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Ethics

The Author

RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF has had an unusual background for an American college professor. Born in Sofia, Bulgaria, he started his college career at Robert College in Constantinople but transferred to Oberlin College, where he received his A.B. degree. He was an instructor at Clark University for a short time after earning his Ph.D. degree at Cornell University, and since 1914 he has been on the faculty of The Rice Institute, except for short leaves to act as Visiting Professor at Boston University, University of Southern California, the University of Texas, and, in 1945, at the Shrivenham American University conducted in England by the United States War Department. He is the author of many articles, monographs, and pamphlets, and of a number of distinguished books, including *The Moral Ideals of Our Civilization, Religious Crossroads, The Nature of Evil,* and *The Problem of Immortality: Studies in Personality and Value.*

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Ethics

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To

MY YOUNG FELLOW STUDENTS
OF ETHICS AT
THE RICE INSTITUTE

Contents

PREFACE xiii

Part 1. Introduction

1. THE NATURE AND RANGE OF MORALITY 3
   1. THE FIELD OF ETHICS 3
   2. THE ROOTS OF MORAL WISDOM IN FOLK-LORE AND POPULAR PROVERBS 9
   3. THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER SCIENCES 16
2. THE PROBLEM OF VALUE AND PERSONALITY 23
   1. THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF VALUE 23
   2. RELATIVE VALUES AND THE HIGHEST GOOD 28
   3. MAIN TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY: PRELIMINARY SURVEY 32

Part 2. Main Types of Ethical Theory

3. FORMALISM: UPRIGHT WILL AS THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY 47
   1. THE INHERENT VALIDITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE MORAL LAW 47
   2. UPRIGHT WILL AS THE ESSENCE OF MORAL GOODNESS. MERITS OF FORMALISM 53
   3. FORM AND CONTENT IN MORAL ACTIVITY. DEFECTS OF FORMALISM 57

4. INCLINATION, DUTY, AND SPONTANEITY IN MORAL LIFE 64

4. HEDONISM: PLEASURE OR HAPPINESS AS THE HIGHEST GOOD 68

1. HEDONISM AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND AS AN ETHICAL DOCTRINE 68

2. THE ETHICS OF PLEASURE: PROBLEMS AND PERPLEXITIES OF HEDONISTIC VALUATION 73

5. EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS: SURVIVAL VALUE AND MORALS 84

1. EVOLUTION OF MORALITY AND THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION 84

2. MAIN VARIETIES OF EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS 89

3. SURVIVAL VALUE AND MORAL WORTH 94

6. PERFECTIONISM: SELF-REALIZATION OR FULFILLMENT OF PERSONALITY 103

1. ONE-SIDEDNESS AND INTEGRITY IN ETHICAL METHOD 103

2. THE HARMONIOUS REALIZATION OF OUR CAPACITIES 106

3. THE RANGE OF OUR VALUES: GRADATION AND PREFERENTIAL CHOICE 111

Part 3. Problems of Personal Morality

7. VIRTUES AND VICES OF PERSONAL CHARACTER 125

1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VIRTUE IN MORAL JUDGMENT AND IN UNFOLDING OUTLOOK ON LIFE 125

2. SOME CARDINAL VIRTUES 131

8. THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIENCE 144

1. THE IDEA OF MORAL OBLIGATION 144

2. MAIN THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE 146

3. CONFLICT AND DECISION IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CHARACTER 152
4. CONVICTION AND TOLERANCE 157
5. LARGER SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM 163

9. EGOISM AND ALTRUISM 169
1. INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL CHARACTER OF MORAL VALUES 169
2. THE ETHICS OF SELF-ASSERTION AND OF SELF-DENIAL 172
3. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SELF AND A GRADATIONAL VIEW OF VALUES 177

Part 4. Social Ethics

10. MORAL PROBLEMS OF FAMILY LIFE 189
1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY: SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL FACTORS 189
2. ETHICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FAMILY 193
3. SOME MODERN COMPLICATIONS: CONJUGAL, PARENTAL, AND FILIAL 202
4. THE PROBLEM OF DIVORCE 207
5. FAMILY LIFE IN A MORAL CIVILIZATION 210

11. THE FRUITION OF CHARACTER THROUGH EDUCATION: INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL TRAINING 213
1. THE SOCIAL CONSERVATIVE FUNCTION OF THE SCHOOL 213
2. THE PROBLEM OF MORAL TRAINING IN THE CLASSROOM 215
3. EMPHASIS ON INSIGHT AND INTEGRITY 221
4. OUR HERITAGE IN THE HUMANITIES 231

12. CULTURE IN WORK AND IN PLAY 237
1. CULTURE: DAILY LIVING MADE SIGNIFICANT 237
2. WORK AND PLAY: THE PENDULUM OF NORMAL LIVING 240
3. LEISURE, CULTURE, AND THE ARTS 246

13. VOCATIONAL ETHICS 253
1. A JOB, A PROFESSION, A VOCATION 253
2. PROFESSIONAL CODES OF ETHICS 256
3. THE DAY'S BUSINESS AS A CONTEST OF RIVAL VALUES 267

14. MORAL PROBLEMS OF OUR ECONOMIC SYSTEM 270
1. THE RIGHT PLACE OF ECONOMIC VALUES IN HUMAN LIVING 270
2. ECONOMIC JUSTICE: WEALTH, WAGES, AND WELFARE 275
3. CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND ALTERNATIVE VIEWS 281
4. THE VITAL MORAL PRINCIPLE IN ANY ECONOMIC REFORM 288

15. CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNMENT 293
1. THE ETHICAL BASIS OF POLITICAL ORDER 293
2. THE SCOPE OF CITIZENSHIP IN A DEMOCRACY 297
3. JUSTICE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT 303
4. CONSERVATISM, RADICALISM, AND REFORM 309

16. NATIONAL LIFE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 316
1. THE EXPANDING RANGE OF MORALS: TRIBAL MORALITY AND A MORAL CIVILIZATION 316
2. WAR AND PEACE 320
3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 326

Part 5. Ultimate Problems of Moral Philosophy

17. MORAL FREEDOM, PROGRESS, AND CIVILIZATION 335
1. DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM 335

2. MORAL FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: SELF-DETERMINISM AND SELF-EXPRESSION 340
3. CHANGE, EVOLUTION, AND PROGRESS 344
4. OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM 348
5. CIVILIZATION: AN EXPANDING RANGE FOR GOOD OR FOR EVIL 353

18. MORALITY, RELIGION, AND PHILOSOPHY 360
1. THE INTERACTION OF MORAL AND RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT 360
2. MORAL CONVICTION AND RELIGIOUS FAITH 367
3. MORAL ACTIVITY IN ITS COSMIC SETTING 372

INDEX 381

Preface

This book is an outline of a moral philosophy of life. Philosophy means the love or pursuit of wisdom, and its two requirements are understanding and vision. These are also two essentials of significant living. Thought probes its object to understand its nature; insight also evaluates. Our reliance must be on experience: the tested experience of fact, by which the scientific mind achieves knowledge, and the critical sharing in the long experience of mankind, its visions and ideals, whereby in our own way we may attain unto wisdom. This alert, reasonable, tolerant, creative temper is examined here in relation to many problems, some of homespun simplicity, others of more involved design. The aim has been, throughout, to see how much discernment and worth we can realize in the tangled web of living, by balanced judgment and a generous spirit. Our daily life may be a random stir of desires gratified or thwarted, but eventually without significance; or it may evince progressive harmony and perfection of character. Our problem here is to trace the ways of living that lead to the frustration and to the fulfillment of personality.

The beginner in ethical studies may be introduced to his subject by a historical survey of the main doctrines and moral philosophies, and also by a direct examination of the principal ethical problems. The present writer has undertaken the first of these tasks in an earlier volume entitled *The Moral Ideals of Our Civilization.* In this book we shall concentrate on a plain account and criticism of the moral life in its many as-

pects. The difference between the two inquiries is mainly one of emphasis. Our former work involved continual interpretation of the theories and principles that we were examining in their various versions through the ages. So now in turn we shall consider the main alternative principles and issues as they have engaged the moral reflection of men before us and shall engage ours.

The reader may observe the absence of any footnotes or page references in this book. The omission is deliberate. My aim has been to deal with the principles and the problems of the moral life as directly and as simply as I can. To be sure, these ethical inquiries have their historical development, and in discussing the various alternative views the main advocates have been mentioned and their most significant statements have often been cited. But the emphasis throughout here is on the issues themselves, not on erudite thoroughness and elaborate documentation. If the reader desires to explore further some particular theory or treatise of our Western ethical tradition, he may find an exposition of it in the above-mentioned *Moral Ideals of Our Civilization,* and also detailed footnotes to the treatises themselves.

I have incorporated in this book some parts and occasional passages from previously published essays. In particular, I should express my thanks to the editors of *The Philosophical Review* for permission to take from its pages a substantial portion of Chapter VIII; and for using parts of my essay "The Theory of Moral Value" from the volume *Contemporary Idealism in America,* I am grateful to its editor Professor Clifford Barrett and to The Macmillan Company.

My daughter Katherine has given me much good assistance in the final preparation of my manuscript. For unstinted help and counsel throughout my work, I am indebted to my wife.

THE RICE INSTITUTE
HOUSTON, TEXAS

RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF

Part I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter I

THE NATURE AND RANGE OF MORALITY

1. THE FIELD OF ETHICS

In beginning any careful study we try to survey the field we propose to explore, to consider the main purpose of our inquiry and the available methods. That is to say, we ask what we are going to investigate and understand, and how and why we are to do it. All this would be included in what is usually called a definition of a science and compressed in the name by which it is known. So, as the words themselves indicate, zoology is the science dealing with animal life; geography, with a description of the earth; sociology, with social processes and institutions; and so forth. The term ethics is likewise a compact definition or outline of its subject matter. The two Greek words from which it may be derived signify character and customary, approved conduct. The latter of these two meanings is expressed also in the Latin term *moralis*. Hence we may say broadly that the science of ethics or morals is concerned with character and with conduct that is approved or disapproved. Every science seeks systematic and universally valid knowledge of the field in nature which it investigates and of the laws and principles manifested in it. So ethics, the science of morality, seeks intelligent, reliable judgment of conduct and character.

The terms approval and disapproval indicate the point of view from which ethical science investigates its field. Our common terms for expressing moral judgment are good and bad, right and wrong, better and not so good, worse and not so bad, noble, highest and best, worthless, wicked. We have also words of more specific reference, such as just, honorable, courageous, intemperate, treacherous, perverse, corrupting, saintly. Critical thought undertakes to order all these and other related ideas under the general principle of Value. The central importance of this principle will become clearer as we proceed; for ethics is essentially concerned with the values of our experience. Its aim and guiding principle may be stated as "intelligence in valuation."

Let us consider first the scope of our investigation. What sorts of character and conduct are subject to moral judgment? Conduct, behavior is as widespread as existence. Does the range of ethics include the world of inanimate objects, of plant and animal life; or is it limited to human conduct and only by distant reference, if at all, to the behavior of some of the higher animals? And if exclusively and preeminently dealing with human conduct, does ethics regard all human experience, or the conduct of all human beings, as subject to moral judgment? If not, then by what principles of discrimination can we define reliably the more special field of ethical inquiry?

The first of our questions might appear idle, raised only for the sake of supposed completeness in the survey. Is it not self-answered in the very asking of it? How could we possibly regard morals as being concerned with the behavior of oak trees or oysters, to say nothing of oxygen? But popular traditions and customs of earlier societies yield much material of surprising interest here. A savage would chop down a branch that had fallen and crushed a man, and scatter the chips to the winds; or he might curse a rock which had mashed his foot.

Xerxes ordered his troops to whip the stormy Hellespont with three hundred lashes. At Athens there was a special court for the trial of inanimate objects. In England up to 1846, a wagon that had crushed a man was forfeited to God, and by the sovereign's authority was sold for charity. In the Burma campaign during the Second World War, a Japanese truck loaded with troops stalled in the mud and refused to budge. The troops dismounted, lined up and saluted, while their commanding officer ceremonially whipped the stubborn engine with a bamboo pole.

Animals have been exposed to tribal blood feud and more generally have been treated as subject to judgments of moral condemnation and penalties. The natives of Madagascar issue annually a public warning to the crocodiles to behave themselves or take the consequences. A dog in East Africa was whipped in public for desecrating a mosque. The Book of Exodus decrees death by stoning for an ox that had gored a man. If a bee's sting blinded a man, old Irish law condemned the entire hive as guilty. In a fifteenth-century court trial at Lavergny, a sow and her pigs were tried for having killed and partly devoured a child. The sow suffered capital punishment, but the pigs were "acquitted on account of their youth and the bad example of their mother." A twelfth-century bishop of Laon excommunicated the caterpillars in his diocese, using the same formula that he had applied to priests who violated the marriage restrictions. Edward Westermarck, from whose work *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* most of the above instances have been cited, mentions and refers to many other ideas and practices of similar purport.

How are we to regard such traditions? Do they express a primitive persistent animism, the belief that all things have a soul and are responsible for their behavior? Or are they evidences of tenacious popular convictions that objects, plants,

and animals may become magical instruments of good or bad luck and should be treated accordingly? Without adopting any definite explanation of these beliefs, may we reconsider the problem which they raise, of the relation of animal behavior to human conduct? From the evolutionary standpoint we should expect that, as there is no sharp break between human and subhuman life biologically, so there must be some transition from lower reactions and behavior in animal life to the distinctively mental experience and moral conduct of man. Might we not then hope to trace some such moral evolution: from instinctive and impulsive anger and resentment, to a sense of justice; from gregarious and herd instinct, to social-mindedness; from obedience to leader and master, to dutiful fidelity? The two chapters on the Mental Powers and the Moral Sense in Darwin's *Descent of Man* contain pioneer work along this line. The tremendous stimulating power of Darwin's basic suggestions here have been shown not only in the direction of zoological and anthropological research but also in the advance of descriptive ethics, the investigation of the actual development of moral ideas and practices. But despite considerable recent advance, animal psychology is still a science of the future. Pending better knowledge that might be forthcoming, the student of ethics is well advised to concentrate his attention on human conduct.

As we turn to human experience, we find that our field demands certain further restrictions. Is the conduct of all human beings subject to moral judgment, along their entire course from birth to death? Clearly, we should say, the earliest years of us all are precluded. An infant or a child that has not yet come to years of discretion may give joy to the family, may hurt or be hurt, but cannot be treated as a moral agent. There is a stage of childhood below which discipline is of little avail, to say nothing of moral reproof. Punishment of such babies is

futile and only a cruel exhibition of parental stupidity or bad temper. As a good mother tells me, if her well-trained family dog is left to guard the baby, and the little one should come to some grief, it would be more intelligent to whip the dog than to spank the baby. The process of maturing moral powers is gradual. Full responsibility is attained earlier by some children than by others, and earlier in some lines of moral judgment than in others.

The capacities that thus normally come to self-consciousness in boys and girls are not realized by abnormal youths, not at all by downright imbeciles, and inadequately or very slightly by defective and subnormal persons. Of such individuals we say that they are not responsible for what they do. Pathological conditions may be remediable, and individuals may be reclaimed at least partially to personal activity and its responsibilities; or they may take a turn for the worse and leave the man or woman helpless and unaccountable for his or her behavior. Disease or severe injury may upset the career of a normal youth or adult. The abuse of drugs or intoxicants may temporarily unbalance a person so that, as an epileptic in his fit, he may not know what he is doing. All such cases of complete or partial insanity, be it lifelong or suffered late in life or only a passing aberration, exclude an individual's conduct from moral judgment. We may condemn the profligate or the drug addict or drunkard for the madness to which his depravity has brought him; but it is the earlier sane men whose evil ways we judge, not the pitiable madmen before us. Moral judgment is thus concerned with the conduct of normal human beings of years of discretion.

The delimitation of the field of ethics up to this point has surely occasioned no great disagreement. But some further questions arise that are not likely to fare so well. We may ask: Is every act of a normal responsible person subject to moral

judgment? Are there not acts morally indifferent, which may be relevant to an intellectual or an aesthetic interpretation of human life but are of no concern to morality? In so far as this question affects the relation of ethics to the other sciences and to other forms of valuation, it will be considered in the last section of this chapter. But the exclusion of moral judgment from the behavior of infants and also of subnormal persons suggests the problem of a corresponding condition in the process of social development. Do moral ideas apply even to adult members of savage races that seem to be little higher than the apes? Do such primitive tribes have any claim to our moral respect, to any recognition of their rights?

This problem has both theoretical and practical aspects. It confronts especially the student of the evolution of morality. It need not necessarily assume a sharp form, but all the same it affects the moralist's choice of method and distribution of emphasis. The moral philosophers of classical antiquity addressed themselves explicitly to mature intelligent Hellenic minds; the range of recognized rationality was extended in later Roman days. It would not have occurred to Plato and Aristotle to include barbarians in their ethical public. Many standard treatises of morals entertain a similar attitude. If John Locke had a word to say about Tououpinambo cannibals, it was in order to confute his rationalistic opponents, not because he hoped to learn anything of moral worth from the savages. In our time, however, the growing evolutionary interest in social origins has led some moralists to become engrossed in the early chapters of human conduct.

The center of interest in the present work is in the ethical values and issues which confront us and our society. The primitive background will be noted only when it is relevant to our discussion of specific problems. At this point we can take only brief note of the moral gropings of earlier simple peoples.

This is important because, as we shall see, ethical inquiry is so largely a testing and a judgment of social traditions. This agelong wisdom should prove enlightening at the beginning of our study. It reveals many evidences of moral insight where we do not expect to find it. It also exposes, in their rank nakedness, certain moral superstitions to which we civilized persons still cling. We may thus learn to cultivate more tolerance towards our ignorant forebears as we ourselves outgrow more of their errors. The darkness of their benighted state is familiar enough; so we may turn with greater interest to the gleams of wisdom in the thinking of simple folk.

2. THE ROOTS OF MORAL WISDOM IN FOLKLORE AND POPULAR PROVERBS

Moral wisdom in its roots and beginnings is not moral philosophy. We cannot expect to find here elaborate theories of nature and human nature, analyses of the essence and implications of value. Philosophy thus regarded is like science, the achievement of man's cultural maturity. But surely men did not have to wait until they had attained mastery of analytical methods, of experiment and theory, before they could perceive the problems of life and nature. On the contrary, just because they did have a dim presentiment of the problems of existence and so grasped some basic truths which life teaches all of us, they required and achieved gradually the fuller perfection of the mind as an instrument of understanding. We cannot afford to neglect this point. It is a dull parent who fails to recognize the real questions and pleas which children try to express in their untutored ways. The folk mind, like the child's, is untutored, but it is not stupid. The moral wisdom which may be found in folklore reveals a feeling about the problems of nature, confused, uncritical, but genuine and fertile. In our more learned maturity of culture we may

be enabled to understand the wonder and the deep creative perplexity of the childhood and the early adolescence of mankind. This is a vast theme, but we could glance along one or two paths of investigation that could be pursued to advantage.

Primitive man, in his groping inquiries and speculations, ascribes the most various potencies to particular things and acts. The savage beliefs and ritual of taboo disclose, in almost indiscriminate confusion, practical everyday caution, wariness of contagion, poison, or other lurking dangers, moral scruple and vigilance, unquestioning conformity to tradition. These are all ways of respecting the dread powers that are believed to control human life. To take an instance: regarding blood as above all things taboo, primitive man may at first shrink from the slayer as from one smeared with a fatal contagious taint. He does not distinguish clearly between the deliberate murderer, the innocent bloodshedder, or even the blood-bespattered object. In the course of time, more mature reflection becomes more discriminating; it reacts with horror, not to the bloody stain but to the murderous act. So men come to see the difference between killings that call for revenge or punishment and mere fatal accidents. In distant prospect, the blood taboo may be seen as yielding the lofty idea of the inviolable sanctity of human life and personality.

At first the ritual of taboo prohibitions may be unmotivated or unanalyzed: simply one must on no account do this or that. In the gradual development of religion the idea of God comes to dominate man's outlook. Taboos are then interpreted as divine prohibitions, and the transgressions of them, as sins. As men's ideas of deity mature, a time arrives when more critical minds realize the inappropriateness, or even the absurdity, of certain ancient restrictions. So the taboos of tradition are revised to meet the demands of a progressive conception of God. The Old Testament records this sort of advance, in the

prophetic reformation from the folklore of tribal monolatry to the sublimities of ethical monotheism.

There is another, more secular, path of advance. Primitive man may respect in practice the verdict of tradition; he may not venture to question the taboo potency, that certain transgressions are inexorably followed by suffering and by death. But he may become curious about the manner of taboo operation. How or why does so slight a contact have such dire consequences? Persistent observation here would lead men to notice many negative instances. They may revise or even dismiss certain ancient beliefs. In this process, successful causal thinking in more routine experiences invades and takes possession of taboo areas also. Successful in explaining little things, men attempt larger issues; even dread perplexities yield to expanding inquiry. But the ultimate wonder and the cosmic uneasiness remain. They first moved the primitive mind to its strange speculations, and they characterize the deepest thought of scientist and philosopher.

Sometimes the simple folk mind in its efforts to explain some calamity, private or public, stumbles accidentally upon the right track, but lacking trained intelligence cannot quite grasp the meaning or the application of the idea. Then civilized man comes along and realizes the full possibilities of the strange notion. But modern thinkers, in sophisticated contempt for popular superstitions, sometimes reject offhand traditional ideas of great value. So the learned Dr. Samuel Johnson ridiculed the belief of the islanders of St. Kilda that the epidemics of colds from which they suffered periodically were due to the landing of strangers on their shores. Another very striking instance illustrating this point came to my notice while reading Sir Richard Burton's book *First Footsteps in East Africa,* in which the translator of the *Arabian Nights* reports his travels and adventures in eastern Ethiopia during the years 1854–55.

He describes vividly the customs, dwellings, food habits, manner of life, and the many diseases of the black natives. Speaking of the tribesmen's partiality for the bats which keep off flies and mosquitoes, the plagues of the Somali country, Burton observes: "Flies abound in the very jungles wherever cows have been, and settle in swarms upon the traveller. Before the monsoon their bite is painful, especially that of the small green species; and there is a red variety called 'Diksi as,' whose venom, according to the people, causes them to vomit. . . . The mosquito bites bring on, according to the same authority, deadly fevers: the superstition probably arises from the fact that mosquitoes and fevers become formidable about the same time." So here in immemorial traditional belief, waiting for modern science, was the secret of malaria and yellow fever and other pestilences. But Burton's civilized scorn for black natives leads him to toss it aside in a footnote as savage superstition, and his readers pay it no heed, and the world has to wait decades before modern research reaches the same fruitful suggestion and utilizes it in medical application. This example is cited to illustrate how important it is for us to have the proper attitude towards the ideas and mental processes of simple folk. They may turn out to be on the right track in other subjects besides those of flies and mosquitoes.

We may trace briefly another path of folk wisdom, which finds expression in the prayers of men through the ages. In primitive incantations, the savage may undertake to work a magic. He believes that the course of events, especially human events, may be controlled and directed by his spells. Sooner or later disabused of their conceit, like Chanticleer of his notion that he brings sunrise by his crowing, magician and medicine man lead their former votaries in imploring the cosmic powers which had proved unyielding to magical compulsion. While thus the prayers of entreaty and supplication replace the in-

cantation spells, a further twofold process may be observed in operation. On the one hand in the field of religion, with maturing ideas of divinity, worshipers come to realize that prayers for unworthy ends are insults to God and impious. So this conviction is expressed with peasant irony in a proverb: "If God were to listen to the buzzard's praying, there would be dead horses lying about right and left." The prayers of tradition represent a progressively more refined spiritual perception. On the other hand, with expanding experience and reflection, men recognize the operation of natural causes and effects, and this leads to the dismissal of much pointless supplication. "The rain falls on the just and on the unjust." Rain or no rain, "a rocky vineyard does not need a prayer but a pickaxe." The right conclusion of a prayer in many practical difficulties is in a person's own firm resolution to carry out that for which he prays. So the Bulgarian peasant concludes: "It is not enough to say, Our Father; one must also say, Amen."

Not accidentally have proverbs crept into our discussion. Folk wisdom does not find expression in systematic doctrines; it engages the imagination, sees truth and principles concretely, and is communicated in tale or parable or more concisely in proverbs. The wisdom of life which we can learn from popular proverbs is one of thousandfold observation, reflection, irony. There is, of course, as radical a difference between real folk proverbs and sophisticated epigrams as there is between the genuine folk tale and the literary fairy tale. The folk proverb is a little orchestra of moods and motives and slants on life.

Before me is a collection of Bulgarian proverbs, thousands of them, on all conceivable themes, often with many variants of the same wisdom running from mild to tart irony. They are marvels of conciseness. Not only is all irrelevant and stodgy argument spared, but also all the lame qualifying clauses, and all the flunky words of mere grammar that do not count in

the meaning. It is as if, after a long, tedious discourse, the conclusion and upshot of the whole matter had been uttered in one telling sentence, four words perhaps, four hammer blows. Is not modern history a tragic record of the wars of Great Powers for supremacy, in which conflicts smaller nations serve as pawns and are ground down: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the Balkan States? The peasant takes this distressing topic of international affairs, glances over his pasture or stable, and sums it all up curtly: "Stallions stamp, donkeys get the kicks." But the least change of phrasing, and we have a sardonic chapter in social-economic philosophy, without justification or protest or propaganda, just the bare statement of fact: "Stallions prance about, donkeys work to death." We might learnedly advocate an international policy of conciliation and mutual concession, or in individual relations urge the advisability of a spirit of reasonable understanding and tolerance. But the folk mind does not need so many long words; it declares more briefly: "Two sharp stones grind no flour." Our journals are full of discussions of hours of labor, a living wage, and the price index of various commodities, the subtleties and refinements of men speaking for capital or for organized labor. The peasant settles one side of this argument very neatly: "Nine livers for a penny are still too high for Uncle Lackpenny." We remember that Rome was not built in a day; the village sage has not been to Rome, but he scratches his head and reminds us: "In twenty-four hours, a louse can become a patriarch." So in proverb after proverb. Do these two need any commentary?—"God does not pay wages every Saturday." "The donkey is back from his pilgrimage to Holy Land; his ears are as long as ever."

Folk wisdom is not one-sided; sometimes two turns of the same proverb state both sides in balanced irony. Should we elaborate at length that a man's worth of character is better

than pretentious external polish? The peasant expresses it with one whiff: "On golden platters, rancid butter." But often a vulgar exterior or a disagreeable manner may spoil the career of a really honest and competent man: "Perfect butter, packed in a dog's skin." And then, as if both of these truths had to be told as one, with double-edged irony, we have the story of two thieves robbing a church. Above the altar is a golden lamp, and one of them starts climbing up to reach it. "Fie, fie," the other thief censures him, "take off your sandals when you climb on the holy altar." "Don't worry," the first robber replies as he unhooks the lamp, "the Lord does not care for clean sandals but only for a clean heart."

This wisp of a folk tale is cited, and other tales crowd into the mind, tales with treasures of wisdom or perplexed meaning. We recall the old English story of Childe Roland: how his sister Helen was stolen by the fairies and carried away to the Dark Tower of the King of Elfland, how his two brothers one after the other sought to release her, but because they did not prove loyal to all their duties, failed in their quest and were themselves enchanted, and how when Childe Roland finally went forth to save his sister, his task was made more grievous because of the failure of his two brothers. This has been interpreted as the eternal tale of the good suffering for the evil, the innocent atoning for the guilty. Or shall we mention the folk motive of stories in which builders of mighty towers or wide-spanning bridges, to assure solid and abiding construction, bury a human soul in the foundation, preferably the soul of a maiden or a young bride? This theme has inspired story teller and dramatist in many lands, Teutonic and Balkan, and in faraway China Lafcadio Hearn found it, the tale of the bell founder in whose crucible a lovely girl was melted with the metal, his own daughter sacrificing herself in devotion to her father's art, to give the great bell the deep

resonant wail of the human life that was in it. This tale has expressed to men the profound truth of ethics and social philosophy: that all abiding achievement and all beauty and loveliness in life are rooted in the hearts and souls of men, that human life and character are the source and basis of all real value. Some of the greatest works of literature had their germ in such folk tales: the myth of Prometheus, the story of Job, and in the days of the Renaissance, the Faust saga. It is a great poet who can hear in the simple accents of folk speech "the still, sad music of humanity" and give it fuller and more mature expression.

3. THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER SCIENCES

In outlining the sphere of morality to comprehend the conduct of normal persons of years of discretion, we have also anticipated, as decisive in moral character and conduct, the recognition of the principle of value. The analysis of this principle will be our first task in the next chapter. But prior to any formal treatment, the ordinary reflective mind prepares for it by its further definition of moral conduct. Even in the daily lives of normal responsible persons, we say, not all actions are of moral import, morally good or bad. In regarding a part of our life as morally indifferent, we in effect either recognize or raise the problem of the distinguishing characteristic which makes other parts of our life clearly moral or immoral, subject to moral judgment. So the basic criterion of morality is our next object of inquiry.

Common judgment has tended to dismiss a great part of our conduct as morally neutral. In the daily course of our organism, though we may be well or ill, we are neither good nor bad. Likewise in our mental activities, our perception, memory, and rational thought may be uncommonly well developed or they may be defective. Though we may admire such gifts or

deplore their lack, they do not warrant any judgment of moral approval or disapproval. Nor is a man of aesthetic crudity or bad taste regarded as wicked. This tendency of thought may proceed far, to mark off whole regions of our experience as outside the realm of morals. We tend to regard virtue as above certain parts of our life and as outside others. In terms of an ample and sometimes callous expediency, we often declare that we "are confronted by a condition and not by a theory," proclaim a realistic concern for actualities, object to any intrusion of moral considerations as unwarranted sentimentality. The refusal to recognize moral standards or principles as decisive in final judgment of certain problems is not a rejection of standards altogether. The principle or norm is in the respective region of activity, be that intellectual, aesthetic, economic, political. This view and attitude has found expression in stock phrases such as the "value-neutrality" of pure science, or in more popular sayings, art for art's sake, business is business, politics is politics, everything is fair in love and war.

Ethical criticism is bound to confirm some of these exclusions of parts of conduct from the moral sphere. An infant and an imbecile are not morally accountable because they lack self-judgment, deliberate choice, or voluntary action. These characteristics of what we commonly call a responsible person of years of discretion are primary conditions of morality. By the same token, we may agree, moral judgment would not apply to those parts of our experience in which voluntary choice and self-judgment are not involved. We may grant this, and yet we may also see that we do not have the whole truth here. A strong appetite for a certain dish or an intense thirst may be purely organic reactions, but they may lead one to eat or drink unduly, to his later grief or degradation. Sleepiness is merely a natural condition, but the sentinel at his post may

have to fight it as he fights dishonor. Any experience or activity whatever, any bodily or mental reaction or condition—hunger, thirst, sex, corpulence, a keen or a confused memory, any peculiar aptitude or deficiency—may become morally relevant or even important in its bearing on our voluntary choices and actions, on our realization or frustration of aims and principles of conduct.

So the common wisdom of tradition has concluded that character is nine-tenths of life. By this we need not mean, in the manner of prigs, that we should make a solemn ceremony of our every step or gulp or breath, but that we should recognize the integrity of our nature in our moral view of it, the involvement of our every act and experience in determining our moral career. Our study of ethical theory will teach us that no one particular type of experience is the centrally important, the preeminently moral. Here at the outset we should acknowledge the other corresponding truth, that while some activities are not primarily of moral concern, none is wholly indifferent or without significance morally in some of its bearings. The ethical view of our life, and of any condition and action in it, is the view of its ultimate integrity and character of worth.

The same line of reasoning applies in larger and more significant terms to the problem, whether intellectual or aesthetic principles, economic or political institutions are or are not subject to moral judgment. In later chapters we shall take up for more special examination the ethical questions raised in these fields of human experience. Here a more general statement might suffice. These and also other regions of specialized human interest have their appropriate methods and standards of operation or criticism. In this phase of expert procedure they are rightly autonomous. But these specialties are, after all, parts of human life, affecting its character

and worth. They concern and must serve the larger purposes and direction of our life. It will become clearer in the course of our inquiry that the right principle of specialized competence should not be confused with the wrong notion of special privilege and general unconcern. "Art for art's sake," as a principle of distinctive and pure devotion to aesthetic convictions, is a high ideal for true artists; but as a challenge of defiance to the other values of life in their integrity and harmony, it is shallow and perverse. Likewise with other similar stock phrases: their basic error is that they ignore the integrity of human life, in which special activities play their respective roles and are ultimately realized or frustrated.

The essential features of the moral outlook on life thus are already becoming clearer. Ethics is concerned with judgments of approval or disapproval, with the norms of valuation in human conduct. In dealing with the values of our experience, ethics emphasizes the integral outlook rather than any special fields or phases. Ethics is thus the integral normative science, or the science of systematized valuation. In simpler words, used by W. G. Everett, "Ethics is the science of values in their relation to the conduct of life as a whole." Or more briefly still, Durant Drake describes ethics as the knowledge of *what matters.*

This character of ethical science suggests its relation to other sciences, in what ways it depends on them, and how they in turn point to it. In considering this we are also brought to realize some of the serious difficulties of ethical inquiry and the reasons for some of its misdirections. We might even understand, though we do not concede the charge, that the expression "ethical science" is unwarranted, that a real science of morals is impossible to achieve.

In undertaking a scientific system of human values, ethics is necessarily concerned with our understanding of ourselves

in all fields. The whole span of the humanistic sciences comes within its inquiry. When Aristotle set out to achieve a science of the good on functional lines, defined virtue as a habit of the will, studied man's nature and behavior in relation to those of animals and plants, and the various impulses and situations of our life when directed and when not directed by reason, he set an example in ethical procedure which has not been sufficiently followed, but to which many contemporary moralists incline in their method and outlook. Here, as mentioned already, the influence of Darwin has been outstanding. Certainly ethics today has much to learn from the expanding knowledge in biology and psychology and from their corresponding fields of pathological research. The proposal to seek the standards of moral valuation in the principles of biological evolution, to reduce moral worth to "survival value," provides a variety of ethical theory which comes far short of doing full justice to morality. But this nowise affects the dependence of ethical study on biology and anthropology, especially in certain departments of conduct. We no longer try to "crush the devil" in the hopeless sullen school boy: he may really need to have his adenoids removed. The listless and unreliable workman may only require the correction of his glasses or of some serious diet deficiency. The whole field of gland-irregularities, and also the physical and the mental hygiene in sex relations illustrate the need of scientific factual basis in ethical discussion.

Anthropology and psychology provide us with the facts of human nature and experience in various fields of conduct and human relations which ethics evaluates. Against the unwarranted assertion of supposed matters of fact, on which ethical theories have sometimes relied in the past, is the new body of evidence and scientific methods of testing it. The former reliance on instincts and inborn sentiments is a case

in point. Modern ethical science must test and verify its account of human nature, human customs, character, and institutions. Thus provided and equipped, ethics must then undertake its distinctive task. After we have understood the determining individual and social factors, say, in the evolution of monogamy, or of this or that economic system, our distinctively ethical problem is to estimate these particular strains in human development. What in them deserves our approval and support, and what calls for reform, in what directions, and why?

Each of the various fields of special values demands its own science with its own appropriate principles. We may concentrate our attention on property and market values, and economics then formulates its own methods of factual investigation and theoretical analysis and its own standards of valuation. Likewise in the field of political values and the science of government, or in the fields of intellectual or aesthetic activity and the respective logical or aesthetic values and norms. Each one of these humanistic normative sciences yields its own insight into the significance and worth of human life and also into its own respective problems. A critical ethics must acknowledge the great merit of this specialized insight in valuation, and be itself duly instructed in details. But these are all as it were radii in the circle of human life. The specific principles of valuation to which they appeal cannot be ultimately irrelevant to each other. Challenge any one of them to justify itself, and before you are through you will have gone along the special radius, say, of economic or of political evaluation, towards the center of value, value basic, integral, and decisive, which is the concern of ethical theory.

No time in the history of civilization can illustrate this inevitable process more clearly to us than the present. The Second World War was a struggle of contending political and

economic-social values and systems. In the post-war reconstruction also, we must make our decision, alike in standing inflexibly by what we regard as the supremely important values and in our concessions in matters of subsidiary concern. Now what are the higher and what are the lower values, and what is our right principle of preference? If political considerations lead us to support certain economic policies, or if our convictions on domestic and international trade dictate certain political alignments, it will not be enough to analyze and explain our motivation. Other states with different motives may be led to different policies. In our own statesmanship the problem of choosing between rival motives may vex us, alike in our domestic legislation and in our international course of action. Finally we are bound to consider what our basic decision is to be, and that means, what is our ultimate conviction and value in human life altogether. We come down inevitably to an ethical problem and an ethical judgment.

Chapter 2

THE PROBLEM OF VALUE AND PERSONALITY

1. THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF VALUE

The various normative sciences to which ethics is related (logic, aesthetics, economics, jurisprudence, social-political theory) are concerned with the establishment of their respective standards, and they all point to some fundamental principle of evaluation. The concepts of truth, beauty, economic well-being and security, justice and social order are all specific instances of this basic principle. When we use the terms good or bad broadly to qualify a process of reasoning or a work of art, a business transaction or contract, a piece of legislation or a social-political system, we do not confuse all these with the ethical use of good or bad, but we do recognize their ultimate kinship. It is important, therefore, to consider here the meaning or meanings of Value.

This general problem has become outstanding in contemporary philosophical thought, and the proposed definitions and theories of Value are many. Value has been defined as that which we want, or as whatever engages our support or opposition, interests us in any way, serves or obstructs our practical needs and purposes (utility value), insures or threatens our life and well-being (survival value), meets or disappoints

our expectations. Any extended systematic criticism of the various theories of value would be out of the question here. But we may turn our attention to one aspect of the general problem which is relevant to ethical studies, namely, the personal connotation of all values.

We may begin with the following statement: Value is revealed in the personal response to experience. We say personal response to experience, rather than to objects or events, because it is as contents of experience that objects or events are available for valuation. We should be led to this statement whatever view we might entertain of the relation of our experience to its objects. Furthermore we state, not that value is the personal response to experience, but that it is revealed in that personal response. The expression is intended to take account of the kinship of value and valuation. It may also prepare us for some necessary distinctions essential to our understanding of the place of value in the ultimate nature of things. This topic, important in our estimate of the final implications of ethics, will engage our especial attention towards the close of this book, but it will be noted briefly at the conclusion of this section.

The expression "personal response to experience" may be criticized as lacking in precision. We can only reply that value is manifested in ways as various as the versatility of persons affords: in satisfaction or significance, in purpose or interests, in demands or preferences or problems. The proposal to pack all this rich complexity of personal response into a single formula is of dubious advantage. Whether we define value as any object of any interest, or as any interest in any object, or as the emotional tone of conative process, or as the satisfaction of desires, the various differentiae in our proposed definition are insufficient. Unless we load our terms with ambiguity to serve the requirements of our formulas, we should see that

values are definable in the particular ways just mentioned but also in other ways. What characterizes them all is the personal character of the response. So instead of forcing the wealth of personal activity into some one specific response, and defining value in terms of it, we should rather explore the rich field of values in which the complex and subtle character of personality is revealed. We cannot be more explicit than our subject matter permits; otherwise we may pay too dearly for our abstract precision.

This manifold personal response may be examined in various regions of valuation. Even at the lowest and most elementary level of activity, in the satisfaction of organic needs and appetites, though the process is one of physiological functioning, our entire complex nature may so engage the desires and the gratification of them as to provide the personal tone and value of the experience. But this more integral personal involvement is naturally manifested more fully in the activities of our so-called higher faculties.

In our intellectual response to the various structures and relations in nature, it would seem that if we are moved by any interest or desire it is by the desire to be as disinterested as we can, in the objective grasp and report of facts or meanings. But though our science and our philosophy thus aim at objectivity—disinterestedly—our attitude towards this sort of understanding is not neutral. We require it and we prize it highly, for the disinterested intellectual response yields knowledge, which we value and prefer, truth rather than error. Knowledge is both an end and a means: of intrinsic worth as intellectual self-expression, but also instrumental as grasp and mastery of our environment, and a condition of richer and more effective individual and social life. Intellectual activity demands precise mastery of details, but its true aim is integral and systematic. We may begin as specialists, dissecting

the living whole of nature and of human culture, but we must proceed to some reasonable cosmic interpretation, and seek to understand and appreciate the living reality which is human civilization. This is what we mean when we say that science, physical or social, as it matures, points towards philosophy.

Aesthetic experience manifests very subtle personal response, involving intellectual and emotional elements but not reducible to either. Here, on the one hand, some kinds of perceptual material reveal a certain form of harmony, imaginative or emotional contagion which we may recognize and point out. But here also we observe ourselves investing and flooding the objects of our perception with enjoyment and appreciation. The beautiful thing animates us creatively; in each one of us it is revealed anew and finds unique expression. It is in this subtle personal interplay of aesthetic experience that the values of beauty are to be sought.

We may likewise note personal response in the expanding field of more final valuations of religious or philosophical character. We may admit the actuality of that which we yet refuse to accept, which we acknowledge as a grievous problem of injustice or other evil. Or we may demand assurance of the ultimate reality of a divine summit of perfection, to which some ideal strains in our experience point but which is not a directly experienced fact. Value in the personal response to experience may be a projection beyond the limits of the actual. Mistaken views of actuality or downright delusions may be of value as truly as the most fully established truths; or we may value certain possibilities or conjectures, or conditions definitely contrary to fact.

In our study of moral conduct, the factual influence of environment or habits or special urgency of stimulus cannot be ignored. Deliberation and choice reveal personal temperament. But the moral situation concerns fundamentally the

espousal or rejection of contending values according to their relative worth and rank. That is why impending approval or condemnation of the choice is acknowledged as pertinent and is actually experienced in retrospect. The values we choose may be evidence of our prevailing likes or dislikes, but in choosing them we also lay claim to defensible preferences. So we see further that moral value concerns not only our action but also the manifestation in it of some ideal standard or principle with which we are identified. This last reflection will show its importance presently when we consider the various types of ethical theory.

In valuation we are nowise passive spectators but active participants, demanding, resisting, preferring. Valuation is selective in intention and gradational in outlook. Always the chosen value is the preferred claimant. As chosen, it is considered not merely alongside the others, not merely different, but of different rank, worthier, better. This comparative and gradational outlook in valuation acknowledges or seeks ideals, to provide standards for defensible preferences. Valuation may thus be a demand on actuality rather than a report of it, but in this demand the character of personality is revealed.

In all the cases which have been cited and in others that might be mentioned, the study of values in the characteristically personal response to experience seems to be enlightening in both directions. The character of values is revealed, and also the subtle and complex character of personality.

At this point we note briefly the more ultimate aspect of our general problem mentioned earlier in this section. It may be asked: Are values real parts and aspects of nature, or are they only our personal ways with things, what we ourselves ascribe to objects? Now is not this question confused? If values are in our personal response to experience, are they not also aspects of real nature in any ultimately significant sense of

that term? My reaction to any thing reveals somehow the character both of that thing and of myself. Even my illusory idea of it has some of that revealing character, as does the image of an object in a distorting mirror, or in any mirror, or the view of a stick half submerged in water. Nature, real nature, is disclosed in a variety of relations and perspectives. Even if values were called creations of our own, still they would be in and of nature, for nature includes us and them. If, however, it be objected that by the term nature we should mean the causally ordered system with which the physical sciences deal, then we grant that values would not be comprehended in it, but we should object to the inference that values are therefore not real. To see and to express the relation of the physical-causal system to the system of values as both aspects of ultimate reality, may be precisely the intension of the term Nature, in its fuller and truer meaning. Actually we are always turning from one of these conceptions of nature to the other: from the more obvious and manageable use of it in physical science, to the more adequate meaning of it in humanistic reflection. So art, as we are told, improves on nature; yet Nature comprehends this improvement. Shakespeare expressed this truth once for all:

> Yet nature is made better by no mean,
> But nature makes that mean; so over that art
> Which you say adds to nature, is an art
> That nature makes.

2. RELATIVE VALUES AND THE HIGHEST GOOD

Even a broad glance over the field of values shows us their range and variety along the entire course of our experience. Closer insight reveals more than various interests and tests. The difference between values is one of relative importance and rank. In the personal response to experience, any process or object, any interest or demand or purpose or hope that en-

gages our attention in any way has a conceivable value for us, for good or for ill. Our experience does not normally proceed along any single track. We are aroused, attracted, or repelled by different things; and our unreadiness to act resolutely in any one definite way is due to our tentative inclination to follow a number of contending impulses, and to avoid the conflicts in which they involve us. Characteristically our problem here is one of initial indecision. We are urged to action but do not yet really know which way to turn. Different sides of our nature, or different ideas or interests, each intent on its respective end, contend for preferential treatment, and the eventual success of one or another of these decides the course of our action.

A person on whom various motives are thus brought to bear may react in several ways. He may without reflection follow the first inclination of the moment, only to change to the opposite direction on the impulse of the next counteracting idea. The process may be repeated with variations. This vacillation of inconclusive actions is a common experience. I leave my house after breakfast, but after walking several blocks suddenly remember something that I have left behind me. I turn back at once, but even as I do it I remark that I cannot spare the time or that I can spare the forgotten object, so turn about again, only to reconsider and reverse my course yet a third time. In less amusing ways such impulsive behavior may be observed in our daily conduct. Sometimes impulsiveness is as stubborn as it is uncritical. We follow a certain initial strong interest and then remain blind to any other considerations. In all such cases the procedure is directly from incentive to action, on the spur of the moment or on the strongest inclination. In the eventual action only some one side of our nature is active. The rest of us, our entire self, is not engaged in like measure.

The process of deliberation is a conscious engagement of

our whole being, with all sides of our personality being brought to bear on the issue—the legislative tribunal and verdict of personality over against the lawless drive of unreflective impulse. The weighing of counter motives, which we agree in regarding as essential to moral conduct, is in effect a critical comparison of contending values. This thing and that and that other, each in some way seems good and desirable; or else they are all evils to be avoided. But in our deliberation we consider which one most matters now, how the others are to be left for later attention or quite set aside. Our reflective life is involved in a multiplicity of values, and our daily problem is to compare and appraise them. Our deliberate choice in each case expresses our declaration of the highest and most important value in the situation.

This relative importance of values which we seek to determine in any particular case raises further general considerations, essential to morality. Repeatedly we subordinate certain motives and interests, certain values to others, and our tested reflection approves this subordination. Now if some values are evidently higher than others, and some are still higher, what is the standard and what is the summit of valuation on which all such comparative treatment depends? Is there a Supreme Value or a Dominant Principle of Valuation, by reference to which the various values are graded in a hierarchy, preferred or set aside in any particular decision? This sort of inquiry engaged the ancient Greek moralists in their idea of the Highest Good, or the *summum bonum* as the Romans called it. So Aristotle remarked that there must be a final and fundamental good to which all other goods point.

The very idea of the Highest Good implies not only that some goods are higher than others and form a hierarchy of values, but also that some goods are valued as contributory to others and some are valued in themselves. Values are related

to each other in various ways. The distinction just made is important and should be made clearer. The goods or values of our experience may be considered as intrinsic or as contributory (instrumental). Examples of these are familiar. A mountain climb, the solving of a mathematical problem, an evening with Shakespeare or Beethoven, the experience of intense devotion in love or in religious worship, these are experiences which we cherish in and for themselves; they are intrinsically good. But they are not valued in isolation, nor are they sterile. Each of these values is also instrumental or contributory to other experiences of worth. Vigorous bodily or mental activity serves to achieve superior mastery that makes higher achievements possible and their respective satisfactions. Likewise in the other fields mentioned, the values are of inherent worth, and they bear also their fruits in more expansive fulfillment. In fact, every value may be seen to be in some relation contributory to others. All values have a contributory aspect. It may be noted also that most values have an intrinsic aspect. But to this there is an important exception. The values of wealth and material possessions are contributory or instrumental only. They are not intrinsic; we value them solely as means to other values. This strictly contributory character of economic values will have to be examined further. The recognition of it is essential to the right ethical treatment of economic problems.

The lack of intrinsic worth in economic values justifies their low rank in any reasonable scale of valuation. But in comparing the intrinsic and the contributory aspects of the other values we cannot conclude offhand to prefer one of these phases to the other. More likely we shall be led to consider other features of our valuing activity, which enter in a sound judgment of defensible preference. It is clear that the contributory character of values varies. Some are abundantly

fruitful; others by comparison are meager or well-nigh sterile. Some enter and affect a very narrow strip of our experience, while others are pervasive and transfigure our entire life. The influence of some is passing and unreliable; others are abiding and sure. Some are largely individual; others are social in their reach and involvement. Some values affect our lives deeply and intensely; others are contributory in a mild and superficial degree.

Similar distinctions may be observed also in the intrinsic aspects of some values. John Keats could trace the delight of drinking claret from the tip of his tongue down the length of his throat; but the joys of poetry absorbed and permeated his whole being. We recognize clearly the relative intrinsic intensity of different values, their integral, abiding, assured, and outreaching worth, or the opposites.

Now clearly in all these discriminations certain lines of relative valuations are already apparent. When we examine the main doctrines of the Highest Good, we shall note the use that has been made of these and of other specific tests of relative value. In all these efforts to sustain ethical conviction, a more general and ultimate decision of supreme emphasis in life has concerned men in raising the question of the Highest Good. They have asked: What is the Chief Good to which all other goods are contributory, by which they are tested, in which they find their fruition and their final justification? Ethical inquiry seeks this ultimate moral principle or core of human life. The main varieties of answers that have been given to this basic question in morals distinguishes the principal types of ethical theory outlined in the next section and examined in the following four chapters.

3. MAIN TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY: PRELIMINARY SURVEY

Our fundamental problem is dual in character. We seek the highest value and the ultimate sanction in valuation. We ask:

What is the Supreme Good? We also inquire: What makes it good and supreme? Our reflection pursues the ideal summit and also the standard of moral values. Ethical reasoning does not always distinguish clearly these two sides of the problem. Often the argument along either of the two lines is inconclusive, and each may seek support from the other. Consideration of one aspect of the problem may lead to the choice of a theory, and then more definite selection and formulation is reached by a study of the other side of the basic issue.

Before considering the main theories of critical ethics, account must be taken of a type of answer which has seemed quite sufficient to most people through the ages. It is the answer of Traditionalism, and it assumes general and more specific forms. The traditionalist not only shares the customary scale of valuations which prevail in his society; he also points to traditional sanction as the warrant and basis of his judgments of approval and disapproval. Morality is rooted in the *mores;* that is good which conforms to custom, and it is good for that sufficient reason. We may call this form of traditionalism conventional or customary morals. Both its merits and its defects will be manifested repeatedly in our treatment of specific ethical problems. We may reflect briefly here that no system of moral ideas and practices is without social ancestry. It is rooted in the past. The traditions which it shares or which it resists are the accumulated results of human experience and judgment through the ages. No fair-minded person can dismiss the customary answer offhand.

But the conventional or customary sanction faces many serious difficulties. It varies in different societies and is rarely stable in any. Thus it lacks the universal character which ultimate ethical sanction must possess. Several traditionalists, all agreeing in their reliance on conformity to established custom, may yet clash in their actual judgments even as their customs clash. The traditional code of any society, especially the early

ones, may include certain allowances or certain requirements of the good life, which later societies reject as morally indifferent or as bad. Blood feud, infanticide, polygamy, dietary restrictions, rigor or laxity in a dozen other fields of conduct provide abundance of illustrations confusing to the traditionalist. How can morality be really valid in Borneo if it is questionable in Benares and plainly invalid in Bagdad, to say nothing of Boston?

Our sound intelligence may reply here: Surely we cannot ignore development in morals. Practices which do not meet our more mature standards may have been the best that the savage mind or his conditions in life could afford. We need not condemn in him what we should certainly reprove in ourselves. This is incontestable, but it points to a conception of moral value, unfolding and reaching its fuller fruition through the ages, which no mere appeal to custom at any stage of its development can suffice to vindicate.

The standard of conformity could not account for the very customs on which it relies, since no society, however low or high, is really aboriginal. It has its background from which it has arisen and developed. It itself is the result of changes and growth. The customs which it exalts are the sanctioned revisions of older traditions, revisions which only non-conformity and criticism could have achieved. So our traditionalist has to accept his standards from those whose resistance to their own earlier customs he must in consistency condemn. This ethics of conventional adherence cannot be reasoned out; it breaks down before its final conclusion.

Similar difficulties confront some special varieties of traditionalism. One of these is Legalism. It seeks the basis and the sanction of morals in the system of established law. The chief exponent of this doctrine, Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, went further and maintained that prior to the

establishment of the state with its legislation and its enforced commands and prohibitions, no morals were conceivable. Morality, so he thought, arises in man's relations to others under the control of the Sovereign's power. That is good which the Sovereign commands, and that is evil which the Sovereign forbids; and they are good or bad just because they are thus ordered or prohibited.

Aside from the various defects which legalism shares with the general theory of traditionalism, it has its peculiar shortcomings. It constricts the vast range of morals within the framework and mesh of legality, which by common consent has never comprehended the more intimate human experiences, some of them most important elements in the moral sphere. While it is true that men have sought to formulate in their system of laws the verdicts of the social conscience, it is also a fact that legality has included only those parts or aspects of the social good which could be framed abstractly in statutes. Furthermore the legal slant is characteristically retrospective; its reliance is on established procedure and precedent. Sometimes for good and more often for ill, it has lagged behind the living demands of men and their active conscience. Legalism lacks the broad range, the universality, and the intimate probing of human life which are required in an adequate moral theory.

A more venerable form of traditionalism finds the moral standard of good and evil in religious authority. This is the position of Theological Ethics, or as it has been called, Decalogue Morality. The theologian comprehends morality under religion. Goodness is for him godliness. All our good is from God; in him we live and move, and in him is our well-being. Morality without piety lacks its sap and savor and its fruitage. If you want to know the true meaning of good and evil, of virtue and vice, you must recognize them as righteous-

ness and sin: devotion or resistance to God's will and law. Some theological moralists, and also some moral philosophers of considerable eminence, have sought the ultimate ethical standard in the fiat of God's will. Not content with acknowledging as good whatever God commands, they have declared that it is good simply because God commands it. God's will is itself the ultimate moral determinant. Followers of Duns Scotus in the Middle Ages proceeded to this position, which is accordingly called Scotism in ethics.

The sacred authority of religion in the various stages of human culture sets in high relief the variety and inconsistency of standards which it shares with the general field of custom and tradition. If we declare that the standard of goodness is God's will and law, bewildered humanity may gasp in confusion. What divine will and law are to be authoritative here: those of the Lord on Sinai or of the Lord in Galilee, of Allah or of Ahura-Mazda, or else of Moloch or Kali or Huitzilopochtli? The mere mention of these latter deities arouses our horror and revulsion, but to their votaries their laws were unquestionable. Were one to draw an indictment of human depravity, the sacred laws and observances of various religions would suffice to swell the dreary record. Human sacrifice, sacred prostitution, unspeakable austerities, self-mutilations, obscenities, and holy filth stain the pages of religious history. We should not forget the religious derivation of the words "thug" and "assassin." Our more extensive knowledge of the religious evolution of mankind might lead us to appreciate even better than Lucretius did the element of truth in his dismal line:

> *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.*—
> Such is the power of religion, evils in life to engender.

Now any fair-minded student of religion should immediately recognize the woeful one-sidedness of any such estimate

of the moral worth of religion in human civilization. If some of the sinks of human bigotry and corruption have had the noisome sanctity of religion, in religion also the human spirit has reached its summits. Against Moloch, we have the Sermon on the Mount. The very recognition of moral depravity and moral perfection, both religious, shows the inadequacy of any uncritical appeal to religious authority as a standard in determining moral issues. The typical advocate of theological ethics is apt to admit this in fact, even though he may not acknowledge its implications. He proclaims the Divine Law as the basic sanction in morals, and then immediately explains that he means the Law of God, the true one, and cites his reasons for the preferential claims of his own creed. The last part of this reasoning clearly follows and must follow a different line from the first.

This is not the time to examine in any adequate detail the large problem of the relation of religion to morality. This discussion is postponed to our closing chapter. Here we are concerned simply with the theological variety of traditionalism as a theory of the ethical standard. And we have seen that history manifests, in the field of religion just as in the field of morals or of human experience generally, a growth of customary ideas and practices, from the lowest and crudest to the highest and most mature and refined. Theological traditionalism does not really answer the question: What is the real good, the highest good, and why is it supreme and decisive? In referring these issues to the will of God, we merely restate them in the language of religion. Call the good life the godly life, you still have to prove what the really good life is, and why. In religion just as in morals the problem of ultimate and supreme valuation and its sanctions is imposed on the critical mind.

In rejecting theological ethics the secular moralist does not dismiss religion. He only seeks an ethical answer to an ethical

question. This requirement the theologian must also recognize when he tries to vindicate his godly life as really good, for then and there he himself also undertakes a moral inquiry. In the conception of the godly life, the religious ideal, God is viewed and interpreted in a moral perspective. It is not independently of our moral convictions and aspirations but precisely in and through them, ever more maturely, that the idea of God is attained, becomes available for worship, and in its turn acts as a spiritual dynamic on the higher stages of morality, where virtue and the good life reach towards saintliness and blessedness. Thus, nowise ignoring the outstanding importance of religion in the moral fulfillment of human life, we are yet bound to seek an adequate ethical theory and a basic standard by a direct examination of human nature and of the principle of value and personality.

The more scientific and more philosophical treatment of our problems, and the alternative theories to which it has led, will first be stated in very broad outline. The four principal varieties of ethical theory will then be considered more closely.

In our moral evaluation of any action, or of conduct and character generally, our judgment may follow either of two lines. We may consider the action in its consequences: how it works out in the experience of the agent and of others who may be concerned. That is to say, the action may be examined in the course of ongoing human experience in which it plays its part. The type of ethical theory which thus centers its attention on the results of an action and seeks in this way to determine its moral value is called Teleological. The term comes from the Greek word *telos,* meaning end, result, consummation. The verse in the Gospels, "By their fruits ye shall know them," expresses this basic teleological appeal and standard.

Against teleology in ethical theory, some moralists have

insisted on emphasizing the inner spirit of the agent. The actual results of an action may not have been those intended by us. They may only show our deed to have been beneficial or harmful. But our moral judgment concerns ourselves, our real convictions, what we are identified with, the principles on which we propose to act. An action has moral worth only if the principle on which a man is acting is the right one. And this rightness does not depend on how his undertaking may actually turn out. It is inherent and universal. Right is right, and wrong is wrong.

The dutiful acknowledgment of this essentially right principle and the direction of conduct by it, without any accommodation to expediency, mark the truly moral will. It is not the consequences of the act that really matter here, nor even the act itself, but only the right principle behind and in the act, the upright will. It is not enough that I do the right. I ought to do it because it is the right. This dutiful spirit is alone good. Here then is a standard that judges the moral worth of actions by the formal quality of the will expressed in them rather than by their consequences. This ethical theory is called Formalism, and as we shall see, it exalts the principles of duty, conscience, and the moral law as authoritative in conduct.

The general contrast between Formalism and Teleological Ethics of consequences does not express fully the main varieties of ethical doctrine. The moral judgment of acts by their results may itself yield a variety of alternative theories of morals. "By their fruits ye shall know them"—what fruits, namely? Here the principal answers have been two, and a third doctrine has gained some prominence in recent ethical inquiry.

One type of answer, as old as the first chapters of ancient Greek ethics, selects pleasure or happiness as the supreme end of human life. Any action, any course of conduct is judged by its results as enhancing or diminishing this chief good. This

theory, following the Greek word for pleasure, *hedoné,* is called Hedonism. A modern variety of it, exalting the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is named Utilitarianism.

This ethics of pleasure is involved in many difficulties. The one aspect of our experience, its emotional tone of pleasure or displeasure, selected here for special emphasis, has been criticized as too one-sided and inadequate for final moral valuation. So it has been maintained by many masters of ethics ever since Plato and Aristotle: the moral value of actions must be appraised in their bearing on the entire life and character of men. The goodness of any particular act must be sought in its contribution to the harmonious realization and fruition of human capacities, in the manifold perfection of human life. The ethical theory which proceeds from this conviction is called Perfectionism.

In developing the theory of Perfectionism, moralists through the ages have recognized the whole scale and gradation of human faculties and corresponding values, emphasizing those of the so-called higher life. Therefore perfectionism has proclaimed the dominance of reason; the preeminence of spiritual values, intellectual, aesthetic, religious; and the integrity and harmony of the morally developed and matured character, notably in its social relations. This ideal has found modern expression in the perfectionist doctrine of Self-Realization or the social realization of personality. The theory of perfectionism has been advocated especially in philosophical idealism.

To a certain type of modern mind, realization of personality has seemed too idealistic. The advance of the physical sciences has tended towards an interpretation of human life in physical-naturalistic terms. The biological theory of evolution and its influence in the whole field of the humanistic sciences—anthropology, psychology, sociology—has emphasized the demand to comprehend human conduct within the naturalistic frame-

work. A revised statement of human perfection has been sought on the analogy of the evolutionary formula, "the survival of the fittest." This is the theory of Evolutionary Ethics, which recalls that self-preservation is the first law of nature. It would refer all human values to this primary survival value, and would exalt biological fitness, sanity, and health as the essence of human perfection. The probing and the criticism of this proposal to erect a moral system on strictly biological-evolutionary foundations have expanded the range of moral inquiry and have engaged some of the best thought in contemporary ethics.

So we may see in a rapid glance the main alternatives before us. An action or conduct generally may be praised or condemned because of the formal quality of the will and the inner spirit and principle of which it is the active expression (Formalism). Or we may judge actions and conduct according to their results and consummation in the course of experience (Teleological Ethics). In selecting the consequences by which we are thus to judge the moral value of conduct, we may emphasize pleasure or happiness (Hedonism). Or we may consider the bearing of the actions on the entire life and character of men (Perfectionism). In this latter valuation, we may be content to trace mainly the career of men in the evolutionary stream of life and may seek an ethical theory on biological lines emphasizing survival-value (Evolutionary Ethics). Or we may pursue the realization of human capacities along their entire range, the fulfillment of personality to the summits of human activity (Idealistic Perfectionism or Self-Realization Ethics).

A writer may fondly imagine himself as undisturbed by the protests or hecklings with which oral discourse is apt to be visited. And, to be sure, it might be supposed that here we have recognized diversity and impending controversy in abun-

dance. But this chapter cannot close fairly without acknowledging another kind of disagreement, the dissenting voice of radical skepticism in morals. Ever since the Sophist in the time of Socrates, rational thought has been rudely challenged by this skeptical doctrine that all ethical inquiry, just as all science and philosophy, is finally vanity and a striving after wind. The Sophist and Skeptic in ethics point at the bedlam of conflicting customs and traditions, at the shifting tastes and preferences of men, at the disagreements and controversies in moral philosophy, and pronounce all alleged knowledge to be merely opinion, and all conviction only sorry bigotry. There is and there can be no valid standard and no true conclusion in morals, but only expressions of passing tastes or more stubborn prejudices. Even so no real knowledge of nature and no science are available, but only a round of shifting impressions and more or less habitual beliefs and doctrines. This disruption of all critical inquiry will be noted repeatedly as we consider our various specific problems in morals. Suffice it at present to observe that it unsettles all constructive work in every field of science. We may further reflect that skepticism is itself a piece of dogmatism, and self-refuting too. For it is no small claim to knowledge, to assert that no knowledge is to be had or that no reasonable solution of a certain problem is available. Critical intelligence, despite the skeptical defiance, proceeds with its work and vindicates its capacities by the exercise of them.

This has been the progressive record in the various sciences. Is it so in ethics likewise? Can we gain reliable insight in systematic valuation; can we achieve a normative integral science of conduct? The worker in the field of ethics should beware of dogmatism and overconfidence, but he need not be dismayed. He can and he must simply proceed with his critical inquiry.

This problem which confronts all ethical reflection has in our day been thrust forward in the idea of the relativity of

morals—an idea which requires very careful interpretation. As used by different writers, ethical relativity may call attention to the vitality of moral convictions and the expansion of moral outlook in individual growth and in historical development; or it may become a defiant challenge to any alleged validity of moral principles. The Sophist's repudiation of all moral beliefs as merely shifting tastes and personal likes and dislikes has echoed again and again through the ages. It is voiced loudly today by self-proclaimed radicals; but it has impressed also some learned minds who have tried to make a theory of the mere subjectivity of moral values, proceeding to the denial of any objective knowledge or any science of morals. As just noted, however, the Sophists were penetrating enough to realize and to point out that the claim to theoretical or factual knowledge, in science and philosophy, is open to the same charge of mere subjectivity. Moral convictions are only shifting likes and dislikes; professed knowledge and scientific truth are only unstable sense impressions dignified into conventional notions. Physical science is subject to the same corrosive skepticism as moral science. The alarming anarchical implications of all this sophistry aroused the equally radical but constructive mind of Socrates, and his teachings as developed by Plato and Aristotle mark the classic achievement of Greek reason.

