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CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT OF GERMANY

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CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT OF GERMANY

VOLUME I

BY

W TUDOR JONES

M.A., D.PHIL.

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PREFACE

THE following pages are the result of many years of reflection on the contemporary thought of Germany. I was fortunate in being introduced to the subject by three of the great teachers of Jena—Rudolf Eucken, Otto Liebmann, and Max Scheler. These teachers set me on the track of the philosophical thought of Germany from the time of Kant to the close of the nineteenth century. I have constantly tried to carry down this work as to include the work of contemporary thinkers of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, lack of space compelled me to be exceedingly brief with regard to several writers, especially as the number of thinkers was very large. Some of the writers of the twentieth century are included in the volume simply because their teaching was most closely allied to those who had gone before them. Volume II will deal with present-day writers who have made important contributions in the various branches of the philosophical sciences and of religion.

In a work of this kind I am, of course, indebted to many sources of information. In the first place, the most important works of most of the thinkers are known to me. In the second place, I have not hesitated to transcribe (after, I hope, assimilating) from "books about books". I have found the histories of such men as Kuno Fischer, Windelband, Eucken, Eisler, Siebert, Külpe, and others of great help. It has been my main aim to present the philosophical thought in as simple a manner as

the subject-matter lends itself to those who are unacquainted with the German language. I hope in Volume II to amplify many points which had to be left out of the present volume.

I wish to thank my friend, Mr. J. T. Walley, M.A., late Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, for his reading of the proofs and for making several valuable suggestions. Finally, I cannot be too grateful to my Publishers for the great patience exercised towards me in the preparation of the volume.

W. TUDOR JONES

TO THE MEMORY
OF MY THREE GREAT TEACHERS
IN JENA
RUDOLF EUCKEN
OTTO LIEBMANN
AND
MAX SCHELER

CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT OF GERMANY

CHAPTER I

SOURCES OF MODERN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

MODERN German Philosophy may be said to have actually started with Kant. Certainly acute systems of Philosophy concerning the great problems of the universe and of life were in vogue in several European countries from time immemorial and this inheritance was the possession of Kant. Besides possessing one of the keenest intellects the world has probably ever known, Kant was fortunate in having as his immediate predecessors many men who had succeeded in casting a clear and penetrating light on some of the darkest problems of the world and of man. His three great Critiques were read with avidity by many thoughtful men during his own lifetime, and they became the jumping-off grounds for the discussion of old problems and of the resetting of these in new forms. The Critiques, on account of their uniqueness, originality, and profundity, compelled thinkers either to appreciate or to criticize them. All who were able to value things knew and felt that in Kant's teaching qualities of permanency had come into being. What these were we shall have occasion to see in further pages of this volume.

The first great thinker who found it necessary to deal with Kant's teaching was Fichte. Fichte, even in much of his own teaching, was greatly indebted to the great sage. There is much in Fichte's teaching which he had quarried from the works of Kant. Much of Kant's material was also the subject of Fichte's teaching. For instance, Kant's *Ding an sich*, if it drove Fichte to deny it, drove him also to affirm it as a quality which constitutes the very nature of consciousness. This also holds true of the two philosophers of "feeling", Hamann and Jacobi, both of whom attempted to show the futility of the Philosophy of Kant. Both were, able as they were, too weak to wrestle with the unique, logical mind of Kant. Fichte's teaching of "activism" became of enormous help to Germany in its dark Napoleonic days, and his influence cannot be over-estimated. He preached a gospel of idealism with such an insight and a fervour that he became, in an important sense, one of the main creators of the modern culture and civilization of Germany.

A turn of the tide came. Kant's teaching, except here and there, was placed on one side and the Romantic Movement made its appearance. We are now in the centre of a group of poets, aesthetes, and literary writers. Fichte had laid the foundation of the mental and social development of the nation to consist in philosophical insight and passionate activism; the Romanticists had laid it on Poetry—the only medium for the "salvation" of the world. It may be truly said that Kant's influence was not entirely dead even in this movement. In Goethe,

Schiller, the Schlegels, and others, much of the old warrior's teaching has been popularized. It was seen, after all, that much of it was not as dry as was at first suspected. The Romantic insight had its value in that it attempted to connect Poetry with Life, but often it was far removed from clarity of mind and from the very highest levels of morality; and much of the teaching consisted in parabolical, mythological, and fanciful presentations of the world and of man. But most of the leaders of Romanticism knew their Kant and could not get away from him. Certainly, in such men as Schiller, Fr. Schlegel, Novalis, Goethe, Herder, and others, we find deep studies of *History*; and the great world of the *history of civilization* in its varied branches became now a subject of investigation. To this movement is due the modern origin of the Philosophy of History. This Romantic mode of treatment concerning the relation of man to the universe had less rigorism in it, and required less intellectual penetration than was required for the understanding of the Kantian Philosophy. It thus lent itself to the imagination of ordinary people, and slid more easily into the domain of religion and religious experience. The presentation of Nature in a poetical form, as found in the poetry and philosophy of Novalis, formed a ground ready to receive the seed of religion. Thus the culmination of what was thus presented was in religion. At this time Schleiermacher appeared. He emphasized the great fact of the need of the resurrection of Feeling in human nature. His thorough training and his eloquence as a preacher in Berlin exercised a

profound influence on the life of the educated classes. He appealed for the consecration of the whole nature of man to the service of the Highest and Holiest. He emphasized the part which the intellectual and moral nature has to play in the redemption of the individual from the common dead-level of human life to a life of union with the Divine. He showed how all effort finds its final resting-place in a feeling of dependence upon God. This turn which Romanticism took is remarkable in many ways, and it has exercised a permanent influence upon the intellectual life and religious experience of the German people down to the present, and is destined to do so in the future. Closely connected with Schleiermacher's religious point of view was K. C. F. Krause who made original and important contributions concerning the *Ground* of the World, i.e. God and created a School of Philosophy of Religion.

The life of a nation cannot be entirely confined to one line of thought and experience. Consequently we discover other movements arising, and often these are "revivals" of past contributions. When these past contributions are rediscovered, especially by great men, they are never exact copies of the conclusions of their founders. In Schelling we find a birth of Neo-Spinozism. Schelling and Hegel taught the spiritualization of the universe as the culmination of the efforts of idealism. Schelling framed a Philosophy of Nature in this respect. Such a presentation is in many ways similar to that of Spinoza. The relation of Nature and Spirit are shown in the form even of a Theory of Knowledge;

and in this respect, in his early years, Hegel moved on similar lines. It has to be borne in mind that Fichte in his *Wissenschaftslehre* had prepared the ground for these later developments. The unity of Nature and Life was once more emphasized. All this, of course, is to be found in consciousness. The aim and goal of Nature are then no other than to bring into activity this consciousness of man. Schelling consequently held that there is an unconscious reason in Nature itself, which receives its meaning and goal in the consciousness of man. Thus we are in the midst of a Philosophy of Mind or Spirit along with a Philosophy of Nature.

Many and varied are now the manifestations on both sides of Nature and Spirit. In the realm of Spirit the intellectual side has to be taken into account, especially when one reflects upon the contents present in the conscious self. But when we turn to the realm of Nature we are turning to impressions which are not merely intellectual but "non-rational", and these latter constitute the presence in man of feelings of an aesthetic kind. The conclusion was arrived at that the unconscious-conscious nature of reason constitutes the highest function of the reason of man.

This Philosophy of Identity is brought to a further stage of development by Hegel, who may be looked on as the climax of Idealistic Metaphysics. From his early days, and especially from his Jena days, he was constantly engaged in grappling with some of the most difficult problems of the universe and of life, and especially with the problem of justifying

the conception of the universe as a development of the Divine Spirit. The solution of the problem was to be sought in the evolution of the human spirit. Fichte had previously emphasized the place of logical thought in the solution of such a problem. If the final connection of all things is of the nature of mind and spirit, we can understand this only in so far as we experience the meaning of things in *our own mind and spirit.* It is then evident that although we start with empirical things, and have constantly to use them, we have to pass beyond them to what is included in Thought and in all that Thought means.

Schelling had already emphasized a kind of teleological idealism of Nature. Hegel passes beyond this to the teleological idealism of History. This principle of Hegel in his dealings with History was a contribution obtained from Romanticism. But no personality among the Romanticists was capable of penetrating to the nature, structure, and meaning of the human mind in the degree Hegel was able to do. It is simply marvellous what a grip he had of materials of the most varied kinds in the worlds of Nature, History, and Thought. The working out of these materials meant the overcoming of Romanticism as well as an overcoming of a great deal of the Kantian subjectivism.

Hegel worked out his immense system by means of his Dialectic. Fichte had stated in his *Wissenschaftslehre* that the meaning of existence and of human life was to be found in the mind of man. This meaning was not any mere subjectivism. Material had to be gathered into the mind from all

possible quarters, but the material had to undergo a transformation by means of the dialectical power of the human spirit. Schelling had emphasized the contemplative aspect of mind in its dealings with Nature, and thus gave a mystical tinge to his teaching. Hegel, on the contrary, rationalized Romanticism by emphasizing the fact that mind can pass from category to category until it reaches the conception of Infinite Spirit. Material from the external world must constantly enter into the mind and spirit of man, but it must constantly pass through a reflective process in order to distil something of its nature; and this process, according to Hegel, continues without coming to any kind of terminus. All reality reveals itself in the dialectical progress of the Idea.

Kant had shown that truth and the reality of reason are to be sought in the valid universal. The Romanticists had emphasized the original rights of individuality. Hegel bridges these differences by showing that the universal is contained in the individual reality, and it is in this individual reality that the universal becomes actually real. Thus the doctrine of Objective Spirit obtains its proof.

Hegel, indirectly, made important contributions to Psychology. As the subject-matter which he handled in the Dialectic consisted of material which is subjective and objective, he was able to cast new light on the nature and workings of mind not only on the subjective side but also on the objective side. Thus he was able to make the most weighty contributions towards a Philosophy of History, of Rights, and of the State. In this respect the influence of his

teaching is far from being exhausted. His methods of approaching these varied problems have certainly undergone important changes, but the results which he reached are at present the subjects of serious study in all the civilized countries of the world. Hegel gave rise to new orientations and meanings in so many directions that these have become a perennial inheritance of civilization, culture, and religion. His outlook on the future results of the work of Thought was optimistic to a degree. In the historical development of humanity he saw the spirit of man ever at work—a spirit finding a way out of the insufficiency and contradictions in which it is imbedded into an ever more complete self-consciousness. This development was viewed by Hegel as constituting the reasonableness or rationality of the universe. Neglected, soon after his death, in his own country, he is again being resurrected there; and although there may be much that is transient in his teaching, especially, as already pointed out, in regard to the mode of approaching the problems of the meaning and significance of man and the universe, still many of his conclusions rest on bases which have permanent foundations.

After the passing of Hegel, problems besides those of idealistic monism were rising on the horizon. The speculations of Hegel and the resolution, in the last resort, of all things to Thought, led some of his immediate successors to examine the problems from the side nearest at hand and in as simple a way as possible. Fries appears and returns to the Philosophy of Kant, and seeks to give to some of

the conclusions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* an orientation towards inner experience. He shows that the *a priori* is discovered through inner experience, but does not originate from experience, but lies in the very nature of the spirit of man. Fries' teaching, termed Philosophical Anthropology, gives a theory of the inner nature of man's spirit—an explanation of the mental organization of our life. The teaching of Fries is not without influence today, as will be seen at a later stage in this volume. As Fries had, by dealing with the psychology of the inner nature of man, "clipped the wings" somewhat of the idealism of Kant and Hegel, so the psychological aspect of inner experience was made a matter of further investigation by Herbart and Beneke.

Herbart followed the method of the older metaphysics when he conceived of "Being" in the form of Substance. He emphasized the fact that every empirical quality of a "Thing" signifies only a relation of any thing to one or more other things. Thus, what a thing means is not any inherent quality which it possesses in itself, but what it possesses in its relations to other things around it, and which helps to make it what it is. We thus find that Herbart's Ontology signifies a pluralistic view of the universe. He indicates such a relation of things to one another as the only possible means of understanding the world and life from a physical point of view. He names such things in themselves and in their relations "reals". It cannot be said that Herbart's point of view has exercised any great influence on our way of viewing the nature of the

physical world, but it did service at the time in emphasizing the need of dealing with things, not merely from a speculative point of view, but from the point of view nearest to our hands. In this way modern Pragmatism is indebted to it.

It is on the side of Psychology and its relation to the Theory of Education that Herbart's Philosophy obtains its great importance. His many contributions concerning the nature and function of consciousness, the place and importance of apperception, the place of values in human life, were the means of giving a new trend to Psychology in particular and of determining a method and a material which were carried further by Lotze, Wundt, and many others. Herbart was thus able to open out new ways which deviated in many respects from the main currents of the past.

In Schopenhauer a deviation different from that of Herbart's is to be found. Schopenhauer's own personality, with all its varied and contradictory experiences, constitutes his philosophy. It is certainly true that he was wonderfully well versed in the philosophies of the Orient and the Occident. He also prided himself on having presented the deepest problems in terms of the natural, commonsense understanding of the ordinary intelligent mind. His style of writing has probably never been surpassed by any writer on the deep problems of the universe and life. In many respects he cannot be called an exact psychological or metaphysical thinker, but he possessed such a vision of the universe and of life as to compel attention. Such a vision, at

its height, is spiritual in its nature, and deals with nothing less than the nature of the universe itself and man's place in it. He was thoroughly versed in the Philosophy of Kant as well as in the various branches of the Natural Sciences. It needed a unique combination of qualities to write *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*.

Schopenhauer looked upon man as Will, and the universe itself has to be looked at in the same way. It is of the nature of Will to be restless, and as a "stormy petrel" to try to find a footing, though forever doomed to fail. Thus the universe has by means of its Will climbed from matter to organic life and further to mind and spirit. At each remove restlessness, pain, and sorrow have increased and will continue to increase. There is no alternative to the partial removal of these but to cease to give up the Will to live. Schopenhauer in this manner denies Hegel's conception of History as an ever-gradual formation of the Absolute. History is to Schopenhauer nothing other than an eternal sameness which only changes its forms, costumes, and masks.

There is no complete escape for man save by giving up his Will. But this is impossible as the universe itself is Will. The way of escape or salvation is obtained, in so far as it is obtained at all, in some form of Indian mysticism. Something positive is to be found in such a manner, and which grants a certain allayment of the spirit to the human petrel. And, as is also shown by Schopenhauer, the aesthetic contemplation of the world and of human relations

is allied to such Mysticism. We finally see that such a non-rational teaching is the opposite of Hegel's rationalism. This non-rational element will be shown at a later stage to constitute, not the negative side of reason, but a supplementary side of fundamental importance.

Schopenhauer's teaching did not find much immediate response on account of the powerful influence of the teaching of Hegel. Hegel's dialectic construction became capable of remarkable extension, and seemed to be a key which could open any door. David Friedrich Strauss used the key to show how Nature passes beyond itself into spirit and thus brings into existence an evolution of spirit which is as real as the evolution of organic phenomena. Marx and Engels used the key for the presentation of the doctrine of Socialism. Both showed how all the branches of human development, for good or for ill, were the results of economic processes. Certain elements of their teaching go back also to Comte. In short, the essentials of the processes and factors of life were not to be found in any philosophical or religious idealism, but in the ordinary needs, relations, and movements of groups amongst the various nations labouring for the material welfare of life. Thus the *cosmic* aspect of Hegelianism was relegated to the background. But Socialism, for the time being, and, indeed, down to our own day, received checks on account of the development of certain fundamental conceptions of the State as these were presented by Hegel. The history of the unity of the German nation is a testimony of this

Hegelian conception of the State until the close of the Great War in 1918. Since the close of the war Socialism, which had gradually been forming in Germany during the present century parallel with the strengthening of the unity of the State, has become a powerful factor in Politics and even in the general life of the nation. But, at the present moment, it cannot be denied that strong individualistic forces are also at work. A kind of partial reconciliation between various political parties constitutes the situation to-day.

A factor which has also coloured the mind and spirit of a vast mass of the German people is based on Feuerbach's Materialism. This is partly due to the rapid strides made by certain branches of the Physical Sciences during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, especially by the sciences which pertain to an interpretation of the universe and of the life of man in its relation to the universe. Through the teaching of Karl Vogt and Moleschott certain French materialistic theories were revived, and the universe and all forms of life were to be explained from mechanical and chemical standpoints. Piles of literature appeared dealing with this subject, which included Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe* and Ostwald's *Theory of Energetics*. The teaching at the Universities went on as usual, and, amongst the majority of the Professors of Philosophy, this teaching remained as idealistic as in Kant's and Hegel's days. But the prevalent tone of life undoubtedly became materialistic, and this was helped by the fact that the enormous prosperity of

the nation in all the departments of technics had brought many blessings of a natural kind into the homes and habits of the people; such, indeed, as had never before been experienced by them.

I have said nothing with regard to the religious situation within the Churches. This will be dealt with in fulness at a later stage (in Vol. II). But here it may be pointed out that the gradual decline of attendance at public worship started at a later period than in France and at an earlier period than in England. The decline has been greater in Protestant than in Catholic circles. Catholicism remained, of course, what it had been, and the force of its appeal was, on the whole, to minds of a simpler type than the Protestant type. But to-day a number of Catholic teachers are finding it necessary to make ever greater attempts to equate their traditional theology with modern scientific views of the universe and life. For instance, they present the newer teleological views of the universe from the standpoint of Physics and the newer teleological views of life from the standpoint of Biology. This is far from being universal, but important sections are dealing with these and other similar problems.

The Protestant Church, on the other hand, has had to spend a good deal of its energy in establishing more rational views concerning the Bible in general and Christianity in particular. This kind of effort received great impetus from such works as those of Strauss and Baur. The more Evangelical section of the Church became helpless before the results of the great Protestant teachers, with whom

we shall deal at a later stage in the inquiry. But external aid had to be obtained by these teachers in the works of Kant and others, and their wide outlook brought the results of the various physical, and especially of the philosophical, sciences within the domain of religion. The Evangelical section has laboured hard to keep intact much of the essentials of Luther's theology, and, what is of more importance, of his spiritual experiences of faith, conversion, and reconciliation of the soul with God in the spirit of Christ. But the Evangelical section has had to pay a heavy penalty for its comparative neglect of the results of the various branches of knowledge which pertain to the nature of the universe and to man's relation with the universe as well as with his spiritual life and destiny.

We shall now take the various Schools of Contemporary Thought and try to present some of the essentials of their teaching.

CHAPTER II

KANTIANISM AND NEO-KANTIANISM

It has been pointed out that a return to Kant formed a fundamental part of the teaching of Fries, who was Professor in Jena. Jena became the centre of the Kantian movement in Germany.

Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758–1823)

K. L. Reinhold was born in Vienna in 1758, and in 1784 he removed to Weimar, where he lived for several years as a journalist, and became a friend of Wieland. He studied with avidity the works of Kant and became a diligent expounder of the Kantian Philosophy. In 1787 he received a call to a Chair of Philosophy in Jena. He was able to simplify many of the ideas of Kant, and possessed a great capacity for making clear such difficult Kantian points of view as the *Ding an sich*, the meaning of the *a priori*, the relation of subject and object and the contribution of each in the act of knowing.

Ernst Reinhold (1793–1855)

Ernst Reinhold was the son of the above Karl Leonhard Reinhold. He was thus imbued early with the ideas of Kant, and the father's enthusiasm for Kant must have exercised a great influence upon the son. The son stood throughout his whole life upon the secure ground of Kantianism, although he carried this standpoint in the direction of a more realistic

attitude towards the process of knowing than Kant had done. He presented a kind of ideal-realism on the one hand and a speculative theism on the other. Aspects of both these points of view are to be found in the teaching of Kant himself. The material of knowledge, as presented by Kant, was taken up by Reinhold as constituting some reality that actually exists outside ourselves; and it is of importance to take this fact into account. With regard to speculative theism, Reinhold showed that the facts of consciousness have a basis in the order of the universe itself. What is in man must have originated from an *Urwesen* (an original essence) that is alive and personal.

Reinhold emphasized also the fact that the Norms which are present in the life of the individual and of society have originated from the fundamental "ground" of human nature. This "ground" must somehow contain what is unfolded from it. The soul of man was viewed by him as immortal because spirit cannot be reduced to mere matter. The spirit of man is capable of forming ideal meanings and ends, and it is by means of such that the world has risen to be what it now is. And what it now is, is only a prelude to what it shall be. All this is not a matter of pure speculation but of the highest practical ideal of reason which in the last resort is the harmonious working out of the spiritual life of mankind.

ALEXANDER VON REICHLIN-MELDEGG (1801–1877)

He was a Roman Catholic Priest who later became Professor of Philosophy in Heidelberg. His contri-

butions may possess no permanent value on account of the fact that they were only slight deviations of emphasis from Kant's own points of view, but he was the means of extending the Kantian teaching at an early period, and in this way was able to exercise a great influence upon his pupils. Of value is his autobiography which depicts his journey from bondage to freedom and the permanent importance of the Kantian Philosophy.

Friedrich Albert Lange (1828–1875)

Lange may be looked on as the real founder of Kantianism. He was Professor of Philosophy at Marburg when he died in 1875. When he was born Hegel was still living, though he died three years later (1831); the Hegelian Philosophy was at its height and was already exercising great influence on the collective life of Germany. Many factors contributed to bring about the downfall of Hegelianism. Natural Science was beginning to make great strides in various directions, and on account of this not only the teaching of Hegel but also that of Fichte and Schelling lost ground. Darwin's *Origin of Species* appeared in 1858 and was translated into German in 1859. Karl Marx and Engel were working for the coming of Socialism and the industrial centres were drawn into the movement. Such was the atmosphere when Lange was a young man. Lange saw that the post-Kantian Philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were of too speculative a character, and that the foundations on which they had been built were far from secure. He felt

that the only alternative was to return to Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.* Here one is on different grounds from the metaphysical speculations of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. This change in the point of view was largely due to Lange, and brought into existence the Neo-Kantian Movement, which in one form or another has remained until this day the main current of the Philosophical Thought of Germany. Along with Lange we find at the head of the Movement Helmholtz, Otto Liebmann, and Eduard Zeller. Thus special fundamental thoughts of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* were re-examined and given a clearer presentation than had hitherto been the case, and were shown to be capable of a further development. Such was to be Lange's work. Lange's main work then remains within the domain of the Theory of Knowledge. He places on one side Kant's "practical" Philosophy, his Ethics, and his Philosophy of Religion. In no sense can Lange be designated as an orthodox Kantian. He agrees with Kant that the world of experience, the reality which is investigated by science, possesses no independent existence apart from sensation, perception, and thought; it does not exist "in itself" (*an sich*), but is far rather present in our perception, knowledge, and our self-consciousness.

Kant had emphasized the fact that experience is a product of fundamental concepts, and that the knowledge of Nature is conditioned by our mental organization. Lange, in his *History of Materialism*, claimed that the validity of ideas is not to be justified by means of their connection with a higher truth,

but that they are applicable to the domain of the external world. The capacity for such ideas is grounded in the nature of man and is of value in that it is able to complete a physical world into an ideal one. Thus, at the best, the *an sich* of the physical world cannot be more than a symbol, and leads naturally to a kind of poetic and mythical conception of the universe and life. It is on account of this that he explains the idea of God, the higher meaning of religion, as an experience in the life of man. He emphasized the fact that there was no scientific warrant for such conclusions and experiences, yet he showed the necessity for them as they were the only elements which enriched life and gave it meaning and significance which it could not otherwise obtain. He saw that the whole progress which man had already made was due to the fact that man had found a home of ideals for his spirit. Thus, although Lange had given up Christian beliefs as improbable things, he preserved the Christian spirit and clearly saw that such a spirit meant an infinite deal for the welfare of the higher life of humanity. The cardinal principles of the Christian religion seem to ring true within the deepest needs and aspirations of human nature, and for this reason, although they have no scientific warrant, they should be experienced, practised, and further developed. Here, then, comes into existence an experience of an *Als Ob* (As If). This point of view of the necessity of "Fictions" has been worked out by Vaihinger with great force in our generation, and certain elements of the same idea are to be found

in modern Pragmatism, especially in the works of William James, John Dewey, and F. C. S. Schiller. Lange was then *negative* with regard to the discovery of any external proofs of an Eternal Reality either in or beyond the physical universe, but he was *positive* in emphasizing the kernel of religion as consisting in the perpetual effort of man to raise his life and experience beyond the physical world and to create a "home of the spirit" for himself. This, at least, means the ever fuller completion of life, and science can never gainsay the need of such a completion.

It was in such a spirit as this that Lange turned his attention to the material and social welfare of mankind. His book—*Arbeiterfrage*—is in many respects prophetic. It appeared first in 1865 before the great industrial problems had become acute. Much which he predicted sixty-five years ago has become true. He saw the coming unions of the workers; he also saw the different roads which would be taken for the amelioration of the lot of the worker; he predicted the taking of wrong roads and of right ones. It is simply astonishing how he unravelled the complexities of the industrial problems. He felt that Marx's thesis was one-sided in its materialistic character, and did not include the best elements found in human nature. Still, Lange himself advocated an evolutionary kind of Socialism as the partial solution of industrial and national troubles, and he felt that man can safely go far in such a direction if the higher principles of religion, in the sense touched on above, have been implanted in his

deepest disposition and heart. Lange's point of view concerning social evolution was noticed very soon after his death, but the work was of too philosophical a character to be understood by the masses. Lange could not say that "all things would be right the morning after the revolution", and consequently his work was taken up only by the most thoughtful. Eduard Bernstein, Friedrich Naumann, and others saw the great significance of the work, and helped to bring it to the notice of the "revisional" section of German social democracy. It is true to state that Lange's work was significant in many ways —in the further development of some of the fundamental principles of Kant, in the presentation of the necessity of religion despite all materialistic conclusions of science, in the need of a reconciliation of Capital and Labour in order that the working classes may come to the enjoyment of the things of the spirit, and, finally, in the overthrow of materialism with its illegitimate claims of finality concerning the meaning of life and existence.

Hermann Lotze (1817–1881)

Lotze was the son of an army doctor, and was sent to the University of Leipzig to study medicine. In 1844 he went to Göttingen as Professor of Philosophy, and remained there until 1881 when he received a "call" to Berlin. He passed away within a few months of his entrance to the city (July 1, 1881).

The new results of various branches of the Natural Sciences were pouring in. These results had

their influence upon young Lotze, but his fine feeling for Aesthetics and Poetry prevented him from being carried away by the more materialistic results of the Natural Sciences. He saw the necessity of being true to the results of both the Natural and the Philosophical Sciences. It was his aim to remain in the closest possible contact with the physical side of all things, and, at the same time, he was convinced that a description of the physical side did not connote all that is present in man. In one of his early books on "Medical Psychology" he opposes the purely materialistic attitude of his time and presents his view of the existence of a particular psychical principle—of an immaterial "soul"—which is entirely different from the fundamental conceptions and laws of the physical sciences. Thus Psychology, according to him, cannot be reduced to a Natural Science. It is true that he keeps in the closest possible contact with Physiology in his treatment of Psychology. Indeed, his work on the nervous system in this respect is of the most exact nature, and he was well aware of the effect of the physical on the whole life of man. But, according to him, there is not only an empirical and neural Psychology but also an explanatory and metaphysical Psychology as well. The former kind of Psychology belongs to the domain of the Natural Sciences; the latter belongs to the domain of the Mental Sciences.

The metaphysics of the "soul" is to be built up from the nature of the psychic life and from the effective energies and conditions which have brought human life to be what it now is. Thus Lotze's

doctrine of the "soul" does not rest upon a physiological Psychology which, in its turn, rests upon a materialistic foundation. The consideration of the relation between physiological and psychical processes leads inevitably to the metaphysical problem of the relation of mind and body, and also to the problem of the nature of the "soul" itself. The result of this is that Lotze found himself face to face with the great problems of Logic, Metaphysics, and Religion.

It was he, more than anyone else, who propagated the theory of Values which was worked out later. He saw, in the evolution of the world and of mankind, a movement towards great and permanent moral and metaphysical unities, and viewed these as realities originating in a Ground of a similar nature to themselves. His emphasis on "dialectical or teleological necessity" over against psychological necessity led Lotze to the construction of logical and moral Values which constitute a domain of their own, and which are, as it were, adumbrations of a Reality that exists as the "Ground" of the cosmos.

Otto Liebmann (1840–1912)

Liebmann was educated at Tübingen, and became a *Privatdozent* there in 1866. In 1872 he became Professor in Strassburg and in 1878 in Jena, where he remained active until his death in 1912. He was a unique man in many respects, and may be described as the last of the great Kantians. He had great respect and even admiration for Kant although he insisted that many of Kant's conclusions had to

be supplemented and corrected. He was also deeply influenced by the teachings of Plato, Spinoza, and Leibniz. The range of his subjects of investigation is very wide: it covers the fields of the Natural Sciences, the Theory of Knowledge, Psychology, Ethics, Metaphysics, and even the supposed "grounds" of Theism. Influenced as he was from so many directions he remained convinced until his death of the necessity of a *Zurück zu Kant.* When lecturing on the Romantic Period in Germany, on Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, one could always feel that he was out of sympathy with them all. He felt that they were not exact enough; that they had all, from the conclusions and wishes of their own nature, projected out such conclusions and wishes into the universe itself. He saw that only mist and fog could be brought into existence in that way, and he perpetually warned us as students to return to Kant; for the "weather" there, if sometimes cold, was extremely exhilarating, and so good for our mental "nerves". Perhaps he may be looked upon as only a semi-Kantian in certain respects, and this for the reason that he went beyond Kant in many of his theories and gave a more idealistic turn to things.

He wrote early on Kant. As far back as 1865 a book of his appeared on *Kant und die Epigonen.* He felt that, although certain particulars do not hold water, there are all-important elements in the Transcendental Philosophy, the Critical Idealism, and the Phenomenalism of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which will remain. Liebmann thought that

the conception of the *Ding an sich* should be discarded. *Things* are given only as appearances. The external world as such is a conditional *kephalozentrisches Phänomen* by means of the *a priori* forms of Perception and Thought. It is only by means of the "translocation" of sensations in Space and by means of an unconscious relation of the same to a cause that the world of external objects exists for us. The external world is as such only a phenomenon of our inner percipient intelligence and therefore subservient to the *laws* of the same. The empirical perception of Space, together with the empirical world, is a product of our intelligence, and is the great optic total phenomenon in our sensuous consciousness. The idea of (pure) Time is indissolubly linked with the organization of our intelligence—a circumstance which in the Kantian terminology is designated as the *a priority* of Time.

There are different kinds and levels of the *a priori*. Even qualities of the senses may be viewed as relative *a prioris*. But it has to be borne in mind that *a priori* is not a psychological subjectivity, but is "metacosmic", i.e. it is the *law* for all forms of intelligence, for the universal and necessary, the ground-form and norm of knowledge, the logical *prius* of body and mind, and the transcendental. Space and Time are ideal and subjective—products of our intelligence and *a priori* forms of viewing all things. Space is a phenomenon of consciousness, but in the absolute order of the world a "ground" arises for *the determination of our presentations* of Space. With regard to Time, it, too, is conditioned

by means of the *identical ego*. It is possible to conceive of an infinite, absolute Intelligence beyond Space and Time, but such an Intelligence is not knowable.

Liebmann looked upon Metaphysics as a hypothetical and critical knowledge which views the universe and life from our own standpoint and which deals with the hypothetical unfoldment of human presentations and ideas concerning the nature, the "ground", and the connection of things. *Ideas* are the unalterable foundations of development, and form complex laws by means of which we can become aware of our standpoint or situation with regard to things. The universe itself reveals an *Idea-Order*.

With regard to the Natural Sciences in their contributions, Liebmann reminds us that all the conclusions, from mechanical and chemical points of view, leave a "riddlesome Plus" at the end of these conclusions. Indeed, he went so far as to emphasize the presence of an Entelechy in the universe, and of an idea-typical character in organisms. The organic life, he states, is more than a loose play of physical and chemical processes. Even a true mechanism cannot in the last resort exclude Teleology, and even Ends cannot be conceived as mere constitutive concepts and categories, but as a mode of considering things demanded by the necessity of reason itself.

Consciousness is an *Urtatsache*—an original fact and phenomenon—which cannot be deduced from the physical. In Nature there is something to be witnessed as an "objective reason"—a Logic of facts.

who is the possessor of a Will. Thus he relates himself to things in a way other than is possible for him to do in the way of knowledge. He handles things; he selects and rejects: all things become Predicates to him. There arises, on account of this, a system of Judgments of Value in his mind concerning things, and on account of this fact it is true to say that he transforms physical reality into values. What are these values? No answer can be obtained to the question from a scientific and theoretical point of view, but the answer can be found in what Paulsen terms *faith* or belief that the world in its deepest "ground" is not indifferent to the order, arrangement, and rank which the consciousness of man gives to the things which are presented for his consideration and for his life. The experience of man is that there is more Teleology than Dysteleology with regard to these qualities which seem highest and best for him. Even death itself has in it more of Teleology than of its opposite. Fechner was also of this conviction. There is no circumstance in life that touches the Will of man in a deeper manner than the consciousness that we ourselves and those whom we love will die. There is no circumstance in which we are so helpless, and yet it is here that the power of the Will rises triumphantly above the *seeming* nothingness of our personality. The Will insists that it is impossible for such an ending to occur. The annihilation of the worthful is not possible, although we have no *logical* proof for stating this. But we do believe so because a reality which destroys the worthful is not at all the

true reality, and this life which is destroyed is not at all the true life. Beyond the present world of coming and going, of shadows and appearances, there is the world of *truly being*, and everything belongs to this truly existing world. Paulsen states further that he does not believe that a fact of greater significance and consequences in development has entered into our world than the fact of death—a fact which compensates for our material limitations in this physical world. It is the fact of death which has given being to Religion and Metaphysics and also to the sciences which have arisen from these. They are all attempts to answer the problem of the continuation of life on account of the inherent qualities it possesses over against the purely physical.

In his *Ethics* Paulsen places before us the fundamental importance of moral principles because it is in these that the genuine welfare of man is to be found. He goes on to show in the second volume of the *Ethics* the all-importance of building all forms of life in accordance with the highest moral principles. He develops here the doctrines of virtue and obligation with the vigour of a Kant, and shows how these must filter into the life of the family, the life of friendship, the industrial life, society, and, finally, the State.

Paulsen was anxious to show that the best that is in man is included in the Divine All-Spirit. The lower unities of consciousness find their goal there. The causal connections which we discover in the universe are symbols of processes of a will, and are therefore connections of ends. The course of

Nature itself is an explanation of an inner teleological connection of "moments" in the Divine revelation of sensuous knowledge. Reality is a mirroring of a domain of Ends. The universal reciprocal working of elements in the physical world is an appearance of an *inner, aesthetic-teleological necessity* by means of which the All-One unfolds the content of His nature in a multiplicity of modifications, and in a cosmos of concrete ideas. This *inner necessity* is at the same time absolute freedom or self-realization. Thus all Values come home at last to their realization in Absolute Reality.

Erich Adickes (1866–1928)

Adickes, since 1905, was Professor of Philosophy in the University of Tübingen. His works, in the main, deal with the interpretation of various elements in the teaching of Kant. His own points of view bear an indelible stamp of the influence of Kant on him, just as is the case with Paulsen with whom Adickes has strong affinities.

Philosophy is, on the one hand, a Theory of Thought, and, on the other, a Metaphysics. As Theory of Thought, Philosophy is to be constructed from the sides of Logic and of the Theory of Knowledge. As Metaphysics, it has as its object the working out into Principles the conclusions that are involved in Logic and the Theory of Knowledge. These Principles, in their turn, have to be supplemented and extended into the various provinces of investigation which are examined by Psychology, Ethics, and Aesthetics. Adickes would

not state that Sociology has such a close relation to Philosophy as these on account of the fact that a great deal of the material of Sociology lies in the anthropological conditions of man and in the relation to the various aspects of physical and physico-social influences which play upon his life.

The main object of Philosophy is to deal with such forms as mentioned above, and it is not its main object to reduce itself to the conclusions of the Natural Sciences.

Adickes is aware, in the line of Kant, of the presence of *a priori* functions in the conscious nature of man, but these are not in any sense a ready-made kind of knowledge: they are discovered only by means of inner experiences, and they look as if they were the inner experiences of man's conscious nature which are active when one is seeking for the solution of a problem. But there is no *theory* of an *a priori* possible. Yet, on the other hand, Adickes was so true to the spirit of Kant that he viewed with suspicion our trusting to inward experience without a constant testing of the desires of inner activity by means of the conclusions of Logic, the Theory of Knowledge, and Metaphysics (or the most comprehensive Principles). Thus a minimum only of an *a priori* should be used. Thus in Mathematics a theory of geometrical axioms is possible without an *a priorism*: Geometry deals with relations and quantitative differences which are valid for all times. In connection with conceptions of Space and Time, what is *a priori* here is the demand of consciousness to view things under the forms of Space and Time

and not to view them in the light of some supposed ready-made knowledge of Space and Time. He follows Kant farther by stating that "Matter is a work of our spirit, and exists only as a situation of consciousness". External things exist for a subject, and it is in ourselves that we possess a key to our knowledge of the world.

In the realm of Ethics Adickes is aware that man passes far beyond the empirical level to a level of universally valid Norms and Values, but it cannot be said that he passes to an *absolute* level. There are relative and utilitarian elements in all ethical principles as well as a psychological determinism, but there is also much besides these in them.

Knowledge can lead us far in forming a *Welt-anschauung*. But even Adickes is convinced that there is something else, and that of a very real nature, in man. In his *Antrittsrede* to Tübingen in January 1905 he points out the place of belief or faith as a necessary supplement to knowledge in the life of man. He does not explain fully what this means, but one can gather that it means some kind of convincing forward-view of human experience in dealing with all problems. Such a belief or faith is not a science, but a kind of inner *necessity* in human nature to accept fully the *reflection* which the world makes upon human experience. Impressions beyond the reach of the farthest conclusions often come into activity within the human consciousness. They vary from individual to individual, and even vary in the individual himself; they cannot be standardized, but they can become permanent and

increasing convictions in the developing life of man.

