UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_156822

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 325.342 C68B Accession No. 32568

Author Coatman, John

Title Br. Family of Nations

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

THE BRITISH FAMILY OF NATIONS

THE BRITISH FAMILY OF NATIONS

BY

JOHN COATMAN

DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
ST ANDREWS UNIVERSITY

AUTHOR OF
"MAGNA BRITANNIA" "YEARS OF DESTINY (INDIA 1926-31)"
"INDIA: THE ROAD TO SELF-GOVERNMENT"



GEORGE G. HARRAP & CO. LTD
LONDON SYDNEY TORONTO BOMBAY

First published 1950
by GEORGE G. HARRAP & Co. LTD
182 High Holborn, London, W.C.1

Copyright. All rights reserved

Dewey Decimal Classification: 325.342

Composed in Imprint type and printed by J. W. Arrowsmith Ltd, Bristol
Made in Great Britain


PREFACE

THIS book describes the British Commonwealth of Nations as a working concern. Only those few historical facts are mentioned which are necessary for the understanding of any particular theme. The purpose of the book is to show what the British Commonwealth is to-day, how it works, and its place and the place of its members in the world. The reason why the conventional division between the Commonwealth of self-governing nations and the dependent Empire is ignored in this book is explained in Chapter IV.

J.C.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	Growth of the Commonwealth Ideal	13
II.	Geography and Population	31
III.	Economic Resources of the Commonwealth	41
IV.	The Political Structure	58
V.	Co-operation and Consultation: (i) Political	74
VI.	Co-operation and Consultation: (ii) Economic, Scientific, and Cultural	95
VII.	The Dominions in World Affairs	111
VIII.	Development and Welfare in the Colonies	122
IX.	Political Developments in the Colonies	142
X.	International Aspects of Colonial Policy	161
XI.	Industry in the Commonwealth	176
XII.	Commonwealth Trade and Economic Problems	192
XIII.	Migration in the Commonwealth	208
XIV.	Defence	220
XV.	The Future	235
	Appendix	255
	Index	259
	MAP	
	The British Family of Nations	8–9


CANADA
U. S. A.
EUROPE
ASIA
AFRICA
SOUTH AMERICA
AUSTRALIA
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
UNITED KINGDOM
NEWFOUNDLAND
BERMUDA
BAHAMAS
LEEWARD Is.
WINDWARD Is.
BARBADOS
TRINIDAD
BRITISH HONDURAS
JAMAICA
BRITISH GUIANA
Equator
SAMOA
PITCAIRN ISLAND
COOK Is.
FALKLAND Is.
FALKLAND Is. DEPENDENCIES
GIBRALTAR
MALTA
CYPRUS
ADEN
GAMBIA
SIERRA LEONE
NIGERIA
GOLD COAST
UGANDA
BRITISH SOMALILAND
KENYA
ZANZIBAR
TANGANYIKA
SEYCHELLES
NYASALAND
NORTHERN RHODESIA
SOUTHERN RHODESIA
MAURITIUS
St HELENA
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
Bechuanaland
Swaziland
Basutoland
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
HONG KONG
SARAWAK
NORTH BORNEO
CEYLON
MALAYA AND SINGAPORE
BRUNEI
N.E. NEW GUINEA AND PAPUA
GILBERT Is.
ELLICE Is.
SOLOMON Is.
FIJI Is.
NEW HEBRIDES (Anglo-French)
TONGA Is.
NEW ZEALAND
THE BRITISH FAMILY OF NATIONS
Colonies, Protectorates, and Trust Territories
Dominions and Self-governing Colonies
South African High Commission Territories

TO

MANCHESTER GRAMMAR SCHOOL

CHAPTER I

GROWTH OF THE COMMONWEALTH IDEAL

As we look at a map of the British Commonwealth we see a large number of territories in every quarter of the world. There is a complete continent in Australia, and there are regions of sub-continental extent in Canada and in the two neighbour Dominions of India and Pakistan, which, until August 15, 1947, formed one country.

In East and West Africa we have countries covering great areas; Malaya is a long peninsula stretching south from the land-mass of South-eastern Asia; Ceylon, the West Indies, Fiji, and many other important islands or groups of islands, including the archipelagos of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, introduce another kind of geographical unit to the physical structure of the Commonwealth, while the many strategic and trading-places, such as Gibraltar, Aden, and Hong Kong, introduce yet another. Finally, there are the vast, uninhabited, and, indeed, largely undefined and unexplored territories claimed by Great Britain and Australia and New Zealand in the Antarctic. The peoples of these many lands are as varied as their climates, their areas, and their economic resources. They differ from each other in race, colour, religion, and culture—that is, in all the most important, and indeed, fundamental things that distinguish one human being from another.

At first sight it seems impossible that there should be any kind of political or other forces or principles capable of making a unity out of these scattered and diverse peoples. Of course, history tells us how they have come to be subjects of King George VI, and why their homelands are included in the British Commonwealth. Many of the peoples of the British Dominions overseas owe allegiance to the King because

they are of British stock, and because they look to Great Britain as the Mother Country, and wish to be joined with her and their sister Dominions in one inclusive association of kindred peoples. But the majority of King George's subjects overseas are his subjects because they or their ancestors and their countries were included in the British Empire as the result of war and conquest. In what sense, then, can these peoples be said to form a unity with their fellow-subjects of British origin, other than in a purely mechanical sense? We shall answer this question in the pages which follow, but it is necessary for us first to understand that every political system rests on certain ideas, beliefs, and principles of action, whether that system is a nation-state, a league or federation of nation-states, or a Commonwealth like our own; whether it is a monarchy or a republic, a nation-state, or a combination of monarchies or republics or both.

It is hard at first to realize that such powerful political systems as those of the United States of America, the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics—*i.e.*, Russia—and the British Commonwealth of Nations are based on such intangible things as ideas, beliefs, and principles, and not on military or economic power, or, even, racial unity. Of course, these giants in the world owe their leading positions to their military and economic power, but they owe their existence to the fact that their peoples accept certain beliefs and act according to principles based on those beliefs.

Thus in the United States of America the people, drawn originally from all parts of the world, are moulded into a nation by an educational system which teaches them that the United States is the freest and most democratic country in the world, and offers greater scope to the enterprising individual than any other. In fact, patriotism is one of the subjects of the curriculum in American schools, and, by the steady teaching of the ideas mentioned, the people of the United States are imbued with a strong sense of their own national unity and a firm belief in the destiny of their nation. In short, it is by the inculcation of certain ideas and beliefs that the

representatives of so many different races have been welded into, and kept together in, the most powerful nation-state of the modern world.

Similarly, the great variety of races and peoples inside the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics to-day find one of their main springs of unity in the political, economic, and social ideas of Marxist philosophy, which is known as Communism, and by the policies based on those ideas. Before the 1917 Revolution these basic ideas were supplied by Czarist Imperialism. And so we could go on in regard to every other sovereign nation-state in the world. Each one of them has, as the magnet which holds its people together as a united nation, certain ideas and beliefs—racial, religious, cultural, social, traditional, and so on—which cause them to regard themselves as distinct from other peoples; a separate entity, endowed with various rights and duties in virtue of their sovereign status, and entitled to adopt policies and follow courses of action based on principles which flow from the ideas and beliefs on which their nationhood rests.

But on what ideas and beliefs is the British Commonwealth based? Obviously not on the same sort as those on which a sovereign nation-state is based. With such a diversity of peoples and countries as we find in the Commonwealth, there can be no question of common race, religion, culture, and all the other mighty intangibles which weld individuals into a nation.

There is no one native land to hold its people's love and claim their service. Clearly we must look for a different set of ideas and principles of action, which will be less obvious and much harder to define and understand than those which form the foundations of the nation-state. Later in this book we shall study the various institutions and activities which act as connecting links or instruments of co-operation between the peoples and countries of the Commonwealth, but these are not the things we are seeking now. Some of them are symbols of unity, the Crown being the greatest and most potent of them all, while others are pieces of political machinery

devised to make co-operation possible between the many separate units of the Commonwealth, and to give practical expression to the relations which exist between them. In fact, all these things, with the exception, of course, of the Crown, which is the highest and most ancient symbol of the unity of the people of Great Britain, came into existence only because the Commonwealth was already in existence.

Our difficulty in defining the ideas, beliefs, and principles of action on which the Commonwealth is based is all the greater because it did not have its beginning in, nor did it grow according to, any settled theory or precisely formulated body of ideas. The beginning of the modern British Commonwealth was the settlement of British people overseas in New England and Virginia, and in the West Indies and Newfoundland, and the reasons why these folk went overseas were many and varied. Some went for profit, some for adventure, some for religious reasons, and so on. As these settlements grew and others were added to them all sorts of problems arose concerning the relations between the settlers and the Mother Country, but, for a century and a half these problems were practical problems peculiar to this or that body of settlers, and they very rarely raised any general or constitutional problems.

In short, British Commonwealth policy has developed in the same way as the British Constitution—namely, by constant adaptation to new conditions, by *ad hoc* solutions of specific crises and problems, and by constant compromise and adjustment of both practice and theory. The earliest literature of British imperial history is mostly descriptive and practical. We find detailed accounts of new lands suitable for colonization, including reports on economic resources, existing and potential, and practical suggestions for peopling these overseas territories with settlers from the British Isles. There is much dissertation on the advantages and glories of extending the sovereignty of the throne of Britain (or, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of England and Wales) by the inclusion of colonies overseas, but this cannot be dignified by the title of an imperial policy. It seems that great national or

international crises are necessary to induce the British people to make a serious examination of the fundamental conditions in which they live and to make them form general theories concerning these conditions. In the British Commonwealth such crises are to be found, among others, in our Civil War, in the revolt of our American Colonies, in the rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada in 1837, in the German challenge to our naval supremacy at the beginning of this century, and in the breakdown of the established international system from 1914 onward. At such times as these events force the British people to realize that they are not only citizens of Great Britain, but members also of a greater political system—the British Commonwealth—in which their own country is included. They learn, moreover, at such times, that their welfare is very closely connected with—indeed as the years follow each other, is increasingly dependent on—the strength and solidity of that greater political system. Out of this realization comes always some clarifying of the relations between themselves and their fellow-citizens overseas, and the continuous evolution of a definite theory of their Commonwealth—that is to say, a statement of the ideas and principles on which it is based.

Thus the first broad theoretic statement concerning the relations existing between the Mother Country and her colonies overseas arose from a specific crisis, and in response to a specific practical question. This was in 1649, when the Long Parliament passed an Act abolishing the office of King. At once this raised the fundamental constitutional problem of the exact relations between Mother Country and Colonies, the very same problem which in an even more complicated and developed form has occupied the attention of Commonwealth statesmen throughout the three hundred years which have passed since the Long Parliament first tackled it. It is interesting to note the exact wording of the Act of 1649:

> the people of England [so the statute runs] and of all the dominions and territories thereunto belonging, are and shall be, and are hereby constituted, made, established, and confirmed, to be a

> Commonwealth and Free State, and shall from henceforth be governed as a Commonwealth and Free State by the supreme authority of this nation, the representatives of the people in Parliament, and by such as they shall appoint and constitute as officers and ministers under them for the good of the people, and that without any King or House of Lords.

Incidentally, it is worth while noticing that the modern titles of the various members of the modern Commonwealth are included in this extract—namely, Dominion, the title taken by Canada ; and Commonwealth, the title now adopted by Australia. At any rate, this Act lays down the very important principle of the supremacy of the Parliament of the Mother Country over all the territories and dominions belonging to her people.

More than a hundred years later, when the trouble with the American Colonies was coming to a head, this next major emergency brings forward a similar declaration in the Declaratory Act of 1766. This is what the Act says :

> The said Colonies and Plantations in America have been, are, and of Right ought to be, subordinate unto, and dependent upon, the Imperial Crown and Parliament of Great Britain; and that the King's Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons of Great Britain, in Parliament assembled, had, hath, and of Right ought to have full Power and Authority to make Laws and Statutes of sufficient Force and Validity to bind the Colonies and People of America, Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, in all Cases whatsoever.

But, of course, as always in any great institutional controversy in this country, the Governmental or official view is by no means the whole statement of the case. The freedom of thought and speech which British people carry as their birthright everywhere in the Commonwealth ensures full expression to unofficial views also. So it was in the dispute between the British Government and the American colonists, which is still far and away the greatest turning-point in the history of the Empire. There was a great outburst of unofficial thought and

feeling on both sides of the Atlantic, and as we read the views of the leading protagonists in the Colonies and in the Motherland, we are often amazed to notice how modern they sound, and how some of them actually anticipate developments in inter-Commonwealth relations, some of which had to wait for a century and a half to be realized in practice, and others which may still be realized in the future.

Thus Richard Price and John Cartwright in this country were preaching a doctrine of the British Empire as an alliance of independent states acting in full and friendly co-operation with each other. In 1776, the year of the outbreak of hostilities between the Mother Country and her American Colonies, Price published his *Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty*, in which he proclaims the very spirit of the British Commonwealth of to-day when he says:

> The truth is that a common relation to the supreme executive head; an exchange of kind offices, ties of interest and affection, and compacts, are sufficient to give the British Empire all the unity that is necessary.

In 1775 Cartwright, in his *American Independence, the Interest and Glory of Great Britain*, not only argued in favour of all that we now call Dominion Status, but went a step farther by asking for a British League to be formed between Great Britain and the Colonies after a formal declaration by Parliament of their independence.

Similar views had already been proclaimed in the Colonies. Benjamin Franklin, writing in 1770, says:

> That the Colonies were originally constituted distinct states and intended to be continued such is clear to me from a thorough consideration of their original Charter and the whole conduct of the Crown and nation towards them until the Restoration, . . . the several states (in the King's Dominions) having equal rights and liberties and being only connected as England and Scotland were before the Union, but having one common sovereign—the King.

In another place he writes: "We have the same King but not the same legislatures." This most important point is

elaborated by James Madison, fourth President of the United States, who, writing after the final break between the Mother Country and the Colonies, but expressing views current before that event, says :

> The fundamental principle of the revolution was that the Colonies were co-ordinate members with each other and with Great Britain of an Empire united by a common executive sovereign, but not united by any common legislative sovereign. The legislative power was maintained to be as complete in each American Parliament as in the British Parliament, and the royal prerogative was in force in each Colony by virtue of its acknowledging the King and its executive magistrate as it was in Great Britain by virtue of a like acknowledgment there. A denial of these principles by Great Britain, and the assertion of them by America, produced the revolution.

The language of these various declarations is somewhat dry and technical, but the meaning is simple. It is that the colonists were perfectly satisfied to remain in an association of kindred peoples and friendly states of which the King was the head, but that they insisted on being masters in their own house, and that their own legislatures and not the Parliament of Great Britain were their law-making bodies. This is the very essence of the Balfour Declaration of 1926, which defines Dominion Status as we know it to-day. We shall see shortly what the Balfour Declaration and Dominion Status are. Indeed, these eighteenth-century statements in places go beyond the Balfour Declaration, and foreshadow the position to which we may be moving now, twenty years later, in which the British Commonwealth will be a society of sovereign states in free and friendly co-operation with each other.

Burke's famous speeches on the policy which ought to be adopted towards our colonies need not be quoted here. It is enough to remind students that he advocated with rare eloquence the application of the principles of liberty and self-government to the Colonies, and that he was supported by the powerful voice of Charles Fox in Parliament, and by some writers of the first quality outside it.

The American War of Independence was ended by the Treaty of Versailles of 1783, and, in view of what has been quoted above, and of the outcome of the war, it is strange that our imperial policy after 1783 should have been in some respects even less liberal than it was before the American Colonies revolted. For example, later colonial charters, such as the Canada Constitutional Act of 1791, were granted by Parliamentary statute. This was in effect to implement the doctrine contained in the Act of 1649 and the Declaratory Act that the overseas possessions of Great Britain were subject to the will of the British Parliament. Colonists, therefore, could no longer say that they had allegiance to the Crown but not to Parliament. In practice too the British Parliament often intervened directly in the internal affairs of the Colonies. The abolition of slavery in 1833, for example, was an unprecedented interference with colonial internal affairs. Therefore, the idea, which is widely current, that the Parliament and Government of this country adopted a *laissez faire* policy towards the Colonies after the American Revolution is not true. What is true is that successive Governments of Great Britain attempted to continue the government and administration of the Empire from this country, and even men of enlightened views and considerable knowledge of imperial affairs could not see how the unity of the Empire could be maintained unless the control of the Mother Country over the affairs of the Colonies was continued unimpaired. This view comes out very clearly in George Cornwall Lewis's *Government of Dependencies*, which was published in 1841.

For about half a century the leading philosophic and political thinkers of this country were found in the so-called Utilitarian school of philosophy, whose greatest figure was Jeremy Bentham. The views of this school had great influence on the policy and legislation of Great Britain during the first half of the nineteenth century. The gist of utilitarian teaching is that the value and goodness of conduct are measured by the extent to which it promotes the happiness of the greatest number of people. Unfortunately, the leading men of this

school did not apply their doctrines to any constructive theory of Commonwealth policy. Nevertheless, their general doctrines, together with those of Burke and Fox, in regard to colonial government undoubtedly influenced Lord Durham, who is one of the chief architects of our present-day Commonwealth.

It was Durham who went to Canada in 1837 to find a solution to the grave political problems in that country, which had resulted in rebellions both by the French inhabitants of Lower Canada, or Quebec, and the British inhabitants of Upper Canada. The control of the Government of Canada by the Mother Country had given rise to feelings and aspirations similar to those of the American colonists more than half a century earlier, and, once more, had led to rebellion. The Canadian risings were suppressed, but Durham realized that the political aspirations of the Canadian peoples must be satisfied, and his policy of uniting Upper and Lower Canada in one legislative union, and making the executive Government of the Union responsible to its Parliament—that is, making the life of the Canadian Government depend on its power to secure a majority in the Canadian Parliament—proved completely successful. It began the era of 'responsible self-government' or, to use a simpler phrase, 'home rule' for the Colonies, which was to develop later into the more complete form of independence known as Dominion Status.

Within a quarter of a century or so of Durham's solution of the Canadian problem the same system of government was extended to the other Colonies of British settlement, which, as they grew in population and economic strength through the nineteenth century, grew also in political stature, until, by the end of the century, they had many of the marks of full national sovereignty, including absolute control over their own trade and fiscal policies. Further, an active group of colonial reformers, the most prominent of whom was Edward Gibbon Wakefield, made the development of the Colonies a live issue in British politics, and were responsible for the inception of various schemes of organized emigration from

this country to the Colonies. As we look at the Durham settlement in its historical perspective, we see that it was the great dividing line between the old conception of an Empire held together and controlled by the Mother Country and the present-day conception of the Empire as a Commonwealth of freely co-operative, fully self-governing states, held together partly by ties of kinship, partly by the attractive force of certain ideas and doctrines, and partly by the unifying influence of institutions and working arrangements common to the whole Commonwealth, which finds its supreme symbol of unity in the Crown.

The true character of Durham's achievement was not perceived in this country for many years. In fact, to many observers, notably to Disraeli, who could write to Lord Malmesbury of " those wretched colonies which hang like a millstone round our neck," and Lord John Russell, who, in an official dispatch to the Governor-General of Canada, looked forward to the time when the colonies would declare their independence of the Mother Country, it seemed as though there were nothing but dissolution in front of the Empire. Certainly the unity of the Empire in the sense of control from one centre had gone, and quite clearly a group of nation-states were growing out of the soil of the old Colonies. To many mid-nineteenth-century eyes, no effective and permanent ties could be perceived to keep these evolving nations within one political system. Statesmen of those days could no doubt have understood a federation of the different British countries, and, indeed, Molesworth actually sketched out a Bill for a federation of the Empire.

Happily, no imperial federation ever materialized. A federation involves a common legislature and a common executive for certain basic activities of government, and, in the nineteenth century, such a development would have meant in effect the government of the whole Empire by Great Britain, which was vastly stronger in population and wealth than all the colonies combined. A federation really would have destroyed the Empire. The force of the growing nationality

of the young colonies would undoubtedly have burst through the mechanical political trappings of federation. Like the thirteen colonies of the first Empire, the colonies of the second Empire simply had to tread the road to nationhood, whatever the result might be for the imperial connexion; and, in the middle decades of the century, even the most intelligent observer might have been pardoned for expecting the colonies to go their own way independent of the Mother Country once they had attained full national stature and could look after themselves. But this did not happen, and the reason why it did not happen is of the utmost significance, not only for the British Empire but for the whole world.

The reason is that the grant of responsible government to the colonies, coupled as time went on with fiscal autonomy, gave them all the scope they needed—spiritual and mental as well as political and economic—to work out their own conceptions of nationhood. On the side of the Mother Country there was toleration of this process, albeit a pessimistic toleration on the whole, and the prevailing climate of opinion in our national politics and economics—namely, that of the Manchester School—was not actively hostile to the Empire, in spite of the pacifism and anti-imperialism of men like John Bright. Therefore—and this is the important point—time was given for the new relations established between 1840 and 1870 to perpetuate themselves; relations, that is, not only of active co-operation between self-governing countries, but of union within a political system which was neither federation, nor alliance, nor any other form of political association hitherto known. This new kind of union the British peoples had discovered simply by following the ideas and developing and modifying the political institutions native to them. It was a discovery in politics comparable to their other and earlier major discovery in politics—namely, Parliamentary Government, which, with all its imperfections, is the completest expression of true democratic principles so far devised.

It is desirable that this should be understood clearly,

because the British Commonwealth of Nations is something new in political association. It has developed during the last half-century or so into something like an association of completely independent sovereign states. It is not an alliance, it is not a union, it is not a federation or confederation, but an association. Yet the whole system, conscious though its member parts are of their own independence and individuality, forms a unity. To us who belong to the Commonwealth, the individuality and independence of its member units tend to be more apparent than the unity of the whole. But anyone who has had to study foreign writings on the British Empire realizes that foreigners are more conscious of the unity of the whole than of the separateness of its parts. It is very striking, too, to notice how puzzled foreigners are to account for the British Commonwealth, and how earnestly they search for tangible bonds of union between the parts. Of course, some British writers do the same thing, but the truth is that the British Commonwealth to-day consists in the relations between its different parts. The essential things about the British Commonwealth are not the political status, the strength, nationality, economic resources, trade, or anything else of its constituent parts, but simply and solely the relations which exist between them.

This analysis can be carried a step farther. Although the British Commonwealth is a unity, it is not a unity in the same sense as an ordinary nation-state, or conglomeration of peoples or territories like the Soviet Union, is a unity. That is to say, there is no one central sovereign authority for the whole, and in international affairs it does not speak with one voice like the U.S.S.R. or the United States. At any rate, when it does the unanimity is the result of free agreement reached by prior discussion, and is not the decision of one central governing authority. Such agreement is never the result of a majority vote, since majority votes and coercion find no place whatever in our Commonwealth relations, at least, in the relations between those members who are also members of the United Nations Organization. When agreement is not possible,

disagreement is no indication of hostility or rancour, and the dissidents realize that, although their own particular interests or opinions impel them to disagree, nevertheless, their particular interests are still only one element in the wider interests of the greater entity which is the British Commonwealth.

The idea of an imperial federation died hard. It was revived early in this century by Joseph Chamberlain, only to be destroyed once and for all by the spokesmen of the Colonies, which had by that time advanced much too far along the road of nationhood even to contemplate any such surrender of their sovereign power as would be involved in their inclusion in a federation. Indeed, after the Imperial Conference of 1907 the word ' Colony ' ceased to be applied to the self-governing members of the Commonwealth, and these countries took their present titles of ' Dominion of Canada,' ' Commonwealth of Australia,' ' Union of South Africa,' and the ' Dominion of New Zealand.' The First World War set the seal on the Dominions' claims to be nations in their own right. They all took a full part in that great contest, and all of them became original members of the League of Nations, equal in international status as in self-governing powers to the Mother Country herself. Therefore, it became urgently necessary to define once more the relations existing between the self-governing members of the Commonwealth—that is, Great Britain, Ireland, and the old Colonies of British settlement, which, since 1907, have assumed the title of Dominions. Lord Balfour drew up a statement defining these relations which was accepted by all the Dominions at the Imperial Conference of 1926. This is how the essential part of the Balfour Declaration reads :

> They [*i.e.*, Great Britain and the Dominions] are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

In 1931 this conception of the relations between the self-governing members of the Empire was embodied in an Act of Parliament—the Statute of Westminster—which was also adopted and passed by every Dominion Parliament, and is thus, so to speak, the present Constitution of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The Statute makes it clear that the 'Dominion Status' defined by the Balfour Declaration is, in effect, complete sovereign independence, and includes liberty to leave the Commonwealth altogether if the people and Parliament of any Dominion decide to do so.

The Second World War has carried both the theory and practice of inter-Commonwealth relations a stage further. Until 1947 the relations between Great Britain and the Dominions were in charge of the Secretary of State for the Dominions, but this office has now been changed to that of Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. The change is by no means one of title only. It means, in fact, that the last shreds of the old administrative character of the dealings between the Mother Country and the Dominions have gone, and have been replaced by the idea that these dealings have now acquired a diplomatic character akin to the dealings between any Commonwealth and any foreign country. And yet the ties of Commonwealth relationship still hold. Though the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations are individually as free and unfettered in their home and foreign policies as any sovereign state in the world, its peoples are conscious of the fact that they are members also of the wider grouping of the Commonwealth. The relations between them are very different from those which we call international relations, a statement which will be fully justified in the chapters which follow.

The importance of this for the world and international relations in general is surely apparent. The world has not yet learned how to transcend the interests of sovereign nation-states in the interests of the whole. The United Nations Organization, like its predecessor, the League of Nations, is a recognition of the need to transcend the interests of sovereign

states in the interests of the whole society of nations, and in its function attempts to achieve this. But it is obvious that this task, so far from being completed, has hardly been begun. The greatest difficulty in the way of the United Nations Organization is the unwillingness of all concerned to abate their full autonomy as sovereign states in their relations with each other. The difference between a world constellation of sovereign nation-states and the British Commonwealth is that the members of the latter are prepared to consider and shape their national policies so as to promote, as far as is practicable, the welfare of the wider whole to which they belong.

There is another most important point to be noted here. The theory of the sovereign nation-state is a fixed and static one so far as international relations or a world system is concerned. The nation-state exists for itself. Its own interests and those of its people must come first, and so it is very difficult indeed to see how a world system of fully, freely, and peacefully co-operating nation-states can ever come into existence, since such a system involves a real and continuous surrender of national sovereignty, to which, as all our experience seems to show, is precisely what no sovereign state will agree. But the British Commonwealth, on the contrary, is the result of a dynamic process of constant change and development of the relations between its different members. In this process the growth of their national sovereignty has been accompanied by changes in the kind of relations which exist between them, and a constant growth and change of the whole conception of the wider system to which they all belong.

As lately as 1947 the world was given a supreme example of this, when British India, hitherto a dependency of the British Crown, was divided into two independent countries, both of them electing to remain inside the Commonwealth as Dominions. It is true that continued membership of the Commonwealth was the only practicable way out of the highly intractable position created by the difficulties arising out of the conflicting claims of India and Pakistan. But for this,

opposition to membership of the Commonwealth would certainly have been stronger in India. Nevertheless, complete political freedom for India and Pakistan was no bar to their continued membership of the Empire and Commonwealth in which they will remain by their own free choice for as long as they choose. Burma chose to leave the Commonwealth, and did so formally in January 1948. Ceylon, like India and Pakistan, on receiving full Dominion Status, chose to remain in the Commonwealth. And there are other countries in the Commonwealth who will reach, in due course, the same political status, when they will have to make a similar choice. Here we see the Commonwealth growing naturally, and it cannot be doubted that these newcomers among the Dominions will all write new and fruitful chapters in the history of the Commonwealth, just as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa have done. Indeed, India has already written one. At a meeting of Commonwealth Premiers (Canada being represented by her Minister for External Affairs) in April 1949 India reaffirmed her resolve to stay in the Commonwealth still united with her sister countries by the link of the Crown, but calling herself a Republic.

South Africa's chapter is indeed a remarkable one. Within the lifetime of men still in their middle age, the two Dutch republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were incorporated in the Commonwealth as the result of war. Only a few years after the end of that war they and the British Colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal formed a Union and were given full self-government. Since then the Union of South Africa has voluntarily fought side by side with her sister Dominions in two great wars. Her greatest leaders have been of Dutch descent, Field-Marshal Smuts being one of the greatest of the world's living statesmen. Inside the Commonwealth, men, not only of different races, but of races which have fought each other, as in South Africa and Canada, can live together as citizens of one state.

So we see now on what sort of ideas and principles of action the British Commonwealth is based. We have seen young,

growing nations finding scope and protection for growth inside a great political system, with the most politically experienced and most truly democratic nation in the world as its centre and mainstay; a union which can last only as long as membership of it means perfect freedom for all its parts. Its principles of action are co-operation through agreement and consultation, the very principles which the United Nations Organization are seeking now to establish.

CHAPTER II

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

THE three greatest power groups in the world to-day are the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States of America, and Russia. Yet a glance at the globe reveals immediately a profound difference between the British Commonwealth and the other two. Apart from a few island dependencies, the U.S.A. and Russia are compact land-blocks, their territories being contiguous throughout. The lands of the British Commonwealth, on the other hand, are scattered throughout literally every quarter of the globe, and lie in or around every one of its oceans. This outstanding fact gives the clue to the development and perpetuation of the Commonwealth. Discovery, followed in some cases by colonization, and by conquest in others, the resulting system of settlements and dependencies being consolidated and protected by British sea-power—both military and mercantile —this, in brief, is the process by which the Commonwealth has been made. No other empire in history offers a parallel to the British Commonwealth in the matter of its dispersal in space. Its nearest analogue, the Roman Empire, was, for the most part, a compact land-block, the only dividing seas being the few miles of the English Channel and the narrow waters of the Mediterranean between Sicily and North Africa and the Near East. From the northern coast of France to the borders of Persia the legionaries could march on foot the whole length and breadth of the Roman Empire.

Still continuing our examination of the globe, we notice that the countries of the British Commonwealth are almost all islands or peninsulas, except for the extensive continental territories of Canada and East and West Africa. Thus the Commonwealth has land boundaries with only three of the

major powers of the world—Canada, with the U.S.A., the West African Crown Colonies, with the adjoining French territories, and the northern dependencies of Kashmir, with the U.S.S.R.

How does the British Commonwealth stand in the physical world? It has been estimated that there are nearly fifty million square miles of land on this globe suitable for human habitation, and, excluding the mandated territories, over eleven millions of these are in the British Commonwealth—that is, approximately a quarter of the whole. In his most valuable book, *A Political Geography of the British Empire*, Professor Fawcett shows that almost the whole of the lands of the British Commonwealth fall into two great groups: one group bordering the shores of the North Atlantic, and the other group surrounding the Indian Ocean. Another reference to the globe will make this clear, and show which lands fall into which groups. The only extensive areas outside these two groups are the West African territories on the shores of the South Atlantic, which together total no more than half a million square miles, or a little over 4 per cent. of the whole area of the Commonwealth. Apart from these three groupings, the only other Commonwealth territories are small but highly important strategic points and islands, such as Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus, in the Mediterranean, St Helena and the Falkland Islands, in the South Atlantic, and Hong Kong, off the southern coast of China. Thus once again we notice the character of the old British Empire as a 'thalassocracy'—that is, an Empire based on sea-power—for these smaller constituents of the Commonwealth lie in and along the sea-routes which connect the major groupings of the Commonwealth and link their various members one with another. Indeed, the influence of the sea is seen not only in the existence of the Commonwealth, but in the activities by which its people live. Before the Second World War three out of every five merchant ships afloat had been built in British shipyards, nearly half of them flew the Red Ensign, and nine of the ten greatest cities of the Commonwealth were sea-ports.

How is the land-mass of the Commonwealth distributed as between the different climatic zones ? The first great division occurs, as we would expect, between those parts of the Commonwealth which have been colonized by peoples of British or other European stock, and those whose climatic conditions have repelled white colonists. Naturally, white settlers went to the lands in the temperate zone both north and south of the equator. All the North Atlantic lands, with the exception of Canada's arctic and sub-arctic parts, fall within the northern temperate zone, and in the southern temperate zone are Australia south of the Northern Territory (which is in the tropics), New Zealand, and South Africa. It will be noticed, therefore, that all the Commonwealth countries of the temperate zone, whether north or south of the equator, are countries of European settlement, each of them completely self-governing, with the exception of Newfoundland, which, as we shall see, has become a province of the Dominion of Canada. In fact, these self-governing countries occupy all the land in the temperate zones within the British Commonwealth, and it is a striking fact that the four and three-quarter million or so square miles of temperate-zone land in the Commonwealth are almost exactly equally divided between the north and south temperate zones. The Colonial Empire—the Crown Colonies, Protectorates, and other Dependencies—in contrast with the self-governing Dominions, lie, with negligible exceptions, entirely within the tropical and sub-tropical zones. The area of the Colonial Empire is about two million square miles, and all but about 300,000 square miles is in Africa. Until 1947 India and Burma occupied an intermediate position between the Dominions and Crown Colonies, but Burma has now left the Commonwealth, and India has been divided between the self-governing Dominions of India and Pakistan, the two together occupying about one and a half million square miles in the sub-tropical zone. Ceylon, also, with her 25,332 square miles, left the Colonial Empire in 1947 to become a self-governing Dominion. Finally, there are about a million and a half square miles

of territory in arctic and sub-arctic Canada and Labrador, and more than a million square miles in the tropical north of Australia.

The land-mass of the Commonwealth is divided between four broad natural regions. First come the temperate regions north and south of the equator : the British Isles, the Eastern and Western Provinces of Canada, New Zealand, and Tasmania are all temperate-zone countries. In such countries as these—leaving minerals and manufacturing industries out of account—we find, in the forest areas, good hardwood timber in the lowlands and coniferous trees in the uplands and colder parts. In the western regions of Canada and New Zealand some of the best timber trees in the world are found, such trees as the Douglas and the Kauri Pines. In these same western areas of the temperate countries the sheltered parts support fruit-growing industries. In the interior of a vast country like Canada, where the climate is of the ' continental ' type—hot in summer and very cold in winter—we find wide stretches of treeless plains, the prairies, which support cattle and wheat-growing.

The Canterbury Plains of New Zealand are of this type, and it is here that the New Zealand sheep-farming flourishes. Oats, barley, and roots are all temperate-zone country crops.

The second of these great natural regions is the sub-tropical, to which belong large areas in South Africa and Australia, as well as small places like Malta and Cyprus. Here, the west-coast regions receive their rains in the winter, while the summers are hot and dry. Such fruits as grapes, figs, oranges, and olives are grown in these places, and flocks of sheep and goats and, in Australia, cattle are reared. The interior parts of these countries are often barren and agriculture can only be carried on where there is irrigation. Of course, there are favoured areas in the sub-tropical lands, and Australia grows a considerable amount of wheat and rears great herds of sheep and cattle.

The tropical region—the third of our great natural regions —includes the West Indies, India, the Northern Territories

of Australia, the Sudan, and Rhodesia. Here the temperature is high throughout the year, and there is a regular rainy or ' monsoon ' period. Much first-class hardwood timber grows in these places, and such crops as sugar-cane, rice, cocoa, coffee, bananas, tea, cotton, and so on are produced in abundance. In the higher and cooler parts cattle and sheep can be raised, and such crops as wheat produced.

Lastly, we come to the hottest and wettest region of all—the lowlands of the equatorial belt—in which we find Malaya, British Guiana, and the coastal regions of East and West Africa. These are fine timber countries, where such valuable trees as mahogany and ebony grow, together with rubber-trees and oil- and coconut-palms.

Such is the distribution of the territory of the Commonwealth throughout the oceans and continents and climatic zones of the world, and before we consider how its geographical layout affects the equally important matter of the distribution of its population, let us consider for a moment the question of transport and communications between these far-scattered units of this great political system. At present, obviously, the chief means of transport, whether of persons or of merchandise, are the shipping-lines which use the ocean highways. Year by year air-lines will more and more replace shipping-lines for passenger transport, and, even, for certain classes of goods transport, particularly parcel mails, perishable goods, medicines, and the like. Nevertheless, for heavy-goods traffic, shipping must retain its pre-eminence for as far ahead as we can see.

Much the most important of all the Commonwealth's lines of communication are its North Atlantic shipping-routes, where a vast bulk of goods and passenger traffic flows between Liverpool and Southampton to the ports of Montreal, Halifax, and Quebec. South from London, Liverpool, and other British ports run the sea-lines down the west coast of Africa across the Atlantic to the West Indies, through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the Indian Ocean to India, Ceylon, Malaya, Australia, New Zealand, and Hong

Kong. Outside this country other great centres of Commonwealth shipping-routes are Capetown, Vancouver, Montreal, Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Sydney, and Auckland, from which the ocean lanes criss-cross the North and South Atlantic and the Indian and Pacific Oceans in all directions, leading to the Dominions, the Crown Colonies, and other Dependencies; alike to the giant centres of world trade and population and to the remotest archipelagoes of the seven seas.

And now the Commonwealth's air-routes are coming into operation. One great line goes from the United Kingdom to Australia and New Zealand, across Egypt and Iraq to Pakistan, where Karachi must inevitably develop as one of the world's great airports. Calcutta, in the Dominion of India, is another such airport. From Calcutta the airway goes to Rangoon, now no longer in the Commonwealth, and thence to Singapore. Cairo, in Egypt, is an important station on this route, and from it lines branch off south to East Africa and so on to their connexion with South African airlines. Westward, from Foynes, in Eire, the airway goes to Newfoundland and thence to Montreal, from which trans-Canadian aircraft fly to Vancouver, on the Pacific Coast. The years ahead will be years of strenuous development in airlines all over the Commonwealth, for the air in future will steadily replace the sea in Commonwealth communications.

But if shipping-, air- and railway-lines are the framework of the Commonwealth's body, its cable and wireless communications are its nerves, along which are transmitted the impulses which result in economic and political activities. The Commonwealth's commercial cable and wireless services are operated by a joint Commonwealth Corporation, " Cables and Wireless." The world-spanning ' all-red route ' between the British Isles, Canada, South Africa, India, Australia, and New Zealand has all its stations on Commonwealth soil, and between them the giant transmitters of " Cables and Wireless " link all the great countries of the Commonwealth together in an invisible but continuous and effective system of communications. And wireless broadcasting, too, must not

be forgotten. Every day the B.B.C. broadcasts programmes to all the other countries of the Commonwealth, linking up with the broadcasting services of the Dominions and taking the broadcasting of the Colonial parts of the Commonwealth under its wing. From the Dominions and the Colonies comes a reverse flow of programmes, and in all this broadcasting activity we have another of the great lines of communication between the countries and peoples of the British Commonwealth, a line along which travel ideas and culture and all the vastly important intangibles of the mind and spirit.

After the land and the communications of the Commonwealth, we come to the peoples who inhabit these lands, exploit their natural resources, and operate their trade and industry, and for whom its systems of transport and lines of communication operate. There are nearly five hundred millions of them all told, one-quarter of the total population of the world. They are of all races and stages of cultural development, and of all the colours which it is possible for men to be. The overwhelmingly greater proportion of them—between 80 and 90 per cent.—are in the self-governing Dominions, including, now, India and Pakistan and Ceylon.

The population of the Colonial Empire to-day is something over fifty millions, and of these about twenty millions are in the West African colony of Nigeria.

The peoples of the Commonwealth are distributed very unevenly over its vast extent. Taking first the white peoples of the temperate-zone lands, Professor Fawcett tells us that, whereas the British Commonwealth includes nearly a sixth part of the land within the temperate zones, its peoples are barely a fifteenth of the population of these areas. Moreover, the inequality of distribution of population persists in the Commonwealth itself, for, while in England there are upward of seven hundred to the square mile, in the rest of the Commonwealth's temperate-zone lands, the average density of population is only five to the square mile. Indeed, Canada and Australia have less than three persons per square mile. South Africa has fifteen, including non-whites, and New

Zealand fourteen. Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand, too, for that matter, include vast stretches of land that will never be of any use for agriculture, no matter what mineral resources they may ultimately be found to contain, and their proportion of good, cultivable land to total area is, overall, probably about one-third of that of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the United Kingdom, which occupies only a fiftieth of the area of the Commonwealth within the temperate zones, and has about one-fifteenth of its good cultivable land, has three-fifths of the inhabitants of the area in question. These facts seem to show that the former colonies of British and European settlement, which are now the Dominions, are underpopulated. We discuss the problem of migration in the Commonwealth in a later chapter. However, as long as any country is underpopulated its natural resources, whether agricultural, mineral, or other, cannot be developed as they ought to be, nor can the maximum standard of welfare for its people be reached. Other factors besides the economic enter into this question of population. Economic and defence considerations exert their force in one direction, while racial, social, and, sometimes, religious considerations exert their force in another. But, particularly since the Second World War, there is a strong and possibly preponderant section of opinion in every one of those self-governing Dominions which were once Colonies of European settlement, in favour of admitting as great a volume of planned immigration as the circumstances of the country would appear to warrant.

The population problems in the Middle Eastern Dominions—*i.e.*, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon—and in the colonial territories of the Commonwealth are different from those we have just been considering. In the sub-tropical and inter-tropical regions, in which lie the countries we are now discussing, human life tends to multiply to the full extent to which it can be supported by the natural resources of the countries in question. For example, the population of India and Pakistan combined is between 350 and 400 millions, which gives an

average of more than 200 persons per square mile—*i.e.*, five times the average for the world as a whole. Moreover, India and Pakistan are receiving a net increase to their combined population of between five and six millions a year. In Nigeria the average density of population is fifty-six to the square mile, a figure which is well above the world average of forty per square mile. In fact, of the Commonwealth's West African territories, only the Gold Coast fails to exceed the world average of population density per square mile. In East Africa, on the other hand, the average number of persons per square mile is only fifteen. Here the little Protectorate of Zanzibar, about a thousand square miles in extent, has 230 persons to the square mile. Uganda, which comes next, has only forty-four. The two great regions of Kenya Colony and the mandated territory of Tanganyika have fourteen persons only to each of their square miles. Except for the valleys and the coastal plain along the Indian Ocean, British East Africa is a vast tableland, two-thirds the size of Europe, much of it high enough—5000 feet and upward—to have a climate suitable for settlement by white peoples. And, in fact, both Kenya and Tanganyika have attracted a number of European settlers. Kenya has about 34,000 and Tanganyika about 15,000.

In contrast to the sparsely populated East African territories, many of the West Indies have a fairly dense population. Thus, Jamaica has 280 persons to the square mile, Trinidad 208, the Leeward Islands as a whole 257, while in the Windward Islands the population reaches the totals of 497 per square mile in Grenada, over 400 in St Vincent, and upward of 300 in St Lucia. These islands, however, are tiny compared to the great land-masses of the African Colonies and Protectorates. Going across the world from the West Indies to the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius, we find there another dense population of over 500 to the square mile, while in the Malayan Union the figures vary from about eighty to something below 200. Fiji has the modest population density of twenty-seven.

Thus it will be seen how very unevenly distributed is the population of the British Commonwealth both in regard to race and habitation. More than three-quarters of the total are Asiatics, about 13 per cent. are of European stock, and of the rest 11 per cent. are Negroes. Of the peoples of European stock roughly 70 per cent. live in the British Isles, while of the remaining twenty-three millions in the rest of the Commonwealth roughly half are in Canada. Of the homelands of the Negroes in Africa, the West African territories of the Commonwealth have a population density in excess of the world average—about forty per square mile—while the East African territories, with a population density of only fifteen, are very considerably below it. Certain island territories, such as Mauritius and the West Indies, are densely populated, the white, however, being greatly outnumbered by the coloured inhabitants. The vast areas and the natural resources of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, and, also, of the East African territories, all of which are the most sparsely populated parts of the Commonwealth, suggest that they hold out scope for agricultural and industrial development, and consequently, for a level of population materially in advance of what they have so far accomplished. In the self-governing Dominions such developments will come as the result of their own economic and immigration policies, but, as we shall see in later chapters, the Government of the United Kingdom still holds final control over the policies of all the Colonial areas, and has recently formulated extensive policies of economic, social, and political betterment for the Colonies. We shall see, also, that in all those Dominions whose people are of European origin, excepting only French Canada, the birth-rate trends are such as lead to a stationary or declining population, in spite of the fact that they are all at present underpopulated. Clearly, in view of these conditions, there is ample need as well as scope for policies designed both to develop the economic resources and to increase the population of large and important countries, self-governing and Colonial alike, in many parts of the Commonwealth.

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH

THE picture of the British Commonwealth revealed in the foregoing chapters is of a great number of territories, large and small, scattered throughout the continents and oceans, and all the climatic zones of the world. Some of them are fully sovereign states with thriving and rapidly developing industries. Others are in less advanced stages of political and economic development, all moving at their several paces, and with their varying human and material resources, towards the goal already attained by a few of their fellows—namely, full self-government and a diversified economic system. In later chapters we shall see something of the industrial life and prospects of the Dominions, which control their own political and economic destinies absolutely, and something too of the possibilities of industrial development in the Colonies and Dependencies, which still rely on the United Kingdom for guidance and initiative in these matters. Here we shall briefly survey the material resources of field and forest and mine and sea, on which all this multitudinous life and its many activities rest.

It must be made quite clear that the Commonwealth does not form one economic unit. On the contrary, each Dominion has complete control over its own economic and trade policies, and has its own special interests in trading with foreign countries. In some respects the economic and trade interests of the Dominions clash with each other and with those of the United Kingdom, as we shall see in later chapters. The Colonies, too, are becoming increasingly interested in the world market, and, though their economic policies are in the last resort controlled by the Colonial Office, the guiding rule is that the welfare of the Colonial peoples must come first.

Thus, although trade within the Commonwealth is of great importance for all the Commonwealth countries, there is no question of forming the whole into one economic unit. The stimulation of inter-Commonwealth trade is quite another matter, and in Chapter XII we shall consider some of its problems and possibilities.

From the picture we saw in Chapter II of the geographical dispersion of the Commonwealth throughout the world's climatic zones, it is obvious that as regards primary products—that is, foodstuffs (both vegetable and animal), the economically valuable fibres (like cotton, jute, flax, and sisal), and forest products (such as rubber, timbers, and so on)—there are few, if any, which cannot be found or produced somewhere in the Commonwealth. The same is true of minerals and mineral-oils. It is doubtful if there is one of them of which no trace at all can be found in one or other of the countries of the British Commonwealth. It is quite certain that even now there is an immense amount to be learned about the possibilities of growing certain crops, both food and ' money ' crops, in parts of the Commonwealth where they have never been grown hitherto. (The expression ' money crops ' denotes those crops, such as cotton, flax, jute, sisal, and so on, which are grown not for immediate consumption, but to be sold in the world's markets for money with which to buy other raw materials of industry or consumer goods.) The same is true of the mineral resources of the Commonwealth. Only recently diamonds, and these are of great value in industry, have been discovered in rich quantity in Tanganyika, and are already being worked on a large scale. Gold-production in Northern Rhodesia has, in the same period, taken precedence even over copper-production, and there are encouraging prospects of new important possibilities of oil-development in the Bahamas. The scheme for geological surveys of the Commonwealth, which is mentioned in Chapter VIII, will surely uncover abundant new sources of mineral wealth. Let us, therefore, look at the more important of the treasures with which Nature has provided our Commonwealth, and

which she gives its peoples the chances to produce or exploit in agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, and fishing.

Let us begin with what is literally the most vital and fundamental of the Commonwealth's resources—food-production. The lessons of two destructive world wars and the grim experiences of the years which followed them have focused attention on food-production as never before. The chief staple food of the white peoples of the world is wheat, and before the Second World War the Commonwealth produced enough wheat for its own needs. Far and away the greater part was produced in Canada, India, and Australia—Canada and India, indeed, being the world's greatest producers after Russia and the United States. But, as the surplus left over in India after her own needs had been supplied was always comparatively small, and long before the Second World War had dropped away to practically nothing, she was not able to supply much for export. Canada and Australia both exported wheat to foreign countries, and, therefore, the wheat-importing countries of the Commonwealth, notably the United Kingdom, had to make good their requirements by importing from foreign producers, the chief of these being the U.S.A. and the Argentine. Moreover, the wheat-production of Canada, Australia, and India fluctuates considerably from year to year owing to the vagaries of the rainfall over the vast prairies and plains which are the wheat-growing areas of those countries. Nevertheless, in 1946 the export of Canadian wheat was two and a half times greater than the average of her pre-War exports ; Australia's, however, had fallen almost by two-thirds.

Rice is for the white peoples of the Commonwealth only of minor importance as a food, but for many millions in India, Malaya, and elsewhere in the East it is the staple article of diet, literally a matter of life and death, as the Bengal famine of 1942 showed. Rice is, in fact, the most important of the world's foodstuffs in view of the numbers who live on it, and in a normal year the tonnage of rice produced is at least twice as great as that of wheat. In such years the Commonwealth

is not only self-supporting in the matter of rice, but exports large quantities to other countries.

After rice and wheat, maize probably comes next in order of importance in a normal year. As a foodstuff it is chiefly important in the Commonwealth in the African Colonial territories, but it is of great and growing importance everywhere for animal- and poultry-feeding, and the demand for it increases continually. The greater part of the Commonwealth production of maize is in the Union of South Africa, Canada, and Australia, but the total before the Second World War was no more than between 3 and 4 per cent. of the world total. Undoubtedly this percentage will be increased in the future when the many schemes of agricultural development now planned, some of which are concerned with maize-growing, get under way in those territories suitable for this crop, which thrives in a hot, wet climate.

