided by them; but he whom genius guides, he, that is, who thinks for himself, thinks of free will, thinks correctly —he has the compass to find out the right way. One should only read when the source of original thoughts fails, which is often enough the case even with the best heads. But to scare away one's own original thoughts for the sake of taking a book in the hand is a sin against the Holy Ghost. In this case, one resembles a man who runs away from free nature in order to look at a herbarium, or to contemplate a beautiful landscape in an engraving.

Even if sometimes one may find with ease in a book a truth or an insight already given, which one has worked out slowly, and with much trouble, by one's own thinking and combining; it is yet worth a hundred times more when one has attained it through one's original thought. Only then does it become as integral part, as living member, one with the whole system of our thoughts; only then does it stand in complete and firm cohesion with them, is understood in all its grounds and consequences, bears the colour, the shade, the stamp of our whole mode of thought, and this because it has come at the precise time that the need for it was present, and therefore sits firmly, secure from dispossession. Here accordingly Goethe's verse,

> "What thou hast inherited from thy fathers
> Acquire it, in order to possess it,"

finds its most perfect application and explanation. The

self-thinker, namely, learns the authorities for his opinions afterwards, when they serve merely to confirm him in them and for his own strengthening. The book-philosopher, on the other hand, starts from them, in that he constructs a whole for himself out of the alien opinions he has read up, which then resembles an automaton that has been put together of foreign material, while the former resembles a living man. For in this case it has arisen like the living man, since the outer world has impregnated the thinking mind which has carried it, and given it birth.

Truth that has only been learnt cleaves to us like a limb that has been stuck on—a false tooth, a waxen nose, or at best like a genuine one of alien flesh. But that which has been acquired by original thought resembles the natural limb; it alone really belongs to us. On this rests the distinction between the thinker and the mere scholar. Hence the intellectual acquirement of the self-thinker is like a fine painting, which stands out life-like with accurate light and shade, well-balanced tone, and complete harmony of colour. The intellectual acquirement of the mere scholar, on the contrary, resembles a large palette full of bright colours, systematically arranged indeed, but without harmony, cohesion, and significance.

Reading means thinking with an alien head, not one's own. But to original thought, from which a coherent whole, even if not a strictly rounded-off system, seeks to develop itself, nothing is more injurious than too great an influx of foreign thoughts through continual reading. For these, each sprung from another mind belonging to another system, bearing another colour, never of themselves flow together to form a whole of thought, of knowledge, of insight, and conviction, but rather set up a Babylonion confusion of tongues in the head, and rob the mind which has been filled with them of all clear insight,

and thus almost disorganize it. This state is noticeable with many scholars, and the result is that they are behind many unlearned persons in healthy understanding, accurate judgment, and practical tact, the latter having always subordinated to and incorporated with their own thought what has come to them from without, through experience, conversation, and a little reading. The scientific *thinker* does this in a greater degree. Although he needs much knowledge, and therefore must read much, his mind is nevertheless strong enough to master all this, to assimilate it, to incorporate it into the system of his thoughts, and so to subordinate it to the organically coherent whole of a magnificent insight, which is always growing. In this, his own thinking, like the ground bass of the organ, perpetually dominates all, and is never drowned by foreign tones, as is the case with merely poly-historical heads, in which, as it were, musical fragments from all keys run into one another, and the fundamental note is no more to be heard.

People who have occupied their life with reading, and who have derived their wisdom from books, resemble those who have acquired a correct knowledge of a country from many descriptions of travel. Such persons can give information about much, but at bottom they have no coherent, clear, fundamental knowledge of the structure of the country. Those, on the contrary, who have occupied their life with thought, resemble persons who have themselves been in that country. They alone know, properly speaking, what is in question, since they know the things there in their connection, and are truly at home in them.

The ordinary book-philosopher is related to the self-thinker as an historical investigator to an eye-witness. The latter speaks from his own direct apprehension of the matter. Hence all self-thinkers agree in the last resort,

and their diversity only arises from that of their standpoint; and where this does not alter anything they all say the same. For they only put forward what they have objectively apprehended. I have often found propositions which, on account of their paradoxical nature, I only brought before the public with hesitation, to my agreeable surprise repeated in the old works of great men. The book-philosopher, on the contrary, reports what this one has said, and what that one has thought, and what another has objected, &c. This he compares, weighs, criticises, and thus seeks to get at the truth of things, a point in which he strongly resembles the critical historian. Thus, for example, he will institute investigations as to whether Leibnitz had ever been for a time at any period a Spinozist, &c. Conspicuous instances of what is here said are furnished to the curious admirer in Herbart's "Analytical Explanation of Moral and Natural Right," as also in his "Letters on Freedom." One might well wonder at the considerable trouble which such a one gives himself, for it seems as though, if he would only fix his eye on the subject itself, he would soon, by a little self-thought, attain to the goal. But as to this, there is one small hindrance, namely that it does not depend on our will. One can always sit down and read, but not always think as well. It is, namely, with thoughts as with men, one cannot always have them called up at one's pleasure, but must wait till they come. Thought on a subject must make an appearance of itself by a happy, harmonious concurrence of the outward occasion with the inward mood and interest; and it is precisely this which will never occur to the foregoing persons. The above finds its explanation even in those thoughts which concern our personal interest. If we under certain circumstances have to form a decision, we cannot well sit down at any time we choose, think over the reasons, and then decide; for often our reflections on the subject will then precisely not hold, but wander to other