Hermann Cohen (1842–1918)

Hermann Cohen was born in 1842 at Coswig, and was for many years Professor of Philosophy at Marburg. He followed Lange, to whom he was much indebted for inspiration in the Kantian Philosophy. Cohen was hailed as one of the chief representatives, if, indeed, not the main leader, of the Neo-Kantian movement of the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the present century. Though an excellent interpreter of Kant he was in no sense a slavish adherent to, or one of the epigonen of, Kantianism. Much of the teaching of Plato, Fichte, and Hegel is to be found in his writings as well. His Commentaries on Kant's works possess great value, whilst his writings on Platonism and Judaism have exercised great influence on philosophical and religious thought, especially in the Universities and among liberal religious thinkers. His own system, as well as much else of great value, is presented in the three important massive volumes *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*, *Ethik der reinen Willens*, and the *Aesthetik des reinen Gefühls*. The three volumes are written in a simple and clear style, but are yet profound in the best sense of the word. They show a marvellous mastery of the philosophical thought of the ages, and on every page a master's hand is visible. As already stated the influence of Plato, Kant, and Hegel is seen very clearly upon Cohen's system. During the latter

half of the nineteenth century and right down to our own day, a great deal of time was spent, especially in Germany, in interpreting certain fundamental conceptions of Kant's Philosophy. By many thinkers Kant was supposed to have confined our knowledge to the phenomenal world, and to have inferred the *Dingen an sich* ("things in themselves") as lying beyond all knowledge. Cohen and some members of his School deny the validity of such an interpretation of Kant. Cohen himself states that such an interpretation constitutes no more than a shallow understanding of Kant's meaning. Kant's "thing in itself" is partially known even in phenomena; the universe yields some at least of its secrets to the demands of thought. Thought does obtain a certain kind of satisfaction in its effort to read the meaning of the universe, and, at the same time, every answer places before us, in its turn, a new problem. Lange had also seen this fact and had presented it long before his pupil Cohen. The Neo-Kantian School lays stress upon the demands of Thought as well as upon the attainment of reality by means of Thought; and, further still, it emphasizes the all-importance of the ideal elements which are present in the contents and demands of Thought. Cohen would accept Kant's meaning of the *a priori*. With Kant *a priori* meant a thought-relation. For instance, when we have the idea of any material object we have always connected with such an idea—as a presupposition of the idea of the object —the idea of space and of substance presented. There is something "transcendental" present in

consciousness in knowing the world at all, but this "transcendental" element has to become a factor in the individual, subjective consciousness before it can be of any value. The investigation of the meaning of *a priori*, according to Cohen, is a fact of Psychology. But this is not all. Kant goes farther to show—and Cohen follows him—that Thought consists of more than the mere psychological processes which occur in the individual consciousness. And it is in the making of this fact clear in the form of what he terms "logical idealism" that Cohen's great service consists. In fact, Cohen passes beyond Kant in his presentation of the meaning and significance of Thought.

By "pure knowledge" Cohen understands knowledge by means of "pure thought". In so far as we can *know*, the world has existence and meaning in Thought. It is useless to ask what anything means outside Thought: the existence and meaning of all things are for Thought. Existence is then *for us* nothing other than Thought.

Logic deals with pure knowledge, and accepts nothing as merely "given", and it does not begin with sensuous objects but with Thought. The ideas which present themselves as conclusions of logical Thought are the foundations of all knowledge and existence. The content of Thought is not some kind of Substance within consciousness, but the unity brought into being by means of Judgment. This unity of consciousness is no ready-made quality, and is not merely subjective. It is termed by Cohen "transcendental apperception", and is

shown to be the objective unity of the enlightened consciousness. It is not subservient to the *a priori* forms present in consciousness, but grows within the system of the categories. The categories are not inborn ideas, but are products of the Judgment. "The Category", says Cohen, "is the aim of the Judgment, and the Judgment is the pathway to the Category." Thus the real has its origin in Thought.

Just as Logic arises from pure Thought, so does Ethics arise from pure Will. Ethics is the Logic of the Mental Sciences, and presents the Principles of the Philosophy of Rights and of the State. The method of Ethics is not psychological but transcendental. Pure Will expresses itself in action and does not rest upon mere individual disposition and inclination. It is really within the domain of Rights and of the State that morality becomes possible, and the moral ideal can only be realized within a community. It is only by means of such a realization that self-consciousness gives being to an ethical person. The fundamental virtue of the State is Justice.

Cohen goes on to show that the pure Will is autonomous and free; it is never a means but always an End. The idea of End (Kant's *Sollen*) plays an important part in Cohen's Philosophy, and especially in his Philosophy of Religion. Cohen shows here affinities with Plato's Idea of the Good and of God. Present in the phases of both Thought and Will there is a "transcendental". In the case of Thought, as we have already noticed, there is the demand and content of Thought; this passes beyond any and every psychological process. In the case of the Will,

the demands of Thought coupled with the relations of the individual to Rights and to the State reveal a "Transcendental of Goodness".

In the Ethical Ought a systematic union of autonomous qualities takes place and this forms a "Realm of Ends".

Although in the development of his theory within the realms of Ethics and Religion Cohen has many affinities with Plato and Kant, still there are great divergences as well. He objects to the place of Myth in the Philosophy of Plato and objects to an external *Ding an sich* in the Philosophy of Kant.

Though Cohen emphasizes to the fullest extent the place of Thought and Will in Philosophy and Life, he insists that these can only be truly realized in the community and especially in the State. In fact, considered as individual properties, Thought and Will have only an abstract existence. He asks, Where have they come from? Certainly they have not originated from the individual entirely. The individual is bound up, as far as the whole meaning and significance of his life are concerned, with a system of relations. The external world rains its impressions from moment to moment upon the senses, and these, in their turn, carry the impressions into consciousness where, by means of a power entirely unknown—mental and spiritual in its nature—the impressions are changed and transformed into meaning, value, and significance. The worth of the individual life therefore consists in what this meaning, value, and significance really

are when we reflect upon them in the *unity* which arises within consciousness—a *unity* which is made up of the *presence and potentiality of spirit* and of the factors of content which proceed from the world and from human society.

Cohen shows (compare *Die Bedeutung des Judentums für den religiösen Fortschritt der Menscheit* and *Religion und Sittlichkeit*) that the mythical elements in the religions of the world will have to disappear before the real progress of mankind can possibly take place. As things are at present, it is an abstract concept borrowed from physical symbols that comprises a great deal of the essentials of religions and even of the Christian religion. These are his own words. The result of this is that the life of humanity in the relations of man to man, of community to community, and of nation to nation, is hardly taken into account in the construction of ideals of the highest life or of God. The change which has to take place is that the conception of the highest life and of God has to be woven from the very best materials which will enable mankind to live together and to progress. The life of the individual and the salvation of the individual as mere individual have to disappear before the actual meanings and values which result from the co-operative life of men. This is not all that the meaning of religion and the conception of God include. The best in human society has to be idealized; we have to project our best in every realm, imperfect though that best may be, in order that what we possess now may have a personal

relation with what we *ought* to possess. God will then be much more than a *postulate* of God, for the idea of God will include the ever greater ideal completion of the best thoughts and aspirations which have brought forth a collective life of goodness, truth, beauty, peace, and good will.

Cohen emphasizes that religion then means more than linking the life to any one Personality who has brought into being any of the historical religions of the world. He is far from denying that such a linkage has no value; it has had incalculable value in the history of our human world. But it is not only psychologically but morally wrong to conceive that what is actually taking place at every moment in the life of mankind does not either retard or further the unfolding of truth and reality in human life. Religion is not some myth or abstract theological and metaphysical speculation alongside of the actual and possible life of mankind and its meaning. "Wherever two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." "These Gospel words", says Cohen, "express the actual meaning of the best part of the philosophico-religious thought of the nineteenth century, especially as it was enunciated by Hegel and many of his School." Religion is not Psychology or any abstract Metaphysics, although there are elements of both in it. Religion is something more tangible and concrete than all this: it is something from which we cannot escape in any of the relations of life. In fact, its nucleus is found in the Unity and Ought which actually and perennially spring from such relations,

and which still point beyond any and every present Unity to a Unity that ever grows into what is more perfect, holy, and eternal. This ever more perfect, holy, and eternal Unity is the conception of God, and is grounded in the very fact of human life as an organism of co-operation and mutual effort. If we look at the matter in this way there will be no great gulf fixed between the best we are doing—between the life we are becoming the possessors of—and the Divine. The real progress of the world will actually begin when men come to see this. Morality and Religion will be reconciled in the sense that the former is a necessary avenue to the latter; selfishness and greed will disappear because the only reality will be the factor of Unity which comprises what is true to all and good for all. Cohen thus sees in all the efforts which bind men together the hope of a better day for the human world and for the coming of the Kingdom of God on the earth.

Paul Natorp (1845–1924)

Natorp was for many years Professor at Marburg. In many respects his position resembles that of his old colleague Hermann Cohen, but Natorp emphasizes more than Cohen the place of feeling and the social life of mankind as determining factors in knowledge and religion. As this kind of work engaged Natorp's time for many years it is better to deal with it first, and to point out afterwards the significance of his works in the domain of pure philosophical thought. His close affinity with Kant makes him disregard almost altogether the place of

Metaphysics in religion, though, on the other hand, by his development of the idea of the Ought as the goal for the Will, a great deal of Metaphysics is to be found in his writings. He was also much influenced in some directions by Plato, and this fact compelled him to give an idealistic colouring to most of his own writings. He certainly sees that Psychology consists in something more than in a description of mental processes or in the relation between the psychical and the physical. For instance, the function of the Will can never be explained from the side of empirical Psychology. The presence of the "Idea" in a theoretical sense and in its entire content and meaning has to be taken into account as furnishing the only true explanation of human actions. It is in this movement from the *Is* to the *Ought* that the meaning of human life can be found. Life is a constant movement towards the realization of the content which is presented in the theoretical idea. It is in the degree such a movement is realized, it is in that degree alone that truth is found. And it is in the presence of the moral idea that the Will obtains its power to move—to leave every present situation for one which seems to guarantee greater satisfaction for the individual. One moves from station to station—from one situation of rest to another. There is no final terminus, for each temporary terminus can mean nothing other than a temporary halt in the march which knowledge has ever to take farther and farther into the unknown.

Natorp is far removed from the empiricists in his recognition of the ideas and laws which the

human mind frames as norms and guides for its life and development. He goes farther and states that it is not in the objects which surround us, but in the *insight* into these ideas and laws that the true nature of knowledge and life is to be discovered. He states that the recognition of this fact forms one of the immortal services which Kant rendered to Philosophy. Still, on the other hand, Natorp is not ready to go so far as Kant in postulating God, Freedom, and Immortality as the final meaning which practical reason must possess in order to possess at the same time some kind of sheltering place in the midst of the contradictions and storms of life. Natorp states that it is important to bear in mind that the *existence* of the objects of such a meaning lies beyond our reach. We are thus placed between Empiricism on the one hand and Theism on the other. The former cannot satisfy us, for there is more in human nature than is presented by it. And besides, it ignores the best qualities of human nature, and reduces the nature of the ideal to its connections with the physical world and the ordinary life of the day. The very condition of all the mental and moral progress of the world consists in passing beyond the boundaries of Empiricism and holding fast to the reality of mind and spirit however intangible these might have been to the claims of sense and ordinary life. There is no thinker of the present, I believe, who has emphasized this fact in a stronger way than Natorp.

Yet, on the other hand, there is real danger, as Natorp points out, of passing beyond the conclusions

of the idea and of the reality which keeps the world intact into a realm whose validity can never be known by us. Where are we to turn in this dilemma? Natorp shows that we have seen in the development of knowledge and life that ideas, laws, meanings, and values are the very powers which have carried the human world from lower to higher levels. Our deepest feelings testify that there is not enough for us in the surrounding world of nature, and neither is there enough in the surrounding world of human life unless we penetrate beneath its surface. We can penetrate beneath the surface of the life of mankind; we can become conscious of qualities which have eternal value and significance. But this "eternal" is not something beyond the things of time. It is far rather a standpoint, a mode, an idea with which to view the things of time. Things are rigid, dead, but the progress of true creative knowledge is an eternal living process. The eternity and infinity which human beings can apprehend and use are not the eternity and infinity found in *things*. In the deepest part of our nature we are dissatisfied with the limits of the narrow circle of the things around us. In this final centre of our nature we are free, and are able to view not only the domain which is next to the one we are now standing upon, but also to pass judgment on the domain which attempts to set limits to our view.

But it is impossible, according to Natorp, to obtain an experience of these highest and best realities without considering that they are more than individual, subjective qualities. They are individual in the sense that our feeling needs them,

our reason establishes them, our will endeavours to reach them because thus alone can it find satisfaction. These qualities are our own, and yet they are the contributions of others as well. At no moment can we live to ourselves. We are bound to the community, and, for good or for ill, we contribute our portion to the actual movement of the community, whilst it, in its turn, has all along contributed its portion in partially making us what we are. He views religion from such a standpoint. According to him, the essence of religion lies then in our "social education" on all the sides of our being. Our thinking, feeling, and willing are to be those of the meaning, value, and significance of the best in the human society in which we are placed. All our capacities must be devoted towards bringing society to an ever higher level. Society as yet is, in a large measure, in a state of chaos. Our work should be to bring it under the law of reason, until such a law would become an established fact in the life of mankind. Society can progress only in such a way, and also in such a way alone can man become really man. There is at present in existence, Natorp shows, some vague kind of *social teleology*: this has to be saturated with reason and value, for this is the very condition of human progress. He thus emphasizes the fact that the Common Ideal Ends of Society should be constantly held in view.

Though stating that the answer to the question whether anything lies beyond the highest ideals and norms which the human mind can present

before itself is in the negative, Natorp still holds it necessary to keep intact religious communities whatever their particular beliefs may be. In religion, it is often what is *at the back* of the intellectual belief that matters, though certainly the intellectual belief matters, too, in so far as it has an effect upon what lies at the back of it. The belief in the existence of what lies *beyond* the ideal has an influence on the ideal itself and on the work of the ideal upon life. This truth has been verified clearly enough in the history of the religious communities of the world. But Natorp's main point here also means that the attention which religious communities give to what is *beyond* the ideals of reason tends to divert the attention to a region of the fanciful and imaginative—a region which depicts a state of existence that is to happen for us beyond death. He shows that there cannot be a doubt that this mode of presenting religion has had the tendency of weakening the over-individual moral and spiritual level which human life is capable of reaching, and of changing activity into a passivity which is liable to rest upon some imaginary object that will grant us complete satisfaction in another state of existence. The result of this is that half the powers which could be utilized here and now for rising to a higher level of existence remain unused, for such powers are often conceived as being truly real only in so far as they serve the main idea of what is going to happen in the "beyond". Natorp then turns to the enormous possibilities which lie in the life of "the here and now".

Though the will to good, according to him, is individual, the good itself is over-individual. Thus the moral consciousness can realize itself only in a community. Moral consciousness is community-consciousness. The main task, we are told, is to lift ourselves up to the level of the over-individual ideals of truth, goodness, and spiritual power. The active side of human nature and its enormous possibilities have to be presented to our modern world in their moral and spiritual aspects. We are aware how much has been achieved by emphasizing these on their scientific side. The *passive* side of man has been the one that has, in the main, been emphasized in religion. The presence of reason and will, with all their latent power, has never been sufficiently emphasized in connection with the truths, values, and moral qualities which ought to be common to all. In Natorp's own words: Faith, piety, indeed all *names*, emphasize but the passive side of human nature. Certainly prostration and humility before the Eternal have good reason to show for themselves, but only as aspects of the elevation and emancipation which become ours only in so far as we come to realize that God is alive in us in the form of *immediacy*.

This deeper question of religion does not stand to-day where it stood. The world and all its complexities, its awful burdens and colossal tragedies and catastrophes, require a constant emphasis on the immediate reality of a communal life in all the qualities which tend towards binding together individuals and nations and healing their wounds

as they proceed on their onward march through a forest-world full of entanglements and illusions. But all need not be dark, and the awful tragedies which shoot upon us like lightning from the clouds can be avoided if we but discover that within the soul of mankind there are possibilities for better and nobler things. The turn to these will bring about the real birth of God within our souls. Instead of waiting for Him to come down to us, we can feel that we possess something of the very nature of deepest Reality in the form of truth and goodness and love as possibilities within the deepest moral consciousness. These ideals are imbedded in the demands of reason and in the very structure of the life of the community. Take them away, and the whole civilized and moralized structure of society, built through long ages of toil and suffering, will come at once to an end, and the barbarism and animalism of the distant past will once again set in. But all this may be avoided, and the real progress of mankind can obtain a fresh impetus if we but listen to the claims of the ideal as it expresses itself in the deepest life of mankind. It is impossible for the final truth which shall give us strength in life and death to be brought to us from somewhere or somebody entirely outside ourselves. And if there were a God who could be brought from heaven, our deepest soul would remain untouched and unconvinced unless we ourselves were able, through our own power and insight, to affirm this truth in our own soul, and to bring it forth in an original manner ourselves. Life eternal is our own, and yet it is the

brother's also, and could never have become our possession unless it had arisen between the two of us.

The above contains the substance, practically in his own words, of Natorp's views with regard to the things of life, and all the above was written by him before the outbreak of the Great War of 1914. Natorp was convinced that Philosophy, without renouncing any of its exactness and profundity, has a genuine message for the weal of mankind. This is the reason why Natorp, the exact thinker, gave an orientation to some of the main problems in the realms of ethics, sociology, and religion.

Aloys Riehl (1844–1926)

Aloys Riehl was Professor successively at Graz, Freiburg in Breisgau, Kiel, and Halle. His greatest work is *Der Philosophische Kriticismus und seine Bedeutung für die positive Wissenschaft*, which first appeared in 1876. The book is based on Kant, but gives many interpretations of the world and life other than those of Kant's. Riehl's standpoint is that of Positivism, with an emphasis on the empirico-objective factors of knowledge and on a philosophical monism in opposition to a naturalistic monism. Theoretical Philosophy is to him the science and criticism of knowledge, whilst practical Philosophy is the presentation of a theory of wisdom (*Weisheitslehre*). Science regards man in so far as he is an effect of nature and a result of general laws, whilst practical Philosophy considers man in so far as he is a *cause* in nature—man being of such a nature himself that a knowledge of the laws of nature can

be directed by him towards definite Ends. The Theory of Knowledge has its starting-point in Sensation. By means of Apperception the subject is able to give the Sensations a *qualitative* side in the form of ideas. The existence of Sensation includes the co-existence of the non-self. *Sentio, ergo sum et est.* It is thus that the reality of the external world is given to us. The condition of the emergence of the idea is that unity of consciousness which occurs when we link together successive Sensations. This constitutes the measure of all similar and of all dissimilar presentations as well as the "ground" of the syntheses of all conceptual experience, of all the continuity and constancy of the forms of experience, and of all the source of *a priori* concepts. The relation of mind and matter has to be kept constantly in view, for whatever transformations take place in the passage from Sensation to Concept and Idea these transformations must have their basis in the facts of our knowledge of the external world. He views with suspicion every conceptual form which has no relations with the facts of the external world, although he follows close to the Kantian interpretation of the absolutely fundamental importance of mind in its knowledge of all objects, and he lays greater stress on the part the object plays on the subject than Kant does.

Riehl criticizes severely the greater part of the Philosophy of Hegel, especially Hegel's works on the Philosophy of History. Historical phenomena, he points out, viewed as the development of an absolute spirit, are bound to come to grief as

actual and lasting interpretations. The same thing may be said of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. No one will tread this circuitous pathway for long. Riehl's point of view was presented prior to the Neo-Hegelian revival in Germany. Hegel's contributions to History and Philosophy are again on the march, whilst on Riehl's side it has to be borne in mind that Hegel's Philosophy of the State came to grief by the results of the Great War.

Philosophy in the main, especially on its idealistic side, according to Riehl, is in a bad way. He sees the only possible development in the works of such natural scientists as Robert Mayer, Helmholtz, and Hertz. The proofs, even of the things of the spirit, are not to be found in the generalization of concepts and ideas, which are often so far removed from experience in its relation to the physical universe, but in the logico-mathematical manner in which the house of knowledge is in process of being built at the present time. A middle way between speculation, on the one hand, and pure experience, on the other, is the only true way of progress. Galileo had a true inkling of this better way. He was convinced that the facts present in Perception are not sufficient to engender true knowledge. These facts are only one source of knowledge. The other source is not less original and consists of the knowledge which proceeds out of itself. When both sources flow together, the facts of the senses, by means of induction and experiment, are brought under *a priori* concepts, and thus both currents unite to form the stream of knowledge.

The future of Philosophy, in Riehl's conviction, is the elevation of Science to the level of a Philosophy. We shall need specialists of generalization in this realm, but they must all be men who are well versed in the results of physical reality, and there ought not to be amongst them any who are strangers to the methods, meanings, and conclusions of the natural sciences. The future system of knowledge will grow out of criticism and investigation; it will seek the truth, not in any inner, mystical nature of the world or of consciousness, but in the continuous relation of things and in the laws of their appearance.

Alongside of the necessity of working for an interpretation of the physical world and for a further enlightenment concerning the nature of mind, Riehl is fully awakened to the need of further light on the best means for the deepening and heightening of human life in itself. Human life has continually, in the midst of the perpetual progress of science, to form new connections and meanings of life itself which are apart in a large measure from the conclusions of the natural sciences. Platonism, Spinozism, and Kantianism have not passed away; they belong to the life which we live to-day. The thought of Kant that the moral law emerges from the reasonable nature of man, i.e. that the moral law as such is an inherent law of man's nature, has to be revived. This great idea of Kant's Ethics, which first of all founded a moral *Weltanschauung*, is not yet exhausted; indeed, it is as yet hardly understood in its enormous significance. Coupled with this conception, Riehl emphasized very strongly the

need of the creation by mankind of a form of activism such as is to be found in the most spiritual elements of the teaching of Nietzsche.

JOHANNES VOLKELT (1848–1930)

Volkelt was for many years Professor of Philosophy and Education in the University of Leipzig. The main influences upon his philosophical views were Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Eduard von Hartmann. His works are of great importance in the domains of the Theory of Knowledge, Metaphysics, and especially Aesthetics. In the opinion of some of the most competent German philosophers Volkelt's works in the realm of Aesthetics show a greater originality than even his works on pure Philosophy. His writings have also become known amongst a small band of thinkers in Britain and the United States of America. He shows the need of a metaphysic which will be true not only concerning knowledge but also concerning religion.

Theory of Knowledge has a dualistic foundation. This fact is evident in many of the systems of the great thinkers of the world in the past and the present. Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel present a monistic Theory of Knowledge; Hume, J. S. Mill, Avenarius, Mach, and others are also monistic. The former emphasize Thought as the true source of certitude; the latter show that certitude issues out of experience. Volkelt states that neither theory by itself satisfies him. One source of certitude is the self-certitude of consciousness itself—the interior

presence of any facts within consciousness. Without this source of certitude there is no knowledge; this source gives us the material out of which all knowledge issues. The other source of certitude is the necessity of thought—the certitude of logical constraint, the consciousness of actual necessity. This source grants us more of a content than the former source. It may be stated that a satisfying and valid knowledge rests upon a union of the two modes. Therefore, all true knowledge may be designated as the working out by thought of pure experience.

But Volkelt points out that there are other sources of certitude besides the above two. There are various intuitive modes of certitude. Our convictions of our personal self, of the external world, of the moral law, and of God, rest in most cases on intuitive certitude. If we accept this intuitive mode we still discover that it is of a dualistic kind. The foundation of the Theory of Knowledge does not consist in proofs, but is obtained by the individual describing what he experiences within himself. The individual himself experiences *something*, i.e. *something* is an object of his consciousness. *Something* is *given* to his consciousness. Thus a Theory of Knowledge includes a subject that is conscious, in an immediate manner, of itself and of what is "given", and on the other hand the "given" has to be taken into account and seen to be, in an important sense, *trans-subjective*. What is "given" is not trans-subjective in space, but is an immanent of an over-empirical character. The object in this

sense is not an object in the external world, but an object of consciousness.

Volkelt shows with great clearness that by the side of the self-certitude of consciousness we discover the certitude of the trans-subjective. This is designated by him as "logical certitude" or the certitude of the "necessity of thought". This certitude is found in what is valid as *existing* and in what is valid as *meaning*. Once we are landed in these certitudes we discover that we have to deal with two worlds—a world of *existing things* which present themselves to consciousness, and a world of *meaning* which is demanded by thought and which has to be carried into realms more and more universal. The former "world" has to be investigated by the natural scientist; the "world" of "logical meaning" is the domain of the philosopher. Thus there arises the need, from thought itself, that its nature should be interpreted, and that the principles imbedded in it should be made clear. Every normal person does this in a greater or smaller degree. Metaphysics is only the carrying farther of the meaning of common sense with regard to the meaning and value of the universe and of life. It is true that Metaphysics can never hope to become an exact science, but it may be truly stated that there is no science which is entirely exact. Even every branch of natural science deals with a kind of reduplication of the world in human consciousness, with hypotheses which have no existence outside the sphere of thought, and with no more than partial solutions of the problems which confront

man from the side of the physical universe. In establishing a Metaphysic no more is done than is done by the natural scientist; both the philosopher and the scientist are obliged each to take into account his own world—the former the world of logical thought, the latter the world of physical existence; both have to formulate principles and laws concerning the meaning of these two worlds; both have to erect signposts at cross-roads in order that the road most probably the right one may be taken by their successors.

Volkelt admits that there are great difficulties in connection with the material found within the metaphysical domain. This is due to the chaos of the material found in the universe and in life. With regard to some problems the metaphysician finds that nothing can be said either for or against the problems—they are riddled with uncertainty. But even these problems must be faced, for they may yield something of their nature to man some day. Volkelt reckons the problem of personal immortality as belonging to this class.

There is another class of problems concerning the nature and meaning of the *Over-rational.* Often the metaphysician finds himself face to face with results which seem full of inconsistencies and contradictions. But often through patience one is able to thread one's way through a maze of difficulties and thus construct a continuation of the road. Thus some of the difficulties vanish and at the same time give rise to further problems.

Finally, problems concerning the ultimate mean-

ing of Reality present themselves. And often within this clouded domain the mind is obliged to consider the results of metaphysical Reality as being in some way different from all the conclusions of logical thought. It is really this demand of thought to plumb as far into the deeps as possible that constitutes the mystery of the universe and of human existence. And it has to be borne in mind that a consciousness of this mystery, which lies beyond logical thought, is a fact of fundamental importance and has far-reaching consequences. Volkelt is well aware of this experience. He states that he is astonished at the easy way naïve philosophers speak of the great problems, and think of them as if they were either self-evident or did not exist at all. "The more I reflect over the world, the more entangled does it become to me, the more darkness arises beyond all our solutions, and the more all seems to fall into the region of the over-rational and riddlesome. But in all this I see no misfortune either for knowledge or for mankind. Indeed, I believe in all earnestness that life would not possess value and would not have been able to ascend if its own nature and the universe were clear and fully known. The charm of life rests upon a mixture of mystery and clarity" (*Quellen der menschlichen Gewissheit*, p. 112). This is the only way by which human development and the progress of the world can take place. The result is not an agnosticism, for it is absolutely certain that we can pass beyond the experience of the moment, and quite as certain that the final conclusions of the intellect

and the final convictions of the soul do point to *more* of the same nature than what has already been gained. On the other hand, an easy-going certitude has very great dangers attached to it; it paralyses *quest*; it accepts without effort the results of those who have had to labour in order to obtain them; and it has to pay the penalty of not possessing much more than mere words. The spirit of mystery and clarity leads to the cultivation of all that is best in human nature, and to a religion in which all will discover their deepest needs more and more satisfied.

Volkelt deals with this question of the value and significance of religion with great clearness. When he turns to the nature of religion he shows that the subject may be answered in different ways. It may be answered by casting a survey over the historical religions and attempting to reach what is *essential* in each religion. But this method is not satisfactory if only for no other reason than that it consists in comparing Values of very different degrees of development and in abstracting the essential from the living soil in which it grew. It is extremely doubtful whether such a method leads to any satisfactory and permanent results.

Another and perhaps deeper method is the one of attempting to find the meaning of religion in the development of the *feelings* in the course of the historical life of a community. But this cannot be more than a psychological process which deals with the history of religion. It is a method which casts a good deal of light over the meaning and

value of religion as it proceeds, from stage to stage, in the life of a community; but the observer of these phenomena must not forget the fact that there is no terminus in historical religious development: it, too, like everything else that may be known, is subject to perpetual change and new mouldings in the ever-constant growth of the complexity of life and of the perpetual needs of new Ends to meet the needs of new demands. It has to be borne in mind that religion deals not only with the phenomena of human life and the universe in the Past, but also, and in a far greater degree, with these in the Present and the Future.

It may be stated, says Volkelt, that religion deals with the higher life of the soul not merely as a theory of the universe and of life, but far more as a power which enables man to meet and to overcome the contradictions and entanglements of the Present and to ascend to a higher level and form of being. Religion, it is true, includes a theory of the universe and of life; and it includes also the life of the spirit witnessed in the religions of the world from their lowest to their highest forms. But religion is not solely a science, an ethic, or an art. What these have to state in regard to the universe and life is of importance, and constitutes something of value concerning the meaning of religion. Ethics presents the various Standards which seem to include the meaning and significance of life in the world of human society, and presents also an ideal of moral purity before the individual. In Art, on its tragic side, the individual is stirred to the depth

of his nature, and obtains a new view of the complexity of life, whilst, on its pleasurable side, Art exercises a quickening and elevating influence upon man.

Volkelt realizes, as all idealists realize, that the three sides of knowing, willing, and feeling are present in the three phases of consciousness which are operative in science, ethics, and aesthetics. But he goes farther than most idealists by showing that an experience is possible which consists of the *root* of these three different branches, and it is this *root-experience* which forms the genuine meaning of religion. *It is a Metaphysic of Psychology.* The individual has to form some final theory of himself and of the universe. An infinite number of impressions have poured upon his senses and his mind. It is in what happens when the mind has reflected upon such impressions that the meaning of religion is to be found. The result is a view of the universe and of life originating from what happens in the deepest experiences of the individual. In so far as such experience is the individual's own it is psychological; in so far as the content of the experience is concerned—when reflected upon by the mind, when felt as having value and significance, and when viewed as a goal to be reached—it forms a reality which transcends the individual. It is, in the last resort, not a reality which sums up a realization of life—which shows it as a finished product—but is far rather a reality which reveals itself as the *absolute necessity of life.* Life cannot withdraw from this experience without losing it. Life, on the

other hand, having faith in such a trans-subjective experience, is bound to conclude that such a trans-subjective as reveals itself in the *Sollen* (the Ought) constitutes the very essence of the universe. In other words, it is the cause and sustainer of all that is.

Although factors of knowledge, feeling, and will have helped to form this religious experience, the experience is now an *intuitive certitude.* We are as certain of it as we are of green and red presented by Sensation and Perception. Though thoughts, conclusions, and proofs are the media by which the experience is obtained, the experience itself is something other. *After* the experience has been obtained it becomes *immediate*, and assumes the form of a *synthetic feeling* which includes and transcends all that has helped man's spiritual potentiality to frame it. Life is full of such intuitive certitudes. When we open our eyes and are absorbed in the drama which presents itself to our senses in the physical cosmos in its myriad ways; when we witness all its creativeness and see something of its sources, its roots, and its processes—all this is intuitive certitude. And it is an intuitive certitude when we stand face to face with another person and are able to understand and appreciate the thoughts he presents before us; and the same fact is true, in a still higher degree, concerning those who are in love. The intimate and immediate life of another person rests upon as certain a comprehension as the existence of the external world which presents itself to the senses. In the same way, when we sink

deeper and deeper into our own soul we discover our essential, creative self in an intuitive, immediate manner.

Volkelt shows that, in a large number of ways, the fact exists that a characteristic intuitive certitude is present where man is actually certain of being in unity with the Infinite and Absolute—with the deepest Ground of all being. Opponents may state that such an immediate experience rests upon an illusion. Volkelt answers that the opponent cannot deny that the experience exists and produces something other than is found in the moral and aesthetic intuition. This certitude reaches a deeper ground of the personality than the creative ground. "The intuitive certitude of a religious kind originates in the fact that man, in the deepest foundations of his personality, is certain of the Infinite, of the Uncreated Absolute, or to speak in the language of religion, of his God."

The only conclusion of such a certitude, according to Volkelt, is that the foundation of the universe must be of the same nature as the deepest personality that feels the certitude. The Ground of the Universe must then be Absolute Spirit.

Our author finally points out the importance of the development in Philosophy of a clear differentiation between the *Is* and the *Ought*. All idealists are agreed that such an *Ought* has always some kind of transcendental reality. "To think of an Absolute Ought without at the same time thinking of an Absolute Consciousness for whom this Ought exists is impossible." He insists that we are led to

such a result even from the theoretical side by means of Metaphysics. In this way we see that the meaning of religion is not purely subjective, but is warranted by Thought and still more by the deepest certitude of one's own personality. Such a Metaphysics, then, deals with man's relation to an Absolute Ought that can mean no other than an Absolute Spirit. From the practical side we are led to the result that such an Absolute Ought and such an Absolute Spirit are forms present in the very demands of the conclusions of our thoughts and reveal themselves as certitudes whenever our lives are at their deepest and best.

Hans Cornelius (1863–)

Hans Cornelius is Professor at Munich, and is, in the main, a representative of the School of Mach. His best-known work is his *Introduction to Philosophy*, which has passed through several editions. The main idea which is developed here is as follows: Man, in his restless effort after conceptual clearness and connective knowledge, has often entered into many wrong pathways which have led him far away from his initial aims, and has thus floundered about on the right and on the left, losing himself in all kinds of tunnels and bogs, until finally, in his despair, he accepts certain definite, speculative views of the universe and life. Such a restless effort may lead into affirmations which are outside the reach of human experience on its legitimate lines. On the other hand, the efforts may lead to negations which

are not warranted by experience when at its best. Cornelius terms such a false pathway "dogmatic Philosophy". The results on the two sides mentioned above are "poetical concepts" which stand on a deceptive foundation.

A healthy human understanding, with its naturalistic conceptions, finds itself face to face with several forms of dualism. At least four main problems arise when we are on the right philosophical road. These are the problems of the effect of the external world upon consciousness, the problem of our knowledge of the external world, the problem of the will, and finally that of freedom. We have not solved any of these problems, although several important approaches to a solution have been made. If an even greater solution is to happen we must go back to our Kant, soak ourselves in his teaching, and use it as a jumping-off ground in order to get nearer to the goal of solution. A continuous study of the Theory of Knowledge has become absolutely necessary. Emphasis will have to be laid on the need of a further thoroughgoing insistence on psychological mechanism such as exists in Sensation and Perception. We have already gained something of value in this respect; a new meaning has been obtained concerning the nature of psychological connections and of the *Economy of Thought* (Mach).

The fundamental law of experience is to be found in the *connections* of the contents of consciousness. Atoms of consciousness do not exist; every content is part of a whole; differences, similarities, activities, recognition, and, indeed, all elementary functions

of experience arise from the connections of the contents of consciousness. The process begins from these elementary functions and proceeds to the law of the "economy of thought". This law is the principle which governs all thought; it is the effort of knowledge to transform the complex into the simple without losing any of the meaning of the content. Every abstraction, concept, word, and relation are a witness of the presence and operation of this law. The meanings of the world and of life are thus packed into parcels, as it were, and this enables us to spare thought the work of viewing things in their infinite separateness and complexity. Cornelius attempts to solve the most difficult problems by his emphasis on the presence of the law of the "economy of thought" in all knowledge. For example, the external world is nothing other than the regular connection of our experiences. Between noumenon and phenomenon there is no gulf; the *form* is simply the definite order of the latter. Consequently, there is no such thing as a *Ding an sich*. The differences which have been made between the external and the internal world are only illusory differences of a dogmatic Philosophy. A psychical development goes hand in hand with a physiological development. The self is a definite connection of experiences which are characterized by feeling, to which the working together of all the parts of the impressions of the present and of the reflections of the past correspond. Causality is thus viewed as nothing other than a form of the conceptual connections of appearances. The objects are

not causally conditioned until our mind works upon them; it is only conceptual thought that links the things together into uniform causal connections.

The ethical aspect of life is looked upon by Cornelius as a creation of a new mode of life which obtains its validity in the testimony and conviction of our inner world.

Friedrich Jodl (1848–1914)

Jodl was Professor in Vienna, and his work has been mainly in the realm of Ethics. He represented a kind of Positivisitic direction. He was one of the founders of the German Society for Ethical Culture. He believed that the monopoly of the presentation of the moral values of human life should not be left to the Churches. In his opinion the Churches presented views which were far from favourable to the development of the seeds of the higher life of man. It should be the main aim of man to widen his own individual self so that it can include the self of humanity; and the more this happens the easier he can do away with the necessity of adopting any of the tenets and props of religion and of faith which are supposed to have their origin in a world that is beyond.

Jodl's work in Psychology consisted in presenting this particular science as that of the forms and laws of the normal course of all that appears in consciousness in its relation to the surrounding medium in which man moves.

Concerning the nature of the soul, Jodl states that it is impossible for us to possess true ideas

concerning the term. We are not, he states, to present pure spiritual reality before ourselves. Every reality, however non-sensuous it may be, has relations and affinities with the world of things and the world of mental events. Every situation of man, with the sole exception of his consciousness, is spread in a spatial world. Consciousness, on the other hand, is an intensive activity which we cannot think of in the same manner as we think of the body, and yet we must not speculate concerning its origin, its nature, and its destiny. A contemporary of Jodl was

GEORGE VON GIZYCKI (1851–1895)

Gizycki pointed out that it is impossible for us to rest on pure materialism, on the one hand, or on pure metaphysics, on the other, in our views concerning life. The only views we can adopt are those of experience. His text-book on Ethics appeared in English many years ago.