Sugar is not only an important item of diet, but also adds much to the amenities of life, as those who have lived in years when jam, sweets, and confectionery have been severely rationed know well. It is obtained both from the sugar-beet, which grows best in temperate climates, and from the sugar-cane, which can grow only in the sub-tropics and tropics. Many parts of the Commonwealth, notably the West Indies, Mauritius, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Australia, produce large amounts of cane-sugar, while the United Kingdom is now a substantial producer of beet-sugar. Even so the Commonwealth in 1939 produced only about 20 per cent. of the world's sugar, which is far below her own requirements. This crop, however, is peculiarly susceptible to the vagaries of the world market, and to increase the amount grown is a matter for most careful consideration.

Oil-seeds, and vegetable-oils generally, are an increasingly important element in the world's food-supplies, and it is significant that the great ground-nut scheme in East Africa, which is described in Chapter VIII, is the first large-scale food-producing enterprise to be undertaken by the new Overseas Food Corporation. Vegetable-oils of all kinds are, for the

most part, tropical and semi-tropical products, although olive-oil is produced in warm temperate countries. It was about the beginning of this century that the spectacular increase in the use of vegetable-oils as foods, chiefly in the shape of margarine, began ; a development made possible by the progress of chemical science. It has been said that one of the important factors in the defeat of the Germans and their allies in the 1914–18 War was the possession by the United Kingdom and her allies of the sources of vegetable-oils in West Africa and India and Ceylon. From West Africa come ground-nuts, palm-kernels, palm-oil, and copra—the flesh of coconuts—and from India and the East come ground-nuts, linseed, cotton, and sesame seed. Even taking into account the great increase in the production of soya beans, that wonderful all-purpose vegetable, the Commonwealth supplies not far short of half the world's supply of oil-seeds, and future developments in the Colonies should increase this percentage. Vegetable-oils are used for many industrial purposes—paint, for example—as well as for food, but they are products which are in continually increasing demand for all the many purposes which they serve. There is at present practically no production of soya beans in the Commonwealth, but there is no good reason why there should not be. Indeed, the supply of practically every kind of oil-seed found within the Commonwealth could be increased, and it seems certain that it will be increased. It should not be forgotten that oil-cake, which is made from the residue of oil-seeds after crushing, is one of the most valuable foods for livestock, and this fact, and the rapidly increasing demands of human consumption, make the Commonwealth's oil-seed production a matter of great importance.

Tea is another foodstuff the value of which has been emphasized by years of scarcity and rationing. Normally the Commonwealth produces not far short of 60 per cent. of the world's supply, and the three chief tea-markets in the world are London, Calcutta, and Colombo. Thus, the Commonwealth easily supplies her own demands and exports to the

rest of the tea-drinking world. The cultivation of tea has extended from India and Ceylon to East Africa, where Kenya and Nyasaland are both producers. Of the world's production of cocoa, the Commonwealth, principally in West Africa, and there almost entirely in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, produced before the Second World War more than half. In fact, the Gold Coast and Nigeria alone produced exactly half the total world crop of cocoa in the last pre-War year for which reliable statistics are available. With coffee, however, we come to a very different state of affairs, for the Commonwealth at the outbreak of the Second World War produced only a trifle more than 3 per cent. of the world crop, and of the Commonwealth's share Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika accounted for over 70 per cent., all but a small fraction of the remainder being supplied by India.

Thus we see that, leaving aside such food crops as pulse-grains, barley, oats, and rye, all of which are important in specific localities, the Commonwealth, except for rice, tea, and cocoa, is a net importer. Naturally, in view of the experiences of the past few decades and of the possibilities of the future, this position has come under anxious review by the various Governments of the Commonwealth, and improved food-production policies are being everywhere undertaken, and nowhere more vigorously than in Great Britain.

Turning from food crops to money crops, we again encounter a situation which has its bright and dark patches. Beginning with jute, the coarse fibre of which sacking cloth is made, we find that the Commonwealth has a complete monopoly. Jute is grown in the hot, swampy grounds of Eastern Bengal, and is being increasingly manufactured there. Formerly Dundee was the great manufacturer of gunny cloth, which is the trade term for the familiar sackcloth of everyday life, but it long ago lost pride of place to Calcutta.

Wool is an animal product, it is true, but it may appropriately be considered in connexion with such crops as jute, cotton, flax, and the like, because, after cotton, it is the most important of the textile fibres. Roughly half the wool in the

world is produced within the Commonwealth, and of the latter's share three-quarters comes from Australia and New Zealand. Australia is far and away the greatest producer of wool in the world, her production easily exceeding that of her two nearest competitors—the United States and the Argentine—combined. New Zealand ranks fourth among the wool-producing countries of the world and South Africa fifth, while India and the United Kingdom normally produce much the same amounts, which, although they are well below the amounts produced by New Zealand and South Africa, and are only a fraction of the Australian production, nevertheless give them a high place among the wool-producers of the world.

Great though the Commonwealth's production of wool is, it could still be increased, since there are tracts of land suitable for sheep-rearing in others of its countries besides Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The difficulties of achieving any major increase are formidable, involving problems of the distribution of population, the application of science to wool-producing, and all sorts of marketing, transport, and organization problems.

The situation is very different with regard to cotton, for, except in India and the Sudan, there is no extensive cotton-growing in the Commonwealth, and the important cotton industry of Lancashire must, for some time, remain dependent chiefly on the United States. But Pakistan grows cotton, and the crop is being developed also in Uganda and West Africa. The production of the 'Sea Island' cotton of the West Indies is also being stimulated. But the Commonwealth is at present far from the position in which her countries will be able to supply Lancashire's needs and those of her other cotton-manufacturing industries. In 1946 only 21 per cent. of the cotton worked in Lancashire came from the Commonwealth, and the latter's share of the total world crop was only between 15 and 20 per cent., the vastly greater part of this being grown in India and the Sudan. Indeed, apart from these two countries, the Commonwealth produces only 1 per cent.

of the world's crop. It must be remembered, too, that raw cotton is divided broadly into two types—the American and the Egyptian—which differ from each other in the matter of the fineness of their fibre. American-type cotton is generally shorter than one and one-eighth inches, while Egyptian is longer. Thus the Egyptian type is used for making the finer yarns, while the American type is used for coarser yarns. It will be noticed that the expressions 'Egyptian type' and 'American type' are used. The reason is that the shorter fibre-length cotton (the 'shorter staples' in the trade's own terminology) is grown elsewhere than in America, and the longer staples elsewhere than in Egypt. Thus American-type cotton is grown in East and West Africa, and the Egyptian type in the Sudan. Until the Second World War the United States was far and away the principal source of supply of raw cotton for the spinning industry of the United Kingdom. In 1939 they supplied roughly half of our imports of raw cotton, but by 1946 the proportion had fallen to a quarter. On the other hand, our imports from our Colonies in East and West Africa had grown from 3 to 4 per cent. during the same period, and those from the Sudan from 6 to 12 per cent. Imports from India fell in these years from 11 to 6 per cent. owing to her own greater consumption and to the serious disorganization caused by the Second World War. But it is the short-staple American type that Lancashire chiefly needs, and Nigeria of all Commonwealth countries at present produces the nearest equivalent, but only in small quantities. Clearly, therefore, the future policy for Commonwealth cotton-growing is likely to concentrate on increasing the yield of the American type.

Turning now from vegetable to animal products, we see that the Commonwealth produces about a fifth of the world's butter, rather less than that proportion of its meat, and rather more than one-tenth of its cheese. The great dairying countries of the Commonwealth are Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom, with the three first-named producing three-quarters of its butter and more

than three-quarters of its cheese. The Commonwealth's meat-production is concentrated mostly in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, in that order of importance. Apart from the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth is mainly self-supporting in meat and dairy produce, and Australia, New Zealand, and Canada are exporters of all these products. But the needs of the United Kingdom are so great that she has to import meat and dairy produce from a number of foreign countries, particularly beef from the Argentine and dairy produce from Denmark.

Lastly, before we turn to minerals, let us consider the position of the Commonwealth in regard to rubber and tobacco, two of the most important money crops in the world. Before the Second World War more than half the world supply of natural rubber was produced inside the British Commonwealth. The greater part of this large proportion—75 per cent.—came from Malaya alone, while Ceylon, the next largest producer, accounted for 10 per cent. of the Commonwealth's production. Malaya was occupied by the Japanese during the Second World War, but no other rubber-producing Commonwealth country was. (Burma has now declared herself independent.) But the damage done to the Malayan rubber-plantations was not as great as had been feared, and, with the unsettled state in the post-War years of the Dutch East Indies, which produced very nearly as much rubber as Malaya, the latter still heads the list of the world's rubber producers. There are good prospects of expansion of rubber-growing in Sarawak and British North Borneo as well as Malaya and Ceylon. But, apart from such normal difficulties in the way of expansion as are provided by labour and capital-supply problems, a great question-mark hangs over the future of natural rubber because of the immense development of artificial-rubber production, especially in the United States, the world's greatest consumer of rubber. For security reasons the United States Government decided after the Second World War not to dismantle its synthetic-rubber plants.

Before the Second World War the Commonwealth produced

about 25 per cent. of the world's tobacco, but of this share five-sixths was grown in India. There is not the slightest reason why the Commonwealth should not in time become entirely self-sufficient in this valuable crop, which, in the post-war years, was one of the most important channels down which this country's dollar resources drained away. All sorts of technical, agricultural, processing, and labour problems will have to be solved before the Commonwealth grows all the tobacco it needs, but the fact remains that in Canada, South Africa, Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, the West Indies, India, Pakistan, Borneo, and other countries tobacco of the finest quality can be grown. The history of Commonwealth tobacco-growing shows that crops of a quality second to none can be produced given the application of the necessary scientific and technical knowledge and processes, and nobody will belittle the importance of tobacco who remembers that the tobacco trade between England and certain of her American colonies, notably Virginia, was the cornerstone of the Colonies' economic edifice.

The Commonwealth's resources of timber are of vast extent. The limitless forests of Canada and Newfoundland produce an appreciable proportion of the world's supply of the raw material of newsprint, while practically every one of the valuable hardwoods of commerce—Indian teak, mahogany from West Africa and British Honduras, ebony from East and West Africa, jarrah from Australia, and so on—is found somewhere or other within the boundaries of the Commonwealth.

When we turn to the crucially important subject of the Commonwealth's mineral resources we find the overall prospect most encouraging. The Commonwealth's mineral resources are unequally distributed throughout its territories; some, like New Zealand (apart from some small deposits of good coal), being practically devoid of minerals so far as is at present known, while others, especially Canada, are exceptionally rich in a wide range of minerals. At present the outstanding deficiency in the Commonwealth's mineral

resources is in fuel-oil, or, to use the popular word, petroleum. The importance of this mineral is obvious, since oil is now one of the prime sources of industrial power, and therefore one of the main foundations of the world's economic activities. Even here the position seems to be improving with the prospecting and developing of new oil-bearing strata. Fuel-oil can be obtained by distillation from coal or oil-shales, but we shall confine our attention here to its appearance as a natural product to be obtained by drilling wells, normally at depths ranging from three thousand to over five thousand feet.

Inside the British Commonwealth mineral-oil is produced in Trinidad, Canada, Borneo, and Pakistan, in that order of importance. But the total amounts produced are small in comparison with world production. A survey made in 1913 showed that the Commonwealth produced a trifle more than 2 per cent. of the world total. By 1921 this percentage had dropped to about 1·7 per cent., at which figure it stood in 1939. The 1913 and 1921 figures, however, included Burma, which has since left the Commonwealth, and it appears, therefore, that the Commonwealth's percentage of natural mineral-oil remained stationary between 1913 and 1929. The actual amounts raised in the Commonwealth increased materially during the period 1913 to 1939 because the world production, especially in the United States and the Persian and South American oilfields, showed great upward movement during these years. In fact, it doubled between 1913 and 1921. Finally, in 1945 the Commonwealth's proportion of the world's oil-production had fallen to 1·25 per cent., with Trinidad producing roughly two-thirds of the Commonwealth's output. But again it should be noticed that the world output of crude oil almost doubled once more between 1930 and 1945.

Looking at the Commonwealth's oil resources in more detail we observe the following facts. The Commonwealth's chief oilfields, which are at present in Trinidad, increased their output nearly four-hundredfold between their first production in 1909 and the year 1945. Most of the wells on the island are

shallow, but some of them are among the deepest in the world, between six and ten thousand feet. Every effort is being made to increase Trinidad's output by finding new oilfields and applying the most advanced techniques to the production and refinement of the crude oil. Particularly interesting is the under-sea drilling now proceeding in the Gulf of Paria between Trinidad and Venezuela, which, incidentally, is now the world's largest producer of crude oil after the United States.

In Canada the Turner Valley oilfield, in Southern Alberta, produces practically the whole of Canada's output. This oil is of high quality, and there are reasons for believing that the Turner Valley output may be still further increased. In 1946 a flowing oil-well was reported in the neighbouring Province of Saskatchewan, but it still remains to be seen whether oil is there in significant quantities. Alberta, however, may be one of the great oilfields of the future, for a rich strike was reported at the end of 1946 at Leduc, in that Province.

The Indian oilfields are in the Western Punjab (now in Pakistan) and in Assam. Small supplies have been obtained from the hills of Eastern Baluchistan (also in Pakistan), but further exploration will be needed before it is known whether oil is present in any quantity in this area. A glance at the map will show that Western Baluchistan is part of the land-mass of the Persian Gulf and its hinterland, which includes the rich oil-bearing strata of Persia, Iraq, and Arabia.

British Borneo seems to be one of the most promising areas for Commonwealth large-scale oil-production in the near future. Before the Second World War one oilfield alone —at Seria, in Brunei—had produced seven hundred thousand tons, while Mira, in Sarawak, had produced two hundred thousand. Seria has been described as potentially the biggest oilfield in the Commonwealth, and, although oilfields and refining installations were destroyed or damaged by the Japanese, the work of rehabilitation has proceeded apace, and a big new modern refinery is to be built in North Borneo.

The Colonial Geological Survey, referred to in Chapter VIII, will intensify the search for oilfields in the Colonies and Dependencies, and in the meantime active prospecting is going on in the Bahamas (which is regarded as a likely area owing to the discovery of oil in Florida on the opposite mainland), and also in Aden, Cyprus, and Nigeria. Australia and New Zealand are also searching for oil within their borders, but so far without any great success. In the United Kingdom an extensive search for oil was made during the Second World War, and some was, in fact, produced. Discoveries were, however, of quantities insufficient to give flowing wells. The oil had all to be pumped, but the search in the United Kingdom has not been altogether abandoned. This discussion of British Commonwealth oil resources is of a length disproportionate to the place occupied by them in the Commonwealth's economic assets, but oil is of such crucial importance that it is well that students should know what is the actual position in respect to it, and what the immediate outlook.

Important though oil is, coal is still the prime fuel and source of power in the world, and in respect to it, the position of the Commonwealth is very different from its position in regard to oil. Nearly one-quarter of the world's coal is mined in the Commonwealth, and a full three-quarters of the Commonwealth's coal is mined in the United Kingdom. India comes next with less than one-tenth, South Africa third with about one-sixteenth, and Australia fourth with less than one-thirtieth, closely followed by Canada. Elsewhere in the Commonwealth coal-production is at present not significant. This, however, is only the present state of affairs, for there is plenty of scope for coal-production in the Commonwealth outside the United Kingdom. The deposits in Chota Nagpur, in Eastern India, are likely to prove important in the future, while recent discoveries in Southern Rhodesia, which at present is easily the foremost coal-producing area in all the Colonies, show that there is a great future for her coal, particularly as it is accompanied by rich iron-ore deposits.

In British Borneo, too, there are possibilities of extension in coal-mining, and Australia is known to be comparatively rich in coal. Here, again, the Colonial Geological Survey may be expected to reveal hitherto unknown coalfields, which, indeed, are still being discovered in the United Kingdom itself.

The position of the Commonwealth in regard to iron is less favourable, only about 15 per cent. of the world's supplies being mined at present within its borders, and of this amount something less than half is produced in the United Kingdom alone. India comes next with rather more than one-fifth of the Commonwealth's total, closely followed by Australia with rather less than one-fifth. But, indeed, every one of the Dominions, except New Zealand, and many of the Colonies, have rich iron deposits which only await exploitation. It would be surprising if this were not so, because geologists have estimated that more than 4 per cent. of the earth's crust is composed of iron, the only metal which exceeds this proportion being aluminium. Indeed, pig-iron accounts for probably nine-tenths of the world's total production of metals, followed at a long interval by lead, whose production is one-sixtieth that of pig-iron, which, in fact, is about twenty times as great as that of all other metals combined. Thus, the importance of the Commonwealth's immense resources of iron ore is obvious. Mention has already been made of the rich deposits in Southern Rhodesia, where great developments are expected; Nigeria, Uganda, Tanganyika, and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan are also areas which promise important developments in the future. The resources of the Dominions have been noted, but it should not be forgotten that Newfoundland also has very extensive deposits of iron ore. It can be truly said that steel is the framework of modern civilization, and, as we see, the resources of the Commonwealth in this most important particular need are second to those of no other political system in the world.

It is generally known that steel needs certain other metals to harden it—nickel, manganese, chrome, and tungsten.

Nine-tenths of all the nickel mined in the world comes from Canada, nearly two-fifths of the world's manganese comes from India, South Africa, and the Gold Coast, fully two-fifths of the world's chrome from Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and India, while, since the departure from the Commonwealth of Burma, which was far and away the most important producer of tungsten, the Commonwealth's share of this metal has fallen to less than one-tenth of world production. Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, India, Malaya, and Australia, however, all have deposits which are capable of expansion.

Nearly half the world's supply of tin comes from the Commonwealth, mainly from Malaya, and Canada and Northern Rhodesia supply a quarter of the copper mined annually. This proportion should increase, because schemes for increasing Northern Rhodesia's supplies have been put on foot, and Canada's supply showed a steady rise during the years preceding the Second World War. The Commonwealth's share of the production of bauxite—that is, the chief ore for aluminium—is at present no more than 15 per cent. of the world supply, and nearly all of it comes from British Guiana, which has some of the richest deposits known anywhere. But India and Malaya are known to have good supplies, and there is some also in Australia. No doubt deposits will be revealed elsewhere in the Commonwealth by systematic geological surveys. The importance of aluminium is growing steadily, since it and its alloys are better than steel for some purposes.

We have seen that lead comes next to iron in metal-production, and of the world's supply the Commonwealth provides roughly between a quarter and a third, practically all of it from Australia and Canada. Indeed, Australia comes second as a source of lead ore, the first place being taken by the United States. But, very recently, rich lead-deposits have been found in Tanganyika, which should be an important supply of this metal in future. Rather more than a quarter of the world's zinc is found in the Commonwealth, again nearly all of it in Australia and Canada, though Newfoundland makes a

useful contribution, ranking about ninth in the list of world producers.

When we come to the two precious metals, gold and silver, we find that, whereas the Commonwealth produces roughly one-sixth of the world's silver, almost the whole of it is contributed by Canada and Australia, with Canada's share nearly double that of her sister Dominion; not far short of three-fifths of the supply of gold comes from the Commonwealth, by far the greatest part from the Union of South Africa. But Canada has good gold deposits, being, as a rule, the next largest producer in the world after South Africa, with Australia ranking fourth next to the United States. But, indeed, gold is found in many parts of the Commonwealth: in the two Rhodesias, East and West Africa, in India, Malaya, and in a number of the British territories in Oceania. New gold-bearing strata have recently been discovered in British Guiana, and in all the Colonial parts of the Commonwealth where gold is found the Governments are stimulating production. In this precious metal the British Commonwealth has one of its greatest economic sheet-anchors.

Almost three-quarters of the world's supply of diamonds comes from the Commonwealth, with the Union of South Africa's production outstripping that of the rest of the world. The mandated territory of South-west Africa, which is controlled by the Union, comes third on the list of the world's diamond-producers, being beaten only by the Belgian Congo for second place. But, since the beginning of the Second World War, the substantial diamond deposits of Tanganyika have become known. It must be remembered that diamonds are a most important product for a number of industrial processes, as well as for personal adornment and other decorative purposes, and the Commonwealth's outstanding position in diamond-production is, therefore, an economic asset of immense value. Finally, it is not necessary to stress the importance of the uranium deposits of Canada, or of the reports in 1948 of the discovery of this mineral in South Africa and Australia. It occurs in other parts of the Commonwealth,

which should, therefore, be in a good position with regard to this prime element in the production of atomic energy.

Thus, as we cast up the Commonwealth's balance-sheet of natural resources of all kinds, we see what an important place she holds in the total world supply of these goods. There is, of course, scope for further development of these resources, and the scientific and practical problems involved in such development are now being tackled by the Governments of the Dominions and by the Colonial Office and the Governments in the Colonies.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

THE first chapter of this book gave some account of the stages and the guiding ideas and principles of the process by which the British Empire developed from a collection of Colonies and other territories completely controlled by Great Britain into the present British Commonwealth of Nations. In this chapter we shall examine the political structure of the Commonwealth. This is a difficult task, because the political constitutions of the different countries of the Commonwealth vary widely, not only in their institutions, or working parts, but in their general plans. Thus, there are federations like Canada and Australia, and there are unitary governments, like the United Kingdom and New Zealand. There is South Africa, which, although it is essentially a unitary Government, has some of the features of a federation. Malaya, which is a union of a Crown Colony together with a number of native states, presents yet another ground-plan of government. There is a vast amount of difference between Gibraltar, at the entrance to the Mediterranean, governed by an official hierarchy, and Malta, which is well on the road to self-government. Again, there are commonwealths within the Commonwealth in the Mandated Territories governed by Australia and New Zealand. Finally, the many countries of the Commonwealth differ in the very essence of their political constitutions—that is, in the extent of the powers of self-government which each constitution embodies. In the British Commonwealth these powers range from the fully sovereign self-governing status of the Dominions to the total absence of such powers in the most backward of the South Seas dependencies. And in between these two extremes are all manner of gradations: the quasi-Dominion of Southern Rhodesia;

the advanced representative Governments in the West Indies and Malta; the less advanced in the African Colonies; and the purely administrative Governments of such strategic bases as Aden and Gibraltar. Even in our African Colonies we notice different degrees of constitutional development, and, altogether, it is quite impossible to find in the political structure of the British Commonwealth of Nations any orderly or logical plan. The basic reasons for this are, first, the varied origins of the different units of the Commonwealth, some of them being originally colonies of British settlement, others the outcome of voluntary accession, and yet others of conquest, or mere annexation. The second reason is the widely differing strengths, characteristics, and potentialities of the different peoples inhabiting the countries concerned. In short, the political structure of the British Commonwealth reflects the history of its origin and growth through the centuries.

It will be noticed that the term 'British Commonwealth of Nations' is made to include the whole of what is commonly called 'the British Empire'—that is, the Dominions as well as the Crown Colonies and other Dependencies. A distinction used to be, and, indeed, still is, made between the British Commonwealth of Nations and the 'Dependent Empire'—the latter including all those territories whose peoples have not yet attained Dominion Status or full self-government. This distinction is convenient in some respects, but it has the disadvantage of drawing a sharp dividing-line where, in fact, no such line can satisfactorily be drawn, as we shall see when we consider such countries as Malta and Southern Rhodesia, of which it is not easy to say on which side of the dividing-line they should be placed.

But there is a deeper objection to drawing such a hard and fast line. Consider for a moment those developments of the year 1947 in which India, Burma, and Ceylon are concerned. At the beginning of that year all three were within the 'Dependent Empire': Ceylon as a Crown Colony—although with a special form of constitution which gave her much of the reality of responsible self-government—and India and

Burma as having their Governments controlled in the last analysis from the India and Burma Offices in London. Yet the end of the year found the old India split into the two fully self-governing Dominions of India and Pakistan, and Burma, by her own choice, outside the Commonwealth, but retaining certain links in the matter of defence. Ceylon also has become a fully responsible Dominion like India, Australia, or any of the others, as far as her domestic government is concerned, but with certain special arrangements with Great Britain in the matter of defence. Let us also consider the demands made in 1947 by spokesmen of Nigeria, the West Indian Colonies, and Malaya for Dominion Status for their countries (demands which will henceforth be continuous, and, there is no reason to doubt, will be successful sooner or later). As we consider these countries scattered right across the world, we get a vivid impression of change and movement inside the Commonwealth, far-reaching changes and free movement towards a higher political status. Some years ago Southern Rhodesia improved her political status in the Commonwealth. On the other hand, within recent years, both Newfoundland and Malta fell from their existing status—the former of a Dominion, the latter of an internally self-governing colony—to the status of Crown Colonies with representative governments. We shall see that Malta's status was restored in 1947, while Newfoundland has now become a Canadian Province. Therefore, it is clear that the dividing-line between self-governing and dependent is by no means fixed and rigid, and that in a dynamic, developing political system like the British Commonwealth of Nations the very notion of dividing-lines is out of place. For it is the simple truth that every member of the Commonwealth is all the time undergoing political, economic, and social changes, more or less rapidly, according to the degree of development of its peoples, and, consequently, their ability to take advantage of the opportunities of progress afforded by their membership of the Commonwealth. The dependants of to-day are the willing and equal associates of to-morrow, and for this reason we may correctly describe the

whole body of countries and peoples, many and varied as they are, who owe allegiance to the Crown as the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Let us now look more closely at the political structure of this Commonwealth, and first at the relations between what is still its heart and centre—namely, the United Kingdom—and its other members. At once we notice the following facts. First, the British Parliament cannot pass any laws binding upon the self-governing Dominions unless requested by them to do so. For example, in the British North America Act of 1867, which is the Constitution of Canada, it is laid down that any changes in the constitution of Canada can be made only by an Act of the British Parliament. The basic reason for this provision is the insistence of the French-Canadian minority that their position shall be fully safeguarded, but no British Government would dream of altering the British North America Act except at the formal request of a Canadian Government acting under the authority of the Canadian Parliament. Secondly, the British Government cannot enter into any treaties or international agreements of any kind which bind the Dominions, but it does enter into such agreements for the Colonies. Each Dominion, furthermore, has its own representatives in foreign countries, and both India and Pakistan appointed their own ambassadors to a number of foreign capitals immediately they became Dominions. All the Dominions are members of the United Nations Organization, and speak and vote with complete freedom in the General Assembly and the various committees of U.N.O. Therefore, it happens from time to time that different members of the Commonwealth speak with different voices in these international conclaves. Thus, in these two fields of domestic policy and international relations, which cover the whole of a Government's activities, we see how complete is the freedom of the Dominions, and consequently what a strong incentive there is for the non-self-governing members of the Commonwealth to fit themselves for the same status, that of complete freedom within the security of a world-wide association of co-operating states.

This statement of the fundamental differences of political status between the self-governing and the non-self-governing members of the Commonwealth brings us to our examination of the actual systems of government in force in these varied units. But first we must distinguish the broad groups into which they fall. These are the Dominions, the Crown Colonies, the Protectorates, and the Mandated Territories. There are also two territories which we call condominiums because we share their government with a foreign power—namely, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the Anglo-French New Hebrides.

As regards the Dominions, the basic character of their systems of government is exactly the same as ours. There are at present seven Dominions besides the United Kingdom, namely: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, and each of them is a Parliamentary democracy. The three new Eastern Dominions have all adopted the British system of government, India doing so after a careful examination of the rival merits of the American system, which is based on the theory of distribution of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and a fixed period of office for both the executive and the legislature. But the essence of Parliamentary democracy is that executive government is vested in a Cabinet which is responsible to its Parliament in the sense that unless it can command a majority in Parliament it must resign and give way to those who can command a majority. Further, Parliamentary democracy involves the existence of political parties divided from each other by materially different views on political, social, and economic policy, and general elections are fought on specific issues by such competing parties, each of which is trying to get a majority of the seats in Parliament so as to become the Government of the country. The choice of Parliamentary democracy by all the Dominions as their system of government has been by no means an automatic development, as we have just seen in the case of India. On the contrary, it is somewhat surprising that Canada, with the

United States at her door and herself a federation like her great southern neighbour, should have adopted, or, rather, have continued with such a very different form of government when she formed her separate colonies into a federation in 1867.

The same remark holds good of Australia, which is also a federation. The essence of a federation is that there is a division of powers of government between the units which federate together and the national state which is formed by their federation. Thus the federating units retain in their own hands powers of legislation and administration over specific subjects such as education, public works, law and order, and so on, while the federal or central Government controls such obviously national subjects as defence, customs, coinage, etc. The distribution of powers between the centre and the units is carefully laid down in the Constitution of the country, and changes can, as a rule, be made only by a difficult and complicated process. The reasons why Canada and Australia have adopted the British, and not the American, system of government are found, first, in the course of their history, and secondly, in their membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations—the same reasons as have operated in the cases of all the other Dominions which are not federations. The British settlers in these countries took with them their deeply cherished and firmly held political ideas. In Canada and South Africa there are, of course, peoples of non-British origin, but these, too, whether French or Dutch, found the principles of Parliamentary democracy to their taste. Secondly, these countries are members of the British Commonwealth, and, as they grew in political stature, and the Mother Country was able to devolve on them greater and greater powers of self-government, she did so by bringing into their systems of government the same basic principles as those on which her own was founded. Thus the whole of their political development was determined by inherited ideas and rights, and by the almost unconscious but continuous moulding of their developing political constitutions by the Mother Country according

to her own ideas and experience. Nowhere is the influence of this second group of reasons more clearly perceived than in the three eastern Dominions, whose constitutional development has been entirely within the Commonwealth, and has been completely controlled by the British Parliament.

Thus, all the self-governing members of the Commonwealth have the same kind of government, but not the same form, since some are federations, while others are unitary governments—that is, Governments which control the whole range of governmental activities with no subordinate state or provincial legislatures and Governments to share their prerogative. There are one or two differences even between the two fully federal systems of Canada and Australia. For example, in Canada, the federal, or Dominion, Parliament has power to legislate in any matter which is not specifically allotted by the Constitution to the Parliaments of the Canadian Provinces. In Australia, however, all matters which are not specifically allotted to the federal or Commonwealth Parliament, are deemed to come within the purview of the constituent states. Again, the representative of the Crown in a Canadian province—the Lieutenant-Governor—is nominated by the Governor-General, who acts on the advice of his Canadian Ministers, but in Australia the state Governors are still nominated by the King acting on the advice of his Ministers in Great Britain. The Lieutenant-Governor of a Canadian Province has no direct touch with the British Government, but the Governor of an Australian state can discuss state business directly with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. Lastly, the Constitution of Australia, unlike the Constitution of Canada, can be altered by the Commonwealth Parliament itself.

Little need be said about the Constitutions of the other self-governing countries. They are all—even South Africa, which is a Union of two former British Colonies and two former Dutch Republics—unitary Governments with the same sovereign powers in their domestic affairs as Great Britain herself has, and also, with the somewhat doubtful

case of Ceylon, in international affairs also. We say 'doubtful' in the case of Ceylon only, because in her Treaty with the United Kingdom she has undertaken certain specific defence obligations which may have some restrictive effects on her foreign policy.

The Crown is the one tangible link which keeps these independent sovereign states in association with each other, and, of course, such dealings as there are between their Governments and the British Government are carried out by the Governments themselves. Communications do not go to London through the Governor-General, but direct from His Majesty's Government in Ottawa, Canberra, New Delhi, etc., to His Majesty's Government in London. The British Minister responsible for the conduct of relations with His Majesty's Governments overseas is now called "Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations." Until 1947 he was called Secretary of State for the Dominions. The new name of the Ministry more accurately describes its functions than does the old one, and it is another example of the way in which the conception of the Commonwealth is all the time changing and expanding.

Reference has been made already to certain members of the Commonwealth which hold a position intermediate between the controlled position of a Crown Colony and that of a fully self-governing member. Newfoundland, Southern Rhodesia, and Malta all fall within this category. Newfoundland was, in fact, a Dominion until 1933, like its great neighbour Canada, and in the Statute of Westminster is mentioned as such. But it fell into such financial difficulties during the great economic slump of the late 1920's and early 1930's that it could not meet its obligations on its public debt. The two houses of its Parliament thereupon petitioned the King to suspend the Constitution of their country and appoint Commissioners to administer its Government. Their petition was, of course, granted, and six commissioners were appointed —three from Newfoundland and three from the United Kingdom—to act, in conjunction with the Governor, as the

Government of Newfoundland. The ' Governor-in-Commission ' thereupon became responsible for his administration to the Secretary of State for the Dominions, while the United Kingdom assumed general responsibility for the island's finances during this special period. In 1946 a National Convention was elected to consider the future government of Newfoundland and make recommendations which could be submitted to a referendum of the people of the island. The outcome of this is described in the last chapter of this book.

Southern Rhodesia is a very interesting example of a country on the threshold of Dominion Status. In fact, it almost exactly reproduces the state of the older Dominions in the last decades of the nineteenth century, when they had full responsibility for their own domestic and fiscal affairs, but not for their external relations. Southern Rhodesia was acquired by one of those Chartered Companies which have played such a large part in building up the old British Empire. The East India Company, for example, was a Chartered Company. The Company now in question, the British South Africa Company, administered Southern Rhodesia until 1923, when the territory was taken over by the Crown. In addition to the control of its external affairs by the Crown, the latter also exercises some slight control over native affairs inside Southern Rhodesia, which to this extent is not fully autonomous inside its own borders.

Until 1933 Malta had a Constitution which gave this island responsible self-government. It had an elected legislature, with ministers responsible to it entrusted with the whole administration except defence and external affairs. Unfortunately, in 1933 civil strife led to the suspension of the Constitution, when the Governor carried on the administration with the help of officials. It was found possible in 1947 to restore the Constitution of Malta on the same basic terms as that which lapsed in 1933, and the people of the island once more have, in effect, domestic home rule. General elections were held in October 1947 for the Legislature, and a Labour Government came into power as the result. The new Legislature

and Constitution were inaugurated formally by the Duke of Gloucester on November 10.

Cyprus has had a similar experience to Malta and for the same reason—namely, internal dissensions leading to a breakdown of the constitution in 1936. Between 1925 and 1936 it was governed as a Colony, and had both Legislative and Executive Councils. But in 1936 the Legislative Council was abolished, and powers to make laws were granted to the Governor. Hitherto it has not been found possible to restore the Colonial Constitution because there is a strong separatist movement among the Greek-speaking Cypriots, who want union with Greece. A deputation came from the island to England in 1947 to advocate this step, but was informed that no change of the status of Cyprus inside the British Commonwealth was contemplated.

We turn now to the Colonial, or, as it is still quite justly termed, the ' dependent ' part of the Commonwealth—that is, the Crown Colonies, Protectorates, Dependencies, and Mandated Territories. But first, let us see what these terms mean. The Mandated Territories were, before the First World War, possessions of either Germany or Turkey. The Turkish possessions concerned were in Palestine, Trans-Jordania, Syria, and Mesopotamia (now Iraq); the German were in Africa and the Pacific. Of the old Turkish Empire, Palestine, Trans-Jordania, and Iraq were entrusted to the United Kingdom under a mandate by the League of Nations, which prescribed the general conditions under which the government of these countries was to be carried out. Cyprus was in a peculiar position. Formerly a Turkish possession, it came under British administration in 1878 by a Convention with the Sultan, and was annexed outright when the Turks came into the war on the side of Germany in 1914. Of the German possessions in Africa, Tanganyika in the East, and parts of Togoland and the Cameroons in the West, became British Mandates, while German South-west Africa became a Mandate of the Union of South Africa. Those German possessions in the Pacific which were entrusted to the British

by mandate were divided between the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Iraq and Palestine were scheduled to become independent as soon as possible. Britain surrendered her mandate in Iraq in 1932, and the country thereupon became a sovereign member of the League of Nations, while the mandate for Palestine was surrendered to the United Nations Organization in 1948. The Mandated Territories, with the exception of Palestine and Iraq while they were mandates, have, in practice, been administered like ordinary Colonial possessions.

Protectorates (Uganda is the most important example of this class) are not, according to British law, possessions of the United Kingdom, but, in fact, the Crown exercises exactly the same functions in them as it does in an ordinary Crown Colony. Some of the Protectorates assumed their status in the Commonwealth by agreement with their native rulers, while in other cases the United Kingdom simply proclaimed a protectorate. It is indeed difficult to see any difference between a Colony and a Protectorate. The chief one is that the peoples of the Protectorates are not British subjects in the full, legal sense of the term. They are, however, 'British protected persons,' which gives them 'British subject' status for international purposes, so even this distinction is somewhat tenuous.

Before we come to the Crown Colonies proper a word may be said about certain other Dependencies. Scattered about the world are strategic points such as Gibraltar and Aden; the Falkland Islands, in the South Atlantic, provide a base for the whaling industry; St Helena, in the Atlantic, about two thousand miles off the coast of West Africa, with its dependency Ascension Island, is an important base for Commonwealth telegraphic communications; while in the Persian Gulf and Southern Arabia are certain Sultanates over which the United Kingdom exercises some measure of control. These are, however, small places, whose administration raises no particular points of interest.

But the Crown Colonies are a very important element in

the Commonwealth, for it is in them that the most spectacular political and, perhaps, economic developments will take place during the next few decades. Every Crown Colony has a Legislature, but the method of choosing this body—whether by election, or by official nomination, or by a mixture of election and nomination—varies between the different colonies. The powers of these Legislatures—that is, the extent to which their proceedings are free from official control or veto or approval—also vary from one colony to another. The most free and responsible of all Crown Colony Legislatures are those of the West Indian colonies of the Bahamas, Barbados, and Bermuda. Incidentally, these are the oldest legislative bodies in the British Commonwealth after the British Parliament itself, for they date from the seventeenth century. Each of these Legislatures has two Houses : the Lower House being wholly elected and the Upper House nominated by the Crown. Under the Constitution, the Governor can exercise a veto on the proceedings of the Legislature in each of these Colonies, but in practice he very rarely does so, and thus the Colonial Legislature has control over the Colony's domestic affairs. Some of the West Indian colonies and Malaya are demanding Dominion Status, and the possibility of combining the West Indies into one federation has been under discussion for some years. This subject will be discussed in a later chapter. Of the West Indian colonies, other than the three above mentioned, Jamaica, which has been the centre of a good deal of political agitation in recent years, has now been given a revised constitution, which will bring her more or less to the constitutional position occupied by the Bahamas, Barbados, and Bermuda. The Constitutions of Trinidad and British Guiana, too, have been reformed since the end of the Second World War so as to give fuller and more effective representation to the native and unofficial classes.

Malta and the West Indian colonies are the most politically advanced of all the Crown colonies. None of the others has as yet an entirely elected Legislature, and, consequently, none of them has quite the same range or degree of control over its

own affairs. Thus, of the thirty-three remaining Crown Colonies and Dependencies, ten of the smallest (including some which are purely strategic holdings or naval stations) or most backward have no Legislature, but are administered by officials. The others all have the same type of Legislature —namely, a Legislative Council composed of a number of members, some of whom are elected on a variety of franchises, and others who are nominated. The nominated members may be either officials or non-officials, but, as a rule, these Legislative Councils have a majority of official members. The Governor of the Colony is the effective head of the Government, and he is not necessarily bound by the decisions of his Legislative Council, although, of course, he would not depart from them except for good and convincing reasons. In fact, it is rare for a Governor to find himself opposed by a majority of his Legislative Council. Some of the Councils have an official majority, who, of course, support the Governor's policy, and even where the officials are in a minority there are usually enough nominated non-officials to see Government business safely through the Council. In the last resort, except in Malta and certain of the older West Indian colonies, the King in Council can legislate for the Colony over the head of the Legislative Council.

In every Crown Colony the Governor is assisted by the advice of an Executive Council, which includes certain officials and, often, some nominated or elected members of the Legislative Council. Even the Executive Councils are only advisory, and the Governor is not bound to follow their advice. He is the direct representative in the Colony of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who, in turn, represents the Government of the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State exercises close supervision over the Governor. The latter is in constant communication with the Colonial Office, which issues instructions to him in specific matters, and, thus, although the Secretary of State does not intervene directly in the administration of a Colony, he does so, at one remove, through the Governor. The Colonial Office has in recent

years introduced measures by which the Secretary of State can be kept in close touch with the rapidly changing conditions in the Colonies. It sends its administrative and technical officers on visits to the overseas territories, and, in return, receives officers from the Colonies for terms of duty at the Colonial Office. The beneficial effects of such a practice are obvious.

Finally, in every Crown Colony the keystone of the administrative arch is the officer in charge of the basic unit of administration—the District. It is the District Officer who is in personal touch with the people, who knows their circumstances, and who translates the laws and administrative ordinances into action in the towns and the fields. A good District Officer means more to the welfare of his people than any amount of laws and regulations, no matter how beneficial they may be, for it is his energy, sympathy, and wisdom that, in the last analysis, translates the good intentions of the Government into the realities of everyday life. The District Officer is a member of the Colonial Administrative Service, which is recruited by the Secretary of State from among men (and now women) of good education. A member of this Service may be posted to any Colony. On attaining a certain rank, usually that of Colonial Secretary—*i.e.*, Chief Secretary to the Government of a Colony, the next in seniority to the Governor—he may be transferred from one Colony to another, and the Colonial Secretary of one Colony often becomes the Governor of another.

A special word must be said about the Malayan Union, for this is a unique political organization in the Commonwealth. The Union consists of the nine Native States of the Malay Peninsula, together with the two British settlements of Penang and Malacca, with Singapore as a separate Colony. Formerly the two British territories constituted the Crown Colony of the Straits Settlements, with Singapore as its capital. Four of the nine Malay States were federated and associated for certain purposes with the Straits Settlements, while the five unfederated Malay States were left to be governed by their Sultans, as far as their domestic administration was concerned.

Defence and Foreign Policy were controlled by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. But now, under the Union Constitution which came into force in February 1948, all these territories have one central federal Government consisting of a High Commissioner, a Federal Executive Council, and a Federal Legislative Council, the latter having as its members the High Commissioner, fourteen officials, and sixty-one non-officials. The High Commissioner's powers are delegated to him jointly by the Crown and the Sultans of the former unfederated States. Each of the Sultans' states has a State Executive Council and a Council of State with certain powers of legislation. Each Sultan has also a British adviser in his State.

We have now seen how very variegated is the pattern of the political structure of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Yet, though it is variegated, it is not really complicated. The machinery and the motive power of government in its self-governing members can be readily understood because they are essentially the same as in our own country.

Again, in certain of the West Indies and in Malta and Southern Rhodesia we see examples of what amounts to practically home rule in internal affairs, and all these are obviously destined in due course to occupy constitutionally the position in which Canada, Australia, and the other old colonies of British settlement found themselves nearly a hundred years ago. That is, they will have complete control over their own domestic matters, including tariffs, but without control over their foreign and defence policies. Clearly, they are too small and weak for that, at any rate until the United Nations Organization is able to develop and maintain a working system of real collective security.

Next, in the African and certain other Crown Colonies, we see only a modified system of representative government, since not all the seats in their Legislatures are filled by election, nor are the franchise systems so inclusive as in the more developed colonies. This limitation of representation is necessarily accompanied by a limitation of popular control in government and administration. Nevertheless, in most of

these colonies forces are already at work moving them steadily in the direction of political progress. In short, the same basic political principles are at work from end to end of the Commonwealth, and the reasons why some of its members lag behind the others are that by far the greater number of the Colonies and Dependencies are inhabited by peoples whose conditions and histories are such as to have made it impossible for them to develop any real political institutions as we understand these things. Many of them have never advanced beyond the most primitive tribal organization, while others, at the best, have had only the experience of the personal and autocratic rule of chiefs or local kings. Certainly anything like representative or democratic institutions is far beyond their ken. Thus, not only the institutions, but the ideas and conditions on which political institutions are based, have to be developed from their very beginnings among such peoples. This accounts for the varieties of Governmental arrangements and degrees of autonomy in the Colonies and Dependencies which we have just been examining, and it will be noticed that, from the purely official administrations at the bottom of the scale to the sovereign nationhood at the top, all possible stages of progress are represented. One shades into the other, and, most important of all, one *moves* into the other as conditions become suitable and the time ripe. From 1923 onward, it has been repeatedly affirmed by the British Government that their policy for the Colonies is responsible self-government. This is no mere gesture, for the Colonial Office has steadily broadened the scope of the Colonial Governments' powers as we have seen. The position now is that the Colonial Secretary exercises only a final control over colonial legislation, even legislation referring to the annual budget and to provisions for tariff duties and taxation. Only in exceptional circumstances would he interfere with these things. Thus our study of the political structure of the Commonwealth gives us a view, on a broad and impressive scale, of this world-wide association as a continually evolving and progressing whole.

CHAPTER V

CO-OPERATION AND CONSULTATION

(i) *Political*

IT is clear that, as the British Commonwealth of Nations is not governed from one centre by one Government, but from a number of centres by a number of different Governments, there can be no question of one supreme authority legislating for and administering the affairs of the whole Commonwealth. Therefore, instead of relations of authority and control, we have relations of co-operation and consultation. This is certainly true of the relations between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, while even in the case of the Colonies we have seen how the control from London is becoming more and more elastic, adapting itself continually to changing conditions in the Colonial Empire. But the historian and the student of politics know that it is precisely this dynamic quality of Commonwealth affairs that makes the subject of inter-Commonwealth consultation and co-operation one of the master factors in its development. Just as the authority of the United Kingdom over the domestic and external policies of the self-governing Dominions has gone, so it will go progressively in those parts of the Commonwealth which are on the way to self-government. Full consultation, effective deliberation, and free co-operation will be the mainspring, ultimately, of harmony in policy and action between all the members of the Commonwealth. Such is the importance of the subject we discuss in this chapter.

At first glance it might seem as though the relations between the United Kingdom and the self-governing Dominions do not differ from those which exist between foreign countries. This, however, would be a very mistaken view. Both in spirit

and in practice the conduct of relations between the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth differs widely from that of ordinary international affairs. In the first place, the United Kingdom and the Dominions are all members of one inclusive political system—the British Commonwealth—and, consequently, carry on their business with each other by means of different machinery from that which they use in their relations with foreign countries.

Thus, the Foreign Office in this country is not employed as the channel of communications between the United Kingdom and the other British Countries. Until 1947 the Secretary of State for the Dominions, as head of the Dominions Office, was the recognized channel for communication between Great Britain and the Departments of External Affairs in the Dominions. Indian affairs were dealt with by the India Office until 1947, in which year India was partitioned into the two Dominions of India and Pakistan, and the relations of the United Kingdom with these two new Dominions passed into the charge of the Ministry for Commonwealth Relations. This latter has been the title, since 1947, of the former Dominions Office. The new title accurately expresses the function of the Ministry, which has now become that of dealing with the relations arising between Great Britain and a number of sister countries of equal political status with herself. The transformation of the Dominions Office into the Ministry for Commonwealth Relations is a reminder of the speed and scope of the changes taking place inside the Commonwealth. For it was only in 1925 that the Secretaryship of State for the Dominions was created. Before then business connected with the self-governing Dominions had been handled by the Colonial Office, and, indeed, until 1930 one Minister combined in his person the offices of Colonial and Dominions Secretary. Moreover, the Dominions whose business provided the work of the newly created Dominions Office were Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, the Irish Free State (Eire), the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia, and the South African territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland,

and Swaziland. To-day Newfoundland is absent from the list of self-governing Dominions, and India, Pakistan, and Ceylon have been added to it, while Eire has left it.

Here, then, is the first great difference between the conduct of our relations with countries inside the Commonwealth and with those outside it. The fact that the former are centred in a ministry other than the Foreign Ministry shows that they are regarded as essentially non-foreign relations. When we examine the remainder of the machinery for inter-commonwealth relations we shall find their domestic or family character still more strongly emphasized.

The Crown is the outstanding symbol of the Commonwealth's unity, and, with the sole exception of India, the Executive Government of every Dominion, in respect of both internal and external affairs, is vested in the King. The King acts on the advice of his Ministers in the Dominions as he does here in the United Kingdom, and he has his representative in every Dominion, who acts for him. This representative is the Governor-General. The position of the King in the Commonwealth is announced in his title which is 'George VI, by the Grace of God of Great Britain, Northern Ireland the British Dominions beyond the Seas King, Defender of the Faith.' Moreover, the preamble to the Statute of Westminster declares that any alteration in law relating to the succession to the throne or the royal title should henceforth be sanctioned by the Parliaments of all the Dominions as well as of the United Kingdom. A preamble to an Act has not the force of law ; nevertheless, when Edward VIII abdicated in 1936 the formal assent of all the Dominions to the British Declaration of Abdication Act was received, and Canada, South Africa, and Eire passed their own legislation in the matter. Eire took this opportunity to abolish the office of Governor-General and thus remove the Crown from all the domestic activities of the country while retaining the connexion for the purpose of foreign and Commonwealth affairs. It must be emphasized that the Governor-General plays the same part in the Constitution of the Dominion to which he is accredited

as the King does in the United Kingdom. His function is to represent the King not the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Imperial Conference of 1930 laid it down that the appointment of a Governor-General in future should be made on the authority of the Dominion concerned. In 1947 Canada inaugurated a new development in the Governor-General's position by the issue of letters patent relating to his office. In these letters, which, of course, were signed by the King, it was laid down that the Governor-General is authorized to exercise on the advice of Canadian Ministers, all of His Majesty's powers and authorities in respect of Canada. This means that henceforth the Governor-General in Canada will be able to exercise all the King's powers and authorities without any submission to the King. These powers include such matters as signing treaties and issuing letters of credence to Canadian ambassadors to foreign countries. The same is now true of the Governor-General in the Dominion of South Africa.

