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SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Social Problems


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Alfred A. Knopf: *NEW YORK 1950*

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FIRST EDITION

PREFACE

THIS BOOK is an introduction to social problems. It has two purposes: (a) to provide a general background to the study of social problems; (b) to provide an analysis of certain representative social problems. A social problem may be defined as a situation involving a number of people in a dynamic and democratic society, that is believed to threaten an important social value, and that is considered capable of amelioration by appropriate social action. The number of social situations answering this description is large and various. In a single course, it is therefore difficult for the student to learn very much about such a variety of social problems as juvenile delinquency, crime, mental deficiency, mental deviation, poverty, unemployment, desertion, divorce, religious prejudice, and racial discrimination—to give only a partial list of the types of behavior defined (quite legitimately) as social problems and treated in many introductory courses.

This book is based upon the assumption that the introductory student may profitably study: (a) something of the nature and causes of social problems as such, their origins (and inevitability) in a dynamic society, and the general possibilities of constructive action to mitigate or eliminate them; and (b) something of the nature and causes of certain rep-

resentative social problems in more detail than is ordinarily offered in such a course. The purpose of this book is both general and specific, and it is hoped that the student may add to his knowledge of social problems in general and to his knowledge of certain important social problems in particular. The book is therefore a tool in the most literal sense; it is an instrument useful (we trust) by itself, as well as a means to a broader understanding of numerous individual problems.

This book is intended as a basic text for courses in social problems or for the second part of the introductory course. The instructor will immediately perceive that there is not sufficient material here for an entire semester course without any supplement. This arrangement is deliberate. It is based upon the concept of a *core* book, one which would provide the basis of a semester course but which would at the same time permit the instructor to supplement freely with other problems drawn from other sources. Hence the analysis in the first section applies to *all* social problems, not merely to those discussed later in the book. Furthermore, each of the sections devoted to a specific problem also applies to other similar and related problems. Thus the analysis of juvenile delinquency is (in effect) also an introduction to the larger and more complex problem of crime. Starting with the introductory section and continuing (in any order he chooses) with the subsequent sections, the instructor may then extend the work to other and related fields. This arrangement combines a continuity of theoretical approach with a wide possible range of problems.

This book was planned and written as a cooperative effort. It is not a symposium, as that term is conventionally applied to a number of (more or less) disparate essays written about some (more or less) central theme. Rather is it a group of careful analyses, each complete in itself but also written about a general coordinating group of concepts. These concepts are by no means original with the editor or the individual contributors, but are the cumulative work of many writers on social problems. This point of view is widely accepted as a

logical and workable approach to social problems. The contributors to the different sections are (with one exception) scholars widely known in their specialties, who have studied and written extensively in their chosen fields. Hence they possess a competence in dealing with the various problems which few authors (whose individual training is necessarily not so specialized) can approach in a single book. This book thus bears an added stamp of authenticity because it is the work of recognized specialists.

The students who use this book will subsequently encounter different social problems in different roles. Some will take advanced work in Sociology and related fields, in which they will study these and other problems in more detail than is possible in a single introductory course. Others will play a different role and will be case workers, welfare officials, and office holders. But the great majority will encounter social problems neither as advanced students nor as case workers, but rather as citizens. In this latter role, they will be expected to play an intelligent part in solving (or mitigating) some of the most complex and frustrating problems which mankind has ever faced. Education at the college level should give them a greater understanding of some of these problems. This cooperative effort is offered as a modest contribution to this understanding.

FRANCIS E. MERRILL

Hanover, New Hampshire

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Part One

THE STUDY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

by Francis E. Merrill

CHAPTER ONE

Social Change and Social Problems

SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND THE PERSON. A social problem is a situation in a dynamic and democratic society believed to be a threat to or an infringement upon a social value, and considered capable of amelioration or elimination by appropriate collective action. A social problem involves the following elements: (a) behavior on a large scale; (b) a social value believed to be threatened thereby; (c) a belief that the behavior and the value may (at least in theory) be reconciled by the purposive action of a democratic society. These elements must all be present before the behavior may properly be called a social problem. The student of social problems should therefore maintain a healthy respect for the facts of social behavior; he should understand the role of social values in his own and other cultures; and he should understand the possibilities (and limitations) of social action. This book will deal with social problems as so conceived.[1]

The average student does not need to have his interest in social problems aroused by academic instruction. His interest is already present. Such matters as juvenile delinquency,

[1] Cf. Lawrence K. Frank, "Social Problems," *American Journal of Sociology*, 30:462–473 (January, 1925).

crime, prostitution, mental derangement, family disorganization, divorce, and racial prejudice interest him before he has ever heard of social problems. To be sure, much of this prior interest is uninformed, prejudiced, and based upon information that is often either wholly or partially false. The student may believe that juvenile delinquency is caused by the innate characteristics of certain racial or nationality groups. He may be convinced that family disorganization stems wholly from the decline in organized religion. The interest in the existence of social problems, however, rather than the validity of the explanation thereof, is the important consideration here. Most of the situations considered social problems in our society, therefore, are of keen interest to the student long before he opens a book on the subject.

For social problems are an intimate part of personality. Most behavior is defined as desirable or at least harmless to the group welfare. Certain forms of behavior, however, are considered threats to or infringements upon basic social values. These values constitute an important part of personality. The individual learns these values in the course of becoming a human being. His personal integrity rests upon these values and a threat to them is a threat to himself. Hence he cannot consider many of these problem situations objectively because his own personality is involved. The average person born and reared in the Deep South, for example, is unable to discuss the problem of racial discrimination with complete objectivity because the values sanctioning such behavior are incorporated into his own personality. Any threat to these values is therefore a personal threat, not an abstract issue to be debated on its merits.

Social problems are thus of immediate interest to the student because they deal with situations and values that form the core of his personality. We shall consider below how these values become part of the personality and cause the individual to react emotionally to any imagined threats thereto. We merely wish to suggest here the nature of the relationship between social problems and individual personality. The

student wants to know more about the behavior comprising the raw material of social problems. He wants to understand the social values that have been threatened and how these threats have arisen. He wants to know what can be done about these threats to his personal integrity and that of the society in which he lives. He wants, in short, to know more about social problems.

This book is written to help him in his search for knowledge. It is intended as a general guide to the scientific study of *all* social problems and also as an introduction to the study of certain *representative* social problems. It is impossible in a single course for the student to gain even a superficial knowledge of all the forms of behavior defined as social problems. He cannot learn all about juvenile delinquency, crime, mental deficiency, mental derangement, suicide, desertion, divorce, poverty, unemployment, substandard housing, political corruption, religious prejudice, racial discrimination, and war—to name some of the representative forms of behavior defined as social problems. He can, at best, learn to understand the complexity of social problems, their origins in a dynamic and democratic society, and the possibilities and limitations of constructive social action, plus a systematic introduction to certain representative problems. This book provides the tools for this two-fold understanding.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. Social problems are the products of a dynamic society, in which behavior changes more rapidly than its definition. This disparity between behavior and the defining values means that the society is in a chronic state of uncertainty and unrest. This situation is especially characteristic of the contemporary United States, where new techniques, new economic relationships, and new social institutions have combined to produce behavior considerably at variance with traditional social values. The result of this disparity is a proliferation of social problems that is becoming increasingly marked. Americans are acutely conscious of the many disparities between their behavior and the traditional values. They are worried because they are not act-

ing the way they are "supposed" to act—that is, in accordance with the values established by their ancestors in an earlier day and a simpler society. They are aware, in short, of the presence of many social problems in the new and dynamic society that has developed on the fertile continent of North America.

A dynamic society is one in which social change is taking place at a relatively rapid rate. Social change means that large numbers of persons are doing different things over a given period of time. The majority of persons in the United States are doing different things and living different lives from those of their grandfathers. They are earning their living in a different way, under different circumstances, and with different social settings. In 1870, some 74.3 per cent of the population of this country were listed as rural and earned their living either on the farm or in activities closely related thereto. The remaining 25.7 per cent were listed as urban. By 1940, this proportion had been almost reversed, with 56.5 per cent of the population living under urban conditions, with a new census category of rural-nonfarm people constituting 20.5 per cent of the total, and with only 22.9 per cent listed as rural-farm.[2]

This represents one of the most massive social changes ever undergone by any people over a comparable period. It represents the very stuff of social change, for with this change in residence go basic modifications in the way the people make a living, build their homes, raise their children, carry out their religious activities, and otherwise perform the basic activities of organized social life. When these fundamental patterns of behavior continue relatively unchanged from generation to generation, the society is comparatively static and social change is correspondingly slow. When the opposite is the case, the society is in a state of rapid change.

Under the latter conditions, social problems are inevitable. Men and women are obliged to respond in new ways to

[2] Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940, Housing, General Characteristics*, II (Washington, 1943), Part I, 18.

changes in technology, economic relationships, and other institutional demands. When they engage in these new activities, they are acting in ways not sanctioned by their traditional values. Women who work in industry are not acting as women were expected to act during the long millennia when most families were engaged in agriculture and woman's place was clearly in the home. The presence of sixteen million women in gainful employment therefore constitutes a problem to persons whose family values are still based upon the presence of women in the home. Along with many other factors, this emancipation contributes to the high rate of family disorganization, another situation defined as a social problem. When large numbers of men and women perform new economic and social functions, the society is said to be dynamic. A dynamic society gives rise to social problems.

A static society is one in which behavior does not change substantially from one generation to the next. Persons living in a static society continue to do essentially the same things in much the same way as their fathers before them and their children after them. Such comparisons are naturally relative and the degree of change in different societies varies widely. No society is ever completely static, for all behavior changes somewhat. Neither is any society completely dynamic, for all behavior never changes entirely from generation to generation. Nevertheless, we can establish certain general types of static and dynamic societies, from the isolated and primitive society of a remote island to that of a modern, progressive, and interrelated country such as the United States. In the one, change occurs slowly and social problems are correspondingly rare. In the other, change occurs rapidly and social problems are many.[3]

This does not mean that from the modern standpoint the society of the New Hebrides or the Middle Ages is an ideal place in which to live. The mere absence of social problems does not signify Utopia. Poverty, ignorance, superstition, high

[3] William F. Ogburn, "Stationary and Changing Societies," *American Journal of Sociology*, 42:16–31 (July, 1936).

mortality, low scale of living, endemic disease, and many similar conditions are found in primitive and medieval societies. These situations would be defined as social problems in our society, since they are clearly incompatible with the democratic standards of freedom, enlightenment, and a progressively higher standard of living. But to the citizens of these benighted societies, such situations are not considered social problems at all. The social values embody and sanction the very conditions which to us are highly undesirable. These societies have no conception of progress, change, and development in the modern sense. Their ancestors have always lived under these conditions and nobody thinks of changing them.

What is more, conditions of poverty, superstition, and disease are not believed capable of human amelioration in primitive and medieval societies, but instead are believed to represent the will of the supernatural powers that rule the universe. The concept of a social problem involves not only an undesirable situation but a belief that it may be improved by social action. We shall consider below the nature and limitations of this action toward the amelioration of social problems. A belief in the efficacy and desirability of social action characterizes only modern and progressive societies. Throughout most of the history of mankind, these (to us) undesirable situations have been accepted fatalistically as manifestations of the divine will, in whatever form that will is defined in the society under consideration.

Hence nothing can be done in a static society about high infant mortality, because the unseen powers are presumed to take to their bosoms a considerable proportion of each generation shortly after birth. Similarly, poverty has always been the lot of suffering mankind in most static societies and any attempt to raise the scale of living of the masses is regarded as an interference with the eternal scheme of things. Endemic plague is a mysterious visitation that has existed in many static societies since time immemorial and the people make no organized effort to eliminate it. These and many other situations which we define as social problems are viewed in a different

light in static societies. The masses are concerned only with living from day to day and with insuring their personal salvation by propitiating the divinities. They have little time or energy for co-operative efforts to eliminate many undesirable situations, even if they considered them susceptible of such action.

A static society is also comparatively free of another condition that gives rise to social problems. The wide discrepancy between behavior and its social definition does not exist in other societies to the extent found in our own. In primitive or feudal societies, for example, comparatively few persons depart drastically and consistently from the accepted code of sexual behavior. The way of life is so patterned that large-scale violations of the mores do not occur and individual violations are severely punished. Men and women continue, by and large, to do the things expected of them and serious moral deviations seldom arise. Social problems are not the result of a sudden immorality or perversity of large numbers of hitherto conforming citizens in our society. Social problems in this sense arise because the way of life is subject to rapid changes and dislocations, so that many persons cannot follow the accepted patterns of behavior, no matter how hard they may try.

Hence married women do not enter business and industry (thereby creating or intensifying many social problems) merely because they have suddenly become eager for individual freedom and seek to deny the traditional values of the home. They take this drastic step as a response to changing economic and social conditions, in which they have little or no choice. In a static society, no such situations arise and men and women continue to play the same roles and maintain the same moral standards as their ancestors. Social problems arise from the changing behavior of human beings, who must adapt themselves to changing demands. Social problems reflect the adaptations of men and women to conditions over which they have no control and of whose very nature they are ignorant.

CULTURAL LAG AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. A dynamic society is thus one in which behavior changes more rapidly than the values that define it. The resulting situation is one of chronic social problems, with large numbers of persons engaging in behavior that is contrary to the values established by many previous generations. Behavior and values change at different rates of speed. In a society where behavior changes slowly, values and behavior are substantially in accord and social problems are correspondingly few. Where behavior changes rapidly, values are outmoded and a state of disequilibrium exists. Many persons in all walks of life then engage in behavior not sanctioned by the group values. This situation involves four general and interrelated types of social elements. In order of relative rapidity of change, these elements are as follows:

1. *Technology.* The most spectacular manifestations of technology are found in the applied science that has transformed our society in recent decades. Changes in technology occur in ever-increasing numbers, as thousands of scientists direct their energies to new applications of scientific knowledge. Technological changes are growing more bewildering every day and their ultimate effects upon our society are literally incalculable.

2. *Economic Institutions.* Economic institutions are the organized patterns of relationships directed toward the production and distribution of goods and services. Much of the technological development is directly or indirectly applied to these economic institutions, for there is a direct financial incentive in applying the findings of science in this way. The established patterns of making a living, once firmly fixed in agriculture, have been changed almost beyond recognition. Other changes have followed in their wake.

3. *Social Institutions.* Social institutions include all the other organized patterns of social relationships—familial, religious, educational, governmental, and the like. These institutions are themselves affected by changes in the productive base, as the family, the church, the school, and the govern-

ment adapt themselves to the changing economic framework. Individuals who marry, raise families, go to church, and act as citizens of a democracy must first earn a living before they can effectively engage in other institutional relationships. Changes in the noneconomic institutions reflect modifications in the basic economic structure.

4. *Social Values.* Social values are the group beliefs at the heart of social institutions. They embody the stated or implied purposes of institutions, their reasons for being. These nonmaterial elements of culture change very slowly. Changes in the other elements of the institutional pattern occur more rapidly than changes in the social values, which are incorporated in the very fabric of the individual personality. This disparity between behavior and its definition is at the heart of social problems. When large numbers of persons habitually engage in behavior not sanctioned by the values, social problems are the result.[4]

This general sequence of social change produces the phenomenon known as cultural lag. The classic statement of this hypothesis was formulated by William F. Ogburn: "The thesis is," he suggested, "that the various parts of modern culture are not changing at the same rate . . . and that since there is a correlation and interdependence of parts, a rapid change in one part of our culture requires readjustments through other changes in the various correlated parts of culture." [5] In terms of social problems, this hypothesis stresses the differences in rate of change between behavior and the related social values that define and give it meaning. Such a disparity in the rate of change between two related and interdependent elements of society insures the presence and continuance of social problems. Social values do not change as rapidly as behavior is modified by the forces of a complex environment.

[4] Cf. Report of the Subcommittee on Technology, National Resources Committee, *Technological Trends and National Policy*, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1937.

[5] William F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc., 1922), pp. 200–201.

This disparity in the rate of change between behavior and value arises from several factors. The *first* is the essential conservatism of the human being in matters of social values. The individual acquires his basic values early in life from the principal mentors of his society—family, age-group associates, teachers, and religious advisers. By the time he reaches maturity, these values have become an indestructible part of his personality. Values relating to the family, religion, economic relationships, and sexual contacts are rooted deep in his being and any behavior that threatens these values upsets his personal equilibrium. In our society, this conservatism does not extend to technological developments, which are welcomed as an indication of progress. But the same person who willingly accepts new techniques in automobiles fiercely resists any change in his family relationships. Habits of thought in the field of values are strongly tinged with emotion. Group pressures toward conformity are extremely strong.

A *second* factor contributing to social problems is the deliberate action of vested interests to delay social action by insisting that it will interfere with group values. Persons wishing to retain profitable slum property, for example, maintain that public housing violates individual initiative and thereby deprives the individual of certain basic values. Constructive social action toward the amelioration of social problems is thus retarded and the tendency of values to lag behind behavior is thereby increased. The natural conservatism of the average person is reinforced by the deliberate obstructionism of those seeking to delay social action. Different groups and classes have different interests, and reforms threaten the privileged position of many entrenched groups. The latter strive to maintain their position by invoking social values.

A *third* element in the relationship between cultural lag and social problems is the fact that changes in material fields are ordinarily both welcomed and rewarded. The technological innovations bringing about the Industrial Revolution were hailed as unmistakable manifestations of progress. Similar at-

titudes greeted the changes in economic institutions that followed the introduction of new manufacturing techniques. The social changes following these modifications in the economic structure were not received with the same universal enthusiasm. The cherished values established by centuries of settled, agricultural life were threatened. Women left home to work in offices and factories; the family became increasingly unstable; large-scale unemployment increased; and the influence of the church declined. In each case, one or more central values were threatened and a social problem arose. The values of a changing society thus failed to keep pace with the behavior which they continued to define.

There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule that technological and economic changes precipitate changes in values. The rise of Christianity, with its new system of values, is offered as an impressive reversal of the usual pattern, although even here the sequence of change is not completely clear. The major social problems of our day, however, are the outgrowth of changes in behavior following technological, economic, and institutional innovations, with the values remaining more stable. Many persons are thus, in one way or another, responding to changing social situations in ways not in accordance with the values of their ancestors. The result is a proliferation of social problems.

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. A changing society is also a disorganized society, in the sense that the complete integration of a primitive (and organized) society is impossible under changing conditions. Simple behavior patterns become complex and the former integration is no longer possible. The small and isolated primitive society is the epitome of social organization in this sense, for conformity to the values is virtually complete and social problems do not exist. At the other end of the scale, a modern, industrial, urban society contains an infinite number of individual departures from the norms established under earlier and simpler conditions. A disorganized society is not one on the verge of

decay, collapse, or revolution. It is merely one in which social change is rapid and the comparative uniformity of behavior found in simpler societies no longer exists.

A disorganized society is one in which many people fail, for one reason or another, to play the parts expected of them. Married women who work outside the home are not acting as women traditionally should. Men who deliberately refrain from producing large families are not playing the traditional part of the patriarchal father, who wanted many sons to carry on the family name. Men and women who decide, for reasons best known to themselves, to dissolve their marriages and marry someone else are not playing the parts that have come down from a society that insisted on marriage for life. Persons who take no interest in or responsibility for their local community are not playing the parts once expected of a citizen of a democracy. In these and many other ways, people are not living up to the expectations that have descended from another day.

Such persons, in short, are not playing their proper social roles. They are not acting according to the patterns of behavior considered suitable to their age, sex, marital status, or social condition. They are failing to live up to the pattern of thought and action which society has ascribed to them. Society is a network of such reciprocal expectations, specifying the behavior expected of the individual from the cradle to the grave. The child begins to learn his expected behavior as soon as he is born. The little girl learns what is expected of her as a child, an adolescent, a wife, and a mother. The little boy similarly absorbs the patterns of thought and action which society prescribes for him. These patterns of expectations appropriate to age, sex, vocation, and other social positions are known as social roles.[6] They constitute the unwritten standards to which persons adjust their conduct. Failure of a large number of persons to play their allotted roles means that the society is disorganized.

[6] Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Background of Personality* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1945), Chap. 3.

A disorganized society is therefore one in which the behavior of large numbers of persons does not live up to expectations. This situation may arise from the failure of many individuals to understand the nature of their roles in a complex and dynamic society. It may also reflect their inability to play their roles successfully, even if they do understand them. The society may become so heterogeneous that former roles are inadequate to the new situation and hence the individual must improvise his behavior, with no precedent to follow. Whatever the reasons or combinations thereof, many persons do not play their roles with complete consistency or fidelity. They fail to function as they are supposed to and the result is uncertainty and confusion. In short, "A society experiences disorganization when the parts of it lose their integration and fail to function according to their implicit purposes." [7]

Social problems arise when large numbers of persons do not play their expected roles. The family is an example of a group of roles that have undergone basic changes in recent generations, with a variety of social problems resulting therefrom. The wife who works outside the home is abandoning a role that has been traditional since the beginning of recorded history. The husband who is unable to find work is likewise failing (through no fault of his own) to perform his traditional role in an industrial society. Both husband and wife are responding to situations which they can neither understand nor control. Although they only dimly realize the reasons for these failures to act as expected, they are clearly not playing their prescribed roles. In the aggregate, this failure constitutes a social problem.

Failure to play the proper role is apparent in other social problems. The man who is compulsively addicted to alcohol, the girl who engages in promiscuous sexual relations, and the boy who steals an automobile all indicate unwillingness or inability to act according to the expectations of society. The most spectacular example of such failure is the psychotic ("insane")

[7] Robert E. L. Faris, *Social Disorganization* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), p. 49.

person, who plays a role totally at variance with that which society assigns to him. His conception of himself and that held by others differ so greatly that they cannot be reconciled. The individual who entertains systematic delusions of grandeur or persecution, wherein he imagines himself Napoleon or an early Christian martyr, is clearly playing a role that has little or no resemblance to that given him by society. The world in which the psychotic lives is, to a large extent, his own creation and the role he plays therein is often virtually unintelligible to the normal person. We shall consider below the social problem presented by the psychotic, whose behavior represents the most extreme divergence from normal roles. The presence of more than half a million such persons in the mental hospitals of the nation constitutes a serious social problem.

Social disorganization also involves a decline in the influence of organized social expectations upon the individual. This process is variously described as the failure to accept certain traditional values; the increasing secularization of society; the substitution of rational for traditional forms of social control; the partial dissolution of consensus; and the breakdown in the equilibrium between the forces building up and those breaking down the patterns of society.[8] All of these concepts refer to the same general phenomenon, observable in dynamic societies where social problems are common. Under such conditions men and women tend, through no fault of their own, to behave in a fashion contrary to the values established in an earlier day.

Social problems and social disorganization are related, but not synonymous. Social problems are the result of group judgments (values) interpreting a particular situation as undesirable and in addition as susceptible of amelioration by appropriate social action. Social disorganization is a process whereby the social group is broken. Many social problems are the result of social disorganization, but not all forms of social disorganization are necessarily social problems. The disrup-

[8] Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization* (3rd ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), Chaps. I–II.

tion of many of the social patterns holding the traditional family group together is an example of social disorganization. This process may or may not constitute a social problem, depending upon the values of the persons viewing it. The emancipation of women is one result of this disorganization of the family group. Many persons view the changed status of women as desirable and hence not a social problem. Others hark back to the old days when the family was strong and women knew their place. The important consideration is the social value on the basis of which the behavior is judged.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC OPINION. The student of social problems is interested in the disparities between behavior and social values. He is concerned with such matters as delinquency, crime, sexual promiscuity, family disorganization, and political apathy as these and other forms of behavior run counter to the social values. In this sense, he deals with a cross-section of behavior at a particular time and place. Behavior, value, and action are all basic to social problems. But the genesis of the behavior, the rise of the social values, and the prevailing attitude toward the appropriate social action are also important. The student should try to understand how the situation arose and how it came to be defined as contrary to the values. Hence he should have some knowledge of the role of public opinion in the creation of social problems.

For social problems are primarily what people *think* they are. The situation must be defined by public opinion before it constitutes a social problem. Hence it is important to know how and what people think on these matters. The employment of women outside the home is traditionally assumed to be a social problem, since it clearly threatens the values grouped around the historic role of women. A study of contemporary public opinion might disclose, however, that this is no longer a serious problem and that the majority of persons (both male and female) have accepted both the inevitability and the desirability of this change in the role of women. The value may conceivably have changed, so that the majority of persons actually no longer sigh wistfully for the good old days when the

horizon of women was confined to children, kitchen, and church. The techniques of public-opinion study have not yet been systematically applied to social problems in this way. It is important to know what people are actually thinking on these matters, however, rather than what the student of social problems *thinks* they are thinking.

Social values in certain controversial fields are changing more rapidly than many persons suspect. The limiting of families by artificial means was formerly considered a social problem because it specifically interfered with the value centered about the large family. Contemporary behavior, however, suggests that this value is no longer so strong among the majority of the population and hence the limitation of births is not the social problem it once was. Other forms of behavior in the field of morality may have undergone similar changes in social definition, with the value gradually adjusting to the new behavior. Extramarital sex relations are presumably more common than formerly, following the changes in the social structure, the emancipation of women, the urbanization of the population, the dissemination of contraceptive information, the rise of the miracle drugs for the treatment of venereal disease, and other social and technological changes.[9] Such relations are still assumed to be a serious social problem, however, since it is widely held that these values have not changed appreciably in recent generations. Only a thorough and complete study of public opinion will reveal the exact status of this behavior.

A complicating factor in the study of public opinion in its relation to social problems is the fact that the defining values are integrated into the personality at different levels of consciousness. We shall consider the inculcation of values in more detail below. It is important to note here that the techniques of public-opinion analysis can only measure values consciously, as distinguished from those subconsciously, held. The person may thus reply on a rational and conscious level to a

[9] Cf. Alfred C. Kinsey *et al.*, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1948).

question on sex behavior. He may think that he is giving a faithful and complete description of his attitudes and values on the subject when he says that he does (or does not) resent a particular form of behavior and hence does (or does not) consider it a social problem. In the subconscious part of his personality, however, he may be opposed to the same behavior which he condones on a conscious level.

The individual accepts many of his values, such as those defining sexual behavior, at a very early age, long before he has personal experience with any but the most infantile sexual desires. By the time he is an adult, sexual behavior has been defined for him in terms of these deeply held and often subconscious values. He may thus accept innovations in sexual behavior with the conscious part of his personality and hence may consciously view departures from traditional morality with comparative indifference. In the subconscious part of his personality, however, he may react violently against the same behavior. In the field of sexual behavior, the ultimate definition is apparently motivated more by the subconscious than by the conscious mental processes. Hence many departures from the traditional sexual code become social problems.

The student of social problems must therefore recognize that definitions of behavior in terms of public-opinion surveys involve more than meets the eye. The rational part of the personality is easily reached by traditional public-opinion research, wherein the individual responds to a direct question concerning his social attitudes and values. Much can accordingly be learned about the nature and extent of social problems on this level. The investigator who ignores the subconscious part of the personality, however, does so at his own peril. He is in danger of gaining only a superficial understanding of the vital process whereby a particular situation is or is not adjudged a social problem.

APPROACHES TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS. This section of the book sets the general frame of reference within which we shall subsequently deal with specific social problems. The remaining introductory chapters consider the constituent elements of

the social problem—the situation, the value, and the action. These are not static elements, existing without reference to the rest of society, but are dynamic parts of a functioning whole. Limitations of space preclude any extended discussion of the way in which this complex modern society functions. A complete exposition would amount to a social history of the western world, with special emphasis upon the accelerated rate of social change in recent decades. In the following discussion, therefore, the student should realize that, complex as these constituent parts of the social problem may seem as described, they are even more complex in actual experience. This realization should produce a commendable humility, as the student learns the many ramifications of the problems that face contemporary society.

The total amount of behavior in any society, static or dynamic, is very great. In a dynamic society, a relatively large amount of behavior falls in the category of social problems. Social change means that much behavior is not in accord with traditional values. The diversity of society also means that some behavior is considered a threat to the values of some groups and not to those of others. Hence definitions of the nature and extent of social problems tend to vary. We cannot deal with all of the possible forms of problem behavior in the brief space at our disposal. Furthermore, the amount of specialized knowledge on each of these problems—from alcoholism to racial prejudice—is so great that many scientists devote themselves exclusively to one problem, or even to a specialized aspect of it. The present volume is an *introduction* to social problems, not an encyclopedia thereof. The authors have approached the study of social problems both analytically and selectively. The initial section is therefore devoted to an analysis of social problems in general, and four subsequent sections are each devoted to an analysis of a single problem.

One of the sections is entitled *Problems of Delinquency* and discusses forms of behavior contrary to law and public practice. This field includes both juvenile delinquency and

the more formal departures from the law known as crime. Much of the behavior, however, is similar, in that the individual is engaging in activities considered undesirable by the formal definition of society as incorporated into ordinances, laws, and other formal expressions. The stability of *any* organized society depends upon the physical safety of its members against those who lay violent hands upon their fellows. The stability of our own society also rests upon the property relationships that have arisen through the centuries. Much of the behavior known as crime in the adult has its origins in the delinquency of the child. In considering delinquent behavior, we are thus also dealing with the early forms of behavior that will later become criminal.

Another widespread type of social problem is that arising from the maladjustment and disorganization of personality. The section on *Problems of the Personality* deals with the disparity in social role characteristic of the psychotic ("insane") person, wherein he defines his own position in a manner totally different from that of other members of the group. The analysis here is also applicable to other forms of personality deviation and touches upon the forces that produce divergences ranging in severity from a mild neurosis to a hopeless psychosis. As society has increased in complexity, as the rate of social change has accelerated, and as the knowledge of personality and its disorders has advanced in recent decades, these matters have become social problems. Serious personality deviations have always been present, but their existence has hitherto been veiled in shame and secrecy. As the extent of personal disorganization has gradually come to the knowledge of the general public, along with improvements in therapy, the importance of this behavior as a social problem has correspondingly increased.

The third general type of behavior considered in this book is that comprising *Problems of the Family*. The family is the basic social institution and problems arising from changes in its composition, structure, functions, and stability intimately affect every person. The family is also subjected to the stresses

and strains of a dynamic society to an extent that is unique among all other institutions. Every individual (with negligible exceptions) plays an active role in at least one family, and the great majority of individuals belong to two—their parental family and the one which they themselves found. The individual family members are functioning members of other institutions. Hence the problems of the family are also those of a changing society.

The final section is entitled *Problems of Minorities.* It deals with the difficulties arising when certain forms of belief and behavior violate the democratic values embodied in the national creed. Racial prejudice and discrimination expressly deny certain values upon which the nation was established. Equal opportunity, equality before the law, freedom from unjust legislation, and the right to education are among the values that form the fundamental structure of a democratic nation. These values have long been violated, ignored, and suppressed in the case of racial and religious minorities. The analysis will specifically consider the deprivation of these rights in the case of the Negro, as the largest minority group. In this general field, the disparity between democratic values and actual behavior is great. Both in terms of numbers of persons involved and the degree of violation of democratic values, this constitutes perhaps our most serious single social problem.

This book introduces the student to four broad and representative fields in which behavior and social values are out of joint. There are many more such problem situations in a society where complete agreement is the exception rather than the rule. Social problems cut to the heart of a democratic society in the atomic age. The differential rate of change between behavior and related value patterns continues to produce situations for which no easy solution exists. Some values have come down without substantial modification from an earlier day and hence bear only a remote relationship to the realities of the contemporary situation. Other values have undergone some modification with the changing times.

but are still not in accord with current behavior. In still other fields, the definitions have kept pace with changing behavior and social problems here have ceased to exist. Social problems are thus the inescapable heritage of a dynamic democracy. They represent the struggle for human betterment that characterizes the adventure of modern man.

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CHAPTER TWO

Social Problems and Social Behavior

THE DEFINITION OF BEHAVIOR. Social behavior is ubiquitous and limitless. All over the world, people are doing things, with an industry that rivals a colony of ants. The sociologist is interested in all forms of behavior, insofar as he can establish generalizations that will explain it and give it meaning. The specific interest of the student of social problems does not extend so far. He is concerned only with that behavior occurring on a comparatively large scale, violating group values, and believed capable of amelioration or solution by appropriate social action. This delimitation removes a large segment of behavior from the direct interest of the reader of this book. But a great deal remains. We may consider briefly the process whereby some behavior comes within the purview of social problems and other behavior does not.

Behavior has no meaning unless it is defined. These definitions are based upon the prevailing social values and may be either negative or positive, depending upon the circumstances in which the behavior takes place. Eating is a physiological activity which is defined as desirable under practically all circumstances. Sexual intercourse is also a physiological activity which is defined as desirable only under certain pre-

scribed circumstances. When the necessary ceremonies have been conducted, sexual intercourse is considered an acceptable form of behavior and one outside the range of social problems. When these ceremonies have not been conducted, the relationship constitutes a threat to the value of chastity. Similarly, an adolescent theft of an apple may be considered an act of delinquency in a city, whereas it is merely a boyish prank in a country orchard. The action of taking the apple, like that of heterosexual relations, has no moral connotation until it is defined by society.

A given form of behavior is therefore not a social problem until it has been so defined.[1] Sex offenses contrary to the mores, actions committed against the law, aberrant or abnormal performance of social roles, and denials of the democratic creed must all be defined before they constitute threats to the existing value structure. The promiscuous girl must be adjudged a sexual offender, the juvenile must be viewed as a delinquent, the criminal must violate a law, and the bigot must deny accepted elements in the creed before the behavior in the aggregate becomes a social problem. The process of definition is usually informal and spontaneous, but it is ordinarily unmistakable. On most issues (with certain striking exceptions), there is virtual agreement as to the existence of the problem, however much disagreement there may be concerning its solution.

The student of social problems is thus interested in special forms of behavior, which change as the defining values themselves change. A given form may thus be a social problem to one generation and not to another. To a generation in whose collective lives religious values bulked large, nonattendance at church was a serious social problem. To our own generation, other and more secular values are considered important for group living, and the fact that a majority of the people of the United States do not attend church every Sunday is therefore not a matter of national concern. Religious deviation, witch-

[1] William I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1923), pp. 42–43.

craft, and many other forms of behavior no longer fall into the category of social problems. Our own society recognizes other heresies and other ideological sins. Political unorthodoxy has become suspect and its alleged occurrence on a large scale is now viewed as a social problem. But the values centered about religious orthodoxy and its traditional observances have changed with the times.

THE MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR. Information on social problems is often difficult to obtain. Certain forms of behavior come regularly to the attention of the authorities and are duly inscribed in the records. Crimes known to the police fall in this category. Other behavior is highly private (sexual intercourse) and information on its occurrence either inside or outside of marriage is scanty and fragmentary. Still other behavior is known to exist on a considerable scale (desertion), but no adequate national measurement has yet been devised. Hence information on the different types of social problems takes a variety of forms, ranging in accuracy from the decennial reports of the Bureau of the Census to the casual observations of the man in the street. Much of the public concern regarding many social problems is based upon such scanty information as the observation of individual examples, hearsay, and prejudiced reports of various kinds.

A further consideration is the amount of behavior necessary before the situation becomes a threat to the values. This also varies greatly, depending upon the type of behavior and the strength of the values, factors which are in a sense two aspects of the same thing. A few thousand murders every year are considered a social problem because the values attending human life are (in peacetime, at least) very strong. A similar number of persons using alcohol to excess would not be considered a social problem. When the number of compulsive drinkers (true alcoholics) increases to several hundred thousand, however, the abuse of alcohol then becomes a social problem.

There are thus no absolute criteria for the extent of behavior before it becomes a social problem. Certain actions in-

consistent with social values are occasionally committed by most persons. Rare indeed is the individual, for example, who does not on occasion indulge in a prejudiced action or thought against some minority group. The number who commit murder (or seriously consider it) is small. Yet both forms of behavior in the aggregate constitute social problems. Other complications arise when the same amount of behavior is considered a social problem by one group and not by another. The annual number of lynchings in the South has declined in recent decades and is now comparatively small. This fact is often advanced by the white southerner to prove that violent repression is negligible and becoming increasingly so. To many northerners, however, the number of lynchings is not so important as the fact that there are any at all. The annual occurrence of a single lynching, plus the implied threat of such action, constitutes a violation of the American creed in the eyes of many persons.

The average person is only vaguely aware of the nature and importance of the scientific measurement of social problems. Sampling techniques for ascertaining the incidence of certain forms of behavior are largely unknown to the man on the street, who is sure that he knows a social problem when he sees one. The man who sees two beggars in an afternoon may thus conclude that poverty and unemployment are widespread. The woman who lives in a group where divorce is common may conclude that the majority of marriages are terminated in this way. The sheltered person may find it hard to believe that alcoholism, poverty, sexual promiscuity, commercialized vice, and desertion are common problems in other segments of society. The average person untrained in scientific method tends to generalize from his own experience to the detriment of his understanding of social problems.

Information on the incidence of problem behavior that tends to be most accurately and completely noted is that coming within the purview of government. Crimes known to the police, for example, are periodically compiled by the departments throughout the country and tabulated in semiannual

summaries by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These compilations, while far from complete on the total incidence of such behavior, are still the best available index to major violations of the criminal code. The extent of certain extreme forms of personal disorganization is measured by the number annually admitted to hospitals for the care and treatment of mental disease. These data are compiled by the Bureau of the Census. The number of divorces annually granted throughout the country is gathered by the Federal Security Agency and furnishes the most authoritative measurement on the extent of family disorganization. These and other agencies of the Federal Government gather, tabulate, and publish authoritative information on a number of situations in the field of social problems.

Measurement of behavior by other governmental agencies assists in the study of other social problems. The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor gathers information pertaining to many aspects of economic life. The cost-of-living index of this Bureau is the best available monthly survey of retail and wholesale price levels, and as such provides a basis for the study of many economic problems. The same Bureau publishes the most complete data on strikes and other work stoppages throughout the country, thereby indicating the trends in economic conflict. A strike is defined as a social problem whatever its causal factors may be, on the ground that loss of production and loss of industrial consensus are both inimical to social welfare. However legitimate the claims of the workers may be, the strike is still an evidence of faulty institutional relationships and hence a social problem.

The facts of social behavior thus constitute the primary data for the student of social problems. The latter should, accordingly, ascertain these facts at the outset of his investigation. This suggestion is not as obvious as it sounds, for a large number of persons do their thinking on social problems without bothering to find out the simple facts. Many persons do not know what the facts are or where to find them. Others do not want to know the facts, because they are afraid that the

facts will invalidate their own prejudices. Without a sound basis in the facts of behavior, however, the individual will merely intensify his own preconceptions on social problems.

SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL CONTEXT. It is also important to understand the social setting in which behavior takes place. In the broadest sense, this understanding involves the whole of society—its attitudes, values, structure, class stratification, occupational pattern, role systems, and the rest. Personality is a product of the social setting. Individuals who depart from the social values reflect this setting—its conflicts, tensions, confusions, insecurities, and ambiguities—and their behavior can be understood only in terms of the social forces to which they respond. Society is a functioning whole and behavior cannot be isolated from its context without sacrificing a complete understanding. Contemporary social problems occur in an extremely complex society, with a bewildering variety of social roles, group values, and possible forms of behavior.

As an example of this approach, we may consider the problem of divorce. In the year 1948, the estimated number of divorces was 415,000 and the divorce rate per 1,000 of the population was 2.8. Both of these figures represented considerable advances from the prewar figures, but they also showed a substantial decline from the all-time highs of 1946 and 1947.[2] These figures become more meaningful, however, as we examine the society in which they occur. The change from agriculture to industry; the movement from farm to city; the gainful employment of women; the decline in the traditional functions of the family; the cult of romantic love; the heterogeneity of the population; the emphasis upon material success; the change from the patriarchal to the companionate family; and the other changes in the role patterns of the modern family are some of the pertinent elements in the social context in which divorce takes place.

Personality is in large measure the outgrowth of culture, as interpreted to the individual through the agencies of his

[2] Federal Security Agency, Public Health Service, *Advance Release* (April 4, 1949).

society.[3] The delinquent, the criminal, the neurotic, the psychotic, the sex offender, the alcoholic, the deserter, the suicide, and the bigot all represent behavior contrary to one or more of the professed values of our society. These persons are not wilfully delinquent, criminal, neurotic, or bigoted in the sense that they deliberately deny the basic values. Their personalities are the products of their total personal situation, to which they must respond in one way or another. The role of the individual in his family, his standing in his age group, his occupational position, and his minority status are some of the elements in his private social context which determine his behavior toward social values. The social context thus involves both the broad setting of American society and the narrower setting of individual behavior.

The context of social problems also involves the changing values which play such an important part in determining the social climate. Although difficult to measure, such value changes comprise an important part of the larger picture. The differential rate of change between behavior and its related values constitutes, as we have seen, a central factor in the genesis of social problems. Values do not always lag behind behavior and sometimes change more rapidly than expected. As a result, the public may accept behavior that would once have been considered catastrophic. A change in the divorce-marriage ratio from one in six to one in three in less than twenty years seemingly presents a crucial threat to a basic value. Yet public opinion has adjusted with surprising ease to this situation. Value and behavior are parts of a functioning whole, and in this case the value has partially, although not completely, changed. Divorce is now accepted as an unpalatable but inescapable fact. The disorganization of the family is still defined as a social problem, but the social climate has changed to permit some acceptance of this fact. Other values may similarly change and behavior is then viewed in a different light.

[3] Ralph Linton, *The Cultural Basis of Personality* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1945).

The context of social problems may also be considered in local terms. The position of the individual in the community, his physical relationship to other individuals and institutions, and the changes in these relationships comprise the field of human ecology. More precisely, human ecology has been defined as "a study of the spatial and temporal relations of human beings as affected by the selective, distributive, and accommodative forces of the environment." [4] Much of the behavior defined (in the aggregate) as social problems occurs in a local setting of groups, institutions, factories, private houses, neighborhood gangs, parks, schools, recreational agencies, and the rest of the elements that condition individual activity. Different forms of problem behavior occur at varying rates in different parts of the community, with certain sections showing a high incidence of many problems, other sections specializing heavily in some problems, and still other sections exhibiting comparatively few problems of any kind.

The ecological approach has been applied to such problem situations as poverty, dependency, ill-health, juvenile delinquency, crime, mental derangement, desertion, divorce, commercialized vice, alcoholism, venereal disease, substandard housing, and racial discrimination. Many of these problems are closely interrelated and behavior of one kind often reflects many other forms. Some isolated problems, such as certain types of mental derangement, occur in areas comparatively free from all other problem situations. For the most part, however, a variety of undesirable behavior occurs in the same social setting, thereby indicating the presence of social disorganization on a large scale. Many members of such communities are not playing the roles expected of them by the larger society. They are failing, often through no fault of their own, to live up to the organized expectations of the group.[5]

[4] R. D. McKenzie, "The Ecological Approach to the Study of the Human Community," in *The City*, ed. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), pp. 63–64. See also Robert E. Park, "The Concept of Position in Sociology," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 20:1–14 (1925).

[5] Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization* (Rev. ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1941), Chap. XXIX.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE. The social *structure* is the organized pattern of statuses and roles that comprise a given society, together with the goals and purposes appropriate thereto. The social *context* is a broader conception and refers to the whole of the social setting within which problem behavior occurs. The relationships between statuses and roles are also included in the social structure as it provides the framework for social problems. Status is the position of the individual in society, whereas role is the general type of behavior expected of him in connection with his status. If the majority of persons are carrying out the roles *required* of them, if they are refraining from roles *prohibited* to them, and if they are engaging wisely in the roles *permitted* to them, social problems will be comparatively rare. If the opposite is true, social problems will be many.[6]

Social structure is often directly productive of social problems. Every structure has a set of "culturally defined goals, purposes, and interests, held out as legitimate objectives . . . of the society." In addition, the structure "defines, regulates, and controls the acceptable modes of reaching out for these goals." [7] Each society, therefore, has certain values considered desirable as goals for the members to seek during the course of their lives. In many cases, large numbers of persons are unable to attain these goals by socially acceptable means and in their efforts to attain them by any means at all may infringe upon certain group values. These persons thus engage in behavior that in the aggregate is considered a social problem. By insisting upon the goal and minimizing the means thereto, the social structure may thus produce problem behavior as a "natural" reaction on the part of many persons.

An example of this process is apparent in the case of many crimes against property. The socially defined goal is money which is, in the eyes of many persons, its own reward, no

[6] John W. Bennett and Melvin M. Tumin, *Social Life: Structure and Function* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1948), Chaps. 6–7.

[7] Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie: Revisions and Extensions," Chap. XII in Ruth N. Anshen (Ed.), *The Family: Its Function and Destiny* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949), p. 228.

matter how attained. Our society has traditionally established certain accepted modes of attaining this goal, including thrift, frugality, hard work, clean living, and kindness to one's parents. Large numbers of people, however, are unable to attain the desired goal through the application of these and other socially approved methods. Some of them resort to violence or fraud in their efforts to gain the enhanced status attendant upon wealth. In this process, they threaten the value of private property, thereby producing a social problem. Thus "aberrant behavior may be regarded sociologically as a symptom of dissociation between culturally prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for realizing these aspirations." [8]

The stability of the social structure is also an important factor in the incidence of social problems. This stability cannot be measured directly because of the variety of statuses and roles involved. The combinations of social situations (statuses) and their related functions (roles) are far too complex to admit of measurement by a single index. Each individual occupies a number of statuses, wherein he is male, married, adult, father, Protestant, employed, and so forth. Each of these statuses carries with it a group of patterned expectations defining the manner in which he carries out his various positions in organized society. When large numbers of persons are unable to play one or more of these roles in a manner satisfactory to the group, a social problem arises. We may outline some of the ways in which the failure to play the accepted roles may be measured. The following indices thus indirectly measure the stability of the social structure and the extent of social problems.

1. *Mobility and Social Structure.* Mobility is both an index to the stability of the social structure and a problem in itself. The traditional pattern of statuses and roles arose during the long millennia when life was comparatively settled, when most people lived and died in the same community, and when status was based upon custom and maintained in the same way. This pattern has been rapidly changing in recent

[8] Ibid., p. 230.

decades, with the rate of mobility progressively increasing during and after World War II. A large proportion of the population of the average urban community are strangers to each other, with all that this relationship implies in the way of casual contacts, lack of primary group controls, and a general decline in the influence of the intimate group. Patterns of status and role evolved in the settled society of an earlier day are no longer suitable to the new situation, and patterns based upon the new and mobile way of life are not yet stabilized. Society is in transition from a traditional, comparatively stable structure to one marked by greater social mobility.

The extent of social mobility on a national scale was not fully known until the 1940 Census. Following this enumeration, it was found that approximately fifteen million persons (more than 12 per cent of the population) had changed their county of residence at least once between 1935 and 1940.[9] World War II saw an intensification of this movement, and an estimated 15,300,000 members of the nation's population (exclusive of the military) changed their county of residence at least once between December 7, 1941 (Pearl Harbor), and March, 1945.[10] In the single postwar year from April 1, 1947, to April 1, 1948, one out of every five persons in the United States (numbering an estimated twenty-nine million persons) moved to a different house. Nineteen million moved within the same county, whereas ten million changed their county of residence.[11] In the face of such physical movement, many of the traditional elements of the social structure underwent a severe strain.

These data are significant both as indices of the changing social structure and as measurements of social problems. Many of our social values arose in the settled society of the small town

[9] Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population: Internal Migration 1935 to 1940*, Washington, 1943, p. 2.

[10] Bureau of the Census, Population—Special Reports, *Civilian Migration in the United States: December, 1941 to March, 1945*, Series P–S, No. 5 (September 2, 1945).

[11] Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports: Population Characteristics, *Internal Migration in the United States: April, 1947 to April, 1948*, Series P–20, No. 22 (January 28, 1949).

or rural community. The mere fact that a majority of the population now lives under urban and mobile conditions constitutes a threat to many of the values based upon this former stability. The patterns of a mobile society have not yet become accepted and many persons are still attempting to adapt the old patterns to a new way of life. The new social structure may be every bit as "good" as the old. Most persons, however, continue to think of the old structure as the ideal, even though it is manifestly gone, never to reappear. The new mass, mobile society has become the norm, whether we like it or not.

2. *Income and Social Structure.* Our society is one in which pecuniary values bulk large. The ideal situation is one in which everyone has a high income, so that he can buy large quantities of goods and services and thereby live the "good life." The ultimate ethical implications of this value pattern need not concern us here. It is sufficient to note that economic well-being is defined as a basic value and its absence is an undesirable situation. Hence the income of the individual family and that of the nation constitute an important index to the state of the social structure. Under conditions of poverty, the status of the individual wage earner and his family is not all that it should be.

In the year 1947, the median family income was approximately $3,000.[12] This was an increase of 20 per cent over the median figure of $2,500 in 1944 and constituted a striking gain from the figure of $1,160 in 1935–36. Much of the increase in monetary income was dissipated by the rise in the general price level, especially that between 1944 and 1947. In terms of the total cash received by the individual family, however, the year 1947 was the highest on record up to that time. Despite this high level, 4.4 per cent of all families received a cash income of less than $500; 6.4 per cent from $500 to $999; 7.8 per cent from $1,000 to $1,499; and 8.8 from $1,500 to $1,999. A total of 27.4 per cent of all families thus received an annual income of less than $2,000, even in the most prosperous year

[12] This means that approximately half of the individual families had incomes of more than $3,000, half of them had less.

in the history of the country.[13] With the high price levels of 1947, this meant that one out of every four families was unable to participate as actively in the economic life of the country as the ideal standard demands. Through no fault of their own, these families failed to measure up to the accepted status of a prosperous country. Their presence constituted a social problem.

3. *Unemployment and Social Structure.* A third element in the overall condition of the social structure is the employment status of the people. The role of the head of the family in our society has always been based upon gainful employment. The roles of husband and breadwinner are so completely synonymous that they cannot be separated. A society in which each husband is able to play this role is, in this respect at least, a stable one. When most people were engaged in agriculture or related commercial activities, this employed status was comparatively easy to maintain. Throughout most of history, when the traditional statuses and roles were established, large-scale unemployment was rare and most men could and did work.

The Industrial Revolution changed the social structure in this respect. The transition from agriculture to industry, the increase in gainful employment outside the home, and the cyclical changes in the economy meant that many men became periodically unable to play the role of breadwinner. This change in employment status has many repercussions upon related social problems. Poverty, bad housing, ill-health, family disorganization, child labor, and many other types of social problems can be directly or indirectly attributed to the changed economic base. The democratic state has recently entered this field in an effort to eliminate or mitigate the problems arising from inadequacy of income, unemployment, and related economic difficulties.

Information is currently available on the number of persons in the labor force, both those employed and those un-

[13] Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports—Consumer Income, *Income of Families and Persons in the United States: 1947*, Series P–60, No. 5 (February 7, 1949).

employed and seeking work. Methods of sampling the social structure have been worked out by the Bureau of the Census, so that a running monthly commentary is available on this basic aspect of social status. Data are thus available on the total labor force, including the armed forces; the civilian labor force; the number in the labor force at work full time; the number at work part time; the number with a job but not currently at work; and finally the number unemployed. This latter category is defined as "those who did not work at all during the survey week, and who were looking for work." [14]

World War II and the immediate postwar years saw unemployment at an absolute minimum. The demand for labor first for war production and then for peacetime demands was so great that practically every person who wanted a job could have one. Many persons who had retired from the labor market or who were ordinarily not employed because of age, minor physical disability, or other factors were able to find work during these years of high industrial activity. This situation did not last permanently and the summer of 1949 saw the number of unemployed rise to a level of more than 4,000,000. With this failure of many individuals to play their expected role (through no fault of their own), unemployment again became a social problem after almost a decade of virtually full employment. The condition of the social structure in terms of the employment base again became a matter of national concern.

FORMS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR. This chapter deals with the definition and delimitation of certain types of behavior defined as social problems. Out of the many possible forms of problem behavior, we have chosen for discussion four types—involving juvenile delinquency, personality disorganization, the family, and minority groups. Each of these forms presents different questions of measurement after they have been adjudged social problems. Without duplicating the more detailed analysis in the sections devoted to these problems, we

[14] Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports: *Labor Force*, P–57, No. 84 (July 8, 1949).

may anticipate some of the more general questions involved in their definition as social problems and the measurement of their extent and severity.

1. *Problems of Delinquency.* Social behavior contrary to law presents our first problem of definition and measurement. Violations of the law ordinarily bring the offender into contact with the bureaucratic process and its machinery for measuring such behavior. One entire section deals with problems of delinquency, whereby the juvenile runs counter to the behavior norms of the community. Inasmuch as the measurement of this adolescent behavior will be considered below, we may here examine some of the implications of measuring the more formal (but related) deviations of the criminal. One of the functions of urban police departments is to enumerate the number and type of crimes of which they have knowledge, whether or not they have succeeded in apprehending the criminal. Such data are forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, where they are tabulated and published every six months.[15] In spite of the fact that they indicate only the number of crimes known to the police and not the total number committed (which nobody knows), these data provide the best available measurement of certain violations of the law and the trends therein. We can therefore speak with a fair degree of accuracy of the social problems arising from violations of the values incorporated in the criminal code.

All criminal behavior, however, is not measured so completely. Certain forms are more obvious than others and less easily hidden from official eyes. Murder, manslaughter, and criminal assault, for example, usually leave tangible evidence in the person of the victim. Certain crimes against property, on the other hand, do not leave any physical traces and hence do not as readily come to the notice of the police. Furthermore, many crimes against property are so intangible and complicated that it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether or not a criminal act has been committed. When crimes involve *both*

[15] Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports*, Washington, published semiannually.

property and physical violence (or the threat thereof), the resulting situation has a greater chance of coming to the attention of the authorities. Criminal behavior thus presents different degrees of visibility, with some activities extremely public, others more ambiguous, and still others so amorphous that there is some question whether they are crimes at all.

Some of the latter offenses fall into a special category of social problems, about which little is known to the general public. These are the so-called "white-collar crimes," which involve the illegal manipulation of credit instruments, the fraudulent sale of securities, the abuse of confidence of investors, the evasion of income tax payments, the betrayal of trust in business or government (graft), and similar complex but illegal behavior.[16] The amount of property lost through such activities is very great. Measured in these terms, white-collar crime may be as serious as "ordinary" crime. Many millions of dollars are annually lost through these illicit activities, wherein there is no violence, no guns or other instruments of physical coercion, and often only a confused realization by the victim that an illegal act has been committed.

White-collar crimes are often not defined as crimes (and hence as social problems) by society as a whole. Many persons directly involved in the perpetration of such acts are not considered criminals but respectable citizens. The complexity of the behavior, the fact that many wealthy persons have engaged in some of these crimes, and the novelty of the activities have combined to obscure their importance as social problems. The mores and laws have not, in many respects, adjusted to the complexities of modern financial methods, and there is often no fixed dividing line between what is legal and what is not. The man who steals a loaf of bread or an automobile has commited an act that is easily understood and that involves behavior defined as a social problem since the beginning of

[16] Edwin H. Sutherland, "White-Collar Criminality," *American Sociological Review*, 5:1–12 (February, 1940). Cf. also Edwin H. Sutherland, *White Collar Crime* (New York: Dryden Press, 1949).

organized society. The man who steals a million dollars through fraud, graft, or illegal manipulation may have an aura of respectability about both his person and his act. His illegal behavior, furthermore, is often so complicated that the average person cannot understand it. Hence the public definition of a social problem does not take shape.

2. *Problems of the Personality.* Every society sets standards for the normal personality and establishes certain acceptable behavior patterns for its members. These standards vary widely from one society to another, but they operate with relative consistency within a given society at the same time. Each individual is given certain roles which he must play with reasonable accuracy if he is to remain a functioning member of the group. The individual who fails, for one reason or another, to conform to his expected role is considered an abnormal, deviant, disorganized, or otherwise antisocial member of society. The presence of a large number of such persons is defined as a social problem.

We shall not consider here the structure of the disorganized personality or the factors that give rise thereto. This analysis will be conducted later below. We are merely concerned here with some of the factors that establish such behavior as a social problem and some of the difficulties in enumerating it. Behavior against the mores is fairly well defined and difficult to measure. Behavior against the law, with certain striking exceptions, is both clearly defined and easy to measure. Behavior involving personality disorganization is easy neither to define nor to measure. Deviations from the norm may be so slight as to be imperceptible or they may be so complete that the individual is instantly recognized as a psychotic. Between eccentricity and psychosis lies the shadowy ground of neurosis, where even psychiatrists fear to tread.

At the end of the year 1946, there were approximately 468,000 patients in the state, country, and city hospitals for the treatment of mental disease. During the calendar year 1946, an estimated 92,000 persons were admitted for the first

time to such institutions.[17] The extent of this phase of personal disorganization is thus known fairly accurately, at least insofar as the number of hospitalizations is concerned. This does *not* mean that the total number of persons suffering from mental disease is known, but only the number hospitalized.

Several factors have increased the number of persons under care for mental disease. *First*, the facilities for such care have steadily increased, thereby adding to the number of hospital beds available. *Second*, the knowledge of these diseases has become more widespread and more persons are encouraged to make use of the expanding facilities. *Third*, the population has moved from rural areas where housing facilities allowed for family care to cities where private facilities for the mentally deranged are not available. *Fourth*, the number of old people in the population and their proportion to the total has steadily increased, thereby adding to those susceptible to the mental diseases of old age. *Fifth*, the number of persons suffering from extreme personality disorganization *may* have increased because of the increasing complexity of modern life.

The number of hospitalizations for mental disease does not represent the whole of the problem. An indeterminate number of psychotics are not confined to institutions and hence escape enumeration. Some are attended by their families, who are either ignorant of public facilities, or are ashamed to admit that mental disease has touched their next of kin. An unknown number of psychotics also carry on, as best they can, as ordinary members of society. Some may perpetrate an especially revolting crime and thereby reveal their true mental state. The majority escape public attention and remain, throughout their lives, a trial to themselves, their families, and their friends.

When we consider the extent of neurotic, as distinguished from psychotic, behavior the situation is even more confused. The definition and genesis of neurosis is completely clear neither to the medical profession nor (certainly) to the general

[17] Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports: Mental Institutions, *Summary Statistics for State, County, and City Mental Hospitals: 1946*, Series P–85, No. 17 (September 10, 1947).

public. Hence even a partial enumeration of neurotics is impossible in the present state of knowledge. The neurotic personality, furthermore, is not completely disorganized. Behavior is often "normal" in many respects and the neurosis is apparent only under special circumstances. This form of personality disorganization is thus neither fully understood nor accurately measured.

3. *Problems of the Family.* We have heretofore considered certain representative problems arising from the failure of the individual to conform to social definition, whether formal or informal. We turn to a social situation involving two or more persons in a group relationship. The efficient functioning of the family involves the adequate performance of reciprocal roles which have been handed down from one generation to the next in the social heritage. The roles of husband and wife are important social patterns; those of the children not as central to the maintenance of the American family as they are in some other societies. The small and intimate group comprising the modern family is completely dependent for its very existence upon the relationships of the two spouses. When these relationships are inefficient, interrupted, or conflicting, the family ceases to function effectively. When these relationships are broken, the family ceases to exist. These general situations constitute the problems of the family.

Many of the relationships of the family come under the category of private, rather than public, behavior. We shall consider these general forms of behavior in detail below, in connection with the question of social action. We need only indicate here that private family behavior comprises sexual incompatibility, personality difficulties, and all the other factors that interfere with the satisfactory operation of the central relationship between husband and wife. Except for small and rather inconclusive samples, information on this private behavior is not available and hence we know very little about its extent. Only when family behavior becomes public —that is, when it directly comes within the purview of the state—can we measure it with reasonable accuracy. Hence our

direct factual knowledge of family conflict is largely confined to its outcome in the divorce courts.

The National Office of Vital Statistics publishes the annual data on divorces in the United States, derived from figures submitted by the several states. This Office was established in 1946 in the Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency, where one of its functions is to collect statistics on marriage and divorce. Prior to 1946, the Bureau of the Census of the Department of Commerce was entrusted with this function. The combined activities of these two offices have made available the statistics on marriages performed and divorces granted in the United States as far back as 1867. In some years, the exact number of divorces is listed, whereas in other years only estimates are available.[18]

In the period from 1867–1947, both marriages and divorces increased at a greater rate than the population as a whole. The population in 1946 was approximately four times as large as it was in 1867, whereas the number of marriages in 1946 was more than six times as great as in 1867. The number of divorces increased by *more than sixty times* during this period, as compared to the four-fold increase in the population. In terms of divorces per 1,000 of the population, the rate increased from 0.3 in 1867 to 4.3 in 1946. In these two related figures—the absolute and relative increase in divorce—is epitomized the social problem of the modern family.[19]

4. *Problems of Minorities.* Behavior contrary to one or more elements in the national creed is the most common of all the major social problems. The national creed includes those elements of democratic faith incorporated in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the public utterances of the great leaders of the country from Thomas Jefferson to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Some of these elements are established in the law of the land, but many more remain in the mores,

[18] *The American Family: A Factual Background,* Report of Inter-Agency Committee on Background Materials, National Conference on Family Life, Washington, May, 1948, pp. 16–17.

[19] Ibid.

where they constitute an important part of the democratic heritage. Equality of opportunity; equality before the law; freedom of speech and worship; and freedom for the individual regardless of race, color, or religion are some of the simple rights in the American creed. Actions contrary to this creed, when committed on a large scale, are defined as social problems. The fundamental values of our society are threatened by prejudice, discrimination, and intolerance.[20]

Violations of the creed weigh heavily upon the national conscience. Millions of men and women are obscurely troubled when they encounter widespread prejudice and discrimination. This spiritual unhappiness is stronger in the North, but it is by no means absent in the South. In the latter region, there are actually two sets of mores, which are mutually exclusive. The one set accepts the democratic creed with its tradition of freedom and equality. The other is based upon a denial of this freedom to a large minority group. Although many individual instances of discrimination occur in the North, the mores do not justify this behavior to the same extent as in the South. So pervasive are the attitudes of prejudice and the practices of discrimination, however, that it would be difficult to find a single individual who has not, in thought or deed, violated the values of the national creed on more than one occasion.

When we come to quantitative measurement of behavior in this field, however, we find relatively little exact information. We do not know as much as we should about either the extent or the intensity of prejudice. Studies of public opinion are not completely adequate, for many persons are unwilling to admit that they are prejudiced. Formal questions are often met by evasions or rationalizations. Many prejudiced persons honestly believe that they are acting on the basis of facts, rather than prejudice, when they judge an individual or a group of individuals solely on the basis of race, nationality, or religion. Difficulties in wording are also apparent in public-opinion polls, with some forms of wording eliciting a greater

[20] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944).

expression of prejudice than others. Two different sets of questions on the same minority group will thus produce two different sets of answers.[21]

Even greater difficulties in measurement arise from the subconscious nature of prejudice. Persons living in the South, where racial prejudice is part of the mores, incorporate these attitudes into their personalities at an early age. By the time they are adults, prejudice has become completely "natural" and seems to be something they have always had. They cannot remember the time when they were *not* prejudiced and these attitudes thus appear to be inborn. Many persons in the North are equally oblivious of the genesis of their prejudices and likewise assume that they were born that way. The discovery of prejudice by the conventional techniques of attitude sampling meets various difficulties of this kind. Prejudice and discrimination are our most important single social problem.

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CHAPTER THREE

Social Problems and Social Values

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL VALUES. Social values are traditional patterns of belief whose maintenance is considered important to group welfare. Social values are thus closely related to the mores, but they are broader in scope and involve more general social situations. Social values are stronger in emotional content than many (but not all) of the mores. Monogamous marriage, private property, democratic government, and Christian worship comprise some of the most important value patterns in our society. These patterns are implicit in the culture and are often taken for granted, rather than explicitly stated. Like the mores, social values are accepted by the majority and are not ordinarily subject to examination. They give meaning to behavior and constitute the criteria by which it is judged. When they are threatened by divergent behavior on a large scale, the resulting situation constitutes a social problem.[1]

Social values are the heart of social problems. In a formal sense, the problem would not arise if the value did not already exist. The value is the intellectual and emotional basis upon

[1] Richard C. Fuller, "The Problem of Teaching Social Problems," *American Journal of Sociology*, 44:415–435 (November, 1938).

which the problem rests. Out of the mass of social behavior, certain activities come in contact with the value-judgments. As we have suggested, some of these activities can be accurately measured and others cannot. Measurement is therefore important, but not fundamental, to the study of social problems. Many acts endangering the very existence of certain values can be measured only indirectly, if at all. Even if the extent of the behavior cannot be measured, however, the social problem is still there. In this sense, social problems are what people think they are. The thinking is based upon social values.

Values are social products. They grow out of the way of life and reflect the aspirations, as well as the spotted actuality, of human existence. Some values grow spontaneously out of the ordered life of the group, whereas others are deliberately superimposed by church, state, or other formal agencies of social control. Many of the latter values may therefore reflect the standards of a minority, rather than the behavior of the majority. The early Christian value of absolute chastity, for example, never reflected the behavior of all of the people, but was propounded as an ideal by the early Fathers. The values grouped about monogamous marriage, on the other hand, were the spontaneous sanctions for an existent behavior pattern.

Social values represent, for the most part, situations that actually existed, or were at least approximated in an earlier and more stable society. Individual divergences could always be found, but they were not sufficiently numerous to threaten the values themselves. Only when the total situation changes does behavior begin to depart drastically from the value. Social problems are often situations where the value once reflected the customary way of life, but where the behavior has subsequently changed. The resulting disparity between behavior and its definition causes the social problem. Permanent monogamy was once the prevailing form of social relationship for the great majority of persons. Any other relationship was inconvenient, expensive, and generally undesirable. Only

when the social setting changed did many persons seek to dissolve their marriages and thereby bring about a social problem.

Social values are popularly assumed to be fixed and immutable standards that have continued unchanged virtually since the beginning of time. Actually, however, values are in process of change, along with everything else in our dynamic society, although the rate of change is usually slower than that of the other elements. In certain fields of family relationships, values have changed rapidly, as the majority first became accustomed to the gainful employment of unmarried women, then to that of widows and divorced women, and finally to that of married women living with their husbands. The place of women is no longer permanently in the home. The value has changed (at least partially) to comply with the new situation.

If social values were not subject to change and instead continued as immutable definitions of the situation, violations would bode ill for social stability. If social values are viewed as susceptible to change along with their related behavior, however, some amelioration is at least theoretically possible. Family disorganization in the form of divorce, for example, will probably continue on a fairly large scale into the proximate future. Several hundred thousand marriages will be broken every year, as the social situation continues to produce instability of the marital relationship. If such a violation of the value of permanent monogamy were viewed with the same consternation as fifty years ago, the family would indeed be in a parlous state. The defining values have changed, however, to accept (if not to favor) this form of behavior.

Social values are produced and transmitted by social interaction. They form an important part of the culture transmitted to the child as he slowly becomes a human being. They comprise the core of the social heritage which gives meaning to human behavior. The material elements may seem superficially to be the most abiding part of culture. But it is the system of values that gives meaning to the material manifestations, whether cathedral, skyscraper, or peasant cottage.

These patterns of meanings are of central importance to the student of social problems. He must be aware of social values before he can understand the nature of the phenomenon he is studying.

SOCIAL VALUES AND PERSONALITY. Social values are central to the culture of a given society and form the core of the personality reared in that society. The social background of the individual determines the values he will hold most tenaciously. They are incorporated in his personality by a spontaneous and uncritical process of social interaction, wherein he accepts without question the values of his family, friends, and social group. The early years are plastic and the child acquires the values of his society because he has no choice. Individual variations occur in the process of inculcation, based upon such considerations as genic equipment, family status, and position of the child within his own family. But the general value-pattern of the person is that of his society. This pattern constitutes the basis upon which he judges behavior and decides what is and what is not a social problem.

Hence the study of social problems is, as we have suggested, intrinsically interesting. The individual is interested in such problems as delinquency, crime, sexual maladjustment, and family disorganization before he has been exposed to any systematic instruction therein. The values defining these problems are at the heart of his personality, implanted there during his formative years. Threats to these values are threats to his own personality and he resists them as tenaciously as possible. Emotions are involved in the defense of these values, as the individual feels his personality threatened. He wants to do something about these situations, but he does not know how to go about it. Knowledge and understanding are basic to intelligent action toward the alleviation of social problems. The present book attempts to provide some of this understanding.

In the course of personality formation, the ego becomes identified with the prevailing values. As here defined, the ego is the central core of the conscious personality. When the ego is identified with a particular value or cluster of values, the

individual will defend them with all the forces at his command. Ego-involvement is the process whereby an individual acquires the values that will ultimately determine his definition of social problems. Values assume different emphasis in different persons, depending upon the individual's unique biological equipment and the set of social relationships to which he is uniquely exposed. Sufficient agreement usually exists among all members of society, however, that a given situation constitutes a threat to social values and is therefore a social problem. In this sense, the ego of each member of a society has certain basic values in common with all the other egos in the same society.[2]

The process of ego-involvement is illustrated by different problem situations. The values of the immediate environment may be those of a delinquent group, rather than those of the larger society. The adolescent may identify himself with the criminal gang and this may eventually bring him into conflict with the value of private property or even human life. In such instances, the behavior is contrary to the values of the larger society. In the aggregate, this situation causes social problems. Failure of such agencies as the family, school, and church to relate the ego to the traditional values of organized society may thus give rise to problem behavior.

The identification of the ego with prevailing social values may also be illustrated by the concept of private initiative. The economy of the United States was, in large measure, founded by persons who uncritically accepted this value. The pioneer, the farmer, and the small businessman were its enthusiastic exponents. The child today learns this value-pattern early in life, whatever his economic status. Later in life, a threat (real or imagined) to this value becomes a threat to the ego and hence a serious social problem. This danger becomes especially vivid when the symbols of "Communism" and "Socialism" are applied to the behavior in question. The average person reacts to these presumed threats to private in-

[2] Cf. Muzafer Sherif and Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Ego-Involvements* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1947).

itiative as attacks on his ego. He cannot dispassionately discuss the merits of behavior labelled with these emotionally-freighted words, any more than the average white Southerner can discuss the race problem with complete calm. The ego is directly involved and the situation becomes a serious problem.

Social values, as noted, are incorporated into the personality at different levels of consciousness. Some values are acquired early in infancy and are thus imbedded deep in the subconscious part of the personality. Many of the values defining the sexual impulse are fixed at this level and come into consciousness only at irregular intervals and under surprising circumstances. The sophisticated person may consciously accept innovations in the sexual behavior of himself or others, whereas subconsciously he may reject these innovations as threats to his early values. Departures from the sexual code thus may become social problems even to the person who considers himself completely emancipated from the taboos and conventions of his early life.

The subconscious part of the personality is probably more conservative than the conscious. In addition to the value-patterns defining sexual behavior there are those centered about the family—its forms, permanence, and relationships. In many cultures and subcultures, religion is another complex pattern of values incorporated early in life and hence resting deep in the subconscious (and conservative) part of the personality. Values relating to sexual behavior, the family, and religion all play important roles in social problems through the values directly and indirectly related to them. Behavior conflicting with or threatening these values comprises some of the most serious problems in our society. Sexual promiscuity, divorce, and (to certain groups) religious disbelief are therefore among the most important contemporary social problems because the subconscious values are most directly threatened.

The individual is often unconscious of many of these central values, or at least is unaware of their role in coloring his reactions to social situations. He may thus believe that he is acting rationally and in response to demonstrable evidence in

certain questions, only to lapse suddenly into a blind, irrational anger against behavior that seems to threaten his cherished values. Many persons react to such presumed threats to their sexual, familial, religious, racial, or property values with an intolerance that could stem only from threats to their own egos. They cannot accept behavior that conflicts with these values because the latter seem eternally and irrevocably right. Solutions to social problems are thus made more difficult by the fact that many persons deny the validity of any values but their own. Their own values seem natural, normal, and eminently desirable. Other values do not.

SOCIAL VALUES AND CAUSATION. Social problems are directly attributable to the existence of social values. If such collective judgments did not exist, social problems would be unknown. Other elements are necessary to social problems, but the value is the key. At the same time, all societies have social values, but all societies do not have social problems. Changes in behavior, conflicts between behavior and related values, and a belief in purposive social action are all necessary to the final emergence of a social problem. But the problem is directly caused by the value, in both the logical and the actual sense.[3]

Social problems also arise because values are incorporated into social institutions, which in turn produce the undesirable situation. The value is the central part of the institution, the "concept" in Sumner's terminology.[4] The structure is evolved to carry out the purposes implicit in the value. But in the process of evolution other values are threatened, thereby giving rise to social problems. In a society whose institutions are well integrated and hence comparatively static, these problem situations rarely arise. All of the elements of such societies are united for a few common purposes and instances of one institution interfering with the values of another are rare. In our own society, however, interference of this kind is common.

[3] Richard C. Fuller and Richard R. Myers, "The Natural History of a Social Problem," *American Sociological Review*, 6:320–329 (June, 1941).

[4] William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906), pp. 53–55.

The basic institutions generate problems in other fields because of the nature of their central values. This is not a desirable state of affairs, but it is inevitable in a dynamic society. That is one reason why we have social problems.[5]

We may illustrate this central role of the institutional value. Racial discrimination is the product of institutional patterns embodying social values based upon racial prejudice, racial purity, and white supremacy. These patterns are important to the people of the South, even though they give rise to situations defined by others as social problems. The values of national sovereignty lie at the heart of the elaborate institutional structure of the modern state. Conflicts between states involve the integrity of this value and may ultimately take the form of war, which is one of the basic problems of our time. The institution of the family is based upon several related values, among them the stipulations that sexual relations shall be conducted only in marriage and that children shall be born only to married persons. This pattern gives rise to the social problems of extramarital relations and illegitimacy, which are considered unfortunate but not sufficiently important to change the underlying values of the family. The economic system is based upon the values of private enterprise and private profit. When it is no longer profitable to employ a man, he is discharged, thereby giving rise (in the aggregate) to the social problem of unemployment.

