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THE GOOD MAN AND THE GOOD



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TORONTO

THE GOOD MAN AND THE GOOD

AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS

BY

MARY WHITON CALKINS

AUTHOR OF "AN INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY,"

"A FIRST BOOK IN PSYCHOLOGY," "THE
PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY"

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MATRI CARISSIMAE
CHARLOTTE WHITON CALKINS
BONITATIS EXEMPLO DULCISSIMO

PREFACE

The underlying purpose of this book is to treat ethics as the study of live men—of willing, struggling human beings, loyal or disloyal, brave or cowardly, just or unjust. To state this purpose in other words: the book does not conceive ethics as a science of abstractions—of duty, goodness, virtue, or values—but as the science of the dutiful, the good, the virtuous man and his object. Thus concretely conceived, ethics is an inevitable outlet of psychology and an essential source of sociological science.

Against one anticipated misconception it is perhaps permissible to guard in advance. Though the book has to do with 'the good man' it should not be set down as a 'subjectivistic' treatment of ethics. In one sense, to be sure, like all genuinely ethical doctrine, it certainly is subjectivistic since the radiating centre of every moral, every religious—in truth, of every personal—situation is an individual self. But though the book concerns the good man yet, as its title suggests, it also discusses *the good*, the object of the good man's will. And this object it conceives in wholly and unambiguously social terms.

It is hoped that the serious 'general reader' as well as the college student, may find in the book some incentive to his thinking on problems of personal conduct and of social reconstruction. To meet the need of this busy

reader the book is relatively short and untechnical though written with a painstaking effort for clear conception, accurate statement, and consistent terminology. There is, in truth, grave reason to fear lest important doctrines have been insufficiently reiterated. Accordingly the reader is begged to linger over definitions and formulations of theory, in particular over those of the earlier chapters, since almost every paragraph presents a necessary step in the argument.

Many pages would be needed adequately to record my thanks to those who have helped me in my study of ethics. My acknowledgments must be limited to those who have aided directly in the preparation of the book: to my mother and my father, first of all; to my friends and colleagues, Professors Mary S. Case and Eleanor A. McC. Gamble, expert critics, lavish of their time and their interest; and to one other—the brilliant, young sociologist, Carleton H. Parker, who throughout his life devoted his great gifts of eager scholarship, of keen judgment, and of human fellowship to all who turned to him, to his friends, his students, the industrial workers whom he understood, the state and country which he served. A golden morning's conversation with him in a California garden is held in my grateful memory by one of the chapters of this book.

MARY WHITON CALKINS.

MOUNT DESERT,

July, 1918.

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THE GOOD MAN AND THE GOOD

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CHAPTER I

THE GOOD MAN AS ONE WHO ACKNOWLEDGES OBLIGATION

What we most need to know about any man is surely this: whether he is good or bad. To be sure, we seldom put the question so crudely. Indeed we often affect a scorn for mere goodness, persuading ourselves that we are more concerned with a man's breeding, his intellectual vigor, his artistic skill or his practical efficiency, but in the end we all admit, implicitly or explicitly, that we are more deeply interested in his honesty, his courage and his justice—in a word, in his goodness—than in his intellectual or creative endowment, his upbringing, or his possessions. All this amounts to saying that the most significant way of grouping human beings is as good or bad. Since the dawn of history and in all literatures we find traces of this classification. From our earliest childhood we make the distinction. Either privately or publicly we designate nearly every one with whom we come into close relation as good or bad; and we sometimes bring ourselves also under the same ruling. Very often this estimate of ourselves or of others is deeply tinged with emotion—often with passionate emotion of indignation, of reverence, of shame or of pride. In its early phases it is entirely unreflective. But as we grow older we often tend to contemplate from the

detached, unemotional standpoint of the scientist this fundamental distinction of the good man from the bad. In adopting this scientific point of view we become students of ethics and at once make the baffling discovery that there are many divergent ways of describing the good man. Two of these are of paramount importance. A man is good, some moralists assert, in so far as he has and is guided by a consciousness of obligation—what is popularly called a “sense of duty.” A man is good, other teachers insist, not as he is conscious of obligation but as he wills the good. To the consideration of the first of these theories of the moral self this chapter is devoted.

I. The Nature of the Consciousness of Obligation

There is little doubt that to most of us the outstanding feature of our moral experience is the feeling of obligation or duty in its various forms: the acute feeling of responsibility, the realization that “I ought” to lift this heavy burden or to renounce this dear delight; the feeling of remorse, the bitter consciousness that I have not conformed to my “sense of duty”; or, finally, the kindred satisfaction in my conduct when it does square up with my awareness of duty. We have next, therefore, to inquire into the nature of this consciousness of obligation. We shall consider successively the theory that the consciousness of obligation is an elemental experience; the objections to this theory; and, finally, what will be called the two-self theory of the consciousness of obligation.

We are to consider the meaning of the expression “I

ought" in contexts such as the following: "I ought to give to the Red Cross the money saved for a trip to California"; "I ought to elect the course in logic in place of the new course in contemporary philosophy"; "I ought to leave this letter unanswered even if it costs me the man's friendship." Precisely what, in such a complex experience, constitutes my consciousness of duty, of obligation? Or, to state this differently: how does such an experience differ from the consciousness that it is wise or expedient to give away the money, to take the course or to leave the letter unwritten? Wherein, exactly, does the feeling of ought, of duty differ from the consciousness of expediency?

(1) Many people, faced with this question, however phrased, find it unanswerable. The consciousness of duty, they say, is as positive, as distinctive, and as poignant an experience as unhappiness or sympathy or sensation of redness; but like these other modes of consciousness it is indefinable. It can no more be described to any one who lacks it than seeing red or blue can be described to a man born blind or smelling mignonette to a man insensitive to odors. To feel that I ought is, in the same way, an indescribable though a very vivid experience. I may know that I ought to do this or that, in other words, may be able to indicate the occasions or situations in which I feel obligation; but, though I unquestionably have the consciousness "I ought," I simply can not tell what further it is. I feel that I ought—there is nothing more to be said about it.

With this conclusion of the everyday man, that it is not possible to say what one means by "I ought,"

many writers on ethics, upholders of what may be called the "element theory," fully agree though on other points they differ much among themselves. The consciousness of obligation seems, on this view, indescribable precisely because elemental. Description involves analysis into elements, as when one describes a fabric as red, soft, heavy, and lustrous; but elemental characters are themselves indescribable; and my feeling of obligation, like my feeling of redness, if elemental is certainly a further indefinable consciousness. The writers to whom reference has just been made affirm this elemental character of the duty-consciousness. Thus the great German moralist, Kant, is never tired of maintaining that the consciousness of obligation (in his terms, the "categorical imperative") is a "datum," an "inexplicable fact." * To the same purport, Gizycki declares that "the feeling of duty is a fact, an ultimate foundation" †; in our own day, Simmel, one of the most unsparing of the critics of Kantian ethics, says that there is no definition of ought; ‡ finally, one at least of modern utilitarians—Henry Sidgwick—plainly states that the notion of 'ought' or 'right' "is too elementary to admit of any formal definition." § Earliest of the forms of this element-theory is intuitionism,"¹ || the

* "Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. I., Chap. I. (Cf. "Kritik of Pure Reason," A., pp. 547 ff., B., pp. 575 ff.)

† "Moralphilosophie," p. 123.

‡ "Enleitung in die Moralwissenschaft," Chap. I., p. 8.

§ "The Methods of Ethics," Bk. I., Chap. III., § 3.

|| These numerical exponents, beginning anew in each chapter refer throughout to the *Notes* at the end of the book.

traditional conception of conscience as not merely elemental but also primitive and instinctive, or untaught. This theory, common to many moralists from Butler to Martineau, is especially significant in that it usually though not inevitably argues the validity and the authority of duty from the instinctiveness of the consciousness of it. It is however important to realize that intuitionism is one form only of the element-theory²: in other words, that one may be an elementalist and not an intuitionist, may regard the consciousness of obligation as indefinable while yet one considers it as rising late in experience and does not claim for it special validity or authority.

(2) We shall next consider the objections hotly urged against this doctrine that the feeling of obligation is a purely elemental experience to be accepted without further question as we accept the fact that we see yellow, or hear noise. The opponents of this view point out, in the first place, that the feeling "I ought," unlike the admittedly elemental "seeing yellow" with which we have compared it, has no specific stimulus or object. Every normal person sees yellow when he looks at squashes or sunflowers, or (in terms of the physical stimulus) when ether waves at the rate of about five hundred and twenty-five trillion per second excite his retina. But the situations in which diverse people feel obligation differ as widely as acid from alkali. These differences become especially evident when we compare with each other men of different civilizations, and still more evident in the comparison of the so-called civilized with the primitive type. Darwin's

famous chapter on the Moral Sense offers an excellent instance of an apparently vivid sense of obligation directed to an object utterly repellent to us. He quotes from Lamont the story of a West Australian who, in spite of well grounded fear of punishment by the British magistrate, killed a woman of a distant tribe "to satisfy his sense of duty to his wife" who had died of a lingering disease and, in his belief, through sorcery exerted by one of the enemy tribe. Similar instances could be multiplied; yet there is, in truth, no need of anthropological or even of historical study to assure ourselves of the great divergence, even among persons similarly circumstanced, as regards the specific conduct which each conceives as his duty. Thus, one man is as ardently convinced of his obligation to vote a straight ticket as another of his duty to scrutinize every candidate's record; and one man is as certain that he ought to give to him that asketh as another that he ought to discourage public begging. In a word, there is no gainsaying the occurrence of explicit differences in moral ideals; and these certainly mark off the consciousness of obligation from the sensationally elemental experiences which arise as it were mechanically and universally, in a given situation, the same for every one.

And yet the occurrence of these differences in duty-feeling does not tell decisively against the distinctiveness and consequent homogeneity of the moral consciousness. The conscious experience, the inner feeling, of the Australian, sickening and pining under his sense of unfulfilled duty, does not differ from that of the martyr who, shrinking from the arena, is yet swayed

by his overpowering sense of obligation to hold the faith. For what varies from man to man, from social group to social group, from age to age, is not the consciousness of obligation but its object. Men feel the same "ought" though it is directed to such different objects. Accordingly this first assault upon the distinctiveness of the feeling of duty must be abandoned.

Another objection to the avowal of a characteristic and undefinable consciousness of obligation is the fact that we often encounter people, chiefly ethical theorists but, here and there, reflective, everyday people who insist that they never feel obligation, do not know the meaning of the word "duty," never, in a word, have the "I ought" consciousness. These persons of course use the phrase; but "I ought to do it" means to them, they insist, no more than "I would better" or "I am afraid not to do it"; and "duty" means no more than expediency.³ Now it is psychologically possible that these people lack, while others of us have, the consciousness of obligation; and yet there certainly is an antecedent improbability that human beings should differ so profoundly. Accordingly, moralists of this type believing that they find in themselves no elemental sense of duty challenge the accuracy of the self-observation which has led other people to avow an elemental feeling of oughtness. These anti-elementalists frankly declare themselves incredulous of the occurrence in any one's experience of an elemental or even of a distinctive consciousness of obligation. Rather, they hold, this alleged elemental "I ought" experience is a complex anticipation, tinged with emotion; it is a consciousness

of future advantage, a prevision of a happier outcome, or else the shrinking from possible harm. In other words, according to this view, when I say "I ought to do this" I really mean either "I expect to be rewarded if I achieve it" or else "I am afraid of what will happen, either to me or to some one whom I care for, if I don't do it." This anti-elementalist conception (as we are calling it) of the nature of the feeling of oughtness is often combined with an evolutionary account of the rise and growth of the feeling.⁴ The consciousness of obligation, according to this doctrine, is a plant of slow growth developed gradually from a clearly and primitively emotional experience. Thus, according to Herbert Spencer, the consciousness of obligation grows out of the fear of being punished by one's chief, by one's fellows, or by one's god. The feeling of fear persisting when its primitive object has disappeared—when a man is no longer in constant danger of attack by his more powerful neighbor, or of tyrannous treatment at the hand of his superior, or of the mysterious wrath of his god—this originally justified, now externally unmotivated, fear is, according to the anti-elementalists, what is known as consciousness of obligation. And precisely because the feeling grows out of fear (or out of some other emotion) therefore, they argue, it can itself be nothing other than emotional, it can not possibly be a distinctive and unique kind of experience.

This argument, it must at once be admitted, certainly tells against the intuitionistic forms of elementalism which maintain the ready-made innateness and unde-rivedness of the feeling of duty. In opposition to these

views Darwin, Spencer and the rest may indeed have shown that the consciousness of obligation, far from flashing out, like lightning in a clear sky, is the consequence of preceding experiences, emotional in character. But to prove that a given experience is uniformly preceded, and even conditioned, by a certain set of emotions is far from proving that it, too, is an emotion of the same nature. Therefore the fact that the feeling of obligation appears later than the fear of gods and rulers, but in similar situations, would not disprove the unique character of the feeling of obligation when once it occurs. In Rashdall's words, if we "suppose (to put the matter in an extreme way) that Socrates was the first man who ever definitely conceived and was influenced by the idea of duty, that will not alter the fact that such a notion did exist in the mind of Socrates and in many men since." (It is only fair to add that modern anthropological research tends to discredit the negative premise of the evolutionary argument, that primitive men do not have a unique consciousness of obligation. More and more, students are discarding the old conception of the mind of primitive man and of savage as radically different from the mind of the civilized adult and are regarding primitive man and savage as child-men, not inherently different from us in sense-endowment, in intellectual capacity, or even in moral attitude, but differing from us primarily in their blank ignorance of innumerable things, facts of history and of science, which are the common inheritance of civilized men. This conception, with its suggestion of caution in the formulation of "evolutionary" theories, seems to be borne out by a

tale quoted by Westermarck,* of a young Australian who, during his initiation, refused to eat a prohibited opossum, and who replied to the tempting suggestion "You might eat if the old men were not there" by the words "I could not do that, it would not be right.")

(3) It has thus appeared that no one of these arguments against it decisively challenges the element theory of the obligation feeling: the fact that some people claim to be without a consciousness of "ought" may be attributed either to their faulty introspection or to mental defect or else may be accepted as a mark of the individuality of the obligation-consciousness; differences in ideals are rightly described as distinctions in the object not in the content of the "sense of duty"; and the evolutionary theory of the rise of the obligation-consciousness is compatible with an elementalist conception of its nature.

But from quite another quarter rises an objection to this doctrine that my consciousness of duty is an elemental and indescribable experience. More careful scrutiny discloses it as a really analyzable though a very distinctive complex.⁵ Just as by fixed attention one can hear overtones in a clang which at first seems perfectly simple, so one finds in the awareness of obligation, which at first seemed so unitary and irreducible, at least two essential and closely fused experiences. The first of these is the intense and oppressive feeling of being forced or compelled. To feel obligation is to feel

* "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas," I., 118. Quoted by Westermarck from Fison and Howitt, "Kamilaroi and Kurnai," pp. 256 *seq.*

compulsion; a duty is a burden to be borne. There is little need to dwell on this factor of the consciousness of duty for it is admitted by everybody—even by those writers who try to banish the concept of obligation from ethics. Thus, Guyau,* in the book in which he sketches a “morality without obligation,” implies that obligation is equivalent to “interior pressure”; and Taylor, while he denies any specific feeling of obligation, reducing it to the consciousness of what I am “expected” to do, yet constantly alludes to it as “a strong, compulsive influence.”† To be conscious that I ought is, then, to feel myself, in some sense, under compulsion. In truth, everybody who believes himself to know the meaning of “I ought” will acknowledge the accuracy of this statement. It is illustrated in the common figure of the moral life as obedience to “moral law,” in St. Paul’s description of the moral self as a bondman to the law, in the sense which almost everybody has, at times, of impulses and passions and desires as opposed and dominated by the inexorable authority of the Moral Imperative.⁶

But this consciousness of being compelled is one factor only of the complex feeling of obligation. For, paradoxical as it seems, I realize not only compulsion but also freedom and activity in my experience of duty. The moment of performing my duty, of being true to my obligation, is a moment of supreme freedom and

* “Esquisse d’une Morale sans Sanction et sans Devoir,” Livre II., Chap. I.

† “The Problem of Conduct,” p. 355. Cf. H. Spencer, “Data of Ethics,” Chap. VII., § 46.

self-expression. The man of duty is the free man; the moral law is a law of liberty; in a word, the consciousness of obligation, though a feeling of compulsion, differs absolutely from the bare awareness of being coerced by a mightier being—by father, chief, ruler, God, or impersonal power.

This discovery seems, however, to involve us in a hopeless *impasse*. For how, it may well be asked, is it possible to feel at the same time both bound and free, both coerced and active, both dominated and authoritative? The reply to this question is found in the observation that each one of us, so far from being a simple, homogeneous being, is a highly complex and differentiated self of the most diverse and contradictory moods and purposes or (as many writers prefer to state it) a hierarchy of many partial selves within an including total-self. There is no need to expand this view at length for everybody has the experience. As parts of my very self I find a strenuous and a frivolous self (or purpose), a pitying and a censorious self, a student self and a practical self. In the words of the old song:

“Within my earthly temple there’s a crowd.
There’s one of us that’s humble, one that’s proud;
There’s one that’s broken-hearted for his sins
And one that, unrepentant, sits and grins.”

And the song ends quaintly with the reflection that

“From much corroding care I should be free
If once I could determine which is me.”

The truth is that all these partial selves belong to me and, though no one of them is completely identical with

me, I, the central including self, may identify myself with any or all of them. Thus, the experience of obligation is my consciousness of myself (as identified with one of the conflicting purposes or selves within me) being dominated, coerced, commanded, not by an external authority but by myself (as identified with yet another of these partial selves, or purposes). It makes little difference whether the coerced and coercing aspects of me be called purposes or partial selves; whether the dominating self be conceived with St. Paul as the "spirit," or with Kant as the "noumenal ego," or with Freud as the "censor." In any case the consciousness of obligation is the experience of self-compulsion. And the explanation of the paradoxical combination in the moral experience of the seemingly inconsistent factors of submission and freedom lies precisely herein: in the fact that the law to which I submit is neither an inexorable nature-law, or uniformity, nor yet an external social law—the imposition of another's will—but is, rather, the law, the imperative which I, as ruling self, impose on myself, as compelled self.⁷ In Wordsworth's phrase and in literal sense, I am a "willing bondsman," and I "commend" myself "unto the guidance" of a Duty which is imposed by my own deepest purpose.

Besides being conscious of myself as an authoritative, active, and (in this sense) "free" self, I may also be conscious that I am free in a second sense—free to take sides with one or with another of the conflicting purposes, or partial selves, within me. This freedom to choose must be sharply distinguished from the freedom, meaning the authoritativeness, of the self. It is a gen-

uine capacity to will one thing or the opposite. If, for example, Abraham Lincoln was free, in this sense, he might have decided not to sign the emancipation proclamation; and if I am thus free I may decide either to print or not to print this chapter which I am writing. Metaphysicians bring up many weighty arguments to show that men really do not possess such freedom of choice, that they are, on the contrary, bound by their heredity, or their environment (or, as theistic philosophers assert, by the will of God) to certain volitions and ways of acting. Granting his upbringing, his political affiliations, the platform on which he was elected, Abraham Lincoln, these philosophers insist, must have willed as he actually did will. But the philosophical question whether or not I really am free to will what I regard as my duty has no bearing on the undisputed fact that when I am conscious of duty, correctly or incorrectly, I believe myself free either to do this duty or to leave it undone. As surely as I am conscious of obligation, as certainly as I feel that I ought, I also feel myself free to choose. Apparently it is impossible that anyone should take the law-giving attitude toward any person or purpose which seems to be determined. In Sidgwick's words: "When I have a distinct consciousness of choosing between alternatives of conduct, one of which I conceive as right . . . I find it impossible not to think that I can now choose to do what I so conceive."* Thus a man is conscious, in the experience of feeling obligation, of two sorts of freedom. When, for instance, he realizes that he ought to decline an invitation to

* "The Methods of Ethics," Bk. I., Chap. V., § 3.

Tristan and Isolde in order to correct French themes, he is (1) immediately conscious of himself as free in the sense of dominating the musical and gayety-loving part of himself; and he is (2) reflectively if not immediately conscious of himself as free in the other sense also, free to choose between the musical self's and the theme-reading self's purpose. Such freedom to choose may be, as the determinists argue, an illusion, but the consciousness of freedom to choose—whether or not corresponding with any real freedom—certainly accompanies the feeling of obligation.⁸

It is worthy of note that this double-self theory, just outlined, of the consciousness of obligation, harmonizes the claims of the other theories. It obviously satisfies both the main requirement of the element-theory and the unquestionably preponderant testimony of every-day people who are sure that the heavy consciousness of duty, the inexorable gnawing of remorse, the overwhelming flood of repentance are absolutely distinctive experiences differing utterly from fear of consequences or anticipation of benefit. For the double-self theory emphasizes both the reality and the distinctive quality of the awareness of obligation by treating it as an especially unique and distinctive complex of experiences usually disjoined—the consciousness of being at one and the same time commanded and commander, bound and free, coerced and at liberty. And yet, though it thus emphasizes the uniqueness of the obligation-consciousness, the double-self theory also agrees with the critics of the element-theory in denying the absolutely elemental character of the so-called sense of duty. Furthermore, the two-

self theory is strengthened by the evolutionist's account of the rise of the feeling of duty. For precisely the sort of consciousness of compulsion which one feels at a pre-moral stage toward one's chief or one's god one feels in the moral experience of the lower self's obligation to the higher, law-giving self. The feeling of bondage characterizes both experiences, but when subordination to external authority is replaced by the awareness of my lower self as compelled by my higher, there springs up naturally the inner activity and self-assertion that invariably distinguish the consciousness of duty.

In conclusion, a few words must be said concerning the further analysis of the consciousness of obligation, described in the preceding pages as a man's consciousness of himself as coerced or dominated, not by another, but by himself. Obviously, such an experience is very complex and must include the most diverse factors. Thus, the consciousness of obligation certainly includes the two sorts of affective consciousness, for every one dislikes the feeling of being compelled and, conversely, enjoys the feeling of authoritativeness. The obligation-consciousness must, furthermore, include the organic sensations characteristic of the pleasurable and the unpleasant experiences—the pressure sensations included in what we call the “heavy” consciousness of duty to be fulfilled or the sensations of heat and soreness which belong to remorseful feeling. Frequently, also, if not always, the consciousness of approval or disapproval will be involved in my consciousness of obligation and this, as will later be shown,* includes both emotion

* Cf. Chap. IX, pp. 120 ff.

and comparing thought. Finally the experience of dominating and commanding is volitional consciousness, or will. It is unnecessary to our present purpose to carry this analysis into greater detail, for the next chapter will compare emotion with will; and the essentials of the obligation-consciousness are all summed up in the phrase awareness of myself as dominated by myself.

II. *The Place of the Consciousness of Obligation in the Good Man's Experience*

Our main problem, it will be remembered, is to know who is the good man and wherein his goodness consists. In particular we are attempting to decide the place of the feeling of obligation in the good man's consciousness. And the outcome of our study, to this point, is to discredit the skepticism of those who deny the occurrence of a genuine experience of duty and, on the other hand, to emphasize the distinctiveness, the poignancy and the significance of the consciousness of duty as factor of the moral life. But we have yet to test the adequacy of the doctrine that the moral life, the characteristic experience of the good man, consists solely and exclusively in his consciousness of duty. Two considerations challenge this identification of the moral experience with the duty-consciousness. In the first place it is perfectly apparent that the obligation-consciousness is not a constant factor of the moral experience. In Spencer's words: "the sense of duty is transitory and will diminish as fast as moralization increases." * He

* "The Data of Ethics," Chap. VII., § 46.

who conforms to his sense of duty will soon find himself willing, without consciousness of obligation, what, at first, he willed with heavy sense of inner compulsion; he who obeys the moral law imposed upon him by his own higher self is less and ever less conscious of his lower impulses as battling against this higher law. In a word, to grow morally stronger and more mature is to become a more unified and a less divided self. With the fixed habit of willing the good, the occasions for that "mortal moral strife," in which alone the feeling of duty asserts itself, grow less frequent; and ever more simply and inevitably, with ever less conflict, a man wills the good. Yet it would surely be absurd to assert that a man grows less and less good as, on these higher levels of experience, he more and more infrequently has the consciousness of lower and higher self opposed to each other in the obligation-experience.

There is, however, an even more important objection to the doctrine that the moral experience consists solely and simply in the duty-consciousness. Such a view is made impossible by the fact that the consciousness of duty is an obviously incomplete experience never terminating in itself and always leading beyond itself. That is to say, I am never merely conscious that "I ought"; I am always also conscious of a *somewhat which* I ought. I ought to make up the accounts, or to meet the appointment, or to write the report, or to buy shoes for the baby; I ought to curb my temper, or to screw up my courage, or to restrain my extravagance, or to serve my neighbor as myself. Even if I do not know my precise duty I none the less feel that I ought to do or to be

something different. The awareness of duty, in a word, does not exhaust the moral experience and the good man is therefore something more than a man who does what he regards as his duty. The moral experience, it now seems, is never merely a consciousness of duty but a consciousness of duty with some object.⁹ But the attempt to define or describe this object leads us into fresh difficulties. For it has been admitted that people differ immeasurably in their conceptions of the object of duty. It seems at first impossible to discover any relation between the widely varied objects of obligation. In the end, however, if we closely attend to the situations which we designate as moral, we can not fail to hit upon two invariable characters of the object of obligation.

In the first place I am always conscious of the duty—not actually to *do* this or that but to *will* it. It is not literally true that I ought to write or buy or give but, rather, that I ought to choose or will the giving, buying, or writing. I fulfil my obligation in my will; if I am forcibly prevented from acting in accordance with my will I am still achieving my duty. The object of obligation is then, in the first place, a volition, a willing. In the awareness of duty one is always conscious that one ought to will or to choose. And yet not every volition is a duty; that is to say, in willing one is not invariably fulfilling an obligation. For one may will non-morally, as when an artist chooses a color or a ball-player wills to send a ball to base. Evidently, the moral will—the will toward which the consciousness of duty points—must be still further defined. Our second ques-

tion is therefore: precisely what is it which I ought to will? And the answer is verbally simple. I ought to will the good. I may will the agreeable or the disagreeable, the easy or the difficult; and I may will deed or mood or thought; but I am not willing as I ought unless the object of my will, whatever else may be true of it, is correctly described as the good. This result, to be sure, is merely the statement of a new problem. For we have yet to discover exactly what is meant by that ambiguous phrase "the good." In our next chapter we shall seriously face this problem. In the meantime, however, we may safely assert that moral willing is both technically and popularly described as "willing the good." (It may profitably be noted that when "the good" is regarded as the object not merely of the moral will but of the consciousness of the duty to will it is further described as "the right.")

The main conclusions of this chapter may be summed up as follows: Most, if not all, men have a consciousness of obligation, a unique, though not elemental experience, consisting essentially in the awareness which each man has of himself as passive, bidden, swayed, compelled by himself as active, controlling, and law-giving. This awareness of duty, heavily weighted as it is with emotion and with struggle, naturally looms large in descriptions of the moral life. Yet the consciousness of obligation is one factor only—a highly significant but not an absolutely essential factor—of the moral self. The good man is he who wills the good, whether or not conscious of obligation, that is, of authoritativeness over protesting, coerced self.

CHAPTER II

THE GOOD MAN AS ONE WHO WILLS THE GOOD

I. *The Nature of Will*

We call a man good, it has appeared, primarily because of what he wills. It is therefore important to our purpose to consider what willing really is.¹ We shall wisely contrast it, at the very outset, with emotion—fearing, rejoicing, and the like. Both emotion and will are reactions of a self on its environment, ways in which a self is related to its surroundings. But the two experiences differ very widely. In emotion, the self is receptive or passive. In gazing at the moving panorama of a traffic-filled avenue, in listening to the lapping of the waves against the shore, in breathing in the fragrance of a summer morning—in a word, in observing and also in remembering objects—a man is receptively related to them. He does not initiate his experience or control it or oppose it; he is affected by his environment instead of influencing it. And similarly, he is passive or receptive, that is, influenced by his surroundings when he is swept by emotion—smitten with the beauty of a wide landscape, overpowered by devastating sorrow, or overtaken by great happiness. In emotion a man is lifted high on the crests of the rising waves of life or is sunk deep in their hollows but is throughout inactive. In willing, on the contrary, he is active; he influences his environ-

ment instead of being at the mercy of it. To paraphrase Iago's wise words, our lives "are gardens to which our wills are gardeners; so that if we will plant nettles or sow lettuce; set hyssop and weed up thyme; . . . either to have it sterile with idleness or manured with industry; why, the power and corrigible authority of this lies in our wills." In truth—as Ostwald and Pearson, the natural scientists, suggest and as Berkeley, Leibniz and Ward, the metaphysicians, teach—our conception of physical energy, or power, consists essentially in attributing the immediate experience of self-activity to a world of supposedly external objects.² When a man commands, but equally when he deliberately obeys, when he is imperious, but equally when he espouses a cause—in both cases he is willing; and his experience is what we mean by self-activity. It is necessary from the beginning to distinguish will as self-activity from bodily activity. The two are often confused because willing is normally accompanied or followed by a bodily movement.³ Even so-called inner volition, the will to solve a problem or to remember a date, is marked by a contraction of forehead and face muscles; and outer volition, the will to fire straight, to draw accurately, is obviously the antecedent of a bodily reaction. It is therefore, as has been stated, of crucial importance to hold clearly in mind the essential difference between self-activity and bodily activity. As we have seen, bodily movement does indeed follow or accompany volition; but many bodily movements—for example, the dilation of the pupil of the eye—are utterly unconscious; and even movements following on consciousness, and due

to it, may be merely impulsive and thus unvolitional. If, for example, a child, on catching a bare glimpse of a Great Dane runs wildly in the other direction, his bodily movement is impulsive, that is, due to a perception but is not intended or willed. In other words, the child himself is not active, self-assertive, willing: only his body is active. This is the reason why no one is accounted moral because of his bodily activity merely, that is, because of an act which he performs accidentally or through compulsion without intending it, and why, conversely, if the sacrifice fails by which a man wills (for example) to save a train from wreck he is none the less counted as heroically good. In other words, a man is constituted a good man by the character of his will, or self-activity, and not in virtue either of the bodily activity which normally accompanies will or of the external result of the bodily reaction.

We have now to emphasize another essential mark of willing. Not merely is the man who wills related *actively* to the objects of his will but, in the second place, he *individualizes* both his object and himself. The meaning of this statement is, once more, best brought out by contrasting will with other experiences. In perceiving anything—for example, in looking at a fishing boat sailing out of the harbor—a man feels that every one and any one shares his perception, that is, that every one sees the schooner as well as he himself does; and similarly, in conceiving of anything, for example in thinking of a triangle or of the evil of infant mortality, he knows that everybody else has the same conception of a triangle as a three-sided figure or of infant mortality

as an evil to be overcome. In willing, and in emotion which at this point resembles volition, it is different. For a man's will is directed—not toward a generalized class, but toward an individual or individuals: he wills to save this baby, or every baby, or this special group of babies, not "babies" as a conceptual class. And in his willing, far more attentively and vividly and strongly than in any other experience save his emotion, he individualizes himself also; he knows the purpose as his, not another's, the volition as one which only he can achieve, the duty as one which no other can do. So long, therefore, as a man conforms to the laws and customs of the groups, small and large, in which he lives, merely from habit or from unreflective imitation, simply because every one about him acts and has always acted in these ways—he is not acting morally,⁴ he is not, in the ethical sense of the phrase, a good man. He is, in fact, acting non-morally because he is involuntarily, without deliberation and reflection, imitating other people's habits of conduct. Such unreflective, habitual imitation obviously lacks the experience, essential to all volition, of oneself as an individual, as unique and essentially different from the other people to whom one is bound in social relations. Therefore such unreflective conformity to usage can not constitute a man good. A twentieth century English curate, for example, however hard pressed, should not be called good because he does not help himself out of the offertory plate, any more than the Chinaman should be accounted moral who refused, in accordance with immemorial custom, to cut a door on the breezy side of his

house.* Both men are unreflectively, without attentive realization of their own individual responsibility and initiative, following the custom of their class, whereas to be moral "action must be personal and voluntary."

From the description of will as individualizing self-activity it is natural to turn to the consideration of the different types or forms of willing. Very important, from the moralist's point of view, is the distinction between simple will and choice, or will after deliberation. The distinction is so commonly recognized that it need hardly be illustrated. To take examples from the non-moral experience: determining, the first time one hears it played, that one will take lessons on the harp is an instance of simple volition; deciding, after painful oscillation of the two desires, to travel in the Canadian Rockies instead of enjoying a Newport season, is an instance of choice. Now the moral life certainly has its rise in choice, that is in the decision between alternate ends; and, truth to tell, it mainly consists throughout of "one long series of dilemmas." † To trace it back to its source: there is obviously no morality at the stage of immediate reflex motion nor yet at the impulsive stage where antecedent image or feeling immediately and inevitably results in action, for there is not yet any will, and the moral self, as we have seen, is a willing self. So long, for example, as savage or child immediately and inevitably runs away when he hears a loud sound, or eats every fruit that he sees, he is acting reflexly or

* Cf. Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics," p. 69, where, however, this conduct is classified under customary morality.