A most important element in the whole structure of consultation and co-operation inside the Commonwealth is provided by the High Commissioners, which the United Kingdom sends to each one of the Dominions, and which each of the latter sends to the United Kingdom and to other Commonwealth countries. These men represent the Governments of their countries, and are in much the same position as Ambassadors of foreign countries. But only in their functions do they resemble foreign ambassadors. In fact, they form a sort of Commonwealth private diplomatic service, in much more intimate relations with each other and with the Governments to which they are accredited than are any of the foreign ambassadors, even those of the United States. Thus, the British High Commissioners are not appointed by the Foreign Office but by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. Again, in the Annual Report of the External Affairs Department of Canada " the representatives in Canada of Other Governments of His Majesty " are shown in a different list from the representatives of foreign countries.

High Commissioners are exempt from the payment of customs duties and income tax, but they do not enjoy the general legal immunities possessed by foreign diplomatic representatives. The Second World War brought some important changes in the functions of the High Commissioners. Before it their chief concern was with trade and finance, but now they handle political matters, even some relating to foreign affairs, as well as negotiations with the Government of the United Kingdom and defence matters. The Second World War led to a considerable increase in both the number and the importance of the contacts between the High Commissioners in London and the Government of the United Kingdom, and to a corresponding degree between their fellows in the Dominions and the Governments there.

The Crown has not only representative and constitutional functions; some of its old judicial functions still remain. For example, the highest court of law in this country is the House of Lords—that is, the King in Parliament—while for most of the overseas parts of the Commonwealth the highest court of law is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—the latter being, of course, the King in Council. The Judicial Committee traces its origin to the ancient right of all the King's subjects in any of his dominions over the seas to petition the King in Council when they believe they have not received justice in their local courts. Such appeals always went to a Committee of the Privy Council, and, with only one exception, the right of the King's subjects everywhere to appeal to the King in Council remained until the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931. The exception referred to was that in Australia certain kinds of lawsuits concerned with the working of the Constitution itself could be referred to the Judicial Committee only by special permission of the Australian High Court. But in practice, even before the passing of the Statute of Westminster, appeals from South African and Eireann Courts did not come before the Judicial Committee, and only a few came from the Australian High Court.

Even before she left the Commonwealth Eire had abolished all appeals to the Judicial Committee. South Africa, while having the power to do the same, in fact allows the right of appeal to stand in a restricted body of cases. From Canada no appeals may be made in criminal cases, but there is still some disagreement between the Federal Government and the Governments of the several Provinces as to the retention of the right of appeal in civil cases. In Australia appeals from the Federal High Court may go to the Judicial Committee by special leave of the Committee except in certain constitutional cases where the certificate of the Federal High Court is necessary. New Zealand, while able to prevent any appeals to the Judicial Committee from judgments of its courts, in fact allows them fairly freely. From India and the Colonial Empire appeals have hitherto been very numerous. It remains to be seen what restrictions, if any, the new Dominions of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon will put on appeals from their courts to the Judicial Committee. It is now perfectly clear, however, that no right of appeal from any Dominion courts to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council could or would be retained against the wish of the Dominion concerned.

There is another function of the Judicial Committee which has been important in the past and may be even more important in the future in regard to some Dominions. This is its advisory function. The Crown can and does refer questions to the Judicial Committee and get its advice on them. An outstanding example of this side of the Committee's activities is seen in the submission to it of the delimitation of the boundary between Canada and Labrador, which belongs to Newfoundland. A set of questions was drawn up by Canada and Newfoundland and placed by the Crown before the Committee, which, after examining the evidence and hearing arguments of counsel on both sides, then gave its decision in the form of advice to the Crown. It is possible that this function of the Judicial Committee may provide India and Pakistan, for example, with a satisfactory and peaceful method

of solution of some of the thorny problems which will arise between them. Thus, in spite of the fact that judicial appeals from some of the great Dominions no longer come before it, the work of the Judicial Committee is by no means ended. Both the Canadian Provinces and the Australian States have found the existence of an impartial and universally trusted tribunal valuable in the past, and the new Dominions, as they increase in number, will no doubt have the same experience. From time to time proposals have been made to create an all-Commonwealth tribunal as the supreme judicial authority for the British Commonwealth in all disputes of a legal nature between its members. Experience, however, and the British genius for using old-established institutions and adapting them to new conditions and demands seem to show that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council will be adequate for such purposes.

We have now seen how the Crown has certain judicial functions which it exercises through the Judicial Committee, whose origin and functions go back to the right of every one of the King's subjects overseas to appeal to the King in Council in certain circumstances. Similarly, the Crown has certain legislative functions which can be traced back to the fact that since new territories are acquired by the Crown their Government naturally vests in the same authority. Therefore to-day there are, according to constitutional law, three authorities empowered to legislate for the overseas parts of the Commonwealth : the Crown, which legislates by means of Orders in Council or Letters Patent ; the local legislature (*e.g.*, the Canadian, Australian, etc., Parliaments), and the British Parliament in London. In practice, however, the Crown does not now legislate for any part of the Commonwealth except for its non-self-governing members, and then mainly under powers granted by the British Parliament and not under any powers derived from its ancient prerogative right of governing and legislating for newly acquired territories. There are one or two places like Gibraltar—which has no legislature—for which the Crown legislates, but even

in the Colonial Empire the Crown now legislates only when a new constitution is given to a Colony, or when the Colonial legislature refuses to pass legislation which the Crown deems necessary. Even so, in some of the West Indian Colonies the Crown has no powers to legislate by Orders in Council or any other procedure. The local Legislatures are supreme there, and if any of their legislation has to be set aside, this can be done only by the British Parliament. But throughout the non-self-governing part of the Commonwealth, as we saw in Chapter IV, the practice has for long been to set up a representative legislature and instal suitable apparatus of administrative government wherever and whenever circumstances permit, and to allow these to function with full authority subject only to the overriding powers of the imperial Parliament in London.

Coming now to the actual institutions and personnel of co-operation and consultation, we begin naturally with the King's personal representative in the Dominions—the Governor-General. We have seen that his functions are now purely representative, but at one time he was something more than the King's personal representative. He was also the representative of the British Government and thus, to a degree varying to some extent between the different Dominions, he was the intermediary between the Dominion Government and London. Clearly this detracted somewhat from the status and powers of the Dominions' own Ministers, and after the adoption of the Balfour Declaration in 1926 it followed as a natural consequence that the Governor-General should play the same part in the politics of his Dominion as the King does in those of the United Kingdom. Therefore, the Governor-General now acts on the advice of Dominion Ministers, who are responsible for their conduct to the Dominion Parliament.

We have seen that the Governor-General is appointed by the King on the advice of his Ministers in the Dominion concerned, and the Instructions he receives on taking up his office lay down the limits within which he may act, these being to all intents and purposes the same as those within which the

King himself acts in this country. In Canada and Australia there are Lieutenant-Governors of Provinces and Governors of States respectively, who also represent the Crown in their subordinate jurisdictions. The Governors of Australian States are appointed by the King on the advice of his Ministers in the United Kingdom and are responsible for their actions to the Commonwealth Relations Secretary and to the Imperial Parliament, whereas the Lieutenant-Governors of Canadian Provinces are appointed by the Governor-General and are responsible to the Government of Canada. Apart from the Dominions, only one other member of the British Commonwealth has a Governor-General, and that is Malaya. The post was created only in 1946 after the War as part of the new policy to secure a more unified and efficient form of government in the Malay Peninsula. As Malaya is not a fully self-governing member of the Commonwealth, its Governor-General has different instructions and a less limited sphere of action than have the Governors-General elsewhere. In fact, he will have to play much the same sort of rôle in the administration of Malaya as the former Viceroy of India did in that country.

All the countries of the Commonwealth other than those described above have, as the representative of the Crown, Governors, Lieutenant-Governors, High Commissioners, Commissioners, or Administrators, according to their importance and degree of political development. Within their own spheres these officials perform the same functions as the Governor-General and the King do in theirs, but with this difference. They are all responsible for their acts to the Foreign or Colonial Secretary as the case may be, and through him to Parliament. Moreover, they are the effective heads of the Governments of the territories to which they are accredited. The representatives of the Crown in the mandated territories administered by the Dominions are, of course, responsible to the Government of the Dominion concerned.

As we have seen, since 1926 the Governors-General have not been regarded as the representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom, and we must therefore inquire what

machinery exists for consultation and co-operation between the different members of the Commonwealth. First of all, let us distinguish between the means of communication and the agents and methods of consultation and co-operation. The actual means of communication are conversation, direct or by telephone, cable and wireless, and postal correspondence. The continuous development of these means of communication has had a quite important effect on Commonwealth consultations, because every improvement in them has led inevitably to a greater volume of communications of all sorts, and, in consequence, an extension of consultation at all levels between the different members of the Commonwealth. In fact, we have here a very good illustration of the influence of technical improvements on politics and international relations. Without the amazing development of means of communication—including wireless and the aeroplane—during the past two or three decades, it would not have been possible for the different parts of the Commonwealth to be in such constant and intimate touch with each other as they, in fact, are.

Turning now to the agents and methods of Commonwealth consultation and co-operation, we come first to what has been for sixty years one of the most important of all—namely, the Imperial Conference. From its first meeting on the occasion of Queen Victoria's Jubilee, in 1887, until 1907 this was known as the Colonial Conference, but from the 1911 meeting onward it took its present name.

The first Conference, in 1887, was somewhat informal. Advantage was taken of the presence in London of many representatives from the Overseas Empire who had come to attend the celebrations of Queen Victoria's Jubilee to hold a conference on matters of general interest. This conference was not confined to the representatives of the self-governing Colonies—as the Dominions were still called in those days. Representatives from some of the Crown Colonies were also included, and questions of defence and imperial communications were discussed. The meeting, as the first of its kind, is

an important landmark in British Commonwealth history. The next general conference was called in 1894 by the Canadian Government in Ottawa to discuss the question of trade and communications between the Colonies and the United Kingdom and between the Colonies themselves. But it is the Colonial Conference of 1897 which may be reckoned the definite establishment of the regular series of Imperial Conferences. The Prime Ministers of all the self-governing Colonies had been invited as Queen Victoria's guests to her Diamond Jubilee. There were eleven of them, because the Australian States had not then been federated, and Cape Colony and Natal were still separate self-governing colonies, and so was Newfoundland. All present at this conference felt that it had been so useful that it would be a good thing to have similar meetings in the future whenever possible. The conference of 1907 gave both shape and permanence to the gathering, and at that meeting a resolution was adopted which altered the name from Colonial Conference to Imperial Conference and recommended a meeting every four years, " at which questions of common interest may be discussed and considered as between His Majesty's Government and the Governments of the self-governing Dominions beyond the seas." The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was to preside *ex officio* at meetings of the Conference, and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing dominions were to be *ex officio* members. Various other details were specified in the resolution of 1907, among them being a proposal for the setting up of a permanent secretarial staff charged, under the direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, with the duty of keeping the governments represented at the Imperial Conference informed in regard to matters " which have been or may be subjects for discussion." The secretarial staff would also obtain information for the use of the Conference and conduct correspondence relating to its affairs.

Another recommendation in the 1907 resolution was that subsidiary conferences should be held by the representatives of the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth, when

desirable, to discuss specific subjects or matters involving much detail. Such subsidiary conferences were, in fact, held in 1909 and 1910.

There is no need to trace the history of the Imperial Conference in detail because here we are concerned only with its function as a method of consultation and co-operation between the self-governing members of the Commonwealth. It was, however, necessary to mention particularly the resolution passed by the 1907 conference, because the pattern of future Imperial Conferences which was laid down by it is of very great importance. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom was to preside over a gathering which included the Prime Ministers of the other self-governing countries of the British Commonwealth. That is to say, the form of the Imperial Conference was henceforth to be that of a gathering of heads of Governments, men who were in control of effective majorities in the Parliaments of their countries and were therefore in a position to carry out any undertaking to which they gave their assent. Each could speak for his own country and commit it to a course of action as nobody else could. A stronger, more thoroughly representative, and more effective body could not be imagined. Moreover, the decisions and resolutions of the Imperial Conference are not reached by a majority decision. There is no voting and no question of any coercion of a minority or, even, a single individual. No member of the Conference is bound by any decision to which he has not freely assented, and if the members find that they cannot reach unanimity in regard to some particular matter then they agree to differ, and each acts according to his own view when he returns to his own country.

But there is this most important aspect of the Imperial Conference to be noted. Each member is there in a dual capacity—as representative of a particular country of the Commonwealth and as a member of the Commonwealth as a whole. In thinking of the welfare of his own country he is thinking also of the welfare of the wider association of British Commonwealth nations to which he belongs, and he is

genuinely anxious to reconcile the two and to seek the one in the other. It is this which distinguishes the Imperial Conference from any other international gathering in the world. In no other international political conference is there, at the present, the same sense of dual loyalty and the same opportunity of serving one's own country by serving the greater Commonwealth of Nations to which it belongs, and vice versa. Yet precisely such a dual loyalty must develop in the minds of men of all nations before any United Nations Organization can be an effectively working instrument of world peace, security, and welfare. It is true that the peoples of the British Commonwealth have had many advantages in developing this dual loyalty in the existence of ties of blood and common traditions, and by being subjects of one King. But to-day only a minority of the peoples of the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth are of British origin, and yet the bonds between them hold firmly. Certainly there is both inspiration and example here for the peoples of the world. Moreover, the structure and procedure of the Imperial Conference, at which we have glanced, offer another example to the nations of the world. When the heads of Governments can meet to discuss matters of first-class importance, and can either come to unanimous decisions or else agree to differ with no question of the majority's imposing its will on the minority, and with the dissidents still anxious to further the welfare of the whole body, then the United Nations Organization will have come to maturity and the peace of the world will be assured.

The Imperial Conference has dealt with and settled peacefully questions which might easily have destroyed the Commonwealth. In the Imperial Conferences of the first eleven years of this century the statesmen of the Commonwealth decided against an Imperial Federation which was advocated by, among others, a statesman of the first rank, Joseph Chamberlain. Instead, the opposite course was pursued of the advance to complete and independent national status of each of the constituent self-governing countries of the

Commonwealth, and to their unrestricted freedom in all aspects of domestic and foreign policy which is the hallmark of Dominion Status to-day. Another matter of fundamental policy which was thrashed out in successive Imperial Conferences was the policy, advocated by some leading men in all the self-governing Commonwealth countries, including the United Kingdom, for the creation of a full customs union, on the plan of the old German Zollverein, for the Commonwealth. This too was rejected, and so also were proposals from time to time to extend the system of Imperial Preference. To all these proposals the opposition came as much from the United Kingdom as from anywhere else. Quite apart from the fact that the whole economic system of this country was based on the policy of Free Trade, there can be little doubt that the general acquiescence of the civilized world in the existence of the British Empire was largely due to the lack of restrictions imposed on its trade with the outer world. A full-blooded customs union, or even any great extension of preferences, would almost certainly have led to widespread and dangerous anti-British feeling in foreign countries. Intimately connected with the advance of the old Colonies to full national sovereignty were the vital problems of imperial defence, which were thrashed out in the Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 onward. Against the desire of the Government of the United Kingdom to have one great Imperial Navy, with the Dominions contributing to its upkeep, it was decided that each Dominion should be responsible for its own national defences.

Another matter decided by the Imperial Conference was the proposal, which came up from time to time, to establish a permanent Commonwealth Secretariat. At first sight this may seem to be no more than a proposal to create a useful piece of machinery for co-operation and consultation in the Commonwealth, but actually it has important political implications. The proposal was put forth by Mr Alfred Lyttelton, Colonial Secretary in 1905, and it was discussed at the Conference of 1907, where it was supported by Mr Deakin,

Prime Minister of Australia. We have seen what recommendation was made in this respect by the Conference. No Imperial Secretariat, however, came into being, the duties contemplated by the 1907 resolution being undertaken by the Colonial Office. Again, in the 1911 Conference, the proposal was put forward by Sir Joseph Ward, Prime Minister of New Zealand, but, in the end, was dropped. Next, the Australian Government revived the proposal in 1924 in the course of an interchange of correspondence between the United Kingdom and Dominion Governments relating to the general question of the machinery of consultation inside the Commonwealth, but once more it was dropped. So, also, was a proposal made by the Trades Union Congress of this country and the Federation of British Industries for the setting up of a permanent Commonwealth Economic Secretariat in 1932 in connection with the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa. Lastly, in 1943 Mr Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, proposed the formation of a Commonwealth Advisory Council of representatives of the Dominions with a permanent secretariat, but the conference of all the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth, Eire excepted, which met in London in the spring of 1944, did not support the proposal. The fact is that certain of the Dominion Governments, notably those of Canada and South Africa, are strongly opposed to the creation of any body which might tend to derogate in any way from the full sovereign freedom and initiative of the Dominions. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Prime Minister of Canada, summed up the objections to a permanent Commonwealth Secretariat when he said at the Conference of 1911 : " If the body is to be anything at all, it will try to exercise its own views in the Governments."

From all this it will be seen what a truly creative part has been played by the Imperial Conference in the development of the present-day British Commonwealth of Nations. In fact, it has been the great forum in which those far-reaching changes, whether accomplished by legislation as in the Statute of Westminster, by Acts relating to colonial legislation and so

on, or by constitutional conventions in the traditional British manner, have been hammered out which have completely transformed the Commonwealth within the last fifty years. At the time of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, in 1897, the Commonwealth was a system in which there was wide—in some cases, complete—devolution of powers of domestic self-government, but in which the control of the United Kingdom in matters other than purely domestic was still effective. To-day the self-governing members of the Commonwealth are a freely co-operating Society of Nations, self-united by a variety of ties, and with allegiance to one King as the outward and visible sign of their union. It is impossible to say what the future of the Imperial Conference will be. None has been held since 1937, and some observers claim to have discerned signs of anticlimax in its proceedings. They say, truly as we know, that a large part of the proceedings of the Imperial Conference has been to establish the nature of the Commonwealth itself, and that this has now been established permanently by the Statute of Westminster. This is certainly a limited view. A continually expanding and changing political system like the British Commonwealth of Nations cannot have its nature fixed once and for all, and we have already seen reasons for believing that certain of the newly added Dominions will bring problems to the Conference of vital importance not only to themselves but to the whole society of nations of the whole world.

But the Imperial Conference is not the only way of bringing together representatives of Governments in the Commonwealth for effective consultation. During the First World War, between 1917 and 1918, many Dominion Cabinet Ministers, including nearly all the Prime Ministers, visited London, and in 1917 advantage was taken of these visits to form an Imperial War Conference to act as a meeting of the Governments of the Dominions to consult and co-operate for the better prosecution of the war. During the meetings of the Imperial War Conference two sessions of the Imperial War Cabinet were held, the purpose of the latter being to take

decisions and frame policy at the highest level. After the end of the First World War the Imperial War Cabinet functioned until 1919, chiefly for the all-important purpose of settling the peace terms. Moreover, Dominion Prime Ministers and Cabinet Ministers attended meetings of the British War Cabinet, and from 1917 onward General Smuts sat continuously in the British War Cabinet. Indeed, at times it was difficult to distinguish between the Imperial and the British War Cabinets.

During the Second World War all the Dominion Prime Ministers and many Cabinet Ministers visited London from time to time and attended meetings of the British War Cabinet. But all the Prime Ministers were in London together in 1944 (excepting the Prime Minister of neutral Eire), and advantage was taken of this fact to call a Prime Ministers' Conference from the end of April to the middle of May 1944. This was not a regular Imperial Conference. The meeting was smaller and the proceedings more informal. Nevertheless, a wide range of topics covering the problems of both war and peace was discussed. Naturally, no details were disclosed of the proceedings, but Mr Churchill told the House of Commons on May 24 that the Conference " revealed a core of agreement which will enable the British Empire and Commonwealth to meet in discussion with other great organisms in the world in a firmly knit array." In his final speech to the Conference the Prime Minister of Canada spoke of the value of the existing machinery for consultation and co-operation in the Commonwealth. " Thanks," he said, " to the swift and smooth machinery of consultation . . . we came to this meeting knowing much of each others' problems and points of view." Field Marshal Smuts paid striking testimony to the value of the Conference when he said, " At no previous Conference that I can remember has there ever been such a range of far-reaching fundamental problems touching not only this group of ours but the whole world." The Prime Minister of Canada put the situation forcefully in one of his speeches to the Conference, when he said : " It is true we have not, sitting

in London continuously, a visible Imperial War Cabinet or Council. But we have, what is much more important, though invisible, a continuing conference of the Cabinets of the Commonwealth." After their Conference the Prime Ministers issued a Declaration which stated that "our system of free association has enabled us, each and all, to claim a full share of the common burden."

When the Canadian Prime Minister spoke of an invisible continuing Conference of the Cabinets of the Commonwealth he was referring to the very numerous methods of consultation which have been developed between members of Commonwealth Governments at many levels, particularly during the Second World War. First come the consultations between individual Prime Ministers by telephone, cable, or letter, or in person. Next come the consultations between the United Kingdom's Commonwealth Relations Office (until 1947 the Dominions Office) and the Departments of External Affairs in the Dominions, and, also, between the Dominions' Departments themselves. These consultations are largely for the transaction of current official business between these various Commonwealth Departments, but the Commonwealth Relations Office circulates to the Dominions' Departments of External Affairs our Foreign Office Secret Documents. In return, the Dominions' Departments have begun to circulate to the Commonwealth Relations Office and to each other, documents containing information collected by their representatives abroad.

A very important part of the machinery for inter-Commonwealth consultation were the daily meetings between the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Dominion High Commissioners during the Second World War. Lord Cranborne, when Secretary of State for the Dominions, gave a very interesting account of these meetings in a debate in the House of Lords on November 2, 1943.

> I believe [he said] they are in many ways the crown of the structure that has been built up. They ensure that there shall be close, cordial, and continuous relations between the Dominions'

> Secretary and the Dominions' representatives. . . . I am present at these meetings . . . with the Under-Secretary and the Permanent Under-Secretary and the High Commissioners. The meetings are quite informal. There is no fixed agenda. I give to those present all the latest information in my possession as to events in the international sphere and, especially at the present time, with regard to the conduct of the war. I also let them know what has passed at the Cabinet on matters of interest to the Dominions and particularly in the field of foreign affairs, with the object of ensuring that the Dominions, who control their own foreign policy, should be kept aware of all developments in ours so as to ensure, so far as we can, perfect co-ordination. . . . There is also present at these meetings . . . a high official of the Foreign Office. This addition I introduced when I was last at the Dominions Office. His presence ensures that the Foreign Secretary should be immediately acquainted with the views of the High Commissioners on matters which they wish to bring to the notice of the Foreign Office. The High Commissioners, on their part, raise any points which they consider require special consideration from the Dominions angle.

Since the War, however, such meetings have been held only when deemed necessary.

In the Dominions there is no parallel to these meetings, but consultations between the High Commissioners of the various British countries in each Dominion and representatives of the Department of External Affairs can take place on the initiative of either side. Further, to an extent which varies between one Commonwealth capital and another, High Commissioners have begun to deal with Government Departments direct, without going through the Commonwealth Relations Office in London or the Departments of External Affairs in the Dominions. Indeed, during the Second World War another method of inter-Commonwealth consultation, which had started before 1939, became fairly common. This is by way of contact between Government Departments in the United Kingdom and the Dominions. It can be seen that direct communication between, let us say, the Canadian Defence and Supply Departments and the corresponding Departments

in London, would save time and increase efficiency, and it remains to be seen whether this development will continue its progress in the post-War period. It is certainly calculated to increase the scope and volume of inter-Commonwealth official communications, but it will raise some difficult questions of policy co-ordination for the Commonwealth Relations Office and the External Affairs Departments of the United Kingdom and the Dominions respectively.

With the great and increasing development of air travel, it is becoming ever more common for Cabinet Ministers to travel to other countries of the Commonwealth where they can make effective contacts and have useful discussions. Senior civil servants of the different Commonwealth countries and technical experts of Government Departments are also taking advantage of modern travelling facilities to visit their opposite numbers in other Commonwealth countries, and, if this latest development progresses, its importance for the conduct of day-to-day Commonwealth business and for preparing the ground for Commonwealth Conferences of different kinds and on various levels is obvious.

Further, the presence of a number of representatives of different countries of the Commonwealth in the foreign capitals to which they are accredited seems to be giving rise to yet another channel of inter-Commonwealth communications and consultation through the meetings of these representatives.

Lastly, we come to what may in the future be the most important of all the unifying and dynamic forces of Commonwealth consultation : the Empire Parliamentary Conferences. In 1911 Mr L. S. Amery suggested that " His Majesty's faithful Commons from each part of the Empire should, by delegations of their Members, be present at the Coronation " of King George V in that year. This historic gathering duly took place, and out of it was born the Empire Parliamentary Association, a body to which members of the Legislatures of the British Commonwealth may belong. Its chief purpose is described in the first article of its Constitution

as " the establishment of permanent machinery to provide more ready exchange of information and to facilitate closer understanding and more frequent intercourse between those engaged in the Parliamentary Government of the component parts of the Empire." Members of more than thirty-three of the Parliaments and Legislatures of the Commonwealth —including the Legislatures of Canadian Provinces and Australian States—now belong to the Association. The members in each Dominion form a branch of the Association. Colonies like Bermuda, which have old Legislatures and a large measure of self-government, may be affiliated to one of the branches in the United Kingdom or a Dominion. The headquarters of each branch is in the Parliament House of the Dominion concerned, and the Presidents of the branches in this country and the Dominions are the Speakers of the two Houses of Parliament, while the Vice-Presidents are the leaders of the political parties. Speakers and Deputy Speakers take part in the Empire Parliamentary Conferences which are held in the different Dominions and the United Kingdom. There could hardly be a more powerful means of strengthening the spiritual links between the different members of the Commonwealth than is provided by these gatherings of representatives of its Parliaments.

This long survey of the different methods and kinds of machinery for consultation and co-operation in the Commonwealth has shown how numerous, continuous, and important they are. Below the surface appearance of things a vast amount of intimate and effective consultation goes on between the Governments and officials of the countries of the British Commonwealth, consultation which issues in co-operative actions and concerted policies far oftener and on a far wider scale than the casual observer can know.

CHAPTER VI

CO-OPERATION AND CONSULTATION

(ii) *Economic, Scientific, and Cultural*

THIS chapter is concerned mainly with methods and institutions of consultation and co-operation in economic and scientific matters between the self-governing members of the Commonwealth. For the Colonial territories the Colonial Office acts as the general initiator and mainspring in these matters. Indeed, to a very large extent the Government of the United Kingdom, through the agency of the Colonial Office, not only acts as the prime mover in the co-ordination of colonial economic and scientific developments, but even provides the initial capital and much of the skilled advice and supervision which makes them possible. This side of our theme is treated at length in a later chapter, and can, therefore, be ignored for the present.

But, as is clear from what has already been said in previous chapters, there can be no question of any such centralized action in the case of the self-governing members of the Commonwealth. Here consultation and co-operation must be on a purely voluntary basis, and when they result in governmental action that action can be undertaken only on the initiative of the Governments of the individual countries concerned, and only by permission of their Governments. In fact, each of the Dominions has its own extensive apparatus of bodies and institutions for economic and scientific study and development, and any institutions for Commonwealth consultation and co-operation can function only in those spheres of interest which are common to all the Dominions—that is, where their action is not only appropriate but constitutionally acceptable.

The principles, which, until the Second World War, governed the membership, the scope, and the proceedings of inter-Commonwealth bodies, were mostly laid down in 1933 by the Imperial Committee on Economic Consultation and Co-operation, which met under the chairmanship of a distinguished Canadian Civil Servant, Dr O. D. Skelton, to examine the existing machinery for Commonwealth consultation and co-operation, and to consider if any alterations were desirable. After a thorough review of the work, the organization, and the financing of existing agencies, the Committee recommended certain changes, the most important of which was the abolition of the Empire Marketing Board, a body which had accomplished much valuable work in stimulating inter-Commonwealth trade and supporting a number of educational and research activities. The Board owed its origin to one interesting passage in British politics, and its abolition to another. At the Imperial Conference of 1923 the Government of the United Kingdom promised to extend a certain measure of preference to a number of Commonwealth products imported into the United Kingdom. The latter, however, was then a Free Trade country, and the Government of the day found it impossible to carry through Parliament a policy which ran so directly counter to Free Trade principle. Accordingly, in 1924 the Prime Minister, Earl (then Mr) Baldwin, carried in Parliament a motion to allocate a million pounds a year to financing schemes for promoting the sale of Commonwealth produce in this country, this sum representing the equivalent cash value of the advantages which would have been conferred on the overseas countries of the Commonwealth had Parliament agreed to the imperial preferences. In 1925 the Imperial Economic Committee, which came into being in that year, recommended that the million pounds should be spent on maintaining a body which would undertake publicity and research on behalf of the marketing of Commonwealth produce in the United Kingdom. The Empire Marketing Board was the name given to this body, and it remained in being until it was abolished by the

Imperial Committee on Economic Consultation and Co-operation. It was abolished because in 1932 this country ceased to be a Free Trade country through the adoption of a number of protective tariff duties on imports. Thus it became possible to grant preferential tariffs to Commonwealth goods coming into the United Kingdom, and, in fact, a number were granted, particularly as a result of the Imperial Economic Conference, which was held at Ottawa in 1932.

The abolition of the Empire Marketing Board was the outstanding recommendation of the Skelton Committee, which, for the rest, made proposals regarding the maintenance of the Imperial Economic Committee, the Imperial Shipping Committee, and the Executive Council of the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux, all of which will be described in due course. The Committee also recommended that the complete equality of status of the various Governments co-operating in the work of these all-Commonwealth bodies should be marked by the rules governing the appointment of their members, by the allocation of membership as between the different countries concerned, and by the general organization of the bodies themselves.

The story of the Empire Marketing Board deserves attention because it illustrates so clearly the sort of conditions which govern the origin and determine the fate of Commonwealth agencies of the kind we are now examining. It shows, too, how the play of political forces inside individual countries of the Commonwealth can affect directly bodies whose activities concern them all.

The work of the Skelton Committee was only one episode in the long process of the growth and organization of methods and instruments of Commonwealth Economic Consultation and co-ordination. Throughout many years, and more particularly since the acceptance of the Balfour Declaration by the Imperial Conference of 1926, numerous conferences of officials, scientists, and specialists of all kinds have gradually built up a tradition and practice of consultation and co-operation between Commonwealth countries. General

Imperial Conferences and the special Imperial Economic Conferences of 1894, 1923, and 1932 have, from time to time, given form and substance to the traditions and the practices referred to above, and, in some instances, have brought into existence specific agencies for consultation and co-operation.

The list of Committees, Institutes, Bureaux, and so on, which are concerned with Commonwealth Consultation and Co-operation in economic and scientific and technical activities, is a long one. Some of them deal with highly specialized research into specific subjects. The Imperial Mycological Institute is an example of this latter kind. Its work is researching into the diseases of plants caused by fungi, into human diseases having a fungus cause, and into damage caused to textiles by fungi. It came into existence by unanimous agreement among the members of the Imperial War Committee of 1918. This is literally an all-Commonwealth body, since it is maintained by all the Governments of the Commonwealth, including India and the Colonies. Naturally its work does not come before the general public, but it is not difficult to see how valuable it is to the overseas countries of the Commonwealth, practically all of which have agriculture as the main factor in their economic systems, to have such a body operating with resources of trained personnel, and in a field of inquiry greater than any that could be supplied by any individual Government. Thus the fact that an inter-Commonwealth body is dealing with some highly specialized piece of scientific research in no way detracts from its importance either as a channel of Commonwealth co-operation or as a practical activity for increasing the welfare of the peoples of the Commonwealth. The Mycological Institute and the similar Institute of Entomology, which deals with insect pests and their relationship to human, animal, and plant diseases, are, clearly, handling matters of first-class importance to the economic and social welfare of the Commonwealth.

In this chapter, however, we shall deal with only those agencies for co-operation and consultation which have wider

and more general spheres of activity than the two Institutes mentioned above.

The first of these is the Imperial Institute, in South Kensington. It was founded originally as a national memorial of the Jubilee of Queen Victoria in 1887, and after passing through various transformations it received its present form and status by Act of Parliament in 1925. It has on its Board of Governors representatives of all the self-governing members of the Commonwealth as well as representatives of scientific, commercial, and industrial interests, and various departments of the Government of the United Kingdom—the Treasury, the Board of Trade, the Colonial Office, and so on. Its activities are very wide, including co-operation with technical, agricultural, and mining departments in the overseas countries of the Commonwealth for whom it undertakes detailed investigation and inquiries into the composition, uses, and commercial possibilities of any products submitted to it. The Institute maintains laboratories for these and other general investigations, and it also has special laboratories for examining specific products like rubber, cement, and others. Owing to its close relations with users and manufacturers of raw materials, the Institute is able to arrange for large-scale trials of materials and products which seem likely to have commercial possibilities.

But, in addition to these comprehensive scientific and trade investigations, the Imperial Institute carries on a number of educational activities. Its galleries, with their pictures, models, specimens of produce, displays of handicrafts, and many other kinds of exhibits, bring the resources, peoples, activities, and potentialities of the Commonwealth effectively before the eyes of visitors. Its extensive film and lantern-slide libraries, and its lectures on Commonwealth countries and doings, written by experts and illustrated by film and lantern slides, are much used by schools and other educational bodies and associations.

The Commonwealth Economic Committee is another body with membership representative of all the Commonwealth. Each of the self-governing countries has a representative of

its Government on the Committee, and the Colonies and Dependencies are represented by Colonial Office nominees. It came into existence in 1925 as the result of a resolution of the Imperial Economic Conference of 1923. Each of the Governments represented on the Committee contributes towards its expenses, and its functions have been extended from time to time. Broadly speaking, its functions are to increase the sale of Commonwealth products by studying and advising on the problems of marketing in all its many aspects. Thus it investigates the marketing of Commonwealth products in this country, going into such matters as their preparation and packing, including the very important subjects of their grading and standardization. By laying down definite standards and grades of quality of produce, and by assisting co-operation between producers to maintain them, the Committee has done much to popularize Commonwealth produce in this country. Another fruitful side of the Committee's work has been the encouraging of conferences of persons engaged in particular industries throughout the Commonwealth. Its market intelligence notes and surveys of trade and production all over the world have been another service of the greatest value. It provides a centre to which all the Governments of the Commonwealth can refer any economic question for investigation and report. Testimony to its usefulness is given by the way in which successive Imperial Conferences after reviewing its work have decided that it should be continued and extended.

With the work of the Executive Council of the Imperial Agricultural Bureaux we come to one of the outstanding examples of co-ordinated research along a number of different but converging lines that the world can show. The Council is composed of nominees of all the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth and of the Colonial Office, and its duty is to administer ten bureaux, which are financed by the various Governments of the Commonwealth to act as centres of research and to supply scientific workers all over the Commonwealth with the results of that research in ten specialized

fields of agricultural science. This organization came into existence as a result of the Imperial Agricultural Research Conference of 1927, which stressed the need for scientists to keep in touch with what was happening in their own special fields all over the world. The enormous output of scientific literature makes this a difficult matter in any case, and the difficulty is increased by the great number of languages in which information is published. The Conference, accordingly, suggested that the Governments of the Commonwealth should establish eight bureaux on a co-operative basis to collate and distribute information in eight selected branches of agricultural science. The eight branches chosen were Soil Science, Animal Health, Animal Nutrition, Animal Breeding and Genetics, Plant Breeding and Genetics, Pastures and Forage Crops, Horticulture and Plantation Crops, and Agricultural Parasites.

The wide scope of the work of these bureaux is obvious, and the value of the work itself to countries most of which are mainly agricultural needs no emphasis. This was one of the Commonwealth bodies which came under review by the Skelton Committee in 1933, and, not only was its work approved by the Committee, but the Institutes of Entomology and Mycology, referred to above, were put under the administration of the Executive Council. Of the work of the bureaux the Skelton Committee said "[it] is more thorough, more specialized and more definitely directed to the study of particular subjects of interest to agricultural research workers, than that done in the international field." The Skelton Committee was also concerned to ensure that the Council should be guaranteed adequate finance for a period of years and that its work and organization should be examined from time to time by suitable Empire Conferences. Accordingly, the British Commonwealth Scientific Conference of 1936 (note the change of name from the 'Imperial' Conference of 1927) examined the work of the eight bureaux up to that date, and after recommending its financing for a further period it suggested the addition of two new bureaux to the existing eight. In due course the bureaux of Dairy Science and Forestry were

created. Finally, in each of the countries taking part in the scheme a liaison officer is appointed to look after administrative details, while in each Commonwealth country there is also a scientific officer nominated for each of the bureaux to act as Official Correspondent, and, generally, as guide, philosopher, and friend to the particular bureau to which he is assigned.

It is not possible to describe in any detail the work of an organization dealing with such highly specialized scientific research over such a very wide field. But when we consider what the Bureaux have done in such truly vital subjects as the biological control of insect pests, the development of quicker-maturing strains of wheat—which enables wheat-growing to extend to climates where the summer is short—low-temperature research with all that that means for the transport of meat and fruit from overseas, research on textile fibres, and so on, we can at any rate form some slight idea of what this work means to the Commonwealth. Moreover, it is obvious that the Bureaux are all centres of free and friendly co-operation between a number of countries, such as could hardly exist outside the British Commonwealth.

The Bureau of Hygiene and Tropical Diseases does in its wide field something at least of the same sort of work as is done by the Agricultural Bureaux. That is, the officials of the Bureau keep in touch with developments in the study of Hygiene and Tropical Diseases all over the world, collect and arrange, and, where necessary, translate the information obtained, and pass it on to where it is needed. This Bureau also is financed partly by grants from the overseas Commonwealth Governments.

The Commonwealth agencies which we have examined so far in this chapter have all been concerned with matters which affect a wide range of human, economic, industrial, health, and social welfare. As we saw, the activities of bodies with such strange-sounding names as Mycological Institute and Institute of Entomology concern the welfare and health of human beings and of their crops and animals very closely, while the vital importance of the work being done by the

Agricultural Bureaux leaps to the eye at once. But there are Commonwealth Agencies whose work, though valuable and important, does not strike the imagination so much, since it is concerned with inquiring into matters or advising on problems confined to one special set of industrial and technical activities. Examples of this kind of Commonwealth agency are the Imperial Shipping Committee (which was renamed the Commonwealth Shipping Committee in 1948) and the Imperial Communications Advisory Committee. The Shipping Committee owes its existence, like many others of the Commonwealth agencies for consultation and co-operation, to a resolution of the Imperial Conference, while the Communications Committee is the result, as we shall see shortly, of what was, in effect, a large-scale merger of the businesses being carried on by the Governments of the Commonwealth in the telegraphic communications, by cable and wireless, between the different parts of the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth Shipping Committee has among its seventeen members ten who are nominated by the Governments of the Commonwealth, but its annual total expenses, which, however, amount only to about two thousand pounds, are provided by the United Kingdom. The Imperial War Conference of 1918 passed a resolution affirming that in order to maintain satisfactorily the connexions between the different countries of the British Empire, and at the same time to encourage commercial and industrial relations between them, there should be an inter-Imperial Board to bring under its review shipping on the principal Empire routes, especially those between " the heart of the Empire " and the overseas Dominions and India. The Board they had in mind was an ' Imperial Investigation Board ' representing the various parts of the Commonwealth, and empowered to inquire into all matters connected with the development and improvement of the sea communications between the different countries of the Empire. The scope of the proposed Investigation Board's inquiries was to be wide, including such matters as freights, size and type of ships, and harbour facilities. Accordingly the

Imperial Shipping Committee came into existence in 1920. Its work was examined by the Imperial Conference of 1923, which confirmed the scope of its activities, as also did the Imperial Conference of 1926, which adopted a resolution affirming the importance to the Empire of the Shipping Committee's work and the desirability of continuing it on its existing basis—that is, deriving authority from, and being responsible to, the Governments represented in the Imperial Conference. In 1926 the Governments represented at the Conference were the United Kingdom and the self-governing Dominions together with India. Again, at the Imperial Conference of 1930 the work of the Shipping Committee was commended and its maintenance advocated, and its terms of reference were amended in some particulars. They are worthy of note as showing the scope of this Committee's work, concerned as it is with a matter of quite peculiar importance to a Commonwealth which has been founded, built up, and maintained, on sea-power. They empower the Committee to inquire into complaints from persons and bodies interested in ocean freights, facilities and conditions in inter-Imperial trade, or into similar complaints referred to them by any of the Commonwealth Governments, and to report back to the Governments concerned. Further, the Committee is charged with the duty of surveying the facilities for maritime transport on Commonwealth trade-routes, and of making recommendations to the appropriate authorities for co-ordinating and improving these. Among such facilities are specially noted the type, size, and speed of ships, the depth of water in docks and channels, and the construction of harbour works. Very interesting is the final injunction that in carrying out its duties the Shipping Committee is to take into account facilities for air transport on all the Empire routes in question.

The subject matter of the work of the Imperial Communications Advisory Committee grows in importance with every year that passes, since telecommunications, whether by cable or wireless, are increasingly ousting other forms of communication. This is true whether we consider their use for strategic

or business purposes, or for the critically important activity of the collection and dissemination of news all over the world. From the very first Imperial Conference—the Colonial Conference of 1887—onward, imperial communications have always played a great part in the deliberations of the Conferences. It was in 1928 that an Imperial Wireless and Cable Conference met to go into the question of working the wireless and cable services between the different countries of the Commonwealth on a common basis and under the control of an all-Commonwealth Corporation. The question had been brought into prominence by both strategic and economic considerations, and as a result of the Conference's deliberations the now well-known Cable and Wireless, Ltd, came into existence as a business Corporation to co-ordinate the cable and wireless services between the countries of the Commonwealth. The new Corporation acquired the assets of the Commonwealth Governments already concerned in the business of telecommunications between their countries and others in the Commonwealth, and the Advisory Committee was formed to consider broad questions of future policy in this field. In particular it is concerned with the starting of new services, the discontinuance of existing services, alterations in rates, and the distribution of traffic between alternative routes. This matter of alternative routes is more important than may appear on the surface, for it affects the use of submarine cables, which are of much strategic importance, and in which a great amount of capital has been invested, as against the use of the new and always-expanding wireless services. The Advisory Committee's members are representative of all the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth, and there is also one representative of the Colonial Office.

Finally, in this review of scientific and allied agencies for inter-Commonwealth co-operation, we come to the important functions of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research of the United Kingdom. These functions are well known. They are highly technical and severely practical, and have been framed with a view to securing results which

will be of immediate value on the technological side of industry. Similar departments exist in the Dominions—the National Research Council of Canada and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research in New Zealand, for example—and with these the United Kingdom Department maintains close relations.

We come now to a field of Commonwealth co-operation in which Governments can play a useful and energizing, but, at the same time, only limited part. This is the field of cultural and purely intellectual activity. Here the lead must be taken by educationists from university professors downward, by writers and musicians, journalists and broadcasters, artists and film-producers, and a host of others. The goal here is nothing less than the establishing of common intellectual and spiritual values which are the foundations of a common way of life and a common outlook on the major problems and conditions of human destiny. Mr Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, summed up the literally vital importance of this side of our study when, speaking to both Houses of Parliament at Westminster in May 1944, he said :

> The war efforts of the Nations of the Commonwealth owe their inspiration to a common source. That source is the love of freedom and the sense of justice which, through generations, have been nurtured and cherished in Britain, as nowhere else in the world. . . . So long as freedom endures, free men everywhere will owe to the people of Britain a debt they can never repay. So long as Britain continues to maintain the spirit of freedom and to defend the freedom of other nations, she need never doubt her own pre-eminence throughout the world. So long as Britain continues to share that spirit with the other nations of the Commonwealth, she need never fear for the strength or unity of the Commonwealth.

Freedom is above all the child of intellectual and spiritual values, and so with these things we come to the very pith and marrow of our Commonwealth's body. All that has been said so far in this book shows that the Commonwealth's foundations will be found increasingly in a harmony of outlook and

a uniformity of conduct in these intangible but very mighty expressions of the human mind and spirit. In 1933 a non-official Conference on Commonwealth Relations was held in Toronto, and it was a South African who said :

> It is just exactly these cultural relations on which the only kind of unity that is now possible, or has ever been worth while having, depends. . . . Personal contacts and the fostering of common beliefs, traditions and practices are the only forces that in the long run can counteract the effect of the thousands of miles of salt-water which Burke pointed to as the cause of the regrettable incident of 1783 [*i.e.*, the Treaty of Versailles which finally separated the American Colonies from the Mother Country].

The same Conference accepted a Committee report which stated that " co-operation in the intellectual sphere was perhaps the most important form of co-operation." The Toronto Conference was held under the auspices of the Institute for International Affairs of the United Kingdom and the Dominions. The chief of these is the Royal Institute of International Affairs, whose headquarters are at Chatham House, in London. Every five years an unofficial ' Imperial Conference ' is held in one or other of the capital cities of the Commonwealth, at which representatives from all its self-governing countries meet to discuss the problems of Commonwealth Relations in an atmosphere of complete freedom and frankness.

Naturally, the universities of the Commonwealth are in the forefront of this form of co-operation. Students go from the Commonwealth countries to each others' universities, the great majority coming to the United Kingdom. The Universities Bureau of the British Empire dates from 1912, and has received financial help from the United Kingdom Government since 1919. It acts as a clearing-house of information for the Commonwealth universities, arranges joint conferences, helps the movements of students between them, and keeps them in touch with Commonwealth Governments, public authorities, and learned societies. It deals with the establishment of post-graduate scholarships, with teaching appointments in

Commonwealth universities, and with the exchange of university teachers. It holds five-yearly meetings, and at the last of these, in 1936, it recommended the setting up of a Committee to inquire into the possibility of exchanging university teachers.

The flow of students (helped by many scholarships, of which the Rhodes Scholarships are the best known) from the overseas Commonwealth to the United Kingdom is greater than the flow in the reverse direction. During 1937–38, the last normal year for which figures are available, between three and four thousand students came from the other Commonwealth countries to the United Kingdom. More than a third were from India, but the Dominions sent over fourteen hundred, while more than six hundred came from the Colonies. In 1934 a Joint Standing Committee for Empire Educational work was formed " to co-ordinate and develop the educational work of all the non-party Empire Societies in London which include such activities in their programme."

Of hardly less importance than the work of the Universities Bureau is the interchange of school-teachers between the United Kingdom and the Dominions. The Ministry (before the War the Board) of Education recognizes the League of the Empire as the official agency for this purpose. By the outbreak of the Second World War more than three thousand teachers had been thus exchanged and the number was growing. By 1939 nearly two hundred teachers a year were being exchanged. Most of these were teachers in primary schools, but provision for the exchange of secondary-school teachers is now being made. Side by side with this development has gone the process of arranging for visits by schoolchildren to other Commonwealth countries than their own. There is no need to dwell on the importance of this aspect of cultural co-operation within the Commonwealth, for it is obvious.

The world-famous British Association holds its annual conferences from time to time in one or other of the Commonwealth countries overseas, and so does the Empire Press Conference. Nothing can be better calculated to stimulate

pride and interest in the common cultural heritage of the Commonwealth countries than the gatherings of the world-famous scholars of the British Association, while the Press Conferences serve to maintain and extend the links between the all-essential business of gathering and disseminating news and informed comment thereon. But at the beginning of 1947 a development in news-collecting and dissemination occurred which was of prime importance. It concerned the famous Reuters Press Agency, which gathers news from all over the world to supply to the newspapers. The honesty and efficiency of Reuters news service gives it an unrivalled position in the work of gathering and selling news as compared with any similar agency. When, in 1947, an Australian news agency, the Australian Associated Press, and a New Zealand agency, the New Zealand Press Association, became partners with newspapers of this country in owning Reuters, it meant that news-gathering was to be done henceforth on a Commonwealth basis.

Two of the newest techniques which can be used in the field of cultural relations are among the most powerful of all. They are the cinema and broadcasting. Most of the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth now have legislation requiring the exhibition of a proportion of films produced within the Commonwealth. Educational films dealing with the life and conditions of the Commonwealth countries are specially prepared and shown by a number of educational and public organizations in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the Commonwealth.

But it is in broadcasting that the most determined and extensive efforts have been made to realize the cultural possibilities of a new technique. Every part of the Commonwealth, self-governing and dependent alike, now receives an Empire broadcasting service from the B.B.C., and the latter transmits continually to its listeners at home programmes from other countries of the Commonwealth. Every aspect of life in Great Britain is broadcast all over the Commonwealth, and it is only necessary to mention such things as the King's Christmas

broadcast and Princess Elizabeth's wedding to show the unique possibilities of broadcasting as the focal point of the communion of the Commonwealth countries with each other.

