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similarly situated, receive each a signal favour from a disinterested and self-sacrificing benefactor; the one cherishes gratitude all his life, and the other speedily forgets that he is under any obligation to the individual who has thus befriended him. When these two acts are submitted to the mind, it pronounces its decision instantly and authoritatively; and the one decision is expressed in the language, "This is right," and the other in the words, "This is wrong." Let metaphysicians dispute as they may, moralists may say, about the faculties or feelings exercised when the mind pronounces such judgments, there is no doubt that the mind does pronounce such sentences, and cannot be made to give forth any other. Should any one insist on our producing a reason for these judgments, we reckon it sufficient to reply, that they are primitive judgments declared by the mind on the case being submitted to it, and that we cannot produce a reason for the judgment which the mind utters in this case, any more than for that to which it comes, when, on contemplating first sounds, and then colours, it proclaims them to be different.

But other questions press themselves upon us, and demand an answer; and it is of great moment that we be able to separate the questions which have become confounded together in ethical investigation. The later writers on this subject, in our country, appear to us not to have been sufficiently careful in distinguishing the things that differ, and have at times lost themselves in a labyrinth, in consequence of their not laying out in the fabric which they have built a few leading passages, into which all the others might run.

Besides the general question above referred to, there are in reality four subjects contained in the one grand subject, and the greatest confusion of idea, and in some cases positive error, have arisen from not systematically noticing the distinction between them.

There is, FIRST, the mental process, the faculty or feeling, by which the distinction between vice and virtue is observed.

There is, SECONDLY, the common quality or qualities to be found in all virtuous action.

There is, THIRDLY, the rule by which we are to determine whether an action is virtuous.

There are, FOURTHLY, the consequences which follow from virtue and vice in the feelings of the mind and the experience of society.

The elder ethical writers, whether of ancient Greece and Rome or modern Europe, treated very much of what we have called the general question, and of what we have arranged as the fourth of the specific inquiries. They have shown that there is an indelible distinction between right and wrong, and their most eloquent passages are those in which they have pointed out the consequences which usually follow the good and the evil. Their grand aim was to establish both of these truths, and, having done so, they thought they had secured a deep foundation for morality. No doubt some of them resolved the one into the other—the Epicureans resolving all virtue into a refined love of happiness, and the Stoics speaking slightingly of happiness except in its relation to virtue. Still all the higher order of moralists sought to establish both truths. Some have maintained that we should be on our guard against looking to anything but the personal charms of virtue; and others, afraid that these might not be sufficient to fix our regards, have been fond of magnifying her patrimony; but all agree that she is to be sought after for what she is in herself, or for what she brings with her.

The other questions are also of great moment, and an answer is demanded to them by the precision expected in modern investigation.

The FIRST, or the determination of the moral faculty, must no doubt be of a psychological as well as an ethical character; but it is only, as we shall shew forthwith, by an inquiry into the facts of our moral nature, that we can hope to ascertain its principles.

It is of the utmost moment, as we shall see in the sequel, that the SECOND QUESTION, as to the qualities which must meet in virtuous action, should be kept distinct from the first, or the inquiry into the nature of the mental process, which recognises these qualities. The virtue of an agent does not consist in the possession of the moral faculty or feeling, but in the possession of the qualities at which it looks, and of which it approves. We cannot be too frequently reminded that the possession of conscience and the possession of virtue are two different things. Conscience is the faculty, or feeling, which, on contemplating the voluntary acts of responsible beings, proclaims them to be virtuous or vicious; whereas virtue is the quality or the quali-

ties in these acts which call forth the approbation of the conscience. There are points started by this second question, the ultimate resolution of which seems to lie beyond human capacity, but it is possible, we think, to specify the qualities which must meet in virtuous action on the part of man.

The THIRD inquiry, or into the rule, is eminently the practical one. It falls to be alluded to in this treatise, merely that we may distinguish it from the others, and conversely point out its relation to them. The answer to the question will be found in the many practical treatises on the duty of man.

In regard to the FOURTH question, or the inquiry into the consequences that follow virtue and vice, it is of importance to separate it from all the others. It is indeed of vast moment to be able to distinguish between the qualities which, being in an action, render it virtuous, and the qualities of the effects that flow from it. The former of these is a property of the agent, but the latter is a property, not so much of the agent, as of the Divine government.

ILLUSTRATIVE NOTE (F.)—METHOD OF INQUIRY IN ETHICAL SCIENCE.

It may be proper to explain here once for all, that we profess to carry on the investigation of these topics in the spirit and after the manner of Lord Bacon. It is certain that this father of modern science meant his method to apply to the mental as well as the material sciences.—(Nov. Org., lib. i., Aph. 127.) In the one branch as in the other, there should be an orderly observation of facts, accompanied by analysis, or, as Bacon expresses, the "necessary exclusions" of things indifferent, and this followed up by a process of generalization in which we seize on the points of agreement. The only essential difference between the two lies in this, that in the one we take the senses, and in the other consciousness, as our informant. We know of no other way of constructing a scientific ethics than by commencing at least with an inductive investigation of the facts, with the view of determining the necessary laws of man's moral nature.

True it is, that in ethical inquiry we have finally to do, not with *quid est*, but with *quid oportet;* but how are we to determine the *quid oportet* but by a previous and careful examination of the *quid est.* At the very opening of such an investigation, a thousand false views present themselves, and how are they to be dispelled but by an appeal to facts attested by consciousness? The theories as to the nature of virtue differ widely from each other, and how are they to be tested but by an inquiry into the nature of man? The nature of moral principle is to be ascertained—if it can be ascertained—by an investigation of man's moral constitution.

It is all true, as will be urged in opposition to this inductive method of inquiry, that there are moral principles in man's nature prior to all experience. And this fact should, we acknowledge, keep us from appealing to experience, to authorize principles, which are rather fitted and intended to sanction experience. But this

does not at all settle the question as to how we may come to know what these principles are, so as to be entitled to use them in ethical science. It is quite true that they act spontaneously prior to and apart from any observation of their exercise, but we are not at liberty to make a reflex use of them till we have carefully determined their nature as a matter of fact. They operate *a priori* and independent of experience, but *a posteriori* investigation of our experience is necessary in order to the detection of their law or rule.

Virtue or moral good is not natively known by the mind as an abstract or general idea. Nor is the ethical principle, which we acknowledge to be in our constitution, before the consciousness as a principle. In the natural progress of knowledge, physical and moral, the mind begins with the individual and the concrete, and by these it reaches the general and the abstract. Just as no man ever yet saw a law of nature—all that we see are individual facts falling out according to law, so no man can be conscious of ethical principle—all that he discovers by the internal sense is a particular decision of the moral power. We arrive at a knowledge of a law of nature by the generalization of the facts presented to the senses, and we can attain an acquaintance with ethical principle only by an induction of the facts revealed by consciousness. He who would use natural law in the construction of physical science, must be prepared to enunciate its nature; and the same condition should be imposed on ethical investigation —he who employs moral law for scientific ends must be ready to shew what is its place in our moral constitution. Not only so, but in scientific investigation it is required that we categorically declare the precise rule of the law employed. If we proceed to rear a system on an imperfectly inducted or an imperfectly represented law, we may find ourselves landed in ever increasing errors as we advance. The astronomer, for example, would be involved in ever multiplying blunders, provided he represented the law of gravitation as varying inversely according to the distance, instead of the square of the distance. But moralists are landed in far more serious mistakes when they set out with a wrong or even a mutilated view of ethical principle. For example, errors with far-reaching consequences spring up, when it is affirmed that moral good is merely a far-sighted self-love, or a refined love of happiness, or that it has its foundation merely in the sentiments of the percipient mind, for we cannot, under such systems, speak of righteousness as an essential perfection of God. But mental laws when thus inductively determined may be regarded as primary principles, sanctioned by the very structure of the mind in which they are placed, nay, as authorized by the God of truth who hath planted them there, and may be subjected to intellectual analysis, and used deductively in all ethical investigations. We may now construct an ethical philosophy made up of *a priori* principles, but these ascertained by *a posteriori* induction.

Ethics is the science of the necessary laws of our moral nature, just as logic is the science of the necessary laws of our thinking nature. In both, the laws are in themselves *a priori* and independent of experience, but in both they can be ascertained only by *a posteriori* induction. We have indicated the grounds which render it necessary that we should proceed in this manner;—first, there are no *a priori* ideas before the mind as abstract or general ideas; and secondly, there are no *a priori* principles before the consciousness as principles. Hence it is, that while native principles of thought and morality operate *spontaneously*, we are not entitled to make a *reflex* or scientific use of them till we have enunciated their nature and rule in a precise formula. This distinction, so obvious when stated, is lost sight of altogether in those *a priori* speculations which are flooding us from

every quarter. Because there are *a priori*, or, as we should prefer calling them, constitutional principles in the mind, persons seem to imagine that they can also find out their nature *a priori*, and proceed to employ them in system-building. On such grounds as these we reject in ethics, not *a priori* principles, but the *a priori* method of discovering them.

The historical method of inquiry has been recommended by some, as by Schleiermacher, with whom ethics is an investigation of human nature, with its forms and tendencies developing itself in history. We admit that history supplies to ethics some of its most valuable facts and illustrations; but as human action is always presented in history as a complex web, in which good and evil are mixed together, it is needful to have a test to determine which is the one and which the other. We are thus brought back to the inductive investigation of man's moral constitution as the only method of constructing a scientific ethics.

We are speaking throughout of the science of ethics. For the purposes of practical morality, it is not needful to determine the nature of ethical principles; for these principles operate spontaneously, and act best when we are not thinking of them, but are simply desiring to do what is right. So far as we need practical rules, these may best be learned from the Word of God and treatises founded upon it. But the Scriptures, their aim being practical, do not give us ethical any more than physical or metaphysical science. Doubtless the holy and heavenly morality there unfolded, and, above all, the perfect exemplar of the character of Jesus, are useful—nay, I believe, necessary means of enabling us to rise to a perfect idea of the morally good. The Bible doctrines of the atonement and of grace are needed to help ethical inquiry out of the difficulty which originates in the existence of sin—a fact very much ignored by secular moralists. Still there is a scientific basis furnished to ethics in the laws of our moral constitution. So far as it is founded on real facts, such a science cannot possibly lead to error, while it will be found to supply not a few valuable contributions to the Christian evidences. An inductive inquiry into man's moral nature proves that it is faithfully described in God's Word, and that there is a beautiful adaptation in the Gospel remedy to the wants of humanity.

SECT. IV.—INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF CONSCIENCE, OR THE MENTAL FACULTY OR FEELING WHICH RECOGNISES AND REVEALS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG.

We now take up the first of the four special topics which fall to be discussed in treating of God's moral government, or, in other words, we go on to inquire what is the mental state or process by which the distinction between good and evil is discovered and manifested?

Let us begin with taking a passing survey of the mode of the operation of the human mind when different classes of objects are presented before it. Let us first view it as acting when a proposition of a purely intellectual character is submitted to it—any of the propositions, for instance, of geometry.

On any one of these propositions being brought under its notice, it pronounces a decision regarding it, and the language in which we express the decision is, "It is true," or, "It is false." Now, in pronouncing this decision, the mind proceeds on its own laws or principles—principles which are fundamental, and as incapable of analysis as the simple elements to which chemistry at last conducts us in the analysis of corporeal substances.

It is a favourite doctrine of Aristotle, the great analyst of the reasoning process, that everything cannot be demonstrated, and that the beginning of demonstration must be intuition.* All reasoning carries us back to certain first principles. In saying so, we mean that in the analysis of it we are conducted at last to truths which admit of no demonstration. Properly speaking, reasoning does not carry us back to these axiomatic truths—it proceeds upon them. These principles have at no time a separate existence as notions in the mind, at least until it begin to form reflex metaphysical abstractions. The conception of them is one of the most refined and difficult exercises in which the mind can engage, and the correct expression of them one of the most arduous works about which human language can be employed. The reason proceeds on these axiomatic principles, just as the eye sees by means of rays of light; and neither takes cognizance of the media needful for its exercise. It is by a reflex act of the mind, and that a very subtle one, that the philosopher is led to discover what is the nature of the fundamental principles imposed upon, or rather forming part of, the very faculties of the human mind. They are roots or radicals supporting all visible truth, but themselves unseen, and only to be discovered by artificially digging into the depths which they penetrate, and which cover them from the view.

All modern philosophers of authority have acknowledged that there are such fundamental principles. Locke denied them in theory, but confessed their existence in fact under the name of intuitions. Kant expounds them as the categories of the understanding, and the ideas of pure reason. Reid calls them the "principles of the *communis sensus*," very unhappily translated by a name usually differently applied—common sense. Stewart denominates them the "laws of human thought or belief." Brown speaks of them as the primary universal intuitions of

* See Post. Anal., B. i. ch. iii., &c.

direct belief. Cousin talks of them as simple mental apperceptions and primitive judgments. Mackintosh, in referring to them, says—"They seem to be accurately described as notions which cannot be conceived separately, but without which nothing can be conceived. They are not only necessary to reasoning and belief, but to thought itself." Mackintosh elsewhere represents them as "the indispensable conditions of thought itself." It is to them, as we apprehend, that Whewell refers under the phrase "fundamental ideas," so often employed by him. Sir William Hamilton has completed all past metaphysics on this subject, by showing that the argument, from the principles of common sense, is one strictly philosophic and scientific, and by a critical review of the nomenclature, all proceeding on the same principle, which has been employed by upwards of one hundred of the profoundest thinkers in ancient and modern times.* It is very interesting to observe how deep and earnest thinkers come at last to a wonderful agreement, even when they appear, to superficial observers, to have no one principle in common.

There are such principles pre-supposed, where the mind is employed intellectually, as when we argue, an effect must have a cause. There are also such fundamental laws implied in the exercise of the mind when contemplating the voluntary acts of responsible agents. When these pass in review before the mind, it declares regarding them, that "they are good," or that "they are bad," and it does so according to a principle which cannot be resolved into anything simpler than itself.

There is a very general agreement in the present day, as to the marks by which intuitive principles may be distinguished: they are necessity and universality. Moral principle can stand both these tests when they are properly understood. The mind is constrained to believe that there is a distinction between justice and injustice, between right and wrong. It is not that moral principle is necessarily obeyed, for it is ever neglected in practice, and constantly disobeyed—still it is there in the bosom, asserting its claims and ready to condemn transgression. All men possess conscience, just as all men possess reason. Though there are persons in whom the former, like the latter, may be very much in a state of dormancy, or confined within very narrow limits, and engaged about comparatively trivial objects; still

* See Note A. appended to Hamilton's edition of Reid's Works.

both are there and capable of being excited and cultivated. It is not that moral principle is universally submitted to, for, in fact, it is universally rejected, but still it is in all men—when it serves no other end—as a law to condemn them, so that "they are without excuse."

Should any party insist on our resolving this intuitive principle, we remind him, that in doing so we could only be reducing it to a farther principle, and that he might, on the same ground, ask us to resolve that law also, and, as he thus pushed us, we must at length be carried back to a principle which could not be reduced to anything simpler, and which we must therefore just assume. Now, we assert at once, that it is by an original principle that the mind decides, when voluntary acts pass under its notice, that they are right, or that they are wrong. It seems evident to us, on the one hand, that it cannot be resolved into any of those intellectual axioms on which the understanding proceeds in acquiring knowledge. Compound and decompound these as we please, they never will lead to the idea of right and wrong. Nor, on the other hand, can it be reduced to those principles which are connected with the desire of pleasure, or the aversion to pain. No composition of such ideas or feelings could produce the idea or feeling expressed in the words "ought," "duty," "moral obligation," "desert," "guilt." As well, in our view, might we talk of a combination of gases, or of any other corporeal substance, producing an idea, as of mere intellectual ideas, or mere emotions connected with the sensations of pleasure and pain, producing a sense of moral obligation. Even as no composition of colours can produce sound, and no composition of odours produce colours, so, as it appears to us, no possible combination of intellectual conceptions, or sensations of pleasure and pain, or of the desires connected with these, can produce moral approbation and disapprobation.

We are thus brought to the conclusion, that the mind declares that there is an indelible distinction between good and evil; just as it declares that there is an indelible distinction between truth and error. We believe that the mind, in the one case as in the other, proceeds on its own fundamental principles. Does some one insist on our making this moral idea patent to the intellect, and justifying it to the understanding? We reply, that the distinction does not come under the cognizance of the under-

standing, any more than the difference of sounds can be brought under the discernment of the eye, or the difference of colours under that of the ear. Should the objector become proud and presumptuous, and insist on our yielding to his demand, we ask him to begin with demonstrating the axiomatic principles on which reason proceeds; and when he has done so, he may be the better prepared to try his skill upon an analysis of ethical law, or rather, after having made the attempt and failed, he will the more readily acknowledge that there may be moral principles, the existence of which reason may discover, but cannot possibly explain.

Call them by what name you please, you come back in all inquiry after truth to principles which reason cannot demonstrate, but on which, on the contrary, all reasoning proceeds. To deny this is to involve ourselves in the absurdity of an infinite series of proofs, each hanging on the other, with nothing to support them or on which to rest, or in a circle of proof in which there is connexion, but no origin or foundation, and no progress. In like manner, in the inquiry into virtue and vice, we come back to ultimate principles, on which all morality rests. Just as the former class of principles are anterior in the order of things to all exercise of the reasoning faculties, so the latter are anterior to every given exercise of the conscience.

To justify any given proposition to the reason, we have only to show how it is built on the fundamental principles of reason. This being done, reason makes no farther inquiry—it is now completely satisfied. The scepticism which insists on something farther is not sanctioned by reason, but rather requires to set itself against reason, and reason in all its acts condemns it. In like manner, the mind is satisfied when you have shown that an action is reconcilable with the fundamental principles of morality. When this is done, it asks no more questions. If farther inquiries are made, it does not beat responsive to them—indeed, it cannot so much as comprehend them.

While the intellect and its fundamental principles, and the conscience with its fundamental principles, are in many respects analogous to, yet they are at the same time independent of, one another. The understanding does not feel that it is called to justify itself to the conscience, nor is the conscience required to justify itself to the understanding. Each has its own assigned

province, in which it is sovereign and supreme. A thousand errors have arisen from imagining that the conscience should give account of itself to the understanding, and that the understanding should give account of itself to the conscience. Each has its own sphere, and cannot in that sphere interfere with or clash with the other. While independent in themselves, they must, however, as residing in the same mind, and frequently judging of different qualities of the same concrete object, have multiplied points of affinity.

The conscience may be profitably viewed under three aspects:—

FIRST, AS PROCEEDING UPON AND REVEALING A LAW WITH AUTHORITATIVE OBLIGATIONS. Every intuitive principle in our constitution has its special truth to reveal and sanction, and this is to be ascertained by a careful induction of its individual exercises. What then does the moral power in man say, when we accurately interpret its dicta? This seems to be its peculiarity, that it declares what ought and what ought not to be. This is its very nature and function, to point to, and announce a law demanding obedience. In this respect it is a faculty *sui generis*, different from every other principle of the mind. It is not a law merely in the sense in which the fundamental principles at the basis of the intellectual powers are laws, but in a peculiar sense applicable to nothing else. Its office is to declare not what is, but what ought to be. Its mood is not the indicative, like the reason, nor the conditional, like the understanding, nor the optative, like the will, but the imperative. Other powers approve of truth, but this of virtue; others guard us from error, but this from crime. It sits on a throne like a king, its rules are obligations, its affirmations are statutes, its proclamations are enactments. It sits in judgment as a judicature, and its decisions are commands, its sentences are condemnations, its smiles are rewards, and its frowns are reproofs. It asserts not power, but claims, which affirm their superiority to power. It sets forth not might but right, which in its nature is above might. It often says of what is, that it should not be, and of what is not, that it should be. It frequently lends its countenance to what is most despised among mankind, and pronounces a sentence of disapproval on that which is most highly esteemed. It is not afraid to attack power in high places, while it will espouse and defend the cause of the persecuted and the helpless.

It rests on its own prerogatives, and it wears the crown and wields the sceptre, whether its claims are acknowledged or denied.

Many of the ancients delighted to contemplate the moral power under this aspect, as, for example, Cicero, in the well known passage,—"Right reason is itself a law congenial to the feelings of nature, diffused among all men, uniform, eternal, calling us imperiously to our duty, and peremptorily prohibiting every violation of it." "Nor does it speak one language at Rome and another at Athens, varying from place to place, or from time to time; but it addresses itself to all nations, and to all ages, deriving its authority from the common Sovereign of the universe, and carrying home its sanctions to every breast by the inevitable punishment which it inflicts on transgressors." It is under this same view that it is presented to us by a still higher authority. "They who have no law, (no written law,) are a law unto themselves, which show the law written in their hearts." It is under the same aspect that it is presented by the profound German metaphysician Kant, when he calls it the categorical imperative, whose absolute rule is, Act according to a maxim which would admit of being regarded as a general law for all acting beings. So far as the mind listens to this inward monitor, it declares that virtue never can be vice, nor vice virtue; that there cannot be a state of things in which deceit is good and justice evil. The distinction between right and wrong is not a mere personal conviction; we feel that it holds good not only for ourselves, but for others, for all intelligent and moral beings.

Not only is this principle in the mind, but it has, as Butler has shown, an authoritative place there. "Thus that principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove of our own heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what in its turn is to have some influence, which may be said of every passion of the lowest appetite, but as from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all others, insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength as it has right, had it power as it has authority, it would absolutely govern the world."* He

* Human Nature, Sermon ii.

adds, "This faculty was placed within, to be our proper governor, to direct and regulate all under principles, passions, and motives of action. This is its right and office. Thus sacred is its authority." It is the highest judicatory in the mind of man, admitting of appeal from all, and admitting of appeal from itself to no other human tribunal. Reviewing the exercise of all the other faculties and affections of the mind, it is subject only to the immutable law to which it looks, and to God, whose righteous character is embodied and represented in that law.

For though supreme within the mind, the conscience does not look upon itself as absolutely supreme. While it is the conscience which informs us what moral principle is, it is not the conscience which constitutes moral principle. In this respect it resembles the senses and the intellect, and hence may be called the moral sense and the moral reason. The senses do not create the objects which they perceive, nor does the intellect create the truths which it apprehends; and just as little does the moral faculty in man create the law to which it looks, and which it makes known to him. The sun exists in these heavens, whether there be an eye to look to it or not: two parallel lines could never meet, even though there should never be a mind to contemplate their relation; and moral law would be imperative, whether the conscience did or did not acknowledge the obligation. This is what conscience reveals of itself; this is implied in all its decisions, when rightly interpreted. It declares that the distinction between good and evil does not proceed from the caprice, but is written on the very constitution of the mind; and farther, that it does not spring from the structure of the individual mind, but must exist for all beings possessed of intelligence and free will. It points to a law prior to itself, above itself, independent of itself, universal, unchangeable, and eternal.

The conscience is not the law itself, it is merely the organ which makes it known to us—the eye that looks to it.* Alas, that eye may become diseased, and fail to take the proper view of the law. Under the influence of a rebellious will, it may become corrupted, equally with the understanding, or the emo-

* This is a view to some extent overlooked by Butler, and by some otherwise elevated ethical writers, who look at the moral power from a psychological standpoint. We frankly confess, that though it was before us, it was not so with sufficient steadiness, in the earlier editions of this work.

tions, or any other part of our nature. When thus failing to perform its proper functions, no attempt should be made to set it aside, to nullify or destroy it, any more than the reason should be dismissed because it is liable to error, but pains should be taken to quicken, to elevate, to restore it. That it may become deranged, through the influence of a corrupted will, that it may be restored to pristine purity, through the atonement provided for transgression, and the grace of God,—these are topics which will fall to be discussed as we proceed. Meanwhile, we call attention to the fact, that the conscience looks to a law above it, as the sun is above the eye to which its light comes.

Not only so, but the mind is led to connect this law with God as lawgiver. In the opening of this treatise we have said, that the idea of God is pressed on the mind from a variety of quarters. The order and adaptation of nature suggest a designing mind. The law-revealer in the breast also proclaims a lawgiver. Some go so far as to maintain that all this is implied in the very nature of the law—that a law without a lawgiver would be null, would be meaningless. This sense of responsibility, they say, implies a being to whom we must give an account; this sentiment of fear tells of one who may punish. Of this we are firmly convinced, that when we are led to believe in the existence of a living God, on the abundant evidence supplied on all hands, we are also led to trace the moral law up to him. As soon as we admit that man is a created being, and that there is a God who made him, the conscience points to him as sanctioning and appointing the moral law. We cannot conceive of a faculty distinguishing between good and evil, planted in our constitutions by one himself devoid of integrity. We must believe that God approves of the justice and benevolence which the moral power would lead us to commend, and disapproves of the sin which it prompts us to condemn. Tracing up the law to him, we are led to look on him as its Giver, its Guardian, and its Executor. That law is seen to represent his moral nature, with which it may be identified. In obeying it, we feel that we are pleasing him; in disobeying it, we feel that we are giving him offence.

SECONDLY, CONSCIENCE MAY BE CONSIDERED AS PRONOUNCING AN AUTHORITATIVE JUDGMENT UPON ACTIONS PRESENTED TO IT. This is an aspect not inconsistent with that under which we have just been contemplating it. This moral law has an exponent in

the mind to act as an arbiter and judge, and pronounce decisions on the cases submitted to it. In this respect—that is, so far as it judges and decides—it is analogous to the intellect or reason.

Some later ethical and metaphysical writers, we are aware, have maintained that there is no judgment passed by the mind on moral qualities being presented to it. The whole mental process is represented as being one of the emotions, and not of the judgment or reason. And it is at once to be acknowledged, that if we define the reason or understanding as the power which distinguishes between the true and the false, or which discovers relations, as of the resemblances and differences of objects, we must place morality altogether beyond its jurisdiction. Perceptions of this kind are in their whole nature different from the perceptions of the difference between right and wrong—between duty and sin. But if it be meant to affirm, that when the voluntary acts of responsible beings pass in review before the mind, it does not pronounce a judgment or decision, then we cannot but hold the view to be inconsistent with our consciousness, and as far from being well fitted to furnish a foundation to a proper ethical theory. Just as the mind, on certain purely intellectual propositions being presented to it, says, "This is true," or "This is false;" so we find it, on the voluntary actions of intelligent beings being presented to it, declaring, "This is right," or "This is wrong."

The parties who are most inclined to remove morality from the region of the understanding, such as Brown and Mackintosh, are often constrained to speak of the moral faculty, and to talk of its decisions and judgments. The very language which they use, in speaking of the emotions which are supposed by them to constitute the whole mental process—the emotions, as they call them, of moral *approbation and disapprobation*—seems to imply that there must be a judgment of the mind. If approbation and disapprobation are not judgments, we know not what can constitute a judgment of the mind. "We cannot," says Butler, "form a notion of this faculty, without taking in judgment."* Nor is it possible to find language expressive of the mental phenomena which does not imply that, along with the emotion, there is a judgment come to and a decision pronounced; and it would be confounding the different departments of the human mind alto-

* Human Nature, Sermon ii.

gether to refer such a judgment to our emotional nature, or mere sensibility.

We apprehend a mathematical proposition, and we declare it to be true; here there is acknowledged on all hands to be a judgment. We apprehend next instant a cruel, ungenerous action; and we declare it to be wrong. Now, in the one case, as in the other, there is a judgment of the mind. It is true, that in the two cases, the judgments are pronounced according to very different principles or laws—so very different as to justify us in speaking of the conscience as different from the reason. It is quite conceivable that the mind might possess reason, and distinguish between the true and the false, and yet be incapable of distinguishing between virtue and vice. We are entitled, therefore, to maintain, that the drawing of moral distinctions is not comprehended in the simple exercise of the reason. The conscience, in short, is a different faculty of the mind from the mere understanding. We must hold it to be simple and unresolvable, till we fall in with a successful decomposition of it into its elements. In the absence of any such decomposition, we hold that there are no simpler elements in the human mind which will yield us the ideas of the morally good and evil, of moral obligation and guilt, of merit and demerit. Compound and decompound all other ideas as you please—associate them together as you may—they will never give us the ideas referred to, so peculiar and full of meaning, without a faculty implanted in the mind for this very purpose.*

This faculty has to do with a particular class of objects, in regard to which it judges and pronounces a decision. "There is a principle of reflection," says Butler, "in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove of, their own actions. We are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect on our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, as

* Sir James Mackintosh (in the Preliminary Dissertation to the Encyclopædia Britannica) thinks that the phenomena of conscience can be accounted for by the association of ideas. We meet this theory with the important principle, overlooked by not a few in reference to other matters on which it bears, that association of ideas is the mere law of the succession of ideas, and cannot give a new idea, without a separate faculty for the purpose. Had Mackintosh fully unfolded his theory, we suspect that it would at once have been seen, that we must have a principle to account for the idea itself, as well as to account for the way in which it is connected with other ideas.

respecting such objects, and in such degrees, and of the several actions consequent thereupon. In this survey, it approves of one, disapproves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves of his heart, temper, and actions, is conscience—for this is the strict sense of the word, though sometimes it is used so as to take in more."* This greatest of all ethical writers tells us farther—"There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man, which distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external actions, which passes judgment upon himself, and upon them pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good, others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust, which, without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and disapproves or condemns him, the doer of them, accordingly, and which, if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always, of course, goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence which shall hereafter second and affirm its own."†

THIRDLY, CONSCIENCE MAY BE CONSIDERED AS POSSESSING A CLASS OF EMOTIONS, OR AS A SENTIMENT. We have endeavoured, indeed, to show that it is not a mere emotion, or class of emotions. But while it is something more than a "class of feelings"—it is so described by Mackintosh—it does most assuredly contain and imply feelings. The mind is as conscious of the emotions as it is of the judgment.

In opposition to those who insist that there is nothing but emotion, it might be urged in a general way, that emotions never exist independently of certain conceptions or ideas. Let a man stop himself at the time when emotion is the highest, when passion is the strongest, and he will find, as the substratum of the whole, a mental apprehension or representation of an object. There is an idea acting as the basis of every feeling, and so far determining the feeling; and the feeling rises or falls according as the conception takes in more or less of that which raises the emotions. The ideas which raise emotions have been called (by Alison in his Essay on Taste) "ideas of emotions."

* Human Nature, Sermon i.

† Human Nature, Sermon ii. An analysis of the decisions of the conscience will be found in sec. i. of the next chapter of this treatise.

The conception of certain objects is no way fitted to raise emotions. The conception, for instance, of an angle, of a stone, or of a house, will not excite any emotions whatever. Other conceptions do as certainly raise emotions, as the conception of an object as about to communicate pleasure or pain. Such feelings arise, whether we contemplate this pleasure or pain as about to visit ourselves or others.

Emotion rises not only on the contemplation of pleasure and pain to ourselves or others—it rises also on the contemplation of virtue and vice. When the conscience declares an action presented to the mind to be good or bad, certain emotions instantly present themselves. Man is so constituted that the contemplation of virtuous and vicious action—declared so to be by the conscience—like the contemplation of pleasure and pain, awakens the sensibility.

While thus the conception determines the emotions—does not constitute them, however—it is not to be forgotten that emotions have a most powerful influence upon the current of the thoughts and ideas. The emotions may be compared to fluids which press equally in all directions, and need, therefore, a vessel to contain them, or a channel in which to flow; but, like these fluids, they yield the strongest of all pressure, and serve most important purposes in the economy of life.

Upon these general grounds, then, we would be inclined to assert, that there must be the decision of a faculty before there can be a feeling in regard to moral actions. "At the same time," says Cousin, "that we do such and such an act, it raises in our mind a judgment *which declares its character*, and it is on the back of this judgment that our sensibility is moved. The sentiment is not this primitive and immediate judgment, but is its powerful echo. So far from being the foundation of the idea of the good, it supposes it."* On the other hand, we acknowledge that the existence of the feeling has a most powerful reflex influence in quickening the faculty. It breathes life into, and lends wings to what would otherwise be inert and inanimate. But we must quit these general grounds. The connexion between the emotions and their relative conceptions has not received that attention which it deserves from mental analysts. It is a topic lying open to the first voyager who may have sufficient courage

* Du Bien. Œuvres, vol. ii. p. 267.

and skill to explore, without making shipwreck of himself, the capes and bays by which this land and water indent into each other.

The moral faculty, then, can never be employed without emotion. It is the master power of the human soul, and it is befitting that it should never move without a retinue of attendants. These feelings, which are its necessary train or accompaniment in all its exercises, impart to it all their liveliness and fervour. They communicate to the soul that noble elevation which it feels on the contemplation of benevolence, of devotedness in a good cause, and patriotism and piety under all their forms. These attendants of this monarch faculty, while they gladden and manifest its presence when the will is obedient to its master, are at the same time ready to become the avenging spirits which follow up the commission of crime with more fearful lashings than the serpent-covered furies were ever supposed to have inflicted. The conscience travels like a court of justice, with a certain air of dignity, and with its attendant ministers to execute its decisions. All this is as it should be. If it is desirable, as we have seen, that morality should be presented under the character of a law, and that it should have its appropriate faculty, it is equally needful that it should have its train of feelings, to give a practical interest and impetus to all the authoritative decisions which this judge pronounces. "The design of the sentiment," it is finely remarked by Cousin, "is to render sensible to the soul the connexion of virtue and happiness."*

It is always to be borne in mind, however, that the simple possession of conscience, with its accompanying emotions, does not render any individual virtuous. We are made virtuous, not by the possession of the faculty which judges of virtuous action, or of the emotions which echo its decisions, but by the possession of the virtuous actions themselves. This may seem an obvious truth when stated; but it has been strangely overlooked by many, who conclude that man is virtuous because he is possessed of such a power, and of its responsive feelings. These persons do not reflect that the faculty and its accompanying sentiment are ready to condemn the possessor of them, when he is without the affections and actions in which virtue truly consists. We believe that there is no responsible agent so fallen

* Du Bien. Œuvres, vol. ii. p. 314.

and corrupted, that he does not possess this conscience and these feelings: both, it may be, are sadly perverted in their exercise—yet still he possesses them in their essential form, and that by the appointment of God, in order that they may so far punish him, and enable him to measure the depth of his degradation.

The poet, the tragedian, and the novelist, address themselves to these moral emotions, and seek to call them forth by the description or exhibition of scenes in which tempted chastity stands, suffering virtue is triumphant, and patriotism burns with a flame all the brighter, because of the surrounding darkness and apostasy; or, changing the scene, they would rouse indignation, terror, and pity, by the pictures of powerful villany and deceit spreading misery among the innocent and the helpless. It is not to our present purpose to inquire whether such representations do really strengthen the moral faculty, and refine its sensibility; or whether they do not rather, by their vain shows, carry us into an imaginary world, from which we return with less ability and inclination faithfully to perform our part in the actual world. We call attention to these phenomena for two purposes; one is to show that there are such feelings, which can be operated on; and the other, to guard against the idea, that the possession of them constitutes any individual a virtuous agent. Thousands have wept in the theatre over the trials of suffering chastity, and have gone out to commit deeds of impurity, and thereby to increase the temptations to licentiousness, and multiply the sufferings of those outcasts who yield to them. The novel has been stained by many a tear, flowing from eyes which never wept over the real miseries of the poor. Sterne causing us to weep over the dead ass, and meanwhile treating his own mother with unkindness, is only one of a thousand instances recorded in the history of man to demonstrate that the feelings which arise on the presentation of good or evil actions all belong to a different department of the human mind from the virtuous affections themselves. On account of not observing this distinction, multitudes have thought themselves good because they have a capacity of admiring the good. It is the grand error of not a few of the most powerful writers in the present day to suppose that hero-worship and heroism are allied to each other; that he who admires the hero has himself a kindred spirit. From the same cause, philosophers and ethical

writers have drawn far too flattering a picture of human character, and leave upon us the impression, that, because mankind possess feelings of complacency on the contemplation of virtue, they are therefore possessed of virtue itself.

The view now offered of conscience, from the way in which we have been obliged to state it, may seem a very complex one. In reality, it is very simple. It is to be regretted that, in giving a description of any mental state, we are constrained to use language which sounds so abstract and metaphysical. The conscience is the mind looking to a moral law, and pronouncing judgments giving rise to emotions. We do not see how anything could be simpler.

The writer who is generally acknowledged to have written in the most masterly way on the conscience, seems to have viewed it at times at least, in all the lights in which we have now presented it. He calls it again and again a "principle," and a "law," the "principle of reflection and conscience," and the "law of his creation," a "determinate rule," "the guide of life, and that by which men are a law unto themselves;" and affirms, that "every man may find within himself the rule of right, and obligations to follow it." That he regarded the conscience as partaking both of the nature of a faculty and a feeling, is evident from his calling it a "faculty in the heart," and more particularly from the following passage:—"It is manifest, that great part of common language, and of common behaviour over the world, is formed on the supposition of such a moral faculty, whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or Divine reason, whether considered as a *sentiment of the understanding, or a perception of the heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both.*"

We have a complete view of the conscience only when we look at it under this threefold aspect, in this its triune nature. In each of these characters it serves a separate purpose. As looking to law, it gives to morality a clearly defined, a solid and consistent shape, and an authoritative power. When duty is presented merely as emotion, we have an impression that it might change with changing circumstances or with man's changing feelings, and might be tempted with Rousseau, to recommend as right, whatever recommended itself to our sentiments. But when it knows that there is a law, the mind feels

that it has to do with strict precepts and solemn sanctions. Nor is it to be forgotten, that this law with obligations reveals authoritatively the will of God. Again, as a faculty, the conscience is an arbiter ever ready to decide, a master ever ready to issue commands. As a sentiment, it furnishes pleasure, stirs up desire, and leads to activity. Nor is it unworthy of being remarked, that it is in its very nature connected both with the understanding and the feelings, partaking of the strength and stability of the one, and of the life and facility of the other. It is the "faculty of the heart," and the "sentiment of the understanding." While thus linking itself with all parts of our nature, it speaks as one having authority to every other power and principle of the human mind. Were this "faculty of the heart" allowed its proper power, it would, in the name of the supreme Governor, preserve for him—that is, for God—the place which he ought to have in every human head and heart.

SECT. V.—QUALITIES WHICH MUST MEET IN MORALLY RIGHT ACTION ON THE PART OF MAN.

The inquiry into the nature of the morally good is different from the inquiry into the nature of conscience, though the two have often been confounded.

The question here started is, in what does virtue consist, what is its essence or the common quality found in all virtuous action? We have never fallen in with a satisfactory answer to this question in all its generality. We suspect that a definition of virtue taken absolutely is beyond the faculties of man. Price and Stewart represent moral good as an original and simple quality seen at once and intuitively by the mind, incapable of being reduced into anything more elementary, and therefore incapable of definition. We suspect that this is the correct representation, *so far as human intelligence is concerned.* We make this qualification, because we do not mean to decide whether higher intelligences might not be able to fix on some quality or qualities as constituting the essence of the good. But of this we are sure, that all attempted definitions of virtue on the part of ethical writers, have either been utterly defective, or have consisted simply in the substitution of synonymous

phrases. When it is said that virtue is agreement with the eternal fitness of things, or that it is benevolence, or utility, or beneficial tendency, all such definitions are erroneous. When it is said that virtue is that which is good, right, meritorious, obligatory, all such explanations amount to this, that virtue is virtue.

Man must content himself, we suspect—at least we mean in this treatise to satisfy ourselves—with answering a much lower question,—lower in speculation, though vastly superior in practical importance. What qualities must be found in all truly good actions on the part of man?

Whatever these qualities be, they must be in the virtuous agent. What is a virtuous agent, but an agent acting virtuously; it is a virtuous state of the mind. This proposition, frequently overlooked, needs only to be announced to command universal assent.

By keeping this principle steadily before us, we shall be saved from a number of erroneous theories. It will at once shew that it is wrong to represent virtue, with Hume, as consisting in the useful and agreeable; or as the advocates of this theory, somewhat modified, now place it, in beneficial tendency, or the greatest happiness principle. If the supporters of this ethical system had so stated it, as to represent the intent to produce utility, or the purpose to do a beneficial act, as constituting virtuous action, their views would not have been inconsistent with the proposition now laid down. But they are careful to inform us, that the parties who perform the virtuous act may not be aware, or distinctly conscious, of its tendency. Love to God, they tell us, is beneficial; but they acknowledge that the person who loves God is not led to do so by a perception of the benefit to be derived. The utility or beneficial tendency of actions may be observed, they say, by careful reflection, but is not necessarily before the mind of the agent. They farther allow, in regard to the great mass of mankind, that they are not in circumstances to determine the ultimate tendency of actions; that if they waited till they knew precisely all the effects of their conduct, they would never act; and that, if they acted on their own narrow short-sighted views of utility, they might perform the most atrocious crimes in the name of virtue. The advocates of the theory are constrained, in order to obviate these

difficulties, to acknowledge, that though utility or beneficial tendency may be the proper effect of every virtuous action, yet that it has not necessarily a place in the intention of the actor. It cannot, then, constitute the distinguishing quality of virtue. It is not so much an attribute of virtue, as an effect following from it, through the Divine appointment and arrangement; and an effect following, because of the honour which God would put upon virtue.

What quality, then, in the mind of the agent may be regarded as constituting moral good? Butler does not answer this question. There are passages in his Treatise on the Nature of Virtue, which show that the subject had been before him; that he knew the question of the nature of virtue to be different from the question of the nature of conscience; but that he did not think it necessary to prosecute the former inquiry. He speaks of himself, as not "stopping to inquire how far, and in what sense, virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it."

Hutcheson has given a distinct answer to the question, and defended his theory with his usual acuteness; he represents virtue as consisting in benevolence. But so far as by benevolence he means merely an instinctive attachment springing up independently of the will, we maintain that his theory is erroneous; for in such affection there cannot be anything either virtuous or vicious. Again, if by benevolence is meant simply goodwill to a neighbour, or a desire to promote his happiness, the scheme is all too narrow; for it excludes the love of God, and the holy affections connected with it and springing from it. Nor does it seem possible, without an unreasonable straining and perversion, to include one of the most essential of all the virtues, that of justice, under benevolence understood in any legitimate acceptation.

There are, at least, two essential mental elements in all morally right action; there is the will, and there is righteousness; there is the will obeying the law addressed to the moral faculty. It is voluntary action, done because it is right. Not only so, there is a third element, arising from the relation in which the law and man stand to God.

First element.—We regard the will as the seat of all virtue and vice. There is an act of the will wherever there is choice, preference, or resolution—wherever the will has adopted or

sanctioned any particular mental state—wherever there is wish, desire, or volition; and wherever there is none of these, *there* we hold there can be no moral action. There is nothing either moral or immoral in a mere intellectual act, or in a mere sensation, or a mere emotion, considered in themselves, but whenever the will chooses these, gives its consent to them—*there* virtue or vice may exist.

Certain acts of the will, we are aware, are neither virtuous nor vicious. To prefer pleasure to pain, honour to disgrace, society to solitude; in such acts as these, whether they exist in the shape of wish, desire, or volition, there is nothing morally approvable, or the opposite. The morality in the will begins at the place at which conscience interposes. If it says, this pleasure is sinful—this honour can be attained only by unlawful means—this society is full of peril to the best interests of the soul; and if the pleasure, honour, and society are still preferred, the party is guilty of sin.

We are happy to find our views on this subject coinciding in the main with those of Dr. Chalmers. "We would now affirm," says he, "the all-important principle, that nothing is moral or immoral which is not voluntary. We have often been struck with writers upon moral science, in that, even though professing a view or an argument altogether elementary, they seldom come formally or ostensibly forth with this principle." "We think it for the advantage of our own subject that it should receive a different treatment; that it should be announced, and with somewhat of the pomp and circumstances, too, of a first principle, and have the distinction given to it, not of a tacit, but of a proclaimed axiom in moral science." He speaks of this principle as that "which binds together, as it were, the moral and the voluntary."* It is an old theological maxim, *omne peccatum est voluntarium.* Doubtless some eminent divines denied it, but they did so, by narrowing the meaning of voluntary, and confining it to acts done deliberately or with premeditation.

We maintain, then, that there can be neither virtue nor vice where there is no exercise of the will. There is nothing, for example, meritorious in the mere exercise of the intellectual faculties. Except in the motives by which he was swayed, Newton had no more merit in discovering the law of gravitation,

* Chalmers's Mor. Phil., chap. v

or inventing the fluxionary calculus, than the machine has in following the impulse given it; nor is there anything morally approvable in the mere operation of the instinctive feelings and affections, such as the love of pleasure, the love of offspring, and the common likings and attachments which exist in the world. These may be in the highest degree becoming, just as proportion, as order, and beauty are becoming; but in themselves they are neither virtuous nor vicious. In order that they may become virtuous, they must, somehow or other, be placed under the dominion of the will. They are vicious only so far as they are allowed by the will to flow out contrary to the dictates of that law which God hath prescribed for the regulation of the conduct.

On the other hand, there may be virtue or vice wherever there is the consent of the will. But while we are inclined so to limit the seat of responsibility as to bring it within the will, yet we would so extend it, as to make it wide as the will, in all its exercises. Accordingly, we cannot agree with those who, as Cousin and Jouffroy, think that no state of the mind is sinful but a positive volition. If we know that the object is forbidden, and still wish it, desire it, and are prevented only by certain prudential considerations from determining upon the acquisition of it, the act is undoubtedly sinful. No doubt, if we are restrained, not by mere prudence, but by a hatred of sin, from seeking the attainment of the object, in this case the wish, the desire, is not sinful; but then, observe what is the precise nature of the wish: it is a wish to obtain, not the object with all its sinful concomitants, but the pleasure, honour, or society, as separated from the object. Now, in such a wish or desire there is nothing improper; nay, there would be nothing sinful in a positive volition which embraced no more. But if, after knowing the object to be forbidden, or that we cannot obtain it without its necessarily attendant sin, we still continue to long for it, then the very concupiscence is criminal, as the will is giving its consent to its continuance. "Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart."*

* It is at this point that we differ from Dr. Chalmers. Following too implicitly Dr. Brown, whose lectures had just been published at the time when the former was called on to write his Course of Moral Philosophy, he has confounded the will in some of its exercises with mere sensibility. Not that he has allowed his penetrat-

Regarding all virtue and vice as lying within the territory of the will, that is, of the mind exercised voluntarily or optatively, we maintain, at the same time, that their territory is wide as that of the will, and that all states into which will enters, or to which it has given consent, are capable of being morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. Not that the will in every possible state is necessarily either virtuous or vicious; for it may be set on an indifferent object, and neither be the one nor the other in some of its exercises. What we mean is, that under all its modifications, and in particular wherever it exists as wish, desire, or volition, it may be virtuous if properly directed, and sinful if improperly exercised. Let us now look at some of the ac-

ing eye to be completely dazzled by the brilliant coruscations of the ingenious speculator referred to. A lingering attachment to Dr. Thomas Reid, at a time when he was decried in Scotland, and a high sense of moral principle, as distinguished from mere emotion, have saved him from adopting all the views of the singularly subtle analyst whom he so much admired. In particular, we find him distinguishing volition from mere desire, which latter he represents as emotion, with nothing in it either virtuous or the opposite. Dr. Brown has altogether confounded the will and the emotions, and, so far as we can see, has virtually blotted the former out of his map of the mind altogether, at least as a separate territory. Chalmers has hurried in to snatch volition, or the final resolution to act, from the list of mere emotions, and to place it by itself as a separate mental operation. We are inclined to think that he should have gone further, and taken from the mere emotions, not only positive volition, but wish and desire, and placed the whole in a separate department of the human mind, the region of the will, which is the seat of responsibility. We were long sadly puzzled with this whole subject, especially in its bearings upon ethics. We put the question, are mere emotions morally approvable or the opposite, and we had to answer that they are not. What actions then, we asked, are moral or immoral in their nature, and we were taught to reply, acts of the will. But may not wishes, desires, and affections be holy or unholy? Here we paused for a time. On the one hand, we were inclined to think that affections and desires might be virtuous or vicious. Were not the desires of the Psalmist holy, when he said, My soul thirsteth for God? Then our Saviour has said, "Whosoever looketh on a woman," &c. But on the other hand, wishes and desires according to the received doctrine are mere emotions, and can in themselves possess no moral quality. We continued for a time in this painful state of perplexity. We felt relieved beyond measure when the thought occurred, that wishes and desires, and affections into which wish and desire enter, are not emotions, but exercises of a higher power. Following out this view we were constrained to shift the boundary line between feeling and will, from the place at which it has been commonly laid down, but we found that in doing so we were drawing the essential distinction both in a psychological and ethical point of view. It seems to us to settle the old theological controversy about the sinfulness of concupiscence, —the concupiscence of evil is sinful whenever the will has given its consent to its rise or continuance.

knowledged virtues, and inquire if they do not lie in this region of the soul.

It is universally admitted that love or benevolence must ever be placed among the highest of the virtues; nay, some have maintained that it constitutes virtue. But in ranking it among the virtues, it is necessary to draw a distinction. Dr. Brown says, very properly, that "the analysis of love presents us with two elements—a vivid delight in the contemplation of the object of affection, and a desire of good to that object."* Now, we do regard it as of great importance to distinguish these two elements. The one may exist, and often does exist, without the other. There is often, on the one hand, the delight in the object, the selfish delight, without the desire of good; and there may, in virtuous minds, be the desire of good to persons in whom no special delight is felt. The two, though often associated, proceed from essentially different departments of the human mind. The first is merely emotional, and, except in so far as it is used or abused by the voluntary powers, there is nothing in it virtuous or the reverse. But when there is a desire of good, a simple, disinterested desire of good, there is a more active and positive state of mind; we have mounted to the region of a higher faculty, and may find virtue, and virtue of the highest order. But there can, we maintain, be virtue in love or benevolence, only so far as it rises above mere instinctive attachment and emotional delight, and contains a positive energy of the will.

But the field of possible virtue and vice is wide as the domain of the will. Virtue may consist of other mental affections besides mere benevolence.

One of its most essential forms is justice, or a wish, a determination to do what is right, and give to all their due. *Justitia est constans et perpetua* VOLUNTAS *jus suum cuique tribuendi*, is the definition adopted by Justinian in the opening sentence of his Institutes. This virtue certainly comes within the department of the will, but cannot, with any propriety, be classed under benevolence.

Virtue is in one of its highest forms, or rather in its highest form, when the will is properly exercised in reference to the Divine Being. It is something higher than mere benevolence, when thus directed towards so elevated an object. We feel that

* Lect. 59.

God does not need our good wishes, as he does not need our help; and yet we feel that there is a holy exercise of the will due on our part to him. Hence arises the desire to glorify God, being the highest desire which the creature can cherish, and the noblest motive by which he can be actuated. This internal exercise of the will finds its fullest and most appropriate embodiment and expression in praise and prayer. Under this feeling we say, "Hallowed be thy name," and earnestly long that God, as he is all-glorious, may be glorified as he ought. We say, "Thy will be done," and feel it to be the highest work in which we can engage to do his will, and labour that others also may know it, and do it.

Taking this theory with us, we see how there may be virtue, not only in *well-wishing*, but in the opposite of well-wishing; how there may be virtuousness in the voluntary aversion to sin, being the converse of the voluntary love to what is good. There may be high moral excellence implied in resisting vain thoughts rising spontaneously, and sense presenting temptations. In all holy minds, as an essential part of holiness, there is an intense desire that sin may not exist, and that, when it exists, it may not prosper, but be driven into perpetual darkness.*

But the will is not the only element. There is a

SECOND ELEMENT.—Analyze and simplify as we may, we cannot do away with the element of a moral faculty with a rule of action, that is, a moral law. In all our decompositions we come back to this great ultimate fact, and cannot go beyond it. But let us see that we fully and fairly unfold the contents of this fact. Our moral nature reveals a law which is—first, independent of it; secondly, binding upon it; and, thirdly, binding on all intelligent beings.† The conscience declares that it has

* Chalmers says, (Mor. Phil., v. 6, *note*,) that desire respects the objects wished, and volition the action by which the object is attained; and (v. 16) that volition alone is the proper object of moral censure or approbation. We regard desire in actively longing for the object wished, (as benevolence, for instance,) and also the voluntary hatreds, (as the hatred of sin,) as all capable of being moral or immoral, as well as the volition.

† Certain metaphysicians aim at saying something like this, by telling us that the law has an objective existence. But what is meant by objective in such an application? Does it signify an object of thought? In this sense a griffin, when we think of it, is objective. Or is it employed to signify a really existing thing, like God and angels? Then the doctrine lands us in all the absurdities of extreme realism. The phrases subjective and objective are used in so many senses, and

not created that law, it feels that the law has been imposed on it. It feels that it is merely the interpreter of a law binding, independently of the recognition or non-recognition of it by any individual. It declares regarding itself that its function is not to assume authority over the law: but to bow to the law as having authority over it. Tracing up this law, the mind is led to connect it with the Divine nature and character. We thus find the moral law revealed as an ultimate fact in the human mind, and we believe it to represent an ultimate fact in the Divine mind. We can follow it to its ultimate seat on the earth in the constitution of the human soul, and thence trace it up to its last seat in heaven in the very nature of God. We can follow it thus far, and it can be traced no farther.

"For a thing to be done virtuously," says Chalmers, "it must be done voluntarily; but this is not enough, it is not all. It is an indispensable condition, but not the only condition. The other condition—that to be done virtuously, it must be done because of its virtuousness; or its virtuousness must be the prompting consideration, which led to the doing of it. It is not volition alone which makes a thing virtuous, but a volition under a sense of duty; and that only is a moral performance to which a man is urged by the sense or feeling of moral obligation. It may be done at the bidding of inclination, but without this it is not done at the bidding of principle. Without this it is not virtuous."*

It is not, then, mere well-wishing, mere benevolence, or affection, considered even as an act of the will, which constitutes virtue. The affection shown by the ancient Egyptians and modern Indians towards cats and other species of the lower animals, cannot be regarded as meritorious; nor could any extent of that affection, though it should lead to the founding of an hospital for their behoof, come up to the morally commendable. Yet we suspect that much of the benevolence that exists in the world, and which is so applauded by it, is of no

have had such a misleading influence in modern German speculation, that they might, like the word idea, be profitably banished from philosophy, or employed only as correlative phrases, the one signifying the mind as contemplating a thing, the other the thing, real or imaginary, as contemplated. The word objective is certainly not fitted fully to develop what we mean, when we say that the law is independent of the individual mind, having authority over it, and over all minds.

* Chalmers's Mor. Phil., c. 5.

higher nature; it cannot be regarded as virtuous, because it is destitute of one essential moral quality. It is only when we are kind to the lower animals from a higher principle, and exercise benevolence towards mankind, *because this is right*, that our love becomes morally commendable.

Taking this principle along with us, we see how it is perfectly possible that there may be numerous good wishes, and fervent benevolent desires, in which there is no virtue, but rather much sin. There may be much evil in ill-regulated benevolent desires and volitions. Neither the existence nor the fervour of such desires can prove the mind in which they exist to be in a morally right condition. The most wicked of men have not been without their feelings of kindness; some of them have shown their wickedness in the nature and character of their generosity. These feelings, and the corresponding actions, can become morally commendable only when cherished or done *because they are right.*

In summing up the truth which we have gained, it appears that God, the Governor, has given to every responsible agent a transcript of his own nature, first, in a power of will, which we hold to be as free as it is possible for it to be in any intelligible sense of the term; and, secondly, and alongside of this free will, a fixed law for the guidance of the will. Freedom and law are thus the fundamental charters of this kingdom of mind. The mind is virtuous when the two are in union, when the free will is moving in accordance with the fixed law. The mind is criminal when the free will is unfaithful to her partner and husband, the law. There begin from that instant that schism, those family dissensions, if we may so speak, which do so distract the soul. And from these inward contests there can be no escape by means of a lawful divorce. That fixed law still holds forth its claims, and stands by its rights, which it will not, and cannot forego, nor even lower by a single iota. Hence that internal dissension which rages in the breasts of all whose will has rebelled against the law of their nature, that is, the law of God —a schism which, but for Divine interposition, must exist for ever, it being impossible for the distracted parties either to separate on the one hand, or cordially to unite on the other.

The morally good, then, cannot exist without the presence both of righteousness and benevolence or love. There is benevolence

in every right exercise of justice. Justice is love leading us to give every one his due. There is righteousness, too, in every right exercise of love. A holy love is cherished toward a being, according as that being has claim upon it. No analysis can free us from the one or other of these essential elements. Justice without love would be a mere rule, with nothing to impel the agent to perform it. Love without justice is the mere lavishing of a weak affection. The two meet and blend in every act that is morally right, as they meet in the character of every holy creature, and in the character of the holy Creator.

All deep and earnest inquirers into the nature of virtue have got at least a partial view of the concrete truth. Each has seen it under one aspect, and has gone away so ravished with the sight, that he never thought of going round the object and inquiring if it had not another aspect equally lovely. Clarke enunciates a profound truth when he says, that there is an eternal fitness in virtue, for there is such a fitness in that righteousness which regulates benevolence. Hutcheson is right in saying, that in all virtue there is benevolence; and Edwards has given his theory a wider expansion in affirming that love to being is of the very essence of virtuous action. Kant seized on a fundamental principle, when he represented the practical reason as announcing a law imperative and universal. Reid, Stewart, and Cousin, have developed the mental process by which this eternal fitness is discovered, and they have shown, too, that virtue must reside in the will. Each has seen so much of the truth. To use an image of Jouffroy, each has seen one side of the pyramid, and has written beneath it—not, as he ought, This is one side of the pyramid, but, This is the pyramid. One party has seen the love, and another has seen the righteousness. Hutcheson observed that affection and feeling were essential parts of all virtue, but took no cognizance of the fixed principles by which they must be regulated. Edwards, in a profounder investigation, discovered that love must be according to a rule; but failed in explaining the relation of love to law.*

* It is not to the credit of the catholicity of the German philosophers, that they seem to be utterly ignorant of Edwards, who, in point of depth of intellect, is equal to any of themselves, and in holy purity and humility far their superior. We have at times thought that his theory of virtue, considered as an ultimate resolution of it, may be nearer the truth than any other. But he has failed, because no mortal man might succeed. Man has not data to solve the problem. He cannot

Clarke and Cudworth, with clear intellectual intuition, saw the presence of eternal and unresolvable principles. Kant exhibits the imperative in all its rigour, but fails to soften its stern aspect by the smiles of benevolence. Reid and his followers have patiently investigated the powers of the human mind by which these principles are discovered; but none of these latter philosophers seem to give its proper place to the no less important element of benevolence. The true theory is to be found, not in the indiscriminate, not in the mere mechanical combination of the two, but in their chemical combination, in the melting and fusing of them into one.

Justice and Love are each the complement of the other. Let us not separate the things that are indissolubly joined together in this holy marriage-covenant. Let Righteousness stand for ever on the pedestal on which he has been set up, with his high look and unbending mien, the master and the guardian; and ever beside him, beneath him, and leaning upon him, yet beautiful and graceful as he, let there be seen Love, with smiles upon her face and gifts in her hands. Our eye would at times rest most fondly on the latter; but then we are constrained to acknowledge, that were she left alone there would be no principle of discernment for her guidance, and so we look eagerly to justice as the ground of our lasting confidence and security.

These considerations may help us to understand the relation between love on the one hand, and righteousness on the other, the former being the impellent of virtue, and the latter the rule. The two are not antagonist, but conspiring. In the Divine character, and in all holy character, the two are in closest and loveliest union. Love, ever ready to flow out like the waters from a fountain, has unchanging justice determining its measure and direction, and furnishing it with a channel in which to flow.

measure the claims of being as being, the rule to him must be a plainer and more practical one. Edwards' theory fails in giving a proper foundation to justice, and in unloosing the knot produced by the existence of sinful beings. We may here be allowed to add, that the United States of America have of late years furnished very important contributions to ethical science. Waylands' work will continue to be reckoned a standard one even by those who do not altogether accord with his theory of virtue. Alexander on Moral Science, is one of the most satisfactory treatises which we have on man's moral agency. Hickok has given some fine expositions of ethical principle. Dr. Hodge has done more than any living man in the way of expelling the errors that have entrenched themselves in the border territory in which Divinity and Ethics meet.

Let us now contemplate the soul of the agent whose will is acting in unison with the moral law. Taking will in the enlarged sense in which we have been contemplating it, it must, from its very nature and position, exercise a powerful influence upon the intellect and the affections. As seated at the springs of mental action, it can lay restraint upon the rising evil. In a well-regulated mind, that is, a mind thoroughly guided by the moral faculty, the very intellect becomes virtuous, in a sense, in all its exercises, because ever restrained on the one hand, and quickened on the other, by a holy will. In such a mind, too, the sensibility raised by mental apprehension or conception will, like the mental apprehension and conception which raises it, be thoroughly sanctified, and become the first reward which virtue reaps. We have taken pains to show that the will is not the same with the intellect on the one hand, or the emotions on the other; but there are many mental affections in which their streams mingle and flow on together. There is high moral good in the resolute application of the intellectual powers to great and good pursuits, and assuredly deep moral evil in the wasting of high gifts of which so many men of genius have been guilty. The element of will with its attached responsibility enters into all feelings which rise beyond fleeting emotions, and become settled affections, whether benign or malign.