Social values are therefore two-edged swords, which cut both ways. They represent beliefs which our society considers necessary to its continued welfare. The central institutions—the family, church, school, state, and the rest—are based upon these value patterns. At the same time, however, the institutions give rise to situations which are dangerous to other values and hence defined as social problems. Many of the most desirable and the most undesirable aspects of our society are thus different aspects of the same values. Family love and prostitution, honesty and crime, group loyalty and racial prejudice, private property and unemployment—these and many other

[5] Richard C. Fuller and Richard R. Myers, op. cit.

forms of problem behavior represent two sides of the social value. Society is a complex and interrelated whole, sustained by the belief in common values. Social problems are the reverse side of the shield.

We have seen that behavior has no meaning until it is defined. Some individual acts are private and have only slight social significance. Others are considered normal and desirable. Still others represent deviations from social values and hence are social problems. Different societies erect positive and negative judgments about the same behavior. Some groups invest the process of eating with restrictions and taboos, whereby this behavior must not take place in public, must be preceded with various ceremonies, and must be attended by still other ritualistic acts. Other groups hold the processes of exchange to be extremely important and invest these economic relationships with powerful sanctions. Still others hold that their chief function on earth is to propitiate the tribal gods and accordingly spend most of their time in elaborate religious ceremonials.

Our society has long considered sexual relations as extremely serious and important, as indeed they are in terms of reproduction of the species. Even apart from these reproductive manifestations, however, Christian culture has defined sexual intercourse as perhaps the most important human relationship and hence as a central source of social problems. Sexual relations outside of marriage, whether forced or carried on by mutual consent, are severely judged and severely repressed. Many primitive societies treat adolescent sexual behavior as private and hence not important to social welfare. Our own society has traditionally viewed such behavior as a threat to its entire social structure. The sexual act must be defined before it has social meaning. This definition comes from the social value.

Similarly, private property is the product of social definition. The ownership of land and its transmission from generation to generation are social relationships, variously defined by

different societies. Some societies maintain communal ownership of the land for grazing purposes; hence one person cannot "steal" another's land since private property does not exist in this form. A pastoral society therefore evolves one set of property values, an agricultural society another, and a capitalistic society still another. The values pertaining in our own society give rise to problems that are peculiar thereto.

Many of the most cherished values of our society are pecuniary and materialistic and stress the desirability of having and spending large sums of money, often with little regard for the source. Money is defined as a value in its own right, to be sought even at the possible sacrifice of other values. This emphasis upon monetary valuation is one (among many other) casual factors of our high crime rate. Persons unable to obtain sufficient money for what they consider their legitimate needs may resort to criminal means to remedy this condition. This illegal activity may take the form of the grosser types of crime, such as robbery with a gun, burglary, or criminal assault with intent to rob. It may also take the less violent forms of embezzlement, fraud, graft, and similar genteel types of crime. In either event, the prevailing emphasis upon pecuniary values has resulted in activities considered contrary to social welfare and therefore constituting social problems.

Social values play a causational role in still other problems. The integrity of the family has long been maintained by emphasizing the importance of marriage before the birth of the child. Except under unusual conditions, when marriage takes place after conception, children are not supposed to be conceived out of wedlock. The values are unmistakable on this score and any considerable number of "illegitimate" births has always constituted a grave social problem. The girl about to become an unmarried mother will therefore make every effort to conceal the evidence of her transgression. She may resort to abortion, infanticide, abandonment, or even suicide. All of these actions are themselves social problems. Hence one set of value-judgments produces social problems in related

fields, as the harassed individual tries to comply with the values that seem most important at the time.[6]

SOCIAL VALUES IN CONFLICT. The determination of social problems is not always completely clear. Considerable difference of opinion may exist as to whether or not a given situation is a social problem. Definitions of the same behavior vary between groups, with a resulting confusion in the delineation of social problems. This disparity is characteristic of a dynamic society, in which values and behavior are in constant (although usually uneven) change. We have heretofore considered situations where an approximate consensus of values and a virtual unanimity of opinion exists as to the nature of the problem. It is also important to consider situations where no such consensus obtains.

Social problems in this category have been called "moral" problems, indicating a fundamental lack of agreement as to the very existence of any violation of the values. "The moral problem," says Fuller, "represents a condition on which there is no unanimity of opinion throughout the society that the condition is undesirable in every instance. . . . With the moral problem," he continues, "we have a basic and primary confusion in social values which goes much deeper than the questions of solution which trouble us in the ameliorative problem." [7] The employment of children under fourteen years of age at certain dangerous and difficult jobs is widely considered a social problem, threatening as it does the values inherent in the democratic belief in equality of education, individual opportunity, and the like. For certain groups, on the other hand, this is not a social problem at all. Some businessmen consider it desirable to give a child practical experience at an early age—and incidentally maintain a cheap and amenable labor force. Some religious groups regard the prohibition of child labor by statute as an interference with the rights of the family and hence another kind of social prob-

[6] Richard C. Fuller and Richard R. Myers, "Some Aspects of a Theory of Social Problems," *American Sociological Review*, 6:24–32 (February, 1941), p. 26.

[7] Ibid., p. 30.

lem. In each instance, two or more sets of values are in conflict.

War is another situation where a conflict in social values may exist. War is accepted by most people as one of the most serious problems of our day. During the long millennia when warfare was conducted by professional soldiers with hand weapons, the resultant expense and annoyance were considerable, but the social structure itself was not threatened. In the days of mass citizen armies, atomic weapons, and bacteriological warfare, the threat to organized society has become acute. In terms of loss of life, destruction of property, and disorganization of normal social relationships, war would appear to be a central social problem. Even professional soldiers publicly deplore war and refer to it as a social problem.

In another sense, however, war is not considered a social problem, or at least not as serious as other problems. The values threatened or destroyed by war are not regarded as important as those threatened or destroyed by foreign domination or destruction of the national state. The values grouped about the modern state evoke the loyalty of the majority of persons in the Western world. These values are more sacred than life itself and must be defended at all costs, even at the risk of war. The nation has no inherent compulsion to go to war in defense of its rights. There is no "instinct of pugnacity" in the individual, which can be satisfied only through armed conflict. But nations still go to war, often willingly and with a thrilling sense of participation in a great moral crusade, even though their leaders (and many of the people) are conscious of the social problems that accompany it. War thus remains a social problem, but one which nations will face in defense of certain values and thereby avoid what seems to be an even more serious problem.

Another conflict of values accompanies racial discrimination in the South. As we have suggested, two sets of values are present, one incorporated in the caste structure of the South and the other embodied in the democratic creed that is the

common heritage of the nation as a whole. Under the first pattern, prejudice is taken for granted and discrimination is accepted as necessary to the stability of the caste system. On these terms, discrimination is not a social problem to the majority of white people in the South, at least not on the conscious level. Most of them are convinced of the necessity and desirability of discrimination in order to preserve the underlying values of white supremacy and "racial purity."

The social development of the other sections of the country has taken a different form from that of the South, and the mores do not expressly sanction discrimination. The values of the democratic creed are stronger in the North than those sanctioning prejudice and discrimination, and these practices are therefore defined as social problems. The rest of the country is by no means free of prejudice, and racial discrimination is widely practiced on an individual basis. But these practices are viewed with distaste even by many persons who engage in them, for they have no set of mores that unofficially condones such violations of the democratic creed. In general, therefore, the conflict in values is such that racial discrimination is a social problem in one section and not in another.

Even this statement must be qualified to present the complete picture. Despite the conscious acceptance of discrimination in the South, there remains a strong accompanying element of subconscious and collective guilt. Endless arguments are advanced, endless rationalizations offered, endless justifications proposed for a practice which, if perfectly in accord with all aspects of the value-pattern, would require no such explanation. The average southerner will deny the existence of any "problem" in the relationships between the races. At the same time, his conversation, his thoughts, and, probably, his dreams are virtually obsessed with this problem, often to the virtual exclusion of any other topic. There is thus a conscious denial of the problem, accompanied by a subconscious realization that a serious problem exists. Basic values of the American creed are seriously threatened by discrimination and the individual is vaguely aware of the threat. The very

vehemence of their conscious protestations suggests that the problem obscurely troubles the conscience of the South. The problem of racial discrimination is extremely complex, perhaps the most complex in our society. This is not an attempt to explain the race problem in a paragraph, but merely to illustrate the conflict of values.[8]

SOCIAL VALUES AS OBSTRUCTIONS. Social problems exist, as we have suggested, because we hold certain values and incorporate them in our institutions. The institutions produce situations that infringe upon other values. Modern society, with its intricate and reciprocal patterns of behavior and values, produces problems in the "normal" course of events. The elimination or amelioration of many problems is made difficult because the social action runs counter to other values. The solution, if any, thus depends in part on the strength of the competing values. People tend to do the things they consider most important, which means that they will attempt to conform to their most powerful values. In so doing, they may infringe upon other values that are equally important to other people, thereby setting up a chain reaction of social problems.

This obstructionist role of social values is apparent in the case of the slum. Most people are agreed that substandard housing is a social problem, since it denies equality of opportunity, a decent home, desirable surroundings for children, and other values associated with democratic family life. The slum also produces other social problems, such as juvenile delinquency, sexual promiscuity, and family disorganization. Millions of persons live in slums, in obvious violation of democratic values. This situation is not an act of God, but a condition that can (theoretically) be remedied by constructive social action. Engineering knowledge, building materials, and skilled labor are all available in sufficient quantities to change the face of the slum areas of the nation in a comparatively short time.

Attempts to initiate this action, however, immediately run counter to entrenched value-judgments. Slum property is a

[8] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944).

profitable investment, since maintenance costs have been reduced or eliminated, improvements are negligible, and many persons live in a single room, thereby increasing the gross rental. Property values involved in the slum are also very powerful, especially when the building is owned by leading financial, educational, and religious institutions. Furthermore, if rentals on new housing are to be sufficiently low so that the erstwhile slum dwellers can afford to live there, the builder cannot charge enough rent to allow a reasonable profit. The government is the only agency that can afford the luxury of housing the very poor. The values of private enterprise are summoned at this stage, and the enemies of public housing evoke the symbols of Communism and Socialism. Any large-scale solution to the slum problem thus becomes lost in a maze of conflicting value-judgments.[9]

Action against other problems may similarly threaten related values. The birth of some seventy-five thousand children out of wedlock every year in the United States is universally considered a social problem. For both the unmarried mother and her unwanted child, the situation is a personal tragedy, and society has traditionally been merciless in its punishment of "innocent" and "guilty" alike. The values of sexual morality are so strong that any tangible departure therefrom brings down all the outraged wrath of society upon the individual participants. From every point of view, illegitimacy is thus a social problem. Its repercussions are even more devastating inasmuch as the majority of illegitimate children are born not to hardened prostitutes, fixed in their transgressions of sexual morality, but to young, ignorant, and inexperienced girls, many of whom are having their first sexual experience.

Possible solutions to the problem of illegitimacy include sex education in the secondary schools and the legalized dissemination of contraceptive information. The very mention of either of these programs is met with such resistance that

[9] Louis Wirth (ed.), *Contemporary Social Problems* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

there is no possibility of their immediate adoption. The possible elimination of one problem would, in the public mind, increase the danger of other and more serious problems, since many persons are convinced that sex education and the dissemination of contraceptive information would immediately result in a disastrous increase in extramarital sexual relations. Such an outcome would be a more serious problem than the situation which it was designed to remedy.

Even powerful value-judgments, however, may eventually change and thereby cease to interfere with the solutions of problems. Venereal disease has long been a dread specter to Western man, with syphilis and gonorrhea acting as twin punishments for those who transgressed the sexual code—and often to their wives and children as well. These diseases were once widely regarded as retributions for offenses against the sexual mores, and public opinion was correspondingly unwilling to develop or publicize scientific methods of prevention, treatment, or cure. A conspiracy of silence enveloped the very names of these diseases, on the ground that they were (for the most part) acquired in illicit sexual congress and hence were unmentionable.

In recent decades, these values have changed sufficiently to allow their comparatively free discussion and even to sanction public health programs directed toward their eventual eradication. A variety of factors contributed to this change in values. The work of the United States Public Health Service, under the direction of Surgeon-General Parran, was perhaps the most important single agency in this process.[10] The discoveries of the "miracle" drugs and the attendant widespread publicity brought the problem to the attention of the public in scientific terms. The greater freedom of social relationships in general, and sexual relationships in particular, undoubtedly contributed to this change. The traditional taboos have not been lifted here to the same extent as in Sweden, where individual treatment is mandatory as a public health measure.

[10] Thomas Parran, *Shadow on the Land—Syphilis* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1937).

Nevertheless, the changes that *have* taken place indicate that moral judgments, even in the explosive field of sex, can change.

SOCIAL VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY. Social values also interfere with action in situations where agreement exists on the existence of the problem. In many fields, such as crime, almost everyone is agreed that a threat to certain values is present and the situation is accordingly deplored. The values of life and property are so important that, for all practical purposes, unanimity can be reached among all persons of all shades of opinion and walks of life. Even persons who commit crimes, with the possible exception of professional criminals, agree that such behavior in others is undesirable and threatens the existence of organized society.

This agreement does not extend to matters of policy in the prevention and treatment of crime. Here again value-judgments complicate public policy, often to the point of frustrating any constructive efforts toward the elimination of crime. Many persons believe that a tendency to criminal behavior is inherent in the genic equipment of certain individuals, nations, or races and that little can be done to modify these innate predispositions. Persons with even a minimum of exposure to the social sciences know that innate criminality does not exist and that crime is primarily a social phenomenon. Hence social (rather than biological) action is necessary to deal with crime and any program based on other assumptions is completely inadequate.

The value-judgments underlying this difference of opinion extend into many other fields of social problems. The believer in biological causation tends to be conservative in other matters, whereas the exponent of social causation tends to be more liberal in his attitudes and values. We shall consider these two basic value-patterns in the following chapter in connection with social action. It is important to indicate here the role of these value-judgments in connection with public policy. The biological determinist will wish to experiment on the genic equipment of the individual, ethnic group, or racial

type, on the fallacious assumption that most crime is the result of such factors. No adequate solution to the social problem of crime can be reached on the basis of such presuppositions.

Even when agreement has been reached that crime is largely a social product, value-judgment still prevent agreement on the best methods of dealing with the situation. Some persons would concentrate on the prevention of crime, others on the rehabilitation of criminals. The latter would emphasize the reformation of adult criminals, whereas the former would insist that a beginning must be made earlier in the life of the potential criminal. An attack on both these fronts is, of course, necessary to the constructive solution to crime, on whose existence as a social problem all men of good will are agreed. Only the policy differences reflect the conflict in values.

These conflicts are finally reflected in the popular explanations of criminal behavior on the social level. Some persons maintain that lack of religion is the fundamental cause of delinquency and crime. They fail to realize that many of the urban areas where delinquency and crime are highest are also the areas where organized religion is strongest. Lack of religion alone is hardly an adequate explanation for criminal behavior. Others are convinced that poverty is the basic cause of crime. They do not realize that, while most "ordinary" criminals are poor, most poor people are not "ordinary" criminals. Economic conditions clearly constitute one of the important causal factors in criminal behavior, but they are not the only ones. Reforms of the economic system would unquestionably eliminate many crimes; it is doubtful if they would eradicate crime completely. These and other differences of opinion on the causation and treatment of crime reflect the value-judgments of various groups, each naturally stressing its own cherished values and attributing the problem behavior to the violation thereof. Action implementing one such point of view will also threaten the values at the heart of other positions. The social problems are often no nearer to solution.

In the field of family disorganization, values also produce conflicts on the policy level. Divorce is widely regarded as a threat to a fundamental value and hence as a social problem, even though a growing number accept this behavior in themselves and others. The concept of permanent monogamy is still deeply imbedded in our society, however, and most people would like to see this value strengthened, rather than progressively weakened. On the question of action, however, value-judgments immediately present complications. Some would forbid all divorce and make the dissolution of the family illegal for any reason. Others would merely "tighten" the existing laws and try to make divorce more difficult, on the theory that many couples would then continue their marriages rather than submit to additional trouble and expense.

Others would go about the problem in an entirely different way. They would concentrate on better marriages to begin with and on modern therapeutic techniques with marriages already begun. These programs would involve education for marriage in the secondary schools and colleges, premarital counseling, and the establishment of marriage clinics, where husbands and wives could secure expert counsel on their marital problems before entering the divorce courts as a last resort. A program of marriage education in the public schools, however, would immediately encounter the outraged reaction that adolescents were receiving instruction which would lead to sexual immorality through increased premarital experimentation. Under the traditional value-pattern, a minimum of discussion of such matters is permitted, especially at the time of adolescence when the individual would naturally be most interested. Inasmuch as marriage is primarily a social relationship,[11] the logic of maximum instruction in these relationships would appear to be strong. The values maintaining a taboo on the mention of these relationships, however, are still powerful.

Still other complications in value-judgments arise in deal-

[11] Francis E. Merrill, *Courtship and Marriage* (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1949).

ing with divorce as a social problem. Romantic love is an important element in our value-pattern, stressing as it does the individual choice of the marriage partner. Romantic love is accepted without question by the great majority, who do not understand that individual marital choice also implies the right to divorce when romance has presumably gone. Two conflicting values are here presented. Marriage by family arrangement instead of individual choice would probably reduce the divorce rate by substituting other and more stable values for romance as the basis for marriage. Any such change in courtship arrangements, however, is unthinkable in a society whose most important single value involves individual freedom in all fields. The divorce figures suggest that permanent monogamy is increasingly threatened by individual choice, with all that this latter value implies.

"In the last analysis," therefore, "social problems arise and are sustained because people do not share the common values and objectives." [12] Social values are thus the central elements in social problems at all levels. Persons with one set of values may deny that any problem exists, whereas those with another set are outraged by the same situation. Once the existence of a social problem is agreed upon, values may obstruct its solution by presenting ideological roadblocks to constructive social action. Values may also make social action more difficult by introducing differences of opinion on practical policy. Action toward the elimination of one situation may produce an even more serious problem for others whose values are thereby threatened.

Hence conflicts in value judgments produce and complicate even the most (apparently) simple social problem. Social values are the general beliefs by which men live. In a changing society, conflicts arise between these beliefs and the way many persons actually behave. In a democratic and progressive society, there is always hope that these differences can be reconciled by social action. At this point, the social values introduce secondary complications by presenting other reasons why a

[12] Richard C. Fuller and Richard R. Myers, op. cit., p. 321.

certain action should not be taken. At every point in the consideration of social problems, from their origin to their solution, social values play a central role.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Social Problems and Social Action

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL ACTION. The final element in a social problem is the assumption that social action can eliminate or modify the undesirable situation. Social problems are peculiar to modern, progressive, and democratic societies which believe (at least in theory) in the improvement of man and his institutions through collective activity. The concept of change toward a desirable goal was called Progress during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when it was believed that a better world was the inevitable result of a rational evolution. The discoveries of science, the increased industrial productive capacities, and the steady growth of population were among the factors producing the comfortable assumption that mankind was progressing steadily and inevitably toward an era of permanent happiness and prosperity. Two World Wars and the shadow of a third have somewhat dulled the luster of this belief in ultimate perfectibility. Out of this intellectual atmosphere has grown the related (but not identical) belief that purposive social action must be taken if the major social problems are to be solved.

In feudal and static societies, social problems do not exist because inequalities are assumed to be part of the divine order.

The institutions supporting these societies teach acceptance of the inequalities of this life on the ground that they will be eliminated in a life to come. The new life is everlasting and hence of greater relative importance than the brief span on earth. In a society that accepts these doctrines, only a few visionary reformers believe that undesirable social situations can be changed and poverty and plague permanently eliminated. The rope and the stake are often the only earthly reward of those who dare to question the desirability of the *status quo*.

These societies are by no means indifferent to poverty, sickness, and suffering. Their explanation of the causes of these conditions, however, differs from that of democratic and progressive societies. The accepted solution of the static society is a return to religion or an increased propitiation of the gods, rather than to human activity. Divine intervention, therefore, rather than social action is the basis for solving undesirable situations. The belief that man alone, by his own collective efforts, can improve his lot on earth is comparatively recent. Social problems are therefore an indication of a change from a sacred to a secular society, from a society where resistance to change is at a maximum to one where it is at a minimum. Only in a secular society do men believe that they can, by their own efforts, change the conditions of their way of life. A secular democracy is not only conscious of social inequality but believes that something can be done about it.

The conception of social, as contrasted to individual, action is even more recent than the belief in democratic action as such. Societies rooted in the Protestant ethic believe that action should come from the individual and that the solutions to social problems are primarily individual in character. The implication is that the individual (whose behavior in the aggregate constitutes the social problem) deliberately misbehaves because of a flaw in his moral character. Under these tenets, therefore, social action has largely taken the form of legislation making certain behavior so difficult or unpleasant that the individual will voluntarily refrain therefrom. This

conception is still at the heart of the treatment of the criminal and many other types of social action in our society.

This type of social action is not successful in eliminating problem situations because it is based upon insufficient understanding of human behavior. Problems do not ordinarily arise because individuals wilfully transcend their status and role. Human behavior is far more complex than such a simple, rational explanation would suggest. Moral suasion and legal action are based upon the conception of man as a rational animal. He *is* a rational animal, but he is also an emotional, instinctual, and visceral animal. This does not imply the elimination of moral judgments from social action, for our entire analysis is based upon the recognition of the basic role of values in social problems. We merely suggest that moral judgments should be supplemented by scientific considerations in implementing social action.

SOCIAL ACTION AND PUBLIC BEHAVIOR. In terms of social action, problem behavior is of two general types, which we may call "public" and "private" behavior. Public behavior is that which can be directly alleviated or eliminated by governmental action, whereas private behavior involves the individual conscience and does not ordinarily lend itself to direct ameliorative efforts. Unemployment is an example of public behavior and divorce is an example of private behavior. Public behavior calls for direct social action, which can presumably change the institutional pattern producing the undesirable situation. Private behavior can be changed only indirectly because of its personal character. In practice, these two types merge imperceptibly into each other, but for purposes of analysis they can be examined separately.

The democratic nation is becoming a welfare state, dedicated to the proposition that government can and should change the conditions giving rise to many social problems. Poverty, unemployment, ill-health, mental deficiency, old-age insecurity, and venereal disease are among the matters that have become the concern of the state to an extent never before believed possible or desirable. The efforts of many trained

persons and annual appropriations running into billions of dollars are enlisted in these welfare efforts. The existence of the welfare state is itself a social problem to a (declining) number of persons who remember the carefree days when such matters were the concern of the individual, the family, the church, and, in exceptional cases, the village authorities.

The alleviation of social problems in the field of public behavior was once the exclusive function of the local agencies. During the long development of Western European society, the principal institutions for social welfare were the family and the church. The latter was the bulwark of a feudal society and its most powerful institution. Few persons questioned the ultimate desirability of the feudal order which, after all, provided a measure of security and stability for the common man. In this society, problem situations were defined either as Acts of God or as acts of lazy, improvident, or sinful men. The individual condition of these unfortunates was improved by charity as much as was consistent with social stability. The emphasis in these situations was upon the moral factors that presumably gave rise thereto.

The family was the other welfare agency in the feudal society. It combined with the church to care for the victims of poverty, ill-health, and old age. Its role has changed considerably since that time and this change has reflected broad modifications in the social structure. The family has become urbanized; roomy houses have been replaced by small apartments; and the aged and the infirm can no longer be supported in the home. Private insurance and Social Security now provide for some of the financial difficulties inevitable in the new society. The family can no longer protect its members from many of the crises of modern society, no matter how hard it may try. Assistance in the field of public behavior has perforce been assumed by the state.

Social problems growing out of economic insecurity are thus more effectively modified by government action. Unemployment insurance, old-age and survivors' insurance, old-age pensions, health insurance, widows' pensions, care for de-

pendent children, and workmen's compensation are some of the procedures established to meet the public needs of the individual in an industrial society. In addition to caring for the individual victims, the modern state has assumed the responsibility for regulating the entire economic system, so that cyclical fluctuations either do not occur or so that their impact upon public behavior is considerably softened. It remains to be seen how effective a democratic government, with its conflicting pressure groups, will be in performing this new and ambitious form of social action.

Another form of public behavior coming within the purview of the welfare state is the care and treatment of the mentally deranged. The psychotic was formerly believed to be possessed by evil spirits and hence was treated as a moral leper. Such public facilities as existed for the care of the mentally deranged were literally "Bedlams" and the inmates were a source of amusement, mixed with fascinated horror. Even among scientists, this form of behavior has only recently been completely removed from the realm of the supernatural. The popular attitude toward mental disease is still colored by attitudes only slightly removed from the Middle Ages. Most sufferers from mental disease, moreover, were cared for by the family before the gradual installation of public facilities. Governmental action in this direction is comparatively recent and offers another example of the expanding role of the state in the treatment of public behavior.

SOCIAL ACTION AND PRIVATE BEHAVIOR. All social problems do not lend themselves equally to the meliorative efforts of the democratic state. Private behavior involves social values in the field of morality, wherein questions of right and wrong replace those of economic insecurity and physical inadequacy. State action is thus more difficult with private behavior, for many such problems concern only the individual and God. Attempts are occasionally made by the democratic state to act in this delicate field, but such invasions of private morality are often unhappy. The Prohibition experiment fol-

lowing World War I was an example of such an abortive attempt to control personal behavior.

Despite the obvious difficulties of public action in the amelioration of private behavior, many persons cling to a belief in the efficacy of such action. The problem of divorce, as we have noted, is often believed susceptible to legal action through tightening the divorce laws. The national government might, in theory, prohibit all divorce and thereby eliminate the problem. Such an action, however, is clearly an invasion of individual freedom, which is a basic democratic value. One of the most jealously guarded aspects of this freedom is the right to marry (and divorce) whom one chooses, without the necessity of parental, ecclesiastical, or bureaucratic sanction. Free individual choice would be curtailed by forbidding divorce, thereby endangering one of the central values of this country.

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Family relationships are, furthermore, an integral part of the social structure. It is impossible to single out one of these relationships without changing the entire structure. The present high divorce rate has resulted from such diverse factors as the urbanization of the population; the gainful employment of women; the organization of business and industry; the increase in secondary and higher education; and the rise of the cult of romantic love. Effective legislation against divorce would necessarily be accompanied by legislation forbidding or severely limiting the employment, higher education, and general emancipation of women. In addition, a large proportion of the population would have to be sent back to the land. Such arbitrary changes in status and role would never become law in our society. The problem of family disorganization is thus extremely complex and reflects many fundamental changes in the structure of society.

Difficulties also arise in the definition of public and private behavior. Public behavior presumably comes under the jurisdiction of the state, as the agency dealing with the broadest aspects of social welfare. Private behavior is presumably the

concern of the individual, the family, and the church. An amendment to the constitution of the United States forbidding child labor was passed by the Congress more than two decades ago, but it has never been ratified by the requisite number of states. Opposition to this amendment comes from a number of sources, one of which is the Catholic Church. This institution has taken the position that the regulation of this behavior is the function of the family and the church. Hence the government has no jurisdiction in this field. This question is one of the definition of public and private behavior, with the latter defined as outside the jurisdiction of the state.

Problems involving the right of the individual to worship in his own fashion have traditionally been defined as private in this country. The power of the state is not used to enforce religious conformity, as has been the case in other countries. So firmly established is this principle of religious freedom that any attempt to eliminate such a problem as nonattendance at church, for example, would be met with fierce resentment. The distinction between public and private behavior in this field is recognized by the majority of persons, and the state does not attempt to change private behavior. The incursion of the state into such matters would violate the value of freedom of worship and thereby constitute a social problem in itself.

Sexual behavior has both private and public connotations. In one sense, it is the most private possible behavior and is marked by an extreme sensitivity to any outside intrusion. But it also has repercussions in the public domain, necessitating ameliorative action by the state. Venereal disease is one example of such a situation, illegitimacy another. Until recently, as noted, venereal disease was regarded as the just retribution for private immoral behavior. The consequences were assumed to be the private concern of the individual, even as his sexual behavior was a matter between himself and his conscience. The majority of persons in a democratic state, however, now accept the public implications of sexual be-

havior and of the state health activities in their prevention and treatment. Most people no longer assume that the individual who has transgressed the sexual mores should suffer the physical consequences thereof, along with his innocent family. The discovery of the miracle drugs has changed the traditional point of view in this field. The establishment of clinics, universal treatment at nominal fees, and education in the prevention of venereal disease have become standard practice in the democratic countries. Behavior once considered private is now accepted, in certain aspects at least, as a matter of public concern.

Governmental efforts to alleviate another social problem have not met with overwhelming success, partly on the ground that the behavior is private and hence not within the purview of the state. We refer to racial and religious prejudice. The social values centered about the caste system constitute, as we have noted, an important element in the personality of millions of individuals and hence prejudice is difficult to eliminate. The personal nature of prejudice means that the individual considers it private behavior and hence not subject to state regulation. Legislation is thus met with resentment and sabotage by those who are, in effect, jealously guarding their presumed right to hold prejudice against their fellow citizens because of race or religion.

SOCIAL ACTION AND DEMOCRACY. The realization that co-operative activity can modify undesirable social situations, that such efforts are the legitimate concern of this world, and that such activity itself is a social value constitute the chief democratic contributions to social problems. The realization of this value has been a gradual process, advancing at varying speeds in different fields, and still far from complete. In this development, democratic values have encountered many vested interests, both pecuniary and emotional. Different groups have their own values which they wish to preserve, even at the cost of perpetuating other problems. The role of co-operative action in the elimination of social problems is still

neither completely understood nor accepted by the citizens of the democratic state. The status of public and private behavior in contemporary society is still confused.

The belief in social action is, however, gradually replacing the uncritical belief in progress that marked the social climate of the nineteenth century. Most people no longer believe that certain elements inherent in human nature and the social structure automatically make for change in a desirable direction. Instead of inevitable change, guided by the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith, the majority of people are coming to believe, however dimly, in purposive social action. Such action moves along different lines and at different rates of speed. Change will continue to occur whether we consciously direct it or not. But this change must be directed, so far as possible, by purposive social action if social problems are to be eliminated.

The belief in individual, as opposed to group, action is still a central value in our society and one that conflicts on many levels with democratic action. Many people, therefore, still view with suspicion the efforts of any agency larger than the family to ameliorate or eliminate undesirable social situations. These persons resist the activities of the government in economic and social welfare with the same fervor that they resist its intrusions into their private lives in sex or religion. Some forms of behavior logically call for group action, whereas others do not. Unreasoning objections to group action in *any* field, however, merely perpetuate many problems.

The depression of the 1930's produced a widespread change in attitude toward social action in public behavior. Many of the innovations of this period are now universally accepted. Social security in its various forms—unemployment insurance, old-age and survivors' insurance, old-age pensions, aid to mothers with dependent children, and the like—is now part of the accepted social structure and no major group would even attempt to turn the clock back on these reforms. Both political parties are now committed to these general policies, and the only questions are those of organization

and administration. Social security has itself become one of the basic values of the democratic state.

With the increasing complexity of society, many situations have been removed from the realm of private behavior and have become public behavior. The interconnections of modern society are so intricate and far-flung that behavior may affect many persons other than the immediate participants. The days are over when the members of the family, the village, or the parish could lead self-contained lives, caring for their aged, unemployed, and infirm, and not going outside of their own small orbits. Care for the aged, treatment of the mentally deranged, and insurance for the unemployed have ceased to be private and have become public problems, financed and administered by the democratic state. Smaller social units formerly dealt with these and other undesirable situations without outside help. Indeed, there were no large welfare units in the modern sense, except the church. The democratic state is now the only agency with both the resources and the prestige to act in many fields formerly considered the sole prerogatives of the family and the church.

This trend has not resulted from the deliberate quest for power of an ambitious group of bureaucrats. It is rather the groping but inevitable response to a new situation. Never before has society been so complex, changed so rapidly, or presented so many forms of dislocation and disorganization. The majority of persons in the United States, with the Puritan and pioneer traditions strong in their social values, have been unsympathetic to governmental action in problem situations. In spite of this strong ideological opposition, however, the central government has assumed the central role in dealing with many social problems. Something had to be done to alleviate or eliminate a variety of pressing situations. The federal government was the only agency that could do it.

The democratic state is faced with a crucial choice, involving the questions of social action and individual freedom, public and private behavior. The day has passed when the individual, the family, or the local community can operate effec-

tively in dealing with many social problems. The financial and administrative demands are too great to be met by any agency other than the national state. A system of social security is essential to a modern, industrial society. The organization and financing of such a system require the resources and personnel of the nation as a whole. These and other problems involving public behavior must be met by the state if they are to be met at all.

At the same time, the tendency toward centralization in other fields is increasing. The modern dilemma is how to combine security in public behavior with freedom in private behavior. Many European countries have, consciously or not, chosen the first at the expense of the second. The long and fiercely held tradition of individual freedom in our society has strengthened this value and at the same time has made its possible loss a greater problem than in many other societies. Social problems must be solved somehow if the democratic state is to survive. The question is what problems shall be met by the state and what by the individual. The conflict of values between public security and private freedom is acute and perhaps insoluble. This conflict is a central problem of our day.

ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL PROBLEMS. Social problems are primarily *social* in character and causation. Most social problems are the product of society and are not inherent in the biological equipment of man. This sociological truism is not fully understood, even by those with some acquaintance with the social sciences. As for the general public, many of them still think of social problems as somehow vaguely rooted in the inborn heritage. But such problems as poverty, unemployment, race prejudice, delinquency, crime, sexual promiscuity, and divorce do not arise from any inherent physiological weakness, shiftlessness, dishonesty, depravity, infidelity, or moral turpitude. These forms of behavior reflect a particular society with a particular set of value-judgments by which the behavior is judged. These values do not come down in the germ plasm, but are part of the social heritage. In short, both behavior and value judgments represent *learned* behavior.

All social problems are not exclusively social. Many situations involve the physical weaknesses, infirmities, and lack of inherent capabilities of human beings. Sickness, mental deficiency, and old-age insecurity are representative social problems with a clear physiological foundation. But most contemporary problems are not of this kind. The physical heritage of the average delinquent, criminal, or prostitute is perfectly adequate to the ordinary demands of life. Their inherent mental equipment is sufficient for the roles they are called upon to play. They are still young and vigorous enough to take care of themselves, provided they can find work. Most social problems, in short, are not the result of biological factors but reflect the vicissitudes of a changing, disorganized, and democratic society.

The awareness of the social nature of social problems varies between groups and classes. It is considerably greater among liberals than among conservatives. For our purposes, the liberal accepts both social change and its consequences, whereas the conservative attempts first to deny social change and then to delay its advancement. The attitude toward social problems, furthermore, constitutes a fundamental distinction between liberals and conservatives. The latter believe that behavior primarily reflects innate, instinctive tendencies and that it can therefore be curbed but never drastically changed. Social problems are thus viewed as responses to innate and immutable tendencies that have existed since the beginning of time and will presumably continue substantially unchanged. The true conservative thus does not really believe in social problems at all, since he does not think that anything constructive can be done about them. A belief in ameliorative social action is necessary before social problems can be said to exist. This belief is largely lacking in the conservative, who has little faith in constructive social action and prefers to let nature take its course.

The liberal believes strongly in social problems. He is aware that something is wrong and thinks that something can be done about it. Difficulties exist on the policy level, as we

have indicated, because values conflict. Disagreement may arise even among liberals as to the existence of a particular problem. But the belief in social problems *as such* is basic to the liberal philosophy. The liberal holds that the resources of the individual, the family, the school, the church, and the state should be mobilized to redress undesirable social situations. Whether a solution can actually be worked out for some contemporary problems is another matter. Value-judgments may conflict, vested interests may be too strong, and the administrative problems may be too difficult to permit a permanent solution. But the important consideration in the liberal lexicon is faith in democratic action.

The conservative insists that "human nature" is fundamentally static and that nothing can modify man's innate resistance to social change. The events of recent decades have conclusively demonstrated the superficiality of this position. The depression of the 1930's had a profound impact upon mass value-judgments in respect to social action. Millions of people came to realize that, no matter how thrifty, industrious, and careful they were, they might be underpaid or unemployed during their vigorous years and destitute in their old age. Furthermore, they began to understand, however dimly, that the complexities of a changing society had taken many matters permanently out of their hands and left them powerless to cope single-handed with the vicissitudes of the business cycle and similar uncertainties. Many forms of public behavior thus came to be accepted as the legitimate province of government.

SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL ACTION. Social science is ultimately concerned with the more effective functioning of our society, in terms of the standards set by social values. Thus, "the role of social science is . . . to find out ever more clearly what these things are that human beings persist in wanting, and how these things can be built into culture." [1] Social sci-

[1] Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), p. 200.

ence is also concerned with the nature of these values and the institutions that embody them. Certain institutions and values may interfere with other values and thereby cause serious social problems. Instead of avoiding the study of social values as "unscientific" and "biased," the sociologist should be concerned with their formation and operation.

The role of the social scientist in social action is complicated by the accusation that he threatens human values by his investigations into social relationships. This accusation is made by those who hold to certain patterns of values in the field of the family, economic life, or private morality which they believe to be divine revelations and hence not susceptible of scientific study. For such persons, any investigation of the institutions embodying their value-structures, no matter how scientific, is viewed as an attack on these values. The social scientist is not attempting to destroy social values *per se* when he suggests a given course of action. He understands that there are conflicting values, especially in times of change, and that any action will threaten certain entrenched values. The accusation that he is attacking social values as such, however, simply does not accord with the facts.

The relationship between social science and social values has been explicitly stated. "Within an area marked off for scientific investigation," says Leighton, "the values of science reign supreme over each step in the process toward conclusions and in the conclusions themselves. Moral values . . . dominate scientific values at three contiguous points: the selection of the problem . . . ; the limitation of the . . . materials that may be used; and the determination of what shall be done with the results." [2] Social action in a democracy is directed against situations which give rise to social problems. The scientist enlists all his knowledge and insights in this action. The results are measured in terms of the values which the scientist holds as a member of a democratic and progressive

[2] Alexander H. Leighton, *Human Relations in a Changing World* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1949), p. 210.

society. These values constitute the ultimate criteria for his work.

The sociologist may be retained in an advisory and consultative capacity in connection with certain types of social action. Information on the nature and causes of many social problems is far from complete, and in some cases hardly exists. But there is still a great deal of tested information on a variety of social problems that is not being utilized. Reasons for this lack of utilization range from ignorance, through mistrust of the capabilities of the sociologist, to active opposition from certain vested interests to any action that would jeopardize their position. Knowledge of family disorganization, for example, exists to a far greater extent than is currently utilized in schools or divorce courts. Knowledge of the causes of crime and the results of treatment is not being fully exploited by the courts or the prisons. Knowledge of the causes and rehabilitation of mental derangement has not been adequately incorporated into the programs of many mental institutions. The role of the sociologist is to apply such insights and tested information as he has at his disposal in the solution of social problems.

The social sciences are new and relatively untried disciplines and many persons in positions of authority are either unaware of their possibilities or prejudiced against them before they start. The possibilities of social science in many fields of social action were dramatically illustrated in World War II. Here for the first time on such a large scale the social scientist assisted in the solution of various practical problems, ranging from campaigns to sell war bonds to appreciations of the morale of the enemy countries. The major "problem" in whose solution they were mobilized was the defeat of the Axis, and the insights and information of the social scientists were directed ultimately toward that end. But in the process of winning the war, a wide range of secondary problems were also met and surmounted, from the scientific measurement of army personnel to the control of the national price structure.

In many ways, the social scientist contributed to the winning of World War II.[3]

In the course of his wartime activities, the social scientist usually acted in an advisory capacity to someone in a position to "make policy." The social scientist thus provided pertinent information toward the solution of certain problems which the policy-maker wished to have solved. Difficulties arose in the performance of this function, for the social scientist was often called upon to prove a case to which the policy-maker was already committed. Difficulties arising from the inability to experiment were also faced. If the social scientist propounded a hypothesis about the character of the Japanese people, it was usually impossible to demonstrate its truth or falsity to the satisfaction of the policy-maker. Dealing as he does with human experience, the social scientist must always face this difficulty when recommending social action.[4]

The peacetime role of the sociologist as social scientist is less spectacular than his role in wartime. The problems of peacetime do not seem to have the same urgency as those in a total war. In terms of ultimate social values, however, the sociologist may play an even more important role in peacetime than he did during World War II. Social problems arise from the breakdown of the inner relationships that bind groups together. The action recommended by the sociologist often takes the form of bringing these groups together. Thus the family may be reintegrated through counseling and its members may try again with the greater knowledge they have gained through expert advice. The alcoholic may be brought back into intimate relationship with the primary group, thereby dispelling the acute social isolation that was originally partly responsible for his compulsive drinking. The disorganization of the local community may be partially reversed by co-operative efforts toward community integration, in which many individuals and groups are joined. Programs for the

[3] Alexander H. Leighton, op. cit.
[4] Ibid., Chap. X, "Problems of Organization."

prevention of delinquency and crime likewise emphasize group reorganization and adolescent identification with the stable elements of the social structure. These representative examples of social action are based on the principle that, since group disorganization produces many serious social problems, group reorganization should mitigate or eliminate many of these problems.[5]

"Such knowledge as we could achieve about the group in relation to social disorganization," comments Clinard, "could, in turn, be applied to social organization." [6] The role of the sociologist is to supply this knowledge to those who will actually put it into practice. In some cases, the action will also be applied by the sociologist, but in most instances he will provide the background of scientific understanding. The specific techniques of social action will be left to those specifically trained in the different therapeutic fields—the case worker, the public welfare official, the family counselor, the probation officer, and the governmental leaders who make the ultimate decisions. The study of social problems thus provides an introduction to further direct participation in constructive social action. But it is only an introduction. Training for social action has become as exacting as training for the more traditional professions. This book can only introduce the prospective social worker or family counselor to his broad field of future specialization.

Most of the readers of this book, however, will not be social workers, welfare administrators, or public officials. They will be businessmen and farmers, professional workers and salesmen, housewives and secretaries, who make their living in many ways and are ultimately concerned with social problems only as citizens. They will act in their own communities in civic groups that decide matters of policy regarding social action. As members of a democratic society, they will make decisions through the ballot regarding the general course which

[5] Marshall B. Clinard, "The Group Approach to Social Reintegration," *American Sociological Review*, 14:257–262 (April, 1949).

[6] Ibid., p. 262.

they wish the government to follow. They will decide whether they wish the state to take more or less action toward the elimination of social problems. They will periodically choose one party or individual to represent them in the national government. One of the issues in their decision will be the attitude of the candidate toward social action. Some candidates will be frankly unsympathetic to all but a minimum of social action. Others will pay lip service thereto, but will sabotage any practical efforts in this direction. Still others will be sincerely convinced of the necessity for action in social problems.

An understanding of the nature and causes of social problems is fundamental to a liberal education. The student should obviously be introduced to literature, art, foreign language, and philosophy if he is to receive a well-rounded education. He should also have some knowledge of the scientific method in general and the findings of the physical and biological sciences in particular. He should, finally, know something about social problems, for they comprise many of the questions he will face and upon which he must take some action. Every individual will thus sooner or later be called upon to make an intelligent decision on many of the problems considered in this book. These problems affect him directly *as a person* through the values that determine his personality. Knowledge is fundamental to an understanding of social problems. This book is a modest contribution to such an understanding.

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Part Two

PROBLEMS OF THE PERSONALITY

by H. Warren Dunham

CHAPTER FIVE

Personality Problems in Our Society

Rousseau's pronouncement that "man is born free, yet everywhere he is in chains" might be taken as a keynote for the unceasing struggle that went on in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, expressed by the English, French, and American revolutions. This movement attempted to free the human personality from the old social system and to make it the basis of the new social order. This struggle culminated in recognizing the dignity of the human personality, which was incorporated into numerous legal documents throughout the Western world. The general notion that human personality should be the cornerstone of any social system is reflected in the ringing words of the American Declaration of Independence "that all men are created free and equal." This declaration of a major credo helped the human personality to rise to new heights. But it also posed a major dilemma for the new society. This revolutionary period held that the human personality should be the basis of any social system. But at the same time the social system came to dominate the personality, which was molded and fitted to the requirements of the society rather than vice versa.

Human Personality as a Value

PERSONALITY DEFINED. It is difficult to define such a complex entity as human personality. Hence we must call attention to its nature on several different levels. We can speak first of a *physiological* basis of personality. Here we emphasize the original constitution or biological structure, comprising a vast, intricate organization of cells and tissue, along with a particular kind of inherited reactive tendency of the individual. This latter is sometimes called temperament. On the *psychological* level, personality frequently refers to a system of reactive patterns which the individual develops with respect to things, persons, and situations.

On the *social* level, we speak of personality as the sum total of habits, traits, and attitudes which determine the roles that the person plays in different social situations; his conception of himself in relation to others; and his status in the various groups of which he is a part. These three levels of personality are not separate things but are different aspects of the same functioning whole. The personality is not physiological, psychological, or social, but rather a combination of these. It is particularly necessary to understand this fact if we are to understand the various ways in which the personality may literally go to pieces. In general, therefore, the personality may break down if certain parts of the constitutional structure are damaged, if action patterns are channelized in defective ways, and if social roles are uncertain, undetermined, confused, or contradictory.

Personality problems are very prevalent in Western society. We are increasingly aware of these problems because the personality is accorded a prominent place in our mythology and fiction. This emphasis contrasts vividly with the situation in certain societies, where the individual personality is not exalted and where a virtual indifference exists as to its fate. In our society, however, we are greatly disturbed when something happens to the personality and we try to devise

ways and means of caring for and curing personalities who find it difficult to function acceptably.

There are three specific problems to which we shall turn our attention in this section of the book. (1) What is the significance of personality breakdown in our own society? (2) What are the various ways in which personality breakdowns have been defined and described? (3) What kinds of causative explanations, therapeutic techniques, and preventive measures have been and can be developed to deal with personality disorders? We shall devote a chapter to each of these crucial questions.

THE NATURE OF PERSONALITY PROBLEMS. The term *personality problems* centers about the deviant character of various mental processes, the deviant character of behavior, and the role of such deviations in society. These deviations range all the way from mild peculiarities of behavior to the most extreme forms of personality breakdown in the psychoses. Our purpose here is to examine personality problems in their social setting and to consider the social factors contributing to them. We are concerned with personality disturbances as a major *social* problem and with those aspects of the social process which contribute to personality breakdown.

Attitudes toward mental illness have varied at different periods. As knowledge has developed, men have advanced from ideas of demoniacal possession to theories of natural causes. With a gradually increasing public acceptance of the latter, the fact of personality breakdown takes on a problem character. The legal recognition of the dignity of the human personality and the acceptance of a theory of natural causes for mental disturbances provide the framework for the study of personality breakdown as a social problem.

This area traditionally has been considered the concern of psychiatry as a branch of medicine. Hence it is necessary to indicate the nature of the sociological interest. The sociological study of personality deviations or breakdowns stems from three related concerns: (1) Sociology has always been interested in the process of socialization, that social means by which

the biological individual is made into the human personality. In certain instances the process does not work smoothly and, in the place of the normal personality, the abnormal or deviant personality emerges. (2) As that scientific discipline which attempts to analyze the nature and consequences of man's social and cultural environment, sociology has a direct interest in those mental disorders which are regarded as stemming strictly from social and cultural causes. (3) Sociology has taken the social group as its particular reference point in studying human life, and hence is interested in all aspects of group relationships. With respect to mental disorder this interest is reflected in (a) the influence of the disturbed personality in group relationships; (b) the role of group life in affecting the development of disturbed personalities; and (c) the mass expression of deviant behavior.

THE EXTENT OF PERSONALITY PROBLEMS. In dealing with personality disorders, superstitious attitudes have gradually been replaced by scientific attitudes, both on the part of the professional man and the layman. In the case of the latter, there is still much ignorance and superstition, and ancient beliefs regarding mental breakdown still widely survive. Generally speaking, however, there has been distinct progress in our society, as evidenced by the fact that more and more people regard mental disorders as arising from natural causes and consider the volume of mental disorders as a social problem.

Paradoxical as it may seem, war has been the chief medium of bringing into national focus the fact that mental disorders and other behavior abnormalities constitute a major social problem. The psychiatric examinations of our draft army in World Wars I and II provided much significant basic data on the mental health of the population. These data revealed that all was not right in this area and that definite steps must be taken if the situation were ever to be controlled. An inspection of the psychiatric data on army
War II shows the emergence of personali
social problem.

TABLE I

Neuropsychiatric Conditions at Point of Induction for World War II (Induction: November, 1940–August 1, 1945) [1]

Total No. of men rejected for all causes	4,828,000
Total No. of men rejected for NP conditions	1,846,000
Total No. of men rejected for all NP conditions, excluding mental Deficiency	1,153,900
% NP, including mental deficiency, of total men rejected for all causes:	38%
% NP, excluding mental deficiency of total number of men rejected for all causes:	24%

NP—Neuropsychiatric

These figures for psychiatric conditions at the induction stations, however, do not indicate the total extent of the mental health problem of World War II. In addition, there were the army hospital admissions in the U. S. (7% of the total); the hospital admissions overseas (6% of the total); the evacuations (22% of the total); and the separations from the army (37% of the total) for neuropsychiatric conditions. The Army picture clearly did not indicate a mentally healthy population and stimulated the demand that something be done.

TRENDS IN PERSONALITY PROBLEMS. Are mental disorders increasing? This apparently simple question deserves a simple answer. But no simple answer is forthcoming. We would very much like to know if more persons develop mental disorders today than one hundred or even fifty years ago. If we had reliable knowledge on this point, we would be in a better position to evaluate those hypotheses which emphasize present social conditions as causing certain kinds of mental disturbances. But the problem of taking such a measure is complicated by the following considerations: (1) no uniform statistical recording practices over a long period of time; (2) changes in the age and sex composition of the population; (3) variations in the

[1] Quoted from W. C. Menninger, *Psychiatry in a Troubled World*, New York: Macmillan Co., 1948, p. 587.


hospital facilities available; (4) changes in definition of a psychotic person; (5) changes in attitudes concerning mental disease and the use of hospital facilities; (6) uncertainty over the number of the mentally ill in the community who are never officially counted; (7) variation in the kind and speed of transportation facilities; (8) general movement of population from rural to urban areas; (9) increased general mobility (defined by changes of residence) of the various segments of the population. All of these factors make it impossible to count accurately the persons who have developed a mental disorder in the current year and to compare these figures with similar ones for past years.

Three different measures of the frequency of mental disease are in current use: (1) the proportion of a given population group on a given date in a mental hospital; (2) the proportion of a given population group during a given year admitted to a mental hospital for the first time; and (3) the chances that a person of a given age from a given population group will be admitted to a mental hospital at some time during his life. Each of these measures, while useful, does not provide a conclusive answer to the original question as to whether or not mental disorders are increasing. However, even if it is not possible to arrive at a reliable trend-line covering a century, we can point out that there has been a definite increase in the number of persons cared for in mental hospitals and admitted thereto for the first time. The number of persons cared for in mental hospitals for approximately the past fifty years is shown in Chart I.

The trend here has been distinctly upward, from a rate of 186.2 per 100,000 population in 1903 to 382.4 in 1946. The slight drop in the war years reflects the army inductions, which interfered with the normal flow of patients to mental hospitals. This upward trend reflects progress with respect to hospital facilities, psychiatric knowledge, popular understanding of mental illness, and increased public confidence in the management of mental hospitals. It does *not* necessarily indi-

CHART I

Growth of Mental Hospital Population *



Mental Hygiene Statistics, Current Reports, Federal Security Agency, Feb. 1, 1949, Washington, D. C.

cate any real increase in the prevalence of mental disorders.[2] First admissions to mental hospitals in the United States also show an upward trend from 76.7 in 1934 to 110.6 in 1946. This trend can be subjected to much the same interpretations.

The third device for measuring the trend of mental disease is actually an expectancy measure. As used by various investigators, it states the expected number out of a cohort of 1,000 persons (taking account of mortality) who will ever enter a mental hospital. This technique is perhaps best illustrated by Dorn's [3] study, although there are several others. After examining the expectancy measures for both ends of the 1920–1930 decade in Massachusetts and New York, Dorn concluded that the data did *not* support "the contention that mental disorders had been rapidly increasing." He attributed the increase in mental disease, as found, to an increase in the expectation of life. While the time span taken in this study is too short to make any final judgment, Dorn posits the evidence against any long-time upward trend in the rate of mental disorder.

New light on this question comes from a careful study sponsored by the research section of the United States Air Force.[4] Goldhamer and Marshall studied the age-specific admission rates to mental hospitals in Massachusetts for the years 1840 to 1885 and then compared them with rates for the contemporary period. After carefully equating the class of patients and conditions affecting hospitalization of the mentally ill, the authors concluded that "age-specific first admission rates for ages under fifty are revealed to be just as high during the last half of the nineteenth century as they are today." They also found marked increases in the age-specific

[2] It is to be noted that Malzberg, after attempting to make allowances for most of the factors considered here, concludes that there has been a real increase in mental disorders in New York State for the period 1889 to 1935. See his *Social and Biological Aspects of Mental Disease*, Chap. I (Utica, New York: State Hospital Press, 1940).

[3] Harold F. Dorn, "The Incidence and Future Expectancy of Mental Disease," *Public Health Reports*, LIII, No. 45 (1938), 1991–2004.

[4] Herbert Goldhamer and Andrew U. Marshall, *The Frequency of Mental Disease: Long Term Trends and Present Status*. Rand Corporation, R157, July, 1949.

first admission rates for the older age groups. They inferred from these findings that "there has been no long-term increase during the last century in the incidence of the psychoses of early and middle life." This conclusion points particularly to the so-called functional psychoses.[5] The findings of this study should throw into disrepute many of the glib hypotheses that modern civilization is causing an increase in mental disorders. The evidence is fast mounting that there has been no major increase in the functional mental disorders during the past century.

THE COST OF MENTAL DISORDERS. In 1947, it was estimated by the Federal Public Health Service that the total expenditure for the maintenance of all types of mental hospitals (state, county, city, veteran, and private hospitals) was $395,000,000. This figure was an increase of nearly 65 per cent over the estimated expenditure for 1945. The expenditure per patient increased from $470 in 1945 to $731 in 1947. In both instances, the increase is partially a reflection of the rise in the general price level. Even so, the figures reflect the tremendous economic burden which the nation carries. This direct cost, furthermore, is only a fraction of the total. If the loss of earning power of these people during any one year is added, an estimated figure of one billion dollars represents the total monetary cost of mental illness.

The size of the problem—as reflected by the number of people involved and the cost to the nation—indicates that we are dealing with a social problem of great magnitude. This problem has become almost unmanageable, furthermore, if we must depend exclusively upon *individual* clinical study, diagnosis, and treatment. Consequently, there has developed in the minds of many persons working in this area a clear recognition that the successful solution of the mental disease problem requires bold measures. Such thinking culminated in the National Mental Health Act, Public Law 487, passed by the Seventy-ninth Congress and approved by the President on July 3, 1946. With this Act, the Federal government entered

[5] For a discussion of these psychoses, see Ch. VI.

the mental health field to develop techniques for improving the mental health of the people of the United States. This legislative instrument has not only made it possible to continue research work into the causes and treatment of mental diseases, but also to develop preventive devices to control these diseases. By this Congressional Act, an important social problem thus became a major public health problem.

With the passage of the National Mental Health Act, it is now possible to develop action programs designed to treat and prevent mental disorders in three general areas. The *first* area is that of the practicing psychiatrist, who daily sees many mentally disturbed persons in his office or clinic. Most of these persons are never counted in the official statistics. The *second* area is that of the state, where the bulk of the mental patients in the country are being cared for in the state hospitals. The *third* area is that of the Federal Public Health Service, which fosters existing local programs and initiates new ones—all designed to bring mental illness under some definite social control. We shall consider these programs in more detail below. We wish merely to indicate here the scope of the problem of personality disorders.

Environment and Personality Disorders

We have already pointed to the chief sociological concerns in studying personality problems. In the following paragraphs, we shall examine the generalized role of certain social factors in personality disorders. When we speak of the "generalized role of certain social factors," we are calling attention to two things: *First*, we are pointing to the vagueness and lack of preciseness in our knowledge concerning the operation of social factors. *Secondly*, we are pointing to those areas of social life which must be carefully explored if more exact knowledge about the operation of social factors is to be obtained. Such knowledge as we do have is for the most part tentative, inexact, and vague. Most of our formulations have not been subjected to any crucial tests.

ECOLOGY OF MENTAL DISORDERS. The influence of the social environment as a general causal agent in personality disorders has been dramatized by the ecological studies of mental disorders in the United States, now approximately fifteen years old.[6] Such studies plot the distribution of the individual cases of the different kinds of mental disorders by residence in a given geographical area. Most of these studies have used the city as a unit, although some distribution studies have been made in the rural areas of Iowa, Kansas, and Michigan. These studies were first done in Chicago, and the work was later extended to nine other cities of the country. Charts II and III employ this technique and depict the distribution of local area rates for schizophrenia in Chicago and Milwaukee. They suggest that the distribution of certain types of mental disorder shows a typical pattern, with the high rates concentrated at the center of the city and the rates declining toward the city's periphery.


The different studies are not in complete agreement as to the exact nature of the variations of the distribution patterns for all the different psychoses (including some *not* shown on the maps). However, there seems to be some agreement on the following points: (1) that the schizophrenic rates in the different cities form an expected typical pattern, with the high rates concentrated in areas of low economic status and with rates declining in every direction toward the periphery; (2) that the manic-depressive rates in the different cities show a much wider scatter and a general lack of conformity to the concentric circle pattern; (3) that persons residing in areas not primarily populated by their own ethnic or racial group show disproportionately higher rates of schizophrenia than members of the numerically dominant ethnic or racial group.

The findings concerning the distributions of specific diagnostic types of mental disorder have been influential in two directions. *First*, they have added to the variety of ecological

[6] See R. E. L. Faris and H. Warren Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939). C. W. Schroeder, "Mental Disorders in Cities," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVII (July, 1942), 40–47.

CHART II


*Schizophrenia Rates (All Types) in Chicago, 1922–31**
Per 100,000 Adult Population
(estimated 1927 population)



*From, R. E. L. Faris and H. W. Dunham, *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 41.

CHART III

Total Schizophrenia Rates (All Types) in Milwaukee 1925–38 in All 48 Wisconsin Public and Private Hospitals per 100,000 Adult Population (1930 population)*



* Prepared by M. Reuss and S. Hambling from Records of All Wisconsin State, County, and Private Hospitals.

and demographic studies which have provided basic data about our community life. *Secondly*, they have added support and justification for the continued investigations of various environmental factors and their roles in the causation of the different types of personality breakdown.[7] We shall explore this latter factor by examining the roles of family, interpersonal relations, social class, and culture in the production of personality breakdowns.

THE FAMILY SETTING. An important source of insight into current personality disorders may be found in the early developmental experience of the individual in the family. In our society, the family is the recognized way of existence and growth for a person in his early years. The question constantly raised when viewing the distorted personality of an adult is "What was the nature of his early experience within his family?"

Concern over the significance of the early family situation stems from two sources of thought. The *first* comprises the writings of the social psychologists, who are concerned with the socialization process in the family. They are interested in the manner in which the impulsive animal nature of the child at birth is molded and conditioned so that he becomes an acceptably organized human being, with a set of acceptably controlled behavior patterns. A human being is occasionally turned out by this process who is not acceptable to other human beings and does not have a set of organized and controlled behavior patterns. We are then concerned as to what went wrong with this person, when the majority of persons going through the same process prove acceptable to society.

It is true that what constitutes a set of acceptable, organized, and controlled behavior patterns varies with the particular culture. The expectancies of the group and the models held up to the child very markedly from culture to culture. In attempting to explain the failure of the socialization process

[7] See H. Warren Dunham, "Current Status of Ecological Research in Mental Disorder," *Social Forces*, 25:321–6 (March, 1947).

with certain persons, the social psychologists have explored the nature of parental conflict, parental neglect, parental vices, parental self-conceptions, family tradition, and family breakdown as potential sources for an unfavorable familial climate for the child. The attempt is also frequently made to trace a particular adult aberration to one of these sources.

All of these factors emphasize at least one of the following elements: (1) the lack of stability in the familial environment; (2) the abnormal or unconventional adult models held up to the child; or (3) the unique character of certain experiences in the family which contribute to the emotional structure and affect the social ties of parents to children and children to each other. In each instance, the child gradually acquires a set of habits, attitudes, and roles which may unfit him for certain kinds of group life in our society. Many unusual structures of habit, attitude, and role may find unconventional groups which will give support to them. When any human being finds little or no group support for his habits, attitudes, and roles in society, he becomes a personality problem.

This same picture is reflected in certain self-conceptions which the person may develop. Early conceptions of the self are normally formed in the family. However, the family setting may be a weak and shifting one; it may be characterized by abnormal parents; or it may be cold, stolid, and puritanical. In each instance the child may develop a self which cannot function satisfactorily with others in society. This suggests another sociological definition for certain personality problems. A person who develops a self-conception which is at complete variance with the conception of other persons toward him may be said to have a personality disturbance.

In placing emphasis on the family constellation in the early years, the *second* source was the psychoanalytic theory developed by Sigmund Freud. Psychoanalytic thought has enriched psychology and the social sciences through its concepts, its dynamic character, and its plausible hypotheses. The outline of the developmental theory as first evolved by Freud may

be presented here. The primary emphasis is placed on the psychosexual development of the child from birth to the achievement of a normal adult heterosexuality. The central concepts used to describe this growth are the *id*, *ego*, and *super-ego*. The *id* refers to the primitive, animal, uncontrolled sexual impulses. In the newborn child this impulsive raw sexuality is dominant. The *ego* designates that part of the *id* brought under control. It represents the socialized *self*. The *super-ego* is the censor or that phase of the psyche repressing the primitive strivings of the *id* and turning them into the more acceptable ego. These three entities constitute the individual's *psyche*. In the concepts of a broader social psychology, these elements have been referred to respectively as the sexual drive, the internalized self, and the conscience.

Freud's investigations of hysteria and other neurotic conditions led him to posit an explanation for the psychosexual growth of the child. The child at birth is characterized by the all powerful *id* strivings which are a source of pleasure. Among these are urinating, bowel movement, and genital stimulation. The child in early infancy discovers his own body as the chief source of gratification and satisfaction. These bodily satisfactions and libidinal strivings are gradually curbed and brought under control as the child is subjected to toilet training and other kinds of discipline. He enters into childhood when his ego and super-ego are gradually being shaped. In terms of his sexual development, childhood represents a latency period from approximately five to twelve years which is characterized by attachments to others of his own sex. This is the homosexual phase. With the onset of puberty, this phase is followed by the heterosexual period, when supposedly he is capable of forming meaningful attachments to the opposite sex.

This brief description represents the expected and normal phase of the psychosexual development. This course may be interfered with at any point—by a shocking experience, an unusually puritanical mother, the death of a parent, or an unstable environment. Some such experience may arrest the de-

velopmental process and make it impossible for the child to break away from the parent.

The emotional attachment to the parent of the opposite sex, characterized as the Oedipus complex, has been regarded by Freudians as a universal phenomenon, constituting for the developing child a major emotional bond which must be broken if true adult heterosexuality is to be achieved. Certain kinds of experience in the growth years may tighten this bond; other experiences may loosen it. As in the case of the social psychological thought described above, the persons who work within the framework of Freudian theory are constantly concerned with this question: "What are the experiences which have interfered with the normal course of libidinal development and hence make for certain disturbances of personality in the adult?"

Unlike the social psychologists, however, the Freudians consider repression as an expected process, involving the pressures stemming from the general culture and acting upon the person as he grows up. Consequently, the problem is to find the manner in which each individual's psychosexual growth has been interfered with, resisted, or blocked in its development. This is done through the therapeutic and research procedure known as psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is a technique for getting at the repressed mental life of the person—through free association, dream analysis, and sometimes hypnosis—and then integrating it into the conscious mental life.

These two theories—the social-psychological and the Freudian—are in no sense contradictory. The Freudian scheme, in effect, describes a special aspect of the socialization process. While the orthodox Freudian considers the theory sufficient to chart the child's complete development, it is patent that he overlooks many other nonsexual areas which affect growth. He also fails to deal adequately with the roles and self-conceptions which the person develops. Psychoanalysis examines one area of growth which may account for many adult attitudes and actions. But it pays no attention to other areas which also lead to adult attitudes and actions.

Consequently, Freudian theory is significant in this connection chiefly for the hypothetical additions it makes to the content of the socialization process.

These two sources account for much of the emphasis on the family relationships of the child in his early years, as providing causative factors for adult personality disorders. Both theories emphasize two conditions—insecurity and the withholding of love—which produce certain personality disturbances of the adult. The chief difficulty in discussing these two elements is that the crucial conditions for their adverse operation are seldom stated. Consequently, one is frequently faced with the fact that two people were insecure and lacked love as children, but that one is making an adequate adjustment as an adult and the other is not. What is the factor which makes the difference?

From the viewpoint of most contemporary psychiatry, the early developmental years in the family may be regarded as *sufficient* causes to explain many functional adult personality disorders. But they are not completely acceptable from the broader sociological perspective. The sociological view gives additional emphasis to conflicts, faulty attitudes, and distorted roles arising out of later interpersonal relations, and to the continuing impact of the culture upon the person throughout his life. The various incidents related to the early developmental years in the family may thus be regarded as *necessary* conditions for many adult personality disturbances, but they cannot guarantee that the personality disorders will take place. The family setting may therefore be said to prepare the soil in terms of certain traits, attitudes, roles, self-conceptions, sexual orientations, and the like. These in turn are modified, changed, adapted, and repressed by later experiences with persons, groups, classes, or general cultural patterns. The character of the developmental experiences within the family is thus *necessary* but not *sufficient* to explain all the kinds of personality troubles to which the adult is heir.

INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS. The area of interpersonal relations includes the family, but it is much broader and en-

compasses all of the various kinds of interactions which go on between people. One school of psychiatry, of which the late Dr. H. S. Sullivan was the chief spokesman, regarded the field of psychiatry as "the field of interpersonal relations, under any and all circumstances in which these relations exist." [8] This area, however, has long been of interest to the social psychologist and sociologist. From a sociological viewpoint, the focus of attention is the personality problems created by the interaction of the various roles which persons assume in relation to others. Role-taking is imposed upon an already existing personality structure of varying degrees of integration. This personality structure may be well integrated. Or it may be split by conflict; dominated by vague anxiety and insecurity feelings; compensating for some physical or emotional defect; or characterized by various fears, particularly of other people. Any one of these factors may influence the roles taken or not taken.

Certain roles which the person may be forced to adopt create personal insecurity and anxiety. On the other hand, personal insecurity and anxiety may be determinative with respect to certain roles. For example, we may take the marginal-man role as described in the sociological literature. The marginal man is generally a person who spends his formative years in a certain cultural, ethnic, or racial group and then in his late adolescent or early adult years changes to a different group. There he is forced to compete on an equal basis with persons indigenous to the group. He thus knows the ways of two cultural groups but is at home in neither of them. Such a situation can make for a marked anxiety in the person, for he is uncertain as to his new role and very much concerned about responding correctly to the new group expectancies.

As an example, a young man recently came into my office and asked me: "Tell me, am I white or am I a Negro?" This person was brought up by a Negro woman and her white husband, but he did not find out until his alleged mother died

[8] See H. S. Sullivan, "Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry," *Psychiatry*, III (Feb., 1940), 1–117.

that she was not his mother. He then discovered, through the records of a social agency, that he had been found when about five days old in a doorway in the Mexican section of the city. In physical coloring, he was light tan. Combined with the account of his finding and his foster parents, this raised grave doubts in his mind as to whether or not he actually was a Negro—even though he had been living as a Negro up to his present age of twenty-four.

The marginal person is only one example of the confusion and distortion of group roles. In our society, many persons experience a conflict of roles because the expectancies of two different groups hold up opposing value-schemes. The professional woman frequently finds conflict between the motherhood role and the job role. The preadolescent boy finds that his gang role and his school role conflict. Most persons eventually resolve such conflicts, whereas some have difficulty in doing so. Consequently, the conflict of roles may become crucial with respect to other areas of behavior.

There is an intrinsic dualism in some public roles into which a person in our large bureaucratic structures may be placed. Among these structures are government agencies, business corporations, educational institutions, religious structures, and health and welfare organizations. This dualism constitutes one of the major sources of anxiety in contemporary society. The vast size of these social structures makes it difficult for any person, either in a power position or a subordinate role, to see and understand the total functioning of the structure in achieving the ends for which it evolved or was created.

The ways in which these large bureaucratic structures provoke anxieties within the person are manifold. It is impossible to point to all the possible situations which are anxiety-provoking, but we can give some idea of their crucial character for the personality by indicating certain type-situations common to all of them. All of these structures to a greater or less degree are involved in various conflicts in contemporary society. One of these conflicts centers around the issue of control. The issue can be seen in the question: Should control—other

than that exerted by the traditions, customs, and ritual of the institution—be vested in one or two persons, or should the control have a broad, democratic basis where channels make it possible for all persons associated with the institution to have a voice? This conflict is typified in big business by union-management struggles, in educational institutions by faculty pressure groups and the administration, and in health and welfare agencies by the professional staff and the board of control. The individual personality caught in such institutional conflicts becomes uncertain as to his role, comes to doubt his ability, or has his anxieties heightened.

There is also the means-ends conflict which is apparent in certain large institutions and which leaves its mark on personalities sensitive to the conflict. Here the question is: Should all persons who function in the structure keep in mind the original end for which the structure is designed, or should they try to preserve the structure designed to produce the ends? In a recent study of a state hospital which I made this conflict was depicted clearly. In the attempt to preserve the culture and social life of the hospital, the end (namely, therapy for the patients) was frequently lost sight of and often subordinated to the means. In a university the officials may be concerned primarily with expanding the plant, increasing the size of the student body, and promoting the athletic teams. They may thereby lose sight of the end of the institution, which is the education of the students.

Another situation provoking personality insecurity and providing role confusion is the conflict experienced by the leaders in an institution when they must make certain public pronouncements and then act in another way. Here is the crux of much irritation, tension, and frustration in contemporary society. The person in such a position wants to act in a fair, decent, and just fashion. But the checks on his position, the requirements of his superiors, and the kind of action regarded as expedient frequently prevent him from doing so. He is forced to make decisions which go contrary to his own view of the situation.

In this theoretical account, we have been primarily concerned with the interaction of different kinds of roles in various social situations, with emphasis on the special conditions making for anxiety feelings, uncertainty of status, and frustration of goals. While these situations in themselves do not constitute personality disturbances, they represent a phase of the internal psychological climate which makes possible the emergence of such disturbances.

SOCIAL CLASS. In the past two decades, a number of researches have attempted to describe the function of class position in molding personality organization. These researches have largely called attention to those values and expectancies present on the different class levels and how they function to produce a kind of personality in a given class status. These studies have frequently contained implications for the various personality disturbances observed in persons, even though not directly concerned with this aspect of the problem.

Our society has frequently been characterized as having an open class system, thus making it possible for persons with certain kinds of knowledge, abilities, and talents to rise from a lower class position to a higher one. For those personalities with the right amount of these qualities, the opportunities have been considered unlimited. A certain amount of evidence has recently accumulated which suggests that the mobility from a lower class to an upper class is much less frequent than it was a generation or two ago. If we accept this position, the implications for mental health are rather unfavorable. Social expectations emphasizing the rewards and values of a rise in status position still continue, whereas the chances for the person to change his class position have been considerably decreased. This situation is perhaps humorously reflected in one report that graduating college seniors as of 1950 were not asking prospective employers about salary or opportunities for advancement, but rather about the company's pension plan.

Social class may operate to produce personality disturbances in the following ways: (1) the blocking of upward mo-

bility; (2) the failure to realize one's assigned class role; and (3) the rapid status rise of a person in the class system. Warner has suggested that the blocking of upward mobility may lead to frustration of the personality and a distorted self-evaluation in the individual.[9] Excessively rapid upward mobility in the class system may also produce personality anxieties and tensions because of doubts and conflicts concerning the capacity of the individual to meet the demands of a new role.

THE AMERICAN CULTURE PATTERN. When we focus our attention on the culture pattern, we are removing ourselves rather far from the person who presents a personality problem. Consequently, in selecting certain characteristics of our culture pattern we are not necessarily saying that these are bad for people and should be changed, but rather that here are the patterns which represent specific features of our environment with which all of us must come to terms. The manner in which these patterns are incorporated into the personality varies tremendously, because human experience is channelized so differently for different people. The four general characteristics of the American culture pattern which stand out in this connection are puritanism, competition, individualism, and industrialism. These characteristics put a definite premium on efficiency. Because of this fact, American culture provides little opportunity for adjustment for those who have some deviant characteristics.

