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GOD OR MAN?

A STUDY OF THE VALUE OF GOD TO MAN

BY

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TO

CLARENCE AND GLADYS

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PREFACE

IN ORDER to preclude confusion it must be understood that, unless otherwise stated, the word "God" means in this book a superhuman Being with whom social relations can be maintained; it designates, therefore, the Being or beings worshiped in the Christian and other religions. A God of that sort is radically different from the infinite Absolute of which philosophers speak, for the Absolute is not to be moved by human needs and desires, by gifts and supplications, by thanks and praises.

"What God exists?" is a question about which I have had very little to say here, for I have tried to remain within the range of human knowledge. After introductory chapters on the nature, origin, and function of the religions, I have taken up their fruits—commonly ascribed to "God"—and I have sought to determine their cause or causes.

It seems to the author that the more important or, in any case, the more urgent and profitable task before humanity to-day is not to obtain a reliable definition of God, but to learn how, by what method or technique, what is accounted good—and by some called "divine"—can be secured by man or incarnated in human nature. This is, therefore, not a book of a speculative but of a scientific character, and the science on which it chiefly relies is psychology.

I do not write in praise of the sciences concerned with the physical universe,—that is unnecessary. I wish, rather, to draw attention to the need for progress in the biological

and psychological sciences and in their application to the improvement of the nature of man. It is not at all urgent for the happiness of humanity that the former sciences should advance beyond their present position. Food is abundant and good enough, houses are sufficiently sanitary and comfortable, means of communication—roads, railways, automobiles, telephones, telegraphs, radios—will do for the present at least. What is urgent is to realize that the achievements of the physical sciences leave uncorrected major evils rooted in the moral and intellectual imperfection of man, and may even increase their consequences, and that these evils may be mitigated or removed under the guidance of a fuller knowledge of human nature.

When life is mean and unworthy amidst plenty and ease, the remedy is not to be found in more knowledge of the physical universe, but in more knowledge of man. If thousands starve although there is more food in the United States than can be eaten, it is not because we do not know how, or have not the means to distribute the surplus where it is needed; it is rather because those who have too much care too little for those who have not enough. Egoism and other anti-social traits, more than lack of knowledge, make impossible the organization of society in the interest of all. The most urgent task before humanity is the development of the biological and psychological sciences and their application to the moral and intellectual improvement of human nature.

But what should man try to secure, what should be his goal? That problem also has received very little attention, not because it is not of fundamental importance, but again because I had nothing to say of much value outside of what is frequently heard. After all, our best means of

contributing to the solution of that problem lies in a study of the methods for attaining whatever now seems a proper goal. For the only way to achieve whatever progress can be made towards a correct estimate of the value of things is to test them.

In this book the reader's attention will be engaged mainly on the methods of life offered respectively by science and the religions, and this with special reference to the effectiveness and the range of these methods. He will, therefore, be concerned not with "religion"—a vague term with diverse meanings—but with something quite definite and of the highest practical consequence: *the religions*, i.e., institutions which continue to engage a vast amount of the energy, time, and resources of humanity.

In the preparation of several chapters, I have drawn freely upon my former publications, and I have not thought it necessary always to mention the fact. Nevertheless, with regard both to central theme and to form, this is a new book.

Technicalities and unessential developments have been avoided in an effort to make these pages readable to all intelligent persons interested in the methods available to-day for the preservation and enhancement of life and happiness. It is in pursuance of that purpose that several passages of subordinate importance have been printed in small type.

It is a tendency of those devoted to a religion to turn away from any critical examination of its utility or efficacy. They think they know from experience its blessed and incomparable value, and they cherish the opinion that only those who have not had the privilege of knowing it "from

the inside," as a living experience, may propose to consider whether it could not be advantageously replaced. By recalling that the disciples of every religion—even of those regarded by the Christians as abject—make the same claim, and base it on the same ground of "irrefutable" experiences, the reluctant reader will perhaps be induced to pay to this book the attention it may deserve. The author wishes to add that he has had the advantage of being brought up in an intelligent and earnest Protestant circle. During adolescence, he passed through a serious conversion, to which he still ascribes moral value; and, until his convictions changed regarding the main Christian doctrines, he took an active part in several religious societies.

I am under obligation to the Open Court Publishing Company, publishers of the second edition of *The Belief in God and Immortality;* and to Kegan Paul, Trench Trübner and Company, publishers of *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism,* for permission to use several passages from these books.

To my son, Dr. Clarence Leuba, who has read in manuscript most of this book, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness for valuable suggestions.

J. H. L.

Bryn Mawr, Pa., March 1933.

PART I

WHAT ARE THE RELIGIONS AND WHAT IS "RELIGION"?

I

THE THREE METHODS OF CARRYING ON LIFE

IN THIS book the ideal good, the ideal man, the ideal society will not be discussed. Our task is a more profitable one; for we could add but little, if anything, worth while to the endless discussions of philosophers on these subjects. We shall consider the means available for the attainment of whatever goal man may set for himself, and we shall do that with special reference to the means offered by the religions.

Human nature changes little: food, warmth, sexual gratification, power have been desired from the beginning; and also, if less fiercely, kindliness, helpfulness, and rightness. The present differs from the past not so much by the existence of new kinds of desires as by the possession of more effective means of satisfying them, and, more importantly still, by the constant presence of a purpose to improve upon these means. While the uncivilized stumbled upon more or less effective ways of gratifying their wants, we have become systematic searchers and are now in possession of powerful instruments of discovery—that is the distinction of our scientific age. The ancient motto "Know thyself" has been replaced on the banner of the twentieth century by "Know how to satisfy thyself."

Though it is true that until now the main concern of humanity has been the satisfaction of its elemental needs, it would, nevertheless, be a gross libel to accuse it of having cared for nothing more. It is striving also, with the

aid of the biological and psychological sciences, to develop and control the intellectual and moral forces in the hope of establishing a "Kingdom of God" upon earth. By what means can humanity best accomplish this purpose, and what share can the religions have in its realization?

One of the fundamental facts of the history of man is that he has used three and only three kinds of methods or means for satisfying his needs. These methods have undergone development of the utmost importance but no other has been discovered, and the business of life continues to be carried on by the three types of means known already to the uncivilized. They may be called, the mechanical, the social (which includes the method of the religions), and the magical methods. Let us describe them briefly.

The Mechanical Method.—A savage may be observed choosing a flint, splitting it so as to get a sharp edge, lashing it with sinews to a long bone or stout stick, and setting forth on a quest for game. Similarly, he uses a stick as a lever, stretches the string of his bow proportionately to the distance at which he wants to send his arrow, allows for the strength of the wind, etc. Again, he cuts or tears apart the flesh of the animal he has killed, cooks it, or puts it into his mouth raw and chews it. In so far as that type of behavior is concerned, the non-civilized may be said to live in a mechanical world implying a fixed order and a quantitative relation of cause and effect.

The Social Method, Including the Method of the Religions.—In order to obtain each other's help, people render services, offer the inducement of gifts, assume an attitude of subjection or admiration, flattering to the person on

whom they find themselves dependent. In these and other ways, all falling under the general head of social behavior, much of the business of life is transacted.

Now, as the non-civilized believes himself surrounded by invisible beings,—ghosts, spirits, gods—who may do him evil or good, it is only natural that he should use whatever means may seem to him effective for propitiating and securing the assistance of those beings. And, since he thinks of them as very like himself, it should not be a matter for astonishment if he tries on them the social forms of behavior which he has found useful in his relations with his fellowmen: gifts, praises, promises of loyalty, supplications, etc.

"In my country," wrote a native of Solomon Island (Melanesia), "they think that the ghosts are many, very many indeed, some very powerful and some not. There is one who is principal in war, this one is truly mighty. When our people wish to fight with any other place, the chief men of the village and the sacrificers and the old men, and the elder and the younger men, assemble in the place sacred to this ghost, and his name is Harumæ. When they are thus assembled to sacrifice, the chief sacrificer kills a pig. He takes a bit of flesh from the pig and a cocoanut shell and dips up some of the blood, and calls and says, 'Harumæ! Chief in war! We sacrifice to you with this pig that you may help us to smite that place; and whatever we shall carry away shall be your property and we also will be yours!' " (R. G. Codrington, *The Melanesians.*)

Jacob's bargaining prayer, as he was on his way to Laban, is of the same type: "If God will be with me, and will keep me in this way that I go, and will give me bread to eat, and raiment to put on, so that I come again to my father's house in peace, then shall Jehovah be my God

. . . and of all that Thou shalt give me I will surely give the tenth unto Thee." (*Genesis* xxviii, 20-22.)

Social relations with superhuman beings, unless they be devils, is, by common consent, called religion.

But social relations have another aspect than the business-like transactions illustrated above. We do not meet our fellow human beings in order only to seek help from them in the pursuit of some particular purpose. We find at times the sweetest of satisfactions in the mere presence, and even in the mere thought of a friend. We enjoy a sense of harmony, of communion with him, without any thought, it seems, of selfish advantage.

This aspect of human relationship is also, and quite naturally, present in the relations we maintain with invisible beings. It constitutes an aspect of religion clearly distinct from the begging, gift-making, business-like relation,—it is the *mystical strand* of religious life.

Mystical religion is already, if in an embryonic form, clearly discernible among the non-civilized. They perform sacred ceremonies in which it is obvious that the participants feel themselves in contact, in communion of heart and mind with an invisible power, and that they are vivified by that contact. This early religious mysticism is well illustrated by certain totem ceremonies of the central Australians and by the mountain Chant of the American Indians. In rites of that sort, the individuals stand together as a group, with one soul as it were, conscious of the prevailing presence of an invisible, mighty power. The excitement developed by the dancing and singing helps powerfully to deprive the individual of a sense of independent existence; he, and the tribe, and the great power, become one. This is the prototype of the mystical union dear to the Christian mystic.

Closely connected with religious mysticism is an aspect of religious life of considerable importance. We allude to what has been described as a "flight from reality" One of the services rendered by the religions is to provide moments of escape from the difficulties and the disappointments of earthly existence, moments during which intractable reality is replaced by a beautiful, satisfying dream-world.

But men find refuge from frustrations and hardships elsewhere than in religion. Art, particularly in the form of poetry and romance, ministers also to that need. Escape from reality to an ideal world is a part of the religious life only in so far as it is connected directly or indirectly with the worship of gods. We shall, therefore, pay little attention in this book to this secondary function of the religions, for we shall not forget that their primary and essential function is not to help man to avoid, but, rather, to meet reality in a practically efficient way.

The Magical Behavior.—There is a third type of behavior, different from both the mechanical and the social. Its several varieties may be classed together as *magic.* In Florida, a Melanesian island, when sunshine is required, the medicine man ties appropriate leaves and creeper vines to the end of a bamboo and holds them over the fire. He fans the fire with a song to give *mana* to the leaves. Then he climbs a tree and fastens the bamboo to the topmost branch. As the wind blows about the flexible bamboo, the *mana* is cast abroad and the sun does or does not shine out. (R. G. Codrington, *The Melanesians.*) In another variety of magic (sympathetic magic), something is done to an image with the expectation that the same thing will happen to the object represented. In still another variety (will magic), a "will-effort" is involved. Among the Sioux

Indians, "when a race is taking place, a man may bend his thoughts and his will upon one of the contestants in the belief that this act, this 'sending of the mind,' will help his friend to win." Spells and incantations, the necessary accompaniment of many forms of magic, partake of the nature of will-magic. The wizard who says to the harmless thing he regards as a magic spear, "Go straight and kill him," feels doubtless that by these words, in which quivers his very soul, he directs the spear on its errand of death.

The varieties of magic represented in the preceding instances are similar in that each of them has for its object the accomplishment of a particular event: sunshine, rain, wounding or killing an enemy, the curing of disease. There is another class of behavior, *divination,* frequently included under magic. Here the future is predicted, or the significance of what has already happened is explained. This is done by interpreting dreams, the flight of birds, the arrangement of entrails in a dead animal, the position of the leaves at the bottom of a cup of tea, and in many other ways. Among the uncivilized, divination is a much-used way of obtaining knowledge. W. J. V. Saville affirms that in Melanesia, in hunting and fishing and upon all critical occasions, conduct is regulated according to the information secured by divination. It was still in high favour in the Roman Empire, as readers of Plutarch will remember, and it has not altogether died out among us.

The Differentiation of Religion from Magic.—Certain recent scholars (in particular the French sociologist Durkheim and his school) have found it advisable in the interest of their sociological or philosophical theories, to define the term "religion" so as to include under it the two forms of behavior we have called, respectively, "magic" and "religion." They have said in substance that the specific feature of religion is an

awareness of the great encompassing mystery, affecting man as something sacred or holy. There is undoubtedly mystery and sacredness both in what we have defined as religion and in what we have called magic. Does it follow that there is no essential difference between them?

Let us return for a moment to the feature which separates these two types of behavior. There are moments when man seeks to enter into communion with invisible beings or to influence them by requests, gifts, praises, and the like. At other times, he uses a coercive power in order to act compellingly upon inanimate objects, or human beings, or even spirits and gods. Is not the first kind of behavior—social behavior—essentially different from coercion? To beg for protection with gift in hand, to seek some spiritual grace from a great Ruler while giving assurances of humility and obedience, to enjoy the sense of his companionship, is obviously one kind of behavior; and to stick a knife into the image of an enemy, to utter destructive spells, to smear the posts of a new house with various substances for luck, is essentially a different type of behavior. Their likeness with regard to mysteriousness and sacredness does not make them identical. Indeed, whether or not the same feeling-tone accompanies both, no difference could be more fundamental.

It should not be overlooked that the magical power may be brought to bear upon spirits and even gods, as well as upon human beings. In order to bring up the witch of Endor, from whom he wanted certain information, Saul used a spell acting coercively upon the witch. In old Egypt, the priests of the Sun-God thought that, by various magical performances, they could coerce him into doing their will.

With commendable common sense, the non-civilized often uses for one and the same purpose and, so far as possible, at the same time, the three ways known to him for achieving results. When he goes hunting, he sees to it that the spear-head is sharp and firmly fixed to the shaft; he may also perform a magical ceremony; and he may, further, add an appeal or an offering to a spirit for his help.

The combination of magic and religion is particularly frequent. In that curious collection of funerary rites of old Egypt called the *Book of the Dead,* spells and incantations have their place side by side with prayers and adorations. The great Mountain Chant festival of the American Indians, ostensibly for the cure of diseases, and the elaborate Govi festival of the inhabitants of New Guinea are alike woven of magic and religion. In the Govi ceremonies, the priest-magician anoints the soles of his feet, chews betel-nut, smears with his saliva a garden digging stick, pronounces spells, etc. But he also addresses ancestral spirits, asking them to come to the festival in good humor.

The savage is not alone in having three strings to his bow. There are parents among us who, for the protection of their children, seek God's help (religion); they also take whatever natural measures are available (natural, mechanical behavior); and then, to make trebly sure in an uncertain situation, they have recourse to magic: they tie a blessed medal about the child's neck.

However closely interwoven religious and magical behavior may be, their fundamental difference is not obliterated; and one may well wonder at those students of early societies who, because there are intimate combinations of magic and religion in the same ceremonies, regard the two as indistinguishable. Co-existence is not identity.

Though, at first, magic and religion are used promiscuously in the same ceremony, they tend, nevertheless, to be separated. Moreover, a specialization takes place among the performers of these ceremonies. In early times, the same person works both magically and religiously; later, priests and magicians constitute two distinct professional classes. Still later, a third class of specialist appears, the

physician, whose task is the cure of disease without recourse either to magic or to the gods. In the *Medical Papyrus,* a treatise written nearly five thousand years ago, medical treatments are described for ailments which, in the mind of the author, had no connection with either religion or magic.

The follies of magic and of the lower forms of religion are the first results of a new capacity of incredible potential usefulness, namely, the capacity to act with reference to objects not present to the senses. Thanks to that ability, man lives in a world far wider and richer than the world to which animals are confined. It is because he is aware of little more than what his senses immediately perceive, and is limited almost to the immediate present, that the animal is saved from the folly of practicing magic and of begging for food from absent beings. Whereas man, thinking and feeling himself in relation with an invisible world of mysterious forces, uses them all as best he can. This enlargement and enrichment of the universe has had far-reaching and admirable consequences, though it plunged primitive humanity into the errors of magic and of the early religions.

For thousands of years man has carried on the struggle for the maintenance and enrichment of life with these three means: the mechanical; the social, including religion; and the magical. To his religions and magic, useless as they may seem to us, he has devoted an incalculable amount of time and effort. Speaking in general terms, it may be said that among the uncivilized, nothing of any importance is ever undertaken without the celebration of magical or religious ceremonies, and usually of both. Spencer and Gillen have tabulated eighty-eight sacred ceremonies performed by the Central Australians between

July 7 and September 18. (*The Northern Tribes of Central Australia.*)

Though no new type of behavior has been discovered, developments of the greatest practical significance have taken place. After a long period of great influence, the inefficiency of magic became more and more clear; and, consequently, it fell into disfavor. It has almost entirely disappeared from the highest civilizations.

The mechanical type of behavior developed into the procedures of the physical sciences, with what amazing and admirable results every one knows. Extending beyond the physical to the psychical and social realms, the scientific procedure has given rise to the psychological and social sciences. An increasingly large part of the wonders once expected of magic and of religion are now effected through the use of these scientific methods.

As to the social relations with superhuman beings,—the religions—they have undergone great changes. A bewildering variety of gods came into existence, and their worship assumed an almost equally rich diversity. In more recent times, a small number of highly organized systems of worship—Buddhism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism—have spread over the civilized and the semi-civilized world. This recent development includes the passage from belief in many to belief in one God, or at least to something approaching monotheism. More recently still a portentous decline in the belief in the efficacy of the religions has taken place and the question is asked more and more anxiously: Do the religions, like magic, constitute a colossal, world-wide deception?

II

"RELIGION" AND THE RELIGIONS

MANY will say, "But, you are not talking about what *I* mean by religion!" Unfortunately, these persons agree in their use of the term "religion" neither with each other nor with the believers in any one of the historic religions. The confusion passes belief. Some people call the American public schools "godless"; others speak of their "long and valiant religious teaching." Most persons, however, disagree with both these opinions and affirm that the public schools in the United States are faithful to the spirit of the Constitution,—they are neutral in the matter of religion. A book damned by a Protestant clergyman as "a foe to the public good, withdrawing from the public conscience the only possible foundation for moral and social integrity," is praised by another clergyman as answering questions which every one is asking about religion "in such a way that one's belief in religion is increased." The French philosopher, Alfred Guyau, entitled one of his books *The Irreligion of the Future;* whereupon another philosopher, the American Josiah Royce, remarked that if he had written that book he would have called it *The Religion of the Future!*

No wonder that there is no agreement regarding the relation of religion to science. If religion is devotion to the welfare of humanity or obedience to the Golden Rule, as some say, how could there be any antagonism between it and science? But, if religion includes belief in the kind

of god or gods worshiped in the historical religions, the problem is altogether different.

The following quotations representing the teaching of professors in liberal theological schools and of other defensors of "religion," may help the reader to realize more fully that "religion" and "the religions" should not be spoken of together. Each paragraph is from a different writer.

"The religion of any nation consists primarily of these spiritual impulsions, that 'atmosphere of common thought and feeling,' that sense of the values of life and of a common destiny which all its citizens or subjects share." "Religion is the consciousness of the highest social values." "All moral ideals are religious in a degree to which they are expressions of great vital interests of society." "It would be no exaggeration to say that all ceremonies in which the group coöperates with keen emotional interests are religious." When "religion" is used in this way, a patriotic celebration is a *religious* ceremony.

"The sense of the right and true is our contact with God."

"Worship is a desire to know the laws of nature and abide by them."

"Science is or is akin to religion, because it manifests the spirit of self-abnegation and devotion to an ideal good."

The definitions of religion more frequently offered may be classified in five groups:—

(1) *Religion is the feeling* (or emotion) *or the attitude* (or behavior) *called forth by the mysterious or the sacred.*—This conception should be rejected, if for no other reason, because it unites under one name—religion—two methods of behavior which should properly be differentiated and called, respectively, religion and magic. The experience of the mysterious and of the sacred is not the distinguishing mark of religion since it is shared by magic.

(2) *Religion is the quest after the meaning of life;* or, from a somewhat different point of view, *it is the determination of what is most worth while.*—The search after the meaning of life and its ultimate value or values, is doubtless of the highest

importance, for the possibility of wisely directing one's life depends upon the success of that quest. But, as a matter of fact, this conception of religion leaves out the religions. They do not seek to understand the mysteries of life, or to estimate the value of its experiences; they claim to possess that knowledge. What they do, is to offer a way, a method, of attaining the goal they propose. Every religion starts with a ready-made philosophical foundation, set forth, in the higher religions, in formal professions of faith. Instead of being the allies of the philosophical attitude, the religions have been and remain its stoutest opponents. It is only when a believer begins to doubt that he regains something of the inquirer's attitude. "Whoever seeks another truth, let him be anathema," is the implicit if not the explicit proclamation of the religions.

This second conception of religion is not only in contradiction to what the religions claim to be, but it implies the use of the term "religion" to designate what has always been regarded as the task of philosophy, namely, the search for an understanding of the mysteries of life and the estimation of its values. So long as he seeks to discover God, man is a philosopher; he assumes the religious attitude when, having found God, he enters into social relation with him. It is true that at any moment the curious delver into the mystery of life and death may suspend his search and fall on his knees in worship. He has, then, passed from the attitude of philosophy to that of religion. The fact that in the twinkling of an eye this change may take place, does not obliterate the radical difference between the two attitudes.

(3) *Religion is a belief in something human which has the power of making life what it should be.*—According to this conception, the concern of religion is not, as in the preceding definition, the determination of a goal for man's endeavor, but of a method of attaining the goal. Thus, belief in the saving power of democratic institutions, or of science, or of art, is religion.

The emphasis is placed here on belief; but, of course, belief leads normally to action. Belief in the saving power of science, for instance, may be expected to be accompanied by active devotion to its advancement. Moreover, devotion to an

instrument of salvation implies devotion to the welfare of humanity. Thus we pass to the next conception.

(4) *Religion is devotion to the welfare of humanity.*—Here the emphasis is not on any particular instrument of human welfare, but on the end to be achieved. A distinguished university teacher wrote, "The man who enters thoroughly into the social movements of his time is to that extent genuinely religious." When H. G. Wells singled out in one of his novels the founder of the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome as the religious man *par excellence,* he took the word "religion" in this fourth sense.

Neither in this, nor in the two preceding conceptions does religion involve necessarily belief in, and reliance upon, transcendental divine powers, although that is the specific method offered for the welfare of humanity by all the organized religions.

(5) *Religion is an experience implying the existence of a spiritual world.*—This conception may be considered a special case of the third. A person is religious when he thinks of the ultimate Reality as spiritual in nature and feels himself in some sort of relation, however vague, with that reality. "A consciousness of kinship with a kindred-life with which all men are united to fulfill their destiny," is in this sense a religion. So is the pantheism of the well-known lines:

> A presence that disturbs me with a joy
> Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
> Of something far more deeply interfused,
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns.

Now the conflict between materialism and anti-materialism is, doubtless, a fundamental one in the world of thought, and its solution, one way or another, has far-reaching practical consequences. But if it be true that all the higher religions imply an anti-materialistic philosophy, it is equally true that one may hold certain forms of spiritualism or idealism and remain outside every one of the established religions, for they regard the ultimate Power or powers not only as spiritual but, in addition, as maintaining direct, intellectual, and affective relations with man. To be religious, in the sense of the historical religions, is to enter into that social relationship.

When, instead of giving to "religion" any one of the meanings defined above, we mean by it the distinctive method of life embodied in all the organizations bearing the name, a number of ever-recurring vexatious questions find a ready answer, among them the following:

Is There a Religious Instinct?—Many find great satisfaction in the idea that religion is an instinct. That, they think, guarantees its permanence and does away with all possible doubt as to its truth and value. If by "instinct" is meant, as in scientific usage, a form of behavior not learned, not acquired by the individual, but innate, then the claim cannot possibly be admitted. Man *learns* to think of, and to believe in superhuman, invisible beings; and he *learns* to worship them in various ways. As a matter of obvious fact, the god-conceptions and the forms of worship change as knowledge and experience increase.

But although religion, like magic, industry, and other human activities, consists in acquired ways of behavior, it may nevertheless be claimed that the acquisition of these ways is made possible through the existence of innate traits. Men are so made as to hunger, fear, love, and think, according to uniform laws. The outcome of this inherited endowment is the establishment of the various types of activity characteristic of social life The universality, in early humanity, of a belief in gods, and the consequent effort to enter into relation with them, is no more a proof of the instinctiveness of religion than the universality of magic in early society is an indication of its instinctiveness.

Religion, then, is not an instinct in the sense in which the chick, cracking the shell out of which it emerges, or the young mammal sucking its mother's teats, is said to be moved by instinct. Religious behavior is the outcome of a learning process, itself made possible by the presence of an instinctive foundation. In this respect, religion does not occupy a particular position; it does not differ from such other forms of activity as magic, business, or science, which are learned activities based on innate tendencies.

Is There at Least a Specific Religious Purpose?—There is probably not a single thing which early man does not think attainable religiously. He seeks the help of his gods in every

important event, the building of his hut, the planting of seeds, hunting, war, marriage. He may address the god thus: "I wish to kill a Pawnee. I desire to bring horses when I return. I long to pull down an enemy. I promise you a calico shirt and a robe. I will give you a blanket also, O Wakonda, if you allow me to return in safety after killing a Pawnee." Jehovah of the ancient Hebrews could be relied upon to assist in the slaying of the inhabitants of the land belonging to the Canaanites and coveted by his people.

As the ethical notions of men changed and, with them, the character attributed to the divine beings, a selection took place in the purposes in behalf of which they might be called into service. When the god worshiped is conceived as a god of love and righteousness, his assistance may no longer be sought for the perpetration of deeds of hatred and injustice. But this limitation has never resulted in the isolation of one purpose which might properly be regarded as *the* specific religious purpose.

The Christians are wont to regard the realization of the Christian moral ideal as a purpose limited to their religion. But the ideal of justice, charity and brotherly love is obviously not the exclusive possession of the Christian or of any other religion; it belongs to social life in its entirety, for it is the product of life in common.

Neither should the desire for communion with gods in mystical religion be regarded as a purpose distinctive of religion. What does the mystic want when he seeks "God"? He wants peace, assurance, moral strength. But these wants and the possibility of their gratification exist outside of religion. Mystical union is not an end; it is a method of satisfying needs and desires present in every human breast and satisfiable in various ways. That which is characteristic of religion is the way in which desires are satisfied, namely, by a social relation with one or several divinities.

Should any one regard eternal happiness in heaven as the distinctive religious purpose, he would have to be reminded that many a religion, in particular that of the early Hebrews, did not include that aim, and that a great many Christians who expect or hope for a blessed future life, would refuse to

regard it as an adequate formulation of the aim of religion. Religion, they would insist, is first of all for this life.

Is There a Religious Emotion?—The most persistent effort to characterize religion by means of a single feature has been made, perhaps, with reference to its emotional content. In the cruder attempts to find one religious emotion, fear, awe, and reverence have in turn been singled out. More recently, the statement that religion is a *feeling* of dependence upon the ultimate Power has been widely approved. The description of business as a feeling of dependence upon customers, or of war as a feeling of hatred towards enemies, would not be more absurdly inadequate. Fear, awe, reverence, dependence, are, doubtless, emotions or feelings felt by worshipers; but they are just as undoubtedly experienced outside of religion. And as to the feeling of mysteriousness and sacredness, we have seen that it belongs or may belong also to magic.

In any case, no religion may be adequately defined by its emotional tone. The emotion aroused at any particular time in the religious life is determined by the situation in which the worshiper finds himself at that moment and by the nature he ascribes to his god. In the earliest religions, fear and awe dominate; yet not unmixed at times with confidence and friendliness. Whereas, in the up-to-date Christian religion, the tender emotions have replaced the sterner ones. In the most prosperous Christian communities, the dreadful Calvinistic Jehovah is obsolete; God has been won over to the prevalent educational temper: all love and no punishment.

We have not the pretension to predict what will happen ultimately to the term "religion," but we are intent upon making clear that in this book it is used in a sense which includes *the religions*. It does not mean, therefore, merely a particular emotion; or the search for the meaning of life; or a set of ethical principles; or devotion to the good, the beautiful, and the true; or to any of the human instruments of happiness. It does not even mean only a comforting belief in a super-human power "making for righteousness." Whatever else they may include in the

way of desires, emotions and beliefs, the religions involve *social* relations with one or many divine beings; that relation is the very essence of the religious life as it is generally understood by those who profess belief in any of the organized religions.

The god or gods of the historical religions, past and present, is believed to be accessible to his creatures, to sympathize with them, and, under certain conditions, to respond directly, even as men do, to cries for help. Thus the religions constitute one of the methods used by man for the preservation and enhancement of life; or, rather, they arise from an attempt to use the social ways, found effective between men, in the establishment of relations with invisible Beings for the preservation and enhancement of life.[1] We shall, therefore, speak of these relations as constituting *the religious behavior,* or *the religious method of life.* The rejection of that method would mean the disappearance of every one of the organized religions.

The picture of the religions drawn in the preceding pages will have to be completed, for so far we have paid too exclusive attention to their primary function, namely, the satisfaction they provide to conscious desires. They fulfill, however, another important function.

The Religions as Means of Social Cohesion and Control.—The utility of the religions consists not only in the satisfaction they may give to the conscious needs of the

[1] If it should be objected that neither original Buddhism nor Confucianism agrees with this definition of the religions, the answer would be that original Buddhism was not a religion, it became a religion after the death of the founder when his disciples set him up as a god and worshiped him together with other gods. As to Confucianism, it constitutes a religion for those only who choose to give that name to a practical system of ethics or, rather, to a body of precepts of conduct.

individual or of the group; they play, in addition, a highly important rôle in knitting together individuals into stable and efficient groups. That function is exercised without the desire, or even the knowledge, of most of those concerned.

Without the religions the socialization of man would have been much slower; for the belief that customs and laws are made and sanctioned in heaven helped powerfully to establish and enforce them. The infringement of laws, regarded as divinely appointed, was vigorously resented by the tribe, since its good relations with its god were thereby endangered; and so the tribe as a whole strove with the utmost vigilance and severity to enforce the laws. "The first and most momentous step of primitive man towards civilisation must have been the evolution of rigid customs, the enforced observance of which disciplined a man to the habits of control of immediate impulses." That step was achieved with the powerful assistance of the religions.

When it is recalled that, in religious worship, divine beings are concretely represented, that their actions are dramatized, and that worship unites the whole tribe, at short intervals, in rites and ceremonies of considerable duration, the tremendous power of cohesion exercised by the religions becomes apparent. The religion of the tribes of Israel is an admirable instance of this function; so is the religion of Mohammed. J. H. Denison makes the following remark with reference to the astounding coherence of the Arabic tribes: "The five daily prayers (required of all disciples of Allah), when all the faithful, wherever they were, alone in the grim solitude of the desert or in vast assemblies in the crowded city, knelt and prostrated themselves towards Mecca, offering the same words of adoration for the one true God and of loyalty to his Prophet, produced an overwhelming effect even upon the spectator;

and the psychological effects of thus fusing the minds of the worshippers in a common adoration and expression of loyalty is certainly stupendous. There can be little doubt that the power of Islam is due in large measure to the obedience of the faithful to the inviolable rule of the five prayers." (*Emotion as the Basis of Civilisation.*)

It is hardly necessary to add that if, in the infancy of society, the rulers were not clearly aware of the value to them of religion, they discovered before great strides forward had been made, not only the unifying influence of a religion common to all their subjects, but also the tremendous accession of power to themselves when they were regarded as the representatives or the incarnations of the god. Hence the government by kings who were at the same time high priests.

No ancient rulers have known better than the modern Japanese how to use religion for the consolidation of the state. The national religion of Japan, Shinto, propagates the view that all the great gods are ancestral deities and that the royal line of Japan itself descends from the greatest of them all. "The prominence given by the State religion to an ancestralism centering in the imperial line, immensely strengthens the existing political and social system. The imperial throne with its long line of deified occupants becomes, in Shinto, the primary agency for the consummation of national ideals. That is to say, the centre of Shinto, in its modern officialized form, is emperor worship. This is as the authorities would have it." (Daniel C. Holtom, "The State Cult of Modern Japan," *Journal of Religion.*)

When it has become impossible for a ruler to call himself the representative of God, he has nevertheless often achieved a similar result by forming a profitable alliance

with the priestly power. Recent times have provided in Italy an illuminating example of this policy.

To the general socializing value mentioned above, the official Christian religion adds the preaching, with all the weight of its authority and prestige, of humility and of reverence for, and obedience to the established powers. It is, therefore, not surprising that those who are or would be in authority strive for its maintenance. Whoever wishes to hold in check the propensity of human nature to freedom and self-expression, should be a supporter of our traditional religion. It is this aspect of Christian teaching which won for the German clergy the name of "Black soldiers of the State," and it is the same aspect which accounts for the support given to-day to the Christian religion by the very large proportion of political and industrial leaders who have no personal use for it.

The French intelligentsia and politicians who champion the Church of Rome do not usually do so because that religion is precious to their private inner life. They value the sedative and unifying influence of that Church upon the people. The industrial magnates in the United States and elsewhere, who give freely of their wealth to the churches and urge religion upon their workmen, appreciate the economic and political value of the preaching of humility, obedience and renouncement of worldly goods for the sake of rewards in heaven. The American Steel king, who, a few years ago, affirmed in one and the same speech the necessity of religion and of keeping at work part of his employees twelve hours a day, understood how much they needed the great encouragement to resignation found in the traditional Christian religion. More recently, the head of the great Pennsylvania Railroad, writing to a Protestant bishop, affirmed that the forces work-

ing against religion must be regarded as the enemy both of religion and of sound industry.

The protective value of religion to the propertied classes has probably never been set forth more crudely than during a recent effort to collect a huge sum of money for the strengthening of religion in the United States. In 1920, Roger Babson, working for the Inter-Church World Movement, now defunct, issued a "Special Letter" from which the following passages are extracted:

"What is our real security for the stocks, bonds, mortgages, deeds and other investments which we own? . . . The value of our investments depends not on the strength of our banks, but rather upon the strength of our churches. The underpaid preachers of the nation are the men upon whom we really are depending rather than the well-paid lawyers, bankers and brokers. *The religion of the community is really the bulwark of our investments.*

"For our own sakes, for our children's sakes, for the nation's sake, let us business men get behind the churches and their preachers! Never mind if they are not perfect, never mind if their theology is out of date. . . . By all that we hold dear, let us from this very day give more time, money and thought to the churches of our city for upon these the value of all we own ultimately depends."

Two functions performed by the religions have been singled out: a primary one consisting in bringing about the satisfaction of the desires of the individual and of the group through social relations with gods; and a derived function consisting in binding together the populations practicing a common religion, and in supporting the hands of the rulers,—a function of which the religious believers are, on the whole, unaware.

The cessation of the first, the primary and fundamental function of the religions, would carry with it the disappearance of the religions themselves. It is with that function that we shall be exclusively concerned. Of the unify-

ing, cementing function, still regarded by many as necessary to prevent the breaking up of society, we shall say merely that, beneficial as it was in early societies, it is unnecessary to-day in the most developed nations, for they hold together by virtue of many powerful bonds, material and spiritual, which existed not at all or only in rudimentary forms in earlier times.

Adjuncts of the Religions.—But even though the several aspects of the religions discussed above be kept in mind, our description would not seem adequate. A religious ceremony of the Central Australians, worship in an Hindoo temple, the celebration of High Mass at St. Peter's make our description appear a mere skeleton of the reality. Even when all magic has been eliminated from them, these ceremonies include a wealth of activities quite foreign to social intercourse with gods. Nevertheless, our definition of religion is no more inadequate than the definition of a fisherman as a person who gets fish out of water is inadequate because fishing includes at times a picnic enlivened by wine and song.

The fact is that the religions have attracted and incorporated elements not really belonging to them. Some religions have become so overlaid with amusements and beautiful and impressive ceremonies that their main purpose is hardly discernible. In this respect the religions are not unique, they exhibit a general law of life: everywhere diverse activities tend to cluster around a central one. Attendance at the theater is made to contribute not only to the satisfaction of dramatic and esthetic cravings, but also to social needs and business advancement; and the colleges, originally places for intellectual and moral culture only, minister now to most of the needs of youth.

In an Appendix, the main adjuncts of religion are de-

scribed, and the rôle they have played and still play in what is called too broadly the "religious life" is explained.

Our Problems.—One cannot escape the grave problems created by the existence of the religions by saying, "Religion means to me a spiritualistic philosophy, or the Christian spirit, or democracy, or science." For, as a matter of fact, great religious institutions are with us,—powerful, aggressive, and usually intolerant organizations, whose distinctive feature is the means they offer for the preservation and enhancement of life. In their latest forms, these institutions cherish hard and fast creeds and practices, possess a well-organized priesthood or clergy, hold regular services for the satisfaction of spiritual and other needs, baptize the young, marry the adult, bury the dead, and generally claim the allegiance, the time, and the money of all men.

That the religious way of life has absorbed and continues to absorb a considerable part of the energy of humanity, is common knowledge. Definite figures may help to form a more exact estimate. In 1929 the number of church members in the United States was very nearly 50,000,000, ministered to by 220,000 clergymen. The total yearly expenditure for church purposes amounted to $700,000,000. If that is not quite one-third of the total cost of the public schools in that country, it is in part because a vast amount of religious teaching and guidance is unpaid. In no field of public activity is there so much done by volunteers. In the state of Indiana alone there are approximately 47,200 regular Sunday school teachers and 4,400 "supply" teachers, nearly all of them unpaid. (Walter S. Athearn, *Indiana Survey of Religious Education,* Vol. 1.) The enrolled students number 720,000. If that state may be regarded as representing an average

for the United States, there are about 1,316,000 unpaid regular teachers with 21,600,000 pupils in the Sunday schools of this country.

These figures are impressive. Our scientific and efficient age demands definite information about the returns made by this huge and perennial expenditure of money and of energy. What do the religions really achieve? Are there more effective ways of doing what they claim to do? What, in particular, of the efficacy of Christian worship in the formation and reformation of character? Are the fruits of religious worship due to a specific source of power, so that science and religion are really concerned each with a different kind of agent or agents; or is that ancient conviction a deception?

Part III, the largest and main part of this book, is an attempt to answer these questions. Readers in haste to get to that central Part may omit Part II, the "Origins and Functions of the Religions." The reading of it at this time would, however, lead to a deeper and more satisfactory understanding of the problems before us.

PART II

ORIGINS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE RELIGIONS[1]

[1] This Part covers ground partly gone over in our *Belief in God and Immortality*. A number of passages from that book have been transcribed here.

III

THE ORIGINS OF THE GOD-CONCEPTIONS

A KNOWLEDGE of the causes which have brought the religions into existence provides an explanatory background comparable in value to the knowledge of the physician who knows not only what can be observed at the moment but also the medical history of his patient. This advantage may be secured even by a very brief and incomplete treatment of the vast problem of origin, provided attention be focussed upon the more pertinent questions. While endeavoring to do that, we shall of necessity remain silent upon many aspects of the problem.

A long history preceded the appearance of belief in somewhat definite spirits and gods, and of definite ways of influencing them. About that pre-religious history nothing can be said here; we begin at the point where religious behavior had come into existence.

The religious type of behavior includes three and only three necessary components: desires, belief in the existence of powerful invisible beings, and social means of acting upon them. The first,—cravings and desires,—may be taken for granted; no one will ask from us an account of their origin. As to the kind of relation maintained with the gods,—offerings, promises, requests, supplications, expressions of humility and of praise, etc.—they are in substance those usual between men. The ordinary social ways were simply transferred, with necessary modifications,

to man's intercourse with the gods. It appears, therefore, that in a study of the origin of the religions, one need be concerned only with the origin of the god-ideas.

WHENCE THE NOTION OF GODS?—There are few problems more complicated than the determination of the origin of the almost numberless gods with whom men have maintained systematic relations or with whom they have had merely a speaking acquaintance. We know that in the course of time the really primitive gods, whatever they were, have multiplied and become changed beyond recognition. Addition, subtraction, fusion, and confusion of traits went on for centuries among populations where traditions were maintained orally and where the idea of consistency, familiar to the civilized, did not exist.

But it is fortunately outside our province to trace the descent of any particular god. The tangled genealogical trees of the divine population of Japan, India, Greece, or any other land, do not concern us. We propose in this chapter to do no more than set forth the probable causes of the primary god-ideas, and to indicate very briefly the main principles which may serve to explain their subsequent transformations and multiplication.

If we do not possess direct, adequate historical records of the origin of the primary gods, we know, nevertheless, how the god-ideas have most probably come into existence. Our situation is similar to that of a judge who, in the absence of direct proof, relies on excellent circumstantial evidence. He may attain a degree of certitude almost equal to the assurance given by direct evidence.

One encounters here, as elsewhere, that unfortunate habit of scholars to seek for one cause where there may be several. Some have, for instance, sought to derive all gods from ancestors; while others have seen in a personification

of natural objects, such as the sun, the sky, the storm, the one and only origin of all gods. But why start with the assumption of a unitary origin? An unprejudiced consideration of the facts points, it seems to us, to three different origins, giving rise to three types of gods: nature-gods, ancestor-gods, and creator-gods.

(1) *Nature-gods.*—One of the main gods in most uncivilized countries is the sun-god. In Japan, for instance, although the ancient religion (Shinto) is commonly supposed to be purely an ancestor-worship, the most eminent of the deities is the Sun-goddess, the Ruler-of-heaven. There are also in that country a moon-god, a wind-god, a fire-god, and many mountain-gods, sea-gods, river-gods, etc. The wind-god is much prayed to for good harvests; his shrines are in every village and in many private houses. In arid countries, springs are objects of the utmost concern, for they are wonderful givers of life. Baals of springs are, therefore, important gods among the Semitic populations, living in more or less arid lands. These gods are the outcome of a spontaneous and, as it seems to us, unavoidable personification of striking and materially important features of the universe. How is the savage to account for the movements and the influence, alleged or real, of the celestial bodies? How is he to understand the gathering of the clouds, the rumbling of the thunder, the lightning, the downpour of rain? He cannot explain storms as the mechanical outcome of certain physical factors; there is for him only one plausible explanation: storms are the doings of mysterious, man-like or animal-like and surpassingly powerful beings.

Do not our children at times personify natural forces? From many places we hear of the spontaneous worship of celestial bodies by children of the civilized. Lay observed

his six-year-old child praying to the moon shining on him through the window. A child at the *Institut Rousseau* had identified the *bon Dieu,* of whom he had heard people speak, with the sun, and was addressing his prayers to it. The most extensive and intensive survey so far performed of children's thoughts shows that: "Geneva boys up to the age of seven or eight look upon stars, fire, wind and, eventually, water, etc., as alive and conscious, because they move by themselves." A child asks why a marble rolls. He is told it is because the ground slopes. Thereupon, as the marble moves towards his informer, the child adds, "It knows that you are down there." (Jean Piaget, *The Language and Thought of the Child.*) This child had not yet separated movement from life; for him, whatever moved was alive. Apparently all children before seven years of age, and often much longer, are animists. Similarly, the savage, both in earnest and in play, places human and animal-like beings behind certain striking phenomena. How could he gratify better a craving for causal explanation and a love of the dramatic?

In this connection one should keep in mind the presence of great individual differences. If some children live almost entirely in the real world, and rarely, if ever, confuse the product of their imagination with reality, there are also those who hold firmly to the reality of a world of their own creation. It is these believing children who make the myths of childhood. Likewise, it is the savage with lively imagination who originates the religious beliefs of the tribe.

It is not to be supposed that the personification of natural phenomena is necessarily the conclusion of a clear, logical chain of thought. The savage does not reason thus: "Nothing happens without a cause; the only possible cause of the thunder is a being like myself but much more

powerful. The thunder is, therefore, the manifestation of a personal being, and, if I want to escape harm at his hands, I had better do to him the things which I know placate my fellow-men when they are angry." A definite reasoning process of this sort does not represent accurately what goes on when the savage creates nature-gods. What is known of human nature in general, and of the child in particular, leads rather to the belief that the savage first behaves towards the particular natural phenomenon as though it were a person. To a dangerous situation, he makes spontaneously the responses he has learned to make to threatening human beings. According to this theory, the motor and affective response, normally associated with the presence of personal beings, is first in order. No reasoning, no logical train of thoughts precedes it. But having once behaved and felt as if in the presence of a person, the savage takes a second natural and habitual step: he thinks of the cause of his behavior as if it were a person.

The point of view set forth here with reference to personification of natural phenomena is valid generally: in the early stages of the development of the mind, action is before thought—*"Am Anfang war der That."* The man who sits down to think out a problem of conduct is a very sophisticated person, rare even among the civilized.

(2) *Ancestor-gods.*—These are tribal ancestors or heroes aggrandized, glorified, and treated as gods. Herbert Spencer thought that ancestor-worship was the root-form of all gods. Such gods exist, or have existed, probably, in every non-civilized population. Where a belief in the survival of man after death is present—and that is, so far as we know, among every primitive population—there is no particular difficulty in understanding why the ghost of some especially great chief and hero should be singled out from

among the nondescript crowd of common-place ghosts. Nor is it difficult to imagine circumstances which would have consolidated the hold of an hero-ancestor upon his people and made of him a particular object of worship, i.e., a god. The origin of the idea of survival after death may be more conveniently considered in a later chapter.

(3) *The Creator-god.*—Behind the crowd of nature and ancestor-gods there exists among many, perhaps among all primitive peoples, a High-god, regarded as the creator of all things, animate and inanimate. Reflection upon the mental activity of young children makes it seem probable that the problem of creation presented itself very early, and that primitive man solved it by assuming the existence of a great Creator of things in general.

The first definite inquiries about causes are made by children of the civilized before the end of their fourth year. After that, the question "Who made that?" is very frequently on their lips. At first they ask about the making of particular objects. Later on, the general problem of creation dawns upon them. A child notices, for instance, a curiously made stone, and asks who made it. He is told that it was formed in the stream by the water. Then, suddenly, he may throw out in quick succession questions that are as much exclamations of astonishment as queries: "Who made the stream? Who made the mountains? Who made everything?" Children five years old have been known thus to set the general problem of creation.

When these facts are known, it becomes very difficult to refuse to admit that the problem of general, universal causation may present itself to gifted members of even the lowest tribes known to us. The answer they would give to such a query would have to take, it seems, an an-

thropomorphic form; the Creator would be conceived as possessing magnified human characteristics.

Recent discoveries substantiate the hypothesis of the separate origin of creator-gods. In every part of Australia, except perhaps among the Arunta, there is a belief in an All-father, regarded as creator. He is variously named in different tribes: Baiame, Duramulum, Mureli, etc.; that is, our father, father of the whole people, great master, and the like. Mary Kingsley describes a High-god, essentially the same in all the Bantu tribes (Africa). They regard this god "as the creator of man, plants, animals, and the earth; and they hold that, having made them, he takes no further interest in the affair." Mgr. Le Roy reports similarly the presence among the pigmies of equatorial Africa of a belief in a High-god distinct from the spirits whom they worship. He is a creator and preserver, but receives no worship. From Melanesia and North America comes similar evidence.

Everywhere the High-god keeps very much aloof from the affairs of men. This should be expected, for the Creator of all things is too awfully great to permit easy social intercourse. It is rather with more limited gods, a spring-god, an ancestor-god, that the savage will be tempted to establish active communications. Is not the same thing true of the civilized? Are not the supplications and offerings of Roman Catholic worshipers addressed ordinarily to the Virgin Mary and to Christ, and not to God-the-Father, Creator of heaven and earth? The lower the degree of development of a Christian population, the more exclusively does it offer its worship to the saints, the Virgin, and Christ.

The characteristic traits of these various types of superhuman beings will depend, of course, upon their origin. A god arising as the personification of clouds and thunder

will necessarily possess other traits than the sun-god; so will an ancestor-god, and so again the Creator of all things. And man's response to the thought of the existence of any one of these beings will be determined by the characteristics ascribed to the being.

Diverse and sometimes curious consequences have been drawn from the presence in primitive populations of a Creator-god standing above the crowd of gods worshiped, himself venerated but not worshiped. An opportunity has been found here for claiming a revelation. Forgetting that even young children conceive the general problem of creation and solve it by imagining an enormously magnified man, Maker of all things, Christian believers have said: "Of themselves, without the assistance of God, primitive men could not possibly have formed a conception so exalted." It need hardly be said that belief in this primary Creator-god is not monotheism. He is regarded as greater than all the other gods, but not as the one and only god.

Andrew Lang, who has done much towards the recognition of the existence of High-gods, came to another conclusion. For him the lofty Creator-god represents the first, the original idea of the Divine Being, and the other inferior gods are corruptions of that first divinity. (*The Making of Religion.*)

The order in which the three types of gods came into existence cannot be determined with certainty. It seems, however, quite improbable that general Creator-gods should have been first in time. The difficulty raised by Andrew Lang vanishes, together with several others, when it is understood that the gods of historical times are the outcome of three types of primary gods, each with a specific origin; and that, during the long periods of their

simultaneous existence, the original traits of each type could hardly have been kept from fusion and confusion with those of the others.

When associated with ghosts, spirits, ancestor-gods, and nature-gods, the great Creator could hardly be expected to preserve, in the minds of the rank and file, the noble attributes belonging to him. He suffered a degradation similar to the corruption recorded in history with reference to later gods. Were not the Hebrew prophets ever contending against the debasement of Jehovah; and, among Christians, has not the idea of the heavenly Father suffered similarly? It is because of the tendency of superior conceptions to be debased when they become the possession of the many, that progress consists, at times, in a return to origins. Lofty notions originate with the few. Taken up by the masses, they suffer debasement. But, meanwhile, the masses may actually have moved upward to a conception higher than any they had had before. That is the natural and inevitable way along which the masses gradually approach the higher level of the geniuses who lead the way. The Christian who makes a contemptible affair of the noble and simple religion of Christ is, nevertheless, usually improved by his contact with it; he does not degrade it quite to his own original level.

A fertile occasion of alterations in god-conceptions, whether for good or ill, is the settling down of a population in a country already occupied. When the gods of two populations are juxtaposed, there follows usually a far-reaching transformation of the gods and of their worship. The invasion of ancient Greece by northern tribes of Aryan descent provides a notable illustration. The native inhabitants, the Pelasgians, were worshipers of a vast number of vaguely defined gods, the dominant ones being gods of fertility and generation, represented by sex em-

blems. The invading tribes worshiped also, in the main or altogether, nature-gods, but they were better defined and loftier personalities than the gods of fertility of the Pelasgians. Prominent among them was Zeus, the sky-and-rain-god of the Aryan tribes. Many of the Pelasgian gods disappeared at the time of this invasion; others were refined, and the gross sex symbol—the phallus—was attenuated to the point of extinction.

This singularly interesting activity in the making of gods in Greece reached its climax in what Gilbert Murray calls, "the religious reform of Homer." In the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey,* the crowd of more or less nondescript gods is limited in number, and those retained are reduced to some order and much improved in definiteness and dignity. Zeus himself, the wizard rain-maker of earlier times, has risen to the distinction of "Counselor and Cloud-compeller,"—a fairly noble figure.

The conflict of gods, when two populations mix, plays a rôle so important in the making of religions that we may well devote another page to it. The Israelites brought with them as they invaded Canaan, one Jehovah, whose origin is obscure. They found in Canaan a settled agricultural population worshiping mainly nature-gods called Baals; there were Baals of fertility, of springs, of oil, of wine, of mountains, etc. According to the prevalent ideas, agriculture could not be carried on without observing the ceremonies addressed to the local gods. "Altars, shrines, sacred trees and holy stones in all parts of the land could not be appropriated without taking with them the divinities that belonged to them." And so it came to pass, as the Book of Judges and the early prophets repeatedly inform us, that, along with Jehovah, the national god, "Israel served the Baals." In consequence, Israel was in danger of splitting up into a number of small communi-

ties that rallied about the local Baals and of losing the measure of national unity achieved under Moses and the Judges. Consciousness of this peril was awakened through the rapid development of the Philistine power. About 1050 B.C., the Philistines conquered Israel, taking captive the ark and burning its sanctuary at Shiloh. The Hebrew nation was now in imminent danger of extinction; the only thing that could save it was a union of all its clans in a supreme effort to shake off the Philistine yoke. No one of the Baals of Canaan was important enough to form a center for such a union; but Jehovah, the God of Sinai, who had brought Israel out of Egypt and who had united the clans in a common cult in the desert, was able once more to rally them for the common defense. The leaders of Hebrew thought perceived that the only way to save Israel was to forsake the Baals and return to Jehovah. (*Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.*)

Frequently the gods of superposed populations became inextricably mixed; so that what Flinders Petrie says of Egypt is true of many another country: "There is no such thing as the 'Egyptian religion'; during thousands of years there were ever-varying mixtures of theologies and eschatologies in the land." If, therefore, at a particular time and place, there is no recognizable ancestor-worship, as for instance among the North American tribes of the present, it does not necessarily mean that there never has been any.

THE NECESSARY CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOD.—The term "god" in its usual acceptation does not apply to a spirit bent upon evil only; such a spirit might, however, be called "devil." In order to deserve the name "god," an invisible being should possess, in addition to notable powers, some degree of benevolence.

The relations maintained by the non-civilized with recent ghosts, fall certainly under our definition of religion. Until the moment of migration to their permanent abode in the more distant ghostland, the recent ghosts haunt in large numbers the neighborhood of their graves. They are much in the minds of the living and are often spoken to. Occasionally their help is asked. In New Guinea, when the relatives of the deceased venture to take his canoe to go fishing, they test, as it were, the spirit's good will. The *nanama* women frequently address him in a deprecatory way, thus: "Your widow, feel sorry for her, thou spirit! Don't do harm, don't be angry! If they go for fish, cause them to catch it, for they are hungry." These ghosts may be regarded as possessing the minimum requirements of divinity, and the relation maintained with them as constituting a rudimentary religion.