WILHELM SCHUPPE (1836–1914)

Schuppe was for many years Professor of Philosophy in the University of Greifswald. The influences of Kant and Berkeley are discernible in his *Immanent Philosophy*. He taught that the sole, right standpoint for Philosophy should be the investigation of the *immanence of consciousness*. A theoretical knowledge of such is not ready-made and is no empty concept, but one of the most certain and best known of all facts. The *existence of the conscious self* is the first or primary existence; it is the original standard by means of which all concepts of existing

things are to be measured. It is in consciousness that the whole world in Space and Time presents itself as a content. *How* the self has come to be in possession of such a content is unexplainable. But it belongs to the nature of consciousness that it brings a "point" or aspect of the self and of the objective world to a unity, and that one without the other is incapable of giving us any knowledge. Subject and object are inseparable. Everything objective is a content of consciousness, but in differentiation from individual-subjective personal experience. The objective is a content of consciousness, and this consciousness has as its *mode* the individual self. This individual self, which originates in being conscious of itself, can only be a subject, can only possess its own qualities, and can only exercise its own activities. It is an absolute centre of unity, and is thus spaceless and timeless. Such a quality is the possession of man. And are we not right, then, in concluding that in so far as *he is this*, in that sense is he spaceless, timeless, and eternal? As what is termed *real* takes place in a world outside consciousness—a world of space and time—it must somehow have existence. Thus Schuppe had to hold to some naïve form of realism and to state that the *things* are somehow *there* (outside us), and are as we perceive and think them. But the only *certitude* of all existence is to be found in consciousness.

Schuppe brought his system to bear upon Psychology, Theory of Knowledge, Ethics, and the Philosophy of Rights. He attempted to fit all

these into the particular groove of his cardinal principles of *Immanent Philosophy*. At the close of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, Schuppe's system obtained a good deal of influence, especially amongst such men as Richard von Schubert-Soldern, Max Kauffman, Martin Kaibel, and others, whilst a Schuppe School is still in existence in Germany, though it is perhaps on the wane.

Richard von Schubert-Soldern (1852–)

Von Schubert-Soldern was for a time Lecturer in Philosophy in the University of Leipzig, and afterwards became Professor of the *Gymnasium* at Gorz. He is a representative of the Immanent Philosophy of Schuppe. He formulated a kind of theoretical solipsism. He declares that solipsism cannot be gainsaid: every strange self or object is something given to our consciousness. The self is the connection of all the contents of consciousness, and we can never come out of such a total-connection. The self, in a definite sense, is, however, realized as only a part of this connection. The self is, further, a continuous and unified development of experiences bound in a body. Everything stands in relation to the ego. Being and existence are identical with consciousness. Objects are part of the perceptive ego. The "thing" does not originate outside the relations of thought, but only out of relations of percepts and concepts which are bound together into a unity in an empirical subject.

Our author also wrote on ethical and social

subjects, and emphasized the nature of morality as consisting in altruistic relations.

Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915)

Windelband is known mainly to the philosophical world as one of the most eminent historians of Philosophy, but in reality he is more than this on account of his important contributions to the new School of Values which has been developed further by his pupil Heinrich Rickert and others. And even besides this, Windelband has made important contributions concerning the nature of religion. His great teachers have been Plato, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, and he has woven fundamental aspects of the thought of the four into an interesting constructive system.

Plato's influence is visible everywhere in Windelband's writings. Plato's doctrine of Ideas is taken over with some difference. With Plato the Idea, in its pure form, had an existence of its own apart from man; and so much of the Idea as revealed itself in man's nature was at the best no more than an imperfect copy of a perfect pattern which exists in the heavens. Windelband is unable to accept the transcendent aspect of reality in such a sense, but he sees clearly that the most real and valuable elements in human nature do possess a transcendency and objectivity which differentiate them from the ordinary life and inclinations of the individual. It is in some such sense as this that Plato's conception of the Idea of the Good is transformed by Windelband into Kant's Categorical Imperative.

It is not as existing in a spatial universe, and also it is not in any speculative fashion as Plato was inclined to believe, that the highest Reality is to be conceived and discovered, but in the logical judgments framed by the mind, in the effort which the Will makes to reach Ends marked out for it by Judgments of Value, and in the contemplation by the mind of objects which have Beauty and Value.

Windelband allies himself with Kant in this and in many other important respects. He sees, with his master, that reason is capable of stepping beyond the situation of the immediate present into a transcendental realm. Such a transcendental realm is no mere fancy, based upon the analogy of the present world, of a world which lies beyond and above this world. A good deal of such analogy is imbedded in the lower stages of the religions of the world, but there is also imbedded in them something more: they include an aspiration of the soul of man to rise to a higher world, though it is true to say that often such an aspiration realizes itself in the preliminary stages of its ascent by means of symbols from the visible world projected as concepts to form a transcendental world. But every new stage gained means a dropping more and more of the symbols which are obtained from the physical world and from human relations, and the mind finally rests upon a content which is purely mental and spiritual in its nature.

This work of the ascent of the mind and soul is something which demands the greatest repeated efforts on man's part. And it is in this emphasis

on the Will that Windelband connects himself with Fichte. Our mental and spiritual world does not exist in any ready-made fashion. It has to be created by every human being. The possibility of such creation as well as the validity of the creation are guaranteed by Reason and Will. Reason does lead to an ever more comprehensive content, fuller of meaning and value. Will, or the consciousness of need—the attention to an End of Thought—can reach nearer to the Ends presented by reason and can realize more and more fully and deeply what, prior to the experience, was an End of Thought alone.

Further, he emphasizes the actual self-subsistence of reason—a self-subsistence which extends beyond the world of ordinary experience. Such a self-subsistence has to be taken as an actuality. There is something *a priori* in reason in this respect. Our consciousness discovers within itself, not on the surface-level, but as a result of long and deep reflection, a number of presuppositions, and sees that unless these are given their validity and are constantly taken into account the spiritual life of man never becomes conscious of itself. Such *a priori* suppositions are not ready-made ideas within us, but they are certainly the potentialities which make ideas and everything else possible; and, what is quite as important to bear in mind, we are not living in a world which is purely subjective. The world had been running long before we appeared on the scene, and it demanded, long before we were able to select or reject, that a great deal of

our life should be fitted into its mould. Results which took a long time to come to a focus exercise their effect as a kind of atmosphere on the individual. He has to live in such an atmosphere, although as yet he does not know the constituents of its nature, and only becomes clearly aware of it by a gradual and toilsome process. And it is in recognizing this fact that Windelband connects himself with Hegel. A world of spirit is being created; the materials of the world and of human society are analysed; something is accepted and something rejected; syntheses are formed concerning the world of history and of human relations. It is from the standpoint of such a world that human society has to work. Therefore Philosophy has again to-day to return to the Hegelian method: it has to work out the principles of reason from the "historical cosmos" as these principles are presented in every branch of the historical inheritance of the world. The material of the "historical cosmos", present as it is in some degree in every individual, has to be understood and carried farther. The world of History is one world, but it has innumerable phases and never ceases to change.

But, according to Windelband, such a world of History does not exhaust the whole of reality. There is also in Religion another world, more super-sensuous in its nature than the world of History. There is a world of the connection of personalities on a level above the social level. In the World of Values those highest Values, in so far as they stand in relation to an over-sensuous Reality,

constitute a genuine religion. There is a rift in the very consciousness itself between what we are and what we ought to be. Two worlds present themselves in front of us. Here Windelband is partly reiterating Kant's distinction between the *Sollen* and the *Sein* (the Is and the Ought). He states that the Ought itself, being the meaning, value, and bearer of a transcendental world, constitutes a metaphysical anchorage; and in so far as it expresses a union of personalities within this super-sensuous sphere, it may be designated as the Godhead. This is the main meaning he is inclined to give to God. The reason for this is that in this sense the reality of God is definitely established beyond the regions of sense or of mere mentality. In other words, God as the Norm, Value, and Ideal of man—constituting a world of its own—is as real as the conscience which constitutes the rift within the soul. The over-sensuous Reality is not anything which any one individual has created, although its perpetual creation cannot take place without the work of individuals; it constitutes a world of its own, and is conceived by the soul as the most real of all things. Still, it is dangerous to attempt to define such a spiritual world with too much exactness. We are certain that it exists, and certain also of the transformations it is capable of producing upon the soul when the soul bathes itself in its atmosphere. But to reduce it to the level of exact definitions is to analyse it and so strip it of one quality after another, so that at the end of this process the Reality is only a caricature of what it was as a synthesis. The truth is

that it is reason, dealing with the whole of life, which constructed the Reality out of material in the world of nature, history, and human society. Reason, as we have seen, if carried far enough, demands such a world. Such a world unifies so many of the elements of the natural world and of human life. Indeed, in the establishment of such a transcendental world reason has only proceeded in a similar manner as in the realms of all the sciences. What are the sciences but systematized, organized, unified knowledge? Without such a procedure, organized and connected knowledge would have been impossible. It may be said that religion is the same kind of effort to unify more difficult, wider, and more intractable material. The final apex in such an attempt is the reduction of the material of the universe and of life to a few Values which are all-inclusive, and which form Norms and Standards for all the lesser Values with, in addition, a glimpse of the union of these highest Values as *One* and as constituting the ultimate meaning of the universe and of life.

But such an ultimate meaning, though reason in its final synthesis points to it, is not a goal that has been reached or demonstrated, but it does constitute a real experience which is only one step beyond the highest conclusions of the mental and moral life. If that one step is not taken, the universal validity of the final step of reason, feeling, and will is shaken, and thus the whole procedure of reason has no warrant that it means anything which may be termed true and real. Windelband is well

aware of the mystery attached to all this. The very nature of the facts themselves renders insoluble this final problem. It is a holy secret in which we experience the limits of our nature and our knowledge. On this boundary we must be modest and bear in mind that at this innermost point of life our knowledge and understanding cannot reach farther than the other side of our nature—of our will. The duality of values and reality is the indispensable condition of our activity. If value and reality were one, there could be no will and no happenings; everything would remain in eternal readiness. The innermost meaning of the temporal is the difference which never ceases to exist between what *is* and what *ought to be*; and this difference which reveals itself in our wills constitutes the fundamental condition of the elevation of human life, and our knowledge can never reach beyond it to an understanding of its origin. However, there grows in man a joy purified of desire, not by means of a restless will immersed in the transient impulses of the world of sense, but only by means of the stillness of pure thought and vision wherein the values of eternity reveal themselves: *ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἡδιστον καὶ ἄριστον.*

Oswald Külpe (1862–1915)

Külpe was successively Professor of Philosophy at Würzburg, Bonn, and Munich. He is best known in the English-speaking countries of the world as a psychologist of great repute. In many ways his psychological works bear resemblance to those of

Wundt and Avenarius. But, on the whole, Külpe's works show him as an idealist. He is inclined to the belief of the presence in man of a soul or spirit different in its nature from the body and its manifestations, but declares that this is not scientifically provable. The object of Psychology is declared to be the full experience of the individual, an experience which is dependent on the individual alone. Sensations are viewed as appearing in consciousness and possessing the tendency to a reproduction of one by means of another. He views feeling as a mode of reaction of apperception just as Wundt views it.

Philosophy has a threefold task. It deals with a scientific construction of a theory of the world, with an investigation of the presuppositions of all the sciences, and with the preparation of new particular sciences. The Theory of Knowledge deals with the most fundamental concepts and fundamental propositions as the presuppositions of all the sciences. Külpe emphasizes that Logic is not to be conceived in a psychological fashion, but constitutes a normative science, though Psychology does point out the way Logic becomes a normative science. He is a realist in so far as he insists that there is a reality independent of consciousness, whose object constitutes the object of the physical sciences. In so far as metaphysics is concerned, Külpe considers a critical metaphysics or a science of principles as possible. In his view of Ethics he combines empirico-genetic elements and *a priori* normative elements. He was deeply interested in the great problems of

Aesthetics, and viewed the subject not from the standpoint of feeling so much as from the standpoint of contents of ideas in the form of values of reflection and contemplation. His contributions are always lucid and simple, and in his final able book—*Realisierung*—he presents his material concerning "the way we know" in an attractive manner.

Georg Simmel (1858–1918)

Simmel was for many years Professor *Extraordinary* in the University of Berlin and afterwards ordinary Professor at Strassburg, where he died in 1918. His important work lies within the domains of Ethics, Philosophy of History, and Sociology. The writings of the last few years of his life have exercised an influence on the philosophical thought of Europe and America, although up to the present he is little known in Britain. The works, I believe, are destined to exercise a still greater influence in the future.

Simmel has close affinities with Kant and Hegel, and yet his originality has either modified or further developed the teaching of both so that he cannot be described as a pupil of either. The answer to the question, What is knowledge? is given on the lines of Kant. Knowledge does contain *a priori* factors, which, however, as categories, undergo a development and do not remain unchanged as was supposed by Kant. All the forms and methods of knowledge have in the course of man's history on the earth undergone changes and will continue to change. As knowing subjects we are not the passive

recipients over against the impressions of the senses, nor are we formed as indifferent sealing-wax is formed by the impression of the stamp. All knowledge is an *activity* of the spirit of man. The impressions of the senses, over against which we are related in a receptive way, are not knowledge so long as they remain in that state, and neither does the complex of their content, on such a level, constitute what we term "nature" or "world". Far rather must these impressions receive forms and unions which do not lie within themselves, but which have to be exercised by the knowing mind working upon them. What we term "nature" becomes, out of the chaos or the mere simultaneity and succession of sensuous appearances, a connection of meaning and understanding in which all the manifold appears as a characteristic unity bound together by means of laws. This is certainly the meaning of Kant. But Simmel shows that this unity of the manifold is the work not only of the forms in which the human mind finds itself by means of Space and Time, but also by means of the content that gradually arises within the mind in its perpetual contact with the world in its various manifestations. The categories originate out of "the mind's own capacity". There is a certain unity possible for human beings (and perhaps for some animal beings) which may be designated as a standpoint and equipment which we have inherited and by means of which we become conscious of the world. But such a unity would be devoid of content unless the mind and spirit of man came into perpetual contact with the

world around him, and it is this which does actually take place whenever man develops: the inner unity gets filled with ever new content. The self is the seat of an effort to move towards such a unity of ever fuller content, and it can never be said that any terminus exists for the effort, or that any exhaustion of a new content takes place on the path of the effort. In this effort towards an ever new content the self changes its position and brings into itself new elements from the outside. Unless this were possible there would be no such thing as truth or growth for human personality. What constitutes our growth is, then, something within ourselves, on the one hand, i.e. it is the self on its active side possessing, as it does possess, already some amount of content, and, on the other hand, the desire of the self for more than it already possesses, or for something that may be possessed by somebody else, or for something that seems to inhere in the very structure of the world. The self is thus placed between rest and movement, or being and becoming. It cannot be satisfied for all time in a state of rest or mere being with a minimum of content. It has to move towards some aspect or other which perpetually presents itself from the world, or from history, or from the life which surrounds us in the present. A domain thus presents itself for the self which is more than subjective; and, on the other hand, the over-subjective has to enter into man's consciousness in order that the over-subjective may be known. Man is thus a possessor of a "third domain". This is the domain of "ideal content".

As already noticed, we are beings who are on the way to become something other than we are. The presence of all which is outside us, with all its meaning for the self, has to be taken into account if the self is to grow. When this is actually taken into account its objective character is seen, and afterwards its value to some need or demand of the self becomes perceptible. It is a universal fact in human experience that ideas arise which present before man a state of things largely other than the state he already possesses. Such an ideal content constitutes a *Sollen* (an Ought). The *Sollen* is a *demand* which is given to us and cannot be a mere subjective desire, but is a fact of man's relation to the universe. This *Sollen*, then, constitutes the *meaning* of man's relation to the universe, and in however imperfect a way it is present as a Norm and Standard for everything in life. The explicit, ever-fuller meaning of the *Sollen* has to be obtained by the efforts of thought and of will. The Ought is an "original fact", "an original category", however much its content may change and however much it may be modified and conditioned by the social-historical elements of the life of mankind. Simmel emphasizes the fact that the "will of the race" comes to expression in the life of each individual and constitutes a kind of imperative over man. A great deal of the constituents of life are made up of "social content", something of which constitutes a Norm for the life, but such a "social content" of the Past has also to be supplemented by the "social content" of the Present, as well as by the light

which this content of the Present casts upon the Future.

He emphasizes further the place of this Ought in all the forms of life and existence, for it can mean no other than the universe and ourselves coming together, and the union forming a trans-subjective, over-individual reality, meaning, and value.

When Simmel deals with the Philosophy of History he differentiates (as Windelband, Münsterberg, and Rickert also differentiate) the Natural Sciences from the Science of History. The Natural Sciences are built up by means of a process of abstraction. The general or universal, as presented in the main concepts of science, is something which has been obtained by abstracting certain qualities of objects and by framing an interpretation of these qualities at the expense of all the other qualities which the object may possess. Such an interpretation is in fact a remove from the reality of the object to the reality of the concept. Without the general concept science could never have arisen and could not continue.

History, too, has to deal with the general and universal, and in this respect it resembles Natural Science. But the concept in the case of History has to be such as will explain the individual, not merely in the qualities in which the individual resembles other individuals, but in those qualities which are the individual's own. Often in History the general or universal has to deal with "Movements" as well as with individuals. But even in this respect the universal concept cannot be the sole, final meaning

of History; for alongside of this meaning there is always the other meaning of the actual creativeness and activity of the individuals themselves in that period of History—i.e. there is something that did actually occur and changed the face of things at that particular epoch. The Science of History is only possible, according to Simmel, by means "of categories—of *a priori* forms of connection".

When we turn to Simmel's conception of religion we find the same spirit of scientific veracity running through everything he writes. He knows, on the one hand, that we are doomed if we remain where we are—satisfied with the merely given elements in consciousness. As already stated, it is a fact that we possess demands which include an Ought; and whenever the personality, by means of the Will, reaches nearer to the inner meaning of the Ought, man experiences a conviction that something new and transcendental has taken root within him. And it is this transcendental aspect which gives human life its expansiveness and depth. It is warranted by all that knowledge has to say on the subject. It is a fact. It is then a proof that the mere empirical level is something to be passed. It cannot be passed entirely on the physical side, but the physical side can be tremendously modified. It can be passed within thought and conviction. Simmel cannot see that the over-subjective consciousness can pass to any kind of proof concerning the final meaning of things or concerning the existence of God, but he shows that there is a kingdom between Empiricism and Absolutism which has been too much neglected in the

Past by both of these partial theories of life. That should now, he states, be established as the domain of religion. How does he seek to establish it?

It is evident from what has already been stated that religion, in the sense presented by him, cannot be something that has no connection with what has preceded it on the various levels of knowledge and life. These levels, from the lowest to the highest, present, each one of them, various syntheses; the manifold and its unity must ever be present and must ever react upon each other. The Ought is ever present, and gives its meaning and value to every individual act. As Simmell puts it: "It is in the Ought that the whole determines the part and that the whole lives in the part." In this way the Ought is present not only as a universal but also as a particular; "for it is only the real and not the ideal-normative which can be individual, and it is only the universal and not the individual that can be a law". Thus some kind of Ought is present in every act of life, and every act of life measures itself by means of some Standard either to the other individual elements within consciousness or to the qualities which have had their existence outside the individual.

All this is true of life and is included in the very nature of logical thought as well. It is in one sense a religion. Simmel goes farther than this because he believes that in logical thought and in the ordinary moral consciousness there is not everything present which enables man to attain to some kind of positive view concerning his relation to the

cosmos and to the meaning of his life within the universal scheme of things.

Simmel lays great stress on the fact that religion must mean *life itself* and not any mere content of life. Often religion has degenerated into a particular content of life. "Religion in its life often becomes something factual and temporal, and, indeed, something local in space. Its limitation to church-going on Sunday is the caricature of this sundering of religion from life. All this can happen only because religion has become a *content* of life instead of *life itself*." When religion becomes life itself there is a consciousness in the genuine religious person of a Reality that is beyond the Ought and from whom the Ought has proceeded. This is, it is true, an over-belief. He points out that we have no means of knowing what is beyond the Ought. The Ought itself is beyond us and ever remains so, but we can reach essential elements of its nature, and the process never comes to an end. "The vast majority of people postulate the Godhead as already existing: the Godhead stands over against them as an objective Reality, and this Reality is called into existence and is granted efficacy by their own religious energies which are as yet tied up and only half awake." Simmel shows that if such people are robbed of their God in this external sense there is great danger of the actually transcendental disappearing from their lives. And, as he points out, it is a problem of the most painful and even tragic nature of the religious situation to-day whether it is possible for the ordinary mind to keep intact the metaphysical

religious consciousness and yet cease to create a Divinity that is beyond the Ought. That such a "turn" is possible for many minds cannot be doubted, and he seems to think that the gain which would accrue from such a "turn" would be very great. It would mean, he tells us, a "turn" to the religious formation of life itself and to the inner actuality which may be designated, using a philosophical expression, as the self-consciousness of the metaphysical significance of our existence. It is the "turn" with which all the super-sensuous aspiration and devotion, all the felicity and all the righteousness and grace do not any longer dwell on a high dimension *above* life but *within* the deep dimension of the man's deepest being. Religion thus, from Simmel's point of view, has to turn from questioning the cosmic origin of the highest qualities within the soul to an actual cultivation of these qualities. For example, love can possess all its over-individual power and beauty without dealing either with its origin from what is *below* itself or from what is *above* itself. It can be taken in itself as an experience within man which, though most intimately his own, is yet not the mere result of his subjective consciousness, but takes the meaning and worth of its object as its Ought and strives to bring the whole of his life to the level of this Ought. It is quite conceivable that when men learn how to emphasize, value, increase, and conserve the moral qualities which arise within consciousness they will discover that although the origin and final goal of things are wrapped up in

mystery still there is a region of absolute moral worth within the soul which can satisfy the deepest needs and go on progressing without an end. The real blessedness of life can then become man's possession, for in him a transcendental kingdom has made its appearance, and it is given to man to cultivate it without ceasing, and to find in it truth and beauty and delight. That such a level can be actually reached by man is amply verified in human history. And such an experience is a proof of the "pure human", and constitutes the entire meaning of life and existence in this world at least.

Hugo Münsterberg (1863–1916)

Hugo Münsterberg was for many years Professor of Philosophy in the University of Harvard, U.S.A. But as some of his chief work was already done before he received the "call" to Harvard he is here reckoned as one of the thinkers of Germany. He came, at an early age, under the influence of Wundt, especially in the domain of Psychology, whilst his indebtedness to Fichte is discernible in his more metaphysical works. His writings on Psychology show his emphasis of the relation of psychical processes to physical ones, whilst, on the other hand, he emphasizes actual causal relations among the psychical elements themselves. His teaching may be viewed as *voluntary idealism.* The parallelism between the physiological and the psychical is evident and universal; there is no psychical phenomenon which has not a physical counterpart. But he went very much farther than

all this. He saw that the human mind and will could attain high levels by means of concepts handled by the will. What actually occurs in man is very much more than is presented by Psychology. Indeed, Psychology falls so far short of explaining the ideals and values of life that it should be relegated to the realm of the objective, natural sciences. The mental and spiritual in man must not and cannot be explained by physical connections which arise out of causal and physiological co-existence and succession in various nervous centres. The mental and spiritual is "given" in a concrete living will and in values. The spirit of man is in reality a Will, and as such is not a psychological "time"-object at all, but is timeless and eternal. And it is with such points of view that the mental sciences should deal.

The individual, by means of the activity of the Will working upon concepts of Value, is enabled to pass to an *over-individual reality*. On the logical, aesthetic, ethical, and religious sides, life creates for itself a perpetually higher *over-self*. This process of human development is not reached until man realizes the melting of the various values into one; and this fact, which does occur, leads the individual to an experience of a *divine over-self* and to *immortality*.

Münsterberg's work has proved itself of great importance in the differentiation which he made between Psychology and the Mental Sciences. Psychology, according to him, deals with the relation between body and mind, with the emphasis laid

on the *physical* side, whilst the remaining mental sciences take up the concept and idea from the sides of reason, feeling, will, and religion.

After the appearance of his great book on *Values*, his energies were turned into more practical directions. He laboured hard amongst the American people in order to exert an influence in favour of the German people, and this sometimes to the disparagement of Great Britain. In any case, he seemed to be dragged down by certain political forces as to leave untouched in his few final years some of the great philosophical problems which previously he had so admirably elucidated. His books on Psychology and Industry are full of valuable things. He was a man with a real message concerning the value and significance of the mental sciences for the world, and he wrote much that will live for a long time. Had he continued on his early level he could have given the world even greater things than he did actually give. His intellect was of the first order, but he lived amongst people other than his own, and he lived amongst them when his own country was fighting for world-supremacy. It was but natural that he should have done all that he could for his nation at such a time, and in referring to this matter it is my object to show that this was the reason why he did not give us more productive works in his latter years.

Heinrich Rickert (1863–)

Rickert was a pupil of Windelband at Freiburg in Breisgau, and on several occasions has expressed

his indebtedness to his great teacher. For many years he remained Professor of Philosophy at Freiburg, and was called to Heidelberg on Windelband's death in 1915. He may be designated as one of the most important thinkers of Germany at the present time, especially in the realms of the Theory of Knowledge and of Values. His field of research embraces an investigation into the meaning of the physical sciences, on the one hand, and of the philosophical sciences, on the other. Windelband, in some of his important Essays, collected in the *Präludien*, had called attention to this difference between the two kinds of sciences, but he did not develop the hints which he had given in his early days with the thoroughness which Rickert has done. Windelband had also called attention to the need of a Philosophy of Values, but it was left to Rickert to give a new orientation to this important branch of Philosophy.

In the first place, nearly all of Rickert's works deal with the differences between the Natural and the Mental Sciences. In the Natural Sciences the main object according to Rickert is to show that the aim is to bring certain qualities of as many objects as possible under the fewest possible generalizations. Had it not been for the power of the human mind to form abstract generalizations concerning certain characteristics in the objects of the physical world no natural science could have arisen. In these generalizations which constitute the meaning of natural science the objects are not explained in their individuality, but in the resemblances and relations which they bear to one another. It is in

the fact that the objects of Nature are transformed into general laws that Nature constitutes what is termed *reality*. The same is true of the body with its physical and psychical processes and qualities. Whenever the body is made an object from a physical science point of view it has to be interpreted in the same manner as all other objects in the physical world, i.e. by a process of abstraction and generalization. But when we deal, on the other hand, with objects of human life—individual and social—we are not dealing with general conceptions alone, but far more with Values which are drawn from individual conceptions. For instance, when we require to examine the meaning of the personality of the poet Goethe from a natural science point of view we can only say about him what is common to all men: he was born, he lived, he wrote, he died. All that the general conception of natural science is capable of stating concerning him is connected with physical and psychical characteristics not peculiar to him alone. But when we deal with him from the standpoint of the mental sciences we are dealing with what is *individual and unique*. The conceptions which are thus formed concerning him are built up of unique events which occurred once in the life of a man of genius. In other words, we are dealing with the *Value* of the *unique* in Goethe, and that means that we seek the life of Goethe in its *meaning*.

Value and meaning are, then, according to Rickert, not conceptions which deal with certain qualities of things which change and which are conceived

in themselves without any relation to the human beings who do conceive them. Rickert thus sees that the Sciences of Nature and of History are to be differentiated; and it is History which forms the basis of every true Philosophy. [Here Croce resembles Rickert in this respect, but Rickert was in this field long before Croce entered it.] The meaning of the universe can never be adequately answered by natural science. In so far as any kind of answer is given it is obtained by linking the meaning of natural law with the life of mankind. And this ideal is not the main object of natural science. It has to deal with *things* in the external world and only with *persons* in an abstract general way, and only in so far as they resemble *things*. This constitutes the limits of natural science. But, on the other hand, the science of History aims at drawing near to the real in its *individuality* in order to explain it in its *uniqueness*. It is true that *generalizations* are found in the Science of History, but they are only means to an interpretation of the object in its uniqueness and individuality. The historian himself has to possess the idea of the value of each event in its uniqueness and not in its resemblance to other events.

But so much that is valueless appears in History that a process of selection and rejection has constantly to take place. And it is on account of this fact that Rickert finds History as no more and no less than a preparatory ground for a true Philosophy. It is *that*, but we cannot go back to the Past, for the Past has moved into the Present, and has emptied

some of its meaning into a Present which ever flows towards the Future.

True Philosophy uses the conceptions of Science and History. It has to use them, for they form all-important parts of the universe and of life; but all these conceptions have to pass through the process of logical judgments in order that we may know what they are and what worth should be attached to them. These Judgments concerning the meaning and value of everything that presents itself to life form a world of their own—a *transcendental world of the Sollen* (the Ought). The Judgments show that things have such and such a meaning and can have no other. Such a transcendental world of the *Sollen* differentiates itself from the existing world of the mere objects of Nature or of the events of History. The meaning and value which the logical Judgments give to all things presented to them constitute a "world" which has its roots outside any individual, subjective inclination. The Judgments are not merely man's own. Their real objectivity consists in the fact that *mind* and *things* have to be taken into account in the formation of Judgments. What is thus formed as Judgment is a necessity of our nature, and even of thought itself. Such an Ought becomes the Norm and Standard of all our undertakings in the domain of Truth.

This world of the *Sollen* constitutes for Rickert what governs our Thought and what moves our Will. He deprecates the strong distinction that is often made between thought and action. It is the meaning of the *Sollen* which forms the main element

in both. In the search for truth there always goes on a process which entails the presence of Will. The logical Judgment constantly selects and rejects, for without this it cannot possibly conserve and further its world of the *Sollen*.

On the other hand, the Will must move towards something which is placed before it as an End: it has, in Rickert's words, to pass from *Sein* to *Sinn* (from mere existence to meaning). In other words, thought and action are indissolubly bound together and form nothing other than two phases of the same consciousness. Thus the effort to know "truth" is really an effort to be "good" and to possess more and more value and significance for our lives. And the effort to be "good" is not something other than to obtain a real possession of the truth as this reveals itself in the logical judgment.

Rickert shows that the Values which appear in logical Judgments are absolute. They hold for all and are good for all. We are not warranted, he thinks, in granting such values as originate within the Ought an existence beyond themselves; neither is it wise to look upon the possibility of any higher truth descending upon the soul of man other than that which gradually unfolds within the logical Judgment. At the close of his great book—*Die Grenze der naturwissenschaftliche Begriffsbildung*—he does not, of course, deny the possibility of an Eternal Reality beyond the transcendental world of whom we can be certain. Here he ceases to follow Windelband. But Rickert himself clings fast to the mid-realm between empirical existence

and Absolute Reality. His certitude has led him far beyond the ordinary world and beyond every form of a practical philosophy of life. He insists that the logical Judgment enables us to create a world which is transcendental, and thus carries us far beyond our ordinary everyday self. But there is not any means possible, he states, by which we can ascribe being or existence to the Ought beyond the Ought itself. Of the being of the Ought itself we are certain—it does exist in man. But man need not trouble himself much concerning the *existence* of the Ought; what is of importance are the meaning and value which are included in the Ought.

By taking into account what is included in the Ought on all its sides, man can become the possessor of ever greater values for his life, and can become a participator in a reality which has its beginnings in what exists around him; he can pass to the general conceptions and laws of natural science, and can utilize these in relation with his life; he can further, out of the chaos of History, select what is essential and reject what is accidental. Further still, man's logical Judgments, aesthetic contemplation, and moral efforts can actually lead him to a transcendental reality. Indeed, in his *Grenze* noticed above, Rickert justifies the need of a certain kind of Metaphysics which projects such a reality into the whole universe, and sees the need of this as a formation of a true constituent of religion, yet all this he would take as symbolical in its nature. Here the strong influence of Kant rules his mind with regard to the meaning of Metaphysics. The main conclusion of

Rickert's teaching may be summed up by stating that he insists on the cultivation of a transcendental world of Values which can become more and more an actuality in the life of man. When this happens we shall, as he shows, have left for ever the smug satisfaction of resting upon any empirical reality, as well as the futile attempt to mould the meaning of our lives upon the patterns of the categories and generalizations of natural science. The transcendental *Sollen* is a garden which, if carefully tended, will yield rich fruit and flowers, and it will not fail to grant us a vision of something richer still that lies beyond itself.

CHAPTER III

HEGELIANISM

The first half of the nineteenth century was a time of deep interest in the things of the spirit. An atmosphere of a spiritual reality pervaded the whole period. The teaching of Hegel was taking hold of a large number of inquiring minds, especially in Germany. His Philosophy was considered to be the most important view of the universe and life that had ever been presented. The influence spread into the Universities and the Churches, and the gains were felt to be enormous. The interest in Hegel's work touched life on its human and social sides as well, and thus brought the German nation to have increased confidence in itself. This was so with regard to the individual as well as to the State.

But Hegel's system is so complex and many-sided that within four years after his death several Schools had arisen, each School interpreting him in a different way and taking into account different points of view. Some of the great problems which Hegel had raised and attempted to solve were now taken up anew. These were such questions as the relation of Knowledge and Faith, the doctrine of God, the nature of the life of Christ, and the meaning of Immortality. Hegel, of course, had not said the last word on these all-important subjects, and what he had said was interpreted in very different ways. The old Hegelians or the "right wing" were inclined to interpret the teaching in an orthodox

manner. They took hold of the most religious portions and attempted to prove the truth of Christian Theism by means of Hegel's Philosophy. Thus there seemed to be a kind of squaring of Philosophy and Christianity.

On the other hand, the young Hegelians of the "left wing" struggled to keep Christian Doctrine entirely in the background and to confine philosophical questions to their own immediate ground. Thus the "left wing" looked upon Immortality not as a continuation of life after death so much as the eternity of universal reason; they looked upon Jesus not as a God-Man, but as a man of God and as belonging to the human race; they viewed God as immanent and not as transcendent; they saw that Hegel did not mean to present a personal God and Creator beyond the world, but an eternal universal Substance that succeeds in becoming self-conscious in the spirit of man. Men like Feuerbach and D. F. Strauss believed that the God of mere belief was a superstition, and held that all that flows out of belief in this sense was immoral. The object of Philosophy, according to these men, was the interpretation of the natural man in his relation to the external forces which play upon him. Against such views there arose a number of eminent scholars who were midway between the "two wings", and who alone presented the Philosophy of Hegel in accordance with Hegel's own intention. These were men like F. Christian Baur and his pupils, Eduard Zeller, Otto Pfleiderer, and A. E. Biedermann. These scholars saw that the Ground of Existence

was not *mere matter*, on the one hand, or a *mere belief* in a personal Deity, on the other. But just as Hegel had become nearer to the belief in Deity than to a belief in matter, they too arrived at the same conclusion. They saw, at least, that the Ground of Existence was something *immaterial*—indeed, that it was Absolute Reason. Also, the well-known historian of Philosophy—Kuno Fischer—was anxious to bridge the gulf between the two Schools, but he obtained only a partial success. The deep opposition between the two Schools increased, and this fact led to the breaking up of the Hegelian system in Germany, especially in so far as it dealt with cardinal problems of the universe and of the destiny of man. But in other directions, especially in connection with the conception of the State, Hegelianism exercised an enormous influence in the cementing together of the various German States so as to form a united Empire. And it may also be noted that the influence of Karl Marx on Germany is due to his acceptation of portions of Hegel's teaching—portions which were brought out of their context, and which were directed towards the overthrow of Capital and towards the coming of Socialism.

We must now turn to an interpretation of some of the most weighty leaders of the "two Hegelian wings".

(I) THE HEGELIAN RIGHT WING

KARL FRIEDRICH GÖSCHEL (1781–1861)

Göschel became a Judge. He worked hard on behalf of the conservative section of the Evangelical Church. He stood entirely upon the Christian Doctrine of the Church and attempted to combine this with the more religious elements in Hegel's teaching. When Philosophy, he states, seeks for a wisdom other than that of the Christian religion, it is not a true Philosophy. The aim of wisdom is the redemption of man as presented in Christianity. He accepted the Trinity in a far different sense from that in which Hegel presented his Trinity. The soul or the psychical nature of man is created in order to become spirit. Thus the psychical nature develops out of its creation into consciousness, and from consciousness into spirit. The spirit at first is finite, but because it is a product of the Absolute Spirit it becomes immortal and eternal.

J. E. ERDMANN (1805–1892)

Erdmann was Professor of Philosophy in the University of Halle, and is well known in the English-speaking world through his *History of Philosophy*. He kept very close to Hegel's own teaching, and explained, in much simpler language, some of that teaching in connection with the conceptions of being, becoming, being-for-self, infinity, identity, difference, subsistence, inherence, the concept and the idea, the judgment, the conclusion, etc. In

several places of his works he emphasizes the value of the Dialectic of Hegel.

Erdmann called greater attention to Natural Philosophy than Hegel had done, and saw its importance in every true system of Philosophy.

Besides this, he wrote a large number of books dealing with Psychology and Metaphysics. His *Psychological Letters* may be regarded as being one of the few valuable works which were written on the subject at the time. He succeeded in creating great interest in psychological problems, and he may be justly regarded as the forerunner of the Psychology of the Present. But he is remembered best by his *History of Philosophy* which has proved so useful to several generations of students.

Julius Schaller (1810–1868)

Schaller became Professor in Halle in 1838 and remained there until 1861. In his book on *The Philosophy of Our Time* he gives an exposition and an apology of the Hegelian system. He examines and criticizes the systems which have been set up in opposition to Hegelianism, and seeks to show how the Personality of God and the Freedom of Man are to be found in Hegel's system, or at least are not excluded there. He also wrote against Strauss's point of view in his *Life of Jesus*, and subjects Strauss to a severe criticism with regard to his lack of insight into the values present in the life of the Founder of Christianity.

Besides all this, Schaller was well equipped to

deal with problems of Natural Science in their relation to Philosophy, and his history of Natural Philosophy from Bacon to his own day is worth consulting even at the present time.

Franz Biese (1803–1895)

Biese sought to introduce some of the important elements of the Hegelian system into the Higher Schools and amongst enlightened people. He believed that such a teaching would have a fruitful effect upon the lives of the young. He knew of no better training to mark the development of life from the level of Perception to that of the Idea than Hegel's system, and he also laid stress on the mental and moral energy which would be gained by all who devoted themselves to some of the great works of Hegel, especially those which deal with the power of mind as this has exhibited itself in the lives of individuals and of nations.

G. A. Gabler (1786–1853)

In 1853 Gabler became Hegel's successor as Professor of Philosophy in Berlin. A new edition of his *Criticism of Consciousness* (1827) was brought out by the Dutch philosopher, Bolland, as recently as 1901. In this work the Principles of the Hegelian Philosophy are presented with great clearness. Later in his life he wrote that the Hegelian Philosophy is in unison with the cardinal spiritual principles of Christianity. He also answered Trendelenburg in his attack on the Hegelian teaching.