In love, using the term in its highest sense, the main element is the will. The will declares that this object, this person, is good, is to be preferred and chosen, and wishes well to that object or person; and these we regard as the important constituents of true affection. Take, as an example, love to God. Here, the will, in the first instance, fixes on the Divine excellence, and would choose it; and here, too, the will leads us to desire God's glory, and the furtherance of his will. Or take love to man—disinterested love to man. Here, too, the will leads us to fix on living being in general, and such a being as man in particular, as an object to be chosen by us, and to wish well to him, and endeavour to promote his happiness. It is not a mere excitement of mind, or a doting attachment to some of the race, (an attachment to all is impossible,) but a benevolence, a desire that they may be blessed, holy, with a determination to supply them, so far as may be in our power, with all that tends to this end. The affection which goes not this length deserves

not the name of love—it is mere instinct, like the attachment of the dog to its master, or to its offspring, nay, it may become utterly selfish and depraved, entwining round the object to which it is attached only to injure it, clasping it only to ruin it in its embrace.

While we regard the will as the main element in love, we know, at the same time, that there are emotions so far following separate laws; but we maintain, that if the will be steadfast and consistent, it will draw the feelings after it, and come to guide them all. We are quite aware that a mere act of the conscience, saying that such and such an act ought to be done, but in no way attended to by the will, cannot produce such a result; nor will it follow from a mere decision of the judgment, that if we do such and such an act, beneficial consequences will ensue. It is of the power of the will that we are predicating that it can accomplish these important ends. Nor will a single act of the will, or a single wish or determination, in opposition to the will generally set in an opposite direction, change and direct the whole current of the feeling. The wicked man wonders that he cannot love what is good on his making a momentary resolution to do so. Truly, if a mere passing desire to be good could make a man good, there is perhaps no wicked man upon the earth who would not have been good long ere now; for, we doubt if there be any man so depraved, that he has not at times had a desire to become virtuous. But it would be wonderful if, with a will so habitually depraved, the wicked man could be so easily led to love what is good. He wills at this present time to secure the good, but next instant he deliberately prefers the evil. When the will is wavering and inconsistent, the sensibility will come to follow its own impulses, as it does in every ill-regulated mind. When the will prefers the evil, and then takes steps to paint the evil in false colours, in order to awaken the feeling, the perverted feeling will become the most unequivocal sign, and one of the most fearful punishments of a corrupted will. Should the will, on the other hand, steadily prefer the morally good, and take pains to have it ever presented to the mind in the proper light, it will speedily allure the feelings whithersoever it will, and this must always be towards that which is holy and good.

Let but this rudder of the mind be rightly used, and it will

speedily guide the whole vessel—the whole soul, intellect, and emotions—in the right way, allowing them, meanwhile, to perform all their proper functions. How grand, how delicately sensitive would be a soul so regulated! It might be said of it, as Cowper said of the ocean,—

> "Vast as it is, it answers as it flows
> The breathing of the lightest air that blows."

But the view presented would be imperfect, did we not include a

THIRD ELEMENT,—The obedience rendered should have a respect to God. We are not inclined to bring in this as the primary element, it is in a sense a derivative one. It presupposes that we have been brought to believe in God, and the independent moral law is one powerful means of leading us to do so. But this law in pointing to God, points to him as the lawgiver, (*νομοθέτης*, James iv. 12.) When we view the law as appointed by God, it takes a more definite form, and wears a more imposing aspect. Not only so, but upon God being made known, the law constrains us to acknowledge that we owe supreme love and obedience to him, and this opens up a new and higher class of duties. Under both aspects it turns morality into religion, and makes all duties, even those which we owe to our fellow-men, to be also duties which we owe to God. Here the other two elements of law and love meet and become one, as they ascend to heaven in a flame of holy affection.

This is the element, and a most important one it is, dwelt upon by theologians. But divines often put it in the wrong place psychologically and logically; and represent the Divine Will and the Divine Command as the ground of virtue. Doubtless they intend thereby to benefit the cause of religion, but they are in reality doing it serious injury. The proper statement is that a deed is good, not because God wills it, but that he wills it because it is good. To reverse this order, is to unsettle, as it appears to us, the foundations of morality. We found virtue not on the simple will of God, but on his holy will, his will regulated by righteousness, an attribute as essential to him as his will. But it is nevertheless true, that the Supreme Being being acknowledged by us to be the just and holy lawgiver, our morality may henceforth go down deeper and mount up higher, and we must learn to have respect to him in all our

offices. Some moralists—such as Aristotle in his Nicomachean ethics—who acknowledge the obligation of law, have overlooked this element, but in doing so, they have stopped short of the point to which their principle of law should have conducted them. Morality cannot attain its full organic growth, unless it has godliness as its vital power. The sacrifice of duty lies cold upon the altar till it is kindled by the flames of love to God.

These elements are ever united in true holiness, as the three colours are combined in the white beam. The sunbeam is divided into several rays as it reaches our atmosphere and our earth, and this is for our benefit, inasmuch as it thereby furnishes the infinitely varied hues, and tints, and shades, which do so delight the eye. The pure light of holiness is also separated into parts on our earth, but, alas, it is by the murky atmosphere of sin; and as the issue we have those sad perversions and defects found even in the acts of man which are deemed the fairest and best. We have a kindness without godliness, a morality without religion, and a pharisaic piety without morality or love. All these are the effects of sin, which hath shattered and dissevered our moral nature. Most common of all we have a worldly morality which has no respect to God;—why this should be the most frequent form of the disseverance we shall explain in next chapter. But assuredly all the three are combined in one simple affection in the breasts of all pure intelligences. It should be the effort of the soul of man in its regenerating struggles, to endeavour to combine what has thus been separated. This is the grand aim of the atonement provided in the Gospel, to deliver man from the curse of sin, and to set him forth with aid furnished, on the work of regaining that image which had been so marred and defaced.

"Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." This would be no unpleasant or difficult work to those whose hearts were pure and filled with love to God; but how arduous to those who have been alienated from him? Ah! this rejoining of the dislocated is often felt to be the most difficult of all tasks, by those who are striving after the perfect man. They would find it comparatively easy to do the work—they may have been doing it all along—but how difficult to rise to these pure and spiritual motives! It does not consist in taking any new step, it may be, but putting a new

life and motive into those we were accustomed to take before. We believe that nothing short of the "impulsive power of a new affection" will accomplish this. We shall succeed only when we do it to Him who loved us and gave himself for us. But when we are led to set such an aim before us, every office becomes exalted; the glorious end is made to sanctify every lawful means employed to further it; the meanest work is ennobled by being made part of the service which we owe to God; the poor man is raised to the same rank as the rich man, and the servant is as high as his master. Such a motive power will make us insensible to all the ordinary trials and temptations of life, just as the Roman army, when eagerly engaged in battle with the enemies of their country, were unconscious of an earthquake which made the ground to tremble beneath their feet.

But it may be proper, before leaving this subject, to add, that besides the specific question, What is a virtuous act? there is a more general question, into which the other resolves itself, What constitutes a virtuous agent? The answer is, An agent in whom the moral faculty or law has its proper place and power, ruling over all, and subordinating the will as the active principle. The human mind is a unity, and it is impossible to separate the acts, in regard to their responsibility, from the agent who performs them. It is not the act which must bear the responsibility, but the agent who does the act. God judges not so much the acts as the agent in the acts. When the actor is not in a right state—when his will is not in subjection to the law appointed to rule it—it is not possible that he can be virtuous. The conscience will not justify him, and we may conclude that the God in whose name the conscience speaks will condemn him.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that an agent in a morally right state, and no other, can perform a morally right action. It is not enough to consider the isolated act, we must consider likewise the agent in the act, before we can pronounce it to be either virtuous or vicious. We hold this principle to be one of vast moment, both in ethics and theology, and we may return to the consideration of it when we come to consider the existing moral state of man.

SECT. VI.—PRACTICAL RULE TO BE FOLLOWED IN DETERMINING WHAT IS GOOD AND EVIL.

We do not mean to enter upon the practical interests involved in the discussion of this subject. All that is required of us in such a treatise as this, is to shew how the principles unfolded stand in relation to the practical rule.

Every man, we have endeavoured to shew, is led by his conscience to see that he is under law, which is the law of the God who made him, and who made the universe. It is because man is under law, that he can, by disobeying it, become a sinner, and be made to feel that he is a sinner; for "where there is no law there is no transgression." This it is which entitles God to call men into judgment, and which renders every sinner without excuse.

To man, as shut out from supernatural revelation, the law in the heart is the arbiter; they who have no written law are a law unto themselves. But this arbiter always points to a law above itself. And there are times when, even with this monitor, the mind feels itself sadly bewildered, not being able with clearness to see the path of duty in perplexing circumstances, or to distinguish between the voice of conscience and that of interest or passion. We believe that the deepest feeling of conscience in the breasts of the heathen, if they would attend to it, and if it could find utterance, would give forth a cry for a brighter light, for a star to guide them to one whom they have been in a sense expecting. Some of the most deeply thinking of the Pagan philosophers have expressed their longings for a supernatural revelation.

The existence of the law in the heart does not render a written law unnecessary—perhaps not even to beings perfectly pure. Those who possess the inward principle will find stability and consistency imparted to morality by embodying its dictates in a code of precepts. Hence every people possessing the art of writing has had some sort of written law. But the work of forming a moral code without revelation has ever been felt to be encompassed with great difficulties,* and the result of such an

* According to the principles enumerated in Note E, it can only be done by an inductive generalization of the individual decisions of the moral faculty. But besides that the conscience is so misled by a perverted will, how difficult is it to seize and express, in all their integrity, the principle involved in the moral judgments?

effort has invariably been a very imperfect and mutilated exhibition of the moral law itself. The moral power, if attended to, will say how much it needs to have a written law from God to guide it. Taking into account the circumstance that man's conscience is perverted, we believe it to be absolutely necessary, in order to its rectification, to have a revealed law acting the same part as the dial, when it is used to set to right the disordered time-piece.

But it would be a great mistake to suppose that the written law could have efficacy without the law in the heart; on the contrary, the former pre-supposes, and is especially addressed to the latter. For how can we be made to know or feel that we are bound to obey the written law? Plainly by the law in the heart, which says, this is right. Should it be said that we are bound to render obedience, because it is the law of God, we admit that we are so; but at the same time we put the question, How do we know that we are bound to obey the will of God? and the reply must bring us to acknowledge the mental faculty. The inward principle, no doubt, points to an outward law, but the obligation of the outward law is made known to us by the inward principle.

The practical rule of obedience to those who are in possession of revelation, is the written law, as addressed to the conscience. This revealed law is summed up in love, but this love rendered in obedience to the law of God; and it will be observed that there is an agreement between this and the views which we have been giving of the essential elements of the morally good. Having such a law sanctioned by God, the conscience itself declares that we should study and obey it, as the law of God our Governor. In the law of the heart God has a means of making us feel our obligation to obey every other law, moral or positive, which he may superadd by a revelation of his will.

While virtue consists in a willing obedience to moral law, it is implied that what we obey is truly moral law. We must be at pains to inquire whether what we take to be law is really moral law, or the mere semblance of it. The greatest evils have sprung from mistakes on this subject, and from misinterpreting, under the influence of sinful bias, the law of heaven, whether in the conscience or in the Word. The law itself requires that we use all means to determine what is really the

will of heaven on such and such a subject, and that we do not mistake the voice of inclination for the voice of duty, or the voice of man for the voice of God.

It is one of the most beneficent of the effects of the law of God written in the Bible, that it rectifies the conscience, which has become deranged, and bewildered in its derangement, and so needs a hand to guide it back to its right position. It is another of its beneficent effects that, being used as an instrument for this purpose by a higher power, it restores to the conscience its primitive discernment and sensibility, when it becomes a constant monitor against evil, and a means of prompting to all excellence.

SECT. VII.—TENDENCY OF VIRTUOUS ACTION.

We have endeavoured to show that there is a holy quality in virtuous action itself, separate from its tendency or results; and that the human mind is led, by its very nature and constitution, to commend that quality and disapprove of the opposite, independently of the consequences which may follow from the one or the other. But while the intuitions, whether of reason or conscience, are anterior to all experience and observation, the latter are continually furnishing corroboration of the reality of intuitive principles. The mind, for instance, proceeding on a certain instinct of thought, expects the same causes to be always followed by the same effects, and it finds actual nature fulfilling its anticipations. Without such a correspondence between the internal organization of the mind and the actual phenomena of the external world, man would be in a constant state of amazement and fear. There are also confirmations (in many respects similar, though in others different) of the reality and beauty of the moral law constantly supplied by the arrangements of God. It is a most delightful corroboration of the intuitive principle and feeling which is furnished by the discovery of the fact, that all virtuous exercises are immediately followed by pleasant sensations in the breast of the virtuous agent, and ultimately tend to further the best interests of society.

The phenomena, to which our attention is now called, are of a twofold character. There is the internal and there is the external correspondence. There are the pleasurable emotions that

accompany the cherishing of virtuous affection; and there are also the advantages accruing to society from the performance of virtuous action. These consequences are not individual or isolated, but are rather of the nature of classes or groups.

I. There is first the pleasant sensation that pervades the mind when it is cherishing virtuous affection. In all virtuous affection there is love, and this affection in itself furnishes delight. It is a pleasure far higher and deeper than any which can be obtained from mere animal gratification. On the other hand, all sinful affections, such as envy, malice, and revenge, are painful in themselves, and a deep spring of misery, independently of any visible judgments which they may bring in their train.

Then there are, secondly, the pleasurable emotions which spring up on the contemplation of virtuous action as performed by us. This is a pleasure distinct from, and additional to, the former. There is a pleasure in the very cherishing of the virtuous affection, and there is a pleasure in the sentiment raised when the moral faculty looks at these affections. The mind is in a state of pleasurable emotion when it is virtuously employed; and the mind is also in a state of pleasurable emotion when it reviews its own virtuous affections. There are not only, for instance, the delightful sensations produced by holy love, but there are also the delightful sensations of moral approbation, which rise up on the reflex contemplation of such affection. In this respect, virtuous affection has an advantage over every other. There are many other affections of the mind that are pleasurable in themselves—such as the desire of pleasure, and the sense of beauty—but no others that have their pleasure indefinitely multiplied by emotions which rise when these affections are reflexly contemplated. In other cases, the pleasure can be prolonged only by calling up anew the affection in its positive exercise, which it may not always be possible to do. In this case, while the delightful sensation can be renewed by the renewed cherishing of the affection, a new and equally delightful feeling is called forth, by the very meditation upon the affection. The virtuous man has thus the double pleasure, somewhat resembling the twofold sensation enjoyed by those animals which first enjoy the pleasure of eating their food, and then, as they recline at ease, the pleasure of ruminating. Or to adopt an image which comes nearer the reality, (in so far as the secondary

pleasure is one which can be many times repeated :) the pleasant sound which the soul utters to its God, when it is virtuously employed, can be indefinitely prolonged by reverberation from the heights of the moral faculty and the echoing responses of the moral feelings.

There is a similar multiplying of the pain which follows vicious action. All the malign affections are painful in themselves, and painful also in the recollection of them; and they raise pain as the mind reflects upon them with abhorrence. The misery of the soul is immeasurably increased by the regurgitation of feelings as they are beat back by a reproaching conscience.

There is, thirdly, the effect of virtuous and vicious affection upon the association of ideas. This is a view which has not been sufficiently noticed by moralists. It is foreign to our present purpose to enter into any particular explanation of the phenomenon. The fact will not be disputed by any who are at the trouble to remember how soothing they have felt the influence of affection, and how harassing the movements of sinful passion. It is evident that virtue possesses a power of calling up a whole train of pleasing thoughts and feelings, and that vicious action has an equally powerful influence in leading away the mind into an opposite channel, where it meets with everything that is disturbing and distressing. The stream raises along its banks a strip of verdure, composed of rich grass and foliage or of baleful weeds, according as its waters are pure or impure.

This power, according to the views above developed, is of a twofold kind. There is, first, the direct power which benevolent or malevolent affections possess of calling up analogous affections with all their pleasant or painful sensations. By this law of association, virtue and vice propagate themselves after their kind, and the species multiplies itself. There is, secondly, the power of conscience, with its train of feelings, as it reviews virtuous or vicious action. The most delightful frames of which the mind is susceptible, are those that are put in motion by an approving heart. In the rest which a pacified conscience gives, a solid peace is raised up to be a constant companion and help-meet for us. On the other hand, the bitterest feelings which agitate the human breast, are those which follow in the funereal wake of a condemning conscience. The pulsations that are thus set in motion differ in number and intensity, but they generally continue for a time;

the waves now carrying forward the mind to all that is holy and delightful, and again, when evil, casting it back upon a waste and barren shore. The delightful eagerness and buoyancy of the virtuous mind on the one hand, as well as the aching of the vicious man's heart on the other, proceed very much from this cause. It will appear in the next Chapter, that some of the wicked man's most maddening struggles have arisen from a desire to rid himself of this dreadful gnawing of a mind which is not at ease.

Fourthly, there is the general influence of virtuous and vicious affection upon the whole character. Independently altogether of the immediate emotions produced by virtuous affection and the contemplation of virtuous affection, and even of the immediate trains of feeling that follow, it has a general tendency to put the whole soul in a sound and healthy, and therefore in a buoyant and pleasant state. This is the most beneficent of all the effects of virtue. It arises from those nice arrangements which God hath instituted among the various powers and laws of the human mind, precisely analogous to those adjustments which we admire so much in the material world. It is by the skilful adaptation of these laws of association and feeling, one to another, that virtuous affection tends to produce a mind at ease and happy, and habitual virtue produces a soul blessed in all its moods and trains of sentiment and feeling. Peace, originating in virtue as its source, is made to shine upon the soul from all its faculties and feelings, as the light which comes from the sun reflected from and refracted in the atmosphere, shines upon the earth from every point, and in infinitely diversified colours. On the other hand, the tendency of vicious affection is to produce not only the misery which directly flows from it emotionally, and that which springs from an accusing conscience; but also to breed a disordered mind, wretched in every one of its trains of thought and feeling, and lashing itself into greater and more unappeasable fury.

II. Besides these internal there are also external pre-ordained consequences following from virtuous or vicious action. These spring from the pre-established harmony between the world within and the world without. These effects, like those contemplated under the former head, may be divided into various classes, according as they follow immediately or more remotely.

First, there is the immediate effect of virtuous action. As virtue consists in justice and benevolence, and modifications of

them, it is manifest, that its exercises must usually consist in the multiplication of happiness; while the absence of virtue, and much more the existence of positive vice, must lead to consequences precisely opposite.

Secondly, there is the effect of virtue in producing confidence, and of vice in spreading a spirit of distrust throughout society. Where there is no internal confidence, no external bandage could hold society pleasantly together.

Besides these direct effects, there are, thirdly, the general results, good and evil, that flow from virtue and vice, through the arrangements of Divine providence. The success which generally follows the exertions of excellence, and the ultimate failure of wickedness, all attest that there is a Governor in this world upholding his own laws. If it is urged as an objection, that in many cases virtue, especially in its higher and bolder forms, is not successful; and that deceit is often allowed to triumph, the answer is obvious. While good purposes may be served by giving certain encouragement to goodness, it does not seem desirable to stimulate a mere artificial morality, by holding out the certainty of success. Were virtue in every case followed by its merited triumphs, there might be a risk that the triumph would be more valued than the qualities which led to it. The general countenance shown is sufficient to indicate the will of God; and anything beyond might be attended with incidental evils. It is also conceivable, that in a world under probation, advantage may arise from not exposing vice to instant failure—there being all the while, in the manifold visible judgments of heaven, sufficient indications of the Divine hatred of sin.

SECT. VIII.—GENERAL VIEW OF MAN'S ORIGINAL MORAL CONSTITUTION AS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE CHARACTER OF GOD.

If there is any truth in the above remarks, it will at once be seen, how deep a foundation God has laid for morality in man's original constitution. Moral excellence is truly the whole powers and affections of the soul in healthy exercise; and in order to guard it, there is a faculty, with a train of corresponding feelings, presiding over all the other faculties, and seated in the very heart. Besides the original strength imparted, and the lofty position

assigned to it, it has a whole train of attendants that wait upon it to obey its will, and to do it honour in the results which flow from it. It has this high place assigned to it in man's very constitution, which thus declares the high value which God sets upon it; and announces, too, what is the place which we should reserve for that God whom it represents. It is true that virtue has no such lofty position in man's present nature; but still there is evidence, in the sadly ruined building, that though the tower so battlemented, turreted, and guarded, has fallen, it was once the crowning object and defence of the fabric.

It has often been disputed whether virtue has its seat among the faculties or the feelings. This controversy has not unfrequently been a mere war of words. Persons who deny that it is in the intellect, mean by intellect, simply the reason distinguishing between truth and error. Those who deny that it lies in the feelings, mean by feelings the mere flying emotions which depend on the temperament of the mind. When we take a full view, we may discover both the exercise of a faculty and the play of feeling. In virtuous action, all the parts of the soul, and not merely one department of it, are called forth into vigorous exertion. There is the will followed by the sensibility, subordinated to the moral faculty, quickened by its appropriate emotion, and guiding the whole intellectual powers. It is the united anthem of praise, offered by every part of the human soul to God, its Maker and its King.

When the reflex moral faculty, or the conscience, surveys virtuous action, it proclaims it to be good. This faculty in unfallen beings is set as the guard of virtue, warning it of danger, and encouraging it by its smiles on the path of well-doing. But it can scarcely be repeated too frequently, that the possession of virtue and the possession of conscience are not the same. The existence of a judge in a land does not prove that the country is free from crime; nay, it seems rather to prove that there is a possibility of crime; and just as little does the presence of conscience prove that there can be no sin in the soul—it is rather meant to warn us of the danger of sin. In a pure and well-regulated mind, the office of conscience would have been a very easy and delightful one. Occasionally giving warning of danger, its grand office would have been to stimulate the virtuous affections, by the sanctions which it gave, and the

rewards which it added, by means of the pleasing emotions which it excited.

We now feel as if we had a firm footing to stand on, when we rise from the character of man to the character of God. If the physical works of God reflect the Divine power and wisdom, the original moral constitution of man conducts us to a belief in still higher attributes.

So far as man can judge from his own nature, he must look upon God as distinguished, not only by the loftiness of his intellectual being, but by the loveliness of his affections. Some persons, with the view of exalting the Divine Being, would, with the ancient Stoics, strip him of everything that bears any resemblance to will or feeling, as existing in the human breast. He has been represented by such as a mere abstraction, calling forth no affection, because cherishing no affection. This whole representation proceeds on the idea, that intellect is so much higher than benevolence. Yet so far as man is concerned, every thinking mind must acknowledge, that the soul is existing in its highest state when it is cherishing a holy love; and that intellect is in its highest exercise when it is directing us to the object on which that love is to be fixed. Take away benevolence from a moral agent, and you take away the very quality of which the moral faculty approves. Take away affection, warm and living affection from God, and you take away the quality which most endears God to our souls; you take away, if we may so speak, the very heart of God—the heart which loves us, and calls forth our love in return.

In true affection there is the mingling of emotion and well-wishing. In emotions, the elements, we have seen, are excitement and attachment. In regard to excitement, there is no reason to think that there is anything corresponding to it in the bosom of Deity. But most assuredly there is holy attachment. We must be careful, indeed, to elevate him above weak and doting partialities, and above all that adhesiveness which springs from the earthly relationships of family, of kindred, and country; still there is complacency and delight in the affection of the Divine Being towards his works. And higher than this, there are benign sentiments of grace, tenderness, and compassion, leading him to feel the deepest interest in the welfare of his creatures, and calling forth corresponding feelings in their breasts towards him.

These same mental phenomena conduct us to a belief in another attribute of the Divine character. If we are led to believe that there is love in the Divine Being corresponding to virtuous affection in man, we are led by a like reason to believe that there is an attribute in God corresponding to the moral faculty in man. We are thus introduced to another feature of the Divine character—to the attribute which leads him to approve of that love which he ever cherishes, and to disapprove of everything of an opposite character. There is not only an infinite love in the Divine mind, but a perfect justice, commending, exalting, defending, and regulating that love.

It thus appears, that in the character of God there meet two co-ordinate moral attributes—infinite benevolence and infinite righteousness. We can conceive that there may be persons who wish that he had only the one of these without the other—that he had merely the affection without the holiness. But our wishes will not alter the nature of God, or make him different from what he is, and from what his works show him to be. It is easy, no doubt, to conceive of a being of exalted power, who cares only for the happiness, without looking to the holiness of his creatures, and we may call this being God; but he is not the living and the true God; he is no more the really existing God who is thus pictured by us, than are the idols which the heathens make and worship. The one is as much the creation of men's fancy, as the others are the workmanship of men's hands. If you ask, Why is his justice so unbending? we can only answer that such is his very nature; and that justice is as essential to the character of God, as even wisdom, or power, or goodness. Nor can the wishes, the complaints of sinful men or fallen angels, render him less strictly inflexible in his justice. Were he without this attribute, or were this attribute not infinite, he could not be a perfect God, our own minds being the judges. For we have discovered *that* in our own souls which testifies that God is holy, and approving of the exercise of this his holiness.

We are thus enabled, too, to explain in some measure the relation of the Divine love to the Divine holiness. These have often been represented as antagonist principles; and yet truly they are not so, though there are conceivable and actual circumstances in which their separate action might seem to tend in

opposite ways. In themselves they are conspiring, and not conflicting principles. When Divine love is exercised, it has the approbation of Divine holiness; and Divine holiness is exercised in honouring and guarding Divine love. God is love, is in his very will and affections love, and is led by his very nature to approve of that love which is in his very essence.

Let it be observed, however, that holiness is something more than the mere love of promoting happiness. It is not so much the love of promoting happiness, as the love of that pure love which seeks the promotion of happiness. This attribute, in one sense, is inferior to love, because its proper exercise consists in approving of love, and in guiding love. In another sense, it is the highest attribute in the Divine nature, higher than benevolence itself, for it sits in judgment upon benevolence, which it proclaims to be supremely and ineffably good, and regulates and directs that benevolence. Let us look up with equal admiration upon both, as constituting the two polar forces of the moral universe, the two essential elements of the moral perfection of God.

CHAPTER II.

ACTUAL MORAL STATE OF MAN.

SECT. I.—NATURE OF THE JUDGMENTS PRONOUNCED BY THE CONSCIENCE.

THE two inductive methods of acquiring knowledge in physical science are observation and experiment. It has been doubted whether the latter can be employed in investigating the processes of the human mind; and it should at once be admitted that it requires certain modifications in order to suit it to the new object to which it is directed. Even in the physical sciences, experiment in chemistry is somewhat different from experiment in mechanics, and experiment in physiology is different from experiment in unorganized bodies; and we must expect it to require some change before it can be applied to a spiritual substance. While it is most dangerous in some cases, and difficult in all, to experiment on the human mind, it may be safely and confidently asserted that experiment can be wrought upon it. We suspect that the poet Byron artificially put his mind in certain states with the view of calling forth those gloomy ideas and convulsive feelings which he has embodied in his poetry. Such experiments, it must be acknowledged, are very perilous, more so than those which Davy tried with inflammable gases, or than those which Hahnemann, the founder of the Homœopathic school of medicine, wrought upon the bodily frame, when he tried upon himself and upon a few friends those medicines which he adopted into his code. But the mental philosopher needs to submit to no such painful processes as those to which poets have subjected their feelings, and to which anatomists have exposed their own bodies and those of the lower animals. It is only requisite that he present before the mind an object fitted to set

in action the particular faculty or feeling which he purposes to examine, and then carefully note the result. No faculty can be so successfully operated on in the way of experiment, as well as in the way of observation, as the conscience. It is a reflex faculty—Butler calls it the faculty of reflection—judging of the dispositions and voluntary acts of responsible beings. In order to detect the law of its operations, all that is required is to bring these mental states before it, and mark its judgments; and the decisions of this supreme court give us a correct exposition of the laws of the kingdom. This can be done as easily as material substances can be brought under the power of the magnet or galvanic wire. Care must be taken, in the one case as in the other, to separate between what is essential and what is accidental, and this may be done most successfully by varying the experiments, or performing them in new and different circumstances. In particular, pains must be taken, in examining the decisions of the moral faculty, to distinguish between its workings and those of certain cognate feelings, and particularly of the sympathetic emotions, which are so strong in our nature. These feelings, if we be not on our guard against them, will completely disturb the operations of the conscience, just as the iron in a ship disturbs the action of a magnet. In such cases, allowance must be made for the disturbing agent, or rather the object must be placed before the mind in such a way that the deflecting circumstance cannot operate.

It is after this manner that we would proceed to observe and experiment on the workings of the conscience with the view of noting its decisions, and thereby arriving at an exact estimate of the present moral condition of man. At this point we have to leave all the ordinary academic and scholastic writers on ethics behind us; but we are careful to take with us all the important truths regarding the essential and indestructible principles of man's moral nature which they have succeeded in establishing. We can admire with them the beauty of the constitution of man's moral nature, but we have often wondered that they have not seen the wide incongruity between their glowing descriptions of man as he ought to be, and the exhibitions given in our own hearts, and in the world, of man as he actually is. We are not inclined, indeed, to agree with many otherwise excellent divines in slighting the intimations of conscience in man's nature; in this

respect we hold by the doctrines so firmly established by the philosophers. But, then, adopting these very principles of the philosophers, taking with us their declarations in regard to the authority of the conscience, we would bring them to bear upon the existing state of man.

In doing so, however, it may be useful to observe a little more minutely some of the laws of the working of the conscience.

First, It is of mental, and of mental acts exclusively, that the conscience judges. It has no judgment whatever to pronounce on a mere bodily act. We look out at the window, and we see two individuals in different places chastising two different children. The conscience pronounces no judgment in the one case or the other, whatever the feelings may do, until we have learned the motives which have led to the performance of the acts. If upon inquiry we find the motive in the one case to be the extreme care which the parent takes of the moral wellbeing of his child, and in the other case to be blind passion, we now approve of the one individual and disapprove of the other; but let it be observed, that the conscience pronounces its judgment not on the outward actions, but on the internal motives and feelings.

Secondly, It is of acts of the will, and of acts of the will exclusively, that the conscience judges. In saying so, we use *will* in a large sense, as large as that department which has been allotted to it, we believe, by God in the human mind. We employ it to include every exercise of mind in which there is choice, consent, preference, active rejection, wish, or intention. But these may extend themselves over acts of the mind which do not spring directly from the will. There are, we admit, spontaneous affections in the soul originating in instinctive or habitual tendencies, and apart from any voluntary excitation of them. Are these, it may be asked, neither morally good nor evil? The answer is, that they may, provided on the one hand the will has by some previous act produced these tendencies, or provided it now gives its adherence to them by attaching its consent, concurrence, or co-operation; for wherever the will enters, it carries with it responsibility. What is now a spontaneous tendency may have been produced by a succession of voluntary acts good or evil. Or the will may now be aiding and abetting the inclination to evil. A man reads an obscene book, and im-

pure imaginations rise up in his mind, and the moral censor condemns the act, because he has been voluntarily doing what is fitted to call forth evil. Nay, when the spontaneous impulse tends to evil, and is not instantly restrained, the will must bear the blame of the results. In such ways as these the will may associate itself with every affection and action of the mind, and thus render them praise-worthy or blame-worthy. With this explanation the maxim will commend itself, that voluntariness is implied in all actions on which the conscience pronounces its sentence.

Thirdly, The conscience approves and disapproves not of isolated acts merely, but also of the mind or agent manifested in these acts. The conscience judges according to truth, and regards all mental acts as the mind acting, and pronounces its verdict, not so much on the abstract act as on the mind voluntarily acting in them. This may seem an unnecessarily metaphysical method of expressing an obvious truth, but, in the sequel, it will be found of no little consequence to be able precisely to determine what is the object at which the conscience looks, and on which it pronounces its judgments.

Fourthly, The conscience pronounces its decision on the state of mind of the responsible agent as the same is presented to it. It is not the business, or at least the direct office of the conscience, to determine what is the precise mental state—what is the wish, desire, intention, or resolution, of any responsible agent. This must be ascertained by the usual rules and laws of evidence, and by the use of the ordinary intellectual faculties. It is upon the voluntary acts of the mind, as they are represented to it, that the conscience utters its sentence. Thus, in the case which we have put of the two parents chastising their children, the one act presented to the conscience is that of a parent seeking, by proper punishment, to correct vice, and the other act is that of an individual cherishing passion, and acting upon it. It is upon this representation that the conscience proceeds, and, provided the representation be correct, the decision will be sound. But let it be observed, that the representation may be an erroneous one. Under the influence of hasty feeling or prejudice, we may have formed very incorrect judgments as to the real state of mind of the individuals whose conduct we have been observing. While the conscience has pronounced verdicts which

are righteous in themselves, they may be mistaken in regard to the given individual; for the one parent may not have been under the influence of such high-minded virtue, nor the other the slave of passion, as has been supposed. The conscience is in the position of a barrister, whose opinion is asked in matters of legal difficulty. In both cases the judgment given proceeds on the supposed accuracy of a representation submitted, but which may be very partial, or very perverted.

It follows—*Fifthly, That there may be much uncertainty or confusion, or positive error, in the judgments of the conscience, because given upon false representations.* All the actions of man are of a concrete character; by far the greater number of his voluntary acts are of a very complex nature; and so it is difficult for the individual himself, and still more difficult for a neighbour, to determine what are the precise motives by which he is influenced in any given act. The springs of human action are often as difficult to be discovered as the true fountains of the great African rivers, which rise so far in the unapproachable interior; and there is room for endless disputes as to what is the originating and original motive, without which the act would not have been purposed or performed; and when we have fixed on any one source, we are not sure that there may not be others which could dispute with it the pre-eminence.

Meanwhile the conscience will pronounce its verdict upon the action according to the representation given by the other faculties of the mind. Present a concrete action, more particularly if a complex one, under one aspect, and the conscience will approve of it; present it under a different aspect, and the conscience will disapprove of it. Let warlike achievements, for instance, be looked at in the light of deeds of chivalry, romance, and courage, and the mind will be elevated by the very contemplation of them; and the clang of the trumpet will not so effectually stir up the war-horse, as the narrative of the exploits of heroes will awaken enthusiasm. But let us now contemplate the same actions under a different aspect; let us see the blood flowing in torrents, and hamlets and cities in flames; let us hear the groans of the wounded and dying, and the wails of the widows and orphans, as the news are brought to them of the friends that they have lost; let us inspect the hearts of the leaders in the combat, and observe the reigning pride,

ambition, and jealousy; let us look into the hearts of their followers, and as we discover, besides the momentary excitement produced by the battle, nothing beyond a mercenary transaction, or the compulsory following of a chieftain—then our feelings change, and the scene is regarded with abhorrence and disgust.

It follows, that the conscience of two different individuals, or of the same individual at two different times, may *seem* to pronounce two different judgments on the same deed. We say *seem*, for in reality the two deeds are different, and the judgments differ, because the deeds, as presented to the conscience, are not the same. Thus, in the case which we have put, it is in the one instance the supposed devotedness and magnanimity that are commended; and in the other, it is upon the selfishness and cruelty of the parties that the condemnation is heaped. When Mercury stole Apollo's harp, Apollo was at first inclined to be angry; but afterwards forgot the crime in his admiration of the skill displayed in the perpetration of it. The Greeks, in this fable, furnish in the persons of their gods a true picture of human nature, and of the tendency of mankind to overlook the moral qualities of actions, and fix their attention on other features, fitted to call forth other than moral feelings.

From the general cause now referred to have proceeded, if we do not mistake, those irregularities and apparent inconsistencies in the decisions of conscience which have so puzzled and confounded ethical and metaphysical inquirers. The approval which was thought to have been given by the conscience to the widow burning herself on the funeral pile of her husband in India, and to deceit when successful among the ancient Spartans, and to the murder of children in the South Sea islands, and the exposing of the aged, and of helpless children in Africa—all originate in false views presented of the devotedness of the widow, of the heroism of the Spartan youth who succeeds in compassing a difficult end, and of the misery to which the helpless, whether from youth or age, might be exposed, if left to drag out an existence for the sustenance of which no adequate provision could be made..

It is becoming evident, that the conscience may be in the breast of an individual, and exerting itself in a kind of way, while his whole moral judgments are utterly perverted.

Sixthly, The decisions of the conscience are of various kinds. They may be classified as follows:—First, it authoritatively demands that certain actions be done. Secondly, it authoritatively insists that certain actions be not done. Thirdly, it declares that the performance of the first class of actions is good, commendable, rewardable. Fourthly, it announces that the omission of the first, or commission of the second class is wrong, condemnable, punishable. Philosophic moralists have confined their attention almost exclusively to the first or the first and third of these classes of decisions, and have not dared to look fairly at the other two, and at the consequences which necessarily flow from them. Yet the second and fourth are as certainly and as loudly proclaimed as the first and third. It is by the fourth that there is awakened a sense of guilt—a sentiment no less strongly impressed on man's mind than a sense of merit. It is by it, too, that there is raised up that fear of a supernatural power, and of coming judgments, which is felt at times at least by all savage tribes, indeed by all mankind, except in so far as it may be suppressed by speculative unbelief or artificial means. The feeling of reproach as to the past, and of apprehension as to the future, is one of the characteristics of humanity, and he who overlooks it, has lost sight of one of the most striking qualities in our nature, and must have in consequence a very imperfect, nay a positively erroneous view of man's moral condition. It is this sentiment which, more than anything else, has retained the idea of God—in some cases very vaguely—among all nations; it is upon it that the Christian missionary seeks to operate in addressing heathen nations; it is this same feeling which constrains all men to feel, at least on certain occasions, that they need a religion. The moral monitor in man closes all its proclamations by pointing to God as a Judge and to a day of righteous retribution.

SECT. II.—INFLUENCE OF A DEPRAVED WILL UPON THE MORAL JUDGMENTS.

The will, we have seen, is the seat of responsibility. At the side of the will, which is free, God hath placed in the soul a law which is fixed. The morally good consists in the conformity of the free will to the fixed law. Sin, on the other hand, consists

essentially in the will refusing to submit itself to the moral law of God. Let us now suppose that the will of a responsible being has set itself free from the restraints of the moral law. Let us suppose that man is such a being—we say *suppose*, for at present we assume it, leaving the proof till afterwards. We are now to shew that this perverted and rebellious will may come to exercise a reflex influence for evil upon the decisions of the conscience.

It is not difficult to explain this phenomenon of the influence of the will upon the other faculties of the mind. Dr. Brown has some ingenious speculations on this subject. "That it is of the very nature of emotions to render more vivid all the mental affections with which they are peculiarly combined, as if their own vivacity were in some measure divided with these, every one who has felt any strong emotion must have experienced. The eye has, as it were, a double quickness to perceive what we love or hate—what we hope or fear. Other objects may be seen slightly; but these, if seen at all, become instantly permanent, and cannot appear to us without impressing their presence in stronger feeling on our senses and on our soul."* He then shews how this vividness, producing a permanence of the emotion, influences, in a powerful manner, the whole train of association. We are not quite sure, however, that this is an adequate explanation of the phenomena. The emotional nature of any state of mind must of course produce liveliness; and this liveliness may, according to some law of the human mind, have an influence upon that state of mind. But it is not to be forgotten that the liveliness is one thing, and the permanence another thing, though Dr. Brown seems to slide unconsciously from the one to the other. The permanence of a thought, accompanied with will, arises, we maintain, from the direct power of the will retaining the thought.

We are quite aware that the will cannot *directly* call up any absent idea, or any idea not immediately before the mind. To will a given recollection into existence, is already to be in possession of that recollection. But the mind, while yet without the precise recollection, may know that there is a recollection which it is desirable to recall. If we have forgot, for example, the name of an individual, whose person and character we distinctly remember, we cannot by the direct power of the will

* Lect. 31.

call up the name; but by an act of the will, we may keep the recollection of the man's person and character before us, till his name is suggested by the natural process of association.

The will has thus a direct and an indirect power over the train of thought and feeling. It has a direct power in retaining any given thought or idea; for as long as the will to retain it exists, that very will keeps the idea before the mind. The will has also a most important indirect influence. In detaining any given idea or recollection, it can command a whole train of association connected with it. In retaining the idea of a mother, for instance, and dwelling upon it, it may recall all the pleasant scenes of childhood, of tenderness and unwearied care, that are associated with her. The will has also a power of driving away an unpleasant thought, not directly but indirectly, by willingly following other trains, and taking steps to call up such trains of association. We wish, let us suppose, to banish the recollection of some wound or sore which grates on our sensibility: we cannot do so directly, but we can accomplish our end effectually, by rushing into some other scene fitted to interest us, and there following the train of conception that is started. Or we wish to rid ourselves of the recollection of an unhandsome, ungenerous deed which has been done to us: we cannot effect this by dwelling on the deed, but we may accomplish our end by meditating on some other subject, as upon the far greater provocation which we ourselves have given to our heavenly Lord.

It appears, then, that in the influence exercised by the will, there is first the retention of a fixed idea, and then the clustering around this of other ideas, with their corresponding feelings. And let us suppose that the ideas suggested are fitted to raise emotions, there will now not only be the influence of the will, but of the emotions which are excited. But conceptions of moral good and evil are all accompanied with emotions more or less lively, as are also all the objects which are fitted to sway the will. It is easy to understand, then, how in all cases in which the conscience and will are in joint operation there should be the influence of emotion. Now, it is a law of mental operation that emotions tend to quicken the train of ideas in the mind. When the mind is in an emotional state, the thoughts flow as in torrents, and the feelings fly as with a hurricane

velocity. In the phenomena now to be considered, there may thus be a power of will retaining a radical thought, and a power of emotion collecting around it a rapid succession of thoughts and feelings.

The tendency of will and desire is to retain the favourite thought and feeling. The tendency of emotion, on the other hand, is to accelerate the mental states. This difference of influence on the train of association is one of the many proofs which may be urged to establish the difference between the optative and emotional parts of man's nature. But while desire and emotion are different, desire is commonly connected with emotion, inasmuch as the objects which lead to desire also stir up emotion. It is to the power of emotion that we owe, to some extent, the immense number of ideas and feelings which are congregated round a common point, while we owe the stability of the point of attraction not to the emotion connected with the desire, but to the desire itself. We desire that a friend, a mother in ill health, may recover; and we owe the number of the plans of recovery suggested to the rapidity of thought caused by the emotions which the very conception of that mother raises; but we owe the continuance of the fundamental thought to the influence of a deeper part of our constitution obeying very different laws. The desire, in short, is the central body, and the thoughts and emotions the lesser bodies which dance around it. No doubt, that central body has also its motions, but they are round another centre, constituting the true motive power of the human mind.

In all those states of mind in which we have both will and emotion, we have thus a double class of phenomena, a principle of permanence and a principle of change—a continuous thought, and a succession of thoughts—a centre, and bodies circling round it. We have the same things as the ancient Romans had when the body of Virginia was brought forth to the people; or when Antony exposed the body of Cæsar—lifting up the toga, exhibiting to the people the blood-stained garment, and pointing to the wounds by which their friend had been murdered—till the multitude, under a tumult of feelings excited by the object before them, tore in pieces those who were supposed to be associated with the murder, and demolished or burnt the houses of the conspirators. And so, too, in the will there is an object

continuously presented before the mind, and this object gathering round it a whole host of feelings.

The intense desire thus keeps the thought fixed, and the feelings keep other thoughts playing around it. When the object is of a pleasant kind, and is agreeably associated, all the feelings are of a delightful nature, and the desire becomes a source and centre of happiness diffused around it, as heat is from a fire, as light is from the sun. On the other hand, when the object contemplated is painful, when it is the desire to avoid punishment, for instance, or to flee from an angry God, then the feelings, while intensely active, are all intensely distressing, and the mind moves round a point like the fretted animal round the post to which it is chained, or like the moth fluttering about the light which is to consume it.

The will, whether it exists in the shape of desire or positive purpose, has, it thus appears, an influence, direct and indirect, upon the train of thought and feeling. But the will, being responsible for its acts, is responsible for all the effects which these acts produce. If these are evil, the mind cannot escape from the blame, on the ground that they are not immediately voluntary. There may be acts in the highest degree sinful, though not proceeding immediately from the will. As proceeding really, though not directly, from the will, it must be held as accountable for them. The depraved will has undoubtedly to answer for all the brood which it may hatch. Those who sow dragon's teeth must be prepared to take the blame of all the deeds which the armed men who spring up may perform. A rebellious will may thus be responsible for errors which are in themselves merely intellectual, just as the drunkard is held accountable in every court of law for the acts which he commits during intoxication. A perverted will may be chargeable with the full blame of a state of disordered feeling produced by it, just as the opium-eater has to take the guilt of those frightful images which his cherished habit has necessarily called up.

Dr. Chalmers has shown how mere emotions, through their connexion more or less remote with the will, may become morally good and morally evil. "It is this which imparts virtuousness to emotion, even though there be nothing virtuous which is not voluntary. It is true that, once the idea of an object is in the mind, its counterpart emotion may, by an organic or pathologi-

cal law, have come unbidden into the heart. The emotion may have come unbidden, but the idea may not have come unbidden. By an act of the will it may, in the way now explained, have been summoned, at the first, into the mind's presence, and at all events it is by a continuous act of the will that it is detained and dwelt upon." "It cannot bid compassion into the bosom apart from the object which awakens it; but it can bid a personal entry into the house of mourning, and then the compassion will flow apace; or it can bid a mental conception of the bereaved and afflicted family there, and then the sensibility will equally rise whether a suffering be seen or a suffering be thought of. In like manner, it cannot bid into the breast the naked and unaccompanied feeling of gratitude, but it can call to recollection, and keep in recollection, the kindness which prompts it, and the emotion follows in faithful attendance on its counterpart object. It is thus that we can will the right emotions into being, not immediately, but mediately—as the love of God, by thinking on God—a sentiment of friendship, by dwelling in contemplation on the congenial qualities of our friend—the admiration of moral excellence, by means of a serious and steadfast attention to it. It is thus, too, that we bid away the wrong emotions, not separately and in disjunction from the objects, for the pathological law which unites objects with emotions [is it not rather conceptions with emotions?] we cannot break asunder, but we rid our heart of the emotions by ridding our mind of their exciting and originating thoughts—of anger, for instance, by forgetting the injury; or of a licentious imagination, by dismissing from our fancy the licentious image, or turning our sight and our eyes from viewing vanity."*

But the will exercises an indirect influence, not only upon the emotions, but also upon the judgment. It is proverbial, indeed, that the wishes of the heart exercise a most powerful influence upon the common judgments of the mind. It has not been so frequently observed, that the will may sway in a prejudicial manner the moral judgments. This phenomenon is to be explained in much the same way as those to which we have referred.

Here we must take along with us some of the observations made in the last section upon the working of the moral faculty.

* Moral Philosophy, chap. v.

The conscience, it must be remembered, is a reflex faculty, pronouncing its decision upon the case as submitted to it. In order to observe how the will is fitted to sway the decisions of the conscience, let us suppose that it is bent upon a particular course of conduct, and suggests its performance to the mind. Cæsar has come to the river Rubicon, and is bent upon reaching Rome. He knows that the crossing of this stream is a violation of the laws of his country; but when the thought of this occurs to him, he speedily banishes it. Other thoughts meanwhile rise up before his mind, and are cherished—the evil which Pompey and his faction are doing in Rome, and the benefit which his country might derive from their expulsion. We believe Cæsar, in the act, to have been swayed by ambition, and not a perverted moral sense; yet we can conceive how, in the way now indicated, he may have succeeded in deceiving the moral faculty, and justifying his conduct to himself. Or let us suppose, as a case more in point, that certain of the conspirators against Cæsar are bent upon ridding themselves of one who is regarded by them as having robbed his country of its liberties. It is easy to see how, by dwelling on one aspect of the case, under the influence of desire, the deed, as a whole, might come to be regarded as in the highest degree commendable. The desert of the ambitious tyrant will be seen in fearfully dark colours, and the mind will fondly dwell on the immediate and glorious advantages which are to arise from his overthrow; and these features being vividly presented to the conscience, while the other aspects of the deed are carefully concealed, the conscience will now give its approval, and the parties rush to the commission of the deed, as one which they are imperatively called to perform.

Assuming, then, (for the proof must be deferred to a succeeding section,) that the will goes wrong, it is conceivable that THREE GENERAL EFFECTS OF A PREJUDICIAL KIND may follow from the will deceiving the conscience.

(1.) We mistake, in regard to certain actions, *calling that which is good evil, and that which is evil good.* The will accomplishes this, by presenting the evil and the good in a false light. The action being a complex one, the will may present it only under one aspect, and thus draw forth a false judgment. A good act, which we are unwilling to perform, comes to be presented as leading to pain, or to certain prejudicial consequences,

and the conscience is led to give its disapproval of it. An evil act, which we are bent upon committing, comes to be seen only as leading to happiness, and the conscience is kept from laying a sentence of disapprobation upon it. Doubts may arise as to the accuracy of these judgments, upon other views involuntarily suggesting themselves to the mind; but the will contrives to drive them away with all available speed.

Thus it is, that sin comes to be adopted as morally good. Hence the difficulty of getting a favourite sin condemned. Charge it at any one point, and it immediately assumes the name of some virtue to which it bears a partial resemblance. Is the man forgetting God, and the duties which he owes to him, that he may, through deep anxiety, and a contempt of present comforts, amass wealth, and purchase earthly possessions?—he calls his conduct by the name of industry. Is he selfishly and systematically employed in raising himself step by step in society, to the disregard of all higher claims?—he professes to be swayed by an innocent regard to the respect of his fellow-men. Is he in the way of despising the poor, of fostering a spirit of revenge, and avoiding the confession of sin?—his conduct passes for spirit and magnanimity. Is he addicted to rudeness, to quarrelsomeness, and profanity?—he claims the merit due to independence of thinking and acting. Is he led to give a servile obeisance to the prevailing opinion, or conceal his sentiments in the presence of persons of rank and name?—he shelters his conduct under the guise of modesty and civility of manners. It is in this way that we account for the perverted moral judgments of mankind.

(2.) *Men form too favourable an estimate of their own character.* A number of circumstances contribute to this end.

First of all, there is an unwillingness on the part of those who have committed sin, candidly to inspect themselves. Just as the impenitent criminal would avoid the bar of the judge and the examination of the witnesses, so would the sinner flee from the sifting inspection of the moral law. Just as the murderer would visit any spot on this earth's wide surface rather than that at which the deed was committed, and recollect any scene of his past life more willingly than the blood which he shed, and the shrieks of the dying victim; so would the sinner draw back from everything that might remind him of his guilt. Or, if

constrained to admit an investigation, he will yet contrive, like Rachel, to keep one spot concealed, and that the one in which he retains the idols of his worship,—and the inquiry terminates in a more confirmed deception.

Hence we find that of all branches of knowledge, the knowledge of ourselves and of our sins is that which is most neglected. In all other sciences, knowledge flatters our vanity, raises us in the eyes of our neighbours, increases our influence in society; but a searching inquiry into the state of our heart wounds our pride, and lowers us in our own esteem. Hence it is that we meet continually with persons possessed of great shrewdness and sagacity in all other matters, who are most lamentably ignorant of themselves. Many have attained an extraordinary knowledge of mankind in general, and can discern at once the weak points of every neighbour, but are pitiably blind to every one of their own infirmities; it is amusing to observe, that of the whole circle of their acquaintanceship, they are perhaps the only persons to whom their failings are unknown. There are individuals, skilled in all other science, utterly ignorant of this; capable of calculating the motions of the heavenly bodies, and yet knowing nothing of the movements of their own hearts—of predicting the eclipses of the sun and planets, but unacquainted with the dark spots on their own characters—of decomposing the material substances around them, but not of analyzing the motives by which they are swayed. Many, we suspect, pass from the cradle to the grave under the influence of divers views, feelings, impulses, and passions; but without once stopping to inquire what is the relation in which they stand to God and his law. Rather than confess the danger, by casting out their sounding-lines and measuring the depths, they permit themselves to drift along they know not whither, till at last death, like the cry of "Breakers a-head!" awakes them from their lethargy, but only to shew them stranded as a wreck on the shores of eternity. This unwillingness on the part of the human heart to submit to examination —this shrinking from inspection—this trembling and shaking, and studious concealment—all are indicative of conscious guilt. The party would not be so disinclined to look into his accounts, were he not afraid to discover losses, debt, and probable bankruptcy. The limb would not so shrink were there not disease preying upon it.

Yet it is easy to see how, in consequence of this unwillingness to look at the sin, it may readily escape detection. "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked." These two characteristics have a very close connexion. On the one hand, the heart is so deceitful just because it is so desperately wicked. It shews its wickedness by its deceitfulness. It is because of its darkness that it is so fitted for concealment and seduction. On the other hand, the deceitfulness of the heart tends to hide its wickedness from the view. Unless we are on our guard against its power to deceive us, we shall never become acquainted with its desperate wickedness.

But there is something more than a mere *negative* ignorance produced by a deceitful heart. Mankind come to clothe themselves in a *positive* way with qualities which they do not possess.

When man would look to his *past* life, the heart interposes, and exhibits everything through a false and flattering medium. Distance in space, we know, gives a particular hue to the objects seen;—thus, we read of the Blue Mountains, though no mountains are in reality of a blue colour. Distance in time may have a somewhat similar colouring effect on the objects looked at. By the natural process of association under the influence of desire, the mind recalls most readily those parts of our past life which may seem creditable to our talents and virtues, and consigns all else to oblivion. We meditate with delight on our generosity, real or imaginary, our patience under suffering, our courage in the hour of danger. We remember how we outstript others in the path of duty, how we advanced when they shrank, and stood when they fell. We fondly dwell on the success which has attended our schemes, on the compliments which have been paid us, on the honours heaped on us; and when we think of our want of success, it is to attribute the whole to the folly of friends, or the malice of enemies. In the meantime, a thousand evil actions and evil feelings are willingly forgotten. We never forget that we gave a certain sum in charity, but we forget that it was only the tenth or the hundredth part of what we expended on folly. The memory, like a skilful flatterer, thus brings before us those deeds which we delight to hear of, and leaves all others unnoticed; or should these others at times force themselves upon the attention, the heart has a variety of excuses to urge. The act was committed in our younger years, and it is suggested that it was

merely a deed of youthful folly, implying no great criminality; or palliating circumstances are discovered to lessen or excuse its guilt. Has the person been indulging evil temper or violent passion?—he at length brings himself to believe that this was highly proper, when, as he now perceives, so much malice was intended. His cunning he will dignify with the name of wisdom, selfishness is called prudence, and his profligacy, the becoming enjoyment of the pleasures of this world.

The will exercises an equally prejudicial influence when men look to their *present* character. The view which we get of an object depends on the position which we take: thus every man sees his own rainbow and his own aurora borealis. From the position at which he views himself, man gets a delusive view of his own character. He imagines that he possesses good qualities, which, as all neutral persons know, do not belong to him; and is unconscious of infirmities of which all his friends are cognizant. He never doubts of his own fortitude and firmness, at the very time that all others fear that he will shrink in the hour of trial. He imagines that he is generous when others know that he is selfish. It would be laughable, were it not rather pitiable, to see him so self-deluded, while others are so fully aware of his weaknesses.

The heart yet further deceives us when we would look to our *future* intentions. It seduces us in this way, when it fails in every other. Even when mankind have been constrained to discover that they have acted improperly in time past, they cherish the belief that they may wipe out the stain by their future exertions. In particular, they are apt to imagine, that they can perform any deed on their forming a momentary resolution to do so. The young man fancies that he can keep his character pure in the midst of abounding corruption, and attain to any excellence which for the time he may resolve to reach. He wonders to see individuals farther advanced in life so sunk in criminality. He thinks not that in his future life he may descend, step by step, the same dark path of vice, till he becomes the subject of similar wonder. And yet other men will not profit by his fall, any more than he profited by that of others; for every one imagines that he has some peculiar charm by which he can resist all the enchantments of vice, and come forth unhurt from its dangerous presence.

Nothing else is so deceitful as a perverted will. It is more cunning than the most expert thief, craftier than the deepest politician, more artful than the wiliest hypocrite, more plausible than the most skilful flatterer. If we must sometimes be on our guard against the treachery of our fellow-men, it behoves us to exercise a still more watchful jealousy over ourselves. Every wise man is sensitive as to the first approaches of that flattery which interested parties give him, but we have all greater cause to dread the flattery which the deceitful heart is sending up as incense. Others, in their attempts to deceive us, can have access to us only at certain times, and in particular ways; but the heart presents its delusive suggestions at all times, and by an infinite variety of channels. Much as there is among us of deception, of the deception of one man by his neighbour, there is much more of self-deception. Of all flattery, self-flattery is the most common.

And what is the general result of all this willing self-deceit? The man becomes full of himself, of his past conduct, his present character, and his purposes for the future. He constructs for himself a fictitious character of extraordinary excellence, which he is bound to admire. "Surely every man walketh in a vain show." A state of things is produced, as delusive as the scenes of a novel, as deceptive as the exhibitions of the stage; and he moves in the midst of them as a hero. The glare of lamps in a theatre, the curtains raised and dropped at the appropriate time, the perspective, the dresses, the personifications in tone and manner, do not so deceive the spectator, and call up feelings so unsuited to the reality, as the stage pictures and actings which the fancy creates at the bidding of the will—and all that men may be able to personate a character which they do not possess, and to admire themselves in that character. Nor can there be a greater contrast between the possibly mean, mercenary, villanous actor and the noble character personified by him, between the actress of doubtful reputation and the chastity which she represents, than there is between the real man with his sins and the magnanimous hero pictured in his imagination. The mind is deceived by the one exhibition as by the other; and as the actor receives plaudits for the generosity of the sentiments uttered by him, and the actress excites sympathy from the sufferings which she is supposed to undergo, so do mankind claim the admiration

due to the fictitious character which they have assumed. Catherine of Russia, when she travelled through her waste dominions, caused painted villages to be raised along her route, that she might be enabled to give way to the imagination that her country was flourishing and populous. It is in such a delusion that mankind in general pass through life, raising up around them, by the power of their own imaginations, a host of supposed good qualities, in the midst of which they walk, as the statues of the gods walk in the processions, listening to a constant hymn in their own praise.

The hypocrite is commonly supposed to be the most profound of all characters. But there is a deeper and more dangerous deceit. There are persons who come to act the hypocrite to themselves. He who has been deluded by his neighbour for years is not more astonished when his eyes are opened, than are the persons now referred to, when their own character stands fully revealed to them.

(3.) *The mind becomes completely perverted and disordered.* We hold, that a mind which had submitted itself in every respect to the law of God could not be led to pronounce a perverted judgment; but when the will has set itself in rebellion against its law, that is, against God, it is conceivable that sin may soon spread itself through the whole soul. This is one of the most fearful of all the tendencies of sin—its tendency to propagate itself, to "yield seed after its kind." The weed getting into a garden or field does not so speedily or certainly, by roots and winged seeds, spread over the whole space, as sin entering the mind spreads itself through all the faculties and feelings. If we do not mistake, it is the most fearful element in what divines call spiritual death, being a blindness and perversion of mind produced by indulgence in sin. The very mind and conscience become defiled. We can conceive a mind so utterly perverted by an habitual deception practised upon itself, that at length it can scarcely tell what is right from what is wrong, or find out clearly the path of duty even when it has a passing desire to discover it. We know no condition more pitiable than that of the man who has become thus bewildered through the original wanderings of a wayward inclination, and now knows not how to return to the path of duty; for he has tracked so many byways, all leading from the right path, that

he has a difficulty, at every step, of knowing the path which he should take.

SECT. III.—JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED BY THE CONSCIENCE UPON THE CHARACTER OF MAN.

Much of what we have advanced in last section is hypothetical. On the supposition that the heart is wicked, we have shown how it may be deceitful. We are now to enter upon the proof of its wickedness.

We may come to discover the moral character of man in two ways—first, by bringing the conscience to judge of him; and, secondly, taking with us proper ideas of what moral good is, we may inquire if he possesses it. The first is the method followed in this section. We are to arraign man at the bar of his own conscience.

(1.) It will not be difficult to show that the conscience *condemns certain actions committed by us.* Let the purest man on earth pause, and make his past conduct pass under the cognizance of his conscience, the conscience will at once condemn particular portions of it. In short, the conscience announces to every man that he has sinned.

Now, there is much more implied in this decision than those are aware of who have not reflected on the subject. The conscience has, in the name of God, pronounced its sentence; and the question occurs, How is this sentence to be removed? Conscience declares to every individual that he has sinned, but it points out no way by which the sin may be forgiven. It has solemnly pronounced its sentence; but does it ever lift off the sentence? It condemns at this present time the sin which we committed yesterday; but will it not also condemn the same deed, when submitted to it ten or fifty years hence? Is there any lapse of time, any change of circumstances, which will induce the conscience to revoke its own judgments?