† Edwin Holt, "The Freudian Wish," p. 130. ²

impulsively, not voluntarily and therefore not morally. When, however, the savage, hearing a shrill call, instead of fleeing immediately, oscillates between the alternative desires to hide himself and to go forward, or when a child at the sight of fruit, instead of reaching for it at once, fluctuates between the wish to eat it and the desire to avoid punishment by passing it by, then, with deliberation and the possibility of choice, the level of conduct has been reached at which the moral will may emerge. For the moral self, while essentially a man who wills, must also be a thinker. Deliberation means comparison between different objects of will, and comparison is a form of thought. No man is effectively a good man who lacks the practice of thinking, the ability to appraise and to choose between the different purposes which present themselves to him.

Two forms of choice, or deliberative will, have been distinguished by William James, choice "with" and "without effort."⁵ (1) In the latter form of decision, however prolonged the see-saw of alternative imaginings—however long one has vibrated, say, between the desire to buy the fur coat and the longing to use one's money for a season-ticket to the opera, or between the yearning for a sea-voyage and the wish to contribute to the campaign fund—the rejected possibility at last drops away leaving the triumphing choice in possession of the field. (2) In decision with effort, on the other hand, one makes choice in full view of the neglected possibility; one longs for the coat and vividly imagines its sleek, furry feel in the very act of deciding for the music; one fairly smells the salt breeze as one signs the check. This is the type

of will with which the consciousness of obligation is most often fused; and unquestionably it is especially characteristic of the moral experience. I become conscious of moral issues, I feel the reality of moral choice, in my struggles, in the battle of my loyal against my pleasure-seeking, or my ambitious, or my passionate self. The great portrayals of moral experience have consequently almost always described the moral man in this phase of struggle.

But while it is necessary to admit that moral struggle is probably a condition *sine qua non* of the rise of the moral experience, and that it constitutes the travail out of which the moral self is brought to birth, it yet is wholly untrue to the moral experience, in its highest reaches, to portray it as sheer struggle and conflict. The goal of moral struggle is, in truth, the attainment of a level of life on which it shall have become a habit swiftly to apprehend and unswervingly to will the good, long since clearly conceived and chosen. Such a habit of will must be clearly distinguished from the unwilled, often unconscious, reflex which earlier paragraphs discuss. Sneezing, for example, is an habitual but not a moral act. The habit of willing the good must be even more carefully distinguished from the habits *resulting from* moral volitions, modes of conduct once voluntary which have become mere impulses—such as the habit of heeding a “Keep off the grass” sign. The formation of such habits is, of course, one of the prime objects of moral effort, yet they are better called sub-moral than moral and they are not to be confounded with habitual, undeliberative moral volition. For this habitual affir-

mation, this active assertion of the good, without effort, without inner debate, or inner conflict—this it is which distinguishes the mature from the early moral experience, which constitutes that “perfected moral battle,” wherein, in Hegel’s phrase, virtue consists.

Besides the distinction between simple willing and choice, ethics, as will appear, takes account of the difference between social and non-social will. This distinction is obviously made according as I actively relate myself, on the one hand, either to a person or to persons or to personal characters, or else, on the other hand, to events and to things. Most non-social will is directed toward future events: I will, for example, to finish my manuscript before I sleep, or to make a million dollars before I am forty years old, or to pull the stroke oar next June. Of personal will there are, as has already been suggested, two root forms: self-assertion and loyalty. In self-assertion I subordinate my object to myself; in loyalty I subordinate myself to my object. In self-assertion I oppose my object—I subjugate or coerce or destroy or banish or devour or merely defy it. In loyalty I acknowledge my object—I sacrifice myself to it or follow or obey or assert it. The tyrants, the rebels and also the commanders and the prophets are self-assertive men; the saints and the martyrs are the men of loyalty, or faith. And it is highly important to keep in mind that loyalty, as truly as imperiousness, is an active experience. Unreflecting imitation, servility, and the forced yielding to external compulsion are, one and all, as far removed from the free man’s willing devotion of himself to beloved or to church or

to community as east is from west or as heaven is from earth.

The part played by each of these fundamental forms of will in the moral experience must later be considered. We are at present, however, chiefly concerned with still another distinction, that which ethics makes, between the moral will, on the one hand—the will whose object is described as “the good”—and will, on the other hand, which is either non-moral or positively immoral, that is, bad. For our main quest, it must be remembered, is of the good man. And the conclusion reached, at the end of our last chapter, is that the good man, the moral self, is one who wills the good.⁶ We seem now at last to be ready to grapple with the problem: What, precisely, is “the good” which is the object of the moral will?

The attempt to solve this problem must, however, be delayed a little by a brief consideration of theories which identify the moral experience with emotion and not with will. For if such conceptions can be justified it is obviously necessary to revise our conclusion that the moral man is one who wills. Most often these emotional theories regard either the sympathetic emotions or else approval and disapproval as the characteristic moral experience.

(1) The tendency to look upon the sympathetic man as the good man is very easily explained.⁷ The emotion of sympathetic feeling is a fertile soil in which moral loyalty may spring up; and the sympathetic man's conception of the good seems larger, more adequate, than that of the egoist whose emotions are centered in himself. Accordingly, not merely unreflective, everyday

people but moralists of very different types have united to designate sympathy as the preëminently moral experience. Schopenhauer, for example, because he believes that human life is inherently and inevitably miserable, enjoins pity as the truly moral attitude. But it is not difficult to convince ourselves that sympathy is not equivalent to morality. Sympathy is, to be sure, both the out-runner and the servant of goodness; but sympathy may prompt to positively immoral conduct, as when a man forges a note or puts through a doubtful business transaction in a passion of sympathy for distress which he hopes thus to relieve.

(2) The doctrine that sympathy is the essence of goodness thus readily uncovers its own weakness. But a second theory of the moral experience, upheld by a group of moralists, Hutcheson, Shaftsbury, Smith and Hume, in the eighteenth century,⁸ and, in our own time, by Edward Westermarck and A. E. Taylor,⁹ has a firmer root in actual life. This is the doctrine which makes morality *consist in* the feelings of approval and disapproval. It is not to be confused with the assertion that the completely moral experience *includes* moral appraisal. The doctrine now under consideration is, it must be noted, sharply at odds with everyday opinion since it counts a man good not as he himself wills or acts, but as he is estimated by others. Goodness is in other words not so much an active function as a way of being rated. "Morality . . . is simply a name for the fact of social approbation." In Hutcheson's phrase, "The word Moral Goodness . . . denotes our idea of some quality apprehended in actions which procures

approbation;”* and, to quote Westermarck, an act “is good or bad as it is apt to give rise to an emotion of approval or disapproval in him who pronounces the judgment.”†

A formal comment to be made on this theory is that it embodies an only partially emotional concept of the moral consciousness. For though approval and disapproval are in origin and at core emotional, yet each is a complex consciousness in which feeling is overlaid by thought. Approval may best be described as a form of liking, or pleasure in an object, distinguished by the relative permanence of this object and accompanied by the comparison, often vague or implicit, of the approved object with something else.‡ But this comment still leaves us with the unanswered question whether approval and disapproval, however constituted, really make up the essential moral experience. The conclusive argument against this doctrine is based on the fact that approval and disapproval are sometimes non-moral experiences. This admitted distinction between moral and non-moral approbation and disapprobation is most evident in cases where the same stimulus excites both. If one look, for example, at a good color-sketch representing a great burning building one may well feel both warm approval of the accuracy of the drawing and the effective treatment of the background and also enthusiastic approval of the heroic rescue which a fireman is

* “An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil,” Introduction.

† *Op cit.*, I., Chap. I., p. 4.

‡ Cf. p. 123 below.

making at imminent risk to himself. But the first feeling of approval is æsthetic and perfectly distinct from the second, the moral approval. We are therefore justified in rejecting this doctrine, which virtually regards the approving or disapproving spectator as the only moral man, in favor of the old doctrine that a man is good by virtue of his own willing and not through being approved by some one else.* Accordingly we must take up the thread of our argument at the point where we turned aside to examine emotional theories of morality. We had decided that the good man is he who wills the good, but we had only the vaguest notion of the meaning of these words "the good." To the problem "what is the good" we at last address ourselves.

II. *The Good*

"The good" has first of all to be distinguished from things which are simply "good." Every object of will, of desire, of even evanescent wish, is good in the sense of being valued; for by "good," in this its widest sense, is meant whatever is willed or wished.¹⁰ The word has been defined in many different ways but each of these conceptions of "good," as (for example) "useful," "pleasant," or "adapted" can be shown to imply the more fundamental truth that the object, or some function of it, is valued, desired, or sought. Goodness is thus the character of being wanted by somebody; and everything which any one wishes or wills is in so far good. So we speak of good meat, good ball, good poetry—meaning

* For discussion of moral approval and disapproval as the virtue of justice, cf. Chap. IX., pp. 120 ff.

food, play, literature which people like and seek. But not everything good can be described as "*the good*." For the good, that is the chief good, is defined by Aristotle in a phrase which one would vainly seek to better, as "that which is willed for its own sake" (ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα*). It follows immediately, as Aristotle shows, that for the sake of "the good" all other things are willed. "The good" is thus that object, or end, of will which is regarded as supreme or ultimate.¹¹

This conception is of such crucial and basal importance that it must be further amplified and expounded. The good, as ultimate object of will, is sharply contrasted with every subordinate or relative object (or "end"), that is, with everything willed as means to something else. We are all familiar with these relative ends, or means. Thus, a man obviously chooses a surgical operation not for itself but as a means to health; he chooses a hot walk not for itself but in order to get his surf-bath; he purposes to earn money not for the sake of owning greenbacks and bank accounts but because the money is a means to operas, or automobiles, or political power. Operas, automobiles and political power are, therefore, less subordinate ends than greenbacks or coins. But to a starving or a homeless man no one of these would be an ultimate end for he would barter it to gain food or shelter; and food and shelter, in turn, are not absolute ends for they are willed as means to physical well-being; and even health and physical life are not, at least for everybody, supreme ends in themselves, for, of their own will and uncompelled, men sac-

* Nichomachaen Ethics, Book I., Chap. II.

rifice their physical well-being and give their lives for freedom or honor. "The good," on the contrary, is the end conceived as self-sufficient, the purpose to which all other purposes are held to be inherently subordinate, the object which is not, in the belief of the purposing self, willed for the sake of anything else but for the sake of which everything else may be sought. And the good man is he who deliberately seeks the good. The importance of the qualifying adverb must be stressed. The good, that is, the purpose conceived by any man as supreme, either is, or has been, deliberately chosen by comparison with other purposes. This deliberate choice, with its rejection of alternative purposes, need not be a reasoning choice at all and, when once it has been made, it is not of necessity often reaffirmed; it may well have been reached so gradually and adopted with so little effort that time and manner of making it are forgotten; but a deliberate choice it none the less assuredly is.

An important character of this ultimate object, the good, must at once be emphasized. It is always personal in nature. Subordinate objects—food and clothes, houses and furnishings, rare prints and *Americana*, may be of the impersonal or "material" sort. But the supreme purpose for which, in the end, these and all things else are willed, is personal experience, individual or social—whether happiness or wisdom or benevolence later chapters must discuss. Indeed, one of the ways in which "the good" is distinguished alike from "the true," or ultimate object of thought, and from "the beautiful," or ultimate object of aesthetic delight, is in being inherently personal.

It is then next to be noted that whereas there is wide agreement to define "the good" as supreme, personal object of the will, people differ greatly in their conceptions of the specific nature of this ultimate end, or purpose. To one it is pleasure, to another service; to one it is individual perfection, to another social harmony. From this fact follows an important consequence: a man is good or bad, moral or immoral, according as he wills or refuses to will what is to him, and not to any one else, the good. There are therefore no objective criteria of a man's goodness or badness. In other words, there is nothing in his behavior, in the character of his specific volition, which unequivocally stamps his act as the outcome of good or bad will. The act which the onlooker is tempted to call good or bad may have been impulsively or non-morally performed, or it may be the result of the moral will of a man whose deliberate conception of what constitutes the good differs from the critic's conception. Suppose, for example, that a man is being morally appraised for fishing a fly out of a cream jug. Shall he be accounted as "good," "bad" or "non-moral"? From the objective standpoint of the observer there is no sure answer to the question. The man is non-moral if he absent-mindedly extracts the fly. He is positively moral, or good, if he performs the act volitionally and if he is (let us say) a Jain unacquainted with sanitary science, to whom the saving of all life is an essential factor of the good. The man, on the other hand, is bad, or immoral, if he believes that all flies spread disease and yet rescues this one in response to a selfish distaste for watching the fly's struggles.

To take another instance: the young man who enlists may be what we are apt to consider him, a moral hero. Yet if he is merely following an impulse of instinctive daring he is choosing non-morally, and if he is acting in opposition to a more fundamental loyalty, human or religious, he may even be immoral. Once more to state the contrast formally: the good, or ultimate personal purpose, which forms the object of one man's will differs often in its specific nature from the object which other men regard as the good. But if the man truly looks upon it as a self-sufficient purpose to which other aims are essentially subordinate then he is genuinely moral in willing it. Thus, the moral consciousness is an individual experience and men behaving in the most diverse ways and entertaining the most divergent ideals must often be accounted equally good.¹²

Two objections to this view of the good, or moral, man will at once occur to many readers. It will be urged, in the first place, that such a doctrine makes no distinction between the moral and the non-moral will, teaching in effect that any man is moral who relentlessly subordinates everything in life to any purpose of whatever nature. And, the critic will continue, it has already been admitted that not every purpose is moral. A man, for example, who subordinates everything else in life, his health, his culture, the happiness of his family, the just claims of his employers, to the controlling purpose of making a fortune—such a man surely is not a moral, a good man. And the unrestrained pleasure-seeker, who invariably turns to his own pleasure, who subordinates knowledge and benevolence and jus-

tice to his own enjoyment—he, too, this objector insists, is not to be rated as a good, a moral, man. But the theory which is here upheld does not, as the critic wrongly supposes, require us to believe that the man who inexorably brings all his purposes into subjection to his illicit love or to his pursuit of wealth is thereby constituted a good man. This doctrine, of the good man as he who wills that which he conceives as a self-sufficient aim, is far from committing us to the view that if

“ . . . a man contend to the uttermost
For his life's set prize, be it what it will,”

he thus becomes a moral man, or to the parallel view that sin is merely

“ . . . the unlit lamp and the ungirt loin.”

For the deliberate choice of an aim, or object of will, may constitute a man bad rather than good, immoral, not moral. That is to say, a man may know one object as the good and may deliberately choose another as his own determinate aim; he may be disobedient to the heavenly vision; he may turn his back upon the good, as he conceives it, crying “Evil, be thou my good;” he may subordinate all his wishes, all the claims of other people, to a purpose which he knows to be not self-sufficient but, in its real nature, subordinate to the good. And in thus refusing to will the good, as he has himself seen it, he is a bad, an immorally willing man. Now the relentless money-getter or pleasure-seeker to whom, in the preceding paragraph, the critic has appealed

against the teaching of this chapter, may well be of this type. Only if, almost *per impossible*, it be supposed that a man genuinely believes money-getting to be a self-sufficient, absolute end to which all others are inherently contributory, is it necessary by our theory to call the determined money-seeker a good man; only if it is claimed that pleasure is an obviously self-sufficient end is it incumbent on us to account the deliberate pleasure-seeker as good.

It is urged against this conception, in the second place, that it results inevitably in a subjective ethics which justifies whatever seems good in any man's eyes. But this criticism overlooks the distinction between one's estimate of a man and one's estimate of his conceptions and opinions. From the fact that a man is accounted good, or moral, according as he does or does not will what appears to him (and not to another) as the good, it certainly follows that men with different views of the good are equally moral—but it by no means follows that these men's different views of the good are equally adequate. Therefore the moralist, though he must judge a given man good or bad according to the man's own standards must, on the other hand, attempt to estimate both the man's conception of "the good" and also the methods by which he tries to realize the good by comparison with other conceptions and other methods. As a matter of fact we are constantly making this double moral estimate. Thus we account Robert Lee a good man though we condemn "his course in turning against the government to which he had sworn allegiance"; and we revere Elizabeth Fry as a good woman

while we totally disapprove her decision not to countenance by her presence the marriage of her son to a "woman of the world." We may therefore hold to the conclusion that a man must be rated as moral by a "subjective" or "individual" standard, that is, by measuring his choice up to his own conception of the good, and we may none the less reasonably try to estimate his conception of the good according to a less subjective standard. In this way we shall make of our ethics more than a form of psychology—a study of the morally willing self—and more than a mere historical study of moral practices and theories in different ages. For moral psychology, amplified by the critical estimate of concepts of the good, widens out into the normative science of ethics.¹³

Such an estimate of conceptions of the good is to be undertaken in the following chapters. But before entering on this new task it will be well to summarize in a few words the conclusions of these first two chapters which have attempted to distinguish the good (or moral) man alike from the non-moral and from the immoral, (or bad) man. The good man, it has been shown, is contrasted both with the non-morally and with the immorally willing man, by the fact that he wills the good, namely, that which he conceives as supreme and self-sufficient personal object of his will. In thus willing the good, he is conscious (except on the highest level of the moral life) of fulfilled obligation, that is, of his lesser self or desires as yielding to the authoritative higher self which wills the good.

CHAPTER III

THE GOOD AS EGOIST AND ALTRUIST CONCEIVE IT

The task imposed on us by the preceding chapters is to consider and compare different theories of the good. Effectively to carry out this task requires a preliminary grouping of these theories. Perhaps the most fundamental contrast between conceptions of the good is that between individualistic or (as they used to be named) egoistic theories on the one hand, and social, or altruistic, conceptions on the other.¹ It must, however, carefully be borne in mind that there is a sense in which a self is always egoistic, for, whatever else a man is conscious of, he is always (though often very vaguely) conscious of himself. Similarly, there is a sense in which a self is always altruistically, or socially, conscious,² for there is no really isolated self and even such predominantly "impersonal" experiences as thinking and perceiving have a social reference. That is to say, we are aware that other people, similarly placed, see what we see and hear what we hear; and we regard the laws of thought as universal, held by everybody. The clear understanding that every man is, in this fundamental sense, both egoist and altruist and that the two attitudes are not incompatible is an important introduction to the study of ethical egoism and altruism. For when a moral system is designated as egoistic (individualistic) or altruistic

(social) either term is used, in a sense far narrower than that which has just been formulated, to indicate a basal form of willing.

I. It will be convenient first to present in a relatively uncritical fashion both the egoistic and the altruistic theory. Egoistic willing is, as we know, self-assertion, the subordination of my environment, personal or impersonal, to myself. And, from the standpoint of ethical egoism, the good which I ought to seek is precisely my own good, not that of anybody else. The argument for ethical individualism (or egoism), is variously stated. It is sometimes urged that the supreme object of will is a man's own good since only so can his will be directed toward that part of the universe, himself, which is under his own control. A man can not, it is argued, by his willing, alter the course of the sun or the conduct of a tradesman but he can affect his own conduct and he may gain his own pleasure, advantage, enlargement. Or again, it may be argued empirically that men actually reach their highest levels of achievement, develop their utmost strength and capacity, only under the spur of ambition, only in conditions of widest freedom, only through stressing their own individual purposes. The culmination of such a view is Nietzsche's teaching (as it is usually interpreted)—the doctrine that human progress is forever impossible except as each man relentlessly seeks his own advantage in total disregard of the needs of other men so that, out of the welter of failing, defeated beings there may emerge the superman—the man strong enough to trample down all rivalry and opposition and to win against all odds. Most often, how-

ever, egoism is argued negatively by the destructive criticism (presently to be summarized) of altruistic conceptions coupled with the implication that egoism is the only alternative to altruism.

Altruistic (or social) will—sharply contrasted with egoistic self-assertion—is loyalty, or devotion, the subordination of myself to a cause, a person, an ideal—in a word, to some object other than my narrow and individual self.³ The altruist conceives the moral self as furthering the happiness or the perfection no longer of himself but of another self or selves. To the altruist (in the strict meaning of the term) the good man is one who lavishes and sacrifices his own possessions, health, opportunities, his very life, for others. To be good consists in turning from one's own end, in crucifying, in torturing, in annihilating one's self so that one may thereby rescue, help, or enrich others. The mother who completely subordinates herself to her children is thus the never failing embodiment of the altruist's ideal. But there are as many forms of altruism as there are types of personal and social relationship. The cavalier who gives himself, body and soul, to the king's cause, the Jesuit who yields himself to his order, the union workman who goes on a sympathetic strike—these all are (or may well be) altruists. For the altruist abjures his own good and seeks that of other self or selves. And he appeals alike to the casual observer and to the close student of biography to confirm his view that the good men are altruists and that conversely, in Spencer's words, "an unchecked satisfaction of personal desires—in absolute disregard of all other beings would cause . . .

social dissolution.” * Clearly, the altruist repeats, men who are ever seeking others’ gains—devoted physicians, tireless teachers, lavish givers—are willing a good to which the merely individual egoistic good must be subordinate. But the egoist is never silenced by this appeal to experience. He first notes as incidental to his argument, the patent fact that many alleged altruists are really egoists in disguise, seeking, under the cloak of avowed altruism, their individual ends: reputation or material gain. And next, admitting the sincerity of genuinely altruistic ideals, the egoist emphasizes the divergence among them and the difficulty of harmonizing the objects of the personal, the domestic, and the patriotic altruist. It is, on the face of it, equally altruistic to sacrifice oneself for one’s parents, one’s children, one’s country, one’s state; but altruism contains no principle by which to decide between these conflicting objects. With greatest effect, however, the critic attacks the fundamental position of altruism strictly defined, namely, disregard of oneself. Herein, he insists, the altruistic conception is essentially irrational. The mother who wears herself out in the passionate pursuit of what she deems best for her children is purposing to defeat her own end (for she is actually choosing a course which makes her useless to the very beings whose good she is willing); and the object of her will, involving as it does disregard of an individual life, her own, can not possibly be viewed as the incontrovertibly ultimate good. With Herbert Spencer, the critic of altruism, one may

* “The Data of Ethics,” Chap. XIII., *Trial and Compromise*, § 82.

go further and argue that a completely altruistic world is inherently impossible since if literally every self wills another's good, thereby giving up his own, nobody experiences good and so the end sought by each altruistically willing self is non-existent. Spencer, who is a hedonist, argues this explicitly for altruistic hedonism but his argument can be adapted to every form of altruism. "The proposition is" he says "that each self will be made happy by witnessing others' happiness.* But what in each case constitutes the happiness of others? These others are by hypothesis pursuers and receivers of altruistic pleasure. The genesis of altruistic pleasure in each is to depend on the display of pleasures by others and so on perpetually. . . . Obviously there must be egoistic pleasure somewhere before there can be altruistic pleasure anywhere."

II. In the face of this clash of opinions it behooves us to restate the egoistic and the altruistic position and to estimate each on the basis of the fundamental conclusions already reached. Our starting point must be the conception of the good, accepted by egoist and altruist alike, as that purpose which a self conceives to be supreme and self-sufficient so that every other purpose is inherently subordinate to it. From the self-sufficiency attributed to the good there follows, it must now be noted, a character significant as a sort of criterion. The self-sufficient is also the self-explanatory. There can, in other words, be no answer to the question "Why is the good the ultimate object of will?" except just the answer "Because it is what it is." A subordinate end

* "The Data of Ethics," Chap. XIII., § 86.

can always be explained by reference to the larger purpose which it furthers: one wills, for example, to earn money for this or that purpose, to study in order to follow this or that profession. But the end which is willed for itself and for the sake of which all else is willed must be self-explanatory for it would be subordinate to anything which could explain it, whereas, by hypothesis, it is not subordinate but is the supreme end. Whatever purpose can be explained is shown to be at best a means to the good but never "the good" itself. This criterion of the good, its self-explanatoriness, should be very carefully considered and clearly apprehended. It constitutes the clue to all genuine appraisal of different views of the good. One comment, however, is important. The awareness of this mark of the good is no necessary part of the moral will but rather a reflection upon it. That is to say, a man need not realize when he wills the good that to be truly "the good," or ultimate, his purpose must be self-explanatory. But if he attempts to compare several alleged supreme purposes, then, as moralist and not merely as moral man, he must fall back upon the test of the ultimateness of purpose.

We shall profitably divide our problem and deal first with the egoistic conception of the good. Our test, we remind ourselves, is this: is the supreme object of the egoist, namely himself, a truly and inherently self-sufficient object? is it one concerning which it is absurd to ask: "why affirm this object?" At first sight it appears as if, at the very touch of this assay, the metal of the egoistic theory must corrode. It seems impossible

that the egoist should be able to meet the question: *Why* direct your will toward so minute a point of the universe as yourself? why refuse to include in the scope of your purpose these other selves throbbing with life, with desire, with promise, with reality? But the thorough-going egoist finds no difficulty here. He simply denies our right to ask these questions. "I do indeed," he insists, "will to achieve my own purposes. I assert myself as ultimate end. I deliberately subordinate everything to myself. And my supreme object seems to me utterly self-sufficient. I can not tell why I am an egoist just because the object of egoistic will is self-explanatory. "Of course," the egoist adds, "it is open to any one to express his disagreement with an egoistic view of the good, but I do not for myself admit the force of the objection. To will my own good is for me a self-explanatory end. I will it because I will it; and just because I hold it to be self-explanatory I am not called upon to defend it."

Before considering the force of this egoistic argument we shall do well to reëxamine the altruistic position. According to the altruist, we already know, moral will is loyalty to other self or selves, not to one's own small self. Altruism is, therefore, less often challenged. In its narrowest form, it is true, altruistic will or loyalty has as object one self only—lover, mother, or child. But in its ever-widening reaches it affirms larger and larger groups—family, trade-group or profession, proletariat, church, country. And yet no one of these objects of the altruistic will is beyond challenge, for each excludes what seems to some one to be an ultimate ob-

ject of moral devotion. Inevitably, therefore, the question arises: Why affirm the happiness or complete development of this rather than of another group of selves? Why devote yourself to one family among the myriad families in equal need or to just these children among the millions with whom the earth teems? Why direct your altruistic will toward immigrants and not toward degenerate native-born? Why work for the ignorant poor to the neglect of the ignorant rich? Why be loyal to this one country out of all the world? And it is not open to the altruist to reply that the objection tells only against narrow forms of altruism and would not hold against an altruism enlarged to embrace all one's fellow-men. For it has already appeared that there is one way in which the object of the altruistic will is inevitably limited. The altruist is, by definition, one who not only is loyal to another or to others but who also ignores himself. In other words, the object of a man's strictly altruistic will excludes himself. The altruist can never, therefore, escape the danger of being faced by the questions: Why do you leave yourself out? How are you justified in ignoring yourself? ought you not, in the utilitarians' phrase, at least to "count for one"? Thus the altruist, in the end, encounters the objection which was urged against the egoist: he is charged, in other words, with the error of directing his supreme volition toward a demonstrably limited object. Confronted with this criticism the altruist, however, answers as the egoist answered. "I do indeed," he asserts, "hold to this supreme altruistic purpose. But I regard this family, this church, this group, as the self-explanatory object of

my will. Just because it is, in my view, self-sufficient and self-explanatory I can not be expected to explain or to defend it. I will it because I will it."

The apparent outcome is complete victory for those who contend that moral standards are purely subjective and that each man must accordingly be left to do what is good in his own eyes. For here are egoist and altruist with opposite purposes each asserting that he wills what is for him a self-explanatory and ultimate object and each impregnable in the position that he need not show reason for his purpose. For it must once more unequivocally be admitted that any one honestly, intelligently, and fixedly holding his end to be self-explanatory rightly gains exemption from the requirement to explain his position. (To urge against him that he "ought" to abandon his egoism or his altruism is to argue in an absurdly futile circle since obligation has already been defined in terms of willing the good.*) But the upholder of a merely subjective ethics can not be left in possession of the field. He has utterly overlooked a third conception of the good—one which the following pages will set forth and which the remainder of this book will seek to deepen and enlarge. According to this view the good, or object of supreme volition, is all-inclusive: it excludes no one, shuts no one out, embraces me with my fellows, is concerned for every family, and group, and class, and country. Such a conception has this indisputable point of superiority: not only, like the egoistic and the altruistic view, may it be held though challenged, but unlike these theories it certainly can not be rejected for setting ar-

* Cf. Chap. I., p. 20, above.

bitrary limits. Both egoist's and altruist's conceptions are challenged for their exclusiveness, their narrowness. "Why be loyal to yourself alone, in a world so full of other selves?" the altruist cries out to the egoist. "Why single out this special person or group as object of your loyalty?" one altruist protests to another. And "Why refuse to regard yourself except as means to others' good?" the egoist demands of every altruist however widely social his purpose. And, though egoist and altruist alike are justified in the refusal to argue for the purpose which to each seems self-sufficient, obviously each must admit that his object is challenged for its narrowness. But the object of moral loyalty conceived as the great universe of selves, the totality of conscious beings, clearly is not open to this challenge. The altruist can not challenge this object for its narrowness since, as all-inclusive, it embraces the altruist's object—child or lover, family or class, church or state. The egoist cannot criticise this object as excluding the end which to him is self-explanatory, for a truly all-embracing object of the will does not exclude the self which wills. Thus, to be loyal to this truly universal community is to affirm by one's will what we now see is the only object incapable by its very nature of excluding any end which to any one seems self-explanatory.

In the doctrine that the adequate object of the good man's will is the truly universal community of selves we have thus discovered a position not only impregnable but also unassailable by the criticism directed against other positions. No one can even ask the good man who devotes himself to this object why he does not seek some

other. For there is no object which would not be included in the universal community, the Great Society from which no sentient being could be excluded and to which the good man himself would belong. The critics of the doctrine, however, bring up another objection. What has been proved, they point out, is that an all-inclusive object of the moral will could not be challenged for its narrowness. But they question first, the psychological possibility of a man's devoting himself to a universal community. Such an object, they urge, is too vast to serve as a genuine moral ideal. And in the second place, these critics insist that loyalty to the universal community would be practically incompatible with a due regard to one's own individuality: in other words, they hold that a man could not be loyal to himself while truly devoting himself to the universe of selves. The following chapter must be devoted to a discussion of these criticisms.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNIVERSAL COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The problems of this chapter are stated in the conclusion of that which precedes it. The discussion of the earlier chapters has culminated in a description of the adequately good man as one who is loyal to the universe of selves of which he is himself a member; this universal community of selves had been found to be the only object of the moral will which can not be challenged on the score of its narrowness—on the ground that it excludes some purpose which to some man seems self-evidently ultimate. Two important criticisms have, however, been urged against this conception of the universal community as object of the good man's devotion. It has been asserted, first, that the universal community is too vast an object to command actual loyalty and, second, that such loyalty, if it could be yielded, would be incompatible with genuine regard for the individuality of the morally willing self. To the consideration of these difficulties we must therefore address ourselves.

I. According to the first of these objections loyalty to the universal community of selves is psychologically impossible. For it would consist, the critic asserts, either in loyalty to each and every sentient being, past, present, and to come, or else in loyalty to a mere abstract conception. Now it is manifestly impossible, the critic proceeds, to be loyal to men whom one has never seen

and never will see; to men unborn and unheard of; and it is equally impossible to feel and show loyalty to a mere abstraction.

This argument merits the most careful consideration. Some of its premises must unreservedly be accepted. It is certainly true that a man can not be loyal to what he does not know and recognize, or to what he can not identify; and he can know, individual by individual, only the smallest fraction of the human selves who make up the universe of to-day—to say nothing of the greater universe which includes all conscious beings, past and future. Nor can the criticism be avoided by arguing that the term “universe of selves” stands for a purely conceptual unity. For loyalty, like all forms of will, is an individualizing experience and it is absurd to talk of loyalty to an abstract concept. If the universal community were indeed an abstraction it could not be an object of genuine devotion. In opposition however to the critic, the upholder of our theory insists that one may be conscious of a concretely real universe of selves and that one may individuate this universal community, may be loyal to it and to every member regarded as inherent part of it, without distinguishing and being separately loyal to each for each. This assertion is based upon two considerations which the following pages elaborate: first, that social groups are actually thus personified and individuated; and second, that there is no inherent limit to the group which may be individuated.