A noted psychoanalyst has analyzed the significance of our competitive culture upon the emotional life of modern man. In a significant passage, he suggests that modern man appears to be engaged in a never-ending marathon race, his features distorted by strain and his eyes fixed balefully upon his rivals. He spends his whole life running this race, but he never seems to get any place. He is driven, not by a slave driver standing over him with a whip, but by a compulsion deep in his own mind. If he stops to look at the sky, pick a flower, or sing a

[9] W. L. Warner, "The Society, the Individual and his Mental Disorders," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 94:275–84.

song, he is viewed with distaste and suspicion by his fellows, who call him a dreamer or a madman. Deep in their hearts, each of them would also like to stop the race, but they dare not, lest they be left behind. Therefore they go on running until they die.[12]

The vision changes and, instead of an exhausted group of running men, there appears a group of "western amazons," the women of America. They look much healthier than the men, more sure of themselves, more self-possessed—but not necessarily more happy. They look at the anxious and perspiring crowd of men with amusement mingled with contempt. In contrast to the men, these upper-class women appear to have endless leisure, which they employ partly in making themselves more alluring to the men and partly in an attempt to escape their own boredom. They live in a society which considers their biological heritage a nuisance, but which has substituted no lasting value to take the place of this ancient function. Men and women alike in American society are thus frustrated and unhappy.[13]

With some poetic exaggeration, Alexander here catches something of the spirit of our competitive civilization and what it is doing to the personal lives of its men and women. The research problem here is to show how the major characteristics of American culture become so interwoven in the experience of certain men and women that abnormal conduct results. Culture characteristics and patterns are constantly woven into the experience of those who make acceptable adjustments to the society. They are also woven into the experience of those who do *not* fit easily into the society. The differential factors that determine the integration or disintegration of a given personality have not yet been isolated.

SUMMARY. In this chapter we have attempted three major tasks. *First*, we have tried to show how our historical background and cultural values have combined to make ab-

[12] Franz Alexander, *Our Age of Unreason* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1942), pp. 310–11.

[13] Ibid.

normalities of thinking, feeling, and acting one of the major social problems of our time. *Secondly*, we have indicated the extent of this problem and some of the difficulties in measuring the trends. *Finally*, we have briefly examined several facets of our social environment—family, interpersonal relations, social class, and culture—in order to show some of the general ways in which these situations create personality disturbances as they become incorporated in the experience of different persons. In the next chapter, we shall examine the individual person and see the various kinds of disturbances which he manifests. We are concerned with the outer situation as it becomes part of the experience and hence of the inner life of the person.

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CHAPTER SIX

Personality Problems as Clinical Types

We have seen in the last chapter how the human personality emerged as a significant value in Western society and how its disorganization and breakdown have come to constitute one of the significant social problems of our time. In the present chapter we shall deal with four major aspects of the study of personality problems. *First*, we shall distinguish mental disease from physical disease and from insanity. *Secondly*, we shall examine various schemes for distinguishing between normal and abnormal personalities. *Thirdly*, we shall describe some of the major types of personality disorders seen in office, clinic, and hospital. *Finally*, we shall discuss the significance of these abnormal clinical types for sociological study and research.

Physical Disease, Mental Disease and Insanity

DIFFERENTIATION FROM PHYSICAL DISEASE. In turning our attention to the specific clinical forms of personality disorders, we encounter certain grave initial difficulties. These difficulties arise both because of the traditional medical attempt

to deal with personality disorders as diseases and because we become aware of them largely through the operation of cultural criteria. By this latter statement, we mean that personality problems exist for us by the fact that other people point out, identify, and state that a given person cannot adequately perform his tasks or act in accordance with the expectancies of the culture in which he lives.

In this sense the so-called mental disturbances are quite different from physical disorders. When a person is physically sick, he tries to enlist some sort of medical aid. But when a person is mentally disturbed, he generally fails to recognize the fact and, indeed, it must often be brought to his attention by other persons. Even then he may have difficulty recognizing that there is something wrong with him. Admittedly, in certain instances a person may seek help on his own, but even here he must generally receive some prodding by kind friends. The recognition of mental disorders is further complicated by the fact that different social milieus (even within a given culture) often define personality disturbances in different ways. In one cultural situation a person may be normal, in another he may be considered abnormal. Some cultural settings make possible a greater variety of adjustments for certain persons with personality disturbances than do other cultural settings.

Even so, an impersonal and objective group of psychiatric practitioners might examine a given population and come up with an exact percentage of those having personality disturbances. But what would be the value of such an investigation? In other words, what would be demonstrated by such a large-scale diagnostic procedure? One such vast experiment was performed during the war, when all men who were called up for service were given a psychiatric examination. The statistical results of this work were referred to in Chapter V. In the early years of the war, however, men were judged on the sole basis of whether or not they would be able to fight. If the psychiatric opinion was that a man's personality or mental organization was such that he could not be made into a fight-

ing soldier, he was rejected. This judgment, in short, applied only to potential fighting ability and not to other activities. Many of these men had already made some kind of adjustment in civil life. It was only by 1944–5 that psychiatric opinion won out by showing the Army that, even though a man could not fight, he could be used for other things. The army had countless tasks for soldiers to perform.[1]

A lesson for social organization in general could be learned from this attempt to build an efficient army. This experience points to the necessity for society to develop new channels of adjustment, so that many persons who now are considered as personality deviants may have some niche in which they can perform a necessary function. This is one way to reduce personality disturbances.

INSANITY VERSUS MENTAL DISEASE. In popular terminology, we speak of a person whose actions are both unintelligible and disapproved as insane. But the term insanity is actually a legal concept. In accordance with past precedents established by certain legal cases, this concept tells us that a given person does not know the "difference between right and wrong," has one or several "delusions," or cannot control himself because he experiences "irresistible impulses." The purpose of these rules is to distinguish between persons who cannot be considered as responsible for their acts and those who can be. The legal notion of insanity is markedly unsatisfactory, from both the psychiatric and sociological viewpoints.

It is unsatisfactory, furthermore, because it does not and cannot take account of the great variety of mental reactions, emotional states, and conduct distortions that are found in the personality disorders. Unless these conditions are precisely delineated, it is also not possible to make much headway in studying their causation. This work has been done and is represented by various schemes for classifying the mental diseases. *Psychosis* is the general medical term which designates what the legalists mean by insanity. Many of those persons

[1] See William Menninger, *Psychiatry in a Troubled World* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948).

suffering from certain types of psychosis continue to live in the community; others receive private care. In addition, there are many psychoneurotics and psychopathic personalities who would hardly be declared insane, but nevertheless are not completely responsible. We may turn now to an examination of other means of separating the sane from the insane, the normals from the abnormals.

Normality vs. Abnormality in Social Life

There have been repeated attempts by different scientific workers to distinguish between the normal and the abnormal in social behavior. How is it possible to make some satisfactory schematization of the two? Is the distinction exclusively a quantitative matter, or are there qualitative differences which must be considered? The problem is complex and no scheme has gained complete acceptance among the various scientific disciplines concerned with personality disturbances. The complexity of the problem stems from two sources. (a) What may begin at the outset as a *quantitative* difference appears to become a *qualitative* one. (b) Much of the research emphasis on personality disturbances generally has been of an atomistic character; that is, it has tried to account for the variation of some *unitary* characteristic of the personality, such as a trait, attitude, emotional attachment, delusion, memory loss, or intellectual deterioration under certain conditions.

In distinguishing between the normal and the abnormal, two points of view concerning the human personality are always present. *First*, there are definitions of normality-abnormality which regard the human being primarily in an individualistic sense and view him as a complete unit designed to function in certain determined ways. This emphasis comes from biology, physiology, and psychology. *Secondly*, there are other definitions of normality-abnormality which emphasize the person's relationship to his group and culture. These definitions come from sociology.

INDIVIDUALISTIC VIEWS. The pathological view of normality-abnormality assumes that there is a healthy state of the organism and a diseased state. This supposedly points to a qualitative difference among biological organisms. When the organism develops a diseased condition in one of its parts, the main problem is to find the appropriate therapy which will correct or change it. Here the pathological state is identified with the abnormal; an absence of pathology is defined as normal.

There are numerous definitions of normality-abnormality in terms of the individual himself. One such definition states four basic requisites for normality: (1) lack of symptoms; (2) absence of mental conflict; (3) a satisfactory working capacity; and (4) capacity to love someone other than oneself.[2] The opposite of any one or all of these conditions points to an abnormal state.

INDIVIDUAL-GROUP VIEWS. In this set of schemes for defining normality-abnormality, the most frequent view is the statistical one. Here normality is identified with the average. It follows that abnormality is a deviation from the average, and that it is distinguished from normality in terms of degree and not of kind. This scheme is used for the most part in psychology where specific characteristics of the person such as intelligence, a personality trait, an attitude, or a mental conflict may be described. A person may thus be found normal with respect to intelligence but abnormal with respect to anxiety. This view also contends that normality or abnormality is always relative to the norms of the social group in which the person functions. He may thus be normal with respect to certain characteristics in one cultural group, but abnormal with respect to the same characteristic in another cultural group.

One difficulty with this scheme is that, in describing the abnormal person, we must necessarily atomize him into a series of individual characteristics. This approach therefore

[2] E. Weiss and O. S. English, *Psychosomatic Medicine* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders & Co., 1943), pp. 27–9.

cannot adequately present a picture of a person who represents a more or less integrated constellation of abnormal characteristics, as does the neurotic or psychotic. In this and other views of mental abnormalities based upon the individual and the group, however, we derive two general conclusions. (1) The distinction between the normal and the abnormal personality is a matter of degree. (2) The growth and development of either the normal or the abnormal personality are intimately related to the sociological truism that man everywhere leads a group existence.

This latter point makes for some conflict between the sociological viewpoint and many current psychological and psychiatric views. The sociologist sees an anxious, withdrawn, or hysterical personality as a part of a social situation, both in terms of his individual history and in a certain cultural context. The psychiatrist sees these symptoms as in the patient and as understandable in terms of the patient's emotional life. While the emotional life of the patient is in part a product of what has happened to him in his group life, the observable fact is that these symptoms are seen in the patient. The *etiological* (causal) problem may be to unravel the patient's experiences in relation to his group life. The *therapeutic* (curative) problem is to find out what is the matter with the patient and then change him so that he may function adequately in work, play, and love.

This therapeutic concern explains certain further differences between the psychiatrist and the sociologist. The psychiatrist sees persons who present personality problems as the mentally ill, whom he must attempt to cure. In contrast, the sociologist sees persons who think and act in ways that are not understood and are generally disapproved by others. These peculiarities of thinking and acting seem to be related to past experience in different social contacts. The psychiatrist, adhering to his medical speciality and the clinical procedure in which he has been trained, has developed and constantly tried to improve existing schemes of classification for describing the various personality disorders. He has worked

out various diagnostic categories in which can be placed any person who shows enough deviation in his feeling, thinking, or behavior to be identified by others as abnormal. There are three general groupings of personality disorders, viewed from the perspective of psychiatry. These are the psychoneuroses, the psychoses, and the so-called psychopathic conditions.

The Psychoneuroses

The psychoneuroses or neuroses are the most mild of the personality disorders. Persons affected with any one of the several types of neuroses are in contact with reality, but generally display some abnormal feeling, condition, or emotional state which makes it difficult for them to carry on their daily routine. Whereas in each type of neurosis, certain physical symptoms accompany the abnormal feelings, the physical symptoms are generally regarded as resulting from the abnormal emotional state. Neuroses are the most common personality problems and are observed in the person's inability to establish satisfactory relationships with other people.

The incidence of these disturbances is impossible to estimate. Most persons with neuroses are never hospitalized and hence are not counted. The bulk of them are to be found in the private physician's waiting room. Many patients who consult private physicians have no real physical ailments but are neurotically disturbed persons.[3] A federal census report for 1946 records 11,677 first admissions (or 8 per cent of all first admissions to mental hospitals in the United States) for psychoneuroses. These are without doubt the most serious cases, whose symptoms make it impossible for them at certain times to get along on the outside. The bulk of these patients are generally discharged after a short stay. During 1946, 14,254 persons suffering from psychoneuroses were discharged from mental hospitals.[3]

[3] These figures and those on the psychoses which follow are taken from *Patients in Mental Hospitals*, 1946, U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

In a clinical sense, a neurosis implies either a bodily disturbance or a feeling disturbance without a demonstrable organic pathology. The patient rarely understands the cause and has no idea of the meaning of his symptoms. He does, however, experience actual pain, even though such pain has no apparent organic basis. These conditions start in the patient's childhood and are evidenced in his early behavior, which makes satisfying social relationships impossible. The clinical descriptions which follow comprise the most common neuroses observed in the psychiatrists' offices and hospital clinics.

(1) *Conversion Hysteria.* This is one of the more common of the neuroses. It is characterized by the transmutation of a mental conflict, supposedly centering around the sexual function, into a physical condition, such as the paralysis of an arm or leg. This structuring of a physical symptom is unconscious. The patient has no insight into his condition until, through some kind of psychotherapy, he may be helped to see the connection between his emotional and physical conditions. The conflict has been described as between a tremendous desire for some intimate sexual relationship and the restrictions of the social environment with respect to such a relationship. Persons suffering from this condition are often described as emotionally immature because: (a) they cannot establish any significant personal relationship; (b) they present feelings of ambivalence with respect to the possibility of such relationships; and (c) they manifest a marked phantasy-life in preference to any kind of reality.

(2) *Neurasthenia.* In this condition the person shows a variety of feeling states such as moroseness, irritability, and depression. He cannot function well in his work; he is unable to concentrate; he can set no goals for himself; and he often indicates feelings of inadequacy and pessimism. Sometimes he has ideas of suicide. These feeling states generally accompany certain physical symptoms such as headaches, indigestion, loss of appetite, and constant fatigue.

(3) *Anxiety Hysteria.* Of all the neuroses this is perhaps the most common, possibly because anxiety itself arises out of so many conditions of modern life. In this condition the person manifests marked feelings of apprehension, anxiety, and dread, but is unable to center these feelings in any specific situation or on anything that actually happens to him. After the first experience, these feelings may cease for a time, only to return later with intensified strength. The comings and goings of such feeling states leave the person weak and fatigued. Certain persons manifest many kinds of fear in addition to these anxiety feelings. Physically, the person may display heart palpitation, nausea, and may complain of various aches and pains. Diarrhea, sexual emissions, and twitching of muscles are not uncommon. The person has no insight into his condition and generally seeks treatment for his physical complaints, with the result that some time may elapse before a diagnosis of anxiety neuroses is made.

(4) *Compulsion-Obsessive Neurosis.* This condition is characterized by dwelling upon an idea or constantly repeating some kind of behavior to such an extent that the person cannot satisfactorily perform his daily routine. The patient may be obsessed with the idea of world catastrophe, the existence of God, or the ultimate meaning of life to such an extent that all other concerns have no interest for him. He may wash himself often, straighten his desk many times during the day, feel the need to repeat a particular word or phrase, or go through the house repeatedly opening all doors. Such a person gets no real enjoyment from life, is constantly fatigued, may develop symptoms of the gastrointestinal tract, and may prove sexually inadequate.

Many persons not suffering from this neurosis in the strict sense may nevertheless give evidence of certain minor compulsions, which are a definite part of their personality but do not interfere with their normal functions. Such acts as touching every piece of iron, stepping on cracks in the sidewalk, always returning to the house to see if the door is locked, re-

peating certain signs, finding solace in certain numbers, finishing every task within a specified time limit—all of these are examples of the compulsions of normal personalities. The question as to what factor or factors separate these persons from those who develop a clinical compulsive-obsessive neurosis is not yet solved.

NEUROSES—SOME CONSIDERATIONS. The four types of neurosis described above are included in most psychiatric presentations. However, textbook descriptions are more precise than are the different types as seen in clinical practice. The symptoms as given for any type are frequently interchangeable, and it is often difficult for the psychiatrist to differentiate between them when making a diagnosis. Most current psychiatric discussions of the neuroses rely upon Freudian explanations. From this perspective most neuroses appear to be the product of some kind of mental conflict, which is thought to have sexual roots. Thus neurasthenia has been regarded as resulting from a conflict arising from masturbation. Conversion hysteria results from the conflict between sexual desire and the cultural restrictions imposed on overt sexual behavior. Anxiety neurosis reflects a discrepancy between sexual excitation and satisfaction. With sexual satisfaction being inadequate, the resulting tension is diffused throughout the body and appears in the form of palpitation, tremors, nausea, or bodily pains.

It is not our intention here to deal with the numerous theories developed to explain the neurosis. We have touched briefly upon Freudian theory only because it is widely accepted among psychiatrists. While these deviant personality types are of interest to the sociologist and social psychologist, to date there has been no systematic research done by representatives of these disciplines. The notion that neurotic symptoms are exaggerated forms of normal behavior is common. But this is of no value etiologically until we can show the kinds of experience which make the person behave in a deviant fashion. For the sociologist, the clues to such behavior must lie

somewhere in the socialization process which builds up a certain kind of experience and thereby renders the person vulnerable with respect to satisfactory relations with others. Sullivan aptly points out that "skill in dealing with important people is one of the effective ways to get ahead in our society of mobile vertical classes." [4] It is just such skill that the neurotic generally fails to develop, with the result that he experiences further feelings of insecurity and anxiety. His attempts at influencing others are mostly self-defeating because his experience and general style of life prevent him from doing the correct thing. Henry James gives a classic illustration of a compulsive neurotic, showing how an obsessional idea of catastrophe influenced a man's entire life to prevent him from having friends and from giving any love to the woman who loved him.[5]

At this point, we may distinguish between neurotic tendency and a clinical neurosis. In our society the term neurosis is bandied about loosely and applied indiscriminately to persons who manifest certain personality problems or behave in ways that point to a specific neurotic symptom. "He or she is a neurotic" is heard frequently. Some persons even find a prestige factor in having a neurosis, and sometimes describe themselves as neurotic in order to perform certain unconventional acts or persuade others to make allowances for their behavior. The idea that creative persons frequently have neurotic tendencies has heightened the prestige value of these conditions. Such persons may indeed have neurotic tendencies, but these tendencies do not interfere markedly with their functioning as personalities. In certain occupations, these traits may actually enable them to function better and accomplish more. It is one thing to have a neurotic trait. It is quite another to suffer from a full-blown clinical neurosis.

This notion concerning the value of neurotic traits in cer-

[4] See H. S. Sullivan, "Modern Conceptions of Psychiatry," *Psychiatry*, III (Feb., 1946), p. 111.

[5] See Henry James, "The Beast in the Jungle," *The Better Sort* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903).

tain occupations suggest some hypotheses which have not been adequately explored.[6] The question is posed: "What types of occupations can satisfactorily absorb specific neurotic traits and what kinds of occupations will aggravate them?" In certain persons a neurotic trait may be chronic, a fixed part of the personality structure, and thereby represent a minimum interference with one's routine. Other persons succeed in getting themselves into occupational niches where their neurotic traits are permitted a mode of expression. This is, perhaps, the case in occupations demanding intellectual activity where the neurotic traits can find expression in work.

Various types of intellectual activity may not only select some persons of a neurotic tendency, but such activity in itself may make for neurotic traits. Intellectual activity which is truly creative often sets the person apart from others, thus giving him feelings of uncertainty, insecurity, and guilt. Some persons develop neurotic traits, but never succeed in getting themselves in work situations which will help to absorb their neurotic manifestations. They may be the ones who experience the increasing frustration and mounting tension leading to a fully-developed clinical neurosis.

The Psychoses

The psychoses are recognized as the most serious mental diseases. In all of the psychoses there are distortions of greater or lesser degree in the realms of thinking, feeling, and acting. The thinking of psychotics is confused, illogical, delusional, and shows poor and inadequate judgment. Psychotics display memory defects and have lost the power to communicate with others. There may be "sense in the nonsense," but to the average person there is likely to be no meaning in the words of the psychotic. The feelings are characterized by marked

[6] See Joseph Grassett, *The Semi-Insane and the Semi-Responsible*, tr. by Jelliffe (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1907). This book represents an early contribution to this view.

apathy, inappropriate feelings, or swings of mood. Behavior is generally bizarre, peculiar, silly, and unconventional. The psychotic has lost the capacity to be concerned as to how his behavior affects others. He is largely wrapped up in his own problems and difficulties and thus often has little or no insight. In addition, the psychotic person is often destructive and may be dangerous to himself and others. Consequently, he is practically always in need of some kind of institutional care.

The psychoses can be definitely distinguished from the neuroses in terms of clinical descriptions, but the exact dividing line between them is not always clear in observation and diagnosis. One point of view emphasizes a clearly defined, qualitative difference. A neurotic thus does not become psychotic nor does a psychotic become neurotic. They are distinct entities and develop from different sources. Another point of view, growing in acceptance, contends that the difference between them is quantitative or one of degree. In this view the psychosis arises out of the neurotic constellation of symptoms. These symptoms range along a continuum from normal to neurosis to psychosis. Many persons who develop a psychosis display certain neurotic traits in the incipient stage of the disorder. Cameron tends to support this view when he states that "the same kind of personal, social and environmental factors are operating in preparing the ground for and precipitating the functional psychoses as in the case of the neuroses." [7]

Regardless of which one of these views may eventually be accepted, the fact remains that there are certain clear-cut general differences which distinguish the psychoses from the neuroses. *First*, the psychotic appears to undergo a marked change of personality and behavior. Before the breakdown, the potential psychotic is able to function so that he appears normal in his behavior and ideational content. With the breakdown, a personality change often immediately occurs. He may act, think, and feel in a way completely different from his

[7] N. Cameron, *The Functional Psychoses in Personality and Behavior Disorders*, J. McV. Hunt, ed., II (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1944), 861–921.

previous habit and these differences are clearly observable. *Second*, the psychotic displays a loss of contact with reality. Events, things, and ordinary happenings take on a different meaning for him as compared with the normal person or with himself when in a normal state. He has been described as "withdrawing," but in many spheres of life he seems to have no adequate contact at all. *Finally*, the psychotic reflects both his personality change and his lack of contact with reality in his inability to communicate satisfactorily with others. In certain psychotic conditions he may not talk at all; in others he mixes his words up; in still others he speaks in such a vague and circular fashion that no clear meaning emerges. He has thus lost his capacity to participate in any meaningful way in ordinary social life. These differences set the psychotic clearly apart from the neurotic, who shows no personality change, has adequate reality contact, and can verbalize his complaints in a meaningful fashion.

In psychiatry the psychoses are considered as specific, if not always definite, diagnostic types. The official classification endorsed by the American Psychiatric Society in 1934 contains twenty-four different diagnostic groups, including the psychoneuroses and psychopathies. The official classification is an evolutionary product and has evolved gradually as the various psychoses have been differentiated in clinical study and practice. Our concern here is not with all of these diagnostic groups, but rather with those that are of particular interest to the sociologist.

The psychoses are generally regarded as comprising two main groups. *First*, there are the organic psychoses, where the particular mental disturbances are regarded as a result of some pathology in the structure or physiology of the organism. *Second*, there are the functional psychoses, where the mental and personality disturbances are regarded as pure disorders of function without any correlated pathology of either structure or physiology in the organism. For these no organic basis has been discovered *as yet*. This time-qualification reflects one

psychiatric viewpoint, which holds that eventually some organic bases will be found for the various functional disorders.

Functional Psychoses

SCHIZOPHRENIA. Of all the mental disorders, schizophrenia is the most common. In 1946, 145,203 persons were admitted for the first time to all types of mental hospitals in the United States. Of this number, 20.5 per cent or 29,753 were diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia. Of 472,288 resident patients in all types of mental hospitals, schizophrenia was represented by 208,867 patients or 44.2 per cent of the total. Not only do schizophrenic patients make up the great bulk of resident patients; they also have the longest residence in the hospital of any diagnostic group. In a study of a mental hospital made by the author, 44.2 per cent of the patient body had been in residence ten years or longer and 89.5 per cent of this group carried schizophrenic diagnoses.[8]

These figures attest that schizophrenia is the supreme mental-health problem and should be recognized as a major public-health problem as well. It is also a complex psychiatric puzzle. With all the research being done and all the theories developed, schizophrenia still resists any attempt to unravel and cure it. If effective therapy for schizophrenia could be discovered, or if effective means could be found to reduce markedly the number of hospital admissions with schizophrenia, a substantial saving of both personal suffering and tax monies would result.

This disorder was first differentiated by Kraepelin in Germany in 1896. He labelled it *dementia praecox*, a disorder starting in adolescence and progressing rapidly to a permanent dementia. This description implied a poor prognosis and led to a certain hopelessness as far as therapy was concerned. In

[8] H. Warren Dunham and Kirson Wineberg, *The Culture of the Mental Hospital* (unpublished manuscript).

1911, Bleuler suggested that the term schizophrenia would be a more appropriate designation for this disorder, for he noted that certain patients did not deteriorate but on the contrary tended to improve. There are elements of the Kraepelinian conception among individual psychiatrists today. But many psychiatric leaders hold the more optimistic view that schizophrenia is a disorder of the entire personality and, if caught early enough in the incipient stage, can be improved. The etiology is, however, obscure. This is evidenced by cases on record which have had the disorder for many years and then seem to reach some satisfactory level of recovery, apparently in a spontaneous fashion.

Schizophrenia has been broadly characterized as involving the emotional life and manifesting itself in disturbances of feeling (inappropriate moods); conduct (unreasonable, bizarre, destructive, and manneristic behavior); and thought (illogical statements, delusions, hallucinations, and word salads). There is also a definite withdrawal from reality and an increasing loss of interest in the immediate environment. Four sub-types have been clinically differentiated, although in practice the differential diagnosis is often difficult to make. These subtypes, listed in order of frequency of occurrence, are:

(1) *Hebephrenic:* characterized by excitable, manneristic, and silly behavior. Incoherent thought stream sprinkled with delusions, hallucinations, and word salads. Communication well-nigh impossible.

(2) *Paranoid:* a well-organized and systematic scheme of delusions of persecution or grandeur, supported by hallucinations. Onset is gradual, producing a complete break with reality with a corresponding misinterpretation of many aspects of the environment. Communication is possible within the premises of the delusional system.

(3) *Catatonic:* characterized by two phases, one of excitement and one of stupor. In the excited phases the patient is noisy, uncontrollable, engages in silly episodes, and is illogical in thought

processes. In the stuporous stage, the patient is mute or extremely retarded in speech, negativistic, and may manifest a muscular rigidity. Delusions are often present but hallucinations are rare. Onset is usually acute.

(4) *Simple:* characterized by extreme apathy and indifference to environment. The patient cannot be motivated, has no ambition, and is content to idle his time away.

MANIC-DEPRESSIVE PSYCHOSIS. This is the second most common of the functional psychoses and in 1946 ranked fourth among the psychoses in terms of number of first admissions in the United States. In that year, 12,078 persons (or 8.3 per cent of a total of 145,203) were admitted for the first time to mental hospitals and diagnosed as having a manic-depressive psychosis.

Manic-depressive psychosis in its modern dress is a combination of two older disorders, mania and melancholia, found in the psychiatric classifications in the first half of the nineteenth century and earlier. In 1896, Kraepelin put them together to describe the manic-depressive psychosis. This psychosis is broadly characterized by extreme swings of mood, from wild uncontrollable excitement to severe depression, wherein ideas of self-destruction are common. These swings of mood may alternate or the person may always be depressed or always excited. There is no deterioration as is thought to occur in schizophrenia, but sometimes the patient settles into a chronic psychic state where he is almost unresponsive. Hallucinations are not usually present. Sometimes the attacks are of a brief duration and other times may last for years. These patients are in and out of the hospital frequently. Whereas as many as ten different types are described in the psychiatric literature, the main types seen in the clinic are the manic, depressed, and circular (alternating periods of mania and depression with a normal period intervening between them).

PARANOIA AND PARANOID CONDITION. This is the third and final functional psychosis which we shall discuss sepa-

rately. It is rarely seen in either the clinic or the mental hospital. In 1946, for the entire country only 1,757 persons (1.2 per cent of the total first admissions) were admitted to mental hospitals and diagnosed as suffering from paranoia or paranoid conditions. In all probability, at least an equal number of persons with this disorder are outside of hospitals and in communities carrying on their daily work.

This disorder is characterized by the presence of a chronic, systematized, delusional state, usually of persecution, which has developed gradually. Hallucinations are completely absent. Such personalities may become dangerous if placed in a cornered position. They frequently succeed in hiding their delusional structure sufficiently well so that they can continue to perform their daily duties. These persons are very suspicious, self-willed, and often difficult to deal with in interpersonal relations.

OTHER FUNCTIONAL DISORDERS. While the three disorders discussed above are generally regarded as definitely functional in character, they do not exhaust the list of those sometimes spoken of as functional. *Involutional melancholia* is a disorder occurring around the menopausal period in women and somewhat later in men. Doubt, fear, anxieties are marked. It has been held that psychic and situational factors are more important than purely physical ones in causing this disorder.

Psychosis with mental deficiency has been spoken of as functional, although there is no agreement on this in the psychiatric literature. Mental defect is a condition regarded as inherited and in certain types shows evidence of organic pathology. When complicated with a psychosis, its nature is not clear and frequently seems to be functional in character.

Likewise, *senile psychosis* in psychiatric textbooks is generally considered organic. There is a body of opinion developing with respect to certain types—simple senile deterioration, senile depression, and senile paranoid state—that, in the absence of evidence of marked organic change, these types should be regarded as functional. In fact, the paranoid and depressed states of the senile psychoses are very comparable to these same

states developed at other age periods, with the possible exception that the delusions do not become as precise and clear-cut as they are at the younger ages.

Old-age psychoses appear to be definitely on the increase in contemporary society. Their increase is probably related to the fact that the expected span of life has increased and many more people today are living beyond the age of sixty-five than formerly. By 1960, it is estimated that approximately 12 per cent of our population will be sixty-five years of age or older. If current social and economic conditions for older people remain much the same as today, one can expect continued increase in old-age psychoses, including psychoses with *cerebral arteriosclerosis*. The latter psychosis is an organic type. A real social challenge exists in trying to discover and make effective social arrangements which will ease the adjustments of older persons and thus postpone possible psychotic breakdowns.

Organic Psychoses

If one accepts the notion that the above psychoses are real disorders of function, then the organic psychoses would constitute diseases in the real sense of the term. Here the agent producing a definite organic pathology can be identified. The agent may be a germ as in general paralysis; a toxic substance as in alcoholism or psychoses due to drugs; a head injury as in traumatic psychosis; an organic change of tissue and physiology as in arteriosclerosis and multiple sclerosis.

GENERAL PARALYSIS. This disease is regarded as a classic illustration of an organic type of psychosis. It is caused by the syphilitic germ—the *spirochaeta pallida*—involving the central nervous system, working its way to the brain through the spinal column, and thus damaging the brain cells. Whereas syphilis is regarded as the cause of general paralysis, it does not always lead to the latter disease. It is estimated that only from 2 to 5 per cent of persons infected with syphilis ever develop general paralysis. The reason for this has never been

made clear. One theory points to a special strain of the syphilitic germ; another theory emphasizes a particular type of susceptible nervous system. A certain amount of empirical evidence dealing with the notion of "allergy" supports the latter theory.

The mental condition may develop any time between five and twenty-five years after the date of infection. The mental symptoms are somewhat similar to those in schizophrenia. The patient shows a marked change of personality; becomes irresponsible in personal relations; shows impaired memory, judgment, and reasoning processes; and often displays grandiose but bizarre delusions. In 1946, for the entire United States, 6,021 persons (4.1 per cent of the total) were admitted for the first time to a mental hospital with a diagnosis of general paralysis. If the public health attack on syphilis succeeds and this disease is brought under control, it may be possible in the not-too-distant future to eliminate general paralysis completely from the patient roster in mental hospitals.

There is no point here in describing in detail the other organic psychoses. If the reader is interested, he can consult any current textbook on psychiatry for complete descriptions. The sociological concern with these psychoses arises from the fact that they develop in society and that social factors frequently play an indirect role. General paralysis was briefly described because it is a classic picture of an organic brain disease and represents a notable achievement of clinical psychiatry. It has been held for a long time in certain psychiatric circles that continued research would reveal the organic causes of many of the existing functional disorders, particularly schizophrenia. To date this hope has not been realized.

Psychopathic Personalities

This general category includes aberrant personalities not considered psychotic or psychoneurotic but exhibiting certain

qualities in their behavior which definitely set them apart from others. This category has frequently been referred to by psychiatrists as a diagnostic catch-all because of the tendency to place in this group any person who cannot conveniently be placed in one of the more conventional diagnostic groups. This tendency is observed among those psychiatrists who would label such varied types as prostitutes, most homosexuals, drug addicts, and most criminals as psychopathic personalities. Nothing is gained by this procedure of grouping together such diverse types, for deviant behavior cannot be explained by calling *every* deviant personality a psychopath.

Psychopathic personalities are not often found in the mental hospitals; more likely, some antisocial act lands them in court and then in prison. Persons regarded as psychopathic personalities with psychosis numbered only 1,240 or 0.9 per cent admitted for the first time to mental hospitals in the United States in 1946. However, some 1,586 more were admitted who were free from a psychosis. If complete counts and diagnoses could be made, at least an equal number would probably be found in the prisons of the country. Many sensational and destructive criminal acts are the work of psychopathic personalities.

In spite of the tendency to misuse this category, however, there has been some empirical work, notably by Kahn and Birnbaum in Germany, which aims to bring some clinical order to this diagnosis. Persons are thus generally placed there who: (1) display an aggressive, irrational destructiveness; (2) show a continuous lack of dependability in dealing with others; and (3) achieve some kind of recognition by unfair, dishonest, and unscrupulous means. Probably the three characteristics which are most noticeable in such persons are: (1) marked immorality in personal relations; (2) warped and distorted judgments; and (3) complete lack of dependability. Most of the characteristic signs which distinguish the psychopath are still very debatable, but persons who constantly manifest eccentric, immature, inadequate, destructive, lying, explosive, and unstable traits are generally placed in this

category. In the final analysis, the term psychopath is applied to a variety of twisted personalities that find it impossible to fit into conventional society.

Sociological Significance of Clinical Types

We have completed our description of the general groupings and the major clinical types under them which have been evolved by the psychiatrists. For the sociologist, the clinical types delimited under the general functional groupings—the psychoneuroses, the functional psychoses, and the psychopathies—have a definite interest because, to date, no organic basis has been discovered for them. This does not mean a complete absence of somatic symptoms but rather that the somatic symptoms appear to develop *as a result* of the psychic and behavioral disturbances, rather than to precede them in any meaningful fashion. Consequently, if the cause of their development is not found in the organism, then one must look either to biological heredity or to the events which make up a person's social experience. This does not mean that all the things which happen to a person are of equal importance; it merely calls attention to the significance of human experience in causing the various personality disturbances.

In this chapter, we have described the variety of disorganized personalities as types of clinical entities. But it must be remembered that clinical descriptions often cover up the fact that these are real people, with real personality difficulties, that are fitted into the clinical categories. Such personalities are all about us daily. It is necessary only to observe behavior and to listen carefully to what people say in order to see some of the psychopathologies of daily life. The bizarre and disturbed behavior of the neurotic and psychotic may, it is true, be more than a mere exaggeration of normal behavior. With many personalities which pass for normal, however, one can see certain individual signs and symptoms which, if constellated in one person, would clinically label him.

Compulsions, anxieties, fears, paranoid ideas, ideas of reference, intense shyness, overbearing aggressiveness, fixed ideas, and illogical statements are thus the psychological stock in trade of many persons whom we meet daily. These persons, for the most part, function as normal and are regarded by others as normal. These symptoms observed in apparently normal personalities gain their significance through the communicative process of language, which is by definition social. This communication emerges in some context of interpersonal relations, which in turn occur in a particular culture milieu. For example, the fear observed in a person is not an isolated phenomenon, but reflects individual experience emerging from a certain kind of interpersonal relationship.

A certain body of psychiatric opinion regards criminals as mentally abnormal. In reality, however, the criminal is quite the opposite of the clinical types which we have described above. His behavior is organized and directed towards ends which others can understand. The psychotic, on the contrary, displays behavior which is unorganized and absurd. Psychotic behavior may have its own internal rational structure, but it shows no evidence of being directed toward conventional ends.

The psychoneurotic, the psychotic, and the psychopath may thus behave in ways that violate legalistic norms of the society. But these are not the same types of acts as those of the man who is trying to earn a living through crime. In fact, the law recognizes this distinction by holding that a person who is insane at the time of committing a crime is not responsible for his act. The behavior patterns of a criminal are integrated and understood within some kind of social organization, even though not approved by conventional society. The acts and behavior patterns of the psychotic are not in any sense socially oriented, but have meaning only within the private symbolic system which he has constructed for himself.

Little has been written on the social factors which enter into the organic psychoses—with the possible exception of alcoholism. The sociologist is, however, concerned with these disturbances in the following ways: *First*, he is interested in the

factors which cause a person to select those stimuli which may lead to one of these disorders. *Second*, he is interested in tracing the development of certain habits and attitudes in the personality which make a conventional social adjustment impossible. These sociological considerations are of definite relevance in studying persons who develop an organic psychosis. Whereas it may be true, for example, that syphilis is no respecter of persons, it is also true that a given personality with a certain kind of attitude-structure is more likely to become infected with syphilis than one with a different structure. Personality *A* gets himself into a situation where syphilitic infection is possible; personality *B* does not.

SUMMARY. In this chapter we have been concerned with four general aims. *First*, we have called attention to the fashion in which the so-called mental diseases differ from physical diseases. *Second*, we have examined and evaluated certain schemes which differentiate the normal from the abnormal personality. *Third*, we have attempted to give a clinical picture of certain types of disturbed personalities, paying particular attention to those regarded as functional in character. *Finally*, we have attempted to point up the character of these clinical types as they are found in society and to indicate the approximate areas of sociological concern. In the next chapter, we shall be concerned with the different causative explanations for these disturbed personalities and shall describe briefly various current measures of treatment and prevention.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Personality Disorders: Causation, Therapy, and Prevention

We turn now to the problem which demands the insights and research contributions of both the biological and social sciences. This is the problem of causation or etiology of the personality disorders. We face here a type of social problem analogous to that presented by criminal behavior. The field of criminology deals both with the etiology of criminal behavior and with the handling and rehabilitation of criminals. A body of knowledge has been built up here through the research efforts of anthropologists, psychiatrists, psychologists, and sociologists. A similar collaborative effort is required if a sound knowledge is to be developed concerning the behavior and mental reactions of those persons who exhibit various kinds of peculiarities which make them problems to others.

Etiological Complexities in Personality Disorders

The problem of causation in personality disorders centers in the functional types, where there is no apparent organic

pathology. This fact makes it necessary to consider factors in experience and interpersonal relations in the past, the present, and (sometimes) in the expectations of the future. Focusing attention on these elements involves a new orientation, which views man not merely as a disparate individual but rather as a person interacting symbolically with other persons. From this perspective the interacting area, with its potentialities for patterning and disrupting behavior, becomes a field which must be studied and analyzed.

Clinical Orientation of Psychiatry. An important contribution of psychiatry has been the development of a scheme for classifying the various personality disorders or mental illnesses. This approach has pointed to clusters of symptoms which make up a given syndrome. It has also created a receptivity to new syndromes, which would further refine the classification system. The present system used by American psychiatry is not international and undergoes certain changes (generally minor) from country to country.

Clinical categories present a difficulty (especially noticed in the functional disorders) because they make for the examination of, thinking about, and treatment of *personality* disorders as if they were of the same order as *physical* disorders. There seems to be ample evidence that they are of a *different* order. The clinical procedure narrows the examiner's focus of attention by having him concentrate on the individual and his symptoms, whereas the cause of his behavior may be in the interpersonal field. Some psychiatrists have seen the need to look beyond the individual and examine him in his social setting, but many are still largely preoccupied with diagnosis and classification. This has tended both to restrict the outlook and to build individualistic theoretical frameworks.

Body-Mind Problem. This is an age-old philosophical problem which has never been fully resolved. Its seeming insolubility represents another difficulty in isolating the etiology of personality disorders. The investigator's position on this problem will determine the particular things which he will observe. Three positions are represented by the philosophical

considerations. *First*, is the mind-substance created by and dependent upon the physical constitution of man? This view emphasizes that the body is the only reality and that mental life seems to emerge as a function of cerebral activity. If this were true then one would, in research on the personality disorders, be constantly seeking physical explanations for the peculiar mental and behavioral reactions observed. Much psychiatric research in the past has, in fact, been directed toward the examination of man's anatomy and physiology.

A *second* position may be stated as follows. Is the mind-substance something independent of the body-substance? This view emphasizes the unvariable association of the two but provides no explanation for their relationship. This is the dualistic position, of which several philosophical versions exist. It is expressed by the notion that, inasmuch as there is a pathology of the body, there must be a pathology of the mind. This dualism is depicted partially by orthodox psychoanalysis, which has attempted to explore the mind-areas just as other researchers have attempted to explore the body-areas. *Finally*, do the entities of body and mind represent some interacting relationship, whereby they are so closely bound together that they contribute to, mold, influence, and affect one another? This interactionist view is reflected today in the field known as psychosomatic medicine. This field recognizes that a given personality disorder is neither purely mental nor purely physical, but rather that the mind and the body are so pathologically intertwined that a mental disorder is produced.

MIND-SOCIETY PROBLEM. The current explanations of normal and conventional behavior aid in explaining the abnormal and unconventional behavior observed in some psychoses, the psychoneuroses, and the psychopathies. Sociologists and cultural anthropologists have repeatedly shown how the person develops by the organization and integration of his responses so that he can easily fit into a society. They have demonstrated how the customs, conventions, and institutions organize the responses of the person so that he becomes

an integral part of a given cultural order. The responses of the ordinary person constitute an organized, integrated system of traits, habits, and attitudes which enable him to meet with a minimum of conflict the great majority of situations which confront him. He is thus an organized set of expectancies ready to respond to the appropriate stimuli. In our society he may design hats, appeal for funds, drive an airplane, administer a university, or perform any one of thousands of other economic functions. Through experience and training, he has developed the appropriate habits and attitudes for the particular task he must perform.

We have already touched on this experience in Chapter V when we considered the socialization process. The role of the cultural order in molding the *normal* personality logically raises the question of its role in molding the *abnormal* personality. This process points to the interrelationship of mind and society. Not all runs smoothly, however, for the so-called normal person. There are so many aspects to his interpersonal relations that some of his responses are not appropriate to the situation. A fear experienced in early years may thus crop up in later years and make him powerless to act. He may hate his brother, wish his mother were dead, and otherwise act in ways which he cannot understand and which are not clearly understood by others. Not any one item of irrational thought or behavior but a combination of many may throw a person into the abnormal category.

A most unusual response may call the person to the attention of others. Such was the case of an incipient schizophrene who, on filling out certain papers required by his draft board, entered "Mohammedan" in the space for religion. "I knew that would get them," he slyly remarked. "You see I didn't want to fight; I don't believe in war." It got "them" all right, but "they" got him. On a different level, however, why did he do it? What peculiar thought process prompted this response rather than the legal response provided, namely, trying to become a "conscientious objector"? The addition of society thus

makes for complexity of the etiological problem and points to another element which must be taken into consideration in research into personality disorders.

SOCIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONALITY DISORDERS. From the days of early man, superstition, mystery, and dread have always encompassed physical and mental afflictions. Much of this mystery in connection with man's physical ailments has been dissipated with the advance of medical knowledge about the body and its functioning. However, in connection with mental ailments, the change of attitude in society has been slow. Only in contemporary times has it been possible to subject these problems to the same careful study as has been accorded the physical diseases.

Since the days of classical Greece there have, to be sure, always been a few men who recognized the mental ailments for what they were, namely, disorders of body or mind which must stem from natural causes. But the voices of such men were seldom heard above the popular clamor, wherein persons suffering from mental afflictions were often judged as being possessed of some evil demon which made them perform bizarre and irrational acts. This conception was recognized as demoniacal possession and it held sway in men's minds until the early nineteenth century. Even today remnants of this belief are found among certain groups in the western world. The gradual decline of this view did not necessarily free men to develop a secular attitude to such conditions. Instead, a belief developed that such conditions were due to man's sinful way of life. From this perspective, mental afflictions were regarded as a result of violating divine law.

These older notions do not have the widespread hold upon men's minds which they once had; nevertheless one still finds evidence of them among the majority of laymen. There is still terror and fear in the average person when mental disorder hits a member of his family. He is confused and he doesn't know the answers. He does not know where to turn and as a result is often the recipient of poor advice. This uncertainty, confusion, and terror make it difficult for the psychiatrist to

cope with the problem. The exact character of the popular attitude on this subject is not definitely known, although there have been some recent attempts to measure it.[1] Even so, the idea that mental disorder stems from natural causes is not completely accepted. This failure interferes with the prosecution of a well-rounded research program.

Orthodox Theories of Causation

BIOLOGICAL THEORIES. Heredity has long been regarded as causing mental disorders, even though it is still not possible to state any exact principles as to how heredity operates in this respect. Difficulties in investigating human heredity account for lack of positive knowledge in this field. The few persons in a family generation, the long gap between successive generations, the difficulty of obtaining precise data about ancestors, the time and expense involved in locating living members of a family, the widespread use of contraceptives, the practice of abortion, and the low marriage rates of persons affected with certain abnormal conditions are some of the difficulties which confront any investigation of heredity among human beings. In addition to these difficulties, there is still much argument among scientists as to what constitutes a unit-character in the area of mental disorders. Is it a general neuropathic tainting, a specific mental disease, a constitutional predisposition, or a kind of family temperament which is inherited? No definite agreement exists about these matters, but researches into heredity have been conducted under each assumption.

There is one further difficulty in such researches, namely, the difficulty of separating heredity from environmental factors. These two sets of factors are so intermeshed in human beings that it is difficult to hold constant one factor while investigating the other. The most careful attempt to bring about this experimental condition has been in the studies of identical

[1] G. U. Ramsey and M. Seipp, "Attitudes-Opinions Concerning Mental Illness," *Psychiatric Quarterly*, 22:428–44 (July, 1948).

twins. The ideal situation here is to study sets of identical twins separated at birth. Thus heredity, supposedly the same in identical twins, is held constant and the environment is varied for each twin. However, this sort of investigation is very difficult, both because of the expense and the infrequency of such cases. Newman's and Freeman's study during the early 1930's is perhaps the best known of this kind. This study showed that marked differences in educational and social environments accounted for significant differences in weight, intelligence, and educational achievement. Other twin studies have been made but the exacting experimental conditions have been difficult to maintain. In spite of these difficulties and the paucity of results, the generally prevailing psychiatric attitude about the role of heredity is shown clearly in a statement by Henderson and Gillespie, the English psychiatrists. These authors state: "Yet, in spite of the inevitable lack of exactitude, we are certain that the heredity factor is of great importance." [2]

Most of the studies dealing with heredity in personality disorders have counted the incidence of neuropathic conditions in the family tree of a given person afflicted with a mental disorder. This procedure is reflected in current psychiatric examinations, where some inquiry is always made concerning the presence of any abnormal mental or behavioral conditions among present and past family members of the person being examined. If such instances are uncovered and appear authentic, it is usually noted in the clinical record that "heredity is poor." A number of studies, now thirty to fifty years old, have attempted to contrast such "neuropathic tainting" in the family trees of psychotics as compared to the family trees of "normals." These studies are of little value. In dealing with general differences between groups, they are forced to overlook significant detail. In addition, little of a significant character evolves from such studies because, under the labels of "tainting" or "insanity," they tend to lump such diverse con-

[2] See D. K. Henderson and R. D. Gillespie, *A Textbook of Psychiatry* (6th ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 32.

ditions and forms of behavior as drug addiction, feebleminded-ness, apoplexy, alcoholism, epilepsy, criminality, pauperism, dementia praecox, and venereal disease.

In a similar vein have been the attempts to apply Mendelian statistical ratios to the inheritance of mental diseases. According to Mendelian theory, unit-characters or genes are inherited and transmitted from generation to generation. Consequently, in many of these studies neuropathy has been considered a unit-character, and there has been an attempt to see if it is transmitted according to Mendelian laws. There has also been the attempt to consider a specific disorder, like schizophrenia or manic-depressive psychosis, as a unit-character and to apply Mendelian ratios. This approach represents the more recent view. In general, however, the results from such studies have not been much more revealing than when all abnormal conditions were grouped together as a "neuropathic taint."

Myerson [3] has been one of the severest critics of these hereditary studies, yet his own careful study of ninety-seven families has not added much insight upon the operation of heredity. Myerson's conclusions were based entirely on the first-hand evidence which he could collect concerning his ninety-seven families, with only a very few covering four generations. His main conclusions were: (a) that paranoid states are followed by paranoid states in the descendants and sometimes by dementia praecox; (b) that such descendants also show a tendency to develop schizophrenia; and (c) that involutional and senile states give rise to manic-depressive psychosis, paranoid conditions, and dementia praecox in the descendants. This may be equivalent to the sociological proposition that, if one is born in a poor social and cultural environment, there is a greater probability of remaining in such an environment than there is of getting out of it. Only further research will be able to make clear the extent of Myerson's contribution.

[3] See A. Myerson, *The Inheritance of Mental Disease* (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Co., 1925).

Perhaps the most recent and thorough study of the heredity factor is represented by Kallman's work on the inheritance of schizophrenia.[4] Kallman starts with the view that the appearance of schizophrenia in several generations of the same family is more than merely sociologically interesting. It is, he maintains, a kind of biological fact which points to the existence of a specific hereditary predisposition. His work is an attempt to provide scientific proof for this view.

Kallman's technique is similar to that of previous investigators. It consists in counting the incidence of schizophrenia, schizodia (those with schizophrenic traits), other psychoses (so labeled as doubtful schizophrenics), and other evidence of tainting such as psychopathy, alcoholism, suicide, and death from tuberculosis. He attempts definitely to narrow down the "tainting" concept, as he is studying primarily the inheritance of schizophrenia. The data of his study are provided by 1,087 persons who met the following criteria: (1) committed to the Herzeberge Hospital in Germany during the years from 1893 to 1902; and (2) constituted definite cases of schizophrenia in which the disease became recognized before the age of forty. Kallman and his assistants then investigated (through the medium of personal contact, police court records, social agency records, and hospital reports) the parents, husbands or wives, children, grandchildren, half-brothers and half-sisters, and nephews and nieces of his original 1,087 schizophrenics. A total of 13,851 persons furnished records for the study.

It is impossible in a brief space to do justice to Kallman's careful work and to point to all of his significant findings. It is sufficient to say that the incidence of schizophrenia, schizodia, and other psychoses in the ancestors and descendants of his original 1,087 cases is impressive enough to give added support to the view that schizophrenia (or a predisposition to schizophrenia) is inherited and possibly represents a recessive trait in the Mendelian sense. This study is carefully done, is impressive with its voluminous data, and gives strong support

[4] See Franz A. Kallman, *The Genetics of Schizophrenia* (New York: J. J. Augustin, Publisher, 1938).

to the role of inheritance in mental disorder, particularly for schizophrenia.

Even so, when all of the evidence concerning heredity in personality disorders is added up, it does not amount to much in the way of positive knowledge. There are trends, there is much inferential evidence, and there is a tendency for certain families to be disproportionately burdened with abnormalities. There are other suggestive signs such as predisposition—and this is about all. Not until unit-characters are definitely determined and it is possible to distinguish definitely between types of constitutions will we be able to observe heredity in operation with any degree of assurance. At the present time, manic-depressive psychosis appears to have the heaviest weighting of hereditary tainting of all the psychoses. The greatest criticism of all these studies is the failure to eliminate the environmental factors, so that we can without any doubt know that we are dealing solely with biological heredity.

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES. As in the case of the biological theories it has been found impossible to rule out environmental influences completely, so in considering the role of psychological factors it is still more difficult to separate the two sets of influences. The mental and the social are inextricably interwoven into many complex patterns of behavior in the human personality. Current psychological theories of causation in personality disorders usually start with the contributions of Freudian psychoanalysis.

We have considered the basic elements of this theory in Chapter V. Here, it is necessary merely to state that the main channel for symptom formation lies in the conflict between the so-called "instincts" (broadly speaking, man's impulsive life) and the cultural demands imposed by the environment in which man lives. Out of this conflict, man represses certain of his instinctual feelings, depositing them in the unconscious and so building up his unconscious life. With every blocking of an impulse some appropriate emotion arises in consciousness, which *in toto* eventually constitutes the structure of an adult's emotional life. This blockage of instinct, the rise of the

emotion, and the extension of phantasy represent the process of symptom formation. The greatest strides have been made in explaining the symptom structure of the psychoneuroses through this scheme.

In the more behavioristically oriented psychology, the chief contributions have been made in the development of devices to measure objectively certain personality elements—such as traits, attitudes, intelligence, symptoms, and the like. Such factors have no particular causal significance except by indirection, but they have given psychologists a professional role in the clinical examination of the individual case. Through these research efforts, the psychologists have added to the objectivity of the clinical record by showing how to measure the degree of presence or absence of a certain characteristic. This ability to measure certain personality elements also creates a difficulty—namely, how to interpret such findings and combine them with the data obtained in a more introspective fashion in analyzing an individual case.

"Environmental" Theories. The prevailing procedure within the field of psychiatry is to consider certain social or environmental factors which supposedly contribute to the development of mental disorders. It is these factors which we shall consider here as they are considered by psychiatrists. Under this heading we shall discuss briefly the role of alcohol, drugs, injuries, and disease in the production of mental disorders. These factors are defined as broadly environmental because they flow from social contexts.

The exact role of alcohol in the etiology of mental disorder is still very controversial. There is a certain amount of experimental evidence on normal persons as to how varying quantities of alcohol may affect one's work, judgment, memory, mental concentration, and length of life. But these results do not provide many satisfactory clues as to the role of alcohol in mental disorder. The research work on the role of alcohol has centered around the following questions: (1) To what extent does the presence of alcoholism in the parent account for mental disorder or defect in the offspring? (2) To what extent

does the constant intake of alcohol by a given person account for the alcoholic mental disorder in that person? (3) To what extent is the consumption of alcohol to be regarded as a symptom of some other incipient mental disorder?

The final answers to these questions have not been given as yet. The hypothesis that alcohol in the parent may account for mental disorder or defect in the child is supported by some highly questionable statistical data, which there is no point in repeating here. Certain clinical evidence has suggested that alcohol taken over a long period of time may injure the germplasm and hence impair the vitality of the offspring. However, here again the evidence is inconclusive.

The direct production of mental disorder by alcohol is recognized in mental hospitals by the official diagnosis of alcoholic psychoses. In the United States during the last two decades, this disorder has accounted for about 9 per cent of all first admissions. The clinical forms are delirium tremens, Korksakow's psychosis, and chronic alcoholism. Delirium tremens occurs in persons, generally after thirty years of age, who indulge in prolonged drinking bouts. Korksakow's psychosis defines a condition where memory for recent events is impaired and where marked disorientation for time, place, and person are present. Chronic alcoholism has generally described the chronic habitual drinker. Such drinkers show a certain personality change. In both delirium tremens and chronic alcoholism, the social factors may be important. Opportunity to drink, customs associated with drinking, and drinking practices of social groups may play a role in getting the person in a drinking atmosphere. Personality factors may also be important, although little work has been done here. Some persons can seemingly take large quantities of alcohol over long periods of time without noticeable effects, whereas others cannot. Drinking sprees are not productive of delirium tremens in all persons.

The third question suggests many interesting reflections but very uncertain knowledge. Alcoholism has been found to be associated with many psychoses, especially the manic-

depressive disorder. It has frequently been noted that the taking of alcohol is associated with the presence of mental conflict. Alcohol may even be used to suppress the appearance of a full-blown clinical neurosis. As such, alcohol performs for the person a similar function to the neurosis—that is, it provides a temporary way for meeting his difficulty.

The use of drugs of various kinds probably accounts for relatively few psychoses. The official diagnosis of psychosis with drug addiction in itself points to the fact that drug addiction may be associated with a psychosis and, as in the case of certain alcohol users, is more likely to be symptomatic than causative. Opium and its derivatives are the main drugs used by addicts, although various other drugs such as paraldehyde, chloroform, ether, cocaine, and various barbiturates are known to lead to addiction.

Injury or trauma may produce mental symptoms in two ways—by actual brain injury and by emotional shock. In the first instance, we have the true traumatic psychosis. In the second instance, we have a psychoneurosis, where the injury is likely to lie anywhere or the person merely thinks he has been injured. There is some evidence that, with increased use of motor vehicles, the traumatic psychoses have been increasing.

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES. Research and analysis of the role of social factors in mental disorder generally occurs on two levels—*first* that of interpersonal relations, and *second* that of cultural organization. For purposes of this discussion, we shall regard these researches and hypotheses as applying only to the functional disorders and the psychoneuroses. We are concerned, therefore, with those sociological theories which may be helpful in explaining the functional forms of mental disorder.

(1) *Interpersonal Relations.* The core idea around which sociological theories of schizophrenia might be developed is the evolving of the self in various types of difficult social situations. Such situations may involve an especially harsh and brutal social environment, a conflict of different cultures, a

conflict of religious value, or extreme poverty. In any one of these types of situations, the growing self may be at such a disadvantage that the individual fails to develop the habits, acquire the traits and attitudes, and learn the techniques of manipulating others and role-taking which would enable him to become integrated into the larger society. Instead, his self acquires habits, traits, attitudes, and social techniques which actually handicap him for making any sort of adequate adjustment. A self which does not develop the habits, traits, attitudes, and techniques appropriate to the demands of his cultural milieu may eventually display certain reactions of a schizophrenia character. The person may develop a system of ideas concerning the world and his relationship to it which is unique and not shared by other persons.[5] Or he may react by becoming unbearably tense and anxious in contact with others. He may refuse to participate and may reject all overtures to social life. He thus becomes isolated and his mounting anxiety bursts through his controlled behavior patterns into excited and bizarre actions.[6]

Another potential reaction is represented by stupid and circular verbal responses and a marked fragmentation of language. An illustration of this is seen in the peculiar thought content of a person evolving a paranoid schizophrenic reaction.

> I told you there are lots of things coming up all the time, but for me to try to tell you is out of the question. If I wanted to tell you I would not know exactly how to begin.
>
> Here is the way I look at it. Here is science, religion, spiritualism. Having these different points of view I would look at it like this: If a change took place—a big one—I would attempt to see how they all hook together. You get on a good thing, and to me those changes look like an advance. So many

[5] R. E. L. Faris, "Reflections of Social Disorganization in the Behavior of a Schizophrenia Patient," *American Journal of Sociology* (Sept., 1944), 40:134–41.

[6] H. Warren Dunham, "The Social Personality of the Catatonic Schizophrene," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIX (May, 1944), 508–18.

changes took place since I was at the hospital that I find it a good way to check myself. There is too much striving, and not enough striving for the other fellow. You might see something today and say that it looks good to you, and the other fellow doesn't see it that way. Something that I think we might give a little more thought to is the other fellow.

Now here is the way I mean. You see you are doing much differently than you did twenty years ago. New things and new ideas. Then there were tutors and governesses. The big idea we all ought to have is to do the best, and not take every opportunity to upset the best. That is the way I look at it and I think it is right. If you are wrong and don't mend your ways you are always rejected, and you will naturally go into a bigger rut. The penalty is greater and you get more responsible for your acts. Now, I don't want you to get me wrong about this.[7]

Whatever the reaction of the patient, we can say hypothetically that this reaction is related to the personality traits developed in the early years from facing certain unbearable types of situations.

Another contribution of the sociologist in explaining schizophrenia is in the analysis of the process of language communication. Communication can be inadequate and a particular person may not be given enough of the cultural heritage to enable him to act appropriately in different situations. He becomes an example of inadequate socialization. The content of what is communicated may be so contradictory, vague, and unclear that the person does not mirror enough of reality to act properly. In other instances, the ideas given to the person are so false that every time he tries to operate with them he is constantly rebuffed until he does not know where to turn. In any of these instances of faulty communication, the result is generally a marked social isolation of a reciprocal character. The person withdraws from social life and others reject him to such a degree that his own withdrawal is reinforced.

[7] Case from author's files.

This isolation is reflected in the statement of a schizophrenic personality who is trying to build up a view of his life which will explain himself to other persons.

> After you left me last Sunday, I thought of the fact that your principal aim in coming over to see me was to get some story. (And not to help me in any way. Which would enable me for a few weeks, at least, to sit in peace and make some notations of my life experiences—childhood experiences. . . .) But why come to me for some life experiences? I am sure you have lots of "stories" from different delinquent cases.
>
> Now, had my long and vast life story been just "another" case, it would probably not had any more professional value to you than many other stories—delinquency, criminology, and so on.
>
> But, no! When you speak to me about the experiences of my life story, you must pause for a long moment before commencing even on the tiniest part of my big, vast experiences of my life story (even at the very time when an innocent youngster yet!)—and the originality of it! (For it is a life story as interesting and educational to Mankind in general as it will be of greatest value and education—if they ever get it!—to not only social science, but just as much of interest and value to the medical and criminal professions—social, medical, and criminal science are interested!)
>
> I shall only write and speak about my life experience when I am settled down in a more or less degree of peace. I shall only speak and write when being compensated at least to such an extent as it should enable me to get financially on my feet. So I could devote all my time after a while to my literary work—to bring before Mankind all my vast and extraordinary experiences of my long, stormy and original life.[8]

[8] Case from author's file.

Still another area for sociological investigations of schizophrenia might start with the family as a unit. The question might be raised: "What are the different types of family climates in our society which unfit the person for the world outside of the family?" The hypothesis suggested by the question has never been adequately explored with respect to mental disturbances. The *implicit* hypothesis is that, in a community of families, the psychological climate of a specific family which is different from the other families will unfit its members for life in the larger society.

In dealing with the growth of the self, disturbances in communication, or the unique psychological climate of a given family we are elaborating sociological hypotheses concerning the functional psychoses which have never been adequately substantiated. Various sociological studies, case materials, and reported observations do serve as supporting evidence for these hypotheses, but there are many gaps in the total theoretical structure. We turn now to a consideration of certain hypotheses concerning the general influence of cultural organization upon the production of personality disorders.

(2) *Cultural Organization.* Sociological hypotheses relative to the role of cultural organization in mental disorder emphasize "civilization" as a causative agent. Many of these formulations are still vague, unprecise, and lacking in plausibility. Research on this factor has been of three general types. (1) Some studies treat mental disorder as a cultural phenomenon and attempt to show its relationship to other cultural phenomena, such as wars, economic crises, and the like. (2) Other studies take an element of cultural life such as competition or class mobility and try to show how it operates in the life of a person who breaks down with a psychosis. (3) Still other studies center about the specific relationship between cultural organization and personality organization.

Examples of the first type are found in the ecological studies already referred to. In the same general category are those studies which have portrayed the rates of mental disorder through time and attempted to correlate such trends

with various other economic and cultural indices.[9] Such studies often raise hypotheses which should be checked by resort to other data.

An example of the second type of study is Horney's exposition of the neurotic formations of our day.[10] Horney here attempts to show that the competitive patterns of our society account for much of the aggressive striving and ambivalent hostility found in many neurotics. Horney departs from the more orthodox psychoanalytic notion that neuroses are the result of conflicts produced by repressed experiences or by a fixation of the emotional life at some point in its development. She attempts instead to relate the neurotic symptoms of the person to an aspect of the social process. This theory has considerable plausibility as shown by case citations but it lacks convincing proof.

The third group of studies is closely related to the second, although here the attempt is made to show how the patterns of an entire culture form a common personality mold into which most of the persons are made to fit. Recent anthropological research has attempted to show how through child-training techniques, food intake, and the relations between the sexes, a basic personality structure is laid down for most persons within a given culture. When the family training through these techniques is the same, the basic personality will be the same. A typical family training will, however, sometimes produce deviant personalities within the culture.[11]

These brief statements by no means exhaust the research done from these perspectives during the past two decades. We are merely attempting to point out the general trends of sociological explanations of psychoses. In so doing, we are calling attention to the meager results as far as the etiology of the psychoses is concerned. At the same time, we are indicat-

[9] See for example H. Warren Dunham, "War and Personality Organization," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVIII (Nov., 1942), 387–97.

[10] Karen Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1937).

[11] See A. Kardiner, *The Individual and his Society* and *The Psychological Frontiers of Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939 and 1945).

ing a more sophisticated statement of the role of cultural factors. This latter position has had an influence in certain psychiatric circles, but still a limited one as far as the general field of psychiatry is concerned.

Therapy for Personality Disorders

Because of our limited knowledge of causation in personality disorders, therapy is in an uncertain state. Therapy in this area has a long medical history extending backward in time to the ancients. The meager results of this development in the nineteenth century resulted in a marked pessimism with respect to curing the severe mental disturbances. However, during the first three decades of the present century, new conceptions of some of the disorders, combined with the development of new types of therapy, have dissipated the older hopelessness and produced a certain optimism with respect to cures. Even so, many of the current methods still give uncertain results and must still undergo much experimentation before their therapeutic value can be established. Therapy currently available to persons with mental disorders is of three types: physical, psychological, and sociological.

PHYSICAL THERAPY. Under physical therapy we include the hospitalization of persons with mental disorders as well as the various types of medication used on them. The hospitalization of mental patients is a very old practice. Its functions in the past have largely been to isolate the patient from his community, to restrain him in his violent behavior, and to provide him with a kind of custodial care. In recent years there have been numerous attempts to improve the therapeutic function of mental hospitals, but most of them still perform these traditional functions.

In addition to the medical and surgical treatments for physical ailments which mental patients receive as routine, current types of physical treatment include rest, baths (hydrotherapy), various shock treatments, and psychosurgery. The first two types are largely self-explanatory but the differ-

ent shock treatments require a brief word. Shock treatments in use include insulin, metrazol, and electric. The first two are medications and the last is mechanical. All tend to produce convulsions in the patient. Metrazol is not used now as much as formerly, but insulin and electric shock are still used. Electric shock is the least costly of the three, is easily administered, and is in keeping with medical tradition of treating the brain, which is supposedly the seat of mental disturbances. In this connection, however, we have seen that the entire personality is involved in all these disorders.

What shock treatment accomplishes is not quite clear at this stage in our knowledge. Insulin is supposed to produce certain chemical changes in the body, thus bringing the physiological and emotional processes into proper balance. Electric shock supposedly brings about a "redistribution of molecules in the brain," but the nature or effect of this process is not completely clear. Some interpretations of shock cures have been psychological. From this viewpoint it is held that the patient gets well because he prefers to avoid the dread, anxiety, and terror connected with expectancies of the shock treatment. Shock treatments have brought about cures ranging from 60 to 80 per cent of those treated in various hospitals, although the patients have suffered many relapses with resulting readmission to the hospital. We have described the modern versions of shock, but it should be recognized that we are dealing with a very old technique which goes back to the medieval practice of throwing the insane into snake pits.

Psychosurgery has been practiced to a limited extent since 1936. This is an operation which attempts to divide certain pathways connecting the thalamus with the prefrontal regions. The frontal lobes of the brain have long been regarded as a center for some of the higher mental functions. Patients who show marked anxiety, tension, and preoccupation with the self over long periods of time have been selected for such operations. To date the results are uncertain. Definite improvements in some cases have been recorded after a certain length of time following the operation. Many doctors, how-

ever, prefer not to use such surgery until all other forms of therapy have been tried and have failed.

We have described these forms of physical therapy which are for the most part used for the functional psychoses. There are numerous other chemical therapies used for the organic psychoses, which may be found by consulting any contemporary psychiatric textbook.

PSYCHOLOGICAL THERAPY. The chief form of psychotherapy is psychoanalysis. This is used principally as a treatment for the psychoneuroses, but has also been used with psychotic patients in certain instances. Its use is confined largely to private psychiatric practice, for the expense and time have precluded its use in public mental hospitals. In its operation, psychoanalysis is both research and therapy. It involves the attempt by both the therapist and the patient to get at the repressed emotional roots of the patient's conflict and to bring them to a conscious level, where they become an integral part of the total personality. The patient talks to the therapist, recounts his dreams, and engages in free association. Much of the therapeutic success of this technique depends on the rapport established between the therapist and patient.

Other forms of psychotherapy consist of suggestion, reassurance, and talking out one's difficulties. These may be found to some degree in the public mental hospital, but their use there is largely dependent upon the interest of the individual psychiatrist in a given patient.

SOCIOLOGICAL THERAPY. This term refers to therapy which is primarily of a social character in the sense that it requires group activity for its realization. Its chief forms have all been used at different times in various public mental hospitals. They include occupational therapy, recreational therapy, group therapy, and psychodrama techniques.

Occupational therapy has both a formal and informal aspect. On the formal level, the patient works at developing some craft—such as weaving, sewing, rug making, cabinet making, and the like—under trained supervision. In its informal aspect, the patient is assigned a job in the hospital or

given some work on the outside. Work supposedly takes one's mind off one's immediate difficulties. Recreational therapy consists of various kinds of group play carried on either in or out of doors. Indoors, it may be singing, dancing, playing in an orchestra, or parlor games. Outdoors, games requiring physical exercise like baseball are common.

Group therapy takes several forms. Under certain auspices it may approximate recreational therapy. It also consists of devices for getting an individual patient in a group situation to discuss his symptoms and their development. Group therapy is also represented by the discussion group which tries to analyze a case presented by a psychiatrist. Patients attempt to discuss informally among themselves some of their own personal problems under the direction of a skillful therapist. Psychodrama represents a technique developed by J. F. Moreno and utilized with patients at his sanitarium. It consists of letting the patient act out on a stage certain situations of his personal life with other persons ("auxiliary egos"), who take the different roles of mother, wife, husband, father, sibling, or friend.

These sociological forms of therapy have been described very briefly, but enough has been said to point to the two main objectives which they have in common. *First*, they aim to get the person to forget about himself and to shake off some of his self-consciousness. *Second*, they aim to draw the patient out—to get him to speak more freely, to act in different situations, and to participate in group life. Group therapy and psychodrama as currently practiced have other and deeper purposes, but they have these major objectives. The great drawback in all these forms is the lack of positive knowledge to tell us within a margin of error what type of therapy is most effective with a given type of patient.

Prevention of Personality Disorders

There is a certain temerity in writing about preventive work with respect to personality disorders, inasmuch as most

plans are in their infancy. One general objective of such work is to extend the possibilities of adjustment for the incipient neurotic and psychotic in their communities and thus keep them out of mental hospitals. On a deeper level, the objective is to eliminate various kinds of environmental situations which produce the neurotic and psychotic personalities. While easy to state, this latter objective must be examined with great care as to its implications. At the present time most preventive programs work with the first objective.

(1) *Mental Hygiene Movement.* Preventive efforts in the United States date from the founding of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene in 1909 by Clifford Beers. Beers himself was at one time a patient in a mental hospital. He recorded his hospital experiences and the development of the Mental Hygiene Movement in his book, *A Mind That Found Itself.* In addition to working for improvement in the care and treatment of the mentally ill in hospitals, the Committee's preventive efforts have been largely educational by informing the public and interested professionals concerning the facts of mental health. Through radio talks, conferences, publications, and press reports the Committee has for over forty years encouraged communities and states to develop facilities for early diagnosis and treatment of the mentally disordered. Limited budgets have prevented the Committee from doing more effective work.

(2) *Child Guidance Clinics.* These clinics were established in various cities in 1920 by the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, with the financial support of the Commonwealth Fund. These clinics center on the child and attempt to detect and treat incipient abnormal personality tendencies which might later handicap him as an adult. The clinics also work with the parents and thus educate them in dealing with the problem child. Other than their educational influence, the concrete achievements of these clinics in preventing mental disturbances still need to be carefully evaluated.[12]

[12] See George S. Stevenson and Geddes Smith, *Child Guidance Clinics, A Quarter Century of Development* (New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1934).

(3) *Recovery, Inc.* This organization was founded in Illinois in 1937 by thirty recovered mental patients under the stimulation of Dr. A. A. Lowe of the Illinois Psychopathic Institute. It deserves recognition as a preventive device, for its chief aims are to combat relapses (in mental ailments) and to forestall chronicity (in psychoneurotic conditions).[13] Activities of the group are both social and educational. Psychotherapy classes and panel discussions precede a large weekly gathering of the entire membership. Symptoms are discussed by psychiatrists, and nonpatient friends and family members are induced to attend the group meetings. By these and other means, the organization has built up morale and provided a social situation where patients help one another in obtaining jobs and overcoming personal problems. The organization publishes a monthly magazine, *Recovery Journal*, which records the class work and group discussions. Like most such programs, the effectiveness of the organization has never been carefully evaluated.

(4) *National Mental Health Foundation.* This private organization is a relative newcomer to the preventive field. It was established in 1946 and grew out of the combined experiences of the wartime conscientious objectors who worked in the mental hospitals throughout the country. Its efforts to date have been largely educational. Through its publications and daily newspaper stories, it tries to arouse the citizens to do something about mental health in their local communities. The organization attempts to stimulate volunteer service in hospitals, to help hospitals recruit qualified personnel, to make available consultants on the legal aspects of mental health, and to conduct special research projects. The Foundation publishes a monthly magazine, *The Psychiatric Aid*, for attendants and other employees of mental hospitals.

(5) *The National Institute of Mental Health.* This institute was established by the National Mental Health Act passed by Congress in 1946 and represents the first efforts of the Federal

[13] See A. A. Lowe, "A Concise Outline of Recovery Self-Help Techniques," *Recovery Publication No. 11*, Chicago.

Government in the preventive area. Its aim is not to improve mental hospitals but to make it possible for communities to use them less. One phase of its work is to finance the psychiatric training of qualified persons; another is to support promising research projects; and still another is to provide model mental-hygiene clinics for selected communities to demonstrate how preventive work should be carried on. The results of these efforts can only be measured in future years.

(6) *World Federation of Mental Health.* This organization is an extension of the International Congress on Mental Health which convened in London, August 11–21, 1948. Its purpose is to work for progress in achieving mental health in all countries of the world. The Federation works toward this end through an exchange of ideas about mental health in the various member countries in *The Bulletin* and also by attempting to develop multidisciplined thinking and research on mental health problems. Its establishment recognizes a concern which is international and which can help in bringing together for common tasks the peoples of the various nations.