Upon genuine repentance, accompanied with reparation, is the answer which some will be inclined to give. Every one acquainted with the elements of Christian divinity knows that this view cannot stand investigation. We enter not at present into the question, as to whether repentance be in the native power of a being who has once fallen into sin. That remorse

is available to him, we doubt not; but remorse, instead of pacifying the mind, only exasperates it. But we insist upon a more positive ground. Repentance, in many cases, can make no possible reparation for the injury which has been inflicted. The murderer's repentance, for instance, cannot bring back the murdered man from the judgment-seat of God to which he has been hurried, nor dry up the tears of the widow and orphans that he left behind. Repentance, in many cases, cannot make reparation to the injured parties, and in no case can it make reparation to the law of God. We cannot conceive that the Governor of the universe should proclaim throughout the world which he has created, that his intelligent creatures may break his law, and inflict injury as they please, and then that they will be forgiven on the profession of repentance. Does it not seem, as if the conscience would condemn such a mode of governing the universe if presented to it? We think it evident, at least, that the conscience gives no intimation that it will withdraw its sentence, upon repentance following the guilty deed. All that it declares is, that penitence is a becoming act on the part of the transgressor. It would visit the impenitent with a double sentence—first upon the primary sin, and then upon his present hardness of heart, and continued spirit of rebellion. While repentance, when genuine, may be our present duty, it does not appear as if it could make any atonement for past transgression; or make the conscience do anything more than declare that this penitent frame of mind is not in itself sinful, and that he who cherishes it is better than the individual who first commits the sin, and then doubles it by forgetting it or glorying in it.

We point, then, to the adverse sentence of the conscience, and ask for a statement of the circumstances in which it can be led to withdraw the sentence which it has pronounced. We have never seen such a statement clearly and distinctly drawn out; and until that is done, we must continue to believe that the conscience, acting in the name of God, continues to leave its awful sentence upon us, without giving the least indication of an escape. And all this seems to be implied in the admission, that we have committed so much as one action condemned by the conscience. But there is a farther and a more difficult and delicate inquiry to be made—in regard to the extent of human sinfulness as declared by the moral faculty.

(2.) We now inquire whether the conscience *approves of any one state of the mind when the same is truly represented?* In making this inquiry, it will be needful to keep in view some of the laws of the operations of conscience noticed in a preceding section, and also the influence which the will exercises upon the representation made to the moral faculty of any given action. We must remember that the conscience pronounces its verdict of approval or disapproval, not upon the outward act, but upon the inward state of the agent, and that it judges of this state according to the representation given to it. Pains must be taken, then, in submitting any action to the decision of the conscience, to submit not a mere bodily act but a mental state of the agent, and to submit the actual mental state. If the real state of the agent's soul is not laid before the conscience, it may give far too favourable a decision. The difficulty of this whole investigation lies in determining the precise condition of the soul at any given time. In by far the greater number of our actions possessed of moral characteristics, the motives, direct and indirect, immediate and ultimate, are very numerous; and when there have been so many determining feelings, it is extremely difficult to discover the predominating one; not unfrequently it contrives to lie altogether concealed in the complicated folds of the human breast.

But here, we shall suppose, is an individual resolved to ascertain, in the light of his conscience, his precise moral state, being aware meanwhile of the deceitfulness of his heart. This man will soon find, that the more closely he investigates his heart and conduct, it is the more difficult to arrive at felt certainty. The difficulty which he experiences arises, not so much from a want of clearness in the decisions of the conscience when the case is stated, as in determining what is the case—that is, the precise motive by which he is swayed, and the actual state of his mind at any given instant. Were he quite sure that he had been swayed by pure and benevolent motives at the time referred to, he knows what the decision of the moral faculty would be; but the deeper the investigation, and the greater the spirit of candour by which he is actuated, it is seen to be the more difficult to determine the exact influence under which he acted. This inquirer, in very proportion to his honesty, is the more puzzled and distressed; and he may be tempted at last, as he feels himself beset by

thickening difficulties, to take one or other of two courses—either to cease from the inquiry altogether, and to flatter himself with the thought, that he is often or commonly a virtuous agent; or to abandon himself to doubt, distraction, and terror, and as he feels the painfulness of these feelings, to betake himself to superstition, and every kind of bodily exercise that may be fitted to deaden or delude the moral sense. One or other of the results now indicated has commonly been the issue—an uninquiring self-satisfaction, or an uneasy self-suspicion, which drives the individual to the readiest refuge that may present itself, and in which he may, by certain acts supposed to be pleasing to God, allay the reproaches by which he is troubled. Such is the issue in which conscience lands us—it drives us to thoughtlessness, or it goads us to madness. We see it strikingly exhibited in the case of those whose crimes are peculiarly aggravated—as in that of the guilty spendthrift, who has brought multitudes to ruin—or in that of the murderer, with the pangs of his dying victims ever rising up freshly before his mind; such persons either contrive to give themselves up to utter unconcern, or, in restless and feverish discontent, they pursue every superstitious ceremony which may hold out the hope of appeasing an offended God.

But we suppose that there is an individual sufficiently earnest to resist all the allurements which would turn him aside, and sufficiently enlightened to discover the inefficacy of superstitious observances; to what result would he be conducted? He would settle down, we apprehend, in a most painful uncertainty, quite conscious that sin had been committed, and yet ignorant of any means by which sin can be forgiven, and scarcely knowing whether he has ever so much as done one virtuous act.

It seems to be difficult or impossible, then, by a simple direct inspection of the state of mind at any given time, to determine whether it is truly virtuous. But let us inquire, whether there may not be certain general principles which guide us out of our uncertainty, and land us in clear and distinct, though it may be very humbling, views of ourselves.

And, first, it is a general principle that, in judging of a responsible agent at any given time, we ought to take into view the whole state of his mind. We ought not to single out a particular part, or view it under an exclusive aspect. It is here, as

we have seen, that there is room for partiality and endless delusion. The conscience, as a divinely appointed arbiter, judges according to truth, and judges not the abstract act, but the agent in the act; and if it judges correctly of the agent, it must take into view his whole moral state and motive.

As a second general principle, it must be taken into account, that the mental state of the agent cannot be truly good, provided he is in the meantime neglecting a known and manifest duty. It will not be difficult to establish this principle, which is a necessary consequent of the first; and when admitted, the two include all men under sin.

Take as an illustration, a boy arrived at the age of responsibility, running away from his parents, without provocation of any kind. Very possibly, in the midst of the companions whom he meets with, he may be cheerful, kind, and obliging. Present this disinterested kindness to the moral faculty, and it will approve it as something becoming; and if nothing else is observed, it may seem as if he merited our warmest approbation. But present the whole complex moral state of the boy to the conscience, and the judgment will be instantly reversed. As long as this child is living in neglect of a bounden duty, the moral sense refuses to give a single mark of approval; all his kindness will not draw a single smile of complacency from the rightly constituted mind, till he return to his father's house, and to his proper allegiance.

Analogous instances will present themselves to the reflecting mind. A person, let us suppose, has unjustly got possession of a neighbour's property. It is conceivable, that, having done so, he may be benevolent in the use which he makes of his wealth; his hospitality may be the theme of admiration throughout the whole neighbourhood, and the praise of his charity may be in the mouths of hundreds of the destitute. Now, if this individual's original dishonesty is not established on sufficient evidence, we may, in the judgment of charity, give him credit for generosity; but when the whole man is brought under our notice, the mind can give one, and but one judgment, and that is to condemn him, even when he is at the head of his own hospitable board, and scattering his munificence all around him

Or take the case of a Brazilian sugar-planter fitting out a slave-ship, with instructions to the crew to proceed to the coast

of Africa, there to seize on a company of unoffending negroes, and bring them as slaves to his plantation. He makes it part of his instructions, that the captives shall be treated with great lenity on the voyage; and upon their landing, he does everything which kindness and consideration can prompt, to promote their comfort. Now, present the one side of this man's conduct to the mind—let a stranger be taken rapidly over the plantation, let him see the food provided for the slaves, the comfortable dwellings in which they reside, and the amusements allowed them, and there may be a sentence of approval pronounced; but present both sides of the picture, and the sentence will assuredly be one of severe reprobation.

A husband making ample temporal provision for the wife causelessly forsaken, the libertine lavishing kindness on the person whom he has seduced, and with whom he is living in a state of sin—these are cases in point, as showing how the conscience may approve of a moral agent on his conduct being represented only under one aspect, and yet disapprove of it when brought fully under review; and showing, too, how the moral faculty cannot approve of an agent, even when doing an act good in itself, provided he is in a bad moral state, and living in the meanwhile in neglect of a clear and bounden duty.

History presents many examples of such a mixture of motives. Lilienhorm had been raised from obscurity and wretchedness by Gustavus, king of Sweden, promoted to the rank of commandant of the guard, and had the complete confidence of his sovereign. But when a conspiracy was formed against his master, he joined it, instigated by the hope held out to him of commanding the national guard, and holding in his hand the destinies of the kingdom. Meanwhile he endeavoured, by a kind of compromise, to keep his allegiance to the king his benefactor. He wrote him an anonymous letter, informing him of an unsuccessful attempt that had been made to take his life some time before, describing the plan which the conspirators had now formed, and warning him against going to a particular ball, where the assassination was to be committed. In this way he sought to satisfy his conscience, when it threw out doubts as to the propriety of the course which he was pursuing. He spent the evening on which the conspiracy was to take effect in the king's apartment, saw him read the anonymous letter sent him,

and upon the generous and headstrong king's despising the warning, followed him to the ball, and was present when he was shot. Now, take us to the closet of this man, and let us see him writing the letter which was fitted to save his sovereign—show us this, and no more, and we say, How becoming! how generous! but let us follow him through the whole scenes, and we change our tone, and arraign him of treachery; and we do so at the very instant when he writes the letter, and seems most magnanimous.

By the help of these principles, we are enabled to bring home the sense of guilt to every man's conscience; not only the sense of individual sins, but of constant and abiding sinfulness. When there is not a sin of commission, there is a sin of omission; when there is not the sin of excess, there is the sin of defect.

In particular, we hold that every human soul is chargeable with ungodliness. Other sins are committed by individual men, some are addicted to one class of sins, and others to another; but this offence seems to be universal. All are not malevolent or selfish; all are not intemperate or deceitful; all are not proud and ambitious; but all seem to be ungodly. Other sins may be only occasional, but this seems to be perpetual and abiding, and renders all men guilty at all times, even when they are cherishing thoughts and feelings which in themselves are praiseworthy. Does any man stand up and say, I was in a virtuous state at such and such a time, when I was defending the helpless, and relieving the destitute? We admit at once that these actions in themselves are becoming, as becoming as those of the disobedient son showing kindness to his companions; of the unjust man practising hospitality; of the slaveholder supplying his slaves with excellent food; of the husband providing handsomely for a wife abandoned; or of the conspirator sending a notice fitted to frustrate the conspiracy to which he was a party. If we could judge these acts apart from the agent, we should unhesitatingly approve of them. Nay, we do approve of the abstract acts, but we never for one instant approve of the agent. Before we can approve of the disobedient son, but kind companion, he must return to his obedience; of the unjust philanthropist, he must restore the fruits of his iniquity; of the liberal slaveholder, he must undo his deed; of the unfaithful

husband in his kindness, he must return to the society of his wife; of the notice sent by the conspirator, he must first disconnect himself entirely and openly from the conspiracy;—and, in like manner, before we can approve thoroughly of man, even in his generosity, we must find him returning to his allegiance to God, making confession of his past sin, humbling himself before him whom he has offended, and acknowledging that the very gifts which he is about to bestow come from God, the author of all his blessings.

As godliness is a constant duty, so ungodliness, habitually cherished, is a great master-sin, reaching over the whole man, contaminating the service he pays, however proper it may be in itself. Does it not look as if an ungodly man could not do a truly virtuous act? Does it not look as if man must first be made godly, before he can do an act truly good? "Either make the tree good, and his fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt."

SECT. IV.—FARTHER INQUIRY INTO THE VIRTUOUSNESS, AND MORE PARTICULARLY THE GODLINESS, OF MAN'S CHARACTER.

It is extremely difficult for us, in our present circumstances, and with our present prejudices, to form an impartial estimate of the human character. Prejudices intervene to obscure the view, both when we examine others and ourselves. On looking around, we find ourselves in the heart of a crowd of persons and events, so involved one with another, and with us, that we cannot easily form an enlarged conception of them. What a mass of beings spring up before us, when we would survey the world! and these with feelings, with habits, and dispositions so varied; some mild, others passionate; some gifted with lofty powers of understanding, others incapable of rising above the ordinary details of life; some who seem to be looking forward to another world, and others living as if they were to live here for ever, or as if their souls were to go down with their bodies to the grave, and be buried in the same tomb. We are, moreover, personally connected with many of the events that are occurring; some we look to with hope, as about to bring us friends or fortune; others with fear, as threatening to plunge us into the depths of adversity. Then there are a thousand ties connecting us with

the men around us; to this one we are joined by the bond of relationship; to this other, by the ties of business; and with a third, we have passed many a pleasant and profitable hour. Being so intimately connected with all around us, and all around us being so involved, we are constantly liable, in our judgments of character, to be warped by human prepossessions, or at least to become bewildered and confused.

The better way of forming a true estimate of the moral character of man is to examine ourselves. But then we are afraid to inspect ourselves, lest humbling disclosures should be made. And when we have the courage to examine our hearts, prejudice dims the eyes, vanity distorts the object seen, the treacherous memory brings up only the fair and flattering side of the picture, and the deceived judgment denies the sinful action, explains away the motives, or excuses the deed in the circumstances.

It appears, then, that we are too near the object examined to obtain an expanded view, and too personally connected with it to form an impartial estimate. We are in the condition of one surveying a bustling scene while in the midst of it; of a soldier, for example, trying to form a conception of the battle while engaged in the fight. Those who would obtain a correct view of the scene or battle, must ascend an eminence whence they may see it lying before and below them:—and is it not possible to reach a height whence we may survey human nature far above the passions and narrow interests which do here so confine and distract us? Let us in imagination ascend to such an eminence,—higher than that mount, wrapt in clouds and thunders, from which Moses received the law revealed to men who had broken it, or than that other mount whence he descried the land of promise smiling with fertility, or even than that mount from which the Tempter shewed the Representative of man the glory of the kingdoms of this world; we are to rise above these distracting or delusive scenes to those third heavens to which an Apostle was carried, whether in the body or out of the body he knew not, that there we may see all things as God sees them, when he looks down from heaven upon the children of men. As we leave the earth in this flight of faith, we are gradually removed from the sympathies, the prejudices of the race, one after another of the network which ties us to the earth is broken or loosened, till at length we are altogether disentangled from

lower interests, and we find that, as we ascend, our view widens with the wide horizon spreading out around us; that terrestrial objects dwindle into greater and greater insignificance—the property once coveted so earnestly shrinking till it is scarcely discernible, and the very citadels of earth, its proud palaces and populous cities, and these isles in which we live, with their vaunted trade and arts and commerce, and ships which visit every shore of the ocean, diminishing till they appear "a very little thing;" and that as we draw near to Him who dwelleth in light, the brightest earthly glory is stript of its lustre and appears dim, just as every other object appears dark after we have gazed on the splendour of the noon-day sun. Being dazzled with the light, we turn for relief to the earth now far beneath us. We venture to affirm that from this point of view our judgment would be the same with that of God—"God looked down from heaven upon the children of men to see if there were any that did understand, that did seek God. Every one of them is gone back, they are altogether become filthy; there is none that doeth good, no, not one."

From such a point of view we shall be satisfied that all men are on much the same level. We divide mankind into the virtuous and the vicious, the good and the bad. And it is certain that there are differences between one man and another, and between one class of men and another, in respect of their moral condition. Still, if we take a sufficiently high standard, we shall see that, though there are differences, there are far more important points of resemblance. When we ascend a very high mountain, and take a view of the ground lying below us, we find the lower hills, which may have appeared of considerable magnitude when looked at from beneath, becoming more and more insignificant, till at length the whole landscape of little hills and valleys stretches out before us as a level plain; and did we but look upon mankind and human nature from the height of God's law, we should be less impressed with the difference between this man and that man, and see more clearly how much they are, after all, on the same level. "There is no difference, for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God."

Man's favourable estimate of his character arises from his looking at himself from a wrong position—from his taking a

low and imperfect standard. In order to judge correctly, we are, from the stand-point reached, to take the law of God as the instrument of judgment. Having in the last section taken a survey of man's moral nature, as the same can be gathered from the intimations of conscience, we are now to use not the faculty that judges so much as the law by which it judges; and taking with us proper views of the nature of virtue, and of the qualities that constitute it, we are to inquire into the character and extent of the good or evil qualities which man possesses.

In doing so, it is needful to remember, that virtue consists essentially in the will following the dictates of the law fixed for its regulation; and that sin, on the other hand, consists in the mind refusing to follow the rule prescribed to it. Proceeding on these principles, it will at once appear that the morally good does not consist in the possession of feeling or affection. Love is not the only element in the good. There may be positive vice in misdirected love. The circumstance that man possesses affection is no proof of the purity of his nature. We hold it capable, indeed, of being demonstrated by the strongest evidence that man is possessed of disinterested affection. There are sympathies, and tendernesses, constantly shown by mankind towards each other. If there be a person who has never received such kindness from a fellow-creature, it is most assuredly because, by his rudeness or selfishness, he has repelled it. But we maintain that the mere possession, or the lavishing of these affections, does not constitute the race morally good. Some of the most vicious among mankind have been distinguished for their great sensibility—a sensibility abused by them, however, and so the means of spreading a wider evil, just as when corruption begins in vegetable life, its progress becomes the more rapid and the more fatal in proportion to the richness of the vegetation.

Besides benevolence, there is needed, in order to virtuous character, a regulating power of justice. Two things are needful to the beauty and beneficence of that star which shines in the expanse. There is its light, and there is the regularity of its movement in its allotted course. Conceive this star, while retaining the former of these qualities, to lose the latter—it might, in its now wayward career through the heavens, carry

along with it dismay and trouble to every world which it approached, and that just because its fire was still unextinguished. There is still, we acknowledge, light flashing from man's character as from a star, but it is as from a wandering star, whose progress we view with anxiety and alarm.

Man's sinfulness, in so far as affection is concerned, consists, first, in ill-regulated love, and secondly, in defect of love, using love in its highest acceptation as denoting something more than mere sensibility, as implying wish and desire. The former of these we hold to be the first in the order of nature and of succession. There is first some wish, or purpose, contrary to the fixed law; and then there comes to be a drying up of love altogether in regard to some of its exercises. To use once more our illustration, the star first wanders from its path, and gives, in consequence, its light and heat to objects different from those which its beams were meant to irradiate, and then losing, as it wanders further off, its light and heat altogether, it departs into the blackness of darkness for ever.

(1.) The circumstance has often been observed and dwelt on by divines, that UNGODLINESS is the universal sin of humanity. It has not been noticed so frequently how it should have come to be so. The train of observation we have been pursuing conducts, if we do not mistake, to an adequate explanation. There are obvious reasons why a sinful creature should not relish a nearness of approach to, or even so much as to meditate upon, a God whom he has so grievously offended. It is not difficult to see how from this cause, of the three elements which meet in the morally good, namely, the well-wishing, the respect to law, and the respect to God, it should be the last, or the respect to God, which is first dissevered from the others, and ungodliness should come to be the leading exhibition of human sinfulness, and the distinguishing characteristic of all fallen creatures.

Alcibiades thus expresses his feelings in reference to Socrates: —"I stop my ears, therefore, as from the syrens, and flee away as fast as possible, that I may not sit down beside him, and grow old in listening to his talk; for this man has reduced me to feel the sentiment of blame, which I imagine no one could readily believe was in me; he alone inspires me with remorse and awe, for I feel in his presence my incapacity of refuting what he says, or of refusing to do that which he directs; but when I depart

from him, the glory which the multitude confers overwhelms me I escape, therefore, and hide myself from him; and when I see him, I am overwhelmed with humiliation, because I have neglected to do what I have confessed ought to be done, and often have I wished that he were no longer to be seen among men." If such an effect was produced—if such were the wishes excited by near contact with the excellence of Socrates—how much more overwhelming must be the idea of the unspotted purity of God to a man conscious of guilt? Hence the inclination of mankind, owing to the "humiliation" with which his presence overwhelms them, "not to sit beside God," but rather to "flee from him as fast as possible," "to hide themselves from him;" nay, at times to wish that there was no God, or no such God, to take a holy cognizance of their conduct.

Multitudes, we are aware, are so far ignorant of the existence of this enmity, that they have not so much as confessed it to themselves. And it is to be acknowledged, that there are persons in whom it is to some extent dormant; or in whom, at least, it is not at all times called forth and excited in an active and positive manner. But even when there is not the bursting flame, there may be the smouldering embers. The following illustration may help us to understand this. It is conceivable that a person may entertain a repugnance to us in the depths of his heart, and yet this feeling not be in constant activity. As long as we are at a distance from him, and as there is nothing to recall the recollection of our persons or actions to his mind, he may, in the busy pursuit of his usual avocations, forget us for a time, during which his enmity would so far be in a slumbering state. But when we come into his presence, and whenever we happen to do anything, it may be most unwittingly, fitted to humble his pride, or ruffle him in his ruling passion, then the enmity will boil, and rage, and break forth with greater or less violence, according to the temperament of the individual. Of this description is the enmity of man's heart towards God. Its most common manifestation is an habitual or studious forgetfulness. As much as within him lies, he contrives to keep away the very thought of God from his mind, because it is a thought that troubles him. There is nothing in the contemplation to flatter his vanity—there is much to check and reprove him; and he prefers to engross himself with the business of life, or the

pleasures of the world. When Palamedes came to Ithaca, to invite Ulysses to join in the expedition against Troy, the latter, unwilling to engage in the undertaking, betook himself to ploughing the sand and sowing salt, on the pretence of being visited with insanity. There are multitudes as sane as Ulysses, who betake themselves to works as insane, and all in the way of pretence, to excuse themselves from the performance of the immediate duties which they owe to God.

Sometimes, no doubt, notwithstanding his general unwillingness, man is all but compelled to think of God, by the circumstances in which he is placed; but when the thought comes into his mind, he banishes it with all practicable haste, as the Gadarenes besought Jesus to depart from their coasts, when they found that, in consequence of his visit, a portion of their property, kept by them contrary to the law of Moses, which they professed to reverence, had been destroyed. Under some impulse of feeling, in the hour of deep grief and disappointment, and in the apprehension of overhanging judgments, he betakes himself to God, and calls up the remembrance of his name from the oblivion to which it had been consigned; but as He stands before him in awful majesty, he is as awe-struck as were Saul and the witch of Endor, when Samuel actually appeared to them. In some other cases he may cling to the thought still more fondly and for a greater length of time, as eagerly indeed as the Philistines seized the ark of God, and carried it into the temple of Dagon; but he soon loses his desire for so near an approach to God, when he finds it inconsistent with the desires of his corrupted heart, just as the Philistines banished the ark when it threw down their idols and afflicted their cities. The great majority of mankind come at last to learn the art, too easily learned by depraved man—that of living without God in the world. "God is not in all their thoughts."

True, when men succeed in obtaining a false view of God, when they are enabled to look upon him as one who can overlook their failings, and cherish and countenance them in their sins, they will think of him more frequently, and pay him a willing homage. It is thus that we account for the inclination to polytheism and idolatry in the earlier ages of the world, and the simpler stages of society; and it is thus, too, that we explain the tendency among more cultivated nations, and in the present

day, to divest God of his holiness, or to sink the idea of his law and government. We regard these prevailing inclinations as a proof of the deeply seated carnal enmity of the heart towards God —that is, towards a holy God—that is, towards the existing God. But so far as mankind entertain speculatively correct views of the Divine character, their antipathy shews itself in an habitual forgetfulness. And the question arises, How does it happen that they feel no delight in contemplating that God who calls forth the constant admiration and praise of all holy beings throughout the universe? Plainly, because of some deeply seated ungodliness which keeps them from seeing the loveliness which all others admire.

Then there are times when this enmity appears in a more open and offensive form. Whenever God is forced upon the attention, his claims asserted, and the unsettled accounts between him and the sinner fully written out and presented, then the dormant antipathy is called into action—the seemingly dead snake is warmed into vitality, and is ready to inflict its sting. The spirit now feels the enmity, possibly expresses it, perhaps acts upon it. The very thought of God is positively painful, as painful as the presence of the man's worst enemy. Not unfrequently the bitterness of the heart will vent itself in blasphemy; rendering it needful, that wherever a holy religion is proclaimed, it should contain a prohibition against taking God's name in vain. Not unfrequently it will manifest itself in prompting mankind to mar all that may be thought dear to God, to oppose all that may claim to have his sanction, and deface all that bears his name and image. The fires of persecution are now lighted, being kindled at that fire which is burning within the bosom, but which, as it cannot reach God, is directed against all that may be supposed to represent him or possess his authority.

We are apt to wonder at the excessive wickedness of the ancient Jews at certain eras in their history, and their tendency to idolatry in the midst of the light which they enjoyed. Possibly, we may find an explanation in the very number and nature of the privileges possessed by them. They may have felt that God was too near them—that the light was too oppressive; and hence their disposition to retreat to darkened groves, in which a false worship transacted its rites. We suspect, in

particular, that it was the very propinquity and purity of the holiness of Jesus which so irritated the spirit of his persecutors. We may account, on the same principle, for the circumstance, not unfrequently occurring, of the son of pious parents, educated in a religious home, hating all that is spiritual with a malignity above that of other men; if not disposed to yield to it, he will loathe it all the more from the contests which he has had with it. Hence, also, the opposition to spiritual truth on the part of some on whom it has been earnestly pressed. Those who have long resisted it will come positively to nauseate it, as the wicked do a faithful monitor who speaks plainly of their faults. "I hate him, for he doth not prophesy good concerning me, but evil."

We need not dwell upon the greatness and enormity of such a sin as that now referred to. Not only is it a great sin in itself, it is an abiding malady, polluting the whole man, and the whole man at all times, rendering his very heart and character ungodly. Now, as long as this ungodliness is in his bosom, whether in a slumbering or more active state, whether merely burning within or bursting out, we cannot say of man that he is truly good. And let us observe in this ungodliness the manifestation of these two elements, and in the order now named—first, a rebellion against a law, and secondly, a drying up of the affection.

(2.) This ungodliness is the sin with which we charge all men, and there are OTHER SINS of which individuals are guilty. These vary much in the case of different persons. In all we may observe the first of the elements now referred to, the breaking of a law, and in most of them a defect of love or benevolence. First the affection bursts forth from its channel, and then it is dried up altogether in the sandy desert over which it flows.

Such is the general truth which we regard as conclusively forced upon the inquirer by a survey of the qualities of man's moral nature. The doctrine that man is depraved seems to be established, but with *several important limitations.*

First, mankind have still much gentleness, much amiability, and other qualities implying a heart susceptible of love. It is only the more to be regretted that this love should not be directed towards God. Even as regards man, it is commonly perverted and misdirected, and is apt to be destroyed by a growing malignity, or dried up by a confirmed selfishness and

indifference; but in the breasts of many it dwells as in a fountain, and is ever ready to flow out.

Secondly, every particular kind of sin is not practised by every man, or natural to every man. There is, we have seen, at least one form of sin which is common to all, but there are other kinds which are peculiar to some men—one person being inclined to pride, another addicted to intemperance, and a third distinguished by his selfish attention to his own interests and comforts.

Every man is liable to sin, just as every man is liable to disease and death. But in how many different ways may death come, and by the instrumentality of what a vast number of diseases! Sometimes it comes upon mankind insensibly, by the slow progress of consumption; at other times it dries up the strength by the heat of fever; or it lays its victim prostrate at once by the stroke of paralysis. Now, just as the death which reigns over all comes in a variety of ways, so the sin which also rules over all presents itself in a great diversity of forms; and we might as well seek to number the diseases to which our frame is incident, as the divers lusts which mankind serve.

Yet it is most assuredly a very fallacious mode of reasoning which would lead us to look on mankind as not depraved, merely because they are not addicted to every possible sin. We suspect, however, that there are some who have no other ground for regarding themselves as morally right except the absence of certain vices. Thus the miser congratulates himself on his not having run in debt by extravagance, while the thoughtless spendthrift rejoices that he is not so narrow-minded and contracted in his dispositions and aims as the miser. The drunkard boasts that he is not dishonest, and the cunning, deceitful man tells you, with an air of triumph, that he is not intemperate. The man of dull temperament—whose soul resembles a day of mists, without torrents of rain, indeed, but perpetually cold—not absolutely dark, but disclosing none of the distant landscapes on which the eye of faith delights to repose—never brightened by the sunshine of hope, or warmed by the ardour of fervent charity—assumes superiority, because he keeps free from violent excitement, and extricates himself from difficulties into which others, by their impetuosity, contrive to plunge. Thus every man would infer, from the absence of some one sin, the presence of a positive virtue.

In speaking of man's wickedness, it is to be taken into account, *as a third limitation, that he is not so corrupt that he cannot become worse.* Mankind are commonly not so depraved in their younger years as in after-life, when their vicious propensities have had time to expand. Man's natural depravity is more like the seed than the tree—it may be compared to the fountain rather than the stream.

But let no man congratulate himself upon the circumstance that he is not so wicked as he might possibly be. Man's liability to fall farther—his capacity for wickedness—is one of his most fearful characteristics. The depravity is often lurking within, when it has not yet appeared without; there exists the spark, which needs only to be fanned by the winds of temptation to break forth into a flame. Every one has not felt the more sinful passions in their greatest height and vehemence, but he may at least have experienced them in their commencing movements. No one has mingled much with mankind without being thrown into positions, sometimes for a longer and sometimes for a shorter space, in which his utmost exertions were required to keep his spirit from running wild into disorder or violence. On one occasion he may have felt a momentary wish to thwart a rival in business or in fame, who has wounded his vanity or darkened his prospects of success; at another time he may have felt disposed to exact revenge for an offence, real or imaginary; and again, he may have longed to obtain forbidden pleasure, of which he could taste without risk of detection. All of us must have felt these passions, or others equally dangerous, stirring within the bosom; and on such occasions, when the soul is tempest-tossed and stirred, we are permitted to discover depths which might otherwise have lain concealed in their own silent darkness. Such feelings would never spring up in a breast perfectly holy; they are indications of a deeply seated depravity. They are the initiatory or elementary states of those passions which carry men such far lengths in wickedness. They are like the heavy drops which sometimes come before the shower, like the strong gusts which precede the full fury of the coming tempest. They are the first heavings of an ocean, which may soon be tossed by the continuance of the same influence to its lowest profundities. Only allow them to increase—only encourage them by indulgence—only add fuel to the fire—and

they will soon break forth with unappeasable fury, while the astonished reason has to stand by in utter impotence.

It is a most alarming consideration that man's character is seldom stationary—it is like the vessel on the wide ocean with wind and tide against it—and if he is not struggling against the passions, they will hurry him into yet greater extremes of wickedness. What melancholy proofs do we see in the world around us! You wonder at the drunkard become so infatuated; but the grieving, the downcast mother, or the disheartened wife, can tell you of a time—and a sigh heaves her bosom as she speaks of it—when the now outcast and degraded one was loved and respected, and returned with regularity to quiet and domestic peace in the bosom of the family. But, alas! he would not believe the warnings of a parent, he did not attend to the meek unobtrusive recommendations of a wife or sister, he despised the commands of the living God; and seeking for happiness where it has never been found, he spurned at those who told him that the habit was fixing its roots;—till now he has become the scorn and jest of the thoughtless, and the object of pity to the wise and good; boasting to his companions, in the midst of his brutal mirth, of his strength of mind, and yet unable to resist the least temptation; talking of his kindness of heart, while his friends and family are pining in poverty, or weeping over his waywardness. It is only one of many indications that might be adduced of the tendency of sin to propagate itself, and spread throughout the soul in ever-widening circles.

SECT. V.—THEORY OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE EXISTING MORAL STATE OF MAN.

We have been viewing some of the characteristics of man's nature, and the following explanation seems as if it might account historically for the leading phenomena.

We put the case of a being constituted in all other respects as a man is, with his high faculties, his lovely affections, and amiable feelings; but in whom the moral law is wont to exercise its becoming office, and whose heart is filled with love to the Creator and the creature. This being, yielding to tempting suggestions made to him, is led to commit a deed that is openly sinful. The act must speedily pass under the review of the

conscience, and the conscience pronounces an instant condemnation. What is to be done under this sense of sin? Let the person, some one may answer, cherish repentance, and seek forgiveness from God. Now, repentance is undoubtedly the duty, and the instant duty, of a being so situated. But then, this repentance cannot make atonement for the previous neglect of duty. Conscience undoubtedly approves of the penitence as required in the circumstances, but it is beyond the province of conscience to say that thereby amends is made for the evil done; nay, the conscience continues to condemn the deed even after repentance, and points to a punishment to follow. Even on the supposition that repentance succeeded, and that there was never another sin committed, still the mind would look back to the transgression as a fearfully dark event, suggesting terrible forebodings.

But it is just as conceivable that the conduct may be different. It may be doubted whether genuine repentance in the circumstances is within the native power of the human mind. A moral and responsible being departing from the course of rectitude cannot return to it, any more than a planet wandering from, can come back to its path. It seems, at least, to be as probable that the individual referred to refuses to repent, or rather puts aside repentance. His mind will now be in a singularly perplexed and distressing state. Following the natural train of mental association, according to which everything that excites the mind returns repeatedly before it, the transgression will often present itself; and as often as the memory recalls it, the conscience will condemn the deed, and hurry the thoughts onward to impending judgments. These recollections and anticipations will be accompanied by a train of troubled feelings, crowding on one another like the waves of an ocean agitated by opposing winds and currents.

But is there no way by which the recollections of the sin may be banished from the mind? As there are laws of association which recall the sinful deed, there are other principles in the mind which prompt it to turn away from the thought and contemplation of that which brings only pain. A contest has now begun in a mind which was before at rest, and to all appearance it is a contest which, if there be no interposition on the part of God, must rage for ever. There are laws of association

good in themselves, which will tend to recall the deed just because it has excited the mind; and the deed recalled calls forth a condemnation by the conscience, followed by painful emotions; and speedily as they rise, there will be an attempt to drive them away just because they are distracting. The aversion to the contemplation of an unpleasant event will lead the individual to mingle in such scenes, that the objects presented to the eye may carry away the mind to other topics; or he will endeavour so to change the train of association, that more pleasing thoughts may rise up before the mind. The attempts made to expel the evil serve only to exasperate it. The studious endeavours to bury the sin in oblivion will just turn it up the more frequently to have a new and farther sentence pronounced upon it by the conscience, and the sentence will be followed up by those avenging feelings which wait upon the conscience as the officers of its court of justice.

The struggle is now thickened, and other parties are involved in its fearful and all-absorbing eddies and whirlpools. When the governing power of the soul has lost its authority, the appetites and affections of the mind will follow each its own impulse; and all will become unsettled and disordered, as in a country where there is no government, and every man does that which is right in his own eyes. Every lust and appetite now seeks its gratification, and acknowledges no authority to control it. The love of happiness, good in itself, and when properly guided, now becomes a blind chase after pleasure of every kind. The sensibility is dried up when it ought to flow, and forthwith comes "like a wide rushing in of waters," when it should be restrained. The benevolent affections refuse to embrace certain objects to which they ought to be directed, and flow out towards others in the streams of a doting and capricious love. The intellectual faculties, before employed in seeking after truth and in devising good, are now exercised in contriving means of banishing the recollection of sin, and gratifying the unrestrained feelings. And there is another element which now comes into play. Since sin has been committed, and condemnation pronounced, it is thought that a few more offences may not much aggravate the guilt, or place the sinner in a much worse condition; and sins come to be knowingly and wilfully committed. The malignant passions now come out as beasts of prey do in the night, and

the filthy lusts creep out as insects crawl forth in the damp and moisture.

Such, we might predict, according to the principles of the human mind, would be the general issue to which the commission of sin would conduct a being so situated. The particular results cannot be anticipated by human sagacity. We could confidently predict, that evil effects must follow, were a steam-locomotive to pass off the rails, or a stream to burst its banks, or the ocean to break down the barriers against which it beats, though we might not be able to tell the particular direction or channel which the rebellious agent might take. We can, in like manner, foresee evils that must follow from the commission of sin on the part of a moral agent, though we may not be able to define the precise turn which they would take; nay, this turn would evidently depend on the peculiar character of the individual, on the circumstances in which he happened to be placed, and the nature of the sin which he first committed.

A stream bursting from its course will for a time spread tumultuously in all directions, carrying devastation wherever it goes; but it will at last form a new channel for itself. In much the same way, the fallen being we are contemplating, after turning hither and thither for a time, would soon acquire certain confirmed practices and habits, determined partly by his situation, and partly by the peculiarities of his native dispositions. If he is near to God, it is conceivable that he may speedily be exasperated into open rebellion; and if driven to a distance from God, he may rather seek to abandon himself to sulkiness, and forgetfulness of God, and of all that is good. If consigned immediately to punishment, there will result a confirmed obstinacy and hatred of God; and provided a period of respite and comparative freedom be allowed, there will rather—as in the case of Cain—be a swelling pride, and an aspiring ambition, prompting to new and daring enterprises. The employments and habits of the parties would also be determined by their native propensities, now abused and perverted, and flowing out, each in its own channel, all unrestrained by higher principle. Our epic poet seems to be as philosophically correct as he is poetically picturesque, in the view which he gives of the fallen angels, when he represents them as differing from each other in their characters, and each under his own predominating lust and passion.

It must be left to every man's consciousness to determine how far the delineation given bears any general resemblance to his own felt experience. We say, general resemblance; for it will at once occur to every one that there is a difference, and that not of an unimportant kind, between the hypothetical and real case; and we refer to this as sufficient to explain the discrepancy between the picture which has been drawn and the actual state of man. In the supposed case, the individual remembers a time when he was without sin; whereas the memory of man cannot go back to a time when he was not transgressing the commandments of God. This difference in the cause must produce a difference in the effect, and that of an influential character. The conscience of sin cannot be so acute when the mind never knew what it was to be unspotted, as it must necessarily be when it can look back on a time when it was untainted by sin in thought or feeling. Hence the deadness of the conscience on the part of mankind in general, so different from the keen sensibility of those angelic beings who have fallen from purity. We may now discover one reason why man in his present state is prevented from reaching that demoniacal madness and fury which agitate all those who have an acute sense of the sin in which they still indulge. Whether, after the day of judgment, man may not be driven to the same extreme, is a question which will fall to be considered in a future section. We refer to this difference between fallen angels and fallen men, in order to explain how the latter may live in a state of insensibility in regard to their sin. This same circumstance, as accounting for the deadness of the human conscience, also explains the confirmed nature of the sinful affections which mankind cherish, and the courses of conduct pursued by them. Springing up with them from their youth, their sinful affections and habits are entwined with every part of their nature, and have become, as it were, essential parts of themselves. These two tendencies, originating in the circumstance that sin is natural to mankind, act and react upon, and strengthen each other. Sin is scarcely noticed, because it has all along been committed; and because it is not observed, it continues to grow and strengthen without check and restraint. This twofold action must continue till such time as the whole position of the man is changed by events in this world or the next, bringing his guilt before his mind in all its hideousness

and enormity, and setting him upon a new and different career, more nearly allied to that of the fallen angelic host.

But taking this most important difference into account, it is worthy of being inquired, whether the hypothetical case does not in some measure enable us to understand the mystery of man's nature and character.* In particular, there are three classes of

* We wish it to be understood, that we do not profess in this treatise to clear up what should ever be regarded as the profoundest of mysteries, the origin of evil, and original sin. In these sections it is proposed simply to give an account of certain phenomena connected with sin in man's heart; and in other passages in which the topic is alluded to, it is meant merely to shew how man's freedom throws the blame of his guilt upon himself, and not at all to explain how God should have allowed sin to appear in the universe. The origin of evil, like every other beginning, shrouds itself in darkness. The various theories on this subject, as well as on the nature of sin, are discussed with great ability in Muller's Christian Doctrine of Sin. Leibnitz' doctrine of Optimism is the most sublime attempt ever made to solve the mystery, but it cannot be so stated as not to involve this mystery, that God should select a system in which evil is allowed that good may come. Some would clear up this mystery, and every other, by representing sin as mere privation; but we never can be made to believe that deceit, malignity, adultery, are mere negations; they are as positive acts as integrity, benevolence, chastity. A similar objection lies against the doctrine which places it in creature imperfection. All those theories which proceed on the idea that evil is needful in order to call forth and confirm the good, are founded on inadequate views of the evil of sin, and overlook the fact that the evil quite as often seduces the good, as the good overcomes the evil. The theory of the sensational overcoming the moral and spiritual, does not embody a full statement of the facts; for there may be sin, such as unbelief and pride, where there is no sensualism, and it fails to shew how man should have been so constituted as that sensualism should prevail. The view that all sin originates in selfishness is not true to our nature, for there may be sin where there is no formal or calculating selfishness; and if by selfishness is meant merely the rebellion of an inferior impulse, we have merely the statement of the fact, but no explanation. All that man can know—and this he does know—with certainty is, that sin is as much a reality as moral good, and that the one is made known to us by the same moral power as the other. As to original sin, it should ever be treated as a fact established, but shrouded in mystery. Its existence can be argued very immediately from the facts of moral experience. All inquiries into actual sin conduct us to an original sin. The circumstance that all persons sin as soon as they come to act for themselves, is a clear proof of the existence of a sinful nature. Man's state by nature is much the same as that of one who had produced a sinful state of will by previous sinful acts. This prepares us to believe, on the authority of the Word of God, in a relation of our sinful nature to the common father of the race—which farther fact, however, is not fitted to remove the mystery. All such inquiries, too, conduct us to a slavery of the will—a fact which cannot be inconsistent with its essential freedom. The doctrines of the Old Light school of theologians on these subjects seem to us substantially correct, though they have at times set forth dogmatic statements which go beyond the letter of the Word—and on such a subject human logic may err the moment it passes beyond the simple

phenomena, which we are enabled to explain, and these among the most curious in the human mind.

First, we see how, on such a hypothesis, there is room for the exercise of all the faculties of man's nature, and also for an exhibition of the individual character of individual men, and for a variety of character on the part of mankind generally. In the fall of man, much the same effects have followed as we read of being produced by earthquakes, which have turned rectilineal alleys into crooked ones, changed the courses of rivers, and thrown one man's property upon another; or as have been produced in those metamorphic geological rocks which have changed their structure without changing their elements. There has been a similar twisting of the human character in the fall, without, however, the constitution of man's nature being annihilated. Its faculties do not work as before; but still they work, though in a new way, as we see all the vital functions of those who have been deformed from the womb playing in them as in persons of full form and stature. The man of high ability will be a man of high ability still; the man of deep sensibility will still have a fountain of emotion ready to flow out. There may still be shrewd observation, lofty speculation, consecutive argument, fine fancy, bold imagination, tender sensibility, and elevated sentiment. Without any godliness, and with a mind utterly perverted, there may be ingenuity, like that of Hume—acuteness, like that of Voltaire—a noble independence of sentiment, like that of Burns—a sensibility as tender as that of Rousseau—a reach of fancy like that of Shelley—or a power of anatomizing the human heart, as profound as that of Byron.

Secondly, we see how there may be many amiable and even noble and generous qualities in man's fallen nature. Just as the disordered machine may perform many graceful evolutions, shewing what it could do if properly regulated; just as the maniac may sometimes reason correctly, or even exhibit brilliant intellectual feats: so a disordered moral nature is not incom-

explication (analytic not synthetic) of Scripture language. Of this we are certain, that the New Light school have not, by all their theories, let in a single ray of light on the darkness. But we must not allow ourselves to enter too far into a topic which cannot be treated fully without entering upon Biblical Theology. We have gone so far in order to shew, that in Ethics, as in a thousand questions in Physics, we must often rest satisfied with knowing the fact without knowing its origin, ground, or explanation.

patible with the exercise of a hundred pleasing accomplishments, and the working of not a few disinterested and benevolent affections.

The theory now developed also serves to explain a third very important class of phenomena, which we would now proceed to consider, being the workings of conscience in the soul of fallen man.

SECT. VI.—STATE OF THE CONSCIENCE IN THE DEPRAVED NATURE.

It is very difficult to determine, in a precise and philosophical manner, wherein the conscience in man's existing nature differs, in respect of place and authority, from the conscience in those beings in whom it subordinates every other faculty and feeling. There is little difficulty, indeed, in proving that man's moral nature is in a state of derangement, and that the moral faculty has not the power which it ought to possess. It is as easy to demonstrate that there is disorder in man's moral state as to shew that there is derangement in the intellect of the lunatic. In some cases we could bring proof of the madman's insanity sufficient to convince for the time the intellect of the madman himself. We can in every case make the conscience decide that man's moral nature is disorganized. We can constrain every man to condemn himself, just as the people of England made the most infamous of their judges (Jeffreys) write a warrant for his own apprehension. But it becomes a much more difficult task to shew wherein this disorder precisely consists, as difficult as to determine wherein intellectual derangement lies —a question which has hitherto baffled the most sagacious observers.

It is a common way of accounting for the anomalies in man's moral state to say, in a loose and general way, that the conscience has lost its control over the other faculties of the human mind. Now, it is quite true that the conscience has lost its proper control, but it has not lost all power. On the contrary, it is in some respects as active and energetic as ever. It works not the less powerfully because it works destructively. A court of justice perverted into a court of injustice may be as active in its latter as in its former capacity. The Court of Inquisition in

Spain, the Star-Chamber and the Court of High Commission in the reign of the Stuarts in our own country, and the Tribunals in Paris in the Reign of Terror, were as busily employed, and as potent, as the most righteous courts that ever sat in the same kingdoms. It is not conceivable that the conscience should ever cease to exist in the breast of any responsible agent; certain it is, that in man's present nature it often wields a tremendous energy. Misery never reaches its utmost intensity till it comes to be inflicted by the scourges of an accusing conscience. Wickedness never becomes so unrelenting as when it seems to have received the sanction of moral law. What might otherwise have been a mere impulse of blind passion becomes now persevering and systematic villany or cruelty. Not unfrequently it assumes the shape of cool-blooded persecution, committed without reluctance and without remorse. The conscience now shows what had been its power for good if properly exercised, and how it can bear down and subordinate all the other and mere sympathetic feelings of the mind.

The cruelty inflicted in times of political convulsion furnishes a too apposite illustration. It becomes so great just because it has taken the name of justice, and seems to be the avenger of the trampled rights of men, whether of princes or people. Besides feelings of personal revenge, there has been an idea of supporting the rights of sovereigns, and the cause of social order, in those dreadful injuries which tyrants have inflicted on their subjects who, in fact or appearance, were disposed to rebellion. It was because they were esteemed the enemies of the liberties of the people that so many were hurried to the prison and the guillotine during the frenzy of the French Revolution; and it is certain that some of the most prominent actors in the most atrocious scenes, such as Robespierre, were not naturally cruel. Oppression, whether exercised by the many or the few, has never been intensely severe till it has assumed the name, and professes to assert and avenge the rights, of justice; and it now becomes so unrelenting, just because it does everything in the name of law and conscience. We have heard of the bitterness of legalized tyranny, that is, of tyranny legalized by civil law; but this is nothing to the severity which claims to be consecrated by moral law.

The persecution becomes tenfold more bitter and unrelenting

when, instead of the name of justice, it can take to itself the still more sacred name of religion, and the actors imagine that they are promoting higher interests than those of man, and doing service to God. "The apotheosis of error," says Bacon, "is the greatest evil of all." Take the following illustration of the two species of cruelty.

In one of the instructive incidents of the French Revolution, we have the record of a lady of rank, (mother of the Marquis de Custine,) assaulted by an infernal mob as she was descending the stairs of the building in which her father-in-law was being tried. "It is the daughter of the traitor!" (observe how men must first defame those whom they injure,) was the language which, mingled with horrid imprecations, reached her ears. Already some, with naked swords, had placed themselves before her; others, half clothed, had caused their women to draw back—a certain sign that murder was about to be enacted; and she felt that the first symptom of weakness betrayed by her would be the symptom of her death. At this crisis, she observed a fisher-woman among the foremost of the crowd. The woman, who was revolting in appearance, held an infant in her arms. The lady approached her, and said, "What a sweet babe you have!" "Take it," replied the parent, who understood her by one word and glance; "you can return it to me at the foot of the steps." With the child in her arms, the lady descended into the court, unsaluted by even an abusive word.* It is a picture of the scenes of a political convulsion; and we discover in it the working of an unenlightened conscience, and a perverted sense of wrong, making the actors to clothe their victims in imaginary guilt, before treating them as guilty. Mingled with this perverted moral feeling, we discover sympathetic feelings, more particularly in the female bosom; and we observe these feelings gaining over the very conscience at first perverted, and leading the most brutal to act in a becoming manner, when their feelings of compassion are in the right direction.

The massacre of St. Bartholomew exhibits a still darker scene, and one as characteristic of a religious (so-called) as the other is of a political convulsion. A ruthless murderer lays hold of an infant, and while holding it, the babe smiles in his face, and begins to play with his beard; but it is to no purpose, for the

* Introd. of Custine's Emp. of Czar.

dagger is instantly plunged into the child's breast, and the body is cast into the river amidst the jeers of an infuriated populace, who are crying out, "Where is now your God? What is become of all your psalms and prayers now?" The scene that follows is not less characteristic. A crowd of persons have assembled before the gates of the church at Lyons, and are waiting on their knees the return of an ecclesiastical dignitary, who had been paying his devotions in the interior of the building. They are the very persons who had been perpetrating wholesale murders or inciting the murderers; and now they are waiting the absolution and blessing of the cardinal. As he approaches, they bend their heads in lowliest adoration; and he lifts up his hands, and grants them forgiveness and the blessing of heaven. The cries of the murdered are forgotten by the mob as they retire; their minds inhaling the incense of an apparently approving conscience, which seems to point to an approving God.

Such facts as these show that whatever may be the fault of the conscience, it has not lost its power. While man's moral nature is completely disorganized, it has lost none of its essential elements.

The conditions of responsibility seem to be conscience, will, and intelligence—the conscience being the law, the will the agent, and the intelligence the means of announcing the state of the case to the law. The will, as the agent, is the immediate seat of good or evil, and all evil may be traced primarily in it. But the will, if depraved, will soon come to sway the intelligence, and the intelligence gives a false report to the conscience, which utters, in consequence, a false judgment. If this view is correct, then we see that the moral disorder, beginning in the will, lies all along essentially in the will, which corrupts the intelligence, which, again, deceives the conscience. As long as the will is corrupt, the intelligence will be perverted, and the conscience deluded. Give us but a corrected will, and the intelligence will give in faithful reports, and the conscience will become an unerring guide. "And here we may take occasion to observe the misery of man's corrupted nature, wherein those faculties which were originally ordained for mutual assistance, do now exercise a mutual imposture; and as man did join with a fellow-creature to dishonour, and if it had been, possible to deceive his Maker, so in the faculties of man, we may discover a joint conspiracy in

the working of their own overthrow and reproach, and a secret joy in one to be deceived by another."*

There are two ways by which the mind, in its voluntary action, contrives to deceive the conscience.

First, It contrives to banish, as much as possible, the remembrance of the sinful acts committed. When men go to sleep, they darken their windows; and when the guilty wish to be undisturbed, they shut out all consideration of the evil they have done. The polluting lusts that were fondled, so long as they could communicate pleasure, are now banished out of sight when they have served their purpose; as the embalmers in ancient Egypt—sent for, in the first instance, with avidity—had to flee as fast as they could after their offensive work was completed. The malignant passions, after being gratified, must keep out of sight, as hired assassins are got rid of after they have done the deed.

Secondly, the mind learns to present the deeds which it wishes to do or to avoid in a false light. Certain features are brought out into prominent relief, and others are as studiously hid from the view. Hence we find multitudes rushing eagerly to what is evil, but carefully keeping the more painful part out of sight, as the priests in Mexico rung the gong to drown the cries of the human victims offered in sacrifice.

From these two, and it may be from other causes, we find the conscience operating in a number of perverted ways in the human breast.

FIRST, THERE IS AN UNENLIGHTENED CONSCIENCE. The mind makes no inquiry into the objects presented to it; but taking them as they come, the conscience decides upon them as they cast up. Persons under this influence act according to the prevailing views of their age and country, without making any nice inquiry into their accuracy. They follow religiously the superstitions of their country; they practise faithfully the virtues of their family or tribe—be they hospitality, or courage, or whatever else; and they allow themselves to fall into the vices that abound around them—it may be intemperance or revenge—and they scarcely feel any compunctions in consequence. It is the least sinful form which the conscience takes in fallen man. Yet it is not without sin. The mind avoids inquiry, because it

* Bishop Reynolds on the Affections.

does not wish to be disturbed. It is in darkness, because it prefers the darkness to the light. The conscience, in such persons, loses all delicacy of perception and touch; and the possessor does good without doing it as good, and evil without knowing that it is evil.

SECONDLY, THERE IS A PERVERTED CONSCIENCE. This form differs from the other only in degree. It is a farther stage of the same malady. There is now not only ignorance, there is positive mistake. Nor is it difficult, proceeding on the principles above developed, to discover how the conscience should come to pronounce judgments which are positively erroneous. Under the influence of prejudice and passion, the mind views every object only under some one, and that a very partial, aspect. Objects really loved on other grounds come in imagination to be invested with qualities which do not belong to them; and we are led, not only to desire, but to justify ourselves in desiring them. Men will fight for persons and causes altogether unworthy of esteem, because they identify them with something that is good, and they will do so with unflinching fidelity and the deepest devotedness, thinking that they do God service. On the other hand, when they are under the feeling of malice or revenge, all the actions of the obnoxious party will be seen as through broken and coloured crystal. "It would be curious to see how a respectful estimate of a man's character and talents might be changed, in consequence of some personal inattention experienced from him, into deprecating invectives against him or his intellectual performances; and the railer, though actuated solely by petty revenge, account himself all the while the model of equity and sound judgment."* Having succeeded in representing those whom we dislike in jaundiced colours and distorted forms, we feel as if we were not only allowed, but justified, in the opposition offered them. Malignity never becomes deep or bitter, till it has succeeded in calling in the conscience; and men feel as if they did right to be angry. Mankind always misrepresent those whom they hate, as Nero clothed with the skins of wild beasts those on whom he let loose the dogs that tore them to pieces, and covered with pitch those that were consumed by the flames.

In consequence of these aberrations, willing in the first in-

* Foster on a Man's Writing Memoirs of Himself.

stance, the mind lapses into a hopelessly perverted state, calling good evil, and evil good. A deep but somewhat gloomy thinker, John Foster, says, "It were probably absurd to expect that any mind should itself be able to detect all its own obliquities, after having been so long beguiled, like the mariners in a story which I have read, who followed the direction of their compass, infallibly right, as they could have no doubt, till they arrived at an enemy's port, where they were seized and made slaves. It happened that the wicked captain, in order to betray the ship, had concealed a large loadstone at a little distance on one side of the needle."* The illustration is most apposite of the constant power of a sinful will, like this concealed loadstone, to draw aside the conscience from its proper bearing, and to lead the possessor astray while he thinks he is holding on in the right direction.

We can thus account for the extraordinary perversions of moral feeling by which certain religious sects are characterized. The delusion caused in individuals by their personal idiosyncrasy, or the influence of accidental circumstances, is produced in these sects by a skilfully arranged system, the prime movers in which deceive others by the same means by which they were themselves deceived. In all such cases it may be remarked, that there are two necessary means employed—there is an acknowledged virtue placed on the foreground before the mind, and there is a course of training. By this virtue the moral faculty is gained; and by the training, the mind is taught to look at this virtue, and to the advantages flowing from its exercise, while other and offensive aspects are studiously kept out of view. Thus, in the Society of Jesus there are placed before the mind the duty of serving Christ, the virtue of submission to a superior, and the advantages thence accruing of centralization, and the energy of united action; and then there is a system of discipline, with a studious secrecy, and disclosures according as the parties are able to bear them. In Thuggery, it was proclaimed that the sacrifice of human life is sacred to the Goddess of Destruction, and that the strangled go to Paradise, and none were allowed to witness the horrid rites till the third year of their apprenticeship.

These are the workings of the conscience, in regard to its more direct office of pointing out the path of duty. In its more re-

* Foster on a Man's Writing Memoirs of Himself.

flex operation, as judging of the past character of the possessor, it may assume one or other of two forms, as—

THIRDLY, THERE IS AN UNFAITHFUL CONSCIENCE, or a conscience which does not inform man of his sins. It is the most dangerous of all its delusions. It arises from the painful nature of the emotions which the contemplation of sin calls up, and the effort which the mind makes to avoid or deaden the sensation. Hence the unwillingness to look seriously at the evil committed; hence the attempt to keep it out of sight, and to bury it, if possible, in forgetfulness. There issue from all this a deceitfulness of heart, and a cast of character completely opposed to that which we describe expressively as single-minded. These self-delusions may be observed not only in those who are possessed of superior abilities and great acuteness, but even in clowns and simpletons. Those who have no other talent are often proverbial for the exercise of a kind of cunning which displays itself in hiding their faults from others, and which is derived, we are convinced, from the skill which they have acquired in deluding themselves. Persons who have long practised this habit of self-deception come at last to look upon themselves with the most complacent self-satisfaction. The greatest criminals have been known to pass years of their life without being visited with any very deep or conscious convictions of conscience. If certain persons can thus commit the most heinous crimes without being much troubled with the consciousness of sin, it is worthy of being inquired whether it is not in consequence of a general property of man's nature operating in the breasts of all, and leading them to conceal their sins from themselves. Does it not seem as if, through this human characteristic, all mankind might be sinners, and lying under the displeasure of God, while yet utterly unconscious of their awful and perilous state?

The great body of mankind, in ordinary circumstances, are wonderfully little troubled with reproaches of conscience—as little, we believe, as the Jesuit is in practising deceit, and the Thug in perpetrating his murders, and for a like reason—the conscience has been so muffled that no warning sound can come from it. Some have gone down to yet greater depths, far beneath the reach of any disturbing sound—like those depths of the ocean which are beneath all agitation, but in which there

is no life—like those coal-pits into which it is impossible to draw the air, and in which all life must perish.

FOURTHLY, THERE IS A TROUBLED CONSCIENCE. Southey, in one of his poems, tells ús of a bell—which had been suspended on a rock, that the sound given as the waves beat upon it might warn the mariner of the propinquity to danger—having had its rope cut by pirates, because of the warning which it uttered. It so happened, however, that at a future period these very pirates struck upon that rock which they had stript of its means of admonishing them. Which things may be unto us for an allegory. Mankind take pains to stifle the voice that would admonish them, and they partially succeed, but it is only to find themselves sinking at last in misery thereby more fearfully augmented.

There are violent and convulsive movements of self-reproach which will at times break in upon the self-satisfaction of the most complacent. Man's peace is in this respect like the sultry heat of a summer's day; it is close and disagreeable at the time, and ever liable to be broken in upon by the thunders and tempests of the Divine indignation. Even in the case of those who are anxious to keep their attention turned away as much as possible from themselves, and as little as possible upon the state of their hearts, there will occur intervals unfilled up between the scenes that engross them, and on these occasions there will be recollections called up which occasion the keenest misery. It may be after a day of selfish business, or an evening of sinful excitement, that such unwelcome visitations are paid to them to disturb their rest, while others have buried their cares in the forgetfulness of sleep. Or it may be, in the time of disease, or in the prospect of death, that the ghosts of deeds committed long ago spring up as from the grave. These gloomy fears proceeding from conscious guilt always rise up like a ghostly apparition, never in the sunshine of prosperity, but always in the gloom of adversity, to render the darkness more horrific. The wicked are thus, in the time of prosperity, heaping up accumulated sorrow, to aggravate the scenes of misery through which they must at last pass. They are vainly attempting to stop the current altogether by a feeble mound, which, as it gives way, lets in the deep waters upon the soul with the power of an overwhelming flood.