The British Council calls for mention here because it has a separate section—the Empire Division—to give attention to the territories of the Commonwealth. Incorporated by Royal Charter in 1940, its object is to increase knowledge of the United Kingdom and the English language abroad, and to develop close cultural relations between the United Kingdom and other countries. There are representatives of the Council in Australia and New Zealand and in a number of the Colonies.

Lastly, before we close this survey of the chief Commonwealth agencies for consultation and co-operation there is one agency of which mention must be made. This is the Imperial War Graves Commission, and, appropriately, it is in this Commonwealth body that the equality of all its members is most fully evinced. The reverent upkeep of the graveyards of their dead is the equal concern of Mother Country and Dominions alike, and the Commission, composed of representatives of them all, renders its account to every one in exactly the same terms. It is fitting that we should close our long review of Commonwealth co-operation in so many fields of human endeavour—political, economic, social, and spiritual—with the War Graves Commission, for the men and women of all races and creeds and colour who lie in those graves all over the world, testified with their lives to their belief in the ends for which the Commonwealth exists, and so gave the final proof of their devotion to them and to it.

CHAPTER VII

THE DOMINIONS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

IN this chapter we shall inquire into the part played in international relations by the Commonwealth as a whole, and by its self-governing members separately. In all their external relations the Colonies and other dependencies are controlled by the Government of the United Kingdom, and their foreign relations are, therefore, an element in the foreign relations of this country. The self-governing Dominions, together with the United Kingdom, are, however, in the words of the Balfour Declaration, " autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs. . . ." The basic principles of Commonwealth internal relations set forth in this declaration were given formal legal expression in the Statute of Westminster, which, we have said, may be regarded in some sense as the constitution of the British Commonwealth. Clearly, therefore, the self-governing Dominions are as free and unfettered in their diplomatic relations as the United Kingdom herself, and thus we cannot look for one centrally controlled policy for the Commonwealth in its relations with foreign countries and the day-to-day conduct of foreign affairs.

And yet the time is not very far distant when the Government of the United Kingdom could and did claim to conduct foreign policy, including the responsibility for peace and war, for the whole Commonwealth. One of the main questions for discussion at the Imperial Conference of 1911 was the extent to which the Dominions could be consulted with regard to treaties. This question was brought to a head by the fact that, only two years before, the United Kingdom had signed the Declaration of London without submitting it to the Dominion

Governments for their prior approval. But the Declaration of London was of vital importance to all the Dominions because it dealt with the rights of belligerents in time of war in respect to the control of merchant shipping, including that of neutral powers. At this Conference, moreover, Mr Asquith, who was then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, still claimed that the United Kingdom was responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs for the whole Commonwealth.

When the First World War broke out in 1914 the Commonwealth went into it as a united whole, but this was because each of the Dominions freely and without hesitation joined the Mother Country. In spite of any constitutional and theoretical arguments which could then have been adduced to prove the competence of the Government of the United Kingdom to declare war on behalf of the whole Commonwealth, it is certain that in fact the decision in the case of each of the Dominions rested with its own Government. But in 1939 there was simply no question of any Dominion going to war except by the decision of its own Government, and the Government of Eire chose to remain neutral. Both sides respected Eire's neutrality, and this fact, too, has some significance, because it is doubtful whether the enemy in the 1914–18 war would have agreed to respect the neutrality of a Dominion of the Commonwealth. By 1939, however, both legally and constitutionally, after the passing of the Statute of Westminster, and from practical experience of the Dominions as sovereign Powers in external affairs both in the League of Nations and in daily diplomatic intercourse, it was obvious to the whole world that the Dominions were, in fact, as free to decide what part they would play in the War as the United Kingdom herself. Therefore, if the whole Commonwealth—that is, the self-governing Dominions and the United Kingdom with her Colonial dependencies—ever act in concert in world affairs, it can do so only by the full and free agreement of its members. The Balfour Declaration itself states that free co-operation is the instrument of the Commonwealth in all its joint activities henceforth, and we have already seen how

many and what kind of means and bodies there are for such co-operation and for the prior consultation which is necessary. As we saw in Chapter V, methods of consultation and collaboration inside the Commonwealth are more intimate and informal than those existing between any foreign countries. In particular, there is a general agreement that no Dominion will enter into any commitments with foreign countries without prior consultation with her sister Dominions. In another way, too, the diplomatic unity of the Commonwealth did not disappear all at once with the acceptance of the Balfour Declaration by the 1926 Imperial Conference, and its subsequent implementing by the Statute of Westminster. For the declaration of 1926 pointed out that equality of status did not necessarily apply to all the functions of such a status. For example, the United Kingdom had a world-wide apparatus of diplomatic and consular machinery such as none of the Dominions could possibly support for themselves, and, of course, all this remained at the disposal of any self-governing Dominion wishing to use it. Broadly speaking, the Dominions created their own diplomatic and representative establishments abroad in proportion to the strength of nationalist feeling in each of them. Thus Eire appointed a fairly large number of legations in foreign countries. In 1947 she had eight Ministers Plenipotentiary or Envoys in foreign countries. Canada had thirteen, but of these seven were in the U.S.A. and other American Republics with which Canada as an American power naturally has greater interests than any other Dominion. Australia had an Ambassador in Washington and six Ministers in other foreign countries. South Africa had five Ministers abroad and New Zealand had two. Naturally, these figures do not include the Dominions' High Commissioners in other countries of the Commonwealth. The two new Dominions of India and Pakistan, which came into existence only in 1947, quickly established a number of Ministers and Legations in foreign countries, and it is possible that with their necessarily close relations with many of the countries in Asia and the Middle East, the list of their

diplomatic representatives will exceed that of any one of the other Dominions.

These figures show both the extent to which the different Dominions have already equipped themselves with the apparatus of independence in external affairs, and, also, the extent to which they are still using the diplomatic machinery of the United Kingdom. Of course, the Dominions have certain other representatives than purely diplomatic ones in foreign countries, such as Trade Commissioners. But, from the point of view of their degree of independence in world affairs, what matters is their specifically diplomatic representation, and the interest which the Governments and peoples of the Dominions take in foreign policy. Before the 1939–45 war, and certainly before the war of 1914–18, the interest taken in all the Dominions in foreign policy and affairs was very small, if we may judge by such a good pointer as the number of debates on foreign affairs in the Dominions' Parliaments. Before the 1914–18 war, indeed, the Dominions had no foreign policies of their own, as we have just seen, but between the two wars the Dominions were all concerned directly with world affairs through their membership of the League of Nations, and the part which they had to take in its activities. We shall examine shortly some of the main developments in internal affairs in which the Dominions were directly concerned between 1918 and 1939, which were of a kind calculated to impress upon their peoples the importance to them directly of what was going on in the outer world. Nevertheless, on the whole, interest in the domestic politics of the Dominions took precedence over foreign affairs in all of them, even in Canada.

There is a natural reason why this should be so. In the great remote spaces of the South African veldt, the Canadian prairies, the ranges and backwoods of Australia, and the sea-girt isolation of New Zealand, a sense of aloofness from the rest of the world is inevitably present. The 1939–45 war has certainly altered all that. Australia and New Zealand now know that they are one of the world's greatest, and most

exposed, strategic regions ; South Africa is once again coming into the centre of world communications, and Canada is becoming conscious of her destiny as leader of the nations of the middle size. The growth of communications, particularly air communications, will dispel the sense of isolation more and more rapidly and forcibly as the years pass, and from now onward foreign affairs will certainly occupy a larger place in the deliberations of the Dominions' Parliaments and in the thoughts and interests of their peoples. Above all, one vital lesson has been taught by the War to the peoples of the whole civilized world, and that is that domestic and foreign affairs are interdependent.

We have seen that as late as 1911 the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom insisted that the latter was responsible for the foreign policy and the issues of peace and war for the whole Commonwealth. But, in fact, certain breaches in this position had already been made. Even in the nineteenth century representatives of the British Colonies which are now Dominions had been associated with British diplomatic representatives in negotiating and signing commercial treaties affecting their own countries. Indeed, from 1884 onward the negotiation of commercial treaties between a Colony and a foreign country were entrusted to representatives of the Colony concerned, and the British representative was merely present in support. This development did not take place without misgivings on the part of the Mother Country, and, indeed, in 1895 the Colonial Secretary of the day issued a formal dispatch to the Colonies expressing the opinion that the development in question was tending to turn the Colonies into individual sovereign states and thus to disrupt the Empire. He wished Colonial representatives in treaty negotiations to be once more subordinate to the representatives of the United Kingdom.

It proved impossible, however, to put the clock back in this fashion, and in 1907, when commercial negotiations took place in Paris between France and Canada, the British Foreign Secretary on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom specifically declared that the negotiations

should be left entirely in the hands of the Canadian Prime Minister and his Minister of Finance. Nevertheless, although after 1907 it was for some years the general rule that any treaty negotiated by a Dominion must be submitted to the Government of the United Kingdom for final approval before ratification, it was clear that the attainment of full diplomatic independence by the Dominions was only a matter of time. The arrangement outlined in the preceding sentence lasted until 1923, and then disappeared. In that year Canada made a fisheries convention with the United States without the intervention of any United Kingdom representative at any stage of the proceedings. At the same time the valuable arrangement was instituted in the Imperial Conference of 1923 whereby any Commonwealth Government entering into negotiations with a foreign country would consider the possible effects on the interests of the other countries of the Commonwealth and give any of them who might be interested a chance to state their views or take part in the negotiations. Side by side with all this went the freeing of the Colonies, later the Dominions, from inclusion in new commercial treaties concluded by the United Kingdom and their release from the conditions of old treaties which had been made while the Colonies were still under the general control of the Mother Country.

The right to negotiate and conclude commercial treaties is an important one, but not as important as the right to negotiate political treaties, in which any matter of interest or dispute between two or more countries can be included, and this right was not acquired by the Dominions until the end of the 1914–18 war. At the Peace Conference in Paris which followed that war each of the Dominions was separately represented, and their delegates both took part in the negotiations and signed the various Peace Treaties with the different enemy countries. It is true that "the British Empire" was, in the constitutional lawyer's phrase, the "sole contracting party" for the whole British Commonwealth of Nations. Nevertheless, no treaty was ratified until it had received the approval of each one of the Dominions.

But even this was not enough to mark to the world, and to the peoples of the Dominions themselves, the new status which the Dominions had now assumed as sovereign states equal in every point of political status to the United Kingdom herself. After the Imperial Conference of 1926, with the Balfour Declaration statement of complete equality as between the Mother Country and the Dominions, it was decided that all treaties in future should be concluded by the King as the high contracting party, and that in them the Dominion or Dominions for whom the King was concluding the treaty should be specifically stated. Thus, the full sovereign independence of each of the Dominions is not only assured but is made plain to the world in this all-important matter of treaty-making, because the King is, of course, King of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Pakistan, and Ceylon, as well as of the United Kingdom, and when he concludes a treaty he does so only for the Dominion or Dominions on whose behalf and at whose request he is acting. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter V, in Canada and South Africa the Governor-General can now exercise all the powers of the King without reference to His Majesty. As far as these two Dominions are concerned, therefore, all the powers of sovereignty in foreign affairs now vest ostensibly, as well as actually, in them. In India the King has now been eliminated from any direct part in the government of that country.

Thus, such unity in action as the Commonwealth may find possible in future can come only after consultation and agreement between all its self-governing members. This is not so easy a matter as may appear at first sight. The countries of the Commonwealth are widely separated in space, and their economic, political, and other interests do not coincide at all points. The United Kingdom alone is a European Power and is, in consequence, urgently concerned with all the most vital and fundamental matters of European relations. Sometimes the Government of the United Kingdom finds it impossible to wait until the necessarily lengthy process of consultation has been completed and then she has to act alone. She did so

in 1925 in the matter of the Locarno Pact, whereby she entered into certain military obligations in regard to the security of Western Europe. None of the Dominions joined her in this pact, and consequently they and India were specifically excluded from its commitments. But since those days the means of communication have so multiplied and increased in speed and efficiency, and the methods of consultation have been so improved, that consultation is not nearly as slow a process as it was a quarter of a century ago.

Another proof of the full sovereign status of the Dominions was given by the London Naval Treaty of 1936. This was the outcome of an earlier London Naval Treaty concluded in 1930 between the British Commonwealth, the U.S.A., and Japan for the limitation of naval armaments. On this occasion, the King ratified the agreement separately on behalf of all the Dominions except the Irish Free State. One clause in this treaty of 1930 provided that the three powers should meet again in five years' time to draw up a new treaty with the same general purpose. Accordingly the representatives of the Commonwealth countries concerned, of the U.S.A., and of Japan, met and framed a new naval treaty—the London Naval Treaty of 1936. Every Dominion sent representatives, but this time South Africa as well as the Irish Free State refused to sign the treaty. It seems likely that the reason for their refusal was that their Governments felt that the form of the Conference and of the signature of the resultant treaty did not sufficiently emphasize the fully sovereign status of their countries. In fact, the various Naval Conferences and agreements between the two wars to which the United Kingdom and the Dominions were parties gave rise in a number of quarters other than South Africa and the Irish Free State to some confusion of thought on the exact standing of the Dominions in such international dealings. Thus, in 1922 a naval treaty concluded at Washington laid down the maximum naval strength for the whole British Commonwealth. Again, the naval agreement concluded between the United Kingdom alone and Germany in 1935 agreed that German naval strength

should not exceed 35 per cent. of that of the whole Commonwealth, while an agreement between the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom in the following year agreed that the former should have parity with the total naval strength of the British Commonwealth. At first sight it looks as though these agreements infringe the sovereignty of the Dominions, but on reflection the truth of the matter emerges. This is that no limitation of any sort is placed by the United Kingdom on the naval establishments of the Dominions, which are entirely free to build or not to build as each may feel inclined. The agreements merely arrange that whatever the total naval tonnage of the Commonwealth may be after each Dominion has framed and carried out its own building programme, then the parity or percentage arrangements of the agreements come into effect.

We have now seen that the Dominions exercise in foreign policy and world affairs generally all the powers of fully sovereign states, including full control of and responsibility for their own defence, which is the necessary corollary of national sovereignty. In the world at large their status is marked clearly by their membership of the old League of Nations, and now by their membership of the United Nations Organization. All the Dominions, with the exception of the Irish Free State (which did not come into existence until 1921), together with India, were members of the League of Nations from its first formation, and the Irish Free State was admitted to membership in 1923. It is worth recalling that there was at first a good deal of opposition in some foreign countries against the admission of the Dominions and India as full members of the League, since the idea that the British Commonwealth would have six votes at its disposal aroused apprehension and jealousy. The Dominions, however, resolutely pressed their right to membership, which they had won by their vital contributions to victory in the 1914–18 war, and, strongly supported as they were by the United Kingdom, they carried their point. Moreover, they succeeded in establishing the practice that one of the non-permanent

seats in the Council of the League should always be held by a Dominion. The fear in some foreign countries that the Dominions would be unduly influenced by the United Kingdom in their conduct in the League Assembly and Council was dispersed by the course of events. The Dominions did not, in fact, show the least signs of subservience to the views and policies of the United Kingdom, and when they differed from the latter had no hesitation in making this clear.

Particularly in the International Labour Organization did the complete freedom and determination of the Dominions to pursue their own policies make themselves plain. As members of the League of Nations, the Dominions were also members of the International Labour Organization. Here their separate policies diverged frequently and markedly from those of the United Kingdom, and it is worth while noticing that in their proceedings as members of the International Labour Organization the Dominion representatives acted solely as representatives of their respective Governments, and ratified or refused to ratify conventions and agreements without any formal intervention by the Government or Parliament of the United Kingdom, or, even, by the King. Moreover, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council recognized in a judgment that Canada does not enter into any international labour conventions as a member of the British Commonwealth, but solely "by virtue of her new status as an international person."

With the setting up of the United Nations Organization after the 1939–45 war, the Dominions naturally became original members; only Eire was not included, as she was not a belligerent. Her application for membership had, therefore, to be specifically accepted by U.N.O., and when she made it Russia and the nations associated with her successfully opposed it. The United Kingdom is a permanent member of the Security Council of U.N.O. as she was of the Council of the League of Nations, and Australia was made one of the six non-permanent members at the first election to the Security Council. It seems certain that the practice which obtained

in the League of Nations will be established in U.N.O.—namely, that one of the non-permanent seats on the Council will always be held by one of the Dominions, who now include, of course, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan. Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand have all added to the weight and importance of the United Nations activities, and Canada seems to be clearly emerging as a world power.

But perhaps the best illustration of the position of the Dominions in the world is provided by the Canberra Conference, which concluded its sessions towards the end of 1947. The Conference was called by Australia to discuss the Japanese Peace Treaty and to see if a Commonwealth policy in this crucial business could be evolved. The United Kingdom and all the other Dominions followed Australia's lead wholeheartedly, and all sent representatives to Canberra, including India and Pakistan, who had become Dominions only a few weeks previously, and even Burma, which had then not left the Commonwealth. Here was an undeniable proof that the Dominions of the Commonwealth had come to full national stature, and the fact that the Mother Country, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, India, and Pakistan should meet in such a place for such a purpose, under the leadership of another Dominion and not of the United Kingdom, is surely a foreshadowing of things to come. It marks the beginning of a new principle in Commonwealth relations, and assuredly Canberra will not be the last of such Conferences. Linked with the Canberra Conference is the fact that it is an Australian who represents the whole Commonwealth in the occupation of Japan, and that its army of occupation consists mainly of Australians.

CHAPTER VIII

DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE IN THE COLONIES

In this chapter we examine one of the most interesting and important aspects of our study of the British Commonwealth. Economic development and social welfare in the Colonies give rise to a number of activities and problems involving many formidable technical, economic, and administrative difficulties, and many very delicate and even dangerous questions arising out of racial and social relations. This business of Colonial development is not a matter of fraternal benevolence on the part of advanced peoples towards primitive or backward races. It is a question of enabling the latter to play their part as free, self-governing, and self-reliant agents in the world's political and economic system.

Moreover, it is not a question which concerns only the United Kingdom among the self-governing and most advanced countries of the Commonwealth. South Africa is deeply involved because of her own African subjects and her own dependency of South-west Africa, and because, as an African Power, the conditions in other African territories, particularly those on her borders, are necessarily a matter of intimate concern to her. Australia and New Zealand also have their own dependencies, and in a later chapter we shall see something of their policy in regard to them. Canada has for long had close economic connexion with the West Indies, and has already taken an unofficial part in the detailed work of collaboration of the Caribbean Commission, whose functions and structure we shall consider in due course. Thus, all the advanced countries of the Commonwealth are directly interested in the development and welfare of Colonial peoples, and the problems which arise are purely practical problems calling for practical measures. The use of abstract expressions

such as imperialism, subjection, exploitation, and so on, and the ideas connected with these expressions, are really irrelevant in the post-War world. The improvement of the moral and material conditions of life of Colonial populations will not be accomplished by anything but wise and well-informed policies, and efficient and adequate instruments of administration.

The years since the outbreak of the Second World War have seen a profound change in the whole policy of Colonial economic development. We have already seen how the policy of the political and constitutional development of our dependencies has been radically transformed during recent years, so that full self-government or Dominion Status is now the acknowledged goal of them all, to be attained as their circumstances warrant. We return to this theme in the last chapter. Here we must observe that the economic policy of our Government towards its Colonies and Dependencies is the economic counterpart of its constitutional policy. That is to say, the economic resources of these territories are to be developed by the planned application of capital and science in such a way as to provide a firm and adequate material foundation for the political and administrative systems, which will undoubtedly grow up in the years to come. Further, not only will the interests of the nations and peoples of the Colonies be fully safeguarded in the economic developments which are planned, but the people themselves, whose interests are to be so vitally affected, will be educated to enable them to play a direct part in movements of such deep concern to them. Social developments will go hand in hand with economic and political developments, and all this many-sided process will be animated by the fundamental principle that the natural resources which are being thus developed belong to the peoples in whose territories they are found and are to be developed for, and ultimately by, them.

The beginning of what can only be called the new Colonial economic policy dates back to 1929. Before that year the Government of the United Kingdom used to make grants-in-aid to the Colonies and Dependencies, and allowed them special

facilities in the shape of rates of interest on loans lower than the prevailing market rates. Special help was also given at times of exceptional distress or special emergency. The Colonial Development Act of 1929, although its scope was limited as compared with the Act of 1940 and, still more, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945, nevertheless represented a notable advance on the old piecemeal system of Colonial economic aid and development. By the 1929 Act a fund was created from which the British Treasury could make either free grants, or loans, or grants for the interest of payment upon loans to the Colonies. Grants from the fund were, however, limited to a million pounds per annum and could be spent on developmental works alone, since one of the principal aims of the Act was to alleviate the effects of the economic slump in Great Britain, which had already given rise to mass unemployment by 1929. The wider objects of social, educational, and general welfare did not come within its purview. During the whole of the ten years in which the 1929 Act was in force no more than five millions were spent out of the Fund, while in 1940, when it was superseded by the new Act, future commitments amounted to no more than £1,600,000.

The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 radically changed the scope of the 1929 Act, both as regards the amounts to be spent on Colonial development and the objects of expenditure. Indeed, the whole spirit of the policy of Colonial development was altered. The development of the Colonies was recognized to involve a mass of problems—social and educational, as well as economic and constitutional—and the Act of 1940 gave expression to this recognition. Conditions in the West Indies were what brought the new policy to a head. In August 1938 a Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into conditions in the West Indian Colonies, and when a summary of its report was published in February 1940 His Majesty's Government published with it a White Paper describing its future policy towards Colonial development and welfare. This White Paper announced that

His Majesty's Government was a trustee for the well-being of the peoples in the Colonial Empire (and the White Paper throughout includes Protectorates and Mandated Territories in this title), and that the primary aim of their Colonial policy was to protect and advance the interests of the Colonies. They recognized however, that, since the Colonies were so largely dependent on the resources derived from agriculture —an industry whose returns were dependent on the vagaries of world markets and, therefore, varied from year to year— the Colonies needed help from outside if they were to maintain administrative, technical, and social services of a proper standard.

In view of these facts, the Act of 1940 provided for assistance to Colonial Governments up to a maximum of five million pounds a year for ten years. Such assistance was no longer to be limited to schemes involving capital expenditure on developmental works, but was to extend to recurrent expenditure on such services as agriculture, health, education, and housing. At the same time it was made clear to all Colonial Governments that the primary purpose of the Act was not to help isolated projects, but to foster comprehensive plans of Colonial development. His Majesty's Government, in administering the funds made available under the Act, would have the assistance of a Colonial Development and Welfare Advisory Committee composed of both official and unofficial members.

The Act of 1940 then dealt with the crucially important subject of research, stating that it was now intended to place research on a wider and more regular basis than in the past. To this end, the Colonial Office set up a special body called the Colonial Research Committee, and allocated to it a maximum possible grant of half a million pounds per annum. Provision was also made for suitable administrative machinery and personnel, in this country and in each of the Colonies, for carrying out whatever plans might be made for Colonial economic development. Further, inside each Colony arrangements suited to each individual case were visualized for proper consultation and co-operation between administrative officials

and officials of the technical and scientific services. Finally, the whole keynote of the 1940 Act was collaboration between London and the Colonial Governments, and the elimination of anything that might savour of dictation.

It will be noticed that this Act was passed by Parliament at a time when our fortunes in the War were at about their lowest ebb, and when all over the Commonwealth the primary interest of Governments and peoples was to ensure victory in the struggle for survival. Few really comprehensive plans could be completed during the War; nevertheless, by the time it came to an end over five hundred plans had been approved, representing a total cost of nearly sixteen million pounds. These plans were concerned with water-supply, irrigation, communications, transport, education, agriculture, medicine, public health, housing, and veterinary services.

With the coming of peace, a whole host of new problems emerged in the Colonies, many of which had been foreseen by the Colonial Office. The War had changed conditions of life all over the world, and the Colonies of the Commonwealth were all affected by the change. Some of our Colonies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans had been overrun by the enemy, and their political and economic life had to be restored. The large numbers of men who had been recruited for service had to be reabsorbed in civil life, and this meant the provision of training facilities for many of them. Even physical conditions had changed in some of the Colonies. New communications had been made, and new crops and industries and mines developed. The spirit of nationalism had been strengthened where it had already come to life before the War, and had emerged in places where it had been unknown before. All this meant new and comprehensive demands for social and economic services as well as for political and administrative reforms, and, with the principle now firmly established in our Colonial policy that economic development was a necessary foundation, or even a prior condition for social and political advance, it was felt that even the 1940 Act needed some strengthening.

Accordingly shortly before the end of the War another Colonial Development Act, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945, was passed, which altered the 1940 Act in some particulars. Thus, the ten-year period which would have expired in 1950 was extended to 1956, and, instead of the five million pounds per annum for general development and half a million pounds per annum for research, it was decided to enlarge the fund to be made available in the new ten-year period to the sum of a hundred and twenty million pounds, with the proviso that not more than seventeen and a half million pounds (with a maximum of a million pounds for research) should be spent in any one year. Moreover, the 1940 Act had laid down that any money from a grant which might still be unspent at the end of the financial year should be surrendered by the Colonial authorities concerned. The 1945 Act wiped out this condition.

The details of the administration of these vast sums of money, and their allocation as between the different objects involved, are worthy of notice. The whole fund was divided into three parts as follows :

(1) For centrally administered schemes and research, twenty-three and a half million pounds.
(2) Money for immediate distribution to individual Colonial Governments, eighty-five and a half million pounds.
(3) A general reserve of eleven million pounds.

The purpose of this division was as follows. The reserve fund was for unforeseen contingencies ; the schemes to be centrally administered—that is, under the general control of the Colonial Office—were those which would be of benefit to the Colonial territories as a whole, and, therefore, could not be carried out by any individual Colonial Government or group of such Governments. Finally, the large amount of eighty-five and a half million pounds was so earmarked in order that individual Colonial Governments might be able to know in good time exactly what sums they were to receive. This would clearly be of the greatest help to them in preparing

truly comprehensive plans for economic development and general welfare.

Finally, let us look at the allocation of these eighty-five and a half million pounds as between the different Colonial territories of the Commonwealth. Almost two-thirds of the whole (fifty-five millions, to be precise) were allocated to the African territories, fifteen and a half millions to the West Indies, seven and a half millions to the Far East (principally, of course, Malaya), and the same amount to the rest of the Colonies and Dependencies combined. Within this broad allocation were sums allotted to certain territories as groups for schemes designed to benefit them as groups and not individuals. East and West Africa and the West Indies all received these 'group' allocations. Of course, individual territories inside these groupings are eligible for funds for schemes particular to themselves. In the West Indies allocation of this 'general' fund rests with the Comptroller for Development and Welfare.

The principles on which comprehensive ten-year plans were to be devised were laid down by the Colonial Office in 1945. The main guiding principle of economic development as the sure foundation of social and political progress was reaffirmed, and the Colonial Governments were urged to supplement the funds allotted to them to the utmost of their powers by making contributions from their own Colonial revenues and by raising loans.

It is interesting to notice how this has worked out in practice. Speaking in the House of Lords in November 1947, Viscount Hall said that up to that date the first sixteen schemes approved represented a total ultimate expenditure of a hundred and seventy-five million pounds made up as follows: grants from the Colonial Welfare Act, fifty-five millions; money from Colonial revenue and revenue surpluses as supplements to the above grants, sixty-eight million pounds; and, lastly, borrowings by the Colonies on the strength of the Welfare Act Grants and the Colonial surpluses, over fifty million pounds. Thus the actual grants from the Colonial Welfare

Act amount to rather less than one-third of the total capital to be devoted to the schemes in question. We shall see shortly some details of a proposed ten-year development plan for Nigeria, and it is interesting to notice how this will be financed. The estimated total cost will be fifty-five million pounds, of which twenty-three millions will come from the Colonial Welfare Fund, while all the rest will be found from the Colony's own revenues or from loans raised by it.

Since agriculture is far and away the most important element in the economic systems of nearly all the Colonies and Dependencies, the principal objectives of the schemes devised under the Development and Welfare Act must be the improvement of agriculture and animal husbandry. Included in these general objectives are communications of all sorts for the easier and cheaper supply of fertilizers, machinery, and so on, and for the marketing and distribution of crops, and various advisory services to native farmers and peasant producers. Nigeria gives a very good example of the comprehensive development of communications which is going on, in varying measures, throughout the Colonial territories. In the Colony there will be ultimately a network of trunk roads, consisting of two roads running north and south and four running east and west. They will be linked up by secondary and feeder roads, and these again will be supplemented by the development of waterways. Telecommunications also are to be improved and expanded, and it is easy to see what such developments as these will mean to the economic life of Nigeria, the most populous of all the Colonies of the Commonwealth. Again, in the West Indies, of all the schemes for development which had been approved up to the end of 1946, those concerned with the improvement of communications and transport accounted for more than the expenditure incurred on all the other schemes combined. Naturally, some Colonies have major problems peculiar to themselves. Thus Kenya and Tanganyika, in East Africa, are deeply concerned with measures to check the ruinous soil erosion, which is laying waste large tracts which should be valuable agricultural land.

It will be seen that the policy laid down in the 1945 Act is comprehensive and ambitious, but there is nothing merely theoretical in it. On the contrary, all the practical implications of the schemes approved have first been carefully examined, such matters, for example, as the actual supplies of materials and labour available, and, in particular, of skilled supervision. The duty of advising the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the sanctioning of schemes and on questions of general economic and financial policy has been entrusted to a Colonial Economic and Development Council, which was set up in 1946. In all its business the Council has constantly in view the paramount need to keep economic development and the provision of more and better social services in balanced relations with each other. Only by a real and steady development of the economic resources—and thereby of the national income—of the Colonies can the improved and expanded educational, medical, housing, and all the other social services which are so urgently needed be given a safe foundation on which they can rest securely and grow continuously.

Perhaps the best way to show how comprehensive the new Colonial economic policy is, and how bold are its plans, is to describe two outstanding schemes for the organization of agriculture in Africa. The first relates to Nigeria and the Cameroons, in West Africa. The Government of Nigeria has purchased the plantations in the former German colony of the Cameroons, which became a British Mandate after the 1914–18 war, and has set up a public corporation to take them over and develop them for the welfare of the people of the Cameroons. The intention is that these people themselves will take a progressively increasing part in the management of this Nigerian Cameroons Corporation as time goes on. It will thus provide an alternative to the far less efficient small-scale peasant farming on the one hand, and to plantation development by outside capital on the other. The second of these two schemes relates to East and Central Africa.

As is well known, vegetable-oils are now an important

element in our food supplies, and ground-nuts are now a valuable source of supply of these oils. In 1946 His Majesty's Government sent a Mission to East and Central Africa to examine the possibilities of the mass-production of ground-nuts in those territories. The report being favourable, it was decided to cultivate ground-nuts on three and a half million acres in Kenya, Tanganyika, and Northern Rhodesia, using the most modern techniques of mechanical cultivation. Not only that, but the management of the vast enterprise has been entrusted to a Corporation owned and financed by His Majesty's Government in London. A Bill for this purpose was introduced into Parliament in November 1947 and passed into law in 1948. By this Act a "Colonial Development Corporation" and an "Overseas Food Corporation" were set up; the former responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the latter to the Minister of Food. The Secretary of State for the Colonies appoints the members of the Colonial Development Corporation, and the Minister of Food appoints those of his Overseas Food Corporation. Each of these two Ministers also has power to borrow money up to a total of a hundred million pounds, plus a further temporary borrowing of ten millions, for the Colonial Development Corporation, and up to fifty million pounds, plus a further temporary borrowing of five millions, for the Overseas Food Corporation. It is this latter Corporation which has charge of the ground-nuts scheme. But the Overseas Food Corporation need not confine its activities to the Colonial territories of the Commonwealth, or even to the Commonwealth itself. The Act lays down that the duties of the Corporation are to investigate, formulate, and carry out projects for producing and processing foodstuffs and other agricultural products in places outside the United Kingdom. Thus the Food Corporation may enter into arrangements with foreign concerns and Governments, as well as with Colonial and Dominion Governments inside the Commonwealth. Indeed, the Corporation entered immediately into negotiations with the Australian Government for increasing the supply of Australian foodstuffs to this country—to be

paid for in British goods—supplied both to Australia itself and to the Australian Colonial and mandated territories in New Guinea.

The objectives of the Colonial Development Corporation are wider than those of the Overseas Food Corporation. They are "to develop the resources and trade of, and to expand the production of, foodstuffs and raw materials in Colonial territories." The Corporation may pursue these objects either directly, by carrying on itself all the necessary activities, from the preparation of virgin soil to the processing and marketing of products, or indirectly, through the agency of other bodies or individuals. In this latter event the Corporation will decide whether these agents shall work entirely or partly under its control, or whether they shall work independently. Further, the Corporation may carry out schemes in partnership with other individuals or bodies, including Colonial Governments. The scope of the Corporation's activities is as wide as the economic resources of the Colonial territories. It may develop not only agricultural produce but coal and other minerals, and it may undertake the processing of produce. From mining in Northern Rhodesia to rice-growing in Borneo and the canning of Indian Ocean fish, nothing is necessarily outside its scope.

At first sight it might seem as though there must inevitably be some clash of authority between the Colonial and Food Ministries, since each has the Colonies in its sphere of activities, and each is concerned with the development of Colonial agriculture. But such a clash should be avoided by the condition laid down in the Act that the Overseas Food Corporation will not operate in any Colonial territory except at the express invitation of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The main reason why the Food Corporation had to be formed is that it can operate outside Colonial territories in countries in which it would be either impossible or inappropriate for the Colonial Office to operate. The negotiations with the Australian Government, mentioned earlier in this chapter, are a good illustration of this point.

Thus we see how in these two Corporations a new principle of organization in Colonial economic development has been introduced. In the past, development of the natural resources of the Colonies has been by the old traditional method of investment by private enterprise seeking, as, of course, was justifiable and necessary, profit for the capital invested. Tin and rubber in Malaya and copper in Rhodesia, to give only one or two outstanding examples, illustrate the great part played by private enterprise in Colonial development. But, for various reasons which will be apparent from what has been already said, this old method is no longer fully adequate to the tasks involved. The vast scope of the developmental work to be done, its urgency, and, consequently, the speed at which it must be accomplished, and the long wait in many cases for return son investments, all call for resources additional to those available from private investment. It must be supplemented by Government—that is, public—action, and so in its Colonial territories the Government of this country is using the characteristic British institution of the Public Corporation, of which familiar examples in Great Britain are the B.B.C. and the British Electricity Authority. In its structure and organization the British type of Public Corporation is like any great private enterprise with the difference that its capital is owned by the public, is used for the benefit of the public, and may not be a source of private profit. These are the new institutions and the new principles which have now been introduced into Colonial development.

Finally, the urgency of the need for the large-scale operations now being undertaken by our Colonial development policy can be appreciated from the following extract from a dispatch of the Governor of Kenya Colony, who wrote:

> Primary production by African peasants is already on the decline. Populations working under that system are going to find it increasingly difficult in supporting themselves at their present level. There have accordingly to be found measures to enable the African cultivator in appropriate cases to break away from his economically weak and primitive form of cultivation. Where this

cannot be achieved, no amount of benevolent assistance for social services can avail to improve the lot of the people.

It is to enable such a decisive breakaway from old conditions to be made that the economic policy we have been examining has been devised.

It has been repeated more than once in this discussion of Colonial economic policy that economic development is the absolutely necessary and only certain foundation for the vast expansion of social welfare services of which all Colonial peoples stand in such dire need. Economic development and Education and Public Health are no more than different aspects of one and the same problem, and both education and Public Health include a number of component elements such as the provision of teachers—from the primary to the university stage—buildings, technical equipment, libraries, and so on for education, houses, water-supplies, sanitation, open spaces, hospitals, dispensaries, trained personnel, and the like for Public Health.

In education, although there is, of course, an immense amount to be done, much has been already accomplished and more is in the stage of active preparation. In the past the two great obstacles to the spread of mass education have been finance and staff. We have seen how the financial problem is being tackled, and we may look for a moment at the problem of staffing Colonial schools. Individual Colonies are drawing up plans for tackling the shortage of qualified teachers, and large numbers of training establishments are being or will be established in the future. Universal primary education, however, is not a possibility for the near future, because, even with assistance from the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, the financial burden involved will still be too heavy for Colonial revenues. In some Colonial territories there are, it is true, systems of wholly or partially compulsory education. Thus there is compulsory education in Bermuda and certain other West Indian Colonies, and in Malta and Gibraltar about 80 per cent. of the children of primary education age

are attending school. In Mauritius, too, there is compulsory education wherever facilities exist and conditions are suitable.

The experience of Tanganyika illustrates what progress is being made in some Colonial areas. In the African Colonies there are many so-called 'bush' schools, often started by isolated individuals in response to popular demand. Of course, many of these schools are woefully inadequate in buildings and equipment, and their teachers are ill trained or altogether untrained. Nevertheless, they do impart the rudiments of education. In Tanganyika, in addition to the bush schools, there is a plan to build a hundred and fifty primary schools, and as a result the enrolment of children will be raised from a hundred thousand to a quarter of a million—that is, in addition to the children attending the bush schools.

The problem of mass education is now being vigorously tackled, and this is a problem not only of curing illiteracy, but of removing ignorance in all its forms. It aims at making the citizen and the villager aware of the problems of his own daily life, and what he as well as the Government can do to solve them. Unofficial as well as official agencies are at work in this field, and in some Colonies students of the primary, secondary, and university college institutions voluntarily undertake to educate their more ignorant brethren. Women's education, too, is now very much in the mind of the authorities, for the truth is realized of the saying of a famous African educationist, Dr Aggrey, that if you train a man you train an individual, but if you train a woman you train a family. During the Second World War a Committee was appointed to study the problem of mass education in African society, and its report has already led to the appointment of mass-education officers in certain Colonies. Wherever conditions are suitable in the Colonies, secondary, technical, and university college education is being provided and the training of teachers goes on apace. For general education the Secretary of State for the Colonies has the assistance of an Advisory Committee on Education, and for higher education he can rely on the help of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the

Colonies—a body created by the universities in this country—and a Colonial University Grants Committee, which advises him on matters relating to the expenditure of funds provided by this country for the development of Higher Education in the Colonies. The development of university education in the Colonies is being undertaken through the creation of colleges providing tuition for London University degrees. Ultimately, it is planned that such colleges will become full universities granting their own degrees. But with all this, only the surface of the problem has so far been touched. It will be many years before any Governments in these areas will have the right to feel complacent about what has been accomplished.

In medicine preventive as well as curative services are in preparation, and the all-important subjects of maternity and child welfare services are receiving attention. Maternity and child welfare clinics are being multiplied in rural as well as in urban districts, and diseases peculiar to, or especially dangerous in, particular areas—hookworm, leprosy, yellow fever, sleeping sickness, malaria, and so on—are being vigorously tackled. As in education, much attention and important resources are being devoted to the training of skilled personnel. Nutrition, too, a subject which is being given increasing attention the world over, has come well into the foreground of Colonial Welfare policy, and the agricultural developments at which we have glanced have an obvious bearing on this literally vital subject. Special nutrition services have already been set up in many places, and others will be as soon as trained personnel are available. The moral welfare of Colonial peoples also is being cared for. Juvenile delinquency, adult crime, and all other forms of moral obliquity are now subjects of remedial measures, and here education and the many housing and town-planning schemes, which are either under way or in contemplation, have an obvious and important part to play. Closely allied to these and nutritional and general welfare problems are the notable developments in labour organization and conditions in all the Colonial territories of the Commonwealth.

In the years just before the Second World War a good deal of attention had been given to labour conditions in the Colonies. The Colonial Office had an expert adviser on the subject, who studied his problems on the spot. The separate Colonial Governments also had advisers in matters relating to labour, or else special Government Departments to supervise labour conditions. The result of all this special attention was a stream of laws devoted to improving the welfare of the worker. The immense increase in the number of workers and occupations during the War called for a strengthening of advisory and supervisory machinery in this field, resulting in the gaining of much valuable experience. An inevitable consequence of War-time developments was a vast increase in the scope and difficulty of Colonial labour problems, with the resultant demand for a strengthening of the machinery devoted to their solution.

In 1933 only Ceylon and Malta had separate Labour Departments. Ten years later no fewer than thirty territories had either Labour Departments or organizations performing services similar to theirs. In 1937 there were thirty executive officers in Colonial Labour Departments or Inspectorates. In 1943 there were a hundred and fifty, and by 1945 all but two Colonial territories had Labour Departments, with a total staff of over two hundred. Indeed, in many territories Labour Boards or Committees had been set up with representatives of employers and workmen on them and with an independent chairman. Officers from the United Kingdom Ministry of Labour were lent for work in the Colonies, and an especially important development was the appointment of experienced trades unionists from this country to Colonial Labour Departments.

In the Colonial Office itself there was an important change in 1941, when its purely official Standing Labour Committee was replaced by a Labour Advisory Committee, which included representatives of the Trades Union Congress and the British Employers' Federation. This new Committee advises the Secretary of State on any labour questions which

he may refer to it. Another development of some significance is found in a provision of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. According to this the Secretary of State when making a grant to a Colony must be satisfied that the law of a Colony gives reasonable facilities to its local labour to form trades unions, and that fair conditions of labour will be observed on the work carried out by means of the grant. There are, of course, many difficulties in the way of establishing real trades unions in the Colonies, but at least a beginning has been made.

Finally, in this long story of the transformation of Colonial economic and welfare policy, a few words about research are needed. Research into all the problems involved—economic, educational, medical, social, and industrial—is the essential preliminary to improvement. There is an impressive list of official bodies whose duties are to foster and guide research in all these fields, and their work is supplemented by the research initiated and financed by individual industries which have established such research activities as those carried on by the British Rubber Producers' Research Association and the Tin Research Institute. Geological research, which deals with matters of such fundamental importance as mineral resources, water-supplies, and so on, is being organized for each Colony with the help of a Geological Adviser to the Secretary of State. At present we have only an inadequate knowledge of the vast mineral resources of the Commonwealth, which are literally one of the rocks on which the whole economic structure rests.

We have seen that South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand also have colonial territories of their own, while South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Australia, and New Zealand all have native populations within their borders who, indeed, outnumber the white citizens in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. We might, therefore, glance briefly at their Colonial policies. In the colonial territories of the United Kingdom the broad principle is now accepted that the native peoples should have equal opportunities for political, social,

and economic development with any immigrant settlers whether European or Indian. We have seen something of the way inwhich this principle is being worked out in practice. New Zealand's Colonial policy is based broadly on the same lines as those of the Mother Country, and the Maori population are treated on terms of perfect equality in all things by their British fellow-countrymen. In Australia, however, somewhat different views are held. The Australian blackfellows, a tiny and dwindling proportion of the population, are far too primitive to be treated as equals by the white Australians. Such treatment, in fact, would only lead to their more rapid extinction. But the "White Australia" policy, which excludes colonial immigrants from Australia itself, may make it difficult for many Australians to see eye to eye with the Mother Country with regard to this basic principle of full equality of all citizens, white and coloured alike, in her Colonial possessions.

South Africa's policy is generally opposed to the principle of full equality of all citizens, since she aims at the maintenance of European culture and the preservation of European supremacy. In pursuit of this aim South African Governments have established separate legislative institutions for Africans. A few Europeans represent some of the Cape Natives in the two Houses of the Union Parliament, but the real native representation is found in the Natives Representative Council, which has a majority of elected native representatives. This Council has some very useful powers. For example, if any Bill before the Union Parliament deals with matters concerning the interests of the natives it must be submitted to the Native Council for consideration before Parliament can proceed with it. But the Council has only advisory powers which the Union Parliament may ignore. Side by side with this political body there is the South African Native Trust, a corporate body set up to deal with the allocation of land reserved for natives. Additional land has been reserved for natives in recent years, and a sum of ten million pounds has been made available to the Trust to purchase the additional

land. Irrigation and land reclamation schemes are also carried out by the Trust.

In Southern Rhodesia, with the big industrial developments to be described in Chapter XI facing the country, it is hardly possible that there should be such extensive prohibition of competition between white and native labour as there is in the Union. It is likely, indeed, that Southern Rhodesian native policy will approximate more closely to that of the neighbouring Colonies.

The social, educational, and other welfare schemes which we have been considering in the above paragraphs all depend for their realization in the last analysis on the fruition of the schemes for economic development. How are these faring and what are their chances of success? The East Africa groundnut scheme has already encountered serious drawbacks in the matter of scarcity of appliances, materials, communications, and so forth, and has fallen behind its schedule. These drawbacks, however, should be temporary, for they can be overcome. But in the summer of 1948 Parliament's Select Committee on Estimates, the body which reviews the expenditure of moneys voted by Parliament, published its report on Colonial Development. In this report the Committee makes a number of general criticisms of the operation of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945. The Act is described as a great declaration of imperial responsibility, but the report declares that if the Act is to be something better than a mere gesture more is needed than the mere allocation of money.

> If the millions of the Colonial Empire are to be lifted within a reasonable time out of their present backward condition, they must be roused to realize their potentialities and to help themselves. Great expectations have been roused. It is imperative that they should be fulfilled within reasonable time.

So says the report, which also states that money should be backed by men and materials and that the Colonial peoples should be taken into partnership in achieving a goal common to them and to the British people.

The report deals specifically with Nigeria, the biggest of the Colonies, with a population of twenty-five millions. The ten-year plan for Nigeria contemplates an expenditure of £55 million, but the Committee complain that there is no real co-ordinated plan for the spending of this sum, but merely an aggregate of proposals for spending it. The fewness of Government officials in all departments, administrative, social, and technical, is stressed—only 2000 all told. There were two qualified agricultural officers for every million inhabitants, of whom 95 per cent. gained their living from the land. Doctors, teachers, and others were all too few. Communications were completely inadequate.

The Committee make various suggestions for dealing with the situation. The co-operation of the Colonial peoples themselves must be enlisted, a budget of skilled man-power should be drawn up, and technical education provided to meet needs. More Africans should be encouraged to come to the United Kingdom to study modern business methods. In short, the Committee press for the development of a thoroughgoing planned strategy of attack on the many problems involved, and strongly urges the Government to arrange for specific allotments of the equipment and materials required to carry out the colonial development policy. The report, in fact, is a clear exposition of the difficulties which face the British Government's colonial economic policy, and a warning against undue optimism in the matter of quick and spectacular results.

CHAPTER IX

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COLONIES

In Chapter IV we saw something of the system of government in the Colonies. But this was no more than a glance at the machinery of government. It gave us only very little information about the forces which move the governmental machinery in these different countries, about the relations which exist between the ordinary man and the persons and the systems by or under which the administration of his public affairs—which affect his private life in increasing measure—is carried on, or, finally, about actual political conditions and activities in the Colonies. Here we shall see something of these things.

It has already become obvious that in the vast and varied dependent or colonial areas of the Commonwealth there are many degrees of political status. Since the end of the Second World War one Crown Colony—Ceylon—has joined the ranks of the self-governing Dominions, while between the system of representative government in the West Indies and the administration of the Solomon Islands Protectorate by an Administrator assisted by a nominated Advisory Council there are varying degrees of autonomy and dependence. But, as we saw in the opening chapter, none of these systems of government are fixed and permanent. They can and do change with changing conditions in the countries concerned. It is this fact which gives such interest and importance to the study of Colonial government in the Commonwealth ; this fact, also, makes any adequate account of such government so difficult. Moreover, the Second World War, in vastly greater measure than the war of 1914–18, has brought about conditions which must inevitably speed up the political development of the Colonial and other dependent countries

of the Commonwealth. In some of them, notably Malta, Malaya, and the Pacific dependencies, the war has been fought on their soil or in their skies. From others great numbers of men and women have been embodied in the fighting and other services which carried on the war. Tens of thousands of them went overseas, with all that that means in the way of new knowledge and, above all, new ideas of the relations between peoples and the birth of new political, social, and economic ideals for themselves. Everywhere economic development has been speeded up, new methods, new machinery, new systems of administration have been introduced. Colonial peoples have had more money to spend, and they have acquired new wants and new tastes. All these things are formidable solvents of old conditions and powerful incentives to still further change. In fact, there is a widespread demand from the leaders of Colonial peoples for practical proof of our intention to devolve responsibility on them for their own government, and the forces of nationalism and freedom are at work in the Colonies as elsewhere in the world.

The Colonial Office, which, for our present purpose, means the Government of the United Kingdom, has not been slow in adapting its policy and organization to these new conditions. It has acknowledged its duty to express in its policy and administration the liberal spirit and the imaginative understanding which the new conditions demand. The broad goal of Colonial political development was stated in Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in July 1942. "We are pledged," he said, "to guide Colonial people along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire." Obviously this statement implies planned and continuous devolution of responsibility to the peoples and Governments of the Colonies. This was confirmed and expanded in a speech in Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in July 1947, when he said that we should have to adjust ourselves to a much quicker tempo of constitutional development than would have seemed practicable a few years ago. He further stated the need for bold experiment and

the training of Colonial peoples in the handling of political power by practical experience. Very much the same sort of statement was made in the House of Commons in 1917 about India. The Colonial Office has, further, proclaimed its intention of adapting its technique of administration and its relations with the Colonies to the ideas of freedom and responsibility which are now the driving-force in so many of the overseas territories with which it is concerned. The immense range of problems and practical difficulties involved in all this may be best seen in the following extract from an official publication of 1947 on the Colonial Empire. The Colonial Office now has to deal:

> . . . with the growth of political responsibility, the development of economic resources, the raising of social standards and the defence and strategic requirements of a large number of territories spread over the globe. To fulfil these functions it has to deal with the appointment, training and maintenance of administrative and technical staffs, with currency, trade and economic arrangements, with credit and taxation and with land settlement and co-operation. Its special tasks include encouraging production and development, advising on social policy and services, conducting research into agriculture, fisheries, medicine and a great range of other matters, looking after the welfare of Colonials in this country and providing a number of technical services such as geological and topographical surveys.