EDUARD GANS (1798–1839)

Gans was a Jew who adopted Christianity. In 1828 he became Professor of Jurisprudence in Berlin. He advocated the Ideas of Hegel in connection with Law and the State, and strongly opposed the old School of the Philosophy of Rights which was in vogue in his day. Doubtless Gans's energetic spirit and exact learning were some of the initial means for the foundation of the modern German conception of the State. Several of Gans's writings dealt with the need of a creation of a State on Hegelian lines.

LEOPOLD VON HENNING (1791–1825)

Von Henning was Professor in Berlin. He turned his attention to problems of Ethics, and in his *Principles of Ethics in their historical development* he bases his teaching on some of the fundamental ethical principles of Hegel. Thought was to him of a triple nature—immediate, reflective, and speculative. The first presents the things just as they appear to the knowing consciousness; the second seeks to investigate the inner nature of the things so presented, and to bring them under the general forms of thought which are present in consciousness; and the third combines the first two forms into a unity.

H. F. L. HINRICHS (1794–1861)

Hinrichs was Professor in Breslau and afterwards in Halle. His main service in the Hegelian "cause"

was to advocate the teaching of Hegel over against that of Schleiermacher. He was also deeply interested in the works of Goethe and Schiller, and wrote books on the teaching of both.

(II) THE HEGELIAN LEFT WING

LUDWIG FEUERBACH (1804–1872)

Feuerbach was educated at Heidelberg, and was won over to the Hegelian Philosophy through the lectures of Daub. In 1824 he went to Berlin so that he might hear Hegel himself. In 1828 he became a *Privatdozent* at Erlangen. His early work on *Thoughts concerning Death and Immortality* was of such a negative nature that the Erlangen University authorities did not raise him to the rank of a Professor. He retired into the country and spent the remainder of his life writing and in straitened circumstances.

He points out that the course of his life had undergone three stages of development: God was the first stage, Reason the second, and Man the third. His main objects were to interpret the great Philosophers and to oppose the traditional theological beliefs of the Church. The criticism of the latter exercised the greater influence of the two.

In his teaching concerning Theory of Knowledge he identified the sensuous with truth and reality. The old philosophy had emphasized the fact that man is of an abstract and thinking nature; the body does not belong in reality to his real nature. The new philosophy reverses the order of this: "I am a

real sensuous nature; the body belongs to my real nature, and, indeed, in its totality, it is my nature itself. Undoubted and immediate, there is certainly given to me only what is an object of the senses: I know only objects of meaning, perception, and sensation." The conclusion is then drawn that the content of Religion is an illusion. This content of Religion is the conception of God. The sensuous, however, says nothing concerning God. For the believer, God is a being beyond Space and Time: this means that He is unknowable in a human sense; and this means nothing other than that He is *not*, for existence can be ascribed only to what is *perceived*. And as with God, so with the after-life. Feuerbach attempts to show the unreasonableness of Christianity on account of its supposed certitude with regard to the question of immortality. The idea of immortality, he states, is only a wish of the human imagination and consequently a delusion. This is the negative side of his views on religion.

What does he set in the place of the conceptions of God and of Immortality? What God is to man, in the only actual sense, is man's own spirit, his soul, his heart. Religion is this *inwardness of man coming to itself*. It is man becoming self-conscious of the qualities that are imbedded in his nature: these qualities awake and emerge into ever new conscious experiences. When man views the matter in this way Religion becomes a great reality for him. Theology has to be transformed, or rather to give way to Anthropology.

Feuerbach's negative teaching spread very ex-

tensively. His younger brother, Friedrich Feuerbach, helped to spread this new teaching by means of his books. Many others became active in the movement. Feuerbach's points of view were taken up by the two main founders of Socialism—Lassalle and Karl Marx, and also by Max Stirner.

Max Stirner (1806–1856)

Stirner studied in Berlin, Erlangen, and Königsberg, and became a teacher in a High School in Berlin. Some of his remarkable work is being revived in Germany to-day. He translated some of Adam Smith's works into German, and wrote a great book, *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*, which appeared first in 1849 and was afterwards translated into French. According to him, the final word of Ethics is not humanism but egoism. Everything which forces itself coercively on the individual—every power, belief, or idea should be done away with. The individual is an egoist; he has to cut out his very own pathway in life if his life is to mean anything of value, and he needs the world and other men only in so far as they prove of help to further his own interests. Morality, humanity, righteousness, and truth are only ghosts. Ideals are phantoms and fools without any worth. It looks as if Nietzsche was indebted to this teaching in several directions.

Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–1864)

Lassalle studied in Leipzig, Breslau, and Berlin. At an early age he joined the democratic party

and continued to labour for the welfare of the workers. He succeeded in founding many working-men's clubs and associations. He was thus one of the chief, and certainly one of the most influential, founders of German modern democracy and socialism.

Among his philosophical writings may be mentioned his books on a *System of Rights* and the *Philosophy of Heraclitus*, where he shows that the seeds of some of Hegel's ideas are to be found.

Karl Marx (1818–1883)

Marx studied Law, Philosophy, and Economics privately, and later went to Paris to continue these studies. He further passed to Belgium, back to Paris, and afterwards to London. He edited several socialistic journals.

Marx was deeply influenced by Feuerbach's *Nature of Christianity*. He came to the conclusion how necessary it is to lay fast hold on *historical facts* and not on fancies concerning the real factors which have told in the weal and woe of mankind. In this way he came to the view that it was not the State but human society which formed the key to the understanding of the historical and developmental process of humanity. He saw that it was necessary to discover and to clarify the laws of this movement and especially the driving energies which were present in such a process. He further believed that the final causes of all the changes of society did not lie in the heads or ideas of men, nor in their supposed insight into eternal truth and righteous-

ness, but in the changes of the modes of production and of exchange.

In this and in all economic ways the modes of production determine the social, political, and even the spiritual processes of human life. It is not the consciousness of mankind which determines of itself its own nature; its nature is determined by the "being" or reality of society, and it is this "being" or reality of society that determines the consciousness. Marx stated that the law of the development of human society consists in the fact that man needs and has to deal with eating, drinking, dwelling, and clothing before dealing with science, art, religion, etc. There is no need to show here how Marx's theories have had a marvellous effect in our own generation: it has brought down Emperors and Kings, as well as Governments and modes of life which were, previous to our day, supposed to be as firm as a rock and as constant as the rising of the sun. This is not the place to criticize Marx's theory. He adopted much of it from Hegel's *Philosophy of History*.

David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874)

Strauss studied at Tübingen, and, until the appearance of his *Leben Jesu*, lectured there on Philosophy. He wrote a large number of volumes, most of them dealing with certain aspects of Christianity. He differentiated strongly between Knowledge and Faith; the two are not to him identical with each other. The unity of God and man is not realized in Christ but in mankind and its history. The relation of God and man is not a transcendent, but an

immanent one. Religion can no longer be what it previously was, for now we can see that the Personality which men of yore believed to have discovered in the universe is a projection of their own personality. The ground-idea of every real religion is not found in such a conception. In the last resort, it is true, we do bend before *Something* that is in the universe upon whom (or which) we feel ourselves dependent, and resign ourselves silently as well because such a Power is not a crude Over-Power, but order and law, reason and goodness.

Strauss viewed the development of the universe and of life from a purely Darwinian standpoint. Along with this his religious nature could not be satisfied without some form of inward religious experience. "Don't forget at any moment that thou art a *human being* and not a mere product of nature." In this respect Strauss passes beyond the natural order of things. Again and again he wavers. At times we find him in the region of pantheism, which finally flows into atheism. But his moral nature was full of good things: he was always true to his friends; there was a real kind of honour in his nature and a warmth in his heart. All these virtues pointed at least to the presence of a nature not alien to some of the best ideals of life.

Bruno Bauer (1809–1882)

Bauer studied in Berlin and became a *Privatdozent* at Bonn. In three years he lost his *Erlaubniss*—the permission to teach—on account of his radicalism in Theology. In the beginning he was an

advocate of the "Right wing" of the speculative orthodoxy of the Hegelian School. Later, he turned to the "Left wing". Most of his books deal with criticisms of the Gospels, the Book of Acts, and the Pauline Epistles. He also wrote valuable works on the history of Germany under the French Revolution and the rule of Napoleon. He was a clear and critical thinker—a stickler for material facts and of an empirical turn of mind

Arnold Ruge (1802–1880)

Ruge worked as a *Privatdozent* in Halle for nine years and afterwards lived in England for a long time, where he died. He wrote books on Aesthetics, Philosophy, and Publicity, and also translated into German Buckle's *History of Civilization in England.* According to Ruge, mythical explanations of the highest and best phenomena of Nature have formed the foundations of Religion. The Father-God of Christianity is the thunder-god of the Old Testament; Christ, the astronomical God of the New Testament, is the sun-god who conquers night and winter and saves mankind from them. Idealism and truth are the only logical forces, based on ideas, the spirit of man, and science, which liberate man from material Nature, and which constitute an *immaterial world or domain* of their own—a domain of the spirit in the State, in Science, and in Art.

F. Christian Baur (1792–1860)

Baur was the son of an evangelical clergyman and studied Philosophy and Theology at Tübingen,

where he became Professor of Theology from 1826 to the time of his death in 1860. His works are very numerous, and important in the sense of constructing a pathway for the broader and more exact knowledge of the sources of the New Testament. In them all are to be found the marks of great diligence and immense scholarship. His investigations concerning the original history of Christianity have permanent worth. He believed that the revelation of God is to be found in varied forms and in varied degrees of reality. When the human mind and spirit are moved at the deepest there is the revelation of the Divine to be found. Religion in its deepest sense is far more dependent upon the inner plumbing into the depths of consciousness than upon any external revelation. It is a *feeling of dependence* which reveals itself supremely in Christianity. History, especially the history of man, also shows such a revelation of the Divine, and although such history is often interwoven with mythology still it possesses a higher grade of reality than mythology.

We know God in so far as we know ourselves, and we recognize Him as Absolute Spirit because He is the source of all that is best in us. The finite consciousness is only a "moment" of the Absolute Spirit entering finitude.

Baur shows his closest affinity to Hegel in his work on *Dogma and Church History.*

Eduard Zeller (1813–1908)

Zeller is well known as a brilliant historian, especially of Greek Philosophy. He studied at Tübingen and

Berlin, and was successively Professor at four Universities, going to Berlin in 1872 and retiring in 1897. He died at the age of 95. He started his philosophical career as a disciple of Hegel, but very soon discarded the *a priori* world-construction of the master. This seemed to him, for various reasons, impossible. Hegel had his grip of an *a priori* from an abstract world, and overlooked the *conditions* of human knowledge—conditions which only gradually, and that through the most entangled kind of activity, move from below upward. Zeller thus turned away from Hegel to Kant's Critical Idealism. All our conceptions are common products of objective impressions and subjective activity—an activity which enables us to work out or interpret the impressions. We cannot expect to win a knowledge of the real in any way other than that of experience, but the general laws and the grounds of things are known, not through experience as such, but through *thought*. The first step of knowledge is sufficient observation, the second is the differentiation of the elements of our experience, and the third is the quest for causes and grounds of the real processes in order that things may be explained from the sources of their grounds. The fundamental mistake of Kant is the declaration that it is impossible to know things in themselves. It is true that we conceive things by means of subjective conceptual forms, but it does not follow that we do not know them in themselves. Only so long as we somehow take a single appearance (or thing) only for itself is the possibility of a knowledge of the "in

itself" (*an sich*) of things excluded. But what is unreachable through the consideration of a single appearance (or thing) can, by means of a comparison of many things, be arrived at.

Zeller considered that the *a priori* forms of our viewing things are Space, Time, and Number. They are *a priori* in so far as the laws in accordance with which we proceed in the construction of our conceptions are *a priori*. All the matter and energies of Nature stand in the inmost relation to one another; they work upon one another according to definite laws, so that out of this conjoint-activity an ordered whole has come into being—a whole that includes the inexhaustible domains of Life, Spirit, Rationality, and Wisdom. If, then, all the parts thus stand in such reciprocal relations and effects, they must be resting on a "Ground" of the same nature as themselves.

Albert Schwegler (1819–1857)

Schwegler was educated at Tübingen, where he became Professor of Roman Literature and Antiquities. His significance lies in historical domains, where he laboured in accordance with Hegelian principles. His work on Montanism and the Christian Church in the second Century is of great importance. Here he investigates with great learning the origin of the New Testament writings. But he is known best by his *History of Philosophy*, a work which has served well several generations of students in Germany, and by means of translations in England, Denmark, and other countries.

Karl Reinhold Köstlin (1819–1894)

Köstlin was educated at Tübingen and Berlin, where he studied Philosophy and Theology. His point of view was that of the Tübingen School already referred to. Later in life he turned to Aesthetics, and his point of view here was the Hegelian one. His great plea was for the cultivation of the dormant faculty of fancy and imagination to be brought to bear upon the "Beautiful". The effect of this will be a complete transformation of human experience. When the aesthetic feeling has a hearing we are carried into blessed regions closed to us in every other way.

J. K. F. Rosenkranz (1805–1879)

Rosenkranz studied in Berlin, Halle, and Heidelberg. He became Professor of Philosophy in Königsberg. His works are very numerous and are written on such subjects as Theological Science, the Religion of Nature, the service of the Germans concerning the Philosophy of History, a criticism of Schleiermacher's doctrine of Faith, Psychology, History of the Kantian Philosophy, critical interpretation of the Hegelian Philosophy, the Life of Hegel, the life and work of Diderot, Reform of the Hegelian Philosophy, and several others. He also edited in twelve volumes the works of Kant.

He deviated in many important respects from Hegel's teaching, but on many other important points drew very near to Hegel. He relegated Hegel's terminology of "objective" and "subjec-

tive" to the background because they base the science of knowledge upon psychological and phenomenological grounds as well as upon subjective Logic; and further, because Hegel's conception of the duality of consciousness was largely left out of account, and consequently too little place was given to the objective factors of the external world. Being and Thought are, in and for themselves, identical with Hegel.

Friedrich Theodor Vischer (1807–1887)

Vischer was educated at Tübingen and became Professor of Philosophy there. His favourite subject was Aesthetics on which he lectured at Zürich and Stuttgart as well. His chief work on Aesthetics has aroused great interest in Germany during the past few years, and the articles on Vischer by Hermann Glockner in the *Logos* are of great importance. His main work deals with the development of speculative Aesthetics from Kant to Hegel; and he seeks to present this in the Hegelian manner. Religion, Philosophy, and Aesthetics are possessions of the human spirit which enable the spirit to overcome the opposition of subject and object, and to experience an undivided nature of an absolute, pure form. Aesthetics places Metaphysics on one side. The "Beautiful" is the Idea in the realm of bounded or limited phenomena. It is a sensuous particular which appears as a pure expression of the Idea, for there is nothing in the "Beautiful" which is not sensuous, and nothing sensuous appears but is an expression of the Idea. Three "moments"

can be distinguished in this: the Idea, the sensuous appearance, and the unity of both. In the movement-process of the "Beautiful" there appears first of all the Sublime. Vischer emphasized the fact that the highest unity we can reach is not to be found in any formal concept, but in the Beautiful and Sublime which lie beyond all concepts. But this aesthetic experience cannot be found in any particular point of Space or Time: it realizes itself in all Spaces and in the endless course of Time by means of its own ever-renewed process of movement. He further deals with Beauty in accordance with its objective existence or as natural beauty and in its subjective-objective reality as Art.

Gustav Thaulow (1817–1883)

Thaulow was Professor of Philosophy at Kiel. He wrote a book on Hegel's views on education, and looked upon the highest form of Philosophy as that which deals with Education. The Philosophy of Education must be divided into three branches. In the first place there is the Philosophy of the History of Education; in the second place there is the Philosophy of Man from the sides of Anthropology, Psychology, Ethics, Politics, and Morality; and in the third place there is the education of man in the life of the family, in good customs, and in the industrial activities in which the individual is engaged.

Alois Emanuel Biedermann (1819–1885)

Biedermann was educated in Philosophy and Theology in Basel and Berlin. For several years he

was a minister of religion near Basel, and afterwards a Professor of Theology at Zürich. His main work is *Christian Dogmatics*, and his main ideal was to handle and modify Christian Doctrine in accordance with the Hegelian theory.

The essential content of the religious process in the human spirit is the elevation of man as finite spirit out of the conditions of nature in which he is hemmed in to a freedom possessed by means of infinite dependence upon God. The relation of God to man is something revealed and to be possessed by means of faith.

Biedermann looked upon God as Absolute Spirit, who can only be presented to the mind in the form of Personality. This Absolute Spirit is the Eternal "Ground" of all existence, and is also the Eternal Goal. He accepted, in the sense of Hegel, the evolution of the world-process, but Biedermann restated a good deal of Hegel's Philosophy without explaining it as Hegel himself had done.

KARL PRANTL (1820–1889)

Prantl studied Philosophy and became a Professor in Munich. He is best known through his *History of Logic*. In other directions he aimed at a reconciliation of Idealism and Empiricism, and his conclusions formed a kind of Objective Idealism. He emphasized the external material which presents itself to man for the building up of his life. He also laid great stress on the fact that the objective and the subjective must enter into unity in conscious-

ness. The *Time-sense* in man is of fundamental importance. By means of it he is able to survey the Past, and by means of memory to form ideas, whilst at the same time he is able to form ideas and ideal conceptions concerning the future in the hope of the realization of these in the life of the Family as Customs, Rights, Art, Science, and Religion. Man can know nothing of God and Immortality in any simple form of objectivity, but he can, by means of a true Objective Idealism, know his own ideal constructions concerning these, and be raised to an ever higher status of life and experience through such knowledge.

Adolf Lasson (1832–1917)

Lasson was for many years Honorary Professor in Berlin. He looked upon the development of pure thought, as it had begun by Kant and had proceeded to Fichte and Schelling and reached its culmination in Hegel, as the highest form of Philosophy, whose foundation had been laid by Socrates and whose culmination was reached by Aristotle. Lasson viewed thought exactly as Hegel viewed it. Pure thought allows no kinds of presuppositions outside itself. It is a mistake to think that Hegel looked upon his logical categories as being the "sole real". Lasson thus builds his own speculative system not only from the side of thought, but also from the sides of will and the aims of human life. He emphasizes the importance of the practical reason which reveals itself in the great institutions of the Family, the School, the State, and the Church. The final aim of

all these institutions should be to realize a moral and religious consciousness, and to look upon life as well as the phenomena of the external world as realms of Ends, as steps for climbing to the highest goals, and as the revelation of the creative God and the return of all natures to Him and to His Kingdom.

Lasson's work on *The Philosophy of Rights*, written on Hegelian lines, is considered to be of great value even to-day.

The Idea, in a logical sense, passes to itself as Nature, and from itself as Nature to itself as Spirit. The Absolute Spirit is God, who manifests Himself in the creation of Nature, in the will of the aims of History, and in the thought of reason, and this eternal activity leads to the proof of the existence of God. The human spirit is of the same nature as the Divine Spirit; the former differentiates itself from the latter by the fact that the former, as the concept of reason appearing in Time, only gradually comes to consciousness of its divinity.

KUNO FISCHER (1824–1908)

Kuno Fischer was educated at Leipzig and Halle. He became, first of all, Professor of Philosophy in Jena, and afterwards in Heidelberg where, in 1853, he lost the *venia legendi* without any reason being given. But he was called back to Heidelberg in 1872, and remained there until his death in 1908. He was one of the most brilliant lecturers in the whole of Germany, and pupils from all parts of the world enrolled themselves in his classes. He is

best known as the historian of Modern Philosophy, and his work in this direction will last for a long time. His own Philosophy is a kind of blend of Aristotelianism and Kantianism united with his strong Hegelianism. He viewed the Categories as concepts of Thought, of "Ground", and of Knowledge. Logic is the science of the doctrine of Thought; Metaphysics is the science of the doctrine of Ground or Principles; the Theory of Knowledge is the theory of what its name implies. There is also a sense in which these three terms are names for the same fact—the fact of Logic. Logic is thus Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge, and herein lies its task.

The methodical progress of logical development must proceed from lower conceptions to ever higher ones. The lower conceptions are the less developed ones. The more undeveloped and undetermined the conceptions are the poorer and the more abstract they are. The higher the conceptions become the more concrete and determined do they become. Thus the development proceeds from immediate conceptions to mediate ones in the form of a series. We here see the influence of Hegel on Fischer. Fischer states that the development starts from a *Something* that has to be conceived as *existing* or *being*. This *being* again has to be conceived in a still deeper way than the way of its own nature as it appears to us from an elementary and a partial and even individual point of view. It has to be viewed as *Ground*. But this does not complete the explanation of the *existing* or *being*. It has therefore

to be viewed as aim or end, and this aim or end, in its turn, has to be viewed as a self-aim or self-end. Thus the nature of Logic, in its tracings of the development of thought, succeeds in passing from the conception of existence (*Sein*) to the conception of the *nature* (*Wesen*) of this existence, and from this step thought proceeds to the next step of the conception of end (*Zweck*). In this development we thus move upwards from *Sein* to *Wesen*, and from *Wesen* to *Zweck*, and finally to *Selbstzweck*.

Fischer's contributions on great personalities in Literature and Philosophy are models of insight, clarity, and eloquence.

Otto Pfleiderer (1839–1908)

Pfleiderer studied Philosophy and Theology at Tübingen. He spent several years as minister of religion, and later became Professor and University Preacher in Jena. Shortly afterwards he was called to Berlin, first as Preacher and later as Professor of the Philosophy of Religion. He was a man of immense learning in Philosophy, Theology, the History of Religions, and other subjects. He visited England on several occasions, first as Hibbert Lecturer, and afterwards as representative of the movement for the propagation of Free Religious Christianity. His books deal with the Philosophy of Religion (3 vols., translated into English), the Nature of Religion, Primitive Christianity, and (also in English) the Development of Protestant Theology in Germany since Kant and in Great Britain since 1825.

Pfleiderer agreed with Kant and others that our knowledge possesses an *a priori*, but this *a priori* does not mean any content of consciousness, nor any kind of thought out of which other thoughts may be deduced, nor, finally, any definite concept such as Space, Time, Cause, Substance, etc. The *a priori* exists in the *Anlage* (Substratum and Disposition of our being), which is the ground or foundation of human development from the level of Sensation up to the level of Perception and Judgment. In such a passage man discovers a kind of feeling and logical necessity urging him upward, and in all this the *Anlage* of reason seems to work as a kind of instinct. But this *Anlage* is capable of development. This development is conditioned by means of non-*a priori* material which is won out of experience. Without experience it would be impossible for the *Anlage* to come into activity, and therefore impossible for it to become conscious of the *a priori* laws of knowledge. But, on the other hand, without the *a priori Anlage*, the definite *forms* of knowledge would never produce correct experiences. Thus, according to him, there is in the nature of man a potency which drives him from particular to general—to the quest for the grounds and laws of things; and in the degree the quest succeeds in that degree the nature of man unfolds and the nature of the universe becomes more and more intelligible. In order to obtain ever fuller views of the universe and of life we start from our consciousness and seek to explain the appearances and events which present themselves

to consciousness, and, at the same time, reflect upon the "Ground" from which all issues. This "Ground" must contain in itself something similar to what is contained in us. It is true that the pathway to this is that of analogy. But analogy is not to be ignored. It shows us energies and material continually at work in the universe, and these have at last produced man. Man is a being of energies and activities, and finally of consciousness, mind, and the rest. All these exist in man, and man exists in the universe. When we thus carry back the activities of the human body to such energies as exist in the universe, the seeming opposition between body and mind (or soul) disappears. Then it is not the *differences* of matter and spirit that constitute the truth of their relation, but the *affinities* which they exhibit in their constant and reciprocal connections and effects. We cannot fully understand what such workings are unless we seek for their "Ground". And we have to seek for such a "Ground" in analogy to what is to be found within ourselves. We ourselves are thinking and willing beings. The "Ground" of the universe must include these qualities in an infinitely greater degree than they are to be found in ourselves. According to Pfleiderer it is out of something like this that the idea of God arises, but not solely. It builds this presupposition without which no knowledge is possible.

In all this man passes beyond "given" experience to the point where the "given" is explained. We have the same right to accept the conclusions of thought in their region of universality—a region

beyond all particulars—as we have of accepting the conclusions of science in their universal form concerning the nature of the physical world. In science and religion the proofs, in a strict logical sense, are not possible because a Reality *outside* us cannot be proved. But this result is not a pure negation. It has certitude, but not *absolute* certitude. But the partial certitude approaches an absolute certitude by means of the practical life and its postulates. On the theoretical side the idea of God is a necessary hypothesis for the interpretation of the deeper nature of the universe; on the practical side the idea of God is a necessary postulate in order to give our Will and Feelings the highest Goal and the highest Good.

Science arises out of the logical need of knowledge, and it starts from the material presented to consciousness; it seeks to bring the material into connections and to explain the causes of what is presented, and at last it comes to something like God as the "Ground" or explanation of the world and of man.

Religion, on the other hand, does not attempt to explain the universe in a theoretical way, but attempts to place the feeling and willing self in a right relationship to the world, so that life may be raised to a Divine Ideal and released from its dependence upon the physical world. The mediator between Religion and Science is the Philosophy of Religion, which furthers the understanding of both, and which attempts to bring both to ever more ultimate "Grounds" and universality of meaning. Pfleiderer believed this ideal to constitute the essence of

Christianity. He was always strong in favour of differentiating between the essentials and the accidentals. He believed that until this is done the best that is in Christianity cannot get its chance to redeem the whole nature of man.

CHAPTER IV

PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENCES

JOHANNES MÜLLER (1801–1858)

Müller was the founder of the doctrine of the specific energies of the senses, according to which every sense-nerve reacts always upon every stimulus in an inborn manner. From this he infers the complete subjectivity of the qualities of the senses (Colour, Sound, etc.). His most important work is the *Handbook on the Philosophy of Man*, in which the whole province of Physiology is treated in an original manner. In the early part of his career he adopted a system of a Philosophy of Nature which led him to religious convictions on account of the *teleology* which he seemed to see in Nature. Later in life he became, however, a very strong opponent of every form of Vitalism, and the pioneer and perhaps the founder of the modern physico-chemical method in Physiology. He followed the pathways of Locke and of some of the Cartesians in his presentation of the sensuous, perceivable qualities of the objects of the external world as qualities which were not in the objects themselves but in the subject that perceived the objects. Thus some phenomenological aspects of importance remained in his teaching, which have exercised a deep influence on the methods of later investigators in the realms of the Sciences of Nature and of Psychology.

Julius Robert von Mayer (1814–1878)

According to Ostwald, Mayer showed no great talent in early youth until he took a voyage to Java on a three-masted Dutch vessel. An old seaman had made a casual remark to him that the sea was very much warmer after a heavy storm than previously. This remark left a deep impression upon his mind. He himself states that his eyes were opened in a moment of time towards the revelation of a great truth just as the eyes of Paul were opened on the road to Damascus. The hint led Mayer to the discovery of the mechanical equivalent of heat, which is nothing other than *motion*. Thus the great principle of the Conservation of Energy was discovered. Joule had made the same discovery in England. The discovery led to the conclusion that there is but *one* Energy, which is indestructible, and which changes only in its forms. In a process of eternal change such Energy circles throughout the inorganic and organic worlds. Energy cannot arise out of nothing; the amount of Energy in the world remains constant.

This contribution of Mayer and Joule has had very important results in our conception of Nature. These results have also had an influence on that aspect of Philosophy designated as Philosophy of Nature.

Hermann Helmholtz (1821–1895)

About the third quarter of the nineteenth century it was seen by many eminent men of science that

Philosophy had not performed what it had promised, and had merely branched off into various Schools, which, in the main, merely interpreted the Past. In England, Darwin had done such magnificent original work that the attention of the whole cultivated world was called to it. In Germany, scientists such as von Helmholtz, Du Bois-Raymond, Virchow, and others were becoming important investigators. They dealt with problems concerning the universe and life, and their scientific investigations and results were bound to exercise a deep influence upon Philosophy. Such was the case especially with Hermann Helmholtz.

Helmholtz was influenced on the philosophical side by Kant and Schopenhauer. He became Professor of Physics in four German Universities, the years 1871 to 1894 being spent in the University of Berlin. He was a great and many-sided thinker. He pleaded for an increase and closer connection of the points of view of the various sciences, especially when these dealt with the same subject or with similar subjects. He also saw that certain important conclusions of great thinkers such as Kant, Schelling, and Hegel should be taken up once more and revised in the light which modern science was beginning to cast upon things.

Helmholtz emphasized the all-important fact that science is not merely an endless collection of facts. If there was no other ideal than this at work no science worthy of the name could ever have arisen. Science emerges when the investigator passes from facts to laws and causes. Similar facts have to be

viewed in their "togetherness", and general conceptions have to be framed concerning the meaning of the facts in their "togetherness". Of course, Helmholtz worked by means of the Inductive Method, but he looked for results which were more comprehensive in their nature than the necessarily fragmentary elements which were present in the inductive process.

Knowledge, according to him, originates in a conceptual working-out of sense-material, and leads to *symbolical* conceptions of the relations of things. Our perceptions of things can be no other than *symbols*—natural given signs for things which we learn for the regulation of our movements and activities. When we have rightly learnt the meaning of the *symbol*, we are in a position, by means of its help, to regulate our activities. The Law of Causality was looked upon by him as an *a priori* which no experience can contradict. He was constantly aware of the strong mechanism which ruled in Nature, and felt that it should be the constant aim of Natural Science to resolve all phenomena, as far as possible, into mechanical elements; still, he laid quite as much stress on the symbolical conceptions which were the results of the mind in its investigations concerning mechanical phenomena. His contributions on Sensation and Sound have proved themselves to be of importance in the development of Physiological Psychology. His main object may be viewed as a plea for a closer union between the results of the Sciences and those of Philosophy and for modifications to take place on the two sides.

Heinrich Hertz (1857–1894)

Hertz can be named as having made important contributions in the realm of a Philosophy of Nature as well as in the realm of Physics. He pointed out that in our consideration of all things in the external world, as viewed by the subject, the subject has constantly to create within the mind symbols and pictures of the things perceived, so that in the very act of perceiving there is a certain kind of coincidence between the objects of Nature and the symbols and pictures which are in our own minds. Such a contribution as this belongs to the domain of Psychology; and it has been necessary to revise much of the older theories of Perception in the light of such a teaching. This teaching has been the means of bringing Physics into close alliance with Psychology, and indeed with the Theory of Knowledge and a Metaphysics of Nature, so that at the present time much use is made of material which formerly seemed to have no relation to the mental sciences, within the realms of the branches of Philosophy just mentioned. The investigations of Stumpf, as shown in this volume, are a proof of all this, and really such investigations are rapidly becoming more and more universal.

Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919)

Ernst Haeckel, from 1865 to his death, was Professor of Zoology in Jena. Apart from his special scientific work he attempted to carry a number of zoological, biological, and physiological conclusions into the

realms of the mental sciences and even of religion. A wave of materialism was beginning to sweep over Europe in Haeckel's early days. The great problems of the idealists and the psychologists were supposed to be all capable of resolution and reduction to the new scientific results which were arising in the various provinces of the natural sciences. Jacob Moleschott had, previous to Haeckel, worked in this direction. With him body and mind are only two sides of the same monistic nature or substance. Karl Vogt followed in the same direction. Thought was viewed as a movement of the "stuff" of the brain.

In his latter years Haeckel became President of the "Monistic Bund" in Germany—a Society which held, with a kind of religious fervour, to various materialistic doctrines of the universe and life. Haeckel became a kind of high priest amongst the members. His teaching spread throughout the world, and his works in this respect are not even yet "dead". The two books which have been the means of spreading his theories are *The Riddle of the Universe* and the *Wonders of Life*. The contents of both are a kind of blend of zoological and biological conclusions with a speculation, by means of analogy, that they can be extended to all that exists. Ludwig Büchner had attempted the same kind of thing just before Haeckel. Haeckel explains that *The Riddle of the Universe* is not an attempt to solve fully the mysteries of the universe. He starts by attempting to show that sensuous experience and thought are the two avenues of approach to the

solution of the "riddle". But all forms of dualism must be thrown on one side, and thought consequently must be traced back to movements in the association centres of the great brain.

With regard to what is termed "substance", monism knows only one substance in the universe, and that substance includes what is called "God" and what is called "Nature" in one. Body and mind are also one, just as "God" and the World are one. Haeckel does not say that everything has arisen from dead atoms, but he speculates that all has come into existence by means of "immaterial energies". Although he often mentions the term "immaterial energies", he does not mean that these have any quality in them which is other than that of matter. Matter and energy are stated to be inseparable. The atoms have movement, sensation, and will. But Haeckel would explain this astounding statement away by showing that all this means nothing other in its origin than what has proceeded from matter and energy.

When we come to the domain of Biology we are told that the conscious and the unconscious are separated, but that they have an indissoluble relation. In other words, they have both sprung from the same material source. Indeed, the soul is a phenomenon of Nature, and Psychology is a branch of Physiology. The various appearances of life are grounded in a material substratum.

Haeckel was a great anatomist, and he pleads for the introduction of an anatomical investigation in regard to the problems of every form of life. He

states that most Psychologists have no qualifications for the task. He confuses energy and mind with an enormous amount of self-confidence—a self-confidence which far surpasses any knowledge on the matter. But this is not the place for criticism. And I shall deviate here merely to ask how much truth there is in Wundt's statement with regard to Haeckel's conclusions concerning the universe. Wundt stated that these conclusions were not the products of science but of a poetic phantasy. It would not be fair to close this short sketch without paying a personal tribute to Haeckel as a great scientific investigator, a great teacher, and one of the gentlest and kindest of men.

Wilhelm Ostwald (1853–)

Ostwald was for many years Professor of Physical Chemistry in the University of Leipzig, and at an early period became known throughout the scientific world for his researches in his own subject. His interests were also directed towards the problems of the universe in their relation to the meaning and significance of the life of man. He has thus presented a philosophy of the universe. He has attempted to bring the results of the various sciences under concepts which will include them all, and which give a synoptic view of the universe and life. We thus see that Ostwald follows on the lines of the philosophers, and has taken into account the value and significance of the concept and idea in a way which brings his theories within the philosophical domain. He recognizes "realities" not only within

the realm of the physical world, but also within the world of ideas. He shows in his *Natural Philosophy* (pages 15, 16) that "it is one of the most important functions of science to achieve as *perfect* an elaboration as possible of *all* the relations conceivable, and in this practical necessity lies the foundation of the general or theoretical elaboration of science. Here the question arises: How can we secure such perfection? The answer to this general preliminary question of all the sciences belongs to the sphere of the first or the most general of all the sciences, a knowledge of which is presupposed for the pursuit of the other sciences. Since its foundations by the Greek philosopher, Aristotle, it has borne the name of logic, which name, etymologically speaking, hints suspiciously at the *word*, and the word, as is known, steps in where ideas are wanting. Here, however, we have to deal with the very science of ideas, to which language bears the relation only of a means—and often an inadequate means—to an end. We have already seen how, through the physiologic fact of memory, experiences are found in our consciousness which are similar—that is, partially coinciding with one another. These coinciding parts are those concerning which we can make predictions, for the very reason that they coincide in every single instance, and they alone, therefore, constitute that part of our experience which bears results and hence has significance."

Such coinciding or repeated parts of similar experiences are called concepts. Ostwald is philosophical enough to know (what Haeckel and Loeb

do not seem to have realized) that the formation of concepts constitutes a function absolutely necessary in the development of natural science. He is further aware that merely to perceive any reality in the external world does not constitute an adequate knowledge of that reality. "A necessary part of knowledge is the memory of former similar experiences. For without memory and the corresponding comparison it is quite impossible for us to get at those things which agree, and which therefore may be predicted; and we should stand before every one of our experiences with the helplessness of a new-born babe" (ibid., p. 17).

We are carried farther by Ostwald into the truth of the subjective nature of concepts, and from these to empirical concepts, which, as he rightly designates, possess reality and are based on experienced facts. Next the difference between simple and complex concepts is pointed out. The Laws of Nature are viewed as ideal constructions, and as the more complex conceptions which have been formed from simpler ones. Of course, there is nothing new in this method of Ostwald, but it is dealt with here in order to show that the view of the universe which he takes does not consist of an aggregate number of facts which are perceptible in the physical world, but deals with general conceptions and hypotheses which the facts have contributed to the mind that observes them, whilst in their turn such general conclusions of the mind act as criteria in regard to the explanation of the facts themselves.

It is impossible in this sketch to deal with Ostwald's whole system. As already stated, he works on lines which are scientific and philosophic, and is one of the few natural scientists whose eyes are opened to the great problems of metaphysics.

In passing from the work of concepts as an interpretation of the world and life he reaches the conclusion—idealistic in its nature—that man is not entirely determined by the physical course of the external world. Here he moves on lines largely similar to those of Kant's. In dealing with the problem of the freedom of the will he sees great differences between the "ideal course" which the mind is able to take and the concatenation which the sciences show to exist among physical objects; and although such an "ideal course" cannot as yet be scientifically demonstrated, still it has to be postulated as real and true in order that the progress of the scientific interpretation of the world may proceed step by step from the level of naïve perception to the level of scientific and metaphysical constructions. In other words, we stand on a mid-path between freedom and determinism. He shows that there is no objection to the holding of a fundamental determinism which explains that the feeling of freedom simply means "that a part of the causal chain lies within our own consciousness". He thus arrives at the result "that we can and must assume in our practical attitude to the world that the will is only partially determined".

This is a far remove from the "mechanisms" which have often been presented by many scientists

with regard to all things in heaven and on earth. There is another remove from the attempt to reduce consciousness and its content to physico-chemical terms. The "new monism" presented by Ostwald is, in a large measure, idealistic in its nature. The Ends which, in the form of complex general concepts, present themselves to thought and will have their greatest significance on knowledge and life although the beginnings of all things may be traced back to energy in the various forms it manifests itself as the vehicle of matter. Ostwald is unwilling to speculate what, if any, psychical elements are present in Matter and Energy as these exist in the universe or in themselves. All we know is what comes out of them—what happens in the actual forms of the evolutionary process from the lowest to the highest forms—from, say, a stone up to man. He sees amongst the chemical elements the peculiar manner in which one form of energy is transformed into other forms. In some forms of energy the transformation is effected by the body itself. "If a stone is thrown and it hits against a wall, it loses its kinetic energy, the greater part of which changes into heat. But in order to liberate the *chemical* energy of, say, coal, the coal *alone* is not sufficient; *another* chemical substance is required, the oxygen of the air. The interaction of the two produces a new substance". . . (*Nat. Phil.*, p. 161). But energy reaches more complex aspects than those found in what is generally termed inorganic life. He states that the energy that is in the universe is capable of becoming more and more complex, and

can assume, in material bodies, ever higher forms. In the forms of nutrition, self-acquisition of nutrition, reproduction, etc., we find that as "the energy of organisms is stored up and used in the main in the form of chemical energy, the two tasks which a stationary body has to perform, that of meeting the need for substances and for energy, are as a rule externally combined". With regard to the organic world, "the flight of a bee or the swimming of a dolphin cannot be conceived of except as brought about through chemical energy" (*Nat. Phil.*, p. 167).