In our own day also we should grasp the truth which constructive intelligence has been vindicating through the ages. It is a truth about the essential character of all truth and also of any other value. All value is revealed and realized in the personal response to experience. But personal experience, outlook, and activity cannot be regarded as rigidly set once for all. So Nature in a personal perspective is ever relative to the developing, expanding, and self-reconstitutive view and insight, and to corresponding capacities and problems of maturing intelligence. All truths and principles, all values, are

characterized by relativity, but it need not be the relativity of merely unstable and unreliable impressions and tastes. It can be and it is also the relativity of deepening insight, expanding outlook, developing mastery. So the historian of morals can trace from primitive to barbarian to civilized societies the growing substance and principles of the moral life. The direction of the historical process is not an assured straight line upwards; nor can we say that all problems are steadily surmounted, and certainty progressively more sustained. But even in the deepening tragic conviction of many crucial moral issues, the reality of moral principles may be reaffirmed. Ethical relativity expresses dramatically the reality of truth and of all other value. These values are relative to the nature and the outlook of personal activity. They manifest but they also challenge and test our real moral capacity.

The distinction, which is here indicated broadly, between the two ways of intepreting the relativity of morals, the sophistic-skeptical and the active-constructive way, is of the utmost importance in ethics. We shall see it expressed more particularly in our discussion of specific problems of moral inquiry. We should always keep it in mind, if we are to preserve sane balance in ethical judgment and to resist the shock of skeptical defiance with its blighting negations.

Part 2

MAIN TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY

Chapter 3

FORMALISM: UPRIGHT WILL AS THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY

1. THE INHERENT VALIDITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE MORAL LAW

Our introductory outline of the main types of ethical theory, in the preceding chapter, included theological ethics as a variety of traditionalism. Some readers, while agreeing that the ethical appeal to religious authority might warrant examination under the general head of conformity to tradition, may object that this view of theological ethics misses an essential and important aspect of it. The aspect overlooked is the significance of the theologian's intention to test our changing human judgments and choices by their regard for an eternal Divine Law. Perhaps his own statement of this Divine Law suffers from sectarian limitations or otherwise is unconvincing or quite unacceptable. If so, it would only mean that his specific answer is not the right one. This would nowise set aside the problem of a universal and authoritative standard of right and wrong. The demand for such a standard still remains imperative. Christian and Moslem may disagree in their versions of God's Law, but they agree that only a law beyond the expediency and changing circumstances of daily life, a law inherently

right, absolute, and unquestionable, can be a really decisive and adequate basis in morals. They call it the Law of God; non-sectarian ethics may seek a revision of the formula in secular terms; but can it evade the fundamental requirement for a really supreme principle in morality?

This objection is good, and it may serve to fix our attention on the characteristic alternative view of moral principles which finds expression in the various versions of ethical formalism. Virtue, moral good, says the formalist, cannot be sought in the contingency of fortunes and devices and tastes of men. The rightness of an act must be inherent, an inner worthiness independent of expediency or consequences or ulterior advantages. Right is right, and wrong is wrong. All particular moral judgments must be tested by appeal to the sovereign norm of inherent universal and eternal right.

This method is called formal because it is not concerned with the particular content or field of application, but with the essential principle of rectitude itself. The term formal is used here on the analogy of the familiar logical distinction between formal and material truth. Consider the formal structure of the valid syllogism: All *B* is *C;* and all *A* is *B;* therefore all *A* is *C*. We may not know whether these three propositions are statements of actual fact, materially true, for it may not be stated what *A, B,* and *C* stand for. But here we are concerned with the validity of relating these three propositions in this specific way. Or clearer still for our purpose, consider the logical Law of Non-Contradiction: *A* cannot be *C* and *non-C* at the same time. Here, the formal logician tells us, we have an unquestionable principle irrespective of particular situations or circumstances. In all the varieties of reflection, in whatever science, the mind recognizes and must respect the fundamental principles of logic, formally and universally valid. Now the ethical formalist adds: if ethics is to be a valid

science, it can be only in terms of similar formal validity of its basic first principles.

The central demand for an unquestionable and unconditional standard has led some theologians and moralists to a firm rejection of Scotism. The more usual theological ethics is content to describe virtue and vice as righteousness and sin, obedience and disobedience to God's will. But the Scotist, as was noted earlier, goes further and declares that good and evil are good and evil just because God's will commands and prohibits them. This doctrine, in its pious exaltation of Divine authority, actually introduces an element of contingency in its conception of the moral law. Against Scotism, it has been maintained that the basic principle of morality is really absolute, eternal, and immutable. No edict and no will, human or divine, originates it, nor can any will rightly nullify or alter it, make falsehood or injustice virtues, and veracity or justice vices. God's will is the sovereign champion and sustainer of righteousness, but it does not constitute any act righteous. We say: "Great is truth, and will prevail." That it will prevail, we trust ultimately to God's will; but its greatness, its moral worth is inherent and absolute. Indeed we are convinced that God's will guarantees the ultimate triumph of truth just because of this essential worth, which God is bound to recognize and so espouse. The significant point in this turn of theological ethics is its final emphasis on an absolute and nowise contingent moral standard. This does not mean that moral verities are external to God, but that in nature and in the Divine essence they are eternal and immutable. God would not be God, nor man man, if there were no such everlasting order in the very nature of things.

This emphasis on formal and unvarying validity dominates the thought of some moralists, and it is present also in some kinds of ethics that cannot be described offhand as formalistic.

Cudworth's "eternal and immutable morality" is an instance of the former; the latter is illustrated in the Stoic conception of the good life as the life according to law, according to nature, a doctrine which is then developed along the lines of austere rational perfectionism. The inclusion of some elements of formalism in mainly theological ethics is not infrequent. The due recognition of the formal aspect of moral validity is an essential of a really adequate ethical theory. But this due recognition has its limits which we may define by a critical examination of the more thoroughly and explicitly formalistic ethics.

Ethical formalism is marked by a characteristic tone which its adherents would call elevation and its critics grave solemnity. A typical statement by Richard Price may serve as an illustration: "Rectitude . . . or virtue is a law. And it is the first and supreme law, to which all other laws owe their force, on which they depend, and in virtue of which alone they oblige. It is an universal law. The whole creation is ruled by it: under it men and all rational beings subsist. It is the source and guide of all the actions of the Deity himself, and on it his throne and government are founded. . . . The repeal, suspension, or even the relaxation of it, once for a moment, in any part of the universe, cannot be conceived without a contradiction."

Price was a contemporary of Kant, in whose moral philosophy formalism reached its fullest and most systematic treatment. Kant was especially concerned to understand the meaning of law in ethics. If we say that the laws of morality are inherent in the very nature of things, do we think of them as laws of nature in the scientific sense of that term? There is a radical distinction here, according to Kant. A law of nature, in science, expresses a certain universal and uniform dependence of specific events in space and time on specific antecedent con-

ditions. Conversely, a certain relative necessity is indicated in a law: if certain results are expected or demanded, certain determining conditions are required. This sort of law was called by Kant a "hypothetical imperative"; he could see no way of using it as a basis in morals. With such laws in conduct you could have only a system of explaining or of effectively directing the operation of the mechanism of human behavior, incentives and reactions—that is to say, some sort of anthropology, not ethics.

Real ethics, moral philosophy, requires the recognition of a radically different kind of law. It must be a law of unconditional obligation. Kant called it a "categorical imperative." There can be no moral goodness in an act performed as a means to some ulterior gratification or object in view. The ultimate end must be acknowledged and chosen in the action, which is thus never dependent for its worth on any consequences but solely on its own uprightness.

This is the essence of the characteristic conviction in all genuine moral activity, that we *ought* to act thus or so. Unlike the relative necessity exemplified in laws of nature, moral necessity is absolute. The obligation here is unconditional. In science we always ask and must ask the question, Why? Likewise in practical expediency, in regulation of diet or efficient order or convenience. You must follow this strict diet, if you wish to achieve or to maintain these dimensions, or if you would avoid this hazard to your health. You must make your seat reservation in advance, if you would be assured of accommodation. You must go through the initial discipline of finger exercises, if you would master piano playing. But a moral law has a radically different character. Here the main point is that of an inherent and unquestionable sanction. If I am told, you ought to tell the truth, you ought to pay your debts, not as maxims of expediency but of morals, then morally speaking I may not ask

the question, Why? If I tell the truth or meet my obligations merely from motives of expediency or ulterior considerations, then it is not the moral worth of veracity and honesty that is decisive in my act. No morality enters here at all, nor can it enter, until my sole motive for the act is my recognition of its rectitude. Telling the truth might be useful or inconvenient as the case might be, but it is morally good only when I tell the truth truthfully, that is, tell the truth because it is the truth and because I ought to be truthful.

As may be seen, there are far-reaching implications in this account of the moral law, in distinction from the laws of nature as science understands them. Human nature and conduct seem to allow of a dual treatment. On the one hand, we are involved, mind and body, in the structure and causal connectedness of things in nature; but on the other hand, we are judged to belong to a realm of principles and ideal values, of unconditional authority and worth. How is this duality of human character to be interpreted ultimately? Radical problems of philosophical and religious importance are involved in this question. They are the problems of the "cosmology of values." In their essentials they are reducible to this: What must be our idea of the basic and ultimate character of nature and of human nature, if we take morality and spiritual values seriously? But it may be premature to examine these problems now, on the basis of ethical formalism alone; for we may be thus led into difficulties which are due to the formalist's one-sided interpretation of morality. Better, then, to examine first formalism and the other alternative accounts of moral value, and also the ethical problems of the various social institutions. Then, against the background of such a more comprehensive survey of ethical reflection, we may proceed to consider some of the ultimate philosophical and religious implications of morals.

2. UPRIGHT WILL AS THE ESSENCE OF MORAL GOODNESS. MERITS OF FORMALISM

We should keep in mind several aspects of the moral problem that may be distinguished in the formalist's treatment of it. First, there is the doctrine of the nature and the sanction of the moral principle itself, that it is nowise contingent but absolute and unconditional. Second, we may raise the question, how we come to know and recognize this principle of ultimate and eternal worth. About this, formalists may differ: some regard it theologically as God's voice in our souls; others declare it to be a direct intuition of our moral sense; still others treat it as the indubitable conviction of our moral reason, analogous to the self-evidence of axioms. This problem of the nature of moral insight will be examined in our eighth chapter which deals with Conscience. At present we shall consider the formalist's standard itself: What makes any action of ours morally good and justifies us morally in the performance of it?

It will be recalled that the formalist rejects the teleological moral judgment of acts by appeal to their consequences. Consequences, in our common experience of them, may be really beyond the reach of the moral will and so not determinants of its goodness. We all know how often the action of a man of high principles, despite his good will, turns out disastrously, and also the less frequent cases when good Providence seems to defeat a man's evil designs and bring his bad act to a good outcome. The goodness of a persons's action must be found in the inherent worth of the principle which he has acknowledged and chosen. But even this is not searching enough. Can I say that my act is morally good because the principle on which I am acting is the right and true principle? Such proper conformity on my part may qualify me as morally competent, but

does it distinguish me as morally good? The more exacting formalist would not accept the doctrine of moral goodness as conformity to the moral law. He demands more: loyal respect for the right principle. The heart of goodness is in this loyal heart and spirit of upright will. The Right is inherent, eternal, and absolute. I may grasp this principle, understand it clearly, and conform to it in my conduct. But neither knowledge nor conduct are morally sufficient and decisive. My will ought to be upright. In doing the right I ought to do it because I respect it and am identified with it as the right.

The formalist not only withdraws his view from the eventual result of an action, to appraise the act itself. He turns from the external action to consider the inner spirit which it expresses. He asks: Was this man acting on principle, on the right principle, and out of pure respect for its rightness? This formal quality of the will alone constitutes an action morally good. We may welcome or deplore the actual result of a deed, but it cannot sway our moral judgment. We seek assurance of the moral law, and demand conformity to it, but it is not enough that the Right be known and that it be done. Goodness is only in the pure respect for the Right, which marks the dutiful and loyal person.

A fair critical estimate of formalism in ethics cannot overlook its merits. It reaches beyond any external survey to a more inward probing of moral experience, and its final valuation is intimate, of the person himself, of his own spirit and convictions, and not merely of his performance. This merit is incontestable; our conviction of its central importance is deepened when we test it in actual cases of conduct. Is not this more intimate appraisal one of the essential marks that should distinguish a truly moral from a merely legal verdict? Legal procedure itself in its long evolution registers the progressive effort, beyond the judgment of the ascertained transgression of

law, to probe and to judge the criminal himself, his motivation and character. In this more searching scrutiny courts and magistrates may fail; the guilty may evade punishment, and innocent men may suffer. Moral insight leads the pious soul to find both admonition and hope in the thought of the Lord who "tries the heart and is pleased with uprightness."

The formalist might protest at this point that even in the recognition of the merit of inwardness in his theory, too sharp a distinction between the action and the agent is imputed to him. More strictly speaking, formalism does not neglect the actual deed; but observe, it is not content with a merely external inspection—it appraises the action in relation to the agent. An act is morally good if the agent is truly identified with it, if the two mutually reveal each other in an upright spirit. This is not the case in my mere obedience to a law, which I may inwardly detest. When I am moved by pure respect for the principle to which I conform, however, my will is not subject to any external compulsion. My act is then one of inner obligation, and the law which it espouses is its law. The moral person is thus a self-legislative will. In his every deed of loyal obedience he champions and himself reenacts the law to which he submits. In the moral realm he is both subject and sovereign. This second merit formalism may fairly claim, that in its view of moral conduct it transcends the usual dualism of act and agent, and reaches a union of the two, in the genuine self-expression of the moral agent in his action, on the principle of the self-legislative will.

Might we not go even further, and allow the formalist's plea, that he does not neglect the importance of consequences but rather insists on reviewing them in their right moral perspective? The results of an action, as external eventualities beyond the control or possible anticipation of the agent, are, to be sure, morally irrelevant. But an act has consequences which decid-

edly concern the integrity of the moral will. Every proposed act of mine is an impending commitment of my personality. I choose and decide that I am to be this kind of will and no other. Likewise my every action points to a kind of moral order which I have espoused and would sustain. The moral will in every choice proceeds to self-expression in the principle which it would also vindicate and reaffirm. In its purport and effect every good act sustains and reconstitutes the moral order. So the formalist might plead that he does not ignore consequences or consider the individual out of his natural or social setting. But he demands that a moral act be viewed in its moral context and relevance, not in its circumstantial and perhaps fortuitous issue.

As in this way formalism repeatedly centers our attention and moral judgment on the character of the upright will, does it give our recognition of values genuinely personal emphasis? Integrity, nobility, rectitude are not qualities of some event or condition in nature. They are thoroughly personal in connotation. The moral will is now seen as the unique center of worth. And this unique character of man is the essence of his dignity as a person. It is also the ground of his claim to our recognition and respect for it as inviolable. Other things in nature may come and go; we may use them as our convenience and expediency may dictate. The moment our moral will is involved, however, unyielding self-respect demands our primary concern for its integrity and inner worth. And likewise in all our dealings with other persons: we ought not to treat any man as merely a means or tool to whatever profit or pleasure or advantage he might yield us. First and foremost we ought to respect his moral dignity as a person. In the words of Robert Burns, "A man's a man for a' that!" This conviction has found religious as well as philosophical and poetic expression. It is uttered in the language of faith as God's loving regard for

man's eternal soul. It is the core of the moral teaching of the Gospels.

This estimate of man's unique dignity as a person is not a monopoly of formalism. It is expressed quite as well, and more fully, as we shall see, in the theory of perfectionism. But modern formalism, especially as formulated by Kant, has given this moral principle a telling statement which has proved very fruitful in social ethics. We shall have to acknowledge this merit of formalism repeatedly, in our later discussions of specific moral problems, where the recognition of personal dignity and its claims is imperative.

3. FORM AND CONTENT IN MORAL ACTIVITY. DEFECTS OF FORMALISM

The merits of formalism outlined above are all aspects or implications of its insistence on the moral importance of active devotion to the right principle. The good act is the act of an upright will, the act of dutiful loyalty to the moral law. We are good when we do the right on principle, just because it is the right. All this emphasis on the inner tone and spirit in conduct is important, and no ethical theory is adequate unless it recognizes it and includes it in its final evaluation of our life and character. But is this formal account of the good sufficient? To be sure, the moral person is one who does the right on principle; but what is this right conduct to which he is to be dutifully loyal? Unless we can find content and substance in these exalted formulas, we are apt to reflect with the ironical critic of them that they come in the end to a vacant truism: a man is not good unless he loyally means to be good.

The critic's demand on formalism, to provide its abstract concept of moral worth with more definite substance, has been recognized by advocates of the doctrine in various ways. They have shown the concrete embodiment of the sovereign prin-

ciple by following the lead of some other ethical theory. The record of this tendency in formalistic ethics may be read in a series of very elevated declarations concerning the moral law and the life of dutiful loyalty to it. The good life, morally law-abiding, is a life according to nature, loyal to Divine Providence. The moral law is the law of reason, by control of the passions achieving moral perfection. It is essentially a law of righteousness, equitable respect for our duties in all our relations. This basic and formal righteousness is exhibited in specific content as piety in our relation to God, justice and benevolence in our relation to our fellowmen, sobriety and temperance with respect to ourselves.

It may be questioned whether any such detailed elaboration of the formal principle could be achieved without appeal to teleological ethics, unless it be by implicit avowal of traditional norms, usually theological. The intuitionist in ethics may be quite certain, not only of the supreme moral principle but also of his more definite formulas of the good, that they are axioms directly evident to reason. So the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More, cites twenty-three *Noemata* or rational principles of conduct. For the most part they elaborate in abstract details the formal characteristics of the virtuous life, and then infer some applications to actual conduct. Modern analysis has not been so confident of its basic axioms and definitions. The maxims of our moral sense had seemed directly certain and indubitable to the earlier intuitionists; but their vague self-evidence becomes unsettled when it seeks a formulation with more definite content. Only principles of the widest generality may be sustained by such analysis, perhaps because they are essentially synonyms of the Right and the Good: namely, what ought to be sustained and chosen. While endeavoring to avoid supposed axioms that might be unquestionable but only tautologous, Henry Sidgwick did acknowledge the self-evidence of three

basic principles: those of Justice and Benevolence and Prudence: "I ought not to prefer my own lesser good to the greater good of another."—"I ought not to prefer a present lesser to a future greater good." In his case the further concrete development of moral insight pointed beyond intuitionism and formalism to a utilitarian ethics.

The most famous proposal of formalism along this line is that of Kant. Kant declares, in the first sentence of his ethics: "Nothing can possibly . . . be called good without qualification except a Good Will." This statement does not signify a morality of good intentions. It exalts the dutiful will. The will loyal to duty is not to be confused with the will to perform *a* duty, to accomplish a certain moral task. What is important in morals is concentration on right principle. How can we be assured of this pure devotion? By discounting all reference to expediency in any particular situation. The action which I ought to perform is not to be justified by any need or advantage, nor excused by any extenuating circumstances. If it has only these merits of particular fitness on this occasion, it lacks moral worth. The inner principle should be right, right irrespective of my condition or another's. It must be such an action as on the face of it formally certifies itself as worthy of performance; such an action as any moral will ought to recognize and perform.

This is then the test and the rule of moral conduct: "I am never to act otherwise than so *that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.*" By this appeal to universality Kant would be assured that his will in any situation is acting dutifully out of pure respect for right principle and for inherent worth, that it is not moved by any special inducements or considerations irrelevant to morality. That is to say, in our actions there should be no ulterior motives, but in every specific case only the same basic and imperative loyalty to duty,

the law of eternal and universal worth. I will, simply as I ought and because I ought: so, without regard to any specific fitness, my action is to be universally right and good.

The moral elevation of tone in these pronouncements of the dutiful will is unmistakable, but their abstract formalism involves us in perplexities when we use the maxim as a test in actual conduct. Here is a man who obtains a loan by promises of repaying it, which he knows he cannot fulfill. If all promises were thus unreliable, no one would trust them, and they would be futile. So we cannot reasonably adopt it as a rule that "Everyone may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate himself." Or here is a prosperous man who would not be worried by the needs of the poor. But surely we could not have a society of universal callousness to distress, for it might conceivably leave anyone of us in a hopeless condition. These examples, which Kant uses, indicate a certain eventual appeal to consequences. But the formalist might protest that he is under a disadvantage when he illustrates his universal principles by specific examples. To this we can reply that precisely such definite tests would determine the validity of Kant's maxim and similar formulas.

A further confusion in the application of the formalist's principle is due to the unique elements in each individual's experience. I might protest that my act cannot be condemned as coming under a certain general head of unworthy acts. If anyone else were ever in my own unique plight, I say, he might well do as I propose to do. Is not this the perennial apology of the transgressor? The perplexity of pure formalism when dealing with concrete problems of moral experience exposes its defectiveness as an ethical theory. We recognize the importance of the pure, dutiful respect for the moral law which the formalist exalts. And we agree in approving of honest, faithful

promises and of benevolence. But we can see no way of justifying our moral approval solely by a formal principle, without some teleological appeal to consequences, and to specific consequences.

Formalism does not yield conclusive vindication of definite acts, just because it considers form alone and neglects the substance and content of actual conduct. This same excessively formal treatment might also betray it. The application of its maxim, which does not justify conclusively acts that seem manifestly good, may in some cases provide a plausible apology for acts of very dubious moral worth. The world is full of unprincipled rascals; but is it not also true that some of the worst moral disasters are due to misguided firm convictions? Here is a fanatic propagating his gospel to one and all, ready to go any length in loyalty to his chosen holy mission. Here is a free-lover-on-principle, who really believes in the promiscuity that he practices and would make it universal if he could. Here is an anarchist applying the formalist's maxim: to make all men, like him, resist established authority by whatever means they can use, that is precisely his dutiful conviction and his hope. Are these men justified morally in their acts by their resolute convictions? We might say that both their practices and their principles are morally astray. But how could we maintain this last statement by a purely formal standard?

These morally disturbing applications of formalism are emphasized by a more searching inspection of Kant's own instances in illustrating his maxim. Abstract procedure here may lead to some puzzling reflections in morals. Is it really the case that we cannot conceive of a society in which all promises and engagements are made without any intention of faithful performance but only with regard to specific advantage and expediency? What else was the old society of traditional diplomacy, which is by no means extinct, a profession of double dealing and mu-

tual deceit? Talleyrand said: "Language is given us for the purpose of concealing our ideas." A diplomat is expected to contend with his colleagues and rivals, wit against wit. In such a society the unexpected use of the truth might sometimes win over a deceitful opponent: so much the better! Or, to take the formalist's other example: Why should I adopt benevolence by ruling out as irrational the conception of a society in which every man considers only his own comfort and advantage? Might not humanity fare quite as well, or even better, if every man took and kept his own, and let others do likewise? Such a prospect would require respect for justice, but it need not include any charity.

The formalist is not without a reply to such heckling. In each case, he would remind us, the sort of society that you imagine would be one that no rational man could accept. The oppressive religious fanatic would ignore the respect for the genuine integrity of others, which is essential to religious-spiritual life. The promiscuous free lover would be denying the mutual abiding devotion that characterizes true love. The anarchist would defy the high function of law and organized authority which are conditions of reliable social order. The double-dealing diplomat would flout the mutual good faith of nations, which is a fundamental requisite of a sound international system. The uncharitable man would be blind to the truth of the solidarity of men, partners and fellow members in a common ongoing life, in plenty and in need. Each of the foregoing statements may be revised to make its moral criticism more convincing; but we should then see even more clearly that the conviction is not reached on purely formal grounds but involves a variety of teleological considerations.

Formalism thus proceeds to its own self-criticism, in the very process of its operation and exhibition in ethical conduct. Put its abstract formulas to work in our daily life, and they must

needs seek the sustaining appeal to the other elements of our moral nature.

May it not be, however, that throughout this marshaling of all our moral resources the formalist is still true to his main emphasis, to his sovereign principle of rectitude? Just as the upright will is alone really good, so the only teleological prospect, the only aim or goal that we should allow, would be the fuller perfection of the dutiful spirit, the consummation of it and of all that it signifies in the life of humanity. Kant's Kingdom of Ends or Realm of Values expresses this moral conception of life. In our century Josiah Royce developed his ideal of Loyalty, "the willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause." Royce did not intend to suffer the constricting effects of a too rigid formalism. He would incorporate in his principle all the insights of a broad critical examination of moral experience and the elements of truth in the various interpretations of it. But his central emphasis was on loyalty as the badge and banner of the moral will. The conflict of standards is a conflict of loyalties, and in that conflict it is again the principle of loyalty that can reconcile, subordinate, emphasize, achieve a deeper harmony of our life. Back of all our moral aims is this pervasive and prevailing spirit, and itself is its own ultimate goal, to realize and enhance the spirit of loyalty. So the moral life at its best is a *loyalty to loyalty*. The man of moral worth, whatever the cause that he might be espousing, is ultimately a devoted spokesman of the spirit of dutiful loyalty itself. And it is just this ultimate and finally decisive loyalty that leads the good man, faithful in few things, to rise in moral mastery over many and higher things. This is the story of moral progress in history.

Royce's theory of loyalty uses formalism in more concrete ethical construction. Its superior merits are due in large measure to its less abstract and less rigid formalism. Its critics would

ascribe its final inadequacy to its still persisting reliance on a formal principle in moral judgment.

4. INCLINATION, DUTY, AND SPONTANEITY IN MORAL LIFE

Formalism has impressed most students of ethics as too austere in its view of human conduct. Its insistence on the inherent and eternal nature of moral values—right is right, and wrong is wrong—seems to ignore severely any extenuating circumstances. In its emphasis on dutiful conviction and respect for law, it sets moral reason against the inclinations of our sensual nature, but it also depreciates the importance of feeling and makes no provision for the spontaneous choice and enjoyment of the good. These shortcomings of formalism, especially in Kant's version of the theory, have aroused much critical comment, some of it perhaps unduly satirical.

In the next chapter we shall examine the overemphasis on emotional tone, on pleasure and displeasure, in the hedonist's moral estimate of actions. The formalist rejects hedonism as spurious ethics, but he goes to the opposite extreme and would exclude any consideration of happiness from the moral motive. This position is difficult to sustain throughout. Even Kant finally includes happiness with virtue in his conception of the Complete Good. Reason, he thinks, demands the ultimate union of virtue and happiness; since these are not harmonized in this life, they must surely be united by God in the hereafter. So the consummation of morality is shown to involve the postulates of Immortality and God. Without taking up here these two religious-metaphysical corollaries of Kant's ethics, we may note that Kant does not proceed from virtue to happiness by purely formal analysis. He calls the union of the two a "synthesis." Reason demands the final recognition of happiness in his ethics. But this recognition and inclusion is not achieved in terms of strict formalism. The complete or perfect good *(bonum consummatum)* must include happiness, but no regard

for happiness is allowed in the supreme good *(bonum supremum),* the purely dutiful spirit of the upright will.

The essentially rational character of the moral will is marked by austere commitment and impending conflict. Duty is here opposed to inclination, and the solution of this opposition is in the moral resolution that duty prevail over inclination. The moral law, as we have seen, is categorical, and it is a categorical imperative. This imperative note in the moral act is expressed in the central idea, "I ought." Man's moral career is always a dutiful quest, a loyal reply to a sublime challenge.

But it may be said in protest, this conception leads to some very strange inferences; it ignores some of the finest fruitage of the moral life. To be sure, virtue does demand the mastery of many of our lower impulses and inclinations; yet are not some of our natural tendencies in the normal line of our moral fruition? And can these get any recognition from the formalist who accentuates the active conviction of duty as an indispensable element in every good act? Ready friendliness may be a native sense of equity or sympathy or emotional harmony; decency, generosity, piety may simply pervade a person's character and be as it were his second nature. These are surely welcome qualities in a man. Without the dutiful spirit of rectitude, however, they would have no moral value, not for the formalist. Kant considered even maternal love, a commonly recognized summit of human worth, and denied its moral goodness in cases where it is not explicitly motivated by dutiful devotion. This excess of consistency prompted the ironical lines by the poet Schiller, who, be it remembered, appreciated deeply the finer aspects of Kant's ethics:

Willingly serve I my friends; but alas, I do it with pleasure;
Therefore I often am vexed that no true virtue I have.
As there is no other means, thou hadst better begin to despise them;
And with aversion, then, do that which thy duty commands.

This shock of satire may impress on our minds the normal place of spontaneity in the good life. Aristotle defined virtue as the habit of the will. In every moral experience, we are partly moving on familiar ground, partly going ahead. Some acts may involve only the ready operation of habits that have become our second nature. Others may include new exploration, still along lines already traversed. They expand the reach of our habitual and spontaneous responses, but raise no issue of radical readjustment. In still other acts, either the strange complexity of the problem or its sharp challenge to our habitual ways and avowed principles forces us to face sharp alternatives in an experience of crisis. Our moral career neither begins nor is consummated in any specific act; it always involves some habitual and more or less spontaneous activities, some of them of simple, others of more complex adjustment, and then also elements of conflict calling for the active rededication of the dutiful will, or for crises of radical reversal and conversion. On the ground already mastered, possessed, and thoroughly native, our normal habitual life proceeds spontaneously; but there is always some impending challenge on the vanguard, with new issues joined and a principle at stake.

Spontaneity and struggle both are thus daily aspects of our moral experience. They are both elements of virtue and moral worth. If virtue is a habit of the will, if we attain ready mastery of it as our personality matures, would not the arrow of moral perfection point towards growing ascendency of spontaneity, with less and less dutiful struggle and resolution? Yet actually, on the level of vaster and deeper assured attainment, deeper problems and still vaster issues confront the moral will. A theoretical perplexity also confronts the formalist here. If dutiful consecration in conflict with desires is essential to the moral will, then the attainment of moral perfection should manifest less and less this kernel of virtue, so that it should be tran-

scended altogether in the Divine Experience. God's will is holy: how could it include a conviction of duty? This embarrassing inference only shows that morality cannot be comprehended adequately in the formal shell of duty and rectitude alone.

In these various ways formalism manifests its merits, but also its radical limitations as an ethical theory. Its main defect is one which, as we shall observe, is shared by other ethical doctrines. It is the tendency to select some notably important element of value in human life, and then to judge the moral worth of conduct solely in terms of that one element. This is what the formalist has done in his exaltation of the upright dutiful will. Yet even in his overemphasis and one-sidedness, the champion of rectitude has served ethics well, for he has burned into our minds certain convictions of great weight in any sound ethical theory. We may note his narrowness and refuse to follow him the whole way, but the elements of truth in his doctrine will still demand recognition. By his strong partisanship he may even help to expose and to correct some opposite one-sidedness in alternative accounts of morals, which otherwise might have gone undetected. In these ways the advocacy and the criticism of formalism prepares the way for a more balanced estimate of moral values.

Chapter 4

HEDONISM: PLEASURE OR HAPPINESS AS THE HIGHEST GOOD

1. HEDONISM AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND AS AN ETHICAL DOCTRINE

The obvious is a pitfall on the pathway to truth. In the history of morals this proverb is illustrated by hedonism; it is doubtless the most obvious of ethical doctrines. It starts with an incontestable fact of experience, as directly and universally felt as any; namely, our feeling of pleasure and displeasure. That the pleasant is good seems a foregone conclusion. It is, if not the only or the final, at any rate the first use of the term "good" in common speech: from the earliest years, when a child tastes something that he likes, smacks his lips and cries out, "Good!" Throughout life our usual comment on things or experiences as good or bad is apt to mean that we find them pleasant or unpleasant. The hedonist thus begins with this ready agreement that pleasure is good, and he undertakes to make it a first principle in his ethics. Only he phrases it conversely: in place of the general comment that the pleasant is good, he declares universally, the good is the pleasant. The logical warrant of this conversion is very questionable.

We should observe from the outset this concentration of hedonism on pleasure as the essential or highest good, as the

root and fruit of value in human life. By this exclusive emphasis hedonism stands or falls. The hedonist does not challenge his critics effectively when he asks them if they could conceive of the good life without any enjoyment. This view is nowise the only alternative to hedonism, nor is it a position to which any one of the main ethical theories is committed. While the formalist does depreciate the pleasure aspect of value, other ethical doctrines do not, and the common judgment of men includes it. Our problem here concerns the preeminence of pleasure in determining the worth of our life. Without this view of the chief good, the hedonist has no special doctrine calling for ethical argument.

This exaltation of the pleasant as the summit and essence of value should now be examined and appraised. First of all we should note and distinguish two parts of the hedonist's usual discussion, for they are really two theories. The hedonist sets out from the general regard of men for the factor of pleasure in their experience. He concludes that pleasure-getting is men's chief concern, and this he proposes as his analysis and description of human conduct. This doctrine is called Psychological Hedonism. Its thesis may be stated as follows: pleasure is the object of desire; pleasure is the aim of action; pleasure is the direct motive or incentive in conduct; what we seek and pursue is basically pleasure. Clearly, this is not an ethical doctrine at all; it is not an evaluation of human conduct, but a proposed factual description of it, which calls for verification. This hedonistic account of our experience is to be distinguished from hedonism as an ethical theory, which declares that pleasure is the chief and decisive value of life. Psychological hedonism states that pleasure is the incentive and aim of action; ethical hedonism maintains that a pleasurable action has worth or is good precisely for that reason.

Our present interest in psychological hedonism is concerned

primarily with its bearings on hedonistic ethics. Would the proved validity or invalidity of the former serve to establish or refute the latter? Reflection on this question does not warrant any conclusive inference from psychological to ethical hedonism. Even though hedonism is erroneous as a psychological description of human conduct, it might still be a valid ethical theory to estimate the value of actions in terms of their pleasantness. From the opposite side the reasoning is more extensive. Though pleasure is the direct and universal aim of our actions, yet morality might demand or may consist in our gradual rise from the life of pleasure seeking to the life of true virtue. This is the claim of the formalist in his championship of duty over inclination. And is not this the core of many a religious gospel, whether or not it proceeds to ascetic extremes? The pursuit of pleasure may be general, and the devotion to duty and godliness most exceptional; still the moral merit of these two ways of life would not be settled by such statistics but by relative worth. "Wide is the gate, and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many are they that enter in thereby." In other fields of experience a similar judgment may prevail. Sound thinking is commonly judged to be one of the least congenial occupations; all the same it is an indispensable requirement of our higher life. And Spinoza concluded more generally: "All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare."

The hedonist might reply that though morality concerns our choicest experience and value, it need not run counter to the normal tendencies of our daily life. Unless we conceived of morals rigorously in terms of regeneration, would not the conclusive ascertainment that pleasure is the common incentive to action strengthen the ethical theory that evaluates acts in terms of their pleasantness? The likely reply to this question would be an admission of plausibility, but qualified: psy-

chological hedonism, if proved, would justify our insistence to include happiness in our moral appraisal of conduct. But then it may be added, we should very likely do this even without having to prove that doctrine.

Proceeding now to the more direct examination of psychological hedonism, as it is a proposed report of definite actions and incentives to action, we can best appraise its accuracy by consulting specific evidence. The hedonist declares: Men always want and pursue pleasure. Let us see. What does a hungry man want? Is it not his dinner? And likewise the thirsty man wants his drink, and the man stalled on the highway wants to get his car started again, and so on with the man running for office, or the soldier leaping onto the coast from the invasion barge, or the mathematician engrossed in the solution of a problem. In all these cases there is a definite situation, and a man desires, pursues, and exerts himself to attain a certain object or objective state or condition. It would surely be an artificial description, in any of these cases, to cite pleasure as the direct aim or incentive of any of the men mentioned above. Not even the psychological hedonist would so describe himself, in a concrete experience. Imagine him on a strange road in the Texas Panhandle, studying his road maps. If he reported his desire fairly, without expounding his theory, would he not be bound to say: "I want to find the road to Amarillo?" And even when he is expounding his theory, what does he really desire? To prove and to establish it conclusively.

But does not pleasure enter as a factor, and an essential factor, in all these experiences? Hunger satisfied, thirst quenched, the distraught traveler once more assuredly on his way, the candidate for office elected, the invading soldier at his goal, the problem solved: aren't these experiences pleasant and cherished? There is, of course, only one answer to these questions. These experiences are doubtless enjoyable,

but the further explanation of this reply does not sustain psychological hedonism. It indicates the hedonist's mistaken analysis of experience. Pleasantness is the emotional tone of our experience of achieved purpose or satisfied desire rather than itself our purpose or desire. We want various things, and we are pleased when we get what we want. Pleasure is felt in our actual success or achievement or fulfillment of desire; or in the hope and anticipation of realized purposes; or in the memory of past satisfactions and achievements. The actually experienced or the remembered or the anticipated fulfillment of desire or purpose is pleasant; but that is nowise the same as saying that pleasure itself is our aim. Likewise with displeasure, it characterizes the emotional tone of frustrated wants and purposes, actual, remembered, or feared. Psychological hedonism errs in confusing one element in the experience of achievement or failure, their emotional tone of pleasantness or unpleasantness, with the direct objective aim of the desire or the interest which led to the experience in question.

At this point the critic of psychological hedonism would be well advised to watch his step lest he in his turn go too far in his disposal of pleasure as a factor in motivation. We hear sometimes that pleasure or the thought or anticipation of it has no place in the satisfaction of appetite or in the pursuit of ambition or of understanding or in any other want and purpose. Only the dyspeptic, the jaded rake, the broken-down toiler, or other variously abnormal persons are likely to try arousing their failing appetites or energies by thoughts of pleasure. But is this really so? The aim of our actions, and so the fulfillment or frustration of that aim, is some objective state or condition. Pleasure or displeasure are included in these experiences only as their respective emotional tone. Granted; but as their emotional tone they surely are included. We are no more warranted in disregarding the pleasantness or unpleas-

antness of experience than in centering all our attention on these aspects. If we fairly report our desires and aims, we are bound to note the element of pleasure or displeasure in our thought of them. The critic of hedonism should respect this warning, but must yet insist on rejecting the doctrine which treats pleasure as the explicit aim of action. Psychological hedonism, in its analysis of conduct, has overemphasized and entirely concentrated on this one aspect of emotional tone. Does not ethical hedonism, in its valuation of acts, suffer from the same defect?

2. THE ETHICS OF PLEASURE: PROBLEMS AND PERPLEXITIES OF HEDONISTIC VALUATION

The hedonist sets out with a strong initial advantage. The value of pleasure on which he centers his attention is recognized by common consent as a prime element in the good and desirable life. This general view is on record in daily speech. Our ready synonyms for "bad" are "wretched" and "miserable," and we express our good will towards a person most commonly by wishing him all happiness. As was observed earlier, we should be careful here not to confuse the obvious with the true. Our question is not whether happiness or pleasure generally speaking is good or not; nor would the obvious settlement of this issue establish the validity of hedonistic ethics. The problem concerns the basic valuation of our life in terms of pleasure, the proposed definition of the good as the pleasant. Aristotle indicated the main point neatly: pleasure is a good, but it is not the good. The second part of this statement is the criticism which the hedonist must meet.

With this outline of our discussion, we may examine now the hedonistic moral evaluation of conduct. It enjoys the advantage of appearing to be a simple and straightforward statement. Doesn't everyone understand clearly what is meant by

happiness? Don't we all know whether an act is pleasant or unpleasant? Isn't this a plain moral judgment? The good action is the pleasant action; the central and decisive value of our life is pleasure; pleasure is the moral test and standard. It seems perfectly simple and in no need of long explanation or qualifying clauses. But the simplicity is only on the surface. The apparent plausibility of hedonism covers some decidedly perplexing questions.

Even if we were to accept tentatively the general hedonistic valuation, still we should require a more definite statement of it. To say that the value of an action is to be judged by its resultant pleasure is not sufficient to serve as a decisive standard in actual conduct. For pleasure is of many sorts, and it concerns many people. So I may fairly ask, What sort of pleasure? and again, Whose pleasure is to be considered by me in my choice and action?

The earliest professed hedonists in antiquity, Aristippus the Cyrenaic and his followers, do not seem to have grasped the importance of either of these questions. The later and more famous hedonistic school, the Epicureans, faced the first question. Across the centuries of its modern development, hedonistic ethics may be traced in its struggle with these two unsettled issues in its doctrine. Proposed solutions of one or the other or both of them mark the numerous varieties of hedonism. Here we should cut through the brushwood of historical details and from a broad vantage point examine our general position.

Whose pleasure is a person to consider in his conduct? As we have just noted, the hedonists of classical antiquity do not seem to have been disturbed by this question. They proceeded on a self-regarding plan as a matter of course. But in its richer modern development hedonism has followed in the main a philanthropic direction. Social benevolence has been a strong

motive in the thought of the modern hedonists or utilitarians, who expressed it in their formulation of the moral ideal, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. In fact, British utilitarianism provides an important chapter in the history of modern liberalism and social reform. In this altruistic tenor, the utilitarians manifest the influence of the Christian ideal of charity. John Stuart Mill, while thoroughly and unbendingly secular in his outlook and method, states in so many words: "In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbor as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality."

We may grant the moral nobility of benevolence, but the recognition of it is not exclusively or preeminently utilitarian. Indeed, we may question whether it is a necessary corollary of hedonism. Why, really, should I as a believer in hedonism be interested in promoting the happiness of others? Several reasons may be cited in reply: Because the surest source of my own happiness is in making the lives of others more pleasant; because if each person forwards the general happiness, the total satisfaction attained by all will most likely reach its desirable maximum; or again, because a true hedonist should pursue the moral good in its fullness; be it his own pleasure or another's, he should bend his efforts to reach it. But I may reflect that the first of these reasons seems to disqualify genuine benevolence rather than to sustain it. Jeremy Bentham candidly avowed: "I am a selfish man, as selfish as any man can be. But in me somehow or other, so it happens, selfishness has taken the form of benevolence." If so, I for my part may protest, how can you urge me to promote the general happiness, if my selfishness happens to take a different turn and does not include a personal liking for philanthropy? As for the other two reasons, might I not reply that I am not interested in statistical

and dutiful accounts of happiness. Pleasure is very subjective in character. I am certain only when I experience it myself. The pleasures of others, presumably very real to them, are only hearsay pleasures to me. Let them see to their own happiness, as they doubtless will; but why should I ever prefer it to my own immediately real and definite satisfaction?

This protest may not be so unreasonable as it sounds. Even if I set out with considerable good will, how can I know what is sure to promote the general happiness? Let us imagine that I have a neighbor who owns a radio with a volcanic loud speaker. He is a hedonist; the radio must give him great pleasure, for he plays it at all hours of the day or night. But he must also be a benevolent hedonist, and so has invested in the extra-loud speaker. He wishes to share his happiness with the whole block. He is even willing to be deafened himself by the blaring noise in order that all of us may enjoy his radio. So I do not have the heart to tell him the truth, that I do not like the sort of music which he picks out on his dial, or the incredible hours of night when he distributes his bounty. In his plans to add to our happiness, our neighbor is actually pestering us; far better for us if he would enjoy his nocturnal jazz by himself.

In fact, more generally stated, would not a consistently self-regarding policy provide a higher statistical average and a total more nearly approaching the maximum of pleasure than we are likely to get by practicing benevolence? If each one pursues the pleasure of which he is competent to judge, his own, he would be more likely to attain it, and likewise his neighbor; and the general happiness might be best realized by everyone shifting for himself.

Our example, in calling attention to the directly subjective character of pleasure, illustrates a double hedonistic embarrassment. If I should find my own pleasure in promoting the

happiness of others, or if I should even in pure generosity try to add to their pleasure, I may fail in my endeavor, since my likes and dislikes may differ from theirs; what I enjoy they may detest. This embarrassment suggests the other and more fundamental difficulty, and leads our discussion to the second question mentioned above: What sort of pleasure is to be the aim and the test of moral value in conduct? I find pleasure and satisfaction in certain experiences; so do you. The fact that the experience which pleases me may displease you, indicates our different tastes and temperaments. As each of us gets what he desires, he is pleased. The hedonist now tells us that our life is good or ill depending upon the increase of pleasure which it yields, that we ought to promote the increase of happiness. But who is to be the judge here as to what is to give me happiness? Clearly I myself, else we get into confusion. My neighbor may say: He ought to enjoy the music which I am generously providing for him, and enjoy it he shall! In this hedonistic sentiment my neighbor may be right, but I am inclined to doubt it.

If each man is to decide about his own pleasure, however, would it then mean more than this, that I am right in desiring the pleasure which I do desire: that I *ought* to do as I please? Wouldn't this be an amazing conception of the moral standard! Or shall we say that a man's better judgment is to decide—not in the heat of desire but in a cool hour? Would the judgment of the cool hour alter the fact that in the ardent hour keen pleasure was actually enjoyed? And why should the judgment of the cool hour be preferred on the basis of pleasure? Are the pleasures of the cool hour keener or greater? They are apt to be mostly regrets, perhaps deserved but scarcely enjoyable. Turgenev was once asked to give the formula for perfect blessedness. He answered unhesitatingly: "Indolence without remorse."

Our very informal discussion of the hedonistic perplexities has already brought out the several main varieties of this theory of ethics. We should indicate and distinguish them for a clearer view of the whole situation. In his moral estimate of actions by the pleasures which they yield, the hedonist (considering the question, Whose pleasure?) may allow each one of us to be concerned with his own pleasure. This is Egoistic Hedonism. Or he may emphasize philanthropic sentiments and may advocate the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This is Universalistic or Altruistic Hedonism, chiefly represented in modern Utilitarianism. Turning then to the second question—What sort of pleasure?—the hedonist may recognize a variety of tastes and enjoyments, but refuse to grade or rank them, may be content to measure only increase or diminution of pleasure and displeasure in human life. This is Quantitative Hedonism. Or, on the contrary, we may be told that a sound moral judgment requires the study of the relative worth of pleasure, for they are of different kinds, and some are better and nobler than others. This is Qualitative Hedonism. As might be judged, hedonistic thought, in dealing with our two questions, might conceivably combine an egoistic or an altruistic attitude with either a quantitative or a qualitative estimate of pleasure.

Let us now examine the issue between a merely quantitative view and calculation of pleasures, and the qualitative appraisal of them and their proposed grading as higher and lower. Each of these views has its peculiar difficulties and in its turn exposes serious defects in the general hedonistic position. The difference is brought out sharply by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. In Bentham's estimate, "the quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry." Mill judges quite otherwise: "No intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no per-

son of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. . . . It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."

Quantitative hedonism, concerned only with measuring the balance of pleasure or displeasure in various actions has a plausibly scientific manner. It conceives of ethics as primarily hedonistic metrics. In fact, the very expression "balance of pleasure over unpleasantness or pain" implies some available method of reliable measurement. Such a method of procedure was offered by Bentham in his "hedonistic calculus." Deliberation involves a comparison of the pleasures or pains which each of the acts under consideration would yield. On this comparison our choice is to depend. A number of factors in every pleasure have to be weighed. Intensity and duration are the two usually selected, but others are also to be taken into account: the certainty or uncertainty of the eventual satisfaction; its nearness or remoteness; its likelihood to lead to further enjoyment; its unmixed pleasantness or its liability to be followed by some accompanying pain or dissatisfaction. To the comparison between two acts by this sixfold hedonistic calculation, a seventh factor has to be added for consideration: extent, how many persons will be affected by the eventual pleasures or displeasures in question.

We should agree that we have here a good general suggestion about the various aspects of the life of satisfaction. But as a really reliable scientific method of precise calculation it is very defective. Can I estimate precisely the relative intensity of the pleasures derived from two acts, or their respective duration, certainty, nearness, and so forth? These surely cannot be measured before either of the actions has been performed. Nor

can we calculate them for the act that was not chosen or performed. And even the chosen act, when accomplished, may yield a different appraisal. Calculation in advance would be largely conjecture; reckoning in retrospect may well be disillusion or remorse. Furthermore our difficulties with each separate comparison would be multiplied when we reckoned the several comparisons together. Is intensity on a par with duration, so that we could balance twice of one against half of the other? A cautious person may readily dismiss the pleasures of the moment; he is prepared to wait long for his chosen satisfactions, remote but certain and abiding. Another would stake a gambler's throw on his moment of flaming intensity, no matter what its risks of subsequent expiation. How are we to judge of these and other men's preferences of eventual pleasures on the basis of quantitative hedonism?

When the qualitative hedonist tells us that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied, our moral judgment emphatically agrees. But we cannot recognize such a view as a consistent inference from the hedonistic doctrine that the moral value of life is determined by its attainable pleasure. A standard of value must admit of critical use. How can we on the basis of pleasure exalt some pleasures and depreciate others? As we have seen, we cannot even calculate them reliably. And even if we could master hedonistic measurement, our basic perplexity would still remain. Hedonism may perfect its analysis of the mechanics of desire and of our various preferences; but how can it express and justify the decision that this pleasure is desirable and preferable to this other pleasure, that of two pleasures one is noble and the other unworthy? And has one learned even the alphabet of morality, if one cannot grasp and express the significance of such judgments of moral value?

Mill's proposed test for judging the relative worth of two

kinds of pleasure is debatable. The better of two pleasures, he writes, is the one that is preferred by men of fuller experience, who know both kinds. The fool may disagree with Socrates, but the fool knows only his folly. Socrates knows both folly and wisdom, and makes the right choice. Let us ask: Does the sage know a fool's delights any better than the fool knows the joys of a sage? If in lofty decency we pity a drunkard, might he not retort with pity: "Have you ever been drunk?—You have not? Then what do you know about it?" How is one to judge in a case like this, if our standard be merely that of experienced pleasure? So Browning muses for us:

> How sad and bad and mad it was,
> But then, how it was sweet!

This is the quandary of consistent hedonism. Pleasures cannot be evaluated and graded and some of them pronounced preferable to others, if pleasure itself is to be our basic, decisive standard of moral value. If the good meant simply pleasure, then "better" could only mean "more pleasurable," and then how could we say that it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied? Actually the qualitative hedonist recognizes that a fool's pleasures are likely to be attained more easily and even more surely than those of the wise man. Socrates does not have so good a prospect of pleasure; still his lot is called the better one!

A man's character is revealed in that which satisfies and pleases him. Dissatisfaction with a certain sort of life may be the first mark of spiritual uplift in a man and the one redeeming light in his moral darkness. It was not ill but rather on the way to being well with the prodigal son when his swinish life became disgusting and painful to him. The real question in morals cannot be this: Are men happy or unhappy? The searching moral question is a different one: Is it well that men

are thus and thus happy or unhappy? Pleasure or pain, satisfaction or dissatisfaction of some sort enter into every moral situation. We hear that a man enjoys reading the kind of book that he likes. This by itself takes us nowhere. If we are to judge of taste, we have to consider what makes certain enjoyment and satisfactions worthier than others. Until we realize that we cannot evade this problem, we have not even crossed the threshold of really ethical thinking.

The hedonist errs in concentrating on emotional tone; he neglects the other aspects of our activity. He does not take due account of the whole experience in which the feeling of pleasure is only one factor. The full significance and worth of the satisfaction itself are expressed in this relation of feeling to the rest of our nature. Qualitative hedonism does recognize this difficulty and endeavors to meet it. It is then bound to go outside of the frame of strict and consistent hedonism. We need a standard other than pleasantness itself, if we are to appraise pleasures qualitatively and to pronounce some of them better, nobler, or worthier than others.

At this point a certain type of hedonist may interpose: Might we not say that the pleasures we call higher are really greater, amount to more? Qualitative hedonism would then be finally reducible to a quantitative statement. But such a proposed solution of our difficulty would require a revision of the meaning of pleasure which the typical hedonist could scarcely comprehend. Even though disappointed, or defeated, destroyed, and dying, the sage, the just man, the martyr would still have to be reckoned as having more pleasure! Amazing as this may appear to plain judgment, it yet might be. But let us now suppose that these men did not have more pleasure; would you not still regard their lives as better than the opposite sort, as decidedly preferable? If so, where is your hedonistic standard?

The qualitative hedonist may be seen moving towards a

more adequate ethics, but away from consistent hedonism. He is no longer content merely to measure enjoyment, but undertakes also to judge tastes, to find a sound basis of defensible preference. This is logically implied in the position of qualitative hedonism. In the history of its development the ethics of pleasure exposes the insufficiency of its proposed moral standard. The need for a principle of integral valuation in human conduct is thus reaffirmed, and so the search for an ethical theory that can supply it.

Chapter 5

EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS: SURVIVAL VALUE AND MORALS

1. EVOLUTION OF MORALITY AND THE ETHICS OF EVOLUTION

Our criticism of hedonistic ethics was mainly that its view of human experience is too narrow and one-sided. It limits its valuation of life to our feelings of pleasure and displeasure. From a decidedly opposite angle of approach, formalism shows a similar failure to comprehend the whole round of human conduct in its moral bearings. Moral experience is surely not limited to the pure respect for universal and eternal principles of rectitude. The validity and worth of an ethical theory depends upon the adequacy of its interpretation of man. The words of the Delphic oracle which Socrates chose for his motto may serve as a perennial maxim of morals: "Know thyself!"

The history of ethics, in reviewing the moral ideals of our civilization, is bound to note the persistence or the decline of certain traditional views of human nature, their partial or drastic revision, the emergence of radically new designs, new valuations, and new moral principles. The growing dominance of the physical sciences in modern life and thought raised a problem of fundamental method in philosophy. On the one

hand, it seemed clear that the successful application of scientific methods to the investigation of nature could not be indifferent to the student of morals, and to the workers in the other humanistic fields. Man is in and of nature, and the sciences of man must square their methods with those of natural science. But many thinkers have followed Kant in rejecting any ethics constructed on physical-scientific lines as spurious. Physical science recognizes only a system of causally related events. It can only describe and explain the mechanism of human behavior and yield some sort of anthropology; it cannot evaluate and acknowledge principles of worth, and can achieve no moral philosophy, no real ethics. This sort of outlook might lead to a dual view of human character: as a member of the causal structure of nature and subject to scientific laws, and also somehow as a member of a higher realm of ideal values and principles.

Modern thinkers have sought a more integral interpretation of nature and of human nature, to comprehend and do justice to the moral-spiritual qualities of our character. As we shall see in the next chapter, this is the outlook on life expressed in modern Perfectionism, developing a philosophy of life first advocated by Plato and Aristotle. On the other hand, a number of modern moralists have endeavored to retrace the whole outline of moral ideas and values so as to fit them in the general framework of the physical sciences. This type of definitely "naturalistic" ethics has found an especially vigorous statement in the evolutionary doctrine of morals developed by Charles Darwin and his successors. We should state plainly here that we are not concerned with evolution as a dominant principle of modern biology, but with its implications for ethics. The following brief summary is given only as the basis of our ethical discussion.

In the older traditional view, the animal world was re-

garded as a hierarchy of distinct species of lesser or greater complexity. As the Mosaic doctrine had it, "God made the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and every thing that creepeth upon the earth after his kind." Evolutionary biology not only recognized species of different complexity; it undertook to explain them genetically. Paleontology and geology record earlier stages of existence with only simpler and more elementary forms of life. The words which Darwin used as the title of his great work, *The Origin of Species,* are in the first place a plain statement of fact in nature. There is an origin of species. Life through long periods of time has proceeded from simpler to more complex forms. This is the first meaning of evolution. T. H. Huxley phrased it as "a gradual change from a condition of relative uniformity to one of relative complexity." Herbert Spencer called it "a change from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity." That is to say, we find gradually increased complexity in nature, involving greater and greater differentiation of parts and organs, and also their increasing functional cooperation, the integration of organisms. We also find, and this is to be noted, that during certain periods and in certain environments, for instance during glacial floods, the opposite process operates in nature, a return to less differentiated and more elementary forms of plant and animal life.

But the doctrine of evolution was not merely a description of this general and gradual growth in complexity of living beings, and of the opposite less common process of reversal to simplicity. It also undertook to explain these processes, to trace and probe them so as to discover the determining factors in evolution. At this point the work of Darwin and his successors became epoch-making. With this evolutionary explanation, biology no longer needed to expound intelligent design or Providential direction in nature. Like the other physical sci-

ences, it could proceed throughout in terms of causal necessity.

According to Darwin's explanation, the increasing complexity in the world of living things was not planned; it occurred. The vast fertility of lower forms of life was bound to make any environment one of more or less insufficient nourishment. The struggle for existence was therefore a plain, inevitable fact. The too abundant fertility of living organisms raised the grave problem of their survival. Their continual variation, while sealing the fate of many individuals, increased the chances of others. For a variation might make its possessor helpless, or it might make it better adapted to its environment, provide it better food and security. In the latter case, this particular type or species would survive, would bear and bring up offspring like unto itself.

This is the survival of the fittest. The fittest in any environment were those that survived and perpetuated themselves. By this process of fortuitous, suitable variations, organisms of increasingly complex fitness—that is, more highly differentiated, versatile, and better integrated organisms—could and did preserve themselves and their kind in an increasingly complex environment. So the whole vast span of evolution could now be surveyed and understood as a process of causal necessity, of certain behavior and certain eventual results, organisms of certain equipment living, surviving, or perishing under certain environmental conditions. This was a factual account throughout, without reference to any Divine plan or cosmic design.

In this evolutionary view, human beings took their place in the animal world, and the science of human nature, anthropology, became a branch of biological science. The skeletal or cranial exhibits familiar to every museum visitor indicated the curve of organic development in mammals, reaching to the higher apes, to prehistoric, and then to civilized man. The

successful application of the evolutionary method in comparative anatomy and physiology naturally raised the demand for a similar treatment of mental and moral processes. Darwin recognized this natural part of evolutionary investigation, despite his own reluctance to expound any doctrines about the ultimate nature of mind. Whatever its primal origin, mental activity could be studied in its development, and likewise moral behavior. The chapters on the Mental Powers and on the Moral Sense in Darwin's *Descent of Man* (1871) were pioneer reports of the evolution of morals in the life of the higher animals, pointing towards dim human-social beginnings of a more definite morality.

This work stimulated further investigation in the general field of descriptive ethics. Basic human reactions and forms of conduct could now be traced to their earlier forms, perhaps to or towards their first origins. The evolution of hospitality, justice, veracity, loyalty, chastity, and domestic morals, and the gradual definition of law and principle in various fields of conduct became clearer as the respective practices themselves were referred to their basic incentives, some of them primitively human, others reaching below the human level to animal reactions. The moralist gained here not only more extensive and reliable knowledge of customs and institutions, but also a more vivid sense of human living in its larger natural setting. All this closer factual contact of ethics with anthropology, psychology, sociology, and the biological sciences generally was a significant advance.

These investigations did not merely throw light on the evolution of morals; they also suggested a new conception of morality, by a new method and principle, an evolutionary ethics. This more systematic contribution of evolutionary biology to ethics was bound to follow either or both of two lines. Starting with a certain conception of the moral life, the evolu-

tionist might show how the distinctively human ideas and practices could be traced back to certain animal forms of behavior. This would be the evolutionary confirmation, say, of hedonism. Or a moralist might begin with the evolutionary evidence, point out the main directive tendencies of animal-human behavior, and then maintain that they should be adopted as standards and principles in moral judgment. In this second method, ethics would be getting both its facts and its criteria from evolutionary biology. Again, in the third place, in a seemingly more reasonable way but with some precarious logic, the two methods might alternate, with varying distribution of emphasis. Either the reliance on evolutionism would finally prevail, or else evolutionary ethics would be shown to be inconclusive and incapable of doing justice to the whole range of man's moral nature. Each of the above procedures may be studied in the large variety of evolutionary doctrines of morality advanced in our time.

2. MAIN VARIETIES OF EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS

No other difference between man and the lower animals seemed so important to Darwin as that of man's moral sense or conscience. Yet he felt confident of tracing its origins to certain social instincts, parental and filial affections, by perfected sympathetic reactions, by the experienced unpleasantness of unsocial impulsive behavior, by the social influence exerted in spoken reproof and training and in habit and custom. From group compulsion and social prestige and urging, with the dynamics of disgrace and remorse, to obligation and a sense of probity and duty and conscience, the line of development is long, but it is in the course of evolution. We may thus learn how men become convinced that good conduct is socially minded, obligatory to conscience. But how can these moral values be not only evolving factors in the history of conduct,

but also justified principles in evolutionary ethics? The evolutionist would answer: because they are tested and vindicated in the process of evolution, in terms of survival value. Social conduct may not always conduce to the individual's own advantage or survival, but it is a condition of the group's welfare. The common life depends upon it. And this is in fact the basic value and the highest goal in ongoing human life: vital well-being itself; as Darwin phrased it, "the rearing of the greatest number of individuals, with all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are subjected."

Herbert Spencer, whose application of this ethical method was the most extensive and the most popular in the English-speaking world, combined evolutionary and utilitarian convictions in morals. His basic conception of moral value was really hedonistic. The good is pleasure, happiness. But this value, the general happiness, according to Spencer, is both indicated and vindicated in man's progressive adaptation to his natural and social conditions of living. Man's morality is evoked, developed, and sustained by his social evolution. Of the entire round of processes and activities, a great deal may appear irrelevant to "conduct," until we probe more closely and note the intricate functional mesh in which each act is tied together with others to subserve some more remote end. Human living, like all life, is a struggle for existence; but in the progressive history of man, adaptation to increasingly complex conditions of social activity makes cooperation and community more advantageous to one and all than conflict, and more essential to survival and general satisfaction. So human evolution gradually attains the moral level. "Conduct gains ethical sanction in proportion as the activities, becoming less and less militant and more and more industrial, are such as do not necessitate mutual injury or hindrance, but consist with, and are furthered by, coöperation and mutual aid. . . . Ethics has

for its subject-matter, that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of evolution."

Both Darwin and Spencer, as we see, start with the conviction that social-benevolent conduct is morally good (Spencer is convinced of it on utilitarian grounds), and would establish this conviction scientifically on an evolutionary basis. This basis is provided by a view of evolution as involving not only the struggle for existence but also cooperation and community. This is shown to be the case especially at the higher levels of human existence. Evolution is seen to sustain philanthropy, and the ethics of philanthropy or of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is justified as following naturally from the actual course and direction of ongoing life.

Further support to the evolutionary doctrine of general benevolence was supplied by Peter Kropotkin in his work *Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution.* He maintained that the war of each against all is not the only law of nature in evolution. Better parental care and more general and persistent group cooperation are essential conditions of survival, just like more adequate aggressive equipment in the struggle for existence. Not only at its highest stages in human life but throughout the entire biological scale, mutual aid is a law as truly as rivalry and struggle. Cooperation, justice, and good will have their roots deep in the evolutionary process.

Other systematic moralists have expounded the evolutionary ethics of social solidarity without explicit reference to hedonism. Morality is conceived by them as espousing and safeguarding the social welfare. In active response to the needs of the social order which nourishes and sustains them, good men achieve the fullness of health and vitality and well-being. This is the moral record of our civilization. The upward turn of the arrow of evolution has been usually traced in definitely secular terms, for the natural-scientific warrant of this doctrine

was its boast. But alongside the traditional theologians who resisted evolutionary ideas as godless, there were more liberal religious minds who discovered deep spiritual meaning in evolution. They called it God's way of gradually drawing all creation to himself. From "nature red in tooth and claw," evolution rises to the stage of human life, to mental, intelligent, responsible, socially-minded levels; it points towards the highest reaches of moral-spiritual activity.

These morally commendable interpretations of evolution seemed altogether unwarranted to other investigators in the field, among whom T. H. Huxley was outstanding. The central importance of the struggle for existence in the process of evolution cannot be gainsaid and should not be toned down. Civilization, morality, philanthropy, virtue are not the natural fruits of evolution, any more than logic and science and art and religion are. Our higher life is a sort of garden plot which men have achieved amidst the ever-encroaching jungle of nature. Moral activity, "the organized and personified sympathy we call conscience," is not along the line of those evolutionary qualities which man shares with the ape and the tiger, but in just the opposite direction. "In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence. . . . The ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it."

Whether evolution is essentially a life-and-death struggle, or whether it points to amity and comity, it certainly is bent on survival. And in its struggle, just as in its alleged sociality, it is the survival of the species that seems to matter to nature:

So careful of the type she seems,
So careless of the single life.