(1) Nobody questions that social groups, as a matter of fact, are personified and individuated.¹ For example, an incorporated business is treated in law as a “juristic

person." Furthermore, people individuate not merely small groups, made up of men who are singly accessible, but groups so large that acquaintance with each constituent person, taken by himself, is impossible. And to these personified social groups, men may be and are loyal. A striking instance of such loyalty is patriotism, the loyalty of a man to his country, his acknowledgment of its paramount claim, his devotion of himself to its interest, his sacrifice of himself for its life. A man's country certainly is to him not the aggregate of its inhabitants, of whom he knows but a few, and is not even certain representatives and leaders, and is still less the symbols, the wind-stirred banners and the strains of music, though these are truly the immediate stimuli and the symbolic objects of his loyalty. No: a man's country, though it certainly includes many selves, is none the less personified, even by those who believe, as most of us do, that so far from being literally an individual person it is constituted by the persons who compose it. A man's country is, in a word, felt and treated as if a self. The young men who are fighting in Europe to-day, who are enduring cold and hunger, toil and wounds, who are dying in uncounted numbers, have abandoned mothers and wives, children and homes and work, each for the sake of a passionately realized and individuated community, his country. From every land rises their cry of measureless devotion:—

"O Weissdorn mit den roten Beeren
Was wird der Frühling uns bescheeren?
Das alles liegt in Gottes Hand
Wir bluten gern fürs Vaterland."

Not alone to the native-born but to the citizen-by-adoption his country is object of personal, passionate loyalty. Hear the words of one of these citizens who has sought and found such a country: "As I read how the patriots planned the Revolution and the women gave their sons to die in battle and the heroes led to victory and the rejoicing people set up the Republic, it dawned on me gradually what was meant by my country. The people all desiring noble things, and striving for them together, defying their oppressors, giving their lives for each other—all this it was that made *my country*. It was not a thing I understood. . . . But I knew one could say 'my country' and feel it as one felt 'God' or 'myself.' . . . For the country was for all the citizens—and *I was* a citizen." *

The loyalty of the Christian to the church offers another striking example. Long ago the apostles described the church as a mother to whom one turns for comfort, or as a bride adorned for her bridegroom. And in "The Problem of Christianity" Professor Royce conceives Christianity as loyalty to the church, or Blessed Community. Our concern is not here with the adequacy—or even with the accuracy—of this interpretation of Christianity but with Royce's teaching that the Christian community is not a "mere collection of individuals," but a "sort of supra-personal being" which a man may really love and serve.† For Royce's doctrine of the Blessed Community holds true of the fully universal community.

* Mary Antin, "The Promised Land," p. 225.

† "The Problem of Christianity," Vol. I., Lect. II., pp. 66–67 ff. Cf. Vol. II., Lect. IX., pp. 26 ff.

And of the man who is loyal to the universe of selves may be said what Royce declares of the lover of any community, that he "regards its type of life, its form of being as essentially more worthy than his own . . . incomparably vaster than his own individual life. He becomes devoted to its interests as to something that by its very nature is nobler than himself.*"

(2) The preceding paragraphs have shown that loyalty to a group—and even to a group of unnumbered selves—is a common human experience. We have still, however, to argue the possibility of devotion to the community of selves which is truly universal—the great society from which no conscious being is excluded. This argument will state explicitly what has already been suggested that loyalty tends constantly to overflow its boundaries so that its object is progressively widened. The moral life may, in truth, be well described as a progressive yielding of narrower to wider object of loyalty. Certainly no moral crises are more poignant than those in which men turn from the call of beloved, of home, of country and of church to sacrifice themselves to the insistent claim of another community. So Christian when he turned his face from Christiana and his children toward the Celestial City, and Scott when he left the Confederacy, and Luther when, as the story has it, he rose from the *Scala Santa* facing away from the Roman church, each, in this great moment of conflicting loyalties, acknowledged the claim of the larger, not the nearer, community. And so many an undistinguished man makes the bitter decision to yield the obvious

* *Op. cit.*, Vol. I., Lect. II., pp 67–68.

loyalty to his family, his class, his position, when he hears the call of the Greater Community. In all these cases devotion to the smaller group merges with loyalty to the larger, more inclusive society. So one's loyalty to the class of 1918 or to the department of botany may grow into college spirit, party fealty may turn into patriotism, service of a special sect may become loyalty to the church. And, before our very eyes, among all factions and parties we behold patriotism taking on the form of international loyalty. Not merely theorists and visionaries but some of the responsible statesmen—Wilson, Asquith, Grey—are calling us to a supernational loyalty² and are pledging allegiance to an "organized major force of mankind," a federation or league of nations. "We must get people," Lord Hugh Cecil says, "to feel that there is something higher than the loyalty to their own country—there is an obligation to the interests of all mankind." And the proof of the genuineness of this growing international loyalty is measured by the sacrifices which men definitely undertake to make for it. Revolutionary Russia's abandonment of a claim to Constantinople, the demand in the early days of 1918 by the British Labor Party that all colonies, including India and the conquered African colonies, be placed under international control—these are not vague prophecies but definitely proposed policies.

The enlarged loyalty, it must again be insisted, does not submerge or annihilate, but includes the lesser loyalty out of which it grows. Thus, the reiterated purpose of the most ardent advocates of a league of nations is "that every people should be left free to determine its own way

of development, unhindered, unthreatened, the little among the great." Loyalty may burn undiminished to guild or to nation, as part of a larger whole not as an independent being. Devotion to the narrower and smaller group may become, in truth, an insistence on its individual contribution to the larger society. For example, national language and literature and traditions may be cherished for their significance and value to the world-whole.

The bearing of these facts upon the argument must now be unequivocally stated. The plain truth open to observation that men, simple and gentle, ignorant and informed, actually are loyal to great communities, great organisms of interrelated persons—actually are devoting themselves, soul and body, to "International" to country or to church—clearly indicates the possibility of an object of loyalty widening to a horizon beyond which there is no conscious creature. For if a man can individualize his class, his country or his church without knowing, one by one, all his comrades, all his countrymen, or all his fellow churchmen, if he can even individuate and be loyal to a League of Nations, then certainly there is no inherent difficulty in his individualizing the totality of conscious beings without knowing each of its members as a separate being.

This analogy must however on no account be pressed too far. The facts we have quoted—facts of class loyalty, patriotism, and internationalism—in no way justify the inference that any league of nations, any Great Society as the economist or statesman conceives it, is or can be identical with the moralist's universe of selves.

For even at its highest the statesman's conception of world-state or of federated nations would remain a visible society and fall short, therefore, of the universal community. The truly Greatest Society, on the other hand, is figured in the group whom St. John saw in the apocalyptic vision when he not only heard "the number of them that are sealed . . . an hundred and forty-four thousand from all the tribes of the children of Israel" but also "beheld a great multitude, which no man could number," a group from whom none were excluded "of all nations and kindred and people and tongues." And by St. Paul the universal community is described as the "household of God," no mere numerical totality of "all men on all the face of the earth" but the vital unity of "the whole family in heaven and earth." Thus a man who is loyal to the good, as here conceived, must mean by the phrase the literally universal community of all selves, not any mere concert or league of nations, nor world-state, nor international association of workers, nor visible church, nor any other group, political, industrial or religious. The good man, devoted to the all-inclusive object, will indeed cherish the lesser loyalties as contributory to the greater; he will eagerly uphold the international ideal; he will seek laboriously and unswervingly to break down the barriers—economic, industrial and political—that separate human beings into hostile camps. But it does not at all follow that he will aim at the foundation of a world state, or that he will demand a centralization of existing governments. Loyalty to the universal community is as compatible with a pluralistic liking for many loosely federated associations

as with the ideal of a world-state or of a few great imperial nations.³ Precisely because we refuse to identify the universal community with any association, political or industrial, we may leave open to discussion the ideal constitution of the societies, national and industrial, included in it.

Yet the universe of selves, though it can not in truth be identified with any visible and tangible association of men, remains a vividly real object of loyalty. And the devotion of men to the universal community is no merely mystic attitude but a practical service. They make their governing decisions and conduct their lives in fealty to it. It is true that the behavior of the good man possessed of this ideal is often outwardly undistinguishable from that of the enlightened altruist or even from that of the rational egoist. But this means only that the same subordinate purposes may serve alike a man's own self, another self or narrow group, and the universal community. There remain situations in which the good man, loyal to the Great Society, will reach a conclusion differing from that of the moral altruist or that of the moral egoist. It is probably impossible to give an unambiguous example, for the case rests in the end on introspective testimony. The following are therefore merely tentative illustrations:—A morally egoistic self might decide to break a contract whereas a man deliberately loyal to the universe of selves would hold to his promise. A chivalrous altruist might consent to divorce the wife whom he passionately loved if he were convinced, rightly or wrongly, that he himself constantly hampered and dwarfed her, whereas the good

man, loyal to the interrelated totality of individuals and families making up the universal community, would almost certainly hold the marriage covenant binding. And, if it be objected that a man loyal to a lesser society, to a trade-group or to a nation, might reach these same decisions, appeal may be made to contemporary history which seems abundantly to prove that a diplomat, loyal to his own nation, or an agent, loyal to his own class, can and does enter into agreements in which no statesman or representative affirming his loyalty to the Great Community could concur.

The argument of this chapter, up to this point, may conveniently be summarized as follows: To the objection, "it is psychologically impossible to be loyal to the universe of selves—since such a universal community is either an abstraction or else an aggregate of persons so numerous that the good man can not individuate them," we have replied: First, we actually experience and observe loyalty to social groups individuated by this devotion. Second, there seems no reason to set any limit to the breadth and inclusiveness of these communities actually individuated by loyal men. Psychology has, therefore, no objection to interpose to the conclusion that the adequate object of moral loyalty is the universe of selves, the truly universal state, unbuilt by human hands, of which all groups of men and all individuals are vitally related members.

II. The second criticism to be considered, of the doctrine that the moral experience is rightly described as loyalty to the universe of selves, concerns the practical possibility of being loyal to the universal community

and at the same time true to oneself. Those who urge this criticism may admit that it is logically possible to be loyal to a universal community, but they believe that in actual experience the utter whole-hearted devotion of a man to church, to party, or to state has always meant renunciation of his personality. To be sure, as the critics must admit, party and state are communities which fall far short of being universal, but the possibility of guarding individual freedom by widening the object of loyalty is precisely what is questioned. And it is rightly urged that complete self-abnegation would entail the loyal self's loss of his inherent value, his only irreplaceable worth—his individuality. The man who devotes himself utterly to church or state or larger community—so the critics proceed—yields the right of private judgment and the claims of personal feeling, abdicates the authority of his own conscience and the sovereignty of his own will, surrenders his personality before the demands of the community. In the words of Treitschke, a logical advocate of the subjection of individual to state: "Not only the life of man but also the right and natural emotions of his inmost soul, his whole ego, are to be sacrificed." This, the objector insists, is to sacrifice the highest values of life, the very treasures which constitute the worth of the community.

It will be profitable to introduce the discussion of this difficulty by considering the ready way in which utilitarians meet it. Utilitarianism⁴ is a system put forth by Cumberland, Hume, and other moralists of the eighteenth century, formulated by the great penologist Jeremy Bentham, enriched and made popular by John

Stuart Mill. According to this view the self-explanatory and ultimate object of the good will is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. There are, obviously, two factors here involved—the qualitative and the numerical as they may be called. By the first of these characters utilitarianism, since it identifies “the good” with “the pleasant,” is a form of hedonism and, as such, will be discussed in the next chapter. We are here concerned with the second, the numerical,* phase of utilitarianism—with its insistence that the ultimate good is the good of all, and, in particular, with the answer which it offers to the objection that, in willing the good of all men, a man abdicates his own individuality. The utilitarians carry on the tradition of individualism in English ethics—not the egoistic and selfish individualism of Hobbes but the collective individualism of Locke.⁵ They consistently teach that “the greatest number” is the sum, or aggregate, of individuals externally related. Each individual, they imply, remains a separate being with distinct rights and privileges, so that the gain of others is indeed always achieved at some expense to himself. The ideal arrangement, in their view, would apparently be for each to gain his own ends without the coöperation of others. Since that is impossible they hold that men should combine simply in order that they may the better

* The term “numerical” is here used, *faute de mieux*, in spite of its too mechanical implication. It is hoped that the reader will not thereby be led to conceive the universal community as a bare aggregate, or merely external unity. The term “quantitative” might perhaps be used in place of “numerical” but would suggest fresh difficulties. “Concrete,” in the Hegelian sense, is another possible synonym.

gain each his own greatest advantage. The highest ideal is therefore that of the maximum freedom consistent with the safety of life and property. In Herbert Spencer's words: "Every proposal to interfere with citizens' activities, further than by enforcing their mutual limitations, is a proposal to improve life by breaking down the conditions of life." John Stuart Mill expresses the same view when he says that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection." Thus the utilitarian ideal is that of a society conceived as an arithmetical total of all selves, of whom each seeks the sum of the individual happinesses, with the least possible interference of one with the other.

Obviously, the utilitarian moralist hereby shows the inherent individualism of his system, his jealous care for the rights of personality. But he achieves this only by yielding the true universality of the object of the moral will. He conceives "the good" always in terms of separate individuals, never in terms of state, of community, of humanity, or of vitally interrelated individuals. The upholder of our theory, that the moral will is sheer loyalty to the universe of selves, can not therefore have recourse to the utilitarian answer to the objection raised by individualists to universalistic ethics. For utilitarianism, while it unquestionably guards individuality and while it advances on many forms of altruism by refusing to limit the object of moral volition to any one person or group, yet substitutes the conception of an externally related sum of separate persons for that of a universal community. We have still, therefore, to consider the

objection that loyalty to the universal community is incompatible with a scrupulous regard for the individuality of every moral self. We have rejected the utilitarian answer to the criticism on the ground that utilitarianism does not have a right conception of the universal community. We are next to discover that neither the objector nor the utilitarian who tries to answer him rightly conceives the individual.⁶ As long as an individual is thought of as existing for himself and only accidentally related to his fellows obviously his interest is opposed to that of his community. But the individual is not the absolutely self-dependent being. Individuality means not separateness but uniqueness. An individual self is distinguished, not separated, from the community to which he belongs. He is inextricably bound up with other people, a complex of personal relationships and attitudes—a son, a citizen, a party man, a church member and always a citizen of the Great Society. And these relationships are not external excrescences but integral parts of him; if they were stripped off he would no longer be himself. It follows that the critic who upholds loyalty to the individual in opposition to loyalty to the community does not adequately understand the essential characters of the individual. For a man completely realizes himself only as he strengthens the ties which bind him to the whole community of vitally interrelated selves. Thus superficial individualism, choosing one's own good in disregard of the good of the community, discloses itself as an inherently inconsistent policy. The crass individualist achieves his specific ends only at the price of ignoring his true needs as socially related self.

Once this conception is gained and held of the individual self as a unique but vitally coördinated part of the great social organism, the opposition of the one to the other perforce vanishes. The universal community is now clearly seen to be an organic whole of completely interrelated selves, such that the whole requires each individual self, while each self possesses its individuality only in its relation to all the rest. In the words of Thomas Hill Green, the perfect life of an individual is "fully attainable by one man only in so far . . . as it is attained by all": it is "a social life exhibiting the exercise of self-denying will in which the multitude of the redeemed, which is all men, shall participate."* To state this in other terms:—the individual self, thus rightly conceived as unique self, not as an unrelated self, can never stand in opposition to the universal state, for the individual is an organic part of this Great Community: he can not be dwarfed, or robbed, or wounded without depriving the community of his inherent contribution to it. The Treitschke ideal is defective not only because it so obviously violates the rights of the individual; but also because it untruly and abstractly conceives the state as a reality *over* the individual and not as a reality of which the individual is himself a vital part. The truth is that in being loyal to the universe of selves a man can not ignore or deny himself. For his loyalty is of no avail if he is an ineffective and inherently worthless citizen, however faithful. The man who is loyal to the Great Society must therefore seek for himself enlargement and enrichment. In Professor Palmer's words, if he "would be a

* "Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. IV., Chap. IV, § 370.

great giver he must first be a great person.”* Inattention to his individual self, disregard of his own capacities and his own needs, would defeat the very ends of that universe of selves which he is seeking to serve. On the other hand, when his own pleasure or intellectual advancement or creative impulse is in opposition to the large ends of the universe of selves he certainly will sacrifice them—not, however, to the good of “others” but to the good of the “all” of whom he is one. To paraphrase Mary Antin’s words, already quoted: the country is for all the citizens and he is a citizen. The loyal individual is thus subordinating not his own will to the will of the community, but his lesser will to those great ends of the community which are his, too, by virtue of his citizenship. In loyalty to the community he is loyal to himself, but to himself as related member, not to himself in any isolation from the Great Society.

It must be emphasized in conclusion that the loyalty, thus conceived, of individual self to universal community, is compatible with—indeed implies—relations, often of opposition, to other individuals and to lesser groups.⁷ For it is profoundly true that “consent to disagreement” † is a factor of vital harmony. But, underlying this genuine opposition between individuals and groups, is the common loyalty of all who seek the good of what they conceive as the universal community. The individual is organically, vitally, a part of this community and he can not therefore realize himself except in his entire loyalty to it.

* G. H. Palmer, “The Nature of Goodness,” p. 177².

† H. Laski, “The Problem of Sovereignty,” p. 25.

CHAPTER V

THE GOOD AS HEDONIST AND NON-HEDONIST CONCEIVE IT

The discriminating reader is bound to have noticed that the account so far given of "the good," the object of the moral will, is incompletely determined. According to this account, the moral man is he who is loyal to the universe of selves. But how, the critic asks, can this Great Society be said to constitute the good, the object of the moral will? What, concretely, is to be willed? Precisely what shall the good man's loyalty further—the health, or the wisdom, or the happiness of the Great Society, the universal community? These questions call attention to the important distinction already suggested between the "numerical" and the "qualitative" aspects of any personal or social object of the will. The discussion of the preceding section has concerned the first of these aspects only. And its outcome is that, numerically considered, the good is neither myself nor any one "other self," nor any restricted group of others but the all-including, vitally related, society of selves. The following pages must be devoted to a discussion of the neglected topic. They must answer the question already formulated: Are we to further the happiness or the knowledge or the power of the Great Community? That is to say, our next purpose is to estimate conceptions of the good from the qualitative point of view.

These conceptions are most conveniently distinguished as hedonistic and non-hedonistic.

I. Historically, the earliest form of the theory under consideration is egoistic hedonism, the doctrine that the good, the ultimate object which the moral self wills, is his own individual pleasure. But since the egoistic conception of the good has already disclosed to us its inherent inadequacy we are, strictly speaking, no longer at liberty seriously to debate the claims of any egoistic theory. Nevertheless there is one form of this egoistic doctrine, so-called psychological hedonism, which has been so ardently espoused that it will here briefly be discussed.¹ Upholders of this theory maintain that as a matter of fact a man, in willing the good, always wills his own pleasure. Indeed, according to the psychological hedonist, whenever he wills anything whatever he is actually always willing what is pleasant. This is the hypothesis which the immediately following pages will discuss.

At first sight it may seem very easy to disprove psychological hedonism by our own experience, or by well-established historical instances of men who sacrificed their own pleasure. The unreflective non-hedonist, for example, points triumphantly to Garibaldi's superb relinquishment of Sicily and Naples to Victor Emmanuel. Here, he cries, is a clear instance of will directed not to egoistic pleasure but to the common good. Garibaldi voluntarily refuses the dictatorship, lays down at the feet of the government, which had not dared openly to sanction the Sicilian expedition, the victory purchased by his own "magical" leadership and by the blood and

the valor of the Thousand. But the hedonist finds no difficulty in accounting for Garibaldi's choice in terms of his own system. He simply claims the sacrifice as enlightened choice of the greater pleasure. Garibaldi has fought for "Italy and Victor Emmanuel," and the joy of furthering the union of a free Italy outweighs, in the great patriot's estimate, the triumph of being dictator. Thus (the hedonist insists) Garibaldi really chooses what is for him the greater of two irreconcilable pleasures. And, to take an example from everyday life, when I turn aside from the Penobscot salmon which my dealer offers me because my mother does not eat it, I am willing not to give up the pleasure of eating the salmon but to gain the greater pleasure of seeing my mother's satisfaction in the prosaic boiled halibut.

In truth no account can be given of a definite decision to yield a pleasure or to endure a pain on which the hedonist may not and does not put his own construction. He never disputes the fact which is urged against him; he cheerfully admits that men have scorned delight and lived laborious days, that they have freely chosen death and torture; that they have torn their very heart's delight out—yet always, he insists, the sacrifice must have been made for the sake of gaining some even greater joy or for the sake of escaping some even grimmer toil or of avoiding some even sharper pain. In very truth, hedonism can not be disproved by any number of examples of sacrificed pleasure. For no such instance excludes or can exclude the *possibility* that pleasure is never yielded save in favor of a greater pleasure, or for the sake of avoiding pain.

But this admission of the logical possibility of interpreting in the hedonist's fashion every instance of the sacrifice of pleasure carries us only a little way toward the solution of the problem. For the real question at issue is not: "Is it conceivable for a man to will the unpleasant for the sake of greater pleasure?" or even "Does a man often sacrifice one pleasure in order to gain a greater?" To both these questions an affirmative answer must be given. But psychological hedonism teaches not that a man always *may*, but that he invariably and inevitably *does* will his own pleasure. A single established exception to this universal affirmative proposition would suffice to disprove psychological hedonism. And, as a matter of fact, exceptions of two sorts must be conceded. (1) In the first place very many, though not all, observers of themselves insist that they find in their experience instances of moral will whose object is not pleasure; that they make moral decisions, affirm moral loyalties, espouse moral causes, without any anticipation of pleasure. Among these, who declare that in certain moral crises they choose what is unmitigatedly unpleasant to them, are numbered many expert observers; and the unprejudiced critic—making all allowances for faulty introspection—must conclude that the psychological hedonist is unjustified in asserting that every morally willing self invariably wills his own pleasure. (2) And even in the non-moral experience there occur innumerable cases of volition, during the process of learning to perform an external activity, in which, once more, the object of will is not pleasure.² When, for instance, I will to get the ball over the net, or to pedal with my left foot,

or to purl a stitch in a bit of knitting, I am so absorbed in willing to do this new thing that every anticipation of pleasure, as a result of the doing, is crowded out. So exclusively am I attending to and willing either the novel movement of wrist, foot, or fingers, or else the completed process as I concretely image it (ball landing in net, pedal down, or purled stitch) that the anticipation of future pleasure is simply lacking while I am still learning the new process. Thus both the non-moral and the moral experience seem to furnish instances in which pleasure is not willed.

The non-hedonist need not, however, await the hedonist's admission of these introspective results. Psychological hedonism can, in truth, be discredited without thus demonstrating the occurrence of cases where volitions are directed toward the non-pleasant. Such disproof consists simply in pointing out that there assuredly are cases in which men, even if they will their own pleasure, are also willing something besides pleasure. For hedonism affirms pleasure as sole object of will and is therefore disproved by any instance of willing, not pleasure, but *the pleasurable*—the object in which pleasure constitutes one ingredient only. Now unquestionably most careful introspectors believe that they will the pleasurable far more often than they will mere pleasantness. And if the non-hedonist waives this everyday testimony he may still establish his contention by calling on the great cloud of witnesses to voluntary heroic deeds. When, for instance, on the terrible day of the explosion in Halifax harbor, a man deliberately left a place of comparative safety on a wharf and boarded the abandoned,

burning *Pictou*, fighting the flames single-handedly in the effort to keep the fire from the munitions in the ship's hold—surely he could not have willed *solely* the pleasure which the desperate attempt would bring. Even if it were granted that he did will to gain the pleasant feeling of self-approval and the delight of popular acclaim it would be sheer absurdity to hold that he did not also will to save the lives and homes that he saw threatened. And with this admission the psychological hedonist would yield his position, for he would grant a case of willing something in addition to pleasure.

The psychological hedonist, however, ingeniously finds a last loophole for escape from the non-hedonist's arguments. Just as men may go hunting or fishing for the sport and not specifically for the quarry or the catch, and just as we all may play games for the fun of the game so, he urges, a man may will what is not in itself pleasant just for the zest, the pleasure in willing.³ But the analogy plays the hedonist false. Assuredly there often is a zest in willing, as there is pleasure in hunting or gaming, apart from the pleasure in trapping or hooking or winning. But certainly hunt or game would never be entered upon except for the possible catch or victory. And this proves that the pleasure in action is subordinate to the pleasure in the normal end of action.

Herewith the last argument of the psychological hedonist is fairly met. To be sure, the concrete facts which he adduces have all been admitted; and these are first (1) the fact that a man may at any time will his own pleasure; next, (2) the fact that pleasure often forms

a constituent of the complex object of volition; and now finally (3) the fact that pleasure in willing often becomes a direct object of volition. But, one and all, these facts fail to prove what, in truth, has shown itself untenable: the psychological hedonist's excessive claim that pleasure is the only object of the will.

II. From this parenthetical discussion of the egoistic system of *psychological* hedonism, which really is not an ethical theory at all, we must turn to the consideration of a hedonistic doctrine of a very different stripe: *ethical*, or rational, universal hedonism.³ According to this theory the proper, though not the invariable, object of the morally willing self is pleasure, not his own pleasure but the greatest pleasure, or happiness, of the world of sentient beings. Our concern is with the hedonistic part, only, of this theory for we have already adopted its universalistic teaching. It is first necessary to brush away the ordinary misconceptions which attach to the view. To begin with, hedonism is not subversive of moral discipline. Like every other ethical teacher the egoistic hedonist exhorts to honesty and industry, to courage and abstinence, because these are the means to happiness. He cannot be drummed out of court, after the naïve fashion of everyday critics, without a genuine examination of his claims. By pleasure, in the second place, the hedonist need not mean sense-pleasure only, and it is therefore very unfair to argue against the doctrine as of necessity sensualistic. For a man may regard pleasure as the highest good and at the same time may eschew sense-delights as transitory or uncertain and may seek intellectual or even religious happiness. Ep-

icurus,⁴ most revered of the hedonists, teaches that abiding pleasure, which is serenity of soul, may be found only in friendship and in the exercise of thought and that it is entirely independent of wealth. "Give me a barley corn and water," he exclaims, "and I am ready to vie even with Zeus in happiness."

We are now fairly ready to consider whether pleasure can constitute that experience of the universe of selves which we know as the good. And we have first to note that though it is indeed, as has just been argued, inadmissible to object to the conception on the ground that it sets before us, as the good, the satisfaction of our sense desires exclusively, there is, on the other hand, nothing in rational hedonism which uncompromisingly forbids a man to seek sense-satisfactions as his ultimate purpose. For pleasure is pleasure; and on hedonistic principles one pleasure is greater than another, as Jeremy Bentham expressly teaches, only if it is intenser, or more prolonged, or nearer, or surer, or more unmixed with pain, or more productive of future pleasure.* The rational hedonist has to "sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side and those of all the pains on the other" and choose between them. He will follow Epicurus rather than Aristippus only if he believes that thought and friendship yield him greater, surer, and more enduring pleasure than wealth and luxury. But if it can once be proved to him that gluttony and sensuality and indulgence yield deeper and surer and longer pleasure he will abandon books and work and friends for food and wine and revelry. John Stuart Mill, to be sure, dissents from

* "Principles of Morals and Legislation," Chap. IV.

this view and teaches that certain pleasures are inherently higher than others, not merely stronger and more enduring.⁵ But in this view Mill unquestionably, though unwittingly, abandons his hedonistic position. For one pleasure can be rated, in this sense, higher than another only if something besides pleasure—sympathy or thought, for example—is added to it. And when this has happened the object of the moral will is something other than mere pleasure. To admit with Mill that “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” is to imply that the good is other than pleasure even though inclusive of it.

We rightly conclude therefore that the consistent hedonist must conceive the good as the greatest happiness—by which is meant, in Sidgwick’s phrase, “the surplus of pleasure over pain”—whatever the nature of the pleasure, personal or impersonal, intellectual or sensual. Our problem is to estimate the adequacy of this account of the experience of the Great Society which should constitute the supreme object, qualitatively considered, of the moral self’s will. Is “the greatest happiness of the universe of selves” in truth the most accurate formulation of the ultimate moral ideal, the good? The following paragraph will seek to show that the hedonistic conception invites challenge.

By the good is meant, as has so often been said, the object which the willing subject sets before himself as supreme and self-explanatory. And there is no reason to deny the fact that there are people, moralists and everyday persons alike, who honestly believe that

pleasurable experience—their own, that of family or class or country, or that of the universal community—is the self-explanatory object of will, to which all other purposes are inherently subordinate. As the discussion of earlier chapters has suggested, these seriously-minded hedonists are relieved, by virtue of their belief in the self-sufficiency of pleasure as an aim, from the necessity of arguing further for their hedonism. But the security of the individual moralist, in his conception of the good does not, as we now so well know, preclude the possibility of challenging the adequacy of his conception. And, as a matter of fact, hedonism is challenged, much as egoism and altruism were challenged, for the narrowness of its conception of the good. Pleasure, the critic urges, may well be a significant factor, but it is one factor only, of human experience. I am not merely a self happy or miserable, but I am a thinking, an aspiring, a working self. “Why then,” the non-hedonist protests to the hedonist, “why do you exclude activity and thought from your conception of the good, or ultimate end? Why do you limit this chief good to happiness alone?” And the hedonist, though he justifiably disclaims the necessity of arguing for his own ideal, can not deny the fact on which the criticism is based, namely, the limitedness of his concept of the good.

III. This hesitation in accepting hedonism leaves us with the problem on our hands from which in this chapter we set out. We had gained the conception of the universal community as object of our supreme loyalty and we asked the question: “Concretely what experience of the Universal Community shall the good man further? In

technical terms, what is the good, qualitatively considered?" Now that the hedonistic answer to this question is discredited we turn, naturally enough, to anti-hedonistic doctrines. Of these there are many types. Schopenhauer, for example, has defined the good as pity. Nietzsche has identified it with strength; others have conceived it as wisdom, as self-assertion, as benevolence. It will, however, prove unnecessary to examine these conceptions each for each. For the inevitable outcome of such study is already clear. Every one of these conceptions is exposed, as the hedonistic doctrine was exposed, to challenge for its narrowness. The convinced anti-hedonistic moralist, to whom wisdom or self-activity is the ultimate and self-explanatory end can not, it is true, be driven from his position. For he will rightly insist that he should not be required to explain what is for him the good precisely as he conceives it to be self-explanatory. But this admitted impossibility of forcing the anti-hedonist to argue for his doctrine does not absolve the impartial critic from the duty of estimating it. Such an estimate discloses the limitations of the conception, the fact that it ignores genuine factors of human experience—forms of consciousness which, to many at least, seem to constitute elements of the supreme good. In particular, the anti-hedonistic conception of the good is challenged for excluding happiness from the ultimate ideal. Even those who most eagerly deny that the good is identical with happiness realize that the good contains happiness and that pleasure though not the whole of life is genuinely a part of it. Thus, the rigoristic moralist, Kant, though he firmly opposes hedonism,

still asserts that "the complete good includes happiness." *

It is already clear that only one qualitative theory of the good can escape challenge for its narrowness. This is the doctrine which describes the good not in terms of any one kind of consciousness, as pity, loyalty, wisdom, or happiness, but as inclusive of all these experiences and of all others which people wish or will for themselves. The good thus conceived is the utterly complete, the richest, the fullest, the most varied experience, the conscious life to which neither sense-delight, nor arduous thought, nor beatific love, nor active will, nor any other kind or form of experience is lacking.⁶ In the words of the Platonic Socrates, "we should seek the good not in the simple life but in the blended (ἐν τῷ μίκτῳ)." †

So much at least is evident: this conception, and this alone, escapes the criticism which assails both hedonistic and anti-hedonistic ideal. "Why exclude pleasure?" the hedonist cries to the anti-hedonist. "Why limit ultimate purpose to happiness?" the anti-hedonist retorts: "why exclude, except as mere means to happiness, anything so positive as knowledge or loyalty?" The conception now achieved is beyond either challenge, for it describes the good as union not only of happiness and knowledge and loyalty, but of all factors of desired experience. In our loyalty to the good, thus conceived, we are seeking as supreme object neither the happiness nor the wisdom but both the happiness and the wisdom,

* "Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. II., Chap. II., Hartenstein Edition, p. 116.

† Philebos, 61 B.

neither the self-assertion nor the loyalty but both the self-assertion and the loyalty—we are seeking, in a word, the fullest expression of every capacity, the freest exercise of every activity of the whole universe of selves.

CHAPTER VI

THE VIRTUOUS MAN

We study ethics, Aristotle says, not primarily to know the good, but in order to become good. In bolder fashion, Spinoza announces his purpose, in his *Ethics*, of taking his reader "as it were by the hand" and leading him to "the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness." * But there are not wanting modern critics who frankly question the ability of Aristotle and Spinoza to make good these promises and who candidly assert that ethical conceptions are practically useless.¹ These are "fine sayings," Havelock Ellis admits. But, he asks, will they serve "as guides, as motives to practical action in the world?" And in supposed answer to his own question Ellis, followed by many modern critics, asserts that "slavery to rigid formulas" is "the death of all high moral responsibility." † Let us reflect on the problem raised by these diverging views of the practical use of the science of ethics.¹

It must at once be admitted that a thinking man who is truly and completely moral—in other words a man who affirms as his supreme volition and acknowledges as obligation, that object of will which he conceives as "ultimate good"—that such a man may be at a loss in the

* *Ethics*, Part II., Preface.