These formal organizational efforts do not include all of the preventive work which is being done. In communities all across the land there are many local efforts—university courses, mental health clinics in schools, special instruction for public-school teachers in mental-hygiene principles, and various kinds of programs to improve family life. All of these efforts have as their general aim the improvement of the mental health of the nation.

SUMMARY. In this chapter we have attempted to characterize some of the problems centering around the causation, therapy, and prevention of personality disorders in our society. With respect to causation we have pointed to the obstacles to its understanding, the current orthodox hypotheses concerning it, and the sociological research aiming at a more precise statement of the role of environmental factors in personality disorders. In considering therapy, we have centered our attention primarily on the kinds of therapy available to persons with the so-called functional disorders. We have consistently

pointed to the need for research to test the effectiveness of any specific therapy. Current work in therapy is more widespread than preventive measures, although even here work is going ahead. We must look to the future for a positive evaluation of these efforts. As citizens of a great democracy, we must recognize that it is necessary to attack personality disorders on all fronts if we are to preserve the well-being of our greatest asset—our people.

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Part Three

PROBLEMS OF DELINQUENCY

by Paul W. Tappan

CHAPTER EIGHT

Delinquency as a Social Problem

SOCIAL VALUES AND DELINQUENCY. A social problem may be interpreted as a pathological situation resulting from the failure of a value system to maintain conformity and integration in some area of the social structure. As a result of the threat to a value in a particular group in the population, society must act to modify the forces out of which the nonconformity arises. The significance of the problem may be measured roughly by the degree of feeling attached to the particular values violated and by the amount of variation from the generally accepted standards.

It would be difficult to find an area of social deviation better illustrating our definition of a social problem than juvenile delinquency. To a great extent, as we shall see, the problem of delinquency is a reflection of and a precipitate from the diverse values cherished by the community. At the same time, the imprecise and conflicting character of the values makes the problem more difficult to define and measure. The importance attached to delinquency has stimulated a wide variety of efforts to mitigate the problem. The success of this social action, however, has been seriously curtailed by the failure to recognize the nature of the values underlying

the problem. These curative efforts have also failed to come to grips with the influences which underlie the deviant behavior.

In the following chapters, we shall therefore consider: (1) the social values in relation to which juvenile deviations are defined and the amount of such deviation that is believed to exist; (2) the forces that operate to produce deviations from the accepted norms; and (3) the forms of action that have been taken in the effort to meet the problem.

One of the greatest difficulties impeding adjustment in contemporary society rests in the chaos that marks the standards by which men live. The excessively rapid transitions that have characterized the past thirty years have greatly intensified the difficulty of individual adjustment to social norms, a problem that had already become acute through the impact of the industrial revolution upon modern man. A generation ago, however, men could achieve a fairly high measure of integration through a set of values rather uniformly and sturdily adhered to by the entire community. In childhood and maturity, the individual had guideposts clearly marked which he could depend upon for the direction of his personal and social behavior.

The child of the present generation, in contrast, is confronted with value systems that are confused, incoherent, and contradictory. The secularization of attitudes has developed at a rapid pace in the twentieth century under the pressures of industry and mass urbanism, ripping away the structure of motives which reflected the familial, religious, and educational institutions of a rural and primary group society. The contemporary age has revolutionized conduct without providing a set of integrated values to direct the altered behavior. Under incessant pressure to make and enjoy a "living," there has been little time or inclination to evolve new codes to define man's newly evolving demands.

Today's child therefore faces value conflicts in two very important respects: (1) He suffers from his parent's own insecurity and confusion of values through which the parental functions have come to be increasingly difficult. (2) He is also

endangered by the varied and uncertain conceptions concerning the child's role, the behavior to be expected from a normal child, and "good" parent-child relations. The mores of child behavior are even less clear and less uniformly agreed upon than are adult mores.

The contemporary confusion of values is reflected in the widely divergent views concerning the proper functions of the family, the church, the school, the police, and the juvenile court in their relations to the child. Increasingly, the responsibilities of the family and religious institutions are thrust upon public agencies, often with bitter controversy as to the sorts of tasks that the latter can properly and effectively perform. All too often the child is forgotten in the resulting struggle of agencies either to forsake responsibilities or to achieve extended powers. Increasingly we find the court and the cop, the school and the social agency, attempting to perform in the parental role. The result is often unhappy if the child is limited to the spasmodic, hit-or-miss good-will of an agency worker, a totally inadequate substitute for the love and training he should have had in his home. Let us look now at some of the values in relation to which delinquency is defined today.

PARENTAL VALUES AND DELINQUENCY. Parental standards in regard to filial behavior may operate to the child's disadvantage in two general ways: In the first place, excessively rigid and high levels of expectancies imply that the child will fall short of the demands imposed upon him. The youngster may thus be delinquent not so much through any fault of his own as through the unrealistic demands of his parents. Great difficulty may also result from the methods by which parental standards are asserted. The way in which norms are administered in the home may be responsible for children's feelings of insecurity, anxiety, and guilt, or for a general pattern of rebellion against authority. Parental power is often employed as a bludgeon to coerce the youngster's conformity to a set of adult rules, rather than as a support to strengthen his sense of security through a reasonable standard which he can achieve.

Nowhere is the modern child's plight more clearly exemplified than in the rapid transitions that have been occurring in parental values. Much of this problem has reflected the rapidly changing orthodoxies of child psychology during the past generation. Many "experts," for example, insist that to avoid dependence in the child he should be spared the physical expressions of affection that parents have traditionally showered upon their young. The baby must not be picked up, cuddled, kissed, and warmly loved—or he may become unduly attached to the parents. Acceptance of this philosophy has resulted in a tragic emotional malnutrition in children deprived of the most essential ingredient in character formation, a certainty of their parents' love. These youngsters have indeed attained an emotional detachment. But they have lost that warm identification with a love object through which they might receive a set of values as a firm, well-integrated core of their personality structure. The counsel of affectional starvation has alternated with a belief, now fortunately more prevalent, that the child needs to be loved and that his psychological dependence is a natural phase of growth and a foundation for the healthy interdependence and socialization of group living.

There is another area of disagreement among the authorities from which has developed serious confusion among parents and children. This is a matter not unrelated to the expression of parental love. Briefly, it is a question of child obedience to a set of adult-established standards and taboos. To what extent, if at all, should the child be expected to conform to rules? In reaction against the excessive patriarchal domination that is a part of our cultural heritage, the trend has been toward freedom from repression and the child's right to unrestrained self-expression. The "permissive approach" has become a popular slogan for modern child care. Unfortunately, this is a negative term, without any real direction to parental methods in the handling of the young. Hence the connotations of permissiveness have been diversely interpreted. To the lazy or unloving parent, this approach has

provided an easy excuse for plain neglect. To many a "liberal" parent, it has implied a kind of domestic laissez faire that would avoid the establishment of any standards of child behavior.

Other parents have employed a more reasonable interpretation under which, while avoiding the assertion of excessive and unnecessary authority, they have nevertheless guided the child with rules reasonable for his age. Commensurate with his maturity, he has a part in making the rules. A parental pattern of rigid severity leads to an unwholesome repression which, though it may insure some conformity to regulations, at the same time produces anxiety and insecurity in the child. At least as unfortunate, however, is the anarchy of unstructured character that develops from an environment without controls. The child needs standards suitable to his age. Along with them, he needs consistent responses of warm approval for successful achievement and disapproval for acts violating others' rights, accompanied by suggestions of more acceptable alternative behavior. Many parents are discovering to their chagrin that children who have not been regulated in their responses to authority during the early years become undisciplined adults, contemptuous of the controls that society attempts to impose. The so-called "recalcitrant" child may thus be a victim of parental definitions, either when parents' standards are excessively rigid or when parents have failed to establish any consistent standard at all to guide the child's behavior. The difficulty in defining delinquency results largely from the lack of uniformity in what is expected of the child. This is both a matter of parental values and of the conflict between these values and those of the larger community.

Another aspect of parental values that is vital to child adjustment concerns the respect of the parents for the personality and individuality of the child. Not only does the child require praise for his strengths but, even more, he needs a tolerant understanding of his weaknesses. This tolerance implies real help in accepting those weaknesses that cannot be corrected, as well as in improving his remediable deficiencies. The com-

mon methods of carping criticism by which parents relieve their frustrations only intensify the child's weakness and add to his sense of inadequacy. To understand the child at his level and accept him as a person implies a readiness to help him through the crises by which he matures. Much of his learning must come through trial and error rather than mere conformity to the edicts derived from the experience of others. Yet tolerance of the child's experimental strivings is neither in our tradition nor very common today.

The parent who appears in juvenile court to have his child declared delinquent is characteristically one who has failed to help the child accept authority and learn the limits to which he must accommodate himself in facing social reality. Too often that parent, instead of treating the youngster as a person who must learn from experience, has expected complete obedience to an impossible standard and has employed one coercive device after another to threaten and force the child into an artificial mold. Resort to the police and the courts becomes a further manifestation of failure in the parental function. This experience is a tragic transition from the child's poor relationship in the home to an equally ineffective adjustment to public authority. The development of a generalized rebellion against the community is often a quite unnecessary consequence of the unrealistic standards of the parent, together with a too-ready willingness of public authorities to accept the challenge inferred from the rebellious behavior of the youngster, however trivial or normal his acts may be.

Children's court laws are usually cast in general and moralistic terms of "willful disobedience" and "moral depravity." This encourages some parents, in their search for sanctions to constrain their young to a stereotyped model, to rush to public officials on inadequate pretexts. They thereby complete their rejection of the child and relieve themselves of parental responsibility. Daughters are more frequently accorded this treatment than sons, as mothers hasten to dispossess themselves of female children who have dared to stray

from the narrow channels erected by the parental taboos. Under our persisting double standard, sons are dealt with somewhat more leniently when they run away from home, skip school, or express their sexual curiosities.

Another facet of the child's need for treatment as a person is expressed in his groping for emancipation from the limits of the home. His emotional and social growth must come from his expanding identification with his peers outside the home. This is normally accompanied by an iconoclastic questioning of parental standards and by efforts to throw off the family yoke. It is difficult for parents in our society to accept the evidences of emancipation in their young, let alone encourage the growth of the independence and maturity which society expects of them. The social media are so inadequate that it is not surprising that many youths falter in their striving for a mature status. Few receive the affirmative assistance from their parents that is necessary if the individual is to succeed in his social development. The evidences of social and emotional immaturity are legion in our culture. Defective responses to authority are merely one specialized phase of the failure to grow up. Quite often, what the family and the court have defined as delinquency has been only an innocuous expression of a youth's unaided efforts to arrive at a new status in which his emerging emotional and social requirements may be satisfied.

We do not know how often the intervention of the court and the correctional system deflect adolescent development into a persistent rebellious reaction against the family and society. It appears clear, however, that contemporary society is veering away from the responsibilities of primary group roles and is attempting to project an increasing burden of duties upon public and official agencies. In this exchange, the latter display their ineptitude in the performance of intimate, affective parental functions. The doctrine of *parens patriae* as applied to the juvenile court's handling of the child is therefore predicated on the translation of paternalistic roles to an agency that cannot possibly perform them.

COMMUNITY VALUES AND DELINQUENCY. Although parental values play an essential role in delinquency, a distinct role must also be attributed to community standards. Differences between community and familial norms may make adjustment to the one or the other impossible. This is most easily illustrated in the antisocial home where the patterns learned by the child are in conflict with the law. More frequently, however, family rules correspond to the minimum standards of the state, but difficulties arise out of the poor implementation of the rules through the home, the court, or both. Let us consider some of the community values of special importance in relation to delinquency.

Implicit in what has been said about family values is the problem rising out of the diverse definitions of normal and acceptable childhood behavior. The range of opinion among different families today is tremendous. Delinquency may be measured in one sense by the deviation between the minimum demands of the law and the extremes of tolerance and intolerance exemplified in different family mores. The child's adjustment to community values is frequently impeded either by the standards established in the home or by the methods through which those standards are instrumented. The uncertainty of parents today as to the values they should attempt to transmit and the methods of child training they should employ increases the difficulty in the child's adaptation to community standards.

Community conceptions of parental responsibilities are also related to the definition of delinquency. The readiness of public authority to intervene or even to supplant parental roles through commitment to a correctional institution is a real determinant of the meaning of delinquency in a community. In this connection should be noted the widespread tendency to discover in the parents the underlying fault for their children's delinquency. This attitude illustrates our familiar search for an easy scapegoat, and is unrealistic for understanding or meeting the problem of delinquency. Blaming parents does not resolve the problem of those adults who

are themselves the poorly adjusted, insecure, and unhappy products of faulty training. Exposure of such parents to ridicule and punishment serves only to intensify their personal problems and the difficulties in their relationships to their children.

Community standards, like those of the family, are not uniform or consistent. Relative to delinquency, however, they reach their highest level of integration in the juvenile court. Therefore, the values of the court are of peculiar importance in determining who is delinquent and what should be done about it. The court's conception of its role in relation to the child and its premises concerning normal and deviant juvenile behavior determine the field within which it operates. The juvenile court is in transition from its criminal court origins and reflects in its personnel the widely divergent values of the community. Hence there is no singleness of purpose or philosophy to characterize the juvenile court. A generally prevalent characteristic of the court is the disparity between its ideal objectives and its actual performance. This situation reflects the discrepancy that may exist between ideation and action where the values are incoherent.

The children's court generally ascribes to itself a protective and paternal role in such terms as these: "It (the law) is not for the punishment of offenders, but for the salvation of children, and points out the way by which the state undertakes to save, not particular children of a special class, but all children under a certain age, whose salvation may become the duty of the state in the absence of proper parental care or disregard of it by wayward children. No child under the age of 16 years is excluded from its beneficent provisions. Its protecting arm is for all who have not attained to that age and who may need its protection." (Commonwealth *vs.* Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198, 1905.) The methods by which this "salvation" is accomplished are commonly indistinguishable from the penalties imposed upon adult offenders in the criminal court. Detention in jails and other facilities, extended incarceration in rigorously disciplined institutions, fines, and probation are more

like criminal-court punishments than a truly beneficent protection of the juvenile.

In spite of the essentially punitive character of most of the treatment resources available to it, the juvenile court has based its policies largely on a paternalistic philosophy, assuming jurisdiction over an increasingly wide assortment of cases. In many communities the court has come to view itself as a sort of generalized social agency, designed to provide help to any youngster who represents an adjustment problem. Control is further widened by the common presumption that "the child needs help or he wouldn't be here." The specific character of the child's misbehavior, if any, is deemed unimportant under the doctrine that delinquency is merely symptomatic of underlying unadjustment. Furthermore, since it is the benevolent intent of the court to remedy the underlying problem, delinquencies per se become irrelevant. The juvenile court is thus considered as an administrative social agency and the nature of delinquent acts ceases to be important in many courts. The court aspires to operate as a generalized instrument of child welfare.

But a court cannot function as a general social agency, for many reasons. Since a large proportion of the cases brought in by the police are serious and habitual offenders, the court experience carries with it associations that are inevitably deleterious. These courts also lack the treatment facilities and personnel to do an effective case-work job on all manner of unadjusted children and their families. Moreover, the authority vested in the court and employed by its personnel is a detriment to case-work treatment *when* the child does not need authoritarian control. In spite of these limitations upon effective court operation, the trend in statutory enactments and in court administration has been to avoid clear definition of delinquency and to handle an increasingly wide assortment of cases. It is rare indeed to find a modern court with the realism to declare: "The judgment against a youth that he is delinquent is a serious reflection upon his character and habits. The stain against him is not removed merely because the

statute says no judgment in this particular proceeding shall be deemed a conviction for crime or so considered. The stigma of conviction will reflect upon him for life. It hurts his self-respect. It may, at some inopportune, unfortunate moment, rise to destroy his opportunity for advancement and blast his ambition to build up a character and reputation entitling him to the esteem and respect of his fellow men. . . . Guilt should be proved by evidence which leaves no reasonable doubt. Inferences must give way when in conflict with facts established by positive proof." (Jones et al. *vs.* Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S. E. 2nd 444, 1946.)

The confusion of values implicit in the situation we have described involves such considerations as the following: the clinical and rehabilitative ideals of contemporary case work, the patriarchal and protective objectives of an equity jurisprudence, the punitive-retributive standards carried over from the criminal courts and penology, the stern patriarchal repression of juvenile recalcitrants traditional in our culture, and—overall—an utterly unrealistic aura of beneficent sentimentality.

The indeterminate quality of delinquency has been increased further by the application of the term in several situations where the child is not even adjudicated as an official juvenile delinquent in court. This usage has occurred partly through the wide development of unofficial court treatment of children who are brought to official attention but are then handled informally, without going through a hearing to determine the fact of delinquency. Such youngsters are handled in great numbers—in many jurisdictions 50 per cent or more of the cases—by the ordinary probation personnel and frequently in the institutional facilities that are employed for official juvenile delinquents. This practice illustrates the court's inclination to handle nondelinquents, since many of the cases have committed no offense at all.

Developing conceptions and practices in police work also account for some confusion in regard to delinquency. As specialized juvenile bureaus are set up in urban police de-

partments to handle children's cases, they avoid arrests and court petitions for a substantial proportion of offenders who in another day would have been found official delinquents. Children who have violated minor municipal ordinances, others who have simply engaged in unguided play activities, and sometimes more serious offenders may thus be handled terminally by the police. The policy is to avoid the recognized evils of arrest and court treatment and to provide instead an informal handling through admonition, warning, persuasion, and often leisure-time programs of competitive athletics. As these methods develop, they are applied to an increasing variety of cases for "preventive" purposes, until both nondelinquents and mature offenders are being covered by the unofficial devices. Aside from important policy questions involved in this trend, it also results in greater confusion as to the nature of delinquency and the values that are at stake.

In our discussion of parental and community values, the view was expressed that much so-called delinquency is simply the discrepancy between the value systems current in society and the behavior in which certain children engage. The occurrence of such discrepancy is thus determined to a large extent by the reasonableness of the standards. Where the expectancies are obsolete in relation to the circumstances of child living, deviations from the standards will be frequent. Where conditioning experiences would lead the youngster in one direction and community standards in another, fault should often be attributed to the standards rather than simply to the training of the young.

The moralistic standards which evaluate juvenile behavior are very slow to respond to other changes in the culture. Moral norms are characteristically absolute and nonrational in character and carry a heavy freight of feeling. Therefore, modification of established values is difficult because of the intense emotional bulwarks that support them, however inappropriate the norms may have become in relation to the rest of the culture. Hence the boy living in a twentieth-century urban environment, with its stimulations to sensory pleasures available

at a price, may be led to any one of a large variety of outlets for expression. The very conditions of his experience facilitate diverse, individualized, and often antisocial expression of his wants. He is little restrained by the traditional sanctions of church and community opinion, and his familial training lacks the consistency and intensity of an earlier day. Nevertheless, his behavior is evaluated by criteria set up in an age long past for youngsters living in rural communities where they experienced little of the motivations that operate today. Few of the adventures of nineteenth-century youth are accessible today. Most of them, indeed, appear rather tame by contemporary standards. In their place, contemporary youth is enticed in to new, more thrilling pleasures that custom defines as wrong.

Legal standards, particularly those with a moral foundation, are even slower to change than are the mores themselves. Considerable community tolerance may develop for new lines of conduct before the statutes or the courts will give them cognizance or approbation. The legal doctrine of *stare decisis* (the rule of precedent) expresses the veneration of traditional rules and the hesitation to follow new lines of cultural development. Laws and court decisions may change rather quickly today in some areas of economic and social policy where the practical value of innovation is obvious. But the imponderables of morality lag indefinitely, honored mainly in the breech. This point has been made very clear by Professor Porterfield's recent studies, which show that the same sorts of behavior which lead a few children, mainly of low socio-economic level, into juvenile court had been engaged in with impunity by virtually all the college students that he studied.[1] Professor Kinsey has shown even more dramatically that only a small proportion of the persons that engage in sex behavior deviating from our moral traditions and laws are ever brought to court.[2] Yet for the millions who violate the old taboos, a

[1] Austin L. Porterfield, *Youth in Trouble* (Leo Potishman Foundation, Austin, Texas, 1946).

[2] Alfred C. Kinsey, et al., *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1948).

TABLE 2

Offenses of College Students and Juvenile Delinquents [3]

Offenses by types	Percentage of students						Percentage of juvenile court cases charged with the offense	
	Reporting the offense			Charged with the offense				
	Precollege		College men	Precollege		College men		
	Men	Women		Men	Women		Boys	Girls
Vagabondage:								
Suspicious character	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.0	4.9
Vagrancy	4.0	0.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
Begging	5.5	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0
Peddling, no license	5.5	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Runaway, wandering	14.5	4.3	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	42.0	31.5
Stranded transiency	14.5	0.0	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	†	†
Truancy	42.5	34.3	28.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.1
Loafing in a pool hall	48.0	0.0	46.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
Percentage charged in court: total	.	.		0.0	0.0	0.0	53.3	37.5
Liquor violations:								
Illegal manufacture	8.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Illegal possession	35.5	2.9	47.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Buying as a minor	38.0	2.2	53.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Drunkenness	39.0	2.9	43.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.1
Percentage charged in court: total	.	...	...	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.2	1.1
Theft:								
Automobile theft	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.5 ‡
Bicycle theft	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.0
Theft of tools, money	5.5	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.8	0.0
Burglary	7.5	0.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	0.0
Shoplifting	10.0	1.5	5.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	11.4
Miscellaneous, petty	23.0	8.8	11.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7	4.1
Stealing melons, fruit	69.0	16.0	15.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
Percentage charged in court: total	...		.	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.2	16.0
Dishonesty (other than stealing):								
Forgery	2.5	5.1	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.6
False collection	8.0	2.2	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Possessing stolen goods	20.0	3.6	14.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.0
Passing slugs, bad coins	24.0	0.0	14.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Gambling	58.5	17.4	60.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0
Percentage charged in court: total	.	.	.	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	1.6
Sex offenses:								
Attempt to rape	5.5	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Indecent exposure	24.5	2.2	23.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Extramarital coitus	58.5	0.7	59.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	11.4
Percentage charged in court: total	..		. .	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	11.4
Other cases:								
Carrying concealed weapons	14.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Homicide, murder	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.5 §
Homicide, negligent	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Incorrigible	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	10.3
Neglected, abused, etc.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	12.0
Miscellaneous appearance in court	..	..	...	2.0	0.0	4.0	0.0	2.1
Percentage charged in court: total	..		. .	2.5	0.0	4.0	2.0	24.9

† See "Runaway." ‡ As accomplice. § Self-defense.

[3] Austin L. Porterfield, op. cit., p. 41.

few score of cases may be sent to jail or prison, sometimes for ten, twenty, or thirty years.

The truism that "without law there would be no crime" obviously offers little in the way of a practical solution for the growing problem of delinquency. Nevertheless, it suggests the desirability of expunging from our laws those norms that are no longer realistic or enforceable under contemporary circumstances. These archaic norms serve too little purpose as symbols of outdated social goals. In the lack of a reasonable measure of enforcement, an attitude toward authority is generated that impedes the administration of other more useful laws. It is an extremely difficult question, however, to determine what traditional moral evaluations should be excised from contemporary law. However easy it may be to describe a legal norm as outdated and unenforceable, its mere difficulty of administration and its frequent violation should not be taken as proof that it no longer fits the public need. No matter how greatly the crimes of theft have increased in modern society, for example, it would be economic suicide to annul the larceny laws. How much more realistic would it be, therefore, to abandon all those laws in relation to sex that are being transgressed daily? The stability of the familial system would apparently be threatened even more than it is today were we to remove from the laws all those sex standards which are difficult to administer. In relation to juvenile delinquency, however, the fact still remains that our legal standards are excessively imprecise. It is important, therefore, that the standards administered by our judges and probation officers should not be flagrantly in conflict with the generally recognized community values to which most behavior conforms.

THE NATURE OF DELINQUENCY. Let us consider now more specifically what is the nature of delinquency. It may well be understood from what has already been said that, in comparison with many other social problems, this is a phenomenon peculiarly difficult to define. Under the old common law of England and still today in that country, delinquency is simply described as conduct which, if it were committed by an adult,

would be a crime. The British law is infinitely simpler than our own in this regard, however.

Under the statutes in the United States, the above definition is quite generally included among the clauses that determine juvenile court jurisdiction. In addition, our laws customarily include a series of other more general specifications, such as "moral depravity," "recalcitrance," "willful disobedience," "bad associates," running away, truancy, and numerous other courses of conduct. These terms are so vague in their substantive content that the nature of delinquent behavior becomes a matter of court determination in the individual case. The values of the judge and the probation officer relative to child conduct and parent-child relations are thus of extreme importance in determining what sort of juvenile acts will be deemed to come under the statutory phraseology. Moral conceptions enter into the law specifically and often indirectly as well, since juvenile and family court cases tend to invite the moral judgments of the court. Hence the determination of delinquency is often based largely upon moral standards when the child's conduct has differed from the values of the court. These moral preferences may be of a highly idiosyncratic character and may vary markedly within the community and between different judges and court officers.

THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY. The significance of a social problem may usually be measured by the frequency of incidence of divergent behavior, together with the amount of social danger inhering in that behavior. These criteria are somewhat less applicable to juvenile delinquency than to other forms of problem behavior. The importance of delinquency flows not so much from the intrinsic hazards of child misconduct as it does from the probability that juvenile aberrations will persist into adult years and manifest themselves in criminal conduct of greater cost and danger to society. For this reason, the delinquency problem may be measured indirectly by adult crime rates, as well as by rates of juvenile law violations. The volume of adult criminality thus reflects to a

large extent the community's failure to deal effectively with juvenile delinquency. The point of immediate emphasis here, however, is that juvenile delinquency itself represents a serious contemporary social problem as manifested indirectly in the rates of adult crime. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover has estimated that there is a fifteen-billion-dollar annual expenditure to cope with a "standing army" of some five million serious and habitual criminal offenders. This figure is a crude measure of our failure in prevention and treatment of unadjusted or delinquent youngsters.

Statistics on criminality, though inexact, are considerably better than those on juvenile delinquency. Crime data would not be particularly useful, however, to our consideration here. Such statistical information as is available directly on delinquency rates will therefore be presented below, inadequate as it is. There are two main reasons why data on juvenile delinquency are of limited utility: (a) the nature of the phenomenon itself, and (b) the wide variations in administrative practices. Both of these difficulties will be briefly considered here before presenting statistical materials.

The chief barrier to measurement in the field of delinquency has been suggested in our earlier discussion, namely, the nature of the phenomenon is not clearly defined. Estimates of the extent of delinquency must vary tremendously in relation to the criteria for the selection of cases. These criteria may be based upon: 1) officially adjudicated delinquents; 2) unofficial delinquents, handled informally by the courts; 3) police cases, including either those arrested or, in addition, the larger group dealt with by admonition and informal programs of treatment; 4) children with conduct problems handled by nonauthoritarian agencies in the community; or 5) all children displaying conduct problems, whether or not they are brought to the attention of any agency for treatment.

The last category would obviously be the most complete measure of the extent of delinquency in the community. Aside from the fact that there would be no agreement even among authorities as to what constitutes the coverage of the term

"conduct problems," there is no source from which data as complete as this could be obtained. Dr. Sophia Robison has suggested the desirability of setting up a community index system for the filing of information on all children found to be suffering from some maladjustment or conduct problem.[4] The closest existing approximation to this device may be found in some of the more efficient community co-ordinating councils. In certain communities, the council attempts to discover the youngsters who need help and to refer them to those agencies that are most qualified to handle the particular type of problem. In general, however, these councils have not been specifically concerned with the problems of research or accumulation of statistics. Plans have been made for the development of such an index in New York City that should prove useful there.

A recent study conducted in the District of Columbia has shed some interesting light on the occurrence of delinquency that does not appear in juvenile courts. In this study an effort was made to discover the *total* volume of delinquency in a single community, as recorded in the juvenile court and by those public agencies with responsibility for dealing with offenders. As indicated in the table below, this research demonstrated that a large part of delinquent behavior is handled in public agencies other than the juvenile court, without actual recording as delinquency. These data do not include many other cases displaying similar behavior where the children were handled only by private agencies, their families, churches, or by no community agency at all.[5] Data of this sort would not be available from the agency records of most communities, even if the agencies were willing to submit their records for investigation. Other communities might or might not display any consistent similarities to the District of Columbia in the proportion of cases handled outside of the juvenile court by other agencies, public or otherwise.

[4] Sophia M. Robison, *Can Delinquency Be Measured?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936).

[5] Edward E. Schwartz, "Community Experiment in Delinquency Measurement," *National Probation Association Yearbook*, 1945.

TABLE 3

Court and Agency Delinquency [6]
Children Registered for Specified Reasons for Reference by All Agencies and by the Juvenile Court

(1) Reason for reference	(2) Children registered by all agencies for reason specified in (1)	(3) Children registered by the juvenile court for reason specified in (1)	(4) Per cent of all children registered for specified reason who were registered by the juvenile court for that reason
Traffic violations	591	585	99
Stealing	1,870	1,487	80
Assault, injury to person	187	148	79
Acts of carelessness or mischief	951	733	77
Being ungovernable	456	244	54
Sex offense	258	61	24
Truancy	3,488	177	5
Running away	819	16	2

According to information provided by the Juvenile Aid Bureau of the City of New York, thirty thousand cases were handled by the Bureau in 1948. Of this number, only eleven were brought under petitions to the juvenile court. A great proportion of these cases were first offenders and children engaging in "unguided play activities," yet they were of the sort which in former years would have been handled officially by the court. As a result of the policies developed by the Juvenile Aid Bureau, the number of cases handled officially by the juvenile courts of New York City has declined tremendously, whereas the population of children has increased. From these and other evidences of child treatment practice in various communities, it appears that whether a youngster is

[6] Ibid., p. 173.

officially delinquent may depend less upon his conduct than upon the available agency resources and the referral practices in the community. Moreover, administrative procedures, as well as treatment facilities, vary so widely from one community to another that the statistical data from a series of reporting courts have little meaning because of the noncomparability of figures from one jurisdiction to another. Within a given community, figures obtained over a period of years may in a rough way show something about changes in the frequency and types of delinquent behavior. These figures may reflect as well the development of new resources or procedures.

THE EXTENT OF DELINQUENCY. Bearing in mind what has been said concerning the limited import of the official statistics, we nevertheless inspect available court statistics on the extent of juvenile delinquency. Such data *do* reveal significant information on cases that have been exposed to court experience and to the treatment measures that are employed there. The child's exposure to the official agency and its treatment facilities may often be more important to his subsequent behavior than was the deviant behavior which led him into trouble in the first place. The United States Children's Bureau, which has collected and published juvenile court statistics for a number of years, suggests a somewhat different interpretation of the significance of their materials: "They present," says the Bureau, "a general picture of the extent to which the courts are called upon to express their community's interest in children and their needs and problems." Table 4, taken from their 1946 publication of statistics, reveals something of the changes that occurred in the volume of officially recorded delinquency through the war years, along with the changing percentages of boys' and girls' cases from 1938 through 1944.

The growth in the number of cases reported by juvenile courts in the prewar period, 1927–39, is shown in Table 5.

It should be noted that these figures include dependency and neglect cases as well as other proceedings. Also shown is the increasing number of courts reporting to the Children's

TABLE 4

Juvenile-Delinquency Cases, 1938–44: Changes from Year to Year in Cases Disposed of by 78 Courts Serving Areas with Populations of 100,000 or More [7]

Year	Number disposed of			Per cent change from preceding year			Per cent change from 1938		
	All cases	Boys' cases	Girls' cases	All cases	Boys' cases	Girls' cases	All cases	Boys' cases	Girls' cases
1938	53,134	44,819	8,315						
1939	57,601	49,223	8,378	+8	+10	+1	+8	+10	+1
1940	55,545	46,544	9,001	−4	−5	+7	+5	+4	+8
1941	60,644	50,329	10,315	+9	+8	+15	+14	+12	+24
1942	65,351	52,837	12,514	+8	+5	+21	+23	+18	+50
1943	86,906	70,784	16,122	+33	+34	+29	+64	+58	+94
1944	84,879	69,235	15,644	−2	−3	−3	+60	+54	+88

Bureau. In spite of the wider area of reporting that has developed during the past generation, the available data still represent only a minority of the total volume of court cases throughout the United States. Something over one-third of the population is represented in the Children's Bureau reports of recent years. Moreover, the figures provided by reporting courts vary considerably in accuracy and completeness. Poor reporting results inevitably from the lack of time, training, and interest in such matters in the juvenile courts. Somewhat greater uniformity may be expected in future publications of the Children's Bureau. Beginning in 1946, the reporting plan has been revised to include only uniform summary reports received from state agencies.

AGE AND SEX OF JUVENILE DELINQUENTS. One of the numerous difficulties involved in securing comparable information about juvenile delinquents from different jurisdictions rests in the varying statutory specifications as to age and offense covered by juvenile court control. This control extends only through the age of sixteen in six states and in parts

[7] *Juvenile Court Statistics*, United States Children's Bureau, Washington, 1946, p. 8.

TABLE 5

Number of Cases of Specified Types Reported by Juvenile Courts, 1927–39 [8]

Year	Number of courts reporting	Cases			
		Total	Delinquency	Dependency and neglect †	Special proceedings ‡
1927	43	42,915	30,363	12,552	
1928	65	55,171	38,882	16,289	
1929	96	65,117	46,312	18,805	
1930	92	75,401	53,757	20,711	933
1931	169	83,313	59,880	22,317	1,116
1932	267	89,680	65,274	23,235	1,171
1933	284	90,836	68,039	21,605	1,192
1934	334	90,300	66,651	22,499	1,150
1935	398	96,696	71,475	24,019	1,202
1936	384	88,236	63,320	23,599	1,317
1937	462	103,535	78,688	23,546	1,301
1938	476	108,054	77,289	27,816	2,949
1939	473	107,874	83,758	22,429	1,687

† Dependency and neglect cases handled by juvenile courts include cases of children referred because of inadequate care or support from parents or guardians, abandonment or desertion, abuse or cruel treatment, living under conditions injurious to morals, and being physically handicapped and in need of public care.

‡ Special-proceedings cases were not reported prior to 1930. They include cases of petitions for commitment of feeble-minded children, adoption cases, controversies regarding custody of a child, children held as material witnesses, and certain other types of cases.

of two others. In contrast, the power of the children's court extends to the age of twenty-one (at least in some cases) in seven states. The overlapping jurisdiction of the juvenile and criminal courts, along with the terminal ages of juvenile court jurisdiction, is shown in Table 6.

There is wide variation not only as to age levels covered, but also in the offenses that may be within the exclusive or discretionary power of the adult courts to handle. This means,

[8] *Children in the Courts, 1938–1939*, United States Children's Bureau, Publication No. 280, Washington, 1942, p. 6.

TABLE 6

Jurisdiction over Juveniles [9]

	Original Jurisdiction of Juvenile Court Extends to Age	Overlapping or Concurrent Jurisdiction of Criminal Court Ages	Offenses for Which Criminal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction over Juveniles
Alabama	18	14–18	None
Arizona	18	All	None
Arkansas	21	12–21	None
California	21	18–21	None
Colorado	18	10–21	Capital and life imprisonment offenses
Connecticut	18	16–18	None
Delaware	17 (male) 18 (female)	16–18	Capital offenses
Florida	18 and 17	All	Any crime
Georgia	16	All	Capital and life imprisonment offenses
Idaho	18	All	None
Illinois	17 (male) 18 (female)	10 and over	Crimes of violence
Indiana	18	16–18	Violations of traffic laws
Iowa	18	All	Capital and life imprisonment offenses
Kansas	16	None	Murder
Kentucky	17 (male) 18 (female)	All	None
Louisiana	17	None	Murder, rape, attempted rape
Maine	17	None	Infamous offenses
Maryland	21	18–21	Capital or life imprisonment offenses
Massachusetts	17	None	Capital and life imprisonment offenses
Michigan	19	15–19	None
Minnesota	18	All	None
Mississippi	18	14–18	Death or life imprisonment offenses
Missouri	17	12–17	None
Montana	18	All	Murder, manslaughter, armed crimes
Nebraska	18	16–18	None
Nevada	18	All	None
New Hampshire	18	None	None
New Jersey	18	16–18	Murder, violations of traffic laws
New Mexico	18	All	None
New York	16	15	None
North Carolina	16	None	Crimes punishable by more than 10 years in prison
North Dakota	21	18–21	None
Ohio	18	All	None
Oklahoma	16 (male) 18 (female)	None	None
Oregon	18	All	None
Pennsylvania	18	16–18	Murder
Rhode Island	18	16–18	Violations of motor vehicle laws
South Carolina	16 and 18	All	Capital and life imprisonment offenses
South Dakota	18	All	None
Tennessee	16	None	Capital and life imprisonment offenses, rape
Texas	17 (male) 18 (female)	None	Homicide
United States (Federal Law)	17	All	Capital and Life Imprisonment Offenses
Utah	18	14–18	None
Vermont	16	None	Capital Offenses
Virginia	18	None	None
Washington	17	17	None
West Virginia	18	14–18	Capital Offenses
Wisconsin	18	16–18	None
Wyoming	19 (male) 21 (female)	All	None
District of Columbia	18	16–18	None

[9] Paul W. Tappan, "Children and Youth in the Criminal Court," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 261:128–136 (Jan., 1949).

in effect, that juveniles may be treated as criminals when they are apprehended for specified offenses, in spite of their age. Particularly where capital crimes or (in some states) other felonies are involved, the criminal court may take jurisdiction and in some cases send the child to prison for a long term of years. Statutory age-limits mean that in some states a high proportion of the juvenile delinquents are in fact quite mature and thoroughly habituated law violators. Federal statistics show that some 35 per cent of the cases reported from children's courts are sixteen years of age or over (see Table 7). In most states, the proportion of children under twelve received by the courts is very small, referrals being most frequent in the age group from fourteen to sixteen.

A rather different view of youngsters' offenses is suggested by the arrest data collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (see Table 8). Since these figures are based upon ar-

TABLE 7

Juvenile-delinquency Cases, 1945: Ages of Boys and of Girls When Referred to Court, in Cases Disposed of by 374 Courts [10]

Age of child when referred to court	Juvenile-delinquency cases					
	Number			Per cent		
	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls
Total cases	122,851	101,240	21,611			
Age reported	110,415	91,435	18,980	100	100	100
Under 10 years	4,172	3,763	409	4	4	2
10 years, under 12	8,032	7,311	721	7	8	4
12 years, under 14	18,362	15,558	2,804	17	17	15
14 years, under 16	40,872	32,645	8,227	37	36	43
16 years and over	38,977	32,158	6,819	35	35	36
Age not reported	12,436	9,805	2,631			

[10] *Juvenile Court Statistics, 1944 and 1945*, Children's Bureau Publication, Washington, 1946, p. 11.

TABLE 8

Arrests by Age Groups, January to June, 1947 [11]

Offense charged	Total, all ages	Age																	
		Under 15	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25–29	30–34	35–39	40–44	45–49	50 and over	Not known
Total	371,228	2,124	2,134	5,864	9,139	13,818	14,416	15,409	17,700	16,999	16,118	15,002	59,720	48,130	41,844	33,463	23,564	33,599	2,185
Criminal homicide	3,345	12	12	32	63	77	99	120	152	154	166	128	581	538	386	292	211	312	10
Robbery	11,572	27	61	269	488	818	850	826	886	848	735	686	2,214	1,244	741	447	220	165	47
Assault	28,284	35	42	210	383	720	886	1,104	1,270	1,303	1,384	1,278	5,468	4,418	3,588	2,443	1,636	2,032	84
Burglary—breaking or entering	20,936	651	534	1,319	1,549	1,703	1,408	1,364	1,195	1,076	1,083	887	3,105	1,832	1,354	824	510	474	68
Larceny—theft	33,659	466	343	969	1,550	2,006	1,842	1,776	1,860	1,723	1,573	1,373	5,218	3,763	3,022	2,350	1,658	2,036	131
Automobile theft	9,776	167	263	696	821	1,078	947	815	775	644	542	494	1,318	610	298	148	69	69	22
Embezzlement and fraud	8,747	12	12	40	82	156	214	244	309	352	333	366	1,640	1,403	1,212	852	700	793	27
Stolen property; buying, receiving, etc.	1,797	3	10	22	37	94	87	73	84	66	72	47	277	261	222	155	116	165	6
Arson	517	8	5	10	22	16	22	23	27	17	36	9	72	59	46	52	33	58	2
Forgery and counterfeiting	4,336	9	18	75	104	167	209	170	180	245	232	201	817	581	463	351	227	273	14
Rape	4,785	13	30	107	188	340	329	342	298	272	240	263	888	533	346	209	151	230	6
Prostitution and commercialized vice	5,228	2	5	19	54	125	165	181	314	335	335	326	1,074	783	555	373	252	274	56
Other sex offenses	8,622	19	15	77	107	267	310	328	417	431	428	406	1,619	1,274	917	702	461	819	25
Narcotic drug laws	1,561	1	1	4	15	64	98	84	71	79	80	78	275	221	138	144	90	109	9
Weapons, carrying, possessing, etc	6,577	10	17	156	227	322	312	329	398	379	323	324	1,197	833	667	453	259	349	22
Offenses against family and children	6,588	2	3	2	25	52	99	143	200	238	267	247	1,471	1,380	1,080	666	367	318	28
Liquor laws	3,687	5	4	12	18	112	129	104	125	139	133	126	591	554	511	384	315	409	16
Driving while intoxicated	19,314	5	11	23	63	187	320	492	728	703	707	716	3,316	3,128	2,847	2,394	1,549	2,074	51
Road and driving laws	3,634	2	9	22	83	148	192	238	300	230	215	182	699	409	355	239	131	168	12
Parking violations	48				1	1	2	1	3	5	4	2	12	2	7	3	4	1	
Other traffic and motor vehicle laws	3,591	1	10	36	77	147	198	236	228	229	200	177	681	443	308	260	146	196	18
Disorderly conduct	24,885	38	54	220	422	828	989	1,252	1,474	1,386	1,310	1,120	4,436	3,330	2,667	1,970	1,344	1,975	70
Drunkenness	86,258	18	21	126	344	1,107	1,450	1,852	2,670	2,496	2,506	2,470	11,453	11,722	12,554	11,733	8,914	14,143	679
Vagrancy	21,389	32	58	258	609	1,055	958	929	1,100	1,053	893	852	2,973	2,262	2,127	1,918	1,393	2,408	511
Gambling	8,184	7	6	13	38	95	96	121	174	211	218	220	1,291	1,410	1,297	1,118	798	1,047	24
Suspicion	24,051	213	219	510	1,024	1,255	1,236	1,285	1,399	1,378	1,232	1,188	4,018	2,834	2,213	1,580	1,040	1,286	141
Not stated	3,533	9	18	33	69	139	151	153	165	156	152	148	556	462	422	275	237	361	27
All other offenses	16,324	357	353	604	676	739	818	824	898	851	719	688	2,460	1,841	1,501	1,128	733	1,055	79

[11] *Uniform Crime Reports*, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, XVIII, No. 1, Washington, 1947, 70.

rests rather than court petitions or complaints, they do not show as to juvenile offenders the large number of cases that are brought in by parents, social agencies, and other petitioners. Moreover, in many places today, arrests of children are discouraged by departmental policy except for certain felonious crimes. The arrest data are interesting, nevertheless, in revealing the contrast between the relatively low rates of serious offenses charged against youngsters sixteen years of age and under, and the very high rates for youths from seventeen through twenty-four. The F.B.I. figures are valuable also in showing the crimes charged against individuals at the various age levels. Among young offenders, property violations (especially larceny and burglary) are most common—as they are also at older age-levels. The considerable proportion of juvenile cases taken to court for recalcitrance, running away, and truancy do not appear in the arrest statistics. But larceny is the most common offense charged against juveniles both under arrest and in the children's court.

From the data shown in the tables above, it will be seen that girls contribute a relatively small proportion of the load handled by the juvenile court. They usually represent somewhere between one-fifth and one-sixth the number of boys referred to court. The discrepancy is characteristic at all ages, adult as well as juvenile. In our culture, females apparently conform more closely to legal standards than do males. The lesser aggressiveness of woman, as well as their conservative family training, probably account for the difference to a great extent. A larger proportion of female offenses reported to court involve moral violations, but these figures presumably reflect the double standard with its tolerance of male peccadilloes. The number of girls' cases taken to juvenile court increased greatly during the war years, causing widespread perturbation among parents and officials. Yet even at the height of their unorthodox wartime behavior, the girls fell far short of the records set by the boys. The large proportionate increase in the apparent delinquency of girls during the war undoubtedly reflected the intensive crusade against "bobby-

soxers" carried on by military and civilian authorities. Through curfews and a stepping-up of police patrols in areas of moral risk, this relatively small number of female delinquents arrested in normal years was greatly increased. This is not to deny, of course, that a real increase in the delinquency of girls actually did occur during World War II.

TYPES OF DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR. The Children's Bureau provides some further information on the types of complaint which result in juvenile court action. Theft (including the theft of automobiles, burglary, and robbery) is the most prevalent offense. Acts of carelessness or mischief are next in order, but are less than half as frequent. These two general categories account in most years for more than 60 per cent of the cases in children's courts. The official statistics provide no complete or accurate picture of the actual rates of delinquent conduct, or even necessarily of the order of frequency of such conduct. Rather do the statistics show the measure of concern in the community for the behavior involved.

Truancy, running away, and unlawful entry thus unquestionably occur much more frequently than is revealed in the official data. Some types of petitions (e.g., incorrigibility and morals complaints) reflect such varied definitions that it is impossible to guess the frequency of their occurrence in relation to the number of cases that actually get into the courts. Table 9 shows the relative proportions of the various types of juvenile offenses as reported to the Children's Bureau.

In concluding our comments on the frequency of the social problem of juvenile delinquency, the point should be reemphasized that no source provides really adequate information. Arrest figures give us useful information on cases experiencing official police contact, however, and court figures tell us something about the number of cases that are exposed to the treatment measures of the juvenile court. The more important problem of the frequency of actual law violations by juveniles we know very little about. From a broader child-welfare point of view, it would be even more important to know the number of youngsters who express their physical

TABLE 9

Juvenile-delinquency Cases, 1945: Reasons for Reference to Court, in Boys' and in Girls' Cases Disposed of by 374 Courts [12]

Reason for reference to court	Juvenile-delinquency cases					
	Number			Per cent		
	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls
Total cases	122,851	101,240	21,611			
Reason for reference reported	111,939	92,671	19,268	100	100	100
Stealing	40,879	38,610	2,269	37	42	12
Act of carelessness or mischief	19,241	17,779	1,462	17	19	8
Traffic violation	9,852	9,659	193	9	10	1
Truancy	8,681	6,164	2,517	8	7	13
Running away	9,307	5,652	3,655	8	6	19
Being ungovernable	9,840	5,542	4,298	9	6	22
Sex offense	5,990	2,579	3,411	5	3	18
Injury to person	3,224	2,828	396	3	3	2
Other reason	4,925	3,858	1,067	4	4	5
Reason for reference not reported	10,912	8,569	2,343			

and emotional needs in all sorts of deviant behavior, of which delinquency is only one type. Data from noncourt agencies, such as schools, social agencies, guidance clinics, and homes are even less adequate than the court statistics, however. Hence communities are at a great disadvantage in attempting to appraise the preventive and treatment efforts needed to deflect youngsters from the channels of maladjustment, unhappiness, criminalism, and other forms of maladapted behavior.

The unplanned and confused character of our approaches

[12] *Social Statistics*, United States Children's Bureau, Washington, 1945, p. 11

to child welfare has encouraged the juvenile court and the police to take over many cases of child unadjustment where there is no real delinquency shown, and where the youngster has been passed over by the spasmodic, hit-or-miss efforts of other community agencies. As a result, the large load of juvenile law violators inundating our children's courts is augmented by an increasing number of youngsters unhappily exposed to an agency that is poorly designed to treat the non-delinquent child. These youngsters are left with the stigma of court contact and experience. The seriousness of the problem of juvenile delinquency, however, is not diminished by our lack of accurate information concerning its prevalence. Indeed, the inadequacy in definition and the lack of any systematic effort to discover the cases needing preventive and curative help lead to more difficult problems of criminalism and other maladjustments among delinquents grown up.

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CHAPTER NINE

The Etiology of Delinquent Behavior

DELINQUENCY AS NORMAL BEHAVIOR. A major objective in the study of delinquent and criminal behavior is to discover why individuals violate the law. Toward that end we must rely upon the behavior sciences, the function of which is to determine why man behaves as he does. Where faulty adjustment occurs, we must seek remedial treatment methods that will facilitate more adequate responses. Some progress has been made both in the study of etiology, as indicated in this chapter, and in treatment research, as indicated in the next. The study of causation involves a number of difficult problems, however, which we shall consider below.

There is a common premise in causation research that a line may be drawn between "normal" and deviant behavior. This is a rather general assumption in the investigation of personal and social problems, one that appears to simplify analysis. Actually, however, human conduct cannot be defined in terms of this clear-cut dichotomy. As we have noted, there is no precise demarcation between normality and abnormality, between delinquency and conformity. Effort to distinguish the two raises the problem of determining standards of normality, a task that quickly seduces the scholar from

objective inquiry into the uncharted realms of evaluation. In the analysis of social problems one is led very easily to the role of critic, moralist, reformer, or utopian. The behavior sciences may become merely a means of attaching prestige to highly personalized opinions concerning man in society. It is easy to say, in effect, that: (a) what I approve is normal; (b) what I dislike is pathological; and (c) what treatment I believe in is necessary.

As we have seen, delinquency—like other forms of behavioral deviation—must be measured by its variation from standards established in the prevailing community opinion. These norms are neither very clear nor stable in a dynamic society, and about them individual sentiments may differ widely. As compared with other types of conduct deviation, it is peculiarly characteristic of delinquency that its connotations vary with the individual judge, case worker, police officer, researcher, and textbook writer. The criteria of child behavior and the functions of the various child-welfare agencies are so loosely drawn that there is general confusion as to what constitutes behavior justifying official action.

It is thus manifestly impossible to investigate the causes of a class of behavior without delimiting that behavior. Those children found delinquent in children's courts who are not significantly different from other children in the population will obviously display no differences meaningful to delinquency causation. It is very likely, however, that the adjudged delinquents *would* display such differentials as submarginal socioeconomic level and race, nationality, and religious peculiarities. In other words, nondelinquents referred to and adjudged in children's courts would generally reflect the greater risk that minority and underprivileged groups will be exposed to authority. This fact should be borne in mind in relation to studies of individuals handled by juvenile courts. Furthermore, among those children who are actually delinquent in behavior, there is much greater likelihood that minority group and underprivileged individuals will be han-

dled by the courts rather than exclusively by their parents, psychiatrists, and nonofficial social agencies. Hence studies of official delinquents must reflect in considerable measure the influences that enhance the risk of exposure to officialdom, quite aside from the conduct or personality of the individual.

It is thus often observed that "delinquents" display such social influences as slum environment, inferior economic status, broken homes, foreign parentage, Catholic religious background, and gang associations. But there is a nice question as to the extent to which these qualities have operated invidiously to discriminate types of adolescents experiencing a greater risk *from* rather than *to* authority. When individuals more underprivileged than antisocial are exposed to correctional instead of welfare resources, their later delinquencies may be induced by the distorting effects of punitive treatment rather than by any basic antisocial personality trends or any specifically delinquent combination of social factors. In an unknown but considerable number of cases, adult crime is mainly the product of our correctional handling.

In many instances, allegedly delinquent behavior is therefore "normal," i.e., identical with the conduct tolerated in other youngsters. This is particularly true where court complaints are founded in disobedience, recalcitrance, or the child's being "a source of danger to the morals or health of himself or others." Under these vague generalities, almost any child could be found delinquent. In another sense, too, delinquency may be considered normal behavior. From an etiological (causal) point of view the child's conduct is completely normal, no matter how widely it may differ from an average or ideal standard. Delinquency is merely a part of human behavior and, like socially approved conduct, it is the entirely natural product of the complex of forces comprising the individual's character structure and his conditioning experiences.

Delinquent behavior is thus in certain respects quite normal. This fact is frequently overlooked because of our in-

clination to view criminals, along with defectives, as creatures very different from ourselves. Our ego often blinds us to the extremely close similarities of men. This difficulty leads us to another problem in attempting to understand the delinquent: How can we discover the influences in behavior required to produce the limited measure of difference that is presumed to exist between law violators and conformists?

METHODS OF CAUSAL ANALYSIS. Two general classes of methodology are employed in studying the delinquent: the *genetic* and the *cross-sectional*. Under the former may be grouped the various techniques of psychiatry, clinical psychology, social case work and probation, insofar as these approaches attempt to probe back into the formative influences out of which character structure and antisocial conduct have presumably emerged. The genetic approach is generally pursued on a single case basis, with more or less intensive exploration of the dynamics of the individual's behavior. It has the virtue, depending upon its exhaustiveness, of revealing a relatively complete picture of the individual's motivations. However, this method depends upon the ability and orientation of the particular specialist; hence findings may vary greatly with different observers. Moreover, the individualized focus of this method may not provide much basis for generalization concerning other cases of delinquency. It is much easier to draw a descriptive analysis of an offender than to determine what particular factors were essential to the delinquent behavior and what ones may be expected to occur in other delinquents.

Genetic analysis points up an important, unresolved controversy as to the nature of causation: Should one look upon cause as a total pattern, in which all elements are significant parts of the causal configuration so that none should be omitted from consideration? An affirmative position here suggests that there would be little possibility of projecting inferences from one case to another. Prevention and treatment of the deviate would be difficult to guide intelligently, since by assumption there are no specific conditions or traits to be sought or avoided. Delinquency would be held to result from

the particular dynamic interrelationship of a totality of influences, not from any limited series of specific factors.

In contrast, causal analysis may be (and usually has been) predicated upon the assumption that in the delinquent's history there is a limited number of particular factors which are essential to the prohibited behavior. Furthermore, these factors are *sine qua non;* that is, factors without which the result would not have occurred. Beyond this, it is customary in criminological analysis to assume that the "necessary causes" as they appear in a particular case will occur with similar meaning in other delinquent histories. This latter hypothesis is one of the most dubious among those commonly employed in causal analysis. One conclusion, however, that appears to be amply demonstrated in careful psychiatric studies is that the factors in behavior do not operate in a static or isolated fashion. Their significance depends upon the dynamic interrelationship of the variables present, so that a given trait or incident (e.g., the breaking up of a home, a failure in school, mental deficiency, a traumatic experience) takes on meaning only as it is related to other elements in the particular individual.

Cross-sectional research on causation, on the other hand, is ordinarily carried on through statistical studies of samples of court or institutional delinquents. An effort is made to discover the frequency of particular social and/or psychological variables—the number of individuals coming from defective home situations of various sorts; the number displaying poor leisure-time activities; and similar considerations. This method has so many limitations that, although nearly all of the sociological research on delinquency causation have employed it, we must conclude that the data secured thereby are virtually meaningless from an etiological point of view.

LIMITATIONS OF CAUSAL RESEARCH. Cross-sectional research rests on a static conception of the variables in behavior, treating them as though they possessed a similar qualitative meaning for each individual in the sample. This is an obvious fallacy. Other difficulties may be mentioned:

1. The statistical correlation between delinquency and certain variables constitutes no basis whatever for imputing cause.

2. The items on which data are secured limit in advance the adequacy of the resulting information, even for purposes of bare description of the sample. The researcher finds only what he looks for, whether it be primarily sociological, psychological, or constitutional factors. Ordinarily he seeks only simple, quantifiable items that can easily be fitted into a schedule for statistical analysis. It appears from careful psychological and psychiatric studies that the variables of greatest importance in delinquent histories not only differ in significance from one case to another but are characteristically subtle, nonquantifiable elements in personality.

3. Where the study of delinquents does not employ a control group, there is not even the basis for a descriptive comparison with the offenders as to the prevalence of the items investigated. Moreover, if a control group is poorly selected in the matching of traits, the conclusions drawn from the study tend to perpetuate false notions about significant traits of delinquents.

4. All the causal studies have been limited in their representativeness of the delinquent population. Court and institutional samples of offenders cannot be taken to characterize all youngsters who engage in delinquent activities.

Behavior sciences have revealed something of the infinite complexity of forces entering into human conduct. Indeed, it sometimes appears that the authorities have agreed on little but the complexity of behavior. However, modern experts in psychiatry, psychology, case work, and sociology carry on their investigations almost exclusively through *retrospective analysis* and description. They classify individuals into categories and draw inferences as to why one has behaved as he did on the basis of what they have been able to discover about him *after* his action. Often enough, these *post facto* guesses are predicated on very insubstantial data. Proof of the causal hypothesis is not possible in any scientific sense. One may ac-

cept or reject the clinical evaluations but he can scarcely disprove them. Some psychiatrists have developed a remarkable proclivity for technical diagnoses, even at long distance. Frequently, however, they differ in these analyses even after close and persistent observation of a patient.

Authorities on behavior are not usually called upon to prognosticate the future conduct of a subject, a task that would put to the acid test their ability to evaluate causes accurately. However complete his observations, the discreet psychiatrist will not attempt to predict behavior even in relation to hypothetical situations to which the subject might be exposed, save perhaps for a few clear-cut clinical types where the repetition of past patterns of conduct may be expected. Social science has not developed to the point where it is possible to say that, given a particular configuration, an individual will or will not violate the law. Until we can make fairly accurate predictions about *future* behavior, there is real question as to the validity of causal evaluations concerning *past* conduct. The basic difficulty is that human investigators, employing limited tools, must study other human beings over short time spans and, on the basis of partial observations, estimate causal relationships. Their findings may thus often reflect themselves and their techniques more accurately than their subjects. Where brief clinical observations are made of court cases who are assumed in advance to differ from other individuals, authorities may well be looking for—and finding—many distinctions that are not there.

In the processes of police and court work, selective factors also operate to increase the probability that individuals of depressed and minority backgrounds will be arrested and convicted. This is true at both juvenile and adult levels. There is greater risk that children of broken homes, immigrant families, unemployed fathers, unhappy school situations, and slum environments will be dealt with by the courts, quite aside from whether or not they are more often law violators. On the basis of limited facts obtained from masses of court or institutional social histories, it is absurd to assume that a given factor or

combination of factors occurring among these delinquents accounts for their law violations and distinguishes them from others who conform.

Professor Walter Reckless has made the point that we may be more accurate in denoting certain influences as "risk factors" in relation to law violations, in view of the impossibility of showing direct causal significance. One may go further and say that some of the social factors that occur more frequently in court cases than in the population at large may in reality be merely *factors producing greater risk of court contact.* Certain it is that individuals may display a host of defective personality and social influences and yet not violate the law. It would be valuable to study individuals *without* court experience and attempt to discover why some persons born to inadequate families, bred in slums, and conditioned by adversity do not become official delinquents. Are there distinguishable differences here from delinquent histories, aside from the police-court contacts of the latter? If there are personality or social distinctions in individual cases, can these—as assumed in statistical studies—be generalized to characterize delinquents en masse?

The answers to the numerous questions posited by causal research are thus far from clear. It does appear, however, that a moratorium on statistical descriptions of court samples would do no one any harm, at least until the data can include more subtle elements in personality and in the relationships between variables. More attention should be given to discovering whether court delinquents—particularly those alleged to be disobedient, morally depraved, neglected, and runaways—are significantly different from other youngsters coming from similar socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds. It is a fair prediction that any existing differences are of degree rather than kind and that in most instances the amount of difference would not be large. It is just as safe to believe that, in many instances where more marked differences in personality and conduct may be observed, these result from exposure to official methods of control rather than from constitutional or

early psychological and social influences. The effects of police, detention, and court upon the individual are obviously significant factors in the social history of the delinquent. These factors have not been studied at all.

CAUSATION IN BEHAVIOR: A GENERAL STATEMENT. The point has already been made that delinquency is merely a part of all human behavior. The processes involved are similar to those in other types of social conduct. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to consider briefly the motive forces to behavior and, more specifically, the influences that may be especially significant in directing conduct into antisocial channels. Like the nondelinquent, the delinquent is a product of specific conditioning circumstances acting upon his organism. Just as law-abiding individuals are infinitely varied social products, so too are law violators. Their differences in personality and behavior are much greater than the uniformities of their antisocial behavior. In spite of similar illegalities, delinquents are distinct in the particular configurations from which these similar responses have emerged.

In spite of this variability among offenders, it is a fair hypothesis that, in the development of delinquency, there are certain types of influences that function with special effect to produce misconduct. Moreover, a particular form of delinquency may reflect any one of a diverse but characteristic set of conditioning influences. Beyond this point of general analysis of causation, however, guesses as to specific relationships become increasingly tenuous. One does not know all the significant forces in delinquency causation, and even less the relation of particular factors to particular offenses. Furthermore, given traits of personality or environment may assume large significance in the course of one offender's misconduct and may be quite insubstantial in the life history of another. Etiological factors operate in conjunction, not in isolation, so that delinquency may be attributable less to specific causes than to the relationship which exists between them.

Consider a sociopsychological statement on behavior, from which some idea of the dynamics of delinquency development

may be drawn. One may conceive behavior, legal or illegal, to result at any given time from the personality as it responds to a precipitating situation. The personality at that time is itself a product of the individual's constitutional and psychological equipment as it has previously responded to the surrounding environment.

Among the constitutional factors that may bend the personality toward antisocial behavior are organic defects, distortions of function, and peculiarities in maturation. Cerebral, glandular, and sexual deviations and gross constitutional defects appear to be significant in many case histories. These physical pathologies may have hereditary origins or not; their significance does not depend on their source. However, the time when the deviation appears may be important in determining its overall effects on personality. In such abnormalities as thyroid excess or deficiency, sexual precocity or retardation, hypertension, epilepsy, accidental injury to the brain, and many others, influences are observed that may, when associated with other factors, lead toward delinquency.

The individual's psychological equipment and organization are not separable strictly from constitutional factors. This equipment includes the intellectual, emotional, and temperamental aspects of his being, as these are established through heredity and modified by maturation and experience. Especially important in the individual's reactions to society are his emotional equilibrium; his powers of inhibition (particularly the inhibition of the affective responses of the sympathetic nervous system, since here is manufactured the emotional responses of hate, anger, and fear); and the degree and organization of his intellectual abilities. The overemotional, the emotionally uncontrolled, the overerotic, the homosexual, the mental defective, and the psychopath are common types of problem individuals whose deviations may have organic roots.

One may next distinguish the social, physical, and biological milieus to which the individual reacts, composed in important part of the sociogenic elements which limit and

direct his responses. Of particular importance for the development of personality traits are the early conditioning stimuli, especially the family environment, since early reaction patterns retain a tremendous importance for subsequent behavior patterns. Early trends of personality tend to be rather stable and permanent phases of reaction in the individual's life history. Hence the home and family and the neighborhood and congeniality group are powerful molders of the personality. Many criminologists have stressed the neighborhood and family factors as focal points of social infection.

Apart from the external environment, but analogous to its influence upon the psychogenic history of the child, is his reaction to himself. The ego feelings—pride, self-confidence, narcissism, insecurity, and self-pity—may have tremendous import for a child's adjustment in general and for his delinquent tendencies in particular. As Cooley and Mead have shown, the child becomes an object to himself in experience in much the same fashion as he discovers his external environment. The results of these reactions to the self are significant in affecting his adjustment. His conceptions of himself are largely derived from the responses to him from his environment.

Beyond the individual and environment per se in determining behavior, particular stress must also be placed upon the dynamic relationship between them. Elements in an individual's milieu assume significance only if and to the extent that he responds to them. Moreover, the patterning of his response depends on his organic-psychological orientation, and not merely upon the intrinsic nature of that milieu. Thus "We see things not as they are, but as we are." The response of the individual to his environment, insofar as it affects social behavior, is described usually in terms of reaction, association, identification, experience, or relationship. In inducing delinquency, certain patterns appear to assume peculiar weight: traumatic response to crucial incidents, such as discovery of forbidden knowledge—sex shock, illegitimacy, abandonment; or guilt, fear, and anxiety reactions to overwhelming stimuli.

Where the effective stimulus is human, the behavior dynamics become more complicated, for the individual not only responds more intensely to other persons, but he responds also to their reactions to him. A progressive, mutually aggravating interaction may thus be set in motion. The possible culmination of this process in delinquency depends on the nature and intensity of the social stimuli, as well as on the individual's native and conditioned psychological equipment.

The personality is the progressing, dynamic emergent, at any point in time, of the individual's organic-psychological organization and its total accumulation of responses to continuously changing internal and external environments. "Character" is that important phase of personality involving the fairly stable and customary reactions in social and (particularly) morally defined situations. Character is composed chiefly of the ideals, goals, values, moral attitudes, and the related overt behavior that represent the product of his environment and experiences. It is epitomized in the psychoanalytic concepts of the super-ego and the ego-ideal. Of great importance to potential delinquency (as to the character structure in general) are the child's conditioned reaction tendencies or "attitudes" to reality and authority, whether his basic trends be toward conformity or rebellion.

In relation to personality and character, the individual's "will power" (as it is known popularly) is his power of inhibition and integration. This "will" is based upon organic and psychological foundations, especially the organization of the sympathetic division of the nervous system and the strength of cortical control over the visceral and emotional processes. Will power, or capacity to repress, is conditioned by experience, by the learned capacity to inhibit suggested responses. Areas of moral and legal taboos are of great importance in determining where the culture expects individuals to repress impulses to deviation. Ability to repress is a function of the individual's psycho-organic and experiential foundations that facilitate or inhibit the conduct in question. What Clifford Shaw has called the individual's "resistance limit" is a

more expressive phrase than "will" in referring to the capacity to inhibit socially undesirable responses.

In the light of these conceptions of personality, behavior motivation becomes clear. As noted the behavior elicited at any time is a resultant of the evolved personality content at that time as it responds to the immediate stimulus, situation, or crisis that confronts the individual. Among the sorts of situations that may be particularly effective in precipitating misconduct are "temptations" to nonconformity, frustrations, and provocations. Under a deterministic philosophy, if one could know all that was contained in the personality at the time and the stimuli immediately impinging upon it, one would presumably be able to predict with complete accuracy the nature of a person's response. The existent tools of measurement and analysis do not permit such complete knowledge, and hence prediction of behavior is quite inexact.

Antisocial conduct may be further regarded as one means by which the person expresses his needs and drives. As the noncriminal works through his motivations more or less successfully without law violation, so the offender secures some partial satisfaction of his wants in crime. Even the criminal, it should be remembered, conforms to legal and moral requirements in most of his behavior. Particularly in the juvenile, carelessness, ignorance, awkwardness, or indifference may be chiefly responsible for expressing drives in prohibited ways. To state it somewhat differently, the child may engage in delinquency *not* in order expressly to violate the law but because, like other youngsters, he is impelled by acquisitive, aggressive, and sexual demands. He thus seeks channels for satisfaction, but some of his outlets are forbidden by the state. His training has been inadequate to deter him from the illegal activities. The youngster bred in a high-delinquency area may easily be led to expressive behavior that the larger community defines as illegal.

A different element appears to enter into the delinquency of other offenders. Some individuals may violate the law as an end in itself, because they *want* to break the rules. Out of

hostility to authority, rebelliousness, a need for punishment, or the thrill of outlawed pleasures, the delinquent may challenge the state. These offenders frequently become our most dangerous criminals, especially when their youthful experience at the hands of the law and correctional institutions confirms their delinquent trends. Offenders of this sort may appear to differ markedly from strictly law-abiding individuals. This difference is based upon attitudes which in the serious delinquent support transgression and in others tend to conformity. However, these personality responses are matters of degree, with wide gradations between the extremes. Most members of modern society probably rest somewhere in the middle, tempted to sporadic forays beyond the bounds of our restricting taboos, but held by law and custom close enough at least to avoid entrapment by public officials. Even those offenders whose antisocial acts are a manifestation of intense hatred for authority are, it should be noted, quite normal from an etiological point of view. Their behavior is the natural, expectable emergent from the social, psychological, and constitutional configurations which have molded them.

Psychological and Social Influences

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a consideration of the more specific influences which may play a role in the making of the delinquent. Emphasis will be placed upon sociological and psychological factors, and for purposes of analysis these will be considered individually for the most part. It is important, however, for the reader to bear in mind certain limiting facts in relation to these influences:

1. Causal factors do not operate separately or in isolation. The student may be misled by the separate consideration of the individual factors generally believed to play a role in delinquency.

2. Multiple causation of delinquency (and crime) does not mean a simple summation of several static traits or situations, but rather an *interrelationship* of influences whose *total* effect is law violation. Variables promoting delinquency must thus be viewed as dynamic and interrelated.

3. Psychological, social, and constitutional variables are closely associated, so that the assumption that a particular factor is solely one or another of these types is unrealistic. Attitudes and motives important to delinquency arise out of and are conditioned by a social environment. Both psychic and social variables may be rooted in constitutional factors and cannot be considered without reference to the organic limitations and possibilities of the individual.

4. The bridge between the offender and the nonoffender may be exceedingly short, with each group composed of many individuals resembling very closely those in the other. Aside from court and correctional experience, a great majority of criminals are probably not essentially dissimilar to noncriminals in most respects.

5. Most, if not all, theories of delinquency causation have been oversimplified through focusing attention on some limited aspect of the problem and attempting to explain too much too easily.

6. Any general theory evolved to explain the infinitely varied etiologies of the widely assorted types of delinquency and crime would necessarily be too broad to offer any very real insight into the processes producing antisocial conduct. Such a theory, to be valid, could be little more than a generalized hypothesis concerning the motivation of all human behavior, such as we have already presented.

7. Finally, it should be reiterated that to a great extent our inferences concerning delinquency have come from samples of offenders which do not accurately reflect the delinquent population. As a result, confusion has inevitably arisen concerning the qualities of offenders and their differences from nonoffenders.

It is possible, although by no means clear, that offenders

are on the average somewhat more deprived, rejected, spoiled, hated and hating, disillusioned, jealous, greedy, neurotic, ignorant, careless, and less easily deterred than are nondelinquents. In social background, delinquents may more often reveal faulty and conflicted homes, gang associations, slum neighborhoods, inadequate recreation and education, and a lack of proper supervision. Researches on convicted populations have appeared to indicate that these traits are more prevalent among law violators. It is certain, however, that the differences from nonoffenders have been exaggerated. Too often researchers and educators have made distorted estimates from nonrepresentative samples of criminals, drawn excessively by our courts and institutions from the socio-economically submarginal and marginal segments of the population. Further, they have tended to compare these individuals, tacitly at least, with the imagined social and psychological traits of their own middle-class society. Large admixtures of the social and psychological traits mentioned above are prevalent among nondelinquents, though less markedly perhaps in the *total* population of nondelinquents, because a fair percentage of this group lives in relative emotional and economic security. Among the law-abiding representatives of depressed environmental histories, however, the incidence of these pathic traits may well be nearly as high as it is among offenders.

If, as appears clear, many nondelinquents have experienced as many and more of the disorganizing forces in their lives, why do they conform to legal requirements whereas others do not? It is easy enough to say that the law-obedient have been able to work out expressions of the needs derived from their backgrounds in channels approved by the law and society, whereas the violators have not. This is merely a statement of fact that does not explain anything. The question of *why* remains. We have not yet arrived at a stage of maturity in social diagnosis where we can resolve this basic issue.

Attention should also be given to the fact that each day, hitherto nondelinquents cross the line into crime, usually

without any perceptible change in their underlying psychological and social configurations, their environment, attitudes, or motives, at least until state authority is imposed. Most if not all law-abiding individuals could be led into crime under circumstances appropriate to the illegal release of their drives. But the dynamics by which some individuals pass into the criminal population are too subtle, varied, and complicated for satisfactory analysis. In many instances, purely aleatory factors may determine the transition.

A theory that has attained considerable popularity among criminologists, particularly those who are psychiatrically oriented, holds that there are two main types of influences producing crime: *predisposing* and *precipitating* factors. The former refer generally to the structuring of personality, to the attitudes and motivations which foster a propensity to criminality. These are considered the most important influences, the basic ingredients of criminality, requiring individualized therapy to remove them. Precipitating factors are the situations which may set off the tendencies of individuals already inclined to law violations. Examples of these factors are experiences of stress or failure. This approach has some value in thinking about causation. However, it suggests a too easy and arbitrary classification of influences on crime. There is a real question, raised by our previous comments, whether one can properly say that some individuals are *predisposed* to law violation as such and that others are not. Actually, there are probably wide degrees of "readiness," determined in large part by general patterns of reaction to authority and training in relation to specific conduct standards and controls.

From a behavioristic point of view, individuals are so conditioned as to be both impelled toward and deterred from a given course of conduct. Their proneness to a crime may be measured conceptually by the relationship between facilitating and inhibiting motives or by the adequacy of the deterring influences. It appears that all individuals are in some degree impelled toward prohibited types of behavior by their drives and their conditioning; all are thus "predisposed" in this

sense. Moreover, the extent of this disposition is not a static thing, but changes as the individual is increasingly impelled toward or deterred from a particular form of prohibited behavior.

As to "precipitating" influences, the theory suggests again an oversimplified and mechanized conception. One may assume when a crime has been committed that the offender's life situation has become such as to stimulate him further toward the crime or to reduce the efficacy of the influences that have deterred him. In fact, however, the precipitating factor has functioned only as one more in an infinite series of conditioning influences, of which the total has been sufficient to permit the transgression. The "precipitator" may be only the final straw, the terminus in a series of "predisposants." It is therefore too simple to view these facilitating and inhibiting influences as a predisposing base and a precipitating experience. It is even worse in criminological research to assume that these influences can be isolated so as to distinguish between offender and nonoffender.