things, for which sometimes even the disinclination for the circumstance is responsible. We should not therefore attempt to force it, but wait till the mood comes of itself; it will often do so unexpectedly and repeatedly, and every different mood at a different time throws a new light on the subject. This slow procedure it is which is understood as *maturity of judgment*. For the thought must be distributed; much that has before been overlooked will thereby be clear to us, and the disinclination will thereby be lost, since things more clearly kept in view appear in general much more endurable. In the same way, in theoretical departments, the right time has to be waited for, and even the greatest mind is not always capable of thinking for itself. It will do well therefore to utilize the remainder of the time for reading, which is, as already said, a surrogate of original thought, and brings material to the mind, in that another thinks for us, albeit invariably in a manner which is not our own. For this reason one ought not to read too much, in order that the mind may not become accustomed to the surrogate, and thereby forget the thing itself; in other words, that it shall not accustom itself to an already trodden path, and by going along an alien track of thought become estranged from its own. Least of all ought one, for the sake of reading, to withdraw oneself entirely from the view of the real world. For the occasion and the disposition to original thought occur incomparably more often here than in reading. For the perpetual, the real, in its originality and power, is the natural object of the thinking mind, and is able most easily to move it deeply.

If these considerations are correct, we shall not wonder that the self-thinker and the book-philosopher are easily to be recognized by their delivery; the former by the stamp of earnestness, directness, and originality, in the idiosyncrasy of all his thoughts and expressions; the latter, on the contrary, in that everything is pieced together at

second hand, out of traditional notions and stuff that has been raked up, and is thus flat and dull, like the impression of an impression. His style, consisting of conventional, banal phrases and current tags, resembles a small state whose circulation consists solely in foreign money, because it does not itself coin.

Mere experience can replace thought just as little as reading. Pure empiricism is related to thinking as eating is to digestion and assimilation. When the former boasts that it alone, through its discoveries, has furthered human knowledge, it is as though the mouth should boast that the maintenance of the body was its work alone.

The works of all really competent heads distinguish themselves from the rest by their character of *decisiveness* and *definiteness*, together with the distinctness and clearness springing therefrom, for such heads always know definitely and distinctly what they want to express, be it in prose, in verse, or in sounds. This decisiveness and clearness is wanting in the rest, and in this they may be at once recognized.

The characteristic sign of minds of the first order is the immediateness of all their judgments. All that they bring forward is the result of their own thinking, and everywhere proclaims itself as such by its delivery. They accordingly, like princes, have an imperial immediacy in the empire of mind; the rest are all mediatized, as may be easily seen from their style, which has no original stamp.

Every true self-thinker thus resembles *pro tanto* a monarch; he is immediate, and recognizes no one above himself. His judgments, like the decisions of a monarch, spring from his own supreme power, proceed directly from himself. For just as little as the monarch does he accept commands and authorizations, but lets nothing obtain that

he has not confirmed himself. The common herd of heads, on the other hand, entangled in all sorts of opinions, authorities, and prejudices, resemble the people who silently obey his law and mandate.

Those persons who are so zealous and hasty in deciding most questions by the quotation of authorities, are glad when, instead of their own understanding and insight, which is wanting, they can bring into the field someone else's. Their number is legion, for as Seneca says: "*Unus quisque mavult credere, quam judicare.*" In their controversies, authorities are the universally chosen weapons. With them they attack each other, and he who happens to be mixed up in them is badly advised if he attempt to defend himself with reasons and arguments. For against these weapons they are horned Siegfrieds, dipped in the flood of incapacity to think and to judge. They will therefore hold up their authorities before him as an *argumentum ad verecundiam*, and then cry *Victoria!*

In the realm of reality, however beautiful, happy, and cheerful it may happen to be, we move ourselves continuously under the influence of an oppression, which has ceaselessly to be overcome; while in the realm of thought we are incorporeal spirits, without weight and without trouble. There is, therefore, no happiness on earth like that which a beautiful and fruitful mind in a happy hour finds in itself.

The presence of a thought is like the presence of a loved one. We deem that we shall never forget this thought, and that this loved one can never become indifferent to us. But out of sight, out of mind! The most beautiful thought runs the risk of being irrevocably forgotten if it is not

written down, and the loved one to be torn from us if she has not been wedded.

There are many thoughts which have a value for him who thinks them, but few only among them which possess the power of acting through re-percussion or reflection, that is, after they have been written down, to gain the reader's interest.

But as regards this, that only has true worth which one has in the first instance thought out *for oneself*. One may divide thinkers into such as at first think *for themselves*, and such as at once think *for others*. The former are the genuine *self-thinkers* in the double sense of the word; they are the true *philosophers*. For they alone take the matter seriously. The pleasure and happiness of their existence, indeed, consists in thinking. The others are the *sophists;* they wish to *appear* and seek their happiness in that which they hope thereby to obtain from others; herein lies their seriousness. To which of these two classes a writer belongs, may be easily recognized by his whole style and manner. Lichtenberg is an example of the first kind, Herder already belongs to the second.

If one considers how great and how near us is the *problem of existence*, of this ambiguous, tormented, fleeting, dream-like existence; so great and so near, that as soon as one is aware of it, all other problems and purposes are overshadowed and hidden by it; and if one keeps before one's eyes how all men, with few and rare exceptions, are never clearly conscious of this problem, seeming indeed not to be possessed of it, but to trouble themselves rather about anything else than about it, and are concerned only for the present day, and for the scarcely longer span of their personal future, either expressly declining the

problem in question, or willingly contenting themselves in respect of it with any system of popular metaphysics; when one, I say, well considers this, one might almost be of the opinion that man could only in a very general sense be called a *thinking being*, and one might wonder at no trait of thoughtlessness or simplicity, but rather recognize that the intellectual scope of the average man, although it indeed transcends that of the animal (unconscious of its whole existence, future and past, and living, as it were, a single present), but yet not so incalculably removed as one is accustomed to imagine.