† Havelock Ellis, in the "*Atlantic Monthly*," 1914 (Nov.), pp. 701, 707.

application of his ethical conceptions. It follows, as we know, that equally conscientious men, with the same conception of the good, often make genuinely moral choices diametrically opposed to each other. And it happens also that conscientious men are often paralyzed by indecision in their inability to descry the specific choices by which to further their genuinely moral purpose. These reflections certainly seem to justify only a skeptical attitude regarding the practical nature of the science of ethics. Why, it may well be asked, should one seek to widen and purify and justify one's conception of the chief good, when, apparently, it has so little specific effect on one's concrete choices? Why should one so carefully compare different theories of morality when there is such difficulty in applying theoretical, ethical conclusions?

In reply to this arraignment of ethics and of reflectively moral behavior it must, in the first place, be insisted that the possession and the comprehension of a supreme end, however often practically futile in a specific case, is of genuine value at crises and turning-points of life in the estimation of the comparative worth of particular choices toward the achievement of the supreme purpose. This value of a governing purpose may be abundantly illustrated even in the field of non-moral volition. To decide to climb Sargent Mountain may not help a man choose between the mountain trail and the blueberry path, which start together from the foot of it, but this governing purpose certainly determines the general direction of his walk. To hold Lord Kelvin's in place of Boscovitch's theory of the constitution of matter does not help a

physicist to perform a specific experiment and yet does guide the direction of his experimental work. Similarly, the clear apprehension that in a man's moral choices he has in view the universe of selves, and no special group, will, by itself, prevent him from obviously individualistic or narrow party decisions.

Yet if this were the only way of answering the criticism it would be necessary to admit the highly formal and general character of the science of ethics and to agree with the critics that it has little to say about many specific choices and little aid to give us as we try to solve many practical problems of conduct. The truth is, however, that our study of ethics is not yet completed. We have so far considered the elemental characters of the moral consciousness and the nature of the ultimate object of will; we have yet to subject to scientific scrutiny the specific habitual volitions by means of which men seek to achieve the good. These habits of volition, ways of furthering the good, are known as virtues; and the study of the virtues is, in a sense, the science of applied ethics.

By a virtue is meant a habit of will through which a man controls his instinctive tendencies in such wise that he furthers the chief good, or the ultimate object of his will.² From this point of view, a man's moral experience consists in the progressive transformation of his instinctive behavior into the habitual decisions which further the chief good, as he knows it. In terms of that conception of the good for which this book argues, our virtues are those habits of our will in which, through control of our instincts, we express our loyalty to the universe of selves. Plainly, this definition demands an introduc-

tory discussion both of habitual and of instinctive experience and behavior.

I. A habit is most simply and, for our present purpose, sufficiently described, as a recurring reaction or experience. The fruitful conception of virtue as habit was first distinctly formulated by Aristotle. It must be taken, as he takes it, in close connection with the fact that the moral consciousness is through and through volitional. Neither an habitual reflex nor an habitual impulsive act, even if it furthers the good, is virtuous. Only an habitual volition which controls instinctive tendencies in the effort to attain the good may rightly be called a virtue. It should be added that there is a popular distinction in the use of noun and of adjective. A single volitional control of instinct, in furtherance of the ultimate end of will, may be called virtuous—for example, one repression of the instinct of flight may be the virtuous decision of a man who has not yet learned the habit of courage. But as one swallow does not make a summer, so a single virtuous act does not make a virtuous man. And it is a patent fact that the crying need of our age, as of all ages, is precisely for men who have formed virtuous habits—men who are not merely capable of occasional acts of courage, of honesty and of justice, but who can be counted on to be brave, honest, and just. We may pause also to observe that the habitualness of virtue once more indicates the progressive transformation of moral struggle into effortless will.* For habitual acts tend always to be performed with ever decreasing attention and effort.

* Cf. Chap. II., p. 18.

II. A virtue has been defined as a habit of will which controls instinctive tendencies in furtherance of the ultimate purpose. This term "instinctive tendency"³ is used to cover all innate tendencies (or "dispositions"), mental or bodily or, more often, both mental and bodily. It is meant to include both the specific instincts, as ordinarily enumerated, fear and anger, for example, and more general tendencies, such as credulity and imitation. The point especially to be emphasized is the distinction between unacquired, unlearned, inborn tendencies and those which are acquired, or learned. Our instinctive tendencies, simple and complex, special and general, bodily and mental, emotional and unemotional, constitute our stock in trade, our physiological and psychical capital. In virtuous willing we seek to control our instinctive tendencies of every sort. Thus, a man may try to modify his quick temper or his native suspiciousness in subordination to his supreme loyalty or he may seek to control his over-quick bodily reactions—his gestures or his words. In truth, the bodily reactions are often more immediate objects of our moral will. The soldier, for example, can effectively will to advance when he cannot successfully will to feel courageous; the child with twenty-five cents to spend can will to walk toward the tooth brush counter and away from the candy counter while he cannot will to want the tooth brush more than the candy.

An enumeration of the instinctive tendencies with which ethics is specially concerned will best conclude this section and will serve as introduction to the doctrine of the virtues. The primary distinction, as will appear, is

that between instinctive tendencies in which attention may be concentrated on myself alone and those which are inevitably social in the sense of including a reference to other self or selves. Under the first head, that of (a) instinctive tendencies either individual or social, fall (1) the two opposed tendencies of *approach* and *withdrawal*, with their psychic correlates *curiosity* and *fear* and (2) two other similarly contrasted tendencies, *acquisition* and *rejection* (in its conscious aspect, *disgust*.) Among the (b) inherently and essentially social tendencies may be distinguished (1) the basal instinctive tendencies, *gregariousness* and *shyness*, *communicativeness* and *secretiveness*, *liking* and *disliking*, along with the more specific *mating* and *parental instincts*; (2) the obviously sympathetic tendencies of *imitating* and *giving*; and (3) the non-sympathetic tendencies, *resistance* and *pugnacity*. The analysis and illustration of these varied instinctive tendencies will form part of the discussion, later to be undertaken, of the corresponding virtues. But it must be noted expressly that only more or less fundamental tendencies are named and that the classification, at most only tentative, is not made from a biological nor even from a psychological but from an ethical standpoint.

III. An individually or socially beneficial instinct is not yet a virtue. Thus it is not, under ordinary circumstances, virtuous to retreat from danger or to eat one's dinner, though both are instinctive and useful acts. It is not even virtuous to do deeds of rescue or to relieve poverty through purely instinctive daring or lavishness. For an instinctive experience is primarily unvolitional;

whereas a virtue, as has been so often said, is a habit of will which controls instinct in furtherance of the ultimate end of will.⁴ A preliminary consideration of (a) the basal principle and (b) the methods of such control must next be undertaken. The following chapters will illustrate the abstract statements of the succeeding paragraphs.

(a) Our ethical theory describes the good, or ultimate object of moral loyalty, as the completest possible conscious life—the life so rich and so full that it includes all forms of desired experience. From the standpoint of this conception it is evident that the virtuous control of the instincts must be guided by the following principle: *Each virtue must further the completeness, the richness, of experience of the moral self and of the community to which he belongs.* From this principle there are two important corollaries. (1) The first of these may be stated as follows: *The existence of an instinctive tendency is a prima facie argument, though not of necessity a decisive argument, for the satisfaction of it.* If I instinctively dance or act this is directly a reason for my dancing or acting. And not only is it true that the satisfaction of instinctive tendencies is essentially desirable but it is also probable that the instinctive tendencies which may be called positive—approach and appropriation, for example—tending as they do directly to enrich and enlarge the self, have, as it were, the right of way over negative and directly impoverishing tendencies such as withdrawal and surrender.

(2) But while an instinctive tendency unquestionably is a strong excuse for its own being—it is not, as has been stated, a conclusive reason. For there certainly are many

instinctive tendencies, such as cruelty, which it seems must be utterly repressed. Even Aristotle, with all his Hellenic insistence on moderation, admits that there are some actions or feelings in which, as he states the matter "you never can go right but must always be wrong. The wrong," he adds, does not, in these cases, "depend on the selection of a proper person, time or manner . . . but simply doing any onesoever of those things is being wrong." * And there are still more numerous occasions when tendencies often rightly satisfied ought not to be indulged. We have thus to reconcile the demand for a complete, rich life in which all instinctive tendencies find expression with this empirically discovered necessity of often repressing them. The principle of this reconciliation is not far to seek. For every self is a complex, a many-sided, a richly facettted self of many instinctive tendencies and interests and capacities. To secure completeness of experience the self, just because of the multiplicity of these often incompatible instinctive impulses, must fully organize and integrate them. And this organizing and harmonizing must of course mean the frequent checking of certain impulses. Thus the second corollary from the basal principle of virtuous control of instinctive tendencies is the following: *No instinctive tendency may be indulged to the degree of intensity at which it tends to drive out or unduly to thwart the others.* The point at which a tendency is to be modified or repressed is simply that at which it endangers the completeness of experience; it is to be checked merely because it does not leave room for the virtuous

* Nicomachean Ethics, Book II.

exercise of the other instincts. The ideal conduct would therefore be that which should "fulfil all a man's wishes at once, suppressing none." *

(b) The basal principle of the virtuous control of the instinctive tendencies, the truth that the moral life is the completest possible experience, with its two corollaries—the law that complete experience demands the free play of instinctive tendencies and the law that the tyrannous, thwarting instincts must be controlled—has next to be applied in the discussion of the practical methods of transforming the instinctive impulses into virtues. These methods are theoretically of two main types: either (1) strengthening, or urging, the instinctive tendency or else (2) opposing and suppressing it. But the first method of control, the express volitional affirmation of instinctive impulse, is practically negligible, since instinctive behavior seldom needs the spur of will. Thus, without detriment to our moral purpose, many harmless instincts may be left to themselves without being affirmed by volition. It is equally probable that no truly basal instinctive tendency ever has to be absolutely suppressed, whereas unquestionably it is sometimes morally incumbent on us to uproot certain specific and complex tendencies. Thus miserliness must be repressed but not acquisitiveness, the basal instinct of which miserliness is an extreme; and similarly cowardice, but not the instinct of withdrawal, needs to be entirely eradicated.

Both the checking and the suppression, it should be observed, are of necessity indirect, not direct, forms of control. For volition always includes attention and,

* Edwin Holt, "The Freudian Wish," p 131.

therefore, one can not will *not* to have a certain experience without in some faint or distant form having it. This is as true of non-moral as of moral volition. One can not even will to suppress a bodily motion without at least a tendency to carry it out—a fact which the collisions of untrained chauffeurs often attest. I check one tendency, therefore, by willing the opposite. For instance, if I instinctively want to go sailing I shall in vain look out over the white-capped harbor trying not to want the sail. Let me, however, turn my attention on to-morrow's examination and on the importance of passing it—and my impulse to be off and away is at once checked by my concern for my lists of dates or for my geometry theorems. A second way of modifying an instinctive tendency is by directing it toward an entirely new set of objects. Thus, as will later be set forth, one may seek to divert pugnacity from men to principles or may direct acquisitiveness toward first editions in place of securities. Both methods of control are almost always deliberative, usually involving decision with effort.

The discovery that the repression of an instinctive tendency is necessarily indirect, most often involving the arousal of an opposite tendency, is an immensely important finding. For it shows that the normal method of dealing with instinctive tendencies is neither to strengthen them (which is ordinarily unnecessary) nor to suppress them absolutely (which is probably impossible) but to modify or combine them. The virtuous modification of the instincts is always, to quote Holt once more,* “a free play of both the involved sets of

* *Op. cit.*, p. 122².

tendencies whereby they meet each other. . . A line of conduct emerges," Holt adds, "which is dictated by both sets of motives together and which embodies all that was not downright antagonistic in the two."

It follows that every virtue keeps, as it were, a balance between corresponding vices. For a vice is simply the over-indulgence of any instinctive tendency, the absence of any moral control of a given impulse. The material of our vices is, in other words, precisely that of our virtues—our instinctive feelings, impulses, reactions—but these are uncontrolled by moral habits of willing. So, the greedy or untruthful man gives full play to instinctive acquisitiveness or secretiveness; he throws the reins over the neck of every impulse and disposition, whereas the virtuous man does not humor any instinctive tendency to the top of its bent. Every virtue is thus, in Aristotle's words, a "mean" between two opposing vices, in Holt's term, a "resolution" of diverse instinctive impulses. So, courage involves the control of instincts which, unmodified, would become rashness, on the one hand, cowardice on the other; and, thrift, as will later appear, stands in like relations to greed and to prodigality.

It should now be clear that this conception of virtue as the control of instincts is equally opposed to two simple conceptions of conduct: to asceticism⁵ on the one hand, whose ideal is the suppression of the instincts, and on the other hand to naturalism which—viewing instincts as inevitable self-expressions—justifies the unbridled indulgence of them. Plainly this naturalistic theory lacks self-consistency. It claims a right of way for every instinct in the interest of a rich and full experience,

and yet it offers no redress to the lesser instincts, overridden by the great passions, and (a defect even more serious) it fosters the passive attitude of self-indulgence and leaves no scope for self-activity and self-control. Asceticism, on the other hand, though it requires self-activity, unduly limits the activity to the merely negative function of suppression. In its turn it thus fails to do justice to the richness of experience and by its austere dwarfing of natural capacities renders an incomplete moral loyalty.

CHAPTER VII

THE VIRTUOUS MAN (Continued)

VIRTUES EITHER INDIVIDUAL OR SOCIAL

Our present aim is the study of the good man's virtues, the habits of will by which he makes his instinctive tendencies serve what he knows as the good. The earlier part of this book has shown that the good, or self-sufficient and supreme object of will, is adequately conceived as the full and complete experience of the universal community of selves; and the immediately preceding chapter has furnished us with certain aids to our detailed study of the virtues. These are first, a provisional table of instinctive tendencies to which the virtues, habitual ways of controlling these tendencies, are likely to be closely related; second, a statement of the principle on which such control must be based—the purpose to secure, by organization of instincts, the completest and fullest life possible; and third, suggestions concerning the specific methods of control.

In the effort to classify the virtues it is convenient to group them, as the instinctive tendencies have already been grouped, into two classes: virtues, either individual or social and virtues "inherently social." Virtues of the first group have been often, in the history of ethics, described as merely individual, or self-regarding virtues,¹ and thus more sharply contrasted with the social virtues.

But though it is certainly true that a crass individualist would wisely cultivate thrift and abstinence, courage and prudence, in order to further his own ends, yet for the moral self who has discovered that the good must be defined in social terms "there are," as Clifford says, "no self-regarding virtues properly so-called."¹ Such a man will study to be brave and prudent, thrifty and abstinent; but his virtuous purpose will have regard to other selves and he will act for himself only as he is vitally a part of the Great Community to which he is loyal.

Our study of this group of the virtues will perhaps be facilitated by a simple tabular view of them in their positive relation to the instinctive tendencies which are either individual or social. We have then:—

Instinctive Tendencies: Approach, Withdrawal, Appropriation,
Rejection.

Virtues: Courage, Prudence, Thrift, Abstinence.

Such a grouping throws into sharp relief the error of the ascetic practice of opposing the instinctive to the virtuous. For if the virtues are, as appears, outgrowths from the instinctive tendencies, it is unlikely that the two are sharply opposed. Rather a virtue consists, as has been stated, in the control and not in the annihilation of the instinct. The actual forms which such control must take will appear in the study, immediately to be undertaken, of certain fundamental virtues.

The Thrifty Man and the Abstinent

I. The word "thrift," taken as it should be in a large sense, covers all manifestations of the virtuous habit

of enriching oneself at any point or in any way, of enlarging any part of oneself, of extending one's boundaries in any direction and of holding tenaciously to what one has gained. The thrifty man, in the large meaning of the term thrifty, secures for himself good conditions of work, expert service, and exhilarating holidays besides saving money or amassing property.

The virtue of thrift is based on the instinct of appropriateness in its two forms, acquisitiveness and tenacity.² Both are early manifested and yet permanent tendencies. Thus, the baby grasps at everything in his range of vision and the child collects pebbles or postage stamps as the squirrel collects nuts and the bibliophile amasses first editions. And baby, animal, and adult cling tenaciously to their treasures. It is easy to see that both forms of the instinct are individually and racially useful.

Our next question concerns the methods of transforming these instincts into the virtue of thrift.³ There are theoretically, as we already know, two methods. That is to say, my moral will, in its control of one of these instincts, may take either the form of spurring it on or else the form of checking an opposed instinct. Thus, the virtue of thrift may conceivably consist either in giving volitional emphasis to my instinct of appropriation when this furthers my moral loyalty; or it may consist in my volitional repression of the opposite instinct to dissipate or lavish such possessions as my loyalty to the universal community seems to require me to keep under my own control. In actual experience however thrift, like the other virtues, ordinarily involves a fusion of incitement

and repression. To spend nothing is no more truly thrifty than to save nothing. A man is thrifty as he checks his tendency to lavish spending while yet he holds to his instinct to acquire. Thrift is, in other words, a modification of two opposed instincts and is vitally related to both of them. And our tabular view has obviously, therefore, represented the relation of virtues to instincts in far too simple a fashion.

Up to this point, we have barely sketched the outlines of our figure of the thrifty man. And according as we fill in this outline our portrait of him will be true or false. For it is evident to every one that the emphasis of the instincts to appropriate and the repression of the instinct to spend may well constitute not the virtue of thrift but rather the vice of greed. A vice, as we have seen, is simply the over-indulgence of an instinctive tendency or disposition which the good man habitually modifies; and a virtue is not a compromise but (in Holt's fine phrase) a resolution of opposing instincts of which each, if unmodified, would be a vice. Thus thrift is opposed on the one hand to improvidence, the over-indulgence of the tendency to reject, to let go what one holds, and is contrasted on the other hand both with over-acquisitiveness, or greed, and with undue hoarding, or miserliness.

The crucial question, evidently, is this: how distinguish that "mean" degree of appropriativeness, wherein consists the virtue of thrift, on the one hand from the over-intense acquisitiveness which is greed, on the other hand from the over-stressed disposition to reject or neglect which constitutes the vice of improvidence. In

order to reach a solution of this problem it is necessary to apply the basal principle, as we have named it, of the virtuous control of the instincts. The result may be stated somewhat as follows: First, there is no inherent limit to the virtuous indulgence of the instincts of appropriation: I may seek and seize and hold all that I instinctively want—food, clothes, jewels, pictures, books, houses, lecture-courses, advantages of travel, money. More than this, the very fact that I instinctively desire and seek and cling to these things justifies my effort to possess them unless, by this very effort, I thwart another equally or more insistent desire. In the second place, therefore, the good man must not indulge his instinct of appropriation to the point at which it suppresses the surrendering tendencies, thus making impossible a full and complete experience. Organization of instincts must mean modification of each of them and loose rein cannot be given to the appropriative tendencies when the indulgence of them would hinder the equally free play of other instincts. Thrift becomes greed when acquisition or tenacity hampers my indulgence either of other egoistic instincts or of the obviously social instincts. To illustrate: I am over-indulging my appropriative instincts if my eager money-getting stands in the way of my acquisition of health or culture; if I scrimp myself of food or clothes in my passion for rare editions; if I roll up my bank account in oblivion of crying human need. Not because there is anything inherently wrong in seeking and having food, clothes, curios, knowledge, emotional enrichment, but because in giving way to these instincts for seizing and holding I thwart other

instincts whose functioning is a factor of my moral loyalty. I must often check not only my improvident but my appropriative instincts if I would practice the virtue of thrift.

The precise methods of the modification of these instincts will vary but, as the last chapter has already shown, will take one of two forms. I may keep my instinctive appropriativeness from turning into greed either indirectly by changing its object or directly by facing it with another instinct and thus lowering its intensity. A man may, for example, earn as much money as ever but invest it no longer in Paris clothes, Sheraton cabinets or gilt-edged securities but in endowing co-operative manufacturing ventures, in industrial investigations, in immigrant industries. Or, he may modify his money-getting instinct by inciting an opposed instinct—intellectual or purely social—and may therefore withdraw from his business when he has earned a “modest competence” and devote all his time to study or to social service. Similarly a man may check or repress his improvident tendency either indirectly by changing its object, by lavishing time instead of money, for example, or by opposing to it an opposite impulse, the social tendency to generosity, for instance. Thus many a man incapable of saving for himself becomes thrifty simply as a result of his foreseeing love for his family.

This discussion of thrift may be summed up as follows: Thrift has been described as the virtue which results from checking the instincts of rejection and spurring on the appropriative instincts in such wise as to avoid, on the

one hand, the vice of avarice or greed, on the other hand, that of improvidence. The principle underlying this control has appeared to be this: free indulgence of every instinctive tendency to acquire and to hold so far as acquisition and possession do not thwart the normally functioning activity of the other instincts, individual and social. The concrete devices for checking the over-indulgence of these instincts have been shown to consist in exchanging one object for another, or else in pitting an opposite instinct against over-strong appropriativeness. And the purpose of this controlled and organized instinctive activity is simply the attainment of *the good*—which means, in our conception of it, the fullest and completest possible conscious life of the universal community. For it is never to be forgotten that thrift, like the other virtues, is no end in itself, that there is nothing elementally and self-evidently desirable in getting and saving. On the contrary, the thrifty man is virtuous only when he is controlling his instincts in pursuit of the supreme end.

The utterly unmoral, and sometimes immoral, tendency to exalt thrift not as a virtue, or means to the good, but rather as an end in itself, is spectacularly illustrated in the time of war in which this book is written. After a long period of social improvidence in which thrift has been relegated to the category of the ancient virtues, of a sudden, menaced as we are by actual dearth, we exalt saving as a sort of *deus ex machina*. Clear-sighted publicists rightly remonstrate with us from the standpoint of our national need. "There is no war time meaning," they point out, "in thrift which does not

increase the industrial power at the command of the nation." For example, "to induce the worker who is already inadequately supplied to cut down the consumption of his family and himself is of doubtful service to the nation. . . . Thrift at the expense of industrial power represents a sacrifice of the end to the means." * This is a truth which is limited neither to the time of war nor to the realm of industry. Everywhere and always it is true that "there are conditions in which thrift may defeat its ends"; and that thrift is a virtue only as it creates and preserves the full functioning, the complete activity of the whole universe of selves.

II. The virtue of abstinence, like that of thrift, must be conceived in a sense larger than that of popular ethics. It is too often discussed with exclusive reference to sensuous objects just as thrift is considered solely with reference to property. Deliberately to refrain from the food, drink, companions, recreations, or pursuits which would divert or separate a man from the attainment of his ultimate moral purpose—this is to practice the virtue of abstinence.

The instinctive tendency basal to the virtue of abstinence is rejection.⁴ It appears earliest in the rejection from the mouth of distasteful substances but is perpetuated in our instinctive prejudices of one and another sort. In this primitive form, as rejection of poisonous foods and dangerous shelters, the instinct is obviously essential to the protection and propagation of animal life. In its relations to the appropriative and to the rejecting tendency the virtue of abstinence is precisely

* "New Republic," December 2, 1917, p. 199.

opposed to the virtue of thrift. The abstinent man is he who incites the instinct of rejection while checking that of appropriation; and the virtue of abstinence is, in Aristotle's phrase, the mean between the extremes of over-acquisitiveness and immoral lavishness.⁵ The specific ways of controlling these tendencies need not be set forth in detail, but it is not unimportant to consider the application to abstinence of the underlying principle of moral control. As a general rule, we have found, an instinct is to have free rein so long as it does not interfere with other instincts. But instinctive rejection, and its parallel virtue, abstinence, are negative tendencies, depleting rather than enlarging the self; and abstinence, therefore, is a virtue to be cherished and delighted in solely for its object and not for itself. The good man does not practise abstinence as such, but abstains from alcohol, for example, because it always overstimulates him and sometimes makes a beast of him; or gives up tennis because the exercise exhausts him to the point of being unequal to his work. It follows that the objects of virtuous abstinence not only correspond with the primitive human appetites and impulses but also vary greatly with individual people. There is nothing abstractly wrong about going to the theatre or eating strawberries or writing poetry; but if I invariably lie awake all night after a play, if I am always rheumatic after eating strawberries, and if I neglect my family and break my appointments and take a general moral vacation when in the throes of the poetic frenzy, I may well practise the virtue of abstinence from theatre, strawberries, and the haunts of the Muse. And yet,

though there is nothing inherently virtuous in the tendency to abstain, or reject, everybody has need to cultivate the virtue of abstinence. People of the selfish, respectable, middle-class type to which many of us belong—people who commit neither crimes nor heresies—are wont to thank God that they are not as other men are, drunken and licentious, and to regard themselves as quite above the moral plane of those to whom abstinence is to be commended. This is a colossal and a Pharasaical blunder. Everybody is assailed by the temptation to over-indulgence of the appropriative instinct in some one of its forms—to the excessive pursuit of money, or luxury, or learning, or beauty. Everybody has accordingly to cultivate the virtue of abstinence—always holding well in view the double aspect, individual and social, of moral loyalty. The good man may not eat or drink or read or play golf or get rich too exclusively, for so, on the one hand, he will dwarf his other egoistic impulses, and so also he will be unresponsive to the appeal to his sympathy, incapable of social loyalty. In a word, the good man must check acquisitiveness lest the cares of the world interfere with his own full and vigorous development and so with his service to the Great Community. No limit can be set to the extent of abstinence thus motivated. If the right eye offend, it must be plucked out; if the right hand offend, it must be cut off. But the mutilation of instinctive tendency is never for its own sake;—it is always subsidiary to the development of a clean, strong personality completely loyal to the universe of selves.

The Brave Man and the Prudent

I. All the world loves a brave man, as it loves a lover; but not everybody knows the difference between the virtue of courage⁶ and mere instinctive daring, the impulse to "go forward" in situations of danger. Instinctive daring is a variety of the tendency to approach. Its intellectual form is curiosity, the attraction toward the strange or novel object. This tendency is so strong that hunters take advantage of it to lure wild animals within shooting distance. "Any one," McDougall says, 'who will lie down in a field where sheep or cattle are grazing and repeat at short intervals some peculiar cry . . . may draw every member of a large flock nearer and nearer until one finds oneself the centre of a circle . . . of which every pair of eyes and ears is fixed upon the strange object of their curiosity.'* Instinctive approach toward an object or objects known to be dangerous is called daring; and this is the instinctive tendency to which courage is parallel. Instinctive daring is in truth a universally admired and applauded character but it is far from being identical with the virtue of courage. A man is no more courageous for his impulsive fits of daring than for his good digestion or for his regular breathing. He becomes courageous only when his advance in face of peril involves, not the mere indulgence of instinctive daring, but a control of instincts and notably a repression of instinctive fear.

Theoretically, there are two ways of controlling the instincts with which courage is concerned: first, the

* "Social Psychology," p. 58.

deliberate spurring of the instinct to advance and second, the checking of the instinct of withdrawal or fear. But it is evident to everybody that the virtue of courage is almost always due to this repression of fear. For instinctive daring seldom needs to be incited by the will, whereas the strong, primitive instinct of fear constantly thwarts and hampers a man in his effort to face danger. The brave man who is brave because he controls his instinct to fear does not, in truth, ordinarily succeed in banishing his feeling of fear but advances in spite of it. Thus, Marshall Ney is said to have apostrophized his trembling legs: "Poor legs! How much greater the danger you must march into!" And, in the same sense, according to the old story, to the jeer of a new recruit: "You are white to the lips; are you afraid?" the seasoned soldier replies: "Yes, I am afraid; and if you were half as afraid as I am you would run away."

There are as many forms of courage as there are diverse objects of fear; and Aristotle's description of the brave man as one "who is fearless in respect of honorable death" is therefore very inadequate because restricted to one type only of courage. The every-day man holds that there are two sorts of courage, "moral" and "physical;" and though this enumeration makes the false assumption that a virtue directed toward a physical object is thereby itself physical, none the less it suggests the main difference between forms of courage—the distinction, namely, between courage which checks the instinctive fear of death or bodily pain and courage which checks fear of other objects. (1) We are all familiar with the great chronicles of the men who have been

brave in face of danger to their lives and to their bodies; the great martyrs—Christian and pagan, Puritan and Cavalier—who have gone clear-eyed to the stake and to the scaffold; the great warriors, who have faced the spears and blades or the cannon of their enemies; the great foes of war who have faced the court-martials and the firing squads of their fellow countrymen; the great rescuers, coast guards and firemen, the heroes of modern industry, who have bravely met the onset of nature perils. Less spectacular but no less real is the courage of the sickroom and the hospital, that “still courage bred of pain,” a man’s gallant bearing of himself in the face of torturing pain, mental weariness, and abject weakness. (2) In contrast with courage of this type is that by which a man checks his instinctive shrinking from toil, from poverty, from loneliness, and from the scorn, the blame, the ridicule of his fellowmen. There is no lack of instances for him who has the eyes to read them: the courage, for example, of the girl who marries a man on a narrow income; the courage of the young scientist who challenges the traditional theory; the courage of anybody who stands out against passionate, prevailing beliefs.

In our search for the specific methods of training ourselves in courage we shall, of course, fall back upon our general rules. In particular, we shall exorcise fear and cultivate courage not by the direct effort of will but by summoning to our aid all those instincts which inhibit flight—instincts of curiosity and of acquisitiveness, and, far more effective, the great social tendencies, imitativeness and sympathy, which hold cowardice at bay.

Thus, every wise nurse knows that a little child's fear of dog or pussy may be checked by stimulating his interest in the animal's soft coat or frisking tail or eager lapping of milk. And everybody knows the desperate courage with which a human or an animal mother will face the danger from which she most instinctively shrinks to protect her offspring, babies or nestlings. And with no less fortitude the man whose passionate sympathy is with the needs of the great human family goes forward to face physical danger, intellectual poverty, and social ostracism.

II. It has already appeared that courage is a "mean" between instinctive daring, carried to the extreme of recklessness, and timidity carried to the height of cowardice. It is time to consider another "resolution" of recklessness and fear, the virtue of prudence which is parallel to the instinct of withdrawal or flight. Flight, as everybody knows, is one of the very strongest and most widely diffused instincts. It has an obvious protective value; and it appears in the very simplest unicellular animals as well as in higher forms, in the young gull, for example, which huddles into rock crevices, or in the baby who shrinks from a strange face. But instinctive withdrawal is no more like prudence than daring is like courage. The virtuously prudent self is not the naturally timid man but rather he who, by retreat from unnecessary peril, guards his possessions, his health, his mental vigor as essential to the completeness of the life which he lives as contributing member of the Great Community.

The practical questions concerning the relative scope of courage and of prudence must be answered by re-

newed application of our basal principle. There is nothing inherently good or bad in the daring impulse to advance upon an object nor yet in the opposite impulse to retreat from it. A man's daring becomes recklessness and retreat becomes a virtue only when daring threatens the life or health or possession which should be conserved in furtherance of his supreme aim, the good. The army surgeon in the Civil War who, in a fence corner under fire, dissected a field mouse to study its heart beat, was not brave but reckless. But the same young surgeon, a few days later, when he stayed in a hospital tent which was being shelled and (while the orderly fled with the bandages) steadily held between thumb and finger the edges of the artery he was tying, was, as every one will recognize, superbly brave.

The significance of thought in the moral experience⁷ has, we must note in conclusion, become very evident in this study of virtues. As emotions constitute in great part the material with which the moral will has to work, so the basal forms of thinking—analysis, comparison, and reasoning—are the instruments of moral willing. Thus the dispassionate comparison of the moral gain and loss involved in the indulgence of an instinct, the logical subordination of lesser to greater moral purpose, deliberate reasoning about the specific means for the virtuous control of the instincts—all have been shown to be essential to effective morality. Human history is full to overflowing of pathetic or tragic instances of illogical virtues—of the austere celibacies of men who should have been tender fathers, of the rigid economies of women who

should have practiced the virtue of hospitality, of the meticulous prudence of human beings who were made to take glorious risks, of the narrow, individual virtues of men who might take the wide outlook and practice the genuinely social virtues. Eagerly, therefore, every man should take to himself the admonition of St. Paul and should "add to virtue—knowledge"—that is, thought.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SOCIALLY VIRTUOUS MAN

The virtues which we are next to study are, on the face of them, social virtues based on social instincts necessarily directed toward other people. Courage and prudence, thrift and abstinence, as we have seen, are virtues which may be practised solely in the service of a man's single narrow self—in other words, a man may conceivably be thrifty and abstinent, brave and prudent without considering any body save himself, whereas in being truthful, obedient, generous, and just he is inevitably aware of his relation to other people.