THE FAMILY AND DELINQUENCY. If one set of influences is more important than any other in producing or preventing delinquency, it is that carried through the family. The family plays a vital role in the personality and social history of the individual. Emotional security, so essential to stability and normal development, is rooted in the child's intrafamilial relationships. Where he is emotionally deprived, either unloved or treated inconsistently, the foundation is established for his continuing unadjustment. The delinquent often reveals the affective inadequacy of his early experience, and his behavior may be interpreted as a method of responding to the deprivation—by rebellion and attack or by withdrawal and escape, e.g., in running away or truancy. At the same time, many unloved individuals work out their problems in ways other than law violations. To some persons the experience of rejection may be a goad to achievement.

Some measure of rejection of children is characteristic of the contemporary family system. The unwanted or unloved

child is no oddity, although different parents express in very different ways their grievances at the loss of their independence and individuality. It appears that the emotionally undernourished youngster may resolve his deprivation in diversely assorted fashions also. Probably the manner of doing so is related somewhat to the pattern of rejection employed by the parent. We have no way of knowing what proportion among the unloved children work out their affective problems in delinquency, or how many display other deviant outlets. Almost certainly the great majority of the rejected do not express their discomfort in delinquency; otherwise many more would be delinquent than appear in the official statistics. Very likely the most usual consequence of deprivation is the relative unhappiness and insecurity of the individual, which appear later in his own marital and parental roles.

Why some persons are led to law violation through rejection it is difficult to say. The answer lies in the relationship of the deprivation itself to other elements in the psychological and social configuration. Unloved by a parent, does the individual find compensatory affection elsewhere? Are his insecurities diminished or dissolved through some form of achievement and recognition? Has the rejection produced hate for the father image and authority and, if so, does the child also fear authority sufficiently to be deterred from law violation? Are his social response patterns aggressive or submissive? Has he developed a rigid "conscience" in response to family discipline and found expressive outlets in neurotic symptoms? Obviously there are infinite possibilities of personality and social relationships to be found among the rejected. Widely assorted potential consequences, most of them taking the form of personality maladjustment, may arise. Suicide, psychosis, psychopathic trends, alcoholism, neurosis, and many other deviations display this element in the social history. The delinquent child is thus often (not always, by any means) rejected. On the other hand, the rejected child is only occasionally a delinquent. The effects of emotional deprivation are characteristically pathological, however, and

social efforts need to be directed toward preventing and resolving the personality insecurities engendered by unloving parents.

The lack of parental affection is probably the most significant among the pathic influences on the maladjusted child. There are numerous other influences of greater or less importance. The youngster may suffer as well from excessive and distorted parental love. Where the child is quite unrestrained by his doting parents, there is serious danger of maladjustment in his social relations. Delinquency may ensue from the exploitative, unsublimated demands of the egocentric spoiled child.

In our age of family disorganization the delinquent is often but one incidental by-product of disharmony in the home. Research has made much of the relationship between law violation and divorce, often designating divorce as a cause of delinquency. The interpretation appears to be oversimplified. Divorce does not in general cause delinquency at all. The divorce of badly mated individuals may, indeed, rescue children from the hazard of an unsatisfactory family environment. The evil influence upon the youngster generally comes, it seems, from the incompatibility and conflict of the parents. There is a high relationship between law violation and domestic discord in the parental family. This does not mean, of course, that there is always a direct causal nexus. The personality responses of the child to (a) the conflict processes, (b) each of the parents and siblings, and (c) to the *causes* of the disharmony may emerge in delinquent as well as in other types of maladapted behavior. A family permeated with severe tensions and hate cannot prevent delinquency merely by the negative technique of avoiding divorce. It is true that ideally the child should have the care of two parents in a real home. But where the parents remain together only out of a sense of duty, they cannot give their young a harmonious, stable, and loving family experience. Hence mere preservation of the marital chains may be more unhealthy than otherwise.

Aside from such processes as rejection and overprotection, conflict, and disciplinary regulation, there are other important influences on the child mediated through the home. As "the cradle of the personality," the family plays a major role in nurturing attitudes, both generalized and specific, that may bear closely on the incidence of delinquency. Attitudes toward authority and reality, toward responsibilities to the property and person of others, toward oneself and the community are among the response patterns that are established early, at least in a rudimentary form, in the home situation. The specialized patterning of drives toward adventure, recognition, response, and security develops to a considerable extent within the family; where the primary group fails to provide needed channels for expression of these needs, in a negative sense it drives the child to seek them where he can.

In relation to the other major social institutions, the family also plays a pivotal role. The extent to which and the way in which religion impinges upon the individual is partly determined by family reactions. Religion can play no great part in social control over the individual, save to the degree that it is actually implemented in family attitudes and behavior. The loss of religious influences in personal living has occurred through changes in the family and the culture rather than the church.

To a somewhat lesser degree, the effect of the school on the child may also be determined by the parents. The part they take in the educational process is of fundamental importance to the child's learning and his attitude toward learning. Prejudices against school, teachers, and educational techniques are frequently fostered in the home, with serious results on children's responses. Our society has generally held that matters of religious, moral, and sexual education should be handled by parents rather than the school. Aside from the merits of the argument on these matters, it is clear that with the diminishing effectiveness of the home, education in these social areas has lagged seriously, with consequent effect upon delinquency rates. To develop well-adjusted, nondelinquent

children, it is essential that the home provide a systematic set of conduct norms and attitudes. What with the transitions and confusions in our culture, the average American family is decreasingly effective in performing this educational and character-building function.

NEIGHBORHOOD AND COMMUNITY INFLUENCES. Although the family may well be called the cradle of the personality, the community is to a great extent its nutrient. This has become increasingly true as the emergence of the city and the defunctionalization of the family have transferred a growing number of functions to other social institutions and secondary groups. Many of the basic attitudes and habits are still bred through family relationships. There is danger, however, of assuming an excessive and unreal fixity of character deriving from the first months of life. Parents and siblings characteristically exercise a more persisting influence on the child than does any other individual or agency. From the time the child toddles out the portals of his home, however, he also begins to respond to a larger world. At the age of two, the parents' omniscience may be challenged by the nursery teacher's apparent wisdom. At three or four, the child may be seduced by the appeal of his peers to question and defy the repressive world of his elders. Indeed, the child's estimation of and his response to his parents are conditioned by his extraparental experience. What G. H. Mead has called the "generalized other," the introjected interpretation of the responses of others, is no slavish model of his elders. Rather is it a compound of wider experience in which the immediate family is one important—but sometimes rather strongly depreciated—ingredient. Personality development is marked by the continuous struggle toward emancipation from parental restraints and standards.

The social histories of juvenile delinquents frequently display the trenchant effect of neighborhood and community influences, operating through various channels. The play group, the gang, and other group associations are of real importance not only for the expression of gregarious drives but in

molding habits, attitudes, and character. It has been shown that a vast majority of delinquencies are committed in association with others. Antisocial activities may clearly be facilitated through the group—by the ego challenge to bravado, the desire for recognition, and the sense of impunity in group behavior.


In the delinquent gang, furthermore, delinquency is an expression of conformity to the nonconventional standards of the group. Where there are prevailing patterns of law violation in the groups to which he belongs, the youngster may be strongly conditioned to the values and behavior of the delinquent subculture. Professor Edwin H. Sutherland refers to this process as "differential association," in which the child is exposed to associations persuading him to identification with the antisocial group. The cases reveal that this may occur in the face of strong familial pressures that are aligned with the dominant cultural standards. More commonly it appears, however, that the family is relatively indifferent, ineffectual, or is itself in agreement with the minority values of the gang. The neighborhood may be marked by general fear and hate of the "cops" and the law they represent, and may display resistance either passive or active to constituted authority. A defensive, paranoid community response is not uncommon in repressed minorities. Nor is this strange in view of the abuses in the administration of justice that characterize these areas.

Clifford Shaw has done more than any other scholar to reveal the significance of the "delinquency area" in producing a high incidence of law violation. He points out the pattern of ecological zones which tends to develop in cities. The largest rates of delinquency and crime tend to concentrate in the transitional area at the city center, with a gradually diminishing volume of cases outward through the zones of workingmen's homes, better-class residences, and finally commuters' dwellings. The ecological diagram of Chicago, according to Park and Burgess, is shown in Chart IV.

Shaw's research makes it clear that the law violation in delinquency areas is not a consequence of mere geography as

CHART IV

Ecological Diagram of Chicago [1]



[1] Zone I is the Loop business district, II the business area impinging on the residential section, and the outer zone is suburban. The lake front to the east is shown by the wavy line. From R. Park and E. W. Burgess, *The City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925), p. 55.

such. The zones of high delinquency and criminality display various evidences of social deterioration and personal demoralization that appear to characterize life in city centers. These pathologies are associated with population mobility, minority segregation, social transition, and inadequate social services of a constructive sort. Shaw and McKay found a close relationship between delinquency and such indices of disorganization as families on relief, poor homes, proportion of minority groups, infant mortality rates, mental disorder, and tuberculosis. Obviously it is not the ecological patterning per se that causes the law violations, but the interdependent pathologies of the area which tend to function together in promoting individual unadjustment. McKay points out that the neighborhood furnishes the setting in which the child is educated, either for conventional or for delinquent behavior. Where values are consistent and in conformity with the predominant mores, there is relatively little likelihood of law violation. Strong conflicts of values, on the other hand, are likely to be reflected in high rates of delinquency. McKay maintains that the elimination of conflicting values from the neighborhood and the protection of the child from definition as a delinquent are needed to reduce delinquency. How these objectives are to be accomplished within the framework of our contemporary culture is not clear.[2]

RECREATION AND DELINQUENCY. Some attention has been recently devoted to the role of such factors as the radio, comics, cheap books, movies, and other forms of recreational activity in the development of delinquency. The studies are unsatisfactory, largely because they fall short of the standards of objectivity that are required in measuring causation. Some recreational agencies, including the athletic leagues and juvenile bureaus of police departments, have sought to convince the public that delinquency is mainly "undirected leisure time activity." In a study of recreation and delinquency conducted in Chicago, however, it was found that, of those

[2] Clifford Shaw et al., *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).

children who took part in recreational activities, delinquent boys spent *more* time in such activities than did nondelinquent boys.

Other researches have confirmed the common-sense impression that organized recreation and delinquency are far from incompatible, and that indeed the former frequently offers increased opportunity for the latter. Directed leisure will rarely consume so much of a child's time and energies or influence his attitudes and habits of behavior as in itself to prevent or recondition the delinquent personality. It is possible, however, for gang associations and participation in the group activities of antisocial groups to encourage the defiance of conventional norms. Such association and participation are themselves conditioned by the attitudes, values, and general character structure of the individual, as well as by such factors as neighborhood of residence and socioeconomic level. Leisure-time activities are not themselves responsible for law violations: frequently they *are* law violative, but ensue from a complex of factors, individual, group, and social. Recreation alone is neither a cause, a preventive, or a cure for delinquency.

ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON DELINQUENCY. The role of economic factors in delinquency is peculiarly difficult to appraise. Policing and prosecutory practices greatly increase the risk that children of deprived neighborhoods will be found delinquent. Families living in underprivileged areas are also more inclined to seek court solutions to their domestic problems than is true elsewhere. Slum areas, with their reduced social services, their relatively numerous agencies of moral risk, their gang associations, their relative economic need, and their conflicting social and moral values, provide a configuration that encourages both law violation and official prosecution. There is danger, however, of assuming a more direct and simple relationship between delinquency and poverty than actually exists.

Delinquency and crime rates have reached their highest levels in an age and a society where poverty and economic

insecurity have been reduced to a minimum in comparison to other times and places. It is very dubious whether poverty as such is a common cause of crime. Certainly it does not operate in isolation, but must be combined with values in the individual that are congenial to criminality. Economically depressed areas are, it is true, more receptive to such values. It appears that the various forms of social and personal disorganization rife in neighborhoods of high delinquency all increase the risk that an individual resident there will be led into trouble. While these variables are obviously correlated with economic level, they are produced by a configuration of interrelated factors of which poverty itself may be only a limited ingredient. These disorganizing influences operate (a) through the family in producing a greater frequency of rejection and inconsistency in the raising of children, (b) through the gang in producing hostility to authority, and (c) through the social institutions to intensify conflict.

Law violation, however, is only one possible symptomatic expression of the subjective discontents of the poor and the unemployed. Usually these individuals do not commit crime, and do not "need" to do so in order to live. The case literature reveals that property offenders from the slums commit their derelictions more often with the rationale that "only saps work" than because of the pressure of necessity. Jealousy and greed, competitive emulation based on what the person has rather than how he obtained it, and intense materialism are unquestionably more important in generating delinquency and crime than is poverty per se. It is doubtful if the continuing increase in economic security will have any apparent effect in decreasing delinquency and crime, whatever other benefits may arise therefrom. Like recreational facilities, economic opportunity can be justified for its own sake in a developed culture. But there is little reason to assume that these will be panaceas against criminality. The dynamics of delinquency are too complicated and the etiology runs too deep both in the culture and in the individual to attach the significance to poverty and unemployment that some writers have done.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN DELINQUENCY. There has been a tendency for authorities charged with the problem of the juvenile delinquent to split into two extreme camps in their approaches to the child. One school of thought may be said to look upon the delinquent as a young criminal, a thug in the making, a moral monster, however diminutive. The other conceives him as merely an unadjusted or maladapted child, a "sick person." Each of these views has some support in the facts, but each has potentially unfortunate treatment-implications. Good sense appears to lie in an interpretation that would integrate some elements in each of these views.

A conception of the delinquent as a junior yegg very easily assumes connotations of moral blame and retributive justice, like the traditional responses to the criminal. Some who would not ordinarily use the unfashionable verbiage of vindictive punishment will nevertheless rail at the "mollycoddling" of the youngster through permissive and therapeutic methods, and demand that "he be taught a lesson." This reaction against efforts at more effective treatment is a strong and common force among the administrators and other personnel charged with the handling of the delinquent. Its malicious effect should not, as it often does, blind the student to the obvious. Matured, habitual delinquents *are* a dangerous force in society. The missile from a weapon manufactured or "found" by a fifteen- or sixteen-year-old can do injury as deadly as any wrought by an older criminal. His mugging, rape, or robbery is no less a threat to public security. Persons and property in the community must be protected from excessive damage, regardless of the age of the offender. Indeed, as we have indicated, serious law violations are revealed in the statistics to be the peculiar propensity of teen-agers, many of them within juvenile court jurisdiction.

It does not follow from this that society should proceed punitively against the young. But this situation *does* imply the need for frank recognition of a security problem that in some instances requires preventive custodial detention during treatment or close supervision in the community. Neither moraliz-

ing, nor scolding, nor even therapeutic interviewing are sufficient to avoid large hazards to the public from repetitive adolescent offenders. A considerable proportion of the juvenile delinquents who really need the authoritative handling of the children's courts are clearly motivated by well-established attitudes of hostility toward society and indifference to public welfare. Hence any realistic approach to their treatment must imply some measure of isolation as well as efforts at reorientation of motives. Sentimentality is little more meritorious than brutality, so far as efficacy of their retraining is concerned.

More popular among contemporary leaders in child welfare is the attitude that the delinquent is sick, an emotionally maladjusted individual who requires clinical diagnosis and therapy. There is virtue in this idea, so long as it is contained within the bounds of reality. In planning treatment of the youngster, it is highly desirable to seek the dynamic sources of his maladjusted behavior and to apply a program of guidance and re-education appropriate to the apparent etiology of his conduct. For several reasons, however, a narrowly and exclusively clinical orientation is quite unrealistic in the handling of the delinquent child. Unhappily, the need for community protection may sometimes conflict with a purely therapeutic goal of treatment under circumstances of freedom. The compromise of institutional custody and training is not always satisfactory from a clinician's point of view. Equally important is the fact that there are only five or six thousand psychiatrists in the United States, most of them in private practice. With only a few hundred specialized in orthopsychiatry, we lack the clinical resources even for adequate diagnostic work. We are in a considerably worse position as to treatment experts, psychological and psychiatric. Under the limitations of medical-school training facilities, we shall not be able to function in accordance with clinical ideals within the forseeable future. The existing small-scale experimental programs, however, should prove of considerable value for informational purposes.

An insidiously attractive proposition has been promulgated

by the clinical school. This position holds that the child's specific behavior is unimportant, being merely symptomatic of the deeper underlying psychic difficulties, and that the latter should be the sole object of inquiry. This position is used commonly to support the assumptions that the child who is brought to children's court *must* need help (and therefore be sick, presumably) and that the facts in children's cases are almost never in dispute (despite the frequency of petitions for disobedience, immorality, and recalcitrance, where the conduct and its interpretations are clearly subtle matters). The resulting situation is an anomalous exception to our most basic standards of justice: the presumption of delinquency without proof, the lack of any definite charge, the deprivation of ordinary opportunity for defense, a lack of legal counsel, and —in many jurisdictions—not even a formal right to appeal.

All of this is customarily rationalized in terms of the alleged rehabilitative role of the court. The child is thus not being punished for a crime, but "saved" and cured, a position that is taken apparently quite without reference to the narrow limitations of the treatment facilities available to even the best of children's courts. The child committed to a state training school for an offense that is minor or unproven should observe the irony in this protective and therapeutic gesture of his *parens patriae*. Treatment of the child should be guided so far as is possible by his apparent needs, psychological and social. But where his delinquency is alleged, clear proof should be required that he is in fact a source of danger to the community, before proceeding to handling through court methods. In a court situation, the specific conduct in issue *is* significant. Whatever its limitations as a basis for determining details of treatment, the illegal behavior is the best criterion available as to the youngster's need for processing through a court rather than a guidance clinic, a social agency, or some other sort of therapeutic facility. It is the best evidence of his need for authority and the community's need for protection. A requirement of clear legal proof of delinquency would in itself be no deterrent whatever to a therapeutically oriented diagnostic

and treatment program after the showing of law violation. Indeed, a narrowing-down of the case loads of overtaxed juvenile courts would do much to increase the efficacy of their efforts to correct the delinquent's difficulties.

Most delinquents, even those who are committed to institutions, are within the range of normal intelligence. We are still in a phase, however, where it is common to describe delinquents (as well as numerous other types of deviates, such as sex offenders, alcoholics, and criminals in general) as mentally ill. The student should understand, however, that these groups do *not* suffer characteristically from the major forms of psychiatric aberration. He may well ask whether the concept of mental illness is not being diluted to a point where it is without real meaning. If it be held that the "sickness" of the delinquent refers merely to his being "disturbed," there is a very real question whether delinquents are more so, on the average, than nondelinquents. In many instances, certainly, the law violator works out his impulses and frustrations, his physical and psychological wants, in behavior that he thoroughly enjoys, without guilt feelings or repression. The delinquent, indeed, is more gregarious and more athletic than are members of the nondelinquent control groups that have been studied. In important respects—expressiveness and socialization—the delinquent may be less disturbed than the impeccably proper child.

Let us inspect the other side of the coin. What of the adjustment of the nondelinquent youngster? Is he on the average more healthy, less disturbed? Unfortunately, we do not have satisfactory answers to the question. But we can raise further relevant issues. In a complicated, dynamic, individualistic, and hedonistic society such as we live in today, how healthy psychologically can the great masses of individuals be? Is it fair to say that a very large proportion, if not the entire population, experiences an emotional malaise of real intensity in various syndromes. We are all in some measure insecure, anxiety-ridden, frustrated, inadequate, rejected, and unloved. To the individuality and fulfillment of others—our parents,

in particular—we represent a threat and a frustration; their responses frustrate and threaten us in return. Is it not reasonable to believe that individuals conditioned in close conformity to the host of legal and social norms, many of them mutually incompatible and "unnatural" in relation to human drives, learn obedience to conventional standards only at great psychic cost? The delinquent's adoption of unconventional norms may conceivably be more satisfying and healthy, judged by standards of mental hygiene, however much it may be deprecated from the point of view of public security. We may therefore assume that if delinquents are "sick" people, so too are nondelinquents.

Consider the further implications of a judgment that delinquents suffer from some form of mental aberration. What sort of approach to treatment is implied for the sick delinquent? This is perhaps the most significant problem raised by an exclusively clinical approach. If delinquency is held to rest squarely on psychic maladjustment, the delinquent should presumably be dealt with therapeutically by experts who are psychiatrically oriented. This is the counsel of numerous contemporary authorities. Mental hygiene or psychiatric treatment has thereby become the new and universal nostrum. The result is unfortunate in the extreme. It is most dubious that, if we were to replace our correctional facilities with mental hygiene institutions, we should achieve any greater measure of success in dealing with delinquents than we do today.

Actually most law violators do not require psychiatric treatment. This is fortunate, since we lack the available personnel to offer effective service, even in cases where it is obviously needed. Considering the limited resources in relation to total community needs, it is clear that we cannot afford to spend them extravagantly on minor delinquents in the court, at the expense of those nondelinquents outside who may be greatly in need of help. Beyond this, however, there is a special need to avoid the recurrence of a familiar pattern in the evaluation of treatment techniques. In the field of correction, we have run through a long series of uncritical enthusi-

asms for particular methods—the reformatory, the foster home, the cottage plan, trade training, recreation, and spiritual counseling, to mention a few. The unrestrained expectations have in themselves implied inevitable disillusionment. A great disservice is done to the role of psychiatry in the handling of the offender by those who impute some magical and exclusive potency to the nomenclature or techniques derived from Freud and others.

The services of psychiatrists and case workers as a skilled team in diagnostic and therapeutic work are obviously important, but that they cannot take the place of several other methods in a correctional program. Education, retraining in habits and attitudes, supervision and custody, authority, and understanding relationships, all are phases of treatment in handling the usual, normal delinquent that are of fundamental significance for success or failure. We cannot afford to approach clinical services on an all-or-nothing basis. The etiology of delinquent behavior thus derives in some measure from varying patterns of psychological relationship. But the dynamics of delinquency does not lie exclusively or even mainly in psychiatric aberration. Attitudes conditioned in relation to diverse social environments are of crucial importance. These require versatile efforts at exploration and treatment, rather than any single orthodoxy.

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CHAPTER TEN

Prevention and Treatment of Delinquency

TREATMENT OF THE DELINQUENT. The possibilities of effective treatment and prevention of delinquency depend upon both the nature of the phenomenon and its etiology. For that reason we have already devoted passing attention to these problems in the last two chapters. More specific and systematic consideration will be given in this chapter to the various methods employed in the handling of the young offender. Despite the wide extension of a humanitarian philosophy in the child-welfare movement during the twentieth century, the treatment of the delinquent reflects a serious confusion of methods and purposes. The greatest difficulty lies in the huge gap between ideals and reality, between the realm of thought about and action toward the delinquent. It frequently appears that what people say about the child (expressing the most benevolent intentions) has utterly no relation to what they do. Often *neither* what they say or do is very realistic in relation to the child's behavior and his needs.

One may observe, particularly on the level of theory, the desire to individualize attention, to look at the delinquent as a

person expressing his peculiar needs, who needs sympathetic understanding to help him work through his subjective difficulties. This approach is most characteristic, perhaps, of the effective child-guidance clinic. Approximations to it may be discovered in the limited clinical facilities serving some children's courts. In the agencies vested with authority, however, it is more common to encounter the quite different rationale of *parens patriae*. This interpretation of the state role is that of parent substitute, presumably to offer the care, protection, and beneficence that have been denied to the child by his own parents.

This is an unfortunately loose conception, however, in view of the widely variant ideas both of how a parent should behave and how formal, secondary community institutions can act as familial substitutes. For the most part, the paternalism of the court appears to be of a very stern patriarchal variety. It is the rare judge, probation officer, or institutional worker who offers the youngster the understanding and warmth on which emotional security is based. The methods employed on the delinquent are, in fact, almost entirely those which have come to us by way of the criminal and penal law, though with an altered semantics. "Crime," "moral responsibility," and "punishment" are unpopular terms in the juvenile court. To the adjudicated delinquent, however, subtleties of word choice have little meaning. He is exposed to the realities of interpersonal relationships, to attitudes and their overt manifestations rather than to intellectual abstractions.

Correctional practice, particularly in detention and commitment institutions, has thus been based upon the same punitive and custodial features for the juvenile and adolescent that have characterized adult penology. Indeed, in most states the public institutions for juveniles are marked by more rigid regulation and harshly retributive punishment than is true in our prisons and penitentiaries! Many juvenile institutions do not even maintain a façade of verbal pretense to benevolence. We should not be deluded through the iteration of pious objectives to a fond persuasion that delinquents are ac-

corded parental—or even humane—treatment. The occasional attendance of a part-time psychiatrist at diagnostic sessions of the court or institution should not obstruct our view of the total treatment process.

DISPOSITIONS OF THE CHILDREN'S COURT. The child handled by a children's court is frequently exposed to a detention facility of some sort. After arrest and prior to his hearing in court, during a period of adjournment when a social investigation is conducted into his background, and often again after the court has made its disposition, some sort of arrangement must be made for the child's custody. During these periods the child may be "paroled" to reside with his family or a relative, particularly if the charge is minor and the parents are deemed fit. Frequently, however, a "remand" is made to some sort of detention institution. In some courts the remand is virtually automatic, being looked upon by some authorities as a cooling-off period, a beginning of treatment or punishment, or a possible substitute for longer-term institutional commitment. In most places detention is used with excessive frequency, much to the injury of the children involved.

The table below shows the official data on detention, including the types of facilities employed. Detention cases, however, particularly those in which jail is used, are apparently underreported. The data from about 380 courts reveal the use of ordinary jails for detention in some 12 per cent of children's cases, involving 25 per cent of all children detained. Estimates have placed the number of children held in jails at between 30,000 and 100,000 each year, some of them for weeks and months. This is one of the most barbaric penalties of the twentieth century, utilized for children who have not even been adjudicated delinquent. Many of them are quite innocent of any wrongdoing.

Where facilities other than jails are available for juvenile detention, these are frequently barred cells no better than jails. In other places, shelters are employed in which the emphasis is still on close custody and little else. The most prevalent evil is the utter lack of program or opportunity for the

TABLE 10

Juvenile-delinquency Cases, 1945: Places of Detention Care of Boys and of Girls, in Cases Disposed of by 374 Courts [1]

Place of detention care	Number			Per cent		
	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls
Total cases	122,851	101,240	21,611			
Detention care reported	76,002	62,353	13,649	100	100	100
No detention care overnight	43,100	36,824	6,276	57	59	46
Detention care overnight or longer	32,902	25,529	7,373	43	41	54
Boarding home	331	292	39	†	1	†
Detention home ‡	22,659	16,948	5,711	30	27	42
Other institution	760	503	257	1	1	2
Jail or police station §	8,735	7,507	1,228	12	12	9
Other place of care ‖	156	75	81	†	†	1
Place of care not reported	261	204	57	†	†	†
Detention care not reported	46,849	38,887	7,962			

† Less than 0.5 per cent.

‡ Includes cases of children cared for part of the time in detention homes and part of the time elsewhere but excludes cases of children also cared for in jails or police stations.

§ Includes cases of children cared for part of the time in jails or police stations and part of the time elsewhere.

‖ Includes cases of children cared for in more than one place but in places other than detention homes, jails, or police stations.

constructive use of time. During a period when children inevitably suffer from acute anxiety about the court experience and the possible punishments in the offing, they are characteristically provided no helpful counsel and no occupation for

[1] *Juvenile Court Statistics, 1944 and 1945*, United States Children's Bureau, p. 11.

their time other than the ubiquitous comics and perhaps a few discarded books. A National Probation Association survey of detention institutions in the United States found two-thirds of the facilities studied to be badly overcrowded, with some children waiting from six months to more than a year for court or agency action. They found only four detention homes out of sixty-eight observed in twenty-two states where there was provided the kind of program that was needed.

> Delinquent children requiring secure detention were often found cared for in the same institution as dependent and neglected children. There was a tendency in almost every community studied to concentrate on one type of detention care to the detriment of children needing other types of care. For instance, detention homes geared to the care of dependent and neglected children failed to provide security for the older delinquent group who were relegated to the jail. Other homes were operated as though all the children detained were young criminals. Nowhere did we find realistic provision for the sixteen and seventeen-year-old delinquent youngster although juvenile court jurisdiction in over half of our states now includes this group.
>
> Finally, in most detention homes we found the very conditions which out in the community are pointed to as causes of delinquency: lack of understanding relationship between children and adults; the presence of companions who act as delinquency seducers; lack of a full recreational program; lack of a meaningful school program; lack of professional child-guidance service, etc.[2]

The most important function of the juvenile court lies in its disposition of cases. Many of the cases that are carried through to dispositions ought not to have been handled by children's court at all. There is no way of obtaining data on the

[2] See also Sherwood Norman and Helen Norman, "Detention for the Juvenile Court; A Discussion of Principles and Practices," National Probation and Parole Assoc., 1946.

frequency with which official authority is unnecessarily employed in juvenile cases. This would vary widely according to the conceptions and facilities in different communities, but the number must be very large. The very fact that in many places 50 per cent or more of the cases are handled unofficially is symptomatic of the tendency to apply court resources to youngsters who are not really delinquent, and thus to discourage the development of more appropriate facilities.

The Children's Bureau provides figures on dispositions of cases as reported by the children's courts. As shown below, about 30 per cent of the cases are supervised by probation officers in most years. These data indicate that some 9 per cent are committed to institutions. There are in addition a considerable number committed to agency care who are then institutionalized by the agency itself. The table shows 43 per cent of the cases dismissed, adjusted, or held open. This category includes a wide variety of practices. Many of these cases have spent periods of time in detention or commitment institutions; others have been under informal probation supervision for months or years before their cases were discharged. Where unofficial practices are used, the specific character of the technique does not appear in the statistics.

A child may be treated through the juvenile court in any of three main ways: 1) He may be permitted to remain in his own home under a suspended sentence, either without any real treatment efforts or under probation supervision. Occasionally assistance may be given by some community agency, public or private, either as a substitute for or a supplement to probation supervision. 2) He may be placed in a foster home under the supervision of a probation officer or under some other program of agency care. 3) He may be committed to an institution, public or private.

In the decision on disposition, much depends on factors other than the child's behavior or even his personality and social situation. The treatment facilities available to the court represent a most important limiting factor. There are not

TABLE 11

Juvenile-delinquency Cases, 1945: Dispositions of Boys' and of Girls' Cases, Disposed of by 374 Courts [3]

Disposition of case	Juvenile-delinquency cases					
	Number			Per cent		
	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls
Total cases	122,851	101,240	21,611			
Disposition reported	114,887	95,027	19,860	100	100	100
Case dismissed, adjusted, or held open without further action	49,040	42,184	6,856	43	45	35
Child supervised by probation officer	34,981	28,829	6,152	30	30	31
Child committed or referred to an institution	10,101	7,748	2,353	9	8	12
State institution for delinquent children	5,789	4,640	1,149	5	5	6
Other institution for delinquent children	3,157	2,346	811	3	2	4
Penal institution	222	206	16	†	†	†
Other institution	933	556	377	1	1	2
Child committed or referred to an agency or individual	5,400	3,546	1,854	5	4	9
Public department	1,751	1,183	568	2	1	3
Other agency or individual	3,649	2,363	1,286	3	3	6
Other disposition of case	15,365	12,720	2,645	13	13	13
Disposition not reported	7,964	6,213	1,751			

† Less than 0.5 per cent.

[3] *Juvenile Court Statistics*, U. S. Children's Bureau, p. 11, 1944 and 1945.

quent children, even where this is clearly the most desirable treatment. The case load of the probation officers in a court and the extent of crowding in the correctional institutions are further important determinants as to whether the youngster will be handled by one method or the other. The attitudes of the juvenile court judge, who is usually quite untrained for the task of dispositions, and of the investigating officers in his court may result in inordinately high rates of commitment or of probation.

Dr. Carl Rogers has worked out an interesting tabulation of criteria relevant to treatment either in or outside the home. His emphasis is upon the desirability of keeping the child with his parents if the home offers any real assets. Since these standards are based entirely on qualities in the child and his home, their application would need to be guided in some measure by the availability of good social agency or institutional resources in the community.

CRITERIA FOR REMOVAL FROM HOME[4]

Conditions Making Placement Advisable	*Conditions Making Continuance in Own Home Advisable*
	Behavior
Behavior difficulties of more than average seriousness, definitely associated with, and probably caused by, parental attitudes, management, or behavior.	Behavior difficulties definitely associated with some other cause or causes—hereditary, physical, or social—rather than with parental attitudes.
	Family Atmosphere
Child has little affection for parents.	Child has normal degree of affection for both parents.
Child feels emotionally insecure at home.	Child feels emotionally secure with his parents.

[4] Carl R. Rogers, *Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1939), p. 166. (Reprinted by permission.)

CRITERIA FOR REMOVAL FROM HOME (cont.)

Conditions Making Placement Advisable	*Conditions Making Continuance in Own Home Advisable*
Family Atmosphere—continued	
Child is rejected by one or both parents.	(The above conditions lose some of their force if the child is young, or if the parents are desirous of treatment through placement.)
Parents' affection for child is of unwholesome type, causing too great dependence or infantile attachment. Parents' behavior and attitudes are such that they have caused great emotional conflict in the child. Child has little loyalty to family group.	
Possibility of Change	
The parental attitudes which seem to cause misbehavior are fixed, deep-seated, and of long standing. Skilled efforts to change essential attitudes of parent and child have failed.	Parental attitudes which are associated with misbehavior are recent, or superficially held, or conditioned by factors which may be changed.
Placement Opportunity	
The child possesses the characteristics as to age, intelligence, stability, type of behavior, etc., which indicate better than 50 per cent chance of success away from home.	The child possesses characteristics which make him a poor risk for placement.

The wide discrepancy between the disposition practices of different judges and their lack of specialized qualification for determining appropriate treatment have led to some constructive suggestions and programs to remedy the problem. The most general trend has been to increase the emphasis upon probation investigations as a basis for court decisions. Increasingly children's court judges have come to depend upon the guidance of their probation officers in deciding the opti-

mum treatment for the individual delinquent. Practice in this respect varies widely, however. Many authorities consider the answer to this problem to be the development of larger and better probation staffs. Others maintain that judges for the children's court should be thoroughly trained for their important task of determining dispositions.

THE YOUTH CORRECTION AUTHORITY. For many years, criminologists have recommended that the dispositions function should be taken out of the hands of judges and entrusted to some sort of agency composed of individuals specialized for this particular task. Thought in this direction culminated in 1940 in the creation of a model bill for a Youth Correction Authority, sponsored by the American Law Institute, and drawn by a number of the nation's prominent criminologists. This was originally designed to provide a specialized three-man authority for determining dispositions in youth cases from the ages of sixteen to twenty-one. After the enactment of the Y.C.A. in California in 1941, however, it became optional for the children's courts as well as the criminal courts in adolescent cases to commit to the Authority.

Since then, somewhat similar laws have been passed in Minnesota, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Texas. These have been directed to the juvenile rather than the adolescent level, as contemplated under the Law Institute bill. These states have set up boards of considerable size, with a heavy emphasis upon working out programs of delinquency prevention. The principle of the Authority plan has been widely attacked, particularly by judges and probation leaders. These criticisms have centered on the ground that it represents a costly duplication of the function that probation departments can better perform and that it entrusts a dangerous amount of power to an administrative board, the composition of which may be determined by politics rather than merit. There are real administrative dangers implicit in the Authority plan, but its apparent success under unusually fine leadership in California and assiduous public relations work by its advocates elsewhere point to the likelihood of its spread to other jurisdictions. In

1950, bills to set up Authorities were before the legislatures of the federal government and several of the states.

One considerable virtue of the Authority plan, if it is well administered, is the provision that the agency will maintain continuing supervision and control over the offender until discharged. The Authority would not only select the institution to which the individual should be sent, but would determine thereafter any desirable reclassification and the time of release. It is also empowered to recommend the establishment of needed additional resources for treatment. Several states have been developing compromises that do not vest so much power in one agency. The Reception or Diagnostic Center idea is a notable development looking toward the improvement of dispositions from the courts. New York and Pennsylvania established centers in 1945 and New Jersey in 1949, to make available to the courts diagnostic resources on the basis of which improved institutional commitments might be made.

The policy differs considerably in these three states. In New York, the Elmira Reception Center is employed exclusively for adolescents from sixteen to twenty-one. In Pennsylvania, the Classification Center is empowered to receive all persons sentenced by a court to a state institution and all defective delinquents. The State Diagnostic Center at Menlo Park, New Jersey, is accessible for intensive psychiatric investigation of any case voluntarily referred from a court, social agency, or institution. These Centers do not have persisting supervisory powers, nor are they specifically entrusted with the task of extending treatment resources. They do not involve the political and economic risks of the Correction Authority Plan, however, and something of their sort should develop in other states in coming years. It should be recognized that none of these schemes can work to any great effect if the state lacks adequate and diversified treatment resources. Such plans may indeed represent a costly waste where diagnostic investigation can be followed only by inadequate institutional placements, as is true for the most part in Pennsylvania

and New York. Among the states that have developed specialized diagnostic or dispositions facilities, at the present time only California provides such a variety of institutions as completely to justify intensive individualized study.

PROBATION. Probation as a technique of treating the offender antedated the juvenile court by more than a half-century. The first juvenile court was established in Illinois in 1899, whereas probation was carried on unofficially in Boston as early as 1841 through the efforts and services of John Augustus, "the first probation officer." Probation had developed considerably in the criminal courts by the turn of the century. The method has become during the past fifty years a most vital part of court procedure and philosophy, particularly at the juvenile level. Juvenile courts and probation are now provided for in the laws of all the states and the territories. However, according to the report of the National Probation and Parole Association for 1947, 1,610 out of 3,071 counties throughout the country lack any probation service for juveniles. In that year there were only 3,681 officers for juveniles in the United States, many of whom devoted a great part of their time to an adult case load. A large number of these officers devote only a part of their time to this work as an incident to their main occupation as sheriff, police officer, welfare worker, truant officer, or other activity. It is obvious from these statistics alone that probation is generally a very thin service to the child.

The tasks of the probation officer are manifold, although he is supposed to perform two main services: investigation and supervision. When a defendant is held for a court hearing, it is traditional under our system of law to wait until the completion of trial and a finding of guilt before inquiry is directed to issues that may bear upon sentence. These matters would generally be prejudicial and irrelevant to guilt. Among other matters, the offender's social history is an important determinant of the court's disposition. In juvenile courts it is customary, where the service is available, for a social investigation to be conducted as a basis of determining treatment. In an

increasing number of courts, however, such inquiry is made *before* the hearing, and the information obtained is commonly used by the judge as one (sometimes the only) basis of decision as to the child's delinquency—or, in effect, his need for court treatment.[5]

This is an important deviation from basic due-process conceptions of law, like a number of other children's court procedures. This practice is not countenanced by some judges in these courts, on the ground that a decision crucially affecting the child's future history may be predicated upon insubstantial and unverified data, gossip, slander, and prejudice. More generally, however, it is held that the child is not being "convicted" of a "crime" and will not be "punished" for wrongdoing, but will be cared for protectively as a ward of the state. Hence due-process considerations of the criminal court are not needed to protect the child. Thus the probation investigation is often conducted during a period of court adjournment of the case before the hearing has been held. Anywhere from a week or two to a month or more may be allowed for the investigation, depending somewhat on the case load of the probation department.

At the time that a complaint is made to the juvenile court, it is considered good practice for a probation intake-officer to obtain fairly extensive data through an initial interrogation. The National Probation and Parole Association provides recommended forms for this purpose and many large probation departments employ something of the sort. Samples of these are shown on the following pages. The later investigation conducted by an officer characteristically seeks amplification of the information called for on these forms. This information is obtained through interviewing a series of informants, including relatives, teachers, employers, neighbors, other agency workers, or others when it is deemed useful. The results of the investigation must be recorded by the officer for

[5] For a detailed consideration of this practice, see Paul W. Tappan, *Juvenile Delinquency* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949), Ch. IX, and *Delinquent Girls in Court* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), Ch. V.

TABLE 12

Treatment of the Delinquent [6]

JUVENILE FACE SHEET

Family record No.

Probation department Court

Name: Address: Tel.: Color: Sex:

Lives with:

Parents	Address	Birth date, place	Ver.	Death	Religion	U. S. citizen	Marriage date, place	Occupation School grade
F.								
Maiden name								
M.								
S.F.								
S.M.								
Children (chronological, including subject)								
Others in home	Relationship							
Agencies and others interested	Address			Date latest contact			Relationship or interest	

Major Court Hearings

Date	Reason for referral	Docket No.	Disposition	Probation officer

[6] Reprinted by permission of the National Probation and Parole Association.

TABLE 12 (*cont.*)

Probation

JUVENILE

GUIDE FOR RECORDING INITIAL SOCIAL STUDY (Preliminary Investigation)

Complaint

State date, nature, accompanying circumstances, and sources of the complaint, together with complainant's attitude toward offense.

Previous court or institutional history

State any previous court experience of the child with date, name of judge, and disposition.

Family history

Use narrative form without topical headings. State sources of information.
State the family background including racial, religious, social, and economic facts, with delinquency records of family members, if any. Give in detail early history, education, and employment data for both parents. Give circumstances preceding marriage, the success or failure of the marriage, and reasons therefor. Describe present living conditions. Note moral and ethical standards of the home. Give personality data for each member of the family, mental and physical health, education, employment experiences, attitude of parents toward each child and of children toward parents and each other, and attitude of family toward the child's situation.

Child's history

Individualize the child.
Include attitude of parents toward birth of child, developmental history, age of weaning, teething, walking, talking, preschool life, and status in the family.
Discipline in the home and child's reaction.
Neighborhood and its effect on child's personality; periods of separation from family and reaction of the child.
Physical history, illnesses and their effect, physical and emotional.
Personality traits and behavior trends.
Significance of previous court or institutional experience and of other delinquent experiences.
Practical meaning of religion to the child; application of religious principles to everyday experience.
School experience, grade attained, attendance, reasons for truancy and other misconduct, attitude toward teachers and classmates, and vice versa, and reasons for leaving school.
Work record, jobs held, how secured, wages, reasons for leaving, vocational interests, results of tests given, and attitude toward job or employers.
Recreational outlets, group activities (including organized and supervised), status in group, type of movies, hobbies, type of reading matter, recreation with family or outside, and kind of companions.
Child's attitude toward present situation; his explanation of conduct and plans for the future.

Information from social agencies and others

State experiences of social agencies with child and family including reasons for agency contact, services rendered, family's response, and agency recommendation in reference to present situation.

Analysis, interpretation, recommendation

presentation to the court, ordinarily with a summary and, in some courts, a recommendation to the judge. The record should reveal the sources of information and its probable degree of validity. In practice, either because of the inadequacy of investigation or the limitations of the officer in case recording (frequently both), probation investigative reports are extremely poor. It could scarcely be otherwise, what with the size of case loads and the quality of most probation personnel.

The extent to which judges rely upon probation reports in their decisions on delinquency and dispositions varies widely. As time has gone on, there has come to be an increasing dependence, particularly where a competent department services the court. Indeed, some judges lacking any special training to deal with juveniles derive a good deal of "in-service training" from their effective probation officers and reports. This is a very undependable and partial educative process, however. The widely varying rates of adjudication and of the several types of disposition from different courts reveal more clearly than anything else, perhaps, the variation in judges and probation departments. The chart below, taken from a quarterly report of the Division of Probation of the New York State Department of Correction, shows the variance in adjudication rates and in the employment of different types of treatment. One expert has estimated that, where there is a good court and probation department with adequate community services, as much as 90 per cent of the juvenile delinquents could be given probation "the first time around" and 50 to 75 per cent "the second or third time around," with an expectancy of a success rate of from 75 to 80 per cent. Probably no court uses probation this extensively.

The second major function of the probation department is to provide supervision to those cases that are given a probation term by the court. This usually implies some measure of regulation either for an indefinite period or for a term of one, two, or three years, fixed in advance. According to the standards set by a committee of the U. S. Children's Bureau,

home visits should be conducted at least once every two weeks for effective supervision "except in rare cases," in order that unfavorable conditions out of which the delinquency arose may be corrected. Actually it is the rare case that is visited at home as frequently as this under established practice. Reporting by the child at the department to his probation officer is much more common.

The supervisory function is the potentially creative aspect of probation, since it is through this process that the child's more adequate adjustment to the law and the community may be produced. Unfortunately it is much easier to recognize the importance of supervision than it is to provide for effective performance. There are serious difficulties at both the practical and theoretical levels. The practical problems are the most obvious and presumably remediable. The simple fact here is that we have too few probation officers and those we have are inadequately trained and poorly compensated.

Standards set by the National Probation and Parole Association would require that officers should be college graduates, carefully selected for their personality qualifications, with training in the social sciences, and at least one year's supervised experience in a recognized social agency. They should be offered a beginning salary from $2,600 to $3,000 per year and expenses. Various authorities have held that the case load per officer should be no greater than 30 cases (some go as high as 50). These standards are modest enough, and would appear to be possible of attainment in communities today. In practice, however, salaries and training fall far short of the ideal, and case loads commonly run from 75 to 150 cases. As a consequence, a greater part of probation-officer time goes to the preliminary but necessary work of investigation. Supervision accordingly tends to be nominal, a limited policing function based upon occasional brief reporting to the officer. So long as politics and parsimony play a predominant role in the operation of the probation systems of most communities, there is little possibility of meeting even minimum objectives.

On the positive side, however, probation is steadily im-

TABLE 13

Cases in Children's Courts in New York State[7]

April, May, June, 1949

Counties	Population 1940	Cases disposed of in this period				Judgment in cases adjudicated							
		Dismissed		Cases adjudicated		Children's delinquency and neglect cases				Adult cases			
		Children	Adults	Children	Adults	Placed on probation	Committed to institution	Committed to public or private agency or person	Other	Placed on probation	Committed	Ordered to contribute to maintenance of family	Other
Erie	798,337	85	28	228	105	55	22	30	17	3	0	80	22
Westchester	573,558	52	33	148	81	46	8	36	20	27	3	49	2
Monroe	438,230	31	8	158	35	20	16	15	3	13	4	18	0
Nassau	406,748	10	11	62	50	36	3	5	0	49	0	1	0
Onondaga	295,108	6	8	126	91	39	5	19	13	13	4	62	12
Albany	221,315	18	19	100	118	23	11	10	23	3	6	88	21
Oneida	203,636	18	18	50	26	16	0	1	1	3	3	14	6
Suffolk	197,355	15	15	38	33	7	1	10	0	28	0	3	2
Broome	165,749	28	8	66	51	11	0	46	0	6	1	41	3
Niagara	160,110	10	15	83	32	26	7	13	0	21	0	6	5
Orange	140,113	8	31	23	27	14	2	5	0	27	0	0	0
Chautauqua	123,580	3	2	31	2	12	3	4	2	0	1	0	1
Schenectady	122,494	11	6	59	25	13	1	4	29	9	4	10	2
Rensselaer	121,834	4	30	60	62	6	7	7	25	14	6	27	15
Dutchess	120,542	1	8	49	26	8	1	11	14	1	0	22	3
St. Lawrence	91,098	0	2	18	4	6	8	1	0	0	0	4	0
Ulster	87,017	5	0	19	6	4	0	5	0	0	0	6	0
Steuben	84,927	0	6	28	18	1	0	12	0	3	1	9	5
Jefferson	84,003	0	1	26	19	3	1	12	4	0	5	10	4
Rockland	74,261	6	3	13	9	0	1	2	1	6	0	1	2
Chemung	73,718	2	3	40	44	2	0	17	3	35	3	5	1
Cattaraugus	72,652	5	0	25	4	5	0	4	3	1	0	2	1
Oswego	71,275	7	5	48	14	11	1	11	16	2	0	11	1
Saratoga	65,606	3	1	36	29	1	1	6	16	0	3	19	7
Cayuga	65,508	1	1	21	7	1	0	1	4	0	0	5	2

[7] *Report of the Division of Probation*, New York State Department of Correction, (April–June, 1949).

Herkimer	59,527	2	11	9	27	0	0	1	3	1	1	14	11
Montgomery	59,142	5	0	30	9	0	2	12	1	0	1	6	2
Ontario	55,307	3	..	19	..	3	0	11	0	..	..	..	..
Clinton	54,006	2	2	28	10	0	0	7	15	1	0	8	1
Wayne	52,747	0	0	12	2	8	1	1	0	1	1	0	0
Fulton	48,597	1	1	7	14	1	0	0	0	5	0	9	0
Washington	46,727	0	1	18	3	4	4	0	5	0	0	3	0
Otsego	46,082	1	1	12	6	0	3	0	4	0	0	6	0
Genesee	44,481	2	0	13	5	2	1	0	4	0	0	4	1
Franklin	44,286	0	1	10	8	1	0	6	0	2	0	6	0
Tompkins	42,340	1	3	34	14	2	1	12	10	13	1	0	0
Columbia	41,464	5	0	20	6	6	6	1	2	0	1	5	0
Delaware	40,989	13	2	13	12	0	0	2	5	0	2	8	2
Allegany	39,681	0	0	14	8	5	0	1	0	3	0	2	3
Madison	39,598	4	0	31	3	3	1	7	16	1	0	2	0
Livingston	38,510	10	6	27	7	4	0	0	16	0	0	5	2
Sullivan	37,901	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chenango	36,454	3	3	22	10	4	1	4	2	0	0	7	3
Warren	36,035	1	1	11	4	1	0	5	1	0	0	4	0
Essex	34,178	3	7	10	8	1	0	1	1	0	1	7	0
Cortland	33,668	13	4	12	7	0	0	0	5	5	0	2	0
Wyoming	31,394	0	1	17	3	11	0	0	2	1	0	2	0
Greene	27,926	0	0	11	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
Orleans	27,760	0	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Tioga	27,072	6	2	9	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Seneca	25,732	0	0	10	1	1	0	4	0	0	0	1	0
Lewis	22,815	0	0	4	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0
Schoharie	20,812	0	1	11	11	0	0	8	1	0	2	6	3
Putnam	16,555	0	1	3	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0
Yates	16,381	0	1	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Schuyler	12,979	0	0	6	2	0	0	0	5	1	1	0	0
Hamilton	4,188	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total, except N. Y. City		404	311	1,995	1,109	425	121	370	297	298	55	610	146
Per cent		10.6	8.1	52.2	29.1	35.0	10.0	30.5	24 5	26.9	4.9	55.0	13.2
New York Dom. Rel. Child. Div.	7,454,995	337	56	1,715	120	1,098	195	0	387	0	1	0	119
Per cent		15.1	2.5	77.0	5.4	65.4	11.6	0	23.0	0	.8	0	99.2

proving and some few cities have attained an outstandingly high level of performance. This has come mainly through the dynamic leadership of capable chiefs of probation who have struggled to improve standards of selection, training, compensation, and performance. The N.P.P.A., to which we have referred, has also done a great deal in inducing the gradual improvement of probation throughout the country.

The theoretical problem is more difficult to answer. What should the content of good probation service include? This is a much disputed matter among those who are interested in the field. Probation authorities have generally discarded the conception of probation as merely judicial leniency, although many judges appear still to consider it that. Where case loads are huge, probation can be little more than judicial leniency in effect. The experts are also fairly uniform in denying that probation is a mere policing function to assure that the child conforms to the terms of the court's orders. This definition encourages the methods of ordering and forbidding. In reality, probation is very often of this latter character because of the limitations of time and talent in so many departments.

Disagreement as to function arises chiefly at the higher levels of aspiration. It is fairly generally maintained that probation should be a case-work process. Indeed, probation is sometimes defined today as "case work with authority." Leaders in the field have argued effectively and to the satisfaction of criminologists (if not to that of most private-agency social workers) that the use of authority is not inconsistent with effective case work. Yet the substance of this case work is a matter of dispute; whether its methods and objectives are identical with those of an ordinary child-welfare agency or family case-work agency, or whether they should be more limited and specialized because of the juvenile court framework. The prevailing view is that juvenile probation should operate pretty much like any other social agency specializing in case work with juveniles by attempting to work out their various social and psychological needs.

This broad view of probation is expressed officially in the Attorney General's *Survey of Release Procedures:* "Adequate probation supervision must deal with all phases of the offender's life, including his family and the community in which he lives. The physical and mental health, capacities, and limitations of the offender; his home and family; his leisure-time activities; his religious life; his education, vocational training, economic status, and industrial habits, as well as his capacity for discipline and self-control, must all be considered by those who are attempting to remold him into a worth-while citizen." To do this for a case load of 50, 75, or 100 children, in addition to investigations, extensive correspondence, case recording, and conferring with the judge on the cases, would require superhuman energy and skill.

According to a less popular but perhaps more realistic view, the probation officer's role should focus as specifically as possible on the issue that brings the child before the court: namely, his defective relationship to authority. The officer should leave to other social agencies in the community the more extensive task of family case work. Under this interpretation, attention should be mainly directed to re-educating the youngster toward conformity to the standards set by the state. Professor Nathaniel Cantor has expressed very well the difficulty and the goal in probation case work, as he sees it:

> A probation department which tries to serve as a health clinic, collection agency, vocational training bureau, family welfare society, employment agency, and legal aid society can no more function efficiently than can a psychiatrist who spends his time and effort in delivering groceries to his patient's home, preparing the dinner, washing the dishes and acting as governess to the children. The offender is not provided with a definite direction toward which he can move, or with a definite limited obstacle which he can strive to overcome.
>
> The probation officer represents in outer reality the negativisms, the hostility, and the resentment of the

> offender toward society. He symbolizes the negative side of the offender. The client can unload upon him the poison seeping through his system. The officer accepts this, but at the same time holds the man to his responsibility, that of meeting the conditions of probation. *Against that reality the offender must struggle until he realizes that it is himself he must overcome.*
>
> The probation worker defines the focus around which and the limits within which the struggle takes place. It is the limitation within which the offender finds himself, which disciplines him if he has the capacity and desire to develop. Thus only can he accept for himself a willingness to become sincerely law-abiding. The probation officer defines the situation and sets the conditions. That is his function. What the offender wants to do about it is *his* responsibility.[8]

Whether probation can or should perform the comprehensive tasks of family and psychiatric case work, it must be recognized that those departments that attempt something of the sort have been frustrated by the unlimited scope of the task. Other types of social agencies have tended to narrow, specialize, and define somewhat precisely their areas of service and the associated methods discovered to be effective to that service. In probation the trend has been, on the contrary, toward continuous and unlimited expansion of its efforts to serve. It appears desirable for probation to narrow down its role and techniques so as to accomplish its limited job more effectively, instead of attempting to give a little help to all youngsters whom chance may bring to children's court.

In a summary conclusion of the discussion of probation function, the following statement reflects the author's view on desirable directions of probation development:

[8] Nathaniel Cantor, "The Function of Probation," *National Probation Association Yearbook*, 1941, pp. 290, 297.

The modern children's and adolescent courts rest for their effectiveness on the shoulders of their probation departments. Probably more than any other single factor, the achievement of these courts depends on the quality of probation personnel. Professionalized probation implies several very significant roles:

1. The worker must attempt, after a child's delinquency has been shown, to discover so far as possible within the limits of contemporary sociological and psychological inference the symptom picture of the child's behavior, why he is a delinquent, and what caused his particular manifestations of behavior disorder. This may involve, of course, not only her own personal skills in social investigation and interpretation but ideally will incorporate the insights into psychological and physical deviation, too, as these bear upon the child's unadjustment.
2. From such investigation, examination, and diagnosis must come a plan of treatment, systematized according to the type of problem represented by the case and, beyond that, individualized so far as possible to meet the child's particular needs. As part of this phase of the officer's work there is a frequently tremendous and important task of assisting and educating judges who may be uninformed and even unsympathetic about the liberal treatment ideals of the juvenile court: Probation should help to direct the dispositions process if the service is professionalized and if investigation and diagnosis are skilled and accurate.
3. Most important of all, professionalized probation must concentrate its skills (a) to secure and extend the services from the supporting facilities of the psychiatric or guidance clinic, which many cases need badly and by which all cases should be observed at least briefly; (b) to apply defined and adapted case-work techniques in guiding the child

to an adjustment which will at the same time satisfy his needs and still come within the boundaries established by legal authority; (c) and, where intensive and persistent family case work is required to modify the environing situation of the child, to procure the help of specialized family case-work aid. Nothing less than all this can qualify as professionalized probation to remedy the delinquent's defective reactions to authority.

In light of what has just been said, it is quite probable that professionalization will come only if and when the court is serviced by an affiliated psychiatric clinic, staffed by competent medically and psychiatrically trained clinicians and by a full complement of psychiatric case workers, closely collaborating with the psychiatrists. To approximate ideal goals of competence, probation should, it seems, be translated eventually into psychiatric case work in an authoritarian setting. Much gain might accrue even from the abandonment of the term "probation officer" with its persisting connotations of surveillance, unskilled prying, and moralism. The status and craft training of the psychiatric case worker are already established in large measure. Though her skills and technique are undergoing rapid reformulation in the light of contemporary developments (growing particularly out of war experience in the speeding up of therapy and of delegation of functions from psychiatrists to case workers), the performance and promise of the work is very considerable in comparison with old manipulative methods of social-work treatment. It is appropriate that probation treatment should develop as a specialized authoritarian psychiatric case work, conducted under the supervision of psychiatric clinicians. The case workers may be known as "probation officers" but it appears that more could be gained quickly in professionalized status, salaries, and public recognition from an abandonment of old semantics along with the traditional inferior standards. The work of the

clinics of Dr. William Healy and Dr. Augustus Bronner evidence very well the need for and the potential accomplishments of this clinical approach.[9]

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS. Compared to other forms of correctional treatment of the juvenile, institutional custody is very old. Perhaps the earliest experiment of this sort was established at the Hospital of Saint Michael in Rome in 1704, where a hall was set aside "for the correction and instruction of profligate youth." London established a school for the children of adult convicts in 1788 and in 1852 founded the Kingswood Reformatory. Later English reformatories were modeled on the Mettray cottage plan that had been established in France in 1839. In the United States the first specialized institution for juveniles was the New York City House of Refuge, which was opened in 1825 because of the unfavorable results observed to flow from the confinement of youngsters in the city penitentiary. Several other municipal institutions for juvenile offenders developed during the following years, culminating in the establishment of state reformatories, first in Massachusetts in 1847 and quite rapidly elsewhere. By 1900, there were sixty-five reformatories in the United States. At the present time there are some 115 state institutions for juvenile delinquents, including federal and territorial facilities. These have not been marked by any consistent philosophy or design in their development.

Enthusiasm for the reformatory idea and experimentalism in its expression prompted the establishment of varied types of structure and method in different places. Especially characteristic, however, have been: (a) the emphasis upon rigid military discipline, (b) work training in agriculture or industry, and (c) general academic education. In general these institutions have fallen into two main structural forms: (a) the mass-congregate types where all are housed in one large, prison-like structure; and (b) the cottage type in which inmates are housed in relatively small, presumably homelike

[9] Paul W. Tappan, *Juvenile Delinquency* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949), pp. 336–338.

units. The State School for Boys at Lancaster, Ohio, established in 1856, was the first cottage-type institution in this country. As in many others established later, the "cottages" were much too large to provide any substantial advantages in treatment.

As in the case of probation and foster-home placement, institutional treatment for the delinquent has suffered from the uncritical enthusiasm of its advocates. Here was a device by which the youngster might easily be removed from the community where he was causing mischief and taught a lesson through a severe program of training. It was through the apparent failures of the institutional method that probation and foster homes, as well as a new philosophy and techniques of institutional training, were developed. Awareness has gradually developed that many types of youngsters ought not to be exposed unnecessarily to the regimen of the training school. For certain types, on the other hand, it is about the only method of treatment available. With the development of probation and agency care for juveniles, the relative frequency of institutional commitments has declined. The tables below reveal something of the extent to which institutional and other forms of treatment are being employed.

TABLE 14

Dependent and Neglected Children Cared for in Institutions and in Foster-family Homes in New York State in 1911 and 1942 [10]

Year	Grand total		In institutions		In foster-family homes			
					In boarding homes		In free, wage, or work homes	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
1911	48,797	100	33,901	69	3,783	8	11,113	23
1942	43,263	100	18,347	42	21,102	49	3,815	9

[10] Howard W. Hopkirk, *Institutions Serving Children* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1944), p. 38.

TABLE 15

Children Receiving Service from Public Institutions for Dependent and Neglected Children or for Delinquent Children in 36 States, Dec. 31, 1945 [11]

State	Total			Number of children receiving service from institutions for					
				Dependent and neglected children			Delinquent children		
	Total	Living in institution	Living outside institution	Total	Living in institution	Living outside institution	Total	Living in institution	Living outside institution
Total, 36 states	39,515	25,609	13,906	14,520	9,463	5,057	24,995	16,146	8,849
Alabama	743	743	...	....	...	....	743	743	
Alaska	...	.	...	...	...	....	..	.	....
Arkansas	401	240	161	22	10	12	379	230	149
Connecticut	1,380	913	467	562	497	65	818	416	402
District of Columbia	1,162	792	370	290	290	. .	872	502	370
Georgia	689	689	....	69	69	....	620	620	....
Hawaii	396	396	..	29	29	. ..	367	367	....
Idaho	166	166	..		.	...	166	166	. .
Illinois	1,170	1,167	3	276	273	3	894	894	....
Indiana	2,684	1,825	859	1,086	1,086		1,598	739	859
Iowa	1,565	982	583	981	529	452	584	453	131
Kansas	401	401	..	125	125	...	276	276	....
Kentucky	865	865		573	573	.. .	292	292	.. .
Louisiana	528	322	206	. .		....	528	322	206
Maine	494	338	156	38	38	....	456	300	156
Michigan	642	642		16	16	....	626	626	....
Minnesota	1,406	749	657	61	61	....	1,345	688	657
Mississippi	301	218	83	.		....	301	218	83
Montana	372	372	...	233	233	...	139	139	....
Nebraska	494	492	2	148	146	2	346	346	....
Nevada	62	62	...	42	42	....	20	20	....
New Hampshire	415	103	312	..		....	415	103	312
New York	3,894	1,402	2,492	159	144	15	3,735	1,258	2,477
North Carolina	866	866		40	40	...	826	826	....
North Dakota	286	157	129	..	..	.	286	157	129
Ohio	11,459	5,354	6,105	7,777	3,770	4,007	3,682	1,584	2,098
Oklahoma	912	824	88	465	440	25	447	384	63
Oregon	491	203	288	.	.		491	203	288
Pennsylvania	2,058	1,614	444	666	341	325	1,392	1,273	119
Puerto Rico	878	771	107	569	517	52	309	254	55
South Dakota	153	114	39	.	.. .	. .	153	114	39
Utah	357	225	132	....	....	....	357	225	132
Vermont	223	134	89	....	....	....	223	134	89
Virginia	631	631	.. .	....	....	....	631	631	....
West Virginia	709	709	....	161	161	....	548	548	....
Wyoming	262	128	134	132	33	99	130	95	35

[11] *Children Served by Public Welfare Agencies and Institutions, 1945*, U. S. Children's Bureau, Pub. No. 3, 1946.

Certain obvious disadvantages inhere in the use of juvenile training schools. It is difficult to remedy the problem of delinquency by throwing into continuous association large numbers of youngsters who share attitudes and habits of law violation. A situation is thus created in which the confirmation of antisocial attitudes may very naturally occur. This has been the experience, unfortunately. A considerable proportion of the youngsters leave institutions more thoroughly oriented toward delinquency than when they entered. According to various studies, from 65 to 85 per cent of individuals committed to state training schools fail to conform to the law after discharge. This results in part from several other faults of such institutions. One of their most prevalent characteristics is the employment of traditional punitive methods in dealing with children. Disciplinary measures are quite commonly more harsh in the large juvenile institutions than in state prisons for adults.

Less obviously deleterious, perhaps, is the danger of developing attitudes and habits of dependence as a part of the overorganized life of the training school. There is little in the usual program of the state institution to encourage patterns of maturity, responsibility, and self-determination. The overdisciplined military program of many juvenile training schools and adolescent reformatories, instead of producing the intended consequence of respect for authority, robs the youngster of the powers of normal thought, feeling, and volition. He may be well adjusted to the specific, narrow institutional regime but is often quite incapable of self-direction in a community of free and responsible citizens.

It has come to be recognized increasingly in recent years that certain qualities quite difficult to attain are needed in juvenile institutions to improve their effectiveness. From the point of view of the youngster's eventual postinstitutional adjustment, it is important that, when he is committed from the court, he should be prepared psychologically for the purpose and the nature of the experience before him. In this way, some of the excessive anxieties and hostilities produced at this time

may be alleviated. Ideally the program of the institution should be slanted toward preparation for release, so that from the very beginning it is made clear to the child that the purpose is not to punish him but to help him develop his capacity for adjustment in the community. Particularly as the time for his release approaches, both he and his home should be prepared for the transition in order to facilitate this difficult period. All of this implies a careful individualization of attention in order to understand and work through the peculiar difficulties of each child in the institution. However, most public training schools involve the mass association of hundreds of delinquents, many crowded beyond their theoretical capacity. Attention to the individual requirements of the delinquent is thus virtually impossible on any really meaningful level.

In a few well-supported private institutions, it is possible to work intensively with a small population under selective intake. In a cottage system approximating as closely as possible the conditions of family living, it is possible to provide the individual understanding and assistance necessary for reorganization of personality and attitudes. State facilities, however, are usually residual in function, taking those cases that cannot be cared for elsewhere. Masses of youngsters widely assorted as to age, ethnic traits, personality, offense, and mental and physical condition must be cared for cheaply under the narrow budgets that are provided. It is therefore little wonder that the treatment program is usually sterile. The state training school is characteristically a big, mass-congregate, under-staffed, and often poorly administered, disciplinary barracks where the principal necessity and sometimes the only real preoccupation is the enforcement of order.

In spite of these disadvantages inherent in the correctional institution, something must be said in their behalf. They do offer the rather negative virtue of providing a measure of temporary security to the community by taking the offender out of circulation. This is a largely self-defeating function, however, for the conditions of incarceration that maximize

security against escape also minimize the chances of preparing individuals for a responsible use of freedom. In a more positive sense, however, the well-equipped institution may make treatment much more consistent and specialized than is possible in the average community. When a youngster requires steady, close guidance by experts, usually only an institution can provide it. Psychological, case-work, and psychiatric resources may be more accessible there.

Moreover, if the nature of his own home is such that the child cannot be left there, he may find more growth and stimulation through the experience of a full program in a good institution than would be possible in a foster home placement. Since foster home resources often cannot be found for delinquent youngsters, there is rarely a real choice where the child's home is grossly deficient. In the exceptional situation, where the size of the institution is small and the staff is relatively large and well-trained, excellent results can be secured in individual and social training, along with clinical therapy. This is true particularly if there is careful classification of the youngsters into small cottages where attention can be individualized. This treatment implies so high a per-capita cost, however, that it is usually possible (under contemporary conditions of budgetary philosophy) only in the experimental programs of privately financed institutions.

It is generally agreed that certain types of individuals are particularly suited to institutional placement, rather than to some other form of treatment. According to Dr. Carl Rogers, these include:

1. A mental defective. (He should be sent in such instances to an institution specialized for defective delinquents, of course).
2. A badly spoiled child or a psychopath, whose history of misconduct is so serious or persistent as to indicate the necessity of securing the community and providing him with specialized and intensive treatment such an institution may pro-

vide. (Ideally this should be in a specialized type of institution too.)

3. A mature child or adolescent, especially one over twelve years of age who does not require the close attention and security that a foster home might provide.
4. One who has failed under prior treatment plans of other sorts. The institution appears to be best reserved as a method of last resort for those who have failed distinctly under plans of treatment in their own communities.[12]

EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT. A program of effective institutional treatment requires, as our criticisms have implied, a series of favorable circumstances to overcome the intrinsic handicaps in this approach to the delinquent. Careful *selection* and *classification* of the committed population are important at the start. We have already suggested the principles upon which the decision to segregate youngsters in institutions should be based. In practice, expedience and the views of a given judge are more likely to guide treatment determination. Improved decisions may be expected: (a) through more skillful guidance of dispositions; (b) through the more adequate investigations and diagnoses made by well-staffed probation departments in association with mental hygiene clinics; and (c) through the studies of reception and classification centers. Good classification of offenders for institutional experiences also implies careful diagnostic investigation. Beyond that—and much more difficult to secure—it requires that a variety of facilities and programs be available. Successful treatment of youngsters is based upon small and diversified institutions. These institutions should not in any case exceed a population of 250 and ideally should be considerably smaller, particularly where they are attempting to perform individualized treatment.

[12] Carl R. Rogers, *Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1939).

More effective results can be secured with normal children through the wider employment of small cottage institutions and camps. A cottage plan should keep the number of children in any single unit as much under twenty-five as possible; ten or a dozen represent an ideal in which cottage parents may give to each youngster something of the understanding and warmth that he needs. This practice also increases the possibility of carefully classifying a youngster into the sort of group best meeting his needs in terms of maturity, intelligence, personality, size, and conduct problems. It permits the development of elastic and experimental efforts to improve the treatment process. Minimum security facilities for the child and adolescent, such as the camp plan, have been successfully employed for a number of years in the English Borstal and Approved School systems for adolescents and juveniles. Camps have been developing recently in California, Wisconsin, New Jersey, and under the Federal Bureau of Prisons, where they show great promise for rehabilitation. Unlike the traditional reformatory, they stress freedom and responsibility and provide full programs of constructive activities that can give the boy a sense of his worth.

A further problem of institutional diversification is the provision of special treatment facilities for types of individuals who receive too little of the attention they need in the mass-congregate type of training school. A considerable proportion of committed delinquents display some fairly marked degree of emotional disturbance needing treatment. Some authorities have estimated this proportion at 40 per cent or more. Usually there is no special help available unless and until they become psychotic. For this group and for youngsters who are intellectually dull but not commitable as feeble-minded, specialized resources are needed. Special facilities should also be provided for minor offenders of normal personality who cannot be left in their communities and (ideally) for individuals with special abilities or high intelligence. So long as we continue to handle all delinquents alike, with very little real

treatment of any of them, we must anticipate persisting failures.

A further significant aspect of good institutional programs is the employment of personnel adequate in number, personality-qualifications, and training. Even with the best possible plant and budget, effective results cannot be secured without skilled workers. Most important, aside from the administrative head, are the cottage parents or supervisory officers who are in closest and most continuous association with the children. Inadequate individuals have characteristically been employed for this role, since their jobs have carried poor status and salary, and their work has been considered merely custodial and domestic. With the development of training for this occupation and with more careful selection and adequate compensation for the workers, a great change may be wrought in institutional performance. It is desirable, so far as may be possible, to obtain the services of psychiatrists, psychologists, case workers, group therapists, and other "treatment experts." A modicum of such clinical facilities cannot possibly assure successful treatment, however, since most of these limited resources are devoted to diagnostic efforts. The establishment of a clinical orientation by a small group of specialists is doomed to failure if the supervisory personnel are unsuited for and untrained to their vital function of understanding, guiding, encouraging, training, and loving their youngsters.

The institutional training of the child may well be considered as essentially a process in re-education, in which all staff members are concerned with a task primarily educational, and in which each is interested in the development of the whole child rather than merely in some specialized phase of his personality or intelligence. This has been very well expressed in a publication of the U. S. Office of Education:

> If the purpose of the school is the education and adjustment of youth, then everything the school does

must contribute to that dominant purpose. . . . It should be remembered that "education" is not confined to classroom work and vocational assignments. Life in the cottage, on the campus, in the assembly, or church service should be just as truly an educational experience as the narrower confines of schoolwork, and everyone who has supervisory responsibilities over the boy in any of these other areas is by virtue of that fact an "educator" with an important contribution to make to the total program.

A twenty-four-hour-day educational service is what the residential school has to give. Cottage mothers and fathers, workmen on the farm and in the shops, nurse, physician, placement supervisors, psychologist, teachers, and administrative officers must work together in analyzing their common objectives and in determining how each one can make his own service count most toward these ends. . . .

What, for example, do the boy's teachers know of his "home" life and problems in the cottage? To what extent do they utilize his experiences there as the basis for classroom consideration of social relationships, of home conversation, of household mechanics, of health and nutrition, of leisure-time activities, of household budgeting, and of innumerable other everyday problems vital to the boy's present and later adjustment? What do the cottage supervisors know of the boy's school activities, his work on the farm and in the shop, his need for special help or a quiet time for reading and study? What can the academic teachers learn from the boy's vocational activities as to his interests and capacities? What should vocational teachers know about his academic work?

Every youth is a unitary being and every part of him goes to school, works on a vocational assignment, and lives in the cottage. Each activity he carries on is an influence contributing to his ultimate adjustment—or the lack of it. No person who deals

> with him can think of his own responsibility as standing apart—isolated from the rest. Every person must be willing to try to understand the whole boy, the whole girl, and to see his own responsibility for their welfare in relation to the work that everybody else does. Only thus can the pattern of the school's effort to rehabilitate the boy or girl be closely interwoven and well integrated, and only as such integration exists can one expect productive results.[13]

Finally, the importance of release from the institution must be stressed. The purpose of segregation is to train for life outside rather than within institutions. Preparing the individual for responsibilities and respect for authority in the community is essential, therefore, throughout the period of training. This process can often be aided greatly by devices to give the children greater freedom before release, including visits home, recreation and perhaps educational classes in the community near the institution. Equally important in preparing the child for his release is preparing the family and community to receive him. This matter often calls for considerable family case-work efforts prior to release. It may be performed by an institutional social worker or parole officer, with the assistance of agencies in the home community.