It is in accordance with the above, that in conversation one finds the thoughts of most men clipped as short as chopped straw, and therefore not admitting of any longer thread being spun out of them.

It would be impossible, moreover, if this world were peopled by merely thinking beings, that noise of every kind should be allowed and given such unlimited scope, even the most horrible and purposeless. If nature had intended man for thinking, she would never have given him ears, or would at least, as with the bats, whom I envy on this account, have furnished him with air-tight covers. But he, like the rest, is in truth a poor creature, whose powers are merely directed to the maintenance of his existence, for which reason he always requires open ears, which unsolicited, and by night as well as by day, announce the approach of the persecutor.

ON READING AND BOOKS.

IGNORANCE first degrades a man when it is met with in company with riches. The poor man is crushed by his poverty and distress; his work takes the place of knowledge with him, and occupies his thoughts. The rich, on the contrary, who are ignorant, live merely for their lusts, and resemble brutes, as may daily be seen. To this is to be added further, the reproach that they have not used their riches and leisure for that which gives them their greatest value.

When we read, another thinks for us; we merely repeat his mental process. It is as when in learning to write the pupil follows with his pen the strokes that have been made in pencil by the teacher. In reading, accordingly, we are relieved of the greater part of the work of thinking. Hence the perceptible relief when we pass from the occupation of our own thoughts to reading. But while we read, our head is, properly speaking, only the arena of alien thoughts. Hence it is, that he who reads very much and almost the whole day, amusing himself in the intervals of his reading with thoughtless pastime, gradually loses the capacity even to think, just as one who always rides at last forgets how to walk. But such is the case with many scholars; they have read themselves stupid. For perpetual reading recurred to immediately at every free moment cripples the mind more than perpetual work with

the hands, for with the latter one can always follow one's own thoughts. Just as a spring by the continuous pressure of a foreign body loses its elasticity, so does the mind through the continuous pressure of foreign thoughts. Just as one injures the stomach by too much aliment, and thereby damages the whole body, so the mind may be clogged and suffocated by too much intellectual nourishment. For the more one reads the fewer traces does what is read leave on the mind. It is like a tablet on which many things have been written over one another. It never comes to rumination therefore; but it is only by this that one makes what one reads one's own. If one reads incessantly, without afterwards thinking further upon it, it does not take root, and gets for the most part lost. For it is precisely the same with the intellectual nourishment as with the corporeal; scarcely the fiftieth part of what we take is assimilated, the rest passes off through evaporation, respiration, or otherwise.

In addition to all this, thoughts reduced to paper are nothing more than the footprint of a wayfarer in the sand; one sees well enough the way which he has taken, but in order to know what he saw on the way we must use our own eyes.

There is no literary quality, as, for example, persuasive power, wealth of imagery, the gift of comparison, boldness, or bitterness, or brevity, or grace, or facility of expression; or again, wit, striking contrasts, a laconic style, *naïveté*, &c., which we can acquire by reading authors who possess such qualities. But we may nevertheless call forth thereby these qualities in ourselves if we already possess them as disposition, that is, *in potentia*, and bring them to our consciousness; we can see all that is to be done with them, we can be strengthened in the inclination, or

indeed in the courage to use them; we can judge by instances of the effect of their application, and so learn the right employment of them, after which we assuredly first possess them *in actu*. This then is the only way in which reading educates to writing, inasmuch as it teaches us the use we can make of our own natural gifts, always supposing of course that we possess these; without them, on the contrary, we can learn nothing by reading but cold, dead mannerisms, and become arid imitators.

As the strata of the earth preserve the living beings of past epochs in their order, so the shelves of libraries preserve in their order past errors and their expositions, which, like the former, in their time, were living enough and made much noise, but exist now stiff and petrified, only to be contemplated by the literary paleontologist.

Xerxes, according to Herodotus, wept at the sight of his countless host, when he thought that of all these not one would be in life after a hundred years. Who would not weep at the sight of a thick catalogue, when he considers that of all these books, after ten years, none will any longer be alive?

In literature it is not otherwise than in life. Wherever one turns, one encounters immediately the incorrigible common herd of humanity present everywhere in legions, filling everything and defiling everything, like flies in summer. Hence the number of bad books, those rank weeds of literature, which withdraw the nourishment from the wheat and choke it. They absorb, namely, the time, the money, the attention of the public, which belong of right to the good books and their noble purposes, while they themselves are merely written with the intention of bringing in money or procuring places; hence they are not

merely useless, but positively injurious. Nine-tenths of our whole modern literature has no other purpose than to swindle the public of a few thalers out of its pocket. Author, publisher, and reviewer are in a conspiracy to do this.

It is a mean and base, but not inconsiderable trick, which the *litterateurs*, bread-and-butter writers and scribblers, have succeeded in playing off on the good taste and the true culture of the period, in that they have brought things so far as to have the whole *elegant world* in leading-strings, so that the latter has been condemned to *read a tempo*, to wit, that all must read the same thing, and that the newest, in order to have material for conversation in its circles. For to this end serve bad novels and similar productions from once celebrated pens, as formerly those of Spindler, Bulwer, Eugène Sue, &c. But what can be more miserable than the fate of such a belletristic public, which deems itself in duty bound to read, always to read, the latest scribblings of the most ordinary heads who merely write for money, and are therefore invariably to be had in crowds, and, in consequence, to know the works of the rare and deep-thinking minds of all times and countries merely by name! The belletristic daily press is especially a cunningly devised plan to rob the æsthetic public of the time which it should devote for the sake of its culture to the genuine productions in this department, in order that it may accrue to the daily twaddlings of these everyday minds.