A number of circumstances combine to force sin upon the

notice, even when there is a general desire to overlook it. External objects and events may frequently make it pass in review before the spectator. More commonly it is excited feeling that fixes it constantly before the mind, so that, turn itself as it may, it ever sees the deed standing out in colours of flame, like a lurid light glaring in the midst of darkness, and attracting the eye, though only to pain and annoy it. A crime long concealed from the public gaze has at length, let us suppose, been detected, the indignation of the whole community is excited, and the finger of reproach is pointed at the perpetrator. It is manifest, that he cannot now banish the recollection of the offence so constantly or effectually as he was wont. It will rise up anew with every feeling of wounded vanity, and whenever he is exposed to studied neglect or insult. We can account, on precisely the same principles, for a seemingly contradictory phenomenon—the great annoyance given by the conscience in cases in which constant exertion requires to be made to keep the crime concealed. The very attempt at concealment, according to the natural law of association, must keep the deed perpetually before the mind, to awaken the conscience and madden the soul. The man who has such a fearful secret to keep has a fire in his bosom which he is "gathering to keep it warm;" and he would not be lacerated by the lash of public reprobation so fearfully as by these scorpions of his own exasperated conscience. The sin is also kept before the mind, and the conscience troubled, when there is any circumstance connected with the commission of the sin which is fitted to excite the social and sympathetic emotions. When the shrieks of the murdered, for instance, ring for years in the ears of the murderer, the mind cannot but be in a state of constant restlessness—the burning centre of the most intense anguish.

In other cases, the troubling of the conscience is produced, we can scarcely tell how, by the state of the nervous system, or by an accidental event, recalling the deed committed to oblivion, or by a sudden flashing of some willingly forgotten scene upon the mind, revealing, like the lightning's glare at night, dreadful depths of darkness. In regard to such phenomena, we may know what are the general laws; though it may be as difficult to condescend upon the specific causes, as it is to tell the immediate cause of the raising this gust of wind, or of this cloudy

atmosphere, of both of which we may know perfectly what are the general means of their production.

The swelling of the passions has often been compared very appropriately to that of the waves of the ocean. The reproaches of conscience bear a greater resemblance to the *ground swell*, thus described by an eloquent scientific female writer :—" It continues to heave the smooth and glassy surface of the deep, long after the winds and billows are at rest. A swell frequently comes from a quarter in direct opposition to the wind, and sometimes from various points of the compass at the same time, producing a vast commotion in a dead sea without ruffling the surface. They are the heralds that point out to the mariner the distant region where the tempest has howled, and they are not unfrequently the harbingers of its approach."* Every word of this description might be applied to those reproaches, which, coming from various quarters, and rising at a great distance, move the soul far beneath the surface, and tell at once of sin that may be long past, and of storms yet to arise.

Sometimes these reproaches are but momentary flashes, extinguished in darkness ; at other times they are a constant firing. Human misery is consummated, when the gnawings become constant, eating like a cancer ever inwards. The memory of sin is now the only object on which the mind can fix. The conscience unceasingly chides, and all its chidings are prolonged and repeated, as by surrounding echoes. An avenging power is seen ever hovering over the soul, like a bird of prey over its victim. Who can describe to others the pain produced, when these convictions coil around the mind as serpents coiled around Laocoon ? Nor can any change of scene or position lessen or distract the misery. You may recommend scenes of mirth and amusement ; but their very music grates upon the ear, and is as the "singing of songs to a heavy heart." You may recommend the beauties of nature—the bracing breeze, and the gladdening sunshine—the stream, fitted to make the heart to leap as lively as itself—the mountain, whose air becomes purer and more ethereal as we rise higher and higher, elevating the spirits as we ascend, and expanding the mind as the prospect widens—or the ocean, the sight and sound of which are ever as fresh to the exhausted spirit as the breeze which blows from it is to the exhausted body ;

* Sommerville's Physical Geography.

but it is all to no purpose; for when there is music in the ear, there is discord in the heart—when there is glad sunshine without, there is darkness within.

It is the world within that needs to be rectified, and then it will gladden the world without, as by a perpetual sunshine streaming upon it. But this rectification must proceed from a higher power than the perverted mind of man.

SECT. VII.—RESTRAINTS LAID UPON MAN BY THE CONSCIENCE—THEIR EXTENT AND CHARACTER.

Though man is fallen, there is abundant scope for the exercise of many of the original properties of his nature. Every one acknowledges, for instance, that there is room for the play of the ingenuity and fancy in man's existing nature, and that the sympathetic and social affections may be as strong and lively as ever. We maintain, farther, that in not a few cases, the conscience is making its power felt in the way of instigating to what is good, and restraining from what is evil. It cannot be denied, that great and beneficial ends are produced in the government of the world by the exercise of this faculty, weak and imperfect though it be. But let us properly understand in what sense, and under what restrictions, the admission is made.

The possession of conscience does not make any man morally good, but it undoubtedly renders every man a responsible agent. It would be an evident error to affirm, that if man were without a conscience, he would commit a greater amount of wickedness; for, so constituted, he could be as little capable of moral evil as of moral excellence. But if we cannot, with any propriety of language, affirm, that without the possession of the conscience, human wickedness would have been greater than it is; it is perfectly competent to assert that, without such a restraint, human passion would have raged more furiously, and that the human misery produced would have been vastly more extensive. The conscience, weak and perverted though it be, is one instrument employed by God to hold mankind in subjection in spite of their wickedness. Bacon speaks of it as "sufficient to check the vice, but not to inform the duty." Though chained like the watch-dog, it does, at least at times, give warning of danger. This broken rudder is not capable of conducting the vessel into the

harbour; but may be used for preventing it, till certain ends have been accomplished, from dashing upon the rocks. "We believe," says Vinet, "in the wreck of humanity; we believe that its unfortunate ship has perished, but that the remains of that great catastrophe float on the waves. A few of these are fit for some use, but none of them can bear to the shore the least of the passengers."

In many cases, there is direct obedience, not indeed full and constant, but partial and occasional, to the dictates of the conscience. Let it be acknowledged frankly, and without any mental reservation whatsoever, that there is in society much sterling honesty, proceeding from conscientious integrity of character, and not from any discovery of the advantages which may spring from the course of conduct pursued. Not only so, there is in many a high sense of honour, and a noble-minded generosity of character, originating in a largeness of heart, and guided by an acute sense of right and wrong, which command our esteem and admiration. We always suspect the man who sneers at the idea of the existence of human integrity and benevolence, that he is himself the villain which he believes others to be. Now, it needs but a moment's reflection to discover, how much the peace and general wellbeing of society are promoted by the belief in this high honour and disinterested philanthropy. Though society could be held together in a sort of way by the restraints of God's providence, it would be a sad scene of constant jealousy, without the mutual confidence engendered by sterling honour and generous love.

But while it is freely admitted that the peace and decorum of society are thereby greatly furthered, we are not therefore to conclude that human nature is spotlessly pure. The disorganization of the mind may be discovered in the very character of the restraints which the conscience imposes. There is a favouritism displayed where all may seem to be candour, and the partiality of the judge comes out in the selection of the cases in which a righteous judgment is pronounced.

Let us mark the peculiarities of those cases in which the conscience is in the way of controlling the mind, and directing it aright. *As a general rule, it is most disposed to do so when the sin, after commission, would be forced most readily and frequently upon the cognizance of the conscience.* As for instance—

First, when it is known that external circumstances must force the sin upon the attention. Mankind in general avoid those sins which after commission must be constantly recalled by events ever occurring. Nor is there need of any profound reasoning to discover what sins must thus bring so immediate a punishment—the mind discovers them at once, and flees from them as naturally and spontaneously as it would from a precipice or any manifest bodily peril. It is in consequence of this salutary awe that we find external sins avoided by persons who meanwhile cherish the sinful feeling and purpose. Lewd thoughts, malice, and revenge, are mentally indulged by thousands who refrain from perpetrating the corresponding deed, and this not merely from a perception of the reproach with which they would be visited by their fellow-men upon the act becoming manifest, but because of the chiding of their own hearts, called up by the public notice taken of them. Hence it is, likewise, that there is commonly a restraint on those sins which call forth instantly the reprobation of society. But those offences are most keenly condemned which inflict immediate injury on the temporal interests of mankind. Deceit and dishonesty, and the kindred vices, are those which are most deeply felt by society as inflicting the greatest amount of injury, and these are the vices which the wise and prudent man is most disposed to avoid. Hence the straightforward honesty and sensitive honour so characteristic of our higher class of men of business. It would be altogether a miserable fetch to impute this, their distinguishing quality, to a mere refinement of selfishness—it proceeds rather from a becoming fear of the accusations of a conscientious mind.

It is for a like reason that we find the general tone of morality in society exercising a powerful influence on the individual members of it. When the standard of honour and virtue is high in a community—when, for instance, unbecoming levity in the female sex, and everything mean on the part of the higher classes of society are severely reprobated, when industry and honesty are commended among the poor—then we find a shrinking from all those violations of established propriety which would expose the individual not only to the scorn of men's tongues, but, along with that, to what is more fearful, the gnawings of a dissatisfied mind. On the other hand, when the standard of so-

ciety is low—when no mark of disgrace is attached to unchastity, to meanness or to dishonesty—we find persons falling greedily into these sins, and contriving easily to avoid the reproaches of conscience. A member of a community of robbers or pirates can, with comparatively little self-reproach, inflict injury on society at large every day of his life, and his compunctions become acute only when he is tempted to act unfaithfully towards that band with which he is associated. Hence we find criminals perpetrating without much remorse the most enormous crimes against mankind at large, and yet maintaining a nice sense of honour in reference to one another. This, too, is a cause (additional to that before noticed) of the circumstance that mankind in general are upright in their transactions with one another, while they are utterly ungrateful and rebellious in their conduct towards God, their governor and best benefactor. Must there not be some fearful derangement in man's nature when sins are weighed, not in the unchangeable scale of God's law, but the varying scale of ever-shifting circumstances?

Secondly, sins are avoided when the social and sympathetic feelings of man's nature tend to recall them frequently and vividly. The feelings referred to will fall to be considered in the next chapter. They are in themselves different from the moral feelings, and are commonly far more powerful, owing to their liveliness in their influence upon the character. They must give a strong bias to the train of association; and whatever sins rouse them into operation, must of necessity be much before the mind. Hence we find the attention dwelling on sins, not in proportion to their greatness, but according as the occurrence may have excited and interested the emotions. Hence we find, in all minds not utterly abandoned, an instinctive shuddering at crimes which produce instantly bodily suffering or mental anguish, fitted to move the more tender feelings of man's nature. It is owing to this cause, perhaps, more than to the healthy working of the conscience, considered in itself, that we find the murderer, the seducer, and the defrauder of the simple, haunted by such fearful reproaches, with nothing to lessen or alleviate them. We can believe all that is said about the murderer feeling as if the stain of the blood of his victim could never be washed out, and as if he saw the wounds ever open, and blood flowing from them. It is pleasant to think that the widow, the

orphan, the poor, and the afflicted, have thus a powerful friend, not only in the sympathetic feelings of every man's bosom, but in the moral sense called up by these feelings to the discharge of its duties. This is one of the helps which God provides for the helpless—one of the most potent defences of the defenceless.

We now see in what circumstances the conscience is apt to be deadened, and in what circumstances it is apt to be roused. We see how mankind can continue in a most apathetic state in reference to sins of which the whole race is guilty, while they are sensitive as to other sins, less heinous, it may be, but which are generally abhorred. We see, too, why certain sins come to weigh heavily on the mind, while others are speedily forgotten.

> "Great crimes alarm the conscience, but she sleeps
> While thoughtful man is plausibly amused."—COWPER.

The great crimes which alarm the conscience are commonly deeds which arouse the sympathies or startle the sensibilities of mankind; but the other sins which he forgets are those which in no way move the common interests of humanity. We see likewise how sins, forgotten for a time, may be made to flash before the mind by the recalling of associated circumstances, or how they may be steadfastly forced upon the attention by the power of associated feelings. This topic will fall to be resumed in next section.

But in considering how these circumstances bear upon the government of God, it is worthy of being noticed, that by their means God can effectually restrain the vices which have the most pernicious influence upon society. In proportion as society is injured, is its indignation called forth, and in that same proportion is the conscience roused to denounce the perpetrator of the evil; and in proportion as pain is inflicted, so are the sympathetic feelings of the guilty party moved, and, in awakening the sympathies, there are awakened, at the same time, the more terrible pangs of an accusing conscience. Does it not seem as if God were using the very wrecks of man's nature to keep him from sinking altogether, and making the sinfulness, as he makes the wrath, of man to praise him?

SECT. VIII.—ON THE EVIL EFFECTS PRODUCED BY A CONDEMNING CONSCIENCE.

The sad effects that follow from a falsely approving conscience, producing a self-deceived, self-satisfied temper of mind, have already been pointed out. We are now to contemplate the evil effects which originate in a condemning conscience. These are greater and more numerous than the superficial observer is apt to imagine. Their source lies deep down in the human heart, and is therefore unseen, but is on that account the more tremendously powerful.

We are inclined to refer much of the discontent which abounds in the world to the influence of an unsatisfied conscience. As repeated neglects of duty pass under the notice of the mind, there is a wretchedness ever renewed, though very possibly without the individual being at all aware of the source from which it springs. In this respect it resembles the constant uneasiness produced by the derangement of the digestive organs, or the irritation caused by a diseased nervous system. The reproaches of the conscience, though individually transient, exercise, by their recurrence, a powerful influence. They resemble those noxious ephemera which make up in number what they want in strength; and while the individuals perish, the species survives. By their constant renewal they disturb the flow of association in the mind, and dispose it to anxiety and fretfulness. An accusing conscience must thus ever be rendering the possessor restless and unhappy. We refer to this cause much of what we call temper, both of peevish and violent temper. True, the individual may not know the quarter from which the restlessness which he feels proceeds—nay, he may be inclined to trace it to every other source rather than the true one. He thinks that it arises from his condition, and hence his constant endeavours to better his position, to free himself from certain external inconveniences, and to attain certain temporal privileges; or he refers it to the ill usage which he receives from mankind in general, or from certain individuals who have thwarted, envied, or insulted him, and hence his irritability or the obstinacy of his temper. He may not be aware of it—nay, he might scout at the idea, if propounded to him; but nevertheless it is certain

that the spring of his misery is to be found in a conscience awakened without being pacified.

We are inclined to refer not only much of human misery, but much more than is commonly supposed, of human sinfulness, to the working of an evil conscience. Much of human passion and human violence is the fire and sound emitted by nature in its effort to restore a deranged equilibrium. Alas! we cannot even understand man's wickedness, under some of its forms, without taking into account the existence of a moral sense. It is possible for the conscience to become a deranging instead of a regulating power; and when it does so, it becomes the most corrupting of all agents, even as water, so essential to all living vegetation, becomes the most powerful of all means of corruption in a plant deprived of vitality.

Whatever rankles the mind—and nothing so much rankles it as an unappeased conscience—must tend to keep alive the worst feelings of the heart. The fever produced will prompt to anger, to ambition, and to every passion which may carry away the individual from himself, or absorb him in strife or in the giddy whirl of business or pleasure. And there are times when the sleeping volcano will burst out with awful and irresistible power. "A wounded spirit who can bear?" and that which is intolerable within will find vent without. When the mind is thrown into a tumult—when it is tossed from the lowest depths—all that is impure will be cast up, like the "troubled sea when it cannot rest, and whose waves cast up mire and dirt." Some of the direst crimes ever committed have been prompted by this laceration of spirit, as when the guilty have sought to rid themselves of those who have been witnesses of their crimes, or whose presence told them of their guilt, or whose lives have been a reproach upon their own. Some of the incidents of greatest horror recorded in history have originated in the aversion of the mind to the near contact to spotless virtue. The Athenian mob were allowing more truth to escape from them than mankind are accustomed to do, when they gave as their reason for banishing Aristides, that they did not relish the constant reference made to his justice. Not a few of the murders of wives by their husbands, and of husbands by their wives, have sprung from a determination to be rid of the memorials of broken vows. We can trace to no other source than a conscience goading on the

passions, the demoniacal deeds which have been committed around the martyr's funeral pile. So potent is this principle, that we believe it capable of explaining the fearful scenes at the foot of the Cross, where the meekest of sufferers was denied the sympathy which has not been withheld at a dying hour even from the vilest malefactor.

If we would understand all the effects which follow from a condemning conscience, we must not forget that the passions are often irritated and inflamed by the opposition offered to them. It is proverbial that what is forbidden is apt to be the more eagerly sought after. Nor is it difficult to account for this. The mind under the influence of desire dwells on the prohibition and the thing prohibited, becomes more eagerly bent on obtaining it, and chafes at the denial. The effect of the interposition of the conscience in such circumstances is only to exasperate the mind; just as the rocks which do not impede the stream serve to dash it into greater violence. The natural effect of a monitor warning, without being attended to, must be an increased irritability of spirit. The ocean, even when the waves are high, never seems to rage in all its fury except at the shore, where it is opposed by breakers; the deepest stream will flow along softly, and almost imperceptibly, till it meets with opposing rocks or cliffs, which dash it from one to another, when it is forthwith lashed into foam; and it is from a like cause that the rebellious temper of man rages against the conscience, when it would lay restraints upon him. Paul seems to refer to this power of an awakened conscience:—"Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence." As the prisoner will tear his chains, and beat upon his prison walls, so will the spirit of man fret and rage, when it feels its fetters, and yet is not able to break them. It is the wild beast beating upon its cage, and, indignant at every restraint upon it, becoming more furious than when it ranged in the forest. Scourged by remorse, there are multitudes who have sought to drown their pain by the most frantic movements. Criminals have been known, with the view of diverting their minds, to jest even upon the scaffold. Others have sought to madden their minds, and so to ease their feelings, by rushing into unblushing profligacy and daring criminality, and would drown the remembrance of old iniquities by the noise which new ones create.

In other cases, the mind is hardened into a confirmed rebellion against God and all that is good. This effect follows, whenever it is constrained to look constantly at the sins of which it yet does not repent.

In ordinary circumstances the passions of the soul, by means of the conspiracy which they have hatched, contrive to deceive the conscience, but they will not always be so successful. Speaking of the conscience, Bishop Reynolds says—"Though in many men it sleep in regard to motion, yet it never sleeps in regard to observation and notice—it may be heard and seared, it can never be blind. That writing on it, which seems invisible and illegible, like letters written with the juice of lemon, when it is brought to the fire of God's judgments, will be most clear."* The time is coming when the mask which man wears will be torn off, and his character will be displayed to himself in all its hideousness and deformity. There are circumstances occurring in the world quite sufficient to explain what is here meant.

Let us look, in the way of marking the operations of the mind, at those persons who go on for years in a course of undetected sin, but who are afterwards exposed. There is a servant, let us suppose, cheating his master, or one of the sex in which chastity is so highly valued giving way to an unlawful lust; we are to mark the state of mind of such persons, first, when the sin is yet concealed, and then when it comes to be detected and published. Though they will, no doubt, be troubled all along with secret misgivings and reproaches, it is astonishing to find what habitual calmness they may assume—nay, what complacency they may feel, at least if they have no difficulty in concealing their sins. After the first awkwardness has been conquered, it is conceivable that the parties may feel at ease in the very presence of the master deceived, or of the husband to whom the wife has proved unfaithful. It is evident that, besides a studious concealment from the eyes of others, there is also a hiding of the sin from the eyes of the guilty parties themselves. They think of the sinful deed as seldom as possible; and when it is brought before the mind, it is in a disguised dress and appearance. Society will condemn the deed when known, and equally certain is it that the conscience will condemn it every time it is presented. If the scorn of men be difficult to endure, the constant gnawing of

* Bishop Reynolds on the Affections.

self-reproach is, if possible, still more intolerable. Hence the ingenious stratagems of concealment which the mind is ever plotting, with at least temporary success. The person acts the hypocrite to himself, and uses as many contrivances to save appearances before the censor within, as to shield himself from the criticisms of the world without.

But let us suppose that the crime is now discovered, and let us mark the effect. It is one or other of the two following:—the person is humbled and grieved, and becomes penitent and reformed—or more commonly the result is the very opposite, he becomes hardened, and sets the opinion of mankind at defiance. When this latter is the issue, the individual from that instant becomes more open and unblushing in criminality. He acts not only in contempt of the opinion of society, but in more direct rebellion against the dictates of conscience. The old motives which led him to conceal from the community the sins which he was committing, have now lost their force, and have taken with them almost all his old methods of concealing his sins from himself; and now he sins not only more openly, but more greedily and recklessly. He feels like the gambler who has lost at one venture nearly his whole property; he thinks he may risk the remainder, it is so small. This is the feeling of the man whom crime hath deprived of peace of conscience! he acts as if farther crime could scarcely make him more wretched.

It seems that there are cataracts in the descending stream of wickedness at which the fall is more tremendous than at other places. Let us take another illustrative case. Let us trace the descent of a criminal who has been hardened by the sentence pronounced upon him, and the punishment to which he has been subjected. Let us mark how he goes down step by step in the scale of being, and how the very interferences with him are the means of hurrying him down the faster, as he breaks loose from them—just as the abutting rocks that would stop the rolling stone are often the means of making it take a more tremendous leap. Under the influence of some transient feeling, not without criminality, a youth, we shall suppose, is tempted to engage in some night foray which ends in pilfering, and he is in consequence apprehended, condemned, and subjected to confinement for a certain length of time. It is a critical period in his history. Suppose him to be brought to true repentance, we may have

from his time a life of persevering integrity. But suppose, on the other hand, that he is led to spurn at the sentence, and endure the penalty in a grumbling spirit; from that date there will, in all probability, be a succession of crimes leading to a succession of condemnations, and the whole rendering the heart more hardened than ever.

Now, the issue must be analogous, in regard to all men, when at any time they are made to feel deeply and solemnly, be it in this life or the life to come, that God is calling them into judgment. We say in this life, because there are times in the history of the world, and in the history of every individual, when God seems to be setting up a throne of judgment on the earth, and calling men before it. Certain it is, that every man must at length stand before the Judge of the universe. When thus summoned into the presence of the Judge of all, it must be for one or other of two purposes—either to have his sins forgiven, or to have them charged upon him. In the former case, it is conceivable that, with the sentence of condemnation removed, the heart, without any violence done to its principles, may be inclined to submission and repentance. Hence the appropriateness of the plan of salvation revealed in the gospel, which disarms rebellion by providing a free forgiveness. But it is to the other alternative that our attention is at present called. Man, we suppose, is summoned to give account of his deeds to a Judge who cannot possibly be deceived.

Unable to justify himself, with no promise of forgiveness, with no disposition to repent, the natural result is sulkiness and open rebellion. Were there room for deception, the party might be prompted to excuse or lessen his sin; or with the promise of forgiveness, he might be disposed at least to profess repentance, and might have a momentary desire to practise it. But if repentance be impossible on the one hand, and the door of hope seem to be shut on the other, every principle of man's nature will drive him on to the recklessness which proceeds from conscious guilt and despair.

Meanwhile his sin will stand disclosed before him in all its hideousness and with nothing to conceal it. The remembrance of sin, we have seen, may be called up either by external circumstances, or by a powerful inward feeling. Both of these now combine to keep his sin before him. Why am I so situated? is

the constant inquiry put. Because of sin, is the answer uttered, as it were, by a responsive voice from our own bosoms. And these feelings of intense anguish, whence come they?—Because of sin, is the reply, prolonged, as it were, by subterranean thunders. But the sentence is unnecessarily severe. Well, let me consider why it is inflicted. Because of sin, is the sound heard, as coming with awful solemnity from heaven, and from the very mouth of the Judge. But this sin is not so great after all, it is suggested. Well, let me examine it. "Here is a sin," is the voice coming from one quarter; "Here is a sin," is the voice coming from another quarter; till earth, over all its wide surface, joins with heaven and hell in ringing the sound of sin in the ear.

The insects which issue from an ant-hill, when it is stirred, are not so numerous nor fierce as the eager reproaches which come forth, when the judgments of heaven visit the spirit. All the scenes of the past life, even those regarded as most interesting at the time, and remembered with greatest pleasure ever since, are now made to disclose to the view the sin involved in them, but which was for a time concealed beneath the lovely foliage on which the eye rested. This youthful frolic, which once communicated such pleasure in the remembrance—ah! it is now seen that it proceeded from vanity. This deed of generosity to man—alas! it was accompanied with an utter contempt of God. Nor was Fitz-James more astonished, when, in one of the most magnificent, and seemingly one of the most peaceful, scenes in nature, there sprung up an armed warrior from every bush and brake and hollow, than the person who has walked through life in a vain show, when his sins at last start up before him.

"Wild as the scream of the curlew
From crag to crag the signal flew—
Instant, through copse and heath, arose
Bonnets, and spears, and bended bows:
On right, on left, above, below,
Sprung up at once the lurking foe;
From shingles grey their lances start—
The bracken bush sends forth the dart;
The rushes and the willow wand
Are bristling into axe and brand;
And every tuft of broom gives life
To plaided warrior arm'd for strife—
As if the yawning hell to heaven
A subterranean host had given."

All of us who have experienced anything like the following may comprehend how there should be such a resurrection of feeling. Conceive a world-involved man taking a quiet day, in a life of engrossing business, to visit the scenes of his childhood. The house in which he was reared—the room in which he slept—the field in which he played—the garden or glen in which he gathered flowers—this gnarled oak, and that sequestered dell—have all an attraction to him which they have to no other; and their attraction arises from their raising recollections of scenes which seemed to be for ever lost, but which were vastly interesting at the time, as they are still interesting in the gushing memory of them as they well up from the mind as waters from a fountain. Events which were regarded as absolutely buried are made to spring up in vivid reality, and they come with intense power to move the soul to mirth or melancholy. It is an experimental proof of the possibility of the resurrection of buried thoughts. So far as forgotten sins are concerned, the conscience is the archangel's trumpet, whose sound raises them from the graves to which they had been consigned, in the hope that they might dwell in perpetual darkness; and they stand before us shivering and shaking, calling on the hills to cover them, and the caves to hide them—but all to no purpose, for there is no place in which these risen ghosts can find a shelter, except in the land of perpetual darkness, where their misery is concealed, though not lessened or remedied. There is a death for the soul, but there is no grave in which to bury it.

But will the mind not endeavour still to conceal the guilt from itself? Most assuredly it will, but in a new way. The old methods have failed, but new ones will present themselves, and be eagerly followed. After the exposure which has been made, it knows that it cannot conceal inself in its old mantle; it must therefore find a new one, which if not so fair and becoming, nor adapted for concealment, may yet be harder and more impenetrable, and fitted for defence; and underneath the external garb, when it is torn away, there will be found a coat of mail for protection. The man cannot now flatter himself into the belief that his virtues are numerous and his faults few; for, as he stood at the bar of the Judge, he got a view of his character in all its blackness and hideousness. Still he cannot bear the continual gnawings of that condemning conscience. But if it cannot be

silenced, may he not succeed in getting beyond the reach of its voice? Or he may allow other feelings to hurry him along till the sound no longer falls upon his ear. Such feelings will rise up spontaneously in the mind, under the irritation produced by the condemning sentence of the judge; and if these feelings of rage and disappointment can but allow the mind to escape the conscience, they will be willingly followed. Not that they are felt to be pleasant, but they are at least of a more moving and hurrying character than those which oppress the spirit, as the conscience utters its judgments, and admits of no appeal. If they do not give relief, they at least furnish a change of misery, as the man racked with pain on all sides will again and again change his posture, were it only to vary his distress. Tied, like Mazeppa, on a courser over which he has no control, he would feel a kind of ecstasy in the very wildness of its careering. Not only so, but acquiring courage from despair, he may proceed the length of making war with the judge. Since he cannot flee from him, he will perhaps affect to contemn him, or impugn the authority of his law.

> "Souls who dare look the omnipotent tyrant in
> His everlasting face, and tell him that
> His evil is not good."—BYRON'S CAIN.

But this is by no means so easy a work, for meanwhile God has a witness in every man's bosom. There must be some way of deluding this witness before so bold a step can be taken. The spirit will now try to make the conscience condemn the judge, as being harsh and relentless. Strange and paradoxical as it may appear, it will, to some extent, be successful. It will picture to the conscience the condemnation pronounced, as a dark deed of tyranny and revenge committed by God; and believing, or trying to believe, that God is malignant, it will view Him with the feelings which malignity should inspire. And now the soul will not only be angry with God, but feel as if it did right to be angry, and the war which it carries on will not only be that of the passions, but of an evil conscience. The feelings roused will be a strange mixture of heat and cold. The whole soul will, as it were, be travelling constantly from "beds of raging fire to starve in ice;" and there will be found in it such extremes as Sir James Ross saw in those lofty mountains near the south pole, where molten lava, with a glaring light, constantly poured itself

on eternal snows. The war, too, will now be incessant. If the war were merely that of the passions, there might be cessations and gaps and intervals; but being now that of a troubled conscience, as well as that of a disordered heart, it becomes a constant and everlasting warfare, without respite and without end.

Such seems to be the necessary issue of the very principles in the nature of responsible beings. It is conceivable, then, that there may be beings, angelic beings, who wage a never-ceasing warfare with God, urged on by a disordered conscience, and passions which have broken loose from all restraint. Man's reason and experience cannot tell him that there are such beings, but they show that there may be such, and that this is the natural and—unless God miraculously interpose—the necessary result of the fall of beings who have a moral law in their hearts. Every one can understand how a criminal, repeatedly condemned and punished by an earthly judge, becomes hardened in the very process. This phenomenon, constantly presented in every country, is the natural issue of principles in the mind of fallen man. But these same principles, on the condemnation being pronounced by the Judge of the universe, will lead to a similar result; and just as we find that those who have once been elevated become the most degraded on their being seduced into crime; just as we find the most abandoned criminals in nations that are refined; so we may expect that beings who stand the highest must descend the lowest when they fall—their very previous exaltation making them roll the farther down. Revelation is not, then, telling us of an impossibility, in announcing that there are fallen angels ever incited by restlessness within, to try new projects of wickedness, were it only to vary the sameness of their misery; ever seeking to extract a bitter consolation from the frustration of the Divine purposes and the extension of vice and misery, and to drag down others with them into that abyss into which they have been plunged. He who fell by pride, may surely now be expected to gratify an unruly ambition by attempting to multiply the restless spirits who may do him homage. True it is that every apparent victory has been followed by overwhelming defeat; but the seeming triumph has been sufficient to goad on that spirit which has nothing to hope from assumed and forced submission, while it is indisposed to genuine repentance. And we have only to look to man, to discover that propensities to evil

rush on towards their objects, regardless of consequences, and in contempt of all experience. It seems as if the moral being who falls must fall for ever, and that his descent must be a rapidly accelerated one, the termination of which is to be found only at the bottom of a pit that is bottomless.

Man has only to look within to discover principles which might bring the possessor into a state similar to that of fallen angels. "But for the grace of God, there goes John Bradford," was the exclamation (often quoted) of a well-known Reformer, as he saw a criminal led away to execution. If man will only look into his own heart in a searching manner, he may discover principles which, in some of their possible operations, are capable of sinking him even into the depths of demoniacal wickedness. He who knows his own nature will be prepared to acknowledge that the contest, of which poets have sung, between the spirits of evil and God, are at least possible. Nay, it may be doubted, whether such poets as Milton and Byron could have given such a painfully graphic anatomy of demoniacal pride and passion, had they not drawn from their own nature; or whether we should have been so moved by the description, if there had been nothing responsive in our own bosoms.

> "Thou speak'st to me of things which long have swam
> In visions through my thought."—BYRON'S CAIN.

Combining these considerations, which have a foundation in the principles of our fallen nature, it is difficult to see how, if God does not interpose, man can stop short of the demoniacal state. There are persons who wonder that man should be consigned to the place prepared for the devil and his angels; but when he has acquired the character of the devil and his angels, in what place can he so appropriately be?

There is one other tendency of falling humanity to which it is needful to attend. We would call it the drying up of the natural affections, according as wickedness increases, and the heart becomes rebellious.

We have already contemplated one striking manifestation of this tendency, in the natural feeling being restrained from flowing towards God, from the very instant that sin was committed. It is evidently an authentic statement that is given of the conduct of our first parents, when they are represented, after their first act of sin, as avoiding the presence of God. They did not

flee from one another; they had still love one to another; but they now felt the presence of God repulsive, and they had already ceased to love him. We see that a guilty conscience is capable of drying up one stream of affection; it has dried up the stream of love that flowed towards God. In the affection which man lavishes, God is the exception; it would seem as if he could love everything except his Maker.

At least he seems capable of doing so in the earlier stages of his career. But the same guilty conscience that has dried up one stream can dry up others. Hence the prejudices against certain individuals—the envy, the malice, the revenge that are to be found in the world—these are not original parts of man's constitution, but acquisitions made, to some extent at least, by a guilty conscience, and to the full extent by the conscience neglecting to exercise its legitimate control.

There seems to be an impression among some, that if conscience were the supreme regulator of human conduct, it would give the character so far a stern and forbidding aspect, by preventing the flow of human affection. But this proceeds from a mistaken notion. It is one of the highest offices of the conscience, in directing all the principles of the mind, to guide in an especial manner the affections, and cause them to flow out, in due measure, in their proper channels. The instant effect of a deranged conscience is the drying up of one of the streams—that which should flow towards God; and the drying up of other streams follows in the progress of wickedness. In the deranged nature of man, the fountains of the affections, which should have been kept pure and fresh, are first allowed to be partially choked up and polluted, then the waters flow in perverted channels, and finally they are lost altogether in the barren sands to which they are carried.

In this downward career there is no change of the fundamental principles and constituents of man's nature; yet there are sad changes of personal character. There are numberless analogies in human life to show, that there may be a change of the train of feelings in the mind, with no change in the original faculties. Look first at this sprightly girl, then at this sober matron, and then at this forlorn widow; it is the same person throughout, but how different the individual thoughts and emotions at these different times! Compare her at this present

moment, grieving over the recent loss of her earthly partner, with what she was but a few weeks ago. Or follow that widow into the work in which she is now called to engage, and mark the new energies called forth by the unexpected situations in which she is placed. In these new scenes she is the same as she was five years ago as the wife, or as she was twenty years ago as the lively girl—yet how different the train of thought and feeling! We urge this merely as an illustration of an interesting psychological phenomenon, and as preparing us to believe, that in the downward progress of wickedness there may be fearful changes—and they must be changes to the worse—in human character. There is not a greater difference between the sparkling diamond and the black carbon into which it may be burnt, than there is between the original soul of man, transparent and lustrous, and the same soul calcined by the fires of guilt into the darkest indifference and the most sordid selfishness.

In particular, we may anticipate a drying up of natural affection. The raven that brought intelligence to Apollo was white till it conveyed the sad news of the death of a favourite, when its colour instantly became black: almost as great, almost as sudden, is the change of feeling with which men view certain objects after a change of circumstances. In the vernal days of youth and prosperity, the affections flow and sparkle on all sides, and water and refresh every object near them. But as years roll on, they are more sparing and restricted in their current. Competition, clashing interests, and selfishness begin to produce an apathy; then the malign passions breaking out, engender a fixed hatred and antipathy. These are the lessons commonly learned by human nature in the school of the world, where selfishness in one leads to selfishness in another, and malignity in one party leads to malignity in the opposite party. The general result is, that first the leaves wither—they may remain for a time in this state—and then they are driven away.

But we are now contemplating the effects produced on the affections, not by the world, but by that judgment which we have supposed God to institute, and issuing in the positive and open rebellion of man. It is difficult to see how any affection, except of the most perverted kind, can outlive such a scorching of the soul. The amazon, in her warlike pursuits, had her breast dried up that she might fight the more fiercely; and there is, we sus-

pect, such a drying up of the breasts of human affection in the indulgence of the fierce feelings called up by a condemning conscience. We doubt much if a soul so maddened by the conscience can ever afterwards look upon any object with kindness and complacency. There is more than a freezing of the affection, such as may be produced by the cold atmosphere of the world—for if there was nothing but a freezing, the affection might again melt and flow in a more genial clime; this awful judgment, like the Medusa's head, has turned it into hard and enduring stone.

SECT. IX.—GENERAL REVIEW OF MAN'S EXISTING MORAL NATURE.

In the researches prosecuted in this chapter, we have had little assistance afforded, at least directly, by other inquirers into human nature.* Metaphysical and ethical writers have commonly contented themselves with investigating the original moral constitution of man's mind, and developing the office of the moral faculty; but they have instituted no particular inquiry into, nor given any explanation of, its existing state. On the other hand, we find in the writings of divines many statements and speculations as to the present state of man's heart; but then there is no inquiry into the original and indestructible structure of man's moral nature. Every thinking mind has felt that there is a gap to fill up between such writers as Hutcheson, Reid, Stewart, Brown, Mackintosh, Kant, Cousin, and Jouffroy, on the one hand, and the common treatises of divinity, such as those of Augustine, Calvin, Owen, and Edwards, on the other.†

* There are important principles, however, laid down in several of the discourses of Chalmers and Vinet.

† This discrepancy was clearly perceived by the acute and accomplished mind of Dr. Wardlaw. It may be doubted, however, whether he has been successful in constructing in his Christian Ethics a system at once philosophical and scriptural. Towards the close of the seventeenth century, there arose a set of writers who sought to meet the rising rationalism by maintaining that the human faculties, in consequence of their being depraved, could not establish any body of truth. The religious philosophers of the following age followed a better method, and used the human understanding in building a system of evidences in behalf of Christianity. Wardlaw has fallen into an error in reference to the conscience, similar to that which was committed by the parties referred to in regard to human reason. Instead of slighting or setting aside the revelations of conscience, it is surely vastly

We have not felt ourselves called on to dispute the general accuracy of the investigations of ethical writers, who have given a high place to the moral faculty, and who have sought to exalt man's moral nature. It is difficult to convince those who have been taught to look upon man as merely the highest of the animals, as merely an upper brute, that there should be such things as sin and salvation. We rejoice then to find certain great and important truths established regarding man's moral constitution, and instead of overlooking them, we have sought to apply them to the existing state of man. There are parts of the writings of all the philosophers referred to, in which they admit that the conscience has not in fact the control which it ought to have; but they speedily lose sight of their own admission, or at least attempt no explanation of a phenomenon which, to say the least of it, is as worthy of being investigated as the original functions of the conscience. We have as certain evidence that the conscience convicts every given man of sin, as we have of the very existence of the conscience itself. It is upon the very doctrine that the philosophers have established, that we have sought to rear the other doctrine, which they are so averse to look at. Adopting the principles which philosophers have furnished, we have followed them to their legitimate consequences; and in doing so, we have arrived at the same conclusions in regard to the corruption of man's nature, as those divines who have derived their views from the volume of inspiration.

While the view presented of human nature has been sufficiently dark and melancholy, it has at the same time been discriminating, which the doctrine set forth by divines has not always been. In maintaining the total depravity of man's nature, they have been afraid to make the least admission as

wiser to attempt to unfold them and use them to give a contribution to the Christian evidences—a thing which cannot be done by those who deny to the conscience an independent authority. It is a mistake to imagine that conscience can do everything; but it is equally a mistake to suppose that it can do nothing. (1.) Its fundamental laws furnish a foundation to Ethics; (2.) It reveals a law which constitutes all men responsible; (3.) It restrains from many sins; (4.) It shews that all men are sinners; (5.) It points to the need of a Redeemer; (6.) When rectified by heavenly aid it is the means of exciting to all excellence. All this may be maintained in perfect consistency by those who acknowledge, (1.) That the possession of it does not render any man virtuous; (2.) That it cannot, apart from revelation, set before us a perfect moral standard; and (3.) That it cannot keep from all sin or conduct to true holiness.

to the qualities and features of man's character, which are undoubtedly pleasing and praiseworthy in themselves; and they have taken great pains to explain away those numerous passages of God's Word which "accord to human virtues those praises which could not be accorded to them in a system which denies all moral value in the actions of men."*

In particular, we have seen, (1.) That the conscience retains in the human mind its original claims of authority. The law is broken, but it is still binding. Then, (2.) There is room in the depraved heart of man for the play and exercise of all the high talents and susceptibilities with which man was originally furnished. (3.) There are still in the human mind many amiable and benevolent qualities. (4.) There are actions of moral honesty and integrity, and even of religion so called, performed in obedience to the conscience. But over against these truths we have to place an equal number of others. As, (1.) While the conscience asserts its claims, these claims are not attended to. (2.) The powers and sensibilities of the mind are abused and perverted. (3.) The affections are not under the control of right principle, and, in particular, are not directed to God as they ought. (4.) The actions, whether of morality or religion, performed in obedience to the conscience, are performed in obedience to a perverted conscience; and so there is something defective in the actions themselves, while the general state of the agent being depraved, we cannot approve of the agent in the acts.

It is of the utmost moment that the doctrine now expounded be distinguished from the miserably low and grovelling views of those who would represent all and each of mankind as utterly selfish and dishonest. This is an opinion, learned not in the school of religion, but in the school of the world. It prevails among the low-minded and the suspicious, and in those ages and states of society in which men's sentiments have been debauched by reigning profligacy, (the most selfish of all the vices, though it may seem the most generous,) or utterly prostrated and perverted by the disappointment succeeding a period of great public profession of generosity which has turned out to be hypocritical. Men judge of others by themselves; and the selfish cannot be brought to believe in the existence of disin-

* Vinet.

terestedness. Those who have made it their business to corrupt their species, and those who habitually mingle with the abandoned, have generally reasoned themselves out of all belief in human virtue. Persons once cheated are afraid of deceit all their lives after; and when nations have come to see the hollowness of the professions of patriotism which those who wish to lead them have made, they are apt to conclude in their haste that all men are deceivers.

We are most anxious that it should be observed, that the view which we have presented of human nature encourages no such dark and suspicious sentiments. It does not lead every man to suspect his neighbour; it rather leads every man to be jealous of himself. No two classes of maxims can be more opposed than those of such writers as Rochefoucault and Helvetius, who exhibit human selfishness in unrelieved colours, that we may be brought to distrust all men; and those of good men who love the human race, even when they mourn over its sad degeneracy. We acknowledge that, in perfect consistency with the views above developed, there may be among mankind much real hospitality, kindness, and sympathy with distress; much sincere friendship, noble patriotism, and large-hearted philanthropy; the heart to feel and the hand to help; the spirit to purpose, and the courage to execute, deeds of patience and the highest heroism.

We are most anxious, too, that the views expounded should be distinguished from those of the Utilitarian school of philosophy in this country, and of what has been called the Sensational school in France, and of all who tell us that every man is mainly governed by a regard to his own interest. Truly, there are some who would degrade human nature lower than it is, on the pretence of exalting it. Fallen though mankind be, they are capable of entertaining and cherishing many kindly feelings and benevolent affections, and they are fully as often swayed by impulse, caprice, lust, and passion, as by a systematic selfishness.

We utterly abhor such a sentiment as that on which a certain writer would found a whole theory of jurisprudence, namely, that every man pursues his own interest when he knows it. We may agree with Rochefoucault when he says, "That which we take for virtues is often nothing but an assemblage of divers actions, and of divers interests, which fortune or our own industry knows how to arrange." "We are so prepossessed in a way in our own

favour, that what we take for virtues is often nothing but a number of vices which have met together, and which pride and self-love have disguised." But when the same author lets us know elsewhere that he resolves so-called human virtues into the lowest and most grovelling vices, we draw back from his maxims with detestation. "Virtue would not go far if vanity did not keep it company." "That which appears generosity is often nothing but ambition in disguise, despising small interests in order to attain greater."* That there is some justice in these maxims cannot be denied, but we deplore that they should be used for the purpose of furthering so low an object, and leaving so dangerous an impression. The man who believes his whole species to be villains, is sure to end by himself becoming one, if indeed he has not begun by judging others by himself. "I said in my haste, that all men are liars;" the man who says so, not in haste, but in his calm and reflecting moments, is, we suspect, all that he makes others to be. All persons who, like Walpole and Bonaparte, lay it down as a principle that every man has a price and can be corrupted, may be judged by their own standard. Nor can we find language strong enough to condemn that miserable so-called philosophy which tells us, that "a physical sensibility has produced in us a love of pleasure and hatred of pain; that pleasure and pain have at length produced and opened in all hearts the buds of self-love, which, by unfolding themselves, give birth to the passions whence spring all our virtues and vices."† It is true that we must divide off from our catalogue of human virtues many actions which appear virtuous, but which proceed from nothing but pride, vanity, ambition, and a disguised selfishness. But after having made full allowance for such, there still remains a large body of actions, which we must refer to amiable and generous feelings, without one grain of a baser alloy.

There are deeper mysteries in man's spiritual nature than some superficial thinkers ever dream of. Their "inept and unscientific gunnery does not include in its calculations the parabolic curve of man's spiritual nature."‡ Except by taking into our calculation a conscience, and an evil conscience, we cannot comprehend human nature or human action. Those who have left this essential part of man's existing character and

* Maxims, 1, 207, 240, 301. † Helvetius on the Mind.

‡ Miller's First Impressions of England and the English.

nature out of account, have failed to give any rational account of his conduct, more particularly in reference to religion; and as they felt their incompetency, they have burst out into empty declamations against superstition and fanaticism, and have lost their own temper in ridiculing human infirmity. We cannot explain human folly under certain of its modifications—we cannot explain human folly even by human passion—we cannot understand the particular mode and intensity of human wickedness—we are puzzled at every step, till we call in a perverted moral sense. It is by the help of this, the most singular part of man's nature, that we are enabled to account for all other singularities and anomalies of his spiritual constitution.

Man's fallen, like his original, nature is a deep and a complex one. There are other sins and passions besides those low and base ones into which vulgar minds would resolve every principle of man's heart. Some can discover nothing in man's actuating motives but the love of money, others nothing but the love of praise, and a third class, apparently more profound, resolve all into a refined and far-sighted self-love. These contracted views of narrow minds and suspicious hearts are utterly inadequate to explain the mysteries of the human soul. The lusts and pleasures of the human heart are very numerous, and assume an infinite variety of forms. There may be much sinfulness where there is no selfishness. The very attempts which these men make to find such low motives for human action, indicate how inadequate are their views of the true nature of virtue; for they as much as say, that if they could meet with real kindness and amiability in the world, they would be completely satisfied, though there were no godliness and no moral principle. We include all men under sin, not by seeking to debase the human character lower than it is, but by exalting the standard of virtue —not higher than it ought to be—but by making it such as God hath ordained it in our very constitution.

Not only are these two views, which we may call the selfish and the evangelical, different in themselves—they are different also in their practical influence. The tendency of the one is to render each man satisfied with himself, and suspicious of those with whom he comes in contact. The tendency of the other is to humble every man in his own estimation, and prompt him to use all available means to elevate a race that has sunk to such

a depth of degradation. He who habitually looks upon his fellows in the former of these lights is apt to become hard-hearted, cunning, selfish, and grovelling. Believing mankind to be deceivers, he treats them as deceivers, and becomes himself a deceiver in doing so. Imagining himself to be surrounded by persons whose ruling principle is selfishness, and whose mean of furthering their end is deceit, he feels, in dealing with them, as if he were constrained to descend to their level, and fight them with their own weapons. On the other hand, he who views the race as ungodly, but who looks upon himself as tainted with the same evil, will be so awed by a sense of his own sinfulness as to be incapable of judging harshly of others; and the worst feelings with which he regards the race will be those of sorrow and commiseration.

We are not then at liberty to regard man with a cynic, scornful feeling, such as that which rises up when we look at a loathsome reptile. We may denounce man; but we should never despise him. We may blame, but we dare not contemn him, lest, in doing so, we should be contemning the noblest part of the workmanship of God in this lower world. There may be indignation, pity, or horror, but mingled with these there must be feelings of honour, respect, and reverence towards the essential parts and principles of a creature formed in the very image of God. We infer the height at which man was at first placed, from the greatness of his fall; we measure his elevation by the extent of his shadow.

Nor will these views induce us to retire from the world in disgust, or make us feel a less lively interest in the race. The truths on which our mind is made to dwell will rather tend to quicken and strengthen our love, and cause it to flow out in a deeper and stronger current. When is it that we think most of an earthly friend, and are most deeply concerned about his welfare? Is it when he is known to be in safety, dwelling in security in the bosom of his family, far from violence, or disease, or accident? or rather, is it not when he is thought to be in danger, when he is on the midnight journey, in paths which robbers infest, or crossed by deep and rapid rivers, sweeping many an unguarded traveller from this world to the next? When is it that the wife thinks most of the husband, and the sister feels the deepest interest in the brother? Is it not when

the party loved is laid on a bed of distress, or fighting with the billows of death? A love is then kindled which never burned before, and tears flow from eyes, the very fountains of which seemed to have been dried up by the scorching power of this world's anxieties. It is the very circumstance that the race is lost which awakens so deep a feeling in the breast of the Christian—a feeling accompanied with the thought that what is thus lost is precious above all price which can be set upon it, and that the recovery of it is worth any amount of labour which he can render—even as it was worth the sacrifice of the very Son of God.

CHAPTER III.

MOTIVE PRINCIPLES OF THE MIND.

SECT. I.—MOTIVE PRINCIPLES NEITHER VIRTUOUS NOR VICIOUS APPETITES AND MENTAL APPETENCIES.

We have divided the Motive Department of the mind into the Will, the Conscience, and the Emotions. Having dwelt at considerable length on the two first of these, we are now to consider the Emotions. At the basis of the emotions prompting and drawing them forth will be found Motive or Appetent Principles.

It would serve many important ends to have an exhaustive classification of the motive principles of the mind, that is, of the principles of action by which man may be led, or the ends which he may set before him in his actions. Without professing to be able to furnish such, we may point out some active principles which are evidently in the very nature and constitution of the mind. Among these we must give a high place to the propensity to seek that which is known to communicate pleasure, and avoid that which is expected to inflict pain, and this in regard either to ourselves or others. But they take a miserably defective view of man's nature who represent him as incapable of being swayed by any other motive better or worse. There is, for example, a tendency in the mind to exercise and gratify every intellectual power, natural or acquired, and to seek whatever may favour such action and indulgence. The mind is also disposed to seek what it is led to regard as beautiful. Man may, and should above all things, be influenced by the desire to secure moral good and avoid moral evil.

Besides these more general motive principles, there are particular natural appetencies which look to ends of their own,

towards (to use the language of Butler) particular external things of which it hath always a particular idea or perception, towards these external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them. These are not in themselves either virtuous or vicious. But it should be noticed that they are all excellent in themselves, and in admirable adjustment to the state in which the Author of our being has placed us. Anterior to the abuse which may be made of them, they are of the most beneficent nature, and eminently fitted to promote the welfare of the individual, and of society at large. The mere possession of them, however, does not constitute any one virtuous; it proves merely the wisdom and benevolence of Him who hath planted them in our natures.

In now proceeding to consider some of these principles of action, we shall not be at pains to make a very nice or subtle analysis of them. It is possible that a refined analysis might resolve some of those about to be enunciated into simpler elements; we look at them in the obvious forms which they assume in the actual operations of the mind. It is of little consequence to the object in view, whether they be original principles, or the natural and necessary result of original principles. It is enough that they be found in the human mind, naturally and intuitively, and anterior to any exercise of the human will producing them.

I. There are the APPETITES.

"This class of our active principles," says Dugald Stewart, "is distinguished by the following circumstances:—(1.) They take their rise from the body, and are common to us with the brutes. (2.) They are not constant, but occasional. (3.) They are accompanied with an uneasy sensation, which is strong or weak, in proportion to the strength or weakness of the appetite. Our appetites are three in number—hunger, thirst, and the appetite of sex. Of these, two were intended for the preservation of the individual, the third for the continuance of the species; and without them, reason would have been insufficient for these important purposes." He adds, "Our occasional propensities to action and repose are in many respects analogous to our appetites."

Had it been our object to point out instances of design in the works of God, these appetites, connecting as they do the bodily

frame, on the one hand with external physical nature, and on the other hand with the mind within, might have supplied many instructive examples. Regarding them merely as materials of government, they do still exhibit some traces of design to the reflecting mind. We see how wise and efficient the provision made for the preservation of the race. We see how the appetites compel man to be industrious and laborious, in order to obtain the food needful for their gratification; and how they render him active on the one hand, and dependent on the other. Without these appetites he would have been sluggish and inactive; or, impelled by propensities merely mental, he would have been rash in his speculations, and imprudent in his actions. They are one main instrument in the hand of God for giving steadfastness to his government, and in making man fulfil the purposes which he has to execute upon the earth.

II. There are the MENTAL APPETENCES.

(1.) *The appetence for knowledge.* This principle, in the form of curiosity, appears in children in early life, and in the most savage and primitive states of society. The unknown, the hidden, have most powerful attractions for the inquisitive spirit of man. The curious prying into a neighbour's character, and the love of news so common in villages and rural districts, show that this principle is found in the lowest grades of society. As the mind is expanded, so is this desire elevated; and it becomes the love of travelling, the love of history, the love of reading, and the love of science. The traveller encountering the most imminent perils in the burning sands of Africa or the icy regions of the poles, the scholar wasting his strength over the midnight lamp, testify how intense this desire may become in individual minds.

The more we reflect, the more must we be impressed with the extent of the influence exercised by this principle upon mankind at large. It is a great incentive to activity among individual minds, and it helps on the improvement of society. Through it the corners of the earth are brought together, and the most distant periods of the past are made to hand down instruction to the present. It brings human character under inspection, and therefore under the control of public opinion, and thus lays great restraints upon human wickedness. Take away the thirst for knowledge from the race, and you sink them beneath

the savage state, and with no reasonable hope of ever elevating them.

(2.) *The appetence for esteem.* It is a principle of all but universal operation. Most men have a wish to leave a name behind them; some cutting it as it were on the rock that it may endure as long as the earth endures; others carving it as it were on the bark of a tree that it may last for years, and some writing it as on the sand, but each striving to have some memorial. "We observe," says Swift, "even among the vulgar, how fond they are to have an inscription over their grave." Some, it is true, have in their career of vice fallen beneath this motive, but few have risen above it. Some court the good opinion of the masses, and others of the select few. One man looks down with contempt upon the approbation of the poor, the illiterate, and the vulgar; but it is because he would stand high in the favour of the rich, the learned, the polite, and the accomplished. The demagogue cares not for the good opinion of the higher and more refined classes of society, and he thinks that he shows his courage in doing so; but then he is as vain as the other, for he drinks in greedily the applause of the many. Most of those whom the world worships have been the very slaves of this principle. Lord Chancellor Erskine calls it "the inherent passion of genius." Fame is an idol before whom more have bowed than before Baal or Jupiter, Brahma or Budha, or the most extensively worshipped of the gods of heathenism. The sound of human applause is heard by ears commonly regarded as most shut against it. The student hears its rising sound in his closet, and longs to bring forth from his researches a work that may swell the noise yet louder and louder. The politician and patriot listen to it in the shout of the applauding rabble, or in the whispered compliment of some more select, and, as they think, more discerning circle. The soldier hears it louder than the din of battle or the voice of the trumpet, and is prepared to follow it even over the mangled carcases of his fellow-men. It is suspected that it has not been unheard by the monk in his cell, or the nun in her cloister. The very minister of religion has heard its echoes when he is arranging his thoughts for addressing his congregation, and has difficulty in shutting his ears to it when as an ambassador he is delivering the message of mercy to sinners.

This desire does not seem to be in itself either virtuous or

vicious. So far as it is not degraded by being associated with human wickedness, it serves most important purposes in the government of the world. It is one of the most potent of those principles by which, in spite of prevailing selfishness and malice, the race are banded together. It is the true source of much that we call amiability, or that spirit which leads us to study the temper, the tastes, and feelings of our fellow-men. Many of the schemes for ameliorating the condition of mankind have originated in this feeling rather than in any spirit of enlarged benevolence. Take away this intuitive principle, and many communities of mankind would become dens of wild beasts, with their interests and their passions engaging them in never-ceasing conflicts.

(3.) *The appetence for power.* This principle, which seems to exist to some extent in all minds, exercises a prodigious sway over certain minds, and may become one of the deepest passions of the human breast. It is a peculiarity of it, that, more than any other of the intuitive desires, it seems to increase with exercise and gratification, and it comes at length to seize the mind with an iron grasp. In regard to some other passions, the mind is often led to discover their vanity, and to abandon with disgust the objects pursued for years; but the love of power seems to grow with advancing years, and holds its possessor in a state of more slavish subjection than he holds those who have submitted themselves to his sway; so that every tyrant is himself ruled over by a tyranny more grasping than that which he wields over others.

Looking at this principle as it is in itself, and not in its sinful excess, it must evidently have a powerful influence in uniting mankind together. The patriarchal, the chieftain, and the monarchical systems derive much of their strength from it. It is the cement of much of the combined action that produces such mighty effects. It is seen and felt in republics, as well as in monarchies. The leader of a band of his school-companions, of a troop of youths, of a village, of a valley, of a town or country, of a powerful state party, of a cabinet or a parliament—these may all be under its sway no less effectually than the monarch upon the throne, and may each be the nucleus around which there cluster numbers who would otherwise be isolated in all their actions, and wavering and unsteady in all their movements. All unknown to the parties themselves, wave has rolled on wave to keep this

world from stagnating, and all perhaps under the attracting power of some satellite, which is itself attracted to a planet rolling round a central sun. It is thus that one great central energy, one great ruling mind, has held together and swayed the destinies of kingdoms, and reached in its influence through successive generations.

(4.) *The appetence for society.* This is a propensity which man may resist under the influence of other and stronger propensities; still it is one which every human being feels. "It is not good for man to be alone." The hermit draws such praise from his admirers, just because he is resisting one of the strongest principles of our nature. Nor is it needful, in support of our argument, to plead that this love of society is a principle which cannot be resolved into anything simpler. It may very possibly be the result of other feelings, which are called forth by the very position in which man is placed. Still it cannot be doubted, that it is of spontaneous growth in the human mind, and is not the result of any voluntary and far-sighted calculations. Springing up, as it does, under the influence of natural causes, it is made to accomplish many important results. It lightens many hours that would otherwise be intolerably heavy, and perfumes, by the kindnesses which flow from it, the very atmosphere which society breathes. Hence many of the amenities of society, and the numberless offices of kind and obliging neighbourhood. It raises a smile upon many a countenance that would otherwise settle into a murky sulkiness; and calls forth many a cheerful remark, pleasant anecdote, and smart repartee, from lips that would otherwise be sealed in silence. This power may not act at large distances; but, like capillary attraction, it holds bodies that are near compactly together; and banding as it does each little circle, and the members of each little circle being connected with the neighbouring circles, it reaches in its influence over the whole of society.

(5.) *The appetence for property.* Some analysts of the human mind have resolved this principle into a modification of the love of power. Be it so, it is not the less a spontaneous product of native principles. And in whatever other element it may originate, it becomes at last an independent principle of action. In some of its forms it may appear to be about the most sordid of all human passions. But speaking of it, not in the abuse of it,

but as it is in itself, it wields a most powerful influence, holding men as by gravity to this earth on which God has placed them. In some of its aspects, nothing can be more irrational than to toil for years, as many do, for property which is never to be enjoyed, and from which they must speedily be separated. Still the very habit has given steadiness of aim and a spirit of caution to individual minds, and the general issue is the accumulation of wealth, with the powers which wealth puts in operation. More beneficial still, there are the refinements and the elegances which wealth produces, and the conservatist feeling which the existence of valuable property spreads throughout the more influential portion of the community. Satirists may ridicule wealth as they please, and describe the poorest nations as the happiest; still it cannot be denied that accumulated property tends to produce an elegance and a social order which cannot be found in communities stricken with poverty and constantly striving about the very necessaries of existence.

Now, these appetites and appetences are among the most influential of the principles by which human nature is governed. The will may erect upon them, or by them, a calculating self-love which strives to obtain as much enjoyment as possible, or a habitual benevolence which deliberately seeks the good of others; but it is by the primary impulses fully as much as by the secondary principles of self-love and benevolence, that mankind are induced to maintain an outward decency of deportment, and society at large is made to clothe itself in becoming decorum. Some of these principles give life, movement, and onward progress to society, and others impart to it strength and endurance. Some act with a springing, elastic force, and others have a gravitating power. Some tend to disjoin what ought to be separated, and others to band together the things which should be united. The implanting of these principles—diverse from one another, and yet all tending to the same end—shows how admirable is the provision made for the social order of the world.

Yet so far as mankind are under the influence of these principles they are neither virtuous nor the opposite. It is to be remembered, however, that the very possession of these intuitions, like the possession of high intellectual qualities, brings along with it additional responsibility, and, when they are abused, additional guilt.

SECT. II.—THE EMOTIONS AND AFFECTIONS.

The Emotions are called forth by the Motive Principles, spoken of in last section. It is of some moment to establish this.

First, we would have it observed, that in every emotion there is a mental representation, or apprehension of an object. This conception is the substance from which feeling is exhaled as fragrance is from the rose or lily—it is the body, of which feeling is as it were the accompanying atmosphere. Thus when hope is kindled, there is the apprehension of an object as about to bring good to us; when fear is roused, there is the representation of an object as about to produce evil. Emotions are thus dependent on the mental representations to which they are attached; though it is to be carefully observed that they are something more, as consciousness clearly attests, than the mental conception upon which, as well as upon the general train of association, they exercise a powerful influence. The Author of our nature in making the conception of certain objects emotional, has added vastly to man's capacity for enjoyment, and has provided for himself a powerful instrument of government. But all conceptions are not accompanied with emotion;—and the question arises, what are the objects or the conceptions of objects which are so? This leads us to remark—

Secondly, the conceptions which raise emotions are of objects which gratify or disappoint the motive principles of the mind natural or acquired. Nothing raises emotion except the contemplation of an object bearing a reference to them: every object conceived as furthering or frustrating these motive ends raises less or more of feeling. We have in a previous part of this treatise (p. 266) pointed out the peculiarities of emotions; they are characterized by attachment or repugnance and excitement. All objects gratifying the motive propensities call forth attachment, whereas all objects which seem to thwart them are viewed with aversion, and all such attachments and aversions put the mind in an excited state. The objects thus appetible or the reverse are regarded by the mind as good or evil—and these phrases may be applied to them in a loose sense, and provided they are not understood as implying anything moral or immoral,

It is always to be remembered that above these motive principles and emotive attachments, we have the conscience, whose office it is to say when they should be gratified, and when they should be restrained, and also the will to decide between competing impulses or between inclination and duty.