This section on institutional treatment may be concluded with the summary suggestions of one authority, who conceives the training function as one primarily of preparation for release:

1. First and foremost we need a temperamentally fitted, emotionally balanced, mature, sympathetic, cultured, technically trained, and decently paid staff.
2. A reasonable case load must be maintained.
3. Within the institution some form of self-governernment is needed to encourage the children to

[13] Quoted in Christine P. Ingram et al., *Education in Training Schools for Delinquent Youth*, Bull. 1945, No. 5, U. S. Office of Education, from an unpublished report of a residential school survey by the U. S. Office of Education.

become cooperative members of the institutional community and to prepare them to become useful citizens following their release.

4. Within the institution methods of classification and treatment should be based upon as complete knowledge as possible of the child, his home, and his environment.
5. A sufficiently ample maintenance staff should be provided at the training school so that children may not be used unnecessarily for purely maintenance work at times when their particular needs require that they be provided with education, vocational training, recreation, and opportunity for developing hobbies and new interests of a wholesome nature.
6. The training school through its parole officers as well as through members of its immediate staff should have constant cordial relationships with the community in order to interpret the work which it is doing and to enlist the community's cooperation.
7. The parole staff must work in close harmony with the institution by attending case conferences and classification meetings, by conferring with members of the institution staff, and by consulting the records at the school.
8. The parole officer must come to know the prospective parolee and must have worked out with him plans for his adjustment outside.
9. The parole officer must have a thorough understanding of the family, its assets, its liabilities, its pressing problems, and the pertinent factors in the immediate neighborhood.
10. The parole officer should attempt to prepare the home and the neighborhood for the child's homecoming.
11. A system of gradual release from the institution by means of vacation period and by other methods is very desirable.
12. If it is necessary to place the child in a foster

home one should be found which meets the particular needs of the child.

13. While on parole, the child should be seen as frequently as his particular situation demands, practically every day at first, with a gradual tapering off until he is ready for discharge. Whenever a situation arises which makes it necessary, contacts should be increased.
14. A goal not merely of automatic discharge at twenty-one years of age but of honorable discharge prior to that time for exceptionally good behavior and for cooperation with the parole department is very effective.
15. A case record system which gives a complete social history, a summary of medical, psychological, and psychiatric findings, and a record of the child's behavior, vocational training, academic education, interests and hobbies while in the institution is essential.
16. But above all no system or method will be effective no matter how well planned unless there is a well-qualified parole personnel, selected not on the basis of politics, favoritism, special preference, race, or religion, but on the basis of sympathetic understanding, intelligence, ability, education, specialized training, and an integrated personality.[14]

DELINQUENCY PREVENTION. At the present stage of our knowledge in the social and behavior sciences, it is difficult to suggest a program of prophylactic methods designed to prevent delinquency and crime, as distinct from other types of social problems. As we have seen, influences that appear to promote law-violative behavior may conduce as well to other types of deviation. Remedial measures will presumably not operate narrowly to diminish one single form of nonsocial or antisocial expression.

[14] E. Borenstein, "Release of the Child from the Institution," *National Probation Association Yearbook*, 1940, pp. 65–67.

Social disorganization is inherent in contemporary society. There appears little likelihood of wiping out any preponderance of our social problems within the framework of our civilization. It is doubtful if we can even provide sufficient counteracting influences of a preventive and therapeutic nature to decrease significantly the effect of a highly complicated, dynamic, conflicted society, with its heterogeneous and mobile peoples. Social change which produces greater integration and simplification may, to be sure, involve by-products of increasing personality stabilization and thus decrease maladjustments. But such changes are not deliberately undertaken by societies. Many such temporary influences in national and international groups have been produced indirectly through war and other tragic crises. In general, efforts to mitigate society's problems have been only partial devices applied because of obvious emergencies to cases already marked by unadjustment. In part, this ensues from our ignorance of the specific causal dynamics of social problems. In part, it also reflects our materialistic cultural orientation and our cavalier attitude toward society's "rejects," who cannot make their way in a stringently competitive ethos.

There is some evidence that the considerable proportion of the population displaying pathological responses to the intensified pressures of society is provoking apprehension and some remedial efforts of a stop-gap character. Both state and community agencies of many sorts are coming to focus greater attention upon the physical, psychological, and group disorders of man. Up to the present, however, the emergencies develop far more rapidly than the alleviators. Within the limitations of space available here, it is not proposed to consider the numerous approaches that are being made to the prevention of social problems generally, or even of delinquency in particular. Comment will merely be made upon a few of the apparently significant areas of effort.

Aside from improbable efforts to manipulate the total culture, the deepest level of penetration that we can attain in

preventive efforts must involve intensive work on and through the family. Much of human pathology develops in the interpersonal relationships within the home. This is not to say that ultimate responsibility for our disorders rests with the family, as one might be led to conclude from some writings. The members of the individual family bring to it and perpetuate through it the powerful molding influences and conflicts of the culture, the community, and secondary group life. Nevertheless, the family plays so central a role in instrumenting the values that originate outside that corrective efforts may be applied most effectively in the home. Better-integrated children with a healthier orientation to social reality and authority must be bred by parents who, themselves more adequately adjusted, are suited to the difficult task of nurturing wholesome personality development. Parents cannot lift themselves by the bootstraps of their aspirations to better parenthood. But they can be helped by such various devices as counseling, case work, and education, which provide, in effect, remedial treatment for their own deficiencies. Improved parenthood will make for better childhood development and, in turn, still better parenthood. Disorganizing influences tend to develop the cycle in the opposite direction. More than anything else, the youngster needs to draw from his family the emotional security and maturity upon which effective life adjustments are based. These do not come from insecure, immature, and confused parents.

Next to the home and working to a great extent through it, the school must develop preventive efforts against delinquency and other unadjustments. This is not so much because of the teacher's potential role as therapist, for it is unlikely that public school teachers can perform any considerable role in treating the potential delinquent. However, the school is the one social institution outside the home to which all children are exposed over an extended period and in situations where their subjective difficulties are likely to appear. Ideally, the school could perform a very significant function in case finding and

referral of youngsters who display the danger signals of unhappiness, insecurity, excessive aggression or withdrawal, and other pathogenic traits.

Truancy is one of the common symptoms of unadjustment that leads into delinquency. Truancy often indicates specific dislike of school and/or a more general personality problem of poor adjustment to social reality. It is doubtful if the problem is as commonly a consequence of the inadequacies of the school curriculum as some authorities have inferred, however. Mass education will never be perfectly suited to the individual requirements of all children. This does not mean that childrens' educational experience cannot and should not be better motivated. It is an over-simplification, however, to hold that a mere change in school curricula can significantly reduce the dislike of school or the accompanying delinquency. Considerably more important would be the improvement in selection and training of teachers so that they may discern the evidences of unadjustment among their students and see that assistance is provided before youngsters are thoroughly disorganized.

Children who are much disturbed require more specialized help than parent or school can give. The American community recognizes that mental hygiene, case work, and other child-welfare resources are essential to mitigate and deflect undesirable trends in personality development. Furthermore, experience proves the increasing costs of caring for the more severely disturbed who have not received help in proper time. Nevertheless, we still persist in a pattern of niggardly provisions for early curative treatment. The nation's wealthiest, most populous, and clinically minded city provides too thin a trickle of psychiatric and psychological services, even for the emergency cases of utterly distraught personalities, juvenile or adult. We wait until the offender is habitual, disorders are chronic, and pathologies systematic before we offer a minimum of alleviation.

We therefore need desperately the large-scale extension of child guidance and case-work facilities to provide treatment

when personality and social problems are in their incipience. We need the co-ordination of community resources, improved case findings, and carefully selective referral practices in order to assure that youngsters who need specialized clinical assistance may be brought under the services of agencies equipped to provide it. Our market-basket philanthrophy, our barren institutional custody, our minimal court supervision, and our sporadic and spotty agency facilities are not the answer to delinquency prevention. So long as the state and the community maintain the position that their role is simply to provide residual facilities for the remains of private philanthropy, we shall deal ineffectually with the great masses of rejects who do not fit into the standards of agency intake.

In conclusion, the question must be raised again as to the utility for delinquency prevention of the simple and popular devices that are often proposed to deal with the problem. Some of these measures are justified in their own right but have little if any perceptible relation to delinquency prevention. It is most unhealthy to delude ourselves that, by some inexpensive method of mass treatment, we are going to resolve any social problem that is difficult and deep. Thus large-scale recreational enterprises, so enthusiastically subscribed to in our police juvenile bureaus and elsewhere, provide a relatively cheap and quick "group therapy" that accords nicely with our cultural myths about sportsmanship and character. However desirable the development of leisure-time facilities as such may be, we should disabuse ourselves of the notion that this approach can go to the roots of delinquency and crime. Similarly, measures of repression and censorship, so appealing to our Puritan conscience, cannot be relied upon either to build or retrain the character structure of potential delinquents. The prevention and treatment of delinquency depends upon close interpersonal relationships in which the child's personality responds to understanding, warmth, and guidance. Where the parent cannot give these relationships, they may be supplied by teacher, case worker, spiritual leader,

or friend. But these vital contacts will not come from mass enterprises, however well-intended they may be.

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Part Four

PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY

by Francis E. Merrill

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Problems of the Changing Family

THE NATURE OF FAMILY PROBLEMS. [1] The American family is not what it used to be. This simple statement sums up, in effect, the problem of the modern family. The family is the central institution of our society and current changes in its structure, functions, and roles are profoundly disturbing to the average person. The family embodies social values that are deeply incorporated in the personality of the individual. A presumed threat to this central relationship is thus defined as a threat to the integrity of the individual. The latter worries about the alleged decline of the family as it has been known in our society for hundreds of years. Changes in the family therefore constitute a social problem of the first magnitude. This problem takes a variety of forms but, in the last analysis, it arises from the fact that the family is not what it used to be.

Let us examine this statement in more detail. In the frame-

[1] The following does not purport to be in any sense a complete discussion of the American family. The treatment merely deals with some of the representative areas of family relationships currently defined as social problems. For a brief and penetrating statement of the family in process of change, see Ernest W. Burgess, "The Family in a Changing Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, 53:417–422 (May, 1948).

work of social problems, it means that many persons are acting in ways which threaten basic social values connected with the family. The resultant situation, while undesirable, is still considered possible of solution by the average "expert" on the family—whose numbers run, incidentally, to some one hundred and fifty million persons in the United States alone. The three constituent elements of the social problem are thus present in connection with the family: (a) a situation involving large numbers of persons; (b) a central value or values believed threatened thereby; and (c) a belief, more or less well-founded, that appropriate social action can eliminate, or at least mitigate, the discrepancy between the behavior and the value.

The family behavior considered unfortunate or undesirable takes a variety of forms, depending upon the values held most important by different groups. Certain aspects of family behavior are almost universally viewed as problem behavior, however, although groups may differ concerning the possible steps to eliminate them. Among these acknowledged problem elements of a family behavior are: (a) the smaller size of the family; (b) the decrease in close family ties; (c) the loss of many of the things the family used to do; (d) the conflicts between members of the family; (e) the mobility of the family; (f) the increasing number of married women working outside the home; (g) the growing differences between parents and children; and, above all, (h) the increase in the number of families broken by divorce. Other aspects of family behavior concern other groups, but these represent behavior considered undesirable by the great majority of persons, regardless of class, religion, or background.

The above behavior runs counter to the social values centered in the family, values by which behavior is widely judged. These values arose during the long centuries when the family was largely rural or small-town in character; when families were large; when the interests uniting the members reflected a similarity of experience; when the family performed a variety of basic institutional functions; when the statuses and roles

of the members were clearly defined and widely accepted; when most married women (and, indeed, most women) worked exclusively in the home; and, finally, when marriage was a relationship ordinarily terminated only by death. This cluster of value-judgments constitutes the basic criteria by which the contemporary family is judged. The present reality does not measure up to the values in a variety of respects and the resulting situation thus constitutes a social problem. The most important single aspect of that problem is the presence of large-scale divorce. As we shall see, divorce is the symbol of the social problem of the modern American family.

The final element in the pattern of a social problem is the possible social action to change the undesirable condition. Here the situation becomes more complex. Some persons are convinced that the solution to the problem of the family lies in an increase in organized religion. Others believe that the fault lies with the legal structure and hence would tighten the divorce laws so that it would be difficult, if not virtually impossible, to break the family relationship in this way. Still others are sure that the difficulty stems from the increased economic independence of women and hence, in some unspecified fashion, would drastically decrease the employment of married women. A mass return to the farm also has its exponents as a solution to the family problem, a solution whereby millions of families would be induced or compelled to leave the cities, go back on the land, and resume the idyllic rural family life of a century ago. Finally, others would act more modestly by attempting to educate men and women for marriage; by furnishing them with expert advice after they have married; and by establishing general social conditions (such as family welfare provisions) so that the family could function more adequately in an industrial, urban, and dynamic social setting.

The problem of the contemporary family is thus complex. It involves the whole of a changing society, many of whose aspects are judged in terms of value-judgments evolved in an earlier and simpler society. Persons who wish to revive the

family of colonial or pioneer days are thus doomed to frustration, because they are attempting to apply a rigid set of past values to a social situation that has drastically and permanently changed. The modern family is still defined by the majority of persons as (in part, at least) an undesirable departure from an ideal pattern existing at some indeterminate time in the past. This disparity, as we have noted, constitutes the social problem.

In certain respects, however, the values themselves are also changing. The employment of unmarried women is no longer considered a social problem, and the employment of married women is not considered the problem it formerly was. Even the attitudes toward the indissolubility of marriage are slowly changing, as the experience with divorce becomes increasingly widespread. A new family is therefore emerging, out of the changing pattern of the old. The individual family members are members of a society that is changing with more rapidity than any society in history. Each person must perforce adapt his behavior to the immediate situation, even if thereby he violates one or more traditional values. The new family will thus retain and intensify certain of the former functions, with affection and child-rearing increasing in relative importance. The new family will continue to relinquish many of the economic, recreational, protective, and related functions which it formerly performed. The new family will be smaller in size, with fewer children and marginal members, such as grandparents, maiden aunts, and the like. The new family will be more unstable than the ideal family of the past, based as it is upon the ephemeral bonds of personal affection. New values will slowly arise to justify and sanction this new family. When (and if) that process occurs and the new family pattern is more completely stabilized, family behavior and its defining values will be more closely in accord. The social problem of the family may then no longer be so important.

TRENDS IN FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS. In any discussion of social problems, the first task is to find the facts. In a field as broad and controversial as the family, misconceptions, mis-

understandings, and plain ignorance are common, and even a rudimentary knowledge of the factual basis of family problems is often conspicuous by its absence. We may consider briefly, therefore, some of the aspects of the changing family which are known with reasonable accuracy and upon which our subsequent discussion of family problems may be based.

1. *Definition of the Family.* The first consideration is a working definition of the family. We shall take that employed by the Bureau of the Census and used in their most recent compilations, inasmuch as most of the national data on the family derive from this source. The family, then, is "a group of two or more persons living together and related by blood; all persons residing together and related to each other are regarded as one family. The number in the entire group of relatives currently living together is referred to as the 'size of the family'." [2]

2. *Number of Families.* The number of social units answering to the above definition on April 1, 1949, was 38,537,000. This represented an increase in the number of families from 32,166,000 in 1940 and 36,240,000 in 1947. The figure for April 1, 1949, included an estimated 35,323,000 married couples (defined as husband and wife living together, with or without children), whereas the balance of the 38,537,000 families comprised groups where the husband or wife was dead, divorced, separated, or otherwise absent.[3]

3. *Proportion in Families.* The family relationship is more popular in this country than ever before. A larger proportion of Americans of marriageable age (fourteen years and over) are now married than ever before. On April 1, 1949, an estimated 66.1 per cent of all females fourteen years of age and over were married, as compared to 59.5 per cent in 1940. The period from 1940 to 1949 produced several million "extra"

[2] *The American Family: A Factual Background*, Report of Inter-Agency Committee on Background Materials, National Conference on Family Life, Washington, May, 1948, p. 5.

[3] Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics, *Changes in Number of Households and in Marital Status: 1940 to 1949*, Series P-20, No. 25 (August 19, 1949).

marriages (in terms of normal expectancy). Even discounting the million or more "extra" divorces (measured by the same criterion) in this period, the war and postwar years tremendously increased the proportion of married persons in the population. Even without the unusual economic and psychological conditions of these years, however, the proportion of the population that is married has steadily increased since statistics on marital status were first compiled in 1890. Many persons pessimistically view the family relationship as a disappearing way of life. These figures do not bear out this gloomy assumption.[4]

4. *Size of Families.* The size of the family has steadily decreased since the founding of the country as an independent nation. In 1790, the average (mean) size of the household [5] was 5.7 persons; in 1890, it had declined to 4.9; by 1940, it had declined still further to 3.8; and by 1947, it had reached 3.6 persons. This decline in family size reflects many factors in the changing social structure, but it primarily reflects the declining birth rate. A discussion of the factors leading to this situation would lead us too far afield; suffice it to indicate that the smaller family is defined as a threat to the traditional values and hence is widely considered to be a social problem.

5. *Residence of Families.* The 36,240,000 families in the United States on April 1, 1947, were distributed as follows: 63.6 per cent were listed as urban (i.e., living in communities over 2,500 population); 18.8 per cent were listed as rural-nonfarm (i.e., living outside of cities but not on farms); and 17.7 per cent were rural-farm (i.e., living on farms).[6] An exact comparison with an earlier generation is impossible, but a rough comparison may be found in the fact that the 1870 Census listed 25.7 per cent of the population as urban and

[4] Ibid.

[5] The household is defined as "the entire group of persons who occupy a house, an apartment, or other group of rooms, or a room that constitutes a dwelling unit. . . . It includes the related family members and also unrelated persons, if any. . . ." Ibid., p. 5. Figures based on historical trends are in terms of households, rather than families, since data on the latter are not available.

[6] Ibid., Table 4.

74.3 per cent as rural. Many of the characteristics of the modern family which conflict most seriously with the traditional values reflect, directly or indirectly, this massive change from rural to urban residence. Hence this shift itself—and the attendant repercussions—constitutes a social problem for the nostalgic lovers of the old family.

6. *Mobility of Families.* The traditional family values were centered about a stable home, preferably one in which the family lived for several generations and where the family status was fixed by the primary community. The members of the family gained much of their social identity from the stability of their family life. The social control exerted by the community operates more effectively when the family is physically stable. Hence social mobility is defined as a social problem, both by itself and because it leads to other problems. The mobility of the American family in recent years is proverbial. In the period from 1940 to 1947, some 56 per cent of all the heads of households moved at least once, thereby cutting to a greater or lesser extent the ties binding the family to the local community.[7]

7. *Gainful Employment of Married Women.* On April 1, 1947, an estimated 6,700,000 married women were gainfully employed outside the home. This figure represented approximately 20 per cent of all married women living with their husbands and suggests the extent to which the role of the wife has changed.[8] Much of this change is in the direction of greater independence, a trend defined by many persons as constituting a social problem in itself. In 1900, only 5.6 per cent of all married women were gainfully employed.[9] This trend is another indication of the modification of the family away from the "ideal" family type, which presumably existed a century or more ago. The added independence of women is widely be-

[7] Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 11.

[8] Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Population Characteristics, *Characteristics of Single, Married, Widowed, and Divorced Persons in 1947*, Series P-20, No. 10, Table 9 (February 6, 1948).

[9] Frieda S. Miller, "Women in the Labor Force," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 251:35–43 (May, 1947).

lieved to constitute an important reason for the increase in divorce and hence is contributory to an even more serious social problem.

8. *Separation and Family Disorganization.* Another changing trend in family relationships involves the extent to which this institution is broken by the deliberate decision of the principal participants. As we shall see, divorce is the principal popular symbol for this deliberate rupture of family ties—as distinguished from their involuntary dissolution by death. But large numbers of marriages are annually broken by even more informal means through separation. Many of these broken unions (perhaps 50 per cent) are never reunited. The extent of separation is not known exactly, but in 1947 an estimated 1,754,000 married women were not living with their husbands.[10] For religious, financial, or other considerations, many of these families refrain from divorce. But the family is nevertheless, in many cases, broken as completely and permanently by separation as if divorce had actually occurred.

9. *Divorce and Family Disorganization.* Divorce is the symbol of family disorganization. So complete is this focus of public attention on divorce that we shall consider it in detail below. We shall merely indicate here the extent of this formal, legal rupture of the family relationship. In 1948, an estimated 405,000 divorces occurred, with a rate of 2.8 per 1,000 of the population. This represents a substantial decline from the all-time high figure of 610,000 for 1946 and the accompanying rate of 4.3 per 1,000 population.[11] But the number and the rate for 1948 are still among the highest in history. The disorganization of the family through divorce is the central aspect of the social problem of the family.

THE CHANGING SOCIAL CONTEXT. Social problems should be viewed in their changing social setting. The problems of the

[10] Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Population Characteristics, *Characteristics of Single, Married, Widowed, and Divorced Persons in 1947*, op. cit., Table 1.

[11] Federal Security Agency, National Office of Vital Statistics, Vital Statistics-Special Reports, *Provisional Marriage and Divorce Statistics: United States 1948*, Volume 31, No. 16 (November 4, 1949), Table 9.

modern family are no exception, even though a complete exposition of this setting would involve a social history. We may therefore sketch in with very broad strokes some of the general social trends that have affected the family in recent decades. In keeping with our purpose of presenting the problem aspects of the family, we shall stress those forms of social change defined as injurious to the traditional values.

1. *Industrialization.* The Industrial Revolution changed the economic foundations of the family, diverted the gainful activities from the home to the shop and factory, and modified the internal relationships within the family. These social changes have been perhaps more instrumental than any other single group of factors in changing the social context of the family. Most of these changes are regarded as constituting problem situations, inasmuch as the ideal type is the multifunctional family of the farm or small town. The individual who looks wistfully to the preindustrial family (and considers any departure therefrom as undesirable) is not always aware of the nature of his value-judgments. He would find it difficult to suggest a feasible way out of the dilemma, short of a complete return to the preindustrial world, with its large and solid family. The general trend, however, is widely considered as undesirable for the family and productive of many problems.

2. *Urbanization.* We have noted some of the changes from a rural to an urban setting for the family. This trend, of course, directly reflects the industrialization of the Western world, whereby millions of families are now concentrated in the urban and metropolitan areas. This trend has affected the family in a number of ways. Housing has changed from an environment where there was plenty of room for children, adults, the aged, and the sick to one of small apartments, where space is at a premium. Home ownership is decreasing, as the family moves from the farm and small town to the metropolitan area. The family no longer has an emotional identification with a permanently owned home that it once had.

The family in the urban setting, furthermore, is not constrained by many of the primary controls that characterize

the rural area and small town. Summarizing some of the nation-wide effects of urbanization upon the family, Burgess points out that: "Urbanization . . . includes commercialization of activities, particularly recreational; specialization of vocations and interests; the development of new devices of communication. . . . All these still further promote the urbanization and secularization of families residing not only in cities but even in remote rural settlements." [12] These urban trends are defined as a threat to social values that were once a part of the family pattern. Hence increasing urbanization is widely defined as a social problem in itself, besides giving rise to many related problems.

3. *Secularization.* As a consequence of industrialization and urbanization, modern society is becoming increasingly secularized. The traditional patterns of a stable society are replaced by those of an unstable and dynamic society. In the older and more "sacred" society, marriage was indissoluble, religious values were predominant, and the family was thought to be divinely ordained. Under such conditions, a relationship instituted by God could not be put aside by man. Without expressly denying the sacred character of the family, a secular modern society tacitly assumes that marriage is made for man, not man for marriage.

Accordingly, when marriage ceases to be satisfactory for the individual partners—for whatever reason or combination of reasons—there is a strong assumption that the relationship should be terminated. The *institutional* aspects of marriage and the family that were once part of the value-structure of a sacred society are gradually being replaced by the *companionship* aspects. The husband and wife accordingly evaluate their marriage in terms of the personal happiness which they can derive therefrom. This attitude, needless to say, is considered inimical to the values of the permanent and institutional family. Hence the trend toward secularization is also defined as part of the larger social problem of the family.

4. *Freedom.* An industrialized, urbanized, and secularized

[12] Ernest W. Burgess, op. cit., p. 419.

society is one in which personal freedom becomes more important than traditional restraints. The young girl who is gainfully employed prior to marriage has experienced such a heady taste of personal freedom as her great-grandmother never dreamed of. The young man who leaves the farm or the small town to seek his fortune in the city has likewise experienced an expansion of his personal horizon that would ordinarily have been impossible for his great-grandfather. This freedom is extended into many more fields than the mere choice of occupation. Freedom of personal behavior, sexual relations, and marital choice are other fields where the individual may find emancipation. Applied to marriage and the family, this new freedom means that the individual can marry on the basis of personal choice, instead of having his or her mate chosen on the basis of family, religious, or property considerations. This emancipation has given freedom and flexibility to the family and the individual's relationships to it. The traditional family values were fundamentally opposed to any such freedom. The family was, on the contrary, a permanent and relatively inflexible relationship. The introduction of personal freedom into this rigid pattern is widely viewed with suspicion.

5. *Social Disorganization.* The society which we have broadly described is one characterized by social disorganization. Social disorganization involves the literal breakdown of the social group, whereby the relationships holding people together become weakened and broken. The ties of the primary group are erected upon the slow, steady accretions of a stable society, where each generation transmits the cultural heritage to the next and where the experience of the new generation closely parallels that of the old. In our own society, group relationships are subjected to the stresses and strains of the constant changes in behavior of the individual members. The latter must respond to new and unprecedented situations in ways not anticipated by the mores. The stability of a social group rests in the intangible but vital relationships between its members. When these relationships are broken, society is, to

that extent, disorganized. The family group is vulnerable to the social disorganization of our day. Bereft of many of its former unifying functions, the family is more easily broken now than ever before.

CHANGING FUNCTIONS OF THE FAMILY. The central problem of the family is thus the fact that it is changing. More precisely, the problem arises from the fact that family behavior is changing more rapidly than the social values which define it. We shall consider family behavior from two points of view: (a) its functions as a social institution; and (b) the roles of its members. The functions of an institution refer to the things it does, the activities of its members in their institutional capacity. The roles of an institution refer to the parts which the members play by virtue of their status in the institution.

1. *Economic Function.* The economic function of the family was established in the agricultural society which was the basic way of life in the early days of this country. As one authority puts it, "The prevailing ideas and attitudes held by both men and women regarding the position and sphere of women in society and the proper organization and activities of the family and the home are largely the products of the economic and social arrangements that prevailed prior to the industrial revolution, when society was organized primarily around the home as the producing unit. . . ." [13] During this period, the family performed the economic functions of production and consumption more completely than any other single institution. The family was the central agency both for the growing, processing, and fabrication of goods and for their ultimate consumption as well. Some 17.7 per cent of all families are still rural-farm and continue to carry on many of the traditional productive functions. Most of these functions, however, have been shifted to other agencies and the family has ceased to be a major productive force.

The family is still the central unit for the consumption of many forms of goods and services. Most of these commodities

[13] Viva Boothe, "Gainfully Employed Women in the Family," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 160:75–85 (March, 1932).

are now made outside the home and the family buys what it can with its monetary income. Hence the amount and fluctuations of the cash income become the central economic fact for the family. The median income of nonfarm families was $1,389 in 1939; it rose to $2,697 in 1944; and reached a high point of $3,010 in 1946.[14] In the latter year, the consumer's dollar was spent as follows: 10.4 cents went for durable commodities (automobiles, household appliances); 60.6 cents for nondurable commodities (mainly food and clothes); and 29.0 cents for services (mainly expenditures for household operation). This division was slightly modified in subsequent postwar years when various consumer durable goods were in greater supply. In these later years, the expenditures for durable goods went up; the percentage for services went down; and the percentage for food and clothing remained approximately the same.[15]

2. *Educational Function.* The family was formerly the central agency for transmitting the social heritage from one generation to the next, through the process broadly known as education. The child is still "educated" by the family in his early years, but after he reaches school age this function is largely taken over by the school. As society has become more complex, the knowledge and skills necessary for the individual to make his way have increased correspondingly in complexity. The family no longer has either the knowledge or the facilities to transmit the complicated cultural heritage of the modern day. As a result, "more people at more different age levels, in all racial groups, in all residential areas and of every economic status are getting more education than ever before. . . ." [16] This shift in educational function from the family to the school is considered by the majority as a desirable trend and not a social problem. The democratic creed endorses public education and encourages the participation of all persons therein.

[14] See Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Consumer Income, *Income of the Nonfarm Population: 1946*, Series P-60, No. 3 (June 3, 1948).

[15] *The American Family: A Factual Background*, op. cit., p. 5.

[16] Ibid., p. 133.

Formal education has also assumed many functions even more closely related to the family. Family-life education has been defined as "that part of a total program of functional education which equips individuals for effective membership in the family, so that each contributes to home and community life according to his capacity." [17] Included in this category are such varied activities as "the programs for parents originally called mothercraft and then child study or parent education; homemaking education for children, youth and adults; programs of marriage counseling, social hygiene, and mental hygiene; courses in marriage and family living now being given in many colleges." [18] A wide variety of formal educational agencies carry on these activities, which were formerly conducted informally by the family. Among these agencies are schools, colleges, universities, churches, libraries, social agencies, the Federal and State governments through their extension services, and various voluntary study groups, both lay and professional. We shall consider education for family life in more detail below.

3. *Protective Function.* The family was formerly the principal agency for the protection of the individual. This function took such diverse forms as protection against outside enemies, sickness, unemployment, the vicissitudes of old age, and other physical and social hazards. During the centuries when the power of the central government was negligible, the family, aided by the church, was the only social welfare agency. Today, the protective functions of the state operate through such diverse facilities as unemployment insurance, old-age and survivor's insurance, old-age pensions, aid to widows with dependent children, hospitalization of the aged and infirm, and public health services. Some of these services are regarded by some persons as undue governmental infringements upon the prerogatives of the family and hence as social problems. The majority, however, gratefully accept these protec-

[17] Ibid., p. 145. Quoted from Office of Education, *Vocational Education in the Years Ahead*, Washington, 1945, p. 191.

[18] *The American Family: A Factual Background*, op. cit., p. 145.

tive activities in an age when most families lack the means, the facilities, and the knowledge to carry on independently.

In the field of health, the role of the family is especially pertinent; the health of the individual in turn reflects the status of the family. Thus "the hereditary, environmental, and socio-economic characteristics of the family unit into which a child is born will determine or influence his life expectancy, his growth and development, and his resistance or predisposition to physical and mental disorders." [19] Such matters as family housing, sanitary facilities, hygienic standards, and the family income are reflected in the health of the members. Modern society is largely convinced that these matters are social problems and can be mitigated or eliminated by democratic action. The family is still largely "responsible" for the health of its members, but the organized group is attempting to supplement these limited facilities by applying the combined resources of society as a whole.

4. *Religious Function.* "In religion, as in general education, the family is the oldest and most fundamental educational institution." [20] In these words, the White House Conference on Children in a Democracy stated one of the traditional functions of the family. This function is incorporated into the value-pattern held by most people and its omission or violation therefore constitutes a social problem for them. In contrast to the educational function, however, the declining religious function of the family reflects the decreased importance of organized religion in the average family (especially the urban, Protestant family). The total amount of educational activity has thus unquestionably increased decade after decade, although its locale is now largely outside the family. It is questionable, on the other hand, whether religious observances have undergone a similar increase, either within or without the family circle.

5. *Recreational Function.* The function of providing recre-

[19] Ibid., p. 201.

[20] White House Conference on Children in a Democracy, *Final Report*, Children's Bureau Publication No. 272, Washington, 1942, p. 186.

ation has also undergone a massive shift from the family to other agencies. As nostalgically portrayed by the poets and novelists of the last century, the family was the center of wholesome recreation, enjoyed by young and old alike, and providing still another reason for its integrity as an institution. The centrifugal forces that have moved children and adults alike out of the home and into the movie house, bowling alley, club, or tavern thus threaten a basic value which once made the family great. This recreational movement from the home is so unmistakable that no supporting data are necessary to document it. Proponents of the "ideal" family are therefore again faced with large-scale behavior which they do not like, but which they can do little about. For better or worse, the day has probably passed when the family will constitute the chief center of recreation for its members.

6. *Biological Function.* We have briefly examined the family functions which are, to a greater or lesser degree, in the process of being taken over by other institutions. We turn now to a consideration of the functions which are continued by the family to an equal or (sometimes) augmented degree. The biological function is one of the two or three which still remain with the family, somewhat modified in extent, it is true, but still uniquely performed by this institution. The family is and will be the only accepted relationship within which children will continue to be born and receive their early training. The biological function, as roughly interpreted by the crude birth rate, has sharply declined during the century and a half since the nation was founded. From 1800 to 1940, the crude birth rate (the number of births per 1,000 population) declined from 55 to 17.9, with a low point of 16.6 in the depression year 1933. The first seven years of the decade of the 1940's saw a spectacular (although probably temporary) increase from 17.9 in 1940 to 25.9 in 1947. In the latter year, the high marriage rates of the immediate postwar years bore fruit.[21]

[21] *The American Family: A Factual Background*, op. cit., p. 26.

The biological activity of the family, as exemplified in the birth rate, is a product of the social structure as a whole. A variety of social forces impinge upon the individual family in determining the number of children it will have. Economic, religious, psychological, technological, and "cultural" (i.e., norms, values, and patterns) factors combine to determine the extent to which the family will exercise the biological function. Unsuccessful attempts by dictatorial European governments to alter the patterns of fertility demonstrate that this behavior is deeply rooted in the society and reflects fundamental social and cultural conditions. The secular trend toward a lowered birth rate is, as noted, widely defined as a social problem. The fertile marriages of the last century (women bearing children in the 1860's, for example, had four children as the modal or most frequent number) still embody the central value for many persons. The modal number for women bearing children in the 1920's was two (with 15 per cent of them childless), a situation that is considered a social problem.[22]

7. *Affectional Function.* The other principal continuing function of the family is the supplying of affection (in the broadest sense) to its members. The family is the only relationship wherein the individual can gain love, affection, and sexual gratification in accordance with the mores. In an increasingly impersonal society, where the individual is denied generalized affection, and where emotional insecurities lurk for the weak and unwary, the mutual affection given by husband, wife, and children has become perhaps more important than any single element in the well-being of the individual. In the days when the family performed the variety of general functions listed above, the individual could find security, protection, recreation, and religious gratification therein. Today many of these stabilizing functions in the family have disappeared, at least to the extent that they were formerly present. The individual is therefore reduced to a greater dependence upon the emotional satisfactions he can

[22] Ibid., pp. 24–25.

gain in the family, satisfactions rendered even more necessary by the atomistic competitiveness of modern society.[23]

This dependence upon the affectional function renders the family more vulnerable to disorganization than it has ever been. We shall consider this vulnerability in detail below, and will merely suggest here that the family in which affection, personal happiness, and romantic attraction are the primary considerations is resting upon a precarious foundation indeed. Men and women enter marriage with extravagant expectations based upon romantic love, which cannot be permanently realized in the day-to-day relationships of marriage. The failure to find the same romantic ecstasy in marriage they found in courtship is a profoundly shattering experience for many persons. The over-emphasis upon affection (broadly defined) in marriage is thus an important factor leading to the problem of family disorganization.

CHANGING BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL ROLES. The changing functions of the family give rise to new roles which the members are expected to play. More accurately, the traditional roles of husband, wife, and child are part of the value-pattern of the family as it once existed. The actual *behavior* of the husband and wife often fails to correspond to the group of expectations which have become crystallized in the culture and handed down as part of the social heritage. This disparity between expected role and actual behavior is upsetting to the person whose values embody, consciously or unconsciously, the ideal roles of husband or wife. The social problem arising out of this aspect of behavior reflects the fact that husbands and wives (and children also) are not acting the way they "should" act. Through no fault of their own, they are failing to live up to group expectations.

We have considered the general relationships between social structure and social problems in Chapter II. Here we may expand the concept of social role and apply it explicitly

[23] Cf. Lawrence K. Frank, "What Families Do for the Nation," *American Journal of Sociology*, 53:471–473 (May, 1948).

to the standards that define how the husband and wife shall act. The social role has been defined as "the organization of habits and attitudes of the individual appropriate to a given position in a system of social relationships." [24] Expressing the same general point of view in somewhat different terms, the role is pictured as "a general term for describing certain duties, prerogatives, and attitudes which persons having a like function in any given group . . . tend to have in common." [25] Social roles are embodied in the mores and tend to change with them. Like the mores, the roles do not change as rapidly as behavior in a dynamic society. Hence large numbers of persons are engaging in behavior which in the aggregate becomes a social problem. We may briefly explore these changes in behavior and role.

1. *The Wife.* These changes have been most striking in the case of the wife, whose behavior has diverged most spectacularly from her traditional role. This situation is especially true of the urban, middle-class wife who, in a sense, sets the pattern for a country that is predominately middle-class in outlook. Her behavior has been transformed by such factors as the transfer of the production function from the home, the introduction of domestic labor-saving devices, the decrease in the size of the family dwelling, the increase in commercial recreation, and the gainful employment of women both before and after marriage. The average wife must adjust, as best she can, to social changes which she has not planned and often only vaguely understands. In this process of adjustment, she often acts in ways not considered proper or desirable in terms of her traditional roles.

The most important single manifestation of this changing behavior is the gainful employment of women. Contrary to the impression produced by the motion pictures, the average wife does not work because she desires a glamorous business or

[24] Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., "Roles and Marital Adjustment," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 27:107 (1933).

[25] Katharine Dupre Lumpkin, *The Family: A Study of Member Roles* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1933), p. 3.

professional career. Few wives ever attain these satisfactions and the majority work at clerical occupations, as factory operatives, and as domestic servants. Most wives work because they must, either to support their families or to supply some of the small luxuries for their children.[26] But the mere fact that the wife is adding to the family income and thereby sharing, to a greater or lesser degree, the burden of economic support has drastically changed her family behavior. The social expectations comprising the role of the wife have gradually changed to meet this wholesale change in behavior. Hence the majority of persons probably accept with good grace the large-scale participation of married women in business and industry. They accept with considerably less grace some of the logical concomitants of this situation, however, such as the increased independence of women, the growing individualism of the family, and the rising level of divorce.

2. *The Husband.* The behavior of the husband has changed less drastically than that of the wife. People seldom refer to the male as "the lost sex" because he has allegedly abandoned his traditional role in the family.[27] The husband still performs the basic economic function that has characterized his role for thousands of years. He is still the principal breadwinner and, especially in this country, his role performance is defined largely in these terms. That is, if he is an outstanding financial success, the husband is considered a "good provider" and hence one who has lived up to the fullest expectations of an individualistic and competitive society. Men who have been unsuccessful in this role are often defined as partial failures, at least, in their role as husbands, even though their lack of success reflects factors completely beyond their control. The most spectacular example of this large-scale (but temporary) role failure occurs during times of depression. Millions of husbands are unable to play their central

[26] Hazel Kyrk, "Who Works and Why," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 251:44–52 (May, 1947).

[27] Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia F. Farnham, *Modern Woman: The Lost Sex* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947).

role as breadwinners, with results that are extremely damaging to individual morale and family solidarity alike.[28]

In other respects, the behavior of the husband has not undergone changes commensurate with those undergone by the wife. The husband is ordinarily not as active in the transmission of the social heritage to his children (especially the male children) as was the case in former times. As a result, the male child is often obliged to learn much of the male role from a woman—i.e., his mother. The educational behavior of the father has thus changed from the day when he instructed his sons in the techniques of getting a living, as well as in the mysteries of being a man. The ultimate effects of this situation upon the personalities of middle-class children are not fully apparent, but they may find later expression in subtle, but unmistakable, modifications in personality structure.[29]

Changes in behavior (and the expectations therefor) on the part of the husband are also occurring in connection with the affectional relationships of the family. The traditional role for the American male was marked by disdain for the preoccupation with sexual relationships, in and out of marriage, which allegedly characterized the European male. The growing expectation of sexual pleasure in marriage by the wife may in turn bring about a greater interest in such matters by the husband. The sale of books on "married love," the hundreds of millions of dollars annually spent for contraceptives, and the popularization of the sexual theories of Freud are among the factors that suggest that the affectional role of the husband is changing. These and other exceptions do not, however, change the fundamental premise: namely, that the behavior of the husband in our society has not changed as drastically as that of the wife. The latter has by far the most complicated set of adjustments to make in contemporary family life. Her inability to reconcile behavior and

[28] Ruth Shonle Cavan and Katherine Howland Ranck, *The Family and the Depression* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

[29] Margaret Mead, *Male and Female* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1949).

social expectation is therefore productive of many aspects of the wider problem of the changing family.

We have considered some of the major trends in the modification of the modern family. Many of these trends are defined as evidences of the decline or instability of the family. In this connection, Burgess pertinently comments that: "Much of what is termed the 'instability' of the American family arises from the shift to the democratic companionship type from the old-time rural family of this country and the transplanted old-world family forms of immigrant groups." [30] Whether stemming from the early frontier in this country or the peasant cultures of Western Europe, the value judgments of many persons are threatened by "the family in process" (to use Burgess's expressive phrase). These persons do not like what they see. The changing family is therefore a social problem.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

Problems of Family Conflict

THE NATURE OF FAMILY CONFLICT. The ideal pattern of family life is one of romantic love, conjugal affection, and parental devotion. That is the atmosphere of family relationships which has come down as an ideal almost unchanged from the early days of the family. The individual roles within the family have, it is true, changed with the times. No longer is the father looked upon as the patriarch, whose word is law for wife and children. No longer is the wife considered biologically unqualified for the serious concerns of family life and the larger relationships of the outside world. No longer is the child expected only to be seen and not heard. In these and many other ways, the pattern of family expectations has kept pace, sometimes haltingly, with the changing times.

The personal and emotional atmosphere within the family, however, has not substantially changed from the happy, unified, congeniality long held up as an ideal. The family is still expected to be a harmonious relationship, occasionally marked by temperamental difficulties and disagreements, but still one in which basic disparities of opinion are at a minimum. Hence any substantial departure from this situation, any large-scale exhibition of deep and abiding family conflicts, is defined as a

social problem. The contemporary way of life inevitably gives rise to many conflict situations which were either rare or unknown in the traditional family. It follows, therefore, that social problems on this level have also increased in recent decades.

Family conflict is not something new under the sun. The rising level of divorce has caused many persons to look back wistfully to a former day when the family presumably lived in perpetual peace and concord and the ideal of family harmony was literally a reality. This happy picture is, however, not in accord with the facts. The increase in divorce does not *necessarily* mean that there has been an absolute increase in family conflict, but merely that it has come to public attention to a greater degree than formerly. The divorce rate is not an absolutely reliable index to the extent of family conflict, for many families suffered in silence in the time before divorce became a socially accepted method of "solving" their problems. Wide differences naturally exist in the divorce rates between states like South Carolina (which until 1949 allowed no divorce on any grounds) and states like Nevada (which allows divorce on several grounds). These differences in rate have not meant that family conflict was nonexistent in South Carolina and common in the states where divorce was legally possible. As we shall see, divorce is merely one index (and not an especially accurate one) to the degree of family conflict present in any society.

Family conflict has been present as long as we have written records. Even before that, the nagging wife, the disobedient child, and the cruel husband were part of the common folklore of all known peoples. Individual disagreements, differences in temperament, and the irritations arising from daily contact have always characterized the intimate family group. Biography, history, and literature contain many stories of family conflicts arising from these and even more serious individual differences; neurotic and psychotic husbands and wives have made family life miserable for many a long-suffering spouse, who had no recourse but to suffer in silence. The social

expectancies of an earlier day, however, were based upon marriage as an indissoluble relationship. Hence the discomforts, uncertainties, and hazards deriving therefrom were accepted as part of the natural order.

This general situation explains why family conflict has become a social problem in recent decades. As we have suggested, much of the *behavior* within the family has not changed very much. But the *definition* of such behavior has changed a great deal. Whereas the members of the family formerly viewed their difficulties as inevitable (and hence not as a social problem), many persons today do not accept this element of inevitability and believe that they can do something about their marital frustrations. This action may take the form of divorce, which is often a dubious solution to marital problems. The point, however, is not whether or not divorce actually does "help," [1] but rather that many people *think* it does and are willing to try it as a solution to their marital disappointments. Many people divorce each other for frivolous reasons or for minor annoyances which, in another day, would have been accepted as part of the responsibilities of family life. Family conflict, in short, has become a social problem because of the widespread belief that something can be done about it.

Family conflict has thus assumed greater importance in modern times because of the widespread assumption that such difficulties constitute valid reasons for divorce. Throughout most of the historical development of the family in Western Europe and America, conflicts contained no intrinsic danger either to the individual family or to the family as a whole, inasmuch as the institution was not affected by the amount of conflict occurring therein. Family conflict could be an extreme annoyance to the members of the individual family, but it did not involve any threat to the existence of the family *as such.* It is true that there were periods in the history of Western Europe—notably in Greece and Rome—when the divorce rate among the upper classes reached such proportions as to scandalize the moralists and appear to threaten the continu-

[1] Edmund Bergler, *Divorce Won't Help* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948).

ance of the institution.[2] But these periods were comparatively brief and also did not touch the wide strata of the population that are today involved in divorce. In general, therefore, the role of conflict as a possible disintegrating factor in the family is comparatively new. It has become a correspondingly important part of the larger problem of the modern family.

Another and related factor in the problem of family conflict is the individual basis upon which the family now rests. The marriage partners are chosen by each other and by no one else, in striking contrast to the situation existing in other times and cultures, where the parental families had a prominent part in the choice of spouses. Today, the criteria of marriage choice are for the most part individual in character; physical attractiveness, popularity with the opposite sex, "personality," and potential ability as a breadwinner or glamorous companion are among the factors determining the choice of a mate. These factors are, for the most part, (a) difficult to gauge, (b) ephemeral, and (c) lack the solid institutional qualities that once characterized the family. Conflict may therefore disrupt the union so tenuously held together by individual relationships. Tensions and conflicts, once taken in stride, now bulk large in the consciousness of the individual members of the family.

We shall consider family conflicts under two general headings. These categories tend to overlap in practice and, furthermore, are in a sense two different aspects of the same social reality. We refer to *personality conflicts* and *social conflicts*. The former involve those elements of tension that pertain directly to the personalities of the participants. The latter involve those elements that affect the family relationships from outside. Whatever their origins, these two types of conflict situation are expressed through the personal relationships of the husband and wife and hence are, in the last analysis, "personality" conflicts. Nevertheless, sufficient difference exists between, say, conflicts arising from temperamental differences and those

[2] Carle C. Zimmerman, *Family and Civilization* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947).

arising from unemployment to warrant the distinction. We shall conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of conflicts in family roles, which are an important expression of the prevailing *malaise* of the family.

PERSONALITY CONFLICTS. Contrary to the prevailing impression, marriages are not made in heaven but on earth, and their participants are very human and fallible men and women. This situation is clearly expressed by Harriet R. Mowrer when she points out that "Every individual enters marriage with certain potentialities and impediments to adjustment. These 'assets' and 'liabilities' consist in general of the ideas of the person as to what constitutes marriage, of habit complexes, and of dominant trends in personality." [3] In this sense, the marital equipment is largely acquired before marriage and the individual personality is formed by the time the boy and girl are ready to take this momentous step. This does *not* mean that the participants must not adjust to each other and to the marriage relationship if they are to be successful in their search for security and happiness. But it *does* mean that the personal qualities which determine the relative success or failure of these adjustments are clearly established long before marriage. Women who marry men with the wistful hope of "reforming" them (i.e., producing a fundamental change in their characters) are doomed to disappointment. Men who marry women and then try to change them into figures of their heart's desire are likewise destined to frustration.

1. *Temperament.* Some husbands and wives are quick to anger, quick to forget. Others are roused only after repeated stimuli and take equally long to recover. Some persons are affectionate and out-going, others cold and reserved. Some habitually look on the bright side, whereas others chronically expect the worst. Differences of this type apparently are due to temperament, which is a general term referring to innate capacity to react in a certain way to situations involving the emotions. Family conflicts based upon clashing temperaments

[3] Harriet R. Mowrer, *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord* (New York: American Book Co., 1935), p. 35.

are perhaps the most completely personal of all, for they involve traits which appear to be largely inborn in the individual and susceptible only slightly to social modifications. Some babies are happy, others cry all the time. These temperamental differences appear to reflect complex and, as yet, little-understood factors, which extend into behavior in marriage.

In their study of marital happiness and unhappiness, Terman and his colleagues found that temperamental qualities were extremely important. In families where the relationship was patently unhappy, the spouses tended "to be touchy and grouchy; to lose their tempers easily; to fight to get their own way; to be critical of others; to be careless of others' feelings . . . to show any dislike they may happen to feel; to be easily affected by praise or blame. . . ." [4] Such discordant qualities in one or both spouses would obviously not produce marital harmony. These temperamental qualities are presumably as old as human society and will continue to be the heritage of prospective husbands and wives. As noted, such conflicts assume significant proportions in the contemporary family because of the possibility of divorce, whereas they did not jeopardize the existence of the traditional family.

2. *Habits.* Habits are products of individual life experience, in contrast to temperament, which is apparently innate. Habits are acquired during the long and complex process whereby the person gradually matures and finally marries and founds a family of his own. Habits represent learned behavior and many of them are, for all practical purposes, almost as difficult to modify in the adult husband or wife as temperamental traits. Hence marriages in which the habitual behavior of one spouse clashes violently with the habit-patterns of the other will be marked by conflict. These habit-patterns may be related to superficial forms of behavior (i.e., table manners) or they may involve more important considerations (i.e., the use of alcohol, or sexual fidelity). In a society with so many classes, nationality groups, and subcultures, wide divergencies

[4] Lewis M. Terman et al., *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1938), p. 369.

will exist in the habitual behavior of persons conditioned by these different groups. Furthermore, the romantic conception of marriage stresses these differences as forming the basis of romantic attraction between young people. These varying patterns are a prolific source of conflict in the family.

3. *Values.* Closely related to habit-patterns in engendering family conflict are differences in social values. We have been concerned with social values at many points in our discussion, inasmuch as they constitute the heart of social problems. Values are inculcated in the individual by the forces of his culture, with a particularly important part played by his parental family. He will thus acquire the particular definition of social values held by his parents and will carry these definitions relatively unchanged into his own family relationships. Social values are clustered about such important family concerns as the type of occupation, the attitude toward money, the desire for children, the role of education, and the choice of religion.

Differences in values often constitute the underlying motive for family conflict, even though other and more superficial concerns seem to precipitate the conflict. Families may therefore fight over what appear to be trivial matters of personal behavior, for example, whereas the real source of conflict lies in a fundamental difference over religion. Conversely, husbands and wives whose basic values are substantially similar can overcome many difficulties which might otherwise disorganize the family. The values about which married couples orient their lives are thus an important source of harmony or conflict.

4. *Roles.* The early role which the individual brings to marriage is often the basis for conflict. In this context, the role refers to that special pattern of expectations which the person acquires in the parental family. The child learns to play a series of roles in his parental family long before he is called upon to play an adult role in a family of his own. Boys may be spoiled by their mothers and girls by their fathers and thereby acquire variations of the well-known Freudian Oedi-

pus and Electra complexes. The average child eventually loses the inordinate affection for the parent of the opposite sex that provides the emotional drive for these complexes. In the process of becoming an adult, the person learns to stand on his own emotional feet and play a normal marital role toward his husband or wife, as the case may be.

In some instances, however, the man or woman is unable to change from an infantile role of emotional dependence to an adult role of independence. Hence the "mother's boy" is always unconsciously comparing his wife to his mother, to the obvious disadvantage of the former. Similarly, the "daddy's girl" is unable to give her husband the complete affection and co-operation so necessary to conjugal affection, because he does not measure up to her unconscious image of her father. These role-fixations produce a wide range of behavior in marriage, all the way from the person with unconscious homosexual tendencies to the one who has merely been extremely spoiled in his parental family and hence cannot play an adult role in his own. Such overly dependent role-patterns are formed in the early years of the parental family. The basis is thus laid for conflict many years before the adult status is reached.[5]

5. *Affection.* A final aspect of family conflict involving the personalities of the spouses comprises the pattern of behavior and expectations centered about affection. As we have suggested, the affectional function has become extremely important in the total complex of family relationships. Many persons enter marriage with exaggerated conceptions of the joys evoked by affection, not only in the field of sex but in that of generalized affection. The attitudes and values of each marriage partner toward affection have been established during their early years, long before they were physically or socially mature enough to engage in adult affectionate relationships themselves. The individual in our society learns to define sexual behavior—in and out of marriage—many years before he

[5] Cf. J. C. Flügel, *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family* (London: Hogarth Press, 1926).

actually experiences it. These attitudes are thus part of the personal equipment of each individual who enters marriage.

Family conflicts based upon or related to affectional behavior may take various forms, which we can only briefly indicate here: (a) *antagonism*—One party may thus have a deep-seated antagonism for sex, resulting sometimes from an unpleasant personal experience but more often from unfavorable attitudes inculcated by others; (b) *ignorance*—The sheer lack of elementary knowledge of the processes of reproduction, sexual hygiene, and similar matters may also generate marital conflict; (c) *fear*—Many families in the lower-income groups associate sexual relationships with unwanted pregnancy. These families already have more children than they can support and they lack the knowledge to prevent further conception; (d) *refusal*—The sexual relationship has long been accepted, both in law and the mores, as the symbolic act of marriage. Persons may dramatize their complete aversion for their spouse by refusing to enter this symbolic relationship.[6]

Throughout most of the Christian era, the subject of sex was largely taboo, within as well as without marriage. The increasing freedom of a secular society has tended to overemphasize this relationship and attribute *all* marital conflict thereto. This emphasis is as unsatisfactory as the traditional silence, in terms of family adjustment and maladjustment. Affection is universally recognized as *one* of the factors producing family conflict. But it is not the *only* factor—or even the most important one. The role of sex in this connection is summarized as follows: "Sex cannot . . . be considered the basic factor any more than any other of the factors which make up the conflict pattern." [7] Many conflict situations seem to reflect sexual incompatibility or hostility. But this expression is often a superficial manifestation, arising out of another situation that has nothing to do with sex.

Social Conflicts. We turn from a discussion of family conflicts originating in the personalities of the respective

[6] Harriet R. Mowrer, op. cit., Chap. 9, "The Sex-Conflict Pattern."
[7] Ibid., p. 151.

spouses to those originating outside the personality and relatively independent thereof. This distinction between personality and social conflicts, as we have suggested, is by no means complete, since personality is largely a social product and is affected by outside factors. Hence personality and social factors in family conflict are, in a sense, merely different aspects of the same thing. We shall briefly consider, however, some of the motivating factors in family conflict which are *relatively* extraneous to the personality.

1. *Religion.* The first of these is religion. Here we immediately meet the question as to whether this factor is individual or social. The church and its organization and doctrines clearly exist apart from the individual, but at the same time religious values are an integral part of personality. In any case, religious differences, whatever their origin, clearly constitute important factors in family conflict. These conflicts rarely take the form of differences over dogma, but rather involve behavior patterns peculiar to different religious groups. Conflicts on this level thus often center about questions of education, contraception, or marital roles, which are seemingly remote from religious doctrine as such, but which are nevertheless religious in origin. Individuals reared in a strongly religious tradition will view many aspects of life as religious (or moral) questions, in addition to those questions that are universally placed in this category. Persons whose attitudes and roles are determined by secular considerations will come into conflict with their spouses on many matters.

The extent of "mixed" marriages, involving persons of different religious faiths, is not known. Hence we cannot judge accurately the degree of conflict engendered or intensified by religious differences. Furthermore, many marriages between Protestants and Catholics occur only after the former have either been converted to the Catholic faith or have made certain prior concessions relative to the education of the children. In such cases, religious conflicts may still occur, even though the individuals are nominally both members of the same faith. Religious conflicts often take a symbolic form, with the spouses

venting frustrations arising from other situations but using religious symbols to do so. The spouse may thus call slighting attention to the religion of the other only when other tensions have precipitated a conflict situation.

2. *Nationality.* A second source of social conflict comprises cultural differences growing out of divergent ethnic and nationality backgrounds. The heterogeneous character of American society, with its large-scale immigration continued over a century, set the stage for many such conflict situations. The customs, traditions, and roles of one nationality group may differ widely from those of another group, thereby precipitating conflicts in many families. Many of the conflict factors outlined above—habits, values, behavior patterns, social roles, religious definitions, and the like—are also the products of varied ethnic backgrounds and as such constitute the bases for family conflict.

Intermarriage among members of different nationality groups is apparently increasing. In the years immediately before World War II, for example, two-thirds of all foreign-born grooms married native brides.[8] This would suggest either (a) that the amount of family conflict arising from nationality differences is increasing; or, more probably, (b) that cultural differences are no longer important and hence such family conflict is decreasing. The restrictions on immigration during the past twenty-five years have gradually reduced the importance of this factor as far as the nation as a whole is concerned.[9] Judging from such data as these, assimilation seems to be occurring with commendable dispatch. In the meantime, however, nationality differences—with their attendant cultural disparities—will continue to plague many a family.

3. *Occupation.* The occupational status of the husband is another factor determining family conflict. Men whose professional activities bring them into contact with attractive members of the opposite sex—as coworkers, clients, or patients

[8] Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, "Intermarriage Among National Groups Increasing," *Statistical Bulletin* (May, 1946).

[9] Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, "The Passing of Our Foreign-Born," *Statistical Bulletin* (June, 1945).

—have a higher rate of family conflict than those who work on the farm. Actors, doctors, and lawyers thus probably have a higher rate of family disorganization than farmers, although exact data have not been kept for the nation as a whole since 1906. Such fragmentary information as we have, however, suggests that the occupational way of life is a factor in family conflict, other things being equal.[10]

Other occupational factors have been suggested as productive of family conflict. Mobility of one or both members may result in increased opportunities for new experience (as is presumably the case with traveling salesmen). Mobility may also bring about a decrease in primary neighborhood controls (as in the case of the extremely mobile family).[11] This hypothesis, however, has been questioned on the ground that family conflicts are so complex that they cannot rightly be attributed to a single factor, such as mobility.[12] Another study of occupational factors in family conflict concludes that "the divorce rate increases progressively from the professional group through the proprietary, clerical, skilled, and semiskilled groups. The unskilled group reverses the trend and shows a lower rate than any group except the professional . . . this group shows the highest separation rate of any of the occupational classifications."[13] Although the various investigations leave many questions unanswered, the importance of occupation upon family conflict is by no means negligible.

4. *Unemployment.* In unemployment, the modern family is faced with a source of potential conflict largely absent from the traditional family. The latter could usually rely upon a stable occupational base, with steady employment. The contemporary family, however, is periodically confronted with large-scale unemployment, which immediately introduces many tensions into the family relationship. Insecurity, frustra-

[10] Meyer F. Nimkoff, "Occupational Factors and Marriage," *American Journal of Sociology*, 49:248–254 (November, 1943).

[11] Harvey J. Locke, "Mobility and Family Disorganization," *American Sociological Review*, 5:489–494 (August, 1940).

[12] Meyer F. Nimkoff, op. cit.

[13] H. Ashley Weeks, "Differential Divorce Rates by Occupations," *Social Forces*, 21:334–337 (March, 1943), pp. 335–336.

tion, fear, and deprivation are among the dangers to family harmony associated with unemployment. The extent of this massive modern trauma may be estimated by the fact that in 1937 there were 7,418,000 men and 3,565,000 women completely unemployed and 5,550,000 persons partly employed.[14] We do not know how many of these men and women were the sole or partial support of their families, but it is safe to assume that the majority of the men (at least) had major family responsibilities.

The role of unemployment in generating or intensifying conflicts is not uniform with all families. Some families take such a crisis in their stride and remain unified, whereas others show immediate signs of disorganization, which may take the form of constant quarreling, chronic alcoholism, or even desertion or divorce. Families which have successfully faced other crises are apparently able to surmount unemployment; those whose integration has previously been precarious find this situation increased by unemployment.[15] The feeling of frustration at the inability to play the traditional role of breadwinner if often too much for many husbands to bear.

5. *Housing.* Housing may be broadly defined as "that combination of physical factors constituting the family shelter and the immediate neighborhood in which the home is located." [16] Housing thus comprises not only the actual living space of the family but its social setting in the neighborhood and community. The housing of the underprivileged presents the most obvious situation productive of family conflict, either directly or indirectly. The slum induces or exacerbates such diverse family problems as infant mortality, epidemic illness, sexual immorality, juvenile delinquency, and desertion. Inadequate housing, growing largely out of insufficient income, thus intensifies many family conflicts.

[14] *Final Report on Total and Partial Unemployment, 1937*, Washington, 1938, I, 1–4.

[15] Ruth S. Cavan and Katherine H. Ranck, *The Family and the Depression* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), Chap. I.

[16] Edmund N. Bacon, "Wartime Housing," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 229:128–137 (September, 1943).

Not all problems of family housing are the product of inadequate income, however. Many families of the middle and upper classes live under conditions which, in the matter of overcrowding at least, might be described as "upper-class slums." Family quarters are often as cramped in relatively expensive apartments as in old-law tenements. Tensions between husbands, wives, and children who have inadequate space are thus not uncommon where the amount of the rent is not the primary consideration. Tempers may be frayed, harsh words exchanged, and the physical tranquility so necessary to contented family life may be difficult under these conditions.

Crowded housing conditions were intensified in the postwar years, with a shortage of living space of any kind for millions of newly married couples. In April, 1948, an estimated 2,333,000 married couples were living "doubled-up" with other families; this figure represented 7.1 per cent of all married couples at that time.[17] The traditional pattern of family life in America has assumed an individual home for each married couple. This insistence upon an individual dwelling unit differs from the custom in the old world, where the children were ordinarily expected to live with the parental family until such time as they (the children) were able to take over the dominant family role. In view of the individualistic expectations in the United States, however, the fact that more than two and one-quarter million married couples were without separate homes constituted a serious social problem. Clashes between children and in-laws inevitably occur under these conditions, as well as conflicts between the spouses themselves who are forced to live under such (to them) abnormal conditions.

CONFLICTS AND FAMILY ROLES. Family conflicts are also based upon differences in the interpretation of family roles. We have earlier considered the problem of roles as individual parts learned in the parental family. These patterns are in-

[17] *The American Family: A Factual Background*, Report of Inter-Agency Committee on Background Materials, National Conference on Family Life, Washington, May, 1948, p. 263.

corporated into the personality and tend to complicate or facilitate (as the case may be) subsequent relationships in the adult family. We may explore the further inplications of family roles as the reciprocal patterns of expectations incorporated in the society and forming the general behavior expected of the husband and wife. Marital conflicts thus arise from the failure of one of the members to live up to the role expected of him or her by the other. These failures in turn reflect such factors as: (a) conflicts in roles; (b) dissatisfaction with the ascribed role; (c) frustrations arising from the failure of a role to measure up to expectations. These general factors clearly overlap, but they still represent sufficiently distinct aspects of marital conflict to warrant separate consideration.

1. *Conflicts in Role.* The first reason for conflicts in family roles is the fact that the social patterns are so complex that many husbands and wives simply are not sure what is expected of them. Commenting upon this general situation, Cottrell states that "The degree of adjustment to roles which a society assigns to its age-sex categories varies directly with the clarity with which such roles are defined." [18] In a changing society, the definitions of marital roles are in a state of flux and the husband and wife are often bewildered at the different patterns of behavior expected of them. As we have suggested, this bewilderment is especially apparent for the wife, whose role has changed more rapidly and extensively than that of the husband. The modern wife is expected simultaneously to be companion, mistress, glamour girl, housekeeper, mother, and often wage earner as well. This complex repertoire of roles is a far cry from the day when the wife was expected to confine her attentions largely to the home and the children.

"The degree of clarity," Cottrell continues (in commenting upon conflicts in marital roles), "is determined by the proportion of the social situations in which the individual is called on to act for which there are explicit definitions of the recip-

[18] Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., "The Adjustment of the Individual to His Age and Sex Roles," *American Sociological Review*, 7:617–620 (October, 1942).

rocal behavior expected." [19] Marital roles descending from Old Testament times conflict with the secular behavior of the modern metropolis, and roles that reflect the frontier and the farm are offered as plausible forms of behavior in the equalitarian family of the urban middle class. Wives are thus expected at one and the same time to stay at home and to work to support the family; to defer to their husbands and to express their democratic rights as individuals; and to have several children and still keep the face and figure of a girl of eighteen. Long before they are married, married couples learn patterns of expectations that are mutually contradictory. With such conflicting patterns held out to them, it is not strange that husbands and wives fail to do what their spouses want them to do. They have been brought up under different sets of expectations concerning the role of a good husband and a good wife. With perfect sincerity, each is acting the way he is expected to act. But in the process of living up to his earlier expectations, each is annoying, wounding, or infuriating the other.

2. *Dissatisfaction with Role.* Many husbands and wives may understand their roles perfectly, but still not like the parts they are expected to play. This conflict is again especially apparent in the modern wife, who is often obliged to play one role while secretly longing to play another. "Many a capable woman," suggests Kirkpatrick, "with talents fully equal to those of her husband, has gone neurotic living her years as a housewife in envy of the woman who is a marriage partner." [20] This dissatisfaction with the traditional role may or may not become so acute as to cause a neurosis, but it is often a source of family conflict. When the wife is dissatisfied with the role she is expected to play, her irritations and frustrations may take many forms.

In common with many of the problem situations of our

[19] Ibid., p. 618.

[20] Clifford Kirkpatrick, "The Measurement of Ethical Inconsistency in Marriage," *International Journal of Ethics*, 46:444–460 (July, 1936), p. 447.

society, this conflict in roles is related to other social values. For example, the increase in higher education for women has naturally stressed the greatest possible development of their abilities.[21] This individual development in itself is a value in a democracy, but it also involves difficult adjustments for a highly educated wife who wishes to express her abilities outside of the conventional channels. The majority of women willingly become housewives and mothers and thereby abandon their undergraduate dreams of a career. Some women, however, are unable to find complete fulfilment in their role as housewife and mother and yearn for the role of career woman for which they were educated. Whether or not family conflict ensues, the educated woman is in an ambivalent position in this respect. This ambivalence may produce marital conflict.

A further element of marital conflict arises from the fact that the husband has one set of definitions concerning the role of his wife, while the wife has another. Some husbands may resent the intellectual abilities of their wives as a possible threat to their own egos. This resentment may take both conscious and subconscious forms. Families where the wife is working at lucrative and highly trained positions may be marked by conflict on other levels, for which the emotional drive comes from the subconscious resentment of the husband. This feeling reflects his traditional background, wherein he was indoctrinated with the idea of the wife as exclusively a housekeeper and mother. These definitions are a part of his personality and any departures therefrom by his wife meet with hostility. The wife may thus be torn between affection for her husband and the desire to live up to her own capabilities and expectations.

3. *Frustration of Role.* Family conflict may finally reflect the failure of the roles to measure up to the expectations of the individual participants. Husband and wife are often unable to experience the behavior which they have expected in marriage. As a result they experience a deep and, sometimes, bitter

[21] Katharine Elizabeth McBride, "What is Woman's Education?," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 251:143–152 (May, 1947).

sense of frustration. The blocking of an impulse short of its expected goal often generates aggression by the frustrated person.[22] The spouse may have nothing to do with causing the frustration and may, in fact, be frustrated for the same reason. Nevertheless, the husband may vent his frustration upon his wife (or vice versa) with resultant family discord. The person who has failed, for reasons which he understands only vaguely, to realize his expectations in marriage may be a difficult partner in this exacting relationship.

These expectations are themselves social products. They are absorbed by the individual in the process of maturation. The boy and girl learn to play the role of good husband or good wife, as expected in our society, and at the same time learn what to expect in their mates. In many cases, the expectations are so extravagant that they cannot be realized by fallible human beings. Marriage cannot possibly be as romantic as it is in the movies, the magazines, and the popular songs. Persons deprived of these satisfactions may feel that they have been deprived of a value which they have every right to expect. An important factor in marital happiness (and unhappiness) is thus the group of expectations with which the individual enters marriage. Those who expect the impossible are bound to be disappointed.[23]

At some time in their lives, most people accept the unreal expectations of family life based upon the popular folklore. Adolescence is the usual time for such fantasies. As he grows older, the average person accepts the fact that married life is not the life depicted in the movies. The majority thus manage, like Margaret Fuller, to "accept the universe" and work out a satisfactory married life. A considerable minority, however, are unable to do so. They are the families who crowd the divorce courts and swell the desertion rates. Others whose religious faith does not sanction divorce vent their frustrations in family conflict.

[22] John Dollard et al., *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939).

[23] Francis E. Merrill, *Courtship and Marriage* (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1949), Chap. XV, "Frustrated Roles."

The marital frustrations arising from unrealized expectations are especially apparent in the broad field of affectional relationships. This is only natural, inasmuch as the most extravagant hopes are vested in the affectional function. The satisfactions which allegedly accompany the affectional relationships of marriage include sex as an obvious component. The emotions and behavior centered about this function are both deep-seated and explosive. Conflicts thus arise between many husbands and wives concerning the role which affection should play in marriage.

The sexual relationship, broadly conceived, thus probably constitutes the most important single source of marital disagreement. In one study of marital adjustment, only half of the couples said that they had made a satisfactory sexual adjustment from the outset of their marriage, and one out of eight admitted that they had *never* made an adjustment in this field.[24] Much of this difficulty reflects the frustrated and conflicting expectations of our society toward the function of sex in marriage. The Kinsey report indirectly approaches this source of conflict. The study points out that many wives complain that their husbands desire coitus "too frequently," whereas many husbands wish that their wives desired it "more frequently." [25]

The other principal aspect of frustrated affection is romantic love. Here the frustration is primarily psychological, rather than physiological, in origin, for romantic expectations define behavior in the field of interpersonal relations, rather than sexual release as such. Romantic love is largely intangible and the individuals often do not even know exactly what to expect in the way of satisfaction. The conceptions of marital romance gleaned from the popular folklore seldom accord with the reality of the marital experience. This very intangibility, combined with the highest expectations, often produces a pervasive frustration. The married pair are not exactly sure

[24] Judson T. Landis, "Length of Time Required to Achieve Adjustment in Marriage," *American Sociological Review*, 11:666–677 (December, 1946).

[25] Alfred C. Kinsey et al., *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1948), pp. 127–128.

what they were expecting in marriage, but they are sure that they are not getting it.[26]

The right to expect romantic satisfaction in marriage implies the right to take steps when it is not forthcoming. Instead of examining their own relationship and attempting to adjust it to the realities of marriage, many persons assume that they have failed, in some unexplained but conclusive sense, to live up to the ideal of romance. It seldom occurs to them that the ideal itself is at fault, in the sense that it implies a permanent continuation of the romantic raptures of courtship. The failure of their marriage to fulfill the romantic expectations of our culture is defined by the participants as a social problem. They resolve to do something about it. Their action often takes the form of divorce.

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[26] Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization* (3rd ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), Chap. XVII, "The Romantic Fallacy."

6. MEAD, MARGARET, *Male and Female.* New York: William Morrow & Co., 1949. This is a penetrating analysis of the social role of man and woman in our society.

7. MERRILL, FRANCIS E., *Courtship and Marriage.* New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1949. The roles of husband and wife in a changing society constitute the principal subject-matter of this study of courtship and marriage.

8. MOWRER, HARRIET R., *Personality Adjustment and Domestic Discord.* New York: American Book Co., 1935. This book deals with both personal and social conflicts in marriage and offers many significant insights into these problems.

9. TERMAN, LEWIS M., et al., *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1938. This research examines the elements in the personalities of the spouses which initiate or intensify family conflicts.

10. ZIMMERMAN, CARLE C., *Family and Civilization.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1947. This ambitious and far-flung study traces the historical development of the family in terms of a rigorous frame of reference. The author postulates three major types of family—trustee, domestic, and atomistic—and indicates their recurrence in different historical periods.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Problems of Family Disorganization

THE NATURE OF FAMILY DISORGANIZATION. Family disorganization is the culmination of all the related problems of the contemporary family. We have considered some of the major trends in the composition, structure, and functions of the family, as well as some of the major conflicts that continue to plague it. These trends are widely viewed as undesirable departures from an ideal pattern of family values and hence as social problems. Changing functions and increasing conflict are not only undesirable *as such*, but they also contribute to the central problem, which is the disorganization of the family. The failure of millions of individuals to continue their marital relationships until death constitutes the central social problem of the modern family.

The roles of husband and wife are no longer played with the same partner for the rest of his or her natural life. In taking matters into his own hands and (with the passive collaboration of the state) terminating a relationship that for two thousand years has been indissoluble, modern man is violating one of the fundamental values of our society. Christianity has insisted that marital roles shall be terminated only by God, at such a time and under such conditions as He shall see fit. The

secular conception of this role implies that it can be broken voluntarily and hence that conception is an intolerable affront to many people. The widespread acceptance of this new conception is in itself an important social problem.

Family disorganization involves the breakdown of the pattern of roles and relationships that comprises the individual family. As suggested above, these roles involve strong habitual and emotional ties. When they are broken, the individual participant undergoes a difficult period of adjustment, even though he may strongly desire the break. Furthermore, he must improvise his behavior after marriage, for our society has, until recently, provided no accepted set of responses for the divorced person. The latter has perforce lived somewhat beyond the pale and his social status, outside of a few advanced groups, has been an ambiguous and unsatisfactory one. The person who has deliberately broken the marriage ties has been guilty of a form of moral turpitude in the eyes of most persons. This definition is changing in the direction of a greater acceptance of divorce and in the status of those involved. But family disorganization continues to be viewed as a major social problem and will be for some time to come.