In these circumstances, may I not protest: If survival be the concern of nature, my concern is my own survival. Why should I choose benevolent devotion to the common good in a case where such devotion jeopardizes my own survival? And if assertion of all the means to survival is the law of evolution, why should I not myself live by that law? And do we not need just such an energetic, ruthless, heroic morality to bring out the utmost that our nature affords? This radical turn of evolutionary ethics is the morality of the Will-to-Power proclaimed with contagious fervor by Friedrich Nietzsche.

Nietzsche was a self-declared "graver of new tablets." He did not get his ideas from Darwin, but he did find in the doctrine of evolution scientific support for his own chosen "transvaluation of all values." He had learned from Schopenhauer to regard human life as a process of boundless striving of the Will-to-Live; but unlike Schopenhauer, he did not condemn self-assertion. On the contrary, he championed the Will-to-Power as the upward dynamic in conduct. Thus he reaffirmed his cult of the aristocratic excellence of the elite, to which he had been converted by his studies of classical antiquity. His new morality was in firm opposition to the Christian gospel of compassion and charity. Against these ideals, which he scorned as sickly, he pointed to the upward evolutionary curve. Man must become hard, ruthless with all that is weak and morbid, in others and in himself. He must be consecrated to strength and excellence and mastery.

Our chosen values are tactics of survival in the struggle for existence. A slave values what he needs in his weakness and indigence. The values of the master reveal his self-possession and dominance. Civilization should not be corrupted any longer by the ideals of invalids and beggars. Let the men of

superior worth feel their mettle, hold their ground, impose their will. What we require is inflexible honor, worthy pride and the noble scorn that goes with it, the feeling of plenitude, of high tension, unyielding dominion, Will-to-Power. Only in this way can the currents of our humanity enter again the mighty flood of evolution, renew our vitality, let the ailing and the subnormal perish as they should, reassure survival of the fittest. By breeding and training for superior and dominant qualities, we can realize the utmost possibilities of human nature. We can go further. We can attain to Superman, the next stage in the evolutionary scale. The random spawn of common folk does not matter; mastery alone justifies human existence, sets its own heroic goals, marshals its resources, marches to victory with high disdain for anything and anyone that may be in its way. This is to be a morality, not of saintly heavenly ideals, nor of satisfaction and contentment, nor of rectitude, nor of spiritual fruition, but an earthly morality of the pent-up energies of life pressing forward, unhindered and unafraid.

3. SURVIVAL VALUE AND MORAL WORTH

How are we to understand this confusing variety of ethical inferences from the evolutionary account of human nature and conduct? Evolutionism was supposed to clarify our view of the early origins and gradual development of our moral ideals and practices. It was also used by some of its advocates to provide and substantiate a factual-naturalistic analysis and theory of moral value. But in both of these respects the actual inferences have been inconclusive and ambiguous. In the so-called evolution of morals, if we glance across the vast expanse which seems to separate human conduct from the behavior of even the highest animals, we may trace backward from what we acknowledge as indubitable moral qualities to their early origins. Or we may start low in the animal scale, and proceed

upward to human conduct and human values. In both cases we encounter difficulties in fitting moral ideas and principles into the strict evolutionary frame. Nature at subhuman levels does not seem to be so very scrupulous in its tactics; and at the human level morals do not seem to have a convincing superior warrant from unmitigated nature. As we have seen, the evolutionary process includes aggressive or defensive equipment in a ruthless struggle for existence, and likewise parental care, the herd instinct, and mutual aid. Both sets of qualities are factors in survival. That is to say, if we begin with acknowledged moral values, we do not find that the virtues have a better authenticated genealogy than the vices. And if we start way back in the evolutionary stream, we do not find any distinct current that brings us reliably and unmistakably to moral values.

The crucial difficulty here is this: You cannot reduce human nature to a merely animal statement. You cannot extract from animal behavior an adequate account and estimate of human conduct. You cannot trace human values to their supposed animal antecedents and determining conditions, and retain their human significance throughout. Even within the scale of human history and prehistory, the student of traditional ideas, practices, and institutions knows that he must be on his guard not to read later meanings into earlier notions, nor to ignore the radical transformation included in social-historical development. Descriptive ethics, as has been already and repeatedly acknowledged, has been greatly stimulated and advanced by evolutionary methods, but only when it has used the caution of a truly historical perspective.

These limitations of any far-reaching work in the "evolution of morals" on Darwinian lines serve to exhibit also the inadequacy of a strictly "evolutionary theory of moral value." The evolutionary method in biology explains the increasing com-

plexity of structure and function in animal life, by the operation of the mechanism of natural selection of certain fortuitous variations in certain environments. The survival of certain species under certain conditions of existence is simply a factual causal result, and the factual survival qualifies the species in question as the fittest in that environment. Below the human-mental level, this procedure serves all biological demands. It may also serve us in dealing with the organism of the human animal. But for a fuller and more characteristic account and estimate of man, his distinctive attainments of mind and intelligence must be considered, and then the factors and processes of mere animality do not suffice. Human intelligence is not simply an additional variation. Its activity affects the rest of our nature and quite transforms our animality. Our human conduct includes radically new activities, new ways and directions in our entire organic behavior.

It is one thing to trace clearly man's definite connection with the rest of life in the unfolding of nature through the ages. That is the great merit of evolutionary science. But it is another thing to regard biological-evolutionary principles as adequate for an interpretation of human character in all its expressions. This is not a scientific merit. It is not scientific at all. Because the human organism, structure and function, has animal antecedents and kinships in the evolutionary chain, it does not follow that man is a mere animal, that "animal organism" exhausts the full meaning of human nature. There is grave confusion of basic ideas here. It is an important part of ethics to recognize that which the rest of animal life does not share with human life.

Evolutionary ethics is defective, therefore, because it fails to comprehend the outstanding importance and transforming agency of mind, rational intelligence, decisive in human conduct and values. Be it noted here, that the acknowledgment of

this outstanding importance of reason in human life does not depend on any particular philosophical doctrine as to the ultimate origin of mind, whether it does or does not transcend any evolutionary derivation from other forms of nature. Even if the gradual attainment of mind in the biological process should be proved conclusively, still we should have to recognize the revolutionary character of this attainment. The entire process of evolution became radically different as soon as human intelligence entered upon the scene.

Intelligent man, unlike the animals, is not merely *in* a certain environment, there to perish or survive. He is himself, and increasingly, a producer of his environment. It is not mainly his adaptation to the environment that is decisive any longer. He adapts the environment to suit himself. To be sure, nature has her last word in many vital disputes with man; still man's lot is largely determined not so much by what nature imposes as by what he proposes and exacts from nature. In the evolutionary clinic, unlike the beasts, man is not a patient only; he is also doctor and surgeon. Though his selected and produced environment is also in and of nature, it is a nature devised and provided by himself to accord with his requirements and ideals. His survival or his perishing are increasingly on his own terms. He will not die in his struggle with microbes or bacteria, and he remakes his environment accordingly. But with open eyes he will lay down his life for his chosen value, for country, for truth, for conscience, or for God. A beast in the evolutionary jungle, taking its chances with its conditions in nature, lacks both the life-preserving creative intelligence of man and also man's readiness to spend himself for the values and principles by which he judges himself and his life.

The expression "survival value" in evolutionary ethics is thus seen to be ambiguous and confusing. In its strictly biological use we may say that any specific adaptation to a certain

environment has survival value, if it enables its possessor to survive. Even so a round body may be said to have rolling value. But when we erect this into an ethical doctrine, and judge the values, principles, choices, and actions of men as factors in their survival and so evaluate them, we force moral meaning into biological ideas.

This point can be put to a direct test. In what sense relevant to biology could we maintain that loyalty to conscience or to country, veracity, righteousness, justice have "survival value"? It may be replied that though Socrates may die, though the shipwrecked captain at his bridge station, the sentinel at his post, the martyr at the stake may perish through their virtuous devotion, they sustain human society by their acts and make it more likely to survive. It is not survival itself, however, but the survival of a certain kind of society, the right kind, that warrants and dignifies a man's self-sacrifice. A man ought not to be willing to die for a society in which he would count it a dishonor to live. It is not by his chances of survival that a morally decent man orders his life in a crisis; it is by his choice of values that he decides how or whether he is to survive.

A similar confusion mars the use of the expression "the fittest" in evolutionary ethics. In strictly biological terms, "the fittest" in any environment are simply those that survive. There is no evaluation here but only a factual statement of factual adaptation to specific conditions. The more complex organism better adapted to survive in a more complex environment is not nobler or worthier as we use these words in value judgments. Nothing of the sort: amphibians are not better than worms any more than coal tar is better than hydrogen. No more is man better than amoeba. Better, really better in the moral sense, is an idea of more than biological connotation. To be sure the evolutionary process has actually scaled the

tremendous rise from amoeba to man. But the evolutionist would be the first to deny any progressive operation of purpose in this actual advance; nor should he consider it an advance in an evaluative sense. It has simply been the factual course of events in animal life under the given environmental conditions. Other variations and mutations or another environment would have yielded different results. The fittest survivors would then have been quite others, and *that* would have been the actual "advance" of evolution. Should a new glacial flood sweep over our world, in its icy grip the fittest organisms that survive would be more and more stunted animals and plants, and eventually perhaps only lichens and some microorganisms.

The evolutionist may interpose at this point: Despite this reasoning, why not estimate evolution on its actual record? Has it not in fact achieved man, with all his capacities for perfection? Discounting dismal possibilities of the sort just mentioned, why may we not expect in the future the continuation of this progress, and order our human values on an evolutionary survival scale? Even Darwin, who was not inclined towards ultimate speculation, entertained some such optimistic prospect. He concluded his *Origin of Species* with the forecast that "we may look with some confidence to a secure future of great length. And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection." These are Darwin's words; all the same it should be pointed out that he uses the terms "good," "progress," and "perfection" ambiguously here. Natural selection is the operation of a causal mechanism. In a variety of environments various organisms survive or perish. The survival of some, the extinction of the rest are both involved in the natural selection. The term "good" here must mean effective adaptation. Likewise with the "progress towards perfection": in strict biology it could only mean that in a cer-

tain environment the more and more effectively adapted organisms will more and more surely preserve themselves and propagate their kind.

Human-social evolution includes processes beyond and even counter to the factual mechanism of natural selection. Human intelligence does face its environment actively, adapts and transforms it to fit its purposes, its principles and values. The "good" that it pursues, the "perfection" that it achieves have now a meaning that ethics can understand. The old process of natural selection has been revised and partly replaced by a system of purposive-intelligent activity. Is this a "denial of nature"? Yet Nature in the fullest sense must comprehend this so-called denial. Mind, rational intelligence with its principles and values must somehow be ultimately in and of Nature.

The problem in which we are involved at this point concerns the final cosmic status of moral values, and so our philosophical view of the universe. Some contemporary thinkers have conceived of reality as a process in which a certain type of nature serves as the ground or matrix in which a higher type of nature emerges. So life rises out of the causal mechanism of space-time, and mind rises out of the matrix of life. This is the doctrine of Emergent Evolution; it traces the span of existence from star dust to spirit. Now we may ask: Does not this emergence even at its lower stages manifest in principle the activity and the reality of all its highest eventual perfection? Is the religious mind so far astray when, in its aspiration towards the Divine summit of perfection, it conceives of God as the core and directive reality of the whole process of emergent evolution? "In Him we live and move and have our being."

At the close of our work we shall have to return to these problems of the "cosmology of values" and the interrelation of morality and religion in some ultimate view of the universe. These reflections are mentioned here as appropriate in their

bearing on evolutionary ethics. Some such reinterpretation of the evolutionary process would provide for the unambiguous recognition of persons and moral values. But in that case the ethics of evolution would have to abandon its strictly biological framework. A radically revised evolutionism might serve well as a phase or aspect of ethical perfectionism.

If evolutionary ethics holds fast to the mechanism of natural selection and the struggle for existence, it may seek to avoid ambiguity and confusion by demanding a frank and radical naturalistic-biological revision of moral ideas and values. This sort of professed "new morality" does not have so many exponents in contemporary ethical theory, but it has captivated the imagination of a certain type of literary-social moralizing in our time. This self-proclaimed sturdy naturalism brushes aside the spiritual values of life, and would go "back to nature." It acknowledges prevailing force, but not inviolable right and principle; it cherishes sensual indulgence and chafes at any control; it knows struggle for mastery but not loyalty in endurance and defeat; it recognizes success in getting on, but is impatient with the scruples of conscience and the upright will as old-fogy puritanical notions. It picks out of modern psychology or sociology whatever suits its "naturalistic" morality of unashamed and expert animal drive. This is the ethics of the jungle, and sometimes of the sty.

This direction in our modern ways of life took a terrible turn in international affairs. The doctrine of the Nazis squared with their practice. It was their way of applying the doctrine of the struggle for existence and the Will-to-Power. Certainly Darwin would have disowned with scorn this sort of evolutionary morality, and any good Nietzschean scholar could tell us what the author of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* would have thought of Hitler's breed of supermen! Nevertheless, as T. H. Huxley rightly recognized, "the thief and the murderer follow

nature just as much as the philanthropist." If you rely for your moral values solely on animal evolutionary reactions, how can you repudiate altogether those who share your source and sanctions but only make a different selection and use of it? So here was the Nazi Aryan race, claiming a mutation for world mastery. What were the old moral values and principles to them? Merely crutches for cripples. These new robust overlords asserted their own will as sovereign principle. Nietzsche had written: "Verily a polluted stream is man. One must be a sea, to receive a polluted stream without becoming impure." Hitler's warriors gave these words their own version: "Since we are a sea, no polluted stream can make us impure; neither treachery nor murder, neither unbridled lust nor foul cruelties. These are all swallowed up in the sea of our victorious might!"

In its ambiguities, in its confusion and irrelevance, and in its more sinister and perverse expressions, evolutionary ethics exposes its radical flaw. Its predilection for a naturalistic-scientific method leads it to seek the foundations and the standard of morality in animal forms of life. This is a misguided quest. Nothing lower than man can provide a true standard for the evaluation of human conduct. Our ideals must be sought in the summits of our nature.

Chapter 6

PERFECTIONISM: SELF-REALIZATION OR FULFILLMENT OF PERSONALITY

1. ONE-SIDEDNESS AND INTEGRITY IN ETHICAL METHOD

The examination of formalism, hedonism, and evolutionary ethics has exposed a common defect which they share despite the radical differences in their accounts of the moral standard. Each of them tends to select some one aspect of human conduct, to concentrate on it as the sole or prime essential of moral value, and to use it as criterion for the ethical evaluation of the rest of our life. The specific aspect which is thus given exclusive emphasis is, in each case, an important one; no adequate moral judgment could ignore any one of them. This undoubted merit, however, is marred by one-sided or oversimplified interpretation of moral experience. Right and deeply significant though each theory is in what it affirms, it is radically deficient owing to what it ignores.

It seems advisable at this turn in our discussion to clarify the above general criticism by drawing together these three ethical theories in more explicit statement. Thus, in the first place, it is true that moral acts have a peculiar dignity as expressions of the agent's loyal devotion to a principle. Virtue is dedicated to duty; it is conscientious; it manifests the upright

will acting out of pure respect for the moral law. No matter how beneficial the results of an action may be, unless it expresses a person's convictions, it is only a useful act, nowise entitled to distinctively moral approval. In these judgments formalism calls attention to a very important phase of moral character: the inner spirit of rectitude, without which no accomplishment however salutary has moral worth. But while the upright will should be recognized in the formulation of the moral standard, it alone cannot supply it. Unless we take due account of the other elements and factors in our experience, conscience and duty by themselves may prove abstract formulas, or even misleading. Furthermore, while in many instances of conduct the conviction of duty is morally indispensable, this is not always the case. Some of the finest examples of moral excellence are characterized not so much by conscientious dutiful resolution as by wholehearted spontaneity of love or generosity, involving no explicit sense of obligation. Even in dealing with dutiful loyalty, formalism leaves us profoundly impressed but still unable to proceed decisively to action. We are asked to sail all the way under sealed orders; our hand is raised to take the oath of loyalty, but the oath is not forthcoming. We ask: What shall we *do* to enter this Kingdom of Ends?

Likewise pleasure, happiness or satisfaction of some sort, is a genuine element in the life which we judge worthy of moral approval. This element, however, is insufficient to serve as a standard. The moral problem cannot be reduced to hedonistic calculation. Unless ethics were to erect absurdity into a principle by holding that I ought to do as I please—and ought the more, the more I am pleased—we must recognize not only amounts but also grades of pleasure. But if pleasures are to be graded and ranked, we require an appeal to another standard than the pleasantness that the hedonist emphasizes. Real moral

judgment cannot merely measure enjoyment; it must also estimate taste. While it is to the lasting credit of hedonism that it has always recognized the intimate and universal experience of emotional tone, the moral worth of an action cannot be judged simply in terms of the amount of pleasure that it yields.

So again in considering evolutionary ethics: an important phase of behavior is brought to attention, but it is not seen in its full perspective, in relation to the other aspects of personal experience. The investigation of the organic groundwork of human conduct, the primeval source or matrix of emotions, reactions, scruples, and eventual customs and laws is a prime merit of this ethical doctrine. Many moralists in the past had interpreted conduct as though men were purely rational disembodied spirits, or as though human nature were without animal ancestry. In compelling ethics to face and to explore man's character and experience in their evolutionary setting, Darwin and his successors have rendered an inestimable service to morals. This naturalism in ethical method means a gain in substance and factual content, a continual check on loose if lofty speculation. The evolutionary doctrine is itself a major contribution to a more integral ethical theory, for it serves to tie ethics, an essentially normative science, closer to its descriptive basis in anthropology and biology.

This integrating contribution can be realized adequately only by correcting the one-sidedness of evolutionary ethics. It does not merely explore the early origins and prototypes of human-social experience in the behavior of the higher animals. It also undertakes to read the full meaning of morality in biological terms. It does not consider that the adequate view of human conduct would require fuller recognition of intelligence, rational judgment, responsiveness to values. On the contrary, it undertakes to judge man as simply the most highly evolved animal, by the factors of adaptation to environment

and natural selection. Evolutionary ethics, with its survival value as chief principle and standard of evaluation, turns the merit of exploring the animal origins and kinships of human nature into the defect of interpreting human activity merely in terms of its animal-organic factors. Sound ethics must learn from the evolutionists what human nature shares with the animal; but it should never neglect the recognition of the higher attainments which the animals do not share with man.

Genuine and adequate moral judgment must respect and must express our character and activity in its all-round wholeness. On principle it must be opposed to any narrow partisanship. The moral problem is not a specialized inquiry into some fragment or corner of life. It is rather a synthesis of all the problems of specialized values which confront men and women.

2. THE HARMONIOUS REALIZATION OF OUR CAPACITIES

The moral value of any act must depend upon the role it plays in the perfection of human nature. This is not a mere tautology, that an act is good if it makes us better. The perfection of anything is in its characteristic fruition. In realizing our capacities harmoniously, our character comes up to its promises; its good is in its perfect consummation and fulfillment. Its evil, contrariwise, is in the stunting, the frustration of its capacities, the corruption and perversion of character.

Moral value here shows analogies to logical value. The truth of a theory in any field depends upon this, whether it takes due account of all relevant evidence, with appropriate distribution of emphasis, and whether it not only makes the topic with which it deals more intelligible, but also opens new vistas of thought and new problems. So it is with a valid ethical theory: the true moral evaluation of a man's act must be one which judges it in terms of all that is distinctively and fully human.

It must be a true estimate of the significant place and role of that act in the whole drama of human life. Always by this reference to the whole of a man's career, in the full context of a man's being and character, each specific action is to be probed and appraised. Each step of real moral advance should reveal us, individually and in our social participation, a step nearer to that which we are fully meant to be. Good conduct is thus the progressive self-expression of man in his fullest significance. It is what he does when he is not misguided or merely impulsive or thoughtless, but truly knows what he is, what he is about, and what he means to become. It is the active fulfillment of his personality. The good life is the humanly appropriate and abundant life. Moral judgment involves self-evaluation based on self-understanding. The discipline which is essential to it is a control of self for the sake of fuller and more harmonious self-realization. What it subordinates, or emphasizes, or exalts, all depends upon its conviction of fulfillment and fruition of our humanity.

Already in classical antiquity Aristotle made this significant approach to ethical theory by his general analysis of the good in functional terms. We call anything good when it fulfills its distinctive function: be it a good sickle or a good fig tree or a good watchdog. A good man is one who lives up to the distinctive capacities of human nature. And long ages before the evolutionists, Aristotle examined man's kinships with plant and animal life. Like the plants, man grows with nourishment; like the animals, he can move about and has his five senses and various appetites. In certain parts of our life we are like cattle and like cabbages. But these parts nowise express the distinctive human function and character, for man has the capacity of reason; he is the rational animal. Human nature can be fully realized only in a life controlled and directed by reason. The good life for man is the rational life.

It can be seen how an Aristotelian perfectionist would criticize both hedonism and evolutionary ethics. No mere feeling suffices for moral valuation, and no capacity less than the distinctively and fully human, the rational, avails as a principle of human worth. We may call the Highest Good happiness, but its meaning is better expressed by the term well-being or welfare: faring or doing well, coming up to the full measure of man, in the rational life. This principle of reason is itself the judging and ordering principle; and only by its direction can our life achieve order and balance, avoid the one-sidedness and extremes and vices of the impulsive life. Impulsively a man under attack might prove either foolhardy or a coward; with the right rational estimate of his danger and of his capacity to resist it, he can be truly courageous. So the other virtues similarly follow the balanced midway between contending impulses. Virtue is the rational "golden mean" between extremes, between too much and too little.

While Aristotle's perfectionism resisted one-sidedness and advocated order and balance as essential to the moral life, the earlier classical statement of Perfectionism, the Platonic, emphasized the principle of aristocracy in the hierarchy of values. Aristocracy means the dominance of the best. Our first step in true insight and right living is to recognize the best and to choose it for our aim and guiding principle. Things are not merely different, nor indifferently on a par. Some are higher and nobler, and entitled to prevail. Therefore the goal and good of human life cannot be in random satisfaction, but only in the true selection of the higher in mastery over the lower. This is the wisdom and the art of life: to keep first things first; to recognize the highest principle, reason, and to give it the mastery of our life; and then to let the lower sides of our nature, our active energies and our appetites, play their subsidiary roles, directed by reason.

Already in these two classical versions of perfectionism, essential principles of the theory found expression: achievement of integrity of human character by order and balance, rational control and direction, due distribution of emphasis, true perception of relative worth in the hierarchy of values. Modern perfectionism has sought to possess these principles more fully and to weld with them certain other moral values which were not clearly grasped in classical antiquity.

One of these is the acknowledgment of the unique and inviolable dignity of each person, irrespective of race or rank. This recognition derives mainly from the Christian doctrine of man's eternal worth in the sight of God. It was a spiritual universalism radically opposed to the proud ancient exclusiveness which expressed itself in the Hebrew's high estimate of himself as one of God's chosen people, in the Greek's disdain of other races as barbarians, and in the very phrase, a Roman citizen. The Stoic ideal of cosmopolitanism, the communion of all truly rational men, was itself a new and higher exclusiveness of all sages; it came short of truly universal respect for the spiritual worth of all men whatever. The Christian ideal of brotherhood was motivated religiously, but its moral effects have been far-reaching, in economic, social, and political activity and institutions. The demand for this recognition of man's inviolable moral dignity may be seen as a factor in the progressive abolition of slavery, in judicial and prison reform, in the gradual though still slow achievement of economic and social justice, in the long struggle for world-wide public education, universal suffrage, and a democratic way of life, We shall have occasion to consider this significant moral advance in our examination of some of the main problems of social ethics. This decisive principle in the development of modern perfectionism indicates its vital application to all the fields of human experience.

Another principle of major importance in modern perfectionism is the recognition of the essentially social character of personality and of the process of self-realization. The fruition of our capacities is attained largely through our participation with others in the purposes and activities of social-institutional life. Man cannot realize the full possibilities of the abundant life by himself. He finds his own larger meaning and value by identifying himself justly and generously with the purposes and fulfillment of others. He lives his own fuller life in theirs, as they in his. The true moral justification of any social institution is that it provides a medium and a condition for the growth and perfection of all who participate in it. Characteristic and indispensable values of our moral life are thus expressions of social cooperation. The life of the family is the matrix and nursery of much that we value and cherish, without which our life would be stunted. So it is likewise in the other social regions and directions. In each of them we may trace a certain strain of our personality, a phase of what we increasingly signify to ourselves. Consider in this light civic-communal activities, vocational or professional relations, political conditions of security and stability, justice and reliable progress, the universal republic of the human spirit, sustaining and achieving the higher perfection of our life, intellectual, aesthetic, religious.

Perfectionism is not to be regarded as simply another ethical theory alongside the three which we have been considering. In a real sense it represents the integrating of our moral activity and reflection. Moral experience thus conceived engages all our energies, and engages them so as to harmonize them, to reveal and to attain unity of character. Our self-understanding is deepened. We recognize not only what is within our grasp and reach, but also what is worth our reach and grasp: our range of capacities and also the grading of them. Our life

course is not a neutral level but a concourse and contest of ennobling and degrading tendencies, achievement and debacle, an urge and a drag, the gleam of the ideal and the lure of the degenerate. At the crossroad of decision, our choice may point towards fruition, harmony, and self-fulfillment, or to backwash and atavism. The slope on which we are moving is an upward but also a downward slope; our every act and word and thought are either uplifting or degrading us, and through us uplifting or degrading others.

Recognize the impending-challenging character of value, the active-creative character of personality in its issue of alternatives, the inexhaustible-perfecting character of nature. Moral worth is then revealed as realization in the fullest naturalistic sense, the sap and savor of a man's soul. This worth is not in formal obedience, or in bare satisfaction, or in mere accomplishment. These are all elements in the experience, but their value is in the contribution they make to the decisive aim and meaning of our life, the active harmony of self and fulfillment of personality.

3. THE RANGE OF OUR VALUES: GRADATION AND PREFERENTIAL CHOICE

We have been discussing the essential aspects of moral activity as viewed in the theory of perfectionism. But this general survey and estimate is not enough. We should explore more definitely our human treasury of values, organize and appraise them, enunciate clearly the principle of relative worth as our standard in choice, and apply this standard in typical cases of moral preference and decision.

This inquiry is not strange or abstruse; it concerns our familiar everyday interests. So we may ask: What are the chief good things of life? What do men live by; what do we mainly cherish or hope for? We are not seeking here to devise a table

of virtues, or of basic rights and duties, but of the various kinds or fields of value.

Our first statement is intended as a plain report of common daily judgment. It might be presented in a random account, even as the eye may sweep over the high peaks and the valleys and foothills of a mountain region, before endeavoring to fix the view and natural contour more definitely in a map. Now we shall proceed directly to a tabulated list of the range of human values. The ordering of the values in our table is not accidental; it is meant to express their relative worth. But the ranking is in some respects tentative and recognizes debatable points.

In parallel columns we may indicate the main fields of our experience and the respective types of values, as follows:

Fields of Experience	*Values*
Religious experience	Worship or ideal devotion
Intellectual and aesthetic activity	Understanding and beauty
Association with others	Social order, peace, fellowship
Work and leisure	Livelihood and play
Bodily activity	Health, vigor, vitality
Economic condition	Security, prosperity

Before we examine our table, we may consider some other values often cited, which have not been included here. It may be remarked that the life of the feelings might have been recognized alongside our intellectual activity, not only in its aesthetic and religious manifestations but also more generally. For instance, the feelings of comfort and confidence are among our cherished values, to attain which we strive and toil. Likewise the feeling of serenity and also of animation and good spirits are reckoned among the good things of life. These and other emotions have not been listed here, for, as we noted in examining psychological hedonism, every experience has an

emotional tone; so these and other feelings find their recognition in our various fields of activity.

There may be a more searching question here. Might we not make a table of values by a survey of our experience on its emotional side? In that case what sort of emotional tone would be entitled to emphasis in valuation? The failure to take any notice of this aspect of our problem would surely be a defect in the table; but the inclusion of it in the actual tabulation would complicate it unduly, and a broad acknowledgment of the factor of feeling as qualifying the various entries in the table may perhaps suffice. Such an acknowledgment, however, would have to be explicit and imperative in the case of happiness, which is not so much a specific value as a fundamental emotional tone of the experience of value realization in any field.

Certain qualities of will and activity have also been listed sometimes among our principal values. The man of affairs would be astonished to see success and mastery omitted, for are these not the qualities of his special choice, and likewise the related values of efficiency and ambition? But these are really synonyms of achievement and perfection, more especially appropriate in some regions of conduct, less appropriate in others, but in all of them signifying active pursuit and attainment, characteristic of the whole life of self-realization. In the perspective of social involvement, the values of honor and fame would require similar treatment.

Two outstanding values, essential to any true fulfillment of personality, are love and rectitude. Their role in our moral life is so central and decisive that each of them has sometimes been chosen as the sovereign moral principle to provide the standard in the judgment of conduct. But rectitude is not so much a special value as the quality of upright spirit that marks genuine moral worth in conduct, especially in the higher fields

of spiritual activity. The kinship of rectitude to honor would be evident here, as will be mentioned further presently. Love may have been cited as the highest emotional value; but we all know that it is not only an emotion. It is a supreme way of expressing the utter self-possession of personality by the values with which it is identified, in emotion most strikingly, but also in thought and in action. So we find love consuming and transfiguring human life along its entire gamut: in man's love of woman, of kin, of mankind, of justice and truth and beauty, of God. There is no specific place for love in our table of values, because its place is throughout, and its major role inspires the whole drama of our life.

Enough has been suggested already even in this brief rehearsal of likely objections and comments to show how complex the system of human values is, what new facets of meaning it reflects when viewed from a new significant slant. Language itself may teach us deeper insight here. The same word may reveal many connotations, all of them significant, as we use it in different perspectives of our moral experience. Let us take for instance the ideal of honor, which was twice mentioned above. Unquestionably we shall agree that it is among the principal goods or values of life; but its meaning is manifold and elastic, not easily encased in any rigid formula. We may describe it as the social esteem or acknowledgment of personal worth, together with any of the external marks or forms of such distinctive regard. It may then signify value of any sort, or the essential worth of character, as considered in its social perspective of respect and repute. So considered, it may be manifested across the entire scale of activities surveyed in our table, wherever homage or deference is accorded. Or our judgment may center not on the dignity received but on dignity deserved, on one's own more searching self-esteem, on our conviction of personal worth whether acknowledged abroad or

not. Aristotle dismissed honor in the first sense: a man's highest good cannot be honor, for it depends on others to bestow it, whereas a man's final good must be a man's own. But in his list of virtues Aristotle exalts High-mindedness or true rational self-esteem of a person of great worth. Honor thus may pass from worth in a definitely social perspective of fame or glory to the more intimately individual approbation of conscience. In one reference it is among the most external marks or emoluments of worth; in another it may be manifested in resistance and contrast to any externalities. So it may come to signify the austere spirit of moral rectitude. If we follow the thread of this one idea of honor through the warp and the woof of the moral texture, we may see how involved is the pattern of our valuation and how thoroughly each element in it is qualified and colored by its relation or its setting in the whole: an affair of honor, a debt of honor, a woman's honor, a word of honor, an honor student, a man of honor, honor bright, upon my honor, honor thy father and thy mother, honor be to God!

Clearly, then, if we have grasped the significance of perfectionism, we should not only be prepared for objections and additions to any table of values which we may devise, but should ourselves invite critical comment. For is it not a main point of this theory of ethics to insist on the recognition of integrity of conduct and character, in relation to which each specific value or aspect of value finds its role and meaning? As this concrete-integral worth of personality cannot be expressed adequately in terms of pleasure alone, or of duty and uprightness, or of survival value, so no elaborate table can do it full and exhaustive justice. The table is useful only as a framework to present the main elements of worth in an orderly scheme. The bodily frame with all its living tissues is the real individual; but strung together in dry bony array, it

is only a skeleton. These reservations and concessions are important in the exposition of perfectionist ethics, lest in our natural desire for schematic perfection of statement we ourselves fail to report the complex living process of moral activity and produce in its place only an elaborate abstract formula.

We may now return to our table of values, ready for a fairly general acceptance of its outline but also for uncertainty or dispute about details, some of them important.

If we keep in mind that the entire scale is meant to express our range or scope in fulfillment of personality, we should very likely agree that some values in this expansive range are higher than others. Without committing ourselves to the above order precisely, should we not avow that the so-called values of our higher life—worship, understanding, beauty—are indeed higher than those of bodily strength and material possessions? In calling the latter values lower, we do not derogate or denounce them. They may be seen as conditions or elements fundamental to the attainment of the other values. But as with the foundations of a structure so with them: they support the higher life of personality, which the other values express more fully.

Without too rigid classification, the economic and the bodily values, wealth and health, may be grouped together as representing the basic conditions for attainment of welfare and competence. The values of fellowship, understanding, beauty, and worship, by comparison, express a higher life of character and culture. Work and play may be said to provide the medium of operation in which, on the basis of the lower values, the higher perfections may be pursued and achieved.

The general principle of order which has been followed in grading the values in our table is the principle of value itself. Value is revealed in the personal response to experience. *The highest value is the one manifesting the greatest expression and*

fulfillment of personality. By this standard of relative and progressive self-realization, or fruition of character, the various values of our life may be ranked. With this criterion in mind, our table indicates certain significant directions of the rise in perfection. The scale of values proceeds from the advantageous provisionment of our needs and desires by our material environment, first, to sound organic-bodily conditions of energetic and effective activity; then to productive significant occupation and recreation, in work and leisure, in which our capacities are brought to bear on our natural and social environment; and then in more and more thoroughly personal involvement, to the social interplay of temperaments and interests and purposes; rising to the highest values of the inner life, the activities of rational intelligence, creative imagination, reverence, and aspiration. The arrow of perfection points from the more external goods to the values of the inner life, from partial to more integral expression, from the conditions of personal fruition to the achievement of it.

The rest of this book will include a more direct and detailed probing of these principal values of our life, in their individual and social manifestation, and in the problems which they present, problems of practical attainment as well as of theoretical grasp. No extensive examination of any type of value will be attempted at this point, but it seems advisable to consider briefly each one of them alongside the others, to confirm our conviction of their close interrelation in the harmonious life of true moral well-being.

The relative position of economic and bodily values in our scale may be questioned: for do not organic-bodily existence and activity actually precede any economic status, ownership, or property? To be sure, "naked we come into the world"; but the moral relevance of this chronological reflection is debatable. What we have and own is certainly important, but impor-

tant as a condition of what we are and may become, and most immediately in our bodily welfare. "The life is more than the food, and the body than the raiment." As has been noted, the economic values, unlike all the others, have no intrinsic quality but are contributory or instrumental only. This consideration alone should decide their proper rank, at the bottom of the scale. No value in life can be rightly subordinated to them; to make them in any way our intrinsic end or aim is moral folly.

This point needs especial emphasis in modern perfectionist ethics owing to the preoccupation of our industrial society with the amassing of material possessions. Very significant in this connection is the common description of a wealthy man as "a man of means." A person has surely missed his true fulfillment if he has spent his life on the accumulation of means and failed to realize himself. It is not enough to have things; one must also be something. But while economic resources are only means, we should not ignore that they are necessary means. They are important as conditions in the attainment of the other and higher values. The two aspects of this moral principle must be decisive in any ethical examination of our economic system. We should not subordinate human well-being to property, but we should also understand and acknowledge the rightful claims of men to a fairer share of material resources, of the economically necessary means requisite for more healthy and secure, productive and significant human living. Here an alert modern morality must recognize its unmistakable concern in the modern struggle for economic justice.

The bodily values of health, vigor, and effective vitality received considerable critical estimate in our examination of evolutionary ethics. We noted the serious shortcomings of any ethical doctrine that would evaluate the whole of human life

and character by a standard of merely or mainly organic-biological efficiency, survival value. But we also recognized the evolutionist's great service to ethics; even in his overemphasis on our bodily-animal nature, he has provided a sound corrective to some earlier accounts of morality that had dealt with man as though he were pure disembodied reason. Man is a rational animal—the adequate account of morality is one which emphasizes the adjective, rational, but which does not ignore the noun, animal.

Our modern civilization manifests a strong revival of the cult of bodily perfection, less balanced than the ancient Greek ideal on which it is sometimes modeled. This may take the form of athleticism, but sometimes also chooses less arduous pursuit of bodily comfort and ease and indulgence of the appetites. In both of these manifestations, the modern tendency is opposed to the disdain of the body which has led in many religions to monastic-hermit austerities and self-mortification. The fuller truth is in correction of these two opposite extremes. No cult of the body can lead to human perfection. We do not overlook the intrinsic value of glowing health, of bodily organs in full vigor and perfect control, of abundant vitality. Yet it is the perfectly timed self-possession of the great athlete, the perfect dancer, the person of ready prevailing energy whom we admire—not merely the strong or agile body but the perfect mastery of it by mind and will.

So bodily welfare is rightly valued as in the main contributory to the expression of our higher capacities. Health, vigor, vitality have real bearing on our larger life, on the harmonious realization of our whole personality. This important role of our bodily values should be acknowledged, but they should keep to their role and their place. A sane morality is one that respects our bodily nature, not scorning it in misguided asceticism; it is also a morality which recognizes that mere

brawn and agility do not avail us, that man is neither steer nor squirrel, that if he is to keep his body fit, it is to be fit for something, a fit instrument for the fullest human achievement and human self-expression.

The right ethical interpretation of the activities of work and play, which mark the pendular sweep of our normal daily living, require the same respect for our total career as human beings. The work by which we earn our livelihood will never quite serve our purpose unless it engages our interests and our energies so as to provide significant self-expression. The play activities of our leisure, in which we give vent to our free initiative and preferences of the moment, must yield us not only passing amusement but also constructive and significant recreation. Just as in our work we resist deadly routine and drudgery, so in our play we should be wary of equally dull and empty pastime. Work and play are not really opposite but complementary. Each with its different emphasis contributes to the other, and both together provide the everyday stage for a productive enjoyable life.

Even more convincingly are character and personality integrated in the manifold activities of our higher life. Moral advance demands a socializing of our nature, spiritual growth through cooperation with others. It is therefore committed to the attainment of a social system of reliable order, of peace, of human fellowship and brotherhood. The mere mention of these values calls up at once the social-institutional fields in which they must be realized; economic, educational, judicial, political, international, interracial. We are compelled to recognize that in our civilization not only war is global but likewise peace and justice and brotherhood. This ethical problem demands much of our attention in later chapters.

The so-called spiritual activities of our intellectual, aesthetic, and religious nature raise a hard problem of right emphasis

and relative estimate. The question whether understanding or beauty should rank higher is one on which conclusive agreement is scarcely to be expected; perhaps the decision is not as important as it might seem. Despite the rigid abstract distinction often made between the intellect and the imagination, their mutuality and shared character of creative intelligence is manifest in the achievements of really great thinkers and poets. Progress in self-realization must rely on the criticism and insight of intellectual activity in its progressive mastery of truth. We are committed to the advance of knowledge, and we have an intellectual conscience. The growth in understanding and self-understanding, however, is not only analytic and conceptual. Great intelligence seeks and finds also poetic utterance, in the whole field of aesthetic creativeness and appreciation. Our higher life is extension of knowledge; it is also a refinement of taste. The poetic spirit reaches its summit of perfection in creative vision. This is the full realization of beauty in human life. Perhaps these two high values, understanding and beauty, may be expressed more truly, in a way that expresses their mutual relation, as insight and vision.

These words, insight and vision, may serve also to relate the intellectual and aesthetic values to the religious. Is it not the claim of religion that in its supreme values of worship and aspiration it reveals our deepest insight and our most sublime vision? The medieval theologian exalted religion so high above our daily interest and values as, in his laudation, also to isolate it. That was the traditional cleavage between the sacred and the secular, from which a truer moral and spiritual view has largely emancipated modern intelligence. But some scientific naturalism, in reacting sharply against traditional theology as obscurantism, has tended to dismiss religion itself as mere superstition. The socialists and communists in several countries found the ecclesiastic hierarchy allied with their political and

social enemies, and so repudiated religion as "opiate for the people." At the conclusion of this work we shall try to grasp in more balanced judgment the true supreme role of religion and its significance in the moral life of man. Religious values are in and of our human texture and its perfection. They are not, in misguided adoration, to be set up, above and apart from the rest of our human nature; nor are they to be set aside in shallow disdain. Notwithstanding criticisms from the right and from the left, we must accord to religious values their due place: in the same scale with the other human values, and at the top of the scale.

So we may follow the vast life outlook that unfolds before perfectionist ethics, and the searching penetration with which it examines and evaluates human conduct. Perfectionism judges our life as a process of progressive understanding, mastery individual and social, expression and perfection of character—or as disintegration, degradation, defeat of capacities. Morality thus thrives on the mellowing of intelligence in all the fields in which we are realizing our values, and always it voices the imperious demand of the larger life and character against upstart impulse or discordant and debasing passion. Logic, aesthetics, social philosophy, philosophy of religion are all tracing the curves of man's rise up the scale of values. Moral philosophy should see all these as various paths to its own goal, which is harmonious, integral realization, perfectibility, fulfillment of personality, achievement of a sound, sane, just, free, humane, creative civilization.

Part 3

PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL MORALITY

Chapter 7

VIRTUES AND VICES OF PERSONAL CHARACTER

1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VIRTUE IN MORAL JUDGMENT AND IN UNFOLDING OUTLOOK ON LIFE

The evolution of moral standards which was noted in our examination both of evolutionary ethics and of perfectionism may be studied more particularly in the field of personal qualities of character that evoke moral approbation or reproof. These are the traditional virtues and vices of ethical discussion. In the older treatises of morals they engaged the main course of exposition. Contemporary ethics has preferred to concentrate on the contents of the moral life in the various fields of individual and social activity. This change in method, however, does not signify a dismissal of the more definitely individual aspects of moral attainment or failure. The closer study of morality in economic and political relations emphasizes new aspects of the traditional virtues and vices. Ethical thought here reflects the increasing importance of political and economic issues in contemporary life.

Some moralists have listed the virtues as "character values" and treated them as coordinate with economic, bodily, intellectual, or aesthetic values. This procedure is questionable.

Virtue is understood better as moral value itself, which might be pursued and attained in various fields, but regarded in a more definitely personal perspective. It is not so much a particular type of activity, what a man does, as what a man is and becomes by acting in a certain way. Some qualities of character, as right ambition, for instance, are more suitably developed and realized in particular spheres of action, and so are virtues of more special connotation. Even these regional virtues have their aspects of general reference.

The expanding range of moral valuation manifested in the history of ethics may be regarded as the more adequate exploration of the traditional virtues, by ramified pursuit of them in the wider reaches of the moral territory. A cardinal virtue such as justice, which may be lauded in general terms as fairness or balance in judgment and conduct, may gain both depth and range as it is seen in the perspectives and kinships of due requital, or tolerance, or gratitude, or piety, or economic and political fair treatment.

The ethical history of our civilization may be studied very significantly in its steadfast or changing selection of its "cardinal virtues," and in its traditional or revised interpretations of them. The critical probing of these processes of moral judgment may sometimes yield the characteristic tone and spirit of a great thinker or of an epoch in culture. So we may note the deep-lying contrast between the medieval-Christian view of life and that of classical antiquity, despite the many doctrines and problems which scholastic philosophers shared with the Greek.

Greco-Roman ethics regarded the virtues as various aspects of the excellent life, man's full fruition and satisfaction in all lines of activity, duly harmonized and directed by reason. Even the Epicurean hedonist, who centered his attention on the attainment of pleasure, relied on good judgment for the right

choice of enjoyments, to get reliable and abiding contentment. The classical doctrines of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics agreed in exalting the rational life. The Greek moralist relied on his insight and on his rightly directed will in the pursuit of the Highest Good. Where the rational life was extolled, the virtues would be interpreted according to the conception of the role of reason in relation to the passions. As we noted in the preceding chapter, Plato championed the rational ideal of harmony and due distribution of emphasis on every side and interest of our nature, according to its rank in the hierarchy of human values. His cardinal virtues—temperance, courage, wisdom—exhibit this rational harmony in our tripartite nature (control of the appetites, direction of will-energy, insight and judgment of reason); his virtue par excellence, justice, expressed the basic rational principle of due order. Aristotle pointed to reason as the mediator between the extremes of conflicting impulses. His virtues manifest the good balanced life in the various regions and situations of human conduct. The highest human perfection, according to Aristotle, was in the intellectual virtues of the contemplative life, pure rational activity, undisturbed by any irrational urge. The Stoics saw no possible reconciliation of reason and the passions, and sought moral excellence in the repression of all emotion, in unqualified rational self-mastery and serenity. Their view of the role of reason demanded a reinterpretation of the cardinal virtues: so courage became fortitude in adversity, and temperance became a firm check on any indulgence.

Christianity was preached as a religion of salvation, and its ethics changed the basic emphasis in the ancient-classical view of life. Man's moral career was no longer conceived as his attainment or failure in the perfection of his normal human capacities and satisfactions. The dominant conviction became that of a divine value of holiness, and of man's sinful corrup-

tion and indigence, his utter need of redemption and divine grace. The goal was no longer a goal of man's own endeavor, but of man's contrite trust in God. The Highest Good was not a human-secular value, human perfection and satisfaction here and now, but rather a heavenly saintliness and blessedness. This did not mean that moral qualities were disregarded; not at all—but they were viewed in a new scale of valuation. Christians read a new table of virtues in the Beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount: lowly humility of the poor in spirit, the penitent distress of those that mourn, the forbearance of the meek, hunger and thirst after righteousness, mercy, purity of heart, a peace-making spirit, and martyred righteousness. The virtues of the ancient sages were filled with the new meanings of spiritual-religious concentration. Aristotle had emphasized the virtue of high-mindedness, rational self-esteem, and listed humility among the vices. But the Christian saint, judging himself by a divine standard, regarded humble-mindedness as a virtue appropriate to our sinful state.

In the Christian outlook on life the cardinal virtues of Greek ethics become only the lower stages of the Christian's rise to the real perfections of the soul, to St. Paul's blessed triad of faith, hope, and love. Love, *caritas,* as the supreme Christian virtue, is seen as the inner spiritual dynamic in every moral value. The virtues are interpreted as various expressions of love. Temperance is now ascetic in its self-mastery: keeping oneself chaste and uncontaminated, in loving devotion to Christ alone. Courage no longer expresses the classical emphasis on valor, staunch in resistance or aggression; it is now long-suffering endurance for Christ's sake, and finds its summit in martyrdom. Justice, bent on safeguarding rights and firm in conflict, yields here to placating fellowship and brotherly love in all relations. Wisdom is no longer self-reliant rational insight but rather trusting faith, and its perfection is

the saintly vision of God. The entire moral life is seen, not as man's own career, his pursuit, attainment, and satisfaction, but as the operation of Divine grace in the life of the sinner, his redemption and regeneration and blessedness.

By keeping in mind this fundamental shift in outlook and valuation, we can understand why Plato and Aristotle, notwithstanding their radical disagreements on many issues, were less unlike each other than either of them was unlike his medieval Catholic disciples. Nothing illustrates this truth better than a study of the moral philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas side by side with Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics.* The Angelic Doctor adopted but also transformed the ancient Greek's rationalistic naturalism in ethics. On the one hand the cardinal virtues of classical antiquity were surmounted by the virtues of Christian saintliness. On the other, the pagan virtues themselves were radically reinterpreted in a Christian spirit: the same words, different meanings.

Against this background of ideas, ancient-classical and medieval-Christian, we may recognize the characteristic moral scene and the guiding tendencies of the modern age. As the modern spirit got beyond its initial upsurge, clash and adventure of the Renaissance, and settled to its task of rethinking and rebuilding its structures of thought and its practice, it found itself the heir not of a single but of a dual tradition of principles and ideals. The outlook of Christian-medieval life was refracted by the revived world view of classical antiquity.

Modern intelligence recognizes this double inheritance. Beyond any vague compromise of the Christian and the pagan, it seeks to do justice to these two philosophies of life, while facing its own modern problems and issues. The progress of knowledge and the direction of prevailing interest influence each other. In one field they bring to the fore naturalistic

convictions and a resurgent paganism; in the investigation of other fields they are led to reaffirm spiritual values and some sort of Christian solution. But even more typical is the modern man's attack on his moral problems directly, in their bearing on his own needs and interests, without conscious loyalties to either of the two traditions that he has inherited.

Two or three examples may be cited briefly to illustrate the modern temper in its treatment of the cardinal virtues. The Renaissance revolt against theological authority found ethical expression in the philosophy of its main Italian leader, Giordano Bruno. Bruno proclaimed a new scale of virtues for the new age of free inquiry. His supreme virtue was Truth, compass and beacon star in the voyage of man's spirit. His other virtues, with truth, were wisdom, prudence, law, judgment, courage, culture, repentance, simplicity, solicitude, philanthropy. In this list of human perfections we can see the Renaissance outlook on the life worth living: an ethical declaration of independence, and the manifesto of a new age.

Two centuries after Bruno, in an epoch of more firmly established modern science and more general tolerance, the philosopher of religion Schleiermacher undertook in his ethical system a modern synthesis of Greek philosophical and Christian ideals. His four cardinal virtues were wisdom, love, composure, and steadfastness. We may see here Plato and St. Paul reflecting and supplementing each other. Wisdom is right judgment or conviction, as in Plato; but in its ultimate reach it inclines to faith. Composure and steadfastness are transparently the Platonic temperance and courage, but together in Schleiermacher's final outlook they have the quality of hope. And the replacement of Plato's justice by St. Paul's love is characteristic of the prevailing Christian emphasis in Schleiermacher's ethics.

One more instance may be cited, of a definitely and popu-

larly modern outlook in valuation rather than of systematic analysis in moral philosophy. Benjamin Franklin, whose name is a synonym for modern practicality, plain honesty, and dignity of character, compiled out of the traditional lists of virtues a table of his own for his private cultivation—thirteen virtues, to which he applied himself in order, one a week, four times a year! Franklin's choice of moral perfections is his practical confession of faith: temperance, silence, order, resolution, frugality, industry, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness, tranquillity, chastity, humility. His concluding precept is characteristic: "Imitate Jesus and Socrates."

2. SOME CARDINAL VIRTUES

The science of ethics is systematized valuation. It examines the types of virtue which we can realize in various fields of our experience, and it seeks to relate and rank these values in a system convincing to reason. We have recognized the virtues as qualities of character manifested in the life of moral worth. The sort of value attainable depends upon the kind of experience in which we are engaged, be it economic, political, aesthetic, intellectual, and so forth. But whether the respective value is attained or not, depends not only upon the specific conditions of experience, but also and essentially upon the right attitude and personal quality which virtue connotes. This right spirit and quality of character will determine whether we attain truth or error and confusion, concord and cooperation or dissension.

The ethical ideal of perfectionism has been conceived as the harmonious realization of values along the manifold range of our capacities: economic competence, health, culture in work and play, fellowship, understanding, beauty, worship. But this same ideal is also expressed in our right and value-achieving quality of character. Some of the values of moral

experience emphasize what is achieved; in others we cherish our role and spirit in the achieving. Both of these aspects of the moral ideal are essential in the fulfillment of personality. As we might expect, the subjective side of the moral experience is as complex as the objective is manifold and expansive. Just as there is no single principle supreme and encompassing all moral value—neither happiness nor survival nor duty—so there is no paramount virtue to which all others can be reduced. Sound ethical reflection must recognize the complexity of its exploration, in its analysis of the moral person. Its task is to select the decisive qualities of moral character, and contrariwise the most serious defects. These would be the principal virtues and vices.

Wisdom

A fundamental mark of moral activity is its deliberate, voluntary character. Every choice of real moral value reflects, not merely strong liking or overmastering impulse, but rather a preference that is defensible, careful and right judgment. Intelligence is the basic need of the moral life. The good man is a mind alert to this need. Wisdom or insight is thus rightly considered a cardinal virtue. Many moralists have regarded it as the foundation and also the crown of the moral life. So the Hebrew sage in the Book of Proverbs ranked it: "Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore get wisdom; yea, with all thy getting get understanding." The first sentence of moral philosophy in our Western civilization is the Socratic principle: "Virtue is knowledge." Be it noted that by knowledge Socrates did not mean learning or information, but life-directing conviction. Human nature, he believed, is bent on realizing its good. If man truly recognized his chief and real advantage, he would be sure to choose and pursue it. Vice is due to ignorance; the bad man is primarily a man of bad judg-

ment. He is mistaken in his choice of values; his gold is a fool's gold. He lacks both knowledge and the right spirit of inquiry.

We may distinguish in a wise choice the extensive and thorough grasp of the relevant evidence, and also the open-minded readiness to let the other side be heard, to make sure that no aspect of the truth is overlooked, no chance of error undetected. All these elements of real insight characterize the sage; our moral progress demands our increasing possession of them.

Wisdom as moral insight shares some qualities with purely intellectual excellence and also with practical good sense or prudence, but it has some features of subtler and more exacting valuation. In the intellectual life the mind is bent on knowledge, but not all knowledge is on a par. The great thinker or master, as distinguished from the reliable journeyman in science or philosophy, is the man who not only tests the validity of his ideas but also appraises their significance. Many an experimental or theoretical conclusion may be a well established fact, yet a fact of no particular consequence. In science as in art, what really counts is high vision.

The life of practical utility and efficiency cultivates a prudential intelligence, a concentration of the mind on the definite end in view and a keen eye for the means that will most surely and effectually accomplish it. What is not so much in evidence here is critical and scrupulous regard for the worth of one's purposes. Common prudence is deficient because of its concentration on shrewdness in performance rather than on discerning choice. It is astute but not really wise. When it springs from a basically perverted choice and outlook on life, its wisdom may be as "the wisdom of the serpent," evil cunning. Moral wisdom is primarily true insight into the relative worth of various interests, purposes, and satisfactions. The

moral sage is a connoisseur in values. This sensitive and scrupulous valuation is akin to discriminating taste, and common speech is on the right track when it expresses its moral disapproval of an action by describing it as "in bad taste." This estimate of worth requires a judgment of each purpose or action in its bearing on life as a whole. The really good man is a man of integrity in this first sense of wisdom. His acts do not spring from some sweeping impulse or from blind passion or bigotry. They are deliberate expressions of his conscience and character. And because his conduct is thus duly considered, it is also considerate and thoughtful in its regard for others.

The very nature of the life of moral integrity should lead us to expect a close interrelation of the virtues. Already we may note the kinship of wisdom or moral insight with prudence, with good taste, with balanced judgment and self-control, with conscientiousness and tolerance and considerate thoughtfulness. In all these the need of critical intelligence is paramount. This need is met and reaffirmed in every moral achievement. Our hazard of going astray is never overcome definitely, but on an ever wider and higher plane the wise man must always be probing his aims and values. Buddhism expressed this deep conviction in its doctrine of the Ten Fetters or obstacles to the blessed life. The first barrier the new convert had to overcome was self-delusion—and at the summit of his rise to perfection, the last fetter of evil which the Buddhist saint must surmount is still the basic one, ignorance. The good life all the way through is a life of enlightenment.

Courage or Steadfast Will

In the ethical vocabulary the etymology of the term virtue reveals some interesting strains of early moral judgment. Virtue comes to us from the Latin *virtus,* derived from *vir,* man,

and thus meant originally manliness, valor, courage. The Greek term *arete,* which came to signify human perfection in its broadest sense, had originally the same martial connotation. Perhaps it was the plain intention of the early society to judge a man's capacity by his prowess. At a later stage of culture, men recognized worth in other fields of achievement and so expanded the meaning of virtue. At any rate courage has a long-settled rank among the cardinal virtues.

Evolutionary ethics might point out that elementary courage, physical bravery, is an obvious condition of survival in the struggle for existence. And in a low order of society martial excellence may be valued just because it does assure survival and the fruits of victory. So where this main and decisive virtue has sway, other acts or sentiments might be overlooked. "To the victor belong the spoils," and one cannot be too scrupulous regarding the cruelty or greed or profligacy of warriors. Yet this leniency expresses, even more than the eulogy of sheer and prevailing valor, the chief concern with tribal or national victory or other social good which valor assures. In a combat or in the face of mortal peril, it is precisely the courageous man who shows mastery over the instinct to save his own skin. Unlike "dumb driven cattle," he stakes his life on his firm will of resistance or aggression. To him, then, his aim, his side is more than his survival. That is his manliness. His courage is praised as unqualified and noble virtue only when his aim and side evoke approval. The boldest stroke, if one's cause is wicked, may arouse only horrified condemnation. The Nazi warriors provided world-wide evidence of this iniquity.

What we laud in the virtue of courage is a will steadfast in perilous pursuit or defense of a value or aim which we approve. Undue venturing would be scorned as foolhardy only if we scorned its goal as of small account. Aristotle's de-

scription of recklessness as a vice is acceptable only within this qualification. So the peasant proverb says: "You do not plunge into hell to light a cigarette." Where supreme values are at stake, the man who disregards his meager powers and stands firm is not reckoned as foolhardy but as a hero. We honor this prevalence of indomitable will over any bodily limitations. But whether we honor or deplore or scorn it, depends finally upon our estimate of the will or the aim in question. John Huss at the stake was revered by his followers as a martyr, abhorred by his judges as a hardened heretic.

The scale of moral development manifests an expansion and elevation in the meaning of courage. At a low level it is plain valor in combat, spear against spear, where a warrior is brave as a lion, or staunch as a bulldog. A higher type of courage is manifest where overpowering physical odds are matched by a will inflexible in its conviction and devotion. This is one variety of moral courage, spirit against spears or against flames. But an element of physical courage still remains here, the martyr's fortitude in peril and torture. On another level of conduct, a second kind of moral courage may be noted, a will steadfast against unworthy suspicion and unmerited hatred, courage of high spirit in struggle with bigotry and corruption.

Temperance or Self-Control

Moral choice issues from a judgment of preference, and it is an intelligent and good choice if it expresses the harmony of our various needs and interests. The vices and defects of character involve usually misguided preferences and unachieved or disrupted harmony of the self. Some onrushing impulse or discordant passion sweeps aside all other considerations and drives us, unbalanced and unchecked, to wanton indulgence or violence. The glutton, the drunkard, the liber-

tine are the usual examples of this moral disaster, intemperance. But it may be noted also in the seizure of the soul by other infatuations. Consuming jealousy or envy, inordinate ambition, avarice, vindictive fury, desolation of grief, or blind egotism—any passionate lure or upsurge may defy our balanced judgment and plunge us into intemperate and ruinous excesses.

Even as the well-ordered state is ever on guard against lawlessness or violent partisanship, so the rational balance of our lives can be maintained only by constant and resolute self-control. This alertness to incipient disorder and this steady concern to preserve balance and harmony in conduct are expressed in the virtue of temperance. Self-control here signifies control by the entire integral self of any particular interest or passion, so as to make each choice and action the expression of the self, to achieve a harmony of conduct. It involves sober decorum in the ordering of one's life, everything in its due place and time. This seems to have been the meaning of the Roman *temperantia.* The Greek conception of temperance expressed rational control of the passions, to assure the subordination of all desires and feelings to the dominance of intelligence. Even as in sound thinking no passing impression or opinion is allowed to sway the judgment unduly, so in conduct our sanity and integrity require the subordination of our desires and partialities to the rule of reason.

The virtue of temperance may emphasize integrity of character as order or balance, moderation, and avoidance of excess; but it may also be motivated by a derogatory estimate of the passions and appetites as corruptions of the soul. Stoic apathy was an expression of this moral austerity in philosophical-rational terms. The repression of all appetites found a religious utterance in Christian asceticism. Temperance came

to mean abstinence; its ideal was inviolable purity. Intemperance was now loathed as contamination. In the Christian's self-dedication, he saw his body as his holy charge. So St. Paul urged the brethren: "Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God." Self-control in various ethical traditions expresses concern for the integrity of the moral self and resistance to any disorder or lawless incursion. Whether temperance tends to emphasize moderation or abstinence, depends upon the partial or the utter depreciation of the passions generally, and especially of the sensual appetites.

The special varieties of intemperance stigmatized by a society indicate its moral outlook on life. The Greek moralists censured especially gluttony, drunkenness, and licentiousness. The Christian spurned the carnal life altogether and worldliness of any sort. So Pascal wrote of the "triple concupiscence" of sense, of science, of ambition. Not only sensuality is to be curbed but also worldly pride and the vain probing of the intellect. In our age boundless zeal for knowledge and for high achievement are accounted noble virtues. With regard to the various forms of sensuality the modern conscience is unsteady. Gluttony arouses commonly disgust, but we are apt to be ambiguous with regard to drunkenness and profligacy. The sot in the gutter may move us to as much jesting as distress. While we recognize in general terms the dangers of intoxication in our machine age, especially of tipsy drivers on the highways, we are not aware keenly of the moral depravity of drunkenness: its loosening of self-control, its connection with corruption in politics, its incitement to gambling and violent crime and to sexual delinquency and prostitution. Our day is witnessing a revival of people's idiotic pride in being "men of strength to mingle strong drink," which the prophet Isaiah denounced. A similar looseness in sexual relations, not only in practice, which is nothing new, but in avowed unconcern re-

garding dissoluteness, is an alarming aspect of contemporary morals. The roots of this rank growth of dissipation are many, and some of them are deep in our social order. Economic reform and moral education, more decent conditions of life and higher ideals of human dignity are needed, to check excesses and inculcate self-control, sobriety, and personal self-respect in clean living.

Social Virtues

Thoreau wrote somewhere that no temple ought to be without a goddess of Sincerity. Not only religion but morality also demands this genuine note of distinctive individual utterance. Without it no conformity to custom and law, however consistent, has the true stamp of virtue. Some moralists have exalted spontaneous frank self-expression as the chief perfection and the highest good. The Cynics in antiquity sought above all to free themselves of all social attachment and conventional bonds, so as to be able every moment to follow the mood and tenor of their minds, in perfect candor. But the actual course of moral experience points the other way. Conduct is definitely social in its implications, and only in a social setting can we realize the fullness of self-expression. This social character of moral activity is revealed in all the virtues. Even wisdom, courage, and temperance, which are mainly self-regarding, have definitely social aspects, which are shown especially in their respective vices: folly or bigotry, cowardice, debauchery.

Some of the virtues are preeminently social, are manifested and developed in social relations, and express an active social-mindedness of one kind or another. The cultivation of them is an important part of the life of a moral society, for without them no abiding social gains or progress can be assured. We shall be concerned with a number of these virtues in our

studies of social ethics, and shall consider at this point only two of these qualities of personal character, on which the moral soundness of our society depends.

Justice

General agreement would rank justice first in the list of the social virtues. Justice may be identified with righteousness or fundamental devotion to the right principle, basic harmony or balanced good living. It is then almost a synonym for the moral life generally. In a more specific sense it signifies a spirit of fairness in dealing with the social system of rights and obligations, uprightness in one's transactions with others. Even in this more definite meaning justice manifests a great variety of expressions in the multiplicity of social relations. Society exacts of each individual reliable membership in its system of mutual confidence. This is fundamental law-abiding honesty. It is our trustworthy commitment to definite promises and obligations, and also the deeper and subtler respect for the rights of others, which mark the truly equitable man. Upon this mutual confidence the entire social system rests. The dishonest man abuses and defrauds this equitable order, while relying on it for his own security. Dishonesty or any other transgression disrupts the social system, and justice then becomes the vindication and restoration of it. This is the exaction of punishment. In this field of penology and jurisprudence—the adjustment of grievances, correction of wrongs, punishment of crimes—justice may express the demand for retribution or a firm concern for social protection and security, to prevent future disorders and preserve the peace.

Our respect for each other's rights manifests itself in a demand for a fairer distribution of goods and opportunities of livelihood, for a due recognition of each person's social aptitudes and responsiveness, for a surer guarantee of the right-

ful share and claims of each in the life of the commonwealth. This is economic, social, political justice. In other and more personally intimate relations, justice discloses its kinship to other virtues, in all of them expressing what a fair-minded person would acknowledge that he owes to others. Some of these have been mentioned: gratitude, hospitality, courtesy, fidelity in general and especially in friendship, truthfulness, loyalty, tolerance, benevolence or love. The last four on this list, while sometimes related to justice and valued as acknowledgment of individual or social rights, also reveal other social aspects of moral perfection. We may briefly consider truthfulness here.

Truthfulness

Truthfulness usually comes up in ethical inquiry as the question whether it is ever morally permissible to lie. A great deal of special pleading has characterized this controversy in many treatises, austere moral pedantry on one side, sinuous or evasive argument on the other. In uncompromising rigor some moralists have upheld veracity as the core of virtue. The least falsehood is a corruption and a fatal stain on the upright soul, its self-betrayal. Lying is thus a personal vice; more specifically, it is due to cowardice, moral stupidity, and laxity. A sudden emergency or danger or embarrassment confronts us. We cannot or dare not or do not take the trouble to grasp it effectively and promptly. Instead, we prefer to lie our way out of it. Deceit is always the mark of frailty and ineptitude and general moral looseness, the reverse of integrity in every way. It is a slave's way out. The master in any situation does not have to lie. That is why the taunt of "liar!" is such a mortal insult.