We are to consider the emotions exclusively under one aspect, that is, as means of government. As viewing them in this light the common divisions or classifications will not suit our purpose, and so we are necessitated in the notice we take of them to form an arrangement of our own. These emotions, like the other instruments employed by God, physical and moral, contemplate two ends, one of incitement and encouragement, and another of restraint and arrest. The emotions may all be viewed under this double aspect. To every emotion of the one class, there is a corresponding emotion of the other class. Thus—

(1.) Some are INSTIGATIVE, and others ARRESTIVE; (2.) some are ADHESIVE, and others REPULSIVE; (3.) some are REMUNERATIVE, and others PUNITIVE; (4.) some are RESPONSIVE TO JOY, and others RESPONSIVE TO SORROW; (5.) some raise ÆSTHETIC ADMIRATION, others a SENSE OF REPUGNANCE.

I. There are the emotions which arise from the contemplation of possible or probable evil or good, they are THE ARRESTIVE AND INSTIGATIVE. The conception of evil, as about to come upon us, leads to apprehension, fear, dread, terror, according to the greatness or probability of the evil. This is in itself an agitating frame of mind, and so rouses the mind from lethargy; and, like all emotions, it quickens the train of thought clustering round the object, and thus suggests means of escape from the apprehended peril. The apprehension of good as about to be conferred, on the other hand, leads to hope and expectation; and the buoyancy of spirit produced prompts us to use the means required in order to procure the contemplated good, and helps to prepare for its reception. To the same class are to be referred, as partaking of the nature both of the arrestive and instigative, those emotions of astonishment, surprise, and wonder which arise on the contemplation of new, unexpected, and strange phenomena, and in regard to which the mind is not aware, for a time, whether they may be for good or evil. The emotions now named tend to summon the attention, and to brace the mind to meet the emergency. We owe to the arrestive feelings much of

the caution which prevails among mankind, with all the hardy virtues which grow upon caution. We owe to the instigative feelings a large portion of human energy and activity. One-half of man's exertions, and more than one-half of his happiness, proceed from hope. Where there is hope, there will generally be some life; when hope ceases, action also ceases. God in his administration employs both these classes of emotions; by the one, he can cast at particular times, as at the time of a plague, for instance, a gloom accompanied with utter helplessness over the minds of a whole community; and by the other, send forth half a continent, as was done in the times of the Crusades, on some great enterprise.

II. There are those which arise from the contemplation of persons and objects as supposed to possess good qualities, they are THE ADHESIVE AND REPULSIVE. In such cases the mind experiences a delight in the contemplation of the object, and specially in the presence of the object as fitted to make that contemplation more vivid, and also a tendency to cling to that object. Opposed to these feelings we have another class, leading us to abhor and turn away from certain objects, as supposed tc possess evil qualities: they are the feelings of aversion and hatred. When we are led to contemplate persons as having conferred favours upon us, we are inclined towards them by a feeling which, if not gratitude, (for gratitude, as implying wish, is a virtue,) is often the incentive to gratitude. When we contemplate them, on the other hand, as inflicting injury upon us, we are led to repel them from us or to flee from them: and the emotions that arise are anger, indignation, and such-like feelings, no way sinful if unaccompanied with sinful desires. Every moralist has observed how admirable the provision which is made through these instinctive affections for the instant repulsion, and so the prevention of injuries. The feeling arms the mind on the instant with weapons, and provides it with resources to check or throw back the evil, when cool reflection might be too slow or too feeble in its operations. It has often been noticed, as another beautiful provision, that all the benign affections are pleasant at the time, while all the malign affections are unpleasant; and by this means, as well as by many others, God would lead us to cherish the former, and to expel the latter as soon as possible. Revenge, even when successful, has within

it its own punishment—a revenge of the revenge. The Greeks represent Medea as successful in wrapping the bride of whom she was jealous in a burning robe; but, to show the nature of her enjoyment in consequence, she is spoken of as going off in a chariot of serpents—no unfit emblem of the feelings which accompany gratified resentment.

III. There are the feelings which spring up on the CONTEMPLATION OF ENJOYMENT AND DISAPPOINTMENT. They might be called the remunerative and punitive, provided these phrases could be used as implying nothing moral, but merely as indicating that these emotions are the results of steps that have gone before. They are the emotions which arise on the contemplation of the good or the evil as already attained. They are such emotions as gladness, joy, and complacency on the one hand, and grief and depression on the other. They compose a large portion of the enjoyment which the good, so long expected, it may be, confers, and a large portion of the miseries which the loss entails. They constitute the mental elevation and the mental depression to which success and disappointment conduct. They become, in consequence, among the most potent of the instruments of the Divine government.

IV. There are the emotions which beat RESPONSIVE TO THE JOYS AND SORROWS. Man is so constituted that he experiences emotion not only when he contemplates good and evil as accruing to himself, but good and evil as accruing to others. This is one of the most beneficent parts of his constitution. This sympathy is a powerful means of lessening sorrow and increasing happiness. "A friend," says Jeremy Taylor, "shares my sorrow, and makes it but a moiety; but he swells my joy, and makes it double. For so two channels divide the river and lessen it into rivulets, and make it fordable, and apt to be drunk up at the first revels of the Syrian star; but two torches do not divide but increase the flame; and though my tears are the sooner dried up, when they run upon my friend's cheeks in the furrows of compassion, yet when my flame hath kindled his lamp, we unite the glories, and make them radiant like the golden candlesticks that burn before the throne of God, because they shine by numbers, by unions, and confederations of light and joy." It is a bountiful provision that in ordinary cases sympathy with sorrow is vastly more intense than sympathy with joy. The

joy can do with or without the sympathy, but the sorrow needs and demands the sympathy to alleviate the grief, or stir up action which may remove the cause of it.

V. There are the ÆSTHETIC FEELINGS, WHETHER OF ADMIRATION OR AVERSION. The love of the beautiful, of the picturesque and sublime, does not seem to be very strong or sensitive in rude states of society or in uncultivated minds. To such, the taste, if keen and active, must have been a source of pain more than of pleasure, for there could have been little time for its gratification. Still, even to such, there are scenes and objects which possess a deep interest—such as the grassy slope, the fertile plain, the flowing river, and the cheerful and smiling countenance. But among persons blessed with leisure and learning, this affection becomes very powerful, and embraces a far wider range of objects. As the order that is in nature leads us to put trust in it, so these æsthetic emotions lead us to love it, to delight in it; and we become attached to certain objects, animate and inanimate, because of the feelings which they raise up in our bosoms. It is pleasant to observe that, while there is a general correspondence of taste among all, there are important differences, inasmuch as different individuals admire different objects. Opposed to the emotions of admiration, there seem to be feelings of repugnance; but these latter are comparatively weak, and seem to be intended to keep us from dwelling amid the more ignoble and deleterious parts of nature. The feelings of admiration, on the other hand, tend to make us observe and linger among the more important works of God, and are one most powerful means of leading mankind to cultivate a propriety and decorum of demeanour.*

But we cannot understand the nature of the affections and passions by merely looking at the individual emotions. One of the most wonderful characteristics of the emotions, in our apprehension, is their power over the train of thought. The affections and passions do not consist so much of single emotions, as of trains of emotions, or of trains of thought, all of an emotional kind. The pleasing affections consist of a succession of ripples, the passions of a succession of gusts and waves; and in both there is apt to be a tidal ebb and flow. Whenever the mind is

* A full enumeration of the emotions should include at this place the Moral Emotions; but these have been discussed in a previous chapter, (pp 302-306.)

deeply moved, there is a tumult of thoughts and feelings, crowding like a mob round a point; and yet often, like that mob, scarcely able to tell what is bringing them together. It is this tendency to run in a train which renders these emotions among the chief sources of human happiness and human misery, and about the highest reward of the well-regulated, and the most fearful punishment of the ill-regulated mind.

We have entered so far upon the examination of the emotions, to show how fitted they are to become instruments of government. Like aëriform bodies, they are elastic—admitting of great extension, and great compression; and also all-penetrating, and admitting of great rapidity of action. They are seen to be especially powerful, when we reflect that God can employ the physical world, in correspondence with these internal feelings, to turn mankind as he pleases, in spite of their rebellion and folly.

But we must be careful, in speaking of these emotions or affections, to distinguish between them and the attached consent, wishes, and volitions of the mind. These emotions do commonly lead to wishes and desires; but wishes and desires are always something more than mere emotions, and may be virtuous or vicious, which mere emotions never are in themselves. And this distinction enables us to settle the question, so often discussed, as to the virtuousness or the sinfulness of the natural affections. None of them is either the one or the other in itself; nor can there be any moral element, till they stir up desire, or at least secure the consent of the will. Do our attachments lead, as they are intended, to true benevolence?—then the complex affection is virtuous; but it is so because it contains benevolence. Do the repulsive passions stir up, as they too frequently do in man's disordered nature, revengeful wishes? —then they become sinful from that instant. In every case, the moral good or the evil lies not in the affection itself, but in its accompanying desire or volition. So far as the emotions are disconnected with virtuous or sinful wishes and voluntary determinations, they have no moral character whatever, but are mere instruments employed in the Divine administration. Yet how much of human virtue, so called, consists in the mere possession of the benign emotions! Alas! how much of moral evil, properly so called, consists in the abuse of these parts of our

admirable constitution! Indeed all actual sin seems to consist in voluntarily allowing, following, or exciting motive principles condemned in that particular exercise by the law of God.*

SECT. III.—GOVERNING PRINCIPLES THAT ARE EVIL.

We are now entering on topics of considerable difficulty and delicacy. Some sensitive minds shrink from the anatomy to which we are to subject human motives, and the manner in which, in our dissection, we must lay bare the muscles and organs of human life. But bold spirits have entered this region, and drawn from it the most pernicious doctrine, and we must follow them, were it only to counteract the evil use which they have made of their observations.

In this inquiry, great care must be taken, first, not to make God chargeable with the evil principles, which serve a useful purpose in the government of the world; and, secondly, to show, that though there may be beneficial ends served by the sinful affection or principle, the guilt of the agent is not thereby diminished.

There is a constant tendency in the present day to fall into the latter of these errors. Crimes are discovered to be links in the chain of causes on which hang good and glorious results; and, in approving of the issue, historians have sometimes been inclined to justify all the steps which have led to it. One class of writers, delighted with the order, the peace, and physical comfort found under some despotical governments, have been led to transfer their praises to the very acts of tyranny and

* Certain moralists have got themselves confused in their estimate of man, by observing that moral evil lies in the abuse of principles good in themselves. They give to man all the credit of the good principle, and excuse the evil on the ground that the motive principle in itself is good. But they forget that the instinctive principles of action, while good in this sense, that they have a beneficial tendency, do not imply any moral good on the part of the possessor, unless a good action of the will has attached itself to them. The sin consists in an act of the will permitting or causing that which God has made good to become evil. It has been said that man cannot, in his greatest violence of wickedness, desire moral evil as moral evil, but for some ulterior end. Be it so, that God has so fenced human nature by this limitation of instinctive motive principles, it is certain that man does all he can in wickedness, for he allows and chooses moral evil, knowing it to be evil, as a means of gratifying inferior motives.

cruelty which have been instrumental in producing such blessings. Another class, observing how political convulsions have led to great social improvements, have been tempted to excuse the pretension, deceit, and violence employed to ferment the popular mind. Some of those writers who profess to be elevated above all prejudice, in the way of showing their affected candour, have allowed the issue of actions to influence their moral sentiments, and have forgotten that virtue is virtue, and that vice is vice, independently of the incidental results flowing from them. Literature is never engaged in a work more unbecoming its high functions, than when it is shedding a halo around successful crime, or disparaging the excellence of humble and unsuccessful merit. Arnold asks "whether the Christian ever feels more keenly awake to the purity of the spirit of the gospel, than when he reads the history of crimes related with no sense of their evil." Never is history fulfilling its high office so appropriately as when it is stripping splendid vice of its false colours, and calling attention to the flower which would otherwise bloom in the shade, unnoticed by the vulgar eye.

But while history and philosophy must specially guard against the prepossessions which fortune instils, they are most assuredly at liberty to contemplate and to weigh the good effects which will at times flow from actions evil in themselves. While they denounce in no measured language the perpetrators of the crimes, let them praise the administration of God, who can bring good out of evil, and control such rebellious elements. Meanwhile, we observe what is the nature of the pillars on which the world destined to destruction is supported, and what fearful effects must follow when God's purposes are finished with them, and these pillars are taken down.

(1.) Attention was called, in a former section, to the beneficial effects following from the intuitive desires, which are neither virtuous nor vicious in themselves. Let us now contemplate the results when these principles are abused and become vicious.

In themselves, all the actions which proceed from such perverted desires are evil. No attempt should be made to defend them on the ground of their consequences. To palliate them is to palliate sin. To approve of them is to partake of their guilt. Yet every one sees, that in this sinful world there are certain effects which are good in themselves, following from vanity and

ambition. Take away these incentives to action, and it is impossible to calculate how much earthly excellence would be taken away, or rather to say how little would remain. "All the works of human industry are, in a great measure, referable to ambition of some sort, that, however humble it may seem to minds of prouder views, is yet relatively as strong as the ambition of the proudest. We toil that we may have some little influence, or some little distinction, however small the number of our inferiors may be."* We are not denying the existence of genuine philanthropy; it requires, however, but a very little acquaintance with the lives of poets, statesmen, artists, warriors, and philosophers too, to gather from the motives which they avow, that, but for the praise of men, and the influence expected to be obtained, they would not have made such sacrifices or practised such self-denial, and the world would not have reaped from their labours the benefit which has accrued.

The advantages arising from frugality, and this even when it assumes the form of avarice, have been pointed out by the father of political economy. "Parsimony," he says, "by increasing the fund which is destined for the maintenance of productive hands, tends to increase the number of those hands, whose labour adds to the value of the subject on which it is bestowed. It tends, therefore, to increase the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country. It puts into motion an additional quantity of industry, which gives an additional value to the annual produce."† Such are its effects in an economic point of view; and its influence in spreading a spirit of caution, prudence, industry, temperance, and foresight, throughout a community, are not less salutary. The virtues of poorer nations, and of the labouring classes, are all intimately connected with that frugality on which parents set so high a value, and which they are accustomed to recommend to their children.

But it has not been observed by Dr. Adam Smith, that in the overruling providence of God beneficial effects also follow from the opposite spirit, that of prodigality. "It is quite obvious," says Malthus, "that the principle of saving pushed to excess would destroy the motive to production. If every person were satisfied with the simplest food, the poorest clothing, and the meanest houses, it is certain that no other sort of food and

* Brown's Lectures, Lect. lxviii. † Wealth of Nations, B. III. c. iii.

clothing would be in existence; and as there would be no adequate motive to the proprietors of land to cultivate well, not only the wealth derived from convenience and luxuries would be quite at an end, but, if the same divisions of land continued, the production of food would be prematurely checked, and population would come to a stand, long before the soil had been cultivated."* It has not been observed, either by Smith or Malthus, that it is by the free operation of both that national wealth is promoted. The latter, indeed, speaks of an intermediate point, at which the "encouragement to the increase of wealth is the greatest." But truly it is not by this happy medium that the economic prosperity of a nation is fostered, so much as by giving full liberty to both extremes; and the issue is, that capital is accumulated by the frugality of one section of the community, and is again lavished on productive labour by the prodigality of another. These centripetal and centrifugal forces are held in balance by the nice arrangements of the providence of God, and according as the one or other prevails, so is the path which a nation describes—so is it planet-like or comet-like in its orbit. We see how a nation may owe its commercial and political prosperity, not so much to the wisdom of its statesmen or citizens, as to the skilful adjustments of the government of God.

These remarks apply to the abuse of all the instinctive springs of action in the human breast, and it is not needful to treat of them in order. The love of society, for example, while it encourages extravagance, and often leads to bankruptcy, gives rise meanwhile to those pleasing qualities which are expressively called social. The ages and nations which have been most addicted to sociality, as England in the reign of Charles II., and France in the reign of Louis XIV., have also been characterized by their politeness, and the flow of pleasing conversation.

(2.) Nay, there are incidental advantages springing from the malignant passions, under some of the aspects in which they present themselves. No doubt, these passions would be unmingled evils in a world in which sin was otherwise unknown. In the actual world they are also evils; but then, to keep wickedness from becoming intolerable, the evils are made to counteract each other, as, in another departmeat of God's works, one species of insect and wild beast is made to destroy another.

* Political Economy, p. 8.

In a world in which intentional ill-usage and injustice were unknown, the passions of anger and resentment would have been useless, or worse than useless. But it cannot be denied, that in the real world the resentful passions are often the means of scaring persons from the infliction of injury, when higher principle could have accomplished no such end. Full of injustice as this world is, insults and injuries would have been much more frequent, but for the instinctive passion which is ready to rise up and redress the wrong. Sinful though private feuds, duels, and the majority of wars have been, it is evident, notwithstanding, that they have been the means of checking other evils which would have spread inextricable disorder throughout society. True it is that this circumstance does not lessen the sinfulness of the evil passion, nor does it show that other and innocent and far more effectual restraints might not have been laid on these evils, than are laid by instruments which in themselves are evil; yet it proves, that while the government of God does not create either evil, it uses one evil to restrain another.

We have often been struck, in reading the narrative of the Old Testament, to find one wicked man employed to punish another. This feature of the Divine government comes out, very strikingly, in the declining age of the history of the Hebrews, and more particularly of the ten tribes. Jeroboam is employed to punish the house of David; Omri, in a later age, is raised up to punish the house of Jeroboam; while Jehu appears at an opportune time, to avenge the evil wrought by Omri and his descendant Ahab. The method is observable throughout the whole economy of God's providence, as revealed in the sacred volume. Egypt, Nineveh, Babylon, and Persia, are made the instruments of punishing the Jews, and themselves are punished for the evil which they wrought. We have at times wondered at this, and felt as if there was something in it which seemed to reflect on the Divine government. But then, we observe the same method in operation in the world around us; and we have only to consider, that as God is no way participating in the guilt of parties who are left entirely to their own freedom, so he is no way implicated in their conduct by the use to which he turns it.

Envy itself, though among the basest and most malignant of human passions, has served certain purposes of restraint. Not that we would excuse, much less defend, this mean passion. It

withers under the sunshine of another's prosperity, and ever springs up most luxuriantly upon decayed fortunes, and the wrecks of blasted reputations. It wounds, with its serpent tongue, the very fairest forms of earthly greatness. The lovelier the flower, it is the more eager to light upon it. Yet it cannot be doubted that, evil as it is, it has counteracted evils which would otherwise have hurried away individuals and society at large into the extremest folly. There is ground for the name which Crabbe represents flattery as giving to it when he calls it "virtue's jealous friend." It is a means of checking the love of fame on the part of individuals, and of the admiration of great men on the part of the public, when these might become excessive. It may be argued, too, that without such a principle operating as a check, the vain, the forward, and the audacious, would, by means of hypocrisy and pretence, delude mankind into the greatest extravagance and follies. It would be vastly better, no doubt, that these pretensions were checked by the good sense and high moral feeling of the community; but in the absence of these, envy has been serviceable in accomplishing the same end. Of use in detecting simulated, it is also of service in increasing real excellence; and it makes the truly great man still greater, inasmuch as it compels him to cultivate habitual circumspection, and prompts to farther exertion when he might be induced to give himself over to indolence, as the gadfly buzzing round the ox rouses him from his lethargy, when he would recline too long under the shade. It is not unworthy of being observed, that those who have their character fully established rise at last far above the reach of detraction. The great man is like the luminary of day, which, as it circles above the horizon, pales the wax tapers which before shed their feeble light; for a time they cast their blackening shadows; but as he rises higher and higher, all the shadows vanish. Some persons may be inclined farther to assert, that envy is so far advantageous, inasmuch as, attacking only prosperity, "while misery passed unstung away,"* it so far equalizes the inequalities of external fortune.

There is no one who does not lament the prevalence of evil-speaking under its various forms. Every one has seen its fatal effects, for it reigns among all classes, from our rural districts and retired hamlets, up to the circles of the nobility and the

* Crabbe.

court of the sovereign. Yet who can tell how many incipient vices have been checked by this scandal, or the salutary dread of it? In this wicked world, it sometimes serves the same purpose as those insects which are the scavengers of nature—it prevents society from becoming intolerably corrupt and putrid. It would be infinitely better, no doubt, could mankind be induced to avoid the appearance of evil through a becoming fear of the evil itself, or by a discerning and wholesome tone of public sentiment; but when these are wanting, jealousy may serve a good end, even when it is far from being pure in its motives, or select in the means which it employs. Meanwhile, the virtuous man must be deterred from the evil by higher principles, and be on his guard against countenancing the scandal, even when he sees that beneficial effects may be produced by it.

Another subject of general lamentation is the evil produced by party spirit in politics and religion. Lord Brougham, in a well-known passage, supposes all the statesmen of last century arranged before us as in a picture-gallery, and a stranger coming to survey them. "Here," would that stranger say, "stand the choicest spirits of their age, the greatest wits, the noblest orators, the wisest politicians, and the most illustrious patriots." "Here stand all these 'lights of the world and demigods of fame;' but here they stand, not ranged on one side of this gallery, having served a common country. With the same bright object in view, their efforts were divided, not united. They fiercely combated with each other, and did not together assail the common foe. Their great exertions were bestowed, their more than mortal forces were expended, not in furthering the general good, not in resisting their country's enemies, but in conflicts among themselves; and all their triumphs were won over each other, and all their sufferings were endured at each other's hands." The Rev. J. A. James quotes this passage, and adds, that the stranger, in surveying the portraits of our theologians, polemics, authors, and preachers, would be compelled to endure the same painful surprise, and indulge in the same sorrowful reflections.

And no one should allow himself to palliate this spirit, proceeding from the most selfish and ungenerous feelings in the human breast. Nor is any one entitled to affirm that, though incidental benefit has arisen from it, far higher good would not have sprung from the cherishing of an opposite spirit. It could

be demonstrated, we think, that the spirit of love would have produced far greater good than the spirit of party, and this a good unmixed with accompanying evil. Still, we must shut our eyes to facts which are every day forcing themselves upon our notice, if we deny that in the existing world, partisanship in politics, and sectarianism in religion, have been made to serve important purposes in the prevention of evil, and the instigation of what is positively good. But for the existence of such a spirit, patriotism would often have languished and died, and persons in possession of power would have been allured onward to acts of most atrocious tyranny. The sifting investigation to which public measures are subjected, arises sometimes from the jealous temper with which parties watch each other, rather than from disinterested patriotism. The history of the Church shows how activity among the clergy, and a spirit of reading, inquiry, and reflection, among the great mass of the people, have been produced and fostered by the clashing of opposing sects, when deeper principle and higher feeling might have proved utterly ineffectual.

SECT. IV.—INFLUENCE EXERCISED BY THESE PRINCIPLES IN BIASSING THE CONSCIENCE.

The attention of the philosophic mind of modern Europe was first called to the class of phenomena now to be examined, by Hume, more particularly in his famous Dialogue appended to the Treatise on Virtue. The train of observation has been followed, too, by Adam Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, and reappears once or twice in his Wealth of Nations. It is prosecuted by Macaulay, with his usual splendour of thought and diction, in his remarks on Macchiavelli, and is fondly dwelt on by several other writers of our age.

We may first take a view of the phenomena noticed by these acute writers, and then point out the proper use to be made of them. In this, as in many other particulars, Hume has been guiding, in a manner much to be deplored, the thinking mind of our countrymen. It is needful to rectify the conclusions rashly drawn from a class of facts, the existence of which cannot be denied.

It is a fact, explain it as we please, that men's moral judg-

ments are swayed by the supposed beneficial or prejudicial consequences of actions. The mother at Athens murdered her child rather than expose it through life to poverty and growing hardship. The Indian drowns his mother in the Ganges, the Caffre exposes her by some fountain, and they justify their conduct on the ground that it is better she should thus perish than drag out a protracted life of misery. The Greeks and Romans defended the practice of suicide, and argued that life should terminate when it ceases to be useful. The modern gentleman thinks it nothing improper to fight a duel, and tells us that it is only by such a practice that a nice sense of honour can be maintained. The Frenchman of the days of Louis XIV. prided himself on his gay and gallant behaviour, on his liberty or licentiousness, as necessary to the production of the easy and lively manners which prevailed at that period.

Dr. Adam Smith, opening up another vein in the same mine, has shown how fortune, utility, custom, and fashion, have all their influence on the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation.* He shows how the "effect of the influence of fortune is first to diminish our sense of the merit or demerit of those actions which arise from the most laudable or blamable intentions, when they fail of producing their proposed effects; and, secondly, to increase our sense of the merit or demerit of actions, beyond what is due to the motives or affections from which they proceed, when they accidentally give occasion either to pleasure or pain." "The superiority of virtues and talents has not, even upon those who acknowledge that superiority, the same effect as the superiority of achievements." "The agreeable or disagreeable effects of actions often throw a shadow of merit or demerit upon the agent, though in his intention there was nothing that deserved either praise or blame, or at least that deserved them in the degree in which we are apt to bestow them. Thus, even the messenger of bad news is disagreeable to us, and, on the contrary, we feel a sort of gratitude to the man who brings us good tidings." He shows how custom and fashion influence our moral sentiments. "Those who have been educated in what is really good company, not what is commonly called such, who have been accustomed to see nothing in the persons whom they esteemed and lived with, but justice,

* See Theory of Moral Sentiments, P. ii. sect. iii., P. iv., P. v. chap. ii.

modesty, humanity, and good order, are more shocked with whatever seems to be inconsistent with the rules which these virtues prescribe. Those, on the contrary, who have had the misfortune to be brought up amidst violence, licentiousness, falsehood, and injustice, lose, though not all sense of the impropriety of such conduct, yet all sense of its dreadful enormity, or of the vengeance and punishment due to it." "In certain ages, as in those of Charles II., a degree of licentiousness was associated with generosity, sincerity, magnanimity, and loyalty, while correctness of demeanour is connected with cant, cunning, hypocrisy, and low manners. Hence the vices of the great come to be copied, as associated with politeness, elegance, and generosity. From this same cause proceed those requisitions which we make in reference to professional character, insisting on a clergyman that he be grave, austere, and correct; and reckoning the spirit and bravery of the soldier an excuse for his licentiousness and dissipation. The relative value set upon virtues, and the disapprobation of vices, among different classes of society, all proceed from the same source. Among savages and barbarians, hardiness or superiority to fatigue and pain, and an affected indifference to the softer feelings and sensibilities of the heart, as they are among the most useful, so they are among the most exalted of the virtues. In civilized societies, on the other hand, the virtues of humanity are more respected, and full play is given to the gentler affections of the heart. Hence, too, the virtues and vices that are characteristic of different ranks of life." "The vices of levity are always ruinous to the common people; and a single week's thoughtlessness and dissipation is often sufficient to ruin a poor workman for ever, and to drive him, through despair, upon committing the most enormous crimes. The wiser and better sort of common people, therefore, have always the utmost abhorrence of the vices of levity and excess, while they commend the strict and austere virtues. On the other hand, among the upper classes, luxury, wanton and even disorderly mirth, the pursuit of pleasure to some degree of intemperance, the breach of chastity, at least in one of the two sexes, &c., as being less ruinous, are treated with a good deal of indulgence."*

Mr. Macaulay has avowedly borrowed from the Scotch meta-

* Wealth of Nations, Book v. chap. i.

physicians, and has used their observations to explain the different standards of character found in different nations.* Among the nations north of the Alps, valour was absolutely needful in order to self-defence, and hence courage came to be ranked among the highest of the virtues, and was supposed to excuse ambition, rapacity, and cruelty—and cowardice to be branded with the foulest reproach ; while all the vices belonging to timid dispositions, such as fraud and hypocrisy, hollow friendship and violated faith, came to be objects of abhorrence. Among the Italians, on the other hand, everything was done by superiority of intelligence ; and they came to regard with lenity those crimes which require self-command, address, quick observation, fertile invention, and profound knowledge of human nature. Much the same difference seems to have existed between the Greeks and Romans in the ages in which they first came into contact—and hence the contempt which each party felt for the virtues which the other commended. "Such," says Mr. Macaulay, "are the opposite errors which men commit when their morality is not a science but a taste, when they abandon eternal principles for accidental associations."

We perceive that, in a recent work, the same general observation is employed to explain and excuse the quibbling of the Greek sophists—it was as useful, the author thinks, as the pleading of modern barristers ; and also to defend that understood principle of Greek law which required the accuser in a criminal case to avow that he was actuated by personal feeling —it was, it seems, that he might not be reckoned an officious informer.†

Such is the train of observation pursued at length by these writers—very much to the disgust, let it be added, of many ingenuous and sincere though perhaps over-sensitive minds, who feel as if the remarks offered were intended to palliate sin, and remove the landmarks which separate vice from virtue. In consequence of the use which has thus been made of them, many have turned away with as much loathing as George III. did from everything that savours of Scotch metaphysics.

Still it cannot be doubted that the above are real phenomena. To deny them is to refuse to hear the voice of history, or to

* Macaulay's Essays—Macchiavelli.

† See Lewes' Biographical History of Philosophy.

open our eyes on the scenes which are constantly pressing themselves on the attention. We cannot avoid observing them, but as we do so, let us endeavour to give the right explanation, and rescue them from the improper use made of them.

Holding, then, as we do, that there is an indelible distinction between virtue and vice, we maintain that there could have been no such perversions of the moral faculty in a mind perfectly pure and spotless. The conscience needs only to be enlightened and enlivened to condemn the perversions into which it has fallen in its state of deadness and ignorance. Like the plaintiff who appealed from Philip inattentive to Philip attentive, we can appeal from the conscience misled to the conscience rectified, and the latter will announce, that no excuse should be offered for the manner in which it has been perverted under the influence of sinful and blinding passion or prejudice.

In a former chapter, we have pointed out the way in which the conscience is deluded. A concrete fact is presented under a partial aspect, and it pronounces its judgment according to the representation made to it. This representation, or rather misrepresentation, is made, directly or indirectly, by the influence of a rebellious will—the true seat of all moral evil. It is only by the help of such a principle that we can, on the one hand, uphold the rectitude of the decisions of the moral faculty, and, on the other hand, admit that in fact many of them are prejudiced and perverted.

There is abundant room for the interference of the prejudices of the heart in the representations which are given to the conscience of our own actions and the actions of our neighbours, whenever they are closely connected with our self-interest, our favourite habits, our social, sympathetic, and benevolent feelings. The father, unable or unwilling to support the child who is yet beloved of him, the child indisposed to expose himself to privations on account of his aged parents, will lend his ear to those suggestions which would allure him to commit an act which, when regarded under a particular aspect, may seem commendable, but which the mind would utterly abhor, if discerned under all its aspects. That it is really such a prejudice which is swaying the judgment, is evident from the circumstance, that in those countries in which females are disparaged, children of that sex, and they alone, are in the way of being exposed. We see, too,

how, by the same peculiarity of our nature, fortune and utility must influence the moral judgments. The fairer features of actions useful to ourselves or others, these, and these alone, are presented to the mind, which proceeds in consequence to applaud the actions. Deeds which are in themselves vicious come to be popular, and regarded, if not with positive commendation, at least without any abhorrence, because associated with certain pleasing feelings or beneficial results which have flowed from them. All this does not show, as Hume would argue, that virtue consists in utility; it merely shows that *a strong feeling of utility*, like a strong feeling of passion, may influence the moral faculty, and make it pronounce a sentence which it would not have pronounced had it not been so biassed.

But reprobating, as we ever must, these perversions of our moral nature, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that they have been overruled in many cases so as to bind communities together. Every man complains of the influence which fortune, and even custom and fashion, exercise upon the moral sentiments; and we would not complain of these complaints; they originate in the moral sense, and they tend most effectually to check a flagrant sin. But while the influence of such baser considerations upon the sentiments which should be elevated far above them is in itself evil, it may become the occasion of good. A high tone of moral sentiment in a community, it is true, might have been the cause of infinitely greater good; still the good which can be brought out of that which is in itself evil, is patent to all. Adam Smith* has a whole chapter on the final cause of that irregularity in man's nature, by which fortune comes to influence our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation. "Everybody agrees to the general maxim, that as the event does not depend on the agent, it ought to have no influence upon our sentiments with regard to the merit or propriety of his conduct. But when we come to particulars, we find that our sentiments are scarce, in one instance, exactly conformable to what this equitable maxim would direct." This very irregularity, he proceeds to show, has promoted the welfare of the species; he should have said, in the absence of higher principle, has been the occasion of good. "Man must not be satisfied with indolent benevolence, nor fancy himself the friend of mankind,

* Moral Sentiments, P. ii. sect. ii.

because in his heart he wishes well to the prosperity of the world." "Nature has taught him, that neither himself nor mankind can be fully satisfied with his conduct, nor bestow upon it the full measure of applause, unless he has actually produced the ends which it is the purpose of his being to advance." "It is even of considerable importance, that the evil which is done without design should be regarded as a misfortune to the doer as well as the sufferer." "As in the ancient heathen religion, that holy ground which had been consecrated to some god was not to be trod upon but upon solemn and necessary occasions, and the man who had even ignorantly violated it became piacular from that moment, and, until proper atonement should be made, incurred the vengeance of that powerful and invisible being to whom it had been set apart; so, by the wisdom of nature, the happiness of every innocent man is in the same manner rendered holy, consecrated round about against the approaches of every other man, not to be wantonly trod upon, not even to be in any respect ignorantly and involuntarily violated, without requiring some atonement in proportion to the greatness of such undesigned violation."

From the same irregularity, or, as we would rather call it, perversion of sentiment, there proceeds the excessive regard paid by certain individuals, or by certain grades of society, ages, or nations, to those virtues which happen to chime in with the prevailing tastes, or to be immediately subservient to the interests of the parties. Prudence, outward decency, and caution, a spirit of frugality and industry, come to be commended among certain classes, as if they were all that was required to render the possessor's character pleasing in the sight of God; while, in other grades of life, a spirit of liberality and courage is supposed to make atonement for every vice. Hence, too, the popularity which attaches to certain qualities which are evil in themselves, because supposed to be the concomitants, and therefore the indications, of pleasing or useful virtues. While we cannot, without partaking of the sin, commend this spirit, we may observe how it has been one great means of fostering the temperance, the frugality, and the industry which so distinguish certain walks of life, and the spirit of generosity and valour, the chivalry, the romance, and heroism which have been so beneficial in certain stages of society. We may deplore the absence of higher and

deeper principle; but we cannot help admiring, that in the absence of such, the world is kept from sinking into intolerable degradation, and helped forward in the onward march of civilisation, by evils being made to counteract prevailing evils, and harmony being produced by notes in themselves discordant.

Having resolved these phenomena into the perversions of conscience, we are enabled to class along with them, and under the same head, those superstitious fears which have exercised so extensive a power upon mankind. A superstitious terror has been the means of restraining multitudes from crime, when love to God or to virtue would have been altogether ineffectual. Witches and fairies, ghosts and demons, gods and goddesses, the penances inflicted by the priesthood, and the terrors brought from the invisible world, (we allude, of course, to superstitious terrors,) have all exercised a power in keeping back mankind from deeds which would have proved injurious to society. The peopling of the air, the streams, and the woods, with supernatural beings, and of the darkness with ghosts, has deterred from the commission of crime multitudes who could not have been awed by the thought of an omnipresent God. Every one knows how dangerous it is, so far as the peace of society is concerned, to remove even a false religion, till such time as true religion has taken its place; for, in rooting up the weed, the very grain may be torn up along with it. All statesmen have now come to see, that man cannot do without a religion. It has often been said, that the very worst governments are better than no government: and a precisely analogous maxim seems now to be adopted in regard to religion, that the very worst religions are better, so far as the peace of society is concerned, than none. Legislators have thence leapt to the conclusion, that the state should countenance every religion; but this reasoning proceeds on the perilous fallacy that virtue consists in utility, and that virtues and vices pass into each other by insensible gradations. A higher and juster view of the nature of virtue, and of the essential difference between it and vice, would lead to the very different conclusion:—that, though under obligation to tolerate a religion believed to be false, we are not at liberty directly to countenance it in any circumstances, nor to any extent, without contracting a far greater amount of guilt than those who sincerely, though ignorantly, are the votaries of the mistaken faith.

Here the remark is forced upon us, that as almost all changes

for good in society have been produced by men of earnestness and sincerity, as Carlyle has shown, so it cannot be expected of the legislators and philosophers of the utility school, that they should turn out to be the most effective agents in promoting the utility which they profess so much to esteem. Their principles will lead them to admire martyrs, but not themselves to become martyrs; for always, when the establishment of truth seems to be impracticable, they will be tempted to yield to the force of circumstances. They who are under the influence of principles which do not change with changing circumstances, are the parties who make circumstances to bend before the energy of their will, and who produce all those revolutions in opinion, in sentiment, and in action, which have given the impulse to human improvement.

Illustrative Note (G.)—HUMAN VIRTUES (SO CALLED) AND VICES RUNNING INTO EACH OTHER.

"There is not on earth," says John Foster, "a more capricious, accommodating, or abused thing than conscience. It would be very possible to exhibit a curious classification of consciences in genera and species. What copious matter for speculation among the varieties of—the lawyer's conscience, cleric conscience, lay conscience, lords' conscience, peasants' conscience, hermits' conscience, tradesmen's conscience, philosophers' conscience, Christians' conscience, conscience of reason, conscience of faith, healthy man's conscience, sick man's conscience, ingenious conscience, simple conscience," &c.* We are not to enter into this wide field of curious and dark though not uninstructive speculation. Having given the general theory to account for them, we take up merely some points illustrative of man's existing state. It is curious to observe human virtues (so represented by the conscience) and human vices growing on the same root.

The modern French novelist is accustomed to exert all his startling art in exhibiting the growth of the common vices under fostering circumstances. A child, who never knew what it was to be warmed by human affection, is placed in circumstances in which there is no air to nourish the commonplace virtues, while there is a feverish encouragement given to far different qualities. Living in the contempt of the ordinary laws of morality, the child springs up into a bold, heroic, and generous youth, and performs deeds which command our admiration;—he saves the life of another at the risk of his own, or casts his protection over the weak and helpless. No doubt he has a bitter antipathy to certain individuals and sections of the community; but he has received kindness from none, and has been treated with cruel scorn and injustice by thousands. What claim has society upon him, except for his revenge, on account of the multiplied injuries inflicted upon him? His virtues, set off by the meretricious art of the writer, are all his own; while his vices, his fights, his robberies, his very murders, can be fairly charged upon the community, rather than upon himself individually, and are relieved by the gallantry and generosity of spirit displayed in the very perpetration of them. Or it is a

lady of extreme beauty and sensibility who is made to flit before our vision; and we see her sacrificed to family pride or avarice, and bound to a husband whom she cannot love. An attachment springs up involuntarily in her breast towards a youth of daring courage and the gentlest generosity, who comes accidentally in her way, and reciprocates her affection. Resolutions are formed, and struggles made, with the view of eradicating the attachment, only to be baffled by untoward circumstances, and cruel usage inflicted on the parties suspected while yet innocent, till they are led or driven to an intercourse which, the author tells us, the world in its uncharitableness condemns, but condemns in utter ignorance of the circumstances, and which may be regarded as being hallowed, as well as sweetened, by the spirit of devotedness and self-sacrifice with which it is characterized.

The healthier English mind recoils from such a picture with a just abhorrence; and reprobates the literature in which vice is so painted as to be admired. But this same boastful English spirit overflows with feelings of admiration towards a different, and it is supposed, a more perfect picture. We have an attractive view of the country squire—warm-hearted, honest, kind to his tenantry, liberal in supplying the wants of the poor, and sticking fast to his political party; and though it is not denied, but rather avowed with self-complacent candour, that he is given at times to excess in drinking, that he swears when in a passion, that at least he has no respect to God in his conduct, or humble submission of heart before his heavenly Governor—we are made to forget, or justify all this, in our admiration of his bluff integrity and disinterested charity. Or it is the British merchant that is brought before us in the market-place, open-hearted and open-handed; or the English yeoman in his sequestered cottage, industrious, respectful to his superiors, and attached to the ancient heads of his house; but both the one and the other, it is acknowledged without shame, if not with pride, are notoriously not given to penitence for sin, or to express love to God, which they do not feel; nay, it is not concealed that they are at times addicted to profanity and gross neglect of sacred duties; and yet we are made to admire none the less, but all the more, this worldly morality, because it is not rendered offensive by religion.

Truly our popular novels give us a correct picture of human nature; but not in the way in which their advocates would have it. They give us a picture, not of the world as it is, but of the world, as the world supposes itself to be. The skilful eye may see, by a deeper skill, in the skilful novel, the tricks to which mankind resort to disguise their characters from themselves, and deck them in assumed colours.

If the question related to the relative superiority of the Frenchman's or Englishman's feeling, we should have no hesitation in giving the preference to the latter as the healthier; but the question rather is, Is the feeling of the one or the other what it ought to be? The Englishman condemns, and very properly condemns, the picture drawn by the Frenchman. But can you deny, says the Frenchman, that the tenderness, the sympathy, the devotedness of my hero and heroine are commendable? No, says the Englishman; but we are not accustomed to think in our country that fine sentiment excuses open immorality. But the Englishman is too blunt and self-confident to perceive that it is with the same weapons that he defends himself when attacked. Do you not, says he, commend this sterling honesty and openness of character? Most assuredly we do, more than the fine sentimentality of the Frenchman; but we feel all the while, that if fine sentiment cannot excuse immorality, just as little can an earthly morality excuse an acknowledged ungodliness. That there is truth in the one picture as in the other—in the Frenchman's as in the Englishman's—we frankly admit. We would not dispute

the co-existence at times of genuine feeling and purposes of heroism in the heart that plans robbery and adultery. We believe that there may be the exercise of sterling honesty, and large liberality, and devoted attachments, in peer and peasant, in merchant and mechanic, altogether unaccompanied with faith in God, or a sense of dependence on him. But just as the Englishman sets little value on the Frenchman's flowing sensibilities, cherished in contempt of the laws of morality; so we believe that the man whose conscience is properly balanced, and weighs all things in equal scales, will not allow himself to be hurried along by a blind admiration of mere instinctive qualities, which either have no respect to God, or set God at open defiance. Let us condemn not only the Frenchman's attempt to cheat us out of our morality by a theatrical exhibition of sensibility, but the Englishman's attempt to cheat us out of our reverence for piety, by the attractive and possibly far from faithful picture of a godless morality.

Let us mark how human virtues and human vices ever slide into each other, and are not separated, as true virtue must ever be from vice, by a distinct line of demarcation. We find, on anatomizing the characters of great men, who have also been bad men, that their noble qualities are woven like warp and woof with those that are baser, in such a way, that the two cannot be separated. The pride, the self-assurance, and passion of Robert Burns were indissolubly connected with that noble manliness and independence of spirit which he delights to display. Rousseau's exquisite sentiment, and his morbid jealousy and addictedness to sensuality, were associated together in his fine but effeminate and diseased temperament. No man can separate Byron's thoughts, often so grand and yet so wild and loose, from his previous history, his early vices, his precocious lusts and passions, with a conscience—roused into activity by the open nature of the rebellion against it—kicking against them. We think it should be admitted in all these cases that we could not have had the one set of qualities without the other—the genius and feeling in the particular form without the previous history, the disordered temperament, and the melancholy experience. We could not have had these throes, so indicative of strength, without the accompanying fever. Just as the wound in the body helped Harvey to discover the circulation of the blood; so it has been the rent in these men's nature which has enabled us to look into the living movements of their hearts. Are we therefore to palliate the vice, because of its connexion with the properties which we are constrained to admire? No; it were vastly more becoming to suspect the virtues that have sprung from so dubious a source—no, not to condemn the virtues, but to condemn the agent in his supposed virtues, as well as in his vices, because the elements of which the one is composed are about as base as the elements of the other.

Proceeding on the idea, that what are commonly called virtues are real virtues, we should find that no line can be drawn to divide them from contiguous vices; and Hume is right in saying, "All kinds of vice and virtue run insensibly into each other, and may approach by such imperceptible degrees, as will make it very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to determine where the one ends and the other begins."* It might easily be shown how, out of the same elements of our nature, there may be produced avarice, as well as industry—malice, as well as what is called spirit—vanity, as well as amiability—cowardice, as well as caution. One man is a great hero, another is a great criminal; if they had but exchanged places, they would also have exchanged characters. Take the common ideas of virtue, and we shall speedily find that the difference between virtue and vice is one of circumstance, rather than nature—of degree, rather than of kind. What was

* Morals, P. ii. sect. vi.

esteemed as vice in one rank of life, would require to be regarded as virtue in another. Proceeding on the views of the world, and carrying them to their legitimate conclusion, we shall find moral distinctions effaced, and all defined ideas deranged and confounded. Let us learn, then, to draw back before we reach such an issue, and examine the stability of the ground on which the common notions are built. If it be true that certain vices spring from the same root as what are supposed to be virtues, it is worthy of inquiry whether these supposed virtues are to be regarded as virtues at all.

Every observer of human nature will admit, that the person of most correct demeanour might, under a different training, but with the same internal principles, have fallen into not a few acknowledged vices. This person has been kept right, merely in consequence of a way being hedged in for him, and by the operation of instincts in which there is nothing truly virtuous; and in another position, these very instincts might have hurried the possessor into open crime. Are we therefore to excuse the crime on the part of those who commit it? No, assuredly; but we are to make a searching inquiry into our mere outward decorum, lest it should turn out to be founded on principles and originating in motives which are no way morally commendable. Let us anticipate, in this matter, the day of judgment, where there will be "innumerable false and imaginary virtues, which will involve their possessors in deeper disgrace than vices themselves when acknowledged and deplored."

SECT. V.—SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT FROM THE COMBINED VIEW OF THE PHYSICAL AND THE MORAL.

In astronomy, the distance of a star is determined by surveying it from two points. In like manner, there seem to be heavenly truths which are best ascertained by taking two positions, and a view from each. It is from a consideration both of the physical and the moral that we obtain the proper measure of the Divine administration.

We cannot from the physical alone determine what God and this world are in their relation to one another. Considered in itself, the physical does seem so constituted as to be restrictive of human folly and punitive of human wickedness. But the argument is far from being complete, till we demonstrate, on independent grounds, that human folly and human wickedness exist. We have, throughout the whole of this Treatise, proceeded on the principle, that we cannot connect the facts till the separate existence of each has been ascertained on satisfactory grounds. By a preliminary examination of the Physical, it may be shown to be fitted to promote such and such ends; but the complement of the argument is derived from the consideration of the Moral, which shows that there are such ends to be served.

On the other hand, it does not appear, that from a consideration of the moral taken separately, we could readily form a proper estimate of the relation of God and the world. The internal feelings would be apt to be disregarded by mankind, so inclined to look to the world without instead of the world within, and would certainly be misinterpreted, but for the confirmation furnished by the visible dispensations of Divine providence. As the physical requires the moral, so the moral requires the physical, as its complement in giving a full exhibition of the character of God, and of his administration in reference to our world.

We have failed of the object which we had in view, if we have not shown that the two, the physical and the moral, are in complete harmony—a harmony implying, however, that man has fallen, that God is restraining while he blesses him, and showing his displeasure at sin while he is seeking to gain the heart of the sinner. Leave out any one of these elements, and to us the world would appear an inexplicable enigma. Take these truths with us, and there is sufficient light struck to show, that if we had but farther light, every mystery might be explained; and we feel that this farther light may be denied us just because of the probationary state in which, according to these truths, we are placed. There is thus introduced a consistency into the whole, including even the seeming inconsistencies which, if we cannot clear up, we can at least account for.

METHOD OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

BOOK FOURTH.

RESULTS—THE RECONCILIATION OF GOD AND MAN.

CHAPTER I.

NATURAL AND REVEALED RELIGION—THE CHARACTER OF GOD.

SECT. I.—ADVANTAGE OF HARMONIZING NATURE AND REVELATION.

At the close of our extensive survey, it may be useful to collect into a few heads the results which we have been able to gather in our progress. If, in the discussions in which we were engaged in the first book, we felt ourselves merely, as it were, in the vestibule; we now, after having passed through the temple, feel ourselves to be entering the chancel, the holiest of all. Here we seek to have God himself communing with us in a supernatural way, to clear up doubts and mysteries. "When I thought to know this, it was labour in mine eyes, until I went into the sanctuary."

One of the objects contemplated in this Treatise has been the spiritualizing of nature, which has been so carnalized by many, and in sanctifying it, to bring it into communion with religion.

We have often mourned over the attempts made to set the works against the Word of God, and thereby excite, propagate, and perpetuate jealousies, fitted to separate parties that ought to live in closest union. In particular, we have always regretted that endeavours should have been made to depreciate nature, with the view of exalting revelation; it has always appeared to

us to be nothing else than the degrading of one part of God's works, in the hope thereby of exalting and recommending another. It is at all times perilous on the part of the votaries, whether of science or religion, to set the branches of knowledge which they severally prosecute against each other. On the one hand, science cannot accomplish ends truly beneficent, if it make an idol of works of God, and, Parsee-like, worship the sun, and moon, and elements of nature; and, on the other hand, religion is unnecessarily raising prejudices against itself, and is truly dishonouring God—while it may profess to honour him—when it would discourage inquiry into those works which he has spread around us, which are manifestly inviting us to contemplate and admire them, and rewarding us by a thousand discoveries, when we treat them as we ought to treat the Divine workmanship, and investigate them with patience and with reverence.

Perilous as it is at all times for the friends of religion to set themselves against natural science, it is especially so in an age like the present. We live at a time when all our educated youth are instructed in the elements of natural science, as well as in the more sacred doctrines of theology. We fear that there are many who know not how to reconcile the two faiths in which they have been educated. Meanwhile studious attempts are being made to show that Christianity cannot stand the light of the age in which we live. The impression left is very painful, when the mind imagines that it discovers a discrepancy between two departments of knowledge in which it has been trained, as painful as if one were to hear it reported of a revered friend, a parent, or brother, that he had committed a dishonourable or criminal action. Thousands have felt in this way, and thousands are at this present time so feeling, as they turn from secular books of science to the Bible, and when they enter our upper schools, our mechanics' institutions, and colleges. The heart of many a youth of promise has been wrung, till feelings more bitter than tears have burst from it, as he stood by the chasm over which no bridge seemed to be thrown. A dark cloud of doubt arising from that gulf has brooded over and settled upon many a mind, and has produced the same effects as a wet and cloudy atmosphere upon the body, damping by its moist and heavy influence all generous confidence, all zeal and enthusiasm. Others, abandoning religion, as laying restraints upon them to

which they were not willing to yield, have betaken themselves to the splendid but uninhabited halls of science, and wander through them in wonder and admiration, but without ever finding, or so much as looking for, a governor to rule or a teacher to instruct, a friend to comfort, or a mediator to intercede for them.*

It is no profane work that is engaged in by those who, in all humility, would endeavour to remove jealousies between parties whom God has joined together, and whom man is not at liberty to put asunder. We are not lowering the dignity of science when we command it to do what all the objects which it looks at and admires do, when we command it to worship God. Nor are we detracting from the honour which is due to religion, when we press it to take science into its service, and accept the homage which it is able to pay. We are seeking to exalt both, when we show how nature conducts man to the threshold of religion, and when from this commanding position we bid him look abroad on the wide territories of nature. We would aid at the same time both religion and science, by removing those prejudices against sacred truth which nature has been employed to foster; and we would accomplish this, not by casting aside and discarding nature, but by rightly interpreting it.

Let not science and religion be reckoned as opposing citadels, frowning defiance upon each other, and their troops brandishing their armour in hostile attitude. They have too many common foes, if they would but think of it, in ignorance and prejudice, in passion and vice, under all their forms, to admit of their lawfully wasting their strength in a useless warfare with each other. Science has a foundation, and so has religion; let them unite their foundations, and the basis will be broader, and they will be two compartments of one great fabric reared to the glory of God. Let the one be the outer and the other the inner court. In the one, let all look, and admire, and adore; and in the other, let those who have faith kneel, and pray, and praise. Let the one be the sanctuary where human learning may present its richest incense as an offering to God; and the other, the holiest of all, separated from it by a veil now rent in twain, and in which, on a blood-sprinkled mercy-seat, we pour out the love of a reconciled heart, and hear the oracles of the living God.

* See a very melancholy picture of the experience of Jouffroy in his "Mélanges Nouvelles."

In the foregoing discussions we have studiously avoided the direct introduction of Scripture, and this for several reasons. First of all, we did not wish to make religion responsible for our speculations, which must stand or fall according to the evidence adduced. Augustine has uttered a proper warning against the identifying of Scripture and human dogmatism, "lest, when a more thorough discussion has shown the opinion which we had adopted to be false, our faith may fall with it, and we should be found contending, not for the doctrines of the Sacred Scriptures, but for our own attempts to make our doctrine that of the Scriptures, instead of taking the doctrine of Scripture to be ours." We wished to avoid rendering ourselves liable to the rebuke of Bacon in that well-known passage in which he remonstrates with those who seek philosophy in the Scriptures, which he describes as seeking the dead among the living—as the seeking of religion in philosophy is the seeking of the living among the dead. "And this folly," he adds, "is the more to be prevented and restrained, because not only fantastical philosophy, but heretical religion, spring from the absurd mixture of things divine and human. It is therefore the wisest, soberly to render unto faith the things that are faith's."* Such weighty considerations, have led us to separate between our own ratiocinations and the dicta of the infallible Word. We were resolved, that if we could not bring any contributions to religion, we should at least keep from injuring it by making it lean upon our views and opinions.

We have had another object in view. We wished to contribute a quota of evidence to the support of the Divine original of the Scriptures. We were anxious to show that nature, rightly interpreted, so far from setting itself against Christianity, furnishes not a little to favour it, and that both give the same views of the character and government of God, and of the nature and destiny of man. But in order to lend such a support, however feeble, to revelation, it is evident that the prop must be built upon an independent basis. We have sought for such a basis, and have found it, as we conceive, in the government of God, as seen in his works, properly comprehended.

Nor are we bound to prove, in order to the use of this argument, that the human mind could have discovered all these

* Novum Organum.

doctrines by its native force. It may be doubted whether, without a revelation from God, we could have discovered the mine in which we have been digging; but this is no reason why we should not employ the wealth which has been found there in supporting the cause of Him who has conducted us to it. Such cases of action and reaction in evidence occur in every department of inquiry. The question is not, whether these views could have been discovered by unaided reason; but the question is—Now, when reason has been aided, does it not give its sanction to the doctrines which we have been expounding? Without the telescope we could not have discovered a multitude of the heavenly bodies which are now open to the observation thus assisted; yet it is by these very bodies that the astronomer tries and tests his instruments. The prop derived from the interpretation of God's works may be a support, provided always it has a separate basis, though it partially lean on the object supported.

And hence we are at perfect liberty, and in consistency with all that we have been urging, to agree with such writers as Halyburton and Leland, when they show the importance of revelation in clearing up the doubts that press upon and weigh down the human spirit. We may acknowledge the necessity of a light from heaven, to enable us to find out the territory which we have been exploring; but from that territory we may look up with gratitude to the light which has guided us, and every new discovery made may demonstrate that it is truly a light from heaven. Our argument is not a moving in a circle, but the reflection of light back upon the body from which it has come.

We are entitled, then, to urge the analogy or correspondence between natural and revealed religion as an argument in behalf of the latter. The phenomena to which the attention has been called are facts, and they establish the very doctrines revealed in Scripture. Other explanations, we are aware, may be given, and have been given, of some of these phenomena; but we hold that the explanation which we have advanced is the only satisfactory one. Even though it should be regarded only as accounting for them better than any other, or as well as any other, still the argument would not be without its force. Taking even the low view, that the Scriptures can enable us to explain some of the mysteries of the Divine government; or the still lower

one, that the darker phenomena of nature admit of an explanation agreeably to the Divine Word—we should find even then a reflex contribution to the Word which has furnished us with such a key.

Apart altogether from the evidence in behalf of the Divine origin of the Scriptures, we have obtained, as it appears to us, many instructive and pleasing views of the ways of God, and humbling, yet exalted, views of the character of man. We have entered fields into which the inspired writers do not carry us, and in them we have gathered instruction in unison with the letter and spirit of the Word, and fitted to enable the reflecting mind to make a Christian use of modern philosophy. If it is the will of God that men should use their lofty faculties in investigating the works of nature, it is surely his will that they should also employ them in connecting the truths of nature with the truths of revelation. All cold and distant though some of these truths may appear, we believe that when the light of heaven shines upon them, the thoughtful mind may derive much from them to refresh and quicken the faith, as the snow-covered mountains send forth their streams to water the thirsty plains of torrid climes.

SECT. II.—PREVAILING DEFECTIVE VIEWS OF THE DIVINE CHARACTER.

There have been ages in the history of the world in which it might have been more needful to bring into prominence what are commonly called the natural attributes of God, such as his omnipresence and omnipotence. But the spirit of this age, fostered by the extensive study of geology, astronomy, and chemistry, always brings these perfections into bold relief, at the risk of causing other properties to sink out of view. We have been endeavouring to bring under notice the phenomena that are fitted to correct certain views of the Divine character, which are so prevalent and yet withal so superficial and inadequate.

First, the mechanical view of God. This is the natural product of a mechanical age. It is an age engrossed in studying the mere mechanism of nature, and its idea of God has come to be that of a great mechanician, or an omnipotent engineer

constructing worlds like steam-engines, to work according to the properties with which they are endowed.

An apostle seems to allude to this form of infidelity as about to appear in the latter days. "Since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation." Strange it is, that this infidelity, proceeding, no doubt, from the ungodliness of the heart, but taking its specific form and particular direction from the scientific character of the age, should have been spoken of, eighteen centuries ago, by a fisherman of Galilee. This error is to be met, not by an empty declamation against general laws, or a crusade against the discoveries of science, which must prove injurious only to the party undertaking it; but by a narrow scrutiny of these general laws, and a resolution of them into their elements; and, by demonstrating, that God is present in the very midst of those things which continue as they were—present, just as much as he was in the ages of miracles in which the fathers lived, or as he can be in that renewal of miraculous interpositions which may yet take place before the history of our world closes. We shall not succeed in making persons avoid the poison, administered in food, by denouncing the food, but by carefully separating the one from the other: the most effective method, in short, of rectifying error is to separate the truth from the error with which it has become associated.

We have sought to eliminate the truth by exhibiting nature in its full and living action. (1.) In the very operation of physical causes there must always be the presence of two or more bodies, with their several properties bearing a relation to each other, and so adjusted as to admit the action of the properties. (2.) In those general arrangements, so beneficial, which constitute general laws, there are numberless implied adaptations of substance to substance, of property to property, and cause to cause, and all these abiding or recurring in a world of activity and change. (3.) There is a vast number of events falling out, not according to any general order of recurrence, but individually, and, so far as human sagacity is concerned, incidentally; and, constituting a power by which, on the one hand, God accomplishes his specific purposes, and by which, on the other hand, man is rendered completely dependent on his Governor. Taking these general facts along with us, we are

thereby introduced into the very heart of God's works; we can discover him alike in the general and the particular, and in the accommodation of both to the character of man. We are now out of that mechanism, which minds of high sentiment feel to be so offensive. We see not only the heart of the mechanism, we see also the very heart of the worker. It is not mere wheel upon wheel, and cylinder upon cylinder—we see now the moving power, and the whole issue contemplated; and in the connexion between them, we discover the agent displaying his affection and lofty principle, his purity and grace. All nature, before so dull, is now lighted up, but with light, we have to add, too brilliant for those eyes which prefer the darkness.

Physical investigation gives the mere bones and muscles, and these very commonly without their connexions. Common natural theology gives us these in their adjustments, but without the life, the full form, and expression. Both are too like the plates of bare anatomy, so different from the living form of the human body. But we must go beyond a mere machine—we must go beyond an organism—we must show how the works of God testify of one who lives and acts, who loves his creatures, who indicates his approbation of all that is good, and his disapprobation of all that is evil. Science, in short, gives us the mere ANATOMY of the body of nature, instructive, no doubt, in its exhibition of important members and organs; common natural theology gives us the PHYSIOLOGY of nature, and shows the full frame in its connexions and beautiful proportions: but the human mind will not rest till, in the region of a higher art, we have also its PHYSIOGNOMY, and nature presented in its living forms, its face radiant with smiles, and the deep lines of thought and character graven on its forehead. Such is the figure we have endeavoured to present, rising beyond mechanism to life, and beyond law to love, and finding the traces of a living God whom we may admire and trust, and, at the same time, revere and adore, and whose image, as we cherish it, assimilates our character to itself.