Now, the great beings, originating in the three ways we have indicated, are nearly all of them, in virtue of their origin, necessarily benevolent and markedly powerful. The sun, though it may scorch, is the source of beneficent light and heat; it brings the crops to fruition; an ancestor can hardly be altogether malevolently disposed towards his tribe; and, as to the great Creator, no one but an absolute pessimist could find all his works evil. These beings are, therefore, qualified to become objects of religious behavior.

It comes to pass, moreover, that the forces of nature most readily personified and used in worship are those concerned in the production of things and events valuable to the individual and the group. If a community is dependent upon the sea for its existence, its interest goes, naturally, to whatever possesses the powers necessary to make fishing productive and safe. If a tribe subsists mainly upon agriculture, its religious dealings will be chiefly with gods of fertility and of vegetation; and sex-symbols may be prominent in the representation of its gods. In dry regions, much of the ritual will center about

rain and spring gods. The divinities will thus not only be part of the social order, but they will be conceived so as to be closely related to the economic and geographic factors.

As to the general fact of man's entering into social relations with the gods he has conceived, it needs, as we have already said, no other explanation than is afforded by the lust for life and the knowledge, acquired in human intercourse, of ways of influencing the behavior of others.

THE ORIGIN OF MYSTICAL RELIGION.—We have seen in the first chapter that the religious life is woven of two strands, one business-like and the other mystical. The gods whose origin we have just traced lend themselves most readily to the former, for they are thought of, in the first instance, as personalities sharply distinct from man and standing before him very much as a great chief stands before his subjects. Miss Kingsley tells us how a chief of the West African coast would "go out alone, conscious of the weight of the responsibility on him of the lives and happiness of his people. He would talk calmly, proudly, respectfully, to the great god who, he knew, rules the spirit world. It was like a great diplomat talking to another great diplomat." That, with the difference that ordinarily man assumes a humbler attitude towards his god, represents the business-like religious relation. It constitutes the more obvious aspect of the religions.

There are moments, however, when men do not seek the assistance of their gods for some particular objects; they aim at nothing less than union with them. This desire, this need, leads to the mystical relation. One may see in this appalling desire an expression of the limitlessness of man's ambition. He can be entirely satisfied, it seems, with nothing less than the possession of all the

power and blessedness which he attributes to the gods. Not only does he nourish this audacious desire, but he believes that he has found means of realizing it.

Three kinds of experience, familiar to the non-civilized, make him, as he thinks, one with the Invisibles; they are, sacred ceremonies, the use of certain intoxicants, and fasting. Let us consider them briefly.

Much has been written on the psychology of the crowd in explanation of the effects produced on the individual by participation in group action. When men are joined in a crowd, or, better still, in an organized group, for some sacred purpose—a magical or a religious ceremony—there often steals upon the individual a curious impression of being lifted above his ordinary level and, at the same time, of undergoing a loss of individuality; it is as if a fusion with another-than-self were taking place. These alterations have been well described by Cornford in *From Religion to Philosophy:* "When a totem-clan meets to hold its peculiar dance, such nascent sense of individuality that a savage may have is merged and lost. The group is now feeling and acting as one soul, with a total force much greater than any of its members could exercise in isolation. The individual is lost, 'beside himself,' in one of those states of contagious enthusiasm in which it is well known that men become capable of feats which far outrange their normal powers." Thus, in collective activity, the individual may become aware of the presence within himself of a power apparently greater than himself, and seemingly coming from beyond himself. The psychologists can, without having recourse to some transcendent beings, explain this impression of superhuman power generated in the presence of others, but the primitive can hardly help feeling that he has been in communication with mysterious super-human agents.

Certain intoxicants produce a similar impression. In nearly all non-civilized populations, drugs are used in religious ceremonies. An historian of religion states that: "The negroes of the Niger had their 'fetish water'; the Creek Indians of Florida, their 'black drink.' In many parts of the United States the natives smoked stramonium, the Mexican tribes swallowed the *peyotl* and the snake plant, the tribes of California and the Samoyeds of Siberia had found a poisonous toadstool—all to bring about communications with the Divine and to induce ecstatic visions." (Brinton, *The Religion of Primitive Peoples.*)

In *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism* we have examined the effects of the drugs and other physical means used to produce divine powers or divine union. A brief summary of conclusions will have to suffice here. Visual and auditory hallucinations, produced by these means, convince the primitive that he sees and hears, unhampered by opaque obstacles or by distance, and that he travels through space according to his good pleasure. A partial anesthesia of the skin and muscles makes him feel as if the body had lost its grossness, had become as tenuous as the body ascribed to spirits. The social constraints which weigh so heavily upon all of us, the savage not excepted, are no longer felt, and there is an exhilarating assurance of being more than able to cope with the difficulties of life. The mind seems to have broken with its earthly shackles, taken wings and soared, unrestricted, in a world of infinite possibilities. If to be human means to be hemmed in at every turn by physical and moral infirmities, then the condition of seeming freedom and power produced by intoxicants must in truth seem divine.

That the impression due to sacred drugs is delusive, that they do not make man equal to gods, was obvious to a careful observer even before the physiologist and the

psychologist came with their delicate instruments and placed beyond doubt the illusory nature of that glorious sense of intellectual and muscular power. What these drugs do is to silence the aches and the worries, to remove the sense of effort, of difficulties, and of limitation; they do not increase physical or intellectual abilities, or permanently remove the causes of moral suffering.

We must not fail to note that similar effects may take place as the result of exhaustion, whether produced by fasting or otherwise. There seems to be a phase of exhaustion when visions are likely to occur and when a surprising release from feelings of pain and fatigue coincide with a sense of ease, comfort, and power. That is the reason why fasting also is regarded by the uncivilized as a means of acquiring divine powers and of holding intercourse with the Invisible World.

Such are the main sources for the non-civilized of his firm conviction of the possibility of communion or union with the divine, i.e., of mystical religion. It is a firm conviction because it has behind it the weight of "experience," even as the Christian's assurance of the reality of God is held to be beyond doubt because of the peace, the strength, the joy, found in prayer.

Let us remark in closing that, if the great-ancestors, the nature-gods, and the remote Creator-god, assume, because of their origin, an objective, external existence, the mystical experiences leave one with a much less clearly individualized conception of the divine. The mystical god is *felt* rather than objectified in images; he is immanent rather than transcendent.

Philosophers have provided metaphysical arguments in support of the reality of divinities variously defined. We

are to bear in mind, however, that belief in divinities has had its origin in experiences such as those described in this chapter, and that experiences of the same sort, and not metaphysical arguments, continue to be its essential cause.

IV

MAKING THE GODS USEFUL

THE development of the god-conceptions follows two directions. On the one hand, they are changed with amazingly little regard for facts and logic in order to satisfy the desires traditionally referred to the "heart." On the other, they are transformed, as knowledge increases, in order to give satisfaction to the desire for understanding—a desire traditionally referred to the "head." The story of these transformations constitutes the essential and fascinating history of the gods. We shall be concerned with only two features of that history: their moralization and their depersonalization; the first illustrates their development under the influence of the heart, and the second their development under the influence of the head.

THE MORALIZATION OF THE GODS.—The original god-conceptions were not the creation of desire. Whether nature-gods, great ancestors, or creator-gods, they appeared as unavoidable explanations of observed facts. One of the consequences of this origin of the primary gods is that they were not necessarily interested in the ethical quality of man's behavior. With the possible exception of ancestor-gods, they were, on the whole, unconcerned with morality. The storm destroys indiscriminately, the sun shines on the just and on the unjust; the spring gives and withholds its gifts capriciously. "Man holds some things

wrong and some right, but to God all things are fair and good and right," said Heraclitus.

If any morality was lurking in original divinities, it must have been in great-ancestors. They, it seems, must have been concerned with the behavior of those to whom they were related. As a matter of fact, however, primitive man did not at first regard his divine ancestors as in any definite way the guardians of the tribal virtues. That appeared in the relation he maintained with them: much of his time was spent in attempts to prevent them from doing harm and in bribing them to do good.

But if the gods were originally explanatory notions without ethical significance, they did not long remain so; they became virtuous; and, ultimately, stood as perfect representatives and guardians of morality.

When traditional opinion affirms that the virtues come from the gods, it puts the cart before the oxen. The virtues are revealed to man in the humdrum details of social life; in the family and tribal relations he discovers the value of helpfulness, kindliness, loyalty, generosity. And, as he discovers these virtues, he comes to conceive his gods as possessing them and as demanding their practice. The history of that transformation shows that man moralizes his gods not only because it seems rational to endow them with what he considers good, but because, then, they become powerful supports of his infirm purpose to live righteously.

The history of the crude tribal God of the ancient Israelites may serve as an illustration of the rôle played by the desire for divine help in the development of the god-conceptions. What sort of god did the ancient Hebrews need as they undertook the conquest of the fertile land of the Canaanites, long coveted from the semi-desert country in which they had been wandering since their departure

from Egypt? Not the righteous, compassionate God of their later prophets, but the terrible Jehovah who was ready to order the massacre of the rightful inhabitants of the land, men, women and children, in order that his people might occupy it.

The virtues possessed by the early Jehovah were those most needed to lead to the realization of the purpose of his people. Whatever weakened that purpose or endangered its accomplishment was sin in the eyes of the Lord who had covenanted to see this barbarous business through. This cruel and vengeful war-chief bears little resemblance to the God of the later prophets, the friend of the oppressed, who tempered righteousness with compassion. It was under the influence of repeated defeats at the hands of the surrounding nations—Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians—and of the loss of all hope of ever realizing the dream of worldly dominance, that Jehovah was shorn of his warlike virtues and endowed with traits more useful to an oppressed and disheartened people. Having discovered in their new rôle of underdogs that there is something detestable called injustice, and something desirable called mercy, generosity, kindness, the Hebrews made of their God a model and a source of these virtues.

Because the goodness of the gods is derived from men's ideals, divine morality always lags behind that of the best among men. There is in Shinto scarcely any suggestion of a moral code, there is no direct moral teaching in the sacred books of Japan. Yet the ancient Japanese condemned theft, lying, adultery, and valued the ordinary social virtues. The same thing is true of the Greeks. We have already had occasion to refer to the elimination of certain gods, the improvement of others, and the introduction of new and superior gods in the Homeric epics. Gilbert Murray summarizes this movement as "a moral

expurgation of the old rites, an attempt to bring order into the old chaos, and an adaptation to new (and higher) social needs." The Olympian gods remained, nevertheless, on the whole, far below the morality taught by the Greek philosophers. None of the Greek deities came up to the level of Plato's ethics; even the best of them were, on occasion, guilty of human weaknesses such as deceitfulness, resentfulness, and jealousy.

Every religious founder has been a reformer of the gods. Zoroaster, a thousand years before Christ, classified the old Aryan gods according to their ethical worth. On the one side, in the Kingdom of Light, he placed those who were sufficiently good; and in the Kingdom of Darkness, the others. At the head of the Kingdom of Light ruled what seems to have been Zoroaster's own creation, Ahura Mazda, the perfect One, the embodiment of all good. In Christ there came to perfect expression the consciousness of the supreme value of brotherly love, a conviction which had been slowly finding form in the consciousness of the Hebrew prophets.

The motives at the root of the moralization of the gods are no other than those to which parents owe their idealization at the hands of their young children. A child endows his parents with the powers and the qualities which he finds desirable and in which he feels himself to be lacking,—this, not only because his parents demonstrate daily that they possess in some measure some of these traits. He goes far beyond the evidence; he is blind not only to the limitation of his parents' power but even to evidences of their vices. He idealizes because belief in the omnipotence and perfect goodness of the father is a source of priceless peace and confidence. With a father such as he has made, no harm can befall him; he has a refuge against all dangers, and the faith he needs to live at his best.

Thus the idealization of gods, parents, and other heroes is one of life's ways—tricks, if you like,—of furthering its own ends.

The extent to which civilized humanity goes beyond, and even against observable facts in its will-to-believe in the Perfect is a great marvel. No amount of inexplicable evil in the world seems able to destroy that confidence. To bestow upon fathers, heroes, and gods the powers and virtues in which one is lacking; and then to derive from them, by an unconscious autosuggestion, something of the treasure with which we have endowed them, is one of the most curious and important methods of social progress,—it realizes the miracle of lifting oneself up by one's boot straps.

THE DEPERSONALIZATION OF THE GODS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.—Explanations of striking objects and events led, as we have seen, to the primary conceptions of divinities, i.e., to personal gods with whom can be maintained profitably social relations. But these naïve interpretations were merely the first, or one of the first steps in a sustained effort to understand causal relations. Greater knowledge led to another type of conception of the divine, namely, an impersonal Absolute, an infinite First Cause—a conception which, in good logic, would make social relations and, therefore, the religions impossible.

The God of the Christian creeds unites these two incompatible features: he possesses the essential mental traits of a human person, and can, therefore, sympathize with man and minister to his happiness. He is also an infinite, impersonal Absolute and, as such, cannot be affected by man's behavior. The social, personal traits of God are due to man's desire for some one able and willing to protect, comfort, do justice, and otherwise gratify the needs of

the heart; his impersonality is the outcome of a desire to understand rationally, logically, to see things as they are and not as we would like them to be. No god who is not both personal and impersonal can altogether satisfy human nature, compounded as it is of heart and head. The presence of these contradictory features in the conception of God accounts for confusions and compromises, some tragic and some ridiculous, which afflict civilized humanity.

Note on the Meaning of the Expression "Personal God."—As the term "personal" is subject to various meanings, we had better say that by a "personal" god we mean a being who, like man, is an individual self, distinct from other selves, and moved to action by feelings and emotions in some such way as human beings are. A "personal" god, as we shall use the term, need not have the form of man, i.e., he need not be anthropomorphic, but he must be anthropopathic (feel like man), otherwise he is not to be called "personal."

The following frank remarks of the distinguished philosopher Bradley upon the use of "personal" in two senses deserve to be quoted: "And if by personality we are to understand the highest form of finite spiritual development, then certainly in an eminent degree the Absolute is personal. For the higher (we may repeat) is always the more real." He regrets this use of the term "personal" mainly "because it is misleading and directly serves the cause of dishonesty." "For most of those who insist on what they call 'the personality of God' are intellectually dishonest. They desire one conclusion, and, to reach it, they argue for another. . . . They desire a person in the sense of self, amongst and over against other selves, moved by personal relations and feelings toward these others—feelings and relations which are altered by the conduct of others. And, for their purpose, what is not this, is really nothing. . . . Of course, for us to ask seriously, if the Absolute can be personal in such a way, would be quite absurd. And my business for the moment is not with truth, but with intellectual honesty." (F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality.*)

· When consciousness is attributed to the Absolute, as in the Hegelian metaphysics, it should be added in order to preclude deception, that the consciousness of the Absolute and human consciousness "cannot be comprehended in a single conception." So that "consciousness" in the Absolute and "consciousness" in man is not a point of agreement, but one of divergence; for the term is used in two different senses according as it is applied to one or to the other. (T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics.*)

Of these two opposed characteristics of the God of Christianity—his personality and his impersonality—the first was mainly derived from the Hebrews, the second from the Greeks. The different contribution of these two peoples reflects differences in mental habits due chiefly, it seems, to differences in the circumstances in their national life.

The life of the Israelites had been one of particular difficulty; a semi-desert was their abode, and it seemed almost beyond their strength to succeed in establishing themselves in the fertile land of the Canaanites. Hardly were they firmly settled in the promised land when there descended upon them, in rapid succession, the numberless hosts of the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Persians, the Romans. Throughout their early existence in Palestine, the Hebrews were engrossed in intense struggles against enemies far more numerous than they. If ever nation needed a powerful god to help them, it was the Israelites. Under these circumstances their great men could hardly be interested in theoretical speculations about God: they did not enjoy the mental peace required by the dispassionate thinker. The struggle for life was too keen for them to care for abstract truth; they wanted a helper.

The position of the Hellenes during their great creative period was very different from that of the fighting or enslaved Hebrews. They had in earlier times delighted their

fancy with the creation of the rich Olympian mythology. Now, they were living in a beautiful city, with an abundance of servant-slaves, conscious of their power. What need had they of gods to provide them with bread and deliver them from enemies? They were, on the whole, a self-satisfied, self-reliant, happy population. That was not a situation apt to bring forth such a god as came out of the needs of the ever struggling Hebrews. The Greeks of the great period could assume a detached and dispassionate attitude towards the universe. In that frame of mind they addressed themselves with the enjoyment of creative artists to the solution of the ultimate problems. One of the results of their dispassionate consideration of the problem of God was the conception of an impersonal Being, an infinite, ineffable Absolute, i.e., a God who did not possess the attributes demanded by the "heart."

God in Greek Philosophy.—Plato's conception of the divine is so abstract as to baffle the ordinary mind. He identifies God with the *Idea of the good.* Exactly what he meant by that expression cannot be fully explained here. Let it be said merely that for Plato the world is rational and good because it is a copy of the Idea, and the only true divine worship is virtue and knowledge. The question of the self-consciousness and personality of God, warmly debated by later philosophers, was not even raised by Plato. In any case, his God did not possess the traits of personality demanded by the human heart when it yearns for companionship and for help in the various homely circumstances of life.

Plato's great disciple, Aristotle, was more definite and easier to understand on the subject of the relation of the Deity to man. He rejected completely the belief in any interference of God in the universe: every effect in nature and every experience in the human mind he referred to natural causes. His God is altogether impersonal, and, therefore, outside the reach of man by any formal worship.

The philosophical schools which followed drew from these two giant minds what suited them, and developed philosoph-

ical systems more or less akin to theirs. But none of the great systems, elaborated before Christ and in the first century, would justify the behavior towards God characteristic of the disciples of all the historical religions.

In Stoicism is found an early expression of the pantheism subsequently developed by the Neo-platonists, by Plotinus in particular, in a way fraught with the most important consequences for religion. The Stoics reasoned thus: since the universe is the work of God and since it contains certain parts endowed with self-consciousness (man in any case), and since the whole must be more perfect than any of its parts, the world as a whole cannot be unconscious. The consciousness belonging to the universe is God. This God permeates the world as an all-pervading breath; it is the soul and reason of the universe. It would be absurd to identify this Stoic God with the God of Christian worship; he would be better described in the words of Pliny, "God is the helping of man by man"; that is a god in whom even atheists may readily believe.

Let us see more fully what happened when Hebraic and Hellenic currents met in the making of the Christian creeds. The early apologists and Church Fathers lived in a world permeated with Greek thought. At the time of the formation of the Christian doctrine of God, there was no other philosophy but what had come from the Greeks, mainly from Plato, the Stoics, the Epicureans, Plotinus, and other Neo-platonists. The Church Fathers (Clement of Alexandria, Irenæus, Origen, Tertullian, Athanasius, St. Augustine, etc.) were both philosophers and fervent disciples of the Nazarene. In their attempt at defining God and his relation to man, they were moved, on the one hand, by the philosophical conceptions of the time; and, on the other, by the motives at the root of Christian Judaism, i.e., by what we have called the motives of the head and of the heart.

How could these creed-makers reconcile the infinitude, the absoluteness, and the impassivity of God—attributes

which reason found it necessary to ascribe to him—with features of personality required by human hearts yearning for friendship and help? One cannot enter into social relations with the Absolute: some at least of the Church Fathers were aware of that. St. Augustine recognized that the expression "mercy" could not properly be applied to the Absolute God, since the word implies suffering through the suffering of others. Nevertheless, he thought himself justified in using the term in order *to save the ignorant from stumbling.* He went further, for his own *Confessions* show him maintaining tender relations with his God,—relations more dignified, to be sure, but of the same character as those described by more ignorant and not less lovesick Christian mystics.

The intellectual gymnastics to which the Church Fathers were prompted by this perplexing situation are a monument to man's resourcefulness and, in particular, to his ability to believe the unbelievable in order to live content. The achievements of these men equal probably any other self-deception achieved by humanity.

In the effort to depict God under features satisfactory both to reason and desire, Origen (185-253) distinguished himself more perhaps than any other. He managed to prove that although God is omniscient and omnipotent, he is neither; i.e., both his omniscience and his omnipotence have limits. He contrived also to reconcile the absolute apathy of God, his absence of compassion and pity, with his non-apathy. A curious and most useful conception, the Logos,[1] was brought into service. In becoming the Logos, God divested himself, in the interests of the world, of his absolute apathy. As Logos, he created the universe, and, later, became man in Jesus, the incarnation of the Logos and the second person of the Trinity.

The recognition of the unknowableness of the infinite God by finite human intelligence led to another curious invention,

[1] As used by the Greek and Hebrew philosophers the Logos meant the reason immanent in the world.

the doctrine of mystical knowledge. It is the most daring blow aimed at the claim of reason to supremacy. The argument for mystical knowledge assumes, perhaps, its most definite form in Plotinus (204-270): the Original Essence is without limit form or definition. No attribute belonging to finite man can be ascribed to it; neither thought, nor volition, nor activity, not even self-consciousness. How, then, could man know God? Assuredly not by intelligence, since there is nothing in God describable in terms of human thought. Only by turning away from intelligence and rising above it in the ecstatic state, where thinking ceases, can man approach and make contact with God. In ecstasy man achieves the only possible "knowledge" of God. But this is another manner of knowledge than the ordinary one. Thus Plotinus argued; and from that day to this there has been talk of two kinds of knowledge: the ordinary knowledge, which comes through observation and thought; and the superhuman, mystical knowledge, which comes some other way.

In *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism* we have endeavored to set forth the nature and meaning of mysticism. Our main conclusion was that this attempt to rise above the limitation of rational knowledge was a huge self-deception.

The alleged existence of a superhuman source of knowledge is mainly responsible for the amazing doctrine of Faith invented by the Christian church. The doctrine acknowledges that no truth can be *against reason;* some truths may *seem* to be, when reason is insufficient to understand. We are here, it is affirmed, in the presence of truths not against but above reason. In order to accept them an effort of the will must be made. The intellect assents to the articles of Faith in obedience to the command of the will, and not because forced to do so by the recognition of their truth, says Thomas Aquinas (1227-1274), the philosopher of the Roman Catholic Church.[2]

[2] According to the teaching of that church, faith is " 'the act of the intellect assenting to a Divine truth owing to the movement of the will, which is itself moved by the Grace of God' (St. Thomas Aquinas). And just as the light of Faith is a gift supernaturally bestowed upon the understanding, so also this Divine grace moving the will is, as its name implies, an equally supernatural and an absolutely gratuitous gift. Neither gift is due to previous study, neither of them can be acquired by human efforts, but, 'Ask and you shall receive.' " (*Catholic Encyclopedia,* article "Faith.")

The outcome for the Christian church of the anxious labors of the Fathers in their search for an acceptable definition of God, was, it has now appeared, a juxtaposition of two mutually exclusive conceptions: one, the fruit of dispassionate thought, a God, infinite, ineffable, unchangeable, impassive, i.e., a God unfit for the purposes of the religions. The other, the naïve product of relentless cravings for help and companionship, a merciful, compassionate Father who hears us and is moved by our needs and sufferings to act beneficently, i.e., a conception of God false in the eyes of the philosopher but necessary to the existence of the religions. The extent and the depth of the disturbance caused in the discussions about God and religion by the failure to recognize clearly the mutual exclusiveness of these two ideas, have not been fully recognized. These two incompatible conceptions of God remain in the books of worship because a Janus-headed God is well adapted to the propensity of man to pass from the rational to the practical attitude, to be ruled now by the head, now by the heart. The prayer books suit those who say, "I feel, therefore, that we have not only the right but perhaps even the duty to represent to ourselves the divine as personal. But, at the same time, we must never forget that this idea of the personal God 'corresponds' not to the nature of the divine, but only to the nature of man." If such persons ever feel the need to excuse the incongruity of their behavior, they may say with the German chancellor reproached for breaking a solemn international agreement, "Necessity knows no law."

The disregard of logic and knowledge by the religions was, probably, beneficial in the infancy of humanity. We shall argue in subsequent chapters that it is no longer so.

V

THE ORIGIN OF THE PRIMARY CONCEPTION OF CONTINUATION AFTER DEATH

THE only conceptions of continuation after death which we propose to consider are those designated here as the "Primary," and the "Christian" conceptions. We shall see that, earlier than the Christian belief in immortality, there existed in the countries in which it originated another belief in continuation after death, quite different with regard to origin, nature, and function. The sharp and vital differences existing between these two conceptions have been so little recognized that they are often spoken of together as if they constituted one and the same belief.

The creative activity of humanity in its efforts towards self-realization, and its readiness to disregard objective facts, is strikingly illustrated in the origin and development of these two beliefs.

The expression "immortality," when used to designate the belief of uncivilized man in a Hereafter, had better be avoided, for it is inaccurate. He does not think of infinite existence but merely of indefinite duration. According to his understanding of the matter, it happens not infrequently that, through accident or otherwise, ghosts come to an end; and in the opinion of some savages, there are persons who have no soul and who, therefore, do not survive death at all.

"It might be hard to point to a single tribe of men, however savage, of whom one could say with certainty that the faith (in a Hereafter), is totally wanting," writes J. G. Frazer, whose knowledge of uncivilized men is probably unrivaled. Other competent anthropologists affirm, with less caution, the presence of that belief in every tribe however removed from civilization.

The Main Features of the Primary Idea of Continuation After Death.—The separation made by death between the living and the departed is much less radical than might be imagined. The ghost is not, for the savage, what the modern philosopher calls a "spirit"; the modern distinction between spirit and matter does not exist for him. If ghosts are usually invisible, they are not immaterial; they may be seen by old men or by members of a superior race. Africans have been known to ask a white traveler to catch a troublesome ghost for them.

The World of the Dead is variously, and more or less vaguely, located somewhere to the east or to the west, under the earth, in or above the sky, on the other side of a mountain or of a river, on an island, in a cave, in or under the earth. The ghosts may also remain in the immediate neighborhood of the tribe to which they belong. Ordinarily, they are supposed to linger for a period after death about the place of burial, and then to depart for the land of the dead. That departure ends the period of mourning; it appears to coincide roughly with the complete decomposition of the body. With the removal of the ghost to ghostland, his relations with the living become more distant.

The Other World differs little from this one. As the individual was in this life, so he is in the other: either strong or weak, courageous or cowardly, clever or stupid,

rich or poor, young or old, healthy or sickly. The kings remain kings, and the slaves, slaves. Ghosts can be spoken to. Miss Kingsley relates how she heard a Negro speaking aloud to his dead mother, just as if she were beside him. In certain islands of Melanesia, "all ghosts, upon leaving the body, swim . . . to two islands lying off Marau in Guadalcanar. The children chatter and annoy the elder ghosts, so they are placed apart upon the second island; men and women ghosts are together, they have houses, gardens, and canoes, yet all is unsubstantial. Living men cross to Marapa and see nothing; but there is water there in which laughter and cries are heard; there are places where water is seen to have been disturbed, and the banks are wet as if bathers had been there." (R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians.*)

The belief that one enters the next World in the condition in which one leaves this one, leads to practices most revolting to us. Some Australians and Fijians, for instance, put their relatives to death before they are very old in order that they may not be too feeble to care for themselves in the other world. These prescribed murders might be regarded as illustrations of a real belief in survival; but the desire to get rid of useless mouths should not be left out in an estimation of the significance of this custom.

Ghosts are regarded by all savages as mischief-makers, causes of sickness, death, and poverty; and the majority of the ceremonies connected with death and burial aim at preventing the ghost from returning to the living, or at warding off his nefarious activities. Curious methods are used to throw off the track the ghost who might try to return to the body or the hut just vacated. Among the Tuski of Alaska "those who die a natural death are carried out through a hole cut in the back of the hut. This

is immediately closed up so that the spirit of the dead man may not find his way back." For the same reason, the corpse is sometimes let out of the house through the floor, or is carried two or three times round the house at top speed so as to bewilder the ghost.

Elsewhere, "when a man is dying, his friends bring him food and say 'be good; if you leave us, leave us for good.' Among the Igorrotes of the Philippines, during the first days following death, the old women and then the old men sing several times the following chant: 'Now you are dead. . . . We have given you everything that was necessary and made fitting preparations for burial. Do not come back to fetch any of your relatives or friends.' " (Lévy-Bruhl, *Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures.*)

These efforts to keep away and get rid of ghosts are not to be taken as expressions of entire lack of affection. Proofs of friendly feelings are many. In Australia, ghosts are "generally looked upon rather as beneficent, especially for the members of their families; . . . the soul of the father returns to help the growth of his children or grandchildren." (Durkheim, *Les Formes Elémentaires de la Vie Religieuse.*) But, after all, ghosts are no longer quite the persons known on this earth; who can tell what these mysterious beings may be about?

The causes of the universal fear of ghosts are many. The main one is doubtless the one just referred to,—an instinctive apprehension of the mysterious; the unknown is feared. And fear breeds antipathy; for one cannot like that which keeps one continually in a state of fearful suspense. Under these circumstances, it unavoidably comes to pass that the commission of particular evil deeds is ascribed to ghosts. However blameless he may really be,

a disliked person is soon blackened by numberless sins of omission and commission.

The Origin of the Primary Conception.—Such are the main aspects of the Primary belief in survival. What is its origin? How does the savage come by it? Three characteristic traits brought out in the foregoing descriptions may serve to guide our search. (a) The Primary belief is as firmly held by the savage as the belief in the existence of objects perceived by the senses. (b) There is no indication that he desires a future life; whether he likes it or not, the ghost exists and has to be taken into account. (c) His own future concerns him but little; it is with the ghosts of others that he is concerned, and that, mainly, under an apprehension of the harm they may do him. These features indicate that we are here in the presence not of a creation of desire, but of a belief imposed, as it were, from without, in some such way as the belief in the existence of the physical world.

There is no lack of striking and frequent experiences which could provide both the idea of a ghostly existence after death and a quasi-perceptual assurance of its objective truth. We shall mention three of them, the more important ones in our opinion. A fuller discussion may be found in *The Belief in God and Immortality.*

A general state of apprehension and the frequent definite fears to which man is subject, together with the almost ineradicable habit of assigning personal causes to events, may have been enough to give rise to the belief in the existence of spirits in general. "Fear," said Hobbes in *Leviathan,* "must needs have for object something. And, therefore, when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good or evil fortune but some Power or Agent *invisible.*" From the belief in in-

visible personal powers to that in human ghosts who have survived death, there would be but an easy step. There are, as a matter of fact, many events in which a believer in spirits could hardly fail to recognize the hand of a person recently buried: the harm or the good done, would seem to be just what the dead would have liked to do; and to have been done in the very way he would have done it!

There is an experience known to many people, perhaps to all, which may be called the Sense of Invisible Presence. It is an assurance of the presence of some one in the absence of any testimony from sight, sound, or touch. Nevertheless, it has the immediacy and the compelling power of perception by the external senses. Illustrations and an explanation of this phenomenon have been provided in a chapter of this book. If we may assume that early man was subject to it—and we do not know why he should not have been—it may well have had an important share in the establishment of the ghost-belief.

Of more importance are the apparitions, in the dreams of sleep and in the visions of waking life, of persons who have died.[1] All the necessary requisites for the production of the belief are clearly present in these frequent experiences. For the uncivilized, dreams and visions possess a reality of the same sort as that of perception. Students of primitive peoples tell us that "what a savage experiences during a dream is just as real to him as what he sees when he is awake." A Cherokee Indian who has just dreamt that he was bitten by a snake-ghost, must follow the same treatment as if he had been bitten by a snake when awake, otherwise the place would swell and ulcerate,

[1] The derivation from dreams of the belief in ghosts is mainly due to Edward B. Tylor. (See his epoch-making work, *Primitive Culture*.) Doubts have recently been cast upon this hypothesis, but without sufficient reason. Tylor's theory is not to be cast aside, it is merely to be completed by addition, to the visions of dreams and trances, of other common experiences likely to lead to the same belief.

immediately or years afterwards. Sir Everard in Thurn relates the following incident: "One morning, when it was important to me to get away from camp on the Essequibo River, at which I had been detained for some days by the illness of some of my Indian companions, I found that one of the invalids, a young Macusi, though better in health, was so enraged against me that he refused to stir, for he declared that, with great want of consideration for his weak health, I had taken him out during the night and had made him haul the canoe up a series of difficult cataracts. Nothing could persuade him that this was a dream, and it was some time before he was so far pacified as to throw himself sulkily in the bottom of the canoe. At that time we were all suffering from a great scarcity of food, and hunger having its usual effect in producing vivid dreams, similar effects similarly occurred. More than once the men declared in the morning that some absent men, whom they named, had come during the night, and had beaten or otherwise maltreated them; and they insisted on much rubbing of the bruised parts of their bodies." (Edward Clodd, *Animism.*)

What more natural and less avoidable, for a person in the condition of the savage, than to take certain dreams at their face value,—this dream, for instance: he sees his arch enemy, comes to grips with him, feels his hand round his throat and awakens just as he is about to suffocate. Nothing could be more vivid and tangible. How is he going to account for this adventure, unless he regards it as meaning that, somehow or other, the enemy recently buried still lives and has attacked him during the night? What simpler explanation is within his reach? Let us remember that even among us there are those who are, at times at least, content with that explanation.

To dreams must be added visions of waking life, of

fever, and of other abnormal conditions. The savage is subject to and deeply influenced by visions. They affect not only the seer but also those observing him: the dramatic behavior of the hallucinated may convey to the witnesses, more vividly and irresistibly than any verbal account, a sense of invisible presences.

It should not be forgotten that persons of great mental distinction and ability, as well as commonplace and totally insane people, have been favored by, or plagued with visions of such vividness and convincingness that belief in their reality was inescapable. In many instances, such visions have played a determining rôle in great social movements, particularly in religions; notable in this respect are the cases of Mohammed, Swedenborg, and Joan of Arc.

The profound influence which a gifted savage, suffering from occasional hallucination, might exercise upon his contemporaries, can hardly be overestimated. It is one of the errors of anthropologists not to take sufficiently into account the unusual person, the genius. For among savages also, there are originators.

Each of these three kinds of experience possesses the qualifications required to lead the savage to belief in survival; i.e., all three are for him equivalent to direct sensory perception. Are we to hold that each of them contributed equally to the formation of the belief in survival, or that one of them was the determinant factor while the others served merely to confirm the belief? No assured answer can be given to these queries. The dreams of sleep and the visions of waking life seem likely to have played a leading rôle.

Making the Hereafter a Paradise and an Instrument of Moralization.—The foregoing picture represents the ghosts

and the Other Life as originally thought of. It is a conception of the future life radically different from the Christian idea of immortality, for it does not give satisfaction to any craving and it is independent of any moral consideration; it is in no sense a reward for virtue or a punishment for vice.

It was surely not long, however, before, under the influence of desire, the conception of the Hereafter was altered so as to make of it an instrument of individual satisfaction. In many places appeared a belief in survival very different from the one we have pictured. The tribes of arid central Australia, for instance, place ghost-land in a well-watered country. In German New Guinea, the Monumbo, who, we are told, "are acquainted with no supreme Being, no moral good or evil, no rewards, no place of punishment or joy after death, no permanent immortality," believe, nevertheless, that in the land of spirits the souls dwell without working or suffering. "Betel-chewing, smoking, dancing, sleeping, all the occupations that they loved on earth, are continued without interruption in the other world." Among the North American Indians, the place of the dead is generally pictured as a Happy Hunting Ground, in which wishes are gratified without painful effort. Thus an undesired Hereafter, forced upon man as an explanation for various experiences, is transformed into a paradise.

There is no cause for surprise in this development of the Hereafter; but its transformation into an instrument of moralization is more remarkable. This momentous alteration is first indicated by obstacles to be overcome, dangers to be avoided, and ordeals to be successfully met before the ghost may be established in his new quarters.

Some of these difficulties are merely the creations of fantasy, without moral significance; the savage has amused

himself by inventing dramatic or comic incidents. Certain tribes in New Guinea relate, for instance, that a ladder is placed over a great water for the souls to pass over on their way to the land of the dead. A spirit who has the ladder in his keeping exacts gifts of all who wish to go by. If any attempt is made to sneak across without paying toll, the ladder is tipped up, the ghost falls and is drowned.

But, side by side with merely playful stories of the dangers threatening the ghost on his journey, one finds indications of the advantage to the ghost of having possessed in his earthly life certain traits valuable to the tribe, or of having performed faithfully certain tribal customs. In Northern Melanesia those who have been niggardly on earth are punished on their way to ghost-land. Furthermore, all breaches of etiquette or of the ordinary customs of the country are met with appropriate punishments in spirit-land. Among the Fijians, "the fate of a bachelor ghost is a hard one. In the first place, there is a terrible being, called the Great Woman, who lurks in a shady defile, ready to pounce upon him; and, if he escapes her clutches, it is only to fall in with a much worse monster from whom there is no escape. So vigilant and alert is this monster that not a single unmarried Fijian ghost has ever reached the mansions of the Blessed." The Blackfeet Indians of Saskatchewan deny admission to the future Life to those who have spilled the blood of their tribes' people, and to women guilty of infanticide.

When, instead of being punished for the neglect of one or two valuable customs, the ghost is made to stand a general examination into his conduct on earth, a great stride forward has been made in the moralization of the Hereafter. This stage had been reached in Egypt probably as early as the Middle Kingdom; the *Book of the Dead* marks

its advent. Before that time, although the Egyptians had already attained a considerable civilization, righteousness was not among the conditions of entrance into the other world. Kings were able to secure a place in the land of the Sun not through their social virtues but through their rank, their power, and their "equipped mouth," i.e., their knowledge of the ritual, religious and magical. King Pepi, for instance, although he valued courage, loyalty, kindliness and other virtues making for social cohesion and happiness, became a glorious one, "by reason of his equipped mouth." He was, it is true, to undergo a purification, but this might take place after his arrival in the sky, and was usually intended to produce nothing more than a ceremonial purification.

In the *Book of the Dead,* Osiris appears as judge before whom stands the balance on which the heart of the deceased is to be weighed against Truth. The dead makes a confession in which he declares that he is free from a long list of sins. Many of the offenses which he disclaims are mere breaches of religious or magical etiquette, but others make it clear that no man is now considered "justified" and fit to enter the world of the dead unless he declares himself free from all the ordinary sins. It is true that the soul's attitude before the heavenly court has nothing of the humility of a confession. The soul is *instructed* by the *Book of the Dead* to affirm his innocence of murder, stealing, cheating, lying, avariciousness, pride, covetousness, etc. This is not yet the genuine ethical relation that came to exist later between moralized gods and sensitive consciences.

Let us observe a parallelism in the development of the idea of continuation after death and of the god-conceptions. Originally they were both, not creations of desire, but unavoidable explanations of phenomena without eth-

ical significance. Man's craving for happiness and self-realization led to the addition of traits which gave to both conceptions a personal and social utility. We shall see now that the socially valuable traits added to the Primary Conception of immortality—naïve paradises and rewards and punishments—soon fell away from it; their appearance was merely episodic in its history.

The Final Form of the Primary Conception.—When one passes from the savage to the civilized or half-civilized peoples from whom Europe has derived its civilization, i.e., the peoples around the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea—Egyptians, Babylonians, Hebrews, Greeks, and others—one finds that the picture of the Other World has assumed the somberest colors. And the nearer one approaches to the Christian era, the more marked is the hopeless desire to escape from the repulsive fate thought to be in store for man.

In Egypt, a country which reached a considerable development at a much earlier time than either Palestine or Greece, the final form of the Primary belief had appeared before 3400 B.C. The Pyramid Texts provide definite glimpses of a prehistoric religion of the Underworld in which the dead continue an unhappy existence under the earth. "It involved," writes Breasted, "a forbidding hereafter which was dreaded." A dead woman is represented as saying to the husband she has left behind, "Oh, my comrade, my husband. Cease not to eat and drink, to be drunken, to enjoy the love of women, to hold festivals. Follow thy longings by day and night. Give care no room in thy heart. For the West Land (a domain of the dead) is a land of sleep and darkness, a dwelling place wherein those who are there remain." (A. Wieldemann, *The Realm of the Egyptian Dead.*)

For the Babylonians, death made all men equal. There were no distinctions of rank in the underworld; kings, priests, conjurors, magicians, and common people all found themselves together in the dry and dusty Hurnugea. Everything one touched was dusty. "Dust and earth were the food, the muddy water the drink of those living the shadowy life of the Underworld." (Friedrich Delitzsch, *Das Land ohne Heimkehr.*) "The day of death is a day of sorrow, 'the day without mercy.' What distinguishes the dead from the living is their inactivity." They "are weak, and, therefore, unless others attend to their needs, they suffer pangs of hunger, or must content themselves with dust and clay as their food." (Morris Jastrow, *Aspects of Religious Beliefs and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria.*)

Among the Hebrews, Sheol, the place of the dead, was also a place of dread. The shades were forgotten of God; Jehovah was the God of the living, not of the dead. They are described in the Old Testament as *rephaim,* that is, feeble and ineffective creatures. "Go thy way," says Ecclesiastes, "eat thy bread with joy and drink thy wine with a merry heart. . . . Let thy garments be always white; and let not thy head lack oil. Live joyfully with the wife thou lovest all the days of thy life of vanity; . . . for there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in Sheol whither thou goest."

In Greece, the souls went to Hades bemoaning their lot, for it was wretched. From that dark country souls never returned, and with them there was no communication.

For centuries, this, the final form of the Primary belief, with its hopelessness and horror, oppressed the millions among whom European civilization was dawning. Why this change? Surely not because all optimism had departed from the human heart. That the impulses out of

which paradises are created were not dead was triumphantly demonstrated by the production, a little later, of the glorious modern conception of immortality. The temporary triumph of the dismal belief in impotent and vacuous souls is to be attributed to the inability of men, who had begun to think, to conceive of a person who possessed nothing better than a shadowy body as enjoying a tolerable existence.

The facts which proved survival, proved at the same time that the souls lacked weight, that they were tenuous to the point of being able to pass through invisible cracks. How could people so lacking in substance, mere shadows, live satisfactorily! The few fortunate individuals represented as having been translated to the Greek Elysium or the Hebrew heaven (notably the prophet Elijah, who was carried to heaven in a chariot of fire) to live there in happiness, did not pass through death and had consequently retained their full-fleshed body. The embalming custom and the erection of great pyramids to protect the embalmed bodies, were supreme efforts to preserve for the soul whatever could be preserved of the body.

The seriousness of the difficulty offered by the dissolution of the earthly body to a belief in happy survival, appears also in the Christian conception of immortality. Whatever we may believe to-day, the early Christians were not able to conceive of souls existing without an adequate body. They believed in the resurrection of the body, and were very much put to it to form a satisfactory idea of the nature of the "glorified" body and of its relation to the earthly body. What did that word "glorified" imply? According to Tertullian, a Church Father of the second century who contributed his share to the making of the creeds in which we are supposed to believe, the immortal bodies had teeth, admittedly unnecessary for

the purpose of eating, but, according to him, useful to illuminate an eternal smile.

Against the dismal prospect of the final form of the Primary belief in immortality, man rose in unyielding rebellion; and under the urge of desire, a new and vivifying belief made its appearance.

VI

THE ORIGIN OF THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF IMMORTALITY

THE reader may recall the surprising statement frequently made that, at the beginning of the historical period, the peoples to whom we have been referring had no thought of a personal soul and of its continuation after death. Historians of high standing say, for instance, that the Israelites' belief in immortality cannot be traced much farther back than the beginning of the Christian era, and that the great Hebrew prophets knew nothing of a survival after death. Of the Romans, J. B. Carter wrote that the idea of an individual soul and of its survival after death was not present at the time of the Punic wars (264-146 B.C.); and Pythagoras, the Mysteries, and Plato are usually named as marking the rise of the belief among the Greeks. And yet, in every one of these lands, incontrovertible evidence of the presence of what we have called the Primary belief existed long before the time referred to by these authors.

Georg Beer has shown that the old Jewish mourning customs originated with the desire for protection from the liberated spirit of the deceased. "The loud cries uttered by the mourners frighten away the spirits. The dress, the covering of the head with ashes, the shaving of the hair, the disfigurement and mutilation of the body aim at making the mourners unrecognisable." Saul is re-

ported as visiting the witch of Endor in order to have her summon up the ghost of Samuel.

The evidence for the belief in survival after death is just as clear in the case of the Greeks as in that of the Jews. The Homeric conception of man is of a dual personality, composed of a visible, earthly being and of its shadow or copy which continues to live in Hades after the severance of death. If the personages of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* did not offer any cult to the dead, earlier Greeks did. The books of Homer themselves contain remnants of that older faith. Jane Harrison has conclusively demonstrated that while the religion of the Olympic gods was in process of formation, and even much later, the Greeks practiced rites clearly indicative of the belief in human ghosts. They recognized two different classes of rites, one of the nature of "service" addressed to the Olympians, the other of the nature of "riddance" or "aversion," addressed to an order of beings wholly different.

If the existence before the Christian era, among the populations bordering the eastern end of the Mediterranean, of practices indicative of a belief in survival, is well established, it is equally evident that a definite and widespread antagonism to the Primary belief existed at that time. We have just seen that in Palestine, in Greece, and in Rome, the cults addressed to ghosts were deprecated; the leaders called them superstition.

But the rejection of the repulsive, devitalizing Primary belief did not leave man satisfied. One of the most striking facts in the history of humanity is the unwillingness to accept this life as the sum-total of existence. It would seem that nothing short of another life, in which the demands of reason, of justice, and of love should find their fulfillment, could make life on earth acceptable. Out of

these needs arose the belief which may conveniently be called the Christian belief in immortality.

It is hardly possible in a few pages to give a satisfactory account of the formation of that powerful belief; we shall do the best we can with the space at our disposal. For a time the greatness of the nation and its continuation satisfied whatever longings for the preservation of values were dimly present in the human breast; messianic dreams were born. Nowhere did such dreams take a more definite form and a stronger hold than among the Hebrews. The triumph of the coming Day of Jehovah embodied the national will-to-live endlessly in power and happiness. Highly individualized as we are, this identification of oneself with the nation is difficult for us to understand. Yet so it was; at that stage of development, little if any thought was given to the destiny of the individual; a vision of national greatness and permanence was sufficient.

When, later, the individual had become clearly conscious of his own independent worth and of the demands of reason, justice, and love, the situation was radically altered. If individual existence ended at death, then, whatever might happen to one's nation, life was irrational, unjust, and cruel. "All the labor of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius cannot be destined for extinction." This fateful conclusion was not, of course, reached suddenly, and it was not brought home to everybody. Here and there certain gifted individuals became aware of the inadmissibility of extinction and revealed it to those who had ears to hear.

The earliest expression known to us of the insufficiency of earthly life came from Egypt, but it is probably in Hebrew sacred literature that one sees best the spiritual

forces at work in the transformation of a national into an individual immortality.

The author of the book of Job came near to solving the tormenting problem by positing another life in which the present one would find its explanation and justification. Job's rebellious complaint against the limit set by death rises clear and loud: "Man that is born of a woman is of few days and full of trouble. He cometh forth like a flower, and is cut down. He fleeth also as a shadow, and continueth not. . . . Thou hast appointed his bounds that he cannot pass. . . . There is hope of the tree, if it be cut down, that it will sprout again. . . . Though the root thereof was old in the earth and the stock thereof die in the ground, yet through the scent of water it will bud and bring forth boughs like a plant. But man dieth and wasteth away: Yea, man giveth up the ghost, and where is he?"

Job seems ignorant of the existence of the Primary belief, and yet we know it to have been familiar to those about him. But why should he have referred to it? He could not have had any use for the traditional belief in continuation. Sheol offered no solution to the problem that tormented him; it preserved nothing that he wished to preserve; it was an altogether irrelevant tradition.

Among the Hebrews the production of the Modern belief is closely connected with the establishment of personal relations with Jehovah. Until the later prophets, he dealt not with individuals but with the nation; his convenant was with the nation. The nation sinned and the nation was punished; he visited the virtues and vices of the father upon his children. With the fall of the Northern Kingdom and, later, of Judah itself, a change took place which had been prepared by Amos and Hosea. The most important outcome of the sore trial to which Jeremiah's

faith was subjected by the misfortune of his country was the establishment of individual relations between him and his God. He enters into frequent dialogue with Jehovah—an innovation in the religious history of Israel,—complains, contradicts, contends with him.

Continuing the development of Jeremiah's thought, Ezekiel drew, from individual relations with God, the unavoidable conclusion that each individual is to be rewarded or punished according to his desserts. This doctrine permeates the Psalms and the Book of Proverbs. But if life is limited to earthly existence, the doctrine is obviously false, and Job and the author of Ecclesiastes are up in arms against it. Ezekiel's doctrine could be made true only by positing another life after death in which the injustice of this life would be repaired.

Human affections, as much as and perhaps more than the sense of justice, incited man to the belief in survival. Cicero provides a precious illustration of the influence of affection in the establishment of the new belief. Agnosticism was his usual attitude. In one of his letters he seems to speak of his own non-existence after death. Nevertheless, when his beloved and only daughter, Tulla, died, he thought of her as surviving. In a *Consolatio* addressed to himself he insists upon the spiritual nature of the soul. "And in the concluding words he hints strongly at the divinity of the soul which is of the same immaterial nature as the only Deity of whom we mortals can conceive. His daughter, therefore, is not only living in a spiritual life, but she is in some vague sense divine." (W. Ward Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People.*)

The preceding notes will probably suffice to indicate both the peculiar circumstances under which the Christian belief in survival after death came into existence among the Hebrews, and the motives for its production. The

breaking down of the national hope, the appearance of the individualistic spirit and of personal relations with God, taken in connection with the realization of the spiritual worth of man, constituted among the Hebrews a situation altogether favorable to the appearance of that belief. Wherever it appeared, its basal motives were in general the same as among the Hebrews: reason demanded it, for, if death ends all, existence has no rational meaning; the heart demanded it, for affection and love affirm their own deathlessness; justice demanded it, for if there is no Other World in which compensation is done for the injustice of this life, then there is no justice in the universe. To these motives is to be added a powerful one, of another order, the so-called instinctive love of life, with its counterpart, the unreasoned recoil from extinction.

The official form assumed by the Modern belief—judgment after death, paradise, hell, with or without purgatorium—is familiar to every one. It is, in substance, a crude attempt to satisfy a craving for a happy self-realization and to control behavior on earth by threats of punishment and promises of rewards in a future life.

Plato on Immortality.—In Greece, under the inspiration of Orphic teaching, Plato (427-347 B.C.) elaborated a lofty doctrine. He taught that souls were self-existent, incorporeal, simple, and eternal spirits. They were uncreated, preëxistent to the body, but from the first destined to animate bodies. Bodies were, however, not necessary to them, and might debase them. At death, if a soul had lived a noble life of successful striving against lust and other passions generated by the body, it underwent a period of purgation in an incorporeal existence, and, later, entered the glorious world of pure spirits. If, on the contrary, it had suffered the corrupting influence of the body, it was doomed to animate other bodies, low or high, according to the value of its preceding existence. Reincarnations followed each other until the soul had tri-

umphed over the impediments and temptations which come to it from its association with the body.

This conception was, of course, not established by Plato on a basis of perceivable facts, as was the Primary belief, nor was it logically deduced from evident propositions. It bears, on the contrary, all the marks of a creation of desire. The arguments adduced in its support in the *Phædrus* are those of a moralist and poet. Plato wanted a doctrine satisfactory to man's highest aspirations: a wish to enlarge and beautify human nature was the most potent inspiration of this part of his thinking.

Despite important differences, this Platonic doctrine of the soul includes what is essential to the Christian doctrine,—unending continuation in a purified and glorified condition.

We have seen that the Primary belief was forced upon early man by commonplace experiences, such as dreams and visions, which he could not explain otherwise than as implying survival after death under conditions very much like those prevailing on earth. Here and there, however, but only for a time, the original After World was transformed into a Paradise where desires could find their full satisfaction. Yet the obstacle to a happy continuation (the decomposition of the body after death) was too great to be overcome by yearnings for a blessed survival, so that the final form of the Primary belief—the form in existence at the beginning of the historical period—was altogether repulsive.

The Christian belief, was, therefore, not the offspring of the Primary belief; it was not developed out of it, it represented a new start. Since it was a creation of desire it was endowed from the beginning with the features necessary to satisfy human yearnings. For centuries this creation has been a solace and a source of inspiration to humanity.

But why was the new belief in a blessed immortal future

not nipped in the bud by the knowledge of the body's fate at death? Why were souls deprived of their earthly body no longer regarded as incapable of satisfactory existence? The answer to this question is not that man had come to *understand* the possibility of personal life in the absence of a body. No, the early Christians looked forward to the resurrection of the body; the creeds testify to that expectation. The answer is that the will-to-self-fulfillment had become strong enough to leap over the difficulties before which the desires of their predecessors had succumbed. The disregard of the consequences of bodily disintegration is a triumph of desire over knowledge.

The urge which finally blossomed into the vision of a blessed immortality was felt in India, in Egypt, in Babylonia, in Greece, in Palestine, and, in general, wherever groups of men had come to reflect upon the meaning of existence. It is, therefore, a psychological as well as an historical error to think that Christ brought into the world the hope of immortality; for not only the hope but the belief had already become the possession of many in several lands. All that may be said truly of Christ is that his life, more than that of any other personality, stimulated the aspiration for immortality.

It is perhaps not unnecessary to add that, although without official standing of any sort, the Primary belief has not altogether disappeared from among us. Even in the most civilized Christian countries, there are those who believe in ghosts, without recognizing how incongruous that belief is with the official Christian teaching. Ghosts roaming about the earth, haunting places, appearing suddenly in the dead of night, are survivals of the Primary conception; they bear kinship neither to the glorified spirits inhabiting the Christian heaven nor to the eternally damned souls of hell.

The Christian, like the Primary, belief was at first naïvely, uncritically accepted. When, in the course of time, the habit of critical reflection had been formed, cravings could no more be regarded as sufficient grounds of belief than dreams and visions. In this situation, an effort was made by the thoughtful to legitimize the modern faith by placing it upon a valid foundation. This effort, continued for centuries, produced the so-called "metaphysical proofs" of immortality.