Thus Ostwald reaches a conclusion that in the photo-chemical process—that is, in the transformation of radiant energy into chemical energy—we obtain the basis of life. But he is far from believing that this is all that constitutes the phenomena of life, especially as these phenomena present themselves, in the life of man, as a thinking-feeling-willing being with Ends presented before himself, and as a member of a human society which grows ever more complex and possesses ever more meaning. He is far-sighted enough to see that such Ends, absent, at least in a conscious manner, in the realm of Biology, are absolutely necessary to be taken into account when we deal with the world of human beings in their various relations and experiences. Energy is capable, therefore, not only of forming the physical basis of life, but of transforming itself into mind, into collective life, and into ideals and aspirations which far surpass the forms which it exhibits in the physical universe and in physical

life, until it reaches the higher forms which are revealed in civilization, culture, morality, and the other spiritual elements which are the possession of a large portion of the human race.

To know what is at the back of things, or in front of us is, according to Ostwald, beyond our ken. But still, in spite of this he does hold that the highest qualities which have carried the race to its present stage are of fundamental value and significance and constitute the deepest reality of all. He faces the problem of life from a scientific standpoint in the main; but in spite of all the difficulties and contradictions which scientific conclusions present, he holds fast to a scientific idealism on the sides of knowledge and life. Much of the emphasis which is to-day laid upon the presence of the conceptual elements present in the conclusions of Physics was foreseen as a necessity by Ostwald more than a quarter of a century ago.

Ernst Mach (1838–1916)

Mach was for many years Professor in the University of Vienna. His main approach to Philosophy was through the Natural Sciences. In an independent manner he reaches similar conclusions to Richard Avenarius (1843–1896). The teaching of both may be looked upon as a return to a Realism of an empirical type. Mach shows that the aim of all investigation should be the complete description of facts. What can be accomplished by mechanical Physics is either an extension of physical processes by means of mechanical analogies or by means of

a quantitative enumeration of the connection of mechanical processes with one another. When we speak of a "cause" we can really mean no more than the fact of the linkage of things, and it would be better to give up entirely the idea of cause as it is generally used, and face each fact by itself. Mach states this because he believes that there is no reason for conceiving things differently from what they actually are. His ideal is thus a science free from all forms of hypotheses.

Science arises from biological and practical needs, and serves for the preservation of life and for the gradual conquest of Nature in connection with human needs. Science does not deal with any kind of "substance" or "essence", but with the "given", the immediate, and the experienced, and describes these as correctly as possible in their relations. Of course all this has to be done by thought, and has to be expressed in the form of ideas. Such a transformation of fact into idea forms an "Economy of Thought", and this should be of the simplest possible character. The essentials of the facts are to be transformed into the fewest and simplest concepts and judgments.

Knowledge, according to Mach, consists in the description of facts and in showing their functional dependencies and connections without any presuppositions of factors which cannot be directly experienced. The "elements" of the universe have created man and all that he possesses: even now man is a part of these. These elements are neither entirely psychical nor physical, and it is by conceiving of

the external world in this naïve way that science can give the truest description of the physical world and its relation to our own physical life. There is no absolute cleavage between the self and the world. His main point is to face all things as they appear, and describe their connections without any kind of dogmatic theory or prejudice. Far more fruitful results, he thinks, in regard to Nature and Life can be obtained in this way than in the way either of speculation or of mental constructions, both of which are far removed and very different from what is occurring from moment to moment. Here, again, we may notice that Mach's emphasis on sensation and perception is of a purely realistic character. His whole attempt is, on the one hand, to grant their validity to things just as we find them, whether these be the things of the external world or the contents of consciousness, and, on the other hand, to find the explanations of all things in sensations, which are neither entirely physical nor entirely psychical, but which may consist of both. There is much that is purely materialistic in Mach. For instance, he reduces Psychology to Physiology and Biology; ideas and feelings are reduced to sensations; the will is nothing other than a bundle of impressions which fight one another for supremacy; hunger is nothing very different from the passage of one physical element into another. This, of course, is the tendency of a good deal of modern Physics, and there is much to be said in its favour if it be remembered (as Mach often forgets) that the reduction of the "higher" to the "lower" is not the

sole explanation of the "higher". It is alien to Mach that the "higher" is what it is *now* and what it has in it *to become*. And it is on account of this distinction between the origin and validity of things that a cleavage has become necessary between the natural and the mental sciences in their explanations of the same objects. Mach at times is aware of this truth. "Given a sufficient constancy of environment, there is developed a corresponding constancy of thought. By virtue of this constancy our thoughts are spontaneously impelled to complete the half-observed facts. This impulse towards completion is not prompted by the individual facts as observed at the time; but we find it operative in ourselves entirely without our personal intervention. It confronts us like a power from without, yet as a power which continually accompanies and assists us, as a thing of which we stand in need, in order to supplement the facts. Although it is developed by experience, it contains more than is contained in the single experience. The impulse in a certain measure enriches the single fact. Through it the fact is more to us. With this impulse we have always a larger portion of nature in our field of vision than the inexperienced man has with the single fact alone. For the human being, with his thoughts and his impulses, is himself merely a piece of nature which is added to the single fact. This impulse, however, can lay no claim to infallibility, and there exists no necessity compelling the facts to correspond to it. Our confidence in it entirely rests upon the supposition, which has been substantiated by numer-

ous trials, of the sufficiency of our mental adaptation —a supposition, however, which must be prepared to be contradicted at any moment" (*The Analysis of Sensations*, English edition, p. 333).

In this passage we see that Mach believes in the necessity of ideas although man appears to him but a fragment of Nature. There cannot be a doubt that his emphasis on the indissoluble connection of our mental world with the physical world is partly an illusion. With him, our mental life and all its constituents are determined by our previous experience as that experience has been formed by the influence of the physical world upon us. There is in Mach's Philosophy no denial of the superiority of the ego over what acts upon it. "Psychology and Psychopathology teach us that the ego can grow and be enriched, can be impoverished and shrink, can become alien to itself, and can split up—in a word, can change in respects in the course of its life. In spite of all this, the ego is what is most important and most constant for my instinctive conceptions. It is the bond that holds all my experiences together, and the source of all my activity" (*Analysis of Sensations*, p. 357).

The problem of the nature of the connection of subject and object is, according to Mach, insoluble, and instead of taking refuge, on the one hand, in materialism, or, on the other, in solipsism, the two sides—self and object—have to be taken into account in order that all the factors may be taken into consideration, and in order that a more satisfactory solution of this problem of connection may

take place in the future. In so doing we may obtain a glimpse of the truth, and may hope for more practical results than have hitherto been obtained. Mach's realism contains, scattered throughout the pages of his extensive works, a great deal of idealism, and its importance consists in having raised problems and offered partial solutions concerning the unbroken connection of the psychical and the physical. He believes that such a conclusion, viewed in the right way, will help towards bringing about a reconciliation between realism and idealism; and without such a reconciliation Science, on the one hand, and Philosophy on the other, will have to proceed on separate paths without having much to say to each other and without giving help to each other to frame a theory of the universe and life which is true to all physical phenomena and also true to that psychical phenomenon of consciousness which holds together the impressions of the physical world, and out of such impressions, in union with its own potency, creates a world of its own which will ever remain contiguous with the physical world. It is certainly true that Mach has not done justice to the psychical world of consciousness, but he tells us that his main object lay in the elucidation of the physical side of things. One of the aims which Mach kept constantly in view was that when those who are working on the psychical side pay greater attention to the physical side of things some of the present-day problems of Psychology and Metaphysics may be modified, and, at the same time, the conception of the meaning of reality may be deepened.

Hans Driesch (1867–)

Driesch was for a good number of years Professor at Heidelberg, and soon after the retirement of Volkelt was appointed to succeed him at Leipzig. He will be remembered, I believe, not so much on account of his philosophical works as on account of the fact that he stirred the scientific world a quarter of a century ago by his theory of *Neo-Vitalism*. It will be pointed out that Reinke's "Dominants" are considered as directive tendencies within the physico-chemical processes of matter, but he does not claim the same scientific warrant for his results as Driesch does. Driesch takes his standpoint upon the phenomenon of life itself, and states but little concerning the nature of the energy present in the universe as it exhibits itself in the planes below life. He starts by stating that the most fundamental problem of Biology is to discover whether the phenomena of life have been produced in a mechanical manner, or whether a vital principle is present in all the phenomena. He seeks to answer the question whether there may be processes in the organism which may be teleological or purposeful in more than a merely formal sense.

The answer to the question whether life be mechanistic or vitalistic cannot be fully obtained by a consideration of the facts of the *adaptations* of life. Such facts may be explained mechanically. The study of *adaptations* teaches a good deal with regard to the purposefulness present in organic phenomena, but such a purposefulness might

very well be present and, at the same time, be mechanistic. *Adaptation* is a fact to be taken into account, but it is not sufficient to base a theory of the origin of life upon it.

How do we fare when we turn to the remarkable facts of *regeneration* or repairing processes discernible in various forms of life? Doubtless, when face to face with such processes, we witness phenomena which will defy being resolved into a process entirely physical, but, on the other hand, they tell us no more than that such forms of life are able to work in a teleological manner. But by themselves the regenerative or "healing" processes tell us no more. In order to obtain more knowledge concerning the processes, "*teleology* must be examined so directly as to see whether it is of the machine-like or vitalistic type".

Driesch shows that the machine-like theory has been present in the study of evolutionism in Embryology from the time of Leibniz to the present day. In modern times, Roux and Weismann, among others, have shown that there is a most complicated "machine" in the egg, and that "the development of the embryo is carried out by the *disintegration* of this 'machine' during the great number of cell-cleavages which occur during the embryological process". Roux became convinced that here was to be found the key to embryological evolutionism. But Driesch shows that Roux's experiments did not solve the problem. These are Driesch's words: "Roux killed one of the two cleavage cells of a frog's egg that had just performed the first cleavage;

and from the surviving cell he reared an embryo which was in all respects *one-half* of the normal one—that is to say, either the right or the left side of it. Was not this a very convincing result? It seemed so, no doubt, but only for a few years. In 1891 I repeated Roux's experiments by a somewhat different method on the egg of the common sea-urchin. And my result was just the reverse of what Roux's result had been; not one-half of an embryo was reared out of the surviving cell, but a *complete* embryo of *half-size*. And I also observed the development of *complete* embryos of smaller size when I made my experiments with the four-cell stage instead of the two-cell stage. I might destroy one or two or even three of the first four cleavage cells; in the latter case I got a *very* small embryo—but it was complete in its organization" (*Problem of Individuality*, p. 10).

Driesch shows further experiments of his of cutting the *blastula*—a hollow sphere built up of about a thousand cells formed by the so-called cleavage of the egg. If this *blastula* is cut finely in any direction, each part will go on developing, provided it is not smaller than quarter of the whole, and the result here again is a complete larva of small size. Such a result would be impossible in Driesch's opinion if the "prospective potency" of all the cells of the *blastula* were the same. The *blastula* is therefore an *equipotential system*, i.e. a re-formation of the whole is obtained on a smaller scale from each part cut out of the whole, provided that the part is not less than a quarter of the whole. This fact,

along with other facts which cannot be dealt with in a sketch like this, had compelled Driesch to acknowledge a *vitalistic* factor as being present in life—a factor which works as a *dynamic teleology*. This factor is not material although it is a natural factor; it is more allied to the psychical than to the physical. It is the presence of such a psychical factor which makes life *autonomous*. He shows that some agent that *arranges* is required, and such an agent cannot possibly be of a machine-like, physico-chemical character. Driesch uses the old Aristotelian word *Entelechy* to designate the *autonomous agent* at work in the vital processes of life everywhere. *Entelechy* has then to be conceived as being of a non-physico-chemical character. In so far as we attribute to *Entelechy* a positive character we are at least entitled to say that it is an actual agent of Nature itself. But it is of importance to bear in mind that the mistake of the old vitalists should not be repeated, i.e. of regarding the agent as "psychical" without any further consideration. Driesch emphasizes this point with great force, a fact which shows that he wishes to keep on strict scientific lines. "In Nature there is no room for 'psychical' entities at all, if, at least, the concept of Nature and the concept of the Psyche are well defined. I may talk of *my* own psychical life, or of *my* soul, if you like to call it so; but even to speak of what are popularly termed the 'souls' of others is already to make a statement with regard to Nature that ought really to be formulated in another terminology. It, therefore, is quite meaningless at first, and will perhaps only

acquire a meaning in metaphysics to say that *Entelechy* is 'psychical' in character. On the contrary, that which is generally spoken of as 'psychical' in other beings, men or animals, is, strictly speaking, in the sphere of natural science simply *non-mechanical*; but we can assert nothing as to its nature until we have undertaken special logical inquiries. Only in the region of metaphysics, we repeat, Entelechy may possibly appear to be a 'psychical' type. But even then the word 'psychical' would not be applied without a certain limitation, at least with regard to the phenomena of instinct and all organic regulations. For even if you were to use the word 'psychical' with regard to these phenomena you would mean something very different from what you mean when you apply the word to other human beings. For all instincts and restitutions *do not rest upon experience*; they present themselves in a *primary* teleological manner the very first time they occur. It is as if Entelechy had a knowledge of peculiarities *without having met with them*. Great caution is then required with regard to the biological application of the word 'psychical' even in a metaphysical sense" (*Problem of Individuality*, pp. 33, 34).

Doubtless Driesch has dealt with the problem of Entelechy only in so far as it is based upon observation in the plant and animal world. On these levels we cannot conclude anything more concerning the nature of Entelechy than is contained in the actual processes of life that are under observation. The *more* that is present in Entelechy comes out in Driesch's metaphysical system of Order. This

system of his is based largely on the work of Kant, and I do not think that it possesses the same importance as Driesch's biological investigations. Driesch's greatest service seems to consist in having demonstrated scientifically the presence of non-mechanical factors in life, in having shown that Entelechy differs from Energy, and, finally, in having shown the teleological character of Entelechy. He has covered a vast range of subjects and has touched everything with distinction. He has found a foothold in the biological world which has enabled him to mount, step by step, to the regions of logic, ethics, metaphysics, and religion, until he has arrived at the final conclusion that God or the Absolute is the primary Entelechy of the Universe.

Richard Avenarius (1843–1896)

Richard Avenarius was Professor of Philosophy at Zürich from 1877 until his death. Along with several others he is treated in this book because his training and work have a close affinity with certain aspects of German thought. He is, like Mach, one of the thinkers who have shown the necessity of taking into consideration the influence of Natural Science on Philosophy. The root of Philosophy, according to him, consists in the adoption of the smallest possible presuppositions.

Avenarius's teaching may be designated as a kind of Positivism or Empirico-Criticism. This does away with the experience of any metaphysical principles: the only really worthy experience is that which is satisfied with recognizing only what is

already in existence. It is not consciousness, the self, or thought, and certainly no transcendental things, but the "immediate Given" which is important for us to take into constant consideration. Everything that is not an "immediate Given" should be expelled, for anything which is not a portion of such a "Given" cannot be valid. The *environment* conditions the nature of every *true* experience.

Avenarius gives to his theory a biological foundation. The culmination of the various external energies of Nature are to be found in the brain. What we determine as experience or existing facts are to be found as dependent upon the brain and its environment. Experience can be termed "pure" only when all else is eliminated. A training on such lines is the only true one, and in order to obtain it and develop it further every kind of "introjection" has to be removed. It is necessary to eliminate every kind of such "introjection" or else we reduplicate the world as well as our own experiences. There is in reality only one kind of existence; and every form of dualism of physical and psychical is false. What is termed psychical is only a fact which is due to an alteration in the great brain. This alteration does, it is true, become something other than mechanical, and, in so far, has a meaning which is more than mechanical—it constitutes an experience. But it is a pure experience only in so far as it is a direct impression of what is *without*.

Everything that we term experience is relative to the physical. Truth and the rest which we possess are merely what exist in the facts of the world, which

become *our facts* by means of Perception. He shows that the vast speculations concerning the world and life have hitherto hindered our real knowledge of things; they have to be eliminated, and we must take our stand on the perceiving of the facts of the environment. When this is carefully and sincerely done, and when all wishes and desires for a "beyond" of these are expelled we reach what he terms "pure experience". Probably this teaching of Avenarius has exercised a considerable amount of influence in the reappearance of certain forms of realism and behaviourism which have become a fashion in some philosophical circles in Britain and the United States of America.

Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850–1908)

Hermann Ebbinghaus was for many years Professor of Philosophy at Halle and editor of the *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie d. Sinnes Organe.* His main work lay in the realm of Psychology, and it is difficult to over-estimate the importance of his contributions, especially on the sides of Sensation and Memory. He adopts a mediating position between the atomistic and the idealistic standpoints of the prevalent Schools in vogue even to-day. He was probably nearer to the atomistic than to the idealistic view. He belonged to the Associationist School in so far as he considered Association, with its ever greater connections and unities which the mind forms from the fragmentary material presented to it, as possessing great importance. All perceptual and fragmentary material enters into previous con-

nections and unities. *Attention* is viewed as the lively presentation and working out of individual potencies at the expense of other potencies. *Feelings* are looked upon as the after-effects of the causes of Sensations and Presentations. With regard to *Will*, there is no such thing as a pure act of Will—the Will being no other than combinations of Sensations, Presentations, and Feelings. Will is in reality an impulse rising into activity. All psychical processes have a biological significance, and serve the aims of life. The psychical nature and the nervous system are one and the same, each showing itself in a different manifestation from the other.

Ebbinghaus's views on Memory are in the main based upon experiments, and are considered of importance to-day within the domain of experimental Psychology.

In his *Abriss der Psychologie* he introduces even such subjects as Social Life and Religion. He does not seem to have any idea of the origin and significance of the communal and the religious life apart from the effects of the natural environment upon the life of man and its development. The whole treatment of the higher achievements of the mind is viewed by him as being grounded in a physical environment, although he does admit that such achievements do obtain a certain autonomy of their own, and that the working out of these independent meanings and convictions constitutes the best part of human life. He emphasizes the value of the best human qualities. But, as he points out in the *Abriss*, the physical is indissolubly connected with the mental

and moral. Seeing and hearing, presentation and feeling, reproduction and concentration stand side by side; they do not stand over against one another, but complete one another. Just as the same atmosphere, brought into existence by wind and water and warmth, brings forth the fruitful rain and the destructive hail, there *above* producing the beautifully formed clouds and here *below* producing the thick mist, so also the life of man brings forth error and truth, passionate satisfaction and selfless joy, self-seeking and moral goodness.

Johannes von Kries (1853–)

J. von Kries has been for many years Professor at Freiburg in Breisgau. He has made important contributions in Logic and in Psychology. He shows that in the Judgment a number of concepts are thought together as a unity which possesses a consciousness of value. There are two kinds of judgments—judgments of reality and judgments of relation. The association of ideas is explained by him in a physiological sense as a stimulation of the common domain into which different stimulations radiate and meet and produce a total situation. He has made an important contribution to the place and function of Psychology and Physiology in connection with the organs of the senses.

Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1917)

Amongst the psychologists of the world during the latter quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth, the name and fame

of Wundt stand pre-eminent. But he is a great deal besides being a psychologist. There is scarcely a branch of the mental sciences which was not familiar to him, and in all the branches he was able to carry the subjects to a further stage of advancement. He spent most of his long life as Professor in the University of Leipzig.

Wundt devoted the earlier part of his life to the problems of Natural Science and Psychology. Together with Fechner, he was the founder of the first laboratory for experimental Psychology in Leipzig in 1878. Along with this he became engaged in extensive work in the domains of Logic, Ethics, Sociology, and Religion on its anthropological and social sides. He may be designated as one of the great systematic philosophers of the latter half of the nineteenth century.

He has constructed his system by starting with as few assumptions as possible, and by keeping in very close contact with the facts of the external world and of human experience. It is necessary to deal with the material that is nearest to our hands—to examine and analyse such a material before any kind of synthesis in connection with it becomes possible. This shows the importance of Natural Science in all true views of the universe and life. Full justice must be done to this side, and all the conclusions of science must enter into the higher syntheses which the mind forms if such syntheses are to prove all-embracing and are not to be contradicted by facts in the realms of the sciences of nature and of man. Science and Psychology do

actually compel the mind to pass to something beyond the mere facts and events; they do present general statements and laws concerning the events of the world and of life. Philosophy, according to Wundt, is the general science which examines the conceptions of the various particular sciences and brings these conceptions to a systematic unity, and thus presents a theory of the universe and of life. Philosophy is thus a *mental* science which rests upon psychological experience, but which also passes beyond individual psychological experience.

Philosophy consists of two main branches—the genetic and the systematic. The genetic deals with the possibility, forms, and laws of Thought and Knowledge, whilst the systematic deals with the principles involved in Thought and Knowledge.

The *psychical* is not some kind of substance which exists by the side of the *physical.* At least we can never experience that it is so. The most original experience we can observe in ourselves or in any other living person consists of two factors, viz. a *content* that is given us from without, and an apprehension of this content by the mind. We designate the first factor as the object of experience; the second as the experiencing subject. It is on account of the presence of the two factors that experience moves in two different directions. One is the direction of the external world—the field of Natural Science—where the *object* of experience is considered as being independent of the subject. The other direction is that of Psychology, where the emphasis is laid on the activity of the perceiving

subject in handling his material. The two factors are necessary in order to understand the meaning of the world and of consciousness. The psychical is thus not a mere "appearance" but an "immediate reality". It is at the same time not a mere static substance or "being", but is perpetual "becoming". The psychical life is thus a unity of a process which constantly changes in Time. We can go, then, so far as to say that the essence of the "soul" lies in this connection of consciousness itself. Nothing is gained by speculating concerning the soul as some substance outside this unitary process. We have no means of knowing such a substance. What we can know and experience is a consciousness which can perpetually unfold and ascend to ever higher levels. Body and Mind are not two things, but two modes of existence for conceiving the one reality. According to Wundt, the soul is the *Entelechy* of the body. It would be a great mistake to think that Wundt is a materialist on account of this description of his concerning body and mind. He refuses to frame vast hypotheses as to the origin of the soul. He takes his stand upon experience, builds up inductively, passes from particular to general, and finally lands us in an idealistic realm—a realm brought about by the soul acting as an *Entelechy* for the body. The difference between body and mind, small as it certainly appears in the beginnings of life, becomes ever greater as knowledge and experience grow and place themselves before us in the form of values. The psychical is not entirely under the heel of physical causality. When we are in the realm of

mind, meaning, and value we are, according to Wundt, in a world of "psychical or spiritual energy". Though nervous energy is needed for this, still psychical or spiritual energy belongs *now* to a world very different from the physical one. Such energy is a "creative synthesis" that governs all thought and life. Such a "self-creation" belongs to the very nature of all mental and spiritual development. As Höffding points out, Wundt lays great emphasis on this "creative synthesis". "It finds expression in every sense-perception, and most clearly in the apprehension of space, which springs from the mutual reaction of perceptual, tactual, and motor experience, and in the timbre of sounds, which is produced by the intermingling of overtones and undertones. It was first discovered in the higher phases of psychical life, in the rise of imagery, concepts, and ideas. But the peculiarity presents itself in the most elementary psychical processes, as well as in the highest. In this respect also it bears witness to the continuity of the soul-life" (Höffding's *Modern Philosophers*, p. 14). The essence of the "creative synthesis" is therefore that the psychical life is capable continually of forming a new content out of given elements.

Wundt's Psychology has been designated as Voluntaristic-Apperception-Psychology. He views Feeling and Will as processes of consciousness and not as results or accompaniments of Thought. They are a stage of a unitary process which works originally as instinct. At such a stage the original unity begins to branch out in various directions:

it can bring one element of its totality to the foreground and develop it, whilst the rest remain very largely in the background.

Wundt's "Apperception Theory" shows that in the psychical and mental life we are dependent upon past experience in a greater degree than we are often aware of. There is present a "continuum" which gives its orientation to life. This "continuum" within the mental life forms a unity or totality into which all the particulars which present themselves from moment to moment must enter and there obtain their meaning and value.

When we pass to his Social Psychology we discover ourselves dealing with material quite other than that which belongs to the individual as individual. From earliest times we can observe the factors of society operating upon the individual and mapping out the direction of man's life. "The total spirit" is as original as the individual consciousness. Wundt explains this "total spirit" from its early beginnings, and shows its ascent through forms more and more complex created by human beings as members of society. The energies present in human society have originated through the necessity of human beings having to live together. Their very "togetherness" gives rise to ideas which connote every member of the group, and to ideals which are true for all and good for all. Such ideas and ideals must be conformable to the individual mind, but at the same time they constitute a reality which is over-individual. New conditions arise through the reciprocal relations of individuals and these form a

reality which is objective in its character, although such objectivity is not anything in space. It is important to bear in mind that the individual is not passive in regard to the presence and objectivity of this "total spirit". Each individual helps in the creation of such spirit, and though the individual is subordinated to it, still each individual is partially independent. The creation of such "total spirit" is not the mere result of the happenings of the day in a naïve kind of way. The "total spirit" is brought to the consciousness of the majority of individuals and is further developed by means of "guiding personalities". The colossal effects which society exercises upon us—in which "we live and move and have our being"—arise from "total energies" and not from a mere summation of individual wills.

It is in the degree man becomes conscious of himself as a unity of feeling, thought, and will—the will being the "carrier" of all the remaining elements—that he becomes a personality. In such a unity there is therefore included what exists outside the individual's life, what is discovered as Standard and Norm within the community. It is the growth of such Norms and Standards that constitute what is termed "culture' —a state of things in regard to the whole life of man which differentiates itself from the natural, elementary conditions of life.

It is impossible here to do more than mention Wundt's conception of the evolution of the forms which human society has taken and the meanings he attaches to these. He takes the reader through the evolutionary idea as it reveals itself amongst primi-

tive peoples, as it becomes a conception of the State, as it develops the idea of Rights, and as it finally conceives of the ideal of the "total will of mankind". Thus the organic union of mankind exhibits itself, in the form of "moral total personality, as an ideal which perhaps may be never completely realized, but towards which we must strive without ceasing". Wundt, in tracing out the meaning and significance of such an ideal, from its lowest to its highest forms, cannot accept the theories of materialists such as Haeckel, or of vitalists such as Reinke and Driesch. According to Wundt, some kind of Teleology and End is present in all organic phenomena, but this is explained as a potency which is present in *life itself*, whose meaning is rendered more obscure by adopting either the mechanistic or the vitalistic theory. Indeed, Wundt is never weary of showing that such a potency *is* what it *does*, and comes to fuller realization as we ascend the scale of life and deal with the content of consciousness. But, as he shows, in the organic world below man Ends are reached in an unconscious manner. Such Ends, as far as can be known, are not conscious of any motives, and consequently differentiate themselves from Ends which human beings consciously set before themselves. They are thus more objective in their nature than human Ends. But such unconscious Ends are also present in human life, and carry on their work by the side of Ends which are consciously willed. It is this fact that has made Wundt emphasize the "Principle of the Heterogeny of Ends". In human life many of the sub-

sidiary Ends come under the domination of Ends which are willed, and are by this means given an orientation in the direction of the claims of the spirit, but many also proceed in the channel which has been cut out for them by Nature, and carry on such work in a marvellous manner. This aspect of Wundt's theory resembles very closely Bergson's theory of instinct. Wundt, of course, was much earlier in the field.

Causality and *End* are the two conceptions under which the universe is to be interpreted. Causality shows that all things are partially determined; the presence of End shows that Causality has not tied anything entirely to what it merely is, but that all things proceed not only according to fixed relations already determined, but also according to *new relations* which are still *to be determined.* Causality shows that all things move according to certain forms; the presence of Ends shows that such forms are constantly widened on account of the *movement* of every object into situations and relations which only come into existence when the movement itself actually occurs.

We find on this level of Wundt's Theory of Knowledge that we are carried into a realm of Metaphysics. But his Metaphysics is the result of the logical work of thought upon the universe and life and not a speculation used as a hypothesis as is the case with most of the materialists and of the idealists. For instance, Haeckel's "substance" and Ostwald's "energy" are conceptions which are merely accepted without a critical investigation into

the nature of logical thought. That some kind of Metaphysics is present and necessary in all the sciences is stressed by Wundt everywhere. Problems continually present themselves in every science concerning the "togetherness and wholeness" of things. These problems cannot be ignored, for if they are so treated the progress of the sciences comes to a standstill. The only alternative is that such problems should be faced and at least partially answered. The partial answer concerning the ultimate "grounds", "togetherness", and "wholeness" of things constitutes what is meant by Metaphysics, and lands us in a realm which transcends the phenomena and facts of the physical world. There is no other course open for the scientific investigator, and although he often speaks glibly of the worthlessness of Metaphysics it is well to bear in mind that the scientist uses Metaphysics whenever he passes from "thing" and "fact" to their interpretation.

If such is Wundt's conclusion as to the final meaning of science, how much more is the presence of a transcendent realm visible within the domains of logical thought when this turns from the observation of the physical world to that of the inner world of human life as this reveals itself in social life, morality, art, and religion.

Wundt's Ethics may be termed "evolutionary universalism". This means that it attempts to show the evolution of the "spiritual" by means of the subordination of the individual to the Ends of the Whole. It is in this alone that the principle

of morality is to be discovered. The individual is not passive in this process, but he develops as a personality only in the degree he recognizes the principle of the "Heterogeny of Ends", and obeys the Ends of the "togetherness", "unity", and "wholeness" which manifest themselves in social life and which show the growth of human personality as conditioned by the welfare of the whole. All such conditions are *moral* and form the only pathway upon which the progress of the individual and of mankind can take place. Such Moral Ends have their value in themselves; they are the factors which make for the upward evolution of humanity. They are to be judged and valued as such and not as to the quantity of *pleasure* which they may bring to the individual as a mere individual. Such a conception as a mere individual apart from the community is a figment, a figment which is capable of narrowing and lowering the personality and of placing it on a path which destroys the moral progress of the world.

When Wundt turns to the final question of religion it is this moral conviction we have already touched on which includes the nucleus of his teaching. Such moral implications are the conclusions of Logic and Life whenever they do not stop short at any half-way house. We are driven by the very demands of knowledge and life to a religious idealism which shows itself as the determining factor in the progress of the deeper possibilities of human nature. All this is not speculation or mere external revelation. It is something grounded in the very

condition of progress. All questions concerning God and Immortality are to be answered in the light of this meaning of moral progress as the law of our being. Let this law be fulfilled more and more by man and he cannot fail to wonder and revere the depth, tenacity, and permanence of the mental, social, and moral factors which rule the human world. These factors are yet in their infancy, and their further development depends upon the co-operation of men and women within the realms of these spiritual ideals which bind the world, which lift mankind upward, and which are created ever anew within the secret chamber of the final convictions of knowledge and life. Such convictions possess, in Wundt's words, an "absolute, indestructible value". In other words, we must have some eternal participation in this process which interprets the physical universe and which creates the conditions which make human life and moral progress possible. Wundt's Ethics thus passes into Metaphysics and finally into Religion. Whenever ideals transcend what can be attained by individual human effort they merge into religion. Our author, in his final conclusions, borders upon such conceptions of life as are presented in Christianity, especially as revealed in the life and teaching of its Founder. In some of its later developments Christianity, says Wundt, degenerated into "nature-worship". The essential element of Christianity consists (says Wundt again) in purifying those supposed religious sides which give no great help to the ethical content of the religious idea. The

personality of Jesus will then be viewed as that of an ideal pattern for mankind—as that of a man who bore witness in his life, teaching, and death to his union with the "ground and goal of the universe", and with all that is noblest and best in the ideals of life.

Carl Stumpf (1848–)

Stumpf was influenced very early in his life by Brentano and Lotze. He graduated at Göttingen under Lotze, and in 1873 was appointed Professor of Philosophy at Würzburg in succession to Brentano, who in that year retired from his Chair. He was always very successful as a teacher and received calls to Prague (1879), Halle (1884), Munich (1889), and finally Berlin (1894). He actually created the Psychological Institute in the Capital, thus following the examples of Fechner and Wundt, both of whom a few years previously had created a similar Institute at Leipzig (1878).

The life-work of Stumpf covers a vast field. Not only has he done work in certain particular provinces of Physiological Psychology, but he may also be reckoned as a systematizer with regard to many problems concerning the meaning and significance of the natural and the philosophical sciences as a whole. His first important work was concerning the origin of the idea of Space. This work is dedicated to his great teacher Lotze. Later, in 1883, appeared his great work on *Tonpsychologie* (*The Psychology of Sound*). The main object of the work is to describe the psychical functions which are awakened by means of the Sensations of Sound. He investigates,

in the first place, the antecedents, and afterwards the results, of Sound. Besides this, he has dealt with a large number of some of the most important problems of the Theory of Knowledge, Psychology, and the History of Philosophy. More, perhaps, than any other German Philosopher he has kept very close to the various branches of Philosophy from the sides of their connections with the Physical Sciences, and he looks forward to the rebirth of Philosophy through loyalty to the scientific contributions which have already been made, and to the bringing of these to bear on the problems of mind in all their intricacies. He shows that the weakness of the Hegelian Philosophy was its neglect of the physical side of things. The second half of the nineteenth century broke away from its previous relations with concepts which have hardly any relation with objects in the external world, and which have largely ignored what the various branches of Physics, Chemistry, and Biology have to state with regard to our conceptions of the world and of life. He looks on Fechner and Lotze as pioneers in the new direction. The medical aspect of the work of Lotze and the physical aspect of the work of Fechner are of great significance in the realm of Psychology. In the writings of Lotze, according to Stumpf, from Psychology to Metaphysics, we find permanent contributions based on physical evidence, although such conclusions in their development pass beyond every form of the physical. And in Fechner, in spite of his phantasies, there is a solid mass of new truth concerning the subject-matter

of psychophysics. Stumpf does not ignore the all-important contributions made by Kant and Hegel. He, indeed, shows that they obtain, in many respects, a new significance in the light of the philosophical work of the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Stumpf shows that man can well hope of a double contribution from Philosophy in the future. In the first place, Philosophy will give a completion to our knowledge by means of bringing the most universal conceptions of all the sciences to a unitary connection. And in the second place, Philosophy will deal methodically, and with sufficiency and acuteness, with all that is external and physical. In other words, it will create views of the universe and of life as a whole. Generalizations in connection with *facts* and evidence in connection with *forms* are qualities which must be exercised in a superlative manner if Philosophy is to be reborn as the Queen of the Sciences. Philosophy is capable of uplifting us above the dust of the earth and above the trivialities of everyday life. She is capable of helping us to find a footing in doubtful cases, and to recognize and follow the way of obligation. And she will accomplish this task by means of raising the level of the understanding of man until it advances to the domain of genuine knowledge, and until it is able to differentiate between appearance and reality, the accidental and the necessary, the temporal and the eternal.

Both the Philosophy of Experience and the *a priori* Philosophy have to be worked out from all possible

sources. The Philosophy of Experience grows out of the particular Sciences, and endeavours to keep constantly in the closest touch with such sciences. It deals with the "Given", and always allows the "Given" to have its say without any prejudice on the observer's part, and always fears to lose itself in mental conjectures which have no relation with physical grounds. It forms relative conclusions for the time being, values these in themselves, and tries to connect them with what is still higher than themselves. By doing this it stands on the solid ground of the reality of the physical world, and it is able to carry such conclusions to the aid of the still higher claims and demands of the human spirit.

The *a priori* Philosophy, on the other hand, finds its "music" in Idealism. It springs from the claims, needs, and demands of the spirit of man, and has appeared in many varied forms in the successive ages of humanity. There is a "Faustic" element in human nature which springs from the deeps of our being. It is a thirst after knowledge, after ever greater completion of life and after perfection. Every knowledge rests upon a faith, and every faith upon a will. Such a conviction was the decisive turn which gave being to German Idealism.

Stumpf shows us that History teaches us that man has been led to a knowledge of reality in various and devious ways. In the main, in past times, it was the Feeling and Will of man that took the initiative in the formation of views of the universe and life. But, it is shown, we are in danger of being led into all kinds of morasses if we relegate logical

evidence to the background. The "faith" which discards what concrete thought brings forth is no real source of knowledge in a scientific sense. Yet there is a very important sense in which a rational belief can unfold the meaning of the universe and life. This is evident from the turn of Jacobi and Fichte to a Philosophy of Feeling and Will. Fichte in reality showed how every knowledge rests upon faith and every faith upon the will. This teaching constituted the decisive turn with which the development of German Idealism began.

But the rise of modern science brought about new and all-important conceptions concerning the nature of the physical world and of man. Many of these conceptions have modified the previous conceptions of the Philosophy of Feeling and Will. But man felt that the Natural Sciences could never have the last word to say in connection with the riddles of the universe and of life. Thus we find in Schelling something of the mysticism of Plotinus and of Jacob Boehme. And even in the Philosophy of Hegel mysticism plays a great part, as shown by Dilthey in his History of Hegel's early life. As Brentano pointed out, Hegel can be compared with Proclus and Nicholas of Cusa. Theosophical elements are to be found in the writings of Hegel's latter days which have affinities with Boehme and with the theosophist F. von Baader.

Stumpf shows, further, how aesthetic elements have exercised a great influence on our views of the universe and of man. But as Science is in our midst, and as it has brought fundamental concep-

tions of reality into being, we dare not ignore it. If we do so, we do so at our peril. Philosophy, it is important to bear in mind, must never lose touch with the natural and the purely logical sciences. If we discard such sciences, or even if we relegate them to a secondary place, we are losing our anchorage and are drifting into a perilous sea. Fichte, Schelling, and Schopenhauer thus drifted, and consequently their alienation from the exact natural and mental sciences will render their teaching of less and less inportance as time passes on. They can never have the importance which Leibniz and Kant have had and will continue to have.