Falsehood is also a social wrong, the gravest injustice. It is the violation of basic human rights, of the mutual trust on

which all social order rests. We owe the truth to every moral agent. To deceive a person is to treat him, not as a fellow citizen of the moral realm, but as an outcast; worse, as a dangerous thing or obstacle which we should only try to evade. It is this moral indignity that we resent when we are deceived, far more than any injury which the lie may have caused us. Our duty, therefore, is to stand by the truth, at whatever cost or hazard. This view may proceed to the most unyielding rigor. Was it Fichte who declared that he would not tell a lie even to save mankind?

On the other hand, we find the more common defense of "white lies" and courteous evasions and misdirection of enemies, or diplomatic disposal of inquisitive gossips and scandalmongers, or charitable misleading of gravely ill or intolerably anxious persons or of a panicky crowd who could not bear the truth. When it is said that we owe everyone the truth, we are apt to say: Yes, the truth to which he is entitled and which he can bear. The traitor has no right to my true report, else he involves me in his treachery. The mischievous scandalmonger should not get from me aid in aggravating human distress. I owe this desperately sick person, not the true word of my worst expectations but the consoling untruth that would bring him the only solace, or might conceivably with new hope bring wholly unexpected restoration. This second estimate of the range and the limits of veracity has its own moral hazards. In morally unstable and unexacting persons it might easily pass into habitual duplicity. Outright deceit may be readily justified as necessary, and truthfulness made a matter of mere convenience.

The ethical solution of this problem is not easy in specific cases, but it provides a crucial test of a principle already cited, the interrelation of the virtues. A virtue is a certain aspect of moral perfection, to be understood and esteemed fully in its

relations to the other aspects. The rigorous championship of veracity as inviolable and absolute "no matter what" is misleading in moral activity, just as it is misleading in ethical theory to exalt duty or pleasure or survival as supreme, and to subordinate to it all the rest of our life. Only in its relation to the other virtues and moral demands of our nature do we see the proper role of truthfulness in relation to prudence and courage and self-control and justice and loyalty and charity and so forth. In cleaving to the truth we should be conscious of all this complex-integral character of our moral experience. Failure to respect this complexity is the defect of the too abstract and pedantic rigorism. But we must also beware of the counter and far more common and graver hazard of evasive expediency. An upright man is bound to proceed on a basically resolute plan of truthfulness. Only the most serious and the most certain demands of his integral moral judgment could ever warrant his swerving from veracity. And even when he is so justified, still his conscience is smitten with a certain sense, if not of guilt, yet of dismay at the apparent self-conflict of the moral order. This scrupulous dismay is a moral safeguard. Stiff absolutism regarding veracity may be ethically unsound, but it is very exceptional. The real danger morally for you and for me is in too easy and undisturbed relaxing in our adherence to the truth.

Chapter 8

THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIENCE

1. THE IDEA OF MORAL OBLIGATION

In the philosophical Mother Goose there is a satirical jingle which goes as follows:

> The centipede was happy quite
> Until the frog for fun
> Asked: "Pray, which leg goes after which?"
> This worked his mind to such a pitch,
> He lay distracted in the ditch
> Considering how to run.

To some of their critics, philosophers seem to be in the predicament of the centipede. He gets so tangled up reasoning about his legs that he cannot run at all. And the moralist, in seeking to formulate rules of conduct, may be only confusing the active will, which operates by incentives and not by reasons.

Another type of critic would maintain that the demand for formal regulations in morals is impertinent and usually motivated not by the intention of loyal commitment but by the hope of evasion. Moral argufiers are often trying to equivocate somehow in regard to some mean purpose they have in mind. In *Paradise Lost,* Milton, after portraying Satan's evil con-

ference with his cohorts, tells us how the rebellious troop were spending their leisure. The milder ones still played on their harps, but the more robust, sitting apart on a hill retired, betook themselves to ethical speculation:

> In thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high
> Of providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate;
> Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute;
> And found no end, in wandering mazes lost.
> Of good and evil much they argued then,
> Of happiness and final misery,
> Passion and apathy, and glory and shame;
> Vain wisdom all, and false philosophy.

Milton or centipede notwithstanding, the idea of moral obligation is imposed on our critical intelligence. When the Ethical Culture Society of New York erected its Meeting House facing Central Park, some criticism was aroused by its dedication "To the Ever-Increasing Knowledge, Practice, and Love of the Right." There is no trouble in knowing the right, the critics said; the only trouble is in practicing and loving it. But this general claim to moral knowledge and plain duty is easier to proclaim than to vindicate. Do we know offhand what we mean when we say that an action is right and that we ought to do it? Or if we do somehow know, how can we state it clearly and convincingly?

Our present inquiry is not: What kind of life is most worth living? We have already considered the principal answers to that question. But whether the best life be a life of uprightness, or of the greatest happiness, or of the most assured survival, or of the fullest perfection of character, our decision and choice of it, in general and in any specific case, would be an implicit demand on the will to carry out the decision. It would be a conclusion as to what we ought to do. The two questions: What life is most worth living? and What life ought

we to live? are really two phases of the one basic problem of morals.

The way we decide what we ought to do, depends upon the sanction to which we appeal or acknowledge allegiance. So arises the problem of conscience, of its source and of its authority. We may distinguish the two inquiries. First, How do we get our conviction of conscience, that we ought to do this rather than that? Second, What makes the dictates of conscience trustworthy and authoritative? Or in simpler words, Why *do* I feel or think that I ought to act thus and so? and, Why *should* I act as I feel or think that I ought to act?

2. MAIN THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE

The earliest answer to these questions is that of theological tradition. It regards conscience as the voice of God in our souls, a divinely implanted conviction of right and wrong. If we obey this voice of God, we do the right; if we disobey, we sin. God has made the inherent rightness of his law evident to our better judgment. Were it not for the corruption of our will by sin, we should never have any uncertainty regarding the voice of conscience or any hesitation about obeying its behests.

This doctrine in various forms characterizes the religious thought of mankind, especially in our Western civilization, and it is still widespread. It expresses men's demand for an authoritative conscience and their inability to achieve it themselves. It is for man, but of God, to be acknowledged and obeyed without question. That seems to have been the initially perfect arrangement, as the old Hebrew story of Adam and Eve in Paradise tells us. The one tree whose fruit these two were not to touch was the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The old writer of this story in the Book of Genesis was apparently of one mind with him who gave us the jingle about

the centipede. Precisely this disobedient spirit of inquiry in matters of conduct, this eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, was man's original sin which cost him his paradise of blissful innocence. But once fallen—only this was a strange case of falling upwards—once fallen from his state of unquestioning compliance to the level of deliberation, man needed a guide. God provided this unfailing guidance in conscience.

We can understand how men have sought an explanation of conscience by appealing to the supernatural. Confronted with the task of going the right way, men have felt in need of specific authoritative direction. The Church in the Middle Ages assisted them by devising an elaborate guide in daily conduct. It was originally intended to direct priests in specifying the various penances due for sins that were reported to them at the confessional. So a tabulation of all sorts of actions was prepared, and then in judging a particular man's doings, the right instance was sought, just as a lawyer today seeks the right precedent for the case before him, in previous court decisions. These tabulations of so-called "cases of conscience," which were meant to report God's judgment on every conceivable kind of behavior, were elaborated gradually into the famous science of Casuistry, which undertook to state, by due citation of eminent advocates for God, just what a man ought or ought not to do in all imaginable circumstances. In this way men who wanted to know just how far they could go and where they had to stop were given specific instructions. To many theologians casuistry served as ethics. The well-known Professorship of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge University was called a hundred years ago "Moral Theology and Casuistical Divinity."

The desire for rule and precept also rouses the effort to find exceptions and allowances under the law. We know from

Pascal's *Provincial Letters* how often casuistry became in practice a technique of duplicity and moral evasion. But even if our conscience is straightforwardly directing us one way, our wishes and calculations may yet point and press the opposite way. Our will may thus be torn in dissension, or our nature may be in turmoil, demanding a course of action which our conscience forbids and resists. This sense of a divided will and personality expresses itself in theological doctrine. It is declared that our righteous conscience, which commands our recalcitrant desires or our unstable will, is God's own voice in our souls. It is a guiding, a reproving, a condemning voice; in one doctrine moral scruple and remorse for evil-doing are both explained. Against the voice of God are the devil-tempted impulses and desires. So the entire process of moral motivation was given a supernatural version.

Modern philosophy, seeking a more scientific statement of moral principles, without appeal to the supernatural, has proposed alternative accounts of conscience. One of these is the Moral Sense Doctrine, Intuitionism. According to it, men possess a direct sense of right and wrong as they have a sense of color or sound, or a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. This is a sort of moral taste by means of which men respond directly to various acts or desires or proposals, approving some and disapproving others. This moral sense may be subtler and more refined in some men than in others; it may be misled by false thinking, or its direct judgments may be sustained by the reasons of a critical intelligence. But normally it does not argue or conclude: it unhesitatingly decides and directs. Unspoiled human nature may trust its moral sense just as it can trust its eyes and ears.

Some champions of the moral sense doctrine have emphasized its emotional quality, while others have treated it as a direct perception not necessarily emotional. The directness of

the moral sense responses has been questioned by some critics. Our right guidance in problems of conduct, it has been said, is not in moral sense and intuition but in the moral competence of reason. According to some of the advocates of reason, conscience is the voice of our critical intelligence in its demand for control of the senses and the passions. Some medieval rationalists distinguished between a faculty by which a man judges whether a certain particular action is right or wrong and the faculty by which he is convinced that he should always do the right. Though I may be mistaken about the rightness of a specific act, the basic certainty of my moral reason, impelling me to righteousness, is always authoritative.

This emphasis on moral reason found its classical expression in the ethical formalism of Immanuel Kant. As has been noted already, Kant determined the moral worth of an act not by its consequences but by the quality of will which it reveals. No matter how beneficial an action may be, unless it is performed dutifully it has no virtue. What distinguishes man as a moral being is that he can identify himself freely with moral principles. He acts not only in response to various incitements, but purely on principle, out of respect for the moral law. Conscience or the moral reason emphasizes the pure spirit of dutiful loyalty. This alone characterizes the truly moral will. Whereas many earlier moralists had been concerned to establish the authority of conscience to direct the will in the performance of such acts as duty commands, Kant exalts Duty itself. In his ethics conscience or rather conscientiousness is the heart of morality.

In all these doctrines we may note the affirmation of the direct certainty of conscience: whether we regard it as the voice of God in our souls, admonishing us to do his righteous will; or as the response of our moral sense, directly feeling or perceiving the right course of action and approving the acts

to which it urges the will; or again as the dutiful loyalty of the rational will. These doctrines assume an evident certainty and finality of the moral direction of our lives. What we ought to do is clear to us, and that we ought to do it is likewise clear and imperative.

We should now consider a radically different view of conscience, both of its origin and of its sanction. It is interesting to note that this opposition to universal authority in conduct has come from the same school of thought which has also denied the intellect's claim to universal knowledge. This is the challenge of empiricism. According to this theory, we do not have any innate ideas or initial certainties or rational first principles. Our ideas and our so-called knowledge in any field are simply the accumulated results of our experience. The doctrines of intuitionism, whether supernatural or perceptual or rational, are unwarranted and contrary to human nature as we observe it.

Despite the advocates of a divinely implanted conscience, history shows us that in all ages and peoples men's conception of Deity and their corresponding sense of religious devotion to the divine will have varied with their experience and general culture. Nor is there any evidence of an unmistakable moral sense of right and wrong. Here as in other respects one man's meat may be another's poison. The savage may lack altogether the sense of respect for private property which at a higher level of social development appears as an almost inborn conviction. To you and to me, lying, theft, murder are unquestionably wrong; but certain barbarians have prided themselves on their deceitful cunning. The Turkoman makes pilgrimages to the tombs of famous robbers; a South Sea Islander had to have several authenticated murders to his credit before he could respectably pay court to his lady-love. The alleged intuitive moral sense is thus disclosed as

varying at various stages of social development. Even so the supposed universality of reason is but the accumulation and ordering of particular experiences. It is the summation of sense experience, not a faculty independent of it. One way judges reason in youth, another way in maturity; one way in the mind of the uncouth bumpkin of meager experience, another way in the mellow thought of a person of social culture and refinement.

So the empiricist declares that all we know is relative to our experience, depends upon it and varies with it. Our conscience is simply the inference from our past experience as guidance for the future. It is not universal but various; its sanctions are relative to specific situations, and its authority is ever subject to revision and recall.

The purely empirical view has its own difficulties. If our ideas of right and wrong are merely individual habit or social custom, how can there be real moral obligation, or any ground for approval or condemnation? We could only have a variety of tastes. As with the pease porridge in Mother Goose, "Some like it hot, some like it cold, some like it in the pot nine days old." How one likes it depends on past experience, and there can be no arguing about tastes, even though there may be conventional opinions about diet. Do we claim that good can be distinguished from evil by considering the consequences, which can be observed and reported; that in this way, say by using statistical methods, an empirical ethics can reach general scientific conclusions? But how do you know what consequences to classify as good? Most people value happiness, but in a strictly empirical view that also may be a merely customary opinion. How are we to be assured of imperative obligation, of really defensible preference and choice in moral matters? The appeals to supernatural authority, or to an intuitive moral sense, or to an unconditional rational imperative, may

all be open to the empiricist's objections. But the insistence on a genuine difference between right and wrong expresses true moral insight. How is empiricism to supply this lack in its own doctrine?

3. CONFLICT AND DECISION IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CHARACTER

In this clash of ethical theories we may note on the one hand the demand for unity and authoritative principle seeking to affirm itself by intuitive fiat; on the other, the disturbing citation of actual diversity and change of moral judgment, with no universal sanctions in prospect. We need a more critical grasp of our problem.

Let us ask: What is it that takes place in moral deliberation? Is it not a contest between rival tendencies of a man's character, and so between one or another eventual personality? Here some particular passion is struggling to assume the upper hand; abetted by others that with it would be swept to prominence, it is resisted actively or weakly by other incentives and considerations. Or it is a conflict of obligations, a tragic perplexity, where duty seems to be ranged against duty, and a man does not know which way to turn. Devastating is the anguish of a man who, in the very performance of his bounden duty, has been led to terrible deeds which stagger his conscience. This was the plight of Orestes, which engrossed the masters of Greek tragedy. Filial piety moved Orestes to avenge the murder of his father Agamemnon; but the adulterous murderess whom he had to kill was his own mother. In obeying his conscience Orestes became a matricide. The development of this harrowing theme from Aeschylus to Sophocles to Euripides reveals maturing criticism in the ancient ideas of God and of divine justice, but it also discloses, through the very tragedy of conflicting duties, the nature of conscience itself as a developing and ever subtler authority.

Whether resisting the strong incursion of evil or judging between contending obligations, conscience involves the emergence of one or another character. Man is at the crossroads of decision; the choice is before him, and when made, this choice will find him on one road or on the other, one sort or another sort of person by the very decision which is made. Moral character is not abstractly permanent; it is ever in the process of self-molding. But the personality that is realized progressively is not to be regarded as a bare result of antecedent conditions. It achieves the sanctions which it acknowledges. Our character is always more or less impending; the resolution which gives it actuality is arduous as it is imperative. In the crisis of moral decision, which in more or less dramatic ways everyone has experienced, conscience is the voice of a man's fuller self, the man that he may yet be, if he can only resist the upstart fury of some wayward impulse and let his more mature intelligence assume and maintain direction.

Acting conscientiously is acting according to the best light that we recognize. Certainly, we say, there can be no question of our duty to do our wisest and best in all circumstances. If we act against our conscience, our course is evil, even though as it happens our act comes out well. That is, *we* do ill, no matter how beneficial the consequences turn out to be. Events may take also the opposite course. We act conscientiously, in good faith, but our action has deplorable results. An act is not wholly worthy of moral approval just because it is done conscientiously. The decision of my conscience is the expression of my judgment that the course of action which I choose is the one likely to prove the most valuable in the circumstances. My action is thus a venture on my conviction. In its results, however, it is also a test of my judgment. It is vindicated or it is repudiated by the event.

Consequences, we say, are beyond our control. It may be

discreditable to others, to society, that our honorable conscientious acts have proved in effect ruinous. The whole scheme of things sometimes seems callous or even hostile to the spirit of moral integrity. This is not a protest which can be dismissed lightly. All the more imperatively, then, we should explore every hazard of possible disaster for which we might be responsible. Acting against one's conscience is always bad, but this does not mean that all we require morally is to obey our conscience. Conscientious loyalty is a fundamental aspect, but only one aspect of moral excellence. It is indispensable, but not all-sufficing. It is like sincerity in art and poetry. While a work of art, to be good at all, must be sincere, it is not rightly judged good merely because it is sincere. The magpie may sing most sincerely, but the magpie is not a nightingale. More than sincerity enters in the creation of a masterpiece: range of vision, depth of insight, originality, significance, stimulating power, contagious sympathy, discriminating taste, craftsmanship. So in the moral life conscientiousness, loyalty to our best self, demands that our best self be really good. Just because we are morally bound to follow our best light, we are doubly bound to make sure that the light we do follow is actually the best light available. Man's first duty is to see his real duty clearly and truly. So we read in the Gospel: "If thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!"

The fanatic is not justified morally by his conscientiousness. He has one of the essentials of the good life, loyal conviction, but not another equally important, intelligent judgment. Intense devotion to duty, when allied to bigotry and obscurantism, especially if sanctified by the halo of religion, may lead a man to unspeakable evil. Without a qualm of conscience, acting devoutly in the name of Christ, Torquemada, the head of the Spanish Inquisition, consigned thousands of men and

women as heretics to the flames. Allied to our duty to be loyal to conscience is our duty to educate it, to keep it enlightened, worthy of continued loyalty.

Thus we see that an important element of dutiful conduct is cautious but also resolute self-criticism of the moral judgment. Our conscience should be conscientious about itself. This is involved in any genuine deliberation. Our resolution should issue from a real solution of our problem. The standard by which we judge, the principle on which we act, must be vindicated by constant criticism. So we may avoid headlong bigotry. While laxity of moral convictions is disastrous, too strong or rather too self-confident a conscience is also a moral peril; it may mark a man as an insufferable prig. Men are often ready to fight, even to lay down their lives for convictions which they have not examined thoroughly. Martyrdom is one of the glories of our human nature; but sometimes martyrdom has also been the pathetic climax of intractable fanaticism.

There is, however, a counter hazard in the moral life. If resolute conscientiousness is apt to become fanatical zeal, the reflective and forever balancing spirit may lead to moral inaction. Deliberation is important, but deliberateness and criticism should not be allowed to devitalize the will and sap its decision. Failure to translate conviction into action because of continual entangling reflections may condemn the soul to stagnation and become itself a ruinous choice, the choice of moral sterility. Is not this the heart of Hamlet's tragedy:

> . . . The native hue of resolution
> Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
> And enterprises of great pith and moment
> With this regard their currents turn awry,
> And lose the name of action.

The mature conscience combines inquiry and decision, both essential to the moral life, a life of intelligent loyalty, critical

and resolute. Only the alert and energetic moral person can thus unite firm allegiance to his best judgment with as firm decision to keep his best *good* and by resolute search to make it ever better. He masters indecision without yielding to self-assurance. Real moral achievement is incompatible with smug righteousness. James Martineau said: "The blessings of a satisfied conscience are least experienced where they are most deserved." To this we may add: One sure way to know when a man is not a saint is when he thinks that he is one.

The direction of conduct by resolute and growing devotion marks moral character at its finest. This enlightened conscience is not the badge of any moral aristocracy of mankind; it is found in the humblest pursuers of the good life. This sort of alert conscience may be in the way of a man's getting on. Too keen a sense of moral obligation, of personal integrity, inability to wink at unfair and questionable practices, and too exacting and scrupulous veracity, have cost men advancement in this world. No matter: whether they be lords of the earth or not, it is men of the living conscience who have ever been the moral pioneers and saviors of mankind. The main thing here is not the magnitude of the task accomplished but the spirit in which it is met and done. In the Gospel parable, to one man five talents were given, to another two, and to still another, one: to each according to his ability, and as was the ability so was the expectation. The man with the one talent was condemned, not because he did not earn with it as much as the man with the five talents, but because he failed in his duty to his one lone talent.

The right spirit in conscience is one of critical self-reliance. In the very recognition of our duty we may also perceive our capacity to achieve it. Nothing is clearly our duty which we are incapable of undertaking. There is a right and a wrong way of reasoning here. Not "This is beyond my powers, and so it

cannot be my duty"; but more resolutely, "This is clearly my duty, and so how can I say that it is beyond me?" Emerson wrote:

> When Duty whispers low, *Thou must*
> The youth replies, *I can.*

Our ability, the limit of our powers, is not our main concern. What do we know about our real limits? The majority of men live only half lives, unaware of what is in them, because they have never been moved by a devotion great enough to strain their utmost and so reveal their own unspent powers. This truth applies not only to individuals but also to nations. When our country faced its hour of great peril, after the treacherous Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, who could have estimated our vast capacities for productive achievement? Our imperative duty in crisis called them out.

4. CONVICTION AND TOLERANCE

We have seen that, regarded as an individual's loyal pursuit of the highest values, the life of moral endeavor demands the steady self-criticism of conscience in its acknowledgment of imperative principles. On the successful outcome of this interaction of critical intelligence and a dutiful will depends the moral career of the individual. These complicated problems of conscience in a man's preferences and decisions become still more perplexed by the social involvements of individual conduct. Morality is a social enterprise, an enterprise of interdependence and cooperation but also of conflict; and the conflict is one not only of interests but of principles.

In following the dictates of conscience, no matter how critically and intelligently judged and sustained, I may be jeopardizing the happiness and well-being of others. I might even offend their conscience and, despite my own personal in-

tegrity, actually unsettle and corrupt their moral will. Systematic ethics has not given due attention to the conflicts of conviction and tolerance. Religious reflection, however, in charting the ways of righteousness, has struggled with many of these difficulties, and poets and dramatists have found in them some of their most absorbing themes. Some of these tangled problems may be indicated here, with an outline of moral strategy in confronting them.

That a person of honor, in unflinching loyalty to his convictions, should sacrifice his pleasure and profit, should even lay down his life, especially if he thereby could save others, his kin, his friends, his country, has ever been held worthy of the highest praise. Regulus faces death at the hands of his country's enemies, refusing to advocate at their command a policy which he believes to be wrong and against the best interests of Rome. We might doubt our own ability to emulate Regulus' heroism, but there is no hesitation in our esteem for him, or for countless other men who in their high or humble stations in life dutifully spend themselves for the common good.

Now what is it that we really admire in these men? Is it their heroic loyalty to their convictions, or their self-denying devotion to the general welfare? Where these two agree, we have classic instances of moral elevation. But when they are in conflict, our moral judgment is perplexed. The common good to which allegiance is demanded may itself be in a strife of contending interests between which the dutiful will is obliged to choose. Antigone cannot respect the law of King Creon without proving disloyal to the law of pious reverence for her killed brother whose body is refused honorable burial. And in a thousand instances, despite the best will in the world, all of us have to choose among conflicting loyalties, and our conscience may be torn between two social claims, both of which we may respect but cannot reconcile.

Now if in such cases we judge that we should follow the greater good or rather the lesser evil, a policy of expediency invades our moral thinking, which the alert conscience is bound to regard with suspicion. If I may set aside established law and tradition and risk upsetting the social order, to save my brother or my neighbor, why not also to save myself, especially when my own conscience is clear? This problem faces Socrates as he reasons with Crito whether he should avail himself of his friends' arrangements for his escape from prison. Should he submit loyally to the death verdict of the Athenian court, when that verdict in his judgment is unjust?

Most readers would respect Socrates' decision to suffer this injustice rather than be in any way unjust himself in defying the laws of his native state: to remain unyielding in his own convictions, but not to flout his country's laws by flight from his prison cell. Our moral attitude is not very resolute here. Do we really condemn Hugo Grotius for his escape from the Louvenstein prison where he was confined unjustly? This escape made possible Grotius' continued work for his people and for mankind, his advocacy of international Law in War and in Peace. Now if a conscientious man may, for the sake of the common good, act in defiance of law, why should he not also on grave occasions be ready to subordinate his own conscience to the common good? The state of Florence sent a pardon to Dante in exile; but Dante refused to be pardoned: unless the Florentines acknowledged the rightness of his cause, he would never return home. We may interpret this as unflinching moral resolution and not as intractable stubbornness on Dante's part. And yet Florence needed him. His sage counsel to his people, his direct influence in their midst might have helped to curb injustice and allay ruinous strife.

The conflict between the individual's own interest and the common good may be seen here in a different setting. Is the firm loyalty to my own conscience more important morally,

even to me, than the social welfare? Perhaps this is a moral version of the religious all-absorbing concern for one's own salvation. Is it true moral piety to set my own dutiful conscientiousness as my sovereign moral principle and concern? Is not this a subtle instance of egoism, perhaps the subtlest and the most insidious in the moral-spiritual life? For in pursuing my own conscientious course I may be resolute but also ruthless. My dutiful acts express my own will, but they concern the wills and the lives of others. In refusing to allow others to involve me in acting against my own convictions, am I not myself actually involving others, my family, my friends, society at large? The dramatic significance of this problem was realized strikingly in the plays of Henrik Ibsen. Dr. Stockmann's dutiful insistence on publishing without delay his discovery of the pollution of the town's baths would save some invalids from infection, but jeopardizes the livelihood and the future prospects of his townsmen, and so he becomes an Enemy of the People. *Brand* is perhaps the outstanding modern tragedy of the unyielding conscience, imperious in principle but despotic in execution, ready to sacrifice itself, but others also, wife and child, in its consecration to duty alone.

The career of Count Tolstoy after his conversion to the Gospel was a lifelong struggle to master this moral dilemma: how to live his own life according to his faith, without hurting the lives of others, especially of his own family. His Christian duty, as he was convinced of it, was to live a life not only of literary production but also of humble manual work, without exploiting the labor of others. He should not keep others from plowing for themselves the vast Tolstoy domains which he could not plow; he should not charge people money for his books. But this way of living upset the entire daily program of his aristocratic family. It involved a disposition of the family estate which concerned them everyone, on principles dear to

him, which some of them did not accept at all. In doing his Christian duty to his peasants and to strange needy people, was he in effect to disinherit his own children? His gospel was one of non-compulsion, yet in living according to it he was actually exerting compulsion on those dearest to him. Tolstoy's forthright honesty in facing the tangled issues of his conscience is revealed in his later writings, which provide moral documents of the highest importance.

These are some of the moral perplexities which may confront the dutiful non-conformist. Ready he is to bear his cross for the sake of conscience, and we honor him for that. But in his loyalty to conscience he may be jeopardizing the happiness and well-being of others. Is he then to compromise with principle? Has he the right to set his own moral integrity above the acknowledged rights of others, of society?

Another moral issue may arise to bedevil the conscientious man, particularly in his dealings with immature or uncritical folk of traditional devotion. He insists that society should not compel him to betray his convictions. But there may be matters which to him seem morally indifferent that others, perhaps his friends or older members of his own family, consider sacred or impious. Shall he conform to their scruples or spurn them? If he disregarded their piety or their set convictions, no explanation which he might offer would alleviate the offense. Even worse, general respect for his good judgment might induce some of them, the more immature, without a reasoned change in their own beliefs, to betray them. Would not the severe judgment of the Gospel apply in such a case?—"It were well for him if a millstone were hanged about his neck and he were thrown into the sea, rather than that he should cause one of these little ones to stumble."

To be sure, it may be answered, plain courteous consideration for the feelings of others would yield conformities where

no question of principle arises. When our host says grace before dinner, we bow our heads with him, be he Christian, Jew, or Moslem. But a problem confronts us when acquiescence in practice may seem the expression of actual conviction on our part, or when it is expected or even exacted of us. The hazard of hypocrisy complicates our decision. Honesty clashes with charitable indulgence, and it may tax an enlightened conscience to know where to draw the line between the two.

Even in such cases integrity and tolerance might be reconciled. We may consider what is entitled to our respect and deference. Perhaps not our neighbor's actual beliefs and scruples, but surely his conscientious regard for them. Short of being or seeming disloyal to our own convictions, we should beware of offending his conscience. So Spinoza took his stand firmly against dogmatic compulsion; despite rabbinical anathemas and fanatical threats to his life, he held fast to his own principles. He thought and wrote with single-minded devotion to truth wherever it might lead him. But he addressed his works explicitly to mature critical minds, asking the others not to read his books. He assured his simple landlady that she would be saved in the religion which she professed, and reminded her children to be regular in going to church.

Tolerance, which does not usually mark the actual working of the firm conscience, may be seen as an essential element or rather fulfillment of it. Kant's social version of his moral principle serves to illustrate this: "So act, as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only." The first part of this imperative is the law of duty. The second part has been interpreted in social ethics as the law of respect for the inviolable moral dignity of men, against the evils of exploitation and oppression. I ought not to use my neighbor as a mere means of my own pleasure or profit or advantage. And so in-

terpreted, Kant's principle is one of the noblest and most essential truths of social morality, and a truth never more in need of recognition than today. But there are some further implications of Kant's principle which we should keep in mind here. As my dutiful loyalty is the highest moral principle in me, so the dutiful loyalty of my fellowman is the heart of his moral career. By virtue of it he is a moral agent, and therein is his moral dignity as a human being, and his claim to my respect for it. This respect for the conscience of others reveals tolerance as having strong roots where we do not usually look for them, in the ethics of duty itself.

Even though firm convictions usually make tolerance difficult, yet tolerance requires and presupposes firm convictions. If nothing is sacred to me, then that which my neighbor reveres may perhaps get my patient indulgence but not my genuine respect. I can understand his devotion only if I myself have experienced devotion. Though I may be critical of it as wrong, because convinced of my own right one, with which it disagrees, yet I am also critical of my own conscience and so tolerant of his. The vigilance which my own conscience needs, to keep itself enlightened and so to be worthy of my continued loyalty, that vigilance finds social expression in my respect for other loyal wills. It issues in a spirit of tolerance. The struggle for the light and truth which engages and absorbs me, my own opportunity and freedom to seek and find the right, that free struggle and that opportunity I must also accord to my neighbor. Only a genuine conscience, which knows what it signifies, can allow tolerance; only a critical conscience can achieve it.

5. LARGER SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM

The mutual implication of conviction and tolerance, which on the surface may seem to be only in conflict, may be noted

also in the relations of social groups and classes. Here the basic human worth of loyalty to one's beliefs motivates the decent society to recognize and to defend the individual's moral rights. This is the basis of the democratic guarantees of freedom of speech and press and worship. A charter of human rights can be sustained only by a tolerant people. I may struggle and dispute with my opponent, but I must not deny him the possibility of disputing and struggling. Democracy requires mutual tolerance, which is fair play in conflict. It is moral sportsmanship, without which there can be no free play and interplay of minds and wills. Truly democratic government includes both those officially in power and those who criticize and resist them. Out of the contending activity of them both, issues the actual legislation, the policy and direction of the state. British political maturity has expressed this truth in a significant phrase. The government of Britain is, of course, His Majesty's Government; but the British call the opposition in Parliament "His Majesty's Loyal Opposition."

The realization of tolerance in a people's government is an index of its political intelligence. The insurgence of dictatorships, intolerant of criticism and crushing all opposition, is a distressing indication of the decadence of social-political morality in our time. In our economic system and in the relation of social classes and races there is a woeful need of a tolerant spirit which is the indispensable basis of conciliation and fruitful cooperation. In these various fields men may be moved by real convictions, but these convictions are intensified by pressing want and interest. Some of the most stubborn intolerance issues from entrenched greed or envy and hatred self-dignified into principles.

Genuine tolerance is most difficult, as it is also noblest when

achieved, in the field of our inmost spiritual devotion. To have profound religious beliefs and devout piety, and to be truly tolerant to other and opposite forms of worship, is a rare spiritual achievement. Most of what passes for religious tolerance in our sophisticated modern age should more properly be called indifference. When we say that it is not good manners to introduce religious issues at a social gathering, we are apt to mean that it is hardly courteous to start social dispute over differences which cannot be settled and which really do not matter one way or the other. If this interpretation is true, our growing freedom in religious topics has perhaps a sinister aspect. The dangerous and the resisted heresy nowadays concerns social-economic issues, because they are paramount in our business society.

Our discussion of the tensions of moral activity has shown that conscience requires for its maturing and fruition the spirit of tolerance. But we have also seen these two in conflict. Though we cherish conscience and revere her alone, it seems that we cannot live with her. Our moral life in actual practice is so often a renunciation of happiness or else a compromise with principle. And not only our own well-being, that of our fellowmen is also continually disturbed by our convictions. Even the most straightforward person finds himself in circumstances where, if he tells the truth, he is sure to hurt others, and in order not to hurt he must perforce lie. In these conflicts of conscience with expediency the compromise is not always, as the rigorist might suppose, a weak surrender. Often it is an acknowledgment of the higher value. But though moral sanity may demand these concessions of conscience, it is shamed in yielding them. Moral experience has nothing more trying than these dilemmas in conduct: whichever way we act we are smitten by a sense of guilt. A pessimist might find here

evidence of the congenital perversity of the cosmos. Unfit for harmony and order, our nature seems to be a self-rending conflict of motives and values.

Expediency or practical regard for the common good may demand compromise with avowed principles; repeatedly this conciliation is a tactical requirement, if our principle is to prevail in the end. Our Christian Gospel inspires us to return good for evil and love our enemy; so likewise does the Buddhist *Dhammapada:* "Overcome anger by love . . . the greedy by liberality, a liar with the truth." We adopt and follow the very opposite policy, and then we cite another verse from the Gospel: "They that take the sword shall perish with the sword." The preservation of social order, we say, requires the compulsory restraint of those who cannot be dissuaded from evil. In a hundred ways all of us, individuals and societies, are undertaking to resist the devil with the devil's own weapons. Devoted to peace, democracy was being destroyed by its very spirit of conciliation and appeasement; it was at last forced to forge itself the enemy's engines of war in order to defend its right to security and peace. Great is truth, but does it really prevail? Or justice, or freedom? We give up our democratic practice in times of crises, hoping to safeguard our principles the more securely for the days to come. Are all the high principles of the moral life thus continually humiliated by the actualities of living, and is the truth of our inmost being thus publicly self-refuted?

Sanity of judgment and steady reflection are needed, if we are not to go astray here. Our motive, clearly recognized, is morally all-important, alike in the unflinching resistance of conscience and in its concessions or outright submission. This is not to be confused with the notion that the end justifies the means. No single step in our course is judged rightly by itself. Its significance and worth are evidenced in the whole plan and

career of which it is but a step—the whole plan and career. Our every act must be evaluated by the principle and basic purpose of which it is the outward expression; but the act and its consequences test the sanity and worth of our principles and purposes. "By their fruits ye shall know them." A people must be clearly and firmly devoted to its democratic principles, to its rights and freedoms, even while it is surrendering and entrusting some of them to its chieftains in the hour of battle. Important is the concession, never to be made lightly; but more important and decisive are the abiding spirit and principle in the concession.

The same kind of moral insight and direction is revealed here as that required for the mutual tolerance of conflicting loyal wills. I might be ready to stand my ground or even to suffer martyrdom for my convictions. But my act or my refusal to act involves others, as honestly as myself committed to opposite principles. Where is the border line of right decision here: between refusal to betray one's own honor, and unwillingness to ruin other honest folk? It is on this side of unreasonable and stubborn self-righteousness, but also on this side of the opposite accommodating indulgence. It is in a spirit both militant and tolerant. My right motive should be a prevailing concern for the higher value: for Truth even while I am defending this truth of mine, and for Justice even while I am standing by this particular justice.

The life of conscience, a life of heroic allegiance, is also a life of ever-expanding and self-reconstitutive activity. Royce said that there is no such thing as a last moral task. The man who thinks that he has entirely fulfilled his duty may be sure that he has quite missed it. No man can do all that God exacts of him and even more, no one can have as it were a credit balance with God. The idea of "merit" is morally misguided. The truth is rather that nothing really worth doing is ever

fully accomplished and settled. Our moral activity reveals to us in every worthy achievement a still worthier task and a still higher duty. Only a resolute loyal spirit can pass beyond the present duty to the next. But the steady awareness, in the very defense of our convictions, of our further prospects is also an implicit recognition of our likely limitations. So the truly loyal spirit is also tolerant.

We hold our ground, but hold it in order to move forward. Our ground is a path, and whither it leads in the far prospect cannot be definite to us in advance. It may be that more than one path must be traveled to reach the full prospect. That is a conclusion which many lines of ethical reflection indicate. The history of moral theories, as we have noted, exposes the error of selecting some one element of conduct as the sovereign good, and then evaluating the rest of our life in terms of it alone. The moral deepening and uplifting of our nature is not unilinear. It is not like the driving of a rigid post into the ground. It is like the growth of the living tree that spreads its roots throughout our being, and branches out in a rich variety of values.

Chapter 9

EGOISM AND ALTRUISM

1. INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL CHARACTER OF MORAL VALUES

In examining the nature and the manifold perplexities of conscience we emphasized a problem which has been cropping up repeatedly in our study of the main ethical theories. The hedonist, exalting pleasure or happiness as the aim of our actions and their chief fruition or value, is confronted by the question, Whose happiness or pleasure am I to consider? Where the pursuit of my enjoyment conflicts with my regard for your happiness, which of the two am I to choose? This problem does not seem to have worried the hedonists of classical antiquity, who assumed the self-regarding pursuit of satisfaction as a matter of course. But after the revival of the ethics of pleasure in the Renaissance, the Christian emphasis on benevolence showed its effects in the advocacy of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the principle of modern utilitarianism. This hedonistic philanthropy, as it seeks by various arguments to find adequate sanction, exposes the insufficiency of its basic principle of valuation.

The grievous tangles of the ethics of duty and conscience in individual conduct and even more in social-institutional life have been probed in our discussion of conviction and tolerance

and need not be rehearsed at this point. The critical exploration of these issues, in the theory of duty as well as in hedonism, proceeds from the standpoint of perfectionism. But some moralists have sought to expose a subtle form of selfishness even in the most distinguished form of perfectionism, the ethics of self-realization.

The emergence of this problem of self-regard and benevolence in various forms of ethical theory indicates its basic character in moral reflection. Recognize that a number of values of our experience have been exalted as preeminent, each by its special advocates; then critical judgment must seek a balance between these partisan views, must include their respective merits and correct their excesses, in a rational organization of values. Now we ask: in this more orderly pursuit of values, are men normally partners or rivals? Is the life of moral activity, however we may describe it in detail, a life of contending or of cooperating human wills? Does it leave selfishness, candid or covert, in final possession of the human scene; or is egoism resisted and confuted and overcome; or does moral intelligence, without evading this issue, resolve it by rising to some higher ground? These are the problems of morality as they affect the common life of men together.

The readiest and seemingly the most sensible answer to this sort of question would be an open grant to both self-regard and benevolence, each in its due place and season. Morality must somehow include them both, concurrently or in turn. We should prudently temper the contest between them, not push it to a decision one way or the other. This sort of broadminded compromise has made the reputation of some moralists. Social-psychological analysis of the interrelation of individual and social factors in human nature and experience has led certain contemporary discussions of our problem to the same general conclusion. So we are told: Growth and fruition of human

character are thoroughly socialized processes. Language, tradition, the varied institutional framework of nurture, education, protection, production, the whole accumulated treasury of skills and expert techniques, all that I really mean to myself is rooted in the social organism and lives and grows only as a leaf or branch of it. In the larger life of humanity I live and move and have my own being. I am bound to recognize my own social origin and involvement: how then can I fail to acknowledge my social obligations, in a generous regard for the well-being of my fellowmen?

From the other side of the discussion it is pointed out that such phrases as the social organism or the larger life of humanity or the common welfare and general happiness must be used with caution. We should not be misled by metaphors which import into our ideas of society meanings that are and remain distinctively individual. Society, the body politic, is essentially a body of individuals. Whenever we speak of a happy nation, it is the happy people, the individuals, that we should keep in mind. Likewise with the other moral values, they are manifested, pursued and realized in the lives of persons—together, socially, yes, but together by you and by me. The distinctive selves, you and I, cannot be absorbed in any social or socialized outlook on life: we are and must be recognized as nuclear in the social structure. Gross selfishness should be condemned, but only as a too extreme and overbearing expression of a man's otherwise normal self-concern and self-expression.

This sort of compromise and conciliation reasonably surveys the two aspects of the human scene, but is indecisive and insufficient in its final reluctance to take the radical moral step. Here as elsewhere, this step involves a choice between alternative contending values, by the probing of their relative worth. When self-regard conflicts with social-mindedness and benevo-

lence, it is little to the purpose to reflect that they are both natural aspects and expressions of human life. Our intelligent specific choice between them requires assured grasp of a principle and hierarchy of values which we can apply to our particular problem and situation. In examining the vigorous advocates of both egoism and altruism, we may trace the course of their doctrines to their opposite extremes, we may perceive their contrasting misdirections, and so proceed more clearly to the right resolution of the issue between them.

2. THE ETHICS OF SELF-ASSERTION AND OF SELF-DENIAL

Advocates of egoism might point out that the most devout apostles of benevolence have recognized the natural selfishness of men. Altruism has been a gospel of salvation of man from his native impulses. Self-denial is literally a denial of self. The medieval saintly author of the *German Theology* is possessed by the conviction that the root of all iniquity is egoism: "Be simply and wholly bereft of Self. . . . Put off thine will, and there will be no hell." But he realizes that this demand runs counter to human nature. Only Divine Grace can still our desires and lusts. To attain unto the life of charity we must be born anew. With this Christian portrayal-and-condemnation of human nature we may compare the Buddhist. The essence of the Buddha's gospel is found in his four Cardinal Truths: human misery is universal; it is due to egoism; it can be extinguished only through the suppression of egoism; and this can be achieved through the "eightfold path" of Buddhist devotion, which finds its goal in Nirvana, the utter renunciation and extinction of self and all its desires.

Egoistic ethics expounds man's native selfishness. These accounts of human conduct may proceed from various motives and reach different conclusions. Many modern writers have

followed the lead of La Rochefoucauld in seeking to expose the basically selfish incentive in every human action. Some of these exposures are and are meant to be caustic; others profess and sometimes actually proceed, without irony, to analyze human conduct with scientific objectivity. These analyses may use the generally accepted framework of physiological or psychological science, or they may find startling appeal in some new wind of doctrine, as recently in Freudianism. The portrayal of man's nature and activity as basically egoistic was advanced by Hobbes as a conclusion from his materialistic account of all nature. Human conduct is an inextricable part of the mechanics of nature; emotion is simply motion; the selfishness of men is analogous to momentum or corrosion or animal instincts of self-preservation. Insatiate self-assertion is another name for vitality.

Two centuries after Hobbes, Schopenhauer exposed selfish desire as the manifestation, on the level of human life, of the universal drive and urge for self-maintenance which he regarded as the root and ultimate reality of all existence and named the Will-to-Live. A little later, Darwin was inaugurating modern biology with his evolutionary doctrine of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. While Darwin himself advocated social-mindedness, some moralists saw in his new science factual warrant of egoistic ethics. Nietzsche found this evidence of self-assertion in both Darwin and Schopenhauer; but unlike them he interpreted the evidence as also a vindication. Schopenhauer had been moved by his account of human egoism to pessimistic revulsion and to the advocacy of a morality of compassion and renunciation of self. Against Schopenhauer, Nietzsche boldly proclaimed the assertion of the Will-to-Power as the principle of his new ethics, a "transvaluation of all values."

All these varieties of egoistic ethics indicate the broad range

of motivation in similar portraiture of man. Here is cool surgical dissection of our moral organism; or ironical stripping of surface pretenses to disclose the raw greeds and rancors underneath; or dismal exposure of egoism as the root of all wickedness and misery, and gospels of salvation from this basic evil of our life; or else the audacious espousal of self-assertion as itself the call to a new ethics and a new humanity.

The actual advocates of self-assertion in ethics have been a very small minority, and the propriety of referring to all the above doctrines broadly as varieties of egoistic morals might well be questioned. But, on the other hand, we might recall here that classical antiquity, especially in its development of hedonism, proceeded with its valuations mainly in self-regarding terms. Nietzsche would interrupt us to point out that it has been only the morbid influence of Christian doctrines and scruples that has disturbed this candid classical recognition of human actualities. Other advocates of egoism have insisted that despite Christian professions men generally proceed on a self-regarding plan. If you want to be assured of a man's cooperation, make it worth his while to be on your side. A wise government is one that frankly recognizes this truth in framing its laws: obedience to them is assured only if they appeal convincingly to the people's interests.

Even benevolence may be, if not a mere pretense, yet a peculiar form which egoism assumes in some people. Because the basic self-regard of human nature leads many people to callous disregard of others, we are not justified in branding it as evil. In some people self-satisfaction does not conflict with benevolence; such men, like Bentham, naturally pursue their own enjoyment, but find it chiefly in promoting the general happiness. This in fact has been held to be the real distinction between good and bad people: whether the satisfaction which they seek is found in acts which benefit or hurt others. "Virtue,"

wrote Holbach, "is merely the art of realizing one's happiness in the felicity of others."

The number of moralists who recommend egoism is very small, but the number of those who do not recognize it generally in human life is nil. A cynic may be moved to reflect: "Men laud benevolence and recommend it—to others." This is scarcely a fair statement. Unless we are to share a misanthrope's view of men as hypocrites at large, we must respect the common censures of selfishness, and also the tribute of admiration which they pay to benevolence and self-denial. The religious teaching, Christian or Buddhist, has no doubt influenced, but also reflected the well-nigh universal human judgment in these matters. See how these characteristic estimates have been registered and documented in popular language. No higher eulogy of a deceased person is likely to be given than this, that "he always thought of others, never of himself"; while the term selfish is a common synonym of bad: "a selfish brute."

A number of moral philosophers have followed here the customary judgment: men are generally selfish, but they rise to virtue in more or less exceptional acts of benevolent self-denial. This judgment may be expressed in the language of sin and salvation or in the weekday speech of plain morals. Modern ethics has sought a secular statement of moral values. So the advocates of altruism, in their analysis and estimate of human nature, have undertaken to show that social-mindedness and benevolence are as normal as common self-regard but higher and nobler. The long line of British refutations of the slanderous Hobbesian portrayal of man is a record of this general procedure with varying distributions of emphasis.

Even Hobbes recognizes that the life of unprincipled and insatiate greed, though it be the original state of man, is an insecure and quite impossible state. If men are to survive and

live together, they require conditions of social activity, and the prime condition is the surrender of unlimited greed. But, Hobbes's critics say, such a surrender need not be a mere tactical device of selfish men, nor would it be a radical negation of human nature. The saying *homo homini lupus,* "men are wolves to each other," loses its disparaging force when we consider parental care and the pack instinct. Animal gregariousness serves to illustrate a bent in nature which human sociality completes. Genuine attachment to others, to family, friends, country, to mankind is undeniable.

Since benevolence divides with egoism our motives and emotions, the moral problem is on what terms these two are to share the direction of our lives. The altruist answers: By the control of selfishness and the cultivation of social regard and philanthropy. Some advocates of benevolence have sought an aesthetic expression of it, as a harmony of the emotions or passions. Others would engage our moral worship of benevolence alone, as the chief perfection and virtue, transforming ordinary human conduct in a way analogous to Christian regeneration. Or else a sovereign principle of imperative authority in our life is invoked, Conscience or Reason, to control and direct our self-regarding and our benevolent impulses in a harmonious order, inclining to benevolence.

Selfishness and benevolence have ordinarily been regarded as opposed to each other, so that the ascendency of one would require the decline of the other. But the problem of the likely transition from self-regard or its development into genuine social-mindedness has also engaged ethical thought. The maturing sense of justice has been traced and explained in this manner. Men have a native resistance to all that threatens their security or their possessions. So they come to oppose any menace to social security, resist injustice anywhere. Social contagion and sympathy make this hostile reaction to injustice

increasingly widespread. Our desire for the approval of others reinforces our benevolence. We come to cherish and promote this social solidarity and to defend justice and the common security and solidarity as integral elements of our own happiness. Emulation, our regard for the esteem of others, is not necessarily a form of selfish pride. It manifests the social implications of our moral values and judgments of approval and disapproval. Our success or satisfaction is marred by any feeling that we are condemned by others. Even when we may seek and find vindication in our own conscience, "the impartial spectator in our breast," and stand our ground against the social verdict, still it is from a higher universal ground that we survey and judge our act, against the judgment of our opponents, but also above any merely personal attachment. We appeal to posterity or to history or to the eternal righteous judgment of God. Our stand, seemingly self-centered in its immediate circumstances, is the more completely social in its ultimate appeal and concern.

3. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SELF AND A GRADATIONAL VIEW OF VALUES

The foregoing survey is apt to leave a sense of bewilderment in ethical theory. The defiant challenge of full-blown self-assertion, the bugle of the Will-to-Power, might stir and enthrance us but does not really convince our moral intelligence. We are shamed in this upsurge of arrogant aggression. The appeal to self-denial and renunciation moves us tragically but leaves us baffled, with all our vitality of body and spirit protesting. How can it be that the highest step of our life should lead to negation? The manifold proposals of compromise and accommodation do not really solve our problem. We still lack a real principle to test the relative worth of so-called selfish and unselfish acts and to decide the choice between them by

ethically defensible principles. Our difficulties are not cleared up so long as the normal character of self-regarding desire is recognized. Men would still seek for the covert selfish incentive in much alleged altruism, or protest against the exaltation of self-denial as a morbid ethics of escape from human nature, or else adopt some compromise of benevolence and altruism.

Along several lines the claims of altruism have been advanced as itself the principle of higher fruition and expression of human nature. This has been urged even in biological-evolutionary terms. We recall Kropotkin's emphasis on mutual aid, as marking the survival of the fittest no less than superior aggressive equipment. The history of mankind, both in its progress and in its downfall, registers the operation of mutual aid in evolution and points out its moral inferences. The most popular evolutionary moralist, Herbert Spencer, recognized both egoism and altruism as normal incentives in human conduct. Either by itself is self-defeating. A compromise and a mutuality of the two is required for effective human activity.

While we may thus find promotion of altruism even in the evolutionary camp, positivistic-sociological moralists have taught us that the full expression or fulfillment of human character is possible only in social terms. The whole range of human values, starting with justice, is charged with social meaning. Values are social in origin, in sanction, in vitality. As Comte expressed it, the full meaning of the term "human" is "social." Only in social currents of ongoing human life, in civilization, can the individual find his characteristic nature or realize his true destiny. The crass egoist negates himself; as a branch severed from the tree, he shrivels and blights his humanity at its source.

One way of refuting or resisting egoism is Henry Sidgwick's advocacy of disinterested promotion of happiness, be it one's

own or another's. This is in principle a concentration on the supreme value, happiness, allied with an acknowledgment of the claims of justice, that no one should have preferential treatment. As a true utilitarian, why should I cherish my own happiness above yours? As a true perfectionist, why should I set my own realization of capacities above my brother's? If I bend my will truly to the pursuit of the supreme value, I should choose the utmost of it, be its enjoyment or fulfillment mine or another's.

These various pleas for benevolence and for disinterested devotion to the realization of values, as upbuilding factors in human life and in civilization, point towards a more fruitful treatment of the problem before us. But we need a closer concentration on the gradation of values and on the analysis of the moral self, to grasp the real meaning of self-assertion and self-denial.

In the traditional controversies between egoistic and altruistic ethics, the self has been regarded as something set and discrete, as some kind of substance, which can be thrust or withdrawn. A more critical insight into the nature of self-consciousness and personality reveals the error of such views. As our discussion of the problem of conscience has already brought out, we cannot treat personality as a thing or a definite substance. It is ever complex, a process of manifold impending directions of activity. There can never be any bare identity of self. The self is a living system of values contemplated, pursued, preferred, chosen, negated, frustrated, realized, enhanced. That is just what you are and what I am, and the way we are known and understood: by our purposes, our interests, ideals, fears, antipathies, in the reaffirmed or in the ever-contested decisions and activities which mark our lives.

This view of human nature exposes a radical confusion at the very basis of the traditional controversy between ego-

istic and altruistic theories. The rigid opposition of acts of self-assertion to acts of self-denial is unwarranted. Any action whatever expresses the emphasis of certain interests or purposes or values—and the corresponding neglect or denial of others. In every decision and action, a personality that might have been this or that emerges as actually this rather than that. Inevitably the preference that has committed the self to this direction has turned it away from the other. The assertion of this value or this side of the self is the denial of the other. I become identified with this rather than that, which I disown. Only in this variety of dual ways can my personal activity be recognized. It is therefore misleading to speak of acts of self-assertion and contrast them with acts of self-denial. No action can be regarded as simply and definitely one of self-assertion or one of self-denial. In every concrete act one eventual self is asserted and another or others are denied. The usual dispute between egoism and altruism demands fundamental revision.

It is not assertion of the self as such that we deplore. What we condemn in the "selfish brute" is the brutal direction which his self-assertion has taken: the purposes and the values with which he has become identified, and those which he has neglected or denied. We condemn both what he asserts and what he denies. Contrariwise, what we admire in "saintly self-denial" is not only the negation of low impulses and interests but also the affirmation of high ideal values. Instead of judging abstractly the contending claims of egoism and altruism, we should rather trace human lives and actions as they reflect our rise or decline in the gradation of values. We should then consider this pursuit of higher or lower values, this moral perfection or frustration of personality, as it affects the relation of different persons to each other, their conflict or their co-operation and harmony.

But it may be objected at this point: Would not this be a prejudging of our case? How do we know conclusively what is higher and what is lower in the gradation of values, and so the direction of perfection or degradation? The moral advantage of coopèration over strife might also, conceivably, be questioned. We need not claim indisputable certainty on either topic, but only enough confidence to explore the correlation suggested above. Warrant for our confidence is found in our interpretation of the table of values in perfectionism, on the principle that the highest value is that which expresses the most integral fulfillment of personality. If it should now develop that the pursuit of the values already recognized by us as higher transcends the conflict of persons which embroils the hunt of the lower values, and so achieves a social harmony in the moral realization of personality, there should be gain in two fields of ethical reflection.

It has been observed that, while men may differ widely in their ethical theories—the basic reasons which they cite in support of their approval or their disapproval of actions—there is more general agreement in the approval or disapproval themselves. In our discussion of perfectionism, or the theory of self-realization, we proceeded on the basic estimate of value as fulfillment of personality. This basic criterion may not be acceptable from the viewpoint of hedonism. There may also be considerable disagreement in details, for instance regarding the relative rank of aesthetic and intellectual values, or of bodily and economic values, or about the supreme rank accorded to religious values. Despite these and other differences, however, the general distinction between the values of our so-called "higher life" and the lower interests and satisfactions is likely to be acknowledged as unquestionable. The evolutionary moralist should agree with the theological and philosophical formalist in ranking the values of rational activity

above those of organic-sensual impulses and material interests. Perfectionist and utilitarian would agree that it is better to be an unsatisfied sage than a satisfied fool.

With such a broad outlook along the entire range of human values and activities, we find a guiding idea in Thomas Hill Green's doctrine of shareable goods. Some values cannot be shared; others can be shared; and still others must be shared and are attainable only in community. Accordingly the pursuit of the first sort of values would be a competitive activity involving men in rivalry and conflict; while the others would permit or would emphasize the social-mindedness and mutuality of persons. And that is what human experience in fact reveals.

The life of economic activity, the desire for wealth and material possessions, has been the proverbial hunting ground of selfish men. Here, we are told, one man's gain is another man's loss, and it is everyone for himself and the devil take the hindmost. A man is here bound to look after his own interests: *caveat emptor.* Likewise, where bodily provisions or comforts are scanty, or where men rush for safety in peril, it becomes again a question of either you or me. "Higher considerations" in these cases may lead to self-sacrifice, but whether grasping my advantage or surrendering it to another, I am engaged in a conflict of interests with others, with others in my way.

From a somewhat higher point of view, where at least some fair-minded intelligence is brought to bear on the desire for private profit or individual security, it may be pointed out that even gain and safety are at long range mutual rather than competitive values. A good trade or a good contract must be advantageous to both parties. Progress in economic understanding may pass from "the public be damned!" to "the customer is always right!" In a fire panic the safety of each man depends

upon his own and others's orderly regard for the rescue of all in due turn. In a shipwreck I may share the scant supply of provisions fairly and even generously with the other survivors in the lifeboat, for the likelihood is that together we shall be saved or together perish. Yet the basic conflict of private interests in such cases still remains. A social-benevolent action here is regarded as self-sacrifice.

The life of social converse and common friendliness, neighborly and civic cooperation, involving teamwork rather than individual contests in work or in play reveals the pursuit of values that can be shared. Here is the field of companionable or hospitable experience, where men vie in genial expansiveness, and in genuine good will seek to make themselves agreeable: "the more the merrier."

The truly shareable values, values that must be shared, are manifest at the highest levels of our life, in activities that yield the deepest and most integral fulfillment of personality. These are values that are essentially pursued and attained only in social partnership, participation in a higher life in which men are "severally members one of another." Science, art, religion are most thoroughly personal, yet essentially universal activities. Copernicus' heliocentric astronomy, Newton's new system of physics, Darwin's theory of evolution: each of these were achievements of creative intelligence, of personal stamp and possession. Yet they were not and could not remain private. To be really attained and possessed they had to be shared: only as they entered into the common treasury of science could their truth and vitality and worth be realized by their inceptors or by anyone else. It is the same with any mastery in applied science, be it a cure in medicine or a technical improvement or invention in agriculture or industry. These fruits of exploring mind can mature and be enjoyed fully only in social experience. Pasteur did not really possess his cure of

rabies until he had shared it with mankind. Poet and composer are likewise wedded to their public, find their values in sharing them and publishing them to the world, and are blessed when their own intimate songs have become the beloved songs of all.

The higher life of moral and spiritual endeavor reveals most truly this thorough fellowship of men. There can be no conflict of my genuine moral needs and interests with those of anyone else. Only as others advance with me or through me, only thus is my own moral progress possible at all. The summit of this truth is reached in religion. Here is interfusion of sacrifice and victory, bestowal and possession, surrender and mastery, each revealing the other. Rabindranath Tagore, in one of his *Gitanjali,* sings of a beggar who had hoped that the great king would throw him some alms. But as the royal procession passes by him on the road, it is the king who smilingly asks him for a gift. Confused and undecided, he slowly takes and gives his least grain of corn. That night he finds in his bowl one grain of gleaming gold. Tolstoy in a kindred spirit tells the story of two old peasant pilgrims to Jerusalem. One of them, Yelisei, is diverted from his holy journey by various calls of mercy, and is left penniless and unable to continue. The other peasant, Yefim, pushes on by himself, thrifty and calculating. But when he finally reaches the Jerusalem of his pious ambition, and stands before the Holy Sepulchre, behold! Yelisei is there already, in front, right by the holy altar!

Our two parables bring out another important point. In speaking of the higher life of man we are not speaking only of Newton and Shakespeare. Though there are undoubtedly high expressions and values of personality that demand special capacities and uncommon cultivation of intellect and taste or are the prerogatives of genius, yet the very best and the essentially good may be sought and possessed by the humblest

of us. Contrariwise, as soon as even the noblest spiritual values are, as we say, commercialized, rivalry and conflict emerge at once: scientist and inventor worry over prior claims to fame and patent rights; artist and poet are consumed with their jealousies and lust for recognition; and saints dispute each other's divine warrant and rank. Or consider love, the experience of the greatest worth. The gradation of its expressions covers the whole range of human nature, from its dark slimy abysses to its luminous summits: from the corrupting exploitation and sham devotion of lust, the vulture of sensuality in character; through friendship in all its forms and degrees of personal attachment; to more expansive ranges of devotion, in patriotism and philanthropy; to intense and life-absorbing love that comes to full fruition in the home; and so up to that celestial love of man for God of which the mystics chant.

It is of interest to note here that at the summits of human living the values attained cannot be expressed truly either in terms of self-assertion or of self-denial. Love is both intense affirmation of self and also its surrender and absorption in another; so likewise with other high values. The moral issue, therefore, is not one between egoism and altruism. This traditional controversy has only obscured the real and imperative choice, which is always a choice between lower and higher values, between indulgence and aspiration, between the hankering of some appetite or greed and the steadying demand of our whole being for integral harmonious expression and fruition, fulfillment of personality. The critical exploration of this process up the scale of values, as it serves to clear the confusions in the traditional dispute about self-assertion and self-denial, gives added support to perfectionism as an ethical theory.

Part 4

SOCIAL ETHICS

Chapter 10

MORAL PROBLEMS OF FAMILY LIFE

1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY: SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL FACTORS

Our discussions have already brought out the fundamental principles of moral advance: the maturing of character and the perfecting of human life by critical, loyal, socially-minded thought and action. In the relation of individuals, moral growth leads from conflict to community of aims and interests. The good society is one that avoids the suppression and sacrifice of men and women in the rigid molds of institutional regime, but also seeks to curb the spirit of willful indulgence and the lawless temper which spurns obligation and disrupts social order. The moral test of any institution or any social agency is this: Does it make the lives of its members, through their participation in it, more humane and significant? The right society is not one of conflict partly checked by stipulated concessions or commitments. It demands and achieves genuine cooperation; it rests on mutual recognition of personal worth. There is no escaping this law of moral activity. If I treat others as mere tools of profit or passion, I brutalize them, and am thus myself brutalized. Only through a life of moral re-

spect for others is my own personal worth realized and enhanced.

In the light of these principles let us now estimate the family and its role in the fruition of human life, and face some of its peculiarly modern problems. This discussion of the ethics of the family prior to that of some other social institutions is well advised. Owing to the small number of persons engaged and the steady intimacy of the home circle, we have here the most thoroughgoing example of human perfection through creative interpenetration of individual lives.

The filial, the conjugal, and the parental interests, or in a word home relations through the years, absorb a greater part of men's and women's thoughts and energies, affect character for good or ill to a larger extent than any other institution. The evolution of the family has engaged the careful attention of historians and sociologists, and the detailed exploration of this field has yielded surveys of great interest and value. It is beyond our present purpose to undertake any summary of these detailed accounts; but we should keep in mind the significance of the historical backgrounds. The modern family differs in many ways from families of bygone days because of the changed social order and civilization. But the basic moral principles are not annulled by the altered social structure. The problems still remain: how to realize under modern conditions the high values which in earlier and less complex societies were realized at least partially by other forms and traditions of family life; how to meet and overcome the confusions and corruptions in the modern family; and how, with more mature enlightenment, to proceed to still higher values.

Here we should recognize at the outset the social character of the family. In earlier stages of civilization, a family was not merely or mainly the relation of a man and a woman and their children. It was a part of the larger social group, which con-

trolled it and molded the lives of its individual members. Primitive men and women were pawns in a system of social cohesion, to marry and live together or apart as the larger interests or traditional convictions of the group demanded. Social tradition might allow only marriages between persons of the same clan, and punish any alliance with an alien as disloyal. Or the consciousness of tribal blood kinship might regard any wedlock inside the group with horror, even as we regard incest, and compel men to seek their mates in some other specified tribe. In marriage, a man might have to leave his parents, to dwell in the home of his wife, whose father and brothers protected her and controlled her children. Or a man might literally take his wife, by capture or purchase or service, take her away to his own home where he and his menfolks disposed of her and of the children that she might bear. Sociologists have distinguished and investigated these various domestic institutions in their social or religious, economic or political bearings. The interested reader may pursue them further, under the headings of endogamy, exogamy and totemism, mother-right, father-right.

We should note in these early forms of family life the preeminence of clan interests and authority over any personal concerns. Loyalty was loyalty to the group. Primitive society applied to all its members the over-individual standard. Not only the king's or the chief's marriage, but that of every man was in a real sense "an affair of state." We know how persistent some of these ideas have proved in one form or another. Royalty and hereditary aristocracy, and also the more established and solid classes in certain countries have long recognized these "dynastic" principles as governing all respectable family alliances. A marriage is not the mating of two individuals; it is the union of two family strains and domains. The estate is the family estate, to be transmitted from gen-

eration to generation, by primogeniture or otherwise, without a primary regard for the needs or the preferences of individual children. As the apportionment of the family estate was settled by tradition, so traditional standards governed the acceptable marriage, in which the elders claimed the right of initial selection and final approval. Young people must respect the rights of their families in considering the spouse they propose to introduce into the family circle. In old Japan, too intimate devotion of husband and wife to each other was frowned upon as unseemly. It was even held as sufficient ground for divorce, which was arranged by the clan elders. Fathers and mothers-in-law would decide that the excessive love of the pair for each other affected their right loyalty to the larger interests of their allied families.