The following table roughly groups the more fundamental of the social tendencies and indicates the corresponding virtues:

I. BASAL SOCIAL TENDENCIES AND VIRTUES.

Instinctive Tendencies:	Mating Instinct, Parental Instinct,	
<i>Virtues:</i>	<i>Chastity</i>	<i>Parental Virtues</i>
Instinctive Tendencies:	Gregariousness	vs. Shyness,
	Communicativeness	vs. Secrecy,
<i>Virtue:</i>	<i>Truth</i>	
Instinctive Tendencies:	Liking	vs. Dislike,
<i>Virtue:</i>	<i>Justice,</i>	

II. SYMPATHETIC SOCIAL TENDENCIES AND VIRTUES.

Instinctive Tendencies:	Imitableness,	Giving,
<i>Virtues:</i>	<i>Obedience,</i>	<i>Generosity,</i>

III. NON-SYMPATHETIC SOCIAL TENDENCIES AND VIRTUES.

Instinctive Tendencies: Resistance, Pugnacity,
Virtues: Non-conformity, Militant Virtue.

The most important of the distinctions embodied in this summary is that which marks off the sympathetic from the non-sympathetic social virtues. The truthful man, the virtuous non-conformer, and the virtuously militant man are socially virtuous (that is to say, their virtuous will is necessarily directed toward other selves) but they need not sympathize with these other selves. But a man can be neither just, obedient, nor generous to another man without sympathizing with him.

Our present concern is chiefly with the non-sympathetic and basal virtue of truthfulness. For it does not seem essential to this study of general ethics to discuss in detail the virtues and vices correlated with the mating and the parental instincts. In truth no one specific virtue corresponds to parental tenderness; and though the virtuous control of sexual instincts is conventionally known as chastity, yet this is by no means the only virtue involved in the fully moral relation of man and woman to each other.¹ Evidently the uncontrolled exercise of sex instincts leads to the egoistic subordination of another self to one's own desires; while over-indulgence of the parental instinct may mean an immoral, altruistic unconcern for oneself. Uncontrolled, both instincts are subversive of the supreme moral loyalty. Thus, when marriage is regarded primarily as satisfaction of the mating instinct, divorce becomes the inevitable result of waning passion, whereas marriage, from the point of view of the self loyal to the Great Community, is not merely a

consummation of individual happiness but an ordinance of family and of state which demands stability and permanence for the achievement of its end. And similarly, when family love is treated as excuse for its own being great estates are founded and great fortunes are heaped up without reference to the prior claim of the Great Community.

The Truthful Man

The foundation of social life, the very bed-rock of the social structure, is found, as all students admit, in the strong instincts of gregariousness and communication. By gregariousness—the social form of the tendency to approach—is meant the universal impulse of living creatures to meet together.² It is manifested as well in the wild ox who shoulders his way into the very midst of the herd from which he has been separated as in the human being who seeks the crowded piazza of a summer hotel. Communicativeness is simply gregariousness carried further—an impulse toward unity of expression as well as of feeling. It shows itself, among animals, in barks and growls and tail waggings, among human beings, in gestures and conversations and letter-writing. It is opposed to instinctive concealment as shyness is opposed to gregariousness and somewhat as flight is opposed to daring. Corresponding to it is the fundamental virtue of truthfulness, or veracity.³

The virtue of veracity can not, however, consist in merely unpremeditated, unwilling, perhaps unrealized communicativeness. Instinctive communications—the

natural language of animals, their cries and signals to each other—though they correctly represent the fear, the need, the pugnacity of the animals who use them, are not truthful. For, like the other virtues, truthfulness involves the control of instincts in the service of the supreme good.

The first of these tendencies which the truthful man controls is the strong instinct of concealment—an instinct which is readily transformed into habits of secrecy and suppression and which, untrammelled and unchecked, may constitute the vice of untruthfulness. The instructive tale of a Hindu who once, in great perplexity, consulted Sir Henry Lawrence illustrates the strength of this instinct. The Hindu's problem was the following: how should he value his piece of land? If he undervalued it, he would be insufficiently paid in case it were taken over for public use; if he over-valued it his taxes would be too high. Sir Henry's advice that he rate it at its true value was received as an incredibly brilliant device to meet a grave difficulty.

The second of the tendencies which the truthful man controls is his instinctive communicativeness. To be truthful emphatically does not mean to give loose rein to one's native garrulity, to babble out all that one knows as inevitably as a crow caws or a cat mews. Indiscretion, the over-indulgence of the communicative instinct, no less truly than untruth, the over-indulgence of instinctive concealment, is a sheer vice. Its most hateful form is that which assumes the garment of virtue, labelling as frankness what is mere garrulity with intent to hurt. But careless indiscretion also is morally

wrong, since one no more has a right to communicate, what it belongs to other people to tell or to withhold, than one has a right to give away material possessions of others. Such an obvious statement would hardly be worth making except that people, scrupulous at every other point, are so irresponsible as regards their tongues. The fact is, of course, that for the control of the instinctive tendency to express himself a man is just as responsible as for the control of any other tendency or disposition.

Truthfulness is undeniably and literally the fundamental social virtue for without it there can be no society. A society made up wholly of unkind or of unjust men is barely conceivable, but a society literally composed of utterly untruthful men is not possible. For there can be no society without communication, and there can be no deliberate communication without the presupposition of truthfulness. To illustrate: suppose that one had absolutely no assurance that any of the statements one heard were true or that any of the statements one made were believed. Suppose that one never imagined that trains announced as leaving at ten a. m. would start at that time; that one never expected goods marked at one dollar a yard to be sold at that price; that the man who agreed to meet another at the Century Club was no more likely to be there than in his Wall Street office; that the man with whom one agreed to collaborate in a piece of work had no remotest expectation that the promise would be regarded, and made no preparation for the coming work. Obviously, under such conditions there could be no co-operation, no commerce, no transporta-

tion—in a word, no social organization; indeed, there would no longer be any effort at communication. For the interrelation of human beings in social groups always tacitly assumes truth between them; and, under civilized conditions, no matter how often people are disillusioned they always assume truth to be the practice and untruth the exception. The opposite assumption is always the mark of essential social disintegration. One of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of international diplomacy is precisely the fact that its underlying convention is not truth-telling but evasion.

The conclusion, therefore, is justified that the perversion of gesture, language or behavior, the recognized media of communication, to the untruthful concealment of one's feelings, one's fortune, one's personality is nothing less than an attack upon society itself, an attempt which, successfully carried out by every one, would break up the community into an anarchic chaos of individuals powerless to come into any relation with each other. Untruth is the cardinal vice precisely because it is the vice which would make all virtues impossible by destroying the relation of self to self.

The most practically difficult of the problems involved in this analysis of truth concerns the moral propriety of any degree of concealment. Indiscretion, the garrulous habit of revealing, unasked, facts which it is wise to withhold, is admitted to be a vice. Must it not then, one wonders, be either virtuous or permissible to conceal such facts? More abstractly stated, may there not be, as in the case of the other instinctive tendencies, an allowable degree of concealment? Or is the instinct of

concealment one to be not merely repressed, but totally annihilated?

To attempt an answer to these questions it is necessary to distinguish between the two main types of untruthfulness: lying, or explicit untruth, and deception, or implicit untruthfulness, of which the extreme form is hypocrisy, the deliberate attempt, not to conceal the specific act or deed or event, but to conceal oneself by seeming to be what one is not—well-informed when one is ignorant, sympathetic, when one is self-centred, socially minded when one is an arrant individualist. Hypocrisy is thus the most terrible because the most complete form of the vice that would make human society and human intercourse literally impossible. This explains the passionate vehemence of Christ's denunciation of the "Pharisees, hypocrites;" and explains also the universal human recoil from hypocrisy. But besides hypocrisy, there are innumerable other grades and degrees of deception; and it is certainly open to question whether deception is not occasionally justified when it aims, not at the breaking up of normal communication, but at the concealment of facts which it seems certainly harmful to divulge. May I not, for example, still be set down as truthful if I glance solicitously toward a place far removed from that in which the silver actually is hidden, in order to mislead a burglar; or if I use an ambiguous phrase to parry an impertinent question; or if I imply that the sweater which I am knitting for Robert's Christmas present is meant for somebody else? The problem certainly is crucially hard, but a test of the moral innocuousness of deception may be suggested:

to ask oneself whether the discovery of the deception may or may not be expected to violate the victim's confidence in social truth. To consider one of the trivial illustrations which have been given: if Robert remembers, on discovering the sweater among his Christmas gifts, that when he caught me knitting it, I parried his question about it, saying: "Didn't you hear me telling Jack that I would knit him a sweater?" then Robert is likely to think of himself as having been fooled, not deceived, and to blame himself for dulness of wit instead of branding me as untruthful. In other words, I have not been essentially untruthful, for I have reasonably supposed that Robert's confidence in the social relatedness of human beings would not be shaken. But it is evident that this line between justifiable deception (if such it be) and untruth is perilously difficult to draw and that the test proposed is inordinately difficult to apply. Especially if one's own interests are involved in the evasion it is easy to persuade oneself that one is expecting the victim to interpret as jest the conduct which one really believes that he will regard as untruth.

At best, then, the justification of concealment applies only to certain forms of deception. Spoken or written falsehood on the other hand, explicit untruth, since it is unambiguous, never can be justified as a jest. And this is the fundamental reason for the sanctity of spoken truth. It is, however, important to keep in mind that truthfulness is not primarily concerned with words but with their meaning. To quote Richard Cabot: "telling the truth is doing one's best to convey to another person the impression that one has about the matter in hand."

Dr. Cabot's illustrations are very illuminating. "When a patient," he says, "who has three fine rales at one apex and tubercle bacilli in his sputum asks 'Have I got tuberculosis?' it would be conveying a false impression to say 'Yes, you have,' and stop there. . . . To be true to that patient you must explain that what *he* means by tuberculosis is a disease invariably and rapidly fatal; that many people have as much trouble as he now has and get over it without finding it out; that with climactic and hygienic treatment he has a good chance of recovery. . . . What is sometimes called the simple truth, the 'bald truth' or the 'naked truth,'" Dr. Cabot adds, "is often practically false." * But this exposition of the nature of truth telling, it must be observed, leaves unaffected our conclusion that lying, explicit falsehood, is absolutely unjustified.

In opposition to this doctrine that truth-telling is a fundamental virtue and that explicit falsehood is always wrong, impressive objections are urged: How, it is asked, can the difference between "Yes" and "No" or between "Here" and "There" constitute the distinction between right and wrong? Why is not a lie sometimes justified by a benevolent purpose? Is it not a duty to lie in order to save life? This last question, always asked in a discussion of truth-telling, brings the objection to a sharp point. For the answer to this question we shall turn again to Dr. Cabot, who discusses the matter from the physician's standpoint. He begins by making his position clear. "A straight answer to a straight question," he says, "is

* "The Use of Truth and Falsehood in Medicine: an Experimental Study," *American Medicine*, 1903, V., pp. 344 ff.

what I am recommending, not an unasked presentation of the facts of the patient's case . . . a true impression, a freely drawn and properly shaded account. . . . To refuse to answer questions," he grants, "is now and then a necessity and need not involve any falsehood." And then he describes the crucial situation. "There may be cases," he states, "when the patient does not react from the shock of a cruel truth, but is made worse by it. It is said that a shock sometimes turns the scale and brings death. Ought we," he asks, "to persist in telling the truth even when we believe it may kill the patient?" Dr. Cabot's answer is an unequivocal "Yes;" and he justifies it thus: From his experience, amply confirmed by that of physicians and laymen, he points out that the knowledge which family and friends and nurses of deceived patients have of life-saving lies, begets "a quiet, chronic incredulity," a skepticism of physicians' truthfulness which makes it increasingly impossible either to deceive or to inform people about their own physical condition or that of others. And he concludes with these words: "Suppose," he says, "it lay in our power to let loose into the atmosphere a poisonous gas which would vitiate the air of a whole town so that the whole community would gradually suffer in efficiency, in physical and moral fiber. Would it not be worth a human life to save a whole community from such a deterioration? Now a lie seems to me to do something like that. By undermining the confidence of man in man it does its part in making not one but every human activity impossible. If we cannot trust one another, we cannot take a step in any direction. Business, social relations, science,

everything worth doing depends on mutual confidence. It is the very air we breathe. To poison it is to do a far worse thing for society than could result from the loss of a single life."

Few virtues are so rare, and so imperfectly developed, as that of truth. Delicate, unswerving, direct, inevitable truthfulness—how many of us have the habit of it? Constant and insidious are the attacks upon it. By our fears, our ambitions, our vanities, our loves, our friendships, we are lured or driven to conceal what we have or what we are. In little ways and in large we deviate from the straight way of truth. And, of a sudden, habituated to untruth by the little thefts, the little lies, the little discrepancies of our every-day lives—by evaded car fares, insignificant plagiarisms, and flattering falsehoods—we find ourselves menaced, perhaps overmastered, by the temptation to a great untruth. There is no hope for us unless we breed in ourselves a horror of lying and hypocrisy, no hope, except in the humble, untiring pursuit of truth. Every one of us needs to turn upon himself, as he detects his own petty pretences and his graver dissimulations, the thunder of Christ's denunciation against the hypocrites who "outwardly appear righteous unto men but within are full of iniquities." For how can the hypocrite "escape the damnation of hell"—the hell of a world in which a man is separated from his fellow-men by the cleft which his own hypocrisies have hewn?

CHAPTER IX

THE SOCIALLY VIRTUOUS MAN (Continued)

THE JUST MAN

The Nature and the Basal Forms of Justice

I. Since the golden day when Socrates, stopping on his way from the Piraeus at the house of Cephalus, discussed with Glaucon and Adeimantus and Thrasymachus the nature of the just man, this problem—which is even older than Socrates—has pressed for solution. The problem arises because men are called just in so many situations and for so many reasons—for their estimates of themselves and of their fellows, for their award of prizes and penalties, for their apportionment of treasure and gifts and time. There can be little question, however, that the basal form of justice is appraising justice, the virtuous estimate, or valuation, of oneself or of another self. Next to truthfulness, justice, as will appear, is the fundamental virtue; and, little as many of us suspect it, injustice is the most hotly resented of the vices—not merely unjust apportionment of money and favors, but unjust estimates and valuations. A man's demand for justice is, in truth, far from satisfied when he has had all that is justly "coming to him" in goods or in positions. Quite as insistently he claims that he be justly estimated. He may indeed resent an unjust prejudiced judgment of

himself or of his acts more than he resents an unjust apportionment of goods. No injury rankles and stings more sharply than undeserved blame, unjust perversion of one's meaning, unjust interpretation of one's motives.

The just man may be described as the man who holds his instinctive, personal likes and dislikes under moral control. Obviously, liking and disliking are very fundamental sorts of feeling, lying at the core of all emotional experiences. One likes, or is pleased with, things and qualities and persons of the most diverse types; and conversely one dislikes, or is displeased with all sorts of people or things. When the object of like or dislike is relatively permanent and when the affective experience is overlaid with thought, like and dislike are transformed into approval and disapproval.* Justice is a form of personal approval or disapproval¹; it is the estimation of persons, or of personal activities or qualities, in their relation to the universal community of selves. The extremes which it modifies are extremes of prejudice—undue liking, excessive dislike. The end which it holds before itself is the end of moral loyalty: the fullest life of the universal community of selves.

It will be profitable to suggest at the outset some of the forms of prejudiced liking and prejudiced dislike, between which, as between Scylla and Charybdis, the just man must steer his way. The just man is governed in his moral appraisals neither by odd temperamental congenialities and incompatibilities; nor by conventional and traditional prejudices; nor finally, by likes and dislikes founded on agreeing or disagreeing interests. To

* Cf. Chap. II., p. 31.

illustrate: the just man does not take the position of the author of the famous couplet:

“I do not like you, Dr. Fell;
The reason why I can not tell;”

he is uninfluenced by racial prejudice in his estimate of “dago,” negro, or oriental; his estimate of an I. W. W. leader is not weighted by the sense of the danger, to his own property interests, of the syndicalist propaganda.

We have next to study more closely the just man’s estimation of his personal object—that is, the discriminating appraisal either of man or of act as related to the Great Society. And we shall find that this just estimate of person or of deed, presupposes three fundamental characters of justice.¹ (1) In the first place, justice involves sympathy, and the just man is one who comprehends. It is obviously essential to know the man whom one is justly to appraise; and one may not know a man save by taking his point of view, sharing his feelings and purposes, immersing oneself in his problems—in a word, by sympathizing with him, taking on, as it were, his personality. The old opposition between justice and sympathy is evidently, therefore, founded on the misapprehension of both. The truly sympathetic critic will accuse no less often than he will excuse. He will feel, as no unsympathetic critic is capable of feeling, the undertow of inherited dispositions, the lure of primitive passions to which the tempted man has succumbed, but he will also sensitively apprehend his stifled aspirations, and his violated insights. “To understand all” will mean to the just man, who must needs sympathize,

neither wholly to excoriate nor wholly to exculpate. It follows, as we may note in passing, that popular ethics is certainly in error when it sets down love as always blind. Of course no man can claim that he fully knows another, but certainly none know us so adequately as those who love us, for to no others can we show what really is in us. There is, therefore, no judge so inexorable as the just lover, who knows the highest reaches of the beloved's purpose and ability.

(2) The second of these fundamental characters of the just man is already implied in the first. For sympathy, like all the emotions, individualizes its object and the just man, accordingly, individualizes the man whom he estimates. Indeed it is clearly impossible really to know a conscious being except as an individual. "Probably," as William James says, "a crab would be filled with a sense of personal outrage if it could hear us call it without ado or apology a crustacean. 'I am no such thing,' it would say, 'I am MYSELF, MYSELF.'" Whatever is true of him in other situations, the man who is justly judged or appraised must be known for what he is, himself. The just man accordingly values a man not superficially for what he is said to be, nor for what he appears to be, but for what he really is as seen against the background of his opportunity and his environment.

This is indeed the reason why we make such sorry work of our attempts to estimate great groups of men in a wholesale fashion. We are too apt to judge a man by relegating him to a class—say, of criminals or defectives, to be executed or segregated for the good of other people. It is the glaring fault of deterrent theories of punishment

that they ignore the individuality of the criminal, treating him rather as the undistinguished kernel of a heap than as a unique individual, a person, a being with a life of his own. Evidently a punishment falls short of justice if it concerns itself exclusively for "society"—if, for example, it favors prison labor for the money it brings in, or criticizes it for breeding trouble with free labor, but never considers it from the standpoint of the prisoner's need for work. The unique advantage of the educative theory of punishment is that it sees the criminal in his relation to society, as himself suffering from his own attack on the community, and that it seeks to train the criminal to control his own social impulses and to subordinate his skill to community interests.²

(3) Justice, finally, involves thinking, not merely as every virtue requires thought in its control of instincts, but in a more special way. For thinking is of the very essence of justice. In approving or disapproving any one I ordinarily break up the *ensemble* of his character into constituent parts, dwelling on one or other of them; and I always compare him with some standard, explicitly or implicitly adopted. The rôle of thinking in justice is accordingly of crucial importance. There is no such thing as unthinking justice. For example: to make a just promotion means thoughtful estimate of service given; to render a just decision means scrupulous analyzing and weighing of all evidence. In a word, the just man must of necessity be a thinker. And this is the reason why, admittedly, justice is a rather rare primitive virtue. For the habit of thinking is relatively late in experience, and little children like early races are

notoriously deficient in the essentially intellectual virtue of justice. In truth, countless men and women, possessed of other graces and virtues—people who are scrupulously truthful, splendidly brave, and lavishly generous—seem to be utterly incapable of being just. The fact that justice demands thought accounts also for the slow growth of political and industrial justice. For custom and tradition, which are the strong support of governments and institutions, are essentially unthinking imitations of past and present modes. Thus, the struggle for social justice is already half won when men are induced to discuss the problems of the short ballot, the minimum wage, or the old age pension instead of following on unthinkingly in the paths “their fathers trod.”

It is of some importance to stress, in conclusion, what the preceding paragraphs have distinctly implied, that the great handicaps to justice, so conceived, are exaggerated egoism and undue altruism. If I am utterly immersed in myself I simply can not see myself as I truly am, one member only of a great living, pulsing organism of myriad selves whose life is my life; nor can I rightly value these other selves—their reality, their claims and their needs—if I am vividly conscious only of myself. In utter egoism and self-absorption I am, in a word, incapable of adequately estimating either myself or other people. And somewhat similarly I may make unjust moral estimates through absorption not in myself but in some one for whom I passionately care, whom therefore I constantly overvalue. This favored being or group is flawless in my eyes, can do no wrong; and every other person or group pales in significance. If opinions or

estimates clash, the object of my love is always to be justified. Thus, Boswell found no fault in Johnson, and Hume wrote a history in which, as Macaulay said, "all the high lights were Tory and all the shades Whig." The just man, on the contrary, appraises people neither from his own point of view nor from theirs; his horizon is not narrowed by his sympathy; rather he estimates men as unique, constituent members of the great human society.

II. Like the non-moral forms of personal appraisal justice may be classified in two ways. Whether moral or non-moral, personal approval and disapproval are, in the first place, egocentric when directed toward myself, as in remorse and in pride, or aliocentric when concerned with some one else, as when I condemn the German government or approve of Arthur Henderson. In the second place, personal approval-disapproval, whether egocentric or aliocentric, may be concrete or abstract. That is to say, it may have regard, as in the illustration last given, to a man as a whole or else to his specific qualities, decisions, or actions. So one may disapprove Clemenceau as a man or one may disapprove specifically his speech disavowing internationalist aims. It is important to note that one may approve either man or purpose while disapproving the other. So, for example, I may approve a man's work for civil service reform while I disapprove the man as one who neither seeks to achieve the good as he knows it nor acts in accordance with his consciousness of obligation. And conversely, I may abstractly disapprove of a specific choice or act while approving the man who makes it. In these latter cases, I am of course estimating decision and conduct according

as it furthers or opposes the good as I conceive it; while, if I am truly just, I approve or disapprove the man who makes the choice on the basis of his own conception of the good and of the way to attain it. Thus, if I am a tolerant socialist, I may approve Mr. Carnegie as a conscientious and generous man, loyal to his own conception of the chief good, while on the other hand I myself regard his philanthropies as subversive of the genuine co-operation of free men loyal to the Beloved Community. Or, if I am a large-minded militarist, I may approve the conscientiousness of the Quaker even while I reject his conception of the good on the ground (rightly or wrongly held) that it lacks the vital element of self-sacrifice. It must, however, be admitted that only the exceptionally just man can be trusted, in the case of another man, to make the complete divorce between actor and act and really to approve the conscientious seeker after political, religious, or social ends flatly in opposition to his own; or to exonerate the ignorant sinner while hotly resenting the sin. Jesus, indeed, said, "Neither do I condemn thee; go and sin no more;" but the human judge's sentence on the sinner is wont to be dyed by his disapproval of the deed. On the other hand, it is comparatively easy for a man to exculpate himself from the guilt of a choice which he later condemns and even easier to approve his own rectitude of purpose and his conscientiousness when he has grown to disapprove the former object of his moral will. So Paul records the sincerity of his youthful belief that he verily served God in consenting to the death of Stephen.

In conclusion it should once more be explicitly stated

that approval and disapproval are not inevitably moral. All our aesthetic and intellectual appraisals of impersonal objects and a great number of our personal approvals and disapprovals are in truth either non-moral or even immoral in character. Especially is this true of egocentric self-appraisal. For I ordinarily make little effort to modify my self-satisfaction and remorse. Rather, I yield myself to their power; in my self-content I am too completely lapped about with pleasure, and in my remorse I am too bitterly or too hotly ashamed, to be capable of dispassionate analysis and balancing of motives and of that wide concern for all members of the Great Society, which are essential to just appraisal. And, more than this, both in self-content and in remorse I am likely to be too exclusively concerned with myself, and with the other self or little group whom I have pleased or offended, to assign myself my rightful place in the whole universe of selves. When, on the other hand, I justly approve and disapprove myself then I modify self-content till it turns into self-respect, the proper valuation of my own capacity and service; and I purge remorse of its abnormal intensity and its utter self-absorption till it issues in the virtue of humility, the just appraisal of my moral defects.³

Admiration, or praise, and blame, the aliocentric forms of approval-disapproval, are also either non-moral or moral. To approve people whom we instinctively like and to disapprove those who are uncongenial; to approve men when they agree with us and to disapprove them when they disagree; to admire or despise people according as they help or hinder us, abet or thwart our pur-

poses—all this is obviously emotional and non-moral. In truth, personal appraisal is justice only when a man modifies his instinctive like and dislike so as dispassionately to view himself, or another, in true relation to that Great Society of which all are members.

Justice in Distribution

I. The just valuation of all the persons implicated in a moral decision is a factor in every moral situation, an element in the effectively virtuous control of every instinct. In other words, a man is never adequately brave or prudent or obedient without being justly brave, justly prudent, or justly obedient. His control of conflicting instincts is never fully virtuous unless he justly appraises each of the selves, and justly coördinates the relations of all the selves, who are involved in the given situation. Traditional ethics has obscured this truth, that justice is a constituent factor of every virtue, by its one-sided emphasis on what is known as distributive justice. In our study, immediately to be undertaken, of distributive justice, we must be on our guard against the implication that we are herewith exhausting the consideration of the forms of justice.⁴

Distributive justice is virtuous control, on the one hand of the appropriating and on the other hand of the surrendering instincts, which involves the adequate appraisal and comparison of all the persons concerned. Distributive justice accordingly includes both thrift and generosity. For example, a hard-worked man who justly distributes his money may well give up his club but not his camping trip in order to write a large cheque

for war-relief; and he will not make the cheque so large that he must cut out his customary contribution to the Floating Hospital or his membership fee in the Consumers' League.

The form of thought which especially characterizes distributive justice is comparison. Its problem is to decide the claims of different persons or groups; and this requires not only an analytic study of the persons concerned but a specific comparison of their different needs, different capacities, and different claims. The just appointment of an official, for example, demands not only an independent estimate of his capacity and merit but a comparison of his claim with that of all the others who are eligible to the vacant position; and the just disposition of a man's estate, by will, requires not only the consideration of each of his possible heirs but a comparison of their rival claims. Obviously distributive justice presupposes just valuation, or appraisal, for only by rightly estimating the different persons involved is it possible to compare their needs and claims.

The great and constant hindrances to distributive as to fundamental appraising justice are on the one hand egoism, a man's over-concern for himself, and on the other hand narrow altruism, his exclusive absorption in one other self, or in a little group of others. For the truth is that (again to quote the Platonic Socrates) "for a long time past we have been talking of justice and have failed to recognize her." Clearly justice was already involved in that moral experience which is constituted by loyalty to the universal community and is sharply opposed to self-assertion and to incomplete altruistic

loyalty. When a man's horizon narrows to himself he is incapable of adjusting his position to that of all environing selves. And when a man's desire is concentrated on one object—friend, wife or child—he sees this figure alone, exaggerated, not in its just proportions as one among others in family, state, or society. Thus, there is no commoner form of injustice than that of the devoted mother snatching food or clothing or pleasure for her child, in utter disregard of any other children or, for that matter, of any other human beings. Mrs. Squeers who invariably found that all “articles of apparel” sent by absent parents to their pupils of Dotheboys Hall “were too large or too small and calculated for nobody but young Squeers,” and Madame Thenardier who grudged Cosette the blissful minutes with the doll reserved exclusively for her own children, are mere types of a class of mothers of all times and societies who, for the health or pleasure or advantage of their children, are ready to sacrifice not merely themselves but everybody else. In truth, there is no greater test of a man's justice than that which comes with the call to surrender something which he holds or grasps for one whom he passionately loves.

II. So far, the discussion of distributive justice has concerned itself with the just man's attitude toward the persons whose conflicting claims he must estimate and harmonize. It is time now to consider what may be called the secondary object of distributive justice, namely, the object to be distributed. This may be of any form, material or spiritual. A man is just “with respect to whatever he has to distribute to others and to

receive from them. . . . He distributes his attention, regard, and attachment . . . according to the reasonable . . . claim of each factor." * But the most difficult problem of distributive justice certainly concerns the distribution of property. We shall discuss successively the instinctive basis of property-holding; ⁵ the principles fundamental to the just distribution of property; and the specific problems involved.

By property is meant the "title to the exclusive use or possession of goods,"† or objects of desire. The psychic basis of property lies, as has been shown, in the deeplying instincts of appropriation.⁵ "Birds defend their nests, the dog fights for his kennel," the child jealously guards his own plate or fork or coat. But these instincts must be disciplined, mere impulsive acquisitiveness and tenacity must be guided and dominated by self-control and endurance, before accidentally gained and loosely held possessions become property; and the appropriating and seizing instincts must be profoundly modified before the virtue of justice emerges from the struggle of instinct with instinct, appropriation with surrender, rapacity with sacrifice. The basis of all forms of property holding is what is technically called "occupation," ‡ one of the expressions of the appropriative instinct. But there are two radically different sources of occupation and it is important to our purpose to distinguish them. (1) On the one hand occupation may be involuntary or effort-

* Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics," p. 415.

† Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, p. 487².

‡ Westermarck, "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas," Chap. XXIX., pp. 35 ff.

less, that is, it may be due either to the bounty of nature, or to accidental discovery, or—finally—to gift or to inheritance, without effort of the occupier. Thus, a nomad owns the spot where he has pitched his tent and an Australian marks as his own a bees' nest which he has found, and the Astor baby inherits his millions. (2) The contrasted type of property holding has demanded action and effort, either working or fighting, and not mere receptiveness and tenacity. The instincts involved are acquisitiveness, a form of the appropriative instinct, and imperiousness. For "to seize, master and possess are instincts inbred by the biological process." * There is no lack of examples. All about us we see men and women, working at desks and machines, in hayfields and at fishing nets, at pianos and at washtubs, for the food they eat and the clothes they wear. And, looking further afield, we see nations fighting on the battlefield and high financiers fighting in legislature, court, and stock exchange to enlarge their holdings.

From this consideration of the instinctive basis of property-holding we turn to the discussion of the principles underlying the just distribution of property of these two types,—the moral adjustment of the apparently conflicting claims of different people and of different social groups. Here, as elsewhere, we may not expect ethics to provide us with ready-made solutions of specific problems. The possession of a clear conception of justice "only leads us," in Sidgwick's words, "to view the problem in a new aspect." † The basal

* Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, p. 490³.

† "The Methods of Ethics," p. 271¹.

principle of justice, however, may and must be held firmly in mind. Justice to any self involves the realization of him in relation, not alone to me or to any other individual, and not merely to his family or to any limited group, but to the most inclusive group to which he belongs. For no adjustment of one person to others can be adequate while it is incomplete; and the bonds which tie a man to his fellows are innumerable and ramify in all directions. This explains the fact that a man may have injustice done him even when he is treated "for his own good" if he is thereby conceived as out of relation to the society to which he belongs. It would be unjust, for example, to tell a man a lie even if it would benefit him; and it would be unjust to deprive a man forcibly of the millions which are ruining him. For the man is not a separated unit which can be treated in isolation but a member of a society whose stability and efficiency (alike a condition and a goal of his own moral life) would be disturbed by untruth and by arbitrary force, whatever their specific aim. But, as so often has been argued, there are no assignable limits to the society of which every self is a member; and the just man can no more treat any one community, whether family or nation or church, in separation from the others than he can isolate any one individual. Justice is literally, therefore, regard not for one self nor for any restricted group of selves nor even (after the utilitarian ideal) for all the selves, taken each for each, but regard for the great all-including community of all selves inextricably and vitally related to each other.

From this enunciation of the basal principle of all justice there follows with entire necessity the statement of a

second fundamental principle of distributive justice: there is no inherent, individual right to property since "every right, legal or moral, derives from the social whole." * Even an individualistic and an incompletely socialized ethics must admit this as a statement of empirical fact, for recognition by others is necessary to constitute property. So also some form of government is necessary to secure a man in the occupation of his property. And to us for whom an individual self is a member of the Great Community, subordinate though essential to it, the conclusion is inevitable that no person, as separate and unrelated unit can assert his individual *right*, or just claim, to any possession. The claim to property is justified only when the possession of it is essential to a man's highest contribution to the universal community.

But this denial of an individual's inherent right to the "exclusive possession of goods" is far from being a denial of the justice of property holding. For if it can be shown that property holding so enhances a man's effectiveness and vigor that it is essential to his highest service to the Great Society, then the right to private property seems to be justified. And this is precisely the conclusion to which observation leads most of us. It seems to me perfectly certain, for example, that my efficiency is increased by my exclusive property right, in my own marked copy of James's "Psychology," in my fountain pen, and in my toothbrush. The complete abolition of private property is, therefore, in no sense an obvious principle of distributive justice. On the contrary it would prob-

* Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, p. 415.

ably hamper effectiveness and initiative, squander time, and make for social disorder.