The question of their validity and present influence calls here for the briefest of remarks. Let it be said first that had those arguments never been formulated, the hold of the belief upon the Christian world would not have been materially different, for men believe because of perceptual or quasi-perceptual experiences and because of desires, not because of metaphysical arguments. In this respect, the belief in immortality is in the same situation as the belief in the gods of the religions. Moreover, the contemporary world has grown suspicious of these arguments. The great majority of those who are acquainted with them and who profess a belief in immortality claim no more than that they create a *presumption* in favor of immortality; "the *hope* of immortality" is a favorite expression with theologians. The Reverend Mr. Washington Gladden speaks for the leaders of liberal orthodoxy in the United States when, after setting forth arguments for immortality, he writes that his belief is "of course, a glorious hope, a confidence, a strong expectation; it can be nothing else." In *The Christian Hope,* William Adams Brown, professor at Union Theological Seminary, New York, expresses himself similarly.

The attempt to establish the truth of immortality by metaphysical arguments having proved a disappointment, efforts have taken a new direction, suggested by the preva-

lent scientific interests and methods. If human souls survive after death, there may be a way of transcending metaphysical uncertainty by entering into direct communication with them and providing, thus, a "scientific" demonstration of their existence. This effort constitutes the latest chapter of the history of immortality.

The literature on psychical research—a name given to investigations of this sort—has become so vast and intricate that it would not be an easy task to review it and to estimate its proof-value. In our opinion, whatever else the methods of the psychical researchers may have established or come near to establishing—as, for instance, telepathic communication between the living—they have fallen far short of proving spirit survival.

But, whether or not the results in hand are regarded as convincing, it must be admitted that no amount of ingenuity in explanation and no optimism can hide the unattractiveness of the glimpses alleged to have been caught of the other life. There is no hint in them of any glorification, no sign of any retribution. Instead of providing a proof of the objective reality of the modern conception of immortality—the kind of survival wanted by the Christian world—the evidence would rather point to something nearer the Primary belief, a belief from which humanity, in its early adolescence, turned away in dread and disgust.

PART III

THE WORKS OF MAN AND THE WORKS ATTRIBUTED TO GOD; DESCRIPTION, COMPARISON, AND EXPLANATION

VII

PHYSICAL FORCES AT THE SERVICE OF MAN[1]

THE achievements of science in providing physical comforts and means of relaxation—shorter hours of labor, more abundant and better food, more adequate clothing and housing, fast and comfortable means of communication, a greater variety of amusements,—are often disparaged with the remark that they do not necessarily make for greater happiness. True, they do not; but are not these achievements, on the whole, either conditions or adjuncts of happier and worthier living? Have they not relieved us of the bestializing effect of too much work, made child labor unnecessary and universal education possible? "Scientific research and the applications of science in the course of 150 years have increased four-fold the productivity of labor; they have doubled the length of life. Science has made it possible for each to work at routine tasks half

[1] *The Relation of the Mind to the Body.*—It is unnecessary for the purpose of this work to take sides in the ceaseless controversy about the possibly unfathomable problem of the relationship between body and mind. We write from the common sense position, i.e., as if that which is accepted as self-evident by all the unskilled in philosophy was true; namely, that the mind acts causally upon the body and the body upon the mind.

Whoever desires to do so may transpose, if he can, the mental (psychical) terms which we shall use, into physiological ones, and *vice versa*. When, for instance, we say that fear causes an arrest of the gastric secretions, he may replace the conscious mental experience called "fear" by its "correlated" or "accompanying" physiological activities, whatever they may be.

The word "cause" is used in several senses. In present-day science the affirmation of a relation of cause and effect need not involve any metaphysical implication; it means usually nothing more than the affirmation of an apparently constant and necessary sequence of events, such that when the first is produced the second follows. We shall, therefore, adhere to common usage in speaking of causes and agents and of their effectiveness.

as long as formerly and at the same time to consume twice as much wealth as formerly. Fourteen hours of labor, shared by women and children, once provided hovels, lice and black bread for most people, luxury for a few. Seven hours of labor will now supply comfortable homes, warm clothes and healthful food for all. If the resources provided by science were properly distributed there would be sufficient wealth to enable all to share in the desirable luxuries that science has created, and to enjoy in full measure the most nearly ultimate goods of life—home, friends, things to do, freedom, self-respect." (J. McKeen Cattell, address of the retiring President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1925.)

Our dependence on science for happiness is perhaps more obvious in the prevention and cure of disease than in the production of physical comfort. We need not speak of the dentist and of the oculist, although the magnitude of their services to humanity is beyond estimation. The losses, suffering, and degradation spared humanity by the application of recent surgical and bacteriological knowledge is a more impressive item of our debt to science. Remove the means of disinfection now at our service and 15% instead of 1% of the patients would pass from the operating table to the grave. Not long ago, the mortality from diphtheria was 80%; it is now reduced to a very small figure. Only parents who have watched a beloved child struggling with death will be able to conjecture what that single item may mean in relief from mental torture.

Is it necessary to draw up a list of other scourges mastered by medical science: smallpox, yellow fever, hydrophobia, tetanus, sleeping sickness, syphilis, leprosy? These and other diseases, responsible in the past for a very large part of the losses and suffering of humanity, are now under complete or partial control.

No less wonderful than the success of science in checking or eliminating microbic diseases are the discoveries in connection with the functions of the endocrine glands. These glands, the thyroid in the neck, the pituitary at the base of the skull, the adrenal above the kidneys, and many others, secrete substances (hormones) which modify the structure or function of certain organs. "The baby born with an *inadequate thyroid* gland is a misshapen, drooling little being with protruding tongue and abdomen. He becomes a stunted, bandy legged imbecile." But if early enough he be given thyroid extract, he will probably develop into a normal human being.

"Deficiency in the secretion of the anterior lobe of the *pituitary* causes a child to become a diminutive dwarf, a man in miniature. Early overactivity of the same gland makes him a symmetrical giant. If the activity begins after puberty, well rounded development is no longer possible, but the resulting overgrowth takes place in only such parts of the body as are still susceptible to the influence of the hormone. The result is a large misshapen individual who seems to have reverted to a gorilla type." Typical giant rats have been produced by the daily injection of the hormone from the anterior lobe of the pituitary. In one instance a rat received 333 such daily injections, and at the end of that time it weighed 596 grams. Whereas a healthy litter mate, brought up and fed in exactly the same way but without injections, weighed only 248 grams.

"Overactivity of the *adrenal cortex* causes a marked accentuation of the masculine sex traits. This may take place in either the male or the female, causing in the one an accentuation of virility in its various manifestations and, in the other, a transformation towards the opposite sex. The deep-voiced, coarse-featured bearded ladies of

the circus side-shows are probably victims of this glandular mishap." Abnormally early development of that gland makes sexual adults of young children. An extract from the ovary and placenta is able to bring a newly weaned rat to sexual maturity in four days; whereas 36 to 80 days are normally required. The reverse may also be produced: animals may be made to reach normal size and development in all respects save the sexual system which remains immature.

These brief notes will suffice to open up a vista on a new world dawning upon medical science. It seems to hold the promise of a control of human nature far more complete than had ever been dreamt of,—a control not only of the physiological organism but of the intellectual and moral being. For, together with bodily development comes a general mental growth: the physical and psychical appear together. The sex characteristics, for instance, are not merely physiological features; they include well marked mental traits: the cock differs from the hen not only in organs and plumage but in instincts and temperament; the eunuch differs from the full male in disposition and moral traits. Thus the hormones are producers and regulators not of the body only but of personality. (The preceding quotations referring to glands of inner secretions are taken from several specialists writing in *Chemistry in Medicine,* the Chemical Foundation, New York.)

If the triumphs of the physical and of the medical sciences have been so great and so obvious that in these fields the competing use of the religious method has become little more than perfunctory, the situation is different with regard to the moral life. Somehow, despite the evidence, the majority of Christian believers continue to think that the moral life can be affected only by the direct action of

moral forces, and usually of moral forces under divine control. An intelligent Protestant woman represents this opinion when she writes concerning an experience regarded by her as communion with God, "In this divine contact I gather strength, life, a sort of vivification of my moral being; *all things which, it seems to me, can come only from a personal Being.*"

It is truly remarkable how easily one forgets that even such ordinary stuffs as coffee and tea may transform, at least temporarily, the moral attitude, and thus may rival the action attributed to a divine Presence. There are neuropaths, not to speak of normal persons, who describe their transformation after a cup of tea in terms falling little short of those fittingly used to characterize religious exaltation. Similarly, a hot bath may improve not only the general well-being but also the moral attitude: restlessness, mental dispersion, irritability, malevolence, pessimism, may vanish and be replaced by peace, collectedness, benevolence, optimism. This curious tendency to ignore the potency of physical and physiological forces in matters psychical, justifies the introduction of the following rather commonplace illustrations.

A butcher, fifty years old, received a severe blow on the head. The scalp wound healed readily, but an insidious headache developed and became worse as the years passed. He thought frequently of suicide as a means of ending his misery. A decided change in his character was observed: he mismanaged and neglected his business, indulged in fantastic financial transactions, and was unduly generous to his friends. In these ways he brought about his financial ruin. Irritability of temper and failure of memory for recent events developed. He passed through alternating periods of depression and elation. During the latter, he had an abnormal sense of well-being, in-

dulged in witticism, and committed various minor breaches of conduct. His case was erroneously diagnosed by several physicians as the incurable disease, *paralytica dementia.* An X-ray examination disclosed a tumor. After its removal, the headaches disappeared, and the patient returned rapidly to his normal condition. (*Journal of the American Medical Association,* 1923, Vol. 80.)

The child suffering from an insufficient thyroid gland remains at the intellectual and moral levels of the animals. On taking thyroid extract, he soon gains the characteristics which we have in mind when we boast of having been created in the image of God.

After extirpation of the frontal lobes of the monkey, Bianchi observed incoherence of conduct, loss of initiative, jealousy, sociability, and of other forms of behavior attributable to the higher sentiments. Certain drugs exert a very active influence on the feelings and emotions: adrenalin, in sufficiently strong doses, produces a state of anxiety; hyoscine suppresses sexual desire; certain essences produce a sense of euphoria, etc.

The preceding pages contain some indication of what can be done for the moral improvement of humanity by an indirect method, i.e., by acting upon the body instead of appealing directly, as traditional education does, to the intelligence and the conscience. The direct method, when used in its crude unscientific form, is rarely altogether satisfactory. To seek to mold character by proposing ideals, imparting knowledge, providing rewards and punishment, is often an appalling waste of effort. It is here as in war: frontal attacks are costly and often futile, while an indirect approach may lead easily to the desired results. There are, for instance, children who develop undesirable traits because of slight bodily defects, such as adenoid growths, eye or ear weaknesses, malnutrition; or they go

wrong because of bad environment. The elimination of these handicaps has often produced what years of advice, admonition, threat and punishment had been unable to accomplish. Evil sex habits with their train of corrupting consequences, before which the direct method seems powerless, are at times readily removed by medical or surgical intervention. The schools have become aware of those organic and environmental causes of misbehavior and often provide for their elimination.

The most potent of the indirect methods for the production or elimination of traits—physical, intellectual and moral—is selective breeding. The introduction of systematic, fundamental, eugenic practices would undoubtedly prove to be a turning point in the history of humanity. Even now the knowledge of inheritance and breeding would make it possible, should we choose to do so, to remove from humanity some of its grievous defects and to multiply some of the best qualities of its most gifted members. Imagination is not sufficient to picture a world in which a rational, ethical control of births would have kept only the best. And if the time when the leopard shall change its spots is not yet in sight, it is not mainly because knowledge is lacking—we know enough to make a beginning—; it is because of the persistence of deeply rooted habits and traditions, some of which are deserving of respect and continuation, while others are the mark of an irrational and immoral conservatism.

In the animal world, where we are not hampered by extraneous considerations, the effect of selective breeding has been tested in the successful breeding of cows for a larger milk production, of hens for more eggs, of horses for greater running speed. What has been done for these traits can be done for certain traits of intelligence and of temperament: superintelligent and moron strains of rats

have been produced, a strain of gentle mice and one of wild mice have been bred from a mixed group.

The insufficiency of consciousness as a channel of action upon the personality, i.e., the insufficiency of the ordinary, direct method of education, is so often and so painfully evident that it could not have failed to be recognized. But the amazing possibilities of the indirect method in furthering intellectual and moral development and in eliminating or establishing particular traits of personality, have hardly been realized.

In the light of facts such as those just referred to it is not extravagant to hold that the time is not far distant when years of labored and unreliable efforts by the direct method will be replaced by a vastly shorter and more reliable indirect method. Do we not already observe transformations of character under the action of controllable bio-chemical processes; can we not bestow intelligence and moral status on the cretin; can we not, in certain instances, transform the affective life and alter the general disposition and tendencies by means of surgical or chemical intervention? The indirect method will grow in importance together with our knowledge of man; it is the method of the future.

It may seem to some persons that the control of character-traits by physical means would be the final triumph of a repulsive materialism,—building up character by means of gland secretions! But this indignation would be misplaced. Science, as we have already had occasion to say, does not decide what is good or bad, does not set goals for humanity; it merely offers means for securing that which is desired. Before physical means are used to recover or implant desirable traits of personality, appreciation and desire for them must be present in some mind.

Who decides upon the goal to be reached?—The endocrine secretions? Nonsense!

Every civilized person should know that restoration and improvement of character, as well as of intelligence, can be achieved in many instances by drugs, surgical intervention, or other physical treatment. That which concerns us chiefly in this book is, however, not the influence of the physical forces upon the mind, but of the mental or of the *psychical* forces, as we shall also say, upon the body and the mind. To that problem we now turn.

VIII

PSYCHICAL FORCES AT THE SERVICE OF MAN

THE classification of agents into physical and mental (or psychical) is a familiar one. Whatever the fruits of worship may be, they are regarded by the faithful as due to the action of psychical powers exerted by divine beings; and much that is done by man, for healing body or mind and for forming or reforming character, is achieved also by mental forces. As a first step towards an explanation of the achievements of man by psychical means, the action of the main human psychical forces will be described.

Before we proceed, however, the distinction made in medicine between *organic* and *functional* disorders must be understood. In an organic disease a part or the whole of an organ is destroyed or damaged. In a functional disorder, this is not the case: the organ, *so far as our means of observation go,* seems to be in perfect condition; nevertheless, it does not function properly.

A comparison of the human organism with an automobile will help us to appreciate this distinction. Every one to-day knows that with an insufficient amount of gas, or with wrong timing of the spark, a car works badly or not at all. In the first case, the defect is spoken of as a lack of power; in the second, the defect may be described as bad coördination of the parts. For the best result, a certain quantity of gas and no more must reach the carburetor within a given amount of time; and, furthermore,

the spark must pass through the gas mixture in the cylinder when the piston is in a certain definite position. If the ignition should take place when the piston is at the lower end of the cylinder, the explosion would be ineffective. Now these two defects—an insufficiently rich gas mixture and bad coördination of function (incorrect timing of the spark)—correspond in the human organism to what is called functional disorders: the parts are all there and, so far as we know, nothing is wrong with the parts themselves; nevertheless, the organism works badly or not at all.

It must be said, further, that disorders having the same appearance may have either an organic or a functional cause. A paralysis, for instance, may be due to a substantial injury of nerve or muscle; or, nerve and muscle may be, so far as we can tell, in working order; and yet movement may be made impossible by some functional disorder of the nervous system. The possibilities of imperfect cooperation and coördination in an organism consisting of as complex a system of functions as the human body, are almost endless. Hence, one might expect a great variety of functional disorders.

Two notable consequences follow from the functional nature of a disorder: (1) It can sometimes be remedied rapidly; sometimes, indeed, instantaneously, even as a car suffering from the defects mentioned above. (2) Mental forces are, as a rule, sufficient for the cure of the disorder.

We are now ready to examine the main mental forces making for life or death. Whatever decreases the normal energy and whatever breaks down the useful coördination or organization of the parts of the organism, is a potential agent of death; and whatever, within certain limits, produces or stimulates energy, and whatever helps to main-

tain or to establish desirable coördinations is a potential agent of life.

Protracted fear with its relatives, anxiety and worry, and the consciousness of inferiority together with the lack of self-confidence or self-respect it engenders, fall under the first category; while loving and being loved together with the attitude of confidence in oneself and the loved one, produced by love, belong with the second. We shall discuss these psychical agents because they are by far the most powerful. Something will also be said on "suggestion" and "faith" which, as we shall see, stand on another level than the agents named above.

Fear and Its Relatives, Worry and Anxiety.—Fear makes possible unusual exertion. Under the whip of intense fear, men have been known to perform feats impossible to them in cold blood. But when it is intense enough to produce the condition of pent-up, arrested action, known as terror; or when, for any reason, fear does not come to a speedy end but persists in the form of dread or anxiety, the consequences are often disastrous for body and mind. Many disabilities arising in the course of ordinary existence, and the larger number of those referred to as "shell-shock," have been traced to one or to both of these causes. But how does fear exert its action?

The discovery of the bio-chemistry of fear, anxiety, and worry is one of the recent triumphs of science. Some knowledge of it is necessary in order to understand the stimulating effect of fear, the disorders it and its relatives may cause, and the surprising ways in which these disorders may be cured.

The action of fear on the body includes a stimulation of the adrenal glands—one of the still largely mysterious system of glands of inner secretion. The secretion of that gland (adren-

alin) liberates sugar stored in the liver, thus flooding the blood with a substance very readily converted into muscular energy. In addition, it modifies the distribution of the blood so as to send large quantities of it to the organs called upon in making violent muscular efforts (heart, lungs, muscles), and withdrawing it from those of digestion. Thus, while the heart's action is reënforced and the rapidity and depth of respiration are increased, the secretions upon which digestion depends and the churning movements of the stomach, as well as the peristaltic waves of the intestine, come to a stop. In that way the affrighted individual finds himself in the best possible condition to put forth rapidly a great amount of muscular energy; and that is often needed in order to escape danger. The biochemical effect of fear is, thus, a protective device. But the device is useful only when violent action, running away, for instance, speedily removes the cause of fear. When long protracted, fear leads obviously to exhaustion, since it involves, simultaneously, a great expenditure of energy and an arrest of the original source of energy: digestion.

That fear and related emotions interfere with digestion is common knowledge, but few persons know to what length that interference may go. A refined and sensitive woman came to Boston in the company of her husband to be examined with reference to difficult digestion. The physician asked her to see him again in the morning, one hour after having taken a test meal. She did as desired. The examination of the content of the stomach made the next morning, with the help of the stomach pump, revealed no free acid and no digestion of the test breakfast and, moreover, it betrayed the presence of a considerable amount of the supper of the preceding evening. The reason for this arrest of the digestive functions was the behavior of the husband. He had given his wife a night of turbulent anxiety by getting uncontrollably drunk. The next day, after a peaceful night, the digestive functions had returned to their usual condition.

The churning waves of the stomach and the gastric secretions of a cat, observed with the help of Röntgen rays, were seen to stop as soon as she showed signs of anxiety about her kittens. Even slight worry was attended by complete absence of these movements and secretions.

Our concern is, however, not with these emotions when they are of short duration,—in which case they are of relatively little consequence—but with what happens when they are prolonged through weeks and months. The sufferer may become so weakened by the inhibition of the digestive functions as to be unable to cope with his daily tasks and to resist the assaults of disease. The form of his breakdown will depend upon external circumstances and, still more, upon natural predispositions. The weaker organs will be the most seriously threatened. Thus, many minor disorders, and a goodly number of serious ones, may have their beginning in a chronic state of worry. A person constitutionally prone to tuberculosis of the lungs might yield to the disease when debilitated by the imperfect nutrition incident to a long siege of anxiety; and the removal of that source of weakness might lead to recovery.

The effect of malnutrition is varied and far reaching. "H. Cabot reported a case in which failure of a fracture of the leg to unite was found to be due to impaired nutrition, resulting from worry. The patient, fearful lest his family was suffering because of his absence from home, had no desire for food. Failure to take food resulted in impaired nutrition which, in turn, resulted in such impairment of the reparative processes that the fractured bone failed to unite. Assurance that his family was being cared for and was well and happy, brought about immediate improvement. He ceased worrying and began to eat heartily. As his nutritive condition improved, his broken bone also began to knit." (Albert Kuntz in *Auton-*

omic Nervous System.) In this instance, the removal of the inhibitory action exercised upon nutrition by anxiety permitted the vital bodily forces to repair the fracture. Thus, the healing of an organic disorder may be said to have been due to a psychical cause. It has been estimated by McLester (1927) that "one-third of the patients with digestive disorders have no recognizable organic disease, but are suffering because of lack of emotional balance." This fact throws light upon the success of Christian Science, which regards fear and worry as the main enemies of man, and their removal as the condition of the reëstablishment of health.

Other evil effects of fear find their explanation in the answer to the question, "What becomes of the energy liberated in fear when, for some reason or other, muscular action does not take place?" What becomes of it is obvious when fear has the intensity of terror. Instead of running away, the person remains on the spot in a cramp-like condition, i.e., there is innervation not only of the muscle. which would perform coördinated movements, but also of the antagonistic muscles; flexors and extensors are simultaneously stimulated, and so there is tension everywhere and no movement: the liberated energy acts against itself and paralyzes.

The paralyzing effect of unescapable or too long protracted fear, bears not only upon certain voluntary muscles and the digestive system, but upon the activity of the whole brain. Most people could walk on a board the width of their foot if the board was on the ground. How many would be able to walk on the same board if it were suspended one hundred meters high? What makes this difference? And why the difficulty experienced by the unpracticed lecturer in stepping, in a natural way, across a platform before which sit hundreds of watchful people?

Why that strange and dreadful muddle-headedness called stage fright? These various situations illustrate the widespread disturbing effect of fear when prevented from expressing itself freely; it makes impossible the delicate coordinations necessary for walking on a narrow board and for speaking in an orderly, logical way. Fear wastes energy by setting, uselessly, muscle against muscle; and it disorganizes and petrifies the mind.

In warfare, these effects of fear take frequently the form of paralyses of the senses: blindness, deafness, mutism, as well as paralyses of the limbs. In everyday life, it has given rise to similar disorders: blindness has followed upon a terrifying lightning and thunder clap; an arm has become paralyzed in some one suddenly suspended in midair by the forearm, even though no organic injury had been done, etc. It should not, however, be supposed that functional paralyses arise as a consequence of intense terror-shock only. In persons predisposed by their constitution to dissociation of functions, little provocation may be required to bring this about.

Fear paralyzes. But why does it produce in one person mutism; in another, incapacity of the right arm; in still another, blindness? The explanation most generally accepted in authoritative circles is that the form of the disorder is determined by predisposing tendencies, by autosuggestion (suggestion originating in the patient himself), or by suggestion coming from other persons or from external circumstances. A mason scrapes his left arm against a wall in falling from a scaffolding; although the arm received no injury more serious than slight abrasions, it becomes paralyzed. In this case, autosuggestion, guided by external circumstances, designated the particular organ to suffer paralysis.

Briefly, then, the preceding remarks point out that sud-

den intense fear paralyzes body and mind, and that protracted fear is productive of the two important causes of functional disorders singled out above: disorganization and insufficient energy,—disorders which can ordinarily be set right by the removal of their primary cause: fear or anxiety. We shall see that, whether they know it or not, both the religious healers and the secular psychotherapists heal in this manner a large number of disorders.

The reader should realize that fear exerts the effects described above because it is a psycho-physiological activity and not a merely psychical one. We have seen that its presence indicates liberation of energy in the organism and its direction into particular channels. To that energy, fear owes its action; without it, fear not only would be powerless but would not exist. And this statement, true of fear, is true also in the case of all the other forces discussed in this chapter under the name of mental or psychical forces: mental forces are, in fact, psycho-physiological forces,—man is a psycho-physiological being.

Love.—"Love" means here the whole range of the tender emotion with its physiological correlate; it includes, therefore, ordinary affection, parental love, and sex love. Both loving and being loved are sources of life. The energy of loving arises from the stimulation of the sex activities and from the consequent possession of a center of interest (the loved one) which organizes and unifies impulses and desires. As to being loved, it owes its vivifying power chiefly to the increased self-regard and self-respect it produces, and to the accompanying self-confidence.

As a stimulant of life, reciprocated love is unrivaled, for it mobilizes the main psycho-physiological energies of man. The power that is in the sex life is seen in its most comprehensive manifestation at adolescence when

the newly awakened activity of certain glands produces what has been aptly called the second birth. The child remains a child or becomes a man or a woman according as the sex glands do or do not perform their secretory functions. This power appears also in a striking manner in grafting experiments: when the male sexual glands are substituted for the ovaries, or *vice versa,* a reversal of the physical sexual traits takes place and, at the same time, of the behavior characteristic of the respective sexes.

The energizing and organizing effects of the coarser love are often forced upon the attention of the psychiatrist. A woman, forty years old, declared that the only thing which had always been successful in keeping her in health, was amorous adventures: "I have tried religion and philanthropy, but they are only makeshifts; always I have to come back to the treatment which suits me best." Another woman, forty-two years old, has passed through several great fits of depression; "for months she remains inert and groaning, complaining of digestive troubles, of insomnia, of anxiety, etc.; then rapidly she appears to recover and her husband is delighted. These recoveries mark the beginning of a *liaison* with the husband of one of her friends. 'These secret assignations occupy and divert my mind, prevent me from thinking of my unfortunate marriage with a good fellow, but so prosaic! When I had seen him [her lover] during the day, I digested very well and slept all night.' This relation lasted three years, during which the patient had no relapse. Unfortunately, her lover died and speedily the fits of depression returned. After many months of suffering, she thought of trying religion, went to a priest and formed the habit of seeing him every day. A new intrigue began, mysterious meetings followed, and the attack of melancholia came to an end. After one year of perfect health the patient is again mis-

erable because the priest, fearful of being discovered, brought the relation to an end and left the country." (Pierre Janet, *Médications Psychologiques.*) We shall see later on how love for a priest, mistaken for the love of God, produced similar energizing effects on Mme. Guyon, the founder of Quietism.

Great poets and philosophers have shown what a nobler love can do. One recalls Petrarch's worship of Laura, Dante's adoration of Beatrice, Comte's dependence upon Clotilde de Vaux. No god in heaven ever did more for the moral comfort and inspiration of a devotee than did Clotilde, both before and after her death, for her lover, the celebrated author of the *System of Positive Philosophy.* A passage of the *Autobiography* of the equally distinguished English philosopher, John Stuart Mill, describing the loss he suffered by the death of his wife, gives some idea of what she had been to him during her life: "I have sought for such alleviation as my state admitted of, by the mode of life which most enabled me to feel her still near me. I bought a cottage as close as possible to the place where she is buried, and there her daughter (my fellow-sufferer and now my chief comfort) and I live constantly during a great portion of the year. My objects in life are solely those which were hers; my pursuits and occupations those in which she shared or sympathized, and which are indissolubly associated with her. Her memory is to me a religion, and her approbation the standard by which, summing up as it does all worthiness, I endeavor to regulate my life."

Stimulation and organization of life's energies by love in its double aspects—loving and being loved—is, of course, not met with only in psychiatric patients and in famous poets and philosophers. It is fortunately an ordinary occurrence in the life of the common mortal. The records

of social service work provide abundant instances of the saving power of loving affection. Here is one of them taken from *The Kingdom of Evils,* by E. E. Southard and Mary C. Jarrett:

Dora Hadley, a very intelligent girl of respectable family and fairly good New England stock, lost her mother at birth. She was expelled from Grammar School for insubordination. In High School she flirted with boys, disturbed the class, and did not do her work; and, so, she was asked to leave. She lived with several different relatives, tried factory work three times, but was discharged each time for poor work and bad conduct. During a number of months she lived by prostitution. Under advice she entered willingly Trinity House, used by the Psychopathic Hospital of Harvard University. A social worker of the House drew this picture of her character: Unsuccessful because she cannot apply herself continuously to one task. Takes strong likes and dislikes, fickle and vindictive. Untidy in her appearance. Nervous, fidgety, quick to anger, flippant. Completely wrapped in herself, her own pleasures and ends. Holds lewd conversations with men over the telephone, picks up men, deceives and lies. She has always shown a brutal strain and a desire to torment some one or something; she once pinched a baby in her charge, till he was black and blue.

Soon after entering Trinity House, she wrote to one of the social workers of the Psychopathic Hospital: "I have made up my mind at last, Miss Adams, I am tired of leading the life I have led for the past months. Now I have given up my freedom and am going to put in six months here at Trinity House. I want to be good. I simply cannot trust myself, even though I hate everything immoral. I am not immoral, Miss Adams,—I hate it. I have been

unmoral, that's all. You understand me, don't you? And I think you believe in me. I want to be a real, true woman. I am going to be one. I am going to try so hard to please every one. Miss Ellis is beautiful and good. I love her, and Miss Mansfield; and I want to be like them, just the kind of a girl they want me to be. I can do it. I want you to come and see me, and surely you will write to me." Arrangements had been made by the Psychopathic Hospital for her to remain six months at Trinity House; she chose to remain a whole year. It gave her time to acquire an ideal of womanhood and to form new habits in accordance with it. The affection of the social workers about her, and her admiration and love for them, kindled in her a firm intention to become "just the kind of a girl" they wanted her to be. With the help of man, and without any reference to the God of the religions, Dora Hadley made good. "She is now," says the Social Service Record, "doing well as a nurse in training."

The Vivifying Influence of Self-confidence and Self-respect.—When a failure serves as a spur to renewed and successful efforts, all is well. That is what usually happens in the normal person. But when failure follows failure, and when in every social contact one finds oneself in a position of inferiority, discouragement and shame cannot be avoided. This state of consciousness, as much as pent-up fear and its relatives, threatens to arrest or to mislead the flow of life's energies.

In those who will not accept defeat, those who at any cost must win some kind of recognition even though it be notoriety, the sense of inferiority may lead to perversions of conduct and engender mental disorders. Alfred Adler and others have analyzed and magnified the evils arising from what they have called the *inferiority complex*. They

have turned the light upon the vicious compensations and the incapacitating habits of mind to which it may lead.

Even when repeated failure in that which we ourselves wish or society demands of us does not lead to noxious ways of self-affirmation, when it produces only discouragement, lack of self-respect and, therefore, indifference to the respect of others, it is an evil of the first magnitude, for it robs man of one of his most powerful sources of energy, namely, belief in himself, in his ability to achieve. A man without self-respect and careless of the opinion of others is like a rudderless ship, the plaything of any impulse.

The will to maintain, in the opinion of others and in one's own opinion, an ideal of one's self, is an incomparable source of energy. Its ethical value depends, of course, upon the quality of the ideal; but whatever its ethical value, energy is produced. A prize-fighter will endure the hardships of severe training and refrain from excesses in order to establish his claim as a champion pugilist; a saint will, similarly, renounce the flesh for the glory of saintliness; a soldier will risk death in a duel in order to vindicate his honor. Life is a struggle, and there cannot be any struggle without a goal to struggle for. The loss of self-regard and self-respect is the loss of all personal goals; it brings with it, unavoidably, the cessation of the struggle.

The dramatic account of the renovation of a drunken Scotchman, as related by the Reverend Mr. W. T. McElveen, at a Presbyterian Ministers' Meeting in Chicago, will help us to realize to what extent the saving power of psychotherapy and of religion rests upon the strengthening or awakening of self-respect and self-confidence.

While Dr. McElveen was pastor of the Shawmut church in Boston there came to his study one day a stalwart,

brawny fellow, a good deal more than half drunk, who thickly inquired whether the minister could tell him anything that would keep a man from drinking when he didn't want to.

"That I can," said Dr. McElveen, and he began to talk of signing the pledge, of trusting in Jesus Christ, of joining the church. But all that made no impression. The man stolidly replied that he had been all through that, and it was no good.

Dr. McElveen asked his caller to kneel down for prayer. The man refused. He had prayed enough; the heavens were brass. To gain a moment's respite Dr. McElveen asked the man's name. "MacDonald," he answered. "Are you Scotch?" "Yes, sir, that's what I am," the drunkard replied with a noticeable touch of pride. "What's your name, Mr. Minister?" "McElveen." "You Scotch, too?" "Yes." The drunken visitor fell upon the preacher like an onslaught of soldiery. He almost wrung the minister's right hand off him.

The pastor perceived his advantage. He meditated a moment how he should use it. Then he spoke very deliberately: "MacDonald, you're no Scotchman." "What's that?" "I say I don't believe you're a Scotchman—no pure Scotchman, I mean. You're a mongrel. You're mixed up with English; maybe some Irish, too. I could do something for a real Scotchman. But that combination is too much for me. You might as well go along."

The man was no longer a drunken caller; the shock had sobered him, and made him towering angry. He stormed; he swore prodigiously. Then he cooled off enough to demand, "What makes you say I'm no Scotchman?" "Well, MacDonald, you know yourself that one thing the Scotch are famous for all the world over is that they're so stubborn. Once they make up their minds, nothing can

change them. Nothing in creation can drag them into doing what they don't want to do. They always keep their promises. But you here, MacDonald—why, you have promised repeatedly that you won't drink, but something always leads you off. You can't keep your promise. You even promised God in heaven you'll do right, and you don't keep your promise to him. Oh, it's plain enough, MacDonald; you're not Scotch."

The man vowed and protested that there wasn't a drop of anything but Scotch blood in him anywhere from top to toe; but Dr. McElveen stuck to it that his claim was incredible. After a while he got to pleading with the pastor to believe him, but the pastor was obdurate. Finally the unhappy fellow burst out: "If you'll only believe I'm Scotch, I'll let you pray with me." "No, it wouldn't be worth while," Dr. McElveen answered. "You've broken so many promises to God that I think it would be a good deal of an insult to bring you round to him again. Not being Scotch, you'll soon go back on him again."

The man pleaded more pathetically than ever. At length Dr. McElveen said: "I'll pray for you on one condition—that you'll pray for yourself when I am through." MacDonald said he would. They went down on their knees. The minister prayed fervently, but when he had ended, MacDonald wouldn't utter a word. Dr. McElveen leaped to his feet, shouting with indignation: "Now I know you're no Scotchman. You've gone back on me."

"Get down again," whispered MacDonald, huskily, "I'll pray." And this is what he prayed in agony of soul: "O God above, make this minister man know I'm a Scotchman, for Jesus' sake. Amen."

"I knew I'd won then," said Dr. McElveen, telling the story. "MacDonald hasn't taken a drink since. He con-

fessed Christ, joined the church, and continues to this day a sober, consistent Christian." (Quoted in E. E. Weaver's *Mind and Health.*)

MacDonald was proud of being a Scotchman; he had identified himself with his country and, in a way, he loved it. The realization that he had not been true to one of the dominant traits ascribed to his countrymen—ability to overcome obstacles, to achieve what they set out to do, to keep their promises, cost what may—shamed him powerfully. A dormant self-respect was reawakened: he could do what Scotchmen were famed for being able to do. Why did the Reverend Mr. McElveen see in this transformation a divine intervention in answer to prayer? We shall let the reader answer that question for himself.

Nothing is more potent in removing a sense of inferiority and in awakening or strengthening self-regard and self-respect than being loved. To be loved is to be preferred to all others. The bestowal of complete love is the only all-inclusive praise. What that means in the way of stimulus may perhaps be inferred from the effect of limited, commonplace praise, independent of love: "A compliment from the General," says B., "and I straighten up like a horse feeling the spur. During several days I remain full of energy, for I am the man who has been congratulated by the General." If a word of praise addressed by a General to a soldier can have that dynamic effect, what may not be accomplished by the praise implicit in the love ascribed to the divine Father!

It has not escaped the attention of the reader that in the striking instances of the great philosophers mentioned above and of Dora Hadley, the effects of loving and being loved were combined. He has also observed that in order to be the beneficiary of being loved, it does not matter

whether one is really loved; it is, of course, sufficient that one should think so.

Faith.—If one were to ask people how psychotherapy and the religions cure, a frequent answer would be that they cure by "faith." It is undoubtedly true that, both in psychotherapy and in religion, constant efforts are made to produce faith and that, when a transformation comes, it comes frequently together with faith.

But what does "faith" mean when it is not a mere synonym for "belief"? It does not mean only acceptance of the truth of some proposition. Assent to certain "truths" is present in faith, but this assent is not its essential element. In fact, more often than not, assent is a consequence of the substance of faith. The ancient theologian, Anselm, said, "The mere idea does not make faith . . . in order to have true faith the right tendency of the will must be added, which Grace imparts." Another theologian defines faith as "the consciousness of reconciliation with God." Now a "right tendency of the will," and "reconciliation with God" mean far more than intellectual conviction.

When we turn to descriptions of the actual appearance of faith, its substance becomes quite clear. At the age of thirty-five, John Wesley, the founder of the Methodist Church, passed through a conversion crisis. It came to a conclusion suddenly, at a meeting, while some one was reading the famous preface of Luther to the Epistle to the Romans. At "about a quarter before nine," writes Wesley, "while the speaker was describing the change which God works in the heart, through faith in Christ, Christ alone for salvation; an assurance was given me that He had taken away my sins, even mine, and had saved me from the law of sin and death." (John Wesley's *Journal.*)

Wesley's transformation, whatever it was, did not consist in his becoming convinced of the truth of the Christian religion; he was already fully convinced. What happened was something quite different: sources of life were awakened. He says, "I felt my heart strangely warmed, I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for salvation." What is this, if not love?

In another instance, that of a woman, teacher of botany, faith appeared suddenly, together with an unreserved commitment of herself to God after years of loneliness and lack of a vivifying life-purpose. After an emotional crisis which need not be related here, she found herself willing to do anything, go anywhere, "under any conditions, only that Thou wilt never leave me, nor let me wander from Thee again." "The consciousness of the Father's presence, of the touch of his hand, was as strong and real to me as that of any bodily presence." "Faith, love, trust, hope, immortality, everything that I had spent so many years schooling myself against . . . came to me now in all their beauty and worth." (*A Scientist's Confession of Faith,* published by the Baptist Publication Society.)

In this last instance, the establishment of a rational belief was again not the cause or condition of the advent of faith. Faith appeared in this woman in spite of doubt and brought along the unreasoned acceptance of a number of theological propositions. A rational conviction of the truth of, let us say, the atoning work of Christ, may well be the starting point of the advent of faith, but it is not faith. The devils, we have been told, are convinced that Jesus is the Son of God, but they have not faith; they are damned and tremble.

The descriptions to be introduced later on, of the experiences of certain Christian mystics, will confirm this

finding, already indicated in the quotations from John Wesley and the teacher of botany: Faith, as used in the Christian religion, is the state of enthusiastic confidence due to loving and to the conviction of the love of an all-powerful and all-wise Being. The agents of life in faith are, then, the very same ones which sustained John Stuart Mill and, at a lower level, the neurasthenic woman mentioned above. Faith saves because it sets into activity energizing and organizing sources of life. Thus the saying "have faith and thou shalt be saved," is justified and explained.

Suggestion.—When the effects of psychotherapy and of religion are not attributed to "faith," they are ascribed by many to "suggestion." As a matter of fact, in the more common of its several forms, suggestion is not itself a power; it is merely the name given to a particular way of mobilizing agents of life and death. The suggestioner manages, for instance, to set aside a cause of worry and to establish self-confidence, and then the natural beneficial consequences of the replacement of worry and diffidence by peace and self-confidence follow.

How the words of the suggestioner may act upon the subject so as to produce a saving belief, appears in a homely way in the illustration used a while ago of a narrow board, placed high above the ground, along which some one is attempting to walk. Would not the suggestion, "You are shaking all over, you cannot possibly do it, you are going to fall," induce or intensify fear? And, with the increase of fear, would not self-control become increasingly difficult? The person might get into a cramp-like condition of body and mind, or a state of general relaxation resembling a collapse. Either of these states would make impossible the delicate muscular coördina-

tions necessary in order to remain on the board, and would produce belief in the imminence of the fall. That belief would increase fear, and thus a vicious circle would be established. The reverse suggestion: "You are doing well. Good, take it quietly, you will certainly do it," would, on the contrary, tend to stop any tendency to fear and loss of self-mastery, and thus make success likely.

There is, however, another way in which suggestion acts, a way which at first sight seems to partake of magic: the words or gestures of the suggestioner do not act by dispelling fear or by replacing the consciousness of inferiority by confidence and self-esteem, or yet by awakening the sources of life that are in the tender emotion; they seem instead, to act directly upon the organism so as themselves to realize the suggestion. The suggestioner says, for instance, "The pain is decreasing, presently it will have entirely disappeared"; or "You cannot lift your arm," or, "See this bird in my hand?", and his command or suggestion is realized.

In this way, bodily functions such as circulation, digestion, defecation, etc., may be modified. It has been claimed in numerous instances that hemorrhages, diarrhea, pains of various origin have been stopped almost instantaneously. Accounts of cures of that type are richly scattered throughout the literature on healing by suggestion—a literature too often quite unreliable. A large number of them may be found in *Suggestive Therapeutics* by Dr. H. Bernheim, the founder of the Nancy School of psychotherapy. It has even been claimed on good authority that burns have been produced in this manner. Krafft-Ebing has reported, for instance, the appearance of a burn where he had placed a cold piece of metal, described to the hypnotized subject as hot. Accurate observations

are said to have been made upon modern stigmatists, like Louise Lateau and Catherine Emmerich, with sphygmographic tracings and other precise, objective methods. In the case of the latter, the blood circulation, controlled by autosuggestion, was found to be distributed as it would have been in an actual crucifixion. (Charles Baudouin, *Suggestion and Autosuggestion.*) Still more recently, Pierre Janet of the *Collège de France,* has reported the production, in an ecstatic woman, of small vesicles on the feet and breasts in imitation of the wounds of Christ and of those which are said to have appeared on St. Francis. To make deception impossible, the places where the blisters were to appear had been previously covered, and the covering sealed, so that it could not be removed without breaking the seals. It must not be overlooked that, in the cases of the stigmatists, powerful emotions were involved in the production of the "miracles."

The complication introduced into the procedure when the patient is hypnotized before receiving the suggestion, need not disturb us. Hypnosis is a condition akin to natural somnambulism, and its only characteristic of which we need take account is increased suggestibility. The curative agent remains the same whether suggestion is made to an hypnotized or to a fully awake or half-awake person. To this may be added that there was a time, not very long ago, when psychotherapists did not venture to treat by suggestion unless they had previously hypnotized their patient. That time is past; at present the majority of them dispense with hypnotism and are satisfied with the condition of decreased mental activity, of quiescence, unavoidably induced in a patient who submits to a psychotherapic treatment. Since mental quiescence is a condi-

tion of reduced mental activity, it is, like hypnosis, a state of increased suggestibility.

Difficult problems are involved in the attempt to account for the direct action of words or gestures; yet, even in a non-technical work, something may be said to deprive this form of suggestion of its magical appearance. It should be understood first that although every one is in some degree suggestible,—nothing is more natural and normal than a certain degree of suggestibility,—the more remarkable effects of suggestion can take place only in persons possessing particularly unstable constitutions; or when they are, for some other reason, in a condition of unusual suggestibility. More will be said presently regarding the former.

Between a word and the psycho-physiological activity it represents,--between, for instance, the word "vomit" and violent rejection of food from the stomach,—there comes to be, normally, a material continuity, so that the word tends to bring about directly that activity. The command "Shoulder arms," heard unexpectedly in the courtyard of the *Hôtel des Invalides* by an old veteran of the Napoleonic wars carrying his dinner, caused him to drop it. The sound of the words "Shoulder arms" had become mechanically connected with the movements designated by these words, so that, independently of any intention on the part of the old soldier, they brought about the movements. The origin of that material continuity can be explained without much trouble.

To the babe, words are no more than meaningless sounds; the word "milk" for instance leaves it unaffected. Later, however, that word, or the words "roast beef," cause salivation. How does the sound "roast beef" acquire that power? The explanation of this important fact begins

with the remark that originally, before any learning, the presence of roast meat in the mouth, i.e., its pressure, touch, taste and smell, causes salivation. The moment soon comes, however, when the mere sight of the meat does likewise, as also any symbol standing for the meat, such as the word "meat."

The mechanism of this substitution of the sight or of a symbol of the object for the object itself, is well known. While the meat is being eaten, it is also seen. The frequently repeated simultaneity of the sight of the meat with the various sensory-motor activities going on when the meat is in the mouth, results in sight alone producing that which, originally, the meat in the mouth was needed to produce. The sight of the meat, now, not only makes the mouth water, but it determines secretions lower down in the digestive tracts; it does partly what, originally, could be done only by the actual eating of the meat.

The substitution of an auditory symbol for an object may be accomplished in the same way. As a matter of fact, as the learning child eats the meat and sees it, the words "roast beef" are said for him; soon he tries to say them himself. This happens so often that a direct connection is established between the hearing and saying of the words and the psycho-physiological processes involved in eating meat. When that point is reached, the sound of the word "meat," like the sight of it, exercises its action independently of any thinking about it.

The substitution of one stimulus for another, for instance, of a symbol for that which is symbolized, has been carefully studied in laboratory experiments. It is spoken of as the establishment of a *conditioned reflex* or *response:* a bell rung many times, together with the presentation of food to an animal, came to produce, when rung alone, the same effects as the sight of the food.

The principle involved in the establishment of a conditioned response may be stated thus: When two different stimuli (or groups of stimuli) act together a sufficient number of times, the effect originally produced by one of them comes to be produced, in part or totality, by the other (or a part of the other) when present alone. The establishment of conditioned responses constitutes one of the main methods of education.

We understand now the direct action of words upon the organism. Instead of the words "roast beef," we might have used as instances such other words as "good," "bad," "cold," "warm," "right," "left," etc. Whatever the word, it may have come to possess a direct, quasi-automatic connection with the specific bodily activity it designates. It is for that reason that the apparently foolish, endless, and indiscriminate reiteration by the salesman of "That is good, very good," is not altogether useless. It sets up in the customer, at least incipiently, the actual experience of something good; he feels something of the very satisfaction which would come with the enjoyment of something good. And so it comes to pass that the mere repetition *ad nauseam* of laudatory adjectives is not lost even on the critically minded man who seeks to free himself, by reflection, from the spell of words; for even he *feels* that the thing is good, even though he may *think* that it is bad.

The word "reflex" used in a recent sentence, with reference to the "suggestive" power of words, would not convey our meaning if it were interpreted as signifying that we become mere automata, mechanically moved by words; that, for instance, whenever we hear or see the word "left," we are *irresistibly* impelled to look or turn to the left. That is obviously not true. A tendency to turn to the left has, indeed, been established as explained above; but that tendency has also become connected with a mechanism of arrest which usually

provides time for a consideration of what had better be done under the existing circumstances.

For the rest, the distinction made here between a kind of suggestion in which the words act directly upon the organism, and another in which they act indirectly, through various ideas and emotions, is not an absolute distinction. In both cases word-sounds (the air waves) act directly upon certain definite parts of the nervous system.

Many pathological disorders are to be explained substantially in the same way as the direct action of words or other symbols: a part of a former total experience reproduces the whole of it. A person who had suffered seriously from sea-sickness when at sea would, afterwards, while standing on dry land and looking at the water, have vertigo and severe pain in the eyes and forehead. Another patient "afflicted by nausea, vomiting, headache and dizziness, following shock in a railway accident, suffered from the same symptoms for several months afterwards whenever he rode in the cars, although between times he was practically free from them." (Dr. Morton Prince, *Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases,* 1891, Vol. XVI.) The original vomiting, dizziness, etc., had taken place as the consequence of an accident while traveling in a railway car. Now, peaceful traveling in a car reinstates the rest of the total original experience, including the pathological symptoms.

The above instances will suffice to illustrate the power, acquired under certain conditions by a part of a complex experience, to reproduce another part or the whole of it. Many of the effects of "suggestion" find their explanation in that psycho-physiological law.

After the preceding preparatory remarks we enter upon a comparative study of the works of man and of the works of God.

IX

THE WORKS OF MAN, DESCRIBED AND EXPLAINED

SOME of the psychotherapeutic achievements just referred to and many of those reported in this chapter are so remarkable that they may seem miraculous. A person, paralyzed during a lifetime, suddenly stands up and walks; another, suffering from intense pain of long duration and of seemingly organic origin, finds himself instantaneously delivered; a wicked individual is so transformed that he appears to be another person. These and other equally surprising, sudden transformations may seem to be beyond the action of the natural agents considered in the preceding pages. Some knowledge of the peculiarities of certain constitutions or temperaments, and of the process of sensitization to which are submitted the subjects of religious or psychotherapeutic healing does away with much of the difficulty.

Unstable Constitutions.—The stability of the human personality is not so great as we commonly take it to be. Very little may be enough to alter greatly, at times permanently, body and mind. The psychiatrists have singled out and given names to two particularly unsteady constitutions. They speak of an hyperemotional and of a cyclothymic constitution. People of the first type are popularly called "temperamental," "emotional," "hysterical"; it is among them that the psychotherapist and the revivalist find their most susceptible subjects.

When strongly marked, the cyclothymic constitution may lead to a disorder (manic-depressive insanity) characterized by periods of abnormal activity and exaltation, alternating with periods of inactivity and depression. Seen in his two states, the patient can hardly be recognized as the same person. A large proportion of mental disorders belong to this class. Dr. T. S. Clouston reports the following among many others: The patient had been a staid industrious man, who had been in business all his life. He had been excited for the last three months. There was great mental exaltation and hilarity of manner. He was very fond of the ladies, but never erotic. During this period his temperature was always over 99°, he ate enormously, craved stimulants, and slept little. His conduct was extremely ridiculous for an old man.

That stage gradually passed into one of violence, delusion of being insulted, and suspicion. Later, he became depressed, never spoke, looked dull and heavy, slept well, and got fat. All his brightness and curiosity and much of his intelligence had left him. He passed through these contrasting periods several times. No cause could be assigned in explanation of these alternations of character and temperament. (Quoted freely from *Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases.*)

Instances as extreme as that are, of course, rare; but none of us is entirely stable and steady; every one, if in a different degree, suffers oscillations of important traits of personality corresponding to those described. When strong external causes work upon a particularly unstable disposition, astonishing alterations may be produced.

One should guard, however, against the supposition that remarkable and apparently sudden transformations can take place only in persons of an abnormal instability. Noteworthy and sudden conversions happen, for instance,

in persons whose life has been normally constant. In this class of cases, investigation shows that the instantaneousness of the transformation is only an appearance. The work of transformation had been going on for a long time, often for years; there had been protracted consideration and hesitation; the conversion-crisis marked simply the moment when the trays of the balance changed position.

Two things should never be lost sight of in a search for an explanation of more or less sudden and otherwise astonishing changes of mind and body: the disorder cured, or the transformation produced, may be of a functional nature; and, the subject of it may be a person possessing an hyperemotional or a cyclothymic constitution.

Sensitization.—The psychotherapist does not rely entirely on the natural suggestibility and unstability of his subject. He prepares the ground for his treatment by producing these traits in an unusual degree. This is done by impressing the subject with evidences of the healer's great powers, by placing the patient in an attitude of relaxation and passivity and, at other times, by submitting him to strong emotions.

A visit to a successful psychotherapist, to Coué, for instance, makes clear the ways in which confidence in the healer is established: "While a sitting is in progress, a great many patients are waiting their turn in the garden or in an adjoining room. Every one knows the reputation of the clinic. To the simple-minded it is a place where Coué works miracles. The public on which he acts is a public on which suggestion has already been at work. Furthermore, the sitting itself is methodically utilized to superadd the force of example to the force of the preliminary suggestion based on reputation. The newcomers sit among persons who have already attended numerous sit-

tings and who make no secret of their progress towards health. From sitting to sitting, each patient can see how the others improve, can see how paralytics walk, how the deaf hear." (Charles Baudouin, *Suggestion and Auto-suggestion.*)

The preparation of the subject is usually completed by the demand that he assume a relaxed attitude, that he place himself passively and unreservedly in the hands of the healer. One is reminded of the revivalist's admonition to the sinner: "All efforts on your part to save yourself are vain; you must surrender to the saving grace of God." Thus the patient reaches the healer in a state of greatly increased sensitization.

There are conditions under which relaxation of body and mind causes not only a disappearance of the wasteful muscular tensions which interfere seriously with organic functions and lead to enfeeblement and disease, but they also facilitate a re-centering of the mind about the more important purposes of life: minor things which had assumed undue importance fall back into their proper places, while the deeper and larger ones gain prepotency; vision becomes clearer and truer. It is, therefore, an attitude highly favorable to moral healing. More will be said elsewhere concerning relaxation and the prayerful attitude as part of the technique of character building.

Remarkable Healing of Body and Mind.—We begin with instances of healing which, although surprising, are, nevertheless, susceptible of very simple explanations and do not depend upon the possession of a constitution particularly favorable to "miraculous" cures.

Dr. H. L. Taylor reports, among other striking cures, the following: the left knee of a young athlete had given out while he was tramping in Germany, six months before

he consulted the physician. For ten weeks preceding the consultation he had used a crutch. He thought that his knee was swollen; but he was energetic and ashamed of his hobbling. The patient was told that he suffered from no serious disorder, and was encouraged to stand up and bear his weight on both feet. Within five minutes he was walking around the table without assistance. He went out on the street and again walked up the steps into the house. At the end of fifteen minutes, he walked without a limp. His family were bewildered. He never had any trouble afterwards and played on the Harvard football team at Thanksgiving, 1887. (*Journal of Mental and Nervous Diseases,* 1888.)

More spectacular is the cure of a woman thirty-seven years old, who had spent seventeen years in bed or in a wheel chair and who, a few days after her first interview with Dr. Taylor, was able to stand and walk. Dr. Taylor explained to the patient that her condition was curable and inspired her with enough self-confidence to attempt to wal'.. He made her believe that she could walk.

Dr. Taylor diagnosed the first of these two cases as that of a limb suffering from disuse. The second appears to have been of the same nature. One has the right to assume that in the case of the young athlete, the original organic disturbance, a sprain suffered by some tendon or ligament in the knee, had been repaired by the natural vital forces during weeks of enforced rest. But the long period of disuse had brought about some slight changes tending to make the movements of the leg somewhat difficult and a little painful. That was enough to maintain in the young man the conviction that even now he could not walk and, therefore, to prevent him from making whole-hearted and persistent efforts. The authority of the physician and his encouragement induced in the suf-

ferer sufficient self-confidence to enable him to make the effort necessary to overcome the initial painful resistance to movement. Nothing more was required to restore the leg to its normal efficiency.