The family is disorganized by other factors than divorce. Death annually takes more than a half million husbands and wives (564,000 in 1940), thereby breaking irrevocably that number of marriages.[1] The total number of persons at any one time in this sorrowful state is therefore considerable. In 1947, there were 2,134,000 widowed males and 6,376,000 widowed females in the country.[2] But death is not considered a social problem. The sorrow of bereavement is great, the sympathy of friends and relatives is wholehearted, but death is defined as an Act of God and hence not a social problem. Husband and wife must adjust as best they can to their new

[1] Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, "Our Annual Toll of Widows and Orphans," *Statistical Bulletin* (May, 1944).

[2] Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports: Population Characteristics, *Characteristics of Single, Married, Widowed, and Divorced Persons in 1947*, Series P-20, No. 10 (Feb. 6, 1948).

status, aided by the solicitude of the community. But they cannot change the will of God.

Desertion is another widespread form of family disorganization. The informal nature of desertion has meant that it has never attained the status of a social problem commensurate with its importance and consequences. Desertion implies an act of leaving the spouse without legal action and hence accurate figures upon its incidence are lacking. It has been estimated that approximately 50,000 marriages are annually broken by desertion, most of them permanently. A more accurate estimate involves the number of women *at any time* whose husbands are absent from the home. In 1947, this figure assumed the impressive total of 1,754,000, of whom an unknown number represented permanent desertion.[3] Whatever the actual numbers of families broken by this means, it is by no means negligible as a phase of family disorganization.

The majority of persons are unaware of the extent of desertion. Many others are aware of its existence but prefer to ignore its implications. Desertion is often called "the poor man's divorce" and represents an action taken (usually) by husbands who lack the legal knowledge, financial means, or religious sanction for divorce. The deserted family is thus not legally broken, even though the wife has no husband and the husband no wife. Neither party can safely remarry, for fear of charges of bigamy. Children of deserted families still have a father in name but not in fact. Ambiguity of status is thus the most difficult aspect of the deserted family. The mother is not entitled to social welfare benefits paid to "legitimate" widows with children. She cannot make provisions for herself and children by remarriage. Her marital roles are thus in a permanently chaotic condition. The same ambiguity of status applies to the husband.

Divorce is still the symbol of family disorganization, however, even though death and desertion annually disrupt an

[3] Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports; Population Characteristics, op. cit., Table 1.

equal number of families. When the average person thinks of family disorganization, he usually thinks of divorce. Editorials are written, sermons are preached, and young married couples are warned against the "evil of divorce," as though the latter were a physical force, malevolently intent upon destroying the family. Divorce, however, does not "cause" the disorganization of the family, any more than the legal definition of certain acts "causes" crime. Divorce is merely the formal recognition that two persons wish to terminate the civil contract which unites them as husband and wife. The disorganization of the family is actually caused by changing conditions and clashing personalities. These factors change the attitudes of the marriage partners and cause them to seek the legal dissolution of their union. Divorce is the symbolic representation of family disorganization, but it does not cause it.

Divorce, furthermore, may not even involve the "worst" marriages. However we may define "good" and "bad" marriages—whether in terms of individual happiness, conjugal affection, or similarity of interests—those ending in divorce do not form a category of the hopelessly bad, as against those which do not end in divorce, and so are uniformly excellent. Many marriages that are bad by all conceivable criteria are still held together by factors which Waller has called "cohesiveness." Other marriages are reasonably good but merely lack this element and end in divorce.

Divorce is expensive; it involves emotional strain; it presupposes a certain knowledge of the law and a willingness to resort thereto; and finally it requires a strong and consistent purpose by one or both partners if it is to be carried through to its conclusion. Many marriages which are wracked by conflict, torn by opposing values, and broken by actual desertion still do not end in divorce. These marriages have great *cohesive* power, even though they are in no sense better marriages than some of those where the same factor is less pronounced. Summarizing this important consideration, Waller points out that "marriages which end in divorce are selected from the less satisfactory group of marriages, but it is certain that they do

not represent the whole group of unsatisfactory marriages, and possibly they are not the worst of the group." [4]

Divorce is a reflection of an individualistic society. This individualism has such apparently remote and diverse origins as the Protestant Ethic, the spirit of capitalism, the freedom of the frontier, the decline of the patriarchal family, and the rise of romantic love. We cannot discuss these ideological elements comprising the pattern of individualism, for such a discussion would take us too far afield. Suffice it to point out that the individualism that has permeated our society in economic, political, and religious relationships has not spared the family. Men and women who learn to make their individual choices in every other phase of life do not suddenly abandon this viewpoint when they are married. Individual choice in marriage carries over into individual choice in divorce. The insistence upon individualism is a basic value of our society. Carried to its logical conclusion, this value endangers the value of permanent marriage. Social problems therefore reflect conflicting and inconsistent social values.

FORMS OF DIVORCE. We have been speaking as though there were only one kind of divorce, that absolutely severing the bonds of matrimony and allowing the principals to remarry. In a general sense this is true, and the great majority of divorces are of the *absolute* type, wherein the marriage chains are literally broken forever (*a vinculo matrimonii*). Another and much less common form of divorce is legally possible in approximately half of the states of this country. This is variously called *legal separation*, *limited divorce*, or *partial divorce* and refers to a legally recognized situation wherein a couple no longer share each other's bed and board (*a mensa et toro*) but are nevertheless not free to remarry. The marriage still legally exists, although its relationships no longer obtain. Such an arrangement thus follows the letter of the ecclesiastical prohibition against the severing of those bonds which God has joined.[5]

[4] Willard Waller, *The Family* (New York: Dryden, 1938), p. 537.

[5] Chester G. Vernier, *American Family Laws* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1932), Vol. II, pp. 341ff.

A third variation accompanies absolute divorce in some jurisdictions (notably California) and stipulates that a preliminary decree is not final until a specified period has elapsed, which may range from one month to one year. This means that persons who have been divorced under these conditions cannot remarry until the prescribed period has elapsed. This is the so-called interlocutory decree (*decree nisi*), which is merely a different form of absolute divorce and does not represent a third general type.[6] Federal statistics list the forms of divorce together and do not distinguish between them. The great bulk of the cases, however, are absolute divorces. Permission to remarry is recognized and, in the case of the younger age groups, is usually followed.

TRENDS IN DIVORCE. We may now trace the recent trends in divorce, with special reference to the past two decades. This period saw the number and rate of divorces rise in 1929 to hitherto unprecedented heights, only to fall during the depression. The period immediately prior to our involvement in World War II saw a high rate of employment and a corresponding increase in the number of divorces. Contrary to the general anticipation, the number of divorces continued to climb during our actual participation in the war, even though millions of married men were out of the country. The postwar year 1946 saw the divorce trend reach its highest number and rate in history, only to decrease rapidly in 1947 and 1948. The divorce rate for the decade of the 1950's can only be anticipated at this time. The consensus seems to be that the rate will continue high, although not so high as in the immediate postwar years. The new and comparatively unstable family is apparently here to stay.

Complete statistics on divorce in the United States since 1867 (when data were first compiled) are given in Table 16. In 1867, only 9,937 divorces were granted, with an estimated rate of 0.3 per 1,000 estimated population. The year 1946 marked the largest number of divorces in history, with an estimated 610,000 and a rate of 4.3 per 1,000 population. The

[6] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 152.

TABLE 16

Divorces and Crude Divorce Rates: United States, 1867–1948 *
(Rates per 1,000 estimated midyear population. Figures for 1948 provisional, those for 1947 revised)

YEAR	Estimated midyear population	DIVORCES		Year	Estimated midyear population	DIVORCES	
		Number	Rate			Number	Rate
1948	146,113,000	405,000	2.8	1907	87,000,271	76,571	0.9
1947	143,414,000	483,000	3.4	1906	85,436,556	72,062	0.8
1946	141,235,000	610,000	4.3	1905	83,819,666	67,976	0.8
1945	139,585,518	485,000	3.5	1904	82,164,974	66,199	0 8
1944	138,083,449	400,000	2 9	1903	80,632,152	64,925	0.8
1943	136,497,049	359,000	2 6	1902	79,160,196	61,480	0.8
1942	134,664,924	321,000	2 4	1901	77,585,128	60,984	0 8
1941	133,202,873	293,000	2 2	1900	76,094,134	55,751	0 7
1940	131,970,224	264,000	2 0	1899	74,798,612	51,437	0 7
1939	130,879,718	251,000	1.9	1898	73,493,926	47,849	0.7
1938	129,824,939	244,000	1.9	1897	72,189,240	44,699	0 6
1937	128,824,829	249,000	1 9	1896	70,884,554	42,937	0 6
1936	128,053,180	236,000	1 8	1895	69,579,868	40,387	0.6
1935	127,250,232	218,000	1.7	1894	68,275,182	37,568	0.6
1934	126,373,773	204,000	1 6	1893	66,970,496	37,468	0.6
1933	125,578,763	165,000	1 3	1892	65,665,810	36,579	0 6
1932	124,840,471	164,241	1 3	1891	64,361,124	35,540	0.6
1931	124,039,648	188,003	1.5	1890	63,056,438	33,461	0.5
1930	123,076,741	195,961	1 6	1889	61,775,121	31,735	0.5
1929	121,769,939	205,876	1 7	1888	60,495,927	28,669	0.5
1928	120,501,115	200,176	1 7	1887	59,216,733	27,919	0.5
1927	119,038,062	196,292	1 6	1886	57,937,540	25,535	0.4
1926	117,399,225	184,678	1 6	1885	56,658,347	23,472	0 4
1925	115,831,963	175,449	1.5	1884	55,379,154	22,994	0 4
1924	114,113,463	170,952	1.5	1883	54,099,961	23,198	0.4
1923	111,949,945	165,096	1 5	1882	52,820,768	22,112	0.4
1922	110,054,778	148,815	1.4	1881	51,541,575	20,762	0.4
1921	108,541,489	159,580	1 5	1880	50,262,382	19,663	0 4
1920	106,466,420	170,505	1 6	1879	49,208,194	17,083	0 3
1919	105,062,747	141,527	1 3	1878	48,174,461	16,089	0.3
1918	104,549,886	116,254	1 1	1877	47,140,727	15,687	0.3
1917	103,413,743	121,564	1.2	1876	46,106,994	14,800	0 3
1916	101,965,984	114,000	1.1	1875	45,073,260	14,212	0.3
1915	100,549,013	104,298	1.0	1874	44,039,527	13,989	0.3
1914	99,117,567	100,584	1 0	1873	43,005,794	13,156	0.3
1913	97,226,814	91,307	0.9	1872	41,972,060	12,390	0.3
1912	95,331,300	94,318	1.0	1871	40,938,327	11,586	0.3
1911	93,867,814	89,219	1 0	1870	39,904,593	10,962	0.3
1910	92,406,536	83,045	0.9	1869	39,050,729	10,939	0.3
1909	90,491,525	79,671	0.9	1868	38,213,216	10,150	0.3
1908	88,708,976	76,852	0 9	1867	37,375,703	9,937	0.3

* National Office of Vital Statistics, Vital Statistics-Special Reports, *Provisional Marriage and Divorce Statistics: United States, 1948*, Vol. 31, No. 16 (Nov. 4, 1949), Table 9.

year 1948 saw the number reduced to 405,000 and the rate to 2.8. In the decades from 1867–1948, the disorganization of the family has fluctuated in cyclical fashion because of wars, depressions, and other social changes. Throughout this period, however, the secular (i.e., long-range) trend has been consistently upward. Divorce has thus steadily increased in importance as a social problem.

A misleading comparison of marriage and divorce figures has been popular in recent years, based upon the ratio between marriages and divorces in a given year. This comparison erroneously assumes that such a ratio indicates the "predictability" of divorce. In the year 1945, for example, there were approximately 31 divorces for every 100 marriages, thereby giving rise to the slogan that "one out of every three marriages ends in divorce." This statement does not provide any insight into the number of marriages in 1945 (or any other year) which will eventually end in divorce. The great majority of divorces granted in any one year involve marriages begun several years before; very few marriages begun in one year end in divorce *in the same year*. Thus any data on the number of marriages begun in 1945, say, and eventually ending in divorce would have to wait until the 1945 newly weds who would eventually divorce each other had actually done so. Hence any ratio based upon the number of marriages and divorces in any given year is meaningless in determining the probability of divorce.[7]

A somewhat more valid conception of the marriage-divorce ratio may, however, be derived from the *average* ratio over a period of years. In the years from 1930 through 1947, for example, the *average* ratio of divorces to marriages was 20.1 (or one in every five), with the average ratio in the war years (1941 to 1945) as 23.0.[8] In this way, a rough approximation of the percentage of past divorces to past marriages is obtained,

[7] *The American Family: A Factual Background*, Report of Inter-Agency Committee on Background Materials, National Conference on Family Life, Washington, May, 1948, p. 19.

[8] Ibid., p. 20, Table 8.

although even this figure has little actual predictive value for the future. We *do* know, however, that a considerable number of the marriages begun each year will eventually end in divorce, thereby constituting a social problem. We also know that a large proportion of the divorced will ultimately remarry (see below) and begin other family relationships. This fact of remarriage further complicates the definition of family disorganization, since this situation is not anticipated in the traditional value-pattern.

ASPECTS OF DIVORCE. We turn now to some of the aspects of divorce as the central symbolic form of family disorganization. These elements involve varied sociological considerations, from the vagaries of the law to regional differences in the United States.

1. *Legal Causes of Divorce.* Divorce is first and foremost a legal matter. Divorce is granted only after a legal process wherein one party (the plaintiff) demonstrates to the satisfaction of the judge that the other party (the defendant) has injured him or her to such an extent that the contract binding them in marriage should be dissolved. Hence it is necessary to show legal cause for a divorce, which means (in effect) that the respective lawyers must demonstrate that one party has committed an act defined *in that state* as constituting grounds for divorce. This requisite act may have little or nothing to do with the actual reasons why two persons wish a divorce; hence there is often only an incidental relationship between the "legal" causes of divorce and the "real" causes which have actually disorganized the individual family. The "real" causes of family disorganization have been considered above. The "legal" causes depend upon the statutes of the various states.

Legal causes differ widely from one jurisdiction to another. In South Carolina, divorce was not allowed on any grounds whatsoever until 1949. In New York State, divorce is granted only on the grounds of adultery—i.e., "the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married man or woman with a person other

than the offender's spouse." [9] Other states grant divorces for a variety of reasons, some of them bizarre and fantastic indeed, such as "fleeing from justice" and "joining the Shakers." The principal legal grounds, in terms of incidence in a representative group of states, are as follows: cruelty (50.2 per cent); desertion (33.0 per cent); neglect (8.4 per cent); adultery (3.5 per cent); drunkenness (2.0 per cent); and miscellaneous (2.9 per cent).[10]

Cruelty and desertion thus constitute more than 80 per cent of all legal grounds employed. This choice is dictated largely by the fact that the definitions of cruelty and desertion are both more elastic and less damaging to the defendant than, for example, adultery or drunkenness. This obviously does not mean that more than 80 per cent of all family conflicts actually involve cruelty (however defined) or desertion. As we have seen, the most serious conflicts are only remotely related to cruelty or desertion, but instead reflect such factors as clashing personalities, religious differences, frustrated romanticism, and the like. With few exceptions, legal provisions are not made for these difficulties as grounds for divorce. The common law arose over the long centuries when marriage was expected to be for life. Hence the individual had to commit a very tangible injury upon his spouse to provide the latter with grounds for breaking this presumably indissoluble relationship. Today, persons break their marriages for other and less "tangible" reasons. The law, however, continues to maintain the traditional definitions.

2. *Number of Divorced Persons.* In April, 1949, there were 842,000 divorced men and 1,233,000 divorced women in this country who had not remarried. This figure represented 1.6 per cent of all males and 2.2 per cent of all females over fourteen years of age in the population. The increased divorce rate from 1940–1949 is indicated by the lower percentages of divorced men and women in 1940, which were 1.2 and 1.6 re-

[9] Helen I. Clarke, *Social Legislation* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1940), p. 120.

[10] Bureau of the Census, *Divorce Statistics*, Vital Statistics-Special Reports, Vol. 17, No. 25 (June 9, 1943), Table 3.

spectively.[11] Even so, the high divorce rates during the 1940's were largely counterbalanced by the high marriage rates, so that the residue of divorced persons who had not remarried at the end of the decade was not as large as might have been supposed from the divorce rates themselves. Nevertheless, a substantial number of persons had experienced the abrupt change in role accompanying divorce and had not yet made the subsequent adjustment of remarriage. A much larger number of persons, of course, had experienced the crisis of divorce and *had* subsequently remarried.

3. *Children of Divorce.* A central social problem arising from divorce is the presence of children. The contemporary family is so tightly knit that the child looks to his parents for much of his emotional security. During the early years, this dependence upon the parents (especially the mother) is almost absolute and the child deprived of this affection by divorce may undergo a profound shock. This traumatic experience may disorganize his personality temporarily and sometimes permanently. The child who suddenly and inexplicably loses one of his parents through divorce thus loses a basic element of security.[12]

The individual severity of this problem is often very great. Its extent, fortunately, is not as great as might be expected, for the simple reason that the majority (perhaps two-thirds) of all divorces involve childless couples. In addition, the majority of divorced families with children have only one child. Even so, a large number of children under eighteen experience the shock of divorce. It is estimated that this number is annually in excess of 200,000, although exact figures are not tabulated.[13] Furthermore, the high divorce rate in the postwar years, combined with the high birth rate in the same years,

[11] Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports-Population Characteristics, *Changes in Number of Households and in Marital Status: 1940 to 1949*, Series P-20, No. 25 (Aug. 19, 1949).

[12] James S. Plant, "The Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 10:807–818 (Summer, 1944).

[13] Kingsley Davis, "Sociological and Statistical Analysis," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 10:700–720 (Summer, 1944).

may have temporarily increased the number of children in divorce. Whatever the actual numbers affected by this devastating experience, its implications as a social problem are clear.

4. *Regional Differences in Divorce.* Although the broad American culture pattern blankets the country and makes it into one huge culture area in many respects, certain regional differences still remain as vestiges of an earlier day. One of these differences is apparent in the case of divorce. The rates per 1,000 of the population are subject to considerable variation between the different regions of the country. Broadly speaking, the tendency toward divorce rises as one goes west, with the area west of the Mississippi and north of the Mason-Dixon line showing a progressively higher rate of family disorganization than the East and the South Atlantic States. Data for 1940 show a range in the rate from 0.9 per 1,000 population for the Middle Atlantic States and 1.2 for the New England States to 3.5 for the West South Central and Pacific States and a high of 4.1 per 1,000 for the Mountain States. The average for the country as a whole was 2.0 per 1,000 population.[14]

The reasons for these regional differences are cultural in character. The religious distribution is one factor, with the largest concentrations of Roman Catholics in the New England and Middle Atlantic States, where the rates are lowest. Other factors, however, are even more important in determining the tendency of the different regional populations to resort to divorce. Among these factors are the sex ratios (a higher proportion of men to women in the West gives the latter more freedom); social mobility (the western part of the country tends to be more mobile than the East and South); and finally the intangible but important differences in the freedom and elasticity of the social patterns themselves. Freedom in personal relations is the heritage of the frontier, where the individual was less constrained by traditional ties (family and other-

[14] Bureau of the Census, Vital Statistics-Special Reports, *Estimated Number of Divorces by state: United States, 1937–1940*, Vol. 15, No. 18 (March 20, 1942).

wise) and individual choice in marriage and divorce was (and is) most pronounced.

5. *Rural-Urban Differences in Divorce.* The secularization of our society has had, as we have noted, a corresponding effect upon the family. This change has been defined as a social problem by many persons. The basic values of the family are still those which evolved in a rural and agrarian society, and the family which still most nearly approximates the ideal is the rural-farm family. The social disorganization of the city has not spared the family and hence a considerably higher rate of divorce is found among the urban population than among the rural. This rural-urban differential has been summarized by Burgess and Locke as follows: "For both 1940 and 1930, divorces were not distributed in proportion to the distribution of the population; cities had a decided excess, villages a slight deficit, and the farming areas a decided deficit." [15]

This differential in divorce reflects other rural-urban factors. The proportion of gainfully employed wives is much greater in the urban areas, with all that this increased freedom implies in the way of family instability. In 1947, an estimated 20.8 per cent of all urban wives were in the labor force, whereas only 14.9 per cent of the rural-farm wives were so listed.[16] Furthermore, the kinds of gainful occupations differ greatly between urban and rural areas. The majority of gainfully employed women on the farm do either farm management or domestic service, whereas the majority of urban wives work outside the home. The results of this employment pattern have been suggested as follows: "Urbanization means not only greater pressure for money income, fewer children, and lightened household tasks; it means also a more liberal attitude toward employment of daughters and wives, and, above all, enlarged opportunities for employment."[17] This increased eco-

[15] Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke, *The Family* (New York: American Book Company, 1945), p. 633.

[16] *Report of Inter-Agency Committee on Background Materials*, op. cit., p. 95, Table 5.

[17] Hazel Kyrk, "Who Works and Why," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 251:44–52 (May, 1947), p. 48.

nomic horizon is one of the several factors accounting for the higher urban divorce rate.

INTERRUPTIONS OF MARITAL ROLES. Divorce is a social problem because it involves the interruption of a series of relationships deemed vital to the individual and society. The most complex group of relationships for the average individual is that comprising the family. These roles are many and their interruption means a series of crises for all concerned. We may consider some of the forms which these interruptions take, as the individual works out new role-patterns to fit his new situation.

1. *Economic Roles.* The divorced person must make an immediate economic adjustment to his or her new status. This interruption ordinarily concerns the wife rather than the husband, for the latter is usually able to continue his previous occupation. The exceptions arise with certain professional men, whose practice (or even position) may be adversely affected by divorce. Farmers are also immediately affected by the interruption of marital roles, since the wife performs definite and indispensable economic functions in and about the home. For the majority of male urban workers, however, their economic role continues relatively unchanged, whereas that of the wife undergoes an immediate modification. Alimony is granted only in approximately one-third of all divorce actions, and in the balance of the cases the wife must support herself. Hence the high proportion of divorced women in the labor market.

The average divorced woman, as noted, does not have children. She also tends to be comparatively young and able-bodied, so that she can usually find some means of self-support. Of the 1,140,000 divorced women in April, 1947, 792,000 or 69.5 per cent were in the labor force. This compares with only 1,805,000 gainfully employed widows out of a total of 6,376,000, or 28.3 per cent of this group in the labor force.[18]

[18] Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports: Population Characteristics, *Characteristics of Single, Married, Widowed and Divorced Persons in 1947*, loc. cit., Table 9.

Many of the divorced women had previous employment experience, either before or during marriage or both. Even though they may have been previously employed, however, the economic shock of divorce is often a violent one. Whether she wants to or not, the average divorced woman is forced to make an abrupt entrance into the labor market, often under terms not of her own choosing.

2. *Social Roles.* The divorced person must also make immediate adjustments in his social relationships. He must maintain his contacts with former groups and make new contacts as well. Married couples carry on the majority of their social contacts as a unit; when this unit is broken, other relationships are interrupted. Because of the comparative novelty of his status, the divorced person has no well-established pattern to guide him. His friends are often embarrassed at his new status and his wife's friends are often openly hostile, on the assumption that he has deliberately "wronged" his erstwhile spouse. The traditional roles of husband and wife—and the reciprocal roles of others toward them—are established by precedent and universally understood. The new roles of divorced husband and wife are not yet firmly established. As a result, the participants in the new relationship are unsure of themselves. This element of personal insecurity is a difficult basis upon which to establish a new set of roles.[19]

3. *Affectional Roles.* Sooner or later, the divorcee must adjust to his new affectional status. The importance of this function to the contemporary family not only makes affection a fertile source of conflict, but it also renders the deprivation of affection especially difficult. No matter how estranged the individuals may have become before the divorce, they can both look back to the early days of their courtship and marriage, when they meant the whole world to each other. Once completely centered upon each other, these affectional relationships have progressively deteriorated prior to the divorce. But it is still a difficult situation when these relationships are com-

[19] Willard Waller, *The Old Love and the New* (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1930), pp. 212–214.

pletely and (presumably) irrevocably broken. The individual must perforce look about him for some new outlet for his affectional impulses, whether it be a person, a job, or some other substitute for the love that is lost.

This process of transference is not always easy. Affectional relationships are not as easily severed as legal ties. The newly divorced person may try to find another one who will fulfill the same role as the erstwhile spouse. In this search, the divorcee may undergo a period of sexual promiscuity, with all the attendant risks of venereal disease or permanently changed sexual values. These risks are especially apparent for the divorced woman. The role of the woman in our society does not sanction the aggressive sexual experimentation which has traditionally been permitted the man. Hence the divorcee is faced with the loss of social status if she engages in postdivorce sexual relations, a risk which is not so great for the male. In the latter case, indeed, the Kinsey report suggests that the total amount and character of the sexual relationships of the divorced man do not greatly differ from those of the married man.[20] Whatever the adjustment (or lack of adjustment) of the divorced person in this sphere, the interruption of roles is fraught with difficulties.

4. *New Marital Roles.* The majority of divorced persons adjust to their interrupted roles by assuming new ones. The exact proportion of divorced persons who ultimately remarry is unknown. One estimate for twenty-three states compiled by the National Office of Vital Statistics showed that 7.1 per cent of the brides and 6.8 per cent of the grooms married in 1940 had been previously divorced.[21] Another and even more general indication of the remarriage rate was the comparatively slight increase in the number of divorced persons still unmarried in 1946, despite the large number of divorces in the years from 1940 to 1946. In this period, approximately 5,500,-

[20] Alfred C. Kinsey et al., *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1948), pp. 294–296.

[21] National Office of Vital Statistics, *Vital Statistics-Special Reports*, Vol. 27, No. 10, p. 172, cited in Report of Inter-Agency Committee on Background Materials, op. cit., pp. 20–21.

000 persons obtained divorces, but the number of divorced (and still unmarried) persons in the population increased by only 500,000. An unknown number of these divorced persons, of course, died during the interim, but the great majority of the 5,500,000 remarried.[22]

The high proportion of remarriages among divorced persons thus raises certain qualifications of the social problem of divorce. Much of the discussion seems to be based upon the tacit assumption that each marriage broken be divorce involves the permanent nonmarital state of both participants. If this assumption were valid, the family would indeed be in a rapid state of decline. The remarriage of the majority of divorced persons (especially the younger ones) changes this definition somewhat. For these persons are not abandoning the family relationship entirely, but are merely resuming it with another spouse. Such behavior on a large scale is something new under the sun and is not defined by traditional social values. The status of divorce *and remarriage* as a social problem therefore remains somewhat indefinite.

The mathematical chances of remarriage after divorce have been computed for different age groups. These opportunities obviously vary on the basis of dependents and personal charm as well as age, although age is the most important statistical consideration. Hence the young divorced woman of thirty has 94 chances out of 100 of eventual remarriage, as compared to 60 chances out of 100 for a widow of the same age and only 48 for a spinster of thirty. The divorced man of thirty has an even higher probability of remarriage, with 96 out of 100, whereas the widower has 92 chances out of 100 and the bachelor only 67. The discrepancy between the men and women reflects the traditional role of the male in taking the initiative in marriage. The unmarried woman is still obliged to play the passive role and as a result often remains single for the rest of her life. The young divorced woman, on

[22] Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports: Population Characteristics, *Characteristics of Single, Married, Widowed, and Divorced Persons in 1947*, loc. cit., p. 1.

the other hand, apparently has already demonstrated her marital qualifications, no matter how unsatisfactory her first attempt may have been.[23]

THE REORGANIZATION OF FAMILY ROLES. The central social problem of the family is, as we have suggested, that the family is not what it used to be. Failure of large numbers of persons to play their expected roles thus consititutes the basic social problem. This failure is reflected in the changing functions of the family, in the increased scope and severity of family conflict, and finally in the high rate of family disorganization through divorce. Many of these changes reflect basic modifications in the social and economic structure. Hence nothing much can be done about them, short of introducing a totalitarian dictatorship which would change the family by changing the entire face of our society. We do not wish, however, to conclude our discussion of the social problems of the family on a negative note. Although the clock can never be turned back to colonial days, certain efforts *can* be made toward strengthening and reorganizing the family. We may briefly survey some of these educational efforts, whose ultimate aim is to make the modern family a more effective relationship.

The family of today is dependent upon the satisfactory operation of several general functions, among them the biological, child-rearing, and affectional. Of these three functions, the affectional is probably the most important in terms of the success or failure of the individual family. In the eyes of the participants and the general public alike, the family stands or falls upon the degree to which it fulfills the expectations of its members in this respect. Hence most of the current efforts at family reorganization are directed, deliberately or not, at making this relationship more satisfactory. Marriage is initiated for affectional reasons, with romantic love as central. Marriage is continued as long as it continues to fulfill satisfactorily the expectations of its members with regard to affection. Marriage is broken when it fails to live up to the

[23] Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, "The Chances of Remarriage for the Widowed and Divorced," *Statistical Bulletin* (May, 1945).

desires of the participants as to how much and what kind of affection (broadly defined) should be forthcoming.

1. *Education in Secondary Schools.* An extensive educational program on the secondary level has been in effect for some time in home economics. This work includes instruction in such areas as "food and nutrition, clothing, child development, home management, family relationships, housing, and consumer buying." [24] An estimated 1,500,000 pupils are annually enrolled in such courses in the public secondary schools alone. These programs are geared to a practical level and deal with actual home situations as far as possible. Large numbers of young people receive practical instruction in the mechanics of family life and home management. In this way, they presumably become more efficient in the necessary physical operations of family life.

2. *Education in Colleges and Universities.* Education for family living, however, is more than learning such practical skills as cooking and dressmaking, important as they are. Education in this sense involves the education of the whole person for the most demanding experience of his life. This process is necessarily less tangible than training a boy how to keep the household accounts or a girl how to bake a cake. Education for marriage is, in a sense, more exacting than education for a trade or profession. The skills are less concrete and the expectations are less specific in marriage. But the demands are greater. A man and a woman will make a success in marriage if they are wise and patient persons, not because they happen to know certain technical homemaking skills. The criteria of success or failure in education for marriage are thus difficult to measure. But they are very important.[25]

Education for marriage is training for a role. Most of this training is still imparted informally, through the family, religious affiliations, and age-group companions. Judging from the large number of failures in the marital role, however, this

[24] Report of Inter-Agency Committee on Background Materials, op. cit., p. 147.

[25] John F. Cuber, "Can We Evaluate Marriage Education?," *Marriage and*

informal training is not enough. More complete and efficient education is needed all along the line. Speaking of these broader implications of marriage education, a noted social philosopher has suggested that "The task presented here is to examine the many traditional prescriptions for the male and the female and for the masculine and feminine roles, their implications and consequences, their congruity with the contemporary climate of opinion and social situation, and the necessity for their continuance." [26] Colleges and universities have only recently begun to educate for marriage in this sense.

The pioneer work in this field was instituted more than two decades ago at the University of North Carolina by Dr. Ernest R. Groves. Academic instruction in the family as a social institution had, of course, long antedated the work of Dr. Groves, which was formally inaugurated in 1927. His course was the first (or at least the best known) attempt to educate college men and women for the adult roles of marriage. Growing out of student requests for instruction in this central role, the marriage course at North Carolina dealt with the following matters: "Courtship, Choice of Mate, Engagement, Finances, Marital Adjustment, Domestic Adjustment (meaning problems of relationship outside the realm of sex), Conception and Pregnancy, Birth Control, and Divorce." [27]

The current extent of education for family life in the institutions of higher learning is very considerable, with the trends indicating a continued increase. In the academic year 1948–1949, a questionnaire was sent to 1,370 colleges, junior colleges, and universities to ascertain the amount and kind of education for marriage offered (exclusive of work in home economics and similar subjects). Of the total number of 1,370 questionnaires sent out, 1,270 or 93 per cent were returned. Of this total, some 632 (49.8 per cent) of the institutions indicated that they were offering programs of instruction in marriage and family living (however variously defined and ad-

[26] Lawrence K. Frank, "Opportunities in a Program of Education for Marriage and Family Life," *Mental Hygiene*, 24:578–594 (Oct., 1940), p. 590.

[27] Ernest R. Groves, "Teaching Marriage at the University of North Carolina," *Social Forces*, 16:87–96 (Oct., 1937), p. 87.

ministered). An almost equal number (638 or 50.2 per cent) said that no such work was then being offered. In view of its comparatively recent evolution as an academic discipline at the college level, this showing is indicative of the widespread interest in the strengthening of marital and family roles by education.[28]

The central consideration in this instruction, whether directly or tacitly expressed, is the relative success with which the marital partners play their affectional roles. Such matters as family finances and household management are, to be sure, superficially remote from the affectional relationships of the married pair. But differences at the economic or domestic level sooner or later have repercussions upon marital happiness and conjugal affection. If these affectional roles are played in a manner satisfactory to the participants, other considerations are relatively unimportant. The wife who cannot balance the family checkbook is seldom divorced because of her financial ineptitude. Basic conflicts reflect factors having little to do with double-entry bookkeeping.

The emphasis upon love as the basis for marriage in our society is so strong that it is the central factor either in keeping the marriage together or driving it apart. This emphasis (or overemphasis) is in itself a social problem to many persons because it places a (to them) undue emphasis upon one marital role. Whether acceptable or not, this fact should be recognized and young persons should be encouraged (1) to choose their marriage partners wisely and (2) to do everything possible to make their subsequent personal relationships satisfactory. Education for marriage, by making the individual a wiser and more tolerant person, can do much toward making him or her a better husband or wife.

3. *Adult Education.* The demand for education for marriage in recent years has extended beyond the college campus. Adjustment to marital roles is a problem to people of all social and educational levels and is not confined to the minority who

[28] Henry A. Bowman, "Marriage Education in the Colleges," reprinted from *The Journal of Social Hygiene* (Dec., 1949).

go to college. Hence many of the general organizations serving young people, both single and married, have recently undertaken to provide education for marriage. Adult study groups, church groups, parent-teacher associations, Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. groups, and the like are among the organizations that have sponsored such instruction. This adult education may comprise courses of lectures, panel discussions by experts in the different fields connected with marriage, or discussion groups led by clergymen or educators and covering a course of readings. The purpose of all these courses is the same, whatever the means—namely, to learn as much as possible about the exacting business of being a husband or wife in contemporary society.

These educational efforts by interested organizations are supplemented by the work of several national agencies which provide study materials and expert guidance to adult groups interested in the problems of marriage. The National Council on Family Relations is the most inclusive of these agencies. In its magazine, *Marriage and Family Living*, the Council gathers, summarizes, and disseminates research on marriage and family relations. The related field of parent education is the special province of the National Committee on Parent Education. A third national organization is the Child Study Association of America, which has recently widened its interest from an exclusive preoccupation with the child to include marriage and family relationships. These and many other organizations serve the growing adult interest in family roles.[29]

4. *Marriage Counseling.* A final method for reorganizing and strengthening family roles is the new profession of marriage counseling. Informal counseling of persons about to be married or those who experience marital difficulties is as old as the family itself. Older members of the family, friends, ministers, priests, and doctors have traditionally provided more or less disinterested advice on these problems. The bona

[29] Cf. Muriel W. Brown, "Education and Family Life," in Morris Fishbein and Ernest W. Burgess (eds.), *Successful Marriage* (New York: Doubleday, 1948), Part 5, Ch. 7.

fide marriage counselor, however, has been professionally trained for his important and exacting role and brings to his instruction (in theory, at least) the accumulated knowledge of the social and biological sciences. The average marriage counselor, like the average minister or family doctor, may fall short of this ideal pattern, whether because of inadequate training, personality, or both. The ideal marriage counselor combines a wide fund of information with a wise and sympathetic personality. In this way, his function is to aid husbands and wives to play their marital roles more adequately.[30]

(The marriage counselor has both a preventive and a therapeutic function.) Some persons consult a counselor before marriage and thereby presumably acquire information and insights which will make them more adequate in their new roles. The majority of married couples, however, consult the marriage counselor *after* they have encountered some (more or less) serious difficulty in the performance of their marital roles. Some may desire specific information on contraception; others may be contemplating a divorce and wish legal advice; still others may have a haunting sense of failure at their inability to perform their marital roles in accordance with their expectations. (The relationships in marriage are extremely complex, and the husband and wife may have correspondingly complex problems. The counselor is not an all-wise Solomon, but he can often bring to a situation a fresh perspective which has been completely overlooked by the participants. In these and many other ways, a trained, impartial, and sympathetic third person can often provide insight for a couple which will enable them to start their married life anew.[31])

The American family is in process of transition from a form that was handed down for centuries with little variation to a new type that has not yet completely evolved. Most persons do not like this transition in the institution which plays a central part in their lives. They unconsciously measure the new family

[30] Ernest R. Groves, "Professional Training for Marriage and Family Counseling," *Social Forces*, 23:447–451 (May, 1945).

[31] Cf. John F. Cuber, *Marriage Counseling Practice* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948).

in terms of the values of the old, and they are not happy at what they see. Many of the fundamental changes in the family reflect the adjustment of its members to the social changes occuring in recent decades. These social changes cannot be reversed, nor can the traditional family be revived. Each family must adjust as best it can to industrialism, urbanism, secularism, and the other forces that have revolutionized the society in which the family functions. In terms of the roles which the individual plays in the family, however, a great deal can be done. He can be educated to be a better and wiser human being and hence, presumably, a better and wiser spouse and parent. The problem of the modern family is by no means hopeless. Social action is entirely feasible. It can be taken.

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Part Five

PROBLEMS OF MINORITIES

by Arnold M. Rose

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Minority Groups in America

MINORITY GROUPS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. To a certain extent, all social problems are "problems of conscience." There is a choice of several standards of behavior, and the individuals involved cannot easily decide which to choose. The reader has discovered from previous chapters the conflict of values involved in delinquency, mental disorder, and marital discord. The conflict is largely in the minds of those afflicted with these problems—that is, the delinquents, and criminals, the mentally deranged, and the maritally unhappy. The rest of the population seldom considers itself as contributory to the social conditions which cause these problems, and sincerely wishes them to diminish or disappear. It is not they who have the conscious conflict of values.

For the problem we are now about to consider, however, *most* of the American people have a conflict of values concerning it. Even those who are not primarily hurt by the problem of intergroup relations, who are from what may be called the "majority group," carry on a debate among themselves and within themselves as to how they feel about the problem. The internalized debate is seldom conscious, of course, but is real enough because an unresolved conflict of values exists in the

minds of most citizens. The conflict revolves about how one should act toward members of minority groups. On the one hand, most members of the majority group want to act fairly and decently toward members of the minority, as toward everyone else. On the other hand, they hate and fear the members of the minority, and do not mind taking advantage of them. This conflict of values—which Myrdal called "an American dilemma"—creates the problem of intergroup relations.

How did this problem arise? Our first approach to an answer will be to discover the historical roots of the conflict. We shall restrict our investigation to the United States, not because other cultures and other epochs do not offer comparison, but because our information is relatively complete about the United States.

THE INDIAN. When the European travelers and colonists first arrived in the American hemisphere, they found a population of Indians already here. At the very first, neither group was hostile toward the other. When it soon became apparent, however, that the whites wished to make a permanent settlement and to extend their land holdings, conflict between the two groups developed. In the inumerable battles between whites and Indians—occurring up to the very beginning of the twentieth century—the whites usually won out by virtue of superior weapons, better organization, and usually larger numbers. The Indians were pushed farther and farther west, even after a peaceful accommodation had arisen between the white and the remaining Indian communities in the east.

The nineteenth-century solution to the Indian "problem" was to place them on reservations—tracts of land in isolated parts of the country—run by agents of the federal government and to pay them small sums annually for the other lands taken away. There was not much serious questioning of the belief that it was desirable and necessary to push the Indians west and ultimately onto the reservations. But the harsh treatment of the Indians required a justification—a rationalization. This

took many forms: (a) the belief that the Indians were cruel and dangerous and so had to be kept away from white settlements; (b) the belief that the Indians were shiftless and ungovernable and so were not capable of being incorporated into white communities; (c) the belief that the Indians were mentally inferior and so not amenable to being civilized; and so on. Regardless of the truth or falsity of these beliefs, the fact that they were expressed and repeated so frequently indicates that the problem of how the Indians should be treated was on the minds of the whites. Today, Indians have either scattered and merged themselves into the white population or still live on the isolated reservations, partly supported by the federal government. In the latter situation, they constitute a social problem for the government and for those individual whites who know about them or live near them.

Most of the land in reservations is poor in quality. It is also insufficient in quantity to support the growing populations of Indians. Even in the year of greatest postwar prosperity (1948) the large tribe of Navaho Indians in the southwest was getting so close to starvation that it became a matter of national alarm. The original cause of this situation is that the land given to the Indians was usually land that no one else wanted. Some of the tribesmen were not crop-raisers anyway, and wanted land only for sheep and cattle grazing. Later, when it became more necessary and more feasible to grow crops, the land was too poor to be used for that purpose.

Another early difficulty was that the reservation land was divided among individual Indian owners. Some sold their land, and the reservation shrank in size. A law was then passed preventing the sale of land. Other Indians divided their land among their sons when they died, and the plots became smaller and more unequal in size. Finally, as recently as 1934, a good portion of Indian land was turned into communal property, and the Indians were urged to farm cooperatively. The federal government also bought some land and added it to the reservations. These measures were of

some help, but did not solve the basic economic problem arising from the fact that Indians were originally relegated to reservations of limited size and resources.

There has been a political problem, too. Most Indians were not given American citizenship until a few decades ago, and until 1934 the reservations were closely controlled by agents of the federal government. That meant that Indians were complete political dependents, with no democracy whatsoever. When citizenship was granted to them, they could share in the election of the President and congressmen, but they still had no control over their own reservation, or (in most cases) over local politics.

Since 1934, the federal government has encouraged democratic control where the Indians were willing to assume responsibility for running their own reservations. The majority of Indians took advantage of the opportunity, and a significant number of decisions about how the reservations should be run are now made by the tribal councils. The United States Indian Bureau also greatly extended the practice of hiring Indians to serve as its functionaries on their reservations. But until these changes occurred, the United States was in the position of proclaiming democracy to the world and at the same time denying it to the country's original inhabitants. Even now, a large minority of reservations are still run almost completely by the Indian Bureau, and all of them take some direction from that arm of the federal government.

The Indians are now free to leave the reservation. Why do not more of them go, and solve their economic problem in other parts of the country? The answer is simple: (1) They are frequently rejected by white employers when they apply for jobs; (2) They have had no opportunity to learn the skills that would make them desirable workers; (3) They have not even a small amount of capital to start a business; (4) There is always a little income an Indian can be sure of on the reservation. The dilemma for the Indian is whether to take a chance on getting ahead in the outside world or be sure of his pittance on the reservation. The dilemma for the rest of the nation is

whether or not to keep the Indian out of sight but pauperized and a drain on the federal treasury.

THE NEGRO. In the past century, Negroes have constituted a more serious social problem, partly because of their larger numbers and partly because of the nature of their relationships with whites. A few Negroes came in with the early Spanish and French explorers, but the Negro problem stems from the importation of Negroes to the English colonies after 1619. These were brought in, not as slaves, but as indentured servants. Under English law, an indentured servant was anyone, white or black, who was obliged to work a certain number of years to pay off a debt or fine. An English debtor or imprisoned vagrant could sometimes choose to work off the debt or fine by becoming an unpaid servant in the colonies. Any person who wished to migrate could make an agreement with a ship's captain to be taken to the colonies and set to work for a small number of years. After that period he was free to start afresh in the New World.

Many of the first Negroes had been slaves in Africa, but when brought to America had much the same status as white indentured servants. After serving their term of labor, they hired themselves out or set up small shops. Their social status was like that of white ex-servants. They had their own social and recreational life, and there is evidence that intermarriage was frequent. Conceptions of race had not yet developed, although many whites probably made differentiations on the basis of physical traits. More a barrier than the biological features were the cultural differences; Negroes had to learn the English language and other aspects of Anglo-colonial culture before they could freely associate with whites. Despite these barriers, a few Negroes achieved economic success and positions of influence in the colonies. The increasing difficulty of obtaining Negroes in Africa; the increasing antagonism to the institution of indentured servitude in England (so that white servants were no longer available); and the culture and color antagonism gradually transformed indentured servitude into slavery for Negroes. Beginning in 1664 and carried on well

into the next century, a series of court decisions and colonial laws made servants into slaves. Still there were considerable numbers of Negroes who were not slaves by this time, and many masters continued the practice of freeing their slaves.

The latter half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century was the Age of Enlightenment, which led to the democratic revolutions. During this period there was increasing sentiment against slavery. The European nations gradually abolished indentured servitude and slavery and finally gave full civil rights to those minority groups from whom such rights had been withheld. In America, Jefferson expressed the sentiment against slavery in his first draft of the Declaration of Independence by charging that the King of England was responsible for the slave trade. Others wanted to abolish slavery immediately. But property rights were involved and there was a compromise. The new Constitution provided that the slave trade was to be abolished twenty years after the Constitution's adoption. The wealthy slave-owners were encouraged to make wills giving freedom to their slaves. The Northern states were ready to abolish slavery by law. In 1790, slavery seemed a dying institution, if we examine public statements and the low price of slaves.

A series of events then occurred which transformed the situation completely. The invention of the cotton gin and the discovery that sugar could be produced from cane, coupled with new sources of power and transportation, made it enormously profitable to grow cotton and sugar cane in the South. Cotton cloth replaced wool and linen as the chief source of clothing in much of Europe, and the South expanded and grew wealthy in the trade. Someone had to plant, cultivate, and pick these crops in the hot and humid climate. Most native whites refused, as did European immigrants brought over especially for the purpose. So the Negroes were forced to do this work. As the market expanded, more and more slaves were put into the fields. Large numbers were brought over from Africa illegally after 1808, and slaves were bred to increase their numbers and strength. The greatly increased

value of slaves made it less likely that they would be freed. At the same time, the increased use of slaves and their exploitation in extremely unpleasant jobs also created a mental concern on the part of the whites. A social problem was born.

Justification was therefore sought for this institution which most people had previously thought was wrong and which was being abolished in other nations. Many speeches, books, and articles were turned out in an effort to give slaveholders the feeling that what they were doing was right and necessary. Appeal was made to the Bible, to economic efficiency, to the need for a leisured class as a prerequisite for high civilization, to the alleged needs of the slaves themselves, to conceptions of social order, and above all to a newly expounded biology of races. Linnaeus and other early natural historians, in classifying and naming all the known plants and animals, divided mankind into races on the basis of skin color and supposed mental and moral traits. The slaveholding and Negro-fearing population of the South seized on this possibility that the Negro was an inferior race, a child race that needed to be guided and directed.

The theory of racism was born. This theory spread quickly throughout the country and has since come to be the single most important determinant of intergroup relations. The theory has several points: (1) Negroes are innately inferior to whites in mental and moral traits; (2) This biological inferiority of necessity reduces the Negroes' capacity for cultural achievement and social life; (3) If any Negro "blood" entered the white population, as a result of sex relations between Negro men and white women, the white man's civilization and social life would be doomed. These three component elements of racism were used to justify not only slavery, but also a system of social relations between whites and Negroes, whether slave or free, that for the sake of convenience has been called the caste system.

The caste system was developed in the South in the decades after 1820. Although it was strengthened after 1875 and weakened after 1910, it has basically governed the relations

between Negroes and whites ever since. Its elements include: (1) a complete taboo on formal marriage between whites and Negroes, and a similar taboo on informal sex relations between Negro men and white women (though not on relations between white men and Negro women); (2) a strong and institutionalized effort to minimize the number of social contacts, especially those involving any degree of intimacy between Negroes and whites; (3) where social contacts are necessary to maintain the economy and the community, they must be hedged about by many rules of behavior designed to express the inferiority of the Negroes; (4) a minimum of recognized rights for Negroes, but grants of favor from whites as a substitute; (5) no access by Negroes to the instruments of power (government, large business, and large voluntary associations which act as pressure groups); (6) a fairly sharp division of occupations between whites and Negroes, except that Negroes may hold certain occupations usually reserved to whites if they hold them in the Negro community alone.

This caste system and the racist beliefs which buttressed it were woven deeply into all aspects of Southern life and into some aspects of Northern life during the nineteenth century. It served as the basis for an economy that was highly productive of wealth, for a leisure that was productive of certain desired aspects of culture, and for a system of politics that placed a relatively small Southern oligarchy into positions of national power. It is understandable that, when this system was threatened by democratic and abolitionist sentiment and when the growing industry and population of the North threatened the political leadership of the South, the South should cling even more closely to its caste system and seek to break politically with the North. The South's mental concentration on its racist beliefs and caste system—with the fears they engendered regarding what might happen if slavery were abolished and the pride they evoked in the "superior civilization" of the South—gave that region a fighting morale that allowed it to carry on a war for four years against the overwhelming odds of wealth, manpower, and unhampered for-

eign trade of the North. The North's victory abolished slavery in form and began a movement to attack the caste system. But the North abandoned this effort around 1875, and the unfulfilled threat to abolish the caste system made the Southerners integrate it all the more strongly into every aspect of their way of life. The caste system had become a complete device of oppression by the turn of the century. It is being seriously modified only since World War II.

The broad framework that we have sketched of the Southern caste system should not be thought to be the entire situation. Actually, it consists of hundreds of specific rules that govern the relations between Negroes and whites in all possible respects. The rules differ somewhat from area to area in the South, and some rules have been weakening faster than others, but nevertheless a complicated system of rules may be readily discerned.

We may illustrate the specific rules by citing those which apply to the field of transportation. In the first place, a Negro may not occupy a position of authority on a vehicle where he would come in contact with whites. That is, he may not be a conductor on a train or streetcar, the driver of a bus, or the steward of a dining car, although he is likely to be a Pullman porter, dining car waiter, or redcap. Secondly, the place for him to sit or stand must be separated from that for the whites. In the train there is usually a separate coach car for Negroes, and a Negro who succeeds in buying a Pullman ticket usually gets a private compartment for the price of a berth. In the streetcar or bus, there is a separate section at the back for Negroes, or else Negroes are expected to fill up the vehicle from the rear and whites from the front. Thirdly, there are rules governing how members of the two groups must enter the vehicle. In the bus or streetcar, all whites enter before Negroes. In many railroad stations there are separate entrances for whites and Negroes, separate ticket windows and waiting rooms, and sometimes a Negro has to wait until the ticket seller has served all whites, to find then that he cannot buy a Pullman ticket. Fourth, the Negro coach on a train is

generally in much worse condition than the coaches for whites, and is placed closer to the engine. Until a recent Supreme Court decision, Negroes were not served in the dining car, but today they are allotted one table which is screened off from the other tables.[1] Only Negroes may use this table, but they may not use any of the other tables.

The caste rules in the South, as noted, are not uniform; that is, some areas have many more rules, and more rigidly enforced rules, than do other areas. In general, the Deep South has more caste rules than does the Upper South, and rural areas have more caste rules than do the cities. More significantly, there are variations in application of the caste rules within the same area. Some whites think it proper to behave toward Negroes in ways that other whites think improper, and most whites are willing to violate some caste rules if they are not observed by other whites. These facts illustrate one aspect of the Negro problem as a social problem. There is frequently difference of opinion, questioning, and self-analysis among Southern whites with respect to their behavior and attitudes toward Negroes. Although it used to be true that Southern whites would deny that there was a Negro problem and would maintain that relations between Negroes and whites were fixed and settled, many observers believe that the problem has always been on the minds of the whites. Evidence of this has come from the efforts of Southern whites to justify their caste system to outsiders, from the frequent use of Negroes as subjects of jokes and epithets, from the frequent testing of Negroes to see if the latter cannot be provoked into some expression of opposition to caste. In other words, the Negro problem is a problem of conscience in the sense that it weighs on the minds of people. Thus far, our analysis has been restricted to the South; we have scarcely considered the attitudes and practices of white Northerners or of Negroes themselves. Some of these elements will be considered in subsequent sections.

[1] As this is being written (Winter, 1950) there is a case pending before the Supreme Court regarding the legality of this procedure.

THE EUROPEAN IMMIGRANT. America has always been considered, both by Europeans and by Americans, as a land to which those who were economically, politically, or religiously oppressed could go to escape the oppression. It was also considered a land of opportunity, where Europeans who could not earn an adequate living or who could not rise in accord with their abilities could get a chance to demonstrate their worth. From the earliest white settlements in the New World to the middle of the nineteenth century, there was apparently little feeling that immigrants were exploiting this country or that they took opportunities from those already here. There was a need for labor, and the more workers there were, the more wealth was available to everybody. Furthermore, most newly arriving immigrants took jobs at the bottom of the occupational scale, thus tending to push the native-born upwards. Ideas of political democracy and religious diversity were explicit and strong values for Americans, and thus the predominant attitude toward Europeans who came to America because they were political radicals or religious sectarians was one of sympathy or at least tolerance. Coupled with these attitudes was the "melting pot" theory that all immigrants would eventually become Americanized and hence that any "unpleasant" characteristics they may have had, or any unpopular beliefs they happened to hold, would gradually but inevitably disappear. These attitudes and theories were integrated into the native American's conception of his country as a "frontier democracy" and a generous society.

Because of all these attitudes, America was settled largely by oppressed minority groups from Europe. The first colonists consisted predominantly of Puritans in Massachusetts, Quakers in Pennsylvania, Catholics in Maryland, Jews in New York, and other religious dissenters in other colonies. Beginning with the settlement of Georgia by debtors, the economically oppressed also came to the New World to gain a fresh start. America was made up of minority groups. Although one group dominant in one area might not be tolerant of scattered members of another group in their midst, most of

the early colonists recognized themselves to be minority groups and jealously guarded their group independence and cultural diversity.

Sometime in the early nineteenth century, attitudes began to change. Persons whose ancestors had been among the first colonists began to forget their background as minority groups and began to think of themselves as a majority group called "Americans," with other groups being "foreigners." This development was coincidental with the rise of racism in the whites' attitudes toward Negroes and Indians, and was in part an extension of racist concepts to other whites. The new attitude toward immigrants first became apparent toward the Germans who were arriving in large numbers after 1840. But its virulent character did not manifest itself until the Irish came into the country after 1848. The Irish had the special handicaps—from the established Americans' standpoint—of being extremely poor, uneducated, Catholic in religion, and anti-English in political orientation. The Irish were attacked with words and with weapons. They were charged with a "papist" plot to seize the country, and it was seriously questioned whether they were members of the white race. Descriptions of their character during this period sound like those written by the Nazis about the Jews. Not a few Irish lives were lost in the beatings and riots. A whole political movement called the "Know Nothing Party" was started to combat the Irish. It was only the great intensity of feeling generated by the Civil War that drew attention away from the Irish and allowed the "Irish Problem" to disappear gradually.

The trend of attitudes away from respect for minority differences and away from a belief in the equal rights of minorities revived during the 1870's. The United States was developing an interdependent industrial and commercial economy. Security was correspondingly reduced, as compared to the time when every man could be assured of a basic livelihood by working the soil with his own hands. The first major depression struck in 1873, and the unemployment and poverty made a great impression on all. Writers as well as politicians

called attention to the limited number of opportunities, and some directly stated that immigrants were serious economic competitors. About the same time, the character of the immigration changed; an increasing proportion of immigrants came from southern and eastern Europe. Since the early immigrants were overwhelmingly from northern and western Europe, the new immigrants had cultural practices and norms differing in certain respects from those of their predecessors. These differences alone might not have attracted any special attention, except for the fact that racism had already had a strong development in connection with the Negro problem. Racism sensitized people to look for group differences. The difference which was most frequently seized upon for special attack by the dominant Protestant group was the affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church held by a majority of the new immigrants. Further, a large proportion of them (especially those from Italy) looked forward to returning to their country of origin rather than staying to become Americans. This fact prevented many Americans from thinking of the newcomers as potential Americans of equal status.

Opposition to immigration steadily mounted, led especially by some leaders of labor and farmer groups, and by certain newspaper publishers. It accelerated during World War I, when there was suspicion that some foreign-born persons were actively sympathetic toward the enemy. Opposition continued to accelerate after the war because of antagonism toward the rise of Communism in Europe and a fear that it might infiltrate into the United States through the foreign-born. In 1921, Congress passed the first law deliberately restricting the number of white immigrants and discriminating against those from southern and eastern Europe (earlier laws aimed at keeping out Orientals, and also those who were sick, mentally deficient, or dependent). The law was made even more discriminatory in 1924 and 1927. It limited the total immigration per year to 150,000 and provided that the quota from each country should reflect the distribution of the population by national origin as of 1920. This gave the advantage

to immigrants from western and northern Europe. In 1930, President Hoover exercised his power to prevent the immigration of anyone liable to become a public charge, and for several years during the 1930's the number of immigrants fell so low that it was exceeded by the number of emigrants.

While the economic and political fears of immigrants were strong and real enough, the earlier ideals and values associated with immigration were still present, although now modified and having a conflict role. During periods of prosperity, the economic fear declined. Likewise the political fear disappeared almost completely when it became apparent that fewer and fewer radicals were foreign-born. However, racist and cultural antipathies toward the foreign-born continued, such as hatred of the Jews because of alleged evils in their "nature" and antagonism toward Italians because they were Catholics and had distinctive customs. These became expressed more frequently whenever any question was raised about lowering barriers to immigration. Many individual and organizational voices are, however, still raised to support a bill before Congress to permit the immigration of political and religious refugees. Some businessmen believe that it would be economically healthy to have a steady inflow of immigrant labor. There is usually strong public support for the United States government and private organizations to send money and supplies to other countries for relief and rehabilitation.

Except when an immigration bill comes up for consideration, antiforeign-born feelings get less and less of a chance to express themselves. The number of European immigrants entering the United States, at least those who are poor and have divergent cultural backgrounds, has been very small since 1927. The foreign-born population of the United States is, therefore, both increasingly elderly and increasingly assimilated. Furthermore, its proportion to the total population is declining. There is thus less and less occasion to express the cultural bases of anti-immigrant feeling. The important point, from the standpoint of the native American, is whether the

dominant American cultural patterns in public. In cities at least, the ethnic groups of European origin are identified by nonmembers mostly in terms of distinguishable names; occasional European ceremonials; adherence to the Roman Catholic Church (to which nonethnics also belong) or to one of the Eastern Orthodox churches; and special food tastes. In smaller towns and rural areas, there seems to be greater awareness of cultural differences because people are closer to one another and more observant of private lives. However, most of the foreign-born live in cities where they can maintain their old-country customs more or less unnoticed by outsiders.

Immigration from Europe is now relatively insignificant; the children and grandchildren of most immigrants assimilate readily into the dominant American cultural forms; and immigrants from Europe have the same biological characteristics as the dominant group in the United States. Hence it would seem that the problems of European ethnic groups would shortly disappear. This prediction is based on extrapolation of the trend, not on any principle of inevitability. The German and Scandinavian groups have all but completely accepted the dominant American cultural forms, except in some small communities where they have fairly effectively isolated themselves.[2] Regardless of the degree of retention of original cultural traits, there seems to be little antagonism toward the German or Scandinavian groups by Americans not in those groups. More specifically, there is little or no effort to exclude those of German or Scandinavian background from job and educational opportunities, political office, legal rights, and social intercourse with others. There is no longer much discussion about the danger from, or the inferiority of, members of these groups, nor are they maliciously joked about or given derogatory group names (such as "wop," "pollack," "sheeny," etc.).

[2] In these small communities—many of them in Minnesota and Wisconsin—the Scandinavians and Germans have isolated themselves not only from the rest of American culture, but also from the changes in culture in their native lands. They remain relatively static replications of, say, Sweden in the year 1900, except for technological developments.

These types of discrimination, segregation, and derogation are, to a certain extent, still practiced in the United States against the more recent immigrant groups—for example, the Italians and the Greeks. In the case of the Italians, there was also a tendency toward stereotyping in terms of criminal activities, supported largely by leadership of Italians in criminal gangs and racketeering enterprises and by the high rate of delinquency among Italian youngsters. In the case of the Greeks, the stereotyping was supported by concentration in certain occupations, such as the low-priced restaurants. But even this form of stereotyping has declined, and the groups themselves have lost some of the distinctiveness which supported the stereotypes. It would thus appear that the trend is strongly toward the elimination of all nationality prejudices. This is apparently true even where the nationality group has revived an interest in the group's cultural past and has fostered voluntary segregation in residences or for recreation.

What antagonism remains toward European nationality groups has shifted from their nationality characteristics to their religious characteristics. But even the strong antaognism toward Catholicism on the part of some Protestants is less directed toward individual lay Catholics than it is to the Church and its functionaries. It is a fear of the Church's alleged power and an opposition to some of its policies and doctrines rather than a prejudice against the Catholic people as such. There are signs, however, that antagonism of the latter type is growing—that Catholics as people are increasingly being stereotyped as amenable to superstition and as incapable of independent thought. Some of the more vocal anti-Catholics would revive various kinds of discrimination against Catholics, and would even use violence to repress them.

THE JEW. A major exception to the trend of decreasing antagonism toward immigrants from Europe is the attitude toward the Jews. Jews have lived in America since the earliest colonial days, although their rate of immigration greatly accelerated after 1880. There was always a certain Christian concern about the salvation of Jewish souls, and there was

even a certain amount of social ostracism of Jews after 1870. When the Jews from Russia and Poland came into the country in large numbers after 1880, there was hostility to these particular Jews just as there was to other "new immigrants." But nothing that could be called a distinctive and significant anti-Semitism appeared before 1911. Then, for the first time, newspaper advertisements began to specify that no Jews were wanted in certain available jobs or in certain kinds of residences. There was also a lynching in Georgia of a Jewish manufacturer who was accused, but later acquitted, of killing a non-Jewish child.

It was after the World War I that anti-Semitism really got under way in this country. Jews were widely believed to be behind the Communist movement in Russia and other countries. Some of the "White Russian" refugees convinced some Americans—including Henry Ford—of the authenticity of the forged documents called "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" which claimed that Jews were in a conspiracy to seize control of the world. Ford publicized these forgeries and other anti-Semitic literature for six years before he realized that he was serving as a tool for propagandists. During the 1920's the Ku Klux Klan was also revived and it attacked Jews and Catholics as much as it did Negroes. These activities had their first observable effect in causing some employers not to hire Jews and in causing some landlords to refuse to sell or rent to them.

Henry Ford publicly apologized for his errors in 1927. The Klan was weakened by legal action in 1928. There was a brief respite in open attacks against Jews. In 1933, however, Hitler took over political power in Germany and set up a world-wide propaganda machine against Jews. Numerous organizations were formed in the United States to propagandize against Jews. They achieved a considerable degree of success in several ways. Whereas Jews had formerly been thought of largely as a religious or nationality group, many non-Jews became convinced that Jews were a distinct biological race—a belief which has no basis in scientific fact. Another false belief

which has become widely accepted through propaganda is that Jews "control" certain key industries (banking mainly) and certain political positions in the United States. Actually, the only industries in which Jews are to be found in disproportionate numbers are the manufacture of clothing and the field of entertainment—neither of which are particularly powerful industries. There is strong prejudice against Jews in banking, and only a very small number of Jews have succeeded in becoming bankers. Not many more Jews are to be found in government. Yet several public opinion poll studies have shown that many non-Jews are afraid of Jews because they are too "dominant" in government, banking, and key industries. During World War II, the propaganda decreased somewhat, but the false beliefs continue to be spread by word of mouth.

THE ORIENTAL. The American Indians are members of the Mongoloid race, but their racial kin from Asia did not begin to arrive in the United States in significant numbers until around 1850. At that time there was a tremendous need for cheap labor in the western section of the country to build the transcontinental railroads. Labor agents were sent to China and succeeded in enticing many thousands of Chinese to migrate to the United States as laborers. After playing a large role in building the Central Pacific and other Western railroads, some of the Chinese returned to their home country and others went to work in the mines.

By the 1880's it became apparent that the West was not going to provide the unlimited opportunities it had earlier seemed to promise. Many white men were now willing to give up gold prospecting and work as ordinary miners. Unemployed whites agitated and used violence until they succeeded in driving the Chinese out of the mines. In doing so they created a general sentiment against the Chinese which manifested itself in this country's first racist law restricting immigration. After that, several other laws were passed restricting the rights of Chinese, and propagandists increasingly stereotyped them either as subservient fools or sinister criminals. The Chinese

tried to fight back, but since few of them were citizens their rights were very limited. Because of these conditions, most Chinese immigrants regarded the United States as a temporary stopping place and looked forward to returning to their home country. While they were in this country, they were more segregated as to both residence and occupation than even the Negroes. Chinese in cities were relegated almost completely to slum "Chinatowns" for their homes. Few could get jobs outside of hand laundries and "Chinese" restaurants.

This situation lasted until the 1930's. The only significant change in attitudes of whites toward Chinese between 1880 and 1930 seems to have been that less attention was paid to the Chinese and that they were ignored as accommodating servants. In 1931, the Japanese nation attacked the Chinese nation, and white American sympathies were with the Chinese. Some of that sympathy was extended to the Chinese in this country. Not so many years later, America found itself a military ally of China, and the anomaly of prejudice and discrimination against Americans of Chinese ancestry became apparent. The federal government accordingly changed its immigration laws in 1943 so that Chinese could come into this country and apply for citizenship on a quota basis. More important was the fact that Chinese were allowed into factory jobs, and some were even allowed to live outside of the Chinatowns. They also went into the armed forces on the same nonsegregated basis as any other American soldiers. The general attitude of tolerance toward Chinese has lasted beyond the end of the war.

Japanese did not begin to come to the continental United States in significant numbers until the late 1890's, and the first ones also came on a contract-labor basis. Most of the early Japanese immigrants became farmers, and most of them never left California until the 1940's. When they did go to cities like Los Angeles and Seattle, many of them became successful small storekeepers. In general, they quickly assumed a middle-class position in the United States, not only in terms of occupation but also in terms of education.

The Japanese immigrants suffered the antagonism toward the Chinese prevalent in the United States during the 1890's. Attitudes toward them grew less antagonistic, however, as it became apparent that they were assuming farm jobs not in competition with whites. Their hard-working efficiency impressed some whites, as did their middle-class values, and a certain degree of distant friendliness grew up. About 1905, a new factor entered the situation. Japan had just beaten Russia in war, and certain newspaper publishers saw that as an opportunity to stimulate the fear of white Americans and thereby increase the sales of their newspapers. These newspapers printed a series of articles on "The Yellow Peril," spreading rumors of Japanese infiltration all along the west coast of North and South America. (The imported immigrants were supposed to be Japanese soldiers in disguise.) The newspapers also drew cartoons making Japanese appear sly and sneaky. Most whites on the West Coast were not immediately impressed with this "yellow press" propaganda, but over the course of years their attitudes were gradually changed. Japan was growing as a world power, and they were suspicious of its intentions. These suspicions were directed at home toward the Japanese-Americans.

American newspaper propaganda had another effect. It was utilized by the militarists in Japan to build up popular support for themselves—on the ground that the United States was planning a race war against Japan. By 1931, the prowar party had complete control of the Japanese government and began a military campaign against China in Manchuria. The war lasted more or less steadily until Japan was defeated by the Allies in 1945. During this period there was mounting antagonism toward the Japanese in this country, which reached the proportions of fear and hatred when war broke out in 1941. All Japanese and all American citizens of Japanese descent living on the West Coast were forced to leave their homes and jobs and move into camps in the inland desert and mountain area.

After the end of the war, when American troops were occupying Japan and the United States was looking for new allies, attitudes toward the Japanese again shifted radically. Now they were friendly people, at worst susceptible to being misled. Japanese-Americans, some of whom were cautiously let out of the relocation camps in 1943 and 1944 if they did did not return to the West Coast, became acceptable to white communities in the short space of two or three years. In fact, some were allowed to integrate almost completely in cities of the Midwest and the East. Even on the West Coast, after a short period of antagonism, the attitude of most whites toward Japanese-Americans became almost friendly after 1947. In 1948, Congress passed a bill compensating Japanese-Americans for property losses up to $2,500 incurred in evacuation. This decline of open hatred and discrimination does not mean the end of the "Japanese Problem," however, since many whites still hold the wartime attitudes, and the basic attitudes of racism remain.

A third group of Orientals to come to the United States were the Filipinos. At first they came mainly as students, but after 1920 significant numbers were in the United States for permanent residence. Practically all of those who came were males. They also settled on the West Coast, and met one of the most hostile reactions directed toward any immigrant group. An example of the effects of their ill treatment by Americans is shown by the history of Jose Laurel, who came as a student to the United States, experienced many insults because of his race, and went back to the Philippine Islands with a strong resentment that manifested itself throughout his successful political career. The United States lost much in military and diplomatic support during and after World War II because of the way it had treated a young Filipino student.

Filipinos who took up permanent residence in this country were hired almost solely as migrant farm workers and as houseboys. There were race riots directed against them as early as 1928. There were also several efforts to get laws passed to

drive them out of the country. Congress did prohibit their further immigration in 1934, but repealed this provision in 1946 to allow a small quota to enter. By the Repatriation Act of 1935, Congress also encouraged the departure of Filipinos by offering to pay the expenses of any one who wished to return to his homeland. Only 3,190 persons took advantage of this Act out of a total Filipino population of about 48,000. But the Filipinos as a group are likely to disappear from this country in the not-too-distant future. Most of them are unmarried and many of those who did marry have white wives.

MEXICANS AND OTHER LATIN AMERICANS. The original Mexicans in the United States came with the territory that this country took from Mexico after the war of 1846. In ancestry they represented an admixture of Spanish and Indian. These early residents, called Hispanos, kept themselves aloof from later immigrants from Mexico who had a larger admixture of Indian blood. Although concentrated in New Mexico and Colorado, the Hispanos are not completely a minority group. They vote freely and in some sections of New Mexico are politically dominant. Their legal rights are not curtailed and they are not subjected to mob violence, nor are they socially ostracized. They do have a low average income, a high illiteracy rate, and a high death rate, but in these respects they are not greatly different from the isolated and underprivileged descendants of the English and Scotch who settled in Tennessee, Kentucky, and West Virginia. In earlier days, the Hispanos were discriminated against by Congress, which for a long while refused to allow New Mexico to become a state or to provide public schools and other public facilities. Today the Hispanos are looked down on by some of their neighbors, and they maintain some cultural aloofness by being Spanish-speaking. But there is no serious problem of discrimination against them.

Immigration from Mexico occurred on a small scale up to 1910. About that year, immigration began to rise, and in the following twenty years about one million Mexicans entered the

country (although some three-hundred thousand of these returned to Mexico). Most of the Mexicans moved into Texas and California, where the industrial and agricultural demands for them were heaviest. Some of them moved up into the Midwest, either as seasonal workers on the farms or as permanent unskilled workers in the cities. In Texas, they have been treated something like the Negroes, being subjected to violence, deprivation of legal protection, segregation in both public and private institutions, and economic exploitation. The situation has been so bad that, during and after World War II, when the United States government contracted with the government of Mexico to bring Mexican farm labor into the U. S., the Mexican government would not allow its nationals to go into Texas. In 1948, the governor of Texas took official cognizance of this attitude, and engaged in a number of "good will" activities to change the attitudes of Mexicans and Texans toward each other.

In California, Mexicans have been treated much like other immigrant groups in the United States; there is a strong tendency to look down on and to exploit first-generation immigrants, but not to deprive them of political or legal rights. The second and third generations are considered much more acceptable since they have adopted American cultural forms and are educated in the public schools. In fact, in many California communities, third-generation Mexicans are frequently not even regarded as Mexicans by the rest of the population. By some trick of racist imagination, they are called "Spaniards"—that is, are regarded as whites with somewhat darker skins than most. Against these "Spaniards," especially those who have accumulated some wealth, there is no discrimination or segregation—not even the barrier against intermarriage.

There are still a large number of first- and second-generation Mexicans in California, especially in Los Angeles, who are regarded as being members of an inferior race. The second-generation children of the immigrants are not only subjected to

discrimination but are placed in the confusing situation of not knowing whether to accept the cultural values of their Mexican parents or those of their American surroundings. Not finding themselves accepted by the "Anglos" (as the non-Spanish whites are called), when the institutions of the community urge them to accept American standards, some have formed a somewhat unique society of their own. They have adopted a distinctive costume (a variation of the "zoot suit"), added new words to their vocabulary, and formed their own recreational and social groups. As in the case of most other second-generation youth, they have a somewhat higher crime rate than the general population, and consequently have been stereotyped as dangerous.

In other parts of the country where Mexicans are found, their experience has been not unlike that in California as far as the general level of discrimination and segregation is concerned. Where they are seasonal farm workers, they are faced with the added burden of frequent migration and failure to establish roots in the community. The children do not attend school properly, since they spend so much time in the fields and in moving. The adults eligible to vote do not do so because they do not stay long enough in one place to meet residence requirements. They cannot find decent quarters to live in even when their earnings are high because few landlords like temporary tenants. In turn, their impermanence creates certain problems for the communities in which they work.

Many other Latin-American groups experience the same problems that Mexicans do in the United States, except that they are not concentrated in such large numbers. Especially among those Latin-Americans coming from Central America, the Caribbean Islands, and the more northerly countries of South America (Brazil and Colombia), there is a mixture of white, Indian, and Negro ancestry that makes some of them conspicuous targets for racism. Since racism is relatively unknown in most of their home countries, they become especially sensitive to it when they meet it here, and the rate of return to

the homeland is consequently fairly large. The attitudes they carry back with them nullify a good part of the "good neighbor" policy of the federal government, as government officials have testified. Especially important among these groups are the Puerto Ricans, because of their relatively large numbers (several hundred thousand of them live in New York City) and because they—as residents of an American protectorate—migrate freely into this country. There is great poverty and overcrowding in their homeland, so they can be expected to provide a minority problem in the United States for some time, unless an intelligent policy is adopted in regard to them.