The conclusions so far reached about the just distribution of property are, thus, the following: that an individual self has no inherent right to property and yet that his ownership of private property is likely to enlarge his capacity to serve the Great Society. The pressing concrete problem of distributive justice concerns the extent and limits and methods of the just ownership of private property. And, once more, in discussing this question, we can attempt no more than the formulation of underlying principles. Distributive justice, in the first place, certainly does not imply a mechanical equalization of private property. Such a conception is nothing more nor less than a return to the outlawed dogma of the inherent individual right to property. That theory, fused with the sentimental form of democratic doctrine, the indiscriminating conviction that "a mon's a mon for a' that," precipitates this mechanical conception of equalization of property. But to parcel out, if it were possible, the world's possessions in equal shares and to hand over one apiece to every man would bear no remote resemblance to a just distribution. A man's sole claim, it must be remembered, to any private property whatever is simply its power to raise his capacity for "doing his bit" in the common cause. And it well may be that to render society most morally efficient one man should have more and another less of concrete possessions. This conclusion, it must be at once noted and will later be argued, does not at all commit us to an assertion that all present-day inequalities of fortune are just!

It has next to be observed that justice, the adjustment of selves with each other, of necessity involves social order. Anarchistic propaganda, in so far as it is an effort to abolish not only government but ordered society, is inherently unjust, just because it is arrantly individualistic, because it flatly denies the fundamental inter-relatedness of men with each other. But, once more, the truth that justice involves order must not be perverted, as too often it is, into the flagrantly absurd assertion that the political, the social and the industrial order of our day and our civilization are ideally just. It seems impossible, for example, to maintain that the seven hundred odd Englishmen who, a few years ago, owned one-fourth of the soil of England * were enabled by their ownership of these estates to render to society service so eminent that it offset the incapacity, demonstrably due to land-poverty, of the small-farming class. And, similarly, when we compare the growing number of American incomes running well up into the millions not merely with the abject poverty of the "submerged" but with the ten-dollar-a-week earnings of countless hard-working families, the justice of such inequality assuredly is not self-evident. For justice though unquestionably it permits, and indeed involves, property laws and property regulations, does not stand for tenacious, uncritical adherence to existing laws and traditions. Indeed, respect for the laws which preserve the social order is compatible with justice only if it is supplemented by a tireless effort to appraise, to modify and to enlarge laws—in a word to

* Cf. J. Hyder, "The Case for Land Nationalisation," (in press, 1913), Chap. III., p. 40.

make laws just. It follows, of course, that there will emerge great social crises when the just man must break with law and social order. John Hampden, when he refused to pay the ship taxes; the Boston men who threw the tea overboard and defied the Stamp Act; the English Nonconformists who in 1902 refused to pay the school rates—all these were law-breakers, but many of us believe that they were just.

We have still therefore to press for the solution of our concrete, present-day problem. Granting unequivocally that there must be property laws, and granting that arithmetical equality of resources, even if attainable, would really run counter to the ideal of social justice: what, more exactly, is a just distribution of private property? In particular: are the property conditions of our own age and of our modern society in principle just, and are they therefore to be accepted and carried to their highest efficiency; or does justice demand a radical reconstruction? One answer to these questions, offered by an increasing number of contemporary thinkers, stresses the distinction already made between property gained without effort and property achieved through toil or struggle. Dispassionate examination of the facts shows that almost every great fortune and many a small one is founded in large part on natural resource—on oil-well or mine or water-power accidentally in possession of one man or of a few—or else is founded on social increment, the increase in value due to the growth of communities. That is to say, even the fortunes which men make by adding thereto toil of mind and body are in part due to effortless occupation; while inherited

fortunes are wholly of the effortless type. Now, not merely moralists but many publicists of our day are asserting that there are strict limits to the claim of private ownership through accidental occupation or discovery or through inheritance. Accordingly there is a growing tendency to restrict private property by making individuals and corporations pay for franchises and waterrights, by setting off public reserves and, finally, by taxes on bequests.

On the other hand, most people still believe, with Locke, that a man is entitled to a share in the property to which he has contributed by his labor. "He that is nourished," Locke says, "by the acorns he picked up under an oak or the apples he gathered under a tree, has certainly appropriated them to himself. . . . I ask then, when did they begin to be his? . . . and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his nothing else could. That labour . . . added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right."* But we must guard ourselves, at this point, with the utmost care, against the danger of relapsing into the old discredited but long-lived doctrine of the individual's absolute right to anything that he holds. We are beginning to realize that a man has no inherent right to an unearned fortune. But most of us have still to learn that, from the standpoint of moral justice, a man has the right to any property—even to that which he earns—only if the possession of it makes him a greater contributor to the universal good. For since truly I am inherently a member of the

* "Of Civil Government," Chap. V., § 28.

Great Society I must work for myself only as integral part of it; and I must look upon myself, literally, as steward, not owner, of the property which expresses my own thrift. We therefore utterly and finally reject—more easily doubtless in the case of unearned property but as unequivocally in the case of our earnings—the old dogma of the individual's inalienable right to any possession for himself, and assert with perfect literalness that, from the standpoint of justice, the ultimate owner is and must be the universal community.

Two sharply contrasted sociological doctrines are based on this ethical teaching that private property is held not absolutely but in trust. According to one of these—socialism, in a technical sense of the term⁶—the effective acknowledgment of the Great Society as ultimate owner can only be made by entrusting to a political or an industrial group—to state or municipality or industrial guild, the ownership or the control of a significant part (if not all) of the property now privately held. According to the rival theory, often known as individualism, socialism is practically untenable because under these conditions of social ownership or social control the incentives would vanish to individual initiative, industry, and thrift and so the Great Society would suffer loss in the deterioration of its members. In reply most socialists urge that social control or ownership, especially if limited to basal necessities, would affect only the sub-human struggle for the bare requisites of life, that it would, in truth, “free moral energy”* for healthful competition and for individual initiative in truly social

* Simmel, “Moralphilosophie,” pp. 325-36.

enterprises. Whatever the outcome of the controversy between the socialist and his critic, it is certain that the just man must actually and concretely—not theoretically and verbally—hold any property which he possesses, as he holds his spiritual treasure, in trust for the Great Society that in this age of unearned privilege and inherited injustice he must not cease to work for a social order in which property will be gained and held and used in direct furtherance of a completely moral loyalty.

CHAPTER X

THE SOCIALLY VIRTUOUS MAN (Concluded)

The immediately preceding chapters have undertaken the analysis and illustration of justice and truthfulness, the basal social virtues corresponding to the fundamental instincts, like and dislike, communicativeness and concealment. This chapter will discuss those important social virtues, sympathetic and non-sympathetic, whose instinctive correlates are the tendencies to surrender or give; to follow, or imitate; to resist, or oppose; and to fight. These are generosity, conformity, or obedience; nonconformity, and militant virtue.

The Generous Man

Generosity is an obviously sympathetic virtue. At this point, therefore, we may wisely ask ourselves how, precisely, sympathy is related not only to virtue but to instinct. Sympathy¹ may well be defined as the conscious sharing of the experience of other self or selves; it is the realized oneness of a man with his fellows. This conscious participation, not always or merely emotional, in the experience of other selves has first to be distinguished from instinctive love. For such love may be utterly selfish: one may passionately love

another self and yet treat him solely as minister to one's own pleasures. Thus, a man may lavish gifts not in order to give pleasure but because he gloats in the uplifted sense of his own beneficence; he may avoid the acts which give another pain, not through sympathy, but because he shrinks from sight of suffering; or he may even, like George Meredith's egoist, have an "infinite thirst" for another's suffering in order to display his magnanimity and to "ease his heart of its charitable love." But love, become a virtue, always involves the sympathetic sharing of experience.

It must, however, next be emphasized that sympathy, though different from instinctive love, is itself instinctive.² This has often been denied by dogmatic egoists who have taught that all the instincts are either non-social (egoistic) or, if social, of the commanding, combative type. Our doctrine of the instinctiveness of the social emotions, sympathetic as well as unsympathetic, clogs the wheels of this relentlessly naturalistic conception. And with reason. For such a doctrine of instinct is plainly opposed to biological and to psychological fact. The self-preservative and unsympathetic instincts and tendencies are often stronger; the sympathetic tendencies are certainly later manifested in the individual. But the fact that children, primitive peoples and, it seems, even animals suffer with their fellows and are conscious sharers of their experience can hardly be denied or even regarded as exceptional. Mechanistic biologists, to be sure, try to explain parental instincts as exhibited by animals—nest building, brooding over eggs, protection of the young—as mere tropisms, unconscious reflexes stimulated

by the bare contact with nest, egg or young. But it is very difficult to make such a conception cover all the facts—to make it apply, for example, to apes of the species in which “the mother is said to carry her young one clasped in one arm uninterruptedly for several months.”* And when we turn from animals to human beings we not only have abundant introspective reports of instinctive affective sympathy, *the conscious sharing* of suffering and joy, in the experience of children and of undisciplined adults, but we have also the testimony of the students of primitive men. Thus Darwin attributes to “primeval man” sympathy and fidelity as well as courage and asserts that “many a savage has been . . . ready to sacrifice his life rather than betray his companions.”† Indeed Darwin explicitly recognizes “the instinct of sympathy.” And first-hand observers practically agree, in opposition to popular prejudice, that “there is no feature of savage life more nearly universal than the kindness and tenderness of savages, even of savage fathers, for their little children.” Professor McDougall, from whom these words are taken, tells us that he has “many a time watched with interest a blood-thirsty head-hunter of Borneo spending a day at home tenderly nursing his infant in his arms.” And Westermarck quotes from Guinnard the observation that among the Indians of the Pampas “an infant becomes from the moment it is considered worthy to live ‘the object of the whole love of its parents who, if necessary, will submit themselves to the greatest privations to satisfy its least

* McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

† “The Descent of Man,” Chap. V., paragraphs 6–9.

wants.'” * These are instances of parental tenderness rising, apparently, to a self-denial which is most readily viewed as sympathetic. And in the records of initiations, totemistic rites and sacrifices abundant evidence is found of the vivid reality of tribal sympathy.

The basis of the virtue of generosity³ is the sympathetic instinct of surrender—best known in its extreme form, the mother’s lavishing of care and food and life itself on her young. But the instinctive tendency to give, or surrender, is not an exclusively parental impulse. One may see a very little child fairly force a cherished toy or bit of food on a beloved nurse, and one sometimes, if rarely, meets an older person with an apparently ineradicable tendency to dispossess himself of all that he owns in favor of his friends. Opposed to this instinctive tendency to give or surrender are two others: first, the sometimes purely egoistic instinct, already discussed, of appropriativeness, the getting and holding instinct; and second, the instinct of pugnacity (or aggression). There are many degrees and modes of surrender culminating in the supreme form—the genuine sacrifice of life, physical or spiritual. But no form of instinctive surrender is in itself a virtue. For the virtue of generosity requires, in the first place, not the mere indulgence of a natural tendency but an habitual willed control of instincts—an express incitement of instinctive surrender or a checking of either the instinct to hold or of the fiercer instinct to fight for the possession which the virtuously generous man voluntarily yields. And in

* Westermarck, *op. cit.*, I., p. 405; quoted from A. Guinnard, “Three Years’ Slavery among the Patagonians,” p. 144.

the second place not even every generous control of these instincts is a virtue—but only such control as serves the good, and no merely narrow end. “Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor and though I give my body to be burned” it will profit me nothing in my claim to the virtue of generosity if, for example, the sacrifice is made in subtle ministry to my own benefactor’s pride, or to feed the flame of an unjustified passion. Thus the great, mediæval exponent of sacrifice, Francis of Assisi, was virtuously generous, not simply because he stripped off velvet cloak and silken hose, not because he forswore dainty food and luxurious home, but because, loving luxury and comfort and gayety he yet checked his longing for them; and not because he fed and clothed loyal disciple and patient beggar, but because he lavished himself on cursing ingrate and on ungrateful leper, seeing in every man his brother, his fellow in the Beloved Community. For, measured by the conception of the good which this book upholds, not my instinctive gifts and not my loyalty to lover, mother, child, not even my devotion to church or country—nothing less than the crowning loyalty of will to the Great Society “of all nations, and kindreds and people” can transmute my gift of toil, treasure, life, into the genuine virtue of generosity or sacrifice.

It has already been noted that the instinct of surrender is opposed not to one tendency only but to at least two others—appropriativeness and pugnacity—and that generosity is therefore menaced by two sets of vices. It is menaced on the one hand by over-lavishness, the over-ready dissipation of one’s possessions and by pusil-

lanimity, the failure to exact one's dues and the facile yielding on demand of opinions and possessions which loyalty to the supreme good requires one to hold. It is threatened from the other quarter, not only by greed but by aggressive rapacity, the tendency to attack the institutions and possessions of other men. Envy, the unexecuted longing for other people's treasures, capacities, and distinctions, is the subtlest form of this ungenerous rapacity.

The distinction between generosity and sacrifice, admittedly two forms of the same virtue, has finally to be made more precise. The term generosity is applied more often to that mode of the virtue which checks immoral indulgence of appropriative instincts. But it is by no means properly restricted to the moral surrender of sense things—food, money, gifts, concrete possessions of any sort. The generous man gives these things indeed, but not merely these. He gives also of his time and his thought; he surrenders his ambitions; he yields points of taste—in a word, “he gives himself with his gift.” And as generosity is opposed to greed so also it is, as has appeared, entirely different from overlavishness, the indiscriminating neglect of oneself, the outpouring of time and effort and money indispensable to one's own effective service to the Great Society. Jane Barlow's delightful old woman, for example, who lives “down beyant” alone and in abject poverty and who, the lucky inheritor of a tiny sum, journeys to the County Fair and comes back burdened—not with the coals and flannels and flour and tea which she so desperately needs—but with a ribbon for Maggie and a

knife for Pat, a shawl for Bridget and a pound of tea for every neighbor, is impulsively not virtuously generous.

In at least two ways the term "sacrifice"⁴ is, in practice, distinguished from "generosity." It suggests, in the first place, the pain, the unhappiness involved in surrender. And it is used to designate the higher reaches of generosity in its spiritual forms: Thus, one sacrifices one's cherished purposes, one's life, one's love rather than one's clothes or food or money. Sacrifice is, in truth, so widely held to be the consummate virtue, that it is sometimes treated as if it were an end in itself and not merely a means to the supreme end. Sacrifice "is the very culmination of the moral life," Professor Palmer says. And he adds that it "calls forth from mankind as nothing else the distinctively moral response of reverence." On every hand, we find illustration of the truth of these words. Rupert Brooke, Alan Seegar, "a student in arms"—we bow our heads before them not primarily for their courage or for their kindness but for the supreme sacrifice they made of life and youth and art. But while all men join to praise the virtue of sacrifice most moral systems, more or less in agreement with everyday practices, narrowly limit its scope. In other words, most moralists find few occasions in which sacrifice can be wisely regarded as a significant means to the ultimate end. Rather, they hold, very many crucial situations—personal, institutional and national—require the ultimate good to be sought through the exercise not of the virtue of sacrifice but through acquisitive or through militant virtues. Christian ethics is sometimes supposed to give

large place to the virtue of sacrifice; and it is certainly true that Jesus, as the gospel-writers portray him, sought his supreme end by the straight and undeviating way of sacrifice. Yet few interpreters of Jesus' teaching agree with Tolstoy in the conviction that the disciples should follow the master in his literal and uncompromising practice of the virtue of sacrifice. Most expositors, on the other hand, regard Jesus as a unique figure capable of esoteric virtue which mere men are unable to emulate. In the teaching of these Christian moralists sacrifice really holds much the same subordinate position as in other conventional systems of ethics. It is fair to add that not only are there few experimenters in the realm of ultimate sacrifice but that the problem of the scope of this virtue doubtless demands more critical and more dispassionate consideration than any so far accorded to it.

The Conformer and the Non-Conformer

The virtue of conformity, or obedience,⁵ corresponds with imitation—a sympathetic instinct widespread at least among human beings. Imitation is well shown in its external form by a young child's attempt to follow the rhythmic motion of someone's hand and is constantly illustrated in its very characteristic personal form by an older child's impersonation, in his plays, of the people—policemen, clergymen, soldiers—whom he particularly admires. Unlike imitativeness, but closely parallel, is the instinct of opposition—the impulse to be different, to diverge, to initiate. It has received less attention from the social psychologists, but is to the full

as significant. The child's instinct to contradict, to excite surprise, to be "contrary" is as strongly marked as his impulse to imitate or to follow. Both instinctive tendencies are of obvious use. Through imitation the child lays hold on the experience of the race; through his independence and initiative he makes his own contribution to society. And though different individuals belong preëminently to the class of the imitators or to that of the non-conformers, yet all normal people embody both tendencies. But imitativeness and contrariness, conformity and non-conformity, however useful, are not yet virtues. On the contrary, a man's virtuous obedience must be sharply distinguished both from instinctive and from forced compliance. Impulsively to imitate good examples and to follow good leaders, unreflectively to abide by regulations and adhere to conventions—this may be socially advantageous but certainly is not morally obedient behavior; and to conform to law because of physical, economic, or industrial pressure is mere instinctive yielding to power. Similarly, instinctive rebellion against authority is never a virtue and is often socially harmful. The virtuously obedient man is he who has the habit of following precept or example of authoritative persons when this habit is an expression of moral loyalty involving a modification of instincts—an affirmation of instinctive imitation and a checking of instinctive opposition. And conversely the virtuous non-conformer is he whose moral loyalty leads him to oppose authority by holding down the instinct to follow and inciting the instinct to rebel.

I. The good man's obedience, it has thus appeared, is

his habit of willing such compliance with the will of his superior as furthers his loyalty to the Great Society. One popular misconception must be removed at once. Obedience, it must be emphatically asserted, does not consist in being persuaded or argued into a course of action. Neither child nor adult is obedient, he is merely choosing with deliberation, when he consents for what is proved to him to be a good reason. In the nature of the case, therefore, obedience is unreasoned: one may, and often should, argue the question whom to obey, and whether or not to obey, but there is no other than unconditioned obedience: to obey is to carry out the command because it is commanded.

It is not difficult to show that obedience—within what limits one need not for the moment consider—is essential to any sort of social organization. And experience shows that some degree of social organization is necessary to the achievement of every ultimate purpose, even that of egoistic pleasure; it is obviously necessary to the attainment of the ultimate end as we have seen reason to define it—as the complete life of the Great Community. For not merely deliberate disobedience, voluntary over-indulgence of the instinct to rebel, but the uncontrolled exercise of one's instinct to be untrammelled, independent and different, must result in a state of chaos and disorder in which nobody has sufficient protection or help in carrying on his work. There is little need to argue this, for our own age offers a perilously close approximation to this state of things and every one of us suffers from the anarchic and crudely individualistic non-conformity of our day and country. On every hand, in

the family, in the school, in the state, we find flagrant contempt for authority expressed in utterly capricious efforts to escape restraint and in entire unwillingness to execute commands. Trains collide and bridges collapse because men have not scrupulously followed orders; important negotiations fail because other men have not delivered letters as directed; everywhere, in every relation of life, nearly everybody is delayed and hampered and thwarted by the failure of nearly everybody else all along the line to obey. And yet, as has appeared, no business, least of all the great business of living, can be carried on without effective organization which in turn demands that some should lead and others follow. This conclusion is theoretically justified by our conception of society as an organically related unity of many selves and by the fact that these selves differ very greatly in capacity and in experience, so that, in the case of every enterprise, some are more fitted than others to be leaders. Most of us fully accept this condition of things. We constitute or adopt certain people or groups as authoritative over us either tacitly, by accepting their protection, or expressly by voting for them or in some other way designating them. Obedience to these persons is implied in acceptance of the social tie which binds us, and, once we have recognized their right to command, it becomes our duty and our virtue to obey.

Such a conception is aristocratic, in the technical sense of the word, only when leadership is viewed as a natural and arbitrary and inalienable right, and when he who is leader in one undertaking assumes to be leader in them all. But different tasks require different leaders;

we must follow different men in things political, domestic, academic, spiritual. This is indeed the reason why all truly great leaders, when their positions are reversed, become such simply and whole-heartedly efficient followers. Such obedience to those in authority over us is a means to our supreme service. It is freed from its merely impulsive character by being freely chosen and it is purged of all servility when it is chosen as realized means toward the ultimate purpose. When this purpose is conceived, as we have conceived it, as the fullest life of the great community of selves, then in truth the object of obedience is one's own larger self; the authority to which one bows is the universal kingdom of which one knows oneself to be an integral member.

The preceding paragraphs have contrasted obedience with insubordination and have shown why the good man must often be obedient. The moralist must, however, be on his guard against the common over-estimation of obedience. By governments, by officials, by adults in their relation to children, by "upper dogs" of every type, obedience is extolled as a self-evident and fundamental virtue. And the "under dogs," the governed, the controlled classes either accept at its face value this estimate of obedience, or else, waxed rebellious, they brand obedience as utter servility and deny to it any flavor of virtue. The moralist can not passively adopt either view of obedience. For, on the one hand, it is simply irrational to enjoin obedience as an end in itself. There is nothing sacrosanct or axiomatically binding about obedience—or, for that matter, about any one of the virtues. It is absurd to say to any one, child or man,

"You ought to obey, to conform," without justifying the necessity of the obedience. On the other hand, it has already appeared that there are many situations in which obedience is an essential means to the achievement of the ultimate end of moral loyalty.

The function of obedience in the moral life and its relation to the opposite virtue of non-conformity will be most clearly shown by distinguishing virtuous obedience not only from the contrasting vices of insubordination and immoral conformity but, even more fruitfully, from non-moral compliance. Non-moral conformity is of two sorts: first, forced compliance, the obedience involuntarily rendered by the stronger to the weaker; and, second, habitual conformity, the mere imitative habit of doing the things that other people do, of following fashions, of clinging to traditions, keeping laws. This, sometimes known as "custom morality,"⁶ is not morality at all because it is involuntary; it is mere instinctive imitation, often socially expedient, often, on the other hand, the most impregnable of barriers to social progress. The limits of this book prevent the discussion of this type of conformity in its complex relations to genuine morality. On the other hand, a consideration of forced conformity, the other form of non-moral compliance, is essential to the fuller understanding of obedience and will be undertaken in the following paragraph.

A common instance of forced compliance is the obedience exacted by adults from children when it is gained through actual physical compulsion or through threatened punishment. Such obedience clearly is non-moral, for it does not express the will of the conforming self.

Yet it may play an important part in the moral life of a child. For the habit of conforming to legitimate and wisely exercised authority normally leads to genuinely willed obedience. Parents and elders may therefore be justified in exacting obedience from children even through punishments and penalties. Somewhat as a child may wisely be taught to memorize words which he does not understand in order that they may lie ready to his later awakening understanding so a child should be trained in habits of compliance which will serve the free obedience of his later upspringing will. To the lack of such training in early childhood it is reasonable to attribute a great part of the chaos, the tumultuous ineffectiveness and the criminal negligences of our American life of to-day.

The conclusion which has just been reached, that a child should be trained to the habit of complying with the will of parents or responsible elders, must not blind us to the two great risks involved in exacting obedience. The first of these may well be stated in the terms of a Freudian expression which Holt effectively uses: the parent, by exacting conformity to his will is likely to make himself a "barrier" between the child and the real things which surround him and so to keep the child from knowing and playing his part in the world he lives in. If, for instance, the little boy is inexorably prevented by his mother from ever handling a knife, then instead of learning that a knife is a sharp thing he learns that a mother is a powerful person who disapproves of knives. The objection to this situation is two-fold: mothers are not always at hand to protect little boys from knives and boys who do not know how to use knives are very

helpless creatures. Evidently the child who has never learned by his own experience that knives may hurt is at a hopeless disadvantage in a world which abounds in them. Child or man, every one of us must make his own fight, must exert his own authority over his own up-rushing instincts. And to learn this control is obviously impossible if the expression of the instincts is forcibly thwarted. To recur to our illustration, the child naturally reacts to the knife both with the instinct of approach and, once he has been pricked or cut by it, with the opposite instinct of withdrawal. But precisely the relation which ought to be established between boy and knife is a combination of these two instinctive tendencies, a prudent approach. Left to himself the child is sure to learn this right use of a knife though to be sure he runs a risk of seriously injuring himself with it. On the other hand, prohibited by the barrier of his mother's command from learning what a knife really is he will never learn to use a knife at all. For part of his instinctive reaction to it will be forcibly repressed. Clearly his mother's duty in this dilemma is, not to exert unreasoned obedience to the command "Never touch a knife," but rather to permit the child to handle the knife and to be hurt by the knife—seeing to it (it goes without saying) that the knife is dull and the hurt a slight one. To help a child in the organization of his own moral life is the aim and only justification of training him in obedience: and such training is a tragic failure if it check at their source the outgush of instinctive tendencies which form the stream of moral experience, the current which the good will must direct into its own channels. The second great

risk which one runs in exacting obedience from children is the risk of making oneself a barrier not merely between the child and the world about him but between the child and "the good," or ultimate object of moral endeavor. For a parent to arrogate supremacy to himself because he has his child in his power is sheer tyranny; and it is blasphemy to set up his own will as the chief good. In truth, the parent who exacts conformity trains the child in virtuous obedience only by leading him to see that compliance with the will of mother or father is a necessary means to his own free obedience to the supreme good. On the other hand, the parent who demands obedience to his own will as absolute is either inciting the child to rebellion or habituating him to servility.

The preceding pages have discussed at some length the relation of obedience to *non-moral* compliance, whether involuntary or forced. *Immoral*, that is, voluntary but servile obedience may be described in a sentence or two since it is so obviously opposed to virtuous conformity. Immoral obedience is acquiescence in another's will when this violates one's own supreme loyalty to the chief good. It is the vice of cowards and of men greedy of their own ease and pleasure and is as evident in a modern American's supine conformity to unjust laws as in the recantation of Galileo.

II. From the description and illustration of immoral conformity it is an easy step to the discussion of virtuous non-conformity. Because conformity is so perilously easy for those who are favored by existing social conditions, because a truculent servility to the will of men in high office, men of influence, above all, men of property

is so paralyzing to genuine moral vigor, even the virtue of obedience tends always to be discredited by men alive to the evils of the social order. In opposition to immoral conformity they rightly urge the virtue of non-conformity, the virtuous rebellion against constituted authority. Such virtuous disobedience, involving as it does the repression of the instinct to imitation and the incitement of native opposition, is to be sharply distinguished from the uncontrolled and merely instinctive form of opposition. The Irishman of the classic tale who described his political convictions by the words "agin the government" illustrates the instinct, not the virtue, of the non-conformist. For rebellion against constituted authority is never justified when it is mere egoistic assertion of one's own individual desires, or when it is mere passionate resistance to authority that threatens the wishes of those whom one loves. Only when a man's conformity to a law entails his disloyalty to the supreme purpose; only when obedience to a human law is disobedience "to the heavenly vision"—only then has a man the right and the duty to refuse obedience to recognized authority, to say with Luther "Here I stand: I can do no other!"

It follows that the great non-conformists have always been the most scrupulously obedient of men wherever the higher loyalty was not at stake. Thus Socrates, though he stood out against all the senate when he resisted the illegal proposal to decide by a single vote of the assembly the fate of the eight generals of the Arginusæ seafight, refused absolutely to evade the hemlock cup by the easy escape which lay open to him. And

Jesus, though he broke the law by healing on the Sabbath, paid the tribute money and commanded to render Cæsar's things to Cæsar.

The Militant Man

By militant virtue is meant that checking of instinctive conformity and surrender and that incitement of instinctive pugnacity which further moral loyalty. Many sentimental systems of ethics, that of Schopenhauer for example, ignore or deny the existence of militant virtue. Against such views this book ardently champions the evident need of aggressive militant virtue, in a world where toil and trouble must be bravely met and where evil must be fiercely grappled. Pugnacity, the basis of militant virtue, is, like resistance, a form of the instinctive tendency to opposition. It ranks with fear as, at once, the earliest, the most intense and the most widespread of the primitive instincts.⁷ It is an impulse widely diffused among animals, early observed among children, and persisting with undiminished vigor in adult life. In a word, we are all—animals and men, barbarians and civilized, children and adults—born fighters. And as we are all fighters, so each of us fights in all imaginable situations and surroundings for all things: for food, shelter, mate; for opinions and ideals; for offspring, friends, church, country, party. In technical terms, pugnacity has no specific object of its own * and thus directs itself toward the characteristic objects of all the other instincts. Pugnacity is thus the natural fellow and follower of all other instincts—of acquisitiveness, as

* Cf. *Intern. Journ. of Ethics*, 1917, XXVIII., pp. 71 ff.

when dog or man fights to get or to hold his bone; of instinctive love, as when the youth challenges his rival with weapons physical or mental for the hand of his lady; of the sacrificial mother instinct, as when cat mother or human mother gives mortal combat over her sleeping baby. It follows that pugnacity may grow out of almost any other instinct. Even from fear it normally issues—for animal or man, at bay, turns to attack the object from which, till now, it has fled.

Militant virtue, however, involves the control, not the unrestrained exercise, of instinctive pugnacity. The virtuous man fights but he does not strike about him, right and left, for the mere love of fighting. He fights for an object; and the adequately and consistently good man—as we now know—gives battle never in his own interests, save as defense of them is a factor of the higher loyalty; he strives never in the service of those only whom he loves; but solely and wholly for the great cause, the ultimate purpose. Like generosity, militant virtue is a “mean” between over-aggressiveness and pusillanimity, the servile surrender of one’s own. The vice which most closely resembles it, which indeed sometimes counterfeits it, is contentiousness—the habit of opposing every project, however innocent, of contradicting every statement, however justified, of combating every suggestion, however significant. In its commonest form—irascibility or crossness—this is the vice which above every other may undermine the foundations of happiness and poison the very springs of life in the average “happy home.” For this is the characteristic vice of the otherwise virtuous man—of the brave, the abstinent, the

thrifty, the truthful, even of the generous man. And it is one of the tragedies of the moral struggle that one who has come off with flying colors in a battle royal with temptation is peculiarly liable, for very fatigue, to fall a prey to his instinctive pugnacity and to lash about him restlessly with that keenest, most stinging scourge, his tongue. The pity of it is that ill-tempered querulousness, this everyday vice which consists in the failure to check instinctive pugnacity, may flourish best among those who best love each other. A man may forego luxury and live laborious days for sake of wife or mother and yet may make her house a purgatory by his violent outbreaks, his snarls of temper or his cutting repartee; and the woman who would cheerfully lay down her life for her children may harry them unmercifully by her sharp words, her incessant "nagging," or her obstinate opposition to their wishes. The closest love, like propinquity, looses the restraint of fear and reverence and puts men on an equality with each other. With those whom we slightly know, we hold in leash our instinctive irascibility lest we lose their confidence and respect. But because we are so sure that we can not forfeit the love or wear out the tenderness of the members of our families and our closest friends we permit ourselves to scold and worry and harass them—in a word to give rein to instinctive pugnacity instead of controlling it in the service of the supreme loyalty.

To turn from the vice to the virtue: militant virtue admittedly characterizes every reformer, every doughty fighter against entrenched customs, unjust legislation, and corrupt legislation. Dorothea Dix who faced select-

men, and legislatures, and senators, who tramped through wildernesses and forded streams and went shelterless in her long struggle for the better care of the insane--Dorothea Dix is as literally a fighter as Joan of Arc. The first Lord Shaftesbury who, till the day of his banishment, ceased not to cry out in a hostile Parliament for toleration; and the sixth lord, who, throughout his life battled against the entrenched class spirit, and greed, and conservatism of England to protect the health, and purity, and lives of the children in the cotton mills--these men, no less truly than Nelson and Kitchener, were men of militant virtue though they urged a bloodless warfare against sloth and selfishness and injustice.

Up to this point, moralists are virtually all agreed. Their differences emerge in the discussion of militant virtue as displayed in war. War is organized pugnacity in the relation of tribes and of nations to each other. And the discussion of militant virtue can with difficulty be divorced, in these days, from the consideration of the moral problem of war. So terrible is the devastation of war, so appalling is its destruction not of mere physical bodies but of homes and hopes and ideals, of the achievements of men's love and of their toil; so piteous is man's tribute of blood and tears and spiritual gifts that war can be morally justified only if it can be shown to be a genuine and adequate means to the good.

One common argument in defense of war as a necessary factor, in our day, of the struggle toward the supreme ideal is based on the fact that war is an expression of pugnacity and that pugnacity, like every other instinct, can not be stamped or crushed out of human life.⁸ Rather,

it is urged, pugnacity must be modified and transformed into a virtue. This is psychologically and ethically an absolutely sound position which the preceding pages have enforced. Whatever may be thought of pacifism, passivism, a lazy acceptance of things as they are, a selfish disinclination to take risks and to lead attacks, is a morally untenable position. For as we have found the moral life is in a profound sense a battle, the struggle of instinct against instinct, and of instinct with purpose and thus every virtuous man must be a fighter. As Tom Brown learned from his great teacher: life is "no fool's or sluggard's paradise into which one wanders by chance, but a battlefield ordained from of old where there are no spectators but the youngest must take his side and the stakes are life and death."