These comprehensive policies have involved changes and expansion in the Colonial Office and in the administrative and technical services in the Colonies. At present, it is true, the main initiative and responsibility for the supply of officials and technicians of all kinds rest with the Colonial Office, but this does not mean that the Colonial Office intends to control from London this vital element in Colonial development. On the contrary, it is a fundamental principle of its policy not to impose its own will, but to persuade Colonial Governments and peoples to build up their own institutions. Moreover, the Colonies themselves are demanding more and more help from the Colonial Office in the provision of advice

and service of all kinds, as they become increasingly conscious of their own needs. In the meantime the Colonial Office is supplying to the Colonial services some thousands of men and women who represent a comprehensive cross-section of our own population. A special word is called for here concerning the personnel of the Colonial Administrative Service, which is the Civil Service, properly so called, in each Colony. No more than half have been recruited from British universities. Practically all the others have been drawn from local government, business, industry, finance, and so on. These are the men who will be charged with translating into action on the spot in the overseas territories the policies evolved in London and sanctioned by Parliament. The importance of the fact that they go out to their new tasks with experience and ideas acquired in active participation in the full stream of British public and economic life is thus clear enough.

Reference has already been made to the difficulty of presenting an adequate picture of constitutional development in a large number of very diverse and continually evolving political systems. The Colonial Office deals with over fifty Colonies and Dependencies, and the first thought that occurs to the student as he considers this fact is whether or not there is any possibility of reducing this large number of separate administrations by amalgamation. Such regions as the West Indies and East and West Africa, for example, seem at first sight to offer obvious possibilities for further union, such, for example, as we have seen in the case of Malaya. Naturally this aspect of Colonial government has not escaped the notice of the Colonial Office, and the possibilities of closer union in all the above-mentioned territories, as well as in Malaya, have engaged its attention for many years. Unfortunately, in every case the problem of closer union bristles with difficulties—geographical, administrative, racial, and social. Communications, for example, must always be a major factor in the problem, since in these tropical and sub-tropical regions, with their great distances and scanty road, rail, and air services, geography often disposes of what politics would propose.

Communications present a specially formidable problem in the West Indies, for these are all sea communications, and the Leeward and Windward Islands, in the Lesser Antilles, and Trinidad, off the coast of Venezuela, are a thousand miles away from either Jamaica or the Bahamas, while six hundred miles of water lie between Nassau, the capital of the Bahamas, and Kingston, the capital of Jamaica. The extreme dispersal of the British West Indies and their population can be judged from the fact that, although they are spread out over hundreds of thousands of square miles of ocean, their total area is only twelve thousand square miles—roughly twice the size of Yorkshire—and their three million inhabitants live in scores of islands and on the mainland of America. Moreover, Jamaica alone has almost half of the total population within her borders, and more than a third of the twelve thousand square miles.

Thus the practical difficulty of uniting or federating such a collection of fragmentary units into one whole leaps to the mind at once. Nevertheless, as the result of repeated examinations of the problem of closer West Indian union by successive Committees or Commissions, particularly by the West India Royal Commission of 1939, it has been decided to try to unite the two neighbouring groups of the Leeward and Windward Islands.

Following on the Commission's report, a conference of delegates from the Island Legislatures met in St Kitts at the beginning of 1947 and recommended that the Leeward and Windward Islands should be federated under a strong central Government. But since the end of the Second World War a wider issue than the federation of the Leeward and Windward Islands has been raised. This is the question of some form of regional grouping of the British West Indian Territories, in the Caribbean Sea, and on the neighbouring mainland—namely, Barbados, Jamaica, the Leeward and Windward Islands, Trinidad, British Guiana, and British Honduras. In 1947 a conference was held at Montego Bay, in Jamaica, to discuss federation. The Secretary of State for the Colonies,

Mr Creech Jones, was present, and there were representatives of the Legislatures of Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, the Leewards and the Windwards, British Guiana, in South America, and British Honduras, in Central America. The case for West Indian federation is based on two grounds. The first is that the separate Colonies cannot support the services and the kind of Government necessary in these days to ensure the material welfare of their peoples according to modern standards, and, secondly, that fuller political freedom—and Dominion Status is now the goal of the Colonies—cannot possibly be realized in some of the tiny units of the West Indies. Yet the tempo of political freedom has quickened in the West Indian Colonies of late years. Let us recall what was said in Chapter III. Jamaica and Trinidad now have universal adult suffrage, and Jamaica has a fully elected House of Representatives and the beginnings of a regular ministerial system of government, while in British Guiana, Barbados, and Trinidad recent changes have increased the influence of the elected members of the Councils as against that of the officials. As a result of the Montego Bay Conference, a standing committee, representing all the Legislatures, with headquarters at Barbados, was set up to study the question of federation, as well as that of a Customs Union and the unifying of the various currencies.

In certain other ways, too, it has been found possible to give expression to interests common to all the British West Indies. Thus a Comptroller for Development and Welfare of the West Indies jointly has been appointed. He is in charge of a special organization, assisted by expert advisers, to advise on proposals for assistance to the West Indies under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. He does not himself carry out schemes financed under the Act. This is for the Governments concerned to do. Nevertheless, he is a central and common point for all the islands in the matters which come within his purview. In the all-important matter of education, the West Indian University College, which has been established at Kingston, Jamaica, brings students from

the whole region together in one institution. Thus common institutions and points of contact are being established in the West Indies wherever these are possible, and active examination is going on into ways of still further extending the process.

In Africa, too, East, West, and Central, there has been much progress in inter-territorial organization for purposes of common concern and welfare. The justification for closer union is found in the fact that they have common interests in such things as communications, trade, prevention of disease, land and agricultural problems, and so on, which cannot be satisfactorily handled in the somewhat artificial units of the individual Colonies.

As far back as 1906 conferences of the Governors of the East African Colonies and Dependencies were first held to discuss matters of common concern, and ways and means of co-operation.

As the result of a Commission to East Africa in 1924, these Conferences were given a regular status. The Commission recommended the holding of conferences between the Governors of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, and also between the heads of Government departments in those territories. Later, in 1927, a movement was started for the closer union of these territories, one of its aims being the creation of a central executive authority for all three. A joint Select Committee of Parliament, reporting in 1931 on the proposals for closer union, rejected that for a central executive, but reaffirmed the value of regular conferences between the Governors of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, with extraordinary conferences from time to time which should include the Governors of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Zanzibar. A regular secretariat for the conferences was advocated, and, as a result, the annual Conference came into being. A permanent secretariat was provided to give continuity to its proceedings, to keep the members of the Conference in touch with developments between the meetings, to prepare the agenda, and generally to act as an executive body for such matters as are entrusted to it.

During the Second World War the need for consultation and co-operation between the Governments of these territories became especially urgent, and the Conference remained in permanent session. Since 1940 the Governor of Kenya has been permanent Chairman of the Conference, vested with certain powers over all the territories included within the Conference. Special Committees and Councils were set up in East Africa to co-ordinate the War effort. These bodies were concerned with industry, production and supply, manpower, and so on, and, naturally, most of them were purely war-time institutions. The East Africa Industrial Council, however, as its name suggests, became charged with the handling of problems of other than merely war-time importance.

But this arrangement has been found to be no longer adequate for post-War conditions in East Africa, and the Colonial Office, as the agent of His Majesty's Government, has decided to develop and strengthen the inter-territorial organization of the East African Colonies and Dependencies. Various reasons have led to this decision. In the first place, the Governor's Conference was created by a purely administrative direction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and did not arise in response to any demand from the legislatures or public opinion inside the territories concerned. It has, in fact, no place in the constitutions of those territories. Its proceedings are not public, and the Governors in Conference as a rule discuss and act on material which is available only to the Governments and not to the public. Further, each of the East African territories has its Executive and Legislative Councils, who cannot be consulted before decisions are taken by the Conference, and have, therefore, normally to accept a *fait accompli* in matters of public importance in which there has been no opportunity of public discussion. Next, when the Governors have agreed on any particular subject at their Conference the agreement is implemented by the submission of an Ordinance to the Legislature of each of the Colonies concerned. Clearly, if any Legislature wishes to amend the Ordinance in any particular, the unanimity of agreement at the

Governors' Conference is broken. Yet, unless Legislatures are able to suggest and make amendments their powers are impaired, and their debates become more or less unreal. We have noted the rising strength of constitutional and democratic forces in the Colonies, and it is clear that the Governors' Conference is no longer in tune with them.

The inter-territorial organization in East Africa is, in future, to have a regular constitutional framework to enable it to administer efficiently certain services and Government departments operating on an inter-territorial basis. This constitutional framework will be composed of (*a*) an East African High Commission, consisting of the officers for the time being administering the Governments of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, (*b*) an East African Central Assembly, and (*c*) an executive organization supported, where these are suitable, by advisory and consultative bodies on an inter-territorial basis. The High Commission will administer the services and departments referred to above, just as a Colonial Government administers the services of its own Colony, and it will also appoint staff to them. It will legislate for the whole of East Africa, either with the advice and consent of the three Legislatures, or, as regards the specified subjects and services, with the advice and consent of the Central Assembly. The Central Assembly will consist of twenty-three members under the Chairmanship of a Speaker appointed by the High Commission, the members to be appointed as follows: seven official members appointed *ex officio* from the staff of the High Commission Services; five members each appointed from Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika; one member of the Arab Community appointed by the High Commission.

The five members from each of the three territories above named would be appointed as follows: one official by the Governor; one person elected from among their own number by the non-official members of the Legislative Council; one European, one African, and one Indian, chosen by the Governor of the Colony from the non-official members of those three communities. In Kenya, where European and Indian

non-official members of the Legislative Council are elected, the representatives of these two communities on the Central Assembly can be elected by these elected members of the Council. Finally, the following new advisory and consultative bodies are to be appointed: (*a*) an East African Revenue Advisory Board; (*b*) an East African Posts and Telegraphs Advisory Board; (*c*) an East African Transport Advisory Council.

Thus it will be seen that this notable improvement in the scope and efficiency of inter-territorial consultation and co-operation in East Africa is accompanied by the introduction into the system of the principles of representation and election of the Colonial peoples concerned. Admittedly the immediate measure of the introduction of these principles is not very great, but, it must be remembered, representation and election are principles, not mere administrative devices, and therefore have the power within themselves to grow and flourish in congenial conditions. We know from our own experience how strongly these principles can develop, and what a vast harvest they can produce.

In West Africa there has not been the same degree of development as in East Africa. Nevertheless, a Conference of the four Governors of Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia was set up just before the outbreak of the Second World War, in 1939, and a central secretariat was established for it two years later. Further, in 1942 a new post of resident Cabinet Minister in West Africa was created as a war-time measure, following the precedent of the Minister of State for the Middle East in 1941, whose area included Palestine, Transjordania, British Somaliland, Cyprus, and Aden. This, also, was a war-time measure. But the West African Governors' Conference is a permanent institution for regional consultation and co-operation. In Central Africa, again, the beginnings of regional co-operation are seen in the setting up of a Central African Council for North and South Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Like the other African Conferences it has a permanent secretariat charged with duties similar to the other two, and

its duties, as stated officially, are "to promote the closest contact and co-operation between the three Governments and their administrative and technical services."

Whether this limited co-operation will lead to some form of closer political grouping remains to be seen. A section of non-official European opinion in the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland favours a federation of the three territories, while there are some who would even like to see them amalgamated. African opinion, however, is hostile to any such developments. Native policy in Southern Rhodesia, while not as restrictive as in the Union of South Africa, is still not as liberal as in Northern Rhodesia. Africans in the latter and in Nyasaland naturally fear that if there were any form of political union between the three territories Southern Rhodesian ideas on native policy might prevail. Largely because of African opposition, a Royal Commission in the 1930's rejected the idea of a union of the two Rhodesias.

But, indeed, there are some great obstacles in the way of closer union here. As we have seen, Southern Rhodesia is on the threshold of Dominion Status, and in the summer of 1948 its Parliament requested that a Select Committee might be set up to examine the steps and procedure necessary to give the Colony full Dominion Status. Both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the other hand, are Protectorates. Southern Rhodesia has about 100,000 Europeans and roughly one and three-quarter million Africans. Northern Rhodesia has 22,000 Europeans and something over one and a half million Africans, while Nyasaland has only 2500 Europeans and two and a quarter million Africans. It is obvious from these figures that one uniform native policy for the three territories would not easily be found.

This question of the political future of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland came up for formal discussion in 1948. In August a delegation of non-official Europeans from Northern Rhodesia arrived to discuss with the Colonial Office the questions of the granting of effective self-government to Northern Rhodesia and the union, either by amalgamation or

by some form of federation, of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. African opinion generally opposes both these proposals until Africans are able to play a much more effective part in the government of their countries than they do at present. Africans are steadily improving their position in Northern Rhodesia. Non-official European feeling towards them appears to be increasingly liberal, and this is a matter of some importance, since non-officials are taking an increasingly important part in the government of the Protectorate. Moreover, in the summer of 1948 Africans were for the first time represented by Africans in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council, two African members having been elected. Clearly, therefore, the question of a union, in whatever shape, between the British territories in Central Africa is one which is not likely to be settled either easily or quickly.

Naturally, the Dominion of South Africa is interested in all developments affecting the other territories of the African Continent, more particularly, of course, the British Colonies and Dependencies in East, West, and Central Africa. The Dominion is the only self-governing country in the whole continent south of Egypt and Abyssinia—if we except Liberia—and is, further, a country of European settlement. For this latter reason it takes great interest in those territories of East and Central Africa—Kenya, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, and the Rhodesias—where there are other settlements of Europeans. Further, there has been some migration from and to South Africa and these other territories, and this, together with general political and economic and trade considerations, has given rise to speculations in certain quarters as to the possibility of setting up in the future some agency for British territories in Africa, including South Africa. Indeed, at the Congress of Field-Marshal Smuts' United Party in 1944 a motion was brought forward recommending that immediate steps be taken to unite all the British territories in Africa, together with the Dominion of South Africa, into one self-governing unit of the Commonwealth. The Field-Marshal, however, dismissed this as a project " for future generations."

The policy for the present, he said, should be "an African community of states working together and helping each other." He looked especially to establishing closer relations with the British countries to the north of the Dominion through increasing trade and general economic contacts.

It must, however, be admitted that this is an enterprise faced with some difficulties. The victory of the South African Nationalist Party in the South African General Election of 1948 gave rise to fears elsewhere in Africa and also in Great Britain that relations between the Union and Great Britain might be less close and cordial than they had recently been. However, the visit of the new Prime Minister, Dr Malan, to London in the spring of 1949, and the important part he played there in the discussions concerning India's future relations with the Commonwealth, did something to calm these fears, which, however, were renewed in the summer of 1949 by the Union Government's legislation on South African nationality. Before that legislation British immigrants were registered as voters after two years' residence in South Africa. The new Bill extended that period to five years, and even then every registration had to be sanctioned by the Minister of the Interior, from whose ruling there is no appeal. Like all Dominion Premiers, Dr Malan is bound to consider the interests of his own country first and foremost, but that is not necessarily the same thing as saying that he wishes to alter the basis of her relationship with Great Britain. The natives of the neighbouring British territories in Africa, however, have reason to believe that the Union's native policy may take a somewhat more restrictive form than in the past, and this fact, together with the new South African Government's undoubtedly strong nationalistic feeling, must impose a certain check on the working out of any such policy as that visualized by Field-Marshal Smuts.

The South African Election was held in May 1948, and almost immediately the Malan Government tightened up the Union's Native Policy in certain regards. Thus it decided that in future natives shall be confined to areas reserved for them alone. They are not to be trained for skilled jobs, and

they are not to be given military training. Africans outside the Union, as well as within its borders, naturally fear that these measures, restrictive as they are, are no more than a first instalment, and that other similar acts are to be expected. It cannot be denied that the effects of these developments on native opinion in all the British territories in Africa are bound to be serious.

In the Southern Pacific a beginning has been made in regional co-operation by the Canberra Agreement, concluded in January 1944, between Australia and New Zealand, for co-operation between the two Dominions in all matters of common interest. This agreement includes a section dealing with the general welfare of the Native peoples of the Pacific territories and discusses measures of collaboration in various important matters of social and economic administration.

Finally, in South-east Asia the same trend towards the carrying out of policy and administration on a regional basis can be observed in the Malayan Union. This has already been described, and all that need be added here is that an important part of this plan is the creation of a common Malayan Union citizenship intended to foster a common loyalty to the Union on the part of all the races—Malays, Indians, Chinese, and others—who have made their homes in it. Moreover, the new office of Governor-General in Malaya includes within its sphere the British territories in Borneo as well as Malaya—namely, North Borneo, Sarawak, and the protected State of Brunei. Thus the co-ordination of the activities of what, before the Second World War, were a number of separate Governments, Administrations, and Sultanates now comes within the duties of one Governor-General.

In Chapter IV, and again in this chapter, we have studied the broad constitutional and administrative systems in the Colonies and Dependencies, and noted the general trend towards unification, grouping, or further inter-territorial co-operation throughout the non-self-governing part of the Commonwealth. But this is not the whole story. In every one of the territories we have studied—except only the West

Indies, whose history begins for all practical purposes with European discovery and settlement—there was some framework of organization, either political, tribal, or of kindred groups, within which the native peoples ordered their relations with each other and carried on their avocations. In very few parts of the Colonial regions of the Commonwealth have these indigenous institutions entirely disappeared. On the contrary, they have been used in varying degrees as active elements in the constitutional and political systems set up under British rule. This was true in Malaya, as we have just seen, where in the Federated Malay States the Sultans carried on under their ancient Malay constitutions, subject to a fairly close control, while in the Unfederated States the Sultans had much more independent authority in their domestic concerns. In the Pacific the Australians have pursued a policy of encouragement of tribal authorities in their territories of Papua, New Guinea, and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands. In the Tonga Islands the old native administration under the chief ruler has been adapted to modern conditions, but both the ruler's council and the civil administration have a majority of Tongan natives.

But it is in Africa that the system of administering through native institutions—indirect government, it is called—has been carried farthest. Here it is, for the most part, the special kind of indirect rule first worked out by Lord Lugard in Northern Nigeria. It has embodied three main principles—namely, the devolution of a measure of real authority on the leading native ruler of the area concerned, the maintenance of native courts with judicial powers in a defined sphere, and, lastly, a native treasury which collects and controls certain revenues. This system has been applied with varying degrees of success and against varying degrees of difficulty in all the West African territories, and, also, in Tanganyika in East Africa. The basic reason for the inclusion of the institutions of indirect rule in the system of government in these Colonies is to protect the natives as far as possible against the impact of the West on their age-old tribal organization and way of

life. We can understand something of the disruptive power of the impact of western civilization on the ways of life and the institutions of primitive peoples if we think of the Roman conquest of Britain. It is true that the Romans had a much more effective military organization than any that the Celtic tribes could put into the field against them. It is true, also, that their political institutions and their technical skill in many directions were far more advanced than those of the peoples of the Celtic kingdoms into which Britain was then divided. But between Romans and Britons there was not that immense gap between the scientific and technical knowledge and powers of the two sides as that which stretched between British and Africans when the two first met. The Britons in the town were ' Romanized ' to the extent of dressing in the Roman fashion, probably even speaking some Latin, and adopting many of the customs and practices as well as some of the national embellishments of Roman life. There was much less of this superficial Romanization in the countryside and over great areas of Britain; life must have gone on much as it always had done. This would have been impossible had the Romans possessed our present-day science and technique with the systems of communications, from metalled roads to wireless telegraphy, the ability to control continuously every material and many of the non-material activities of human life, and, generally, the irresistible, ubiquitous power which science has put into the hands of the Governments of civilized peoples the whole world over. But we have all these powers and refinements of modern science and technique, and, accordingly, the impact of the West on primitive peoples is revolutionary. They have been brought by us suddenly into the main stream of the world's life, and, inevitably, not only have their social, political, and economic institutions been transformed, not only have their ways of living and of governing themselves been changed, but the whole rhythm of their lives has been disturbed. It has been speeded up, set to new patterns, and governed by new forces.

Indirect government is meant to leave to the natives as

much as possible of what is old, familiar, and well tried of their institutions, to let them traverse, as it were, at least some familiar ground on their passage to the new, untried, and, in many ways, fearful life which the West has thrust upon them. Moreover, indirect rule is not just a theory, not something invented by us *ad hoc*. It arose more out of practical needs than out of theory. British administrators are, even now, few in number compared to the areas and the peoples they control, and in the use of native institutions and traditional leaders there was sound administrative policy as well as humanity. In some territories, such as Northern Nigeria and Uganda, we found organized systems of native government under native rulers already in existence, and these we continued with suitable modifications and supervision. But even where such indigenous organizations did not exist, and 'direct' or centralized rule was a necessity, local chiefs and leaders still had to be used to a greater or lesser extent as go-betweens by the British rulers between their Governments and the natives. Here and there it was found possible, as time went on, to create artificially the personnel and institutions of indirect rule.

The units of indirect rule are called Native Administrations, and Professor Coupland in his book *The Empire in these Days* describes the annual budget of one of these Native Administrations:

> Out of a revenue of £6740 . . . £1700 is allocated to the Paramount Chief's salary, and roughly another £2000 to the salaries of various sub-chiefs, headmen, clerks, overseers, messengers, and medical-dressers. On roads £300 is to be spent, on buildings £50, on dispensaries £90, on a leper settlement £120, on the tsetse-fly campaign (observe its comparative importance) £400, on the purchase of seed £50.

It will be noticed that the subjects of expenditure are all such as to interest directly the people of the administration because they bear on their own daily lives and their own neighbourhood. Some native administrations spend money on schools

and other cultural and non-material activities which they can understand, and whose results visibly affect their present and future welfare.

Then, too, these Native Administrations enter into relations with each other; sometimes, indeed, federating for certain purposes or actually amalgamating themselves. In the same book Professor Coupland quotes as follows from the report to the Council of the League of Nations on Tanganyika for 1927:

> In Bukoba [Tanganyika], where the chiefs were as jealous of their independence as they are proud of their ancient and common lineage, a Council of Chiefs has been created representing some 200,000 inhabitants and disposing of a joint revenue of £28,000 a year. In Mwanza Province, two areas, each of which was until recently divided between half a dozen chiefdoms, have of their own motion formed themselves into two Native Administrations under two paramount chiefs, each of whom now rules over some 170,000 inhabitants. . . . The chiefs of Kilimanjaro, who for centuries and until the establishment of European rule made ceaseless warfare on each other and who five years ago would scarcely meet, are now grouped in three Councils, each of which has a common treasury and is constituted as a court of appeal. . . . . One of the most pleasing effects of our policy has been a revival of ancient ties, the effacement of old animosities, and the union of sections which by nature belong to the same stock, the creation of wider interests, and a new spirit of unity and co-operation. . . . As yet this development is in its infancy, but there is every prospect that closer union will spread until all of those groups which have a common custom and language will be united in some form of tribal amalgamation.

From this it will be seen that the system of indirect rule has certain creative as well as stabilizing political possibilities.

But indirect rule is not a final halting-place; it is only one element in a system of Colonial Government, which even now visualizes ends which would have seemed fantastic only a quarter of a century ago. In our final chapter we shall see how the policy of tutelage of Colonial peoples has changed into

one of partnership. From our opening chapter we know what this implies in the future. The Colonial territories will move, when the time is ripe and their conditions are suitable, into the same places as India, Pakistan, and Ceylon have recently moved, the places into which Canada and her sisters moved long ago.

In January 1948 another notable development took place in the whole system of Colonial policy and government. This was the creation of the post of Minister of State for the Colonies. The basic purpose of this new post is that the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Minister of State will be free to visit the Colonies more frequently, and study the working of government and developmental schemes on the spot. One or other will often be able, for example, to preside at meetings of regional conferences or councils, such as those of East and West Africa—a development which will immensely strengthen the beneficial process, which we have already noticed, of personal contacts between the Colonial Office in London and the Colonial Governments, which it controls.

CHAPTER X

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF COLONIAL POLICY

THE system of government in the Colonies and Dependencies of any Colonial empire is laid down or, at any rate, approved by the Power whose empire it is—the Metropolitan Power as it is termed in official language—and, therefore, their day-to-day administration functions according to rules and under conditions which are sanctioned, either directly or indirectly, by that Power. Even in mandated territories the Power holding the mandate is in full control of the administration. Nevertheless, Colonial policy and administration were influenced before the Second World War by world opinion, and in some respects were even subject to action by organized international authority. The Second World War brought about conditions in which world opinion will take a more active interest than ever before in Colonial affairs, and already we have seen the creation of new international bodies whose work is concerned with Colonial policy and administration. As the British Commonwealth includes the greatest of the world's Colonial systems, and the United Kingdom is the most important of the Metropolitan countries, we must know something of the kind and scope of international action in regard to Colonies and Dependencies.

Before the Second World War the international organization most directly concerned with Colonial policy and administration was the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. This came into being, as we have seen, owing to the fact that after the 1914–18 war the German overseas Empire was taken from Germany by the victors, as, also, were certain territories which had hitherto been under Turkish rule. The question of the future of these dependent territories had to be decided by the League of Nations, which,

in the end, allotted them to various of the victorious Powers under a League of Nations mandate. In effect this meant that the mandated territories were governed by the mandatory Powers as Colonies, but subject to certain conditions laid down in the mandate, including the obligation to report annually to the League on their administration. Among the principles laid down in the mandates were freedom of conscience and religion and prohibition of slavery, of military training of natives, and of traffic in liquor and arms, and of all forced labour which could not be shown to be essential to the welfare of the territory and its people. This obligation to observe the terms of the mandate and to report annually to the League did not, in practice, give the League any power to intervene in the actual administration of the mandated territories—Japan, for example, practically ignored her obligations throughout—but it did make Colonial affairs a matter of greater interest than before, and it gave an international authority a right to examine and query the administration by individual Powers of certain of the Colonial territories governed by them.

The mandates system was really an application of the principle of trusteeship, which had operated in British Colonial policy for many years before the 1914–18 war, a principle which held that the Metropolitan Power was the trustee for the welfare of the Colonial populations in their charge. We have seen in Chapters IV and VIII that this principle has been carried still further in British Colonial policy in recent years, and has developed into a doctrine of partnership between the Metropolitan Power and the dependent peoples under its rule. Naturally, the League of Nations could not develop its own mandates system as the United Kingdom has developed its Colonial policy, because the League's functions were purely supervisory and advisory, not administrative. Nevertheless, the Mandates Commission of twelve members, most of them coming from countries which themselves had no mandate, could, after they had examined the reports of the Mandatory Powers and the

petitions which the inhabitants of the mandated territories were entitled to send to them, advise the Council of the League of Nations concerning any matters on which they thought some representation by the League was desirable. The Council of the League could then, if it wished, make recommendations to the Mandatory Power.

By 1939 the opinion was growing widely that the principles of the mandates system should be extended more generally to Colonial policy and administration, and, as we shall see, this opinion has certainly not weakened as the result of the Second World War and its aftermath. World opinion will be an increasingly important factor in Colonial affairs, and there will almost certainly be an extension of the kind of international intervention in Colonial administration such as the Mandates Commission exercised in respect of the mandated territories.

But the Mandates Commission was not the first example of international action in Colonial affairs. We shall see in Chapter XII that as long ago as 1885 the Berlin Treaty represented an attempt at international regulation of certain aspects of Colonial administration in the so-called 'Congo Basin' territories. Following that treaty, the idea grew up that any new annexations of Colonial territories should be made by general agreement, and according to certain understandings as to the conditions on which the territories should be held. The West African agreements between France and the United Kingdom at the end of the 1890's arose partly out of this movement of opinion, while the 'condominium,' or joint government, of the New Hebrides by the same two countries since 1906 has provided an example of actual international administration.

Thus we see that by the outbreak of the 1939–45 war opinion had progressed some way towards the acceptance of the view that the world as a whole had an interest in the Colonial policies of the Metropolitan Powers, that these policies should be based on principles universally acceptable, and that they should be amenable to the verdict of world opinion. Certainly,

in the years immediately preceding the 1939–45 war British Colonial policy had, both in spirit and in letter, become increasingly adapted to the principles of the Mandates system. And there were other international organizations than the Mandates Commission concerned to a greater or lesser extent with Colonial affairs. One of the most valuable of all the bodies set up under the auspices of the League of Nations was the International Labour Office, which was concerned with the conditions of labour all over the world. The conventions agreed upon as the result of the International Labour Office's work covered Colonial as well as other countries, and many of these represent an impressive amount of international consultation and co-operation. The International Health Office, too, with its headquarters in Paris, and its disease-reporting centres in Geneva, Washington, Singapore, and Paris itself, was another valuable institution which brought the nations together in beneficial activities in Colonial matters. The Singapore centre, for example, was the clearing-house for the reporting of disease from India, East Africa, South-east Asia, China, Japan, Australia, and the South Seas. Yet another example of international co-operation in matters affecting the welfare of Colonial peoples was the establishment of the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome in 1905, to act as a clearing-house for information on agricultural affairs.

The Charter of the United Nations Organization, drawing on the experience of the Mandates system, and in accordance with the development of opinion referred to in the matter of Colonial trusteeship, visualizes a more complete—and, indeed, a more realistic—scheme of trusteeship for the future. Just as the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations owed its origin to a British suggestion, so the Colonial Chapter in the United Nations Charter is due to the initiative of the United Kingdom and Australia. The Charter distinguishes between two types of trusteeship. The first is "national trusteeship," to be exercised according to principles set forth in the Charter. This is the same principle as

the Mandate system, but, as we shall see in a moment, its detailed application is very different. The second is "international trusteeship," according to which territories will be governed under close supervision by an international body or under international administration. If the scheme contained in the Charter comes into action it will mark a notable advance in international co-operation in Colonial affairs. There are about a hundred and twenty Colonial or dependent territories in the various empires of the world, and about a hundred of these will be subject to national trusteeship under the terms laid down by the Charter. This figure is contrasted with the ten or so territories which were held under League of Nations Mandates.

The trusteeship system of U.N.O. is of wider scope and more strict application than the Mandates system. International recognition is given to the 'trust territories'—as the territories subject to national trusteeship are termed—and the principles to be applied to them are laid down. Thus, there is to be regular submission to the Secretary-General of U.N.O. of "statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories." Further, the old Permanent Mandates Commission, which was a body of men chosen for their personal experience and qualities and not subject to the authority of their Governments, is replaced by a Trusteeship Council, whose members are representatives of Governments. Members representing Powers holding Mandates must be a minority of the membership of the Council. The Council, as being representative of Governments, will have greater authority than the former Mandates Commission, and this is desirable on the whole because its powers are so much wider. Again, the Council acts by authority of the General Assembly of U.N.O., and thus all general discussions on trusteeship matters will take place in the strong publicity of the Assembly's proceedings.

More realistic as compared with the Mandates system is U.N.O.'s handling of the 'open-door' and 'defence' themes.

We have seen that under the open-door system nationals of all the Nations were to have equal treatment in mandated territories in regard to trade, while, as regards defence, it was laid down that except in the case of the French Mandates the use of forces drawn from a mandated territory was to be confined to the territory itself. Now, it is provided that the open-door clause must not be used to prejudice the interests of the dependent peoples concerned, while forces raised in trust territories must play their part in maintaining " international peace and security." Another important advance of the Charter over the old League Covenant is in regard to the ultimate political goal of trust territories. The Covenant spoke of " independence," while the Charter refers to " self-government or independence." The object of this is no doubt to avoid the automatic addition of a large number of new sovereign states to a world which is already much too divided by them. Instead of this, the Charter specifically says that " self-government or independence " is the goal " to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world." This is an important new principle, because one of the root causes of insecurity in the world is precisely the menace to stability, and the obstacles to co-operative action, presented by the uncompromising claims of national sovereignty.

Lastly, the Trusteeship Council is empowered to carry out inquiries on the spot in a national trustee territory. The Mandates Commission of the League of Nations could not do that. All these general principles that we have been examining apply also to the international trustee territories.

But when all this has been said it is clear that there has still to be brought into existence a comprehensive and effective international organization for surveying Colonial problems as a whole and bringing the force of world opinion to bear upon them. Nor does it seem at present as though any such organization with such functions will be possible in the near future. Certainly there is no prospect of the actual administration of Colonies being taken over by any international authority against the will of the Metropolitan Powers, or of the Colonies

themselves being administered by Services recruited on an international basis. As far as the British Commonwealth is concerned, no such development is either contemplated or desired. The British Colonies and Dependencies will be administered by the United Kingdom until their peoples are able to stand on their own feet and control their own affairs. As we have seen, our Colonial policy is now directed specifically to assisting the Colonial peoples to advance to such a position.

Yet the British Commonwealth, of all the world's political systems, is the last to abstain from such international collaboration as is possible, and, in fact, in all the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth the idea of regional bodies or commissions to act as co-ordinating agencies in Colonial administration has found much favour. Before the Second World War we were becoming increasingly aware of the fact that there are many problems in Colonial administration which can be solved only on the basis of co-operation between the various Metropolitan Powers controlling neighbouring territories within a particular geographical region. If we look at the map of Africa, for example, we see that Colonial boundaries are often drawn quite arbitrarily, taking no heed of racial or natural conditions, thus making economic and efficient systems of transport, agriculture, control of insect pests, disease, and so on, impossible. And so it is in other areas where different Powers control neighbouring territories. The events of the Second World War strongly reinforced our pre-War experience, and it is for this reason that the idea of regional bodies or Commissions has found such wide support in this country and elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The Government of the United Kingdom has not so far announced any policy with regard to regional bodies for international co-operation, but Mr Oliver Stanley, when Secretary of State for the Colonies, referred to the subject in a speech in the House of Commons, in July 1943. Concerning problems common to a number of Colonial administrations, which could be solved only by regional co-operation, he said :

> Developments of modern transport and modern communications have brought together vast areas which before were widely separated. Many of their problems to-day are common problems and can only be solved in co-operation, for problems of security, of transport, of economics, of health, etc., transcend the boundaries of political units. His Majesty's Government would, therefore, welcome the establishment of machinery which would enable such problems to be discussed and to be solved by common efforts. . . . While each State would remain responsible for the administration of its own territory, such a Commission would provide effective and permanent machinery for consultation and collaboration so that the States concerned might work together to promote the well-being of the Colonial territories. An important consideration in designing the machinery of each Commission will be to give to the people of the Colonial territories in the region an opportunity to be associated with its work.

This statement is in very general terms, and gives no information concerning the constitution or the specific functions of the proposed Commissions. A few months earlier, however, the Institute of Pacific Relations, which is an international body, held a conference at which the question of an International Council for the Pacific region was discussed. Lord Hailey, the leader of the British delegation to the conference, in proposing the formation of the Council, dwelt on its functions and constitution, and it is worth while quoting his words, since he is the leading authority on Commonwealth Colonial problems, and his views have, accordngly, great weight:

> I suggest [he said] that there should be created a Council for the Pacific Zone, consisting of the representatives of the Sovereign powers concerned. It would have a double function. It would, in the first place, be the local agency of whatever organization may be established by the United Powers for safeguarding the peace of Asia in common with other parts of the world. . . . Its second function would be to secure, by joint consultation, and by co-operative action, a common policy so far as may be, in the economic development and of the tariff and customs arrangements within this zone. It would maintain a technical staff, available for

advising the administrations concerned, on health, agriculture, economic or cultural problems. It would be the agency through which areas unable to finance their own development would obtain the assistance required. It would receive regular reports from the different national administrations in the area, and be empowered to require information and explanation from them. It would finally—and I desire to emphasize this point—be charged with the periodic review of the progress made in the promotion of self-governing institutions in the Dependencies, and in the improvement of their standard of living.

The reaction to Lord Hailey's proposals was favourable, and the Conference expressed the opinion that the Regional Council should be set up even before the end of the Second World War. Moreover, coming from such a quarter, and endorsed by such a representative international gathering, these proposals will in all probability be the goal of future regional organizations.

In Lord Hailey's suggestions there is nothing that is antagonistic to British Colonial policy or to the interests of any Commonwealth country, self-governing or non-self-governing, and, in fact, the idea of regional Commissions, as we noticed above, has received wide support throughout the Commonwealth. In Southern Rhodesia, for example, there is a body of opinion which holds that African problems are really continental in scope, and that political boundaries are artificial. Abstract theories should give way to the co-operation of neighbouring authorities for the welfare of their African populations.

But, as we saw in the preceding chapter, recent developments in South Africa have been such as to impair for the present at any rate the chances of any closer drawing together of the ties between the Union and her Northern neighbours. Still, it may be that time and circumstances will effect some improvement even here.

Of late years the officials of the South African Native Affairs Department, which has been described as a Colonial Office in miniature, have been studying the problems of other

African territories on the spot, and have been struck by the similarity of these problems to their own. The Department is now seeking to establish the closest possible relations with other administrations.

Australia and New Zealand have given full proof that the policy of Regional Commissions for co-operation in promoting the welfare of Colonial peoples is also the accepted policy of their national Governments. The Canberra Agreement of 1944 contains a number of clauses relating to the welfare and advancement of the native peoples of the Pacific. The Agreement recognizes that the familiar British principle of ' trusteeship,' which was adapted by the League of Nations in its mandates system, applies also to the peoples of the Pacific. The agreement recognizes also that the principle cannot be applied unless there is collaboration among the various authorities who control these peoples. Therefore, the Canberra Agreement proposes the establishment of a South Seas Regional Commission, to consist of accredited representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and France. Unlike Lord Hailey's proposed Pacific Council, however, the function of the South Seas Regional Commission as set forth in the Canberra Agreement is purely advisory. The avowed aim of the Commission is to secure a common policy of social, economic, and political improvement of the native peoples of the Pacific, but, in the absence of all power except that of merely giving advice, it is difficult to see how the Commission can be very effective in achieving this aim.

The Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which adopted and elaborated Lord Hailey's proposal, saw clearly that mere advisory functions were not enough. It was necessary to join power to responsibility, and, therefore, the Conference believed that if the United States, for example, would join the Council and take its full share in the effort to improve the lot of the Pacific peoples, then some effective powers could be given to the Council. It could, among other powers, be given the right to suggest the general lines along

which self-governing institutions should develop, and, also, policies of social and economic welfare. It might even be given the power to investigate on the spot any grievances entertained by Colonial populations against the governing power.

The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, which was set up in March 1942 for the purpose of strengthening Anglo-American co-operation in the Caribbean region, was from the beginning a body vested with definite powers to carry out its purpose. It consisted of six members : three of them appointed by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Colonies and three by the Government of the United States, and their terms of reference are related primarily to labour, agriculture, housing, health, education, social welfare, finance, and economics generally. A permanent secretariat to the Commission was set up in Washington, since the Caribbean region was in the defence area allotted to the United States, and Washington was, therefore, the most convenient place for the Commission's headquarters. In view of the date when the Commission was established, it is obvious that its most pressing concern was with those activities which were necessary for the successful prosecution of the Second World War—namely, the provision of shipping, the establishment of lines of supply, and the purchase and delivery of foodstuffs and raw materials, the supply and transport of labour, and such-like activities. Nevertheless, the wider and more long-term objectives of the Commission were not neglected even during the stress of war, and much fruitful co-operation took place in the matters of health, agriculture, forestry, communications, and so on.

From the beginning of 1944 a system of regular West Indian Conferences was inaugurated, attended by local representatives of the territories concerned. These Conferences covered a wide range of social, industrial, economic, and health problems, and their recommendations were normally accepted by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States as well as of the Colonial territories in the region. An agreement on a basic economic

policy for the region was adopted by the two metropolitan countries as a result of recommendations by the Conference. The long-term aspects of welfare and development were studied by research organizations, which surveyed fishing possibilities, animal husbandry, pasturage, and other problems in the region, this work being carried out under the ægis of a Caribbean Research Council, which was constituted in 1943. The Council arranges for the pooling of information and for the holding of specialist conferences.

Then, in 1945, the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was enlarged into the Caribbean Commission by the inclusion of France and Holland. At the same time the membership was extended to include representatives from the Caribbean territories themselves. Thus, the Commission is now fully representative of all the metropolitan countries concerned and of the Caribbean territories. With the coming into existence of the Caribbean Commission it was decided to establish its permanent secretariat inside the region, and Port-of-Spain, in Trinidad, was chosen. Early in its career the Commission stressed the need for improvements in education and in the standards of agriculture so as to produce better citizens. It also occupied itself with problems of trade and transport, industrial development, and research. The Commission is financed by its member Governments, the amount which each contributes being fixed by agreement, and each of the four metropolitan countries has four representatives. The West Indian Conference will remain in existence and so will the Caribbean Research Council. It is perhaps inevitable that the new Caribbean Commission should be of a more advisory character than its predecessor, the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, but its potentialities are very great, always providing, of course, that its members can avoid the temptation to get involved in political issues and stick to their primary function of furthering the social welfare and developing the economic and industrial resources of the region. But certainly the Caribbean Commission is, in constitution and aim, a model of what regional Commissions ought to be. It

is possible that as time goes on it will be found possible to vest the Commission with more directly administrative functions and authority, but this development must come naturally. It cannot be forced.

The future may conceivably see developments in West Africa similar to those in the Caribbean. During the Second World War the French and Belgian authorities in their West African territories found it beneficial to enter into arrangements for purposes of defence and economics with the British authorities, and there was much consultation and co-operation between these three Colonial Powers. This, again, is an area in which political boundaries are often irrelevant to the needs of the peoples within them, and everybody concerned has much to gain from the growth of regular means of collaboration in the solutions of problems which are common to them all. Even if it is not found possible at once to set up any formal machinery for collaboration in economics, communications, and such-like material activities, there seems no need why there should not be collaboration in the extensive range of the social services where the pooling of experience alone would be of great value. Certain kinds of research which have no direct bearing on military precautions might also be a possible field for collaboration.

Some action has been taken along these lines. At the end of 1945 it was agreed that there should be regular exchanges of information over a wide field of social, technical, and economic subjects, as well as exchanges of visits by specialist officials of the two Governments and conferences on technical matters. Several conferences between French and British representatives have been held in West Africa, and a conference of economic experts was held in London in 1947 to discuss marketing, production, and trade problems. Similar arrangements have been made with the Belgian authorities also, and some useful results have been achieved.

It is clear from what has been said in this chapter that the movement for regional co-operation between Colonial Powers is already under way and is supported by a strong and steadily

growing volume of informed opinion in many parts of the world. There is little reason to doubt that the movement will be, on the whole, beneficial to the Colonial peoples concerned, and valuable to the rest of the world. Half a century ago such regional agreements between Metropolitan Powers might have given rise to fears that they would turn into schemes for still further exploitation of the native populations, and making profits regardless of the human losses and sufferings involved. To-day the motive force behind the movement is mainly a genuine desire to increase the welfare of native peoples as well as to add to the world's material amenities. The doctrine of trusteeship can hardly fail to extend until it permeates all Colonial policies in some degree or other, and so interlinked are the peoples of the world to-day that news flies quickly from one to another, and advance in one Colony thus becomes the objective in another. The news agencies are ubiquitous and their means of communication instantaneous. What happens in a remote Colonial area to-day is broadcast throughout the world by Press, radio, and cinema to-morrow, and Colonial policies are becoming peculiarly susceptible to the pressure of world opinion.

Finally, we have seen that the development of regional Commissions is entirely in tune with the Charter of the United Nations. The League of Nations, in Article 22 of its Covenant, declared that the guiding principle of Colonial Government was that the well-being and development of Colonial populations formed a sacred trust of civilization. Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations puts the matter more precisely. This is what it says :

> With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote :
>
> (*a*) Higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development ;

(*b*) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and

(*c*) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

The next Article in the Charter of the United Nations says: "All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."

The intention of the Charter in these two sections is quite clear. The benefits specified in Article 55 are "for all without distinction as to race, etc."

What has been said earlier in this chapter is amply sufficient to show that it is one of the major purposes of the United Nations Organization to ensure these things for Colonial peoples as well as the more advanced peoples of the world, and joint action by members to achieve this purpose is specifically enjoined.

Thus we see that the old exclusive views of Colonial policy are being steadily eaten into alike by theory, by world opinion, and now—in the movement towards regionalism, and in the trusteeship policy of the Charter of the United Nations—by actual practice. There has been ample proof in foregoing chapters that British Commonwealth policy is in line with the developments in world opinion and practice, which we have just been studying. Inside the Commonwealth there is full scope for regional arrangements between its various members, and these can and do pioneer the way for more inclusive international agreements.

CHAPTER XI

INDUSTRY IN THE COMMONWEALTH

IN previous chapters we have seen something of the plans for agricultural development in the Colonies, and also of the amount of the production of primary products—vegetable, animal, and mineral—all over the Commonwealth. We have seen the Commonwealth countries supplying large proportions of the world's yield of many foodstuffs, economic vegetable products such as rubber and timber, wool, minerals, and so on. Before the Second World War there were schemes on foot everywhere for increasing and cheapening production of all kinds, and the War, of course, greatly speeded up these schemes and gave birth to many others. In this chapter we shall examine the situation in the Commonwealth in regard to secondary or industrial development. All the Dominions greatly strengthened their industries during the War, and all of them will consolidate and extend the ground thus gained in the years of peace. This is true even of some of the Colonies, and we shall see in particular what a hopeful future there is for such a country as Southern Rhodesia, which is not yet a Dominion even though it is not a Crown Colony either. As long as there is the possibility of war in the world, every country will strive to develop its industries to the utmost for reasons of national security, and, in any case, as the economic system of each country expands, the development of industry becomes necessary in the interests of a balanced economy. The economic system of every Commonwealth country is expanding, and countries like Canada and Australia, which are already world Powers of the middle rank, and South Africa, whose world position is growing in importance, clearly intend to enter on a course of intensive industrial development.

Most of the Crown Colonies lie within the tropical and

sub-tropical zones, and there is, naturally, a broad division so far as economic activities are concerned between these territories and those situated in more temperate climates. It is true to say that, hitherto, industrial development in the Colonies has advanced only as far as is essential for the satisfactory handling of local raw materials. There are, however, various bodies and schemes now in existence whose object is the systematic development of industries appropriate to Colonial conditions. These schemes do not overlook the all-important fact that, for as far ahead as we can see at present, agriculture will continue to be the main economic activity of the Colonies and, therefore, the principal source of their national wealth. Another important fact is to be noticed also. It will be a long time before agriculture can be carried on in Colonial territories with as great an economy in manpower as is possible in the more advanced countries of the temperate zone. The latter are far more highly mechanized than the Colonies can possibly be for long enough to come, their transport systems are incomparably better, and labour is more efficient. For example, at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution probably three-quarters of the population of the United Kingdom were engaged in agriculture. To-day the proportion is less than a quarter, although the output of agriculture in this country is greater now than it was then. Mechanization, transport, and increased efficiency of labour account for this fact. It will be a long time before comparable economies can be effected in the Colonies so as to release labour for industrial development. Nevertheless, the building up of appropriate secondary industries in the Colonies is an essential part of Colonial development policy.

One way in which the Second World War stimulated industrial growth in the Colonies was in connexion with the processing—that is, the drying, curing, preserving, packing, and so on—of locally grown products. Many of the supplies of these things, both for the armies and for civilians, came from the Colonies. Towards the end of the War the Colonial Economic Advisory Committee carried out an inquiry into

the ways in which the Governments of the Colonies could help in establishing sound manufacturing industries in their respective territories. The upshot of this inquiry was the issue by the Colonial Office of a memorandum to Colonial Governments in 1946, informing them that manufacturing industries were essential in Colonies if these were to have healthily diversified economic systems. It was laid down as a general principle that any industries established in the Colonies should be able to compete with similar industries elsewhere, but that some Government help to them was permissible to enable them to get established.

Thus the development of secondary industries in the Colonies is now a principle of Colonial government, and permanent organizations to carry out this policy have been set up in many parts of the Commonwealth. An Industrial Council for East Africa was set up during the War, with an Industrial Research Board and an Industrial Management Board working under its auspices. This body produced a report in 1945 outlining a programme for industrial development in the East African territories. A good deal of geological and general scientific research will have to be carried out here and everywhere else in the Colonies as the necessary preliminary to industrial development. For example, the possibility of producing coal in Tanganyika is now under examination, and coal, of course, is one of the most important foundations of industry.

In West Africa, too, and notably in Nigeria, the possibility of mining coal is being actively examined. West Africa already has Departments of Commerce and Industries in Nigeria and the Gold Coast. Nigeria is laying stress at present on the extension and improvement of the village textile industries and on local pottery-, tile-, and brick-making. In the Gold Coast attention is being given to the development of the furniture, weaving, and boot-making crafts.