SECONDLY, THE SENTIMENTAL VIEW OF GOD. This is the product of the poetry as the other is of the science of the times; or, to go deeper, the one is the creation of the imagination and emotions, as the other is of the mere intellect empirically exercised, and both under the guidance of an unholy heart. The

one view, like the other, is not so much erroneous as it is defective. Let us clothe the Divine Being with as bright a robe of loveliness as we please; but let us not pluck from him, meanwhile, his sceptre and his crown, or represent him as indifferent alike to evil and to good.

We have endeavoured to go down deeper than the mere floating feelings, in which, as in a shining atmosphere, so many envelop a body that is truly dark in itself, and call it the God of Light. (1.) There are arrangements of Divine providence by which God is visibly seen to restrain, to correct, and punish mankind. (2.) There is a law in the heart, which leads the possessor to approve of that which is morally good, and disapprove of that which is evil, and that even when he is neglecting the one and committing the other; and all this points to a righteousness in the Divine character, which is no less essential to his nature than his benevolence. (3.) There is an evil conscience which charges the possessor with guilt, and reveals impending judgments, while it makes known no method of atonement, and the whole pointing to an offended God. These are facts pressing themselves on our notice from without and from within, and which we are not at liberty to leave out of account, in forming a basis on which to construct our idea of God.

Taking these facts along with us, we rise above a Divinity, the mere creation of sentiment. Such a God—with reverence be it spoken—were not worthy to rule this great universe. We have sought to mount to the conception of a God fitted to govern the world, and to awe mankind into obedience and submission without any detraction from his love. True, he is a God on whom the eye of the sinner determined to continue in his sin does not delight to rest, and whom the wicked will hate just because they are wicked. But even in the very bosoms of such, God has a witness which testifies that his character is very beautiful; and which declares that it would be good for man were his eyes so strengthened that he could gaze upon it with pleasure, and were his character shining in the light reflected from it.

There are not a few in our day who, instead of contemplating the true character of God, look merely at certain pleasing accompaniments; and, instead of the true light, allow their eye to rest upon the clouds gilded by his beams, and which fade,

like the blaze of the evening sky, into darkness while we gaze upon them. We would fix the eye on God himself, shining for ever in these heavens, and whose beams melt that which is hardened, and warm that which is cold on the earth—

> " As the great sun, when he his influence
> Sheds on the frost-bound waters, the glad stream
> Flows to the ray, and warbles as it flows."—COLERIDGE.

THIRDLY, THE PANTHEISTIC VIEW OF GOD. Pantheism has been compared to a cloud, and it bears to it a resemblance in more respects than one;—it is capable of great expansion, it bulks largely to the eye, at a distance it looks very like a solid body, it assumes picturesque shapes, and is often beautifully gilded, and when we would seize it, we find it eluding our grasp, and evanishing. It takes a number of forms, and upon our apprehending it, it is apt to perform a metempsychosis, and change from one to another. There is Material Pantheism, according to which it is the material universe, with its laws, its animation, and its thought, the result of organism, which constitutes the only God. There is Organic Pantheism, which speaks of nature as endowed with vitality, and deifies it (to use the language of Carus) as the highest, the most complete, the universal organism. If this mystical language has any realistic signification, it must mean that nature is just a magnificent vegetable, or an infinite brute, and that this vegetable, this brute, is God. There is Ideal Pantheism, which is the form which the system has taken with certain schools of metaphysicians addicted to deep reflection upon the subjective and upon the abstract notions which the mind of man can form. As they gaze upon these the material world disappears from the view as an independent reality, and leaves only a connected series of subjective forms or mental ideas, which are supposed to constitute, at one and the same time, God and the universe. According to Spinoza, this One is substance possessed of thought and extension. According to Fichte, it is a universal ego projecting the universe from itself. According to Schelling, it is a sort of ethereal essence, developing, according to a law, thought and being, which are identical. With Hegel it is the absolute unfolding itself according to a logical process, in which nothing becomes something, and the ideal the real, and God becomes conscious in humanity. What-

ever be the shape taken, it is liable to the following among other objections:—

(1.) It might be shewn to be inconsistent with the consciousness of self, with the consciousness of personality. In all consciousness we know ourselves as persons; in all knowledge of other objects we know them as different from ourselves, and ourselves as different from them. It follows that all is not God, that God is not all, for we know of at least one eminent exception, and that is ourselves, the object with which we are most intimately acquainted. Pantheism is thus found to be opposed to our very intuitions, to our very consciousness, and no matter what the proof adduced in its favour be, it never can be equal to the evidence against it found in the very constitution of our minds.

(2.) It is inconsistent with the traces of adjustment and purpose everywhere met with in nature. No form of Pantheism admits final cause, and yet how numerous the traces in God's works of a concurrence of means to produce an end. It is not mere law or development, physical or logical, which can give us existing nature, with its curious coincidences, its intended accidents, and pre-determined contingencies, but a mind seeing and ordaining beforehand, contemplating at once the means and the end. Nature tells us regarding itself that it is not a power coeval and co-ordinate with God, but a work planned and executed by a Maker existing before it, and still existing above it. We have found in the course of these investigations something more than a mere power, or principle, or abstraction; we have reached a personal God, whose character is in his works, but whose works do not constitute his nature or character. The painter's soul is no doubt thrown into his painting, and the sculptor's and architect's into their statues and edifices, but their souls meanwhile exist apart, and are capable of other acts besides. In a sense as true as it is grand, the soul of the Creator is streaming through the order and life of creation, but meanwhile he exists independent of and far above them.

(3.) It is inconsistent with the possession by man of a separate and a free will. It is the circumstance that we are possessed of a distinct will which suggests the idea that God is not a law or principle, but a person with a power of voluntary determination. As conscious of an inherent and positive freedom, we are led to look upon God as also free. Nay, we go a step

farther, and maintain that the possession of voluntary power and freedom on the part of man is a proof that the God from whom these proceeded has a will, and this a free will. It is not easy to gather, as to certain forms of Pantheism, whether they do or do not attribute will and freedom to God. All forms of Pantheism which do not ascribe a separate will to God, land us in the absurdity of supposing them to produce in man a free will not possessed by himself from eternity. If the other alternative be taken, and will be ascribed to Deity, then we have two wills in the universe,—the will of God and the will of man; and it follows that all is not one in any intelligible sense, for we have two distinct wills which may run counter to each other. Whatever be the philosophic system adopted, we have, as a matter of fact, the hundreds of millions of distinct wills possessed by human beings. These separate wills shew by one process that God must have a distinct will, and by another process that there cannot be merely one will in the universe, and they thus set aside every system which declares that "All is One!"

(4.) It is inconsistent with our intuitive belief of accountability to God as Judge. There is in man, we have seen, a native principle leading him to distinguish between good and evil, and pointing to a punishment to follow, and to a Being to inflict the punishment. This feeling of responsibility implies that God is Judge, and that we must give an account to him of the deeds done, whether they have been good or evil. But Pantheism must set aside all belief in a personal immortality, and all apprehension of a judgment day. Under such a system it is seen to be vain to suppose that God can seriously purpose to punish the sin, or so much as to condemn it, and it is acknowledged that at death the soul is swallowed up and lost in the all-absorbing One. At this point, then, Pantheism comes into collision with irradicable principles of the mind, (stronger far than any arguments which can be urged in its favour,) which announce that we are accountable, that we who are judged must be the same as the persons who committed the deeds, and that God as Judge must be different from those who are judged.

A German speculatist has lost himself in the windings of nature, as the traveller will lose himself among the trees and intertangled branches of a forest. There is a way through the wood which humbler men, which peasants know; but which the

proud will not submit to inquire about, and they toil and wander amidst gorgeous scenes, and think that they are making progress, and they do turn aside many a branch which would interpose itself in the way, and they exert prodigious strength and amazing ingenuity, but having never found the near way, or the right way, the paths in which they walk either conduct them into deepening thickets of error, or land them nearly at the point at which they started. "By the roaring billows of time, thou art not ingulfed, but borne aloft into the azure of eternity." By the roaring billows of proud speculation, we would rather say, thou art but borne along to that dim region in which we lose sight of thee. No doubt, the imagination is often deceived by the gay drapery in which the object set forth to our contemplation by Pantheism is decked, and the intellect, dizzied by the many turnings of sophistry through which it has been carried before the vision is disclosed, is the less capable of detecting the deception; yet the heart, more faithful than the head, will feel at times that it is but a phantom which it is required to love and worship, and that truly within there is neither heart nor life, though there may be grace and motion in the outward form. The worshipper carried through the long avenues of columns and statues, and the splendid halls of the ancient temple of the Egyptian Thebes, was not conducted at last to a more miserable termination, when in the inner shrine he found one of the lower animals, than the follower of a modern philosopher, when conducted through processes, laws, and developments to a divinity who has less of separate sensation, consciousness, and life, than the very brutes which Egypt declared to be its gods.

SECT. III.—CHARACTER OF GOD AS REVEALED IN SCRIPTURE.

"Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord." We quote this language in the way of adaptation—not in its original meaning, (when it simply states the doctrine of the unity of God,) but as expressive of the important truth, that there is a wonderful consistency, or rather identity, in the representation given of the Divine character in the Scriptures. "The God of Israel is one Lord."

"The Bible itself is a standing and an astonishing miracle.

Written, fragment by fragment, throughout the course of fifteen centuries, under different states of society, and in different languages, by persons of the most opposite tempers, talents, and conditions, learned and unlearned, prince and peasant, bond and free; cast into every form of instructive composition and good writing, history, prophecy, poetry, allegory, emblematic representation, judicious interpretation, literal statement, precept, example, proverbs, disquisition, epistle, sermon, prayer—in short, all rational shapes of human discourse; and treating, moreover, of subjects not obvious, but most difficult; its authors are not found, like other writers, contradicting one another upon the most ordinary matters of fact and opinion, but are at harmony upon the whole of their sublime and momentous scheme."*

In the language now quoted, reference is made to one of the most convincing of the self-evidencing truths of that Word, which carries within itself its own credibility, and is visible in its own light. We have an example in the thoroughly consistent representation given of the character of God. It is the same God exhibited under the patriarchal, the Jewish, and the Christian dispensations. Except in the degree of development, there is no difference between God as revealed in Eden, on Sinai, and on Calvary—between God as exhibited in the books of Moses, and as exhibited so many centuries later in the writings of Paul and John. In the garden, we have the lawgiver, and we have indications, too, of the Saviour. On Mount Sinai there is the same combination of awful justice and condescending mercy. In the mysterious transactions on Calvary, there is an awful forsaking and a fearful darkness, emblematic of the righteousness and indignation of God, as there is also a melting tenderness in the words of our Lord breathing forgiveness and love, and telling of an opened paradise. The first book shows to us, near its commencement, a worshipper offering a lamb in sacrifice, and the last discloses a lamb as it had been slain, in the midst of the throne of God. To Moses he reveals himself as Jehovah, the Lord God, "merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, . . . and that will by no means clear the guilty." Paul speaks of him as "just, and yet the justifier of the ungodly;" and John, as "faithful and just to forgive us our sins." Whence this harmony

* Discourse by Professor Maclagan.

or rather unity in the Divine character? Whence this wonderful correspondence in the portraits drawn by so many different hands? We can account for it only by supposing that they all drew from one great original.

We have endeavoured to show that the God of revelation is also the God of nature, when nature is rightly expounded, and when all its phenomena are contemplated. An exalted view of the spiritual nature of man will at once conduct to a belief in the spiritual character of God. Enlarged conceptions of space and time, and of the magnitude of creation, will at once suggest an omnipotent and omnipresent God. The providence of God indicates wisdom and care, with government the most particular and minute. The moral principle in man, pointing to an excellence in God to be admired, but to an excellence which man does not possess, gives evidence of a holy God governing a fallen race. Leave out any of these classes of natural phenomena, and we have a God under some one or other of the partial and distorted forms in which he has been presented in different ages and nations. Combine the whole, and we have a God identical with the Jehovah of the Scriptures.

All professed religions have seized on some one or other of the features of God, and their votaries have been determined in the choice made by the prevailing sentiments of their hearts, and the habits in which they have been trained. In those eastern countries in which the mass of the people have been consigned to a slavish subjection to authority, the popular religions have represented the supernatural power as exercising an iron despotism, and exacting a deep prostration. The dreamy and meditative spirits of the same region, again, have cherished abstractions which widen, and are dissipated more and more, till they are lost in an illusive and ethereal nonentity. Among the more active, spirited, and liberty-loving nations of western Asia and eastern Europe, the popular faith became more individual, personal, and anthropomorphic, and they approached their gods with a greater feeling of familiarity. Each divinity among the Greeks had a special character with special objects of interest, and the Pantheon embodied all the popular virtues and vices of the country. In less civilized countries, where the inhabitants ranged through wide forests and over rugged mountains, and the tribes were generally at fierce war with each other, the presiding divinities

were painted in colours of blood, or in robes of darkness. And let us observe how, in each of these pictures, there is the seizing of some real feature of the character of God, though fearfully distorted, and brought out with horrid prominence. Vulgar minds would ascribe all this to the priesthood, forgetting that the priesthood itself, so different in different nations, is the product, and not the cause, of the tastes and cravings of our nature —which it may yet, however, by reaction, greatly foster and augment. And why, of all people, should the ancient Hebrews be the only nation which succeeded in embracing all that is great and lovely, to the exclusion of all that is degrading and offensive? Ingenious minds may speculate as they please, but sound reason will ever most fondly rest on the belief in a supernatural communication as alone able to explain the phenomenon.

How totally different is the God of the Hebrews from the divinities revered by those who lived in the neighbouring countries, and in the same states of society! What a difference between Jehovah on the one hand, and Osiris, or Baal, or Jupiter, not to speak of Astarte, and Venus, and Bacchus, on the other! The characters differ, not only in degree, but they belong to a different class or order, and are without a single common virtue, except that suggested by an unpacified conscience, as it points to a God displeased with human rebellion and folly.

The God of Israel, on the other hand, is altogether different from the God of the philosophers, whether of the demi-civilized nations of the East, of ancient Greece and Rome, or modern Europe. It might be easy, we are aware, to cull isolated passages from Plato, Cicero, and Seneca, in which there appear to be wonderfully enlarged views given of the Divine nature; but when the whole theology of these authors is taken in its combination, we find the select quotations to be utterly deceptive. Take Greece and Rome in their ripest periods, and examine their boasted "disciplines." The Epicureans removed their gods far above the care and supervision of human affairs; in short, as Cicero says, "admitted their existence in words, but denied it in fact."* The Academics may be regarded as represented by Cicero; they delighted in discussing everything, but they believed little. The Peripatetics habitually overlooked Divine things, and their views of God are acknowledged to be miserably meagre and

* Verbis ponunt, re tollunt Deos.—De Nat. Deor.

unsatisfactory. There remains only among these famous sects that of the Stoics, usually represented as the most advanced of all the sects of Greece or Rome in the knowledge of Deity. According to them, there was one great Divine Principle or Being, with a vast number of other gods. This Being or Principle was represented by them as of the nature of fire, and was identified with the element fire, regarded by them as the most elevated and powerful of all the elements. This Divine power of fire they represented as the governing principle of the universe, regulating all things by cycles. In these cycles, which followed one another in never-ending succession, there was a periodical conflagration, in which all things were consumed into the elemental fire or Divine principle, which at this period reigned alone. Then, in the proper course of development, this ethereal substance began to condense, and first the sun, the heavenly bodies, and the gods were formed, and then the earth and men, and these continued to act their allotted part till the cycle closed with another conflagration, in which heaven and earth, with gods and men, were absorbed in the Divine and all-devouring ether. It might be easy to find language in the writings of this sect sounding loftily to the ear, (the Stoics were addicted to lofty phrases in ethics and religion;) but such was really the theology of the sect which produced the hymn of Cleanthes, which Cicero selects to represent sound and enlightened theism, and which ranked among its votaries Seneca, Epictetus, and Antoninus, among the greatest divines and moralists of all heathen antiquity. May we not hold the Stoic Deity to be the highest product which the Greek and Roman intellect could furnish in Divinity?

How different, at this day, is the God of revelation, from the god of abstract and academic philosophy, whether it be that of speculative Germany, or sentimental France, matter-of-fact England, or Scotland with an intellect as hard as its rocks! These gods are all of a class. However they may differ in minor particulars, some of them being painted in more meagre and others in more gorgeous colours, they all agree in this, that they are shorn of the attribute of holiness. They all differ from the living and true God, who, while clothed in attributes as lofty as any which the reason of philosophers can develop, or the imagination of poets can conceive, is raised far above their crude conceptions, by being constituted a holy Governor and Judge.

But here we must draw a distinction, to save ourselves from a seeming contradiction. We assert, on the one hand, that from every mind there are reflected the living lineaments of the true God, and yet, on the other, that unaided reason has failed to exhibit them, except in a partial way. There is no real inconsistency here. The difficulties in the way of discovering the true character of God lie in the prejudices and partialities of the heart. These have so narrowed and warped the mind, that it has failed to rise to a full idea of the Divine character. Nevertheless, when that idea has been developed by those who have been carried up into a higher region by a supernatural power, the human mind may be capable of declaring that this notion is the true one. Nebuchadnezzar could not recall the "image of gold, and silver, and brass, and iron," which he had seen in the visions of the night, though he seems to have had some straggling recollections of it; but what his own memory and the knowledge of his sages could not produce, was accomplished by the prophet, when he made the figure stand distinctly, and with all its fulness of meaning, before him, and then he instantly recognised it. Now, we may hold, that there are on the human heart faint impressions of the Divine character, which it is difficult to read in the light of nature, but which, being read in the purer light of revelation, disclose the very God whom this revelation fully describes and exhibits. Some of the truths which we are expounding stand on the very horizon of human vision, and are seen very dimly by the unassisted eye; but when the optic glass of revelation is directed towards them, the misty shapes start into defined forms, and we are satisfied at once of the correctness of the guesses made without the telescope, and of the accuracy of the telescope which has given such distinctness to the indefinite. We are entitled, then, in perfect consistency, to wield a double argument—in the first place, to show that the scriptural view of the Divine character is altogether in unison with that furnished by the works of God; and, in the second place, from the beautiful agreement of the two, to establish the Divine original of that Word in which the Divine character is so accurately represented. So far from being contradictory, we believe that the one involves the other, and that they meet in the necessary harmony of true reason and real revelation.

All this appears the more evident, when we consider, that in

the various false religions which have appeared in the world, there are always to be found some of those conceptions which enter into the true idea. All religions exhibit some part of the truth, being that which the human heart was led to fix on in the circumstances. False and defective religions have, under the guidance of human nature, singled out merely those properties of God which impressed that nature, while in revelation we have the complete figure, drawn evidently by parties to whom God had immediately revealed himself.

In particular, we find, in all religions which have recommended themselves to large bodies of mankind, and which have exercised a powerful influence upon the human mind—a deep impression of man having rendered himself obnoxious by transgression to a God who has prescribed a moral law, and is offended by disobedience. The prevalence of such a sentiment shows how deeply it is seated in the human heart, and how unfitted philosophical theism (which provides nothing piacular) is to meet the felt wants of mankind. While the Scriptures have not overlooked this property of the Divine nature, they have stripped it of all the offensive adjuncts with which it is usually associated, and combined it with all those lofty natural perfections which the philosopher delights to contemplate, and with a love as unbounded and tender as the sentiments of man's heart have ever conceived; thus revealing a combination, of each part of which, the understanding, the conscience, and the affections are constrained to approve, but which, notwithstanding, has never been so exhibited, in its completeness, by the highest efforts of unaided reason.

CHAPTER II.

RESTORATION OF MAN.

SECT. I.—SYMPTOMS OF INTENDED RESTORATION.

Our argument under this particular section is far from being very consecutive or conclusive. It is safer, to say the least of it, to establish *a posteriori* that God has afforded a means of restoration, than to waste ingenuity in proving *a priori* that such an interposition of heaven is probable. In conducting this latter argument, we find invariably, that not a little is assumed which could have been discovered or rendered certain only by the revelation itself.

The few scattered observations which we have to offer are of an *a posteriori* and inductive character. We are to point to some facts which seem to indicate that God did intend to institute a method of restoring the race. In order to attain even such a presumption or probability, we must take into account two apparently opposite classes of facts.

First, we must carry along with us an acknowledgment of human guilt, and of God's enmity to sin. Without doing so, we cannot advance a step in the argument. Proceed on the idea that man is very much what God would have him to be, and it is impossible to find a ground on which to build an expectation of the interposition of heaven. It is at this point that the argument of those who would demonstrate *a priori* the necessity for a Divine revelation is felt to be weakest. If mankind are in an unfallen state, and their Maker upon the whole satisfied with them, no other improvement can be reasonably looked for, beyond that which may be expected to proceed from human intelligence and philanthropy. We cannot get a foundation for the argument till certain facts have been established. In the *a posteriori* reasoning now pursued, we proceed

on the demonstration which we have given of the sinfulness of the race, and the just indignation of the Governor of the world.

This fact alone, however, would not enable us to construct an argument. For it might be urged, with some plausibility, that God meant to allow the race to continue in their present degraded condition, without any special interference or restoration beyond that which might proceed from human agency.

And so we must, SECONDLY, take along with us the deep interest which God takes in the happiness and virtue of the race. Such facts as these press themselves upon our notice. (1.) There is the continued existence of mankind upon the earth, showing that, if God is displeased with human sinfulness, he is at the same time keeping up a system of government, having a special respect to them, and allowing them a period of respite and probation. (2.) There are the numberless bounties which mankind enjoy, shewing that, in spite of human sinfulness, God can be their benefactor. (3.) There are the pains which God is taking in his government to recommend and uphold virtuous conduct.

It is from the sharp collision of these classes of facts that we derive any spark fitted to shed light upon the destinies of our world. The former, if taken alone, could not lead us to suppose that God meant to do anything for a race under his displeasure. The latter, considered apart, might seem rather to indicate that God was contented with mankind, and meant to give them nothing beyond what they naturally possess. But let us take along with us the general fact that God is offended with human guilt, and connect it with the other fact that he is showering benefits upon the race; and there results a possibility, a presumption, if not a probability, that God intends to interpose for the vindication of a government which has been dishonoured, and the restoration of a race in which he is deeply interested. We cannot conceive of a thinking mind, seriously contemplating these two classes of facts, without there following a wish that there might be something to reconcile them—may we not add, without a hope or expectation, that the God who hates sin, and yet loves mankind, would manifest himself in a way fitted to exhibit his character under both these lights in combination? "I perceive that God is offended with mankind," would be the way in which such a mind would reason, "and I see that he is disposed to be merciful, and he would only be following out his

own method of procedure were he to devise and execute some plan by which man might know the mystery of his relation to God, and rise from his present degradation."

Upon these two general facts, some general considerations may be founded, carrying a certain weight with them.

(1.) Mankind seem to be a race fallen, but not a race abandoned—a race which cannot rise of itself, but a race which seems to be kept with care, because it is yet to rise. When we see persons taking pains to deck a tomb, we are led to suppose that they expect the dead to rise again. The paintings, the ornaments, and devices on the sepulchres of ancient Egypt and Etruria, all seem to indicate that those bodies on which such delicate attention was lavished were expected to spring up in renewed life and vigour. Some of our readers may have been struck with the graphic description which a popular writer gives of the present condition of the Holy Land, appearing as if it were just waiting for the promised renovation.* "They shall build the old wastes, they shall raise up the former desolations, and they shall repair the waste cities, the desolations of many generations." And seeming as if they were waiting the fulfilment of this prediction, there is a soil—gathering in depth and fertility; and in the east of the Jordan, there are numberless cities without inhabitants, (Buckingham saw from one rocky eminence upwards of twenty-five,) but with the houses yet standing—in some instances, so many as 800 deserted dwellings, all ready for the inhabitants who are yet to dwell in them. And does it not look as if, after the same way, there were among the ruins of our nature some materials which God is keeping with care, that he may rear a new fabric? While, like the old men in Judah, we weep over the recollection of a glorious temple fallen, may we not with the younger men shout at the prospect of a more glorious temple yet to be built?

(2.) It does look as if our earth were waiting for something greater and better than has ever yet been realized. "For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope; because the creature itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the

* Keith's Land of Israel, chap. viii.

children of God; for we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now." Inanimate nature and the lower animals do not serve the noble ends which they would have served had man walked upon the earth a pure and sinless being. The air of heaven, as we breathe it, has to pass through bodies which have been polluted by sin. The food which the earth furnishes has been commonly employed to pamper the bodies of those who give no thanks to God, and to nourish strength which has been expended in breaking his law and dishonouring his name. That sun which was to have lighted mankind on errands of love, has now to shed its beams upon the evil and the unjust, as they prosecute their schemes of selfish aggrandizement. And that lovely moon, and these chaste stars, have they not to look on still darker deeds of criminality which dare not face the light of day? May we not hope, that these great and beauteous works of God were preserved for a grander purpose than they have ever yet served? that this air is yet to be breathed by, and the light of these heavenly bodies to shine upon, beings as pure as they themselves are?

(3.) How universal, too, the restlessness, how deep the groanings and travailings of the human race! This world is not now, and never has been, what its inhabitants would wish it to be. Hence the constant endeavours to improve it, and which are successful at least in changing it. Whether taken individually or collectively, humankind do not feel themselves to be at ease. There is a deep uneasiness in every human bosom, arising from desires which have not been gratified, and craving appetites for good which has not yet been attained. This prominent feature of the individual is also a characteristic of the race. What never-ending schemes for the improvement of mankind, all proceeding on the principle that mankind need to be improved! Science is advancing its discoveries, and politics its reforms, and all to remove the evils under which the world is labouring. Some of these projects, it is true, are utterly impracticable—many of them leave the world just as they found it; but still, the very eagerness with which they are proposed and pursued shows that man is not satisfied with his present condition and the world in which he dwells. His exertions are too often like the struggles of the fever-patient, issuing in no permanent improvement of his condition, but the writhings and groanings prove that he is

in pain, and would wish to be in a different position. Can we suppose that such universal wishes and expectations would be excited without a deep reason? Do not the universality and the fundamental depth of the desires seem to indicate that they may be gratified?

(4.) Let it be frankly admitted that there is progress in the world. There is progress in agriculture; there is progress in all the arts; there is progress in all the sciences; the earth is every succeeding year made to yield a greater quantity of produce, and man's dominion over nature is rapidly increasing. The fruit of the discoveries of one age contains the germ of the discoveries of the generation that follows; and the new plant springs up alongside of the old one, to scatter seed like its progenitor all around. No valuable invention of human genius is ever lost, and most of them become the means of multiplying themselves by a greater than compound interest, and thus render each succeeding generation richer than the one which went before. The wealth of all preceding generations is thus to be poured into the lap of the generations that are to live in the latter days of our world's history.

How sad to think, that amidst all these improvements in the arts and secular knowledge, there should be no corresponding improvement in the *morale* of the human character! A thousand means have been tried, and the tendency of many of them has been excellent; yet human nature has continued as vain, as proud, and selfish, as much given to lust and passion as it ever was. When some one was enlarging to Coleridge on the tendency of some scheme which was expected to regenerate the world, the poet flung up into the air the down of a thistle which grew by the roadside, and went on to say, "The tendency of that thistle is towards China; but I know, with assured certainty, that it will never get there—nay, it is more than probable, that after sundry eddyings, and gyrations up and down, and backwards and forwards, it will be found somewhere near the place in which it grew." Such has ever been the issue of those boasted schemes of human wisdom which have professed to change the heart of man. Human nature is in this respect like the salt sea; the sun is daily evaporating its waters, but does not drink up one particle of that saline ingredient; if men will drink of its bitter waters, they sicken, and madden, and die; all the rivers that run

into it have not changed its saltness. It is thus with that malignant nature which we inherit and propagate, all human means have failed to purify it, and it stimulates to madness, disease, and death.

But is there to be a physical and an intellectual, and no moral progress? Is the lesser to advance, and the greater to remain stationary? Does God take a greater interest in the improvement of human knowledge and refinement than in that of the heart and conduct? Is he to dissever more and more the physical and the intellectual from the moral and religious; to move on the one, while the other continues where it was, to impress us the more with the fearful gap between? Or, rather, does not the whole government of God show that he values the former chiefly as subsidiary to the latter? In the past progress of the one, we have thus a presumption in favour of the coming progress of the other. The one advances by human agency under the ordinary proceeding of Providence; it requires, no doubt, means, but not miracles. The other, it seems, cannot attain its end through mere human activity; and since it can be accomplished in no other way, we call in the intervention of God, and feel as if such were necessary, in order to the harmony and completeness of plans at present in operation.

Some of these considerations may seem to be brought from a great distance, but by their collection and clustering, they appear to us to form a pleasant belt of light—a kind of milky way, hung over our world, in this its dark night, to give light to the traveller who has set out in search of truth.

SECT. II.—WHAT IS NEEDFUL IN ORDER TO THE RESTORATION OF MAN—(1.) IN RELATION TO THE CHARACTER OF GOD.

We feel now as if we had firmer ground to stand on. It is difficult to prove *a priori* that God should interpose for the rectification of his own government, and the improvement of human character. There is less difficulty in fixing on the points which require vindication.

The gospel professes to be remedial, and remedial of an evil affecting the laws of God, and the character and condition of man. It is in its reference to the Divine government that we are to discover, if indeed we can discover anywhere, its appropriateness.

Now, we find the plan of redemption fitted in every particular to meet the evils existing in the world, as these present themselves to an earnest and thoughtful mind. This adaptation furnishes one of the highest of all the internal proofs in favour of the religion of the Bible. There may be an argument derived from the beauty of the style, so much superior to what might be expected from Hebrew shepherds and Galilean fishermen; and an argument from the heavenly elevation and purity of the morality; but there may be an argument of a still higher order obtained, from the fitness of the whole scheme in its reference to the government of God and the state of mankind. That these excellencies should all have met in a cunningly-devised fable of certain Hebrew writers, is a supposition vastly more improbable than that the religion should have descended from heaven. Those who ridicule the alleged credulity of the Christian, are themselves obliged to yield their assent to the most monstrous incredibilities.

Nature cannot tell beforehand how a Divine intervention is to accomplish its object, for that intervention must be beyond nature, beyond all its findings and experience. It can announce, however, that if it meet the clamant evils, it must be of a twofold character, corresponding to the twofold derangement.

FIRST, THERE MUST BE A PROVISION FOR VINDICATING THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT, DISHONOURED BY THE REBELLION OF THE CREATURE, AND THIS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARACTER OF GOD. THEN, SECONDLY, THERE MUST BE A PROVISION FOR RECTIFYING THE HEART AND NATURE OF MAN. The first of these is found in the righteousness and sufferings of the Mediator, as giving glory to God, and effecting a reconciliation; and the second is provided in the inward operation of the Sanctifier. In the one, God's government is justified; and by the other, man's character is sanctified.

FIRST, THE INTERVENTION MUST PROVIDE FOR THE VINDICATION OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.

"Of law, there can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is in the bosom of God; her voice, the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, admiring her

as the mother of their peace and joy."* If so much can be justly said of law, what is to be said of those who have set this law at defiance, and that under its most sacred form—the form of moral law? No proposed scheme for dispensing pardon deserves to be looked at which does not provide a means of upholding that law.

This moral law points to God as giving and defending it, and when we look to him we are constrained by our moral nature to regard him as a being who hates evil and who punishes it. The conscience of man not only approves of the good but disapproves of the evil, and declares that the evil is deserving of punishment. Besides, an abhorrence of evil is an essential element in holy exercises of will. If we follow out the intimations given by these facts of our moral constitution, we must believe that God hates sin, and that as upholder of the law and Governor of the world, he ought to punish transgression. We have the very same evidence of all this, as we have of the fact that God approves of the good, and will reward it. We are entitled to say, not metaphorically or anthropomorphologically, or in the way of accommodation to man, but literally and truly, that God hates sin—not as a personal offence against himself—but that he hates sin as sin, and has a feeling of holy indignation against the perpetrator.† He who proposes to provide a

* Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity.

† All systems of atonement (that of Mr. Maurice, for example) are defective, which do not embrace (along with other elements) a means of reconciling a God who hates and who punishes sin. But let it be carefully observed, that it is not a retaliation or revenge for a personal offence that God is supposed to require. This is the only idea of an atonement which some (*e.g.* Mr. Greg in his Creed of Christendom, p. 262) are able to entertain, and hence they wonder how God should not at once forgive sin as man may forgive a personal slight. But we have seen in examining the moral constitution of man, that the disapproval of sin, (see p. 341,) and the hatred of sin, (p. 314,) differ in their whole nature from the mere resentment on account of offence given, (p. 425.) The two first belong to the moral constituents of man, the conscience, and the will, and the last to his emotional nature. It has been customary with these same parties, Christian and Antichristian, to represent the punishment of sin as merely something following sin in the course of things, "not the execution of a sentence, but the occurrence of an effect." True, it is an effect following in the course of things, but the question arises, who hath appointed this order of things? The course of events might surely have been otherwise. The course of things brings punishment because God hath so appointed it, and God hath so appointed it because he hates sin. In order to avoid the effect, there must be a means of rendering satisfaction to the justice of God.

scheme by which the sinner can be received into favour, must not be allowed to overlook these essential elements of the Divine nature and perfections.

In contemplating its moral state and the relation in which it stands to God, the mind of man has ever felt in its unsophisticated musings that there must be some satisfaction given to God and his law. Hence the services which the heathen have paid to God, and the sacrifices which they have offered with the view of appeasing him. These "unconscious prophecies" (as Trench has called them) of the one great offering and sacrifice, shew that man feels his need of reconciliation with a God who has had just cause of displeasure. Yet they point to the need of a true saviour less by what they furnish than by its palpable insufficiency to effect the end contemplated. What man brings shews that he has felt the void, but shews, too, that he cannot fill it. The remedies applied prove that disease exists, but prove at the same time that they are unfit to heal it.

There is something in man's nature which intimates that God, in calling—as he does call—his creatures into judgment, demands of them that they bring an obedience. It is because of this deeply seated feeling that there are such exertions made by the thoughtful to procure a righteousness; hence the ceremonial services to which mankind naturally resort, "going about to establish a righteousness of their own." Need we shew how vain the attempt? For why does God demand obedience? It is because of his very nature and character as a just God, and from the relation in which he stands to his creatures as their Governor. But the same attribute of God which leads him to demand obedience, makes him also demand that it be an obedience in all things, at all times, and in all places. The conscience is in this respect in unison with the Word of God, and announces that the righteousness which man brings should be spotless and perfect. But then, in transacting with God, no given man can present any such righteousness.

As feeling this, man has ever anxiously looked round for a substitute, and would fondly believe that he has found such in a priesthood, or in some creature representative. But the proposed substitution, while it shows the feeling of need, only brings out the more strikingly the impotence of the remedy. For a fellow-man, from the circumstance that he is a sinner, cannot

give for himself such an obedience as God exacts, and still less can he give it for others. Nay, no other creature of God can provide such a righteousness for him, for every creature is required as for himself to fulfil the universal law of God, and after he has loved the Lord with all his heart and discharged every commanded duty; he has not acquired any merit of supererogation to be carried over to the account of another. Not only so, but it might seem as if God himself were precluded from providing anything to suit the transgressor, and that this inability arose from his very greatness. The righteousness required of man is obedience, and the only righteousness which can be of any use to him must partake of the nature of obedience. But God, as the author of the law, the Governor of the world, cannot give obedience. Herein lay the difficulty in the way of the restoration of a fallen being. Incapable of redeeming himself, no creature can possibly have any superfluous righteousness to impute to him, and it might seem as if God himself could not provide what man requires.

Three important facts are now before us. Man has felt the want; he has tried to supply it; and he has failed. Feeling that the heavens are at such a distance, he would construct a chain by which to mount to them, and he finds that he has nothing whereon to hang it. But where man has failed, God has succeeded, and by means which man could not have anticipated, but which, when announced, commend themselves to his moral nature as fitted to meet the evils which he had ever been endeavouring to remedy, but without success.

It is when we consider it in its fitness to solve all these problems, and harmonize all these oppositions, that we see the manifold wisdom of the mystery once hid but now unfolded, "the mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh." The majesty of the law is upheld, the justice of God is satisfied, and an obedience is provided by one from whom obedience is not required as for himself, but who has power in himself, and puts himself in circumstances to render it. In order to accomplish these ends, and to display at one and the same time the two essential moral attributes of God, his justice, and his benevolence, one of the persons of the ever-existing and ever-blessed Godhead associates himself with humanity, and becomes

"obedient unto death," fulfilling the law in its precepts, and submitting to its penalty.

"I HAVE GLORIFIED THEE UPON THE EARTH." We reckon this language as very remarkable. We know not if God has been dishonoured anywhere throughout a boundless universe so much as he has been upon the earth. Revelation, indeed, speaks of the angels who fell; but, with their exception, we know not if any other creatures of God, in any other world, have so dishonoured him by breaking his commandments; and in regard to them, the righteousness of God was instantly vindicated by their being consigned to punishment. But for these four thousand years which had run their course, before the appointed Deliverer came down to this earth, one generation of men after another had gone on dishonouring his name and breaking his laws with apparent impunity. Never had God been so dishonoured without an instant and public vindication of his justice. But on the very earth where he had been so dishonoured, is he now glorified. This is done in the work of the appointed Substitute, in which the law is magnified and made honourable, and divine justice satisfied, while room is opened up for the fullest manifestation of the divine mercy. This is done in the name and nature of those who had so dishonoured God, so that, as by man God has been dishonoured, by man God is now glorified. All this is done at the very place at which the wickedness of man had been so great; so that, as on the earth God had been dishonoured, so now, on the earth, God is glorified.

That we may be the more forcibly impressed with this exhibition of the divine glory, let us convey ourselves, in imagination, into the heart of those dark scenes into which the Redeemer is represented as having entered immediately after the utterance of the words on which we have been commenting. At the darkest hour of that night, a band of officers, headed by an apostate apostle, come with glaring torches to apprehend him. His other followers, after showing a momentary courage, speedily abandon him. He is dragged before the tribunal of the high priest, where, on the testimony of lying witnesses, bribed for the purpose, that high priest pronounces a sentence of condemnation on him, from whom, though he little thinks of it, his office derives all its authority. In the courts of the judge, we hear, mingled with the scoffs and jeers of the multitude, the cursing, swearing,

and open falsehood of an apostle. He is now carried to the judgment of the civil governor, by whom the decision is referred to the people, who loudly demand that he should be exposed to the most painful and humbling of all deaths, and the governor, convinced all the time of his innocence, orders him to be crucified. All parties take their part in the scene. The soldiers scourge him; and as he moves along the streets of that city which had heard his discourses of unparalleled wisdom, and witnessed his miracles of astonishing power, the multitude cover him with infamy. It is amidst derision that he is nailed to the accursed tree. His dying agonies move no compassion. One of the thieves crucified along with him reviles him, as a greater malefactor than himself. His prayers, breathing of divine compassion and melting love, are answered back by reproaches and scorn. Where else can such concentrated wickedness be met with? Blindness and darkness of mind, unbelief in spite of overwhelming evidence, ingratitude for unnumbered favours, injustice, perjury, profanity, malignity, unappeasable revenge,—and all this against the meekest of all men—all this against God who is blessed for ever. It might seem as if God had never been so insulted and defied. We wonder not that the earth should have trembled and shuddered, as if desirous to cast forth such wickedness from its bosom. We wonder not that the sun should have hid his face as unable to look on such a scene, more horrific than the most wicked which he had seen in all his unwearied rounds. But it was at the very place at which man was most dishonouring God that his representative was glorifying him. Where man was exhibiting the most appalling wickedness, *there* his surety was giving the most signal display of goodness. Where man, breaking loose from all restraint, was abandoning himself to open rebellion, *there* his substitute was becoming obedient even unto death. Where the wildest passions that ever stirred the human heart were raging uncontrolled, *there* one in our own name and nature was giving the most moving display of a tenderness which could not be ruffled, and of a love which could not be quenched. Where sin abounded, *there* righteousness did much more abound. The representative is lifted high upon the cross, that he might become a spectacle, and in the view of all men, in the view of wondering angels, and in the view of God, glorify God wherein he had been most dishonoured

We may now define and gather into a head the general observations which have passed before us.

In contemplating this world, the thinking mind discovers a twofold derangement, and each presenting itself under a twofold aspect. Under one aspect we observe a government obviously orderly, yet filled with disorder. Under another aspect we perceive man, a sinful being, covered with kindness, and yet called to give an account of his deeds to a God who hates sin. These four facts will not be disputed by any man who has thoughtfully contemplated the world, or seriously examined his own nature. We everywhere meet with order, and also with sin, which is certainly disorder. The same moral nature announces to us that God hates sin, and that man has sinned. It must be difficult for a reflecting mind to deny any one of these four facts —almost as difficult as to deny the very existence of God, or the distinction between good and evil. How wonderful, that in a system originating in the sequestered land of Judah, we should have a plan in which they are all embraced and reconciled, the double derangement which they exhibit provided for, and mercy extended to the reconciled transgressor, while the order of the Divine government is upheld, and the justice of God completely satisfied! That land, shut out from intercourse with the rest of the world, must, we are constrained to believe, have had a special communication with heaven.

SECT. III.—WHAT IS NEEDFUL IN ORDER TO THE RESTORATION OF MAN—(2.) IN ITS RELATION TO THE CHARACTER OF MAN; THE NEED OF AN INTERPOSITION IN THE HUMAN HEART AND CHARACTER.

The need of such an interposition, in order to the rectification of a clamant evil, becomes visible whether we look at society at large, or inspect our own bosoms.

The infidel writers of last century were wont, in furtherance of the objects which they had in view, to represent savage life as one of spotless innocence and perfect peace. The visits of travellers, sufficiently shrewd to look beneath the surface, have served to dispel the illusion, and to demonstrate that there is more cunning and deceit, and no less selfishness and malignity, among rude than among civilized nations.

Again, there are persons who announce with oracular authority that advancing civilisation will change the very character of society. They forget that increasing knowledge, while it holds out new encouragements to excellence, also furnishes additional instruments and facilities to all that is evil. The art of printing, for instance, through which useful knowledge is disseminated, is also the medium through which scandal, vice, and irreligion propagate themselves; and this they are doing, to an incredible extent, in this our country in the present day, through the millions of noxious publications which annually issue from the press. The rapid modes of travelling and communication which modern times enjoy, and which enable the good to exercise a wider influence, admit, at the same time, of the more effectual and speedy transmission of all that is corrupt, baleful, and infectious. We require only to open our eyes, and not to shut our ears, to discover vice presenting itself with as unabashed and disgusting an aspect, and uttering as blasphemous words in the present, as in any other age of the world. In some respects, indeed, civilisation has reformed the outward man, whitened the outside of the sepulchre, but it has left it within as full of corruption as before.

The inhabitant of some busy town, wearied with its prevailing artifice and selfishness, its competitions in trade and rivalships in rank and family, repairs for a season to some sequestered village or secluded glen; and the peace and serenity that reign around him, the absence of all turmoil and open crime, leave upon him the impression that the character of the inhabitants is as lovely as are the works of God among which they dwell. Alas! he needs only a little deeper acquaintance with those who seem so innocent and simple, to find the same passions at work, and the same feuds and jealousies, as in the bustling city population. The countryman repays the visit of the citizen at a different season, and is surprised at and delighted with the comfort, the elegance, the courtesy, and apparent affection which everywhere fall under his view. It requires some little inquiry to discover that pride, vanity, and ungodliness, are beating and reigning in bosoms so decked and adorned as to conceal every rankling passion within. Should he go forth from the narrow precincts of the refined into the haunts of the lowest population of our cities, he will feel his sensibility affected by deeper sinks

of iniquity than are to be found in any previous age of the world's history.

All classes of men bear, if we but narrowly examine them, the traces of their common lineage. You may discover them to belong to the race by their sins and passions, as well as by their bodily frames and common features. This common nature breaks forth and exhibits itself in each individual. The fond mother, as she rocks her child to rest on her bosom, or plays herself with its playfulness, is tempted to think that one so engaging can never be torn by wild passions. Yet it is most certain, that this child will no sooner begin to act as a moral and responsible being, than it will show an evil heart. That child, grown up to youth, and engrossed with the objective world as it dances before the eye, and seldom looking down into the dark subjective, is just as unaware as the mother was of the wickedness slumbering within, till perhaps it has carried him to a length at which he sees how far he is from innocence, but feels that retreat is cut off, and that there is nothing for him but to advance.

The remedy for such evils, in order to be effectual, must be a universal remedy, admitting of application to all ranks of men and stages of society, to poor and rich, savage and civilized. If one of these classes requires it, it can be shown, by a like reason, that all the others require it. Society, as it advances, opens up more exquisite pleasures, but it brings, too, more exquisite pains; it multiplies enjoyment, but it multiplies sorrow also; it kindles hopes, but it often quenches them amidst fearful anguish. Our readers may be reminded of that fine passage in which Burke speaks of the pity which we should feel for the "distresses of the miserable great," and the "fat stupidity and gross ignorance concerning what imports men most to know, which prevails at courts, and at the head of armies, and in senates, as much as at the loom and in the field." "They, too, are among the unhappy. They feel personal pain and domestic sorrow. In these they have no privilege, but are subject to pay their full contingent to the contributions levied on mortality. They want this sovereign balm under their gnawing cares and anxieties, which, being less conversant about the limited wants of animal life, range without limit, and are diversified by infinite combinations in the wild and unbounded regions of imagination.

Some charitable dole is wanting to these our often very unhappy brethren to fill the gloomy void that reigns in minds which have nothing on earth to hope or fear; something to relieve, in the killing languor and over-laboured lassitude of those who have nothing to do; something to excite an appetite to existence, in the pallid satiety which attends on all pleasures which may be bought; where nature is not left to her own process, where even desire is anticipated, and therefore fruition defeated by meditated schemes and contrivances of delight, and no interval, no obstacle is interposed between the wish and the accomplishment." Every one who has read the lives of the poets, and other persons possessed of that fearful gift, the gift of genius, knows that minds finely and tensely strung are fully as liable to be deranged as others, and need, no less than those who are exposed to the temptations of wealth and rank, the application of this soothing medicament.

But in order to discover the real depths of human depravity, and the extent of human helplessness, we must look beyond the mere outward action into the heart. It has been most mercifully enacted, that no man can look directly into the heart of another; but it has been most wisely provided, that every man can look into his own heart, and he is so far entitled to take it as a type or representative of our common nature. But no man can carefully inspect his own nature without being constrained to admit that he needs strength higher than his own to enable him to keep the law of God.

But if there be some one under the impression that he can of himself fulfil the will of God, apart from supernatural aid, we invite him to make the experiment. Let him determine to perform all his duty, and walk for ever in the light of purity, and all by his own strength of resolution. We are ready to admit, that there is much which he may do of himself. He may perform the ordinary business of life, discharge the courtesies of kind and obliging neighbourhood, and attend to the external forms and observances of religion. He may succeed in doing many a deed of kindness to a neighbour, and in refraining from acts of open immorality; he may acquire the habit of uttering a cold and formal prayer morning and evening. Some have attained to a character so becoming, that the most jealous and prying eye cannot detect in it a single outside blemish.

They have become as righteous as the straitest of the sect of the Pharisees, with no charity, but still with the most perfect correctness; with no meekness or humility, but still with the sternest rigidity. But let it be remembered, that there is something more than this requisite in order to our fulfilling the law of God. For the law is on this wise;—that a man love the Lord with all his heart, and his neighbour as himself; and that he live habitually under the influence of these affections, and of others flowing from them, and obligatory upon him in the condition in which he finds himself. Let the person who is inclined to make the supposed experiment, ponder this law in its purity and extent, and the probability is, that, previous to making the attempt, he will be oppressed with its utter hopelessness.

But there is a self-confident man not so easily appalled by difficulties. By all means then let him make the attempt, and let us watch him as he does so. Let him resolve to create this supreme love which he owes to his Creator, and the other kindred spiritual dispositions. For this purpose, he seats himself in the quiet and retirement of his closet, and resolves that he will induce or compel himself to love the Lord with all his heart. Knowing that it is conception that determines feeling, he calls up an image of God. First, he pictures a being of awful majesty and infinite power, and corresponding feelings of awe and wonder rise up in his mind. Again, he represents God as delighting in the happiness of his creatures, and for an instant there is a pleasing emotion playing upon the surface of his mind, and he begins to imagine that he has been successful. But suppose that the idea of the holiness of the Divine nature, shining in all its dazzling splendour, now rises up before his view, and that he feels himself to be a sinner in immediate contact with this searching light—we venture to affirm, that the contemplation will become less pleasant, and that, writhing under an unpleasant inspection, he will be tempted to turn away to other and less holy, and therefore more pleasing topics; or his love will be turned into slavish fear, and he will scarcely dare to gaze any longer upon this focus of light in the heavens —and the brighter the beams, he will be all the readier to turn away his eye to the lower, and what is to him the lovelier and greener scenery of this earth; or if, in obstinate determination, he continue to gaze, we venture to affirm, that the very light

shall appear as darkness—as when the eye gazes long on the sun, he becomes shorn of his greatness and grandeur, and is seen a blank and uninteresting surface.

Such must be the fruitless issue of all attempts to create spiritual affection to a spiritual God. The man may say, Let there be light; but no light will arise. The result will be the same, should the experimenter attempt the performance of any of the specific duties which he owes to God. But if not convinced, let him make the effort in the spirit of Luther, and the failure will tend to give him a deeper sense of the ungodliness of his heart. Let him resolve to repent of his transgressions: for this purpose he would call up his sins; alas! it is only to find the treacherous memory dwelling rather on the good qualities that are supposed to make amends for them, or fixing on the pleasures which the sins have conveyed, and so tempting him anew to the commission of them. Or let him resolve to pray, as is his duty; he will find, that even while the words proceed from his lips, the heart is blank and void; that there is the attitude without the feeling of reverence—the prostration of the body without the humiliation of the soul. He may bring the sacrifice to the altar, as the priests of Baal did on Mount Carmel; but, apart from the opening of heaven to let down an influence, he will be as little capable of kindling it, as the priests referred to by cutting their bodies could bring down fire, which at once descended to the prayer of Elijah.

Such considerations as these should show, that as spiritual dispositions do not spring up spontaneously in the breast, so neither can they be forced. And if they refuse to give their momentary attendance when called, what reason have we to think that they will abide? And yet it is required, not only that we entertain them at certain times, as when a present object calls them forth, as when in a temple of God, and listening to a discourse on an exciting topic, or to music which causes our feelings to rise or fall with its notes, but that they be cherished habitually, and become the guiding principles of the life. Let it be supposed, for the sake of argument, that our experimenter has raised a momentary love to God by the force of native resolution; or, what may very possibly be, that he is temporarily under the influence of high religious emotion. The question now is, Will these feelings continue? If it be difficult to kindle the spark,

it will be found still more difficult to preserve it from being extinguished by every burst of earthly passion. It is

> "The most difficult of tasks, to keep
> Heights which the soul is competent to gain."—WORDSWORTH.

There are times, no doubt, when there is a fervour naturally produced by the atmosphere in which the man happens to be placed; but there is a risk that his emotional temperature will sink as he goes into a different and colder atmosphere, as instantly as his bodily temperature when he has gone out of a warm apartment into the chill of a frosty night. Every careful observer of humankind knows that there are certain minds which, like mirrors, reflect the object passing before them, but only so long as it passes before them. When full under some heavenly truths, the emotions produced are lovely as those images of rocks and trees and clouds which we have seen reflected on the bosom of a tranquil lake—beautiful while they last, but removed by the first ruffling of the passing breeze. Not only so, but in the natural recoil and collapse, there is a possibility that the high excitement may speedily terminate in apathy or in enmity. The flame, beautiful while it lasts, dies down, and nothing remains but ashes. There are tides in human feeling, just as there are tides in the ocean; and because the tide is flowing now, there is no assurance of its continuing to flow—we may rather fear that it will soon ebb and recede. The man feels a momentary interest in religion, and he becomes vain in the thought that it is to continue; and this very vanity becomes the passage that leads him away to a far different temper. To-day, he weeps over his sins; and before he is aware of it, he is rejoicing in iniquity on the morrow. His efforts, even when they seem to be successful, are merely like the rippling on the surface of a stream made by winds opposed to the current; they have indeed a slight effect, and may make the careless spectator imagine that the waters are flowing in an opposite direction, but meanwhile the current beneath is flowing on in its proper course as determinedly as ever. His elevations are like those of a ship buoyed up on the top of a wave, seemingly above the earth, but never so high as heaven, and from this height he is apt to fall into the contiguous hollow. All this shows, that while man, by his unaided strength, may rise a little above his habitual level of earthliness,

he cannot soar to the heavenly regions of purity and peace; and that if he seek, Icarus-like, to mount by earthly means, his flight may only make his fall the more lamentable.

Nor is our argument exhausted. The difficulties are seen to be immeasurably increased, when we consider, that man has not only holy dispositions to cultivate, but sinful dispositions to conquer. The carnal thoughts and feelings found in such rank luxuriance, all spring up with a native and spontaneous power. We think that we have succeeded, at some particular time, in destroying them; but, like noxious weeds, whose roots are interwoven with the soil, and whose seeds are scattered throughout it, when cut down in one quarter they speedily spring up in another. But should there be some one, confident that he can subdue them all in his own strength, we encourage him to make the effort. Let him say to his unruly thoughts and passions, "Thus far, but no farther, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed," and mark if the waters will roll back at his command. There will be times, indeed, when, removed from excitement and temptation, he may think that he is succeeding; at their natural ebb, the waters may seem to be obeying him, and fleeing as if in terror. But when they begin to flow in full tide, he will not be able to master them; and they will roll over him, with as little regard to his commands as the waves once rolled over the feet of the Saxon monarch, who showed his courtiers, when they were seeking to give him too exalted an idea of his power, how little control he had over nature without him, by an experiment not unlike that which we have instituted to show how little control we have over nature within us.

This evil, then, the evil of man's inability to raise himself, we find pressing upon our notice in all directions; and to meet it, we find the revealed redemption proffering the supernatural aid of the Spirit of God.

SECT. IV.—SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED—MEANS OF APPLYING THE AID.

We are now to mark the appropriateness of the method in which the aid is dispensed. It is in admirable adaptation to the constitution of man. The four indestructible principles in the

human agent are—the REASON, the CONSCIENCE, the AFFECTIONS, and the WILL; and let us observe the manner in which each of these is addressed.

I. THE REASON IS ADDRESSED. We are required to believe, but to believe on evidence. This evidence is partly external, arising from miracles properly attested, and the fulfilment of prophecy; partly, indeed chiefly, internal, being such adaptations as those we are now considering, many of them being as wonderful and conclusive as those brought to prove the existence of God. In this, the Christian religion stands alone. There are persons who talk of the rivalry of religions as an excuse for adopting none, but in this respect there is no rivalry. Other religions, Pagan or Mohammedan, claim the beliefs of their votaries, on the ground of mere authority or descent from ancestors, of terror or blind feeling. Of all religions, Christianity is the only one which professes to be founded on evidence, and which is at pains to furnish it.

II. THE CONSCIENCE. (1.) *The conscience is pacified.* Conscience, we have seen, is a reflex faculty, judging of action presented to it. Sin, presented to it as sin, it must ever condemn. The sinner finds little difficulty in deadening it, at least at times, by presenting sin under a false aspect. But to pacify the conscience, to give it real and deep satisfaction, this surpasses the utmost exertions of human ingenuity. And yet, without such a satisfaction, the conscience will ever crave; or if occasionally lulled into slumber, it is only that it may awake in renewed vigour. Repentance, we have seen, cannot appease it, nor can self-inflicted tortures assuage it—they merely indicate that the mind is writhing with pain. In order to the pacifying of the conscience, there must be clear evidence that God is pacified. The attempts made in superstition, under all its forms, show that the human mind feels that God is offended, and that it is needful to provide a satisfaction. The conscience, in telling us that we have sinned, announces that God is holy, and cannot overlook sin. Nor will it be satisfied with a declaration that God will overlook sin; this would only puzzle and perplex the mind, as landing it in a seeming contradiction. The announcement that God overlooks sin would ever be met by a counter announcement, that God cannot overlook it. Human skill has not been able to reconcile this contradiction; and so it has never suc-

ceeded in doing more than deceiving the conscience, which is the readier to exact revenge, when the fraud is detected. But if it is needful, as every one admits, in order to the pacifying of the conscience, that God be pacified, it seems equally necessary, in order to its satisfaction, that a ground be presented on which God can be satisfied in consistency with the holiness of his character. In every system of proffered mercy in which no such provision is made, a double voice will be heard, as it were, ringing in the ear—the one saying, God is pleased; the other saying, God is angry; and the mind, instead of being at rest, will be distracted between them.

But let us mark how in the gospel system God is represented as pacified, and pacified in strict accordance with the maintenance of justice. Under it, our moral nature is oppressed with no sense of incongruity, when it is declared that sin is forgiven. We believe not only that the heart is melted by the expression of the Divine tenderness, but that our moral nature is made to approve of God, and entertains a more exalted conception than ever of his unbending rectitude. On the scheme being presented, and on the understanding being convinced that it has the sanction of heaven, the conscience, the feelings are satisfied—the whole soul is satisfied.

It is in this light that God is everywhere represented in the Scriptures. From the day on which man fell, God is presented to man under the double aspect of a just God and a great Saviour. The sentences pronounced on the guilty parties in Eden tell of an offended God, who has, however, provided a means of reconciliation. Sacrifices from henceforth become an essential part of all acceptable worship; and in them the worshipper, laying his hand on the animal, devotes it to destruction in his room and stead, in acknowledgment that he himself deserves to die, and yet in confident expectation of forgiveness through a substitute. The ancient Jew prayed morning and evening with his face towards the tabernacle or temple in which the lamb was being offered in sacrifice, and this in token of his belief in a means by which his person and services were accepted. The types of the Old Testament are still employed in the New Testament as means of communicating instruction, and serve the same purpose as pictures and symbols in a skilfully taught elementary school. The Old Testament is not superseded by

the New. The one is a preparation for the other, not only historically, but also to some extent morally, in the training of the mind of the disciple. Introduce the reader into the New Testament, untutored by the Old, and he will feel a difficulty in grasping several of its truths. There is a great depth of meaning in the saying of an apostle, that the law is our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ. Besides supplying a body and a life to our conceptions, the Old Testament ordinances positively give us some of the conceptions themselves.

We have seen that the conscience decides according to the view presented to it. Hence the importance of right conception, in order to the satisfying of the conscience. Hence the pains which God took to raise a people in ancient times—the Israelites, for instance, just delivered from bondage in Egypt—to correct views of God, and the relation in which they stood to him. All that training through which they were put, has been handed down to us as a legacy, in much the same way as the discoveries in science and the arts are handed down from one age to another.* We become trained, as it were, in their training, and all that we may rise to correct conceptions of the character of God, and of the relation subsisting between him and man. We confidently affirm, that no other conception of the Divine character can satisfy all the essential parts of the constitution which God hath given to man—can satisfy at once the conscience and the affections.

Such is the view presented in the earliest revelation which God gave of himself. In the New Testament, the same view is exhibited, but much more clearly; and we have "Jesus Christ evidently set forth as crucified," and God displayed in "the face of his Son." "The only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." So far as we are under the faith of the New Testament, we cannot look up to heaven without discovering an advocate, which is Jesus Christ the Righteous, standing at the right hand of God, or a Lamb before the throne.