This example from Japanese tradition exposes the evil in the old system: its neglect of the intensely personal and intimate character of the family bond, which it forced into the larger framework of social cohesion. But the example serves another purpose, to illustrate by sharp contrast the unsocial individualism that is rampant in the domestic morals of our modern age. In violent reaction against the hard regime of the past, men and women have gone to the opposite extreme. How common is now the tendency to treat the family relation as a matter of strictly individual concern, as if marriage were an arrangement of mere personal mood or taste, to be made or dissolved as may suit the individual's sweet will! The old *mariage de convenance* could style itself *mariage de raison.* It was calculating, but still it concerned itself with preserving a steady ongoing family tradition. Many modern marriages could also be called, if not traditionally conventional, yet marriages of convenience; but it is now the convenience of passing impulse and feeling, without the likelihood and sometimes even without the initial firm intention of abiding

loyalty. The more conservative critic of contemporary family life is filled with dismay. Modern youth have shaken loose from the tyranny of the old rigid order, but in their loose thought and practice many of them seem bent toward anarchy.

This morally irresponsible view of the family accounts for many of the distressing conditions in home life. It is mainly to blame for our divorce rate. We cannot deal with this and other specific problems until we have faced fairly the basic reason for them all. This is of great importance, especially to young people; for upon the ideals and principles which youth respects today will depend the well-being or the disaster of adult lives tomorrow. The real problem of unstable families and prevalent divorce is not legal. It is moral. It lies in the confusion of men and women as to what marriage means and what constitutes family life and a home. It is also due to the lack of social solidarity that can keep wayward individuals from going astray in this field of most intimate personal alliance.

2. ETHICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FAMILY

A family is not an association for profit or for pleasure, nor is it mere comradeship, nor mere sexual mating. These elements in the relation, if dissociated from the central bond, may prove unreliable or disruptive. In primitive life a young man paid so many cows to acquire a wife, who was then his property, his toiler for life and the mother of other young toilers. Later society reversed somewhat the relation. A rich man's daughter hoped to be a grand lady in her own home, even as her mother in hers, and so was expected to bring to her husband's estate a substantial dowry. The Kafir tribesman would scorn a wife for whom no price had been paid; in the European family of yesterday, a daughter-in-law who had brought no dowry could expect only condescension.

Masculine arrogance has sometimes fused proprietary motives and feelings of sexual mastery in the traditional notion of "family honor." Petruchio's words, from *The Taming of the Shrew,* come to mind:

> She is my goods, my chattels; she is my house,
> My household stuff, my field, my barn,
> My horse, my ox, my ass, my any thing;
> And here she stands, touch her whoever dare.

The common double standard in domestic morality has found some of its roots in this dual motivation. The family honor does not seem to be tarnished by the husband's marital infidelities; his pride is in his wife, who presumably should be pure for them both. But a woman's adultery is a mortal insult that must be avenged in blood because it has dishonored and also because it has cheated her lord and master. The primitive man makes a frank distinction here. Though he would slay his unfaithful wife and her paramour, he may quite readily lend her to a guest, as a gesture of grand hospitality, and without any hint of dishonor. The intolerable insult is the affront to his male mastery; the violation of his proprietary rights outrages him and demands retaliation. An honorable man cannot allow another to "steal his wife." This notion is long-lived, with various turns of interpretation. In Boswell's *Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides* we read some strange words spoken by Dr. Samuel Johnson. We are urged to "consider, of what importance to society the chastity of women is. Upon that all the property in the world depends. We hang a thief for stealing a sheep; but the unchastity of a woman transfers sheep, and farm and all, from the right owner." Clearly a man's profligacy does no such grievous harm to his wife!

These conceptions of family life ignore the idea of thorough mutuality which is essential and decisive here. A husband and a wife "belong to each other" in a sense that completely tran-

scends property or profit or agreement or claim and restitution. Back of the double moral standard which our society still tolerates is a basically mistaken view of the whole family relation. The modern struggle of women for their due equal place and role in human affairs is bound to have far-reaching moral consequences. To be sure, there will be much unsettlement and looseness in the period of transition; but the prospect of achieving more perfect mutuality in domestic and in other social relations is worth the risks it involves.

As important as the mutuality and community of the family relation is its integral and abiding character. And so we can see again that it cannot be motivated by considerations of mere pleasure or profit, and that it goes beyond comradeship. Profit or pleasure are of the passing situation or fancy; comrades enter each other's life only partially or occasionally. Different is the permeating and permanent nature of the family union.

Here we meet a modern protest. Actually a man's home does not engage all his energies; there are other sides to his life, and other relations. His wife may also have her own friends and interests, her own career. Why may not their home be one point, most important to be sure yet not all-decisive, one point at which their lives unite, permanently if possible or for as long as may be? The question of home life in its relation to "careers" will be noted presently. It is interposed here, to show how closely the mutual, the integral-permeating, and the abiding principles in home life belong together, stand or fall together.

The modern revolt against traditional discipline in family relations was first manifested as the romantic cult of feeling, sovereign in each individual and setting its own laws. Our literature glows with this ardor of the "grand passion" which, so we have been told, decides our lives and is its own justification. This modern resistance to many of the old restraints and

compulsions was right; but in breaking some of their shackles men and women have tended to become impatient of all control and suspicious of all principles as enslaving and artificial, unnatural. So the rampant individualist prefers now a naturalistic rather than a romantic apology for his unbound life. Chafing under any social sanction whatever, he would fain "follow nature" in living his own life in his own way.

But what is nature's way here? Biologists and anthropologists have shown that the course of evolution has involved a growing range of parental care for offspring. This has made possible a postponement of maturity and self-support on the part of the young, and this prolongation of infancy has allowed a more complex, more delicate and refined nervous development, and higher mental capacities. This is actual nature. The modern domestic anarch who regards marriage and family life as matters of his changing fancy, eager for indulgence but dull to his responsibilities, should not appeal to nature. When he visits a zoo he should remove his hat.

We are thus starting in plain animal terms on our way to the recognition of more distinctively human, spiritual principles. The essence of life is its growth and self-reproduction. At subhuman levels self-reproduction is a bodily process. The sexual and the parental instincts are in closest relation, which is manifested in the very structure of the organism. The perpetuation of the race is thus assured, not only conception and birth but also the nourishing of offspring during the period of helpless immaturity. At the root of other obligations, which the growing complexity of human life unfolds, is this basic requirement to bear and to safeguard a coming generation. We shall see how many other loyalties find their initial analogy in this law of life. This is literally tradition. Our rampant individualists are quite ready to observe that the sexual instinct and its indulgence are the most natural matters in the world,

which therefore should be left to the individual's inclination and should no longer be subjected to outworn and unscientific restrictions. But they ignore the organic bond in nature between sex and parental care, and the abiding loyalty which this bond implies at the human level.

Human reproduction differs from animal in being more than a merely biological process. It involves the transmission, the nurture, the perpetuation of organic characteristics, but also of all that makes our lives really and fully human. This is the primal and elementary function of the home. It is the indispensable nursery of human nature in all senses of the term. It nourishes bodily and mental capacities, the treasures of character, social experience and tradition, original and creative genius. The family should be viewed as ongoing human life. We make a mistake when we speak of married people as "couples." This point is not one of verbal quibbling; it calls attention to a defective perspective. Some marriages, to be sure, remain childless; some people do not marry at all. But just as the normal state of human life is wedded not celibate existence, so the normal family is not merely a couple; it is not a merely two-sided but a triangular relation. The eternal triangle in human nature unspoilt and unperverted is not the triangle of husband, wife, and paramour; it is the triangle of husband, wife, and children.

The advance of humanity has required the perpetuation from one generation to another of all the attained human values. This is the dual role of family life. On the one hand, it provides the direct experience and realization of many of these values, the mutual enrichment of life and character in the intimate sphere of the home. On the other hand, it achieves spiritual self-perpetuation, the imparting from parents to children, by heritage, nurture, culture, and personal example, of all that can make the lives of youth sound and rich in body

and mind, bright and generous and devoted in remembrance and in prospect. Parental care, thus influential in molding the lives of children, has also a paramount reaction on the parents themselves. Not only does it stabilize them and their lives together, but in the truest sense it civilizes them. It serves to give them a firmer hold on the values and purposes and principles which they are imparting to their children. Parents must forsooth live up to their children's expectations, and by giving a good example, endeavor to master what they teach.

So evidently family life, while intimately personal and individual in its tone and expression, is thoroughly social in its many bearings. It is arrant nonsense to say that a man's home is his own business and concerns nobody else. Obviously it concerns his wife and children whether he remains loyal to them or abandons them to form other alliances resulting in homes equally precarious. Extensive statistics as well as our own daily observation show us that abandoned wives or husbands mean neglected children, mean disrupted lives, without loyalties or objects of devotion. A large part of the destitution and prostitution, of the vagabondage and depravity and crime in our society is directly traceable to broken homes. The integrity and the sound growth of our civilization demand the preservation of stable home life, sound ideas of the family and the realization of them.

Against the willful individualism that so loudly challenges the long experience of mankind, we should reaffirm the deep wisdom of morality and religion alike. In the Gospel we read that, to find our life, we must lose it. Only as a man cherishes something larger than his own narrow wishes and interests, only as he is absorbed in a larger life and becomes wholly identified with the highest and deepest in others, only then does his own life experience that enlightenment, expansion, mellowing, and fulfillment which are the high aim and des-

tiny of us all. Is not this true in every one of the higher ranges of human activity? I cannot get what my social environment or what my nation has to give me, until I become heart and soul one with the great commonwealth. The intellectual or cultural life of the race will not enrich me until I participate generously in these activities. Nor will religion truly redeem and bless me until I devote myself freely and utterly to my worship. In all the upper reaches of our life, possession requires self-bestowal, and conquest is through consecration.

Our language has one supreme word for this bond and interfusion of human lives, which in losing each in the other realize most fully the finest personal capacities. This is the marvel and the mystery of Love. Through mutual inclination and understanding and will, but also beyond them, it achieves soul-pervading communion of persons. This is what we mean when we protest that, without love, a *mariage de raison* has no reason for being; but also that it takes love and not mere hankering fancy to make a true family and a real home. We may try to define this intimate interpersonal experience, but psychological analysis will not do it full justice nor poetic genius exhaust its meaning. It includes physical attraction and personal liking, respect and admiration, intellectual or emotional sympathy and shared tastes, but it goes beyond these to express itself in most intimate and abiding communion. These are the marks and the meaning of a home. It is an utter integration of individuals. We can understand what the Church intends by its traditional description of marriage as a sacrament. Marriage, family life, is no mere agreement or compact. It has been described in a telling statement by the British philosopher Bradley, as a contract to pass out of the state of contract. That is to say, a man and a woman agree that henceforth in their relation to each other and to their children that are to come there is to be no balancing or adjustment of indi-

vidual interests or demands, no mine and thine, but that truly each is to be one with the other, each wholly identified with the life and purposes of the other.

We may see now in what sense love is to be understood as being its own justification. It yields the social benefits of parental care and abiding family loyalties, but finally it is its own fruitage and reward. It is the perfect instance of intrinsic value. The best that love yields is more of itself. A man and a woman may marry so as to combine and stabilize their two estates; or because they need each other on the farm; or in order to provide the companionship they enjoy or the sensual indulgence they crave; or more eugenically, to propagate the race; or else they pledge their faith as comrades in the communist or other social struggle; or supinely at the behest of a dictatorship which needs cannon fodder; or again for no reason whatever, but simply in order not to remain single and peculiar. Some of these reasons may be less questionable than others, but not one avails, if love is lacking. The romantic ideal of the family exalted love as its chief motive, but its idea of love did not rise above the impulsive-individual to spiritual-social significance. Love is not truly understood or experienced unless it bears fruit in devoted service; yet no citation of whatever services or benefits justifies it unless they are pervaded by itself, by its self-bestowal. It is root and fruit; and neither acknowledged obligation nor any recompense nor gratitude avail in response, but love alone. Here we can understand by analogy some mysteries of the religious life. The supreme prayer of St. Francis of Assisi and of St. Thomas Aquinas is the same plea of absorbing love: "Lord, I will have Thyself."

Now it may be asked: Isn't this just high idealism? What does it have to do with the actual daily lives of men and women today, of parents and children in our brutal and nasty world? But only in the light of this ideal and true principle

can we recognize the right means of its daily gradual realization, or face fairly the obstacles and the disruptive influences, avert or resist dissension and disaster in these most intimate recesses of men's and women's lives. It is by knowing what you mainly and unconditionally cherish that you can also know what you are prepared to yield readily, or concede in a crisis, or nowise and never surrender.

The ideal principle of absorbing personal communion in family life does not ignore individual peculiarities or limitations. It is not a romantically cultivated illusion of unqualified perfection, the proverbial "lover's dream." Actual family life brings together men and women, young and old, such as we all know, with all their good and bad points and fine hopes and queer ways and peculiar mean streaks. The communion is decidedly a communion-in-difference. This principle and this problem characterize in greater or in lesser measure all our varied social activities; but they are first met and mastered in the home.

Abiding devotion of husband and wife is not normally a practical conclusion from citation of good evidence that they are well suited to each other. Nor is it usually an unmotivated infatuation. Though not reasoned out, it has its reasons, its predisposing and favorable conditions. Consuming devotion sometimes prevails over seemingly insuperable obstacles. But fortunate are those whose marriage and family life are sustained by daily companionship, mutual regard, a sympathy in tastes and basic valuations, a harmony of spiritual tone. Precarious and pitiable is the home in which husband and wife fail to share enthusiasm or aspiration or dismay or anguish. This sort of sympathy does not require acquiescence; it does not preclude criticism or even sturdy opposition; but it demands understanding of mind and heart together.

3. SOME MODERN COMPLICATIONS: CONJUGAL, PARENTAL, AND FILIAL

From the higher reaches of human character we may turn to some lower but important conditions of likely success or hardship and possible disaster in home life. As a family is normally a lifelong communion, too great disparity in the ages of husband and wife is a disturbing factor, which may be faced with initial equanimity but eventually imposes its grievous verdict. Yet there are cases in which persons may well choose the care and the regret along with the quality of love while it lasts. This is a matter of individual decision. There is a related problem in which wiser planning in our social system may contribute substantially to the common happiness and welfare. The growing difficulty of acquiring the means of supporting a family which many young people in our society find at the time when physiologically and mentally they are most ready to marry and bring up children, is a major problem of social ethics. How much sexual and other delinquency, or morbid disturbances and embittered attitude towards life, lowered vitality of mothers and deficient vigor in children, could be prevented if a more intelligent and equitable social system could enable young people to marry at the right natural age! Social pride is sometimes a deterrent factor here, but more usually economic needs and barriers. The problem is widely ramified.

Multitudes of young women in our day solve this problem by retaining their jobs after marriage. In some cases this is done mainly in order to provide the advertised modern conveniences and gadgets without which our life would seem to lose its meaning. But very often this decision is imposed on the young people by sheer economic necessity, with perhaps additional obligations of one or both of them to help support

their old folks. In either case, however, the young people are deprived of a real chance at homemaking. They shift along from week to week on the narrowest margin, and pray for good health, as any illness would be a major disaster. In less indigent cases, a convenient little program may be adopted. After the day's work, a stop at a cafeteria, followed by a drive or a movie, might replace a dinner or an evening at home; and this nomadic existence about town becomes habitual. To a young husband and wife in these circumstances, the prospect of a child is not a hope but a worry. The problem of more normal living is mastered in some cases by brave hearts with stout constitutions. Others keep on a while longer, either discontented or else finding some comfort in the larger company of others like themselves.

On a higher economic level a similar problem arises when the young wife insists on having and pursuing her own career. A man must be very dull morally nowadays who would dismiss such a demand with impatience. The rise of modern woman to equality with her former lord, in education, in political rights, in social and economic self-reliance, is one of the most important definite achievements of our civilization. One chief hope for the better status of women in the homes of today and tomorrow is in the plain fact that marriage is freely chosen by the modern girl and is not imposed on her as her inevitable lot.

Despite their business or professional alternatives, most young women still naturally prefer homemaking. Those on the farm or in some lines of business can, if they will, share more intelligently and actively in their husband's work, which may become their common enterprise. A smaller number of wives, happily, can pursue literary, artistic, or professional activities which do not take them away from their homes. But there are young women, and they are among the most capable

in our society, who insist on "having their own careers," and not only in the early years, to help with the budget, but as a regular and permanent plan of life. The efficiency with which some of these women arrange for the details of their housekeeping and child nursing compels admiration. But even in the most exceptionally successful cases, there are gaps and also elements of friction in such homes, which tax the resources of intelligence and mutual respect and good will. Unusual abilities and good education might enable a wife to earn as good a living as her husband, to match or even excel him in his career. But nature has not enabled him to supply to their home and children that which only she can bring.

This problem has been complicated in our life by the many ways in which modern industry has invaded the home, upset its traditional order, appropriated one after another of its activities. The fact is that much of woman's daily work has been taken right out of her hands by organized business. Compare the old family life, in which practically everything was made at home, with the modern house, supplied almost entirely by purchases from the outside, and you can see the problem of the capable and energetic wife. The advertiser and the radio man are tireless in telling her that her husband's favorite dishes can not only be better prepared in a food plant, but can also be served more cheaply at the Easy Cafeteria. She may not realize at once what she and her husband and family might lose if they regularly exchanged their own table for the restaurant. But she does find her own life emptied of content, and her dissatisfactions keep pace with her increasing leisure. No sharp rule can remedy this situation. In some cases wives have used their multiplied free hours to "improve themselves," with resulting better care of their children, more beautiful rooms or gardens, more cultured and stimulating atmosphere at home. In other cases intelligent women have taken a leading

part in the social and cultural enterprises of their communities. Or more directly perceiving the many ways in which our social-economic and political system affects the well-being of their homes, women in various organizations have plunged into the work of getting better government, more wholesome conditions of industrial life, and in particular better food and drugs, higher sanitation, more competent medical care of children, improved education.

The relations of parents and children raise many problems. We noted already the desirability of avoiding too long postponement of marriage and childbearing in our society. Undeniable is the importance of sound upbringing of children, to assure the health and well-being of the next generation. Equally important is the stabilizing and tempering influence of parental care upon the parents themselves, nourishing in them qualities of gentleness, affection, justice, patience, and tact; and in their common devotion to their children uniting them more firmly to each other. Where else in life is a satisfaction more profound than this gradual unfolding and achievement of young powers, another's and yet truly our own, by us begotten, nourished and tended by us, bound to us by filial devotion, absorbing our life and bringing its hopes to fruition?

Husband and wife have chosen each other, should know what to expect of each other, may therefore be reasonable in mutual devotion and in the tolerance which it may exact. But it is otherwise with children and parents. Neither have been selected, yet cannot be disowned. Here is the deepest responsibility where there has not been any choice but a blessing or else a trial at the hands of Nature. Much of the pride in a promising child's accomplishments may be due to parental egotism. All the more intolerable are the parents' own defects when mirrored back to them in their children. But hardest to bear is the unaccountable infirmity or dullness or evil streak

in a child on whom loving care has been lavished to no avail. Alongside these tragedies of the home are the lesser daily dramas of young tempers and old that call for reasonableness and sympathy. Affection and justice together must guide and sustain the parental training of the child, whether in indulgence or in discipline: to avoid the spoiled temper that cannot be crossed, and also the sullen and hardened spirit with which nothing can be done.

Even under the best conditions of home life, a time comes when growing youth reaches years of decision, forms independent judgment and taste. Parents may advise and admonish, but they must also be prepared for disagreements. The reluctance of son and daughter to be in every way echoes of their parents is not to be deplored. It is normal, and wise is the parent who is prepared for it. The young may disagree in important matters, the choice of a career, marriage, social-political alignment, religious beliefs. How can parents be indifferent to all this? Yet they cannot impose the decision. The son or daughter, in turn, as they lose the earlier unquestioning view of father or mother and are forced by larger experience to a more critical estimate of them, may recognize the same need of tolerant understanding, and the more mature devotion which it yields.

The full fruition of family life in the care and education of children, and their good start in life, takes up time and means as well as intelligence and affection. We know how the demands of child care have sometimes called out the full measure of capacities and character in men and women who otherwise might have continued in their sluggish and unresponsive ways. But we can also see the many miseries in improvident families swarming with children that have overtaxed their mothers' vitality in bearing and in keeping them alive, their fathers' resources in caring for their needs, untrained, neglected, unfit.

No simple prescription of birth control or public nurseries or mothers' pensions can remedy this evil in our social system. The right treatment should provide more effective medical protection to wives whose condition does not permit childbearing; more generous public hospital provisions for expectant mothers, without the odium of pauperism and with wider extension of health insurance, to tide their families over the period of reduced income and increased expenses. But on the other hand, it should stigmatize a certain part of our "higher classes" whose life of irresponsible indulgence and evasion of parental duties is sapping some of the better strains of our race and threatening the future of our civilization.

We see in how many ways family life involves the interplay of souls and bodies, individual tempers and social sanctions and barriers. This interplay is all too often a conflict, but it can and should be a harmony. "Marriage," said Robert Louis Stevenson, "is like life in this—that it is a field of battle, and not a bed of roses." But it also provides the nearest approach to perfect communion that our life affords: both self-absorption in another and also complete self-expression. The home enables us to make this transforming and perfecting experience a lifelong reality of expanding range and significance. Here we find the ethical claims of monogamy. It concerns much more than the loyalty of husband and wife to each other. Monogamy signifies lifelong parenthood, the deepening and spreading mutual influence of parents and children. A person's life is no longer confined to his own immediate round of interests: he lives a richer and more abundant life in the lives of those whom he deeply and abidingly loves.

4. THE PROBLEM OF DIVORCE

The frictions and the eventual disruption of many homes result from the failure to achieve mutual understanding, from

incomplete mastery of the willful strain in intense affection. In dealing with divorce we should look to these roots of the trouble. Census statistics give a definite statement of this problem of unstable and broken homes. Our observation of neighbors and acquaintances yields a similar if less impressive conclusion. Perhaps the gravest aspect of the situation is that we do not regard it as so impressive. Divorce appears more and more common and matter-of-course to many of us. Yet the least arousal of our moral intelligence should make us realize the odious mess signified by the divorce statistics.

The problem of divorce is not to be solved by a rigid yes or no. You cannot dispose of human lives in such a wholesale manner. Two proposed ways of dealing with divorce engage current discussion. One is an unbending opposition to it. The other is a frank demand to make divorces easier and to remove the least vestige of social stigma that may still attach to them. The more sober truth seems to be between these extreme views. Surely we must be blind if we do not recognize that there are tragic cases of utter and irremediable failure in family life, where one or all of the individuals concerned would be wrecked if the ruinous relation continued. These are cases calling for domestic surgery. We should acknowledge them in all fairness. But in all fairness we should also recognize that such cases are quite exceptional. Most divorces are due to the insufficient moral training of men and women, to their instability and confusion of principles, or to social or economic maladjustments: to conditions that our society can and should meet and correct.

A family in which strains and misunderstandings multiply and threaten a disruption is a family which calls for mutual concession and adaptation. The outlook is dark either way you take it; one has to be reasonable to avoid disaster. Is husband or wife hard, impossible to live with? But suppose the tie is

broken and new ties formed: some concession, some readjustment would be required in any case, in the new relation. Why not try to get more mutual understanding where one is, to save one's home and one's children? We must frankly admit that sometimes separation of husband and wife is required in the interests of the children themselves, whose continued presence in the infernal house is a moral calamity. But incomparably more numerous are the cases where some added sense of responsibility and parental regard would help save the home.

As an alternative to divorce, temporary or extended separation has been advocated, and in fact it is a common measure of last recourse, especially in the case of childless families. In dealing with such problems the modern radical insists that divorce is preferable: recognize frankly the woeful blunder, break the tie, and seek in some other alliance happier living. This sort of reasoning is sometimes the only sane counsel in a ruinous situation. Far more often it springs from a distorted view of marriage. In easily suggesting the experimental trial-and-error method of successive wedlocks, it cultivates moral shallowness and a corruption of the home at its basis. There is no cunning in argument comparable to that of a hankering attachment that would excuse and justify itself, that urges a man or a woman to cast aside old loyalties and seek satisfaction in new ties. One has to face one's life in its entirety, past, present, and future. What can one expect from the new relation when already one's soul has been blighted by earlier disloyalty? No amount of expected personal enjoyment and indulgence would quite atone for that inner shame of our best nature, sullied. Robert Burns's warning here cannot be evaded:

> I waive the quantum of the sin,
> The hazard of concealing;
> But oh, it hardens all within,
> And petrifies the feeling.

Considerations of this sort have helped many a reasonable man or woman through the frictions incidental to family life. What we really need, however, is moral training that at the right time, early, establishes in young men and women sound stabilizing principles, to sustain them in times of crisis. A spirit of abiding loyalty is required, to guide in the formation of family ties and also to deal with exceptional cases of threatened family disaster. In reverence for this high principle, divorce may sometimes be justified. In reverence for it likewise, all the conditions or influences which disrupt the family should be resolutely opposed.

5. FAMILY LIFE IN A MORAL CIVILIZATION

To avoid loose and irresponsible divorces, deal first with the problem of loose and irresponsible marriages. This leads us further, to face honestly the conditions in our society which unsettle the foundations of the home. We all have a duty to combat the evil forces in our age which tear up family solidarity, which make it difficult for men and women to live together normal human lives. Here is a stream of insidious or open depravity, sneering at the homely virtues, gilding vice, exalting violent passion, in drama and movie and fiction and newspaper report or comic strip, emphasizing lawlessness while professing to condemn it, depreciating duty and self-control, lampooning normal and simple folk. Here is wealth without culture, fostering idleness and insatiate desire for excitement, luxurious display, a riot of thrills, uncontrolled, irresponsible, thinking only of the passing moment. Here is a callous economic system which in industry and trade exacts the most that it can and gives the least that it must. It invades the home; tears up its integrity; takes the mothers of the poor away from their children; or the children themselves, wherever it can secure a driving bargain, luring young blood to rush into life

before it has been seasoned either in skill or in intelligence—and then throwing men and women prematurely on the trash heap of unemployment. If we really and understandingly care for the integrity and sanctity of the home, we should recognize these forces in our society—which corrupt and crush the human dignity of men and women—and resolutely oppose them.

The basic facts of solidarity and cooperation are impressed on our minds. No sooner do we face squarely the problems of the family than the whole complex tangle of our social system embroils us. For families cannot live unto themselves any more than individuals can. The exposure of the confusions in wayward individualism, with its anarchic notions of family life, leads us to perceive the counter error of a social policy that calmly lets individuals and families shift for themselves and make the best of it. The essentially right idea of respect for personal initiative should not be mistaken as a warrant for callous disregard of men's grievous need in facing crises in our social system, where no mere individual effort is of any great avail.

Critical intelligence compels a more emphatic recognition of the social tissue of human living, but more especially it reveals the collective character of modern society. Self-reliance is a virtue, and paternalism is to be avoided. For this very reason, if the individual is not to be swallowed up in the crucible and cast into the routine mold, or else cast away on the slag piles of modern life, intelligent social policy is needed, to safeguard him in his personal worth and dignity.

The mention of this personal-social interdependence, and of the right public policy which it implies and demands, may serve to conclude our discussion of the family and to raise some of the larger moral issues of our social system. Modern states acknowledge unquestioningly the duty of providing education and a considerable degree of vocational training at public

cost. Sanitation and public health agencies show further recognition of society's duty to assure its members the proper environment for wholesome living. In our day, this social intelligence is probing deeper levels, reaching larger prospects. The right of children to untainted birth and to a fair start in life, the right of prospective parents to healthy family relations, forces us to face certain ugly actualities in our society, and to acknowledge our disgrace in failing so long to utilize the resources of genetics and medicine, to stop the pollution of our human stock. We are outgrowing the folly of cowardly evasion; we are learning to speak of syphilis and prostitution by their names, and the fight with these slimy pestilences is at last being waged openly. Individual need and public concern can now combine to protect the family from initial corruption.

Programs of economic justice and social security, legislation concerning child labor, health and hazards in industry, wages and hours of labor, unemployment insurance, all affect sound and stable conditions of family life. As society on the one hand is concerned in assuring its youth a decent chance in life, so it can no longer leave old age to the care of perhaps indigent and incapable children, or to private charity. The stalking fear and then the brutal fact of penniless old age have often corrupted parental and filial love and poisoned the home. Children have been brought up as the future support of their parents, and then the children have come to regard father or mother as burdens. A soundly devised and administered system of old-age pensions, in utilizing the resources of earning years to provide for the closing stage of likely indigence, also creates conditions of less sordid and more humane homes. So the integrity and interpenetration of human life in all its phases, individual and institutional, is again revealed, and we recognize the prime importance of a responsible, just, and generous intelligence, against willful and wayward and improvident living.

Chapter 11

THE FRUITION OF CHARACTER THROUGH EDUCATION: INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL TRAINING

1. THE SOCIAL CONSERVATIVE FUNCTION OF THE SCHOOL

The interrelation of individual and social values is shown clearly in the school process. Education may be defined in two ways that express two phases of a mutual relation. It transmits to growing youth the already attained knowledge and skill required for competent membership in the social enterprise. It also assures the conservation of the social values; it is the self-renewing treasury of tradition. Youth need the school, that they may be enabled to take their stand in the commonwealth; and the commonwealth needs the school, that its principles may live and grow from one generation to another.

The social-conservative importance of education has been recognized by philosophers and statesmen alike. Consider one of the earliest versions of the perfect society, the *Republic* of Plato. Here the philosophic guardians or magistrates, in their direction of state affairs, regard it as most important to train their successors in office. Their entire educational system is designed to serve this end. By a program of bodily and mental discipline, the students are continually being sifted and selected for superior mastery of the rational principles of order

and harmony. The majority are prepared for the sundry crafts suiting their mediocre abilities. But the exceptional minority are given the higher training to fit them for their high offices. As Plato's ideal state was an aristocracy of Reason, so his educational process was intended to maintain his system of sovereign rational principles by aristocratic selection.

During the medieval centuries of Christian-Catholic authority, schools and universities were dedicated to the life of the spirit. Through the faculties of medicine and law they aimed at the healing of bodily and mental ills. But the dominance of the faculty of theology expressed the scholastic conviction of man's supreme concern: to know God, man's duties to God, man's destiny under Divine Providence. This Catholic ideal was not rejected but was reaffirmed by the Protestant reformers. Martin Luther established his system of public schools in Germany for the express purpose of enabling the people to read God's law and admonition to them, in Holy Writ. The founders of Harvard earnestly urged the student "to consider well, the main end of his life and studies is, to know God and Jesus Christ, which is eternal life."

The secular spirit of modern thought, initially resisted by the older university tradition, generally affected it and then transformed it. The new education, in its program and method, was adapted to the new age of naturalistic inquiry and preoccupation with man's interests here and now. This dual emphasis was expressed in the phrase "science and the humanities."

In our day new systems of government have sought to consolidate their regimes by systems of education designed to indoctrinate youth in their principles. The schools in Soviet Russia were reorganized to teach communism. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy set out to mold the young to their totalitarian patterns by all devices of training, harangue, and compulsion.

In and out of the classroom, Hitler's and Mussolini's agents sought to efface from young minds all trace of the traditional loyalties, principles, and scruples that might still be imparted to them by the influence of home and church. They undertook to make youth completely subservient instruments of their iniquitous new order.

So in various epochs different social systems and cultures have expressed and have tried to preserve themselves in different educational processes. By their schools ye shall know them. The democratic nations were locked in a war of life or death with invading tyranny, which taxed their every available resource. They needed the full possession of their material and moral powers for the struggle, and their vigilant self-criticism has been also a criticism of their education. What does a democracy like ours have a right to expect of its people and of their schooling in the trial of destiny? Such a war and also the post-war settlement place in high relief the deep-lying principles which we have been taught, to which we are committed, and which we are resolved to maintain at whatever cost. The national crisis is also a crisis in our education. We need a more living sense of the life outlook, the aims and ideals in which our democratic schools are meant to confirm us, for the conflict of war from which we did not shrink, but even more for the normal life of peace to which we aspire. This war, like a raging fever, tested our stamina and spirit; the post-war reconstruction is and will be a trial equally severe.

2. THE PROBLEM OF MORAL TRAINING IN THE CLASSROOM

Our democratic principles of religious freedom and tolerance complicate the problem of including moral instruction in the school program. Moral education seems to be connected with religious training, and that, we say, is objectionable in our public schools. The opposition to it includes of course

those who are convinced that education in a democracy should be secular. But many intensely devout people, who regard moral and religious training as most important, fear to entrust their children to the likely influence of some other religious doctrine than their own, and so prefer to keep all sectarian bias out of the public school.

Meanwhile the absence of any systematic training of character in our education has had serious and far-reaching consequences. There was a time when church attendance was general on Sunday and was accompanied on weekdays by Bible reading and devotional services at home. In those days the public schools reflected the spirit of church-going people. Now religious training in the home is even less common than church attendance on Sunday. The automobile, the golf course, and the Sunday newspaper vie with the pulpit. Little son or daughter are apt to get their Sabbath edification from the comic sheets. The relaxed hold of the church on two classes of society, the intellectual class and the masses of industrial and other manual workers, has raised a grave educational problem that cannot be shirked. The church, the social agency which had charge of the training of character in earlier days, has lost contact with millions. In our land of religious freedom, multitudes of young people are growing up without any religion or morals. This is a grave problem which only the public school can meet, for it alone reaches all classes of boys and girls.

Some advocates of moral-religious training propose to set aside certain hours in the weekly school program during which pupils are to be instructed by clergymen of their respective religious denominations. This method had been followed in Germany, before the Nazis ran amuck; but it met with strong objections there, even though only two religious bodies, the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic, divided the field. How could it prove successful in a denominationally conglomerate

land like America? This plan has other serious defects. A school system which emphasizes religious differences and several times weekly chops up the student body into sectarian chunks would tend to defeat one of the main social purposes of public education in our country: the purpose of building up a spirit of tolerance by daily democratic working together. Moral instruction in the schools should not be allowed to tear up this educational integrity. It should be free of any hint of sectarian indoctrination.

This aim is easy to state, but how can it be attained? School experience in France and England may be of value to us in the United States. The French policy was motivated by the effort of the Republic to preserve itself. Suspicious of the monarchist leanings of the Roman Catholic Church, republicanism excluded the priests from the public schools of France. Without any theological commitment, the schools were to teach French boys and girls moral ideals and practices, insight into individual and social problems of conduct, high principles and the zeal to realize them. This secular moral instruction met with severe criticism. We need not here comment on the apparent failure of this system, as manifested in the collapse of morale and the national debacle of France during the Second World War. The French plan was attacked as spiritually barren. It was further censured as inducing a new type of sectarianism, reflecting political and social-economic conflicts of opinion. A republican non-churchman might dislike to have his children trained by a priest, but fear no less to entrust them to moral guides of whose social outlook he disapproved as too reactionary-capitalistic or too radical-socialistic. The clashing strains of democratic society have produced much educational confusion. These criticisms would not be irrelevant to the proposal of such a system for our country.

England has had the great tradition of Dr. Thomas Arnold,

Matthew Arnold's father and Master of Rugby School. Arnold set out to develop the social consciousness and the sense of personal responsibility in his pupils. He rejected extreme restraint or supervision and encouraged student self-government. His aim was to train fine, stalwart, upstanding young English gentlemen, alert to their expected rank and station in life and to their corresponding duties. Avoiding much formal edification, he emphasized the teacher's personal influence. He used the moral power of literature to reveal the living features of true greatness and impart a love of high achievement and nobility. He also advocated a system of organized athletics designed as discipline in vigor, self-control, and fair play.

In the light of these various experiences we should recognize a truth basic in any intelligent system of moral education. Morality is not a certain fragment of life, any more than religion is merely a Sabbath affair. The problem is not solved by setting apart two or three hours weekly in which some fine old gentlemen or ladies are to teach our young people to be good. Irrespective of whether clergymen or laymen do the teaching, this sort of plan springs from a wrong conception of the relation of morality to the rest of life. The plan shows also a misunderstanding of the adolescent mind. The maturing intelligence of young men and women, at college, may and does turn eagerly to the critical examination of moral principles and problems. But very young adolescents, normal boys and girls, not ready for criticism, are yet straining at the leash. They are apt to be suspicious of the classroom where they are to be explicitly improved and edified. And some of this wariness and resistance are never surrendered. If we saw someone who had announced plans for our salvation, most of us would cross to the other side of the street.

We should beware of the common tendency to restrict morality to certain departments and relations of conduct, as

though the rest of life were indifferent to morals. To recognize in balanced view the claims and opportunities of life entire, that is the essence of morality. It is the organization of all our energies and the practical direction of them to the enrichment and enhancement of character. Character has been called nine-tenths of life. It is the other tenth also. It is all of life that has value and significance, that is worth educating. So education for character is not a certain particular branch of education. Genuine education of any sort is education of and for character.

A clear word is needed at this point to avoid misunderstanding. In maintaining that all genuine education is education of and for character, we do not propose to dismiss the special methods and problems of education, and to replace it offhand by morals. Education has its own professional field, and specific competence is demanded to explore and to cultivate it effectively. Within this field, which is vast, workers may and do concentrate on particular types of educational inquiry: educational psychology, the organization of school activities in various types of society, fundamental principles and philosophy of education, problems of specific methods and of administration. These are all of them important, and we do not presume to dispose of them. But as soon as we consider the educational process in a moral perspective, the demand is raised for the recognition of the pupil's career in its entirety; we pass beyond special skills and the methods to attain them, to emphasize first and last the realization and fulfillment of personality; we reach the dominant conviction that all education must ultimately aim at character.

The true purpose of moral education in the schools will begin to be realized when this conviction really takes possession of teachers and school officials and parents. The young mind must be guided in the choice of a career, encouraged to postpone definite choice as long as expedient, and in the meantime

trained to master fundamentals. But first and last, youth are to develop a sound judgment of values, what really and finally matters in the direction of our life and affairs.

Real vocation includes but also transcends technical skill and practical efficiency. Man's true vocation is to live a humanized and socialized life, to develop intelligence, depth and breadth of character, a will emancipated from prejudice, loyal and tolerant. This is the aim of practical education, if we understand what is worthy of being practiced. Such education is moral: the knowledge it imparts is not mere intellectual baggage. It is the beginning of wisdom. It instills real goodness into the pupil, vital goodness; it achieves integrity of life, harmony and a sense of proportion. It strikes in all personal relations the dominant note of social solidarity, a democratic philosophy of life.

One or two particular features of such a system of moral education may be mentioned here. First of all is respect for the discipline required to achieve thorough mastery of any subject. Misguided is the tendency in some of our public schools to make things easy, or to make things appear easy that are and should be recognized as difficult but important, and so calling for hard work. "There is no royal road to geometry." Nature to be controlled must be obeyed, must be understood, and the understanding of nature and of human nature is no mean task. The first step in the training of character in the classroom is sound mental discipline: to take a confused and lagging mind, and by consistent work make it a real intellect, accurate, balanced, reliable, critical, creative. The flabby and easily-satisfied teacher who has low standards turns out students with no standards at all. The normal young mind is not lazy and unresponsive, if only its interests are stirred, if only it is enabled to see the meaning and the worth of a subject. To be sure, in every subject a certain training in technique is indispensable,

and apt to be dull, like finger exercises for the piano. The mind is also an instrument; it must be mastered before it can be played freely and greatly. If our schools are to send out young men and women of character, all teachers should believe in the gospel of hard work, believe it and live it.

Another important point has already been mentioned: the training in vocational-social responsibility, the intelligent relating of whatever is learned to the larger human enterprise. Schooling should develop a living sense of this social tissue. The various class activities should be seen as chapters in a book that makes sense. Mathematics can be taught so as to exhibit its inner logic, the laws of order and consistency which the mind must respect. Literature can be revealed as an expression and a criticism of life, allowing us to share in the finest experiences of genius. In history we can read the record of how high man has risen and also how low man has sunk, the reenactment of the million-voiced drama of mankind. It gives us a sense of perspective; it can make us more tolerant and sane in dealing with the problems that confront our age and our nation. Social studies and sciences are not so far apart as they seem. The pupil should be led to grasp the significance of the modern industrial revolution. The progress of the sciences and their application in industry have released for human use the countless energies of nature, making possible a safer and a richer human existence. But this vast technology also threatens to brutalize and mechanize men themselves, unless they resolutely keep the human factor first, unless they clear-sightedly make brute nature and machinery instruments, subordinate to directive human principles.

3. EMPHASIS ON INSIGHT AND INTEGRITY

These problems and the solving of them do not stop with the public school. Progressively they extend through the whole

educational process. They confront our colleges and universities today. They concern the role of knowledge in its relation to the other values of life.

Three tendencies of mind and three estimates of intelligence may be distinguished in the contending motivations of educational policies: the dilettante, the specialist, and the sage. I may use a little story to illustrate them. A Presbyterian church in Scotland was in search of a pastor and had invited a young clergyman to preach at the morning service. The young man delivered what he felt confident was a very good sermon. After church he was the guest of the elder chairman of the committee, and naturally expected to be congratulated. But, courteous and hospitable though he was as a host, the old Scot said not a word about the sermon. Unable to endure it any longer, the guest broached the subject himself after dinner. "How did you like my sermon, sir?" "Well," the host replied, "I shall be frank with you. I did not like it. I did not like it at all, and for three reasons. In the first place, you read it. Secondly, you did not read it well. Thirdly, it was not worth reading."

We might catch the drift of our three tendencies of mind in the Scottish elder's three criticisms. The dilettante's objection to much of our thinking and expression is that it is read, that in its rigorous formalism it misses the spontaneity of free utterance. What the specialist criticizes in our thought is just the reverse: not that it is read but that it is not read well. He censures it as slipshod and confused: in trying to say many things at once it fails to state any one thing definitely; it lacks discipline. But alongside these two is an occasional sage who is never content until he has asked the question: "After all, is it worth reading?"

The dilettante with fine impulsiveness enjoys, detests, praises, grows indignant. The specialist more cautiously and laboriously analyzes, investigates, experiments, formulates. As

between these two, the sage would expect more from the specialist. Without discipline thought is unavailing. The mastery of any topic requires concentration of attention, precision of statement, rigorous self-limitation to the relevant matter at hand. Especially does it demand the logical control of abstractions. So we are not to forget the words which Plato had inscribed at the gate of his Academy: "Let no ungeometrical person enter here." But, remembering Plato, we should also remember the words of Pascal: "I see little difference between a man who is merely a geometer and a skillful artisan." These words Pascal, himself a mathematician and a physicist of eminence, wrote to Fermat, whom he admired as the leading geometer of the seventeenth century. Logical mastery of abstract concepts is essential to knowledge, but it is not sufficient for wisdom.

So the sage, while insisting with the specialist or scholar on the importance of logical discipline, would go further. In considering an idea he would test its meaning and value. Is it like a window opening on a new field, revealing new vistas; or is it a door that closes on the mind, a skillfully polished but empty shell? Thus nowise neglecting the freedom of the dilettante or the discipline of the specialist, the sage is above all in quest of significance.

The dilettante has always been with us and in us, but the specialist is a product of the modern extension of knowledge. In antiquity a man like Aristotle could carry in his own head all that was known. The rise and the amazing spread of modern learning and investigation have replaced the universal savant by the special expert. The vast growth of technical perfection of science which the concentration on specific problems yielded in experiment and theory alike, and the life-transforming results of the application of this specially tested knowledge to the practical needs of medicine, agriculture, transportation,

and other forms of communication have made the modern man a devotee of specialized scientific methods.

The prestige of modern science, pure and applied, has accustomed our age to the view of the world as a mechanism. To this materialism in theory the popular mind has responded with a practical materialism, with the demand to translate the mechanism of nature into machinery and to exploit the machine for immediate material advantage. In the Middle Ages science was called the handmaid of theology, but our society is asking it to become the cook of industry. This prevailing technological ideal is reflected in much educational policy of our time. We may note it in the professed new methods of teaching elementary science in the public schools. On a more advanced level it is manifested in the deliberately utilitarian direction of so much scientific work in our universities.

Against this aim of scientific investigation as primarily an exploitation of nature, the ideal of pure science has always had its eminent advocates, urging the intrinsic worth of knowledge for its own sake. We are reminded of Pasteur who early in his career refused an offer to concentrate his mind on experiments likely to benefit the silk industry. Pasteur feared that his scientific intelligence might be cramped by any such initial narrowing of interest. In the long run, pure scientific thinking is itself the most fruitful, creative in theory and in practice. How often it achieves results of the most far-reaching practical benefits, the career of Pasteur himself illustrates preeminently.

While the scientific specialist is thus balancing his choice between the aims of pure science and the technological promotion of research, another issue confronts him, and confronts also the directors of educational policy: the issue between specialized methods and intellectual synthesis. Two observations demand mention here. First, the very advance in scientific investigation has raised many complex problems which tax

the resources of the specialist and require cooperation of workers from different fields. With the expansion of the scientific territory important borderlands are revealed where various disciplines touch and overlap: mathematical physics, physical chemistry, biochemistry, psychophysics, physiological psychology, social psychology, historical sociology. Expanding knowledge manifests itself as not provincial but a commonwealth. A second growing conviction must be impressed on the specialist: that no one set of postulates can exhaust or do full justice to the vast complexity of nature. "Hamlet's principle" is in operation here: There is more in heaven and earth than is dreamed of in any one set of abstractions. Precisely the leading minds in the various sciences recognize the need for critical reconsideration of fundamental principles and some ultimate philosophical synthesis.

I have a very good friend, a distinguished scientist in his own field, who is also a mind of great versatility. He knows some philosophy and some German, and wished to learn more of both, so he started to read Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in the original. After he had been at it for some time I asked him how he was getting on. "Well," he replied, "I understand the words, and usually the sentences, but I miss many of the paragraphs." Modern specialists have persistently tried to read the book of Nature. In the editions of this book which the various sciences provide, we can surely read more clearly the words and even the sentences; but do we yet understand the paragraphs? How are all the tested truths of the various sciences, of physics and psychology, of biology and ethics, how are they true together? Their consistency with each other is certainly not self-evident. Is it attainable, and if so, how is the consistency to be understood and expressed? A great modern physicist, Clerk Maxwell, stated this philosophical belief, that the book of Nature is a book and not just a magazine.

Many contemporary thinkers ignore this problem. Our universities include men who are specialists by definite choice, who virtually dismiss the demand for correlation and for a world view of things. If they had their way, they would make intellectual activity not less but more specialized. Is it owing to the elaborate departmentalizing of our institutions of higher learning that knowledge itself has been so parceled? To judge from the *Report on Graduate Instruction,* published a number of years ago by the American Council on Education, it is still possible for a student to pursue advanced work in Physics and Chemistry, without further narrowing his field; but when I looked for similar information about Biology, I found no notice of it. Instead of Biology, I noted special entries and tabulations of Animal Nutrition, Bacteriology, Botany, Entomology, Genetics, Plant Pathology, Plant Physiology, Zoology.

This scientific manner is affecting the humanities, though the very character of the study of human culture should have discouraged too narrow specialization. How many students have sought from college and university an understanding of the structure and spirit of modern civilization! Those who seek bread are often given an assortment of stones. At a university summer school I once met another visiting professor and inquired what his field of interest was. He did not tell me that he was a historian, or even an American historian. "I am the Andrew Jackson period," he said. This sort may be found in various departments. Here is a young indubitable expert in philosophy. By chance, my part of the conversation turns to Kant's ethics, but he cuts me short: "I am not concerned in any way with Kant or with ethics. I am a logician." It is not only that he is ignorant of ethics or of Kant. We are all ignorant of so many things. It is his pride in ignoring ethics and Kant, which somehow confirms and countersigns him as a special expert logician.

Is this judgment too severe? Let us consider it, keeping an eye on our academic programs and schedules. The student might seek or might be led to understand our civilization so as to be an intelligent, all-round member of it. But what do we usually give him? To begin with, the entire scientific achievement is distributed among the various laboratories. He may have physics, chemistry, biology, psychology; but if he should become interested in the broad enterprise of modern science, he would likely have to trace the scientific scene without guidance, for a history or criticism of scientific method does not usually appear on the university program. Art, religion, literature, economics, social and political science: each one is given separate treatment, and in some cases deliberately separate, to emphasize technical-scientific perfection of method. And in these ways our student may get many different knowledges, but no understanding of the integral whole, no insight.

At the risk of repetition, I should like to avoid misunderstanding at this point. The thorough technical grasp of any particular problem does require specialized methods. To get precise knowledge of any field, one has to concentrate on that field. We cannot be proving all the theorems at the same time. This is the merit of specialized research. But while we must make use of abstractions, we should not forget that we are using them. The part that we isolate from the whole for more careful analysis should not in the end remain abstracted from its setting. Unless we also see it in its large context, unless the synthesis of interpretation goes hand in hand with technical analysis, we get a one-sided and distorted view, a view which may be correct in details but is essentially untrue and misleading.

Minds thus mistakenly educated may become the minds of skilled technicians, but not really intelligent, that is understanding, cultured minds. It is as if, instead of grasping and

appreciating the texture and design of a rare carpet, we were to pull out all the different kinds of threads and study and classify and label each lot. While in our various university departments we gather learnedly our threads and strands, the sense of the real design may escape us: the design and the texture, let us say, of the great seventeenth century, which was not only the century of Richelieu, Cromwell, and the Thirty Years' War, but likewise the age of Milton and Molière, of Rembrandt and Velasquez, Galileo and Newton, Hugo Grotius and Hobbes, the age of Descartes and Pascal and Spinoza and Leibniz. The study and the program of instruction in our modern humanities would require basic revision before they would give us such a living realization. But the difference between it and what we usually get would be like the difference between the knowledge of a man which his intimate friend has and the knowledge of him that may be possessed by his grocer or his laundryman.

A similar academic convention has led to the teaching of literature, especially foreign literature, as a part of each separate language study, French, German, Spanish, as the case may be. Literature reflects the intellectual and cultural currents of the age producing it and is thus bound up with the history of civilization. Though it does express national genius, it fuses strains and tendencies of thought and feeling which cross national boundaries. This point should not be overstated. A masterpiece does lose something vital in translation; we cannot quite spare a poet's language if we are to understand him fully. Reading the *Divine Comedy* in translation may be a fine experience; still it is as if Dante, in the absence of Beatrice, were to entertain himself with her sister. All this may be urged in support of the intimate relation of literature to language, and it should be granted. But is it not likewise true that to split literature under languages is to lose much of what it has to

say to us? Surely the great masters can do more than provide us with readings for foreign language courses.

With such thoughts in mind one sometimes has the vision of a more enlightened humanism in our colleges and universities which will put the grammarians and the philologists together as they together belong, but put together also the students of literature. Both philology and literature would gain from such a reassembling, for one cannot go very far in either literature or philology without realizing the importance of comparative studies. Even more important and enlightening would be a change in our methods which would bring literary men and historians and philosophers and social scientists in active cooperation, to deepen our understanding of the integral character and spirit of our civilization.

In these ways growing minds might advance in real humanistic education, real literature, real history. It would be real philosophy, too, not the pedantic recital and dissection of a welter of doctrines, but the pursuit of the ongoing march of ideas, the epic of man's struggle to make sense of the world in which he lives.

Insight or wisdom goes still farther. We cannot be satisfied with description and explanation however comprehensive, unless we proceed to some evaluation. In asking of every idea, What of it? our demand is not only informational but also purposive. Our understanding reveals the world to us as a system, a cosmos; our sense of values recognizes it as a hierarchy. To be really educated and enlightened is to be a connoisseur of values.

Never before has mankind been in greater need of such a critical view of life, a balanced sense of values. In the growing perception of this need is the hope of our society, for the neglect of it has brought us to the brink of disaster. Where spiritual culture lags behind material progress, and barbarian

spirits expertly command the resources of the most advanced science and technology, our civilization is menaced with ruin. The moral sterility of so much science and so much scholarly learning is due to the fact that they reach neither bedrock nor summit in their views of human nature. Modern science has refashioned Western civilization inside and out, has expanded incredibly men's reach of activity and their control over nature, is opening before us ever larger vistas. But the modern cult of progress and the worship of science have been rudely shaken by the disastrous turn of affairs in our time, both at home and abroad. The perfection of scientific knowledge and technical skill have made war only the more ghastly and overwhelming catastrophe. We tremble for our civilization, lest it destroy itself through having more knowledge and power within its grasp than wisdom to control and direct them. We can split the atom, but we still cannot bind men together in a decent society.

Even as agents of production and distribution, science and technology are today weighed in the balances. The so-called labor-saving machinery has not saved labor from distress. Goods move much faster, but still they do not reach those who need them. Even in our America we witness nation-wide destitution in the midst of abundance, and indeed, so we have been informed, due to overproduction. The nation was in depression because it had an excess of everything but the one thing needful, wisdom. Can there be any doubt of the demands which this situation imposes on our whole educational system?

Practical wisdom requires clear perception of guiding ideals. Unless we know our ideal aim we cannot take the first step rightly, any more than we can draw a straight line from any point until we know our objective. And more important still in practice, that straight line will not be the right line until we are assured that it is the line we ought to draw, leading to

the right and true end. We may know most expertly how to get or how to avoid certain results. But the crucial question still remains: Are these things and results really worth getting, or are they to be dismissed or avoided? This view of life, the ethical view, is that of an actively integrated consciousness. The ideals or principles which command a man's intelligent devotion are expressions of his own deepest meaning. We rightly say that he is identified with them. From thoughtless impulsiveness and instability of judgment and will, to the critical insight and steady resolution of a mature conscience, moral progress is marked by progressive achievement of integrity and harmony in our outlook on life.

4. OUR HERITAGE IN THE HUMANITIES

We have noted the aim and the range of true education, which achieves insight in thinking, fruition of character in living. We may observe that this educational process is not restricted to school or college. The so-called institutions of learning are only more explicit and systematic agencies of a pervasive influence by which society molds and trains its members. The same formative direction which any type of society gives to its schools may be noted also in individual outlook or in general opinion and custom. The social psychology of any people or of any epoch is the cumulative result of this social education. The resistance or revolt of the non-conformist soul is apt to be violent just because it is a hard wrench from the customary. Yet even the radical and rebel is scarcely alone; he also is educated in his tradition of defiance, in the struggle that has its heroes and its persistent influences and loyalties.

So we may trace in and out of the classroom the ongoing process by which the social system of values maintains itself in the rising generation, and the conforming or defiant response of youth to this manifold influence. One of the gravest

problems which faces the democratic nations in the post-war reconstruction is how to cope with the millions of young fanatics educated in the Nazi and in the Japanese cults of aggression. Our own final reliance is on the deep-rooted convictions which our democratic system has bred in our youth. It is of paramount importance that all the social agencies clarify and revitalize these convictions, for in them is the security of our civilization.

The humanities are the abiding expression of men's choicest experiences, three strains of the great tradition handed down from the ages, ancient, medieval, and modern. So Pindar wrote: "The thing that one says well goes forth with a voice unto everlasting."

From classical antiquity we inherit Greek art and history, epic and dramatic poetry, philosophy, and Roman law and institutions. This is the achievement of great men who thought and spoke and lived greatly, in self-reliant concentration, who faced the problems of nature and human nature without illusions and without humility. Possessed by the sense of beauty and harmony, they bent their genius to give harmony and beauty concrete embodiment. Dedicated to truth wherever it might lead, they pushed to the utmost horizons of knowledge, yet, baffled but unyielding, ever felt the boundless expanse of the unknown. Their speech is winged in Homer, searches the heart of man in Aeschylus, Sophocles, or Euripides, aspires and reaches to divine heights in Plato, to cosmic sweep in Aristotle and Lucretius, and in Virgil wields "the stateliest measure ever moulded by the lips of man."

These men believed in human perfection as natural and attainable here and now, and they gave us not only the precept of it but also the example. How is our life to be lived to the full, most characteristically and harmoniously? This problem and its various solutions engage the Greek and the Roman

after him. They are expressed in Plato's vision of the life of just and orderly development of our capacities through rational control and direction; in Aristotle's ideal of the balanced life of reasonable moderation, the Golden Mean; in the Epicurean dream of simple frugal contentment; in the Stoic self-possession and serenity through mastery of all unruly passions; in the Neoplatonic consecration of spirit and aspiration to the Divine. To deny ourselves the chance of sharing in all this noble experience is to miss some of the greatest pages in the book of humanity. Therefore we should give support to those who plead for classical education in our schools; even though in this day we may have to read the classics in translation.

A second heritage of our civilization is the treasury of the Christian tradition. It brought to men a living realization of the supremacy of spiritual values. It taught the world a new truth which classical antiquity had never grasped and which, alas, men for nineteen centuries have been slow to possess fully. This is the Christian truth of the infinite and inviolable value of a man's soul, irrespective of race or social rank or status, man's eternal worth in the sight of God. Together with this, Christianity taught men a divine ideal of perfection, manifest to us in the life of Jesus, which made men's pride unseemly. Jesus taught us humility before the ideal, a sense of spiritual need, and a faith in divine guidance: the conviction of sin and the hope of salvation. This gospel of man's woeful need but also of his eternal worth and infinite possibilities was more than a theological doctrine. It was a spiritual power destined to reform our entire civilization. If in the sight of God we are all brothers in need, then respect for the inviolable moral dignity of men becomes a basic principle in social relations. If the kingdom of God is within us, we may trust in salvation through Divine Grace, but we must also seek

to realize human brotherhood in our lives here and now.

This ideal resists and overcomes slavery, mitigates oppression and exploitation, raises the social status and dignity of women. In the course of centuries it permeates Western thought and feeling. Sometimes supported by the Church, at other times in conflict with ecclesiastic leadership, yet moved by ideals that have their source in the Gospel, men seek to express their conviction of the inherent worth and rights of common men in terms of reformed political and social-economic institutions. This is the democratic trend in our civilization. Those tyrants who tried in our day to clamp their shackles on the bodies and the souls of men recognized in the Christian spirit the greatest obstacle to their schemes of oppression. Our churches and our schools must revitalize these all-important convictions which are the roots of tolerance and fair play, brotherly cooperation and the preservation of human rights and liberties.

The third heritage of our modern life is in the modern spirit itself. The term "modern" is used here in its proper historical sense, to indicate the period of reconstruction in our civilization during the past four centuries since the Renaissance. The radical turn of the modern mind, in breaking with the traditions and methods of medieval-scholastic authority, was manifested first in the revival of classical Greek and Roman ideas. But the modern age did not break completely with its Christian-medieval past, nor did it remain merely a revival of classical antiquity. It undertook to face its own problems critically. So it turned to the direct investigation of nature and achieved the modern sciences. It sought to understand human nature, man's range and capacities individual and social. In all this change of emphasis from theology to science and to secular human activities, the modern spirit altered the earlier dogmatic-monastic motivation. But the living Christian ideals

were not extinguished in the modern reconstruction. Their abiding influence is manifest in many of the highest achievements of our modern life.

The rise of modern democracy is itself the chief instance of that blend of traditional and radically modern ideas which marks our civilization at its best. Many of us, heirs of the democratic life, assume without question our rights and liberties in the commonwealth. Secure in our own possession of them, we regard with some charity and more condescension the less privileged in other lands who have not yet attained to our standards. But we have not earned full title to our precious heritage. We need to explore our roots and foundations, to know them and be certain of their soundness. Today more than ever we should keep these gains in the humanities clearly before our eyes, realize their high worth and defend them more intelligently and more resolutely, that the flood of barbarism may not again threaten to engulf us and destroy all that makes our lives really worth living.

We have been considering in this chapter a basic problem in morals from the educational angle. How are young minds to be trained in the technical mastery of their specialties; how are they to become also enlightened and responsive to the wider range and deeper significance of human life and ideals? We have revealed to the world our prevailing genius in meeting the overwhelming demands of the war emergency. But now, as the problems of the post-war reconstruction confront us, the real worth of our higher education is being tested. Do the men and the women who have come out of our classrooms have the understanding and the vision required for the achievement of real world-wide peace? In the crisis of national destiny, education manifests its vital relation to the fruition or the frustration of human lives. Wanting its right direction, men drift along in bigoted and sterile living, or are swept by pass-

ing furies, blind greed, futile schemes. But in the spirit of true enlightenment, education can and does preserve and renew in each generation the abiding values of civilization. Through its right guidance, the heirs of great tradition can also become pioneers.

Chapter 12

CULTURE IN WORK AND IN PLAY

1. CULTURE: DAILY LIVING MADE SIGNIFICANT

"Culture" is an abused word. Our urban advertisers have vulgarized it by their boasts about the "cultural assets" of their cities, and the implications of German *Kultur* have made it odious. Yet we have no other word that quite serves its purpose or could replace it to express, not intellectual eminence or sterling character or fine competence or distinction of manner or social grace or nobility of taste or keen sense of beauty, not any one of these but the blend of them all, the full fruition and rich harmony of spiritual faculties, mellowness of personality. We have seen that real education points to it as chief aim and result, and our moral outlook leads us, beyond any constricted frame of goodness, to this more expansive reach of personal worth.

Definitions of culture abound; we have set one as the title of this section. Culture is daily living made significant. We are constantly inclined to think of our modern life as drab. We look for culture in the occasional high lights and holiday attire of otherwise routine and undistinguished living. But, so regarded, culture remains alien and artificial, and the humble admiration of the Philistine for it is ambiguous and hardly

genuine. When our man of affairs discriminates between business and cultural assets, he pays tribute to the latter but with only professed regret concentrates on the real business at hand.

We should first clear up the confusion of the holiday conception of culture. We can no more attain true culture as the occasional garnishing of our life than an architect can achieve a masterpiece by erecting his building and then as a flourish applying the art and decoration. The fact is that none of the true virtues and excellencies of human life are such gala fineries. Unless they are of the homespun fabric of everyday they are apt to be spurious trumpery. Genuine religion cannot be merely a Sabbath morning manner. Real morality includes more than being now and then on our good behavior. A cultivated intelligence goes beyond the occasional ordeal of a reasonable conversation or a serious book. True courtesy and good breeding reach deeper than the dressed-up display of company manners. Living art penetrates life to the core and is not the exceptional polishing of a generally crude existence. True culture signifies not the decoration but the permeation of life by these values. Goethe summed it up for us: "One should every day look at a good picture, hear some good music, read a good poem, and if possible, say a sensible word."

In the conception of culture as daily living made significant, a demand is made on our nature, and a lofty claim for it. Culture is the grace of common life, and common life can attain unto that grace. Like all ideals, it is a discipline and a hope.

Our nature is not single but dual. Our life career is ever on a slope, an upward but also a downward slope, with the urge for the ideal and the drag of dullness and depravity. We all know the rare thrill and joy of energies far-flung and creative, that reveal the best and the utmost of us, mind and body—life on the outermost ridge of endeavor. Ordinarily, however,

we are reluctant to be so fully ourselves. Sinews and soul both feel a tension and a flabbiness, and our life is a tug between these two impulses. The supreme promise of our being, though it is also a hazard, is in the urge to reach our summit; but our failure and futility are mostly due to dull inertia.

Consider how much vice and vulgarity issue from this loose-lying tangle of sense and soul. What is hackneyed vulgarity in speech but the inability or the laziness of the mind to fix its ideas in focus, to give them lucid and distinctive expression? We let the same driveling phrase of popular currency serve any purpose. I had a yardman whose vocabulary consisted mainly of a two-letter phrase. It served his every intention, to express pleased agreement or occasional contented surprise or else venture in criticism, or cajolery, disappointment, sullen or appealing protest, or more often a nondescript comment, distinguished by a versatile modulation of tone or grunt, but all of them using the same invariable "O.K." Much prejudice and bigotry likewise are due to the unreadiness of our thinking to exert and realize itself—thinking, our distinctive but also our least congenial activity. Back of the humbug drive of furious sensuality we may find our reluctance to possess and realize ourselves harmoniously. There is no fraud like unregulated appetite, and many of us console and maybe flatter ourselves by declaring our strong passions, and overlooking our weak intelligence.

This craven laggard in us seeks exemption from high endeavor in any field by his lip admiration for culture as refined, too refined and exceptional, as not for him, not for everyday living. The lazy slave in us would rather pay this tribute of eulogy and then resume his dull routine or duller pleasure, than gird himself for the struggle of his higher faculties that might earn him his freedom of creative expression. The ideal of culture as daily living made significant is a chal-

lenge to our souls, to rise to our higher capacities, in perception, in thought and outlook, in enjoyment, in action; to realize and possess our available treasury of choice experience;

> . . . Turn away from half-way being,
> And in fullness, goodness, beauty
> Resolutely live!