In both Northern and Southern Rhodesia there are great possibilities of industrial development. Indeed, Southern Rhodesia may well provide the most spectacular example of

industrial development in the Commonwealth during the next few decades. The Government of Southern Rhodesia created a Development and Co-ordinating Commission in 1947 to survey and help to expand its vast natural resources. As Chairman of the Commission, Sir Miles Thomas, a prominent British industrialist, carried out an intensive industrial survey during 1947, and from his report a good idea can be formed of the future of Southern Rhodesia. The country has abundant stores of such valuable minerals as coal, iron, chrome, mica, asbestos, lead, and copper. In the country round Bulawayo sheet-metal pressing, high-temperature enamelling, foundry work, and light engineering are already flourishing. By damming the Kariba gorge a water-supply can be obtained to irrigate millions of acres of land and also to supply three-quarters of a million kilowatts of electricity for industrial purposes. Much of the coal is of good coking quality, and can be produced at a fraction of the cost at which it is produced in the United Kingdom and other advanced industrial countries. The lack of skilled labour will not be as serious a handicap now as it would have been some years ago. During the Second World War the technique was developed in the United Kingdom of producing the most elaborate engineering products by means of unskilled labour through the use of highly refined and ingenious machine-tools and jigs. This technique is, of course, of the highest value now for territories like Southern Rhodesia, which will have to use a good deal of unskilled or semi-skilled native labour.

Northern Rhodesia also has great possibilities with its important natural resources. It has immense deposits of copper, while silver, gold, zinc, lead, cobalt, manganese, and vanadium mines are also worked. The new policy for Colonial economic and social welfare has encouraged the Government of Northern Rhodesia to plan for the Colony's long-range development. Health and education services figure most prominently in what has been called 'Northern Rhodesia's Ten-Year Plan,' since these services are the foundations of a sound and progressive society. After them come agriculture,

forestry, animal husbandry, and other rural subjects, with housing, communications, and public works well to the fore. Provision is made for training Africans for developmental work, and the fostering of secondary industries, some of which will probably be concerned with processing raw materials on the spot, is also included. This promising plan is the outcome of a careful study of Northern Rhodesia's needs and potentialities by a Joint Development Adviser who has been appointed for the two territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Malta presents a somewhat difficult problem. In this small island much of the soil is unsuitable for cultivation, and the population of nearly three hundred thousand is dense for an area of only ninety-five square miles. A number of small industries—lace, cotton, cigarettes, tomato-canning, wine, beer, and butter-making—have been established, but the natural increase of population continues to press on the economic resources of the island, and the Government has a number of schemes of industrial development under consideration. Cyprus decided to undertake her planning on a ten-year basis, spending about six million pounds during that period. The whole scheme will be financed under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. The island's fruit-growing and fishing and their allied processing industries naturally will receive attention, while the improvement of harbour facilities will beneficially affect the whole economic life of Cyprus.

In the West Indies, as in Malta, there is a difficult population problem, and in these Colonies all the Governments, both jointly and individually, are devoting a great deal of attention to industrial development. In Chapter X we examined the composition and working of the West India Conference and the Caribbean Commission, and saw how comprehensive were their operations for the economic development of the West Indies. Here, as elsewhere, the Second World War provided the conditions for setting up a number of industries, mostly on a very small scale. In Jamaica,

Trinidad, and Barbados enough soap and edible oils are now manufactured from copra—the flesh of the coconut—to meet the needs of those three Colonies, and the manufacture of cigars in Jamaica is now an important industry. Matches, cigarettes, pottery, tiles, condensed milk, and alcoholic and soft drinks are among the products from industries now established in these parts of the West Indies. An interesting experiment is the setting up of a spinning-plant in Barbados to work the local cotton. Among the more important projects now under way are those for developing a glass industry, based on the very extensive silica sand deposits in British Guiana, a cement industry in Trinidad and Jamaica, and oil-production in Barbados. With these and other possibilities in mind, Industrial Development Corporations to supplement locally the more general operations of the West Indian Conference and the Caribbean Commission are coming into existence. British Guiana has an Industries Committee, and the Government of Jamaica has set up a Department of Commerce and Industries to help existing industries and to develop new ones. In Trinidad there is a Corporation, financed by private investors, to develop that Colony's industries, but elsewhere such undertakings are still mainly supported by public funds.

We have seen that there are possibilities of oil-production in certain parts of the West Indies, but, taking the Colonies and Dependencies as a whole, the mineral sources of power—coal and oil—are not at present known to be plentiful, although much is hoped from the systematic geological surveys which have now been started. All the more important, therefore, are the hydro-electric possibilities in these territories. We have seen the impressive possibilities of one site in Southern Rhodesia, and surveys have been undertaken to examine the hydro-electrical resources of East Africa, Northern Rhodesia, the Gold Coast, Borneo, British Guiana, and the West Indies. But, as we survey the possibilities for industrial development in the Colonies and Dependencies, Africa stands out as the most important field of all. Even now the immense promise

of the African Colonies is hardly appreciated, and much research of all kinds is still needed, in the social as well as in the geological, mining, engineering, and other technical sciences. For the most part the people of the African Colonies are still small-holders or herdsmen, very poor and ignorant, fighting against Nature in some of her most cruel moods. Here and there some modern enterprises have been started—in the Rhodesian mineral-fields, and in the tin-fields of Nigeria and the iron-fields of Sierra Leone. Large-scale plantation enterprises have been developed in East Africa—coffee and sisal fibres in East Africa, palm-oil in West Africa, and cotton in Uganda and the Sudan. All these things hold out the promise of the establishment of processing and other small ancillary industries. But the large-scale plantation enterprises referred to above are all European undertakings, and henceforth the African must play a more and more prominent part in all such undertakings. Broadly speaking, the first stage of industrialization in Africa should be based on the processing of Africa's own raw materials on the spot. For example, West Africa produces most of the cocoa and much of the palm-oil of the world. These have to go through a number of processes before they are sold to the consumers in other countries as chocolate, soap, margarine, and so on. In the past most of these processes have been done in the industrial countries of the West, chiefly in the United Kingdom, but in future they will be increasingly done in West Africa. Similarly, the ambitious ground-nut scheme in East Africa should lead in due time to the erection of crushing mills there to extract the food-oils from the nuts. The cotton of Uganda, again, has gone overseas for ginning and weaving, but in future these industries should take root inside the Protectorate itself. More ambitious is the prospect of the development of a pig-iron industry—in Southern Rhodesia and Sierra Leone for example—by electrolytic processes which were introduced in the United Kingdom during the War. Ferro-chrome steel should be produced in Southern Rhodesia when the hydro-electric schemes already referred

to are completed, thus making the Commonwealth a net exporter instead of an importer of this basic material. The second stage of Colonial, particularly African, industrial development might come with the production of the simpler parts of fabricated engineering goods, of which the more refined parts, which require advanced industrial techniques and highly skilled labour for their production, will be made in the United Kingdom or the other industrialized Dominions. Finally, it is not necessary to regard these as developments of the very distant future. If basic foodstuffs and industrial materials can be produced plentifully and cheaply in Colonial areas they will be produced, and some of the African territories are likely to be the scenes of big developments within the next few decades.

A word is necessary here about the financing of the economic, particularly the industrial, development of the Colonies. We have seen what an immense part is being played by Government and other kinds of public finance, and have realized that the resources provided under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, great though they are, are only the foundations of a still more massive scheme of credit and subsidiary finance erected on them. But even this is not enough. There is still an important part to be played by private enterprise. Economic development in Colonial territories has been carried out largely hitherto by private enterprise. We have only to think of such things as the rubber and tin of Malaya, the copper of Rhodesia, the large-scale plantations in East and West Africa, sugar- and fruit-growing in Mauritius and the West Indies, the railways, shipping-lines, and other forms of transport, which are as vital almost as the soil and the minerals of the Colonies to their development, and all of them the result of private enterprise, to see the truth of this remark. In 1936 a South African economist estimated that about a hundred million pounds had been invested in East Africa alone. When we add to this figure the vast sums invested in other Colonial territories, not to mention India, it is clear that public finance alone will not suffice for the future

development of the Colonies. The more alert and adventurous operations of private enterprise and its capital resources have still a vast field open to them. There should be no question of exploitation of the natives in the future. Colonial Governments are vigilant nowadays in protecting labour by all the most up-to-date methods, and the plain fact is that many industries will be more appropriately developed by private than by Government capital. But, indeed, we saw in our discussion of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act and in the scheme for the Overseas Food Corporation that public authorities and private bodies can work in partnership, or the latter can be the chosen agents of the Government, as the United Africa Company was chosen to act as managing agents for the East Africa ground-nuts scheme.

All the self-governing Dominions of the Commonwealth still find the greater part of their national wealth in agriculture, and all of them are exporters of agricultural and other primary commodities. Yet all of them have become industrialized during the past hundred years, and Canada should become one of the greatest industrial countries of the world during the present century. Australia, South Africa, and India all have important manufacturing industries, and all are determined to expand them and add to their number. Indeed, the rate of industrialization of all the Dominions—but particularly of Canada, Australia, and South Africa—between the two World Wars has been one of the outstanding features of the modern history of the British Commonwealth. These Dominions would, in any case, have made it their object to become fully industrialized nations, but the two World Wars have strengthened their determination to achieve this object, and at the same time have speeded their progress towards its attainment. The wars made heavy demands on their productive powers for contributions to the war effort, while the lack of shipping and of exports from the United Kingdom and elsewhere to be carried in them forced the overseas countries to start producing for themselves many of the goods which they formerly imported. Now considerations of

national security, and the policies of full employment for their peoples, which have been adopted by the Governments, will still further stimulate the growth of industry in the Dominions.

New Zealand was the last of the Dominions to make a serious effort to develop secondary industries. Her two greatest industries are dairying and sheep-farming, and two developments towards the end of the nineteenth century combined to delay the time when the need for manufacturing industries would be forced on her people. These developments were the mechanization of dairy-farming, which reduced costs and economized human labour, and refrigeration, which made it possible to send New Zealand mutton overseas. Before the coming of refrigeration New Zealand's exports had been mainly wool, hides, and tallow, but from the last quarter of the nineteenth century onward her impressive meat-exporting trade developed. In connexion with this trade the great freezing works of the country grew up, and so did a number of other industries connected with the processing of the foodstuffs which New Zealand exports. But, apart from these and a few light industries such as printing, repair and maintenance outfits, and similar activities, which must grow up in any country to meet its local requirements, manufacturing industries had to wait in New Zealand until the twentieth century.

Their time came with the great economic slump all over the world in the late nineteen-twenties and early nineteen-thirties. New Zealand was particularly hard hit by the slump because not only could the United Kingdom, which was, and is, far and away New Zealand's best customer, not afford to buy her meat and cheese and the rest of her products, but world prices also moved against agricultural produce. The gap between agricultural prices and the prices of manufactured goods widened, and New Zealand was compelled to consider how she could improve her economic condition. The solution was found partly in the development of secondary industries. Of course, it was realized that the country could never be

self-sufficient industrially, and therefore the Government rightly concentrated on manufactures which used New Zealand's own raw materials—that is, woollen goods manufactured from New Zealand wool, linen from New Zealand flax, boots and other leather goods from New Zealand hides and skins, and so on—and this was the general line of progress until war broke out in 1939. In that year the number of people engaged in industry in New Zealand was over a hundred thousand, roughly a 25 per cent. increase on the numbers so employed in 1930. During that decade a number of British firms as well as two Australian and even two Canadian firms had established branch factories in the country.

Among the industries affected by the above developments were chemicals, textiles, ships, machine-tools and other implements, and paper-manufacturing. During the Second World War, when New Zealand was largely cut off from imports, she developed the manufacture of pottery, rubber goods, various kinds of toilet and cosmetic articles, certain superior kinds of wearing apparel, and the like. The production of minerals in the Dominion was increased, including aluminium, and, in fact, duralumin, which is a complex aluminium alloy, was made in New Zealand during the War. Naturally, such developments as this point to the possibility of the rise of a light-metal industry in the Dominion, and the policy of the New Zealand Government is to press on with their policy of extending secondary industries. Even civil aircraft are likely to be assembled there in the next few years. This industrial development will, of course, set some serious problems for the New Zealand Government, and there, as elsewhere in the past, agriculture and industrial interests are bound to clash to some extent. It is likely that these new industries will have to be protected for a time at least, and this, by reducing New Zealand's imports of manufactured goods, will react on her exports of agricultural commodities, the products, that is, of New Zealand's greatest industry. But New Zealand is a Pacific Power, and the Pacific is a developing area. New Zealanders will study carefully how to

increase their manufacturing industries without damaging their agriculture, and, being situated as they are in a region which should expand economically in the future, their problem should not be insoluble.

The story of Canada's industrial development is different from New Zealand's. Canada has immense mineral resources, including oil, while recent and continuing discoveries continually add to the tale of her mineral wealth. After the 1914–18 war Canada began to change from a mainly agricultural country into one in which a balance was being sought between agriculture and manufactures. Her mining industry increased by leaps and bounds, with important repercussions on Canadian secondary industries. During the ten years 1918–28 manufactures contributed a third of Canada's total national production, but by 1939 the proportion had risen to about 40 per cent. The greatly increased output of the Canadian mines led to a vast expansion of her metallurgical plants. Between 1929 and 1939 the number of copper, brass, and electrical apparatus plants practically doubled, and the chemical industry grew into one of the major manufacturing activities of the country. The War, of course, stimulated Canadian primary and secondary production enormously. It has been calculated that in the six years of war Canada's overall production rose by 25 per cent. She became the world's chief source of nickel, platinum, radium, copper, zinc, and silver. The new factories and plants which were built during the War brought up Canada's manufacturing and general industrial output to 49 per cent. of all her national production, and it is likely that when her peace-time production is fully restored and the industrial plants which were built purely for war purposes have been scrapped, the manufacturing capacity of the Dominion will remain as high as 45 per cent. of her total national production.

Thus, although Canada's industrial development is older than New Zealand's and on a quite different scale, she is faced in the post-War age with much the same basic economic problems as New Zealand. Canada has to strike a just balance

between the claims of her agricultural and her manufacturing industries. If she is to continue to sell the products of her chief industry, which is still agriculture, to her chief market, which is still the United Kingdom, she must import the latter's manufactured goods, and this basic consideration will influence her domestic policies considerably. Moreover, she must find an outlet for many of her own manufactures, and this she will be able to do only if the rest of the world is reasonably prosperous and world trade expands. This fact will not be without its influence on Canada's general foreign policy. However that may be, Canada is on the upgrade as a manufacturing country, and, whatever the problems raised, and whatever the obstacles encountered may be, her manufacturing industries will grow in scope and numbers, backed by vast natural resources and a growing population.

When we come to South Africa we find a set of conditions which are peculiar to that country. Most of it is a high plateau, lying from three to six thousand feet above sea-level, and everywhere, except in the coastal districts, the rainfall is scanty and uncertain. For this reason agriculture has languished in the past, and European farmers were not encouraged to undertake extensive farming operations. But there is fertile soil in many parts of the country, and the Government has for many years past given active assistance in irrigation works with good results. The South African fruit crop is now an important item in its national production and animal husbandry has been fostered by some of the best veterinary science in the world. Wool is the second most valuable commodity among South Africa's exports, coming next, but a long way after, gold. Hides and skins, too, are an important element in her exports. But, though South Africa is not a natural home for agriculture, her mineral deposits are very rich, and it is on these that her industries are being built. She mines about half the world's gold, and this metal constitutes roughly three-quarters of the value of her exports. She exports coal and diamonds, too, while iron and manganese are also mined. On the basis of these natural resources South

Africa is now building up a varied industrial system ranging from cotton ginning to electrical engineering and chemicals. The output of her manufacturing industries multiplied by two and a half between the two wars, while the number of manufacturing establishments of all kinds almost doubled, as did the number of persons employed in manufacturing industries. Here, as in every other country of the Commonwealth, the War led to a great forward movement in industry. In 1939 the Dominion was dependent on supplies from outside for certain kinds of steel, but now she produces over two hundred different types of special steels. The steel industry in South Africa dates only from 1935, but already by 1939 it was turning out three hundred and fifty thousand tons of steel ingots, a figure which was greatly increased during the War. Indeed, South Africa was entirely responsible for the production of certain items of engineering equipment for military purposes. She built certain types of small naval craft, including anti-submarine craft and fast motor patrol-boats.

The Dominion intends to consolidate and extend the industrial ground she gained during the War. In 1940 a Bill was passed by the South African Parliament creating an Industrial Development Corporation, a public company charged with the duty of developing existing industries and establishing new ones.

When we come to Australia we encounter another peculiar set of circumstances. Of the population of between seven and seven and a quarter million people, nearly three and a quarter million live in the capital cities of the five states—namely, Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, and Perth. The reason is that the income of the country is largely drawn from its export trade, and, accordingly, the ports are the great places of employment. Thus, at the outbreak of the Second World War, rather more than half a million people were employed in agriculture and pastoral and dairying occupations, much the same number in manufacturing industries, and not far short of half a million in commerce and finance, and nearly a quarter of a million in transport and communications.

These few facts show the great dependence of Australia on external markets for her wool, grain, fruit, meat, and dairy products, in return for which she imported textiles, machinery, motor-cars, iron and steel goods, oil and petrol, electrical machinery, and the other products of highly industrialized countries like the United Kingdom and the United States. But Australia is rich in minerals—in coal, gold, silver, lead, iron, zinc, copper, and tin—and these are now forming in Australia, as in Canada and South Africa, which are similarly endowed, the basis of important manufacturing industries. For Australia, like all the Dominions, is determined to have a strong industrial foundation for her economic system and her nationhood. Indeed, competent judges have said that Australia's steel-production costs at the famous Broken Hill mines are probably the most economical in the world. By the outbreak of the Second World War Australia was producing well over a million tons of steel ingots per annum, and this figure was considerably stepped up in the following years. A new type of weldable armour-steel for armoured vehicles was developed in Australia and used by the other allied nations. The strength of Australian industry may be understood from the fact that in her yards were built ships of the corvette type, destroyers, sloops, and freighters. Aircraft, too, were produced—fighters, heavy bombers, and torpedo-carrying bombers. Before the War Australia had never produced even a motor-car, but by 1943 she was producing not only cars but tanks. These facts speak eloquently for the industrial development of Australia, for, of course, before such things as these can be produced there must be an adequate range of ancillary industries. Like the other Dominions, Australia means to extend the industrial ground she has gained, and if her production costs can be kept at a competitive level she should find a good field for her products in the Pacific and in the Far and Middle East.

Finally, we come to India and Pakistan. The latter will be slow in developing any important industries for she is poor in minerals, and has only a very slight industrial equipment

with which to begin. India, however, has an industrial history of three-quarters of a century, and for many centuries her textiles and metal wares have been famous. Her modern industry began in the 1860's with cotton mills, followed later by woollen and leather manufactures. By the outbreak of war in 1939 she had become supreme in the manufacture of jute, which was centralized in Calcutta. Jute is the fibre out of which sackcloth is made, and the fibre is a monopoly of Bengal. But the jute fields are in Eastern Bengal, which is in Pakistan, while Calcutta is in the Dominion of India. Therefore Pakistan is likely to try to develop the manufacture of jute inside its own borders.

Then, in the present century, began the notable development of India's iron and steel industry, at Jamshedpur, in the east, in the coal- and iron-fields of the Chota Nagpur Plateau, in the Province of Orissa. Based on this great and growing industry various engineering and light-metal industries grew up. The Government of India in the days of British rule protected India's infant industries by tariffs, and the new Government of India will seek by all means still further to develop her manufacturing potential. India has good mineral resources. Apart from plentiful coal and iron, she has aluminium, manganese, gold, and other metals, as well as some oil. Her greatest need for the near future is a settled Government, and peace with her neighbouring Dominion, Pakistan.

CHAPTER XII

COMMONWEALTH TRADE AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

AN examination of the Commonwealth's trading activities, and the broad economic considerations and problems which arise from them, reveals straight away a most interesting fact. This is that, in spite of the complete economic freedom of the Dominions and the increasingly greater freedom of the Colonies and Dependencies in their economic affairs, trade between the many different countries of the Commonwealth is governed in some respects by general conditions, and, even, specific agreements of a kind which do not exist between these countries and the world outside. Among the general conditions we must take notice of the intimate economic relations between the United Kingdom and her Colonies and Dependencies set up by past and present Colonial development policies, while among specific agreements the most important are the Imperial Preferences. For the most part, these preferences are granted by the Dominions to the United Kingdom and by the latter to the Dominions and Colonies, except the so-called ' Congo Basin Treaty ' countries, a term which will be explained later. Sometimes the Dominions have extended Imperial Preference to each other, but not often. Therefore, the trade of the United Kingdom with other countries of the Commonwealth dominates all the statistics of inter-Commonwealth trade.

We shall see in due course that Imperial Preferences in their present form date only from 1932. From 1897 to 1932 there was a one-sided system of preferences according to which the Dominions granted preferences to the United Kingdom on certain of her exports to them, without the Mother Country's being able to return the benefit in the shape of preferences on Dominion exports to her. The reason for

this was, of course, that between 1849 and 1932 the United Kingdom was a ' free-trade ' country—that is, the only duties imposed on her imports were those for revenue purposes (for example, duties on tobacco, wines and spirits, and suchlike things, which were levied at a single rate on imports from all countries, British and foreign alike). But during the first half of the nineteenth century, under the so-called ' old Colonial system,' very effective preferences were given to imports from British overseas countries, with considerable benefits to the growing colonies. The change over to free trade at the end of the 1840's hit all the colonies very hard—so hard, indeed, that in Canada there was a by no means inconsiderable body of opinion which favoured secession from the Empire to the United States. It was only natural that with the disappearance of the Mother Country's preferences the colonies, now the Dominions, should devote their energies to their own economic development, and it was not long before Canada began to impose protective tariffs on imports, even on those from the Mother Country herself. This was in 1859, and gradually the other Colonies also imposed protective tariffs on goods from the United Kingdom, until by the end of the nineteenth century all the Colonies which are now Dominions had fully fledged systems of protective tariffs against British as well as foreign goods which competed with their own products.

Then, at the end of the century, in 1897, the year of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, an important development occurred—namely, the granting by Canada of the first Imperial Preferences to the Mother Country in the shape of a reduction of the customs duties on certain of her goods imported into Canada, while the full duties were levied on the same imports from foreign countries. Other Dominions followed Canada's example in due course. A variety of reasons led to this institution of Imperial Preference—the general sense of solidarity between Mother Country and Colonies induced by changes in world conditions, the desire to give a *quid pro quo* for the military and naval protection accorded to the Colonies, and so on. We have seen that, since the United

Kingdom was then a free-trade country, she could not accord reciprocal treatment to imports from the Colonies, but, as it happened, in those days the Mother Country's free-trade policy suited the Colonies as well as herself. It gave the Colonies a vast and assured market for their agricultural produce, and it gave this country all the benefits of cheap food and raw materials, and, consequently, of cheap production, which enabled us to sell our manufactured goods, both to British overseas and foreign countries, more cheaply than our competitors could do.

Yet, in spite of the beginnings of Imperial Preference, from the end of the nineteenth century onward, the trade exchanges between the Mother Country and the Colonies began to encounter increasingly difficult obstacles. The protective tariffs of the Colonies rose higher and higher, and, although they still had a completely free market for their agricultural produce in the United Kingdom, our manufactured goods had to get over their tariff walls, built to protect their own rising industries. For this reason suggestions that the United Kingdom should revert from a free-trade to a protective-tariff policy found much support in some quarters, particularly during Mr Joseph Chamberlain's campaign for protective tariffs coupled with Imperial Preferences in the opening years of this century. Nevertheless, until the outbreak of the 1914–18 war the tariff system of this country remained wholeheartedly free trade ; the only duties levied, as we have seen, being revenue duties. The first breach in this system came with the McKenna duties of 1915—so called after the Chancellor of the Exchequer at that time, Mr R. McKenna. These duties were meant primarily to restrict luxury imports and release more shipping capacity for purposes essential to the prosecution of the war. But many of them, including those on private and commercial motor vehicles, cinematograph films, musical instruments, and clocks and watches, were retained after the war.

The trading position of the United Kingdom grew increasingly difficult as the nineteenth century closed and the

twentieth century proceeded. The United Kingdom's free-trade policy made it impossible for her to retaliate effectively against protectionist countries, which discriminated against her, and some countries did, in fact, treat her very illiberally. The beginnings of economic nationalism and economic imperialism showed themselves more and more clearly throughout this period, one of the signs being a tendency on the part of countries with colonial empires to control the trade of their colonies as much as possible in their own interests. Indeed, tropical colonies attained their present immense economic importance from 1890 onward. The great improvement and multiplication of means of transport, the increasing dependence of industrialized countries on colonial produce of all kinds for their manufactures, and the richly productive fields provided by the colonies for capital investment all enhanced their value. France and the United States adopted tariff policies during this period which actually assimilated the economic systems of their colonial territories to their own, thus bringing them within the circle of their own strongly protective tariff systems, while Italy also pursued a policy of strictly preferential trade with her dependencies.

The United Kingdom did not remain entirely indifferent to these developments, and from 1898 onward, when an arrangement was made by which a maximum level could be imposed on United Kingdom imports into Rhodesia, various breaches were made in the ' open-door ' policy (a name which explains itself) in regard to the trade of British Colonies and Dependencies. One of the most significant of these breaches was, however, made on the initiative of Canada, which concluded preferential tariff agreements with the West Indies by which she herself, the United Kingdom, and Newfoundland all gained appreciable benefits. In 1904 the duty on the export of tin-ore from Malaya was modified so as to give advantages to United Kingdom tin manufacturers and to those of Australia. Later a similar duty on tin-ore exported from Nigeria was levied with an Imperial preference in favour of British Commonwealth countries.

The results of the war of 1914–18 greatly extended both the policy and the scope of Imperial preferences. As well as the Dominions, from 1922 onward the West Indies also extended their preferences, and they were joined successively by Fiji, Cyprus, Mauritius, Somaliland, Sarawak, Sierra Leone, and the Straits Settlements. There are, however, a number of important British Crown Colonies and Dependencies which are withdrawn from the scope of preferential duties by international agreements. Thus by the Berlin Treaty of 1885 it was agreed that the trade of all nations should enjoy equality in the basin of the Congo river and certain adjoining areas. According to this, Uganda, Kenya, Nyasaland (and now the mandated territory of Tanganyika), parts of Rhodesia and the Sudan are all 'open-door' areas. This treaty was, in effect, continued by the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, concluded in 1919, and there are also bilateral agreements between the United Kingdom and France, concluded in 1898, and the Netherlands, concluded as far back as 1871, guaranteeing equality of treatment for these countries in certain West African territories. Thus after the 1914–18 war the 'open-door' policy in the British Colonies and Dependencies was largely abandoned except in the territories covered by international agreements. We must remember, too, that preferences in Colonial economic systems are not limited to preferential duties on imports and exports. There are also limitations on concessions to develop the natural resources of Colonies. In the Colonial territories of the British Commonwealth the investment of foreign capital for developmental purposes has been generally welcomed and given equal terms with British capital. Nevertheless, there are a few exceptions. For example, in some Colonies the exploitation of oil-fields is limited to British subjects, and where monopolies have been granted there has been a tendency to restrict these to British Companies.

In the United Kingdom itself, the great power-house of the Commonwealth's trade and economic system, the march towards Protection and Imperial Preference proceeded

inexorably after 1919. Following the McKenna Duties, the so-called ' key industries '—that is, various kinds of scientific and other glassware and porcelain, some scientific instruments and electrical goods, certain dye-stuffs, rubber manufactures, metal compounds, and chemicals—received protective duties, and in 1925 came the ' Safeguarding Duties.' These were duties meant to protect any British industry which could show that it was of substantial importance, that it was reasonably efficient, and that it had suffered from the subsidized or uneconomic dumping of foreign products. In fact these latter duties were never of much importance, but, inside the whole body of protective duties built up between 1915 and 1932, the old, one-sided system of preferences by the Dominions and Colonies to the United Kingdom was modified by preferences now given to the Dominions and Colonies, as well as by the preference amounting to about a halfpenny per pound on refined sugar accorded to Empire sugar by the United Kingdom after 1919.

But all these developments were completely overshadowed by the Import Duties Act of 1932. This Act reversed the tariff policy of the United Kingdom, changing the latter from a free trade into a protectionist country. A duty equal to 10 per cent. of their value was levied on all imported goods other than foodstuffs and raw materials, but goods from the overseas countries of the Commonwealth were exempted from the general 10 per cent. duty until November 15, 1932. There was a reason for that date. When the Act was passed it had been already decided to hold an Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa to discuss Commonwealth trade and economic matters, and the Government of the United Kingdom therefore kept the *status quo* so far as imports from the Commonwealth were concerned until after decisions had been taken at Ottawa.

When the delegates from all the Dominions and India met at Ottawa in the summer of 1932 it was obvious that some important decisions would have to be taken. All over the world there was economic distress and mass unemployment, and

countries like Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, whose products and exports were mainly agricultural and raw materials, were particularly badly hit. The reason was that the prices of primary produce—that is, agricultural stuffs and raw materials—were disproportionately low as compared with the prices of manufactured goods which were their principal imports. Moreover, many of the primary-producing countries had large debts, particularly to the United Kingdom, for capital borrowed in the past for purposes of development. The interest on these debts had to be paid in exports, and this, together with the prevailing low prices, had brought many of them to a desperate pitch by 1932. On the other hand, the impoverishment of these countries and their natural markets had hit the United Kingdom and other industrial countries very hard indeed, and they too were in sore economic straits. These conditions all worked together to induce most countries to pursue policies of economic nationalism—that is, policies framed with the single view of protecting national economic interests by means of protective tariffs and other restrictive methods such as import licences. For these reasons the Ottawa Conference was awaited with high expectations by the peoples of the countries represented at it. It was hoped that it would, at any rate, be possible for the Commonwealth countries to make arrangements to trade more freely among themselves, particularly as the United Kingdom was the greatest market in all the world for overseas produce, especially the foodstuffs and many of the raw materials which were the chief products of India and the Dominions, while herself exporting the manufactures of all kinds which formed their staple imports. In the technical phrase, the trade of the United Kingdom and the Dominions was complementary, each side producing what the other side needed. This, however, is reducing the problem of inter-Commonwealth trading to unduly simplified terms, for the Commonwealth, great as it is, comprises no more than a quarter of the world's surface and peoples, and all the Commonwealth countries had to consider the effects of any agreements made at Ottawa on

their trade with foreign countries. Especially was this true of the United Kingdom, which had to find markets for her manufactures all over the world, and, also, was compelled to take many of her imports from those countries in which she had made capital investments, most of them countries with precisely the same sort of agricultural produce to sell as the British overseas countries. It can be easily seen, therefore, that in these circumstances a narrowly restrictive policy of inter-Commonwealth trade would be calculated to harm the Commonwealth countries, and particularly the United Kingdom, rather than benefit them.

A few figures showing the relative importance of inter-Commonwealth and foreign trade to the Commonwealth as a whole, followed by figures relating to the trade of the United Kingdom, will make this point clear. In the year 1928—that is, the beginning of the great world slump, at the lowest point of which the Ottawa Conference was held—almost exactly one-quarter of the total trade of the Commonwealth was accounted for by the trade of members of the Commonwealth with each other. Therefore, three-quarters of its trade was with foreign countries. Further, the part played by foreign countries in the Commonwealth's total trade had been increasing—very slightly, it is true. Nevertheless it had been increasing for some years prior to 1928, and in 1929 it again increased slightly. Broadly, the same was true of the trade of the United Kingdom with the rest of the Commonwealth and with foreign countries. In 1928 something more than a quarter—27 per cent., to be exact—of the total imports into the United Kingdom came from the Commonwealth, while no less a proportion than 42 per cent. of her exports went to other parts of the Commonwealth. This percentage was rather lower than that of the two previous years, but higher than that of 1929. India was far and away the biggest market of the United Kingdom, with Australia second. India was also the largest Commonwealth source of the United Kingdom's imports from Commonwealth countries,* and here also Australia came second.

When we turn to the relative figures for India and the individual Dominions in the years immediately prior to the Ottawa Conference we see that of the total imports of each one of them, Canada alone excepted, half, or more than half, came from the United Kingdom. Conversely, the latter was in practically every case the most important market for these same countries, and, as economic nationalism strengthened its grip on the nations, the market of the United Kingdom tended to grow in importance to the other Commonwealth countries.

These are the bare figures of imports and exports. They take no account of re-exports and the complications which ensue from the fact that a country's foreign trade is not a simple bilateral operation, a deal or bargain between two countries in which goods are exchanged for goods. If one country has an unfavourable balance of trade with another—that is, if country A has bought more from country B than B has bought from A, the latter can offset its unfavourable balance with B by means of a favourable balance with a third country or a fourth or a fifth, and so on. And it must always be remembered that many of the United Kingdom's imports in those years, both from Commonwealth and foreign countries alike, represented the payment of interests on loans and not payments for exports of goods. Nevertheless, the figures quoted give a broad picture of the trading-position of the Commonwealth, and particularly of the United Kingdom, at the time of the Ottawa Conference. Here we had a number of countries trading together under some conditions, and even some specific preferential agreements peculiar to themselves, forming a world-wide Commonwealth and Empire; with economic interests which in many cases were complementary, and with a conviction that they could help each other, and thus set an example to a world that was sick of economic nationalism and its ruinous consequences. What system of Commonwealth trade emerged from the Conference?

Only the broadest results can be given here, for the detailed agreements and schedules show a bewildering multiplicity of

details. As might be expected from the statement given above of the position of the United Kingdom as a world trader, the object of her representatives was to reduce the tariffs of the Dominions on her goods, because, in their eyes, all tariffs were bad, and the United Kingdom had accepted a policy of protective tariffs only because this had been forced on her by world conditions. To the Dominions and India, on the other hand, tariffs were necessary to ensure the growth of their industries and thus enable them to achieve balanced economic systems, which are the necessary foundations of social welfare and political and national power. Therefore, the United Kingdom delegates argued in favour of lowering tariffs among the Commonwealth countries rather than raising the general tariff walls still higher against the rest of the world. That ideal was only partly achieved. Thus, although the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India granted some new or additional preferences to each other, they did so partly by raising some tariffs against foreign goods and partly by lowering some tariffs in favour of Commonwealth goods. Further, the United Kingdom guaranteed equal privileges in its markets to all the overseas Commonwealth countries except the then Irish Free State, with which no agreement was made. Next Canada, Australia, and New Zealand agreed to administer their preferential tariffs according to certain general principles, these principles to be applied by tribunals independent of the respective Governments. The exporters of the United Kingdom were to be free to state their cases to these tribunals before decisions of interest to them were taken. There were various other agreements or groups of agreements made at the Ottawa Conference. Some of them, for example, related to the abolition, as soon as possible, of a number of restrictions on overseas trade, which had grown up during the slump, such things as actual prohibitions of imports, surtaxes on imports, and so on. But perhaps the most valuable of all the ideas which found acceptance at the Conference was that of a general formula to regulate the maximum height of protective tariffs within the Commonwealth.

One other result of the Ottawa Agreements is worth noticing, for by it the Colonies and Dependencies were brought into closer relationship than before with the economic systems of the self-governing Dominions. Every one of the separate agreements between the latter and the United Kingdom contained two clauses. The first of these bound the Government of the United Kingdom to " invite the Governments of the non-self-governing Colonies and Protectorates to accord to [the Dominion concerned] any preferences which may, for the time being, be accorded to any other parts of the British Empire." The second clause bound the Dominion concerned to accord to the non-self-governing Colonies any preferences for the time being accorded to the United Kingdom. For the first time, therefore, the members of the Commonwealth, self-governing and non-self-governing alike, were linked together by preferences reciprocally conferred. Prior to the Ottawa Conference only the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand had granted any preferences to the Colonies. By 1932 the trade between the Colonies and the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth had grown to important dimensions. Eleven per cent. of the exports from the United Kingdom went to the Colonies, which, in addition, bought almost as much from the remaining Dominions combined as they did from the United Kingdom.

At the outbreak of the Second World War the general trading position between members of the Commonwealth was as follows: In 1932 12 per cent. of the United Kingdom's total exports went to the Colonies and 8 per cent. of her total imports came from the Colonies. In the same year the Colonies took about one-quarter of their total imports from the United Kingdom and sent to her about one-third of their total exports. Trade with the Colonies was a smaller but not neglected part of Dominion trade. Before the War Canada's imports from the Colonies were 6 per cent. of her total, consisting mainly of sugar, bananas, coconut products, coffee, tea, cocoa, vegetable-oils, rubber, tin—affecting all the principal groups of Colonies, but mainly the West Indies, Ceylon

and Malaya. Her exports to the Colonies were 3 per cent. of the total (mainly flour, shoes, motors, textiles, and timber, half of these exports going to the West Indies). Australia's Colonial imports were 4 per cent. of her total (similar composition plus phosphates, except that she protected her own sugar and bananas to the exclusion and annoyance of Fiji); Malaya, Nauru, and Ceylon are therefore the principal sources of her Colonial imports. Her exports were 4 per cent. of her total, and went mainly to Malaya, Hong Kong, Ceylon, and Fiji. New Zealand's Colonial imports were 3 per cent. of her total (sugar, bananas, phosphates, tea, etc.) mainly coming from Ceylon, Fiji, and Nauru. Her exports were less than 1 per cent. The Union of South Africa's imports from the Colonies were only 2 per cent. of the total (Ceylon and East Africa) and exports 2 per cent., mainly to Northern Rhodesia and East Africa. India's imports were 9 per cent. (Uganda, Malaya, and Ceylon), and her exports 8 per cent. (Malaya, Ceylon, Hong Kong, and elsewhere).

It is not easy to say what was the specific effect of the Ottawa Agreements on the trade of the Commonwealth. That they led to no spectacular increases in the trade of Commonwealth countries with each other is certain. The trade figures show that. But what cannot be proved is that the agreements did not prevent the trade of the Commonwealth countries from falling to lower levels than it did. For throughout the 1930's the strangulation of international trade went on. Tariffs ceased to be the principal agents of control and restriction in overseas trade. Governments began more and more to control the imports into their countries by issuing licences to import, by themselves purchasing certain commodities in bulk, by controlling investment and movements of capital, and even by prohibiting the imports of certain classes of commodities outright. It is only reasonable to suppose that the Ottawa Agreements mitigated this restrictive process as far as the countries of the Commonwealth were concerned. At any rate, they did ban prohibitive tariff duties on Commonwealth trade inside the Commonwealth, a ban which obviously

must have had some beneficial effect. But we have just seen that there are other and even more powerful obstructions to trade than tariffs, and in the years following the Ottawa Conference a number of Commonwealth countries deliberately restricted the imports of certain commodities. For example, the United Kingdom made certain cuts in the imports of beef and dairy products, cuts which had important effects on the trade, among others, of Australia and New Zealand. In Australia particularly some opposition to the Ottawa Agreements was declared on this account. It was argued that the manufacturing interests of the country had been sacrificed to the interests of the primary producer, and that even the latter was now being robbed of his Ottawa prize by the United Kingdom's restriction of Australia's primary produce. And so it was in other cases.

Even this brief discussion of the Ottawa Conference, which was far and away the most determined attempt made since the old Colonies became fully self-governing Dominions to devise a system of preferential trade agreements for the benefit of the whole Commonwealth, shows what a complicated business this is. There is no getting away from the fact that every one of the Commonwealth countries needs to increase its trade with foreign countries as its industries and agriculture expand, as the standards of living of its peoples improve, and as its national economy comes into more and more intimate relations with the world's trading and economic system. This is only another way of saying that the British Commonwealth is not, and cannot be, self-sufficient either economically or politically. Indeed, for some of the countries of the Commonwealth it is an advantage, or, indeed, a positive necessity, that its sister countries should trade with foreign countries.

Let us take the case of the United Kingdom's trade with the United States. This country imports vastly more from the U.S.A. than it exports thither. The greater part of the raw cotton on which Lancashire's vitally important cotton industry depends, the greater part of our tobacco, our petrol imports, and so on; all these imports are paid for, not by exports

from the United Kingdom, but by tin and rubber from Malaya, hides and skins from India, cocoa from West Africa, and so on. But many of these exports from Commonwealth countries to the United States represent interest on British capital invested in the rubber and tin industries in Malaya, in West African economic development, and the like. One of the crying needs of our United Kingdom economic system is precisely that the United States shall trade more freely with British Commonwealth countries, so as to put them and us in possession of American dollars to buy the American goods and foodstuffs which we need so badly. At the International Tariff Conference held in Geneva in 1947 an important objective of the United Kingdom was to persuade the United States to use less of its own synthetically prepared rubber and more of Malaya's natural rubber, so that the latter could earn dollars in the United States.

It is worth while going a little deeper into this question in order to understand more fully the complexity of the subject, and, also, to see the importance of the Commonwealth's trade as a whole—that is, with foreign as well as British countries—to its members. Before the Second World War the United Kingdom imported from the United States, on an average, six times as much as she exported to that country, about a hundred and twenty million pounds' worth of imports as against twenty million pounds' worth of exports. Canada too had a heavy import surplus from the United States, her exports thither being only about 60 per cent. of her imports. South Africa too, on a much smaller total of trade, had a balance of U.S.A. imports over her exports to that country. Australia and India had just a small balance of exports over imports with the U.S.A., and New Zealand, on a very small turnover, balanced her imports and exports. The Colonies and Dependencies, on the other hand, had a large balance of exports to the U.S.A., raw materials and certain tropical foodstuffs accounting for this. It was this balance plus South Africa's gold shipments to the United States, the latter's vast tourist expenditure in Canada, and the United Kingdom's

shipping and other kinds of ' invisible ' exports which, in the end, finally squared in normal years the whole Commonwealth's balance of trade with the United States.

The importance of the United Kingdom's investments both in the Commonwealth and outside it has become clear from what has already been said, but a few words on this subject will be useful. It has been estimated that at the outbreak of the Second World War this country had about three thousand two hundred and fifty million pounds invested overseas. Roughly, two thousand millions were invested in the Commonwealth, the overwhelmingly greater part of this being in the Dominions, Newfoundland, and North and South Rhodesia, with two-thirds of the remainder being in India, Burma, and Ceylon. This capital was invested in all manner of productive undertakings, as well as in transport facilities and other necessary adjuncts to production. In the chapter devoted to Colonial development we gained some knowledge of what the productive investment of capital in the new countries can mean. Very many of our pre-War investments have now gone, sold to finance our war effort, and now we must begin again. Enough has been said to show that both the United Kingdom and the other British investing countries cannot confine their investments entirely to the Commonwealth, but it is clear also that the Commonwealth affords ample scope for investment, and that investment there is both economically and politically desirable. In investment in productive enterprises, including all forms of transport, we have the best, the safest, and the most natural foundations for inter-Commonwealth economic exchanges and the expansion of inter-Commonwealth trade.

The Ottawa preferential system held as the framework of inter-Commonwealth trade until the War, in spite of such setbacks as the denunciation of the Agreement by India, largely as a political gesture, and the legitimate objections of the great trading entrepôts like Singapore, Colombo, and Hong Kong to anything which limited those activities of a free market on which their prosperity had been built. Primary

producers, at any rate, in practically every part of the Commonwealth clung to them and still cling to them, and a country like Canada, whose trade is mainly with the United States, but who finds very great difficulties in exporting to that country, knows that trade with the United Kingdom is essential to her welfare. For this reason the Geneva Tariff Conference of 1947 witnessed a strong opposition on the part of all members of the Commonwealth to any attempt to abolish, or even to weaken seriously, the system of Commonwealth preferences. The Conference was held, largely on United States initiative, to devise a freer system of international trade by the lowering of tariffs and the removal of the other barriers to freer trade which we have already noticed. In particular, the Americans attacked the British Commonwealth preferences, but so strong was the support for these on the side of the Commonwealth that in the end the system was left substantially intact. Our survey in this chapter has shown something of the value and also something of the limitations of tariff preferences. They have their part to play, but the best way to stimulate and perpetuate inter-Commonwealth trade and strengthen the Commonwealth's economic foundation is to develop its vast natural resources by Commonwealth capital investments, to promote the social welfare of its peoples, and to strengthen the cultural, racial, traditional, and other ties which hold them together.

CHAPTER XIII

MIGRATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH

LIKE all the other major problems of the British Commonwealth, the problem of migration is constantly changing. All its factors change, both in their own characters and in their relation one to another, as conditions of all sorts—social, economic, and political—change inside the Commonwealth and in the world at large. The conditions which govern migration from Great Britain to Australia or Canada, for example, are very different now from what they were a hundred years ago. Then Canada and Australia were infant agricultural countries with plenty of spare land for farmer settlers. The United Kingdom, though the leading industrial country in the world, still had half of its population engaged in agriculture, and, with her numbers growing rapidly—the population of England and Wales quadrupled during the nineteenth century—she was able to supply large numbers of emigrants, a high proportion of whom had been born and bred on the land. Contrast this with the situation to-day. During recent decades the population of Great Britain has not only begun to tend towards decline, but has become preponderantly industrial. But the overseas Dominions themselves have by now become industrial as well as agricultural countries. It is true that their agricultural and primary industries still have a more important place than the manufacturing industries in their national economies, but the gap is being steadily narrowed. Normally, recruits to industrial occupations in any country are provided by the natural increase of the population, by attracting labour from agriculture, and, where necessary, by immigration from outside. It seems as though a period of intensive industrial development lies in front of the Dominions, and that their immigration

policy will be to favour the admission of skilled labour rather than settlers on the land. The latter will certainly be needed in all the Dominions for some time to come, but skilled workers in such industries as building, engineering, iron and steel making, and so on will be in greater demand for some years to come.

The fact is that economic and industrial conditions in the Dominions are now as complicated as in the United Kingdom itself. They have been drawn more and more into the main stream of the world's economic life during the past century, and world conditions dominate their economic welfare, and, consequently, their capacity to receive and absorb immigrants. Thus, although, as we shall see later, there is still an urgent demand for British immigrants in the overseas Dominions, and readiness on the part of British people to supply the demand, the problem of migration has changed completely during the last two or three generations. Moreover, in considering the change in the problem of migration we cannot confine our attention only to the British Commonwealth. Conditions all over the world affect migration to-day, and not only economic conditions. Centres of population pressure are not the same as they were in the nineteenth century. The populations of some countries which were then expanding are now stationary or declining, while those of others are expanding rapidly.

In the latter group are countries like Russia, Japan, and India. Russia has plenty of spare land and most of the necessary economic resources to accommodate her population increase for generations to come, but Japan and India are in a very different position. The pressure of population on Japan's land and resources has already had the gravest results for the world, and India's emigration problem, as we shall see, raises the most formidable difficulties in inter-Commonwealth relations. In fact, as Japan and India remind us—and other instances could be given from such European countries as Italy—the problem of migration is now no longer one merely of economics and the readiness of individuals to emigrate.

Questions of national power and defence, of war and international power-politics, all come in. So do such imponderables as theories of racial purity, and such practical matters as the maintenance of national standards of living. In short, the problem of migration to-day is one of exceeding complexity.

Inside the British Commonwealth, with the one exception of India, the problem of migration is greatly simplified. Its economic aspects are no less complicated and difficult, but the equally important political and social aspects are far easier. The 'countries of immigration'—that is, as far as white settlers are concerned, the Dominions and Southern Rhodesia—which still require immigrants, prefer British immigrants to any others, and enter into schemes of reciprocal benefit with the Government of the United Kingdom for their supply. In fact, as far as the Dominions of British settlement are concerned—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—the problem of migration from the United Kingdom is almost the whole problem. There are, however, two exceptions to this general statement. Both the French Canadians and the Afrikaners in South Africa have reservations in this matter of British immigration since they fear that it may tilt the racial balance against them.

The broad position at present is that all these four countries want British immigrants, practically as many as they can get. But, naturally, they want young and vigorous people, and, as we have seen, for the most part skilled in such trades as building and engineering, who will be valuable nation-building assets. But these are precisely the people who are needed at home, and, further, the population trend of Great Britain is a factor of major importance in this question. Let us look at this feature. During the sixty years from 1870 to 1930 the net annual gain of population in this country fell from 1·39 per cent., in the decade 1871–81, to ·40 per cent. in the five years ending with 1929. The fall was continuous except for two slight fluctuations in the years 1891–1901 and 1921–25. This means that in sixty years the annual increase in the

population of the United Kingdom fell by more than two-thirds. Recently the British birth-rate has shown an upward trend, but the influence of the falling birth-rate of the last few decades will be felt for a good many years to come, and during the first post-War years it has already shown itself in a severe shortage of labour in some essential industries in this country.

Nevertheless, the Dominions of British settlement want British immigrants for a variety of reasons. All of them are expanding their manufacturing industries on account of national security as well as from economic motives, all of them are concerned with the problem of manpower in connexion with national defence as well as industry, and in all of them, except French Canada, the birth-rate trends are such as to lead to an ultimate decline in population. In the past Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa have all drawn on this country for their immigrants—Australia and New Zealand almost entirely, Canada and South Africa very largely, especially since the beginning of the nineteenth century. During the hundred years ending in 1914 twenty million persons emigrated from the British Isles, but thirteen and a half millions of these went to the United States. However, about four millions went to Canada, two and a quarter millions to Australia and New Zealand, and about three-quarters of a million to the two South African Colonies of Natal and the Cape.

There were various causes for this vast wave of emigration, which illustrates perfectly the operations of the two great forces of ' push and pull ' in all migration. It is the push of inferior conditions at home, combined with the pull of more attractive conditions overseas, which accounts for the greater part of emigration the world over. In the early decades of the nineteenth century the economic depression which followed the Napoleonic wars strengthened the hands of those who recommended emigration as a relief to the prevailing poverty. Consequently, intending emigrants were given some assistance to emigrate, but not necessarily to British overseas countries.