We have this very strikingly exhibited in the latest revelation

* We have seen (pp. 119-128) that there is a typical system in nature; there is also a typical system in the Word of God; and it might be shewn that both are suited to human intelligence, which delights to think by means of images or figures, and to arrange objects according to types.

which God has given. The apostle who closes the canon of Scripture is carried up in vision into heaven, where he sees an exalted and awful throne, surrounded by angels and saints, and innumerable living and immortal beings. Having surveyed the scene in mute astonishment, his attention is called to a book sealed with seven seals, containing evidently the mystery which, being unfolded, is to reconcile heaven to earth. A strong angel is heard asking with a loud voice, which fills heaven and earth, "Who is worthy to open the book?" An awful pause ensues. No one in heaven or earth, or throughout the wide universe, is able for the task, and John weeps over the weakness of creation. While thus desponding, he is told of one fit for the mighty work. He turns his eye to see, and what does he behold? Is it some grand and imposing sight, is it a splendid throne, or a dazzling light, or a majestic form, is it the mightiest of the angels clothed with the sun? No; as he looks, he sees an emblem of weakness and of sorrow, of suffering and of death; the sight presented in the very midst of the throne of God was of "a Lamb as it had been slain." There follows a succession of views or pictures of God and the redeemed; and it is a remarkable circumstance, that in every one of these the same image is presented. He obtains a lively view of the blessed inhabitants of heaven—and "they stand before the throne and before the Lamb." He hears their praise, and it is "Salvation to our God that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb." A question is put as to the past history of those who now stand in white robes, and it is said, "They have washed their robes, and made them white in the blood of the Lamb." He sees them in the enjoyment of the glory provided for them: "They hunger no more, neither thirst any more; because the Lamb that is in the midst of the throne shall feed them, and lead them to living fountains of waters." In another passage, John is represented as looking, and lo, a lamb stood on Mount Zion, and with him a great multitude; and who are they, and whence their joy? They are they "who follow the Lamb whithersoever he goeth." In one of the closing chapters, we have a lengthened description of the holy city prepared for the saints; its walls are of jasper, high and deep, with twelve foundations; its streets and dwellings are of pure gold, with a foundation of precious stones; its gates are pearls, and its watchmen are

angels. But these splendours do not separately nor conjointly constitute the glory of heaven. Its chief ornament is its temple: "And the Lord God Almighty and the Lamb are the temple of it. And the city hath no need of the sun, neither of the moon, to shine in it, for the glory of God enlightens it, and the Lamb is the light thereof." The sinner is made to feel that he dare not look up to heaven, unless he see the Lamb before the throne; but feels that he can look up with confidence when God is presented under this aspect.

Such is the consistent conception of God which the Scriptures lead us to entertain. It looks as if it were the conception above all others (we believe there is no other) fitted at once to give satisfaction to our moral nature and our sensibilities.

(2.) *The conscience is rectified.* It is one of the most melancholy effects of the corruption of man's nature, that his very conscience has become bewildered. Recognising in a general way the distinction between good and evil, it makes sad mistakes in its particular decisions. The deceitful heart has taught it the art of looking through a false medium at the sins which the possessor of it commits, and thus enables him to enjoy an all but unbroken self-complacency. It is difficult, above all things, to rouse the conscience from this its somnolence, through mere addresses to it of truth derived from the natural conscience, for against all such appeals it hath already fortified itself. In order to its being roused, there must be an address from a higher region—there must be a voice from heaven, recalling it to its pristine recollections. We have heard of the high-born prince, lost and degraded from his youth, and with no surviving knowledge of his native grandeur, having the memory of it awakened by the voice of a friend, who had been with him in the scenes of his younger years, and who recalls incidents which make the forgotten truth flash upon his mind. There needs such a voice—the voice of a pure and holy law, descended from the region in which the conscience received its first instruction, to recall it to a sense of its present disorder and primitive destination.

And the voice which rouses it must continue to guide it. For never did it feel itself so helpless as now when it is awakened to a proper sense of its condition. Before, it was wandering without knowing it; but now it feels itself bewildered as in a forest, and the very tracks before it confusing it the more, for it knows not

which one to choose. Ever going wrong, it knows not when it is right; and it has a painful feeling of the need of something by which to regulate itself, and in accordance with which it may move. The law, then, has not only, in the first instance, to arouse the conscience, it has to serve the farther purpose of righting it in its motions. When it hath lost its delicate sensibility, and its power of direction, there seems to be only one method of restoration, and that is, by placing it alongside of a pure standard of right and wrong, as the magnetized iron which hath lost its virtue is restored by being bound up for a time with a correctly pointing magnet.

III. THE AFFECTIONS ARE GAINED. (1.) Here let us mark how it is needful, in order to this, that the conscience be appeased. An evil conscience always leads the mind to avoid, as if instinctively, the remembrance of the party offended. There cannot, then, be love to God in a mind in which conscience has not been appeased, nor can there be any of those cognate graces of faith, confidence, hope, and joy, which ought to fill and animate the soul. The appeasing of this moral avenger is an indispensable preliminary to the flowing out of the affections towards God. Provision is made for this in the Christian religion, but in no other religion recommended to man. The philosophic systems have no proposed method of appeasing the conscience. The more influential of the superstitions that have prevailed in the world have felt the need of satisfying God and the conscience, and have set man on a vain attempt to accomplish this end by means of the affections which he cherishes and the services he pays, forgetting that no true affection will be cherished, and that therefore no acceptable service can be paid, till first the conscience is assuaged. Herein lies the weakness of all the philosophic religions, that they do not so much as profess to make any provision to meet this felt want; and herein lies the weakness of all forms of superstition, that they would accomplish the end by means which cannot be attained till the end itself is attained. The former do not so much as profess to give what to the sinner is a prerequisite to the commencement of religion, and the latter set us in search of it in a road which ever leads back to the point at which we started. In Christianity, and in it alone, a provision is made for thoroughly cleansing the heart from the sense of guilt, that thus the soul

may be allured upwards in holy affection, and onward in practical godliness.

Not only so, but in order to gain the heart there must be a free, a full, and instant forgiveness. It must be free; for it cannot be purchased. It must be full; for if anything were left unforgiven, the conscience would still grumble, and the soul, so far, would be in a state of enmity and rebellion. It must be instant; otherwise the mind, still without peace, could not begin to cherish confidence and affection. Nothing short of this will allay its agitated waves, and allow the image of God, who is love, to be reflected on the bosom.

Besides this instinctive aversion which it excites towards God, an evil conscience is ever, it may be unconsciously, a source of irritation. We say, Peace, peace, when there is no peace. How can there be peace, when the soul is not at peace with its Maker? And when the soul is not at peace with God, it cannot be at peace with itself. When conscience, as the regulator, has lost its control, all the other principles of the human mind are in disorder, and are moving with appalling rapidity, and each in succession disturbing the soul, and all adding to the tumult. Instead of love, peace, and trust, there will be instincts, lusts, and passions, under no restraint except that which is laid upon them by their jostling against one another. When the winds of heaven cease, the waves of the ocean gradually rock themselves to rest; and when the conscience, acting on behalf of God, ceases to lash the soul, there is a preparation made for all the thoughts and feelings gradually composing themselves into calmness and repose.

(2.) Let us mark how, contemporaneously with the pacifying of the conscience, there is presented an object fitted to win the affections, now at liberty to flow towards it. The Saviour, who delivers us from the condemnation of sin, presents himself in all his loveliness in order to gain our hearts.

"WHOM HAVING NOT SEEN, YE LOVE." Some, we are aware, would doubt of the possibility of our loving an object which we have not seen, and would represent the affection of the believer to his unseen Redeemer as visionary in the extreme. But in doing so, they shut their eyes to a property of our nature which is every day in exercise—truly, there are persons who do the greatest dishonour to human nature, while they pretend to exalt

it. Man is so constituted by his Maker, as to be able and disposed to love objects that are distant and unseen.

We go farther, and maintain that it is not sense which kindles the mental affection of love. It is conception, the conception of a lovely object, which calls forth love towards that object; and sense aids affection only so far as it aids our conceptions, and in making them more vivid, makes them more fitted to awaken the emotion. Let us inquire whether we have not in the Scripture representation of Jesus everything needful to call forth emotion. Let us inquire, in particular, whether we have not much that makes up for the want of sensible manifestation.

First, we have in the Word a very clear and lively picture of the character of the Redeemer. When the information communicated to us, in regard to any given individual, is very vague and imperfect, it is difficult, however worthy he may be, to fix our affections upon him. Had we been commanded to love Jesus, without any particular account being given of his life or his love, and without the lovely features of his character being delineated, it must have been very difficult to obey. But in Jesus, as presented to us in the Gospels, we have everything to attract and retain the affections. O that we had but lived in the days when Jesus tabernacled on the earth! is the wish which will at times rise up in our breasts. So situated, we think that it might have been easier for us to love him. In opposition to such vain wishes, and the gross ideas on which they are founded, we maintain that we have a view of the character of Jesus as much fitted to engage the affections as even those who are supposed to have been so much more highly favoured. Let us suppose that we had been living in the land of Judea, at the time when Jesus was working his miracles and publishing his sublime doctrine. On hearing a report of the new Teacher, we hasten with the crowding thousands to listen to his discourse; we hear one, it may be, of the most beautiful of his parables, or see him perform one of the most signal of his miracles. The whole transaction leaves a deep impression on our minds; and because we have seen, we believe. But in the meantime Jesus and the crowd sweep by, or he retires to the mountains to pray, or he visits some other part of the land; and we are constrained to return to the cares and business of life, and have few other opportunities of meeting with him.

Now, we maintain that we, who have the full Scriptures in our hands, have a better means of forming a full and attractive conception of our Lord than even those who lived in these apparently so favourable circumstances. In the writings of the Evangelists, we have his beautiful discourses, his striking parables, his casual remarks, all collected within a narrow compass, and a lively delineation of his conduct, with the particular incidents of it, by parties who lose sight of themselves in thinking of their Master, and never interpose to obstruct any of the light which comes from him. We, as it were—so lively is the painting—see Jesus acting, and hear him speaking, and that in a great variety of interesting and instructive circumstances. We see him while with his disciples, and with the Jewish doctors; amidst the acclamations of the people, and amidst their execrations too; as he rejoiced over the conversion of sinners, and as he grieved over their hardness of heart; as he pitied his enemies, and as he wept over the grave of a friend. We have all this, in books so simple, that a child can understand them, and so brief, that a little space of time will enable any one to peruse them.

Secondly, the Being whom we are expected to love is constantly bestowing favours upon us. We are willing to grant, that in ordinary circumstances, distance has a tendency to lessen the regard which friends entertain towards one another; but when we have around us constant memorials of our friend, the influence of separation will be counteracted. When the bereaved mourner, when the widower, for instance, looks around his dwelling, and sees in every part of it the peculiar property, or perhaps the very workmanship, of a beloved consort; and when the widow sees in every child that clusters around her knee the image of a lost husband,—they feel as if the departed were still present, and that amidst these memorials they can never forget those of whom they are so reminded. Now, the believer feels himself to be thus surrounded by memorials of God in his works—in the heavens and earth, and in his wonderful providence. The fact that God has made it adds a new lustre to every star, a new beauty to every flower, and the meanest of the works of God carry up the mind to the great Creator. Distance, we acknowledge, has a tendency to lessen the affection of friends; but this influence may be overborne when the friend is ever bestowing substantial favours. The believer does not feel that

God is absent, when he is constantly sustained by his power and fed by his bounty. The believer in Christ connects his very temporal mercies with the work and sufferings of his Saviour. "Blessed be the Lord, who daily loadeth us with benefits, *even the God of our salvation.*"

Thirdly, there is provided a means of communication between the believer and the object of his affection. Granting that distance may tend to diminish the affection of friends, we find this influence lessened when they can correspond by letter, or have frequent opportunities of meeting. We are willing to acknowledge that the love of the believer would grow cold and languid were he shut out from all communication with his God. But, in gracious condescension, God engages to meet with those that love him—not, indeed, in bodily presence, but not on that account the less truly, effectually, and comfortably; and love him as they may, they are assured that he is loving them with a ten thousand-fold greater affection. It is one of the most beneficent of the effects of the gospel, that it provides for the renewal of that fellowship with God which man had lost, but after which he is still aspiring in his deeper moods of mind. In this communion, there are all the elements to be found in the fellowship of a man with his neighbour. In human fellowships there are four elements—we speak to our neighbour, and he hears us; he speaks to us, and we hear him; and thus there is a thorough interchange of thought and feeling. There are the same elements in our fellowship with God when by faith we rise to it; we pour out our hearts before him, and he listens to us; he condescends to instruct us, and we attend to the lessons which he is giving. With such means of communication available, the believer feels as if his Saviour were present with him alway; and so far as he still feels that the communion is distant, so far as he still mourns an absent Lord, it is to desire more earnestly to reach that place where he shall enjoy a closer and an unbroken communion.

Aided by such circumstances as these, it is possible to form a vivid and abiding conception of the character of the Being whom we are required to love. And that character has in itself everything that is grand and yet attractive. Just as there is a beauty of shape and colour that pleases the eye, and a sweetness of sound that delights the ear, so there is a moral loveliness which

ought to draw towards it the affections of the soul. But here, in the character of Christ as God, we have all kinds of beauty meeting and harmoniously blending. The excellencies to be found separately and to a limited extent in the creature, all meet and are infinite in him. We profess to admire true majesty when we meet with it; and will we not admire the Ancient of Days, on the throne of the universe, amidst the hosts of heaven, and exercising dominion over unnumbered worlds? With what should we be so much struck as with spotless holiness, which shrinks from the very appearance of evil? Alas! our eyes, as they wander over the world, cannot discover it among men, but here we have it shining in beauty, without a spot to detract from its loveliness. Do we feel ourselves constrained to admire benevolence? and will not our feelings flow towards Him who hath filled every part of creation, air, earth, and ocean, woods and waters, with animated beings, sustained by his power and fed by his bounty? Are our hearts softened by that tenderness which can forgive an enemy and receive him as a friend? and will they not melt in love when we hear of God pardoning the very chief of sinners, stretching out his arms to embrace them, and preparing for them enjoyments as glorious as they are enduring?

And there are qualities in the person and character of the object set forth to our contemplation and love which endear him yet more to the heart. In the very idea of an infinite God there is something calculated to overpower the spirit of weak and sinful man. Man, in every age of the world's history, has been afraid to look upon the full purity of God. His mind, pained by the contemplation, has been at great pains to carnalize a spiritual God, and embody him in symbol. Man has ever been carnalizing God, and in carnalizing has degraded him; but here, in the Christian system, is a God incarnate without being degraded. In the Mediator, the Divine and human natures are united, and in such a manner that the one does not destroy or overpower the other, but each retains its own properties, and the whole is in unity and harmony. The brightness of the Father's glory, without being shorn of a single ray, is represented under a milder lustre. All coldness and distrust are banished when we remember that, in drawing near to Christ, it is man coming to man. Unbelief is dispelled when we con-

sider, that we have a brother's heart beating for us upon the throne of glory.

As in water face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man. There is a universal sympathy between the members of the human family—there is a universal language which finds a response in every man's bosom. The cry of distress on the part of one man awakens compassion in the breast of every other man. Let a person indicate that he is in trouble, and numbers will crowd around him with eager curiosity and intense emotion. The language of feeling and sentiment will ever stir up corresponding feeling and sentiment. The orator and poet exercise such power over mankind, because they address these essential feelings of humanity. While our hearts are naturally drawn, by certain sentiments and sympathies, to every other man, there are certain men, or classes of men, towards whom our hearts are attracted with greater force, as, for instance, towards all whose sensibilities are quick, and whose heart is tender. And if these persons have themselves been in trouble, if their heart has been melted and softened by the dispensations of God pressing heavily upon them, our feelings turn towards them in yet stronger confidence. Disposed at all times to love such, our hearts are especially turned towards them when we ourselves are in trouble. Whoever may feel for us, we are sure *they* will feel for us, and we pour our complaints into their ears in the assurance of receiving attention and sympathy.

Now, this principle has a powerful influence in drawing the hearts of Christians so closely to their Saviour. The tenderness and sensibility of his human nature, as well as the holy love of his Divine nature, are brought before us in almost every incident of his life. We recollect how he fed the hungry and healed all manner of diseases; how he restored the young man, whose dead body was being carried out of the gates of the city of Nain, to the embraces of his mother; how he wept over the grave of Lazarus and the impending destruction of Jerusalem, —and we run to him as to one who feels for us under all our trials. We remember how he himself was acquainted with grief, in its multiplied and diversified forms, in body and in spirit, inflicted by man and God; how he was often an hungered, without a home, or where to lay his head; how the tongue of calumny was raised against him, and the finger of

scorn pointed at him; how the favours which he conferred were met by no corresponding gratitude; how an apostle betrayed him, and the rulers of the nation condemned him, and the people demanded his crucifixion, and reviled him in the midst of his dying agonies; how the Father himself forsook him;—and when we remember this, we feel that there is no sorrow of ours which he will not commiserate. The friendless rejoice, for they have a friend in him; the helpless take courage, for their help is in him; the forsaken lift up their head and are comforted, in communion with him who was himself forsaken.

We have in him, the Son of God, and the Son of Man, the image, the only image (every other is idolatry) of God, and the model man, the type to which we are to look in the absence of any such pattern in our own hearts or among our fellow-men. An example in all things that we should follow his steps, he is especially so, in the spirit of self-sacrifice shewn by him, so unlike the spirit of the world. The great among men have become great by rising from a lower to a higher degree of power and honour; but the greatness of the Son of God consisted chiefly in this, that he made himself "of no reputation." If we would but think it, there may be a greater glory in suffering and sorrow than in prosperity and splendour. There may, for example, be a greater glory in the soldier's death than in his life,—there was a greater glory in Samson's death than in all the achievements of his life. But speak not of the glory of the soldier bleeding in defence of a nation's rights; speak not of the glory of the patriot toiling and suffering for his country's freedom; speak not of the glory of the martyr calm and rejoicing while tied to the burning stake; these have no glory, because of the glory that excelleth, the glory of him who left the bosom of the Father in heaven to suffer upon the earth and die upon the cross.

Such is the provision made negatively in removing obstacles to the flow of the affections, and positively in furnishing a suitable object on which to fix them. Could any other than the God who made man have so suited the remedy to his nature and constitution?

IV. THE CHANGE IS ACCOMPLISHED IN THE HEART OF MAN IN COMPLETE ACCORDANCE WITH THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Several interesting adaptations present themselves under this head.

(1.) There is a means, we have seen, of convincing the reason, and there is also a means of gaining the heart. These are not sufficient of themselves, such is the perversity of the human mind, radically to change the character; but in the very fact that they are employed, there is a homage paid to the human will. It is of the nature of the will to be swayed by motives, in the formation of which, both the understanding and the emotions act a part, and in the Christian religion all these human principles have their full play and liberty.

(2.) The blessed and Divine agent who produces the change commonly works through ordinances of God's appointment. The main means is the truth set forth in an inspired Word, and that truth of a kind eminently fitted to awe, and yet to elevate, to convince and persuade the soul. In the use of these means the mind is kept from indolence and inactivity, and yet is obliged to be humble and dependent. The Christian is spiritually put under an economy, not differing in the results, though differing in the means, from that under which every man is placed in the natural providence of God. In the use of the ordinary means which commonly lead to success in worldly matters, no man is absolutely sure of securing his end, owing to the cross arrangements of Divine providence, (which we were at pains to analyze in a former part of the Treatise,) while yet there is such a prospect of success as to hold out a motive to activity. It is by this double means, as we have seen, that the race is rendered at once active and dependent. It is most interesting to observe, that we find the same double agency in the spiritual dispensation of God, and that in this respect there is a beautiful analogy between the natural and spiritual economies.

While there is a resemblance, there is also a difference. In the spiritual economy, the means employed are not of themselves fitted to produce the end, and hence the Christian is rendered dependent on a higher power, while, at the same time, they usually produce the end, being so blessed of God, and so he has sufficient motive to vigilance and exertion. In the natural providence of God, on the other hand, the means produce the end of themselves, but may be thwarted by a thousand cross providences. May we not discover a design in the very diversity of the means employed? In the natural providence of God the means produce their end by an inherent power, and so invariably

produce the end, except in so far as they may be crossed by other agencies. All this is done in order that we may put trust in nature, in order that sight itself may induce us to cherish faith, and that we may see the interposition of God more impressively, when the end is not produced. In the spiritual providence of God, on the other hand, the mean has no inherent power to produce the end, and thus the Christian is prevented from trusting in it, and made to look more devotedly to God as the true and alone source of all spiritual excellence. It is the manner of God in all his works to accomplish the same end by more than one means, and we may discover the Divine wisdom in the very variation of the agency to suit the circumstances.

(3.) We do not perceive the agent, who changes the character, at work; but we conclude that he has been working, by discovering the effects produced. It is for this reason, among others, that he is compared to the wind. "Thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, nor whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." The silent nature of the Spirit's operations has sometimes made his agency to be denied altogether, by those who are ever demanding some sensible evidence of the truth communicated in the Word. But those who urge this objection, forget that many of the most powerful of the agents of nature are themselves unseen, and are only to be discovered by their fruits. We do not, for instance, see the wind whether it comes in the gentle breeze to fan us, or in the hurricane, to work such devastation among the labours of man and the very works of God. The heat that nourishes the plants of the earth, and the electricity so intimately connected with all atmospherical and organic changes, move secretly and in silence. These individuals forget that God is always himself unseen in the midst of his works. When we walk forth in the silence of eventide to meditate, we are constrained to acknowledge that God is everywhere present among these works of grandeur; and yet, by intense gaze, we cannot discover his person, nor, by patient listening, hear the sound of his footsteps, No jarring sound of mechanism comes across the void that intervenes between us and these heavens—no voice of boasting reaches our ears to tell of the worker; it is the heavens themselves that declare his glory. And why should the God who created us not be able to renew the heart when it is debased by the effects

of sin, and yet be as unseen in the one case as the other? And there is a manifest congruity in the circumstance, that this agent conducts his work so silently and imperceptibly. It is only by such a mode of procedure that the spirit of man can retain its separate action and freedom. There is no violence done to man's nature in the supernatural work carried on in the heart. The dealings of God are, in every respect, suited to the essential and indestructible principles of man's nature. "I drew them with the cords of a man, with the bands of love."

V. Given a fallen race; to set them on a CAREER OF ACTIVE OBEDIENCE—is a problem which all reformers and philanthropists of the highest order have been endeavouring to solve, and with but very meagre success. Revelation professes to have solved it, and it propounds the following constructions:—

(1.) It provides a pacified conscience and a pacified God, and both pacified in agreement with the law of their nature. Other and mere human systems make, and can make, no such provision, and hence their partial failure. Under a reproaching conscience, the mind feels an awkwardness in all the services which it would pay to God. When the servant is conscious of having given offence to his master, there will always be somewhat of constraint in the obedience rendered, till such time as he has made confession of guilt, and obtained forgiveness. There is a restraint proceeding from a like cause, in the service which the sinner, labouring under an unpacified conscience, would pay to God. Besides, when he has no reason to think that his past offences have been forgiven, he feels as if all future exertions must be utterly fruitless. After he has done his utmost, he feels that he has not fulfilled that law of God which is so straight, and so unbending just because it must be straight. Climb as he may the height of perfection, he sees the summit rising still above him, wrapped in darkness and lurid with flame. After he has made some great exertion, he looks to the law to see if it will give him a smile of approbation, and he beholds only a darkening frown upon its face. Lashed by conscience, he makes greater and yet greater struggles, only to feel all his toilsome labours to be like those of one labouring under a load which is crushing him to the ground, or like the convulsive struggles of a drowning man, whose efforts are sinking him more speedily in the waters.

There is an individual who has contracted a load of debt which it is impossible for him to pay; and who, toil as he may, finds all his exertions to be lost, because they do not sensibly lessen his obligations. Care is painted on his countenance; fear haunts him by day, and disturbs his rest at night. The load which is pressing on his mind comes at length to prostrate his energies; he flees the society of his friends; he buries himself in solitude, he is ready to give himself up to despondency and despair. He has lost all his accustomed energy and ingenuity, because he has lost all hope of success, and all motive to activity. How, we ask, is it possible to rouse this man anew to a healthy energy? We know of only one way in which it can be effectually done. In his hour of deep mental prostration some friend runs to his aid, and supplies him with all that is required, in order to cancel his debt. The man now feels a burden lifted from his breast, while gratitude for the seasonable aid is quickening him to exertion, and hope is anew irradiating his path. Behold him once more in his customary place, holding up his head in independence in the midst of his associates, engaged with his wonted energy in the discharge of duty, and regarding all his past difficulties as only an incentive to additional vigilance. The reader will at once see the application of this illustration, as fitted to lead him to acknowledge the propriety of that scheme in which the burden of condemnation is removed, to set forth man upon a career of renewed obedience.

(2.) Revelation displays a supernatural agency to lead the soul to love and obedience; this agency, reaching the innermost principles of the mind, and that not to do them violence, but restore them to order.

(3.) Revelation displays also a means of gaining the affections by means of the objects presented to it. The service now paid by the reconciled heart is different altogether from the previous service. The one service, the legal service, was irksome; the other is willing and cheerful. While the one is the task of a prisoner who cannot, labour as he may, earn his freedom, the other is the homage of a spirit restored to liberty. The one proceeds from the fear which prostrates, and so is restrained, limited, selfish; the other proceeds from an inspiring confidence and a ready mind, and is in consequence hearty, generous, devoted. In the one, man works in the spirit of a hireling,

always pausing to ask if he has not done enough, and if his taskmaster is not satisfied; in the other, in the spirit of a son, who loves the service and him who appointed it, and is ever asking, if his Father in heaven has any other work which he wishes him to perform?

(4.) There is a *beau ideal* of excellence provided in the character of Jesus. All human excellence, whether earthly or spiritual, has been attained by the mind keeping before it, and dwelling upon, the ideas of the great, the good, the beautiful, the grand, the perfect. The tradesmen and mechanic attain to eminence by their never allowing themselves to rest till they can produce the most finished specimens of their particular work. The painter and sculptor travel to distant lands that they may see, and as it were fill their eye and mind with the sight of the most beautiful models of their arts. Poets have had their yet undiscovered genius awakened into life as they contemplated some of the grandest of nature's scenes—or as they listened to the strains of other poets, the spirit of poetry has descended upon them, as the spirit of inspiration descended upon Elisha while the minstrel played before him. The soldier's spirit has been aroused more than even by the stirring sound of the war-trumpet, by the record of the courage and heroism of other warriors. The fervour of one patriot has been created as he listened to the burning words of another patriot, and many a martyr's zeal has been kindled at the funeral pile of other martyrs. In this way fathers have handed down their virtues to their children, and parents have left their offspring a better legacy in their example than in all their wealth, and those who could leave them nothing else, have in this example left them the very richest legacy. In this way the good men of one age have influenced the characters of the men of another, and the deeds of those who have done great achievements have lived far longer than those who performed them, and been transmitted from one generation to another. Now we have such a model set before us in the character of Jesus. And in beholding by faith his image set before us in the Word as in a glass, our character becomes assimilated to his. In looking with open face into the face of Jesus, his likeness is impressed upon the soul as we have seen the image of heaven reflected on the bosom of a tranquil lake spread out beneath it. "*We all with open face,*

beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord."

We affirm, without any risk of contradiction, that no religion, rational or mythic,* originating in human wisdom or human history, has met, or even so much as attempted to meet, these fundamental principles of the human mind, which are all satisfied in Christianity. It is surely strange, that a system in such beautiful harmony with all the constituent parts of man's nature, should have sprung up among the hills and plains of Judah. We could believe that a Hebrew shepherd composed the Principia of Newton, or propounded the principles of the Novum Organum, or the profoundest modern work on metaphysical philosophy, more readily than that he could thus have measured the heights of the Divine character, or sounded the depths of human nature. We are utterly confounded and lost in amazement, till, above the plains where ancient shepherds tended their flocks, we see a light from heaven shining around them, and hear a voice guiding them to the Saviour, which is Christ the Lord.

But we have reached the *loci communes*, the common places of divinity which pious divines have trodden, while the steps of peasants have followed them. These are the topics enlarged on from the pulpit, and which, followed out during the week by the ploughman in the fields, by the shepherd on the mountains, and the mechanic in the workshop, have furnished them with the most convincing and satisfying of all evidences.

* The objection used to be, every faith has had its supernatural events, and the miracles of Scripture are like those of other religions. This was answered by showing that the miracles of our Lord were entirely different in their nature, and in the evidence supporting them, from the miracles of heathendom. The objection now is, that every religion has had its myths, and that the narratives of the Word of God are mythical. This is answered by showing that Scripture history is corroborated, which myths never are, by history acknowledged to be true, and that they are different in their whole nature, and especially in their moral and religious tone, from any heathen fables. No records start up to corroborate the theogonies of Homer and Hesiod, as those of Nineveh confirm the Old Testament narrative. No human ingenuity could extract from any system of myths a pure morality, and still less a means of solving those great problems regarding the relation of God and man, which are settled in Christianity. But as the tendency to believe in supernatural interpositions shows that men have been looking for a revelation from heaven, so the disposition to embody faith in myths may be held as showing that they need a narrative as a means of instruction in doctrine. God has furnished in his Word, what man has ever felt that he needed, but was unable to supply—a true narrative evolving pure precept and doctrine.

ILLUSTRATIVE NOTE (H.)—THE GERMAN INTUITIONAL THEOLOGY.

We think it needful to distinguish between the method which has been pursued in this work and that speculative spirit which some are seeking to introduce into our country through the German philosophy and theology. Throughout the whole of this Treatise we have been examining this world in an inductive manner, with the view of obtaining a solution of some of the most important questions on which the mind of man can meditate. These truths, if we do not mistake, conduct to a well-grounded belief in the Divinity of the Scriptures. But when reason has handed us over to revelation, it bids us listen to that revelation. This witness as much as says, "There standeth one among you greater than I, and I exhort you to look to him."

There is an end for the present—and we should hope for ever—to that boasted rationalist school which prevailed to some extent in our land in a former age. Its icicles, thought to be so very beautiful, and really so very cold, have melted away in the heat of a more fervent season. But the dreamy sultriness which has succeeded is as unwholesome, and as unfavourable to spiritual life, as the cold which it has banished. All deep and earnest thinkers now see that there are truths in every branch of science too high, too deep, and too broad to be defined by a formal logic, or grasped by the logical understanding, that is, by the understanding logically employed. Human logic cannot define electricity or heat, nor explain vegetable or animal life; and how can we expect it to unfold the mysteries of the Godhead, and the Divine decrees? The human understanding, so far from being able to prove everything, needs itself a basis on which to rest, and that basis unproved and incapable of proof.

Instead of the RATIONALIST, we have now what we may call the INTUITIONAL THEOLOGY. It is not now the understanding, but *intuitions* of thought and feeling which are placed above the Word, and to them, with the Word as a mere servant or assistant, is allotted the task of constructing a religion. The religion thus devised, if not so consistent as that formed by the understanding, is vastly more showy and gorgeous, and suits itself to a great many more of the impulses of human nature. As in natural religion the blank scepticism of former times has been obliged, in the present day, to clothe itself in the dress of pantheism, to keep mankind from utterly abhorring it; so, in revealed religion, the rationalism, which was felt to be insufficient for any one practical purpose whatsoever, either in the restraining of sin or the gendering of holiness, has become a more pretending intuitionalism. Persons who believe in the Scriptures in no higher sense than they believe in Homer, Pythagoras, or Plato, who could not give an intelligible answer to the question, "What think ye of Christ? whose son is he?" and who know not so much as what the Holy Ghost meaneth, do yet decorate their pages with constant references to faith, to spiritual life, and the religious consciousness.

It would carry us too far away from our present purpose to trace the history of this system; nor do we think it needful carefully to allot to each supporter his share of the heterogeneous materials which have been collected to build the fabric. Certain principles laid down by Kant—principles which we regard as false in themselves (see APPENDIX VI.)—were being followed out in Germany to their legitimate consequences, and producing a very pretending form of universal scepticism, when Jacobi rushed in to protect philosophy by setting up Feeling (Gefuehl) as a counterpart principle to the Understanding. Schleiermacher carried a similar principle into theology, and sought to construct a religion out of feeling or consciousness. This scheme has been adopted by De Wette, and even, we regret to

say, to some extent by Neander and other eminent divines, who have of late years been defending their system against another supported by the followers of Hegel, which professes to be more rational and logical. In doing so, it should be acknowledged that they have furnished very able defences and beautiful exhibitions of some of the essential truths of Christianity. But, as the practical result of the whole, the scepticism which began with the universities and the clergy has now gone down to the common people, and has assumed, at least in the cities, a form sufficiently vulgar and offensive; and the followers of Schleiermacher find that they have no power to allay the spirit which has been called up, for the dreamy intuitions of the divines are felt to be as incapable of being grasped by the practical understanding of the common people, as they are acknowledged to be incapable of being apprehended by the logical understanding of the philosophers. Yet this is the system which is being imported into our country by certain clergymen of the Anglican Establishment and Congregational ministers in England. In particular, Mr. Morell, after mixing with it a farther medley from the eclectic philosophy of Cousin, is seeking to recommend it to the British public. Our limits do not admit of our exposing its errors, but we are tempted to point out the fallacies to be found in some of its principles.

1*st*, We insist that no intuition be admitted in philosophic or religious speculation, till it is proved by induction to be in the constitution of the mind—nay, till its nature and rule be pointed out. *Crede ut intelligas* was the maxim of Anselm, and the counterpart maxim of Abelard, *intellige ut credas*. Both maxims are true, and the one limits the other. We acknowledge that there are intuitions in the human mind, and that, without them, the understanding, having no basis, could erect no superstructure. The whole would be like multiplying nothing by nothing—the result would still be nothing. But then we are not entitled in any speculation to proceed on an alleged intuition, till it has been shown to be an intuition. Nor can an appeal on this subject be made to the consciousness, for we are not immediately conscious of an intuition. We can be conscious only of the working of an intuition, and he who would determine what the intuition is, must by induction ascertain its law. The intuition, it is true, acts spontaneously in the mind, whether we observe it or not—nay, it must first act before we can observe it; but then, the previous observation is necessary, in order to our assuming this intuition in philosophic investigation. The intuitions act according to fixed principles, and these are the true principles of metaphysical philosophy; but we are not directly cognizant of them as general principles, and we cannot use them in science, till we have specified their precise nature. By no process of induction can we demonstrate the truth of fundamental principles, but it is only by a process of induction that we can find out what they are, and make a scientific use of them.* If we neglect to do so, we may find ourselves starting with error, and so can never arrive at truth, and the mind would ever have to

* We are prepared to defend the following propositions in regard to innate ideas or constitutional principles of the mind:—I. Negatively, that there are no innate ideas in the mind, (1.) as images or mental representations; nor, (2.) as abstract or general notions; nor, (3.) as principles of thought, belief, or action, before the consciousness, as principles. But II. Positively, (1.) that there are constitutional principles operating in the mind, though not before the consciousness, as general principles; (2.) that these come forth into consciousness as individual (not general) cognitions or judgments; and, (3.) that these individual exercises, when carefully inducted—but only when so—give us primitive or philosophic truths. It follows that, while these native principles operate in the mind spontaneously, we are entitled to use them reflexly, in philosophic or theologic speculation, only after having determined their nature by abstraction and generalisation. (See ILLUSTRATIVE NOTE E, pp. 289-291, and APPENDIX VI.)

unweave its own web. Nay, this latter error may just as readily conduct to scepticism as the former; for (to borrow an illustration applied to reasoning in Plato's Phaedo, § 89) as the individual who has trusted every man that professes to be his friend, comes at last to be utterly sceptical of the existence of friendship, so the person who sets out with believing every supposed natural intuition, may speedily arrive at a universal infidelity. For ourselves, we are exceedingly suspicious of some of those intuitions on which the theologians of Germany would rear such a superstructure, such as faith in God, consciousness of God, the knowledge of the infinite and absolute, the gazing upon truth as a whole, the perception of abstract beauty and holiness, and the religious life or consciousness. We would like to see them thoroughly sifted and tested, in the sense in which we have explained, by human intelligence, while we would like to see such an acknowledged intuition and faculty as the conscience followed out to its legitimate consequences by the learning and penetration of a German philosopher.*

2dly, We maintain that revelation addresses itself to the other qualities of the mind as well as the intuitions or intuitional consciousness. We have our doubts of the propriety of arranging, in a general way, all the higher faculties of the mind, into the logical understanding and the intuitional consciousness. What is made of the conscience on such a system—what of the will—what of the emotions? Religion, as a practical matter, is not addressed exclusively either to the logical understanding or the intuitions. Just as any one of them, or the two combined, cannot make any man a faithful father or an obedient son, a just sovereign or a righteous judge, so they are incapable of turning the sinner into a good Christian. The Christian religion addresses itself to the whole soul, providing evidence and facts for the understanding, and truth which shines in its own light to the reason; holding forth a perfect law and a perfect righteousness to the moral faculty; excellence to gain the will and loveliness to draw the affections; exhibiting these now separate and scattered in individual persons, incidents and propositions, and again displaying them all in unity in the character of God and Christ. As each of these faculties is addressed, so each has its part to perform; the understanding apprehending the facts, examining the evidence, and defending the truth; the reason sanctioning and adopting the truth when presented; the conscience bringing the sinner to the knowledge of sin, and approving of the righteousness of Christ; the will accepting of God as the perfect good; and the affections flowing forth towards God and all mankind, and enlivening the soul as they flow. We deny that religion has its seat among the mere intuitions. It spreads itself over the soul, and every faculty and feeling has a work to perform.

3dly, It is a Divine appointment, that the objective truth presented in the Word should be the means of rectifying the whole soul. There is truth presented to all and each of the faculties, that all and each of the faculties may be rectified. There are persons who complain of the Word, because it is not addressed to some one department of the human soul, on which they set a high value. The systematic divine wonders that it is not a mere scheme of dogmatic theology, forgetting that in such a case it would address itself exclusively to the understanding. The German speculatists, on the other hand, complain that it is not a mere exhibition of the pure ideas of the true and the good, forgetting that in such a case it would have little or no influence on the more practical faculties. Others seem to regret that it is not a mere code of morality, while a fourth class would wish it to be altogether an appeal to the feelings. But the Word is inspired by the same God

* The real intuitions of the human soul are just the human faculties and feelings acting according to their fundamental principles. (See APPENDIX VI.)

who formed man at first, and who knows what is in man; and he would rectify not merely the understanding or intuitions, not merely the conscience or affections, but the whole man after the image of God. It is the enlarged and comprehensive character of the Word which makes narrow minds complain of it. Its variety is as great as that of the faculties and feelings, which it would restore to their primitive state and proper exercise.

4*thly*, There are in the human mind capacities to apprehend the truth presented in the Word. "There is a light which lighteth every man which cometh into the world," (John i. 9,) and this light we are assured comes from the Eternal Logos. What the nature of that light is, we seem to be told in Rom. i. 20, and ii. 14, 15. It is partly external, being the light which shines from the works of God, and partly internal, that which is reflected from the moral constitution of man. What we need in the present day in systematic theology, is a scientific exposition of these two elements. Until they are unfolded in an inductive manner, we have no right to use them in the construction of any system, Christian or anti-Christian. For if Schleiermacher appeals to feeling, so also do Rousseau, Emerson, and F. Newman, and in order to determine which is making the legitimate use of feeling, we must inquire, in the manner of Lord Bacon, what feeling is, and what feeling says. Physical science is unfolding, in this way, the external facts, and mental science should bring out in the same manner the internal intuitions. This treatise may be regarded as a proffered contribution towards such a construction of the elements of natural religion. The internal capacities and principles at the basis of them, constitute the natural subjective of which some make so much. These, if inductively unfolded, will of themselves shew that they do not render supernatural truth unnecessary, nay, one of their deepest utterances is a cry for something which they cannot furnish, but which is supplied in the Word of God. For while there is light in the world, it is light which "shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not." (John i. 5.)

5*thly*, Along with the objective Word, there is a Divine power applying it internally, not merely to the intuitions, but to the whole faculties of the soul. This Divine power does not act independently of the objective truth presented in the Word, but acts by means of the truth, and thus deals with man as an intelligent and free agent. It is by the double influence of the objective truth and the subjective operation of the Spirit of God, that the religious life or consciousness is awakened within.

6*thly*, It appears evident to us that the truth presented in the Word must, in order to rectify the faculties and feelings, be pure truth, without any admixture of error. A corrupted truth presented to a corrupted mind would be a new element of confusion and derangement thrown into the already bewildered mind. Were the mind not perverted, it would not need such truth to rectify it, but, being perverted, it requires truth to set it right; but should the revelation made to it be mixed truth and error, it could not, because it is perverted, separate the one from the other. "The harmony of our nature," says Mr. Morell, "has been disturbed, and with it the power of intuition is at once diminished and rendered uncertain."* The same author, following his German masters, lets us know, that the Bible is mistaken as to its historical and scientific facts, incorrect in its language as expressing the truth meant to be conveyed, erroneous in doctrine, not unfrequently wrong in its morality, and illogical in its reasoning. Every one must see that a word so defective is not fitted to restore the disturbed harmony of the soul, or to give certainty to the intuitions, but would rather tend to increase the distraction

* Philosophy of Religion, p. 59.

and the painful uncertainty. The soul which has lost its proper movement needs a pure standard to rectify it, just as a disordered timepiece needs a dial. Had the Word come to the soul as a mixture of truth and error, it would only have thickened the doubts of the anxious and inquiring spirit. In such a case no one could have been sure, in any given passage, whether it was the God of truth that was speaking, or merely Paul or John, or whether Paul or John had or had not committed a mistake. Nor could the mind, as yet perverted and disorganized, be expected to distinguish between the truth and the falsehood, and it would be constantly fixing on the falsehood as truth, and on the truth as falsehood. We cannot be grateful enough to God, who hath not left man to wander in an abyss of darkness, where he cannot get truth without error, and yet has no light to enable him to distinguish the one from the other.

7*thly*, They are putting that which is first last, and that which is last first, who seek first a religious life, and then imagine that mankind are to devise a religion for themselves by means of that religious life. For how are we to get the religious life but by means of the truth? The divines of the school referred to are speaking perpetually about the importance of the religious life: but they do not tell us distinctly how the sinner naturally without it may be made to attain it.* Now, we set as high a value as they do on a religious life: we acknowledge that without it there can be no acceptable worship or service, no true enjoyment of God or of the pleasures of religion. It is because we set so high a value upon the religious life, that we set so high a value on the inspired Word, as the means of awakening it. There is first the truth recommended by evidence, apprehended in some measure by the mind, and pressed upon the acceptance of the soul; and then, there is the truth acknowledged and received in faith, through the subjective operation of the Spirit of God; there is all this as preliminary to the religious consciousness. The religious consciousness thus produced consists of a many-coloured robe of righteousness, clothing and adorning the whole soul. Nor do we regard ourselves as guilty of any real or even apparent contradiction when we add, that it is by means of the spiritual life awakened within, that the believer rises to a full comprehension and enjoyment of the truth which first awakened that life.

But, 8*thly*, We cannot admit that the religious life, even when produced, has any right to sit in judgment upon the Word. For how do we obtain the religious life but by the truth? Nor does it seem possible to attain a true spiritual life but by a scheme of pure truth, bringing with it certainty and assurance to the disordered and bewildered mind. That truth was conveyed to the early Church by the Old Testament Scriptures, and by the inspired teaching of the Apostles, or of persons instructed by them, and in after ages it is conveyed by means of the completed Scriptures. That Word comes to us as the truth of God, and when accepted it assures the mind, and succeeds in rectifying it; but having accepted it as the truth of God, we are not at liberty to treat it as a mixture of truth and error. We are now to obey the truth, and not make the truth obey us. As the mind needs pure truth presented to rectify its judgments, so it cannot, when rectified, treat that truth as if it were impure—accepting what it pleases, and rejecting the rest, according to what it believes to be its intuitions.

Nor is it to be forgotten that the religious life, even when formed in the soul, does not arrive at perfection on this side the grave. The religious life needs anew to be fed and strengthened by the truth which at first quickened it. Not even

* Mr. Morell seems to derive the religious life from a very low source. "Our religious *life* we receive, for the most part traditionally, from the development of the Christian consciousness in the different communities which now compose the visible Church."—(Phil. of Religion, p. 199.)

those who are in possession of spiritual life are in a state to set that life above the truth which has gendered it; for as it was by this truth that the religious life was first produced, so it is by the same truth that it is perfected. Nor are they at liberty to despise the letter, in a pretended attention to the spirit. Every man who acts in this manner will at times be putting his own spirit in the room of the Spirit of truth, and will be found asserting that to be the Spirit of the Word which is merely his own spirit.

This placing of the intuitions above the Word is in some respects more perilous than the setting of the understanding above the Word; for, when the understanding thus presumes to act as the arbiter of revealed truth, we can meet it on its own grounds. Its dogmas, if unsound, are at least clear and intelligible, and so can be met and refuted. But this intuitional theology carries us into a region where every man's own spirit creates for him a scheme, which cannot be so much as examined, because it cannot be developed in a clear system, or put in such a shape as to admit of its refutation. In these circumstances we do not regret to find, that God seems to have sent among the builders of this heaven-defying tower such a spirit of confusion and variance, that no two of them can speak the same language.

We have a deep admiration of the genius and learning of the German philosophers and divines; but with all their ability and scholarship, they will never arrive at a system of speculative philosophy, clear and consistent, true and useful, progressive and permanent, till they condescend to study the human mind in an inductive manner; nor will they ever develop a sound system of theology, till they submit to sit at the feet of Jesus, and receive with meekness the Word from him.

SECT. V.—THE WORLD TO COME.

The world to come, of which we speak, may be understood, first, as the future earth; and, secondly, as the state of man after death.

FIRST, THE FUTURE EARTH. The past and the present point alike to the future. We live not only in a world of change—we live in a world of progress. There has been a gradual and evidently an intended advancement in the physical and intellectual amelioration of the race. While every benevolent mind must rejoice in this, it is just to regret the more that these real improvements are incapable of renovating man's nature morally or spiritually. The improvements of which we boast are mere means or instruments, which may be used for good, but which are also employed for evil. The electric telegraph will employ its lightning velocity in the service of sin, just as readily as in the service of God. Painting and statuary have been patronized, not unfrequently, by the most selfish and profligate of men—such as the Medici—and have been corrupting as well as refining

the minds of their votaries. Music must ever waft the spirit of man into a region of greater loveliness and grandeur than the actual world; but instead of lifting it to heaven, it has often transported it into scenes where sin is rendered the more fascinating by the dress in which it is presented. Architecture has built temples to God; but it has also built mansions, in which temptation has spread its allurements, and its temples have been as frequently dedicated to superstition as to the true worship of God. There is no one power or element in the world capable of regenerating it. The power which regenerates the world, like that which regenerates individual sinners, must descend from a higher region.

Nay, the very Church of God, and the Word of God, cannot of themselves regenerate the world. They are inadequate for so great a work; because they cannot, by their own power, change human nature. With all our privileges, we feel that there is still something wanting. Our very acquisitions impress us the more with our still remaining deficiencies. We are more astonished at the crimes coming to light in our day, than we are in reading of the same deeds committed in any previous age. The creature is still groaning; and it will continue to do so, till, according to the promise of the Word, the Spirit is poured out on all flesh.

Not that we are on this account to despise or hate our world. We are rather to love that world which God so loved as to give his Son to suffer and to die for it. Whatever the gloomy and disappointed may say to the contrary, this world of ours is a glorious world after all. It is glorious in the displays which it gives of the Divine perfection and beneficence—glorious in its capacity, and the instruments ready for use. Let but human nature, as the root of bitterness, be regenerated; and then all its capabilities, all its acquisitions and improvements, will be devoted to the most beneficent purposes, and will change the very aspect of the world. The state of the earth depends essentially on the character of its principal inhabitant: and when the character of man is renovated, the state of our world will be renovated also; the agencies, at present conflicting, will become conspiring; that which is barren will become fruitful; and that which is hurtful will become beneficent. We live in the lively expectation of a coming era, when the work which the first man failed to accom-

plish will be performed by the second man, which is Jesus Christ, and when it shall be sung, "How excellent is thy name in all the earth!"

SECONDLY, THE STATE OF MAN AFTER DEATH. The idea impressed on man by natural religion is, that he is under government. There is (1.) a law prescribed to him; and (2.) a God who upholds that law; then (3.) a consciousness of having broken that law; and (4.) a fear of punishment to be inflicted by the God whom he has offended. These four great truths of natural religion point to a fifth—that there is to be a final judgment. Every man feels as if he had, at the end of his earthly career, to appear before his Governor, and as if there was to be a reckoning at the close of the day of life. The time and manner of the judgment are unknown, but the judgment itself and the law are so far revealed. There is a feeling of this kind —originating in deep internal principles, and strengthened by the observation of the instances of retribution in the providence of God—haunting mankind all throughout their life, and coming on them, impressively, at a dying hour.

This we hold to be the grand central feeling of mankind, in reference to the world to come; it is an expectation, or rather an apprehension, of a day of reckoning. Such a day of accounts evidently implies a future world and a separate state. This, if we do not mistake, is by far the strongest argument for a future life. We believe it to be the one which, in fact, carries conviction to the minds of men. It is an argument which, like that in behalf of the existence of God, looks to various phenomena, internal and external, but these, in the one case as in the other, pointing to one conclusion.

Let it be observed, that we are not stating the argument in the common form, and maintaining that there is injustice in this world, which must be rectified in the next. We are not willing to allow that any one has a right to complain of injustice. There is in this world a government complete, so far as it goes, but not consummated. It is complete in this sense, that it is in exact adaptation to the character of man; but the character of man and the Divine administration in its reference to it, alike point to an ulterior conclusion, towards which all things tend. We see the process begun, but not ended—the progress, but not the termination; and we expect, at the close of the passage

of life, to find a throne of judgment set, and an impartial judge seated upon it.

This is the argument which, whether they are able to state it or no, does carry conviction to the minds of mankind, and makes the belief in a future state so prevalent. It is an argument sufficient to make man feel his responsibility; for it reveals the law, and makes known the judge. We doubt much whether there be any other in favour of a future world, which can stand a sifting examination, when viewed as an independent argument. Yet when we have found such a firm basis in the government of God, other considerations worthy of being weighed come under our notice, and have all more or less of force. There is, for instance, the consciousness that the soul is not the body, and may not die with the body; nay, there is the feeling that it is so far independent of the body, that as it remains entire in the midst of the struggles of bodily dissolution, so it may remain entire when these struggles are ended. Socrates expressed this, when, in answer to the inquiry of his disciples, as to what they were to do with him after he was dead, he sportively remarked, "Just as you please; if only you can catch me, and I do not escape you."* Again, there is the shrinking from annihilation, and the strong tendency to believe in immortality. This feeling cannot arise from a longing after a continued enjoyment beyond the grave, for, alas! the anticipation has in it fully as much of fear as of hope. It seems to us to be a native belief springing from principles planted in our minds by him who made us. Not perhaps that is simple, original, or unaccountable; a number of separate intuitions seem to conspire to produce and strengthen it, and chiefly those derived from the sense of accountability, and the consciousness of spiritual personality. Still it may be regarded as a native feeling, and looks very much like an anticipation which guarantees a realization.

These arguments seem to us to have considerable force, which cannot be said of others that have been adduced. There is probably not a more sublime scene out of Scripture than that in which Socrates is represented as conversing with his disciples, on the day of his death, on the subject of the immortality of the soul. But much as we admire the conduct of Socrates on the occasion referred to, we are doubtful whether all the arguments

* Plato's Phædo, 147.

employed by him are conclusive. That the soul existed before it came into the body, and will therefore exist after it leaves the body; that as life implies death, so death must imply life; these are arguments suited to the dialectic intellect of the Greeks, but scarcely fitted to work conviction in a doubting mind. The Girondist philosophers, on the evening before their execution, tried hard to be persuaded by them; but it is evident that there were deep anxieties preying on their minds,* from which they could have been relieved only by turning to the death followed by the resurrection of One infinitely greater than Socrates.

That it is this belief in a coming judgment which is the deepest natural feeling, is evident from the conceptions entertained of the future world in the popular superstitions. The doctrine of the transmigration of souls appears in the earliest superstitions of the world, and has been entertained in all later ages by the most widely-diffused forms of heathenism. According to it, the soul, as a punishment, passes after death from one animal body to another. The Egyptians placed a searching judgment-day, conducted by Osiris, on the foreground of all their representations. The Greeks had a Minos and Rhadamanthus as judges in the region of the dead, and placed there the stone of Sisyphus, the sieve-drawing of Danaides, and the wheel of Ixion. The other world, in the common conceptions of mankind, has been the place of Shades, and has always had a Tartarus as well as an Elysium.

That the Governor of the world must call his creatures into judgment, this we believe to be a natural sentiment; but all beyond this, in relation to the state of the other world, comes from perverted tradition, from the fables of the priesthood, or the dreams of the wayward spirit of man—always excepting what comes from revelation.

Here again we find that revealed religion meets the felt wants of natural religion. When revelation draws aside the veil which separates this world from the other, we see, in exact accordance with our natural convictions, a throne of judgment. And the Bible gives certainty to what is but a dim anticipation; it is Christ that brings life and immortality to light. He does more; he shows how sinful man may come to that judgment-seat to be acquitted, and look forward to it without fear. The whole com-

* See Lamartine's Girondists, vol. iii.

plex feeling with which man naturally regards the world to come is one of apprehension rather than of hope; it is a world of darkness rather than of light. Nor do we know any way by which these fears can be effectually dispelled but by the rays which the Sun of Righteousness sheds on the darkness of death and the sepulchre.

Natural religion has been described by one party as a mere negation, or a mere syllabus of wants. By another party it has been represented as furnishing the basis to revealed religion. There is some truth, but there is more error, in each of these representations. Natural religion is not a mere negation; it gives a God and a government, and it anticipates a future day of retribution. We do not assert that in lands enjoying the light of Christianity, the idea of God is suggested by the works of nature; for it is obvious that in fact it is called forth in the minds of children by parents or guardians who appeal to God's word as well as his works. Nor do we mean to affirm that, in order to a rational belief in the Word of God, it is necessary that the Christian should have before him an argument in behalf of the existence and the government of God formally drawn out. But we are convinced that there are native intuitions in the mind, and palpable order and adaptation in the world, which constrain men to believe in a God, and help to lead them on to a reasonable belief in the Word as a revelation of his will; and farther, that it is of moment to have certain great truths of natural religion placed on a stable basis, in order thereby to have a ground-work on which to proceed in constructing a systematic defence of Christianity. The instincts of nature thus prepare us to believe in the revelations of heaven; and a scientific Natural Theology furnishes certain starting principles to Apologetic Theology. Thus far Natural Religion gives something positive. But then all its positive truths only remind man more impressively of what he needs. Its queries are far more instructive than its answers to them. It is of little use to any, unless it lead on to its true complement—to that sublime system of revelation in which all its wants are met and satisfied.

The principal office of natural religion should be, to point to Him who is the True Light. If it does not aim to accomplish this end, if it comes between any and that light, it may

rather be pernicious. When it has succeeded in this, it may then disappear with its proofs and processes, and allow the eye to rest immediately on God. Such a treatise as this, if blessed from above, may be a finger-post to direct the inquirer—possibly the wanderer—in the right way, but when it has fulfilled this office, it should be lost sight of, as he goes on to the experimental knowledge and enjoyment of Him who alone can enlighten and satisfy the soul.

APPENDIX ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES.

ART. I.—LOGICAL NATURE OF THE THEISTIC ARGUMENT.

(PAGE 8 OF TEXT.)

WE are not entitled to demand of every one who believes in the being of a God, that he should be able to give an analysis of the argument which has convinced him. Every logician is prepared to acknowledge, that to have a reason for our conviction is one thing, and to be able to develop it, is a different thing. It is by a spontaneous process that the mind is led to believe in the existence of God; to state the argument in regular form is the business of natural theology as a science. When unfolded, the argument will be found to have both an intuitive (law of intelligence) and an observational element. There is the one, as well as the other of these, alike, in the so-called *a priori* and *a posteriori* arguments. In the rational (it does not profess to be *a priori*) demonstration of S. Clarke, there is a fact assumed, the existence of space and time, implying the existence of a substance of which they are modes (?). In that of Descartes there is also a fact assumed, that the mind has the idea of the perfect, implying, it is argued, (we think inconclusively,) the existence of a perfect being. Again, in the *a posteriori* argument, there are certain mental principles assumed, such as the necessary connexion of cause and effect. (This is shewn by Cousin, *Œuvres, Deux Ser.*, tome iii. Less. xxiv., &c.) In this country, natural theology has been chiefly engaged in unfolding the external element, and has given a beautiful exhibition of the adaptation of parts to be found in the universe. In another department of this same external evidence less has been done. The ancients argued the existence of God, not only from the *adaptation*, but from the *order* of the universe. This branch of proof must come once more into prominence, in consequence of the late discoveries in natural history, in regard to the homologies and homotypes found in the vegetable and animal structures. (See pp. 120-126.) The argument will be strengthened, when it is taken, as it can now be, from COMBINED ORDER AND ADAPTATION. (See p. 158.) But when fully unfolded, the argument will be found to imply certain internal principles. British Natural Theology seldom entered upon this field during the two or three past ages. Its aim was to give satisfactory external proof, that there exists an Intelligent Being who planned the universe, and in this it has succeeded. But Natural Theology must now go beyond this. It must defend the principle of intelligence, which leads us to argue from the effects in the world, that there is a cause above the world. It must do more. A distinction should be drawn between the evidence, in behalf of the existence of a Living Intelligent God, and that in behalf of his Infinity. The natural theologians of Britain have been anxious chiefly to establish the first point—the other being seldom denied. Hence they are reproached

with putting more in the conclusion than they have given them in t e premises, and arguing an infinite cause from a finite effect. The reproach is scarcely deserved; for all that they professed to do, was to prove the existence of an intelligent being in opposition to the atheist. Still it is needful, in order to the completion of the argument, that it should be shewn how we are constrained by an internal principle to look upon the intelligent God as infinite. Metaphysical philosophy will be able, we are convinced, to supply a statement and defence, both of the principles of Causation (see Art. III. and IV.) and of Infinity, (see Art. VI.), provided it proceeds, not in an *a priori* or critical, but in an inductive manner, to examine the intuitions of the human mind. The intuitions, it is true, are in the mind *a priori;* but their precise nature and value, and the truths guaranteed by them, can be determined only by inductive investigation.

Since the publication of the third edition of this work, we have had a farther expansion of Sir W. Hamilton's views, by the publication of his Discussions on Philosophy. The principles there laid down, cut up by the roots the common theistic arguments. Comparing his philosophy of the Conditioned with that of the Absolute, as evolved in Germany, he says, "In one respect both coincide, for both agree that the knowledge of Nothing is the principle or result of all true philosophy. 'Scire Nihil—studium quo nos laetamur utrique.' But the one doctrine maintaining that the Nothing must yield everything, is a philosophic omniscience; whereas the other holding that Nothing can yield nothing, is a philosophic nescience. In other words, the doctrine of the unconditioned is a philosophy confessing relative ignorance, but professing absolute knowledge; while the doctrine of the unconditioned is a philosophy professing relative knowledge, but confessing absolute ignorance," (p. 584, 1st ed.) Such a system renders it impossible to construct an argument in behalf of the Divine existence by means of man's intelligence. Taking up the same position as Kant, he says—"the only valid argument for the existence of God or the immortality of the soul, rests on the grounds of man's moral nature," (p. 595.) We are most unwilling to engage in an argument with this eminent man, not only because we feel ourselves inferior to him in learning and logical power,—not only because we must ever feel gratitude to him for the indulgent word spoken in behalf of this treatise when published; but mainly because of the service which he has rendered by his Appendix to Reid, which we reckon the most valuable contribution made in our day to philosophy. While still a living man, (and long may he be a living man among us,) he is acknowledged by all who are competent to judge, to have taken his place beside Descartes and Kant, and those men of other days who have done most to search the foundations of knowledge. But with these views as to human nescience, and the inconclusiveness of the common arguments in behalf of the Divine existence, we cannot coincide. We acknowledge that it is one good consequence of his philosophy, that it shews "that no difficulty emerges in theology which had not previously emerged in theology," (p. 584.) But his doctrine of relativity, more especially in its application to cause and effect, really leaves us nothing by which to prove that God exists. We cannot see how even the moral argument remains, if "good and evil" are subject, as they must be, to the same all-sweeping system of relativity and nescience. It will be needful then, in these Articles, to utter our dissent from the principles laid down in the Discussions.

Sir W. Hamilton (in his Discussions) is the Kant of Scotland and of the nineteenth century. His followers now form a considerable school, all agreeing in this, that man's knowledge is simply of the relative. Those of them who have carried their speculations into theology, feeling that human intelligence or reason cannot

prove the existence of God, seem to be inclined to call in an intuitive faith in God, in much the same way as Schleiermacher called in a God consciousness to save himself from the nihilism of Kant, (it is curious to observe how the old phases of philosophy return.) This seems to be the position taken up by the gentleman, who, of late years, writes the metaphysical articles (characterized by a fine, though somewhat winding vein of reflection) in the North British Review, and by Mr. Calderwood, in his spirited work on the Philosophy of the Infinite. But this faith or consciousness must be either of something unconditioned, in which case it is inconsistent with the theory of relativity, or it must be of something relative, conditioned, finite, in which case it cannot be a faith in an infinite God. We are convinced that the common arguments, if properly unfolded, are valid, and that all the difficulties and supposed contradictions, which these gentlemen fear so much, are self-created, and spring from an error which has crept somewhere into their fundamental principle. We see no occasion to call in a "mysterious faith" to assure us of the existence of God; his existence, as it appears to us, can be proven by obvious observations of facts, aided by principles implied and employed in the common affairs of life, and acknowledged in all metaphysical systems. There is wisdom in the statement of Leibnitz:—"Almost all the means which have been employed to prove the existence of God are good, and are capable of serving their end, if only perfected."—Nouv. Essais, Liv. IV. c. x.