Stumpf does not deny the value of branches of the mental sciences such as Philology and Jurisprudence, but he insists that the more exact methods of the mathematical and the physical sciences will have to be used more and more if actual scientific linkage-points are to be obtained such as we already obtain in our knowledge of external things. The main lines of progress lie in the adoption of such an orientation.

He shows that it is not by evolving universal concepts in a formal manner that our knowledge of reality will extend in the truest manner. For example, in Biological Science the idea of development is prominently visible, and many errors have given way in the light of such a development. Such a thought of development is found in Hegel, but it is not found in the way we find it in Darwin and Haeckel. For we look upon development to-day, not as a timeless series of what is often termed

"essences", but as a temporal and causal connection of a "new higher" with a lower.

The matter is the same in the realm of History. Here the physical and the psychical world must be taken into consideration and looked upon as a temporal-causal process of development. In order to see the problems clearly, Botany and Zoology have to be taken into account. Inorganic nature on the one side, and the spirit of man on the other, have to be read in their connections somewhat in the dialectical form of Hegel's Philosophy. But they all have to be read from below upward if a true temple of knowledge is to be built.

Stumpf carries this matter farther still. The same must be the case with regard to Psychology. We cannot understand the world without a knowledge of the laws of the psychical, and we cannot understand it without taking into constant account the reciprocal relations and mutual influences of psychical and physical. Stumpf is not blind to what emerges as "higher" in the process of development, and he emphasizes the fact that the "higher" in many all-important respects must be read not only in the light of what it once was, but of what it is now and of what it has in it to become.

Our work, he tells us, is to create a world of ideas from material gathered on the fields of the natural and the mental sciences. When we are true to the proven results of both an energy of conviction will become ours towards a constantly greater illumination of the meaning and significance of reality, and, at the same time, we shall be filled with a new life-

energy within ourselves. This is the goal of humanity, and its ideal man is a kind of blend of Leibniz and Kant, possessing the mathematico-physical gift of the former and the clearness of mind and the ethical pathos of the latter.

Benno Erdmann (1851–1921)

Benno Erdmann was, for many years, Professor of Philosophy in Berlin. The scope of his knowledge was very extensive. In his early days Darwin's *Origin of Species* was much talked about in academic circles in Germany, and a new view of the universe and of life was believed to have come into existence. Erdmann's mind gravitated towards the new subject. At a later period he came under the influence of Helmholtz, which meant so much for him in later years, for Helmholtz's teaching interested him greatly concerning the importance of the conceptions of the Natural Sciences in any valid system of Philosophy. His special equipment in Mathematics was also an additional element of value in connection with his knowledge of various branches of the Natural Sciences. Throughout his life he kept very close to the teaching of his youth, and he may be acknowledged as one of the most exact philosophical thinkers of the present generation.

Erdmann is best known as a logician and an interpreter of Kant. In several of his works he insists that increased emphasis should be laid on the Theory of Knowledge, Logic, and Psychology. These are the three domains which must be constantly examined, probed, and interpreted. Theory of

Knowledge constitutes the particular science whose task it is to investigate the presuppositions common to all the sciences concerning the actual foundation of our knowledge. Logic is the science which deals with the modes and validity of the forms and functions of Judgment. This means the formal presuppositions which lie at the root of all scientific thought. Logic thus takes into consideration all processes of thought; and it is through it that we are able to distinguish, to differentiate, and to unite the various forms of thought. It becomes thus a criterion of the nature of thought and of the differentiation between truth and error. Thus Logic is not a Psychology because it deals with the meaning and validity of all forms of the content of thought. It is a general, formal, and normative science of the methodical presuppositions of scientific thought. Its standard is the ideal of general validity or truth. Our judgments are related to what is transcendent, and act as intermediaries in our knowledge of the physical world. As a phenomenon, the external world is only a particular section of what is presented to our consciousness. Psychical and physical are not reciprocal effects, but constitute a parallelism. They are co-ordinated steps of the "appearances" which go to construct in our consciousness the causal foundation of the inner as well as the outer world. The mechanical and the psychical consist of a phenomenological dualism based upon a monistic foundation.

In regard to Psychology, Erdmann shows that a portion of the psychical "happenings" is uncon-

scious. There are stirring and non-stirring forms of the unconscious. The fringes of memory are unconscious conditions of possible consciousness.

In much of his teaching Erdmann has remained very close to Kant. Probably his greatest contribution to knowledge lies in the domain of Logic, where he has given a deep and clear interpretation of the function of Logic in all the departments of thought. He has kept very close to the natural sciences, but he is through and through idealistic in the sense that the sciences themselves are incapable of interpretation except in the light of the conclusions of a Theory of Knowledge. He has seen clearly that general Judgments have to be formed concerning all existing things. Such general Judgments have to take into account, on the one hand, the *physical* basis of our knowledge, and, on the other, the *methodological* basis. With the former the Theory of Knowledge plays a part, and with the latter Logic functions.

Erdmann, although he followed Kant in the main, deviated from him in many respects. Both Kant and Erdmann had in front of them, as one of their main objects, the ideal of a possible reconciliation between rationalism (or idealism) and empiricism. In this respect Erdmann tends towards the empirical side as this was represented by Helmholtz. Kant tended towards the other side—the increased affirmation of the *a priori*. It is quite evident that the heart of Kant was in such a direction, and it is quite as evident that Erdmann has continued throughout the years to lay great stress on the empirical side

of things. Still, he cannot be termed an empiricist. In the *Logic* great emphasis is laid on the Judgment as the core of logical investigation; and he was fully aware that all this constituted a reality which could not be accounted for by any attempts at its reduction to the events and connections which are happening in the physical world. Indeed, Erdmann goes so far as to designate the Subject and Predicate, termed in the older Logic as concepts, as objects, and this changes the doctrine of concepts to a doctrine of objects. This change is rapidly exercising a great effect on some modern conceptions of the Theory of Knowledge and of Metaphysics. This doctrine of objects of his differs from Meinong's doctrine (*Gegenstandtheorie*). Meinong's theory of objects deals with objects *a priori*, whilst Erdmann's theory is much more general and covers a far wider field.

Some reference should be made to Erdmann's contributions in the domain of Psychology. He covers here a vast field. In all the problems he kept very close to a critical and scientific investigation. He was not given to any form of speculative generalization, but constantly kept in close touch with what is empirically revealed, although such empirical light leads to what is beyond itself. He followed to that "beyond" in his Theory of Knowledge and his Logic, but he turned back all the time for further light to proofs found in empirical and experimental data. The psychological problems which he attacked were those of the Body-Mind Problem, the Unconscious, the Psychology of Perception, Reproduction,

Attention, Abstraction, Phantasy, Thought, Speech, Reading, and the Child. In all these again he keeps close to the empirical side of things, but he goes so far as to show that Matter is nothing absolute—nothing which exists in itself—but belongs to the world of "appearance" which has somehow an unknowable absolute reality at the back of it.

Erdmann, in spite of his scientific strictness, was well aware that the processes of life cannot be reduced in their entirety to material elements. The nature of life itself and the nature of the cell, as viewed by him, were looked upon as forming some kind of substance which is other than physical. It is, he states, very puzzling to know what this substance is from the level of man down to the level of plant-life.

He has some interesting things to say with regard to the "unconscious psychical" which he believed to exist. He comes to such a conclusion from the fact of the phenomenon of memory. He does not doubt that in the brain a certain material residuum of memory in the form of brain-stirrings is to be found which corresponds to the processes of consciousness. What becomes of the psychic processes when these stirrings disappear from consciousness? They cannot pass over into nothingness, for such a case would mean the contradiction of the law of causality; they cannot become physical processes, for the psychical can never transform itself into the physical. The only probable answer is that the processes of consciousness leave behind themselves some *psychical* residuum, whilst the physical stirrings of the

brain leave behind themselves a *physical* residuum. The total residuum originates, therefore, out of a psychical and a physical residuum, and has a psychical and a physical side. Thus at the back of the conscious-psychical is the unconscious-psychical. And consequently all living substance is psychical in its nature, and universal parallelism is the story of the union of physical and psychical. His conclusion concerning the world and life is thus a phenomenalistic dualism resting upon a monistic foundation.

Erdmann has some interesting and important things to state concerning the evolution of consciousness in the individual. He lays particular stress upon concentration of attention in this development of consciousness. He shows how consciousness can pass from stage to stage, possessing at each higher stage more and more of "livingness". This "livingness" enables the individual to alter the content of what is presented to him until one reaches a stage of *over-consciousness*. The result of reaching this stage is an increase of clarity and energy with regard not only to the meaning of external things but also with regard to the meaning of inward experience as well. Erdmann stresses the great value of such an over-consciousness and of the need of its ever further development. All his pupils who had the privilege of hearing him have been seriously impressed by the brilliancy of his interpretations and his free and eloquent speech. His works are a testimony to his capacity of throwing new light on the most intricate psychological and philosophical questions

without reducing these to the traditional level of viewing them.

JOHANNES REINKE (1849–)

Reinke has worked for many years as Professor of Botany at Kiel. To him, in a very large measure, is due the increased importance which the twin sisters, Botany and Biology, have acquired during the past quarter of a century. Just as Physics has, in our day, become something more than a descriptive science of particular physical phenomena, so is Botany far on the way to becoming a systematic science. Its particulars are being gathered together and woven into a whole. Botany and Biology are beginning to cast light on some of the great problems of life, and the conclusions which have already been drawn are destined to exercise greater and greater influence on the mental sciences in their investigations concerning the nature of the universe and of man.

Reinke was one of the first to tackle the problems in some such respect. He bases his belief even in Theism upon the grounds of the nature of living organisms. It has to be borne in mind that he is a botanist of great repute. He is a strong opponent of all forms of naturalistic monism. He states that the facts of nature show that something besides mechanism and chemical combinations is necessary to account for the phenomena of life in its origin and development. The facts are explained as follows:

The original or earliest cells had a non-parental origin. They cannot be accounted for at all except by the fact that they have been *created* by a power

that is of the same nature as is present in their own lives. The difference between the organic and the inorganic is not a relative difference, but an absolute one. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the problem here is not a mere chemical but a physiological and organic one. The only hypothesis which explains the actual nature of living things is the one that teaches a creation of organic elements by means of God. The universe is a *deed* (*Tat*)—a product of Divine intelligence. "God" is the symbol for the *Summe jener intelligentum* and for the shaping forces which are at the same time immanent and transcendent—the transcendent engendering the immanent. Outside the energies present in organisms there are present what Reinke regards as "Dominants". The "Dominants" are conceived by him as driving energies which seem to possess a kind of "mind" or "soul" which works in a teleological manner upon the mechanical and chemical elements present in organisms. The "Dominants" do not interfere with the mechanical and chemical workings within the organism, but guide the stream of energy within the organism towards definite ends. Reinke states that all this is not a mere dream or illusion, but an actual fact in the case of the living organism. He quotes a saying of Heinrich Hertz that there are unrecognized masses and movements, and within these, *Energies* which are at the back of all that is known concerning Nature. It is so with living organisms. We are not able to *observe* these *Energies*, but we are able to conclude to their presence from the effects which they produce upon matter.

Reinke goes so far as to state that nothing less than creative intelligence is sufficient to account for the phenomena of life. This, he says, is neither mythology nor allegory, but a conclusion of analogy. Organisms are brought forth by means of an intelligent *Ur*-Energy, just as a machine and every work of Art are a product of human intelligence. If, he says, all this seems to be a miracle, then the whole universe is a miracle. "As an investigator of Nature, I should say that the organisms are *given*; as a natural philosopher I should say that they are *created*."

Reference has already been made to the effects which Reinke attributes to the "Dominants". It may be stated further that he views the "Dominants" as orientating and directive energies which possess qualities which seem to work as psychical energies upon matter. The "Dominants," according to him, perform no mechanical work, but act as guides in ruling the current of the stream of energy. Thus they assist matter in its particular physical energy to work towards ends which are conscious, mental and spiritual; they work upon matter and render it capable of becoming the servant of the spirit.

Erich Becher (1882–1929)

Erich Becher's field of labour was one of the most comprehensive in Germany, and his comparatively early death is lamented by all who are acquainted with his writings. He was influenced by such great teachers as Lange, Lotze, Benno Erdmann, Carl Stumpf, and Fechner. His range of knowledge was

quite exceptional. He felt perfectly at home in the biological and the physiological sciences, whilst his works dealing with Psychology, the Theory of Knowledge, and Metaphysics are of great importance. He had felt early in life that there was something out of place in the existence of such a deep chasm between the natural and the mental sciences, and felt also that his main object in life was to lessen this chasm. He was also aware of the increasing gap between Philosophy and Psychology, a gap which had widened through the growth of the natural sciences. There was a real danger of Philosophy, on the one hand, being resolved into a Natural Science, and, on the other hand, there was a danger of the mental sciences being resolved into Psychology. Becher attempted to do justice to the natural sciences, to psychology, and to the self-subsistence of the domains which lie beyond these—i.e. to Logic, Theory of Knowledge, Metaphysics, and Religion. He insisted that we must take into consideration the connectedness and relations of the various sciences—physical and mental—before a valid theory of the universe and of life can become possible. Thus most of his works deal with philosophical problems in this light. Becher's earlier works thus deal with such subjects as Darwinism, physical theories of the physiological processes in the constituents of Perception, and the presuppositions of the exact natural sciences. He was in this kind of work laying the solid foundation of what was to follow. As he disliked pure speculation which had no relation with physical reality, there was no other

course open for him to take. Any other attempt at building any kind of theory concerning the universe and life, apart from the results of the exact sciences, was destined to failure. He was aware that the physical sciences have to pass their conclusions on to other sciences for a still closer investigation of these conclusions. But these conclusions of the exact sciences must be constantly kept in view, and the mind must survey and relate all that emerges beyond the exact science in the light of what has gone before. Thus we find Becher now dealing with the problem of Ethics. His work on the subject is influenced by John Stuart Mill's theory of Utilitarianism. Further, from the same point of view he looks at the subject of Social Ethics. He views the development of social phenomena and social connections and combinations from the standpoint of the struggle for existence, finding that it is possible to found an ideal of human good will on such a basis.

At a later stage in his life the great problems of Psychology, the Theory of Knowledge, and Metaphysics occupy his attention. The problems of Mind and Body and of the presence of Purpose in organic life now come to the foreground. He started by accepting the theory of psycho-physical parallelism. But his studies at a later stage compelled him to see the closer connection of the physical and the psychical than is allowed by the theory of parallelism. His observation of the presence of the conservation of energy, not only in the non-living world but in the living one as well, led him to the conclusion that

there was an undeniable causal character between the two worlds. The result of this was that Becher came to hold that there were, along with physical and chemical and even mechanical elements which are present in all forms of life, psychical or "soul"-elements present as well. He remained convinced of this until the end as is clearly shown in his *Einführung in die Philosophie* (1926). The contents of this able book are worthy of the closest consideration.

With regard to the presence of Purpose in the domain of organic life, Becher carried the psychical or "soul"-hypothesis into every living thing right down to the cell. It is this "*soul*"-*element* which conditions the difference between "living" and "dead". The *material* in every living thing *lives* only in so far as it is under the direction of its "*soul*"-*element*. He considered that there was a reciprocal action between "matter and soul", or physical and psychical. He carried out this theory as being true with regard to the whole organic world—even with regard to the whole world itself. He came, therefore, to the conclusion that a *psycho-vitalistic* conception is the truest scientific and philosophical conception concerning life and the universe.

When we come to Becher's work on the Theory of Knowledge we find it "coloured" by the view which has been enumerated above, at least in part. But Becher does not bring these analogical ideas into his examination of the natural and mental sciences except in the form of *final* conclusions. His great book on *Naturwissenschaften und Geistes-*

wissenschaften is a mine of learning and exactitude. Here Becher handles, in a most clear manner, a vast mass of scientific and philosophical material. He shows the development of our knowledge of all things as passing from the level of the existential object (*Sein*) to the level of the object in the form of judgments of thought (*Sosein-Urteile*); and, further still, to an insight born of necessity, to hypotheses, and to constructions of thought with regard to the structure, the content, and the growth of what happens within thought itself in its varied forms of unfoldment. Thus Becher finds from the standpoint of biological science the presence of a *reality* other than that of the *physical*. This compels him to accept the presence of such a Reality in the Universe. From the standpoint of the Theory of Knowledge he shows how man is led to conclusions of thought which are beyond anything he has attained scientifically and that the mind is capable of *knowing* all this. Such a Theory of Knowledge, according to him, leads inevitably to Metaphysics. Thus from the side of Science and from the side of Philosophy we are led to the result that there is *Something* present in the universe to which (or to whom) our conclusions concerning the nature of life and concerning the nature of the most comprehensive forms of metaphysical thought correspond. Becher's main point is that we have warrant for coming to such a conclusion. At the close (p. 325) of his book, already mentioned—*The Natural and the Mental Sciences*—he states words to this effect: That there is something of a psychical nature in the world around us, but an

absolute knowledge of this Being existing in itself (*an-sich-seienden*) lies behind our perception of the physical world. The nearest approach to a belief in some such form of Reality or God is to be found in the *Sosein* of Thought. It is quite thinkable that we are in relation with such Being in the innermost part of our soul. Becher is well aware of the presence of deception often in what is generally termed "intuition", but, on the other hand, there are intuitions of a depth and height, of a glory, and of a blessedness for man which are formed and experienced beyond the limits of ordinary thought. Our great helper is Metaphysics, but its mistake has been that, on the whole, it has had too speculative a character. "Metaphysics is the queen of the sciences; but this queen has been for a long time an over-delicate and even a sickly woman. She is in great need of a propping-up from her healthy and strongly developed sisters—the natural sciences. May the queen of the sciences, fed with the healthy food of experience, recover to the proud energy of her sisters!"

Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887)

Fechner, the son of a minister of religion, lost his father when he was five years of age. At the age of sixteen he wended his way towards Leipzig, and there remained during the whole of his life, where he died on November 18, 1887. His whole career is one of the most remarkable presented in this volume. He laboured hard all his lifetime on psychological and cosmic problems, and succeeded in working

out certain views of the universe and life from the scientific, analogical, and speculative points of view which have continued to exercise great influence in all kinds of directions. He possessed, on the one hand, remarkable powers of exact observation, and, on the other, a speculative power of transferring such scientific observations, by means of analogy, to the problems of God and the Universe. His personality was a unique combination of scientific investigation and of the "will to believe". He thought it possible to reconcile knowledge and faith in their entirety, and felt that unless this was done the deeper faculties of human nature as well as the deepest bliss would remain unrealized.

As already stated, his intellect demanded exactness in connection with everything which he investigated, and his speculations were not based upon any formal conclusions of the Theory of Knowledge and idealistic Metaphysics but upon the inductive process of viewing everything and upon the analogy of scientific conclusions as being applicable to what is beyond themselves. Besides this, he turned to practical principles in order to strengthen the validity of many of his cosmic beliefs. He found that the *fruits* of the practical life justified such beliefs. In this respect he was a precursor of Pragmatism. William James was certainly indebted to Fechner in many ways, as James himself testified in his writings.

Fechner's important volume on *Elemente der Psychophysik* first appeared in 1859, and has gone through several editions. At the start it was received

coolly by the older psychologists, but was soon seen to have revealed a law of Psychophysics hitherto unperceived. This is termed Fechner's "Law", which states that Sensation varies in the ratio of the logarithm of impression. Fechner's contemporary at Leipzig, Wilhelm Wundt, stated in his important address on the commemoration of the 100th year of the birth of Fechner, in 1901, that Fechner was the first to introduce exact methods as well as exact principles of measurement in the investigation of psychical phenomena. In this manner he was able to place psychological science on a strict scientific basis. Herbart had attempted to reach the same goal but had failed. Modern Psychology, through Fechner, came to take a purely scientific character and has been able to separate itself from the entanglements of metaphysical and speculative controversies.

We must now turn to Fechner's view of the cosmos. His views are best seen in his book entitled *Die Tagesansicht gegenüber der Nachtansicht.* Here he constructs his metaphysical and religious views from the experience presented in the conclusions of *analogy.* The "Day-view" means to him the bright, joyous view of the world and of the whole universe. The "Night-view" characterizes the conclusions of the naturalists, the materialists, and the Kantians. This latter view looks upon the universe as a sphinx so full of riddles that it is practically impossible to find out its meaning. According to the "Night-view" the world is dumb as to its origin or its final end; we can never, as the Kantians say, get out of

ourselves and so can never know what anything outside ourselves really is.

Fechner states that such a view is not true. The things that we perceive are in Nature, and Nature is not dead but living. Nature is not mere matter, but matter with a "soul" in it. He proceeds to show that the marvellous manifestations found in the plant world are a proof of all this. Plants live a life very similar in many ways to the life of man. The work which they do, the struggles which they encounter, and the conquests which they attain to complete their cycle of life prove undeniably that there is present in them a "soul"-element which, it is true, has its clothing in matter.

When we turn to the practical life of man we discover that when he adopts the "Day-view" he finds a happiness impossible of attainment in any other way. His "Day-view" enables him to work for the elimination of all that is injurious to the pleasure and joy of his life, and which thus enables him to increase the qualities that tell for human weal and to decrease those that tell for human woe. All this kind of work is founded upon a hypothesis that is warranted by the conclusions of *analogy*.

Not only living things show the presence of a Teleology, but the universe itself shows it clearly. The phenomena of Nature everywhere are so marvellous that they cannot be accounted for in dead mechanical terms. The body of the earth is like our own body—its parts fit so compactly and harmoniously together. Look at the harmony in human life—in sleep and waking. The same har-

mony is found in Nature: witness the change in day and night, summer and winter. Witness the play of the ebb and flow of the sea and of the pulsation of our blood. Instances of this harmony are to be found everywhere. There must then be a Spirit in the Universe itself that includes the qualities which we as human beings experience as being present *in* us and *around* us.

Fechner passed from natural phenomena to the higher unities found in Science, Art, the State, Religion, etc. These, too, are "soul"-combinations, implications, and interlacings of the all-binding unity of the Divine Spirit. We are included in such a Spirit, and, if so, we cannot be lost in death. Just as sense-perception exists within our consciousness or soul this consciousness or soul exists within the Divine Spirit. When sense-perception disappears it does not get entirely lost, but remains in the form of *memory*, and out of that deep it can arise and form a new idea for us. Using the conclusion of *analogy*, Fechner states that our soul, with its seeming disappearance at death into nothingness, cannot get lost but exists as a content in the Divine Memory; and just as was the case with our own sense-perception, so here, our soul existing in the Divine Memory will rise and live again. Of course, all the details with regard to this metamorphosis cannot be filled in but the fact seems undeniable according to Fechner.

Fechner combines with his religious Metaphysics an Ethics of Happiness—a Eudæmonism. Our desires aim at happiness, but often this is happiness

concerning the body and its wants. A higher spiritual happiness is possible as well—a joy in the Beautiful, the Good, and the True and in the experience of being at one with God.

He felt himself able to reconcile Freedom and Determinism. Our "souls" are contents or parts of the Divine Spirit, and in this respect are subservient to these contents. A Freedom of the Will in the sense of an entire indeterminism is impossible. Our Will can only be free in the sense of a Determinism, or, in other words, our freedom consists in being true to our inner, reasonable nature, and free from giving way to outward compulsions and impulses.

He also attempted to determine the relations between body and mind, and came to the conclusion of a parallel two-sided-hypothesis. It is important to bear in mind, he tells us, the *outside* and the *inside* of all things. The reality or the presence of all existence outside our consciousness reveals itself to us when we perceive it with our senses; it is in a sensuous and external form that we perceive things, i.e. the *outside* aspect of things. The "psychical" is the *inside* of the world, the inner nature of which we grasp in our own consciousness.

Much of Fechner's Philosophy is that of his own inner experience. He made great contributions in the domains of Psycho-physics and Experimental Psychology. He is and will be recognized in these domains as a pioneer. And in the directions pointed out in this brief sketch he managed to present as reasonable and as valuable a hypothesis concerning

the higher things of the spirit as it is possible, at least at the present, to obtain. He attracted everybody who came in contact with him by his simplicity and warm-heartedness, and as one who longed for the coming higher welfare of mankind.

CHAPTER V

THE SCHOOLS OF SCHOPENHAUER AND OF NIETZSCHE

EUGEN DÜHRING (1833–1921)

Eugen Dühring entered the Government service after having studied Jurisprudence and Political Economy in Berlin. He had to leave his post as a civil servant on account of the weakness of his sight. He finally became blind. He became *Privatdozent* in the University of Berlin, and after fifteen years was dismissed on account of his supposed enmity to several of the Professors. The whole story is a miserable one. The remainder of his life was spent as a private teacher, journalist, and philosophical writer.

Dühring termed his teaching a Philosophy of Reality. It is rooted in Materialism although he saw the need of a metaphysical knowledge of the world and of life and attempted to supply such knowledge. His teaching may be designated somewhat as follows: Our forms of thought have not merely a subjective but also an objective character. These forms are logical and ideal copies of the world. The fundamental doctrine for the unfoldment of this doctrine is laid down by him in his *Natural Dialectic*. It deals with the Principle of Identity and the Principle of Sufficient Ground. He takes the Principle of Identity to mean that there would not have been possible any such Principle had not there been present a Principle of difference and strife

somehow in unison with it. The development of all things is possible in that way alone. Development is not in any sense a static situation. Before it can take place it is obliged to meet with hindrances of various kinds. On the other hand, there is no such thing as a Principle of Sufficient Ground. The idea of such a Principle is due to the fact that we are resting, in our ignorance, in a half-way kind of house. It is the task of science to go farther back—so far back, indeed, as to become convinced that there is no such Sufficient Ground. In the place of this Dühring states a Principle of "no ground".

The second part of the *Dialectic* deals with the conception of Infinity. The idea of Infinity is subjective, and these *subjective* conceptions of Infinite Space and Time have to be differentiated from the *objective* conceptions of *finite* Space and Time. In his Logic and Theory of Knowledge these matters are carried still farther in the same direction. Probably his greatest work is the *Kursus der Philosophie*, and this deals with Metaphysics, Ethics, and the Philosophy of History. The task of Philosophy is to point out the way of a development of the highest form of consciousness concerning the universe and life. Our knowledge is not, as Kant stated it to be, a knowledge of phenomena, but a knowledge of the real nature of the world. In thought there are principles which hold quite independently of their being perceived in a real or in a conceptual way. There is a certain coincidence of thought with existence, and this fact enables us by means of concepts and judgments to win certain definite views

of the real nature of existing things. The understanding of man has to "school" itself to aim at a grasp of reality, and to plant such conclusions constantly in the very depth of one's own life.

Dühring showed that there is a real *emergence* in nature: new processes and modes of existence make their appearance. Thus we can see that the idea of emergence is older than some people are inclined to think. He not only looks at the scientific aspect of origins, but, in a metaphysical manner, ventures to prophesy many things with regard to the future of the universe and life. In connection with the future of our world, mechanism may be its final course. But there is a more probable course. The world may transform itself more and more. Transformation is a fundamental law of nature and has already produced radical differences. And it does not seem likely that these differences will reach any final goal. Nature has produced all this, and we are obliged to believe that it will produce more. The transformations which have already occurred have come into existence by means of the compounding of simple elements and not by means of a metamorphosis. Matter and energy are capable of development and unfoldment in this particular way.

He sees a parallelism between our perceptions and our thoughts; but he also insists that a philosophical knowledge, apart from the knowledge gained by means of scientific work, is of immense importance. All our knowledge should be brought into connection with our life. And this should be the main object of Philosophy.

The world has already evolved far; change has worked wonders. In this evolution of the world we find constancy and development. The former quality conditions the inorganic world; the latter reigns in the organic world. Whatever it is, there is something that works in certain phenomena alongside of the mechanism. It may be said that Nature is a mechanism, but somehow one is obliged to admit that sensation is counter to it, and that somehow it catches the mechanism in the form of *thought.*

The soul is not any kind of substance. Sensations arise on account of the antagonism of energies. Strife or antagonism is found everywhere, and it changes all things into *new combinations.* Obstacles and opposites are to be found in the supposed "ground of the world", and these constitute the foundation of all existence.

Dühring turned his attention in all kinds of directions in which the phenomena of the universe and life reveal themselves. He notices the enormous importance of food and sex in the world of industry. He was more of an optimist than of a pessimist. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that optimism is the only correct view of the universe. The affirmation of optimism rests upon three arguments. In the first place, there is present the law of change which rests upon the differences of energies. Each change, each transition from one situation to another, even the transition from life to death, engenders often pleasure and even delight, for death is only a freeing of a life which has now done enough. In the second place, there is present the law of the *necessity* of

all appearance, and this verifies a kind of inner rest for man. And finally, there is the conviction of the increased happiness of man in the future. Man can be and will be raised more and more above his misery. Dühring proceeds by advocating a moral education for human life. This consists in the all-sided training of the best impulses and sympathetic tendencies whose foundation is Nature.

In his *Philosophy of History* he shows that the task of a Philosophy of History is to show the way by means of which the human race may attain perfection. Some kind of Community must be created outside the Church and Politics by means of which a spiritual, political, and scientific emancipation can take place. No historical religion has hitherto shown the way to the solution of such a problem, and Dühring further states that the solution will have to be sought in what has proved true within the domains of Science and Philosophy.

Dühring states that the external world exists as it presents itself to the senses, but alongside of this naïve form of realism he depicts, as already hinted, a form of scientific idealism. He states that Philosophy should be positive and categorical, and should deal with the essential factors which tell for the welfare of mankind. It is also essential that man's *understanding* should be at work in order that he may come to know what is useful and what is useless for the development of his life. And along with this man must possess a *rational imagination.* By a union of these two qualities new combinations come into being. When the individual possesses a

feeling on these lines, it will be a kind of feeling of oneness with the universe, and thus his previous experiences will be continually recombined and reshaped.

EDUARD VON HARTMANN (1842–1906)

Eduard von Hartmann, in his early days, was an officer in the army, but on account of an accident to his knee he had to retire. He afterwards graduated at Rostock in 1865, and lived in Berlin as a private teacher and writer until his death in 1906. Hartmann's writings are very numerous. His first important work was the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, which first appeared in 1868, and was translated into several European languages. The English edition, translated by the late Dr. W. C. Coupland, was out of print for many years, but a new edition has just appeared.

The book contains practically all the germs of Hartmann's system of Philosophy, which was further developed in later volumes. He bases his system upon certain aspects of Schopenhauer's conception of the will and of Hegel's conception of reason. Besides this, mystical elements which are present in his teaching may be traced to Schelling.

Hartmann sees in the Universe everywhere the presence of an "absolute unconscious spirit". This "spirit" is present in the mechanical forces of nature, in instinct, reflex movements, sex love, feeling, speech, thought, in the goals and ends of every living thing, and, finally, in all the course of history. This "universal spirit" is both will and idea, but it is impersonal, before creation, and with-

out consciousness as well. It has existed from all eternity and has brought everything into existence. As it had no object over against itself it could have no consciousness. Originally it must have existed in a state of inactivity and rest so that will and idea existed in it only as potencies. The reason why this Absolute passed into a state of activity is inconceivable. The impetus or impulse must have proceeded from the will-element. Also, the potential reason present in the Absolute and connected with the will was drawn into this activity. The world, as well as the whole cosmic process, originated by means of a dumb movement of the will. It was most fortunate that the movement of reason happened as well, because the movement of the will by itself would have been of a senseless, meaningless nature. The movement of reason gave meaning and orientation to the movement of will. That the world came into existence is due to the work of will. *How* the world became what it has become is due to the work of reason. The world is thus the best of all possible worlds because, by means of the work of reason and on account of the wisdom of reason, it has proceeded by means of wisdom towards good ends, and thus the Absolute is delivered or redeemed from the misery of the will.

Hartmann's meaning here is that the *will-nature* of the Absolute consists in eternal unrest and disquietude. The Absolute was like a stormy petrel which found it extremely difficult to reach a resting-place. In the early stages more of will than of reason was present in the Absolute, and hence there was

need for the presence of more reason to quiet the will and thus to redeem the Absolute or Spirit of the cosmic process.

The world is no mere appearance or phantasm but a reality. Its original ground is matter, which originates from some form of primeval psychical quality which had points of energy without extension and material stuff. Natural Science is unable by means of its teaching of energy and matter alone to solve the riddle of existence. The world-process is development, and its final aim is the redemption of the Absolute from the torment of the will. All forms of will, in all the manifestations of its existence, have not pleasure but pain as their consequences. Indeed, the less of a will anything or anybody possesses the less is desired, and consequently the happier is that existence or being. Primitive people are much happier than civilized people; even the poor are much happier than the rich; the stupid are happier than the clever. Now, with the progressive development of mankind there grows not only new needs but also an ever greater sensibility of the nervous system and an increase of pain over pleasure. There follows thus the break-up of previous illusions, and man becomes more and more conscious of the misery of life, of the vanity of most pleasures and efforts, and of a feeling of the misery of all things. The pain of the world has followed progress from the original, primeval cell up to the appearance of man, and it will grow further still with the progressive development of the human spirit until the spirit has reached its

Among other writers who have popularized von Hartmann's teaching may be mentioned Raphael von Köber, Olga Plümacher, and Agnes Taubert. The last writer has attempted to show how Hartmann's teaching can be turned into a powerful lever for the regeneration of the world. Resignation and self-denial are bound, she says, to create characters who will work for the amelioration of all that disturbs the peace and concord of the world.

Richard Wagner (1813–1883)

Wagner's name as a musical composer is well known and admired throughout the civilized world, but it is not so well known that he deserves the name of Philosopher and Poet as well. He was deeply influenced by the teaching of Schopenhauer. We know, he says, that all natural things are only manifestations of a Will. This Will is entirely a blind impulse or desire (*völlig dunkler Drang*)—a blind impulse of power which casts light only on the immediate surroundings. The activity of this Will upon life is an unbroken suffering. Life is suffering, and world-suffering is an axiom. An external, objective knowledge of the world in any real sense is not possible; we receive no more than an impression of the "shadow" of the world. The world of light—in so far as it can be called light—is an illusion; between the way we view things and the things themselves there is a great gulf fixed, and we can never bridge it. It is impossible for the intellect to know the world. In so far as we can know the nature of the world at all, we know

it in self-consciousness, especially in the feeling-element present there.

Wagner looked upon religion as an "anthropological fiction". He values the significance of religion as an allegorical clothing for metaphysical ideas and ethical truths which are destined to develop the best in human life. Religion, in so far as it has incorporated itself in space and time as a Church, is an historical necessity. Religion brings a quietude to the restlessness of the Will and a power which thwarts unbridled egoism. The innermost kernel of religion is to be found in the denial of the Will—in the denial of the seeming fact that all rests upon an illusion. Man thus receives a salvation or escape prepared through denial and reached through faith. The highest forms of religion are Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Christianity, because they show the need of swimming against the current of the world. This teaching, according to Wagner, is not to be found in the same degree in the Old Testament as in Christianity. The Old Testament should be relegated to a secondary place. The over-earthly world is unknowable. The over-earthly existence is Nirvana. Wagner emphasized the need of quietism in order to calm the troubled Will and to enable it to find rest for itself—at least as much rest as is possible to obtain in the midst of such a stormy world as ours.

Paul Deussen (1845–1919)

Deussen was for many years Professor of Philosophy at Kiel. His teaching is a kind of blend of the Philo-

sophies of Plato, Indian religious metaphysics, Christianity, and Schopenhauer. He emphasizes the fact that nothing exists outside consciousness in so far as the meaning which human beings can ascribe to things is concerned. The objects are Presentations, and this is true even of our own sense-organs and our brain. The external world is immanent in consciousness; in consciousness it has transcendental ideality, but it is, at the same time, empirical reality. The empirical consciousness is the mode in which consciousness *appears to us*; the transcendental consciousness is *consciousness in itself*. The transcendental consciousness engenders space, time, and causality as well as the whole of the material world of appearance, and it is as well the vehicle of empirical reality, the subject of knowledge, eternally unknowable in its true essence, spaceless, and timeless. In an empirical sense consciousness appears as a "brain", and sensations appear as effects of nerve-endings. Thus the "Given" for the empirical consciousness is sensation; for the transcendental consciousness the "Given" is the "relaxation" of the empirical and its transformation into the nature of mind and meaning. Thus there is an all-important sense in which the transcendental consciousness is independent of the physical world. The *Ding an sich* is spaceless and timeless; it is thus a transcendental content. This *Ding an sich* reveals itself in us as unconscious Will. The active Will is the driving-energy of our own life as well as of the life of the whole of Nature. But we *know* the *Ding an sich* only in so far as it reveals

itself to us in the form of body and will. The "in-itself" (*an sich*) of bodies and energies is everywhere Will, which on its lowest planes appears as a blind impulse, but as human life, at least, ascends the Will works towards definite Ends and as a unity of the nature of human life itself. The Will is immortal because of its independence of Time. It is thus seen that Deussen was very much dependent upon Schopenhauer in this direction.

When he comes to some of the problems of Ethics he takes his stand on altruism and on the virtues of righteousness, love, and asceticism. All egoism is to be overcome. He would go as far as Schopenhauer here again by stating that the highest ideal is the denial of the "will to live" especially with regard to man's absorption in the physical. His main point is to turn the attention away as far as possible from the empirical to the transcendental aspect of things. In morality there is a metaphysic to be found which opens the door into an *eternal realm*. True morality is, in the first place, a *negation*, but it is a negation which leads to an affirmation. The affirmation comes into being by soaking ourselves in the principles and virtues mentioned above. The nature of the Will has now been so transformed as to conquer egoism and to carry triumphantly into further domains the essential qualities of the cosmos. God is these essential qualities. All forms of a "Personality" of the Godhead are relegated to a background. The passage from empirical experience to the transcendental "Ground" of our being is a passage from a

world of mere echoes to a world of light and reality.

Deussen's works on various branches of Indian Metaphysics have proved of great value, and it is to his credit that he was one of the first to see the great necessity of interpreting this Metaphysics of the East to the West. His work on the "Philosophy of the Bible" is one of the most original books of this generation, and presents in a concise form the essential connections of the various sources which have merged to form the contributions of the Old Testament and the New.

FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE (1844–1900)

Nietzsche studied Philology at Bonn and Leipzig. He was highly gifted as a young man, and at the age of 24 he became assistant Professor of Philology at Basel, and a year later (1870) was made Ordinary Professor. When the Franco-German War broke out in 1870 he joined the German Army; and the privations through which he had to pass undermined his health, which was already delicate. He returned to his Professorship and was able to fulfil his duties until 1879. He started writing in 1871 and continued to do so, with occasional breaks, until 1889, when he was struck down with paralysis of the brain. He was brought to the Psychiatric Institute in Jena, but was soon removed to his mother at Naumberg, and afterwards to his sister at Weimar. And after suffering in this tragic way for eleven years he passed away on the 25th of August, 1900, at the comparatively early age

of 56. Before his death several of his volumes had found their way to the uttermost parts of the globe, and probably this was due in a large measure to the influence of G. Brandes of Copenhagen.

It is a tremendous mistake to consider his writings as the result of mental aberration; they form a coherent system, especially when they are studied in their totality and when the nature of the "grounds" and "aims" of the theory which they present is taken into account.

The works were the result of a long preparation. Being of a lonely, reserved disposition he endeavoured to place before the world a theory of life which would include a self-sufficiency for human life apart from the dependence of life on external props or on any advantages which enter into life from the surroundings. He felt that he was called to deal with the *future of mankind*, and to inquire into the values which would enhance the status of man by means of the realization of these values. He dedicated his whole life and sacrificed ease, comfort, and happiness for the presentation of such an ideal. It is not an easy matter to discover all the main thoughts of his teaching but some cardinal principles are easy of discernment.

Nietzsche viewed, in his first great book on the wonderful achievements of the Greeks, human life as having reached an evolutionary stage of development which has never been surpassed. Such a development was of a twofold nature. On the one hand was the Apollonian development, i.e. the development which had come into being

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by means of an epic clearness and an aesthetico-plastic truth. On the other hand, a development proceeded along the lines of a Dionysian lyric and musical enthusiasm as well as of religious ecstasy. Nietzsche saw the value of the two modes, but looked upon the former as being of a higher order in the scale of values than the latter, although the latter in several respects had its quota to contribute towards leading life to the heights.

Great emphasis is laid everywhere on the *Will* and on the transformations it is capable of bringing about in human life. Man enters the world without a Will, and lives at first without the consciousness of any such power. But at a later stage man becomes conscious of the possibility of developing further his own life. He can raise himself beyond his ordinary life, and view a life *that is to be* as if it were at a distance in the womb of the Future and so apart from the life that now is. He becomes further aware that it is only by means of *great decisions* concerning things which, on the one hand, have to be affirmed, and concerning things, on the other hand, which have to be negated that life rises to higher levels. Nietzsche thus *affirms* the *Will to live*. In this respect he is in direct opposition to Schopenhauer's conception of the Will. Schopenhauer felt that the Will had brought all kinds of miseries into the life of man, and pleaded for its rejection and for the sinking of human experience into some form of Nirvana in line with Indian Buddhism. Nietzsche *affirms* life through and through. It seemed to him so petty to claim ease and happiness in the world.

The sole valuable and lasting qualities are to be found in the achievements of the Will. Human life must be constantly affirmed, for it is by such constant affirmation that a *bridge* is constructed which enables man to pass from the side of the ordinary routine life to the life and experiences of an *Overman*.

The Will seems capable of deciding for something only when it appears as having worth or value. If man sees the value of something he affirms life upon the "ground" of this value. Nietzsche shows that such a mode is an illusion. The worth of a thing, according to him, is decided by the Will, and not the Will by the worth of a thing. The worth of life is in life itself. It is in the potentiality which can constantly emerge into actuality that the worth of life consists. Otherwise the values which are congenial and pleasurable would be preferred to those which are tragic, impulsive, stormy, and superhuman —values which have to be fought for in wild weather, and which call for energies which are not required in the ordinary life at all. There are so many people who look at *happiness* as the standard and value of life. When they obtain happiness they obtain rest, peace, security, sleep, and thus become satisfied with a passive kind of existence. Indeed, unless they obtain such results of happiness they conclude that life is a failure. Nietzsche has very hard words to say concerning such people and such a theory of life. In fact, he throws such a theory to the winds. We have to rise above being pampered in such a way and look upon life as an

evolution of the soul—as something that is to defy ordinary conventions and easy smugness and that is to pass over the *bridge* to the domain where the Over-man is born anew.

It is neither happiness nor virtue which constitutes the fundamental element for the creation of the Over-man. The only power that will accomplish this gigantic task is the affirmation of the potential greatness of human personality. Man can be great only in what he is in himself, and life has value in the degree it becomes conscious that it is treading beyond the traditional commandments of happiness and virtue which of themselves have buried the Will to live under a mass of mental, social, and religious conventionalities. The real goal of life is *Greatness*, and life ascends only in the degree it is moving towards such a goal. Nietzsche shows that all the really great and lasting qualities which have entered into our human world have been brought here by individuals whose goal was beyond all values of ordinary life and beyond all the conventions of human society. These became the founders of mighty States and the pioneers of the pathway to greatness. But there are higher peaks still to climb, and the saviours of humanity are those who never count the cost, who never live on the plains of ease and happiness. It is something like this which constitutes Nietzsche's conception of the standard of value and of the worth of life.

In several of his works he examines the ways in which different types of men view life. He sees the grave, retarding conceptions which pertain to many

aspects of Philosophies, Moralities, Religions, and Arts. There are men who are blind to every human greatness. Their cry is "we are all the same". In their vanity they often think themselves great whilst in reality they are only in the larva stage of human evolution and are stranded there. There are men, also, who partially see what greatness is, but they remain indifferent and even stupid. They say "the thing is too difficult", and thus the partial vision vanishes; they sink back into the pool of the petty interests of the day, and there they remain. Their souls have become smaller and smaller, and they hide their shallowness behind a mask of social and ethical conventions. There are, further, men who see the "Great" and are attracted to it, but their Will is timid over against what they see. And, also, there are others whose Will has been weakened by their adherence to what has been realized in the human world in the Past. They rest on this, and feel that the highest value of life consists in recovering and making effective once again what in the past possessed elements of greatness and significance. They view with wonder the achievements of great individuals in the Past, and hold that there is no possibility of greatness in any individuals of the Present, and, on the whole, they are without hope of great values appearing again *de novo* in the human world.

Nietzsche points out, of course, the presence of the pessimists in our midst. Their cry is always that "all is nothing". By their side stand the braggarts (*Maulhelden*) who *talk* of greatness, but in their

"inner parts" are empty of the kernel of it all. Other types come on the stage by Nietzsche. All in all, only a small group of men do we see as active in the real sense and who have constantly great aims in front of themselves, and who move steadily, through all opposition, towards such aims. Even within this group there are some who have a good deal of dross in their nature, and who are not entirely devoid of vanity and love of fame. When we view things in the light of this winnowing process, very few indeed are those who labour in a purely unselfish fashion for Greatness itself.

Nietzsche deals with the possibility of creating a larger number of such heroes. There is no ready-made pathway in front of them. The road has to be *made*. The man, in order to reach the other side of the *bridge*, has to become selfless, to throw ease and happiness to the winds, to become *hard against himself*. He has to become indifferent to all pains, sorrows, opposition, and disappointment. The power and greatness of the Over-man come into being and develop in an impersonal manner, and entirely uninfluenced by praise or blame. The secret of all is the conscious activity of a fulness of power. In such a man Life and the Will to Power reach a height beyond all human conventions. Such an Over-man brings about a "transvaluation of values". Some new creation has thus entered the world and has become a Norm and Theory of Values of what the life of the Over-man has witnessed and experienced on the summits.

Nietzsche was thus led inevitably to the radical

differentiation between men. In a very real sense some are not, and cannot be, more than serfs when compared with others. They have not paid, or cannot, or will not, pay the price. No values worthy of the name are brought into existence by such men, for they have never become masters of themselves and of the environment around them. They revolve in their own slavery, and this is due entirely to their own account. To quote again his words, they are in the larva state of life.

The great call of modern times, according to Nietzsche, is for a consciousness of the driving powers that are lying dormant in human life. The first condition is to awaken such powers and bring them into activity, for a man poor in driving-power can never become a great individual. The Over-man constantly affirms himself and the possibilities of his Will to Power. Every negation and every denial of the Will to Power arises out of weakness and narrows the power of the Will itself.

All progress is to happen by the intensification of the inner life and not by a betterment of the social conditions of life. Nietzsche states almost fanatically that Christianity is a religion of *Sklavenmoral.* He probably refers to the poor specimens he had come across, or to arid times in the history of the Christian religion. But it cannot certainly be held that Christianity was anything of the kind in the life of the Master and His Apostles. But it is not the object of this sketch to attempt to answer Nietzsche in this respect. There is much in our religious profession which does not lift us very far above the

ordinary routine moments of the day; and on account of our weakness the progress of human society is lamentably slow. A value often arises which promises much for the good of mankind, and is suddenly extinguished by counter-influences of doubt, indifference, and lethargy. Perhaps it was something of this nature that Nietzsche had in mind.

He held to the "eternal recurrence" of things. The real explanation of what this means is far from clear in his writings. Many great things have happened in the human world, and he was confident that they would happen again. The values of life and the Will to Power have often, like a river, run underground, only to come up again to the surface. Our deeds may remain buried for a long time, but once they have been awakened in the deeps of our nature they will recur, for after such an awakening, though we may flounder for a time in the shallows of life, the cosmic awakening of the Will prevents us from remaining satisfied with the thin and superficial goods of life, and the sudden recurrence of the Will will drive us on our upward march once more. The sum and substance of the whole matter with Nietzsche was: Live and work in the sense of the great spirits of mankind and of the great aims which they constantly set before themselves and which they constantly approached.

CHAPTER VI

PHENOMENOLOGY

Adolf Trendelenburg (1802–1872)

After the death of Hegel (1831) the pre-Kantian Philosophy was studied with avidity, especially Greek Philosophy and that of the Middle Ages. The revival dealt, in the main, with the Scholastics and with Aristotle. The prime mover of this movement was Adolf Trendelenburg. He was for many years Professor of Philosophy in Berlin. His fine feeling and exact scholarship have been noted in several places by his famous pupil Rudolf Eucken. Trendelenburg, in his *Logische Untersuchungen*, subjects the Formal Logic of the Kantians and the Dialectic of Hegel to a severe examination, and presents his own logico-metaphysical system, which soon became a speculative Theory of Knowledge. He based his Philosophy, in a large measure, on Aristotelianism, and thus gave a new orientation to the German Philosophy of the future. He holds that every science, on the one hand, leads to Metaphysics which endeavours to interpret "being" or "the existing" as the ground of particulars; and, on the other hand, every science leads to Logic, i.e. to the meaning of Thought. The two modes of investigation are necessary in order that the inner possibility of Knowledge may be understood, and in order that Thought may pass into Knowledge. According to him it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the true function of Logic lies beyond

its "formal" level, but, at the same time, Formal Logic has its legitimate place. Further than this, he criticizes Hegel's Logic on account of the fact that Hegel introduces alien elements from the external world and conceives of these as pure thought. All this goes through the sieve of the Dialectic and is patented then as "pure thought". Trendelenburg shows that there is no such thing as "pure thought". Many of the conceptions of Hegel are *external* elements: they do not become "pure thoughts" by merely thinking out their meaning. The things of the world are thus reduced by Hegel to nothing, and the true legitimate relations of thought and thing disappear.

In the external world—the world of things—every activity is linked to movement. The mechanical, chemical, and organic elements cannot be conceived without movement. Movement is also to be found in Thought. Movement conditions experience on all its levels; it is by means of some form or other of movement that we are able to perceive, conceive, and understand external objects. Experience links itself to matter, but in *spirit* man has become free. This freedom grants him the possibility of a knowledge of objects. This possibility has originated in the spirit that is in man, and it does not depend on mere experience. Such a "spirit" has originated from a source that is the *condition* of experience.

Trendelenburg presents practically the same form of Teleology as we find in Aristotle. He emphasized the necessity of possessing a strong hold on

the conception of Goals or Ends because it is in such a way alone that the meaning of the universe and life becomes clear to us, and that the "spirit" of man deepens and expands its own inherent freedom.

There is no space here to describe the great extent and depth of Trendelenburg's range of knowledge. As already pointed out, the germs of his teaching are to be found in Aristotle, at least most of them, but he himself was well versed in the various branches of the Natural Sciences of his day. Besides this, his logical investigations are of value even to-day, whilst in the domain of the History of Philosophy his teaching has been of great significance. His philological and philosophical investigations have been the means of enabling his successors to attack problems of Philology and History from the standpoint of their connection with Philosophy. It may further be stated that closely connected with some of the more religious sides of Trendelenburg's Aristotelian Philosophy we find the rise of the *New Thomism* in Germany amongst the Roman Catholic teachers of religion. This fact is not entirely due to the writings of Trendelenburg. The teaching of St. Thomas was on the wane amongst the Catholics of Germany until the appearance of the *Encyclica Aeterni Patris* of Leo XIII in the year 1879. Several Catholic Journals were soon founded in Germany. To-day a real revival in this direction is to be found in the Catholic Theological Faculties of several Universities with regard to the fundamental significance of the message of St. Thomas. This

movement will be dealt with at a later stage of our investigation.

Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848)

Bernard Bolzano was a Priest of the Roman Church, from which he was suspended in 1820. He looked on Leibniz as his great teacher, and left on one side the further development of the Kantian Philosophy. In many senses he is an opponent of subjectivism, although he constantly deals with an objectivity other than that of the external world. He recovers and carries farther the medieval teaching of "truths in themselves" (*Wahrheiten an sich*). Such truths are to be differentiated from the *act* of Judgment and constitute an *objective content of the Judgment.* In other words, they constitute the meaning or proposition and are independent of the *act of thinking them.* Thus they form Judgments in themselves (*Sätze an sich*). We are obliged to make a distinction between what *is* and what *is not.* Something either *is* or *is not.* And it makes a fundamental difference which of the two it is. If the *Satz an sich* is, we are obliged to ascribe to it some form of existence; whether it is expressed in words by anybody or not at any particular moment, or whether it is thought or not at any particular moment. Of course, it is impossible to ascribe a *physical* existence to the *Satz an sich*, but it has an *ideal* being or existence. As we shall see at a later stage, Bolzano's teaching has exercised deep influence on Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl in their presentation of Phenomenology.

Bolzano further develops certain aspects of Aesthetics and Metaphysics, based, in some measure, on the teaching of Leibniz. He was of opinion that the Beautiful was the result of the excitation of man's knowledge. With regard to the moral law, he viewed it as a power whose main end is the furtherance of the weal and morality of its members. But closest of all to Leibniz's idea is Bolzano's conception of the place of Metaphysics in life.

Things arise from monads, whilst dominant monads bring forth *souls*. Creation is thus spiritual and timeless and the world is infinite. Between the monads reciprocal relations arise. The teaching of Bolzano has undoubtedly shown itself as capable of developments especially within the realm of the higher Logic. This is quite evident from the work of several of his followers, such as Pálagyi, Bergmann, Husserl, and others.

Franz Brentano (1838–1917)

Brentano was for many years a Roman Catholic Priest, but later became Professor of Philosophy in Würzburg and afterwards in Vienna. In 1902 he retired. He may be designated as a psychologist. The more empirical side of his teaching is based upon Aristotle, whilst Scholasticism constituted the source of much of his material with regard to the important place of Psychology in Logic.

Psychology, in the first place, must be of a descriptive character. It is the science of psychical appearances and of inner perception. Inner observation is mediated by means of memory. The psychical part

of man's nature has immediate and absolute reality. The Sensations are designated by Brentano as *physical*, but the *act* of sensing is *psychical* in so far as it contains the content of the object. *This "containing of the content" intends (or means) the object.* Thus we find him agreeing with the Scholastics that the *Intention* means the non-existence of the physical object at the moment the content itself works. References certainly have to be made to external objects, but the *act and the meaning* have as their object the creation of *objects in themselves.* Many are such psychical phenomena in number and kind as, for instance, presentations, judgments, dispositions such as interest, love, hate, etc.

The Judgment presupposes Presentation and Perception, but is fundamentally different from these. It is, in fact, a particular and even a unique *act* of consciousness. The Judgment, further, is either an acceptation or a rejection. The acceptation constitutes a truth; the rejection (based on sufficient grounds) constitutes a falsity. Many Judgments have references to *Propositions of existence*, and thus it is not essential to consider these as originating from Subject and Predicate. But there are also *Impersonal* Judgments which do *not* deal with *existence*, but with *acceptation* or *rejection*. These latter are objects which have no counterpart in the physical world: their reality is found in consciousness alone.

Brentano shows that *Existence* is irrelevant within the domain of Judgment. When we state that "A is," we mean that A is known and recognized

as true; affirmation and negation are the forms of the judgment.

In the realm of Ethics Brentano may be termed an intuitionist. There is, he states, evidence of the "Good". An inner orientation of right stamps the nature of every moral act of Will.

Brentano's teaching has been the means of turning the attention of many thinkers towards other ways of conceiving the nature, modes, and functions of mind than those of Kant and his followers. We find Brentano's standpoint exerting a great influence on Meinong, Husserl, Heidegger, and many others, who are labouring to present Phenomenology as a mental discipline which will produce radical changes in our mode of attacking the way of Knowledge in the world *without* and the world *within*. A great deal of such teaching is contrary to some of the fundamental principles of Kant and his followers, especially in the domain of Psychology and the Theory of Knowledge of the relation of subject and object.

Julius Bergmann (1840–1904)

Bergmann was Professor of Philosophy at Königsberg and afterwards at Marburg. In 1868 he founded the *Philosophische Monatshefte*, which in 1894 was transformed into the *Archiv für Systematische Philosophie*. He wrote a large number of books on such subjects as *Problems of Ontology*, *Theory of Consciousness*, *Pure Logic*, *Being and Knowing*, *The Aim of History*, *The Idea of Rights*, *Metaphysics*, *Ethics*, *History of Philosophy*, and *Aesthetics*. He designated

his Philosophy as Objective Idealism. By this he meant that the physical world, together with Space, does not exist apart from our perception of it; and, on the other hand, something is presented to us which is not our own. He looked upon the external world, not as a *Ding an sich*, nor merely subjective, but as a content of a divine universal consciousness, and thus as *independent* of the knowing subject. The nature of the self is spirituality; it is not a special phenomenon of a material element, but an *existence in itself* (*Sein an sich*). In itself everything is a kind of self (*Ich*). Material bodies are appearances of monads which do not exist independently but together in common. The Laws of Nature are consequences which follow from the nature of the "Ground" of such Laws. In God, who is the unchangeable "Ground" of eternal change, every content is contained as a self-conscious unity or a soul. Existence (*Sein*) in its "Ground" is a consciousness perceiving itself. Metaphysics is the science of this *Sein*—of existing things, and, at the same time, a science of consciousness. Bergmann's teaching may thus be looked on as an Objective Idealism.

JOHANNES REHMKE (1843–)

Rehmke is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Greifswald. He may be termed an objective idealist and still there is much in his teaching that is allied to the immanent Philosophy of Schuppe. He is an opponent of every form of thought which sets up a doctrine of an unknown physical world

behind the world that is *perceived.* What we know is a world of the "Given", and this "Given" exists independently of every individual subject as content of a universal, all-inclusive, divine consciousness. A fundamental science should have as its object a presupposition of the "Given" in its most universal determinations. The splitting of the world into two realities of an entirely different kind is illegitimate. There is only one mode of *Being* and this is a "Being-Conscious" (*Bewusst-Sein*). The two forms of the two worlds are abstractions out of one world, and both forms possess the same kind of immediacy and certitude. The external and the internal worlds belong indissolubly together. The contents of perception are not pictures or images of things outside us, but are themselves the external things—i.e. the *other* of the self. External world and internal world, not-self and self, perceptual and non-perceptual existence, are contents of the soul which, though not a thing, "has" the things and knows of them in the form of immediacy. External world and internal world are the two abstract pieces of a world which the soul "has" or possesses.

The soul of man is able to "have" a world because it is non-material in its nature; it is *no thing* and *no substance,* but *concrete consciousness.* As non-material and individual essence the spirit of man is non-spatial; it is not in any particular place. Of course, having a body, the body is in space. Between body and mind (or spirit) there is a simple causal connection, and this causal connection is reciprocal—body has its effects upon spirit and spirit upon body.

Consciousness is neither a quality brought into being by means of presentations from the external world, nor is it an activity of the spirit, nor the common denominator of psychical experiences. Consciousness is a concept of relation—an expression for the relation of *content* to *spirit* (*or soul*). Soul or spirit is then a consciousness that finds itself in constant working unity with body. An unconscious spirit or soul is a contradiction.

Rehmke shows that consciousness, apart from what it possesses from the external world, has its own pure inward domain. This we find in the feelings of various kinds present in man. These feelings lead to much that is beyond pleasure and pain. They create a *Gemüt* or atmosphere, attitude, disposition, etc. Besides this, experiences can be changed. Will is viewed by Rehmke as a special determination of consciousness, which is present alongside of the knowing and feeling aspects. Thought must not be viewed as a mere activity, but as a spirit differentiating, unifying, conceptually determining. To form Judgments is to decide concerning any "Given", to determine or conceive any "Given" through a "Given".

The Will is the kernel of the individuation of the soul; it is a special determination of consciousness from the side of Feeling. Feeling, in its turn, is a determination of consciousness in its own state of inwardness.

Rehmke emphasizes the difference between the external world and the inner world of consciousness. Though they have reciprocal relations and effects

they seem to belong to realities of a different nature. The external world proceeds in accordance with causes which are material in their nature, whilst, on the other hand, what constitutes the inner world of consciousness must have proceeded from a "Given" of the same nature as itself and that actually exists in the universe.

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911)

Dilthey was for many years Professor of Philosophy in Berlin, and there ended his wonderfully interesting and important career. He was one of the most original thinkers Germany has produced since the time of Hegel. He was also probably the personality who, by means of his teaching, exercised the greatest influence upon the mind of his pupils, many of whom have become thinkers and writers of world-wide reputation. Dilthey combined the qualities of the man of letters and of the philosopher. His early work on the life of Schleiermacher has permanent value, whilst his *Introduction to the Mental Sciences* is of equal importance. It was extremely difficult to get him to write, but his connection for many years with the Berlin Academy of Sciences almost compelled him to take his turn in the reading of Papers. And these Papers have proved of great significance, and have stimulated thinkers such as Windelband, Rickert, Husserl, Benno Erdmann, Misch, Spranger, and many others to proceed farther on the same pathway of philosophical research. Dilthey was interested in Psychology as a science which seeks to make clear not only the connection of mind and

find material almost sufficient to create a History of Mind or Spirit. This is evidently more than a History of Philosophy; and it is not conceived in the speculative sense of Hegel's, but deals, in Dilthey's own words, with the personal experience, expression, reflection, and understanding of the mental sciences over against the meaning of things given in the natural sciences. The latter sciences are *mediate* and proceed by means of induction and deduction, in an external, abstract way, whilst the world of consciousness, in its meanings and values, is *immediate.*

The *content-side* of life interested Dilthey deeply, and he laboured to construct a philosophy of the spirit of man upon it. The deepest views and experiences of life are not found, he states, by postulating any anthropomorphic Deity over against man, but by the formation of deep connections of human experience, which can be perpetually raised to a higher consciousness. This higher consciousness, in its possible union with objective socio-spiritual power, constitutes a genuine religion in the deeper personality of man. This reminds us of Comte. The experience of man has "grades" through which he can pass. Many elements have to be taken into consideration concerning the mode of human development. All can be taken into account, and all is justified to be so taken, if one thing is borne in mind—that the greater reality of everything in the world is to be centred in the *understanding* and *valuing* of it. His teaching may thus, as already hinted, be termed objective idealism.

Dilthey was too much of a genuine artist to leave

the physical world out of account, and he was too much of a thinker not to supplement it by the experiences of the spirit. His real message was to call upon men to sink into the meaning and value of the science of society already attained in the world, and to carry this meaning and value to a higher summit, leaving (at present at least) metaphysical speculations on one side, and emphasizing the enormous development that can take place on the side of the deepening of the life of understanding, valuing, and continually experiencing through and through the best that comes to us.

We can thus see that Dilthey's differentiation of the physical and the mental sciences has been worked out in great detail and with great clearness by Windelband and Rickert, whilst, on the other hand, his contribution on *understanding* as a reality of its own (*an sich*) places him on the side of the School of Phenomenology. It may also be added that Dilthey's idea of *Understanding* (*Verstehen*) has been turned to some excellent uses by one of Dilthey's great pupils—Eduard Spranger. It looks, too, as though the growth of the new science of "Characterology", now so much in vogue in Germany, is due to seeds which Dilthey planted. There was something so beautifully naïve in his mind and mode of expression. No one whom I know could write on Philosophy in its deepest aspects in the simple and beautiful forms in which Dilthey wrote. He could be clear and simple without being superficial. More than anyone he showed that profundity and clarity can walk together hand in hand. When Dilthey's mode will be uni-

versalized it may happen that the problems of Philosophy will become popular without the need of popularizing them.

Alexius von Meinong (1853–1920)

Von Meinong was Professor of Philosophy at Graz, and was the founder of the first Psychological Institute in Austria in 1894. He started from some of the cardinal principles of Brentano, but soon branched off in other directions. In the first place, it is important to bear in mind that Meinong is a subtle psychologist and consequently all the problems which present themselves to him have to be attacked in his own personal way. On the other hand he is more than a psychologist. He is, of course, aware that Psychology, in the main, presents no more than the *way* of knowing. Beyond all this is *what is known*. Consequently Meinong branches out beyond Psychology to a Theory of Knowledge, and to a kind of Objectivism and *a priorism*, but not in the Kantian form. His Theory of Knowledge is based on Psychology, but is not a part of Psychology, and his Logic, although based on Psychology, is something other than that on which it is based.

Meinong's main contribution to Philosophy centres around his *Gegenstandtheorie* (Theory of the Object). Here he deals with Objectivity as a theory in itself, and from Objects in their relations he passes to Sensations, Perceptions, Concepts, and Judgments. According to him, there is a general and a special theory of the Object. His theory deals with *existing*

and *non-existing* objects. The mode of considering this theory of his is to conceive of it as *free of existence* and abstract; it does not trouble much about the external reality of the object itself whatever that may mean. The various relations of objects, such as equality, difference, number, etc., are *a priori*, immediate, and necessary, and these relations have to be taken into account. Independent of the experience of natural objects, for the time being, we are able to obtain an insight into these relations of objects, and it is so also with regard to Objects of Thought which have nothing real corresponding to them. In connection with these latter Objects of Thought, to which nothing real corresponds, we gain a knowledge of a general and of a special kind. Such a mode of conceiving objects is of great value in all the sciences. Such a mode further becomes a foundation for the *affirmation* of what is *accepted* (*Annahme*). The Presentation or Perception has a content and is directed towards an object, but such an object need not have real existence, as, for instance, a round triangle.

The "objects" fall into two kinds—objects and "objectivities" (objects of Judgment). The former are matter-of-fact objects; the latter are "objectivities" of *being* or of *resemblances of being* (*Sosein*). Instances of the *former* are common matters of fact, such as "the earth exists", "the earth is a planet". The *latter* do not lend themselves to the senses, but to a Predicate in the sense whether they are true, false, etc. "True", for instance, is a Judgment in so far as it conceives an "objectivity of being".

Meinong shows that there is a kind of "order" or system of levels pertaining to objects. The objects of the "higher order" are composed of relations and complexes; these are the "Superiora" which are established by means of the "Inferiora".

A priori relations ("black is not white") are obtained by *evidence* which is *free of existence*, or which does not exist in the things perceived. It is certainly true that we could not form the Judgment that "black is not white" had it not been that black *and* white *objects* had been perceived, but we have never had the perception that "black is not white". It is then true to say that such *a priori* knowledge is founded upon the natural objects perceived, but the real judgment with its evidence of certitude is no longer dependent upon the fact whether the "founding objects" exist or not. Knowledge is a Judgment which is true from *within*, though material from *without* has entered as an element in its formation. Of course, both the *Within* and the *Without* have to be taken into account, and it is for this reason that Meinong terms knowledge a "double fact".

Meinong shows that Experience as Perception is not a mere idea but an Existential Judgment with a positive objectivity; it deals with real objects and with direct evidence. In this statement we find an entire deviation from Kant. On the other hand, the object of the *inner* Perception is a *real existing* one of the nature of *immediacy*. Metaphysics rests upon experience but passes beyond it. Or, to express it otherwise, experience rests upon

outer Perception but passes beyond to *inner* Perception.

The fundamental psychical processes, according to Meinong, are Presentations, Judgments, Feeling, and Impulses. There are feelings of Perceptions and feelings of Judgments.

The Judgment has not only a "thetic" function, but also a "synthetic" function, i.e. Judgment is not only a Judgment concerning existing things, but also a Judgment concerning *So-sein*, i.e. a Judgment concerning an Object of Thought.

According to Meinong, there are then Judgments concerning existence (*Sein*) and Judgments concerning objects of thought (*Sosein*). To each Judgment there belongs a conviction—a belief in the truth of the Judgment. There is a mid-region between the Presentation or Perception and the Judgment, and Meinong terms this the region of the *Annahme*. "Annahme (acceptation) is Judgment without conviction." "Judgment is *Annahme* (acceptation) when conviction steps in." The *Annahmen* (acceptations) play a great part in the activities of fancy, play, art, hypotheses of various kinds, scientific fictions, etc., as well as in unperceivable objects.

He shows that feelings of the Judgment are found in the form of feelings of *knowledge* and of feelings of *value*. Knowledge, as already hinted, deals with objects of nature or with objects of thought. Value is such a relation that the object reacts upon the imaginative feeling of the person. Every value includes a relation to a subject, but at the same time there are true objectively founded values. The

theory of value is the basis of Ethics; and Ethics is a normative science which has to deal with the manner in which man considers his deeds and his omissions.

Theodor Lipps (1854-1914)

Lipps was made Professor of Philosophy at Munich in 1894, and remained there until his death. He is the author of a large number of volumes in various branches of Philosophy, and all of them reveal a subtle mind, especially in the domains of Psychology, Aesthetics, and Ethics. Lipps, an older man than Husserl, was in the field of Phenomenology at an earlier period, and has made important contributions which have formed a good deal of the basis of the Phenomenology of the present.

He looked upon Psychology as a fundamental mental science in which the branches of Logic, Aesthetics, and Logic have their roots. Psychology has nothing to do with the *content* of these branches, but deals with the analysis of the ground of human consciousness and of the various modes through which consciousness passes. In his *Selbstbewusstsein* he shows that although consciousness has connections and relations with things external to itself and to its body still these connections and relations do not constitute the nature or essence of the "real self". A stick in my hand has relations with consciousness; so in a closer way do the clothes which I wear; in a still more closer way my body; and, finally, in an even still more intimate way, the content of my perceptions, concepts, and ideas.

All these are somehow branches of a root of a real self which lies deeper than all, which gives being and meaning to them all. It is a great mistake to try and resolve the "real self" into any of these. It is therefore a mistake to conclude that the "real self"—the very kernel of our being—is a physiological thing. It is in its deepest root a psychical quality present in man.

This "real self" branches out in all kinds of directions, but it is always immanent and always present in the midst of all its branches. The mistake often made is to forget that the "real self" is active in every mode of consciousness and in every undertaking.

Philosophy is viewed by Lipps as "the mental science of inner experience". Logic is a psychological training or discipline. In its elementary stages it has to deal with the analysis and examination of Propositions and proceeds in an inductive manner. Material is thus formed within consciousness which passes beyond the *factual.* Hence, in what is termed Pure Logic, we are dealing with material which constitutes the Laws of over-individual thought, or, as such material may be also designated, Laws of Reason. In his later works he emphasizes the need of a pure science of consciousness in contradistinction from what is termed individual Psychology—such a Psychology as will deal with the ways of knowing and with the play and individual connections of mental elements within consciousness. Along with this there is the further demand for an *awakening* consciousness for con-

sidering what is *thought* and *valued* as *objective*, but, of course, not outwardly but inwardly objective. We thus see once more, in this important point, Lipps's contribution to the formation of a Philosophy of Phenomenology. He views the consciousness of objectivity, in the first place, as a *feeling* of perceptive binding or unity, somewhat on the lines of Husserl's *Einklammerung* or mental bracketing. Every personal experience is not merely subjective, but is objectively conditioned as well. There is present in such an experience an apperception if not of an object in space, yet of a pure object, i.e. of what stands conceptually over against the self that reflects. Thus this particular kind of object is not a *mere content in* the self, but *for* the self; it stands over against the "psychical acts" of the self. This object is not an immediate content of consciousness but is *what is meant*, what forms a goal for the self, and what is beyond Perception. This way of viewing the object is an actuality and a demand of the conscious self. In this actuality and demand objective relations are contained, and such relations are experiences of apperception. The relations are logical and *a priori*. They are logical in the sense of what has been constructed in a harmonious way by the self; they are *a priori* in the sense that before all else they are the nature and mode of working of the mind itself.

Lipps's work on Psychology is also of importance. Psychology should not be handled merely in a physiological sense. Its main object is to further a science of individual consciousness—of what is

termed mind or soul—and to further as well the manner and meaning of psychic presentations. These psychical processes are to be described, analysed, and conceived, and this kind of work is to continue. This inner Perception is a "backward glance"—a re-experiencing in the Present. The object which presents itself to inner Perception has absolute reality. We are *unconscious* of the nature of the *psychical act* which does this kind of work, but we are conscious of the *content* which is brought into existence by means of such an act. There seems, then, to be present in us some kind of psychical energy which engenders all that we come to possess. Associations of various, mysterious, and all-important kinds are forms within the self, and all this is a proof of the activity and unity of the spirit of man.

Characteristic of psychical happenings within the self is the fact of *striving* or *effort*. It is grounded in the very nature of man. It means the necessity of the march of man to further realizations of the conscious meaning and value of the potential reality which is within himself. There are active and passive strivings: there is *my* striving and there is a striving *in* me. It is a striving to go farther and to overcome hindrances. There are also *feelings* in man: they are experiences of the self and symptoms of the manner in which psychical processes move and how the psychical life relates itself, places itself, connects and joints itself. "The Will", in its turn, "is this striving operating in order that something may happen through me, through my deeds."

As already hinted, Apperception plays an important part in Lipps's teaching. He is probably indebted to Herbart and Wundt for the prominent place which he gives to it. The meaning of Apperception is that we bring the content into ever closer relation to our self-feeling and also bring it into the system or order of our self-consciousness.

Lipps emphasized, further, the conviction of *possibilities* which are present within the self. There are possibilities, in the first place, grounded in the self so that it is capable of becoming more and more a complete personality. The more this happens the more does the self come to realize its own nature —that it is not a mere phantom or a mere appearance of something. It knows that it has connections of the closest kind with the brain, but it also knows that it is *an sich* of the brain. The real ego is a transcendent cosmic ego in a determined point, and consequently is limited and imperfect. But it need not remain where it is, and it must always be on the move; it has, through a consciousness of the conviction of its possibilities, to adapt itself towards ever new realms of ends; and this work is accomplished by the work of the Will in a teleological manner.

In his *Ethische Grundfragen* Lipps deals with the various values of life, such as Egoism and Altruism, Fundamental Moral Motives and Evil, Utilitarianism, Moral Right, the highest Moral Norms and Conscience, the System of Ends, the Social Organism, Freedom of the Will, Responsibility

and Punishment. He concludes this splendid book by stating that Kant had given us three questions to answer in life. What we in reality are depends upon the way in which we answer them. What can we know? What shall we do? What may we hope? Lipps states that in so far as we *know*, the highest and final things are partially hidden from us. But we can move on towards such a goal as is presented in our highest conceptions. What shall we do? We shall and can do the *Good*. And what may we hope? We may hope that the Good, which we on our part strive to realize, will more and more come to an ever fuller realization, although by slow degrees, in the life of mankind.

Lipps kept in very close contact with natural philosophy and was fully aware of its important contributions concerning the nature of the physical universe; but as a distinguished psychologist and philosopher he was also aware that such contributions were not all inclusive in so far as the mind and spirit of man are concerned. He saw that much in the conception of Evolution must be interpreted in a mechanical way, but such a mechanical way is subject to the conception of certain forms of Ends which are clearly perceptible. The nature of consciousness is also subject to Ends and Laws of its own. If *rerum cognoscere causas* is true of the things of the natural world, γνῶθι σεαυτόν is none the less true of the things of the spirit. The notes of the music in consciousness get blended into a harmony other than that of the conclusions of the physical world.

EDMUND HUSSERL (1859–)

Husserl was educated under Brentano. He became Professor of Philosophy, first at Göttingen and afterwards at Freiburg-in-Breisgau. He retired from his "Chair" in 1929 in order to obtain greater leisure for his future writings. He has become the founder of one of the most important Schools of Philosophy in the world. As has been pointed out in several places in this volume, the Kantian Philosophy, although important discussions and modifications had continually taken place in connection with a number of conceptions found in it, reigned, on the whole, supreme. Certain feeble attempts had now and then been made to revive Hegelianism, but they soon passed away without leaving any appreciable effect behind themselves. At present these attempts are again revived and that with a much greater philosophical insight than before, and such a revival, blended with elements of Kantianism, is likely to increase in the future. But the increase probably will be small compared with the Phenomenological Logic and Transcendentalism which Husserl and his pupils are presenting before the philosophical world.

In a sketch of this nature it is impossible to deal adequately with the value and significance of Phenomenology. Until the present moment the conclusions attained by Phenomenology are on the whole confined within the domains of Logic and the Theory of Knowledge; but several of Husserl's pupils, such as Heidegger, Becker, and others, are

beginning to apply phenomenological methods and results to the interpretation of the universe and of life. I am under the strong impression that such attempts will succeed, and will transform many of the Kantian and neo-Kantian conceptions of the present.

Husserl has been deeply influenced by Plato, the Scholastics, Bolzano, and Brentano. In June 1920 he visited London and delivered four lectures at University College on "Phenomenological Method and Phenomenological Philosophy". These lectures gave an excellent conspectus of a large part of the field which Phenomenology attempts to investigate. I do not think that I can do better than attempt to amplify the notes which I took at these lectures with the aid of Husserl's published works.