Hence, in respect of our reading, the art *not* to read is extremely important. It consists in that, what at all times occupies the greater public, should for this very reason not be taken in hand, as, for instance, political or ecclesiastical pamphlets, novels, poems, &c., and this notwithstanding that they make much noise, and reach many editions in their first and last year of life. But rather let us remember

that he who writes for fools will always find a large public, and let us turn the always comparatively short time we have for reading exclusively to the works of the great minds of all times and peoples, which tower above the rest of humanity, and which the voice of fame indicates as such. These only really educate and instruct. We can never read the bad too little, nor the good too often; bad books are intellectual poison, they destroy the mind. Because people, instead of reading the best of all times, only read the *newest*, writers remain in the narrow circle of circulating ideas, and the age sinks ever deeper into the slough of its own filth.

There are at all times two literatures which go along a parallel course tolerably independent of each other; a real, and a merely apparent. The former grows to be *enduring literature*, carried on by persons who live *for* science or poetry; it goes its way seriously and quietly, but with exceeding slowness; produces in Europe scarcely a dozen works in a century, which works however *endure*. The other, carried on by persons who live *on* science or poetry, goes in a gallop, amid the great noise and applause of those interested, and brings yearly many thousand works to market. But after a few years one asks, Where are they? Where is their so early and so loud fame? One may therefore designate the latter as the floating, the former as the standing literature.

In the history of the world, half a century is always considerable, since its material is always flowing on, inasmuch as something is always happening. In the history of literature, on the other hand, the same period of time is often not to be reckoned at all, since nothing has happened, for clumsy attempts do not concern it. One is, in this case, where one was fifty years before.

In order to make this clear, let us view the progress of

knowledge in the human race under the figure of a planetary orbit. Let us then represent the deviations which it mostly acquires after every important progress, by Ptolemaic epicycles, after passing through each of which it is again where it was before the deviation began. The great heads, however, which really lead the race farther along this planetary orbit, do not participate in the recurring epicycle. From this is to be explained why the fame of posterity is generally paid for by the loss of the applause of contemporaries, and *vice versâ*. Such an epicycle is, for example, the philosophy of Fichte and Schelling, crowned at its close by the Hegelian caricature of it. This epicycle began from the last circle described by Kant, which I have since again resumed in order to carry it farther. But in the meantime the above sham philosophers, together with sundry others, have passed through their epicycle, which is now just completed, the public which has gone with them having become aware that it finds itself precisely where it was at starting.

With this progress of things is connected the fact that we see the scientific, literary, and artistic spirit of the age make a declaration of bankruptcy about every thirty years. During such a period, the recurring errors have so increased, that they collapse under the weight of their absurdity, and at the same time the opposition to them has strengthened. The position is now reversed; there often follows now an error in the opposite direction. To show this course of things in its periodical return would be the correct pragmatical material of literary history, but with that the latter troubles itself little. The data of such periods, moreover, are, on account of their comparative shortness, often difficult to bring together from distant ages; and hence one can observe the matter most conveniently in one's own age. If one requires an illustration from the real sciences, one might take Werner's "Geology

of Neptune." But I stand by the illustration already given, which lies nearest to us. There followed in German philosophy upon the brilliant period of Kant, another immediately after, in which the endeavour was not to convince but to impress; instead of being deep and clear, to be brilliant and hyperbolical, but especially to be incomprehensible; indeed, instead of seeking the truth, to intrigue. In this way philosophy could make no progress. Finally, there came the bankruptcy of this entire school and method. For in Hegel and his consorts, the barefacedness of nonsense on the one side, and of unconscientious glorification on the other, together with the obvious intention of the whole edifying procedure, reached such a colossal magnitude, that at last the eyes of all were opened to the whole charlatanry; and, as in consequence of certain disclosures, protection from above was withdrawn from the concern, so was also the applause. The Fichtian and Schellingian antecedents of this most miserable of all philosophizings that has ever been, were dragged by it into the abyss of discredit. Thereby appears the complete philosophical incompetence of Germany, during the first half of the century following upon Kant, and yet, notwithstanding, we boast in the face of foreign nations of the philosophical gifts of the Germans, especially since an English writer has had the malicious irony to call them a nation of thinkers.

But he who desires to have confirmation from the history of art of the general theory of epicycles here put forward, need only consider the flourishing school of sculpture of Bernini, in the last century, especially in its French development, which represents, instead of antique beauty, common nature, and instead of antique simplicity and grace, French ball-room etiquette. It became bankrupt when, after Winckelmann's criticism, there followed the return to the school of the ancients. The first quarter

of this century again furnishes a confirmation from painting, since it regarded the art as a mere means and instrument of mediæval religiosity, and hence chose ecclesiastical subjects for its exclusive theme. These were now treated by painters who lacked the true seriousness of that belief, but who, nevertheless, in consequence of the delusion in question, took as models Francesco Francia, Pietro Perrugino, Angelo da Fiesole, and similar painters, and valued these even more highly than the really great masters who followed them. In connection with this craze, and because an analogous attempt had made itself apparent at the same time in poetry, Goethe wrote the parable "Priest-play." The latter school was thereupon seen to be based on whims, became bankrupt, and there followed upon it the return to nature, announcing itself in genre pictures, and scenes from life of every kind, even though at times they ran into the commonplace.

In accordance with the course of human progress described, is *literary-history*, which is for the most part a catalogue of a cabinet of abortions. The spirit in which these preserve themselves the longest is swine-leather. On the other hand, one does not require to seek for the few successful births. They remain living, and one encounters them everywhere in the world, where they go about immortal, in an ever-fresh youth. They alone constitute the *real* literature referred to in the preceding paragraph, a literature of whose history, poor in personalities, we learn from youth upwards from all educated persons, and not first of all from compendiums. Against the monomania for reading literary history dominant now-a-days, in order to be able to gossip about everything, without properly knowing anything, I recommend an extremely readable passage from Lichtenberg, vol. ii., p. 302, of the old edition.