This active career which achieves culture is our self-discipline, but it is also our liberation. In one region after another we can attain to more thorough self-understanding and to richer and more complete self-consciousness, and thus progressively achieve and fulfill ourselves. That is what we mean when we call a cultured man a real personality. The originality which we recognize in such a person is other than willful or unprincipled oddity. It is his own, but through it he has himself shared the best that humanity has tried and treasured. The life of culture is a genuinely individual but also a thoroughly universalized life. This is the promise of culture: the richest heritage of mankind is within your reach; put forth all that you are in order to possess it, and it shall be yours.

2. WORK AND PLAY: THE PENDULUM OF NORMAL LIVING

A person's primary concern is with his daily work. Even before assuming their life's vocation, young people are brought up to look forward to it, to prepare for it. Only the hopeless invalid, or the mentally or morally unfit treat their occupation as a blank. This hard core of our daily life has been generally accepted as our plain lot and destiny:

> Man works from sun to sun,
> But woman's work is never done.

Was it a weary sense of toiling humanity that found utterance in the old Hebrew tale of man's expulsion from his paradise of

childlike bliss? "Cursed be the ground for thy sake. . . . In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." Though normally we should not share this estimate of work as a burden and a curse, who has not sometimes shared the dismal feeling of the ancient story? To be without work would be a most desolate condition or prospect. Yet the laborer is ever chafing and complaining of his hire or his hours or his hardships. He demands a betterment of his working conditions; and he also pleads for some occasional relief from them altogether, as his plain human need: "All work and no play make Jack a dull boy."

In dealing with the ethical problem of work and play it is important that we grasp their essential nature and the role of each of them in the rhythm and harmony of fruitful living. A common but misleading tendency emphasizes the contrast between the heavy exertion in work—hard work, a man's work —and the light ease of play, a child's play. But the least reflection should suffice to show that men often and gladly tax and overtax themselves in play activities. Surely it is not the light ease of a football game or of a mountain climb or an endurance swim which mark them as varieties of play. Another erroneous idea contrasts the enjoyable quality of play with the irksome and at best only tolerated character of most work. Some kinds of work required in our social order have been branded as hateful; of many others it has been said, the less of them the better. As we shall note presently, there is ample reason for this estimate of work, but the general inference expressed in this sharp contrast is astray. By way of correction, we might note the widespread common joy in so much of men's daily work, and on the other hand, the many wearisome elements in play, as dull training and insufferable finger exercises, and also the distasteful or painful parts of many play activities to which we have to be inured if we are to continue playing. A third confused notion uses utility as the distinguishing

factor. Work is or is normally meant to be a useful activity, whereas play dismisses any thought of utility. This sort of reflection is not corrected by merely pointing out the bodily and mental restorative usefulness of play, and the futile and really useless character of some kinds of work in our society. It is when we inquire further into the nature and role of utility in work and in play that we grasp better their interrelation.

Both work and play may be more or less arduous, and parts of both may be more or less enjoyable, more or less useful. What really distinguishes them from each other is this: work is activity that in a large measure points beyond itself to its end or purpose; whereas play is mainly self-aimed and self-rewarding. Man works primarily to earn his self-support or to achieve certain results of individual or social advantage, certain ulterior values. But man plays for the sake of playing: "the play is the thing." It should not be overlooked that our distinction is qualified; it is valid only if it is not taken too sharply. There is a borderland, a region of shared qualities in which each of these two, work and play, normally manifests to a certain extent some features of the other. If we may here cast a glance ahead towards our conclusion, we may say that in a well-ordered life one's work must have some of the redeeming qualities of play, and play some of the rewarding aspects of work.

A topic which has engrossed some psychologists and sociologists, concerning the basic theory and explanation of play, will be noted here only in so far as it concerns our ethical inquiry. Play has been described as the spontaneous discharge of overabundant energies not claimed or not taxed by one's daily work, and so finding an outlet in freely indulged and simulated play work or play acting. Another theory has emphasized, not man's zest to discharge his excess of unspent powers, but his far more usual need of rest and restoration of fatigued

energies. Play engages and may even tire body and mind, but in ways which distract, relax, refresh us. A third account of the essential nature of play emphasizes its biological-evolutionary function in human and more generally in animal life. It is a sort of training of the kitten, the puppy, the boy or girl, in anticipation of their respective occupations in life. More critical inquiry would scarcely vindicate the exclusive validity of any one of these theories. Their merit is in their cumulative significance; they supplement each other in selecting for emphasis important aspects of play activities. They show the close relation of play to work whether as preparation for it or as relief from it or as free display of powers and faculties not taxed by it.

So we note this alternation of work and play in our experience, the normally pendular sweep from one to the other in our daily course of life. What characteristics in the daily pendulum of activities call for special ethical emphasis? What compensations of values unrealized in their work do toiling men seek in their occasional leisure and play? Might not these values somehow and in some measure be assured to them also in their work, by the right reform of their daily program? What elements in various play activities tend to frustrate the realization of human values? Might not the creative quality of much recreation be safeguarded by emphasizing in play some constructive and significant features more distinctively characteristic of work?

Working or playing, men in two different ways seek and may find realization of character and personality. Yet this basic fulfillment does not proceed along the same lines, and the hazards of going astray are different in work and in play. We may consider these briefly, not neglecting the peculiar merits and defects of work and play but keeping in view the basic principle of value manifested in both. It will be re-

vealed as pointing to the ideal which we have recognized as that of culture.

Work is commonly described as a man's way of getting a livelihood. This is largely correct but it is not thoroughly true. The fuller truth is that man hopes to find in his work the way of getting his livelihood that would develop or express at least some of his principal interests in life. In his choice of work a man of moral intelligence seeks primarily his channel of life-long fulfillment, what he most prefers to be doing day after day, his own venture and adventure in life. We should be clear about this central truth, despite much seeming evidence to the contrary. The lure of high financial reward may lead a person into a type of work that would not have been selected on its own merits or appeal. Even more common is the lot of multitudes who, glad to get anything, simply try to make the best of whatever job they can hold, hoping vaguely that something more suitable will turn up. But we all know that neither of these two kinds of people find in their work what they should expect of it and what it ought to yield: significance and satisfaction.

We may see what is lacking in a man whose work is to him mainly the source of a fortune or at any rate of a living. Such work is done simply for what it pays. It has none of the intrinsic worth which we recognized as the main characteristic of play. Therefore it is natural that men should seek to do the least of such work for the most pay that they can get. Not only greed but sheer boredom in their work commits multitudes to the fight for lower hours and higher wages. On the other hand, we can also understand why some men contentedly pursue their craft or their art or profession, naturally hoping for as high income from it as may be, but at any rate thoroughly at home and glad in doing the work in which they have found themselves. Our discussion at this point raises some problems

in vocational ethics and in the ethics of our economic system. They will be examined in our two following chapters.

Even if a person has truly found his vocation, however, he cannot expect that every bit of his work should be creative adventure. All work whatever is bound to include some elements of mere routine. The man who complains of his due share of it or tries to unload it regularly on others is an unreasonable slacker. The work of multitudes, however, is so thoroughly mechanized as to swamp all opportunity to find self-expression and significance in the performance of it. Routine work of this sort becomes dull and deadly drudgery, and men hate it as a curse.

On the side of play, we may note a corresponding swing of the pendulum of human activity. The values of play, we say, are chiefly intrinsic; we play for the sake of playing. But these values, intrinsic in play, must be genuine and fruitful. If a man's chosen work is ideally meant to provide him a daily avenue of self-expression, the kind of play which he freely selects reveals the range and tone of his personality. The best kinds of play are those which engage the free exercise of our higher faculties and so include the higher enjoyments. This does not mean that play should be mainly a feast of soul and a contest of wits. Be it aesthetic or athletic, it is the higher and better the more it engages our skill and subtlety and the more creative it is. That is what we mean when we say of a man admiringly that he is an artist in his play. To be sure, only a prig would fail to recognize and to welcome a certain amount of sheer amusement and some plain foolery withal. But where creative qualities are altogether lacking in one's play, recreation scarcely deserves its name. A person then brings nothing of worth to his leisure, and finds nothing worthwhile in it. This is mere pastime, empty diversion. Play may be even worse than a void, of no positive worth. It may fritter away our

powers and capacities, and instead of bringing us refreshed to our work, leave us only duller and more unfit. This is the hazard of dissipation, incipient ruin of soul and body.

Fix in one glance now the pendular sweep of human activities, the two opposite extremes of frustration in work and play, and the significant and creative zone of living. In work we must combat the brutalizing effect of deadly drudgery, accept our minimum of routine but bend our skill and intelligence to reduce it. In play we should resist any tendency towards dissipation, be wary of much empty diversion. In both play and work, the decisive norm is that of fruitful self-expression. The best work and also the best play is that which realizes a man's character so that he truly finds and fulfills himself in whatever he does. Both work and play may be avenues of culture.

3. LEISURE, CULTURE, AND THE ARTS

We may now turn more directly to aesthetic experience, but not in a spirit of compromise with the prevalent delusion already criticized, which identifies culture with artistic competence or polish. Culture attunes the entire scale of our daily experience to significant expression. Because it achieves this fine harmony of living, we could catch its characteristic tone in any type of rightly directed activity, be it work or play. We could discuss culture without centering our attention on art. But we are bound to recognize that aesthetic experience is especially congenial to cultural influence or expression. Mind and character are formed and transformed by all that engages thought and feelings; but few experiences are more potent factors in this molding of personality than those which arouse the soul to aesthetic delight. Perhaps our inner culture, the sap and savor of our spirit, is affected more thoroughly by what we detest or enjoy than by what we learn or forget. It is a hack-

neyed phrase but true, that art is a serious matter—as intimate as love, and vital in refining or in depraving the soul.

Goethe wrote of "the Americas of the mind." In the artist's life of the imagination there are vision and adventure and the discovery of new worlds. An artist's masterpiece is such an America of the mind: a new world of meaning expressed in terms of abiding beauty, be it in marble or paint or words or musical tone. And in this great vision we are privileged to share. To see eye to eye with a great artist is to expand and enrich the world in which we live. Is the average life a dull and drab affair? It need not be, but even if it is, it can be enkindled and illumined by the gleams of poetry and art.

The aesthetic experience is a participation. It is never passive. What takes place is a genuine creative activity so living and so contagious in expression that it can be shared and recreated by the beholder. The beauty of the picture or the statue was in the artist's soul, and it can enter your soul and mine. The beauty is itself an experience.

Consider music: it is a kind of language, self-expression in the composition and the performance of it, in which the listener participates. All these are essential to musical values. The beauty of the music is not on the composer's page alone; it is not all there, nor under the performer's fingers. It is and it must be also in the ears and in the soul of him who listens. Through the arousal of the soul by harmony and in the soul's response to this arousal—as it were between the composer's page and the instrument, and between these and the audience —a great harmony becomes a shared possession, and the experience of it is musical beauty.

Musicians and audience are indispensable to each other. Especially in our age of noise and gabble and broadcast caterwauling, lacking ear-flaps we are deafened and our better taste is insulted at every turn. We are so confused that even the

little good music in us remains unuttered. And yet we could have it, if we really choose to hear it. If we choose to hear it often enough, we would not endure the other. Our society should cherish its true artists through whom and with whom great harmonies may become ours. Here is great speech, Beethoven's, that reaches the heart of man, ennobles, transfigures. This speech most of us cannot speak, but we can hear it. If we hear it again and again, we may come to understand it, and with understanding comes response, and with response enriched experience. All this and more is in a symphony concert: the transforming and the mellowing of human lives by musical culture.

Amazing is the work of the poetic faculty. As the word "poetic" signifies, it is creative. Again and again it achieves what to ordinary view seems impossible, yet once achieved shows itself as the most natural and inevitable thing in the world. With apparently the simplest materials and the most everyday subjects, the creative insight of the poet achieves his marvels. Where on the surface no meaning and no beauty were to be seen, beauty and meaning are revealed, and we are transfigured through the experience of them. By subtle imaginative insight, charged with intense feeling mastered by contemplation, the poet seizes and communicates the abiding worth in the experience of the moment, love or wonder or joy or sorrow. Most intimate but never familiar, he speaks forth his own heart so deeply that he reaches all hearts. In reading him we seem to be betrayed or discovered to ourselves, one with him and with all men in the high adventure of spirit, by the magic of his poetic utterance of it. Some of the finest experiences on earth are ours for the asking; the poet's works are on our shelves; but they need our bestowal to yield us their beauty. Great poetry achieves in various readers various grades of beauty. Keats was awakened to fine utterance by Spenser's

poems and by Chapman's version of Homer. In some degree this may be our experience also.

We should refer again to the value of actively cultivated interest in the humanities. This thoroughly humane interest and outlook is especially important to the mind whose training has been concentrated on problems of physical range and mechanical efficiency. We are told that it was a traditional Jewish custom for every rabbinical student preparing for his religious calling to learn also some trade or handicraft. That was a very good idea, to keep men who were to be devoted mainly to spiritual work in homely touch with the plain actualities of physical nature. The other side is equally important. Precisely that man whose daily bent is going to be technical-mechanical owes it to himself to open up the other windows of his intelligence, to become alert and responsive to the larger significance and values of cultivated living. A humanely responsive life of this sort expands the range of our nature and enriches its substance. It opens to us fields of fine experience to which we might have remained dull and blind, and our life meager and less fully realized. An English lady once said to the painter Turner: "Sir, I have never seen such sunsets as you paint." "That may be, Madam," Turner replied, "but don't you sometimes wish that you had?"

We have spoken of culture and of aesthetic experience in individual terms. We may, if we only know and will, turn from the dreary routine, from the vulgarity and the stupidity which surround us. We can live on the heights. Refinement of personality requires mainly intelligence, self-understanding, and the right choice of values. Mainly so, but not altogether. Though some men of superior gifts can do this in any society, not all of us can. Societies also are confronted with the same alternatives, face the same prospects. The social problem of culture is this: Will our society be one in which the finer interests of men

thrive, or in which they are stunted and wither? Fine as the experience of a thoroughly cultured personality is, there is no fairer sight on earth than a cultured commonwealth. That was Plato's "pattern laid up in heaven," and very rarely have men matched it on earth.

Of cities and peoples, just as of people, we may say that they are no other than the aims with which they are identified. There are aims and interests which engross a man so as to isolate and stunt and harden his personality, that may increase his property but leave him poor and shriveled. And there are other interests and aims that expand the person, make him more humane, open the windows and door of his soul. These higher values of culture that make human life humane may be most intimately individual, but in social cooperation they attain their full fruition. To live a life fully rational, we require a rational society; so for a life of rich aesthetic activity we need a society of fine responsiveness and critical taste. Thinker or artist and public need, elicit, sustain, perfect each other.

In the most personal experience a certain self-forgetfulness is essential to self-realization. To make our subject truly ours, we must absorb and lose ourselves in it. Unless we yield ourselves to the spell of art, music, or poetry, their beauty will not enter our souls, and all our effort at enjoyment is vain. So it is in moral activity and so likewise in religion. This utter absorption and consecration of the higher life, though intensely personal throughout, has something overindividual, disinterested in its tone, and is social in its full range of expression. The perfect culture is in a society dedicated to perfection. In the year 1401 the city fathers of Seville passed the following resolution: "Let us citizens of Seville build a cathedral to our Lord so great that those who come after us, as they look at it, will think us mad for ever having attempted it." This is the speech of ideal self-outreaching that achieves perfection.

Cities as well as individuals must see to it that they become something else besides only big and old and rich. To the superficial view, material resources seem the most substantial and real—real estate—yet in the end they turn out to be the least abiding. This is the old lesson of human experience, and our recent depression served to confirm it. The things that outlast the ravages of time and fortune are the treasures of the mind. The man or the nation that really lives in the ongoing life and thought of mankind is the man or the nation that has thought, felt, expressed truth, beauty, character of worth.

The spirit of culture, which we have been considering here especially in its aesthetic expression enters every field of thought and activity. It is dedicated to the ideal of spiritual enrichment and harmony in everyday living. It is not so rare a spirit as some despisers of our modern age would have us believe, nor so hopeless of attainment. It is a liberal spirit, alert and alive to new fact and new truth, yet not prizing the new for its novelty or the old for its age, but in the old and in the new alike seeking and prizing truth and justice whatever they be. It is a critical spirit, resisting credulity and bigotry, and most critical of itself. It is a tolerant spirit, trying to understand and appreciate even when it resists, and with imaginative sympathy according to others the freedom which it demands for itself, and ready to make reasonable concessions or to change sides if better evidence or higher right demand it, rating loyalty to truth above conformity to any particular version of it. It is a spirit of cosmic range and depth, counting no knowledge as unimportant, nor any knowledge as more important than the wisdom which it yields; a sensitive spirit, finely responsive to the abiding values of life, poetic, just, and naturally pious. And it is a spirit social in the truest meaning of that term: living and helping to live, generously entering into the lives of others, eliciting and responsive to worth of char-

acter or intelligence in others, with a deep sense of duty and common fair play, more alive to high appeal than to low advantage, and most alive to the challenge of the ideal, to make it a reality in human lives. It is the spirit of man in civilization.

Chapter 13

VOCATIONAL ETHICS

1. A JOB, A PROFESSION, A VOCATION

Our preceding chapter included a general discussion of the interrelation of work and play in the attainment of significance in daily living. The ethical problems of work require some further examination in their individual and in their social bearings. Work is man's usual means of self-support; it is also in many cases, and ought to be in all, an important avenue of self-development and personal expression. We tend to it as our livelihood; we may and should also cherish it as a main value of our life. The distinction here is between work regarded simply as a source of profit, and work that appeals to us on its own account, that engages and develops our personality.

Let us recall our distinction of values as contributory (instrumental) and intrinsic. A man's work may be only a condition of material gain. It may also be contributory to his higher life. The work itself may be valued, intrinsically. As our daily process of "earning our keep," work is simply the way in which we acquire our share, or at least a share, of the economic values and goods we require. Work only for profit is an endured necessity in ordinary human affairs. A man works

because he lacks the means to dispense with labor. To be sure, one may find his work-for-profit actually so profitable that he may value it for providing him abundance of means to procure his desired goods and values. Or he may become obsessed with the idea of economic gain. But whether endured or even hated, or performed with the lust of miser or profiteer, such work is always only a condition of economic gain, not an inherently rewarding and significant human activity.

Work usually consumes most of a man's waking hours and energies. It surely ought to be a major part of his career, not merely his unavoidable way of securing his material provisions. The work itself ought to be congenial and stimulating, arousing his interests, engaging his trained skills and abilities, affording him his own chance, the initiative and the adventure in achievement which he seeks, with the sustaining conviction that what he does is useful and really worth doing.

The work activities of most of us combine in some measure these various aspects of motivation and accomplishment. But in what measure do they combine them? The distribution of emphasis among the several elements distinguishes the sundry kinds of working men and their respective lot in life. Work may be done merely for the material profit that it brings. It is then a man's job and nothing more. It may also engage his trained gifts and capacities; it may be his special expert share in the world's work, so motivated and so recognized. It is then his profession. Or a man's work may pervade his entire life and personality, set the tone and direction of his thought and feeling, so that he sees it as his particular role and self-expression. It is then in truth his vocation.

We should observe that this threefold distinction in work applies irrespective of the field of one's occupation, irrespective also of how humble or outstanding one may be in his line of work. We are apt to think of jobs as mainly in business

or industry. A profession connotes to most of us such occupations as those of the lawyer, the physician, the engineer, the teacher, the civil official, or the military officer. We reserve the term "call" or distinctive vocation for the clergy; other workers in the field of spiritual values, intellectual or aesthetic, and likewise some leaders in public life and statesmanship aspire to this high description of their labors. The true distinction, however, does not necessarily follow these lines. In any one of these occupations we may find men with a real vocation, men of professional competence and spirit, and men merely holding a job. Let the reader only recall in his mind the various types of physicians and lawyers that he knows. A university professor, despite his pretensions, may be only using his teaching and his research as levers with which to secure academic promotion. Such a reputed professor has only a job. But a business man, normally committed to making money, may in fact be taking distinct pride in raising the standards of competence and service in his business, with a really professional attitude and approach to his work. And I knew a simple cobbler near a college campus, who could have taught anyone the meaning of a vocation. His insistence on workmanship in the shoes that he made or repaired, his complete absorption in his work and his plain dignity in it, without envy or pretense, are to this day conclusive proof to me that any kind of work can become a true vocation to the right man. Against this high example of an artisan, we know many proud experts who are simply exploiting lucrative jobs. A man may have the ability, efficiency, and energy to achieve outstanding success in his work, which he may regard throughout as only a source of profit. Another less gifted and less pushing person may have real devotion to what he is doing. Even in the holy calling, there are multitudes of humble parish priests and ministers who spend themselves in deep and life-ennobling consecra-

tion; but are there not also imposing bishops and prelates for whom organized religion is mainly very good business?

2. PROFESSIONAL CODES OF ETHICS

The challenge to every man of moral insight in the field of his daily work is unmistakable: "Be a real person, and have a vocation!" Contending lures of profit, or else drags of easy-going indulgence dull this challenge in many men, and the way in which we respond to it depends largely on our personal character. But it is an ugly fact that only a minority gets anything better than a job in our social system. The normal possibilities of personal development through work are generally stunted in the framework of mechanical efficient routine. While the higher realization of character through work must remain largely an individual problem and attainment, social reform is required to provide at least some of the conditions for this fulfillment. It should emphasize the professional aspect in all types of work, give definite attention to standards of competence, social-corporate rights and obligations, and personal integrity and responsibility in the occupations already recognized as professional.

Both of these purposes are important in our social development. The spreading tendency in many occupations towards self-promotion of artisan crafts or merely gainful work to the dignity of professional status, frequently by the device of some new title, should not amuse us as mere evidence of small-type vanity. Our society should welcome this tendency as the expression of expanding vocational outlook in our working groups, and encourage them to define and commit themselves, alike in their better hopes for themselves and in their more genuine and competent share in the world's work and service.

The fact that over two hundred organizations of this sort are active in America, with formulated standards of admis-

sion and general operation, manifests the social importance of this movement and its positive value if rightly directed. Do the insurance men aspire to the professional status of underwriters; are the erstwhile bookkeeping clerks elevated to the rank of auditors or certified public accountants; does the rental agent or dealer in houses and lots graduate as a realtor; is the former coffinmaker now a mortician or a funeral director? In all these rising dignities there is promise for the future. The desire for exclusiveness and priority, urged by the expectation of greater profits, is doubtless a major factor in this social drift, alongside plain common self-importance. But in the very process of forming a select group with professional claims, standards of selection are required. The formulation and the enforcement of these standards may be trusted to develop the incipient professional conscience of the members. In the course of time it may modify the mere profit motive. When proper training and tests of competence are emphasized, and also a more settled purpose in one's work as a life-career, with acknowledgment of personal service obligations to society as prior to any trading advantage of the moment, the essentials of professional activity may be realized in increasing measure.

The direction which this manifold professional aspiration in sundry occupations is likely to take will be influenced by the recognition and revision of standards in the long-established professions. This larger social influence of the latter, as well as their specific roles in our social order, indicate the importance of their so-called professional codes of ethics. These codes are in the first place organized defensive measures by professional groups. They determine the conditions of admission to membership and the general requirements for good standing. They thus make the profession more definitely reliable and strengthen public confidence in it. Especially in the relation of professional groups to each other, they help to as-

sure the recognition of mutual rights and obligations. They develop an exacting professional consciousness. It may express itself in an effective demand on the state to provide more adequate education for the profession and better protection of it in its acknowledged rights, especially against quacks and shysters. Likewise its organized corporate character may respond more dependably and more effectively to the public needs, whether expressed unofficially or through legislation.

We may consider first the codes of ethics in two of the oldest professions, the medical and the legal. The medical code has served as a model in the formulation of standards in other occupations. The physician may point with pride to the oldest formula of professional ethics in our civilization, the Oath of Hippocrates, traditionally dating from the days of Socrates and Plato. Probably no other profession is better organized or composed of men who, as a class, come closer in their practice to their standards of professional work. This may be due to the character of vital emergency in the responsibility which they assume and the plain human appeal of their patients to their curative knowledge and skill. The desire for material success, wide recognition, and high fees is natural and generally operative; but in the specific case of a dread illness, the challenge to his medical science grips the doctor's mind, and the eagerness to prevail and to help dominates his will. The expert surgeon is not at all modest about the value of his services, but he scales his fees to fit the resources of his patients. The same critical operation which may cost the millionaire a tidy fortune and the plain salaried man several months' savings is performed for the poor patient free of charge. The physician assumes charity work as a matter of course in planning his professional program. In his more ordinary practice, though he may expect some preliminary knowledge of a new patient's financial and moral credit, he turns

his attention to the needed treatment. In an epidemic or in other sudden emergencies, a doctor will spend his time and strength without stint, heeding neither fatigue nor personal risk however grave in his professional duties. In all these ways the better medical practitioner fulfills honorably in practice his public declarations, that service to mankind is his prime object, more important in his view than fees and profits.

The ethical code of the medical profession outlines the general relations of the doctor to his patients, to his medical colleagues, and to the public in all matters concerning health. Honesty in treating a patient, implicit discretion in respecting any confidences entrusted to him by a patient, and persistent effort to cure are essentials of honorable practice. In his devotion to the profession, the doctor must be unremitting in keeping up his studies, should avoid any empty pretense of expertness, should be eager to learn from his colleagues and to share with them freely any new medical skill or knowledge which he may attain. No hope of private gain from secret medicines should enter his mind. He should let his own work speak for itself, and his patients speak for him, without any solicitation or self-advertisement. He should not in his conversation mar the good repute of his profession or of any colleague. But before properly constituted medical or legal authorities, he should be ready to expose professional corrupt practice without hesitation. He should observe scrupulously traditional etiquette in his relations to other physicians, when called into consultation or when called in by a patient to replace another doctor. Whenever a patient is sent by one doctor to another, the action should be one of purely medical judgment and should involve no financial consideration and no giving or receiving of commissions or fee splitting. In his general relations to the public, the doctor should on every occasion cooperate with the proper authorities in safeguarding public

health, in promoting and perfecting sanitary regulations, in checking contagion and combating epidemics, and in any other measures that safeguard the common welfare in matters of health.

The fine principles in this code reflect the professional and personal standards of the better sort of doctor, who might probably have done as well without them. They have guided the policies and conduct of many practitioners who do need this definite professional sanction in moments of temptation, to sustain their generally straight but not always firm character. But does this code really face the many evils in the medical profession, and does it meet them by appropriately devised and resolute measures? Notwithstanding our admiration for the advance of modern medicine, especially of recent days, and its great service to ailing men, may we not fairly ask whether our society cannot get a better system of medical care that will check the abuses in the profession, and that will realize substantially more prevention and cure of disease in return for the public's total investment in medicine?

Despite codes of ethics and professed standards of reputable medical practice, fee splitting is reported to be a common abuse. General practitioners send their patients to specialists who agree to pay them a commission for the service. The emoluments of this sort of practice induce some doctors to advise and to perform needless and hazardous operations. Dishonest and incompetent men enter the profession, commercialize and corrupt it. The high fees charged by specialists encourage young men to specialize prematurely, before they have mastered the basic principles of their profession. Neither medical schools nor medical associations have recognized this evil adequately or taken due steps to check it.

The social importance of the general practitioner has been neglected in our day; the high fees and the homage have gone

to the specialist. The narrow range of the specialist's professional interests makes him unavailable as a general medical adviser. We miss today the opportunity to have that broad supervision of our health which the old family doctor provided, the help in prevention of illness which nipped in the bud many ailments that now creep upon us unawares. These considerations lead to the entire social problem of preventive medicine.

The drift to the cities, which sends also members of other professions to the centers of expected greater advancement, has seriously affected the medical service available to our nation. In contrast to small metropolitan zones of oversaturation in medical care and hospital accommodation, there are large rural stretches with medically neglected population. The same maldistribution of available service may be seen in various social classes. The rich can command the best service, and the man who signs a pauper's oath may also get expert treatment in the charity wards. The respectable majority of the middle classes cannot meet individually the high costs of a prolonged serious illness or a major surgical operation. Yet as a class they are so numerous that they could readily take care of their eventual health risks, in a system of socialized preventive and curative medicine, whether organized on an insurance basis, or controlled by the state through prorated charges or taxes. Such a system might provide a more equitable distribution of medical service to all regions and to all classes, by the public employment of physicians to care for all who need them. This proposed reform has vigorous advocates but also firm opponents in and outside of the medical profession. Some careful students of our social trends believe that it is definitely coming in some form, to meet the increasingly grave problems of public health in post-war reconstruction. It need not replace altogether our present medical professional sys-

tem, but only supplement it as needed. The two systems may then thrive together and develop as they best can or deserve.

The legal profession is as old as the medical and as highly respected. Court procedure has provided traditionally official regulations, but the professional tendency has been to emphasize legal norms and requirements rather than ethical canons. Definite formulation of professional ethics by the American Bar Association is of more recent date.

In our complex modern society we rely implicitly on the advice of our lawyer in matters that affect our entire estate and reputation; and rarely is this confidence misplaced. A good lawyer commands respect, not only by his exceptional mind, versatile in mastery of so many human problems, but also by his integrity. We should not lose this balanced estimate of the whole profession when we consider the many dubious legal practices and the effective control which they require. The canons of the American Bar Association, like the ethical principles of the physicians, reveal a high conception of professional ethics and also clear awareness of existing malpractices. But in the legal as in the medical profession there is not yet adequately organized correction and reform of these abuses. The quack and the shyster who do not actually transgress the civil or the criminal laws of the land can range over a wide stretch of unfair and unethical but still professionally safe conduct.

A serious cleavage in the conception of a lawyer's profession is in a large measure responsible for many of the irregularities and evils in it. Is the attorney who is admitted to practice law and argue cases before judge and jury, is he properly speaking an officer of the court, just as truly as any other officer cooperating in the examination and appraisal of justice? Or is he only a paid special pleader, seeking by any reputable or even by only passable means to win his case? Is he in the courtroom

to make from his side a contribution to the true execution of justice; or is he there merely to secure a verdict for his client, if he can?

A lawyer may fairly question this contrast of alternatives. He may say: "My own best contribution to the execution of justice in court is to present my most effective plea for my client. So will my opponent do for his client. Out of this able presentation of two contending sides, a just verdict should follow." Against this reasonable statement of legal procedure in theory, we may note the common criticism of legal practice, that the profession has in fact become a trade. Litigant and lawyer are engaged in driving the hardest bargain that they can secure from the court within the manageable provisions of existing law. Even in business, the old standard of "Let the buyer beware!" is no longer quite respectable. But how many lawyers, while personally honest, may yet be ready to concede the claim that a lawyer's right and duty to his client are simply to argue and win his case! The other side of the argument is his opponent's: let him see to it! The proper or improper use of the law, the balanced appraisal and final verdict are for the judge and jury to settle: let them beware!

The deeper truth of professional ethics here is in a very delicate balance in motivation. But it is because of the insufficient and irresolute probing of the motives that so large a margin of ethical evasion is allowed even in reputable legal practice. Small wonder that the inducement of skillful profiting within the law has tended to corrupt the legal profession. The lack of adequate ethical instruction in our law schools, and the still low and loose educational and personal standards of admission to legal practice have been filling the profession with crowds of men wily rather than wise and versed in jockeying not in justice. Our system of law is presumably meant to accord justice to all, and to safeguard the rights of the people.

But what chance has real justice in cases of capital stakes, where litigants with immense resources can command the services of experts far more astute in manipulating the law than any jurists which the state can secure to administer it fairly? The results are as we might expect them. In such a system of commercialized legal intelligence, though multitudes of men of the highest personal integrity can and do practice the law without abusing it, a great many men of different moral caliber become legal partners in unfair or unsocial business enterprises, or even lawyer-confederates of organized crime.

The fact that the legal profession has a far larger representation than any other social group in the legislative direction of our public and national affairs indicates another aspect of this problem of vocational ethics. Here again the question is not what individuals of great ability and sterling character may and do accomplish, but what ethical hazards the existing system allows, what checks are needed to exclude socially disruptive minds. The legal profession includes not only many of the keenest intellects but also the finest examples of personal solidity and nobility of character. This statement is true of many of their colleagues in our legislatures and in Congress. But our society needs more than this. It needs surer protection in the professional system itself, protection that will predispose its members more generally to the genuine pursuit of justice. Lawyers professionally accustomed to serve as paid agents of their clients may, and very often do, as members of Congress, espouse the cause of the people whose elected representatives they have become. Many of them, however, simply continue in their legislative capacities to serve the special interests to which they have long been committed. It is not the instances of specific corruption that are mainly in question here. Even more dangerous is the general spirit of unscrupulous partisanship. It perverts the councils of deliberation essential to de-

mocracy into hotbeds of contention and intrigue ruinous to the democratic process.

Mere censure of the many evils and abuses in legal practice is futile. A more energetic and better equipped conviction of reform is required, to emphasize the ethical note of social responsibility in legal education, to sift more critically the applicants for admission to the Bar, to frame and to enforce stricter principles of legal practice, to set justice above profits in the lawyer's motivation and in his professional standing and rank.

Other professions, in the formulation of their codes of ethics, and more important, in the application of them, disclose their respective outlooks on social service and also their serious problems of squaring individual advantage and professional group prerogative with genuine and effective concern for the larger interests of society. A detailed special study of this subject such as Carl F. Taeusch's very competent work, *Professional and Business Ethics,* shows us the widely ramified territory of professional activities in which ethical upbuilding purposes of our society are struggling with tenacious unsocial practices and with flagrant or covert abuses.

One or two further illustrations may be mentioned here to supplement our statement of this general problem. In considering ethical practice in medicine our attention naturally turns to the standards and principles in the manufacture and distribution of medicines and drugs. We may appreciate the conflict of commercial and professional motives in a trained pharmacist with some medical ideals who is also a plain trader in drugs and patent medicines. The public danger in the sale of impure and deleterious drugs promoted by nation-wide advertising has roused social reformers, within and outside the profession, to check this evil by more stringent legislation. The stubborn resistance to this reform shows how strongly en-

trenched corrupt business is in this auxiliary branch of medical service in our society.

The predominance of lawyers in our legislatures and in Congress as well as in the entire system of government may suggest the close contact of other professions with public office and public works. The engineers and architects are of special importance in this connection. Here again a strong contest of motives complicates the professional conscience. On the one hand is professional-social integrity or the more personal ambition and pride in doing a really fine piece of work. The modern technical knowledge and constructive skill of engineers can give solidity, permanence and structural distinction to our public works. Our age may gain enduring and noble expression in buildings of architectural balance and beauty. But on the other hand, there is the lure of great profits in immense public contracts, the temptation of shoddy work and plain graft. Strict regulations and accounting may help to protect the public treasury; fairer and more open competition in the awarding of public contracts may help exclude ugly and incompetent work. The ethical problem is still deeper: how to safeguard the engineer and the architect from the contractor's corruption, by the right kind of education, and by organized, definitely expressed, and resolutely practiced high standards of professional conduct.

The mention of the right kind of education suggests the connection of our present problem with our critical examination of the educational process in its ethical perspective. The teaching profession by its very character requires high regard for moral principles. The mere devising of a professional code would nowise suffice here. We are led to the basic conception of education in its more personal expressions and in its larger social significance. This larger problem of education and culture has engaged our attention at some length in

earlier chapters. We may refer to them at this point and so avoid perhaps needless repetition.

3. THE DAY'S BUSINESS AS A CONTEST OF RIVAL VALUES

Repeatedly we have noted in various forms of professional life the general recognition of ethical principles, of competent, honorable, socially responsible and responsive practice. These high principles are compromised in daily conduct by lower interests of greed and exploitation. The basic drama of our moral life is thus clearly reenacted in our daily work. A professional career reveals the strife of these contending values more sharply because one side of the issue, trained and possibly creative intelligence, is more definitely active. The same kind of strife, in one form or another, marks the moral career of every man.

The social unrest and protest in our laboring world is in large measure due to this strife. Vast multitudes in their confused way feel deep demands in life which their daily work fails to satisfy, and their prevailing sense is one of frustration and revolt. They are cheated in the heart of their hopes of existence. Their ideas of these high hopes and purposes may be very dim and distorted, and they may be morally astray regarding their real needs. To the outsider their protest may seem to be motivated only by greed. But this upsurge of discontent is merely the evidence that their work, meager even in its material returns, has yielded them nothing vitally significant or satisfying. This spiritual emptiness of their work—their second, deeper indigence—is no less tragic than their material distress.

Vocation is the moral core of all work whatever. A person should be able, by education or right guidance or by his own insight, to recognize real meaning in his day's work. Unless his work thus attains vocational character, the profit it yields

will not avail him in the end. He will grumble if his wages are meager, and yet the largest income will not give him abiding satisfaction.

In this ailing condition the professional man and the common workman are alike. The difference between them is that the professional man can diagnose his ill better than the other. In this discontent of morally infirm lives is the hope of better and more significant living, if the real problem can be faced and if energies be redirected towards higher values. This solution is easier to indicate on paper than to achieve in fact. It is partly an individual and partly a social undertaking. We can see on all sides men and women, some of them in the humblest and seemingly most unpromising walks of life, who have succeeded in welding their daily work and their life and character into a satisfactory self-expression. The advantage of organized professional careers, with acknowledged ideals and ethical codes, is that they guide men more definitely in the right direction. The guidance is the more effective morally because it is not the external compulsion of a statute but the inner imperative of the organized professional conscience in which the individual may share with his fellow members. This sanction of professional codes of ethics, social but not statutory, exercises on the higher levels of trained intelligence the function of tradition and custom. Aristotle styled virtue a habit of the will. We may see in various professional groups the promise of habitual-customary commitment to higher principles of vocational activity.

The social conscience may influence the individual by suasion and emulation. We need also the restrictions and compulsions of juster and more humane employment, which only the state can provide by suitable legislation. It is your and my moral problem not to allow the profit motive to swamp our chance of significant self-expression and moral worth in life.

But social-legislative protection is required to save the working multitudes in our industrial age from becoming brutalized and mechanized victims of strongly entrenched greed. This problem in modern industry and business leads us to the basic study of ethics in the economic system. As we shall see, it is not a problem of negations only, of protest and revolt against social-economic injustice. It is likewise an investigation of the positive role of economic values and processes, as contributory to the realization of our higher values and to a more humane civilization.

Chapter 14

MORAL PROBLEMS OF OUR ECONOMIC SYSTEM

1. THE RIGHT PLACE OF ECONOMIC VALUES IN HUMAN LIVING

In the preceding chapter we recognized that a man's work should be more than a job which provides for his livelihood; it must also be his vocation, his chosen role in life. The realization of this demand is every man's personal problem. It must also be the aim of a just society. And in pointing to this ethical ideal we nowise dismiss the actual importance of material gain in human affairs.

Our problem now is to consider our well-being from the economic angle, and our economic conditions in an ethical, integrally human perspective. Let it be understood clearly at the very outset that we are neither ignoring the specific principles and methods of economics, nor presuming to dispose of them in a chapter summary by the easy expedient of a moralizing account. Our discussion here proceeds from two convictions: first, our moral career is radically affected by the economic conditions in which we have to live our lives; and therefore, second, these economic conditions and the whole system of economic institutions demand an ethical analysis and evaluation. Our standpoint is and remains ethical; we

enter here the field of economics because human life enters it, and in it finds either self-realization or frustration.

Let us then inquire, in what ways may one's economic situation serve or impede the fulfillment of personality? What sort of social system would be most likely to assure growing opportunities for truly human living in business and industry? By acknowledging human well-being as the main justification and the ethical test of any social institution, we can face our present problem sanely. We should be no more anxious to uproot than to retain; conservative in holding fast to whatever is morally sound and upbuilding in our present system, but as radical as may be required to correct its evils.

Our guiding principle in dealing with these problems is determined by the very character of economic values. They are not intrinsic but solely contributory or instrumental. That is to say, moral intelligence cannot recognize the amassing of wealth as a self-rewarding aim in life. Failure to perceive this truth leads to the morally distorted outlook on life which is flagrantly shown in the miser's greed. But it marks more generally the practical materialism of our modern industrial society. Utter self-engrossment in "making one's pile" describes the career, in both thought and action, of the hustling "go-getters." Their estimate of themselves and of others is dictated by the tangible evidence of success in this "main chance." Nothing is more revealing of this practical materialism than the almost pious homage accorded by the lesser journeymen in the money-getting craft to the outstanding magnate in industry or trade. To have been in his gracious presence is a blessed memory to be recalled on every suitable occasion, even as the memory of the Holy Sepulcher was a benediction to the devout pilgrim of yore.

Where material prosperity is given the chief place in life, the entire scale of human values is turned upside down, and

the other activities and interests are judged by what they yield in dollars and cents. This warped outlook may be observed in the entire range of conduct and social relations. The ambitious young salesman or industrialist is encouraged to make the right personal contacts, meet the right people, join the right church, for the proper social standing and public notice he gets are definite factors in his eventual success. His friends and associates should be people of substance, who are likely to count. In the field of aesthetic experience, our chambers of commerce are urged to recognize the value of art museums and symphony orchestras as "cultural assets" of the cities which they advertise and promote. But art, of course, has its place. The "coming man," climbing but still on the lower rungs of the ladder, confesses regretfully but with some self-importance that his expanding business overtaxes his time and leaves him no leisure to cultivate art. His chief, to be sure, may rightly make a grand flourish as an art collector or a generous patron of culture: expensive evidences of his commanding and settled prosperity. Intellectual activity is likewise judged by its material returns. Higher education is pursued and supported because it pays. The growing emphasis is on applied science in its service to industry. The entire direction and purpose of life and social order follow the same orientation. Men are out of patience with "brain trusts" in government; they want a "business administration." Just as in their own life so in national affairs, property and the concern for it are given the chief place, and other aims and policies are graded by the economic standard.

This sketch of the plutocrat may be censured as being a cartoon. Certainly it would be only a caricature, if intended as a portrayal of our entire modern society. Its element of truth is in disclosing a certain aspect, but a prominent one, of the contemporary scene. We may observe this strain more clearly

in typical members of our industrial and commercial classes. But in some measure it affects us every one, for it has helped to mold the present system in which we live and pursue our respective careers. Yet even the magnate and his emulators may protest with some justice that their real motives have not been fairly understood. Profits are not really their final aims, but rather the dominance which comes with great possessions: the glowing sense of ascendent power in the winning of a fortune, and the mastery, influence, personal prestige, effective dictation of will—yes, and "power for good"—which are the fruits of outstanding material success. Is this so very different from the self-realization of which the moralist discourses? Except that it is not in the lofty regions of spiritual blessings, but in the business world of hard facts.

There is an element of truth in these protests, and they may serve to complete our statement of the right place of economic values in human living. In describing these values as solely contributory, we should not ignore their vital importance as instruments or means to the attainment of the other values of life. The full truth about economic values should combine the denial of their intrinsic worth with the emphasis on their importance as providing many conditions for self-realization. Even the plutocrat may tell us why he pursues wealth, to attain that which wealth may procure for him. We may not share his choice of his more ultimate values, but we must recognize man's basic need of means for the pursuit of ends.

So from the outset this contributory role of economic values must be definitely settled in our view of daily life. Two large problems will then confront us. The first is a problem of social-economic justice: What rightful claims does each person have, to what share or to what degree of sure possession of these means of human welfare? The second problem is one of the right emphasis in valuation: How can we direct our

thought and our conduct so that our share of this world's goods may contribute most to our significant living?

We do not need a long argument to prove that economic welfare and security are indispensable conditions of a normal worthwhile life, and necessary means to the attainment of other values. Some religious leaders, in rejecting the corrupting lust of gain, have gone to the opposite extreme and preached holy poverty. But the cure of the depravity of greed is not to be found in utter withdrawal from the daily work of men. The holy poverty of hermit and monk did not always heal the distress of common folk whose poverty was anything but holy. When we are told that "it is easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God," we are not warranted in drawing the inference that the nursery of saintliness is poverty. This sort of logic is of a piece with the rest of the ascetic's reasoning. Moral progress and social reform have long been retarded by this cult of unworldliness, the escape from the thorny problems of men's daily lives which should be faced and solved.

The poor man may reassure us grimly that he has never been contaminated by wealth. His troubles are of quite another sort. In depressing contrast to the vices of affluence are the crying needs, the squalor, hardness, degradation, and destitution of uncounted millions. Poverty in our modern industrial society does not predispose mind and heart to the higher life. It stunts and obliterates both heart and mind in the daily grind barely to keep alive. As incredible exceptions here and there, men and women of iron constitution and indomitable spirit breast the evil tide and reach higher ground despite their indigence. But the usual tale is quite the other way. Undernourished and ill-clad, without decent housing or steady employment or proper medical care, deprived of a fair chance in life, untrained and incompetent, without the means to under-

take any long-range planning or to translate any generous, hospitable, or cultured idea into action—what likely prospect do these multitudes have of any human fruition?

The truth so dismally and nakedly exposed in the lives of the poor is manifest in us all, individuals and societies. Look at the entire scale of values—health, work, play, generous fellowship, competent creative intelligence, spiritual capacities and attainments—they are all conditioned by the economic resources that are available to us. In seeking his fair share of these resources, a morally intelligent man is really trying to secure the economic basis of a decently human, worthwhile life. This is the moral ground of the demand for social-economic justice. Here we see also the moral need of the right organization of values in an economic perspective.

2. ECONOMIC JUSTICE: WEALTH, WAGES, AND WELFARE

What is a man's fair share of the material conditions to the right kind of life? This question has several aspects. It may concern the minimum requirements for decent living which no self-respecting society dare deny to any man. It may also reach beyond this, to consider the more desirable and ideal provision for human needs, in a fairer and more equitable commonwealth. Furthermore, in estimating a man's fair share, we may be content to rest our case on the available legal provisions of private ownership and established property rights. Or we may regard the legal framework as meant to serve and to accord with changing human needs and convictions. We should then concentrate our attention on the moral principles and not merely on the legal norms in this individual-social settlement.

At this point a certain type of conservative individualist might well interrupt us. Are we going to consider the plain claims of justice here, or are we going to plead for generosity

and brotherly love? If the latter, he would join in commending charity, but would observe that it cannot be exacted of a man. If we are speaking of justice, however, we should be reminded that men differ in their capacities to earn and to keep. Some men naturally come into the possession of more than do the rank and file, and some cannot manage to gain or keep anything. These are the bald facts of human nature. The existing system of property rights recognizes these facts and protects the individual's claim to what is his own. Instead of agitating for alleged economic justice that does not reckon with the actual incompetence of multitudes, far better to appeal to the benevolence of the well-to-do. The lot of the poor would be more likely improved if entrusted to their kindly care than by any radical change in our economic system which would in effect expropriate able and reliable men of substance, to endow the incompetent and improvident majority.

He who disposes of the problem in this way has not faced it squarely. There are indeed a great many people in our society incapable of self-support in any system, who have really no case except in terms of charity. Our social statisticians tell us that there is an irreducible minimum of unemployables, men and women who cannot sustain themselves. But this description does not fit the bulk of the indigent multitudes. Most of them have the will and the ability to "better themselves," if only they could get the opportunity. Furthermore, we cannot allow the sharp antithesis that is commonly drawn between justice and generous regard for the common weal. A man's legal rights represent the minimum of his socially acknowledged and guaranteed security in the social system. But this legal justice is only an approximation to the larger moral justice, which would assure to each individual in society the essential conditions of a fair human career. When men speak of plain justice, therefore, they may hold back to what suits their

advantage, which may be the letter of the law; or they may reach out to the broader and deeper equity which leads to the revision of certain legal forms as human needs and the general welfare may require.

This is the ethical, not the legal, interpretation of economic issues. We must center our attention on the moral actualities of the existing situation, and not be diverted by abstract formulas of an earlier tradition no matter how firmly entrenched, if they are morally defective. "Property rights" and "freedom of contract" meant one thing in former days of a simpler economy of individual production and disposal of goods. Their meaning is quite another in our complex industrial machine age of mass production and distribution. Some of the legal prerogatives which rightly assured to men the fruits of their labor under the old system may be only empty legal fictions nowadays, or may even run counter to real justice. With respect to them, enlightened social conscience may demand not conformity but reform.

We shall therefore defer to the jurist in his statement of the existing laws. Our interest is a different one: to consider the claims of the larger ethical justice in economic relations, so as to outline the conditions and principles of it without partisan bias; to be morally just in our criticism even as we seek fuller justice in the system which we are examining.

Economic justice should satisfy or reconcile the manifold claims of individuals as producers, distributors, consumers. These may be claims of individuals, rights which society should respect; they may also be claims of human needs, for which society should if possible provide. On the basis of rights—*suum cuique,* everyone is entitled to what is his own—a man's fair share, his due property, would be that which he has inherited or earned or produced or created; there are some debatable additions to this list. If your friend spends the day

hunting and you fish, both of you out in the wilds, and at evening you trade parts of your day's catch, there might be some difference of opinion about relative values, but certainly no question about the respective ownership of game or fish. But if the next week in the city the trade concerns automobiles or cotton oil or railroads, it is quite otherwise. It would require omniscience to break up the market value of the product fairly among the multitude of persons that have been engaged in producing it or in making it possible. At any rate, two things are clear. There are a great many persons rightly claiming a share in the product.

In addition to specific individual claims, there is a broadly social factor in creating and preserving the economic values with which we are now dealing. I may own, by inheritance or investment, a piece of land in another state, which I have nowise improved and on which I may not have laid eyes for years. Urban expansion towards it in the course of these years may have increased its worth tenfold. Social demand that may lapse or be revived determines in large measure the market values of various goods. Where wealth is so largely social in origin and in stability or fluctuation, how are the respective property rights to be rightly adjudicated? Surtaxes on socially enhanced values or on excess profits may partly retrieve for social use the social share in the product. But further legislation along this line is needed, to protect the individual in his own rights, and also to satisfy the larger claims of society to the expanding economic resources in our system.

If now we turn to consider the due share of the various individuals involved in a complex economic transaction, what is to be our guiding principle? It may be the so-called law of supply and demand. Why should you pay me what I call a living wage, when you can get any number to do my work for as much or for less? And if I, in turn, can organize my fellow

workers in a special trade, why should I not, in a season of emergency, exact an exorbitant contract, if I can enforce it? This is a kind of settlement familiar to all, of interest to economists but socially distressing, for it represents an economic system not yet organized on moral principles.

Surely another approach to justice is available. It should be a plan designed to appraise the respective shares which you and I and others have in this product, what each of us has actually put into it, a plan to appraise fairly also our needs as consumers and our normal expectations as human beings. On such a plan of just provision society should seek the legislative and administrative system of securing these rights and opportunities to its members.

Consider the problem in this thoroughly human way, and it becomes clear that the economic relations between men cannot be isolated from their other mutual engagements. Real men never act as mere economic agents. Therefore I may not rightly regard my dealing with you as an exclusively economic contract, ignoring the rest of your life that may actually be involved in the transaction. Is the contract of employment a merely economic transaction for the workman? It is certainly more than that for his part of it. In the work which he is to do he will be investing his strength and may build up or jeopardize his health. The work literally will acquire his body and mind, to develop or to stunt and brutalize him. His main chance of finding sweetness and light in his life or only drudgery, this chance is being settled when he signs up. This is the workman's side of the contract, what hours and wages and conditions of employment mean to him. In the very nature of the case these human personal factors enter in the work. No actual employment of a man can fail to include them. Therefore no fair employment of a person is warranted in ignoring them. And it is a mark of growing social morality in our time that

business and industry are coming to recognize some of these truths in increasing measure. Social welfare provisions, health protection for the worker, some regard for his claim to participate in initiative and direction, all these are promises of better days.

Fairness and social-mindedness involve clear moral obligations for the worker: honesty and consistent attention in performing his task, consideration for his employers, respect for the good name of the firm's product to keep it good, scrupulous regard for the safety and rights of his fellow workers, and also for the fair expectations of the eventual consumer and the general public. What, on the other hand, is his fair return? In addition to the human values mentioned above, which a workman should want to realize in his work, what is he to get out of it as wages? While we have broadly included money with the other forms of wealth or property or goods, economic values, a man's wage, money, should more properly be styled pecuniary value. It will procure him the economic values; it is a symbol or medium of exchange. A man's pay is worth to him as much as it will purchase, and as much as he can use the various goods that he can buy with it. So we may see that while a man's employment and work concern him mainly as producer, the wages for his work concern him as consumer. No fair wages therefore can ignore the man's needs outside the plant or the general social conditions under which he has to live his life.

Where so many individual and social factors are interwoven in the social texture, is there any particular design or system of economic operation that would yield the maximum of justice to all concerned, employers, workmen, the general public? This is a vital question in our time. Every day we are reminded that it is a burning issue in the post-war reconstruction. The two main alternatives are capitalism and socialism. They are

flanked by proposals of compromise and by some more specialized plans of reform.

3. CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

The advocates of capitalism point out its distinguished role in developing our natural resources and the industrial potential of our scientific age for vaster human use and the improvement of living conditions. So long as individuals are allowed free competition in pursuit of gain, ability and efficiency reach higher standards, knowledge and skill are utilized to the full, the total amount of wealth expands with increasing variety and perfection of products, more extensive consumption, enhancement of the social welfare. The profit motive and the incentive of private ownership and individual mastery spur men to the exceptional effort that leads to outstanding achievement. Society should not grudge those men their uncommon success, for by it common men also are benefited all along the line. There is expansion of available employment, a greater volume of better goods, a steady rise in the standard of living. The present frictions and the occasional human distress in our industrial system are only the growing pains of the machine age of mass production. If business is given free scope and capital allowed to find its place and direction on practical lines of sound investment and efficient operation, the system of free enterprise will gradually correct its defects, consolidate its merits, move forward to the greater advantage of all.

More broadly this program of individualism claims a conservative regard for traditional social values: man's freedom to run his business and his affairs in his own way, to hire or be hired when and as he sees fit, to earn what he can and use it according to his own judgment, to take his chance in the competitive struggle, with consideration for his neighbor, to be sure, but without governmental meddling. This plan, we are

told, stimulates a man's ambition. It makes for a free and progressive society.

Socialism and allied movements of social reform are opposed to the system of private ownership and exploitation of the means of production by modern capitalism. In its more radical forms, socialism repudiates the profit motive altogether and the entire institution of private property as wrong and detrimental to human welfare. It condemns the so-called system of free enterprise in our machine age of mass production as actually a system that exploits vast multitudes of men. The socialist declares: The capital now controlled by individuals and private corporations represents for the most part the surplus product of underpaid workmen's labor. As its present owners expect a profit from it, more and more similar fleecing of working men will be required to raise still higher the pyramid of capital. Whether managed by rapacious or by benevolent men, a capitalistic system is bound to leave the laborer short of his right share. Economic justice requires the replacement of capitalism by some form of socialism. Production for profit and private exploitation should yield to production for use and for service. Society as a whole should own all the capital and all the means of production. Each man should do his share of the world's work and receive his share of the returns, and together with his fellowmen thrive on the over-all production.

Some of these radical programs contemplate equal compensation for all kinds of work as the only just policy. Others would expect from each man work according to his abilities, and would reward each according to his services, or else according to his needs. Here the socialist is apt to distinguish between a desirable ideal goal and accommodating policies in the interval of social adjustment. Some forms of socialism envisage radical reforms only or chiefly in the field of public

utilities, industry, and mass production. Others believe that capitalism can be overthrown only by the complete reconstruction of the entire social system: family life, politics, education, art, religion, all. We find here sharp conflicts within the socialistic movement itself. Some socialists look forward to the eventual abolition of the state, and the replacement of it by the socially organized and directed and utilized economy for welfare. Others would have the various industries organized on a socialistic plan, but would retain a political government with police, judicial, and military functions. In their proposed methods of achieving their reforms, likewise, some socialists definitely plan a revolution to overthrow the existing system. Others propose a "legal" method of expansion as a political party within the existing democratic or other system of government and the advance to their goal by legislative means.

Another form of resistance to capitalism is that of trade-unionism or organized labor. It may operate politically as a labor party, or it may bring its influence to bear on existing parties. It definitely struggles for the correction of specific abuses, for better terms of employment, but it does not contemplate the abolition of the capitalistic system.

This is a field in which special pleading and propaganda are to be expected. The purveyors of panaceas are many. Some of these cure-alls have their special merit. Their promoters err chiefly in their confidence that they would remedy all ills. Thus taxation has been urged as adequate to meet all social needs in directing business and industry, in recovering excess profits from individuals or corporations for the public use, in preventing the private retention of wealth or capital by inheritance, in generally controlling and correcting abuses, as gradually or as drastically as may be needed. More specifically, the Single Tax plan proposes to prevent the excessive private exploitation of the unearned increment in land values.

Another plan of reform, with great promise in its special field, is the cooperative movement. It would protect the common people as consumers from the evils in our system of distribution, with its multiplicity and exorbitance of middlemen, jobbers, wholesalers, and retail merchants. This movement undertakes to organize the workers and the general public into cooperative societies and to provide them with stores where they can buy the goods they need without traders' profits, operating on a basis of cost, with employed managers, and the return to the members of any eventual annual surplus. In some European countries this movement has made considerable progress; American experiments along this line have not been very extensive.

No fair judgment of actual social-economic conditions can dismiss or refute all the charges made by the opponents of the capitalistic system. On the other hand, the disagreements and conflicts within the socialistic movement indicate inconclusiveness in the radical program. A more critical approach to our problem might well question whether the right solution of it would be found in either of the two opposite systems exclusively. The very complexity of the human situation in our industrial age shows that the basic trouble is more than rigidly economic. As we have seen, the actual transaction between employer and workmen is not and cannot be a merely economic contract.

We shall be well advised to avoid partisan commitment to either capitalism or socialism as a standard and platform, and to center our attention on the moral ills and requirements of the existing industrial situation. We should keep foremost the human factor—regard for human needs and well-being—and from that point of view explore the relative merits of various economic systems in various fields of human activity. The system of private ownership owes its traditional hold on our

society to the fact that it does satisfy some of our basic demands and realizes certain fundamental values. But it ignores other needs of our nature, which surge in the socialistic revolt. The fuller truth is not likely to be in either of these two doctrines exclusively.

Critical ethical judgment should beware of oversimplifying its problem and of doctrinaire rigidity. The problem is as complex and pliable as human character. The important point to remember is this: Economic values, and so likewise economic systems, are entitled to consideration only as conditions of social welfare. There is nothing sacrosanct about private property, but neither is there any absolute virtue in the abolition of it. Our ethical faith should be centered on fulfillment of personality. In dealing with various economic processes, we should be ready to emphasize either private enterprise or social-public direction, whichever proves more suitable to the greater human needs in a definite situation.

This is not the spineless counsel of compromise. The spine has its place in our constitution, but its role is not that of reflection and judgment. Backbone we need here precisely not to be stiffly partisan but upright in concession and in adherence alike, as our balanced discernment may dictate. This is the essence, not of compromise, nor even of mere reconciliation, but of sound judgment in dealing with a problem of such complexity and conflicts. And this is the more advisable general policy and attitude at present, in view of the entrenched and unyielding parties arrayed in opposite camps, which nevertheless must come to some understanding and basis of cooperation.

American democratic experience, and the relative valuation and choice to which it inclines us, manifests a prevailingly individualistic, not a socialistic emphasis. It is with reluctance that we in America concede any merit in socialistic measures, and we are inflexibly opposed to alien communistic propa-

ganda in our society. But our general attitude does not classify us as inflexible capitalists. Actually we have met many of our problems without any such doctrinaire commitment. Numerous services have been placed under municipal or state or federal direction as the most successful plan of operation. And we may consider fairly various expansions along this line, and also other fields of activity in which the individual would be well advised to uphold his private initiative and direction.

A few examples may clarify this principle and general policy. There are activities and services in our society which are definitely public in character, requiring no commercial promotion but mainly sound administration for the public good. It would not occur to anyone to question the public operation of post offices or water supply systems. We demand continual improvement in these services but should nowise remove them from public to private control. The postal rural free delivery cannot possibly pay its own way on each specific route, and no privately managed business could be expected to supply it; yet is it not abundantly justified as a service of a democratic government to the people? This sort of public enterprise might fairly be extended to include other utilities and means of communication. Consider, for instance, telegraph and telephone service, radio, or even the railroads. In some countries these are privately owned; in others they are operated by the state. They are relatively recent attainments in our social economy, and the organization of them can scarcely be regarded as a settled matter. The major importance of electric power supply alike in our homes and in industry might well compel a reconsideration of this entire utility. Managed as an individual enterprise paying its own way, electric service may have to be supplied at prices which even if commercially fair are yet too high. The nation may be able to provide electric power more advantageously as a by-product of its system of

flood control and irrigation dams. In all these cases we have to balance the profit-motivated drive for technical improvements in a private corporation, against the more public-spirited concern in a democracy to provide service as needed and not only as it pays its own way on each transaction, and make our choice accordingly.

On the other hand, the case for private initiative and direction is also very strong in certain lines of activity. There are types of work in which state interference would hamper the finest achievement. The various fields of creative and inventive intelligence provide the main instances here. Intellectual and artistic production is apt to be stunted if cramped too rigidly by routine control, whether private or governmental. The same is true of many types of professional work. In these fields of activity a wise society should provide all the advantages of adequate training and fair opportunity, and then afford the freedom of individual bent and expression, to insure the creative advance on which our higher civilization so largely depends. There are difficult cases in this field, such as the problem of socialized medicine, where contending considerations, each one important, have to be reasonably considered.

Other fields may be mentioned in which private rather than public direction is likely to prove more advisable. Private enterprise seems better than socialized control in certain large areas of industrial production and in very extensive varieties of trade. We need encouragement of individual taste and self-expression in all manner of craftsmanship, in neighborhood or community small business and artisan services. Among the main human occupations, farming in all its varieties should continue to be a predominantly private undertaking. It should benefit by all the public services of flood control, irrigation, and by governmental protection of the farmer in the disposal of his produce. But we should not upset the private character

of the farmer's home economy or its individual and social values in our civilization.

4. THE VITAL MORAL PRINCIPLE IN ANY ECONOMIC REFORM

The relative claims of capitalism and socialism, of private enterprise or social control in any specific economic process, may be appraised in terms of expediency, or production and distribution costs, or quality of service. But the basic problem of choice here is moral, and it cannot be solved merely in terms of an economic framework. This does not mean that ethics can evade the thorny controversy about definite economic reconstruction which engrosses our society. The system of operation is important morally, for it may facilitate or it may impede the right kind of moral relations among the men who work under it. The final decisive choice is that of the right moral relation and attitude.

This basic recognition goes deeper than any economic framework. Capitalism has been commonly charged with callousness to human values, but some radical discussion likewise is strangely insensible to them. The socialist protests vigorously against the injustice and iniquity of the modern economic system. He denounces the wicked exploitation of the working masses by the capitalist class, and who can fairly say that his complaint is groundless? At the same time, however, the scientific socialist regards man as a purely material being, and in human history he sees only the operation of material forces. Now, if man is merely so much economic material, why should it be wrong to exploit him? What makes the exploitation of man not merely uneconomical, but also iniquitous, is man's personal moral worth. "A man's a man for a' that." This inviolable worth and right of men should be kept in mind first and foremost: human labor is human, not a commodity. It cannot be treated simply in terms of expediency or efficient

operation. It might be perfectly good business, for instance, to wear out one dollar watch after another, instead of carefully preserving and repairing a delicately constructed timepiece. The question may be simply economic, how accurate a watch we require and how much annually we care to spend for the service. But if we apply the same reasoning in our treatment of a man, we find that it goes against our moral grain. Morally I dare not ignore that he is, not a utility, but my fellow-man. I dare not flout his moral dignity as a man.

Put this principle to work in a concrete situation. Let us take a factory: What makes its operation really good business? What justifies its existence as a human enterprise? This, that through its operation the men and women associated with it can realize more perfectly their human capacities, both by the work and by the income from it. Furthermore, in its relation to the larger consuming public, this factory must contribute to the satisfaction of real human needs, to the upbuilding and not the corruption of human lives. These and no other are the true purposes of a factory. Therefore, if I am an employee, I may not say: The better bargain I can drive, the less time, the more pay, the better. For the right principle cannot be the work for the sake of the wages, but always, the wages for the work. Therefore likewise, if I am an employer of men, I may not say: The lower I keep wages, the better profits I make, the better off I am. This is even bad economics, as modern society is gradually coming to understand, but it is worse morals. One has to pay for everything. We pay for many things with money, and we may pay for money and profits with some things that are far more important. If my alleged high profits have been secured with the squeezed manhood and womanhood of those whom I have exploited and stunted in that business which I call mine, then the profit balance which I show in dollars and cents turns like a red accusing finger on my

human ledger and points at me as a human failure in the whole transaction.