In the paper already referred to, Dr. Morton Prince mentions the cure in a similar way of a similar disorder. He notes that he has found that such patients are usually timid about using the leg "for fear of aggravating the mischief." Hence, when left to themselves, they do not make the required effort.

The more striking case of the woman who had been an invalid for seventeen years bears a similar explanation. The original disorder had been set right during the enforced rest, but the long disuse of the limbs had produced impeding bodily effects and mental habits which had to be overcome. She needed nothing more than the stimulus that came to her through the encouragement of her physician; he communicated to her his own confidence in her ability to walk, and thus induced her to overcome whatever organic and functional resistances were present. In that way does belief perform some of its "miracles."

Something should be added here regarding the pain which may be felt by persons whose injury has practically been healed. It may be merely the pain normally attaching to the effort to move a "rusty" limb. But it may also be a pain of another source, namely, the original pain reinstated now by the sensations of movement which were originally part of the total painful experience. The recurrence of a whole experience, under conditions such as the above, is, we have seen, a fact well known in psychology.

It should furthermore be recorded that pains, at times violent, may come and go in a most capricious manner without any known reason. This happens frequently in hysterical persons.

Thousands of cases of mutism, deafness, blindness, and paralysis occurred during the War. Mutism appeared frequently at the moment of an explosion. Nearly all the afflicted recovered, and the majority of them as suddenly as they had been stricken. Frequently the cure takes place under circumstances which do not seem to provide a sufficient cause, as in the instances of a patient who regained his speech on hearing that Roumania had entered the War, and of another mute who was cured on killing a snake. Dr. Mott reports a similar case of six months' duration in which the patient suddenly recovered his speech on being pitched out of a punt. A sham operation has been known to be equally effective: after a shell explosion a soldier had become deaf and, although he had undergone several different treatments, he had remained deaf for seven months. He was then told that a slight operation would have to be made. Two small incisions, *affecting the skin only,* were made behind the ear, under light anesthesia. During the "operation" a loud noise was made; he heard it, and jumped from the table. To his intense delight normal hearing had returned. (E. E. Southard, *Shell-shock and Other Neuropsychiatric Problems.*)

On the psychical treatment of a great variety of disorders, there are few volumes so illuminating as Southard's. It presents 589 case-histories from the war literature of 1914-1918. The compiler of this volume was Professor at Harvard University Medical School and, during the War, Director of the United States Army Neuropsychiatric Training School. In one part of the book the cures of 117 cases are brought together; they followed upon the use of either physical or psychical means or both: drugs, hydrotherapy, mecanotherapy, suggestion, persuasion, education. "Miracle cures are wrought through many pages. Mutism, deafness, and blindness, palsies, contractures and tics disappear at times as if by magic," says a distinguished neuropathologist in the preface. A number of our instances are taken from that book.

A. N. Bruce used ether: "The administration of ether for the cure of functional deafness and functional loss of voice has always in our hands proved satisfactory. It is essential that the loss of consciousness be slight and that the patient be suddenly roused so as to realize that he is speaking or hearing."

In the above instances of mutism we are again justified in assuming that whatever the cause of the disturbance, and whether organic or functional or both, it had been removed and the damage had been repaired; and that there remained only a conviction and a habit: the conviction that speech was impossible, and the habit of silence. The excitement produced in our instances by the occasion of the cure of mutism—being thrown into the water, killing a snake, learning that Roumania had entered the War—had a double effect: it liberated energy and prompted vigorously to automatic, exclamatory speech. The belief that the subject could not speak was thus proved false and the first, the difficult step in the recovery of speech had been made. That step consisted in overcoming the belief in the impossibility of speech and the habit of speechlessness.

The recovery of hearing, following upon a sham operation and an unexpected loud sound, involves the same elements, i.e., the mobilization of energy and its direction into auditory channels; the patients expected or hoped to recover hearing. Thus, the operation played the rôle of suggestion; and the loud noise, produced during the operation, added its influence to that of the excitement and of the expectation.

Dissociation.—We might have brought into the preceding explanation the concept of dissociation. The term as ordinarily used in functional nervous disorders, means a functional interruption in the continuity of nervous processes. Thus,

mutism may be said to be due to a dissociation of higher brain tracts (those involved in the desire and intention to speak) from those more directly concerned with the inervation of the speech organs. But this dissociation-concept is not of any special value in this study. It is more important for us to observe that the patient referred to above had not made the effort necessary in order to overcome the dissociation and that, when they made that effort, the "break" in the nervous connections was bridged. The main questions for us, those we have tried to answer, are "What are the conditions for overcoming the resistance, the dissociation?" and, "Why was the subject unable or unwilling to fulfill these conditions?"

An organic disorder brings frequently in its wake faulty habits of digestion, excretion, posture, gait, sleep, etc. And these derived, faulty habits may persist after the disappearance of the fundamental disturbance. Their removal by psychical means is often as surprising as easily accomplished. The reader will find in Professor H. L. Hollingworth's book, *Abnormal Psychology,* a valuable treatment of this and of other related problems.

Healing by psychical means may be much more laborious than in the preceding instances. Among the instructive procedures developed during the War, that of Dr. Lewis Yealland, an English physician, deserves description. It is a combination of the Kaufmann treatment—painful electric shocks—with persuasion and suggestion. We are to observe that every one of the means used by him was intended to convince the patient that he could be cured, to make him desire that consummation, and to induce or compel him to do his utmost to use his limbs. Electricity was not used because of its healing power, but merely to compel an unwilling patient to put forth his utmost effort, and also to cause mechanical movements of the speech organs or limbs, and, thus, to convince him that they had not lost all capacity of motion.

A soldier, twenty-four years old, who had gone through

the Mons retreat, the battles of the Marne, of Ypres, etc., was brought to Yealland suffering from a mutism of nine months' duration. Many attempts had been made to cure him. "When I asked him if he wished to be cured," writes Yealland, "he smiled indifferently. I said to him, 'You are a young man with a child and wife at home. You owe it to them, if not to yourself, to make every effort to restore yourself. I have seen many patients suffering from similar conditions, and not a few in which the disorder had existed for a much longer time. I understand your condition thoroughly, and it makes no difference to me whether you desire or do not desire to be cured. You must recover your speech at once.' He became somewhat depressed; his eyes fell from looking at me, and I left him.

"In the evening, he was taken to the electric room, the blind drawn, the lights turned out, and the doors leading into the room were locked and the keys removed. The only light perceptible was that from the resistance bulb of the battery. Placing the electrodes, I said to him, 'You will not leave this room until you are talking as well as you ever did; no, not before.' The mouth was kept open by a tongue depressor; a strong faradic current was applied to the posterior wall of the pharynx and, with this stimulus, he jumped backwards detaching the wires from the battery. 'Remember, you must behave as becomes the hero I expect you to be,' I said. 'A man who has gone through so many battles should have better control of himself.' Then I placed him in a position from which he could not release himself and repeated, 'You must talk before you leave me.' A weaker faradic current was then applied more or less continuously, during which time I kept repeating, 'Nod to me when you are ready to attempt to speak.' This current was persevered with for one hour with as few intervals as were necessary, and at the end of

that time he could whisper 'ah.' I said, 'Do you realize that there is already an improvement? Small as it may seem to you, if you consider rationally for yourself, you will believe me when I tell you that you will be talking before long.' I continued with the use of electricity for half an hour longer, and during that time I constantly persuaded him to say, 'ah, bah, cah'; but 'ah' only was repeated. It was difficult for me to keep his attention as he was becoming tired, and, unless I was constantly commanding him, his head would nod and his eyes close. To overcome this, I ordered him to walk up and down the room and, as I walked with him, urged him to repeat the vowel sounds. At one time, when he became sulky and discouraged, he made an attempt to leave the room, but his hopes were frustrated by my saying, 'Such an idea as leaving me now is most ridiculous; you cannot leave the room, the doors are locked and the keys are in my pocket. You will leave me when you are cured, remember, not before. I have no doubt you are tired and discouraged, but that is not my fault; the reason is that you do not understand your condition as I do, and the time you have already spent with me is not long in comparison with the time I am prepared to stay with you. Do you understand me?' This evidently made an impression on him, for he pointed to the electrical apparatus and then to his throat. 'No,' I said, 'the time for more electrical treatment has not come; if it had, I should give it to you. Suggestions are not wanted from you; they are not needed.' I had intended at that time to resort to electricity, but owing to his attitude, I postponed its use and, instead, made him walk up and down the room repeating, 'ah,' 'ah,' 'ah,' merely to keep him awake and to show him that his suggestion regarding electricity would not be accepted. Each explosion of the whispered 'ah' was accompanied by an almost

superhuman effort, manifested by spasmodic contractions of the muscles of the neck, the head being raised in jerks. . . . It was not long before he began to whisper the vowels with hesitation. When that was accomplished I said to him, 'Are you glad you have made such progress?' I expected him to answer me, but he did not; instead he began to cry and whispered in a stammer, 'I want a drink of water,' and I replied, 'Yes, you will have a drink of water in a few seconds; in fact, just as soon as you can utter a sound.' He again made an attempt to leave the room, and I said firmly, 'You will leave the room when you are speaking—speaking normally. You are a noble fellow, and I know you want to be cured and are happy you have recovered to such an extent. Now you are tired and cannot think properly, but you must make every effort to think in the manner characteristic of your true self—a hero of Mons. You are already doing splendidly.' His attitude then changed considerably and from that time he made every attempt to recover."

Four hours after entering the room, the patient left it speaking normally. (From *Hysterical Disorders of Warfare.*)

By the same method Yealland cured paralyses of the legs. We may quote the last part of his account of the recovery from a nine-month-old paralysis of the two legs. When the patient had succeeded, while on his back, to move his feet and to raise his legs from the couch, he was made to stand up. We let the physician speak:

"While assisting the patient to his feet, I said to him, 'You must be very pleased with the results so far obtained.' 'Yes, Sir,' he replied, 'I am glad I am so much better, but I have had enough for to-day.' 'I am sorry you are so easily satisfied,' I said, 'but you must remember that I am satisfied with nothing except complete recovery.' I took

him with both of my hands and hurried him up and down the floor. The limbs dragged and he put most of his weight on me at first. I constantly urged him to rely more on himself, and soon he was able to walk slowly with the assistance of one of my hands, then by holding on to one of my fingers. When I left him alone, he fell, but I hurriedly brought him to his feet and told him he was not to do that again. . . . In less than one hour he was walking normally. He went back to his ward, walking down a steep flight of stairs, and his mental condition was quite changed."

These last two cases do not differ from those preceding in any essential feature. The only differences worthy of notice are that Yealland's patients did not at first desire to be cured; they feared probably a return to the trenches. Besides, the organic resistance to movement was apparently much greater, so that more intense and persistent efforts were required to overcome it. The main task of the physician consisted in inducing the patient to make persistent efforts to speak or walk. To that end he used whatever means he could: he sought to inspire confidence in his knowledge of what was to be done to bring about a cure, he showed a determination to continue the treatment until the cure was achieved, he encouraged the patient in various ways, and he did not fail to arouse his self-respect and pride; finally, by the electric "punishment," he induced the patient to make efforts and convinced him that his paralyzed muscles could move.

Although laborious, the treatment was brief enough: one hour to make a man, paralyzed for almost a year, walk down a flight of stairs!

Frequently the cure seems to demand a more complex procedure. William McDougall relates: "A young gipsy

labourer, working on a hayrick, was caught by the left hand in some of the mechanism concerned in raising the hay onto the rick. He was violently dragged high in air, and left suspended for some time by the left arm. When he was released from his predicament it was found that the whole of his left fore limb was in a condition of complete flaccid paralysis and total anesthesia. He remained in this condition for more than a year before he was sent to me. He had been examined and treated by several medical men. One had applied electrical stimulation with such vigour that the skin of the arm bore several deep scars burned by the strong current. Another, a surgeon, had offered to cut away the useless limb, that dangled like a flail; whether seriously, or as a joke or a threat, I do not know. With the failure of every such attempt at treatment, the patient's conviction that the arm was permanently useless had become more firmly established; and thus the case was a very difficult one. He seemed to be much depressed by his paralysis and the prospect of diminished economic efficiency through life. Hypnotic suggestion produced no immediate effect. It was only through a course of education, persuasion, and suggestion (waking and hypnotic) and encouragement continued over some weeks that the cure was effected. The essential step was to shake and undermine his fixed belief in the permanent nature of the paralysis." (*Abnormal Psychology.*)

The paralysis of this laborer was a functional one, i.e., the nerves and muscles had not suffered any organic damage, otherwise healing would not have been so quickly achieved. Even so, it required "some weeks." It may well be that Yealland's more energetic ways would have met with speedier success, for the agents used by McDougall were at bottom no other than those employed by him and by Dr. Taylor: establishing confidence in the

cure and inducing the patient to do his utmost to move his arm.

McDougall tells us that in this last case suggestions made during hypnosis had no immediate effect. Usually, however, suggestions given in that stage have a greater efficacy. C. S. Myers, formerly professor of psychology at Cambridge University and, during the War, Lieutenant Colonel in the English Medical Service, summarized as follows his treatment of fifteen shell-shocked patients whom he hypnotized: six were apparently completely cured, six distinctly improved, three remained unimproved.

Several physicians, notably C. L. Tuckey and J. M. Bramwell, both in London, have made a study of the effectiveness of hypnotic suggestion on drunkards classified as dypsomaniacs. Dr. Tuckey reports complete cures in one-third of 200 cases. Of 76 cases treated in the course of ten years by Dr. Bramwell, 28 recovered completely. The average duration of the recovery, at the time of the publication of the statistics, had been three years. It must be noted that most of these were desperate, hopeless people who had tried all other available means. The success of these two physicians surpasses the achievements of the best mission workers or revivalists.

Among the cures by hypnotic suggestion reported by George B. Cutten, there is the following: "Mr. X, 36 years old, started drinking when twelve years old, and when 24 was in the habit of drinking heavily. About one year and a half before applying for treatment, he had taken the Keeley cure and had remained sober afterwards for four months. Every inducement was offered and even threats of various kinds were made to induce him to stop drinking, but they were powerless. Early in September 1900,

he came to Dr. Cutten in the evening, partially intoxicated. He was hypnotized every day for two weeks, then every other day for about the same length of time. (Suggestions against drinking were made while he was in hypnosis.) At no time did he get beyond a light hypnotic sleep. From the first day he did not take a drop of any kind of alcoholic liquors and, on the ninth day, all craving for liquor was gone." He had twenty treatments in all. The man was still sober when this account was published in 1907. (*The Psychology of Alcohol.*)

The principal difference between this procedure—suggestion during hypnosis—and that of Taylor and of Yealland, is that no effort is required of the patient; he need not even know, when awake, what suggestions have been given him; they work in the automatic, direct manner described in the discussion of the action of suggestion. They are remarkably effective because hypnosis is a condition of increased suggestibility, i.e., the higher critical mental activity is largely diminished or entirely arrested, and consequently whatever enters the mind remains unopposed. Beyond that, there is nothing peculiar in the effects of suggestion made during hypnosis. Suggestion meets likewise with remarkable success on patients who are not technically hypnotized, but who are very much awed or fascinated by the physician. The effectiveness of the suggestion is, here as elsewhere, proportional to the degree in which the higher mental activity is arrested. Hence, the importance of the preparation of the patient before he receives the psychotherapeutic treatment. The unusual success of Coué was undoubtedly due to the high degree of mental passivity, of receptivity, induced in his patients.

Among the surprising cures reported by Coué is that of a woman suffering from neurasthenia in an extremely aggravated form. Although not paralyzed, she was spend-

ing half her time in bed, utterly unable to get about or to do any work. Her appetite was bad, her digestion poor, her spirits low. Coué explained to her his method, the nature and power of suggestion or, rather, of autosuggestion, and announced the cure. It took place after a single sitting. We are told that the case was followed up for two years during which there was no relapse. This recovery from severe neurasthenia was, even in the opinion of psychotherapists, unusually rapid. Nevertheless, it need not have involved other agents than those with which we are already familiar.

Explaining to the patient the cause of his suffering is, at times, enough to cure him. "An officer and his servant were blown up by a shell. The servant ran to fetch a stretcher for the officer to whom he was much attached. On his return, the officer made a few convulsive movements and died. Immediately after, the servant had a fit. During the next two months he had eleven more. Hurst made a diagnosis of hysterical fits resulting from emotion, and explained his idea of their origin and nature to the servant, and the convulsions then ceased completely." (Southard, case 501.)

At times the disorder has its origin in an experience entirely forgotten. Such is the case in an instantaneous cure reported by Dr. J. A. Hadfield in *Psychology and Morals*. "A man twenty-eight years of age had never been able to take milk as long as he could remember. It had always been attributed to a congenital idiosyncrasy of his physiological system. On analysis under hypnosis, it was discovered that at the age of three he was given a powder (probably Gregory) in milk, which he found too horrible to swallow. At the sixth attempt, as soon as he had taken the mixture into his mouth, the doctor seized his jaw and

held his mouth closed, to compel him to swallow. He choked badly and was nearly suffocated. Thus the taste of milk and Gregory was associated in his mind with this terror. The incident was forgotten, but the link of association remained and made it impossible for him to take milk."

As soon as the sufferer had understood that his dislike was not for the taste of milk but for that of Gregory powder, the repulsion to milk disappeared. He said, on tasting milk, "This does not taste like milk at all."

In a similar case, the tolling of church bells had become connected in the mind of a woman with her intense emotional reaction to the death and burial of her mother, so that ever after, church bells would plunge her into a dreadful paroxysm similar to the one experienced at the death of her mother.

As a considerable proportion of the wonders performed by psychotherapy belong to the class just illustrated, we must endeavor to give a clear explanation of them. In the first instance it is obvious that the disgust was not due to the taste of milk but to that of the powder mixed with it. The repulsion to that compound was, furthermore, greatly increased by the attempt of the physician to make the child swallow it. In his frantic resistance the child almost stifled. Is it surprising that, afterwards, even the sight of milk or the word "milk" would nauseate him? As a matter of fact, the mind of this person worked according to a well known law.

More unusual is the fact that the original circumstances under which the dreadful impression was produced had been forgotten, and still milk remained repulsive. But this again is not different in substance from very usual happenings. It is a commonplace observation that things and persons often continue to determine in us definite

emotional reactions when the original circumstances have been forgotten. When, after an absence of a great number of years, the writer went back to the city of his infancy, certain places and objects brought up marked feelings and emotions, even though he could not recall any reason for them. We come, thus, to the conclusion that the repulsion for milk felt by this grown-up person is, in substance, an expression of well-known psychological laws.

The cure came as soon as the patient understood that it was not to milk that he had a violent objection but to Gregory and the rest of the total original experience. At that moment the word "milk," the sight of milk, and milk itself, lost their objectional potency. Surprised, he said, "This does not taste like milk at all," which meant that the very taste of milk had been distorted, falsified by the original experience, and that now he could approach milk dispassionately, mentally free to find out what its real taste was.

The case of the tolling church bells is quite similar: first, a complex and deeply painful experience, including the ringing of bells; thereafter, the bells themselves, alone, bring up the emotional experience, even though its original cause had been forgotten. And, finally, when the person learns why she reacts as she does to the bells, the connection between tolling bells and the affective experience breaks down.

In a book already mentioned, Hollingworth remarks, in connection with the explanation of disorders of the type just discussed, that bears are taught to dance by the trainer playing a tune while they are standing on a heated platform. After a time the bears will dance even when the platform is cold, provided the tune is played; a part of the original experience (the tune) reinstates now the whole of it. Apparently the

bears, like the child with the milk and Gregory powder, do not analyze the situation; they do not separate in their minds the heat which makes them dance and the tune which accompanies the heat. If one could make the bears understand that the dancing was originally caused not by the tune but by the heat of the platform, the tune would lose its compelling power, even as "milk" lost its repulsive effect when the sufferer learned that not milk but Gregory powder was the offender.

Although the patient's knowledge of the cause of a disorder is in a certain class of cases sufficient to achieve a cure, it is, of course, not always so. There are patients who suffer from that very knowledge; they are not able to liberate themselves from the harmful remembrance of a damaging experience. That was the predicament of the soldier who, in the excitement of warfare, had killed a wounded enemy asking for quarter. Here, the task of the physician is to lead the patient to cease struggling against his memories, for that merely establishes them more firmly in the mind. He should be made to come to terms with them, to face them with composure. When the sting has been drawn from them, they disappear and, with them, sleeplessness, terrifying dreams, headaches, inability to work, and other psychopathic symptoms.

In this particular instance, it was explained to the soldier that a man under the intense excitement of hand-to-hand fighting for his life could not be accounted altogether responsible for his acts; that, furthermore, he had already expiated his fault by his suffering. These explanations coming from a person enjoying moral prestige in the eyes of the patient, rid him of the dread of the deed he had done, reëstablished his self-respect and, thus, the plaguing memories left him and health returned.

What else need be at work in the successful ministrations of a priest-confessor who, in the name of God, as-

sures the sinner that, having repented and done penance, he is pardoned and enjoys again the loving care of God?

When a terrifying belief is groundless, an explanation may speedily remove it and reëstablish health. "A woman of thirty-two, married, had three children. She had been nervous for three years and had been going from clinic to clinic, receiving, without relief, the usual routine treatment of bromides, tonics, etc. Psychoanalytic examination [i.e., nothing more esoteric than questioning] of the patient, aided by the information obtained by our social worker regarding her home surroundings, disclosed the following facts: She had got the idea that pregnancy in nervous people would lead to insanity and that the offspring of such a mother would also become insane. She would go into a panic every time she thought she was going to become a mother, and would carefully observe the conduct of her children and misinterpret their ordinary actions as signs of mental trouble. Her continuous worry almost disorganized her household, and she formed fault, habits of mind and body. The correction of her misunderstandings by the physician, combined with the remedying of her faulty home surroundings by the social worker, brought about a complete recovery, which was as decisive as it was amazing." (M. S. Gregory, in *Proceedings of Mental Hygiene Conference and Exhibit,* 1912.)

Psychotherapists know that moral defects may so disorganize the mental life as to produce serious mental incapacity. A moral education of the patient is then the treatment indicated. The following instance is taken from Dr. Paul Dubois's *The Psychological Treatment of Nervous Disorders.*

A married woman, mother of several children, manifested all the symptoms of neurasthenia: fatigue; inability

to do any mental work, even reading; persistent headache; sadness, etc. During two years she was under treatment by physical means, and the disease grew worse. She became irritable, could no longer bear the presence of her children, and came to think of herself as incurable. Dr. Dubois separated her from her family, and, in daily visits, subjected her to the following moral treatment: "Without letting myself be discouraged by the skepticism of the patient, I insisted that she should treat all her nervous troubles as though they were trifling ailments. I showed her that they were consequences of nervousness, and that, no matter how distressing, they were always without danger. . . . Little by little, leaving all manifestation of nervousness out of the question, I dared to approach the more general question of morality and of practical philosophy. I did not hesitate to put my finger on the diseased egoism of her life, in that she was always preoccupied with her own well-being. I changed the basis of her thoughts in the altruistic sense, advising her to think of those who belonged to her, her excellent husband and her children. She became enthusiastic over these very simple lessons upon the art of living, and drew me out by her questions on subjects which were always more elevated. . . . Little by little the inner conversion became complete, and I could advise correspondence with her husband. Two months had been enough to bring about the cure. The patient resumed her place in her household, active, indefatigable, gay, and free from all phobias." The distinguished physician who had treated her by physical means, said, "I must admit that she is another person."

This woman replaced a self-centered egotistic attitude by a healthier one; she took a new interest in her children and her husband; the vital fountain of love was reopened and her life became organized. The awakening of the

tender emotion is often the initial instrument of the transformation spoken of here as "moral education."

Between the psychotherapist and his patient, and between the priest-confessor and his penitent, there exist usually confidence and admiration; that is a step towards tender feelings. How easily and frequently this first step is followed by others, is better known to the physician than to the layman. The sympathetic physician does not exercise his function of director, and the compassionate priest that of confessor, without frequently arousing feelings and emotions which go beyond mere respectful affection.

Character Formation and Reformation.—With the case reported by Dr. Dubois we may have passed outside the field belonging to the psychiatrist, but we are not outside the pale of science. The formation and reformation of character is as much a concern of science as anything else. Success depends here upon whatever knowledge has been acquired on human personality. The aim of the character-reformer is to organize and unify the mind under the influence of adequate ideals and purposes, and to provide energy to support them. In the case of the young and much-handicapped Dora Hadley, we have already had occasion to show the secular character-reformer at work. This young woman was redeemed by the acquisition of an ideal of womanhood linked with the awakening of ties of affection and admiration for persons representing that ideal.

The non-religious method of character formation and reformation is perhaps seen at its best in such institutions as the Borstal Institutions in England and Sleighton Farms in the United States. The *Report of the Commission on the Treatment of Young Offenders at the Borstal Institutions,* presented in 1927 by the Secretary of State for Home Affairs (England), directs attention to "the personal

relations of friendship and loyalty" established between the boys and the managers of the Institutions and certain outsiders belonging to an association organized for the purpose of helping the boys. Those personal relations, the Commission insists, are what "alter the lad's life and stand between him and relapse." Awakening of self-respect and regard for the esteem of good people, and the fixation, in habits of behavior, of higher moral conceptions, are the conditions of success. Statements to that effect could be quoted from the managers of all the leading institutions for juvenile offenders, as well as from the most successful social workers. The more important forms of the procedure and its effective psychical factors appear clearly in the following extracts from the Report.

To these Institutions are committed by the Juvenile Courts young people between sixteen and twenty-one, who thus escape the debasing associations of prison life. "The routine of the institutions is that of an active day of fifteen hours, beginning with physical training, continuing with eight hours' work in workshops or outdoors, and ending with one-half to two hours of school and study." It is "a combination of mental, moral, physical, and industrial training of a strenuous kind," lasting a minimum of two years and a maximum of three, followed by one year under probation and supervision.

Personal liberty, at first restricted, is gradually increased as the boy or girl passes through the various grades, until in the Special Grade, his sense of honor is left practically alone to stand between him and misconduct. "Entrance to the Special Grade is a formal and serious acceptance of personal responsibility for self-control and right conduct which the lad makes before his Governor. It is presented to him rather as the undertaking of a task, than as the gaining of a privilege. Thenceforward, he moves

freely about the place, outside as well as inside. Out of a daily average of three hundred Special Grade lads, during 1926, only eleven abused the confidence placed in them."

Each Institution is divided into a number of houses in which the young people live. Prefects, chosen from Special Grade lads, are responsible for good order in general, and for parts of its life: library, games, dinner table, etc. A Senior Prefect is House Captain.

"Borstal training would fail without the work of the Borstal Association." That is a voluntary body disposing of funds. Every inmate of a Borstal Institution is seen by one of the representatives of the Association during his stay at the Institution, and arrangements for his future are settled. On his discharge, he is placed under the care of one of the Associates; if possible, employment is found for him; in any case he is placed in suitable lodgings. He receives help and advice during the legal period of his supervision. Of the one hundred thirty-six lads and girls discharged during the first quarter of 1926, work was found for seventy-eight by the Association, and fifty found work under its guidance.

Few people, even among the well informed, know how much progress has been made in the application of recent knowledge to the moral education of the child without reference to heaven and the God of the religions. The resources of psychology are now being brought to bear upon the child by hundreds of persons devoted to character improvement, with results which promise much for the future. New methods are devised, tried, and their results measured. Those found effective, replace the traditional talking, preaching method, still current in the church, the Sunday school, and the ordinary home—the method exhibited at its most naïve in the tragi-comedy of Topaze, the schoolmaster who thinks that honesty will

follow the learning by heart of the maxim, "Honesty is the best policy."

A powerful movement carried on by educators, psychologists, social workers, and even psychiatrists is on foot, sweeping past the religions. The following specific items of information about this movement may interest the reader.

Among the recent organizations founded in the interest of scientific knowledge and practice in this field may be mentioned the Institute of Child Guidance of New York; the Institute of Juvenile Research and the Behavior Research Fund of Chicago; the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station, at the State University of Iowa; the Character Education Enquiry set on foot by the Institute of Social and Religious Research; etc. The colleges open Bureaus of Educational Counsel, and enlist in their faculties specialists whose task is to look after the moral health of their students.

The psychiatrists do a large share of the work in this field. The books in which their labors are recorded would alone make up a fair sized library. We may mention, as an instance of their contributions, *The Treatment of Behavior Disorders following Encephalitis; an experiment in re-education,* by Earl D. Bond and Kenneth E. Appel, of the Pennsylvania Hospital for Mental and Nervous Diseases. The after-effect of encephalitis, better known as "sleeping sickness," involves frequently a moral transformation for the worse. Well-behaved children become suddenly social delinquents, with whom neither the home nor the school can cope. In this book is related an experiment, of five years' duration, in the study and treatment of sixty-two children who had become unfit for the ordinary schools. "The work developed into a thorough going reeducation of habits and attitudes. . . . The experiment has now shown a measure of success that has led the Pennsylvania Hospital to establish a special School for Post-encephalitic Children."

Among the valuable most recent works, in a wider field, may be mentioned *Fifty-five 'Bad' Boys,* by Samuel Hartwell, Director of the Worcester Child Guidance Clinic. It is the

record of the attempt to help "unhappy, worried, misbehaving" children who had been brought to the Judge Baker Foundation. The reader may find in that book clear and detailed information on the technique now in use for the reformation of character. He would notice the basal place occupied in that technique by an effort to induce the child to take the psychiatrist into his confidence, to confess to him his fears, his worries, and his sins. The researches of William Healy in the United States and of Cyril Burt in England, to mention only two names, on the respective rôle of traits of personality and of the environment in the production of delinquency and crime, are important contributions to the science and art of character formation.

Every one knows something about the existence and the practical application of intelligence and school achievement tests, but few are aware of the active search now being made for measurements of temperament and character-traits. The construction of tests of general intelligence, of special abilities, of achievements in almost every one of the school branches, is a notable achievement in the field of intellectual development. One can now measure, with an accuracy sufficient for many practical purposes, not only the general intelligence of a person and some of his special aptitudes, but also the progress a pupil is making in spelling, arithmetic, penmanship, reading, etc. One of the far-reaching outcomes of the use of achievement tests is that, since they make possible an exact comparison of the value of the different teaching methods, it is no longer possible for an inferior method to maintain itself against a better one.

The corresponding accomplishment now in progress in the field of moral education, is of momentous significance, for here also the possession of definite measures will make impossible the endless survival of prejudices regarding the effective means of moral improvement, and will save us from the use of futile methods hallowed by tradition. For detailed, technical information regarding the nature of these tests, how they are established, how their validity and reliability are tested, and what can be done with them, the reader will have to go to special treatises. He might, in particular, turn to the publications of the Character Education Enquiry, to those of the

Institute of Character Research of the University of Iowa, and to the second volume of the Indiana Survey, entitled, *Experimentation and Measurements in Religious Education,* by Goodwin B. Watson.

The "Systematic Questionnaire" prepared by Floyd Allport, and the test devised by P. E. Vernon and G. W. Allport to determine the relative prominence of six important traits in a given person, are among the valuable aids recently provided by scientific men for the study of character and personality.

This experimental work is being carried on by trained psychologists and educators. The Character Education Enquiry is under the direction of Professor Hugh Hartshorne of Teachers College, Columbia University, and Professor Mark A. May of Yale University, and under the general supervision of Professor E. L. Thorndike, also of Teachers College. The Iowa Institute was directed, until recently, by Professor Edwin D. Starbuck.

The fruit of the five years' labor of the Character Education Inquiry has been published in three volumes: *Studies in Deceit, Studies in Service and Self-Control,* and *Studies in the Organization of Character.* They contain mainly the record of a search for devices for detecting and measuring certain forms of conduct. The investigators chose modes of conduct which "were not only significant in living but also susceptible of precise measurements and experimentations." In the first volume, they paid attention to deceitful and to honest behavior; in the second, to coöperative and charitable behavior and to self-control. The result, says the writer of the Foreword to *Studies in Service and Self-Control* is that "scientific evidence has been supplied for doubting the efficacy of certain conventional efforts at character development in both secular and religious circles, and has also contributed to the more difficult task of building anew the whole structure of moral education."

In *Studies in Deceit* the research bore upon some twenty tests referring to lying, cheating, and stealing, given to nearly 11,000 children, ranging in age from 8 to 16 years. A review of this book by Albert E. Wiggam may be found in the *World's Work* for May, 1927, under the title, "Science Measures Morals."

The Institute of Character Research of the University of Iowa, established in 1923, and legally recognized by the Iowa State Board of Education in 1927, is devoted, on the one hand, to the study of character and of the sort of influences and training upon which its qualities depend; and, on the other, to the improvement of methods of character training and of the books and other material usable for that purpose. Among its undertakings, the preparation of *Guides to Books for Character* deserves mention. Two of the eight volumes contemplated have already appeared, *The Guide to Fairy Tale, Myth, and Legend,* and the *Guide to Fiction.* The third volume is to be a *Guide to Biography.* Of this undertaking a prospectus of the Institute says, "This Guide is unique in the educational world. It is exhaustive: All books available in English for each unit have been considered. It is discriminating; selections are accurately ranked according to their degree of literary excellence (the Institute itself included in 1930 four literary critics) and character value. It is objective; all judgments are subjected to scientific control. It is critical, being done by experts in literature and in education."

Many a reader of these pages will be inclined to jeer at the claim made by these guides to scientific measurement of literary excellence and at their value for moral education. Fuller information would bring to these readers the conviction that these first attempts at the application of exact, objective measures to the business of character formation and reformation mark a fundamental progress.

Shall we admit that the outcome of these painstaking and praiseworthy efforts falls far short of the success anticipated? A problem of this difficulty can be solved neither in one day nor by a few men, however able and well prepared they may be for their task. To one aware of the staggering difficulties in the way, these first results, and similar work done by other investigators armed with the modern scientific technique, are a heartening promise of ultimate success.

The conclusion of the Character Education Inquiry mentioned above, with regard to the utility of the ordinary way of teaching morality—the traditional, talking way—is that "the mere urging of honest behaviour by

teachers or the discussion of standards and ideals of honesty, no matter how much such general ideas may be 'emotionalized,' has no necessary relation to the control of conduct. . . . There seems to be evidence that such effects as may result are not generally good, and are sometimes unwholesome. This does not imply that the teaching of general ideas, standards, and ideals is not desirable and necessary, but only that the prevailing ways of inculcating ideals probably do little good and may do some harm."

Scoffers at the efforts of science in this difficult field should first inform themselves, and then compare the achievements of science with those of the Christian Church during two thousand years of teaching and worship. Has the church usefully increased our knowledge of the various causes of personal and social evils and of their prevention? While an army of physiologists, neurologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, and educators are laboring with encouraging success to find and to remove causes of social maladjustment, of delinquency, of crime, and of sin-breeding ignorance, what are the ministers of the Christian churches doing?—Denouncing, remonstrating, encouraging, announcing punishments and rewards (mainly in a distant Heaven) and offering to the sinner divine assistance and the comfort of such doctrines as the atoning death of Christ and of such practices as the sacraments. As to the theologians, the fruitfulness of their labors with regard to "sin" and "sinfulness" had better not be inquired into; there are few chapters of history better calculated to make humanity look ridiculous.

X

THE WORKS ATTRIBUTED TO GOD, ILLUSTRATED AND EXPLAINED

THIS chapter may be opened appropriately by some remarks on the causes of the success mistakenly attributed to magic which are present also in the religions.

The mystery of the long vogue of magic is not sufficiently explained by Puck's saying, "What fools these mortals be!" If the results due to the wiles of the performer are left out, magic owes its reputation to coincidences, immediate or delayed (if one may speak of delayed coincidences), and to its subjective mental effects. As an example of the first, rain is bound to follow more or less closely upon rain-making ceremonies,—quite closely indeed if the magician persists until it comes! Many patients cannot fail to improve, and even to recover, soon after the usually absurd practices of the medicine man; for many diseases are normally of brief duration, and others have sharp turns: fever abates at times very rapidly, and fits of asthma are known to come and go with disconcerting suddenness. How, under these circumstances, is even a semi-civilized man to regard magic as ineffective?

Magic is held in favor not only because of fortunate coincidences but also, and perhaps mainly, because of its mental effects. It is unnecessary to insist at this time upon the reality of the influence of a magical ceremony. When, as among the American Indians of Puget Sound, members of the tribe gather in a circle about a sick person, and a

magician, surrounded with the halo belonging to his calling and helped by the atmosphere of excited expectancy created by those about him, grasps his magic cloth, waves it in front of the patient, blowing at the same time with his mouth so as to drive the disease out of the body, while an assistant stands ready to seize it with a cloth, the reader of the preceding chapters will find no ground for astonishment if a marked improvement or even a cure takes place. The benefit derived from the treatment will depend mainly upon the nature of the disease and the mental characteristics of the patient. Frazer reports, on the authority of an eye witness, the death from "cramps" of a New Zealander on learning that he had eaten the remnants of the chief's dinner—a food tabooed to all his followers. Shall this account be ridiculed? A psychologist would not condemn it before investigation, for he knows how powerful the influence of intense fear may be; and if he should discover that the man was suffering from heart disease, he would say that, apparently, the man died of an attack brought on by terror.

The ordeal by rice, practiced in old India, is an interesting application of the well-known fact that fear, by arresting the secretions of the salivary glands, causes dryness of the mouth. When a crime has been committed, the suspected persons are given dry rice to chew and to spit out after a while. Spitting out the rice dry is a sign of guilt. This way of discovering the culprit might be recommended if it were sure that no other than the culprit would be moved to fear by the ordeal. Among sincere believers in magic the innocent would not usually fear a mistaken discovery, and so the method would work among them about as well as jury trial does among us.

There are secondary causes for the persistent use of magic, but the primary ones—chance successes and mental

effects—are quite sufficient to account for the failure of minds as powerful and enlightened as that of a Julius Cæsar or a Plutarch to abandon it. A general rejection of magic came with a better understanding of the nature and of the workings of the mind.

Is not belief in the action of gods supported, even as magic is, by happy coincidences and mental (subjective) effects? Coincidences are obviously as unavoidable here as there; escape from danger, abundant crops, the healing of body or mind, frequently follow more or less closely upon prayer.

As to mental influences, they can be eliminated from the religions still less than from magic. Who, then, would gainsay the statement that these two causes alone would have been sufficient to keep the religions alive as long as they have kept alive magic, and much longer if the mental effects of the religious beliefs should be more numerous and more striking than those produced by the magical beliefs?

To accept the preceding argument is not equivalent to a total rejection of the action of gods. It is clear, however, that should adequate psychological explanations be found for every one of the phenomena resulting ostensibly from worship, it would become unnecessary to regard personal, divine beings as their causes.

It is undeniable that the psychical agents of life, to which have been ascribed in the preceding chapters bodily and moral healing, are responsible for at least a part of the results of religious worship. *Whether these agents suffice to explain all these results or whether a personal divine intervention is, in addition, required, is the problem to which we are now turning.*

Love, peace, confidence—these removers of wasteful fear-

inhibitions and of the sense of inferiority—work in the Christian religion whether God, Christ, the Virgin, and the saints are living personalities or mere creations of the human mind. And, of course, suggestion in its double aspect plays an important rôle in all the religions: the voice of God, recorded in Holy Books or coming through his representatives on earth, takes the place of the affirmations, commands, and directions of the psychotherapist. The divine voice comes to the faithful with an authority, a prestige not to be equaled by that of any man. It comes, moreover, usually to a person artfully prepared for the ready acceptance of suggestion, by exercises and forms of worship which are the residual wisdom of thousands of years of more or less unconscious experimentation. Whether it be the voice of a divinity or only the product of the human mind, it cannot fail to exert a powerful influence.

Among the non-civilized, the desire for the comforts of intimate companionship with invisible beings is not in evidence. Religion is for them primarily a way of satisfying the grosser needs: hunger, safety from enemies, protection from the elements. In the higher religions, however, the situation is different. Liberal Protestantism has little faith in prayer for rain or for the lifting of a contagious plague. It shrinks from the affirmation that storms and the propagation of microbes can be stopped by religious services, however devout they may be. Among educated Christians, God is first of all, and often exclusively, the divine companion, comforter in sorrow, enlightener in perplexity, strengthener in moral failure.

We shall, therefore, disregard the alleged action of God upon physical nature and concern ourselves only with be-

liefs held in greater honor among the educated adherents of the religious method. It is proper, however, to remind those adherents that the official books of worship, which they use without protest, retain prayers for the weather and against physical accidents, and that these prayers are still read in all seriousness in the churches they attend: "O God, Heavenly Father . . . send us, we beseech thee, in this our necessity, such moderate rain and showers that we may receive the fruits of the earth to our comfort and to thy honor." In a "Prayer for Fair Weather," the Lord is reminded of his promise not to send a second deluge: "O, Almighty Lord God, who for the sin of man didst once drown all the world, except eight persons, and afterward, of Thy great mercy, didst promise never to destroy it so again, etc. . . ." There are other similar prayers, "for Dearth and Famine," "in Time of War and Tumult," "in Time of Plague and Sickness," etc. And there is a corresponding set of Thanksgivings for gracious answers to the said prayers: "We give Thee humble thanks that it has pleased Thee, in our great necessity, to send us at last a joyful rain. . . ." As the English are a seafaring nation, their Book of Common Prayer, from which the preceding quotations are taken, includes appropriately a section of many pages on "Forms of Prayer to be Used at Sea"; some of these are to be said daily in the King's Navy: "We, thy creatures, but miserable sinners, do in this our great distress, cry unto Thee for help: Save, Lord, or else we perish." "O send Thy word of command to rebuke the raging winds and the roaring sea; that we, being delivered from this distress, may live to serve Thee and to glorify Thy name all the days of our life." In similar words did the ancient Greeks cry aloud to Poseidon to still the waves and save them.

Gods as Physicians of Body and Mind.—Although healing, in connection with religious rites, is a well attested fact, it is just as evident that a great many of the reported religious cures are to be rejected, or at least discounted. Our task at present, however, is not to separate the genuine from the fictitious cures, but to provide instances and, if possible, explanations, of the *kinds* of cure incontestably produced as a consequence of religious beliefs and practices. We shall try to select well authenticated cases, but whether or not every one of them is entirely unassailable, is of little importance. It is better for our argument that we should grant too much than too little.

Healing by appeal to the gods seems to be as old as the religions themselves. It is, as every one knows, a common practice among the present-day savages. The old Greeks made much use of it: the temple of Pergamon was the center of a famous healing cult. And, among the Greeks, the gods were not only healers of the body but of the soul. Diodorus is not alone in reporting that "those who have taken part in them [the Samothracian Mysteries] become more pious, more upright, and in every way better than their former selves."

Jehovah of the ancient Hebrews was thought to be a helper always at hand. When Abraham discovered that the Lord had "closed up fast all the wombs of the house of Abimeleck because of Sarah, he prayed unto Jehovah and Jehovah healed Abimeleck and his wife and his maid servants, and they bore children." (*Gen.* xx, 17-18.)

Jesus is said to have sent forth the twelve disciples with the command to "heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, raise the dead, and cast out devils." (*Matt.* x, 8.) And we have it from several Church Fathers that healing by the God of the Christians played a considerable rôle in Christ's conquest of the pagan world.

In addition to religious healing, Jesus and his disciples cured also by an alleged power similar to the *Mana* of the Melanesians or the mesmeric fluid much talked about a century ago.

Religious and Medical Healing Among the Ancient Greeks. —The conscious combination of worship with the medical art for the purpose of healing is much older than the Emmanuel Movement of the Rev. Ellwood Worcester in Boston. The ancient Greeks anticipated us in this as in many other things. The Temple of Pergamon seems to have enjoyed a specially high reputation as a healing center. Patients came to it in large numbers. The custom was for them to spend the night either in the porticoes or in separate chambers provided for the purpose. In addition to the priests, a number of men lived at the Temple in order to assist in the care of the patients and to help in the performance of surgical operations. What the relation of the priest to the physician was, is not altogether clear. We are told that where the emphasis was ritualistic, the physician was subordinated to the priest, or was even absent. In certain cases, the priest left the supplicant at the door of the sleeping room, and a physician took charge of him. But it seems that, even when the physician was left in charge, the cures were regarded by the credulous as miraculous and due to the god. The physicians of Athens sacrificed every year to Asklepios as their patron, and thus helped to maintain the confusion between natural and divine results. In any case, there was no competition or antagonism between priest and physician.

Votive offerings, representing the parts of the body that had been healed, were left by the patients. Many accounts of cures, with the names of patients, have come down to us inscribed on steles; they correspond strikingly well with similar inscriptions in our Roman Catholic churches.

By the second century, A.D., a marked change had taken place: the medical treatment had become quite distinct from the religious and, more remarkable still, suggestion was systematically practiced. Here again, the Greeks anticipated us: "The cures were effected by courses of treatment suggested to the patient in sleep. There is no trace of a miracle left.

Plenty of exercise, frequent use of baths, hot and cold, and carefully regulated diet, few medicines, and above all, a cheerful temper and restful surroundings, these are the later means employed. . . . The sanctuary has become a sanitarium. Here is a body of skilled men, trained by tradition and experience." (From J. Baunack, *Inschriften aus dem Asklepieion zu Epidauros,* Vol. 1, Leipzig, 1886, quoted in Alice Walton's *Cult of Asklepios,* a Doctor's dissertation.) Let this not be misunderstood; there was at that time in Greece a school of physicians practicing in the manner described, but there were also priests bent upon healing by the religious method, and even magicians performing their rites for the same purpose.

The significant fact to be noted is that in Greece, as early as the first century of our era, the natural and the religious methods had become so clearly conceived and specialized that a distinct class of men devoted themselves to each. The Christian world did not have the clarity of understanding of the Greek world and indulged in a mongrel combination of magic and religion on the one hand, and of medicine and religion on the other.

Magical and Religious Healing by Jesus and His Disciples.— It should be noted that most of the cures performed by Jesus and his disciples were regarded by them as due to a fluid-like potency issuing from them, and not as the result of a personal intervention of God. They seem to have understood the healing power as it was understood in their time, i.e., as the Melanesians understand *mana,* and as the early magnetizers understood the "magnetic fluid." Observe how Luke relates the cure of the woman who had spent all her living upon physicians without benefit. She came behind Jesus "and touched the border of his garment; and immediately her issue of blood stanched. And Jesus said, 'Who touched me? . . . Somebody has touched me, for I *perceived that virtue is gone out of me*'" (viii, 43-48). When Jesus went into Peter's house and saw his wife's mother sick with fever, "he touched her hand and the fever left her, and she arose and ministered unto them" (*Matt.* viii, 14-15). Here again a healing power issues from the body of Jesus. Similarly, St. Paul lays his hand upon the father of Publius, sick of a fever and a bloody flux, and

heals him (*Acts* xxviii, 8). The conception of Jesus and his disciples was not materially different from Mesmer's idea of animal magnetism.

Jesus possessed the healing power in his own right, whereas usually the disciples had to secure it from him or from God. It must be observed, however, that it was also regarded as a gift with which particular individuals were naturally endowed. According to St. Paul, some are endowed with the gift of healing, some with the gift of prophecy, and some with other gifts (1 *Cor.* xii, 9, 28).

The only advance made by the contemporaries of Jesus beyond the Melanesians of to-day, is that the latter think the magic power (*mana*) can be secured from divine beings, both by the religious and by the magical method, i.e., they think it possible coercively (magically) to make them yield some of their *mana;* whereas the disciples of Jesus never thought of magically compelling God to give them the healing power.

Both kinds of healing practices, the religious and the magical, have continued side by side in the Christian Church, and they have remained to this day undifferentiated in the mind of most of its devotees. In the popular, though not in the official, understanding, holy water, the sign of the Cross, relics, etc., are not mere symbols, they possess in themselves (either in their own right or because the power has been put into them by priestly blessing or otherwise) the power to protect and heal, i.e., they are magical, just as the *mana*-laden sacred objects of the South-Sea Islanders.

The Christian world has never been without many famous healers. Places of pilgrimage all over the world, Christian and other, boast of a great number of striking cures; and, even though the reports are often not to be accepted at their face value, the genuine cures are sufficient to establish a claim to frequent successes.

In modern times, one of the most remarkable healers by the grace of God was Prince Alexander Leopold Hohenlohe. Ordained priest in 1815, he acquired in later years a widespread reputation. G. B. Cutten in *Three Thousand Years of Mental Healing* quotes a letter of Louis, ex-

king of Bavaria, referring to the Prince's activity: "There are still miracles. The last ten days of the last month, the people of Würzburg might have believed themselves in the times of the Apostles. The deaf heard, the blind saw, the lame freely walked, not by aid of art, but by a few short prayers and by the invocation of the name of Jesus." Professor Onymus of the University of Würzburg was an eyewitness of the following cure: "A man of about 50, named Brandel, caused himself to be carried by six men from Carlstadt to the Court at Strauffenburg. His arms and legs were utterly paralyzed, hanging like those of a dead man, and his face was of a corpse-like pallor. On the prayer of the Prince, he was instantly cured, rose to his feet and walked perfectly, to the profound astonishment of all present. (D. H. Tuke, *Influence of the Mind upon the Body.*)

It is very often impossible to know exactly what happened in any particular case of healing, at the ancient Greek Temple of Pergamon, for instance, or under the ministrations of more recent religion healers, or yet at the numerous healing shrines of Christianity. Too little information is given about the disease and about the result of the treatment. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the great majority of the religious cures are of paralyses of one or several limbs or of sensory functions, speech, audition, vision. An examination of the records left at famous shrines, at St. Anne de Beaupré, in French Canada, for example, confirms entirely that conclusion.

It is also perfectly clear that in these alleged miracles there were present the very factors which we have found sufficient to account in a natural way for the sudden cure of that class of disorders. The cure performed by Prince Hohenlohe is quite similar to that of the woman, bedridden for seventeen years, who was healed by Dr. Taylor;

and so are the agents of life involved in those performances. We may, therefore, let the reader find the explanation of this class of cures in the preceding chapter, and pass on to other classes. As we do so, let us keep in mind that if the task of the psychotherapist is usually greatly facilitated by an artificial preparation,—a sensitization of the subject, as it has been called earlier—the work of God also is made easier by a similar procedure.

There are evident and substantial analogies in the circumstances under which religious and secular healing take place. The description made earlier of the preparation of the persons attending Coué's clinic would fit in substance what went on at the temple of Pergamon, at the healing sessions of Prince Hohenlohe, and at the various Christian healing shrines. In an atmosphere conducive to belief in the cure, and pregnant with causes of emotional excitement, Coué assures the patient that, if he accepts what he is taught and does what he is told, he will be healed. Before being dismissed, he is instructed to imagine himself in Coué's presence every morning before rising and every evening as soon as he has gone to bed, and to repeat many times, "Day by day, in all respects, I get better and better."

In far more dramatic surroundings, the religious believer at Lourdes, in southern France, is also impressed with the certainty of his cure if he accepts certain "truths" and performs the required acts of faith. He also is admonished to place himself morning and evening in the presence of the Great Healer and to repeat prayers expressing, among other things, just what the declaration of Coué's patients means, namely, confidence in his cure.

The preparation of the patients who seek the help of Notre Dame de Lourdes is, however, usually more thorough and intense than the one received by the patients of the psychotherapists. It begins usually at home, months

before the journey to the shrine; friends and priests have a share in it. It continues during several days before the sacred grotto, where impressive sacred dramas are enacted; and it reaches its climax when the enraptured patient is lowered into the miracle-working water in the presence of an expectant and fervid multitude. It is that moment,—the moment when the suggestibility of the patient has been raised to an extraordinary degree,—which is usually chosen by God for the manifestation of his power.

The Sudden Cure of a Clergyman.—The Reverend Mr. Len Broughton, D.D., pastor of a large Baptist Church in Atlanta, Georgia, relates the following instance of the power of the grace of God. "For seven years I had suffered from acute subpleurisy following a bad attack of pleuropneumonia. Not a deep breath had I taken all those years but had caused me pain, and every month I was laid up for two or three days with a recurrent attack." While returning from England, just out of Liverpool, while his ship was fogbound, he fell a prey to what seemed a new attack of pleurisy. The ship's doctor found his temperature to be 103 and his pulse 120. He was greatly upset for he did not feel he could stand another attack. The doctor left him to attend to some steerage passengers and said he would return later. "After he had left, something came over me. It was a very peculiar feeling. At the time I could not take even a half-breath without pain. I could not lie on either side. I had that awful stitch in my side that is understood only by those who have had it. Then I heard a voice. It was not such a voice as could be heard by any one else present. Only my ears could hear it, for the voice spoke to my own soul. It said, 'Why not trust the Lord? He wants to teach you the supreme lesson of your life, the lesson of his infinite power and

love.' And I answered, 'I am ready.' Then the voice said, 'Would you be willing to give him credit if he heals you?' I said, 'Yes, Lord.' Then I got up and closed the door and knelt down by my bed and looked up to him for healing strength. And there came over me such a calm, such a peace, and joy as I had never known. . . . I got up from my knees and went to bed. There was no pain. Then I tried lying on both sides and deep inhalations and still no pain, not a whit.

"Soon the doctor came back, and I said, 'Doctor, I am well.' He said, 'What has come over you?' I said, 'Put your thermometer in my mouth.' He did so and not a bit of fever did it register. My pulse also was normal. He then put his ear to my chest and all abnormal sounds had disappeared. . . . I got up and dressed, went out, and ate a hearty dinner, mingled with my friends and told the story. That was three years ago, and let me say it to the praise of his name, never once since has there been any pain in that side." (E. E. Weaver, *Mind and Health.*)

The first observation which a physician would make about the Reverend Mr. Broughton is that his symptoms were probably indicative of an hyper-emotional constitution. What is the meaning of these regular attacks of subpleurisy? Why should they return monthly? And how unusual the continuation of breathing pains during seven years! The circumstances suggest pains of an hysterical nature; such pains are not of rare occurrence. An instance of them is described by A. F. Hurst: A man "aged 24, developed an acute attack of appendicitis. He was operated upon the same night . . . and allowed to get up about five weeks later. . . . Since then he had had constant sharp pain in the region of the scar. . . . He was sent to work and told that the pain would go in time." But he could not work and complained of constant pain

in the region of the scar, especially when in bed. When the nature of the pain had been explained to this sufferer, it "disappeared completely, and two days later he was given work on the farm. There had been no return of the pain when he was discharged a month later." (Hollingworth's *Abnormal Psychology*.)