But the admission that pugnacity must be brought into the service of moral loyalty does not at once commit us to the conclusion that the expression of pugnacity in war is morally justified. It has already been stated, that pugnacity allies itself with the most diverse instincts and tendencies. In league with greed or even with fear pugnacity obviously is not likely to be transformed into virtue. Only as it lends strength to the great protective instincts, only in chivalrous warfare, may we hope to see pugnacity as militant virtue. The exact form which our present question takes is therefore the following: Though we unite to condemn the wars of aggrandizement, the wars undertaken to enforce the lust of the strong against the weak; though we admit that most of the wars which men have urged against men have been expressions of this ruthless self-seeking—may we none the

less hold that war is sometimes justified, that there are crises in human history when militant virtue must fight with carnal weapons, when we can fight war only by war, when only through war itself we can create a world in which physical war—maiming, destroying, slaughtering—shall be forever abolished? This is precisely the point of division between those upholders and those opponents of the doctrine that war is necessary who alike see before them, as ultimate end of their moral striving, the vision of the Great Society of the nations. The one group affirms, the other denies, that the carnage of war may be a factor of the supreme loyalty. To attempt to decide this crucially important question would carry us beyond the limits of a book on general ethics. But we may properly demand of pacifists and of militants alike a discriminating attitude toward the problem. Opponents of war can not justly obliterate the distinction between wars of aggrandizement and wars of protection and of defense. However passionately they urge the futility and the evil of war they can not be insensitive to the spirit of sacrifice and consecration in which men may and do fight in trenches, in the air, on the sea. A parallel demand may be made of those who believe that war may be justified, nay, necessitated, by actual conditions—by the seeming impossibility of repelling unwarranted aggressions, of averting wrongs, of securing freedom and justice on the earth without the resort to war. These conscientious advocates of war, as a tragically necessary means of furthering loyalty to the Great Society, must yet never close their minds to the possibility of genuine substitutes for the “righteous war,” methods which might achieve

the end without working the devastation of war. Many such methods are suggested by the venturesome opponents of war: unarmed resistance, or non-conformity carried to the limit, the invaded nation's organized and steadfast refusal either to take arms against the invaders or to comply with their commands; the general strike, an expression of non-conformity in industrial life—a method which actually secured the Russian constitution of 1905; finally, the boycott, turned to use by a group of nations against a national offender, the cutting off of all relations, economic and political, with the marauding government.

Into the detailed discussion of these problems it is not the object of this book to enter. But so much is certain: however they may clash in immediate purposes, men genuinely and adequately moral—upholders or deniers of the morality of war—must hold all aims, whether national or supernational, and must devise all methods, military or anti-militarist, in loyal subordination to the great including object of their ultimate loyalty, the Great Society of all nations and all people.

CHAPTER XI

THE LOVER OF THE GOOD, THE LOVER OF THE BEAUTIFUL, AND THE LOVER OF GOD

I. *The Lover of the Beautiful*

This brief, last chapter will attempt to distinguish the moral both from the æsthetic¹ and from the religious experience. At least since the time when Socrates discoursed or Plato wrote of *καλοκαγαθία*, beauty-and-goodness, it has been held by many that these two great objects of human pursuit are closely fused, if not wholly identical. This conviction is probably in part due to the "ideality," as it is called, of these experiences—the fact that neither of them is concerned with the satisfaction of immediate "bodily" needs. And there are other ways in which the good and the beautiful resemble each other. Both are valued and desired, not merely observed and contemplated objects; and it follows that conceptions of the beautiful, like conceptions of the good, are estimated or compared with each other. Thus æsthetics like ethics is a normative science. And at precisely this point, in the æsthetic as in the moral experience, thinking plays its part, and comparisons are made. A final important similarity is the following: the beautiful object, like the good, involves a subordination of part to whole, a harmoniousness, a unification of

detail. In Palmer's words, "organic wholeness is essential to beauty" and "at the very heart of moral excellence is the aim at organic wholeness." * As daring must be tempered with prudence in the courageously moral man so, in a picture, a bright color must balance a dull; as the divergent impulses are brought into unity by the supreme moral purpose so the many sense-impressions are unified in the symmetrical form or in the rhythmical sequence.

The contrasts between the good man and the lover of beauty are far more important than the similarities. Fundamental to them is the difference in object. For the object of the moral experience (as it has been a main effort of this book to make clear) is a vitally personal object while the object of æsthetics—the beautiful—is as clearly impersonal. The maple bough against the stretch of October sky, the note of the song sparrow in a lilac-fragrant summer morning, the dim, rich masses of color of the Persian carpet—these are the beautiful objects of the æsthetic experience; but the good I seek is the control of my temper, the right training of my children, the upbuilding of the universal society—in every case an immediately or ultimately personal object. Like the thinker, whose characteristic object is the impersonal relation, the artist is therefore distinguished from the moral man by his equally impersonal, though predominantly sensuous, object. Münsterberg stresses a second significant difference in object. The object of beauty, he points out, is always isolated; it is set apart from its surroundings by frame, or by stanza-form, or by

* "The Field of Ethics," p. 102.

natural limit. And in the truly æsthetic experience a man is absorbed in this isolated object; he does not, like the scientific observer, seek to explain it, to connect it with other objects but he immerses himself in it, absorbs himself in the enjoyment of it. In Münsterberg's words: "art never looks beyond the frame of the picture"; the beautiful object "expresses nothing but itself."* On the other hand every ethics, save that of the egoistic type, concerns itself with the variously related members of the great community; and the moral man regards himself and every other self as a center of radiating relationship.

The third contrast to be named sharply differentiates not the æsthetic from the moral object but the æsthetic from the moral experience. The characteristic æsthetic attitude is obviously the passive, emotional attitude, whereas the moral consciousness, as has become so evident, is activity, loyalty—in the large sense, will. Both the æsthetic and the moral object are, it has been noted, "valued" or desired, but æsthetic valuing is happy absorption whereas moral valuing is dominating or sacrificing will. One is engulfed, immersed, in the æsthetic delight, one works and battles for one's moral purpose. The lover of beauty opens his eyes to see and spreads wide his arms to receive, the lover of goodness bares his arm to toil or to strike and strains his muscles to press forward.

The best evidence of the truth of these distinctions is the contrast, in any concrete case, between the æsthetic and the moral point of view. Let us, for instance, imagine an artist and a moralist in contemplation of lower

* "Die Philosophie der Werte," VIII., pp. 254-257.

New York from a North River ferry boat. The artist, or indeed the æsthetically tuned observer, is absorbed in the picture—the great masses of cliff-like buildings cut by the cañon-like streets, some of them dark in the shadow, some glowing with the sunlight, the wreaths of feathery smoke against a deep sky, the foreground of swirling water and the swooping gulls. Utterly different from this artist's attitude to the great city is the yearning of heart, the vigor of will, the passion of devotion of the morally conscious self to whom these same great buildings are not primarily architectural masses but work-rooms and homes of toiling, suffering human beings, fellow-members with him of the Great Society. "The æsthetic and the ethical" are, indeed, in the phrase of Tolstoi, "two arms of one lever. To the extent," he adds, "that you lengthen and lighten one side to that extent you shorten and make heavier the other." It goes without saying that this contrast holds between the æsthetic and the moral experience and not between an æsthetic and a moral self. For though one may not be at one and the same moment, and toward one and the same object, both æsthetic and moral, one may none the less be both a lover of beauty and a lover of the good. The great figure of Tolstoi, consummate artist and intrepid moralist, clearly attests this truth.

II. *The Lover of the Good and the Lover of God*

In his illuminating book on the "Religions of India," Professor James Bissell Pratt quotes from a young Hindu, these words: "I believe to find out what is good and do that thing. I don't know about the rest. . . . That is

my religion." But though many thoughtful people hold that to know and do what is good is indeed religion, to the writer of this book it seems very clear that the Hindu youth is here confusing the moral with the religious experience. It is the purpose of these concluding pages to suggest how the good man is related to the religious man. It is easy to understand how the two experiences have come to be confused. Religious rites and moral customs have grown up together in the social life of tribes and of peoples. By way of tribal rites or ceremonies, through totemic practices, in the vigils attending a youth's initiation a content is given both to the moral and to the religious consciousness. Often, also, the moral consciousness of obligation is centred on a religious object. One man may have, for example, the sense of violated duty if he has touched such and such tabooed objects; and another may feel that he ought to sacrifice to the gods and to respect their sanctuaries. It is, therefore, always difficult to discover from a study of customs, rites, taboos, or penalties whether they are expressions of a moral experience, of a religious experience, of an experience both moral and religious, or finally, of experience which is strictly speaking neither moral nor religious but in a wider sense merely social.

Religion and morality have moreover two great points of similarity. In the first place, the good man like the lover of God and unlike the lover of the beautiful, is conscious of a personal object. And, in the second place, the moral like the religious consciousness is a 'private' experience, a man's realization of his own unique, individual relation to this personal object. Both these

assertions of similarity are made in the face of opposition and must therefore be further discussed.

(1) No one of course denies that the primary object of a man's moral willing is personal; but it is often held that certain forms of religious consciousness have impersonal objects. Adequately to discuss this question would lead too far afield but it may confidently be re-asserted that the conception of religion as directed toward a personal object is likely to win acceptance when rightly understood.² For even when, or if, the object of the religious consciousness—fetish, or heavenly body, or *mana*—is *conceived* as impersonal it is *treated* as if personal; it is felt as personal by the worshipper in his sacrifice or prayer or festival rite.

(2) The description of the moral and the religious consciousness as 'private' experiences is likely to be challenged both by sociologists, who hold that religion as well as morality is social in origin, and by psychologists who teach that both are social in nature. But the social origin and the social element of morality and religion are facts entirely compatible with the privacy of both experiences.³ For, to take up first the matter of origin, a consciousness of oneself as uniquely related to social group or to God may perfectly well emerge with the heightened consciousness of self which arises during group-activities, such as war or the chase, or during social ceremonial—totemic festival, for example, or sacrifice. And, to consider next the alleged social nature both of morality and of religion, it is certain that each may be at one and the same time social, in the sense of being shared, and may be also a private experience. In other

words, it is certain that the warm sense of companionship, the sense of working or worshipping in a great fellowship, may supplement both the intimate, individual communion of a man with God and the awareness of his own unique, responsible attitude toward his fellow-men. In truth, the testimony of religious and moral men of all ages confirms the belief that a man is religious only when (to paraphrase Fichte) "in his own person and not in that of another, with his own spiritual eye and not through that of another he immediately beholds, has, and possesses God;" and that he is moral only when in his own person and not in that of another, through his own will and not through that of another, he devotes himself to the pursuit of the abounding life of the whole world of selves.

The moral and the religious experience, it must next be pointed out, though they have grown up together, though they resemble each other both in object and in attitude, and though they are often in actual life inextricably combined, may none the less be clearly differentiated, the one from the other. The most important contrast is that of object. For though each has, as we have seen, a personal object yet the moral self is loyal to himself, or to a fellow-being, or to a community which includes himself and men "of like passions" with his; whereas the object of the religious man's experience is a self, or selves, greater than himself or than any other human self.⁴ This statement may be made with great confidence. Students vary widely in the definition of religion but are agreed as touching the greatness, the power for help or harm, the mysteriousness, of the object

of religious experience. Whether this be described as ancestral spirit, sun or wind, tribal deity, or the One God—always his essential superiority to the worshiper is acknowledged. Fundamentally, thus, the moral self differs from the religious in that he must relate himself to human selves and does not of necessity concern himself for any being who is to be treated as greater than human.

A second contrast to be drawn between the seeker after God and the pursuer of the good, is the contrast of the religious with the moral attitude. The moral consciousness is, or must include, the active attitude of will or loyalty. The religious consciousness also, at its highest and completest is an experience of loyalty and devotion. But just as toward our human fellows we may be variously related—either actively or passively, emotionally or volitionally—so our religious attitude is not of necessity of the stuff of which morality is made. A man may fear the gods, or love them, or even hate them; he may wheedle or curse them—and no one of these is a willing, moral consciousness. Religion in truth may be positively immoral: it may consist in a cringing, truckling attitude toward a God who is invoked to protect a man from the consequences of his ill-doing. The often-quoted prayer of an Oceanian to the god of thieving is an illustration of this sort of religious experience. "Here," he cries, "is a bit of the pig; take it, good Hiero, and say nothing of it." And Louis XI, as portrayed by Walter Scott, "having kissed devoutly . . . a fragment of the true cross . . . in a golden reliquary . . . suspended from his neck" orders the secret execution of a

faithful agent who has become dangerous to him. It is hardly needful to add that religion of this type is a socially lower experience than the lofty morality, untinged by religion, of such men as John Stuart Mill and John Morley.

It has just appeared that a man may be moral and yet not religious and conversely that he may be religious and yet not moral. But it must now be pointed out that this relation is not completely reciprocal. The man who does not believe in God at all may be consistently moral, completely loyal to the universe of selves as he knows it, whereas the immoral man who is none the less religious deliberately and inconsistently refuses to regard God in his relation to other human selves; he highhandedly annexes God as a private little deity of his own, somewhat as devout sinners of an earlier day used to carry about in their hat-bands small images of saints and Virgin to whom to have recourse in case of emergency. It is obvious that such religion is both irrational and inadequate. A man can not consistently conceive God as a person of superior wisdom and power without regarding him as the center of social and moral relationships. This relation of God to the universe of selves may be conceived in many ways. God may be viewed as the ruler of human beings, as their friend, or (in the absolutistic fashion) as the Greater Self who includes yet transcends them, but in one form or in another He must belong to the world of selves which is the realm of morality.

The most intimate of the fusions of morality with religion is that made by Jesus and the later Hebrew prophets in their teaching that God is father of men.

According to this view it is simply impossible to serve the Father with utter devotion unless one also serves the great family of God's children. And conversely one can not be completely loyal to the children of God unless one is loyal also to the Father of all. When a man becomes in this sense religiously moral his moral loyalty will burn with the passion of his love for God. The universal community of selves will become for him the family, the kingdom of God. "The faith that has come into his life will form . . . a conception of this world changed in the direction of God's purposes. . . . Self-transformation into a citizen of God's kingdom and a new realization of all earthly politics as no more than the struggle to define and achieve the kingdom of God on the earth, follow on from the moment when God and the believer meet and clasp one another."⁵

NOTES

The pages which follow supply bibliographical material and more or less technical discussion of moot questions. The notes of each section are numbered to correspond with the numerical indices of the corresponding chapter of the book. The notes are designed for the use of the student and for the satisfaction of the hungry reader whose appetite the foregoing chapters may have whetted. It should be added that discussions and bibliographies alike are neither exhaustive nor systematic.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I.

1. *Intuitionism.* (Note to page 4.)

The term intuitionism is ordinarily applied to a theory "according to which" (in the words of Henry Sidgwick*) "conduct is held to be right when conformed to certain precepts or principles of Duty, intuitively known to be binding." Well-known intuitionists are Henry More (*Encheiridion Ethicum*, 1667); Samuel Clarke "Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion," 1706; and Joseph Butler. (Cf. especially his "Dissertation on Virtue," at the end of his "The Analogy of Religion," 1736.)

The points at which the intuitionists (in the narrower sense of the term) are to be distinguished from others who agree with them concerning the indefinableness of the feeling of obligation, include the following: (1) The intuitionist regards the specific virtues, as well as the feeling of duty, as unique and indefinable. In other words he argues or assumes that certain kinds of conduct—truth-telling and courage, for example—are intuitively known to be right. (2) The intuitionist (as has been already stated, p. 5) claims for his consciousness of obligation validity and authoritativeness. He argues for courage, justice, and for other virtues on the ground of his intuition of them; often, for example, comparing the intuitive intellectual certainty that $2 \times 2 = 4$ with his moral certainty that he ought to act in a certain way. (Cf. H. Rashdall: "Is conscience an emotion?" I., pp. 3 ff.)

In opposition to this view, this book argues that the con-

* "The Methods of Ethics," Book I., Chap. I., § 2.

sciousness of obligation, despite its distinctiveness, does not by its mere occurrence justify its objects, and that only by taking thought can one decide what are the virtues and what sort of conduct is morally justified. For a brief and illuminating comment on intuitionism, cf. Durant Drake, "Problems of Conduct," Chap. VI (with bibliography).

2. *The element-theory of the obligation-consciousness.* (Note to page 5.)

In applying the term "element-theory" to the conception of the obligation-consciousness as distinctive experience, it is not intended to use the word element in the precise sense of the structural psychologist. By "element" is meant merely an unanalyzed factor of an experience. The "feeling of duty" according to such a theory might be a "personal attitude," rather than a "structural element," but would in either case be elemental, that is, regarded as further unanalyzable and thus indescribable. (For discussion of these terms, cf. the writer's "A First Book in Psychology," 1914, pp. 328 ff., 333 f.)

3. *Conceptions of the feeling of obligation held by those who do not regard it as a distinctive experience.* (Note to page 7.)

The text of Chapter I. has formulated the criticisms on the conception of the feeling of obligation as elemental and further indefinable. But moralists who deny altogether the distinctiveness of the consciousness of obligation must, none the less, give some meaning to the terms "ought," "duty," and the like. And as a matter of fact they define obligation, or duty, or right, in whatever fashion they define "the good." To will the good means to them the same as to will the right, that is, duty. Bentham, for example, who is a hedonist identifying the good with pleasure, holds that "an action

ought to be done" when it is "conformable to the principle of utility . . . which approves of every action . . . according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment . . . happiness." ("Principles of Morals and Legislation," Chap. I., paragraphs X. and II.) Similarly, to John Stuart Mill, another hedonist, "actions are right [and also good] as they tend to promote happiness . . . wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." ("Utilitarianism," Chap. II., paragraph 2.) To take another example: Westermarck, who is not a hedonist and who defines the good as that which is approved, says: "That is right which tends to rouse moral approval." And Taylor, who conceives the good in similar fashion, describes "the sense of obligation or duty" as a "sense of what is expected of us by our fellow-tribesmen or fellow-citizens." ("The Problem of Conduct," p. 140,² cf. p. 355.¹)

4. *On the evolution of the moral consciousness.* (Note to page 8.)

Consult C. Darwin, "The Descent of Man," especially Chaps. III.-V.; T. Huxley, "Evolution and Ethics and other Essays;" E. Westermarck, "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas;" W. H. Rivers, "History of Melanesian Society, 1915;" L. T. Hobhouse, "Morals in Evolution;" Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics;" W. McDougall, "Social Psychology."

5. *The consciousness of obligation as a fusion.* (Note to page 10.)

The consciousness of obligation is by no means the only instance of a fusion so close that the complex appears elemental. The feeling of familiarity is another example. A person untrained in introspection, challenged to analyze his consciousness of the familiarity of a scene, may utterly fail to enumerate the attitudes and elements of consciousness—

pleasantness, sense of relaxed muscles, consciousness of oneself as identical with one's past self, and the like—which he will later acknowledge as constituents of the experience. And, to take a simpler instance, few of us realize that the consciousness of wetness, though seldom analyzed in every day observation, so far from being elemental is a fusion of pressure sensations with the sensation of warmth or of cold.

6. *The Moral Law* (p. 11).

The fact that the feeling of compulsion is so important a factor of the consciousness of obligation in part explains the tendency to identify duty, or obligation, with the "moral law." This doctrine has been needlessly confused on account of the two widely different meanings of the word "law." This term is used, first, to designate scientific law, the observed and inferred uniformity in the succession of events; and second, to designate civil law, in the sense of "command" or "imperative" imposed by a person or a group on another person or group. Cf. Karl Pearson, "The Grammar of Science," Chap. III., "The Scientific Law." The moral compulsion exerted by myself on myself is evidently "law" in this latter sense; and the consciousness of obligation is the acknowledgment of this moral law. (Cf. W. G. Everett "Moral Values," Chap. XI., p. 316.)

7. *The consciousness of obligation conceived as realized compulsion of myself by myself.* (Note to page 13.)

Implicitly if not explicitly this view seems to be held by many moralists. Thus Kant, though he treats the obligation-consciousness as indefinable, none the less describes it as the authoritativeness of the "noumenal," rational self over the "phenomenal," pleasure-seeking self. The following quotations embody this view: "The ought of reason confronts" the volition due to "sensuous impulses." ("Kritik of Pure

Reason," A, p. 548; B, p. 576.) "Reason issues its commands inflexibly refusing to promise anything to the natural desires." ("Metaphysik of Morality," Hartenstein ed., p. 253.)

More recent writers formulate this conception very clearly. The following are representative passages from ethical writers who differ very widely on other points:—

From Thomas Hill Green: "It is the very essence of moral duty to be imposed by a man on himself." ("Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. IV., Chap. II., Section 324.)

From Georg Simmel: "As the social group demands from the individual member of it conduct which is definitely related to the group, so the single conscious experience is subject to an obligation which prescribes to it a definite relation to the whole of the personality." ("Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft," I., p. 178. Cf. p. 166 *et al.*)

From G. von Gizycki: "The distinctive mark of the moral law is precisely the circumstance that the agent imposes it on himself." (Moralphilosophie, 4^{ter} Abschnitt, p. 153.)

From Sidney Mezes: "The 'I must' is imposed by me on myself and the act is freely performed." ("Ethics," Chap. V., p. 77.)

From J. S. Mackenzie: "The 'ought' is . . . the law imposed by our ideal self upon our actual self." ("Manual of Ethics," Chap. X., p. 173.)

This law-giving self is very often conceived as a social self conscious of its interrelation with the community. Thus, Mackenzie supplements the statement just quoted by the words: "The ideal self . . . is not realized in isolation but in a society of human beings." And Leonard Hobhouse holds that "man is bound by spiritual ties to a community with a life and purpose of its own" and that "the conception of obligation [rests] on the position of each man as a member of the great whole. It is that in him which answers to this

position, which realizes however dimly the nature of the whole to which he belongs, which drives him on and impels him even through . . . the ruin of his personal desires to play his part." ("Morals in Evolution," Chap. VII., 4.) To the same purport, Green says, "No individual can make a conscience for himself. . . . He always needs a society to make it for him." ("Prolegomena to Ethics," Section 321.) Simmel also has this conception of the realized relation of individual to community as involved in the "ought." Even Herbert Spencer recognizes in the moral consciousness, in addition to the feeling of coerciveness, what he calls the "idea of authoritativeness." ("Data of Ethics," § 46.) And W. K. Clifford, when he has distinguished "in the mind of each . . . man" something that he calls "the tribal self" from "the individual self," adds: "When the tribal self wakes up the man says 'In the name of the tribe I do not like this thing that I as an individual have done.' This self-judgment, in the name of the tribe," Clifford concludes, "is called conscience." ("On the Scientific Basis of Morals," Lectures and Essays, II., p. 114.)

James Martineau has a two-self theory of the obligation-consciousness differing from any of these. He believes that the authoritative law-giving self is, and is known to be, none other than God. "If the sense of authority means anything," he says, "it means the discernment of something *higher than we*. . . . If I rightly interpret this sentiment I cannot stop within my own limits but am irresistibly carried on to the recognition of . . . the Father, of spirits." ("Types of Ethical Theory," Part II., Bk. I., Chap. IV., p. 104²). But this conviction, though it may be capable of philosophical proof, certainly cannot be grounded, as Martineau seeks to ground it, on "the depositions of consciousness." For it is inadmissible to carry over the immediate certainty of one's consciousness of self to one's belief that there exists an

authoritative Person external to oneself. Martineau makes the assumption only because he believes that only so can the consciousness of obligation be accounted for. He argues that the conception of the ought-consciousness as recognition of an authoritative self requires the acknowledgment of God since, he says, "no authority of higher over lower . . . could . . . really exist . . . within the enclosure" of a "detached personality." On the contrary, as has been shown in the text of this book, there are many recorded instances of the "divided self" in which a man is conscious of a law-giving coercing self as opposing a coerced self. Such a law-giving self may, in truth, be conceived as fundamentally identical with the infinite spirit but may also be regarded as part of the genuinely human self.

8. *The self as free to choose.* (Note to page 15.)

The psychological conclusion that a moral self has a consciousness of freedom leaves wholly open the metaphysical question whether he actually is free. For the moral self might well be mistaken in its sense of freedom. To adopt a classic illustration: an arrow coming to consciousness in mid-air might suppose itself free to pierce the target or to miss the mark, yet would inevitably reach the spot at which it had been aimed. The metaphysical problem basal to the psychology of obligation is thus the question whether freedom is illusory or valid, whether, in a word, the good man has real freedom of choice.

Preliminary to any discussion of this problem is the careful distinction of freedom in this sense from two other most important senses in which the term is used in ethics. (1) In the first place, freedom is often contrasted with mechanism or determination from without. Freedom, in this sense, characterizes the self—in particular, the active willing self—as opposed to the mere nature phenomenon. This is the sense

in which Kant very often, and Hegel almost always, uses the term. So, Hegel says, "Freedom is a basal condition of the will as weight is a basal condition of bodies. . . . The free is the will." ("Philosophie des Rechts," § 4, Note. Cf. § 27.) And similarly Kant writes: "We must necessarily attribute to every rational being that has a will the idea of freedom." ("Metaphysik of Morality," Hartenstein ed., p. 296.) Thus conceived, every self is in truth a free self simply in so far as it is a willing self. Freedom in this sense is admitted not only by every ethical system but by every personalistic philosophy. But this is not the kind of freedom whose reality is under discussion. (2) A second kind of freedom (very like that of the "authoritative self" of Chap. I.) holds an important part in many systems of ethics. It is well defined in the words of Kant: "A free will is the same thing as a will that conforms to moral laws." ("Metaphysik of Morality," Hartenstein ed., p. 295.) This is the freedom of the man who comes off victor in the moral struggle. It is the freedom from lower impulse, from debasing desire, the freedom which, on its positive side, consists in conformity with law. In this sense, according to many ethical systems, the good but not the bad self—the positively but not the negatively, moral self—is free; and the service of God is "perfect freedom." (3) The freedom implied by the consciousness of obligation is freedom, in a third sense, freedom of choice, the genuine opportunity to will one *or* another object, the freedom, in Sidgwick's words, "to choose between right and wrong." (*Op. cit.*, Bk. I., Chap. V., § 1.) We can not often enough insist that without such freedom, real obligation, duty, would be impossible and the consciousness of obligation an illusion. Nor can it be denied that in acknowledging obligation I always recognize freedom. "Du kannst *wenn* du sollst" we may paraphrase Kant. And Emerson is right when he sings:

"So nigh is grandeur to our dust,
So near is God to man,
When Duty whispers low, *Thou must*,
The youth replies, *I can*."

It is this freedom of choice which deterministic philosophers deny and libertarians assert. In the opinion, already stated, of the writer of this book the moralist will most wisely hesitate to raise the metaphysical question at all. As a practical man he probably finds himself acting as if he were free; as a philosophical thinker he must fight out the battle between libertarian and deterministic philosophy; but as student of ethics he may take his stand on the fact of the consciousness of freedom, flatly refusing to tackle the philosophical problem.

9. *The object of the consciousness of obligation.* (Note to page 19.)

In one portion of his ethical teaching, Kant seems to formulate the view that there is no definable object of the consciousness of obligation. He reaches this conclusion as a result of the sharp contrast which he makes between desire and the consciousness of duty. "The simple principle of morality," he says, "consists in independence of all matter of the law—that is, of every object of desire and in the determination of the will by the mere universal form of law." ("Kritik of Practical Reason," Bk. I., Chap. I., Section 8, Hartenstein ed., p. 35.) But it is hard to believe that Kant ever meant to teach the doctrine, imputed to him by most of his critics from Jacobi down, that the moral experience consists merely in willing to do one's duty—without any further definition of what, concretely, one's duty is. For Kant has clearly outlined a social conception of duty; and has described the good man as one who treats humanity whether in his "own person or in that of another always as an end, never merely as a means." ("Metaphysik of Morality,"

Hartenstein ed., p. 277. For other notes dealing with Kant's ethics, cf. pp. 180 f., 184, 188, 191. For a brief sketch of Kant's ethics, cf. the author's "The Persistent Problems of Philosophy," Chap. VII., pp. 256-266.)

Simmel more unequivocally than Kant teaches that there is no general definition of the object of obligation which, on the contrary, varies endlessly so that the object of duty simply is to follow one's sense of duty. ("Moralwissenschaft," Bd. II., Kap. V., esp. pp. 2 ff.) The significant and useful part of this doctrine is the following: In crises of moral deliberation when a man faces courses of action in apparently hopeless opposition to each other and when he finds himself unable, by his best reasoning, to adjust their claims, then his only guide is the feeling of duty which he has no choice save blindly to follow. Simmel argues that such a blind reliance on "conscience" is, in any case, a safer guide than the hedonistic principle of choosing the greater pleasure.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II.

1. *The nature of the willing self.* (Note to page 21.)

Cf. M. W. Calkins, "A First Book in Psychology," Chap. XII. (and Appendix XII. with bibliographies); or "An Introduction to Psychology," Chap. XXI., II. Cf. also T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. II., Chap. II, Sections 143-147, 153. "In willing," Green says, a man "carries with him, so to speak, his whole self to the realisation of the given idea."

On emotion as distinguished from will, cf. M. W. Calkins, "A First Book in Psychology," Chap. XI.

2. *The conception of activity.* (Note to page 22.)

Professor Karl Pearson ("The Grammar of Science," Chap. IV, *On Cause and Effect*, Sections 2-7) explicitly argues that force and energy are meaningless terms in physical

science except as they stand for a certain mathematically stateable order of phenomena. The "superstition" of physical force or energy, in any other sense, he attributes to the "not unnatural" fact that human beings are "impressed at a very early stage with the real, or at any rate apparent, power which lies in their will of originating motion." But the impression of one's own power, apparent or real, is clearly an experience of self-activity. W. Ostwald ("Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie," pp. 153 ff.) says even more definitely: "To gain an idea of the content of the concept of energy, we will start from the fact that we are . . . able through our will to call forth occurrences in the external world."

3. *Will and bodily movement.* (Note to page 22.)

Cf. W. James, "Psychology, Briefer Course," Chap. XXVI, pp. 415-422, or "Psychology," Vol. II, Chap. XXVI., pp. 487 ff.; E. L. Thorndike, "Elements of Psychology," pp. 86 ff.; M. W. Calkins, "A First Book in Psychology," Appendix XII., § II., and Supplementary Bibliographies, p. 413.

4. *Customary as distinguished from moral conduct.* (Note to page 24.)

Cf. E. Westermarck, "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas," I., Chap. VII; Dewey and Tufts, "Ethics," Chaps. II., V., IX. Cf. also Chap. X., p. 153 of this book.

5. *Choice with and without effort.* (Note to page 26.)

Cf. James, "Psychology," II., Chap. XXVI, pp. 528-538, or "Psychology, Briefer Course," Chap. XXVI, pp. 428-442.

6. *Ethics as the study of the self who wills the good.* (Note to page 29.)

This theory of ethics is held by moralists of widely differing schools who diverge sharply in their views of the nature of

the good which is object of the moral self's will. The following quotations are illustrative:—

From Kant: "Nothing in the whole world, or even outside the world, can be regarded as good without limitations except a *good will*. . . . A man's will is good not because the consequences which flow from it are good but . . . because it wills the good." ("Metaphysik of Morality," I., Hartenstein ed., pp. 241-242.)

From Hegel: "The starting-point of the right is the will." ("The Philosophy of Right," § 4.)

From Wundt: "The norms of ethics . . . are directly applicable to the free voluntary acts of thinking subjects." ("Ethics," transl. by J. H. Gulliver, Vol. I., p. 8.)

From T. H. Green: "The distinction between the good and bad will . . . must lie at the basis of any system of Ethics." ("Prolegomena," § 154.)

From G. H. Palmer: "Ethics, the science of the will *par excellence*." ("The Field of Ethics," p. 32².)

From L. T. Hobhouse: "The conception of the Good is the central point of Ethics." ("Morals in Evolution," Chap. I., 9.) It should be noted that contemporary descriptions of ethics as a science of values merely substitute the term "value" for the older word "good." Cf. W. G. Everett, "Moral Values," Chap. II., p. 36: "Ethics . . . is a science of values. But value is a word of wide and varied meaning. It may be used both in a positive and a negative sense; positive value will then be the good; negative value the evil."

7. *The conception of the moral consciousness as sympathy.* (Note to page 29.)

Schopenhauer's description of the good man as one to whom "no sorrow is strange" ("The World as Will and Idea," Bk. IV., § 68) is a direct outcome of his conception of life as will, and of will as yearning for the unattained

and discontent with the actual. For, thus conceived, life essentially is misery, and pity is the only rational attitude toward any living being. Cf. A. Sutherland, "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct," 1898, especially Chap. XIV. "Moral conduct," Sutherland says, "is that which is actuated by a wise sympathy."

In the eclectic ethical systems of eighteenth century English thought, sympathy is one factor only of the moral experience. (Cf. the following note).

8. *Eighteenth Century English moralists.* (Note to page 30.)

Prominent among those who emphasize approval and disapproval (among other factors of the moral experience) are the following:

Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747).