This is not a danger that only the rich capitalist has to fear. Each workman at his bench or desk has to reckon with it. Here is a laborer for whom work is something to get through with. He slurs along as far as he can, doing no more than he must. In his dull dishonesty he insults himself in his daily work. He protests against his unfair employer, yet himself is unfairness and futility personified. And there on the other hand is the real workman who labors with respect for his craft. Is he like the medieval craftsman, carving stone on the cathedral spire where no eye can see but the eye of God? Is he giving that extra turn to the bolt, or that extra polish and precision of machinery, which perhaps no inspector will notice but which might just make the difference in an emergency? Think of the men who made the motors, the planes to which our fliers entrusted their lives over land and sea. Here was implicit trust of man in man, a challenge and a plea to designer, maker of materials, machinist, not to betray human life by slipshod work. This same responsibility applies in less dramatic situations. Regard work merely as a grind for wages, and then it is only a grind, the less of it the better, and no better than exacted. But see work as affecting life, as touching the welfare of men and women, consider the honor of reliable work, the good name of the product, think of the consumer whose health and whose life may depend upon its quality; put the human factor first, and shoddy work becomes hideous in the workman's eyes.

Once the principle of mutual respect is really acknowledged, men will seek the economic operation most likely to realize the human values of all concerned. On that basis employers and employees can face together the crying evils of industry

and business. These evils are familiar to us all: waste, undue risk to life and limb, avoidable health hazards, unsteadiness and insecurity of employment, special perils of premature work of youth ill prepared and without safeguards, industrial neglect of mothers before and after childbirth, callous disregard of old age without suitable adaptation of work to waning powers or protection from the stalking fear of indigence—and throughout the entire process, dull mechanical routine and drudgery, profitable perhaps in material returns but wasteful and brutalizing to our humanity.

The material goods and economic processes, the wealth available in our society—if those who direct them understood them as human resources—could wipe out poverty in one generation, check degradation and ignorance, set the whole tone of our civilization on another, higher plane. It all depends upon this, whether the lust for material possessions could be subordinated to the zeal for human betterment.

The problem of economic reform reduces itself to the basic moral problem of right valuation and choice. Our modern industrial system presents a great human opportunity, with as great hazards. We can make the forces of nature do our bidding; through industry dumb nature may get a voice, may serve to humanize more fully the lives of men and women. Or we can, as we do, harness human life, our own and our neighbor's, exploiting it for mere material aggrandizement. Human nature is then degraded to the level of brute matter. Expert knowledge is not enough, nor practical efficiency and technology, nor the adoption of one or of another economic framework. Moral insight is needed here, human piety. Upon the moral outlook which a man adopts towards his own work and that of others, in whatever line of business he follows, will depend the success of his life as a human enterprise. This choice

may present itself in different details to you and to me, but at bottom it is the same fundamental choice. Side-step it we may not, and if we try to evade it, only moral dullness can save us from a guilty conscience. Upon the wider and more thorough recognition of this basic principle by our society depends any likely prospect of right reform in our economic system.

Chapter 15

CITIZENSHIP AND GOVERNMENT

1. THE ETHICAL BASIS OF POLITICAL ORDER

Our central principle in ethics, the direction of conduct for the harmonious realization of human capacities and values, or fulfillment of personality, has already been applied in several fields of social-institutional life: the home, the school, the broad range of cultural activities, the economic system. In each of these we have seen manifold opportunities for pursuit and attainment of personal worth, but we have noted also barriers to moral progress, stunting and corrupting influences. The ethical test of any social institution is this: Is it an adequate medium for the nurture and fruition of human values? Our life is an interplay of unique and intimately personal demands and satisfactions, in a variety of social relations. On the one hand is the individual with his wants and hopes and interests. On the other hand is the social order—rival claims to be reconciled, obligations to be recognized, competition and cooperation as operative principles. A morally sound society is one in which the system respects and makes provisions for individual self-expression and initiative, and in which the individual loyally does his part and duty in the social enterprise. This characteristic process of personal-social involve-

ment will now be examined in the field of politics and government. As has been mentioned already in connection with education and economics, so it may be repeated here: We are not concerned with the exposition of political science and its special principles and methods. Ours is an ethical inquiry, and here we are examining the principles and the problems of morality as they are manifested in a political perspective.

The basic viewpoints of ethical inquiry are revealed significantly in the conception of political life and the role of government. A few instances may illustrate this point. Hobbes regarded men as by nature unsocial and unprincipled egoists. Their insecurity and continual strife led them to curb their insatiate greed by a compact whereby they agreed to subject their wills to the authority of an absolute sovereign. This contractual surrender of private claims, according to Hobbes, established both political and moral obligation, both entirely conforming to the sovereign's edicts. Some advocates of popular government, in their turn, have used the doctrine of the social contract to urge limitation of excessive governmental intrusion into private affairs. Government is by consent of the people, and the less it interferes with the individual's normal initiative, the better. In other political theories the state has been regarded as principally necessary to curb those who lack self-control. Government agencies prevent those who are not themselves good from doing harm. A morally mature person is protected by the laws, but scarcely requires them in making his own decisions, and in fact lives a life of moral and not of political obligation. Radically different is the demand for unhampered right of way by the self-styled aristocrat, genius and master in human affairs, insisting on the subjection of the common herd. So Nietzsche chants his paean of "master-morality": "A nation is nature's roundabout way of producing six or seven great men."

These political doctrines are defective ethically because they share a fundamental unsocial conception of human nature. Despite their radical differences, they agree in their view of the state as mainly a restraining agency. A basically opposite idea, of deeper ethical insight, was expressed by Aristotle: "The state arises so that men may live, and develops so that they may live a good life." Aristotle called man a political animal. Man is by nature social, and only in the life of the state can his capacities be brought to full fruition. The laws and agencies of government, in the well-ordered state, are not obstacles to the individual's development but important avenues to his complete life. This fundamental conception of the political system determines also the test and the choice of a good government. It is good if it aims at the people's well-being. That government is best, ideally or in actual operation, which is most likely to assure the fullest perfection and happiness of the greatest number.

The state is normally an essential condition of a full and satisfactory life. Let us ask more specifically: What is the distinctive function of the state in the realization and perfection of human capacities? The answer to this question would supply an ethical definition of the state and of the proper role of citizenship and government. With this end in view the following statement may be proposed: The political system is properly meant to provide an abiding and reliable order for the right interplay and cooperation of the many different types of individual and social activities in a people's life. Thus conceived the state is manifestly unlike the economic system or the intellectual associations for the advancement of knowledge or the so-called republic of letters. It is analogous to the institution of the family. As compared with the family, the state in its social engagements of our interests and values is as various, less intimate, more expansive.

The propriety of this analogy of the state will be firmly contested by many, for many allow the state only a special limited place in human affairs and demand that it be kept to that place. In our exposition of a different conception, candor urges the use of this analogy. We need a clearer and more balanced statement, in both the family and the state, of the dual moral strategy in human affairs: acknowledgment of the social bond, respect for the unique individual.

Even in the most intimate communion of family life, with the thoroughgoing sympathy of its members for each other's life and purposes, the distinctively personal character of each of them is nowise ignored. Recognition of it, respect for it are essential requirements without which no truly personal communion is conceivable. The conjugal, parental-filial, brotherly-sisterly devotion and unity—all of them acknowledge recesses of special absorption in each member which the others dare not invade, and also an inner core of seclusion in which each person is uniquely himself. Precisely this unique and inexhaustible character of our individuality, and our recognition of it in others, makes possible our intimate relations with other persons, distinctive and significant in each case. Where this unique heart of personality is not engaged, social relations become routine and perfunctory; where respect for unique personality is lacking, professed intimacy is resented as clumsy familiarity. Men and women of moral insight respect these principles. Ignorance or neglect of them have confused or ruined many a home or friendship.

The political system cannot be expected to engage men with the thorough mutuality that obtains in the home. As compared with family life, citizenship neither secures such absorption of the individual in the life of the state, nor does it elicit and express in any similar degree his distinctive personality. In the family each one is devoted, recognized, cherished as him-

self. The state in its legal and administrative framework can be concerned with the individual only as a certain type and kind of man. National life is a system of social institutions and classes; it does not reach you and me. Yet it is with us and with our neighbors that the state is concerned, ethically speaking. The moral task of the state must be to organize and maintain such an institutional system and such relations between the various types of institutional order as would best elicit and develop the personal worth and happiness of the citizens.

Our lives are touched and molded by home and school and employment and other associations. But it is the political order of the commonwealth that safeguards us in these fields of self-realization, and it can and should thus safeguard and assure our well-being still more fully. That must be the guiding idea of the state. It is ultimately concerned with the lot of the individual citizen, even though it cannot recognize this or that citizen. Certain men object to this so-called paternalism of the state. How can the state understand their real needs or promote their true interests for them? Let government be kept within the strict framework of agencies required for public security and protection of law-abiding men. Beyond that, in his own business and other affairs, allow the individual the fullest possible initiative to live his own life as he alone knows best.

We should examine more closely these contending views of the role and function of the state in human affairs, especially as they find expression in modern democracies.

2. THE SCOPE OF CITIZENSHIP IN A DEMOCRACY

The democratic ideal as we understand it is a modern achievement. To the ancients the word democracy signified a corrupt form of government, rule by the masses. Some of this contemptuous meaning of the Greek term has survived in our use of it, when we speak of a demagogue. Classical antiquity

distinguished between men of intelligence, ability, and high worth, who were full-fledged citizens and fit to rule, and the multitude who were not capable of exercising active powers in the state but were mere subjects. Modern democracy proceeds from an acknowledgment of the inherent worth of all men whatever, and so it aims at "a government of the people, by the people, and for the people." Now in this view of the state, how are we to conceive of the proper function and also of the limits of government? What is the scope of citizenship and the range of law?

Democracy has been described as a two-way road. Politically, economically, socially, it is a commonwealth based on the principle of fair play. In it the demand for individual rights is balanced by the acknowledgement of corresponding duties, both of them conditions of the common good. Democratic life is a socially-minded life, in which the principle of mutuality is uppermost. Popular speech expresses this ideal in the words, "Live and let live." The world tragedy of our days is teaching us the need of a more positive and active concern for the common welfare. So a refugee statesman of an invaded and ravaged democracy revised the slogan to read: "Live and help to live."

Democracy is essentially opposed to class government, and it is wrongly defined as the rule of the majority. If the majority exploits its prevailing power to promote its class interests at the expense of the minority, we have a kind of despotism, unjust and also precarious, for it is ever menaced by dissension and possible revolt. In the second place, democracy is mistakenly regarded as a government by compromise of rival class interests. On that basis you can get only a truce, never abiding and constructive peace. Real democracy is attained as individuals recognize genuine mutuality in their relations. Even

contention and conflict must be viewed in the light of a more adequate social integration.

These principles of mutuality, tolerance, and fair play may be readily granted by all in general terms. It is when they are translated into policies of state that different political standpoints are disclosed more sharply. One is the view already mentioned, demanding private freedom from governmental interference. It is not difficult to understand the reason for this conception of democratic government. The modern champions of democracy struggled in opposition to systems of political authority in which they were subjects, not citizens. So they naturally demanded that government be kept within narrow limits. Let law be to each man a charter of independence; save him from excess of government, so that he can live his life to suit himself, granted of course that in his conduct he shows similar respect for the rights of others to live their own lives in their own way. From this point of view, a citizen's political activity consists in periodically reaffirming his stalwart independence. On election day the democratic man "exercises his right of citizenship": that is, he puts men in office who will not abuse their authority but will let him run his own affairs for the rest of the year.

There is nothing strange or unfamiliar about this view of democracy, but it suffers from a mistaken conception of the relation of freedom to law, of the citizen to the state in which he lives. Is law and is government an obstacle to self-realization, that we should say, "the less government, the better"? On the contrary, law is an essential condition of complete expression and freedom of the individual. This is the democratic enterprise, a social enterprise, a commonwealth organized so as to realize more fully the capacities and the real freedom of men. The central principle, the working aim, and the result of

sound democracy is this: the citizen's growth through participation in a common life of justice and tolerance. Self-identification of the individual with the laws which he observes, self-legislation in this sense is the democratic ideal.

How is this aim to be attained or at least approximated? By a common effort to secure the social conditions which serve to humanize thoroughly the interrelations of the citizens. Consider what these conditions are: What does the democratic state demand, if its ideals are to be achieved?

The democratic state requires social intelligence, a developed social consciousness in the individual. Where the people determine public policy on election day, social intelligence is an absolute necessity. Hence public education is the bulwark of democracy. The public school receives the conglomerate mass of children, and it must develop this mass into a society of young men and women conscious of their democratic solidarity, vocationally alert, energetic, tolerant. Not machinelike uniformity in education is the democratic ideal, but clear perception of the rights of boys and girls with different aptitudes and prospects to receive equally the different training and preparation which they require.

This principle of social intelligence is in contrast to the thoughtless claim of the aggressive individualist to live his life as he pleases. We noted in an earlier chapter the importance of a more socially-minded conception of family life. This basic principle applies in all social relations. The social texture is closely interwoven. The stability of the home is bound up with economic and social justice. The democratic state may undertake to protect the individual from his own folly and ignorance, just as it is bound to protect itself from his unsocial and lawless acts.

We must guard against confusion and distortion of good principle when it is used to sustain misguided policy. The

opponents of child labor legislation, who would exploit young lives without restriction, have appealed to "freedom of contract." What is a really free contract? Is it one in which the alternatives are life-stunting labor or starvation? So with economic and industrial relations more generally: is not government rightly concerned to assure really fair bargaining for all, laborers and employers of labor? Where the individual is at the mercy of others, the state cannot remain a passive spectator. Society, if it is intelligently democratic, is bound to defend its members, for their sake and for the sake of their families. Justice, benevolence, and plain good sense all point in the direction of firmer social legislation.

This view of democratic government does not signify any general control of business and industry by the state. As was pointed out in the preceding chapter, state control and individual initiative may well go hand in hand. Some economic processes are preeminently social in character, require collective direction, and are wrongly surrendered to private exploitation. In other types of activity personal initiative is the more adequate means for attainment of the fullest measure of welfare. An intelligent democratic society should not commit itself to a rigid formula, individualistic or socialistic, but must apply its basic principles flexibly and suitably to different conditions.

The partisans of the communist system strive for maximum state control, and would allow private ownership of certain personal commodities only as an exceptional concession. A man in such a society has very little that he can call his own and scarcely any free initiative. But the capitalistic advocates of private property and free enterprise cannot fairly deny that in actuality their social system affords these proclaimed boons in very small measure to the rank and file, and not at all to very many. Private ownership and initiative, the importance

of which the individualist proclaims and which he claims for himself, should be made more general experiences. What we need in our country is more private property, property for 140 million people. The policy of the ethically enlightened state, even when it assumes direction of certain public utilities, must be to provide at the same time increasing opportunities to the mass of the people to own and develop freely their own economic means to a more prosperous and satisfactory life.

Institutional order and activity of every form are the proper concern of government, to safeguard and maintain them so as to assure a more humane and more abundant life for all. If rightly motivated and rightly exercised, this expansion of governmental authority and direction does not invade but rather guarantees personal rights. Social control in a true democracy is consistent limitation of each citizen for the sake of the fuller and more significant liberty of all, including himself. An intelligent society should sustain this sort of control in certain fields of activity and in certain social relations. It should resist control that is really intrusive, in those parts of personal life that are and should remain intimately personal.

One example of this should suffice. A man's religious life, if it is to be genuine, must express his inmost spirit, reflect his own intellectual, aesthetic, moral outlook. Though shared with others in public worship, it must be his own. If the state is to enter here at all, it is in order to protect the inviolable person, to safeguard him from any compulsion or intrusion by others. This is our democratic charter of freedom of worship. Democratic society opposes any state control of religion, not because it ignores the social import and involvement of the religious life, but because it judges that here intimately personal freedom is paramount and prevails over any other considerations. Democratic government is scrupulous in its regard for a person's sincere religious convictions. It respects

the conscientious objection to military service on the part of certain religious groups, even in a war crisis. Only when sectarian beliefs and practices include the violation of established law or are flagrantly antisocial, only then does democracy resist such alleged holy disruption of the commonwealth. The suppression of Mormon polygamy is a ready illustration.

3. JUSTICE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT

Loyalty to the fundamental democratic ideal rather than to any rigid formula or framework of government is manifest also in the true conception of the function of justice and law. In every state and at every stage of civilization, the prevailing system of laws has represented *at its best* the verdict of the social conscience *at the time of their enactment.* The two qualifying phrases are necessary. Thus we have to keep in mind, first, that there have always been what may be called lawless laws, laws which even when they were first enacted were only the erection of prejudice or class greed or rancor or panic into legislation. Time may give such laws a certain tenacity, but they remain as tumors or cancers in the social organism; they bring discredit to the whole system of law, encourage distrust in it and disdain for its observance, and are thus inimical to the stability of the social order. Second, even at its best, a law is only the expression of a certain social conscience at a certain time. Wider experience and changed social conditions may render even the best laws of an earlier period obsolete and unsuitable. Of laws as of men we may say: "They have their day and cease to be." Some laws on our statute books are like the Ptolemaic astronomy or the exploded beliefs in magic and witchcraft.

At this point the constructive critic of laws may well learn from the scientist. The scientist's devotion to truth makes him very scrupulous to discard all so-called laws of nature and

theories which more careful experiment and larger evidence fail to sustain. This constant revision of principles is essential, if science is to retain the confidence of growing minds. Only the uncritical see in this continual revision of scientific principles an evidence of confusion and unreliability in science. With the clearing up of error and the discarding of obsolete ideas, the revised system becomes all the more solid and stable and reliable. This progressive self-reconstitution characterizes living truth.

Jurisprudence should adopt this principle of science, and legislation should put it into practice. On respect for law rests the stability of our social order. We should not allow legislation itself to nourish disrespect for law. No laws should be kept on the statute books to which loyal obedience cannot be reasonably expected. Either enforce a law, or revise it, or repeal it. The constant demand for enlightened revision of laws does not mean easy disregard for existing law, each person obeying such laws as he sees fit and loftily neglecting the rest. Only he who respects and obeys law is fit to revise any laws. The safety of society is in the strength of law, but the strength of law is in the constant and growing sustenance and also correction of it by the living social conscience.

The true social reformer, even in his most radical plans of reconstructing the existing legal-institutional system, is unwaveringly law-abiding. He is a more thorough and more critical champion of true law and order than the usual routine conformist. His legislative reforms are motivated, not by incentives of private gain or convenience, but by active social conviction, itself the warrant and sustaining power of any law. Through him and his work the social order and the legal system are led to self-judgment and self-revision. He cuts, not to cut down, but to save; not to destroy, but to fulfill.

Diametrically opposite to the social reformer is the law-

breaker or criminal. Whereas the reformer has a more than usual concern for the social welfare, the criminal is crassly and aggressively antisocial. A crime is a disruption of the entire system of law, a violation of the social order by a private lawless will. The criminal may be consciously and defiantly an enemy of society, or morally dull in his lawlessness, or himself the victim of some violent and ungovernable passion. His wrongdoing may be an act of aggression, or it may be his own revenge for some private wrong, in which he has "taken the law into his own hands."

How is the enlightened state to deal with such destructive elements in its midst? This is the ethical problem of punishment. We may grasp better the requirements of its fair solution, if we consider first the main alternative justifications of punishment in our society.

The traditional view, of immemorial antiquity in primitive life, is that of retaliation or retribution. A beast that is attacked or cornered or injured snarls and fights back. So a man naturally resents the wrong he has suffered and tries to get even. He may vent his anger on the first person he sees, but more directly and stubbornly on the offender himself or on his kin and tribe. The victim's family and tribesmen share the resentment and the demand for revenge. So arise tribal feuds. As higher social organization is attained, the state through its courts of law takes the retaliation out of the plaintiff's hands, but still it seeks to exact an eye for his eye and a tooth for his tooth. Punishment thus regarded finds its motivation in resentment and is socially intended to satisfy and allay it. Religion and moral philosophy have been invoked to give their sanction to this view of punishment. It has been exalted as the divine law of retribution. St. Paul writes: "God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap." So Aeschylus before him: "Whatsoever one doeth, that shall

he suffer." The Pythagoreans expressed this idea of retribution by identifying justice with the number four, the first square; as if we were to say, "a two for a two."

Mature moral judgment has protested against retaliatory punishment as unjustifiable and has sought other ethical warrants for chastising lawbreakers. The idea of retribution has sometimes been reinterpreted to express, not the submoral or immoral desire to get even, but the deep necessity of the moral system to sustain and revindicate itself. Hegel declared that the criminal by his act has negated the system of law. Through its court verdict the system reaffirms its integrity and validity; it refutes his lawless defiance. It is the criminal's own deed which judges itself, and only by being punished can he now sustain the order which he has violated. In this sense, retribution is the transgressor's moral desert and share in the system of law—forsooth, then, the murderer has a right to be hanged! Despite this ironical inference, retribution may be revised to signify, not private revenge nor public retaliation, but rather the external manifestation of a system disrupted in crime and reaffirmed in effective condemnation. By its verdicts the social order declares what it resists and confutes. It thus reaffirms itself and makes itself known to all citizens, reclaiming their allegiance in solemn admonition. In this view of punishment as the self-restoration of the social order, other ideals and ways of justification are already implied and call for explicit statement.

If we ask, Why ought the criminal to be punished? the answer, formally, may be either, Because a crime has been committed, or else, So that other crimes may not be committed. Retributive punishment, in its prospective aspect as a satisfaction of vindictiveness, is outside the pale of morals. In so far as retribution has any claim to ethical worth, it is an instance of the first answer. It is retrospective. Without any

regard to consequences, it inexorably reaffirms the dignity of the law.

The other justifications of punishment are teleological: in one way or another they aim at the future prevention of crime. We may in fact call them all varieties of the prevention theory. Punishment may then be justified as a check to the criminal's further lawbreaking or as a deterrent to others who may be criminally inclined. In popular language, the transgressor is punished "to teach him a lesson" or "to make an example of him to others," so that he, and others too, may learn to "toe the mark." These two views of punishment as prevention are both very common, but have been subjected to both legal and ethical criticism. If penalties are meant to prevent or deter from lawbreaking, it has been said, their severity should be as great as there is need for restraint. But the practice is just the opposite. The most common offenses, to which anyone is liable, are punished mildly, whereas unspeakably atrocious crimes which scarcely anyone would even think of committing receive the harshest punishment. This sort of objection may elicit the reply that the penalty is as severe as the crime is heinous. This determines how gravely society is concerned to prevent or deter men from repeating the offense. So a traffic violation is punished less drastically than murder, not because men are more likely to murder than to break the traffic laws but because society is more anxious to prevent murder than speeding. More generally it has been observed that deterrence is not according to severity of punishment. What really prevents crime is the speed and the certainty of conviction. The heaviest penalty, if only possible but unlikely, fails to deter men from taking their chances with the elastic law.

Deterrence or prevention of crime may be estimated in a social perspective, as protection of the state. Just as we take the most severe measures to halt an epidemic or quarantine the

carrier of it, so we restrain the criminal. But, it is answered, though in this way you may muzzle the vicious man and make him harmless, his destructive spirit is still hostile. Your moral problem still remains. Even if crime is a sort of madness, still you cannot treat men as mad dogs. The only morally justifiable course of action here must be one that reforms the criminal, that educates him back to social loyalty. This process of reformation requires the segregation of the criminal, strict discipline; but imprisonment should not be a mere locking up of a dangerous man. Prisons should become true reformatories, to provide criminals with the training and practice that might replace destructiveness by upbuilding interests and stimulate another outlook on life.

The gospel of prison reform and social reclamation of criminals is sometimes discredited by maudlin sentimentality. In its saner expressions it corrects emotional excesses and demands a positively constructive approach to the problem of crime. Society, the victim of crime, itself shares in the guilt. We must explore the roots of lawlessness, the incentives to lawbreaking, the depraved influences, misguided upbringing, broken homes, destitution, neglect and abuse and corruption that incite men to break with the social order. Even as it subjects the criminal to the drastic treatment required for his reclamation, society should learn from him and be itself reclaimed morally, should reform itself by correcting the conditions that deprave and alienate men. As it is, the punishment of a crime is apt to be as drastic as is demanded by the popular indignation aroused by the delinquency in question. But indignation does not suffice, and itself is unreliable. It may neglect callously much grave corruption, or it may be fanned by propaganda to deal itself lawless judgment, in lynching and other barbarities. Only when the infliction of punishment comes to be regarded as judicial surgery, drastic but curative, only then will there be a prospect of real reform.

The specific problem of capital punishment may be viewed significantly in this perspective. Seemingly justified in terms of retribution, it yet leaves an ineradicable stain of guilt in our moral nature. The social conscience itself is brutalized by this sanction of death, even as on a vaster scale it is seared with the ignominy of mass destruction in war. No easy or lofty apology avails in either case. We are bound to recognize both capital punishment and war as surviving barbarities in our civilization. Though we may honestly find them still unavoidable, yet our firm purpose must be to achieve a social order that will increasingly and finally be rid of them both.

The infliction of the death penalty signifies that society regards the condemned person as hopelessly beyond any possibility of reclamation. We should consider the occasional irreparable judicial blunders in the execution of innocent men, and also the morally hardening influence of capital verdicts and executions on society. Better grounded and more humane would be the refusal to admit that any sane person is morally incurable. The alternatives to capital punishment should be convincing to fair human judgment. Detention for life in a prison reformatory or in an asylum for the morally insane would meet every claim of social protection and prevention of crime, without prejudging the final hopelessness of the criminal. To protest that the dangerous prisoner might escape or be eventually pardoned by some corrupt official is unworthy. Can a self-respecting society consent to the evil of inflicting the death penalty rather than correct its own judicial maladministration?

4. CONSERVATISM, RADICALISM, AND REFORM

A great modern democrat, Mazzini, expressed a profound truth basic in all social relations: Man has a moral right to that freedom which he needs for the performance of his duties. Here is a principle that applies to those in authority as well as

to the plain citizen, to employer and employee alike. The portly individualist declares: My property, my business is my own, to do with as I please. His more meager cousin protests: Society owes me a living; I want this, that, and the other thing. But here is another kind of demand: I want to do my share in a social order that will enable me to realize for myself and for others the values that make human life truly human. I want to be a good son to my parents, a good husband and father, a decent neighbor, an active citizen. These are surely elementary human rights which I should expect to realize and to retain. If I seek my fair share of material resources, I seek them as necessary means to the attainment of a more thoroughly human existence. These same rights I am bound to respect in my neighbor.

Democratic life depends for its sustenance on social fair-mindedness of different persons and groups. And the differences to be reconciled are themselves in an ongoing process of change and revision. Is the greater or lesser fluidity of the democratic structure its merit and promise, or its grave hazard? The whole problem of conformity and criticism as factors in the attainment of values, confronts us here in a political setting.

We may observe two forces at play in our society, engaging and counteracting each other: radicalism and reactionary conservatism. The latter tenaciously upholds established tradition. Its watchword is, Let things alone. It is suspicious of any proposal to change the settled order; it counts itself guardian of priceless social heirlooms which it believes to be threatened by upstart innovators. Were it not for this conservative tendency, our social order would lack stability. It could not fully retain its traditional values. But were conservatism to remain unchallenged, it would lead social life to a state of stagnation.

The other strain in our life, the strain of radicalism, sets the premium on novelty. It chafes under the restraint of ancient

ways. It demands the revision and readaptation of custom to meet present individual demands. It is ever eager to construct a new world better than the old. In art, in morality, in religion, in science and philosophy, in social theory and practice this is the force of upheaval that turns the wheels of progress. Were it not for this radical tendency, society would settle down to dead dullness; it is the factor and condition of all advance. But left to itself, it could not assure the preservation of its own gains. Unchecked and uncontrolled, it would plunge the world into anarchy.

These two strains contend with each other in our life. Laud them as the strain of stability and the strain of progress; condemn them as the strain of stagnation and the strain of anarchy. Upon the healthy balance which a society maintains between these two, depends its attainment of the best social goods, and the real possession of them when once attained.

Men are wrongly advised when they think that they are protecting society from perilous radicals by clamping down the lid on free discussion. The only idea that is really dangerous is the idea that is denied a fair chance and so is apt to seek an unfair chance. Are you in favor of making it hard for the radical? By all means make it hard for him, for he is advocating far-reaching changes that might prove hazardous in our society. But make it really hard for him: compel him to prove his case, meet idea with idea. There should be something more to the point with which to answer his speech than a threat of trouble if he continues with it. The more firmly we believe in our institutions the less willing we should be to have the impression prevail that the critic of them can only be silenced, not answered. The objection that the masses cannot distinguish between sound and spurious ideas is inadequate, and prejudicial too. The wily demagogues are not all on one side. Repression may only give the advocate of a policy the advantage

of seeming martyrdom, which to many uncritical minds is a convincing vindication. Intolerance in conflict is thus both unjust and also poor policy.

Respect for law and for established institutions is sound and intelligent when it rests on a clear recognition of what alone justifies them, their service in the fruition of human lives. Social well-being is the ultimate warrant of all rights. On our regard for social well-being must depend our conservative attachment or our radical criticism in dealing with any specific law or institution. This humane and reasonable initial spirit should be operative throughout in the contest of ideas and policies in a democracy. What we require is loyalty to our ideas, unwillingness to abandon them unless and until they are proved inadequate, combined with a sense of fair play, readiness to let the other side be heard, provision for the active interplay of ideas, and higher loyalty to the truth whichever way it may point. Intelligent democratic society needs neither uncritical insurgence nor equally uncritical tenacity, but the alert deliberative attitude of mind. "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

Democratic life is a socially responsible, socially participating life. Democracy represents not the lessened but the expanded range of citizenship and political activity. In an absolute monarchy or in a dictatorship, there is strictly speaking only one political individual, the autocrat. In an aristocratic form of government, only a small ruling minority are politically active. In a true democracy the lives of all are politically effective and therefore politically responsible. In a democratic state alone do the rank and file have the chance to grow to the fullness of individuality, to make their own distinctive contributions to the common life.

We should be especially on our guard against hasty thinking in social matters. Our age has shown a hankering for quick

remedies and panaceas. Impatient with democracy, men and nations have tried crosscuts to the land of heart's desire. We have seen the spreading cult of dictatorship, urging seizure of power, methods of violent compulsion, ruthless discipline, resistance to any criticism. Men lay the emphasis on ready efficiency and prompt results. And so great is our respect for efficiency and immediate results that many of us are apt to respond to the dictator's lure. But far more important than the efficient way in which a thing is done, is the question whether it is the right thing to do, whether it is worth doing at all. The basic truth of good government is this, that it rests on the consent of the people, that it enables them in their relations to each other to achieve tolerance and cooperation, respect for rights and justice, and the conditions of a truly worthwhile and satisfactory life. Only such a government is in the long run assured of stability and entitled to loyal support. All class dictatorship, be it from above or from below, fascist or communist, is ever faced with tyranny or revolution.

Only as we thus keep the human factor first, the well-being of men and women, can we see the real problem of the state, the real social needs and issues. Thus we may set our minds to understand the basic tragedy and ignominy of economic crises and depressions in a country of such inexhaustible resources and such profusion of material goods as America. The tragedy is not in the temporary abandonment of the gold standard or the increase of the national debt. The real distress and downfall is in the collapse of morale, of human self-respect and self-reliance, of homes torn up and uprooted, of broken attachment to soil and homestead and neighborhood. It is this human tragedy that we should always keep first in our minds. So the real recovery must be a national recovery, the recovery of the nation, of men and women.

In the Fourth Gospel Jesus is reported as saying: "I am come

that they might have life, and that they might have it abundantly." And not only Jesus, but every good man is in this world for the same purpose, and that, in its political version, is the purpose and the faith of true democracy. Back of all the social unrest of our time is this deeply felt though not always clearly expressed hunger for a life more abundant and more human. We all know what enters in the larger and fuller life: bodily health and vigor; wholesome conditions of existence; stimulating and enjoyed activity in work; free expenditure of energy in play and the restoring of it in rest and leisure; the enrichment and the intensifying of experience through intimate personal relations, in friendship, love and devotion; moral upbuilding of character; aesthetic appreciation; growth in insight and wisdom; piety. These things may have different meanings for different people, but they are the treasures the possession of which marks the really fulfilled and satisfactory life.

Let us not in blind arrogance think that only the so-called higher classes feel these high demands, that the rank and file of common folk lack such delicate refinement. Some of us are apt to resign ourselves to the inevitable poverty and hunger of those whom we call the masses: like the cook who said that there was no harm in boiling lobsters alive; they had always been cooked that way and were used to it. Against this complacent resignation of the self-styled aristocrat in his prosperity, the enlightened democratic conscience is a steady protest for economic and social justice and for a fairer and more humane commonwealth.

These democratic ideals are continually threatened by private rapacity, class bigotry, general callousness. Democracy justifies itself by its reforms of the conditions and external framework of our lives, and also by its revision of our ideas and estimates of people, of our common regard for each other.

There was a time when men conceived of a certain special type of excellence marking the alleged gentleman. You were or you were not a gentleman. Democratic experience, as it broadens the range of responsible and satisfactory human activity, is also recognizing the wide scope of worthy attainment and the variety of types of excellence. The term gentleman is thus growing in dignity as its connotation is expanded. The old phrase that went with the aristocratic conception of gentlemen and nobles, *noblesse oblige,* will find a better expression in the life of the perfected democracy. Rights are correlative with duties, and freedom is not opposed to law but conditioned by it. All four are essential to the finest fruition and culture of man.

Chapter 16

NATIONAL LIFE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1. THE EXPANDING RANGE OF MORALS: TRIBAL MORALITY AND A MORAL CIVILIZATION

Moral ideas and practices reflect the actual conditions of men's activity and their social structure and relations. Primitive society was tribal in scope and also in its sanctions. Kinship ties and the principles of clan solidarity determined the individual's choice and obligations. His relations to his fellow tribesmen were dictated by the larger interests of the group. To all outsiders he was only a clansman, bound to stand his ground and resist them as his clan might require. This is the closely circumscribed range of tribal morality. Within the narrow scope of group life, mutual regard developed along the definite lines of loyalty to the tribe. This bond of loyalty determined the tribesman's inevitable relation and attitude to any alien. The alien was outside the moral pale; he was a potential if not an actual foe. In support of his own tribe or of any of its members, a really good man was bound to show the outsider a firm hostile front. The foreigner had no moral claims entitled to respect. To deceive, despoil, and destroy him, by any means whatever, for the advantage of one's own tribe, was praise-

worthy. The very spirit of group allegiance which dictated rights and obligations within the tribe precluded any recognition of them outside it.

These familiar characteristics of primitive morals may be observed to this day in the life of savage tribes. They have proved stubborn, surviving in various forms or degrees in so-called civilized nations. They have inspired racial and religious pride and national exclusiveness, and have been feeders of discords and wars throughout history. Language has preserved this traditional arrogance and self-engrossment. To the ancient Hellene, all other nations spoke gibberish, were *barbaroi,* gabblers, outlandish gross barbarians. The Germans through the ages have regarded Czechs, Poles, and Russians as ignorant inferior peoples, to be mastered and exploited. These Slavs reply to scorn with contempt, and call the German *nyemetz,* dumb. Our term hostile comes from the Latin *hostis,* which signified originally a stranger or foreigner. The alien was enemy.

This self-centered note of tribal-national morality may be given religious sanction, which a later and higher conscience would revise and reform. In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus cites the old Mosaic precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy," meaning the foreigner, and urges in its place a love that transcends kinship bonds and hostile barriers. The Christian gospel was universal and all-human in its ideal intent, but its transforming effect has been slow and still awaits full realization. The ancient polytheists called the Christians, who did not believe in the old gods, *atheoi,* godless—atheists! As Christianity gained possession of the culture of classical antiquity, the leaders of the Church Universal, firmly established in Rome and other centers, manifested holy disdain in their turn towards the still unconverted devotees of the older cults surviving in remote countrysides. They were the

pagans, *pagani,* meaning peasants, rustics, who lived out on the heath, heathen.

If we turn from this brief glance at primitive tribal morality and its many survivals in later stages of social evolution, to consider our contemporary scene, we can diagnose some of the radical evils of our age. We have ruined ourselves in global wars because our modern life has become global, while we have not attained a global morality. Our economic and social life is increasingly international, but our political thinking and our moral outlook have not outgrown tribal exclusiveness. We are still largely dominated by self-centered and aggressive nationalism.

The actual conditions of modern life rule out any isolationism, whether it be one of individuals or classes or nations. In the complexity of our civilization our lives have become increasingly bound with the lives of others, and the range of this social interdependence has expanded until it embraces all mankind. Time was when a family or a community was largely self-contained, consuming what itself produced. We no longer live thus unto ourselves. The cotton farmer may raise a vegetable patch for his own use, but he plants cotton for mankind; his own well-being hangs upon the course of international affairs.

In many other ways we are affected by the conditions of life throughout the world. The incredible intercommunication of modern nations, through press and radio, makes each people a daily spectator of the lives of all. We hear a great deal today about propaganda. The very information which we seek and obtain of the way in which various countries are attacking their grave problems, and their respective success or failure, is in effect a constant and inevitable propaganda. How each nation lives, and whether it can continue to live decently at all, a really human life, is partly determined for it by others.

For good or for ill, all peoples are interdependent. To recognize this clearly and to face the issues which it raises becomes the duty of intelligent men and women, the world-wide task of modern morality.

If we keep in mind the significance and the role of government in human affairs, then the expansion of social-ethical order from the national to the international scope must be seen as the next essential step in civilization. Just as good government in each state, by the right integration of the institutional agencies in society, safeguards the citizen's rights and promotes his fullest development and satisfaction, so the right international system should operate in the larger society of mankind. Individuals and social groups require, for the right and effective adjustment of conflicting claims, the acknowledgment of a system of law and order by which they are governed. So peoples and national groups, in the settlement of international disputes, need a world order of law and a world system to maintain it.

There are backward countries and regions in our time where the reliance on law and justice has not yet prevailed over private or group settlement of bloody feuds. In some of these regions whole families and clans have become exterminated by the alternate operation of gruesome vendettas. Is not this precisely our present state of international affairs which we are struggling to remedy? So long as each nation feels free to take the law into its own hands, to avenge a wrong or secure its claim or grab what it can or simply sate its lust for mastery, our so-called civilization will be continually plunged into disastrous conflicts, and international life will be a stupendous vendetta. The two world wars of our century were simply the bloody feuds of nations that had not risen above the level of tribal morality. The United Nations expresses the striving of humanity to reach a moral civilization.

2. WAR AND PEACE

The problem of war and peace is entangled with other grave questions in our confused civilization and cannot be settled by any simple proposal of disarmament or by diplomatic pacts and treaties. To end international conflicts we must diagnose and cure the war-breeding diseased strains in our civilization. There is the angry wound of outraged national pride or bitter rancor or envy burning for revenge. There is the pressure of seething populations which cannot be contained within existing national boundaries and would dignify aggression as a national necessity. There is the surging protest of races still outside the pale of civilization, whose souls have been aroused enough to claim plain justice and to dream of equality, but who are not yet capable of self-government and are still largely pawns in the colonial strife of great powers. There is the tangle of international trade and tariff barriers, which condemn some nations to virtual serfdom and others to overproduction and futile labor. And there is the radical problem of economic justice in all lands, without the settlement of which no merely political peace can last.

The problem of war, therefore, cannot be attacked by itself. Failure to realize this is the error of utopian pacifism. To love peace is laudable, but in our age it is not sufficient. We must also understand how it is to be secured. The pacifist has shown us how growing national armament predisposes nations to aggression, and the evidence he can cite in support of his thesis is abundant. What he should also consider is this, that in a world like ours a pacifist country may only be inviting war and disaster. The settlement of peace is not wholly in the hands of the peace-loving nations, when whole countries turn to brigandage, like modern Genghis Khans. Yet democracy must refuse to recognize war as a solution of international problems.

Even while preparing for war, even while waging war, it must cultivate in itself and in others the social conditions and the spirit that can achieve peace. A doctor tending a desperately sick patient may have to use violent remedies to save his life through the crisis, fight poison with poison. But the further and more complete cure of the invalid will require a slower and far-reaching treatment of diet and rest and recuperation. So it is with the thorough and abiding cure of national and international ills.

Criticism of the utopian strain in contemporary pacifism should not lead us to neglect the importance of the active peace-loving spirit in the promotion of international conciliation. The old proverb still holds: Where there is a will there is a way. This does not mean that a resolute will can remove all obstacles, but that without the right will no mere way or device can avail in the end. There is no real way unless there is the right kind of will. International conciliation will be bound to make use of ways and devices, formal agreements and treaties and legal procedure, but these by themselves will remain ineffective unless they are backed by international genuine good will.

A great obstacle to peace is that in all conferences the various nations have entered with a nationalistic attitude, still definitely aggressive even though professedly only defensive. We think of international affairs in terms of competition and eventual conflict, and then we try to devise ways and means of keeping these in check, to maintain a moderately safe truce. Nations, all nations including the greatest, should deliberately consider a different alternative and an altogether different attitude: not to think of mankind in terms of our country, but to realize that the best way to think of our country is to think of its relation to mankind. This is the greater and the truer patriotism, and the actualities of modern life as well as sound

moral thinking impose it on our mind. It must be repeated: We need the expansion of our sense of moral relations, so that it will come to embrace international affairs. The consciousness of fair play, of individual concern for the common good, the principles which every honorable man acknowledges as an individual, we should all adopt as nations.

This program is very far-reaching; it is not a quick remedy and will show its results very gradually. It requires a public spirit in education and in the basic conception of nationality that does not perpetuate the idea of international conflict. We should instill in young minds, the minds of tomorrow, the idea of our country as a member of the community of nations, cooperating with others in a common human enterprise. This is no mere utopian scheme, too idealistic, as some say. What is indeed utopian and an empty dream is rather the opposite, that peace can be secured without such a spirit, by merely muzzling nations which remain essentially hostile. Here is the challenge to the educated manhood and womanhood of the world that best understands the ruinous meaning of war. Without such a sustaining basis in the very thought of patriotism and national life, international peace will remain ever precarious.

The attainment of international concord demands of us all the gradual attainment of a new conception of nationality. The old system is symbolized in armaments and customhouses and tariff barriers. The new idea should express a pervading sense of world-wide cooperation, a nation's conviction of having a real share in the world's work, as a member in the large society of mankind, civilization. It is old wisdom and still true though not enough recognized, that righteousness alone exalteth a nation. A modern nation's true greatness cannot rest upon what it has managed to squeeze out of the rest of the world by superior power or greed or cunning, but upon this,

how indispensable it has proved itself to the real welfare and advancement of mankind. We have and we admire public-spirited men. What world peace requires is public-spirited nations.

This essential public spirit in a nation—we may call it world-mindedness—may express itself not only in official state policy but also in economic, cultural, and philanthropic promotion of international cooperation. Our American "dollar diplomacy" proved neither profitable nor creditable in the long run. But America has another and nobler record, of service to civilization: her "good neighbor policy" that is bearing fruit to the south of us; the world-wide missionary movement; the educational and health service of large philanthropic foundations which are wiping out yellow fever, malaria, and other pestilences in many parts of the world. These humane policies and movements are giving the name "American" its cherished connotation: just, liberating, enlightening, generous. To deserve increasingly such high predicates in the life of humanity is the right and noble ambition for our nation.

These high principles are resisted and obstructed by a lower strain in our thinking, isolationism in national values. We have been told loudly to mind our own American business and not to meddle in other people's quarrels. What are the vital interests of our nation, what is essentially at stake from our point of view? Is it not the preservation of democratic life and institutions: freedom of thought and speech and worship, equality of opportunity, justice and tolerance in social relations, respect for the dignity of men? We seek to maintain these principles and to defend them both at home and abroad, for any negligence of our responsibility as a democratic nation weakens democracy throughout the world, weakens our own democratic solidarity. That precisely is minding our American business, our national duty.

This has been for us not only a problem of isolationism or intervention in a world war. It has expressed itself also in our foreign trade. Regional or class partisanship should be educated to a clearer recognition and more definite formulation of a trade policy on broader and more liberal lines. Our reciprocal trade agreements point towards progressive release of the channels of world trade. Our farmers and our industrial workers should see the greater good to all that freer trading will bring. It has been pointed out that a sudden and sharp reversal in our tariff policy would work havoc in our entire economic system. But the actual change may be gradual, if only our ultimate intentions are thought out and expressed clearly. Democratic cooperation, fair play in foreign trade as in our domestic economy, exacts its immediate cost and sacrifice from each, but yields more abundant fruits for all.

Alike in domestic and in foreign policy this democratic progress is hampered by partisan and sectional narrowness and special pleading. A carpenter working in my house during the worst years of the depression summed up our basic difficulty in national recovery. "Sure," he said, "we all believe in cooperating: let everyone cooperate and make some sacrifices for the common good—that is, everyone but ourselves. All of us, bankers, manufacturers, labor union men, farmers, and professors too, we want all to cooperate, but in such a way that in the end you or I shall be left with what we have, or a little more." Didn't my carpenter express also the basic difficulty in international relations and in post-war reconstruction which confronts us today?

World-mindedness has been made imperative by the world-wide scope of modern life. The organic character of a nation which we express by the phrase "the body politic" is today global in range. The body politic is a world body. Our national life is involved in the life of other nations; so their

policies and problems are bound to be our concern. We cannot be undisturbed by the unsettling of democratic confidence in many parts of the world. The cult of dictatorship expressed a contempt for the democratic process and a demand for the imperious affirmation of a sovereign will. This led to the exaltation of personal regimes exacting unquestioning obedience from the people. The worship of the dictator was in effect a cult of compulsion. Government was set up as a master of men's entire lives, and men welcomed this mastery. By a strange perversity millions of men actually developed a satisfaction in being told just what to do, in gaining this new freedom from any personal judgment or responsibility!

The seeming efficiency of these totalitarian regimes, their aggressive advance and imposition of will on many irresolute democracies, inclined multitudes to the belief that democracy was played out, incapable of dealing with the problems of the modern national economy. The sturdier and more mature democracies had to stand their ground all the more resolutely, if the personal rights of men were not to be obliterated in the new totalitarian molds. But though civilization has been saved and tyranny defeated on the field of battle, the issue between the contending principles is not effaced. We should not be confused about the real issue that confronts democracy, our true choice of alternatives. In our resistance to dictatorship and totalitarian control, are we bound to go to the opposite extreme of unregulated individualism? Should we not rather try to insure the fuller realization of all citizens, by a more equitable recognition of the collective interdependence of human lives, with such controls and social legislation as the common welfare needs? This general problem, already discussed in the preceding chapter, is mentioned here again, to show how national and international issues involve each other.

3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In our present discussion we have concentrated on the main ethical principles of interdependence, mutuality, fair play, cooperation. It may well be said in objection: "Stating the main principles is well enough, but the real task is to implement them and to carry them out in actual specific policy. That is where you get into trouble." The pertinence of the objection is shown in the perplexities of our post-war reconstruction. We are all compelled to recognize that nations must subordinate their professed economic sovereignty, to meet the larger demands of international trade. This is quite evident when it concerns countries ravaged and bankrupted by war. But does it not apply in principle also to the solvent and the prosperous nations? Should not they also be prepared to make concessions of some traditional rights and prerogatives, to assure freer trading throughout the world? The reestablishment of peace on a permanent basis and the immediate check to any eventual aggression would seem to require international police action by the United Nations. Shall we consent to subordinate our own military and naval direction to the international authority? We see no future for Europe on the old basis of national rivalries and aggressive sovereignties. But how far are we ourselves prepared to go along this path of effective international law and order, which we are ready to recommend to other nations?

We must understand the effects of the Second World War. This world catastrophe has ruled out any easy return to our previous life. Here are famished and burned and tortured millions, crazed and shattered by war. We cannot expect them to return to their smoking ruins and take up meekly where they left off when the enemy invaded their lands. Social upheavals and civil wars are bound to complicate the post-war

settlement in many countries. The Second World War has very rightly been called a world revolution. Alongside and also beneath the military and naval conflicts, a second and just as desperate war has been going on, between reactionary minorities bent on retaining or acquiring control and its profits, and distraught masses that struggle on the brink and even over the brink of ruin. It is not stubborn perversity in European peoples that may cause them to move radically to the left. This is the result of what the war has done to them, and also of conditions which they had to endure before the war and which have now brought them beyond the limit of endurance. We need plain good sense to recognize European life as it is, today and tomorrow. Otherwise our view of the problems which confront us will be unrealistic, and the policies which we adopt will prove ineffective.

As in the waging of this war, so in the post-war reconstruction, we require integrity in our pursuit of right aims and clear-sighted view of the facts. We all know that, in order to win this war we had to learn not to wage it by antiquated methods and tactics, for our battle line was not that of 1917. So the peace that we must establish cannot be the peace of 1918, for it deals with the Europe of today. Instead of indulging in futile dreams of a return to "normalcy," we should probe and attack our problems as we find them.

The effectiveness of international cooperation depends mainly upon the likelihood of agreement by the Great Powers, but it demands also the participation of many small nations. It likewise concerns the destiny of immense lowly masses throughout the world that are surging but still without any voice, astir but helpless. The economic and political imperialism of the dominant nations and their conflicting policies which hamper real international cooperation and retard world peace are shown most strikingly and discouragingly in the problem

of small nations and in the colonial problem. Economic imperialism has reached out to possess the rich lands and natural resources of undeveloped dark-skinned races. The wealth of distant lands has been scooped or drained by the exploitation of cheap native labor. The same imperialism has used many small nations as pawns in the evil game of power diplomacy. It has abetted ridiculous small type imperialism in them; it has backed and even subsidized rival rapacious governments ever on the edge of aggression. This seething unrest has repeatedly burst beyond bounds and involved the Great Powers themselves in war. Have we really "learned our lesson this time," as sage General Smuts assures us? If we have, we should not only propose but also achieve an international world order in which the small nations will make their various contributions to the common welfare and culture, but without being used as pawns and without becoming the tinderboxes of disastrous conflagrations. Common justice should at last face the shameful colonial problem, and should start the undeveloped races on the road to full membership in the society of nations.

The colonial reform is a difficult undertaking, and it has ramified implications. The right treatment of lower races in Africa and Asia calls our attention to a similar demand in our own country. The more resolute conscience of mankind can no longer evade the interracial issue in faraway colonies. How will it affect the status and the prospect of our own Negro population, in economic justice, in health and sanitary provisions, in education, in political-social rights and claims? We know how much partisan special pleading confuses the basic issues. On the one hand is rigid callousness to crying abuses, resistance to most elementary rights and justice for the black man by self-styled defenders of a white man's culture and racial purity. On the other hand are sweeping proposals of changes that alarm the more conservative friends of the Negro

and weaken the support for immediately needed and feasible reforms. As the hard-working interracial committees in many cities know, conflicting extremists hamper the progress of reasonable reform. Even so we may observe it on a world-wide scale in the controversies that entangle the United Nations.

The colonial problem overseas has also close relations to the problem of the social-economic struggle for justice in our Western nations. In both cases there is growing resistance to the exploitation of "lower races" or of "lower classes." Is it surprising that well-entrenched exploiting groups who oppose the struggle for social-economic reform at home oppose also any real reconstruction of the traditional colonial policies?

Our post-war problems are complicated, but not insoluble. We can positively choose active membership in a system of international cooperation; but then we must be ready to make the necessary political and economic concessions for the common good of mankind. Or we may stubbornly hold to our own dominance and its prerogatives, steadfastly refuse to yield to anyone; but then we should frankly face the threat of a third world war.

We shall all require fair-mindedness in dealing with others. When we do not agree with them, we should remember that they do not agree with us. Self-righteousness here is of little avail. We need tolerance along with our convictions, and a real ability to admit that we also can learn something from others. Perfection is not completely and exclusively ours. Surely this war which has done so much to Europe has not left us wholly untouched and unchanged. There will be some reform and reconstruction ahead of us, too. We should face this problem in a really democratic spirit, as an opportunity. The great founders of our republic achieved a masterpiece because they created a democratic commonwealth capable of normal and progressive self-improvement. At the closing ses-

sion of the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin spoke great words of wisdom, which are very appropriate these days. "I confess that there are several parts of this Constitution which I do not at present approve. . . . But . . . I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they be such; because I think a general government is necessary for us." Start where you are, where you best can, so Franklin thought; work with others fairly, and hope for better success with growing better judgment. Likewise Thomas Jefferson, while demanding for himself the right to struggle for the achievement of justice, foresaw future struggles for further reforms, and welcomed them, as a good democrat.

The right way to face our world problems and responsibilities is not to glorify nor yet to deprecate either radical change or conservative conformity. It stands to reason that in this world of tragic disruption and upsurge we too shall be bound to revise some of our customary ways. But it is also reasonable to hold on to our tested principles, unless the evidence against them is overwhelming. The really wise democratic statesman is the one who knows just what to hold firm and what to change or concede. He is the one who has the right scale of human values. His changes are true reforms, for they conserve and fulfill the higher principles. Abraham Lincoln fought to abolish traditional slavery, to preserve the Union. That is why he is Abraham Lincoln today, both North and South. We should not be overanxious for radical changes, but we should not be afraid of them either, if they are imperative. Emerson spoke of some of his staid New Englanders, who were very proud of their Revolutionary parentage but opposed the social reformers in their own midst. It is not enough to be proud of our past. We must face our problems as they are today, else we shall not be of much worth in the judgment of tomorrow. A man should so think and speak and

live today that he may not be ashamed tomorrow to look his children and grandchildren in the face.

In the rapid march of events some of our policies are already being settled, and other equally tangled problems are emerging. The task of social ethics here is both easy and difficult. The guiding principle can be stated easily, for it expresses the basic truth of human life. But the difficulties of realizing it in practice multiply as this principle is translated into policies of statesmanship. In the face of partisan bias and conflicting interests, the aroused social conscience of our time must persist in reaffirming the main principle: our true role in the achievement of a moral civilization, of abiding peace based on justice and aiming at the common welfare.

Part 5

ULTIMATE PROBLEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Chapter 17

MORAL FREEDOM, PROGRESS, AND CIVILIZATION

1. DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM

We have examined moral activity in the expanding range of social participation, from the intimate home circle to the world-wide setting of international relations. Considered thus in its largest scale, human experience accentuates certain issues which confront critical reflection also in individual conduct. In our initial outline of the field of ethics we distinguished human activity from the behavior of other beings. The latter can only be investigated in causal-physical terms, whereas man's life allows also of evaluative judgment. So we have considered man's moral career as a responsible person, his purposes and preferences and choices.

Now the question may be asked: Does man actually have such responsibility as a so-called free agent, and how is this alleged moral capacity to be understood? This is the fundamental problem of moral freedom. It is directly connected with the further problem of moral progress. As distinguished from the causally determined and investigable sequence of events in the mechanics of nature, human history seems to reveal the progressive unfolding of purposes and achievements subject

to evaluation. But is this assumption of progress in human affairs justified? Are we warranted in entertaining a morally positive estimate of civilization?

The first of these problems, concerning human freedom, has long been a subject of controversy. Be it understood that this problem does not concern merely man's liberty from political and economic oppression, but rather his freedom in nature, his fundamental capacity for free choice and action. Our present inquiry has its bearing on social ethics, but it is really a basic philosophical problem. In nature, where all things are regarded as subject to causal necessity, man speaks of his choices and actions as free. What can be the meaning and the warrant of such a claim?

Two extreme opposite doctrines of human character and activity demand consideration here. They are mechanical determinism and utter indeterminism. Determinism is an emphatic application of the mechanism of causal necessity to cover all human conduct without reservation. In sharp objection to this account, indeterminism portrays human action as entirely undetermined and spontaneous. The fuller truth of moral experience seems to point between and beyond these two views.

The extreme determinist is convinced that a scientific view of nature requires the inclusion of human conduct within the causal mechanism, without any exceptions or qualifications. Physical science describes nature as a system of events causally connected in space and time. Every event must be regarded as the necessary effect of a certain antecedent cause, and as causing necessarily a certain subsequent event. We have scientific knowledge of anything only when we can thus describe and explain it in terms of causal determination. When Darwin explained the evolutionary course of life causally, as the extinction or the survival of certain species with certain varia-

tions under certain conditions in the environment, modern biology became a real science.

This same sort of explanation is required also of human conduct, if we are to have a science of man, anthropology. More specifically in dealing with our moral experience, the extreme determinist maintains that every so-called purpose, choice, and voluntary action can and must be traced to the determining conditions which explain them. A scientific ethics should be a causal account of the incentives and motives in human behavior and the necessary determination of the eventual acts. This is an investigation of the dynamics of the complex human mechanism, individual and social. Within the range of scientific discovery or control of the determining conditions which the complexity of human nature allows, we should have, with increased knowledge, also increased accuracy of prediction.

In dealing with this doctrine, the critical moralist should acknowledge that it tries to integrate its account of human conduct with the general science of nature. But he is bound to object to the mechanical interpretation of our life by which the integration has been accomplished. We do not recognize ourselves in the deterministic portrait of our character and activities. If we regard our actions as simply the effects of certain causes, what could be meant by our moral judgment of them as praiseworthy or blameworthy?

The fiery stream of lava in a volcanic eruption follows the mountain's curving slope and destroys or just misses the village in its path. A squirrel infested with deadly fleas dies in some inaccessible mountain crevice, or else at a cabin door, where its plague carriers infect the woodsman's children. These are typical cases of fortuitous but strictly necessary consequences. We can try to investigate and explain them, but we find no warrant for judgments of approval or disapproval. The

volcano, the lava, the mountain slope; the squirrel, the fleas are simply what they are. Shall we now include in this sort of account also human conduct? So-called virtue and vice would then be merely this or that kind of behavior of men of a certain hereditary character in reaction to certain incentives within certain conditions in a certain environment. Corruption of character would be like the corrosion of a metal; a man in a rage, like a mad dog; moral education and reform, like chemical treatment of the soil or like grafting; a genius or a saint, like some startling mutation.

Shall we describe and explain in this way Judas Iscariot's betrayal of his Master, or Socrates drinking the hemlock, or Martin Luther nailing his theses on the church door in Wittenberg, or Tolstoy in mid-career reversing his entire course of life, or Hitler's million iniquities, or the unyielding courage of the English in the Battle of Britain, or of the Russians before Moscow and at Stalingrad? To see in such actions nothing but the operations of a causal mechanism, to miss the wickedness or the nobility of them, is to miss the essential meaning which they have for us. On this basis morality would be simply ruled out. Our intelligence protests against such a distortion of human nature and character in the name of physical science.

The indeterminist in his account of human conduct proceeds to the opposite extreme. Our actions, he declares, are not determined by causal-mechanical necessity; they are not determined at all, in any way whatever. It might seem to us that we are directed by our inclinations or habits or reflections; but none of these are really decisive, according to the indeterminist. In the actual moment of decision, what prevails is a wholly unpredictable and spontaneous act of the will. In any specific deliberation the very same person could conceivably have chosen the opposite course of action. This wholly

free, undetermined and unpredictable choice makes us morally responsible for what we do. Our whole life and our every action express moment by moment our free and untrammeled moral will.

This doctrine of the so-called "free will of indifference" is radically defective as an account of our actual conduct. Far from providing a true interpretation of moral character, it would make all character unintelligible. If every decision of the will is entirely unconnected with a man's past experience, the act performed would nowise represent a man's nature. Nor would it have any significance for the future. How could we speak then of moral development or self-realization? Every choice or action would be an unaccountable spontaneity, without origin or destiny. This chaos of events—as it were the acts of a swarm of persons—would not allow of moral judgment, for who or what would be subject to judgment? Censure and punishment would be pointless. The former murderer at the bar of judgment may be, then, a saintly will; and the judge about to condemn him may unaccountably decide to run amuck. Moral education would be futile; for it presumes a certain influence of past experience on the present and on the future. There could be no social order, as this implies a reliable continuity of relations and transactions between persons. No institutional life—family ties, economic or political organization, or laws—would be conceivable.

When we consider the bedlam view of human life to which the acceptance of strict indeterminism would lead us, we are bound to see that its exponents cannot entertain it at its face value. And in fact they do not: else no indeterminist in his senses would make an agreement or an appointment, choose a spouse or a partner, entrust his life to the driver of a car, or in any other of the thousand details of life proceed on the expectation that men's present and future actions will in some

degree square with their past conduct as expressions of their character. Indeterminism does not provide us assurance of moral freedom and responsibility. In its account of conduct as a series of unconnected and unaccountable acts we can recognize no real ongoing personality that could be called either free or responsible, no moral character whatever.

2. MORAL FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: SELF-DETERMINISM AND SELF-EXPRESSION

The two extreme doctrines of determinism and indeterminism seek to do justice to legitimate demands of our moral experience, yet each in its turn distorts our real personality. The determinist rightly tries to recognize in our life the connected order which he investigates in the rest of nature; but he errs in describing the human order as a merely causal mechanism. The indeterminist is rightly moved by our moral conviction that we are not mere mechanisms, that our acts are free and our own; but he goes astray in his doctrine of complete spontaneity, dismissing all determination in our conduct. While describing human character in naturalistic terms, the determinist does not consider adequately what sort of nature is expressed in personal voluntary conduct. While distinguishing man from the rest of nature, the indeterminist divorces human conduct entirely from all order and leaves our personality unaccountable in any way.

The true doctrine of the freedom and the determination of our acts must come from a better understanding of the nature of the self in its relation to the rest of nature. For such an understanding our study of moral conduct has already prepared us. In various fields of experience we have seen that moral achievement signifies the perfected integration of the self in its perception and realization of values. Moral perfection is in the fulfillment of personality. Freedom and re-

sponsibility as moral principles should be viewed as aspects of this fulfilled-integral character of personal experience. An act, we may say, is morally free and responsible when it is representative of the agent, an act with which he is identified and for which he can answer. This view of our moral freedom has been called self-determinism. A better term to describe it is "self-expression."

This view of human character and activity manifests a certain contrast to our view of physical nature. But more careful reflection discloses a gradual approximation in nature to this self-expressive character of behavior, and deepens our insight into the relation of human nature to the rest of existence. The causal determination of a mechanical structure manifests the togetherness rather than the integrity of its parts. No matter how complicated the structure may be, the causal action is still action of parts on parts. The most elementary plant, however, operates as an organism, acts and reacts as a system. This integral activity is manifested more and more significantly as we ascend the evolutionary scale of animal life. The living organism does not have simply parts. It has members, organically one with each other. The organs flourish and suffer integrally; damage to one organ affects the organism and may be repaired by the organism. Mind, rational character, reveals in an immensely greater degree this self-determining behavior. For mind is not only a systematic organic process but also the awareness of it, self-consciousness. Thinking man is preeminently capable of self-expressive and self-representative activity.

Observe human development, and note how perfection of character and value achievement in any field manifest this fuller integrity of self-expression, harmony and fulfillment of personality. It may be observed especially in our higher life. Intellectual advance points from the random assortment of impressions, opinions, and prejudices of an ignorant mind, to

the growing and vital coherence of a mature intelligence, with its system of ideas in which every thought reflects and affects the logical whole. Follow a person's mastery of a musical instrument. The beginner is, so to say, between himself and his instrument; his fingers are all thumbs. But progressively his whole being, fingers, eyes, ears, memory, emotional mood, reflection, taste, all become harmoniously one; he can express freely, without impediment, his spirit in terms of his chosen musical value. He has achieved musical freedom.

So throughout the range of moral experience, this progressive harmony of self-expression marks growing perfection. It is emphasized in our conception of the virtues. We acknowledge it when we criticize one-sided ethical doctrines. It finds systematic formulation in the theory of perfectionism. We may say that moral advance is advance in the attainment of freedom. A man may be progressively released from the lures or the checks or the bias and sweeping compulsion of random and disordered impulses and passions. His life may in truth become a harmony of free and significant self-expression. This process is one of gradual attainment. Freedom and determinism are not bare alternatives, so that we could say of a man's action that it is determined or that it is free. We should rather speak of man's gradual attainment of greater degrees of freedom, in his moral advance in any direction.

In recognizing the significance of moral freedom as self-expression, we also see moral responsibility in a new light. We observe that the older distinction between the determined and the spontaneous character of human action was beside the point. The real meaning of moral freedom eludes us so long as we consider in factual terms the problem whether human spontaneity is an admissible exception to the uniform necessity in nature. The real question of freedom, for ethics, is not whether my moral activity is determined or undetermined.