The Reverend Mr. Broughton's experience may be explained thus: he had formed the habit of living in dread of attacks of pleurisy; the dread induced not only a constant pain but also recurrent mild attacks. Why was their periodicity a monthly one and not a bi-monthly, or a yearly one? Perhaps because, for a reason unmentioned in the account, he had formed the habit of expecting them every month. While his ship was fogbound, and he had abundant time to think of himself and of his recurrent pleurisy, he became aware of symptoms which he took as a threat of a new attack. How would a person of his temperament take such a threat? We are told that he did not think he could withstand another attack. One may imagine what an emotional upheaval such a conviction would induce. It would probably set up a feverish condition with racing pulse and high temperature, and a recurrence of the habitual pain.

Shall we marvel that at the height of the crisis, Mr. Broughton heard the words, "Trust the Lord," and thought that the Lord was coming to the rescue?—Not if we remember that these ideas were those which he, as a minister of the Gospel, was in the habit of presenting to his listeners. The voice may be explained in the same way as psychology explains the words said to us by the creatures of our own minds in dream and in those other more or less dreamy conditions when we engage in mental conversation with absent and, often, non-existent persons.

In all probability, the minister did not suffer on shipboard a genuine, organic attack of pleurisy, but a functional imitation of one, induced by autosuggestion in an hysterical temperament. The attack disappeared under the influence of a counter suggestion. That suggestion took, for obvious reasons, the form of the voice of God.

The Case of Mr. Stanley Jones.—The experience of Mr. Jones, a missionary in India, must have seemed particularly convincing to William Adams Brown, professor at Union Theological Seminary, New York, since he reports it in proof or illustration of the divine power.

Mr. Jones had been under a great strain and had apparently broken down: "I saw that unless I got help from somewhere I would have to give up my missionary career, go back to America and go to work on a farm to try to regain my health. It was one of my darkest hours. At that time I was in a meeting at Lucknow. While in prayer, not particularly thinking about myself, a voice seemed to say, 'Are you yourself ready for this work to which I have called you?' I replied: 'No, Lord, I am done for. I have reached the end of my rope.' The Voice replied, 'If you will turn that over to me and not worry about it, I will take care of it.' I quickly answered, 'Lord, I close the bargain right here.' A great peace settled into my heart and pervaded me. I knew it was done. Life—abundant life—had taken possession of me." (*The Life of Prayer.*)

In the form in which it is given to us, this case is too lacking in important details to permit of an entirely safe explanation. We do not know what Mr. Jones' condition really was before the crisis. He *felt* all in, and yet he may have possessed great reserves of energy. Neither are we told whether, as the result of the crisis, he modified his

habits of life. If his attitude towards his work became calmer, if he attended more regularly to such ordinary hygienic factors as rest and food, his condition might have improved without any other cause, even to the point of recovery.

As a matter of fact, however, the crisis meant to Jones something more than a warning to slow up the pace. We may take it that as he found the work too heavy for him and realized more and more clearly his insufficiency, fatigue and discouragement fell upon him, and he became completely unfit for his task. Under these circumstances, what would be the effect, on a believer like Mr. Jones, of mere *belief* in divine intervention and of the conviction that if he would give up worrying and would rely on God, he would be cared for? In the light of what we have learned concerning the effects of worry and anxiety and of their replacement by joyful confidence, the answer would have to be that belief itself may very well have been sufficient to produce the results attributed to divine intervention.

As to the explanation of the conversation regarded by Jones as taking place with the Lord, we have already reminded the reader of the conversations which every one holds, with imaginary persons, during sleep and at other times. "Talking" with people not objectively present is a common occurrence.

But why does Mr. Jones think of the Lord at this particular time, and place in his mouth the comforting words which he needed? It is because the Lord and his power are ordinary thoughts with him, and because he is now in dire need of help. Our needs determine usually the nature and course of our thoughts. If, finally, it should be said that Jones was conscious of the actual presence of the Lord in a way so altogether peculiar and convincing that

it demands an explanation, we would refer the objector to the chapter on the "Sense of the divine Presence" to which he will come presently.

The two instances with which this chapter closes are of a more common sort than the preceding ones. A visitor at a revival meeting of the Presbyterian Church, or at a gathering of the Salvation Army or of the Oxford Groups Movement,—the most recent effort to recapture "the power that is in Christ,"—might hear several testimonies to transformations like the following.

Miss Y was brought up in a good Christian home. While studying at one of the Oxford colleges she let herself slip into a rather wild life. She seemed to live for dancing and drinking parties. Yet she found no real happiness in those amusements. She felt the futility and disorder of her life and suffered at the recollection of the ideals formed in her younger years. She was a divided soul. Then she came into contact with a group of the followers of tl e Reverend Mr. Buchman. Their happiness, frankness, friendliness, and enthusiasm impressed her deeply. She yearned for their happiness and their moral wholesomeness. She repented and forsook her evil ways, and joined the movement. And now she is satisfied, life is worth while.

The Reverend Mr. Z felt that he was not doing what he ought to for his congregation, even though he spared no pains in the preparation of his sermons. His personal relation with God was not right; prayer had become difficult. He had lost a child under unusually dreadful circumstances and had remained bitter, unreconciled to his loss. But until after his conversion he was not clearly aware that his bitterness was against God himself. When a group of the Oxford Movement came to his city he was

convicted by them of "unreality and unhappiness." He felt more powerfully than ever that there was no really vivifying relationship between him and his congregation. The main cause of his lukewarmness and failure was revealed to him as the bitterness felt on account of the death of his child. He was able to overcome that feeling and to meet God again in trustful assurance. He confessed to his congregation his delinquencies towards them and asked for their forgiveness and their coöperation in a better and more fruitful association. Their trustful and affectionate response moved him deeply and inspired him with added confidence and joy. He is now an effective, enthusiastic, and happy minister.

In both these instances are seen plainly the action of natural psychical forces mentioned in the preceding pages. Both these persons were divided souls: the best impulses in them were checked by other tendencies; they were doing what they did not want to do and were not doing what they were desirous of doing, and so they were unhappy. They needed no more than the contagious influence of a group of sympathetic, affectionate and enthusiastic young people who had won moral unity, in order to be able to do what was required to become like them.

The same forces are at work among certain groups of revolutionary atheists. Many a young man and woman living, at a low dynamic level, a futile, unsatisfactory life has been regenerated by contact with such groups and has henceforth devoted himself body and soul to a cause regarded as promising the salvation of the world. That was the case of Catherine Breshkovskaya whose life we shall have occasion to describe later on.

XI

THE WORKS ATTRIBUTED TO GOD, ILLUSTRATED AND EXPLAINED– (Continued)

THE POWER OF DIVINE LOVE

The Salvation of a Drunkard.—Although the tender emotion is not absent from the preceding transformations, it is not as conspicuous as in the reformation of G. This case should be compared with that of other dypsomaniacs whose cures, reported in earlier pages, were achieved by psychotherapy without the introduction of the love-factor.

Until the age of twenty-one G. had lived in a Christian home. He took his first glass of whiskey at that age, and gradually became a drunkard. Three years ago, after the ruin, through dissipation, of his business establishment, he went tc Canada, where no one knew his antecedents, with the intention of beginning life anew. But soon he fell a prey to his old enemy. He had signed enough abstinence pledges to "cover the wall of a room"; they were never kept more than a month, generally only a few days, and sometimes but a few hours, in spite of hard struggles to be true to his promise. In Montreal he lost a very good position, and was thrown into prison for disorderly conduct. Disgusted and tired of life, he left Canada to go to W. Here he arrived intoxicated. He secured a position, but was soon dismissed for drunkenness, and then found himself once more without money, without friends and without home. Gladly would he have welcomed death. While he was in this wretched situation, a lady showed him sympathy and invited him to a mission. Her kind-

ness made him look within. For years no one had ever cared about him; this unwonted kindly interest went to his heart. At the meeting a pressing invitation was given to all persons present to give themselves to the Lord Jesus Christ with the assurance that he would save them. A bed was given G. in the mission house. While his roommate lay drunk, he sat up, or paced the room all night long in a sullen, despairing mood. Some one had lent him a Bible; he tried to read it, but his thoughts were too disturbing. That which he had heard in the meeting had brought to his mind recollections of youth, the thought of the young wife he had left in England, of his family, etc. He realized that there was no hope, that if he died then he would go to hell. He prayed, asking God to take him as he was; saying that if God was willing to save him, he would let him. "I said, here I am." At about 6 A.M. he felt that God had pardoned him. The anguish of the night had passed, and he found himself calm and peaceful. That very morning he told a companion that he was converted, that he had given his heart to God. Terrible were the temptations that day as he passed before the saloon doors; but he was sustained. They recurred day after day for more than a week. The lady's continued sympathy was a great comfort to him.

Three months after his conversion he opened a mission, which progressed rapidly, and is now doing very good work among drunkards and other outcasts. (Related by the convert himself to the author, and printed in an appendix to "Studies in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena," *American Journal of Psychology,* 1896, Vol. VII.)

Let us attempt an analysis of the psychological causes of this transformation. At the mission meeting, suggestions, conveyed by many who testified to their deliverance,

acted forcefully upon G. The emotional atmosphere of the meeting, the discourse of the missionary speaking in the name of God, and his own sense of helplessness, focused and arrested his attention, and disposed him to receptivity. All resistance to the acceptance of the divine offer broke down; and, during the night, the moment came when he could say to God, "Here I am, do with me what Thou wilt." Belief in the power of God to save had come. He was in the condition in which the psychotherapist wishes his patient to be in order that suggestions may work themselves out in him.

To disregard the woman in the case would show great ignorance of the marvelous power of the tender emotion. We have seen love, at its coarsest, delivering neurasthenic women from their sufferings; and, at its noblest, inspiring and sustaining great personalities, poets and philosophers. After years of lonely struggle, when it seemed that final failure had come, when all had been lost, including friends, family, and the last remnants of self-respect, a woman showed him kindness. For years he had not known any human affection or regard. No wonder this kindly interest of a lady went to his heart. A tie with life had come into his existence: once again he cared for the esteem of a human being; self-regard and self-respect had been reawakened, i.e., the praise implied in esteem and affection had begun to do its vitalizing work. The rest of this man's experience during the fateful night is to be read in the light of the flame kindled by that woman and of the hope that God would save him.

At about six in the morning, after a restless, anguishing night, something striking happened: he found himself surprisingly calm and peaceful. This he took as a sign of the divine pardon, he thought himself saved. Whether he was really saved or not, the sequel only could show. But at

that moment, he believed that God had come to his rescue. He believed that because of what he had heard during the evening, and, more directly, because the raging storm within him had suddenly subsided and peace had come.

Was he mistaken in interpreting that event as the sign of his deliverance from the passion for alcohol; or was the calm, following the storm, an event without any relation to his passion and God? The unavoidable answer is that it may very well have been the latter. Something of that sort is a fairly common experience: whether the cause of the tormenting unrest be physical—a toothache, an attack of asthma—or whether it be a moral problem. In this instance we see two causes for the rapid subsidence of the distracting struggle as the morning came: G. had done his share; i.e., he was ready to do whatever God might ask him to do in order to save him; the rest was up to God. Moreover he had become convinced that God could save him as he had saved those he had heard the evening before. The second cause is exhaustion. It is of common knowledge that after hours of suffering and struggle, a lull of blessed quietude may permit us at last to fall asleep; extreme fatigue puts an end to pain and disquiet. When the disturbance is of moral origin, as in this case, its continuance depends upon mental activity. It is only in so far as G. recalls his past life, realizes what he has missed, and anticipates the repulsive future awaiting him that he suffers and recoils. Here again exhaustion brings to an end the struggle, for it brings thinking to an end.

But one cannot expect G. to give to his experience this natural explanation. The sudden and unexpected advent of peace with the dawn, could hardly be interpreted by him otherwise than as a sign of divine grace. Let us not fail to notice that that assurance would constitute an added source of energy when in the presence of temptation.

As a matter of fact he never fell back again into his evil ways. The natural agents of life which had been at work upon him and which continued to act upon him, proved sufficient to keep him from falling again. These agents were the continued interest and sympathy of the lady, the belief that God, during the fateful night, had extended upon him his healing hand and that he would continue to keep him. Thus, self-respect and self-regard, and affection for man and "God" had returned,—he *was* saved.

When everything is taken into account, the salvation of G. is not so remarkable as it may seem. On several previous occasions he had withstood his temptation as long as a month at a time. After the fateful night he held out three months and then opened a mission. There he entered into the relation of leader and helper to the outcasts who came to hear what God could do for them. New interests, new human ties, and a new sense of worth and of responsibility had come into his life. He was now in possession of much more powerful motives for resisting the temptation to drink than before he became the leader of a mission.

Christian Science and the Replacement of Fear and Worry by Love and Peace.—The attention of Mrs. Eddy seems to have been drawn to the problem of mental healing by a Dr. Phineas P. Quimby, who cured her in her youth of a disorder presumably of an hysterical nature. Quimby himself had learned the art of suggestion in hypnosis from Charcot at the Salpêtrière in Paris. It is in the light of that beginning that one should seek for the key to the understanding of Christian Science.

Mrs. Eddy's career may have been "shadowed by falsehood and deceit, clever trickery, and misrepresentation," and much of *Science and Health* may be nonsense; nevertheless, the fact remains that for the first time in a religion certain effective psychotherapic principles have been disengaged from much of the dross in which other religions had hidden them. Christian Science has boldly swept aside the dogmatic scaffold-

ing of orthodox Christianity. The triune God, the Fall of man, the Incarnation of the Son born of the Virgin Mary, and his atonement for the sins of man—all that abracadabra is disregarded, and fear and worry are directly and vigorously attacked as constituting the major cause of physical and moral evils.

"Always begin your treatment by allaying the fear of the patient. If you succeed in wholly removing the fear, your patient is healed," says *Science and Health.* The philosophy taught by that book is calculated to replace fear by peace and confidence. One of their leaders writes with the naïve boastfulness characteristic of the sect: "The Christian Scientist, with calm assurance, elucidates to his patient the fact that he is in the very presence of God, infinite love, and that his rest is in God, in whom man lives and has his being. The patient is made to know why and how God is ever present and why he sustains his creatures and gives them peace at every moment. The patient is thus lifted into a consciousness of ever present Spirit, the infinite good, and this good overcomes evil."

There is nothing so uniformly striking to the uninitiated person who visits places of worship of Christian Science as their atmosphere of peacefulness and the serenity of the worshipers. That attitude finds fitting expression in hallowed utterances displayed upon the walls: "I will fear no evil for Thou art with me"; "In quietness and confidence shall be my strength"; "The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want," and the like.

To the short-sighted vision of the masses it hardly matters whether the theology of this cult is true or not. What matters is whether, when accepted, the death-breeding attitude of fear, worry, and failure is replaced by the life-giving attitude of assurance, peace, and love.

If Christian Science frequently succeeds where the traditional Christian religion fails, it is not because the latter does not include in its doctrinal and in its practical teaching the saving forces that are in Christian Science, but because it is less direct in its use of them. It preaches Christ crucified and a distant heaven, while Christian Science teaches and demonstrates the danger of fear and worry, the healing power of

"Mind," and the illusory character of all things except divine love.

Mrs. Eddy, by Edwin F. Dakin, is a fair account of the founder of Christian Science.

The Love of Man and the Love of God.—It is not altogether easy to understand how the awful and infinite God may become the object of the love of man. To feel for an invisible and infinite being the full glow of love seems neither natural nor possible. Here, however, the admirable resourcefulness of human nature comes to the rescue; the awful, infinite God before whom even the mighty ought to tremble, is reduced to convenient dimensions. The object of Christian worship is not really the creator of heaven and earth, described by philosophy as infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent; he is a companionable Father; or his son Jesus, born of a woman; or even Mary, the Mother.

How easily accessible a theoretically inaccessible God may be made in order to suit human purposes, has been demonstrated by countless Christians and by none so strikingly as by the mystics. There was, for instance, the good Heinrich Suzo, a great German mystic of the fourteenth century. On entering the Dominican Order, he gave up reluctantly the love of woman. Soon after, he discovered that he had to give up his male companions also, for they found pleasure in things forbidden by his conscience. The loneliness of his life-prospect frightened him, and he turned with famished eagerness to the substitute for earthly love offered by the Church. "See," said he to himself, "whether this great Mistress [Mary, the Mother of the God Jesus] of whom you hear such wonders would not become your love; for a young man and an unsteady heart can hardly remain long without a personal love." For a space of time that thought haunted him. Then came

a rapturous experience similar to that of the woman professor quoted in another chapter; he had found the Heavenly Bride. "Then entered into his soul the original source of all good. In it he found everything that is spiritually beautiful, lovable, and desirable." "Should I be," he continues, "the husband of a Queen, my soul would find pride in it; but, now, you are the Empress of my heart, the bestower of all gifts." Thus Suzo discovered experientially the "love of God" in the guise of love for Mary, the perfect Woman; and he found in its warmth and intimacy a substitute without which religious life would have been an unacceptable martyrdom.

How far, under the stress of human need, the Almighty may be transformed into a commonplace lover, is well known to the student of grand mysticism. When Saint Theresa of Avila was about fifty years of age, her familiarity with God knew no bounds. As she had been suffering from a depression, regarded by her as betokening the absence of God, she broke out in the following amazing speech: "What? Is it, then, not enough that you should keep me in this miserable life; that I should submit for the love of you? Must you also hide yourself from me? How can that be reconciled with your compassion? How can your love for me tolerate that? Lord, were it possible for me to hide myself from you as you do from me, your love, I feel sure, would not tolerate it. Such ungratefulness is too cruel; consider, I beg of you, that it is not fair towards the one who loves you so ardently." The astonishment with which one reads this passage is not much relieved by this explanation: "Often, love moves me in such a way that I am no longer master of myself; then it is that with the greatest freedom I dare to address such plaints to our Lord, and He is gracious enough to tolerate all this." (*Saint Theresa's Autobiography.*)

One and all, the great mystics who, because of an unusual temperament or of untoward circumstances or of both, had been unable to form normal social relationships with their fellowmen, found in the service and companionship of divine Beings that which the earth had refused them. They became not only divine lovers but also God's privileged co-workers, entrusted with glorious missions. The great Catherine of Genoa, sanctified by the Roman church, was married at the age of sixteen to a man much older than herself, "undisciplined, wayward, of an impatient and explosive temper, selfish and self-indulgent." She never had any love for him, and from him she received only slights and neglect. For five years she nursed her sorrow in seclusion, seeing no escape from what she called a living death; then she found in Christ an ardent lover.

The human origin and nature of "divine love" is nowhere, perhaps, so startingly clear as in the biography of Mme. Guyon, the founder of quietism. She helps one to realize that there are not two emotions, love of man and love of God, but only one, having now a human being for its object, now a divine person. As a girl, sixteen years of age, she exchanged a home, where she was happy in the admiration of those about her, for the home of her husband where she was listened to only to be contradicted and blamed: "If I talk well, they say it is only for the purpose of showing off." She was no longer the idol of any one; her pride suffered horribly. Soon her husband became a semi-invalid, and the young wife was transformed into the nurse of a jealous old husband under the eyes of a mother-in-law, ill-tempered and envious. She was, indeed, in great need of loving and being loved. It was under these circumstances that she consulted a Franciscan monk. Their meeting was momentous. She relates in

her autobiography that, as he told her to seek God in her own heart, she felt the stab of an arrow which quite pierced her heart: "At that moment I felt a wound very deep, as delicious as it was amorous, a sweetness which was felt so powerfully by my senses that I could scarcely open my eyes or my mouth."

This first meeting with the Franciscan monk opened for Mme. Guyon a period of exaltation in great contrast with her preceding life. He became her Director, and for several years all went well with her. She seemed an altered being; her household duties were now performed without reluctance and "divine" love was in her heart. When the Director who had brought to her the "love of God," went away, a change came over her. It seemed to her that God, instead of remaining the loving Bridegroom, had become a rigorous Judge.

A return to "divine favor" was bound up in a very illuminating way with the birth of a second tender relation, this time with a certain Father la Combe. She had made his acquaintance some years previously. Their first interview had produced a deep impression on both of them. They lost sight of, without apparently forgetting, each other; for, one day, several years later, she improved an opportunity of writing him concerning one of her servants. On the same occasion she recommended herself to his prayers. He comforted her by assuring her that the state of her soul, painful though it was, was nevertheless one of grace. The Father was then at Thonon, distant a few miles only from Geneva. Mme. Guyon saw in this the hand of God who, in her opinion, set about contriving devices to make her go to that city. An angel announced to her in a dream that God wished her to be in Geneva, and coincidences which might appear marvelous came about to lead her there.

Father la Combe also had "indications." She had asked him to say Mass for her on the day of Mary Magdalen. During the service he heard a voice repeat three times with great vehemence, "You shall live in the same place." That same day Mme. Guyon recovered her long-lost peace of mind: "It was on that happy day of Mary Magdalen," she wrote, "that my soul was completely freed from its pain"; and she added, "After the first letter from Father la Combe, I began to live a new life."

At the first meeting with the Father, after their long separation, she was surprised to feel an inner peace and a joy never before felt with any other person. "It seems to me," she says, "that a great wave of grace swept from him to me, passing through our inmost souls and returning from me to him, so that he experienced the same feelings. But it was a grace so holy, so pure, so clear, that it was as a wave ebbing and flowing, and then losing itself in the divine unity." In similar terms she tried at an earlier time to describe her relations with God himself.

Her peace was so extraordinary that she felt the need of a particular word to describe it. She called it *"Paix-Dieu."* Why not *"Paix-la-Combe"?* Why did she interpret that inexpressible inner state as the "splendid and holy" return of him she thought she had lost forever? Early in life she had been cheated of human love. Later on she had long awaited in physical torment and moral desolation the return of the heavenly Bridegroom. He had not come. But a man, with whom she had exchanged at an earlier time sentiments which are the harbinger of love, entered her life. Her heart awakened, her soul lived again, and "God's" love manifested itself once more to her in trances inexpressibly delightful.[1]

[1] Much in the last paragraphs is taken from the author's *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism.*

What fundamental difference is there between the love-experience of this Christian mystic and that of the neurasthenic woman who found health and happiness in amorous adventures? The love of Mme. Guyon remained platonic; it was, nevertheless, sensuous.

Mme. Guyon is far from being an isolated case. Despite their theory of the all-sufficiency of God, the famous mystics, Fox and a few others excepted, have not been able to do without a loved and loving friend of the opposite sex with whom they have maintained tender, if usually platonic relations. St. Francis of Assisi was attached to Santa Clara, Suzo to Elizabeth Staglin, St. François de Sales to Mme. de Chantal, Mme. Guyon to Father la Combe.—Human beings as pace makers in the race for "divine" love! That is a curious and very significant fact. What would these distinguished people have lost if they had lost the love of God and kept the love of their devoted friends? In the case of Mme. Guyon at least the answer seems clear.

These celebrated examples of extravagant, abnormal love of God should be regarded as extreme cases of an experience familiar to every earnest Christian: the sense of the loving presence of God.

Space may be made here for a conspicuous example of extraordinary manifestations of love for God and of the use made of them in the Roman Catholic religion. In 1864 Pius IX decreed the beatification of Marguerite Marie Alacoque (1647-1690). More recently a movement, inspired by her revelations, took shape under the name *Apostolat du Sacré Cœur de Jésus* (Devotion of the Sacred Heart of Jesus). According to a biographer of the saint, this movement "revivified the Church." Of the puerility of the revelations of Marguerite Marie, the reader will be

able to judge for himself. They are about Jesus and his heart from which flames issued, and about being drawn upon his bosom,—about this and little else. The time came when "every first Friday of the month the sacred heart of Jesus would appear to me as a sun shining with a dazzling light. Its rays struck perpendicularly upon my heart which was set afire and threatened to be consumed to ashes." At times the heart of Christ would appear pierced through and torn by blows; at other times, pressed upon by a crown of thorns, and bleeding. The tablet commemorating the Devotion of the Sacred Heart bears this quotation from her *Memoirs*,—it contains the substance of her "revelations": "My Sovereign Master made me repose long upon His divine breast, and discovered to me the marvels of His love and the inexplicable secrets of His sacred heart which He had so far hidden from me. Jesus said to me: 'My divine heart is so filled with love for all mankind and for you in particular that it is unable to contain longer within itself the flames of its burning charity; it must spread them abroad by your means.' After these words He asked for my heart, and I begged Him to take it; this He did, and placed it in His own adorable heart."

There is no escaping the term "erotomania" in connection with this Saint. She provides as lurid a picture as can be imagined of a virgin sexually excited from childhood by repeated vows of chastity to Christ, her Bridegroom; and by the constant consciousness of his loving presence. On one occasion God rewarded her for a repulsive act of self-mastery by keeping her mouth "glued to his sacred heart during two or three hours of the following night." There was no rest for her, day or night, from divine love. "The more she progressed, the more this love of God consumed her. Her delicate constitu-

tion could not endure such emotions. Lean, pale, almost transparent, as if through her flesh one could see the flame of the spirit, she realized more and more the song of her novitiate:

"I am a harassed doe,
Ardently seeking cool waters.
The hand of the hunter has wounded me;
The dart has reached to my very heart."

Once as the Bridegroom was crushing her by the weight of his love and she was remonstrating, he said: "Let me do my pleasure. There is a time for everything. Now I want you to be the plaything of my love, and you must live thus without resistance, surrendered to my desires, allowing me to gratify myself at your expense." (*Mémoires de Marguerite Marie Alacoque, édition Languet.* The relation of human sex-love to the love of God is discussed in Chapter V of *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism.*)

From this diseased love and these "revelations" has sprung the powerful "Devotion of the Sacred Heart of Jesus" with its headquarters in the vast *Basilique du Sacré Cœur,* dominating Paris from the height of Montmartre.

XII

THE WORKS ATTRIBUTED TO GOD, ILLUSTRATED AND EXPLAINED– (Continued)

SENSITIZATION.—We must now return for a moment to the important question of sensitization (see page 161). It should not be imagined that it is only at special places of pilgrimage and in the surroundings of particular healers that the worshiper is submitted to a process of sensitization to the agents of life. Ordinary worship itself is a subtle art of preparing the faithful for the reception of what is regarded as divine grace: singing, the attitude of prayer, the sacraments, and many other minor aids to worship, such as the sign of the Cross, genuflexion, holy water, place the worshiper in a mental condition favorable to the action of suggestions. Other adjuncts of worship, lofty architecture, rich pageantry, solemn music, lead of themselves to a frame of mind antagonistic to fretfulness, discouragement, and debilitating emotions; they begin the blessed work ascribed to God. They do more than that: they focus the mind they have made receptive, upon the values which God represents.

Worship, as practiced either in public or in private, produces a trance-like condition of intellectual inactivity. When prayer goes beyond crude begging, body and mind come to rest, the eyes are closed, the world is shut out. If at all prolonged, that attitude of passivity leads to a delightful, thoughtless somnolence over which hovers the vague consciousness of a great and benevolent Presence.

Whether or not there has been communion with God, or Christ, or the Virgin, the worshiper issues from this peaceful abstraction, refreshed and invigorated.

The Christian mystics have pushed further the preparation begun in the ordinary prayer of communion. They have elaborated a technique ending with total "absorption" in God, i.e., a state of complete trance, dominated, as long as a glimmering of consciousness remains, by the idea of God, or Christ, or the Virgin, or even of one of the numerous saints.

The terms *Meditation* and *Contemplation* are commonly used to designate the first two degrees of the "Ladder of Love," as the mystics call the stages through which "Union with God" is reached. "Contemplation," says St. François de Sales, "is a unitary, total view of the loved object." "It should be a prayer not of the thought, but of the heart," writes Mme. Guyon. And St. Theresa of Avila speaks of it as involving a "great reduction of the mental activity," so that the powers of the soul are unable to do anything except enjoy.

As the soul proceeds in her approach to God, she passes successively through what some mystics call the "Prayer of Quiet" and "the Sleep of the Powers," and reaches finally "Ecstasy" or "Rapture." If, in the preceding stages, the s[illegible] is still "able to indicate, at least by signs, what she expe[illegible]ences"; in ecstasy, she "is absorbed in enjoyment, without understanding that which she enjoys. . . . If spoken to, the soul hears the sound of the voice but no distinct word." The condition thus described authoritatively by St. Theresa, and in substantially the same terms by all the classical mystics, is obviously a trance in which the mental activity is reduced to mere feeling.

The preceding information on the Ladder of Love is intended mainly to point out that its lower degrees, Meditation and Contemplation, are reached by the pious Christian in ordinary prayer. They indicate a condition of affective union with "God" and of decreased intellectual

activity; and, hence, one of increased suggestibility to whatever promptings are felt at the time. Since, under the conditions of prayer, the only promptings still present are in agreement with God's will (as the worshiper knows it), it follows that *prayer is a state of increased suggestibility to that Will.*

The creation of a ritual inducing a state of relaxation and increased suggestibility to the will of God, constitutes a notable achievement; to it Christianity owes a large measure of its success.

The nature of the preparation induced by certain forms of worship, and the reason for its value, could not be more convincingly set forth than in the description of the mental state to which the Reverend Mr. Jonathan Edwards, the great New England metaphysician of the eighteenth century brought his hearers in the revivals which he conducted at Northampton. As the following account is read, it should be borne in mind that what Edwards accomplished with unusual success, is accomplished in a lesser degree by all the revivalists and other orators, as well as by the ordinary forms of worship.

In the fall of 1734 Edwards began a revival in the town of Northampton. As the winter progressed, the revival gathered intensity, until virtually every one of the two hundred families composing the town, and most of the population of the surrounding district, felt the influence of a tremendously impressive preaching in the most uncompromising Calvinistic style.

Let us try to realize the situation: a small community in which every one knew every one else, shut in for six months by a New England winter, under the awful ministration of a man of unrelenting earnestness and surpassing talent. Every day the news of the miraculous transformation of one or several well known persons spread

through the town like wildfire. The spiritual atmosphere was changed. It became, wrote Edwards, "a dreadful thing to lie out of Christ, in danger every day of dropping into hell; and what persons' minds were intent upon was to escape for their lives and to fly the wrath to come." "Our young people when they met were wont to spend their time in talking of the excellence and dying love of Jesus Christ." "And even at weddings, which formerly were merely occasions of mirth and jollity, there was now no discourse of anything but the things of religion, and no appearance of any but spiritual mirth." No revivalist could ever boast of having brought about a more complete moral transformation of a community.

By what force was this wonder achieved? Edwards himself answers, in words of which he did not understand the complete significance. Almost two centuries of scientific progress were to pass before the full import of his observation could be realized. Toward the end of that winter, the suicide of a person who had been "kept awake nights meditating terror, so that he had scarcely any sleep at all for a long time," warned Edwards that "the spirit of God" was withdrawing from them. "After this, multitudes in this and other towns seemed to have it strongly suggested to them, and pressed upon them, to do as this person had done. And many that seemed to be under no melancholy, some pious persons that had no special darkness or doubts about the goodness of their state, nor were under any special trouble or concern of mind about anything spiritual or temporal, *yet had it urged upon them, as if somebody had spoken to them: 'Cut your throat, now is a good opportunity. Now! Now!' So that they were obliged to fight with all their might to resist it.*" (The italics are ours.) (From a pamphlet by Edwards himself,

published in 1736, entitled, "A Narrative of Surprising Conversions in Northampton.")

What does that mean? Obviously, that Edwards had plunged the whole community into a condition of abnormal suggestibility in which many found it almost impossible to resist suggestions of suicide. Would these people, in that condition, have been able to resist suggestions much less antagonistic to human nature, made by Edwards in the name of the Almighty?

Similar means are used in Roman Catholic churches in order to bring men to repentance and salvation. A certain priest of *Notre Dame du Mont* (Marseilles) was especially successful with children's *retraites.* They lasted usually six days, with several sessions each day. On the last day, he would lock the doors in order to prevent any one from coming in and distracting the attention of the children at the psychological moment. He would draw the blinds half down, spread a mortuary sheet before the altar, place upon it a crucifix and two lighted candles. The stage thus set, he would launch into a discourse on Christ's passion, dwelling especially on the thorns penetrating the flesh, on the running blood, on the suffering of the Saviour. Soon a sob would break out and set loose a mighty wave of emotion in the room. With the children in this state of uncontrolled emotion, the priest would confess them. One wonders whether he really thought that God had anything to do with the preparation of the children and with the final result.

RENDERING TO GOD WHAT BELONGS TO CÆSAR.—In the preceding pages we have written as if the religions worked exclusively with the religious method. It is, of course, quite otherwise. The Christian religion, in particular, has supplemented worship by natural means of fostering

good conduct and desirable character-traits, as well as of attaining other less worthy purposes.

Many of the practices and exercises demanded or recommended by the Christian churches have a value quite independent of divine action. They bring to mind or keep before it certain "truths," or deepen the impression made by them; they serve to set up certain attitudes and to induce certain habits of thought and action. Such are, for instance, the sign of the cross, genuflexion, the rosary for the repetitious use of prayers, and many other helps to worship. Much of the teaching, directing, advising, done by the churches, has no necessary reference to a social God. They are the ordinary, natural ways of the home, the school, and society in general. The lack of clear thinking on this point is so extraordinary,—people bred in the atmosphere of the churches are so much in the habit of rendering to God what belongs to Cæsar,—that we must point out how extensively non-religious means are used by the religions.

When a preacher imparts to his audience information regarding any aspect of life, under the conviction that it is not possible to behave for the best if one is ignorant of the world in which one lives, he is not using a religious but a secular method of advancing the coming of the Kingdom of God.

When a church organization establishes a settlement and provides workers to teach the denizens of the slums the rudiments of housekeeping, of thrift, of cleanliness, it is not, thus far, making use of a religious method. It would be doing so only if the workers were instructed to point to faith in God and Christ, and to reliance on prayer as the means of achieving the desired transformation of individual and of social habits. Social work and education, which constitutes an increasingly large part of

the activity of the churches called progressive, is a non-religious method.

The teaching of ethical principles in Sunday Schools, by means of the lives of great and good men, or even with the help of the beautiful parables of the Gospel, is no more a religious method than any of those in current use in the secular schools. Only in so far as the virtues are presented as of transcendental nature and origin, and in so far as it is sought to implant them in man by direct divine action, can one speak of a religious method.

One may say that the Protestant churches commonly regarded as progressive are those which make the widest use of the secular and place the least reliance on the religious method. Nevertheless, when secular activities are carried out by or under the direction of a priest or minister of religion, or sponsored by a religious organization, they are commonly regarded as religious. It is as if, by a sort of contagious magic, the secular became religious when associated with a religion.

The scientific movement in the field of moral education is, at least in the United States, usually labeled "religious." It has probably not escaped the attention of the reader that the Character Education Inquiry, mentioned in Chapter IX, is an offshoot of the Institute of Social and *Religious* Research. He may also be aware that a very influential educational association, actively devoted to the advancement of morality by the most modern methods, calls itself the *Religious* Education Association. Let him turn to the pages of its *Journal* and he will see that, for the most part, it is not concerned with the God of the religions at all. Their work, dubbed by themselves, "religious education," is nothing else than the application of the most recent development in the art and science of education to the realization of an ideal of life. The main

supporters of that association—as also the distinguished pioneers we have had occasion to mention in connection with tests and measurements of character-traits—remain, in their educational work, outside the cardinal belief of the churches: personal divine intervention.

"Religious education" means, for the most part, in college and university circles, simply "moral education." Many have lost altogether the notion of anything else which might be meant by the former expression. When Bertrand Russell writes a book on *Education and the Good Life,* John Dewey, the Dean of American philosophers, and no believer in the God of the religions, speaks of it as "education regarded as religion." Francis T. Peabody, equally firm in his rejection of the social God, writes on *The Religious Education of an American Citizen.* It appears that the aim of what he calls "religious education" is to save the child from the religions, and to draw out his latent faculties, in order to make him conscious of his powers and efficient in their use for the realization of a rational and beautiful ideal. And so of dozens of books and shorter writings coming out in an uninterrupted flow from defenders of "religion" who reject every one of the religions.

The Christian believer, far from recognizing how much comes from the pedagogical wisdom of God's representatives, tends to see divine intervention everywhere. The reader's curiosity on this point might be gratified by a glance into the celebrated *Spiritual Exercises* of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit Order, a man who knew how to bend human nature to his purposes. Or, he might consult a work in three volumes on *First Communion, a course of instruction, preceded by a method* (1851), by the Abbé F. le Gendre. He would find in this book minute directions on ways and means of placing the child in the most advantageous mental state in order to make of him a devoted Roman Catholic Christian. In Dieulin's

The Priest, Judge and Physician in the Confessional (1845) much good practical information is provided on the different temperaments, and directions are given to the priest-director for adapting his sacred office to each.

The institution of the confessional is another good example of the worldly wisdom of the religions. Everybody knows that, in certain circumstances, confession to a wisely chosen person means deliverance from an intolerable burden. In particular cases, when suppressed memories are the cause of a mental disorder, bringing the objectionable experience to the light of consciousness may end the disturbance. William McDougall relates this instance of the curative effect of confession to a physician—himself—by a soldier who had become incapacitated for further service: "At last, after many weeks, he told me of an incident the memory of which was undoubtedly strongly repressed but not dissociated. He had not forgotten it but had not been able to bring himself to speak of it in spite of all my urging. The essence of it was the killing of a wounded enemy during the excitement of battle. After confession and readjustment, recovery was almost immediate." (*Abnormal Psychology.*)

Distressing past experiences never liquidated, skeletons in mental closets, account not only for psychoneuroses but for a vast amount of ordinary enfeeblement and mental misery. A patient of Pierre Janet, suffering from the obsession that he had contracted syphilis,—though, in fact, he had not—found relief in telling to a relative things he had carefully hidden from every one. "The visit was extremely distressing to me," he said, "for I told him about all the follies I had committed, the follies which had exposed me to the risk of syphilis. I told him all kinds of things which did not concern him in the least, and which cost me a great deal to confess. From one point of view

I regret very much having made a fool of myself in this way; but, from another point of view, I have no reason to complain, for this visit and this confession put an end to my crises and thus spared me a great deal of suffering."

Confession readily passes from the acknowledgment of evil deeds to a simple "letting oneself out"; even that may achieve something worth while. A patient who had to make a long journey to see his physician at the hospital of Johns Hopkins University, told him, "It takes me five hours in all to make this visit to you, but the hour with you is the only hour of the twenty-four when I can really be myself." We have here one aspect of the value of prayer: God becomes a confessor to whom one may tell everything.

A psychologist who for many years was attached to Juvenile Courts was moved by the grievous effects of the knowledge of certain evils, when possessed by children and kept secret (or, as the Freudians say, suppressed), to address parents and teachers in these words: "We should most earnestly counsel that children should be accustomed to go over the items of their daily life with their guardians that there may be no hidden knowledge to be dwelled on in morbid fashion. Of all forms of prevention of delinquency I know of nothing comparable to the confidences and counsels between elders and children." (William Healy, *Honesty: A Study of the Causes and Treatment of Dishonesty Among Children.*) Confession to a priest is not without value, but confession to one who knows what has been learned about human nature since the Bible was written, offers greater promise of success.

But why do the representatives of the Christian religion, who are aware of the presence in confession of natural healing forces, continue to introduce divine inter-

vention as if it were a necessary factor in the blessed outcome? The Reverend Mr. O. Hardman, chaplain of Dulwich College, writes as a well informed psychotherapist would about the natural effects of confession: "The method of sacramental confession has the strongest psychological support. The opportunity of telling the precise nature of an offense in a solemn way, in the presence of an official representative of the Church, the sense of receiving an authoritative declaration of forgiveness, and the knowledge of the binding nature of the seal of confession, all possess considerable psychological value, and conspire to create a sense of restoration to fellowship in a manner that permits of, requires even, the making of a fresh start. There is something truly purgative in vocally and definitely naming one's sin and in declaring, 'I am heartily sorry.'" (*Psychology and the Church.*) Why, then, does this author agree with his church—the Church of England—in saying that at least the main effects of confession are to be attributed to "the operation of Divine Grace"?

More surprising still is the double-mindedness of another church leader, the Reverend Mr. Leslie D. Weatherhead, professor in a theological school. His *Psychology in Service of the Soul* contains interesting instances of what a wise man, with some knowledge of psychotherapy, can do for suffering humanity. There is in particular the case of a bright girl in her twenties. "She lived at home. Until the last twelve months she had been radiantly happy. It was a joy to have her in the house. Every one liked her. She had been engaged to a young dentist. He had good prospects. They were to have been married. Then he fell a victim to an incurable disease. Marriage became impossible. She watched him die. She was deeply grieved, but seemed to be getting over it. She be-

came engaged to a young business man. They loved each other deeply. Mrs. Murray (the mother) was positive about that. And the man was all that could be desired. He was a member of the same Church. Every one spoke highly of him. His character was of outstanding worth. But during the last twelve months something had happened. Dora had been morose and sad. She had given way to fits of weeping. She had complained of insomnia. She had even 'wished she were dead.' The doctor had diagnosed nervous breakdown and ordered fresh air and good food, and a thorough rest and complete change. Dora was even then at the seaside with a friend. Her lover could not understand it. He was looking forward to marriage. Dora, on the other hand, maintained she would never marry. When asked why, she said she was not worthy to be Gordon's wife.

"Of course, I said at once that I must have a chat with Dora. But Mrs. Murray said the doctor had said she was too ill to travel, and must on no account leave the seaside. I suggested what I thought might be the matter, but Mrs. Murray repudiated this with some warmth and expressed regret that I had mentioned it. And there the matter ended for some weeks. Then an urgent telephone call. Would I see Dora if she were brought to my rooms by car from the coast? Certainly I would. So the day came, and a very despondent and distressed girl sat in my room. I asked very few questions. . . . In a day or two we arranged the second interview. Dora came with her father, who remained in another room. 'Now, Dora,' I said briskly and cheerfully, 'tell me *the truth.*' For one instant she faltered, then she said, 'I'm so glad you opened the subject like that. I've so hated myself for lying to you.' Then in uninterrupted jerks came the story which was exactly what I had suggested to her mother. Re-

peated sex indiscretions with the dentist leading to the fixed idea that she had rendered herself unfit morally for marriage with her present lover. The reader can imagine how the girl's mind had brooded over her mistakes, and how severe was the mental conflict raging, a conflict made more serious by the mother's frequently expressed belief in the girl's character and by the belief of her lover in her. . . . Dora promised to tell her lover all he ought to know." In order to bring her to that decision, the clergyman spoke of God, of his readiness to pardon the sinner, etc. But was reference to God required in order to persuade her to confess to her lover? Most probably not; she was an intelligent girl, we are told. She could, therefore, understand that there would be no peace for her until her relation to him had been straightened out. It was confession to the lover and his pardon that she needed. God might have been left out altogether and, yet, health and happiness would have returned—as they actually did—when after learning of her "sin," Gordon remained her lover and continued to wish to marry her. Why does the Reverend Mr. Weatherhead speak of "the slate which God had washed quite clean"? Why does he say with reference to the recovery of this girl that "God can find a way out of difficulty for all his children"? Does he not know that this difficulty was overcome by his own human wisdom, the intelligence of Dora, and the true love of Gordon? There is no more evidence here that God, or even the idea of God in Dora's mind, played any effective rôle, than in the instance of the deliverance of the Scotch drunkard who was supposed by the Reverend Mr. McElveen to have been saved by God's intervention. Is there any candor, and is there any gain in thus ascribing to the God of the religions what belongs to man?

THE LIMIT OF THE POWER OF MAN AND OF THE POWER OF GOD.—Enough has been said to convince the most reluctant that all the psychical agents present in psychotherapy are present, singly or together, in the kind of achievements attributed to God which have been considered in the preceding pages; and, moreover, that there is in those cases no evidence of, and no need for, the presence of other psychical forces than those described.

It might be urged, however, that the power of God is to be seen more conclusively in the cure of other and more serious disorders and deficiencies than those examined here. That, in fact, is the claim made by champions of the religions. They affirm that whereas psychotherapy can cure only functional disorders, God cures both functional and organic diseases; "nothing is impossible to God." The better-informed among them have even ceased to urge the cure of functional disorders in defense of their belief; they speak slightingly of them as "mere nervous affections," and give us to understand that when God cures diseases of that kind, he condescends to do what man can and should do himself. The present and, presumably, the final phase of the quarrel raging about divine healing in general, centers about alleged cures of severe organic affections, cancer, tuberculosis, cardiac diseases, etc., cures which, it is affirmed, have occurred suddenly, without a period of convalescence,—achievements quite beyond the means of psychotherapy.

This claim of the champions of divine intervention makes necessary some addition to what has already been said concerning the relation of functional to organic disorders. Some—perhaps all—functional disturbances, when of long duration, may bring about, if not directly, then indirectly, definite organic disorders. It is sufficient to refer in this connection to what has been said earlier on

the action of the emotions of the fear-anxiety type. Interference with vital functions produces debility and may permit the breaking out of an organic disease. In such an occurrence, the first and often the only necessary requirement for recovery, is the removal of the chronic anxiety. That achieved, the disease is likely to be more or less speedily overcome. In that case an organic disorder may be said to have been healed by a psychical agent.

There are psychotherapists who claim to have cured tuberculosis. We cannot side with those who think that they have disposed of that claim when they have jeered at the idea of a "suggestion" pursuing in the recesses of the lungs the dreadful bacilli and killing them. That is a clownish way of representing the action of psychical agents.

Of all diseases, tuberculosis is one of those most readily influenced by the general condition of the patient. It is quite definitely known that many persons who have never been under treatment for tuberculosis, have nevertheless suffered from its attacks. If they have overcome the disease, it is because of their constitution and of conditions of life favorable to a speedy arrest of the development of the tubercular bacilli. When the debility has a mental cause,—let us say depressing failure in one or several of the great aims of life, love, fame, money—might not a cure follow a mental treatment successful in removing the sense of failure? The treatment should, of course, be begun early enough. But, as to that, who knows where the line has to be drawn beyond which the disease may no longer be arrested by the removal of the mental conditions which have favored its development?

It is often said that psychotherapy suppresses symptoms only and not the disorder itself. We are not sure that if all the symptoms were removed, there would remain any

disease. But all chicanery apart, it must be admitted that the suppression of symptoms is often the first step towards the cure. If, to return to tuberculosis, suggestion enables one "to relieve the insomnia, to restore the appetite, and to alleviate the violence of the cough without suppressing the expectoration," the sufferer will have been placed in a condition favorable to the healing activity of nature.

How far may psychical agents go in remedying, indirectly, organic affections? That is a question to which nobody at present is competent to give a final answer. As to the amazing deeds which have been reported and ascribed to God, and which psychotherapy is apparently powerless to achieve, no conclusion can be reached before all possibility of erroneous diagnosis has been eliminated. It is only recently that adequate means have been discovered for the elimination of error in the diagnosis of cancer at an early stage. But even now cancer is not infrequently diagnosed mistakenly by physicians who do not avail themselves of the new means of detection. The readiness of believers in God to believe in astounding miracles is notorious.

One may expect many impressive cures at such places as Lourdes, where psychical agents, hope, confidence, love, etc., are powerfully brought into play. Nevertheless, of the many thousands who seek health at that place, all but a few return to their homes no better or worse. As far as a satisfactory comparison is possible, it would appear that the number of cures by scientific psychotherapy is far greater. This may be affirmed on the strength of the experience of medical men during the Great War and of the statistics referring to the treatment of dypsomaniacs by suggestion. The Medical Bureau of Lourdes makes a great show of scientific rigor in the matter of evidence, but we have not yet heard of a single crucial case—a case

in which the psychical forces known to be present could not be regarded as sufficient—where the possibility of error or deception did not remain.

It is significant that although the number of patients seeking health at Lourdes has increased rapidly (in 1929 about twenty-five thousand persons in quest of health visited Lourdes), the number of reported miraculous cures has decreased year by year. The Verification Bureau (*Bureau des Constatations*) admits the decline, and explains it as due to increased care in gathering the evidence. If the standards of the Bureau were to be raised enough to satisfy the canons of science, how many cures would remain in the column of the miraculous?

Our survey of the deeds of man and of those ascribed to God in the healing of body and mind, points to an equal limitation of each. How difficult it is to escape that conclusion may be inferred from the fact that even a committee appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury to investigate divine healing, affirms that there is no evidence that spiritual healing can produce cures of a kind which cannot be paralleled by similar cures wrought by scientific psychotherapy without religion. (*The Lambeth Committee's Report,* 1924.)

The evidence gathered together in these pages shows the conclusion of that Committee to be true with reference not only to the physical and the intellectual, but also to the moral or spiritual nature of man: character is formed and reformed, ideals of value are implanted, and habits of action in conformity with them are formed, under the influence of individual and social forces. To infer from facts of the kind discussed here the existence and action of the God of the religions is, therefore, altogether unnecessary; rather must we see in this equal limi-

tation of God and man an indication that the forces at play in so-called "divine" healing are no other than the natural forces at the service of man.

We must not leave this subject without remarking that the discovery of the superfluity of personal divine intervention in the physical and the psychical realms, leaves the mind before an unsolved problem; for the human mind insists upon going back of the forces we have mentioned to their cause or source. The metaphysical problem of the ultimate nature of Reality is, however, not to be discussed in this book.

Let it be added that the solution of the problem with which we are concerned does not lead to an alternative between materialism and the spiritualistic metaphysics of the religions. What it does, is to lead to a choice between a primitive conception of God—the one embodied in the religions—and some other conception, in our opinion an anti-materialistic one also. The materialistic systems of philosophy appear to us radically false.

XIII

INTUITION AND INSPIRATION[1]

BELIEF in the intervention of a divine Person is rooted not only in remarkable bodily cures and moral transformations, but also in other kinds of experiences which bring, or seem to bring with them unusual knowledge, energy, and happiness. In this and in the following two chapters, we are to consider the most striking of these experiences with the purpose of discovering what justification there may be for regarding them as dependent upon a divine intervention.

Intuition.—Whenever we find ourselves in possession of some striking knowledge without knowing how we have come by it, we are tempted to call it an intuition or an inspiration or even a revelation. To say that an item of knowledge is an intuition is for most of us nowadays equivalent to saying either that it comes from Above, i.e., from some superhuman being; or that it wells up from below, i.e., from a subconscious activity.

It is pleasant to believe in the possession of a wonderful source of knowledge; intuitive power is, therefore, the boast of many, particularly of those who have little inclination or ability to arrive at the truth by painstaking observation and judicious conclusions. Their claim is a lazy way, and perhaps a not very honest way, of gratifying

[1] The substance of this chapter was published in *The Forum* for May, 1928, and much of it appeared in *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism.*

a natural desire for self-esteem. When women are accused of lacking the ability to reason, they counter by claiming a superior power of intuition!

Of the several classes of experience called intuition, two at least express a real knowledge not acquired by the person possessing it: instincts and axiomatic propositions. Animals and men know instinctively how to do certain life-preserving things without having had to learn them. They have inherited the ability to act in these ways. Axiomatic propositions are intuitions of an altogether different sort. The dictionary defines them as propositions known to be true as soon as thought of. Such propositions are found at the root of logical thinking. The statement, "Two things each equal to a third are equal to each other," is immediately acknowledged as true, says the mathematician. It needs no demonstration; it is self-evident.

We shall be concerned neither with the problem of instinct nor with that of self-evident propositions. They stand clearly apart from the intuitions to be considered here, and demand another explanation.

Most of the intuitions which provide occasions for much gratuitous admiration are expressions of a knowledge acquired by the individual himself in an entirely ordinary manner,—but he does not remember how he has come by it. Were you to visit an institution for defective children some Sunday afternoon and ask one of the children whether he has had a good dinner, the chances are that—since it is Sunday—his face would shine with satisfaction and he would say, "First rate dinner." Should you push your inquiry further and ask him what he ate for dinner, he might remain speechless for lack of any recollection of what was given him. Since the boy has altogether forgotten what he has eaten, his knowledge of having had a good dinner may seem mysterious. He has

knowledge without any known cause for it! That is precisely what most of us call an intuition.

The explanation of this commonplace experience is obvious. Here is an imbecile who a few hours ago has eaten a good meal. His pleasure in it was to him—as it would have been to any of us—the main thing. That main experience is still in his mind, but the memory of the dishes which were on the table is gone. There is nothing mysterious and nothing to be proud of in this lapse of memory. It is easy for human nature to forget causes and remember consequences. The forgetting of causes, while the memory of the effects remains, explains a great many experiences usually regarded as more or less marvelous intuitions.

Do not many of us call "intuition" the insight we have into the character of a stranger on meeting him for the first time? We would be less proud of this talent if we knew how often we are wrong. Nevertheless, it may not be denied that frequently we know that a person, never before met, possesses this or that trait. The explanation of this sagacity can be given by almost any one: the stranger produces upon us the same effect as certain other persons *whom we have known;* therefore, we feel toward him as toward those other persons. Facial expression, ways of speech, intonations, connected in our minds—as a result of past experiences—with certain traits of character, again suggest these traits.

The formula for "intuition" of this kind is simple: Do not remember how you came by a certain bit of knowledge,—forget! Thus the pudding will seem to have been made without any ingredient.

Artistic Inspiration.—There are few beliefs more widespread than that in the passivity of the artist at the su-

preme creative moment. It is a common saying that he must wait upon "inspiration." That word, so ready upon the tongue in connection with artistic creation, points to the spontaneity, the unexpectedness of this kind of mental production.