His "Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil" begins as follows:—"The Word Moral Goodness in this Treatise denotes our Idea of some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, attended with Desire of the Agent's Happiness. . . . Approbation and Condemnation are probably simple Ideas which cannot be farther explained."

Adam Smith (1723-1790). "Theory of Moral Sentiments."

Adam Smith identifies approval with sympathy (*op. cit.*, Pt. I., Section I., Chap. III.) and introduces the conception of the "impartial spectator."

David Hume (1711-1775).

To Hume the good is that which is useful (that is, agreeable) to a person approved by the morally appraising spectator. (Cf. his "Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals," Sections I., V., VIII., IX).

9. *Westermarck's and Taylor's conception of the moral experience as constituted by approval and disapproval.* (Note to page 30.)

Both Westermarck, in the first six chapters of "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas," and A. E. Taylor, in "The Problem of Conduct" (pp. 103 ff.) teach that approval-disapproval constitute the moral consciousness. They differ in that Westermarck sharply distinguishes moral from non-moral approval and disapproval whereas Taylor virtually identifies the two. For Taylor, all personal appraisal is a moral experience. Westermarck, on the other hand, carefully distinguishes moral from non-moral judgment as disinterested, impartial, and possessed of "a flavor of generality." The two first of these terms he expounds in the following way: "When pronouncing an act to be good or bad," he says, "I mean that it is so independently of any reference to my own interests . . . [and] of the fact that the person to whom the act is done is my friend or my enemy" (pp. 101², 103³). The "generality" of the experiences he thus describes: "He who pronounces an act to be good or bad feels that [his judgment] would be shared if other people knew the act and all its attendant circumstances" (p. 105¹.) By these statements he certainly distinguishes admirably the universality of a moral estimate from the individuality of an egoistic or altruistic appraisal. But he fails altogether to differentiate the moral from the intellectual valuation. An estimate of the nebular hypothesis or of the De Vries theory of mutations is disinterested, impartial, and truly "flavored with generality," yet it is not an expression of moral approval or disapproval. Thus Westermarck, though he advances on Taylor by admitting a difference between moral and non-moral estimates, yet fails adequately to state the distinction. In truth, Westermarck's adoption of the theory that the moral consciousness consists essentially in approval and disapproval seems to be due solely to his mistaken belief that such a doctrine is the only escape from utilitarianism on the one hand and from intuitionism on the other. He himself

admits that "the only proper object of moral praise and blame is the will;" and this statement indicates the possibility of affiliating his doctrine closely with that upheld in this book.

For further criticism of the conception of the moral consciousness as approval and disapproval cf. H. Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics," Bk. I., Chap. III., § 1, end. For an eloquent statement of the truth that moral approval-disapproval have a personal object, cf. J. Martineau, "Types of Ethical Theory," Part II., Bk. I., Chap. I., Section 1.

10. "Good" as "valued," *i. e.* as *willed or wished*. (Note to page 32.)

Two contemporary neo-realists, G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, oppose this conception, teaching that "goodness is an indefinable quality which attaches to things independently of consciousness." (See especially, G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 137.) This doctrine is not, however, as yet a foundation stone of neo-realism. R. B. Perry, an ardent neo-realist, unequivocally holds that though "the being or nature of things is independent of their possessing value" yet "it is the primary relation of desire that endows a thing with value." (Cf. "Present Philosophical Tendencies," p. 332 and "The New Realism," p. 141.)

11. *The good as personal object which is (and ought to be) willed for its own sake*: (Note to pages 33 and 34).

In this conception of the good, most moralists are also agreed. Even Kant, who is commonly supposed to define the moral consciousness as acknowledgment of objectless obligation, says: "Suppose . . . that there is something the existence of which has in itself absolute value, something which, *as an end in itself*, can be a ground of definite laws; then there would lie in that, and only in that, the ground of a possible categorical imperative or practical law." ("Meta-

physik of Morality," Hartenstein ed., p. 276.) In truth the admittedly great divergences among moralists are with reference to the precise nature of this ultimate end—not as regards the ultimateness of it. In the words of J. S. MacKenzie: "Ethics . . . sets itself to consider . . . the supreme or ultimate end to which our whole lives are directed. . . . If ethics is to be a strictly exact science we must presuppose that there is such a supreme end." ("A Manual of Ethics," Chap. I., Section 1.)

The description of the end-in-itself as personal is made on the basis of psychological observation not as the outcome of an idealistic philosophy. As a matter of fact, men do define the objects of their ultimate loyalty in terms of personal experience, their own or other people's—in terms of enjoyment, of knowledge, of benevolence, and the like.

12. *The good and the good man.* (Note to page 36.)

It will be observed that in this book "good" is used both as a noun to designate an object of will and as an adjective to describe the man who wills "the good."

13. *Ethics, psychology and metaphysics.* (Note to page 39.)

Ethics is related to the psychology of the willing self much as logic is related to the psychology of the thinking self. Ethics like logic includes its own special part of psychology and is, in so far, a descriptive science. But ethics narrows the psychology of the willing self by studying only the will as directed toward the good and the right; just as logic studies thought primarily as true or false. Some writers, of whom A. E. Taylor is a prominent example, conceive ethics as merely a brand of psychology. It is difficult to maintain such a view in face of the fact that actual systems of ethics have always included more than a psychological treatment of conduct. Taylor's position is, in all probability, the result

of an exaggerated reaction against T. H. Green's equally unjustified conception of ethics as a branch of neo-Hegelian philosophy. The truth is that ethics is neither mere psychology nor metaphysics. It is a science in that it deals with a well-marked group of phenomena without attempting, after the fashion of metaphysics, to discover by reasoning the ultimate nature of its facts and their ultimate relation to the universe. But ethics, unlike psychology proper and unlike the physical sciences, is a normative science and, as such, supplements its psychological study, of the self who wills what he regards as the good, by comparing and estimating the different conceptions of the good, just as logic estimates and criticises judgments in regard to their truth. (It is important to bear in mind that ethics is thus both a descriptive and a normative science. There are, in truth, no purely normative sciences). Cf. Simmel, *op. cit.*, and G. H. Palmer, "The Field of Ethics," I.

It is important, however, to note in conclusion that a complete metaphysics always must concern itself profoundly with the facts of ethics. In other words, the philosopher must rightly know the moral self and his object, the good, in their relation to the rest of the universe. There is thus a philosophy of ethics, though ethics is science not philosophy.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III.

1. *Egoism and Altruism.* (Note to page 40.)

Consult: H. Spencer, "The Data of Ethics," Chaps. XI.-XIV., especially Chap. XIII.; G. Simmel, *op. cit.*, Chap. II. In this important discussion Simmel argues (1) that the claims of egoism—its claim, for example, to be more primitive and more widespread than altruism—are grossly exaggerated; (2) that Darwinism and altruism are not incompatible; (3) that every self is both egoist and altruist;

finally (4) that neither egoism nor altruism is a foundation principle of ethics.

2. *The self as inherently a social self.* (Note to page 40.)

Consult: J. M. Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpretations," Chaps. I. and II.; C. H. Cooley, "Human Nature and the Social Order," especially Chaps. I., V.-VI.; M. W. Calkins, "An Introduction to Psychology," Chap. XXII.

3. *Loyalty.* (Note to page 42.)

Consult: J. Royce, "The Philosophy of Loyalty," especially Lectures I., III., VI.; M. W. Calkins, "A First Book in Psychology," Chap. XIII.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV.

1. *The individual and the social group.* (Note to page 52.)

Consult: J. M. Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpretations, 1897, Chap. XII.; W. Wundt, "Völkerpsychologie," Bd. I., Th. I., Einleitung, especially II.; C. A. Ellwood, "Sociology in its Psychological Aspects, 1912, Chap. XV.; J. Royce, "The Problem of Christianity," 1914, Vol. I., Lecture II., and Vol. II., Lecture IX.; R. M. McIver, "Community: A Sociological Study," 1917, Bk. I., Chaps. I., II.; Bk. II., Chaps. I., II.; Bk. III., Chap. V.; H. T. Laski, "Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty," 1917, Chap. I.

The writer of this book has been strongly influenced by Professor Royce's teaching but takes issue with his occasional statements that the community is or may be "in a perfectly literal sense a person" (Letter from Royce to the writer, *Philosophical Review*, 1916, p. 67.¹ Cf. "The Problem of Christianity, I., pp. 62, 67; II., p. 87). For this conclusion Royce argues simply from the fact that we treat a community

as if it were an individual—that is to say that we do, as a matter of fact, individualize it. But this is far from proving that a community literally is a person, in the sense in which the reader is a person; and many facts oppose such a view—notably the mechanical fashion in which communities increase and decrease. From the standpoint of a social ethics it is not, however, essential to decide this question. For, evidently, according to Royce himself, loyalty to a community is possible—whether or not the community is literally a self—whenever people are so vitally and closely bound together, by relations of mutual influence, that they treat their community and feel about it “as if it were” a person. But this notoriously is the attitude of individual self to community in every reflectively conscious society—wherever, in other words, every individual is aware of himself as closely and complexly related to the other persons of the group, as influenced by them and influencing them, as fellow, or subordinate, or leader, toward a common goal. One need not, in other words, conceive the community as literally a person in order to believe that it is treated as if personal. Thus, Wundt (to whom Royce refers for psychological confirmation of his theory), though he speaks of the *Gesammtwille*, is so far from conceiving the community as a person that he says explicitly (*op. cit.*, pp. 11-12) “The domain of the voluntary (*des willkürlichen*) lies outside the phenomena of social psychology (*Völkerpsychologie*).” And Harold Laski, though widely diverging from Royce in his “pragmatic and pluralistic” method, nevertheless says definitely: “When we take any group of people leading a common life, to whom some kindred purpose may be ascribed we seem to evolve from it a . . . personality, that is beyond the personality of its constituent parts. For us that personality is real.” In confirmation, Laski adds: “A man who looks at the battlefield of Europe will assuredly not deny that certain per-

sonalities, England, France, Germany, are real to the soldiers who die for them" (*op. cit.*, p. 4).

2. *Supernational loyalty.* (Note to page 56.)

Consult: H. N. Brailsford, "A League of Nations," 1917; J. A. Hobson, "Towards International Government," 1915; H. G. Wells, "What is Coming? A European Forecast," 1916; and the bibliography (compiled by P. K. Angell) in E. G. Balch's "Approaches to the Great Settlement," pp. 346-351.

3. *Universal community and world-state.* (Note to page 59.)

For recent emphasis on the distinction between community and state, cf. McIver, *op. cit.*, pp. 28 ff.

For criticism of the "mystic monism" which represents "a state as a vast series of concentric circles each one enveloping the other, as we move from individual to family, to village, . . . to city, to county, thence to the all-embracing state," for protest against the dogma of the sovereignty of the state so conceived, and for emphasis upon the significance of non-political communities, churches, corporations, guilds, trade-unions, cf. H. J. Laski, *op. cit.*, especially Chap. I. It is a matter of regret that Laski should inaccurately and irrelevantly identify the doctrine of state sovereignty with metaphysical absolutism and the disavowal of this belief with metaphysical pluralism. One may be both a metaphysical and (as Chap. IV has shown) an ethical monist and yet one may refuse to identify universal community with political state and may lay stress on the individuality of the "constituent" persons.

4. *Utilitarianism.* (Note to page 61.)

Cf. E. Albee, "History of English Utilitarianism," for an account of the utilitarians and their systems which goes back

to Cumberland and his "De Legibus Naturae" (1672). Cf. also Note 1 to Chap. V., below.

5. *The individual and the state.* (Note to page 62.)

Mill's view and Bentham's of the relation of individual to state really is a perpetuation of Locke's doctrine; and Locke's conception is doubly related on the one hand to that of Hobbes, on the other hand to that of Rousseau. Hobbes believes that men to save themselves from the "poor, nasty, brutish, and short life consequent to a time . . . when every man is enemy to every man" have yielded themselves absolutely to ruler or to state, whereas Locke does not regard men as purely selfish, warmly maintains the liberty of the individual, and conceives the relation of subject to sovereign as that of a contract which is terminated when it is broken by either party to it. Yet Locke, like Hobbes, views the individual self as an isolated, independent being who takes on and lays off at will his social and civic relations. Rousseau, on the other hand, with all his emphasis on individual liberty and his conventional adherence to Locke's fiction of a "social contract," none the less reaches the conception—whatever the fluctuations with which he holds it—of each individual self as a vitally related member of society. "Each man," Rousseau teaches, may so subordinate himself "to all" as to "obey only himself and remain as free as before." The individual will of each man thus becomes a vital factor of "the general will." On all this, see: Hobbes, "Leviathan," Chaps. XIII.–XVIII.; Locke, "Of Civil Government," especially Chap. VIII; Rousseau, "The Social Contract," especially Bk. I., Chaps. VI–VIII; and B. Bosanquet, "The Philosophical Theory of the State," Chaps. IV.–VI.

On the relation of individual to state, see also: T. H. Green, "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation," *Works*, Vol. II., pp. 335ff.

On the history of the development of the conception of the state, cf. W. A. Dunning, "A History of Political Theories Ancient and Mediaeval," 1902, and "A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu," 1905.

6. *The nature of individuality.* (Note to page 64.)

Consult: J. Royce, "The Conception of God," second edition, 1897, Supplementary Essay, Part III.; C. Sigwart, "Logic," Part III., Chap. II., Section 78; R. Eisler, "Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe," articles on Individuation, Individuism.

7. *Opposition within the community.* (Note to page 66.)

On relations of opposition existing among the members of a community, cf. J. S. Mill, "On Liberty," Chap. III.; J. Royce, "The Psychology of Invention," *Psychological Review*, 1898, pp. 113 ff.; E. A. Ross, "Social Psychology," Chap. XXIII.; W. Fite, "Individualism," Lectures II and IV.; and H. J. Laski, *op. cit.*, especially Chap. I and p. 25: "We shall make the basis of our state consent to disagreement. Therein shall we ensure its deepest harmony."

NOTES TO CHAPTER V.

1. *Psychological hedonism.* (Note to page 68.)

For statement, consult:—J. Bentham, "Constitutional Code," Introduction, Section 2; J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism," Chap. IV., paragraphs 8 ff.; Leslie Stephen, "Science of Ethics," 1882, Chap. II., pp. 42 ff.

For criticism, consult: H. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, Bk. I., Chap. IV; T. H. Green, *op. cit.*, Sections 158 ff. Graham Wallas, "The Great Society," Chaps. VII. and XIII.

The writer of this book has greatly profited by Professor Mary S. Case's class-outlines on this topic.

2. *Non-moral volitions not directed toward pleasure.* (Note to page 70.)

Consult the critics of psychological hedonism cited above, and the following:—W. James, "Principles of Psychology," II., Chap. XXVI., pp. 549 ff., or "Psychology," Chap. XXVI., pp. 444 ff.; N. Ach, "Über den Willensakt und das Temperament," (Leipzig, 1910). Dr. Ach conducted an extended series of experiments on the comparative strength of volitions and memory-habits, studying with especial care the reported introspections of his subjects. While many of these observers recorded pleasure in willing not one reported the experience of willing pleasure.

3. *Ethical hedonism.* (Note to page 73.)

For statements of the hedonistic argument, consult:—J. Bentham, "Principles of Morals and Legislation," especially Chap. II.; H. Spencer, "Data of Ethics," especially Chap. III.; H. Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics," Bk. II. on egoistic hedonism; and Bk. IV., an admirable statement of the argument for universal hedonism.

Many arguments for hedonism suffer from the assumption that hedonism is proved when a certain number of other theories are disproved, whereas the enumeration of these discarded theories is never shown to be complete. Even Sidgwick's argument for universal hedonism virtually assumes that the disproof of intuitionism, in its extreme form, constitutes a proof of hedonism.

4. *Epicurus.* (Note to page 74.)

Cf. the histories of philosophy, and J. Watson, "Hedonistic Theories," Chaps. II. and III.; Wallace, "Epicureanism."

5. *Mill's doctrine that pleasures differ, qualitatively, from each other.* (Note to page 75.)

For statement, consult: Mill, "Utilitarianism," Chap. II., paragraphs 6 ff.

For criticism, consult: H. Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics," Bk. I., Chap. VII., § 2. (Sixth edition, pp. 94-95.)

6. *The good, qualitatively regarded as full and complete desired experience.* (Note to page 78.)

Note that the qualifying word "desired" means "wished or willed." It is a synonym, therefore, of "valued"—a term to conjure with in contemporary books on ethics and philosophy. Cf. Chap. II., p. 32 of this book.

Consult T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," §§ 286, 375; F. Paulsen, tr. by F. Thilly, "A System of Ethics," Bk. II., Chap. II., pp. 270-282; J. S. MacKenzie, "A Manual of Ethics," Chap. XV.; G. H. Palmer, "The Nature of Goodness," II.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI.

1. *The utility of the study of ethics.* (Note to page 80.)

Consult T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. IV, Chaps. I., II., especially Sections 307, 315.

2. *The conception of virtue.* (Note to page 82.)

The theory of virtue which this book upholds is, essentially, that of Aristotle as set forth in the "Nicomachean Ethics," Bks. II., IV.-VII. "Virtue," Aristotle says, is "habit involving purpose, in the mean relation to us and determined by reason. (*Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὀρισμένη λόγῳ*, Bk. II., VI., 1106b). The definition expressly recognizes virtue as a habit of will involving thought; and its rather cryptic description of virtue as "in the mean position" is illuminated by the discussion, in the succeeding chapters, of particular virtues. These

chapters suggest if they do not prove that, to Aristotle, virtue is "in a mean" in the sense of moderating and harmonizing opposite tendencies of instinctive behavior.

3. *Instinct and instinctive tendency.* (Note to page 84.)

The term "instinct" is used with great variety of meanings: "it stands next only to feeling," Titchener says, "in looseness of usage and multiplicity of application" (*op. cit., infra*, p. 462³). One point of disagreement concerns the relation of reflex to instinct. Most biologists distinguish the instincts from the mere reflexes—such, for example, as sneezing and swallowing—on the ground that the instincts are more complex and specialized reactions, "definite responses to particular stimuli." The second dispute concerns the consciousness of instinctive actions and the existence of instinctive consciousness. On the one hand "the idea of consciousness" is "rigidly excluded" from the conception of instinct; at the other extreme, McDougall insists that every instinct "determines its possessor to perceive . . . to experience an emotional excitement . . . and to act in a particular manner" (*op. cit. infra*, p. 29²).

The moralist need not take sides in either controversy. He may well abandon the term "instinct" to the biologist, adopting in its stead the vague expression "instinctive tendency" which he will use to cover reflexes, instincts in the narrower sense, impulses, and feelings—whatever is natural and untaught in human behavior and experience. This is, roughly speaking, the position of C. A. Ellwood ("Sociology in its Psychological Aspects," Chap. IX). Consult: W. McDougall, "An Introduction to Social Psychology," Chap. III.; E. B. Titchener, "A Textbook of Psychology," § 126, pp. 462 ff.; Graham Wallas, "The Great Society," Chap. III.; W. James, "The Principles of Psychology," Vol. II., Chap. XXIV., or "Psychology, Briefer Course," Chap.

XXV.; W. E. Hocking, "Human Nature and Its Remaking;" J. R. Angell, "Psychology," Chaps. XV.-XVI.; T. Veblen, "The Instinct of Workmanship," Chap. I.; *British Journal of Psychology*, 1910: A "Symposium;" C. H. Parker, "Motives in Economic Life," *American Economic Review*, 1918, Vol. 8, 1, Suppl. pp. 212-231.

4. *Virtue as a modification of instinctive tendencies.* (Note to page 86.)

Most moralists, explicitly or implicitly, conceive virtue as modification of instincts. But the earliest suggestion known to the writer of the fruitful possibility of classifying the virtues by following the clue of the instincts is found in a paper by Professor W. K. Wright, "The Evolution of Values from Instincts," *Philosophical Review*, 1915, pp. 165-183.

5. *The inadequacy of the ascetic ideals.* (Note to page 90.)

Consult Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," Bk. X., 1172a-1177a; T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. III., Chap. V., Section 262.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII.

1. *The self-regarding virtues.* (Note to page 92.)

To the list of 'self-regarding' virtues enumerated in Chapter VII., may well be added the virtue parallel to that creative tendency which Veblen calls the instinct of workmanship. (Cf. T. Veblen cited above in Note 3 to Chap. VI.)

On the impossibility of exclusively self-regarding virtues, cf. W. K. Clifford, "Lectures and Essays," Vol. II., p. 121³: "There are no 'self-regarding virtues.' The qualities of prudence, courage, etc., can only be *rightly* encouraged in so far as they are shown to conduce to the efficiency of a citizen." Cf. also E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Vol. II., Chap. XXXVI.,

pp. 265-267ff: "It is undoubtedly true that no mode of conduct is exclusively self-regarding. No man is an entirely isolated being."

2. *Instinctive appropriation.* (Note to page 94.)

Consult W. James, "Psychology," Vol. II., Chap. XXIV., pp. 422 ff.; W. McDougall, "Social Psychology," Chap. XIV.

3. *Thrift.* (Note to page 94.)

Consult E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Vol. II., Chap. XXXVI., pp. 268³-283.

4. *The instinctive tendency to reject.* (Note to page 99.)

Consult W. McDougall, *op. cit.*, pp. 55 ff.

5. *Abstinence.* (Note to page 100.)

Consult Plato, "The Republic," Bk. IV., 430 ff.; Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," Bk. III., 1117b ff.; T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. III., Chap. V., Sections 261 ff.; H. Sidgwick, "The Methods of Ethics," Bk. III., Chap. IX.; F. Paulsen (tr. by F. Thilly) "A System of Ethics," Bk. III., Chap. II., pp. 485-490; E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Vol. II., Chaps. XXXVII. ff.

6. *Courage.* (Note to page 102.)

Consult Plato, "Lysis" and "The Republic," Bk. IV., 429ff.; Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Bk. III., 1115a, ff.; T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. III., Chap. V., Sections 258-259; H. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, Bk. III., Chap. X., pp. 332-334.

7. *The place of thought in the moral experience.* (Note to page 106.)

Consult T. H. Green, "Prolegomena to Ethics," Bk. II., Chap. II., Sections 148 ff.; G. Wallas, "The Great Society," Chaps. III., X., XI.; C. A. Ellwood, "Sociology in its Psychological Aspects," Chap. XI.

For vigorous enforcement of the truth that an acquaintance with facts is essential to the moral experience, cf. E. H. Holt, "The Freudian Wish," Chap. III.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1. *Chastity, marriage, the family.* (Note to page 109.)

Consult: Durant Drake, "Problems of Conduct," Chap. XVII. with bibliography.

2. *Gregariousness.* (Note to page 110.)

Consult: W. McDougall, *op. cit.*, Chap. III., pp. 84 ff.; C. A. Ellwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 219, ff; W. Trotter, "Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War," 1916, pp. 11-66 (reprinted from the *Sociological Review*, 1908, 1909. (Trotter virtually identifies gregariousness with "the social habit.")

3. *The truthful man.* (Note to page 110.)

Consult: R. C. Cabot, "The Use of Truth and Falsehood in Medicine: An Experimental Study," in *American Medicine*, 1903, Vol. V., pp. 344-349; F. Paulsen, "A System of Ethics," Bk. III., Chap. XI.; Leslie Stephen, *op. cit.*, pp. 202 ff.; Durant Drake, *op. cit.*, Chap. XIX.

For discussion of "the regard for truth and good faith among savages," cf. E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Chap. II.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX.

1. *Justice as personal approval-disapproval.* (Note to page 120.)

The frequent identification of the moral consciousness with approval-disapproval is probably due to the confusion of the essentially moral experience, willing the good, with this

significant factor of it, the virtue of justice, personal appraisal in furtherance of one's loyalty to the Great Society.

2. *History and theory of punishment.* (Note to page 123.)

Consult: E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Chaps. I.-III.; L. T. Hobhouse, "Morals in Evolution," Chap. III.; S. R. Steinmetz, "Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe," 1894; G. W. F. Hegel, "Philosophy of Right," §§ 99-103; T. H. Green, "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation," Sections 176 ff., *Works*, II., pp. 486 ff.; B. Bosanquet, *op. cit.*, Chap. III.; T. de Laguna, in *Philosophical Essays in Honor of J. E. Creighton*, pp. 318-327.

The matters of special interest to the student of ethics are the following:—(1) On the historical side, the development of punishment from retaliation through control of instinctive resentment and through recognition of the interest of society in the offense and in the treatment of the offender. It may be noted that the occurrence of punishment, in the fully social sense, among primitive peoples is well established. (Cf. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, I., pp. 170,² 185,² with citations.) (2) On the theoretical side, the fact that the three prevalent theories of punishment, though often treated as exclusive, really supplement each other. The deterrent theory conceives punishment as a method whereby society protects itself against aggressions. The other two theories take their start from the offender, not from society. The earlier of them, the retributive theory, emphasizes, on the one hand, one of the instinctive roots of punishment, namely, retaliation, and stresses, on the other hand, the responsibility of the culprit. The educational theory, finally, insists on the consideration of the capacities and the needs of the offender. To show in detail the compatibility of these three theories would lead us too far afield, but so much may be said with confidence: first, that individual resentment is the precursor

of punishment and that many penalties of our own age express the degree of public indignation, not the degree of risk to society; second, that the most truly deterrent punishment is the "educative" penalty so administered as to transform lawbreakers into keepers of the law.

3. *Spinoza on remorse and self-content.* (Note to page 127.)

Consult Spinoza's "Ethics," Part IV., Propositions LIII., LIV., LVI.:—"Humilitas virtus non est, sine ex ratione non ortur; Poenitentia virtus non est . . . sed is, quem facti poenitet, bis miser seu impotens est; . . . Maxima superbia vel abjectio maximam animi impotentiam indicat."

4. *Aristotle's classification of justice.* (Note to page 128.)

In Book V. of the "Ethics" Aristotle first distinguishes between (1) justice used in a wide sense as equivalent to "virtue" and (2) justice as a particular virtue. Of justice in this latter sense he names the two forms ordinarily rendered as "distributive" and "corrective" justice. Cf. "Nicomachean Ethics," Bk. V., 1130a and 1130b.

5. *Property holding.* (Note to page 131.)

Consult: L. T. Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, Pt. I., Chap. VIII.; E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, II., Chaps. XXVIII.-XXIX.; Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXII., § 1; G. Wallas, *op. cit.*, Part II., Chap. XII., pp. 291 ff.; W. Fite, "An Introductory Study of Ethics," pp. 349 ff.

6. *Socialism and individualism.* (Note to page 139.)

Consult: Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, Chaps. XXIV., XXV.; E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, II., Chap. XXIX., pp. 70-71; I. B. Cross, "The Essentials of Socialism," 1912; E. Kelly, "Twentieth Century Socialism," 1910; W. E. Walling and others, "The Socialism of To-day, a Source-Book," 1916; H. G.

Wells, "New Worlds for Old," 1910; A Report on Reconstruction by the Sub-committee of the British Labor Party, in *The New Republic* for Feb. 16, 1918; C. W. Eliot, "The Conflict between Individualism and Collectivism in a Democracy," 1910; Herbert Spencer, "Social Statics;" F. Le Dantec, "L'egoïsme, seule base de toute société," 1916.

For discussion of socialism and syndicalism, consult J. Spargo, "Syndicalism, Industrial Unionism, and Socialism," 1913.

NOTES TO CHAPTER X.

1. *The nature of sympathy.* (Note to page 141.)

The conception of sympathy which this book upholds differs in two ways from the popular view of it embodied, for example, in W. McDougall's description of sympathy as "the experiencing of any feeling or emotion when and because we observe in other persons or creatures the expression of that feeling or emotion." ("Social Psychology," p. 92.) The first difference is to be found in the teaching that sympathy is not necessarily emotional and that we share the perceiving and thinking as well as the feeling of other people. The second distinction is the exclusion from sympathy properly so called of "organic sympathy," a suffering which, though due to witnessing the physical laceration of some one else, none the less includes no consciousness of this other person's suffering.

2. *Sympathy as instinctive.* (Note to page 142.)

Consult: C. Darwin, "The Descent of Man," Chaps. III-V.; H. Höffding, "Outlines of Psychology," VI., pp. 244 ff.; G. W. Nasmyth, "Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory," 1916, Chaps. III. and IX.; A. Sutherland, "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct," *passim*; W. McDougall, *op. cit.*, Chap. IV.

3. *The virtue of generosity.* (Note to page 144.)

Consult: Aristotle, *op. cit.*, Bk. IV., Chap. I.; H. Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, Bk. III., Chap. IV.; F. Paulsen, *op. cit.*, Bk. III., Chap. VIII.; E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, Chaps. XXIII., XXIV.

4. *The virtue of sacrifice.* (Note to page 147.)

The term "sacrifice" is often used, in a sense more profound than that of Chapter X., to designate not merely a virtue, one habit of will among others in furtherance of the ultimate end, but the essential subordination in all moral willing, of a "lower" to a "higher" self. Cf. G. H. Palmer, "The Nature of Goodness," VI., especially pp. 179ff.; and R. Calkins, "The Christian Idea in the Modern World," III.

5. *The virtue of obedience.* (Note to page 148.)

Consult: T. H. Green, "Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation," in *Works*, II., pp. 448 ff.

6. "*Custom-morality.*" (Note to page 153.)

Consult: E. Westermarck, *op. cit.*, I., Chap. VII.; Dewey and Tufts, *op. cit.*, Chap. IV. Cf. also Chap. II., p. 24 of this book.

7. *The instinct of pugnacity.* (Note to page 158.)

Consult: W. McDougall, "Social Psychology," Chap. III., pp. 49ff.; W. James, "Principles of Psychology," Vol. II., Chap. XXIV., pp. 409 f. H. M. Stanley, "Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling," Chap. X.

8. *Pugnacity and war.* (Note to page 161.)

Consult W. James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," in "Memories and Studies," pp. 267 ff. and R. Calkins, *op. cit.*, III., pp. 37 ff.

An instance of the popular view, which Chap. X combats, that war is the inevitable expression of the instinct of pug-

nacity, is found in a speech made by General Leonard Wood on April 3, at Baltimore. "Do not talk," General Wood is reported as saying, "as if this were the last great war. God will have to change human nature before we can discuss such a thing." The unwarranted assumption which underlies this statement is that the instinct of pugnacity and the institution of war are one and the same.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XI.

1. *Aesthetics and ethics.* (Note to page 165.)

Consult G. H. Palmer, "The Field of Ethics," Lecture III. with bibliography.

2. *The object of the religious consciousness as personal.* (Note to page 170.)

Cf. G. T. Romanes, "Thoughts on Religion," 4th edition, 1898, Part I., Essay I., pp. 42 ff.: "The distinguishing features of any theory which can properly be termed a religion is that it should refer to the ultimate source, or sources of things: and that it should suppose this source to be of an objective, intelligent, and personal nature. To apply the term Religion to any other theory is merely to abuse it."

For the recently formulated theory of pre-animistic religion, whose object, often known as *mana*, is conceived as impersonal power, cf. R. R. Marett, "The Threshold of Religion," 1914, I.; E. Durkheim, "Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse," 1912, especially pp. 269ff., 307ff., 333f. In opposition to these writers Dr. I. G. Campbell concludes, from a detailed study of field-workers' reports, that "there is no justification for calling *mana* an impersonal force." ("Manaism. A Study in the Psychology of Religion," *Amer. Journ. of Psychology*, 1918, XXIX., pp. 1-49, with important bibliography).

Consult also J. H. Leuba, "A Psychological Study of Religion," Chaps. II., IV.-VI.; M. W. Calkins, "A First Book in Psychology," Chap. XIV. and *Journal of Philosophy*, 1911, VIII., pp. 606-608.

3. *The privacy of the religious experience.* (Note to page 170.)

Consult W. James, "Varieties of Religious Experience," Chap. II., pp. 28 ff. and *passim*. It must be reiterated that this view of religion as conscious relation of individual to divine self is entirely compatible both with the teaching, emphasized by Durkheim, Ames, King, Campbell and others, that religion is social in origin and also with the teaching that the religiously conscious man is, or may be, profoundly aware of himself as one of a great fellowship of worshippers. Professor Royce seems accordingly, to the writer of this book, occasionally to over-state the contrast between his conception of religion as "social experience" and that of James. (Cf. "The Problem of Christianity," Preface, pp. XV.-XVI). For a clear statement of the position taken in this book, cf. C. C. J. Webb, "Theories of Religion and the Individual," 1916, especially Chap. IX. "The present experience of God," Webb says, "can not be admitted to be something which is merely public."

4. *The object of religion as superhuman.* (Note to page 171.)

Cf. Wundt, "Völkerpsychologie, Mythos u. Religion," 3ter Teil, p. 751: "Die [Wurzel] der Religion ist die . . . Idee des Uebersinnlichen; die der Sittlichkeit liegt zunächst in den sinnlichen Affekten."

5. *Morality as fused with religion.* (Note to page 174.)

Cf. H. G. Wells, "God the Invisible King." The closing words of Chapter XIII. are quoted from Wells, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

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