I could wish, however, that someone would attempt once in a way a *tragical literary-history*, in which he would describe how the different nations, each of which places its highest prize in the great writers and artists whom it has to show, have treated them during their lives. In this he would bring before our eyes that endless struggle which the good and genuine of all times and countries has had to wage against the mistaken and bad which is always dominant; the martyrdom of almost all true enlighteners of mankind, of almost all great masters, in every department and art, would be described; he would bring before us how they, with few exceptions, have languished without recognition, without interest, without disciples, in poverty and misery, while fame, honour, and riches were the lot of the unworthy in their calling; how, in short, it has gone with them, as with Esau, who hunted and killed game for his father, while Jacob disguised in his cloak was at home stealing his father's blessing; how, nevertheless, notwithstanding all this, love for their cause kept them upright, till at last the bitter struggle of such an educator of the human race was accomplished, the undying laurel beckoned to him, and the hour struck, which meant that for him also—

> "The heavy armour vanishes to a toy;
> Short is the sorrow, endless is the joy."

ON WOMEN.

BETTER than Schiller's well-meditated poem, "The Dignity of Woman," effective though it be by means of antithesis and contrast, these few words of Jouy's express in my opinion, the true praise of women: "*Sans les femmes, le commencement de notre vie serait privé de secours, le milieu de plaisir, et la fin de consolation.*" Byron expresses the same more pathetically in his "Sardanapalus" (act 1, scene 2)—

> "The very first
> Of human life must spring from woman's breast;
> Your first small words are taught you from her lips,
> Your first tears quench'd by her, and your last sighs
> Too often breathed out in a woman's hearing,
> When men have shrunk from the ignoble care
> Of watching the last hour of him who led them."

Both indicate the correct point of view as to the value of women.

The very look of the female form teaches us that woman is made neither for great intellectual nor corporeal labours. She bears the guilt of life, not in doing, but in suffering; in the pains of childbirth, the care for the child, subordination to the man, for whom she ought to be a patient and cheerful companion. The severest sorrows, joys, and manifestations of power do not fall to her lot; but her life should flow on more quietly, more insignificantly, and more mildly than that of the man, without its being essentially more happy or more unhappy.

As nurses and educators of our first childhood, women are suited, precisely in that they are themselves childish, simple, and short-sighted, in a word, are their whole life—grown-up children—a kind of middle step between the child and the man, who is the true human being. Only look at a girl, how for days together she plays with a child, dances and sings with it, and think what a man with the best intentions could accomplish in her place. Nature has destined the girl to produce what in a dramatic sense is called a startling effect, inasmuch as it has furnished her for a few years with superabundant beauty, fascination, and fullness, at the cost of her whole remaining lifetime, in order that during these years she may be able to conquer the imagination of a man to the extent that he shall be so far carried away as to honourably undertake in some form or shape the care of her for life; a step for which mere reasonable deliberation seems to give no adequate security. Nature has accordingly armed the woman, like every other creation of hers, with the weapons and instruments which she requires for the assurance of her subsistence, and at the time she requires it, a course in which she has proceeded with her usual economy. For as the female ant after copulation loses the henceforth superfluous and, indeed, as regards breeding, dangerous wings, so after one or two childbeds does the woman generally lose her beauty, and probably for the same reason.

In accordance with the above, young girls regard their domestic or business avocations in their hearts as a subordinate matter, or even as a mere joke. They deem love, its conquests, and what stands in connection with them, such as toilette, dance, &c., to be their only serious calling.

The nobler and the more perfect a thing is, by so much the later and more slowly does it attain to maturity. The

man hardly reaches the maturity of his reason and intellectual powers before his eight-and-twentieth year, the woman with her eighteenth. But she has a reason in accordance, a very circumscribed one. Hence women remain their whole life long, children, never see more than what is nearest to them, cling to the present time, take the appearance of things for the reality, and prefer trivialities to the most important subjects. Reason is that, namely, by virtue of which man does not, like the animal, live merely in the present, but casts his eye over and considers the past and the future, whence arises his foresight, his care, and his frequent depression. The woman, in consequence of her weaker intellect, participates less in the advantages, as in the disadvantages, which this brings with it. She is rather an intellectual myope whose intuitive understanding sees distinctly what is near, but has a narrow range of vision, which does not embrace the distant. Hence all that is absent, past and future, affects women much more feebly than ourselves, whence arises the tendency to extravagance so much more frequent with them, and sometimes approaching insanity. Women think in their hearts the destiny of men to be to earn money, while their own is to get through it, if possible during the lifetime of the man, at all events after his death. That the man gives over to them his earnings for housekeeping, strengthens them in this belief. Notwithstanding the many disadvantages which it brings with it, it has nevertheless the good side, that the woman is more absorbed in the present than ourselves, and therefore enjoys it better, if it is at all endurable, from which circumstance the special cheerfulness of woman proceeds, and makes her suited to the recreation, and, in case of need, consolation, of the man burdened with care.

In difficult crises, to take women into counsel, in the manner of the ancient Germans, is by no means unadvisable; for their way of apprehending things is quite

different from ours, more especially in that they like to go the shortest way to the goal, and generally keep in view what lies nearest them, which we, just because it is immediately under our nose, generally overlook, in which case we have need to be led back to it, in order to regain the near and simple view. To this may be added that women are decidedly more objective than we are, and thus see no more in things than is really there; while we, when our passions are excited, easily magnify the existent, or add to it what is imaginary.