There is in Longfellow's "Diary" the following entry: "I wrote last evening a notice of Allston's poems. After which I sat till twelve o'clock by my fire, smoking, when, suddenly, it came into my mind to write the 'Ballad of the Schooner Hesperus,' which I accordingly did. Then I went to bed, but could not sleep. New thoughts were running in my mind, and I got up to add them to the ballad. I feel pleased with the ballad. It hardly cost me any effort. It did not come into my mind by lines but by stanzas."

Similarly George Eliot, who is not suspected of mysticism, declared that in all her best writings there was a "not herself" which took possession of her and made her feel "her own personality to be merely the instrument through which the spirit acted." A parallel affirmation is made by the French novelists, the brothers Goncourt: "It is fate," they say, "which brings to you the initial idea. Then an unknown force, a superior will, a sort of compulsion to write commands you and leads your pen; so much so that at times the book you have written does not seem to be your own." Similarly De Musset:

"On ne travaille pas, on écoute, on attend:
C'est comme un inconnu qui vous parle à l'oreille."

A well-known saying of Goethe expresses very well this current opinion: "All productivity of the highest kind, every important conception, every discovery, every great thought which bears fruit, is in no one's control, and is beyond every earthly power. Such things are to be re-

garded as unexpected gifts from above, as pure divine products." The great German was true to the facts in not limiting revelation to artistic creation, but in extending it to every kind of thought. Science, as well as art, may be a beneficiary of revelation.

Scientific Inspiration.—The distinguished French mathematician, Henri Poincaré, relates striking instances of scientific inspiration. He was so familiar with the phenomenon that he affirmed the most striking feature of mathematical discovery to be "apparent sudden illumination." Of the greatest of his discoveries, the *fonctions Fuchsiennes,* he wrote: "I had been endeavoring for two weeks to demonstrate that there could exist no function analogous to those I have since called *fonctions Fuchsiennes.* Each day I spent an hour or two at my working table . . . but I came to no solution. One evening, against my habit, I drank some black coffee. I could not sleep; ideas crowded in my mind; I felt them knocking against each other, until two of them hung together, as it were, and formed a stable combination. In the morning, I had established the existence of a class of *fonctions Fuchsiennes.* There remained merely to set down the results and that was done in a few hours." (*Science et Méthode.*)

This accomplished, he set about exploring systematically the new domain brought to view by the discovery. In the course of that exploration a problem arose which again stubbornly resisted solution: "My efforts served only to give me a fuller knowledge of the difficulty—that was already something gained. So far, my work was entirely conscious. Thereupon, I left for Mont Valérien, where I was to be during my military service; my preoccupations became therefore very different. One day, as I was cross-

ing the Boulevard, the solution of the difficulty appeared suddenly." He found himself in possession of all the elements for the solution. Nothing remained for him to do but to bring them together and to organize them. This he did, as he says, "at one sitting and without any trouble whatsoever." Of another mathematical discovery, made while out walking, he wrote that it came to him "with the accustomed traits: brevity, suddenness and immediate certitude."

An equally remarkable instance is that of the greatest discovery made by Sir William Rowan Hamilton—the Quaternions. In a letter to Professor P. G. Tait, dated October 15th, 1858, he wrote: "To-morrow will be the fifteenth birthday of the Quaternions. They started into life, or light, full grown, on the 16th of October, 1843, as I was walking with Lady Hamilton to Dublin and came up to Brougham Bridge, which my boys have since called the Quaternion Bridge, that is to say, I then and there felt the galvanic circuit of thought close; and the sparks which fell from it were the fundamental equations between i, j, k; exactly such as I have used them ever since. I pulled out on the spot a pocketbook, which still exists, and made an entry on which *at the very moment* I felt that it might be worth my while to expend the labor of at least ten (or perhaps fifteen) years to come. But then it is fair to say that this was because I felt a *problem* to have been at that moment solved—an intellectual want relieved—which had haunted me for at least fifteen years before." (R. P. Graves, *Life of Sir Wm. Rowan Hamilton.*)

Inspirations of scientific value come sometimes—very rarely though—just before complete sleep or just before awakening. The distinguished chemist, A. Kekulé, reported two important discoveries made by him under

those conditions. He concluded his account with these words, "Let us learn to dream, gentlemen. Then, perhaps, we shall find the truth . . . but let us beware of publishing our dreams before they have been put to the proof by the waking understanding." Yes, beware! because most of the time dream solutions are the merest nonsense. But why are they, on very rare occasions, correct? During sleep, the mind is, after all, still the human mind and can be productive of valuable thoughts. The following explanation of scientific inspiration during waking hours fits also the instances provided by Kekulé; but whatever one may think of our explanation or of others, the fact itself has to be accepted: in artistic as in scientific creation,—i.e., in the field both of imagination and of rational construction,—there come, after periods of mental striving or brooding, moments of fruition so effortless and unexpected as to give the impression of inspiration.

Examination of striking scientific inspirations yields the following results. (1) They take place only after a period of work, i.e., they complete or continue something already begun. (2) When the solution is complex, it does not come to the mind with all the details fully worked out; the key is at hand, but it has still to be used; or, as Poincaré says, *"Il faut déduire les conséquences."* (3) Discoveries just as remarkable are made in the ordinary way, i.e., through sustained effort. (4) If it is true that the solution of a problem may come unexpectedly and, at times, long after we have ceased to be actively engaged in its consideration, nevertheless there is no satisfactory evidence in support of the assumption commonly made that the solution sometimes appears after the person has ceased to be interested in the problem. On the contrary, the solutions that come in the form of inspiration refer to problems which have not been finally dismissed, which have re-

mained, as it were, in the "back of the mind," ready to force themselves upon the attention. Sir William Hamilton states that during the weeks preceding the revelation, active interest in the problem of Quaternions had revived, and that as he was approaching the bridge, although he was talking "now and then" with Lady Hamilton, yet in his mind "an undercurrent of thought was going on" which suddenly flared up into the memorable equations. When Poincaré remarks that during his military service he was occupied with matters other than mathematical problems, we are not to understand him as affirming that the problem of the *fonctions Fuchsiennes,* with which he had been long and profoundly engaged, never crossed his mind. Lord Kelvin, the great English physicist, said on the occasion of a jubilee address that there had never been a day for the forty years past when he had not thought of the problem of the constitution of the ether. (5) Finally, the instances of scientific revelation with which we are acquainted may not be said to transcend the capacity of the persons who get them. These persons are known to have made remarkable discoveries in the ordinary way, while at their work.

These five traits cast a gray shadow upon the lurid colors in which scientific inspiration first presents itself.

It is not because the discovery of the *fonctions Fuchsiennes* seems to transcend the powers of a great mathematician that it is regarded by some as demanding a superhuman intervention, but because it came to Poincaré unexpectedly, when not sought for. Had it been made while he was at his desk, actually working at the problem, no one would speak of inspiration. The discovery would be regarded as the natural result of great knowledge and a powerful mind. Unexpectedness, absence of effort, pas-

sivity—these traits alone, earn for the experience the name of inspiration. We shall now try to show that much of our thinking, good or bad, remarkable or otherwise, is marked by these same traits.

We have said that Goethe was right in including among the "gifts from Above" not only poetical thoughts but also thoughts of any kind. He was wrong, however, in limiting these gifts to great and important thoughts. *All* sorts of ideas, and ideas of all degrees of puerility or importance, appear in our minds under the conditions which we have found to be those of revelation. "The Ballad of the Schooner Hesperus," which flowed from Longfellow's pen by stanzas, without effort, does not embody any great thought. Mozart seems to have claimed that all, and not only his remarkable musical compositions, came to him unexpectedly.

• But why look so far for illustrations? Almost every moment of our conscious life provides each of us with facts of the same kind. Instances of clever ideas, of happy thoughts, which offer themselves when we have ceased to seek them and which seem not the reward of effort but gifts from unknown sources, are common-place. Thinking proceeds very much like the formation of the delightful animals we have all seen coming into existence on the moving picture screen: each part appears separately and jumps into place suddenly. There is no more continuity in the thinking by which a conclusion is reached or a problem solved than in the formation of those cinematographic pictures. The elements of thought appear most irregularly. There are moments when no progress is made; attention relaxes and turns in desultory fashion to other things. Suddenly a new link pops into consciousness and adds itself to the chain. The interruptions may

be so brief as to be unnoticed; and then, remaining under the impression of the effort, we assume that there has been continuity of thought.

The moments of interrupted attention are filled with thoughts and feelings belonging to another topic or with nothing at all; we look up, finger our eyeglasses, consult the clock, light a cigarette, and presto! the idea we had ceased to seek is present. Or, the interruption may be protracted and the task given up for the moment. A week or a month later, the necessary thought may suddenly and unexpectedly appear.

It is a complete misrepresentation of thought to picture it as proceeding in a straightforward, uninterrupted, flowing movement. Conscious processes are, on the contrary, full of stops, of breaks, and of sudden forward leaps. They are like a fire which seems to go out when blown upon, and spasmodically flares up again when left to itself. It is often when the unproductivity of effort has compelled us to give up, that an illumination surprises us. Old Egyptian wisdom had already reduced the truth involved in these facts to an aphorism: "The archer hitteth the target partly by pulling, partly by letting go; the boatman reacheth the landing partly by pulling, partly by letting go."

We reach the conclusion that the traits, by which inspirations are commonly separated from ordinary mental processes—unexpectedness, absence of effort, passivity—do not really distinguish inspirations from ordinary thinking. The differences between startling and ordinary instances of productive thinking are merely that in the former the problem is of much importance and that a long time has elapsed between the last systematic attention paid to it and the appearance of the solution.

Up to this point we have merely described striking scientific inspirations and shown that the conditions under which they appear are, in essence, identical with those of commonplace thinking. We can now advance a little further and give a plausible reason for the appearance of a solution after a long lapse of time. Why does the answer come when we are no longer studying the problem?

In the learning of any art involving movements,—learning to typewrite, for instance,—each wrong movement establishes a tendency to repeat itself, and it is well known that if one continues practicing too long without rest, the moment comes when so many errors are made that it is useless to practice longer. Now, it is occasionally observed that after a sufficiently long rest, on resuming practice, it seems that an improvement has taken place. As a matter of fact, improvement after a long rest has been observed by several psychologists. W. F. Book has reported the following observation:

A person practiced typewriting until he made, during the last ten-minute practices, the average score of 1508 words. After an interval of one year and a half he was tested again, under exactly similar conditions as those prevailing during the practice. The average score during an equal period of time was 1611 words. There had taken place an actual increase in skill during a rest interval of one year and a half! How is this to be understood?

The explanation may be presented in this simplified way. Suppose that during a practice period you have made the right movement a hundred times and a wrong movement ten times. The right movement is more firmly established than the wrong one; nevertheless, there is a tendency to make the wrong movement, and that tendency interferes with the production of the right movement. Let a sufficiently long interruption in the practice take

place, and the moment will come when the tendency to the wrong movement will have died out, while that to the right movement, more firmly established, will still be present. Hence, when you return to your practice, after a not too long interval (of course if the interval is long enough, both the right and the wrong tendencies will have disappeared), the chances are that typing will be more perfect and rapid than at any previous time. That improvement will not have been due to any mental effort, —not even of an alleged subconscious mind. It will have taken place as a consequence of rest.

How one may pass from the above instance of improvement in typewriting during rest, to the explanation of scientific inspiration, is not very difficult to see. Thinking, as well as typewriting, involves a bodily mechanism, particularly a speech mechanism; for words cannot be dispensed with in the abstract thinking of those who speak and write. Now, thinking, like typewriting, involves false moves; tendencies to wrong movements (speech-thought-movements) are established when thought goes astray. When we go over and over a problem without finding the solution, we make and repeat wrong moves. As the unprofitable thinking is repeated, the production of the right thought becomes increasingly difficult. We all know that under certain circumstances it seems as if the mind had become limited to wrong directions. It explores the same blind alleys; it goes round and round in the same vicious circle of unprofitable associations. If at such times we let go, thus producing a condition making possible a weakening or a disappearance of the unprofitable thought-movements, and return to the problem after a rest, we stand a better chance of striking out along a new path,—and the new path may be the right path.

Thus we may understand why people of all sorts, and

not only scientists and poets, are at times surprised by the appearance of fruitful ideas which strenuous efforts had failed to produce. Has the effort been useless? Certainly not; or, rather, some of the effort was necessary. Had not the problem been carefully examined and all the possible knowledge bearing upon it gathered, the solution would not, so far as the facts can be read, have been secured after relaxation.

Examination of the mental processes of ordinary productive thinking has disclosed its fundamental identity with scientific revelation. Whatever differences exist are differences of degree and, on the whole, unimportant. We have obtained, in addition, what seems to us a satisfactory explanation of the conditions under which relaxation, passivity, rest, favor the appearance of new thoughts.

It cannot be too much emphasized that an examination of the facts shows that thorough preparation is a necessary condition of the solution of problems by so-called "inspiration." The revelation of the *fonctions Fuchsiennes* and of the Quaternions came to great mathematicians who had worked long at the tasks. Poetical inspirations follow the same fundamental law. Poems do not flow out from the pen, and eloquent speeches from the tongue of persons who are not in the habit of thinking poetically or eloquently; and the substance of extemporized poems and speeches is dependent upon previously acquired knowledge.

Let us observe in passing that a phenomenon which seems one of the strongest supports of the popular theory of subconscious *thinking,* has been explained here without making any use of that theory. Subconscious thinking is no more necessary to explain scientific inspiration than it is to explain the improvement taking place in type-

writing during a long interruption of practice. This observation does not, of course, dispose of the theory of subconscious mentation; it merely drives it out of one of its favorite feeding grounds.

The Impression of Levitation and of Flight of the Soul from the Body.—A note may be added regarding a phenomenon hardly falling under "inspiration," yet one which, like it, may lead the unsophisticated to a conviction of divine intervention and, in addition, to a belief in an immortal soul independent of the body.

When drowsiness deepens to the verge of sleep or of a less usual trance, there comes a moment when the senses have ceased to function though the person is still aware of his own existence. Then, the body, no longer perceived, may either be thought of as having lost all weight and floating in mid-air, or as having been left behind by the soul. Many instances of levitation are to be found in the classical mystics: "Often my body would become so light that it lost all weight; at times this went so far that I no longer felt the floor under my feet," wrote St. Theresa in her *Autobiography*.

A trance need not be very deep in order to lead to the impression of levitation. Professor James B. Pratt quotes one of his correspondents as follows: "It is a singular feeling or sensation which comes to me when I pray, I feel my body lifted up from the floor, and I feel light and floating, so to speak, in the air. Though my eyes are shut, I see objects far below, and yet I feel my arms on my bed (as I usually kneel down beside the bed)." (James B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness.*) If this person had been able to observe his general condition at the moment of levitation, he would have discovered that he was partially asleep.

Under these circumstances, the unsophisticated who have retained more or less unchanged the notion that the soul is a tenuous something inhabiting the body, may conclude that since they neither perceive nor feel their body, the soul has escaped from it. They may speak as certain mystics do, of the Flight of the Soul or of the Ascent of the Soul to God, and regard the experience as a proof of the independence of the soul from a material body.

Our own experiments with ether and nitrous oxide gas confirm the findings of others. At a certain stage of the trance, two of our subjects had the impression of levitation; their bodies seemed to be floating in space.

The illusion has been studied in connection with certain psycho-physiological alterations which precede death. H. Piéron has reported four instances of death-bed impression of levitation. The illusion often takes a more elaborate form: the dying person thinks that he is being carried to heaven by angels; others, presumably burdened with an evil conscience, are being dragged out of their beds by demons and resist with all their remaining energy. (*Rev. Philosophique* LIV, 1902.) In all these cases, a benumbing of the sensations from the skin (touch and temperature) and of those coming from the voluntary muscles and the arterial system, give rise to the illusion. At the approach of death, on going to sleep, or on entering into another trance-state, these sensations disappear earlier than the consciousness of self. The impression that the self has become disincarnated may, therefore, be produced.

It is hardly necessary to remark that, when thus produced, i.e., by a loss of sensibility, the impression of the independence of the self or soul from the body should leave the wide-awake person entirely unimpressed. For it means merely that some thinking may still go on when the senses are in abeyance. It does not mean that thought can go on when *every part* of the nervous system has ceased to function. The body of the entranced person, who still thinks, is very far from being dead.

XIV

THE "SENSE" OF THE DIVINE PRESENCE[1]

SHOULD man be deprived of the grounds of belief traversed in the preceding Part (wonderful cures of body and mind, moral transformations, intuitions, and inspirations), there would remain experiences usually called "mystical" which convey, in the opinion of many, a direct, *immediate* knowledge of God; i.e., a knowledge independent of any train of thought and, therefore, free from the danger of error to which human thinking is prone. Whatever vitality the belief in a social God possesses, is due in a very large measure—some say entirely—to experiences of this kind. The most influential of them are the "sense" of the divine Presence and certain ecstasies.

We may take what a leader among contemporary Quakers says of the Society of Friends as true, if in a lesser degree, of Christianity as a whole: "The fundamental significant thing which stands out in early Quakerism was the *conviction* which these founders of it felt, that they had actually discovered the living God and that He was in them. They all have one thing to say—'I have experienced God.'" "The movement came to birth, and received its original power, through persons who were no less profoundly conscious of a *divine presence* than they were of a world in space." (Rufus Jones, *Social Law in the Spiritual World.*)

[1] Most of this chapter is reprinted with some changes from an article in *The Atlantic Monthly* for January, 1927.

When in possession of this alleged proof of God's reality, the believer no longer fears destructive criticism; he is in a boastful mood; he says: "Argue as much as you please, display all your critical knowledge, you cannot shake my conviction, for I have experienced God directly. You are like a blind man who should attempt to convince those who see that there is no light."

Our task with regard to these experiences is to determine whether the "unshakable" assurance they yield is warranted. Are they really what they are felt and thought to be: a union with, or apprehension of the God of the religions; or can the assurance of God they produce be shown to be due to an interpretation—an unwarranted interpretation—of an immediate experience itself incontrovertible?

There is an illusion which consists in the failure to realize the presence of some one actually perceived by the senses. The understanding of that curious illusion will help us to solve our main problem. Confronted with his daughter, an unfortunate neurasthenic father would say, "It seems to me that she is not my daughter, for if she were my daughter I should experience a great joy." Another person in the presence of her mother, whom she recognizes very well, would nevertheless deny that the woman was her mother, and even affirm that the person before her had no real existence.

This absence of the impression of reality may affect not only things actually perceived by the senses, but also memories of past experiences. It is not that the past is forgotten; memory remains; but the things recalled have lost their reality.

Pierre Janet reports very striking instances of this abnormality. A lady who had suffered throughout her life

from neuropathic disturbances, enjoyed a few years of happiness after a late marriage. When the husband died, the unfortunate widow returned to her earlier neuropathic condition. The disturbance took on a particular form. She accused herself of lack of the proper feeling for her husband. "It seems to me," she would say, "that one must feel a peculiar sorrow for the death of a child, of a friend, of a husband. Well, I do not feel any particular sorrow for my husband, that excellent man—his personality escapes me. To have no appropriate sorrow—that is revolting and unjust. It is humiliating to live thus heartlessly. And the friendly visits of condolence; friends who come weeping and saying, 'I understand your grief, I sympathize with your great sorrow'—they are more than I can stand. With whom do they sympathize? I feel no sorrow. It is painful not to be unhappy, and I should be happy if I could be unhappy." She searches her memory for past incidents which will bring back to her the affection and the love she knows she had for her husband. The memories come, but there is no life in them; she remains indifferent; they do not have the kind of reality which normally would belong to them. She says, "I was proud to be his wife. Well, when I think of an outing with him, arm in arm, or of a visit, I do not get even a trace of pride or satisfaction. I try to imagine that he is going to come in—I remain indifferent. I think that he will never again come into this room—again I remain indifferent. It is as if my memories were not about him, as if they were not about myself." (*Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 1921.)

It is unnecessary to add other instances; the main features of these curious experiences are clear enough. We understand now that to perceive and to recognize a person with the external senses is not equivalent to having a nor-

mal consciousness of the reality of that person; and, similarly, we see that a remembered experience—however clear and detailed it may be—may fail to affect us as if it were really a recollection of that experience. Something must be added to what the senses give us and to the recalled impressions in order to produce the conviction of reality. What that something is, is partly indicated in the instances described: the sight of the daughter leaves the father cold; he does not feel the joy he knows he would feel were that young woman really his daughter. And the idea of the beloved dead husband leaves the wife entirely indifferent.

We normal people may perhaps get a glimpse of the disheartening experiences of these unfortunate neuropaths by seeking to realize what would happen within us if, when about to greet with joy an old friend, we found ourselves facing, not the friend, but some stranger who happened to be a perfect image of the friend. Our attitude, feelings, and thoughts would instantly be radically changed; and, with that change, would come the realization of the absence of the friend.

The obvious psychological lesson taught by this mental disorder is that the conviction of the reality of people and things does not depend merely on the impressions they make upon the external senses, but also on the awakening within us, by these sensory impressions, of complex reactions among which emotions play a conspicuous rôle.

We are now ready to pass on to the opposite of these abnormal experiences, i.e., to the conviction of the presence of some one, in particular of a personal God, in the absence of any perception by the external senses. The consciousness of the presence of God has been and continues to be of momentous importance in the history of individuals and of societies; it has been the starting point

of profound transformations of individuals, and even the genesis of new religions.

The writings of the classical Christian mystics contain numerous instances of the invisible presence of God. Here is one of the many reported by the great Spanish mystic, Saint Theresa. "On the day of Saint Peter, as I was in prayer, I saw near me, or rather I felt—for I did not perceive anything either with the eyes of the body or with the eyes of the soul—I felt the Christ near me and I knew it was He who was speaking to me. . . . It seemed to me that He kept walking at my side; and, as it was not a vision of the imagination, I did not know under what form He was present . . . but He was always on my right side; I felt Him very clearly." Observe how, in this description, Saint Theresa is puzzled by the assurance she has of the presence of Christ in the absence of any external sensation or even of "vision of the imagination."

A Protestant woman, Mlle. V., had suffered unresignedly throughout her life from the lack of an intimate companion. One night, before falling asleep, she became suddenly aware of a friendly Presence. She calls it the Friend. His approach was not made known to her through the external senses. She *felt* him somewhere in space and yet within herself. She talked to him more than he to her. The Presence was soothing, purifying. But although this Friend affected her as a really present person, Mlle. V. did not long let herself be deceived. She knew too much and was too keen an observer to mistake the creation of her heart's desire for an objective reality. She said, "I wish I was not so sure that he is merely a split in my personality, so that I might take it more seriously; but I see the ropes too clearly."

A few months later, the character of the Presence changed. It was no longer a human Friend, but a divine

Presence. It reappeared thirty-one times at irregular intervals in the course of sixteen months, and then the manifestation ceased. There is not room to explain how Mlle. V. convinced herself gradually that the whole affair was a creation of her "subconscious self,"—that is her own expression,—and how, when she had made that discovery, the experience came to an end.

A last illustration which might have been used as a demonstration of the power of love: a university teacher of science, a woman very similar to Mlle. V. in her profound loneliness and yearning for an adequate intimate companion. Throughout her early maturity and until the events we are about to relate, her life had been a pathetic, almost tragic, experience of frustration. Satisfying human companionship having failed her altogether, she came to believe that her only hope of a tolerable and honorable existence lay in a divine Companion who would understand her, sympathize with her, and love her. This period of her life culminated in a soul-stirring, mystical adventure which we relate in her own words:—

"Then one night, after a week of this sort of thing, the sense of God's presence came upon me with overpowering fullness. I cannot express the sense of personal intimacy, understanding, and sympathy that it gave to me. I felt the thing—whatever it was—so close to me, so a part of me, that words and even thoughts were unnecessary, that my part was only to sink back into His personality—if such it were—and drop all worries and temptations, all the straining and striving that had been so prominent in my life for years and years. Then, as I felt consolation and strength pouring in upon me, there came a great upwelling of love and gratitude toward their source, even though I was all the time conscious that that source might not be either personal or objective. It felt personal, I said to

myself, and no harm would be done by acting as if it were so. This experience lasted for two days in nearly its original strength. Every time attention relaxed from my tasks, the Presence was there, and it was the last at night and the first in the morning in my consciousness. Gradually it became less vivid, but at times it still recurs with its original force." (*A Scientist's Confession of Faith,* published by the American Baptist Pub. Soc., Philadelphia, 1898.)

With these instances before us, it is probably unnecessary to say that the Sense of Presence is something else, something more, than the mere *thought* of some one's presence. On hearing sounds on the steps, I may *infer* that some one is there in my neighborhood. That inference of a presence is not at all the Sense of Presence, although it may well be its starting point. The difference between these two experiences will be more fully defined as we proceed.

It would be an error to suppose that this conviction of an impressive Presence, more concretely real than what the eyes see and the hands touch, occurs only in the religious life. Many are the persons who have experienced it outside all religious connections. From a collection gathered from contemporaries I transcribe two instances that are little more than commonplace.

(1) A young woman was sitting in the drawing room of her parents at half after eleven at night, waiting for her father's return. Her mother lay on a couch near her, dozing. She herself was completely absorbed in the reading of a book. No one else in the house was awake. As she read, she was slightly disturbed by the feeling that some one was in the room, in the corner opposite her mother's couch. She looked up, expecting to see her father, but saw no one, and began reading again. The same impres-

sion came over her three or four times; but since, each time she looked up, she saw no one, she continued to read. Suddenly she felt some one come from the corner and cross between herself and her mother. She felt it so vividly that she even thought she saw something, but could not say what the "something" looked like. She was perfectly certain, however, that something had crossed the room. Startled, she cried to her mother, "What was that?" Her mother had seen and felt nothing, but the girl insisted that some one had passed and persuaded her mother to search the house with her. They searched the house in vain.

(2) "We had had an early dinner, as we were all going to a wedding. I was dressing in my room on the third floor, and the rest of the family were on the second floor. I could hear them talking, and I sometimes joined in the conversation, calling down the stairs. Altogether, we were having a most hilarious time. Suddenly, for no reason that I know of, a sort of terror came over me. The electric lights had not yet been turned on, and my bedroom, although not dark, was lighted only by the gas light from my study and from the hallway. I seemed to feel a Presence, and it was in the air, moving quite rapidly, about six feet from the floor. I did not look in that direction, but tried to quiet myself by thinking that such a thing could not physically hurt me, and that, if it were anything spiritual, I should be glad to learn what it had to say. Then I turned—of course to find nothing. I was still nervous, and went downstairs as soon as I was dressed." The writer of this letter adds that under ordinary circumstances she is never afraid in the house. In these instances the Presence was indefinite in character; whether it was a person or something else was not revealed. Such cases are not rare.

On September 20, 1842, James Russell Lowell wrote to

a friend: "I had a revelation last Friday evening. I was at Mary's, and happening to say something of the presence of spirits (of whom, I said, I was often dimly aware), Mr. Putnam entered into an argument with me on spiritual matters. As I was speaking the whole system rose up before me like a vague Destiny looming from the abyss. I never before so clearly felt the spirit of God in me and around me. The whole room seemed to me full of God. The air seemed to waver to and fro with the presence of something. I knew not what. I spoke with the calmness and clearness of a prophet." Note in this account that "something" filled the room with its vague presence. Lowell says himself that he did not know exactly what it was; nevertheless, he ventured the descriptive term "God." (Lowell's *Letters.*)

An intimate and dynamic realization of the presence of invisible persons, either human or divine, is fairly frequent. It should not be regarded as an expression of abnormality—even though it should have to be regarded as an illusion. The Sense of Presence is, in fact, the expression of a mental activity so natural and ordinary that it can be reproduced probably in any one willing to submit to simple experimental conditions. The author has himself induced it in a number of persons. The subject of the experiment was seated in a dimly lighted room with his back to the assistants, who sat silent some twenty-five feet away. His eyes were carefully covered to exclude all light. He was told that at any time some one might come forward and stand behind his chair, and that he was then to indicate awareness of his presence by raising his hand. The floor between the attendants and the subject was covered with heavy rugs in order to eliminate, so far as possible, all sound of footsteps. Under these circum-

stances we expected that the subject would have two different experiences, and would spontaneously separate them: the ordinary thought of, and belief in, the presence of some one behind him; and that other impression we have called the Sense of Presence. That anticipation was verified. Of the seven subjects who took part in the experiment, three experienced the Sense of Presence. Had we persevered, all of them might have. The following notes are extracted from the observations of one of the successful subjects.

"After an interval, there came a Sense of Presence not very clear. Then *It* became very clearly present. 'Bearing down upon me' was the phrase that flitted through my mind. There was a growing feeling of terror tinged with awe. By this time there was a noticeable muscular tension all over, accompanied by an increased rate of breathing. Shortly after this I began to shiver, and later I had a feeling of cold not connected with the temperature of the room. When the shivering began, I had the feeling of cowering in my chair. After a short time I could stand it no longer and I impulsively removed the bandage from my eyes, though I knew we had agreed that the experiment should last ten minutes."

Attention should be called to an interesting feature of this experiment: several of the subjects made an effort to produce the Presence. They thought hard of a person and attempted to visualize him and to determine his position with reference to their own. These efforts remained invariably fruitless. If the Presence appeared at all, it came unexpectedly, after they had ceased the effort to visualize. This is exactly what the mystics have recorded. They also desired and sought a Presence,—in their case it was generally Jesus,—but, do what they might, it appeared, if at all, when it pleased, unexpectedly, either when no

effort had been made or when the effort had ceased.

This last feature of the experience might suggest intervention by a personality other than the subject. One should recall, however, that the same traits are characteristics not only of the Sense of Presence but of much of our ordinary mental life. When discussing scientific inspiration, we have already drawn attention to the ordinary ways of the mind in the process of thinking. Ideas pop into our minds unexpectedly, often when we have ceased to make any effort to find them,—that is, while we are passive,—just as the Presence jumps to our side, not as an immediate sequence to our efforts, but, as it seems, of its own volition. In neither case is the sense of passivity of the subject a sufficient proof of the activity of another person.

Two final remarks concerning these experiments: the subjects found no difficulty in separating the Sense of Presence from an ordinary conviction that one of the attendants was standing behind the chair; and, although it might have happened, the Sense of Presence never coincided with the actual presence of one of us behind the subject.[2]

What can be said in explanation of this curious Sense of Presence? If we understood how the ordinary and *veridical* conviction of the presence of a person comes into existence, our problem would be near its solution. With that purpose in mind, let us observe what takes place in the growing infant.

It is evident that the impression made by a person upon a newborn infant is something quite different from, and far simpler than, the corresponding experience of the

[2] A fuller study of this and other aspects of religious mysticism may be found in the author's *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism.*

adult; and yet the babe sees perfectly well. What is it that must be added to the bare, original sight sensations of the infant in order to produce the rich impression of the presence of a particular person?

The infant sees the mother not only in one but in a thousand different attitudes. She stands erect, walks, bends, sits. More than that, sensations from the other senses are added in countless numbers to the visual sensations. Her steps and other movements make noises, she speaks and utters pretty sounds while smiling at the child. She touches and fondles it in an indescribable variety of ways. All these sensations contribute in some measure to the formation of the sense of the reality of the mother: her presence means not merely the sight of her, it means a great complex of sensations arising from her.

But we have, so far, left out a most important class of impressions produced by the mother. The child is not a passive receiver of sight, sound, and touch; he responds to these impressions. At first, little is elicited from the child by the mother's presence—merely some uncoördinated movements of various parts of the body. These movements multiply and acquire significance. The child stretches out its arms toward the mother, moves its lips, etc. More important still than the movements of the external limbs, is what takes place within the babe, beyond direct observation. One may say, speaking generally, that every part of the internal body of the child comes to be affected in definite ways by the presence of the mother. When it is hungry, the main, though not the only, effect produced by the approach of the mother is an increase of salivation and of the several secretions connected with digestion. The smile with which the babe now greets the mother is an expression of a complex physiological activity. It involves changes of circulation, of respiration, and

of other mechanisms productive of a mass of sensations and feelings. In short, the sight of the mother comes to call forth in the babe, not only readily observable external movements, but also an extremely complex system of internal reactions, including, more or less, the whole organism: respiration and circulation, the digestive organs, the glands of inner secretions, etc.

When the infant has reached maturity, the complexity of his reactions to persons he knows, and even to those he does not know, beggars description. Where is the novelist who could represent adequately the infinite variety of address, intonation, attitude, and gesture, by means of which the accomplished society woman indicates to each person his relative position in her social world? These infinite nuances of behavior correspond to an infinite variety of impressions made upon her by different persons,—impressions among which mere sight counts for little.

Thus, knowing a person does not mean chiefly familiarity with his features. That alone is almost nothing. Knowing him means being able to anticipate the tenor of his thoughts and the character of his feelings and actions; and that involves the production within us, by his presence, of certain feelings, emotions, thoughts, and volitions. It is the production of these effects which gives to the sight of a person the vivid, intimate meaning characteristic of a real presence. If we usually speak and act in a way appropriate to the particular person before us, it is because of this inner activity. In its absence, the sight of a person is utterly unconvincing; we see some one with the personality left out, a mere shell of the reality! It is under these circumstances that Masselon's patient could not believe, despite the testimony of his eyes, that his daughter was really before him. You remember his saying, "If she were my daughter I should experience a great joy." On

the contrary, whenever the inner responses take place, the impression of a real presence is produced, *even in the absence of any sensation from the external world.*

Who the invisible person is supposed to be depends upon a number of factors. Chief among them is the dominant preoccupation or concern of the subject. Christ appears to those who, at some time or other, have desired his presence. When there is no predisposition, no anticipation, the Presence is usually, at first, quite indeterminate, and later may acquire definiteness under the influence of the subject's guesses about it. But an adequate elucidation of this point would take us into too technical channels.

The preceding description of the conditions under which, in the absence of any testimony of the external senses, the presence of a person is felt, means that the Sense of divine Presence cannot be taken at its face value, whatever those who have had the experience may think about it. The completeness of the conviction of God's presence is in itself entirely insufficient evidence—as insufficient as the equally compelling testimony of the senses in cases of illusion or hallucination.

XV

"DIVINE" ECSTASY AND THE CLAIM OF THE MYSTICS

AMONG the wonderful experiences which have played a momentous rôle in religion must be placed, side by side with the Sense of divine Presence, certain ecstatic moments often regarded as divine manifestations. At times, as in the first instance given below, they coincide with the assurance of a divine Presence. In the first part of this chapter will be found illustrations and comparative descriptions of these divine ecstasies and of others considered as natural. In the second part, the claim made by the mystics that their ecstasies are divine manifestations will be examined.

ECSTASIES, DESCRIBED AND COMPARED.—As ecstatic experiences take place during, or, rather, constitute a partial trance, the reader should bear in mind that although some trances are symptoms of a diseased condition, others do not admit of that construction. Partial trances are common, and not always abnormal. Wordsworth, Tennyson, G. T. Russell, to mention only three modern poets, have described ecstatic semi-trances into which they would occasionally fall.

Note on Trances.—A partial trance is the condition in which, the body having come to rest, and the mental activity, especially the sensory functions, having become reduced, one is hardly aware of the body and of the external world; while,

at the same time, one remains definitely conscious of one's self. Somnolent abstraction, day dreaming, and the condition between sleeping and waking are states of partial trance. An ecstatic trance is a partial trance enriched by intense and delightful feelings; in the absence of such feelings, a trance should not be called ecstatic.

A complete trance is the condition in which the mental activity is, or seems, in total abeyance. A swoon is a complete trance; sleep may well be regarded also as a complete trance of a particular kind. Between ordinary abstraction and complete trance are found all possible degrees of partial trance.

In religious literature one finds rather frequently instances of ecstasy similar to that of M. E., a young man of superior education and of great moral earnestness who was in the habit of seeing in the dramatic events of life the hand of Providence:—

"As to ecstasies, I have experienced one, among others, which I remember perfectly. I was thirty-six years old. I was climbing with some young fellows from Forclaz to the Croix de Bovine in order to reach Champex. We were following a road bordered by blooming oleanders and looking down over a stretch of country dotted here and there with clumps of firs. The wind scattered the clouds above and below us, sending them down or driving them up in whirling eddies. Now and then one escaped and floated over the valley of the Rhone. I was in perfect health; we were on our sixth day of tramping, and in good training. I can best describe the condition in which I was by calling it a state of equilibrium. When, all at once, I experienced a feeling of being raised above myself, I felt the presence of God—I tell of the thing just as I was conscious of it—as if His goodness and power were penetrating me altogether. The throb of emotion was so violent that I could barely tell the boys to pass on and not wait for me. I then sat down on a stone, unable to stand any longer,

and my eyes overflowed with tears. I thanked God that in the course of my life He had taught me to know Him, that He sustained my life and took pity both on the insignificant creature and on the sinner that I was. I begged Him ardently that my life might be consecrated to the doing of His will. I felt His reply, which was that I should do His will from day to day, in humility and poverty, leaving Him, the almighty God, to be judge of whether I should sometime be called to bear witness more conspicuously. Then, slowly, the ecstasy left my heart; that is, I felt that God had withdrawn the communion which He had granted. . . . The impression had been so profound that in climbing slowly the slope, I asked myself if it were possible that Moses on Sinai could have had a more intimate communication with God. But the more I seek words to express this intimate intercourse, the more I feel the impossibility of describing the thing by any of our usual images. At bottom the expression most apt to render what I felt is this: God was present, though invisible; He fell under no one of my senses, yet my consciousness perceived Him." (Th. Flournoy, *Archives de Psychologie de la Suisse Romande,* II, 1903.)

The experience of St. Paul may be compared with that of M. E. Unfortunately for the student of ecstasy, it is reported without details. When, in the second Letter to the Corinthians, the Apostle comes to the subject of "visions and revelations of the Lord," he relates how fourteen years before, he was "caught up to the third heaven," and "heard unspeakable words which it is not possible for man to utter." Whether he was at the time "in the body or out of the body," he does not profess to know.

Poets seem to be especially subject to ecstatic trances, and the influence they have exerted through their writings is a notable feature of the history of modern superstition.

In "Tintern Abbey" Wordsworth describes this experience and interprets it:—

"That serene and blessed mood
In which the affections gently lead us on,—
Until the breath of this corporeal frame,
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul:
While with an eye made quiet by the power
Of harmony, and the deep power of joy,
We see into the life of things."

In "The Prelude," the poet describes a similar experience:

. . . "Gently did my soul
Put off her veil, and, self-transmuted, stood
Naked, as in the presence of her God."

Tennyson also was familiar with trance-ecstasies and was influenced by them even more, perhaps, than Wordsworth. In the conclusion to "The Holy Grail," King Arthur says—

"Let visions of the night or of the day
Come as they will; and many a time they come,
Until this earth he walks on seems not earth,
This light that strikes his eyeball is not light,
This air that smites his forehead is not air
But vision—yea, his very hand and foot—
In moments when he feels he cannot die,
And knows himself no vision to himself,
Nor the high God a vision, nor that One
Who rose again. Ye have seen what ye have seen."

In a letter to a friend, Tennyson gives some detailed information on his trances: "A kind of waking trance I

have frequently had, quite up from boyhood when I have been alone. This has generally come upon me through repeating my own name two or three times to myself silently, till all at once, as it were out of the intensity of the consciousness of individuality, the individuality itself seemed to dissolve and fade away into boundless being, and this not a confused state, but the clearest of the clearest, the surest of the surest, the weirdest of the weirdest, utterly beyond words, where death was almost a laughable impossibility, the loss of personality (if it were so) seeming no extinction but the only true life. . . . This might be the state which St. Paul describes. . . . I am ashamed of my feeble description. Have I not said that the state is utterly beyond words?"

The Hindoo mystics obtain a similar trance by repeating, not their names, but a mysterious, sacred syllable; and the modern scientists know how to achieve a similar end by using a variety of equivalent means.[1]

G. T. Russell delighted in moments of ecstatic semi-trance, and William Blake was prone to trances of apparently the same kind. But the preceding quotations must suffice to indicate the importance of trances in religious life and the influence they have exerted through the poets, upon the reading public.

The characteristics common to all these instances of ecstasy are these: a sudden and unexpected break in the train of thoughts and feelings, without any conscious cause for it; a more or less complete loss of the consciousness of the existence of the external world and of the body, coinciding with an impression of expansion and freedom of

[1] On poetry produced during partial trance, or inspired by what passes in the mind during partial trance, see Edward Snyder's *Hypnotic Poetry*. Further developments of the problems presented by ecstasy will be found in our *Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, from which much of this chapter is taken.

the self; a sense of lofty illumination which, however, refuses to let itself be put into words; and, finally, an incomparable delight.

It is hardly a matter for surprise that M. E., St. Paul, and the poets quoted agree in regarding as of transcendental significance the weird experiences which gave them the impression of being lifted up to a superhuman level of feeling and thought. They saw in these experiences a divine manifestation, and gained from them a firm assurance not only of the reality of God but also of immortality.

Do these experiences signify really a superhuman level of feeling and understanding? When one seeks beyond the professedly mystical adventures and discovers that an ecstasy possessing the essential traits of the preceding instances, i.e., unexpectedness, separation of the self from the world and the body, illumination, ineffability, may be induced by drugs, and that it may also be a symptom of disease, an interpretation other than the traditional suggests itself. It is well known that in some persons epileptic attacks are preceded by a moment of rapture. In *Modern Medicine,* Dr. Spratling reports the case of an epileptic priest who would suddenly feel, as it were, "transported to heaven." This state of marvelous enjoyment would soon pass, and he would find himself seated on the curb of the sidewalk aware that he had suffered an epileptic attack. The same author mentions elsewhere two other epileptic patients, "teachers of noted ability," who speak of the initial stage of their attack as "the most overwhelming ecstatic state it is possible for the human to conceive of." (*Epilepsy and its Treatment.*)

Similarly, the Russian novelist Dostoievsky, himself an epileptic, describes in his novel *The Idiot,* the prelude to an attack of epilepsy: "I remember among other things a

phenomenon which used to precede his epileptic attacks when they came in the waking state. In the midst of the dejection, the mental marasmus, the anxiety which he experienced, there were moments in which all of a sudden the brain became inflamed and all his vital forces suddenly rose to a prodigious degree of intensity. . . . A strange light illumined his heart and mind."

Did St. Paul and M. E. suffer from what physicians call "psychic epilepsy," a form of epilepsy without violent movements and with no, or only an instant of unconsciousness? The answer matters little. We know in any case that in them, as in the epileptic patients, no immediate mental antecedents existed which might be regarded as the cause of the disturbance.

Nitrous oxide gas, opium, and other drugs, may produce a similar condition. Jacobson, in experiments with nitrous oxide, was thrilled with lofty emotions; he described them as "enthusiastic and sublime." And the great chemist Sir Crichton-Browne reported that the mental symptoms of nitrous oxide gas "consist in conviction of emancipation, relief and happiness, in grand and sublime ideas which in their expansion seem to break down all barriers of doubt and difficulty." (Cavendish Lecture, Lancet, 1895.) Opium gave De Quincy similar emotional experiences.

In *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism* we have shown that in very many primitive populations, the worship of gods culminates in a drug-intoxication regarded as a divine state. The reason for that conviction is clear enough: "To the intoxicated, the way seems clear; the desired knowledge and the ability seem present. What there is to do, can be done; done with ease, with joyous laughter. Imagination is no longer restricted to rational channels or checked by the sense of the irrelevant, the improper, or the

grotesque. Its quality, judged objectively, may not be high, but what matters so long as the subject thinks differently and is proudly happy? The mind seems to have broken its earthly shackles, taken wings, and soared unrestricted in a new world of infinite possibility. If to be human means to be hemmed in at every turn by physical and moral infirmities, then intoxication must, in truth, seem divine."

A moment comes in the development of humanity when seeking God by means of drugs, seems inappropriate; but the delight of ecstatic trances is not, on that account, relinquished. Psychical means of getting the same results are discovered, and replace drugs. It is probably in India that the psychical method first reached a high degree of systematization. The description of one of its several varieties will serve to indicate the mixture of physical and of mental means in use among the ancient Hindoos: "A devotee should constantly devote his Self to abstraction, remaining in a secret place . . . fixing his seat firmly in a clean place, not too high nor too low, and covered over with a sheet of cloth, a deer-skin and blades of Kusa grass, —and there, seated on that seat, fixing his mind exclusively on one point, with the workings of the mind and senses restrained, he should practice devotion for purity of self. Holding his body, head and neck even and unmoved, remaining steady, looking at the tip of his own nose, and not looking about in all directions, with a tranquil self, devoid of fear, and, adhering to the rules of Brahmakarins, he should restrain his mind and concentrate it on me [the Deity], as his final goal." (*Bhagavadgita.*) Tennyson's method was, in essence, similar to the one recommended here; he restrained and concentrated his mind by repeating many times his own name, and we shall see presently

that the Christian method involves the same two features: concentration and limitation of mental activity.

Although in none of the instances so far considered is ecstasy preceded by a conscious mental event which might account for its appearance, such cases do occur. But even then the conscious experience cannot be taken as adequate cause of the ecstasy; it plays the humbler rôle of an occasion; it acts like a spark when it explodes a train of powder. *Gs.,* contemplating Paris from the top of the Trocadéro, is roused to intense admiration, and for a moment forgets his suffering. "It seems to me," says he, "that it is too beautiful, too grand, that I am lifted up above myself. At the time, it gives me an enormous pleasure; but it exhausts me; my legs shake, and it seems to me that, unable to stand, I am going to swoon." Jean experiences occasionally what he calls *"sensations sublimes et solennelles."* This happens, for instance, when he thinks of himself as a representative in the Chamber of Deputies, pronouncing before well filled galleries a great political speech. A slight—not unpleasant—shudder, runs through his body; instead of his habitual humble tread with head down, he straightens up and strides along with an important air. His intelligence is exalted and keen—so he thinks. Above all, he enjoys a sense of happiness never otherwise felt. "These are," he says, "divine impressions that prove to me the existence of a soul in the body." (P. Janet, *Les Obsessions et la Psychasténie.*)

Jean's ecstatic trances do not go very far; the following remains still closer to the usual. Unlike the last two, it belongs to a perfectly normal person. Like St. Paul and the epileptic patients, this person finds no word better than "heaven" to describe the inexpressibly delightful quality of her adventure: "Once when walking in the wild woods and in the country, in the morning under the blue

sky, the sun before me, the breeze blowing from the sea, the birds and flowers around me, an exhilaration came to me that was heavenly—a raising of the spirit within me through perfect joy. Only once in my life have I had such an experience of heaven."

Whatever the construction put upon the mystical ecstasies described in these pages, there are in all of them,—just as in simple partial trance,—indications of a limitation of sensory and of the higher mental activities. Since certain Christian apologists deny mental limitation in the ecstasies called "mystical," let us turn to the descriptions given by the Christian mystics themselves. Several of them have described minutely what they call the "Ascent of the Soul to God." In the main their descriptions agree very well. The first step in the ascent consists in a limitation of the range of mental activity. It is achieved by choosing a subject of meditation and by concentrating the attention with as much completeness as possible upon the chosen theme. The function of this first stage, *Meditation,* is to limit the activity of the mind. The second stage, *Contemplation,* involves a greater mental simplification and a cessation of all effort, i.e., complete passivity. Contemplation, says St. François de Sales, "is a unitary, total view of the loved object." Mme. Guyon writes of the same stage, "it should be an orison not of the thought, but of the heart"; and St. Theresa of Avila speaks of a "great reduction of the mental activity," and declares that, in Contemplation, the powers of the soul are unable to do anything except enjoy. Oftentimes the trance passes beyond Contemplation. It sometimes happens, writes François de Sales, that "the soul ceases even to hear the Well-beloved; she feels no longer any sign of His presence. Then, on awakening, she can truly say, 'I slept with my God and in the arms of the

divine Presence and Providence, and I knew it not' "—the trance has become complete.

The preceding quotations will suffice to convince the reader that the ecstasies of the classical Christian mystics, like those of other persons, are partial trances, and that, as such, they include a limitation not only of the activity of the external senses but also of the higher mental functions.

THE MYSTICAL CLAIM EXAMINED.—Despite the significant fact that all ecstasies, whether they have a religious setting or are part of a physiological disorder produced by drugs or otherwise, possess the characteristics we have singled out, the mystics affirm with impressive assurance that their own ecstasies are fundamentally different from others, that they have a divine origin, and that they consist in a union with God. They add that there is no room for error in this conviction, their knowledge being beyond the reach of criticism since in their ecstasies God is experienced *immediately*.

Such are the mystic's claim and his main argument in support of it. To thousands of intelligent and learned persons who have enjoyed ecstatic experiences, as well as to numberless others who have not, it has seemed a well established claim. Thus from time immemorial, ecstatic experiences have constituted one of the rocks upon which rests the belief in the God of the religions.

We have already hinted that the mystic may be mistaken,—his claim may involve an *interpretation* of what is actually immediate. Should it be so, his conviction would be subject to the errors natural to the human mind: a claim based not upon an immediate experience, itself incontestable, but upon an interpretation of it, may or may not be valid. Let us see, then, whether the mystic takes

as immediate experience not only what is really given, but also interpretations of the given.

In what did the really immediate, incontestable experiences of M. E. and St. Paul consist? St. Paul believed that he was "caught up to the third heaven." He may have seen or heard wonderful sights and sounds, but how did he know he was in heaven? He interpreted these sights and sounds as indications of heaven, just as a traveler interprets the language he hears and the sights he sees as meaning that he is, let us say, in France. St. Paul may have seen "angels." If so, how did he know that it was not an hallucination? If it was not, how did he know the angels were in heaven? Perhaps, instead of seeing and hearing wonderful things, he experienced nothing more than a weird and supremely delightful rush of feelings which suddenly interrupted the course of his consciousness; and, thereupon, concluded that he was in heaven. In any case, it seems that St. Paul did interpret his "raw" experiences,—sights, sounds, feelings, emotions. And he interpreted in the particular way he did because of his mental hal its and his knowledge or ignorance.

M. E. *felt* the presence of God, and, in consequence, entered into a dialogue with him,—a dialogue such as every one holds frequently, mentally, with persons he knows to be absent. In a preceding chapter we have attempted to explain under what conditions an absent person may be *felt* to be present. Nothing more need be said here in explanation of the illusion of invisible presence.

The importance of separating the really immediate,—the given,—from mental elaborations, whatever name they may bear (personification, interpretation, causal explanation, etc.), is obvious. We shall, therefore, at the risk of wearying the reader, insist further on this point; for not

only the naïve mystic, urged by an unchecked will-to-believe, but also others, from whom a better judgment might have been expected, have assured us that "the mystical states have the right to be absolutely authoritative over the individual to whom they come," that "the mystic is, in short, invulnerable." (Wm. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience.*)

The reality of any given datum—of an *immediate* experience in the sense in which the term is used here—may not be impugned: When I feel cold or warm, sad or gay, discouraged or confident, I *am* cold, sad, discouraged, etc. Any and every argument which might be advanced to prove to me that I am not cold is, in the nature of the case, preposterous; an immediate experience may not be controverted, it cannot be wrong.

But if the raw data of experience are not subject to criticism, the causes ascribed to them are. If I say that my feeling of cold is due to an open window, or my state of exaltation to a drug, or my renewed courage to God, my affirmation goes beyond immediate experience: I have ascribed a cause to it, and that cause may be the right or the wrong one.

Similarly, the affirmation that I have had a thought—the thought, for instance, of a physical object or of a merciful God—may not be contested: I *have had* that thought. But if I should affirm not only the existence of my thought of an object, but also the actual existence of the object outside me, then my affirmation would be open to discussion; I might be wrong. The mountain of which I have thought might have no objective existence, and the idea of a merciful God might be an unwarranted inference—consciously or unconsciously made. The validity of these inferences is to be determined in the way in which the

validity of inferences and conclusions in general is determined.

The mistake made by the mystic is that the validity belonging incontrovertibly to sensations, emotions, thoughts, as such,—to the raw datum of experience—is transferred to an explanation of the datum, or to an external object to which the thought is said to refer. That is why he feels secure in saying: "Argue to your heart's content, nothing can alter the fact; I have had an immediate experience of God's presence. Awhile ago I was weak, now I am strong; I was hopeless, now I am confident; I was ignorant, now I know." As a matter of fact, his only immediate and incontestable experiences have been various feelings, emotions, conations, and ideas of a divine Being; the objective existence of a Being corresponding to those ideas may be an illusion.

When the naïve mystic triumphantly throws at his critic the well-worn argument: "You are like a blind man who would convince those who see that there is no light," he uses a faulty comparison. That which is rejected by the critic of the mystical claim, does not correspond to a light he does not perceive, but to a causal explanation of the light. He does not deny the existence of light but he questions, for instance, that it is due to the emission of corpuscles of a particular sort, or that it proceeds from a particular object. These are causal explanations, not immediate experiences; they may be right or wrong and are, therefore, subject to rational criticism.

The Christian mystic is guilty, if in a more refined way, of the kind of error committed by the savage when he thinks he "hears" the Thunder-god. The only thing he really hears, his immediate, incontrovertible experience, is a noise; what more he thinks he hears, is an interpretative inference,—a personification of the phenomenon.

The mystic who *feels* the presence of God is no less vulnerable than the savage who *hears* the thunder-god.

When one has shown that the mystic's alleged knowledge of God's presence is no more immediate than the savage's knowledge of the Thunder-god, there remains to be considered the validity of that knowledge,—it may or may not prove true. After the examination of the Sense of the divine Presence in the preceding chapter, and the comparative study of ecstatic experiences at the beginning of this chapter, nothing more seems required to cast the burden of proof upon those who uphold the mystical claim.

When, in an effort to establish that claim, the mystics have gone beyond the bare affirmation of the clearness and convincingness of God's presence with them, they have urged "revelations" which, they have said, have come to them during trance-ecstasy. But when they have been asked to put into words their revelations, they have given expression to pious effusions well within the unaided powers of the human mind. We have already seen what these "revelations" amounted to in the instance of Marguerite Marie Alacoque, sanctified by the Roman Church, and inspirer of the "Worship of the Sacred Heart of Jesus." Usually, however, the mystic is less naïve than Marguerite Marie Alacoque; he escapes behind the plea of ineffability. The reader has found that word in many of our instances of ecstasy, whether mystical or otherwise. The fact that the impression of revelation comes equally frequently in ecstasies taken as divine manifestations as in those known to be a prelude to epilepsy or to have been induced by a drug, bears heavily against the plea for an actual revelation which cannot be put into words.