The rate of emigration was not uniform. It varied according to economic conditions in the United Kingdom, and to the prevailing political and even philosophic theories. Thus, the widely accepted doctrine of Malthus, who taught that population would always increase to the limit of the available resources for its support unless prevented by the natural checks of war, famine, and disease, inevitably caused emigration to be regarded as a more humane method of regulating population than the 'natural' checks of Malthus. Gibbon Wakefield, one of the most famous of the 'Colonial Reformers' of the first half of the nineteenth century, advocated emigration based on a practical method of land settlement as a bridge between the Mother Country and her Colonies. His scheme proved to be one of the soundest and most fruitful of all the schemes for the transfer of British men and women to the British Colonies.

The industrial depression of the 1840's, the "hungry forties," led to a great wave of emigration from the British Isles, but, again, not all to countries inside the Commonwealth. But in the 1850's conditions improved in this country, and although more than one and a half million emigrants went to the United States and the British Colonies between 1850 and 1854, the number fell during the next five years to half of this figure. The gold discoveries in Australia and New Zealand partly counteracted the effects of better conditions at home during this period, but in Canada there was economic depression and some political unrest in this period which greatly reduced her demand for settlers. In South Africa the white settlers were finding it hard to compete with the natives, and the demand of Cape Colony and Natal for immigrants was only small. Again, after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 there was a wave of emigration from this country owing to industrial depression arising largely from the growing competition with our exports in world markets from the United States and Germany.

Then, towards the end of the nineteenth century, other considerations began to enter into the question of emigration

from this country to the Colonies. Broad considerations of co-operation in measures for imperial solidarity and security were linked to considerations of trade and economics. The idea found favour that it would be sound policy to distribute the white population of the Commonwealth more uniformly, a view that is being more and more widely held to-day. Economic and trade advantage was seen in the process. It was argued that the agricultural development of the Colonies would be speeded up and their markets would be more valuable for British exports. Therefore the Mother Country and the Colonies alike would benefit from this process, and the strength of the Commonwealth as a whole would be increased. The Imperial Conference of 1907 advocated the settlement of British nationals in British countries, and the Conference of 1911 wanted to see practical co-operation between all the countries concerned to achieve this end. In 1912 a Dominions Royal Commission was set up to examine the question of the development of the Dominions' resources. In its final report in 1917 the Commission stressed the argument that the organization of emigration from the United Kingdom to the Dominions was at the heart of the whole problem of developing the vast resources of the Dominions and increasing the power of the Commonwealth as a whole. In 1918 the United Kingdom Government created an Overseas Settlement Committee to give help and advice in the matter of emigration to the overseas countries of the Commonwealth and to foreign countries.

The slump which quickly followed the 1914–18 war caused the Committee to say in its report for 1920 that the United Kingdom now had a surplus population, at any rate for the present, and in 1922 it recommended a policy of State-aided migration as the best cure for unemployment at home and the best means of fostering the industrial development of the Dominions and increasing inter-Commonwealth trade. Nevertheless, the report made it clear that the Committee looked to emigration to the Dominions chiefly as a means of developing their primary resources, since large-scale

industrialization in those countries lay still in the future. A special Conference held at the Colonial Office in 1921 also stressed the prime importance of settlement on the land and recommended a scheme of aid for intending emigrants, who should be selected and approved by the Governments concerned. The Dominions were ready to co-operate in such a scheme, and at the Imperial Conference of 1921 all the delegates except those from South Africa, who were unable to join the others because of certain domestic labour troubles of their own, agreed to a system of State-aided migration from the United Kingdom. Accordingly, in 1922 the Empire Settlement Act was passed, which provided for " co-operation by the Secretary of State for the Colonies [the Dominions Office did not come into existence until 1925] with any Dominion Government or with any approved private organizations in carrying out agreed schemes." The Act provided for an expenditure of three million pounds a year, of which one million was to be spent in training intending emigrants and on assisted passages, while the remaining two millions were to be devoted to financing enterprises in the Dominions in connexion with the scheme. The Dominions concerned were to contribute a sum equal to that received by them from the United Kingdom.

Australia and New Zealand, and to a lesser extent Canada, all made arrangements for settling British immigrants on the land under this scheme, but the results did not come up to expectations. In fact, emigration in the following few years was well below the pre-1914 figure, and even below the figure for 1920 before the scheme came into operation. Nevertheless, the Imperial Conference of 1923 still believed (to quote from its resolution on this subject) that " the development of the vast open spaces would quicken the rhythm of general economic activities and so overthrow depression." But still the number of emigrants from the United Kingdom continued to decline, and only twice, during the years 1919 and 1930, did their numbers equal even half the number of emigrants in 1914. Nevertheless, renewed efforts were made by the

United Kingdom Government to increase emigration by means of land settlement. In 1925 a scheme was agreed with Australia which was to cost thirty-four million pounds, and provision was also made for the settlement of three thousand families in Canada on farms that had already been prepared. The Australian scheme was a failure owing to the high cost of creating farms in that country and the poor quality of much of the land available for settlement. The Canadian scheme was at first successful, and, in fact, more than three thousand families were settled. But the world economic slump of the late 1920's and early 1930's ruined many of the settlers, who had to abandon their farms. Thus, by 1930 the flow of emigrants from this country had diminished to a mere trickle, and between that year and 1933 the number of emigrants returning to the United Kingdom was about equal to those going out.

The Imperial Conference of 1931 examined the position and came to the sound conclusion that in the modern world the absorptive capacity of the countries to which the emigrants were going was more important than the conditions in the countries they were leaving. They recognized, too, that increase in the absorptive capacity of the Dominions depended on the existence of an outlet in external markets for their produce, and on an adequate supply of capital to support new developments. In these reflections the Imperial Conference struck the keynote of present-day thinking on the subject of emigration. Clearly the capacity of a country to absorb emigrants is at the root of the problem, and the old schemes of land settlement are now only one of the elements of a migration policy, since, as we know, all the Dominions are expanding industrially and the new labour they want is largely skilled labour. The agriculture of the Dominions will certainly be developed, but it will be part of a general economic development in which agriculture, industry, and commerce will all play their parts. The need of all the Dominions for immigrants for reasons of national power and security must perforce be governed by these general economic considerations.

So, after 1930, the problem of migration was examined afresh by a Committee of the Economic Advisory Council under Lord Astor. Two fundamental questions called for answer—namely, Is it in the interests of the Dominions to encourage British immigrants ?, and, secondly, Is it in the interests of the United Kingdom to encourage emigration to the Dominions ? The Committee took a wide view of these problems, taking into account the trends of the United Kingdom's birth-rate and the basic economic conditions of this country and the Dominions. They came to the conclusion that a steady flow of British migrants to the Dominions should be maintained, but made it clear that this opinion was not based on economic grounds alone. They took into account the importance of maintaining the British character of the Commonwealth, the general desirability of redistributing the white population of the Commonwealth, and other similar ' intangibles.' Indeed, the Committee admitted that the influence of economic forces might even be adverse to migration from this country to the Commonwealth.

The Astor Committee reported in 1932, and two years later a Committee comprised of representatives of various Departments of the Government of the United Kingdom examined the question afresh and came to the conclusion that in normal times a flow of immigration into the Dominions as great as in past times might be achieved by what they called " infiltration." By this they meant that in future no settlements would be formed by large-scale planned immigration, but that emigrants would go to the Dominions as they found openings and opportunities there. This theory of infiltration had no time to be properly tested before the outbreak of the Second World War. The fact is that by the end of the 1930's more emigrants were returning to this country than went from it, although the signs in 1939 were that there was about to be once more a net outflow of migrants.

Nevertheless, conditions in the Dominions were not favourable even then for large-scale emigration. Canadian emigration to the United States was being limited by American

legislation, and, therefore, there were reasons for believing that her own natural increase would largely supply her needs for new labour. New Zealand did not want any large-scale immigration, preferring to make her own economic and social conditions attractive enough to induce settlers to come of their own accord. Only in Australia did the opening up of new industries and increased capital investment hold out any prospect of increased demands for labour. On the whole, the outbreak of the Second World War came at a time when there were no really large openings for immigration to the Dominions.

Finally, in 1936, the Overseas Settlement Board was created to advise on migration to the overseas countries of the Commonwealth. In 1938 it issued the last of its reports, a comprehensive and instructive document. It recommended that emigration to the Dominions should be revived, but in such a way and on such a scale as not to weaken the position of the United Kingdom. The main reason it gave for the resumption of emigration to the Dominions was to offset the results of their declining birth-rates. The Board noted that the overflow from this country had almost ceased, and they advised the Dominions to consider the possibility of getting immigrants from other countries, " preferably from those countries whose inhabitants were sprung originally from the same stock as ourselves and who share our outlook in many directions." Thus the Board laid down two important principles. First, that immigration into the Dominions could no longer be British only, because of the population and birth-rate problems both of the United Kingdom and the Dominions ; secondly, that the problem of future migration was an international problem. Certainly let the Dominions get what British immigrants they could while they could, but other countries of kindred peoples must be drawn on. In fact, the problem of Commonwealth migration now was to create conditions—by freeing international trade and the movement of peoples, and by making the fullest possible use of the resources of the Dominions by the number of British people

available for the work—which would enable British nationals to infiltrate. The encouragement of migration by direct Government assistance was, in the opinion of the Board, of minor importance. It is true that the Empire Settlement Act of 1922 was renewed in 1937, but its provisions were on a small scale, and were, in effect, a support of the principle of infiltration.

We have examined our experience of planned and encouraged migration in some detail, because it brings out all the fundamental factors of the migration problems of to-day and the new future. This country will no longer be able to supply the vast numbers of emigrants which she supplied in the past, but she can still supply a fair number. As the experience of the post-War years has shown, and is showing, very large numbers of British men and women want to go to the Dominions, and the latter want to receive them. We have seen that all the Dominions are entering on a period of industrial and general economic expansion, and that, for some years to come, they will be able to absorb all the British immigrants who can make their way to them. The planned migration of the past is in abeyance. The process now is that of infiltration. The demand comes from all the Dominions, and the Dominion Governments have been active in making arrangements for transport for migrants, and, generally, making their movement as easy and speedy as possible. Southern Rhodesia, too, is a claimant for British settlers, and a large number will make their way to that country in the years ahead. Australia and New Zealand are particularly anxious to get as many British immigrants as possible for security as well as economic reasons, and there is a vigorous movement of migrants from the United Kingdom to those two Dominions, a movement which grows in volume as transport facilities become available. It is certain, too, that all the Dominions will receive suitable immigrants from foreign countries. But now we can understand what a complicated business migration has now become. The ultimate deciding factor in a Dominion's capacity to receive immigrants is its

economic position, and this in turn depends largely on world conditions.

Finally, something must be said about one of the most difficult of all the problems of Commonwealth migration—that of Indians. There are about three million Indians in the Commonwealth outside India, most of them in Ceylon, the West Indies, Malaya, East and South Africa, Mauritius, and Hong Kong. Apart from South Africa, which has nearly a quarter of a million Indians, none of the other Dominions of white settlement has more than a negligible number. All these Dominions now have a ban on the immigration of non-white peoples, and they now admit practically no Indians. This is, of course, a cause of offence in India, but, apart from South Africa, Indians in the 'white' Dominions are subject to no disabilities, and the Government of India has no quarrel with them on that account. But the relations between India and South Africa have been strained for years owing to the various disabilities imposed there by law on Indians in that country, many of whom belong to families which have been settled there for a century. In the early days of Natal's development Indians were brought over to work on the land, and many of them made their homes in the Colony. Indian traders and professional men followed, and, in fact, Indians have played no small part in the general progress of Natal. Indeed, in 1947 India brought the question of the treatment of her nationals in South Africa before the United Nations. In East Africa, too, notably in Kenya, there are one or two points still in dispute between India and the Colonial Office, but the situation there is, at any rate, better than it was twenty-five years ago and should, on the whole, improve rather than deteriorate. But the population of India is expanding, and the problem of emigration is an important one for her, and will require much statesmanship on the part of her leaders as well as those of the United Kingdom, of South Africa, and of the other Dominions and the Colonies for its satisfactory solution.

CHAPTER XIV

DEFENCE

IT is worth while remembering that the most important question discussed at the first Commonwealth Conference ever held—that of 1887—was Commonwealth defence. This question has never been far away from the thoughts of the Commonwealth statesmen who have represented their countries at the Conferences since 1887, and at times it has occupied their minds to the exclusion of all other topics. In 1887 the Dominions were still Colonies, and their defence was practically entirely the responsibility of the United Kingdom. The Royal Navy was undisputed mistress of the seas, and no hostile forces could cross the seas to attack either the Motherland or any of her colonies in face of the Navy's supremacy. Nevertheless, the shadow of coming events had already begun to lengthen across the world, and from 1887 onward questions of Colonial, then of Imperial, and now of Commonwealth, defence have occupied a large part of the proceedings of the Imperial Conferences held between that year and the outbreak of the Second World War. The conditions of Commonwealth defence have changed mightily in some respects during these sixty years. In other respects they have remained unaltered. Obviously the things that have not altered are the facts of world geography—the location of Commonwealth countries and strategic bases and the seas which both divide and unite them—and the enduring solidarity of the Commonwealth itself. But all other things have changed out of recognition. No longer is the Royal Navy the undisputed mistress of the seas. No longer, indeed, is the battleship, with her attendant smaller warships, the queen of the seas. The aeroplane and the submarine, the amazingly ingenious and destructive mines which have been developed, and, lastly,

the atomic bomb have made the very existence of surface fleets in the future a matter of doubt. Armies and their equipment, at least much of it, can now be taken by air over sea and land and dropped where they are to fight. Fleets of bombers can destroy industrial plants and the homes and lives of the people who work in them, flying hundreds of miles in a night, and striking crippling blows far behind the fighting-line. The very latest refinements of science in the shape of radar, wireless, atomic and bacterial warfare, all affect deeply the problems of Commonwealth defence, and, above all, armies, aircraft, and fighting-ships cannot be produced on the scale needed for major wars to-day except by countries of large population and highly developed industry. In a word, technological development has, during the past half-century, turned war into a total conflict in which all the people of the warring countries are engaged, old and young, combatants and non-combatants, male and female alike.

This is the broad background against which we must examine the problem of Commonwealth defence, and, in view of what has just been said, we see that every one of the aspects of the Commonwealth hitherto discussed in this book has a bearing on this supreme problem of defence. The growth of trade, industry, and migration, the agricultural and mineral wealth of the Commonwealth, even the health and contentment of its peoples, all these things are factors in the defence and security of the Commonwealth. Yet, with all the many changes that have occurred since 1887, the United Kingdom is still the head and front of the Commonwealth's defence. Here are the greatest concentration of industry, the leadership in science, the strongest armies, navies, and air forces in the Commonwealth, and she still holds two-thirds at least of the Commonwealth's white population. But the aeroplane and the atomic bomb, the submarine and others of the new weapons have now nullified most of the former advantages of her geographical position with the sea between her and the Continent, and, also, have made immeasurably more difficult the supreme task of bringing to her people the food and raw

materials which they must have from overseas if they are to survive.

Speaking in the House of Commons, eighteen months before the outbreak of the Second World War, the Prime Minister (Mr Neville Chamberlain) stated the aims of the defence policy of the United Kingdom in the following order of priority. First, the defence of the United Kingdom and the trade-routes on which she depends for her supplies. Next, the defence of Commonwealth territories overseas, and, thirdly, co-operation in the defence of the territories of any allies we might have.

These priorities remain in the same order, but the experience of the War shows that in any 'global' conflict (and every major war will, in future, be 'global'—that is, will embrace the whole world in its scope) the overseas territories of the Commonwealth will not, in fact, be able to rely automatically on United Kingdom naval, military, and air forces. It is obvious that a new pattern of Commonwealth defence will have to be shaped. The overseas territories of the Commonwealth—particularly, of course, the Dominions—must enlarge their responsibility for their own defence, each according to the measure of its population and resources, and 'regional' systems of security will probably have to be evolved. We saw in Chapter X what we mean by 'regional' schemes. In the South Pacific area, for example, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom are jointly concerned with the problem of security. One of the few certain things in international relations is that if there is another war the British Commonwealth and the United States will be on the same side.

Again, in the North Pacific and North Atlantic regions, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada are concerned. In the North Atlantic particularly security not only depends on joint action between these three Powers, but is impossible under any other conditions. On the other hand, assuming it to be axiomatic that there always will be such joint action, it is difficult to see how any other Power or combination of Powers can seriously threaten the English-speaking

nations here. In the North Pacific the position is somewhat different. It cannot be taken simply for granted that Japan will never revive as a world Power, while Russia also is a North Pacific Power.

Another vitally important strategic area is the Indian Ocean, with its most sensitive nerve-centre in its northerly extension, the Persian Gulf. Here a number of Powers are interested. Of the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Malaya are concerned. Holland and France, China and Portugal, outside the Commonwealth all have very important interests, and the United States' new rôle as an active world Power brings in that country also. Hitherto the defence system in the Indian Ocean has been firmly based on a combination of British sea- and air-power and Indian land-power, but that combination has been disrupted by the partition of the old Indian Empire into the two Dominions of India and Pakistan. The strong and efficient Indian Army of the past has been dissolved, and it will be some years before India and Pakistan can replace it by two modern, well-equipped, and well-trained Dominion armies.

Moreover, India and Pakistan, although they have vitally important joint interests in matters of defence, have also some divergent interests. Pakistan is a Moslem country, and both geography and natural interests will turn her eyes towards the other Moslem countries of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East—Afghanistan, Persia, Iraq, Arabia, and Egypt. India has greater interests in East and South Africa, in Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies, and China. Some of Pakistan's activities in foreign policy will have but little interest for India. Some may even be distasteful to her. The same can be said of Pakistan's attitude towards some of India's foreign political activities. And yet, from the point of view of defence, the unity of India remains. The north-western highway leads into India as well as into Pakistan. An embroilment between India and any Power in South-eastern Asia cannot leave Pakistan unmoved. Eastern Bengal,

which is separated from the main body of Pakistan by a thousand miles of Indian territory, is inevitably involved in any external attack on India, and, in any case, there are no natural frontiers between these two new Dominions.

It may be that the Mediterranean will lose some of its strategic importance for the Commonwealth in the coming air age, but at present it is still the main route to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, Australia, and New Zealand. Now that the United States has decided to take an active part in the affairs of Europe, the Mediterranean has become as much an American as a British 'lake,' and, as far as the Commonwealth is concerned, the defence of the Mediterranean must remain chiefly a United Kingdom responsibility shared with the United States and France.

This review of the importance to the Commonwealth of these main strategic areas of the world shows us how much mixed up with each other are the interests not only of the Commonwealth countries in these areas, but also those of the Commonwealth and some foreign countries, and first and foremost with the United States. In every one of them the United Kingdom and the Dominions find their defence and security problems all postulating friendship with the great English-speaking country which is not of the Commonwealth, and, in fact, at the heart of the external and defence policies of all the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth is the principle of friendship with the United States. Enough has been said to show that this principle is now one of the central buttresses of Commonwealth defence.

After this quick run round the world we may now turn to a more detailed examination of the specific conditions and problems of Commonwealth defence. Until aircraft supersede ships as carriers of the world's trade and as the principal means of human travel overseas the defence of the Commonwealth will still rest primarily on sea-power, the ability to keep open and operate those vital ocean routes which bring us our food and raw materials and enable us in this country to receive help from our kinsmen overseas, and to help them

in return. A generation ago the maintenance of sea-power was a matter of fighting ships and merchant vessels, but to-day aircraft are as essential an element as ships, and naval strategy and warfare become combined operations in which the sea, air, and land arms all play their part. It sounds like a paradox, but it is the simple truth that the most important factor in the effectiveness of a navy which, like the Royal Navy, has world-wide duties is the possession of land bases. These are necessary to enable the ships to refuel, to undergo repairs, to shelter if necessary under the protection of shore batteries, booms, mine-fields, and so on, and, generally, to return to as a man returns to his home after his day's work.

The Commonwealth is well supplied with bases, and, since naval defence is becoming more and more a joint affair of sea and aircraft, these bases should be regarded as serving both our naval and our aerial defence. There are five main ocean highways in the world, and Commonwealth bases guard or control them all. The first of these highways is that from the United Kingdom to Canada and the United States, a short route of between two and three thousand miles. At its eastern end it is inshore from Western Ireland to its home ports, while at its western end are the base of Halifax, in Nova Scotia, and the bases in Newfoundland leased to the United States. Along this route the dangers to be feared are from raiders and submarines, and Eire's neutrality in the Second World War showed how important it is that the defence of this route should be completed by the availability of the southern Irish bases of Cork, Berehaven, and Lough Swilly, of which the navies of the United Kingdom and the United States were deprived.

The next main ocean highway runs through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal to the Indian and Pacific Oceans, to India, Malaya, and China, and to Australia and New Zealand. This is a much longer route than the North Atlantic highway, for it is nine thousand miles to Hong Kong and eleven thousand to Sydney. Moreover, the first part of the journey lies by the coasts of foreign countries and through the great inland lake which is the Mediterranean. This part is

obviously very dangerous when any of the Powers along whose shores the ocean highway runs is at war with the Commonwealth, as the Second World War so grimly showed. Gibraltar guards the western entrance to the Mediterranean, and Malta is a strong place in its centre. The naval base of Alexandria, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, which we used until 1947 by agreement with Egypt, must now be replaced by another in Commonwealth territory to guarantee the security of the Suez Canal. As we proceed on our way to the Far East and Australasia we find Aden standing guard over the entrance from the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean, and Kilindini, in Kenya, watching the latter's middle western reaches, while Simonstown, in South Africa, stands sentinel over the entry from the Atlantic. From Aden, first Bombay, and then Trincomalee, in Ceylon, take over the duty of guarding the highway until we come to Singapore, one of the finest natural strategic points in the world, standing where the routes from India, China, Japan, and Australia all meet at the entrance to the Pacific. In spite of the tragic history of Singapore during the Second World War, there is little reason to doubt that this base will be restored. Finally, at the end of our long journeys to China, Australia, and New Zealand we come to Hong Kong and Sydney and Auckland. Far away across the broad waters of the Northern Pacific from Hong Kong is the naval base of Esquimault, in British Columbia, which guards the western gateway to Canada.

The third main ocean highway is that via the Cape of Good Hope, which is an alternative to the Mediterranean as a route to Australia and the Far East, and, as is well known, it had to serve this function during the Second World War. This was a threatening and costly business for the Commonwealth, because, apart from the fact that the longer voyage round the Cape gave enemy submarines many more opportunities for attack, far more ships were needed to do the same amount of work, and shortage of shipping was one of the greatest hindrances of all to our war effort. On this route between Gibraltar and Simonstown is the naval base of Freetown, in Sierra

Leone, which helps to keep watch over the Atlantic at its narrowest part between West Africa and South America.

Finally in this list of main ocean highways come the two alternative routes to Australasia and the Far East: the route through the Caribbean and the Panama Canal, and that *via* Cape Horn, which is also a direct route to the South American ports of Valparaiso, on the east, and Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Rio de Janeiro, on the west. This route is guarded by Halifax, Bermuda, and the West Indian bases, and is, moreover, additionally protected by the naval and air bases now acquired by the United States in Newfoundland and in some of the West Indian islands, as well as on the mainland in British Guiana. Thus we see how the great ocean highways, which are the life-lines of the Commonwealth, are guarded by a world-wide system of bases which are nowadays air bases as well as naval bases.

Although the burden of the naval defence of the Commonwealth falls mainly on the United Kingdom, it must not be imagined that the other members of the Commonwealth do nothing. On the contrary, before the Second World War Australia, Canada, and India had their own navies, New Zealand had a Naval Division, while South Africa also co-operated in the Commonwealth's naval defence. The largest of the Dominions' navies hitherto has been the Australian, which becomes part of the Royal Navy in time of war. Before the outbreak of the Second World War two Australian cruisers, H.M.A.S. *Australia* and *Sydney*, served with the Royal Navy in the emergency measures undertaken by the United Kingdom at the time of the Italian-Abyssinian War, and a notable event of the First World War was the destruction of the German raider *Emden* by H.M.A.S. *Sydney*. The *Emden* had managed to break into the Indian Ocean, where it did considerable damage and even shelled Madras before the Australian ship caught and sank it in a brilliantly fought duel. The New Zealand Naval Division is actually a division of the Royal Navy, comprised of ships of the latter lent free of charge to the New Zealand Government, which

pays for their maintenance. When war breaks out the Admiralty takes control of these ships automatically, but the peace-time training of the Division, many of whose personnel are, of course, New Zealanders, is undertaken by the New Zealand Naval Board. The Canadian Navy, like the Australian, is entirely under the control of its own Government, but, unlike the Australian Navy, the Canadian Navy was meant only for local defence. At the time of the outbreak of the Second World War it had no ships heavier than destroyers, whereas the Australian Navy had two cruisers. The Indian Navy in 1939 was under the ultimate control of the British Admiralty, but now it has passed entirely under the control of the Governments of the Dominions of India and Pakistan. Finally, South Africa before the Second World War undertook the responsibility for its own coastal defence, and also for the land defence of the Simonstown base. In addition to all this it should not be overlooked that the Colonies and Dependencies have helped the Royal Navy in various ways, notably by subscribing towards the provision of fighting-ships. The outstanding example is the gift of a battleship to the Royal Navy by Malaya. Naturally all the pre-War naval forces of the Dominions were increased during the Second World War, and, as we saw earlier in this chapter, there are reasons for believing that in future all the Dominions will take a greater part in naval defence than they have done in the past.

This is true also of the Royal Air Forces of the Commonwealth. It can be easily understood that the Dominions, with their small populations—apart, of course, from India and Pakistan—cannot build and maintain fleets of capital ships. Aircraft, however, are a different thing. The Dominions can, and no doubt will, greatly increase their air strength. The value of this to the Commonwealth will be immense. We have seen how many and how widely scattered are the overseas bases of the Commonwealth. Stronger Dominions Air Forces will reduce the burden of her overseas commitments on the United Kingdom, and, by enabling her to concentrate her air-power at home, will increase her strength both in war and

in the counsels of Europe and the world. Canada and Australia can build aircraft, and India and South Africa should be able to do so in due course. The two World Wars have shown that British aircraft are equal in performance to any others in the world, while the airmen from all over the Commonwealth who fly them have shown that they too are second to none. Further, the Commonwealth's effort during the Second World War in the training of airmen for the different Royal Air Forces was immensely helped by one of the most notable co-operative achievements in the whole history of Commonwealth defence. This was the Joint Training Plan for airmen from many parts of the Commonwealth which was put into operation in Canada. Far away from all danger from hostile forces of any kind, in a country where it was possible to get experience of flying in a variety of climates, the mighty air weapon of the British Commonwealth received a steady flow of men from all parts, who had been trained together as members of one world-wide family. It is greatly to be hoped that the future may see plans of this sort put into operation in times of peace.

Every one of the Dominions has its own land armies, but only those of the United Kingdom and India were of any size before the War. Moreover, the Dominions' land armies, as well as the Indian Army, were recruited for the defence of their own country primarily, and they are all—including now those of Pakistan and India—entirely controlled by their own Governments. Nevertheless, they and the British Army all use a common system of organization and training, uniform manuals of instruction in the various military arms and operations, and weapons and equipment of the same patterns. With the exception of India, the regular military forces of the Dominions were exceedingly small in number before the Second World War—the number of the ' permanently active ' militia of Canada, for example, was fixed at ten thousand, while the Australian regulars shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War numbered something over two thousand. The primary purpose of these forces was to act as

the nucleus of a citizen army. How well they fulfilled that purpose is shown by the War. Thus, by the middle of the War Canada had over three-quarters of a million men in her armed forces, of whom nearly half a million were in the Army. Australia, with a population of only seven millions, had not far short of a million men in her armed forces in December 1943, and New Zealand, with about two hundred thousand, had enlisted a quarter of her whole male population under arms. South Africa, with a white population of two million two hundred thousand, had about a hundred and seventy thousand of them in her military, naval, and air forces in 1943, while India raised over two millions by purely voluntary recruiting. The Colonies, too, raised strong and valuable fighting forces, a striking, and, in many cases, a touching proof of their feeling for the Commonwealth.

But, apart from their forces, the Dominions and Colonies contributed prodigiously to the War effort in supplies of all kinds, in money, and in services, and it is certain that without them the United Kingdom could not have maintained the burden of the War alone, as she did for a year after the fall of France.

The peace-time garrisoning of the Commonwealth bases—except those in the Dominions—falls to the British Army, and the statement of its distribution just before the outbreak of war in 1939 showed approximately half of its total personnel in the United Kingdom and the other half divided between fifteen or sixteen Commonwealth countries. India and Burma alone were garrisoned by half of these overseas detachments. Finally, the United Kingdom and India were the only Commonwealth countries which could send an expeditionary force overseas in a sudden crisis.

Thus, as we survey the defence arrangements of the Commonwealth at the outbreak of war, we see how vast a charge had to be safeguarded by so comparatively few ships and aircraft. The formal agreements for joint action in war between the Commonwealth countries were few, and the only permanent organization which could be called a co-ordinating

body was the Committee of Imperial Defence, which kept contact in the vital matter of defence between the United Kingdom and the Dominions. The Imperial Defence College for the higher training of staff officers of all three arms was attended by students from India and the Dominions. Further, Imperial Conferences from time to time discussed defence problems, and there was certainly more co-ordination and joint action than appeared on the surface. For example, the Imperial Conferences of 1909 and 1911 made plans for providing uniform organization, training, and equipment of the Commonwealth's military forces, while the Imperial Conference of 1923 did the same regarding the development of air forces. This Conference, indeed, defined certain general principles of Commonwealth defence policy—namely, that each Dominion should be responsible for its own defence, that the sea-routes of the Commonwealth should be adequately guarded by bases with facilities for repairs and refuelling, and that the Commonwealth's naval forces should be at least equal to the naval forces of any foreign Power. Finally, the Conference supported the plan for a naval base at Singapore, and stressed the desirability of having a powerful air force in the United Kingdom. The Imperial Conference of 1926 endorsed the above plans and principles, and added to them recommendations for an adequate and fully equipped chain of air bases. It also agreed with the idea of an interchange of officers between the different Royal Air Forces, and even of complete air units for liaison and other duties. It also took notice of the progress made in Commonwealth co-operation in technical matters.

An authoritative study of the Commonwealth entitled *The British Empire*, published in 1937 by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, sums up the results of the Imperial Conference's resolutions as follows:

> The principles underlying these resolutions may be taken as these: first, that the defence of the Empire is a problem of common concern to the Commonwealth nations; second, that the primary contributions of each member of the Commonwealth must be

provision for its own local defence, but that even in this sphere the common purpose is to be recognized in the shape of technical co-operation and standardization; third, that defence of the communications, both by sea and by air, between the different parts of the Commonwealth is peculiarly a matter of common concern requiring an unspecified measure of further co-operation.

Lastly, no true picture of the amount of co-ordination in matters of Commonwealth defence can be gained without knowledge of the great volume of correspondence which passes between the various Commonwealth naval, military, and air authorities, and the constant personal contacts of officers and civil officials of all ranks concerned with defence in the Commonwealth countries. Since the end of the Second World War this co-operation has, to say the least, not grown less. Quite apart from any arrangements that may be made regarding the fighting services, naval and air bases, training and equipment and the like, there is a vast field open to co-operation in scientific research and the application of scientific discoveries to warfare. The geographical conditions of Commonwealth defence have changed to some extent owing to technological developments, changes in the international balance of power, new groupings of Powers, and so on. For example, the Mediterranean, though still vastly important to us, will not, as we have seen, be so important in the air age as it has been in the past. Our withdrawal, first from Egypt and then from Palestine, has obviously affected the balance of power in this area. South Africa must come more and more into the foreground of the world's strategic areas and highways. East Africa is clearly marked out for an important part in the Commonwealth's future strategy. Such changes as these will call for more, not less, Commonwealth co-operation than in the past, and in the air age the Commonwealth will be in no less an advantageous position with regard to bases than she was in the days of steamships.

Yet Commonwealth co-operation in defence in future will take place within the wider framework of international co-operation. Early in this chapter the subject of regional

arrangements for defence and security was introduced. In the present alignment of the world's Great Powers and their associated or satellite countries it appears as though the ideal of a world system of collective security, the ideal which was written into the constitution of the old League of Nations, must be postponed to some future date. Between the two World Wars the countries of the British Commonwealth strove hard to bring a system of collective security into being, and made it one of the pillars of their foreign policy. So earnestly did they strive to realize the ideal that they endangered their own safety. It seems, then, that for the present at any rate the ideal of an all-inclusive system of collective security may be replaced by the more practical and more easily realized systems of regional security. These latter can be co-ordinated with each other whenever practicable, and the great part to be played in world affairs in future by the British Commonwealth and the United States means that only certain parts of Eastern Europe and of Asia will be outside their spheres of influence.

Developments in foreign policy and in the world balance of power determine defence arrangements, and there is no reason to doubt that the foreign policy of the Commonwealth Nations will be framed in accordance with the principles of world co-operation and peace on which the United Nations Organization itself is founded. The United Kingdom and the United States have permanent places on the Security Council of the United Nations, the Council which is the mainspring of the whole organization, and one, if not two, Dominions of the Commonwealth will also have a place on the Council. Thus the English-speaking countries are strongly placed in the counsels of the nations, and the fact that they will certainly act in concert in the interests of world peace will strengthen co-operation in matters of defence between the Commonwealth nations, and between them and the United States and other countries who are prepared to join them in the regions where their interests touch each other.

These observations are seen to be true when we study the

reactions of certain of the Dominions to the proposal for a Union of Western Europe and to the dangerous international situation which arose out of the Russian blockade of Berlin in the summer of 1948. In regard to the latter, Mr Chifley and Mr Fraser, at that time Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand respectively, made it clear that their countries took their stand without hesitation on the side of the United Kingdom and her Western allies. Mr St Laurent, who became the Canadian Minister for External Affairs in 1948, has made Canada's position no less clear. In regard to the Union of Western Europe the three Dominions have shown their friendly interest, but, naturally, they wish to have a voice in the planning of its organization. Their own security, as they realize, is intimately bound up with the peace and security of Western Europe, and, of course, the questions of inter-Commonwealth trade and Imperial Preference also concern them closely. Canada's military representatives sat side by side with those of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the countries of Western Europe in the military committee of Western Europe, which met in London in the summer of 1948. By reason of her geographical position Canada would be closely involved physically in a war between Russia and the Western Powers, and her foreign policy favoured the creation of a large defensive union comprising the whole group of free nations of which the North Atlantic Ocean is the connecting link. Accordingly she became one of the signatories to the Atlantic Pact when it was signed on April 4, 1949, to give effect to the idea of a defensive union comprising the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and the free countries of Western Europe.

CHAPTER XV

THE FUTURE

WE have now studied the British Commonwealth as a working system as it has emerged from the greatest war in history. The chief features of the political and economic conditions of all its many parts have been passed in review, and we have also studied the working of the machinery of consultation and co-operation which is common to the whole Commonwealth, and which, together with other less visible or tangible elements, gives it a unity and a corporate identity. We began by learning that the Commonwealth is a dynamic and not a static system, and that its members are moving at different speeds and along different routes towards the goal of full national status within a Commonwealth of freely united peoples. Chapter after chapter of the book has thrown light from various angles on the mode and rate of progress of this dynamic movement, and now we can ask ourselves if it is possible to see anything of the shape of the Commonwealth and the relations between its different members in the near future.

Mere prophecy is vain and must be rejected as useless and possibly harmful. But if we stand firmly on actual experience, and draw therefrom only such deductions as are warranted by it, then we find that we can make a few statements with a reasonable assurance of their truth. In fact, all over the Commonwealth students of politics and economics have given much thought to the next stages in the development of its different countries, both singly and in their relations with each other. Of one thing we can be quite certain—namely, no matter what institutions may grow up to embody or implement methods of co-operation and construction in all spheres of activity within the Commonwealth, these institutions will all be freely accepted by the peoples who are

affected by them, and they will always be the expression of an already active desire to co-operate. They will never be an artificial attempt to stimulate such a desire. Another thing we can say with confidence is that the devolution of power—political, economic, and diplomatic—from the United Kingdom to its Dependencies, which has proceeded steadily for a hundred years, will continue in the future. The Dominions are, in fact, fully self-governing nations, and their number will be increased as circumstances permit.

Will any of the present members of the Commonwealth choose to leave it on attaining the full powers of self-government? Only one, Burma, has chosen to do so hitherto, and even that country has retained certain links, military and economic, with the United Kingdom, and, therefore, with the rest of the Commonwealth, which give her a somewhat more intimate relationship with us than is possessed by any foreign country. The case of Eire is different from that of Burma. Eire has chosen to break the link between herself and the Crown, which makes her a completely independent State so far as foreign policy and defence are concerned. But, broadly speaking, nothing else has been formally altered in the relations between her and the United Kingdom, at any rate for the present. Thus in future the position of citizens of Eire in the United Kingdom will be governed by the British Nationality Act (1948). This Act ensures that Eire citizens, although they are not British subjects, shall continue to be treated as British subjects and not be called aliens. Naturally, this simple statement leaves many difficult problems unsolved, and the other members of the Commonwealth have yet to state their position in this matter.

India and Pakistan have both chosen for the present to stay in the Commonwealth, and as long as they are there Burma has additional strong reasons for retaining such ties as are possible with the rest of the Commonwealth. As for the four old Dominions—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—the reasons why they should stay in the Commonwealth seem to grow stronger as they grow not only in national

stature, but in international status also, as Powers in the world system. Canada with her large French population and South Africa with her Dutch majority of European citizens could hardly retain their national unity outside the Commonwealth, while the overwhelmingly British populations of Australia and New Zealand would no more choose to leave the Commonwealth than would England, Scotland, or Wales.

The same is true of Newfoundland. We saw in an earlier chapter that Newfoundland's Dominion Status lapsed in 1934. In 1946 it was decided that Newfoundland should choose its own future, and in September of that year a recently elected National Convention met for the first time. In June 1947 it sent seven of its members to Ottawa to confer with the Canadian Government as to the possibility of a federal union between Canada and Newfoundland. A referendum on the subject was held in Newfoundland in June 1948, but the result was indecisive. Three choices were open to the voters: to retain the existing Government-by-Commission, to return to Dominion Status, or to federate with Canada as the tenth Canadian Province. A negligible minority had previously canvassed the possibility of establishing closer economic and possibly political ties with the United States, but this question did not even arise at the referendum. The continuance of Government-by-Commission was decisively rejected, but the votes were almost equally divided between the restoration of full self-government and federation with Canada. Accordingly a second referendum was held in July 1948, and this time a slender majority was secured for federation. The Canadian Government thereupon announced that it would receive Newfoundland as a new Canadian Province. The formal agreement to implement this was signed in Ottawa between Canada and Newfoundland on December 11, 1948. The agreement came into force on March 31, 1949.

There are material benefits to both sides in this arrangement. Canada gains important strategic advantages from Newfoundland's position on the North Atlantic air- and sea-routes which round off her own strategic position. The

extensive forests of Labrador (a dependency of Newfoundland) and of Newfoundland itself give her great additional resources of pulp and newsprint, while the important iron-ore deposits of Labrador are now assured to the Dominion. Otherwise they might have passed under the control of U.S.A. steel interests. Newfoundland on her side finds her public debt taken over and herself accorded the full privileges of a Canadian Province. Finally it is an advantage to the United Kingdom to have Newfoundland joined to Canada. It was not possible to go on administering the country indefinitely as a colony, and Newfoundland belongs naturally to the economic system of North America and its dollar area. The fact that it is possible for Newfoundland and Canada to create such a union without the slightest international repercussions, and with no more division of national opinion in either country than would accompany any major decision of domestic political or economic policy, is a striking proof of the value of the British Commonwealth in world affairs, and of the reality of the sense of common citizenship enjoyed by its peoples.

In 1948 this matter of Commonwealth citizenship became a question of controversial politics in the United Kingdom. Legislation concerning it was passed by the House of Commons, but was amended when it went to the House of Lords. When the Bill—entitled the British Nationality Bill—was returned to the Commons the Home Secretary advised the House to reject the amendments proposed by the Lords. Thus the question of British Nationality became a cause of dispute between the two Houses of Parliament. Let us see what all the dispute was about.

Every one of the King's subjects anywhere in the Commonwealth is a British subject. But in each of the self-governing Dominions he has also a local status as a citizen of that Dominion—that is, he is a Canadian, Australian, New Zealander, and so on. How are these two personal statuses of British subject and Dominion citizen to be combined so that there shall be no confusion in the minds of anybody, either inside or outside the Commonwealth ?

There are two possible answers to this question.

Every one of the King's subjects may be regarded as possessing the status of British subject as his fundamental nationality. Thereafter each of the self-governing Dominions may be regarded as picking out those which it claims as its own citizens and conferring on them certain peculiar rights, and requiring of them certain peculiar duties as Canadian, Australian, etc., citizens. The second answer is that each self-governing Dominion should by law establish its own local nationality, and that the aggregate of all who claim these local nationalities should be regarded as the body of British subjects through the Commonwealth.

Until 1946 the first of these two answers was the one given to the question, and this was the general law of the Commonwealth. It was generally assumed that any amendment of the law of Commonwealth citizenship would retain the essential features of this pattern. With the exception of the United Kingdom, all the self-governing Dominions before 1946 did in fact treat their own nationals as a separate class among British subjects, entitled to certain privileges in their own country to which other British subjects were not entitled. But in the United Kingdom all British subjects, whether from self-governing or non-self-governing countries, were treated alike.

In 1946, however, the Canadian Parliament passed an Act by which Canadian citizenship became the fundamental status of each Canadian individual, and Canadian citizens were declared by the Act to be British subjects in virtue of their Canadian citizenship. When the Commonwealth Prime Ministers met in London later in the same year they agreed that the best plan would be for the other self-governing members of the Commonwealth to follow the example of Canada and make the status of British subjects consequent on the individuals' status as Canadian, etc., citizens. In 1947 a conference of experts representing the Commonwealth countries concerned met in London and drew up a scheme for legislation to be passed simultaneously by the Legislatures of their countries. The British Nationality Bill, over which

Lords and Commons have clashed, represented the fulfilment by this country of the 1947 agreement.

At first sight it may seem as though this is a case of " Much Ado about Nothing," but this is a wrong impression. The fact is that by basing British subjecthood on United Kingdom, Canadian, Australian, and so on, citizenship certain cleavages are effected between one group of British subjects and another. Thus, in the United Kingdom and the Colonies the peoples of all these countries will enjoy the same rights and privileges in each one of them. But South Africans, Canadians, New Zealanders, and other citizens of the self-governing Dominions will not. As one authority has put it, a Malayan in London will have rights denied to a New Zealander, and a Maltese in Northern Rhodesia a status not enjoyed by a South African. But this is not all. One of the foundations of the Commonwealth is the common status of British subject of every individual owing allegiance to the King. But if this status is in future to be a derivative of some local citizenship it is to be feared that it will tend more and more to become a mere ornament or name and lose the reality which it has hitherto possessed.

This was the gist of the Lords' opposition to the British Nationality Bill. The Government, on the other hand, point out that all the self-governing Dominions have agreed to take the same steps in this matter, and we in this country must, therefore, fulfil our obligation. But it will be seen that this somewhat technical and difficult matter of British nationality or subjecthood is by no means merely academic.

It was said above that as the Dominions grow in international status their adhesion to the Commonwealth seems to strengthen. The two World Wars of this century illustrate this point. In 1914 the Government of the United Kingdom still claimed responsibility for the foreign policy of the whole Commonwealth, but by 1939 there could be no doubt about the responsibility of each Dominion in this sphere. Nevertheless, in 1939 every one of the Dominions overseas came voluntarily into the war. Eire's neutrality had its own special

reasons, and as it was her men and women joined the fighting services freely and played a large part in the United Kingdom's industrial effort.

The recent war was, in fact, the most severe test possible of the essential unity of the Commonwealth. In South Africa strong sections of the Dutch opposed the entry of their country into the war, and, after that issue had been settled, opposed conscription for overseas service. A section of French Canadian opinion also opposed conscription, but whereas in South Africa there were sixty votes in favour of entry into the war and fifty-seven against, in Canada there was hardly any opposition to the declaration of war. Nevertheless, in those two countries the Governments found Parliamentary majorities to support their war policies throughout. Australia and New Zealand, although there could never be a moment's doubt of their participation in the war, nevertheless had to take their decision in face of the formidable fact that Japan, joined with Germany and Italy in the so-called Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, would almost certainly intervene in the war sooner or later. Thus, it is unlikely that the future will present the Dominions with any test more severe than the outbreak of the Second World War, if only for the reason that in any future war in which the United Kingdom or any of the major Dominions may become involved the United States will also be involved from the outset. This, of course, did not happen in either of the two World Wars.

But, just as the First World War brought the Dominions to their present national stature as fully self-governing nations, and also conferred separate international status on them as original and independent members of the League of Nations, so the Second World War has increased their international status and given them an enlarged view of both their power and their duty in international affairs. One sign of this is the increase in the numbers of their diplomatic representatives in foreign countries, and of their High Commissioners in other countries of the Commonwealth. Both Canada and Australia have emerged as Powers of the middle class. The proceedings

of the United Nations Organization during the first two years of its existence have been largely frustrated by the clash between Russia and her associates on the one hand and the 'Anglo-Saxon' democracies and their associates on the other hand. Nevertheless, the new strength and influence of these two Dominions have already made themselves felt.

South Africa too is becoming conscious of a new position in world affairs. The coming of the air age and the new strategical lay-out of the Commonwealth and the world are bringing her back into the central geographical and strategical position she occupied before the days of steamships and the Suez Canal. Further, in view of the economic and political development of the peoples of Africa, which are so vividly foreshadowed by our new Colonial policies, South Africans are becoming conscious of their responsibilities as the strongest African Power. So, too, with Australia and New Zealand. The Second World War has left them with the knowledge that they must play a greater part than ever before, primarily in the Pacific, but also on the wider stage of the world. Their links with the United States must multiply and strengthen, and they know that they must increase their populations and develop their economic systems to fit them for their new and enlarged rôles in world affairs.

As a result of all this, there is growing up among the peoples of the Dominions the view that henceforth they can no longer stand apart in isolation from world politics, and, connected therewith, the belief that it is to their interest to guarantee the position of the United Kingdom as a Great Power in Europe. It is likely that those members of the Commonwealth who are also members of the United Nations Organization will wish to implement these views primarily by the policies they advocate and the actions they take in the international organization. Nevertheless, inside that organization there should be a steady unity of purpose between them all, which will make the Commonwealth as a whole an entity strong enough to speak in the world's counsels with any other Power. A very strong cementing influence will be the

peculiar brand of Parliamentary democracy and all the ideals and objectives bound up with it. In the support and propagation of these ideals the self-governing members of the Commonwealth will play a creative, perhaps a decisive, part in moulding the future pattern of world relations. Another strong cohesive force is the interest of all the Dominions—Canada most of all—in the growth of friendship between the United Kingdom and the United States. In this growth each one of the Dominions can play an individual, indeed, a unique, part. It is interesting to notice that at the International Tariff Conference in Geneva in 1947, in which the United Kingdom and all the Dominions took part, the Commonwealth as such entered into direct negotiations with the United States, the first time this has ever happened.

During and since the Second World War every one of the Dominion Prime Ministers has spoken of the desirability of such co-ordination of foreign policies as is possible inside the Commonwealth. Speaking in the Canadian House of Commons in 1944, Mr Mackenzie King, Prime Minister, spoke of the desirability of "full consultation, co-operation, and co-ordination where possible" of Commonwealth policies, and said that collaboration inside the Commonwealth had a special degree of intimacy. At the same time he made it clear that Canada's commitments in any important international issue must be part of a general scheme on a world, or, at least, a regional basis. Field-Marshal Smuts, ex-Prime Minister of South African, on the other hand, believes in a united Commonwealth front on foreign policy, and Mr Curtin, a former Prime Minister of Australia, has advocated a somewhat similar idea. Indeed, Mr Curtin proposed the creation of a standing Commonwealth Council to advise on a common foreign policy for the Commonwealth.

But such a development as this is not likely to occur. Feeling in Canada, for example, will always be very strong against it, and, in fact, the growth of opinion in the Dominions towards the abandonment of policies of isolation and in the direction of active and positive participation in world affairs

is well calculated to bring about a unity in opinion and outlook, which will lead, in all important issues, to co-ordinated action by the members of the Commonwealth. Indeed, the methods of consultation and co-operation which we studied in Chapter V provide the essentials of the Council which Mr Curtin proposed, particularly the meetings between the Minister for Commonwealth Relations and the High Commissioners and between the latter themselves. Formal machinery for consultation and co-operation may even be less in evidence in the future than it has been in the past, but that does not mean that the essential unity of the Commonwealth will weaken. On the contrary, the web of communications outward and inward between the countries of the Commonwealth grows steadily in extent and effectiveness. The system outlined in Chapter V is not easily visible to the casual observer, but it is there, active and useful. The Nations of the Commonwealth will want to play their parts in world affairs mainly through the United Nations Organization, but the march of events is calculated to draw them together in harmony if not in formal unity at all times of crisis. Each of the Dominions will continue to grow in national and international stature, but there is no reason to fear that the increased strength of each will not also be the increased strength of all. Indeed, there are good reasons for believing that the Dominions will enter in future into specific agreements with each other in matters of fundamental policy. Thus, Australia and New Zealand entered in 1944 into the important agreement which we have already noticed. The ancient Colony of Newfoundland actually joined the Canadian Federation in 1949, while South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, by making their economic relations more close, have brought into being a community of interest in one sphere, which may well spread to others, given the right political atmosphere in the Union. India and Pakistan find themselves compelled to act in concert in many matters of economic and administrative concern, in spite of the bitter disputes between them which followed the partition of the old Indian Empire in August 1947. So bitter

were these disputes, which reached their most dangerous point in the clash over the allegiance of Kashmir, that India referred them in December 1947 to the United Nations Organization.