We may trace to the same source the fact, that women have more pity, and therefore show more human love and sympathy for the unhappy, than men; while in the matter of justice, honesty, and conscientiousness, they are behind them. For in consequence of their weak intellect, the actual, the perceptible, the immediately real, exercises a power over them against which abstract ideas, permanent maxims, firm determinations, consideration for the past and the future, for the absent and the distant, can seldom accomplish much. They have therefore the first and most essential requisite of virtue, but they lack the secondary and often necessary instrument. One might compare them in this respect to an organism which possessed indeed the liver but not the gall-bladder. I refer the reader as to this to § 17 of my "Treatise on the Foundation of Morality." In accordance with the foregoing we find *injustice* as the fundamental failing of the female character. It arises immediately from the want of reason and reflection above alluded to, and is assisted by the fact that they, as the weaker, are driven by nature to have recourse not to force but to cunning; hence their instinctive treachery, and their irremediable tendency to lying. For as nature has armed the lion with claws and teeth, the elephant and the wild boar with tusks, the bull with horns, and the sepia with ink which

blackens water, so has nature armed woman with power of deception for her protection, and all the force with which she has endowed the man, in the shape of corporeal strength and reason, has been diverted in the woman into the form of the above gift. Deception is therefore born in her, and is almost as much the property of the stupid as of the clever woman. To make use of it on every occasion is hence as natural to her as it is to the animals in question when attacked to employ their weapons, and she feels it, to a certain extent, as making use of her right. For this reason a perfectly true, unsophisticated woman is almost impossible. For the same reason they see through deception in others so easily, that it is not advisable to attempt it as regards them. But from the fundamental failing indicated and its accessories, arises falseness, disloyalty, treachery, ingratitude, &c. Women are much more often guilty of judicial perjury than men, indeed it may be fairly questioned whether they ought to be allowed to take an oath. The case has repeated itself everywhere, from time to time, of ladies who wanted for nothing, going into a shop and secretly pocketing and stealing something.

Young, strong, and fine men are called by nature for the propagation of the human race, in order that the race may not deteriorate. This is the fixed WILL of nature, and the passions of women are its expression. This law takes the precedence in age and force of every other. Woe therefore to him who so places his rights and interests that they stand in the way of it; no matter what he says and does, they will be mercilessly crushed on the first important occasion. For the secret, unexpressed, and indeed unconscious but inborn morality of women is: "We are justified in deceiving those who, because they barely provide for us, the individual, think they have acquired a right over the species. The structure and consequently the welfare of

the species is placed in our hands by means of generation, which immediately proceeds from us, and is entrusted to our care; we will conscientiously manage it." Women however are by no means conscious of this first principle *in abstracto*, but merely *in concreto*, and have no other expression for it than their mode of action when the opportunity comes, in which their conscience allows them generally more rest than we might suppose, since they feel, in the darkest recesses of their heart, that by the breach of their duty to the individual, they have so much the better fulfilled that towards the species, whose right is infinitely greater. The more detailed discussion of this matter will be found in the 44th chapter of the second volume of my chief work.

Because in the last resort, women exist solely for the propagation of the race, in which their destiny is exhausted, they live altogether more in the species than in individuals; in their heart they regard the affairs of the species as more serious than those of the individual. This gives to their whole being and action a certain frivolity, and altogether a fundamentally different direction from that of the man, from which cause arises the so frequent and almost normal want of agreement in marriage.

Between men there is by nature merely indifference, but between women there is enmity even by nature. It comes from the fact that the *odium figulinum*, which with men is limited to their particular guild, with women embraces the whole sex, since they have all only one trade. Even when they meet one another in the street, they look at each other like Guelfs and Ghibellines. Two women, moreover, on their first acquaintance, encounter each other with more embarrassment and dissimulation than two men in the like case. Hence the mutual complimenting of two women appears much more ridiculous than that of two men. Further, while the man as a rule speaks with a certain

consideration and humanity, even to one who is far beneath him, it is unbearable to see how proudly and brutally, for the most part, an aristocratic woman conducts herself towards one in a lower position, even though not in her service, when she speaks to her. It may arise from the fact that all distinction of rank is much more precarious with them than with us, and can be altered and abolished much more rapidly; since while with us a hundred things come into the scale, with them only one decides, to wit, which man they have pleased; as also from the fact that they, because of the onesidedness of their calling, stand much nearer to one another than men do, and for this reason seek to exaggerate class distinctions.

Only the male intellect befogged through the sexual impulse could call that undersized, narrow-shouldered, broad-hipped, and short-legged sex, fair; for in the sexual impulse resides its whole beauty. With more justice than the fair sex, one might call the female the *unæsthetic* sex. Neither for music nor for poetry nor for the plastic arts have they really and truly any sense and receptivity, but they merely ape it for the sake of making themselves attractive, when they pretend and affect to have it. For they are capable of no purely objective interest in anything whatever, the reason of which is, as I take it, the following:—The man strives in all for a *direct* mastery over the things, either by understanding them or by compelling them. But the woman is always and everywhere driven to a mere *indirect* mastery, namely, by means of the man, whom alone she has directly to master. It lies therefore in the nature of women to regard everything solely as a means to win the man, their interest in anything else whatever being never more than a simulated one, a mere detour, which ends in coquetry and aping. Hence Rousseau has truly said: "*Les femmes en général n'aiment aucune art, ne se con-*

naissent à aucun, et n'ont aucun génie" (*Lettre à d'Alembert, note xx*). Everyone indeed who has got beyond appearances will have long since observed it. One need only notice the direction and manner of their attention at a concert, an opera, and a play; for instance, look at the childish innocence with which during the finest passages of the greatest masterpieces they continue their chatter. If the Greeks in reality did not admit their women to the drama they only did right; one would at least have been able to hear something in their theatres. For our own time one ought to add to the *taceat mulier in ecclesia* a *taceat mulier in theatro*, or to substitute it and to place it in large letters on the curtain of the theatre. One can expect nothing else from women, when one considers that the most eminent heads of the whole sex have never been able to produce a single really great, genuine, and original achievement in the fine arts, and have never once given the world a work of lasting value. This is most striking as regards painting, the technique of which is at least as suited to them as it is to us, and which they pursue industriously enough, but nevertheless have no single great painting to show, for they are wanting in all objectivity of mind, a thing that painting most directly demands; they always remain in the subjective. This accounts for the fact that the general run of them have properly-speaking not even receptivity for it, for *natura non facit saltus*. Huarte in his, for the last three hundred years, celebrated book, "Examen de ingenios para las sciencias,"[1]