Nevertheless, the mystic might maintain his claim to a

revelation and explain that he has forgotten it. As a matter of fact, many things pass in our minds during sleep and during partial trances, about which, on awakening, nothing or almost nothing is recalled,—an elusive emotional flavor is all that remains. No psychologist will throw out that plea; he will admit that various thoughts, feelings, impulses have passed through the mind of the mystic during his ecstasy, of which nothing remains afterwards but a puzzling sense of something sublime. But while admitting the plea of forgetfulness, the psychologist will, of course, ask for proofs of the affirmation that the forgotten was of divine nature and origin. And he will draw attention to the fact that forgetfulness bears only upon what may have passed in the mind when the ecstasy coincided with a deep trance. In the majority of cases it is with the mystic as with *Gs.* and Jean, who experience "sublime emotions" while still sufficiently conscious to express themselves. There was in their minds nothing more "divine" than Paris seen from the Trocadéro, or making a speech in the Chamber of Deputies. Similarly, when during his ecstatic trance the mystic is able, as he frequently is, to express himself, nothing comes from him bearing in any way the marks of a superhuman origin, unless his emotions be regarded as such,—emotions which, as a matter of fact, can be produced at will by drugs and which occasionally herald the approach of an epileptic fit.

Most of us have solved insoluble problems while in the trance of sleep. That curious illusion of revelation came to James Russell Lowell during the ecstasy reported in the preceding chapter. He concluded the letter from which we have quoted with this remark, "I cannot tell you what that revelation was. I have not yet studied it enough. But I shall perfect it one day, and then you shall

hear it and acknowledge its grandeur. It embraces all other systems."

St. Theresa once issued from an ecstasy with the conviction that the mystery of the Trinity had been made clear to her; and Jonathan Edwards has reported that, through an extraordinary influence of God's spirit, he became convinced of His justice in "choosing whom He would to eternal life, and rejecting whom He pleased; leaving them eternally to perish and be everlastingly tormented in hell." To other Christians the truth of doctrines opposed to the Trinity and Predestination has been revealed, presumably by the same God. It is not without necessity, then, that the Roman Church has declared itself the final court of appeal regarding the truth of revelations obtained during mystical ecstasy!

Finally, it should not surprise us if knowledge of an unusual quality were to appear during ecstatic trances, for at least one phase of a partial trance is a state of relaxation and passivity favorable, under certain conditions, to the production of valuable ideas. Have we not seen in the chapter on "Intuition and Scientific Inspiration" that sometimes an idea which had not been produced by persistent and intense effort, appeared suddenly and unexpectedly during mental relaxation? That much at least may be expected by those who reject the belief of the mystics in an intervention of God.

The Roman Church, aware of the weakness of the arguments for the divine nature of ecstasies, has attempted to separate natural from alleged "divine" ecstasies by means of the moral fruits of the latter. That the mystic issues from "communion with God" in a greatly improved state of mind is very often true. But how can that fact be taken as proving a divine intervention when marked moral improvement follows not only moments of peaceful com-

munion (in which there is no thought of God) with one's better self, as the phrase is; but even, at times, ordinary sleep, a bath, the use of tea or coffee? Even a drunken bout—a method not to be recommended—may have something of this effect. In *Braves Gens,* Richepin, that keen observer of human nature, speaks of occasional drunken bouts as "good baths of forgetfulness out of which one arises done up and yet renewed; a great purge of alcohol which scours, as with fire, body and soul." That the moral value possessed at times by ecstatic experiences cannot serve to support the claim of the mystics will appear more clearly in the next chapter where the psychology of prayer is set forth.

Where Science Meets Mysticism.—Science has observed that a healing, organizing, creating process takes place in humanity. At times the creative energy manifests itself suddenly and strikingly: health and vigor return suddenly to a cripple; the artist is seized with a "divine frenzy" and works as if inspired from Above; the thinker unexpectedly finds himself in possession of a long-sought answer; the moral seer perceives the way and becomes aglow with a proselytizing fervor. Awhile ago, the ability, the knowledge, the desirable attitude, the purpose, were not present; now they are,—something new has come into man's life. Ordinarily the life-urge shows itself in no dazzling manifestation but in the common-place efforts to do rightly, kindly, beautifully, whatever is at hand.

The point of highest significance is the direction taken by the energy of life: it appears to seek the perfect. Insofar as the moral life is concerned, the aim is the realization of a social ideal. Civilized humanity exhibits a stupendous and heroic effort, outside as well as within the ethical religions, to establish a "Kingdom of God" upon

earth. Believers in God and atheists alike,—Christians, Socialists, Bolsheviks—struggle with unconquerable tenacity, in the face of stubborn and cruel resistance, and often of mortal danger, to create a new social order within which their physical and psychical needs may be satisfied. They do not do what the biologist says the animal world does: seek adaptation to its surroundings. This striving away from adaptation to the already existent, and towards a social ideal is, it seems to us, the most noteworthy characteristic of the urge that is in humanity.

Science is aware of the presence of this urge, creative of knowledge, goodness, and beauty; and so it may recognize, even as do the religions, that there is in the universe something mysterious, greater than the individual. And although science may not admit the claim of the mystic that the ecstatic trance is the exclusive or even the preëminent "way to God," and may not identify the transhuman power as the social God of the religions, it may at least hail the religious mystic as a bold experimenter who has discovered some of the conditions favorable to the realization of the ideal ends of humanity. In the struggle for more and better life, man needs, among other things, moments of quiescence, in order that the losses, the disorganization, the confusion of battle may be repaired and the fruits of past experience reaped. The mystical trance produced at first by means of drugs and, later, by a psychological technique born of an unconscious and uninformed experimentation, provides these moments. It remains for science to improve upon the mystical technique of the religions in order to succeed far beyond them in enhancing life.

The replacement of the religious by a scientific mental technique is not all in the future. We have seen that psychotherapic methods, characterized by relaxation and

passivity, have already come into existence in the non-religious treatment of mental and moral defects, and that the method of suggestion and autosuggestion—present, though unacknowledged, in the religious method—is to be counted among the problems with which contemporary psychology is concerned. The search for the best ways and means of realizing its conscious purposes is the great task before humanity.

Let it be added that the practice of mystical "communion with God" need not include the extravagances which have made certain mystics famous. "God" may be sought not in the transports of ecstasy but in the passive receptivity of Meditation and Contemplation. The mystical practice of the Friends, for instance, ignores sensuous delight, and does not go beyond the stage called, in the descriptions of the spectacular mystics, Contemplation. The mysticism of the Friends is, after all, nothing more than the experience familiar to all the Christians for whom prayer is more than a transaction with an external God. We are to consider in a later chapter the natural causes of the effects of the prayer-attitude.

PART IV

PRESENT AND FUTURE

XVI

THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

As there are people who have so far lost contact with their time as to imagine that in civilized countries, except among the stupid and the very ignorant, the traditional Christian beliefs and the practice of the religious method have been discarded, we shall open this chapter with certain items of evidence to the contrary. We begin with Roman Catholicism.

At the General Council of 1869-1870, the first General Council held since that of Trent (1545), the following declaration was made: "If any one say that the doctrines of the Church can ever receive a sense in accordance with the progress of science, other than the sense which the Church has understood and still understands, let him be anathema." That Church had some time before condemned the Copernican conception of the universe because it displaced the earth from the central position ascribed to it in the solar system. More recently, it has condemned the doctrine of the descent of man from the animal world. These condemnations still stand. It has seemed to the Roman Church more profitable to decree (1870) the infallibility of the Pope in matters of faith and morals than to retract its errors in matters of science.

In 1916, Pius X, in an effort to stop the spread of Modernism, sent out to the Italian clergy this order: "Let not young clerics be permitted to frequent public universities

except for very weighty reasons and with the greatest precaution on the part of the bishops. Let the pupils in the seminaries be entirely prevented from taking any part whatsoever in external agitations; and, to this end, We forbid them to read newspapers and periodicals, with the exception of some one periodical of sound principles which the Bishop may judge convenient to be studied by the pupils."

A year later, the same Pope issued the celebrated Encyclical letter against Modernism (*Pascendi Gregis*). It is the proclamation of a will to stand immovable in a changing world. It directs that "Any one who in any way is found to be tainted with Modernism is to be excluded without compunction from these offices whether of government or of teaching, and those who already occupy them are to be removed. The same policy is to be adopted toward all those who show a love of novelty in history, archeology, or biblical exegesis."

From general declarations of principle let us pass to daily practices. Next to the *Institut Catholique* of Paris, a school of university rank, stands the well-known church of Saint-Sulpice. On its inner walls are displayed, according to a custom of Roman Catholic Churches, tablets returning thanks for specific favors granted by the Virgin: "For having reunited us," "For success in examination," etc.

In 1930 when two houses collapsed in Marseilles, causing the death of many persons, the newspapers opened subscriptions. They were acknowledged by the publication of the names or of the initials of the donors, accompanied, in hundreds of instances, by a request for some divine favor. In one issue of the *Petit Marseillais,* one of the main dailies of the region, appeared acknowledgements in the following form, customary in that country:

"That the love of Jane and Charles may prosper, ten francs"; "For the peace of my dead, five francs"; "That I may bear a child, five francs." Why should this shock Protestants? What essential difference is there between the "well-educated" Protestant who prays for protection against storm, sickness and accidents, and returns thanks for past blessings, and the Roman Catholic mother, who, having sent ten francs for the victims of an accident, seizes that golden opportunity to ask a favor of heaven? They both worship the same God in substantially the same way.

Places of pilgrimage are centers of activity for the confirmation and spread of faith in the religious method. The *Annals of Good Saint-Anne of Beaupré,* a monthly magazine published in Quebec by the Redemptorist Fathers, contains usually a number of pages entitled "Extraordinary Favours." The following quotations are from the issue of December, 1930: "Later when I myself caught a big cold, I had recourse to good St. Anne, using the Holy Oil and swallowing miniatures for nine consecutive days, and soon all my pains disappeared, except for a slight pain in my right lung, for St. Anne had cured my left lung pronounced incurable by doctors when I went on a pilgrimage last year." Another person relates how he made a novena to St. Anne and wrapped a leaf of the Annals around his foot. In two days "it cleared up. Thanks to Good St. Anne for her intercession." These beliefs and practices are not simply tolerated, they are encouraged by Roman Catholic bishops. Protestants will say, "Things of that sort happen only among ignorant Roman Catholics." Let us see how far that opinion is true.

In 1914, nearly seven hundred clergymen of the London Diocese, i.e., half the incumbents, signed an address to the House of Bishops expressing their "grave anxiety" and asking "that the Upper House repudiate the claim of

some clergy to reject the miracles of Our Lord's birth of a Virgin and the actual Resurrection of His Body from the tomb." These seven hundred clergymen were far from having doubts on the question of the existence and effectiveness of the God of the religions.

At a conference of two hundred and fifty-two Anglican bishops (Lambeth Palace, 1920), the following doctrinal conditions for a united Christendom were put down: "The doctrine of the Virgin Birth, the Bodily Resurrection of Christ, the Absolute Deity of Jesus Christ, Salvation only through His Death upon the Cross, and the Divine inspiration of the Holy Scriptures." That is the limit of the concessions the Anglican bishops, in their most liberal and friendly attitude, could make to other Christians.

The two largest Protestant groups in the United States, the Methodists and the Presbyterians, are just as far from rejecting the Christian God as are the English clergy; they also continue to cling even to the secondary Christian doctrines. The General Presbyterian Assembly of 1923 restated the belief of the Church in five points, called by the Assembly "the essential doctrine of the Word of God and our standards." "We believe," they said, "that the visible unity of the Church will be found to involve the whole-hearted acceptance of: The Holy Scriptures, as the record of God's revelation of Himself to man, and as being the rule and ultimate standard of faith; and the Creed, commonly called Nicene, as the sufficient statements of the Christian faith, and either it or the Apostles' Creed as the Baptismal confession of belief."

It is not difficult to show that these declarations correspond fairly well to the practice of those who make them. During a serious epidemic of influenza in 1918, the Board of Health of Philadelphia, U. S. A., in an effort to check

the spread of the disease, asked for the suspension of church services as well as of all other large gatherings. Twenty-two clergymen of the Episcopal denomination sent to the Board of Health their remonstrance, of which a part follows: "We the undersigned clergymen of the Episcopal Church in the diocese of Pennsylvania do hereby protest against the closing of the churches and places of public worship because of the prevailing epidemic. We recognise fully the seriousness of the situation, and we are doing all we can to help the sufferers and prevent the spread of the disease. But we believe that such a trouble *calls for renewed and redoubled public prayer and worship,* that God, *our only help in time of need,* may recognise our trust in Him and send us relief. We believe that God will care for His people when, in obedience to His Will, they meet to plead with Him for deliverance from evil, to confess their sins and to go to His altar in remembrance of Christ's death and in accord with His Command." (The italics are ours.) Among the signers of this protes were many of the leading clergy of the city.

The churches of almost every denomination are in the habit of offering prayer for divine help in all particularly trying circumstances. They affirm in cases of unemployment and economic distress, as well as in sickness, that human hope rests with God's intervention. On the occasion of the kidnaping of the baby of Colonel Lindbergh, prayers ascended to heaven from every part of the United States. Bishop Manning of New York sent to all the clergy of his diocese this letter: "I ask that in all our churches prayers may be offered for the distracted parents, for the safety and immediate restoration of the child, and for those who are guilty of this act that their hearts may

be softened and that they may realise the full meaning of their heinous crime."

A vast number of powerful business men who control to a considerable degree the intellectual and spiritual development of the nations are prepared to confess the faith expressed in the first article of his will by Pierpont Morgan, Sr., for a generation the dominating financial power in the United States: "I commit my soul into the hands of my Saviour, in full confidence that having redeemed it and washed it in His most precious blood, He will present it faultless before the throne of my Heavenly Father; and I entreat my children to maintain and defend, at all hazard, and at any cost of personal sacrifice, the blessed doctrine of the complete atonement for sin through the blood of Jesus Christ, once offered, and through that alone."

Belief in the God of the Religions and in Personal Immortality, Among Men of Science.—The extent to which the belief in the God and in the method of the religions persists among the educated is indicated far more exactly in the following abstract of the statistics we published in 1916.[1] They give, reliably, the proportions of believers, disbelievers, and agnostics among intellectual and moral leaders of the American people, namely, American men of science as they are listed in Cattell's Directory, and among the members of the American Historical Association, the American Sociological Society, and the American Psychological Association.

The two great difficulties to be overcome in order to establish valid statistics are the "sampling" error, and the error due to an insufficient definition of the object of the

[1] Part II of *The Belief in God and Immortality*, Open Court Pub. Co., Chicago, Ill., U. S. A. Comparable statistics for the year 1933 will soon be published.

inquiry. Full information regarding the measures taken to avoid these errors will be found in the book mentioned. The questionnaire contained the three following statements about God and three corresponding affirmations concerning immortality. The persons who received it were asked to mark the statements true for them:

(1) I believe in a God in intellectual and affective communication with man, I mean a God to whom one may pray in the expectation of receiving an answer. By "answer" I do not mean the subjective, psychological effect of prayer.

(2) I do not believe in a God as defined above.

(3) I am an agnostic regarding this question.

These statistics refer, therefore, to the God of the religions and to no other conception of the Divine.

In each class investigated we were able to separate the less from the more distinguished members. How this was done without involving a choice by the writer cannot be explained here.

The following figures indicate percentages of believers in God and in immortality.

	GOD		IMMORTALITY	
	Less Distinguished	*More Distinguished*	*Less Distinguished*	*More Distinguished*
Physical scientists	49.7	34.8	57.1	40.
Biologists	39.1	16.9	45.1	25.4
Historians	63.	32.9	67.6	35.3
Sociologists	29.2	19.4	52.2	27.1
Psychologists	32.1	13.2	26.9	8.8

Somewhat less than half the learned men belonging to the classes named, profess a belief in the God of the religions, and somewhat more than half of them, a belief

in personal immortality. A comparison of the several classes with each other and, in each class, of the less with the more distinguished group, yields particularly interesting results. In every class, without exception, the number of believers is considerably smaller among the more distinguished men. It is among the psychologists, who may be supposed to have more knowledge bearing upon God and immortality than other scientific men, that one finds the smallest number of believers. Whereas, among the greater men of the other classes the number of believers in God varies from 35% to 17%, it is only 13% among the greater psychologists. And, as to the belief in personal immortality, while it varies from 40% to 25% among the greater men of the other classes, it dwindles to less than 9% among the psychologists. The probable explanation of these facts, as well as that of other problems relating to these statistics, are discussed in the book already referred to.

Modernism.—By the side of the Roman Catholics and the Protestants unaffected by modern knowledge, there are those who would adapt the obsolete Christian ideas to the new conceptions of the world and of man. They have been labeled "Modernists." Many Protestant scientists have recently come forward as Modernist champions of "religion." As their prestige is great and has been won in the field of science, the arch enemy of the religions, their support has been joyfully and noisily acclaimed by orthodox Christian people. Had these scientists taken more pains to make clear what "religion" they defend, their reception by the churches would have been much cooler; they might even have been received as wolves in sheep's clothing.

Before consulting the more finely shaded and more au-

thoritative teaching of Modernist theologians, let us hear these great scientists. As they all say very much the same thing, one of them may be taken as representing the group. Robert Andrew Millikan, Nobel Prize winner for physics in 1923, deserves that distinction. The following information is drawn from his *Evolution in Science and Religion* and from a paper in *The Forum* for October, 1929.

According to Millikan, the distinctive feature of the Christian religion is its aim, which may be formulated in the terms of the Golden Rule: "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets." This rule is "the most potent and significant element in the religion of the Western World to-day." The task of religion is "to develop the consciences, the ideals, and the aspirations of mankind." As to the way offered by the religions for realizing the Golden Rule and developing consciences, he passes it discreetly under silence as if it were of no consequence; he appears to know nothing of the existence of the Prayer Books and of the nature of Christian worship. And yet, as a scientist, he knows that the realization of one's purpose, the solution of one's problems, depends upon the method and the technique used: find an adequate technique and the problem is solved, the aim is reached. In the moral life, as elsewhere, success depends upon the means used. Why does this skillful user of the most refined tools known to physics refuse to take into consideration the specific method which separates the religions from other institutions? Does he perhaps imagine that with respect to the aim of the churches the method is indifferent?

Millikan's idea of God is what one would expect of a modern scientist, but is his God the God of the religions?

He tells us that God is "that which is behind the mystery of existence and that which gives meaning to it." Science shows us "a universe that knows no caprice, a universe that can be counted upon; in a word, a God who works through law." "The God of science is the Spirit of rational order and of orderly development." Thus, this Christian Modernist agrees with Spinoza, the atheist—so at least he was called—who said, "By the help of God I mean the fixed and unchangeable order of nature." But Spinoza, unlike the American physicist, never allowed himself to be mistaken for a champion of any organized religion. Understanding God as he does, Millikan cannot possibly believe that adoration, supplications, praises, thanks, addressed to God, are the ways to be used for spreading the practice of the Golden Rule.

"The latest stage in the evolution of religion" is, for Millikan, the realization that we can improve ourselves and nature by conforming to, or applying the discovered laws; that is "the most stimulating and inspiring motive for altruistic efforts which has ever been introduced." "I am going to call the introduction of this idea as divine an event as has ever taken place. It is due directly to science." Have we not been led into a rather bewildering situation? The realization that we can improve ourselves and nature by discovering and applying laws, is as divine an event as has ever come to pass, and it is due to science; nevertheless, it is the latest stage in the development of the religions!

The substance of this teaching is contained in three propositions: (a) Religion is the fulfillment of the Golden Rule. (b) God is the unchangeable order of nature; or, if you prefer, the mystery behind it. (c) The last great divine event is the discovery of the reign of law throughout the universe, and the realization that we can improve

the world and ourselves by discovering the laws and using that knowledge.

Does this Modernist creed entitle one to membership in a Christian or in any other church? Not only does it reject secondary features of the Christian scheme of salvation; its negations reach the very foundation of the Christian faith,—it denies the God of the religions, for it conceives of God in such a way as to make impossible the maintenance of personal social relations with him. There is no real kinship between the Christian heavenly Father who tempers justice with mercy, and the immutable, unfeeling God described as Law. Human science takes the place of Jesus, the Saviour of mankind, and of our Father in Heaven.

Nevertheless, in spite of beliefs which are the negation of all the Christian creeds, and a method which has no relation to the religious method of preserving and enhancing life, Millikan and his friends pose as champions of the existing churches. They say, as if their differences with the Christian churches bore on unimportant details only, "Let us assist organized religion as it now exists, helping it to eliminate its faults and to be more effective in emphasizing and spreading its essentials with ever-increasing vigour." No matter the method by which it proposes to do that!

The attitude assumed by these scientists towards the churches would delight an old-style diplomat. It was illustrated in a conspicuous and particularly offensive manner by a late president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. At a recent annual meeting of that great association, a paper was read attacking the belief in the traditional God. The president objected vigorously to a discussion of such a subject in an association devoted to science, and gave out to the Press

a statement in which he said, "We have been requesting the clergy to relieve the public mind of the belief that there is any conflict between science and religion. There is none. There can be none. Some of the greatest men of science have been very religious." There can be, of course, no conflict between science and religion if to be religious means merely the acceptance of the Golden Rule, plus some vague feeling of dependence upon a power making for righteousness through the efforts of man.

Had this distinguished anthropologist been engaged in a scientific controversy, he would have taken pains to use terms understood in the same way by both sides; speaking of religion, he took the liberty of using the term "religion" in a sense other than the one in which those who were to be placated would take it. Thus, in the face of profound divergences, he produced an illusion of agreement. Nothing will clear these defenders of "religion" from repulsive suspicions except compliance with what is required of a witness in a court of law: nothing but the truth and *all the truth.*

Let us turn to the Modernist theologians. As Modernism in Roman Catholicism seems to have altogether disappeared, at the command of the Pope, we shall be concerned with the teaching of Protestant theologians only.

The Modernist's God is so utterly different from man that no personal relationship with him, such as the Christian is in the habit of maintaining with his God, is logically possible. This is frankly recognized by the Dean of St. Paul's in words which, were he fully to understand them, would stun and horrify the average Christian: "I agree with Tyrell," says Dean Inge, "that the fiction of God's finitude and relativity is a necessity of man's re-

ligious life, but that the interests both of intellectual truth and religion require us to recognise the fiction as such, on the pain of mental incoherence on the one side and of superstition and idolatry on the other." And he adds, "Perhaps we may say that the notion of a finite God is one that a moralist can never afford to forget nor the metaphysician to remember." This means that even though for the philosopher the compassionate, social God of the Christian worshiper is only a fiction, the moralist must maintain that fiction, for it is necessary to the welfare of humanity. And so, the Dean of St. Paul's, and with him the Modernist clergy in general, standing in the presence of believing multitudes, go solemnly through the beautiful Anglican worship of a fictitious God!

The English Modernists believe, nevertheless, in a transcendent God, i.e., a Being distinct from, and more than the life that is in man and the energy that is in the universe: "Although the Modernist believes in God as working in and through the creative process, he also believes in Him as existing both before and independently of the created universe," writes H. D. A. Major, Principal of a school for post-theological studies at Oxford and editor of *The Modern Churchman*. Dean Inge agrees: "I assume that no faith can call itself Christian which does not assert the existence of an eternal, transcendent Creator-God whose life is above time and change." This infinite, immutable, and ineffable God manifests himself by way of physical and psychical laws: "The eternal and unchangeable thoughts of God are objectified as a system of vital laws and finite purposes, which need both time and place for their development." (Dean Inge.)

The Christ of the English Modernists is as different from the Christ of the rank and file of the worshipers as the infinite, impassive God is different from the compas-

sionate Father. For these Modernists Jesus differs from other men not in kind, but in degree only. The rational and moral element in man is an incomplete, imperfect incarnation of the Divine, while Jesus is a perfect incarnation of that element "under strictly human limitations." One would grossly misunderstand the Modernists if one failed to give due weight to that last clause. It means that Jesus is divine as much as a man can be, whereas the other human beings are simply less divine than they might be. We are all born of God and divine in the same sense as Christ.

The most important practical consequence of this conception is that humanity is not dependent upon Christ for increments of divine grace; it is directly dependent, even as Jesus of Nazareth himself was, upon God only. Between this Christ and the Only Son of God, who bore our sins on the Cross and redeems those who believe on him, there is a chasm which not even the subtleties of Modernism can bridge.

How far the historic rôle of Jesus has dwindled and the meaning of "Atonement" and of "Resurrection" changed in modernist theology, may be gathered from the startling answer given by Principal Major to the hypothetical question: "What would become of the Christian religion if Jesus were a myth?"—"Certainly we should be the poorer if we did not believe in the Incarnation, Atonement, and Resurrection, which are essential Christian doctrines; but it is possible, I think, to believe in the essential truth of each of these doctrines, without believing in an historic Jesus. I will not argue that point now, but there is something to be said for it. I would merely remark that we have no difficulty in believing in the profound moral and spiritual truths set forth in the Parable of the Prodigal Son, because it is parable and not history. But the test of

the Christian life is doing the will of God, and would the fact of the discovery that Jesus had never lived affect our conception of the will of God or the sense of obligation to strive to do it, I think it would not for most thoughtful people. But would such a life be really entitled to be called Christian? Yes, it would. Christ's test was the test of works: the test of conduct and character. We should still have a form of Christian religion which could find its realization in love to God and love to man." (From "The Fifteenth Conference of Modern Churchmen," in *The Modern Churchman,* October, 1928.)

Modernism in the United States is substantially what it is in England. In *Adventurous Religion and other Essays* by Harry Emerson Fosdick, Professor in Union Theological Seminary, New York, probably the most widely known American Modernist, there is an enlightening passage on prayer. He agrees both with the scientists and with the English theologians quoted above in rejecting miracles and in conceiving God as a transcendent Power expressed in laws. "Between the two false ideas of prayer—clamorous petition to an anthropomorphic God and the inward endeavour to lift oneself by one's bootstraps—multitudes are to-day uncertain and dissatisfied. Yet the way out is not difficult. . . . True prayer is fulfilling one of the major laws of the spiritual world and getting the appropriate consequences. Just as around our bodies is the physical universe, in dependence upon which we live so that we create no power of our own but assimilate it—eat it, drink it, absorb it,—so around our spirits, and in them, is the Spiritual Universe. True prayer is fulfilling the conditions of our relationship with this spiritual world. To see the truth of this is to believe in God." "To be sure, God cannot be an individual to whom we cry. . . . What we are manifestly dealing with is a vital universe

surcharged with Creative Power. . . . That Power has issued in spiritual life and in terms of spiritual life must be interpreted."

Let this be noted: in the opinion of the New York clergyman, the Creative Power may not be interpreted as an individual to whom one may cry for help. He is, therefore, not the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, or of the writers of the New Testament,—he is not the God of the religions.

In the theology of the Reverend Mr. Fosdick, as in that of the English Modernists, the rôle of Jesus has ceased to be essential, for the Fall and the Atonement by the Son of God are myths, and man has direct access to God.

Modernist theology may be summed up thus: the whole traditional scheme of salvation is dismissed as a myth; the Fall, the Original Sin, and the Atoning Death of a divine Being have altogether lost the meaning intended in the creeds; that stupendous nightmare is gone.

Christ is reduced to human proportions. He differs from other men in the degree only in which the divine has been manifested in him. He is no longer the Saviour of a lost humanity; he is merely a model man.

God is a transcendent Being, infinite, immutable, and impassive. His relationship to his creatures is not of the kind existing between a father and his children; he manifests himself in the form of laws, physical and psychical. This conception is the one we have called the philosopher's conception of God, the "God of the head" in opposition to the "God of the heart."

Logically taken, Modernist theology would make impossible the traditional worship; nevertheless, these disbelieving Modernists address God in terms fitting a great Being

in social relation with them; they supplicate him, praise him, return thanks to him,—all according to the ancient formulæ. Many of these practicing disbelievers lead their congregations from pulpit or altar in this sham (they prefer the word "symbolic") worship. This situation demands a word of comment.

On the ground that "Christianity is a living, growing, changing organism which has by no means as yet reached its final form," they "claim the right to translate the language of an obsolete metaphysic into terms of modern thought." (Dean Rashdall.) Strong in this assumed right, Modernist clergy stand up before their congregations and, in the language of the creeds, confess, with hands joined and eyes upturned, that they "believe in the resurrection of the flesh," but, as Bishop Westcott explains, they do not mean by "flesh" "that material substance which we can see and handle,"—*The Historic Faith.* They say that they believe in Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary by the operation of the Holy Ghost, but they know that the sperm of Joseph operated. They affirm the Fall and the Atonement for Original Sin, but the "Fall" means the Darwinian ascent from brute to man.

They speak thus, and yet they are aware that their sophisticated behavior "does press on certain sensitive consciences"; especially on young men preparing for ordination who, believing like their Modernist masters, are nevertheless required to solemnly subscribe to the Articles of Faith. "In such cases," writes Principal Major, "it seems extremely unsatisfactory to say to them that the Church Authorities require them to subscribe; but, really, since the form of subscription has been relaxed, it means very little. That situation . . . seems repellent to enthusiastic, loyal-hearted, morally sensitive young people." So it does! The Modernist's symbolistic transformation of

the creeds, says the same teacher, "sticks in the throat, not simply of rigid traditionalists, but of plain men who are, it may be, agnostics, atheists, Unitarians, or Quakers. It revolted the soul of 'honest John Morley' and of Professor Henry Sidgwick," the English ethical philosopher.

Why, then, recognizing this, do they continue their morally offensive and corrupting practice? A thorough psychoanalysis alone might yield a complete answer to that question. The self-gratifying motive actually mentioned by them is that the cause of the Church, as it is organized, "seems one desirable to promote and one in promoting which the individual could find his best life work." But this is hardly the only motive. We are all driven, more or less unconsciously, by suppressed desires, less admirable than those we offer to ourselves and to the public. As the Modernists are, after all, no more than mere good men, it may be surmised that a probing of their souls would bring out two desires as dominant factors in their objectionable behavior: the desire to retain a wealth of pleasant associations accumulated from infancy about a hallowed Church and its worship; and the desire to keep a social position, of honor and influence, when one is hardly prepared to fill any other.

A church in the position of the Modernist Christian church is unintentionally a school of intellectual dishonesty. In order to avoid that evil, it is not sufficient to insist, as Principal Major does, that there must be on the part of the Modernists "unflinching truthfulness." When one systematically acts what, to most, appears a lie, it is futile to speak of unflinching honesty.

With regard to the spiritual aim of man, the Modernists do not substantially differ from the Fundamentalists or from most men of science who reject the religions.

They approve the Golden Rule; they desire the spiritual progress of humanity, and they take pride in its struggle for the good, the beautiful, and the true.

The present age is characterized not by a new aim but by a new method. The Modernists are not modern, for if they have given up magic, they keep the traditional religious method; they belong with the pre-scientific age. They say that the glory of man, the hope of the future, is our access to a divine Life, and that a divine incarnation is actually taking place; but they neither offer nor seek an improved technique for wresting from heaven the divine fire. Concerning the modern problem, i.e., the discovery of the conditions under which the divine spark manifests itself in man, the Modernists have less than nothing to say; they go on with the antique religious ritual,—the prayers, the songs, the praises, the sacraments,—these are still their means of contact with the source of Life.

Before they deserve the name they bear, the Modernists will have to recognize openly that the ancient worship misleads humanity; that the primary, the true source of modern inspiration and energy lies elsewhere than in the worship of social gods. And they will have to join science in the search for more effective means of actualizing the good, the beautiful, and the true.

Should any one exclaim in righteous indignation that the Modernists know the value of modern methods of establishing and developing physical, intellectual and moral health; and that they actively share in the effort of science to improve the material and spiritual conditions of humanity, our answer would be, as the reader already knows, that in so far as they do that, they turn from the worship of the God of the religions to secular methods.

XVII

THE EVILS DONE BY THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

A. THE NEGLECT OF KNOWLEDGE AND OF SELF-DETERMINATION

IT might be argued that even though everything we have said about the value of the scientific method were true, the religious method should not be altogether discarded. Is not belief in heavenly reward and punishment an advantage; and are not the peace and the assurance of help, gained in prayerful communion with God, of great value when they lead, as they may, to active thinking and confident endeavor,—this, even though God should have no other existence than in the mind of the believer? Religion need not take the place of other and better methods. Then, why not *add* the religious to the scientific method of life?

Against this course of action there are several weighty objections. Expectation of reward and punishment in another life is a very inferior motive for good behavior; a genuine love of virtue and a fine character are not readily produced by threats and promises to be realized after death. As for reliance upon God, it has far reaching harmful consequences of which we are to take note. It cannot fail to decrease in some degree the efforts which would otherwise be made to help oneself. Belief in divine help is not more damaging among us, simply because the belief is in a state of decay. On the whole, reliance on man is inversely proportional to reliance on God. To this

may be added that the resignation, the peace of mind, the courage generated by belief in the God of the religions are not fruits of faith in that god only. These same fruits may be produced also by conceptions of the divine not open to the objections to be urged against the Christian religion. One may give up the social gods of the religions and, nevertheless, enjoy the contentment and energy which a faith, however beyond proof it may be, in the ultimate triumph of the good can give. The faith of a Marcus Aurelius had that potency.

The main objection to the use in civilized countries of the religious method is neither that it does no good, nor that it is not so effective as the scientific method, but that it breeds evils which outweigh the good it does. These evils should not be left out of the reckoning; one does not ignore the debit side of the ledger when one wishes to know the value of one's possessions. Nowhere, however, is candor less honored than in the evaluation of religion; there tradition and prejudice take its place.

We do not propose to fill these pages with all the misdeeds of which religious institutions,—the Roman Catholic church, for instance,—may justly be accused. We shall ignore that "from the fourth century onwards, the great Church has been an imperialistic theocracy, a political organization with a singularly bad record of cruelty, oppression, and fraud,"—a record which, when fully revealed, is enough to horrify even the sophisticated. We shall disregard also the excessive and indiscriminate stress placed upon the negative, soporific virtues of humility and obedience,—a teaching which everywhere has helped to keep the people in moral slavery and has served the evil ambitions of priests and princes.

It must, however, be said of these abominations that they are not to be made light of on the ground that they

grow out of human defects and not out of the religions themselves. Every religion which regards itself as the true religion, as offering the beliefs and the practices necessary to salvation, sows, unavoidably, the seed of intolerance. Where is the man who, convinced that a certain set of beliefs is the condition of escaping eternal misery and gaining eternal happiness, will look with composure upon a neighbor who rejects these views? It is not in human nature to hold that the most precious thing conceivable depends upon the possession of a particular faith, and, yet, to tolerate those who condemn that faith. Religious tolerance is, among us, a measure of the uncertainty or indifference with which the traditional beliefs are regarded.

Our main purpose in this and the following chapter is to call attention to two major evils arising, inevitably, from belief in a God who maintains with man the social relations implied in Christian worship: disregard of the value of knowledge in general, and the teaching that the Christian God is the source of the virtues. A preliminary remark will be made, however, regarding the evils resulting from the sense of close dependence upon the Christian God.

These evils appear only among people of a high degree of mental development, where scientific conceptions have become established. Among the uncivilized, it is with the religions as with magic: both serve, on the whole, a useful purpose, and it is probable that neither could be advantageously replaced.

The most important recent advance in the field of education is probably the discovery that a large amount of freedom and self-determination is best for the child. Just as living too long on mother's milk retards the physical growth of the child, so a too severe parental authority de-

lays his intellectual and moral development. Give the child the largest possible degree of independence and responsibility; let him discover the natural consequences of his actions, and he will the more quickly gain wisdom and self-control. This has come to be a fundamental principle of education,—a principle not to be construed, however, as opposed to the systematic giving of information and advice and even, in certain cases, to the use of force.

Closely connected with this change of attitude towards the child is an important discovery connected with the name of Freud. In certain circumstances there develops in the child a tendency to fix so firmly his affection upon his father or mother ("Œdipus complex") that when maturity comes, he is unfitted to love normally an individual of the opposite sex and is, therefore, in danger of falling into seriously abnormal behavior. Something of this sort takes place in the life of certain religious persons: energies and interests, which should be directed towards their fellow men, are diverted to God, Christ, the Virgin, the saints. Examples of this abnormal and, at times, repulsive misplacement of human affection are found among the celebrated mystics.

The intimate, affective relation favored by the conception of the divine Father and, in the Roman Catholic church, of the divine Mother, is open to all the objections valid against an excessive dependence of the child upon his earthly parents. The habit of seeking refuge in God, comforting though it is, may be as much a handicap to the adult as excessive reliance upon his parents is to the molly-coddled child. Instead of constituting a satisfactory adaptation to the world of realities, faith in the "Good Shepherd" keeps one in a world of illusion. It is on the whole an infantile relationship, to be outgrown as speedily as possible.

One of the main evils perpetrated by the Christian religion is disregard of knowledge in general. "Love the Lord with all thy heart and thy neighbour as thyself" is an inadequate prescription. Without knowledge, love is blind; even as, without the right will, knowledge is dangerous. A religion of love and of reliance upon Providence is by its very nature indifferent, if not antagonistic to knowledge and, thereby, defeats its own purpose, insofar as that purpose is the welfare of humanity.

The way to heaven and to sainthood, as understood by Christianity, lies not through institutions of higher learning; not even necessarily through the Grammar School. The chance of salvation is no greater for the learned than for the ignorant; why, then, should the churches be concerned with the acquisition of knowledge? Faith and love, not knowledge, open the gates of heaven.

If, in two thousand years, the Christian nations have failed so conspicuously to realize their ideal of brotherhood, it is in part, of course, because the ideal is high. But it is also, and in a measure hardly suspected by those who are in the habit of regarding religion as the assured way to the millennium, because of the inadequacy of its teaching. So long as it continues in its traditional position, the Christian religion will, on the whole, remain a hindrance to the economic and political reorganization of the world which is necessary to the advent of universal peace and brotherhood.

What can be expected of men who speak as did the plenipotentiaries assembled at Vienna to reorganize Europe after the downfall of Napoleon? "Their Majesties, the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia, as a consequence of the great events which have signalised, in Europe, the course of the last three years, and principally of *the benefits which it has pleased*

the Divine Providence to spread over the States whose governments have placed their trust and hope in Him alone, etc." (The italics are ours.)

One reads with something like horror the logical Christian conviction of brave General Serret who was in command of the French troops in Alsace at the beginning of the World War and who died from wounds in 1916. In a letter to his wife, dated November, 1916, he wrote: "Yesterday I lectured a lady who revolted against war, its length and its tragic sorrows. I proved to her that she failed to recognise the most elemental basis of religion, which is to believe in Providence who rules everything and to bow without discussion before His decisions."

Did the message of the first "Universal Conference of Applied Christianity" (Stockholm, 1925), representing, we are told, a major part of the Christian world, indicate a different conviction? The Conference sent out an appeal to all the disciples of Christ to "collaborate by prayer, repentance, and thank offerings to the understanding and the performance of the present duty." They seem to have been of the same opinion as General Serret, an opinion admirably expressed long ago by Francis Bacon: "Wars are no massacres or confusions, but the highest Trials of Right in which princes and states that acknowledge no superior authority put themselves upon the justice of God for the deciding of their controversies by such success as it shall please Him to give on either side."

With relief and renewed confidence in humanity one learns that at Versailles, in 1918, the High Contracting Parties left to man the responsibility for the War and for whatever success the Peace Treaty might have. They did not mention the God of the religions; they did not pretend to place their trust in him. They attempted, instead, to set aside causes of War. In this attitude, despite the

grave defects of their work, may be seen an intimation of progress. The civilized world is coming to realize clearly that a desire for peace, supported by prayer, is not sufficient to insure peace; but that the state of peace is conditioned by an organization of international relations,—economic and political,—which will remove all major causes of friction and angry rivalry; and the world is aware that such an organization depends on vast knowledge to be acquired through systematic research and profound understanding.

What has just been said regarding the question of universal peace applies, of course, to all the problems facing humanity, in particular to the grave social problems arising from uncontrolled procreation. They demand for their solution a knowledge and a wise application of contraceptive methods in the interest of eugenic principles. The Church of Rome, however, claiming, with an impudence which has ceased to offend, that to her "God has intrusted the defence of morals," intends "to preserve the nuptial union from being defiled by this foul stain . . . and proclaims anew that any use whatever of matrimony exercised in such a way that the act is deliberately frustrated in its natural power, is an offence against the law of God and nature, and those who indulge in such are branded with the guilt of a grave sin." (*Encyclical on Marriage and Divorce,* 1931.) An American cardinal was reported in the daily press as having uttered the following words in defense of the sanctity of marriage: "Children troop down from Heaven because God wills it. . . . He blesses at will some homes. . . . Woe to those who degrade, pervert, or do violence to the law of nature as fixed by the eternal decrees of God Himself." Such a teaching as this—a teaching logically derived from fundamental

principles of the Christian religion—is an evil of the first magnitude.

It is true that in early times education, both in its lower and its higher reaches, was fostered by organized Christianity, and that in modern times the Christian churches have been zealous in the establishment of schools and colleges of a certain sort. But the main motive for these foundations was not a disinterested appreciation of knowledge. In a world in which knowledge increased by leaps and bounds, the churches could not have maintained themselves without an educated ministry. It is this practical need which led in the past and still leads to the foundation of religious institutions of higher learning in which the faith of the students shall not be endangered by their studies. To-day, in the United States as in all the most civilized countries, a church college, judged from the point of view of intellectual culture, is an inferior institution.

The keen interest of Roman Catholics in elementary education, and the great financial sacrifices they are willing to make in order to establish parochial schools in Protestant countries, is avowedly due to the will to make Roman Catholics of the children. The flock can best be kept and increased by indoctrination during the early, receptive years of life. When they are not stimulated by rivalry with the secular schools, Roman Catholic efforts are much less admirable.

The attitude of the official representatives of the larger Protestant bodies is not very different from that of the Roman church. It may be seen in the recommendations for the training of candidates for Holy Orders issued recently by the Church of England in Canada: "The highest duty of the Theological Colleges is to give to the Church clergy who, in prayer and meditation, speak to God and

listen to His voice speaking to them. . . . The Chapel should be the center of the life, teaching and activity of a Theological College. . . . The great value of intercession and its supreme importance should also be taught through special services of intercession held at frequent and regular intervals."

Even friends of the established religions admit that "with rare exceptions the seminaries are not conspicuous as centers of scholarly pursuits. Students are usually not admitted on the basis of scholastic attainment. Acquaintance with the scientific, the historical, the philosophical, and the critical methods, recognized in other quarters as indispensable tools of scholarship, are only in rare instances prerequisites of theological study. There is not, ordinarily, insistence upon high intellectual achievement as a primary qualification for effective service." (Robert L. Kelley, Executive Secretary of the Council of Church Boards of Education, in *Theological Education in America.*)

In the preparation of the would-be ministers of salvation, the study of man and society by the methods of psychology, anthropology, and sociology is almost entirely replaced by Greek, Latin, Hebrew, Old and New Testament exegesis, and by a "devotional use of the Bible," "chapel as the centre of the life, teaching, and activity" of the students, and intercession in order to learn "more of God and His ways of dealing with man."

The evil done by the orientation of the religions away from knowledge is so great and so evident that one need not go to the enemies of the religions to hear it proclaimed; even in Divinity schools the conviction is expressed that the ethical service rendered by the religions has been over-compensated by the damage they have done to clear and honest thinking. In *The Wrestle of Religion*

with Truth, Professor H. N. Wieman, of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, declares that religion "has blinded men to facts, magnified delusion, and hindered men from making adaptations to things as they are."

To the protest that vast numbers of professing Christians are aware of the value of knowledge and that many of them are zealous supporters of science, the answer is that their attitude towards science is maintained in spite of their religious beliefs or because their religious beliefs are no longer strictly held. Their attitude is fostered by the irresistible demonstration of the value of science, and by the inescapable necessity of keeping abreast of the times in order to remain alive in the economic struggle. They cannot be expected to escape entirely the impact of reality, even though their religion does.

No religion teaching that love is the cure-all and that God, through Jesus, Mary, and the saints, is the unfailing source of help in time of need, can be seriously concerned with the progress of knowledge.

XVIII

THE EVILS DONE BY THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION—(Continued)

B. FALSE TEACHING CONCERNING THE SOURCE OF THE VIRTUES

THE higher religions and in particular the Christian religion, have led the world to believe that they are the primary source of the virtues. Even non-believers have become accustomed to regard morality as indissolubly connected with church beliefs and practices. That is the main or only reason for the support given by many to religion; they imagine that kindness, honesty, loyalty, generosity, self-sacrifice, would disappear from humanity, together with the religions. A consequence of that assumption "is to drive men further away from insight into virtue and deeper and deeper into mere negations and rebellion." (Walter Lippmann, *Preface to Morals.*)

In the chapters on Origins it has been shown that the ethical ideas that are in humanity did not come from beliefs in gods but the reverse: man gradually moralized his gods. A similar relation has been demonstrated between the belief in immortality and its ethical function: originally the Hereafter possessed no ethical significance, but little by little it was transformed so as to provide sanctions for conduct the value of which man had discovered in his social life. We might rest content with that demonstration of the human origin of moral values. But the assumption that belief in a Providence-god is the source of

morality is so deeply rooted among us that we shall devote the first part of this chapter to show that the founda tion of human morality exists already in animals. In the second part we shall point to human feelings, generated in social intercourse,—not in communion with God,—as the source of what is regarded as highest and best in human behavior.

THE ANIMAL FOUNDATION OF HUMAN MORALITY[1]

(1.) *The Need for Union or Communion with Others.* —Observant persons have noticed with surprise that certain dogs, when scolded by their masters, seem to be afraid, though they may never have suffered physical punishment at their hands. The emotional reaction brought out by the displeasure of the master is, as a matter of fact, not the simple fear-reaction: the animal does not run away, as it would if it merely feared blows; it remains near; it even approaches, crawling on its belly as in supplication, seeking to rub against the master's legs, trying to lick his hands. This is ob iously not an expression of fear of physical chastisement. What is it?

A distinguished psychologist, Professor Köhler of the University of Berlin, who has had the good fortune to spend several years in the company of chimpanzees in Teneriffe Island has recorded in a most interesting book, *The Mentality of Apes,* an observation which may be brought in for comparison with the behavior of the dog: "When I had been in Teneriffe a few weeks only, I noticed, while feeding the squatting animals, pressed close to me, that a little female, at other times quite well-behaved, was snatching the food out of the hand of a weaker

[1] The substance of the following pages has appeared in *Harper's Magazine,* Vol. 157, 1928, under the title "Morality Among the Animals."

animal, and as she persisted in this, I gave her a little rap. The little creature, now punished for the first time, shrank back, uttered one or two heart-broken wails, as she stared at me horror-struck, while her lips were pouted more than ever. The next moment she had flung her arms around my neck, quite beside herself, and was only comforted by degrees when I stroked her. This need," adds Professor Köhler, "is a phenomenon frequently to be observed in the emotional life of chimpanzees." This is certainly not an expression of simple fear.

If the reader hesitates still in his interpretation, let him consider the following behavior of a child. The writer remembers punishing a young child by removing him from the family table at meal time and placing his high chair in the corner of the room. He had his food with him and could see and hear the family at table; there was, therefore, no food-punishment and no cause for fear. Nevertheless, the child fell to weeping in a most disconsolate manner—not cries of anger or fear; no, a wail of utter misery! When he was brought back to us, there was an affecting show of reëstablished friendship. Here hesitation is not possible; the desolation came not from physical pain, or fear of pain, but from a dread of separation from or rejection by the parents.

Can we now refrain from interpreting in the same way the behavior of the dogs and apes referred to above? They are affected not by the fear of physical pain, but, like the child, by the pain at being rejected by those to whom they are attached. Of all kinds of isolation, the one produced by the breaking of bonds of trustful affection is the worst. The need for companionship, for union in affection, assumes in civilized man the form of a yearning for communion with God.

(2.) *Shame at Having Misbehaved.*—Darwin relates that a dog of his, who had never been struck by any one of the household, was caught by him with a chop just snatched from the table. On seeing the master enter, the dog slunk under the sofa with ears down and tail between its legs, and could not be persuaded to show itself. Here again the behavior of the animal may not be explained as evidence of the fear of physical pain. Is it a prototype of the tragic first act in the moral drama of humanity related in Genesis? There are striking similarities in the behavior of Adam and Eve and of Darwin's dog. Instead of gambolling joyfully towards his entering master, the dog hid under the sofa. Likewise our first ancestors, guilty of disobedience, concealed themselves from their Maker;—thus, it seems, does conscience make cowards of us all!

If the terms "shame" and "conscience" do not seem altogether appropriate here, the fact remains that this dog, like other dogs and other animals of the higher species, behaved in a way which, when seen in human beings, is understood as manifestation of shame and conscience.

(3.) *Disinterested Helpfulness and Generosity* are among the finest traits of the moral nature of man. They are also prominent traits in the higher animals. Mated birds of certain species show what in man would be called admirable devotion and tenderness. They coöperate in building the nest, and they feed, protect and comfort each other during a long incubation period.

Apes excepted, it is probably among elephants that mutual helpfulness is best developed. When an elephant is wounded by a bullet, others have frequently been observed to come to its help and support it. If it falls, some of its fellows will kneel by its side and pass their tusks

under its body, while others wind their trunks about its neck, in an attempt to put the wounded animal on its feet.

But it is, as might be expected, among apes that sympathy, compassionate helpfulness, self-sacrifice for the sake of others, reach their highest level. Whether in this respect the ape falls far below uncivilized man, the reader may determine for himself.

A chimpanzee's burst of affectionate concern in the presence of a suffering fellow-creature, especially when small and weak, would put to shame the callous indifference of many a human being. One of the younger and smaller apes of Professor Köhler's, Konsul by name, was sick. He had just been let out of the infirmary and was dragging himself towards his fellows, who were eating green fodder some distance away. After a few steps his strength gave way and he fell to the ground, uttering a piercing cry. Tercera, a female ape, chewing near by, sprang up in great excitement, uttering cries of distress, and reached Konsul in a few strides. She caught hold of him under the arms, trying to set him on his feet, her face expressive of the utmost concern. The witness of this scene adds, "One could not imagine anything more maternal than this female chimpanzee's behavior."

These apes befriended and helped one another in various circumstances. When one was being punished, the others not only showed passive sympathy but sought to stop the punishment. Little Konsul would run up excitedly and, with a pleading countenance, stretch out his arms to the punisher. He would even try to hold his arm tight; and if the chastisement continued, growing exasperated, he would hit out at the big man! Not only Konsul, but all these chimpanzees, in varying degrees, showed this helpful interest. When they had grown up and their awe of the big man had diminished, it became impossible

to punish any of them while the others were in the same room. "At times the most insignificant episode between man and ape would arouse the whole group to a concerted attack."

Of all the traits displayed by the human species, none is of greater consequence to its continuance and well-being than the devotion of parents to their children. Now this type of behavior is also commonplace in the animal world, and it is nowhere more powerfully illustrated than among monkeys and apes. Among many striking instances of such behavior the following is chosen because it was observed under entirely reliable conditions by Professor Yerkes, the distinguished animal psychologist of Yale University. A *Macacus rhesus* had brought forth a still birth. "Repeated attempts were made to remove the dead baby, but they were all futile because Gertie either held it in her hands or sat close beside it ready to seize it at the slightest disturbance. Each day opportunity was sought to remove the body; no such opportunity came. During the second week the body so far decomposed that, with constant handling and licking by the parents it rapidly wore away. By the third week there remained only the shriveled skin covering a few fragments of bone, and the open skull from the open cavity of which the brain had disappeared. During a period of five weeks, the instinct to protect her offspring impelled this monkey to carry its gradually vanishing remains about with her and to watch over them so assiduously that it was utterly impossible to take them from her except by force. ("Maternal Instinct in a Monkey," *Journal of Animal Behaviour.*)

There is little doubt that the desire to separate at almost any cost the human from the animal world will prompt many to exclaim, "Yes, that is assuredly quite interesting. But the self-sacrificing behavior of animals is,

after all, merely an instinct; it is nature's way of obtaining its ends. The mother monkey's conduct is remarkable as much by its stupidity as by its devotion. Hers is an absolutely blind love; it does not know what it is for; it spends itself as readily on a dead remnant as on the living young."

To this, the proper answer is that the human mother also is moved by a blind urge to lavish care upon her child. Does she not to a marked degree behave as our monkey: cherish the inanimate remnants of her child; yea, even his clothing and his playthings? Does she not find it almost impossible to part with whatever has belonged to him? The truth of the matter is that the difference between the average human parent and the higher animals in the care of the new-born is not one of kind but of degree. There are instinctive elements in the behavior of human parents, and there is some degree of intelligence in that of animals. The latter are, to a degree not usually suspected, socially educated; they learn to behave in certain socially useful ways in response to the behavior of others. "The few facts I have given," says Craig, a trained observer, summarizing his observations, "are sufficient to show that the contentions between pigeons are settled, not in accordance with the will of the strongest contestants, but in accordance with certain principles comparable to our principles of right and duty." (*American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XIV.)

(4) *Gratitude.*—That animal behavior, when it happens to be in agreement with the Golden Rule, is not always the irresponsible product of instinct is obvious in the case of Konsul defending his punished friends. It is perhaps even more obvious in behavior which it is difficult to call otherwise than a manifestation of gratitude. Madame

Abreu relates that when she did not put sugar into the milk of a certain baby chimpanzee, he would try to throw it away. When she added sugar, the animal would take the milk and offer to give her a kiss by way of thanks. One of the most surprising observations of Köhler is similar in its meaning: Two chimpanzees had been shut out of their shelter by mistake during a cold rain storm. They were standing dejected, water streaming down their shivering bodies when Professor Köhler chanced to pass. He opened the door for them. Instead of scampering in without more ado, as many a child would have done, each of them delayed entering the warm shelter long enough to throw its arms about its benefactor in a frenzy of satisfaction.