SUMMARY. We have made a very brief survey of the history and present status of minority problems in the United States. While only the highlights have appeared, we can discern a number of important conclusions:

1. The attitudes of racism are part of our culture and are held by most Americans, especially by the dominant whites of Protestant religion and old-American ancestry. These attitudes are at the heart of all minority problems in the United States. These attitudes are in our minds, of course, and thus in a very important sense we create and perpetuate our social problems.

2. There have been changes in these attitudes in the past, both gradual and rapid changes. This indicates that the problems are subject to solution. But past experience also indicates that the problems are capable of becoming greatly accentuated.

3. Except for a few isolated groups, the problems of nationality groups—which were so significant a few generations ago—are steadily declining. These groups are either becoming absorbed into the general American population or they are forming completely accepted and self-accepting sections of the population. The racial groups are still the object of great discrimination and segregation, but hard-fought struggles to reduce their problems are now being won in the courts, at the ballot box, and in the hearts of all Americans. It is difficult to

judge the exact status of religious groups, but there are ominous signs that the problems are increasing.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Discrimination and Minority Groups

MINORITIES IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC LIFE. It is not possible, of course, to describe systematically all aspects of minority problems in the United States in the brief space allotted in this book. Rather, we shall present selected aspects of problems, using each as an illustration of a problem facing several minorities. It is convenient to classify the matters we shall deal with into economic, legal, political and social problems.

1. *Negroes in Southern Agriculture.* As of 1940, 76 per cent of the Negroes in the United States lived in the South and about half of these lived on farms. In earlier decades these proportions were even higher, so it can be said that the major economic problems of Negroes have been those of Southern agriculture. While over one-fourth of the total Southern farm population was Negro in 1940, only 8 per cent of the Southern farm land was operated by Negro owners, tenants, and croppers. Their share in the value of Southern farms, buildings, implements and machinery was equally small. Of those Negroes engaged in agriculture, only about 13 per cent were farm owners or managers, as compared to about 42 per cent among the whites. Some 65 per cent of Southern Negro farmers were

either wage laborers or sharecroppers, for whom there is no possibility of an adequate income and for many of whom there is no assurance of a year-round job.

Regardless of the position of Negroes, Southern agriculture is in a precarious condition. There are too many people trying to earn a living from agriculture; a good section of the land has not been properly cared for and so is eroded; a considerable part of the land is in large plantations, so that most farmers must be tenants or sharecroppers rather than owners; most agriculture is devoted to growing cotton rather than being diversified; the demand for cotton is gradually falling off as new types of cloth become popular and as other nations learn to grow their own cotton; a cotton-picking machine is now available which could replace most of the human labor; the boll weevil is a special menace to the cotton crop; the federal government (through the Agricultural Adjustment Act) pays farmers not to grow cotton, and there is thus less demand for agricultural laborers.

For all these reasons, the Southern agricultural economy has long been a sick economy, from which only a few large plantation owners could make a consistently satisfactory livelihood. The position of the Negro has been especially bad. Never given any land to start out with after the end of the Civil War, Negroes only very gradually acquired ownership of land. But even this reached its peak as far back as 1910, when the factors discouraging Negro farm ownership became so strong that the absolute as well as relative number of Negro farm owners began to decline. Negroes owned the small and poorer farms and so were especially afflicted by the hard conditions of Southern agriculture. Because they were Negroes, they could hardly get any bank credit; demands from mortgagors were much more stringent; the possibilities of getting tax reductions were slimmer; the chances of getting cheated by middlemen who bought the crop were greater; and—most important of all—in many areas of the South Negroes were not allowed to buy land at all. Thus there have

been few opportunities for successful farm ownership for Negroes in the South.

Negro sharecroppers and farm laborers face still other special difficulties in the South. They are systematically cheated by the white farm owners who hire them. The cropper or laborer is practically never paid in cash, but in credit advances at a general store. On the larger plantations, the store is owned by the plantation owner, but whether owned by him or not there is a general agreement that the store advancing credit charges high prices (for usually inferior merchandise). Records of purchases are kept by the storekeeper, who turns them over to the farm owner, who uses them to balance the wages or profit share he owes the laborer or cropper. While purchases are kept to a minimum, seldom are wages or profits calculated to be higher than purchases, so that the cropper or laborer usually ends the year with a debt rather than a cash balance.

With all the law-enforcement agencies on their side, white farm owners sometimes use this debt as an excuse to prevent croppers or laborers from ever leaving the farm. A legalized peonage may result, from which there is no escape. Negro croppers and laborers, unlike white ones, cannot demand to look at, or complain about, the records of purchases or crop sales, nor can they default on their debts. Unless the owner turns honest, or gets disgusted with the Negro, or the Negro steals away under cover of darkness (very difficult if there is a family and no cars or horses) the Negro cropper or laborer is doomed to a marginal existence the rest of his working days. When past the working age, he has no savings or source of income except what his children may be able to provide. Where the owner allows the cropper or laborer to leave at the end of the season—and this is much more common these days—he may still cheat him out of his cash balance. Croppers move from one plantation to another, year after year, looking for more productive land or for more honest owners. This moving discourages repairs on houses, the development of year-round

vegetable gardens, or the maintenance of the soil. Both Negro cropper and white owner are caught by the unbalanced cotton economy and the caste system.

During the 1930's the federal government (through the AAA) stepped in to aid the Southern farmer, but its influence has been generally detrimental to the Negroes. Seeking to operate democratically, the A.A.A. carried on most of its crop reduction activities through elected committees of farmers. In accord with Southern practices of keeping all political matters in the hands of whites, these committees were dominated by whites who often made their decisions to match their racial interests. In the first years, large government bounties for crop reduction were kept entirely by farm owners, although the owners were supposed to share with croppers and tenants. Even when this practice was stopped, the natural loss of tenants and laborers would not be completely replaced with new ones, and these groups were thus driven out of agriculture. In the long run, this proved beneficial to them, as they moved to cities in both the South and the North, where eventually they obtained better jobs than they ever could have had on the farm. But its immediate effect was harmful. Negroes were more affected than whites, even though they were fewer in number on the Southern farms, because they had no recourse to the legal authorities if the owner wished to drive them out. There were 192,000 fewer Negro tenants and 150,000 fewer white tenants in the South in 1940 than in 1930.

The government's other farm program during the 1930's (the Farm Security Administration) was designed to aid small farm owners and thus helped Negroes and white alike. Still it did not compensate for the economic devastation caused by the A.A.A. The war created temporary economic relief for the cotton economy, as there was an unusual demand for cotton. But the old problems remained, and are exerting their full pressure in the postwar years. While general prosperity continues, it is generally good for Negroes to be especially hurt by the cotton economy, since they are thereby forced into the

cities where they are gradually able to improve themselves economically.

2. *Orientals in Business.* As we have noted, Chinese faced the violent opposition of white workers in mining and manufacturing in the later decades of the nineteenth century. Japanese were never allowed into these industries at all, but were imported as agricultural laborers. Economic opportunities were thus severely restricted for both groups of Orientals, and many returned to their native lands. Those who stayed frequently went into marginal occupations in which white workers either had never been successful or for which they had no desire. The Chinese were successful in starting hand laundries, restaurants, and curio shops. In the case of laundries and restaurants, their success arose from unusually low returns, long hours, and the use of family labor. In the case of restaurants and curio shops they could also exploit the attraction of exotic merchandise. Requirements for any kind of business were that it should not need much capital and that it should not rely on white suppliers of raw materials; these white suppliers might be both prejudiced and expensive. The Japanese early began to move from positions as farm laborers to ownership of small truck farms near cities (on the West Coast), where intensive labor and little capital could create a highly demanded product. Even here, however, they found themselves cheated by middlemen, who paid very low prices for Japanese-grown vegetables and fruits and yet sold them for high prices in the city market. So some Japanese extended their operations closer to the ultimate consumer. They successfully started market stands, produce houses, restaurants, and later on, even hotels. In Seattle in 1938, Miyamoto [1] reports that 46 per cent of Japanese income earners were independent small businessmen or professionals.

For the most part, these small businesses were kept going by extreme frugality and the labor of the entire family. Some of them catered only to the needs of the Chinese and Japanese

[1] Shotaro Frank Miyamoto, *Social Solidarity Among the Japanese in Seattle*, University of Washington Publications in the Social Sciences, II, No. 2. (Seattle, 1939).

communities. It is thus not surprising that very few of them were able to grow into large enterprises. Indeed, as time wore on, competition from large businesses and the greater financial needs of Americanized families forced a high percentage of these businesses into bankruptcy. When Japanese-Americans returned to the West Coast after their forced evacuation during World War II, many of them, formerly self-employed, found their businesses destroyed. Consequently, they were forced to seek employment in other fields. Most of the small entrepreneurs, however, did manage to support themselves and their families in spite of language and cultural difficulties and in a highly competitive system.

The fact that a large proportion of immigrants (and this includes Jews, Greeks, Italians and other immigrants from Europe as well as Orientals) started their own businesses and were successful enough to support their families shows to what a great extent they possessed ideals of independence and self-help. The actual technique by which capital was accumulated to start a business also reveals the co-operative character of the minority community in the face of the white man's prejudice against lending them money or servicing their enterprises. Sometimes the co-operation is carried on by means of Old World institutions, such as the *tanomoshi* among the Japanese.

> Briefly, the *tanomoshi* operates in this manner. If some individual, whom we shall call A, needs monetary aid, he calls upon one of his close friends, B, to start a *tanomoshi*. B then goes around to several of their common friends and induces a group of fifteen or twenty who are interested in such a *tanomoshi* to gather at a dinner on an appointed date. Each contributes an agreed sum, such as $25 or $50, and the pool is rented to A *gratis* since the object of it is primarily to help him. A ordinarily reciprocates by paying the cost of the dinner, and he later pays off his obligations with a small monetary gift to each of the members. His debt is paid back in monthly installments. Thereafter, monthly meetings are called in which

> new pools are set up, and the remaining members bid for its use, the bid representing the interest upon the principal which the individuals agree to pay. With the passing of each monthly meeting, the circle of bidders is gradually narrowed down. The *tanomoshi* closes when each member has paid his debt. This, of course, is only one form of the *tanomoshi*, since several variations are possible.[2]

Despite these aids, most Japanese businesses operate very close to the margin of failure, for only a few are able to overcome the white man's prejudice sufficiently to obtain a white clientele.

MINORITIES UNDER AMERICAN LAW AND JUSTICE. American law is based on the principle of equal treatment of all citizens, and of regarding each person as an individual rather than as a representative of a group. But these principles do not always operate. Lawmakers and judges may be prejudiced against certain ethnic groups, or they may feel that certain groups need special consideration to make up for the discriminations they suffer. Justice is sometimes taken out of the hands of the law and violated by some despotic official or by a mob. Let us consider certain problems of law and justice facing minorities.

1. *Immigration Laws.* One of the strong ideals of the United States until the latter part of the nineteenth century was that this country should be open to free immigration and that it would be a haven for the oppressed and a land of opportunity for the ambitious from other lands. The racism first expressed against Negroes and Indians was gradually transferred to Orientals and to white foreigners. The first manifestation of this in law appeared in the immigration laws, since this was one of the few kinds of law which the Constitution permits the federal government to make discriminatory. In 1882, a Chinese Exclusion Act was passed by Congress to keep out all Chinese working people. By 1907 agitation against Japanese immigration in California had become so strong that Presi-

[2] Ibid., pp. 75–6.

dent Theodore Roosevelt negotiated a "Gentlemen's Agreement" with the Japanese Government, whereby that government would issue no visas to workers, but only to students and businessmen for temporary visits, with the understanding that the United States would pass no formal law to achieve this same aim. In 1917 most other Asiatics were excluded, and by 1921 the antiforeign feeling had grown so strong that a drastic new law was passed.

The 1921 law prohibited the immigration of Japanese (thereby violating the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1907) and contained a "national origins" clause directed primarily against immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. With later modifications, that clause limited the total immigration in any one year to 150,000, and set up a quota from each country which was in proportion to the number of persons in the United States in 1920 "having that national origin." This Act marked the end of free immigration into the United States and acknowledged in law the group antagonisms that had grown up in this country. Although North and South Americans do not come under the quota system, they must meet other qualifications for entry, some of which are quite severe. In 1930 President Hoover by executive order further limited immigration, especially that of Mexicans and Canadians. The immigration law bars anyone "liable to become a public charge." By interpreting this clause with extreme severity, officials were able to refuse entrance to practically all members of the working classes. As a result of all these limitations on immigration, there have been a number of years since 1930 when emigration from the United States exceeded immigration. In 1934, the most recent law against immigration was passed. As part of the law establishing the independence of the Philippine Islands, a clause was inserted specifying that no Filipinos would be allowed to come to the United States except on temporary business.

The motives behind these various laws are, partially, at least, based on the racist beliefs that Orientals and peoples of Southern and Eastern Europe are biologically inferior to

other Americans and incapable of assimilation. Naturally, this provoked a good deal of international ill-will. The militarists in Japan used the U. S. Immigration Act of 1921 as an example of American treachery and hostility. They were helped thereby to gain control of the Japanese government and eventually to declare war on the United States. Other Asiatic leaders who collaborated with Japan during the war—notably Laurel of the Philippines and Bose of India—were motivated partly by the hostility shown toward them by Americans. When the United States was trying to rebuild international good-will during World War II, one of the things it did was to pass laws repealing the exclusion of Chinese, Filipinos, and Indians, and allowing them to immigrate on a quota basis. That relieved some of the special sting for Orientals, although in practice no more than about one hundred persons a year may enter from each country. Those who do immigrate are for the most part wives or intended wives of those already here.

The complete exclusion of the Japanese remains on the statute books and is a source of hardship for the Japanese-Americans in this country. The quota system applies to all the other nations outside the Americas and prevents this country from aiding in the relief of the "displaced persons" who have been victims of the German and Russian dictatorships. In 1948 a Displaced Persons Act was passed by Congress—not to change the quota system but to help displaced persons take full advantage of past unfilled quotas. This Act was so written, however, as to discriminate pointedly against Catholic and Jewish refugees, a fact that has increased the insecurity feelings of Americans of those religious faiths. There is no law against the immigration of Mexicans, but they are kept out by Presidential order. In view of the heavy demand for agricultural labor, border authorities have winked at the illegal entry of Mexican laborers. But any time that a large employer wants to frighten Mexican workers, or any time white workers believe there is too much competition from Mexicans, they get the immigration officials to raid Mexican communities

to arrest and deport these illegals. This practice has proved more than annoying to those Mexicans legally in this country, including American citizens, who are frequently arrested temporarily during these raids because they do not have immigration papers with them. It has also created some friction with the Mexican government.

2. *Fair Employment Practice Acts.* If we exclude the laws and treaties specifying that the United States has certain obligations toward the Indians (because the latter were deprived of their lands and other natural resources), the first positive effort of the government to prevent private discrimination against minority groups was made during the World War II. In the first year of the war, when industry was scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel and war contracts were going unfilled for lack of labor, there were large numbers of minority persons—predominantly Negroes—who could not get jobs because of prejudice. It was said that Negroes were inherently incapable of handling machines and that white workers would quit, even in wartime, if Negro workers were brought into the shop.

The situation was so serious that Negroes organized a "March-on-Washington" movement to bring their plight to the world's attention. President Roosevelt pleaded with them not to display disunity in wartime, but they argued back that they could make a greater contribution to the war effort if allowed to work in war plants. Finally, just before the march was scheduled, the President issued an Executive Order specifying that all contracts with firms supplying war materials should contain clauses prohibiting discrimination on grounds of race, religion, or national origin, and that a Commission (called the Fair Employment Practices Commission) should be set up to watch for violations of the contracts.

The F.E.P.C. had no way of enforcing the rules except by persuasion and publicity. But it did have a staff to which individuals or organizations representing minorities could appeal, and it did have a certain amount of prestige. The F.E.P.C. was able to help many minority members to obtain

jobs from which they had formerly been barred. Three things helped the F.E.P.C.: (1) highly organized protests from minorities, particularly the Negro groups, against discrimination; (2) an extreme shortage of labor; and (3) a heightened consciousness of democratic ideals during the war. Since the F.E.P.C. was a product of an executive order under wartime powers, it died when Congress refused to appropriate money for it at the end of the war. Bills to set up a permanent F.E.P.C. have been introduced into each Congress, but have not yet passed, largely because of the opposition of Southern Congressmen.

In 1946, the State of New York passed an F.E.P. law modeled after the President's defunct order, except that it applied to all employers instead of only to those working on a state contract. Even though there was no longer such a drastic manpower shortage, and even though the state F.E.P.C. was deliberately so gentle with discriminatory employers that it did not even threaten to bring them to court, the Act had great success. The mere existence of the law, and the presence of a distinguished F.E.P.C. to present the facts to employers and unions, served to make many employers hire qualified Negroes, Italians, and Jews (who are the groups mainly discriminated against in New York). Not only did an efficient person in a minority have a better chance of getting a job, but Negroes got the *kinds* of jobs from which they had previously been completely barred—such as department store selling and office clerical work. Employers encountered much less opposition from customers and white workers than they seem to have expected.

After observing the operation of the New York F.E.P.C. for a year or more, various other states and cities in the North and West passed similar laws. Some of these laws went considerably further in giving powers of enforcement to the committees, but such powers have been used very little. Everywhere the F.E.P.C.'s have relied on education, persuasion and—at most—publicity regarding a firm or union violating the law. At the beginning of 1950, ten states and four large

cities outside those states had F.E.P. laws. These states and cities include most of the Negroes living in the North and West, and it has been the Negroes who have been most helped by them. Although the states of California, Minnesota, and Illinois have rejected F.E.P. bills, that seems to have been due to general ignorance of the content of these bills and to the opposition of a few employers who do not want government to interfere with them under any circumstances. On the whole, it would seem that the North and West are not opposed to the principle of "fair employment practice." Major opposition remains in the South. Even there, however, the existence of successful F.E.P. laws in other states has greatly reduced the belief that Negroes cannot learn to run machines or to appear for work on time and dressed neatly. The South is much more willing to give Negroes jobs of various kinds than it was ten years ago, but it is still not willing to pass laws permitting Negroes to make complaints against discrimination. The opposition of white workers to working side by side with Negroes seems to be more important today than the opposition of employers to hiring them.

3. *Maladministration of Law.* The policeman in the North usually belongs to the middle class, has at least a high school education, and is well trained in the technicalities of his job. When he is in contact with minority groups, however, especially where there is tension and unrest, he needs many more tools than he has. He needs to be something of a sociologist and something of a psychologist too. Like many middle-class people, he is often prejudiced against one or more of the minorities with which he deals, and he may not understand why some minorities live under such poor conditions, remain in vice areas, and produce more than their share of criminals. Consequently, he may deal with them as if they were an inferior group, which creates both fear and resentment among minority group members themselves. A few of the large Northern cities have recently attempted to give their policemen training courses designed to provide some understanding of the problems of minorities and how best to handle racial prob-

lems coming under their jurisdiction. If these courses should continue and spread, they should go far in improving the attitudes of Northern policemen toward minority groups.

Southern policemen, by and large, are the least well trained and paid in the country. In many small cities, educational requirements are very low, appointments to the police system are made purely on a political basis, and training on the job is practically nonexistent. In the rural areas, sheriffs are the law-enforcing agents, and they tend to have lower qualifications for their jobs than even the policemen in Southern cities. In addition to enforcing the law, the policemen and sheriffs in the South also have to enforce the system of segregation against Negroes. They further take it upon themselves to uphold those aspects of the caste system which are not part of the law, largely because they personally believe in them. This means that the Southern policeman is usually the agent for depriving Negroes of their civil rights rather than for protecting them. He also is more prone to use violence, partly because resort to violence is more common in the South than in the North, partly because he has contempt for Negroes, and partly because he is not trained in other methods of accomplishing his aims. As a result the policeman is often arbitrary and sometimes acts in a completely illegal way when he is dealing with Negroes. He may enter and search their homes without warrants, take them to the police station on the barest suspicion of wrong-doing, fail to give them adequate protection against real criminals, and at all times be disposed to view them as potential criminals.[3]

Many of these statements about policemen on the beat hold true for the administrative police and for the lower courts. Illegal detention, denial of bail or of the right to see a lawyer, use of the third degree, and plain brutality are more likely to be inflicted upon minority group members than upon

[3] The material on the Southern policeman is taken from an unpublished manuscript by Arthur Raper, *Race and Class Pressures*, 1940. It was prepared for the Carnegie-Myrdal Study and the material may be found summarized in Gunnar Myrdal, with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose, *An American Dilemma* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1944), Chap. 25.

the average citizen. Police officers know that considerable public opinion is opposed to such methods of operation, but they believe, and rightly so, that minority group members are less likely to be able to afford lawyers or to get publicity on their cases. In the South, large sections of the public feel that the Negro is not entitled to any better consideration, and the Negro has very little chance of getting redress except in extremely severe violations of his rights.

The lower courts, too, frequently fail to give equal justice to minority group members. Lower-court judges and justices of the peace are frequently not men of high legal standing. The dockets are crowded, poor people have no lawyers, cases are heard quickly, and often the prejudice or ignorance of the judge operates against the minority group member. Rarely is there protest or appeal, for there is neither time, money, nor knowledge on the part of the victim.

In the South the Negro not only has the disabilities of a poor man, but he also faces special caste discriminations. Crimes of Negroes against whites are dealt with much more severely than are similar crimes of whites against whites. On the other hand, crimes of Negroes against Negroes are looked upon leniently. The word of a Negro has little weight in court. If a Negro wants to be let off, he usually gets a white man of some standing in the community to speak for him. The whole atmosphere of the courts is undignified and informal, compared with our usual picture of the gravity and dignity of law courts. The higher courts, both North and South, are rarely guilty of discrimination or undignified and illegal processes.

4. *A Pattern of Violence.* Prejudiced people occasionally take the law into their own hands in relations with minority members, if they believe they can get away with it. In the South illegal violence is used frequently by whites against Negroes who have committed crimes, against Negroes who have not committed crimes but who have violated one of the hundreds of caste rules, and occasionally against Negroes who simply happen to be around when whites are angry. The frequent use of violence against Negroes in the South occurs

largely because there is practically no punishment for whites who engage in such violence. Even where Negroes are murdered, there is seldom a conviction if the murderer is a white man. The fear of organized white revenge is so great that few but psychopathic Negroes ever retaliate on white men who have beaten them or stolen their property.

Illegal violence in the North tends to take the form of a riot. Riots occur very infrequently, but there may be many people hurt or killed and much property destroyed. In a riot both majority and minority groups are aggressive. Usually highly prejudiced members of the majority group start the illegal violence, but there are exceptions (as in the Harlem Riot of 1935). Once the riot begins, minority members also engage in violence against the majority. Riots in the United States have, at different times, involved many minority groups. We shall describe one riot which involved Mexican-Americans, a riot which occurred in Los Angeles in 1943.[4]

As soon as the Japanese had been forcibly removed from the West Coast in 1942, the newspapers of Los Angeles substituted the Mexicans as the major scapegoat group, and built up a number of incidents of Mexican juvenile delinquency. When a young Mexican was killed under mysterious circumstances, the press and the police made a case against a "gang" of Mexican youths who were alleged to be taking the law into their own hands. The trial was almost a ritual of race prejudice, lashed on by the press and by the court officials who took advantage of the publicity. A citizen's committee successfully obtained an appeal, and the higher court established the innocence of the defendants. But the public had been convinced that Mexican youths were dangerous criminals. Egged on by the press and the public, Los Angeles police conducted raids on the Mexican communities, in which hundreds of people were taken into custody on charges of suspicion and on charges of possessing "implements that might have been used in assault cases."

[4] This summary description is taken from Carey McWilliams, *North From Mexico* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1949), pp. 227–258.

Since it was during the war, the Axis radio was gleefully reporting all evidences of cleavage between the Allies. Representatives of the federal government therefore urged newspapers not to feature the word "Mexican" in stories of crime. The press agreed, but soon substituted the words "zoot-suiters" and "Pachucos," which more effectively labeled the Mexican youth as criminals. This went on for over a year, and there was constant friction between whites and Mexicans. On June 3, 1943, a group of eleven white sailors were beaten by a gang of Mexican boys, and some two hundred sailors organized to take revenge by following the police raid model. They hired a fleet of twenty taxicabs, swooped down on every Mexican they could find, and beat him. The newspapers pushed the war news from the front page and devoted headlines and front-page articles to the "sailor-zooter clash." The next night the sailors were joined by soldiers and marines who paraded through downtown Los Angeles. Only a few incidents happened that evening, but on the following two evenings there were full-scale operations. At first there was no resistance from the Mexicans, but all the arrests made by the police were of Mexicans. ". . . the press now whipped public opinion into a frenzy by dire warnings that Mexican zoot-suiters planned mass retaliations. To insure a riot, the precise street corners were named at which retaliatory action was expected and the time of the anticipated action was carefully specified. In effect these stories announced a riot and invited public participation." [5]

The mobs of June 7 and 8 numbered several thousand servicemen and civilians. They marched through the streets, beating up every young Mexican they could find. They searched movie houses, bars, and streetcars to pull Mexicans into the street, tear off their clothes, and beat them up. Dozens of youths were left lying, sometimes bare and bloody, on the sidewalks. No white person was arrested for longer than a few hours. The riot stopped when the Navy declared down-

[5] Ibid., p. 248.

town Los Angeles "out of bounds" to sailors, the Mexican ambassador addressed a formal inquiry to the Secretary of State, and the federal government appealed to the Los Angeles press and police. Isolated incidents occurred for some time afterwards, and in other sections of the country there began a series of Negro-white riots that continued until responsible committees were formed to stop the practices that caused them.

MINORITIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL LIFE. Minority group members have two major interests in politics: (1) to be able to participate in local, state, and federal political processes as first-class citizens; and (2) to be able to use the political process to better their condition. Both the interests reflect the abnormal position of minorities in America. Some minority groups are deprived of their vote, and some minority members who are candidates for public office cannot draw votes from outside their group because of prejudice. Members of some minority groups vote as a bloc rather than as individuals because they believe that this is the only way to get their rights recognized by politicians. We shall consider each of these kinds of situations.

1. *Preventing Japanese from Voting.* Except for the earliest arrivals, Japanese immigrants have never been allowed to become citizens. They have not been permitted to go through the naturalization process, as are all white immigrants. This prohibition stands as American law, without any exceptions tolerated to this very day. Thus there are many elderly Japanese who were brought to this country as children, who never had any loyalty to any other country but the United States, and who have sufficient knowledge of American history and law to pass the naturalization test. But they never can become American citizens. However, under American law, their children are automatically American citizens, since they are born on American soil without the privileges of extraterritoriality accorded to foreign diplomats.

About the time that a significant proportion of second-

generation Japanese had reached the voting age, Japan declared war on the United States. All Japanese on the West Coast (who then constituted some 88 per cent of all Japanese in the United States) were ordered into "relocation camps" inland. They were not allowed to vote in federal or state elections from these camps, and local matters were controlled by the white camp authorities. In the 1944 election, the only Japanese-Americans theoretically allowed to vote were those who were volunteers in the American Army and the few civilians not interned (and with established residence). Even this privilege was largely theoretical, for the soldiers had to send their ballots to their original home communities on the West Coast, where they were frequently ignored.

After the war, when Japanese-Americans were released from the relocation camps and the Army, they had to reestablish residence (usually taking a full year) and register before they could vote. Few of them could have established their eligibility to vote in the 1946 elections. Thus 1948 was the first election year in which a significant number of Japanese-Americans could exercise the ballot.

2. *Negroes and Group Interests.* The Republican Party was in office after the Civil War, when slavery was abolished and Negroes were given full rights as citizens. Just as the overwhelming majority of Southern whites voted Democratic, so the overwhelming majority of Negroes voted Republican. The attachment of the Negroes to the party of Abraham Lincoln lasted up to the 1930's, when it was broken for the first time by the Democratic party under the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. His administration aided the Negroes in a number of ways on a relatively nondiscriminatory basis and thereby severed the traditional connection between the Negroes and the Republican Party. This change also broke the stereotype that Negroes are too politically ignorant to know which party is best for them.

In 1932, Negro protest voting against Hoover brought the proportion voting Democratic up to about 25 per cent of all

Negroes voting.[6] The estimated proportion of Negroes voting for Roosevelt in Chicago rose from 23 per cent in 1932 to 52 per cent in 1940; in Detroit it rose from 36.7 per cent in 1932 to 69.3 per cent in 1940. While the Negro vote showed every sign of being able to revert quickly to the Republican Party if that party should evince an interest in Negro rights, it has remained predominantly Democratic in national elections. Negro leaders and publicists lose no opportunity to tell the Negro voter that he holds the balance of power in certain key states. In the election of 1948, for example, much publicity was given to the fact that the Democratic victory in the pivotal states of Ohio, Illinois, and California was by a smaller margin than the Democratic majority among Negroes in those states.

Since the 1880's, Negroes have been practically prevented from voting in the South. Among the pseudo-legal devices used to prevent them from voting were:

1. The "grandfather clauses," which restricted voting to those who had voted prior to 1861 and to their descendants. These clauses were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1915 as a result of a case brought by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.).

2. The "white primary," which prohibited Negroes from voting in the Democratic Party's primary election—the only important election in the South. This was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1944 as a result of a case brought by the N.A.A.C.P.

3. The "poll tax," which prevents any one—white or Negro—from voting who has not paid a small tax each year. This has been abolished by legislation in all but six states in the South as a result of efforts by white liberals and poor people.

4. Literary and "understanding" requirements for voting, which are applied only to Negroes, are used as excuses to pre-

[6] Since the race of a voter is not recorded, the figures cited are not exact but are based on special studies of voting in Negro areas of selected cities. The studies are by Elmer Henderson, Harold Gosnell, and Edward Litchfield.

vent Negroes from voting even when they pass the other tests. Because of their discriminatory applications, these requirements were declared unconstitutional by the federal courts in a series of decisions between 1945 and 1949 (cases brought by the N.A.A.C.P.).

In addition to these formal devices, violence and threat of violence have been effective in preventing Negroes from voting. Nevertheless, the legal outlawing of the formal devices during the 1940's, as well as the rising spirit of resistance against discrimination among Negroes, brought increasing numbers of Negroes to the polls. In South Carolina in 1948, for example, about 10 per cent of the eligible Negroes cast a vote. While the evidence is sparse, it indicates that Southern Negro voters, like Northern ones, are voting for liberal candidates in the Democratic Party whenever possible.

The political attitudes and political behavior of the Negroes are thus influenced materially by their minority group position. Their vote is consequently more flexible than that of most other American groups. They are less influenced by other factors which determine how individual white Americans are going to make up their minds about political issues. This situation is admittedly not ideal for the democratic process, where the individual is supposed to make up his mind on the merits of individual citizens and candidates. But the situation is not of the Negroes' own choosing.

MINORITIES IN AMERICAN SOCIAL LIFE. 1. *The Social Status of Jews.* Jews experience a great deal of segregation and discrimination, despite the fact that they belong to the white race and adopt the cultural forms of America after the second generation. It is impossible to identify most American-born Jews on the basis either of physical appearance or manners. But when one *is* identified by other people, he is subjected to social segregation and discrimination. Although there are no laws against marriage between Jews and non-Jews in the United States, feeling against it tends to be strong. Nevertheless, a significant number of such marriages do occur. While Jews are seldom excluded from commercial hotels, they are

frequently excluded from resort and residential hotels. There are no segregation laws against Jews, and hence no legal discrimination in public services, although individual officials occasionally manifest discrimination. Private schools and colleges are sometimes "restricted" to non-Jews completely, or they have "quotas" under which Jews are allowed to enter. Nearly every medical college in the United States has a quota system against Jews, and the quota has been made narrower over the past two decades.

Certain types of employment also tend to be closed to Jews —notably banking and insurance. Sometimes only one Jewish salesperson is employed to take care of the Jewish clientele. Formal restrictive covenants are in force against Jews in nearly every city where they dwell in significant numbers, and there is strong feeling against selling or renting property to Jews in many upper-class Gentile areas where the formal covenant is not employed. Voluntary associations with sociable or recreational purposes (especially those whose membership is drawn from the upper classes) frequently exclude Jews, although voluntary associations with other purposes tend not to exclude them. Fraternities, country clubs, sports groups, and social clubs are among the most completely segregated associations in the United States.

It is in interpersonal relations that segregation of Jews is most extensive. Not only are they kept out of social clubs, but they are not invited to informal gatherings or parties in many circles. They are talked about behind their backs and kept at a distance in neighborly relations. The rationalization usually advanced to justify this behavior is that Jews are unmannerly or "pushing," but the rationalization is even more frequently applied to Jews who do not have these traits than to those who do. The latter tend to be first- or second-generation Jews who have not yet learned American cultural forms, but who also make little effort to associate with non-Jews. Scorn, disgust, and studied indifference are frequent attitudes manifested by non-Jews in their personal relations with Jews.

2. *The Residential Segregation of Negroes.* Housing segrega-

tion occurs at least as frequently in Northern cities as in Southern cities, since in many of the latter Negroes live in what were formerly slave quarters behind the white men's houses. White Southerners have effective ways of separating Negroes and whites other than by residential segregation, and they want Negroes who work as domestic servants to live close to them. In the North, residential segregation plays a greater role in proportion. Since there are no laws requiring segregation, people use those institutional and public facilities which are closest to them. If Negroes live in separate areas, their institutions and public facilities thus also tend to be separate. For the same reason residential segregation prevents Negroes and whites from crossing each other's paths so often on the street. In the South, Negro streets are less likely to be paved and to have adequate street lighting, cleaning, garbage and sewage disposal. In the North, the segregated Negro areas are more likely than not to be slums, with worn-out and obsolete sidewalks and streets, schools, and other public institutions. There are few public parks, public toilets, and drinking fountains. Discrimination arising from residential segregation is less intentional than the systematic kind used in the South, since whites who live in slum areas experience it too. But it nevertheless affects Negroes with special intensity. Also, Negroes cannot move out of the slums, even if they raise their incomes.

Residential segregation has been maintained by various formal and informal pressures. At first laws were used, but they were unequivocally declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1917. Then the restrictive covenants came into use, and operated through most of the period of northward Negro migration. The Supreme Court has recently declared the covenants to be unenforceable in the Courts, and it is yet to be seen if any formal means will be devised to get around this ruling. Extralegal devices—ranging from persuasion to bombing—have also been used to keep members of minority groups out of certain areas. The refusal of individual owners to sell or rent is, of course, the main way of preventing minorities from coming in, and this is legal. However, the

pressure for housing is so great among Negroes that a few of the wealthier ones have to pay huge sums to acquire a residence in an area bordering on the Negro area where normally no one would sell to them.

Frequently real-estate speculators organize the initial invasion, since they know they can get higher prices from Negroes. The informal pressures, including the illegal ones, are then used. If they prove ineffective, because the Negroes are so desperately in need of housing, the whites become panicky and start to move out of the neighborhood. Other Negroes buy or rent the residences, though often not until the latter have passed through the hands of real-estate speculators. Whites who sell out during the panic get low value on their property, although usually the Negroes buying still pay high prices to the speculators. After the panic is over, in a year or two, the value of the property rises above the original level, because Negroes are still overcrowded and still have to pay high prices for housing. The whites who moved out have lost money and have had their hatred of the Negro reinforced. Although residential segregation caused the trouble in the first place, the whites are more determined than ever not to allow a single Negro to gain a foothold in their areas.

Formal segregation in Northern cities has kept Negroes bottled up in small areas, while their numbers have grown considerably. By far the most densely populated areas of the United States are the few square miles allotted to Negroes in Chicago and New York City. The overcrowding makes for bad health conditions, lack of privacy, and friction between people, as well as for high rents. The Supreme Court Decision of 1948, which made restrictive covenants unenforceable, caused a rapid outward movement of Negroes into previously all-white areas in those cities where Negroes were not too frightened by threatened violence. A good number could pay high rents and higher prices for houses than could many of the whites with whom they competed for housing.

In Chicago, for example, Negroes found it possible to move both eastward and southward for several miles outside the old

"Black Belt." In some of the areas, some of the whites gave way to panic and formed mobs to intimidate the Negro families moving in. In these cases, youths bent on excitement used the occasion to overturn cars driven by Negroes, to smash windows and break down doors, and even to do bodily harm to individual Negroes. The police maintained a firm control of the situation by drawing cordons around the Negro homes and by arresting those participating in the violence. After a few days, the mobs ceased to form and the few Negro families in each area were thereafter unmolested. The situation appeared frightening to the uninitiated, for the mobs included up to ten thousand people on at least three separate occasions in the space of a year and a half. But the total amount of damage was not great. The whites calm down when they see that violence does not intimidate the police or the Negroes, and they relax when they find the Negro families respectable and socially responsible. Negro movement into hitherto all-white areas will be reduced as the pressure of overcrowding is now diminishing in the Negro areas. The novelty of one or two Negro families moving in will also soon wear off. It would seem that under present attitudes of prejudice, ignorance, and fear mob violence is a temporary but not unnatural consequence of a Negro family finding a decent place to live.

In this chapter, we have examined a few of the many specific problems of intergroup relations in the United States. We have obtained a notion of the range, but not of the distribution or depth, of these problems of the national conscience. Questions have been raised about the underlying causes of these problems. We may now turn to a consideration of the factors producing discrimination against minority groups. This involves an analysis of prejudice.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

The Causes of Prejudice

THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE. Speculation and study regarding the causes of prejudice have been carried on for a long time, yet a satisfactory answer has not been achieved. The theories advanced are based on a wide range of causal phenomena, and the findings of the studies do not fit into an integrated pattern. Included among those who propound explanations of the causes of prejudice with great certainty are: (1) propagandists for a certain type of policy toward minorities; (2) advocates of certain monistic explanations of social phenomena of the type that includes prejudice; or (3) those who are ignorant of the range of manifestations of prejudice and of the diverse theories and empirical generalizations in the literature. At the present time, it would thus appear wise not to set our minds too exclusively on one explanation, and instead to remain open to explanations that seem at first impression to be bizarre. Accordingly, this chapter will offer the theories and facts relevent to the causes of prejudice, will criticize this information, and will point out some possibilities for integration.

Most of the theories and related studies deal with prejudice against Jews and Negroes, probably because those groups are

the objects of the most continuing and widespread prejudice. Many of the writers on anti-Semitism, and some of the writers on anti-Negro prejudice, consider prejudices against Negroes and Jews to be entirely different in origin and psychological make-up. Other writers deny the distinctions and treat prejudice as a unitary psychological phenomenon. Evidence for the former point of view is offered by those sociologists, like Frazier,[1] who point to the unique historical development of antagonism against one minority group, and by psychologists, like Frenkel-Brunswik and Sanford,[2] who find unique personality characteristics among those strongly prejudiced against another minority group. Evidence for the latter point of view is offered by various studies showing the high degree of relationship between anti-Semitism and anti-Negro prejudice. A notable example of the latter kind of studies is that of Hartley,[3] who showed that anti-Semites said they were also against Danireans—a nonexistent group—as well as against Negroes.

OLDER THEORIES OF PREJUDICE. 1. *Prejudice and Difference.* One of the oldest explanations of prejudice against all minorities is made in terms of fear or dislike of differences. A person who is physically different or culturally different (a Jew or a Negro, for example), is said to cause an instinctive antipathy. This instinctive fear of the unknown or the unusual is supposed to have developed among animals for self-protection and to have continued in modern man as a vestige. The weakness in the theory is that within most species (dogs, for example), different breeds excite no such antipathy in each other. Studies of children show that younger ones do not manifest any inherent antipathy towards members of other races, but are trained to do so, sometimes with great effort. History shows that group differences do not inevitably and naturally lead to dislike and hostility, and it also shows that there is as

[1] E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro in the United States* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1949).

[2] E. Frenkel-Brunswik and R. N. Sanford, "Some Personality Correlates of Anti-Semitism," *Journal of Psychology*, 20 (1945), 271–291.

[3] Eugene Hartley, *Problems in Prejudice* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1946).

much dislike of imagined or stereotyped differences as of real differences. In our own day, the syndrome of red hair, ruddy skin, and freckles has no social significance, whereas the combination of dark skin, broad nose, and thick lips provokes some people to intense hatred. While the theory in its pure form is thus disproved, it nevertheless conforms with observations that men tend to form in-groups in opposition to out-groups, and to avoid sympathetic contacts with members of out-groups that would tend to break down the barriers which are artificially set up.

Two implications for social action could be derived if the theory were correct. One is that prejudice is inevitable as long as group differences exist. The other is that—to the extent that group differences are removable—the minority group is responsible for the prejudice by not looking and acting like the majority. History has given us several examples in which prejudice has declined or changed its character without the minority group changing its characteristics or its behavior (e.g., the Scotch in England in the seventeenth century; the Japanese in the United States after World War II). Studying the incidence of prejudice against Negroes, for example, reveals that there may be no less prejudice against those whose physical features and manners are like those of white people. In fact, in the American South, the Negro who acquires education or wealth or who acts too much like a white man is likely to attract the most extreme antagonism of whites.

Many Jews report quite the opposite experience. Long-Americanized Jews of the upper-income class frequently are told by those who manifest anti-Semitism that this behavior is directed not at them but at the "kike" Jews whose manners are so bad. We do not know whether this observation of the prejudiced can be trusted or whether it is simply a manifestation of the well-known phenomenon that those who are known as individuals are never fitted into stereotypes. The most extreme manifestation of prejudice in modern times occurred in Germany, where Jews were more like non-Jews than in any other country in the world. Other evidence points to the fact

that, under many circumstances, the strange or the bizarre may be the most attractive. Certainly the evidence is so complicated that not much validity can be attached to the "dislike of differences" theory. It should be thought of as a rationalization of prejudice rather than as an explanation of it.

2. *Prejudice and Competition.* Another early explanation of ethnic prejudice is in terms of *economic competition.* When two groups of people are competing for the same economic values —the same jobs or the same markets—they are likely to become antagonistic to each other. Rationalizations for the prejudice may appear, such as charges by one group that the other is unfair, but the essential element is competition. In its original form this theory included a postulate of some biological instinct, such as the instinct of self-preservation, to "explain" why competition took a strong and personal form. In its modern form, it is held by economic determinists, especially by Marxists, who find the economic struggle the central fact in all social phenomena. For them the motivating force behind competition that turns it into group antagonism is not an instinct but the capitalistic system. The capitalistic system thus creates a scarcity in the midst of plenty and one worker is encouraged to pit himself against another. The division can be of one ethnic group against another if historical circumstances have naturally placed workers into such groups. But the motive forces behind antagonism are still competition and the capitalistic system which profits from it.

An example frequently offered is that of Negro and white workers in the South. The white workers are encouraged by the capitalists to express all their dissatisfaction—arising out of working at unpleasant tasks and out of discomforts caused by low pay—against Negroes. Prejudice thus provides an outlet for unrest which might otherwise turn to revolution, and allows the capitalists to exploit both white and Negro workers.[4] Prejudice takes place not only at the worker level but at

[4] This point of view is expressed by, among others: (1) Herbert Aptheker, "A Liberal Dilemma" *New Masses* 59 (May 14, 1946), pp. 3–6; (2) Oliver C. Cox, *Caste, Class and Race* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1948).

all occupational levels, since competition occurs throughout the capitalistic system. Businessmen in the United States, for example, became antagonistic to Jews when the latter began to rise out of the working classes toward the end of the nineteenth century and to compete against the established businessman.[5]

The competition theory seems to explain a good number of historic facts. As was observed in an earlier section, slavery in the United States was on its way to gradual and unopposed extinction in the 1790's, when techniques were discovered to make the production of cotton and sugar cane enormously profitable if slave labor were available. Slavery was then rapidly extended and cemented into the social structure by the growth of racist attitudes of prejudice. Whereas slavery had formerly existed as a weak institution, an economic incentive made it strong and apparently provided the stimulus for the introduction of race prejudice. Another historical evidence for the competition theory is provided in the history of the Chinese in America. When the Chinese were first brought to this country to do the undesirable work of building the Western railroads, there was no prejudice against them. When they first shifted into mine work, there was still no prejudice against them and no competition for their jobs, since whites were engaged in more lucrative pursuits or were prospecting for precious metals. But when it became apparent, in the later 1870's, that few further discoveries of precious metals were likely, and furthermore that the miners' work was steady, whites began to move in and compete with the Chinese. Soon great hostility grew up against the Chinese, and the whole pattern of discrimination was put into operation against them.

Yet the theory has a number of grave weaknesses. Social patterns may continue for reasons other than those which caused them in the first place. In fact, a force which causes a social pattern may later unsuccessfully operate against it. That has occurred in the case of anti-Negro prejudice. There

[5] This point of view is expressed, for example, by: Carey McWilliams, *A Mask for Privilege* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1948).

is no longer much economic gain in the South from the exploitation of Negroes that could not be more successfully had from other activities. If the same amount of time, capital, and other resources now spent in cotton growing with hand labor were diverted to other economic pursuits (including industry and some cotton growing with machines), more profit could be made. But many Southerners are tied to the past and to the exploitation of Negroes so strongly that they cannot see better economic opportunities in other directions. The economic situation is obviously not the most important factor in determining attitudes toward any minority group in the United States today (with the exception of Mexicans), although it might become so again in the future. Another criticism of the economic-competition theory is that this factor is never sufficient by itself to explain prejudice. Competition may exist at an even keel, and yet prejudice will have its ups and downs. Clearly the explanation is too simple, even if it has an element of truth.

3. *Prejudice and Social Control.* A third "classical" theory is based on the sociological concept of *social control.* Like most other social patterns, prejudice against certain groups can become a tradition. Studies of prejudice among children [6] show how parents, older playmates, and the formal institutions of society not only transmit race prejudice to young children, but force them into the social groove which requires that their actions show discrimination. The theory helps to account for the continuation of prejudice when its original cause has disappeared. It also helps to explain why antagonism begun against a particular group continues against that particular group, when other theories simply give a cause of prejudice and do not indicate why one or another group is more hated.

The theory obviously fails to account for the original cause of prejudice. It also fails to account for its motive force. Manifestations of prejudice have an element of violence in them;

[6] See, for example, Bruno Lasker, *Race Attitudes in Children* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929).

anyone who examines them closely will see an element of aggression in even the most traditional and mildest prejudice. The sociologists' explanation of violence in social control is best expounded in Sumner's theory of the mores. Notions of social welfare thus sometimes become attached to traditional ways of doing things and then their violations come to be regarded as an attack on society which must be speedily and rigorously punished. Those who consider prejudice a tradition in the mores frequently take their illustration from the treatment of Negroes in the Southern states. They say that violence occurs when the Negro seeks to get out of his place, and not when he maintains his subordinate role. This, however, is much more a Southern myth than a reality. Violence is associated much more with conditions affecting the white man than it is with changes in the behavior of Negroes.[7] The concept "mores" does not fit the Southern pattern of prejudice in other respects. The mores are universally accepted and not discussed, whereas the Negro problem is constantly being discussed in the South. Furthermore, those who are most aggressive against Negroes in the South are not the leaders of white society but those who are least integrated into the society in general. Clearly, the theory of traditional social control fails to do justice to the facts about prejudice.

4. *Prejudice and Experience.* A minor theory of prejudice explains it in terms of some unpleasant early experience with a member of a minority group. Quite a number of admittedly prejudiced people will seek to explain their behavior and attitudes in terms of some traumatic experience, usually occurring in childhood.[8] The weaknesses of the theory are apparent. Children and adults are constantly having major and minor

[7] C. I. Hovland and R. R. Sears, for example, have demonstrated a correlation between high lynching rate and low cotton prices. Cf. John Dollard et al., *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939).

[8] A study by Gordon W. Allport and Bernard M. Kramer shows that persons with strong prejudice say they have had unpleasant childhood memories of members of groups against which they are prejudiced, to a much greater extent than do less prejudiced persons. "Some Roots of Prejudice," *The Journal of Psychology*, 22: (1946), 9–39.

traumatic experiences involving all sorts of people of their own race as well as of other races, but they do not acquire prejudice against all persons with the physical or social characteristics of the hated individuals. There must clearly be some sensitization to the concept of race as a category before a traumatic experience with one individual can cause hatred of that individual's ethnic group. Psychiatrists have also revealed many individual cases in which the "traumatic experience" proved to be imaginary. From these considerations, it would appear to be as accurate to say that prejudice causes traumatic experiences as to say that traumatic experiences cause prejudice.

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF PREJUDICE. 1. *The Frustration-Aggression Theory.* The frustration-aggression theory was developed at the Yale Institute of Human Relations as a general concept to explain several kinds of human behavior, of which prejudice is only one. Prejudice is considered to be a type of aggression, which is a universal response to frustration. When people's needs are unsatisfied or their acts are interrupted, they respond with aggression. Aggression takes many forms, but these have psychological equivalence. Therefore it is just as satisfactory to be aggressive against a minority group as to be aggressive against the source of the frustration. In this simplified form, the theory is equivalent to the even more generalized Freudian concept of "displacement," in which an attitude toward one object can be shifted to another object and still maintain psychological equivalence.

In his study of race relations in the South,[9] Dollard observed an unusual amount of dissatisfaction with social conditions. Whites of the lower and middle classes could get substitute satisfactions ("gains") of an economic, sexual, or prestige nature at the expense of the helpless Negro. In other words, hatred for an exploitative economic system and a drab life was displaced onto a convenient, easily identifiable object —the Negro—which could provide substitute satisfactions.

[9] John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937).

Later studies of frustration and aggression included an experiment on prejudice.[10] In a boys' camp, the boys were obliged, unexpectedly and arbitrarily, to take a long and difficult examination which prevented them from attending the movies. Half the boys were given a scale to rate Mexicans before the examination, and Japanese afterwards. The other half rated the Japanese before, and the Mexicans after, the examination. The attitudes toward the set of foreigners rated after the frustration (that is, the examination which prevented them going to the movies) were in each case the more unfavorable.

The displacement theory has been used for scientific support by the economic determinists and is subject to some of the same defects of their theory. Specifically: (1) it basically holds that one frustration, or one type of frustration, is the determining factor in a group's whole relation with another group; (2) it assumes that frustration must always have an outlet in aggression; (3) it does not satisfactorily explain why one group, rather than another group or another object, is chosen as the object of aggression.

2. *The Projection Theory.* Closely related to the concept of displacement is the Freudian concept of "*projection.*" Here people attribute to others motives which they sense in themselves but which they would not wish to acknowledge openly. Fascists whose aim is world dominance thus accuse the Jews of plotting to seize control of all countries. White Southerners who hunger for an unbounded sex life accuse the Negroes of being naturally immoral. People who are fearful because of the many uncertainties of modern existence are likely to persecute all the people they can, especially the minorities, because the latter are weak. The fearful "persecute so that they may project upon others the fear that is gnawing at their own hearts. By creating in others terrors greater than they themselves experience men seek to build up for themselves an illusion of security and safety." [11]

[10] John Dollard et al., op. cit., p. 31.

[11] David W. Petegorsky, "The Strategy of Hatred," *Antioch Review*, I (September, 1941), 377.

Projection is a valuable concept since it describes a frequently-acting psychological mechanism. It has a counterpart in everyday speech in the notion of "using a scapegoat." However, it cannot be regarded as a theory of prejudice unless it is combined with a conception of motive that tells why people sometimes project. Assuming that there is a need to create in others fears, lusts, and designs which we unhappily cherish within ourselves, the theory still does not explain why *certain* undesirable attitudes are projected on *certain* other groups. Neither the choice of attitude nor the choice of group is explained.

4. *Symbolic Theories of Prejudice.* Various symbolic theories have been advanced that attempt to explain choice and motive force. Most of them make use of the concept of projection and all of them can be regarded as supplementary rather than opposed to the frustration-aggression theory. A symbolic theory assumes an ambivalent attitude toward an important object, for which social pressures and one's own values demand an ostensibly favorable attitude. The individual still has an unfavorable attitude (usually unconscious) toward this object, an attitude driven to expression every time its favorable twin gets openly expressed. To get expression, the unfavorable attitude attaches itself to an object which has psychological equivalence to the desired or revered object. This object—the symbol—is thus cordially hated or despised.

Freud's theory of anti-Semitism [12] is one of the most complicated of the symbolic theories. It finds the object of the ambivalent attitude to be "God the father." God must be revered and obeyed, but he is also hated as he is the source of repression and authority. Freud developed a pseudo-history to aid his explanation: Moses introduced monotheism, with its repressive morality, among the Jews. After years of driving leadership, he was assassinated by his followers, who thereupon felt guilty for their crime. They repressed the memory of the murder and identified the stern leader they had killed

[12] Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939).

with the strict God they worshipped. St. Paul discerned this guilty ambivalence and hit upon an idea for getting rid of the sense of guilt. Guilt can be expiated; execution of the murderer removes the guilt. Since the Jews considered God as a father, the Son of God could ceremonially allow himself to be killed and this punishment would expiate the crime. St. Paul fastened this role on Jesus, a minor religious leader who had recently been crucified, and so invented Christianity. The Jews who followed St. Paul—that is, the Christians—now felt cleansed of the murder of God, but hated the other Jews who still would not admit the ancient murder and would not accept the cleansing baptism. In this manner anti-Semitism was born and for this reason it was continued. Freud recognizes other contributory motives for anti-Semitism, such as fear of cultural differences, the alleged conceit of the Jews, the numerical weakness of the Jews, fear of circumcision as a symbol of castration, and hatred of Christ as a Jew. But his central notion is that anti-Semitism is symbolically a rejection of the guilt for killing God the father.

Maurice Samuel [13] has developed a variation of Freud's symbolic theory. For Samuel, anti-Semitism is psychologically Christophobia, that is, a real hatred of Christ has been displaced onto the Jews because they gave Christ to the world. Anti-Semites hate Christ pathologically because he is a symbol of peace, equalitarianism, brotherhood, and the other elements of Jewish morality which Christ taught the world. The Nazis, who wanted force to dominate the world, recognized the symbolic connection between Jesus and the Jews, and so were out to kill all Jews with the ultimate aim of destroying the nonforce philosophy. Samuel holds that it does no good simply to disprove rationally the charges against the Jews, or to ask the anti-Semites to excuse the Jews as Christ-killers because they are also the Christ-givers. The real propaganda which will force the anti-Semites to retreat, and make the neutral Christians realize the true significance of anti-Semitism is to reveal to the world the morality of the Jewish religion and

[13] *The Great Hatred* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940).

to prove that Christ's teachings were fundamentally Jewish teachings. Several other writers have expressed belief in the partial validity of Samuel's theory—for example, Herman Rauschning (the ex-Nazi), Carl Friedrich (the American historian), and Jacques Maritain (the Neo-Thomist Catholic). They all hold to a modified theory that the anti-Semites are out to kill the spirit of progressivism and other principles of the French Revolution, and are using the Jews as a symbol of these principles as one line of attack.

Still another symbolic theory of anti-Semitism is one suggested by Lewis Browne,[14] and developed by Arnold Rose.[15] This is that the Jews are a symbol of urbanism, with its emphasis on individualism, intellectualism, ambition, impersonality, money as a common measure, the possibility of revolution, and so on. Most Gentiles have a rural background not so many generations old, and they still fear and hate these urban values. At the same time, they realize that the city is economically essential, and they also enjoy the many cultural and entertainment opportunities that the city has to offer. In order to resolve this mental conflict, which requires that people both hate and like the city, a symbol of the city is sought that can be freely hated, while the city itself can be the object of more rational-appearing attitudes. The Jews have been historically associated with city life, and so they are a convenient symbol of what is hated. Miriam Beard [16] contributes to this theory by pointing out that Christian capitalists of past centuries often sought to absolve themselves of the stain of being "tradesmen" (in order to gain status with the aristocrats) by seeking to transfer the blame for being capitalists to the Jews. She points to historical evidence to disprove the Sombart thesis that Jews were the fathers of modern capitalism, but admits that this false thesis is widely believed.

Another evidence for the theory that Jews are the symbol

[14] *How Odd of Jews* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1934), esp. pp. 225–238.

[15] "Anti-Semitism's Roots in City-Hatred," *Commentary* VI (October, 1948) 374–378.

[16] In I. Graeber and S. Britt, *Jews in a Gentile World* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1942), esp. p. 367.

of hated urbanism and capitalism is the attention given by German anti-Semites to the distinction between *schaffendes* and *raffendes* (productive and destructive) capital. The former refers to heavy industry and commercial agriculture; the latter refers to banking, the entertainment field, and other industries that do not produce material "good." The latter is believed to be exploitative, and the real or supposed concentration of Jews in these industries makes them an object of hatred.

We may now turn to a symbolic theory of anti-Negro prejudice, which has been variously expressed in both popular and scientific form by Halsey, McLean, Rose, and Smith.[17] The heart of this theory is that Negroes are the objects of the whites' desires for, and yet fear of, uninhibited sex. White Americans have a traditional attitude that sex is sinful, and that relations between man and wife are for the purpose of procreation and not pleasure. Yet they desire sex pleasure, and insofar as that desire is denied in marital relationships, it seeks outlet in other forms. Especially in the South, Negroes are thought to be less sexually inhibited (which they are) and more capable of passion (which they are not). The whites who have sex relations with Negroes feel guilty; those who do not do so feel that temptation must be vigorously repressed. The prejudice against Negroes is thus not simply a matter of personal antipathy but rather of *righteous hatred.*

The psychoanalyst McLean extends this general notion by saying that Southern whites lack the capacity for expressing all the warm sentiments, including those of sex, but realize that the Negro has what they lack: "They anxiously search for something which will give meaning to their lives through their contacts with the Negro. These contacts, however, are fraught with the terror of the forbidden. Their inflexible consciences, in seeking a victim to punish for all manner of forbidden impulses, must keep in subservience those who repre-

[17] Margaret Halsey, *Color Blind* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1946); Helen V. McLean, "Psychodynamic Factors in Racial Relations," *The Annals of the American Academy Of Political and Social Science* 244 (March, 1946) 159–166; Arnold M. Rose, op. cit.; Lillian Smith, *Killers of the Dream* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1949).

sent the temptation. Occasionally a lynching relieves the corporate guilt of the white community." [18] In other words, the Southern white's emotional dependence on, and jealousy of, the Negro and his need to repress these feelings cause his constant manifestations of prejudice.

Lillian Smith adds another twist in her statement of the theory. The Negro woman is not only a desired sex object to the Southern white man, but she is so because she represents the Negro mammy. The mammy is the symbol of the gentle and permissive mother, whereas the biological mother plays a repressive role. There is displacement from both mother symbols for the young white male, and he grows up with a dual sex interest. In a monogamous society this creates conflict for him, and he reduces the conflict by expressing callousness and antagonism toward the Negro attraction.

The major weakness of all symbolic theories is that they have never been subjected to a rigorous test. They are based on inferences from observable facts rather than on the facts themselves—that is, the evidence is purely circumstantial. One theory is substitutable for the other, and there could possibly be an indefinite number of theories to explain the same phenomenon. They have the advantage of offering a possible explanation of why certain groups are selected out for prejudice and of the peculiar forms prejudice takes. They also indicate the complex and fantastic nature of the attitudes we call prejudice. These symbolic theories are supplementary, rather than opposed, to such other theories as that of frustration and aggression. But a systematic test needs to be devised to prove or disprove them before they will be of real use either as theory or in practice.

PREJUDICE AND PROPAGANDA. In two of the theories we have already examined, prejudice was seen to have advantages which a certain group could capitalize on. In the Marxist economic competition theory, the capitalists could use prejudice to "divide and conquer" the workers, and so might well devote their conscious efforts to spreading prejudice. In one

[18] Helen V. McLean, op. cit.

of the projective theories, the Nazis are explained as accusing the Jews of plotting to seize control of the world so that they might themselves do this very thing under the guise of saving the world from the Jews. Evidence does exist, therefore, that prejudice can be spread by deliberate propaganda to serve selfish purposes.

Donald S. Strong [19] made a study of organized anti-Semitism in America during the 1930's and showed how it was a bid for political power. Anti-Semitism involves an appeal to nationalism and an underlying contempt for democracy, liberty, and equality and the other values associated with the French and American Revolutions. Strong's chronological distribution of 119 anti-Semitic organizations in the United States is suggestive of the tie-in with the Nazi bid for world domination. Between 1915, when the first organization was started, and 1932, the year before Hitler came to power, there were only five organizations started. In 1933, nine more were started, and the succeeding years saw the birth of, respectively, 19, 13, 18, 22, 24 and 9 new anti-Semitic organizations.

McWilliams's [20] study of prejudice against Japanese-Americans in California shows that this prejudice has been largely the result of agitation by vested interests. For example, he points out that the peak years of anti-Japanese agitation were election years: "Dozens of California Congressmen were repeatedly elected to Congress by their sponsorship of this agitation." McWilliams also points out that agitation mounted after the Japanese had been evacuated from the West Coast in 1942. This agitation was economically motivated; many persons had benefited from the removal of the Japanese during the war and did not want them back. There is little present feeling against the Chinese in California because there has been no organized agitation against them for about twenty years.

[19] *Organized Anti-Semitism in America* (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941).

[20] Carey McWilliams, *Prejudice. Japanese Americans; Symbol of Racial Intolerance* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1944), esp. pp. 3, 25, 44, 235.

This and other evidence clearly suggests that propaganda can spread or intensify prejudice. But there is also evidence that propaganda is often unsuccessful,[21] and it is known from history that prejudice has often been strong without being stimulated by its beneficiaries. Propaganda must then play only a supplementary role, under some circumstances, in the spread of prejudice. These conditions need to be studied, but a whole theory of prejudice can never be built on the analysis of propaganda and its effects.

PREJUDICE AND PERSONALITY. A number of students have sought to explain prejudice as a sort of mental disease. Functional mental disorders can usually be traced to inadequacies in personality development, and prejudice is regarded under this theory as resulting from a particular kind of misdevelopment. Most of the studies in support of this theory take the form of comparing groups of prejudiced and unprejudiced persons on a number of questions about personality characteristics and personality development. The items where significant differences appear are then integrated into a clinical picture of "the prejudiced personality." One study, by Frenkel-Brunswik, Sanford, and others at the University of California,[22] is based on a detailed comparison between the personality traits of known anti-Semites and the personality traits of known non-anti-Semites. The typical anti-Semite was found to be a compulsive conformist, exhibiting anxiety at the appearance of any social deviation. He appears to be a person with little insight into himself, who projects his own undesired traits onto other people. He has a tendency toward stereotyped thinking, is unimaginative, and tends to have unconscious inferiority feelings. He consciously expresses strong parental and religious devotion, but unconsciously manifests hatred of parents and little concern with values. He exhibits

[21] The history of the Dreyfus affair in France is a classic on the role of propaganda and counterpropaganda in prejudice, in which the deliberate propaganda for prejudice had an initial success but an ultimate failure.

[22] Reported in: Ernst Simmel (ed.), *Anti-Semitism: A Social Disease* (New York: International Universities Press, 1946), pp. 96–124. Also see: E. Frenkel Brunswik and R. N. Sanford, "Some Personality Correlates of Anti-Semitism," *Journal of Psychology*, 20 (1945), pp. 271–291.

aversion against emotionality but unconsciously has a feeling of inferiority toward it. He is prone to aggressive fantasies.

Another study was conducted in New York City by Jahoda and Ackerman. They obtained detailed reports on fifty patients who had expressed anti-Semitism while undergoing psychoanalytic treatment, and tried to determine what role, if any, anti-Semitism played in their unstable mental make-up. It seemed clear that anti-Semitism was derived from some distortion in personality structure, and fulfilled certain needs in this respect. Anxiety and lack of security in group membership are the major and uniform traits of this type. Fearing attacks on their integrity as individuals, these personalities counterattack against Jews, the handiest object. The anti-Semitic personality type in this study also has an overwhelming desire to conform, to appear "respectable," to attach itself to dominant organizations, and is characterized by outward submissiveness and inward aggressiveness.

Hartley [23] also made a study of the personality traits of the prejudiced person. Since he found that intolerance toward one minority group is usually accompanied by intolerance toward other minority groups, his description applies to all prejudiced people and not only to anti-Semites. He also obtained expressions of attitudes toward nonexistent groups, and found that prejudiced people expressed prejudice even against them. Hartley's subjects were college students at several colleges. His summary of the characteristics of the intolerant personality follows: "unwillingness to accept responsibility; acceptance of conventional mores; a rejection of serious groups; rejection of political interests, and desire for groups formed for purely social purposes and absorption with pleasure activities; a conscious conflict between play and work; emotionality rather than rationality; extreme egocentrism; interest in physical activity, the body, health. He was likely to dislike agitators, radicals, pessimists. He was relatively uncreative, apparently unable to deal with anxieties except by

[23] Eugene Hartley, *Problems in Prejudice* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1946).

fleeing from them. Often his physical activity had in it a compulsive component. (It may be that this compulsion to be on the move, that is, constantly occupied with sport, motoring, traveling, etc., served for him the same function as did study and activities with social significance for the individual with high tolerance.")

Personality disorder can also involve the concepts of projection and symbolism, as we see in a clinical interpretation of a notorious anti-Semite by the psychoanalyst Gertrude M. Kurth.[24] Her subject is Adolph Hitler, and since he was in a position to propagandize most of Europe into anti-Semitism, the theory has broader implications than the explanation of prejudice in one man. The explanation is in terms of Freudian theory and assumes that desires for incest can be displaced and that guilt feelings can be projected. Hitler's complex was that Jews were constantly seeking to rape non-Jewish girls. Hitler himself had an unusually affectionate relationship with one of his sisters, who later became his housekeeper, and he took her daughter as his mistress. He had apparently entertained incestuous feelings toward his sister since childhood, and probably transferred them from his mother. Hitler hated his father, who died while he was young, but it seems that a Jewish doctor took the father's place in the Hitler household. According to the theory, Hitler abhorred his own incest feelings and hated and feared the person (the Jewish doctor) who was suppressing them. Hitler later thought of the Jew, who was (allegedly) always trying to rape girls, as black-haired, which he himself was. The theory holds that Hitler feared his own incestuous desires and felt a need to exterminate them. The "black-haired Jew boy waiting in ambush to rape an unsuspecting girl" was thus a symbol to Hitler of his own hatred of self. By exterminating the Jews, Hitler was trying to kill the evil in himself. He could then live with his sister, have sex relations with her daughter, and still be at peace with himself.

[24] "The Complex Behind Hitler's Anti-Semitism," *Commentary* V (January, 1948), 77–82.

Aside from any technical defects in these various studies of prejudice as the expression of a warped personality, there are certain conceptual inadequacies. They assume a particular background of personality development, but as yet beg the question of the nature of the development. They say nothing about the situational influences affecting prejudice. They give the impression that prejudice is never a matter of degree, but rather of kind of personality. Nevertheless, the facts that are turned up regarding the personality characteristics of the strongly prejudiced suggest many important problems for further study.

AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF PREJUDICE. In addition to the studies in support of theories we have mentioned, there are many other studies that attempt to throw light on the causes of prejudices. There is thus a great deal of information, but no real integration, of this information. The studies and theories cannot simply be added together, as many of them are obviously opposed to each other. What is needed is an effort to find similarities in the theories despite differing terminologies and a determination of what parts of a theory are essential for explaining certain facts and what parts are not essential. A first approximation of such an integration will be attempted here.

The older theories can be fitted in large part into the modern theories. The economic competition theory fits in well with the frustration-aggression theory, if we recognize that the frustrations involved in earning a livelihood are major ones. The question of whether the capitalist system contributes more to the workers' frustration than do alternative economic systems can be left to empirical determination, and economic frustrations must take their place along with noneconomic ones. The distinctive implication for action characteristic of the economic competition theory then loses its force. Changes in prejudice can occur by means other than revolution, and revolution is not a sure cure for prejudice.

The notion that vested interests can benefit from prejudice

by using it to divide workers and keep them hostile to each other agrees with the modern conception that prejudice may be deliberately propagated. The inconsistency in the economic competition theory can then be eliminated. If prejudice can be spread and intenisfied through propaganda, it should also be susceptible to reduction by the same means. The economic competition theory identifies the objects of prejudice as groups with which the prejudiced are in competition. That fails to explain such a widespread prejudice as that against the Chinese, who are in competition with practically no one. This theory would also give the patently false advice to a small minority group that, if it wishes to avoid prejudice, it should withdraw from competition to presumably inferior positions. Actually there is evidence that Negroes have been experiencing less prejudice recently because they are achieving more equal economic status and are in greater contact (and competition) with white workers. It would seem that the part of the economic competition theory which identifies the object of prejudice had best be dropped.

The "dislike of differences" theory is obviously false, as we have noted, when applied to all differences. But when applied to differences of unconscious symbolic value, and thus fitted in with symbolic theory, it seems to have some truth. If there is something in "Negro-ness" that arouses the ire of the anti-Negro white, then the Negro with fewer of these traits (that is, with more education, more Puritanism, lighter skin perhaps) will arouse this antagonism less. Of course, even if this be true, it helps very little in either understanding or reducing prejudice. Only when it promotes other values, such as getting a better education, will Negroes wish to direct their efforts to minimizing the differences that disturb the prejudiced white man. Otherwise there will be inquiry into what makes the differences disturbing rather than into locating and abolishing the disturbing differences. In dealing with group differences, we should examine the fact that most strongly prejudiced persons live in a world of exaggerated and

imaginary differences. Such persons will go quite beyond the evidence of their senses in finding differences and will even ignore most of their everyday experiences. Under these circumstances, expressions of differences provide clues to symbolic meanings.

The social control theory makes the valuable point that culture tends to perpetuate itself, but beyond that it does nothing to explain the rise and fall of group prejudices or the violence or hatred which attend expressions of prejudice. Traditions are calm behavior patterns and could not exist with the excitement that attends prejudice. Violations of the mores are attended by excitement, but excitement regarding minority groups is more or less continuous for the strongly prejudiced, even when the minority persons are meek. The final proof that the social control theory is inadequate reveals itself when prejudiced people appeal to it to oppose social change affecting minorities. This observation might give rise to a concept of "pseudo-mores," or a system of rules to which some people adhere allegedly out of deference to tradition but actually out of inner psychological compulsion. It would be of great interest to conduct a study of the "prejudiced personality" type in a region (like the South) where apparently most people are strongly prejudiced. Such a study might reveal that certain people are enforcers of the anti-Negro customs and other people simply passively go along with the "rules." Such a study would help us integrate the social control theory with the newer theories and findings about prejudice.

The essential weakness of the traumatic experience theory has already been demonstrated. An unpleasant experience with a member of a minority group might accentuate prejudice for some people. It might also transform a latent prejudice into an active one. But the improbability of finding that most white Southerners had strongly unpleasant experiences with Negroes when they were children, and no such unpleasant experiences with whites, shows that the traumatic-experience approach cannot be a significant one. The statement

of many prejudiced persons that they had traumatic experiences with minority persons suggests that some symbolic theory is necessary to explain the incidence and role of the traumatic experiences.

The "prejudiced personality" and "deliberate propaganda" theories of the causation of prejudice provide valuable supplementary insights but obviously cannot be sufficient in themselves. Those who have made studies of the personality characteristics of strongly prejudiced persons recognize that they must next delve into the developmental histories of these persons. Their findings will then be more amenable to integration with other theories. In the case of the deliberate propaganda theory, the next phase of investigation would bring one to ask the question, "What propaganda is effective, and why?" Answers to this question will also allow the fact that propaganda has been effective in increasing prejudice—especially in the case of attitudes toward the Japanese and Jews in the United States—to be integrated with other theories.

The central theories today which seriously attempt to explain prejudice are based on the concepts of frustration-aggression, projection, and symbolic substitution. These theories have a good deal in common despite the differing kinds of evidence which lead to their formulation. All of them postulate (1) a need to express antagonism (2) toward something which is not the real object of antagonism. The motive force behind the need might be an external frustration, or a major dissatisfaction with some aspect of oneself, or a social pressure to express only favorable attitudes toward something for which one really feels ambivalent attitudes. Which of these three sources of the motive strength is most important needs to be settled by research, but it is possible that all three operate. Not only is there an essential similarity among the three theories, but they complement each other at their weakest points. The symbolic theory does most to explain which group is selected for prejudice and why. The frustration-aggression theory does most to explain the strength behind prejudice.

The projection theory offers a plausible explanation of the psychological function of prejudice—as a cleansing agent to dissolve inner guilt or hurt.

The problem of reconciling the apparently divergent symbolic theories with each other will have to await the development of keener research tools. In the meantime we can point to the likelihood that the outstanding symbolic theories are not so divergent as they appear. If we consider civilization to be the object of ambivalence, we remember that Freud always equated a repressive father—God—with a repressive civilization, we recognize that urban values represent the highest values of civilization (the Latin word "civitas" is the root of both "city" and "civilization," as Simmel pointed out), and we observe that Christian values of peace and cosmopolitanism arise out of an urban civilization. This type of integration may put too much of a strain on the original theories, but we present it as an interesting possibility.

In our excursion through the various theories of prejudice we have observed something of the complexity of the human mind. The layman—especially the prejudiced layman—usually thinks of prejudice as the simplest thing in the world. This attitude helps him to ignore what the facts of complexity reveal—that prejudice lies very close to the core of our culture and its characteristic personalities. In dramatic terms, it is indeed a problem of the national conscience.

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