[1] Juan Huarte, "Examen de ingenios para las sciencias" (Amberes, 1603), Prohemio, p. 6: "La compostura natural, que la muger tiene en el celebro, no es capaz de mucho ingenio ni de mucha sabiduria." Cap. 15 (p. 382): "Quedando la muger en su disposicion natural, todo genero de letras y sabiduria, es repugnanta a su ingenio." Cap. 15 (pp. 397, 398). "Las hembras (por razon de la frialdad y humedad de su sexo) no pueden alcançar ingenio pro

denies to women all higher capacity. Individual and partial exceptions do not alter the fact that women are and remain, taken as a whole, the most inveterate and incurable of Philistines. Hence it is, that owing to the absurd arrangement that they share the position and title of the man, they are the continuous spurs of his ignoble ambition; and what is more, owing to the same quality their domination and influence is the ruination of modern society. In respect of the first, one should take the saying of Napoleon I. as a clue: "*Les femmes n'ont pas de rang,*" and for the rest Chamfort very rightly says: "*Elles sont faites pour commercer avec nos faiblesses, avec notre folie, mais non avec notre raison. Il existe entre elles et les hommes des sympathie d'épiderme, et très-peu de sympathies d'esprit d'âme et de caractère.*" They are the *sexus sequior*, the, in every respect backward, secondary sex, whose weaknesses we should accordingly spare, but to show honour to which is, to the last degree, ridiculous, and lowers us in their own eyes. When nature split the human race into two halves she did not make the division quite through the middle. With all polarity, the distinction between the positive and the negative pole is no merely qualitative, but at the same time a quantitative one. It is thus that the ancients and the oriental peoples regarded women, and accordingly recognized much more correctly the place belonging to them than we, with our old French gallantry and tasteless woman-worship, that highest bloom of Germano-Christian stupidity, which has only served to make them arrogant and callous; so much so that one is sometimes reminded of the holy apes in Benares, who, in the consciousness of their holiness and invulnerability, deem that anything and everything is permitted to them.

Woman in the west, especially "the lady," finds herself

fundo: solo veemos que hablan con alguna aparencia de habilidad, en materias livianas y faciles," &c.

in a false position. For woman, rightly termed by the ancients the *sexus sequior*, is in no wise suited to be the object of our honour and veneration, to carry her head higher than the man or even to have equal rights with him. The consequences of this false position we sufficiently see. It would be very desirable therefore that even in Europe this number two of the human race should be again referred to her natural place, and that a term should be put to the lady-nonsense, at which not only all Asia laughs, but at which Greece and Rome would also have laughed. The consequence of this in a social, civil, and political connection, would be inconceivably advantageous. The Salic Law as a superfluous truism, ought not to be at all necessary. The essentially European "lady" is a being which ought not to exist at all; but there ought to be housewives, and girls who hope to become so, and who are therefore educated, not to arrogance, but to domesticity and subordination. Precisely because there are *ladies* in Europe, the women of the lower classes, that is, the great majority of the sex, are much more unhappy than in the East. Even Lord Byron says ("Letters and Journals," by Th. Moore, vol. ii., p. 399): "Thought of the state of women under the ancient Greeks—convenient enough. Present state, a remnant of the barbarism of the chivalry of the feudal ages —artificial and unnatural. They ought to mind home, and be well fed and clothed, but not mixed in society. Well educated, too, in religion, but to read neither poetry nor politics, nothing but books of piety and cookery. Music, drawing, dancing, also a little gardening and ploughing now and then. I have seen them mending the roads in Epirus with good success. Why not, as well as haymaking and milking?"

The European marriage laws treat the woman as the equal of the man, in other words, proceed on an incorrect

assumption. In our monogamic continent marriage means to halve one's rights and to double one's duties. When the laws conceded equal rights to women with men, they ought to have endowed them with a male reason. The more, however, the rights and honours which the law concedes to the woman outweigh the natural proportion, by so much the more do they diminish the number of women who really participate in these privileges, and take from all the rest so much of their natural rights as they have given the others in excess of them. For with the unnaturally privileged position which the monogamic institution and the marriage laws connected with it impart to the woman (inasmuch as they regard the woman throughout as the full equivalent of the man, which she in no respect is), prudent and judicious men are very often cautious in making so great a sacrifice and entering upon such an unequal compact. While, therefore, among the polygamic nations every woman is cared for, with our monogamic peoples the number of married women is limited, and there remains a mass of unsupported women, who in the higher classes vegetate as useless old maids, but in the lower are forced to heavy labour, which is unsuited to them, or else to become street-walkers, who lead a life as joyless as disgraceful, but who are under such circumstances necessary for the satisfaction of the male sex, and hence exist as a publicly recognized order, with the special object of preserving from seduction the women, favoured by fortune, who have found husbands or hope to find them. In London alone there are 80,000 of them. What else, then, are these than women who have suffered the most fearful privations in consequence of the monogamic institution—real human sacrifices on the altar of monogamy? All the women above mentioned, who are placed in such a wretched position, are the inevitable counterpart of the European lady with her pretension and arrogance For the female sex,