Such kissing and hugging are obviously not blind innate reactions; they are learned by these apes in their life in common; they are blossoms of their social life, even as similar behavior is with us. And the learning of these amities implies on the part of the learner an appreciation of the behavior to which the kiss or the hug is a response. It should be said that among Madame Abreu's apes, kissing, and among Professor Köhler's apes, hugging, were established ways of expressing affection, unusual joy and, it seems, thankfulness.

The facts reported above lead to the conviction that the higher animals rise to forms of conduct elaborated within their social relations,—conduct which, among human beings, is customarily called morally good.

Should the higher animals, then, be regarded as moral beings, and thus be united to man by this highest of all possible bonds? The answer to this question depends upon the meaning given to "morality." If it is defined as consisting of socially valuable forms of behavior born of

instinct and social experience, then the term would apply to the higher animals. But if morality is held to imply a consciousness of principles of right and wrong, of the Golden Rule, for instance, regarded as a categorical imperative, then morality would have to be denied to animals, for they are unable to formulate principles. But how much morality of this second sort is there among the lowest human societies, and among the lowest members of civilized societies? They display disinterested propensities and habits; they act with a degree of kindness and generosity because of nature's impulses, just as animals do, and because it is customary and expected of them; but their behavior is not guided by abstract principles.

Be this as it may, it is in any case incontestable that a broad foundation for human-like morality is present in emotional responses made by the animal to his social milieu. The list is imposing: affection, sympathy, mutual helpfulness, loyalty, courage, disinterested devotion, gratitude,—these virtues or their behavior-equivalents are observable in the higher animals.

The argument for the ethical kinship of man and beast may be taken a step further. Whatever moral superiority is possessed by man, might be supposed to be due to some specific ethical endowment not present in the animal. It might be that there is or are in man specific forms of innate prompting to higher forms of conduct. That is a theoretical possibility, but, as a matter of fact, not a reality. No form of affective reaction has been discovered in man which is not to be observed also in apes. Whatever the superiority of man, it is due to his intellectual endowment, i.e., his power to learn.

With regard, for instance, to self-sacrifice, animals defend and take care of their young ones unto death; men can go no farther. We surpass them, however, in that we

devote ourselves in some measure to the welfare of people far removed from our immediate families. We are disposed to befriend, let us say, all men, whatever their race and outlandish habits. Why that extension to a great number and variety of objects, of an originally much more limited affective reaction? It is the outcome of more knowledge, of fuller acquaintance with human nature. We have discovered that all the world is kin, that the "naked savage chipping his stone axe is a man of like passion with us, and with equal claims upon justice and freedom." (Wm. McDougall, *Social Psychology.*) We have become aware not only that he is of one flesh, and essentially of one mind with us, but also that the happiness of each individual depends finally upon the recognition of a universal brotherhood.

Similar remarks apply to the improvement which has taken place in the treatment of criminals. The barbarians are, on the whole, terribly ruthless towards the transgressor of tribal morality. In this matter, civilized man is sometimes superio : he seeks to reform rather than to destroy. But that is not the expression of an innate disposition lacking in primitive man; it is rather an extension to criminals of tendencies to action felt originally only toward those who belong to us. And this extension is the outcome of a fuller understanding of human nature and of the requirements of society: We have come to understand that the well-being of society requires that the criminal should be returned to the common life *reformed;* it does not demand that he should suffer, unless the infliction of pain should be the best way to reform.

King Louis IX, celebrated in the "Chronicles" of Joinville, and sanctified by the Roman Church, was a good man, kindly and serviceable, as well as courageous. Yet, speaking of persons who criticized adversely the Christian

I regret very much having made a fool of myself in this way; but, from another point of view, I have no reason to complain, for this visit and this confession put an end to my crises and thus spared me a great deal of suffering."

Confession readily passes from the acknowledgment of evil deeds to a simple "letting oneself out"; even that may achieve something worth while. A patient who had to make a long journey to see his physician at the hospital of Johns Hopkins University, told him, "It takes me five hours in all to make this visit to you, but the hour with you is the only hour of the twenty-four when I can really be myself." We have here one aspect of the value of prayer: God becomes a confessor to whom one may tell everything.

A psychologist who for many years was attached to Juvenile Courts was moved by the grievous effects of the knowledge of certain evils, when possessed by children and kept secret (or, as the Freudians say, suppressed), to address parents and teachers in these words: "We should most earnestly counsel that children should be accustomed to go over the items of their daily life with their guardians that there may be no hidden knowledge to be dwelled on in morbid fashion. Of all forms of prevention of delinquency I know of nothing comparable to the confidences and counsels between elders and children." (William Healy, *Honesty: A Study of the Causes and Treatment of Dishonesty Among Children.*) Confession to a priest is not without value, but confession to one who knows what has been learned about human nature since the Bible was written, offers greater promise of success.

But why do the representatives of the Christian religion, who are aware of the presence in confession of natural healing forces, continue to introduce divine inter-

lation as the prerogative of the religions and, therefore, as outside the sphere of the lay schools. Not until the Christian nations shall have understood clearly the falsity and danger of that assumption, not until they shall have learned that the virtues are independent of any transcendental belief, will it be possible for the lay schools to accomplish the work of character formation to which they are called.

The Source of Heroic Self-Sacrifice.—Any effort to demonstrate the presence in man of a native tendency to noble and heroic deeds, independently of belief in divine Providence and in immortality, may seem superfluous. It will not be unnecessary, however, so long as Protestant Fundamentalists and Roman Catholics continue to teach the doctrines of total depravity and of Salvation through faith in the atoning death of the Son of God; and so long as the religious Liberals, either from habit or policy, countenance the tradition connecting the God of the religions with the origin and development of morality.

From among the virtues we choose, as illustration for the purpose of this chapter, heroic self-sacrifice, because it is generally regarded as the loftiest form of behavior. The newspapers bring occasionally to our breakfast tables news of this sort:

"Cleveland (Ohio).—Policeman Ernest Staab, thirty years old, sacrificed his life to achieve the removal of twenty-one persons from the blazing and gas-filled Cleveland Clinic. Staab arrived while the fumes still clogged the entrance, but time after time he pushed his way into the darkened halls, facing almost positive death. Some of those he removed were alive to-night, some died as he carried them to the open air. But Staab worked away as the fatal gas slowly destroyed his lungs. He collapsed after carrying out his twenty first burden. He followed those

he rescued to an emergency cot where he died a few hours later." Was this man moved to an heroic deed by belief in God and in a blessed reward after death?

It would not do, however, to regard heroes as prompted solely by love for humanity. The desire to distinguish oneself, to show one's power or worth and to win praise, is probably never entirely absent from noble deeds and is not infrequently their main motive.

Those who use the word "religion" to designate devotion to a high and disinterested purpose speak of the "religion of science." A particularly heroic chapter of the history of science has been written by a group of American army medical men and their assistants in the attempt to rid the world from the scourge of yellow fever. Immediately after the Spanish-American war, a commission was appointed to investigate the cause of that disease. The commission determined to test the recently propounded theory that yellow fever was transmitted by a special type of mosquito, the stegomyia. Two members of the Commission, Dr. Jesse W. Lazear and Dr. James Carroll, let themselves be bitten by mosquitoes which had fed upon yellow fever patients. Nothing happened to them,—this, for reasons understood later on. Not long after, while they continued their experiments, Dr. Carroll was bitten accidentally, caught the disease, and had a narrow escape from death. Dr. Lazear, having for the second time permitted an infected stegomyia mosquito to suck his blood, died a few days later.

More recently, Dr. H. T. Ricketts, after having discovered that typhus also was communicated by an insect, died of that disease in Mexico while pursuing his researches. Nevertheless, the quest for fuller knowledge continued, and in 1922 another martyr was added to the long list when Arthur William Bacot died in Cairo of typhus con-

tracted from infectious lice, while carrying on investigations at the request of the Egyptian Government. For years he had run the gravest risks in the study of yellow fever as well as of typhus, and he was of course fully aware of the danger to which he was exposing himself in handling lice which had fed on typhus blood.

If the "heroes" of political revolutions are often selfish seekers after power and glory, many of them stand in the foremost ranks of the true heroes. History has recorded the deeds of a host of them. The following illustration will suggest numerous other convincing instances of the presence in man of high virtues which, we are asked to believe, would be lost if the religions were set aside.

Catherine Breshkovskaya, the daughter of a Russian nobleman, witnessed with an aching heart the suffering of the peasants on her father's and on neighboring estates: hunger, cold, flogging, separation of parents from children, rape, degrading humiliation,—these things tormented her childhood and early adolescence, and made of her the "grandmother of the Russian Revolution."

In order to help the peasants she became a school teacher. She was one of those of whom Prince Kropotkin speaks: "Young men went into the villages as doctors, helpers, teachers, village scribes, even as agricultural laborers, blacksmiths, wood-cutters, and so on; and tried to live there in close contact with the peasants. Girls passed teachers' examinations, learned midwifery or nursing, and went by the hundred into the villages devoting themselves entirely to the poorest part of the population." But these would-be helpers were ruthlessly suppressed. After several years of endeavor she realized how ineffectual her work was.

At twenty-five she married a nobleman genuinely in-

terested in the peasants. She met active, courageous young men, students and others, who in the face of the government's systematic opposition to all efforts for the betterment of the people, asked each other, "What is to be done?" One year later she had come to the conclusion that nothing worth while could be done until the autocracy was overthrown. She knew that to join the revolutionists was to face imprisonment, torture, exile, death. As her husband was not prepared to run these dangers, she started out without him.

The rest of her life may be summed up in a few words: eleven years of underground work as a revolutionist and thirty years of exile in Siberia. Her second exile was for life, but the Russian Revolution of 1917 set her free. Two years before, at the age of seventy-one, she had written to a friend from her exile at Yakutsk: "The longer I live, the more I realise that the foundation of my being is an ardent and invincible love for the human race, which, as I believe, has in itself all the germs of an endless intellectual 'perfectionment,' an ascent to a moral life that will make it infinitely happy. This habit of living in human life as a whole has made me so associate myself with the universal mentality that I love myself in it, and care little about my individual fate, which is not dear to me, once it is separated from the general course." (*Reminiscences and Letters.*) These were not empty words; her whole life had stamped them as genuine.

There is no reference to God, to religion, to immortality in the writings of Catherine Breshkovskaya. She is conscious not of a divine Providence, but of a suffering, degraded humanity, and of the possibility of helping it to reach a beautiful social ideal. Her tender, heroic behavior is a response of man to man. The impulse which drove her forward was no other than the impulse which

moved little Konsul when he threw himself upon the arm of Professor Köhler to stop the suffering of a brother ape. "Divine," though her spirit may be called, she lived entirely outside the distinctive beliefs and the worship of the religions; she regarded them as false and evil institutions.

A sense of enlarged and perfected life is the blessing that comes to those who live like Catherine Breshkovskaya. We may suppose that Jesus had that blessing in mind when he spoke of losing one's life in order to find it. It is a purer happiness than the "love of God" enjoyed by the classical Christian mystics.

But why scan the history of science and political revolutions in order to point out the fundamental independence of the virtues from belief in the central doctrine of the religions? Nothing could be more convincing than the direct observation of the moral life as it unfolds itself about us, in the family and the larger social groups. "Our alleged essential dependence upon transcendental beliefs is belied by the most common experiences of daily life. Who does not feel the absurdity of the opinion that the care lavished upon a sick child by a mother is given because of a belief in God and in immortality, that the love of father and mother on the part of children, affection and serviceableness between brothers and sisters, straightforwardness and truthfulness between business men, are essentially dependent upon these beliefs? What sort of person would be the father who would announce divine punishment or reward in order to obtain the respect and love of his children? And if there are business men preserved from unrighteousness by the fear of future punishment, those who are deterred by the threats of human law and the realisation that, without honesty, the complex,

social and business relations which constitute modern life would be impossible, are far more numerous. Most of them would take their chances with heaven a hundred times before they would once with society." (*The Belief in God and Immortality.*)

On what do political leaders rely when they wish to arouse the public conscience and bring about vital improvements? On divine intervention? How absurd the idea! Whether engaged in politics, business, or education, few indeed are the leaders to-day who speak to God or of God; they speak to man and of man.

One's attitude towards the Christian religion should not be determined by merely weighing the good it does. The good is to be weighed against the evil for which it is responsible. The problem is that of the total value of the religious method for furthering the highest aims of humanity in an age of science.

The fundamental evil of the religions, the one inherent in their nature, is that they point to personal divine beings as the source of all good, and to worship in songs of praise and gratitude, in supplication, and in communion, as the means of securing their assistance. Thus, the religions are constitutionally indifferent, when not actually opposed, to the search after the knowledge upon which the physical as well as the moral welfare of humanity depends.

To prevent the religions from continuing to hamper, by false teaching and a false method, the intellectual and moral development of populations which have outgrown them, and to replace the religious method by other, more effective means of life, is one of the urgent problems before civilized humanity.

XIX

THE REPLACEMENT OF THE RELIGIONS

THE cessation of imagined social relations with superhuman Beings is contemplated with dread in church circles as if nothing could make up for that loss. As a matter of fact, the religious method is already superseded almost completely in the physical and physiological realms. In early times man sought to secure with the help of religion and magic whatever he felt the need of. A stupendous change has come over the world, and each step of that change has meant a shrinkage of the sphere of action originally claimed by the religions. In so far as most educated Christians are concerned, the physical universe has been turned over to the engineer, disease to the physician, and intellectual education to the lay teacher; and, instead of being accounted a loss, the change is regarded by most Christians as of incalculable value.

In the moral realm also, the religious method is rapidly being displaced. In the hands of specialists in character formation and reformation, scientific methods prove their superiority and crowd the religions out of a sphere of activity which they have long regarded as preëminently their own. Thus, the religious method seems destined to suffer the fate of magic, because, like magic, it cannot stand comparison with the scientific methods of maintaining and enhancing life.

The Passage of Moral Education from the Church to the Lay School.—The attention of the reader has already

been drawn to the fact that much of what goes on under the name "*religious* education" has nothing to do with the God of the religions. The more enlightened a religious organization, the more it turns to secular methods. At the same time it is increasingly recognized that character building and the inculcation of ideals are concerns of the community and not exclusively or even primarily of the churches. The taking over of moral education by the public lay schools constitutes the most important phase of the last surrender required of the traditional religions.

It cannot be denied, however, that the situation created by the transfer of moral education from the churches to the schools is a perilous one, for the churches have lost their authority before secular society has become fully conscious of its responsibility and before it has clearly realized the powerful means of moralization placed at its disposal by modern science. The lukewarmness of secular society towards this, its most important task, is largely due to the conviction, still widespread, that concern for spiritual things is indissolubly connected with the religious method. Confused by this error, many are in danger of discarding the ethical purpose of Christianity together with its God and the method it implies. For that stupidity the false teaching of the churches is to be blamed.

Humanity is still absorbed in seeking with thoughtless energy the satisfaction of the primary hungers: the pleasures of food, of sex, and of power. It clamors for size and quantity, with little regard for form and quality. In America, says a representative critic, "*doing* has been exalted into a national cult and *being* is despised by public opinion." "The entire practical life in America urges us *to do* unceasingly and unthinkingly." And, in his enormous expenditure of energy, the individual is concerned, not with society as a whole, but only with himself

and those nearest to him. This is true, in different degrees, of all the leading nations of the world: present-day civilization is deplorably unconcerned with the real value of the ends towards which it is working with feverish energy.

Education reflects this barbarous attitude. In the lower as in the higher schools, it places excessive emphasis upon training for material and personal success. Professors Hartshorne and May sum up, in these words, the outcome of the extensive research already referred to: "There is little evidence that effective organised moral education has been taking place. There is abundant evidence, however, that children have been acquiring habits which are important for character. But what they are at present learning of self-control, as also of service and honesty, is largely a matter of accident. . . Anarchy, in the leadership of moral education is not likely to produce order in the character of a child. At all events, such leadership as we have in typical American communities has not resulted in organised conduct." (*Studies in Service and Self-Control.*) "The outstanding fact of our time, as we all see it, is our enormous success in dealing with things and our relative failure in dealing with human relations." (President William Lowe Bryan of Indiana University in a report of a Committee appointed to draft a constitution of American Education.)

Every issue of the daily papers brings illustrations of the horrible failure of society to educate its youth. Here is one of them: "Trenton, Dec. 29th, 1930. Three boy-slayers die in the Chair.—Three 'mere kids,' murderers all, were put to death in the New Jersey electric chair to-night. It was all over in seventeen minutes. Gimbel was first to go. The current jolted his body at 8.06 P.M. Calabrese was next. He walked into the death-chamber

wearing a white rose in his lapel. A similar flower was worn by Father Cornelius McInerny, prison chaplain, who had just given the doomed man the last rites. The third one,-Cort, tossed away a cigarette and yawned as he walked into the death-chamber. But when he saw the chair he closed his eyes. Guards led him to it. The three ate a large dinner at 4.00 P.M. They spent their last hours in prayer." These "edifying deaths" (did not these men receive the Holy Sacraments and spend their last hours in prayer?) testify to the failure of society to educate its children. For these boys were not "born criminals," impervious to moral training. It is known now that there are very few persons predestined by heredity to a life of crime. There was no indication in these three murderers of any insuperable hereditary trait; they were most probably victims of the general indifference to the corrupting circumstances under which many are born and brought up in civilized, Christian, and wealthy communities. The psychologist knows that between despicable criminals and respectable pillars of society the difference may be one of education only, and not of heredity.

The study of the social environment out of which come the criminals and delinquents, discovers that, in 85% of the cases, one or both parents had no formal education; and that, of the criminals themselves, 42% did not get beyond the fifth grade of the grammar school (the grade reached at eleven years of age by the normal child), that of those who passed the fifth grade, 46% remained below the eighth grade, and that of the 4% who attended high school, only 0.2% completed it. (Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, *Five Hundred Criminal Careers.*) To that picture of the failure of a great Christian country to educate its citizens, let this other damning trait be added: 84% of these unfortunates came from broken homes; the

parents were dead, or separated, or in institutions. Most of these criminals or delinquents had been, therefore, without adequate home supervision as well as without schooling worth mentioning.

The availability of the knowledge required to eliminate a very large part of the evils to which we refer, has, we trust, been sufficiently demonstrated. That the wealth of this and other civilized nations is adequate to make a glorious beginning in applying that knowledge, can be doubted only by those who do not, or will not, know how much is wasted in unprofitable luxuries and non-essentials.

The schools, and only the schools, are able to train a socially minded citizenry, concerned with the realization of personal and social ideals. For the schools alone can exert influence long enough and systematically enough for that purpose. In the United States, every child complying with the law goes to school for something like five hours a day during no less than seven years and, in many States, up to his sixteenth year; increasing numbers continue throughout adolescence, i.e., throughout the most plastic years of life. What can the Church in a desultory hour or two, on Sundays, what can the Y.M.C.A., the Scout and other organizations do in comparison with what is possible to the day school?

Little assistance can as yet be expected from the homes. The ignorance and the moral inferiority of the average parents prevent them from sharing adequately with the schools the task of moral education. The homes wait upon the schools for those improvements in the quality of the parents which will make it possible for them, in their turn, to help the schools to perform their main social task.

The change required in the orientation of the schools and in the matter and manner of teaching implies, of course, a corresponding change in the selection and preparation of the teachers. They are to constitute a priesthood, consecrated to the service of man. This progress, conditioned though it is by a purification of the political life, upon which the fate of the public schools depends, need not be regarded as a utopian dream. Never before have so many men in influential places been acutely concerned with the failure of the schools to perform their ethical service. The frequent discussion of this failure in teachers' conventions and in journals of education, and the formation of powerful associations devoted to the purpose of enlightenment on the moral task of the schools are sufficient proofs of an awakening.

The commission on "Character Education" of the Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association of the United States, an association representing the public school teachers, directors, and superintendents of the nation, has just published a remarkable Year Book (*Tenth Year Book of the National Association of the School Superintendents,* 1931), inspired by the conviction that the schools are established and supported to train for right living for the sake of society, and that they are the most powerfully organized force existing in the world for that purpose. The commission holds that any general improvement desired by society will have to come through the schools. An International Congress for Moral Education gathers together, at regular intervals, men and women actively engaged in the teaching profession, for a consideration of the moral ideal and the means offered by science and the art of teaching to realize it. The Fifth Psycho-sociological Congress, held at the Sorbonne in 1930, offered a prize of 10,000 francs for the best handbook on the moral education of children. Several schools, untrammeled by political or religious control, are trying to realize just such an ideal as we have sketched. The most notable of them are the experimental schools of the New York Ethical Society, founded and directed by Professor Felix Adler.

Apart from providing the general tools necessary to any success in life,—reading, writing, arithmetic,—a double task

confronts the teacher: he is to impart the knowledge and arouse the interest necessary to enable the young to form some idea of the complexity of our social life and of its essential problems; and he is to lead the child to form a scale of values, to establish ideals, which may guide him in his activity as a citizen. The former task can hardly be accomplished with Grammar School children, it refers mainly to the education of the High School and College student. The second task—making the child socially minded—is the most neglected, although it should be a foremost task of the elementary as well of the higher schools. If society is to find a permanent way out of the political, economic, and industrial chaos in which it seems to be drifting, it will be through a satisfactory performance of these two great tasks.

Let it not be said that before humanity has defined more adequately its ultimate purpose a concerted forward movement in moral education is impossible. As a matter of fact, society is fairly well agreed regarding the desirable qualities of a citizen. The natural egoism of the individual is to be replaced by a sense of solidarity with the nation and humanity, and of responsibility for the common welfare. That, after all, means nothing more revolutionary than the cultivation of homely virtues, admired and desired by all: candor, justice, kindliness, coöperation, and the extension of the application of these virtues from smaller to larger groups.

New Churches.—When science in the hands of engineers, physicians, psychiatrists, and educators has taken over tasks heretofore assumed by organizations relying on the help of God for their performance, will these religious organizations disappear without leaving their prestigious

name to others recognized as their lawful heirs? Undoubtedly not.

We have argued in this book that the historical institutions called by unanimous consent "religions" are characterized not by their aim but by their method; and we have avoided the use of the term "religion" in any other sense. But, whether it be desirable or not, the term is actually used with increasing frequency to designate not a specific method of life but a type of conception of the universe and an aim, roughly describable as devotion to the highest good, however that good may be formulated and whatever the means by which it may be realized.

As a matter of fact, societies devoted to the spiritual progress of humanity without reliance upon the gods of the religions and, nevertheless, calling themselves religious, have come into existence in this and other lands. Thus the high purpose, present both in traditional religions and in these societies, becomes the link between the historical and a new type of religions.

The best known of these new religious organizations are the "Societies for Ethical Culture" founded in 1876 by Felix Adler to promote ethical thinking and to encourage better ways of living.[1] They did not at first claim the name "religion." They were regarded by outsiders and even by themselves as anti-religious. That was fifty years ago. Since then their members have learned to call their movement an "ethical religion," and a widespread tendency has appeared among liberal Christians to look upon these societies as the extreme left wing of religion. Words with a halo as effulgent as the one surrounding "religion" are too powerful to be allowed to disappear.

[1] The original New York Society had a Jewish membership, and is, even now, predominantly Jewish. But the Ethical Societies in other cities are not. Of the Leaders of the American Societies two only are of the Jewish race

But the ethical culture societies of the present need not be regarded as representing adequately the ultimate successors of the churches. These societies have not made use of all the knowledge available for the advancement of their purpose. At first their activities were limited to instruction, exhortation, and encouragement by means of spoken and printed addresses. More recently their meetings have been enriched by the introduction of instrumental music and, in some cases, of congregational singing, and by significant festivals. In England the leader of the "Ethical Church," Dr. Stanton Coit, has even made a bold attempt to adapt to the membership of his society most of the forms of worship of the Church of England.[2] Nevertheless, the present ethical societies are very far from having replaced traditional worship by all available means of implanting in the individual accepted ideals and of generating enthusiasm for their realization. They do not use systematically the psychical agents singled out in preceding chapters of this book as being the effective agents in the Christian religion, in Christian Science and, generally, in psychotherapy. And yet, leaving out the markedly abnormal cases for treatment by professional psychiatric and other medical specialists, societies concerned with making and keeping the individual morally whole, should, it seems, continue the alliance which has always existed between the traditional religions and healing.

If the reader will turn back to certain pages of this book, in particular to the instances of Dora Hadley and of the Scotchman in Chapter VIII, of the woman healed

[2] See his *Social Worship for use in Families, Schools, and Churches.* Vol. I contains readings divided into Sentences, Introductory and Dismissory, Meditations, and Lessons taken from English and other literatures. The Lessons fall under several heads, among them National Character and Responsibility, Fellowship and the Moral Life, Democratic Religion and the Advancement of Science, Religious Mysticism, Intellectual Honesty and Moral Faith, Holy Living and Holy Dying. Vol. II contains words and music of Canticles, Hymns, Responses, and Anthems.

by Dr. Paul Dubois in Chapter IX, to the remarks on Christian Science in Chapter XI, to those on confession and to the report by the Reverend Mr. Leslie Weatherhead in Chapter XII, he will probably appreciate the significance of the preceding paragraph.

Some of the developments which may accompany the multiplication of the new religious societies are foreshadowed in the historical religions. The churches have relied greatly upon "means of grace" other than instruction and admonition: beautiful and impressive architecture, music, pageantry, sacraments and other symbols and symbolic gestures like the sign of the cross, genuflexion, the rosary, holy water. They have, in addition, provided some degree of relief from the evils of self-repression and self-division (about which so much is heard to-day) by public confessions, litanies, professions of faith, and song; and by the rite of confession. Furthermore, and most important, they have used prayer in its meditative and contemplative aspects, as a way of rendering the believer sensitive to the ideals recalled to him, when in church, by every symbolic object meeting his eyes and every sound striking his ears.

It seems likely that the ethical societies of the future will call science to the help of art and make an improved use not only of instruction but also of these three kinds of aids: they will enlist the influence of the beautiful and the impressive; they will provide opportunities for public self-expression and private confession corresponding to those afforded in the Roman Church, and they will elaborate a technique through which the individual may place himself at special times in a condition possessing the value of the prayerful attitude.

How the beautiful, the grand, and the noble may serve to purify and enlarge the self and bring peace and con-

tentment, we have tried to explain in an Appendix on "Adjuncts of Worship." Much has been written on the power of music. It may enliven or sadden, stimulate or depress; and it may encourage seriousness or frivolity, self-control or laxity. But because of a lack of scientific means for the study of music and its effects, the best that has been done to adapt music to special needs has not gone much beyond haphazard empiricism. To-day physics, in collaboration with psychology, provides means for an exact analysis of music and for the first steps towards the measurement of its effects upon the emotions. Practical use will doubtless be made of this growing knowledge.

Regarding confession, nothing may be added here to what has been said earlier (see Chapter XII). We trust that it was enough to show that the general wisdom and the traditional method of religious officials has been far outstripped by the knowledge of the psychologist, the psychiatrist and the educator, and that that knowledge is being brought to bear upon the evils of self-repression and of the divided mind, with results altogether beyond what is attainable through the religious method. Ethical societies may be expected to realize that confession has become a part of the technique of scientific moral education. In their efforts to purge the mind from evil and to unify it, they may avail themselves of the understanding and technique of psychiatrists, such as William Healy and Samuel Hartwell.

The Value of the Prayer-attitude.—In most minds the value of prayer is indissolubly connected with the social gods of the religions, and is regarded as unique, irreplaceable, and so great that it more than compensates for whatever evils might justly be charged to the account of the

religions. Even disbelieving physicians, in particular those treating nervous disorders, are outspoken in their testimony on behalf of prayer. It produces, they affirm, "that harmony and peace of mind and that confidence of soul which is needed to bring health and power to a large proportion of nervous patients." (Dr. J. A. Hadfield.)

The conviction that the efficacy of prayer is inseparable from the God of the religions is just as false as the belief that the value of confession is inseparable from that God. Prayer and confession, as well as the beautiful, derive their virtue, not from a divine intervention, but from the natural constitution of the human mind. They need not, therefore, lose their efficacy when they are disconnected from the traditional religious beliefs; on the contrary, they may then assume more effective forms, indicated by a fuller and more exact knowledge of human nature. A few pages must be devoted to setting forth the psychology of the prayer-attitude.

In *The Life of Prayer in an Age of Science,* Professor William Adams Brown lists under four heads the benefits accruing from prayer:

"It opens our eyes to the beauty and wonder of the world.

"It introduces us into a fellowship more intimate and satisfying than any human friendship.

"It furnishes us with supplies of energy.

"It keeps us true to our best selves, by holding ever before our eyes the man or woman we were meant to be."

Yes, under the most favorable conditions prayer achieves much of what Professor Brown claims for it. But is that to be lost together with the God of the religions? How is the production of these blessings to be understood? Are they really inseparable from belief in the social God, or gods, to whom prayers are usually addressed? Let us be-

gin the consideration of that question with the benefits named in the last two items of Professor Brown's list.

The traditional prayer of communion in which, withdrawn from the world, man waits humbly upon his God, involves a general relaxation of body and mind; so much so, that when it lasts a considerable time, marked somnolence sets in. The mystics have given prominence to that feature in their description of what they have called "The Ascent of the Soul to God." As the state of prayer deepens, the activity of the mind, they have said, is reduced to a minimum. Some of them have called that stage, "the Sleep of the Powers." Now, general relaxation has, in itself, definite, well-marked, and beneficial effects, sufficiently important to have claimed the attention of physicians and psychologists. Relaxation of muscles and viscera involves the disappearance of wasteful tensions responsible for much fatigue and often for functional disorders. The striking change of attitude for the better, the contentment and optimism, produced by certain drugs, including tea and coffee, are due mainly to a removal of cramp-like tensions and contractions, and to the accompanying mental relaxation. The beneficial effects of ordinary sleep and of complete rest are also, in part, due to the same mechanism. These common-place ways of producing relaxation supply energy and help to restore joy in living. Technical methods of producing, more or less rapidly, a high degree of muscular and mental relaxation have lately been developed and recommended for the cure of various bodily and mental disorders.

The more important aspect of the prayer-attitude is, however, not the saving of energy and the refreshment resulting from the relaxation of bodily and mental tensions, but a consequence of that attitude, namely, in-

creased plasticity or receptivity. This trait is the most notable and fertile characteristic of states of general relaxation, whether or not they involve the idea of the presence of God.

In a chapter devoted to the study of scientific inspiration, we have seen the value of temporarily letting go when seeking the solution of intellectual problems. It is often during a period of mental relaxation that an apparently unattainable solution presents itself, as if it were provided by another mind. Our conclusion, derived from the examination of notable instances of scientific inspiration, was that passivity, separated by periods of intensive work, is favorable to the production of new thought, of creative syntheses. Why should not the same procedure be favorable also to the organization of the moral life? In moments of dispassionate meditation, during mental quietude, the many small things which had assumed an undue and false importance in a too-eager struggle for life, fall back into their proper places, while deeper and larger purposes assert their potency. Vision becomes truer; ideas, obscured or impaired in egoistic affirmations of the self, are restored, and the mind is re-centered about the larger and better ends of life. In the course of experiments on psychotherapy, the Reverend Mr. Elwood Worcester did not fail to observe that "brief periods of complete repose produce a marked *moral* and physical improvement." (*Religion and Medicine.*) The religious sects,—the Quietists in France, the Friends in England, and the mystics in general,—who have introduced into their religious practice moments of mental silence, of passivity, have discovered the moral value of letting go. They have not, however, realized that it is a psychological effect, quite independent of any specific divine action.

It remains to be observed that the full measure of the

blessings secured to one, supposedly by God through communion with him in prayer, is not secured by passivity and receptivity alone. An equivalent to that for which God stands in Christianity, must be present in the mind in order to make the state of quiescent receptivity as effective as Christian prayer may be. An empty mind, a mind in which stirred no germ of constructing life, would profit little by prayerful quiescence. It is when an ethical purpose works within the mind that a reorganization may take place, and that strength, peace, and joy—the fruits of a coördinated and unified personality—may be generated.

We have reached the conclusion that two and only two conditions need fulfillment in order that man may reap the blessings ascribed to communion with God: plasticity in relaxation, and the possession of an ideal of life equivalent to the Christian moral ideal. Neither one of these conditions requires belief in, and worship of a God with whom social relations can be maintained. To the measure of wisdom possessed in this matter by the religions, science has added a more exact psychological understanding of the rôle played, in that age-old practice, by forward-looking relaxation and receptivity, and has thus made possible a more fruitful management of the prayer-attitude.

"The suggestion that in prayer we only hear the echo of our own voices is ridiculous to any one who has prayed," says Dean Inge. True, it is ridiculous; we hear more than an echo of our own voices. We hear or may hear something new, never heard by us before; just as the mathematician Poincaré found himself unexpectedly in possession of knowledge he had vainly endeavored to secure by strenuous effort, and just as the poet finds himself writing stanzas never before thought of. The prayer-

attitude is a condition favorable to the formation of the new; in prayer, creative life comes to expression or, rather, may come to expression. The Dean might have added that it would be just as ridiculous to conclude that because prayer is not merely an echo of our own voices, it demonstrates the intervention of a personal divine Being such as he seems to worship. The appearance in the human mind of something new, is not in itself an adequate indication of the intervention of such a Being.

Certain Theologians Accept a Naturalistic Explanation of the Effects of Prayer.—It is with some surprise and considerable satisfaction that the psychologist observes how far away from the ancient moorings teachers in great theological schools have been swept by the stream of psychological knowledge into which they have found themselves immerged. Their description of the cause of the effects of prayer does not differ in any essential respect from the views expressed in this book.

Walter M. Horton, of the Graduate School of Theology of Oberlin College, regards communion with the deeper self as a form of autosuggestion and assimilates it to prayer. He holds that it differs from autosuggestion only in the degree in which prayer produces an intensification, enlargement, and betterment of life. "Autosuggestion is an important and useful form of worship," says Horton, it "contains the essence of true worship"; and he speaks of knowing "how to call more completely upon that reserve wisdom and reserve energy *which you carry continually within yourself. . . . That type of worship which consists in calling the past to the aid of the present, and the total self to the aid of the partial self.*" ("The Objective Element in the Experience of God," *Journal of Religion,* Oct., 1927.)

In *Methods of Private Religious Living,* Henry N. Wieman, of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, describes with much insight the prayer-attitude. It is a state of receptivity and responsiveness in which the mind is free, divested of all plans and purposes, yet it wishes the best and waits for some clew which will lead on to something new. If the problem to which a solution is sought in this way is a major human

problem, the experience is what he calls "one of the most profound kinds of worship. It is a problem-solving worship out of which has emerged the great revolutionary insights which have transformed individual lives." He defines God as, "the integrating process at work in the Universe," and the noblest religion as, "man's recognition of this creative cosmic struggle and his personal allegiance to the process of progressive integration." With these utterances Professor Lake, of the Theological School of Harvard University, seems in substantial agreement.

Thus far these theologians do not go beyond what most psychologists will regard as an acceptable description of observed facts and of their causal relationship. Even the terms "self-transcendent" and "objective," which these theologians apply to the state of prayer, is acceptable in the sense in which they use them. Horton, for instance, explains that our psychical nourishment is derived, in the first instance, from our fellowmen; it is the product of society. It comes, therefore, from beyond the individual and transcends him: "By its very structure it (prayer or the state of communion with one's better self) proclaims its social origin and social import." The share of society in the making of the individual is certainly large. It has been made clear, for instance, that conscience instead of being the voice of the God of Mount Sinai, is a deposit in the individual of accumulated common experiences; and that the productions of genius are the fruition in one individual of seeds which had germinated in many. Nothing is more evident than that the individual does not thrive in isolation; his spiritual life is the joint product of himself and his fellowmen. In that sense the mental productions of an individual are "self-transcendent." If recognizing this social dependence is mysticism, then mysticism is an essential aspect of the nature of social life.

But these theologians do not stop with the description of observable facts and of their causal relationship. They step, as theologians should, beyond the boundaries of science to raise and attempt to answer the further question: "Granted that we ourselves are the creators of these values and of these appreciations. Who is it that has made us what we are? Say that we are but the channels through which the mysterious

river we call nature pours its unfathomable waters, what is nature that it should produce this result and no other?" (William Adams Brown, *The Life of Prayer in an Age of Science.*) It seems to these independent and scientifically minded theologians that if the inner life of the individual is capable of merging into the larger life of humanity, then humanity in its turn may well be capable of "transcending its apparent isolation and of allying itself with some larger cosmic life." And they argue that to the power transcending not only the individual but humanity and manifesting itself in it as an ethical urge, must be ascribed personality, for only value can create value;—that which generates value and meaning must have personality. In that philosophical excursion science lets the theologian go alone.

Up to this point we have seen that two of the values of traditional prayer—supplying energy and guidance—need not be lost together with the God of the religions but that, on the contrary, through a truer understanding of human nature, they may be secured more fully and certainly. There is no valid reason for not including revised forms of the prayer-attitude and of confession in the practice of societies for the promotion of ethical thinking and the encouragement of better ways of living without reliance on a social God.

But more is claimed for prayer. The second item in Professor Brown's list reads thus: "It introduces us into a fellowship more satisfying than any human friendship." It would indeed be a boon to be able to look beyond the incomplete and uncertain friendships of earth to fellowship with a perfect Being. What profound satisfaction to find one's self not an alien, lost in the infinite cosmic spaces, an isolated atom in a limitless, meaningless welter of terrifying forces, but the cared-for child of a heavenly Father! Of this value, claimed for prayer within the setting of the traditional religions, two remarks must be

made: it is much overestimated, and much of it may remain when the religious method is given up.

Tradition surrounds trust in and communion with the God of the religions with too dazzling a halo; as a matter of fact, many of the expectations raised by the thought of that relationship are doomed to disappointment, and many of these expectations can be made good by man himself. Frightful, incomprehensible experiences frustrate the expectations raised by the belief in a divine Father. The most touching reliance on the divine Goodness does not prevent horrible, lingering diseases from assailing us; Providence does not shrink from striking the parents in their innocent children; it lays low indiscriminately the powerful and the weak, the young and the old, the good and the bad. The pastures into which the Good Shepherd leads his flock are always green only to the eyes of those who are hypnotized by the dream of a heavenly Father. To them the companionship of God is precious, but it blinds them to the truth. The comfort, the optimism, and the courage it generates have the defects of the comfort, the optimism, and the courage proceeding from intoxicating drugs: they remove the realization of the presence of evil without removing the evil; they make of the world a fool's paradise.

Let it be admitted that there are situations where that deceptive comfort is the best that can be had. Nevertheless, on the whole, humanity had best give up the beautiful dream of a watchful and tender Providence and realize that the Universe is so constituted—say by the will of God, if you like,—that man's only reliance must be on himself, his friends, and society. Financial provision, in the form of insurances against unemployment, sickness, and old age, is, after all, a safer ground of mental peace

and contentment than the confidence in God with which one rises, empty-handed, from one's knees.

To the intelligent, hard-pressed working man, prayer offered as a cure for the evils and difficulties besetting existence, songs of praise, and communion with God, must, on the whole, appear a bad pleasantry. That is why the proletarian turns away from the established religions; he learns to look to man for whatever help he needs. Instead of seeking God, he seeks a good wife, a bank account, and the assistance of the State and of other organizations. To make of man his brother's keeper is the purpose of the enlightened statesman; he pursues the realization of a "social program of human solidarity which would do away with the sense of isolation whether during the active period of life, or in disease, or yet in old age; a social program productive of a feeling of beneficent interdependence and union." (André Tardieu, Prime Minister of France, announcing his policies to the French Senate.)

Science and the Ultimate.—Science does not stand in the way of a conception of ultimate Reality, of God, which would satisfy, at least partly, human yearnings for kinship with the Universe, for cosmic fellowship. One of the facts emphasized in this book is the presence in humanity of an urge tending not towards adaptation to what is, but towards a social world in which goodness and beauty would be realized. That fact opens the door to a legitimate faith in the existence in the Universe of a Power, or a Trend which makes for goodness and beauty,—a faith possible to those who respect the findings of science.

In the distant past, god-conceptions and the idea of continuation after death, forced upon man as explanations of certain facts, were gradually transformed into instruments of fuller and better life, instruments which have

now to be discarded because they have become, on the whole, less than useful. The urge that is in man will not fail to do now what it has done in the past: build the fairest and most useful world consistent with existing knowledge. Science has limits; beyond them extends an infinite, dark realm where the will-to-believe may discern something of what it needs or wants. Provided it be left sufficiently vague and undefined, a faith in a power making for goodness and beauty need not be in disagreement with science. Such a faith would be a comfort to the heart and a satisfaction to reason. It would not, however, justify the confidence of the Philadelphia ministers who protested to the Director of Public Health against the closing of churches during an epidemic on the ground that God would protect from the contagion those who met to worship him.

Ethical societies will, doubtless, assume the task of disseminating and keeping alive whatever valuable conception of the Ultimate may prove acceptable to science and the will-to-believe; and they will labor to maintain and develop an attitude of reverence for humanity in which come to expression the good and the beautiful.

Those who cannot rest content with the minimal, practical philosophy sketched in the preceding pages, those who at any cost must lean upon a social God, will probably find encouragement in the present trend of the physical and biological sciences. Matter is vanishing in the very hands of the physicist, leaving behind imponderables, like "energy." And, to the astonishment of the biologist, purposiveness seems to appear where previously mechanism alone was held to reign. Anti-materialistic theories, in particular "vitalism" and "emergent evolution," have

been formulated in response to the new conceptions forced upon science.

The boldest of our great physicists stops far short, however, of the thought of a social god. Says Sir James Jeans in one of his popular books, "To-day, there is a wide measure of agreement, which on the physical side of science approaches almost to unanimity, that the stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality; the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine. . . . So at least we are tempted to conjecture to-day. . . . We cannot claim to have discerned more than a very faint glimmer of light at the best; perhaps it was wholly illusory." (*The Mysterious Universe.*)

An uncritical person, endowed with a vigorous will-to-believe, might lay hold of pronouncements of this sort, build upon them, and find rest in the belief in a Personal Power directing the Universe towards his own ends, a Power with whom social relations may be maintained. They are not a few who imagine that contemporary science, after having led away from the religions, now shows the way back to their social Gods. But that belief goes far beyond the inferences of Sir James Jeans himself. A Universe "looking like a great thought" does not mean a Universe governed by a social God. Nothing in contemporary anti-materialistic science countenances belief in the God of the religions,—a God who, on request, calms the raging seas, cures the sick, transforms depression into elation, delivers from temptation, and accepts thanks and praises for his merciful deeds.

The claims of the religions and of philosophers that they have given an adequate answer to the problem of God are made in an adolescent conceit. An adequate solution would demand a complete knowledge of all things in

heaven and earth; it will, therefore, be long delayed! But what of that? Too long have we let ourselves be hoodwinked by the conviction that the primary necessity for a happy, worth-while life is the possession of a final knowledge of God and of our destiny. To renounce that knowledge and to find, in the enjoyment and creation of that which now appears to us beautiful and good, a satisfaction sufficient to make life worth while, is a proof of maturity.

The failure to answer ultimate questions has been compensated by the acquisition of a technique for discovering the laws of life and for doing that which "God" is expected by the religious to do for us. We are finding out the conditions under which the creative energy—the Holy Ghost of the Christian church—comes to realization in humanity. To have the assurance that effective means have been found and that better ones will be found for making life, while it lasts, better and more beautiful, is to be in possession of a knowledge sufficient for vigorous and happy existence. To feel the urge and to see the road is enough; its end may remain out of sight.

Let it be repeated that science does not tell us *what* is worth while, it does not provide us with the ultimate goal; science is not a guide, but a tool of life. With regard to the problems of God and of the goal, an increasingly rich experience of life is a condition of progress. That is why our comparative study of the efficacy of methods for realizing the desires of men is to be regarded as a contribution to the solution of ultimate problems.

The systematic introduction of scientific management for the establishment of accepted individual and social ideals in the mind of the young, for purging the individual from evil tendencies, and for the organization of the life-impulses into harmonious personalities, will mark a

new era in the history of humanity in comparison with which the "industrial revolution" will seem of little significance. The scaffolding of a science of character and personality stands erected, and the first experiments in application of that science are in progress.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

ADJUNCTS OF THE RELIGIONS

IT was said at the end of Chapter II that in addition to their essential and primary purpose—the satisfaction of individual and social needs through the action of divine Beings—the religions, like other social institutions, have served as a center about which have clustered diverse activities which, though themselves non-religious, have powerfully attracted men to religion and have greatly increased its hold upon humanity. It is the purpose of this appendix to set forth the more important of these adjuncts of the religions.

Religious ceremonies have everywhere served as nuclei around which have gathered amusements. The great Theban festivals to Amon in old Egypt, lasting twenty days in March and twenty-seven days in August, with a concourse of people of many thousands, were largely amusements without any reference to the god. Into the sanctuaries of ancient Palestine, writes W. Robertson Smith, streamed the crowd "dressed in their gayest attires, marching joyfully to the sound of music, and bearing with them not only the victims appointed for the sacrifice, but stores of bread and wine to set forth the feast. Universal hilarity prevailed, men ate, drank, and were merry together, rejoicing before their god. The identity of religious occasions and of festal seasons may indeed be taken as the determining characteristic of the type of ancient religion generally." Certain religious festivals of the

Roman Catholic Church are clear evidence of the presence of this element in contemporary Christianity. Dean Inge could say of the southern populations of Europe that religion is for them "largely a social diversion, a spectacular performance, an artistic enjoyment." Even the satisfaction of the cruder human needs has found shelter under the wings of religion.

The vigil or wake over a dead body, customary in many Christian countries, became a drinking orgy; and its primary purpose was so nearly forgotten that, during the reign of Edward III, an English Synod had to remind the people that the object of a wake is not drinking and carousing but the offering of prayer for the dead. Every one knows of the sexual indulgences connected with the worship of certain non-civilized and half-civilized peoples. To this day young women are devoted to the service of Hindoo temples. If space permitted, one might tell of the ingenuity with which religious beliefs have been made to sanction and even to demand these practices; but we must pass on to the consideration of less objectionable adjuncts of the religious life.

The intimate and persistent association of art with religion is an obvious fact. No one with any knowledge of primitive decoration and sculpture will have failed to notice that the scenes represented are nearly always religious or magical. The sculptural art of Egypt, of India, of Greece, developed in connection with their religions and their magic; and we are told that the dance and tragedy found their cradles in religious ceremonies. In more recent times, painting and architecture flourished in intimate association with religion. The magnificent blossoming of painting in Italy from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century, marked by the great achievements of the pre-Raphaelites and of a host of later masters, was

nourished by the wonderful stories of the Virgin, the Child-god, the Crucifixion, the Ascension, etc.

But religion has not only enshrined itself in beauty; it has also enriched its ritual and ceremonies with the noble and impressive. Whatever could call forth emotions of grandeur, of awfulness, of mystery, has been welcomed by the religions. The words of Coats, in *Types of English Piety,* would be even more true of Roman Catholic worship than of that of the Church of England: "When a Church of England Service is well rendered, dull indeed must be the soul that would fail to worship. The stateliest architecture, the sweetest and most solemn music, the chastest language, the goodliest vestments, the most seemly postures, and the most suggestive ceremonies are brought into requisition to assist the sluggish soul in its flight towards God. Surely if a man's spirit could take wing above the earth, it would be under these conditions. The eye is wooed heavenwards by soaring columns or by storied glass. The ear is won by melodies that either melt to penitence or stir to praise. It is not surprising that a worshipper accustomed to this kind of devotion, with its rich and multifarious sensuous appeal, should regard with infinite pity and even scorn the bare and jejune worship of Evangelical Protestantism."

Not only do the religions become inlaid with amusements and art, but they develop into powerful organizations claiming to rule earthly affairs in the name of God. The acquisition of secular power by the religions is one of the most important facts of human history. Early societies are, or partake of the nature of, theocracies; kings are high priests, or high priests kings. Ancient Egypt offers a fine illustration of a theocracy; so does ancient Israel. Before the institution of the kingship, Jehovah ruled through the guardians of the sacred places (Bethel, Shiloh, etc.) and through the judges and prophets. Moses filled

the functions both of civil ruler and of high priest; so did his immediate successors. A surprising survival in a contemporary civilized state of the alliance of religion with political power is provided by Japan. But the most notable instance of theocracy is probably to be found in medieval Europe. After gaining a foothold in many parts of Europe by the exaltation of charity and justice and the renunciation of force, the Christian church became drunk with lust for power. In the eleventh century, Pope Gregory VIII claimed the right of sitting in judgment upon the conduct of kings and, on occasion, of deposing them. And that he, and at least his immediate successors, Urban II and Innocent III, were able to enforce these claims was discovered by Henry IV, when, in order to save his throne, he found himself compelled to come to the Roman Court as a humble suppliant.

The Roman Catholic Church of to-day wields as much of this power as it has been able to retain. It claims, for instance, the right to override the authority of the state when it demands attendance of all children at public schools, in which no religion is taught. "The church cannot approve schools which exclude religion (i.e., the "true" religion, namely, the Roman Catholic religion) from the curriculum. The church sometimes tolerates schools in which religion is not taught, and permits Catholic children to attend them, when the circumstances are such as to leave no alternative. . . . She reserves the right to judge whether this be the case, and if her judgement is unfavourable, claims the right to forbid attendance." [1]

[1] Article "Schools" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, New York, 1909; published with the authorization of a Censor and the *imprimatur* of John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York.

The third Plenary Council of Baltimore (1884) decreed in explicit terms the obligation to establish a parochial school in every parish within two years of the promulgation of the decree, except when the Bishop grants a delay.

When the Protestant Reformation broke out in the sixteenth century, the Christian Church had taken possession of the whole man, reaching him not only through the spiritual, but also, and perhaps mainly, through the sensuous. It used the impressive, the awful, the mysterious, the beautiful, to bring him, if not to God, at least to the Church. The Christian ship had become, in fact, so overloaded with extraneous accretions that nothing but unloading could save it from sinking. The Reformation was the spectacular beginning of a purification movement, i.e., of a return to religion as social relation with God,—a movement which has continued more or less actively and irregularly ever since.

The most radical protest against the adjuncts of religion was made by George Fox and the Friends. They rose not only against the exercise of temporal power and against sensuous and licentious amusements, but also against all scenic and artistic display. Art and pageantry, these teetotallers said, distract the mind from pure worship, mislead into an enjoyment of sensuous beauty, conceal the spirit under the form. Like the parasitic mistletoe, they suck out the life of the tree on which they grow.

But why the intimate and almost universal association of art and of the impressive with religion? It is in part an expression of the general tendency, already mentioned, to satisfy together as many needs as possible. Quite similarly, the civilized man combines the satisfaction of his appetite with social and esthetic enjoyment; he likes to eat in the company of his friends, on a table made pleasant to the eyes. That, however, is not the only reason,—probably not even the main reason,—for the persistent association of art and of the impressive with worship. Most important is the fact that the emotions produced by the beautiful, the grand, the awful, and the mysterious are the

very emotions awakened in us by the thought of the divine Person. Perfection, grandeur, awfulness, mysteriousness, are attributes of the divine Being, hence any object possessing these attributes leads man to God by a train of almost irresistible association. There are persons who at the sight of Niagara Falls have to restrain themselves from falling on their knees in adoration: the power and grandeur of the scene acts upon them as would the presence of God. A great cathedral exerts a similar influence.

That alone would be enough to account for the value placed upon the beautiful and the grand by the religions. But that is not all. The emotions and thoughts inspired by the impressive accessories of worship are attributed to God as their source, and, in their turn, these adjuncts are "felt" as partaking of the transcendental nature of the divine Being. The cathedral, the music, in themselves grand, noble, mysterious, become the more so because of their association with the Lord; they acquire a share in the glory that is God's; they become holy even as God is holy. In the devout, uncritical mind, the confusion is complete: God, together with the church building, what it contains, and what goes on in it, forms a whole; and any part thereof elicits a mental response like the one elicited by any other part or by the whole. In this way the church, the altar, the priest, the crucifix, become practically equal to God: one and all, they suggest the same thoughts and emotions.

We are here in the presence of a mental law of very wide application. It may be expressed thus: the nature of things is transformed for us by the nature of their associates. That is why a loving mother cannot treat the clothing of her dead child as if it were mere cotton and wool; that is why also something of the distinction belonging to an illustrious person attaches to his children. The

clothing has become, in a sense, one with the child; and the offspring of the distinguished parent, one with him; therefore they arouse, in some degree, the very thoughts and emotions which properly belong only to the child or to the famous father.

Religious mysticism stands in particularly close relation to the esthetic experience. A substantial psychological similarity exists between the attitude of mind necessary to appreciate esthetic works and the one necessary to commune with God. The former is described as passive receptivity and absorbed attention to the object of beauty: "in the thorough enjoyment of powerful esthetic effects, we stand entranced." Now these words, "passive receptivity," "absorbed attention," "entranced," are precisely those used by the mystic when he describes the attitude he assumes in the search for the divine. Moreover, the dominant quality of both these experiences is such as to convince the art devotee, as well as the religious mystic, that they are in the presence of the perfect. No wonder, then, if the pursuit and the enjoyment of art have been confused with the search for, and communion with God.

If whatever produces esthetic and certain other emotions may be an ally of religion, why "purify" religion? Does any one desire the elimination of the visual and social pleasures with which the civilized enrich their meals? Certainly not, unless concern for a delightful setting comes to replace concern for the food itself. Much rather sit before enough good food on a plain table than before unsavory dishes on a table rich with damask and fine porcelain! The substitution of the accessories for the food would be an intolerable pleasantry.

Religion has, in fact, suffered and still suffers from that kind of substitution. Instead of being simply adjuncts of religion, architecture, music, pageantry have become at

times ends in themselves, and God has been forgotten; the cathedral has become an Opera House and esthetic sensualism has replaced intercourse with God. "For the rest," writes a convert to the Roman Catholic faith, "this religion is so beautiful that it seems possible to love it so as to attain happiness in this very world." There are persons who do not really know what religion is, and who, nevertheless, use the expression "religious feeling" or "religious emotion." They mean by it nothing more than the impression made upon them by the grand, the noble, and the beautiful.

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