The real question is, How is it determined by me; in what sense is it significantly and responsibly mine? My free action is my act, which would not be except for me and for which therefore I am responsible. The judgment of the action joins its worth and mine in the same verdict. Therein is the sting of remorse, which the thought of the inevitable does not relieve: "It is impossible but that offenses will come: but woe unto him through whom they come!"

The moral view of events is neither retrospective nor anticipatory, but alert to the impending. The morally free life is not arbitrary. It is free because it is more than a bare result. It is in our making. Save for us, things would not be as they shall be; and may yet be different, by our will. And in our life these are not merely facts to record, but challenges to meet. On some anvil the iron is glowing hot, and the hammer ours alone. The ideas of self-determination, of personal responsibility, of dutiful obligation, all these elements in the idea of freedom are reflected here on their distinctively moral side. Only as we feel that it is "up to us," do we also come to feel that we ought or ought not. There is no possible recognition of duty, unless the matter-of-fact disclaimer "What is that to me?" is ruled out. The river before us is any river, until we come to see it as our Rubicon. Then we realize what is freely and responsibly in our power and alone morally significant: not whether the river will be crossed, but whether we should and shall be crossing it.

This idea is at the basis of the sense of moral obligation and conscience, of moral creativeness in conduct and character: the vigilant, heroic, self-enhancing, self-transcending life. Profound insight is revealed in a sentence by Josiah Royce: "This is my duty, nobody in the universe—no, not God, so far as God is other than myself—can do this duty for me. My duty I must myself do." In the drama of existence every one of us has a role, and conscience calls your cue and mine. A morally en-

lightened mind is a mind emancipated from thoughtlessness, a responsible mind. Here self-understanding, realization, and satisfaction fuse with duty; a man acts his part. "In Labrador," writes Dr. Wilfred Grenfell, "I have been allowed to find that there was a job that would not be done if I did not do it." Only as a man is possessed by this consciousness of being somehow more than a mechanism, only as he sees himself as a creator of possible values, loyal to unrealized ideals that challenge his particular achievement, and in such achievement finding his own fuller self, only thus is he morally conscious and morally active. This moral conviction is expressed in each of us daily, and all approval or disapproval, all love of honor, compunction, fair play, devotion, shame or aspiration, duty, and piety are evidences of it.

3. CHANGE, EVOLUTION, AND PROGRESS

Some of the perplexities which confront the problem of moral freedom embroil also our idea of moral progress. This idea is of central importance in the whole direction of our moral life. We face it in the problems of post-war reconstruction as we find ourselves at the crossroads of momentous decisions. The future course of our civilization, our nation and our own individual lives will be decided by the turn which we take on this crossroad. Our chosen policy may express our recognition of the social and international prejudices and injustices which have brought our civilization to ruin, and our resolution not to repeat our grave blunders of the past, to solve our problems with fairness to all, and to move forward to a better day. Or our post-war settlement may be dictated by a drab conviction that we cannot prevent class conflicts or wars, that whatever we may do, sooner or later men's insatiate greeds will reassert themselves. All we might accomplish would be a little postponement or a truce, "peace in our time." In every

field of human activity this basic skepticism about our real achievement undermines morale, saps vigorous endeavor. Of what avail are striving and struggle, if we are to be always confounded by the essential futility of value? Our life is then not even a tedious treadmill, but hopelessly unfit.

In ethical terms the problem of progress is that of our moral capacity: the convincing reality or the final illusoriness of moral advance. The fundamental issue of progress confronts us as soon as we take morality seriously and try to include it in our ultimate view of reality. We have been appraising human conduct in its many aspects according to ideal principles of worth. In this and that kind of activity and social participation, we have said, fulfillment of personality would be achieved and human nature approach its characteristic perfection. Now we are brought sharply to terms: Does actual human conduct warrant any such ideal estimate and expectations? This inquiry before us concerns first principles which, in ethics as in other sciences, are apt to be acknowledged at the beginning but come up for criticism in their due season. The vigorous moral conscience proceeds as a matter of course on its self-evident practical axioms. It is in the more critical analysis of moral philosophy that this self-evidence is probed. Our present problems, and those in the concluding chapter, concern the basic postulates and the farthest horizons of a moral outlook on life. Ethics here essays to map out its cosmic domain.

The readiest answer to the question about moral progress may be in terms of a definition. It depends upon what you mean by progress. This is not an evasion or a mere dispute over terms. The clarification of our idea of progress and the testing of its validity in human affairs are two aspects of our critical inquiry. We should first of all avoid the common confusion of progress with mere change. Change is a universal fact, inevitable in a world of manifold activities. Ever since

Heraclitus, men have recognized the flux of existence: "You cannot step twice into the same river." But it is uncritical and very sanguine thinking to identify change with advance. This is the logic of our town boosters who praise their little metropolis as a "progressive burg" in which "something's doing every minute." Progress is not simply process. It is a process of a certain kind, realizing increasingly recognized values.

This confusion is not cleared up when we regard progress as biological development or evolution. Progress is not a merely biological any more than a mechanical principle. As we noted in our criticism of the evolutionary theory of ethics, survival "value" should not be identified with moral worth. The "fittest" in any environment are simply those that do survive in it. Before we can regard a series of evolutionary changes as evidence of progress, capacities for value realization must be present and also the consciousness of them. When we consider evolution on the human-social level, we have to deal, not with the survival of the fittest in a certain environment, but with the judgment and adjustment of environment by persons, to fit it to their needs and purposes. As more than mere growth and evolution is needed to yield the full meaning of value, so the idea of progress, enhancement of value or of the capacity for it, is not to be confused with evolution.

If we were to take a large view of the process of evolution, we might speak of it as "cosmic progress" in that it achieves the human species, mind and personality. But this may mean one of two things. We may be content to regard the biological process as somehow eventually reaching the human level in the series of terrestrial environments. In that case we should say, strictly, that in some factual way evolution does attain the human-mental stage, and then activities of a progressive character become possible. Or else we could view, not only the actual life and character of men, but the very possibility and

attainment of the human level in the evolutionary process, as the evidence of a cosmic unfolding principle. Religious thought might proclaim it as the revelation of God's plan in the universe; or without specific theological commitments, idealistic philosophy might interpret it as evidence of the fundamentally spiritual character of reality. If we entertain the idea of cosmic progress, we must make ultimate provision, in one way or another, for rational-spiritual nature and activity. Already the religious-metaphysical implications of our moral problem are definitely indicated. It is advisable, however, to consider it first in the more direct terms of our moral experience and judgment, within the more immediate range of our human-personal horizons.

The problem of moral progress, plainly and directly examined, is the problem of real achievement and enhancement of values in the lives of men and in the history of man. It is related to the general problem of ethical theory, involving the same basic demands, likewise similar cautions against one-sidedness and oversimplification. Our conclusions regarding men's real achievement and expansion of values would depend on our conception and gradation of values. We are likely to interpret moral progress in terms of our general moral outlook. If our ethical system is narrow, so will be our estimate of progress.

We find ourselves here engaged in a general appraisal of the moral enterprise. It has been said that a person's approving or condemnatory judgment of life is apt to be an expression of his temperament. More usually it springs from his concentration on certain values and on the enjoyed possession or grievous frustration of them. The lack of critical balance in basic valuation compromises the validity of many common estimates of progress; yet such estimates, however one-sided, do report actual positive or negative values of human life. Their very

partiality may bring out certain aspects of our experience which a more balanced examination might not otherwise notice.

4. OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM

These two terms are used to describe two opposite estimates of human life, general approval or condemnation. In their extreme forms they proclaim the world as the best possible or the worst possible. The usual optimist, however, concedes the existence of some evil, which he would justify somehow; and the pessimist likewise sees some occasional good, be it no other than a way out of this world of misery. The real difference between them is the radical contrast in emphasis.

The abysmal problem of evil colors thought and feeling and determines the temper of sages and seers. Philosophy and poetry owe their spirit and tone to it. It has been said that here also is to be found the kinship or the contrast in the various religions, whether they are mainly optimistic or pessimistic. Here is a crucial question: Is the universe ultimately friendly, or hostile, or callous and dull to human needs and aspirations?

We may cite here some of the more important varieties of optimism and pessimism, in their bearing on the idea of progress, by following two or three lines of valuation. As hedonism is one of the most common ethical theories, optimism and pessimism are apt to take a hedonistic turn. Belief in progress would then depend upon whether happiness is found to be increasing or on the wane. There has been no lack of extreme assertion on both sides of this argument. In the eighteenth century, the heyday of optimism, some moralists proclaimed the actual blessedness of creation: "All individuals are always infinitely happy." Such an effusion calls for mention but not for discussion. It is amazing that even a man of the caliber of Adam Smith could express his assurance that there would always be in the world "the greatest possible quantity of happi-

ness." These words make sense only if taken ironically. More soberly, the utilitarians were content to urge that the promotion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number was the reasonable aim for good men. Human life, however good or however defective, has the merit of affording progress, increase of happiness.

Against this hedonistic optimism, a dreary chorus through the ages bewails the unhappy lot of men. Precisely if we set our hearts on happiness our life is proved to be a losing game. Hegesias declared in the days of the Ptolemies: Pleasure is elusive, transitory, and deceitful, yet without it life is not worth living. The modern judgment of happiness provides equally severe utterances. According to Schopenhauer, our nature is consumed with insatiate desire, and our usual condition is one of miserable want. Pleasure is only the occasional relief from pain in the satisfaction of some desire, to be promptly followed by another unsatisfied want, or else by wretched boredom. Hartmann also concluded that life as a quest of happiness is an inevitable failure. Our wants increase faster than our means to gratify them. The distress of the masses cannot be really cured; our charities only palliate and prolong their misery. We feed the starving beggar today, so that he can survive to be hungry tomorrow. It is like cutting off a dog's tail kindly, inch by inch. It might seem dishonorable to desire happiness for oneself in a world of such general wretchedness. Voltaire once wrote that he could scarcely smile without somehow feeling guilty.

A similar contrast of final judgment may be cited if we consider the field of intellectual values, our mind's career in pursuit of knowledge. The optimist lauds the achievements of pure and applied science, especially during the modern period of advance in every field of investigation and invention. It has mastered and harnessed the forces of nature to human

use. It has transformed our civilization. The incredibly expanded range of our daily activity, overcoming space-time limitations and perfecting our world-wide communication, has given us the external conditions of cosmopolitan life. In one field after another the modern mind has probed the secrets of nature and has exploited its energies for human advantage. It is mastering the evil mysteries of dread diseases and discovering new sources of health and strength. It has unlocked new stores of food by perfecting agriculture, new reservoirs of power in nature, labor-saving machinery in industry, countless devices to lessen the hardships and increase the comforts of our daily lives. In the purely intellectual grasp of the nature of things, the modern mind has perfected its methods of experimental inquiry and theoretical analysis. So strong is this confidence in science that it has been called the real religion of modern minds. If a discussion about progress should arise in a typical company of our time, the most likely evidence for optimism would be sought in the field of scientific achievement.

But all this intellectual confidence is continually shocked by flouting negation. Here is the open challenge or insidious irony of skepticism that undermines our rational confidence. The sage may likely miss happiness, but he would be reconciled, were he assured of the possession of truth. Our positive valuation of life remains firm so long as the mind's self-reliance is not discredited. It is noteworthy that the solid rationalistic tradition in the history of thought has been in the main optimistic in spirit, or at any rate resistant to basic negation. But irrationalism involves a collapse of spiritual morale. How can we speak of progress or achievement if we lack trustworthy principles or capacity to judge? Pessimism is apt to be the more desolate and unqualified the more skeptically it estimates the resources and reliability of intelligence.

Skepticism is morally devastating because moral values stand

or fall with the validity of the critical judgment expressed in them. We may remark that the critical judgment is itself skeptical in its way: Does it not question traditional conformity, dismiss popular opinions or preferences, avoid dogmatic self-assurance, urge tolerance of contrary views? The skeptic carries this critical caution to the length of utter distrust and suspense of judgment. He exposes the instability of knowledge and alleged truth in every field of inquiry. He interprets the history of science as the continual revision or rejection of presumably tested and established laws. In our time we are witnessing a revolution in the basic ideas of the structure of nature. Physics and chemistry are following mathematics, the traditional ideal of incontrovertible validity, in reinterpreting their first principles and axioms as working postulates.

If even the physical sciences have to rely for their stability on certain assumed and possibly precarious foundations, what are we to say of philosophy—of theology? Here are monumental edifices of man's self-outreaching zeal, sublime but pathetic. The clamor of controversies in every field of religious belief—a mass of plausible doctrines, none convincing—leaves the critical mind confused and dismayed. The history of philosophy is a parade of brilliant refutations, with ever new systems of presumption to divert or amaze the sober mind. Our principles and systems of value are the results of wishful thinking and in any case suffer from subjective bias. The firmest believers in progress also assure us that this is the best of all possible worlds. What boundless pretension is expressed in this doctrine! We are like the ignorant Highlander to whom David Hume read a page of the *Aeneid* and who pronounced it the best possible poem. The Scotsman's judgment might have been correct, yet what qualifications did he have for making it?

The modern skeptic is moved to general pessimistic dismay in his judgment of our modern civilization with its world's

fair of progress in all fields. Back of the tawdry display is the woeful actuality. If pure science has enmeshed us in ultimate perplexity, its applications have made our life more complex but also more confused and corrupt. The history of our time is proving anew the dismal words of Ecclesiastes: "Whoso increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." Modern man believes himself more knowing, is actually less wise and more miserable than his forebears. We have technical skill but no insight; so our expert methods, without right principles, only lead us to greater futility and more stupendous disaster. The advance of modern medicine in curing certain diseases does not avail to check the general deterioration of our vitality and especially the nervous and mental breakdown caused by the strains and hazards and corrupt conditions of modern life. Modern agriculture fails to yield the human fruits of scientific methods: in a world of potential abundance millions are starving, without access to the soil or its crops.

Modern industry and business have used mass production and expert merchandizing to bring their luxuries and countless gadgets within the reach of increasing multitudes. This has only sharpened the greed and discontent of our society. The machine age of mass production has brutalized and mechanized the workman, has locked capital and labor in a bitter struggle. The perfection of communication over land and sea and in the air, as it has made modern life world-wide, has opened up boundless possibilities for profits and spurred the great industrial nations to rivalry in colonial expansion for the exploitation of raw materials overseas by the use of cheap native labor. The inevitable consequences, international conflicts and wars, have been the more titanic calamities just because of the immensely more destructive armaments provided by modern technology. Not only vast armies on the field of battle but also unarmed and helpless populations were daily

destroyed or maimed in the course of global war. The atomic bomb is the dire climax of this advance of knowledge-without-wisdom.

When the moralist speaks of the human mind as the controller of the environment that has raised evolution to a radically new and higher level, he is indulging in illusions. The human mind has only developed new means, tools and techniques. The basic nature of man has not altered; it is still that of the jungle; life is still a bloody struggle for existence. We have made this struggle only vaster, more ruinous to the losers, and no less futile to the winners. To talk of Divine Providence directing such a world is insulting to such intelligence as we do possess. Moral progress is a delusion. Nature and human life seem rather to be a process of congenital perversity. Or the more likely and perhaps the most charitable view of things is that they simply go their way, neutral to any worth.

5. CIVILIZATION: AN EXPANDING RANGE FOR GOOD OR FOR EVIL

Neither the complacent nor the depressing estimates of civilization reported in the preceding section are finally convincing to critical estimate. Against the docile optimist is the heavy burden of evidence in the life of each one of us. As great poetry touches the deepest chords of the human heart, it strikes the tragic note. Religion, the way to blessedness, is a gospel of salvation. So Jesus addressed himself to the weary and the heavy-laden; he called "not the righteous but sinners to repentance." The first truth which Gautama Buddha proclaimed was that misery is universal. Science and the arts repeat the same truth of hard struggle and human deficiency: "There is no royal road to geometry"—*Ars longa, vita brevis.* The plain day's experience of us all is to the same effect.

Does this sort of reflection proceed rightly to pessimistic despair? Nowise. The tragic note itself is the expression of a

high principle of worth in human nature. A totally depraved or callous character would not feel the tragedy of moral downfall or futility of endeavor. The pessimist should understand the significance of his own condemnatory judgment. It is itself evidence of high value, in exacting negative verdict.

We can perceive better the real character of civilization in its bearing on progress, by considering one fundamental characteristic of value. Every value is either positive or negative and is always manifested in opposition to its counter value. Justice is understood, pursued, attained in the exposure of injustice and in the resistance to it. Harmony is achieved by the overcoming of discords; and truth, by clearing up errors. Perfection in any field of activity is not so much a state of conclusive attainment; it is rather a process of realizing the positive values on an ascending plane and in ever more significant experience, but always confronted with the hazards of more serious frustration. So our beginner learning to play on the piano has the first task of mastering the simple elements. When he has them letter perfect, he proceeds, not to the assured and satisfied performance of those easy exercises, but to the ever more complex music with its harder problems and subtler and richer harmonies in prospect. Real achievement, real progress means becoming fit to face the higher tasks that yield the greater values. Mastering elementary algebra makes us capable of taking up quadratics. As the apprentice grows up to be a master, he does not merely surmount his problems and risks of failure, but problems and risks become more involved and far-reaching. Our entire life career involves the operation of this principle.

History exhibits the progressive expansion of the field on which human purposes are pursued, achieved, frustrated. As compared with primitive and barbaric societies, our modern life cannot be described as either more or less happy, or free,

or just, or wise. A plausible case could be made for either side of the argument in each of these pairs of alternative judgments, but we should then be missing the real truth of the matter. The historical fact is that happiness, freedom, justice, wisdom have themselves grown progressively in significance. Richer happiness is available for civilized society, fuller freedom, higher justice, deeper wisdom; but also more disastrous failure if we fail. In the progress of civilization the scale of activity spreads out in both directions: the more sublime ascent, the more abysmal fall.

Apply this general principle to the appraisal of the historical process, and the deficiency of both optimism and pessimism becomes evident. The optimist cites the successes of civilized man, and the pessimist rehearses his failures and unsolved problems; but both consider progress as though it were the definite possession of some sort of value: the completion of a task, the disposal of difficulties, assured enjoyment. Neither values nor progress can be judged thus simply in terms of accomplishment and bare possession. What matters is the level or range on which the values develop: not whether success or failure prevail, but what success and what failure. The pessimist as a critic of civilization is like a good neighbor of mine who owns a very fine photographic camera; she refuses to bother with the stops and adjustments, and so her pictures are fogs. She prefers another cheap camera which she can simply snap. The simple box, which rarely fails to take some picture, never takes a really good one. The more complicated camera may fail utterly, but when its resources are understood and rightly used it yields a salon print. So it is with civilized life as compared with earlier and cruder societies.

Follow the course of any type or aspect of value in an individual's career or in social history, and see what progress really signifies. Consider happiness, for instance. In childhood, in

primitive life, both pleasures and displeasures are simple and close at hand; in individual and in social maturity the pursuit of happiness becomes more complex and subtler, and no less precarious. We should count ourselves lucky if we could have the same chance of getting our grown-up satisfactions which our children have in getting theirs. Yet we should still have no complaint. Shall we sigh sentimentally for our vanished happy childhood? Would we really go back to the nursery if we could? The deeper enjoyment in "growing up" is the experience of our growth *in* enjoyment, our more advanced education in happiness. The blessed joys of children would be childish in a man. The real happiness for him, whether more or less readily assured, must be the happiness of a man. Any person of intelligence accepts life on these terms, with such actual happiness as his progress and maturity afford, and he would not rate happiness very highly unless he could have it thus progressive and maturing.

The pessimist bewails the miseries of our modern industrial society. But the rehearsal of them nowise proves that our modern system is a corruption of the older society, that the way out of our evils is in a return to the handicrafts and the simpler economy of our ancestors. The real moral problem in dealing with our industrial and economic system, as we have seen, is in facing its actual complexities and problems: both the opportunities and the perils, all that it offers in more secure and more significant living and also its injustices and corruptions. The transition from the earlier simpler economy to our modern industrial age is real progress, for it offers us the opportunity of living on a higher and more humane plane, a more abundant life. But it involves the hazards of all progress, the hazard of human activity: as we advance, our social-economic problems become increasingly serious. In solving any of our present problems at all adequately, we shall be only proceeding to a

still more mature recognition of our social enterprise, with richer values in store—and with a more serious struggle in achieving them.

The life of political activity, national and international, reveals the same unfolding scope of realization or downfall in the progress of history. We shall not here rehearse the ideas of the preceding chapter, which the reader can readily apply to the present argument. The achievement of political values in a small isolated country of earlier days is a relatively simple process as compared with the meaning and the problem of freedom and justice and tolerance and security and statesmanship and common welfare in a country and nation like ours. But we rightly accept, prefer, and cherish our American life with all its problems and complexities, for it is a greater challenge to our more mature democracy—we must face greater odds to attain a still fuller and richer human existence. This problem is now before us on a world span, in the task to which we progress and must progress as we take up our share in the post-war reconstruction.

Spiritual life is especially vulnerable to the shafts of skepticism, but it has the rare quality of restoration and even of gaining new strength from its wounds. Is each law sooner or later disproved or revised by criticism? Yet the criticism and disproof of the theory are the work of reason, and in its self-revision it gains better mastery. Maturity of judgment makes the mind both more searchingly critical and more reliable in its construction. These two aspects of intellectual maturity are of vital importance in moral achievement. Moral progress is conditioned by right judgment alike in the choice and in the rejection of values. That is the meaning of a really defensible preference. With maturing intelligence and deeper and more critical insight, the values available for choice are higher and more significant, and our capacity to discern our alternatives

wisely is greater; we are more likely to make the right choice. Moral progress is thus manifested in the recognition and also in the realization of values.

In the discussion of civilization and progress, it is natural to compare modern life with earlier primitive societies and conditions of existence, and to speak of progress as if it were merely a matter of chronology, as if earlier and later, ancient and modern signified its lower and higher stages, less and more perfect. This is not always or necessarily the case; repeatedly the contrary is the truth. In the lives of individuals there are supreme moments of experience, of heroic endeavor or devotion, inspiration or creative sweep of genius, which the rest of our days do not approach but which set the tone and level of our ideal character. So with civilization. Here also great sages and saints see the great visions, utter the great truths of humanity, and whole epochs are transformed by them and find their own life's meaning and purpose clarified. The supreme values attained by these men become our common and living possession. The reality of human progress and spiritual vitality is demonstrated by these achievements; it is not at all affected by the fact that these great souls have lived centuries before our time. You and I living today are not worthy to unloose the latchet of their shoes. One *Iliad* or *Hamlet,* one Victory of Samothrace or Fifth Symphony, one Sermon on the Mount should suffice to vindicate the spiritual genius of man, his rise from brute savagery, his progress. Though we cannot expect to live our lives on the summits of genius, we contemplate the heights, aspire and plod towards them. It is our higher life.

The examples just cited are deliberately chosen from the aesthetic and religious fields. In both we can witness the creative activity of our higher powers, and so its supreme spiritual visions. Our common life, trudging through the ages, is periodically inspired by these heroic ascents. In other types of

human activity creative power may also transcend our reach and spur us to emulation. But in religion above all this superabundance of spiritual genius moves us to worshipful devotion. The interplay of moral activity and religious experience points to ultimate problems of nature and human nature.

Chapter 18

MORALITY, RELIGION, AND PHILOSOPHY

1. THE INTERACTION OF MORAL AND RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT

Modern ethical inquiry has proceeded on a definitely secular basis. It interprets and evaluates our daily human life, individually and in social relations, as a system of interests, purposes, choices, actions, achievements, failures. Ethics comprehends in its systematic valuations all the humanistic sciences, so as to attain in balanced perspective a program of the most abundant life, realization or fulfillment of personality. It embraces religious experience, as a rich source of values, alongside the aesthetic and the intellectual activities. All these are natural aspects of the life worth living. They are included in our moral outlook on life and are judged on their merits as elements in our valuation of daily experience.

Notwithstanding this resolutely secular method of ethics, which must consistently regard and estimate religion as one of the fields of value realization, the relation between religion and morality is historically and essentially unique, different from the relation that morality bears to the intellectual and aesthetic or other types of experience. We indicated this distinctive role of religious worship by placing it at the summit of our hierarchy of values. We may define religion as man's conviction of

the supreme reality of his highest values. Religion is meant to be the consummation and the cosmic warrant of morality. We can understand why conscience so readily seeks its refuge in piety and considers the good life the godly life, and the godly life as our life in God, our creator and preserver, the Rock of Ages, be-all and end-all of reality.

Religion, while in close touch with morality, is also related to science and philosophy. It expresses man's ultimate idea of reality, the source and the destiny of his own being and of all existence. Just as in one respect the ethical view includes religion as one of the fields of value realization, so in another respect religion includes morality in its world-comprehending vision of supreme reality.

As the highest and final cosmic outlook, religion has a definite connection with men's general culture and enlightenment. From the crude gropings of primitive minds to the profound insight and wisdom of saints and sages, the religions of mankind record the agelong search for the saving truth of life. This journey is sublime in its ascents, but it is also pathetic in its straying and stubborn misdirection. We need historical-critical fair-mindedness if we are to do justice alike to the great debt which morality owes to religion and to the conflicts of moral enlightenment and reform with religious tradition.

Both religion and morality have had a long and varied history. Our present question is: What is the interaction of moral and religious development? The history of religious growth manifests an increasing but not uncontested ascendency of the moral factor. In the earlier and more primitive cults, the moral conscience is not dominant in the God-fearing life. The higher religions emphasize righteousness. But this progressive importance of the moral element is attained as a result of hard struggle and reform.

We may elucidate and illustrate this general statement by

following some lines of the historical process that bring out more explicitly the interplay of morality and religion. Primitive men felt themselves dependent on higher and holy powers that could destroy or could bless. They had an awesome dread of unaccountable perils in nature, of things taboo, contact with which was fraught with disaster. They also sensed certain weird potencies or "mana," whose use by rightly initiated hands could yield all bounty and good luck. While on the one hand speculating in myth and doctrine about this supernatural dominion, they were even more concerned to learn and practice the proper observance of the sacred rites. The early cults naturally emphasized ritual: initiation ceremonies, taboo and mana codes, totemic sacraments, sacrifices, liturgical services.

As the religious consciousness attains more fully the idea of God, and man comes to think of the highest powers as divine and personal, all restrictions, prohibitions, commandments—the entire practical substance of religion—is gradually given a divine reference, as conduct acceptable or unacceptable in God's eyes, as righteousness or sin. The good life is conceived as obedience to God's will. This is of the utmost importance to the moral factor in religion. Men's views of the good and godly life change when their ideas of God and of God's will are altered. Religious and moral convictions reflect each other and reveal the degree of spiritual maturity attained by the worshipers. Of societies as of individuals we may say: "By their gods ye may know them."

We can understand the predominance of sacrifices and ceremonial in the earlier popular cults: the effort to propitiate and ward off the fatal anger of the divine powers and to secure the blessings of their good will. The earlier conceptions of the Divine are crude and naive; crude also are the earlier ideas of God's will and laws, and so the whole spirit and character of the worship. There is hardly any type of gross or benighted or

cruel or corrupt behavior that has not been inculcated as divine worship in some cult or other. Infanticide and human sacrifice, sacred prostitution and frenzied orgies of unbridled lust, bigotry, ferocity, hatred and vindictiveness as pious service to a jealous tribal or national deity, all these for long ages have stained the religious devotion of blind multitudes groping towards the light. And then gradually, as men reached a higher view of the Divine, their worship and their lives have been correspondingly enlightened and transfigured.

We can see the characteristic interplay of morality and religion in the course of man's spiritual development. Religion, in its intention expressing men's supreme values and sanctions, dominates by its traditional forms of devotion the life outlook of its votaries. Especially when men's highest ideals have found great utterance in hymns and gospels, priestly exaltation of them as divinely inspired attains and maintains for them abiding reverence. This is a great service of religion to morals. Religion preserves and perpetuates the moral gains of society by investing them with the halo of sanctity. They become holy and inviolable truths.

This spirit of religious devotion, which cherishes and sustains moral-spiritual ideals so that they become firm possessions of popular piety, this worshipful spirit is also loyal to tradition. Through the ages it would preserve its ancient verities inviolate. Meanwhile ongoing human life, with deeper insight, more mature outlook and more critical principles, complicates increasingly the problem of squaring the living moral convictions of intelligent men with the religious doctrines and precepts of popular tradition. What the ancient scriptures inculcate as divine perfection is seen to be increasingly out of harmony with what men really honor and cherish in their own lives. A time comes when enlightened men can no longer believe seriously in their ancient gods. Unless in-

telligence and virtue are to be divorced from piety, men demand a radical revision of the old ideas of God, God's will, divine perfection: a religious reform or the establishment of a new religion. This is a great service of morals to religion. Moral development periodically challenges religion to vindicate its supreme place in human life by revising its traditional verities so as to express more truly men's deepest convictions and highest ideals.

Ancient Greece and Israel provide two classic illustrations of this moral-religious interaction. Early Greek religious belief and life outlook had found immortal poetic expression in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. These two Homeric epics served as a Bible in Greek society. Their portrayal of the Olympian gods and goddesses expressed the Greek ideas of divine perfection. But to a later and more critical age, the Homeric divinities became intellectually and morally unconvincing. Zeus and his Olympians of the popular mythology, with their intrigues and infidelities, their adulteries and their violent wrangles: how could these be divine, if divinity and perfection were to have any meaning? If the gods could be profligates and deceivers, if they were unjust and confused in their moral judgment, what moral standards could men recognize, and what laws could they respect? The Greek tragic poets, in reenacting the ancient myths on the stage, were confronted by this moral-religious crisis in Greek life. Plato resolutely advanced a higher philosophical conception of God and condemned the traditional religion for its low ideals.

The prophetic reform of the popular religion of Israel was a similar spiritual achievement. The Hebrews thought of their god Yahveh (Jehovah) as the god of their tribes, bound to them by a covenant. He was sure to protect them and to give them prosperity so long as they did not serve any other gods and worshiped him alone in the approved way. Sacrifices and

priestly ritual were emphasized rather than righteousness and moral integrity. This naive and crude tribal religion was challenged by a later and higher spiritual vision. Beginning with the eighth century before Christ, devout men of probity and lofty ideals, led by prophets like Amos, Hosea, Micah, and outstandingly Isaiah denounced the popular ideas of God as unworthy. Yahveh is a God of righteousness, and his worship must be in righteous living. No merely ceremonial observance is of any avail. A benighted and corrupt people might go so far astray as to pollute its religious practice with abominations: idolatry, sacred prostitution, even human sacrifice. True service of God is quite different. As Micah summed it up, it is "to do justly, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with thy God." Later prophets, like Jeremiah in the days of the Babylonian exile, stigmatized the sacrificial ritual as priestly deceit and confusion of the divine law: "Trust ye not in lying words. . . ." "Second Isaiah" rejected the naive notion that Yahveh was merely Israel's god. The true God, the God of right, he declared, is a universal deity, to be worshiped by just and righteous persons in any country.

This ethical monotheism, which was the achievement of the prophets of Israel, reached a still higher summit of moral elevation and a more thoroughly universal and spiritualized interpretation of the religious life in the Christian gospel. "God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship in spirit and in truth. . . . Be ye therefore perfect even as your Father which is in Heaven is perfect." This Christian concentration on the inner life had certain moral hazards, which the history of the Christian church has shown: the tendency to seek perfection in otherworldliness and in withdrawal from the normal daily affairs of men. But it also had boundless power and promise, in reaching beyond any externalities to the personal heart and soul of all worthy human living. True achievement, true prog-

ress, true and abiding gain could only be in the distinctively personal, moral-spiritual nature of man: a gain of soul, life ever more abundant. All other gain is naught if it does not include this: "For what is a man profited if he gain the whole world, and lose or forfeit his own self?" In these words we have the quintessence of the Christian gospel of the godly life: the religious ideal yielding a supreme criterion of moral values.

The true prophet and saint are those who have learned and who can lead others to learn the higher and fuller meaning of the Divine. In their spiritual vision religion perceives the summit to which man can aspire. "When I was a child, I spake as a child, I felt as a child, I thought as a child: now that I am become a man I have put away childish things." St. Paul goes on to say: "Now abideth faith, hope, love, these three: and the greatest of these is love." Experiences of this sort are the supreme moments of the moral-religious ascent in human life.

In our time, too, religion must put away childish things and come of age. It should be abreast of men's most mature intelligence, their finest taste, their deepest moral insight and purest integrity, justice, and devotion, their loftiest aspiration. This is the need of the Christian religion today, and this is the duty of Christian leadership in our society. If religious values are to retain their due place in our life, religious belief and practice must express the consummation of all that is upbuilding and creative and significant. This requires insight into the tangled problems of our modern thought and into the crying social and economic evils of our civilization. Ours is a scientific age; religious thought should not be unresponsive to the principles of a trained scientific mind. So likewise the religion of today and tomorrow must be allied to the pursuit of beauty and harmony in the arts, in literature and music, in creative-imaginative expression.

Moral advance demands the intelligent organization of

values. Religious values can maintain their supreme role in the fulfillment of personality, if religion is in active union, not in conflict, with the other sides of our higher life. Put religion so at the center and summit of our experience that, no matter where we start in human activity, as we approach to full expression we may find it religiously significant.

2. MORAL CONVICTION AND RELIGIOUS FAITH

The mutual interplay of moral and religious ideas reveals man's unfolding outlook on life. This view in its religious expression projects to infinite and eternal range. The belief in God, in divine perfection as the supreme reality, is a conviction about the core and the summit of existence, an idea of ultimate cosmic perspective. The religious gospel of the good and godly life as the way of life eternal is a doctrine of man's immortal nature and destiny. These religious convictions have influenced men's lives vitally, have set the tone of men's morality. As we study further the role of these religious elements in the moral life, we are bound to ask: Are these convictions warranted? Are the beliefs in God and in immortality ascertainable truths of reality? Or are they pathetic examples of man's sublime but misguided aspiration?

Moral Grounds for Belief in God

Men have sought assurance of God's reality by many lines of reasoning. In seeking the sources or explanation of things, the mind is led to more and more primal causes, until it reaches towards the idea of the creative origin and author of all. This is the Cosmological or First Cause Argument for God's existence. Or else our reason is impressed by the evidence of intelligent order in nature, and infers the reality of a directing Divine Providence. This is the Teleological Argument from Design. Or again, we try to grasp by analysis the full implica-

tions of the idea of Deity. The more fully we understand what Deity signifies, the more assured we are of God's reality. This is the Ontological Argument. These and other rational arguments have been advocated by eminent thinkers, and have also been subjected to radical criticisms, of which those of Kant are most noteworthy. Kant concluded that the existence of God cannot be proved by these theoretical arguments. But reason cannot disprove God's existence either. This is a problem beyond the competence of theoretical reasoning. Assurance of God's reality, according to Kant, could come only from our moral convictions, and in his ethics he advocated the belief in God as a postulate of morality.

The moral grounds for belief in God are of two kinds, not both of them of equal worth. We should distinguish these two clearly. The more usual and traditional form of this argument is stated in juridical terms. If morality is taken seriously, then we cannot regard this world as ultimately callous or neutral to justice. Righteousness and iniquity are bound to get their desserts; there is a Divine Providence presiding over human and cosmic affairs, a rewarding and punishing justice on which we can rely and with which we have to reckon.

This doctrine of Divine Providence has been to many believers a strong ground of assurance and also of admonition. But it has been criticized as morally unworthy, in looking beyond the moral life itself to its justification in some ulterior rewards and punishments. Virtue is its own justification, and vice its own punishment. Even if we had no absolute assurance of Divine Providence, as we in fact do not have, our moral career would still have its values and principles, and virtue would still be preferable to vice.

A more significant form of the moral argument for God's existence proceeds from an analysis of the moral activity itself. A moral act involves the recognition of a hierarchy of values.

An ideal standard of perfection is implied in the moral judgment. The search and formulation of any specific truth involves the acknowledgment of infinite and ultimate Truth; likewise with the other values. Our whole spiritual life is a continual recognition of the ideal perfect Value to which all our values would approximate and by which they are ultimately judged. As our outlook develops and expands, so does our idea of the Highest Perfection, our idea of God. Corresponding to our own limited range and activity, our religious faith may contemplate the infinite range and activity of God. If we take morality and our spiritual life in all its aspirations seriously, how can we fail to perceive their ultimate implications in religious conviction? How can we possibly understand and explain the life and thought and character of a great moral personality—in a godless universe?

We should note, in commenting on these two forms of the moral argument for God's reality: first, a sound ethical reluctance to seek the "justification" of the good life in any rewarding or punishing Divine Providence; and second, the significant probing of the final meaning of the moral activity itself. A world that includes personal spiritual beings like ourselves, with careers of boundless scope of achievement, must be a reality of essentially and prevailingly spiritual character. Moral character postulates religious faith in God.

The Moral Faith in Immortality

Reflection on man's moral career naturally raises the question of its scope and final destination. Our past and present is involved in some future—but what is the range of our future? This problem of human destiny has engrossed men's minds from the dawn of history. Man was bound to admit the plain fact of death, but he has refused to accept it as final. In reaching beyond this life to a glimpse of some hereafter, men have

yielded to superstition and to wishful thinking, but they have also sounded the depths of spiritual conviction and soared to visions of sublime aspiration. What has been the moral strain in this agelong search of "the undiscovered country from whose bourn no traveler returns"?

The most common moral argument for immortality in religious tradition is an inference from the juridical argument for Divine Providence. Divine justice demands due rewards and punishments for men's righteous and sinful lives. This due requital is not accomplished in this life; but God's justice is sure to be vindicated in its own good season, in the hereafter. The belief in heaven and hell has assumed different versions. Some of them do not call for serious ethical discussion, and all of them are subject to the criticisms just cited of the juridical argument for God's existence. Furthermore, if man's immortality is morally required in order to accord him the rewards or punishments to which he is entitled and which he has not received in this life, certain strange implications embarrass our reflection. Men whose lives should be regarded as the most nearly perfect, lives of true virtue and also of full achievement and satisfaction, would seem to have least claim to any further justification in the hereafter! Besides, would Divine Providence really need an eternity for the consummation of its justice? Even long-suffering righteous Job, or the blackest villain least punished here on earth, might expect to have their scores evened justly in good season—and then, cleared off the divine docket. Hume's comments here have proved disturbing to traditional thinking: What man is bad enough to deserve eternal punishment, good enough to merit eternal blessedness?

A more fruitful ethical faith in immortality follows the moral argument for God's reality in its second form which we have already considered. This idea of immortality proceeds from an insight into man's spiritual nature, the significance

and worth of personality. We are all biological organisms, subject to the changes of physical nature, yet each of us is also a spiritual character, unique, inexhaustible, and irreplaceable. In personal-spiritual activity nature has found its highest expression. If we take science, art, morality, religion—the whole range of values—if we take these seriously, as real aspects and manifestations of nature, then how can we regard persons as transitory? These values are manifested only in personal activity. They are distinctive in each person, are realized by persons in social relations, and manifest their character as inexhaustible in prospect. The pursuit of truth, beauty, justice, goodness, and other forms of perfection is an eternal pursuit. So long as we recognize the abiding character of values, we must also acknowledge that the vision of man's immortal destiny is not an unreasonable vision. Man's higher spiritual life is an earnest of his immortality. That is what we should understand when religion is called the way of life eternal. A person who chooses and lives the life of spiritual integrity and devotion is even now, living day by day, a citizen of eternity.

The true meaning of death cannot be that of utter extinction of persons. But if we now proceed beyond this basic conviction to ask curious questions about the hereafter, it is a wise man who confesses his inability to answer them. We naturally continue to think of the future in terms of the present. We ask: How can we ourselves be real when all our tangible-visible being is no more? Baffled reason either yields to imaginings and mythology, or else draws back in doubt and denial. We simply do not know in what form personal activity may continue across the abyss of death. Every honest mind that is also intelligent must recognize how difficult it is to attain and to hold definitely the conviction of immortality. If we do hold it, despite its difficulties, it is because the opposite belief, of utter personal extinction, disrupts and negates our

recognition of the abiding character of spiritual values. Surely it seems absurd to us that spirit, reason should become convinced of its own ultimate unreality: that precisely we should reason out that there is finally no reason!

3. MORAL ACTIVITY IN ITS COSMIC SETTING

Our discussion of the problems which religious reflection presents to ethics, and also our study of the problem of moral freedom and progress have brought us face to face with ultimate questions concerning human character and capacities, which involve our fundamental view of nature. These questions have been implied in one form or another throughout our inquiries, and it will be well now, in closing, to consider at least some of them.

In its systematized valuation of our conduct ethics accepts the seemingly plain evidence of our experience, that we are capable of deliberation and choice, choice between alternative values some of which are really preferable to others, better, worthier. This estimate of our purposes and actions implies a view of our nature, and so of the world which includes us. How is this view to be squared with the account of nature presented by the physical sciences? The moralist judges my choice and action as responsible and evaluates it as good or bad. The biologist and anthropologist describe my behavior generally as part of the causally determined mechanism of existence. Are both of these accounts valid? How can we regard them as valid together? It is clear that we must distinguish between the physical-scientific description and explanation of an action and the moral evaluation of it as praiseworthy or blameworthy —distinguish between them, yet also relate them in some coherent view of reality. This, in effect, is the ultimate metaphysical problem in which we are involved when we regard morality as seriously as we do physical science.

Our fundamental problem here is initially that of the "cosmology of values." We ask: What sort of reality do values have; what is the status of value in the constitution and order of nature? It will be recalled that we considered values generally as revealed in the personal response to experience. *So any science of values is a study of some field of experience or nature in a personal perspective.* Now some thinkers, by a depreciative shift of emphasis, declare that values are merely our personal versions of ourselves and of things, to be distinguished from the real facts of nature as reported by the physical sciences.

This is a very common evasion of the problem, not a solution of it. Unless we somehow exclude persons from nature we should recognize that all the value evident or revealed or created in personal activity manifests also real nature as so far valuable. Only to an unduly meager naturalism is nature neutral or values "merely personal." Good physical science might assume this view, for physics considers nature from a special and definite standpoint. But such a partial outlook cannot be good philosophy, for philosophy is comprehensive interpretation. Is it any more reasonable to speak of values as "merely personal" and not ultimately real than similarly to speak of germination and heredity as "merely biological," or of other processes as "merely chemical" or "merely electrical"? These and others are all in and of nature. Philosophically, "Nature" involves all that we experience it to be, *our experience of it included.* The really adequate account of the nature of anything requires consideration of all the variety of relations in which it is active. It is a confusion to speak of a *thing-in-itself.* The violin body reacts to the vibrating strings in one way; our ears react to these vibrations in another way; our aesthetic experience, in yet another. Shall we now say that the first and also the second of these reactions are real, but not

the third, aesthetic response? By what right can we, the ones who have the aesthetic experience, make this gratuitous distinction? Self-declared naturalism should beware of any such incomplete and premature inventory of nature.

If a philosopher should deliberately consider only so-called naturalistic categories, then much of the subtle and characteristic tone of value and personality would be missed, and he might be well advised to reconsider the sufficiency of his initial point of view. Philosophy should not be led astray by the desire to sound like physical science. That is not the way to achieve a scientific philosophy. Really scientific, that is, knowledge-yielding philosophy is one which recognizes nature in all its complexity. We should not expect nature to manifest throughout or in every relation the characteristics which it does reveal in some relations or contexts. Nor should we regard these characteristics as somehow unreal because they are not manifested in certain other relations. The reality of values is not affected by their distinctively personal connotation; on the other hand, it does not follow that we should maintain value as real also in impersonal contexts. Each science requires the use of selected abstractions which outline its sphere of relevance and specific inquiry. Philosophy involves the clear recognition of these various abstractions, but it seeks, beyond them, a comprehensive outlook. It is the demand for a cosmic synthesis.

From this general viewpoint, let us consider a moral situation in its ultimate setting and implications. Here is a man engaged in moral activity, or morally perplexed and engrossed in ethical inquiry. What does this activity or perplexity or inquiry imply regarding his character? What sort of being does his moral conduct and ethical reflection show him to be, and how must we think of a world that includes such beings? Modern thought confronts these two problems, and experiences a twofold enrichment. On the one hand, the study of

nature and of human nature leads to a more detailed knowledge and more critical understanding of conduct and of moral activity. The science of ethics gains in substance what it loses in sanctity. On the other hand, bringing morality down to earth, as it gives us the facts of moral conduct in their natural setting, it imposes on the modern mind the demand to interpret these facts with the other facts of so-called physical nature in a thoroughly philosophical view of reality. If we say that ethics is a science and that man in his moral activity is to be studied as objectively as astronomer and physiologist study their respective fields, then while doing justice to what is "natural" in moral activity, we must also consider how it is related to the rest of nature. What sort of cosmology can make sense of both physics and ethics? If justice and veracity are nothing occult or supernatural, but as natural as breathing and gravitation, then what is the science and philosophy that can comprehend not only gravitation and breathing but also veracity and justice?

The materialist describes man as reacting thus and so to various kinds of pressure, contact, and concussion. According to this view, human nature is nothing but a mechanism, only more complicated than that of the lower animals. But no matter how complicated the mechanism, if it is nothing but a mechanism, it can be described only in terms of causal determination by antecedent conditions. It cannot be evaluated as good or bad. Materialistic ethics is sheer irrelevance. That some materialists do in fact recognize moral principles and appeal to them is not valid inference from their doctrine of human character. It is only their concession to sane judgment. Here is a not very edifying scene: a materialistic lecturer has argued his doctrine, that all human behavior is only some sort of physiological reaction, part of the causal mechanism and nothing more. And now after the students have been thus

described and tabulated, they are asked to take a test on all this wisdom, and to testify "on their honor" that they have not cheated during the examination!

The intelligent view of human nature must include the recognition of moral activity and moral judgment, and of the value distinctions, good and bad, better and not so good, which concern every moral choice. In personality nature reveals its hierarchical character. There is a higher and a lower in the universe, and our moral consciousness is preeminently an acknowledgment of this gradational character of reality. The moral judgment is not one of merely like or dislike, of desire or aversion, though it does include these. It is distinctively a judgment of approval and disapproval, of preference not only felt but judged to be defensible. Whether or not the sense of obligation is dominant in a specific moral judgment, the sense of the superior right or demand of what is judged good over what is judged bad is always dominant. That something is better and worthier is the basic certainty. To ascertain what is better in any particular situation is the aim of deliberation; to have spurned or missed it brings the sting of remorse; to be unresponsive to its appeal is moral dullness. This sense of the gradational character of values and of the rightful dominance of the higher affects the entire moral consciousness. Moral conviction is man's active self-identification with the upward trend in this scale; moral devotion, the wholehearted direction of the will in the line of this conviction.

Naturalism need not always be meager and bound to the factual. A really scientific ethics is one which, in dealing with moral experience and moral judgment, perceives in balanced view the characteristic factors of human nature that enter into it: perceives that the act which we call morally good satisfies in appropriate measure the demands which the will is called upon to meet. In this sense moral activity is man's adequate

and complete functioning. Scientific ethics is thoroughly naturalistic, and for the satisfactory treatment of its task must be in constant touch with all the biological and humanistic sciences. But just because it is thus in a true sense naturalistic, it must perceive what sort of nature moral experience reveals. It is bound to recognize that a moral judgment is not merely about things but a judgment of and on things. Our evaluation is a verdict; it implies approval or condemnation because we conceive of human nature as ennobled or degraded by the act which we judge.

The recognition of this moral-gradational view of nature is the recognition of an ultimate principle, as ultimate as intelligence, as life. It is not of the world apart, any more than life and intelligence are, but if we pursue a truly scientific method, we should see it for what it is, and not try irrelevantly to reduce it to something else. Factually viewed, all things are on a par: carbons and chromosomes and consciousness. But evaluation, the moral view of things, consists in the gradational acknowledgment that some things ought to be rather than others, that they are preferable to others, higher, worthier.

"Rather" is a most important term expressing the essence of conscience—not the mere description or explanation of this or that, nor the distinction of this from that, nor yet the relating of them, but the gradational contemplation and engagement of them as alternatives: this rather than that. Here we have to do with more than likes and dislikes. We claim and must claim a defensible preference, a judgment of and on taste. Hence the imperative temper of conscience as distinguished from science. It states differences as alternatives between which it acknowledges a relative order of worth. The choice may be made in one field or in another; just as there is a hierarchy of values, so there is a gradation of choices and of the spiritual outlook which they reveal. "Rather," said

Democritus, "would I discover the cause of one fact than become king of the Persians." "Rather," says the Gospel, "seek ye the Kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you."

We should perceive that our membership in the moral hierarchy engages all our faculties and energies. It involves in active relation all the factors of our personality and our environment: body and soul, passion and reason, natural and cultural setting. It yields self-expression and self-understanding. All that is true in hedonistic, rationalistic, altruistic ethics may find its place in this recognition: enjoyment in satisfaction of desires and natural aversion to pain and distress; long-range vision and balanced perspective in a reasoned ordering of interests and efforts; socially responsive consciousness and disinterested, generous participation in the lives of others. Some of these partial insights have been mistakenly championed as all-sufficient. They may all be incorporated harmoniously in an inclusive ethical perfectionism.

This conception of an integral and adequate ethics undertakes to grasp what is characteristic and distinctive in moral experience. It does not distort moral conduct, to make it fit into the conceptual molds of factual sciences. On the other hand, it resists with equal firmness the earlier dogmatic-theological view of morality as somehow exalted above the daily actual lives of men and women.

This double distinction is important in modern ethics. As we have seen, the interpretation of nature which gives due acknowledgment to human character cannot be an interpretation which reduces human thought, purposes, and ideals to mechanistic formulas; nor yet can it be one which treats the higher life of man as above and outside of nature. The real truth as it is attained, must be a view of nature which includes intelligence and recognition of values as unambiguously as it

includes life and mechanism. Against any dogmatic or occult supernaturalism, but also against the meager naturalism of the mechanist is the Higher Naturalism, which in its view of the world recognizes moral experience and the entire process of critical intelligence straightforwardly.

To the extent to which man can thus see himself in nature, to that extent his conviction of his characteristic role in the world and so of his moral career and its opportunities and duties would be less and less the expression of traditional or partisan prejudice, passing impulse, emotional strain, or occult unexamined faith and devotion. Without adequate correlation of scientific knowledge that takes due account of the distinctive nature and activities of mén, science itself is narrow and insufficient as insight into the real nature of things. But it is only as men's moral judgments, preferences, aims, and aspirations are sustained by tested knowledge that they become intelligent and really defensible.

The more integral view of man in nature is both the more intelligent and the morally significant view. Man's cosmic orientation is essential to perfection of moral character, but also to real intellectual mastery as distinguished from specialized learning and skill. We need an expansion and deepening of naturalism; we need knowledge that leads to self-knowledge, to the recognition and realization of the higher powers of man. This more humane understanding enlightens moral convictions. When knowledge finds its fruition in wisdom, moral advance manifests mature intelligence in action. This self-realization, fulfillment of personality in social terms, marks the progress of a real humane civilization. Enlightened by critical intelligence and not fired by prejudice or blind emotion, morality will have less heat but more light, less incense and more sense.

Index

Aeschylus, 152, 232, 305 f.
Aesthetic values, 26, 120 f., 246 ff.
Altruism and egoism, 169–185
Ancient classical ethics, 129 f.
See also Aristotle; Plato; etc.
Animals, punishment of, 4 ff.
Aristippus, 74
Aristotle, 8, 20, 40, 43, 66, 73, 85, 107, 108, 115, 127, 128, 129, 135 f., 223, 232, 233, 295
Arnold, Matthew, 218
Arnold, Dr. Thomas, 217 f.

Bentham, Jeremy, 75, 78, 174
Bible, cited, 5, 10 f., 38, 55, 81, 86, 101, 132, 138, 146, 154, 156, 161, 166, 167, 198, 233 f., 241, 274, 312, 313 f., 317, 352, 353, 364, 365, 366, 378
See also Christian ethics
Bodily values, 118 ff.
Boswell, James, 194
Bradley, F. H., 199
Browning, Robert, 81
Bruno, Giordano, 130
Buddhism, 134, 166, 172, 175, 353
Burns, Robert, 56, 209, 288
Burton, Sir Richard, 11 f.
Business and professional ethics, 253–269

Capital and labor, *see* Economic system
Capital punishment, 309
Capitalism, socialism, and alternative views, 281 ff.
Casuistry, 147
Categorical imperative, 51
Change, evolution, and progress, 344 ff.
Chapman, George, 249
Character values, 125 f.
Child labor legislation, 301
Choice, *see* Freedom
Christian ethics, 109, 127 ff., 129 f., 137 f., 146 f., 172, 174, 175, 214, 233 f., 365 f.
See also Bible
Citizenship and government, moral problems of, 293–315
Civilization, an expanding range for good or evil, 353 ff.; and progress, 344–359
Classical tradition in ethics and philosophy of life, 232 f.
Colonial problem, 328 f.
Communism, *see* Socialism
Comte, 178
Conscience, 53, 144–168, 176; in Greek tragedy, 152; main theories of, 146 ff.
Conservatism, radicalism, and reform, 309 ff.
Conviction and tolerance, 157 ff.
Cooperative movement, 284
Copernicus, 183
Cosmology of values, 27 f., 52, 372 ff.
Courage, 127, 128, 134 ff.
Crime and punishment, 303 ff.
Cudworth, Ralph, 50
Culture and aesthetic values, 246 ff.; as daily living, made significant, 237 ff.; values of, in work and play, 237–252
Cynics, 139

Dante, 159
Darwin, 6, 20, 85 ff., 89 ff., 93, 99, 173, 183, 336

Deliberation, 152 ff.
Democracy, 166; education in, 215 ff.; scope of citizenship in, 297 ff.; tolerance in, 164
Democritus, 377 f.
Determinism, 335 ff.
Deterrence theory of punishment, 306 ff.
Divorce, 198, 207 ff.
See also Family life
Drake, Durant, 19
Drunkenness, 138
Duty, 51 ff., 149; inclination, spontaneity, and, 64 ff.
See also Formalism in ethics

Economic justice, problem of, 273 f., 275 ff.
Economic reform, vital moral principle in, 288 ff.
Economic system, moral problems in, 267, 270–292; moral progress and, 352 f.
Economic values, 31, 117 f.; right place of, 270 ff.
Education, a bulwark of democracy, 300; Fascist, 214 f.; fruition of character through, 213–236; moral training in, 215 ff.; Nazi, 214 f.; our social-political crisis and, 229 ff.; Soviet, 214
Egoism and altruism, 169–185
Emerson, 157, 330
Empiricism in ethics, 150 ff.
Epicureans, 74, 233
Ethics, definitions of, 3, 4, 19; field and scope of, 3 ff.; main types of theory of, 32 ff.; relation to other sciences, 16 ff.
Euripides, 152, 232
Everett, W. G., 19
Evolution, biological doctrine of, 85 ff.; change, progress, and, 344 ff.; emergent, 100; of morality, 84 ff.
Evolutionary theory of ethics, 20, 40 f., 84–102; criticism of, 94 ff.; main varieties of, 89 ff.

Family life, 295 f.; and economic-social problems, 202 ff., 210 ff.; ethical interpretation of, 193 ff.; historical development of, 189 ff.; modern complications in, 202 ff.; moral problems of, 189–212
Fascism, 214 f.
See also Nazism
Fermat, 223
Fichte, 142
Folklore and morals, 9 ff.
Formalism in ethics, 38 f., 41, 47–67
Francis of Assisi, St., 200
Franklin, Benjamin, 131, 330
Freedom, and determinism, 335 ff.; moral, 377 f.
Freedom of contract, 277, 301
Freudianism, 173

German Theology, 172
Gluttony, 138
God, moral arguments for, 64, 367 ff.
Goethe, 238, 240, 247
Golden Mean, doctrine of, 108, 233
Golden Rule, 75
Government and citizenship, moral problems of, 293–315
Gradational view of values, 111 ff., 177 ff.
Greek moral-religious development, 364
Green, T. H., 182
Grenfell, Dr. Wilfred, 344
Grotius, Hugo, 159

Happiness, *see* Hedonism
Harmonious realization of our capacities, 106 ff.
Hartmann, Eduard von, 349
Hearn, Lafcadio, 15 f.
Hebrew moral-religious development, 364 f.
Hedonism, 39 f., 41, 68–83; psychological, 69 ff.; quantitative, qualitative, egoistic, altruistic, 71 ff.
Hedonistic calculus, 79
Hegel, 306
Hegesias, 349
Highest Good, 30 ff., 108, 128
Hippocrates, Oath of, 258
History, instruction in, 221, 227 f.
Hobbes, 34, 173, 175 f., 294
Holbach, 174 f.

Homer, 232, 249, 364
Honor, 114 f.
Humanities, our heritage in, 231 ff.
Hume, 350, 370
Huxley, T. H., 86, 92, 101 f.

Ibsen, 160
Immortality, 64; moral grounds for belief in, 369 ff.
Inclination, duty, and spontaneity, 64 ff.
Indeterminism, 335 ff.
Individual and social character of values, 169 ff.
Inquisition, 154 f.
Insanity and moral judgment, 7
Integrity and onesideness in ethical method, 103 ff.
Intellectual values, 25 f., 120 f.; and moral training, 213–236; progress in, 349 ff.
International relations, moral problems of, 316–331; cooperation in, conditions and problems of, 326 ff.
Intuitionism, 148 f.

Japanese education and the cult of aggression, 232
Jefferson, 330
Johnson, Dr. Samuel, 11, 194
Justice, 127, 128, 140 f.; economic, 275 ff.; legal and ethical, 276 f.; penal, 303 ff.

Kant, 50 ff., 59 ff., 85, 149, 162 f., 368, 370 f.
Keats, John, 32, 248 f.
Kropotkin, Peter, 91, 178

Labor and capital, *see* Economic system
La Rochefoucauld, 173
Legal professional code, 262 ff.
Legal professional practice, moral problems of, 262 ff.
Legalism as ethical theory, 34 f.
Leisure, culture, and the arts, 246 ff.
Lincoln, 298, 330
Literature, instruction in, 221, 228 f.
Locke, 8
Love, 113 f., 128, 199 f.
Loyalty, Royce's ethics of, 63 f.
Lucretius, 36
Luther, 214, 338

Mana, 362
Marriage, *see* Family life
Martineau, James, 156
Martyrdom, 155
Materialism and ethics, 375
See also Evolutionary theory of ethics
Maxwell, Clerk, 225
Medical practice, moral problems in, 260 ff.
Medical professional codes of ethics, 258 ff.
Mill, J. S., 75, 78
Milton, 144 f.
Modern fusion of Gracco-Roman and Christian ideals, 126 ff., 234
Moral activity in its cosmic setting, 372 ff.
Moral conviction and religious faith, 367 ff.
Moral development in relation to religious, 360 ff.
Moral law in Kant's ethics, 50 ff.
Moral obligation, 51 ff., 144 ff.
Moral Sense doctrine, 148 f.
Moral training in schools, 213–236; in England, 217 f.; in France, 217; in Germany, 216
Morality, and belief in God, 367 ff.; nature and range of, 3–22; religion, and philosophy, 360–379
Morals, tribal, national, and international, 316 ff.
More, Henry, 58
Mores, moralis, 3, 33
Music, 247 f.

Naturalism and ethics, 376
See also Evolutionary theory of ethics
Nazism, 101 f., 135, 214 f., 216, 232
Neoplatonic ethics, 233
Newton, 183
Nietzsche, 93 f., 101 f., 173, 174, 177, 294

Onesidedness and integrity in ethical method, 103 ff.
Optimism and pessimism, 348 ff.
Ought, in ethics, 51 ff.
See also Formalism in ethics

Pacifism, 320 f.
Pascal, 138, 147 f., 223
Pasteur, 183 f., 224
Paul, St., 128, 130, 138, 305, 366
Peace and war, conditions and problems of, 320 ff.
Penology, *see* Punishment of crime
Perfectionism, 40, 41, 103–122, 127
Personal morality, problems of, 125–185
Personality, fulfillment of, 103–122; moral dignity of, 108; social character of, 109
Pessimism and optimism, 348 ff.
Pindar, 232
Plato, 8, 40, 43, 85, 108, 127, 129, 130, 213 f., 223, 232, 233, 250, 364
Play, definitions of, 241 f.; theories of, 242 f.; work and, 240 ff.
Pleasure, *see* Hedonism
Plutocracy, distortion of values in, 271 ff.
Poetry, values in, 248 ff.
Political ethics, in international relations, 316–331; in national life, 293–315
Prayers and moral development, 12 f.
Price, Richard, 50
Primitive morals, 9 ff.
Professional and business ethics, 253–269
Professional codes of ethics, 256 ff.
Progress, change and evolution, 344 ff.; civilization and, 344–359; idea of, 344–359
Proverbs, popular, and moral judgments, 13 ff., 136
Punishment of crime, theories of, 305 ff.
Pythagoreans, 306

Racial problem, moral aspects of, 328 f.
Radicalism, conservatism, and reform, 309 ff.
Reason in moral activity, 127, 176
Rectitude, *see* Formalism in ethics
Reform, conservatism, and radicalism, 309 ff.
Reformation theory of punishment, 308 f.
Regulus, 158
Religion, morality, and philosophy, 360–379
Religious and moral development, interaction of, 360 ff.
Religious faith and moral conviction, 367 ff.
Religious values, 121 f., 302 f.
Renaissance ethics, 130, 169, 234
Responsibility and freedom, 339 ff.
Retribution, 305 ff.
Royce, Josiah, 63 f. 167, 343

Schiller, 65
Schleiermacher, 130
Schopenhauer, 93, 173, 349
Scientific education, 221, 229 f.
Scotism in ethics, 49
Scotus, Duns, 36
Self, analysis of, 177 ff.
Self-assertion, *see* Egoism and altruism
Self-denial, *see* Altruism and egoism
Self-determinism as freedom, 340 ff.
Self-expression and freedom, 340 ff.
Self-realization theory of ethics, *see* Perfectionism
Selfishness, *see* Egoism and altruism
Sensuality, 136 ff.
Sex and morals, *see* Family life
Shakespeare, 28, 155, 194, 225
Shareable values, doctrine of, 182 ff.
Sidgwick, Henry, 58 f., 178 f.
Single Tax doctrine, 283
Skepticism, 42 ff., 350 ff.
Smith, Adam, 348 f.
Smuts, General, 328
Social and individual character of values, 169 ff.
Social ethics, 189–331; Kant's fundamental principle in, 56 f.
Socialism, 301; capitalism and, 281 ff.
Socrates, 43, 79, 81, 84, 131, 132, 159, 338

Sophists, 42 f.
Sophocles, 152, 158, 232
Soviet education, 214
Spencer, Herbert, 86, 90 f., 178
Spenser, Edmund, 248 f.
Spinoza, 70, 162
Spontaneity, inclination, and duty, 64 ff.
State, the, as system of realizing moral values, 293 ff.
Stevenson, R. L., 207
Stoic ethics, 50, 109, 127, 137, 233
Survival value and moral worth, 94 ff.

Taboos, 10 f., 362 f.
Taeusch, Carl F., 265
Tagore, Rabindranath, 184
Talleyrand, 62
Teleological ethics, 38 ff., 41
Temperance, 127, 128, 136 ff.
Tennyson, 92, 93, 232, 303
Theological ethics, 35 ff., 47 f.
Thomas Aquinas, St., 129, 200
Tolerance and conviction, 157 ff.
Tolstoy, 160 f., 184, 338
Torquemada, 152 f.
Trade-unionism, 283
See also Economic system
Traditionalism as an ethical theory, 33 ff.
Tribal morality, 190 ff., 316 ff.
Truthfulness, 141 ff.
Turgenev, 77
Turner (English painter), 249

United Nations, 319, 326 ff.
Unselfishness, *see* Altruism and egoism
Utilitarianism, *see* Hedonism

Values, cosmology of, 27 f., 372 ff.; definitions of, 23 f.; gradational view of, 108, 112 f., 116 f.; in personal and impersonal contexts, 27 f.; individual and social character of, 9, 169 ff.; intrinsic and contributory or instrumental, 30 ff.; personality and, problems of, 23–28; revealed in personal response to experience, 23 ff.; shareable, doctrine of, 182 ff.; table of, 112 ff.
Vices, 125–143
Virgil, 232
Virtues, 66, 108, 125–143; cardinal, 126 ff., 131 ff.; in Christian ethics, 127 ff.; in classical antiquity, 126 f.
Vocational ethics, 253–269

War and peace, conditions and problems of, 320 ff.
Westermarck, Edward, 5
Will-to-Power, ethics of, *see* Nietzsche
Wisdom, 127, 128 f., 132 ff.
Work and play, 120; as avenues to culture, 240 ff.