Art. II.—ON THE PROPERTIES OF MATTER.—(Pages 77 and 97.)

The qualities of matter are, according to Locke, of three sorts, the primary, the secondary, and those by which one body acts upon another. (Essay, B. ii. c. 8, § 8-10.) In the text we have treated solely of the third of these classes. Sir W. Hamilton has also a three-fold division. There are the primary, which are all evolved from two catholic conditions of matter, the occupying of space and the being contained in space. There are the secundo-primary, which have a relation to space and motion in space, are all contained under the category of resistance or pressure, and are three in number, co-attraction, repulsion, inertia. There are the secondary, which belong to bodies only so far as they are thought to be capable of specifically determining the various parts of our nervous apparatus. (Appendix to Reid, Note D.) These classifications are valuable mainly for metaphysical purposes, and are at best to be regarded as provisional. Physical science, and it alone, can settle some of the questions started, and it must advance several stages and tell us more of the correlation of forces, of polar action, of chemical affinity, of heat, electricity, and colour, before we can have anything like even a seemingly adequate classification of the properties of matter.

All these arrangements seem to us defective in this respect, that they omit, or at least do not explicitly include, power, active property, force, dynamical energy. It seems clear to us, that we cannot know material objects—that we cannot know our own organism or bodies out of it except as exercising property, that is, power. Just as we know matter in our primary cognitions as extended, so we also know it as exercising property. Active property then is entitled to be placed among the primary, or at least among the secundo-primary qualities of matter. In this respect physical science is far in advance of the metaphysics which still clings to the doctrine of Descartes, and represents matter as altogether passive, and its single fundamental

quality to be the occupation of space. The later disclosures of physics clearly prove that matter has a δύναμις. And yet the dynamical theory of matter is equally defective, inasmuch as it commonly omits the occupation of space, which is an equally essential attribute of matter, and inasmuch as it confines the activity of matter to force, whereas it seems to possess active properties of various kinds.

In the midst of all the changes of material objects, there are two things that abide—the substances abide, and the qualities abide. Allotropism may seem an exception. It is ascertained that two bodies possessing the same chemical composition may exhibit very different properties. Thus common phosphorus is yellowish, pliable, soft, can hardly be handled with impunity, and assumes a particular form when crystallized, whereas allotropic phosphorus is almost black, brittle, and hard, can be handled without danger, and assumes a crystalline form belonging to a different system. We are evidently not yet at the bottom of this subject. It is a more striking illustration than we ever had before of the fact, that the same substances may exist in different states, and that all properties need conditions to call them forth. We do not know in respect of what, the bodies, the same in chemical composition, differ from each other, whether in atomic disposition or difference produced by heat or other latent energy. But that the substances have not been transmuted, is evident from the circumstance, that the body changed from one state to a second can be brought back from the second to the first, when it exhibits the very same properties as it did before it was changed.

For metaphysical purposes, the distinction of most moment is between our original and our acquired perceptions. We agree with Sir W. Hamilton in thinking that our original perceptions are probably of our bodily frame, or of our organism and of bodies in contact with it; all beyond this seems to be acquired. In all such perceptions there must be knowledge; it is not a mere apprehension, idea, notion, or impression—none of these words express the mental act, but it is knowledge; not abstract or general knowledge, but knowledge of individual objects in their concrete state. In the very perception of our organism we must know our bodies as extended, and we may add, as exercising active power. Our acquired knowledge proceeds upon this original knowledge, and becomes the knowledge of linear distance and of various kinds of active property. Now it appears to us, that the natural realist may lay down the principle that all our original principles are true, that is, that the thing corresponds to our apprehension, or rather knowledge of it. If he cannot prove this, he may at least defy disproof, and affirm that our intuition guarantees the reality. In adding acquired to our original perceptions, we lay down rules derived from experience, and come habitually to proceed upon them. These rules are of great use, and lead to no error in cases similar to those from which they were derived, but may land us in mistakes when extended to other cases. Thus we lay down the rule that when we feel ourselves to be at rest, and an image of an object moves over the retina of the eye, this object is in motion. This rule is correct enough while we are on land, but fails us when we are in a ship moving away from the shore, for it leads us to think that the shore is moving. If these views be correct, it is wrong to say that the senses deceive us, for our original perceptions do not deceive us; when we are misled it is by an improper application of rules formed by ourselves; and it is interesting to notice, that as it is experience which has led us to form the rules, so experience can determine the legitimate use and limits of them.

It is a very important circumstance that the later discoveries of physical science go to shew that our senses, that is, our original perceptions, are trustworthy. Our senses seem to say that there is a reality (they do not say what) in heat, and the

same truth is now acknowledged in physical science, which affirms that the heat which came from the sun in the geological æra of the coal measures, was absorbed by the plants, and is actually laid up in store in the coal-beds, and is ready to come out in our fires, and to produce or to constitute mechanical force. The main difficulty of natural realism arises from colour. Idealism has ever derived its chief argument from this phenomenon. In ancient times it argued from the crooked appearance of a stick in the water; this difficulty is obviated by modern discovery, which shews that direction is not one of our original perceptions. It still argues that the eye adds colour which is not in the object. Yet surely in all this it is arguing from what is unknown, as if it were known. We know how the sensation of colour is produced in us,—it is by rays reflected from the object and falling on our organism; but we know not what makes the object reflect rays, and reflect one ray rather than another, in short, we know not what colour in the object is. "Colour," says Cousin, (Review of Locke, Less. xxiii.,) "is perhaps more inherent in body than is commonly believed." Speaking of this subject, the highest authority in our country on the subject of colour says, "It may perhaps be ultimately found that nature does not play the fool with our senses: but that the last accomplishments of science coincide with common apprehension." (Field's Chromatology, p. 66.) We have shewn (p. 129) that colours are apt to come out in plants complementary to each other. There must be a physical cause of this general fact. May it not be that when the white beam falls on the plant, certain of the rays are reflected, whereas the others are absorbed, and are ready to come out on certain conditions being fulfilled, in much the same way as heat was absorbed by plants in the geological ages? Thus when the white beam falls on the purple petals of a flower, the purple ray will be repelled on the principle of like repelling like, whereas the complementary yellow will be absorbed, and will come out in the yellow heart. This hypothesis supposes that there is some sort of reality (we do not say what) in colour, but is in no way inconsistent with the Newtonian theory, for it regards colour as discoverable by us only by means of the reflexion of light—only it assumes that there is a colour potency in the object, to reflect the like colour, according to the law of polar forces, that like repels like. But apart from this altogether, the idealist is not entitled to urge colour in defence of his theory, as long as we know so little of what makes bodies reflect rays, and one body to reflect one ray and another body a different ray.

Art. III.—RELATION BETWEEN CAUSE AND EFFECT IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD.—(Page 81.)

In offering some remarks on this subject, we are anxious that it should be understood that we are speaking solely of the nature of the relation between cause and effect, and not at all of the mental principle by which we come to discover that relation—of the objective relation, and not at all of the subjective idea. Many errors have arisen from confounding these two things; and these errors appear again and again in the speculations of those who have derived their views directly or indirectly from the great German metaphysician Kant. Upon the latter, or the internal principle, the German school of philosophy has thrown some light; but we are at present speaking of another topic which they have contrived to confuse—the real relation between cause and effect in the external world.

"Every effect has a cause," is the axiom; but the words *cause* and *effect* are ambiguous, particularly the word *effect*. The aphorism understood in one sense is a mere truism or identical proposition, and may mean nothing more than that every "effect," that is, every phenomenon which has a phenomenon before it, has a phenomenon before it. But the proposition is more than a truism. What is meant by it? What is the exact truth set forth?

Dr. T. Brown, following out and connecting the speculations of Hume, has proven to a demonstration, that there is and can be nothing intermediate between cause and effect. He has shown that cause and effect are joined as the links of a chain, coming into immediate contact, and with nothing between. In doing so, he has cleared away much cumbrous and confusing error—but has he established and clearly defined the positive truth? With a mind of unequalled sharpness of edge, he could cut into parts that which others thought to be indivisible; but it may be doubted whether that edge, through its excessive keenness, was not sometimes bent back when directed to certain solid matters, which require to be inspected and described rather than to be divided or analyzed.*

He endeavours to prove that cause and effect have no other connexion than this —that the one is the invariable antecedent, and the other the invariable consequent. We believe that no one disputes the existence of the invariable sequence as at least one element in the relation. But it is not so universally acknowledged that there is nothing else. Most persons, unable, as they acknowledge, to say where the deficiency lies, have felt that the theory is bare and unsatisfactory; and that, if it does not miss the truth, it does not at least give a full exhibition of it. It is possible that, in the theory under review, Dr. Brown may have got the truth, but not the whole truth.

When we assert that every effect has a cause, so far as we do not play upon words, or utter a mere truism, we are affirming something in regard to *existing things*. We always rejoice to bring down abstractions to actual objects. When we do so, we feel that we have a surer footing to stand on. Let us come to existing things, and examine them with the view of determining what is really said of them, when we affirm that every effect has a cause.

Do we mean that every existing thing has a consequent, and every existing thing an antecedent, and both necessary, to use the old phraseology, or invariable, to use that of Brown? Does it mean that every existing thing (A) is succeeded by an existing thing (B), and that every existing thing (B) is preceded by an existing thing (A), and that this existing thing (A) will always be followed by the existing thing (B), and, *vice versa*, that this given existing thing (B) has always the same existing thing (A) before it? We doubt much if the mind is prepared at once to admit so broad an axiom as this, however expressed. Suppose there were nothing in the universe but some simple unformed substance, such as a piece of earth or metal, would it have been followed by something else—or could we, on the mere inspection of such a substance, have argued that there must have been something before it? Dr. Brown gives a clear, and, as it appears to us, right answer to this question, when he says, "that matter, as an unformed mass existing without relation of parts, could not of itself have suggested the notion of a Creator, since in every hypothesis something material or mental must have existed uncaused, and mere existence, therefore, is not necessarily a mark of previous causation, unless we take for granted an infinite series of causes." (Phil. of Hum. Mind, Lect. 92.)

* The language of Seneca (De Benef.,) applied to Chrysippus the Stoic, may be applied to Dr. Brown—"Magnum mehercule virum, sed tamen Graecum, cujus acumen nimis tenue retunditur, et in se saepe replicatur, etiam cum agere aliquid pungit, non perforat."

"Every effect has a cause," is the aphorism. What do we mean by an effect? If we analyze it, it will always be found to imply a change, or something new. Dr. Brown admits that an unformed mass could not of itself have suggested the idea of a cause, and that there must be something uncaused. But let this mass be seen springing into being, or let it be seen assuming a new form, and the idea of a cause is at once suggested. We must limit the general maxim accordingly. When we say that every effect has a cause, we do not mean that every existing thing has an antecedent, invariable or necessary. There is something new implied in the very conception of effect—it is something effected, something which did not exist before or put in a new state. Whenever such a phenomenon is brought under cognizance, the mind rises intuitively to the belief in a cause.

Having endeavoured to limit and define what is meant by an effect, let us now attempt to determine what is meant by a cause.

Looking as before at existing things, we find substances with their several properties. Dr. Brown has endeavoured to show that substance is nothing but "the co-existence of certain qualities."* Into this speculation, which is very much a verbal one, we do not feel ourselves called to enter. We assume the existence of substances, material and spiritual, possessing their several properties, or, if any prefer the statement, composed of their several properties cohering together. Now, a cause is always to be found in some existing thing, or in a substance spiritual or material, simple or compound. In producing its effects, that substance produces a new substance, or a change upon some existing substance; and we are led to the conclusion that existing things, in producing new existences, or changes on old existences, act according to certain definite rules, which it is the business of experience to discover. The same existing thing, in the same state, is always followed by the same change in that existing thing, or in some other existing thing. The same existing substance in the same state is always followed by the same change, and *vice versa*, the change always presupposes the same pre-existing substance.

When we discover what are the precise changes or productions resulting from a given substance, we call this a property of the substance, and we know that this substance in the given state will ever produce this change or exercise this quality. It is the office of observation and experience to discover the properties of objects.

We are now in circumstances to define more accurately the ideas contained in the words *cause* and *effect*. There is the idea of *universal sequence, but there is something more definite*. Dr. Brown challenges those who affirm that there is something more than invariable antecedence and consequence, to say what it is. We answer the call, and affirm, that in a cause there is *a substance acting according to its powers or properties*. Again, in every effect there is a change or a new object. We are far from saying that Dr. Brown denies what we now state. There are passages in his work which show that he might have been driven to admit all that we now affirm; but still we think that he has not fully brought out the whole truth. Had he done so, we are convinced that his theory would have recommended itself more readily to the mind, because it would have been felt to accord with our cherished convictions.

Cousin has discovered what we now refer to, as existing in the causes which reside in the human mind. "The internal principle of causation, in developing itself in its acts, retains that which makes it the principle, and the cause, and is not absorbed in its effects."† But he has not observed (because, like all who have become involved in the abstractions of Kant, he has fixed his attention too much

* Note C, p. 498.

† Leçon V. (Cours, 1828.)

on the subjective) that the same remark is true of material substances; and that, in producing their effects, they retain the property which they exercised, and are ready anew to produce the same effects.

Dr. Brown has shown, beyond the possibility of a refutation, that in the production of changes there is truly nothing but the substances that change and are changed. Mix them as we please, "the substances that exist in a train of phenomena are still, and must always be, the whole constituents of the train."* But he has not shown so fully as he might how much is implied in these substances. The German metaphysicians are right in affirming that power is implied in our very idea of substance; and Dr. Brown, in one passage, admits, though casually, the same thing when he says, "All this regularity of succession is assumed in our very notion of substance as existing."† These philosophers might have farther affirmed, that there is power in the very nature of a substance as well as in our idea of it. This power, these properties of substances, are permanently in them, and ready to be exercised at all times. With the exception of those who deny the existence of an external world, all admit that properties are of an abiding nature, and constantly resident in the substance. We thus arrive at a power in nature, constant and permanent, and ever ready to be exercised. We cannot, perhaps, speak of a cause as existing when not exercised; but we can most assuredly speak of a power abiding, whether exercised or not—that power abiding in every substance that comes under our notice, and in the very nature of the substance itself, as it is implied in the very idea of substance.‡

Taking these views along with us, we free ourselves from the impression left in reading such a work as that of Brown on Cause and Effect; that impression being one of events proceeding in pairs or couples, the latter member of one couple forming the first member of the next. When we introduce substance and qualities, the idea of a chain is now got rid of, with all its offensive and misleading associations, and we find ourselves instead, in the heart of multiplied harmonies, requiring a divine skill in order to their maintenance, and exhibiting that skill in every department of God's works.

The doctrine now expounded is fitted, we conceive, to clear up and strengthen the argument in behalf of the existence of God. The axiom, that every effect has a cause, stated in this loose form, seems to involve us in several difficulties in regard to the Theistic argument. The sceptic, proceeding upon it, would shut us up to the alternative—of affirming that every existence has a cause, and thence he would drive us to the conclusion, that God himself must have a cause, and that there is an infinite succession of causes; or if we limit our assertion, and say that every existence has not a cause, it is immediately hinted that the world may be uncaused. Now we have rid ourselves from the horns of this dilemma, by the view which we have given both of effect and of cause. An "effect" involves something new; there is change implied in our very idea of it. It is in regard to such a phenomenon that we infer that it must have a cause—and such, every one admits, are all the phenomena in the world. We are warranted, then, to conclude, in regard to all

* Brown on Cause and Effect, p. 29. † Ibid. p. 143.

‡ Of all persons, Dr. Brown should be the readiest to grant this, as he supposes that substance is the mere co-existence of qualities; and it follows, that if qualities were to cease, then substance would cease also. There are passages in which he seems to acknowledge all that we say in the text, as when he says, "that subtances abide, and qualities abide;" and that "qualities are just another name for the power of affecting other substances." (P. 142.) Yet, in direct contradiction, he affirms (p. 176), "that power is not something latent that exists whether exercised or not—there is strictly no power that is not exerted."

such phenomena, that they must have a cause. We thence rise through a succession of causes to the purpose of an intelligent Being. We are required to go no farther, according to the explanation of cause which we have given. All power, we have seen, resides in a substance, and we trace all the instances of contrivance in the world to God, as a substance. We now rest in an *unchanging spiritual Being*, capable of producing all the effects which we see in the universe.

But to return to the subject discussed in the text, we find in the examination of material causes that they always imply two or more distinct bodies, as do also the effects. There is an inconceivable amount of confusion in the common conceptions on this subject. When a hammer is made to strike a stone and break it, the cause is not, as is commonly supposed, the stroke of the hammer, and the effect, the fracture of the stone. The cause, properly speaking, consists of the hammer and stone in a particular state and relation, and the effect, the hammer and stone in another state. These are the real invariable, antecedent, and consequent—the cause tied for ever to its effect. The cause always consists of a plurality of substances in a certain state, and the effect consists of the same substances in another state. In order to the action, or rather the existence of a cause, these substances must be in a certain relation, so as to admit of the operation of the powers or qualities residing in them; and it is only when they exist in this relation, that the effect will be produced. We shall show in another section of this Appendix (VII.), how mental causes operate differently in this respect from material causes, in that the former require the presence of only one substance, the one indivisible substance—mind with its faculties; and how the independent and self-acting power of mind is one of its most striking properties, and that by which it is pre-eminently distinguished from matter.

QUERY.—Does it not seem as if some of the laws of motion were but partial statements of more comprehensive laws? A body continues in the state in which it is, whether of motion or of rest, for ever, unless operated upon *ab extra*. Is not this but a part of the more general law, that matter is inert, in regard to all its properties, till operated upon by something foreign to itself?

Is not the second law of motion, that of action being equal to reaction, just a larger law seen under a particular aspect—this second larger law being the positive, and the other, before considered, the negative? In order to the production of any effect, chemical as well as mechanical, there is required the presence of two or more substances with their qualities, and in the production of the effects, both bodies are changed, or rather the effect consists in the change made on the two bodies. That body which changes another is itself changed, and that which is itself changed, changes that by which it is changed. Not only so, but the change in both bodies is of the same description—[this may be doubted];—if chemical in the one, it is chemical in the other; if mechanical in the one, it is mechanical in the other. May it not also be, that the change in the one is equal to the change in the other, and thus the law of action and reaction may be extended to the exercise of every property of matter?

If so, might not this extensive law be employed to explain some of the curious phenomena of chemical equivalents, and of the polar forces, in which it will be found that action in the particles of matter is always opposed by an equal reaction. The more we reflect on the subject, we are the more convinced that what are called polar forces are just the manifestation of the reciprocal action of two bodies on each other.

ART. IV.—INTERNAL PRINCIPLE OF CAUSATION.—(PAGE 113.)

The correspondence traced in the text, proceeds on the doctrine that the belief in the relation of Cause and Effect is intuitive. This has been the catholic creed of metaphysicians. All science seems ultimately to rest on first truths or fundamental

principles not derived from experience, but rather laws of intelligence enabling us to gather experience. Among these, the principle of causation deserves to be placed. It bears the marks of intuitive truth. First, it is necessary. But the most lengthened experience cannot give this necessity. However long Sirius may have preceded the heat of summer, we would not look on the connexion as necessary,—we can easily conceive the two to be severed. But we cannot be made to believe that there is an effect without a cause; that the heat would come without a power to produce it. Mr. J. S. Mill, indeed, tells us, (Logic, B. iii. c. xxi. § 1,) that he can "find no difficulty in conceiving, that in some one of the many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe, events may succeed one another at random without any fixed law. Nor can any thing in our experience, or in our mental nature, constitute a sufficient, or indeed any reason, for believing that this is nowhere the case." This statement about fixed laws is ambiguous. If by fixed law be meant simply order, and uniformity among physical events, the statement is true. But if meant to signify an event without a cause, material or mental, natural or supernatural, the statement is contradicted by our "mental nature," which impels us to seek for a cause of every event. He is right in affirming that "experience" cannot authorize such a belief; but it is just as certain that our "mental nature" constrains us to entertain it—and surely if there be laws in physical nature, there may also be trustworthy laws in our mental nature. Mr. Mill has improved the account given by Brown, of the relation between cause and effect; he says, it is not enough that it should be invariable, it must be unconditional. We accept the phrase; the mind looks upon the relation as unconditional; and when it notices an effect, looks for an unconditional cause. Secondly, the belief is universal,—that is, all men spontaneously act upon it. Mr. Mill tells us that it is arrived at by induction, from a simple enumeration of cases, that it was late in the history of the world before it was established, and that even now we are not entitled to receive it "as a law of the universe, but of that portion of it only which is within the range of our means of observation, with a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases." (§ 5.) Now, all this is true of the mere order, general law, or uniformity of nature. Our belief in it is simply the result of experience; it was long before men entertained it, and we should be prepared to acknowledge that there may be exceptions, nay, we have such exceptions attested in the creation of new species of animals, and in the miracles of Scripture. But this is not the case with our belief in the relation of cause and effect; the infant acts upon it as well as the mature man, the savage as confidently as the civilized, and when men saw no natural, they called in a supernatural cause; and even now we call in the fiat of God to account for the creation of new species of organisms, and the miracles of the Word of God. (See pp. 114, 156.)

The following is the account which we are inclined to give of the causal judgment. We cannot, as it appears to us, know any substance, except as possessing power. We cannot, for example, know self, except as active, as a potency. Nay, we cannot know material objects except as active. In our primitive knowledge of our bodily frames, we know them not only as extended, but exercising active property. (See Art. II.) A considerable amount of the very highest authority might be quoted in behalf of the doctrine, that power is implied in substance. It is the expressed doctrine of Leibnitz, who says, that acting force is inherent in all substance, and that this is true of substances called corporeal, as well as of spiritual substances. (De primæ philosophiæ emendatione et notione substantiæ.) Kant admits the doctrine, without being able to follow it out. "Where there is Action, consequently activity and force, there also is substance; and in this last alone must the seat of that fruit-

ful source of phenomena be found." (Analogies and Experience in Kritik, Haywood's Translation, p. 167.) It is a fundamental principle of Ulrici, a living German metaphysician. (See Das Grundprincip der Philos. und System der Logik.) It is a maxim all but universally acknowledged, that we know substances by their properties; but what are properties but particular kinds of powers? Power being thus one element in our primary concrete cognition of objects, we are led to believe that substances operate, and that all operations must proceed from powers in a substance. We have in Article VI. given what we regard as the correct psychological genesis of some of the more important intuitive principles. It will be seen from the account there given, that we regard the Simple Cognitive Faculties as cognizing Substance and Quality in the concrete. Proceeding upon this knowledge, we have a faculty leading us upon an effect, being brought under our notice to look for a cause, and *vice versa*. Substance and Property are given primarily in simple cognition, and Cause and Effect in a necessary judgment proceeding on this cognition. Substance and Property are thus the groundwork of Causation, both in themselves and in regard to our apprehension of them.

We regard Sir W. Hamilton's representation of Causation as defective, and his resolution of it into a wide principle of relativity, or law of the conditioned, as a failure. "The phænomenon is this:—When aware of a new appearance, we are unable to conceive that therein has originated any new existence, and are therefore constrained to think that what now appears under a new form, had previously an existence under others." (Discussions, p. 585.) With all deference, this is not the mental phenomenon. Our appeal lies to consciousness; and it seems to us to intimate, that on a new fact (not appearance) presenting itself, the mind seeks, not necessarily for the same thing or existence under another form, but for some thing or substance previously existing having power to produce the effect. It may find the power in the same existence, but it may also find it in another existence. He tells us, "that when an object is given, we are unable to think it non-existent—to think it away—to annihilate it in thought." (P. 591.) "We are compelled to believe that the object, (that is, the certain *quale* and *quantum* of existence,) whose phænomenal rise into existence we have witnessed, did really exist prior to this rise under other forms. But to say that a thing previously existed under different forms, is only to say in other words that a thing had causes." (Pp. 593, 594.) Carrying out this view to its legitimate consequences, he affirms, "We think the causes to contain all that is contained in the effect; the effect to contain nothing but what is contained in the causes. Each is the sum of the other." (P. 585.) There is surely an oversight here. This account of the mental thought or belief, is all too narrow and inadequate. We acknowledge that as an empirical observation, we ever find new material forms springing out of the same existences under a different form. But this empirical observation is not the intuitive principle. The pantheistic doctrine, which derives existence in any one mode, from the same existence in another mode, is founded on the exclusive observation of material phenomena, and does not proceed on the principles of reason or intuition. Let us conceive a soul springing into existence. Do we necessarily look upon it as an emanation, and derive it from the same existence in another form? What we seek, if we interpret our consciousness aright, is power to produce it, and this we may find in quite another existence. We can also conceive of the creation of an atom or a world, and what the mind demands is not an evolution of the one or other out of the same existences, but of a power in a substance,—say God, to produce the effect. Holding Sir W. Hamilton's representation of the mental phenomenon to be radically defective, we reckon his resolution of it into the law of relativity as unsatisfactory. He derives it not from a

"*positive power*," but a "*negative impotence*," not from a "*particular force*," but a "*general imbecility*." (P. 594.) No wonder, when such is his view of causation, that he cannot derive an argument in behalf of the Divine existence from human intelligence. The very *differentia* of causation is left out in a system which represents it as an incapacity to conceive that observation should cease when we have traced effects as far as our observation can reach; it is a belief that there is a something beyond to produce the effect that last meets our view. We are strongly of opinion, that the mental principle is not an impotency, but a potency, not an inability to conceive that absolutely new existences should spring into being, but a necessary thought, conviction, or belief, that should they arise, they must have proceeded from an existence—a substance with power to produce them. This is with us an intuitive principle, constraining belief in the first instance, and ever confirmed by experience. It declares that when the effect is real, the cause must also be real, and is quite sufficient to entitle us to rise from the effects in nature, to a power in an existence above nature. But this Being above nature, bears no marks of being an effect, our intuition rests satisfied, and goes back no farther.

We can thus meet the objection urged with great logical power by Kant. (Antinomies of Pure Reason in Kritik.) "Causality of the cause is thus ever again something that happens and renders necessary your *regressus* to a still higher cause, consequently the prolongation of the series of phenomena *a parte priori* unceasingly." In enlarging on this topic, he breaks forth into a passage of grim eloquence. "We cannot guard against the thought, yet, also, we cannot bear it, that a Being which we represent to ourselves as the highest among all possible, should say, as it were to itself,—'I am from Eternity to Eternity, besides me there is nothing except that which is something merely by my will.' 'But whence am I then?' Here every thing sinks away under us, and the greatest perfection, like the smallest, floats without support from speculative reason." This objection derives its force from an erroneous apprehension, that is induction of causation. Proceeding not in an inductive, but a critical method, Kant has landed himself in contradictions, and then charges the contradictions which are to be found only in his own representations upon human reason.* He says, that proceeding on the principle of causation, there must be a *regressus ad infinitum*. It is at this point that we meet him. We hold that the intuition goes back to a substance in which power resides, but that on reaching this point it is satisfied. It may be questioned, indeed, whether that substance or existence is not also an effect. If it be, the intuition again requires us to look for a cause in a power dwelling in some substance. But when we at last reach a substance which bears no traces of being an effect, we may stop, for the mind is satisfied. Kant himself announces truths, which, if prosecuted, might have led him to see this. He allows, as we have seen, that power implies substance. He farther states that substance and quality, unlike other categories, does not require an infinite *regressus*. When we have found a power in the Divine Being adequate to produce all the effects which we see in the universe, the *regressus* ceases. There is no contradiction then in the idea of a First Cause. We cannot stop till we reach such a cause, or to use the old nomenclature, a self-sufficient power, a self-existent Being, or better still, "I AM THAT I AM"; but having reached this point the mind feels that it can rest. This is the true Absolute which the German speculatists are ever seeking and never finding. Our analysis of the internal prin-

* It might be shewn that this holds true of all the Antinomies of Pure Reason adduced by Kant. The contradiction lies in the representations given of them, and not in the principles themselves as they exist in our constitutions. When the native principles are carefully inducted and expressed, the contradiction disappears.

ciple, thus brings us to the same conclusion as that of the external relation, and leads us to trace up all the activity of the universe, to a Being who has Power in Himself. "Twice have I heard this, that power belongeth unto God."

ART. V.—THE LIVING WRITERS WHO TREAT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE INDUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY.—(PAGE 165.)

(1.) Sir John Herschel's discourse on the study of Natural Philosophy is admirable so far as it goes, but does not profess to discuss the philosophic principles of the Inductive Sciences.

(2.) We like the phrase by which M. Comte (see pp. 4, 105, 165, 240) designates his work, The Positive Philosophy, and every one is constrained to admire his penetrating intellect and his clear style. He professes to rear a philosophy of facts co-ordinated apart from abstractions, but he has overlooked a most important class of facts. He is willing to attend to the senses, but will not pay any regard to the consciousness; he assumes the existence of matter, but denies the existence of mind, except as a physiological process. He is the embodiment of the materialistic tendencies of his age and nation. He occupies very much the same position in this century as Hume did in the last, and Hobbes did in the previous one—differing, however, from them, as much as the nineteenth century differs from the eighteenth and the seventeenth. In mathematics and various branches of natural philosophy he displays great clearness and shrewdness; but, led by a spirit of haughty dogmatism, as unphilosophical as it is often profane, he errs palpably and egregiously in supposing that these sciences exhaust the whole of existence that can fall under our notice. According to his grand generalization, so lauded by his admirers, philosophy, in its early stages is theological, then metaphysical, and finally positive. In modern Europe it has reached, he supposes, this third stage—which is that of manhood—and so has superseded the two former stages of infancy and childhood, which have for ever passed away. This appears to us to be as rash a generalization as ever was made by any German theorist. When scientific inquiry commenced, a great number of topics had to be discussed at one and the same time; these were afterwards separated on the principle of the Division of Labour, which has acted as important a part in science, as in the advancement of national wealth. At first theology, metaphysics, and physics, and other sciences besides, were blended together, and then they came to be treated apart. There is merit in Comte's classification of the physical sciences, if not carried too far, as shewing how certain sciences came before others; but there may be sciences not only of matter but of mind, such as Psychology, Logics, Ethics, Metaphysics, &c. It argues great narrowness of mind, to suppose, that any one of the separate sciences, or sets of sciences, is entitled to supersede the others. Theology may be made as positive a science as any branch of physics, and if mind exists—as consciousness declares—there may always be a positive psychological science. There should in every age be a theological, a metaphysical, and a physical philosophy. We should certainly like to see the other two made as positive as M. Comte has sought to make physical science.

(3.) Exactly the counterpart, in every respect, of the positive philosophy are the two works of Whewell on the History and the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, (see Review, pp. 107-111.) The great merit of the latter consists in showing that

the mind must bring with it certain Fundamental Ideas and Conceptions, (we would rather say capacities with principles involved in them,) in order to the investigation of external nature. All physical research presupposes, he maintains, the possession of fundamental ideas, such as those of space, time, cause, outness of objects, and media of perception of secondary qualities, polarity, chemical composition and affinity, substance, likeness and natural affinity, means and ends, symmetry and vital powers. In following this course, he has done unspeakable service to modern science, which, in attending to the objective, has been much disposed to leave the subjective out of view. We are inclined to think, however, that he magnifies the subjective, in much the same way as Kant did, beyond what it ought to be. He seems to think that these ideas, in physical investigation, furnish laws which are not in nature itself. "Observed facts are connected so as to produce new truths, by superinducing upon them an idea."—(Aphorisms concerning Ideas, xi.) These ideas or capacities seem to us to be rather the means of enabling us to discover what is in nature. He also errs by referring to *a priori* principles, not a few truths, evidently derived from observation.

(4.) Worthy of being ranked with either of the two last, is the Treatise on Logic, by John S. Mill, (see pp. 81, 88, 104, 420.) In respect of the attention paid to the subjective, he ranks higher than M. Comte, but considerably lower than Whewell. He admits consciousness as a source of knowledge, but does not seem to us to have fully studied the revelations of consciousness. He does not profess to deal with the "original data or ultimate premises of our knowledge, with their number or nature, or the tests by which they may be distinguished." (Introd.) Yet there is a metaphysical system derived partly from Dr. T. Brown, partly from Mr. James Mill, and partly from Comte, underlying all his principles, and breaking out from time to time. He acknowledges that there are truths known directly and of themselves, by "intuition" and "immediate consciousness," (Introd.), but he does not see that there must be laws involved in the "mental nature" which is capable of such knowledge. He derives not only the law of cause and effect, but mathematical axioms, from the induction of sensible experience; and if he carry out his principles he must be prepared to acknowledge, that in other worlds not only that there may be no causation, but that two parallel lines may meet—for experience cannot go out into these other worlds and say anything on the subject. We regret that at times he has allowed himself to follow too implicitly the delusive simplicity of M. Comte, whom he so much admires. He is obliged, indeed, to talk of permanent causes and primeval causes, and original collocations.—(B. III. chap. v. xxii.) These permanent causes are substances possessing properties; these collocations are the dispositions made in order to enable the substances to act beneficially. But being afraid to admit, in an unqualified manner, the existence of properties and the power of causation, his work distinguished throughout by clearness and utility, is in some portions of it perplexed and unsatisfactory.

ART. VI.—SCHEME OF INTUITIVE INTELLECTUAL PRINCIPLES CONSIDERED PSYCHOLOGICALLY.—(PAGE 264.)

I. In drawing out the scheme of intellectual faculties in the text, we have taken somewhat from the precious hints scattered throughout the writings of Sir W Hamilton. In one important point we differ from him. We think that conscious-

ness should have a place among the mental attributes. Two reasons may be given for this:—First, it looks to a special object, viz., self; secondly, it is a separate source of knowledge, ideas, or notions, viz., of thoughts, feelings, &c. It was one great merit of Locke, that he represented reflection as a source of ideas. Condillac departed far from Locke when he omitted it. Kant has herein fallen into the very error of Condillac. Overlooking consciousness, he represents sense as alone furnishing intuitions, and he is never able to supply this defect in the foundation by the innumerable artificial buttresses added. We may give consciousness a separate name and place, without meaning to degrade it to the level of the other faculties. In some respects it is superior to them all, having in it more of the essence of the soul, and being exercised whenever the soul is exercised.

II. In the chart of mental powers we have supposed that there are certain faculties of simple cognition, by which we know actually existing individual objects in the concrete: such as perception, which gives the knowledge of material objects, and consciousness, by which we have the knowledge of self in given states. We speak in this way; for it is utterly inadequate language which represents the mind in these operations as having merely an impression, or an idea—it has already knowledge. In the exercise of these faculties we have already a number of intellectual intuitions, all however in the individual and in the concrete. Thus in perception we know the object as a substance exercising some property. Again, by consciousness we know self in a certain mode. Thus in every exercise of perception and consciousness we have a knowledge of SUBSTANCE and QUALITY—not of substance and quality in the abstract, as we shall immediately see, but of individual substances with certain of their qualities. In our knowledge both of self and of objects external to self, we know them as exercising ACTIVE PROPERTY. If we are asked to analyze or explain these cognitions, we answer that we cannot, for they are simple and original, and so cannot be resolved into anything simpler. In much the same way, in every exercise of perception, at least when sight and touch are the organs, we have knowledge of objects as extended, that is, as existing in SPACE. Again, in every exercise of memory we apprehend events as existing in TIME. We have already a cognition, not of body generally, but of a particular body; not of mind in the abstract, but of our own soul; not of space *per se*, but of body in space; not of time separately, but of events happening in time. We know that some will ask in amazement, do we know all this by the senses? We answer that by the senses, considered merely as our bodily organism, we can have no knowledge or idea of anything. What we mean is, that all this is implied in the exercise of mind called forth by the senses.

III. A distinction is to be drawn between the intuitive knowledge of individual objects in the concrete, and the abstract or general notions derived from it by the faculties which discover relations. In consciousness and perception we have a knowledge of substances exercising certain qualities, but we have not by abstraction distinguished the quality from the substance, or formed by comparison a general idea of either substance or quality. In the very cognition of external objects we apprehend them as existing in space; but this is different from the idea of space formed out of this by reflection. In the proper exercise of memory we have a cognition of events happening in time: but the idea of time is formed by abstracting the events from the time in which they have happened. By this distinction we are saved from the manifest absurdity of supposing the infant mind, in its first exercises, to be occupied about substance and quality, time and space, the *ego* and the *non-ego;* these being abstract or general ideas formed—legitimately and necessarily—in mature life, by persons given to reflection.

IV. In the scheme of faculties we have placed the imagination. This faculty in widening its images in time or space, never can image the INFINITE, it can represent merely the very long or very large. So far then as the imaging or picturing power of the mind is concerned, we never can go beyond the finite. But we would take a very imperfect view of human intelligence if we confined it within the limits of its pictorial power. To whatever point we go out in imagination, we are sure that we are not at the limits of existence; nay, we believe that to whatever farther point, we might go, there would be something still farther on. Suppose we were carried to the most distant point which the telescope discloses, we would confidently stretch out our arms, believing in a space beyond into which they might enter, and if our hand were stayed we would believe it to be by a body occupying space. When a sounding line (to borrow an illustration from the German philosophers) does not reach a bottom, we do not conclude that the ocean has no bottom, but in sounding the depths of space and time we are sure that we never could come to their limits. Whence this thought, conviction, belief? We have here come, as it appears to us, to a native law or native belief of the mind. It is a necessary conviction: we cannot be made to think or believe otherwise. Nay it is in a sense universal. No doubt the positive image or conception formed by infants and savages must be very limited, but they believe that, far as it reaches, there is a something beyond. All this shews that there is here a constitutional principle of the mind which we ought not to overlook, and which Locke overlooked, solely because of his antipathy to innate ideas. Such seems to us to be the true psychological nature of the mind's conviction in regard to the infinite. It is not on the one hand, the mere negation to which the British school of philosophers would reduce it. It is not as Sir W. Hamilton represents it, a mere impotence to conceive that existence, that time or space, should cease, but a positive affirmation that they do not cease. On the other hand, it is vastly less than the unconditioned, the absolute, evolved by the speculators of Germany. The mind seeks in vain to embrace the infinite in a positive image, but is constrained to believe, when its efforts fail, that there is a something to which no limits can be put. At the point at which it is obliged to stop, it takes a look, and that look is into infinity.

V. There is a class of faculties discovering relations among the objects that have become known to it. They enable us to take a concrete whole to pieces, and thus furnish ABSTRACT NOTIONS. They enable us to discover resemblances and differences, and thus give GENERAL NOTIONS. When the objects are real on which the abstractions and generalizations are formed, and when the abstractions and generalizations are properly conducted, the abstractions and generalizations also imply realities—not separate realities, but real parts or attributes of a whole and real classes. These faculties are also so constituted that they discover the relation of CAUSE AND EFFECT. In our primitive knowledge, we know substances as possessing active property. Every object being known as possessing active power or property, we are led to believe that this property will act on the needful conditions being supplied; and, again, on being made aware of a new substance being produced, or a substance changed, we are led to trace the production of it to a property either in the substance itself or in some other.

VI. We see how the intuitions stand related to our faculties. They are not separate from our faculties, but the very law of the faculties. Every faculty in its primitive exercise is intuitive, and every true original faculty furnishes cognitions which are intuitive. It is the business of metaphysical philosophy to spread out these roots of the faculties (which are unseen to the common eye) in much the same way as the roots of certain flowers are made visible in glasses. The first and main

duty of metaphysical philosophy is to undertake a careful induction, and furnish a rigid expression, of the constitutional principles of the mind.

VII. These intuitions guarantee the truths which they reveal. As to what precise truth is revealed and guaranteed by any given intuition, this is to be ascertained by inquiring of the intuition itself. No *a priori* dogmas can be laid down on such a subject. There is really no other way of determining what are the truths vouched by the intuitions than by asking them one by one what they have to say. But in thus consulting them, we find that each has one or more truths to utter. These are truths which must be assumed in the first instance. Afterwards attempts might be made to disprove them, (Hamilton's Reid, p. 745); but this has failed. Experience confirms them daily. Going round the intuitions in this way, we should find that perception guarantees the reality of the external object, and consciousness of self in a particular state, and causation that when there is a real effect there must likewise be a real cause, and the belief in infinity that there is something infinite. By the union of the intuitions of causation and infinity, we are led to a belief in a Great First Cause, who has power in himself and is infinite.

VIII. If this be a correct scheme of Psychology, we are enabled to see the fundamental errors of the schools of philosophy which have proceeded directly or indirectly from Kant.

(1.) They maintain that in perception and consciousness we know the phenomenal and not the real—qualities but not substance—the external world, not as it is in itself, but merely as an unknown something in its relation to the mind. We hold, in opposition to this, that we cognize individual objects, mental and material, as at once phenomenal and real, as substances exercising qualities, as positive and not relative.

(2.) They maintain, that when the mind contemplates matter, there is something in the subjective idea to which there is nothing corresponding in the objective world. To us it appears that the subjective is so constituted, as to be able to know exactly certain qualities in the objective world. It is cognitive, not creative.

(3.) Some of them seem to maintain that, on the occasion of the exercise of the senses, there spring up abstract ideas, such as those of Space and Time, Substance and Quality, Cause and Effect, formed by the Reason or Intelligence. We hold, on the other hand, that intuitively we know individual objects in the concrete. The mind has not an abstract idea of space awakened by the first exercise of the sense of touch—it has merely the knowledge of an event existing in space. The infant does not, upon an event being remembered, immediately entertain an idea of time—it merely has the knowledge of the event having been before the mind at a previous date. The formation of the abstract ideas of space and time comes at a later date through the exercise of the faculties of reflection.

(4.) They maintain that the mind is furnished with certain grand principles which it can use consciously and knowingly, and with which it may set out in *a priori* speculation. We admit that the mind in all its actions proceeds on intuitive and fundamental principles, but we maintain that it employs these spontaneously and unconsciously, without directly knowing what the principles are. In order to know what the principles are, we need to observe and classify the cognitions springing up, or the judgments pronounced, and these are all individual. Hence the futility of the *a priori* method of speculation—hence the need of Induction, in order to arrive at the knowledge of Intuitive Principles, which operate, it is true, independently of all experience, but cannot become known to us, or be employed as philosophic principles, till we have determined their nature, rule, and limits, by careful observation.

SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE ON THE PHENOMENAL AND RELATIVITY THEORIES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

There are views prevalent in metaphysical speculation, which are working as much mischief in the present day as the ideal theory did in the time of Berkeley. What we need is a new Thomas Reid, to do in this century what the Scottish philosopher did in the last—to bring back speculation to a modest induction. In the absence of such, we have a remark or two to make in the way of protest.

According to the prevailing metaphysics of this age, the mind perceives as external to itself only PHENOMENA. This is one of the fundamental principles of Kant, and runs through all the philosophies, which have ramified immediately or mediately from that powerful thinker—we cannot add careful observer. Kant goes so far as to maintain that our knowledge even of self or mind is only phenomenal. This phenomenal theory, coupled with the cognate doctrine, that sense is the only source of experiential knowledge (thereby omitting consciousness), and that we are not conscious of self as a distinct object, constitute in our view (this is not the common view) the fundamental errors of the great German metaphysician. In examining this phenomenal theory, it is needful to notice that the word phenomenon has two meanings. In the nomenclature of science, it means a fact to be explained, an individual really known, to be referred to a law or cause unknown. Using the phrase in this sense, we at once admit that the mind does begin with a knowledge of individual phenomena in the concrete, and thence proceeds to analyze the concrete whole into parts (by abstraction), to discover resemblances (generalize), and causes (producing power). We suspect that it is in this sense that many British writers so readily admit the Kantian maxim, that the mind in perception and self-consciousness knows phenomena, and phenomena only. But it is not in this sense that Kant holds the doctrine. According to him, the mind, by the external and internal senses, observes, not real things, but phenomena in the sense of appearances, in regard to which he holds that there is much in them which has no objective reality, and that we cannot tell how much or how little of the remainder is real. Now, this phenomenon seems to us to be a mere modification (and no improvement) of the idea of the older speculators; it is a *tertium quid*, interposing itself officiously between the knowing mind and the thing known. In opposition to this prevailing doctrine, we lay down the maxim, that the mind knows intuitively the thing itself, not all the thing, but the thing in the mode in which it is presented. What we know is phenomenon in the British sense, viz., an individual object or reality. If we are asked to prove this, we answer, that this is a primary cognition, which does not admit of proof by any other cognition clearer, or simpler, or more fundamental. The mind holds the object to be a real object—it may imagine it to be otherwise, but cannot judge or believe it to be otherwise. The mind cannot trust to itself at all if it cannot trust to itself in this. But the mind will, and must trust itself in this respect, and finds its native belief confirmed by daily experience. No doubt, the metaphysician experiences a difficulty in reconciling certain phenomena with the trustworthiness of our original perceptions. (See Art. II.) But some of these difficulties (as, for example, in regard to the reality of heat) have been removed by science, while those that remain are found in departments of nature not yet thoroughly explored, and cannot set aside a doctrine which (though difficult to unfold precisely) can appeal to our very intuitions.

It seems very clear, that unless the mind begins with realities, with things in its primary knowledge, it can never reach these by any logical or intellectual process.

In the Kantian system, the real, external—and we may add, internal, disappears more and more as we advance; and when we rise beyond the categories which are the rules by which we judge of phenomena, to the ideas of pure reason which give a unity to the categories—we have left it behind altogether. Having begun with a shadow, we must end with a shadow becoming fainter and fainter, or rather with a reflection of that shadow. But let us begin with a reality, and apply the understanding to it according to logical laws; and we shall find that we are not led into contradictions nor scepticism, but conducted to farther truths (not however to all truths) also implying a reality.

Somewhat allied to the doctrine of the Phenomenality, is that of the RELATIVITY of human knowledge. Sir W. Hamilton has shewn that there has been a doctrine of relativity held from the beginning of speculation down to the present time. We might argue that this circumstance does not prove the dogma to be sound, any more than the maintenance from an ancient date of the ideal theory of perception proves that theory to be correct. But instead of urging this, we aver that the generally entertained doctrine of relativity (which contains a truth often vaguely expressed) is not the same as that elaborated with such analytic skill and logical power by Sir W. Hamilton. It is known to Sir William, that Reid did not uniformly hold the doctrine in the sense of his learned commentator, for he says, (Hamilton's Reid, p. 313,) that our "senses give us a direct and a distinct notion of the primary qualities, and inform us what they are in themselves."

As Sir William Hamilton has not fully unfolded his theory, we are not in circumstances to examine it fairly. If we are misinterpreting him, to retract these objections will give us pleasure—such as we have not felt in advancing them. We confess that we have found a difficulty in understanding precisely what is meant by the phrases employed. Our knowledge is said to be in itself, and of the phenomenal, relative, conditioned, finite. "Our knowledge of mind and of matter is relative—conditioned—relatively conditioned." "All that we know is phænomenal—phænomenal of the unknown." (Discussions, p. 608.) Do these phrases always denote or imply the same thing? Is the relative necessarily phenomenal? Is the relative necessarily conditioned? May there not be relations which are not conditions? Is every thing relative necessarily finite? God stands in a relation to his works; but this does not appear to make these works stand to him in the relation of a condition. It does not make God finite that he stands in a relation to creation.

Man's knowledge is limited; but it is as his sense and range of vision are limited. The eye sees so much when it looks out on the broad ocean, but there is more that it does not see. So it is with man's mental apprehension. Man does not, cannot know everything; nay, he does not seem to know all about any one thing, material, mental, or Divine. Of the many properties possessed by body or spirit, (not to speak of the Divine Spirit,) he knows only a few. His knowledge of no one thing is absolute, in the sense of being a complete knowledge of that one thing.—Still his knowledge is not of relations, limits, conditions, appearances, but of things to a certain extent, and as presented to him. And this knowledge, though contracted, may be true and sound, so far as it goes, and if he knew more, it would not set aside or modify our previous knowledge, but merely expand it.

In order to express that man's knowledge is confined, some writers say that we know objects merely in relation to our faculties. But they do not thereby mean, that man knows merely phenomena and not things, not things themselves, but things under a relation. They mean simply that we have not faculties to know all

knowledge, and that things are known only so far as our faculties are constituted to attain such knowledge.

True there must always be a relation between the knowing and the known. This must be true of Divine as well as human knowledge. But it does not therefore follow that man's primary and intuitive knowledge is of the relation. In many cases, it is the knowledge which constitutes the relation, and not the relation which is the object of the knowledge.

On the very grounds on which Sir William Hamilton argues so powerfully that our knowledge is original and not inferred, immediate and not through an idea, do we argue that it is positive and not merely phenomenal or relative. No man has shown so clearly that there are cognitions at first hand—which, as the elements of our mental constitution, "must by us be accepted as true."—(Note A. p. 743 of edit. of Reid.) But what is meant by accepting them as true? Surely it is accepting the truth which they certify. But does not the mind in sense-perception hold the object to be a real object? Does it not hold the same in reference to its knowledge of self by consciousness? Does it not hold in both these cases that it knows the thing, and not an appearance, and not a relation between that thing and the mind, and between one thing and another? If we cannot trust our faculties in this, we can trust them in nothing. "If mendacity be admitted of some of our mental dictates, we cannot vindicate veracity of any. If one be delusive, so may all:—falsus in uno falsus in omnibus. Absolute scepticism is here the legitimate conclusion."

Speaking not of the relativity of knowledge, but of objects, we are ever noticing relations among different objects, or different parts of the same object. But we know these as relations among objects known. It is because we know things (so much of them) that we know the relations of things. Thus we know body as at one and the same time substance and quality, and can thus cognize the relation between them. We know substance as having power, and can thus trace its relation to its effects. We know the object primarily as in a certain mode, or exercising a certain property, but we would not say that the thing was unknown, because it thus appeared to us, but that it was so far known, as under this mode, or in the exercise of this property.

The result at which we arrive by these speculations is not "nescience," but a limited knowledge, not a "learned ignorance," which may be a very proud ignorance, but a humble learning, grateful for what it knows, but ever awed with the conviction that what it knows is little in comparison of what it does not know, and cannot know, in this present world; is but a little sphere of light in the heart of an infinitude of (to man) darkness. Man is, after all, but gathering pebbles by the shore of the ocean of truth, which lies before him unexplored and unexplorable—still what he gathers are pebbles, and not the mere appearance of pebbles, or pebbles in relation to him. Let us value what we know as trustworthy, but feel, meanwhile, that we dare not dictate and dogmatize as to topics which lie in the unknowable region which surrounds us above and below, before and behind, on the right hand and the left. "The secret things belong unto the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children."

The most extreme representative of this school is Professor Ferrier, in his Institutes of Metaphysic. The work professes to be a demonstration, but does not at its commencement announce any definitions nor axioms, to let us know what is assumed, and in what sense. His first proposition is:—"Along with whatever intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognizance of itself." Does this proposition announce itself as intuitively true?

We do not admit it, till the word condition is explained. His Second Proposition erected on the First, is:—"The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than what is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self—object *plus* subject —thing, or thought, *mecum*. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition." We admit as a psychological fact, that the consciousness of self coexists with every mental act, but so also does the exercise of certain senses, as the sense of our bodily frame, and the sense of touch; but surely this does not shew that our cognition of an object, say of a distant hill, is a cognition of this hill *plus* a sense of the eye with which we look at it. Consciousness runs through all our mental states, and among others our ratiocinations; but this does not prove that the object before the mind in reasoning is this premiss *plus* self, and this other premiss *plus* self, and this conclusion *plus* self, and this relation of premiss and conclusion *plus* self. Carry out the principle, and the very apprehension of the arguments of the "Institutes" becomes an apprehension of these arguments *plus* self. This lands us logically in an idealism, in which not only the material world, but all truth—the very existence and being of a God—ceases to be a reality, independent of the contemplative mind, and becomes an object *mecum*. It is all true that we know ourselves when we know external objects, but we know external objects as different from ourselves, and having a reality independent of ourselves. The external object is known along with the internal self, but is known as an object independent of self, and not as an object *plus* self. The cognitions of self, and of not-self, coexist, but the cognitions apprehend two objects as having a separate existence. The one of these propositions is as certain as the other, and the one cannot be used to set aside the other. It is one of the conditions of the legitimate use of first principles, (as stated by Hamilton, edit. of Reid, p. 747,) "that we embrace all [and not merely some one of] the original data of consciousness." When we have removed the first two propositions, the castle of cards must fall. We have noticed that in rearing his fabric, Mr. F. is ever, without acknowledgment, assuming principles, which are not clearer than those which they are employed to set aside. His Counter Propositions are at times mere *foils*, constructed by himself to set off his own argument; but they may have this good effect, that they will compel psychologists (of whom he has a great hatred) to observe the mind more carefully, and enunciate the facts more accurately. The book is written cleverly, in the magazine style, and has not a few literary beauties, and will be attractive to some as an exhibition of speculative ingenuity. But our hope is, that it will be regarded by the sober British thinkers as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole style of speculation, of which it is a specimen. If this is not the effect, the next phenomenon appearing in the philosophic firmament must be a Hume or a Fichte.

Art. VII.—OPERATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT IN THE HUMAN MIND.—(Page 273.)

We have endeavoured (Art. III.) to point out the way in which the principle of cause and effect operates in the material universe: it is by the action of corporeal substances upon each other, according to their properties. A material substance is in itself passive. Apart from something external to itself, it will never change. It

seems to be a characteristic of matter, that all its operations proceed from the action of one substance upon another. Hence it is in its very nature dependent.

Herein is the activity and the independence of spirit distinguished from the passiveness and dependence of matter. We hold—we cannot but hold—that the principle of cause and effect reigns in mind as in matter. Our intuitive belief in causation leads us to this conclusion. It is on account of the existence of such a connexion that we can anticipate the future in regard to the actions of intelligent and voluntary beings, as well as in regard to changes in material substances. It is upon it that we ground our confidence in the Character and Word of God. But there is an important difference between the manner in which this principle operates in body and in spirit. In all proper mental operations, the causes and the effects lie both within the mind. Mind is a self-acting substance, and hence its activity and independence.

We acknowledge that things, *ab extra*, do operate upon the human mind. In respect, for instance, to the sensations produced by sensible objects, the mind is passive, though even here the existence of the sensation implies a mental capacity belonging to the mind itself.* But in respect of its proper functions, the mind is self-acting.† Changes are produced within the mind by the mind itself. These changes are produced according to mental laws, and which are the rules or principles of the faculties or the attributes of the agent.

We have said that changes are produced in the mind by means of the faculties of the mind. In investigating the operations of the human mind, the difference between their mode of action and that of material substances has not always been kept in view. Hence, in particular, the error that pervades the system of Dr. Thomas Brown, who speaks of all our ideas as mental states, produced by the immediately preceding state, according to the laws of simple and relative suggestions, without taking into account the active and abiding faculties of the soul, which (and not the mere contiguous state) are the main causes of any given mental state. We say the main causes, or rather the main element in any given cause; for in mind, as in matter, causes have always somewhat of complexity. It is the same quality or power exercised in the same circumstances.

We have seen (B. ii. sect. 1) that in the operation of cause in the material universe, there must be the presence of two or more bodies. We have now said that, in this respect, mind differs essentially from matter. But still there is so far an analogy between the operation of causes in both. In mental, as in material phenomena, there is a certain complexity in the causes. The whole cause of any given mental state is not, as Dr. Brown constantly assumes, the immediately preceding state. When we feel our persons to be in danger, and resolve on adopting steps to avoid the peril, it is not the mere perception of the danger that is the cause of the succeeding volition. There is most assuredly in the cause, not only the sense of the danger, but, as a more important element, the power of will. When, on hearing a falsehood told, we feel a strong moral indignation, there is something more in the cause of this indignation than a mere conception of the falsehood; there is a faculty of the mind which leads us to abhor that which is evil. In short, the true cause of any given mental phenomenon, its unconditional antecedent,

* Hence in all action of body on mind, and of mind on body—in all perception, for instance, and muscular movement—there is a *double cause*. There is body and mind in one state followed by the body and mind in another state. This principle followed out may throw some light both on the philosophy of perception and of voluntary motion.

† "Every body which is moved from without is soulless; but that which is moved from within of itself possesses a soul—such, then, is the very nature of soul."—(Plato's Phædrus.)

which will always produce it, and without which it cannot recur, is composed of two things—the immediately preceding state, and a mental power or faculty. Should the latter be held as truly the cause, then the other falls to be regarded as the circumstances, in the common aphorism, that the same cause produces the same effect in the same circumstances. In many cases the cause is still more complex, and embraces other elements—as, for instance, the previous habits of the soul; nay, the very casual associations of the mind in all its previous history, and the forgotten incidents of childhood, may be swaying more or less powerfully the actual state produced at any given moment.

The non-observance of these important distinctions has led to much confusion in the controversy between Libertarians and Necessarians. Pseudo-necessarians, perverting the proper doctrine of philosophical necessity, have represented man as having all his thoughts and feelings determined by an external cause, and thus as the mere creature of circumstances. Libertarians, in opposing the doctrine, have commonly argued as if all Necessarians held the doctrine as now stated. Nor have Necessarians, even of the highest order, been sufficiently careful to guard the language employed by them. Afraid of making admissions to their opponents, we believe that none of them has fully developed the phenomena of human freedom. Even Edwards ridicules the idea of the faculty or power of will, or the soul, in the use of that power, determining its own volitions.* Now, we hold it to be an incontrovertible fact, and one of great importance, that the true determining cause of every given volition, is not any mere anterior incitement, but the very soul itself, by its inherent power of will. He has not scanned the full phenomena which consciousness discloses, who denies the real potency of will—a potency above all special volitions—and the true power exercised in producing these volitions.

True Necessarians should learn in what way to hold and defend their doctrine. Let them disencumber themselves of all that doubtful argument, derived from man being supposed to be swayed by the most powerful motive. We must ever hold, that a mere incitement can become a motive only so far as sanctioned by the will; so that it is not so much the incentive that determines the will, as the will that adopts the incentive. Let Necessarians found their doctrine on the circumstance, that the principle of cause and effect reigns in the domains of mind as in the territories of matter. Let them also be careful to show that this principle, as a mental principle, works *ab intra*. In proceeding in this manner, they may found their doctrine on one of the very intellectual intuitions of man's mind which leads us, in mental as in material phenomena, to anticipate the same effects to follow the same causes. Their defence, too, might not be injured, but rather strengthened, by their dropping the word necessity, as ambiguous, to say the least of it, and as unhappily associated with the idea of restraint laid on the will, such as mere causation does not and cannot lay upon what we regard as its inherent and essential freedom.

It was only after finishing this edition down to this place, that we have had an opportunity of reading Mr. Bledsoe's Examination of Edwards and his Theodicy. He thinks that the statements put forth in this treatise, in regard to causation and freedom, as both found in the will, are contradictory. It is much easier to assert than to prove this, more especially when the critic does not announce the principle of contradiction. (See *supra*, p. 278.) Mr. B. has made his use of some unguarded

* See throughout Sect. ii. of Part II., on Freedom of Will.

expressions used in the first edition of this work, but which had disappeared from the later British editions before the Theodicy was published; we do not think that the statements now made are inconsistent; but even though they were, this would shew merely that we had failed to give a correct expression of the mental facts, and would not prove that both causation and freedom were not to be found in the will, or that these two principles contradicted each other. Mr. B. deals much more in the criticism of others, than in the exposition of his own system. In such a subject as the freedom of the will, it is easy to start objections, but not so easy to evolve a doctrine free from all difficulties. Mr. B. has landed himself in many. In order to support his theory, he is obliged to strip causation of its very peculiarities, to make effect mean simply what is effected, and the proposition that every effect has a cause, a mere truism or identical proposition, (see page 66 of Examination of Edwards);—thereby setting himself against the representation of every school of philosophers, whether it be that of Locke or Leibnitz, of Reid, Kant, Brown, or J. S. Mill. (See this defective view noticed in Art. III. p. 523.) The principle of cause and effect is, that whenever we notice anything new or a change, there we look for a cause. But here we have something new, here we have a change, say a mental action, say this volition, and for this we must anticipate a cause. Mr. B. is obliged to deny that cause and effect reach to actions of the mind, thereby setting himself against not only an intuition of our nature, but against experience, which can furnish statistics and anticipations of mental actions, and these voluntary actions—such as crimes, as certain as any physical statistics—such as bills of mortality, and all this surely proves that causation must reign in mind as in matter. According to his scheme, there can be no guarantee, even in the power of God, against the very saints in glory falling away, or even—we use the language reluctantly—in the continuance of the Divine Excellence. He is obliged to acknowledge (Exam. p. 225) that consciousness cannot say, as to any mental act, whether it is, or is not caused, for all that we can be conscious of is the act. But then he says, we are conscious of action, and a thing which acts cannot be caused. There is an obvious mistake here, and indeed in his whole view of action and passion. Surely that which is acted on may itself have power of action.

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