considered as *a whole*, polygamy is therefore a real benefit. On the other hand, no valid reason can be seen why a man whose wife suffers from a chronic complaint, or remains barren, or has become gradually too old for him, should not take a second. What gains so many converts to the Mormons seems to be precisely the surrender of this unnatural monogamy. But besides the imparting of unnatural rights to the woman, it lays upon her unnatural duties, the neglect of which nevertheless makes her unhappy. For many a man, namely, considerations of class or of means, make marriage unadvisable, provided there are no brilliant conditions attached to it. He will then wish to obtain a wife under other circumstances which assure the lot of her and her children. Let these be as fair as they may, as reasonable, and as suited to the case, yet if she consents, just because she has no position in the disproportionate rights which marriage alone gives, she will, because marriage is the basis of civil society, be in a certain degree dishonoured, and have to lead an unhappy life, inasmuch as human nature implies that we attach an exaggerated value to the opinion of others. Supposing, on the other hand, she does not consent, she incurs the danger of either having to belong to a man who is repellant to her, or of drying up as an old maid, for the period of her availability is very short. As regards this side of our monogamic institution, the learned treatise of Thomasius, "De concubinatu," is very well worth reading, inasmuch as one sees from it that with all cultured peoples and at all times, down to the Lutheran Reformation, the concubinate was admitted, and indeed, to a certain extent, was a legally recognized institution, which was merely overthrown from this position by the Lutheran Reformation, which recognized in its abolition one more means for the justification of the marriage of the clergy, whereupon of course the Catholic side could not remain behindhand.

Polygamy is therefore not to be argued about, but is to be taken as a fact everywhere present, the problem being merely that of its *regulation*. For where are there real monogamists? We all live, at least for a time, and the most part always, in polygamy, for seeing that every man requires several women, there is nothing juster than that it should remain open to him, indeed that it should be his duty, to provide for several women. In this way the woman will be reduced to her just and natural standpoint, as a subordinate being, and the *lady*, that monstrosity of European civilization and Germano-Christian stupidity, with her ridiculous claims to respect and veneration, will disappear from the world; there will only exist *women*, but no more *unfortunate women*, of which Europe is now full.

In Hindostan no woman is ever independent, but each one stands under the guardianship of her father, or her husband, or her brother, or her son, according to the laws of Manu, chap. v., verse 148. That widows burn themselves on the corpse of their husbands is indeed shocking, but that they should spend the fortune which the husband, consoling himself that he was working for his children, had acquired by the steady industry of his whole life, with their lovers, is also shocking. *Mediam tenuere beati.* The original mother's love, as with animals so with man, is purely *instinctive*, and hence ceases with the physical helplessness of the children. Henceforth there should come in its place one based on habit and reason, but which is often lacking, especially when the mother has not loved the father. The love of the father for his children is of another kind, and more enduring. It rests on a recognition of his own innermost self in them, and is therefore of metaphysical origin. With almost all the ancient and

modern peoples of the earth, even with the Hottentots, property is inherited solely through the male descendants. In Europe only has this been departed from, and even there not with the nobility. That the property hardly acquired through great and long-continued labour and trouble by men, should afterwards get into the hands of women, who, in their foolishness, spend or otherwise waste it in a short time, is as great as it is frequent an enormity, which ought to be obviated by the limitation of the right of female inheritance. It seems to me that the best arrangement would be that women, whether as widows or as daughters, should only inherit an income assured to them by hypothecation during their lifetime, but neither land nor capital, unless it were in the absence of all male descendants. The acquirers of fortunes are men, not women. The latter are therefore not entitled to the unconditioned possession of them, more especially as they are incapable of managing them. Women should never have the free disposal of inherited property, in the true sense of the term, that is, capital, houses, and lands. They always require a guardian, and hence they ought in no case to receive the guardianship of their children. The vanity of women, even if it is not greater than that of men, has this bad quality, that it is entirely directed to material things, to wit, to their personal beauty, and secondly, to glitter, state, and show, on which account Society is so thoroughly their element. It makes them more particularly disposed to extravagance owing to their inferior intellect, for which reason an ancient writer has said: Γυνὴ τὸ σύνολόν ἐστι δαπανηρὸν φύσει (S. Brunck,

[1] "Chez les Hottentots tous les biens d'un père descendent à l'aîné des fils, ou passent dans la même famille au plus proches des mâles. Jamais ils ne sont divisés, jamais les femmes ne sont appelées à la succession." Ch. G. Leroy, "Lettres philosophiques sur l'intelligence et la perfectibilité des animaux, avec quelques lettres sur l'homme." Nouvelle edit., Paris, au X. (1802), p. 298.

"Gnomici Poetae Graeci," v., 115). The vanity of men, on the contrary, is often directed to non-material advantages, such as intellect, learning, courage, &c. Aristotle, in his "Politics" (B. II., ch. ix.), explains what great disadvantages to the Spartans had arisen from the fact that with them too much was conceded to the women, since they had the right of inheritance, of alienation, and generally great license, and how much this had contributed to the decline of Sparta. Was not the ever-growing influence of the women in France, from the time of Louis XIII., responsible for the gradual deterioration of the court and government, that produced the first Revolution, of which all succeeding revolutions have been the consequences? In any case a false position of the female sex, such as has its most acute symptom in our *ladydom*, is a fundamental weakness in the social state which, proceeding from its heart, must spread its noxious influence over all parts.

That woman according to her nature is meant to obey, may be recognized from the fact that every woman who is placed in the, to her, unnatural position of complete independence, at once attaches herself to some man, by whom she lets herself be led and ruled, for the obvious reason that she requires a master. If she is young it is a lover, if she is old it is a confessor.

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