Unfortunately, by the middle of 1948 it became clear that the regular forces of both India and Pakistan were engaged on opposite sides in the fighting for Kashmir. Thus, for the first time in the history of the Commonwealth, two of its members came to the brink of war with each other. Indeed, it must be frankly admitted that the fighting taking place in Kashmir was war, albeit undeclared. This was a situation to test the statesmanship of the leaders of all the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth to the utmost. At the time when the Kashmir dispute was referred by India to the United Nations Organization the other members of the Commonwealth could, and did, give assurance of friendly help and support to the two disputants in settling their quarrel such as no other countries could possibly give.

The cause of trouble in Kashmir is fundamental, and will not be easily resolved. Although the majority of the people of Kashmir are Moslems, the ruler acceded to India. This gave rise to the dispute with Pakistan which has gone before the United Nations for settlement. The Government of India sent troops into Kashmir in 1947 to quell a revolt which had broken out against the Maharajah and to ensure the State's accession to India. Moslem tribesmen from the North-West Frontier then went to fight against the Indian troops and finally regular troops of Pakistan were sent in. Thus, a grave—indeed, a desperate—situation was created between the two neighbouring Dominions. But in the history of the Commonwealth crises have always proved to be the beginning of a new development in Commonwealth relations, and in the strengthening of its essential unity as apart from its surface or purely formal links. It is to be hoped that the rule will hold in this case, for war between the two Dominions is now highly unlikely and the outlook should steadily improve.

When we turn from the Dominions to the Colonies and

Dependencies we are able to forecast a parallel process to that foreshadowed in the cases of the Dominions. That is to say, there is certain to be a steady growth in their political stature, which is likely to be accompanied by the establishment of closer economic and even political links with neighbouring British territories. Thus, in January 1948, as we saw in Chapter IX, the East African High Commission came into existence, a development which involved the setting up of a joint cadre for certain of the administrative services of the East African territories, together with the creation of an East African Central Assembly with power to legislate on the operation of the government services which are now common to Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda. In that same month, January 1948, another notable development in Colonial administration took place. This was the appointment for the first time of a Minister of State for the Colonies, to perform the important duties described in Chapter IX. Finally, in February 1948 the Malayan Union came formally into being.

In these developments we see going forward a process of integration of both administration and policy in Colonial affairs, and it is not impossible that the future will, in fact, see more unifying of administrative activities in neighbouring British Colonial territories, and an extension of joint enterprise wherever possible. Here and there we may even see political unions, although these will always be difficult to accomplish, as we have noted in the case of the West Indies. Their experience and, in lesser degree, that of the East African territories has shown us what strong obstacles are placed in the way of political union by geography, race, tradition, and vested interests. Nevertheless, there are those who foresee the rise of East, West, and Central African Dominions as the result of political unions and political and economic progress. Indeed, a statesman of the first rank, Field-Marshal Smuts, has spoken more than once about possible co-operation between the Union of South Africa and not only the British territories in Africa, but even the rest of the continent of Africa. Thus, in June 1941 he said:

> There is no doubt that the countries in the south of the Equator are called to a great future, and I wish that, like the Pan-American Union, there can be constituted a Pan-African Union, which will ensure economic collaboration and which at the same time will be scrupulously respectful of the political autonomy of each such country.

Certainly, if such a Pan-African Union ever came into being South Africa would be its natural leader, but the realization of this idea lies in the more distant future than the union of contiguous British Colonies like those in East, Central, and West Africa. Nevertheless, the views of a statesman of world repute cannot be ignored.

That the present boundaries of the Union of South Africa will extend by the accession of neighbouring territories is not impossible. Indeed, there is little reason to doubt that the former German South-west Africa, which was assigned to the Union as a Mandate after the First World War, will ultimately be incorporated in the Union. The three native territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland present a different problem. Basutoland and Swaziland are enclaves in the territory of the Union, whilst Bechuanaland is an extensive country, about two hundred and seventy-five thousand square miles in extent, lying to the north of the Union. At present they are administered by the United Kingdom's High Commissioner in South Africa, but the South African Government has long been anxious to have them incorporated in the Union. The difficulty in agreeing to this has arisen from the fact that the natives of the three territories object to the transfer of their direct allegiance from the United Kingdom to the Union of South Africa. On the side of the United Kingdom objections arise on the grounds that South Africa's policy towards the natives is less liberal than the British. It is, however, not easy to see how these objections can be permanently maintained, and, certainly, any liberalizing of South Africa's native policy would be a strong argument in favour of her claims. We have seen, however, that the result of the South African general election of 1948 is

likely to make the Union's native policy not more but less liberal.

Finally, North and South Rhodesia will, in all likelihood, extend their relations with each other and with South Africa. Southern Rhodesia's white population is growing, and her economic future should be a great one. She can help to buttress South Africa to the north even if she does not enter into closer political relations with her. Certainly their economic relations should bring into being an extensive sphere of common interests. As regards Northern Rhodesia with its scanty white and vastly predominantly native population (just over twenty thousand Whites and less than two million natives in an area of nearly three hundred thousand square miles), and its great and still largely undiscovered natural resources, the future trend of South Africa's native policy should have some effect on her attitude towards the Union. There is, as we have seen, another possibility before Northern and Southern Rhodesia—namely, that they may ultimately join a union with Nyasaland, which bounds Northern Rhodesia on the east. At present Nyasaland has only about two thousand Whites and two million Africans, but it is a country which is bound to develop.

It must be clearly understood that these speculations concerning British territories and Central Africa are meant to do no more than point out certain possibilities. Nevertheless, opinion in all these territories and elsewhere has become interested in the question of establishing closer links with each other, and although the developments now under discussion are no more than possibilities, still they are possibilities and not impossibilities. Field-Marshal Smuts would like to see all these territories united with South Africa to form one self-governing state in the Commonwealth. He argues that the economic relations between South Africa and these neighbouring territories are growing closer all the time, that they will, in consequence, become increasingly interdependent, and that the great Union he has in mind would be in no sense an annexation of weaker territories by South Africa,

but a process of coming together under one Government, which would be both natural and beneficial.

Turning now to the South Seas, we read in the Canberra Agreement of 1944, between Australia and New Zealand, that the two Dominions will co-operate in the " welfare and advancement of the Native Peoples of the Pacific." Most of these peoples are very backward, even primitive, in culture, including in their numbers savages and even cannibals. Some of them, indeed, have never yet been seen by their white rulers; such people, for example, as the tribes of the unexplored interior of New Guinea. Nevertheless, it is certain that no part of the territories in the South Seas which are governed by Australia and New Zealand will be for ever unknown and undeveloped. The recent war dispelled much of the hitherto prevailing ignorance of these territories and their peoples, and the economic needs of the future will lead to intensive exploration and development of their natural resources. However that may be, the fact that two Dominions should arrange for systematic collaboration between their various services and authorities in their territories is a noteworthy step in inter-Commonwealth relations. Indeed, both Australia and New Zealand look forward to collaboration in measures for native welfare on a wider scale than they can themselves provide. In the Canberra Agreement they decide to promote the establishment at the earliest possible date of an advisory South Seas Regional Commission on which the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and themselves will be represented.

That such an international Commission for the South Seas territories of the Colonial nations is not a mere dream is proved by the existence of the Caribbean Commission, which we described in Chapter X. But the United Kingdom, of course, has extensive territories in this region, and it may well be that the first big step towards an international commission for the South Seas will be some more formally integrated system for collaboration between her and the two Pacific Dominions. Of course, their various territories are separated

from each other by great ocean distances, and there is no racial homogeneity between their peoples. But the fundamental problems which face their administrations in these widely-scattered areas are very much the same: problems of communications, health, education, and social and economic welfare generally. Moreover, world conditions of the future will turn the Pacific Ocean into one of the most important strategic areas on the surface of the globe. Places which have hitherto been remote and unknown in their ocean wastes will find themselves important for reasons of strategy and communications, and throughout the South Seas there will be a quickening of the tempo of development, a concentration of interest, and an intensification of effort. The territories of Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom will all be concerned, and it is, therefore, only reasonable to assume that in future these three British countries will keep more in step with each other in their policies in this region than they have done in the past.

There seems little reason to doubt that the future will see an increase of interest on the part of the Dominions in their trade with the Colonies and Dependencies. As the United Kingdom's policy for Colonial economic development leads to ever-increasing production of the foodstuffs and other natural resources of the Colonies, trade with them will become of increasing importance to the Dominions as well as to the United Kingdom and the rest of the world. In the past the capital needed for our Colonial economic development has come mainly from the United Kingdom, and this will, no doubt, hold good for the future. But of late years the United States has begun to invest in productive enterprises in the British Colonies, and Canada has important interests in the West Indies. It may be that in such regions as the West Indies and the South Seas the United Kingdom and the Dominions primarily concerned may engage in joint schemes of development. Indeed, in some quarters, the creation of a British Commonwealth Development and Investment Board has been suggested. Such a body may or may not come into

existence, but it is very likely that the future will see much co-operation in the planning and financing of developmental enterprises in the Colonies and Dependencies between two or more Commonwealth countries.

Finally, it seems likely that in future there will be more co-operation than ever before between the United Kingdom and the Dominions in the very important activities of administration, and of scientific research specially directed towards Colonial problems and needs. In administration there is no need to look forward to the setting up of actual condominiums —that is, joint governments in Colonial territories by the United Kingdom and one or more Dominions, or by the Dominions among themselves in their Colonial areas. What is meant here is that members of the Colonial administrative and technical services will come in increasing numbers from British countries other than the United Kingdom. Arrangements have been in force for some years under which British subjects in the Dominions may be recruited to the Colonial administrative services, and there has been a steady, if small, stream of recruits into the Services from these sources. There are good reasons why this stream should grow in volume in the years to come. Similarly in the technical services conditions favouring closer co-operation between the different British countries are increasing and strengthening. Already there have been one or two interesting developments in this field, notably in the South Seas, and particularly in the matter of medical services. Thus, the Central Medical School in Fiji, which is controlled by the Administration of that Colony, although it is financed from the United Kingdom and the United States, trains medical students from the dependencies of New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States as well as its own. The United Kingdom and New Zealand, again, concluded an agreement in 1944 to establish a joint Public Health and Medical Service for their dependencies in the South Pacific region.

So, as we look forward into the future, we see reasons for believing that certain influences now working towards the

closer integration of administrative, economic, technical, and other activities inside the Commonwealth will grow in strength and effectiveness. We even see possibilities, here and there, of political union between neighbouring Commonwealth territories. In nearly every part of the literally world-wide Commonwealth we see signs of economic progress, enlargement of political freedom in the still dependent countries, and, in the self-governing Dominions, a growth in international stature, which will surely contribute to the safety and welfare of the whole Society of Nations.

But there is no room for complacency. The problems which face every one of the Commonwealth countries are hard and urgent—the cases of India and Pakistan, and both these Dominions on the one hand and South Africa on the other show that dangerous disputes can arise even inside the Commonwealth itself. Afrikander nationalism in South Africa sets some troublesome problems for the United Kingdom also, as is shown by the difference of opinion over the three Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, and by South Africa's native policy, which creates difficulties in the British Colonies elsewhere in Africa. Only time and statesmanship can resolve these and other difficulties.

The Colonies, too, will present a continually increasing range of difficult problems. The vast scheme of economic development which we examined earlier, and the political changes which are going on continuously, are altering the very bases of the lives of the native peoples concerned. In Africa and Malaya particularly, peoples who for thousands of years have been accustomed to an economy which was self-subsisting are now being forced into what economists call a 'money economy.' This is an economy in which a vast majority will work, not at producing their own food, clothing, and other requirements, but at producing goods for the world market. Their reward will not be the produce of their own land and village industries, but wages with which they will purchase necessaries which others have produced.

However wisely and generously the Colonial Governments

may discharge their responsibilities, such a fundamental economic change must bring with it enormous social, political, and other problems to complicate the situation still further. Agitators, particularly Communist agitators, will find fertile soil for their propaganda in the masses of bewildered and discontented natives who will be one of the accompaniments, at any rate at first, of the economic changes now proceeding. The very serious troubles in Malaya and the less extensive troubles in the Gold Coast in 1948 are examples of this. The truth is that the British Commonwealth will need the services of the very best of the sons and daughters of all its countries if these and many other formidable problems are to be successfully solved.

One of the most formidable of all is the most recent—namely, that raised by Eire's secession from the Commonwealth. For all sorts of reasons, geographical, historical, social, and racial, Eire's position is unique, and, as we have seen, has been given special recognition. The Government of the United Kingdom has, however, announced that the settlement with Eire is not to form a precedent for any other member of the Commonwealth which may leave it at any future time. Eire is part of the ' heartland ' of the Commonwealth—the British Isles—between all of whose peoples there are ties of blood and ancient connexion, as well as of material interests. It is a practical impossibility to treat her nationals as aliens, at any rate in the United Kingdom, and the settlement reached with her does but register this inescapable fact. Nevertheless, the breaking of the natural link provided by the Crown sets Eire apart from the rest of the Commonwealth, and only time can show whether she can remain in her somewhat anomalous position, and, indeed, whether foreign countries will acquiesce in her retention of the special privileges in trade and economic affairs generally which she at present keeps. The vital matters of foreign policy and defence may draw her closer to the Commonwealth again, where her greatest interests are and where so many of her sons and daughters live. On the other hand, it is possible that she may

drift farther away. Even so, it is not easy to see how the United Kingdom could acquiesce in any foreign policy of the Eireann Government which might threaten United Kingdom security in its very vitals. It cannot be denied, also, that the hitherto intractable problem of the relations between Northern Ireland and Eire has been rendered still more difficult by what happened at the end of 1948. Eire is no longer a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, since the King is no longer King of Eire. And because the Crown is the strongest, the most natural, and the most enduring of all the ties which join the member countries of the Commonwealth to each other, any country which snaps that tie *ipso facto* forfeits its membership of the Commonwealth. A conglomeration of independent republics and of countries owning allegiance to the King can not be a Commonwealth as we of the British Commonwealth have hitherto understood that word.

The general pattern of the world's political and strategic conditions which is now evolving foreshadows a number of new great problems for the Commonwealth. Canada has emerged as a Power of the middle class, and Australia can rightly claim the same status. Canada is one of the major elements in the proposed North Atlantic security system, and Australia's position in the vastly important Pacific Ocean area is outstanding. Is there no possibility that these two Dominions may be drawn into more and more intimate relations with foreign Powers, perhaps more intimate, in some cases, than their relations with their sister Dominions? Then what about India and Pakistan in Asia and the Persian Gulf? May not their interests clash with those of the United Kingdom and the rest of the Commonwealth in these areas? Assuredly, new and strange and difficult problems of the first magnitude lie ahead of the Commonwealth in these and other considerations, and it would be idle to try to solve them in advance, or, even, in regard to many of them, to try to forecast in what shapes and where the problems will arise.

APPENDIX

COMPLETE LIST OF THE BRITISH FAMILY OF NATIONS

1. MEMBER STATES

Australia
Canada
Ceylon
India
New Zealand
Pakistan
Union of South Africa
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland·

Southern Rhodesia is looked upon as a member state although it is not yet a full member.

2. COLONIES, PROTECTORATES, PROTECTED STATES, TRUSTEESHIP TERRITORIES, AND TWO CONDOMINIUMS

Aden, including Socatra, Kuria Muria Islands, Kamaran Island (*Colony and Protectorate*)
Bahamas (*Colony*)
Barbados (*Colony*)
Bermuda (*Colony*)
British Guiana (*Colony*)
British Honduras (*Colony*)
British Solomon Islands (*Protectorate*)
Brunei (*Protected State*)
Cook Islands, Western Samoa, etc. (*Trusteeship Territory under New Zealand*)
Cyprus (*Colony*)
Falkland Islands and Dependencies (*Colony*)
Fiji (*Colony*)

Gambia (*Colony and Protectorate*)
Gibraltar (*Colony*)
Gilbert and Ellice Islands (*Colony*)
Gold Coast, including Gold Coast (*Colony*), Ashanti and Northern Territories (*Protectorates*), with Togoland (*a Trusteeship Territory*)
Hong Kong (*Colony*)
Jamaica and her Dependencies: Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands (*Colony*)
Kenya (*Colony and Protectorate*)
Leeward Islands (*Colony*)
Federation of Malaya (9 *Protected States and* 2 *Settlements*)
Malta (*Colony with Self-government*)
Mauritius (*Colony*)
Nigeria (*Colony and Protectorate*); the Cameroons is a *Trusteeship Territory*, but included in Nigeria
New Hebrides (*Anglo-French Condominium*)
North Borneo (*Colony*)
North-east New Guinea, Papua, and surrounding islands (*Trusteeship Territory under Australia*)
Northern Rhodesia (*Protectorate*)
Nyasaland (*Protectorate*)
Pitcairn Island (*Colony*)
St Helena, including Ascension and Tristan da Cunha (*Colony*)
Sarawak (*Colony*)
Seychelles (*Colony*)
Sierra Leone (*Colony and Protectorate*)
Singapore, including Christmas and Cocos Islands (*Colony*)
Somaliland (*Protectorate*)
South-west Africa and Walvis Bay (*Trusteeship Territory under the Union of South Africa*)
Sudan (*Anglo-Egyptian Condominium*)
Tanganyika (*Trusteeship Territory*)
Tonga (*Protected State*)
Trinidad and Tobago (*Colony*)
Uganda (*Protectorate*)
Windward Islands: Grenada (*Colony*), Dominica (*Colony*), St Lucia (*Colony*), St Vincent (*Colony*)
Zanzibar (*Protectorate*)

3. THREE HIGH COMMISSION TERRITORIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

Basutoland
Bechuanaland
Swaziland

INDEX

ADEN, administration of, 59, 68; strategic importance of, 226
Administration, 58–73, 143–160, 161–175, 237–238, 246, 251–252
Africa—*see* Central Africa; East Africa; West Africa
Agricultural Bureaux, Imperial, 97, 100–102
Agricultural Research Conference, Imperial (1927), 101
Agriculture, 43–49, 177; development of, 129–134, 182–183, 184–186, 188, 189; International Institute of, 164
Air-power, 228–229
Air-routes, 36
Amalgamation—*see* Federation
America—*see* United States of America
American Colonies, loss of, 18–21, 107
American Independence, the Interest and Glory of Great Britain (Cartwright), 19
American Independence, War of, 18–21, 107
Amery, Right Hon. L. S., 93
Armed forces, 229–231
Astor Committee (1932), 216
Australia, 33, 34, 199, 205; density of population in, 37, 40; food-production in, 43, 44, 48–49, 189; mineral resources of, 53, 54, 55, 56; as a federation, 58, 63, 64; and the Judicial Committee, 78; Governors of States in, 82; diplomatic representation of, 113; and Security Council of U.N.O., 120; native policy of, 139, 170, 249; co-operation with New Zealand, 155, 170; industry in, 189–190; trading position of, 198, 203; and immigration, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218; and defence, 222, 223, 229, 230; Navy of, 227

BAHAMAS, oil in, 53; political status of, 69
Baldwin of Bewdley, Stanley, first Earl, 96
Balfour Declaration, 20, 26–27, 81, 97, 111, 112, 117
Barbados, Legislature of, 69; and West Indian federation, 146–147
Basutoland, 247
Bechuanaland, 247
Bentham, Jeremy, 21
Berlin Treaty (1885), 163, 196
Bermuda, Legislature of, 69; and Empire Parliamentary Association, 94; compulsory education in, 134
Borneo, oilfields in, 51, 52; coal-mining in, 54
British Association, 108–109
British Commonwealth and Empire, development of policy, 16–30, 88–89; unity of, 25–26, 65, 240–244; relationship between members of, 27–30, 65, 74–108 and *passim;* geography of, 31–37; distribution of population in, 37–40; economic resources of, 41–57;

political structure of, 58–73; distinction between 'Dependent Empire' and, 59; proposed permanent Secretariat for, 84, 87–88; international relations of, 111–121, 161–175, 233–234, 240–248; and Colonial development, 122–175; industry in, 176–191; trade in, 192–207; economic problems of, 192–207, 250; migration in, 208–219; defence of, 220–234; citizenship and British nationality in, 238–240; future of, 235–254
British Commonwealth Scientific Conference (1936), 101
British Council, 110
British Empire, proposed federation of, 23–26; changed relationship of members of, 26–30; development into Commonwealth of, 27, 59; as a 'thalassocracy,' 32; Universities Bureau of the, 107–108. *See also* British Commonwealth and Empire
British Guiana, 35; mineral resources of, 55, 56; Constitution of, 69, 147; and West Indian federation, 146–147; industrial development in, 181
British Honduras, 146–147
British League, proposed (1775), 19
British Nationality Act (1948), 236, 238, 239–240
British North America Act (1867), 61
British South Africa Company, 66
Broadcasting, 37, 109–110
Burke, Edmund, 20, 107
Burma, 29; gains independence, 33, 49, 60, 236; mineral resources of, 51, 55
'Bush' schools, 135
Cable and Wireless Ltd, 36, 105
Cameroons, the, 130
Canada, Durham's policy in, 22–23; arctic and sub-arctic zones of, 33, 34; temperate region of, 34; density of population in, 37; food-production in, 43, 44, 187–188; mineral resources of, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56; as a federation, 58, 63, 64; constitution of, 61, 62–63; and Governor-General, 77; and Judicial Committee, 79, 120; and Lieutenant-Governors, 82; diplomatic representation of, 113; in world affairs, 121, 241, 243, 254; and West Indies, 122, 195, 203; industrial development in, 184, 187–188; and Imperial Preference, 193, 195, 201, 202; trade of, 193, 195, 201, 202, 205; and immigration, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216–217; and defence, 222, 228, 229, 230, 234; Navy of, 228; and Newfoundland, 237; and citizenship, 239–240
Canada Constitutional Act (1791), 21
Canberra Agreement (1944), 155, 170, 244, 249
Canberra Conference (1947), 121
Cape of Good Hope, 29; shipping-route via, 226
Capital investment, 133, 184, 196, 203, 205, 206, 207
Caribbean Commission, 171–173, 249
Caribbean Research Council, 172
Cartwright, John, 19
Central Africa, ground-nuts scheme in, 130–131; and regional co-operation, 151, 246, 248
Ceylon, 29, 33; density of population in, 37; tea-production in, 46; rubber-production in, 49; Constitution of, 59–60, 62, 65, 142

Chamberlain, Joseph, 26, 86, 194
Chamberlain, Neville, 222
Churchill, Right Hon. Winston S., 90
Cinema in cultural relations, 109
Citizenship, law of, and British nationality, 238–240
Climate and division of land-mass, 33–34
Coal, 53–54, 178, 179, 190, 191
Collective security, 233
Colonial Administrative Service, 75, 145, 251
Colonial Conference (1887), 83–84, 105, 220; (1897), 84. *See also* Imperial Conferences
Colonial Development Act (1929), 124
Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940), 124–126, 138; (1945), 127, 129, 140, 147, 180, 183
Colonial Development Corporation, 131–133
Colonial Economic and Development Council, 130
Colonial Empire—*see* Colonies; Dependencies; Mandated Territories; Protectorates
Colonial Geological Survey, 53, 54, 138
Colonial Office, 41, 71, 73; and the Dominions, 75; duties of, 88, 144; and economic and scientific development, 95, 100, 125, 127, 128; and labour conditions, 137; and political development, 143–160; and emigration, 214
Colonial policy, *passim;* self-government aim of, 73, 123, 143–144, 167; and economic development, 123–124; of New Zealand, 139, 249; of Australia, 139, 249; of South Africa, 139, 153, 247; international aspects of, 161–175
Colonial Research Committee, 125
Colonies, Burke's attitude to, 20; growth of self-government in, 22–28, 123, 143, 167, 246; and proposed imperial federation, 26; climatic zones of, 33; population of, 37; economic policies of, 41, 192–197, 202–203; and food-production, 43–46, 177; mineral resources of, 49–57; and British Parliament, 61; political structure of, 68–73, 246; Governors of, 70, 82; and Judicial Committee, 79; and Colonial Conferences, 83–84; and economic and scientific consultation, 95, 100, 123–134; and cultural co-operation, 108; and international relations, 111, 115, 116, 161–175; economic development and welfare in, 122–141, 192–197, 202–203, 250, 252; financial assistance to, 123–124, 126–129; improvement of agriculture in, 129–134; social welfare in, 134–141; labour conditions in, 138; research into problems of, 138; and native populations, 138–140; political developments in, 142–160, 246; industry in, 177–184; and immigration, 212–213; and defence, 220, 222–234; and British citizenship, 240
Colonies, Minister of State for, 160, 246
Colonies, Secretary of State for, 70–71, 72, 73, 214; and Colonial Development Corporation, 131–132; and Colonial Governors' Conferences, 149
Commonwealth ideal, growth of, 13–30; and old Empire concept, 23
Commonwealth, British—*see* British Commonwealth and Empire

Commonwealth Advisory Council, proposed, 88, 243
Commonwealth Economic Committee, 99–100
Commonwealth Relations, Ministry for, 75; consultations with Dominions' Departments of External Affairs, 91
Commonwealth Relations, Secretary of State for, 65, 77, 82; wartime meetings with High Commissioners, 91–92
Commonwealth Relations, Toronto Conference on (1933), 107
Commonwealth Secretariat, proposed, 84, 87–88
Commonwealth (formerly Imperial) Shipping Committee, 103–104
Communications and transport, 35–37, 103–105, 129, 146, 225–227; Imperial Advisory Committee, 103, 104–105
Communism, 15, 253
Condominiums, 62, 163, 251
'Congo Basin' trade agreements, 163, 196
Constitutional developments, 58–73, 143–160, 161–175, 236–238, 246, 251–252
Consultation, political, 74–94, 111–121; in Second World War, 91–92, 112; economic, 95–98; scientific, 98–106; cultural, 106–110
Co-operation, political, 74–94, 111–121, 240–248, 251; economic, 95–98, 192–207; scientific, 98–106, 251; cultural, 106–110; regional, 148–153, 155, 167–175; military, 222–224, 227–234
Copper, 179, 187, 190
Cotton-growing, 47–48, 182, 191
Coupland, Sir Reginald, 158, 159
Cranborne, Viscount (later fifth Marquess of Salisbury), 91–92
Crown, as symbol of unity, 15, 23, 65, 76, 253, 254; supremacy of, 18, 19–20; and protectorates, 68; judicial functions of, 78–79; legislative functions of, 80. *See also* King
Crown Colonies—*see* Colonies
Cultural relations, 106–110
Curtin, Right Hon. John, 88, 243
Customs union, proposed, 87
Cyprus, 34; political status of, 67; industry in, 180

DAIRY PRODUCE, 48–49, 185, 189
Deakin, Right Hon. Alfred, 87–88
Declaration of London (1909), 111–112
Declaratory Act (1766), 18, 21
Defence, 220–234; United Kingdom's responsibility for, 220, 221–222, 227, 229, 230–234; priorities of, 222; policy aims of, 222, 231; United States' rôle in, 222–223, 224; 'regional' schemes of, 222–224; Imperial College, 231
Dependencies, 58, 60, 68, 70, 122, 142, 145; on Commonwealth Economic Committee, 100; in East Africa, 148–151; and mandates system, 162–166; and U.N.O. trusteeship, 165–167; and trade agreements, 196, 202; future of, 246–251
'Dependent Empire,' distinction between British Commonwealth and, 59
Diamonds, 42, 56, 188
Diplomatic representation, 113–114
Disraeli, Benjamin, Earl of Beaconsfield, 23
District Officers, 71
Dominion status, 19, 20, 26–27, 58, 59, 87, 123; development from

'home rule' of, 22; demands for, 60, 69, 72, 147
Dominions, sovereign status of, 18, 19, 111–114, 117; climatic zones of, 33; underpopulation of, 38, 40; economic policies of, 41, 192–203, 250; food-production in, 43–46, 184, 185–186; mineral resources of, 49–57; political structure of, 61–67; political co-operation with United Kingdom of, 75 *et seq.*; Departments of External Affairs of, 91; economic co-operation between, 95–98, 192–207; scientific co-operation between, 98–106; cultural co-operation between, 106–110; foreign policy of, 111–121, 233, 240–248; in treaty negotiations, 111–112, 115–119; in League of Nations and U.N.O., 119–121, 233; industrial development in, 184–191, 208; immigration policy of, 208–209, 210, 211, 213–219; Royal Commission on (1912), 213; and defence, 220, 222–234; and Western Union, 234; and citizenship question, 238–240
Dominions Office (now Ministry for Commonwealth Relations), 75
Durham, John George Lambton, first Earl of, 22–23
Duties—*see* Tariffs

EAST AFRICA, 35, 246, 247; density of population in, 39; ground-nuts scheme in, 44, 130–131, 140, 182, 184; tea-production in, 46; financial aid to, 128; administration of, 148–151, 156; industrial development in, 178, 182
East Africa Industrial Council, 149
East African Central Assembly, 150, 246
East African High Commission, 150, 246
Economic Advisory Council, Astor Committee of, 216
Economic Conference, Imperial, (1894), 98; (1923), 98, 100; (1932), 97, 98, 197–204
Economic co-operation, 95–100; Imperial Committee on, 96–97
Economic development, 123–134, 140–141, 250–252; financing of, 183–184. *See also* Trade and industry
Economic problems, 192–207, 252
Economic resources, 41–57
Education in Colonies, mass, 135; university, 136
Educational activities, 99, 107–108, 134–136
Eire, departure from Commonwealth, 75, 78, 236, 253–254; abolition of appeals to Judicial Committee by, 78–79; neutrality in Second World War of, 112, 113, 225; and London Naval Treaty, 118; and League of Nations, 119
Emigration, 22, 208–219
Empire, early doctrine of, 19, 21, 23; modern conception of, as Commonwealth, 23, 27
Empire, British—*see* British Commonwealth and Empire; British Empire
Empire in these Days, The (Coupland), 158, 159
Empire Marketing Board, 96–97
Empire Parliamentary Association, 93–94
Empire Parliamentary Conferences, 93–94
Empire Press Conferences, 108, 109
Empire Settlement Act (1922), 214, 218

Entomology, Imperial Institute of, 98, 101
Equatorial regions, 33
Estimates, Select Committee on, and Colonial development, 140–141
Executive Councils, in Colonies, 70, 149; in Malaya Federation, 72
Exports, 199–200, 202–203, 204–205
External Affairs, Dominions' Departments of, 91–92

FALKLAND ISLANDS, 68
Fawcett, C. B., 32, 37
Federation, proposed imperial, 23–26, 86; in Canada and Australia, 58, 63–64; possibilities in Colonies of, 145, 246; of West Indies, 146–148; proposed, of the Rhodesias, 152–153, 248; of Canada and Newfoundland, 237, 244; proposed, of African territories, 246–247
Fiji, 39, 251
First World War, 45, 116, 161, 194; Dominions and, 26, 241; Commonwealth consultation in, 89–90; Dominions' decision to enter, 112
Food, Minister of, and Overseas Food Corporation, 131
Food-production, 43–49, 177; development of, 130–134, 182–183, 184–186, 188, 189
Foreign Office and Dominions' Departments of External Affairs, 91, 92
Foreign policy, 111–121, 233–234, 240–248
Fox, Charles James, 20
Franklin, Benjamin, 19
Free Trade, 96–97, 193–194, 195, 197

GEOGRAPHY, effects of, 31–37
Gibraltar, administration of, 58, 59, 68, 80; education in, 134; strategic importance of, 226
Gold-production, 42, 56, 179, 188, 190
Gold Coast, 46; village industries in, 178; unrest in, 253
Government, His Majesty's—*see* United Kingdom
Government, systems of, 58–73, 142 *et seq.* *See also* Administration; Constitutional developments; Self-government, etc.
Government of Dependencies (Lewis), 21
Governors, Colonial, 70, 82; conferences of, 148–152
Governor-General, as King's representative, 76–77, 81, 117; as representative of British Government, 81; of Malaya, 82
Grants-in-aid to Colonies, 123–128
Great Britain—*see* United Kingdom
Grenada, 39
Ground-nuts scheme, 44, 130–131, 182, 184

HAILEY, MALCOLM, BARON, 168–169, 170
Hall, George Henry, first Viscount, 128
Health Office, International, 164
Health services, 134, 136
High Commissioners, functions of, 77–78, 82, 92; war-time meetings of, with Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, 91–92
'Home rule,' development of, into Dominion status, 22
Hydro-electric schemes, 181, 182
Hygiene and Tropical Diseases, Bureau of, 102

IMMIGRATION, 22, 208–219
Imperial Agricultural Bureaux, 97, 100–102
Imperial Agricultural Research Conference (1927), 101
Imperial Committee on Economic Consultation and Co-operation, 96–98, 101
Imperial Communications Advisory Committee, 103, 104–105
Imperial Conferences, form and functions of, 85–89; (1907), 26, 84, 85, 87, 213; (1909), 231; (1911), 88, 111, 213, 231; (1921), 214; (1923), 96, 104, 116, 214, 231; (1926), 26, 97, 104, 113, 117, 231; (1930), 77, 104; (1931), 215
Imperial Defence College, 231
Imperial Economic Committee, 96
Imperial Economic Conference (1894), 98; (1923), 98, 100; (1932), 97, 98, 197–204
Imperial Institute, 99
Imperial Institute of Entomology, 98, 101
Imperial Mycological Institute, 98, 101
Imperial Preference, 87, 96–97, 192–197, 206–207
Imperial Shipping Committee, 97
Imperial War Cabinet, 89–90
Imperial War Committee, 98, 103
Imperial War Conference (1917), 89
Imperial War Graves Commission, 110
Imperial Wireless and Cable Conference (1928), 105
Import Duties Act (1932), 197
Imports, 199–200, 202, 204–205; restrictions on, 203–204. *See also* Tariffs
India, 28–29, 33, 34, 199, 203, 205, 245; density of population in, 37, 38–39; food-production in, 43, 45; natural resources of, 47–48, 50, 191; mineral resources of, 52, 53, 54, 191; as a Dominion, 60, 62, 236; and Judicial Committee, 79; diplomatic representation of, 113–114; industry in, 191; strained relations of, with South Africa, 219; and defence, 223–224, 229–230
Indian Ocean, 32; a strategic area, 223
Indirect rule of native peoples, 156–160
Industrial development, in Colonies, 177–184; in Dominions, 184–191. *See also* Trade and industry
Institute of Pacific Relations, 168, 170
International Affairs, Royal Institute of, 107
International Health Office, 164
International Institute of Agriculture, 164
International Labour Organization, 120,164
International relations, 111–121, 161–175, 233, 240–248
International Tariff Conference (1947), 205, 207, 243
Investment, capital, 133, 184, 196, 203, 205, 206, 207
Iraq, 67, 68
Irish Free State—*see* Eire
Iron and steel, 54–55, 179, 188, 189, 190, 191

JAMAICA, 39; Constitution of, 69, 147; and West Indian federation, 147; industrial development in, 181
Judicial Committee, Privy Council, right of appeal to, 78–79; advisory

function of, 79–80; and Canada's status, 120
Jute, 46, 191

KASHMIR DISPUTE, 245
Kenya Colony, 39; tea- and coffee-production in, 46; soil erosion in, 129; ground-nuts scheme in, 131; administration of, 149–151
King, abolition of office of, by Long Parliament, 17; Dominions government vested in, 76; represented by Governor-General, 76, 81, 117; ancient right of appeal to, 80; in treaty-making, 117, 118. *See also* Crown
King, Right Hon. W. L. Mackenzie, 106, 234

LABOUR CONDITIONS, 137–138
Labour Organization, International, 120, 164
Land settlement and emigration, 212, 215
Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, 88
Lead, 55, 179, 190
League of Nations, 26, 27, 67; Dominions and, 119–120; and mandates system, 161–166; and Colonial government, 174
Leeward Islands, 39, 146; proposed federation of, with Windward Islands, 146
Legislative Councils, in Colonies, 70, 149; in Malaya Federation, 72
Legislature, in Dominions, 64, 80; in Malta, 66; in Crown Colonies, 69–71, 72, 81, 149–151
Lewis, George Cornwall, 21
Lieutenant-Governors, 82
Locarno Pact (1925), 118
London, Declaration of (1909), 111–112
London Naval Treaty (1936), 118
Long Parliament, 17–18
Lyttelton, Alfred, 87

'MCKENNA DUTIES,' 194, 197
Madison, James, fourth President of United States, 20
Maize-production, 44
Malan, Right Hon. Daniel F., 514
Malaya, Federation of, 35, 39, 246; rubber in, 49, 205; tin in, 55, 205; Constitution of, 58, 71–72, 82, 155, 156; demands for Dominion status for, 60, 69; and Governor-General, 82; financial aid to, 128; social unrest in, 252, 253
Malta, 34, 226; progress towards self-government of, 58, 59, 60, 66, 69, 72; education in, 134; industrial development in, 180
'Manchester School' of thought, 24
Mandates Commission of League of Nations, 161–166
Mandated Territories, 161–166; administration of, 58, 82; definition of, 67–68; international action in, 161–166
Marketing research, 100
Mauritius, 39, 40, 44; compulsory education in, 135
Meat-production, 48–49, 185
Mediterranean, strategic importance of, 224, 225–226, 232
Migration, 22, 208–219
Mineral resources, 42, 50–57, 179–183
Molesworth, Sir William, 23
Montego Bay Conference (1947), 146–147
'Mother Country,' concept of, 14, 23; early relations of, with Colonies and Dominions, 17–30, 63. *See also* United Kingdom
Mycological Institute, Imperial, 98, 101

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (CANADA), 106
Nation-state—*see* Sovereign state
Nationality, British, and Commonwealth citizenship, 238–240
Native Administrations, 156–160
Native populations, policy towards, 138–140, 152–153, 156–160, 170, 174, 247, 248, 249, 252
Naval armaments, reduction of, 118–119
Naval defence, 220, 227–228, 231
Newfoundland, 33, 50, 227; mineral resources of, 54, 55–56; political status of, 60, 65–66, 237–238; and Judicial Committee, 79
New Hebrides, 62, 163
New Zealand, 33, 34; density of population in, 37–38, 40; wool-production in, 47, 185, 186; a unitary government, 58; and Judicial Committee, 79; native policy of, 139, 155, 170, 249; and co-operation with Australia, 155, 170, 249; industrial development in, 185–186; imports of, 203, 205; and immigration, 210, 211, 212, 214, 217, 218; and defence, 223, 227–228, 230; Naval Division of, 227–228
Nigeria, 37, 39; cocoa-production in, 46; cotton-growing in, 48; demands for Dominion status for, 60; economic development in, 129, 130, 141; ten-year plan for, 141; indirect rule in, 156, 158; industrial development in, 178, 182
North Atlantic, 32; security of, 222, 234, 254; as a shipping-route, 225
Nyasaland, 46, 151; proposed union of, with Rhodesias, 152–153, 248
Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty (Price), 19
Oil-production, 51–53, 181, 191
Oil-seeds, 44–45
'Open-door' trading policy, 195, 196
Ottawa Agreement (1948), 237–238
Ottawa Conference (1932), 97, 197–204, 206
Overseas Food Corporation, 131–133
Overseas Settlement Board, 217–218
Overseas Settlement Committee, 213

PACIFIC peoples, policy towards, 155, 170, 249–250
Pacific Relations, Institute of, 168, 170
Pacific zone, proposed International Council for, 168–169
Pakistan, 28–29, 33, 245; density of population in, 37, 38–39; cane-sugar from, 44; cotton-growing in, 47; oilfields in, 52; as a Dominion, 60, 236; diplomatic representation of, 113–114; and defence, 223–224
Palestine, 67, 68
Pan-African Union, proposed, 246–248
Parliament, British, former authority in Commonwealth, 18, 21; supremacy of, challenged by American Colonies, 20; relations with Commonwealth of, 61, 63–64, 65, 80–81
Parliamentary democracy, 62–65, 243
Petroleum, 51
Political Geography of the British Empire (Fawcett), 32
Political structure and development —*see* Administration; Constitutional developments

Population, distribution of, 37–40; trend of, 209–211, 213, 216, 217
Price, Richard, 19
Prime Ministers' Conference (1944), 90–91
Private enterprise in Colonial development, 133, 184, 206
Protective tariffs, 97, 193, 194, 195, 196–197, 198, 201, 203, 207
Protectorates, definition of, 68; administration of, 142, 152–153
Public Corporation in Colonial development, 133, 184

RACIAL policy, 138–140, 152–153, 156–160, 170, 174, 219, 247, 248, 249, 252
Regional co-operation, in African territories, 148–153, 246–248; in Southern Pacific, 155, 249; in South-east Asia, 155; between Metropolitan Powers, 167–175; in defence, 222–224, 232–233; and collective security, 233
Representative governments, 59, 60, 69–73, 142
Research work, 98–106, 138, 172
Responsible government—*see* Self-government
Reuters Press Agency, 109
Rhodes Scholarships, 108
Rhodesia, Northern, gold-production in, 42, 179; tin in, 55; ground-nuts scheme in, 131; proposed union of, with Southern Rhodesia, 152–153, 248; native policy of, 152, 153, 248; industrial development in, 179–180
Rhodesia, Southern, mineral resources of, 53, 54, 179; political status of, 58, 60; progress towards Dominion status of, 66, 72, 152; native policy of, 140, 152; and regional co-operation, 152–153, 169, 248; industrial development in, 178–179, 182; and immigration, 218
Rice-production, 43–44
Royal Air Forces, 228–229, 231
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 107
Royal Navy, 220, 227–228
Rubber-production, 49
Russell, Lord John, 23
Russia—*see* U.S.S.R.

'SAFEGUARDING DUTIES,' 197
Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Treaty of (1919), 196
St Helena, 68
St Lucia, 39
St Vincent, 39
School-teachers, interchange of, 108
Scientific and Industrial Research, Department of (United Kingdom), 105–106; (New Zealand), 106
Scientific development and research, 98–106
Sea-power, 32, 220–221, 223, 224–228
Second World War, 27, 38, 49, 114, 126, 137, 167, 206, 225, 226; and Commonwealth consultation, 90–92; Dominions' decision to enter, 112, 240–241; political developments resulting from, 142–160, 161, 241–242; Anglo-American co-operation in, 171–172; effect on industrial development of, 177–178, 179, 180, 184, 186–187, 189–191; Commonwealth forces in, 227–230
Self-government, Burke's advocacy of, 20; growth of, 22–28, 89, 123, 236, 252; varying extent of, 58, 65, 142; in Dominions, 61–65,

111, 112, 116–121, 236–240; in Southern Rhodesia and in Malta, 66, 72; in Colonial policy, 73, 74, 123, 143–144, 152–153, 167; in trust territories, 166
Shipping Committee, Imperial, 97
Shipping-routes, 35–36, 103–104, 225–227, 231
Singapore, 71, 226
Skelton Committee, 96–98, 101
Smuts, Field-Marshal the Right Hon. Jan Christian, 90, 153–154, 243, 246–247, 248
Social welfare, 134–141, 251
Soil erosion, 129
Solomon Islands, 142
South Africa, 29, 33, 34, 232, 242; density of population in, 37, 40; natural resources of, 44, 47, 188; mineral resources of, 53, 56, 188; Constitution of, 58, 62, 64; and Governor-General, 77; and Judicial Committee, 79; and London Naval Treaty (1936), 118; and Colonial development, 122, 153–155; native policy of, 139–140, 153–155, 210, 219, 247, 252; and regional co-operation, 169–170, 246–247; industry in, 188–189; imports of, 203, 205; and immigration, 210, 219; and defence, 223, 228, 230; and proposed Pan-African Union, 246–247
South-east Asia, regional co-operation in, 155
Southern Pacific, regional co-operation in, 155, 249
South Seas Regional Commission, 170, 249
Sovereign state and sovereignty, theory of, 27–28; in British Commonwealth, 41, 63, 64, 86–87, 112–114, 115, 117; United Nations Charter and, 166
Soya beans, 45
Stanley, Right Hon. Oliver, 167–168
Steel-production, 54, 189, 190
Straits Settlements, 71
Sub-tropical regions, 34; density of population in, 38–39
Sudan, 35; cotton-growing in, 47–48
Sugar, 44
Swaziland, 247

TANGANYIKA, 39; mineral resources of, 42, 55, 56; soil erosion in, 129; ground-nuts scheme in, 131; educational progress in, 135; administration of, 148–150, 156, 159; indirect rule in, 156, 159
Tariffs, protective, 97, 193, 194, 195, 196–197, 198, 201, 203, 207
Tea-production, 45–46
Temperate regions, 34; density of population in, 37–38
Timber, 34, 50
Tin, 55, 190
Tobacco, 50
Tonga Islands, 156
Toronto Conference on Commonwealth Relations (1933), 107
Trade and industry, methods of stimulating, 96–97, 192–207; development of, 176–191, 250; Ottawa Conference on, 197–204; foreign, 199–200, 204, 205. *See also* Economic development
Trading agreements, 192–207
Trans-Jordania, 67
Transport and communications, 35–37, 103–105, 129, 146, 225–227
Treaty negotiations, Commonwealth consultation in, 111–112, 115–119
Tribal institutions, adaptation of, 156–160

Trinidad, 39, 146; oil-production in, 51–52, 181; Constitution of, 69, 147; industrial development in, 181
Tropical regions, 34–35
Trust territories,' 165–166
Trusteeship, in British Colonial policy, 162; United Nations and, 164–166; Canberra Agreement and, 170

UGANDA, 39; coffee-production in, 46; cotton-growing in, 47, 182; political status of, 68, 148–150; indirect rule in, 158
Union—*see* Federation
Unitary government, 58, 64
United Kingdom, food-production in, 43, 177; dairy and meat produce of, 48–49; search for oil in, 52; coal in, 53; a unitary government, 58; relations of, with members of Commonwealth, 61–73, 74 *et seq.*; and Free Trade, 96–97, 193–194, 195, 197; and Commonwealth students, 107–108; and Commonwealth foreign policy, 111–113, 115–121, 240; and Colonial development, 123–175; and United Nations Charter, 164; and regional co-operation, 167–168; and Caribbean Commission, 171–173; economic problems of, 192–207; and United States, 204–205, 243; emigration from, 208–219; population of, 210–211, 213, 216; defence responsibility of, 220, 221–222, 227, 229, 230–234; and Commonwealth citizenship, 239–240
United Nations Organization, 27–28, 30, 68, 86; Dominions and, 61, 119, 120–121, 233, 242; and Kashmir dispute, 143; and Colonial trusteeship, 164–166, 174–175
United States of America, unity of, 14–15; contrasted with British Commonwealth, 25; geography of, 31; and supply of raw cotton, 48; and artificial-rubber production, 49, 205; and Caribbean Commission, 171–173; and exports to Commonwealth, 204–206; and Commonwealth defence, 222–223, 224
Universities Bureau of the British Empire, 107–108
University education in Colonies, 136
Uranium, 56–57
U.S.S.R., ideas and beliefs of, 15; contrasted with British Commonwealth, 25; geography of, 31; Dominions' attitude to, 234
Utilitarianism, 21–22

VEGETABLE-OILS, 44–45, 130–131, 181, 182
Versailles, Treaty of (1783), 21, 107

WAKEFIELD, EDWARD GIBBON, 22, 212
War Cabinet, Imperial, 89–90
War Committee, Imperial, 98, 103
War Conference (1917), Imperial, 89
Ward, Sir Joseph, 88
War Graves Commission, Imperial, 110
Welfare, social, 134–141
West Africa, 35, 37; density of population in, 39, 40; natural resources of, 45, 46, 47; financial aid to, 128; and regional co-operation, 151, 173, 246, 248; 'indirect government' in, 156; industrial prospects in, 178, 182; economic problems of, 196

West Indian Conferences, 171–172
West Indies, 34–35; density of population in, 39, 40; natural resources of, 44, 47; representative government in, 59, 147; demand for Dominion status for, 60, 69, 72, 147; Legislature of, 69, 147; Royal Commission on (1939), 124–125, 146; financial aid to, 128; economic development in, 129, 196; problem of communications in, 146; proposed union of, 146–148; and Caribbean Commission, 171–173; industrial development in, 180
Western Union, Dominions and, 234
Westminster, Statute of (1931), 27, 65, 76, 78, 111
Wheat-production, 43
Windward Islands, 39, 146; proposed federation of, with Leeward Islands, 146
Wireless and Cable Conference, Inperial (1928), 105
Wireless communication, 36, 104–105
Wool-production, 46–47, 185, 186, 188
World War—*see* First World War; Second World War

ZANZIBAR, 39