One of Husserl's main objects is to place the Theory of Knowledge on a basis other than the Kantian one. The weakness of the Kantian foundation consists in its extreme subjectivity. The need, therefore, of a new philosophical science has arisen which will bring about a radical change in the attitude of personal experience towards knowledge. We are certain of the *ego knowing*. In this fact there is present a *transcendental* phenomenological subjectivity over against the *psychological* experience. The two kinds of experiences are entirely different, and Kant did not sufficiently distinguish this difference. Phenomenology is a new *a priori* science derived from phenomenological intuition. This phenomenological intuition is no ready-made kind of thing. The intuition

(*Anschauung*) is a direct inward perception of the essence or nature of the object (*Wesensschau*). This new science deals with all the *ideal possibilities* which are created by the self—ideal possibilities which occur within the periphery of phenomenological subjectivity in accordance with the forms and the laws of their being or existence.

Phenomenology, too, deals with conscious subjects with regard to the mental relations which they have with each other. In these mental relations a transcendental sociological Phenomenology is created. Further, Phenomenology deals with Logic, which interprets what is present in the *act* of knowing, in the *significance* of knowledge, and in the *objectivity* of knowledge. The development of such a Logic leads, by an inner necessity, to an *arrangement* and to the formation of a *totality* of all possible *a priori* sciences. This work constitutes what Husserl calls First Philosophy. Clearness of views with regard to the matters dealt with by First Philosophy renders it capable of forming sciences of *fact* or Second Philosophy. These *second* kinds of science are only rendered possible by means of the absolutely clear and ultimate principles of First Philosophy. It is the First Philosophy which belongs to the essence of Phenomenology, and Phenomenology is thus the *in-itself* (*an sich*) of an absolutely clear science of *sources*. This *in-itself* contains the theoretical system and principles of all the sciences of the Second Philosophy. These principles form, then, principles of construction, in *a priori* forms, of all the sciences of reality (or of the

natural world), and it has to be borne in mind that they constitute the *Forms* as well as the Principles—the Forms which have to be applied in order to interpret the subject-matter of such *second* sciences.

The object of Phenomenology is, then, to explain all sciences of reality (Natural Sciences) from the point of view of an *a priori insight*. That is the farthest "ground" of the sources we can reach. There cannot be anything (in us at least) which can give us a "metaphysic" which is behind or beneath this "ground", and there cannot be any sciences of the *second dimension* (i.e. Natural Sciences) which rest on their own "ground". It is on the phenomenological *a priori* source just mentioned that any and every science finds its justification and meaning. Thus the source of all this is *philosophical*, i.e. it is *conceptual* alone, so that the source of all, in the most comprehensive way, that is scientific lies in Phenomenology.

Husserl pleads for a return, in certain respects, to Plato, who strove for a universal system of a knowledge which is beyond the possibility of a denial. Also, Descartes's great contribution consists in the fact that he rediscovered and expanded the Platonic conception of knowledge. He saw that this was the meaning of Plato's *Ethos*. Plato was aware of a conscious, ethical demand in human nature for knowledge. After Plato's time this conception ran underground for a very long time. Descartes recovered it, and thus pleaded for intellectual conscientiousness. By becoming aware of such an inward demand man becomes a philosopher.

This ethical demand begins as a meditation on the ego or self. With Descartes, as we shall presently see, this meditation was largely devoid of content: it was good as far as it went, but it did not go very far. Where Descartes stops Husserl begins. When this awareness of the ego or self takes the form of meditation, especially with regard to the *content* that is within, all kinds of quests and questions arise. One of the main questions that arises, for instance, is the demand for *sufficient evidence* concerning any and every question and problem that present themselves; and this evidence, if it is to lead to real knowledge, has to be of an apodeictic character. We are here searching for the source or the foundation-meaning of what is presented to the self. Thus the final "ground" of every form of Philosophy must be *experience*, and such an experience must be of an apodeictic nature.

Descartes reached his conception of the *ego cogito* by negating the sensuous world. But Husserl, whilst agreeing to the need of occasional negations of the sensuous world—and this must happen when we deal with ideal forms and possibilities—shows the necessity of dealing with and reflecting upon the *inward a priori content* that is forming in consciousness. The Cartesian method is then in need of a revision. The mere naïve way of conceiving and even of emphasizing the meaning of the "I am" and the "I think" does not take us very far. It is certainly a good elementary beginning, but one must follow the road farther and ever farther and emphasize and grasp the *ego cogito* in apodeictic evidence. It

is in this way that the phenomenological method comes to its own. This transcendental phenomenological attitude attempts to conceive the *ego cogito* as constituting a view unique and complete in itself. This phenomenological subjectivity is not the conception of Descartes: that was merely psychological in its nature. Phenomenology is not an awareness of a *psychological* inner experience but an experience of self in all its contents as well as an experience of the *act* which operates in knowing both the external world and the world of consciousness.

Husserl emphasizes the need of obtaining a real principle of a true *beginning* in connection with our knowledge and of ourselves. We cannot, evidently, begin with a metaphysic or with any form of speculation. The real source of our view of self and the world does not fall upon us in any ready-made kind of fashion, but we must become inquirers and explorers, tentatively, it is true, at the start, but plumbing ever deeper. And at first we obtain the needful help by means of "bracketing" (*Einklammerung*) or synthesizing various partial experiences which are present in us. We must beware of taking as sufficient any naïve assertions concerning the nature of any object which is under consideration or any objective judgments concerning the various perceptive appearances of external or internal objects. The *Einklammerung* allows only further reflective Judgments on the Judgments which are the individual's own phenomena. Such reflective Judgments do not deal with the initial stage of the actuality or existence (*Sein*) of the object, but with

objects *as such* (*Sosein*) i.e. with objects as they reveal themselves in their meaning—as they reveal themselves in their *Sosein*. Such fruitful Judgments in their *Sosein* are thus of the nature of an immediate experience (*Erlebnis*). Thus, further, *intentionality* emerges with regard to the true meaning of the object under consideration. Of course, the existence (its *Sein*) of the object is not ignored, but if we finish instead of actually beginning there we merely view the object in its superficial qualities alone. The essence of *intentionality* is that we *mean* the object.

Many factors have to be taken into consideration in connection with a true knowledge of an object. Perception deals with the immediate present; recollection deals with the immediate past; memory deals with a more remote past. These are various modes of approaching the *intention* or the meaning of an object. We may often have to begin with external aids in the form of signs, pictures, expression, etc., as these are perceived directly from the objects. But we dare not finish there. We must pass on to an *Einfühlung*—to an immediateness of feeling which has entered the circle of the content —as the content now reveals itself in its *Sosein* (in its *as such*). We thus obtain an *intuitive* mode of experiencing the meaning and value of the object. We are thus forming a *continuous inward Perception* and a *synthetic unity* within consciousness concerning the object, and all this must have no terminus. The continually one and the same object of Perception, viewed in this manner, rolls on like a snowball, gathering to itself, and means more and more as it

goes along viewing the object in this phenomenological way. The object thus comes to possess more and more *ideality* in its *intention.* The object now comes to be viewed more and more as it is *intended and meant.* There is thus present in the *intent* of the object infinitely more than is present in the initial stages of sensuous Perception. The *sensuous form,* then, of an object is far less than the *intentional form* which is created by the reflective experience of man.

There are various modes of approaching the object simply because objects have to be known from so many standpoints, and as they are also of a very varied nature. There may be actual objects, possible or probable objects, and doubtful ones. By taking this fact into account we find certitude, or probability, or non-being as characteristics of objects. The ego or self is the centre of attending, of becoming convinced, of becoming doubtful, of negating. These various conclusions lead to the fact that the self or ego is the central power which deals with the cognitive, affective, and conative modes of unfolding what is *intended* or *meant* in the object.

Husserl is of opinion that it is possible, by taking into account what has been stated above, to form a science of the *ego* from the standpoint of Logic. A further consideration may be taken into account at this point. It has to be borne in mind that phenomenological subjectivity is not confined within the limits of the present moment of the *ego* or of present times. It extends backwards and forwards

to an endless Past and Future. But as there are possibilities of *doubt* with regard to the *intentional meaning* of the Past and the Future there arises the necessity of the elimination often of the material to what is *actually given*. But here again we find that we cannot possibly stop at any fixed meaning or at any sphere of the merely Present. It is certain that we cannot remain on the empirical level; it is also certain that the First Philosophy, or "beginning", must *increase* in its *intentional meaning*. Much help can be obtained by the extension of our notion of experience. *A priori* certitudes are to be found in the sphere of the transcendental self; of the self also in its philosophizing attitude; and of taking into consideration the self from the side of Logic—a side which enables us to have access to the essence and the essential laws of the self in the form of adequate and apodeictic evidence. The *Einklammerung* (the bracketing, the synthesizing) of all transcendental possibilities must consist of objects which can be reduced into possibilities of a *logical* character. In other words, the transcendental natural possibilities constitute the *content*; the logical self works upon this content and brings it under the control of order and absolute evidence. We thus obtain an essential theory of our possible ego-logical certitudes which has the backing of absolute evidence. And this is what the "First Philosophy" means. In this particular investigation there is at the higher stages an *elimination* of the sense-data found in sensuous fields. At a level higher than the empirical one we find reference to an ego or self,

to consciousness, and to *intentional objectivity*. But this happens *prior* to such questions as those concerning the consciousness, the intentional objectivity, and the validity of truth and reality. So the prior level has to be passed to that of the *Phenomenology of Reason*. A vast array of problems arise on the horizon at this latter level. We have to ask, What are right and validity? What is the relation of knowledge to objectivities, to things *per se*, to ideas, to theories, to valid truths, valid ideals, norms, values, etc., and, further, we have to ask, How can what is purely subjective acquire transcendental objective significance? Husserl states that we have constantly to bear in mind that it is the *ego* that has to accomplish all this stupendous task. All this work of the *ego*, then, shows that every form of objectivity is what it is only through *intentional meaning and significance*. There is, therefore, only one absolute, concrete "being"—the "being" of transcendental subjectivity, i.e. the *ego*. The conclusion is, then, that any ultimate justification of Knowledge is only possible in the form of adequate and essential *Knowledge of Knowledge*. The method leads beyond Logic to an *a priori deduction of all categories of being*. Thus Husserl arrives at a transcendental monadism which must inevitably take up such problems as those of teleology, the meaning of the world and of the world's history, and, finally, the meaning of God.

A fuller account of Husserl and his School will be given in Volume II.

CHAPTER VII

THE RELIGIOUS *A PRIORI* SCHOOL

HERMANN SIEBECK (1842-1920)

Hermann Siebeck's main studies were Philology and Philosophy. For many years previous to his death he was Professor of Philosophy at Giessen. He is the author of works on Aesthetics, Consciousness, the History of Psychology, the Philosophy of the Greeks, the Philosophy of Religion, and many valuable Essays. Originally he was a Herbartian, but later moved towards Kant's conclusions concerning transcendental Aesthetic and Logic and the ultimate conclusions of the *Critique of Practical Reason.*

When we view the world, he points out, we see a development from the inorganic to the organic, and from the organic, step by step, to the life of human personality. In the self-consciousness of man personality reaches the acme of this development and consequently possesses a unique kind of worth. On this highest level personality has come into possession of an autonomy *sui generis*, but which at the same time retains its connection with the natural and living development which preceded this autonomy. The process of development which takes place *below* the human level shows a kind of unconscious effort towards Ends, but in man the Ends become objects of thought and will which he is able to set before himself, feeling, when he does this, that he is carrying farther

the evolution of his own personality. This goal includes the *spiritualization* of his natural life and the raising of it to a religious level. All this work cannot come about without *thought*, and thus thought becomes an indispensable aid for the furtherance of the practical life. As the consciousness of man feels itself in possession of the possibility of a further development of the substance or reality that is within itself, it is capable of forming Judgments of Value concerning what are offered to it from the side of the world. It is true that man is part of the world, but the very fact that he is able to select and reject, to frame judgments concerning what is offered to him, he concludes that the quality which does this is of a nature other than the things of the world. He is conscious that there is something in man which constitutes an element which is grounded in something of the same nature as itself. There are thus *active* and *passive* moments in man. In the passive moments he is conscious of the "Ground" of his spiritual nature; in the active moments he endeavours to come into ever closer relation with this "Ground" of his being. The active and the passive sides must work reciprocally on each other. Siebeck's great significance is in the realm of a Philosophy of Religion, and it is to this we now turn.

He emphasizes the fact that the nature of the religious consciousness is different from a metaphysic. Religious problems have to be treated, on the one hand, in their relation to the nature and worth of personality, and, on the other hand, in their

relation to civilization and culture. The starting-point for any fruitful investigation concerning religion is to take into consideration the fact that religion is an *actuality* and not any kind of presupposition. Religion is a factor, amongst other factors, in the civilization and social life of mankind. Religion, just like the factors of science, art, and society, is found wherever a communal life develops into culture and civilization. Of course, there has been an evolution of religion. The insight into what man once *was* and now *is* shows that he did not possess religion in the full sense of the term, though seeds of such a development were there. When we look back we find that religion proceeds alongside of other factors: reciprocal effects take place between religion on the one hand, and civilization and culture on the other. There is a relation between the two sides. There is not only a friendly relation but also a critical one as well.

Religion has insisted that the existence and value of this physical world are not valid or final in the last resort. In the world of religion there are other values to which the values of this physical world must become subservient. The work of man within the domain of the physical world is capable of accomplishing much without taking religion into consideration. But in spite of this fact the highest aims and values of human life are set in a world higher than the present one. Religion postulates another domain—an *over-world*—one of the highest spiritual values. Thus the absoluteness of the factors which deal with the world is denied by religion as

being final. And religion, in its true nature, insists on all this. On the other hand, the same claim is made by the meaning of the physical world with regard to itself as being the only real and final world we can know and experience. As already stated, there is a sense in which religion connects itself with the meaning of the world, and a sense in which it differentiates itself from such a meaning. In the latter sense a cleavage is made between all forms of knowledge of the physical world on the one hand, and religious experience on the other. He who holds that the "given" earthly reality is the only reality that has to be considered will look on religion as an illusion. But he who is religiously disposed will see in religion the transcendental "Ground" of the world itself. When thought is exercised in this latter sense a totally different view of the world is presented from that offered from the standpoint of viewing the present world as all-sufficient.

Siebeck shows that in order to become convinced of the presence of an over-sensuous world we are to pass far beyond any knowledge drawn from analogy. This is true from the side of thought; it is truer still from the side of feeling. The characteristic, though not the sole, organ of religion is feeling. But such a feeling is not something opposed to thought. The epoch-making transformations in the life of civilization and culture were conditioned by thought, but *originally* they arose from conditions which included potencies which had arisen from the total-life of the time in the form of a filtering of common experiences into feeling.

There have been certain epochs in the history of the world which revealed the great significance of religion. These epochs constitute a break with the present world; and it is the content of what lies *beyond* the world which constitutes that part of religion which has actual significance for the lives of men, which guides them, interprets the present world for them, and which endures. History bears witness and emphasizes such a new depth of life which was obtained by means of a break with the physical world. Religion, in many instances, has not accommodated itself to the best that was in the world, for great personalities have arisen who have realized something better than that best. Often a *downward* tendency has taken place by accommodating religion to the norms of the social life. An *upward* tendency is visible whenever the demands of the social life conform to the ideas and ideals of the over-world as revealed by great personalities and by the blending of great ideas, ideals, and aspirations which were previously separated.

A positive value or good stands clear over against the things of the world. This has to be recognized if the things of the world are not to swamp us. Such a "good" is present not as something whose existence needs proof. This "good" constitutes the norm which has made civilization what it is. Infinitely more than anything in the physical environment has the idea of the "good" affected man by civilizing and moralizing his nature. The human world was thus made to correspond to the nature and demands of *thought* and its ethical content.

All conceptual and ethical norms must be viewed as *over-world* contents. Such norms are contents of self-consciousness and they have been the means of creating Judgments of Value. Siebeck would not state that even all this includes the deepest nucleus of religion. This realm of Values is a midway one between the empirical life and the life of religious experience. In religious experience it is felt that the highest ideal is inadequate to express the Highest Reality. The highest ideal has to point to what is beyond itself. Still it is necessary to climb to the realm of values as these values reveal themselves as conclusions of thought. There is a real *over-world* to be found in these values. It is necessary to know the content of this over-world; it is necessary, too, to strive to enter there. In the latter case something besides thought operates. An inner experience of a deeper nature than the conceptual one has to be awakened before man starts on the enterprise to *possess* what he *knows*. If this happens, the next step comes within the man's purview. The conception of the *over-world* is extended; it postulates a conception of a Reality that includes the best, and infinitely more than the best that is in human personality on its highest possible level. *The idea of God arises*. God is thus postulated as a causal principle and as an ethico-ideal principle. The religious consciousness passes beyond a *knowledge* of this to a *personal relation* therewith. The nerve of this conception is not God as the creator and sustainer of the world, but God as something absolutely necessary for the will and the heart of man in his

further evolution. The relation passes beyond an analogy, and becomes a personal relation of Will to Will. The Will of God is thus viewed as what cannot arise from merely human motives and cannot be something directed towards merely human aims. Hence the conception of *Holiness* arises in man. All this alters man's whole individual life and all his relations to the world. The soul now realizes what is not of this world.

Metaphysics, as Siebeck shows, can lead us in an intellectual sense very near to this domain, but as it is purely conceptual it can never supply the religious need of man. Religion has legitimate conceptual grounds from the standpoint of metaphysics, but the relation in religion itself—a relation which springs from claims and demands and aspirations of man to overcome the world—is an *individual* relation. And in the last resort such individual religious experience can be independent of any metaphysical conceptions. Man, when possessing genuine religious experience, becomes convinced of the continuity of the Values which are rooted in his nature, and may be more and more unfolded there; and this experience may be termed faith. Increase of Spiritual Values in all their forms, faith in the Source, and so in the continuity of the Values, become the objects of man in his journey through this world of space and time. But it is a journey, in some such manner as is depicted by Siebeck, with eternity in man's heart; and what is in him now is only a prelude to the "hundredfold" increase that is in store for him in a world beyond.

Gustav Class (1836–1908)

Class was for several years a teacher in a High School before he was appointed Assistant Professor at Tübingen, where he remained from 1874 to 1878. In the latter year he was called to Erlangen as Professor, where he remained until 1901, when he had to retire on account of ill-health. His writings are not numerous; the most important of them are *Ideale und Güter* (a short treatise on Ethics), *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Ontologie des menschlichen Geistes*, and *Die Realität der Gottesidee*. The volumes remained practically unnoticed in Germany, and also elsewhere, but attention is beginning to be called to them, and their great value in reference to Ethics, Psychology, Metaphysics, and Religion is being emphasized by several eminent writers of the present day. The teaching, on the whole, is allied to that of Eucken and of Siebeck, but in many respects penetrates deeper into the nature of religious experience than the works of these two thinkers.

In *Ideale und Güter* Class presents a theory of Ethics which deals with the mode of development of the mental and spiritual life of man. The content of human life, as treated by Ethics, is to be discovered in the contributions made by religion, rights and morality, civilization and culture, which qualities we find, more or less, in the lives of all known peoples. Within the domains of these three sources of contributions we discover unconditioned affirmative *imperatives* which possess *universality*. The

three domains reveal themselves, not as results of man's relation to the universe, but as claims and demands which are to be found in the inner nature of man himself. An inner affirmation and a belief in the reality of the content of this affirmation are to be found indissolubly bound up with these unconditioned imperatives. These various imperatives find their unity in the ideal which reveals itself in inner experience as inner knowledge of the worth or value of these imperatives. The unconditioned imperatives in which life finds its ideals constitute the domain of a "higher humanity". Man is obliged to make a distinction between the content of such ideals of imperatives, on the one hand, and the ordinary things which present themselves to him in his relation to the environment or the ordinary life, on the other. Thus the ideal which Class presents for man in order that he may reach the level of a "higher humanity" is a *theoretical* one. This *theoretical* ideal has to become a norm for all the *practical* actions and purposes of life. It is true that within the domain of the good life, considered in this way, the idea of God may not be present. But at the same time the idea of God becomes present when man seeks for the *Ground* of these imperatives. And it is with this latter question that Class deals in his second book which investigates the phenomenology and ontology of the human mind and spirit. The treatment now includes an examination into the true being or reality of these imperatives, claims, and demands which are to be found within the human spirit. In the first part of the second book

he deals with the same subjects as were dealt with in the Ethics, with the difference, as already stated, that he wishes to discover the general, cosmic nature of these imperatives. In the material that is presented to the human spirit from the three domains dealt with in the Ethics, Class finds that the contributions of the three are more than individual, subjective contributions and have a significance on the course of humanity, and also are a revelation of what is like themselves in the universe and in the universal life of mankind. The contribution of religion shows the relation of man to the over-sensuous Ground of Reality. The contribution of rights and morality shows the relation of the individual to other persons. The contribution of civilization and culture shows how contents of absolute importance have arisen in the course of history—contents which give meaning, value, and significance to the life of the individual and to the collective life of mankind.

The second part of the book deals with the way in which man can come to the realization of the Ground of Reality and can have communication with this Ground. He shows what is to be found in the content of the life of the spirit of man. First of all, he finds there thinking, feeling, and willing in the form of activity. This individual content is made up of an *historical* content. There are present in the world systems of thought which have gradually grown on the soil of history. These complexes of thought need the mind and soul of man in order that they may be thought, experienced, and lived. Such a

content has to be sharply differentiated from any personal inclinations of the individual and from the ordinary things of daily experience. Thus Class finds two kinds of contents in man which constitute two kinds of life in him as well. There is in man, on the one hand, the personal, natural life which arises from feeling; there is in him, on the other hand, the spiritual life which arises from thought. There is a relation between the two such lives as are to be found within the same individual. But the imperatives of the nature of man undeniably state that the two forms are forms of two different kinds of reality, however close the relation may be. The imperatives show clearly that the natural life should be subservient to the meaning which the life of the spirit reveals. Class concludes that we are thus obliged to consider the higher life of the spirit as real. Indeed, *spirit*—the spirit that is in man—is the *true reality*. This true reality of spirit is a content of thought and not of any material element. The content of thought cannot die because death is a property of the material element in man. It is impossible for such mental and spiritual contents to be destroyed, for by their very nature they are realities that are not entrapped in space and time. To Class this is the inevitable conclusion that we must arrive at. And if so, there must exist in the universe many possibilities for the living existence of personal spirits. And, further, we are obliged to infer that what is in the higher spirit of man has its root in an Absolute and Personal Spirit. This idea is worked out by Class with great charm

and power from historical and unhistorical (or personal) points of view in his final small volume on God.

Rudolf Eucken (1846–1926)

Rudolf Eucken received his education at Göttingen and Berlin. On many occasions he confessed to the present writer his indebtedness to the theologian Reuter, who was one of his masters at the *Gymnasium*, prior to his entrance to the University of Göttingen. Reuter succeeded in deepening still further the religious feeling which Eucken's mother had already succeeded in planting within him. He also confessed to me that his indebtedness to Lotze was confined to his intellectual development; his young life was yearning for more than could be presented in a scientific and philosophical direction. When he entered the University of Berlin he found the very nourishment which his deepest personality was in search of. This he found in the spirit and influence of Adolf Trendelenburg, who was Professor of Philosophy there. Trendelenburg led him to the secrets of Plato and Aristotle, and this experience gave a new personal orientation to his life. After taking his degree at Göttingen he became a teacher in a High School for about five years, when he received a "call" to the professorship of Philosophy in the University of Basel in 1871. Nietzsche was there too as Professor of Classical Philology; and in later years Eucken spoke of him as one of the kindest and gentlest of men. In 1874 Eucken received a "call" to the University of Jena, and there,

in spite of several invitations, he remained until his death in 1926.

His early studies were concerned with the Philosophy of Aristotle. He also, amidst his professorial work, managed to acquaint himself with the great problems of Philosophy as well as with the history of these problems and of philosophical terminology. He soon became interested in the message of a true Philosophy with regard to the views which it had presented, and could present again, of the relation of man to what is *around* him, *within* him, and *above* him. This particular message is splendidly illustrated in his great book on the views of the Great Thinkers of the ages. Trendelenburg had already shown him the importance of History and the need of taking a wide sweep in relation to the meaning and value of philosophical conceptions. After the appearance of several small works we find him issuing, in 1885, another small work entitled *Prolegomena zu Forschungen über die Einheit des Geisteslebens in Bewusstsein und Tat der Menschheit.* It is only 114 pages, but it contains the seed of practically all his essential teaching in the future. This small volume was amplified, expanded, and deepened in Eucken's greatest book—*Einheit des Geisteslebens* — which appeared in 1888. It is a volume of 500 pages of closely printed matter. Hardly any notice was taken of it at the time. And, indeed, this is true as far as Germany is concerned until late in his life. The tide in his favour turned in the beginning of the present century. By the end of the first decade

of this century Eucken's name and teaching had been carried to the farthermost ends of the earth. In 1908 he received the Nobel Prize for Literature, and his name and fame drew hundreds of students to his lectures. His life was a simple and a very happy one in all respects, and those who came into close contact with him found in him a genuine friend and an inspirer of their lives. The temptation is great to continue in this strain, but has to be resisted in a short sketch of his teaching.

His teaching is centred on the conception of what he termed the *Geistesleben*—the life of the spirit. He had seen the enormous growth of *technics* in his generation. Much had come into existence which had made the physical and social life of man more bearable and even more pleasurable, but in the midst of plenty man's deepest experience and bliss had remained empty. Man was less of a personality than his predecessors, who had often lived in want so far as external things were concerned. He had also witnessed the growth of the Natural Sciences with their (in the main) materialistic conclusions regarding all ontological questions—conclusions which had dampened the ardour of man for the possession of the "light that never was on sea or land". The spirit of man was partially crushed under the weight of materialistic conclusions which offered stones rather than bread for the further development of the half-latent claims, aspirations, and demands which are to be found intuitively in the deepest layer of human personality. Finally, Eucken had witnessed great progress in several branches of the mental

sciences. For example, Psychology was advancing towards the close of the nineteenth century at an enormous pace. Physiological and Psychological Laboratories had been opened at Leipzig and Berlin, and crowds of students were rushing to these from Germany, Britain, and America. Doubtless they threw much light on the relations of body and mind, on reactions and interactions, on the physiological processes connected with memory, dreams, desires, etc. But the problem of meaning and value enshrined in human needs and human ideals remained untouched. Also Logic and the Theory of Knowledge were making great headway. Problems of the concept, of the syllogism, of the idea were examined in new kinds of ways by men like Sigwart and Wundt, and the Theories of Knowledge of Kant and Hegel were undergoing great transformations. The study of human society, its origin, its manifold ways of development, and its relations to the physical and social environments was in full activity, but few were the words which set a goal to human life beyond any natural, social, and logical conclusions. Eucken did not ignore any of these efforts; they are all necessary departments of thought which illumine, in a dim kind of way, the riddle of existence. Eucken's condemnation comes in on account of their self-confidence concerning validity and finality. He considers them all as no more than preliminary sketches of man's life. Man may know them and ought to know them, but if he does not pass beyond them to some deeper need of his being his life becomes incapable of greatness and blessedness

in any legitimate sense. There can be no progress in the deepest core of man's being without passing beyond all forms of knowledge to the consciousness of a *life of the spirit.*

Before we can make clear what Eucken means by this *life of the spirit* (*Geistesleben*) it is necessary to see some of the elements which have gone to its formation. On the one hand, he recognizes the value of the conceptions and theories of his predecessors in the realms of Logic and Metaphysics. On the other hand, he was a man of a practical turn of mind in many ways, and was therefore not blind to certain values which the positivistic and mechanistic views of the universe and of life possess. But he felt that something, and that of the greatest value, was lacking in all these views. In these views the deeper nature of man was not called into activity. The Will of man, in so far as it could raise the whole personality to a higher level, was hardly touched. In the above views History, especially in so far as it gives us a record of the *deeds* of great personalities, is left out of account. And although traditional Christianity did take this aspect of the *deeds* of man into account, and had contributed something of essential and eternal value to the Western World, still Christianity had become so entangled in mythical and miraculous interpretations that without a thorough purification from such interpretations it was in real danger of being unable to affect deeply the life of the spirit of man. This life of the spirit of man has its "ground" in something more real and eternal than exists for all the other

views of the world and of man which are presented by the various branches of knowledge enumerated above. Eucken thus became convinced that the consciousness of man had deeper possibilities and constituted a second kind of world—a world which, if we could get man landed on its confines—would bring out of the depths of his nature and out of the depth of the true conception of History (in its most real sense) treasures of inestimable value. There arose, thus, a necessity of differentiating, within the deepest soul or personality of man, between views which were mechanical and intellectual on the one hand, and views which may be termed *spiritual* on the other. Thus we may obtain views from Biology, Psychology, and the various branches of the Natural Sciences which cast a light upon the nature of man; and, indeed, it is well for us to accept all these views in so far as they have proved themselves to be true, but they all present no more than the initial surface-meaning of the possibilities that lie imbedded in the deeps of personality and in the deeper meaning of history.

Eucken then investigates this domain which lies beneath the surface in the spirit of man. There are two methods of examining the contents to be found within this domain. There is in the first place the *psychological* method. This method is analytical; it deals with relations such as those of mind and body, the relations of the human being to a physical universe, the interactions of the physical, the psychical, the mental, and even the moral and religious. Such knowledge is not to be disparaged

but to be encouraged, but it only touches the surface of the life of the spirit. Another method is now instituted by Eucken, which he designates as the *noölogical* one. This, too, like the previous method, has its contents, but they are contents of a very different nature from those of the first method. The noölogical contents consist of *syntheses* which can be formed from contributions which have entered the human world from the sides of civilization, culture, morality, values, religion, etc. Here, in the main, Ethics, History, and Metaphysics in various forms have made their contributions upon the lives of the masses in some measure, and upon the lives of certain personalities in a unique manner. Through these personalities new contents have come into existence by means of needs, claims, and demands of human personalities which have sprung from the unconscious self and have blended themselves with mental, ethical, metaphysical, and religious conclusions. All this can be formed into a synthesis, and when it is so done it forms an actual existence (or subsistence)—a real *life of the spirit.* This *life of the spirit* differentiates itself from all the other forms which interpret the universe and life. Here Eucken shows such a life of the spirit in its strong metaphysical dualism. It is not the dualism of Psychology concerning mind and body, but the dualism of the *mere ordinary life*, on the one hand, and the *life of the spirit*, on the other. The breaking forth of such a *new life* in the individual, and as it reveals itself in History, is a proof to him that such a life is more than subjective; that it is

a kind of revelation of the breaking forth of a new world of values and of a new order of things. Now, this new world has to be taken *as it is*. It cannot be resolved into the mental life alone, and still less can it be resolved into the ordinary "dead-level" life of the moment and of the day. What can it then mean but the presence of a life which is *beyond* these and which has to be termed *Divine*?

Of course man has to become aware that such a *life of the spirit*—which is a life of eternal values—does not fall upon us unawares as a shower of rain falls on the earth. It is by persistent concentration of attention, by the clear consciousness of what such a life means and includes, and by a *deepest deed of his own* that man plunges into the heart of such a life of the spirit; it is thus that it becomes his own. When it becomes his own all doubts with regard to its reality vanish, and he has now become a denizen of the Kingdom of the Divine. There may be no clear evidence with regard to the *ontological* Source of this *life of the spirit* or with regard to its final goal. Such questions cannot be answered until we are at the goal. But we can be absolutely certain, and are absolutely certain, that the *life of the spirit* is the farthest stage of the evolutionary process of the personality of man—a stage which has already revealed the possibilities, meanings, and values which are latent in personal experience and which are destined, if used, to bring a realm of the Godhead into the soul of man and into the collective life of humanity.

Eucken knew, of course, that this is a dream in so far as the life of mankind as a whole is concerned, but it is even now a *waking* state in the experiences of many individuals here and there. And no other message can be proclaimed to mankind as a sufficiency for its redemption.

Better than most philosophers, Eucken understood the true nature of Christianity as consisting in this. Christianity was this alone at its source. As already hinted, alien elements crept in; the centre of gravity was shifted from personal experience of the Divine to external proofs and symbols of various kinds. The call to-day is for a return to the deeps of our own nature in the light of the spiritual values which have been revealed in History and in Christianity. Soaking ourselves in such values lifts us above narrowness, pettiness, worldliness, negations, and the dead-level trot of human life. Great and constant *affirmations* have to take the place of the *negations* based on mere surface-appearances concerning the *life of the spirit*. Eucken laboured his whole lifetime to present such views as these. There is no space to amplify his views, but it may be stated that his teaching has been gaining in influence and significance since the war even in his own country. It is now seen that anything less than the *life of the spirit* as presented by Eucken, and, indeed, by Christianity (and maybe by other Religions), is insufficient to bring an end to the evils that exist in the world to-day. They can never, according to Eucken, be removed save by some Copernican force of the *life of the spirit* as revealed in the toilsome upward march of mankind

and in the stillness of the deeps of consciousness coming to an awakening and activity.[1]

Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1926)

Troeltsch was for many years Professor of Theology at Heidelberg, and in 1914 he succeeded Pfleiderer as Professor of the Philosophy of Religion in Berlin. Of all the religious teachers of Germany he was undoubtedly the best versed in the various branches of Science, History, and Philosophy. In many respects he was a unique personality. Charming in his manner, natural in all his ways, full of human kindness, learned in so many branches of knowledge as few have been since the time of Leibniz, an excellent speaker—these were some of the qualities which placed him head and shoulders above any teacher of religion in our generation. He was acknowledged in Britain, America, and other countries as well, as the one man who was able to throw light on the complexities and ambiguities into which Christian Theology had got itself entangled, and his comparatively early death was much lamented. His four immense volumes, which were scattered in encyclopedias and journals, have been gathered together, and they form a permanent memorial to his industry and genius.

He was equipped also to a remarkable degree in the history of religions, and this fact enabled him

[1] Further information concerning Eucken may be obtained from my two books on his life and teaching: *An Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy* (Williams & Norgate), and *Rudolf Eucken: Philosophies Ancient and Modern* (Constable).

to view in a very wide perspective the nature of religion in the whole of its evolutionary process.

His own conviction concerning the meaning of the universe and life may be briefly sketched as follows: He recognizes the actual existence of the life of the spirit of man as being superior to man's existence as a physical and psychical being. He also shows the need of pointing out this fact from the history of man on the one hand, and from the contributions and conclusions of Psychology, the Theory of Knowledge, Logic, Ethics, Metaphysics, and Religious Experience, on the other hand.

Troeltsch proves that a *Lebensanschauung* (a theory of human life), religious in its nature, has to be formed over against the conclusions of the Natural Sciences, on the one side, and over against traditional Theology on the other. Such a final view of the meaning, value, and significance of human life is to be obtained in an analysis of the religious consciousness from the sides of Psychology and of the Theory of Knowledge. Much critical work remains to be done in this respect—work that can undoubtedly lead to the discovery of the fundamental categories of all actual religion. Religious science, it it is to become exact, needs the aid of the philosophical sciences. Of course, he knew that such philosophical sciences are not the same as *religious experience itself*. But religion is bound to answer such questions as the relation of the physical universe to man and his destiny, and the meaning of the conclusions of thought in their relation to the further development of the life of the spirit.

On the side of the individual religious experience itself Troeltsch shows that there is something mysterious, non-rational, and over-rational in the nature of man, and this should be taken into account by the Theory of Knowledge and made a subject of thorough investigation. This mystery seems to have no connection with any of the elements of natural causality found in human nature or in the physical world, but seems to be something *ontal* and *a priori*. This is a fact, and it has to be investigated and every right granted to its reality. This *a priori* belongs to the very nature of reason itself; and it has to be explained, not in any abstract kind of way, but in the way in which it can accomplish work upon the nature of man when it is given fair play, and is considered, not in its relations to the natural events either of body or mind, but as it is in itself, and as a law in itself, and as pointing to a Reality other than anything found in the physical world or in the conclusions of thought as these pertain to what only now exists in this world. Of course, this *a priori* may go astray and flounder in all kinds of bogs, as has been, and is being, witnessed by the great aberrations found in religious history. But that should be no reason for smothering it. The best and highest thoughts concerning the various values of life can come to our assistance to keep intact the religious *a priori* on the track of the development of all that is best, and, at the same time, allow it to unfold its nature in accordance with its own demands for the possession of what can become more and more a *cosmic experience* for man.

This *a priori* experience, when at its best, is conscious of passing from darkness to light—a light that has constituents beyond anything found in the realm of thought, even when thought is most all-inclusive. In other words, it is a *revelation*: some secret door has been opened for man; some sublime and trans-marginal elements of his nature have been awakened, and man has now dealings with the *Secret-Ground* of the universe.

The result of such an experience is that the present world is relegated (not condemned) to a secondary place. And so, indeed, is the world of thought. Man has still to live in both, and to be dependent upon both. But even both have now a kind of "halo" about them which they did not possess before; they are both viewed as *preliminary stages* to what man now possesses on the heights. But there is a more glorious halo present than even this. The forward-view of life becomes clearer, and man's spiritual and eternal destiny becomes a conviction, although the spatial and temporal details are not as yet mapped out with any clearness. Man is satisfied that a Divine Light is being infused into the deeps of his personality; that the religious *a priori* is getting his needs and insufficiencies fulfilled more and more. This, according to Troeltsch, is the essence of Christianity. The experience which has been mentioned cannot be gainsaid, but probably the whole of this can never be formulated into an exact logical religious science. It may be that much of such an experience comes from the world, from thought, from the history of the upward march of the race. But even

then it cannot be considered the less of a Reality. Troeltsch knew too much to claim any exactitude concerning our knowledge of Deity, but he also knew as historian that if this *a priori* of man's deepest nature is ignored the values and norms which have brought humanity to its present level may lose their force. He was convinced that this religious *a priori* is the initial stage of a new, unique, and spiritual station for the flight of man's soul to a more ultimate domain—a domain which does not exist for the ordinary mind, but which includes eternal values, and which will enable man to return from such a domain into this everyday world with a message to his fellow-man that life eternal can emerge from the deeps of the soul and can constantly turn to its Eternal Source for its ever greater fulfilment and bliss.

This short sketch should not be concluded without mentioning Troeltsch's work on democracy. He was one of the most practical and human of men. He was intensely interested in the lives of the people, and wrote much on the need of better environment, wider and nobler education, finer desires, and greater equality of opportunity for all who labour with their hands and their heads.

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